


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PEASANTS, DEPENDENCY, AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS OF ALGERIA:

THE CASE OF BENI-CHEBANA

by

Hocine Kouache

A Dissertation

submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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Department of Sociology

1985

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ABSTRACT

PEASANTS, DEPENDENCY, AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS OF ALGERIA:

THE CASE OF BENI-CHEBANA

by

Hocine Kouache

This dissertation is concerned with the analysis of the problem of underdeveloped areas within developing countries. The study focuses on the definition of peasants, peasant movements, and peasant roles, as well as on the negative effects of colonialism and post-colonial dependency. The case study of an Algerian commune was designed in order to examine the concrete effects of planning under subservient conditions in the economic, social, and organizational spheres. The facts demonstrate how dependent plans are shaped by both internal and external factors.

The case of Beni-Chebana shows how a rural commune in Algeria moved from a condition of under-administration in a subsistence economy during the colonial era to a condition of abandoned farming and massive out-migration. Today the main income source is derived from remittances sent by migrants to Algerian cities and by international migrants. Underdevelopment characterizes this commune in all aspects of life, a circumstance that typifies all of rural Algeria.

This study included, in addition to rural development theories and experiences during the colonial era and in post-independence period, rural administration, economy, education, population, and social amenities within the case study of Beni-Chebana's commune.

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To:

Algerian Peasants

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
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Mediterranean Sea

Administrative limits

Wilaya
Laira
Communes

Scale
1/500 000



PART ONE: PEASANTRY AND DEPENDENCY

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The Problem: A Brief Statement

Today's Algerian economy is in trouble, like the economies of most other developing countries, and the socio-economic problems are becoming increasingly difficult to solve. Algeria's problems seemingly originate largely from foreign exploitation of the natural resources which are drained without creating a strong basis for local development. The negative foreign impact started during the colonial era and it is still being strongly felt today, especially in natural resources in which the multinational corporations are involved.

Foreign interests, through various means and multiforms, negatively shifted much of the national wealth and potential to the energy sector in which all efforts have been concentrated. The focus on energy development tends to serve the economies of other countries rather than the national economy as a whole. The agricultural sector already had been destroyed during the colonial era and never recovered its earlier healthy situation. The agricultural emphasis in the colonial period promoted cash crops and converted the best lands of the country into growing wine, citrus fruits, and early vegetables. This was detrimental to the production of foodstuffs that the country needed but was left to the poor traditional sector, characterized by its poor lands, backward farming methods, overcrowded population, lack of modern inputs, and with no help from the state. It is dominated by subsistence production compared to the rich and modern colonial sector. Demographic growth in Algeria, rapidly increased the demand for food

which the colonial agricultural system could not fulfill. The problem here is that the colonial agriculture has been kept intact with regard to its structure while its production sharply declined after the settlers departed.

The FLN (Unique Party) Central Committee recognized the growing dependency which threatened national independence. The food shortage phenomenon seems to be a shared characteristic of many developing countries, including both the "rich" and "poor" among them. Natural resources are not, seemingly, lacking, but internal political strife and external capitalist pressure, are forcing increased food imports to Algeria as well as many developing countries. Scarcity of food leads to high prices which cause famine, malnutrition, and social unrest. Consequently, food scarcity is a threatening phenomenon, both in terms of national independence and political stability.

Algeria has, like most developing countries, enormous agricultural potential, but has been unable to develop a genuine agricultural system capable of satisfying national needs. Some ninety per cent of the country's foreign exchange is with the capitalist countries, and this strong and still growing relationship seems to be the main reason for national socioeconomic imbalance and weakness. The type of national development followed by Algeria after the liberation has been influenced by the colonial past and western experts who advised the capitalist path. The main goal was to develop heavy industry which would lead to a radical change in the national economy and transform the country from its traditional agricultural production to industrial

1

production as in western countries. This major goal looked promising and the government made major efforts to achieve it. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector was overlooked, pending and waiting mature industry to come to its aid. Such aid has not yet come. This has been the result of blindly implementing programs based on others' theories and experiences, without reasonably considering local context and specifics. Transformation models of development simply have not worked.

It can be said that neither industrial nor agricultural development has succeeded in Algeria. The regular importation of two-thirds of the needed foodstuffs was not adequate, and by the summer of 1980 more money than ever before was spent on food and other imports. Around five billion French Francs were spent on a new and increased import project called Programme Anti-Penurie (PAP) designed to satisfy increased needs and to fight successive shortages in essential consumer products. (Algerie Actualite - AA., July 17-23, 1980)

The poverty that prevails in the "traditional" sector is forcing a continual flood of people off the land and into the cities where grave problems are created for the government. The government has tried to solve these problems by resorting to force during the summers of 1978 and 1983. Some shantytown dwellers were sent back to their communes of origin and their shacks were simply destroyed by a special police brigade created specifically to deal with the shantytown phenomenon surrounding all major Algerie cities. These problems, of course, are not solvable through force. Suitable policies must be based on

knowledge of the roots of the phenomenon. The continual rural-urban exodus has been created by rural poverty, since close to half of the rural population depends for survival on earnings by migrant workers, according to a government estimate in the mid-1970s (MERIP. #67).

Thus, Algerian rural society is not closed or completely isolated from the rest of the country or even world markets and events. Rather, it is a remnant of colonial and neo-colonial development. It is an integral part of the world capitalist system referred to by dependency theorists as "periphery of the periphery", representing the lowest and most depressed level. The underdeveloped rural areas of many developing countries, including Algeria, fit this pattern. Rural people in this condition, are barred from effective social, cultural, economic, and political participation.

The Study Objectives

This study explores the socio-economic conditions of the ignored traditional sector as contrasted with the state sector. The study also seeks to assess the effects of the Agrarian Revolution Program, now in effect for more than twelve years. The main declared goal of this program was to introduce radical changes in the rural sector and to satisfy country people's deep aspiration for a better life. The goals of the program were:

"...building a new, just and open society to all but preserving, in priority, workers' dignity (...) This is why the agrarian revolution, beyond its simple social justice preoccupations, means radical transformation of rural world living and working conditions (...) For the agrarian revolution to be a fundamental genuine element of progress for the most destitute masses, it must provide them with all factors of progress." (Charter, 9-10).

The ultimate goal of this study is to try to identify and to help answer the critical and interrelated rural-urban problems created by the new type of post-independence development. Were there any significant improvements felt by the Algerian peasants who were pushed into poor, remote areas during the colonial period and who were given little or no access to the means of modernization? The persistent rural-urban migration suggests, 22 years after independence, that improved conditions among the peasant villagers did not take place and the agrarian reform program has had very little success where it was most needed.

Given the context just specified, this dissertation seeks answers to the following questions:

1. Why is a rich country like Algeria forced to import much of its needed foodstuff?
2. Why does the rural-urban exodus still persist and what is its impact on rural and urban areas?
3. What are the effects of the agrarian reform program?
4. Were there any meaningful changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the traditional sector?
5. What are the peasant attitudes toward existing living conditions?

METHODOLOGY

To answer these questions and others, a limited area of the traditional sector was defined and used for data collection. To be representative of the entire Algerian traditional sector, it should be

sufficiently distant from urban centers. The Beni-Chebana commune met this condition and was chosen as a sample of this sector. It is a rural commune -- the smallest administrative unit -- from the Daira of Akbou (district) Wilaya of Bejaia (State). See map, page xii. It was chosen not through random sampling but rather because of a number of particular considerations. Since it is my commune of origin, I am better acquainted with this commune than any other. Further, I feel some obligation to help its residents solve their problems and improve their living conditions. Beside these subjective considerations, objectively, the commune is representative of the Northern Algerian traditional sector. It is about 250 km. from Algiers, the country's capital and some 90 km. from Wilaya's administrative city center, Bejaia. It has been the center of outmigration since World War I, and a large number of its residents are moving back and forth, to and from urban centers in Algeria and France. French settlers never lived here and its sole transport link was opened, for the first time, during World War II. Finally, it was tarred only some six years ago. This commune is part of the traditional sector by any standard and its participation in the war of liberation was significant.

Since it is impossible to study the commune as a whole, it is necessary to focus on some dimensions that appear most important. Thus, the following will be emphasized:

The economic situation, migration, social amenities, population structure, education, administrative and political structures, and women's role. It is of paramount importance to base rural development

programs on an empirical knowledge of rural society and to implement them in accord with the attitudes and values of the rural people. This is true since it has been shown that many rural programs over the world fail, in part, because of lack of participation, and in some cases fail because of programs imposed from above which did not satisfy felt needs.

To carry out the proposed study, field work was undertaken between March 1981 and September 1983. Short but repeated visits allowed the writer to contact, interview, observe, and collect data from local officials, party leaders and militants, teachers, citizens as well as economic, educational, administrative, political, and financial authorities at Daira and Wilaya levels. The Ministry of Agriculture delivered a written authorization to do the study, as did the party's Mouhafadha (Wilaya level). These permissions allowed the writer to obtain official data whenever possible, contact people, and to organize meetings at the local village level. In addition to interviews using a survey instrument, direct field observations and relevant documents, including census data, are used.

A questionnaire, written in Arabic, was used to collect data at the village level concerning the dimensions just mentioned. A promise was made by the party's Kasma (communal level) to help with the study as much as possible. Once the questionnaire was printed, a one-page notice was distributed to the commune residents, party members, administrative officials, school personnel, as well as to mosques, to inform the people about what was going to take place and why, and at

the same time, help was sought. This took place in April 1983. The Kasma provided me with names of people, party leaders, teachers, and notables in a number of villages of Beni-Maouche and Adjissa. Then I began my weekend visits to these villages. Since I was teaching at the University of Algiers, I had to travel 250 km. one way each week to reach the commune in order to contact the people, organize meetings with them, and to explain the purpose of the study, read and explain the notice, the questionnaire, and how to answer the questions.

The experience of doing the field work proved very costly in time because it took some four to six hours in each of the villages visited to call people for a meeting, to go over the questionnaire, and to answer villagers' questions. The commune counts some 64 hamlets. To avoid this time consuming procedure, I suggested to the Kasma to convene, for the last two quarters of the communal hamlets, Beni-Chebana and Ait Mohli, all those whose help was sought. It was agreed to have this general meeting some fifteen days later in order to allow enough time because of the difficulty of communication. The date set was May 26, 1983. When I came on that date, I found no one assembled for the meeting since the Kasma received a notice from the Mouhafadha not to allow any public meeting without a prior special authorization for it. This decision came as a consequence of not consulting with the Mouhafadha before starting the field work as was explained to me later on.

Due to the university final exams scheduled in June, hot weather, and the fasting period of Ramadhan (prohibition on eating or drinking

during the day), I had to wait until the end of July to return to the field. Once the special authorization was obtained with no problem when requested, and even with moral as well as promised material support, two meetings instead of one were convened on August 8 and 11, 1983 because of the distance problem. Both meetings were held at the communal center, Tarfet, and presided over by the Kasma's coordinator who urged attendants to help. The problem, however, was that not all the invited people came. Some never received their invitations for the purpose, others were on vacation at that time. Those invited were village leaders, party members, high school students home from urban centers, local teachers, and school directors. Their job was to provide leadership for village working teams and to obtain villager involvement.

