

THE DICTATOR'S DILEMMA AT THE BALLOT BOX:
ELECTORAL MANIPULATION, ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, AND
POLITICAL ORDER IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

By

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of authoritarian elections. When holding an election, the authoritarian leader faces a dilemma: In order to maintain his rule, he needs to win big in elections. Yet, the manipulation of election results risks losing some of the informational benefits of authoritarian elections – credibly showing regime strength and knowing the distribution of political support from the citizenry. Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, the authoritarian leader designs authoritarian elections. The manners in which elections are designed, then, have important implications on post-electoral political order in autocracies.

Specifically, this study asks the following three questions. (1) Under what conditions do authoritarian rulers refrain from using serious electoral fraud such as election violence, electoral cheating, and the manipulation of electoral law? (2) When do authoritarian leaders decide to change their electoral system from Single-Member Districts (SMD) systems to Proportional Representation (PR) systems? And, (3) when do authoritarian elections backfire on dictators in the form of protests and leadership turnover.

In this dissertation, I argue that the power distribution between the dictator and political elites determines to what extent the dictator manipulates authoritarian elections. “Strong” dictators, who can mobilize regime supporters by using their financial resources in efficient ways, do not have an incentive to manipulate elections by resorting to extensive electoral fraud and maintaining SMD systems that may bias election results in their favor. By refraining from serious manipulation of election results, dictators can take advantage of elections to overcome the shortages of information under authoritarian rule. On the other hand, “weak” dictators, who lack financial resources or face strong oppositions, need to rely more on electoral manipulation because revealing their *de facto* weakness through election results may lead the elections to exert destabilizing effects on the political order.

In order to test this theory, I conduct cross-national statistical analyses and comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. My empirical analyses demonstrate that autocrats with rich financial resources are more likely to refrain from extensive electoral fraud and shift electoral systems from SMD to PR. I also show that if the dictator fails to manipulate elections strategically when dealing with the electoral dilemma, then authoritarian elections may backfire on him. If the dictator employs excessive electoral fraud, then he is more likely to face popular protests because political elites are unable to make sense of *de facto* strength of the regime. On the contrary, if the autocrat fails to use sufficient levels of fraud, then election results may reveal the weakness of the dictator, leading to leadership turnover via a post-electoral coup or an opposition’s victory at elections.

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To My Parents, Kumiko and Toshiharu Higashijima

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This project explores the causes and consequences of elections in authoritarian regimes.¹ Since the end of World War II, political scientists have explored various aspects of political institutions in democracies. Some scholars did draw their attention to the politics of non-democracies (e.g. Arendt 1951; Friedlich and Brzezinski 1965; Moore 1966; O'Donnell 1973; Linz 1977; Collier ed. 1979; Tullock 1987),² yet their focus was largely on non-institutional aspects of autocratic rule, implicitly assuming that political institutions under dictatorships are no more than just “window dressing” (Gandhi 2008).

After the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991) that swept over authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, scholars shifted their interests to determinants of democratic transitions and consolidation (Dahl 1972; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski

¹ Throughout the dissertation, I use terms autocracies, dictatorships, authoritarianism, and non-democracies interchangeably. By dictators and autocrats, I refer to top political leaders who hold *de jure* supreme authority in authoritarian regimes. I use the male pronoun to refer to authoritarian leaders, given the fact that, according to *Archigos* Version 2.9, 99.7 percent of political leaders in authoritarian regimes after World War II have been male.


² Important exceptions are Hermet, Rose and Rouquie eds. (1978) and Friedgut (1979) in which they explore elections in communist countries and other authoritarian regimes in Europe and Africa. Huntington and Moore (1969), on the other hand, focus on one-party rule that were proliferated in the 1960s.

1991; Haggard and Kaufmann 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). By the end of the 1990s, researchers began to notice that there were still considerable numbers of authoritarian regimes surviving in the era of democratization. This observation encouraged researchers to rethink how authoritarian politics truly operates in the contemporary world (Wintrobe 1998; Geddes 1999; Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Blaydes 2010; Svobik 2012).

Figure 1.1 shows time series change in percentages of democracies and autocracies around the world between 1945 and 2010. Although the number of democratic countries has grown since the late 1970s, there are still a large number of authoritarian countries, comprising more than 40 percent of all countries in the world. Figure 1.2 looks more closely at time-series changes in three types of authoritarian regimes: autocracies with no elections, autocracies with façade elections, and autocracies with semi-competitive elections. The number of autocracies holding semi-competitive elections rapidly increased particularly after the end of the Cold War. Although semi-competitive autocracies consisted of 20 percent of all authoritarian regimes as of 1975, they were more than 65 percent in 2008. On the other hand, autocracies with either façade elections or no elections at all decreased during the same period of time. In 1975, each of the two authoritarian regime types constituted 40 percent of all authoritarian regimes, respectively. But the end of the Cold War terminated the dominance of these two regime types. In 2008,


only 20 percent of autocracies did not hold elections, whereas only 10 percent of authoritarian elections did not allow multiple parties and candidates to participate in electoral processes.

Figure 1.1: Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1945-2010)



Note: The dichotomous distinction between democracy and autocracy is based on Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009). According to their definition, a country is regarded as democratic if the country satisfies the following four conditions: (1) the executive is elected, (2) the legislature is elected, (3) there is more than one political party, and (4) an incumbent regime has lost power. Otherwise, the country is deemed authoritarian.

Figure 1.2: Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946-2008)



Note: A country is regarded as holding semi-competitive elections if either legislative or executive elections allow multiple political parties and candidates. If legislative and/or executive elections are held with only one single party or candidate, then the country is defined as an authoritarian regime holding façade elections. If a country holds neither legislative nor executive elections, it is an authoritarian regime with no elections.

Source: Svolik (2012)

Subsequent to the proliferation of regimes that are now referred to as “electoral authoritarian regimes” (Schedler 2013) or “competitive authoritarianism” (Levisky and Way 2010), researchers started to explore the roles of political institutions in authoritarian politics. Many argued that parties, legislatures and elections play

various roles in benefiting authoritarian rule.³ In founding a dominant party, dictators can institutionalize ruling elite's career promotion and create long-lasting power sharing between dictators and ruling elites. Thus, the establishment of a dominant party helps authoritarian regimes survive longer (Magaloni 2008; Svobik 2012; Boix and Svobik 2013). Dominant party organizations also allow dictators to mobilize mass support (Huntington 1968) by constructing well-developed patronage networks which contribute to the efficiency of economic distribution (Geddes 2006; Brownlee 2007). The legislature serves as a useful access point for political elites to various privileges, spoils and policy concessions conferred by the regime (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust-Okar 2008; Blaydes 2011). As a result, such co-optation mechanisms allow dictators to have a firm grip on power. From the perspective of citizens, authoritarian parliaments may become a main channel of political accommodation and an important source of material favors (Lust-Okar 2008).

Of all the political institutions under dictatorship, this dissertation analyzes authoritarian elections. Compared to legislatures and dominant parties, the impacts and implications of authoritarian elections are still hotly contested among researchers. Thus far, there are two broadly conflicting views on authoritarian elections in the growing literature of authoritarian politics. One strand of research argues that authoritarian elections help dictators hold onto power, in three ways.

³ For exhaustive reviews on the roles of political institutions under dictatorships, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009), Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) and Ezrow and Frantz (2011).

First, by winning elections with large margins, authoritarian leaders can show that their regimes are invincible (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). The demonstration of regime strength at the ballot box prevents political elites from launching coups, assassinating the dictators, and leading popular uprisings. Second, election results may also provide dictators with useful information on (1) ruling elites' loyalty toward the regime and their capability of mobilizing a large number of supporters, (2) the areas where voters are more enthusiastically supporting the current regime, and (3) the strongholds of opposition parties, where these parties may be able to mobilize their supporters against the regime. Based on such information gleaned from election results, dictators can more discriminately apply repression and more efficiently allocate economic resources to cement political support and prevent defection (Ames 1970; Shi 1999; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011; Miller 2013). Third, authoritarian elections may effectively “divide-and-rule” the opposition. Since moderate opposition parties participate in regime-sponsored elections whereas radical opposition parties boycott the elections, elections may enable authoritarian leaders to generate coordination problems among the opposition camp (Lust-Okar 2004; Beaulieu 2006).

On the other hand, other scholars have long contended that elections in dictatorships may pave the way for democratization or result in violent conflict and protests against the regime. Observing the so-called third wave of democratization, Huntington (1991, 174) suggests that holding elections under authoritarian rule is an

important first step for a dictatorship in its transition to democracy. More recently, Lindberg (2006) has argued that, the more elections a country holds, the more likely it is to democratize and improve the quality of democracy particularly in the context of Africa. Similarly, Roessler and Howard (2009) and Brownlee (2009) argue that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize than both hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes. Elections not only encourage democratization but also popular protests and civil war. Tucker (2007), Kuntz and Thompson (2009), and Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) all assert that fraudulent elections are more likely to be followed by anti-government opposition movements and massive popular protests, as exemplified by the Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet region and electoral revolutions in some African countries. Such increased tension may also lead to a violent confrontation between the government and the opposition, and can even trigger civil war (Snyder 2000; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2012).

How can we understand the two contrasting conclusions that extant work derives on elections under authoritarian rule? This dissertation attempts to reconcile these two literatures on authoritarian elections both theoretically and empirically. In doing so, I first provide a new theory of authoritarian elections and aim to shed light on a dilemma that dictators face at the ballot box: If dictators refrain from manipulating elections, they can obtain the informational benefits described above. Free and fair elections, however, decrease the probability that dictators win big, which may result

in revealing their weaknesses, or unpopularity. After centering on this dilemma in autocratic elections, what this dissertation refers to as “the electoral dilemma in dictatorships,” I then derive observable implications and empirically test the hypotheses by employing cross-national statistical analyses as well as comparative case studies of two authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia.

This dissertation first investigates *the causes of autocratic elections*, i.e., why dictators determine the degree of electoral fraud in the way they do and why they choose one type of electoral system over others. I then explore *the consequences of authoritarian elections* by looking at the question of whether elections have a significant effect on political stability in authoritarian regimes by deterring leadership turnover and popular protests. More specifically, this dissertation attempts to solve three puzzles on elections and political order in autocracies.

1.1 Three Puzzles of Authoritarian Elections

1.1.1 Electoral Fraud

The first research question addressed in this dissertation is what explains variation in *electoral fraud* under authoritarian regimes. I here define electoral fraud as a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003). Based on this, I analyze the following three subcomponents of electoral fraud: (1) election violence, (2) election cheating, and (3) undemocratic

restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation during elections exercised largely by incumbent parties (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Governments tend to use electoral violence to threaten opposition candidates and citizens. In so doing, dictators aim to undermine the efficacy of oppositions' political campaigns and discourage opposition supporters from going out to the polling stations. Electoral cheating allows dictators to affect the number of votes during campaign periods and election days through nonviolent fraudulent measures such as constraints on the freedom to campaign, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, and intimidation (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral law refers to a series of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from influencing politics, including limits on voting rights by certain social categories like gender and ethnicity, intentional flaws in the complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and/or to gain seats, constraints on the right to run for office such as language and educational requirements (Kelley 2012). These manipulation techniques are considerably different in the way in which they take place, but all "boost up" regime support artificially, and contribute to the continuation of dictators' overwhelming majority (Simpser 2013).

Although authoritarian elections do not allow government alternation and thus are not fully fair and free, there tends to be a high degree of variation in the electoral fairness across the authoritarian regimes around the world. This is puzzling, since it is often assumed that authoritarian leaders are always rigging elections seriously by

using their dominant political power. This raises a crucial question in our understanding of authoritarian politics: *Why do some dictators refrain from using extensive electoral manipulation, despite the fact that they are entitled to such power in their regimes?*

1.1.2 Electoral System Change

As already discussed, electoral fraud is an illegal strategy to bias election results favorable to authoritarian leaders. Authoritarian rulers, however, can also use other manipulation techniques to bring an overwhelming electoral victory to themselves. *The manipulation of electoral systems* is one of such measures by which dictators can increase the likelihood of winning big without resorting to relentless, blatant electoral fraud. Many researchers have focused on electoral systems in democratic countries or transitioning states, implicitly presuming that electoral systems in dictatorships may not have any meaningful effects (e.g. Boix 1999; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2006; Calvo 2009). Therefore, extant work has not sufficiently explored when dictators are more inclined to adopt one electoral system over others. As this dissertation shows, however, electoral systems are considerably different across authoritarian regimes. Particularly in regimes where authoritarian leaders permit opposition parties to participate in electoral processes, authoritarian rulers strategically choose their electoral systems. Hence, there is wide variation in electoral system types: Some electoral autocrats choose Single Member Districts (SMD)

systems in which only one candidate with a plurality of votes is elected in an electoral district. Others adopt more Proportional Representation (PR)-based systems where voters cast their votes for a political party in a relatively larger electoral district and parties are given seats more or less proportionally according to the votes they obtain.

More importantly, this variation poses an intriguing puzzle on electoral system designs. If we assume that SMD systems bring a large seat premium to big parties, as often happens in democracies, authoritarian leaders should always choose majoritarian electoral systems. Since the ruling party is a major party in most cases of electoral authoritarianism, the party should be able to enjoy such a seat premium. In reality, however, some authoritarian countries continue to adopt PR systems or even decide to change their electoral systems from SMD to PR. This brings about an important puzzle that this thesis aims to answer: *Why do dictators often dare to adopt a less advantageous electoral system, given that majoritarian electoral systems typically help them score an overwhelming electoral victory?*

1.1.3 Post-Electoral Political Order

The final puzzle of authoritarian elections that I will explore is more directly concerned with the different views on authoritarian elections: *Why do autocratic elections, which must have been designed by the dictators themselves, sometimes backfire on them?* In particular, this dissertation focuses on the following two political consequences of authoritarian elections -- *popular protests and leadership turnover*.

Post-election popular protests are often led by opposition leaders as well as ruling elites that defected from the regimes. Taking to the streets, people protest against electoral fraud by the ruling party. Protesters often demand that dictators nullify the election results, call for another election, and/or step down from the government. Either way, protesting against authoritarian governments is a costly behavior for participants because autocrats often brutally repress post-election protests. Yet, once launched, protests may threaten authoritarian stability in both short and long time span. In the short run, popular protests may invigorate opposition forces and forge armed rebellion, thereby dragging the country into civil war, like the cases of Libya and Syria during the Arab Spring. Or, protests may lead to authoritarian breakdown, which was evident in the cases of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine in the Color Revolutions. Even if governments successfully manage to crack down on post-electoral protests, the repressive reaction to public dissidence may threaten authoritarian stability in the long run, with international actors tightening economic sanctions and/or adopting coercive diplomacy. Because popular protests are never good news for authoritarian rulers, they require a more thorough investigation of scholars: *Under what conditions do popular protests occur after authoritarian elections?*

The second consequence, leadership turnover, also sometimes comes about in the aftermath of authoritarian elections. In some cases, leadership turnover is brought by post-election coup d'état or assassination, which leads to transition from

one authoritarian regime to another, as in the cases of Algeria (1991) and Burundi (1993). In other cases, election results announce that opposition parties score a surprising victory and the dictator subsequently steps down from the office, resulting in democratic transition, like the cases of Chile (1988) and Poland (1989). These two forms of authoritarian breakdown are different to a large extent, but both scenarios are common in the sense that authoritarian elections often unexpectedly reveal the weaknesses of the incumbent regime, rather than its strength. This raises another important question: *When do autocratic elections oust dictators?*

1.2 Theory and Argument in Brief

In order to address the foregoing puzzles concerning authoritarian politics and its elections, I construct a theory of elections in dictatorships. Much like extant work on authoritarian politics, I start with the assumption that authoritarian rulers and their potential opponents face information shortages in autocracies. In democracies, the media, the free expression of public opinion, and the presence of civil liberties provide political actors with valuable information on the intentions and abilities of the government or citizens, whereas these rights and freedoms are not fully institutionalized (and are often repressed) in autocracies. Because both the dictator and his potential opponents have difficulties in knowing about the capabilities and preferences of each other, dictators may face two major problems. First, in the

presence of uncertainty, potential opponents may fail to correctly estimate the dictator's *de facto* strength and popularity. Thus, they may challenge the dictator by trying to assassinate him, plot a coup, or mobilize protests after a miscalculation (Tullock 1987). Second, information shortages may make it more difficult for the dictator to know about other actors' true preferences or intentions (Wintrobe 1998). The failure to correctly understand people's preferences may lead the autocrat to resort to indiscriminate violence to preempt the threats that he believes exist. This creates a problem regarding the efficient use of regime's limited resources on existing threats and may also magnify people's grievances against the regime. Put differently, without reliable sources of information on the dictator and other political actors, the dictator is likely to face serious obstacles in governing the country efficiently.

For the purpose of improving the quality of information, autocrats can take various measures; they may relax tight control over the media (Egorov, Griev, and Sonin 2009); allow opposition parties to attend the parliament (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007); become more tolerant of criticism against government policies on the internet (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013); and decentralize the governance in order to accurately grasp preferences and demands among local elites and citizens (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1994; Treisman 1999).

Besides these measures, autocratic leaders can also take advantage of authoritarian elections. As discussed above, semi-competitive elections in autocracies allow dictators to credibly demonstrate their strength or popularity to potential

opponents via election results. Signaling the invincibility of their regimes via overwhelming election victories, autocrats can deter political elites from rebelling against them. In addition, semi-competitive elections also enable dictators to know the distribution of popular support for the regimes and competence of ruling elites through election results. Based on this information, dictators can improve the efficiency of their governance.

If dictators manipulate elections, they can easily maintain supermajorities. Such manipulated elections, however, do not render the benefits that dictators are expected to enjoy through elections. On the flip side, less manipulated elections allow dictators to exploit the above-mentioned advantages of authoritarian elections. However, less manipulated elections should also decrease the likelihood of dictators to win big. The failure to maintain an overwhelming victory is more likely to reveal weaknesses of authoritarian rulers, which may threaten authoritarian rule.

Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma in authoritarian rule, the dictator decides how much they manipulate elections through electoral fraud and/or the adoption of a certain electoral system. The dictator wants to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2010). In order to maximize his survival prospect, the dictator needs to win an election overwhelmingly, but at the same time he also needs to make election results *believable* for himself as well as other political actors. In so doing, he can overcome the problems of information shortages and stabilize authoritarian rule.

This dissertation argues that *the distribution of power between the dictator and political elites* determines the ways in which the dictator designs authoritarian elections. Here, political elites refer to both ruling and opposition elites who have potential abilities to topple down the regimes by using their political resources such as their supporters, money, organizations, and social status. In particular, I argue that differences in *capability of mobilizing popular support between the dictator and political elites* influence the extent to which the dictator engages in electoral fraud and electoral system change. If the dictator is stronger than potential opponents among political elites -- that is, when there is a large gap in the amount of resources to mobilize popular support -- the dictator can garner more supporters than other elites in the elections. Thus, he can win big while exploiting the informational benefits of elections without manipulating the results. Conversely, if the elites possess greater resources vis-à-vis the dictator, the dictator may not be able to organize a large scale of mobilization by himself. In this situation, the dictator tries to manipulate elections and secure an overwhelming majority at elections through electoral fraud and/or electoral system reform.

The theory's empirical implications are twofold with regard to the manner of electoral manipulation in dictatorships. Broadly, there are two ways to manipulate election results. First, dictators can employ *electoral fraud* such as electoral violence, electoral cheating, and the manipulation of electoral law. These methods are undemocratic measures to bias election results. The second technique, *the choice of*

electoral systems, is more of an indirect way of electoral manipulation; yet, it still facilitates the dictators' obtaining an overwhelming majority through the manipulation of the seats-votes elasticity. SMD systems enable dictators to obtain supermajorities with fewer votes, whereas PR systems require them to mobilize more regime supporters to secure the same supermajorities.

My theory predicts that *dictators who have large financial resources to distribute are more likely to refrain from using extensive electoral fraud and adopt PR-based electoral systems*. Both electoral fraud and SMD systems bias election results in favor of dictators and ruling parties. Both tactics help autocrats score an overwhelming victory, yet instead such supermajorities do not necessarily reflect *de facto* strength of dictators. To the extent that election results are artificially produced, the informational effects of elections are undermined. Only "strong" dictators, who can garner political support from the citizenry via public spending, will be able to hold "less advantageous" elections by abstaining from the use of serious electoral malpractices and adopting more proportional electoral systems.

My empirical analysis of electoral fraud demonstrates that dictatorships with abundant natural resources and weak opposition permit elections to be more free and fair by relying less on electoral fraud. Further, the analysis also shows that the positive effect of natural resources on electoral fairness greatly increases when dictators have strong organizational bases that effectively discipline ruling elites and thus streamline public spending. With regard to the choice of electoral systems, I find

that there is a robust, negative correlation between effective electoral threshold and dictators' financial strength measured by their natural resource wealth. It suggests that rich dictators are more likely to choose a proportional representation system to credibly show his strength.

If dictators fail to deal with the electoral dilemma, authoritarian elections may backfire on them. With this in mind, the latter half of my dissertation investigates political consequences of autocratic elections. There may be two scenarios where elections destabilize authoritarian rule: When dictators use excessive electoral manipulation in light of their mobilization power, elections cannot bring credible information. This, in turn, makes it difficult for opposition leaders and their supporters to correctly estimate the dictator's true strength, provoking popular protests. On the other hand, when dictators are unable to resort to electoral fraud at an extent where they would be able to complement their mobilization power through economic distribution, election results then credibly reveal the weaknesses of the authoritarian regimes. Updated information on *de facto* regime weakness via elections encourages ruling elites to defect from the regime or stage coup d'état. Or, it may simply bring a surprising, perhaps landslide, electoral victory to opposition parties, leading to leadership turnover. My theory expects that *if dictators resort to excessive electoral fraud, then authoritarian elections are more likely to spark popular protests. If dictators with less mobilization power fail to rig elections extensively, authoritarian elections are more likely to lead to leadership turnover.*

1.3 Methods and Research Design

In examining the observable implications derived from the theory of authoritarian elections, this dissertation mainly employs two methods. The first method is cross-national statistical analysis. For the analysis of electoral fraud and post-election conflicts, my dataset covers 78 authoritarian regimes from 1977 to 2004. To analyze electoral system choice in electoral authoritarian regimes, I use newly collected cross-national datasets on electoral systems and election results, which cover 95 electoral authoritarian countries from 1946-2007. The primary purpose of the cross-national statistical analyses is to test the expected correlations between the variables of interests, thereby confirming whether the testable hypotheses will hold in general among authoritarian regimes. In addition to testing the direct implications for the hypotheses, I also carry out additional cross-national investigations to explore to what extent assumptions and causal mechanisms proposed in theory is pertinent cross-nationally.

Cross-national statistical analysis using country-level aggregated data is a highly powerful tool for testing statistical correlations between the variables of interests. Cross-national comparison with a large number of countries and macro-level data, however, makes it difficult to illuminate *how* the key independent variable causes a particular outcome, namely causal mechanisms. In order to process trace mechanisms through which dictators' mobilization power is linked to the political

manipulation of elections and its post-election consequences, I also conduct case studies. First, as a typical case in which the dictator strategically controlled the level of election fraud and changed electoral systems depending on his mobilization power in a successful way, I investigate the case of Kazakhstan (1991-2008). Although during the 1990s there were numerous electoral malpractices in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev became less inclined to use blatant electoral fraud by the middle of the 2000s and even decided to shift the country's electoral system from SMD to PR in 2007. Why? Focusing on the distribution of mobilization power between the dictator and political elites, I argue that the president decided to shift electoral strategies from serious electoral fraud to extensive, pre-electoral economic distribution to win elections overwhelmingly.

Second, I carry out a case study of Kyrgyzstan to illustrate how the failure to strategically manipulate elections brings popular protests. In stark contrast to Nazarbaev, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan faced massive popular protests in the 2005 parliamentary elections, which ended up forcing him to leave office. Why did the elections backfire on him in 2005? Similar to the case of Kazakhstan, I describe how the power relationships changed from independence until the collapse of the Akaev regime in 2005. I first show that, while Akaev was relatively successful in mobilizing support by using financial resources and clan alliances under relatively free and fair elections during the 1990s, the weakening regime encouraged him to be more inclined to electoral fraud by the early 2000s. Then, I show that excessive

electoral fraud and the president's electoral victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections sparked popular protests by opposition supporters who formed a belief that the regime should not be strong enough to bring such an overwhelming winning in elections.

I choose the Nazarbaev regime in Kazakhstan (1990-2008) and the Akaev regime (1990-2005) in Kyrgyzstan for my case studies because both regimes share many commonalities like the same historical legacies of the Soviet Union, similar cultural backgrounds, formal political institutions (presidentialism and administrative systems), regime types (civilian dictatorships with semi-competitive elections), ethnic diversity, the implementation of radical economic reforms, and serious economic crisis during the 1990s. All of these factors are seen as important variables influencing the odds of democratization and authoritarian breakdown. The case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are based on my fieldwork in Central Asia in the summers of 2011, 2012 and 2014. I stayed in Almaty and Astana in Kazakhstan, and in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan for about seven months in total. In the case studies, in addition to various secondary sources and election monitoring reports on the two Central Asian republics, I use unique quantitative data gathered at the Statistical Agencies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, various local publications, and qualitative resources collected through 34 semi-structured interviews in the countries.

Comparing these two regimes enables me to control for these factors while focusing on the variable of my interests – power distribution between the dictator

and political elites. In fact, from the same reason, comparativists studying Central Asia have often picked up these two countries to make rigorous comparisons under the most similar systems design (Jones Luong 2002; Schatz 2009; McGlinchey 2011). Besides the *between*-country comparison, there are rich variations with regard to the extent of electoral fraud, electoral systems and popular protests *within* each country. Such within-country variances permit me to control for additional confounding factors that I am unable to control for by the between-country comparison, such as the level of economic development, population size, territorial size, and so on. In sum, combining the two comparative perspectives (time-series and cross-country), the case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan make it possible to provide rigorous case-study evidence on causal pathways in theory.

1.4 Contributions

Broadly, this dissertation aims to contribute to the following three strands of literatures. Most importantly, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of authoritarian politics and its elections. As discussed, there have been two conflicting views on elections in autocracies. Scholars have taken emphasis on the informational benefits of elections on the one hand (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011), and the destabilizing effects of elections on the other (e.g. Lindberg 2006, 2009; Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). Introducing the idea of

the electoral dilemma, my theory provides a general framework to reconcile the two different assessments of authoritarian elections.

Second, the dissertation investigates theoretically and empirically relationships among “the menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002) at elections. Scholars have suggested that, in order to hold onto power, political leaders use a variety of techniques at the ballot box, such as electoral malpractices (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012; Birch 2013; Simpser 2013), electoral violence (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hufner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013), pre-electoral economic distribution (Nordhaus 1975; Tuft 1978; Shi and Svensson 2003; Brender and Drazen 2006), and the manipulation of electoral systems (Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Calvo 2009). Researchers, however, have tended to individually consider each of these different strategies without drawing much attention to how each relates to others. Thus far, researchers have not posited a systematic theoretical framework to understand when political leaders are more inclined to use one manipulation technique over others in elections. We also know little about when political leaders are more likely to combine particular manipulation tools to maintain supermajorities at the ballot box. Focusing on the distribution of power between the dictator and political elites, this dissertation suggests that there may be a trade-off between the “political” manipulations of elections such as electoral cheating, election violence and electoral system change and “economic” maneuvering before elections through public spending. I assert that political leaders do not necessarily choose a

particular electoral strategy at random, but may strategically decide which strategies to be taken under the interactions with political elites and citizens. In so doing, I provide a general theory predicting which manipulation tools dictators are more likely to use.

Lastly, the dissertation makes a contribution to the growing literature on the political economy of natural resources. Scholars have debated over whether natural resource wealth prolongs authoritarian rule (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013), prevents democratization (Haber and Menaldo 2010; Ross 2012), damages political transparency (Mahdavi 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Paler 2013), slows economic growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1995; Jones Luong and Weinthal 2011; Ross 2012), undermines state capacity, and fuels civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005). Resonating with recent studies that begin to rethink the oil curse on democratization and transparency (Haber and Menaldo 2010; Paler 2013), this dissertation also suggests that natural resource wealth, boosting up the dictator's resource mobilization and hence increasing regime supporters, may not necessarily contribute to strengthening electoral manipulation. Findings in my dissertation are consistent with those in the previous literature, which contends that natural resources prolong authoritarian rule by enhancing the dictators' ability to increase public spending. Yet, I suggest that due to the very fact that dictators can buy-off extensive popular support through the distribution of natural resource wealth,

natural resources permit dictators to hold less-manipulated elections. Since petroleum keeps dictators popular among the citizenry, authoritarian leaders take advantage of the informational benefits of authoritarian elections without letting elections backfire on them. Therefore, elections in oil-rich dictatorships stabilize autocratic rule.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2-4 investigate the causes of authoritarian elections. Chapter 2 introduces an information theory of authoritarian elections, focusing on the electoral dilemma and the distribution of power between the dictator and other political elites. Then, I test empirical implications by analyzing electoral fraud in authoritarian regimes through cross-national statistical analyses of 78 authoritarian countries (1977-2004). With the theory in mind, Chapter 3 turns attention to the logic of electoral system change in electoral authoritarian regimes. Employing original datasets of electoral systems and election results in 95 electoral authoritarian countries (1946-2007), I explore the conditions under which electoral autocrats prefer SMD systems to more PR-based systems, and vice versa. Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth case study of Kazakhstan (1991-2008), in which I explore how an increasingly powerful dictator – President Nazarbaev -- shifted his electoral strategies from blatant electoral fraud to extensive pre-electoral economic

distribution over the two decades as he succeeded in obtaining rich natural resource wealth as well as constructing centralized political organizations. I also analyze how the Kazakh government adopted a Proportional Representation system with a nationwide electoral district in 2007 and its consequences, comparing to the precedent SMD-based systems.

Chapters 5 and 6 then investigate political consequences of authoritarian elections. Based on estimation results obtained in Chapter 2, Chapter 5 examines the conditions under which authoritarian elections backfire on dictators in the form of popular protests and leadership turnover by conducting cross-national statistical analysis of 78 authoritarian countries (1977-2004). Chapter 6 illustrates the cases of Kyrgyzstan (1990-2005) to show that, when President Akaev failed to strategically deal with the electoral dilemma, he suffered post-election protests, which resulted in the breakdown of his regime in 2005. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes, while presenting policy implications and future research agenda on elections in dictatorships.

CHAPTER 2

ELECTORAL DILEMMA AND THE MANIPULATION OF ELECTIONS

2.1 Introduction

Modern dictatorships hold elections even though citizens hardly expect to peacefully replace political leaders via the ballot box (Przeworski et al. 2000; Hyde and Marinov 2012). Although not truly fair and free (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010), there is remarkable variation with respect to how much political leaders rig authoritarian elections: Some dictators resort to whatever fraudulent measures they can take to secure an overwhelming electoral “victory,” while others are loath to commit electoral malpractices and even willingly make efforts to keep the electoral field fairer through electoral reforms. In the heyday of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party, stunned by the fact that the main opposition party boycotted the 1976 presidential election, the authoritarian government increased electoral transparency thereby enabling opposition parties to gain some presence in Mexican politics (Eisenstadt 2004, 32-44). Nursultan Nazarbaev, the president of Kazakhstan, announced shortly before the 2012 election that he would “reform” electoral laws so that moderate opposition parties could gain some seats in parliament (Mutlu 2012). Cross-national evidence shown later in the section of empirics suggests that election fraud varies substantially in authoritarian regimes. There are some authoritarian

states where election violence, electoral cheating and legal restrictions on electoral participation are not as severe. These include Bongo's Gabon (especially 1990s-2000s), Mahathir's Malaysia, Singapore under People's Action Party's rule, Kuomintang's Taiwan (1980s through 1995), and Kuwait. On the other hand, in other autocracies including Mugabe's Zimbabwe (2000s), Karimov's Uzbekistan (1990s-2000s), Togo (1990s-2000s), Suharto's Indonesia (1990s), and Paraguay (1970s-1980s), dictators used extreme manipulation techniques in an attempt to fabricate election results. Such differences in the level of electoral fraud under authoritarian regimes remain incompletely addressed by previous work. What explains this variation in electoral manipulation under authoritarian regimes?

In solving this puzzle of elections in dictatorship, this chapter explores theoretically and empirically the logic of electoral fairness in authoritarian regimes. First, I suggest that authoritarian leaders face a serious dilemma between the credibility of election results and the certainty of winning big at the ballot box. Dictators can stay in power by rigging elections through vote stuffing, violent repression, and the manipulation of election rules. Pro-regime bias in electoral results, however, makes it difficult for dictators to not only convey a credible signal of their regime strength to potential opponents, but also to collect reliable information on key actors' strength. On the other hand, if dictators allow excessive electoral reforms, then they may fail to obtain an overwhelming victory, which may result in increased anti-regime sentiment and threatens their dictatorial rule.

Then, I go on to argue that the balance of power between the dictator and its potential opponents (from both ruling elites and opposition forces) explains the level of electoral fraud under the constraint of this electoral dilemma. More specifically, if there exists a large gap between the dictator and the elites in their ability to mobilize voluntary popular support, the former can win a supermajority without relying on heavy electoral fraud. Thus, strong dictators should be able to signal their strength by producing an overwhelming majority without electoral manipulation. By contrast, if other elites possess greater political resources to mobilize supporters, fair elections are less likely to bring a big victory to dictators, who have a strong interest in using extensive fraud to bias election results.

I conduct cross-national statistical analysis to empirically assess my theory of authoritarian elections. There are three key findings. First, natural resource wealth, which I use to measure dictators' financial resources, is negatively correlated with election fraud. Second, political organizations that strongly bind ruling elites tend to magnify the effect of natural resources on reducing electoral fraud. More specifically, both dominant-party regimes and less fractionalized, large dominant ethnic groups have such conditional effects. Finally, pre-electoral anti-government collective action significantly increases the propensity of dictators' employing electoral fraud.

The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is twofold. First, introducing the idea of the election dilemma in dictatorship, this research attempts to illuminate how political leaders design elections under authoritarian regimes. Second,

different from the conventional wisdom that focuses on political-institutional, socio-economic or international factors influencing election fraud, my research shows that government's ability to garner popular support via public spending is an important factor to reduce electoral manipulation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the idea of the electoral dilemma, while reviewing the previous literature of authoritarian elections. Section 3 discusses electoral fraud in authoritarian regimes. In Section 4, I theorize how the dictator decides the level of electoral fraud under the constraint of the electoral dilemma. Section 5 empirically tests observable implications of the theory with a series of cross-national statistical models. Finally, conclusions and policy implications follow.

2.2 The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorship

In dictatorships, the political leader and potential opponents both are likely to suffer information shortages because political transparency is seriously circumscribed (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov, Gariev, and Sonin 2009). This is problematic for the dictator because potential opponents likely fail to correctly estimate the dictator's *de facto* strength and thus may challenge the dictator after such miscalculation, resulting in political turmoil (Tullock 1987). Strengthening the military is one of the most frequently used measures to credibly demonstrate the

dictator's power to potential opponents, yet heavily relying on the sword directly threatens leader tenure via coup d'état (Svolik 2012). Thus, it is not a perfect solution. Second, information shortages in dictatorship make it difficult for the dictator to know the accurate distribution of popular support among the citizenry. Without reliable sources of information on popular support, the dictator faces difficulties in governing the country efficiently. In authoritarian regimes where political leaders retain large potential to use violent repression, people are more tempted to conceal their true preferences for fear of being targeted by state repression (Kuran 1991; Wintrobe 1998). Therefore, the dictator needs to pursue alternative measures other than violent means, by which to solve these information problems.

Scholars have argued that authoritarian leaders use elections to overcome the information problems in dictatorships. First, some researchers point out that elections in dictatorships help dictators show regime invincibility to potential opponents (Hermet 1978, 12; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013). Winning elections while obtaining an overwhelming majority, dictators are able to demonstrate that the regime is unshakable. In so doing, they can prevent potential opponents from launching coups, defecting from the regime, and leading popular uprisings. Second, elections provide dictators with knowledge of the accurate distribution of political support among population. Through election results, dictators can be informed about local popularity of ruling elites, which becomes one of the criteria to pick up competent and loyal politicians and screen out others (Ames 1970;

Shi 1999; Magaloni 2006; Boix and Svolik 2007; Blaydes 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011). Election results may also render information on the distribution of popular support for the regime and/or popularity of opposition parties (Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Miller 2012), thereby enabling dictators to decide the targets of repression or make efficient allocation of economic resources to cement political support.

Which benefits dictators want to exploit the most might be different across authoritarian regimes. Regardless of which electoral benefits each dictator emphasizes, however, the crucial fact is that authoritarian elections do not always bring informational benefits to dictators. The probability that dictators obtain an overwhelming majority at elections will increase as they rig elections in more heavy-handed ways (Donno 2013, 33). In fact, using a comprehensive cross-national data on electoral manipulation and electoral margins, Simpser (2013, 67-72) shows that manipulated elections tend to bring larger margins of victory. The credibility of election results, however, will decrease as authoritarian leaders resort to more serious electoral fraud. When elections are rigged, dictators lose the potential informational benefits of elections in the following two ways. First, results of seriously rigged elections can no longer send a credible signal on regime strength and legitimacy. For instance, if it is obvious that dictators can receive 100 percent of seats and votes easily by not allowing oppositions or using too much election violence and cheating, then election results do not reflect true popularity of the dictator. By

contrast, if dictators do not resort to manipulation but they still win by a large margin, elections can send a costly signal of the dictator's strength to potential opponents. In fact, using *World Values Survey* (2010-2014), Norris (2014, Chapter 6) demonstrates that electoral malpractice tends to undermine people's confidence in governments as well as legal compliance. Second, if they commit serious electoral fraud, then dictators can no longer gather reliable information on the distribution of popular support. When fraud is used to bias election results toward the dictator, the results do not reflect the true preferences of voters (Wintrobe 1998). Therefore, in addition to making themselves invincible during elections, dictators simultaneously have to consider how they can make these election results believable.

When dictators refrain from using extensive electoral manipulation, elections will set a higher hurdle to obtain an overwhelming majority. The failure to craft a landslide victory is likely to activate the defection of ruling elites and invigorate opposition parties. In fact, Kuhn (2012) shows cross-national empirical evidence suggesting that post-electoral protests are more likely to occur after close elections. The cases of Mexico (2000) and Ukraine (2004) are illustrative examples. Conversely, when dictators resort to excessive election fraud, then their governance may become more inefficient because (1) dictators can no longer know the distribution of popular support, and (2) potential opponents cannot accurately estimate the strength of the dictator. Subsequent misinformation and miscommunication among political actors will increase the possibility of political conflict (Beaulieu 2014): dictators may be

forced to use indiscriminate state repression, whereas potential opponents may be tempted to stage coups and protests either for preemptive purposes or as a result of underestimating the dictator's strength. Indeed, Gandhi and Vreeland (2004) empirically demonstrate that authoritarian legislatures without multiparty systems contribute to increasing the risk of violent conflict.

In his study of electoral manipulation, Simpser (2013) argues that committing serious electoral fraud itself enables governments to show their strength because election fraud is costly in that it needs vast amounts of human and economic resources. I do not deny façade elections entail some costs in resource mobilization. There are a number of reasons, however, why, as long as dictators can retain an overwhelming majority, partially transparent elections become more useful than façade elections. First, as discussed, election results from free and fair elections are more informative and overcome information shortages in dictatorships – increasing the credibility and reliability of election results. Second, some empirical studies suggest that excessive and blatant electoral manipulation may contribute to revealing the dictator's weakness rather than his strength potentially leading to protests and leadership change in the aftermath of elections (Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Higashijima 2015). Further, although Simpser's theory tells us why political leaders use excessive, blatant electoral manipulation, it does not provide an adequate answer as to why some political leaders use serious electoral fraud while others do not. My theory is built on Simpser

(2013) in assuming that dictators try to obtain an overwhelming majority, yet I draw more attention to the credibility of election results in authoritarianism.

2.3 Electoral Fraud and the Manipulation of Policy Instruments

Electoral fraud is defined as a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003). In light of this broad definition, electoral fraud consists of the following three subcomponents: (1) election violence, (2) election cheating, and (3) undemocratic restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation during elections exercised largely by incumbent parties (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Governments use electoral violence to threaten and deter opposition candidates and citizens, thereby undermining oppositions' effective campaigns and decreasing turnout of opposition supporters. Electoral cheating allows dictators to affect the number of votes during campaign periods and election days with nonviolent but still illegal measures such as undermining of oppositions' freedom to campaigns, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, nonviolent intimidation (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral law refer to a series of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from influencing politics, including limits on voting rights by certain social characteristics like gender and ethnicity, flaws in the complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and gain seats, constraints on the right to

run for office such as language and educational requirements (Kelley 2012). These fraud techniques, though considerably different in how they manipulate elections, contribute to providing the dictator a margin of victory that would otherwise be impossible.

The burgeoning literature on electoral fraud has focused on various factors to explain electoral fraud. First, placing emphasis on domestic political factors, researchers find severe political competition (Lehoucq and Molina 2002), single-member districts (Birch 2007) and the absence of domestic election monitoring (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012) encourage politicians to use serious electoral fraud. Second, socio-economic variables such as poverty (Lehoucq and Molina 2002), the size of population (Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011), and economic inequality (Ziblatt 2009) have also been regarded as important. Third, scholars find that international factors such as trade openness, foreign direct investment (Birch 2011) and international election monitoring (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012) reduce electoral fraud.

Though these studies have significantly increased our understanding of election fraud, I suggest that there are at least two problems that still need to be addressed. First, most importantly, since they disregard the importance of the election dilemma, the existing studies fail to consider relationships between “illegal,” undemocratic strategies at elections such as election violence, election cheating and manipulation of electoral law, and “legal,” legitimate ones including manipulation of fiscal and

monetary policies. Put differently, previous literature does not consider the possibility that political leaders may willingly refrain from using fraud to mitigate information shortage especially when they can garner popular support using available financial resources. Previous studies have exclusively focused on the electoral fraud side without drawing much attention to the distribution strategies that governments may alternatively take.⁴ Second, the existing studies do not consider possible differences in theoretical scope conditions between democracies and autocracies. Cross-national studies include all the countries in their samples assuming that election fraud should play the same roles both in democracies and dictatorships, namely, producing a victory at elections. Most single case studies primarily focus on election fraud in democratic countries where party competition is strong enough to generate government alternation. As discussed, however, the purpose of holding authoritarian elections is not to get reelected, but to obtain an overwhelming majority to show regime strength via elections (Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013). This notable difference in the governments' purpose of holding elections may change the motivations for committing election fraud.

⁴ An important exception is Hyde and O'Mahoney (2011).

2.4 Power Distribution between the Dictator and Elites

Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, the dictator decides the level of electoral fraud.⁵ After observing the level of electoral fraud and election results, potential opponents among political elites determine whether they revolt or not. The dictator aims to achieve an overwhelming majority in as credible a way as possible, thereby trying to exploit the informational benefits and thus maximize their prospects of survival. Potential opponents opportunistically target the seat of the next political leader in the sense that they try to rebel against the current ruler only when they think that the current regime is too weak to withstand their challenge after the election. More specifically, when elections are either too transparent to obtain a supermajority or too rigged to solve information shortage, the dictator is more likely to face such challenges from potential opponents, compared to when he wins a credible overwhelming majority.

⁵ My theory does not consider *when* dictators begin to hold elections. This is because most modern dictatorships hold periodical elections other than a handful of countries such as China and Saudi Arabia, and thus there is hardly any significant variation (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Hyde 2011, 262; Hyde and Marinov 2012, 3). It is also reasonable to think that when to start elections may be determined by different factors such as colonial heritages, the end of the Cold War, international pressures, and civil war onset. Further, coding when dictators begin to hold elections is empirically intractable. Since dictators can easily manipulate election timing, there is often a surprisingly long period of time between elections, which makes it difficult for researchers to identify when to hold the first election.

In this strategic interaction between the dictator and potential opponents, the dictator decides the level of electoral fraud. I argue that differences in power of mobilizing popular support between the dictator and political elites are important to determine to what extent the dictator resorts to electoral fraud. If the dictator is stronger than the elites, that is, when there is a large gap between them in the amount of economic resources to mobilize popular support, the former can garner more supporters who willingly vote for the dictator than potential opponents do. Thus, the stronger the dictator is, the more able he is to signal his strength by producing an overwhelming majority without using electoral fraud. By contrast, if the elites possess greater political resources vis-à-vis the dictator, the dictator is not able to organize a large scale of mobilization by himself. In this situation, less-manipulated elections are more likely to produce surprising results, so that the dictator has a strong interest in stealing elections in his favor.

Dictators with rich resources can mobilize voters through large-scale economic distribution by adopting expansionary economic policies. Loosening fiscal policies and strengthening pork-barrel politics, authoritarian leaders can create public employment, adopt tax exemption for party supporters and the poor, give bonuses to public employees, construct infrastructure and implement other forms of public goods provision. These tactics are not illegal but garner “voluntary” political support. In fact, numerous studies on authoritarian politics demonstrate that durable dictatorships are more likely to manipulate economic policies prior to elections in

countries like Russia, Mexico, Malaysia, and Egypt to win semi-competitive elections with large margins (e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2009; Blaydes 2011; Wright 2011). Importantly, relying more on manipulation of economic policy instruments, dictators can increase the credibility of election results, which helps them send clearer signals of regime invincibility. In sum, prioritizing economic distribution instead of political fraud, dictators are more able to keep the credibility and certainty of election results simultaneously.

This research observes the balance of mobilization power between the dictator and elites in three ways: (1) natural resources that dictators can control, (2) disciplinary ruling organizations that prevents ruling elites' opportunistic behavior and thus streamline economic distribution to citizens and (3) opposition's anti-government collective action capability.

