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This is to certify that the
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PEASANI‘S , DEW, AND UNIDERIDEVEIDPED AREAS CF

Am: MCASEG‘BENI-QEBANA

presented by
Hodne Kmache

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PEASANTS, DEPENDENCY, AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS OF ALGERIA:

THE CASE OF BENI-CHEBANA

by
Hocine Kouache

A Dissertation
mhnitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillmait of the
requiranents for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Departmmt of Sociology
1985 '

©1986

HOCINE KOUACHE

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

PEASANTS, DEPENDENCY, AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS OF ALGERIA:

THE CASE OF BENI-CHEBANA

by

Hocine Kouache

This dissertation is concerned with the analysis of the problem of
underdeveloped areas within developing countries. The study focuses on
the definition of peasants, peasant movauents, and peasant roles, as
well as on the negative effects of colonialism and post-colonial
dependency. The case study of an Algerian conmune was designed in
order to examine ‘the concrete effects of planning under smbservient
conditions in the econcrnic, social, and organizational spheres. The
facts dennnstrate how dependent plans are shaped by both internal and
external factors.

‘Ihe case of Beni-Chebana shows how a rural camiune in Algeria
mved from a condition of wider-ministration in a subsistence economy
during the colonial era to a condition of abandoned farming and massive
out-migration. Today the min incane source is derived from zenit-
tarms sent by migrants to Algerian cities 7 and by international
migrants. Underdevelopnent characterizes this cannme in all aspects
of life, a circunstance that typifies all of rural Algeria.

This study included, in addition to rural development theories and
experiences during the colonial era and in. post-independence period,
rural ministration, economy, education, population, and social
mities within the case study of Beni-Chebana's connune.

AC K1909»: LEDGMENTS

I would like to express very special and warm thanks to Dr. J.
Allen Beegle, Chairperson of my Ph.D. Committee, whose help was very
critical to me. I have learned much from his great experiences. This
dissertation would not be as it stands without his consistent and deep
involvement. warm thanks are extended to the Committee Members: Dr.
James B. McKee, Dr. Kevin Kelly, and Dr. Harry Schwarzweller for their
constructive criticism.

Thanks to all Algerian officials at wilaya of Bejaia, Daira, and
Communal levels, notably the Party members, the Director of Education,
Ben Cheikh, the Post Office Director, the Director of Agriculture, the
School Supervisor, Larbi Djidjik, the Kasma's Coordinator, Habbadj, and
Laoubi Abd-Al-Aziz, Ministry of Planning.

Thanks to all Beni—Chebana's residents for their benevolent and
generous help and cooperation. Thanks also to Maria Olivia Mejorado,
typist.

The following persons merit special thanks for their direct

involvement in the process of data collection:

Adjissa Section: Abboub Boualem, Adnan Smail, Almai Saleh, Amara
Larbi, Bacha Abd-Allah, Bachi Akli, Djamal Mohamed, 'Djouadi Lahlou,
Douadi Tahar, Haddouche Tayeb, Hafss Hamhni.and Nacer, Hamadi Lahlou,
Lakhdar, and Seghir, Hamlet Taber and Meziane, Hamouda Abd-Allah, Larid
Md.-Ameziane, Louniss Mohammad, Maali Hocine, Mahmoudi Djemaa, Moussous
Teyeb, Nahi Md. Saleh, Saad-Eddin Md.-Akli, and Saabou Mohammad.

ii

Ait Mohli Section:‘ Aissat Ahmed, Azib Abd-El-Malik and Lehcene,

Chibane Nacer, Hamadou Abd-El-Krim, and Saadoud Sadek.

Beni-Chebana Section: Abbas Abd-El-Moumen, Agueni Md.-Said, Ait Baeziz
Hemza and Mokrene, Akkou Abd-El-Hamid, Arich Smail, Azib Mahmoud and
Md.-Amokrane, Bechreou Md.-Cherif, Belkhodje Yahia, Ben Hellal Ahmed,
Ben Mensour Belkacem, Ben Rahal Mahfoudh, Ben Zerare Amer, Bouchou Amer
and Bouzid, Boughanem Belkacem and Mohand, 'Bouhsene Abd-El-Kader,
Bounedjar Mokrene, Boukeroui Md.-Seid, Darghi Md.-Akli, Ghellas
Mouloud, Habbadj Md.-El—Messeoud and Lounes, Haddad Arezki, Hammech
Mohammad, Hemoudi Ali, Hessniyou Lahlou, Hellel El-Hassan, Ibeleinden
Mouloud, Issaad Mousse, Issahmane Zidane, Khandek Saleh,

Khenniche Mohammad, Lebkiri Alleoua and Mahmoud, Lazaar Djemee, Mane

Sassi and Foudhil, Ouari Md.-Arezki, Ourhaz Ahmed, and Tekliat Ameri.

Beni-Maouche Section: Abid Abd-El-Hamid, Djemal, and Mohammed, Adder
Tahar, Aidoussi Md.-ou-Rabah and Mohand, Berrah Necer, Boukider
Abd-El-Hakim, Bounebbeche Md.-Tehar, Boutamlek Melik, Cheabane
Mohammad, Chelleh Boubeker, Chamlal, Founas Hachemi, Heddad Mouloud,
Khelloufi Arebe, Kharmane Mokrene, Kouache Ahmed and Kassa, Lahleh
Djamea Junior, Louichaoui Abd-El—Aziz and Abd-El-Kader, Lounes
Abd—Allah, Mahdid Md.-Akli, Machkour Aziz, Mesroua Arezki, Oudjani

Rehab, and Sila Hamimi and Malik.

iii

To:

Algerian Peasants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PAGE

ABSTRACT . ............................
PCWLWNI‘S . .. ....................... ii
LIST or TABLES .......................... ix
LIST OF FIGURE .......................... xi
LISTOFMAP.......... .................. xii
M O_NE_§_ 9mm 5312 0mm ............... 1
OJAPI‘ER I: INTRODUCTION ................. l
The Problem: A §_r_ie_f Statanent ........... l
_Th_a_ m Objectives ................ 4
monomer . . . . ................. S
CHAPTERII: 'I'I-IEPEASANTANDPEASANTI‘DVEI‘IENTS ....... ll
Peasants: Various Definitions ........... ll
gapitalism and Socialisn ........ . ...... 15
Center-Perm . . . . . .............. l7
Peasant firisims and 213:; .............. 18
Peasants 9; Revolution . .............. 25
Leadership gig Religion . . . . ............ 29
Peasants 3g Colonialism . . . ............ 34
CHAPTER III: €0me LEGACY AND DEPENDEICY ........ 39
Underdevelogrant . . . . . . . ............ 39
Post-Colonial Develmt. .............. 46
mam.w ........ 47
gitalistbevelm .... ....... .....53
m _o_n_ gig 9_apitalist _W_o_r_l£_ . ......... 56
Colonial Reconstruction . . . . ........... 65

 

V

PART Tm: BENI-CHEBANA: A CASE STUDY .............. 73

CHAPTER IV: THE AWINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL

 

 

 

 

 

 

STRICTURES ............... 73
_TE Historical Settims ............... 73
_Th_e_ Effects if. E Reduction §o_ligy ......... 76
11—10; §e_w gel—e 93 _trg Connunes ............ 79
Efielpless Camune . ............... 80
'_I'_he;_ Camunal Working Conditions ........... 82
gig _R_o_l_e_ 2f_ 2).; Political Structure ......... 84
kmms....... ........... 85
GiAPTER V: THE EDIEATIONAL SYSTEM ............ 88
T_h§ Historical Background . . ..... . ...... 88
Ellliterag_£.e_yei........ ........ 89
Litergcz Cmsition . . . . . . . . ........ 91
The Educational Facilities an_d W
2; mi; . . . . . . . ............ 94
mmuon.......... ....... .103
Teachers'Conditions... ..... ........105
Non-formalEducation'........... ..... 110

 

GIAPTERVI: mmcwmmomamnonsosm....u4
ESubsistancaivel...........:....ll4
EMCWHG
_‘l‘tgLardholdigggigg................121

_TEFamiggInats.................122
_‘I'ggl’amlncane............ ....... 129

vi

 

_'I'_he; Livestock .................... 131

 

 

_Th_e_ §.l_:_a£e_ _S_§_c_tg_r_ .................. 132
_Thg Multi-Sources gf £12213 ............. 135
M m Outmigration . .............. 136
_TE 5219.. o_f m . . . . .............. 141
EEEEEHEQJEQSESEEELEEELE:Eflai"' . . ........ 147

QiAPI'ER VII: THE POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL

AMENITIES ................ 152
My; Phenanena ................ 152
Population Polig .................. 155

 

Characteristics g_f_ _th_e_ Algerian

 

 

 

Population . . . . . ............. 157
Beni-Chebana's Population Characteristics ...... 161
_Th_e; Outmigration Phenomenon . . ........... 167
Beni-Chebana's Git-migration. . - ..... . ..... 168

Causes and Destination 93 Out-

 

 

 

migEantsW.. ...... 171
_TEMQEWmigrants. ..... ........174
Muenities....... ........... 175

CHAPTERVIII: SIMRYANDCOI‘CLUSIWS. .......... 187
PeasantDefinition ....... .187
5:3 Peasants Revolutionary? . . .......... ' . 188
Colonialflwaffacts..... ..... .191
ColonialRaconstruction....... ........ .196

Beni-Chebana's Adninistration a_ndg_
Politicalmtem........ ....... 196

vii

 

Beni-Chebana's Education . . . . . . . . ...... 202

 

 

 

 

Bani-Chebana's Econany ............... 205
_Th_eflggm . . . . . . . . . ......... 207
Beni-Chebana's Population . . ............ 209
Out-migration . . '. . . . . ............. 210
MWities............ ...... 211
Develogiant Suggestions . ....... . ...... 213
REFERENCES.............. .............. 219

 

Table

3.

5.

6.

9.

' lg.

11.

LIST OF TABLES

OPEC Production Quotas for 1982-83. . . . . . . .
Percent of Bani-Chebana's Population 10 Year Old

and Over Literate, by Language and Sex. . .

Carposition of Adjissa's Population of all Ages

Literate, by Language and Sex . . . . .
Percent of Ait Mohli's Population at all Ages
Literate, byLanguageandSex . . . . .
Percent of Beni-Chebana's Population at all
Ages Literate, by Language and Sex. . .
Percent of Beni-Maomhe's Population at all
Ages Literate, by language and Sex. . .
Sex Canposition and Increase in School
Attendance in Beni-Chebana, Fran
1977-8t01982-3... ..... .. . .
Percent in School Attendance, By Section

“xx 0 O C O O O O O O O O O O ; O O

Proportions of Beni-Chebana's School Attendance

by Grade Level for 1981-82 and 1982-83.
Average Nmrber of Pupils per Classroom by

Grade Level at Beni-Chebana, for 1981-82.

umber of Pupils in Adjissa's Schools, by
Sex,for1981-82............
Huber of Pupils in Ait Mohli's Schools, by
Ser,forl981—82............
ix

Page

58

92

92

93

93

93

94

95

96

97

'97

98

 

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

24.

Bani-Chebana's School Size by Sex for 1981-83 .
Beni-Maouche School Size by Sex for 1981-82 . .
Beni-Chebana's Teacher Categories, by Language
Spoken,'for 1981-82 . . . . . . . . . . .
Bank Loans to Beni-Cheban's Private Peasants in
1977-1981 By Purpose and Nunber of
Recipients (in Algerian Dinar, R =
Recipient,A=Amount). . . . . . . . . .
Beni-Chebana's Farm Production for 1976, 1979,
1981, and 1983 in mintal With That
Olive Oil iniuggym Liter. . . . . . .
Bani-Chebana's Domestic Animals for 1976,
1979, 1981, and 1983 in Nunber of Heads .
Flow of Money Into Bejaia's Wilaya in 1978-1983
by National and International Categories
(inAD).................
Ait Mohli's Incme fran Outmigrants in 1977-
1981, by National and International
Categories(inAD)............
The Resident Population of Algeria, by Sex,
l977-89.................
Algerian Crude Birth Rate and Natural Increase
Rate,1977-79..............
Camarative Life Expectancy of Chosen Countries
bySex..................
In- and Out-Migration and Net Migration for
Algeria, by Sex, in 1977-79 . . . . . . .

X

99

1G0

106

126

, 129

131

139

149

157

157

159

168

LIST OF FIGURE
Figme O. O O O O ‘0 O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 FAQ

1. Age-Sex Structure of Beni-Chebana's Population,

1977. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 166

xi

 

LIST OF MAP

0 O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O 0 PAGE

Map

Wilaya of Bejeia

xii

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PART ONE: PEASANTRY AND DEPENDENCY

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

E Problem: A _BLi_e_f_ Statement

Today's Algerian economy is in trouble, like the economies of most
other developing countries, and the socio—economic problems are
becoming increasingly difficult to solve. Algeria's problems seemingly
originate largely from foreign exploitation of the natural resources
which are drained without creating a strong basis for local
developnent. The negative foreign impact started during the colonial
era and it is still being strongly felt today, especially in natural
resources in which the multinational corporations are involved.

Foreign interests, through various means and multiforms,
negatively shifted much of the national wealth and potential to the
energy sector in which all efforts have been concentrated. The focus
on energy development tends to serve the economies of other countries
rather than the national economy as a whole. The agricultural sector
already had been destroyed during the colonial era and never recovered
its earlier healthy situation. The agricultural enphasis in the
colonial period promoted cash crops and converted the best lands of the
country into growing wine, citrus fruits, and early vegetables. This
was detrimental to the production of foodstuffs that the country needed
but was left to the poor traditional sector, characterized by its poor
lands, "backward farming methods, overcrowded population, lack of modern
inputs, and with no help from the state. It is dominated by
subsistence production coaparad to the rich and undern colonial sector.
Demographic growth in Algeria, rapidly increased the demand for food

1

which the colonial agricultural system could not fulfill. The problem
here is that the colonial agriculture has been kept intact with regard
to its structure while its production sharply declined after the
settlers departed.

The FLN (Unique Party) Central Conrnittee recognized the growing
dependency which threatened national independence. The food shortage
phenomemn seams to be a shared characteristic of many developing
countries, including both the ”rich” and "poor" among them. Natural
resources are not, saaningly, lacking, but internal political strife
and external capitalist pressure, are forcing increased food imports to
Algeria as well as many developing countries. Scarcity of food leads
to high prices which cause famine, malnutrition, and social unrest.
Consequently, food scarcity is a threatening phenomenon, both in terms
of national independence and political stability.

Algeria has, like nust developing countries, enormous agricultural
potential, but has been unable to develop a genuine agricultural system
capable of satisfying national needs. Some ninety per cent of the
country's foreign exchange is with the capitalist countries, and this
strong and still growing relationship seans to be the main reason for
national socioeconanic unbalance and weakness. The type of national
developnent followed by Algeria after the liberation has been
infle by the colonial past and western experts who advised the
capitalist path. The main goal was to develop heavy industry which
would lead to a radical change in the national economy and transform

the country from its traditional agricultural production to industrial

 

production as in western countries. This major goal looked promising
and the government made major efforts to achieve it. Meanwhile, the
agricultural sector was overlooked, pending and waiting mature industry
to come to its aid. Such aid has not yet come. This has been the
result of blindly implementing programs based on others' theories and
experiences, without reasonably considering local context and
specifics. Transformation models of development simply have not
worked.

It can be said that neither industrial nor agricultural
Melopmant has sucmeded in Algeria. The regular importation of two-
thirds of the needed foodstuffs was not adequate, and by the summer of
1980 more money than ever before was spent on food and other imports.
Around five billion French Francs were spent on a new and increased
import project called Programme Anti-Penurie (PAP) designed to satisfy
increased needs and to fight successive shortages in essential consumer
products. (Algeria Actualite - AA., July 17-23, 1980)

The poverty that prevails in the "traditional” sector is forcing a
continual flood of people off the land and into the cities where grave
problems are created for the government. The goverment has tried to
solve these problems by resorting to force during the summers of 1978
and 1983. Some shantytown dwellers were sent back to their communes of
origin and their shacks were simply destroyed by a special police
brigade created specifically to deal with the shantytown phenomenon
surrounding all major Algeria cities. These problems, of course, are

not solvable through force. Suitable policies must be based on

 

knowledge of the roots of the phenomenon. The continual rural-urban
exodus has been created by rural poverty, since close to half of the
rural population depends for survival on earnings by migrant workers,
according to a government estimate in the mid-1970s (MERIP. #67). A
Thus, Algerian rural society is not closed or completely isolated
from the rest of the country or even world markets and events. Rather,
it is a relaxant of colonial and nee-colonial development. It is an
integral part of the world capitalist system referred to by dependency
theorists as “periphery of the periphery", representing the lowest and
most depressed level. The underdeveloped rural areas of many
developing countries, including Algeria, fit this pattern. Rural
people in this condition, are barred fran effective social, cultural,
economic, and political participation.
3 £951 Objectives
This study explores the socio—aconanic conditions of the ignored

traditional sector as contrasted with the state sector. The study also
seeks to assess the effects of the Agrarian Revolution Program, now in
effect for more than twelve years. The main—declared goal of this
program was to introduce radical changes in the rural sector and to
satisfy country people's deep aspiration for a better life. The goals
of the progran were:

"...building a new, just and open society to all

but preserving, in priority, workers' dignity (...)

This is why the agrarian revolution, beyond its

simple social justice preoccupations, means radical

transformation of rural world living and working

conditions (...) For the agrarian-revolution to be

a fundamental genuine elenent of progress for the

most destitute masses, it must provide them with
all factors of progress.” (Charter, 9-19) .

 

The ultimate goal of this study is to try to identify and to help
answer the critical and interrelated rural-urban problems created by
the new type of post-independence development. were there any
significant improvements felt by the Algerian peasants who were pushed
into poor, remote areas during the colonial period and who were given
little or no access to the means of modernization? The persistent
rural-urban migration 1 suggests, 22 years after independence, that
improved conditions among the peasant villagers did not take place and
the agrarian reform program has had very little success where it was
most needed.

Given the context just specified, this dissertation seeks answers
to the following questions: '

1. Why is a rich country like Algeria forced to import much of

its needed foodstuff?

.2. why does the rural-urban exodus still persist and what is

its impact on rural and urban areas?

3. met are the effects of the agrarian reform program?

4. Were there any meaningful changes in the socioeconamic

conditions of the traditional sector?

5. What are the peasant attitudes toward existing living

conditions?
WY

To answer these questions and others, a limited area of the
traditional sector was defined and used for data collection. To be

representative of the entire Algerian traditional sector, it should be

sufficiently distant from urban centers. The Beni-Chebana commune met
this conditionrand was chosen as a sample of this sector. It is a
rural commune - the smallest administrative unit -- fromthe Deira of:
Akbou (district) Wilaya of Bejeia (State). See map, page-xii. It was
chosen not through random sampling but rather because of a number of
particular considerations. Since it is my commune of origin, I am
better acquainted with this commune than any other. Further, I feel
some obligation to help its residents solve their problems and improve
their living conditions. Beside these subjective considerations,
objectively, the commune is representative of the Northern Algerian
traditional sector. It is about 250 km. from Algiers, the country's
capital and some 90 km. from Wilaya's administrative city center,
Bejeia. It has beenthe center of outmigretion since World War I, and
a large lumber of its residents are moving back and forth, to and from
urban centers in Algeria and France. French settlers never lived here
and its sole transport _link was opened, for the first time, during
, Wbrld War II. Finally, it was tarrad only some six years ago. This
commune is part of the traditional sector by any standard and its
participation in the war of liberation was significant.

Since it is_ impossible to study the comma as a whole, it is
necessary to focus on. some dimensions that appear most important.
Thus, the following will be emphasized:

The economic situation, migration, social amenities, population
structure, education, administrative and political structures, and

women's role. It is of paramount importance to base rural development

programs on an empirical knowledge of rural society and to implement
them in accord with the attitudes and values of the rural people. This
is true since it has been shown that many rural programs over the world
fail, in part, because of lack of participation, and in some cases fail
because of programs imposed from above which did not satisfy felt
needs.

To carry out the proposed study, field work was undertaken between
March 1981 and September 1983'. Short but repeated visits allowed the
writer to contact, interview, observe, and collect data from local
officials, party leaders and militants, teachers, citizens as well as
economic, educational, administrative, political, and financial
authorities at Deira and Wilaya levels. The Ministry of Agriculture
delivered a written authorization to do the study, as did the party's
Mouhafadha (Wilaya level). These permissions allowed the writer to
obtain official data whenever possible, contact people, and to organize
meetings at the local village level. In addition to interviews using a
survey instrument, direct field observations and relevant documents,
including census data, are used.

A questionnaire, written in Arabic, was used to collect data at
the village level concerning the dimensions just mentioned. A promise
was made by the party's Kasma (mammal level) to help with the study
as much as possible. Once the questionnaire was printed, a one-page
notice was distributed to the comma residents, party members,
administrative. officials, school personnel, as well as to mosques, to
inform the people about what was going to take place and why, and at

the same time, help was sought. This took place in April 1983. The
Kasma provided me with names of people, party leaders, teachers, .and
" notables in a number of villages of Beni-Maouche and Adjissa. Then I
began my‘weekend visits to these villages. Since I was teaching at the
University of Algiers, I had to travel 250 km. one way each week to
reach the commune in .order to contact the people, organize meetings
with them, and to explain the purpose of the study, read and explain
the notice, the questionnaire, and how to answer the questions.

The experience of doing the field work proved very costly in time
because it took some four to six hours in each of the villages visited
to call people for a meeting, to go over the questionnaire, and to
answer villagers' questions. The commune counts some 64 hamlets. To
avoid this time consuming procedure, I suggested to the Kasma to
convene, for the last two quarters of the communal hamlets,
Beni-Clebana and Ait Mohli, all them whose help was sought. It was
agreed to have this general meeting some fifteen days later in order to
allow enough time because of the difficulty of commmication. The date
set was May 26, 1983. When I came: on that date, I found no one
assarbled for the meeting since the Kasme received a notice from the
Mbuhafadha not to allow'any public meeting without a prior special
authorization for it. This decision came as a consequence of not
consulting with the Mouhafadha before starting the field work as was
explained to me later on.

Due to the university final exams scheduled in June, hot weather,

and the fasting period of Ramadhan (prohibition on eating or drinking

 

during the day), I had to wait until the end of July to return to the
field. Once the special authorization was obtained with no problem
when requested, and even with moral as well as promised material
support, two meetings instead of one were convened on August 8 and ll,
1983 because of the distance problem. Both meetings were held at the
cmmmal center, Tarfet, and presided over by the Kasma's coordinator
who urged attendants to help. The problem, however, was that not all
the invited people came. Some never received their invitations for the
purpose, others were on vacation at that time. Those invited were
village leaders, party members, high school students home from urban
centers, local teachers, and school directors. Their job was to
provide leadership for village working teams and to obtain villager
involvement.

The questionnaire was not intended to be filled out by single
respondents, rather, hamlet level data were sought. The data were
collected at each hamlet level, then added up, as needed, at section
and communal levels. Thus, the intent was to make a complete census of
the counsel hamlets, whether small or large. But due to field work
problems, some of which were just mentioned, only 37 out of the 64
hamlets were surveyed. They represent, however , around 80 percent of
the total resident population. Individual questions such as those
concerning the number of children for each mother and the mmber of
outmigrants were answered by individual families. Family books where
marriage, births and deaths were registered were also used in this

case. Other questions of a general character were collectively

 

10

answered by a group of villagers representing different families. The
team members of each surveyed hamlet were of different ages. They were
asked to count or make the best of their knowledge in estimating
carefully the answers to different questions. Disagreements appeared
sametimes between group members but a consensus was always found after
each side explained why it took one stand or another. These teams
showed a great willingness to cooperate with the study when they
received satisfactory answers to their questions and assured that the
study's aim was to serve their own general interest in contrast to
administrative censuses that could be used otherwise.

This study is organized in two parts. The first part includes a
brief statement of the probl‘em- studied as well as methodology just
presented. The concept of peasant and peasant movements are dealt with
in Chapter II. Chapter III deals with the colonial legacy and
post—colonial dependency. The second part deals with the findings from
the field study, that of Beii-Chebana, an Algerian rural comlmme,
canposed of four chapters. The fourth chapter deals with the
administrative and political structures of the commune, while the fifth
diapter deals with its educational system. Economic aspects of Beni-
Chebana as well as the role of women are dealt with in Chapter Six.
Chapter Seven deals with the population analysis, outmigration, and
social amenities. The last chapter concludes the study. All

translations from Arabic and French are mine.

 

 

CHAPTER II: THE PEASANT AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS

Peasants: Various Definitions
It is useful to start with a brief definition of peasants, the
subject of this study. Who are they and how are they related to the
larger society in which they are part? The several definitions and
viewpoints presented are intended to help understand more fully this
important portion of every developing society, it's movement and
developlent. These large popular masses have often been forgotten,
underestimated, exploited, and relatively little attention has been
paid them by historians. Range noted that historians:
I'lnvebeensonichunder the spell cast by the
princely and priestly order and under the mistaken
impression that only the upper classes, intel-
lectuals and professionals mattered in the life of
nations that the ideals and aspirations and the
efforts and the struggles of the peasant masses of
the different countries to gain their due place in

society have rarely received sufficieit attention."
(m: 13)

Obviously, peasants are not along any of the above mentioned
categories. I They are, however, struggling to gain their place in
society. Hence this definition does not exclude the urban proletariat
who also struggles for equing to gain their place in society.

I131 Rhaldun may havemade clear the difference between city and '
country people by considering the level of living. Country people are
characterized by a stibsisteice economy as angered to city dwellers who
reach higher levels of living. Ibn maldm wrote:

“Bare mcessities, in a way, are basic, and
luxuries secondary. Bedouins, this, are the basis
of, and prior to, cities and sedentary people. Man
seeks just the bare necessities. Only after he has

obtained the bare necessities does he get to
comfort and luxuries. The toughness of desert life

11

 

 

12

precedes the softness of sedentary life. There-
fore, urbanization is bound to be the goal to -which
the Bedouin aspires. (...) Sedentary people on
the other hand, have no desire for desert
conditions, unless they are motivated by some
urgent necessity or they cannot keep up with their
fellow city dwellers.” (Ibn Khaldun, 93)

The definition, made in fourteenth century and based on. economic
activity and different ways of - making a living, is still relevant
today. Peasants are those who live by agriculture and animal husbandry
which requires wide fields and pastures not needed by residents of
settled areas. What seems more important here is the peasants'
attitude toward urbanization as their ultimate goal. They are
struggling but unable to go beyond bare subsistence level, limited in
food, shelter, and warmth. The peasants' struggle is explained by
their aspirations for city life as a means of getting more wealth and
camfort. Hence, they tend to rest, take it easy, build large houses
and lay out towns and cities for protection. In other words, peasants
becale urbanized.

Contenporary definitions of peasants are not reach different from
that described by Ibn Khaldun. Landsberger points out the thoroughly
confused situation concerning the definition of peasant as follows:

"liners are considerable differences . not only.
between outstanding authors, but even crucial
variations for the same author within relatively
short time. " (Landsberger, 6)
mac differences and variations can be seen in the definitions by
Moore and Eric Wolf. Moore, while recognizing the impossibility of

defining the word pasantry with absolute precision, considered the

 

 

13

main distinguishing features of a peasantry as legal subordination,

cultural distinctiveness, and de; facto land possession. Wolf and

‘ Moore, viewed by .Landsberger to be the chief authorities on the subject

of the peasantry and their movements. Wolf, in his study of Latin
American Types of Peasantry, emphasized land ownership as critical to
an adequate definition. Ten years later, Wolf changed his definition
based on land ownership to another important—criterion, namely, a
peasant's loss of control over land and his om labor: "Peasants
are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant
group of rulers". (Landsberger, 7)

Wolf keeps changing his criterion of peasant status - from land
ownership, to exploitation, and to decision making regarding the
cultivation process:

"I define peasants as populations that are
existentially involved in cultivation and make
autonomous decisions regarding the process of
cultivation. The category is thus mde to cover
tenants and sharecroppers as well as owner-
operators as long as they are in a position to make
the relevant decisions on how their crops are
grown. It does not, however, include fishermen or
landless laborers." (Wolf, XIV)

Wolf makes a clear difference between peasants and cultivators
which fact makes his definition of peasant very close, if not

identical, to that of Itrn Khaldun. He asserts that:

"The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and
social status gained within a narrow range of
social relationships. Peasants are this unlike
cultivators, who participate fully in the market
and cmmit themselves to a status game set within a
wide social network.” (Wolf, XIV)

 

14

The new dimension of the definition of peasant is found in Ibn
Khaldun's definition of the Bedouins who:

”Restrict themselves to the bare necessities in
their way of life and are unable to go beyond them,
while sedentary people concern themselves with
conveniences and luxuries in their conditions arnd
customs." (Ibn Khaldun, 93)

The term Bedouin may need some explanation. It is taken from
“Badiya', meaning countryside and since the Arabic country is mainly
desert, the word becomes synonymous with desert and those living in the
desert who are usually constantly moving and looking for pasture
ground. Animal husbandry is their main source of income. The
sedentary people, by contrast, make a living from land rather than
animal husbandry. Both categories depend on land for their living and
are not city dwellers. Ibn Khaldun clnaracterizes the Bedouin as
follows:

”Through his own efforts, he achieves what he

proposes to achieve in this respect. He has

obtained enough to be ready for the conditions and

customs of luxury, he enters upon a life of ease

and admits himself to the yoke of the city.” (Ibn

nialdun, 93)
Here, we are provided with a process of change from the subsistence to
a higher level of living or in other words frm the peasant to farmer
who:

"...enters the market fully, subjects his land and

labor to open competition, explores alternative

uses for the factors of production in the search

for maximal returns, and favors the more profitable

product over the one entailing smaller risk.”

(Wolf, XV)

-Thus, Wolf only stated the facts without looking at possible

reasons for being and undergoing change. For Wolf, the peasant has no

 

 

15

aspiration, no struggle, no consciousness of the obstacles and
difficulties .facing him and no city-country antagonism. What separates
and creates these two types of societies and how can one change
positions? To these questions, WOlf doesn't say anything. It appears
that Ibn Bhaldun had more depth in his definition than Wolf, despite
his stating that:

”In our accounts, therefore, we must transcend the

usual. anthropological account of peasants and seek

information also about larger society and its

constituent class grouping, for the peasant acts in

an arena which also contains allies as well as

enemies." (Wolf, XII)

Kroeber also stressed the fact that peasants are "part-society
with, part-cultures" in a larger society. This is congruent, as
Landsberger mentioned, with subordination and exploitation as well as
with the necessary existence of a state or of cities, beyond the
peasantry (Landsberger, 8). It is inconceivable to study a peasantry
canpletely isolated from the rest of a nation's situation. This kind
of study'would be out of context and surely'meaningless. Moreover, the
national context :may not be enough, in today's world, to fully
understand the underdeveloped world's peasantry because it is so
closely affected by the international socioeconomic division of labor
and capitalist domination and exploitation. Hence, peasant decision
making, mentioned by Wolf, is scarcely possible.

C_apitalism §r_nd_ Socialism
The above criteria of land ownership, control of “the production

process, partial orientation to a market and or culture cannot,

 

16

separately, explain the situation of the peasantry in developing
countries. A whole set of criteria may be needed to understand this
phenomenon within the framework of the capitalist mode of production
dominating periphery countries. Wolf distinguislned two categories of
farm operations: the peasant, with narrow relationship status and
subsistence activity, and the farmer, wide open to canpetition and
profit-oriented production. The farmer is found in both center and
periphery countries, while the peasant is a phenomenon of the periphery
countries. Wolf, as well as Moore, mentioned some peasant
characteristics but failed to deal with the crucial problem of change.
It was Karl Marx and the Marxists later on who made interesting
insights on the subject. Marx, applying his theory of clnange over time
within the stratification of the peasantry, predicted that:

"Agriculture, too, would became capitalistic.

Consequently, property for the same kinds of

technological and economic reasons operating in

industry, would also became highly concentrated and

would have the same result as in industry,

including the generation of a propertyless,

increasing class consciousness, rural proletariat."

(Iandsberger, S)

Marx, however, as is well known and despite the generalization of
his theory, was not much interested in the agricultural sector and the
situation of the peasantry which as he saw it would disappear. Rather,
it was Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, faced with tactical questions of a
revolution in rural societies, who needed a clear delineation of the

rural situation. Lenin defined, as early as the 18963, three

sub-groups of the peasantry: well-to-do peasantry, including Kulak;

 

17

middle peasant who is a tenant and owning a small plot of land; and the
poor peasant who sells his labor -— a proletarian, part of the toiling
masses. Lenin did not change his division of the peasantry since then
as he maintained these three sub-groups of the peasantry after the
Russian revolution and sought to explore each sub-class position with
regard to bourgeois revolution and the struggle for socialism against
the bourgeoisie. As for Mao, he spoke of organizing five kinds of
peasants into a single organization: landless, semi-landless, share-
croppers, farm laborers and handicraftsuen. (Landsberger, 16-7)
Center-Periw -

The dependency theorists have emphasized the importance of the
relationship between center and periphery countries represented by
trade of mnrd'nandise, flow of capital, technology, organization,
current ideologies, etc. The achieved capitalism of the center
daminatas periphery capitalism in formation. So, the center-periphery
concept is of utmost importance with regard to our study and which will
be kept in mind when analyzing the developing world's socioeconomic
phunamena. As Min pointed out: i

”It is sure that a fundamental error is committed
any time a Third World phenmnon is studied by
looking at its cause in the Third-World itself,
rather than situating it within the world system
dialectic.” (Min, 50) ’

If this is true, the peasants of the developing countries are,
consequently, not only part of their own societies, but they are also
an integrated part of the capitalist system worldwide. This reasoning

wmld allow us to understand why the rural areas of developing

 

18

countries are still experiencing underdevelopment and relative back-
wardness, even many years after national independence. The centers of
the periphery countries are subject to foreign influence that make them
helpless in relation to other parts of the country.

Peasant Uprisiggs erg flags

Peasants throughout the world have always been aware of their
depressed socioeconomic, cultural, and political situation. They
express their deep sense of injustice and discontent in different ways
-- permanent struggles, uprisings, and their literature. The sense of
exploitation is, for instance, clearly expressed in this Argentinian
song in Spanish: (Castex, II)

"Laspenassondenosotros, las vaquinas son de
ajenas." That is: "The pains are ours, but the
cows are not."

This sense of injustice is not limited to individual cases or
accidental situations. Rather, it is a general trend throughout the
world and throughout hnmn history. Peasant uprisings have been
widespread and have appeared in mnost, if not all, countries of the
world. These uprisings have had limited scope in same cases. They
have failed many times, have been'short-lived in many others, but they
were not specific to any country or limited historical period. Among
the peasant uprisings same are very famous as the following quote
attests:

"Not only massive individual discontent, but
organized protests have been an important
ingredient of the history of the rural sector of
many societies. This is true from Russia in the

north to Indonesia in the south; from Latin America
around the world to the Philippines; from at least

 

19

the seventh century of this era until, of course,
this very- moment." (Landsberger, I)

Some uprisings, in which the peasantry played a key role,
constituted major breaks in the history of certain societies, and
others left international effects such as those of the French and
Russian revolutions, or that of Mexico from 1910 onwards and Bolivia
some forty years later. Some of the most recent arnd noteworthy peasant
wars are those of Cuba, Viet Nam and Algeria. The peasant
connsciousness is becaming sharper and his ability to struggle is
growing stronger than ever before:

"In the larger areas of the world, peasants are
astir with a nnew spirit of hope annd adventure.
They are no longer indifferent to their old
shackles of feudalism or the new instruments of
exploitation created by the capitalism. They are
in revolt against capitalism, imperialism, and
feudalism...” (Range, I)

Today's peasant strength is mainly due to two opposite mnodern
forces, namely, capitalism and socialism. Capitalism, through world
market instrmennts, opens the eyes ’of peasants to worldwide economic
crises which create a need to organize in sheer self-defense.
Socialism, to quote Ranga:

'...has shattered whatever inferiority camplex
peasants might have had about their own right to
and capacity for playing their part in the
governannce of their countries annd also their press-
ing nneed to capture political power." (hnga, 2)

Both Ibn Rhaldm and Range saw peasant democratic society as being

the first among the various orders, but peasants lost power annd became

oppressed and enslaved during the feudal era. Everywhere, they came to

 

20

be degraded into slavery, serfdom, and peonage. They lost political
rights and were kept down by the growing pressure of economic, social,
and political oppression.