The questionnaire was not intended to be filled out by single respondents, rather, hamlet level data were sought. The data were collected at each hamlet level, then added up, as needed, at section and communal levels. Thus, the intent was to make a complete census of the communal hamlets, whether small or large. But due to field work problems, some of which were just mentioned, only 37 out of the 64 hamlets were surveyed. They represent, however, around 80 percent of the total resident population. Individual questions such as those concerning the number of children for each mother and the number of outmigrants were answered by individual families. Family books where marriage, births and deaths were registered were also used in this case. Other questions of a general character were collectively

answered by a group of villagers representing different families. The team members of each surveyed hamlet were of different ages. They were asked to count or make the best of their knowledge in estimating carefully the answers to different questions. Disagreements appeared sometimes between group members but a consensus was always found after each side explained why it took one stand or another. These teams showed a great willingness to cooperate with the study when they received satisfactory answers to their questions and assured that the study's aim was to serve their own general interest in contrast to administrative censuses that could be used otherwise.

This study is organized in two parts. The first part includes a brief statement of the problem studied as well as methodology just presented. The concept of peasant and peasant movements are dealt with in Chapter II. Chapter III deals with the colonial legacy and post-colonial dependency. The second part deals with the findings from the field study, that of Beni-Chebana, an Algerian rural commune, composed of four chapters. The fourth chapter deals with the administrative and political structures of the commune, while the fifth chapter deals with its educational system. Economic aspects of Beni-Chebana as well as the role of women are dealt with in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven deals with the population analysis, outmigration, and social amenities. The last chapter concludes the study. All translations from Arabic and French are mine.

CHAPTER II: THE PEASANT AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS

Peasants: Various Definitions

It is useful to start with a brief definition of peasants, the subject of this study. Who are they and how are they related to the larger society in which they are part? The several definitions and viewpoints presented are intended to help understand more fully this important portion of every developing society, its movement and development. These large popular masses have often been forgotten, underestimated, exploited, and relatively little attention has been paid them by historians. Ranga noted that historians:

"have been so much under the spell cast by the princely and priestly order and under the mistaken impression that only the upper classes, intellectuals and professionals mattered in the life of nations that the ideals and aspirations and the efforts and the struggles of the peasant masses of the different countries to gain their due place in society have rarely received sufficient attention."
(Ranga, 13)

Obviously, peasants are not among any of the above mentioned categories. They are, however, struggling to gain their place in society. Hence this definition does not exclude the urban proletariat who also struggles for equing to gain their place in society.

Ibn Khaldun may have made clear the difference between city and country people by considering the level of living. Country people are characterized by a subsistence economy as compared to city dwellers who reach higher levels of living. Ibn Khaldun wrote:

"Bare necessities, in a way, are basic, and luxuries secondary. Bedouins, thus, are the basis of, and prior to, cities and sedentary people. Man seeks just the bare necessities. Only after he has obtained the bare necessities does he get to comfort and luxuries. The toughness of desert life

precedes the softness of sedentary life. Therefore, urbanization is bound to be the goal to which the Bedouin aspires. (...) Sedentary people on the other hand, have no desire for desert conditions, unless they are motivated by some urgent necessity or they cannot keep up with their fellow city dwellers." (Ibn Khaldun, 93)

The definition, made in fourteenth century and based on economic activity and different ways of making a living, is still relevant today. Peasants are those who live by agriculture and animal husbandry which requires wide fields and pastures not needed by residents of settled areas. What seems more important here is the peasants' attitude toward urbanization as their ultimate goal. They are struggling but unable to go beyond bare subsistence level, limited in food, shelter, and warmth. The peasants' struggle is explained by their aspirations for city life as a means of getting more wealth and comfort. Hence, they tend to rest, take it easy, build large houses and lay out towns and cities for protection. In other words, peasants become urbanized.

Contemporary definitions of peasants are not much different from that described by Ibn Khaldun. Landsberger points out the thoroughly confused situation concerning the definition of peasant as follows:

"There are considerable differences not only between outstanding authors, but even crucial variations for the same author within relatively short time." (Landsberger, 6)

These differences and variations can be seen in the definitions by Moore and Eric Wolf. Moore, while recognizing the impossibility of defining the word peasantry with absolute precision, considered the

main distinguishing features of a peasantry as legal subordination, cultural distinctiveness, and de facto land possession. Wolf and Moore, viewed by Landsberger to be the chief authorities on the subject of the peasantry and their movements. Wolf, in his study of Latin American Types of Peasantry, emphasized land ownership as critical to an adequate definition. Ten years later, Wolf changed his definition based on land ownership to another important criterion, namely, a peasant's loss of control over land and his own labor: "Peasants ... are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers". (Landsberger, 7)

Wolf keeps changing his criterion of peasant status — from land ownership, to exploitation, and to decision making regarding the cultivation process:

"I define peasants as populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the process of cultivation. The category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as well as owner-operators as long as they are in a position to make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown. It does not, however, include fishermen or landless laborers." (Wolf, XIV)

Wolf makes a clear difference between peasants and cultivators which fact makes his definition of peasant very close, if not identical, to that of Ibn Khaldun. He asserts that:

"The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and social status gained within a narrow range of social relationships. Peasants are thus unlike cultivators, who participate fully in the market and commit themselves to a status game set within a wide social network." (Wolf, XIV)

The new dimension of the definition of peasant is found in Ibn Khaldun's definition of the Bedouins who:

"Restrict themselves to the bare necessities in their way of life and are unable to go beyond them, while sedentary people concern themselves with conveniences and luxuries in their conditions and customs." (Ibn Khaldun, 93)

The term Bedouin may need some explanation. It is taken from "Badiya", meaning countryside and since the Arabic country is mainly desert, the word becomes synonymous with desert and those living in the desert who are usually constantly moving and looking for pasture ground. Animal husbandry is their main source of income. The sedentary people, by contrast, make a living from land rather than animal husbandry. Both categories depend on land for their living and are not city dwellers. Ibn Khaldun characterizes the Bedouin as follows:

"Through his own efforts, he achieves what he proposes to achieve in this respect. He has obtained enough to be ready for the conditions and customs of luxury, he enters upon a life of ease and submits himself to the yoke of the city." (Ibn Khaldun, 93)

Here, we are provided with a process of change from the subsistence to a higher level of living or in other words from the peasant to farmer who:

"...enters the market fully, subjects his land and labor to open competition, explores alternative uses for the factors of production in the search for maximal returns, and favors the more profitable product over the one entailing smaller risk." (Wolf, XV)

Thus, Wolf only stated the facts without looking at possible reasons for being and undergoing change. For Wolf, the peasant has no

aspiration, no struggle, no consciousness of the obstacles and difficulties facing him and no city-country antagonism. What separates and creates these two types of societies and how can one change positions? To these questions, Wolf doesn't say anything. It appears that Ibn Khaldun had more depth in his definition than Wolf, despite his stating that:

"In our accounts, therefore, we must transcend the usual anthropological account of peasants and seek information also about larger society and its constituent class grouping, for the peasant acts in an arena which also contains allies as well as enemies." (Wolf, XII)

Kroeber also stressed the fact that peasants are "part-society with part-cultures" in a larger society. This is congruent, as Landsberger mentioned, with subordination and exploitation as well as with the necessary existence of a state or of cities, beyond the peasantry (Landsberger, 8). It is inconceivable to study a peasantry completely isolated from the rest of a nation's situation. This kind of study would be out of context and surely meaningless. Moreover, the national context may not be enough, in today's world, to fully understand the underdeveloped world's peasantry because it is so closely affected by the international socioeconomic division of labor and capitalist domination and exploitation. Hence, peasant decision making, mentioned by Wolf, is scarcely possible.

Capitalism and Socialism

The above criteria of land ownership, control of the production process, partial orientation to a market and or culture cannot,

separately, explain the situation of the peasantry in developing countries. A whole set of criteria may be needed to understand this phenomenon within the framework of the capitalist mode of production dominating periphery countries. Wolf distinguished two categories of farm operations: the peasant, with narrow relationship status and subsistence activity, and the farmer, wide open to competition and profit-oriented production. The farmer is found in both center and periphery countries, while the peasant is a phenomenon of the periphery countries. Wolf, as well as Moore, mentioned some peasant characteristics but failed to deal with the crucial problem of change. It was Karl Marx and the Marxists later on who made interesting insights on the subject. Marx, applying his theory of change over time within the stratification of the peasantry, predicted that:

"Agriculture, too, would become capitalistic. Consequently, property for the same kinds of technological and economic reasons operating in industry, would also become highly concentrated and would have the same result as in industry, including the generation of a propertyless, increasing class consciousness, rural proletariat."
(Landsberger, 5)

Marx, however, as is well known and despite the generalization of his theory, was not much interested in the agricultural sector and the situation of the peasantry which as he saw it would disappear. Rather, it was Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, faced with tactical questions of a revolution in rural societies, who needed a clear delineation of the rural situation. Lenin defined, as early as the 1890s, three sub-groups of the peasantry: well-to-do peasantry, including Kulak;

middle peasant who is a tenant and owning a small plot of land; and the poor peasant who sells his labor — a proletarian, part of the toiling masses. Lenin did not change his division of the peasantry since then as he maintained these three sub-groups of the peasantry after the Russian revolution and sought to explore each sub-class position with regard to bourgeois revolution and the struggle for socialism against the bourgeoisie. As for Mao, he spoke of organizing five kinds of peasants into a single organization: landless, semi-landless, sharecroppers, farm laborers and handicraftsmen. (Landsberger, 16-7)

Center-Periphery

The dependency theorists have emphasized the importance of the relationship between center and periphery countries represented by trade of merchandise, flow of capital, technology, organization, current ideologies, etc. The achieved capitalism of the center dominates periphery capitalism in formation. So, the center-periphery concept is of utmost importance with regard to our study and which will be kept in mind when analyzing the developing world's socioeconomic phenomena. As Amin pointed out:

"It is sure that a fundamental error is committed any time a Third World phenomenon is studied by looking at its cause in the Third-World itself, rather than situating it within the world system dialectic." (Amin, 50)

If this is true, the peasants of the developing countries are, consequently, not only part of their own societies, but they are also an integrated part of the capitalist system worldwide. This reasoning would allow us to understand why the rural areas of developing

countries are still experiencing underdevelopment and relative backwardness, even many years after national independence. The centers of the periphery countries are subject to foreign influence that make them helpless in relation to other parts of the country.

Peasant Uprisings and Wars

Peasants throughout the world have always been aware of their depressed socioeconomic, cultural, and political situation. They express their deep sense of injustice and discontent in different ways — permanent struggles, uprisings, and their literature. The sense of exploitation is, for instance, clearly expressed in this Argentinian song in Spanish: (Castex, II)

"Las penas son de nosotros, las vaquinas son de ajenas." That is: "The pains are ours, but the cows are not."

This sense of injustice is not limited to individual cases or accidental situations. Rather, it is a general trend throughout the world and throughout human history. Peasant uprisings have been widespread and have appeared in most, if not all, countries of the world. These uprisings have had limited scope in some cases. They have failed many times, have been short-lived in many others, but they were not specific to any country or limited historical period. Among the peasant uprisings some are very famous as the following quote attests:

"Not only massive individual discontent, but organized protests have been an important ingredient of the history of the rural sector of many societies. This is true from Russia in the north to Indonesia in the south; from Latin America around the world to the Philippines; from at least

the seventh century of this era until, of course, this very moment." (Landsberger, I)

Some uprisings, in which the peasantry played a key role, constituted major breaks in the history of certain societies, and others left international effects such as those of the French and Russian revolutions, or that of Mexico from 1910 onwards and Bolivia some forty years later. Some of the most recent and noteworthy peasant wars are those of Cuba, Viet Nam and Algeria. The peasant consciousness is becoming sharper and his ability to struggle is growing stronger than ever before:

"In the larger areas of the world, peasants are astir with a new spirit of hope and adventure. They are no longer indifferent to their old shackles of feudalism or the new instruments of exploitation created by the capitalism. They are in revolt against capitalism, imperialism, and feudalism..." (Ranga, I)

Today's peasant strength is mainly due to two opposite modern forces, namely, capitalism and socialism. Capitalism, through world market instruments, opens the eyes of peasants to worldwide economic crises which create a need to organize in sheer self-defense. Socialism, to quote Ranga:

"...has shattered whatever inferiority complex peasants might have had about their own right to and capacity for playing their part in the governance of their countries and also their pressing need to capture political power." (Ranga, 2)

Both Ibn Khaldun and Ranga saw peasant democratic society as being the first among the various orders, but peasants lost power and became oppressed and enslaved during the feudal era. Everywhere, they came to

be degraded into slavery, serfdom, and peonage. They lost political rights and were kept down by the growing pressure of economic, social, and political oppression.