2.4.1 Financial Resources

Financial resources that the dictator controls enhance his power of popular support mobilization through extensive economic distribution. In particular, natural resource wealth such as oil, natural gas and minerals enriches state coffers and, thus, increases public spending to co-opt citizens (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Morrison 2009). Since authoritarian leaders can use natural

resources to placate citizens' economic dissatisfaction,⁶ a large body of previous studies has demonstrated that abundant natural resources are more likely to prolong authoritarian rule (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013).⁷

Compared to other sources of revenues such as foreign aid and taxes, natural resources can be more useful sources of pork barrel for authoritarian regimes. The use of tax revenues tends to be carefully monitored by citizens and thus tax revenues are difficult to be squandered by political leaders. On the other hand, budgetary processes of natural resources are highly opaque. This secrecy of natural resource wealth allows dictators to distribute them for their political gain more easily (Ross 2012: 59-62). Foreign aid is also a non-tax revenue akin to natural resources that are

⁶ One may think that oil resources are not necessarily available only by authoritarian leaders. Especially, if oil resources are regionally dispersed and opposition elites control the resources in their local strongholds independent of the dictator, windfalls may also enhance mobilization power of them. For example, Mahdavi (2014) presents evidence from Iran that incumbent parliamentarians, be ruling or opposition elites, tend to be reelected if they possess rich oil resources in their electoral districts. To what extent the dictator can control natural resources are very important and I consider this issue by taking into account the conditional effect of oil upon the strength of centralized organizational bases that enable dictators to control the resources effectively. The case study of Kazakhstan in Chapter 4 also provides evidence that the centralized management of oil is crucial to measure how much oil contributes to the dictator's mobilization power.

⁷ Recent literature argues that natural resources per se do not necessarily undermine political accountability (Paler 2013) and retard democratization (Dunning 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011). Although whether petroleum is detrimental to political transparency is still controversial, much cross-national evidence at least compellingly shows that natural resources do prevent authoritarian breakdown and help incumbent dictators survive by increasing public spending.

not exposed to the public views.⁸ Yet, when using foreign aid, autocrats need to be sensitive to international reputation about how efficiently they utilize it to deepen political and economic reforms (e.g. Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2014). Contrastingly, most natural resources are owned by state companies⁹ and thus not constrained by international scrutiny. Such absence of international monitoring mechanisms makes it much easy for dictators to dissipate oil money for short-term electoral purposes.

Thus, dictators in countries with greater natural resource do not need to institutionalize the electoral arena in ways that are extremely advantageous to them. By mobilizing regime supporters through resource distribution, dictators can win elections with large margins without relying extensively on overt fraud.

Hypothesis 1: If natural resources are abundant, dictators are less likely to rig elections.

⁸ In fact, some studies show that foreign aid contributes to strengthening authoritarian rule (e.g. Morrison 2009; Ahmed 2012). On the other hand, other research contends that foreign aid is positively associated with democratization especially after the end of the Cold War (Dunning 2004; Wright 2009; Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2014). To take into account the impacts of foreign aid on electoral fraud, I include it as a control in subsequent empirical analysis.

⁹ According to Ross (2012, 37-39), natural resources in the developing world had begun to be nationalized since the 1950s and the nationalization of petroleum industries had been completed by 1980. This historical process suggests that natural resource wealth can be used as a good proxy to measure the dictators' ability of economic distribution after the 1970s. In empirical analyses later shown in this chapter, my dataset begins from 1977 when the nationalization of natural resources were almost accomplished in developing countries.

2.4.2 Organizational Bases

Authoritarian leaders need to outsource everyday governance to the members of ruling coalitions including ministers, lawmakers, bureaucrats, and local politicians. Put differently, there is a power-sharing contract between the dictator and ruling elites (Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). To make such deals successful, dictators need to discipline the members of ruling coalitions to make them loyal to the regime. If dictators cannot get ruling elites to comply with deals, then ruling elites are more likely to be tempted to commit serious political corruption and accumulate power resources secretly by abusing the authority delegated by the dictator (Haber 2006; Magaloni 2008).

According to previous work, strong organizational bases that bind ruling elites allow dictators to prevent ruling elites from engaging in such opportunistic behavior and thus to promote cooperation of ruling elites. First, since organizational bases such as dominant parties allow dictators to guarantee institutionalized career promotion to party cadres, dictators can make inter-temporal power sharing deals credible through the creation of such party institutions (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Such disciplined elites work for the dictator loyally while engaging in less political corruption, leading to enhance dictators' mobilization potential. Second, organizational bases may enable dictators to police ruling elites effectively for detecting politicians' corruption and conspiracies, thereby easily deterring ruling elites' corrupt behaviors and anti-regime actions. In African

countries, when dictators are facing strong coup threats from potential rivals belonging to other ethnic groups, they often allow only members of their own ethnic groups to get access to power, aiming to increase the coherence of ruling coalitions (Roessler 2011).

These disciplinary organizations may have different implications on the level of electoral fraud, depending on financial resources available to the dictator. When the dictator does not hold abundant financial resources, he is more likely to order ruling elites to engage in serious electoral fraud because he is unable to garner voluntary support from citizens. In such resource-scarce scenario, if dictators are equipped with strong political organizations, ruling elites are more likely to follow orders loyally and engage in systematic electoral fraud within local strongholds (Levitsky and Way 2010: 63). In fact, dominant-party dictatorships, when suffering serious decline in popular support, systematically resorted to electoral cheating and violence through local party organizations (Eisenstadt 2004; LeBas 2006). This was what happened in countries like Mexico from the late 1980s until the late 1990s and Zimbabwe in the 2000s. On the other hand, when the dictator has rich financial resources, he can confidently delegate to ruling elites the task of collecting popular support in locality through economic distribution, rather than fraud. In this case, financial resources for electoral mobilization will be used more efficiently to garner popular support with local elites committing less political corruption. In fact, Chang and Golden (2010) show that party-based regimes tend to suffer less political corruption than

personalist regimes that under-institutionalize ruling coalitions. In addition, numerous studies also show that dictators with rich financial resources and dominant parties such as PRI's Mexico (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007), UMNO's Malaysia (Pepinsky 2009), Mubarak's Egypt (Blaydes 2011) have all successfully engineered strong pre-electoral economic distribution during their heydays, assuring election victories and demonstrating regime invincibility.¹⁰

Because of these reasons, I hypothesize that strong organizational bases enhance the dictator's power of voluntary support mobilization only when he holds rich financial resources. As strong organizations discipline ruling elites, dictators can effectively streamline the distribution of public resources. Therefore, financial resources with strong organizations should further reduce the need for dictators to manipulate elections in their favor.

Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of natural resources on electoral fairness will become larger if dictators possess stronger organizational bases.

2.4.3 Opposition's Strength

The strength of opposition groups is also an important factor that determines the extent to which dictators rely on electoral manipulation. Especially, the capability of opposition groups launching collective action against dictatorial governments is a

¹⁰ See also Greene (2009) for cross-national evidence regarding the impact of public resources on longevity of dominant party regimes.

good indicator to observe to what extent they can mobilize their supporters against the dictator. In authoritarian regimes, challenging dictators is an extremely costly political behavior because in most cases anti-regime protests are brutally repressed (Davenport 2007). On the other hand, however, once initiated, this costly action will result in credibly showing the dictator that a considerable number of people are extremely unsatisfied with the regime and opposition leaders have enough mobilization power to lead citizens to take to the streets (Kuran 1991; Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2011; Weiss 2012). Therefore, after observing such popular collective action, dictators should consider that they might not be able to bring an overwhelming victory at the next election without serious electoral manipulation. In Zimbabwe, when facing growing power and protests organized by the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), President Robert Mugabe resorted to brutal election violence and serious vote stuffing in the 2008 presidential election. Consequently, the MDC presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the presidential race in the second round, which resulted in Mugabe's victory with 85 percent of the vote (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 41). Conversely, if opposition parties are weak so as to not be able to mobilize citizens and coordinate collective action, dictators are willing to open the electoral field, because it is highly likely that they can win big. Prior to the Kazakhstan 2012 elections, President Nazarbaev changed the electoral law to make it easier for moderate opposition parties to obtain seats. One of his motivations behind this electoral reform was in the fact that

opposition parties were too unpopular among citizens to threaten his overwhelming victory in the election. Despite the most “transparent” elections in over a decade in Kazakhstan (Olcott 2012), the dominant party Nur Otan obtained 80.99 percent of total votes whereas the main opposition National Social Democratic Party only gained a mere 1.4 percent of votes. Therefore, contrary to Magaloni (2011) who expects that strong opposition urge the autocrat to hold less fraudulent elections, Hypothesis 3 can be expressed as follows:

Hypothesis 3: The higher the oppositions’ capability of collective action, the more likely dictators are to use serious electoral fraud.


2.5 Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Electoral Fraud

2.5.1 Data and Methodology

The unit of analysis is country/election year in authoritarian regimes. First of all, I identify authoritarian regimes by using Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) *Autocratic Regime Dataset (GWF Data)*, which codes each regime failure and the subsequent regime government as democracy or dictatorship.¹¹

¹¹ For countries and election years included in empirical analysis, see Appendix C2. I do not use Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) dichotomous measure of political regimes, since in their dataset countries are regarded to have democratized in the country-year when governments lost elections. This is problematic for this research because it arbitrary censors the dependent variable and excludes the possibility that

Figure 2.1: Variation in the Level of Electoral Fraud in Authoritarian Regimes (1977-2004)



Note: The data source is Kelley (2012). VCL consists of pre-electoral violence, election-day violence pre-electoral cheating, election-day electoral cheating and legal structural problems. VC only includes electoral violence and cheating while excluding legal problems. Each component has 4 scales (0 = no problems, 1=minor problems only, 2=moderate problems, 3=major problems).

To measure the dependent variable, *Electoral Fraud*, this study relies on *The Quality of Elections Dataset (QED)* constructed by Kelley (2012).¹² The dataset

the dictators hold fair elections enough to bring government turnover. In this respect, as the GWF dataset codes that democratization occurs one year after the election that brought government turnover, it has an advantage in avoiding this censoring problem.

¹² There are two other global datasets that are publicly available and globally measure electoral fraud. The first is Birch's (2011) *Index of Election Malpractice (IEM)*. The second is Hyde and Marinov's (2012) *National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)*. IEM is similar with QED in many respects, yet only covers between 1995 and 2007. NELDA covers more extensive period (1945-2010), yet focuses more on the competitiveness of elections and does not evaluate the magnitude of election cheating and election violence.

evaluates to what extent each election is characterized by electoral fraud using country reports published by the U.S. Department of State. In light of the definition of electoral fraud presented above, I use the following five variables to measure the extent of election fraud from this dataset: ¹³ (1) Was the legal framework not up to standards, limits on the scope and jurisdiction of elective offices, and unreasonably limits of who can run for office etc.? (“Legal problems”) (2) Were there restrictions on freedom to campaign, media restrictions, intimidations, and improper use of public funds? (“Pre-electoral cheating”) (3) Was there any violence or unrest before an election day? (“Pre-electoral violence”) (4) Did any vote padding, tampering with ballot box, voter impersonation, double voting, vote buying,¹⁴ intimidation etc. occur?

¹³ Previous cross-national studies (Birch 2011; Kelley 2012) use the overall evaluation on the quality of elections to measure electoral fraud, yet this treatment is problematic especially for this research. The overall evaluation includes election administrative capacities as a subcomponent measuring electoral fraud, yet this does not necessarily come from dictators’ eagerness to commit electoral fraud but often stems from the quality of bureaucracy and central electoral management bodies.

¹⁴ Election day cheating includes vote-buying practices and thus one may think that this component of fraud might be overlapped with pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policy that I conceptualize not as a strategy of electoral fraud. Yet, vote buying and manipulation of economic policy instruments are theoretically different techniques of distributing economic favors. The former assumes direct, illegal exchanges between votes and (relatively small) goods under monitored circumstances, while the latter is delivered more or less legally through programmatic fiscal policy and/or pork-barrel politics, not necessarily presupposing clientelistic structures (Stokes et al. 2013, 6-18). In addition, if the data wrongly codes pre-electoral manipulation of economic policy instruments as vote buying practices in a serious way, election-day cheating should be positively associated with financial resources. Yet, oil-gas value per capita is negatively correlated with election-day cheating, suggesting the possible measurement errors are not that serious.

(“Election-day cheating”) (5) Did any violence and unrest occur on an election day? (“Election-day violence”). Each variable takes 4 values between 0 (no problems) and 3 (serious problems). I aggregate the five variables and create a dependent variable *Election Fraud* (Violence, Cheating and Legal Problems; *VCL*) that ranges from 0 to 15. As an alternative measure, I use another dependent variable that takes into account only election violence and cheating (Violence and Cheating; *VC*).¹⁵ Since voters can recognize relatively easily to what extent dictators commit electoral violence and cheating at the ballot box compared to implicit legal restrictions, dictators should be more careful about whether they use election violence and cheating to maintain credibility of election results.

My dataset includes 324 elections in 78 authoritarian countries between 1977-2004. One may think dictatorships with no electoral competition should be excluded from the sample because dictators have no incentive to resort to fraud in such plebiscite elections. Yet, my theory suggests that whether to allow opposition parties to join the electoral battle is part of dictators’ toolbox of electoral manipulation. Indeed, this aspect is captured in a subcomponent of electoral fraud, “legal problems.” I also conduct a difference of means t-test to see if there is a meaningful difference between the two types of dictatorships with regards to the level of electoral fraud and

¹⁵ This variable ranges from 0 to 12 aggregating the values of questions (2) through (5).

do not find a statistically significant difference.¹⁶ Figure 2.1 shows two histograms on the distribution of the dependent variables, *VCL* and *VC*.

To test Hypothesis 1 about natural resource abundance, I use Ross' (2012) oil-gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars to operationalize economic resources that dictators can use at their disposal. The variable is calculated multiplying a country's total oil-gas production by the current oil-gas price and then divided by total population.

To test Hypothesis 2 about the conditional effect of resource abundance, I introduce an interaction term of Ross' (2012) oil-gas variable and dictators' organizational bases. Organizational bases are empirically derived from two perspectives: (1) party-based organizations and (2) ethnicity-based networks. Levitsky and Way (2010, 60-66) conclude that dominant party organizations and ethnic-based identity are two of the most important aspects to measure dictators' organizational power. Dominant-party regimes are likely to solve commitment problems between the dictator and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008). Increasing coherence of ruling coalitions, dominant-party regimes contribute to reducing the need for fraud by increasing the efficiency of economic distribution, but only when the dictator has rich financial resources to distribute. I use a dummy variable based on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) to code party-based regimes. This measure of

¹⁶ I rely on Hyde and Marinov's (2012) empirical definition of electoral competition: elections are competitive if they satisfy that (1) opposition is allowed, (2) multiple parties are legal, and (3) more than one candidate compete.

dominant-party regimes is appropriate, because the variable defines party regimes based on whether party organizations control selection of officials, organize distribution of benefits, mobilize citizens to vote and show party support (Geddes 2003; Wilson 2013: 5) “though other parties may exist and compete as minor parties in elections,” (Geddes 2003: 51)¹⁷

The size and cohesiveness of dominant ethnic groups is another good measure to capture a different aspect of organizational bases — the ethnic organizational power (EOP) of dictators. If an ethnic coalition consists of many ethnic groups, it is more difficult to monitor ruling elites’ opportunistic behaviors through intra-ethnic policing mechanisms (Fearon and Laitin 1995). Indeed, cross-national studies have demonstrated that ethnically fractionalized ruling coalitions are more exposed to coup risk (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Roessler 2011). Furthermore, as the size of ethnic groups gets larger, it becomes easier for dictators to distribute patronage to broader citizens by using extensive ethnic networks than when their ethnic groups are small (Fearon 1999; Chandra 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2008). A large literature demonstrates, in fact, that ethnic diversity prevents efficient public good provisions (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2008; Franck and Rainer 2012). In measuring the size and cohesiveness of dominant ethnic groups simultaneously, I construct an ethnic organizational power index, which is made by

¹⁷ Other datasets such as Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Svobik (2012) focus primarily on the number of parties in legislature to define single-party regimes.

multiplying the proportion of politically dominant ethnic groups in total population by the reversed fractionalization index of dominant ethnic groups.¹⁸ The variable has a lower value as ethnic groups in ethnic coalitions occupy a smaller portion of total population and as ethnic coalitions are composed of more ethnic groups. I expect that the effect of financial resources will be conditioned by both regime types and ethnic organizational power: Financial resources make autocratic elections less obviously fraudulent if dictators have party-based regimes and large, cohesive ethnic coalitions as supporting bases.

For Hypothesis 3, I operationalize the opposition's capabilities of collective action. I follow Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Howard and Roessler (2006: 372) and code "revolutionary threats" or anti-government collective action by counting the number of demonstrations, riots and strikes from Arthur Bank's *Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive*. One possible problem with this measure is that protests in the immediate past may be highly correlated with those in the present, and the observed correlation between protests and fraud may be due to the fact that serious electoral fraud provokes post-electoral protests (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). In fact, the correlation between post-electoral protests (Hyde and Marinov [2012]'s *NELDA* 29) and the one-year lagged collective action variable is quite high (0.25) and

¹⁸ The reversed fractionalization index is based on the Herfindahl formula and expressed as $(1 - \sum_{i=1}^N PDEG_i^2)$ where $PDEG_i$ is the share of a politically dominant ethnic group in total population. Thus, the ethnic organizational power is formulized as $(\sum_{i=1}^N PDEG_i) * (1 - \sum_{i=1}^N PDEG_i^2)$. To distinguish politically dominant ethnic groups from politically excluded ones, I rely on Wimmer, Cederman and Min's (2010) *Ethnic Power Relations* Dataset.

statistically significant, suggesting the possibility of reversed causality. Therefore, I use a three-year moving average (one year lagged) of the number of collective actions (riots, demonstrations and strikes) to better capture the history of opposition's organizational strength. Using the three-year moving average, the correlation between the collective action variable and post-electoral protests becomes much lower (0.09) and statistically insignificant, implying that the variable can now better estimate the effect of collective action capabilities on fraud, while mitigating the risk of reversed causality.

In addition, I use a host of control variables, based on previous work on electoral fraud, authoritarian politics and democratization. Since electoral fraud is more likely in repressive authoritarian regimes, estimating models without controlling for the degree of pre-existing political freedom in authoritarian regimes will bias my estimates for the three hypotheses. Therefore, I use the *Freedom House Index*. This variable is transformed to facilitate interpretation and, thus, ranges from 2 (least free) to 14 (most free), capturing the extent to which civil liberties and political freedom are guaranteed. To mitigate the risk that the measure picks up election fraud and captures the overall trends in political openness, the variable is a three-year moving average lagged one year.

Domestic institutional covariates are also important explanations of electoral fraud and thus should be controlled for. Regime types are important. As Geddes (1999) suggested, military dictators are more likely to step down and thus may allow fair and

free elections whereas personalist dictatorships tend to cling to power and thus may rig elections more seriously. Using Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), I introduce dummy variables for *Military and Personalist Dictatorships*. Some research suggests that *Domestic Election Monitoring* is effective to lower the level of fraud (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012). I use Kelley's (2012) dummy variable identifying whether domestic election monitoring exists in a given election. Independent, professional electoral management bodies (*Election Administrative Capacities*) may improve the quality of elections (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo. 2008). In elections that determine who will hold executive power, authoritarian leaders may be more inclined to manipulate elections because the electoral stakes are high (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). I follow Simpser and Donno (2012) and include a dichotomous variable called *Main Elections*, which is 1 for presidential elections in presidential (or mixed) systems and parliamentary elections in parliamentary systems.

In addition to political institutions, international reputation is also a crucial factor that authoritarian leaders have to concern at elections. The international community may decide to cut foreign aid or impose economic sanction following rigged elections (Bermeo 2011). To control for to what extent dictators will care about international reputation, I introduce three variables. A first codes whether a country convenes *International Election Monitoring* (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012). A second variable codes the amount of *Foreign Aid* that dictators are receiving. I use percentage of foreign aid relative to GDP (Ahmed 2012). A third variable is *Trade Openness* (sum of imports

and exports relative to GDP) is included to assess how economically dependent an authoritarian country is in the sphere of the international market (Burch 2011).

To account for socio-economic covariates influencing the extent of electoral fraud, I also include logged *GDP per capita* (one year lagged) and *GDP growth* (one year lagged) to control for the level of and change in economic development (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). *Rural population* (one year lagged, percent of total population) is also controlled for because in rural societies authoritarian governments find it easier to engage in electoral fraud (Burch 2011, 62). Autocrats may be more likely to engage in electoral fraud depending on their time in office. Thus, I control for *Leader's Tenure Length*.

As the dependent variables are continuous, I use random effects OLS models that account for the likelihood that the effects of the main variables may differ systematically for each country. Since the party-based regime variable and the ethnic organizational power index rarely vary over time, a fixed effects model cannot be employed for Hypothesis 2 and thus not presented here as main analysis. Instead, I show its results in robustness check.¹⁹ Considering the likelihood that errors are correlated within each country, I adopt robust standard errors clustered by country. I also include decade interval dummies (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) to control for time-specific effects.

¹⁹ Also for results with other estimation techniques, see the robustness check section and Appendix C2.

2.5.2 Results

Table 2-1: Determinants of Electoral Fraud in Dictatorship

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	VCL	VC	VCL	VC	VCL	VC
Oil-Gas Value per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.00937*** (0.003)	-0.00762** (0.003)	-0.00822*** (0.003)	-0.00671*** (0.003)	0.0148^ (0.016)	0.0302* (0.016)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.139** (0.070)	0.176** (0.073)	0.129* (0.067)	0.165** (0.072)	0.137* (0.070)	0.173** (0.073)
Party-Based Regime	-0.652 (0.671)	0.35 (0.671)	-0.293 (0.593)	0.708 (0.604)	-0.613 (0.657)	0.412 (0.653)
Oil*Party			-0.0936*** (0.023)	-0.102*** (0.024)		
Ethnnc Organizational Power (EOP)	1.651*** (0.640)	1.992*** (0.662)	1.535** (0.599)	1.893*** (0.625)	1.781*** (0.665)	2.199*** (0.675)
Oil*EOP					-0.115^ (0.076)	-0.180** (0.077)
Military Regime	-2.045*** (0.78)	-0.366 (0.78)	-1.904*** (0.72)	-0.245 (0.73)	-2.032*** (0.76)	-0.342 (0.765)
Personalist Regime	-0.151 (0.768)	0.655 (0.760)	-0.00275 (0.709)	0.78 (0.701)	-0.135 (0.753)	0.673 (0.736)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0326 (0.024)	0.0102 (0.023)	0.035 (0.023)	0.012 (0.022)	0.031 (0.024)	0.00777 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.482*** (0.079)	-0.219*** (0.073)	-0.504*** (0.080)	-0.241*** (0.073)	-0.489*** (0.079)	-0.230*** (0.072)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.423*** (0.154)	-0.516*** (0.185)	-0.452*** (0.147)	-0.541*** (0.183)	-0.419*** (0.156)	-0.511*** (0.186)
Main Elections	0.124 (0.188)	0.138 (0.166)	0.136 (0.188)	0.150 (0.167)	0.130 (0.189)	0.148 (0.168)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.099 (0.397)	-0.28 (0.455)	0.196 (0.402)	-0.185 (0.466)	0.116 (0.393)	-0.262 (0.445)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0512** (0.021)	-0.0500** (0.023)	-0.0583*** (0.022)	-0.0577** (0.023)	-0.0498** (0.021)	-0.0477** (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0283* (0.016)	0.0177 (0.017)	0.0275* (0.015)	0.017 (0.016)	0.0276* (0.016)	0.0168 (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.00577 (0.004)	-0.00732 (0.005)	-0.00519 (0.004)	-0.00778 (0.005)	-0.00569 (0.004)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.2 (0.464)	-0.272 (0.482)	-0.28 (0.456)	-0.339 (0.478)	-0.212 (0.466)	-0.291 (0.482)
International Election Monitoring	0.26 (0.510)	0.474 (0.480)	0.246 (0.501)	0.459 (0.470)	0.267 (0.510)	0.484 (0.477)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0279 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.0300* (0.018)	-0.0213 (0.019)	-0.0284 (0.018)	-0.0204 (0.020)
Constant	5.878 (4.179)	5.776 (4.532)	5.476 (4.153)	5.384 (4.551)	5.775 (4.134)	5.679 (4.43)
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
Wald Chi2	246.33***	212.29***	529.3***	693.9***	254.4***	229.95
R squared (overall)	0.46	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.46	0.38

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. VCL= election violence + election cheating + legal problems (0-15), VC = election violence + election cheating (0-12).


In Table 2.1, Models 1 and 2 examine Hypotheses 1 and 3. The variable of oil-gas value per capita is statistically significant and negatively correlated with electoral fraud in both models. A case in point is the Suharto regime of Indonesia. In the late 1970s and mid 1980s, Suharto enjoyed rich oil revenue because of surges in international oil prices (Smith 2007, 135-137)²⁰ and thus parliamentary elections held in 1977 and 1982 were both relatively clean (the election fraud level [including cheating, violence and legal problems] was 2 and 4 respectively in my data). After a significant drop in oil price in the late 1980s, however, the Suharto regime began to seriously rig elections. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, when oil-gas value per capita was just 98 dollars, the level of electoral fraud reached 15, the maximum value in the sample.

Models 1 and 2 also show that the opposition's collective action is positively correlated with electoral fraud in a statistically significant way, supporting Hypothesis 3. The more riots, demonstrations and strikes authoritarian leaders face during three years before an election, the more seriously they rig elections. Countries like Kenya (1992), Zimbabwe (2000), Jordan (1997), Tajikistan (1995), Bangladesh (1986), the Philippines (1984) and Indonesia (1997) are typical cases where strong opposition movements forced the governments to resort to extensive electoral manipulation.

²⁰ Oil revenue in Indonesia in the early 1980s (305 dollars) was about ten times as high as in the early 1970s.

The party-based regime dummy by itself does not have a statistically significant impact on electoral fraud in Models 1 and 2. Ethnic organizational power (EOP), on the other hand, is positively correlated with electoral fraud in both models. As previous studies suggest (Levitsky and Way 2010, 63), this suggests that extensive organizational bases may become a political machine to systematically fabricate election results. It does so especially when dictators have few financial resources to distribute to the citizenry.

Figure 2-2: The Different Effects of Natural Resource Endowments between Dominant-Party and Non-Dominant-Party Regimes




Note: The left and right graphs are based on estimation results of Models 3 and 4, respectively.

In Models 3 and 4, I examine the effect of oil-gas value per capita conditional on the presence of the party-based regime. The evidence supports Hypothesis 2. In both models, the oil-gas rent variable and its interaction term with the party-based regime dummy are negative and statistically significant. Figures 2.2-(a,b) visually

demonstrate the difference in the impact of natural resources on electoral fraud for party-based and non-party-based regimes. In non-party-based regimes, natural resources lower electoral fraud very little (0.008). If the country is party-based regime, however, the impact of natural resources is about 12 times higher. Under dominant party regimes that include Malaysia, Mexico, Tanzania and Gabon, a 100-dollar increase in oil and gas revenue lowers level of electoral fraud by 0.1.

Figure 2-3: The Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Endowments Conditional upon Ethnic Organizational Power



Note: The left and right graphs are based on estimation results of Models 5 and 6, respectively.

Models 5 and 6 provide additional evidence supporting for Hypothesis 2 from the other perspective – the ethnic organizational power (EOP). Interaction terms of the EOP variable and oil-gas value per capita are negative and statistically significant. Figures 2.3-(a, b) depict graphs illustrating how the coefficient of oil-gas per capita will change according to values of the EOP. Where the EOP is weak (0 to 0.17) like Cameroon, Zaire, Tunisia, and Syria, the impact of natural resource endowments is

not statistically distinguishable from 0. As politically dominant ethnic groups become more cohesive and larger, the negative impact of natural resource endowments becomes larger. At the maximum value where only one dominant ethnic group occupies 98 percent of total population (Ethnic Organizational Power = 0.98), the coefficient of oil-gas rent per capita is about -0.1, which is 12 times larger than when EOP is equal to 0.2.

2.5.3 Robustness Check and Additional Data Analysis

For robustness checks, I conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses.²¹ First, I alternatively adopt different dichotomous measures of political regimes by using Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) and Polity IV²² to see whether the results are sensitive to other filtering criteria distinguishing authoritarian from democratic countries. These alternative classifications of authoritarian regimes do not change the overall results. Second, all the models are re-estimated with different measures of natural resources (1. change in oil-gas value per capita²³, 2. three years moving average of oil-

²¹ For detailed estimation results, see Appendix C2.

²² Following the convention, I define a country as authoritarian if its Polity IV score is less than 6.

²³ Although the current measure focuses on the level of oil-gas value per capita, change in natural resources may be also important, considering that citizens' voting behavior is based on retrospective evaluations on the government's economic performance and thus sensitive to income shocks. Here change in oil-gas value per capita is measured by taking percent change in the variable between (t-2) and (t-1) years before an election.

gas value per capita²⁴, and 3. Haber and Menaldo's [2011] measure of natural resource wealth²⁵), and the results are robust to these alternative measurements of natural resources. Third, the extent of electoral fraud may be different depending on the country's regional location because the likelihood of democratic transition may be influenced by regional diffusion of democratization. This may make measurement errors correlate within each region, which possibly induces an underestimation of standard errors. Thus, instead of country-clustered robust standard errors, I use robust standard errors clustered by region, yet the main results do not change. Forth, my results are robust to the simultaneous inclusion of other relevant covariates (memberships of democratic international organizations [one year lagged],²⁶

²⁴ Since the dictators may be able to store natural resources for some period of time, taking average for several years may be a better indicator to measure the dictators' available financial resources.

²⁵ In addition to oil and natural gas, Haber and Menaldo's (2011) measure includes other types of natural resource wealth such as coals and metals. Ross' (2012) measure of oil-gas value per capita is very highly correlated with Haber and Menaldo's: the correlation coefficient is 0.989.

²⁶ As the democratization literature argues, strong pressures from inter-governmental organizations induce authoritarian countries to democratize (e.g. Pevehouse 2005). I first identify each country's membership of international organization using the State System Membership Dataset by the Correlates of War Project (2011 version). Then, I calculate how democratic each international organization is by taking the average of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2009) measure of democracy for all member states other than the country under study.

electoral systems,²⁷ foreign direct investment [one year lagged],²⁸ logged population size [one year lagged],²⁹ military spending per capita [one year lagged],³⁰ and duration of violent conflicts [one year lagged]³¹). Lastly, I employ other estimation methods like fixed effects, random effects with regional dummies, and random intercept models³² to see to what extent the results are robust to alternative

²⁷ Burch (2007) contends that Single Member Districts systems are more likely to induce serious electoral fraud. Here I use Effective Electoral Threshold to control for electoral system types.

²⁸ I use inflow of foreign direct investment relative to GDP.

²⁹ Lehoucq and Molina (2002) and Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011) argue that election fraud tends to be positively associated with less populated areas.

³⁰ Natural resource wealth may be also used to strengthen security apparatus (Ross 2001, 332-336). To make sure that the effect of natural resource endowments largely comes from economic distribution, I control for military spending per capita.







³¹ When civil conflict is ongoing, the governments are more likely to violate human rights and thus use electoral violence (e.g. Dunning 2011). I use Armed Conflict Dataset in which violent conflict is defined as at least 25 battle deaths per year.

³² Since the party-based regime and EOP dummies rarely change over time, it is difficult to distinctively estimate the within-group effects from the between-group effects by using fixed effects models with those time-invariant variables. On the other hand, fixed effects models have an advantage in controlling for country-specific confounding factors that do not change over time. Therefore, I use fixed effects estimation to test Hypotheses 1 and 3. For Hypothesis 2, instead of fixed effects, I introduce five regional dummies to control for regional-specific heterogeneous effects. Random intercept models are used for all the hypotheses.

estimation strategies. Other than one exception,³³ these different estimation methods do not affect my results.

³³ This is the collective action variable in a fixed effect model where VCL is the dependent variable. In this model, the collective action variable does not reach to the 10 percent statistical significance (p-value = 0.17).

Figure 2-4: Additional Analyses



Note: For details on estimation results, see Appendix C2. Ordered logistic regressions are estimated. The graphs show predicted probabilities that any level of electoral violence or cheating occurs.

For additional analysis, I disaggregate the *Election Fraud* variable into election violence and election cheating parts and run ordered logistic regressions with clustered robust standard errors to examine whether different causal mechanisms exist between electoral violence and electoral cheating.³⁴ Oil-gas rent per capita always has a negative association with both electoral violence and cheating (Models 7 and 8). Second, the collective action variable is better at explaining variation in electoral violence rather than electoral cheating (Models 7 and 8). Third, an interaction between dominant-party regime and natural resource endowments has a statistically significant impact on reducing both electoral violence and cheating (Models 9 and 10). Figures 2.4 (a-d) graphically show change in predicted probabilities of any level of electoral violence and cheating, suggesting that, when an authoritarian country is party-based regime, the likelihood of electoral violence and cheating tends to shrink more rapidly as natural resource endowments increase. On the other hand, the conditional effect of the oil-gas variable upon ethnic organizational power explains only electoral cheating (Models 11 and 12. See also Figure 2.4 [e,f]). In sum, these additional analyses suggest that all other things being

³⁴ Lumping pre-electoral and election-time violence together, the violence variable ranges from 0 (no problems) to 6 (major problems). The cheating variable, which includes two electoral cheating variables and the variable of legal problems, ranges from 0 (no problems) to 9 (major problems).

equal, strong oppositions fuel violence, whereas non-party-based regimes and weak politically dominant ethnic groups are more likely to commit electoral cheating especially when they lack in rich financial resources.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an informational theory of authoritarian elections and cross-nationally explored the determinants of electoral fraud in dictatorships. Dictators face the electoral dilemma between the certainty and credibility of election results. Focusing on the balance of mobilization power between the dictator and the elites, I have argued that strong dictators, who can mobilize a large amount of votes via public spending, are more willing to lower the degree of electoral fraud. The findings in this chapter imply that the mere existence of free and fair elections does not necessarily lead to further democratization in authoritarian countries.

International development assistance organizations send election observers and/or peacekeeping agents to prevent dictators from committing serious election cheating and violence. If dictators are financially weak, however, fair elections brought by international election monitoring might lead to post-election conflict by revealing the weakness of dictators, which in turn might threaten political order after elections. Conversely, when dictators are strong, election monitoring and subsequent higher quality of elections might legitimate those dictators that get an overwhelming

victory by mobilizing their rich political resources. This is more likely to prevent conflict, but also encourage authoritarian leaders to hold on to power through “legitimized” elections. Based on this understanding of the trade-off between democracy and political order, international development assistance organizations may need to develop strategies to transform dictatorial countries into democratic, peaceful ones.

CHAPTER 3

THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN DICTATORSHIPS

3.1 Introduction

Over the last decade, burgeoning literature on authoritarian politics has documented how authoritarian elections help autocrats hold onto power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Authoritarian elections enable dictators to co-opt ruling elites (Boix and Svolik 2007; Blaydes 2010), party members (Magaloni 2006), or opposition groups within society (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008). Specifically, by scoring an overwhelming majority at elections, authoritarian leaders can show the invincibility of their regimes (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). In addition, election results may also inform dictators of their main supporting bases and opposition strongholds (Ames 1970; Shi 1999; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011). Since moderate opposition parties participate in regime-sponsored elections, whereas radical opposition parties boycott the elections, elections also enable a “divide and conquer” approach of the opposition camp (Lust-Okar 2004; Beaulieu 2006).

Far less explored in the current scholarship, however, are the variations of electoral systems in which elections in authoritarian regimes take place. In particular, the literature on electoral system choice has almost exclusively focused on democracies; meanwhile we know little about the conditions under which authoritarian rulers prefer one type of electoral system over another. This analytical imbalance is indeed puzzling

given our abundant knowledge on the consequences of electoral systems in the literature and the fact that authoritarian leaders do often embark on reforming their electoral rules. For instance, Putin's Russia shifted electoral systems from a mixed system to a pure Proportional Representation system (PR) with a nationwide district in 2005. Nazarbaev, the President of Kazakhstan, also took the same direction by declaring that the country would adopt a pure PR system with a nationwide electoral district prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections. By contrast, Belarus, albeit with regional similarities to Russia and Kazakhstan, has held parliamentary elections with Single Member Districts (SMD) systems since its national independence. Furthermore, electoral authoritarian countries in the Middle East like Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria frequently changed their electoral institutions and district size during the 1980s and 1990s (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002; Pripstein Posusney 2002). As the cross-national data I examine reveals, there is wide variation in the Effective Electoral Threshold among electoral authoritarian regimes across time and space. It makes us wonder: When and why do electoral autocrats decide to adopt one type of electoral systems over others?

This chapter is further motivated by another intriguing observation: Just like in advanced democracies, ruling parties in electoral authoritarianism regimes with SMD systems typically enjoy significant seat premiums due to the seats-votes disproportionality. In addition, as authoritarian leaders delegate local elites to garner support in their localities under SMD systems, they do not need to use their own resources to mobilize regime supporters. Together, SMD systems seem to generate a pro-regime bias in electoral authoritarianism governments and should be the natural

choice for self-serving dictators. Yet, PR systems—a seemingly sub-optimal institutional choice—are still used in some electoral authoritarian regimes. Why?

This chapter develops a theoretical framework to solve these related puzzles. I argue that the choice of electoral systems poses a dilemma to authoritarian rulers. Specifically, while SMD systems provide a seat premium and reduce mobilization costs for dictators, SMD systems also undermine several important functionalities of elections in authoritarian regimes. For instance, under SMD systems, the parliamentary dominance built on the seat premium makes election results less useful and less credible in demonstrating regime strength. Further, SMD systems also make it easier for opposition parties to build a pre-electoral coalition and show their coherence to voters. Importantly, I argue that different dictators develop different strategies to address this electoral system dilemma. I argue that “strong” dictators, that is, those who hold rich financial resources to buy-off extensive political support from the citizenry, have an incentive to use PR systems. Authoritarian leaders with high mobilization power need not depend on the pro-regime bias generated by SMD systems. In addition, PR systems make opposition parties remain divided, which persuades people that the opposition is not a viable option at all during electoral processes. In other words, authoritarian leaders with rich financial resources should prefer to choose a more proportional representation system to convey a clear signal of regime invincibility.

Using newly collected cross-national datasets on electoral systems and election results in electoral authoritarian regimes (95 countries, 1946-2007), I find that there is a robust, negative correlation between effective electoral threshold and dictators’ financial strength measured by their natural resource wealth. The result is sustained

even after using different model specifications, alternative estimating strategies, and various measurements of both dependent and independent variables. Further, I explicitly test the causal mechanisms and show the pro-regime bias and the coherency of opposition parties under SMD systems.

The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, I try to explore the origins of political institutions in dictatorship. Taking particular emphasis on the importance of the dictator's power of popular mobilization, I suggest that dictators are more likely to adopt less biased electoral rules to credibly show their regime invincibility, but only when they can afford to do so. Second, this chapter systematically explores one technique of electoral manipulation in dictatorships that has avoided close scrutiny in the extant literature, namely, the choice of electoral systems. In addition to electoral fraud like election violence, tampering with the ballot box, media bias, and severe limits on electoral laws, as well as pre-electoral economic distribution through vote-buying and fiscal policy manipulation, the chapter suggests that dictators can bias election results in their favor by manipulating the electoral formula. Lastly, the chapter attempts to contribute to the electoral system choice literature. Beyond the importance of opposition threats (Boix 1999), partisan bias (Calvo 2009), and economic interests (Rogowski 1987; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007), I posit a new theory emphasizing a signaling role of electoral systems.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review literature on electoral system choice, suggesting theoretical gaps that should be filled when considering dictators' calculus over the choice of electoral systems. The third section provides a theory of electoral system design in electoral autocracies and derives observable

implications. In the forth section, I show cross-national evidence for my theoretical expectations. I show that natural resources tend to lower effective electoral threshold in electoral authoritarianism. Then, to confirm causal mechanisms in theory, I provide additional cross-national evidence: (1) natural resource wealth tends to boost up regime support, suggesting that resource abundance is a good proxy of the dictator's mobilization power; (2) SMD systems tend to provide a seat premium to ruling parties, showing the existence of the pro-regime bias under SMD systems; and (3) SMD systems tend to promote a pre-electoral opposition coalition, implying that SMD systems help opposition parties send a good signal of its coherence. Lastly, conclusions follow.

3.2 Literature Review

There are broadly two perspectives that scholars have taken to study the choice of electoral systems: political and economic explanations (Leemann and Mares 2014). Rokkan (1970) is the pioneering work that proposes two “political” hypotheses explaining the adoption of proportional representation in Europe during the early twentieth century.³⁵ Rokkan's first hypothesis argues that incumbents adopt PR systems to avoid a devastating electoral defeat in the face of socialist mobilization. Boix (1999) advanced this hypothesis and argues that ruling parties adopt PR systems when the

³⁵ For criticism of Boix (1999), see Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) and Calvo (2009). Using qualitative sources on electoral system reforms in advanced democracies, Kreuzer (2010) argues that Boix's (1999) explanation is more valid than Cusack, Iversen and Soskice's (2007). Regarding Cusack and his colleagues' response to Kreuzer (2010), see Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2010).

rightwing parties are seriously divided between the conservative and liberal camps under the socialist threat. Put differently, parties on the right tend to maintain majoritarian electoral systems when either leftist parties are considered as weak or one of the old parties occupies a dominant position in a party system. Rokkan's second hypothesis, which has been taken up recently by Calvo (2009), suggests that the adoption of proportional representation is also driven by the extent to which the established parties want to avoid "partisan bias" induced by majoritarian electoral systems. Parties with a geographically concentrated distribution of votes tend to enjoy more seats than those having geographically dispersed votes under SMD exposed to severe party competition. Therefore, the old parties with dispersed votes prefer to shift to proportional representation to moderate the partisan bias.

Although these two political explanations are powerful in understanding the choice of electoral systems in pre-war Europe, it is difficult to directly apply these insights to authoritarian contexts. Rokkan's first hypothesis views strong socialist threats as a driving force to adopt proportional representation systems, yet most contemporary authoritarian countries are not exposed to such imminent opposition threats. Indeed, Boix recognized that his theoretical expectation is only applicable to democracies satisfying certain presumptions (Boix 1999, 622). On the other hand, although Rokkan's second hypothesis answers why incumbents may adopt PR systems even in the absence of strong socialist mobilization (Calvo 2009, 268), it still assumes that there should be severe party competition that generates the partisan bias leading to government turnover. A crucial difference between democracies and autocracies is that opposition parties in authoritarian states are too weak to be a viable alternative at elections. In

electoral authoritarian states, incumbent parties generally retain far greater resource advantages to prevent leadership turnover at elections (Greene 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010). Therefore, opposition parties, although allowed to participate in electoral competition in these countries, suffer severe limits on their organizational capacities and monetary resources making a win for the opposition nearly unlikely (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002, 342-345; Schedler 2013). However, despite the fact that ruling parties do not need to worry about opposition parties, why do some authoritarian leaders still maintain PR systems and even decide to change electoral systems from SMD to PR?

Apart from the political explanations, other scholars have tried to explain the origins of electoral systems by focusing on the distribution of economic interests in a country. Focusing on domestic politics, Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007) argue that whether rightist parties adopt PR systems depends on the extent to which businesses and unions forge cooperative relationships via skill formation and well-established collective bargaining at the national economy. If parties on the right are embedded in the cross-class, consensus-based decision-making process, then they can enjoy benefits from such regulatory politics rather than incur costs induced by distributional conflict under PR systems. Therefore, they argue that cross-class alliances encourage governments to choose proportional representation systems. Rogowski (1987), on the other hand, focuses on an external factor. He argues that trade-dependent countries are more likely to adopt PR systems. An open economy encourages governments to resist protectionist pressures, maintain high efficiency, and keep high policy stability because they have to remain competitive in the international market. Under PR systems that tend to have larger electoral districts than SMD systems, incumbents can contain regional and

sectorial pressures more effectively, making governments in trade-dependent countries preferring PR systems.

Unfortunately, the economic-interests explanations do not provide plausible answers about why electoral authoritarian countries change their electoral systems, either. First, similar with the political explanations, they also presuppose that countries under electoral system reforms are fully democratic. Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) and Rogowski (1987) both assume distributional conflict among different economic groups becomes severe in the face of strong party competition. Second, based on the “varieties of capitalism” argument (Hall and Soskice 2001), Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) center on two types of capitalisms—liberal market and coordinated market economies—to explain the choice of electoral systems in pre-war Europe, yet neither of these two capitalisms are systematically present in authoritarian regimes. Instead of capitalism’s variants, this chapter investigates whether and to what extent a government’s financial resources determine electoral system design in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Beyond the context of advanced democracies, researchers have also explored electoral system reforms in new democracies. Many point to the important role of political uncertainty. Specifically, scholars have shown that electoral system change in transitioning states does not lead reformers to gain benefits that they initially expected because the effects of electoral reforms are highly uncertain in those countries where

democratic institutions are still immature (Przeworski 1991; Remington and Smith 1996; Moser 2001; Andrews and Jackman 2005).³⁶

In authoritarian regimes, however, electoral institutions have high certainty about how they work, at least compared to transitioning countries. In stark contrast with the findings in new democracies, a large body of literature on authoritarian elections compellingly demonstrates that electoral rules help dictators consolidate their power (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2010). Discussing electoral systems in the Middle East, Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002) note “both sides [incumbents and oppositions] know their preferences over the electoral rules. [...] Proportional representation and larger member districts tend to increase the number of effective parties and the possibility of minority representation, whereas majoritarian systems and single-member districts tend to limit the participation of smaller parties. [...] Elites hold firm preferences over electoral laws when they negotiate with each other” (345-346). My empirical analysis confirms the proposition that electoral system design is a crucial factor in determining the allocation of seats also in electoral authoritarianism.

³⁶ On the other hand, Bielasiak (2006) illustrates that in the post-communist world, democracy and semi-authoritarian states tend to adopt PR systems or mixed systems while more authoritarian states are prone to select SMD systems. After investigating the cases of Central and Eastern Europe, Ishiyama (1997) concludes that substantial changes in electoral systems would have occurred if communist parties and oppositional forces had thought of their organizations as seat-maximizing political parties rather than as mass movements when they entered the phase of selecting electoral systems. For systematic comparisons regarding the impacts of electoral systems on party systems between advanced and new democracies, see Moser and Scheiner (2012).