Therefore, feudalism kept peasant masses unnder control for a long
time before recovering from political torpor and religious stupor and
to begin again to cherish political ambitions. The European peasants
were the first to benefit from Marxist ideology. In Ranga's words,
they: "had to wait until the Russian proletariat triumphed to give
wings to their political. ambitions." (Range, 15). Marxism, thus,
played a major role in helping the masses to regain power in modern
societies. But peasants did not wait for successful preconnditions to
be put together to stage a revolt or rebellion. Organized protests
started from the seventh century, as Landsberger asserts, while Range
goes even deeper with regard to mt revolts annd slave rebellion in
Europe:

"Especially famous is the slave rebellion which
broke out in Rune about 2006 years ago, under the
leadership of Spartacus, who mobilized a huge army
against the regime of the slave owners." (Ranga,

The fourteenth century witnessed a wave of revolts against feudal
oppression in French and English societies. The French peasants rose
in their revolts of 1338 and struck terror into the fandal lords. A
better organized and integrated revolt took place in England during the
same century. Inspired by such eminent clergyman as Martin Luther and
Husse rising in revolt against the church of Rana, German peasants set

about killinng fendal lords and their agents, burning down their

21

palaces, and occupying their lands. ' They came very near complete
success, but Martin Luther turned against them because he- was not a
thoroughgoing revolutionary. Successive generations of German peasants
went into revolts in 1618-48, 1740-86, and 1790. (Range: 116-31)

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw other peasant revolts
in Western Europe. Swedish peasants found cannon ground with the
rising bourgeoisie and together succeeded in obtaining valuable
concessions from the King; the French Revolution of 1789 owned most of
its success to the revolutionary peasants who suffered so greatly and
for so long that their hearts were set on their various demands; and
the Swiss peasants freed the country around 700 years ago. The Balkan
areas of Rumania, Bukovia, Bessaravia, Czechoslovakia, Austria,
Hungary, Greece and YUgoslavia also were not exceptions. The peasants
in these countries have had a long tradition of revolts. The' struggle
for national liberation frm the Turkish damination was interwined with
the movement against their omressors. They had undergone terrible
sufferings at hands of the Turks and internal enemies, the landlords.
(Ranga: 131-2)

Russian.peasant revolts were many, the most famous of them
occuring in 1606-7, 1670-1, 1707-8, and 1773-5. The Russian peasants
were emancipated from slavery onnly in 1907. Nehru's assessmennt of
Russian peasant achievement.is as follows:

“This confiscation of the big estates took place
entirely on the initiative of the peasants and many
months before Bolsheviks revolution. Lenin was in
favour of the immediate transfer of the land to the

peasants in an organized way. men the Bolsheviks
care to pover later on, they found Russian peasant

proprietors.” (Ranga, 164)

 

 

 

22

Range counted 670 peasant uprisings in Russia between 1900 and
1904, of which 441 were against landlords and 196 against government
authorities. Some two million workers went on strike in 1905, while
fifty to seventy-five million peasants rose in rebellion. They
destroyed some 2,000 'mansions, burned down feudal properties, and
distributed a large number of feudal lands among themselves. (Ranga,
140-65)

The African peasants may have suffered much more than any peasants
due to the slavery system, colonialism, and local feudalism. Dubois
‘wrote in "Black-Folk":

"Africa has been literally bathed in blood at the
behest of Europe: Not only’ was there the
discrimination due to the African slave trade but
there were eleven Zulu wars in South Africa from
1659 to 1893; there were seven wars of the English
against Ashanti; there were the wars around Benin
and the French wars in Dahomey and other parts of
west Africa, there was the English attack on
Ethiopia and in the Sudan and the rise of the
Mahdi; there were repeated rebellions as the
English and Germans entered East Africa, to say
nothing of the fights in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers and
Morocco." (Ranga, 133)

For centuries, the Algerian peasants unsuccessfully fought
feudalism, foreign intrusions, and later on, colonialism. The
political power as well as socioeconamic institutions, were
concentrated in foreign hands. -The rulers lived in Casbahs protected
‘by their armies. Invaders.faced local resistance and revolts but the
limited scopeoftheseallowedthemtobedefeated, aswasthecaseof
many peasant uprisings over the world. Pro-colonial Algerian peasants

rose against their oppressors ever since the beginning of the 19th

23

century; Kabylia, 1804-10, (1823), West, unnder Derkaqua (1805); East,
Nemenrzha and Souf (1813-23), French invasion (1830), Abdelkader
(1832-47), Mokrani (1871-2), and many others before the liberation war
(1954-62), (Wolf, AA, August, 19-25, 1982).

The Indians of Latin America were duped into a false treaty.
First, their chief was murdered before they were converted into a
subjected race. Their lands were confiscated and their conversion into
peons of the Spanish landlords took place without their knowledge.
Bolivar led the revolution and liberated six states from the Spanish
Crown. Presidents Juarez, Zapata, and Cardenas engineered a series of
revolutions in Mexico (1850-1911). Their slogans were "Land and
Liberty" and "Freedom of the State from the.Church". The nost famous
Indian leader of the Mexican peasants declared:

”It is better to die on your feet than to live on
your lenses." (Range, 293)

The Peruvian peasants recently are pressing for change in
waive upsurges seeking to reverse their intolerable position at
the bottom of Peru's social structure. To believe Camejo, oppression
is harsh and more oppressive in modern Peru. He wrote:

”mile the first satellites circled the earth and
jet linerslanded in Lima, the Quechuas were still
working the fields of rich landlords without pay,
like serfs of medieval Europe. Peruvian peasants
suffer a triple oppression: they are oppressed as
Peruviana by 0.8. imperialism; as Quechuas by
Spanish-speaking whites and mestizos; and as
workers or peasants by capitalists and landowners.
Peasant wunen suffer, in addition the oppression
meted out to their sex under capitalism...“
(Blanco, 7-8) ' "

 

 

 

24

These oppressed people rose in the early 1960s and did the unthinkable:
they took back lands stolen from then, declared themselves human
beings, and stopped working for their previous exploiters.

The peasants of the Philippines seered to have been quiet rather
than turbulent during the Spanish era. Most villagers were dedicated
to passive survival. Collective violence occasionally erupted but
tended to be short-lived and isolated. Only the upheaval of 1896‘ took
on the qualities of a general rebellion. Agrarian protests took place
and did not add up to a revolutionary heritage. They demonstrated
hostility—to domination but found freedom in the mountains. According
to Sturtevant:

"Many discontented hamlet dwellers ' fled from the
bells' to the bracing atmosphere and comparative
freedom of the mountains (...) the fugitives
flourished in sparsely settled uplands or on out-
of-the-way islands such as Palawan. They constitut
ed no problem to the Spaniards so long as they were
left alonne. Any effort to force them to accept
either Christianity or Western legal codes, how-
ever, led to bitter resistance." (Sturtevant, 115)

American intervention changed the course of development and
Anglo-Saxon patterns replaced familiar Hispanic ones. The peasants,
subservient to village traditionns found adjustment extrenely difficult.
This led to peasant attitude change after the lawlessness of 1850.
Provincial officials were beinng disturbed and rural crimes took on
class connotations, as indicated in the following quote:

"antlers, highway man, extortionists, and
cutthroats preyed increasingly upon estate owners,
lawyers, usurers, friars, and itinerant Chinese

merchants, all the energing enemies, in short, of
the troubled peasantry.

 

25

"Little more than endemic peasant protest against '
oppression and poverty, a cry for vengeance on the
rich and the oppressors, a vague dreanm of some curb
upon them, a righting of individual wrongs."
(Sturtevant, 116-7)

Peasants, up against the Westernized elite, refused to capitulate and
tie irreconciliable minority shifted fronm overt to covert rebellion. I
Between 1911 and 1920 underground organizations in the countryside
extended the heritage of peasant resistance to external authorities and
provided covering for the new generation of those committed to violent
rectification efforts. Thus, evolving tranquility was destroyed after
1923 wnen the movements surfaced in periods of agrarian unrest and
built. (Sturtevant, 141)
Peasants 9; Revolution

The above represent selected instances of peasant uprisings chosen
fran mung many others showing how tie peasants reacted to domination,
exploitation, oppression, 'enslavenent, and injustice. Tie question
here is whether or not the peasants alone can carry out a revolution.
Nobody underestimated the role peasants can play in social change but
leading a revolution is something else. Rural subordination may be the
key criterion with regard to the definition of peasant. Land
omership, decision-wing, and even suffering could be relatively ,
maningless, sanetimes, in the history of peasant movements. Peasants
need more than suffering to organize a national revolution against
their oppressors. In Landsberger's opinion: "Tie fate of tie Spanish
Peasantry has been among tie met tragic-of any in Europe."

 

26

(Landsberger, 4). This did not, however, bring the Spanish peasants
into the revolutionary front but rather other European peasants such as
French, Germans, English, and Russians made their revolts famous.
Exploitation may be the most important criterion that could be found
everywlere and at any given time. The concept of exploitation means,
also, that peasants, rich, poor, or in between, are part -of the
national society, which is part of the world system. Despite the fact
that peasants in developing countries are forced out of agriculture in
one way or another and tie class difference, within the rural society
itself, rural-urban antagonism seems very strong in today's developing
world. mich peasant category is likely to become revolutionary and
which is not? Tie key issue l'ere is that of leadership and tie nature
of change.

Marx predicted that the main trend of change will go toward
capitalistic agriculture. He faithfully welcomed colonialism as an
agent of change of tie feudal system, but colonialism did not make
expected changes. Both industrial agriculture and tie shrinking of the
family operated farms took place in more advanced, not in developing
countries. Lenin's division of tie peasantry into three categories
according to the wealth criterion: rich, poor and middle is a very
useful tool in the analysis of militancy and peasant attitude toward
the revolution in Russia. This division, however, cannot apply to
colonized countries, because in addition to wealth level, there is a
clear out line between national and foreign farmers whose goals as well

as their social positions are different. Mao's division of peasants

 

27

seems more realistic since it includes all essential categories of
peasants: landlords, semi-landholders, sharecroppers, farm-laborers,
and handicraftsmen. So, despite vocational, ownership, and income
level differences, peasants share common country living conditions and
are, consequently, more likely to form a single organization able to
face city exploitation and oppression. It is true, however, that to
succeed, peasants need a strong national ally on tl'eir side - namely,
the urban proletariat that can provide not only suppport but that
important condition of success, leadership.

Peasant uprisings demonstrate their fierce resistance against
oppression and domination but rarely succeed or go beyond the local
level. Tley keep relative freedom in tleir poor, renote, limited areas
and provide tne very muzh needed secure refuge. Rural leaders, even
tne most powerful of them, like Zapata of Mexico, for instance, could
not interest themselves in problems other than that of the peasantry.
This is why the peasantry needed to make common cause with the urban
proletariat. It is, tierefore, very useful to look into peasant
subgroups as well as the toiling masses as a whole with regard to
achieving a revolution. Most recent writers take into account rural
low-status groups when analyzing a peasantry but differences appear
when it comes to consider which subgroup is more likely to be militant
than others. Lenin and Mao sided with Marx‘s view considering tie
large rural proletariat of landless laborers as a source of revolution,
while Wolf sees middle peasants, predicted to disappear by Lenin, as

the most revolutionary. Moore, also diverged from Mao's view seen as

 

28

closer to truth but will not do as a general explanation. (In
Landsberger, 17)

Although theoretical divergences between Marxists and
non-Marxists, are not tie main focus tere, the facts show Marxist
concepts mmh closer to real life than non-Marxist ones. Tie main
factor calling for a revolution, or more militancy, is peasant and
working class discontent. Tne discontent level would define which
group is more deprived and more radical. Tne rural proletariat is,
tierefore, more likely to be in the front of militancy because peasants
are more deprived and more frustrated in tie developing world. To
(pots Landsberger (26) :

”....radicalisation of means would occur, first like
radicalisation of goals, only after much frustra-
tion, and after violence had just been used by the
damth groups."

Lenin clearly felt that tie poor peasants as well as laborers had
very definite revolutionary potential, but not like the urban
proletariat's spontaneous vigor. Mao, meanwhile, saw poor peasants as
being due ”seven points" out of ten and urban dwellers and the military
rate only ”three points" toward tl'e ”accomplishment of tie democratic
revolution.” Both men, however, believed that even the rich peasants
could be enticed to participate in tie early phase of tie revolution.
(Hmtington, in Landsberger, 35)

Violence and force are needed at the psychological level,
according to Fanon's theory in order for tie colonized to shake off

.foreign oppression. It is not just a military technique but also an

 

 

 

 

 

29

essential precondition to independence as well, because the colony was
established by force and maintained by force. The exercise of force
against the native strips him of his manhood which he can only recover
wten re himself uses force against his oppressors. The use of force,
consequently:

"frees the native from his inferiority complex and

fronm his despair and inaction; it makes him fear-

less and restores his self respect." (From the

Damned, in Wolf, 244)

Fanon goes further wten re asserts that it is not tie proletariat
and tie nationalist middle classes who are likely to use cleansing
violence because they start to get profit at a discount from the
colonial set up, but the peasantry ”rebels by instinct." Ttey put
individual standards aside in favor of tie community (in Wolf, 245).
This goes with the well known tl'eory of Ibn Khaldun about the ethics
and characteristics of city and country people, which play a major role
in social change. Tie rural people are the changing force, since tle
toughness of rural life precedes tie softness of city life. Tie
increase of wealth allows people, according to Ibn Khaldm to enter
neon a life of. ease and submission to the yoke of tie city.

Leadership §_n§_ Religion

Many peasant revolts fail because of lack of adequate leadership.
Religious leaders in- many cases have provided peasants'with this very
muzh needed element of a successful revolution, because as in the
German case:

“They had neitler education nor knowledge of any
previous. revolutionary struggle to guide them. So,

though they came within an ace of victory, trey
lost and lost grievously.” (Ranga, 129-3G)

 

 

 

 

30

Rural clergyman most often side with the revolts of the poor and
oppressed peasants and their religious teaching takes an egalitarian
character unlike that of their town colleagues who often oppose
egalitarianism. in fact, Juarez was the first Mexican to attack the
church and the Russian peasants did not make a great distinction
between feudal masters and corrupt priests. Wren they were able to
bear no more, the Russian peasants, according to Lee:

"rose in rebellion and in their mad frenzy murdered

tleir masters, burned tteir nouses -and even

churches and slaughtered the corrupt, prosperous

priests who had forgotten all true religion and

were ready to give tieir blessing to every

tyrannical practice of the gentry." (Quoted in
Ranga: 164)

Martin Luther, who inspired the German peasant revolt, became
tleir first enemy and called for tie rejection of equality, because he
believed an earthly Kingdom cannot exist without tie inequality of
persons. According to Lutl'er, some must be free, otters serfs, some
rulers, others subjects. Luther said:

”Let all who are able mow them down, slaughter and
stab them openly or in secret and remember that
there is nothing more poisonous, noxious and
utterly diabolical than .a rebel. You must kill as
youwouldamddog; ifyoudonot fall upon him,
he will fall upon you and tie whole land... A man
connvicted of the crime of rebellion is under tte
ban of God and the emperor and every Christian can

and should slaughter him and will,’ thus, be doing a '
good deed.“ (In Range, 129)

In this case has religion used violennce to keep social inequality?
Islam, as well as Christianity, has been used in many Islamic
countries to keep tl'eir dying socio-economic organization alive as long

as possible, especially in the backward regions:

31

"Islam has played a particularly important role in

preventing the appearance not only of an effective

peasant movement, but in fact of any general deno—

cratic movenent in these areas (...). The princi-

pal political slogan-- found in Moroccan country-

side was "Allah and the King". (Alexandrov, 365)
Many Muslim leaders, on the other hand, have understood Islam as an
egalitarian religion and taught it as such. These are 'found among the
first followers of tie Prophet as well as in modern times. Among
otters, are Djamal Eddin of Afghanistan, Abdah of Egypt, Simawi of
Turkey, and Ben Badis of Algeria. These leaders very effectively used
religion in support of the national liberation and social justice.
They took the charge of reforming and renewing religious concepts and
precepts and treir work had a great impact on the struggle for
independence. Political parties have had less influence on the popular

masses than that of the religious reformists, as Wolf wrote:

"It is the Jacobin Islam of Ben Badis which has
ultimately proved victorious." (Wolf, 247)

Effectively, Ben Badis and his Association of Ulemas (Scientists)
put together a set of principles to be realized by the Algerian people:
”Islam is my religion, Arabic is my tongue, Algeria
is my country (...) and independence is a national
right for all people on earth.” (Behr, 44;

Kouache, 1979, 44-5)
Ben Badis expressed the people's aspiration for human dignity, equality
and independence from colonialism. He did not see religion as separate
from material life or cut off from socioecononmic and political spheres.

Ulemas' free schools and newspapers gained large popular support, while

a religious war was declared against those who saw Islam otherwise, and

32

were using ~it to serve their own individual interests. Defining
Islamic characteristics, Ben Badis wrote in 1938 that Islam:

"nonors and glorifies reason and recommends that

all acts of life be based on reasoning. It con-

demns the servitude of man to man, as well as

despotism in all its forms (...). It is essential-

ly democratic and does not admit absolution at all,

even for the benefit of the most just man." (Behr,

45; Kouache, 1979, 49)

Both Islam and Christianity, therefore, were used to support class
or. individual interests. Peasants are revolutionary but their
revolutions fail in most cases because of lack of a strong national
leadership. Furthermore, they often adnere to fundamentalistic
religious influence. Adequate leadership needs a certain educational
level, much experience, and other objective conditions, which are not
found, with some exceptions, in rural areas. Absence of these
conditions limited peasant revolts in time, space, and goals, or did
not allow them to appear at all. Tl'e latter circumstance was the case
of the English landed aristocracy of the 16th and 17th centuries that
drove out the peasantry or the East Gernman Junkers who successfully
subjugated their peasants. Discontent, in neitner case, resulted in
revolt or collective status unrest. (Landsberger, 29)

Re most important needed conditions for successful revolts are,
perhaps, structural characteristics such as:

l. Tne conversion of landowners into pure rent,
tax, and service collectors, without engaging
in farming or rendering service to peasants:

2. Failure to perform compensatory services

becomes econonmic exploitation;

33

3. Becoming effete, weak and functionless
relative to a growing central government;

4. Peasant community partial survival, Moore
called "damaged but intact" as was the case in
Mexico, Algeria, and China. (Landsberger,
29-30)

Among other conditions, modernizing experiences play a major role
in waking up the peasants and forming their leadership. The following
factors have had marked importance in awakening the peasants: living
in towns or abroad where new ideas are acquired, army service where the
use of force is learned, fruits of organization and cooperation are
observed, and the incompetence of the upper strata is denonstrated.
Wars often precede or are associated with outbreaks of peasant unrest,
as Landsberger mentions. Pugachev and Zapata were soldiers. Tie
Algerian case is very meaningful in this respect. Tne 1871 and 1945
revolts took place while the colonial power was at war or at the end of
it. Many leaders and militants of the liberation war (Nov. 1954 - 62)
worked in France and/or served in the French arnmy. A number of
Algerian Liberation Army menbers (ALN) participated in World War II and
in tre Indo-China war with the French. Tleir experiences le'lped a
great deal during the liberation war.

Tlerefore, beside military experience that is necessary to keep
the masses organized and disciplined, modern life, mass media, new
ideologies, and practical participation in mass movements are tie main
means of teaching peasants not only how to express their discontent but

to organize themselves in successful ways.

34

Peasants annd Colonialism

 

Western capitalism expanded during tl'e colonial era. Land was
confiscated and their occupants were subjugated. There was no big
difference between the colonial powers with regard to exploitative
goals, despite differences in procedures and tactics used. Tie first
step was destructive. Socioeconomic structures had to be wiped out to
allow a new system to take shape. From an historical viewpoint it
should be noted that Latin American countries were generally colonized
well before African and Asian countries. Local languages and cultures
were successfully destroyed in Latin America, unlike what happened in
Africa and Asia. This has telped Latin Americans to lead in the fight
to obtain independence before tte two other continents and to develop
internal class conflict earlier as well. Regardless of success or
failure, class conflict started in such countries as Cuba, Chile,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, etc. Tte colonial powers:

"brought with them colonial settlers as in Algeria,
or large-scale capitalist plantations as in Sumatra
or even foreign money-lenders and merchants who
came, - not from the mother country but from otter
dependent territories such as the Indian chettyars
-- money-lenders - in Burma, who owned an
impressive percentage of tie best land . "
(Landsberger, 53)

The penetration of colonialism in Africa and Asia was extensive
but was less than in Latin America in terms of the destruction of local
langnage, culture, and religion. Psychological damage has been severe
despite the fact that both colonial and local communities remained

closed to each otter for a long time after the colonial invasion,

35

especially in the Algerian case. A large number of Algerians had never
seen European people. Mistrust prevailed in inter-community relation-
ships. Tte colonial community did not dare to employ Algerian workers
nor did tre Algerians want to work with the Europeans:

"the natives began to work in the harvest during

tie war of 1914, where farmers were mobilized."

(Launay in Wolf, 223)
Tie settlers did inflict radical changes on the existing cultural
system. Tie basic economic source, fiufi l_an_ds_; (mosques' private lands)
were confiscated from the very beginning in the colonization process.
Thousands of schools were destroyed without compensation by the French.
Tie cultural uprooting intensely affected the mentality of both tre
educated elite and. tie most disadvantaged working people. Ttese groups
suffered more because of their close contact with the settlers.
Education had been a privilege during the colonial epoch and illiteracy
was higler among those Algerians who lived in the colonial areas than
among those who lived far away. Those who worked with the colonizers
had a negative attitude toward their employers:

"Tiey have a tendency to destroy any colonial

property, including their working tools, stealing

time fronm hated labor, or gaining sonme money with

the least possible effort." (Kouache, 1979, 39)

Algerians living in the traditional sector, dispossessed of their
lands at a timewhenn land was most mededand tneonlymeans everyone
had to use to gain a living, suffered grave damage to their social
system, were prevented from participating in public affairs and local

administration, and lost certain cultural elements. The Algerian

36

situation contrasts with what happened in most colonized countries,
notably in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. This long deprivation and
continuous frustration made the people of Algeria to deeply feel
injustice and to regard public property as enemy property which they
felt a need to take over or simply destroy. This mentality is still
alive today, as the president's 19th instruction concerning care of
public property shows. Such instruction has been addressed to the
Party, state structures, local communities and dependent units, public
adminsitrative establishments, socialist enterprises, and agrarian
public sector bodies. It reads, in part:

"So, is it urgent to end this harmful situation to

national economy by consistently fighting against

tle resulting waste in order to make the best of

tie existing potentialities (...) Becoming

conscious of the sacred public belonging (chose

public) is necessary to avoid setting a confusing

climate leading to, sometimes, imposed abuses.

This should be considered by the managers as a

protective measure against any harm to their own
Due to a lack of involvement in public affairs as well as repressive
colonial measures, Algerians, the large majority of whom live in poor
rural areas, learned how to face socioeconomic problems with calm and
subtle protest to avoid individual sanctions. This kind of underground
reaction to daily life problems is still in practice today:

"People are not protesting any housing crisis,

lacking water, shortage of food, or higner prices

nor any socioeconomic problems they are suffering.

‘n'ey keep showing their discontent, as trey were in

tie colonial era, through hidden ways." (Kouache,

1984, 19)

Tie situation is far reaching, more dramatic, and more damaging

because not only did the toiling masses lose tl'eir manhood which they

37

could only recover through the use of violence, as Fanon asserts, but
also the educated elite in charge of the country's development lost
self-confidence as well as confidence in their countrymen. Resort to
foreign technical assistance in almost every aspect of society,
confirms an existing inferiority complex. Tl'e frustrated elite refused
to deal with their countrymen even if they had the needed skills and
required education. Expatriates were preferred and placed in key jobs.
It may be easier to manage productive units without being watched by
one's fellow citizens. The expatriate expert does not care and is not
interested in watching local partners once his own needs are satisfied.
He may even help local friends achieve some personal interests or at
least keep his mouth shut. With regard to technical assistance, the
Algerians went far beyond tie well known types of contracts such as
"product in hand" or "free product". Sharing plant managenent in order
to secure technology transfer is tne new type signed with the U.S.
Company El Paso, a gas importer. This gave El Paso an upper hand in
tie number one natural gas liquefaction factory of Arzew. Not only. are
tie main departments of production and maintenance presided over by ex-
patriates but even the spare parts storekeepers and janitors are tech-
nical assistants. Tte reasons given by high factory officials for this
situation'are: "We have to deal with a highly sophisticated technology
and the Algerians are not trustworthy." (AA, June 12-18, 1988).

Tie colonial effects thus are still being felt by tte developing
nations today and tie political independence has not yet produced

positive effects. T'ne post-colonial relationships between tne newly

38

independent nations and the Western powers just widened the gap between
the two categories. Tte colonized countries -have not yet recovered
from colonial underdevelopment wten they were forced into multiform and
complete dependency on center counntries. Instead of one master during
the colonial era, the newly independent countries found themselves
under old colonial legacy and a new fornm of dependency. Tne negative
Western inflnence is presented in the following chapter in regard to
Algeria. This is a continuation of tie past into the present. and
future. It most certainly affects the whole counntry as well as its

countryside .

CHAPTER III: COLONIAL LEGACY AND DEPENDENCY

(Underdevelopment

Tl'e colonial era left a legacy of underdevelopment, strong unequal
relationships between the mother country and its colony. Tne older
socio-economic structures built to serve colonial power interests are
still operating. They became evenstronger after the colonial military
presence disappeared and the colonial educated elite came to power in
tie post-independence era. T‘te colonial domination, exploitation, and
subjugation continue to work more efficiently than before by changing
its face but not its nature. The old master is using new techniques,
less expensive and more effective means, and new modern language:
trade, loans, aid, and technical assistance.

Today's world is divided into socialist and capitalist countries.
Inequality is found within tie capitalist world, and between tie
developed and underdeveloped nations. Tle question to ask is why some
countries are well developed while otters are not? Some social
scientists welcomed western colonialism, seen as an agent of
"civilization". Tte use of force was justified for this reason but the
colonial relationships failed to achieve this goal because it was
established in such a way that nelped tl'e nmost advanced countries to
develop more while putting constraints upon others. Colonialism not
only stopped tie development of productive forces, but directed them
into a trajectory of underdevelopnent. (Shivji, 55)

Rodney asserts that:

"...development and underdevelopment are not only

camparative terms but they have also mparative
relationship one to the other: that is to say tne

39

40

two halves produce each other by interaction.

Western Europe and Africa had a relationship which

insured the transfer of wealth from Africa to

Europe (...) The developed and underdeveloped

parts of the present capitalist section of the

world have been in continuous contact for four and

a half centuries. The contention here is that over

that period Africa helped to develop Western Europe

in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to

underdevelop Africa.” (Rodney, 75)
Thus, underdevelopment is not due to lack of development potential but
rather the rich parts of the world are actually poor and those parts
that are not so well-off in wealth benefit from the highest standards
of living. The ruling elite of the developing countries also enjoy a
relatively better life in the urban centers, while the rural masses as
well as the urban proletariat are kept away from modern life advantages
which they cannot afford.

The colonization process in Algeria took a very long time through
which the best land was confiscated and distributed to European
settlers. Many goals were to be realized through land confiscation,
such as subjugation of the people, cultural up-rooting, and destruction
of the family's socioeconomic structures. The mediterranean countries
saw Algeria as their source of food, as Jonsson asserts:

"The Romans, for example, considered Algeria and

. other Maghrebin countries as their granary and

everytime that cereal deliveries are stopped, it is

the famine at the metropole...” (Jonsson, 9)
The essential was to provide land to the newcomers. This policy pushed
back the Algerian peasants to remote and poor areas which fact caused
so many of then to seek refuge in other countries and organize open

revolts. Both country people and town dwellers participated in

4].

continuous outmdgration throughout the colonial era: 1830, 1832, 1868,
1875, 1888, 1898, 1910, and 1911. (Lacheraf, 217) Laws of land
confiscation were also clearly intended to create inequality among the
peasants by dividing them into owners and proletariat in order to
weaken social solidarity and break up prevailing mutual help. Nouschi
reported the following views of some French observers:

"There was at the bottom of that chaos some guaran-

tee for work, a certain sentiment of equality.

With the beginning of individualization it will no

longer be the same. Once the land is definitely

acquired, inequality begins: on one side the

owners, on the other side the proletariats, exactly

as in our civilized societies." (in WOlf, 213)

WOlf supports the idea that tribe dismembering and relocating
attempts failed because the French recognized local councils (Djamaa)
and granted them considerable autonomy. This autonomy was not granted,
in my View; Rather, the Europeans did not or could not care about
local community affairs. This fact is shown by the three types of
communal systems: full power with the European majority, maxed power
with the European minority, and military rule where no Europeans lived.
The federated system dominated in the distant regions where colonial
influence was avoided: .

"This was true because conquerors could not and had

no interest entering these regions and staying for

long periods of time.” (Kouache, 1979, 21)
So, the French had to rely on locally imposed Bachagha, Agha, and Caid
(Turkish names of military officers) whose roles included collecting
taxes and performing administrative chores. Village councils were real

managers and decision-makers at a local level. Wolf considered these

councils:

42

"Both open and hidden councils maintained thus a
tradition of decision-making on the local level,
despite the fact that the tribal structure had been
dismantled. They thus maintained also a tradition
of self-management which was to prove of capital
importance in aiding the rebel cause in 1954."
(Wolf, 217)

The colonial system destroyed local socioeconomic structures
before building its own system. The negative impact of colonialism is
seen through the persistent poverty and underdevelopment that reached
the whole countryside where the large majority of the Algerians lived
before the liberation war uprooted their society once again:

"Mal-urban antagonism has persisted in pre-

colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Algeria. The

rural society was strong despite all problems it

suffered. The suffering held it united. It was

uprooted only during the liberation war that took

more than seven years. Independence did not heal

its wounds but finished it up." (Kouache, 1984,

14)
More important is the fact that not only were the best lands
appropriated by the settlers causing poverty but the situation was
exacerbated by demographic growth and tie fact that these lands were
used to produce cash crops to serve French and other European markets.
This forced the peasants to produce their own food on the poor lands,
while the settlers monopolized the most profitable products: 90
percent of early fruits, wire grapes and citrus fruits accounted for 65
percent of farm revenue and were Algeria's principal exports. Tobacco
production grew from 808 kg. exported in 1843 to 215,837 kg. in 1847.
(Kouache, 1979, 43) The vineyard acreage more than doubled between

.1980 and 1954 at tle expense of food crops and pasture. (Wolf, 223)

43

A consequence of colonialism, therefore, was to create a marginal,
poor, and underdeveloped society known as the "traditional" sector:

"The Algerian peasantry, crowded into the least
productive lands, attempted to eke out a bare sub-
sistence.

About two thirds of the Algerian population lived
in the land at the time of independence, but only
half actually owned small plots. The rest were
either unemployed, displaced, sharecroppers,
seasonal, or permanent agricultural workers. More
than ninety per cent of this agricultural popula-
tion existed within the traditional sector, where
extreme poverty and backwardness prevailed."
(Merip, 47)

The striking fact, however, is that some social theories postulate
that rural people resist change and modernization and see them as
having backward behavior. Effectively, some participants to the
International Seminar on Culture, Society, and Development, that took
place in Algiers in June 1982, defended the idea of peasants refusing
modernization due to social and cultural values and beliefs. wo1f,
also, has placed much emphasis in his concluding chapter that the
”rebelliousness” of peasants is for the sake of the ultimate aim."to
remain traditional". This statement has been accepted by Landsberger
who argued that this would occur if uneven improvement takes place at a
time when the peasantry still has vivid memory of an earlier communal
existence. (Landsberger, 36)

The idea of peasant backward mentality is considered an obstacle
with respect to national development. The peasant works little, just
to satisfy family reeds. Tl‘ere seems to be nothing else to do than to

wait for the future to change the peasants' mentality in developing

44

countries. Mbunga, tl'e Tanzanian minister of information, pointed out:

”It is very difficult to change their mentality

from agricultural family production to a national

vision. Much time is needed and more tact is to be

used with people who have, for generations, worked

this way.” (AA. Jan. 27 - Feb. 2, 1983)
It seems that the backward-looking theory of the peasant has survived
tie colonial era when the colonized societies were viewed as being
primitive, archaic, backward, non-logical, and non-economic. Nobody
can deny the importance of social and cultural values and beliefs in
social change. Tie problem, however, is in the very meaning of social
change and the effects of modernization which the peasants resist. For
tie peasants of developing countries, modernization meant "westerniza—
tion” entailing as a consequence, more poverty, exploitation, and
inequality. Rural areas are the most underdeveloped of tie newly
independent nations. Peasants resisted changes that worsened tl'eir
. living conditions through reduced economic status, and imposed more
taxes or reduced their land holdings. Trey resisted programs imposed
from above which did not serve tleir own interests or satisfy their
real reeds. Economic reasons prevented peasants of Algeria, Tanzania,
and other developing countries from playing tteir _ full and genuine
economic role in tie post-colonial era. Trey lack agricultural inputs,
storage facilities, market, supply of machirery, and suffer from low
prices and lack of adequate social amenities that would incite them to
produce mere. Huntington, rightly asserted that peasant revolts "have
typically aimed at tle elimination of specific evils and abuses.” (In
Landsberger, 27) Peasant demands could be limited to land as in tie

45

Mexican and Boliviantases, return of the exiled Sultan as in the case
of Morocco, or to the removal of the late Shah of Iran whose
dictatorship (not his modernization) was responsible for his ouster.
These demands, however, could be wider as in the case of East European
peasants, for instance, who:

"...envisaged the use of new, modern institutions

with their request for education, state credits,

improved agricultural techniques and parliamentary

representation . " (Landsberger , 39 )

The Algerian peasantry was leavily involved in the revolts against
oppression and foreign occupation, notably during tre liberation war.
Rural discontent was so deep that while men formed more than 80 percent
of the liberation army, women and children as well as those who could
not directly participate provided extrerely important assistance to the
fighting forces -- food, shelter, information, and moral support.
Peasants were ready for the war a long time before it started. Women
as well as men had their rifles as in Aures, Eastern Algeria, as
mentioned by some members of the "Special Organization" at tteFirst
Seminar of tie History of tie Revolution. Trese peasants lost appetite
for land and tired of working hard to obtain so little. They did not
participate in the war in order to ”remain traditional" as Wolf
mentiored, nor did they want to retake tl'e lands of tkeir ancestors
stolen by tie settlers. The facts cannot jletify the idea that
peasants aimed only at recovering of lands as can be understood from
Hadj Ali's statement that:

"tte derist dream of the poor peasant is to come
down one fire day into tl'e fertile valleys and

recover the land of his ancestors, stolen by the
colonialists." (Alexandrov, 353)

46

It is partly true, however, that the lack of socioeconomic program or
development ideology for the post-independence period gave way to free
speculation about the future. The FLN first manifesto of November 1,
1954 did not specify any socio-economic program. It was rather limited
to national liberation. The Soummam Congress that took place in 1956
did mention briefly' the peasants' need to recover land, as did the
Tripoli program.of 1962. However, the French—Algerian. agreement that
ended the war gave the settlers the right to stay on their properties.
They were called back when they left the country at the independence
time but never came back. One fact was very clear to all peasants,
namely, that the colonial power has been a major obstacle against their
aspirations and dream of emancipation.
Post-Colonial Development

Nobody can deny the major role played by the poor Algerian
peasants during the national liberation war against French occupation.
This very large proportion of Algerians, however, still live in the
marginal traditional sector which has been systematically overlooked by
the regime. The liberation.war seriously uprooted the peasantry, and
poverty only' worsened after independence (MERIP, 48 and 67; Kouache,
1979; Agrarian Revolution Charter). Tte rural people alffered more
than any otter social category from the colonial deprivation and
despite the fact that they bore the largest burden of the war, they
benefitted the least from independence. This is true because the rewly

independent countries :

”have retained almost intact, the colonial
structure, and also maintained close relations with

47

their old master (...) on the contrary, one school
of thought insists that colonialism is the real
father of underdevelopment." (Khan, I)

If western colonialism created and fostered underdevelopment,
continuing close relations with that sector continues to play the same
role as before independence. Some colonial characteristics such as
elitism, centralization, and paternalism are more than ever in
operation in the same developing countries, including Algeria, without
any recessary physical presence. This explains why poverty, high
illiteracy rate, malnutrition and even famine, high infant mortality,
and low level of life expectancy, still prevail in many of these
countries. Trey are tl'e results of underdevelopment and dependency.
Such conditions result from the policies of the more advanced countries
with the help of the governing elites of the periphery countries. To
quote Johnson:

“Poverty is worldwide and is in part based on an
economic exploitation. Everywhere tl'e poor are
excluded from access to institutions through which
they might improve their wretcted material
existence. They are shut off from education; Labor
unions shun them; He political system ignores,
excludes, or represses them.