Therefore, feudalism kept peasant masses under control for a long time before recovering from political torpor and religious stupor and to begin again to cherish political ambitions. The European peasants were the first to benefit from Marxist ideology. In Ranga's words, they: "had to wait until the Russian proletariat triumphed to give wings to their political ambitions." (Ranga, 15). Marxism, thus, played a major role in helping the masses to regain power in modern societies. But peasants did not wait for successful preconditions to be put together to stage a revolt or rebellion. Organized protests started from the seventh century, as Landsberger asserts, while Ranga goes even deeper with regard to peasant revolts and slave rebellion in Europe:

"Especially famous is the slave rebellion which broke out in Rome about 2000 years ago, under the leadership of Spartacus, who mobilized a huge army against the regime of the slave owners." (Ranga, 16)

The fourteenth century witnessed a wave of revolts against feudal oppression in French and English societies. The French peasants rose in their revolts of 1358 and struck terror into the feudal lords. A better organized and integrated revolt took place in England during the same century. Inspired by such eminent clergymen as Martin Luther and Husse rising in revolt against the church of Rome, German peasants set about killing feudal lords and their agents, burning down their

palaces, and occupying their lands. They came very near complete success, but Martin Luther turned against them because he was not a thoroughgoing revolutionary. Successive generations of German peasants went into revolts in 1618-48, 1740-86, and 1790. (Ranga: 116-31)

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw other peasant revolts in Western Europe. Swedish peasants found common ground with the rising bourgeoisie and together succeeded in obtaining valuable concessions from the King; the French Revolution of 1789 owed most of its success to the revolutionary peasants who suffered so greatly and for so long that their hearts were set on their various demands; and the Swiss peasants freed the country around 700 years ago. The Balkan areas of Rumania, Bukovia, Bessaravia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Greece and Yugoslavia also were not exceptions. The peasants in these countries have had a long tradition of revolts. The struggle for national liberation from the Turkish domination was intertwined with the movement against their oppressors. They had undergone terrible sufferings at hands of the Turks and internal enemies, the landlords. (Ranga, 131-2)

Russian peasant revolts were many, the most famous of them occurring in 1606-7, 1670-1, 1707-8, and 1773-5. The Russian peasants were emancipated from slavery only in 1907. Nehru's assessment of Russian peasant achievement is as follows:

"This confiscation of the big estates took place entirely on the initiative of the peasants and many months before Bolsheviks revolution. Lenin was in favour of the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants in an organized way. When the Bolsheviks came to power later on, they found Russian peasant proprietors." (Ranga, 164)

Ranga counted 670 peasant uprisings in Russia between 1900 and 1904, of which 441 were against landlords and 196 against government authorities. Some two million workers went on strike in 1905, while fifty to seventy-five million peasants rose in rebellion. They destroyed some 2,000 mansions, burned down feudal properties, and distributed a large number of feudal lands among themselves. (Ranga, 140-65)

The African peasants may have suffered much more than any peasants due to the slavery system, colonialism, and local feudalism. Dubois wrote in "Black-Folk":

"Africa has been literally bathed in blood at the behest of Europe: Not only was there the discrimination due to the African slave trade but there were eleven Zulu wars in South Africa from 1659 to 1893; there were seven wars of the English against Ashanti; there were the wars around Benin and the French wars in Dahomey and other parts of West Africa, there was the English attack on Ethiopia and in the Sudan and the rise of the Mahdi; there were repeated rebellions as the English and Germans entered East Africa, to say nothing of the fights in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco." (Ranga, 183)

For centuries, the Algerian peasants unsuccessfully fought feudalism, foreign intrusions, and later on, colonialism. The political power as well as socioeconomic institutions, were concentrated in foreign hands. The rulers lived in Casbahs protected by their armies. Invaders faced local resistance and revolts but the limited scope of these allowed them to be defeated, as was the case of many peasant uprisings over the world. Pre-colonial Algerian peasants rose against their oppressors ever since the beginning of the 19th

century; Kabylia, 1804-10, (1823), West, under Derkaqua (1805); East, Nememcha and Souf (1813-23), French invasion (1830), Abdelkader (1832-47), Mokrani (1871-2), and many others before the liberation war (1954-62), (Wolf, AA, August, 19-25, 1982).

The Indians of Latin America were duped into a false treaty. First, their chief was murdered before they were converted into a subjected race. Their lands were confiscated and their conversion into peons of the Spanish landlords took place without their knowledge. Bolivar led the revolution and liberated six states from the Spanish Crown. Presidents Juarez, Zapata, and Cardenas engineered a series of revolutions in Mexico (1850-1911). Their slogans were "Land and Liberty" and "Freedom of the State from the Church". The most famous Indian leader of the Mexican peasants declared:

"It is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees." (Ranga, 208)

The Peruvian peasants recently are pressing for change in successive upsurges seeking to reverse their intolerable position at the bottom of Peru's social structure. To believe Camejo, oppression is harsh and more oppressive in modern Peru. He wrote:

"While the first satellites circled the earth and jet liners landed in Lima, the Quechuas were still working the fields of rich landlords without pay, like serfs of medieval Europe. Peruvian peasants suffer a triple oppression: they are oppressed as Peruvians by U.S. imperialism; as Quechuas by Spanish-speaking whites and mestizos; and as workers or peasants by capitalists and landowners. Peasant women suffer, in addition the oppression meted out to their sex under capitalism..." (Blanco, 7-8)

These oppressed people rose in the early 1960s and did the unthinkable: they took back lands stolen from them, declared themselves human beings, and stopped working for their previous exploiters.

The peasants of the Philippines seemed to have been quiet rather than turbulent during the Spanish era. Most villagers were dedicated to passive survival. Collective violence occasionally erupted but tended to be short-lived and isolated. Only the upheaval of 1896 took on the qualities of a general rebellion. Agrarian protests took place and did not add up to a revolutionary heritage. They demonstrated hostility to domination but found freedom in the mountains. According to Sturtevant:

"Many discontented hamlet dwellers 'fled from the bells' to the bracing atmosphere and comparative freedom of the mountains (...) the fugitives flourished in sparsely settled uplands or on out-of-the-way islands such as Palawan. They constituted no problem to the Spaniards so long as they were left alone. Any effort to force them to accept either Christianity or Western legal codes, however, led to bitter resistance." (Sturtevant, 115)

American intervention changed the course of development and Anglo-Saxon patterns replaced familiar Hispanic ones. The peasants, subservient to village traditions found adjustment extremely difficult. This led to peasant attitude change after the lawlessness of 1850. Provincial officials were being disturbed and rural crimes took on class connotations, as indicated in the following quote:

"Rustlers, highway men, extortionists, and cutthroats preyed increasingly upon estate owners, lawyers, usurers, friars, and itinerant Chinese merchants, all the emerging enemies, in short, of the troubled peasantry.

"Little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty, a cry for vengeance on the rich and the oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs."
(Sturtevant, 116-7)

Peasants, up against the Westernized elite, refused to capitulate and the irreconcilable minority shifted from overt to covert rebellion. Between 1911 and 1920 underground organizations in the countryside extended the heritage of peasant resistance to external authorities and provided covering for the new generation of those committed to violent rectification efforts. Thus, evolving tranquility was destroyed after 1923 when the movements surfaced in periods of agrarian unrest and tumult. (Sturtevant, 141)

Peasants and Revolution

The above represent selected instances of peasant uprisings chosen from among many others showing how the peasants reacted to domination, exploitation, oppression, enslavement, and injustice. The question here is whether or not the peasants alone can carry out a revolution. Nobody underestimated the role peasants can play in social change but leading a revolution is something else. Rural subordination may be the key criterion with regard to the definition of peasant. Land ownership, decision-making, and even suffering could be relatively meaningless, sometimes, in the history of peasant movements. Peasants need more than suffering to organize a national revolution against their oppressors. In Landsberger's opinion: "The fate of the Spanish peasantry has been among the most tragic of any in Europe."

(Landsberger, 4). This did not, however, bring the Spanish peasants into the revolutionary front but rather other European peasants such as French, Germans, English, and Russians made their revolts famous. Exploitation may be the most important criterion that could be found everywhere and at any given time. The concept of exploitation means, also, that peasants, rich, poor, or in between, are part of the national society, which is part of the world system. Despite the fact that peasants in developing countries are forced out of agriculture in one way or another and the class difference, within the rural society itself, rural-urban antagonism seems very strong in today's developing world. Which peasant category is likely to become revolutionary and which is not? The key issue here is that of leadership and the nature of change.

Marx predicted that the main trend of change will go toward capitalistic agriculture. He faithfully welcomed colonialism as an agent of change of the feudal system, but colonialism did not make expected changes. Both industrial agriculture and the shrinking of the family operated farms took place in more advanced, not in developing countries. Lenin's division of the peasantry into three categories according to the wealth criterion: rich, poor and middle is a very useful tool in the analysis of militancy and peasant attitude toward the revolution in Russia. This division, however, cannot apply to colonized countries, because in addition to wealth level, there is a clear cut line between national and foreign farmers whose goals as well as their social positions are different. Mao's division of peasants

seems more realistic since it includes all essential categories of peasants: landlords, semi-landholders, sharecroppers, farm-laborers, and handicraftsmen. So, despite vocational, ownership, and income level differences, peasants share common country living conditions and are, consequently, more likely to form a single organization able to face city exploitation and oppression. It is true, however, that to succeed, peasants need a strong national ally on their side -- namely, the urban proletariat that can provide not only support but that important condition of success, leadership.

Peasant uprisings demonstrate their fierce resistance against oppression and domination but rarely succeed or go beyond the local level. They keep relative freedom in their poor, remote, limited areas and provide the very much needed secure refuge. Rural leaders, even the most powerful of them, like Zapata of Mexico, for instance, could not interest themselves in problems other than that of the peasantry. This is why the peasantry needed to make common cause with the urban proletariat. It is, therefore, very useful to look into peasant subgroups as well as the toiling masses as a whole with regard to achieving a revolution. Most recent writers take into account rural low-status groups when analyzing a peasantry but differences appear when it comes to consider which subgroup is more likely to be militant than others. Lenin and Mao sided with Marx's view considering the large rural proletariat of landless laborers as a source of revolution, while Wolf sees middle peasants, predicted to disappear by Lenin, as the most revolutionary. Moore, also diverged from Mao's view seen as

closer to truth but will not do as a general explanation. (In Landsberger, 17)

Although theoretical divergences between Marxists and non-Marxists, are not the main focus here, the facts show Marxist concepts much closer to real life than non-Marxist ones. The main factor calling for a revolution, or more militancy, is peasant and working class discontent. The discontent level would define which group is more deprived and more radical. The rural proletariat is, therefore, more likely to be in the front of militancy because peasants are more deprived and more frustrated in the developing world. To quote Landsberger (26):

"...radicalisation of means would occur, first like radicalisation of goals, only after much frustration, and after violence had just been used by the dominant groups."