Lastly, it has been argued that electoral systems are highly path-dependent. Especially in democracies, a dominant view is that, once selected, electoral systems are surprisingly stable because the choice of electoral system is strongly influenced by the stakes of the preexisting parties (Cox 1998, 18).³⁷ Certainly, electoral systems in electoral authoritarianism also have such a path-dependent characteristic. However, there have been significant reforms that changed electoral systems in many electoral authoritarian regimes since the end of World War II. This is contrary to the experience of advanced democracies in which electoral systems tended to be highly stable until more recently. It suggests that in autocracies, political leaders may have more discretion in designing pliable electoral systems. In subsequent quantitative analyses, I focus on this strategic nature of electoral system choice in autocracies after taking into account the path-dependency of electoral systems in a methodologically proper way.

³⁷ For example, Tsebelis (1990) argues that extant electoral systems may shape the interests of legislators within each party, which makes it difficult to change electoral systems, even if an alternative electoral system is rational for parties as a whole. Based on this insight, recent literature argues that, even under such inertia, ruling parties may change more specific and micro-level electoral rules in their favor. McElwain (2008) shows that incumbent politicians tended to enjoy advantages in elections by restricting lengths of the electoral campaign period in Japan. Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2001) assert that in Mexico, under the PRI rule, the ruling party manipulated electoral systems in the way that it was difficult for opposition parties to coordinate their behavior in order to form a majority.

3.3 Electoral System Change in Electoral Authoritarianism

Politicians attempt to hold onto power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This is particularly true for authoritarian leaders who may lose their lives after losing office (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). To stay in power, dictators employ a variety of means, such as violent repression, patronage distribution, and the construction of political institutions like parties and legislatures. When authoritarian rulers use elections to consolidate their rule, previous literature suggests that they try to score an overwhelming majority, not a slim majority, to demonstrate their strength (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). Winning big, dictators convey a signal to potential opponents in society that the regimes are unshakable.

To maintain supermajorities, there are at least three techniques that dictators can use at the ballot box. A first, well-known method is electoral fraud (Simpser 2013). As already defined in the previous chapters, electoral fraud is a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003). Electoral violence (Strauss and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013), tampering with the ballot box, media bias, packing election management bodies, and highly restrictive electoral laws (McElwin 2008; Kelley 2012) are all such examples of blatant electoral manipulation that facilitate obtaining an overwhelming majority.

Second, autocrats may engage in implementing expansionary economic policies prior to elections, namely, engineering political business cycles (e.g. Shi and Svensson 2003). Pre-electoral economic distribution, although not necessarily breaking any laws, allows

governments to derive political support from voters, which is a frequently observed phenomenon in electoral authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2009; Blaydes 2010; Higashijima 2010; Wright 2011).

The last and least researched technique in the literature on authoritarian elections is the design of electoral systems. As previous studies demonstrate, electoral systems significantly influence the manners in which votes for a party are translated into parliamentary seats (Rae 1971; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1998). Similar to democratic countries, changing voting procedures and district size, authoritarian leaders are able to increase their parliamentary seat shares, which would not otherwise be achievable if they had adopted a different electoral system (Jamal and Lust-Okar 2002; Pripstein Posusney 2002).

My proposition is that dictators strategically choose different electoral systems to maximize their political interests, following directly from various studies on the political consequences of electoral systems in democratic settings. Conventional wisdom holds that majoritarian systems usually lead to high disproportionality, that is, “ [larger] deviation[s] of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares.” (Lijphart 1994, 57) Specifically, due to their “winner-take-all” nature, SMD tends to mechanically provide more seats to major parties. This is the reason why a drastic swing in election results often occurs in majoritarian democracies. Also due to this reason, the divided political right feared devastating electoral losses to emerging social democrats in pre-war Europe (Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999).

In the context of electoral authoritarianism, ruling parties are the larger parties which in turn benefit from high disproportionality in SMD systems. In other words, SMD

systems bias election results in favor of ruling parties in authoritarian regimes, a bias that I term here “the pro-regime bias.” This bias is first generated by Duverger’s well-known mechanical and psychological effects of majoritarian systems on the seats-votes elasticity (Duverger 1954). That is, expecting that a large portion of seats will not be guaranteed to opposition parties, voters may cast their ballot for the ruling party or abstain from voting all together. The pro-regime bias is well illustrated by the cases of Singapore and Malaysia, two well-known Asian autocracies usually categorized as electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2013, 4-5). Both countries have held parliamentary elections since independence and also use majoritarian electoral systems with single-member districts. On average, the countries’ ruling parties (People’s Action Party in Singapore and Barisan Nasional in Malaysia) obtained 87 percent of the total seats with only 63 percent of the total votes between 1959-2008, suggesting that they have been receiving very large seat premiums: 24 percent of the total seats.³⁸ Conversely, PR systems prevent major parties from enjoying such seat premiums because the percentages of seats tend to proportionally coincide with those of votes. Accordingly, major parties need to collect more votes to win an overwhelming legislative majority under PR systems.

A second mechanism yielding a pro-regime bias is gerrymandering. In SMD systems where governments are able to design every single electoral district, dictators can engage in gerrymandering to favor the ruling parties. Ahmed (2013) finds that, in mid-nineteenth century Europe when electoral competition was minimal and socialist

³⁸ For other anecdotal evidence on the pro-dictator bias from some Middle Eastern countries (Yemen, Palestine, Tunisia, and Egypt), see Pripstein Posusney (2002).


threats were still very weak, ruling parties tended to resort to redistricting in order to enjoy the seat bias to maintain electoral dominance. Conversely, in PR systems, both electoral magnitude and electoral districts are generally larger and districts are often fixed with administrative units. Therefore, in the PR context, it is more difficult for ruling parties to arbitrarily redistrict, at least compared to SMD systems.

If majoritarian systems help dictators win big, then one may think there is no incentive for them to adopt PR systems. However, empirical evidence shows that many electoral autocracies have maintained proportional representation systems or even changed their systems from SMD to PR (e.g., Russia and Kazakhstan). Why are some autocrats willing to adopt electoral systems that are not necessarily helpful in maintaining an overwhelming majority in parliament?

I argue that authoritarian leaders prefer to adopt a proportional representation system with an eye toward demonstrating regime credibility and strength. The current literature on authoritarian politics assumes that authoritarian leaders and other political actors are more likely to face information shortages (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov, Gariev, and Sonin 2009). In dictatorships where political transparency is seriously circumscribed, it is difficult for political elites to know to what extent the dictator has the capability of governing the country effectively. Such a lack of information may result in, at best, miscommunication between the dictator and potential opponents, and at worse, political conflicts such as post-electoral coups and popular protests (Beaulieu 2014). Therefore, dictators need to show their strength in the most credible way possible, as I discussed in Chapter 2. According to the literature, elections may work as

such a mechanism to fill the information gap in autocracies (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Blaydes 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Miller 2012)

Figure 3.1: Hypothesis and Causal Mechanisms for the Origins of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarianism



If authoritarian leaders adopt SMD systems, election results become less credible to inform *de facto* mobilization power of ruling parties. Under SMD systems, other political actors are more likely to think that the election results and subsequent parliamentary dominance are mainly driven by the pro-regime bias. Even if the regime scores a landslide victory, the signaling function of elections may be more likely to be undermined.

Further, SMD systems allow the dictator to delegate local ruling elites to garner political support in their constituencies. Since electoral districts are small in size under SMD systems, the dictator can rely on powerful local elites to use their own political resources to mobilize constituents. On the flip side, such political delegation to local ruling elites may negatively affect the credibility of regime strength because subsequent electoral victory is likely to be taken as a reflection of ruling elites' mobilization power, rather than the dictator's.

In contrast, PR systems are more likely to provide the dictators with institutional circumstances where parliamentary dominance sends a credible signal of regime strength, in three ways. First, since the pro-dictator bias is low in PR systems, authoritarian leaders need to garner a larger number of votes to dominate parliament with an overwhelming majority. Second, since electoral districts are generally larger in size and the electoral battle is more party-based under the PR apparatus, authoritarian leaders themselves need to organize a wide range of political support across regions without relying on local ruling elites' individual resources in their strongholds. By doing so, election results become more credible to inform the dictator's strength.

Third, PR systems make it difficult for opposition parties to unite and build a significant pre-electoral coalition (Strom, Budge and Laver 1994, 315-316; Golder 2006). Pre-electoral coalitions are "agreements in which parties publicly announce that they will not compete independently in an election. Instead, they coordinate their campaigns to sponsor joint candidates or lists or to not run against each other in some constituencies" (Gandhi and Reuter 2013, 138). Since opposition parties are allowed to have seats with smaller vote shares under PR systems, they have more incentives to participate in elections. Yet, at the same time, they are less likely to coordinate their electoral campaigns to challenge the ruling party. Barbera (2013) demonstrates that PR systems tend to increase the number of opposition parties in authoritarian countries with multi-party elections. This coordination problem within the opposition camp persuades voters that opposition is weak and regime parties are strong in a credible manner.

PR systems increase the credibility of regime invincibility orchestrated by elections so long as ruling parties maintain supermajorities. Yet, choosing a PR system poses risk to authoritarian leaders. If they fail to obtain high political support at the ballot box, then they may also fail to obtain adequate seats because PR systems do not provide the seat premiums brought by the pro-regime bias. Rather, PR systems allow for the possibility that opposition parties, although usually divided, gain more seats. Although the opposition rarely claims victory, they may prevent the ruling party from winning big in the legislature. The failure to maintain overwhelming support may in turn reveal regime weaknesses rather than strengths, complicating regime stability.

When dictators possess strong mobilization power to derive voluntary support from citizens, they can produce an overwhelming majority even under PR systems. And, as discussed already, economic distribution is one of the most frequent ways to collect popular support in electoral authoritarianism without losing the credibility of election results. “Strong” dictators, who have abundant monetary resources to cultivate voluntary support from citizens, should be more willing to choose a PR system over a SMD one to maximize the informational benefits of elections. PR systems help such strong dictators inform regime strength by conveying a costly signal. This is what happened, for example, in Russia and Kazakhstan during the mid-2000s, when both countries transitioned to a pure PR system with a nationwide electoral district. At that time, two autocrats in the country, Putin and Nazarbaev enjoyed very high popularity,

thanks to rich natural resource wealth.³⁹ While increasing mobilization power, both decided to shift to PR systems and the ruling parties, United Russia and Nur Otan, successfully maintained supermajorities in their respective legislatures. Therefore, I propose the testable hypothesis on electoral system choice (See also Figure 3.1 for summarized causal mechanisms).

Hypothesis: The greater the financial strength of the dictator, the more likely he is to choose PR over SMD.

3.4 Cross-National Statistical Analysis

3.4.1 Sample: Electoral Authoritarianism

I focus on electoral authoritarian regimes for the period of 1946-2007. According to Schedler (2013, 2), electoral authoritarian regimes are defined as political regimes where authoritarian leaders “play the game of multiparty elections, [...] (and) these elections are broadly inclusive (they are held under universal suffrage), minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are permitted to run), minimally competitive (parties and candidates outside the ruling coalition, while denied victory, are allowed to win votes and seats), and minimally open (dissident is not subject to massive, but often to selective and intermittent repression), [...] (yet) not minimally democratic.”

³⁹ On Putin’s popularity in Russia, see Rose, Mishler and Munro (2011) and the Economist (2014). On the same issue in the case of Kazakhstan, see Schatz (2009) and Chapter 4.

I use the following two data sources to identify electoral authoritarian regimes. If a country satisfies necessary conditions in either one of the two datasets, I regard the country as an electoral authoritarian regime. The first data source is *National Elections in Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA). Hyde and Marinov (2012) see elections as minimally competitive if there is *ex ante* uncertainty over election results. More specifically, they regard elections as minimally competitive if (1) multiple parties are legal, (2) more than two candidates are allowed to stand in electoral districts, and (3) opposition is allowed to participate in the election. Kinne and Marinov (2013) use the NELDA's criteria to identify electoral authoritarianism from the sample of non-democracies defined by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2009) dichotomous measure of political regimes. Kinne and Marinov's (2013) operationalization and NELDA are useful because they provide us with an extensive time period as well as a large number of countries. Yet, unfortunately, it does not include countries where political parties are *de jure* illegal but there are relevant political groups that function as *de facto* political parties like some periods in Jordan, Kuwait, Swaziland, and Uganda. Therefore, I compliment NELDA with Svobik's (2012) dataset on concentration of legislative power in authoritarianism. Relying on his data and the definition of Brownlee's (2009) electoral authoritarianism, countries are regarded as electoral authoritarian if multiple political actors including both partisan and non-partisan opposition groups are competing in a legislative election. Svobik's data enable us to avoid the problem of nonpartisan competition because Svobik's data identify electoral competition in which both *de jure* and *de facto* political parties participate. However, the datasets coverage is far less

extensive and has many missing values. Therefore, I use both definitions and datasets to empirically specify electoral authoritarian countries.⁴⁰

3.4.2 Dependent Variable: Effective Electoral Threshold

For the main dependent variable, electoral system types, I use the Effective Electoral Threshold (EET) measure originally proposed by Lijphart (1994, 2011) and Taagepera (1998, 2007). The EET measures “the proportion of votes that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary representation to any party with a probability of at least 50 percent” (Boix 1999: 614). It is well known that the EET is measured by using the following formula:

$$EET = \frac{75\%}{(M + 1)}$$


where M represents average district magnitude in a country-year. When the EET is lower than the legal threshold that sometimes exists in PR systems, I use the legal threshold as an Effective Electoral Threshold in the country.⁴¹ Using various data sources including Nohlen eds. (1999, 2001, 2005, 2010), Phil Keefer’s *Database of Political Institutions* (DPI), the Inter-Parliamentary Union website, Bormann and Golder (2013), Carey and Hix (2011) and other relevant Internet sources, I collect data on

⁴⁰ Both measures are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.62.

⁴¹ Even when I do not recode the EET variable in this way, basic results that I show below do not change.

district size and legal threshold for all countries in the world between 1945-2010. To measure electoral system types, the effective electoral threshold variable is adopted by Boix (1999), a path-breaking work on the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies.⁴² Subsequent studies follow this tradition and rely on this measure to explore various explanatory factors explaining the choice of electoral systems (Cusack, Iversen and Soskice 2007; Chang et al. 2010).

Figure 3.2: Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes




Note: Effective Electoral Threshold (EET) is measured by $EET = \frac{75\%}{(M+1)}$ (Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 1998) where M stands for average district magnitude. The EET measures “the proportion of votes that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary representation to any party with a probability of at least 50 percent” (Boix 1999, 614). If the legal threshold under PR systems is lower than the EET, then I use the legal threshold to fill the EET. Figure 2-(a) shows the level of average EET over time. Figure 2-(b) shows within-country time series change in the EET by taking average of the first difference. The vertical dashed lines stand for standard deviations.

Source: Author’s data

⁴² Dichotomous variables of electoral system types (e.g., for example, SMD and PR dummies) may be also available, yet as Boix (1999: 614) suggested, such measures are often too rough to capture significant differences within both systems as well as the legal threshold often adopted under PR systems.

Figure 3-3: Regional Variations in the Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral Authoritarianism



Note: Western Europe and North America are not in the sample because during the period (1945-2010), there are no electoral authoritarian regimes in the regions. Source: Authors' Data

In Figures 3.2 and 3.3, I show time-series variations (both level and change) as well as regional variations in Effective Electoral Threshold in electoral authoritarianism.⁴³ As you can see, the value of the EET has been declining over time. In addition, there are wide variations in the EET across time and space.

3.4.3 Key Independent Variable: Natural Resource Wealth

In order to operationalize the main independent variable—mobilization power of the dictator—I use two measures of natural resource wealth. First, I use Haber and Menaldo's (2011) total resource income per capita. This variable includes natural resources that can produce rents captured by governments such as oil, gas, coal, and metal productions. Second, focusing on major natural resources—oil and gas, Ross

⁴³ I also show descriptive statistics of all the variables I use in analysis in Appendix C3.

(2012) creates a variable of oil-gas value per capita, which is calculated multiplying a country's total oil-gas production by the current oil-gas price and then divided by total population (Ross 2012). Both measures are very highly correlated ($r = 0.98$).

These two variables of natural resource wealth are good proxies to measure dictators' mobilization power from a theoretical and methodological point of view, especially for this study. First, the idea that natural resource wealth strengthens dictators' distribution capability and thus makes their regimes resilient to breakdown is a well-established empirical finding in the study of authoritarian durability (Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013).⁴⁴ Since natural resource wealth, particularly non-lootable natural resources such as oil and gas, has been mostly dominated by state or state-owned companies (Morrison 2009; Andersen and Ross 2014), it contributes to magnifying the dictator's ability to use patronage distribution in deriving political support from constituencies.

Second, natural resource wealth is also a good indicator in a methodological sense because it is reasonable to think that the natural resources variable is mostly exogenously determined by the international market and regional potential of natural resource wealth, independent of electoral system types. The nature of oil-gas value per capita allows me to avoid endogeneity problems between government spending and electoral system choice. In fact, several studies suggest that PR systems tend to have

⁴⁴ Haber and Menaldo (2011) argue that natural resource wealth does not have a negative impact on democratization. Although natural resources may not necessarily discourage a country to democratize, there is still rich evidence that natural resources allow dictators to survive longer and prevent a country from experiencing authoritarian breakdown (Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz and Geddes 2013).

higher tax rates and larger redistribution effects in democracies (Austin-Smith 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2004; Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2006), so possibilities of reverse causalities should be taken seriously. Therefore, more direct measures such as general fiscal revenues and government expenditure are very hard to handle in observational data. In this respect, natural resource wealth, although it consists only a part (albeit a significant part) of revenue sources, is a good proxy to estimate the effect of fiscal strength on the choice of electoral system, while mitigating the possibilities of reverse causality.

3.4.4 Statistical Method

The unit of analysis is country-year. There are several reasons why I use country-year data structure rather than country-election year. First, my data collection suggests that some electoral system reforms are implemented during non-election years (for example, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Russia). Thus, country-election year data makes the analysis less accurate in the sense of capturing the timing of electoral system change. Second, the country-year data format enables me to control for country-fixed effects by expanding the time-series dimension. Since it is not hard to imagine that some electoral system changes are possibly driven by unobserved country-specific effects that are not captured by natural resource wealth and other standard controls, the country-year data structure has an advantage in this respect.

In all models, I add a lagged dependent variable to control for time dependence, or path-dependent characteristics of electoral systems (Cox 1998). To deal with time-specific effects, I include half-decade dummies. There are two methods to test the

hypothesis. First, I employ fixed-effect models to explain within-country variation in the EET while controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Yet, the number of countries (N) is still larger than the time-series (T) ($N = 95$, $T = 65$), suggesting that the Nickel bias might be a serious problem if I include a lagged dependent variable in fixed effect models. In addition, previous studies point out that colonial origins (e.g., British, French and Spanish colonies) are crucial in determining electoral system choice in developing countries (Blais and Massicote 1997) but fixed-effects models do not allow me to directly take into account the effect of such relevant time-invariant variables. Therefore, I also estimate system GMM models (Arelano and Bover 1995; Roodman 2007) in which I can include time invariant variables such as colonial heritage and regional dummies while dealing with several shortcomings of the data, such as the short time span in the sample, fixed individual effects, potential heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation within countries (Roodman 2007).

I expect the natural resource wealth variables to be negatively correlated with the Effective Electoral Threshold, meaning that dictators with rich financial resources are more likely to adopt PR systems. Following Boix (1999), I add logged total population (one-year lagged; World Development Indicators), logged territorial size (World Development Indicators), trade openness (one-year lagged sum of exports and imports relative to GDP; Rogowski 1987; Penn World Table 7.1.), and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (Roeder 2002) as standard controls.

3.4.5 Results

Table 3.1: Determinants of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarianism

	Model 1 (FE)	Model 2 (FE)	Model 3 (FE)	Model 4 (GMM)	Model 5 (GMM)
DV	EET	EET	EET	EET	EET
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)
lagged EET	0.903*** (0.03)	0.881*** (0.03)	0.889*** (0.03)	0.957*** (0.04)	0.972*** (0.03)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars)	-0.011*** (0.0030)	-0.032** (0.0146)	-0.025** (0.0121)	-0.000182** (0.0001)	-0.000147** (0.0001)
Logged Population		0.6630 (0.9680)	0.6060 (0.8920)	0.0428 (0.1320)	(0.0183) (0.1140)
Lagged Trade Openness		0.000 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Logged Land		-44.38** (17.540)	-34.12** (15.010)	-0.1060 (0.107)	-0.0622 (0.089)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		0.0630 (3.587)	0.3220 (3.484)	-0.0055 (0.568)	-0.0359 (0.489)
British Colony				0.3440 (0.692)	0.1000 (0.588)
French Colony				(0.23) (0.383)	-0.41 (0.342)
Spanish Colony				0.091 (0.322)	0.054 (0.272)
Constant	1.91*** (0.65)	529.5** (213.20)	406.64** (181.55)	1.57 (1.33)	2.16 (1.34)
F Value	190.00***	161.89***	210.68***	32154.67***	52740.81***
Wald Chi^2					
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No
Regional Dummies	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Half-Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	95	88	88	88	88
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.16	0.17
Hansen Test	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.48	0.21
Observations	1,557	1,378	1,528	1,378	1,528

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 3.1 displays the results. Two measures of natural resource wealth are both consistently, negatively associated with the EET in all models in statistically significant ways (at the .05 and .01 levels). The results suggest that strong dictators with abundant natural resources are more likely to adopt PR systems by lowering the Effective Electoral Threshold. For example, Model 4 indicates that a 100 dollars increase in

natural resource income per capita lowers the Effective Electoral Threshold by 0.02. Given the fact that average change in the Effective Electoral Threshold ranges between -0.46 and 0.24 with 1 to 4 standard deviations (Figure 3.2-[b]) and the mean of natural resource wealth is 708 USD with standard deviations of 3,563 USD, the impact of natural resource wealth is considerably large. These results provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis—authoritarian rulers with the power of mobilization are more likely to adopt proportional representation systems.

3.4.6 Robustness Check

I run additional models to check the robustness of the main results.⁴⁵ First, one may think that authoritarian leaders feel more free to choose PR systems over SMD when they severely limit political competition prior to elections because limited party competition undermines the “tying-the-dictator’s-hands” character of PR systems. To deal with this possibility, I add Polity IV index (one-year lagged) as a control; controlling for political competition did not change the main results. Second, I adopt clustered standard errors by region for fixed effects models to consider the likely possibilities that measurement errors are correlated within regions. Clustering by region does not affect the results I obtained above. Third, I use an alternative measure of the Effective Electoral Threshold, in which I do not adjust its score by the legal threshold that is often adopted in PR systems, and the main findings are stable. Finally, according to Ross and Andersen (2014: 4), “[u]ntil the 1960s, most of the rents generated by oil production in non-Western countries were captured by a handful of large, vertically-integrated

⁴⁵ For details on the results, see Appendix C3.

international oil companies—sometimes called ‘the Seven Sisters.’ But in the 1970s, the industry was transformed by a wave of nationalizations and contract revisions that enabled the governments of host countries to seize control of these rents.” In order to take into account the history of natural resource rents as a “resource curse,” I limit the sample to the period of 1970-2007 and run system GMM models,⁴⁶ but natural resource endowments remain strongly, negatively correlated with the Effective Electoral Threshold.

3.5 Testing Causal Mechanisms

The above analysis found the likelihood that electoral autocrats with resource abundance tend to adopt PR systems. To evidence causal mechanisms and several assumptions made in theory, I conduct additional cross-national analyses. I first test whether natural resource wealth does contribute to mobilizing regime supporters in legislative elections under electoral authoritarian regimes, thereby showing that natural resource wealth is a good proxy to measure dictators’ ability to collect political support. To do so, I estimate the impact of natural resources on the dictator’s electoral performance. I then explore whether and to what extent SMD systems bring the pro-regime bias. Lastly, I show cross-national evidence suggesting that PR systems exacerbate coordination problems within the opposition camp by reducing the likelihood of building a pre-electoral coalition among opposition parties.

⁴⁶ As I discussed above, fixed effects models with short time span and a lagged dependent variable induce the Nickel bias. Since I limit the sample to 1970-2007 with 88-95 countries, it would be better to employ system GMM models for estimation.

As the unit of analysis, I use country-election year. In country-election year data, I focus on parliamentary elections, which electoral systems vary significantly across electoral authoritarian regimes. Since the time-series (election-year; it is 4.2 on average) is far shorter than the number of countries (65 to 75 countries) in country-election year data, estimation results may be biased if fixed effect models are used with the lagged dependent variable. In addition, since the timing when elections are held is also very different across countries, I am unable to use other methods of standard panel data analysis such as random effects and system GMM models. Therefore, I pool the data, following previous studies on electoral fraud with country-election year data (Kelley 2009). To control for regional specific effects, I add regional dummies. To deal with serial correlation and time-specific effects, I add a one-election year lagged dependent variable and half decade dummies from 1955-2010. Robust standard errors are computed to cope with heteroskedasticity. To conduct data analysis, I originally collect data such as vote and seat shares of ruling and opposition parties, proportion of independent politicians in parliament, and assembly size using various data sources such as Nohlen eds. (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2005a, 2005b, 2010), Database of Political Institutions, Arthur Bank's *Political handbook of the World* (1993-2008, various volumes), the Inter-Parliamentary Union website, African Election Database, and other area studies papers and Internet sources.

3.5.1 Natural Resource Wealth and Authoritarian Regime Support

To test whether natural resource wealth contributes to boosting regime support at elections, I use two dependent variables. The first measure is total percentage of votes

cast for ruling parties. This is a straightforward measure because I can directly estimate what determines ruling party's popularity at the ballot box. Yet, authoritarian leaders may care more about to what extent they win big relative to opposition parties (Simpser 2013). Thus, I use the second measure, margins of victory, measured as the gap in percentages of vote shares between ruling parties and opposition parties.

Besides financial resources, to what extent authoritarian rulers can garner votes is determined by other covariates. To consider other relevant covariates, I introduce the following control variables. The stronger politicians who are not affiliated with political parties, the fewer votes ruling parties can gain at elections. To measure independents' strength, I include *Vote Shares of Independent Politicians* in the previous elections. If there are many ethnic groups in society, it may be more difficult for ruling parties to garner political support. *Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization* constructed by Roeder (2002) is included.

If opposition parties refuse to join elections, then ruling parties can win elections more easily with a large margin. A dummy variable of whether some opposition leaders boycott the election (*Opposition's Boycott*) is introduced by using Hyde and Marinov's (2012) NELDA dataset (NELDA 14). Intuitively, if dictators stuff the ballot box, ruling parties should be able to increase their vote shares and win the elections with a large margin. On the other hand, if electoral fraud is more often used by weak dictators, those who cannot mobilize regime supporters, such positive correlation may not be observed between the variables. A dummy variable of *Electoral Fraud* is taken from NELDA 11.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "Before elections, were there significant concerns that the elections would not be free and fair?"

Previous work claims that pre-electoral violence, which is mainly exercised by ruling parties against opposition candidates and supporters, is conducive to ruling party's electoral victory (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Similar to electoral fraud, if only weak dictators use election violence, its effect is not observed in the form of ruling party's vote share and margins of victory. I use the NELDA 33 to introduce a dummy variable of *Electoral Violence*.⁴⁸ If strong *Political Competition* is guaranteed, it is harder for ruling parties to win elections overwhelmingly. For this, Polity IV score (one-year lagged) is also included in models.

When a legislative election is held in parliamentary system, authoritarian leaders may spend more efforts to win the election than a legislative election in presidential system because election results directly decide who holds power. A dummy variable of *Executive-Legislative Relations* (0: presidentialism/semi-presidentialism; 1: parliamentarism) is introduced.

If the modernization theory is correct, ruling parties in rich countries find it difficult to collect votes because people become less dependent on government in terms of economic well-being. Logged GDP per capita (one-year lagged) is taken from Penn World Table 7.1 to control for the level of *Economic Development*. Better economic performance should make dictators and their parties popular among citizens, leading to better electoral performance. GDP growth (one-year lagged) is measured to take into account *Economic Growth* by using World Development Indicators.

⁴⁸ "Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during and after the election?" (NELDA 33)

Table 3.2: Dictators' Performance at the Ballot Box

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
DV: Ruling Party's Electoral Performance	Share of Votes (%)	Margin of Victory (%)	Share of Votes (%)	Margin of Victory (%)	Share of Votes (%)	Margin of Victory (%)
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)	Ross (2012)
DV in Previous Elections	0.460*** (0.06)	0.410*** (0.07)	0.339*** (0.08)	0.309*** (0.07)	0.343*** (0.08)	0.309*** (0.07)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth	0.005*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.007** (0.004)
Vote Share of Independents (Previous Elections)			-0.243** (0.12)	-0.429*** (0.13)	-0.284** (0.11)	-0.454*** (0.12)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization			1.365 (4.55)	0.821 (8.82)	2.376 (4.31)	3.104 (8.51)
Opposition Boycott			5.780* (2.97)	15.66*** (5.13)	5.190* (3.02)	14.93*** (5.32)
Electoral Fraud			-1.73 (2.03)	-6.393* (3.83)	-1.428 (1.96)	-5.577 (3.74)
Election Violence			-8.645*** (2.75)	-14.61*** (4.88)	-7.524*** (2.73)	-12.79*** (4.92)
Lagged Polity IV			-0.321 (0.22)	-0.727* (0.39)	-0.284 (0.21)	-0.698* (0.38)
Parliamentarism			3.79 (2.37)	4.73 (4.21)	2.74 (2.33)	3.09 (4.18)
Lagged GDP per capita (logged)			-1.721 (1.38)	-3.591 (2.64)	-0.795 (1.25)	-1.439 (2.43)
Lagged GDP Growth			0.511** (0.21)	1.183*** (0.40)	0.547*** (0.20)	1.261*** (0.39)
Constant	39.68*** (7.43)	27.23** (12.26)	63.86*** (13.22)	63.36*** (23.94)	59.02*** (12.21)	53.19** (22.40)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half-decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	75	75	65	65	67	67
Observations	291	285	246	244	255	253
R-squared	0.348	0.261	0.442	0.415	0.447	0.408
F value	9.90***	6.24***	8.39***	8.06***	8.45***	7.46***

Note: Pooled OLS regressions are employed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The margin of victory is measured by the gap between ruling parties' and opposition parties' vote shares. The unit of analysis is country-election year.

Table 3.2 presents the statistical results. In Models 6 and 7, I test the impact of natural resource wealth on regime support without control variables. The natural resources variable has positive impacts both on vote shares and margins of victory and

the effects are statistically significant at the .01 level. In Models 8 through 11 where I include the controls with two different measures for natural resource wealth, the effects remain positive and statistically significant (at the .05 and .10 levels). Substantively, a 100 dollars increase in natural resources income per capita tends to increase ruling parties' share of votes by 0.4 percent and their margin of victory by 0.7 percent (based on Models 8 and 9). The results suggest that natural resource wealth is positively associated with popular support for the dictators. These findings support my idea that natural resource wealth is a good surrogate to measure dictators' mobilization power at the ballot box.

Looking at the control variables, economic growth, opposition boycott, and vote share of independents in the previous election all show expected effects in statistically significant ways. Meanwhile, the lagged Polity IV score has a negative, statistically significant impact only on the margin of victory. And contrary to theoretical expectations, election violence is negatively correlated with both ruling party's vote shares and the margin of victory. This may indicate an endogeneity problem between election violence and regime strength: weak dictators, those who are not popular among constituents, may be more inclined to resort to election violence. As NELDA 33 does not distinguish pre- and post-election violence, this is a plausible possibility. Yet, even if I exclude the variable of election violence, the overall results do not change and natural resource wealth is still positively associated with the dependent variables.

3.5.2 Electoral Systems and the Pro-Dictator Bias

In a second empirical analysis, I investigate whether and to what extent SMD systems bring the seat premiums only to ruling parties. In order to offer evidence of the pro-dictator bias, I use the following three dependent variables:

(i) *Disproportionality Index*. I compute a conventional disproportionality index, which is widely used in the previous literature. Disproportionality is measured by $\sqrt{\frac{\sum (Seats_{it} - Votes_{it})^2}{2}}$ in which both ruling and opposition parties are included to compute disproportionality.⁴⁹ Employing the disproportionality index, I can test whether SMD systems bring the larger number of seats with higher seats-votes elasticity *regardless of whether parties are governing parties or not*.

(ii) *Seats-Votes Gap of Opposition Parties*. The second dependent variable is seats-votes gap of opposition parties. The Effective Electoral Threshold should not have a positive effect on the seat premiums to opposition parties because, however large opposition parties might be, SMD systems bring the seat premium only to ruling parties.

(iii) *Seats-Votes Gap of Ruling Parties*. Third, I use seats-votes gap of ruling parties. In contrast with the above-stated two dependent variables, SMD is more likely to bring the seat bias in favor of ruling parties.

⁴⁹ Disproportionality is calculated by using seats-votes gaps in the ruling party and opposition camps, without disaggregating them into each party's seats-votes gap.

For control variables, my models are largely based on Lijphart (1994), who introduces variables affecting disproportionality in advanced democracies besides my variable of interest, The Effective Electoral Threshold — *logged assembly size* (the natural logarithm of total number of seats in the lower house) and *government form* (presidentialism/semi-presidentialism vs parliamentarism). In addition to these, I also control for vote shares of independents in the previous elections to partial out the impact of independent politicians' strength.

Table 3.3: The Pro-Dictator Bias under Majoritarian Electoral Systems

DV	Model 12 Disproportionality	Model 13 Seats-Votes Gap of Opposition Parties (%)	Model 14 Seats-Votes Gap of Ruling Parties (%)	Model 15 Seats-Votes Gap of Ruling Parties (%)
DV in Previous Elections	0.311*** (0.08)	0.307*** (0.08)	0.223** (0.09)	0.188** (0.08)
Effective Electoral Threshold (EET)	0.092 (0.06)	-0.079 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	-0.417** (0.17)
Vote Share of Ruling Parties				-0.232*** (0.05)
EET* Ruling Parties Vote Share				0.008*** (0.003)
Vote Share of Independents (Previous Elections)	-0.016 (0.05)	0.0409 (0.05)	-0.038 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.04)
Logged Assembly Size	-1.41 (1.02)	0.316 (1.01)	-0.16 (0.93)	-0.807 (0.90)
Parliamentarism	-0.662 (1.72)	-1.106 (1.38)	0.15 (1.44)	-0.464 (1.42)
Constant	19.39** (8.86)	-7.58 (8.92)	9.75 (7.89)	28.4 (8.44)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half-decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	72	72	72	72
Observations	264	264	264	264
R-squared	0.2587	0.282	0.273	0.322
F value	4.54***	4.93***	5.22***	5.41***


Note: Pooled OLS regressions are employed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Disproportionality is measured by $\sqrt{\frac{\sum (Seats_{it} - Votes_{it})^2}{2}}$ in which both ruling and opposition parties are included to compute disproportionality. The unit of analysis is country-election year.

Table 3.3 shows the results. First, Model 12 tests whether SMD systems tend to be associated with higher disproportionality in 72 electoral authoritarian regimes. Although the direction of the coefficient is positive, the EET variable does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value = 0.129). Given that in advanced

democracies, majoritarian electoral systems are the most powerful predictor of high disproportionality (Lijphart 1994; Moser and Scheiner 2012), the result suggests that electoral systems in electoral authoritarianism do not necessarily lead to high disproportionality to both ruling and opposition parties. Model 13 investigates the same proposition from a different angle by setting the seats-votes gap of opposition parties as a dependent variable. Again, the effect of the Effective Electoral Threshold is not statistically significant ($p\text{-value} = 0.149$) and the coefficient is negative, suggesting that majoritarian electoral systems may tend to underrepresent opposition parties in parliament although the impact is not distinguishable from zero.

In the following two models, I test whether SMD systems bring the larger seat premiums exclusively to ruling parties. In Model 14, the Effective Electoral Threshold is positively correlated with the seats-votes gap on the side of ruling parties at the .10 significance level. For example, when the Effective Electoral Threshold is 37.5 percent (SMD), then ruling parties are more likely to obtain 3.33 percent more seats, when compared to the scenario where dictators adopt a PR system and the Effective Electoral Threshold is just 5 percent. This result supports my theoretical expectation that the pro-dictator bias comes about under SMD systems in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Figure 3.4: The Magnitude of the Pro-Dictator Bias Conditional upon Regime Strength (Vote Shares of Ruling Parties)



Model 15 estimates an interaction model to show how the effect of the Effective Electoral Threshold on ruling parties' seats-votes elasticity changes depending on vote shares that ruling parties enjoy at the elections. This is an important investigation into trying to know the existence of a trade-off between certainty and credibility of election results, which I focus on for my theory of electoral system choice in dictatorship: If strong dictators with high vote shares enjoy larger seat premiums under SMD systems, then the signaling function of election results may be complicated because of the stronger pro-dictator bias. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level, suggesting a positive feedback character of the pro-dictator bias: the seat premiums become larger if ruling parties are able to mobilize a large number of

supporters at elections. For instance, if a dictator adopts a SMD system (EET=37.5 percent) and the ruling parties obtain 65 percent of total votes in elections, then the ruling parties receive 3.7 percent more seats compared to the scenario when she adopts a PR system with the 5 percent EET and the same 65 percent vote. In contrast, when ruling parties get more vote shares, say, 85 percent of total votes, SMD provides 8.45 percent more seats than a PR system with the 5 percent of EET. This result suggests a possibility that strong dictators, who can mobilize a large number of regime supporters, may not need to adopt a majoritarian electoral system. Rather, they may even have an incentive to shift an electoral system more to a PR to show their strength because their vote shares are sufficient to secure an overwhelming majority and the large seat premium under SMD systems may obscure *de facto* regime strength.

Figure 3.4 also provides additional evidence that SMD systems do not necessarily backfire on weak ruling parties. The coefficient of the EET does turn negative if the ruling parties' vote share is less than about 50 percent, yet the effect is not distinguishable from 0 at .05 level. The negative impact becomes statistically significant when ruling party's vote share is less than 25 percent, which is, however, rare in electoral authoritarian countries (less than the 5th percentile in the sample).⁵⁰ The overall results again support the theoretical assumption posited in my theory: Contrary to Rokkan's (1970) and Boix's (1999) theoretical expectations, SMD systems do not necessarily backfire on authoritarian rulers with high disproportionality in electoral authoritarianism. The evidence here suggests that this is because opposition parties are

⁵⁰ Such countries are Ecuador (2002), Peru (1990), East Germany (1990), Albania (1992), Cyprus (1970), Russia (1995), Belarus (2000, 2004, 2008), Liberia (2005), Kenya (1992), Iraq (2010), South Korea (1950), and Pakistan (1985).

very weak and even if ruling parties are not capable of maintaining 50 percent of total votes, authoritarian rulers can contain opposition surges in elections by engaging in gerrymandering and other indirect manipulation techniques (Ahmed 2013).

3.5.3 PR Systems Inhibit Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions

Lastly, I investigate whether PR systems prevent opposition parties from uniting to challenge the authoritarian ruler. Here, the dependent variable is whether a pre-electoral opposition coalition is formed. I use Gandhi and Reuter's (2013, 143) measure of opposition coalition making, which is a dichotomous variable coded 1 "if there was a significant pre-electoral coalition among opposition parties, and 0 otherwise." And, the main independent variable is the Effective Electoral Threshold.


For model specifications, I follow Gandhi and Reuter (2013), the most comprehensive analysis on pre-electoral coalition making in non-democracies. Although their sample is all non-democracies (1946-2006), my sample is limited only to electoral authoritarian regimes. Based on Gandhi and Reuter's (2013) models, I include *Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization*, *number of opposition parties*, *parliamentarism*, *age of the largest opposition parties*, *economic growth (one year lagged)*, *logged total population (one year lagged)*, *election violence*, *ruling party's share of seats in the previous elections*, *natural resource wealth (one year lagged)*, and five regional dummies.

Table 3.4: Electoral Systems and Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

	Model 16	Model 17
DV	Pre-Electoral Coalition	Pre-Electoral Coalition
Effective Electoral Threshold	0.0521*** (0.019)	0.0512** (0.022)
Natural Resource Wealth (one year lagged, 100 dollars)	-0.00114* (0.001)	-0.00155 (0.001)
Age of Largest Opposition Party	0.276*** (0.076)	0.304*** (0.092)
Number of Opposition Parties	0.147*** (0.047)	0.117* (0.060)
Ruling Party's Seat Share in the Previous Election	0.0063 (0.009)	0.0292* (0.015)
Parliamentarism	-0.65 (0.647)	-1.221 (0.953)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	3.634*** (1.237)	4.310** (2.029)
Economic Growth (one year lagged)	0.0122 (0.036)	-0.00536 (0.048)
Logged Total Population (one year lagged)	-0.216 (0.162)	-0.0867 (0.258)
Electoral Violence	-0.233 (0.509)	0.487 (0.615)
Lagged Dependent Variable		2.270*** (0.622)
Constant	-2.377 (2.697)	-6.990 (4.715)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	71	55
Observations	225	167
Log pseudolikelihood	-82.84	-53.97
Wald Chi Squared	34.88***	44.94***

Note: Pooled logistic regression is employed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Figure 3-5: Effect of Electoral Systems on Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions



Note: Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. The graph is based on Model 16.

Table 3.4 shows the results. As expected, the Effective Electoral Threshold is positively correlated with the probability of pre-electoral opposition coalition making in both models, suggesting that in PR systems opposition parties are less likely to form coalitions before elections. Figure 3.5 graphically illustrates this result based on Model 16. When Effective Electoral Threshold is 5 percent, the probability of opposition coalition making is just 4.4 percent. When a country adopts a SMD system (EET is equal to 37.5 percent), the probability of coalition increases up to 20.2 percent. This suggests that electoral systems are also important to explain opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes.

On the other hand, consistent with Gandhi and Reuter (2013), the number of opposition groups and the longevity of the largest opposition party both have positive correlations in statistically significant ways in my electoral authoritarianism sample. Natural resource wealth is negatively correlated with opposition coalition in one model, implying that a dictator's financial resources itself tends to inhibit the opposition's coordination at elections, yet the impact is uncertain in the other model. Lastly and counterintuitively, ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a positive correlation with the dependent variable.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the logic of electoral system choice in electoral autocracies. In electoral authoritarian regimes where opposition parties are very weak, dictators and their parties have a seat bias under SMD systems, which help them obtain an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Such a pro-dictator bias, however, obscures an important function of authoritarian elections: Conveying a credible signal of regime strength via elections. On the flip side, strong dictators, who are capable of mobilizing regime supporters, have the incentive to shift electoral systems from SMD to PR because PR systems provide less advantageous institutional settings for dictators, through which they can use election results as a device to send a costly signal by winning overwhelmingly. Using original datasets of electoral authoritarianism, cross-national analyses render strong empirical evidence endorsing my theoretical expectations: (1) Natural resource endowments are negatively correlated with the Effective Electoral

Threshold; (2) natural resource wealth, a good proxy to measure dictators' power of distribution, contributes to increasing regime support; (3) SMD systems tend to bring the larger seat premiums only to ruling parties; and (4) SMD systems tend to promote a pre-electoral opposition coalition.

The analyses presented in this chapter suggest policy implications and further research agendas on authoritarian politics. First, this research shows that authoritarian leaders may strategically choose electoral systems depending on their strengths. By so doing, they attempt to take advantage of electoral institutions in their favor. Without closely investigating the dictator's financial conditions and distribution power in an authoritarian country, the international community may not be able to implement effective measures to reform electoral systems, thereby pushing the country to achieve further democratization.

Second, the present study proposes a further need to research indirect manipulation techniques like electoral system change, gerrymandering and malapportionment as a useful set of tools in the dictator's toolkit. Because direct, blatant electoral fraud often hurts authoritarian leaders by sparking popular protests and other dissents (Tucker 2007; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013), indirect election maneuvering becomes a more secure strategy for authoritarian rulers. One possible research agenda may be to explore relationships between direct and indirect manipulation techniques by systematically theorizing when authoritarian rulers are tempted to use blatant measures over indirect ones and vice versa.

Third, the theory proposed here makes another prediction on an economic consequence of electoral systems in authoritarian regimes: as dictators need to mobilize a large number of regime supporters, they should adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to maintain electoral dominance under PR systems. Studying the various aspects of economic outcomes under different authoritarian electoral systems would be another promising research topic.

Finally, this chapter also suggests the possibility that natural resources may be significantly affecting institutional designs in authoritarian regimes. Scholars of authoritarian political institutions have examined how political institutions change the prospect of the dictator's survival. However, as Pepinsky (2014) points out, every political institution in an authoritarian regime should be endogenous to power relations and the distribution of economic resources in the country. If natural resource wealth influences the origins of political institutions in dictatorships, then we will have to elaborate on an endogenous theory of authoritarian politics, which enables us to take into account both causes and consequences of political institutions in dictatorships, and test the theory with a well-planned research design.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL MANIPULATION OR FISCAL MANEUVERING?

The CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I presented a theory of authoritarian elections and tested its observable implications by conducting cross-national analyses of electoral fraud and electoral system choice in dictatorships. This chapter provides a case study of Kazakhstan to illustrate causal pathways postulated in the theory.

Kazakhstan experienced limited political liberalization a few years after its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The nascent democratization efforts in Kazakhstan were, however, completely reversed in 1995. Since then, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has successfully maintained his rule, and the country has been an electoral authoritarian regime. The intriguing puzzle here is that the Kazakh government has permitted opposition parties to attend elections even after the authoritarian turn in 1995. Interestingly, blatant electoral manipulation in the forms of election violence, ballot box tampering, and the manipulation of the electoral laws have become gradually less severe in the country. This stands in stark contrast with Kyrgyzstan, where electoral manipulation has been escalated under the Akaev regime, as I will discuss in Chapter 6. In addition, Nazarbaev decided to adopt a Proportional Representation (PR) system in 2007, which did not bring large seat premiums to his

party, at least compared to the previous Single-Member District (SMD) systems. *Why could Nazarbaev successfully consolidate his rule for more than twenty years, despite the fact that he became less dependent on political manipulation at the ballot box?*

In order to solve this puzzle, I conduct a case study of Kazakhstan. I use various materials including original quantitative data as well as secondary sources, newspapers, domestic publications including government documents, and semi-structured interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, NGO activists and local researchers conducted through my field work in the country in the summer of 2014.