In sum, the poor everywhere are undernourisked and
sick and die younger; trey live in housing unfit

for humans; they are exploited and subject to
appalling social injustices. (Johnson, 279)

Poverty fl Famine
Absolute poverty has reached 800 million people in the developing
world and is still growing, according to the 1978 World Bank Report.

Not only does poverty continue to grow but people. continue to die from

48

starvation in many developing countries. The reasons are multiple,
according to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations. They range from problems in the natural environment to
man-made causes such as drought, flood, disease, political strife,
rapid population growth, lack of modern technology, and social systems
that are responsible for the persistent famine as in Africa (FAQ, 1982,
7, 15). Some fifty children died in less than two weeks from hunger,
that is, from August 19 to 30, 1980, in the North Central African
Republic. The famire was caused by flood, migrant locusts, and the
arrival of a large number of Chadian refugees (Le Monde, Sept. 7-8,
1980). Around 600,000 to ore million Eritrean people have been
severely affected and in desperate reed of famine relief due to
political strife. Food shortages caused 40,000 deaths from starvation
in Mozambique in 1983 and it is speculated that nine to ten people may
be starving everyday in tre southern part of that country. (Detroit
“Free Press, Dec. 12, 1983 and USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984)
The most important fact to note is that the rural poor suffer more

from poverty and famine than urban dwellers, according to FAO report:

"famine (...) does not develop in big cities or

metropolitan areas in peace time. This is partly

because sources of livelihood for tie urban poor

are less susceptible to sudden variations, partly

because urban dwellers are normally tie first to

beefit frem relief measures in times of emer-

gencies, and partly because-they have He political

means to resist food shortages. Nearress to trade

channels, access to modern storage facilities, and

more effective price control all combire to assure

the urban population a degree of protection usually
unavailable to rural poor." (FAO, 1982, 7)

49

Not only is food shortage causing starvation but also rural poor
cannot afford to buy available food. While some 150 million people in
24 African countries are facing starvation, US goverment 'is paying
millions of dollars to American farmers in order not to produce food
and milk (USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984). Lappe supported the idea that
hunger is not due to lack of food because when it is seen as scarcity,
agriculture becomes the rew growth industry. Those who have tie
recessary means -- land, capital, literacy, and technology -- push
tenants off the land and increase the number of landless poor. "You
get more food, yet more hunger." Hunger in many nations is often due
to unjust regimes. Tie Philippires, for instance, doubled its food
production in the last ten years but Filipinos are tie worst fed people
in Asia ('Re Lansing Star, Nov. 21-27, 1980).

In his first press conference as tle USA Secretary of Agriculture
within the first Reagan Administration, John Block declared that "food
is a great weapon". Robert McNamara ex-Secretary of Defense and
ex-President of the World Bank, felt guilty wten he addressed the
annual joint meeting of tie 14l-Nation International Maetary Fund and
tie World Bank for tie last time. He tearfully condemned the USA for
its "disgraceful" record in alleviating global poverty, which re sees
as:

"...an open insult to the human dignity of us all
(...) for we have collectively had it in our power
to do more to fight poverty and we failed to do
so." (Tie State News, Oct. 1, 1980)
Tears will not police poverty or any of the socio-economic problems of

1.3 billion people, more than ore quarter of tte world population, who

50

are still earning no more than $200 a year per capita, as McNamara
himself mentiored.

George Shultz, Secretary of State, seems to confirm the idea of
"too little, too late" while promising a $500 million economic package
for Africa over five years. Because America responds, as re puts it,
"when people are hungry and dying" not before that happens. Starvation
is taking place now, notably in African countries of Mozambique,
Mauritania, Ethiopia, Upper Volta, etc. Among tre African nations with
the greatest teed for more food are He following according to FAO, as
reported by USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984:

Country Requiretents Imports Remaining

Needs
Ethiopia 400 00 400
Ghana 370 75 395
Mali 275 ' 99 176
Mauritania 216 78 138
Mozambique 600 62 538
Senegal 838 445 393
Somalia 340 5 335
Tanzania 340 , 103 237
Upper Vblta 150 60 90
Zambia 300 123 177

Tie above numbers speak for themselves. Thanks to gas and oil
money, Algeria is not among these countries. Bessis maintains that
Sahel countries have considerable agricultural resources and not only
can become self-sufficient today, but trey can also become exporters in
the reasonable future. Tte food aid can in the best case alleviate tie
temporary deficit but cannot eliminate structural dependency. It is
aimed at maintaining the situation in which donor countries are allowed

to gain markets for their agricultural products, keep countries at

51

their mercy and make this chapter of aid appear in the eyes of
ill-informed public opinion as a disinterested charity. These
economic, political, and psychological goals of food aid also
accentuate the false idea‘that the receiving countries are unable to
satisfy tl'eir own reeds through internal development of food products.
he peasant, weakened by disloyal competition of imported products sold
deeply in tie city and deprived of the natural market, can make only
ridiculously small gains from selling surpluses left over after rural
self-consumption. (Le Devoir, Nov. 22, 1980)

Tte above description applies perfectly to the Algerian case where
rural people suffer from one of the lowest levels of caloric food
intake in tl'e world -- even worse than conditions in India according to
a 1970 United Nations Report — but diminishing food production started
long before independence and forced the government to resort to import
much of the needed foodstuffs. At the same time food demand increases
due mainly to rapid demographic growth and tre supply is decreasing due
to abandonment of land and a rural-urban exodus. Tl‘e tendency should
be reversed in order not only to limit growing dependency, but also to
avoid eventual hunger and malnutrition. Spending on food represented
54 percent of the total Algerian consumption in 1979 and it is expected
to be 46 percent in 1984. Tie cost of food imports has been estimated
to be 43.75 billion A.D. (Algerian Dinars) for the period of 1980-84.
This is the fifth of all imported goods and 16 percent of the total
imports, including services. Nire billion A.D. are regularly allocated

to food import every year (AA. April, 21-7, 1983).

52

Food import costs increased from 1,075 million A.D. in 1972 to
4,200 million A.D. in 1974, while agricultural exports amounted to 664
million A.D. in 1974 as against 910 million A.D. in 1973. (Sari, l)
About 20 percent of oil income is spent on food imports, according to
Bessis (1979). Paul confirms this in the following passage: "By 1975,
the regime had to spend nearly a quarter of its oil earnings on food
imports." (in Merip, 67) The food import budget constantly increases
due to the abandonment of the traditional sector, the non-profitable
state sector whose workers are joining the best wage-paying sectors,
and to non-stable agrarian reform sector where reforming the reform is
now" going on according to "trial-error" methods. Tie cost-of-living is
perhaps tte most expensive worldwide, despite l'eavy imports. The
goverment spent some three billion dollars for food import in 1979 and
the President's pledge that year to make the public sector more
efficient has gone nowlere. (New York Times, Nov. 18, 1980)

To tle weak national production is added the lack of a good
marketing system. The private wholesalers, in fact, contribute largely
to tie market destruction. Ttey monopolize around 80 percent of the
fruits and legutes market without being officially registered as
traders nor supervised by any meaningful control at the price level.
Trey pay no taxes and are free to buy and sell as they like. The cost
of meat is between 70 and 90 AD kg. (around $14 and $19). Potato, a
popular food, is sold by producers at 1,40 AD kg. and found at 6 AD in
tl'e retailer's skelves, etc. (AA. Oct. 7-13, 1983) Tlese conditions

keep food producers from producing for market. Food shortages,

53

tterefore, in Algeria as well as in other developing countries, are not

naturally caused but due to socioeconomic policy since:

"no category of causes is 'ratural' in the sense

of being independent of or beyond human action."

(FAO, 1982,7)

C_‘apitalist Develogent
Peasants of many developing countries, as they did before

independence, are paying tte price of tie capitalist mode of production
and development which has overlooked tie agricultural sector already
decimated during the colonial era. Effectively, Algeria has followed
this route, despite theoretically calling tl'e route socialism. State
capitalism was tre only choice in post-colonial Algeria because tre
national bourgeoisie was too weak to play any significant developmental
role. The colonial system has been kept intact and the way to go was
indicated by Western experts. ,According to W. Rostow: after
appropriate stimulation from tre West by government aid, foreign
investment and modern education, tre econemies of tie developing
countries will take off - the metropoles will then pull treir
hinterlands up behind them. This tleory did not work and tie main
reason was that western inflwee does not, structurally, develop
underdeveloped economies, in order to 'takeLoff' and to permit local
control. Hierarchy fare is quite clear, the first to be served was
foreign investment and the capitalist world market. Heee, as Allen
says: ' '

"growth is promoted only to meet tie reeds of the

capitalist world market and to arable foreign
investors to increase their profits. Foreign 'aid'

54

and investment allow the dominant nations to
extract Africa's economic surplus, further
impoverishing African countries and making them
more underdeveloped." (Allen, 26)

The educated colonial elite made this possible because of the very
simple colonial economic, social, and cultural impact. The rural
masses were put aside during the colonial era, while a small minority
of citizens benefitted from a combination of traditional and colonial-
derived resources and have becorre tie political and economic elites.
Tte developing countries during this period supplied raw material --
ores, oil, timber, and agricultural products - which did not require
advanced education or work skills. Again, to quote Allen:

"As tress elites prosper, tley are drawn even more
fully into the western ideology that trey learned
first in colonial mission schools, individualistic
competitiveess, tie value of private property,
consumption-oriented ideas of status and prestige,
and tie manners, etiquette, and life-style of
'ladies' and 'gentlemen'. They develop a strong

common interest with western elites." (Allen,
26-7)

Such is tie reason trese elites kept tl'e colonial s_t;_tu3 gu_o_ that
gives them their share of tie wealth extracted from natural resources
and the labor of masses. Among “other gereral characteristics of tlese
elites is that they are bureaucratic and commercial and not
ertreprereurial. Trey do not hold wages down because discontented
organized working groups would be a great threat to government
stability. The post-colonial African governments tried to retain more
airplus and expanded education, but tie basic pattern holds. The

richest in natural resources are more strongly tied to the world

55

capitalist market and least in control of their own development.
(Allen, 27-8) Algeria is among these rich countries that suffers from
colonial legacy. The colonial policy continues to reign in the
post-colonial era, thanks to its educated elites.

Amin agreed with Rostow's tteory that the capitalistic production
relationship appeared first in the rural areas but was resisted by the
feudal mode. Tlese relationships were transferred to urban centers
where trey achieved their forrm, leaving agriculture behind. As they
took shape and dorminated tre whole life, agriculture, then, was
completely and deeply integrated. (Amin, 27) This tleory failed in
the perime capitalist formations. The state capitalist industry
that consumes much of the oil and gas incare also is not prospering.
The strict theory of developing industry first, to tie point of
neglecting agriculture was not helpful despite using most available
resources and efforts in this sector. Prestige, ratler than effective
socioeconamic rules prevailed in the Algerian type of development. It
is usual to hear that Algeria got tle largest factory or the biggest
ship in tte world, etc. But- the price of such a factory or its
necessity to national econamy was never mentioned. T're cost of a gas
liquefaction unit was equal to eight years of the agricultural budget.
Industry input is much larger than outputand some factories actually
turn out as little as E to 30 percent of tleir productive capacity.
Anarchy and misuse of the existing potentials have been terrible as
A. Brahimi, present prime minister, pointed out in a TV program (Open
Dialogle) during the 1979 summer: national corporations have no known

 

56

capital, nobody knows if they are making profit or not, and their
importance is defined by the amount of oil money they are spending.
This economic bureaucratic elite seems unhappy with what it is getting
legally. Other ways and all means are being used to serve personal
friends and family interests against the state and public interests.
The president's notice number 19 concerning protection of public
property is very meaningful in this contekt.
Dependency gn_ E Capitalist mg

Algeria is now as before tied to Western Europe and more
specifically to the old colonial power whose political leaders are
still dealing with this country in a paternal way. Commenting on the
last French-Algerian gas supply contract, Cheysson, foreign minister,
called it politely - "not a mere commercial contract but a fundamental
agreenent on developnent". Beregovoy,' Secretary General of Elysee
palace, expressed the meaning clearly in terms of a favor done to
Algeria: ”It demonstrates the determination of Paris to contribute to
the valorization of the natural resources of developing countries."
(The London Times, Feb. 4, 1982) This very close relationship with the
capitalist industrial countries seems to be the main cause of this
persistent (underdevelopment. Fran among around 5600 contracts between
Algeria and foreign partners between 1973 and 1973, 7a percent .went to
the European Econanic Calamity (£512), 60 percent of which went to
France alone. The socialist countries got only four percent, while
jut three percent went to Arab, Latin America, arr! Asian countries,

Japan not included. (AA. June 12-18, 198G) Different means are being

57

used to strengthen this exploitative relationship. Algeria is forced,
within the capitalist world market to export, almost exclusively, one
product, energy, which represented 95 percent of the total exports in
1978 and 98 percent in 1982, according to Statistics Review.
(Alch-Chaab, May 16, 1984) The country's wealth is shared by external
loans, multinational corporations, in the form of technical assistance
and supply of technology and national corporations' wasteful spending.
Not much is left to other sectors of activity. I

In fact, income from energy exports has been the main resource for
both industry and agricultural investments. Neither one is helpful to
the other. Total dependency on oil is Algeria's contemporary
condition. Almost the entire state budget is based on this source of
income, and every project or import is estimated in water of barrels
of oil. This includes products such as bananas, red cheese, frozen
fish, oil, bread, milk, site building, machinery, semi-manufactured
products for factories, all programs, as well as ministrative
spending and waste are financed by crude oil and natural gas exports.
Although oil production decreased fran 52 million tons in 1979, to 47
million tons in 198G am! 44 million tons in 1.981, Algeria has lowered
the barrel price $2.50 since October 1981. (AA. May l-7, 1981) This
was made possible thanks to natural gas export. The London OPE:
Conference decided to keep its production level at 17.5 million barrels
per day. This is divided among its mariners as follows (in million
barrels per day and preceded by March 1982 production):

Table L: OPT-'12 Production Quotas for 1982-83

58

 

Country 1982 1983
Algeria 0.65 0.75
Equator 0.20 0.20
Gabou 0.15 0.15
Indonesia 1.30 1.30
Iraq 1.20 1.20
Iran 1.20 2.40
Kuwait 0.80 1.05
Libya 0.75 1.10
Nigeria 1.30 1.30
Qatar . 0.30 0.30
United Arab Emirats 1.00 1.10
venezuela 1.50 1.675

 

Source: El-Moudjahid, March 17, 1983.

Saudi Arabia, the biggest producer of all, was left with no
specific quota but expected to satisfy and fill market needs. (El
Moudjahid, March 17, 1983) The table shows Algeria gaining 0.10
million barrels per day while some other timbers were losing because
they could not increase their quotes of production. The country was
able to compensate for steadily declining oil production (1.2.mdllion
barrels per day in 1979, 1.0 in 1980, 0.65 in 1982, and 0.75 in 1983)
by' exporting more natural gas to Western Europe, that is, France,
Italy, and Belgium, among others. The figures reported by the New York
Times (Nov. 18, 1980) are not correct since Algeria has never produced
quantities as great.as 438 million barrels in 1979. The right figures
are reported.above. It is true that because of rising prices, earnings
have risen dramatically, but if the price went up fram $15 a barrel to
$37, sale sixyearsago, itdidalsogodownto$29 in1983. Thegas

price, however, did julp fram $3.70 per unit to around. $5.10 lately,

59

but it is still $1.50 lower than other OPEC mambers' price and $0.60
higher than that of the Soviet Union sold to Western European
countries.

The Algerian gas price is, in fact, high compared to that sold by
the Soviet Union to France and West Germany ($4.50/per unit) but low
when carpeted to that asked for by om: and especially Algeria. Japan,
however, agreed to pay for gas from Malaya, Indonesia, and Abu-Dhabi at
an equivalent oil price level. Mexico and Canada export their gas to
the USA at a price based on the crude-oil price as set by OPEC while
the Algerian partners have refused this basis. (The London Times, Feb.
8, 1982; AA. June 5-11, 1980) The point here is that, even though
Algeria is an integrated part of the capitalist world, her partners of
the industrial countries deny her an equal share. If French, in fact,
are paying $1.50 less than the OPEC price, other West European partners
may pay even las than that. The country is, consequently, losing a
great mount of money since as B. Nabi, Minister of Energy, pointed
out, each cent of the price is worth millions of dollars per year. For
theFremhpartnertopaythis low price and secure long term gas
supply is seen as a favor done to Algeria by contributing to valorize
its natural resources. This should not be true since:

'mropean countries which could increase their
production to meet their nods (France, West
Germany, and Italy) notably Britain and Norway have
taken policy decisions not to do so for a mixture
of economic aid security of supply reasons." (The
London Times, Feb. 8, 1982)

Foreign loans are still another means of exploitation. Rostow's

theory does not apply to developing countries since foreign invest-

6G

ments first serve industrial countries. The countries richest in
natural resources are most interesting to foreign creditors and Algeria
is along them. It has, in fact, no problem in obtaining loans to
export to these countries because of its impeccable reputation for
repayment. Its external debt service that amounted to around $8. 800
billion in 1980 and 1981 has been quickly paid, thanks to ending at
least three projects of planned factories of gas liquefaction implying
- certain of the most expensive technologies in the world. Spending for
existing corporations was also reduced in order to spend more on other
programs of social interest. The country is being considered as a big
borrower while its income from oil and natural gas reached $13 billion
in 1981, a figure that is 20 percent higher than that of 1980.
Appreciable increase of incame is expected with gas delivery to Italy
and France. This will campensate for the reduction of oil production
and annulment of the El Paso giant contracts on February 1981. (E1
Moudjahid, March 16, 1982)

Algeria, therefore, does not have the problem many developing
countries are facing today. They are tied up by foreign loans they
cannot repay. Only five to six developing nations were unable to repay
their debt in the previous five years, according to Clausen, World Bank
president. here were around 25 countries in 1983 which asked for
repayment delays. The most fmous of these nations are from Latin
America as shown below (according to Al-l-Iadaf, Decelber 19, 1983):
Argentina $39 billion, Brazil $95 billion, Chile $18 billion, Mexico
$90 billion, Peru $12 billion, and Venezuela $32 billion..

61

Algeria faces a growing dependency on industrial countries since
its main foreign currency income comes from oil and gas. Some 50
percent of this income is being drained away by external loans. This
single product is sold to capitalist countries which are making large
profits from it. Algeria has paid $16.3 billion between 1979 and 1982
as debt, thanks to oil income which increased from 75 percent in the
seventies to 98 percent in 1983. The five dollar a barrel price
reduction for oil will create a loss of $3.7 million a day for oil
only. The 15 percent reduction in the price of gas will create a loss
of 850 :million French Francs with France alone (AA, April 7-13, 83).
External loans are not used to serve the national economy' and popular
masses. Rather, foreign interest is the main goal, as Mandel points
out:

"Loans to foreign countries aretied up in mining,
industrial, or harbour installations, or planta-
tions which have to be protected against the
'ignorant', '1azy', 'fanatical', or 'xenopobic'
mass of natives. The age of monopoly capitalism
has rapidly' become the age of the revival of
colonialism." (Mandel, 452)

Gas liquefaction is extremely costly - $3.5 billion to build a
factory of natural gas liquefaction (NGL). Algeria has three factories
producing 21.5 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Gas transformation
and transportation costs are seven.times the oil cost. Some 25 percent
of gas production is consumed in the complex.which is five times higher
than that of oil. This explains why nearly half of the 90 percent of
external incame from gas and oil is being drained through foreign loans'

alone. (AA. June 5-11, 1980)

62

Beside loans, technical assistance and transfer of technology
represent excellent means of center-periphery domination and
exploitation. The Algerian case is a good‘ example of this fact since
this country has provided not only a market for machinery and a rew
technology testing but a good job market as well for expatriates. A
new technology of gas liquefaction is, in fact, now being tested in
Algeria at its own expense and not yet in use in the countries of
origin. Same five hundred of the 1600 employees of Arzew number one
(MEL) are technical assistants who are paid huge wages in foreign
currency in addition to other benefits and services. New assistants
are taught by Algerian colleagues when it comes to practical knowledge
after which they became their bosses. Assistants and assisted are
reversed in this situation and it has created a deep feeling of
measiress, frustration, and bitterness along Algerian workers and
staff. As for the cost, B. Nabi, energy minister, declared:

“We have exchanged gas against men in 1978. This
means that Algerian gas incame was equal to
spending on technical assistance, which fact is
also true for 1979. This is the contract of the
cmtury." (AA. June 12-18, 1980)

Nabi's statement does not seem to reflect the entire reality as to
different technical assistance costs. Beside workers' discontent with
their low wages compared to those of assistants, there are other
‘ slants causing mhappiness. For ample, they are not allowed to
hold jobs corresponding to their cametence which means misuse or
non-use at all of Algerian bran and technical potentials. Further,

they enjoy less adequate housing units than their colleagues and the

53

labor union representative is not allowed to participate in the
decision-making body as is the case in other productive units. This
means that the socialist collective management is not in force and
workers have no say in this sector. The technical assistance cost, in
terms of money, was $47 billion, this being higl'er than the income from
energy and the difference is great since it amounted to $290 million
between March 1978 and June 1979. This amounts to $1.5 million a day
should El Paso contract he maintained. Worker discontent is expressed
in different ways, for example, in turnover and absenteeism. (AA. June
5-11, 1980)

Technical assistance is not exclusive in the energy sector where
it could be justified, but rather is a general phenomenon found in
every sector of the society. High technology may be needed in some
sectors but the high cost to Algeria is not justified. Resorting to
mchnical assistance in this way shows that the previously colonized
people have lost self-confidence and have underestimated national
potentials which are often misused or not used at all to help solve
difficult local problems. The crisis is very sharp in the housing
sector, for instance, where some 150,000 Algerian families are living
in shantytowns surrounding major cities in addition to the overcrowded
housingunits. Tieshantytowaphelanemisveryoldandfomdeven in
the more advanced nations, but its steady growth presents a real
danger, a time bomb for the near future if not solved in developing
countries. The technical school of urbanism (ETAU) educates architects
whoselelpisnotsought in this daIain as Ould Henia, a school

tender asserts:

64

"We have technicians, engineers, and architects who

have not given an opportunity to show their

know-how.

They will be very happy to think and find out real

Algerian solutions to this problem." (AA. Nov. 19-

25, 1981)
Boudel, another school staff confirmed the above statement of his
colleague:

”The university is educating architects who are

entrusted with no project, even ’ the university

housing is realized by technical assistants.

ETAU's study office is seeking jobs." (AA. Nov.

19-25, 1981)
So, while national experts are not called upon, foreign study groups
are asked for help. The new division of labor seems to go like this:
We, Algerians pay and you, expatriates conceive and realize. These are
a few examples, among many others, where money, time, and effort are
lost due to lack of adequate planning and coordination.

The national corporations, in diarge of national economy, are
responsible for a large part of econamic problems and wasteful
spending. Several examples may illustrate. Among the best known
damages are realization delays where a project can go four to five
times its initial cost and the corporation in charge can still survive
because of the state alpport: importing products which are locally
produced and facing marketing difficulties; and the port of Algiers
perhaps the most falous locus of waste. President Chadli himself
aclared in a labor unidn meeting in 1982 that billions of dollars of
mordlandise remain in the port and nobody knows who bought them. Built

’toservelimitedcolonialimportsandexports,tleport has known no

65

meaningful expansion to satisfy new and more important economic
activities in the post-independence era. For more than a decade, the
port has suffered a chaotic situation and all attempts from the
government, party and mass-organizations, have failed to remedy it.
The damages are devastating. Tons and tons of costly. abandoned
technologies and foodstuffs, machines rusted out even before leaving
port, and parcels of drugs torn open under a blazing sun illustrate
conditions. Many ships patiently wait to unload and the waiting cost
has been estimated to represent as much as a large proportion of the
cost of the four year plan and would permit the purchase of at least
sum of the waiting ships. The port authorities estimate the cost of
the merchandise delays to equal the building of a half port in foreign
currency every year. (AA. August 5—11, 82; April 14-20, 83; July 7-13,
1983)

These corporations are protected by law and cannot go bankrupt,
whether making profit or not. Same corporations not only work at very
low capacity and spend all their income in wages but they tend to rely

onbankcredittopaywagesyearafteryear.

Colonial lReconstruction
The concept of development is know: to have originated from early
mstern experience of local programs. The term ”calamity development"
was in the USA since the 1930's to denote calamity participation in
municipal plaming. It was used to describe government programs to
stimulate local initiative within development activities since l94fl's.

66

Thus, the roots of this program extended into many developing countries
between 1950 and 1965, including:

A. British colonial service experiments that took place
mainly in Asia;

B. USA and European voluntary agency activities abroad and;

C. USA and British domestic programs in adult education,
carmunity development services, and social welfare.
(Holdcroft, 5-6)

Development programs therefore were limited to less developed areas to
help the poor and disadvantaged. The objectives are in larger part
noneconomic. From local areas, Mellor sees development in terms of
econcmic'growth when defining the concept as a:

”Process by which a population increased the effi-

ciency with which it provides desired goods and

services thereby increasing per capita levels of

living and general well-being. The process is a

dynamic one, involving comtant change in the

structure and procedures of the econamy. In

relatively high-incame countries, wtere a large and

carplex administrative structure, and a high rate

of capital formation are more readily available,

growth tends to proceed more rapidly than in low-

income countries." (Mellor, 3)
Agricultural developmnt has a great role in that process, since its
main objectives are to provide: food and fiber for an expanding
population, increased purchasing power, cpaital including foreign
exchange for the econamic transformation, and increasing rural welfare.
In addition to these, a labor force is proviad for industry as well as
a market for industrial sector output. (Mellor, 129) The above are

econamic rather than social objectives.

67

Johnson's definition is different from Mellor's since he focuses
more on social justice in addition to considering increasing production
as a positive aspect. Development alueys implied a:

"Process of economic and social change for better.
Few analysts have stopped to ask themselves if
these changes could be for the worse or if changes
could be better for sectors of society and worse
for other sectors. .

”It is useful to retain the positive value placed
in terms of development, and to formulate the
proposition that development is first of all tl'e
development of man out of conditions of exploita-
tion, poverty, and oppression. The concept also
needs to be firmly grounded in social science
theory. The second proposition, then, is that
development always involves changes in the basic
institutions and structure of society.” (Johnson,
272-3)

It should not be true that the poor are poor because they are poor

as the circular argment suggests:
"Many obstacles to development are both a cause and
consequence of poverty. As such there are circular
relationships that perpetuate the low level of
develomnt." (Meier and Baldwin, 319)
Logicallyaphenamexoncannotbeacauseandconsequeee at the same
time, and to explain underdevelopment by poverty leads nowhere. Under-
developlent is caused, according to these two authors, by market
imperfections that create a chain of phenomena: backwardness, low
productivity, low real incme, low saving, low investment, and capital
deficiency (Page, 319). What this theory does not say is the reasoning
that poverty did not come fram without and that many developing
countries where absolute poverty prevails can get rid of it. with

adequate plaming of national econamies and participation of popular

68

masses. Needless to say most if not all "poor countries" have
development potentials but they are still suffering poverty.

It is obvious that relative poverty existing in the advanced
countries is clearly different from the developing countries' absolute
poverty. The latter has always represented a danger. This is why a
whole philosophy of colonial rural development has been initiated in
many colonized countries during the colonial era and later on so as to
prevent rural . discontent and protest against foreign and local elites
and exploiters. The colonial power in Algeria tried to retedy the
situation created by tie colonial destruction and the first attempt was
in 1893 when a board called Societe Indigene de Prevoyance (SIP) was
organized to help Algerian society impoverished by the colonial system.
The second attempt was in '1933 through the Societe Agricole de
Prevoyance (SAP). The third and last attempt was made during the
liberation war. It was more important but came too late to stop the
war. The attempt, represented by tte Plan of Constantine of 1958,
could not sucmed because the resisters saw it as a means of stopping
the war in its third year.

India was a famous testing field for development theories that
included a cooperative system imported from Gemany as well as the
Anglo-Saxon concept of local government with the hope that "local
councils would radiate feelings of participation, banish apathy, and
encourage local initiative." (Khan, 8) The experience was much more
important than that of Algeria but fruitless because of contradicting
principles of . the experience and the colonial centralist elitist, and

69

paternalistic attitudes. The colonial ideology based on European
superiority, benevolent occupation, and the white man's right to the
guardianship of the colored man, was challenged and refuted by the
nationalists.

F.L. Brayne was tie philosopher of the colonial reconstruction in
India and his ideology has been a major source of post-independence
development programs: "Both the USA and United Nations drew heavily
upon the synthesis of earlier rural reconstruction effort in India."
(Holdcroft, 6) Brayne agreed with Gandhi about miserable village
. conditions but disagreed with him about the causes. Not the colonial
system was the cause, as suggested by the nationalists and socialist
agitators, but tl'e misery of the villagers was die to their own
ignorance, bad habits, folly, and vices. Their short-comings were:
lazy farming, burning precious cow dmg, poor hygiene, litigation,
costly death and marriage feasts, female illiteracy, etc. Tie cure
consisted in knowledge acquisition and reforming the vicious habits
learning better methods of agriculture, tealth education, and social
conduct. He also suggested to convert tie colonial officer into a
guide, philosopter, and friend of tie villagers from the popular
stereotype of an arrogant and corrupt bully. His slogans were : reform
yourselves, help yourselves, and follow the official leader (Khan,
8-11).

'me concept of cammity devleoglent (0)) also beefitted from
charitable efforts to kelp the poor of the United States and Europe
which focused mainly on tle urban poor and was conducted under social

7G

welfare policy. The United Nations' definition of social welfare is
almost identical to (CD) objectives defined as:

"An organized activity that aims at helping towards

a mutual adjustment of individuals and treir social

environment. This objective is achieved through

the use of techniques and methods which are

designed to enable individuals, grouper and

communities to meet their reeds and solve their

problems of adjustment to a changing pattern of

society and through cooperative action to improve

econamic and social conditions.” (Holdcroft, 7-8)
Since initiative was considered as essential, tl'e (CD) program provided
a trained village level worker (VLW) to arouse and stimulate community
initiative, as Brayne suggested. But the (U.N.) program is more
interested in joining cemmnity and government efforts to build,
ratter, national economy than tress mall and isolated republics. The
U.N. saw the program as a process:

"By which the efforts of the people themselves are

united with those of governmental authorities to

improve tie economic, social, and cultural

conditions of cammmities, to integrate these

communities into the life of the nation, and to

enable them to contribute fully to national

progress. (Holdcroft, 2)
The CD born during the cold war era and corrected with its economic,
political, and ideological objectives, was planned to oppose
revolutionary doctrines and remove subversives threats by bringing
people together into harmonious canmmities to prompts permanent
political peace and quick econamic growth. It just ignored
soda—economic problems that made the program politically ineffective.
Such problems are land distribution, elite exploitation, and

urban-rural damination' which could neitler be ignored nor bypassed.

71

(Holdcroft, 26—7) Four crucial imperfections were found in the CD
program:

1. It prompted welfare activities more effectively than

production activities. It seemed particularly
incapable of solving food crises;

2. It did not succeed significantly in forming harmonious

comminities nor did it secure general participation.
The poorer classes remained as they were, apathetic
and skeptical;

3. Reliance on its own agents and total collaboration
with established leaders further confirmed the elitist
and paternalist bias, a colonial teritage which
inhibited tie growth of true local initiative;

4. Tie role of the VLW as a gereralist captain and

' coordinator was not acceptable to tie special depart-
ments. Agricultural experts especially cmplaired
about the inadequacy of a multipurpose (VI-W) as their
agent. (Khan, 18)

Today's rural development programs in developing countries,
planted to solve the sale problems that arise from the increasingly
threatening situations, are unable to beefit from previous rural
development experience or to find out rew ways and methods to cope with
peasant problems. It seems that tie political leaders of developing
countries are not ready yet to take adequate measures and provide
necessary means to gradually develop rural areas of tleir nations. and

72

improve living conditions of the rural masses by providing equal
opportunities to all citizens. Radical political changes are needed to
ameliorate the economy of developing countries as a whole. Hewes
suggested that political leaders should pay much attention to rural
policy. He says:

"They should envision more clearly than they have

their principal role as governing rural consti-

tuencies. They should accept as a fact of less

developed countries (IDC) political life that a

healthy and progressive rural sector is essential

to national prosperity and stability." (Hewes,

XXI)

If rural developmeit is recessary and possible, social scientists
can and should l'elp in meeting its challenging problems. Their role
consists in: "discovering tre sources of self-generating growth and-
the means by which tiese resources may be nurtured and stimulated."
(Mellor, 4) The following chapters of Part No of the study are
intended _to examite realistically the situation of Algerian rural

society, past and present.

PART Two: BENI-CHEBANA: 5 CASE STUDY

 

CHAPTER IV: THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES

.122 Historical Settim

A brief look at the colonial administrative system may help to
understand more fully the Algerian administrative situation today and
its continuing underdevelopment. This vast country could not, in fact,
be directly managed by the colonial power which had to delegate its
authority to local allied families in the rural areas of the country.
Caids (civil officers) were being chosen from these families to
represent the central power at Duwar ' (communal) level of the
countryside. The role of the caidal systemwas not, by any means, to.
serve local commmities but rather to collect taxes, civil
registration, and to exercise a watchful eye on behalf of the rulers.
The caidal families served themselves as well as the colonial
interests. TTey had no way of providing any meaningful service for
local people or of caring about their specific problems. A caid could
not have more than a single secretary (Khodja) .