Lenin clearly felt that the poor peasants as well as laborers had very definite revolutionary potential, but not like the urban proletariat's spontaneous vigor. Mao, meanwhile, saw poor peasants as being due "seven points" out of ten and urban dwellers and the military rate only "three points" toward the "accomplishment of the democratic revolution." Both men, however, believed that even the rich peasants could be enticed to participate in the early phase of the revolution. (Huntington, in Landsberger, 35)

Violence and force are needed at the psychological level, according to Fanon's theory in order for the colonized to shake off foreign oppression. It is not just a military technique but also an

essential precondition to independence as well, because the colony was established by force and maintained by force. The exercise of force against the native strips him of his manhood which he can only recover when he himself uses force against his oppressors. The use of force, consequently:

"frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self respect." (From the Damned, in Wolf, 244)

Fanon goes further when he asserts that it is not the proletariat and the nationalist middle classes who are likely to use cleansing violence because they start to get profit at a discount from the colonial set up, but the peasantry "rebels by instinct." They put individual standards aside in favor of the community (in Wolf, 245). This goes with the well known theory of Ibn Khaldun about the ethics and characteristics of city and country people, which play a major role in social change. The rural people are the changing force, since the toughness of rural life precedes the softness of city life. The increase of wealth allows people, according to Ibn Khaldun to enter upon a life of ease and submission to the yoke of the city.

Leadership and Religion

Many peasant revolts fail because of lack of adequate leadership. Religious leaders in many cases have provided peasants with this very much needed element of a successful revolution, because as in the German case:

"They had neither education nor knowledge of any previous revolutionary struggle to guide them. So, though they came within an ace of victory, they lost and lost grievously." (Ranga, 129-30)

Rural clergymen most often side with the revolts of the poor and oppressed peasants and their religious teaching takes an egalitarian character unlike that of their town colleagues who often oppose egalitarianism. In fact, Juarez was the first Mexican to attack the church and the Russian peasants did not make a great distinction between feudal masters and corrupt priests. When they were able to bear no more, the Russian peasants, according to Lee:

"rose in rebellion and in their mad frenzy murdered their masters, burned their houses and even churches and slaughtered the corrupt, prosperous priests who had forgotten all true religion and were ready to give their blessing to every tyrannical practice of the gentry." (Quoted in Ranga, 164)

Martin Luther, who inspired the German peasant revolt, became their first enemy and called for the rejection of equality, because he believed an earthly Kingdom cannot exist without the inequality of persons. According to Luther, some must be free, others serfs, some rulers, others subjects. Luther said:

"Let all who are able mow them down, slaughter and stab them openly or in secret and remember that there is nothing more poisonous, noxious and utterly diabolical than a rebel. You must kill as you would a mad dog; if you do not fall upon him, he will fall upon you and the whole land... A man convicted of the crime of rebellion is under the ban of God and the emperor and every Christian can and should slaughter him and will, thus, be doing a good deed." (In Ranga, 129)

In this case has religion used violence to keep social inequality?

Islam, as well as Christianity, has been used in many Islamic countries to keep their dying socio-economic organization alive as long as possible, especially in the backward regions:

"Islam has played a particularly important role in preventing the appearance not only of an effective peasant movement, but in fact of any general democratic movement in these areas (...). The principal political slogan found in Moroccan countryside was "Allah and the King". (Alexandrov, 365)

Many Muslim leaders, on the other hand, have understood Islam as an egalitarian religion and taught it as such. These are found among the first followers of the Prophet as well as in modern times. Among others, are Djamal Eddin of Afghanistan, Abdah of Egypt, Simawi of Turkey, and Ben Badis of Algeria. These leaders very effectively used religion in support of the national liberation and social justice. They took the charge of reforming and renewing religious concepts and precepts and their work had a great impact on the struggle for independence. Political parties have had less influence on the popular masses than that of the religious reformists, as Wolf wrote:

"It is the Jacobin Islam of Ben Badis which has ultimately proved victorious." (Wolf, 247)

Effectively, Ben Badis and his Association of Ulemas (Scientists) put together a set of principles to be realized by the Algerian people:

"Islam is my religion, Arabic is my tongue, Algeria is my country (...) and independence is a national right for all people on earth." (Behr, 44; Kouache, 1979, 44-5)

Ben Badis expressed the people's aspiration for human dignity, equality and independence from colonialism. He did not see religion as separate from material life or cut off from socioeconomic and political spheres. Ulemas' free schools and newspapers gained large popular support, while a religious war was declared against those who saw Islam otherwise, and

were using it to serve their own individual interests. Defining Islamic characteristics, Ben Badis wrote in 1938 that Islam:

"honors and glorifies reason and recommends that all acts of life be based on reasoning. It condemns the servitude of man to man, as well as despotism in all its forms (...). It is essentially democratic and does not admit absolutism at all, even for the benefit of the most just man." (Behr, 45; Kouache, 1979, 49)

Both Islam and Christianity, therefore, were used to support class or individual interests. Peasants are revolutionary but their revolutions fail in most cases because of lack of a strong national leadership. Furthermore, they often adhere to fundamentalistic religious influence. Adequate leadership needs a certain educational level, much experience, and other objective conditions, which are not found, with some exceptions, in rural areas. Absence of these conditions limited peasant revolts in time, space, and goals, or did not allow them to appear at all. The latter circumstance was the case of the English landed aristocracy of the 16th and 17th centuries that drove out the peasantry or the East German Junkers who successfully subjugated their peasants. Discontent, in neither case, resulted in revolt or collective status unrest. (Landsberger, 29)

The most important needed conditions for successful revolts are, perhaps, structural characteristics such as:

1. The conversion of landowners into pure rent, tax, and service collectors, without engaging in farming or rendering service to peasants;
2. Failure to perform compensatory services becomes economic exploitation;

3. Becoming effete, weak and functionless
relative to a growing central government;
4. Peasant community partial survival, Moore
called "damaged but intact" as was the case in
Mexico, Algeria, and China. (Landsberger,
29-30)

Among other conditions, modernizing experiences play a major role in waking up the peasants and forming their leadership. The following factors have had marked importance in awakening the peasants: living in towns or abroad where new ideas are acquired, army service where the use of force is learned, fruits of organization and cooperation are observed, and the incompetence of the upper strata is demonstrated. Wars often precede or are associated with outbreaks of peasant unrest, as Landsberger mentions. Pugachev and Zapata were soldiers. The Algerian case is very meaningful in this respect. The 1871 and 1945 revolts took place while the colonial power was at war or at the end of it. Many leaders and militants of the liberation war (Nov. 1954 - 62) worked in France and/or served in the French army. A number of Algerian Liberation Army members (ALN) participated in World War II and in the Indo-China war with the French. Their experiences helped a great deal during the liberation war.

Therefore, beside military experience that is necessary to keep the masses organized and disciplined, modern life, mass media, new ideologies, and practical participation in mass movements are the main means of teaching peasants not only how to express their discontent but to organize themselves in successful ways.

Peasants and Colonialism

Western capitalism expanded during the colonial era. Land was confiscated and their occupants were subjugated. There was no big difference between the colonial powers with regard to exploitative goals, despite differences in procedures and tactics used. The first step was destructive. Socioeconomic structures had to be wiped out to allow a new system to take shape. From an historical viewpoint it should be noted that Latin American countries were generally colonized well before African and Asian countries. Local languages and cultures were successfully destroyed in Latin America, unlike what happened in Africa and Asia. This has helped Latin Americans to lead in the fight to obtain independence before the two other continents and to develop internal class conflict earlier as well. Regardless of success or failure, class conflict started in such countries as Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, etc. The colonial powers:

"brought with them colonial settlers as in Algeria, or large-scale capitalist plantations as in Sumatra or even foreign money-lenders and merchants who came, not from the mother country but from other dependent territories such as the Indian chettyars — money-lenders — in Burma, who owned an impressive percentage of the best land."
(Landsberger, 53)

The penetration of colonialism in Africa and Asia was extensive but was less than in Latin America in terms of the destruction of local language, culture, and religion. Psychological damage has been severe despite the fact that both colonial and local communities remained closed to each other for a long time after the colonial invasion,

especially in the Algerian case. A large number of Algerians had never seen European people. Mistrust prevailed in inter-community relationships. The colonial community did not dare to employ Algerian workers nor did the Algerians want to work with the Europeans:

"the natives began to work in the harvest during the war of 1914, where farmers were mobilized."
(Launay in Wolf, 223)

The settlers did inflict radical changes on the existing cultural system. The basic economic source, Hubs lands (mosques' private lands) were confiscated from the very beginning in the colonization process. Thousands of schools were destroyed without compensation by the French. The cultural uprooting intensely affected the mentality of both the educated elite and the most disadvantaged working people. These groups suffered more because of their close contact with the settlers. Education had been a privilege during the colonial epoch and illiteracy was higher among those Algerians who lived in the colonial areas than among those who lived far away. Those who worked with the colonizers had a negative attitude toward their employers:

"They have a tendency to destroy any colonial property, including their working tools, stealing time from hated labor, or gaining some money with the least possible effort." (Kouache, 1979, 39)

Algerians living in the traditional sector, dispossessed of their lands at a time when land was most needed and the only means everyone had to use to gain a living, suffered grave damage to their social system, were prevented from participating in public affairs and local administration, and lost certain cultural elements. The Algerian

situation contrasts with what happened in most colonized countries, notably in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. This long deprivation and continuous frustration made the people of Algeria to deeply feel injustice and to regard public property as enemy property which they felt a need to take over or simply destroy. This mentality is still alive today, as the president's 19th instruction concerning care of public property shows. Such instruction has been addressed to the Party, state structures, local communities and dependent units, public administrative establishments, socialist enterprises, and agrarian public sector bodies. It reads, in part:

"So, is it urgent to end this harmful situation to national economy by consistently fighting against the resulting waste in order to make the best of the existing potentialities (...) Becoming conscious of the sacred public belonging (chose public) is necessary to avoid setting a confusing climate leading to, sometimes, imposed abuses. This should be considered by the managers as a protective measure against any harm to their own probity." (AA, Feb. 4- 10, 1982)

Due to a lack of involvement in public affairs as well as repressive colonial measures, Algerians, the large majority of whom live in poor rural areas, learned how to face socioeconomic problems with calm and subtle protest to avoid individual sanctions. This kind of underground reaction to daily life problems is still in practice today:

"People are not protesting any housing crisis, lacking water, shortage of food, or higher prices nor any socioeconomic problems they are suffering. They keep showing their discontent, as they were in the colonial era, through hidden ways." (Kouache, 1984, 10)

The situation is far reaching, more dramatic, and more damaging because not only did the toiling masses lose their manhood which they

could only recover through the use of violence, as Fanon asserts, but also the educated elite in charge of the country's development lost self-confidence as well as confidence in their countrymen. Resort to foreign technical assistance in almost every aspect of society, confirms an existing inferiority complex. The frustrated elite refused to deal with their countrymen even if they had the needed skills and required education. Expatriates were preferred and placed in key jobs. It may be easier to manage productive units without being watched by one's fellow citizens. The expatriate expert does not care and is not interested in watching local partners once his own needs are satisfied. He may even help local friends achieve some personal interests or at least keep his mouth shut. With regard to technical assistance, the Algerians went far beyond the well known types of contracts such as "product in hand" or "free product". Sharing plant management in order to secure technology transfer is the new type signed with the U.S. Company El Paso, a gas importer. This gave El Paso an upper hand in the number one natural gas liquefaction factory of Arzew. Not only are the main departments of production and maintenance presided over by expatriates but even the spare parts storekeepers and janitors are technical assistants. The reasons given by high factory officials for this situation are: "We have to deal with a highly sophisticated technology and the Algerians are not trustworthy." (AA, June 12-18, 1980).