The case study proceeds as follows. First, I briefly illustrate political processes through which the country experienced limited liberalization and turned into an electoral authoritarian regime by 1995. Then, I describe how Nazarbaev became less dependent on blatant electoral fraud by the late 2000s in comparison to the late 1990s. I also describe how the country changed its electoral system from SMD to PR during the same period, although the SMD system had brought significant seat premiums to ruling politicians. In the third section, I argue that these “electoral reforms” were possible because Nazarbaev was strong enough to mobilize large-scale voluntary support from citizens: He increased his ability to distribute economic favors to at least some portions of citizens by utilizing rich natural resource wealth and extensive organizational networks of the government as well as the dominant party Nur Otan. On the other hand, opposition parties, especially since the middle of the 2000s, have become too weak to be a real option for voters at the ballot box. The fourth section provides systematic quantitative evidence of political business cycles in Kazakhstan, demonstrating that pre-electoral economic distribution as manifestation of the president’s mobilization power

tended to be larger in the second half of the 2000s, when the government was able to enjoy the rich state resources and strong ruling parties. Lastly, I conclude by summarizing main arguments and findings in this chapter.

4.2 Limited Liberalization

It was December 16, 1991 when Kazakhstan declared its independence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and national independence prompted the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, to implement political and economic reforms. President Nazarbaev took measures to encourage political liberalization. He stated in a newspaper interview in October 1991 “I see Kazakhstan as a democratic, presidential republic, with a professional parliament, elected on a multiparty basis, and with strong executive power in the centre and in the region”(Cummings 2005, 24).

The First Constitution of Kazakhstan that was adopted on January 28, 1993 was indeed more liberal than those of other Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Although it gave the president decisive control over the local governments (Olcott 1995, 276; Olcott 2002, 96-101), it did formally divide the government into three branches: the executive, represented by the large presidential staff; the legislative, represented by the unicameral Kazakh Supreme Council, whose representatives were elected on a territorial basis; and the judiciary. Furthermore, the Supreme Council “enjoyed a wide range of formal rights including the right to approve the budget, amend the constitution and elect the constitutional court” (Anderson 1997, 307). Under the First Constitution, by utilizing the power of the parliamentary

institution, legislators had the ability to challenge the president over the issue on privatization.

Second, Nazarbaev allowed the formation of new political parties and organizations. For example, Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, Kazakhstan's largest noncommunist public organization during the glasnost era, transformed itself into an opposition party called the National Congress (NC) in October 1991. The new party was headed by a Kazakh writer and political activist, Olzhas Suleimenov (RFE/RL Research Report, January 3, 1992). NC received much financial support from big sponsors and private businesses, which provided the party with an independent power base to challenge the president (Issacs 2011, 58). Moreover, the Socialist Party (SP) was founded in August 1991 as the successor to the Kazakhstan Communist Party (KCP), which was previously dissolved by Nazarbaev. After dissolving KCP, Nazarbaev quickly lost control of the successive party (Olcott 2002: 93) because SP consisted of many deputies in the Supreme Soviet anxious about radical economic reforms (see, e.g. Issacs 2011: 57). Given its powerful organizational base and its large membership, SP emerged as the strongest oppositional group at that time. With SP having turned into opposition, Nazarbaev himself formed a pro-presidential party, the Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK) -- the precursor of the current dominant party Nur Otan -- and included ruling elites that would later play important roles in sustaining the authoritarian rule in Kazakhstan (Issacs 2011, 57).

Third, various kinds of social movements were active before and after independence.⁵¹ For instance, the aforementioned Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement was formed in 1989 in an attempt to halt Soviet nuclear testing in the Northeastern region of Semipalatinsk (Uyama 2003, 49). This organization had encouraged more than a million people to sign petitions demanding to ban nuclear tests in Kazakhstan's territory, and as a result huge crowds participated in this group's rallies (Olcott 2002, 90). Moreover, the Kazakh nationalist group (and also party) Alash was also established with a slogan "Islam, Turkism, Democracy", and a political agenda supporting the exclusion of Russians from Kazakhstan. Besides Alash, there were three other Kazakh ethnic groups, namely, the movement Azat, the party Zeltoksan, and the Republican Party of Kazakhstan (RPK), which had a popular support base divided between Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan, and Zhambul oblasts (Jones Luong 2002, 144). In addition, at least six pro-Russian groups with nationalist and federative agendas were formed: Edinstvo, Civic Contact, Democratic Progress, Russkaia Obshina, Russian Center, and Lad. Their main goal was the protection of Russian culture. Russkaia Obshina and Lad, especially, carried out active campaigns for bilingualism and dual citizenship, receiving the bulk of their popular support from the North Kazakhstan oblast and East Kazakhstan oblast, respectively (Jones Luong 2002, 144). Lastly, minority ethnic groups such as Koreans and Germans established cultural centers during Gorbachev's Perestroika era and were quite active and in constant communication with the governments of their external national homelands (Oka 2003, 473).

⁵¹ For more detailed discussion on the social movements in Kazakhstan, see Zhovtis (1999), and Uyama (2003).

Finally, by 1994, Kazakhstan developed relatively free and vigorous media that provided the legislators with opportunities of conveying their opinions to the wider public. Although the two largest official newspapers, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* and *Vesti Kazakhstana*, supported the government's positions, they also reported the speeches of opposition parliamentarians (Olcott 2002, 104). The other major independent newspapers were fully reporting opposition's political campaigns. The largest and most popular of these was *Karavan*, which would engage in reporting scandals. The other major independent newspaper, *Panorama*, would cover parliamentary maneuvering as well as social and economic issues (Olcott 2002, 104). Furthermore, Kazakhstan had a few independent radio stations and one large independent television company, KTK, which would freely broadcast these issues as well.

By 1993, Kazakhstan came to be perceived in the West as one of the more democratic states in Central Asia due to the presence of substantial political competition, relatively free press, and its commitment to rapid privatization (RFE/RL Research Report, January 7, 1994). However, radical marketization policies introduced by Nazarbaev provoked a confrontation between the President and the Parliament which led to the backsliding of the nascent Kazakh democracy.

Confronted with increasing legislative resistance, the government encouraged city, raion (region), and oblast (state) soviets to dissolve themselves in November 1993. Then, Nazarbaev ordered the Supreme Council to "voluntarily" dissolve itself in December, calling for elections to the new legislature in March 1994.

Nevertheless, at the time of the 1994 parliamentary election, the opposition movements in Kazakhstan were still vigorous. Facing strong opposition during the

election campaigns, Nazarbaev resorted to various undemocratic measures to preserve his hegemony. For example, the new parliament had only 177 seats (the Supreme Soviet had 270 seats; Olcott 1995, 263), of which 42 were to be filled from a “state list” by which the president selected legislators. Moreover, electoral districts were drawn in a fashion to guarantee Kazakh pluralities wherever possible (Olcott 1995, 278). Nonetheless, the election results showed that opposition was still considerably strong; the distinct opposition parties, NC, SP, Lad, Azat and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), occupied 43 seats in total, which were roughly equal to the number of seats of the pro-presidential Union of People’s Party (SNEK).

Soon after the opening of the Majlis, an opposition bloc named Respublika was formed largely by members of Azat, Lad, SP, NC, as well as a few members from SNEK and from the state list. In all, the opposition group controlled at least 40 percent (69 seats) of the parliament and, by some estimates, a slim majority (90 seats, Bremmer and Welt 1996, 191). Directing its criticism toward the government, the members of Respublika opposed the government’s radical economic reforms.

The strength of the opposition was clear when members of Respublika passed a vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko, who was a champion of radical economic reforms, with a majority of 111 to 28 in May 1994 (Olcott 2002, 103). Since the Constitution did not provide for a vote of no-confidence, however, Nazarbaev declared that Tereshchenko would remain as prime minister until privatization was completed. This event drew more and more members into the Respublika camp, and led to the formation of an opposition bloc called Otan-Otechestvo, which called for Nazarbaev’s resignation (Olcott 2002, 103). By July 1994, the opposition succeeded in

overriding Nazarbaev's veto regarding two consumer protection bills. Finally, in mid-October, after a scandal over the financial improprieties of two ministers in the Tereshchenko cabinet, Nazarbaev was forced to accept the resignation of the prime minister and his government (Olcott 2002, 104).

4.3 Growing Dominance of Ruling Parties Since 1995

Since Nazarbaev established the Second Constitution in 1995, the government has been consolidating its authoritarian rule. This section will briefly describe Kazakhstan's processes to a stable electoral authoritarian regime, in which Nazarbaev has gradually dominated parliament and consolidated authoritarian rule.

On March 1995, Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, a journalist and a failed candidate in the 1994 election, claimed that the electoral districts had been disproportionately drawn, and therefore, legislators represented constituencies of vastly differing sizes. She also charged that the cross-out method of voting enabled the vote counters to accept a single ballot for one than one candidate if the voter had marked his ballot improperly. Indeed, in several districts more votes were recorded than the number of voters (Olcott 2002, 110; Cummings 2005, 26). Consequently, the Constitutional Court declared the whole 1994 parliamentary elections illegal and ordered the parliament to be dissolved.


Paradoxically, her appeal to the court provided Nazarbaev with an opening to redraft the Constitution and avoid presidential elections. While the parliament had been dissolved, he held two nationwide referenda to strengthen his rule. In April 1995, the first referendum was on Nazarbaev's terms in the office. At that time, 91.3 percent of

voters turned out, of whom 95.8 percent voiced their support for extending his presidential term until 2000 (Olcott 2002, 111). In a second referendum held at the end of August of the same year, Nazarbaev put to vote an entirely new Constitution, the result of which further bolstered the president's power.

The Second Constitution arguably expanded presidential power at the expense of the legislature and judiciary. First, the unicameral legislature was transformed into a bicameral system, composed of the Senate and the Majlis (the Lower House), and both of them would be in the hands of Nazarbaev and his inner circle. In the Senate, seven senators would directly be appointed by the president, and the rest by the oblast council that was controlled by Nazarbaev. The new Constitution also stipulated that Majlis would not be able to initiate legislation and would have to terminate parliamentary deliberation on a bill within a month, seriously undermining the legislative power. Second, the Constitutional Court was abolished and replaced with a Constitutional Council, where the president, the senate, and the assembly each would select two members to form a total of six members. All possibility for the Council to display independence was nullified by a simple tool, a presidential veto.⁵²

⁵² For more detailed description on the Second Constitution, for example, see Bremmer and Welt (1996: 193) and Cummings (2000).

Figure 4.1: Increasing Dominance of Regime Parties in Kazakhstan (1994-2007)



Sources: Olcott (2002) and *Inter-Parliamentary Union* (<http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>)

Since the Second Constitution was adopted, ruling parties would gradually dominate the parliament by occupying more seats all the way up to 2007 (See Figure 4.1).⁵³ When parliamentary elections finally took place on December 9, 1995, “candidates were

⁵³ In Figure 4.1, I show time-series change in seat shares, rather than vote shares of ruling and opposition parties. Detailed data on vote shares are not available for the 1994 and 1995 elections, so for the purpose of comparison between the elections, the data of seat shares are more useful. One may think that seat shares are easily manipulated by electoral systems. As I argue, this is also the case for Kazakhstan. Yet, even under SMD systems that bring seat premiums to ruling parties (Chapter 3; Pripstein Posusney 2002), ruling parties in Kazakhstan could not be sufficiently dominant in the late 1990s, suggesting that they were still much weaker than those in the 2000s.

arbitrarily banned; Russians were underrepresented on the candidate list; and Nazarbaev supporters dominated” (Bremmer and Welt 1996, 193). As a result, many opposition parties decided to boycott the election due to the accusations of electoral fraud (Bremmer and Welt 1996; Oka 2003, 474). The proportion of seats held by pro-presidential parties in the Lower House gradually rose. In the 1995 legislative elections, the People’s Unity Party (PNEK)⁵⁴ and the Democratic Party (DP) won 52 percent of all seats, which was more than two times higher than their seats in the 1994 election.

Between the 1995 and 1999 elections, ruling parties experienced some realignment. The Otan party was established to support Nazarbaev’s electoral campaigns in the 1999 presidential elections as a result of coalescing between pro-presidential parties like PNEK, DP, and others. Two other new pro-presidential parties, the Civil Party of Kazakhstan and the Agrarian Party were also created before the 1999 parliamentary elections. Yet, in the 1999 election, the ruling parties (Otan, Civil Party, and Agrarian Party) occupied only the same total of seats as in the post-1995 parliament (49 percent of all seats).

In 2003, Dariga Nazarbaeva, the president’s daughter, and her husband Rakhat Aliev launched a new pro-presidential party, Asar. After the Civil Party made a pre-electoral coalition called the Aist bloc with the Agrarian Party, three ruling parties joined prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections (Otan, Asar and the Aist bloc). Although the ruling parties suffered mutual competition within and between the parties in each electoral district, they dramatically increased their seats in the 2004 elections (75 percent).

⁵⁴ The previous name of this party is SNEK.

In September 2006, Otan merged with Asar. Three months later, the Civil Party and the Agrarian Party announced that they would also join the Otan party, leading to the foundation of the dominant party, Nur Otan. At the same time, Nazarbaev proclaimed that he would serve as the party leader of Nur Otan. And, in the August 2007 parliamentary election, the newly established dominant party occupied all of the seats in the Lower House. This had completed the processes of gradual dominance of the legislature by ruling parties in the country.

On the other hand, opposition parties had gradually lost their presence in parliament. In the 1994 elections, they obtained as many seats as the ruling parties (24 percent). Yet, they had lost their seats from 24 percent to 10 percent in the 1995 parliamentary elections. In the 1999 legislative elections, two main opposition parties, the Communist Party (led by the former presidential candidate, Serikbolsyn Abdildin) and the Republican People's Party (led by the former prime minister, Akezhan Kazhegeldin) obtained only 3 and 1 seats, respectively, resulting in further reduction of opposition's political influence in the parliament. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Ak Zhol party, which was created as a result of the strong opposition party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement starting in 2002, obtained a single seat in the parliament although there were several opposition parties participating in the elections. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, which was the country's first elections under a pure proportional representation system with 7 percent electoral threshold, all opposition parties failed to obtain sufficient number of votes to make it into the parliament.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The very similar change in electoral systems was taken also by Putin's Russia and Bakiev's Kyrgyzstan.

4.4 Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan⁵⁶

As discussed, party system formation in Kazakhstan has been the process by which ruling parties gradually dominated the parliament and opposition parties incrementally lost their political influence. The electoral dominance of the ruling parties, however, cannot be simply attributed to the fact that the authoritarian government relied exclusively on electoral fraud and state repression. Nor can it be solely explained by the fact that the president just maintained electoral systems in favor of ruling coalitions. Kazakhstan is an electoral authoritarian regime, and its elections still fall short of international standards for democratic elections. Although the government sometimes resorted to violent measures to repress opposition groups, the regime has become less contingent on repressive, fraudulent tools at elections to win big. Moreover, the president even changed the country's electoral system from Single-Member Districts (SMD) based systems (1994-2006) to a pure Proportional Representation system (2007), which resulted in bringing a smaller seat premium to the president. As Schatz (2009) argues, characteristics of the Nazarbaev regime can be more accurately depicted as a "soft authoritarian regime" rather than a highly repressive, closed authoritarianism like neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Schedler (2013, 4-5) also refers to Kazakhstan as one of the typical electoral authoritarian regimes. Here, I show evidence

⁵⁶ Here, by electoral manipulation, I refer to 1. electoral fraud (election violence, electoral cheating, and the legal problems on the electoral law) and 2. electoral system change.

that the government became less dependent on fraud and manipulation of electoral systems at least in comparison to its reliance on such measures in the 1990s.

4.4.1 Electoral Fraud

Table 4.1: Time-Series Change in Electoral Fraud in Kazakhstan (1995-2007)

	1995 Par	1999 Pres	1999 Par	2004 Par	2005 Pres	2007 Par
Competitive Elections	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election Violence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pre-Electoral Cheating	1	3	3	3	2	2
Election-Day Cheating	2	3	3	2	2	1
Problems on Electoral Law	3	3	3	2	3	2
Overall Electoral Fraud	6	9	9	7	7	5

Note: Each election is accessed by Kelley's (2012) *Quality of Elections Dataset* and the author's own coding for the 2005 and 2007 elections. Each component has four scales (0: no problems, 1: minor problems only, 2: moderate problems, 3: serious problems). To assess overall electoral fraud, I aggregate each component.

Source: Kelley (2012) and the Department of State's Country Report

Hyde and Marinov's (2012) NELDA dataset tells us that all the elections in Kazakhstan since independence were "competitive" in the sense that opposition parties and multiple candidates were allowed to participate in the elections, suggesting that the country is an electoral authoritarian regime. Based on Kelley's (2012) *Quality of Elections Dataset* (1995-2004) and my original coding for the 2005 presidential and 2007 parliamentary elections,⁵⁷ Table 4.1 shows time-series changes in the extent of electoral fraud in parliamentary and presidential elections between 1995 and 2007. The level of electoral fraud in the 1995 parliamentary elections, as the elections after limited liberalization, is

⁵⁷ I follow coding schemes that Kelley (2012) refers to and code the two elections by using the US Department of State's Country Report.

relatively lower (6) than the 1999 elections that faced the most serious electoral manipulation (9). Since 1999, the extent of electoral fraud became gradually less serious over time until 2007, when we define electoral fraud in the forms of electoral violence, election cheating and the legal problems regarding the electoral law.

The 1999 elections faced the most extensive electoral manipulation during the time period under study.⁵⁸ The elections were minimally competitive in the sense that 10 political parties and 547 candidates were registered for the single-mandate constituencies. The OSCE report, however, concludes that elections were exposed to severe electoral fraud in many respects. First, electoral cheating was widely observed during election campaigns. International election observers found numerous practices of proxy voting among the regime supporters especially in rural areas (OSCE 2000, 16). Official election activities were often mingled with election campaigns carried out by the Otan party (OSCE 2000, 13). Unfair campaign practices by ruling parties were closely associated with the media being dominated by the government. Khabar, a large, state-controlled TV station operated by Dariga Nazarbaeva, played an important role in biasing the tones of broadcasting in favor of the ruling parties. Otan, which obtained only 31 percent of seats in the 1999 parliamentary election, enjoyed nearly 60 percent of the media coverage (OSCE 2000, 14). The electoral bias was also brought through lower level election commissions. Election commissions had become more effective in presiding over election processes, compared with the past elections. But their members

⁵⁸ Below, I primarily use OSCE final reports on elections, which are also often referred by the US Department of State's country reports, to qualitatively assess changes in the extent of electoral fraud in Kazakhstan (1995-2007). The 1994 legislative elections are not included because both reports are not available for the elections.

were overrepresented by the ruling parties. 70 percent of polling stations were positively assessed for voting procedures and less than half of polling stations were considered as fair in counting procedures (OSCE 2000, 17-18). Yet, these evaluations were much worse than the elections during the 2000s, as I will discuss later. Another irregularity in the elections was that there was widespread non-violent intimidation of the opposition. The former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who stated his intention to stand for the presidential elections on the basis of his high popularity, was disqualified as a presidential candidate and was detained in Moscow on the charges of a dubious criminal allegations and money laundering (Issacs 2011, 68). As a result, his new opposition party, Republican People's Party, was forced to withdraw from the party-list PR part of the election and ended up obtaining only one seat in one single-member district in the parliamentary election.

Second, the government and ruling parties were highly repressive from the mid to late 1990s. During the period, opposition parties were often violently intimidated and prevented from carrying out effective electoral campaigns. For example, during the election campaigns, one of Kazhegeldin's secretaries was suddenly beaten up by unknown assailants. Kazhegeldin himself was also the subject of an assassination attempt, although the assassination attempt failed (Furman 2006, 228). According to a political scientist,

These 5 years [1996-2001] were really difficult, really nightmare for the opposition in Kazakhstan. This was a time of stagnation. My interviewees all claimed that if they wanted to organize protests in the 1999 presidential elections, the activists' doors of flats were not able to open. This is how the

regime was intimidating the opposition, there were threats, and they [regime parties] were even throwing drugs to opposition figures' houses in order to be able to prosecute them. This menu of intimidation, a tool to crack down on the opposition, was so huge at that time that the regime was extremely repressive in the end of the 1990s (Author's interview with a political scientist [#11]).

Likewise, looking back on the 1990s, an opposition political activist states,

He [Nazarbaev] was using administrative resources to *threaten* political movements on behave of the government. (...) There were intimidations, not allowing to organize party meetings with voters. At that time, it wasn't always directly against opposition parties, but sometimes they employed repressive measures. I remember how they switched off electricity in a building where we were gathering. They were preventing opposition parties and groups from campaign activities. They had a variety of methods to do that. (Author's interview with a political activist [#20]; *italic* by the author)

In the middle of the 2000s, when Kazakhstan held three national elections (2004 parliamentary elections, 2005 presidential elections and 2007 parliamentary elections), elections became less fraudulent, at least compared to those of the late 1990s. Looking at Table 4.1, total scores of electoral fraud in the 2004, 2005 and 2007 elections are 7, 7, and 5, respectively. First of all, the parliament had adopted the amendments of the Electoral Law on March 16, 2004, which was assessed by the OSCE as a considerable progress, even though further improvements had to be realized in order to meet the international criteria on democratic elections (OSCE 2004a, 5). The legal framework in the subsequent 2007 parliamentary elections, on the other hand, did not see any

significant progress in further improvement of the 2004 Electoral Law (OSCE 2007, 7).⁵⁹ Yet, the legal framework in 2007 was no worse than that in 1999. *The Quality of Elections Data* reflects the improvements in the Electoral Law by evaluating the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections as 2 (intermediate fraud) in the section of “legal problems on electoral law,” compared to 3 (major fraud) in the 1999 parliamentary elections (see also OSCE 2004b, 1; OSCE 2007, 7) for the same section.

Of the many improvements in the 2004 Electoral Law, important ones to prevent ruling parties from relentlessly using fraud were (1) the prohibition of undue interference in the work of the election commissions by the authorities,⁶⁰ (2) the prohibition of the presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations, (3) more access by observers to the entire election processes and the receipt of relevant election documents, (4) posting of election results protocols in precinct and district election commissions for public scrutiny, (5) stronger efforts to provide equal conditions for election contestants during the election campaign, (6) procedures for compilation and verification of the accuracy of voter lists, and (7) expansion of the list of prohibited activities that could interfere with the election process (OSCE 2004a, 5-6). In the 2007 parliamentary elections, there was also some improvement in the Electoral Law. For instance, in the previous elections, the Law banned public meetings between the end of electoral campaigns and the publication of final results, but this was removed from the

⁵⁹ OSCE reports “despite a constructive dialogue with the authorities since 2006, recommendations to improve the legal framework made by the OSCE/ODIHR were, in general, not addressed by the amendment of June 2007”

⁶⁰ The interference of local authorities to electoral commissions in each oblast was one of the most serious problems in the 1999 elections (OSCE 2000, 2)

Electoral Law amended in December 2006. Yet, significant parts of the Law were not improved in accord with the international standard of democratic elections. The Electoral Law still denied the “suffrage right of a citizen ‘who has a prior conviction not cancelled or withdrawn,’ regardless of the seriousness of the crime” (OSCE 2007, 7). The revised Constitution in May 2007 added a provision stating that eligible electoral candidates must have been permanently resident in Kazakhstan for ten years. “Such a long time period can constitute an unreasonable restriction on the right to seek public office” (OSCE 2007, 8).

Improvements on paper in the Electoral Law did not necessarily mean that pro-presidential parties and the government abided by the Electoral Law without any infringements. In fact, there were considerable level of pre-electoral and election-day cheating practices in the 2004, 2005, and 2007 elections. Even so, the *Quality of Elections Data* and the US Department of State country reports suggest that the substantial level of electoral cheating also tended to become lower over time (total cheating scores of the 2004, 2005, 2007 elections are 5, 4, 3, respectively). Media was still significantly biased toward the ruling parties in all the elections and far from equal media accesses stipulated in the Electoral Law. Yet, in all three elections, there were no reports that media outlets were shut down or journalists were prosecuted, as happened in the past elections (OSCE 2004b, 15). It suggests that the governments had become less inclined to resort to intimidation against the opposition media. Moreover, the media provided all party leaders with more chances to debate political issues during electoral campaigns (OSCE 2004b, 15). In this respect, the OSCE’s analysis of media coverage provides evidence suggesting that the dominance of media by ruling parties tends to be

less heavy in the elections in comparison to the previous elections. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the major state channel, Kazakhstan TV (Kazakhstan-1), devoted 64 percent of its political news coverage to Otan and 9 percent to the rest of the ruling parties, the Aist bloc and Asar. Likewise, the other well-known TV station, Khabar, aired 44 percent and 31 percent of political news favorable for Asar and Otan, respectively (OSCE 2004b, 14-15). In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the newly established dominant party, Nur Otan was covered by only 20 percent on TV Khabar and 17 percent on Kazakhstan TV (OSCE 2007, 18). Different from the 2004 elections, these media outlets broadcast political news about the government and the president (30 percent in total), which generated additional bias in favor of the dominant party, given that the dominant party is heavily fused with the government, as I discuss later. Yet, even with that in mind, total media coverage for the dominant party was still about 50 percent. Considering that Nur Otan is a far larger party in size and has stronger organizational bases than Otan and Asar, the difference in media coverage suggests that the government seems to have refrained from relying exclusively on media bias to make election results favorable to ruling parties even though the media is still biased.

All the three elections were more positively assessed by the OSCE in both voting and counting procedures, at least compared to those of the 1999 elections. The proportion of polling stations where voting procedures were positively assessed was 87 (the 2004 elections), 92 (the 2005 elections), and 94 percent (the 2007 elections), which were all higher than the 70 percent in the 1999 elections (OSCE 2000, 2004b, 2005, 2007; Bader 2012, 53). On the other hand, percentage of polling stations where counting procedures were positively assessed was 72 percent (2004), 72 percent (2005), and 61 percent

(2007). Although the 2007 elections were a bit worse than the rest of the two elections, they were still better than the 1999 elections in which more than half of polling stations were evaluated as negatively in terms of vote counting (OSCE 2000).

Participation and registration of the main opposition parties were highly smooth and did not seem to face serious problems. It stands in stark contrast with Akezhan Kazhegeldin's Republican People's Party, an opposition party in the 1999 elections that was exposed to various obstacles in electoral participation. It was true that during election campaigns the governments prevented the main opposition from carrying out effective campaigns, but such cases were very rare. Activists from the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) were detained by police only three times in the Almaty city and the Pavlodar oblast and local authorities inhibited opposition parties from holding campaign events in only several instances (OSCE 2004, 11). According to one of my interviews with a political analyst, the Ak Zhol party had actually obtained 25-30 percent of total votes, but the official election result was just 12.8 percent, indicating electoral falsification by the government (Author's interview with a political analyst [#8]). Yet, in contrast to the Republican People's Party, a strong opposition party in the 1999 elections, opposition parties were not exposed to severe restrictions on electoral participation. Main opposition parties like DCK and the Communist Party in the 2004 elections, and the All National Social Democratic Party and Naghyz Ak Zhol in the 2007 elections, were all registered without any problems. There were no complainants from the opposition parties, as well as no appeals filed concerning the registration process (OSCE 2004b, 10; OSCE 2007, 14).

Finally, extensive electoral violence against opposition parties was no longer observed by the 2004 parliamentary elections.⁶¹ Although election-time violence was exercised toward presidential candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay during the campaigns of the 2005 presidential elections, this was the last case of such violence. Since the 2007 elections the government has not resorted to violent measures or intimidated the opposition parties (Author’s interview with an opposition activist [#20]).

4.4.2 Electoral System Change: From SMD to PR


Table 4.2: Electoral System Change and Effective Electoral Threshold in Kazakhstan

	1994 elections	1995 elections	1999 elections	2004 elections	2007 elections
Single-Member Districts	76%	100%	87%	87%	0%
Proportional Representation	0%	0%	13%	13%	100%
Effective Electoral Threshold	37.5	37.5	33.5	33.5	7.0
Other Notes	24% was appointed by the president		Electoral Threshold (7%)	Electoral Threshold (7%)	Electoral Threshold (7%)

Note: In the 1994 elections, 24 percent of lawmakers in the Lower House were selected by the president via a “state list.”

⁶¹ This does not mean that the government did not use violent repression during non-election time. The regime has sometimes used violent repression and intimidation against opposition leaders and arrested them even though they tended to be detained for relatively short period of time. Yet, repression was not severe as to label the country as “closed authoritarianism.” Furthermore, electoral violence has been clearly reduced, suggesting that the government may be reluctant to use overt repression during election time when the international community closely looks at the country’s situations.

Figure 4.2: Effective Electoral Thresholds in Kazakh Parliamentary Elections (1994-2007)



Meanwhile, the Kazakh government has changed electoral systems in the Lower House elections a couple of times since independence, shifting electoral systems from SMD (high Effective Electoral Threshold) to more PR-based systems (low Effective Electoral Threshold; Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2). As discussed, the First Constitution, which was adopted in 1993, provided a 177-seat parliament in which 135 lawmakers were elected based on single-member districts and the remaining 42 were selected by the president without electoral competition through a “state list.” In September 1995, the president issued a presidential decree on the Electoral Law in which the number of seats in the Lower House was reduced to 67 and all the lawmakers would be elected

under SMD. In May 1999, Nazarbaev changed electoral rules by introducing a mixed-member majoritarian system in which 67 would be elected in single-mandate constituencies while the rest of the ten members would be determined via a proportional representation system in a nationwide district through a party list and a 7 percent electoral threshold. The 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections would be held under this new electoral system. In June 2007, Nazarbaev embarked on revising the Electoral Law and initiated a big change in Kazakhstan's electoral system subsequent to the substantial amendments to the Constitution in the previous month. In this amendment, the government adopted a full proportional representation system by a party list with the same 7 percent electoral threshold. In sum, effective electoral threshold in Kazakhstan had been decreasing since 1994 from 37.5 percent (1994 and 1995; SMD with a state list for the 1994 elections), through 33.5 percent (1999 and 2004; mixed-member majoritarian system), to 7 percent (2007; a pure proportional representation system).

In the 1994, 1995, and 1999 elections, where electoral competition with opposition parties were relatively strong, the government designed elections in the way in which ruling elites would be able to keep a dominant position in the legislature. Selecting 42 legislators via no electoral competition (in the 1994 parliamentary elections) and more serious electoral manipulation (especially in the 1999 elections) did contribute to preventing a landslide victory for the opposition camp during this period (Author's interview with a political analyst [#4]).

More importantly, majoritarian systems significantly protected the president from being defeated by opposition parties in Kazakhstan, as my theory and cross-national

empirical analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrated (see also Pripstein Popsusney 2002). First, the SMD-based systems enabled the president to delegate the collection of political support to popular local ruling elites in small electoral districts, who ran for the elections as independents but basically supported the president. Many of them held important positions in local governments and were able to mobilize regime support by utilizing their “administrative resources” and intensive support from akims (local governors; see, e.g. Issacs 2011, 88). Second, owing to the seat premium under SMD systems, the ruling elites side received more seats than vote shares. Although vote shares for each party and candidate in the 1994 elections are not formally documented and published, the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan publishes vote shares of elected candidates in each electoral district in the 1995 elections, which enables us to estimate to what extent ruling elites enjoyed the seat premiums (Tsentrlnaya Izbiratel'naya Komissiya Respubliki Kazakhstan 2010). According to the data, average vote shares of elected candidates were 61 percent in the 1995 elections. On the other hand, the ruling camp including pro-regime independents occupied about 80 percent of seats in parliament, suggesting that the government was enjoying an approximately 19 percent seat premium under the SMD system in the elections.

Also, in the 1999 parliamentary elections, the SMD part of the electoral system provided a large seat premium to ruling elites. Ruling parties and independents obtained 80.6 percent of seat shares with 61.7 percent of vote shares. On the other hand, the main opposition party, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, obtained only 3.9 percent of seat shares, even though the party scored 17.7 percent of total votes (Nohlen,

Grotz and Hartmann 2001, 420-423). This indicates that SMD systems undercounted opposition parties' votes when translating votes into seats in parliament.

In the 2004 elections, the ruling parties and pro-regime independents became stronger and increased their vote shares to 79 percent under the SMD system,⁶² resulting in the occupation of all of seats determined under SMD. In the 2004 elections as well, ruling parties had received 21 percent more seat shares than their vote shares, a considerably large seat premium.

After the adoption of the PR system prior to the 2007 legislative elections, the gap between shares of votes and seats decreased significantly. This suggests that PR systems bring smaller seat premiums toward the governing parties, as I showed cross-nationally in Chapter 3. Nur Otan scored an overwhelming electoral victory with 88.41 percent of total votes, having obtained all of the seats determined by the elections (98 seats).⁶³ Even under the pure proportional representation system, the dominant party enjoyed a favorable bias toward its seat shares (11.59 percent). Yet, the bias was half as big as that in the past elections. Furthermore, as evidenced by its vote shares, the government significantly increased its mobilization power. The gap in this new electoral system derived more from the fact that the other opposition parties, be they radical and moderate, could not clear the 7 percent electoral threshold that had been in effect since 1999 and were cleared by some opposition parties in the 1999 and 2004 elections.

⁶² The calculation is based on district-level election data from Nurmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005, 47-49). As I could not find vote shares of the second round voting, I use proportions of vote shares obtained by the three regime parties and independents.

⁶³ The figure was taken from the website of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (election.kz)

4.5 The Dictator's Mobilization Power

The previous sections have shown that, although Nazarbaev had become less dependent on electoral manipulations -- both serious electoral fraud and the adoption of single-member districts systems -- between 1995 and 2007, he successfully maintained an overwhelming electoral victory and kept most ruling elites in line with the regime. As numerous extant studies on politics in Kazakhstan suggested, there is little doubt that he continued to use electoral fraud to a certain extent. Especially in the late 1990s, the government relied heavily on the disproportionality feature of the SMD system, as well as extensive electoral cheating, blatant election violence, and the manipulation of the electoral law. However, given that the level of electoral fraud gradually declined and the government shifted electoral systems from a pure SMD system to a full PR system, electoral manipulation alone cannot explain the ruling parties' electoral dominance in Kazakhstan. This poses important puzzles in authoritarian elections: *Why did the president become less reliant on electoral fraud? Why did he give up the seat premiums under the SMD system and decide to adopt the PR system in 2007?*⁶⁴

⁶⁴ One alternative explanation might be that because Kazakhstan had been already a "closed authoritarian regime" by the late 2000s in which opposition forces had been already severely repressed by the government, government no longer needed to rig elections. Given the fact that the government used some repressive measures in the 2000s, repressed opposition might influence the government's calculus over electoral manipulation and weak opposition. Yet, as many researchers point out, Kazakhstan is far from highly repressive authoritarian regimes like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan where oppositions are barred and completely excluded (e.g. Schatz 2009; Hale 2015). Elections provide at least multiple options other than ruling parties, which is an important criterion to define electoral authoritarianism (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Kinne and Marinov 2013). In this circumstance, in addition to repression, I emphasize that opposition's strategic failure to coordinate their action before elections contributes to


I argue that an answer can be found in the fact that President Nazarbaev successfully enhanced his mobilization power to gain “voluntary” support from the citizenry. From 1999 until 2007, the growing mobilization power of ruling parties can be well-observed by comparing share of votes in the PR portion of the electoral systems in the 1999, 2004, and 2007 legislative elections. As the PR part is under a nation-wide electoral district without any gerrymandering, vote shares are relatively comparable. That the mobilization power of ruling parties at the time of the 1999 parliamentary elections was still weak is well-illustrated by the fact that under the PR portion, vote shares of the regime parties were smaller (10 seats). They obtained only 54.75 percent of total votes under the PR system (Ashimbaev 2008, 840): Otan scored just 30.89 percent, whereas the other two ruling parties, Agrarian Party and Civil Party garnered 12.63 percent and 11.23 percent, respectively. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the three regime parties (Otan, Asar and Aist Block) obtained 79.06 percent of total votes under the PR system determining 10 seats, suggesting that ruling parties significantly enhanced their mobilization power by about 25 percent compared to the 1999 elections. In the 2007 legislative elections, Nur Otan achieved an overwhelming victory with 88.41 percent of total votes, suggesting their mobilization power had increased by about 10 percent. Given my findings that electoral fraud tended to be less serious, growing vote shares in the portion of PR systems indicate that the president had attained stronger, nation-wide mobilization power between 1999 and 2007.

explaining variations in electoral manipulation in the country. Moreover, other than opposition strength, there are other important factors like financial resources and the government’s organizational strengths to explain electoral manipulation. I also look at the government’s strategies to buy-off people’s support through such “soft” measures.

How, then, did Nazarbaev succeed in improving his power of mobilization? This section process-traces how this became possible by focusing on the president's mobilization power via extensive economic distribution. In particular, I will look at the following three aspects that are closely related to the president's mobilization power: (1) natural resource wealth, (2) centralized political organizations, and (3) opposition strength. I argue that the president has been able to reduce the need for manipulating elections with electoral fraud and the adoption of SMD systems because he could rely more on efficient distribution of economic favors toward (at least) some portions of citizens.

4.5.1 Natural Resource Wealth as a Source of Patronage


Figure 4.3: Economic Growth and Fiscal Revenues in Kazakhstan (1993-2008)



Sources: *IMF country report* and *World Development Indicators*.

Notes: The left vertical axis stands for revenue (million US\$). The right vertical axis represents for economic growth (%).

Figure 4.4: Natural Resource Wealth in Kazakhstan (1985-2008)



Note: Oil-gas value per capita is calculated by multiplying the country's total oil-gas production by the constant 2000 oil-gas price and dividing it by total population.

Source: Ross (2011).

Similar to the other post-communist countries, Kazakhstan had suffered serious economic decline during the first years following its independence. In order to recover from recession, the Kazakh government adopted a major economic strategy to liberalize its trade policy and become part of the international market. Particularly after 1995, when most firms except for large corporations had been privatized,⁶⁵ the country began to lower tariffs and export natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals at higher volumes. Subsequent to 1999, when the international oil price rapidly increased, natural

⁶⁵ On the processes of economic reform in Kazakhstan, see Pomfret (2006).

resource sectors substantively boosted the economy, which allowed the country to keep almost two-digit economic growth until 2007 (Pomfret 2006, 7). Figure 4.4a shows that oil-gas value per capita had been 14 times increased between 1998 (207 USD) and 2008 (2,975 USD). This drastic increase in natural resource wealth was largely driven by a rapid surge in international oil prices during the same period (Figure 4.4b).

The economic recovery induced by exporting natural resources greatly enhanced state resources available to the president. Figure 4.3 shows that the government had increased state revenue with very high speed between 1995 and 2008. In 2008, state revenue reached 10 billion US dollars, which is five times as the total revenue in 1995. Growing financial resources, mostly achieved by rich natural resource wealth, dramatically enhanced the government's ability to extensively distribute public goods to voters.

In order to take advantage of natural resources, Nazarbaev began to centralize the management of natural resource sectors, thereby facilitating the efficient distribution of patronage for his political purposes. Immediately after independence, the president was not fully in charge of the oil sector. The energy sector in the country was the prerogative of the Ministry of Oil and Gas as well as the state oil and gas company Kazakhstanmunaigaz, which was subsidiary to the Ministry (Hoffman 2000, 281). Most natural resources in Kazakhstan are concentrated on Western regions and local elites maintained considerable control over natural resource management (Ostrowski 2010).

The failure to seize natural resources, as well as their relative shortages in the earlier periods, made it difficult for the president to use the oil money for the purpose of sufficient distribution. Nazarbaev was under pressure from the internal elites in both

the Ministry and oil-rich Western regions, who aspired to seize full control of the industry and increase their political influence in the central government. In particular, ruling elites, who went up their career ladders within the oil industry during the Soviet era and thus were closely connected to indigenous oil enterprises and the Ministry, attempted to strengthen their grip on natural resource sectors. The case in point is the appointment and dismissal of Ravil Cherdabaev as the Minister of Oil and Gas. Born in the oil-rich Atyrau oblast into a family whose members had worked in oil enterprises since the beginning of the twentieth century, Cherdabaev was one of the most influential “oil men” (Ostrowski 2010, 37). Having taken over the Minister of Oil and Gas, he planned to create a vertically integrated oil company, which would be monitored by the Ministry of Oil and Gas. “This plan, if successfully executed, would spell a significant degree of control over the republic’s most important industry and allow the ministry to regain the authority” (Ostrowski 2010, 37). Fearing the growing influence of Cherdabaev, Nazarbaev forced Cherdabaev to step down in October 1994.

In order to prevent these indigenous “oil men” from dominating the oil industry, Nazarbaev accelerated the privatization of the oil sector by introducing foreign capital. As a result, “by the end of the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry no longer reflected its indigenous roots” (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010, 259). Strong politicians like Kazhegeldin, as well as wealthy businessmen, emerged in strength as a result of large profits yielded by the privatization of companies. These businessmen also helped to establish the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. In his attempt to contain strong opponents without harming the privatization process, Nazarbaev decided to take charge of the oil sector himself. In March 1997, he signed a decree deciding to dissolve the

Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and other related state committees and established in their place the KazakhOil National Oil and Gas Company (Ostrowski 2010, 47-48). By transferring many of the Ministry's functions to KazakhOil, which presides over contracts with foreign companies, Nazarbaev successfully strengthened his control over the country's oil industry (a sector that provides an estimated 37 percent of state revenues), taking it firmly within his own presidential apparatus and away from the executive powers of Prime Minister Kazhegeldin (Hoffman 2000, 282).

In making KazakhOil work fully as a political machine through which he could cement political support for himself, Nazarbaev began to construct direct, patron-client relationships with other ruling elites and his family members within this newly founded national oil company. Nurlan Balgimbaev, Nazarbaev's close ally, was installed as the president of KazakhOil, while Timur Kulibaev, Nazarbaev's son-in-law, became a financial director and vice president of KazakhOil (Ostrowski 2010, 49). Nazarbaev also recruited many young technocrats to the oil company who did not have close connections with the oil-rich regions and thus were loyal to the president (Ostrowski 2010, 49-50). In so doing, he tried to centralize patron-client relationships built around the president and oil resources.

President Nazarbaev and his ruling parties were able to spend a vast amount of oil money for electoral purposes by utilizing the centralized management of the oil industry and dramatically increasing natural resource wealth after 2000. Analyzing the 1999 elections, Hoffman (2000) points out the likely connection between oil resources and electoral processes in the elections, while suggesting the importance of KazakhOil as an informal political organization:

Kazakhoil's political importance stems not only from the strategic nature of petroleum in Kazakhstan; the organization also serves an important budgetary role for the Presidency. Politically prioritized projects, such as the construction of Kazakhstan's new capital, Astana, and the financing of early presidential elections, require huge amounts of capital, yet are not officially funded from the republican budget. It is widely rumored that Kazakhoil has been used as a tool for redirecting state financing to such off-budget items. If true, this would help to explain not only the funding sources of these activities, but the reluctance by top oil officials to open Kazakhoil to privatization, which would require more transparent operations and bookkeeping. It may also serve as a partial explanation for why Kazakhoil through October 1998 had only returned a total of \$2.3 million to the state budget — fully 14 times less than the anticipated amount. (Hoffman 2000, 287)

In the mid-1990s, both central and local authorities possessed a very limited ability in financing pensions, utilities, health care, and other fiscal policies. This is because serious economic decline a couple of years after the collapse of the Soviet Union significantly deprived the government of its fiscal power (Author's interview with a political activist [#29] who had been working in a local government during the 1990s). On the other hand, there is much anecdotal evidence suggesting that the government and ruling parties have distributed economic favors to voters in the 2000s when natural resources dramatically enriched state coffers (Author's interview with an officer of the Soros-Foundation [#2] and a political analyst [#9]). Rakhat Aliev, who was a son-in-law of Nazarbaev yet fell from power and defected from the regime in 2007, criticized the president and alleged that Nur Otan used 10 billion dollars from a "secret fund" to carry out electoral campaigns prior to the 2007 legislative elections (RFE/RL Kazakhstan 2007.8.17).

Large-scale pre-electoral patronage distribution does not necessarily mean that the government alleviates serious economic inequality among citizens by engaging in extensive public goods provisions covering every citizen in an equal manner. But, it would be hard to deny that there is widespread popular support coming from the provision of material benefits that plays a crucial role in the electoral victories of the ruling party besides electoral fraud and manipulation of electoral systems. Sharipova (2013) finds that access to state resources such as public jobs, high-quality public hospitals and state housing is largely determined by close connections with powerful and wealthy people.⁶⁶ The government mainly targets those who are most likely to vote for ruling parties after having received various economic benefits from the government. These people include government officials, doctors in public hospitals, staff, teachers and professors in public schools, and old people whose lives are dependent upon public pensions. The government encourages heads of schools, hospitals and universities to mobilize votes for the ruling parties, often in return for increases in salaries, bonuses, pension, and various other accommodations (Author's interview with a political analyst [#4]). For example, one opposition activist, who had been working as a deputy in a local legislature, succinctly describes how it works:

⁶⁶ Sharipova (2013) used a survey data taken in 2013 and conducted qualitative case studies on health care and housing policy in Kazakhstan,

I myself was a deputy and I know this process. [...] The thing is administrative resources. Let's say we're holding an election in a village. This is especially true in small villages, home to 1,000 people. [...] Before the election, the mayor of the village collects headmasters, all who work in the state budget section, as doctors, or in small and medium-sized businesses and those who can access to credit commitments and tax. And, they hold meetings and say, "we need to ensure people will be participating in the election and also they have to vote for us." (Author's interview with a political activist [#20])

Citizens who vote for the governing parties receive various kinds of material benefits. The Kazakh government often employs several distribution strategies before elections in order to garner votes from citizens.⁶⁷ First, the government increases public spending by raising salaries for public officials prior to elections to buy-off their support. For example, the central government allocated two billion dollars in order to raise salaries for more than 100,000 professionals at central and local governments before the 2012 parliamentary elections, which resulted in an increase in wages by about 20-30 percent country-wide (Author's interview with an economist [#25]; Tengri News 26, December 2011). Also, when the legislative elections were held in 2007, real wages in the country had annually increased by 30 percent, which is about twice as large as wage increases in a non-election year (2006: 17.3 percent; OECD 2011).