After destroying the existing local administration, the colonial
power started building a rew one suitable for serving the European
minority in Algeria as a whole. Tie process of tie administrative
denge took a long period of time. It required the whole colonial era
to be achieved since it started in 1844 with tie creation of a system
called Arab Bureaus intended to take care of local affairs, up to 1956
when tie 56-642 French decree of June 28, 1956 extended the French
legislation of April 5, 1884 to Algeria and unified both systems under

73

74

a single communal rule. This radical change came too late because it
took place during the liberation war, the events of which never allowed
application. The military rather than civilians ruled the country
during the whole war period through a system called Special Administra-
tive Service (SAS) within the rural areas and Urban Administrative
Service (UAS) in the urban areas.
Tie Algerian commmal administrative was set up according to
chronological order as follows: (AA, October 7-13, 1982 and Charter)
1844: Creation of the Arab Bureaus system to
help achieve the conquest through data
collection and to better master the local
socio-economic situation;
1868: Two communal types were created according
to European proportions: .E‘ull Exercise
Commues PEXZ) where they were a majority,
as well as Mixed Communes (BC) where they
were a minority and over military
territories;
1870: Creation of Indigenous Communes (IC) wtere
no European lived. These commutes were
managed by a civilian or military officer
assisted by a municipal body composed of
village council (Djamaa) presidents.
This reached territories under civilian
authority but not part of (PE) or (MS);

1880: (IC) were terminated and only (FEE) and

1937-45

1945:

1956 :

1962

1963:

1966 :

75

(Ml) survived within the civilian terri—
tory;

Municipal Centers (M2) were created over
maxed territories with a financial
autonomy and a municipality composed of
second class voters only, the Algerians;
29 (FEC), 97 (CM), and 158 (NC) success—
ively existed by this time. The (EEC) had
the judicial powers of French communes in
addition to favoring Europeans with a
segregated double voting systems

The communal system*was standardized but
it was too late for the civilians to take
control; and the military dominated again,
up to the time of independence;

Special delegations and socio-economic
commissions of intervention were created
to take care of communal affairs:

On May 6, a reduction of the number of
cultures from 1,576 to (676; on March 22,
the creation of communal councils for
animation of the socialist sector; on
Septemer 18, the Constitution, I
officially consecrated the commune within
the state system;

The communal charter was approved by the

76

goverment on December 20th;
1967 The communal charter ordinance came in
January 18th and the first Algerian
communal elections were held on February
5th;
1976: Setting up of permanent elected members;
1981 Tie Wilaya (State level as compared to
USA) order 67-29 defined five communal
categories according to population size:
1) less than 20,000; 2) more than 20,000
and less than 50,000; 3) more than
50,000 to 100,000; 4) more than 100,000
to 160,000; 5) more than 160,000
inhabitants. This was on October 11 and
the 81-277 decree of October created the
administrative corps of communal
services;
1982: The 82-117 decree of March 27 created
specific commmal jobs such as advisory,
etc.
_Thg Effects pf 9; Reduction _P£_l_ic_:y
Beni-Cl'ebana, tie subject of our study, shows clear negative
effects of the regrouping policy of 1963. This commmre was part of tie
Constantire department (district) when Algeria was divided into three

' departments by the colonial power. It became part-of Setif department

77

when the French left. It is now part of Bejaia Wilaya, corresponding
to French department or state (as in the USA), representing one of the
Akbou's Deira (county in USA) communes, until December 31, 1984, when a
new administrtive reform went into effect. The commune was composed of
four previous commnmes of Adjissa, Ait Mohli, Beni-Cl'ebana, and
Beni-Maouche, each of which was ruled by a Caid before the revolution
war started and became a full commune at the end of war. The 1963
reform regrouped the four into one and Beni-Ckebana became a leading
center since then, while the other three ex-ccmmunes became dependent
from then on and lost decision-making power to the leader in most
aspects of life.

Tre reform just worsened the situation that was already not (good.
Tie vast territory of Beni-Chebana is not generally accessible during
the rainy seasons. Most of its roads are not tarred and were opened
only during the war. Only one bridge exists over Bousselam River,
dividing the commute into two parts. The destitute and isolated
commnxe is 60 Km from the Deira center and around 90 Km from Bejaia
center. Ttere is no direct link between Berni-Chebana and tie Wilaya
center. Tie regrouping policy created more problems than it solved. A
high level official of tre Daira said that elected officials from each
of tie four sections were biased in favor of their own territory. A
high ranking party menber confirmed that 50 percent of today's communal
problems would be solved should the expected communal reform become
effective are day. Ttere is a geeral agreement among officials and

citizens underlining tie urgent need for administrative reform. Just

78

getting together is not easy because of distance, lack of roads,
transportation means, and also regional conflicts. Neither Adjissa nor
Beni-Maouche sections have representatives at communal or Wilaya
asserblies at the present time and before the reform. This fact is a
consequence of internal conflicts between the four parts composing this
commue. The new reform to be put into effect on January 1, 1985
divides Beni-Chabana into three new commues: Ait Mohli and
Beni-Chebana communes becoming parts of Setif Wilaya again with
Beni-Ourtilare ex-commune of Bejaia as a Daira center, arnd Beni-Maouche
including Adjissa to stay within Akbou's Daira, Wilaya of Bejaia.

The communal charter explained the communal regrouping in terms of
the following facts: The full exercise commues (Fm) had no reason to
exist after tl'e settlers' departure and the municipal centers (PC)
transformed quickly by the colonial power were not generally viable
because of small size, under population, little or no equipmnt, lack
of financial resources, and lack of necessary skilled staff. Tte
regrouping policy was intended to reduce the number of communes, lower
managerent spending, and increase personnel and financial means of.tl'e
newly created communes (Communal Charter, 28—9). This version does not
reflect the real situation and tie objectives could not be achieved due '
to lack of technical and financial means, as well as tie centralist
policy. Beni-Cl'ebana has rever had trained personnel, its natural
resources are not exploited fully, and its income is being spent
largely on state over-cost projects mainly due to long distance from

material supply centers and lack of skilled and well-equipped local.

79

enterprises in charge of project realization. Those of urban centers
do not accept rural projects for the above reasons and the bad local
conditions.

Tl'e Algerian commute is seen as a basic cell of tie revolution, a
source of erergy, and an initiator of action, according to the communal
charter which emphasized two main aspects, namely, decentralization arnd
serving the revolutionary power. But ratl'er, the facts show a strict
centralism when it comes to practical life. The commune has no
autonomy with regard to law-making and cannot initiate local
development programs, nor can it decide even on how its workers are
paid and how mmh. The Wilaya must approve and - define how much the
communal workers are paid. It usually keeps wages so low as to prevent
skilled workers from being a part of tie commune's manpower. This is
in addition to payment delays caused by the bureaucratic system. The
commue merely represents the central power, as indicated by the
charter itself.

“The commue should be in all cases in conformity

with the plan's prescription (...) wten it comes to

realization. Tie national plan is, in itself,

unique and not elaborated from the communal plans

as to be tkeir total." (Communal Charter, 33)
Tie communal bodies can only propose and suggest any political,
administrative, socio-economic, and cultural plans that may or may not
be considered by tie planters at the national level. This fact created
a wide gap between national plans conceived mainly by expatriates and

unskilled national bureaucrats and local realities. Tie communal role

is defined, in this respect, by the charter as follows:

80

"T're commune participates in the elaboration of the
national plan through providing the state
structures for national development planning with
propositions and suggestions related to possible
and hoped for actions with regard to different
gamma development programs." (Communal Charter,
Thus, the commune cannot initiate programs. Its. main role in effect is
limited to project realization which it cannot, really, fulfill without
fully taking part in tie first stages of planning and having adequate
means. The state is supposed, according to the charter, to intervene
to eitl‘er unify, complete, and perfect communal actions or to wholly
take clnarge of project realization beyond communal capacities. T‘l'e
state kelp, however, has not come to Berni-Ctebana as exmcted since the
state enterprises do not accept work within this commune due to its
isolation, lack of primary facilities, and project cost over-runs.
This telpless situation is not specific to Beni-Clebana alone. Rather,
it is a gereral characteristic of all rural Algeria.
'_I'_h5 Helpless Canmune
Tie current situation of {helpless Beni-Chebana can be summed up as
follows: 1) a lack of a skilled labor force due to rural-urban exodus
and tie refusal of outsiders to come in; 2) the projected communal
technical commissions simply do not exist l'ere despite being of
' paramount importance for the commune to work as planned; 3) there are
no high schools, no hospitals, no banks, and no factories. No central
administration has had a representative agency in tl'e commune. Should
these exist, their personnel could be of a great lelp to the
administrative and political structures, as is tre case in urban and

suburban communes of the country.

81

Tte newly-created communal enterprise cannot solve the problem of
realization because of high project costs, lack of skilled manpower,
and low wages which prevent skilled workers from working with the state
sector. A young skilled mason was very frustrated when he received his
pay. He was paid 47 Algerian dinars (AD) (around $9.40) per day and
was required to have his own working tools, while a non-skilled worker
was paid 45 (AD) per day with no requirenent whatsoever. Both worked
at the same building site and at tie same time. The private person
pays the first 150 to 200 (AD) per day plus free food. The second is
paid, in tie private sector, 80 to 100 (AD) per day plus free food.
The public sector does not pay for skill in addition to general low
wages and payment delays that may take mnonths after due dates. One of
the enterprise officials summed up the most important difficulties the
enterprise is facing: lack of skilled manpower not used to modern
technology, broken materials due to a lack of experience,
uncontrollable worker behavior , aggravated by tie intervention of
parents and friends against worker sanctions, costly field training,
growth in careless spirit of workers and even destruction of the state
properties, a continuation from the colonial era. The official,
however, recognized the respectable efforts to provide equipment for
the enterprise and thanked the local elected members to the national
Popular Assenbly (N.P.A.) for kelp.

The communal telplessness is made even worse by tie Daira level
helplessness. The following case supports tie fact of the Daira's
inability to telp. A delegation of tealth care experts was scheduled

82

to come to choose a health center site at one of Beni-Chebana's hamdets
but failed to come due to lack of transportation from the Daira center
to the hamlet. The communal secretary general had to use his own car
to provide this delegation round trip transportation the next day. A
site was chosen for the same purpose and by the same delegation before,
but a citizen whose land was to be used to open a road to the icenter
refused. I attended a meeting with the members of this delegation and
asked about the possibility of making a reliable cost estimate by
considering the real cost caused by distant supply centers. The answer
was quick and simple: "we did it once and it was refused at the Daira
level." I asked the same question when the wali (governor of the
Wilaya) came with the minister of public construction to visit the
area. The answer was that the ministry of planning's regulations
require this. It seems that a cost standard has been set for every
project at the national level, regardless of specific conditions of any
nature.
fie Communal Workigg Conditions

I had the opportunity to attend an Enlarged Communal Popular
Assenbly (E.C.P.A.) on November 24, 1982. This kind of assembly is
expected to be attended by political leaders, administrative
representatives, labor union merbers, and representatives of otter mass
organizations, as well as interested citizens. The meeting I attended
by' mere chance had been postponed twice before because of a large
proportion of absentees. Three items were on tre agenda:

1. A self construction project and material

distribution for it.

83

2. A Tarfet drinking water supply project.
3. Trouna's urbanization land reserve
perimeter.

The meeting was presided over by the Kasma coordinator and held in a
perfectly democratic way. Every person present had a chance to express
freely and defend his viewpoint. The first item took a long time and
effort because of problems experienced previously on this matter and
because of the special interest on the part of the people. The second
item also took considerable time» and demonstrated helpless
administration at both Daira and commune levels.

The story of supplying Tarfet with drinking water was very
controversial as shown by the meeting debate. Tte commune as a whole
is rich in springs but each hamlet suffers fronm the lack of drinking
water including the communal center, Tarfet. Tie approved water
project could not be achieved. It failed in three successive attempts
to supply water. T'Ie first attempt took place in tie neighboring
commune territory of Beni-Ourtilane which was stopped after the team
worked about one month. The reason given was that one's own resources
should be used before that of neighbors. Tie second attempt was made
within tie conmmue but ratrer distant in Ait-Afif territory. Tre
working team also was stopped for tie same reason. The third attempt
also failed because the hamlet cluster whose water was used for garden
irrigation asked that it be shared, not just taken from them. They
wanted- to be provided with part because they have no running water in

their homes. Unfortunately, this was not possible, according to the

84

officials, for two reasons: the project budget would not be sufficient
to satisfy the hamlet cluster demand and it was illegal to spend Tarfet
project budget on another project. The Daira informed of these
difficulties approved Beni-Ourtilane's refusal, and asked to build
reservoirs in order to collect all running water to satisfy everybody's
need. This was not possible as just mentioned.

The first item dealt with the problem of relping residents to
build their own homes and the criteria for selecting rew beneficiaries
among the residents. Different views were also in conflict here and it
took a long debate to agree on some principles to guide the selection
process. A committee was formed to survey and study applicant cases.
The third item took less time than the two others, in order to approve
a technical study for Trouna's urbanization perimeter. My conclusion
after attending that meeting was that the local administration is
helpless in dealing with many problems. The badly needed help did not
come to the commune and tre problems still await solutions.

fie Bale o_f 2e; Political Structure

'n'ere are three possible and different powers in rural Algeria:
1) the Party's Kasma, representing political power; 2) the communal
bodies, representing the basic administrative cell in charge of local
affairs; and 3) the strictly centrally controlled agencies,
representing ministries and/or national corporations when they exist.
The problem within this division of labor is the lack cf coordination
and cohesiveness mmh needed to help increase effectiveness in order to

create better living conditions in the rural areas.

85

The Kasme's role is very important. It includes such areas of
orientation, animation, and control at- the commmal level. It can
intervene in the productive units through Party cells. However, these
cells do not exist within Beni-Chebana because productive units do not
exist as well. Tie communal bodies are under direct control of the
Kasma which has the right to select elected communal members, preside
over its gereral asserblies, participate in technical commission and
propose, wrenever reeded, partial or total dismissal of members of the
communal assembly, including the president. Tie Kasme, however, has no
direct control over central agencies or national corporations. There
is no relationship between the communal bodies and centrally controlled
units within the communal territory since neither side has any control
-over the other. This looks detrimental to local administration that
has no say over the main socio-economic events within the commune. The
main exception, however, is made in the agrarian sector wrere the
(E.C.P.A.) is telped either by a technical committee or a survey
commission composed of the following representatives of the communal
executive members, ministry of agriculture, ministry of finance, and
the ministry of hydraulics. The last three have no representatives at
Beni-Chebana, a fact that makes the (51cm unable to realize its
mission as initially defined because of its technical handicap.

. E §_a_r_t.1 Merbers

Beni-Chebana's Kasma is composed of eight cells distributed over
the commmal territory in 1983 as follows:

1. . Ait Mohli, one cell, 7 party members

(with a special authorization due to the

86

limited'number of members);
2. Beni-Clebana, one cell at Ait Afif, 20
members and three cells at Tarfet, 54
members;
3. Beni-Maouche, three cells at Trouna, 77
members.
The totalof party members with full membership is 158 plus 56
aspirants to full membership. The average per cell is 19.75 members,
aspirants not included. This is a very low average compared to that of
urban and suburban areas where the party cells are very crowded. The
mlmber, however, is not that important despite the party's policy to
increase the number of its members. This policy is based on the
precept that: "who is not with you is against you." It is a shift
from the previous policy that considered the PIN as an elite not as a
mass Party.

Beni-Ctebana's Party members suffer from a large problem, namely,
low educational achievement in addition to small numbers and other
problems. This low achievement is shown by tl'e following distinctions,
including both aspirants and full members: college level: zero; high
school: 3; middle school: 25; elementary school: 53; ability to read
and write: 65 and illiterate: 68. Other major obstacles the Party
members face include: advanmd age, distance of residences from cell
location, usually between in ab 15 Km, and more to the Kasme, in
addition to the lack of any political and ideological education. The

last phenomenon is nationwide and not specific to Beni-Chebana. Night

87

classes could not be given due to the long distances and lack of
electrical lights. The gereral educational level could not be improved
because there are no means at all. Such educational factors as
libraries, newspapers, magazines, or movie theaters are not found in
the entire commune today. Radios and TVs, where electric power was
recently made available to some hamlets, are the only means of contact
with the outside world. The Party members, however, may receive the
Party's publication.

The Kasma has also control over mass organizations at the communal
level. Such organizations are the labor union, 106 adherents; the
peasant national union, 1556 members; the youth union, 316 adherents;
and the war veterans organizations, 123 meters. A woman's national
union simply does not exist in this commune. Thus, the prevailing
socio-economic conditions prevent Party members, mass organizations, as
well as the total citizens from doing better than they are now doing.
'I'te following chapter will explore some educational aspects at Beni-

Chebana .

CHAPTER V_: THE EDWATIONAL SYSTEM

1135 Historical Background

The commune of Beni-Ctebana, and more specifically the
Beni-Maouche and Adj issa sections, were among the most favored Algerian
rural areas with regard to education in the recent past. The colonial
power promoted a fairly large number of elementary schools in today's
Beni-Ctebana territory. Most of these schools were destroyed during
the liberation war and not all of them have been rebuilt after
independence. Such a case is M'Zita which has been programmed for a
school but it has been postponed many times, according to hamlet
residents. Taguenit started building its school eleven years ago but
it is not yet finished -- that is, three classrooms, two housing units,
and a canteen. Taguenit residents could not wait that long, so they
managed to rebuild their school through their own means, while waiting
for tie state to build a more modern school with adequate housing and
other facilities. There were four colonial schools in this commune
before the war, but the educational level rarely went beyond reading
and writing skills in French. No Arabic was taught in these schools.
Tte school teachers were sent in from outside.

Ulema's Association of Ben Badis also promoted a free school
system at Tagtenit, Tioual, Aguemoune, and Adjissa which were hamlets
of Beni-Maouche. Ttese private schools were entirely financed by
residents.- The colonial administration opposed activities of this

association and persistently harassed, jailed, and fined the school
teachers for one reason or another. These schools, spread nationwide,

88

89

represented a threat to the colonial presence in this country. They
took a defiant stand by teaching the Arabic language that had been
excluded from. the colonial public schools, a democratic religion
calling fOr individual and national freedom, and nationalism among
others. Each hamaet has, in addition to the two antagonistic public
and private schools, its own mosque which provides religious teaching,
services, and reading and writing skills -to hamdet children. The
mosque's expenses including Imam's wages were provided by the hamlet
residents and income from Hubs lands (lands donated by citizens to
serve the mosque's activities). The European settlers did not
confiscate these lands as elsewhere, notably in the colonial areas.
This important source of income to support the mosque helped a lot but
the local communities had to bear a heavy economic burden to keep this
institution alive. The spirit of sacrifice and mutual help,
fortunately, prevailed among and between hamaet residents.
'_l‘_hg Illiteracy _Lgvgl

The illiteracy rate has significantly decreased at the national
level, according to ‘§§!g§.Statistigues. The decrease was as follows
between 1977 and 1982: 39.7 percent to 20 percent for the age bracket
of less than 17 years; 68.3 percent to 51.6 percent for the l7-60 age
bracket; and 92.6 percent to 90.7 percent for those 60 years old and
over. The decrease is generally'due to the increased proportion of
school age children attending school -— 50.5 percent in 1966; 70.4
percent in 1977; and 77.9 percent in 1982. Rural-urban differences in

this respect, however, are great. Proportions in school reached 90.6

90

percent in urban areas, while the proportion was only 67.0 percent in
rural zones. Parents in rural areas are blamed for taking girls out of
school after only two to three years of schooling, even before they
mastered reading and writing skills. (Eg 5299 L December 31, 1983)

Beni-Chebana's statistics on education tend to confirm the above
facts, with wide differences between the four parts of the commune,
even within the first three years of school. The 1977 census data show
a higher illiteracy rate among Beni-Chebana's residents, namely 80.8
percent. This is much higher than the national rate just mentioned.
The 80.8 percent of illiterates-is composed of 51.7 females and 29.1
males. (It may be useful to mention here that Beni-Chebana's sex
composition is as follows, according to the 1977 census: 55.4 percent
females and 44.6 percent males.) The census used classicial reading
and writing skills as the only illiteracy criterion. The use of a
broader criterion, such as productive performance capability, would
undoubtedly expand the proportion of illiteracy. The Algerian school
system. does not, in fact, provide any vocational training during the
entire school years. School dropouts are an important phenomenon,
notably in the rural areas and more specifically’within the female
pupils. The parents' attitude with regard to early female dropout may
partly be explained by the useless role education of girls is viewed as
playing within the local context. ‘

Formal education seems useless to girls who are rot allowed to
work within the rural areas in general. To be more precise, we should

say that there are not wage-paying jobs available for the female

91

population in these areas and the formal education is not helpful to
females, (nor to males but to a lesser extent) since the males may
expect to get non-formal education when they migrate to urban centers
or find administrative work that does not require any specific
training. Girls, on the other hand, have no chance for out-mdgration
and no training is available now. Parents' negative attitude towards
educating girls could be changed through providing vocational training
centers which require a level of formal education but which would teach
specific skills that could help in a concrete way. These centers would
strengthen parents' positive attitudes and would make education
fruitful. Therefore, education, even when provided, has no major
consequences for girls in rural areas. Among other reasons, this would
explain parents' negative attitude towards not sending girls to. school
at all or pulling them out earlier than boys. Beni-Chebana has no
training center for either sex. A masonry center is in the process of
being started at Tarfet. To say the least, illiteracy is general at
Beni-Chebana, should the productive perfonmance criterion be applied.
The classicial illiteracy criterion is no longer sufficient today,
especially if non-formal education is to be adequately provided.
Litera_cy Composition

The 1977 census provides the percentage distribution of ability to

read and write, by language and sex, for Beni-Chebana's population 10

year old and over. Table 2 shows this composition:

92

Table 2. Percent Composition of Beni-Chebana's
Population 10 Year Old and Over Literate,
by Language and Sex.

 

Language Male Female - Total
Arabic 2.60 0.58 3.18
FrenCh 1.45 0.24 1.69
Arabic and French 10.87 2.87 13.74
Others 0.56 0.04 0.60
Total 15.48 3.73 19.21

 

Source: 1977 Census of Algeria
This table shows, in addition to a high level of illiteracy in the
commune studied, especially among females, a high level of bilingualism
that confirms the fact of Beni-Chebana having French and Arabic schools
during the colonial era, as well as after independence. It is worth
noting that the Arabic percentage is higher than French. Our survey
tends to confinm this trend in general but Arabic literacy. percentages
are higher at Adjissa and Ait Mbhli. Both sections did not have French
schools before independence. Beni-Maouche shows the strongest

bilingualism as compared to otter sections.

Table 3. Composition of Adjissa's Population of
all Ages Literate, by Language and Sex.

 

Language Male Female Total
Arabic 46.0 26.0 72.0
French 8.0 2.0 10.0
Arabic and

French 18.0 0.0 18.0
Total 72.0 28.0 100.0

 

Source: Survey

93

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4. Percent of Ait Mohli's Population at all
Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.
Language Male Female Total
Arabic 55.0 14.0 69.0
French 6.0 0.0 6.0
Arabic and
French 25.00 0.0 25.0
Tbtal 86.0 14.0 100.0
Source: Survey
Table 5. Percent of Beni-Chebana's Population at
all Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.
Language Male Female Total
Arabic 47.0 17.0 64.0
French 15.0 5.0 20.0
Arabic and
French 13.0 3.0 16.0
Tbtal 75.0 25.0 100.0
Source: Survey
Table 6. Percent of Beni-Maouche's Population at
all Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.
Language Male Female Total
Arabic 22.0 10.0 32.0
French 22.0 5.0 27.0
Arabic and
French 23.0 18.0 41.0
Total 67.0 33.0 100.0
Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Survey.

Tables 3 to 6 clearly indicate low female literacy in the four
sections of the commune. The survey data are very close to those of
the 1977 census. These sections differ somewhat with regard to female

and language percentages. Adjissa shows low French and bilingual

94

percentage with regard to both sexes. Two out of the 28 percent of the
females are literate in French, with zero percent bilingual. Ait Mohli
shows even lower female literacy, with zero percent literate in French
and bilingual. Beni-Ctebana is rather moderate as compared to other
sections. Only Beni-Maouche shows relatively higter female literacy
and higher bilingual percentages, with near sex equality. These
differences could be due to easy geographical access to Beni-Maouche,
richer agriculture, and more openness to the outside world. ' More
French and Arabic schools were available in this section than anywhere
else in the commune, during the colonial period.
% Educational Facilities fl _b_l_um__b§_r_ 9; 19.312

The educational facilities in Beni-Clebana are summed up as
follows: There were 22 elerentary schools in 1981-82. Three more
schools were expected to open in tre 1983-4 school year. Seventy three
out of the 92 existing classrooms were functioning in 1981-82, with 82
teachers and 3,806 pupils distributed into 132 classes, according to
Wilaya's education statistics of 1981-82. Thus, 19 classrooms were
empty in 1981-82 school year. Tie number of pupils increased in the
period from 1977-78 to 1982-83 and the percentage of females remained
low during this period as shown by the following table:

Table 7. Sex Composition and Increase in School Attendance in
Berni-Chebana, From 1977-8 to 1982-3.

 

Sdlool Year 1977-8 1978-9 1979-80 1980-1 1981-2 1982-3

BOYS 70.0 70.0 69.0 70.0 69.0 72.5
Girls 30.0 30.0 31.0 30.0 31.0 27.5
Imease - 8.“ 706 30g 300 5.0

 

Source: 1983 Wilaya's Education Statistics and 1982-83 Supervisory
Reports.

9S

Beni-Chebana's elementary schools are distributed over its four
sections as follows: Adjissa 3, Ait Mohli 4, Beni-Chebana 9, and
Beni-Maouche 6. The Algerian school system. provides seven years of
elementary schooling, but five of Beni-Chebana's schools are limited to
just three years. Another terminates after the fourth year, while two
others have no seventh year, according to the 1982-3 supervisory
statistics. Eight schools out of 22 do not provide all teaching
levels. The percentage of pupils by sex for each section is given in
Table 8 for 1982-3.

Table 8. Percent in School Attendance, By Section

 

and Sex.
Section Male Female Total
Adjissa 72.0 28.0 100.0
Ait Mohli 87.0 13.0 100.0
Beni-Chebana 71.0 29.0 100.0
Beni-Maouche 60.0 40.0 100.0

 

Source: Statistics and 1982-83 Supervisory
Reports.

Table 8 shows a large proportion of school children to be males.
The lowest female percentage is found in Ait Mohli; while Beni-Maouche
shows more sex balance as compared to other sections. As for the
distribution of school attendance between the four sections, the
01982-83 statistics of education give the following proportions for each
section: Adjissa 11 percent, Ait Mohli 15 percent, Beni-Chebana 37
percent,A and- Beni-Maouche 37 percent. The 1981-82 statistics show a
slightly different distribution than depicted in Table 8.

The distribution of pupils, according to grade level, shows an
important dropout rate for the last two years of school. The total

96

number of children in school grew from 3,806 in 1981-82 to 3,945 in
1982-83 and the proportions attending school by grade level are as
follows:

Table 9. Proportions of Beni-Chebana's School
Attendance by Grade Level for 1981-82

 

and-1982-83.

Grade Level 1981-82 1982—83
1 22.a 22.9
2 21.0 19.0
3 16.0 17.0
4 15.0 15.0
s 12.a 12.0
6 9.0 10.0
7 5.0 5.0

Tbtal 100.0 100.0

 

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics and 1982-83
Supervisory Reports.

Class size differs within Beni-Chebana schools depending upon
population density. Commune schools are, however, well below urban
schools with regard to crowding in classrooms. Urban schools are,
effectively, very crowded and forced to sometimes practice double arnd
even triple scheduling. The average number of pupils per classroom
goes beyond 50 in the urban areas. Eletentary schools receive, in
fact, between 500,000 to 600,000 newcomers each year. Attempts are
being made recently to stabilize the rapid demographic growth, seen as
an obstacle to teaching democratization in Algeria. This is, however,
true only within urban areas. Tie rural areas are not, generally, in
tre same situation, as Beni-Cl'ebana's educational statistics show with
regard to average number of pupils per classroom by grade level in
1981-82. ~

97

Table 10. Average Number of Pupils per Classroom
by Grade Level at Beni-Chebana, for
1981-82.

 

Grade Level Average Number of Pupils
30 . 46
31. 75
27 . 34
27. 22
23 . 05
22. 60
12. 80

\lonunewNw-a

 

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

Beni-Crebana's classrooms are simply not crowded compared with
most urban center schools. Not only is there a low average of pupils,
but also 19 classrooms were empty in 1981-82 at Beni-Chebana. Tables
11-14 indicate number of pupils by sex for each section in the 1981-82
school year.

Table 11. Number of Pupils in Adjissa's
Schools by Sex, for 1981-82.

 

School Total Pupi ls Male Female
Aourir 211 70.0 30.0
Tiksarine 109 66.0 34.0

 

Source: Wilaya's Statistics for 1981-82
It is worthwhile to note that Aourir's pupils increased by four
percent by 1982-83 while its grade levels decreased from 7 to 6.
Tala-Tinzar pupils also increased by four percent in the same time and
its grade levels increased from 6 to 7. Tiksarine saw a decrease of
nine percent in number of pupils and lost ore grade level. Its four
levels in 1981-82 were reduced to three the text year. Little change

occurred in the proportion of girls and boys at Adjissa despite

98

different changes between its three schools movements. Aourir, the
largest, gained pupils and lost a level, contrary to Tala-Tinzar which
gained as much as Aourir in number of pupils and gained one grade
level. Tiksarine, meanwhile, suffered a double loss of nine percent of
its pupils and one grade level. The reason is unknown. . Tiksarine's
female proportion is slightly higher than that of Aourir because high
class level pupils go to Aourir school, a phenomenon which may have
prevented girls frommdoing so because of the relatively long distance
between the two hamlets. Table 12 shows Ait Mohli's pupil numbers for
the 1981-82 school year.

Table 13. Number of Pupils in Ait Mohli's

 

School Total Pupils Male Female
Agueni Foughal 174 90.0 10.0
Ahfir 186 98.0 2.0
Amezough 85 93.0 7.0
Tichy 53 49.0 51.0

 

Source: Wilaya's Statistics for 1981-82.
This table shows extremely low'proportion of female pupils in the three
largest schools, while the smallest school has almost equal sex
proportions. There was little change in 1982-83, except for Tichy
where the proportion changed from 49 percent males and 51 females in
1982-82 to 70 percent males and just 30 percent females. Another no
less striking phenomenon is the extremely high increase of pupils in
all Ait Mohli's schools in 1982-83. Agueni Foughal which kept its
seven grade levels of 1981-82, saw pupils increase by 26 percent in

. 1982-83. Ahfir also kept its seven grade levels and gained 19 percent

99

in pupil numbers in the same period. Amezough, however, increased 20
percent in pupils by 1982-83 while the number of grade levels decreased
from five to three. The tiny school of Tichy gained 16 percent in
pupils and the number of grade levels also gained one by 1982—83. It
changed from two to three levels between 1981-82 and 1982-83, according
to the same official statistics referred to in all four sections of
Beni-Chebana. Table 13 shows number of pupils in the sections of
Beni-Chebana for the 1981-82 school year.

Table 13. Beni-Chebana's School Size by Sex for

 

 

 

 

 

 

School Total Popils Male Female
Beni-Djemati 263 75.0 25.0
Boundjih 184 76.0 24.0
El-Maissen 180 63.0 37.0
Ighilqui 143 63.0 37.0
Illilten 92 67.0 33.0
Ismamen 121 61.0 39.0
Laazib 68 69.0 31.0
Taourirt 112 85.0 15.0
Tarfet 315 74.0 26.0
Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

The proportion of male pupils is very high in some schools of
Beni-Chebana since four out of nine schools have two-thirds of their

pupils males. Taourirt has 85 percent male pupils. Three schools have

close to 40 percent females. Grade level and pupil .changes are as
follows: Beni-Djemati had a two percent increase in pupils and kept

its seven grade levels. Boundjih lost two percent of its pupils but

kept its seven grade levels in 1982-83. El-Maissen lost 16 percent of
in 1982-83.

its pupils and one of its four grade levels Ighilqui

100

gained three percent in pupils but lost one of its seven grade levels.-
Illilten also gained two percent in pupils and had an increase of one
grade level (four in 1982-83). Ismamen had a 21 percent increase in
pupils and gained two grade levels, that is, an increase from five to
seven between 1981-82 and 1982-83. Laazib went the opposite way when
it lost 12 percent of its pupils and lost two grade levels. The number
was reduced from seven to five levels. Taourirt lost ten percent of
its pupils but kept its seven levels for the same period. Tarfet, the
largest school of Berni-Chebana, gained four percent of its pupils in
1982-83 and kept its seven grade levels. There is a need to know the
reason or reasons for these exceptional losses and gains in a single
year. It may also be interesting to know how a specific group of
pupils isdealtwithwhenaschool loses one or two of its grade

 

levels. Table 14 will show Beni-Maouche case of school size and
change.

Table 14. Bani-Maouche School Size by Sex for 1981-82.

School Total ils Male Female

Wine _1'6772“ 5270 48.0

Djabia 145 56. 34 . 0

Taguenit-Ighil 138 67 . 0 33 . 0

Tioual 150 69.0 31.0

Trouna 431 61.0 39.0

 

Source: 1981—82 Wilaya Statistics.

The proportions of female pupils in Beni-Maoucte are very high as
ampere! to those of the other three sections. Aguenoune represents
the top mng Bani-thouche schools with regard to high female school

101

attendance (52 percent males and 48 percent females). No school of
Beni-Maouche has less than 31 percent females. This trend remained
unchanged or little changed in 1982—83. Some increases and decrease in
number of pupils as well as grade levels occurred between 1981-82 and
1982-83. Aguenoure's pupils increased by only one percent while its
seven levels remained unchanged. This situation is ideal not only at
Beni-Chebana commune level but may be nationwide, both in terms of
pupil increase and female proportion. This school is the largest in
the entire commune. Djabia lost 21 percent of its pupils and its seven
grade levels went down to six in 1981-82. Taguenit-Ighil gained four
percent in pupils and kept its seven grade levels. Tioual lost nine
percent of its pupils and kept its seven grade levels. Tizekht lost
four percent in pupils as well as one of its four grade levels.
Trouna, the actual communal center of Beni-Maouche after the rew 1985
administrative reform, is the second largest school of Berni-Clebana.
It gained 15 percent in pupils and kept its seven grade Levels.

The 1981-82 Wilaya‘s statistics on education show the bthree
largest schools, in order, to be: Aguemoune, Trouna, and Tarfet. They
are also ranked first, second, and third in female proportions. The
1982-83 supervisory reports which allowed us to see comparative changes
show that these three leading schools maintained their grade levels and
increased their student numbers (1, 15 and four percent). They all
maintained their proportion of females. Thus, Beni-Chebana's schools 7
generally are very small due to dispersed residence clusters. As seen

here, size plays a major role in the provision of grade levels. Large

102

dropouts at the end of school years create no need to maintain all
grade levels in the very small schools. This could be the main reason
(if not the only one) to cause a decline in number of pupils and grade
levels in Beni-Cl'ebana's nine schools.

Tle big problem in the educational situation is that hamlet
clusters are far fromeach other and there is no school bus system that
would allow last year's school children to go where qualified teachers
and all grade levels are to be found. It seems impossible now to
provide each school with sufficient number of skilled teachers for all
levels because of the limited number of pupils at each level. Adj issa
as a whole has only a total of 39 pupils in the fifth level, 38 in the
sixth, and just four in the seventh. Ait Mohli has 31 pupils in the
sixth level and 39 in the seventh. Berni-Chebana has 137 pupils in the
sixth level and only 38 in the seventh. Beni-Maouche has 173 pupils in
He sixth level and 66 in tie seventh. To sum up, Beni-Clebana's
commune has only 380 pupils in the sixth grade arnd just 147 in the
seventh grade levels. In addition, pupils whose schools stop teaching
at the third or fourth level, usually stop going to school due to a
lack of transportation, among other reasons. It goes without saying
that not only girls but also boys are victims of this situation.