The colonial effects thus are still being felt by the developing nations today and the political independence has not yet produced positive effects. The post-colonial relationships between the newly

independent nations and the Western powers just widened the gap between the two categories. The colonized countries have not yet recovered from colonial underdevelopment when they were forced into multiform and complete dependency on center countries. Instead of one master during the colonial era, the newly independent countries found themselves under old colonial legacy and a new form of dependency. The negative Western influence is presented in the following chapter in regard to Algeria. This is a continuation of the past into the present and future. It most certainly affects the whole country as well as its countryside.

CHAPTER III: COLONIAL LEGACY AND DEPENDENCY

Underdevelopment

The colonial era left a legacy of underdevelopment, strong unequal relationships between the mother country and its colony. The older socio-economic structures built to serve colonial power interests are still operating. They became even stronger after the colonial military presence disappeared and the colonial educated elite came to power in the post-independence era. The colonial domination, exploitation, and subjugation continue to work more efficiently than before by changing its face but not its nature. The old master is using new techniques, less expensive and more effective means, and new modern language: trade, loans, aid, and technical assistance.

Today's world is divided into socialist and capitalist countries. Inequality is found within the capitalist world, and between the developed and underdeveloped nations. The question to ask is why some countries are well developed while others are not? Some social scientists welcomed western colonialism, seen as an agent of "civilization". The use of force was justified for this reason but the colonial relationships failed to achieve this goal because it was established in such a way that helped the most advanced countries to develop more while putting constraints upon others. Colonialism not only stopped the development of productive forces, but directed them into a trajectory of underdevelopment. (Shivji, 55)

Rodney asserts that:

"...development and underdevelopment are not only comparative terms but they have also comparative relationship one to the other: that is to say the

two halves produce each other by interaction. Western Europe and Africa had a relationship which insured the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe (...). The developed and underdeveloped parts of the present capitalist section of the world have been in continuous contact for four and a half centuries. The contention here is that over that period Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa." (Rodney, 75)

Thus, underdevelopment is not due to lack of development potential but rather the rich parts of the world are actually poor and those parts that are not so well-off in wealth benefit from the highest standards of living. The ruling elite of the developing countries also enjoy a relatively better life in the urban centers, while the rural masses as well as the urban proletariat are kept away from modern life advantages which they cannot afford.

The colonization process in Algeria took a very long time through which the best land was confiscated and distributed to European settlers. Many goals were to be realized through land confiscation, such as subjugation of the people, cultural up-rooting, and destruction of the family's socioeconomic structures. The mediterranean countries saw Algeria as their source of food, as Jonsson asserts:

"The Romans, for example, considered Algeria and other Maghrebin countries as their granary and everytime that cereal deliveries are stopped, it is the famine at the metropole..." (Jonsson, 9)

The essential was to provide land to the newcomers. This policy pushed back the Algerian peasants to remote and poor areas which fact caused so many of them to seek refuge in other countries and organize open revolts. Both country people and town dwellers participated in

continuous outmigration throughout the colonial era: 1830, 1832, 1860, 1875, 1888, 1898, 1910, and 1911. (Lacheraf, 217) Laws of land confiscation were also clearly intended to create inequality among the peasants by dividing them into owners and proletariat in order to weaken social solidarity and break up prevailing mutual help. Nouschi reported the following views of some French observers:

"There was at the bottom of that chaos some guarantee for work, a certain sentiment of equality. With the beginning of individualization it will no longer be the same. Once the land is definitely acquired, inequality begins: on one side the owners, on the other side the proletariats, exactly as in our civilized societies." (in Wolf, 213)

Wolf supports the idea that tribe dismembering and relocating attempts failed because the French recognized local councils (Djamaa) and granted them considerable autonomy. This autonomy was not granted, in my view. Rather, the Europeans did not or could not care about local community affairs. This fact is shown by the three types of communal systems: full power with the European majority, mixed power with the European minority, and military rule where no Europeans lived. The federated system dominated in the distant regions where colonial influence was avoided:

"This was true because conquerors could not and had no interest entering these regions and staying for long periods of time." (Kouache, 1979, 21)

So, the French had to rely on locally imposed Bachagha, Agha, and Caid (Turkish names of military officers) whose roles included collecting taxes and performing administrative chores. Village councils were real managers and decision-makers at a local level. Wolf considered these councils:

"Both open and hidden councils maintained thus a tradition of decision-making on the local level, despite the fact that the tribal structure had been dismantled. They thus maintained also a tradition of self-management which was to prove of capital importance in aiding the rebel cause in 1954." (Wolf, 217)

The colonial system destroyed local socioeconomic structures before building its own system. The negative impact of colonialism is seen through the persistent poverty and underdevelopment that reached the whole countryside where the large majority of the Algerians lived before the liberation war uprooted their society once again:

"Rural-urban antagonism has persisted in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Algeria. The rural society was strong despite all problems it suffered. The suffering held it united. It was uprooted only during the liberation war that took more than seven years. Independence did not heal its wounds but finished it up." (Kouache, 1984, 14)

More important is the fact that not only were the best lands appropriated by the settlers causing poverty but the situation was exacerbated by demographic growth and the fact that these lands were used to produce cash crops to serve French and other European markets. This forced the peasants to produce their own food on the poor lands, while the settlers monopolized the most profitable products: 90 percent of early fruits, wine grapes and citrus fruits accounted for 65 percent of farm revenue and were Algeria's principal exports. Tobacco production grew from 800 kg. exported in 1843 to 215,837 kg. in 1847. (Kouache, 1979, 43) The vineyard acreage more than doubled between 1900 and 1954 at the expense of food crops and pasture. (Wolf, 223)

A consequence of colonialism, therefore, was to create a marginal, poor, and underdeveloped society known as the "traditional" sector:

"The Algerian peasantry, crowded into the least productive lands, attempted to eke out a bare subsistence.

About two thirds of the Algerian population lived in the land at the time of independence, but only half actually owned small plots. The rest were either unemployed, displaced, sharecroppers, seasonal, or permanent agricultural workers. More than ninety per cent of this agricultural population existed within the traditional sector, where extreme poverty and backwardness prevailed." (Merip, 47)

The striking fact, however, is that some social theories postulate that rural people resist change and modernization and see them as having backward behavior. Effectively, some participants to the International Seminar on Culture, Society, and Development, that took place in Algiers in June 1982, defended the idea of peasants refusing modernization due to social and cultural values and beliefs. Wolf, also, has placed much emphasis in his concluding chapter that the "rebelliousness" of peasants is for the sake of the ultimate aim "to remain traditional". This statement has been accepted by Landsberger who argued that this would occur if uneven improvement takes place at a time when the peasantry still has vivid memory of an earlier communal existence. (Landsberger, 36)

The idea of peasant backward mentality is considered an obstacle with respect to national development. The peasant works little, just to satisfy family needs. There seems to be nothing else to do than to wait for the future to change the peasants' mentality in developing

countries. Mbunga, the Tanzanian minister of information, pointed out:

"It is very difficult to change their mentality from agricultural family production to a national vision. Much time is needed and more tact is to be used with people who have, for generations, worked this way." (AA. Jan. 27 - Feb. 2, 1983)

It seems that the backward-looking theory of the peasant has survived the colonial era when the colonized societies were viewed as being primitive, archaic, backward, non-logical, and non-economic. Nobody can deny the importance of social and cultural values and beliefs in social change. The problem, however, is in the very meaning of social change and the effects of modernization which the peasants resist. For the peasants of developing countries, modernization meant "westernization" entailing as a consequence, more poverty, exploitation, and inequality. Rural areas are the most underdeveloped of the newly independent nations. Peasants resisted changes that worsened their living conditions through reduced economic status, and imposed more taxes or reduced their land holdings. They resisted programs imposed from above which did not serve their own interests or satisfy their real needs. Economic reasons prevented peasants of Algeria, Tanzania, and other developing countries from playing their full and genuine economic role in the post-colonial era. They lack agricultural inputs, storage facilities, market, supply of machinery, and suffer from low prices and lack of adequate social amenities that would incite them to produce more. Huntington, rightly asserted that peasant revolts "have typically aimed at the elimination of specific evils and abuses." (In Landsberger, 27) Peasant demands could be limited to land as in the

Mexican and Bolivian cases, return of the exiled Sultan as in the case of Morocco, or to the removal of the late Shah of Iran whose dictatorship (not his modernization) was responsible for his ouster. These demands, however, could be wider as in the case of East European peasants, for instance, who:

"...envisaged the use of new, modern institutions with their request for education, state credits, improved agricultural techniques and parliamentary representation." (Landsberger, 39)

The Algerian peasantry was heavily involved in the revolts against oppression and foreign occupation, notably during the liberation war. Rural discontent was so deep that while men formed more than 80 percent of the liberation army, women and children as well as those who could not directly participate provided extremely important assistance to the fighting forces — food, shelter, information, and moral support. Peasants were ready for the war a long time before it started. Women as well as men had their rifles as in Aures, Eastern Algeria, as mentioned by some members of the "Special Organization" at the First Seminar of the History of the Revolution. These peasants lost appetite for land and tired of working hard to obtain so little. They did not participate in the war in order to "remain traditional" as Wolf mentioned, nor did they want to retake the lands of their ancestors stolen by the settlers. The facts cannot justify the idea that peasants aimed only at recovering of lands as can be understood from Hadj Ali's statement that:

"the cherished dream of the poor peasant is to come down one fine day into the fertile valleys and recover the land of his ancestors, stolen by the colonialists." (Alexandrov, 353)

It is partly true, however, that the lack of socioeconomic program or development ideology for the post-independence period gave way to free speculation about the future. The FLN first manifesto of November 1, 1954 did not specify any socio-economic program. It was rather limited to national liberation. The Soummam Congress that took place in 1956 did mention briefly the peasants' need to recover land, as did the Tripoli program of 1962. However, the French-Algerian agreement that ended the war gave the settlers the right to stay on their properties. They were called back when they left the country at the independence time but never came back. One fact was very clear to all peasants, namely, that the colonial power has been a major obstacle against their aspirations and dream of emancipation.

Post-Colonial Development

Nobody can deny the major role played by the poor Algerian peasants during the national liberation war against French occupation. This very large proportion of Algerians, however, still live in the marginal traditional sector which has been systematically overlooked by the regime. The liberation war seriously uprooted the peasantry, and poverty only worsened after independence (MERIP, 48 and 67; Kouache, 1979; Agrarian Revolution Charter). The rural people suffered more than any other social category from the colonial deprivation and despite the fact that they bore the largest burden of the war, they benefitted the least from independence. This is true because the newly independent countries:

"have retained almost intact, the colonial structure, and also maintained close relations with

their old master (...) on the contrary, one school of thought insists that colonialism is the real father of underdevelopment." (Khan, I)

If western colonialism created and fostered underdevelopment, continuing close relations with that sector continues to play the same role as before independence. Some colonial characteristics such as elitism, centralization, and paternalism are more than ever in operation in the same developing countries, including Algeria, without any necessary physical presence. This explains why poverty, high illiteracy rate, malnutrition and even famine, high infant mortality, and low level of life expectancy, still prevail in many of these countries. They are the results of underdevelopment and dependency. Such conditions result from the policies of the more advanced countries with the help of the governing elites of the periphery countries. To quote Johnson:

"Poverty is worldwide and is in part based on an economic exploitation. Everywhere the poor are excluded from access to institutions through which they might improve their wretched material existence. They are shut off from education; Labor unions shun them; the political system ignores, excludes, or represses them.