Second, the government tends to raise pensions in election years as they want to appeal to elderly people. For example, pensioners, who occupy 2 million people out of 16 million total populations, enjoyed annual increases in pensions continuously between 2009 and 2011. In non-election years (2009 and 2010), increases in pension

⁶⁷ I provide systematic quantitative evidence of these political business cycles in Kazakhstan in the following section.

were 25 percent, and in the 2011 election year (the presidential election was held in April 2011 and the parliamentary election was held in January 2012) they raised to 30 percent (Author's interview with an economist [#25]). "It is the retired people that support Nur Otan because they think this is the party doing something beneficial for them. They think the leader of Nur Otan, Nazarbaev, is the only person who can keep political stability in Kazakhstan. [...] Because many in the old generation as well as the middle-aged generation still believe that Nazarbaev brings stability, they also think Nur Otan is a real powerful instrument to keep stability and development" (Author's interview with a political analyst [#4]).

Third, as many people become more dependent on state resources in terms of salaries, pensions, and loans, it is difficult for them to not vote for the governing parties because they hope to continue to receive these material benefits. If they do not vote for the governing parties at elections and such voting behavior is detected by the authorities, they may be deprived of income sources such as public jobs, tax exemptions, pensions and so on (Author's interview with a political activist [#18]). A political analyst, who had been working in a public university, points out:

Public employees – teachers in schools, professors in universities and doctors in hospitals -- are mobilized to vote for ruling parties. During election campaigns, these institutions not only asked their staff to vote for Nur Otan, but sometimes they threaten employees by saying "if you do not vote for Nur Otan, then there would be some measures, some implications for you, even being fired from your institution." (Author's interview with a political analyst [#4])

4.5.2 Centralization of Governing Institutions

Table 4.3: Percentage of Central Government Transfers in Total Revenues of Regional Governments

Region	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009
Aktobe	13.81	14.05	15.21	27.42	44.82
Atyrau	-	12.04	8.96	25.44	24.41
Akmola	38.58	47.77	58.34	61.75	73.21
East Kazakhstan	9.43	19.06	46.54	54.72	68.73
Jambyl	43.5	56.69	66.07	68.68	81.56
Karagandy	0.65	0.62	27.28	34.62	53.37
Kostanai	7.12	25.56	47.13	55.9	69.67
Kyzyl Orda	17.73	47.53	52.17	66.19	68.34
Mangistau	-	-	7.09	18.93	26.8
North Kazakhstan	31.79	39.42	61.99	67.34	77.3
Pavlodar	4.9	2.54	20.54	31.72	47.97
South Kazakhstan	48.29	43.3	62.91	67.06	82.05
West Kazakhstan	0.04	6.12	33.4	45.44	42.51
Astana City	16.21	16.16	50.54	61.39	76.89
Dependence on Central Government	19.34	25.45	39.87	49.04	59.83


Source: Sharipova (2013, 113)

Kazakhstan had been highly decentralized in real terms until the end of the 1990s, yet since the early 2000s the country has become more centralized. A first aspect is fiscal centralization. Although the Second Constitution stipulates that Kazakhstan has a centralized government, *de facto* fiscal decentralization had been advanced in the 1990s. For the purpose of accurately responding to the demands of local populations, decision-making power on economic and social policies was transferred from the central government to local governments. Moreover, although on paper the central government has the sole authority to collect tax, regional governments in fact seemed to have had considerable discretionary power in tax collection during the 1990s (Jones Luong 2004). Having interviewed with state officials in regional governments at the end of the 1990s, Jones Luong (2004, 188-189) reports that directives from regional governments tended

to be more prioritized than the central government's, when the two conflict. The tide of fiscal decentralization, however, had been reversed from 2000 (Author's interview with an economist [#6] and a political analyst [#9]), and the central government tightened fiscal control over regional governments via government transfers (Dave 2013). Makhmutova (2005, 287) shows that the central government tended to withdraw more money from the Almaty city, the oil-rich Mangistau and Atyrau oblasts to poor, pro-presidential regions such as the South Kazakhstan oblast by 2004. Table 4.3 shows time-series change in central government transfers to regional governments between 2001 and 2009. As it shows, regional governments received most revenues by taxing local populations at the time of 2001. Only 19.34 percent of total revenues derived from government transfers. The amount of the central government transfers had been dramatically raised by 2009, when 59.83 percent of regional governments' revenues were subsidized by the central government. The increasing fiscal dependence on the central government encourages regional governments to be more loyal to the president (Author's interview with a political activist [#29]). Shapirova (2013, 115) acutely points to this: "The main problem of the regions is their dependence on the center. The hands and legs of every single akim (local governors) are tied. [...] If an akim is 'good,' then he receives financial resources; if he is not good and if he does not manage to regulate social tension, then he does not receive money from the center. To be a good akim means to be loyal and provide the right and 'appropriate' indicators of socio-economic development. The functions of akims then are to squeeze money from the center rather than to develop the region." Although regional governments have discretionary power over expenditures such as education, health-care, local economic policies, the center's

strong grip on revenues limits real options that are available to akims.

Figure 4.5: Coherence of Ruling Parties and Proportion of Independents



Note: Fractionalization of ruling parties is computed by using the Herfindahl index $\sum_{i=1}^N \text{Ruling Party}_i^2$ where Ruling Party_i is a share of a ruling party in total seats of the Lower House.

A second aspect is *de facto* political centralization. Although the 1995 constitution had already given strong presidential power (as discussed before), there is much evidence suggesting that Nazarbaev in the 1990s was not as strong as in the 2000s. First of all, ruling parties had tended to be weaker and fractionalized until Nur Otan was founded in December 2006. Figure 4.5 shows how ruling parties had become less fractionalized between 1995 and 2007. The Party of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK), then pro-

presidential party that Nazarbaev seemingly aspired to make a dominant party, could not obtain the dominant position in parliament as there were a number of ruling parties as well as opposition parties in the parliament. In February 1999, eight months before the legislative elections, Otan was established as a result of the merger between PNEK and several pro-presidential parties, although there were still three other ruling parties outside this merge -- Asar, the Agrarian Party and the Civic Party. In fact, these political parties were not necessarily satellite parties completely subject to the president and had fierce political competition with each other (Dave 2004, 9). For instance, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, the leader of the Civic Party, Azat Peruashev, pointed to this inter-party competition, noting that "leaders from Otan called me up and said 'deal with your candidate in the region --- he is trying to compete with the Otan candidate'" (Issacs 2013, 17). In fact, the ruling parties failed to coordinate their candidates and put more than two candidates in a district in 38 out of 67 electoral districts (56 percent of all electoral districts),⁶⁸ Asar, which was directed by the president's daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva and her husband Rakhat Aliev, was not only subject to their father but also viewed as a powerful independent force arguing for democratic reform (Issacs 2013, 17). As I detail later, however, Nazarbaev had successfully merged all the ruling parties by December 2006 and founded Nur Otan, the dominant party in the country.

Second, independent politicians had been thriving throughout the 1990s until the mid-2000s, yet they disappeared prior to the 2007 legislative elections. In Kazakhstan, most independent politicians were pro-presidential (Olcott 2002, 252), so it would be

⁶⁸ This is the author's calculation based on the electoral district data in Nurmukhamedov and Chevotariiev (2005)

more accurate to regard them as members of the ruling coalition. Yet, independent politicians have their own patron-client networks in their strongholds and thus retain more autonomous power than lawmakers affiliated with ruling parties. Figure 4.5 also shows how the proportion of independent politicians in legislature changed from 1995 to 2007. The percentage of legislators in the Lower House who do not belong to any political party tends to decrease over time. Even in the 2004 parliamentary elections where ruling parties became stronger than in the past elections, 18 self-nominated candidates won seats and 14 of them ran for elections from the regions where they were born and/or started their political careers.⁶⁹ It indicates that self-nominated politicians had strong, independent support base built upon informal connections with local populations via kinship or clan (Dave 2004). By the time of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the new electoral law and the adoption of the PR system encouraged independent politicians to be affiliated with political parties. In most cases, they joined the dominant party, Nur Otan.

Third, the center-periphery relationship has also changed in the way that the center tightly controls regional governments. Since independence, the president has reserved the right to appoint and dismiss akims of oblasts on his own decision. Yet, a couple of years after independence, the president tended to appoint elites from regions as akims in the attempt to achieve a balance of power between the political elites in the center and periphery. Cummings (2005, 106) reports that, in 7 out of 20 cases, former regional executive First Secretaries during the Soviet period became akims soon after

⁶⁹ This is the author's calculation based on Tsentralnaya Izbiratel'naya Komissiya Respubliki Kazakhstan (2010), Ashimbaev (2012), and Nyrmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005).

independence. Jones Luong (2002, 287-288) documents that 35 out of 71 akims, about 50 percent of total akims, were regional elites who held a political position in the same region. Schatz (2004) also argues that during the 1990s the president appointed regional elites as well as central ones, drawing much attention to a good balance among three Zhuz or clans. Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, the president began to centralize appointments of akims by using several strategies. First, more members of the national elite, who went through their career in the central government, tended to be parachuted into regions as akims since around 1997 than ever before (Cummings 2005, 107), while regional elites were appointed to the positions of the central government or elected as legislators. Such “national-regional crossovers,” combining with frequent reshuffling of akim appointments every two or three years (e.g. Cummings 2005; Junisbai 2010), allowed the president to effectively weaken local elites who had strong support bases in their home regions. Second, it seems that the president implements not only crossovers between the center and periphery but also “parallel appointments” of akims between regions (Siegel 2014). Employing these strategies, the president successfully tightened his control over regional governments in order to use them as a political machine for his own sake.

4.5.3 The Dominant Party, Nur Otan

Built upon the fiscal and political centralizations of the government, the dominant party Nur Otan was founded in December 2006 as a result of the merger between Otan and three other pro-presidential parties: Asar, the Civil Party, and the Agrarian Party. Even at its inception, the party’s organization was more extensive than the previously

existing ruling parties. Currently, it officially claims that there are about 850,000 party members,⁷⁰ a large number for a country of 17 million people. As of January 2015, the party has 225 regional branches and 5,605 primary party organizations across all the oblasts and the two cities Almaty and Astana.⁷¹

Although these official numbers may be exaggerated and do not necessarily reflect real numbers, what makes the party's organization very strong is that it is highly fused with the government. The party mobilizes supporters using various "administrative resources." As of January 2015, akims in most regions other than the Almaty oblast and the Karaganda oblast serve also as the chairman of the Nur Otan's regional branch in each oblast.⁷² It is a well-known fact that akims become a main actor in localities and mobilize supporters on the eve of elections by using financial and other kinds of administrative resources in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the party and the president (Author's interviews with political analysts [#8] and [#9]). Mobilized by akims, both high and low ranks of state officials in oblasts are strongly encouraged to work for the party during election campaigns, while it is often implied by the possibilities of salary reduction and/or losing their jobs if they do not comply with their bosses' orders (Author's interview with a political analyst [#4]). As I discussed above, similar

⁷⁰ The number is drawn from the website of the Central Election Committee. (election.kz)

⁷¹ The website of Nur Otan. (<http://nurotan.kz/ru/regions>)

⁷² The website of Nur Otan. (<http://nurotan.kz/ru/regions>)

mobilization structures can be also found in public hospitals and schools,⁷³ where the local government officials are entitled to appoint deans of these public organizations, who are then encouraged to work as brokers of electoral mobilization in their work places (Del Sordi 2012). Although all these strategies did exist before the foundation of Nur Otan, the efficiency of political mobilization has increased after Nur Otan successfully integrated informal networks into a single-pyramid system administered by the president at the top (Author's interview with a political analyst [#22]). Using the hierarchical mobilization structures, the president succeeds in using the financial resources effectively and mobilizing a large number of supporters nationwide before elections. As Issacs (2013, 132) rightly points out, "Nur Otan's preponderance, which was achieved primarily through its relationship with the president and other state executive actors, means that it is the dominant channel between society and the state. Nur Otan, however, is also the personal political vehicle for the president to establish greater control of formal political institutions. It is not a channel to articulate societal interests."

4.5.4 Weakening of Opposition

As discussed in the previous sections, opposition movements had been relatively stronger and retained considerable mobilization capabilities at elections during the

⁷³ Nur Otan also organizes a youth wing called Zhas Otan in which youngsters carry out intensive election campaigns mainly in public universities to encourage students to vote for Nur Otan (Del Sordi 2012). Many of them become party officials after graduating and aspire to climb up a career ladder to party cadres, so they work hard for the party in this youth organization (Author's interview with a student [#19]). In a broad sense, they are also an important political actor, who mobilizes potential supporters for Nur Otan in return of benefits.

1990s. In particular, before 1995, opposition activities and ethnic movements were highly powerful and the power distribution between opposition and ruling parties was more balanced. This was one of the most important factors that encouraged the president to resort to serious electoral fraud, make a “state list” to select pro-presidential legislators in the 1994 legislative elections, and adopt pure SMD systems in the 1994 and 1995 elections.

Even after 1995, opposition parties still remained popular at least among some voters. As we have already seen, behind his popularity and rich independent resources as the former prime minister, Kazhegeldin challenged Nazarbaev by declaring that he would run for the 1999 presidential elections and establishing the opposition Republican People’s Party. As a political activist who had defected from the regime together with Kazhegeldin states, his severe criticism against President Nazarbaev and growing nepotism within the government was highly compelling and appealing for a large number of citizens because he had been served as the second position until recently and was thought to know the internal workings of the government very well (Author’s interview with a political activist [#24]). Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the chairman of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, also gathered high political support especially from the urban poor and ran for the 1999 presidential elections as a strong candidate from opposition.

In the run-up to the 1999 elections, Nazarbaev responded to these two real opponents by rigging elections seriously and repressing and harassing the opposition leaders. Kazhegeldin, the most serious contender of the president, was barred from running for the presidential elections due to accusations of money laundering in

Belgium as well as his participation in an unregistered political meeting for “Movement for Honest Elections” (Cummings 2005, 28). Although permitted to participate in electoral battles, Abdildin and his Communist Party were also exposed to a variety of electoral manipulation in both the pre-electoral periods as well as the election days. The election results were allegedly seriously falsified against Abdildin and the Communist Party (Author’s interview with an opposition politician [#16]; Olcott 2010, 121).

In November 2001, a significant number of ruling elites defected from the regime and declared that they founded the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. This opposition movement was said to be the largest and most serious dissent within the regime since independence, and that the party had rich, independent financial resources to carry out effective electoral campaigns. This was because the party cadres of DCK including Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, Mukhtar Ablyazov, and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin had come from key business sectors, held important government positions closely related to businesspeople financing the opposition movements, or both (see, e.g. Junisbai and Junisbai 2005; Junisbai 2010; Chebotariev 2009).

Due to political infighting within the party, as well as a series of repression and harassment exercised by the government, some members of the DCK defected and established the Ak Zhol party in March 2002. A political activist who had participated in the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan before joining Ak Zhol stated: “The movement was so spontaneous that leaders in the movement had not been well-prepared for how to lead this new opposition party. We launched the opposition movement to demand more political transparency, but our views on how we could achieve this goal were diverse, which led some people to prefer to a moderate course and defect from DCK.” (Author’s

interview with a political analyst [#8]) This division among opposition leaders seriously harmed the unity and strength of this new opposition movement before the 2004 parliamentary elections. First of all, financial resources of the opposition were dispersed, making it difficult for them to carry out effective electoral campaigns (Author's interviews with a political analyst [#8] and an opposition activist [#29]). Second, although the Communist Party made a pre-electoral opposition coalition with DCK, the Ak Zhol party did not coordinate its candidates and electoral campaigns with the two parties, which helped ruling parties win seats in single-member districts. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the DCK-CPK bloc and Ak Zhol fielded candidates in 48 electoral districts out of 67. In 21 electoral districts, they fielded a candidate from each party.⁷⁴ The DCK-CPK bloc and Ak Zhol could not get any seats in parliament and obtained only 3.44 percent and 12.04 percent of total votes in a party list, respectively, due to the failure to coordination among opposition parties and the increasing mobilization power of the ruling parties using rich oil resources. There was also electoral fraud that undercounted the votes of the opposition parties. Yet, as we have seen, the scale of electoral manipulation was a bit smaller than the 1999 elections. It is said that Ak Zhol would have obtained 25-30 percent of votes if the elections were free and fair (Author's Interview with a political activist [#8]), whereas the Communist party claimed to have scored 9 percent of total votes, clearing the 7 percent electoral threshold (Dave 2004, 9). However, even if the elections had been completely free and fair, the ruling parties and pro-presidential candidates would still have scored more than just a simple majority,

⁷⁴ These figures are based on electoral results showed in Nurmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005).

suggesting that the regime was becoming increasingly stronger, despite the still fragmented ruling coalitions that were due to several governing parties and many independent politicians.

By the time when Kazakhstan held the 2005 presidential and 2007 parliamentary elections, opposition forces had already been suffering further divisions and realignments. In April 2005, Ak Zhol split because of its leaders' disagreement over whether they would participate in a pre-electoral opposition coalition ("For a Just Kazakhstan") with CPK and DCK.⁷⁵ Defected members formed Naghyz Ak Zhol. In 2006 September, National Social Democratic Party (NSDP) was also formed by Jarmakhan Yuyakbay, the former Chairman of the Lower House and an opposition candidate in the 2005 presidential elections. Even though Naghyz Ak Zhol decided to join NSDP two months before the parliamentary elections in August 2007, NSDP gained only 4.54 percent of votes, failing to secure any seats in the parliament. Many analysts admit that by the time of the 2007 elections the opposition camp had become much weaker than ever before due to factors such as extremely low levels of political support in the rural areas, the very fragile nature of their nationwide organizational networks, and absence of financial resources to achieve effective electoral mobilization (Author's interviews with opposition activists [#15, #30] and political analysts [#3, #22]).

⁷⁵ Eurasia.net. Ibragim Aibekov. "Kazakhstan's Leading Opposition Party Faces Split" (<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021605.shtml>)

4.6 Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan

The previous section argued that the president was able to become less dependent on extensive electoral manipulation to bring an overwhelming victory because he successfully increased mobilization capabilities to cultivate votes from the citizenry vis-à-vis opposition parties. The qualitative process tracing also suggests that the president came to distribute more economic favors as the country was enjoying abundant state resources and centralized political organizations.

This section tests the existence and size of pre-electoral economic distribution, namely, political business cycles, by using newly-collected monthly economic data of Kazakhstan (1995-2008). I use the following three indices as my dependent variables, all of which capture economic manipulation before elections from different angles. The first measure is a monthly-specified Consumer Price Index (CPI). Setting the CPI at December 1994 as 100, I calculate the CPI between January 1995 and December 2008. As many studies on political business cycles have argued, inflation after elections can be interpreted as strong evidence that governments adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies before elections. Second, the unemployment rate, which is also monthly variant data, is a valuable measure to check whether opportunistic budget cycles can be observed. Because the National Bank of Kazakhstan does not publicly show the unemployment rate in monthly units, I calculate the unemployment rate by dividing the number of unemployed workers (which is monthly data from *Statisticheskii Byulleten*) by annual total number in the working population (from *Regiony Kazakhstana*). Finally, electoral budget cycles are observed to see if real wage increases

before elections. As I have shown with some anecdotal evidence, the government increases wages of public employees before elections. Statistical analysis using the variable of real wage increases enables me to present more systematic evidence on pre-electoral fiscal maneuvering than anecdotal data. Since the National Bank of Kazakhstan reports the quarterly average nominal wage among workers, I transform it into average real wage dividing nominal wage by CPI. Data sources for all indices are from *Statisticheskii Byulleten*, published monthly by the National Bank of Kazakhstan.

Figure 4.6: Time Series Change in Consumer Price Index




Figure 4.6 plots time-series changes in the consumer price index.⁷⁶ Visual inspection reveals that while each index has certain general patterns (e.g. consumer price index constantly keeps increasing over time) they have some seasonal fluctuations as well. The Figure allows us to roughly grasp the tendencies the index experiences a certain amount of fluctuation around the election times. For instance, inflation appears to increase precisely after elections. After the elections in 2004, 2005 and particularly in 2007, the country was exposed to higher inflation. Moreover, in order to confirm whether there are significant differences between (pre- and post-) electoral and non-electoral periods for the three variables, I conduct simple t-tests and find that four out of six differences are in the predicted directions.⁷⁷ Controlling for seasonal effects and coping with problems accompanied with time-series data, I also conduct OLS time-series regressions with the three dependent variables.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Although I omitted graphs on unemployment rate and real wage increases because of a space constraint, these are available upon request.

⁷⁷ (1) Inflation tends to increase around elections. (2) Prior to elections, the unemployment rate has been mitigated, while it tends to increase after elections. (3) Real wages are more likely to grow before elections, while they will shrink thereafter.

⁷⁸ For details on statistical methods, see Appendix C4.

Table 4.4: Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan, 1995-2008

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dependent Variable	CPI	UR	RW
Pre-election (six months)	0.707 (0.562)	-0.0008 (0.018)	534.78** (238.5)
Post-election (six months)	1.31** (0.532)	-0.015 (0.017)	178.89 (244.6)
Seasonal Dummies	Yes (month)	Yes (month)	Yes (quarter)
Number of Obserbations	167	141	55
adjusted-R squared	0.184	0.546	0.1663
Durbin-Watson	2.029	2	-
ρ	0.596	0.735	-
F value	3.91***	14.08***	3.19**

Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p<.10. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Durbin-Watson test is performed after correcting serial autocorrelation through AR(1) process.

Models 1-3 (Table 4.4) estimate the impact of (pre and post) electoral periods on the three dependent variables. Model 1, in which the variable being regressed is CPI, shows that in the first six months after elections the inflation rate increases by 1.31 percent at the 5 percent significance level. In Model 3, we can confirm that real wages are more likely to increase before elections. Even after controlling for seasonal effects, the raise in salaries is statistically significant (534 Tenges per quarter before elections at the 5 percent level).

On the other hand, Model 2 shows that elections do not have an impact on unemployment rates with any statistical certainty. Although unemployment rates before elections tend to decrease, this is not statistically significant. This result suggests that the political business cycles are not observed in real economic outcomes but as the manipulation of policy instruments under autocracy as in democracies. By manipulating policy instruments before elections, the government might try to show their "competence" of economic management to their constituencies (Rogoff and Silbert 1988; Drazen 2000, 228-246).

Table 4-5: Electoral Cycles, Organizational Strength, and Financial Resources

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Dependent Variable	CPI	CPI	CPI	RW
Experienced Pre-Elections	0.08 (0.137)			116.84*(59.02)
Experienced Post-Elections)	0.425*** (0.131)			56.03 (59.66)
Pre-election (six months)		3.18*** (1.02)	24.15 (19.00)	
Post-election (six months)		-1.96 (1.40)^	-29.15 (18.27)^	
Prop of Gov - Opp		2.715*** (0.849)		
Pre-election*Prop of Gov - Opp		-4.99*** (1.79)		
Post-election*Prop of Gov-Opp		4.68** (2.195)		
Revenue (Log)			0.0875*** (.0267)	
Pre-election*Revenue			-1.06 (.851)	
Post-election*Revenue			1.339 (.817)^	
Seasonal Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	167	167	167	55
adjusted-R squared	0.2235	0.3368	0.2572	0.1618
Durbin-Watson	1.984	1.96	2.06	-
ρ	0.548	0.49	0.572	-
F value	4.7***	6.30***	4.61***	3.12**

Note: Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p<.10. ^p : jointly statistically significant at the 10 percent level. For details, see Figure 4.7. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Durbin-Watson test is performed after correcting serial autocorrelation through AR (1) process.

The statistical results presented so far demonstrate that political business cycles do exist in Kazakhstan. What are relationships among organizational strengths, financial resources and the size of electoral business cycles? According to Models 5-7,⁷⁹ the inflation rates tend to increase around elections under highly centralized governing institutions or rich financial revenues. For Model 5, I introduce the independent variables⁸⁰ -- the number of pre- and post-elections periods experienced since 1995 -- in order to investigate whether the size of electoral budget cycles has become larger as the

⁷⁹ The dependent variable in these models is the first difference of CPI.

⁸⁰ There are 6 elections in total between January 1995 and December 2008. For the variable, I coded the electoral periods as follows: the December 1995 parliamentary election = 1, January 1999 presidential election = 2, October 1999 parliamentary election = 3, September 2004 parliamentary election = 4, December 2005 presidential election = 5, and August 2007 parliamentary election = 6.

country experienced more elections. Given the fact that President Nazarbaev gradually and consistently centralized the government while accumulating financial resources since 1995, the size of electoral business cycles should have a positive association with the number of elections that the country experienced. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant below a 1 percent probability of error, which means that while after the 1995 election the inflation rate increased by just 0.425 percent, post-electoral inflation escalated to 2.55 percent at the 6th election in August 2007. Compared to Model 1, adjusted R-squared of Model 4 has improved by about 4 percent, suggesting that Model 4 is better at explaining the variation in inflation rates than Model 1.

Figure 4.7: Political Business Cycles, Organizational Strength, and Financial Resources

Figure 6a: Marginal Effect of Elections on Inflation Conditional upon Proportion of Ruling Parties





Figure 6b: Marginal Effect of Elections on Inflation Conditional upon Fiscal Revenues



Note: The straight line stands for inflation rates 6 months after elections. The dotted lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.

I expect Models 5 and 6 to test more directly the interactive effects of organizational strengths/state resources and elections on CPI. Here, I operationalize organizational strengths by calculating the difference between shares of parliamentary seats occupied by ruling parties and opposition parties. Given the fact that the centralization of government institutions coincides with the strengthening of ruling parties and weakening of oppositions in the country's context, taking the gap between the seat proportions of ruling and opposition parties works as a good proxy to measure organizational strength in Kazakhstan. To operationalize government resources, I use

logged state revenue (Annual data from IMF country reports). Model 5 examines how the impact of elections will change according to the level of the government's organizational strengths. Figure 4.7a visually tells us that inflation after elections becomes more extensive as ruling parties occupy more seats in the parliament (confidence intervals are the 90 percent level). Notably, when the difference of the proportions between the parties is more than 0.6, the government is more likely to manipulate the economy around elections. Model 7 tests the marginal effect of post-electoral periods on CPI conditional upon the logged state revenue. The coefficient of the post-election dummy changes from -0.5 (when logged state revenue takes the minimum) to 1.8 (when logged state revenue is maximum) and turns statistically significant when the logged revenue becomes more than about 22.0 (Figure 4.7b). Finally, I estimate how real wage increases will intensify as the country experiences more elections in Model 8. The coefficient of the pre-election variable is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that distributive policy before elections becomes more extensive as the autocratic regime has become more centralized and held richer financial resources. This result further supports my argument that strong organizational strength and increasing fiscal revenues are two important factors increasing the magnitude of pre-electoral economic manipulation.⁸¹

⁸¹ For robustness checks, see Appendix C4.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has empirically examined the causal mechanisms posited in theory by conducting an in-depth case study of Kazakhstan. The case of Kazakhstan provides us with an intriguing puzzle on electoral manipulation and authoritarian stability. Although President Nazarbaev seems to have become less dependent on electoral fraud and electoral system manipulation, he successfully consolidated his rule and won big at elections, leading to Nur Otan's perfect dominance of the parliament in 2007. I have explored this puzzle of authoritarian elections by focusing on the distribution of mobilization power between the president and political elites. My in-depth case study has shown a series of qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrating that Nazarbaev enhanced economic distribution before elections, which helped him score an overwhelming majority without employing extensive electoral fraud. Further, I have also shown that Nazarbaev succeeded in streamlining pre-electoral economic distribution by constructing centralized, hierarchical political organizations such as the dominant party, political and financial centralizations of the government, and a top-down style national oil company. On the other hand, opposition parties, which were powerful in the 1990s, suffered financial difficulties and internal divisions. This reduced the need for the president to employ blatant electoral fraud and keep to adopt single-member districts system that would continue to bring a seat premium to his ruling coalition. The case of Kazakhstan suggests that dictators have incentives to not rely completely on electoral manipulation, as long as they can garner voluntary political support from the citizenry through extensive distribution of money and goods.

CHAPTER 5

PROTESTS AND LEADERSHIP TURNOVER

AFTER AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS

5.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, growing pressure from the international community has made it difficult for authoritarian leaders to avoid holding periodical elections. Coinciding with the proliferation of autocracies with elections (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010), scholars of authoritarian politics began to draw their attention to elections' role in authoritarian regimes, asserting that authoritarian leaders may use elections as a tool to consolidate their rule (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011). However, the more puzzling fact about autocratic elections is that elections do not always benefit autocrats to the extent some research suggests. Rather, elections often induce more political conflicts like popular protests that undermine authoritarian stability. For example, the Color Revolutions in post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan) during the mid-2000s all occurred immediately after elections (Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Likewise after the Côte d'Ivoire 2000 elections, massive protests erupted in favor of opposition parties, which subsequently ousted the incumbent president Robert Guéï. Protests allow the opposition to send a clear signal of public dissent to the international community. Thus, even if subdued by dictatorial governments, the

eruption of serious protests may threaten authoritarian stability in the long run, with international actors tightening economic sanctions and adopting coercive diplomacy.

Another form of unexpected post-electoral political change is leadership turnover as a result of elections producing surprising results for the incumbent leader. For instance, unpopular incumbent Prime Minister Bandaranaike lost the Sri Lankan 1977 elections by the largest margin in the country's history to increasingly popular opposition parties. This resulted in not only the opposition's electoral victory but also the strengthening of Tamil opposition people's sentiment toward separatism (Samaraweera 1977, 1201), which helped contribute to the Sri Lankan Civil War. Similarly, in December 1991, the Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid called the first multi-party election in Algeria's history. This election also unexpectedly brought a sweeping victory to the radical Islamic Salvation Front opposition party, triggering a military coup and a civil war (Bouandel 1993). Separately, in the 1989 Polish elections, the opposition Solidarity Movement obtained an overwhelming majority both in the lower and upper houses, paving the way for a democratic transition. "No one in the political elite anticipated the replacement of a Communist government by a Solidarity government. (...) The purpose of (...) election procedures was to permit Solidarity to enter Parliament but to preserve the continuation of Communist rule" (Olson 1993, 417).

Cross-national data⁸² on 78 authoritarian countries (1977-2004) shows that a small but significant minority of authoritarian leaders faces either political turnover or popular protests after elections: 14 percent of authoritarian elections experienced

⁸² Data range in time from 1977 to 2004 and is compiled using Hyde and Marinov's (2012) *National Elections in Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA) and Kelley's (2012) *Quality of Elections* (QOE).

leadership turnover, whereas popular protests occurred in 19 percent of them. Political leaders in dictatorships like Indonesia (1997), Cameroon (1993), Azerbaijan (2000, 2003), and Mexico (1988, 1994) experienced post-election popular protests, while Uruguay (1984), Bolivia (1980), Chile (1988), Haiti (1995, 2000), Sri Lanka (1977), and Liberia (1997) saw their elections lead to political turnover. These variations in post-electoral outcomes in authoritarian states leave us with several puzzles: why do authoritarian elections, which are expected to help autocrats to stay in power, often backfire? Specifically, why do autocrats face two different types of threats— popular protests and political turnover—after elections and how can we understand the sources of these two distinct political conflicts in dictatorship?

In untangling the puzzling relationships among protests, turnover and authoritarian elections, this chapter suggests an answer: authoritarian leaders likely face either protests or overthrow when they fail to successfully manipulate elections in light of their mobilization power. To do so, I first describe the dilemma that political leaders face at the ballot box. Recent literature on authoritarian politics suggests that autocrats try to take advantage of elections to show their invincibility as well as obtain information on key actors' strengths (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Cox 2009; Blaydes 2010; Simpser 2013). To achieve these ends, elections need to be free and fair enough to make the results believable. On the one hand, if election results are seen to be completely predetermined, then authoritarian leaders cannot enjoy the informational benefits of a more competitive election. On the other hand, if elections are too free and fair, it is more likely that autocrats fail to win overwhelmingly. In other words, autocrats face a serious trade-off between the credibility of election results and the certainty of winning big.

Under the constraint of this dilemma, authoritarian leaders need to carefully make a decision about how much they should manipulate elections.

To what extent authoritarian leaders open up the electoral field given the constraints of this electoral dilemma will be determined by their ability to mobilize voluntary popular support from citizens, or autocrats' mobilization power, as discussed in Chapter 2. When the political leader is able to buy a large portion of popular support through extensive pre-electoral economic distribution, he will be able to win big without relying much on the tools of electoral fraud such as election violence, electoral cheating, and manipulation of electoral law. Thus, if the autocrat is financially strong, the more credibly he is able to signal his strength by producing an overwhelming majority at the polls without making the electoral field extremely favorable to herself. By contrast, when the authoritarian leader lacks of such financial resources, he is unable to organize large-scale mobilization of popular support. In this case, fair elections are more likely to produce surprising results, so that the authoritarian leader has a strong interest in biasing election results by engaging in electoral manipulation.

If authoritarian leaders are able to overcome this electoral dilemma by optimally setting the level of electoral fraud according to their mobilization power, then elections contribute to authoritarian stability via the signaling and information-gathering functions. The more complicated fact, however, is that autocrats may have difficulties in setting the appropriate level of electoral fraud in light of their power. When this is the case, autocrats fail to solve the electoral dilemma, and they are more likely to face political conflict after elections – popular protests or political turnover. More specifically, I argue that there are two distinct pathways through which authoritarian

elections induce political conflict. First, when autocrats underuse electoral fraud relative to their power, election results are more likely to credibly reveal the weakness. This brings about leadership change as a result of post-electoral coups within ruling coalitions or via opposition parties' electoral victory. Second, when autocrats overuse electoral fraud relative to their power of mobilization, elections deteriorate the quality of electoral information and hence cannot work as a credible tool to show regime strength. This encourages post-electoral protest movements.

In order to test these empirical implications, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis including 78 authoritarian countries between 1977-2004. I employ a two-stage estimation to test my theoretical expectations. I first run a model in which I predict the level of electoral fraud using a series of regressors measuring mobilization power of authoritarian leaders and other controls that are found to be important to explain electoral fraud in the previous literature. Then, using predicted values in the first-stage model, I measure differences between the predicted level of electoral fraud that the autocrat is expected to employ in light of his strength and the real level of electoral fraud that he actually exercised in the election. In doing so, it is possible to empirically observe how well the autocrat dealt with the electoral dilemma. Then, in the second-stage model, I estimate the likelihoods of leadership turnover and popular protests using probit regressions with this fraud gap variable. My empirical analysis shows that the more negative the gap variable is, the more likely elections are to bring leadership turnover, suggesting that the autocrat's underuse of electoral fraud is more likely to lead to leadership change. By contrast, when the gap variable takes positive values signifying

that the autocrat overuses electoral fraud, the elections are more likely to be followed by popular protests.

5.2 Literature Review

The extant literature of authoritarian politics contends that formal institutions play crucial roles in consolidating authoritarian rule. Since dominant parties institutionalize their patronage system and enable the autocrat to make credible commitment to the internal elite, party regimes are more likely to survive than military and personalist regimes (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008). Multi-party legislatures also increase autocrats' survival rate because it provides a forum through which autocrats can make policy concession to a large portion of society (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008), credibly share patronage with the elite (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Blaydes 2011; Boix and Svolik 2011), and divide and rule opposition parties (Lust-Okar 2004). For similar reasons, multi-party legislatures also make political order stable by preventing civil war and labor protests (Vreeland and Gandhi 2004; Kim and Gandhi 2010).

Among these institutions, elections have been seen as one of the most important political tools that autocrats can use to stay in power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011). First, autocratic elections are viewed as an institution for authoritarian leaders to *acquire* information on competence of ruling and opposition elites. Semi-competitive elections provide information on the popularity of local officials and candidates in their electoral districts (Ames 1970; Shi 1999; Magaloni 2006). The total number of votes that candidates gain in their districts works as an opportunity for

autocrats to judge who among the elites is powerful as well as who is loyal to the dictator (Blaydes 2011). Election results also render information on the geographical distribution of popular support for opposition parties (Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Miller 2012). Second, elections work as an efficient method to communicate with the elites by *conveying information* on regime strengths. By holding elections and winning them with a large-margin, autocrats can credibly demonstrate to potential opponents that the regime is so unshakable that any rebellious attempt against the current ruler will fail (Simpser 2013; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006).

The current literature of authoritarian politics tends to focus on how elections help autocrats stay in power. Other strands of research, on the other hand, have suggested that elections in hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes often contribute to democratization. Lindberg (2006, 2009) argue that repetitive elections in multi-party contexts contribute to further democratization and improve the quality of democracy in Africa. Employing a comprehensive cross-national dataset covering 193 countries between 1919-2004, Teorrel and Hadenius (2009) find both current and cumulative effects of holding elections on democratization, which resonates with Lindberg's finding in the context of Africa. In a similar vein, Roessler and Howard (2009) and Brownlee (2009) assert that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize than both hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes. In this context, Huntington (1991: 174) notes that "the lessons of the third wave [of democratization] is that elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also the death of dictatorship."

In a similar vein, researchers also maintain that fraudulent elections provide an opportunity for opposition parties and anti-regime supporters to protest (Tucker 2007;

Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). Although most protests are repressively subdued, some post-electoral manifestations of public dissent include large scale, anti-government demonstrations. In some cases, these demonstrations lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, which has occurred in the Philippines (1986), the post-Soviet countries (the Color Revolutions, Tucker 2007; Thompson and Kuntz 2009), and Côte d'Ivoire (2000).

In reconciling these different findings about authoritarian elections, scholars have begun to illuminate the background conditions determining authoritarian elections' effects on democratization, leadership change and protest movements. Conducting both a cross-national quantitative analysis of 31 competitive authoritarian countries and a Kenyan case study, Howard and Roessler (2006) find that election results tend to become more open when opposition parties succeed in forming coalitions and launching pre-election anti-government protests. Donno (2013) also asserts that competitive authoritarian states are more likely to democratize either when domestic oppositions form coalitions or when pre-electoral political and economic conditionality is imposed from international actors. In a study on electoral violence in developing countries, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013) provide cross-national evidence that serious pre-electoral violence is positively associated with the probability of post-electoral protests. Similarly, Kuhn (2012) shows that electoral fraud increases the propensity of popular protests after elections (only in fairly close elections, however). And Bunce and Wolchik (2010) emphasize the importance of the opposition's electoral campaign strategies. They argue that in hybrid regimes where opposition parties can carry out

sophisticated, energetic electoral campaigns elections are more likely to trigger both political protests and leadership turnover.

Echoing these previous studies, this chapter posits conditional hypotheses about authoritarian elections' effects on turnover and protests. This research, however, contributes to the literature in two different and original ways. First, taking into account the costs and benefits of authoritarian elections, this chapter theoretically and empirically endogenizes the authoritarian leader's electoral manipulation calculations. Assuming that autocrats will strategically decide on a level of electoral manipulation that maximizes the informational benefits, I argue that autocrats will likely face post-electoral conflicts such as leadership turnover and protests when they miscalculate on the extent of electoral fraud. Second, I explain both leadership turnover and popular protests in a unified theoretical framework. Briefly, I argue that popular protests and leadership turnover both result from different types of mistakes that autocrats make at the ballot box.

5.3 Dictator's Calculus over Electoral Manipulation

According to the recent literature on authoritarian politics, political leaders and their potential opponents are more likely to lack reliable informational sources to know each other's strength and intention (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov, Griev, and Sonin 2009). Since political rights and civil liberties are not institutionalized in authoritarian regimes, people are difficult to know to what extent the political leader is able and popular through reliable media outlets. In such circumstances, potential opponents among

people are less likely to accurately estimate the strength of the autocrat. Such misinformation may increase the likelihood that a conflict accidentally occurs between an autocrat and potential opponents. Strengthening the military is a frequently used strategy by which an autocrat can credibly demonstrate his power. Yet, history suggests that a heavy reliance on the sword risks an autocrat's tenure by giving the military too much power (Svolik 2012). Therefore, strengthening the security apparatus is not a perfect solution.

On the other hand, the political leader also faces difficulties in knowing what people think in authoritarian regimes, because people have an incentive to conceal their preferences fearing tortures and repression by the government (Kuran 1991; Wintrobe 1998). This is problematic because if he is not familiar with the distribution of popular support, it is more difficult to govern the country efficiently. Strengthening domestic surveillance may be an available option to the autocrat. Yet such methods do not always garner high quality information, because in such situations people will falsify their true preferences in the public fearing possible sanctions by the government, as previous studies acutely pointed out (Wintrobe 1998).

Recent studies of authoritarian politics see elections as an important institution to overcome this information shortage. According to the current literature, authoritarian elections enable political leaders to (1) demonstrate their strength via large-scale electoral mobilization to potential opponents (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013) and (2) acquire information on the distribution of popular support of both the opposition and incumbent politicians—both of whom may turn against the political leader (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Blaydes 2010). When autocrats call

elections, however, they face a serious trade-off between the certainty of gaining an overwhelming victory and the credibility of election results, as I discussed in Chapter 2. Authoritarian leaders can stay in power by winning through ballot stuffing, repression, intimidation, and the manipulation of election rules and institutions. Resorting to serious electoral manipulation, authoritarian leaders can effectively deter opposition parties from winning. Yet, at the same time, excessive electoral manipulation makes elections meaningless or even harmful to their authoritarian rule for two reasons. First, extremely pro-regime election results make it difficult for autocrats to convey a credible signal of their regime's strength to potential opponents because the more manipulated elections are, the less election results reflect the autocrat's real popularity. In such predetermined plebiscite elections, citizens tend to be indifferent or cynical about the electoral process and its results as in the Soviet Union (e.g. White 1988: 13; Tedin 1994). Therefore, the signaling effect of elections will be significantly reduced in heavily manipulated elections. The second problem is that if elections are just a façade, autocrats can no longer obtain accurate information about popularity of potential opponents among ruling elites and opposition leaders. Obviously, electoral manipulation biases election results in favor of the autocrat, so that election results will suffer non-negligible noises on electoral information. Deteriorated electoral information makes it very difficult for autocrats to maintain their authoritarian rule efficiently. This is because autocrats need to govern the country without reliable information that would have been obtained if the political system had been more transparent (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov, Griev, and Sonin 2009).

Therefore, although which electoral benefits autocrats want to exploit the most might differ across countries, they all have incentives to open the electoral field and introduce some degree of competition via electoral reforms. This is what happened, for example, in the Soviet Union during the perestroika era (White 1988), in village-level elections in Communist China (Shi 1999), and in Mexico during the PRI's heyday (Eisenstadt 2004, 32-44). That being said, it does not necessarily mean that relatively free and fair elections are always good for autocrats. Given the strategic interactions between the autocrat and potential opponents under the electoral dilemma, if autocrats make elections too transparent, then they are more exposed to risks and may fail to obtain electoral victory with a large margin, thereby revealing their weaknesses. This may give an opportunity for potential opponents to challenge the political leader. On the other hand, excessive electoral manipulation deteriorates the information problems that I mentioned above, which makes efficient communication between the autocrat and opponents more difficult. Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, autocrats need to decide the level of electoral manipulation while considering likely responses from potential opponents, in a way that autocrats can balance the credibility and the certainty of election results.

5.4 Backfiring at the Ballot Box

When an autocrat wins an election by an overwhelming margin, the total number of votes that he obtains consists of “clean” and “dirty” parts. The “clean” part is the total number of real votes from his supporters. These citizens vote for the dictator after

positively evaluating his economic and policy performance. In particular, previous studies suggest that authoritarian leaders' popular support depends on the breadth of their distribution of economic favors to the citizenry (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007, 2009). For example, non-tax revenues like natural resource wealth or foreign aid significantly enrich state coffers and thus enable increased public spending without having to levy taxes on their citizens (e.g., Ross 2001; Desai et al. 2009; Morrison 2009; Wight, Frantz and Geddes 2013). Even if state revenue is raised by taxation, autocrats can buttress public support by selectively collecting taxes from opposition loyalists and using it to benefit regime supporters, as is the case in many authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010, 10-11, Chapters 5-7). Gaining voluntary support is therefore costly because governments must invest large amounts of financial resources to satisfy their citizens. Therefore, an election victory upheld by costly mobilization of citizens' support makes election results credible to know the autocrat's strength and popularity. In this study, I refer to citizens' voluntary support for the political leader through economic and policy performance as the leader's "mobilization power."

The second, "dirty" part is the total number of votes resulting from various kinds of electoral manipulation. As already defined before, electoral fraud is a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003), including election violence, election cheating, and undemocratic restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation exercised largely by incumbent parties during elections (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Using electoral violence against opposition leaders and anti-regime supporters, autocrats can undermine oppositions' effective campaigns and decrease opposition

supporters' turnout. Cheating also allows autocrats to affect the electoral result with nonviolent but still illegal measures such as undermining of oppositions' freedom to campaigns, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, and nonviolent intimidation (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral laws refer to a series of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from effectively participating in elections, including limits on voting rights based on certain social characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, flaws in the complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and gain seats, constraints on the right to run for office such as language and educational requirements, and so on (Kelley 2012). All three fraud techniques, though different, contribute to an electoral victory with a margin that could not be achieved without these techniques.

Making full sense of his mobilization power, if the autocrat can tactfully match the level of electoral fraud with his strength, he can exploit as much informational benefit as possible while maintaining an overwhelming majority. When this is the case, elections contribute to authoritarian stability. In fact, as Chapters 2 and 4 showed, authoritarian regimes with substantial financial resources and a weak opposition tend to have lower levels of electoral fraud, suggesting that authoritarian leaders strategically manipulate elections based on their ability to cultivate voluntary popular support. When the autocrat fails to adequately deal with the electoral dilemma, the elections are more likely to backfire. More specifically, autocrats fail to deal with the electoral dilemma in two ways.