Among many educational obstacles, the following seem to be the
more important: First, a deficiency of skilled and stable teachers,
for example, only one specialized teacher for tie handicapped; second,
sdnool size which limits the number of grade levels; third, insuffi-

cient supervisory system; fourth, lack of school busing; fifth, absence

103

of middle and high schools within the communal territory. Except for
Trouna middle school which opened two years ago, no school is provided
with a library, reading roonm or reading materials. Further, there is
no waiting roonm in any school and pupils go straight from the classroom
to the street and vice-versa. The existing canteens can satisfy only
1,050 pupils out of some 4,000, many of whom come from distant hamlets
and cannot afford to go back home for lunch and return to school. The
canteen seems to be a necessity in the parents' eyes. A parent told a
school director: "You can do anything you want to my child but never
try to prevent him from going to canteen.” It is also known that some
parents in rural Algeria send theirchildren to school primarily for
food, not for education.
m Education

While Beni-Chebana's children have limited chances to get
elementary school education, they face even more obstacles in
completing higher educational levels. The survey, however, counted
around 506 middle school pupils in Beni-Chebana‘in 1982-83. Trey
attended, in addition to Trouna's middle school which opened only in
1982-83, outside middle schools such as Beni-Ourtilane, Sidi-Aich,
Amalou, Akbou, and Seddouk. Some 107 pupils are in high schools and
around 20 are in colleges. Tarfet's middle school pupils and those of
the surrounding hamlets are provided with businng to the Beni-Ourtilane
middle school, but those fronm Beni-Maouche, Adjissa, and Ait Mohli were
being sent to different middle schools at their parents' expense.

Trouna's middle school solved, at least partially, the section problems

104

facing parents and pupils. Still, pupils from Adjissa, Aguenoune,
Djabia, Taguenit-Ighil, and others need to walk long distances every
day to and from.school. A girl fomm Aguemoune waited five years after
successfully passing an exam in order to enter a.muddle school class,
according to Trouna's.muddle school director. Teachers' housing units
were not ready when the school opened, but the parent association was
of great help to this school after it opened.

The conditions just mentioned create a low educational output when
government spending on this sector is considered. A substantial
proportion of the national income is, in fact, spent on education, but
spending alone seems unlikely to make the system work. The rural
school dropout rate is very high for the above reasons, but the same
phenomenon is found in the urban areas. Tie difference, however, is
that urban dropouts are dominated by exclusions rather than
withdrawals, due to lack of capacity at the end of each educational
level. Forty nine percent of pupils in the sixth and seventh grades of
elementary schools in 1978-79 were excluded at national level. Seventy
three percent of fourth year middle school pupils were excluded in 1982
nationwide. Seventy nine percent of third year high school students
were excluded in 1982-83. The problem is very serious since the
failure rate is rising every year at the end of high school studies.
Only 30.7 percent of all high school students succeeded in their exams
in 1982 but this rate dropped sharply to only 15 percent in 1983
nationwide. What a dismal success rate after 13 or 14 years of

schoolinng subsidized at a high cost. Despite this low rate of success

105

in allowing students to continue college education, new barriers have
-recently been put forward, in university planning to restrict college
enrollments. Those excluded from continuing their education are forced
to join the job market without any specific vocational skills.

. Teachers' Conditions

The number of teachers at Beni-Chebana fluctuated between 82 and
139 between 1978-79 and 1982-83, and it was expected that there would
be 165 in the 1983-84 school year, according to supervisory reports of
1982-83. The following figures, however, indicate that the number of
teachers did not increase regularly, according to the area's need:

Year Number of Teachers

1977-78 85
1978-79 82
1979-80 86
1980-81 95
1981-82 82
1982-83 139
1983-84 165

The steadily increasing number of pupils is not matched by an increase
of teachers due to local educational problems, notably lack of housing
units which numbered only 41 for 82 teachers in 1981-82. The 1981-82
Hulaya's statiStics of education show' a single female teacher at
Beni-Chebana's communal schools for the last six years. She came back
to her father's nnative hamlet of Aguemoune from Sidi-Aich wnere the
father migrated. He got married and lived there until his daughter was

educated. 'She came back to the family'when the father died.

106

Teachers range form low level of education (without a middle
school degree), middle (with that degree), and high (with a high school
degree). Both lower categories could be promoted to higher levels with
special exanms and some vocational training. The 1981-82 Wilaya's
statistics show the size of each category, according to language
spoken, as indicated by Table 15.

Table 15. Beni-Ctebana's Teacher Categories, by
Language Spoken, for 1981-82.

 

Level of

Education Arabic French Total
Low 15 6 21
Middle 45 5 50
High 11 0 11
Total 71 ll 82

 

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

Table 15 clearly indicates the low level' of Beni-Ctebana's teachers,
with 26 percent in the lowest level, 61 percent in He middle, and just
13 percent in the high level. The last two level teachers may or may
not have completed middle and high school education. The number of
teachers could be easily [increased to cope with the quantitative aspect
of the problem, but the qualitative aspect would not be easily solved.

The elementary teaching supervisor, who took office on November
1980 with residence for the first time in the neighboring commune of
Beni-Ourtilanne, best expresses Benni-Chebana's teaching conditions. Tie
supervisory district, inclnding both connmues'of Beni-Chebana and Beni-
Ourtilanne, is too vast with its 43 elenentary schools and 325 teachers

in 1983-84. Its 80 Km of communal roads are in bad condition. A

107

serious teacher vacancy rate is noted every school year when classes
start in Septenber and lasts up to the end of November. New teachers
tl'en are recruited from among youth expelled fronm middle schools, after
failing to pass high school exams or to meet required average points.
They come to teaching as temporary employees only when they fail to
find other available jobs. They are given classes with no previous
training at all. The proportion of such teachers ranges between 20 to
40 percent every year. The supervisor assistant spends most of his
time with this category to the detriment of other categories who are in
utmost need for training and help. The 1982-83 supervisory reports
suggested the creation of a second supervisory district or to employ at
least a second supervisory assistant to help achieve at least a minimum
of needed work.

Why are Beni-Chebana's teachers unstable and what is needed to
improve stability? Such stability is required. to allow teachers to
learn teaching skills before an acceptable educational output is
possible. The biggest problem educators face in Algeria is low wages
in this sector as compared with other sectors of national activities.
Teaching is, effectively, taken as a temporary job,’ as already
mentioned, and in the absence of better wage-paying jobs. The
situation is even worse for the outside teachers coming into the area.
Ttey lack the necessary and adequate living conditions, such as proper
housing units, water at home, food stores, electric power, means of
transportation, etc. Rare are those outsiders who bring their families

to live with them. Rather, they prefer living alone since most of them

108

are not yet married, because of their young age, and coming mostly from
muddle schools. They have no intention of staying for a long period.
They are in a waiting ‘situation before they are called upon for
national service or find a better wage-paying job. The pupils, then,
are simply sent back home for an unknown amount of time. These inex-
perienced young adults live on a day-to-day basis and have nothing to
keep them from moving away. Rural schools have no cultural or recre-
ational activities. No school in Beni-Chebana, to my knowledge, has
any meaningful library, sports field or other means of entertainment.

Rural teachers undergo deep suffering. They live as beggars, a
school director said, referring to outside teachers. We are trying to
help them as much as we can, he said, but they are really miserable. I
have personally witnessed a case when a rural teacher came and asked
his local colleague for food, saying that he was starving. The hamlet
were this was observed has, as many other hamlets, no public food
sources, such as a bakery, food store, or restaurant. Some of these
teachers are forced to take their teaching as a second activity while
they try to increase their income otherwise, as is the case of a school
director who used his own car for public transportation. The villagers
call him anytime a ride was needed. His pupils were sent home when he
transported passengers. Teacher absenteeism is an every day reality.
alpine used to ask at the end of each day whether they will have class
next day or not because trey often come to find the teacher absent,
noted a school director.

Such problems mist be solved, if not at once, in the near future

in order to attract and keep fairly good teachers in the areas. To do

109

this, extra pay is suggested by a high Daira official. The idea,
however, is not new since old French school teachers already receive
extra pay for serving renote areas, as in the case of Aguenoune,
Taguenit and Tarfet, which were considered renote areas during the
colonial era, but not now remote as compared to today's more distant
schools whose teachers do not benefit fronm this extra pay. This is
true despite the new Algerian worker charter that provides for such
extra pay. But a wide gap seems to separate tkeory and practice. The
colonial spirit is still alive after 22 years of independence.
President Chadli said once that when the government approves a law, it
should be applied in each sector nationwide, but this is not the case
of Beni-Chebana's teachers.

Extra pay would not be enough to attract qualified teachers when
living conditions are not improved. Improved conditions include
adequate housing, running water, light, means of transportation, sports
and cultural facilities. The connmune can do much to ease problems
teachers face. Most, if not all, schools have no running water, no
light, and no restrooms are usable due to lack of water which is
available, in some cases, only at one or two hundred meters. Many
schools visited are really miserable. I found, in one school, two
teachers living togetler in a single roomn with a large hole in the roof
allowing rain to come through. Offenders many times destroyed, in the
same school, the tools and materials needed in tl'e classrooms. The
commune authorities in charge of school maintenannce failed to prevent

destruction. The relatively large number of schools and their

110

remoteness from the administrative center may have prevented adequate
care taking. The hamlet residents' help may be of great importance if
sought, but it seems that is not the case here.

I Non-formal Education

Unlike formal education, the Algerian government has provided
little support for non-fonmal education in the rural areas.
Beni-Chebana, in fact, has never had a vocational training center for
the commune's youth. Such a center would be of a great help to
Beni-Chebana youngsters since there is no need for high educational
attainment in order to achieve and improve vocational skills and
productive performance. Only lately a masonry training unit has been
built at Tarfet, which trainees from other sections cannot attend for
lack of transportation and lack of internships.

The ministry of vocational training planned to build some 273 new
training centers at the national level, during the first five-year plan
(1980-84). The training capacity would increase from 27,000 to around
130,000 trainees per year, should these centers be built as scheduled.
Five other centers for trainers were also planned for this period. The
training capacity is very limited. considering training demands. Around
300,000 pupils every year leave elementary and muddle schools, in
addition to sonme 55,000 students excluded from high schools each year.
This is to say nothing about the large illiterate population of working
ages as well as a large nonsworking female population. Some 260,000
female requests for vocational training are received every year. The

demands are much higl'er than can be satisfied. Tte need for trainees

111

is estimated by the first five year plan to be around 673,000, of which
403,000 are skilled workers and 186,000 are technicians (AA., .January
7-13, 1982).

The available data show clearly that formal as well as nonformal
education is not playing its expected role in the economy. A wide gap
between economic activities and the teaching system. recently emerged.
A great gap separates education and employment. Some 1,100,000 youth
between 15 to 20 years old are "nowhere" - not at school and not at
work, noted A. Brahimi, prime minister of Algeria. (AA., June 12-18,
1980)

Since the government has been unable to satisfy the national need
in non-fbrmal education, it recently resorted to the private sector for
help. It is thoughtvthat crafts are disappearing in Algeria. If each
craftsman could take charge of only one trainee each year, then around
100,000 youth could be trained every year. A law ‘was introduced to
help achieve this goal of paramount importance to the national economy
as well as to social and political stability. Vbcational training has
been carried out in Algeria by specialized training centers under
direct supervision of the ministry of vocational training, national
corporations and ministries training their ownn workers. The government
made it possible for the first time, for the private sector to take
part legally in the training with the state's financial support. Some
saw this initiative as a sellout of manpower to the private sector.
The common people, however , expressed doubts about putting this law
into practice for different reasons. Below is the private sector's

attitude on the subject.

112

A coppersmith expressed his viewpoint as follows: "No, the truth
is elsewhere. How can somebody ask to learn a difficult job when he
has nowhere to live? I would not refuse to take charge of someone,
should the state fulfill its promise. The training should not become a
burden for some and a source of profit for others."_ A snnall clothing 0
industry employer commented as follows: "I will do it with a condition
that the newcomer will work with me as any other employee. I am a
clothing industry employer not a vocational training school director."
A third person from the building sector simply refused the idea by.
saying, "It is up to national corporations or state sector to take
charge of the trainees, not me. I pay workers whom I ask to work"
(AA., January 7-13, 1982).

Thus, the attitude of the private sector is, generally, negative
towards this law trying to get the private sector to share some burden
of vocational training but this sector has many reasons not to deal
with the problem in the government's terms. Tie law enforcement will
simply be hampered because of its cost to individual persons to do a
government job in sharing some educational burden deened as the state's
responsibility. This is the case even though the government offers to
pay trainees while they are working for the craftsmen's benefit. Tte
private trainers were not satisfied because dealing with goveinment
regulations is not like 'freely dealing with private individual
citizens.

It is worthwhile noting that Beni-Ctebana's youth, as well as most

rural youth of Algeria, have no opportunities within the rural communes

113

and they cannot easily join urban areas where this possibility still
exists. Urban youth may not feel great enthusiasm to obtain training
in the crafts field for limited job opportunities in the sector. We
can say briefly that education in Algeria, and more specifically in
rural areas, is not in satisfactory shape despite heavy spending in the
sector. Adequate solutions should be sought to improve investment
output in education and, consequently, l'elp national economic growth
since both sectors are closely related to each other as will be seen in

tie following chapter on Beni-Chebana's economy.

CHAPTER VI. THE EVOLVING ECONOMY AND ROLE OF WCMEN

The Subsistence [£51

' Beni-Chebana's residents, traditionally, gained a living from
agriculture and a small number of livestock. As all people of the
traditional sector in Algeria, they used to live on these poor lands
where each household had to provide livelihood for itself by working on
family land. Manpower was plentiful as compared to other farming
inputs: land, water, draught animals, tools, and seeds. Consequently,
labor intensive agriculture was generally practiced. Because of land
shortage all possible tillable land was brought under control through
different kinds of sharecropping systems. The old rich and prestigious
families were those having relatively large plots of land and enough
family labor to work them. Both landless families and those owning
land but without enough labor force could, however, manage to get a
living from available lands, through a fairly equitable sharecropping
system called "Wsah". This system took into consideration five
farming elements: manpower, draught animals, land, working tools, and
seeds which were equally valuable. The system provided multiple
combinations with regard to providing or sharing any one of these
elements. Farming outputs were divided, as a consequence, according to
each element that alpartner provided. No industry existed at Beni-
Chebana. Only lately a snall scale stone-crushing mill has been built
by the coamme to provide this material for its om concrete block

suall industry. Some private individuals started to build their own

114

115

mills recently because of the high cost and shortage of crushed stones
in the region. Private and communal needs are far from being satisfied
with the existing mills' output.

The 1977 census data show a strong agricultural sector in
Beni-Chebana, as compared to other sectors of activity. The active
male population six years old and over was distributed, according to
economic activity and juridic sector, as follows: 56.04 percent in
agriculture, 5.72 percent in industry (all kinds of industry included),
15.34 percent in the building sector, 16.84 percent in administration
and services, and 4.45 percent non-specified. The above totals 98.43
percent of the active population. The female active population repre-
sents only 1.57 percent of the workforce.distributed as follows: 6.36
in agriculture, 1.11 percent, in industry (transformation), 0.07 in
services, and 6.03 percent non-specified. These data emphasize the low
rate of female economic activity, well below that of the national
active female rate. Ninety-eight point forty-three percent of
Beni-Chebana's fanales are housewives whose economic participation is
not recognized.

The census data indeed, may well convey a misleading idea that
Beni-Chebana is an agrarian coumune since more than 56 percent of its
active population is occupied in agriculture and less than seven
percent in industry. The truth is that all those who could not be
classified elsewhere by the census, are seen as Fellahs (peasants)
because, as just mentioned, every household with rare exceptions should

have at least a small plot of land where some working days each year

116

are spent during different seasons. The overwhelming majority of the
peasants left agriculture and the only activity that is still going on
in this sector is collecting figs, olives, and other fruits where they
exist. Some gardening, however, is still practiced in some parts of
the coumme. The Kasma coordinator, effectively, expressed the need to
change the comme's unrealistic agrarian image to that of an
industrial one. This seens unlikely given Beni-Chebana's economic
situation today, but it is very possible, should a good industrial
program, based upon the coamune's rich potential be put into practice.
fl Agrarian Commne

To refer to an agrarian coumme nay seem contradictory, but
different sources of information confirm this situation. Djenadi, for
instance, in 1976 confirmed that industry does not exist in the coumme
except for some artisan units. But he does not say that agriculture
prevails; rather, he reported that 90 percent of the active population
was unemployed at that time, the majority of whom migrated abroad
(Djenadi, 2) Beni-Chebana's temporary urbanization perimeter (PUP)
classified the coumme in the eighth rank anong Akbou Daira's nine
M with regard to economic activity and/23rd among the Bejaia
Wilaya's 28 commas. The (PUP), using 1979 regional statistics,
distributed the conmmal manpower (excluding sane 1050 workers who

migrated) as follows (PUP, ll):

 

Sector mater of Jays Percem:
Primry 5, 230 75.40
Secondary l, 501 21.60
Tertiary 209 3.00

Total 6 , 940 100 . 00

117

These figures and percentages are unlikely to be correct for the
following main reasons: 1) the statistical concepts are not well
defined to fit into the existing conditions of this area, 2) those in
charge of collecting census data, notably for yearly regional
statistics, are unable to do the job correctly. Their time,
educational level, and daily obligations do not allow'them, in my view,
to do the task correctly, given the local context, 3) for 75.40
percent of the labor force to be in the primary sector would suggest
that this sector has been growing and that trend is not in keeping with
the general the trend of rural outmigration. In addition, people
generally fear that census could be used against their interest, as was
the case in the 1971 land census intended to limit the size of land
holdings. The peasants, generally, lowered their landholdings to
escape confiscation, while they tended to increase them when a minimum
of five hectares of land was required to purchase tractors.

The person in charge of regional statistics at the Ministry of
Planning recognized these facts when we talked about them. Beni-
Chebana's agriculture has been declining since the liberation war that
destroyed Algerian rural areas and no other activities that could fit
into the primary sector (such as mining or fishing) existed in this
we. The unemployment rate of 90 percent is another amazing fact
reported by Djenadi. How, in fact, can such a claim be made while no
jobless persons are reported at Beni-Chebana where no employment office
exists. The commune has been exporting its youth for a long time.

Even the Wilaya statistics are surely not correct. They asserted that

118

77 percent‘ of Beni-Chebana's lands are being used in farming, which is
the coamunal essential economic activity, employing 75 percent of its
manpower. This should not be accurate as reported by (PUP, 12) . The
following data will show the most important agricultural features in
this comnune and will allow us to evaluate the truth of the above
statements.

Most of the land in Beni-Chebana is very steep, with mountains
representing 50 percent of the area. About 15 percent are classed as
foothills, 25 percent as plains and 10 percent as non-specified,
according to the 1979 regional statistics. The physical nature of the
land, therefore, is not favorable to extensive farming since tillable
lands are limited. Two climates dominate the commune, namely,
mediterranean and continental. That is, snow in winters and extreme
heat in summers are typical. The rainfall season usually starts in
Septenber and ends near the end of May, with an average of 1,200 mm of
rain per year. Temperature varies between (-8) and (+30) centigrade.
The coumme has three categories of soil: humid clay on the plains,
muddy sands on the banks of river, and calcareous clay on hilltops.
Erosion takes a good proportion of fertile soils every year. The
Bousselam river'divides the coamme into two parts: Beni-Chebana on
one hand and Adjissa, Ait Mohli, and Beni-Maouche on the other. An
electric power dam was started by the French but was abandoned at the
beginning of the liberation war.

Underground water is plentiful but not tapped. Each hamlet has

its own spring or springs. Adjissa River is less important than

119

Bousselam. Both, however, flow all year. Irrigation is limited to
small size gardens, most of which are disappearing for different
reasons. A project of irrigating the plains of Agradou (Beni-Chebana),
Ires and Andeless (Beni-Maouche) was approved by Setif Wilaya but
abandoned when Beni-Chebana left Setif to become a commune of the newly
created Wilaya of Bejaia. Agradou's part of this project was recon-
sidered in 1975 and its realization started in 1983 (Djenadi, 6).

Tillable surfaces of Beni-Chebana differ from one source to
another. The 1979 regional statistics made the following distribution:
40% tillable, 5% forest, 20% bush and 35% pasture. The commune
estimated the area to represent 12,075 hectares, while the cadaster
registered 14,220 hectares. Djenadi reported the following land
surface figures: total agricultural surface, 18,256 ha.; useful
agricultural surface, 15,816 ha.; vegetal production, 13,457 ha.; and
others 2,359 ha. The Wilaya's statistics of agriculture estimated the
private lands, including pastures, as being 11,281 ha. (1 hectare =
2.47 acres). The total lands in 1980-81 were distributed into three
categories with regard to usage:

1. Cultivated lands, including winter cereals, 730

ha.; dry legumes 90 ha.; and artificial
foraging, 100 ha.;

2. Idle lands, 5,932 ha.; the existing planta-
tions, 1,218 ha.; the planned plantations, 31
ha.; total tillable lands, 8,104 ha. of which
only 3 ha. are irrigated:

3. Pastures, 3,177 ha.; including forest and non-
cultivated lands.

~120

The above official sttistiCs, obviously are not in conformity with
other mentioned sources, despite the fact that only private lands,-were
' considered and their total was 19,382 ha. The public sector, however,
is not that significant in Beni-Chebana. There is no way to know which
one of these sources is correct. The Wilaya's statistics may have been
more likely to represent the truth but they contain some contradictions
with regard to irrigated surfaces (3 ha. in the first sunmary page,
then 13 ha. when details are given in pages 3 and 5 on gardening.)
Arboriculture here accounts for only one hectare. This does not concur
with that of Djenadi, as well as with the hand written statistics made
available to me with 45 ha. Djenadi's crop production figures for

Beni-Chebana give still other data shown below:

Crop . Area _i_n_ 312:.
Barley 200
Dry legumes 1,530
Fig trees 2,000
Fruit trees 3,660
Gardening (poly. cul) 50
Hard wheat 720
Olive trees 1,600
Total 9,760

The Wilaya director of agriculture) made available handdwritten
agricultural statistics for 1980-81. These data show the following

different figures, notably between the private and public sectors:

 

 

 

 

Sector Tillable area Forest Total
“""" in ha.

Private 10,852 276 11,128
Agrarian Reform 153 2,039 2,192
Non productive - 0 900 900

Total 11,005 3,215 14,220

121

Economically, olive and fig trees are the most important crops in
this commune. The climate favors them and they require little labor.
There are around 40,000 producing olive trees, according to the 1980-81
agricultural statistics, in addition to some 51,000 young, growing
trees. The production varies, however, according to climatic
conditions. Fig quality from the Adjissa and Beni-Maouche is very
famous nationwide, but production has decreased sharply. Due to socio-
economic conditions, notably abandoned farming, the agricultural
production has, effectively, declined dramatically. Arboriculture has
suffered even more and its decline started during the liberation war.
Recently, olive products have been in a difficult marketing position,
since Algeria has been importing olive oil from Greece and other kinds
of oil products from the industrial nations. Figs suffered to a lesser
extent from a marketing crisis, because its production was even
shorter. Arboriculture reeds less labor, as just mentioned, but
requires on-going care.

The; landholding .3ng

The conflicting estimates of land size are meaningless if other
farming conditions are not examined. Elements such as landholding
size, level of family dependency on living from agriculture, and
farming inputs use and availability are extremely important within the

rural economy.

122

The official statistics of agriculture made no specific mention
about these factors which are necessary for agriculture to develop and
play its great role in the rural and national economy. Only a few
statistical estimates as to fertilizer availability and need are
available with regard to Beni-Chebana. Our survey data, collected from
37 major hamlets of Beni-Chebana's 64 hamlets indicate that very small

size of landholding dominates the commUne, as shown below:

 

Size of Landholding Percent
(in Ha.)

10+ 2.0

5-9 9.0

1-4 40.0

-1 22.0

Zero 27.0

Total 100.0

All four sections of Beni-Chebana are well represented here. The
data clearly indicate a small size of landholdings that is well below
the national required 10 ha. per family in non-irrigated areas (the
case for Beni-Chebana) . Only two percent of the families would be able
to depend on farming for a living, should the national criterion of
landholding be applied here. Almost 50 percent of the households are
landless or own less than one hectare of land. Eighty-nine percent of
households own less than five hectartes each, of which 27 are landless.

Not only is there shortage of land, but its poor quality denies the
importance of agricultural activities as reported by the statistics.
Th§_Farmigg‘£gpg§§
Not only is land scarce in Beni-Chebana, but modern farming inputs

are almost non-existent. Our survey shows low use of inputs for many

123

reasons. Only three percent of Beni-Chebana's peasants use very
limdted quantities of fertilizers, while insecticide and pesticide
users represent about one percent each. These inputs are mainly
restricted to gardening areas where irrigation is available. Non-use
is explained by the peasants as being due to: unavailability of
markets and expensive when found, abadoned farming due to low outputs,
ouhmigration, and lack of knowledge on how and when to use inputs.
Many who used fertilizers in dry lands burned their crops. There are
no farming experts to advise Beni-Chebana's peasants and help them with
'the new farming and animal husbandry technologies. The Communal
Cooperation of Agriculture and Common Services (CAPCS) created within
the agrarian reform system of 1971 with intent to provide both the
state and private sectors with multifomm technical assistance and farm
products marketing could not do so, because of lack of means. This is
true in Beni-Chebana, as well as nationwide. .
The 1980-81 Wilaya's census shows no available fertilizers and
pesticides at Beni-Chebana. The needed quantities were to be ordered,
inluding 2,077 quintals of fertilizers and 330 Kg. of pesticides. No
special seeds are used for the above reasons. Organic fertilizers,
used before the war, are no longer available. The Trouna's CAPCS
officer summed up the difficulties his unit is facing. There are three
main problems: lack of technical and skilled administrative staff,
lack of large size trucks which would have saved drivers‘ time and made
more product quantities available, and non availability of consumer

goods, notably barley and other animal feed. A contradiction, however,

124

is noted between the CAPCS and the census estimates of fertilizers
needed. The CAPCS officer mentioned 200 quintals per year, while the
census mentioned 2,077 quintals as Beni-Chebana's need each year.
Farming not only requires land, water, fertilizers, and other
inputs, ,but modern agriculture needs more than that. Factors such as
marketing, transportation, storing facilities, financial support,
supply centers, knowledge, etc. cannot be ignored by modern agricul-
ture, mainly based on knowledge and mechanization. Beni-Crebana's
traditional farming benefitted from cheap plentiful manpower and
available draught animals. Only oxen are used to till lands in this
region, but their number dropped dramatically from around 968 pairs
before the revolution of 1954 to some 204 pairs today, according to the
survey. The number of tractors, however, jumped from two to 25 in the
same period of time. Tractors could not compensate for the loss of
oxen, not just because of their limited number but also because most
farm lands of this commune are not accessible to tractors due to lack
of farm roads. In addition, most private tractors are used to
transport building materials rather than in farming, while those of the
CAPCS are broken most of the time. Five out of six of Agradou's CAPCS
tractors were broken when I paid a visit to this unit and there was
nobody to repair them. A young man from Boubirek hamlet was hired for
this purpose but left because he was unhappy with the wages he was
paid. The CAPCS (intended to provide multiform assistance to both
public and private sectors) was the main feature of the Algerian

agrarian reform program, but it could not carry out its mission

adequately.

125

Even though tractors are expensive and do not fit into
Beni-Chebana's typical agriculture, they are not easily obtained in
Algeria, due to a short supply. Ten ha. in farm size is required in
order to apply for a tractor. The Algerian National Bank (BNA), in
charge of financing and supplying farming equith and working with
Party, peasant union, and administrative representatives, distributes
tractors and provides loans wherever necessary, according to certain
rules, among which is landholding size. Not many of Beni-Chebana's
peasants can apply for tractors because of small farm size and even
when this condition is met, a peasant may need to wait years to get
one.

The Bejaia's director of (BNA), when asked about peasant awareness
of the available loans, asserted that his bank is doing well within its
limited potential. A single notice, he said, was sufficient to get
more applicants than could be satisfied. The landholding criterion was
lowered to five hectares and even less to allow more peasants to apply
for tractors which are much preferred over oxen because they can be
used for tansportation rather than tilling the lands.

Beni-Chebana's peasants do not think of bank loans as a major
obstacle in farming. However, very few applicants loans were satisfied
lately, according to survey data. The reasons for not applying are
various. Among those reasons are hopelessness in obtaining loans, lack
of farm roads, lack of inputs, giving up farming, low outputs, and
ignorance, for some, of the existing opportunity. Akbou's BNA agency

made available information on the amounts of loans allocated to private

126

people of Beni-Chebana between 1977 and 1981. The loans were allocated
to serve four specific purposes which are: draught- animals, breeding,
traction, and hydraulic as shown below:

Table 16: Bank Loans to Beni-Chebana's Private Peasants in 1977-1981

By Purpose and timber of Recipients (in Algerian Dinar,
R =- Recipient, A 3 Amount).

 

 

Year Draught Animals Breeding ' Tractor Hydraulic Total
R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

1977 4 29, 000 1 10, 000 5 39, 000
1978 7 70, 000 l 20, 000 3 30, 000 11 120, 000
1979 5 S0 , 000 2 67 , 879 3 40 , 000 10 157 , 879
1980 5 50, 000 2 76, 677 1 15, 000 3 91, 677
1981 1 12,000 8 221,836 9 233,836
Total 17 161,000 1 20,000 12 366,393 8 95,000 38 642,393

 

Source: Akbou's BNA Agency

The above table shows only a modest effort in making loans to
private peasants. The number of people served each year over the five—
year period was not high, starting with five people in 1977 and
fluctuating between three in 1980 and 11 in 1978 with a total of 38
loan recipients in the entire period. The mount of loans are not
great. The mount started with a low of 39,000 AD in the first year
andreachedapeakof 233,836ADinthelastyearofthe period. The
total amount of allocated loans in five years is not a great help to
farm investment. The average per year is just 'too low to do any
meaningful improvelent in farming. This averageof 120,479 AD would
not buy much, should high cost of equipment be considered. These
loans, looked at from the purpose served, show a clear. shift from
draught animals to traction through the entire period. Loans for

127

draught animals took a lead in 1977 with four persons served to one in
hydraulic, and none in breeding and traction. The second year draught
animals improved as did hydraulic with only one breeder and no
traction. The shift for tractors started in 1979 to prevail over all
other loan purposes with the one-and-only draught animal borrower in
1981. The Bejaia's BNA director, asserting that peasants are more
interested in tractors rather than animals, is confirmed here. This
shift does not mean that agriculture is being mechanized because
tractors are bought for another main purpose, namely, transportation.
This summary represents the state effort in private sector
financing. As for the individuals themselves, their effort is no
better. Tie following example may indicate a gereral trend toward
abandonment of farming. A peasant from Aourir, Adjissa who was the
only one to possess a pair of oxen in this hamlet, explained how costly
it was to buy feed and to keep oxen today while output is very poor.
He was going to get rid of then and abandon farming, as he said,
because even if a tractor is provided, which is not the case, trere
would be no way to get it to his hands due to lack of farm roads. The
problem is complicated because nobody would allow any one else to open
a road through his land. Only the state authorities have the power to
do so and this has not yet happened. Peasants did not feel any need
for road opening before because they used to get into their lands
through very narrow and non-tractor-usable roads. A pair of oxen would
cost between 20,000 and 30,000 AD in 1981-82 while a tractor, with a

state subsidy, would cost only 20,000 AD. Hence, beside the high cost,

128

care, and less use of oxen from. which there is less output, the
peasants choose to buy tractors whenever available. This is a wise and
economic decision the peasants have made.

Beni-Chebana's peasants as well as others, are not stupid, back-
ward-looking, or making illogical decisions or behaving in a non-
economic way. They try hard to modernize but get no help. Only three
percent of applicants for farm equipment were approved recently at
Beni-Chebana. Others, who are still doing part-time farming, resort to
traditional ways. In regard to farm training, the survey shows 27 of
the peasants received some kind of training, but this seems unlikely to
happen here since no training center for farming has existed at
Beni-Chebana. Those peasants receiving training, however, appear only
at Ait Mohli and this fact was not mentioned in any other of the three
commmal sections. Modern farming simply has not yet existed at Beni-
Chebana.

A high level Party member, a school director commented on Beni-
Chebana's farming conditions in these terms, briefly reported: All
problems come from bad planning imposed from above. Local reeds are
not seriously taken into account. The large and expensive tractors do
not fit into our mountainous lands, rather small size and cheaper
tractors would be welcome» They cannot be used for transportation as
is the case of larger ones. Machinery and other farm) inputs are
distributed to non—peasants. water for drinking and irrigation is in
short supply. The CAPCS does not market farmrproducts such as olives

and figs. The peasants are facing market difficulties, notably olive

129

products. Consequently, farming is being abandoned, the cost of which
is larger than its output. The peasant takes into account manpower
costs and other expenses that prevent him from staying in the farm
business. Wage-paying activities are preferred, in other words, to
poor and high risk farming.
1h: em 122-“.2

Agricultural production may help to define the size of income from
farming within Beni-Chebana and show the importance with regard to
other sources of income. Four different sources of data are used for
this purpose. The sources are: 1) Djenadi for 1976; 2) regional
statistic of 1979; 3) Wilaya's statistics of agriculture for 1980-81;
and our own survey for 1983. Table 17 represents fanm production
according to these four sources and years. Quantities are given in
quintals, with the exception of olives in the survey that are given in
liters of oil.

Table 17: Beni-Chebana's Farm Production for 1976, 1979, 1981, and
1983 in Quintal With That Olive Oil in Survey in Liter.

 

Product 1976 1979 1981 1983
Barley 500 380 5,000 2,360
Dry Legumes 9,900 200 514
Figs 1,245 830 8,050 3,268
Gardening

(poly cul.) 1,200 - 9,515 -
Olives ‘ 1,390 3,220 20,000 190,300 (L)
Other fruits 2,580 - 180 -
Wheat (hard) 1,450 4,700 10,000 1,769

 

Sources: Djenadi, Regional and Wilaya St. Survey.
The data in Table 17 are rough estimates of the main farm products

destined mostly for family consumption. The limited amounts prove that

130

agriculture is not of such great size as to allow saying that
Beni-Chebana's people are living from agriculture. If we divide the
oil liters over the 1977 population, the results will be as follows:
190,300 - 23306 = 8.2. This is eight liters per year per person. This
is less than one person could consume in the entire year. Yet, olive
oil is the most important fanm product of Beni Chebana, followed by
figs, and other products. Only olives and figs could be partially
marketed by a limuted number of households, wherever there is excess of
production. Statistical differences between the four sources could be
due to yearly variations in part and also to different methods of data
collection and presentation. The Wilaya statistics of agriculture
reported three figures with regard to figs, for instance: the total of
fresh figs was 8,050 quintals, 620 quintals of which were dried, while
the rest, 7,430 quintals, were freshly consumed. It is true that
'families consume a large part of fresh figs, but attempts to estimate
the consumed quantities may lead nowhere since no one can make a
serious estimate of how muzh of the crop is consumed fresh.

Olive production may be the most important of all as just
mentioned, but it is also subject to large seasonal variations. The
Wilaya statistics reported 20,000 quintals of olives. The 1979
regional statistics reported only 3,220 quintals. The problemrhere is
that even the peasants themselves do not know, with some exceptions,
the amount of their production, especially that amount consumed by the
family members. Ttere is still another problem with olives reported

here in quintals, while peasants, in general, use liters. The Wilaya

131

used both measures with olives and gave 20,000 quintals and 3,600 hecto
liters of oil. This is, 360,000 liters as compared to the survey's
190,300 liters. The use of liters, therefore, is more likely to
reflect the reality with this product because families need a number of
containers the size of which is known to keep oil production each year.
No other farm product can satisfy the family consumption needs.
Ih§_Livestock

Domestic animals represent an important part of the rural economy.
They provide different services and raw materials such as draft, meat,
leather, wools, milk, etc. Beni-Chebana's commune does possess a
number of types of domestic animals as shown in Table 18, according to
data from several sources. The figures are given in number of head of
each type.

Table 18: Number of Damestic Animals (and Honeycombs) in
Beni-Chebana for Selected Years.