In sum, the poor everywhere are undernourished and sick and die younger; they live in housing unfit for humans; they are exploited and subject to appalling social injustices. (Johnson, 270)

Poverty and Famine

Absolute poverty has reached 800 million people in the developing world and is still growing, according to the 1978 World Bank Report. Not only does poverty continue to grow but people continue to die from

starvation in many developing countries. The reasons are multiple, according to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. They range from problems in the natural environment to man-made causes such as drought, flood, disease, political strife, rapid population growth, lack of modern technology, and social systems that are responsible for the persistent famine as in Africa (FAO; 1982, 7, 15). Some fifty children died in less than two weeks from hunger, that is, from August 19 to 30, 1980, in the North Central African Republic. The famine was caused by flood, migrant locusts, and the arrival of a large number of Chadian refugees (Le Monde, Sept. 7-8, 1980). Around 600,000 to one million Eritrean people have been severely affected and in desperate need of famine relief due to political strife. Food shortages caused 40,000 deaths from starvation in Mozambique in 1983 and it is speculated that nine to ten people may be starving everyday in the southern part of that country. (Detroit Free Press, Dec. 12, 1983 and USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984)

The most important fact to note is that the rural poor suffer more from poverty and famine than urban dwellers, according to FAO report:

"famine (...) does not develop in big cities or metropolitan areas in peace time. This is partly because sources of livelihood for the urban poor are less susceptible to sudden variations, partly because urban dwellers are normally the first to benefit from relief measures in times of emergencies, and partly because they have the political means to resist food shortages. Nearness to trade channels, access to modern storage facilities, and more effective price control all combine to assure the urban population a degree of protection usually unavailable to rural poor." (FAO, 1982, 7)

Not only is food shortage causing starvation but also rural poor cannot afford to buy available food. While some 150 million people in 24 African countries are facing starvation, US government is paying millions of dollars to American farmers in order not to produce food and milk (USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984). Lappe supported the idea that hunger is not due to lack of food because when it is seen as scarcity, agriculture becomes the new growth industry. Those who have the necessary means — land, capital, literacy, and technology — push tenants off the land and increase the number of landless poor. "You get more food, yet more hunger." Hunger in many nations is often due to unjust regimes. The Philippines, for instance, doubled its food production in the last ten years but Filipinos are the worst fed people in Asia (The Lansing Star, Nov. 21-27, 1980).

In his first press conference as the USA Secretary of Agriculture within the first Reagan Administration, John Block declared that "food is a great weapon". Robert McNamara ex-Secretary of Defense and ex-President of the World Bank, felt guilty when he addressed the annual joint meeting of the 141-Nation International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for the last time. He tearfully condemned the USA for its "disgraceful" record in alleviating global poverty, which he sees as:

"...an open insult to the human dignity of us all (...) for we have collectively had it in our power to do more to fight poverty and we failed to do so." (The State News, Oct. 1, 1980)

Tears will not police poverty or any of the socio-economic problems of 1.3 billion people, more than one quarter of the world population, who

are still earning no more than \$200 a year per capita, as McNamara himself mentioned.

George Shultz, Secretary of State, seems to confirm the idea of "too little, too late" while promising a \$500 million economic package for Africa over five years. Because America responds, as he puts it, "when people are hungry and dying" not before that happens. Starvation is taking place now, notably in African countries of Mozambique, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Upper Volta, etc. Among the African nations with the greatest need for more food are the following according to FAO, as reported by USA Today, Jan. 31, 1984:

Country	Requirements	Imports	Remaining Needs
Ethiopia	400	00	400
Ghana	370	75	395
Mali	275	99	176
Mauritania	216	78	138
Mozambique	600	62	538
Senegal	838	445	393
Somalia	340	5	335
Tanzania	340	103	237
Upper Volta	150	60	90
Zambia	300	123	177

The above numbers speak for themselves. Thanks to gas and oil money, Algeria is not among these countries. Bessis maintains that Sahel countries have considerable agricultural resources and not only can become self-sufficient today, but they can also become exporters in the reasonable future. The food aid can in the best case alleviate the temporary deficit but cannot eliminate structural dependency. It is aimed at maintaining the situation in which donor countries are allowed to gain markets for their agricultural products, keep countries at

their mercy and make this chapter of aid appear in the eyes of ill-informed public opinion as a disinterested charity. These economic, political, and psychological goals of food aid also accentuate the false idea that the receiving countries are unable to satisfy their own needs through internal development of food products. The peasant, weakened by disloyal competition of imported products sold cheaply in the city and deprived of the natural market, can make only ridiculously small gains from selling surpluses left over after rural self-consumption. (Le Devoir, Nov. 22, 1980)

The above description applies perfectly to the Algerian case where rural people suffer from one of the lowest levels of caloric food intake in the world -- even worse than conditions in India according to a 1970 United Nations Report -- but diminishing food production started long before independence and forced the government to resort to import much of the needed foodstuffs. At the same time food demand increases due mainly to rapid demographic growth and the supply is decreasing due to abandonment of land and a rural-urban exodus. The tendency should be reversed in order not only to limit growing dependency, but also to avoid eventual hunger and malnutrition. Spending on food represented 54 percent of the total Algerian consumption in 1979 and it is expected to be 46 percent in 1984. The cost of food imports has been estimated to be 43.75 billion A.D. (Algerian Dinars) for the period of 1980-84. This is the fifth of all imported goods and 16 percent of the total imports, including services. Nine billion A.D. are regularly allocated to food import every year (AA. April, 21-7, 1983).

Food import costs increased from 1,075 million A.D. in 1972 to 4,200 million A.D. in 1974, while agricultural exports amounted to 664 million A.D. in 1974 as against 910 million A.D. in 1973. (Sari, 1) About 20 percent of oil income is spent on food imports, according to Bessis (1979). Paul confirms this in the following passage: "By 1975, the regime had to spend nearly a quarter of its oil earnings on food imports." (in Merip, 67) The food import budget constantly increases due to the abandonment of the traditional sector, the non-profitable state sector whose workers are joining the best wage-paying sectors, and to non-stable agrarian reform sector where reforming the reform is now going on according to "trial-error" methods. The cost-of-living is perhaps the most expensive worldwide, despite heavy imports. The government spent some three billion dollars for food import in 1979 and the President's pledge that year to make the public sector more efficient has gone nowhere. (New York Times, Nov. 18, 1980)

To the weak national production is added the lack of a good marketing system. The private wholesalers, in fact, contribute largely to the market destruction. They monopolize around 80 percent of the fruits and legumes market without being officially registered as traders nor supervised by any meaningful control at the price level. They pay no taxes and are free to buy and sell as they like. The cost of meat is between 70 and 90 AD kg. (around \$14 and \$19). Potato, a popular food, is sold by producers at 1,40 AD kg. and found at 6 AD in the retailer's shelves, etc. (AA. Oct. 7-13, 1983) These conditions keep food producers from producing for market. Food shortages,

therefore, in Algeria as well as in other developing countries, are not naturally caused but due to socioeconomic policy since:

"no category of causes is 'natural' in the sense of being independent of or beyond human action."
(FAO, 1982,7)

Capitalist Development

Peasants of many developing countries, as they did before independence, are paying the price of the capitalist mode of production and development which has overlooked the agricultural sector already decimated during the colonial era. Effectively, Algeria has followed this route, despite theoretically calling the route socialism. State capitalism was the only choice in post-colonial Algeria because the national bourgeoisie was too weak to play any significant developmental role. The colonial system has been kept intact and the way to go was indicated by Western experts. According to W. Rostow: after appropriate stimulation from the West by government aid, foreign investment and modern education, the economies of the developing countries will take off — the metropolises will then pull their hinterlands up behind them. This theory did not work and the main reason was that western influence does not, structurally, develop underdeveloped economies, in order to 'take-off' and to permit local control. Hierarchy here is quite clear, the first to be served was foreign investment and the capitalist world market. Hence, as Allen says:

"growth is promoted only to meet the needs of the capitalist world market and to enable foreign investors to increase their profits. Foreign 'aid'

and investment allow the dominant nations to extract Africa's economic surplus, further impoverishing African countries and making them more underdeveloped." (Allen, 26)

The educated colonial elite made this possible because of the very simple colonial economic, social, and cultural impact. The rural masses were put aside during the colonial era, while a small minority of citizens benefitted from a combination of traditional and colonial-derived resources and have become the political and economic elites. The developing countries during this period supplied raw material — ores, oil, timber, and agricultural products — which did not require advanced education or work skills. Again, to quote Allen:

"As these elites prosper, they are drawn even more fully into the western ideology that they learned first in colonial mission schools, individualistic competitiveness, the value of private property, consumption-oriented ideas of status and prestige, and the manners, etiquette, and life-style of 'ladies' and 'gentlemen'. They develop a strong common interest with western elites." (Allen, 26-7)

Such is the reason these elites kept the colonial status quo that gives them their share of the wealth extracted from natural resources and the labor of masses. Among other general characteristics of these elites is that they are bureaucratic and commercial and not entrepreneurial. They do not hold wages down because discontented organized working groups would be a great threat to government stability. The post-colonial African governments tried to retain more surplus and expanded education, but the basic pattern holds. The richest in natural resources are more strongly tied to the world

capitalist market and least in control of their own development. (Allen, 27-8) Algeria is among these rich countries that suffers from colonial legacy. The colonial policy continues to reign in the post-colonial era, thanks to its educated elites.

Amin agreed with Rostow's theory that the capitalistic production relationship appeared first in the rural areas but was resisted by the feudal mode. These relationships were transferred to urban centers where they achieved their form, leaving agriculture behind. As they took shape and dominated the whole life, agriculture, then, was completely and deeply integrated. (Amin, 27) This theory failed in the periphery capitalist formations. The state capitalist industry that consumes much of the oil and gas income also is not prospering. The strict theory of developing industry first, to the point of neglecting agriculture was not helpful despite using most available resources and efforts in this sector. Prestige, rather than effective socioeconomic rules prevailed in the Algerian type of development. It is usual to hear that Algeria got the largest factory or the biggest ship in the world, etc. But the price of such a factory or its necessity to national economy was never mentioned. The cost of a gas liquefaction unit was equal to eight years of the agricultural budget. Industry input is much larger than output and some factories actually turn out as little as 20 to 30 percent of their productive capacity. Anarchy and misuse of the existing potentials have been terrible as A. Brahimi, present prime minister, pointed out in a TV program (Open Dialogue) during the 1979 summer: national corporations have no known

capital, nobody knows if they are making profit or not, and their importance is defined by the amount of oil money they are spending. This economic bureaucratic elite seems unhappy with what it is getting legally. Other ways and all means are being used to serve personal friends and family interests against the state and public interests. The president's notice number 19 concerning protection of public property is very meaningful in this context.

Dependency on the Capitalist World

Algeria is now as before tied to Western Europe and more specifically to the old colonial power whose political leaders are still dealing with this country in a paternal way. Commenting on the last French-Algerian gas supply contract, Cheysson, foreign minister, called it politely — "not a mere commercial contract but a fundamental agreement on development". Beregovoy, Secretary General of Elysee palace, expressed the meaning clearly in terms of a favor done to Algeria: "It demonstrates the determination of Paris to contribute to the valorization of the natural resources of developing countries." (The London Times, Feb. 4, 1982) This very close relationship with the capitalist industrial countries seems to be the main cause of this persistent underdevelopment. From among around 5000 contracts between Algeria and foreign partners between 1973 and 1978, 70 percent went to the European Economic Community (EEC), 60 percent of which went to France alone. The socialist countries got only four percent, while just three percent went to Arab, Latin America, and Asian countries, Japan not included. (AA. June 12-18, 1980) Different means are being

used to strengthen this exploitative relationship. Algeria is forced, within the capitalist world market to export, almost exclusively, one product, energy, which represented 95 percent of the total exports in 1978 and 98 percent in 1982, according to Statistics Review. (Alch-Chaab, May 16, 1984) The country's wealth is shared by external loans, multinational corporations, in the form of technical assistance and supply of technology and national corporations' wasteful spending. Not much is left to other sectors of activity.