First, stability may not be achieved when authoritarian leaders are overconfident about their popularity, hold multi-party elections, and then lose a supermajority (or

even an electoral victory). Researchers have provided substantial anecdotal evidence and noted that autocrats' overconfidence unexpectedly paves the way for democratization and leadership change—e.g. in Brazil (1974), Pinochet's Chile (1988), Marcos' Philippines (1986), Myanmar (1990) and Algeria (1992) (Huntington 1991: 174-178; Diamond 2008: 53-54). In Poland, for example, the authoritarian government held multi-party elections in 1989 without using serious electoral fraud. The incumbent government did not doubt its popularity, and the opposition Solidarity party also did not expect its eventual electoral triumph (Olson 1993, 425). Nevertheless, after the vote count, Solidarity scored a sweeping electoral victory, which resulted in Poland's transition to democracy. Algeria's 1991 election exhibited similar characteristics to Poland's; however, elections there did not result in democratization. Algeria's president did decide to hold multi-party elections with a free and fair electoral process. In the first round of elections, the opposition Islamic Salvation Front emerged victorious with 87.7 percent of the total seats decided (Bouandel 1993, 13). Fearing the rise of the radical Islamists, the army annulled the election results and removed the president from power in a military coup. This military intervention then led to the civil war between the government and Islamist rebel groups. These Polish and Algerian cases suggest that when an autocrat does not increase electoral fraud up to the level that his *de facto* weakness demands, election results can credibly reveal his regime's true weakness to potential opponents and lead to a leadership change. Revealed weakness in an election is most likely to result in leadership turnover via electoral victory of opposition parties and hence democratization like the cases of Poland and Chile. Or, like Côte d'Ivoire and

Algeria, such dictator's weakness may encourage ruling coalitions to change their leader via a military coup or civil war.

Hypothesis 1: When an autocrat underuses electoral fraud relative to his power, political turnover is more likely to occur after an election.

Second, autocrats may likely face another type of political conflict—popular protests—after they use excessive electoral fraud. When the autocrat excessively rigs elections, potential opponents are more likely to think that election results will be largely driven by political manipulation, rather than voluntary popular support. Therefore, the signals conveyed by the elections to potential opponents are more mixed when it comes to knowing an autocrat's true popularity and strength. In particular, previous studies suggest that “sticks” (blatant electoral fraud) without sufficient accompanying “carrots” (economic favors) encourages potential dissidents to speculate that the regime is now too weak to hold up its anti-regime collective action. As Bunce and Wolchik (2010, 38) put it, “while signals in the admittedly murky political environment of mixed regimes are always hard to read, repression can also be read as an indication that political leaders have become increasingly nervous about their hold on power.” In fact, various studies show that both harsh repression and excessive election cheating without much patronage distribution fuel the escalation of protests in authoritarian regimes. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Wood (2000) argue that African autocracies (when failing to provide goods to citizens) have faced anti-regime popular mobilization after adopting harsh state repression. Investigating the

experiences of South Asian countries during the Cold War era, Goodwin (2001) also asserts that political revolution is more likely to occur in the countries where the government has relied on indiscriminate violence against anti-government forces. Color Revolutions in post-Soviet countries were all preceded by rigged elections (Tucker 2007). In the "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan, violence perpetrated by state police and electoral fraud exercised by incumbents fueled opposition forces' grievances, which activated anti-regime mobilization against the Akaev regime (Jones 2007). Therefore, I hypothesize that after being exposed to excessive electoral fraud, anti-government popular protests are more likely to be observed.

Hypothesis 2: When an autocrat overuses electoral fraud relative to his power, post-election popular protests are more likely to occur.

5.5 Cross-National Statistical Analysis

5.5.1 Data and Modeling Strategies

In order to empirically test the two hypotheses, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis. The unit of analysis is country-election year in an authoritarian country between 1977-2004. I limit my sample to authoritarian countries using a binary classification of political regime by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), a frequently used dataset to identify authoritarian regimes in the literature.

To measure the gap between the degree of electoral fraud and the autocrat's mobilization power, I adopt a two-stage model. In the first-stage, I use Ordinary Least

Squares (OLS) to regress a series of predictors on electoral fraud, which is continuously measured with values ranging between 0 (no fraud) and 15 (most fraudulent) from Kelley's (2012) *Quality of Elections (QOE) Dataset*. The electoral fraud variable includes five subcomponents that bias election results in favor of the incumbent: (1) pre-electoral election violence (0-3), (2) election-day electoral violence (0-3), (3) pre-electoral election cheating (0-3), (4) election-day election cheating (0-3) and (5) restrictions on electoral participation and electoral law (0-3). 0 indicates no fraud, whereas 3 represents for serious fraud. To measure the dictator's power of mobilization, the first model is based on Chapter 2, which is briefly described below again. In addition to a series of variables measuring mobilization power, I also include other variables that are seen as relevant in the study of electoral manipulation. I then calculate the gap between predicted values in this first-stage model and real values of electoral fraud. In the second stage, I regress this gap variable (predicted values – real values) and other relevant controls on the two dependent variables – leadership turnover and popular protests. Capturing this gap enables us to see how well dictators match the level of electoral fraud with his power of mobilization. In other words, adopting this two-stage estimation, we can empirically assess how successfully the electoral dilemma is resolved. If the gap variable takes more positive values, then it suggests that the dictator manipulates elections more blatantly than he needs. My theoretical expectation is that excessively manipulated elections should be associated with a higher probability of popular protests, while having a lower likelihood of political turnover. When the variable takes more negative values, elections are excessively transparent in light of the autocrat's

strength. Therefore, I expect that political turnover is more likely to follow such elections.

5.5.2 First Model Specification: A Mobilization Model

As I explained above, the dependent variable of the first model is electoral fraud. To measure the main explanatory factor, the autocrat's power to mobilize popular support, I focus on the factors that I introduced in Chapter 2. The first is to what extent autocrats possess the ability to efficiently distribute economic favors to a wide range of citizens. To do so, they need to have (1) substantial financial resources and (2) strong political organizations to discipline ruling elites (and hence streamline economic distribution). As discussed before, the importance of financial resources to buy popular support has been established by previous studies. Without abundant public resources, autocrats cannot buy off popular support through public goods provision to a sufficient extent (see, e.g., Ross 2001; Morrison 2009). To make economic distribution to the citizenry efficient, disciplinary organizations are also necessary because such organizations can deter ruling elites from engaging in exploiting state resources. To measure the financial resources that autocrats control, I use Ross' (2011) oil-gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars. This variable is calculated by multiplying a country's total oil and gas production by the current oil and gas price and then dividing this amount by the total population. The oil-gas value per capita variable is interacted with (1) a dominant-party regime dummy (Geddes, Wright and Franz [2014]) and (2) the size and cohesiveness of

politically dominant ethnic groups⁸³ (from Cederman, Min, and Wimmer's [2009] *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset*). Making long lasting power-sharing possible between the autocrat and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012) and thus preventing ruling elites' myopic appropriation of state resources, dominant-party regimes contribute to reducing the need for election fraud by increasing the efficiency of economic distribution. Coherent, large politically dominant ethnic groups⁸⁴ make it easier for the autocrat to monitor ruling elites' behavior (Fearon and Laitin 1995) while facilitating public goods provision to a large portion of citizens (e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2008). Thus, such dominant ethnic groups help dictators streamline economic distribution. I expect the negative impact of natural resource wealth on electoral fraud will be magnified when authoritarian regimes have dominant parties and/or less fractionalized, large dominant ethnic groups.

A second way to measure an autocrat's mobilization power is the extent to which clear opposition exists. In authoritarian regimes, challenging an autocrat is an extremely costly political behavior because in most cases anti-regime protests are brutally repressed (Davenport 2007). On the flip side, once initiated, this costly action would result in credibly showing the authoritarian leader that a considerable number of people are unsatisfied with the regime and strong opposition does exist at both national and local levels (e.g. Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change during the 2000s) (Kuran 1991; Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni 2011; Weiss 2012). To measure anti-

⁸³ This variable is measured multiplying fractionalization index of politically dominant ethnic groups by the proportion of the dominant groups relative to total population.

⁸⁴ Here politically dominant ethnic groups refer to ethnic groups that have access to political posts at the executive level in the country.

government collective action, I follow the previous literature like Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Howard and Roessler (2006: 372) and use indicators counting the number of demonstrations, riots, and strikes from Arthur Banks' (2010) *Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive*. I compute three years moving averages of the number of riots, strikes and demonstrations (one year lagged) to operationalize opposition's strength.

Besides these variables measuring the autocrat's power of mobilization, I also add control variables: regime types (personalist, military and monarchy), political rights and civil liberties (measured by Freedom House Index, using three years moving average of the index one year before the election), election administrative capacity (using Kelley's [2012] QOE), logged GDP per capita (using World Development Indicators [WDI] and Maddison 2011, one year lagged), GDP growth (WDI, one year lagged), trade openness (measured by sum of exports and imports relative to GDP, using Penn World Tables. One year lagged), rural population (WDI, one year lagged), types of elections (if an election is parliamentary in parliamentarism or presidential in presidentialism, then 1 is assigned, otherwise 0), leader's tenure length, the presence of domestic and international election monitoring (Kelley 2012), foreign aid (percent of GDP, Ahmed 2012. One year lagged), and decade dummies.

Table 5.1: The First-Stage Model Predicting Electoral Fraud

Dependent variable	Fraud
Oil-Gas Value per capita (1 year lagged)	0.00468 (0.017)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.128* (0.07)
Party-Based Regime	-0.292 (0.587)
Oil*Party	-0.0893*** (0.022)
Ethnnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.612** (0.632)
Oil*EOP	-0.0619 (0.081)
Military Regime	-1.907*** (0.715)
Personalist Regime	-0.00312 (0.705)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0338 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.507*** (0.081)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.448*** (0.150)
Main Elections	0.139 (0.189)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.201 (0.402)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0573** (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0271* (0.015)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00741 (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.282 (0.457)
International Election Monitoring	0.251 (0.503)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0300* (0.018)
Constant	5.436 (4.147)
Number of Observations	321
Wald Chi2	594.56***
R squared (overall)	0.481


Note: Decade dummies are included. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.

In Table 5.1, I show statistical results of the first stage model. As I expected, the oil-gas value is negatively associated with electoral fraud when autocrats have dominant parties or more coherent, larger dominant ethnic groups.⁸⁵ The collective action variable is positively correlated with the level of electoral fraud. These results suggest that stronger dictators with mobilization power tend to refrain from using a series of manipulation techniques. R-squared is 0.446, suggesting that the first model explains more than 40 percent of total variations in electoral fraud. Based on this result, I compute predicted values of electoral fraud, which is showed in Appendix C5.

⁸⁵ The interaction between the oil variable and the ethnic-organizational power index is jointly statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

5.5.3 Second Model Specification: Turnover and Protests

Figure 5.1: Gap in Electoral Fraud under Dictatorship



To measure the dependent variable for Hypothesis 1, leadership turnover, I use a variable capturing broadly defined post-electoral leadership turnover from Hyde and Marinov (2012). This variable is coded as 1 if the incumbent leader is replaced after the election, 0 otherwise (NELDA39). It includes all types of post-election leadership change including turnover brought by hereditary successions and nomination of the next leader by the current ruler before an election. As these types of leadership change do not relate to an incumbent's electoral performance, I remove them from the sample by referring to another variable (NELDA23). This variable captures if a successor assumes power after elections. I also found nine additional cases where leadership change occurred because of pre-electoral successions within ruling parties — rather than turnover as

consequences of election results. I excluded these cases and rerun the model to check the robustness of empirical results.⁸⁶ Further, in both models, I do not include cases that experienced political turnover as a result of large-scale popular protests because these political turnover cases are not driven by election results but by protests (the 2003 Georgian election and the 2000 election in Côte d'Ivoire).

My second dependent variable, popular protests, is measured using the NELDA dataset. NELDA includes a variable indicating whether there were riots and protests after the election (NELDA29). If either riots or protests occur after the election, then the variable is coded as 1. As a robustness check, another variable including only riots and protests over electoral fraud is also used (NELDA30).

I calculate an election fraud gap by using predicted values from the first model and then taking the difference between predicted and real values of fraud (predicted values – real values). Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the gap. Using the gap variable as the main independent variable, I estimate probit models to empirically test my theoretical expectations. My empirical tests consist of two parts — a protest model and a turnover model. Regarding controls, I include the same set of control variables for the protest and turnover models.⁸⁷ I add political rights and civil liberties (one year lagged, measured by Freedom House Index's three years moving average), GDP per capita (one year lagged,

⁸⁶ The nine cases are the Tanzanian 1995 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), the Algerian 1999 elections (presidential), the Mozambican 2004 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), the Namibian 2004 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), and the Zambian 2001 elections (both parliamentary and presidential).

⁸⁷ Even if I try every different combination of controls in both models, main results do not change.

WDI and Maddison 2011), economic growth (one year lagged, WDI), trade openness (measured by Penn World Tables, one year lagged), rural population (WDI, one year lagged), types of elections, presence of domestic and international election monitoring (Kelley 2012), election administrative capacity (Kelley 2012), election boycotts (Hyde and Marinov 2012, NELDA 14), military spending per capita (one year lagged, Correlates of War Project), leader's age (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), leader's tenure length (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), logged population (one year lagged, WDI) and violent conflict incidence (one year lagged, from PRIO's *Armed Conflict Dataset*, Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). I also control for regional and time specific heterogeneities by employing regional and decade dummies. To deal with possible temporal dependence, duration of peace years is also included in all models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).


5.5.4 Results

Table 5.2: Probit Analysis of Post-Electoral Turnover and Protests

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent Variable	Turnover	Turnover (recoding)	Protests	Protests (over Fraud)
Fraud Gap	-0.134** (0.06)	-0.103* (0.05)	0.211*** (0.05)	0.197*** (0.05)
Duration of Peace Year	-0.044*** (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.02)	-0.082*** (0.02)	-0.0496*** (0.02)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.029 (0.059)	-0.054 (0.062)	-0.001 (0.075)	-0.024 (0.077)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.149 (0.303)	0.11 (0.348)	0.102 (0.360)	-0.0469 (0.359)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.038* (0.023)	0.054*** (0.016)	0.0495** (0.022)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	0.0001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.00851* (0.005)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.0135 (0.011)
Main Elections	-0.115 (0.143)	-0.122 (0.156)	0.099 (0.128)	-0.0791 (0.130)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.17 (0.380)	-0.186 (0.376)	-0.601 (0.384)	-0.438 (0.388)
International Election Monitoring	0.257 (0.279)	-0.013 (0.308)	-0.008 (0.301)	0.0565 (0.301)
Election Administrative Capacity	0.141 (0.162)	0.188 (0.193)	-0.286** (0.119)	-0.248** (0.105)
Election Boycott	-0.202 (0.284)	-0.218 (0.292)	0.753** (0.313)	0.603* (0.334)
Military Spending per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0005*** (0.000)	-0.000781 (0.002)
Leader Age	0.011 (0.018)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.00484 (0.016)
Leader Tenure	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.00822 (0.016)
Logged Population (1 year lagged)	0.038 (0.156)	0.07 (0.171)	0.330*** (0.127)	0.259** (0.122)
Violent Conflict Incident (1 year lagged)	0.415 (0.321)	0.311 (0.326)	-0.776*** (0.299)	-0.475 (0.305)
Constant	-4.153 (3.80)	-4.223 (4.03)	-6.843* (3.705)	-3.225 (3.749)
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	246	246	288	287
Log Pseudolikelihood	-105.92	-95.27	-96.584	-92.60
Pseudo R Squared	0.2249	0.2411	0.305	0.2669
Wald Chi2	68.29***	57.8***	194.46***	84.36***

Note: Decade dummies and regional dummies are all included in the models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.

Figure 5.2: Predicted Probabilities of Turnover and Protests



Note: Shaded areas are the 90 percent confidence interval. The graphs (a) and (b) are based on Models 1 and 3, respectively.

Table 5.2 reports results of the probit analysis. In Model 1 where the dependent variable is political turnover, the fraud gap is statistical significantly negative at the .05 level. This suggests that if autocrats fail to increase the level of electoral fraud despite their need to do so, they are more likely to experience political turnover after elections. Model 2 limits the sample by excluding the nine cases where political turnover was driven by pre-electoral leadership succession, and the fraud gap variable has the same negative and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of post-electoral turnover. Based on Model 1, Figure 5.2-(a) graphically illustrates how a predicted probability of

turnover changes as the fraud gap variable increases. When the gap variable takes the value of more than 0, the predicted probability is still small. Yet, when the variable becomes more negative (between -1 and -7), the probability of turnover exponentially increases in a statistically significant way. When the variable is 3, the probability of turnover is no more than 10 percent, whereas the probability increases to 42 percent when the gap variable is -6. These results support Hypothesis 1. Closely looking at the data, countries such as Sri Lanka (1977), Bolivia (1980), Honduras (1981), Guatemala (1982), Uruguay (1984), Zambia (1991), Azerbaijan (1992), Haiti (1995, 2000), Liberia (1997), and Niger (1999) underused electoral fraud in their elections, resulting in political turnover.

Then, Models 3 and 4 estimate the fraud gap's impact on the likelihood of popular protests. In Model 3, the fraud gap has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant at the .01 level, meaning that when elections are more exposed to excessive electoral manipulation relative to dictators' mobilization power, they are more likely to face protesters in the aftermath of elections. In Model 4 where I focus only on protests clearly over the government's electoral fraud, a similar, positive and significant effect of fraud gap is confirmed. Using estimation results of Model 3, Figure 5.2-[b] shows how the probability of protests changes with the values of the fraud gap. When the gap variable is negative between -7 and -3, its impact is not distinguishable from 0. Yet, as the variable gets more positive and bigger, the impact of the fraud gap also tends to increase. For instance, when the gap variable is 0, the probability of protests is no more than 8 percent, whereas when the gap variable is 7, the probability rises up to 57 percent. Some examples in which overused electoral manipulation induced post-

electoral protests include Haiti (1984), Senegal (1988), Kenya (1992, 1997), Mauritania (1992), Cameroon (1992), Togo (1994), Indonesia (1997), Algeria (1999), and Côte d'Ivoire (2000).

5.5.5 Robustness Check

To make sure the extent to which the results are robust, I conduct the following four robustness checks.⁸⁸ First, I use two alternative datasets, Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012) and Polity IV, to identify authoritarian countries and reran the models using new samples of authoritarian countries.⁸⁹ Second, one may think that the results in the second-stage model might be unstable depending on model specifications of the first model. To minimize this concern, I alternatively use the electoral fraud variable per se as a main independent variable and I regress it on the dependent variables with the same sets of controls.⁹⁰ Finally, I try every possible combination of control variables in the second models to see if results may change according to model specifications in the

⁸⁸ The estimation results are available in Appendix C5.

⁸⁹ Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012) are an alternative, binary measure of political regimes (democracy vs. non-democracies) covering 1800-2007. Regarding Polity IV (which ranges from -10 and 10), I use a conventional threshold of Polity2 score = 6 to empirically identify non-democracies. If a country's Polity2 score is less than 6, then the country is seen as an authoritarian country. As Polity2 score is covering countries that are exposed to civil war, we are able to avoid possible bias in estimation that we might have by using Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2010) binary measure, which excludes countries under civil war.

⁹⁰ From the theoretical point of view, using the electoral fraud variable per se does not necessarily represent the idea of the "fraud gap." However, a correlation between the fraud gap and the electoral fraud variable is very high, 0.72.

second stage estimation.⁹¹ As a result of these robustness checks, I find that all results are vertically the same as the ones that I reported above.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter explores the conditions under which elections contribute to political conflict in authoritarianism—specifically leadership turnover and popular protests. Pointing to the fact that authoritarian leaders face a trade-off between the certainty of winning an overwhelming majority and the credibility of election results, I argue that when autocrats fail to match their electoral fraud to their *de facto* power balance with political elites, elections are more likely to be followed by political conflict. A cross-national statistical analysis of 78 authoritarian countries from 1977 to 2004 rendered empirical support for my theoretical predictions. The theory and empirical analysis of this chapter suggest that elections are a double-edged sword for authoritarian leaders: Elections may provide a good chance for autocrats to improve information shortage inherent in authoritarian regimes, yet the failure of choosing an appropriate level of fraud backfires on authoritarian leaders themselves. Recognizing this election paradox and preventing autocrats from flexibly manipulating elections via international pressures and foreign policies, the international community and domestic opposition may be able to transform authoritarian elections into the window of opportunity to achieve democratization.

⁹¹ Due to space limit, I do not show all the results for this part of robustness checks. The results are available upon request.

CHAPTER 6

The FAILURE OF STRATEGIC FRAUD AND POPULAR PROTESTS:

THE CASE OF KYRGYZSTAN

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter empirically examined the conditions under which post-electoral protests and leadership change are more likely to occur through cross-national statistical analysis. Centering on the electoral dilemma and power distribution in dictatorships, I have argued that excessive electoral fraud is more likely to spark popular protests, whereas leadership turnover is more likely to occur when weak dictators mistakenly open the electoral field. With the theory in mind, this chapter provides a case study of Kyrgyzstan (1990-2005) to illustrate how excessive electoral fraud leads to post-electoral popular protests.

There are two reasons why I choose Kyrgyzstan as the object of my case study for post-electoral political conflicts. First, employing the method of difference, two similar countries, Kazakhstan (Chapter 4) and Kyrgyzstan, enable me to explore when authoritarian elections may (or may not) backfire on dictators. At the time of independence, Kyrgyzstan shared many commonalities with Kazakhstan, such as ethnic diversity, implementation of radical economic reforms, economic crisis, presidential systems, authoritarian regime types (civilian dictatorship), center-periphery relationships, and a trajectory of political regimes (nascent democratization after

national independence was soon followed by the emergence of electoral authoritarianism). President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, however, faced a large-scale popular protest after the 2005 parliamentary elections, the so-called “Tulip Revolution.” On the other hand, as I demonstrated through the in-depth case study of Kazakhstan (Chapter 4), President Nursultan Nazarbaev successfully consolidated his authoritarian rule in the same period of time. Comparing the two countries under the most-similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970), the two case studies allow me to focus on the impact of the variable of interests on post-electoral protests while controlling for many other factors.

Second, in addition to the comparison with Kazakhstan, I also conduct a within-case analysis of Kyrgyzstan to illustrate to what extent my theory can explain time-series variations in electoral fraud and post-electoral protests within Kyrgyzstan. Although comparative analysis of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan permits me to match many important covariates influencing electoral fraud and post-electoral conflicts because both countries have much in common, there are still important differences between the two countries that could potentially influence authoritarian politics and regime change such as population size, country size, absolute volume of natural resource wealth, and sensitivity to international influences. Comparing different elections within Kyrgyzstan over time, I am able to control for these additional confounding factors that are very different from those of Kazakhstan.

This chapter is organized as follows. In next section, while comparing with the similar experience of Kazakhstan that I detailed in Chapter 4, I briefly illustrate processes in which Kyrgyzstan transitioned from an electoral democracy to an electoral authoritarian

regime by the mid-1990s. Then, in stark contrast with Kazakhstan, I show that President Akaev's mobilization power had tended to decrease over time, preparing background conditions for the Tulip Revolution in March 2005. Focusing on the change in the distribution of power between the president and other political elites, I explain the level of electoral fraud in the 1995 and 2000 elections as well as the eruption of massive popular protests after the 2005 parliamentary elections. I argue that President Akaev faced massive protests in 2005 because he excessively manipulated the 2005 elections expecting that he would not collect extensive support from voters. Such excessive manipulation and overwhelming election victory at the elections made opposition believe that the regime would be weaker, given the high unpopularity of the Akaev regime. Lastly, conclusions follow.

6.2 From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism

Much like President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Askar Akaev also embarked on political liberalization after winning the presidential election of the Republic of Kyrgyz in 1991. Democratization initiated by Akaev was deeper than that in Kazakhstan and admired by the Western media broadcasting that Kyrgyzstan was an "island of democracy" in authoritarian Central Asia. Indeed, during the first couple of years after independence, the country could be more accurately depicted as an "electoral democracy" satisfying the procedural definition of democracy. First, the country had already held free and fair presidential elections in October 1991, through which Akaev was elected. Although parliament had banned the Communist Party from running a

candidate, no other candidates were prohibited and Akaev and his backers did not intimidate opposition parties. Positively assessing Akaev's consensus-based, multi-ethnic approaches that he had been taking after the ethnic riots occurred in Osh in June 1990 (Spector 2004, 8),⁹² both democratic activists and the opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan strongly supported Akaev and did not offer an alternative candidate (Collins 2006, 179). Although there was a lack of contest, the elections were widely recognized as free and fair, both within Kyrgyzstan and abroad (Collins 2006, 179).

Second, the separation of power between the executive and the legislature was guaranteed in the Constitution. Since independence, there had been a long process and much debate among various political actors over the Constitution. After numerous discussions within the government as well as on the public, the Constitution was established in May 1993.⁹³ Although Akaev sought to endow the president with a strong power to implement political and economic reforms under a presidential system, he simultaneously pursued a constitutional framework in which the presidential power would be checked by the legislature and judiciary. Some political figures in the presidential office such as Felix Kulov wanted a strong president and a weaker legislature, but Akaev himself rejected the idea to adopt such a "super-presidential" system (Collins 2006, 182-183).

⁹² Before the 1991 presidential election, Akaev had been serving as the president of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic for one year.

⁹³ Regarding detailed political processes on the 1993 Constitution, see, for instance, Anderson (1999, 25-27) and Collins (2006, 179-181; 182-184).

Third, political parties and social movements grew before and after the declaration of independence. In February 1991, Akaev signed a law on social organizations, which created a framework for the activities of associations, interest groups, and political parties. And, in practice, the law paved the way for people to create various voluntary associations. By February 1993, the Ministry of Justice had registered 258 social organizations, including 15 political movements or parties, 31 professional bodies, 21 national-cultural centers or organizations, 41 sporting bodies, 11 children's and young people's and 5 women's organizations and the number had been further increased up to nearly 1,000 by the summer of 1997 (Anderson 1999, 31). Twelve political parties were registered for the 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections, including the Social Democratic Party and the Ata Meken party, opposition parties, both of which stemmed from the strongest opposition movement at that time, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (Collins 2006, 184).

Lastly, relatively free media had emerged during the same period. Already soon after October 1990, when Akaev was approved as the president of the Kyrgyz Socialist Republic in parliament, the official media such as *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (later renamed as *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*) began to develop an independent tone and informatively explore a variety of political issues, followed by numerous newly established newspapers and other media outlets (Anderson 1999, 29; Collins 2006, 186-188). One of the most critical newspapers was the parliamentary paper *Svobodny Gory*, which came to severely criticize the president. Another weekly newspaper *Res Publika* also reported corruption scandals (Anderson 1999, 30).

For about two years after independence, the parliament and president had forged cooperative relationships due to Akaev's tactful co-optation techniques toward legislators and Medetkan Sherimkulov's (the speaker of the parliament) effectively restraining the fractured opposition in parliament (Huskey 1997, 256-257). Yet, as economic crisis deepened, different views on radical economic reforms between the parliament and the president contributed to heightening tension between the two. Similar to Kazakhstan, members of the assembly started to challenge President Akaev, criticizing alleged practices of political corruption over privatization and foreign trade among government officials.⁹⁴ The communists in the parliament went on the offensive against the president because most of them were supposed to lose their seats due to the new Constitution stipulating that total seats in the two new chambers would be reduced from 450 to 300 in the next elections (Spector 2004, 19; Collins 2006, 227). Midst the serious confrontation between the parliament and the presidential palace, Prime Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev was forced to resign in January 1994 after the investigation over the selling of mining rights at the Kumtor goldmine to a Canadian firm, Cameco (Huskey 1997, 257). This is also very similar to the case of Prime Minister Tereschchenko of Kazakhstan, who presided over privatization processes from October 1991 until October 1994, yet ended up resigning after having faced the similar scandals over privatizations. Chyngyshev's resignation impressed people that opposition in the parliament had been enhancing political pressures on the president.

⁹⁴ For detailed analysis on economic reform such as privatization and foreign trade, see Pomfret (2006, Chapter 5).

Facing increasing pressure from the parliament, Akaev began to take authoritarian measures by late 1994, turning the country into an electoral authoritarian regime (Huskey 1997; Anderson 1999; Spector 2004; Collins 2006). In order to overcome the impasse between the assembly and the executive, Akaev strengthened presidential power through undemocratic ways. In September 1994, some members in parliament refused to attend opening session of the fall legislature. Taking advantage of this opportunity, President Akaev dismissed the parliament, calling for new elections, because the 1993 Constitution stipulated that when the parliament fails to satisfy a quorum the president is entitled to dismiss it (Collins 2006, 227). At the same time, during the parliamentary boycott, Akaev convoked a referendum to call for a new, smaller, bicameral parliament having only 105 seats in total (the Upper House: 35 deputies; the Lower House: 70 deputies) as well as the electoral law, reducing the power of parliament and strengthening presidential power (Collins 2006, 227-228). Further, convoking another referendum in 1996, Akaev made amendments on the 1993 Constitution and strengthened the formal power of the president. This violated the 1993 Constitution because constitutional changes via referenda were prohibited on the Constitution (Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, 227).

Media and social movements also were beginning to be exposed to intimidation from the government from the mid 1990s. Harassment toward the media and opposition became more serious over time during the Akaev regime. In June 1994, the government began to restrict the media freedom by closing down two newspapers, including the parliamentary paper *Svobodnye Gory*, which was highly critical of the president. In the spring of 1995, the president launched a criminal prosecution for defamation against

Zamira Sydykova and Tamara Slashcheva, editors of the independent newspaper, *Res Publica* (Huskey 1997, 258). Besides these direct measures, the government put pressure on state-run papers to engage in self-censorship and on other media to replace their editors from 1995 to 1997 (Anderson 1999, 57). The number of incidents of intimidation against opposition leaders and religious activities grew, seriously threatening pluralism in the country (Anderson 1999, 56-59). By the late 1990s, the optimistic assessment of the West toward the prospect of democracy in Kyrgyzstan had rapidly faded; an electoral authoritarian regime had emerged, much like that of Kazakhstan.

6.3 The Weakening of Akaev's Mobilization Power

There are, however, important differences between Akaev and Nazarbaev in temporal changes in their mobilization power. And, I argue that this difference led to the contrasting impact of authoritarian elections on political order – massive protests and authoritarian breakdown after the 2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan and post-electoral consolidation of the Nazarbaev regime in the 2000s. As discussed in Chapter 4, Nazarbaev succeeded in enhancing his mobilization power vis-à-vis other political elites primarily with the help of growing natural resource wealth in the late 1990s to the late 2000s, reducing the need for him to use extensive electoral manipulation. Conversely, Akaev tended to deteriorate his mobilization power over time, which encouraged him to gradually resort to blatant electoral fraud in elections. Facing declining power, he consequently used excessive fraud in the 2005 elections and won the elections

overwhelmingly, which triggered popular protests mobilized by opposition elites who believed the regime was already weak. While comparing with Kazakhstan, I examine Akaev's decreasing power of mobilization by looking at the three factors in my theory of authoritarian elections: (1) Financial resources, (2) weakening of organizational bases, and (3) the emergence of strong opposition.

6.3.1 Financial Resources: Gold and Aid

Although he initially possessed financial resources stemmed from gold and foreign aid, the amount of such resources to which Akaev was accessible to distribute had declined from the mid-1990s all the way up to the mid-2000s. Different from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan does not possess rich natural resources such as oil and gas.⁹⁵ Only relevant source of natural resource wealth in the country is the Kumtor gold mine, which accounted for nearly 50 percent of industrial output in Kyrgyzstan between 1996-2000 (Pomfret 2006, 80). In 2002, when a landslide occurred and shut down the gold mine, GDP growth dropped to zero, indicating that the country's whole economy was highly dependent on this gold mine (Pomfret 2006, 80). Yet, compared to Kazakhstan, the gold wealth did not necessarily contribute to improving Akaev's mobilization power especially after the 2000s for two reasons. First, mineral income per capita in the country was still too small to dramatically improve people's living. Gold income per capita accounts for only 1 percent of GDP per capita, which is far smaller than Kazakhstan's natural resource wealth occupying 15 percent of GDP per capita on

⁹⁵ According to Ross (2011), oil-gas value per capita is only 3.9 USD on average between 1992-2005.

average between 1995-2005.⁹⁶ Second, especially from the early 2000s, it is said that the gold wealth were put into high officials' pockets for their personal use. In 2004, a financial restructuring of the joint venture for the Kumtor mine created a new company Canterra listed on the Tronto Stock Exchange. The company was politically controversial because high-ranking government officials were accused of enjoying vast amount of rents from the company (Pomfret 2006, 80).

As Kyrgyzstan did not possess abundant natural resources, Akaev attempted to fill the gap by turning to foreign aid and stabilization loans from international organizations and the Western countries. One of his motivations behind rapid political and economic reform was to appeal to the international community to receive financial assistance (Tordoff 1995, 496). Akaev "took the view that only by adopting such a pro-reform position in advance of many neighboring states could his country hope to attract investment and economic support from the outside world" (Anderson 1999, 75-76). Responding to the radical reforms, international organizations agreed to provide extensive financial support to Akaev; the IMF provided over 60 million dollars to back up the introduction of the Kyrgyz som in May 1993; the World Bank offered a number of substantial credits to support the reform programs; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) also provided large amounts of financial assistance to smooth privatization processes (Anderson 1999, 76). In sum, foreign aid from the Western countries had increased

⁹⁶ I made this comparison on people's dependence on natural resource wealth by using Haber and Menaldo (2011).

dramatically from less than 25 million US dollars in 1992 to more than 275 million US dollars in 1995 (McGlinchey 2011, 89; World Development Indicators).

Yet, as Akaev turned into an authoritarian leader and strengthened authoritarian rule, financial assistance from the international community had been cut, leading Akaev to suffer a lack of financial resources from the early 2000s. Foreign aid, which had been maintained between 230 and 300 million USD between 1995-1999, decreased to less than 200 million USD between 2000-2003. In addition, serious, long-standing economic downturn after the rapid economic reform made it difficult to improve tax revenues.

Essentially, financial resources stemmed from foreign assistance are more difficult to use directly for political purposes than natural resource wealth because international actors pay close attention to how the central government uses foreign aid. As a legislator in the parliament, who had been working in the agency of state budget during the Akaev regime, stated: “Akaev and his government could not use foreign assistance for electoral purposes through fiscal policies due to international organizations’ monitoring budget of the country” (Author’s interview with a deputy [#33]). Yet, as I discuss later, Akaev tended to share the use of foreign aid with local ruling elites, which helped him improve his mobilization power in locality during the mid-1990s. This in turn enabled him to hold relatively fair and free elections.

In the wake of the Afghanistan War in 2001, the Kyrgyz government decided to supply the air base at Manas to the United States, which resulted in generating unexpected windfalls to the Akaev regime. It is estimated that U.S. air base at Manas provided on average revenues of 40 million USD for their fuel subcontracts, 2 million USD for rent of the U.S. air base, as well as 7 thousand dollars every time a U.S. military took off from

Manas to the Akaev government between 2003 and 2005 (McGlinchey 2011, 98). All these payments, however, never passed through official Kyrgyz accounts. The Akaev family was alleged to have put the money into their pockets because family members controlled companies operating the Manas International Airport (McGlinchey 2011, 98). Therefore, fiscal revenues from U.S. air base did not contribute to the president's ability to distribute economic favors to other actors.

6.3.2 Decentralization and Lack of Organizational Bases

In stark contrast with President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan who gradually attained the centralization of his government, President Akaev could not build up centralized political organizations to streamline the distribution of economic resources. Economic reform and privatization promoted *de facto* economic decentralization in the country. Apart from Nazarbaev who always carefully dealt with the risk of fiscal decentralization and controlled the processes of privatization for fear of opposition forces, Akaev allowed economic decentralization. According to Jones Luong (2002, 115), Akaev was "convinced that a significant degree of influence over the economy must be decentralized in order for the transition to the market to succeed. He was hesitant to design an economic reform agenda from the center without careful consideration of local conditions, which he believed regional leaders were in the best position to determine." His decision to delegate economic decision-making to local governments resulted in generating independent businessmen and strong local elites who hold economic resources independent of the central government. The privatization of land did not empower ordinary farmers but benefit collective farm directors, most of whom were strongmen in

locality because the latter could control over privatized land by utilizing personal connections with regional governments (Bloch and Rasmussen 1998, 125; Radnitz 2010, 62-63). Local businessmen, who launched their companies amid of the privatization and received large profits, often ran for legislative elections from their strongholds by using their own local networks and independent resources and gained parliamentary seats (Radnitz 2010; Sjoberg 2011).

Political decentralization went hand-in-hand with economic decentralization. "At this time [November 1990], and especially after his popular elections as the first president of independent Kyrgyzstan the following October, Akaev had the opportunity to decrease or at least impose greater limits on regional akims' growing authority. Yet, he did little to halt the 'spontaneous' devolution of power, and instead, supported policies that directly contributed to this process" (Jones Luong 2002, 108). In March 1992, he supported amendments to the Law on Local Self-Governance and Local Administration in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which strengthened the role of akims in decision-making and the implementation of policies at the local level (Jones Luong 2002, 108-109). Akims had strong powers in their regions. They supervise departments in their oblast governments, serving as the personal and political representatives of the head of governments. Taking advantages of their local authority, they also have an extensive local network "held together bonds of friendship and loyalty, [while having] exerc[ing] extensive patronage (Tordoff 1995, 500). They decide their own budgets, relying less on transfers from the central government, especially in autonomous oblasts. For example, the Southern oblasts such as Osh and Jalal-Abad, opposition's strongholds critical of Akaev, tended to not receive government transfers in 1993 (0 percent and 16 percent, respectively.

Tordoff 1995, 502) and the high autonomy of regional governments was not deprived by the president and rather tended to have got strengthened until the collapse of the Akaev regime in 2005 (Radnitz 2010). Between 1992-1995, 7 akims out of 8 came from the same oblasts (Jones Luong 2002, 290), indicating that decentralization had been much more advanced than that of Kazakhstan. It was very difficult for Akaev to parachute his own favorite, as an akim into regions where the latter did not have local networks, thus was unable to obtain support from local populations. Siegel (2014) documents that only 12 out of 78 akims between 1991-2014 was the ones who “slided” from an akim of one region to that of another, suggesting that the center needed to consider strong regional power in the cadre rotation of akims.

It is not hard to imagine that, in a country where regional elites were very strong vis-à-vis the president, its party system was not well institutionalized. The under-development of national party systems makes the president’s organizational base very weak because he cannot use the party organization to discipline ruling elites. The under-institutionalization of national party systems is manifested by the following two factors: (1) frequent realignments of political parties and (2) proliferation of independent politicians who hold political and financial resources independent of political parties (cf. Hale 2006). Soon after independence, numerous political parties emerged in the country, yet most of them were initiated by powerful regional leaders and/or strongmen in clans and thus attempted to represent only local interests in parliament (Jones Luong 2002, 112-114; Collins 2006, 231-240): “Parties did not serve the function that they do in Western democracies, aggregating the interests of society and translating those preferences into public policy. Instead, parties were vehicles for ambitious elites to gain

or retain a seat in parliament. They were regionally concentrated and weakly rooted in society, and had little organizational capacity” (Radnitz 2010, 71). In the 1995 legislative elections, there were 11 political parties, which obtained at least one seat in the parliament (Nohlen et al. 2001, 447), indicating that the national party system was extremely fragmented. In addition, their support bases were concentrated on certain regions. For example, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, an opposition party led by Topchubek Turgunaliyev, had its main supporters in the Osh oblast, whereas Ata Meken, which was formed when it split from Erkin Kyrgyzstan, had the Jalal-Abad oblast as its main support base. Also in the 2000 legislative elections, in which a party list with a nationwide district was introduced for 15 seats out of 60 to make the party system more nationalized, 9 political parties gained at least one seat and their regional concentrations of supporters were still salient (Nohlen et al. 2001; Abazov 2003, 548; Collins 2006, 240). The Kyrgyz party system did not achieve nationalization but rather remained highly fractionalized, contrasted with Kazakhstan where especially pro-presidential parties became less fractionalized during the same period of time.

Independent politicians also proliferated in elections and the proportion of independents did not decrease during the Akaev regime. Because the country was highly decentralized, independent politicians tended to have close relationships with autonomous akims and local “notables” and thus they were not necessarily pro-presidential (Collins 2006, 237-238), which was different from Kazakhstan where independents were mostly supporting the president, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the 1995 legislative elections, 63.8 percent of elected legislators were independents. The proportion of independents in the 2000 parliamentary elections increased to 69.5

percent (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann eds. 1999, 447), strongly suggesting that the party system remained to not be institutionalized and was more driven by self-nominated politicians. This also makes a large difference with the case of Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan had a large number of independents until the early 2000s, Nazarbaev succeeded in gradually incorporating these independents into ruling parties.

More important is that Akaev could not consolidate his dominant party in such a fractionalized party system and regionally dispersed clan networks. In the 1995 legislative elections, the pro-presidential party Social Democratic Party got only 13.3 percent of total seats. Also in the 2000 legislative elections, the two pro-presidential parties, the Union of Democratic Forces and My Country, obtained 15.2 percent of total seats, which was far from a majority (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann eds. 1999, 447; Abazov 2003, 551). In the party list PR portion of the 2000 elections, the pro-presidential parties scored only 25.1 percent (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann eds. 1999, 445), suggesting very weak mobilization power of Akaev, given that this was achieved only after his seriously having rigged the elections. Two years before the 2005 parliamentary elections, Akaev created a new pro-presidential party, Alga Kyrgyzstan by merging the existing pro-presidential parties, seemingly mimicking dominant parties like Russia's United Russia and Kazakhstan's Otan. Yet, given that the Alga party failed to coordinate with the other pro-presidential party and candidates in the 2005 elections, the party did not incorporate ruling elites very well (Uyama 2006, 49).

6.3.3 Emerging Opposition

Lastly, once it turned out that Akaev could not maintain financial resources to share with other political actors and cement strong political supporters via powerful organizational bases, strong opposition leaders began to challenge him. After the 1995 elections, political elites who had local networks in the Southern regions, began to dissent against the president. Two lawmakers, Omurbek Tekebaev and Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, played an important role to form opposition in the south, being followed by Usen Sydykov, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (Radnitz 2010, 74). As Akaev had lost much of his popularity, opposition had gotten stronger by the time of the 2000 elections, while also involving prominent Northern elites. In particular, powerful ruling elites, who previously supported Akaev and thus occupied important positions in the government, defected from the regime and formed opposition parties while taking advantage of their dense, patronage networks with local populations. Felix Kulov, who came from the north and had served as various important posts in the government including the Mayor of Bishkek between 1998-1999, determined to form the opposition party Ar-Namys in 1999 and declared to participate in the 2000 legislative elections. Daniyar Usenov, another famous politician from the north, also turned into opposition and proclaimed to run for the 2000 presidential elections as an opposition candidate.

Up until the 2000 elections, these opposition forces had been rather divided without making any efforts in coordinating their opposition movements (Lewis 2008, 125-126). But, a riot in 2002 in Aksy, a village which is located in the South of the country, became “a focal point that cemented alliances between new and old oppositionists and pushed fence-sitters into the opposition camp” (Radnitz 2010, 74). Azimbek Beknazarov, the

parliamentary deputy born in and elected from Aksy, was arrested on dubious charges relating to an affray several years ago. Yet, in reality, Akaev ordered his arrest because nationalist Beknazarov planned to impeach Akaev in parliament on the ground that Akaev agreed with the Chinese government to transfer some remote territory in Eastern Kyrgyzstan to China (see, e.g. Lewis 2008, 127). In order to contest the abuse of power by the president, Beknazarov mobilized his local supporters and they started to throw stones at the police, which then opened fire into them, killing five unarmed demonstrators. Subsequent anti-government protests cemented a network of opposition politicians by encouraging a wide range of participation regardless of regions. Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was at that time serving as the Prime Minister and later became the president of Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Akaev regime in 2005, resigned to take a responsibility for this Aksy incident, and then defected from the regime and joined the opposition camp. Prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, he united nine opposition parties into the pre-electoral opposition bloc People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan, consolidating the opposition (Kulov 2010, 342)

In sum, opposition forces had been much stronger before the 2005 parliamentary elections. Strong opposition also makes a clear contrast with the case of Kazakhstan where the opposition camp became weak by the middle of the 2000s.

6.4 Electoral Fraud and the Rise of Massive Protests:

Comparing Elections in the Akaev Regime

By the time Kyrgyzstan held the parliamentary elections in February 2005, Akaev had already lost much of his mobilization power and popularity. His available financial resources had been declining. For his remaining scarce resources, he did not share with other ruling elites and rather he relied more on his family members by appointing them to important government positions, resulting in the family monopolizing state resources (Specter 2004; Collins 2006; McGlinchey 2011). This discouraged local ruling elites to continue to ally with Akaev like they did during the 1990s. In addition, opposition figures, most of which were based on former ruling elites, were challenging the president. In order to explain electoral fraud in Kyrgyz elections since 1995 and the Tulip revolution in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, I analyze the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections in light of Akaev's mobilization power.

6.4.1 The 1995 Elections: Relatively Fair Elections and the Durable Akaev Regime

In the 1995 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), although there were some electoral fraud and irregularities observed, OSCE positively assessed the democratic characters of the elections (OSCE 1995, Huskey 1997, 261). According to Collins (2006, 224-225), "despite some minor violations – far more circumscribed than had been expected, given Akaev's uncertain chances – the elections were given a pass by the OSCE and other international observers." For example, OSCE reported that in some electoral districts multiple voting, vote-buying and non-violent intimidation were

confirmed and Akaev admitted to electoral malpractices (OSCE 1995). Also, in the presidential race, it was said that the presidential candidate Masaliev, who was the first secretary of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the strongest opposition candidate at that time, could not score a slim majority in the Osh oblast where he held a strong support base. This was probably because Akaev extensively stuffed the ballot box in the region by appointing akims in Osh and Jalal-Abad loyal to him (Author's interview with a political activist [#32]; Collins 2006, 236). There were many practices of illegal vote-buying during election campaigns as well in rural area, as Huskey (1997, 261) reported that "in some districts campaign vodka flowed like a river." Yet, the government neither eliminated strong candidates by deregistering them in advance before those elections nor seriously biased media in favor of the president and their pro-presidential candidates. Although there was some intimidation to the media, there were also still active, independent media, and Akaev did not try to hold powerful media outlets broadcasting political views in favor of the president. Many of electoral irregularities were probably due to the low quality of bureaucracy and an inexperienced electoral management body in charge of operating the elections.