 

Animals 1976 1979 1981 1983
Bovines 350 510 580 349
Donkeys 2,913 1,105
Goats 20,000 5,213 5,250 2,200
Honeycombs 350 229
Horses 354 252 138
Poultry

farming 851 30, 000 3, 700
Rabbits 1,250
Sheep 708 900 1,945

 

Sources: Djenadi, regional and Wilaya's
Statistics, Survey.

These statistics should not be taken as representing the entire
reality, but rather, they should be taken as rough estimates, subject

to all types of statistical errors. Some numbers seemr highly

132

exaggerated such as Djenadi's 20,000 goats or the Wilaya's 30,000
chickens. The survey's figures here and elsewhere should, however, be
multiplied by 1.5 to 2 to represent the total of hamlets. Djenadi, for
instance, considered sheep as virtually non-existent because no herd is
seen there, but the Wilaya's statistics reported 900 head and the
survey almost double that figure. Such large differences are due to
the estimating errors not to any exceptional events as the following
facts show. Djenadi estimated no less than six chickens per household
but gave no figure for the commune. The Wilaya's. cattle figures are
from sheer imagination. While over 3,500 cows are mentioned, the fact
is that we can find no more than two cows in most hamlets, and none in
many of them. Cows are owned by rich families. The number of oxen is
decreasing and the cost of keeping cows is high. Rather, most
households own goats and sheep. The total for bovines is most likely
to be 580 as cited in Table 18.
in: see sect-es.

The private agricultural sector, commonly called "traditional",
could not survive at Beni-Chebana. The weak and almost non-existent
public sector did not emerge to fill the gap and replace the vanishing
private farming. The state sector, as represented by self-managed
fanms, does not exist at all at Beni-Chebana, because the self-managed
farms are those previously owned by the settlers or their allied, rich,
Algerian families who left after independence; but no such farms exist
in Beni-Chebana since no settlers lived there. Another semi-public

sector has emerged as a consequence of the 1971 Agrarian reform

133

program. This includes the state nationalized private lands, mosques'
lands, and under used lands of the self-managed sector organized under
a coopertive system. The agrarian reform faced tough and multiple
problems, nationwide and could not survive. The reform of the reform
started some two years ago. The new idea behind it was to include the
agrarian reform sector into the self-managed one. Small sized. units,
which are easily manageable, better equipped, and with qualified staff
members, were thought to be more productive farms. The program called
"restructuration" reached both industry and agriculture nationwide.
Consequently, the agrarian reform program jrat disappears and even the
socialist villages built by the state will be sold to their residents
at a symbolic price, as pointed out by officials.

The restructuration of agriculture has been carried out according
to the motto "small is more productive". The cost in money, skilled
personrel, and equipment, apparently, is not taken into account. There
is a big difference between strictly dividing labor in order to
increase productivity and the act of destroying relatively large farms
to make smaller ones. Beni-Chebana got no cooperative, and around ten
people obtained, separately, plots of land within the agrarian reform
program. Officer of this reform at Bejaia Wilaya level mentioned 72
agrarian reform beneficiaries. The ten found are distributed as
“follows: Adjissa, 2; Ait Mohli, none; Beni-Chebana, 5; and
Beni-Maouche, 3. Mostly illiterate and without adequate means, the
peasants generally have abandoned their plots. The CAPCS, however, has

been given some support but could not fully play its role within the

134

commune. The following shows the state support to Beni-Chebana's CAPCS
composed of two branches: Agradou and Trouna. The help is represented
by Akbou's BNA loans whose total reached 1,445,722 AD in a six-year
period. The yearly average of 240,953.66 AD is almost double of that
allocated to the private sector. The state policy clearly favored
collective institutions over individuals in the past at least, because
this policy shifted sharply lately to the private sector of
agriculture, notably in Southern Algeria. The state loans are,
according to Akbou's BNA Agency:

Year Amount of Loan in AD.

 

1976 303,717
1977 83,282
1978 44,615
1979 414,075
1980 382,367
1981 217,666

This relatively important amount of financial effort went nowhere
because of non-favorable local conditions and lack of incentives. This
was not enough because of larger needs, distant hamdets fromrboth CAPCS
branches, notably that of Agradou situated between hamlets, and
non-effective management of the available resources and potentials.
Akbou's BNA branch sent an accountant to Agradou's.CAPCS, but he left
one month later. He could not stand living conditions there, according
to the bank representative who mentioned this case, which indicates
again that spending alone cannot solve the problems or improve living
cOnditions in rural Algeria. A genuine socioeconomic program is needed

to make the financial effort fruitful.

135

The Multi-Sources of Income

A legitimate question may be asked at this point in analyzing
Beni-Chebana's economic situation, "what are the possible income
sources if neither agriculture nor industry has developed enough to
retain people in the area?" Answering this question is really not easy
in part due to lack of adequate data. This fact, however, would not
prevent us from taking a brief look into the main sources of income for
this commune. Agriculture has been presented as the main income source
by the 1979 regional statistics, since the primary sector alone absorbs
75.4 percent of the communal manpower. The secondary sector accounts
21.6 percent and the tertiary accounts for only 3.0 percent. These
percentages do not seem to reflect the real situation, as our own data
show. The survey, in fact, shows a completely different situation
whereby agriculture represents a very small percentage as compared with

other more important sources, as the following tabulation shows:

Income Sources Percent
Agriculture alone 4.0
Agriculture + others 37.0
Free occupations (agri.excluded) 3.0
Private wage laborers 16.0
Public workers 10.0
Retirements from.abroad 13.0
Retirements (national) 2.0
Traders 4.0
War allowances 11.0
Total 100.0

The above percentages show'part-time fanming dominant, with 37
percent of the manpower, while agriculture alone represents only four

percent. A second remark concerns the importance of income originating

136

from outside the comrmme in the form of retirements, pensions, and
state allowances to war veterans and widows. These three sources
together account for 26 percent of the total income. This equals both
private and public wage-paying workers. The very profitable retail
trade with prices well beyond urban prices is strongly l'eld by four
percent of the manpower in Beni-Clebana. There is no wholesale trade
in the commune. Many small retailers buy from local retailers to sell
at the hamlet level which fact makes prices even higher. Most of them
have no means to buy at wholesale prices. Third, there is a large
difference between those who have retirerent frorm abroad with 13
percent and national retirees with only two percent. That is to say,
that job opportunities for the Algerian proletariat were available in
' France rather than in Algeria during the colonial war.

Artisan activities economically are very important since most, if
not all, socioeconomic reeds had been locally satisfied during the
colonial past. Such activities include: clothing, blankets,
containers and tools, etc. The survey shows that only around 350
households today still make limited handicrafts, notably, wool articles
done by women. Imported and national industrial goods consequently
have destroyed the rural economy in Beni-Chebana, without replacing
those activities of the traditional handicrafts by a more sophisticated
type of production. This fact forced rural people out to seek other
income sources.

LN}; §_r_o_§m Outmigration
The large majority of Algerian rural migrants went to France,

attracted by job market opportunities, and this was the case for

137

Beni-Chebana. The Algerian. colonial economy could not absorb the
rapidly growing rural labor force since not one of the three sectors -
industry, agriculture, and services - had developed enough to provide
sufficient needed jobs. Only when the French economy needed cheap
manpower was it that a great stream of migrants to France started at
the beginning Of this century. A counter-stream of money took place
from France to Algeria, and more specifically to rural areas, the home
of the migrants. The money was being sent to families left behind.

Income from outmigration is much more important than all other
sources together. The survey, in fact, shows 15 percent of the people
receiving their main income from retirerent. The 1979 regional
statistics show the following figures of money flowing into
Beni-Clebana from outside for that year only: 5,840,804 AD from abroad
and 15,481,011 AD from within the national territory. It is worth
noting that no cent of these amounts was sent abroad and 110,240.50 AD
were sent into other national regions. This large amount shows to what
extent Beai-Chebana‘s residents depend for their living on money sent
by outmigrants and received as retirees.

It is of utmost importance to note, however, that Algerian
migrants abroad, notably to France, have practically stopped sending
their saving through remittances as they. formerly did. Rather a
steadily growing black market money exchange emerged after 1969 when
the French Franc (FF) was devalued. This market has reached its
highest point of growth, when Algerian private citizens have been,

officially, allowed to import cars without permission to export the

138

necessary funds to buy them. It was a boon to migrants abroad. The
Algerian financial system does not allow Algerian export of currency
and no money exchange is allowed beyond the present 1,000 AD once a
year per person travelling abroad.

This policy was intended to favor car imports, with no foreign
currency spent by the national corporation holding the state monopoly
of car imports and to encourage outmigrants to transfer their savings
into their country with the highest rate of exchange never reached
before. Despite the low rate of FF, this is: FF1=AD 0.62 during the
beginning of the second half of 1984, the FF was exchanged at 2.50 AB
on the black market. Due to FF low rate, only social security money is
received in Algeria from France. Some retirees even stopped receiving
their allowances in Algeria and asked to be paid in France instead.
This is more profitable to the retirees but very detrimental to the
national economy. The government had to intervene to stop the
phenomenon by allocating some compensations so as to keep some kind of
balance between the values of AD and FF before, and even after, the
system of car imports was introduced.

The price encouragerent system did not work. Only a single
remittance of 200 AD was received at Ait Mohli's post office agency
between 1977 and 1983. It was a gift frem an outmigrant to a
grandparent. The fact is that workers as well as retirees found
themselves losing by sending their savings to Algeria, as shown by the
following case at Trouna's post office. A remittance arrived at Trouna

from France in February 1985. It was sent by the French Social

139

Security and taken by mere chance among many others. Its amount was FF
9,124.84 and its value in Algerian Dinar was 4,718.25. The added
compensation was 1,909 AD. This made the total paid to the receiver:
6,627.25 AD and the loss is 2,502.59 FF. The value of this remittance
should it be exchanged on the black market is: 22,824.60 AD. The
value of French Franc in the black market is 2.50 AD. as practiced
today, if not more. Another factor that helped to stop the sending of
mugrants' savings was family migration increase, beside importing goods
to sell at five or more times French prices. A retiree told Trouna's
post office officer: "You have stolen my money", when he knew the
difference between the amount sent to him in FF and that received in
AD.

This does not mean that Algeria has stopped receiving any money
fromrFrance. Rather, a growing flow of goods and funds is taking place
between the two countries as shown by the steadily growing amounts
received at Bejaia Wilaya level from both national and international

mugrants between 1978 and 1983:

Table 19: Flow of Money Into Bejaia's Wilaya in 1978-1983 by
National and International Categories (in AD).

 

 

 

Year National International
1978 239,904,931 124,354,108
1979 287,903,328 145,562,201
1980 372,884,685 161,742,886
1981 404,946,261 171,272,353'
1982 618,629,702 181,778,115
1983 643,754,831 188,608,030

 

Source: Bejaia's Post Office Statistics, 1984.

The amounts shown in Table 19 are those coming from outmigrants or

received by themrthrough the post office system.at Bejaia Wilaya. As

140

for Beni-Chebana, the figures available do not cover the entire commune
because because no amounts were available for Beni-Chebana's section
an only totals wre provided for Adjissa and Beni—Maouche. Statistics
of the commme were sent to Bejaia and destroyed after a period of
time. Adjissa and Beni—Maouche together received 33,228,985.31 AD from
abroad and 36,787,333.l0 AD from within the national territory, during
the 1979 and 1984 period. The internatibnal amount of 33 mullion AD
included 10 million AD of compensation. Twenty out of 36 million AD
received from*within the national territory, were pensions. The money
received at Ait Mohli from outmigrants is shown in Table 20 below:

Table 20: Ait Mohli's Income from Oubmigrants in 1977-1981, by
National and International Categories (in AD).

 

 

Year National International
1977 476,813.18 160,560.90
1978 878,016.60 448,048.73
1979 1,277,002.48‘ 784,202.65
1980 1,509,081.10 709,319.79
1981 1,685,239.52 739,443.37

 

Source: Ait Mohli's Post Office Agency, 1982

The above figures confirm.the fact that Beni-Chebana as well as
the Wilaya of Bejaia as a whole are centers of outmigration. This
large-scale outmigration is due to three main factors: 1) a poor and
backward agrarian sector; 2) a lack of industry; and 3) inadequate
living conditions. The migrants send money to their families left
behind and prepare to come back home in most cases. This is true for
both national and international migrants. The important amounts of
money would suggest a large-scale outmigration of manpower forced out

of underdeveloped rural areas.

141

Income from outmigrants is not only important at communal or
Wilaya levels, but also at the national level, even though not all
outmigrants' savings are sent home. The mugrants' nominal value
transfer passed from AD 1.199 billions in 1970 to AD 1.807 billions in
1980. The consistent value should have been AD 3.787 billions in 1980,
the lack of transfer would be AD 7.783 billions between 1970 and 1980,
since thermdgrants' saving capacity was AD 5.160 billions in 1980. The
total amount of non-transferred funds and material goods was 31.875 AD
billions fOr the same period, according to a study of A. Chaker (AA.,
February 17-23, 1983).

me 521:. 2:; m

This section focuses on the role of women in socioeconomic
development, with an emphasis on the commune of Beni-Chebana. At the
same time, some consideration will be given to a broader view of the
economic role of Algerian women in general.

WOmen in Algeria are legally equal to men. All state laws and
principles give women an equal right to work, to education, and to
political, and social participation. The National Charter, based on
socialist principles, put much emphasis on woman‘s essential place as a
mother, spouse, and citizen within the family cell. A woman should be
able to work and be paid according to the work done. The constitution
essentially prohibits. any discrimination based on sex, race, or
profession. These policy principles and laws are, unfortunately, not
effectively put into practice.

Algerian society is, in fact, a male dominated society. Even if

social rules are made by political, legislative, or administrative

142

authorities, they may not work because of man's power, based on some
religious tenets and deep cultural traditions. New laws will not
succeed in making radical changes overnight. Man's powerful position
is within the family' cell and laws are almost useless in this case
because no one can enter households to tell them what or what not to
do. Only when a case is brought into public hands can the laws be
enforced. Even then, women usually submit to men who are in charge of
them as mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. This has been
religiously established with the family system and firmdy strengthened
by the dominant socioeconomic conditions of underdevelopment and
rigidness of traditions.

Social facts such as divorce, for instance, show to what extent
women are forced to submit completely to male authority in Algeria.
Early marriage associated with religion and local conditions, is a form
through which men take control of women. Young girls used to get
married as early as 13 or 14 years of age. They have no chance to get
a good level of education or vocational skill at this early age, and no
chance is offered later on to do so. The 1984 family law'made a good
step forward by prohibiting female marriage before the age of 18.
Married women without education or job skills depend completely on
husbands' attitude toward them. Husbands have an absolute right to
divorce whenever they desire and without being seriously forced to
justify their behavior. A judge cannot stop a divorce, the only choice
he has is to ratify the husband's decision of divorce.

It is true that the Muslim dominated male societies take from

religion only what most serves men as opposed to women because in the

143

case of divorce, the Prophet provided women with divorce-sharing rights
when this condition is mentioned in a marriage contract. This
possibility has never come to be widely known or put into practice in
most, if not all Muslim societies. Rather it is meaningless to give a
completely dependent and disarmed wife a right to divorce which she may
never be able to use. Another religious right given to wives is the
choice to stay or go when a husband marries a second wife. The Koran,
effectively, allows men to have as many as four wives at the same time,
with conditions which would make a second wife almost impossible if
correctly followed. These conditions are never made clear to the
public. Polygamy seems widespread in Algeria where a fairly large
proportion of married men (70,000 according to 1977 general census)
have a second wife. The real and tough problem is not that of legal or
religious right in the first place but it is, rather, that of improving
ferale socioeconomic status because a disarmed and dependent wife will
not benefit from divorce or refusing to stay with ter husband's second
wife. The original wife's family would accept her back, this is at
least what prevailed in recent past, but never with her children for
whom she has the right of custody. The only choice left for a wife in
this case is to stay with the husband and accept his rules.

Still another case of ferale submission to men is that concerning
the A right to work. The Algerian woren are gererally not allowed to
work, even if they had worked before marriage. This is contrary to
Islamic law allowing women to take part in socioeconomic activities and

prevent the husband to stop his working wife, should they marry while

144

she works. This is to say briefly that religious laws are not strictly
followed in Muslim societies. Rather, religion has been misused to
repress females. The rew Algerian family law of 1984 gave women
working rights. The problem is aggravated by the fact that even
educated ferale workers of the urban areas are not participating fully
in the job market. Their participation rate was 1.66 percent in 1966
but went down in 1977 to 1.62 percent. So, woren.'s education is not
profitable to the national economy and inequality did not distinguish
between educated and non-educated women. Rather, it equally dealt with
ferale categories representing more than 50 percent of the total
population.

An increased percentage of working woren has been sought recently
by the goverment, not only as a means of socioeconomic, political, and
cultural erancipation, but also as a channel of birth control. It is
thought that educated working women would tend to have fewer children
because of the difficulty of working and simultaneously rearing
children. These remarks apply to Algerian women as a whole while the
rural women areeven more depressed. Can their status be improved?

A clear distinction should be made from the beginning between
urban and rural women. The two cases are different in many respects.
Traditionally, rural woren were very active in contributing to the
family economy, especially when this was a subsistence economy in which
they played a major role. But when the economy expands rew economic
and social activities, the traditional ones are transformed and their

relative importance is reduced, as Boserup asserts. This is to say

145

tlat the traditional economy could not resist the western ecoomic
invasion. The colonized people, notably women, could not participate
in the colonial economic system due to, among other reasons, a lack of
skills. Not only were women but also men as well were put aside during
the colonial era. More important is the fact that rural women were the
first victims of the post independence development of the developing
nations. Woren in Algerian rural development program were simply
ignored. All the agrarian reform charter had said was that a wife of a
beneficiary from the reform has the right to receive her husband's pay
when he dies. Only his oldest boy can replace him. Here we are in a
dangerous situation of division of labor between sexes: while men are
sent to work on the farm, woren are kept home. Woren in other words
are not allowed to do farm work as they used to, within the subsistence
economy. Not just female labor is lost but children's participation is
also lost. The system destroyed the very effective family labor force
by allowing only males to be members of an agrarian cooperative. The
Tanzanian Ujmaa woman by comparison is very burdened. She has to work
her own private land, husband's private land, do the job of a Ujamaa
member, and home chores, as the Tanzanian women's delegation to the
September 1982 African Women's Seminar held in Algiers reported. These
are two extreme cases with regard to rural women in developing nations.

Beni-Chebana's woren not only are prevented from education and
work activities, but they are also not even allowed to be seen in
public under any circumstance. Very few women except some very old and

poor women can go out of their homes. Only during harvesting seasons

146

can Beni-Chebana women go out to help male workers. This is not,
however, the case for all parts of rural Algeria, but rather most other
regions allow woten to take part in family farming as well as to hold
wage-paying work, such as in Eastern Algeria, Aures, greater Kabylia
and Southern parts. The rural ferale population is not allowed to
migrate city-ward unless the purpose is to join her husband.

It is true that men are in charge of women and depeMent children,
in which situation the family can survive when the husband works even
with low income. The problem becomes critical for widows, divorced, or
non—married women. They, then must support themselves and their
dependent children without being previously and adequately prepared.
Consequently, rural woren suffer more from social constraints and
underdevelopment than any other social category. The national plans
overlooked the rural female population in many developing countries.
The United Nations Economic Commission recognized the importance of
polygamy in traditional economy as follows:

"A man with several wives commands more land, can
produce more food for his household, and can
achieve a high status due to the wealth he can
command." (Boserup, 1970, 37)
The female labor force here is a source of wealth for male exploiters.

Among other factors that place women as inferior to men in
economic activity is physical strength. Presumably this fact made for
sex differences in primitive agriculture. This difference was expected

to narrow when human muscle-power was no longer necessary, but this did

not take place everywhere. Rather, technology influenced men who were

147

able to learn how to use tools, while woten, during the transformation
period, want either to abandon farming and retire to domestic life, or
to leave for town. (Boserup, 1970, 53) Boserup, a leading economic
scholar, clearly blamed Western colonialism for woten's deteriorating
status in the previously colonized nations:

"European settlers, colonial administrators, and

technical advisers are largely responsible for

deterioration in the status of women in the agri—

cultural sectors of developing countries. It was

they who neglected the female agricultural labour

force when they helped to introduce modern com-

mercial agriculture to the overseas world and

promoted the productivity of male labour."

This remark does not seem to apply to Algeria, because the
European settlers did not make such a choice. Both men and women were
driven away. Rather, over-mechanization characterized colonial farming
in this country. It was a shame even for Algerian men to work with the
settlers during the whole colonial era. Each community was closed to
the other. Only recently has poverty pushed the most destitute and
landless peasants to accept work with the settlers on a small scale.
Consequently, it seems unfair to accuse Western colonialism of every
kind of problem the developing countries are now facing. This,
however ,- may be true in other parts of the world.

The developing countries are faced with a hard question, namely,
whether to employ women when man cannot find jobs, or to discriminate

against females in order to provide males with jobs. Or is it possible

to encourage sex-free competition in the job market? Boserup calls for

148

female employment in urban centers of the developing countries, despite
the fact that large scale unemployment may be unavoidable because large
number of villagers are pushed from.their homes for lack of employment
or lacking land to cultivate (Boserup, 1970, 196). So, employment of
women will have two positive benefits, according to this idea:
improvement of family income and also stopping rural exodus because no
jobs are available for rural-urban migrants. A third positive benefit,
consequently, is that this policy of limdting rural migration, will
make more food available. The rural people who cannot migrate to
cities should produce more food, according to Boserup's theory of urban
female employment. This does not seem to work in rural Algeria now
because even those who could not leave the area are moving away from
unprofitable farming. The Algerian peasants tend, effectively, to
prefer wage-paying work over poor farming.

A second obstacle opposing this theory is that for women to fill
urban jobs is not easy, either because of personal choices, skills, or
conveniences. Rural poverty will only increase when migrants cease
sending money from urban centers, while the rural areas are not yet
developed since neither urban men or women are willing to work in rural
areas. This is very true in the Algerian case as well as in other
developing nations. The International Labor Organization (ILO) asserts
that:

”Educated women are unwilling to accept jobs as
teachers, .nurses, social workers, etc. either
because of their family' attachment in town or

because of a general desire to live in towns.”
(Boserup, 1970, 197)

149

It also seems too simplistic to think that rural-urban migration
will stop if only urban women take up available urban jobs, which is
unlikely to happen anyway. Rural people will resort to many means to
get jobs even if there are not any. This is not an easy question, and
there are no easy solutions to it, because going straight from one
extreme to another will not be an answer. It will be very damaging to
prevent rural people form.moving city-ward without making jobs and
other services available to them. wage-paying opportunities need to be
made available to rural-urban people of both sexes. No one would
disagree with Boserup that girls should be educated and be consequently
allowed to perform. productive activities, but it seems equally
illogical to favor urban rather than rural residents. Rural-urban
exodus is damaging to both areas in Algeria and its solution may be
sought through providing more decent living conditions and the creation
of job opportunities within the countryside. The more advanced nations
are experiencing large counter-streams and the large cities are even
losing portions of their population due to favorable rural living
conditions.

Boserup's viewpoint of the high cost of urbanization in developing
countries and its prOposed solution are amazingly oversimplified. To
quote Boserup:

“In most villages, people provide the infra-
structure they need, or most of it, by their own
efforts without burdening public investment budget.
‘Villagers in developing countries usually build
their own homes of local materials, supply
themselves with water, light, and fuel, arrange

their own local transportation by carrying
head-loads or use donkeys or carts. In towns by

150

contrast, public investment budgets are burdened by
investment costs to provide migrant families with
dwellings, light, water, sanitation, schools,
hospitals, etc." (Boserup, 1970, 206)

The above descriptions were once, in fact, correct but they are no
longer valid today. The rural people of developing countries went to
war when they could not bear any longer what they were forced to bear.
They went into war to free themselves from.the burdens they had to bear
under the colonial powers and free their countries from, western
exploitation. They cannot accept today what they fought against years
ago and paid for heavily. To propose going back to the colonial era
situation seems to be unwise and fruitless. The governments of
developing countries may consider two possible choices: to provide
infrastructures either in urban areas (which would only worsen the bad
situation of overcrowding and high costs as Boserup rightly mentions),
or in rural areas where the people may even get involved to lower the
cost and probably solve or at least ease the rural-urban exodus
problem. Boserup also suggested restricting town entry to rural people
as was the case of the colonial era, when only single male workers were
allowed to come to work and were cheaply housed, or there were use
restrictions as in some socialist countries such as People's Republic
of China or the Soviet Union. These restrictions are hard to impose in
developing nations and would not be accepted by the rural people who
may feel oppressed and frustrated again and this time by their own
governments. These restrictions would be accepted only if deemed just

and necessary to Serve the general interest, that is when people feel

151

that they are getting their share of the national income and services.
This is the case of the socialist countries. People do not seem to
feel discriminated against. The other viewpoint, in contrast, to that
of stopping rural—urban migration by allowing women to take over urban
jobs or just restricting city entry, is to encourage women to stay home
in order to provide men and especially young men with more _job
opportunities. This view also looks too simplistic and gives credence
to those who are against female education. It would be a terrible
waste of money, time, and effort to educate women without allowing them
to contribute to socioeconomic development of their country and benefit
from their education.

This chapter allowed us to briefly look at Beni-Chebana's
subsistence economy. The role of women in economic development was
discussed. Tl'e problem of male-ferale employment and rural-urban
mugration was also examined, a subject closely related to the following

chapter on population and social amenities.

CHAPTER VII: THE POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL AMENITIES

Demographic Phenomena

The intent here is to examine some major demographic phenomena and
how they are related to the socioeconomic, cultural, and historical
situation of Algeria as well as the local level. Population phenomena,
especially growth, are very important indeed in today's developing
countries where poverty and hunger threaten social and political
stability. Some argue that family planning is being suggested by
demographers. and politicians because of the rapid population growth of
the developing world as compared to that of advanced countries. High
birth rates are seen as an obstacle to socioeconomic development which
should be removed before any hope for development can! succeed. In
spite of theories, both pessimistic and optimistic, many developing
nations are experiencing starvation, notably in Africa, today. The
problem is that birth control is not an easy solution because it
requires a number of conditions to fully succeed and these are not
readily available in developing countries.

These conditions, according to Rammeyer, are:

1) awareness by political leaders that excessive
population growth may be detrimental to
well-being;

2) availability of contraceptive technology;

3) necessary social scientific knowledge for
dispensing such technology; and

4) change in the social structure so as to
people to receive social rewards for not
having children. (Sammeyer, 141-3),

152

153

These conditions are not met in the Algerian case mainly because of the
prevailing socioeconomic, historical, religious, and political
conditions. From an historical viewpoint, Algeria had to be
pronatalist because of the colonial exploitation, as Sauvy mentions,
the colonial aim was:

"To extract wealth, products or even men from. the

new territories. Since there was an ample provi-

sion of men for the market, at very low purchase

prices, it was profitable to treat them more

cruelly than animals. The new rulers, both in Asia

and in Africa, were thus regardless of the numbers

of their subjects." (Sauvy, 108)

Consequently, the settlers paid no attention to population growth
because the colonized sector was dealt with as a commodity. The more
people, the cheaper they seem to be. The subjected people could not
accept any policy_of population control, because their only defense was
to increase their numbers. The increase in numbers can become a reason
for concern when extra subjects are a burden and a threat to rulers.
Those, in fact, who cannot find a place within the existing economic
framework will inevitably rise up. Thus, there was no population
policy during the colonial era:

"...The French governors showed no interest in any
form. of census. Not until 1947 was the problem of
population formulated clearly enough for forecasts
to be made and plans to be laid down to deal with
the probable increase." (Sauvy, 109)

The pronatalist ideology of Islam also helped to maintain
traditions of family and childbearing deeply’ rooted in the local
culture. The sacred marriage is aimed mainly at childbearing. In the

words of the prophet: "Get married, get children, I will be proud of

154

you, among nations, on resurrection day." Add to this the Koran's
.warning not to refrain from having children out of fear of hunger since
God provides both parents and children with needed wealth. For the
pronatalists, prevention of childbearing is killing, while it is not
for those Muslims supporting contraceptive use when needed. The latter
do not regard abortion before a certain period of gestation as murder.
Muslims are opposed to abortion unless the mother's life is in danger.

The Islamic Superior Council of Algeria in 1968 issued a Fetwa
(religious authorization) for contraceptive use but only at an
individual level. This means, in other words, denying the political
power any right to impose a general birth control rule deemed against
the spirit of Islam. The main rationale of the religious men is that
God has created enough wealth for man's needs and if there is poverty,
it is not due to economic development potentials but rather to social
and structural irequality. This comes close to the early Marxist
viewpoint concerning this subject.

Marx, in fact, reacted violently against the Malthusian theory
asserting that hLman misery stewed from population growth and uneven
economic growth. This theory was considered as class selfishness tlat
reversed the real responsibility. The apparent over-population is due,
according to Marxists, to private property and there would be no
population problem. in a socialist regime, especially not
over-population (Sauvy, 524). The Marxists took this position on the
ground that for the working classes, numbers are eséential in the

struggle for freedom. The Marxist stand, however, changed over time

155

since abortion and contraceptives are allowed in the Soviet Union and
divorce is easy. There is equality among the sexes and women must
work. These policies serve to reduce the growth rate in that country.
China also recently adopted the one-child family as policy.

Today's over—population is a mere aspect and consequence of
underdevelopment, according to Sauvy. A country, such as Switzerland,
with 375 inhabitants per square mile, would be extremely poor and would
suffer cruelly from. hunger and cold if deprived of equipment or
education. Food shortage is not due to excessive numbers in many
developing countries but to existing underdevelopment. These countries
can improve their conditions substantially by a better use of
agricultural land, better prospecting for mineral resources, creation
of industry, etc. The fundamental condition of this is the proper
training of the population. (Sauvy, 421)

Population Poligy

Algerian history is characterized by wars and uprisings, notably
the liberation war that killed about 1.5 million people. Because of
the threats by neighbors over colonial borders, and in order to
strengthen the power of the elite, the leaders sided with the
pronatalist position. The colonial policy of non-intervention was
continued up to 1980. The late president Boumediene declared in 1979:

"we do not favor false so1utions such as birth
control. we consider that this would suppress
difficulties instead of adequately solving them.
‘We believe, in fact, that the real solutions are
within development framework even if more time and

efforts are required." (AA., January 28-February
3, 1982)

156

- This has been the official pOpulation policy since independence up to
the fourth session of the FLN (the governing Party) Central Committee,
held in June 1980. This policy required no action. It was‘in perfect
agreement with that position expressed by religious men.

The same governing Party shifted its policy just after Boumediene
died in 1979. The Central Committee expressed concern over the rapid
growth rate of the population that reached as high as 3.2 percent a
year and called for a vast program of information and education.
Necessary financial, material, and human means were promised to
undertake birth control programs for the first time in national
history. The program, however, did not significantly succeed because
the means made available were not sufficient and the programs faced
stiff resistance from those who were expected to help, namely,
teachers, parents, and religious institutions. Hence, the goals were
not achieved. Birth spacing, as officially called, was seen as
contrary to the Koran and consequently rejected. Sore successful
steps, however, were made. Birth spacing centers, for instance, jumped
from around 10 in 1970 to 300 in 1980. But mozh was needed in the
areas of research and technology as well as in campaigns to convince
resisters of its usefulness and necessity. Not only were a large
proportion of citizens not fully convinced but adequate means were not
available to those who needed them. Negative effects of the use of the
pill were also used by the opponents to stop the program. It was not
until 1984 that a relatively serious effort was made. The Party

launched an information program through different media.

157

Characteristics g§_the Algerian Population

 

We first examine some characteristics of the Algerian population
in order to better understand the demography of a developing country.
we~will then turn to the Beni-Chebana case. The following table shows
the size of the resident population and percent increase, by sex, and
sex ratio from 1977 to 1980.

Table 21: The Resident Population of Algeria, by Sex, 1977-80.

 

Year Male Percent Female Percent ng___ Tgt§1_ Eergent_
' Increase Increase Ratio Iggrease

1978 8,578,187 3.3 8,724,057 3.1 98.3 17,302,244 3.2
1979 8,846,360 3.1 8,987,310 3.0 98.4 17,833,670 3.1
1980 9,117,199 3.1 9,258,107 3.0 98.5 18,315,306 3.0

 

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981

The data in Table 22 show an annual rate of increase in excess of 3.0.
The rate is declining slightly in the three periods shown. Note that
there is a consistent low'sex ratio, i.e. an excess of females over
males. The high rate of growth in Algeria, as shown Table 21, is due
to the combination of a high birth rate and a greatly reduced
mortality. Therefore, the rate of natural increase is substantial, as
shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Algerian Crude Birth Rate and Natural Increase Rate,

 

 

 

 

0 1977-79 0 .
Year Crude Birth Rate Natural Increase Rate
1977 46.02 31.66
1978 43.67 30.87
1979 44.02 31.29

 

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

158

These rates, which have decreased slightly since 1977, are still
very high in comparison to those of advanced countries which are better
able to handle demographic growth. The crude birth rate levels may be
used to measure the development level as between advanced and
developing countries. It will take much more time for Algeria to
attain the low level of birth rates of the developed nations or even
those developing nations that have moved further in modernization. The
important fact is that child—elderly dependency ratios are very high in
Algeria, consequently, making an excessively heavy burden with regard
to schooling, infant and maternal health care, housing, and provision
of food.

Too high population growth rate is in part due to a low crude
death rate. The Algerian crude death rate is, in fact, decreasing as
shown below'according to 1981 damographic study’ of the Ministry of
Planning (32):

Year Male Female Total
1977 14.67 14.07 14.37
1978 13.30 12.30 12.22
1979 13.23 12.22 12.73
Infant death rates likewise are decreasing in the .same period,
according to the same source of data (34):
Year Male Female Tbtal
1977 128.00 127.11 127.56
1978 114.60 110.21 112.41
1979 117.16 113.20 115.18
The above figures need no further explanation. Life expectancy

also has improved and its level compares favorably’ with other

159

developing nations such as the neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. The
gap, however, is still wide between Algeria and advanced nations as

Table 23 shows:

 

 

 

 

 

Table 23: Comparative Life Expectancy of Selected
Countries by Sex.

Country Year Male Female Total
Algeria 1979 55.50 58.21 56.85
Argentina 1970-75 56.16 71.38 68.27
Cuba 1970 68.50 71.80 70.15
France 1974 69.00 76.90 72.95
Morocco 1970-75 51.40 54.50 52.95
Syria 1970 54.49 58.73 56.61
Tunisia 1970-75 52.50 55.70 54.10
Yugoslavia 1970-75 65.42 70.22 67.82

 

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

The Population Reference Bureau in 1985 reports the most recent
life expectancy data for the countries in Table 24 as follows:
Algeria, 60; Argentina, 70; Cuba, 73; France, 75; Morocco, 58; Syria,
64; Tunisia, 61; and YUgoslavia, 70.

With regard to death rates, Algeria stands midway between the more
advanced and less advanced nations, as the following death rates
indicate: Algeria, 1979: 12.73; Argentina, 1974: 8.80; Cuba, 1976:
5.50; France, 1977: 10.10; Morocco, 1974: 15.70; Syria, 1974: 15.40;
Tunisia, 1974: 13.80; and Yugoslavia, 1977: 8.40. (Ministry of
Planning, 1981, 42) .