In fact, income from energy exports has been the main resource for both industry and agricultural investments. Neither one is helpful to the other. Total dependency on oil is Algeria's contemporary condition. Almost the entire state budget is based on this source of income, and every project or import is estimated in number of barrels of oil. This includes products such as bananas, red cheese, frozen fish, oil, bread, milk, site building, machinery, semi-manufactured products for factories, all programs, as well as administrative spending and waste are financed by crude oil and natural gas exports. Although oil production decreased from 52 million tons in 1979, to 47 million tons in 1980 and 44 million tons in 1981, Algeria has lowered the barrel price \$2.50 since October 1981. (AA. May 1-7, 1981) This was made possible thanks to natural gas export. The London OPEC Conference decided to keep its production level at 17.5 million barrels per day. This is divided among its members as follows (in million barrels per day and preceded by March 1982 production):

Table 1: OPEC Production Quotas for 1982-83

<u>Country</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Algeria	0.65	0.75
Equator	0.20	0.20
Gabou	0.15	0.15
Indonesia	1.30	1.30
Iraq	1.20	1.20
Iran	1.20	2.40
Kuwait	0.80	1.05
Libya	0.75	1.10
Nigeria	1.30	1.30
Qatar	0.30	0.30
United Arab Emirates	1.00	1.10
Venezuela	1.50	1.675

Source: El-Moudjahid, March 17, 1983.

Saudi Arabia, the biggest producer of all, was left with no specific quota but expected to satisfy and fill market needs. (El Moudjahid, March 17, 1983) The table shows Algeria gaining 0.10 million barrels per day while some other members were losing because they could not increase their quotas of production. The country was able to compensate for steadily declining oil production (1.2 million barrels per day in 1979, 1.0 in 1980, 0.65 in 1982, and 0.75 in 1983) by exporting more natural gas to Western Europe, that is, France, Italy, and Belgium, among others. The figures reported by the New York Times (Nov. 18, 1980) are not correct since Algeria has never produced quantities as great as 438 million barrels in 1979. The right figures are reported above. It is true that because of rising prices, earnings have risen dramatically, but if the price went up from \$15 a barrel to \$37, some six years ago, it did also go down to \$29 in 1983. The gas price, however, did jump from \$3.70 per unit to around \$5.10 lately,

but it is still \$1.50 lower than other OPEC members' price and \$0.60 higher than that of the Soviet Union sold to Western European countries.

The Algerian gas price is, in fact, high compared to that sold by the Soviet Union to France and West Germany (\$4.50/per unit) but low when compared to that asked for by OPEC and especially Algeria. Japan, however, agreed to pay for gas from Malaya, Indonesia, and Abu Dhabi at an equivalent oil price level. Mexico and Canada export their gas to the USA at a price based on the crude-oil price as set by OPEC while the Algerian partners have refused this basis. (The London Times, Feb. 8, 1982; AA. June 5-11, 1980) The point here is that, even though Algeria is an integrated part of the capitalist world, her partners of the industrial countries deny her an equal share. If French, in fact, are paying \$1.50 less than the OPEC price, other West European partners may pay even less than that. The country is, consequently, losing a great amount of money since as B. Nabi, Minister of Energy, pointed out, each cent of the price is worth millions of dollars per year. For the French partner to pay this low price and secure long term gas supply is seen as a favor done to Algeria by contributing to valorize its natural resources. This should not be true since:

"European countries which could increase their production to meet their needs (France, West Germany, and Italy) notably Britain and Norway have taken policy decisions not to do so for a mixture of economic and security of supply reasons." (The London Times, Feb. 8, 1982)

Foreign loans are still another means of exploitation. Rostow's theory does not apply to developing countries since foreign invest-

ments first serve industrial countries. The countries richest in natural resources are most interesting to foreign creditors and Algeria is among them. It has, in fact, no problem in obtaining loans to export to these countries because of its impeccable reputation for repayment. Its external debt service that amounted to around \$8.800 billion in 1980 and 1981 has been quickly paid, thanks to ending at least three projects of planned factories of gas liquefaction implying certain of the most expensive technologies in the world. Spending for existing corporations was also reduced in order to spend more on other programs of social interest. The country is being considered as a big borrower while its income from oil and natural gas reached \$13 billion in 1981, a figure that is 20 percent higher than that of 1980. Appreciable increase of income is expected with gas delivery to Italy and France. This will compensate for the reduction of oil production and annulment of the El Paso giant contracts on February 1981. (El Moudjahid, March 16, 1982)

Algeria, therefore, does not have the problem many developing countries are facing today. They are tied up by foreign loans they cannot repay. Only five to six developing nations were unable to repay their debt in the previous five years, according to Clausen, World Bank president. There were around 25 countries in 1983 which asked for repayment delays. The most famous of these nations are from Latin America as shown below (according to Al-Hadaf, December 19, 1983): Argentina \$39 billion, Brazil \$95 billion, Chile \$18 billion, Mexico \$90 billion, Peru \$12 billion, and Venezuela \$32 billion.

Algeria faces a growing dependency on industrial countries since its main foreign currency income comes from oil and gas. Some 50 percent of this income is being drained away by external loans. This single product is sold to capitalist countries which are making large profits from it. Algeria has paid \$16.3 billion between 1979 and 1982 as debt, thanks to oil income which increased from 75 percent in the seventies to 98 percent in 1983. The five dollar a barrel price reduction for oil will create a loss of \$3.7 million a day for oil only. The 15 percent reduction in the price of gas will create a loss of 850 million French Francs with France alone (AA, April 7-13, 83). External loans are not used to serve the national economy and popular masses. Rather, foreign interest is the main goal, as Mandel points out:

"Loans to foreign countries are tied up in mining, industrial, or harbour installations, or plantations which have to be protected against the 'ignorant', 'lazy', 'fanatical', or 'xenophobic' mass of natives. The age of monopoly capitalism has rapidly become the age of the revival of colonialism." (Mandel, 452)

Gas liquefaction is extremely costly — \$3.5 billion to build a factory of natural gas liquefaction (NGL). Algeria has three factories producing 21.5 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Gas transformation and transportation costs are seven times the oil cost. Some 25 percent of gas production is consumed in the complex which is five times higher than that of oil. This explains why nearly half of the 90 percent of external income from gas and oil is being drained through foreign loans alone. (AA. June 5-11, 1980)

Beside loans, technical assistance and transfer of technology represent excellent means of center-periphery domination and exploitation. The Algerian case is a good example of this fact since this country has provided not only a market for machinery and a new technology testing but a good job market as well for expatriates. A new technology of gas liquefaction is, in fact, now being tested in Algeria at its own expense and not yet in use in the countries of origin. Some five hundred of the 1600 employees of Arzew number one (NGL) are technical assistants who are paid huge wages in foreign currency in addition to other benefits and services. New assistants are taught by Algerian colleagues when it comes to practical knowledge after which they become their bosses. Assistants and assisted are reversed in this situation and it has created a deep feeling of uneasiness, frustration, and bitterness among Algerian workers and staff. As for the cost, B. Nabi, energy minister, declared:

"We have exchanged gas against men in 1978. This means that Algerian gas income was equal to spending on technical assistance, which fact is also true for 1979. This is the contract of the century." (AA. June 12-18, 1980)

Nabi's statement does not seem to reflect the entire reality as to different technical assistance costs. Beside workers' discontent with their low wages compared to those of assistants, there are other elements causing unhappiness. For example, they are not allowed to hold jobs corresponding to their competence which means misuse or non-use at all of Algerian human and technical potentials. Further, they enjoy less adequate housing units than their colleagues and the

labor union representative is not allowed to participate in the decision-making body as is the case in other productive units. This means that the socialist collective management is not in force and workers have no say in this sector. The technical assistance cost, in terms of money, was \$47 billion, this being higher than the income from energy and the difference is great since it amounted to \$290 million between March 1978 and June 1979. This amounts to \$1.5 million a day should El Paso contract be maintained. Worker discontent is expressed in different ways, for example, in turnover and absenteeism. (AA. June 5-11, 1980)

Technical assistance is not exclusive in the energy sector where it could be justified, but rather is a general phenomenon found in every sector of the society. High technology may be needed in some sectors but the high cost to Algeria is not justified. Resorting to technical assistance in this way shows that the previously colonized people have lost self-confidence and have underestimated national potentials which are often misused or not used at all to help solve difficult local problems. The crisis is very sharp in the housing sector, for instance, where some 150,000 Algerian families are living in shantytowns surrounding major cities in addition to the overcrowded housing units. The shantytown phenomenon is very old and found even in the more advanced nations, but its steady growth presents a real danger, a time bomb for the near future if not solved in developing countries. The technical school of urbanism (ETAU) educates architects whose help is not sought in this domain as Ould Henia, a school teacher asserts:

"We have technicians, engineers, and architects who have not given an opportunity to show their know-how.

They will be very happy to think and find out real Algerian solutions to this problem." (AA. Nov. 19-25, 1981)

Boudel, another school staff confirmed the above statement of his colleague:

"The university is educating architects who are entrusted with no project, even the university housing is realized by technical assistants. ETAU's study office is seeking jobs." (AA. Nov. 19-25, 1981)

So, while national experts are not called upon, foreign study groups are asked for help. The new division of labor seems to go like this: We, Algerians pay and you, expatriates conceive and realize. These are a few examples, among many others, where money, time, and effort are lost due to lack of adequate planning and coordination.

The national corporations, in charge of national economy, are responsible for a large part of economic problems and wasteful spending. Several examples may illustrate. Among the best known damages are realization delays where a project can go four to five times its initial cost and the corporation in charge can still survive because of the state support; importing products which are locally produced and facing marketing difficulties; and the port of Algiers perhaps the most famous locus of waste. President Chadli himself declared in a labor union meeting in 1982 that billions of dollars of merchandise remain in the port and nobody knows who bought them. Built to serve limited colonial imports and exports, the port has known no

meaningful expansion to satisfy new and more important economic activities in the post-independence era. For more than a decade, the port has suffered a chaotic situation and all attempts from the government, party and mass-organizations, have failed to remedy it. The damages are devastating. Tons and tons of costly abandoned technologies and foodstuffs, machines rusted out even before leaving port, and parcels of drugs torn open under a blazing sun illustrate conditions. Many ships patiently wait to unload and the waiting cost has been estimated to represent as much as a large proportion of the cost of the four year plan and would permit the purchase of at least some of the waiting ships. The port authorities estimate the cost of the merchandise delays to equal the building of a half port in foreign currency every year. (AA. August 5-11, 82; April 14-20, 83; July 7-13, 1983)

These corporations are protected by law and cannot go bankrupt, whether making profit or not. Some corporations not only work at very low capacity and spend all their income in wages but they tend to rely on bank credit to pay wages year after year.

Colonial Reconstruction

The concept of development is known to have originated from early western experience of local programs. The term "community development" was in the USA since the 1930's to denote community participation in municipal planning. It was used to describe government programs to stimulate local initiative within development activities since 1940's.