One of the most plausible reasons why Akaev won the presidential and parliamentary elections with relatively free and fair elections was that he could successfully mobilize local networks by making cooperative relationships with akims and other local elites (Collins 2006). At that time, sharing with ruling elites financial resources largely obtained from international assistance and gold, he managed to maintain relatively stable ruling coalitions to grip on power. As McGlinchey (2011) succinctly points out, "paradoxically, the diffuse nature of economic and political reform aid – the fact that

reform aid is distributed not directly to the president but to ministers, regional and local governments, members of parliament, even NGO activists -- forces leaders like Akaev to pursue the very wealth redistribution policies that are most likely to sustain autocratic rule" (McGlinchey 2011, 94). In exchange for financial resources drawn from the president, members of the ruling coalition then mobilized their supporters in their electoral districts by utilizing their own local patronage networks and resources, which was very effective in bringing electoral victories to Akaev in the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections (Huskey 1997, 258-259; Collins 2006, 231-240). Although the alliance between Akaev and ruling elites was not established well enough to be sustainable in the long run, the former could derive support from the latter by distributing patronage that he held even amid of serious economic crisis. In addition, my analysis of political business cycles in Kyrgyzstan confirmed that although the effect is not distinguishable in a statistically significant way, post-election inflation rates are about 4 percent, which is even higher than the later elections in 2000 and 2005, suggesting that Akaev's efforts of distribution might have been larger in the later elections.⁹⁷

6.4.2 The 2000 Elections: Electoral Manipulation and the Absence of Large-Scale Protests

However, as financial assistance decreased and opposition became more active, Akaev turned more inclined to use serious electoral manipulation. OSCE concluded that the 2000 legislative and presidential elections both were more seriously manipulated than the 1995 elections and thus fell short of international standards of democratic

⁹⁷ Details on the analysis are showed in Appendix C6.

elections (OSCE 2000b; OSCE 2001). The Quality of Elections Data constructed by Kelley (2012) codes that the 2000 elections were more fraudulent than the 1995 elections: “The pre-election period was marred by a high degree of interference in the process by state officials, a lack of independence of the courts, resulting in a selective use of sanctions against candidates, and a bias in the state media” (OSCE 2000b, 1). Two major opposition parties – Ar Namys and Bei Bechara -- both of which were formed by powerful opposition politician defected from the government, Felix Kulov and Daniyar Usenov, were barred from registering for the election on the ground that the parties did not qualify under the new regulation requiring parties to have been registered for a year before the election. Kulov himself ran for the parliamentary elections and obtained the largest vote shares in the first round of vote, yet on the second round of vote his votes decreased for unknown and unexplainable reasons and he lost the elections (Uyama 2006, 47). After the elections, he was indicted for embezzlement and jailed until the end of the Akaev regime in 2005. Usenov and Topchubek Turgunaliev, other famous opposition leaders, were also imprisoned after the elections. State-owned newspapers and TV news broadcasted political news in favor of leading pro-presidential parties, such as the Union of Democratic Forces and the Democratic Party of Women, as well as the president (OSCE 2000b, 12; OSCE 2001, 9).

Although the 2000 elections were more seriously rigged than those in 1995, they did not provoke nation-wide mobilization. Although there were occasional protests in support of defeated opposition candidates, they did not develop into larger ones (Kulov 2010, 117). Why? First of all, opposition forces were not united at that time, yet some prominent opposition candidates could gain some seats, which may lead them think that,

although elections were surely rigged, electoral fraud was not extensive to completely crowd out the opposition parties (Kulov 2010, 120). In fact, although the most powerful opposition leaders like Kulov and Usenov were repressed and exposed to serious electoral fraud, some others such as Adahan Madumarov, Azimbek Beknazarov, Ismail Isakov, and Omurbek Tekebaev could secure seats in the 2000 elections by mobilizing their local networks. Different recognition over the seriousness of electoral fraud among opposition leaders may have made it difficult for them to unite together after the elections. Second, although financial resources that Akaev could use had been decreasing, he still did not monopolize state resources at the time of 2000 to squander them for his family like he did after the 2000 elections (McGlinchey 2011, 88-86). Although pre-electoral distribution is not observed in my analysis of political business cycles (post-electoral inflation rates are 0.029 percent; see Appendix C6), he could manage to keep most of them to stay in the regime, sharing scant resources with members of the ruling coalition.

6.4.3 The 2005 Elections: Excessive Fraud, Popular Protests and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime

The 2005 parliamentary elections sparked popular protests in some electoral districts in the first round of voting on February 27th, which escalated into national-level mobilization in the second round of voting on March 13th. After the second round, the central election commission declared that pro-presidential candidates obtained an

overwhelming majority of seats.⁹⁸ Protesters, many of whom came from local places and were mobilized by local elites, set out to the capital Bishkek and held meeting to demand Akaev's resignation and called for another election due to serious electoral manipulation. By March 24th, the number of protesters had reached 15,000-20,000, clashing with pro-presidential supporters as well as the police (Marat 2008, 7). Finally, protesters stormed the presidential palace only to discover that Akaev had already flown from there a few hours ago.

OSCE reported that the parliamentary elections were relatively competitive in the election-day (OSCE 2005) in that multiple candidates were contesting in a large number of districts, but at the same time they also documented that prior to the elections, Akaev resorted to extensive electoral fraud to seriously bias election results in favor of pro-presidential candidates as well as the ruling party Alga Kyrgyzstan. This extensive pre-electoral manipulation made people suspect that election results did not reflect real popularity of the regime. First and foremost, de-registration of powerful opposition candidates convincingly impressed people that Akaev may not be able to win the elections overwhelmingly without excluding these opposition leaders in advance. Rosa Otunbaeva, a former diplomat having resided in Moscow and a famous opposition leader, was barred from running for the election because she did not meet the permanent, in-country residency requirement of five years prior to candidate nomination. Besides her, 11 other candidates were rejected from registration (OSCE 2005). Second, illegal vote-buying by pro-presidential candidates was widespread. During election campaigns, as

⁹⁸For detailed description on the Tulip revolution, see, for example, Uyama (2006), Marat (2008), Cummings (2010), and Radnitz (2010, Chapter 6).

they could not rely on the government's expansionary fiscal policy, candidates gave out small gifts like food, clothes, soup, tea, and vodka to a large number of voters (Radnitz 2010, 132-133). According to an international observer, "pre-election vote buying [was] the worst she had seen in fifteen years of Kyrgyz elections"(Radnitz 2010, 133). Third, media was exposed to more extensive control by the government. "Most media monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR failed to provide impartial and fair coverage of the campaign. Almost all media paid extensive attention to the authorities, mainly to the President" (OSCE 2005, 16).

Due to pre-electoral manipulation, election results in the first round of voting were highly favorable to pro-presidential candidates. Out of 725 seats in legislature, 32 electoral districts decided winners. Of these, surprisingly only 2 electoral districts were won by the opposition, and the rest were taken by pro-government or independent politicians (Radnitz 2010, 136). Even among pro-presidential candidates, they often competed with each other, signaling that ruling parties and the president did not control the ruling camp well (Uyama 2006, 49). Bermet Akaeba, the president's daughter who ran for the elections in Bishkek, only obtained 45 percent of votes despite enormous pressure on students to vote for her and restrictions on the campaigns of her opponents (Lewis 2008, 138).

For many opposition supporters, their devastating loss of was very surprising, given that the united opposition actively campaigned amid of serious electoral manipulation by the government. In addition, people generally perceived that the Akaev regime was highly unpopular due to growing nepotism and corruption within the government, as described in the previous sections. Motivated by this large gap between unpopularity of

the Akaev regime and the overwhelming victory of pro-presidential candidates in elections, opposition leaders, most of whom were losing the elections, found it easier to mobilize their supporters to denounce this much electoral fraud by the government. As Henry Hale rightfully points out, “when the first round of voting indicated that Akaev’s supporters were winning far more seats than the regime’s popularity level made credible, when major opposition figures like Roza Otunbaeva were disqualified, and when Akaev’s relatives [...] appeared to be headed to parliamentary seats [...], losers of the formal counts rallied their forces and quickly joined efforts, with southern network leading the way” (Hale 2015, 196). After electoral defeats of opposition candidates, they started to mobilize their supporters to protest against electoral fraud committed by the government. Once large protests occurred in some electoral districts, protests over electoral fraud spread to other districts and regions, which reduced the costs for people to join the public dissents and thus escalated into national-level mobilization.⁹⁹

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the case of Kyrgyzstan. In the 1990s, the Akaev regime tended to share financial resources derived from international assistance and mineral resources with members of ruling coalitions, which made him to outpace opposition leaders and mobilize a large number of supporters even under a decentralized circumstance without resorting to serious electoral fraud. Yet, as financial resources

⁹⁹ The dynamics of protests in the Tulip revolution is well depicted by Marat (2006), Cummings (2010), and Radnitz (2010).

became scarce and Akaev relied more on his family and cronies to maintain his regime, he became more inclined to use serious electoral manipulation. In the 2000 elections, using extensive electoral fraud was still effective to manage to sustain the regime because the opposition was still weaker than later. Yet, as opposition united before the 2005 parliamentary elections, Akaev resorted to far more extensive pre-electoral manipulation, which contributed to generating a big gap between his perceived popularity and pro-presidential candidates' electoral performance at the first round of voting. This sparked massive opposition protests soon after the elections. The case of Kyrgyzstan illustrates well my argument that excessive electoral fraud in light of the dictator's mobilization power encourages people to take to the streets, which then results in threatening the stability of authoritarian regimes.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has explored the causes and consequences of authoritarian elections. Authoritarian leaders need to deal with the dilemma at the ballot box: In order to maintain their rule, they need to win big in elections, yet manipulation of election results loses the informational benefits of authoritarian elections – credibly showing regime strength and knowing the distribution of political support from the citizenry. Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, authoritarian leaders design authoritarian elections. Designed elections then have important implications on post-electoral political order in autocracies.

In this dissertation, I have argued that domestic power relationships between the dictator and political elites determine how much the dictator designs authoritarian elections in his favor. Strong dictators, who can mobilize regime supporters by using rich financial resources in efficient ways, have an incentive to not manipulate elections. By refraining from serious manipulation of election results, authoritarian leaders can take advantage of authoritarian elections to fill the gap of information in authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, “weak” dictators, who lack of financial resources, binding political organizations or face strong oppositions, are likely to rely more on electoral manipulation because revealing their *de facto* weakness at the ballot box leads authoritarian elections to have destabilizing effects on political order.

With this information theory of authoritarian elections in mind, Chapter 2 examined the determinants of electoral fraud cross-nationally. Employing cross-national data covering 78 authoritarian countries (1977-2004), I found that dictators, who have rich natural resource wealth, strong political organizations, and weak opposition, tend to “liberalize” elections by relying less on election violence, election cheating, and the manipulation of electoral law.

Chapter 3 turned to the logic of the electoral system change in electoral authoritarianism. Choosing SMD systems, dictators can enjoy a larger seat bias with fewer votes, which enable dictators to win big with less mobilization power. Yet, SMD systems make election results a mixed signal to convey regime strength as well as facilitate opposition parties’ pre-electoral election coalition making, which undermines the dictator’s demonstration of invincibility at the ballot box. PR systems, on the other hand, require dictators to obtain a larger number of votes to win elections overwhelmingly. In so doing, they can send a costly signal of their regime strength and also can prevent oppositions from making a pre-electoral coalition at the expense of the probability of winning big. Using an original cross-national data of electoral system changes in electoral authoritarianism (1946-2007), I found that dictators with abundant natural resource wealth tend to choose a more PR-based system.

Chapter 4 then provided an in-depth case study of Kazakhstan in which President Nazarbaev consolidated his rule despite the fact that he became less dependent on blatant electoral fraud and electoral system manipulation. My case study demonstrated that during the 1990s when Nazarbaev was still too weak to mobilize a wide range of political support from citizens he was apt to manipulate election results with election

fraud and keeping SMD systems. As he got powerful to mobilize supporters via the efficient distribution of natural resource wealth, however, he became more inclined to use pre-electoral economic distribution rather than electoral fraud and decided to shift the country's electoral system to more PR-based ones.

In Chapter 5, I investigated the determinants of post-electoral political conflicts in dictatorships – leadership turnover and popular protests. The theory provides implications on political order after authoritarian elections. If the dictator fails to strategically manipulate elections and cannot deal with the electoral dilemma, then authoritarian elections backfire on him. More specifically, there were two causal pathways through which elections threaten authoritarian stability. If the dictator employ excessive electoral fraud, then he is more likely to face popular protests because political elites cannot are unable to make sense of *de facto* strength of the regime. On the contrary, if the autocrat fails to use the sufficient level of fraud, then election results reveal the weakness of the dictator, leading to leadership turnover via a post-electoral coup or opposition's landslide victory in elections. My cross-national statistical analysis covering 78 authoritarian countries (1977-2004) has rendered strong supporting evidence on these theoretical expectations.

Chapter 6 has investigated the case of Kyrgyzstan in which President Akaev faced massive protests after the 2005 elections, what is the so-called "Tulip Revolution." During the 1990s, he managed to maintain his regime and hold relatively free and fair elections by using financial resources and maintaining regional alliances with local elites. From the early 2000s, he became more inclined to use serious electoral fraud as he increasingly suffered from a lack of financial resources and faced strong oppositions.

Despite the fact that people were speculating that the regime became weak, the 2005 parliamentary elections with serious electoral fraud announced an overwhelming electoral victory of the president and his ruling parties. This sparked popular protests by opposition leaders and supporters who believed that the regime in fact was weak, resulting in the collapse of the Akaev regime.

The theory and the empirical findings in the dissertation lead us to at least the following two policy implications on international assistance for democratization and election monitoring. First, the dissertation suggests that policy makers may need to provide international assistance for elections while carefully considering conditions of domestic politics -- the power balance between the dictator and political elites -- in authoritarian regimes. If the dictator possesses abundant financial resources and strong disciplinary organizations, then international election monitoring and subsequent relatively free and fair elections may help the dictator use authoritarian elections to consolidate his regime by improving the quality of information that elections bring. Conversely, if strong opposition exists and the dictator suffers from a shortage of resources to distribute, international pressures to hold free and fair elections may pave the way for destabilizing the country's political order after elections reveal the dictator's weakness. To what extent international election monitoring becomes effective to promote peaceful democratization at least partly depends on domestic power distribution in an authoritarian country. Strong international pressures without taking into account domestic politics in authoritarian countries may bring "unintended consequences" to policy makers, such as the consolidation of autocracy through

relatively free and fair elections or the demise of political order in the wake of a relatively free election.

Second, the dissertation also suggests that mere existence of free and fair elections and proportional representation systems do not necessarily contribute to further democratization in authoritarian countries. The findings in the dissertation tell us that dictators may strategically manipulate elections and electoral systems under the constraints of the electoral dilemma. It implies that dictators, who monopolize rich resources and successfully centralize political organizations, may dare to hold relatively free and fair elections and adopt a proportional representation system to obtain the informational benefits while disguising their regimes as democratic to appeal to the international community as well as the domestic audience. In order for elections to be competitive enough to be called democratic elections, elections need to have a real potential of achieving peaceful government alternation. To do so, international organizations may need to also strengthen their support for non-electoral aspects of democratization, such as cultivating the rule of law, preventing the government from monopolizing financial resources, undermining the dictator's centralized mobilization structures, helping opposition forces unite. Combining these measures with international election monitoring, elections are more likely to bring government alternation. While ensuring that such political turnover is achieved peacefully, international assistance may become more effective to democratize authoritarian countries.

That being said, there are a number of topics for which further research will be needed. First, future research should make clear under what conditions authoritarian

rulers might miscalculate on the use of electoral manipulation. Although there are numerous examples in which authoritarian elections turn out to be “stunning” ones, systematic theoretical explorations on why some authoritarian leaders face such elections have not yet been done. This dissertation dealt with such cases as “off-paths” and just treated them as empirical implications that should be observed if the dictator failed to “appropriately” manipulate elections. Yet, theorizing the miscalculation may be relevant when it comes to making a better prediction on a country’s odds of democratization and/or civil conflicts.

Second, although the dissertation has presented cross-national evidence of “political manipulation” such as electoral fraud and electoral system change, it does not cross-national investigate “economic manipulation,” namely, political business cycles. If my theory is correct, we should be able to expect that dictators with holding relatively free and fair elections should rely more on pre-electoral economic distribution: A trade-off between political and economic manipulations.

Third, although I have argued that less-manipulated elections should be able to play the role of signaling the dictator’s strength as long as he can win big, other researchers contend that, the more heavily elections are manipulated, the more successfully dictators can deter challengers via elections (Simpser 2013). Although my analysis found supporting evidence on my theoretical perspective, more direct empirical evidence may need by conducting survey data analysis. Setting people’s perception about the government’s legitimacy as a dependent variable, we would be able to investigate how the effect of election results on political legitimacy may change

depending on the level of electoral fraud and electoral systems. In so doing, we could provide additional evidence on the signaling effect of authoritarian elections.

Lastly, the dissertation did not provide a case of leadership turnover to illustrate causal mechanisms through which excessively free and fair elections lead to leadership turnover. Cases such as Poland (1989) and Algeria (1991) could be useful to provide case-study evidence on the part of leadership turnover.

APPENDIX

Appendix Part I: Cross-National Statistical Analyses

Chapter 2

Table C2-1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 2

	The Number of Obs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Data Sources
Electoral Fraud (VCL)	373	5.21	2.95	0	15	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Fraud (VC)	377	3.91	2.67	0	12	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Violence	410	1.39	1.71	0	6	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Cheating	459	3.91	2.51	0	9	Kelley (2012)
Legal Problems	580	1.6	1.23	0	3	Kelley (2012)
Oil-Gas Value percapita (hundred dollars)	587	3.03	17.4	0	357.97	Ross (2012)
Change in Oil and Gas Value percapita	582	0.19	2.43	-0.61	57.57	Ross (2012)
Three Years Moving Average of Oil and Gas Value percapita	577	3.08	18.7	0	385.84	Ross (2012)
Haber and Menaldo's Natural Resource Wealth	581	3.98	20.42	0	416.62	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Collective Action (Three Years MA)	585	1.07	2.44	0	29.66	Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive
Party-Based Regime	593	0.5	0.5	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Military Regime	593	0.15	0.36	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Personalist Regime	593	0.3	0.45	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Ethnic Organizational Power	574	0.41	0.31	0	0.98	Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009)
Leader's Tenure Length	593	10.24	8.94	0	45	Archigos (Version 2.9.)
Freedom House Index (Three Years MA)	593	5.56	2.34	2	12.33	Freedom House
Election Administrative Capacity	484	4.34	1.13	0	5	Kelley (2012)
Main Elections	593	0.51	0.5	0	1	The author's original coding
Logged GDP percapita	587	7.59	0.85	6.07	10.02	Maddison (2011)
Economic Growth (% of GDP)	587	2.46	6.25	-28.09	24.8	World Development Indicators
Rural Population (% of Total Population)	571	58.52	20.12	0	95.72	World Development Indicators
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	576	67.13	48.38	8.79	376.28	Penn World Tables 7.1.
Domestic Electoral Monitoring	588	0.17	0.37	0	1	Kelley (2012)
International Electoral Monitoring	587	0.36	0.48	0	1	Kelley (2012)
Foreign Aid (% of GDP)	509	7.73	9.62	-0.03	62.36	Ahmed (2012)
1980s	593	0.35	0.47	0	1	N/A
1990s	593	0.38	0.48	0	1	N/A
2000s	593	0.15	0.36	0	1	N/A
Eastern Europe	593	0.13	0.34	0	1	N/A
Laten America	593	0.15	0.35	0	1	N/A
Sub-Saharan Africa	593	0.43	0.49	0	1	N/A
Asia	593	0.13	0.34	0	1	N/A
Memberships of International Organizations	565	0.37	0.11	0.11	0.66	The State System Membership Dataset
Effective Electoral Threshold	519	23.19	14.13	0.37	37.5	The author's original coding
Foreign Direct Investment	584	1.42	3.06	-12.2	28.13	World Development Indicators
Logged Population Size	572	16.12	1.23	13.21	19.15	World Development Indicators
Military Spending per capita	542	90.96	381.86	0	7631.69	National Material Capabilities 4.0.
Duration of Violent Conflicts	593	0.22	0.42	0	1	Armed Conflict Dataset 4.0.

Table C2-2: List of Authoritarian Countries (1977-2004)

Country	Year (Election Type)	Country	Year (Election Type)
Haiti	1984 (Par), 1990 (Pres), 1990 (Par), 2000 (Pres), 2000 (Par)	Niger	1989 (Pres), 1989 (Par), 1999 (Pres), 1999 (Par)
Dominican Republ	1978 (Par), 1978 (Pres)	Cote d'Ivoire	1995 (Pres), 2000 (Pres), 2000 (Par)
Mexico	1979 (Par), 1988 (Par), 1988 (Pres), 1991 (Par), 1994 (Pres)	Guinea	1993 (Pres), 1995 (Par), 1998 (Pres), 2002 (Par)
	1994 (Par), 1997 (Par), 2000 (Par), 2000 (Pres)	Burkina Faso	1997 (Par), 1998 (Pres), 2002 (Par)
Guatemala	1982 (Par), 1982 (Pres), 1985 (Pres), 1985 (Par), 1990 (Pres)	Sierra Leone	1986 (Par), 1996 (Par), 1996 (Pres)
	1990 (Par), 1994 (Par)	Ghana	1979 (Pres), 1979 (Par), 1996 (Par), 1996 (Pres), 2000 (Par)
Honduras	1980 (Par), 1981 (Pres), 1981 (Par)		2000 (Pres)
El Salvador	1984 (Pres), 1985 (Par), 1988 (Par), 1989 (Pres), 1991 (Par)	Togo	1979 (Par), 1979 (Pres), 1985 (Par), 1990 (Par), 1994 (Par)
	1994 (Pres), 1994 (Par)		1998 (Pres), 1999 (Par), 2002 (Par), 2003 (Pres)
Panama	1978 (Par)	Cameroon	1980 (Pres), 1983 (Par), 1988 (Par), 1988 (Pres), 1992 (Par)
Ecuador	1979 (Pres), 1979 (Par)		1992 (Pres), 1997 (Par), 1997 (Pres), 2002 (Par), 2004 (Pres)
Peru	1978 (Par), 1995 (Par), 1995 (Pres)	Nigeria	1979 (Par), 1979 (Pres), 1992 (Par), 1999 (Par), 1999 (Pres)
Brazil	1982 (Par), 1985 (Pres)	Gabon	1979 (Pres), 1990 (Par), 1996 (Par), 1998 (Pres), 2001 (Par)
Bolivia	1979 (Pres), 1979 (Par)	Central African Republic	1987 (Par), 1992 (Pres), 1993 (Pres), 1993 (Par)
Paraguay	1978 (Par), 1978 (Pres), 1983 (Par), 1983 (Pres), 1988 (Par)	Chad	1990 (Par), 1996 (Pres), 1997 (Par), 2001 (Pres), 2002 (Par)
	1988 (Pres), 1993 (Pres), 1993 (Par)	Zaire	1984 (Pres)
Chile	1989 (Pres), 1989 (Par)	Uganda	1996 (Pres), 1996 (Par), 2001 (Pres), 2001 (Par)
Uruguay	1984 (Pres), 1984 (Par)	Kenya	1979 (Pres), 1979 (Par), 1983 (Par), 1983 (Pres), 1988 (Par)
Serbia	2000 (Par)		1992 (Par), 1992 (Pres), 1997 (Pres), 1997 (Par), 2002 (Pres)
Russia	1995 (Par), 1996 (Pres), 1999 (Par), 2000 (Pres), 2004 (Pres)		2002 (Par)
Belarus	1994 (Pres), 1995 (Par), 1995 (Par), 2000 (Par), 2004 (Par)	Tanzania	1990 (Pres), 1990 (Par), 1995 (Par), 1995 (Pres), 2000 (Pres)
Armenia	1995 (Par), 1996 (Pres), 1998 (Pres), 1999 (Par), 2003 (Par)		2000 (Par)
	2003 (Pres)	Rwanda	1988 (Par), 1988 (Pres), 2003 (Pres), 2003 (Par)
Georgia	1995 (Pres), 1995 (Par), 1999 (Par), 2000 (Pres), 2003 (Par)	Ethiopia	1992 (Par), 2000 (Par)
Azerbaijan	1995 (Par), 1998 (Pres), 2000 (Par), 2003 (Pres)	Mozambique	1999 (Par), 1999 (Pres), 2004 (Pres), 2004 (Par)
Guinea-Bissau	1984 (Par), 1989 (Par)	Zambia	1988 (Par), 1988 (Pres), 1991 (Par), 1991 (Pres), 2001 (Par)
Gambia	1977 (Par), 1987 (Pres), 1987 (Par), 1992 (Pres), 1992 (Par)		2001 (Pres)
	1996 (Pres), 1997 (Par), 2001 (Pres), 2002 (Par)	Zimbabwe	1985 (Par), 1996 (Pres), 2000 (Par)
Senegal	1978 (Pres), 1978 (Par), 1983 (Pres), 1983 (Par), 1988 (Pres)	South Africa	1994 (Par)
	1988 (Par), 1993 (Par), 1993 (Pres), 2000 (Pres)	Namibia	1994 (Pres), 1994 (Par), 1999 (Pres), 1999 (Par), 2004 (Par)
Mauritania	1992 (Pres), 1992 (Par), 1996 (Par), 1997 (Pres), 2001 (Par)		2004 (Pres)
	2003 (Pres)	Lesotho	1993 (Par)

Country	Year (Election Type)	Country	Year (Election Type)
Botswana	1979 (Par), 1984 (Par), 1989 (Par), 1994 (Par), 1999 (Par)	Malaysia	1978 (Par), 1982 (Par), 1986 (Par), 1990 (Par), 1995 (Par)
	2004 (Par)		1999 (Par), 2004 (Par)
Swaziland	1978 (Par), 1983 (Paar), 1987 (Par), 1993 (Par), 1998 (Par)	The Philippines	1978 (Par), 1984 (Par)
	2003 (Par)	Indonesia	1977 (Par), 1982 (Par), 1987 (Par), 1997 (Par), 1999 (Par)
Madagascar	1993 (Par)		
Morocco	1977 (Par), 1984 (Par), 1993 (Par), 1997 (Par), 2002 (Par)		
Algeria	1995 (Pres), 1997 (Par), 1999 (Pres), 2004 (Pres)		
Tunisia	1989 (Pres), 1989 (Par), 1994 (Pres), 1994 (Par), 1999 (Pres)		
	1999 (Par), 2004 (Pres), 2004 (Par)		
Sudan	1978 (Par), 1982 (Par), 1986 (Par)		
Iran	1989 (Pres), 1996 (Par), 1997 (Pres), 2000 (Par), 2001 (Pres)		
Turkey	1983 (Par)		
Iraq	1989 (Par)		
Egypt	1984 (Par), 1987 (Par), 1990 (Par), 1993 (Pres), 1995 (Par)		
Syria	1978 (Pres), 1990 (Par), 1991 (Pres), 1994 (Par), 1998 (Par)		
	2000 (Pres)		
Jordan	1993 (Par), 1997 (Par), 2003 (Par)		
Yemen	1997 (Par)		
Kuwait	1981 (Par), 1992 (Par), 1996 (Par), 2003 (Par)		
Turkmenistan	1994 (Par), 1999 (Par)		
Tajikistan	1995 (Par)		
Kyrgyzstan	1995 (Pres), 1995 (Par)		
Uzbekistan	1994 (Par), 2000 (Pres), 2004 (Par)		
Kazakhstan	1994 (Par), 1995 (Par), 1995 (Pres), 1999 (Par), 1999 (Pres)		
	2004 (Par)		
South Korea	1981 (Par)		
Pakistan	1985 (Par), 1988 (Par), 2002 (Par)		
Bangladesh	1979 (Par), 1986 (Par), 1986 (Pres)		
Sri Lanka	1989 (Par), 1994 (Par), 1994 (Pres)		
Nepal	1981 (Par), 1986 (Par)		
Thailand	1983 (Par), 1986 (Par), 1988 (Par), 1992 (Par)		
Cambodia	2003 (Par)		

Note: “Par” stands for parliamentary elections, while “Pres” represents presidential elections.

Table C2-3: Additional Analyses

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	Violence	Cheating	Violence	Cheating	Violence	Cheating
Oil-Gas Value per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.0772* (0.044)	-0.00806*** (0.003)	-0.0239^ (0.047)	-0.00747*** (0.003)	-0.053 (0.092)	-0.000668^ (0.020)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.221*** (0.064)	-0.0793 (0.084)	0.218*** (0.063)	-0.0862 (0.083)	0.221*** (0.065)	-0.0805 (0.085)
Party-Based Regime	1.244** (0.585)	-1.007** (0.502)	1.401** (0.595)	-0.723 (0.466)	1.217** (0.581)	-0.998** (0.498)
Oil*Party			-0.13^ (0.082)	-0.0813*** (0.026)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.01 (0.81)	1.039* (0.58)	0.998 (0.83)	0.989* (0.53)	1.068 (0.85)	1.089* (0.64)
Oil*EOP					-0.050 (0.163)	-0.0354^ (0.094)
Military Regime	2.076*** (0.733)	-3.230*** (0.62)	2.057*** (0.74)	-3.135*** (0.58)	2.046*** (0.746)	-3.231*** (0.615)
Personalist Regime	1.017 (0.66)	-0.336 (0.525)	1.016 (0.664)	-0.229 (0.493)	0.989 (0.663)	-0.336 (0.519)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.00523 (0.015)	0.027 (0.024)	0.006 (0.015)	0.032 (0.022)	0.00411 (0.016)	0.0263 (0.024)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.0166 (0.095)	-0.517*** (0.061)	-0.0216 (0.097)	-0.540*** (0.068)	-0.0171 (0.095)	-0.520*** (0.063)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.04 (0.121)	-0.436*** (0.140)	-0.05 (0.125)	-0.479*** (0.119)	-0.03 (0.130)	-0.432*** (0.141)
Main Elections	0.232* (0.136)	0.00371 (0.187)	0.199 (0.134)	0.017 (0.189)	0.235* (0.136)	0.00811 (0.187)
Logged GDP per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.142 (0.534)	0.264 (0.360)	-0.145 (0.547)	0.359 (0.396)	-0.154 (0.528)	0.264 (0.364)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.02 (0.024)	-0.03 (0.020)	-0.02 (0.024)	-0.0393* (0.022)	-0.02 (0.024)	-0.0316 (0.020)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0174 (0.017)	0.015 (0.011)	0.016 (0.018)	0.014 (0.012)	0.0172 (0.017)	0.0147 (0.011)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.0091 (0.006)	-0.00345 (0.003)	-0.00897 (0.006)	-0.00335 (0.003)	-0.00921 (0.006)	-0.00349 (0.003)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.720 (0.443)	0.160 (0.420)	-0.745* (0.442)	0.0569 (0.400)	-0.712 (0.442)	0.16 (0.420)
International Election Monitoring	0.748** (0.356)	-0.207 (0.439)	0.687* (0.362)	-0.247 (0.445)	0.754** (0.358)	-0.204 (0.440)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0307 (0.024)	-0.0211 (0.014)	-0.0319 (0.024)	-0.0215 (0.014)	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.0215 (0.014)
Cut Point 1	2.005 (4.727)	-4.915 (3.319)	1.915 (4.843)	-4.673 (3.542)	1.927 (4.67)	-4.926 (3.341)
Cut Point 2	2.453 (4.726)	-3.794 (3.363)	2.367 (4.841)	-3.561 (3.583)	2.375 (4.67)	-3.805 (3.385)
Cut Point 3	3.219 (4.728)	-2.844 (3.364)	3.132 (4.843)	-2.623 (3.582)	3.140 (4.67)	-2.856 (3.386)
Cut Point 4	4.883 (4.755)	-2.048 (3.361)	4.788 (4.868)	-1.816 (3.579)	4.809 (4.70)	-2.059 (3.383)
Cut Point 5	5.384 (4.718)	-1.037 (3.363)	5.287 (4.834)	-0.774 (3.587)	5.311 (4.66)	-1.048 (3.384)
Cut Point 6	5.815 (4.681)	-0.166 (3.340)	5.717 (4.795)	0.121 (3.565)	5.742 (4.62)	-0.177 (3.362)
Cut Point 7		0.610 (3.329)		0.915 (3.555)		0.598 (3.351)
Cut Point 8		1.625 (3.351)		1.952 (3.577)		1.614 (3.373)
Cut Point 9		3.396 (3.137)		3.745 (3.394)		3.385 (3.157)
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	321	321	321	321	321	324
Wald Chi2	74.04***	364.26***	88.31***	386.44***	75.50***	366.79***
Log pseudolikelihood	-420.23	-590.42	-419.15	-586.47	-420.17	-590.35

Note: Models 7-12 are estimated using ordered logistic regression. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-4: Alternative Definition of Political Regimes – Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012)

DV	Model 13 VCL	Model 14 VC	Model 15 VCL	Model 16 VC	Model 17 VCL	Model 18 VC
Sample Selection Decisions	Boix et al. (2012)	Boix et al. (2012)	Boix et al. (2012)	Boix et al. (2012)	Boix et al. (2012)	Boix et al. (2012)
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.00855*** (0.002)	-0.00826*** (0.003)	-0.00804*** (0.002)	-0.00782*** (0.003)	0.00901^ (0.018)	0.0266 (0.017)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.346** (0.145)	0.334** (0.145)	0.341** (0.140)	0.326** (0.140)	0.343** (0.145)	0.328** (0.144)
Party-Based Regime	-0.178 (0.833)	0.0213 (0.798)	-0.0777 (0.844)	0.159 (0.804)	-0.161 (0.835)	0.0429 (0.793)
Oil*Party			-0.0657** (0.033)	-0.0845*** (0.030)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.473** (0.666)	1.810*** (0.657)	1.424** (0.635)	1.762*** (0.620)	1.579** (0.689)	2.031*** (0.676)
Oil*EOP					-0.0836^ (0.082)	-0.166** (0.081)
Military Regime	-2.636*** (0.816)	-1.591* (0.891)	-2.673*** (0.809)	-1.613* (0.879)	-2.640*** (0.820)	-1.594* (0.888)
Personalist Regime	0.374 (0.910)	0.259 (0.806)	0.31 (0.905)	0.177 (0.799)	0.376 (0.911)	0.241 (0.801)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.042 (0.028)	0.014 (0.027)	0.041 (0.028)	0.013 (0.026)	0.041 (0.029)	0.012 (0.028)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.486*** (0.120)	-0.210* (0.114)	-0.502*** (0.122)	-0.229** (0.115)	-0.491*** (0.120)	-0.222** (0.113)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.311* (0.177)	-0.440** (0.199)	-0.325* (0.178)	-0.460** (0.201)	-0.309* (0.178)	-0.438** (0.200)
Main Elections	0.0279 (0.213)	0.112 (0.188)	0.0435 (0.213)	0.135 (0.189)	0.0335 (0.213)	0.126 (0.189)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.0617 (0.494)	-0.278 (0.520)	0.000146 (0.508)	-0.2 (0.540)	-0.0475 (0.491)	(0.261) (0.516)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0427** (0.022)	-0.0459** (0.023)	-0.0470** (0.024)	-0.0516** (0.024)	-0.0419* (0.022)	-0.0438* (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0203 (0.017)	0.0118 (0.017)	0.0197 (0.017)	0.0111 (0.016)	0.02 (0.017)	0.011 (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00953* (0.006)	-0.00786* (0.005)	-0.00927* (0.005)	-0.00735 (0.005)	-0.00964* (0.006)	-0.00794* (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.384 (0.508)	0.278 (0.514)	0.347 (0.508)	0.231 (0.515)	0.378 (0.511)	0.265 (0.517)
International Election Monitoring	0.0654 (0.533)	0.318 (0.472)	0.0614 (0.533)	0.315 (0.468)	0.0656 (0.535)	0.319 (0.472)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0244 (0.031)	-0.0163 (0.030)	-0.0249 (0.031)	-0.0162 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.031)	(0.018) (0.029)
Constant	6.606 (5.231)	5.902 (5.116)	6.491 (5.210)	5.756 (5.148)	6.516 (5.204)	5.843 (5.048)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	72	72	72	72	72	72
Number of Observations	292	294	292	294	292	294
Wald Chi2	276.44***	216.3***	684.46***	553.07***	325.3***	251.43***
R squared (overall)	0.35	0.3	0.36	0.31	0.35	0.3

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-5: Alternative Definition of Political Regimes – Polity IV

DV	Model 19 VCL	Model 20 VC	Model 21 VCL	Model 22 VC	Model 23 VCL	Model 24 VC
Sample Selection Decisions	-10 < Polity IV < 6	-10 < Polity IV < 6	-10 < Polity IV < 6	-10 < Polity IV < 6	-10 < Polity IV < 6	-10 < Polity IV < 6
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.00645*** (0.002)	-0.00517* (0.003)	-0.00577*** (0.002)	-0.00447** (0.002)	0.0443 (0.027)	0.0528** (0.022)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.159** (0.071)	0.193*** (0.067)	0.153** (0.070)	0.185*** (0.067)	0.157** (0.070)	0.191*** (0.066)
Party-Based Regime	1.343* (0.707)	1.384** (0.703)	1.501** (0.713)	1.591** (0.709)	1.446** (0.707)	1.498** (0.704)
Oil*Party			-0.0752*** (0.026)	-0.0953*** (0.028)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	0.469 (0.658)	1.059* (0.640)	0.429 (0.631)	1.019* (0.607)	0.709 (0.675)	1.347** (0.655)
Oil*EOP					-0.243* (0.130)	-0.276*** (0.105)
Military Regime	-0.341 (0.875)	0.426 (0.815)	-0.384 (0.866)	0.379 (0.802)	-0.303 (0.880)	0.463 (0.814)
Personalist Regime	2.222*** (0.730)	2.116*** (0.741)	2.182*** (0.727)	2.063*** (0.730)	2.272*** (0.721)	2.154*** (0.729)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.025 (0.026)	(0.000) (0.026)	0.026 (0.026)	0.001 (0.025)	0.022 (0.026)	(0.003) (0.026)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.308*** (0.118)	-0.0991 (0.107)	-0.319*** (0.117)	-0.111 (0.106)	-0.315*** (0.117)	-0.111 (0.106)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.409** (0.166)	-0.491*** (0.190)	-0.419** (0.164)	-0.504*** (0.189)	-0.407** (0.167)	-0.486** (0.190)
Main Elections	0.142 (0.194)	0.16 (0.175)	0.154 (0.196)	0.175 (0.176)	0.145 (0.195)	0.163 (0.176)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.317 (0.467)	-0.0571 (0.505)	0.405 (0.476)	0.0487 (0.519)	0.349 (0.459)	-0.0264 (0.495)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.027 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.021)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0293* (0.017)	0.0195 (0.018)	0.0302* (0.017)	0.0205 (0.017)	0.0282 (0.017)	0.0185 (0.017)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00272 (0.006)	-0.00222 (0.005)	-0.00201 (0.006)	-0.00128 (0.005)	-0.00287 (0.006)	-0.00217 (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.523 (0.495)	-0.632 (0.532)	-0.57 (0.494)	-0.689 (0.530)	-0.534 (0.496)	-0.643 (0.533)
International Election Monitoring	0.0642 (0.499)	0.292 (0.459)	0.0665 (0.496)	0.297 (0.453)	0.0797 (0.501)	0.313 (0.458)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0358 (0.034)	-0.0253 (0.034)	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.0254 (0.034)	-0.0371 (0.034)	-0.0271 (0.034)
Constant	1.192 (5.092)	2.15 (5.215)	0.665 (5.109)	1.529 (5.272)	0.981 (5.009)	1.935 (5.103)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	83	83	83	85	83	83
Number of Observations	337	340	337	352	337	340
Wald Chi2	155.83***	169.78***	275.64***	357.66***	201.91***	201.17***
R squared (overall)	0.32	0.27	0.34	0.288	0.33	0.27

Note: A countries is seen as authoritarian if its Polity IV score is less than 6. Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-6: Alternative Measure of Natural Resources – Change in Oil-Gas Value per capita

	Model 25 VCL	Model 26 VC	Model 27 VCL	Model 28 VC	Model 29 VCL	Model 30 VC
Alternative Measures of Natural Resources	Change in Oil	Change in Oil	Change in Oil	Change in Oil	Change in Oil	Change in Oil
Change in Oil (1 year lagged)	-0.0500*** (0.015)	-0.0416*** (0.012)	-0.0418** (0.017)	-0.0330** (0.015)	0.562^ (0.612)	0.728^ (0.529)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.148** (0.073)	0.182** (0.075)	0.169** (0.071)	0.205*** (0.074)	0.152** (0.073)	0.187** (0.074)
Party-Based Regime	-0.592 (0.582)	0.425 (0.634)	-0.468 (0.585)	0.555 (0.636)	-0.538 (0.569)	0.497 (0.634)
Change in Oil*Party			-1.701*** (0.656)	-1.831*** (0.588)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)		2.040*** (0.663)	1.732*** (0.634)	2.086*** (0.649)	1.772*** (0.644)	2.105*** (0.678)
Change in Oil*EOP					-1.53^ (1.530)	-1.922^ (1.325)
Military Regime	-1.979*** (0.672)	-0.342 (0.745)	-2.016*** (0.660)	-0.392 (0.736)	-1.968*** (0.664)	-0.332 (0.747)
Personalist Regime	-0.000778 (0.666)	0.739 (0.691)	-0.017 (0.646)	0.714 (0.675)	0.0741 (0.659)	0.843 (0.694)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.039 (0.024)	0.015 (0.024)	0.037 (0.024)	0.013 (0.024)	0.0387 (0.024)	0.014 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.476*** (0.079)	-0.220*** (0.074)	-0.494*** (0.080)	-0.239*** (0.074)	-0.468*** (0.080)	-0.211*** (0.075)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.379** (0.151)	-0.486*** (0.183)	-0.368** (0.155)	-0.474** (0.187)	-0.399*** (0.151)	-0.509*** (0.183)
Main Elections	0.141 (0.191)	0.164 (0.168)	0.143 (0.184)	0.168 (0.161)	0.137 (0.191)	0.16 (0.170)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.00146 (0.420)	-0.371 (0.473)	0.0338 (0.417)	-0.332 (0.473)	0.0593 (0.421)	-0.285 (0.475)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0373* (0.022)	-0.0390* (0.023)	-0.0429* (0.022)	-0.0450** (0.023)	-0.0395* (0.021)	-0.0417* (0.022)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0268* (0.016)	0.0153 (0.017)	0.0266* (0.016)	0.0153 (0.018)	0.0280* (0.016)	0.0168 (0.017)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00724 (0.005)	-0.00558 (0.004)	-0.00771 (0.005)	-0.00608 (0.004)	-0.00839 (0.005)	-0.0073 (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.0758 (0.443)	-0.159 (0.468)	-0.0751 (0.437)	-0.153 (0.459)	-0.117 (0.448)	-0.209 (0.474)
International Election Monitoring	0.305 (0.517)	0.513 (0.486)	0.258 (0.511)	0.465 (0.467)	0.271 (0.525)	0.471 (0.495)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0265 (0.017)	-0.0153 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.0235 (0.017)	-0.0112 (0.018)
Constant	6.179 (4.322)	6.216 (4.698)	6.12 (4.315)	6.124 (4.735)	5.661 (4.322)	5.505 (4.707)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	318	321	318	321	318	321
Wald Chi2	307.81***	396.84***	271.79***	289.10***	379.26***	555.34***
R squared (overall)	0.47	0.37	0.48	0.38	0.47	0.37

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-7: Alternative Measure of Natural Resources – 3 Years Moving Average of Oil-Gas Value per capita

	Model 31 VCL	Model 32 VC	Model 33 VCL	Model 34 VC	Model 35 VCL	Model 36 VC
Alternative Measures of Natural Resources	3 years MA	3 years MA	3 years MA	3 years MA	3 years MA	3 years MA
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged, 3 years MA)	-0.00781*** (0.002)	-0.00640** (0.003)	-0.00685*** (0.002)	-0.00563** (0.002)	0.0162^ (0.016)	0.0327* (0.017)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.141** (0.070)	0.178** (0.073)	0.132* (0.068)	0.168** (0.072)	0.138** (0.070)	0.174** (0.073)
Party-Based Regime	-0.645 (0.669)	0.355 (0.669)	-0.375 (0.618)	0.617 (0.626)	-0.605 (0.657)	0.42 (0.654)
Oil*Party			-0.0723*** (0.021)	-0.0775*** (0.025)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.657*** (0.641)	1.998*** (0.662)	1.579*** (0.607)	1.939*** (0.627)	1.800*** (0.675)	2.233*** (0.685)
Oil*EOP					-0.115^ (0.077)	-0.186** (0.081)
Military Regime	-2.035*** (0.775)	-0.358 (0.780)	-1.937*** (0.737)	-0.28 (0.744)	-2.034*** (0.764)	-0.354 (0.765)
Personalist Regime	-0.143 (0.768)	0.66 (0.761)	-0.0308 (0.723)	0.746 (0.716)	-0.133 (0.753)	0.667 (0.737)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.033 (0.024)	0.010 (0.023)	0.034 (0.023)	0.010 (0.022)	0.031 (0.024)	0.007 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.482*** (0.079)	-0.219*** (0.073)	-0.502*** (0.080)	-0.238*** (0.073)	-0.489*** (0.079)	-0.231*** (0.072)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.420*** (0.155)	-0.514*** (0.185)	-0.437*** (0.151)	-0.528*** (0.184)	-0.415*** (0.157)	-0.506*** (0.186)
Main Elections	0.125 (0.189)	0.139 (0.167)	0.14 (0.190)	0.154 (0.168)	0.128 (0.189)	0.144 (0.167)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.0868 (0.398)	-0.291 (0.454)	0.171 (0.402)	-0.211 (0.463)	0.0961 (0.394)	-0.285 (0.443)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0500** (0.021)	-0.0490** (0.023)	-0.0564** (0.022)	-0.0560** (0.023)	-0.0492** (0.021)	-0.0477** (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0283* (0.016)	0.0176 (0.017)	0.0282* (0.016)	0.0178 (0.017)	0.0275* (0.016)	0.0164 (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00747 (0.005)	-0.00558 (0.004)	-0.00719 (0.005)	-0.00505 (0.004)	-0.00756 (0.005)	-0.0055 (0.004)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.198 (0.465)	-0.271 (0.482)	-0.249 (0.459)	-0.309 (0.478)	-0.206 (0.466)	-0.282 (0.482)
International Election Monitoring	0.259 (0.510)	0.473 (0.481)	0.248 (0.502)	0.46 (0.471)	0.264 (0.511)	0.48 (0.477)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0282 (0.018)	-0.0193 (0.020)	-0.0300* (0.018)	-0.0214 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.0213 (0.020)
Constant	5.931 (4.199)	5.826 (4.541)	5.524 (4.182)	5.443 (4.561)	5.897 (4.154)	5.843 (4.421)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
Wald Chi2	280.2***	243.63***	548.73***	811.12***	299.15***	282.14***
R squared (overall)	0.46	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.46	0.38