Another important characteristic of the Algerian population is its
youthfulness, as shown by the proportion of children under 15 ayears

old, from 1977 to 1980:

160

Year Proportion Under 15
1977 47.2
1978 47.1
1979 46.8
1980 46.6

Despite very slight, steady decreases, these proportions are still very
high as compared to those of developed countries, such as France with
25.4 and Sweden with 22.0. The child-aged dependency ratios for
Algeria are shown below for 1977-80 (number of persons under 15 plus
numbers of persons 65 and over, divided by number of persons 15-64,

multiplied by 100):

Year Dependency Ratio
1977 105.9
1978 ' 105.1
1979 103.5
1980 102.3

These ratios calculated from.resident population tables, show a
high but slightly declining load of dependency. However, dependency
would be much higher if those persons under 18 are added to the
non-active population. The proportion of active pepulation from 15 to
18 years old has been estimated to represent only 7.46 males and 1.57
females in 1980. These percentages show’ extremely low economic
activity for this age bracket. Those under 18 are not, legally,
eligible for jobs unless under certain circumstances. Female
participation, of course, is very low both in this age bracket as well
as in the total female population of all ages, as shown below,

according to 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning (18):

161

Year Percent of Active
Female Population

1977 4.3
1978 4.8
1979 4.7
1980 4.9

The dependency ratios would be even higher if young people 19-24
years old who have not yet entered the labor force were to be taken
into account. In 1980, the 19-24 year old age group amounted to 10.5%
of the total population. The age group was composed of about 40,000
‘more males than females.

Another no less important characteristic 'of the Algerian
population is its low level of education, and high level of illiteracy,
among the registered marriages in 1978, notably, among married females.
This is shown below, according to the 1981 demographic study of the
Ministry of Planning (46):

Level of Education Male Female Average

Illiterate 57.4 80.8 69.0
Elementary education 27.7 14.2 21.0
Secondary education 12.5 4.3 8.4
College education 2.4 0.7 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Beni-Chebana '5 Population Characteristics
Beni-Chebana‘s population characteristics are similar to those of
the national population, with only slight differences. The problem
here is that available data at a communal level does not allow us to
make in-depth analysis. We may be sure that the population of our
commune is very young. The 1977 census shows some differences between

the two populations. Beni-Chebana's dependency ratios have been higher

162

(108.65) than the nationwide ratio (105.90). The proportion of
children under 15 is lower (46.45) at the communal level than
nationwide (47.25). This indicates that the communal population is
older than the national level. The communal elderly—child ratio
confirms that fact since it is higher (12.18) in 1977 than at the
national level. The elderly-child ratios for.Algeria ranged from 8.8
to 8.5 between 1977 and 1980. This seems to indicate that the
countryside may have more retirees and disabled old people that go back
to rural areas to spend the rest of their lives than the prOportion who
stayed in the urban areas.

It is worthwhile to note that when the value of the elderly-child
ratio is under 15, it describes populations as being young (e.g., India
7.5, Honduras 5.1; Syria 10.1; Chile 10.8) and the value of 30 and
above can describe populations as old (e.g., France 47.8, Sweden 54.4,
and Soviet Union, 20.5) (Stockwell, 133). Using this indication, both
national and local populations are young, but the local one is older.
The proportion of aged persons or elderly ratio makes a clear
difference between national and' local populations. The local is
undoubtedly older as the following tabulation for the total Algerian

population shows.

Year Ratio
1977 4.17
1978 4.11
1979 4.03
1980 3.95

Beni-Chebana's elderly ratio calculated for 1977 was 5.65, considerably

higher than the national one gOing even lower between 1977 and 1980.

163

However, both are _very young as compared toiinternational elderly
standard, (France 12.1, Sweden 12.0). The ratio under five percent
indicates younger population (Honduras 2.4, Syria 4.7, India 3.1, Chile
4.3) (Stockwell, 133).

Child-mother ratio, another demographic measure, shows the
difference between national and local populations. The national ratio
was reported in the 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning
and the local ratio is calculated from survey. The data clearly
contradicts the usual assumption that rural women have higher birth
rates than urban women. Below are shown child-mother ratios locally

and nationally (28 ) .

Year ' Local Ratio National Ratio
1978 - 6. 92
1979 - 7. 05

Beni-Chebana's child-mother ratios for 1981 are, separately, as

shown below for each section:

Section Chi ld-Mother Ratio
Adj issa 5. 40
Ait Mohli 4 . 74
Beni-Ckebana 4. 65
Beni—Maouche 5. 69
Average 5. 12

Still another important demographic aspect that could be
calculated from census data is sex ratio excess-deficit. Beni-Chebana,
as well as all other communes of the Wilaya, exhibit male deficits due
to losses in the liberation war and large male outmigration. None of

the Wilaya's 28 communes has a male excess; rather they all have a male

164

deficit ranging from less than 0.80 percent in Bejaia commune to less
than 14.56 percent in Akfadou commune. Beni-Chebana is midway between
the largest and smallest male deficit (a deficit "of 5.68 percent),
seemingly due to two main factors, as already mentioned, war losses and
outmigration of male population. women do not migrate alone as is the
case in Latin American and Asian countries. Only when the whole family
mugrates are females included among migrants.

Beni-Chebana's sex ratios for the four sections are also provided
by the survey for 1983, except for Ait Mohli whose sex ratio is

provided by 1983 communal census. These ratios follow:

Section Ratio
Adjissa 95.10
Ait Mohli 122.62
Beni-Chebana 98.00
Beni-Maouche 92.33
Average 102.01

The notable phenomenon here is Ait Mohli's sex excess contrary to all
other communal sections as well as to those of the whole Wilaya. In
fact, I had to use the communal census that showed lower sex ratio of
only 122.62, because the survey showed an even larger ratio of 146.62.
There must be some reasons which are not clear for this exceptional
case.

As for marital status, the 1977 census reported that 38.3% of
Beni-Chebana's population was married. Widowed persons accounted for
5.8%, 0.5% were divorced, and 0.1% were separated. The remainder, or
55.3% were reported as single.

The survey also collected partial figures for Beni-Chebana war

losses, which are distributed as follows according to sex, age, and

165

cause of death (The French Army and the National Liberation Army). The

total number distributed is 925:

Cause of Death Sex-Age Percent
Men 70.70
French Army WOmen 7.57
Children 12.65
Men 8.54
ALN Women 0.54
Children 0.00
Total 100.00

Beni-Chebana's population pyramid shows two important features.
These is a deficit of males that is clearly apparent between the ages
of 30 onward and the youthfulness of this population as compared to
that of more developed nations. Their negative effects are felt at
local and national levels. Out-migration of young men has drained
available manpower which is hardly needed to put government and local
programs into effect. The need for formal and non-formal education is
growing. The youth are not taken care of with regard to different
aspects of modern life. They feel frustrated and abandoned.

The age structure of Beni-Chebana's population in 1977 is shown in

Figure 1. (See page 166).

9 £3 7 6 5 4

Age Group

9
u
0

 

166

   

Figure l. Age-Sex Structure of BenirChebana's Pepulaticn, 1977.

Percent

0.89
0.78
1.04
1.29
1.25

1.16
1.22
1.29
1.04
1.27

3.24
4.25

4.48
5.74
7.60

10.66

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000...... 0 IO...

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mom

167

The Outmigration Phenomenon

Algeria has been characterized since the beginning of the colonial
era by outmigration. It was stimulated by the French settlers during
the entire colonial period. It was first oriented toward neighboring
and other Arab countries before it took a major shift at the beginning
of the twentieth century, toward France in need of manpower following
the destruction from World War I and II. The outmigration to France
was characterized by single male migration until national independence
in 1962. Family migration started from that time onward. It has had a
fluctuating history until officially stopped by the Algerian government
in 1973 due to worsening political and economic relationships between
the two governments. The non-official outmigration, however, continued
in one form or another as the statistics in Table 24 show. Out-
migration, in fact, more than doubled each year from 1977 to 1979.
Neither the French nor the Algerians know the exact figures of
Algerians in France. They represent a source of external income for
Algeria, means by which the French‘ government can exert pressure,
target for killing for French right wing extremists, and subject of
legal problems. Table 24 shows outmigration flows by sex from 1977 to
1979:

168

Table 24: In- and Out-Migration and Net Migration for Algeria,
by Sex, in 1977-79.

 

 

 

 

 

NEE.

Year Sex In-Migration Out-Migration Out-Migration
M 623,902 627,522 3,620
1977 F 293,942 295,647 1,705
T 917,844 923,169 5,325
M 653,343 660,801 7,458
1978 F 307,812 311,326 3,514
T 961,155 972,127 10,972
M 1,190,423 1,207,365 16,942
1979 F 560,848 568,831 7,983
T 1,751,271 1,776,196 24,925

 

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

Following this general characterization of the Algerian
population's outmigration, we now turn to an explanation of
Beni-Chebana's outmigration.

Beni-Chebana's Out-migration

Beni-Chebana's available data are limited and will not allow us to
go in as much depth as we would like. Two sources of data are used
with regard to the subject of outmigration, namely, the 1977 census
data and the survey. The first source is not detailed at the communal
level and the second could not be as exhaustive as desired. The census
data are not highly reliable as will be shown. The following
infonmation may provide a base before treating outmigration.

Beni-Chebana's total population was 23,602 residents according to
the 1977 census. Of that total 11,130 were males and 12,472 were
'females. The population density was 112 inhabitants per square Km,
according to the' 1966 census. The two density extremes were Bejaia

commme with 539 inhabitants per square Km. and Taourirt-Ighil with

169

only 34 inhabitants per square Km. Thus, Beni-Chebana ranks 16th among
the other 28 communes with regard to population density. The 1977
census distributed this population as follows, according to density,
into census districts: Tarfet, the communal center, 1,326 residents;
seven secondary agglomeration districts, 8,824 residents, and around 31
sparsely populated districts with some 13,452 residents. The census
counted 744 visitors and 1,273 outmigrants for the entire commune.
There were 3,892 households and 4,990 housing units, therefore 1,098
housing units were not occupied. They are, most probably, outmigrants'
holes used only occasionally during vacations.

From these data some estimates of outmigrants can be calculated.
The average size of each household is 6.1. This number multiplied by
the number of empty homes would make the total of outmigrants around
6,698. Homeless outmigrants, however, represent a large pr0portion of
outmigrants who lost their homes during the war. At least four hamlets
were completely destroyed, namely, Boubirek, Mzita, Taourirt, and
Tizekht. Many others were partially destroyed and never rebuilt. Each
household has at least two, and sometimes more, outmigrants. These
added would total 7,784 more migrants if multiplied by just two. The
number of outmigrant births may have largely exceeded the number of
those who left Beni-Chebana as some cases confirm. The total number of
outmigrants must at least be equal to the total of residents at census
time. The census figure of 1,273 outmigrants is ridiculously low. The
number of international migrants would exceed or equal the number of

households, if only one migrant per household is counted - this is

170

3, 892 migrants instead of 1,273. Our survey is limited to around 37
hamlets from among 64 and shows the following numbers of outmigrants by

communal section :

Section Number of Out-migrants
Adjissa 1,205
Ait Mohli 629
Beni-Clebana 1,234
Beni-Maouche 879
Total 3,947

Errors may derive not only from counting but also from the concept
of outmigration itself. The 1977 census, for instance, reported 20
outmigrants for Amegroud, Adjissa but our survey counted 280 migrants
to France alone. The census may have counted only family heads and
single outmigrants. The survey included men, women, and children. The
problem here is not easy to solve since many outmigrants have left many
years ago and have rarely visited the areas. They are not known to the
rew generations. Only recent outmigrants would be known and counted by
those now living in the hamlets. Some of these long-time outmigrants
left single, but they married later and now have many children, as is
the case of an outmigrant from Boubirek-Beni- Maouche hamlet. He left
in the 1930's and rarely visited his original hamlet. He was single
when he left for France but now the family numbers 25, including wife,
children, grandchildren, and daughters—in- law. They are all, legally,
Algerian outmigrants, yet nobody can know this without meeting this
person as I did by chance during one of the visits to the hamlet.

Beni-Chebana 's outmigrants represent the following percentages of

migrants by type, according to the survey: 11 percent single; 30

171

percent international; and 59 percent internal. The total counted was
13,236 outmdgrants. Yet, the real total of outmigrants is still to be
determined by proper techniques. The amount of money sent back home is
an indicator, among others, that shows the importance of Beni-Chebana's
outmugration as well as that of the Wilaya level. Yet, not all
mdgrants send their savings home, due to recent family outmigration and
the low exchange rate of the French Franc in recent years. The poor
and underdeveloped Wilaya of Bejaia was reported to have 50,000
international migrants. But this figure may not represent more than a
small proportion of its international mugrants, should Beni-Chebana's
case be applied to the Wilaya level. This is very likely to be true at
Bejaia level as well as in other Algerian rural areas characterized by
rapid demographic growth. Hence, there were large proportions of
manpower moving out in order to improve their living conditions.
gall—seg §_n_d_ Destination 9f Out-migrants

Regardless of the outmigrant numbers, which are very large, the
important aspect here concerns causes and effects, as well as
destinations of Beni-Chebana's outmigrants. The right question to ask
is why do people migrate and where they go? There is no way to answer
these two Iquestions in depth for Beni-Chebana. This would not,
however, prevent us from. taking a brief look into what causes
outmigration, what its effects are, as well as where they go. The
survey shows outmigration causes as expressed by hamlet residents to be
mainly lack of jobs, inadequate housing, poor educational and health
care services, and‘ poor living conditions. In other words, migrants
want to get away from rural underdevelopment and to secure their future

through retirement allowances and better education for their children.

172

Outmigrants also expressed some negative aspects of migration faced by
outmigrants and their families. This includes unfit housing in
Algerian urban areas and high cost of transportation to and from home
with regard to internal migrants. The international migrants suffer
harsh effects of leaving the family abandoned in some cases, racial
segregation, inadequate education for the young, change of traditions,
and forced citizenship change. The temporary residence permit is
another problem. Algerian outmigrants to France are pressured by all
available means to get French citizenship in order to benefit from full
social services. They live under permanent threat of being expelled at
any time, should their timed stay permit expire and not be renewed.
Even those who spent their whole lives working for the benefit of the
French economy may lose part of their rights when retired without
French citizenship. They are also a target of extremist attacks from
the right. In short, many legal and political problems emerwd over
Algerian outmigrants to France .

The French economy benefitted from the abundant and cheap Algerian
manpower since World War I, and. the same phenomenon occurred in Algeria
after independence. Rural-urban exodus seemingly was caused by the
employment policy of national corporations. It is, in fact, no secret
that the Algerian pattern of developrent has favored industry against
agriculture, which was concentrated in the northern urban areas to
whichmanpowerhasbeenattracted. This served to empty the rural
areas of their skilled as well as unskilled labor. Oil development as

well as managers' own interests helped to hire large. numbers of

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seasonal workers, in both agricultural and industrial state owned
sectors, from the poor rural areas such as ~Bejaia Wilaya. This
happened notably in Algiers, the capital city where overcrowding
reached an alarming level recently. The housing crisis led these low
wage earners to live in inadequately prepared garages and shantytowns.
Their poverty and unhealthy conditions made of them a threatening
situation.. The government had to take the dramatic decision to clean
up Algiers and other major cities. The decision was to use the army to
send the inhabitants of shantytowns to their communes of origin and to
destroy illegally built shantytowns in the first stage that took place
in 1983-84. The second stage was planned to destroy illegally and
randomly built hates notably those built in farm lands. It started at
the end of 1984 but stopped shortly thereafter. The home owners'
pressure was very strong, unlike the poor who were driven away. They
are thought to be small traders, ahmy officers, and international.
migrants who are the only categories able to build expensive houses.
The following are the Algerian cities where Beni-Chebana's internal

migrants went, seeking jobs, as the survey of 6,242 migrants shows:

City Percent
Algiers , 86. 42
Bejaia 6. 73
Annaba 2. 74
Skikda 2. 37
Sidi-Aich l. 06
Southern Algeria 9 . 46
Setif 0 . ll
Tizi-Ouzou 0. 11

Total 100 . W

174

The Return g Outmigrants

 

Not all outmigrants are planning to come back to Beni-Chebana.
Both internal and international migrants are largely planning to stay
or join Algerian urban centers. They have no reason to go back to
undesired living conditions. But a good proportion of them are already
back home again, as shown by the important amounts of money received in
this commune from abroad as well as from the national territory. The
survey counted 586 outmigrants who came back and they are distributed
along Beni-Chebana's four sections as follows: Adjissa, 34.9; Ait
‘Mohli, 4.9; Beni-Chebana, 21.9; and Beni-Maouche, 41.9 percent. It is
very rare to find a male adult who has not had outmigration experience.

There are many outmigrants who regularly pay visits to their
families left behind. Both married and single persons, whether abroad
or in national territory, return to visit. The 1977 census, as just
mentioned, counted 744 visitors and the survey estimated the number of
visitors to be 2,397. The frequency of visits is as follows:

Frequency of Visits Percent
Less than a month

per visit 19.9
Monthly 14.9
Every quarter 14.9
Every six months 11.9
Once a year 33.9
More than a year 18.9
Total 199.9

These visits are very costly in time, money, and effort. But they
are much needed, especially for married men with children as well as
newly married ones. The lack of means of transportation and the high
cost make such visits scarcely affordable. Ait Mohli's workers in

175

Bejaia city prefer to walk long distances every week than to pay
illegal private transporters 69 AD weekly. Those caning from Algiers
and who represent 86.42 percent of internal migrants, pay a much higter
price let to see the family. The other cost is rural workers' high
proportion of absenteeism within tre productive units caused by
visiting families far away. Their absenteeism is said to be much
higher than that of their urban colleagues.

In-migrants to Beni-Chebana are very few. Only three physicians
from Egypt, India, and Tizi-Ozou-Algeria, and a limited number of
teachers, as wall as a few temporary workers, now building electric
power facilities are in—migrants.

Siege; Amenities

Social amenities are very important to socio—econamic development
and stability and they are essentially lacking in the underdeveloped
areas of developing countries. The survey covered this dimension as
well as those areas previously discussed. With regard to news media,
the survey counted around 3,157 radio sets and some 496 TV sets.
Almost every household owns a radio set but not necessarily all
households possess them. Sane households have more than one radio and
others do not have any at all. Television sets are mainly found at the
hamlets of Beni-Chebana and Beni-Maouche which recently got electric
pover (Beni-Maouche in Decather 1982). Only a very few TV sets are
operated by motors in some other hamlets of the commre still without
electric pomr. Only one person receives a daily newspaper ’in the

entire cause and no one receives a magazine in a regular way. There

176

is no public library. The party's Kasma in 1981 received some books as
a gift from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism but found no place
where they could be used by the public. Sport activities simply do not
exist because of lack of facilities. A soccer stadium, however, is
under construction at Tarfet but it will take a long time before it is
achieved and will be useful only to the people 'of the surrounding
hamlets, unless some transportation arrangements are found. There is
no movie theater or cultural center at Beni-Chebana commune.

The telecaummication facilities are in poor repair and cannot,
correctly, play their role. The Wilaya director of post offices,
during a meeting with him in 1981, made the following comments: "The
commune of Beni-Chebana is well served with regard to telecormmmica-
tion. It is provided with five post offices for its 25,999 inhabitants
(me agency per 5,999 people), a good rate in a developing country. "
This self-satisfying declaration does not see tl'e whole reality but
only part of it. The truth, however, is that the communal post offices
do exist, in fact, but are hardly doing the job they are expected to
do. It may be useful to mention here before going into other details
that the Algerian postal system inherited from the French is different
from that of the U.S.A. It does include, among other postal services,
banking and telephones. There is no bank in Beni-Chebana or in
surrounding commutes. Only two of these five are able to provide full
services, others of lower adminisitrative level cannot do so. These
five post agencies are not properly equipped to adequately serve their
users. Those of Adjissa and Ait Mohli simply do not have telephone

177

service for themselves or for ‘ the public. I could never make a
telephone call from Tarfet post office, one of the two full-level in
Beni-Chebana serving the communal center, during my visits (1981-84)
period. I was told, every time I tried, that the telephone was broken.
Trouna's first post office in the commune and one of the two high grade
level is better off, despite the fact that its telephone is very often
‘damaged. Agtmoune's post office agency is not different from the
other two low-level cases.

There are 11 personal telephone lines in the whole commune and
sale 599 individuals have applied for telephones but have not yet had a
response. The Party's Kasma receives its telegrams from the security
unit of Beni-Ourtilane. To make a phone call one reeds to travel long
distances outside tte catmure's territory. The City Hall and its four
agencies cannot call each other. The polyclincial center also cannot
reach by telephone its dependent health units or a hospital in an
emergency. No ambulance is available for call in emergency cases from
any hamlet. The telephone is one of the most modern necessities that
is not fully provided within Beni-Chebana. Even the post office's own
offices are not yet built. That of Trouna was planned in 1968 but has
not yet been launched by tie and of 1984. A private builder took
charge but different reasons forced long delays which made it
impossible for him to complete it. Tte transportation cost and price
of materials as well as wages have rise) many times since 1968 when the
project was approved. The Wilaya director of post offices refused to
make cost corrections and the builder could not achieve the project; in

178

1984 with 1968 prices. The case was taken to justice, I was told.
Besides, the post office agencies do not have means of transportation
or mailman going to hamlets. Consequently, the mail may wait several
days at the post office before distribution is made, including
telegrams and express mail. The commme is, briefly, under-served by
the post office system. ‘

Health facilities are now improving'markedly as compared to - the
situation same years ago. Tl'e 1979 regional statistics mention the
existence of a poly-clinic at Tarfet and four other first hand health
rooms throughout the communal territory. The polyclinic suffers from a
lack of skilled staff. Only one generalist physician from India has
been working at this polyclinic which looks and works let like a
private health office with a single physician. The Indian physician
with when I talked was not happy about staying when he first arrived,
but has since changed his mind. A communal official reported that the
physician desires to renew his expiring contract. Akhou hospital,
which controls this polyclinic, offered Beni-Chebana's young girls
training as nurses to work in this polyclinic and got no satisfaction,
since no applications were made by the female population. Outsiders
did not agree to care to Tarfet.

The Algerian medical personnel, generally, do not go to rural
areas such as Beni-Chebana. Two other physicians joimd Trouna,
Ben-Maouche in 1983. An Egyptian was hired by the government and an
Algerian has opened the first private medical office in the columns.
The commune, therefore, is improving but still needs much to be done

179

with regard to the health sector. There is no ambulance service, as
previously mentioned, in the commune for energency cases. The commune,
however, owns an ambulance but it is used for other purposes, such as
personnel transportation. The polyclinic does not benefit all
inhabitants because of long distances to he travelled. Also, a single
general physician is not sufficient medical personnel. Specialist
physicians are me to alleviate the heavy burden of having to go to
Akbou or Bejaia hospitals. It is very costly and a great waste of time
to go to these cities for every tealth check-up. Akbou is 59 to 75
Km., and Bejaia is around 99 to 199 Km. A round trip to any of these
cities would cost, in a private car, beMen 399 to 599 AD (around $69
to $199). Repeated visits may easily destroy a family's savings.

To fully understand Beni-debana's health situation, we need to
look briefly into prevailing health conditions at the national level
and the Party's policy in He area. In order to satisfy large health
needs, tre National Charter proposed the achievement of tie following
goals:

"Increase necessary hospitals, socio-medical
centers and laboratories everywhere in the country
and particularly in rural zones. Adequate distri-
bution of medical and para- medical staff nation-
wide. Accentuation of_ educational effort of
physicians and parenedical personnel. A medical
team for every small cause and quarter of urban
centers. Developmnt of Infant and Maternal
Protection (IMP), job medicine...” (AA., April
24-39, 1989)
The government issued a free health ordinance on Decenber 23, 1973

which faced fierce resistance from medical staff used to the private

1.89

and liberal health system. The Party's Central Committee put much
emphasis on democratic annd effective health care in its 1981 health
resolution. But in addition to medical staff resistance against free
public health care, the process of building more health facilities was
very slow. Hence, only 45,999 hospital beds existed in 1982 nationwide
for around 29 million people. This represents an average of two beds
per 1,999 inhabitants, three times lower than the normal average of six
beds per 1,999: inhabitants. There were 223 polyclinics and 741 health
centers at that time. T‘tese all together could not adequately provide
basic health care. Not only was the nnumber of health facilities
limited but the situation was worsening because of mismanagement of the
existing facilities as A. Abbas reported: ”Sane transformation took
place in Eastern Algeria: laboratory into a meeting room, polyclinic
into a guest house, and hosptial of 1,999 beds into an institute."
(AA, January 14-29, 1982)

More than 1,999 physicians and more than 5,999 para-mdical
technicians graduate every year from educational innstitutions in
Algeria. Yet there were only 8,999 physicians and 34,599 parenedical
staff in Algeria in 1972. This is well below the hoped for one
physician per 599 inhabitants and one para-medical per 499 inhabitants
at national level. Yet, Beni-Chebana has one physician per 19,999
inhabitants should its population reach in 39,999 people in 1985: The
question here is where are all the graduated Algerian physicians? Most
physicians working in the countryside are foreigners fronm many
countries over the world as Beni-Chebana's case itself shows, with its

181

three physicians from India, Egypt, and Algeria. One of the Algerian
physicians is not in the public but rather in the private sector. Only
foreigners are found in most Algerian rural areas, while sonme of these
physicians are unemployed. (AA, January 14-29, 1982).

Around 7,999 Algerian physicians have left the country after
graduating. They are educated at state expense but are unable to stay
annd work within local connditions. Those who stayed are powerless annd .
work only half a day in the mornings. The National Federation of

Health Workers (N.F.H.W.) pointed out:

"Before discussing the possibility of working after
4:99 p.m., let's work up to 4:99 p.m. Today, full
time is expected but not yet a reality. Most
structures are not working tl'e whole day but only
mornings. Full time has been reaffirmed by the
Health Minister, tne Committee Central resolution
requires it, annd people's health needs impose it.
The state should command the staff it educated...to
make the structures more profitable, polyclinics
annd health centers should open 24 hours a day annd
University Hospital Centers should achieve tneir
first vocational goal. Ttere is a new to secure
housing, transportation, restauration, para-medical
decent wages, research and serious recycling
conditions in order to increase human potential
output." (AA., Janaury 14-29, 1982)

Tress are demands of tte public health sector workers aimed at
keeping this sector alive, but tie private sector seems to prevail in
the present policy of health, contrary'to old annd nmany times confirmed
health care policy. Same 161 physicians, 139 dentists, and 189
pharmacists have been authorized between January 23 annd April 24, 1989
to do private business (AA, April 24-39, 1989). This is a total of 489

authorizations issued in just three months. The private sector seems

182

to be leading the public sector since that time. Physicians in the
private sector work up to 9:99 p.m. while those of the public sector,
officially, work up to 4:99 p.m. The truth is that service is never
rendered beyond 12 noon of each working day. Just getting an
appointment requires to be at the hospital as early as 5:99 a.m. The
reason for overcrowded health structures in Algeria is that nobody is
in charge of them. The private people are incited by material gains
and profits. This is why Beni-Chebana got a private physician for the
first time in its history.

Beni-Ctebana's transportation system also is not adequate. In
1981-82, the commune could have three buses for public transportation
for the first time. One of the bus drivers and his assistant were
international migrants. They lived in France and came back to work at
home and live with their families. The driver told me that he came
back on a contract signed with Setif Wilaya to train bus drivers. The
problem was that he could not find a place to live at Setif city while
his family lived at Trouna, Beni-Maouche. Thus, he preferred to work
asabusdriverandcamehomeattreeidoftredayratherthantowork
as a bus driving trainer unable to see his family only once in a while.
The communal buses did not run for long, due to lack of adequate
maintenance, 'non-tarred roads,' and unavailable spare parts. One bus
was used as a source of parts to repair the others. The bus driver
mentioned he became a truck driver when his bus broke down.

The three buses did ’ not benefit the entire population of
Beni-Chebana when they were running because of their itineraries. One

183

was making Ait-Mohli, Trouna, Tarfet and vice-versa. It served better
Ait-Mohli and the neighboring commune of Semaone. Adjissa's people
were unhappy because the bus did not make their three hamlets in its
schedule. They needed to walk a good distance to catch it. The second
bus was making Beni-Djemati, Tarfet, Beni-Curtilane and vice-versa. It
could serve the most distant and more isolated area of Beni-Chebana.
It also served as a schoolbus to pupils admitted at Beni-Curtilane
middle school. The third bus was serving Tarfet, Beni-Maouche, Akbou,
and vice-versa. Sale of Beni-Maouche's residents expressed their
umappiness with the whole system, because the only bus interesting to
them was the last one going to Akbou, through Seddouk, where some
students were admitted. This bus almost alvays runs_full and does not
take Beni-Maouche riders.

In 1979 there were no taxicabs in the cammme, according to the
1979 regional statistics. Now, there are 14, according to the survey,
in addition to around 398 private vehicles. T'i'ere are no school buses,
despite the long distances between hamlets where school classes stop at
. a certain level. Pupils have to walk to other schools to continue
their formal education.

Electric power did not exist at Beni-Chebana until very recently.
Tarfet, the caummal center, got electricity some five years ago. Part
of Beni-Maouche hamlets got it in Decetber 1982. Sale others got their
projects started in 1983-84 while others are still waiting.

Rurming water is another major problem of this m despite the
large potential available. The survey shoved that each hamlet has at

184

least one or two springs. Sate others have more than two springs in
addition to two perennial rivers. It is very easy to collect water
into reservoirs and distribute it for drinking and irrigation purposes.
Sate projects are under way, as Akbou's hydraulic officer said. Such a
project is that of Tarfet whose cost was 769,999 AD, mentioned in
Chapter IV to show same problems the commme is facing. The second
water project is Beni-Djemati's whose cost up to now is 1,149,999 AD
and which is about 89% completed. The third is Trouna-Laazib's with a
A cost of 779,999 AD and which is now 95 percent achieved. The fourth is
Adj issa's, 199 percent completed, but Adj issa's residents face a severe
drinking water Shortage, as I witnessed during my visits there.

It is worthwhile to note why Adjissa's residents are facing a
drinking water shortage. As just mentioned, Adjissa has its own
carpleted water supply project, according to Akbou's official hydraulic
data. The problem, however, emerged when the water pimp broke apart in
1982, according to hamlets' residents and the person in charge of the
pump before it broke. The came bought another pulp but never put it
to work for lack of an expert to do it. It could not be installed by
anyone out of fear it would break again. It is now more than a year
since the pump broke. The hope was that the caumnal officials would
find an expert todo the job'but no experthasbeen found. Even the
person in charge of daily water supply was not paid for more than four
withswhsnlmathimintheelmmerof 1983.

The fact is that those in charge of water supply resorted to
technology without preparing skilled workers to manage it and deal with

185

its problems. The hamlet residents of Adjissa mentioned the
possibility of water supply without a pump at all. There are springs,
they say, that could be collected with no need for technology not
available locally. The experts, who planned Adj issa's water supply
project, were not, seemingly, aware of the existence of these springs
that could be brought to the hamlets without using a pump.

This assumption is confirmed by Taguenit's case. Taguenit's
wring is most likely the strongest spring of all in Beni-Ctebana.
Gardens are irrigated simply and directly with its running water, since
no collection system is used and without any cost. Still, T‘aguenit
residents have no running water in the hames. The spring is a half
mile from tie hamlet built on top of.a hill, making one of the daily
chores of hamlet residents that of fetching water. T'te same hamlet
could be very easily provided with water from other springs by just a
simple collecting system at very low cost. Tteir first spring would
then be used, if a large reservoir is built, to supply other residents
with drinking water and to irrigate large and fertile surfaces of land.
Akbou's hydraulic officer, asked about it, recognized that he was not
aware of these potentials. Tarfet sanitation system is under
construction at a cost of 699,999 DA, but that of Adjissa is nOt
working for lack of water.

A large umber of people stand in line day and night, notably, '
during summers, to fill up their water containers at Adjissa, Trouna
and other hamlets. Hedid hamlet residents, Beni-Chebana, hire a year-

round employee at 499 AD a month .to maintain the water rationing

186

system. El-Maissen hamlet, provided with drinking water just before
independence, is suffering water shortage because the system was not
being maintained adequately. A four-year-old child died by falling
into one of the uncovered water facilities.

Beni-Chebana's most important water supply project concerns
irrigation with an initial cost of 2,899,999 AD, 19 percent of which is
achieved. Due to lack of field work experience, the project was
stopped pending the arrival of new techniques and adequate funds. The
project is that of Agradou, Beni-Ctebana. The water supply is not just
a'local problem in Algeria but it is a national one as well, despite
the large arounts of rain. Sale 72 billion cubic meters fall every
year but not much of it is being retained by the existing dams. This
sector has been underdeveloped and the government has started recently
to take care of this much needed aspect of tre infra-structure. Many
small and large dam projects are under construction as well as
drilling, medially in soutl'ern Algeria. Many of Beni-Chebana's
residents spent relatively large amounts of morey drilling for water
but few have alcceeded.

The many problems taken together make' living rather hard at
Beni-Chebana, and force its residents to seek alternatives. Rural-
urban and even international migration will continue unless radical

developlant measures are soon taken.

CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Peasant Definition

 

This final chapter will sum up the main features of each chapter
and make some conclusions concerning concepts and issues related to the
subject of peasants, underdevelopment, dependency, and development
programs applied to underdeveloped areas of developing countries and
their implications.

This study has tried, in the foregoing chapters, to explore
peasant definitions, movements, and roles in different countries
through different historical periods up to the present. This task was
deemed necessary to help understand the present rural development
failures in the newly independent nations, which are suffering severe
socio-economic problems, such as absolute poverty, starvation, and
political unrest.- Peasants throughout the world, in fact, felt social
injustice and led revolts against local and foreign oppressors. The
struggle took passive, underground, and often armed resistance forms.
Many peasant wars are not widely known, while others are famous
worldwide, notably, those of post-Whrld War II that took place in
developing countries in which we are now interested. Algeria is among
those countries and shares with them underdevelopment characteristics.

Peasants, who are they? They are, according to different
viewpoints, the forgotten social category, primitives, rural residents
aspiring to city life, poor land owners, farml decision-makers. They
are also those who lost control over land and their own labor and their

187

188

surpluses are transferred to dominant and exploiting rulers. They
restrict themselves, with regard'to level of living, to a subsistence
economy, contrary to farmers who are wide open to the market
competition and maximum returns, or agricultural workers who do not own
lands. They live in isolated societies for some, but they are part of
the larger societies which are part of the world system for others.
The areas in which they live represent, according to dependency theory,
the periphery of Periphery countries the lower level of developing
nations. Consequently, they are doubly exploited and subjugated. This
leads to the conclusion that peasants today exist only in developing
nations.
§£g_Peasants Revolutionary?

It seems that only the Marxists have paid serious attention to
peasant analysis even though Marx himself was not much interested in s
that only the Marxists have paid serious attention to peasant analysis
even though Marx himself was not much interested in s that only the
Marxists have paid serious attention to peasant analysis even though
Marx himself was not much interested in he criterion of wealth: rich,
muddle, and poor. He was interested in each sub-group posi ion with
regard to bourgeois revolution and struggle for socialism. Mao
Tse-Tung spoke of five peasant categories to be organized in a single
body: landlords, semi-landlords, sharecroppers, farm laborers, and
handicraftsmen. Mao's definition looks more comprehensive by including
wealth, land ownership, and handicrafts. All of these share rural
living conditions which may induce them to take the same position with

regard to democratic revolution.