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-8: Alternative Measure of Natural Resource Wealth – Haber and Menaldo (2011)

	Model 37 VCL	Model 38 VC	Model 39 VCL	Model 40 VC	Model 41 VCL	Model 42 VC
Alternative Measures of Natural Resources	HM (2012)	HM (2012)	HM (2012)	HM (2012)	HM (2012)	HM (2012)
Natural Resource Wealth (1 year lagged)	-0.00840*** (0.002)	-0.00658*** (0.003)	-0.00701*** (0.002)	-0.00557*** (0.002)	0.0192 (0.016)	0.0353** (0.016)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.139** (0.070)	0.177** (0.073)	0.134** (0.066)	0.171** (0.071)	0.138** (0.070)	0.175** (0.073)
Party-Based Regime	-0.651 (0.670)	0.357 (0.669)	-0.194 (0.586)	0.77 (0.607)	-0.604 (0.645)	0.43 (0.642)
Natural Resource Wealth*Party			-0.0803*** (0.019)	-0.0783*** (0.019)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.643** (0.638)	1.987*** (0.661)	1.468** (0.594)	1.845*** (0.625)	1.861*** (0.671)	2.323*** (0.692)
Natural Resource Wealth*EOP					-0.132* (0.076)	-0.201*** (0.077)
Military Regime	-2.050*** (0.776)	-0.362 (0.780)	-1.855*** (0.711)	-0.207 (0.726)	-2.035*** (0.752)	-0.338 (0.754)
Personalist Regime	-0.151 (0.766)	0.661 (0.758)	0.0566 (0.702)	0.825 (0.702)	-0.122 (0.742)	0.697 (0.726)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.033 (0.024)	0.010 (0.023)	0.036 (0.022)	0.013 (0.022)	0.0313 (0.023)	0.00801 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.481*** (0.079)	-0.219*** (0.073)	-0.498*** (0.078)	-0.232*** (0.073)	-0.491*** (0.079)	-0.233*** (0.072)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.424*** (0.153)	-0.517*** (0.185)	-0.461*** (0.145)	-0.545*** (0.182)	-0.418*** (0.156)	-0.507*** (0.185)
Main Elections	0.123 (0.188)	0.138 (0.166)	0.136 (0.189)	0.149 (0.167)	0.125 (0.189)	0.140 (0.168)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.103 (0.398)	-0.279 (0.454)	0.187 (0.396)	-0.209 (0.457)	0.123 (0.394)	-0.256 (0.444)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0517** (0.021)	-0.0501** (0.023)	-0.0578*** (0.022)	-0.0561** (0.023)	-0.0500** (0.021)	-0.0475** (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0281* (0.016)	0.0176 (0.017)	0.0266* (0.015)	0.0162 (0.016)	0.0262* (0.015)	0.0147 (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00776 (0.005)	-0.00581 (0.004)	-0.00715 (0.005)	-0.00506 (0.004)	-0.00810* (0.005)	-0.00615 (0.004)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.201 (0.464)	-0.273 (0.482)	-0.303 (0.456)	-0.351 (0.479)	-0.212 (0.466)	-0.29 (0.483)
International Election Monitoring	0.26 (0.510)	0.475 (0.481)	0.246 (0.506)	0.46 (0.477)	0.275 (0.511)	0.496 (0.478)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0279 (0.018)	-0.0191 (0.020)	-0.0313* (0.018)	-0.0225 (0.019)	-0.0283 (0.018)	-0.0202 (0.020)
Constant	5.882 (4.172)	5.78 (4.527)	5.576 (4.093)	5.55 (4.483)	5.841 (4.126)	5.777 (4.408)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
Wald Chi2	238.62***	213.72***	555.06***	851.09***	245.63***	234.73***
R squared (overall)	0.46	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.47	0.38

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-9: Region-Clustered Robust Standard Errors

	Model 43	Model 44	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48
	VCL	VC	VCL	VC	VCL	VC
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.00937*** (0.002)	-0.00762* (0.004)	-0.00822*** (0.003)	-0.00671* (0.004)	0.0148^ (0.028)	0.0302^ (0.028)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.139*** (0.038)	0.176*** (0.045)	0.129*** (0.036)	0.165*** (0.038)	0.137*** (0.038)	0.173*** (0.045)
Party-Based Regime	-0.652 (0.548)	0.35 (0.794)	-0.293 (0.533)	0.708 (0.753)	-0.613 (0.548)	0.412 (0.801)
Oil*Party			-0.0936*** (0.029)	-0.102*** (0.028)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.651*** (0.547)	1.992*** (0.613)	1.535*** (0.451)	1.893*** (0.548)	1.781*** (0.617)	2.199*** (0.694)
Oil*EOP					-0.115^ (0.139)	-0.18^ (0.137)
Military Regime	-2.045** (0.837)	-0.366 -1.041	-1.904** (0.754)	-0.245 (0.953)	-2.032** (0.819)	-0.342 (1.022)
Personalist Regime	-0.151 (0.794)	0.655 (0.988)	-0.00275 (0.703)	0.78 (0.874)	-0.135 (0.783)	0.673 (0.971)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0326 (0.034)	0.0102 (0.028)	0.0346 (0.031)	0.0115 (0.025)	0.0313 (0.034)	0.00777 (0.028)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.482*** (0.057)	-0.219*** (0.059)	-0.504*** (0.058)	-0.241*** (0.061)	-0.489*** (0.062)	-0.230*** (0.062)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.423*** (0.096)	-0.516** (0.220)	-0.452*** (0.086)	-0.541** (0.219)	-0.419*** (0.097)	-0.511** (0.222)
Main Elections	0.124 (0.261)	0.138 (0.245)	0.136 (0.267)	0.15 (0.255)	0.13 (0.258)	0.148 (0.246)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.099 (0.454)	-0.28 (0.427)	0.196 (0.438)	-0.185 (0.423)	0.116 (0.458)	-0.262 (0.437)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0512*** (0.015)	-0.0500** (0.023)	-0.0583*** (0.020)	-0.0577** (0.027)	-0.0498*** (0.015)	-0.0477** (0.024)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0283* (0.017)	0.0177 (0.014)	0.0275 (0.017)	0.017 (0.013)	0.0276 (0.017)	0.0168 (0.013)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00768 (0.005)	-0.00577 (0.005)	-0.00732 (0.005)	-0.00519 (0.005)	-0.00778 (0.005)	-0.00569 (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.2 (0.368)	-0.272 (0.412)	-0.28 (0.420)	-0.339 (0.454)	-0.212 (0.374)	-0.291 (0.417)
International Election Monitoring	0.26 (0.374)	0.474 (0.566)	0.246 (0.386)	0.459 (0.570)	0.267 (0.372)	0.484 (0.552)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0279*** (0.004)	-0.0190*** (0.005)	-0.0300*** (0.004)	-0.0213*** (0.007)	-0.0284*** (0.004)	-0.0204*** (0.006)
Constant	5.878 (4.379)	5.776 (3.732)	5.476 (4.285)	5.384 (3.613)	5.775 (4.357)	5.679 (3.699)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
R squared (overall)	0.46	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.46	0.38

Note: Region-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-10: Additional Controls

	Model 49 VCL	Model 50 VC	Model 51 VCL	Model 52 VC	Model 53 VCL	Model 54 VC
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.0111*** (0.003)	-0.00503* (0.003)	-0.0104*** (0.003)	-0.00434* (0.002)	0.00586^ (0.018)	0.0296* (0.017)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.132* (0.077)	0.192*** (0.071)	0.130* (0.073)	0.193*** (0.073)	0.129 (0.079)	0.184** (0.073)
Party-Based Regime	-0.908 (0.740)	0.0655 (0.772)	-0.367 (0.562)	0.603 (0.619)	-0.874 (0.735)	0.128 (0.755)
Oil*Party			-0.139*** (0.026)	-0.135*** (0.023)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.425** (0.718)	1.734*** (0.642)	1.269* (0.679)	1.617*** (0.622)	1.522** (0.750)	1.908*** (0.658)
Oil*EOP					-0.0806^ (0.082)	-0.165** (0.080)
Military Regime	-2.260*** (0.797)	-0.779 (0.825)	-2.055*** (0.645)	-0.579 (0.679)	-2.238*** (0.792)	-0.758 (0.806)
Personalist Regime	-0.274 (0.745)	0.505 (0.786)	-0.128 (0.594)	0.658 (0.637)	-0.258 (0.736)	0.487 (0.753)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0499** (0.025)	0.0299 (0.023)	0.0524** (0.024)	0.032 (0.021)	0.0490* (0.026)	0.0265 (0.023)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.465*** (0.095)	-0.244*** (0.083)	-0.499*** (0.094)	-0.270*** (0.078)	-0.468*** (0.097)	-0.249*** (0.082)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.474*** (0.161)	-0.442*** (0.162)	-0.513*** (0.150)	-0.480*** (0.152)	-0.472*** (0.162)	-0.432*** (0.165)
Main Elections	0.048 (0.192)	0.0753 (0.178)	0.0589 (0.191)	0.0799 (0.177)	0.053 (0.193)	0.079 (0.180)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.361 (0.373)	-0.357 (0.360)	0.411 (0.391)	-0.299 (0.361)	0.369 (0.373)	-0.382 (0.344)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0880*** (0.023)	-0.0646*** (0.024)	-0.102*** (0.023)	-0.0777*** (0.022)	-0.0868*** (0.023)	-0.0624** (0.025)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0537*** (0.016)	0.0400** (0.017)	0.0511*** (0.016)	0.0369** (0.016)	0.0528*** (0.016)	0.0372** (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.0120** (0.006)	-0.00632 (0.005)	-0.0114** (0.005)	-0.00612 (0.005)	-0.0119** (0.006)	-0.0057 (0.005)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.336 (0.485)	-0.325 (0.484)	-0.439 (0.481)	-0.427 (0.478)	-0.346 (0.487)	-0.341 (0.483)
International Election Monitoring	0.313 (0.537)	0.519 (0.479)	0.261 (0.518)	0.468 (0.459)	0.317 (0.539)	0.517 (0.474)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0796** (0.033)	-0.0634** (0.031)	-0.0897*** (0.029)	-0.0727** (0.908)	-0.0802** (1.049)	-0.0638** (0.030)
Memberships of International Organizations (1 year lagged)	-1.649 (3.230)	1.391 (2.934)	-1.402 (3.122)	1.347 (2.803)	-1.737 (3.283)	1.46 (2.988)
Effective Electoral Threshold	-0.0269* (0.014)	-0.0291** (0.013)	-0.0320*** (0.012)	-0.0335*** (0.011)	-0.0265* (0.014)	-0.0280** (0.013)
Foreign Direct Investment (1 year lagged)	0.0723** (0.033)	0.0454 (0.038)	0.0754** (0.036)	0.0475 (0.040)	0.0721** (0.033)	0.0489 (0.039)
Logged Population (1 year lagged)	-0.0901 (0.191)	-0.122 (0.161)	-0.186 (0.149)	-0.213* (0.129)	-0.0755 (0.195)	-0.0926 (0.160)
Military Spending per capita (1 year lagged)	0.000604*** (0.000)	0.000441** (0.000)	0.000599*** (0.000)	0.000426** (0.000)	0.000595*** (0.000)	0.000420** (0.000)
Duration of Violent Conflicts (1 year lagged)	0.502 (0.5040)	0.763 (0.5020)	0.543 (0.4830)	0.812* (0.482)	0.512 (0.506)	0.819 (0.500)
Constant	5.854 (5.258)	7.757 (4.804)	7.757* (4.473)	9.552** (4.159)	5.601 (5.265)	7.503 (4.650)
Decade Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of Countries	70	70	70	70	70	70
Number of Observations	283	284	283	284	283	284
Wald Chi2	333.62***	306.82***	706.98***	1154.07***	367.77***	320.71***
R squared (overall)	0.48	0.42	0.51	0.46	0.48	0.43

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table C2-11: Alternative Methods - Fixed Effects and Regional Specific Effects

DV	Model 55	Model 56	Model 57	Model 58	Model 59	Model 60
Estimation Methods	VCL	VC	VCL	VC	VCL	VC
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.0163*** (0.004)	-0.0123*** (0.004)	-0.00831*** (0.003)	-0.00693** (0.003)	0.00998^ (0.018)	0.014^ (0.018)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.193 (0.142)	0.238* (0.121)				
Party-Based Regime			0.0877 (0.621)	0.936 (0.740)	-0.108 (0.659)	0.718 (0.794)
Oil*Party			-0.0849*** (0.030)	-0.102*** (0.028)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)			0.914 (0.747)	1.286* (0.772)	0.974 (0.747)	1.320* (0.776)
Oil*EOP					-0.0911^ (0.086)	-0.103^ (0.082)
Military Regime	-0.901 (1.347)	-0.573 (1.456)	-1.621** (0.739)	-0.425 (0.804)	-1.620** (0.789)	-0.411 (0.874)
Personalist Regime	0.887 (1.154)	0.868 (1.295)	0.392 (0.782)	1.031 (0.863)	0.335 (0.835)	0.981 (0.931)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0505** (0.025)	0.034 (0.024)	0.034 (0.023)	0.007 (0.021)	0.032 (0.023)	0.005 (0.022)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.363*** (0.129)	-0.18 (0.114)	-0.500*** (0.084)	-0.275*** (0.072)	-0.479*** (0.083)	-0.252*** (0.073)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.428*** (0.152)	-0.469*** (0.165)	-0.468*** (0.146)	-0.555*** (0.176)	-0.439*** (0.151)	-0.526*** (0.179)
Main Elections	0.094 (0.202)	0.132 (0.183)	0.095 (0.200)	0.099 (0.179)	0.095 (0.200)	0.099 (0.179)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.802 (1.118)	0.399 (1.041)	-0.0933 (0.407)	-0.375 (0.455)	-0.233 (0.397)	-0.536 (0.446)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0432 (0.028)	-0.0440* (0.026)	-0.0696*** (0.022)	-0.0786*** (0.023)	-0.0608*** (0.021)	-0.0680*** (0.023)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.065 (0.040)	0.038 (0.039)	0.0271* (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)	0.0287* (0.017)	0.018 (0.017)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.0223** (0.011)	-0.0227** (0.011)	-0.0068 (0.005)	-0.00428 (0.004)	-0.00714 (0.005)	-0.00476 (0.004)
Domestic Election Monitoring	-0.243 (0.520)	-0.406 (0.531)	-0.229 (0.473)	-0.343 (0.496)	-0.142 (0.479)	-0.25 (0.501)
International Election Monitoring	0.242 (0.660)	0.53 (0.589)	0.308 (0.503)	0.515 (0.465)	0.323 (0.510)	0.535 (0.476)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	0.00693 (0.034)	0.0305 (0.030)	-0.0236 (0.017)	-0.0118 (0.019)	-0.0228 (0.018)	-0.0109 (0.019)
Constant	-2.509 (10.580)	-0.0266 (10.180)	8.170** (4.110)	7.315 (4.450)	8.968** (4.134)	8.230* (4.445)
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
F Value/Wald Chi2	F: 22.61***	F: 27.38***	W: 802.88***	W: 1050.92***	W: 377.14***	W: 308.17***
R squared (overall)	0.36	0.26	0.49	0.43	0.48	0.41

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. W indicates Wald-chi squared test. F indicates F test.

Table C2-12: Alternative Methods – Random Intercept Models

	Model 61	Model 62	Model 63	Model 64	Model 65	Model 66
	VCL	VC	VCL	VC	VCL	VC
	RIM	RIM	RIM	RIM	RIM	RIM
Oil-Gas Value percapita (1 year lagged)	-0.00667** (0.003)	-0.00642* (0.003)	-0.00468 (0.003)	-0.00441 (0.003)	0.0242 (0.017)	0.0404** (0.017)
Collective Action (Avg, 1 year lagged)	0.152** (0.067)	0.194*** (0.074)	0.140** (0.066)	0.184** (0.074)	0.151** (0.067)	0.192*** (0.074)
Party-Based Regime	-0.505 (0.545)	0.331 (0.552)	0.00583 (0.521)	0.82 (0.527)	-0.477 (0.540)	0.374 (0.549)
Oil*Party			-0.126*** (0.042)	-0.121*** (0.036)		
Ethnic Organizational Power (EOP)	1.539*** (0.437)	2.021*** (0.435)	1.393*** (0.419)	1.882*** (0.423)	1.708*** (0.460)	2.273*** (0.456)
Oil*EOP					-0.148* (0.081)	-0.224*** (0.079)
Military Regime	-1.840*** (0.594)	-0.295 (0.621)	-1.581*** (0.553)	-0.061 (0.584)	-1.851*** (0.587)	-0.313 (0.615)
Personalist Regime	-0.030 (0.586)	0.493 (0.580)	0.199 (0.554)	0.716 (0.547)	-0.032 (0.579)	0.489 (0.575)
Leader's Tenure Length	0.0302* (0.018)	0.001 (0.017)	0.0371** (0.017)	0.007 (0.016)	0.028 (0.018)	(0.003) (0.017)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.503*** (0.056)	-0.221*** (0.054)	-0.524*** (0.055)	-0.241*** (0.054)	-0.511*** (0.056)	-0.233*** (0.054)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.445*** (0.128)	-0.529*** (0.143)	-0.514*** (0.116)	-0.590*** (0.135)	-0.432*** (0.130)	-0.509*** (0.143)
Main Elections	0.132 (0.260)	0.125 (0.258)	0.138 (0.256)	0.128 (0.253)	0.144 (0.260)	0.144 (0.257)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.076 (0.299)	-0.4 (0.305)	0.2 (0.300)	-0.286 (0.307)	0.079 (0.297)	(0.394) (0.301)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0467** (0.019)	-0.0465** (0.019)	-0.0568*** (0.019)	-0.0556*** (0.019)	-0.0449** (0.019)	-0.0436** (0.019)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0303*** (0.011)	0.0187* (0.011)	0.0277** (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.0288*** (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	-0.00694* (0.004)	-0.00332 (0.004)	-0.00671* (0.004)	-0.0032 (0.003)	-0.00717* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)
Domestic Election Monitoring	(0.282) (0.381)	-0.328 (0.364)	-0.46 (0.375)	-0.498 (0.357)	-0.284 (0.379)	-0.332 (0.361)
International Election Monitoring	0.256 (0.338)	0.428 (0.324)	0.227 (0.336)	0.401 (0.322)	0.264 (0.339)	0.443 (0.323)
Foreign Aid (1 year lagged)	-0.0396** (0.016)	-0.0317** (0.015)	-0.0404** (0.016)	-0.0326** (0.015)	-0.0409*** (0.016)	-0.0335** (0.015)
Constant	6.142** (3.034)	6.966** (2.966)	5.748* (3.021)	6.619** (2.939)	6.186** (3.007)	7.028** (2.918)
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	78	78	78	78	78	78
Number of Observations	321	324	321	324	321	324
F Value/Wald Chi2	W: 325.78***	W: 254.63***	W: 317.11***	W: 287.36***	W: 331.79***	W: 270.04***
Log pseudolikelihood	-706.76	-710.09	-700.55	-704.21	-706.12	-708.57

Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. ^ indicates that a chi-squared joint test shows that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

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Chapter 3

Table C3-1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 3

Variables	Number of Observations	Mean	SD	Maximum	Minimum
Country-Year Data					
Effective Electoral Threshold (EET)	1826	22.64	14.45	0.27	37.5
Resource Income per capita	2005	502.99	2360.071	0	48201.64
Oil-Gas Value per capita	2032	464.56	2310.312	0	41109.66
Logged Population Size	1928	15.74	1.54	12.28	19.15
Trade Openness	1987	75.04	56.43	2.6	440.43
Logged Country Size	1924	12.1	1.9	6.5	16.6
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	2241	0.5188	0.26	0.003	0.922
Country-Election Year Data					
Disproportionality	359	14.86	12.42	0	69.93
Ruling Party's Seats-Votes Gap	363	8.81	11.88	-31.7	46.64
Opposition Party's Seats-Votes Gap	360	-5.02	11.6	-61.03	31.7
Ruling Party's Vote Shares	366	60.31	20.94	0	100
Margins of Victory	362	27.2	37.97	0	100
Opposition Coalition	318	0.15	0.36	0	1
Resource Income per capita	471	609.73	3082.046	0	48201.64
Effective Electoral Threshold (EET)	447	22.16	14.26	0.27	37.5
Proportion of Independents	349	6.28	12.93	0	100
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	527	0.503	0.269	0.003	0.922
Election Boycott	518	0.25	0.43	0	1
Election Violence	519	0.28	0.45	0	1
Electoral Fraud	514	0.55	0.49	0	1
Polity IV	503	-1.73	5.44	-10	10
Parliamentarism	505	0.32	0.468	0	1
Logged GDP per capita	463	7.88	0.99	5.17	10.84
Economic Growth	456	1.48	8.4	-102.51	42.57
Logged Total Seats	477	4.84	0.74	2.99	6.4
Age of the Largest Opposition Party	311	1.9	2.93	0	18
Number of Opposition Parties	354	4.35	3.82	0	23
Logged Population Size	440	15.88	1.5	12.89	19.12

Table C3-2: List of Electoral Authoritarian Countries (1946-2007)

Electoral Authoritarianism	Time Period	Electoral Authoritarianism	Time Period
Afghanistan	2004-2007	Kyrgyzstan	1995-2005
Albania	1990-1992	Laos	1960, 1965-1974
Algeria	1997-2007	Lebanon	1993-2007
Angola	1992-2007	Lesotho	1967-1970, 1993, 1998-2007
Argentina	1962	Liberia	1985-2002, 2005
Azerbaijan	1993-2007	Libya	1952-1955
Bahrain	1999-2007	Madagascar	1961-1974, 1992
Bangladesh	1973-1974, 1978-1982, 1986-1990, 2007	Malaysia	1958-1967, 1973-2007
Belarus	1994-2007	Mauritania	1961-1963, 1992-2007
Benin	1961-1962	Mexico	1967-2000
Bolivia	1979	Moldova	1993-1997
Bosnia	1996-2007	Morocco	1970-2007
Botswana	1969-2007	Mozambique	1994-2007
Burkina Faso	1970-1973, 1978-1979, 1992-2007	Namibia	1994-2007
Burundi	1965, 1996-2007	Nepal	1959, 2002-2005
Cambodia	1954-1970, 1972-1974, 1993-2007	Nicaragua	1946-1950, 1971-1978
Cameroon	1964-1969, 1992-2007	Niger	1996-1999
Central African Republic	1961, 1992, 2005-2007	Pakistan	1977, 1985-1988, 2003-2007
Chad	1961-1962, 1996-2007	Panama	1952, 1989-1990
Chile	1989	Paraguay	1968-2007
Comoros	1989-1994, 1996-1998	Peru	1990-2000
Congo Brazzaville	2002-2007	Philippines	1965-1985
Congo Kinshasa	1963-1964, 2006-2007	Russia	1994-2007
Cyprus	1961-1965, 1968-1977	Rwanda	2003-2007
Czechoslovakia	1946-1947	Senegal	1963-1967, 1977, 1982-2000
Djibouti	1992-2004	Serbia	1993-2006
Ecuador	2000-2003	Sierra Leone	1967-1981
Egypt	1976-2007	Singapore	1968-2007
El Salvador	1963-1979, 1982-1984	Somalia	1969-1975
Equatorial Guinea	1969-1978, 1991-2007	South Africa	1951-2007
Fiji	1972-1986, 1993-2005	South Korea	1949-1959, 1963-1988
Gabon	1961-1966, 1990-2007	Sri Lanka	1977-1989
Gambia	1969-2007	Swaziland	1972-1977, 1993-2002
Georgia	1995-2004	Sudan	1964, 2000-2004
Ghana	1961-1965, 1992-2007	Syria	2007
Guatemala	1955-1957, 1963-1966, 1985	Taiwan	1991-2002
Guinea	1995-2007	Tajikistan	1994-2007
Guinea-Bissau	1994-2000, 2004-2005	Tanzania	1962-1968, 1995-2007
Guyana	1968-2007	Thailand	1955-1957, 1969-1970, 1975, 1980-1983, 2006-2007
Haiti	1987-2007	Tunisia	1960-1963, 1979-1986, 1989-2007
Honduras	1954-1956	Turkey	1946-1961, 1971-1973, 1983
Indonesia	1955-1965, 1971-1998	Uganda	1966-1968, 1986-2007
Iran	1990-2007	Uzbekistan	1993-2002
Iraq	1953-1957, 2005-2007	Venezuela	1947
Ivory Coast	1991-2007	Yemen	1993-2007
Jordan	1947-1970, 1989-2007	Yugoslavia	1991
Kazakhstan	1994-2007	Zambia	1965-2007
Kenya	1964-2002	Zimbabwe	1980-2007
Kuwait	1964-1975, 1982-1985, 1992-2007		

Table C3-3: Including Polity IV Scores as a Control Variable

Statistical Method	FE	FE	System GMM	System GMM
DV	EET	EET	EET	EET
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)
Lagged EET	0.881*** (0.03)	0.889*** (0.03)	0.960*** (0.03)	0.975*** (0.03)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars)	-0.000316** (0.0001)	-0.000242** (0.0001)	-0.000190** (0.0001)	-0.000151** (0.0001)
Polity IV	0.005 (0.036)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.019)
Logged Population	0.678 (0.980)	0.648 (0.905)	0.030 (0.135)	(0.031) (0.114)
Lagged Trade Openness	0.00062 (0.006)	0.00002 (0.005)	-0.00143 (0.002)	-0.00234 (0.002)
Logged Land	-44.76** (17.820)	-34.24** (15.580)	-0.1060 (0.118)	-0.0575 (0.098)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.0857 (3.588)	0.3310 (3.480)	0.0479 (0.549)	-0.0083 (0.475)
British Colony			0.32 (0.656)	0.08 (0.558)
French Colony			-0.239 (0.394)	-0.416 (0.345)
Spanish Colony			0.10 (0.34)	0.06 (0.29)
Constant	535.4** (217.50)	408.4** (189.30)	1.76 (1.33)	2.311* (1.35)
F Value	153.73***	199.16***		
Wald Chi^2			34808.61***	61039.55***
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Regional Dummies	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Half-Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	85	85	85	85
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)			0.157	0.169
Hansen Test			0.482	0.299
Observations	1,349	1,490	1,349	1,490

Table C3-4: Region-Clustered Robust Standard Errors

Statistical Method	FE	FE
DV	EET	EET
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)
Lagged EET	0.881*** (0.02)	0.889*** (0.02)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars)	-0.000316** (0.0001)	-0.000242* (0.0001)
Polity IV	0.0050 (0.0269)	0.0084 (0.0226)
Logged Population	0.6780 (1.2310)	0.6480 (0.8250)
Lagged Trade Openness	0.0006 (0.006)	0.0000 (0.006)
Logged Land	-44.76** (10.080)	-34.24* (12.960)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.0857 (4.979)	0.3310 (5.164)
Constant	535.4*** (113.80)	408.4** (156.10)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Regional Dummies	N/A	N/A
Half-Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	85	85
Observations	1,349	1,490

Table C3-5: Using a Different Measure of the Effective Electoral Threshold

Statistical Method	FE	FE	FE	System GMM	System GMM
DV	EET	EET	EET	EET	EET
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)
lagged EET	0.901*** (0.03)	0.878*** (0.03)	0.888*** (0.03)	0.958*** (0.04)	0.975*** (0.03)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars)	-0.000116*** (0.0000)	-0.000332** (0.0002)	-0.000251** (0.0001)	-0.000192** (0.0001)	-0.000149** (0.0001)
Logged Population		0.7310 (1.0090)	0.6850 (0.9360)	0.0404 (0.1300)	(0.0230) (0.1110)
Lagged Trade Openness		0.001 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Logged Land		-43.69** (17.600)	-34.05** (14.770)	-0.1100 (0.107)	-0.0629 (0.089)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		0.1290 (3.629)	0.3730 (3.511)	-0.0150 (0.574)	-0.0451 (0.492)
British Colony				0.3250 (0.695)	0.0600 (0.592)
French Colony				(0.24) (0.390)	-0.42 (0.351)
Spanish Colony				0.065 (0.326)	0.022 (0.272)
Constant	1.899*** (0.67)	520.0** (214.60)	404.6** (179.10)	1.66 (1.33)	2.252* (1.32)
F Value	175.38***	168.05***	212.63***		
Wald Chi^2				28779.59***	52740.81***
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No
Regional Dummies	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Half-Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	95	88	88	88	88
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.17	0.17
Hansen Test	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.45	0.21
Observations	1,557	1,378	1,528	1,378	1,528

Note: The dependent variable is the Effective Electoral Threshold which does not consider legal threshold under proportional representation systems.

Table C3-6: Limiting Sample into 1970-2007

Statistical Method	System GMM	System GMM	System GMM
DV	EET	EET	EET
Natural Resource Variable	HM (2011)	HM (2011)	Ross (2012)
Lagged EET	0.931*** (0.04)	0.955*** (0.04)	0.888*** (0.03)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars)	-6.20e-05** (0.0000)	-0.000181** (0.0001)	-0.000251** (0.0001)
Logged Population		0.0437 (0.1440)	0.6850 (0.9360)
Lagged Trade Openness		-0.0017 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.005)
Logged Land		-0.1260 (0.125)	-34.05** (14.770)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		-0.0402 (0.651)	0.3730 (3.511)
British Colony		0.3520 (0.709)	
French Colony		(0.21) (0.428)	
Spanish Colony		0.116 (0.371)	
Constant	1.01 (0.97)	1.96 (1.57)	404.6** (179.10)
Wald Chi^2	1114.22***	26495.88***	42689.02***
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	yes
Half-Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	90	83	86
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)	0.175	0.253	0.262
Hansen Test	0.261	0.465	0.355
Observations	1,314	1,226	1,403

Note: The sample is limited to 1970-2007, given the fact that most developing countries had finished nationalizing oil companies by the 1970s.

C3: Data Sources

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Chapter 5

Table C5-1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 5

	The Number of Obs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Data Sources
Fraud Gap	321	0.001	2.156	-5.4	6.46	N/A
Duration of Non-Turnover Years	549	5.293	6.357	0	27	NELDA
Duration of Non-Protests Years	470	5.88	6.63	0	27	NELDA
Freedom House Index (Three Years MA)	593	5.56	2.34	2	12.33	Freedom House
Logged GDP percapita	587	7.59	0.85	6.07	10.02	Maddison (2011)
Economic Growth (% of GDP)	587	2.46	6.25	-28.09	24.8	World Development Indicators
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	576	67.13	48.38	8.79	376.28	Penn World Tables 7.1.
Rural Population (% of Total Population)	571	58.52	20.12	0	95.72	World Development Indicators
Main Elections	593	0.51	0.5	0	1	The author's original coding
Domestic Electoral Monitoring	588	0.17	0.37	0	1	Kelley (2012)
International Electoral Monitoring	587	0.36	0.48	0	1	Kelley (2012)
Election Administrative Capacity	484	4.34	1.13	0	5	Kelley (2012)
Election Boycott	515	0.252	0.434	0	1	NELDA
Military Spending per capita	542	90.96	381.86	0	7631.69	National Material Capabilities 4.0.
Leader's Age	592	57.603	10.927	19	86	Archigos (Version 2.9.)
Leader's Tenure Length	593	10.24	8.94	0	45	Archigos (Version 2.9.)
Logged Population Size	572	16.12	1.23	13.21	19.15	World Development Indicators
Duration of Violent Conflicts	593	0.22	0.42	0	1	Armed Conflict Dataset 4.0.
Electoral Fraud (VCL)	373	5.21	2.95	0	15	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Fraud (VC)	377	3.91	2.67	0	12	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Violence	410	1.39	1.71	0	6	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Cheating	459	3.91	2.51	0	9	Kelley (2012)
Legal Problems	580	1.6	1.23	0	3	Kelley (2012)
Oil-Gas Value percapita (hundred dollars)	587	3.03	17.4	0	357.97	Ross (2012)
Change in Oil and Gas Value percapita	582	0.19	2.43	-0.61	57.57	Ross (2012)
Three Years Moving Average of Oil and Gas Value percapita	577	3.08	18.7	0	385.84	Ross (2012)
Collective Action (Three Years MA)	585	1.07	2.44	0	29.66	Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive
Party-Based Regime	593	0.5	0.5	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Military Regime	593	0.15	0.36	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Personalist Regime	593	0.3	0.45	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
Ethnic Organizational Power	574	0.41	0.31	0	0.98	Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009)
Foreign Aid (% of GDP)	509	7.73	9.62	-0.03	62.36	Ahmed (2012)
1980s	593	0.35	0.47	0	1	N/A
1990s	593	0.38	0.48	0	1	N/A
2000s	593	0.15	0.36	0	1	N/A
Eastern Europe	593	0.13	0.34	0	1	N/A
Latin America	593	0.15	0.35	0	1	N/A
Sub-Saharan Africa	593	0.43	0.49	0	1	N/A
Asia	593	0.13	0.34	0	1	N/A

Figure C5-1: Histogram of Predicted Values of Electoral Fraud




Table C5-2: Alternative Measures of Political Regimes

Definition of Political Regimes	Boix et al (2013)	Boix et al (2013)	Polity IV<6	Polity IV <6
Dependent Variable	Turnover	Protests	Turnover	Protests
Fraud Gap	-0.121 [^] (0.07)	0.144** (0.06)	-0.0563 [^] (0.04)	0.158*** (0.05)
Duration of Peace Year	-0.0371** (0.018)	-0.0582*** (0.019)	-0.0348** (0.016)	-0.0572*** (0.017)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.0989 (0.075)	-0.0466 (0.068)	-0.00428 (0.058)	-0.00335 (0.068)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.0894 (0.302)	0.502 (0.307)	0.347 (0.269)	0.242 (0.285)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	0.00225 (0.025)	0.0147 (0.021)	-0.0016 (0.016)	0.0211 (0.016)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	0.00297 (0.004)	-0.00552 (0.005)	-0.000901 (0.005)	-0.00551 (0.005)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	-0.00229 (0.010)	0.0203* (0.012)	0.0135 (0.010)	0.00345 (0.010)
Main Elections	-0.0847 (0.111)	0.267* (0.151)	-0.172 (0.107)	0.0411 (0.126)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.581 (0.388)	-0.599 (0.390)	0.273 (0.359)	-0.432 (0.355)
International Election Monitoring	0.346 (0.290)	0.628** (0.311)	0.264 (0.271)	0.0858 (0.259)
Election Administrative Capacity	0.247 (0.169)	-0.219** (0.106)	0.291** (0.136)	-0.278** (0.111)
Election Boycott	-0.571* (0.332)	0.503 (0.331)	-0.239 (0.269)	0.575** (0.276)
Military Spending per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.00194* (0.0011)	0.0006*** (0.0002)	-0.00079 (0.0008)	0.000558*** (0.0002)
Leader Age	0.0311 (0.021)	-0.00815 (0.016)	0.0131 (0.015)	-0.00674 (0.013)
Leader Tenure	-0.0403** (0.018)	-0.0154 (0.014)	-0.0288 (0.018)	-0.000272 (0.014)
Logged Population (1 year lagged)	-0.0823 (0.140)	0.195 (0.139)	-0.1 (0.161)	0.245* (0.128)
Violent Conflict Incident (1 year lagged)	0.441 (0.339)	-0.545* (0.312)	0.110 (0.292)	-0.453* (0.263)
Constant	-2.69 (3.891)	-8.389** (3.947)	-5.017 (3.662)	-6.085* (3.398)
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	222	260	270	309
Log Pseudolikelihood	-77.32	-96.32	-122.83	-119.37
Pseudo R Squared	0.2914	0.2596	0.2103	0.2293
Wald Chi2	78.63	124.3	82.2	114.5

Note: Decade dummies and regional dummies are all included in the models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p<.10. [^]p: Although the gap variable does not reach to the 10 percent statistical significance, graphs for the marginal effects show that it has statistically significant effects in a wide range of values in the fraud gap variable.

Table C5-4: Using the Electoral Fraud Variable per se

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent Variable	Turnover	Turnover (Recoding)	Protests	Protests (over fraud)
Electoral Fraud	-0.174*** (0.06)	-0.138** (0.06)	0.211*** (0.05)	0.213*** (0.05)
Duration of Peace Year	-0.0422** (0.017)	-0.0556*** (0.02)	-0.0668*** (0.02)	-0.0382** (0.02)
Freedom House (Avg, 1 year lagged)	-0.105 (0.065)	-0.109* (0.064)	0.0563 (0.078)	0.0347 (0.079)
Logged GDP percapita (1 year lagged)	0.24 (0.286)	0.2 (0.334)	0.202 (0.349)	0.0602 (0.350)
Economic Growth (1 year lagged)	-0.0440** (0.021)	-0.0386* (0.022)	0.0528*** (0.018)	0.0487** (0.021)
Trade Openness (1 year lagged)	2.03E-05 (0.004)	-0.000807 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.00593 (0.004)
Rural Population (1 year lagged)	0.0112 (0.011)	0.00593 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.0175 (0.011)
Main Elections	-0.0459 (0.139)	-0.0637 (0.151)	0.140 (0.130)	-0.0418 (0.136)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.114 (0.385)	-0.226 (0.382)	-0.646* (0.383)	-0.457 (0.390)
International Election Monitoring	0.268 (0.270)	-0.00107 (0.297)	0.107 (0.299)	0.167 (0.296)
Election Administrative Capacity	0.0597 (0.156)	0.124 (0.185)	-0.17 (0.116)	-0.133 (0.105)
Election Boycott	-0.155 (0.279)	-0.163 (0.284)	0.632** (0.301)	0.494 (0.321)
Military Spending per capita (1 year lagged)	-0.00255 (0.002)	-0.00290* (0.002)	0.000455*** (0.000)	-0.00017 (0.001)
Leader Age	0.0154 (0.017)	0.00893 (0.019)	-0.00064 (0.015)	-0.00542 (0.015)
Leader Tenure	-0.00786 (0.018)	-0.00386 (0.021)	-0.0219 (0.017)	-0.0255 (0.017)
Logged Population (1 year lagged)	0.111 (0.140)	0.143 (0.156)	0.256** (0.118)	0.181 (0.112)
Violent Conflict Incident (1 year lagged)	0.463 (0.302)	0.375 (0.311)	-0.825*** (0.290)	-0.551* (0.299)
Constant	-5.338 (3.32)	-5.585 (3.571)	-7.728** (3.485)	-4.209 (3.347)
Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	260	260	305	304
Log Pseudolikelihood	-108.38	-98.46	-99.69	-94.61
Pseudo R Squared	0.2411	0.2511	0.307	0.2772
Wald Chi2	65.99***	59.64***	139.31***	57.58***

Note: Decade dummies and regional dummies are all included in the models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.

Appendix Part II: Case Studies

Chapter 4

C4: List of Interviewees in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

#1 Officer of the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, May 5th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#2 Officer of the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, May 5th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#3 Political Analyst, May 6th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#4 Political Analyst, May 7th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#5 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, May 12nd, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#6 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, May 12nd, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#7 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, May 12nd, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#8 Political Analyst, May 14th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#9 Political Analyst, May 14th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#10 Political Scientist, May 15th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#11 Political Scientist, May 15th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#12 Political Scientist, May 16th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#13 Political Activist, May 26th, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#14 Political Activist, May 27th, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#15 Political Activist, May 27th, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#16 Political Activist, May 28th, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#17 Political Analyst, May 28th, Almaty, Kazakhstan

#18 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, May 29th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan

- #19 Student of KIMEP, May 29th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
- #20 Political Activist, May 29th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #21 Political Scientist, May 30th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #22 Political Analyst, June 3rd, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #23 Journalist, June 6th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #24 Political Activist, June 6th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #25 Economist, June 7th, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan
- #26 Ak Zhol Official, June 9th, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan
- #27 Nur Otan Official, June 10th, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan
- #28 Ak Zhol Official, June 12nd, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan
- #29 Political Activist, June 16th, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan
- #30 Political Activist, June 18th, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan
- #31 Political Scientist, July 2nd, 2014, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
- #32 Political Activist, July 4th, 2014, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
- #33 Deputy of Ata Zhurt, July 7th, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
- #34 Senior Government Official, July 9th, 2014, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

C4-2: Methodological Details and Robustness Checks: the Political Business Cycles Analysis of Kazakhstan

1. Note on Methodology

In order to employ time-series data like the one I used in the analysis of political business cycles in Kazakhstan, researchers have to deal with the following two problems: (1) non-stationarity of data and (2) autocorrelation. Since a Dickey-Fuller test revealed that all dependent variables are non-stationary, I took the first difference to transform them into stationary data.¹⁰⁰ In addition, because both Breush-Godfrey and Durbin-Watson tests suggested that CPI and unemployment rate all suffered from serious autocorrelation,¹⁰¹ I coped with it through AR (1) process through the Prais-Winsten method. Monthly dummies (reference category is December)¹⁰² are included in all models on account of controlling for seasonal effects. I set six months (for real wage, 3 quarters) before/after elections as electoral periods (1); otherwise the months were coded as non-electoral (0).¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ In the first difference data of all four induces, the null hypothesis, "the variable includes a unit root", was rejected at 0.1 per cent level, which means that the first difference data is stationary.

¹⁰¹ As in real wage data the null hypothesis that "there is no serious correlation" was not rejected, a statistical model for real wage is examined without using the Prais-Winsten method.

¹⁰² For real wage, I used quarterly dummies (reference category is the fourth quarterly).

¹⁰³ Blaydes (2011, Chapter 5) also sets six months as election periods to make the election dummies.


2. Robustness Checks

In order to check whether the results are robust, I conduct the following four robustness checks. First, following previous studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003), I alternatively use the logged GDP per capita (Annual data from *World Development Indicators*) as another proxy to operationalize state resources instead of state revenue.¹⁰⁴ Even if I use GDP per capita, the overall results do not change and I obtain almost the same results in all of the models. Second, taking into account the context of Kazakh politics in which almost all independents are pro-presidential, I include independents into the proportion of ruling parties and rerun the models, and the same results are confirmed. Third, instead of using AR (1) process to eliminate autocorrelation, I introduce a lagged dependent variable and rerun the same models. The results remain robust. These additional analyses demonstrate that the statistical results remain stable even if I adopted alternative ways of operationalization and estimation.

¹⁰⁴ The correlation between logged revenue and logged GDP per capita is 0.95.

Chapter 6

Figure C6-1: Time-Series Change in Inflation Rates in Kyrgyzstan



Note: red—Akaev regime, blue—Bakiev regime, green—Interim government, solid line—parliamentary elections, dash line—presidential elections, dot line—referendum.

This section examines political business cycles in Kyrgyzstan under the Akaev regime. For the purpose of comparison, I also include two regimes in the analysis, which were established after Akaev – the Bakiev regime (2005-2010) and the interim government led by Roza Otunbaeva (2010-2011). To be consistent with the analysis of political business cycles in Kazakhstan, I use monthly-specified Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a dependent variable. The data comes from the *Bulletin of the National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic*. Setting the CPI at December 1994 as 100, I calculate the CPI between January 1995 and December 2010. As many studies of the PBCs have argued, inflation after

elections can be interpreted as evidence that governments adopted expansionary fiscal and monetary policies before elections.

Figure C6-1 plots time series changes in CPI. Vertical lines represent the months when elections were held (red—Akaev regime, blue—Bakiev regime, green—Interim government, solid line—parliamentary elections, dash line—presidential elections, dot line—referendum).

Table C6-1: Political Business Cycles in Kyrgyzstan (1995-2010)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	CPI (first difference)	CPI (first difference)	CPI (first difference)
All Elections	4.794*** (1.292)		
Elections (Akaev regime)		2.006 (1.466)	
Elections (Bakiev regime)		5.786*** (1.878)	
Elections (Interim gov)		16.70*** -4.523	
Parliamentary (Bakiev)			11.78*** (3.260)
Parliamentary (interim gov)			16.28*** (4.464)
Parliamentary 1995 (Akaev)			3.942 (3.299)
Parliamentary 2000 (Akaev)			0.0296 (3.299)
Parliamentary 2005 (Akaev)			-1.381 (3.299)
Seasonal dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	192	192	192
adjusted R squared	0.5499	0.5694	0.5742
Durbin-Watson	1.93	1.92	1.89
F-value	20.55***	19.14***	17.18***

Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Durbin-Watson test is performed after correcting serial autocorrelation through AR(1) process.

Using the same time-series OLS regressions and model specifications with the analysis of political business cycles in Kazakhstan, Table C6-1 shows the results. Model 1 confirms that Kyrgyzstan also tends to experience a post-electoral surge in inflation by 4.794 percent, suggesting that the government engineers political business cycles in general during the period of 1995-2010. Interestingly, dividing elections into the ones under three different regimes, Model 2 shows that, while elections under the Bakiev and the interim government have strong statistically significant impacts on inflation rates, elections under the Akaev are not exposed to pre-electoral economic manipulation in a statistically significant way. This suggests that the Akaev regime was not financially strong enough to adopt large-scale expansionary economic policies before elections, as Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan does. More closely looking at the three parliamentary elections under the Akaev regime, there is a declining pattern on the post-electoral increases in inflation rates, although the effects fail to satisfy the 10 percent significance level (Model 3). In the 1995 parliamentary elections, inflation rates after the election were 3.9 percent. But it became almost 0 percent in the 2000 elections and turned negative in the 2005 parliamentary elections, which triggered the Tulip revolution.

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