189

It is true that world peasants have always had a sharp sense of
injustice and awareness of their depressed situation, which led them to
endless uprisings and revolts throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, and
Latin America. Many of these revolts were short lived, others made
major breaks in the history of their societies and even left
international effects. Such revolts, among others, were: the French,
Russian, and that of Cuba, Algeria, Viet Nam, and Nicaragua, etc. Both
capitalism and socialism helped to open peasants' eyes to see their
rights, capacities, and the pressing need to seek political power and
restore delocracy. Feudalism and colonialism kept peasants under
control for a long time before recovery from political torpor and
religious stupor. Peasant revolts started as early as the seventh
century of this era and they are still going on today. It is reedless
to ask whetier peasants are revolutionary any longer . The Algerian
peasants were no exception in both pre-colonial Algeria and during the
whole colonial era. The scope, success, or failure of each revolt
depended on local and international conditions. Emiliano Zapata may
have briefly but clearly expressed the revolutionary peasant ideology:
”Seek justice from tyrannical goverments not with your hat in your
hands but with a rifle in your fist." (Millon, 11)

The success of peasant revolts needed more elements than injustice
- and suffering since the Spanish peasants' suffering was tie most tragic
in Europe, but it did not bring them to the front of the revolution.
The French, Rm'sians, English. and Germans made their revolts famous.
Lenin and Mao differed. on whether the poor peasants or urban

190

proletariat are more revolutionary. While Lenin favored the urban
proletariat, Mao took the opposite stand by giving poor peasants seven
points out of ten and rated urban dwellers and the military only three
points toward accomplisment of the delocratic revolution. Both
believed that even the rich peasants could be enticed to participate in
the early phase of the revolution. Tie truth is that the urban
proletariat provided peasants with the most important condition of
success, namely, leadership. Rural leadership, in fact, rarely went
beyond certain limits as was tte case of Algerian revolts‘from the
colonial conquest until tie liberation war of 1954 in which peasants
and urban proletariat joined forces and could win. Peasants are more
likely to use cleansing violence than the proletariat and middle
classes who started to get profit at a discount frm the colonial set
up. They remain disciplined and altruistic in their spontaneous
movements. They put individual standards aside in favor of the
cammmity. Ila Khaldun expressed a viewpoint similar to Fanon's with
regard to rural-urban behavior and ethics. The rural toughness
precedes softness of city life. '
Rural clergymm also sided with the poor peasant revolts and
provided leadership to their movements, contrary to their town
colleagues who usually opposed egalitarianism as it was seen to be
against nature. This explains why peasants were against church as well
as feudal mater: in their revolts. Martin Luther, for instance,
inspired the Gamma peasant revolt before becening their first enemy.
Islam, likewise, has been used in both ways: to keep backward regimes

191

alive and to strengthen derocracy, egalitarianism, and national
liberation in tre Muslim world. Among the most known modern democratic
religions Muslim leaders were Ben Badis of Algeria and Djamal Eddin of
Afghanistan. Modern experiences such as living in town or abroad, army
service, wars, etc., played major roles in waking up world peasants.
Radicalization of means and goals, however, would occur only after much
frustration and violence had first been used by the dominant groups.
Colonial and Dependency Effects

Tte colonial underdevelopment jlet worsened after independence in
developing countries due to strong unequal interrelationships between
the mother country and its previous colony. Not much changed after
independence. These relationships were establisted in a way that
benefitted the advanced countries, while placing constraints on the
develogrent of developing countries in order to control them through
dependency-creating programs. The umbelamd interrelationships.
between developed and developing nations are seen by dependency
theorists as tte major cause of developing countries' socio-economic
problems. It is asserted that a fundamental error is committed wten a
developing. world ptenarenon is studied by seeking its cause from
within, rather than situating it within the world system dialectic.
This holds true in the Algerian case where neither industry nor
agriculture has developed enough to satisfy national economic needs.
Tlafactsstowageeraldepeidencyofthecountryboth in spiteof its
tremendous wealth and because of it.

The Algerian dapenderey has been strengthened by the helpless
colonial educated elite who helped to maintain the country under

192

growing dependency. This elite lost self-confidence as well as
confidence in national experts, with regard to planning and realization
of programs. Algeria has resorted to expatriates and imports in a
major way, although it was possible to rely on national potentials in
many cases. International technical assistance was sought to conceive,
finance, provide equipment, and even co-manage national development
programs. The negative effects of the still growing dependency are
devastating. Programs are conceived so as to increase the importation
of equipment as well as raw materials. Wool factories of Tiaret, in
the West, and Biskra, in the East, are good examples of this case. The
first has been importing wool despite being built in an area where wool
is available, but the private breeders refused to accept the low prices
offered. The second imports much of its 560 tons of wool consumed per
year. Factories are, sometimes, built where not needed, such as the
Sidi-Aich's modern olive mill. Achieved in 1970, the mill has never
been operated. S. Saadi, Minister of Agriculture, ordered that it be
dismantled in 1.983 and that its equipment be distributed among other
units in need (Al-Ch-Chaab, May 5, 1983). '

Dependency is not limited to poor industrial planning, rather
agriculture has suffered more than other sectors. Colonial agricul-
ture remained intact but it lost its high level of output and the
market privileges it enjoyed during the colonial era. ' The country was
transformed after the conquest, fram exporting food into importing four
fifths of the needed foodstuffs in 1984, according to same experts.

'lhe rich, eat-colonial export sector was transformed into a self-managed

193

sector, playing the same role as before but without adequate means
' available and without easy access to European and world markets as in
the past. The second was that of rich but limited scope held by
Algerians. The third was the poor traditional sector where the
overwhelming majority of Algerians lived and which was over-looked.
Peasants are accused of resisting change and modernization. This
is notjthe case in Algeria where they resisted colonial plans intended
to keep them under control, but the post-colonial programs were no
better. . The main colonial characteristics of elitism, centralization,
and paternalism were maintained as strong as before in addition to a
weak administrative and bureaucratic system. The 1971 agrarian reform
was not based on serious socio—economic studies and did not take into
account peasant economic conditions and needs. The on-going program of
restructuring seams to go the same way as before, because no scientific
studies have been undertaken prior to program implementation. The
social sciences of Algerian universities are not involved in the
process of ctanges. International experts could be involved. Thanks
to incur from energy exports, Algeria is not suffering famine as are
many developing nations which do not have the same resources as
Algeria. Many African countris as is well Imam, do experience food
shortages and famine. Food prices in Algeria may be the highest in the
world. ‘lhe rural poor are suffering much more than other population
categories due to low wages, lack of urban facilities such as storage,
transportation, and the abandonment of local agriculture.
Pinancialdependencyisamtl‘erawectofagereraldependemy in
Algeria. Foreign loans are pramted to serve the capitalist market and

194

increase financial dependency on the more advanced nations. Inter-
national loans, in fact, serve to buy highly costly and job saving
technology and pay very costly technical assistants. Because of the
high cost of exporting energy, Algeria was losing some $3.5 million a
day at the end of the 1979‘s. International trade favors growing
dependency of developing countries like Algeria. Algerian industry did
not take off as expected, despite consuming the largest proportion of
the national income. This industry has been planned and controlled by
international experts so as to serve industrial nations. Spare parts
were not allowed to enter Algeria as was the case of gas burners which
were part of the contract signed by Algeria and its international
partners. Industrial units faced growing market difficulties, lack of
proper maintenance, and unavailable spare parts that caused low rates
of productivity. Only 29 percent of capacity was reached in some
cases. However, most of the industry units depended on the state
budget to defray their operating costs.

- The main exteer incame canes from western capitalist nations who
are receiving Algerian natural gas, the main source of external income
sold at low prices. Gas, in fact, is increasingly replacing oil
export. Energy export, with_98 percent of all exports, has become the
single product Algeria relies on. This puts the country's economy in a
vulnerable position vis-a-vis the strongest econamies of the Algerian
partners, as shown by the current gas prices. It is selling at a
cheaper price than any other in the world, except for the Soviet Union.
. Besides dependence on mono-product export and high cost of technical

195

assistance, Algeria had to pay a $16.3 billion debt between 1979 and
1982.

The Algerian workers and staff felt uneasiness and frustration as
they compare their wages, social conditions, and power of decision
making, to technical assistants wham they have to teach before they
become bosses. Hence, while Algerian energy is gone, frustration takes
place among Algerians. It should not be true that "the poor are poor
because they are poor." The country has abundant manpower, rich lands,
and capital but its colonial legacy and present dependency have
prevented any serious and real local control. Dependency, however, is
not limited to the above aspects only, = because other dependency,
including cultural, military, and most of all mental, are not less
important. The national colonial educated elite look down on the
national culture, values, and language. Their behavior is not much
differtent from that of the colonial masters. The fight to restore
national language is far from over, because of their fierce resistance.
This is to say, briefly, that Algerian dependency is deep and strongly
maintained by this elite to the point of losing any real control over
national socio-economic develogtent programs, as shown by such
ptenanena as wasteful spending, low rates of factory output, poor
planning, low rate of project realization, a large food. deficit,
housing crisis, and over-crowded urban areas due to lack of adequate
developlent of rural areas. Dependency is the main cause of
abandoment of rural‘ areas because industrial nations, the main
economic partners, are not interested in promoting a genuire economic

196

development which ought to include the rural areas where more than 6
percent of Algerians now live.
Colonial Reconstruction

Western colonialists recognized widespread poverty within the
rural areas of their colonies which they, unsuccessfully, tried to
remedy. It took western scholars, involved in the deve10pment of
developing countries, several decades to change their position as to
local people's knowledge. They were denying the people's ability to
take care of their own development. F.L. Brayne's rural development
philsophy was based on knowledge acquisition and reforming villagers'
vicious habits. He suggested that the colonial officer be converted
into a guide, philosopher, and friend of villagers. The post-colonial
development programs, led by western scholars, also maintained the old
assumption of rural ignorance. The community development projects
resorted to creating a leadership systemlrepresented by outside Village
Level Worker (VLW) to help implement, initiate, and bring local people
to participate in development programs. Today, this position has
changed as W. Blaisdell expressed: "Ask the villagers how to proceed
and succeed." The truth, in my view, is that local people posess the
knowledge but are limited by their economic base and low level of
living, as Beni-Chebana's case shows.

Beni-Chebana's Administrative agg_Political Systems

The Beni-Chebana case study’ was designed to examine within a
dependency framework the effects of national dependency on the under-
developed areas of the country. It is assumed that international
unequal relationships would produce negative socio-economic and

cultural effects within the Periphery of periphery countries. The

197

study focuses on a number of dimensions deemed more important than
others. These dimensions give a general picture of the Algerian rural
areas after 22 years of independence and 13 years of the agrarian
reform intended to make radical changes within the Algerian rural
world.

The first dimension dealt with was the administrative and
political structures. The study shows that rural areas of Algeria have
been under-administered from the colonial era until the present time.
The colonial power was, in fact, neither capable of, nor interested in,
direct management of these vast rural areas. Rather, a multiform
communal system was set up to serve the colonial minority interests.
Not until 1956 was the communal system standardized and made similar to
the French system. It was then too late for the civilians to take
control of, and the military became dominant again. The Caidal system
was restricted, in rural areas, to tax collection, civil registration,
and keeping watchful eye on behalf of the rulers. It had no way of
providing local communities with any service. The communities had to
rely on self-help in the absence of central assistance. This fact,
however, strengthened local autonomous councils and community
solidarity which helped to play a major role both in local affairs and
during the liberation war later on.

The post-colonial communal legislation came very slowly. Rather,
it took a step backward in 1963 - one year after independence -— by
reducing the number of communes from 1,576 to just 676. The reasons

for this policy were as_ follows: 1) the colonial communes of full

198

exercise had no reason to exist after the settler's departure; 2) the
mixed communes were quickly transformed by the colonial power and were,
generally, not viable because of being too small, not enough populated,
ill—equipped, without financial resources, and lacking necessary staff.
The reductionist policy, effectively lowered management spending but
Iwithout improving either skilled personnel or financial support. 'The
colonial self-help situation that prevailed in most of the Algerian
countryside was not possible any longer in post-independence time,
because people were expecting and hoping for radical change to take
place after the liberation. A strong, democratic, and popular commune
was needed to replace the previous weak helpless colonial system. The
destruction from war increased the need for socio-economic justice and
made for elevated expectations.

The long colonial deprivation, elitism, centralization, and
paternalism changed little. The fighters' slogan, "by the people to
the people” was a dream that could not become a reality after
independence. Even the late colonial communal reform was not taken
realistically by the regime dominated by the Caidal family members who
mostly opposed the revolution. But the state had to rely on them.after
the departure of French settlers, because they were the only educated
category of the population with some administrative experience. The
idea was that if we are to rely on foreign assistance, we should use
available national potential first. Consequently, those who benefitted
from colonial education have given a chance to lead local and national

administration during the independence era. Since their number was

199

limited, it was necessary to limut administrative offices to, their
size, as shown by the communal reform policy of 1963.

The regrouping action of the previous communes into a "manageable
size" of only 676 communes was an error which caused grave damage to
the countryside. The characteristics were: a long history of under-
administration, under-development, long distances between population
clusters and hamlets, lack of roads and means of transportation, non-
existence of a communication network, and lack of skilled staff before
as well as after the regrouping policy took place, in addition to the
war years that destroyed most of the few existing facilities.

The negative results of the regrouping policy could be summed up
as follows: a persistent centralisml that ran against the long
cherished popular democracy at the village level. This was even
contrary to the state's declared policy of popular assemblies supposed
to involve large popular masses ,in the development process. But
elitism prevented popular participation: the regrouping further widened
the gap between citizens and administrtion which only increased the
size of communal problems. Unskilled administrators were put in
different management and planning positions without adequate means.
The local people felt abandoned by the central power, after all the
sacrifices they paid during the war. While injustice was felt again,
little support, coupled with a good organization and pOpular
participation, could have solved difficult problems of local
communities as well as many rural-urban related issues. The abandoned
and frustrated rural people assumed the same negative attitudes they

had before with the colonial administration.

2M)

Rural-urban exodus and all its negative aspects were consequences
of centralism and dependent planning policy. The rural areas of
Algeria are empty of valid and skilled manpower, while urban centers
are unable to satisfy the ever-growing needs of migrants including the
provision of decent living conditions. The rural poor could have
stayed in their areas and could have participated in development of
these areas, as Beni-Chebana's residents did before independence and
after. After independence, Taguenit-Ighil and Tizkht residents rebuilt
their own schools by their own means. Modern mosques are being built
at residents' expense in almost every hamlet. The residents of
Beni-Chebana section lately helped to build electric power facilities
in the area. The old self-help spirit is still present. Those who
were forced to leave the area.and live in urban shantytowns got the
feeling of frustration and injustice sharpened by poor living
conditions. M. Clinard wrote:

"Although the slum is characterized by inadequate
housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding, and
congestion, it involves much more than these
elements. Sociologically, it is a way of life, a
sub-culture with a set of nomms and values, which
is reflected in poor sanitation and health
practices, deviant behavior, and characteristic
attributes of apathy and isolation. People who
live in slumlareas isolated from the general power

. structures are regarded as inferior and slum
dwellers, in turn, harbor suspicions of the outside
world." (Aloochi, 6)

Beni-Chebana's commune was made up of four once mixed communes:

Adjissa, Ait-Mohli, Beni-Chebana, and Beni-Maouche. Its

underdevelopment only worsened when three of the communal centers lost

201

power and became dependent agencies in charge of civil registration.
Even this very simple charge could not be adequately carried out for
lack of means. Trouna's secretary used many means just to obtain
registrar books, not available in this agency. Adjissa‘s civil
registrations such as birth certificates, required for many social
benefits, may take more than two weeks after they are ordered. The
person in charge of the signing may not come before that specified
time. The commune has no trained personnel and its budget is spent on
state project over-runs caused by distant supply centers. The commune
cannot initiate development programs but can only suggest to national
planners who may or may not consider them. They are more interested in
large programs, because they are dealing with the international money
lenders, technology market, and expatriate experts who are not
interested in small-sized projects more needed for the local economy.
Even when the regional balance policy was initiated to help the poorer
areas of Algeria, its large budgets did not reach rural communes.
Wilaya and Daira levels took the most benefit of it. The state
promised help did not come. Rather, the state corporations do not, in
fact, accept work within Beni-Chebana because of its isolation, lack of
primary facilities, and project cost over-runs. This helpless
situation, however, is not specific to Beni-Chebana alone, but rather
it is a general characteristic of rural Algeria as a whole.
Beni-Chebana's political power is hampered because of the same
~difficult local conditions. The very sheer act of getting together is

not easy for the Party members whose low level of education and

202

political formation do not allow them to go beyond certain limits or
adequately lead communal activities. Local Party members cannot solve
local problems, even if they do know how, for lack of means and limited
skills. Outside help is needed to make cohesive and genuine plans to
serve short- as well as long-term purposes. Narrow interests prevailed
in many cases of development programs.
Beni-Chebana's Education

Beni-Chebana, notably, Beni-Maouche and Adjissa have enjoyed a
relatively good education ever since the colonial era and more
specifically when Ulema Association of Ben Badis emerged in the 1936's
and later expanded. Four private schools were built and successfully
managed by local people led by this Association. This is more than the
French could do in this area during the whole colonial era. Mosques,
the old traditional schools, played a major role in teaching reading
and writing skills in Arabic. Illiteracy, however, is widespread now,
locally and nationwide, as shown by the 1977 census and the survey as
well. Female illiteracy is much higher than male. The illiteracy rate
would be even higher, if productive performance capability is used
instead of reading and writing classical skills. Non-formal education
did not exist in this commune, with the exception of a recently built
small masonry unit. Education seems useless for both sexes but to a
lesser extentfor males, because females are not allowed to work for
wages. Bilingualisml dominates among Beni-Chebana's literates, Arabic
comes second and French third. Arabic, however, dominates at Adjissa,

Ait-Mohli, and Beni-Chebana sections when taken separately. No French

203

schools existed there before the liberation war. Female literates in
Ait-Mohli represent zero in both French and bilingualism.

Beni—Chebana's present teaching system is characterized by small
school size due to sparse hamlets and relatively distant residence
clusters. There were 22 schools distributed among the four communal
sections in 1981-82 including 92 classrooms, 19 of which were empty
this year. Grade levels varied from one school to another. Six out of
22 schools stop teaching at the fourth level and two others have no
seventh grade. Only 14 schools provide all seven grades and conse-
quently allow pupils to get the needed reading and writing skills.
Female school attendance is very low except at Beni-Maouche, where both
sexes have almost equal chance to go to school. Large proportions of
pupils are found at the first grade levels, which fact does not allow
pupils to escape illiteracy. Consequently, not only are those who
could not go to school illiterates, but also large proportions of those
who attend elementary schools are illiterates as well. Rural class-
rooms are not as overcrowded as the urban and suburban ones.

Trouna's unique middle school of the commune may encourage both
pupils and parents to do more in order to get more education. People
will see educational advantages available to them at no cost any
longer. This should be followed by a high school in the near future,
within the communal territory in order to alleviate the heavy burden of
having to go farther to get high school education.

The situatiOn for teachers is really harsh. In order to increase

the number of teachers so as to cope with large numbers of students,

264

local amenities must be improved. Their number fluctuated between 85
and 165 in 1977-78 and 1983-84 period. There were only 82 in 1981-82.
They experience, in addition to low education and low status. Teachers
are highly mobile, caused by poor living conditions and low wages. A
serious teacher vacancy rate is noted every school year starting from
September up to the end of November. Twenty to forty percent of these
temporary young teachers leave their duties each year. Classes are
then given to newly recruited teachers with no prior vocational
training. Such poor conditions are: lack of proper housing, running
water, food stores, electric power, means of transportation, cultural
opportunities, sport activities, etc.

Poor planning is a major obstacle in providing skilled teachers
for rural schools. Bejaia's Institute of Education is unable to
satisfy rural needs because 90% of its patrons are females who are paid
to "walk in Bejaia city streets" according to a high official. They do
not agree to go to rural schools and nobody blames them since even
their male colleagues dislike joining rural areas.

Unlike formal education, the Algerian policy has provided little
support for non-formal education in the rural areas. Beni-Chebana has
never had a vocational training center. Its youngsters are victims of
this policy. Many non—fermal educational studies show no need for
higher education in order to succeed in this field. Non-formal train-
ing is much needed in rural areas and it could have compensated or poor
formal education. Most training centers are concentrated within the

urban and suburban areas to which youth are attracted. Unable to

205

satisfy large proportions of applicants, the government, lately,
resorted to the private sector for help.

Government efforts, consequently, failed to achieve planned goals
in education. It is a worrisome rather than an optimistic situation
that prevails today in Algeria. Both rural formal and non-formal
education is lpoor, or non—existent. Even urban education is in bad
shape, considering the declining rates of success in high school that
went as low as 31.0% in 1982-83. This rate dropped sharply to only 15%
in 1983-84 nationwide. One of the reasons could be overcrowded
classrooms. That problem may be solved through the development of
rural education and economy to keep rural residents where they are.
This, however, is not the only reason for low learning achievement,
because other elements such as overcrowded homes, lack of libraries,
poor pedagogic organization, inadequate social environment, and
teachers' problems are preventing better educational achievement.
Rural schools share these problems with urban schools with the
exception of overcrowding. Poor living conditions, however, are the
main rural issues to be dealt with as soon as possible to attract and
keep fairly good teachers in order to improve educational investment
output. ‘

Beni-Chebana's Econgmy

Beni-Crebana's residents gained a living from agriculture and
artisan activities as was characteristic of the Algerian traditional
. sector during the colonial era. People used to live on these small

poor plots of land, on which each family had to provide a livelihood by

206

working on. family lands and raise la small number of livestock.
Abundant family labor helped in the practice of labor-intensive
agriculture. Both landless families and those without sufficient labor
force could, however, manage to get a living from available lands,
through a very equitable sharecropping system known as Khemmassah in
which five farming inputs were equally considered: manpower, draft
animals, land, working tools, and seeds. The system provided multiple
combinations with regard to providing or sharing any of these inputs.
The output is shared, according to what a partner has provided. No
industry existed at Beni-Chebana. Not until recently were some small
stone-crushing mills built as well as a communal concrete block unit.
Local needs, however, are far from being satisfied by these units which
could be easily expanded so as to satisfy local needs and even
neighbors' needs with these rare and highly expensive materials. A
truck load of crushed stones, three cubic meters, costs around 500 to
600 AD ($100 to $120) with transportation costs, while the material
itself costs only 80 to 120 AD.

The 1977 census shows a strong agricultural sector but the survey
as well as other data sources consider these statistics as simply not
correct and misleading for the following reasons: 1) the statistical
concepts are not well defined to fit into local conditions; 2) those
in charge of collecting census data are unable to do the job correctly;
3) local people do not give right figures to government officials out
of fear the figures will be used against them, as was the case with

land census; 4) the survey managed to get more accurate data that

207

contradicted the census results. Consequently, Beni-Chebana is not an
agrarian commune.

The survey confirms, in fact, that land is short at Beni-Chebana
and land shortage is not compensated for by modern inputs. Only two
percent of households own 10 ha. or more of land. Beni-Chebana's
subsistence and traditional economy could not survive and modernization
failed to take place. Peasants just abandoned farmlwork even if they
stayed in the area. They buy their own food and resort to out-migra—
tion or hold other occupations.

Beni-Chebana's sources of income are derived from out-migration as
the main source and from part-time fanming and war allowances. Farm

income is very limited because of the abandonment of farm work and

animal husbandry. Artisan activities have disappeared and no modern
production takes place. International migrants receive large amounts
of money sent by French Social Security to Algerian retirees who have
returned home. Other migrants stopped sending their savings to Algeria
when a black market emerged in 1969 when the French Franc was devalued.
This market reached its peak when the Algerian government allowed its
citizens to import cars without allowing the export of funds. These
mdgrants also resorted to importing goods for sale at extremely high
prices.
mwam

Rural women had an important role in Algeria within the tradi-

tional economyu Artisan activities were mainly women's work. In

addition to the home economy, they helped with farm work, notably food

298

processing and animal husbandry. They also carried water, maintained
the home, and reared the children. Algerian rural women, generally,
lost their roles and retired to the household. Artisan activities
disappeared and they were not allowed to hold wage-paying jobs. They
are even prevented from being seen in public and in Beni-Chebana's case
less than two percent of the female population performs economic
activities. Algerian rural planning simply ignores more than half of
the manpower available. Family labor was very important before
independence ' and children were heavily involved in productive
activities. Like women, they are no longer involved. This makes women
non-poductive and puts them in a "home arrest" situation. They are
really prisoners at Beni-Chebana. Education is useless to them.
Boserup suggested the integration of women in development of the
develOping countries, through providing training skills for young
girls, which opportunity does not exist for both sexes in the commune.
Some specialists on employment express fear that allowing women to
perform productive activities may increase male unemployment in
developing countries. But this is contrary to the very economic and
social basics, namely, educating women and preventing them from work.
Boserup, however, went far by suggesting giving urban women jobs as a
way of increasing family income and stopping rural-urban migration when
no jobs are available for rural ndgrants in urban centers. This would
also increase food production because of manpower available in rural
areas. This seems to be an urban bias since keeping rural males from
migrating, would also make it harder for rural women to enter the job

market and, consequently, to benefit from education.

209

Beni-Chebana's Egpulation

Algeria has been pronatalist because of religion, colonial
history, post—independence threats, and national economic development
potentials. These potentials were so great that no over-population was
expected. Consequently, no population policy was formulated either
during the colonial. era nor after. Not until recently has a birth
control program been launched by the Party. Religious men's position
on the subject is very similar to that of the Marxists who violently
react against the pessimistic Malthusian theory. Misery stems from
inequality and underdevelopment and the solution to demographic growth
is development, as the late president Boumediene pointed out. This is
also Sauvy's opinion about over-population in developing nations.

Sauvy maintained that food shortage is not due to excessive
numbers in many developing countries but to underdevelopment. These
countries could improve their conditions substantially by a better use
of agricultural land, better prospecting for mineral resources,
creating industry, etc. The fundamental condition of this being the
proper training of the population. What Sauvy forgets is that
underdevelopment has not come only from the lack of training.
Education, when affordable in developing countries, is made useless in
these nations as the Algerian case shows. The Algerian experts in many
fields are misused as shown by just one single case, the Algerian
physicians. More than one thousand physicians graduate every year;
still Algeria has only 8,000 and rural areas are served by expatriates.

The main characteristics of the Algerian population, as well as

Beni-Chebana's, are: rapid growth, youthfulness, large dependency

219

ratios, lowered death rates that increase life expectancy. Beni-
Chebana's population is older than the national average with a large
deficit of males. Child-mother ratios are lower than the national
average, contrary to the usual assumption. Beni-Chebana's age pyramid
shows two important facts, that is, a deficit of males, clearly
apparent between the ages of 30 onward, and the youthfulness of this
population as compared to that of more developed countries.
Out-migration

The out-migration phenomenon has characterized Algeria beginning
in the colonial era up to now. It- started with flight from the
colonial penetration into neighboring and other Arab countries,
strengthened during and after World War I, and peaked after World War
II. Out-ndgration to France started at the beginning of the twentieth
century and fluctuated since then until it was officially stopped in
1973 by Algeria, but it has never stopped in practice.

Beni-Chebana has, in fact, been a center of outsnugration,
because it has nothing other than its youth to export. Out-migration
started by being movement of single males and later became largely
family migration after independence. The 1977 census counted 1,273
out-ndgrants for the whole commune. The survey, however, found this
number ridiculously low by any standard. Errors may have come not only
from counting but also from the concept itself because the census may
have considered only international migration and omitted national
migration. Only 20 out-hugrants were reported at Aourir,.Adjissa, for

instance, while the survey counted 280 to France alone. Only family

2Il

heads may have been counted by the census. The. survey included men,
women, and children. Another factor in making for error is that a
large number of out—migrants left the area a long time ago and they are
not known to the new generations as the Boubirek case shows.

Around one third of Beni-Chebana's out-nugrants are international,
two thirds are national. Bejaia's Wilaya international migrants
numbered 50,000 in 1977, but the number would be much larger should
Beni- Chebana‘s case be applied to the whole Wilaya territory. The
out-ndgration causes are: lack of jobs, inadequate housing, poor
education, health care services, and living conditions. The negative
aspects of out-nugration in Algeria are: unfit housing and high costs
of transportation to and from home. The international migrants often
suffer harsh effects from abandoning their families, racial segrega-
tion, inadquate education for the young, change of traditions, and
forced change of citizenship, in addition to the temporary residence
permit. They are also targets for attacks by right extremists. In
short, many legal and political problems emerge from Algerian
out-nugration to France.

Beni-Chebana's national migrants are found in major industrial
areas, notably Algiers city with more than 86%. Some old migrants are
already back home, others have planned to go to urban areas of Algeria.
Family visits range fromiat least once a month to once in more than a
year.

Social Amenities
Social amenities are poor in Beni-Chebana, including all 'sectors,

news media, culture, sports, postal services, health care (despite

212

relatively recent improvements), transportation, electric power,
running water, etc. All these could be improved with probably less
than current cost, should the population become involved in local
development programs. Beni-Chebana's residents have in the past and
even today shown a strong spirit of sacrifice, mutual help, and
solidarity, as their recent participation in the electric power program
realization shows. They provided free labor, free food for outside
technicians working on the project, and transportation of materials
where trucks could not move. This free and benevolent participation
would make the program's realization cheaper and reduce the time
required. This is just the opposite of what all Algerian programs are
experiencing. This self-help should serve as a lesson not only in
Algeria, but in all other developing countries as well.

The rural poor are ready, as they were before, to participate in
programs intended to serve them when they are given a chance to get
involved. They are known for their sacrifice and unselfishness. Even
living in urban shantytowns is a kind of sacrifice for the family as a
whole. They individually suffer from poor living conditions, but
family members do get benefits from services not available in the
countryside such as health care, education, relatively high wages, etc.
They say: we are now sufffering but at least our children will not
suffer as we do. Shantytown dwellers, however, could follow Zapata's
advice when the time comes anywhere in developing nations. They feel
themselves isolated, forgotten, and unequally served. Their sense of

injustice is very deep as expressed by some now living in Algiers city.

213

They are very aware of the Shantytown advantages and disadvantages and

have accepted the risks.

Development Suggestions

The following is an attempt to respond directly and briefly to the

questions asked in Chapter One, (page S), of this study:

1.

The facts show that Algeria is forced to import

much of its foodstuff because of dependent
development programs. Algerian planners, in the
post-independence era, lost development control

to the benefit of multinational corporations which
are motivated by profit rather than adequately
dealing with local socio-economic problems. Energy
and heavy industry are the main foci of the Algerian
pattern of development and both primarily serve

industrial nations. Agriculture has been overlooked
despite its enormous development potential. The

rapid demographic growth adds to an abandonment of
traditional agriculture, and the intact out declin-
ing excolonial system are the reasons for the massive
import of foodstuff;

The persistent rural exodus is due to uneven rural-
urban development in Algeria. The rural areas
experienced near complete underdevelopment during the
colonial era and not enough attention has been paid to
these areas after independence. Rural people are

forced to move city-ward where job opportunities,

214

social amenities, and more adequate living conditions
are available. Rural-urban exodus has had very
negative effects on both areas. While rural areas
are emptied of their labor force, urban areas are now
overcrowded. These unfavorable conditions may bring
about social unrest in Algeria;

3. The agrarian reform program has had no significant
positive effects on rural living conditions as
expected. Imposed from above, it could not provide
any meaningful help to the rural economy. It was
limited to rich suburban areas and lacked adequate
means within the rural world. Real local conditions
were so poor that their improvement needed a strong
program based on empirical studies, skilled technical
staff, and adequate equipment. A sound rural develop-
ment program should include small scale industry;

4. The general socio-economic conditions improved a great
deal in many respects as compared to the time of
independence, but much still needs to be.done;

5. Peasant attitudes regarding the existing living condi-
tions are, however, characterized by a deep frustra-
tion and sharp sense of injustice. They feel
abandoned because pre-independence expectations were
so high.

The two parts of this study may appear to have no relation to each

other. The fact, however, is that they are highly related since the

'215

history of peasants around the world shows their common exploitation,
injustice, and subjugation as well as their violent reaction against
both national and international oppressors. They share poverty
conditions and lack of participation. The developing countries'
increasing dependency is expected to increase peasant poverty which
would lead, sooner or later, to class struggle and peasant wars within
the dependent nations.

It seems important to make a final quote from Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations that defined the goals of
agrarian reform and rural development as being:

"transformation of rural life and activities in all
their economic, social, cultural, institutional
environmental, and human aspects. National objec-
tive and strategies to achieve this transformation
should focus on eradication of poverty, including
nutritional improvement, and be governed by poli-
cies for attaining growth with equity, redistribu-
tion of economic and political power, and people‘s
participation." (FAO, 1981, 6)

This quotation is closely related to our study. The real question
is how to transform rural life and activities. Are equity, redistribu-
tion of economic and political power, and people's participation
possible in a developing country? Most, if not all, rural programs
fail to achieve development goals in developing nations, because one
aspect or another of rural life is omitted. Many programs were con—
ceived as a kind of charity as was the case with the Algerian reform.
Nice, well-furnished houses, built fully at state expense were handed
free to peasants who could not believe what had just happened. Years

later, they left farm.work and kept their houses, because better wages

216

and working conditions were offered by other administrative or economic
sectors. Lawlessness became a pattern since they have no right to do
what they did. The purpose of building socialist villages - that is,
farming - is no longer served.

In addition to non-productive considerations negative inter-
national effects were ignored by some rural development theorists, as
was the case with F.L. Brayne's philosophy suggesting rural education
as a major need for underdeveloped areas. Rural people needed to learn
how to avoid wasteful spending and to improve farm practices. Depen-
dency theorists consider the unequal world system as the main cause of
underdevelopment in developing countries. Local participation is
required by all development theories, but getting people's involvement
and participation requires a set of conditions among which are knowing
local needs, through serious, consistent, empirical social research,
and making necessary material, financial, and technical means
available.

The previous two conditions require, in the Algerian case as in
many others, putting an end to or at least decreasing dependency
creating programs, taking rigorous measures against wasteful spending
of national corporations, improve industrial outputs, and use of
national technical potentials, instead of systematically resorting to
expatriates. Algerian universities, however, are not serving national
development as they should. Rather, these universities provide more
service to the more develOped nations than to Algeria because more and

more educated people leave the country for one reason or another. The

217

university generally is not involved in intensive, consistent,
empirical studies to help improve development programs. University
programs in this area are alien to Algerian reality and needs. They
are conceived by expatriates ignoring or not concerned about local
problems. The national educated elites have the same ideals,
interests, and behavior as these expatriates whom they asked for help.
Rural Algeria, as Beni-Chebana‘s case .shows, is under-admin—
istered; still no university program is available in this field. The
National School of Administration is not able to satisfy national
administration needs. It is a very selective institution but its
resources do not allow the training of a large number of administra-
tors. Hence, many university students are not prepared to serve in the
administrative sector, much in need of skilled personnel. Both rural
and urban administration as well as students themselves would benefit
joint university and administration school programs. This would allow
universities to directly serve specific national needs, help students
to find jobs, but also to put an end to elite education. Training in
administration is not an isolated case, rather, it is a general pattern
in Algerian college education which has been inherited from the French.
Practical, applied education is carried out by national schools such as
that in administration, agriculture, and demography. Universities then
teach theoretical subjects that are not much related to applied socio-
economic problems.
.Consequently, university education is not doing much to enhance

national development. Field research has not developed because of this

218

separation between practical and specialized teaching on one hand, and
the general and theoretical college education on the other. Executive
bodies are not equipped to do their own research and are not compelled
to ask for university or other help. This lack of real knowledge of
local needs is a primary cause of rural develOpment failure. Local
participation can, as in Beni-Chebana's electric program, become real
when the programs serve real needs. The 1971 agrarian reform was
limited to the richer, more accessible, and suburban areas of Algeria.
The poor areas are still waiting.

The whole issue of the redistribution of economic and political
power in developing nations remains an unsolved problem. Peasants do
not need charity programs, but rather political and economic decentral—
ization enabling rural people to fully participate in all development
stages: defining needs, conceiving, and realizing programs. Beni-
Chebana has great development potential, including its manpower, lands,
and even capital. Modern farm inputs, irrigation, and farm roads, need
to be provided. Small industry could be developed to help agriculture
and promote part-time farming with adequate equipment. Social
amenities need to be improved, especially to allow skilled people to
stay in the area. No single magic action can solve the issues of
underdevelopment in developing nations. Rather, integrated programs
are needed. The people to be served muSt be allowed to take part in

all development stages.

 

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