Thus, the roots of this program extended into many developing countries between 1950 and 1965, including:

- A. British colonial service experiments that took place mainly in Asia;
- B. USA and European voluntary agency activities abroad and;
- C. USA and British domestic programs in adult education, community development services, and social welfare.

(Holdcroft, 5-6)

Development programs therefore were limited to less developed areas to help the poor and disadvantaged. The objectives are in larger part noneconomic. From local areas, Mellor sees development in terms of economic growth when defining the concept as a:

"Process by which a population increased the efficiency with which it provides desired goods and services thereby increasing per capita levels of living and general well-being. The process is a dynamic one, involving constant change in the structure and procedures of the economy. In relatively high-income countries, where a large and complex administrative structure, and a high rate of capital formation are more readily available, growth tends to proceed more rapidly than in low-income countries." (Mellor, 3)

Agricultural development has a great role in that process, since its main objectives are to provide: food and fiber for an expanding population, increased purchasing power, capital including foreign exchange for the economic transformation, and increasing rural welfare. In addition to these, a labor force is provided for industry as well as a market for industrial sector output. (Mellor, 129) The above are economic rather than social objectives.

Johnson's definition is different from Mellor's since he focuses more on social justice in addition to considering increasing production as a positive aspect. Development always implied a:

"Process of economic and social change for better. Few analysts have stopped to ask themselves if these changes could be for the worse or if changes could be better for sectors of society and worse for other sectors.

"It is useful to retain the positive value placed in terms of development, and to formulate the proposition that development is first of all the development of man out of conditions of exploitation, poverty, and oppression. The concept also needs to be firmly grounded in social science theory. The second proposition, then, is that development always involves changes in the basic institutions and structure of society." (Johnson, 272-3)

It should not be true that the poor are poor because they are poor as the circular argument suggests:

"Many obstacles to development are both a cause and consequence of poverty. As such there are circular relationships that perpetuate the low level of development." (Meier and Baldwin, 319)

Logically a phenomenon cannot be a cause and consequence at the same time, and to explain underdevelopment by poverty leads nowhere. Underdevelopment is caused, according to these two authors, by market imperfections that create a chain of phenomena: backwardness, low productivity, low real income, low saving, low investment, and capital deficiency (Page, 319). What this theory does not say is the reasoning that poverty did not come from without and that many developing countries where absolute poverty prevails can get rid of it with adequate planning of national economies and participation of popular

masses. Needless to say most if not all "poor countries" have development potentials but they are still suffering poverty.

It is obvious that relative poverty existing in the advanced countries is clearly different from the developing countries' absolute poverty. The latter has always represented a danger. This is why a whole philosophy of colonial rural development has been initiated in many colonized countries during the colonial era and later on so as to prevent rural discontent and protest against foreign and local elites and exploiters. The colonial power in Algeria tried to remedy the situation created by the colonial destruction and the first attempt was in 1893 when a board called Societe Indigene de Prevoyance (SIP) was organized to help Algerian society impoverished by the colonial system. The second attempt was in 1933 through the Societe Agricole de Prevoyance (SAP). The third and last attempt was made during the liberation war. It was more important but came too late to stop the war. The attempt, represented by the Plan of Constantine of 1958, could not succeed because the resisters saw it as a means of stopping the war in its third year.

India was a famous testing field for development theories that included a cooperative system imported from Germany as well as the Anglo-Saxon concept of local government with the hope that "local councils would radiate feelings of participation, banish apathy, and encourage local initiative." (Khan, 8) The experience was much more important than that of Algeria but fruitless because of contradicting principles of the experience and the colonial centralist elitist, and

paternalistic attitudes. The colonial ideology based on European superiority, benevolent occupation, and the white man's right to the guardianship of the colored man, was challenged and refuted by the nationalists.

F.L. Brayne was the philosopher of the colonial reconstruction in India and his ideology has been a major source of post-independence development programs: "Both the USA and United Nations drew heavily upon the synthesis of earlier rural reconstruction effort in India." (Holdcroft, 6) Brayne agreed with Gandhi about miserable village conditions but disagreed with him about the causes. Not the colonial system was the cause, as suggested by the nationalists and socialist agitators, but the misery of the villagers was due to their own ignorance, bad habits, folly, and vices. Their short-comings were: lazy farming, burning precious cow dung, poor hygiene, litigation, costly death and marriage feasts, female illiteracy, etc. The cure consisted in knowledge acquisition and reforming the vicious habits learning better methods of agriculture, health education, and social conduct. He also suggested to convert the colonial officer into a guide, philosopher, and friend of the villagers from the popular stereotype of an arrogant and corrupt bully. His slogans were: reform yourselves, help yourselves, and follow the official leader (Khan, 8-11).

The concept of community development (CD) also benefitted from charitable efforts to help the poor of the United States and Europe which focused mainly on the urban poor and was conducted under social

welfare policy. The United Nations' definition of social welfare is almost identical to (CD) objectives defined as:

"An organized activity that aims at helping towards a mutual adjustment of individuals and their social environment. This objective is achieved through the use of techniques and methods which are designed to enable individuals, groups, and communities to meet their needs and solve their problems of adjustment to a changing pattern of society and through cooperative action to improve economic and social conditions." (Holdcroft, 7-8)

Since initiative was considered as essential, the (CD) program provided a trained village level worker (VLW) to arouse and stimulate community initiative, as Brayne suggested. But the (U.N.) program is more interested in joining community and government efforts to build, rather, national economy than these small and isolated republics. The U.N. saw the program as a process:

"By which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social, and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress. (Holdcroft, 2)

The CD born during the cold war era and connected with its economic, political, and ideological objectives, was planned to oppose revolutionary doctrines and remove subversives threats by bringing people together into harmonious communities to promote permanent political peace and quick economic growth. It just ignored socio-economic problems that made the program politically ineffective. Such problems are land distribution, elite exploitation, and urban-rural domination which could neither be ignored nor bypassed.

(Holdcroft, 26-7) Four crucial imperfections were found in the CD program:

1. It promoted welfare activities more effectively than production activities. It seemed particularly incapable of solving food crises;
2. It did not succeed significantly in forming harmonious communities nor did it secure general participation. The poorer classes remained as they were, apathetic and skeptical;
3. Reliance on its own agents and total collaboration with established leaders further confirmed the elitist and paternalist bias, a colonial heritage which inhibited the growth of true local initiative;
4. The role of the VLW as a generalist captain and coordinator was not acceptable to the special departments. Agricultural experts especially complained about the inadequacy of a multipurpose (VLW) as their agent. (Khan, 18)

Today's rural development programs in developing countries, planned to solve the same problems that arise from the increasingly threatening situations, are unable to benefit from previous rural development experience or to find out new ways and methods to cope with peasant problems. It seems that the political leaders of developing countries are not ready yet to take adequate measures and provide necessary means to gradually develop rural areas of their nations and

improve living conditions of the rural masses by providing equal opportunities to all citizens. Radical political changes are needed to ameliorate the economy of developing countries as a whole. Hewes suggested that political leaders should pay much attention to rural policy. He says:

"They should envision more clearly than they have their principal role as governing rural constituencies. They should accept as a fact of less developed countries (LDC) political life that a healthy and progressive rural sector is essential to national prosperity and stability." (Hewes, XXI)

If rural development is necessary and possible, social scientists can and should help in meeting its challenging problems. Their role consists in: "discovering the sources of self-generating growth and the means by which these resources may be nurtured and stimulated." (Mellor, 4) The following chapters of Part Two of the study are intended to examine realistically the situation of Algerian rural society, past and present.

PART TWO: BENI-CHEBANA: A CASE STUDY

CHAPTER IV: THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES

The Historical Setting

A brief look at the colonial administrative system may help to understand more fully the Algerian administrative situation today and its continuing underdevelopment. This vast country could not, in fact, be directly managed by the colonial power which had to delegate its authority to local allied families in the rural areas of the country. Caids (civil officers) were being chosen from these families to represent the central power at Duwar (communal) level of the countryside. The role of the caidal system was not, by any means, to serve local communities but rather to collect taxes, civil registration, and to exercise a watchful eye on behalf of the rulers. The caidal families served themselves as well as the colonial interests. They had no way of providing any meaningful service for local people or of caring about their specific problems. A caid could not have more than a single secretary (Khodja).

After destroying the existing local administration, the colonial power started building a new one suitable for serving the European minority in Algeria as a whole. The process of the administrative change took a long period of time. It required the whole colonial era to be achieved since it started in 1844 with the creation of a system called Arab Bureaus intended to take care of local affairs, up to 1956 when the 56-642 French decree of June 28, 1956 extended the French legislation of April 5, 1884 to Algeria and unified both systems under

a single communal rule. This radical change came too late because it took place during the liberation war, the events of which never allowed application. The military rather than civilians ruled the country during the whole war period through a system called Special Administrative Service (SAS) within the rural areas and Urban Administrative Service (UAS) in the urban areas.

The Algerian communal administrative was set up according to chronological order as follows: (AA, October 7-13, 1982 and Charter)

- 1844: Creation of the Arab Bureaus system to help achieve the conquest through data collection and to better master the local socio-economic situation;
- 1868: Two communal types were created according to European proportions: Full Exercise Communes (FEC) where they were a majority, as well as Mixed Communes (MC) where they were a minority and over military territories;
- 1870: Creation of Indigenous Communes (IC) where no European lived. These communes were managed by a civilian or military officer assisted by a municipal body composed of village council (Djamaa) presidents. This reached territories under civilian authority but not part of (FEC) or (MC);
- 1880: (IC) were terminated and only (FEC) and

(MC) survived within the civilian territory;

- 1937-45 Municipal Centers (MC) were created over mixed territories with a financial autonomy and a municipality composed of second class voters only, the Algerians;
- 1945: 29 (FEC), 97 (CM), and 158 (MC) successively existed by this time. The (FEC) had the judicial powers of French communes in addition to favoring Europeans with a segregated double voting system;
- 1956: The communal system was standardized but it was too late for the civilians to take control; and the military dominated again, up to the time of independence;
- 1962 Special delegations and socio-economic commissions of intervention were created to take care of communal affairs;
- 1963: On May 6, a reduction of the number of communes from 1,576 to 676; on March 22, the creation of communal councils for animation of the socialist sector; on September 18, the Constitution, officially consecrated the commune within the state system;
- 1966: The communal charter was approved by the

government on December 20th;

- 1967 The communal charter ordinance came in January 18th and the first Algerian communal elections were held on February 5th;
- 1976: Setting up of permanent elected members;
- 1981 The Wilaya (State level as compared to USA) order 67-29 defined five communal categories according to population size:
 1) less than 20,000; 2) more than 20,000 and less than 50,000; 3) more than 50,000 to 100,000; 4) more than 100,000 to 160,000; 5) more than 160,000 inhabitants. This was on October 11 and the 81-277 decree of October created the administrative corps of communal services;
- 1982: The 82-117 decree of March 27 created specific communal jobs such as advisory, etc.

The Effects of the Reduction Policy

Beni-Chebana, the subject of our study, shows clear negative effects of the regrouping policy of 1963. This commune was part of the Constantine department (district) when Algeria was divided into three departments by the colonial power. It became part of Setif department

when the French left. It is now part of Bejaia Wilaya, corresponding to French department or state (as in the USA), representing one of the Akbou's Daira (county in USA) communes, until December 31, 1984, when a new administrative reform went into effect. The commune was composed of four previous communes of Adjissa, Ait Mohli, Beni-Chebana, and Beni-Maouche, each of which was ruled by a Caid before the revolution war started and became a full commune at the end of war. The 1963 reform regrouped the four into one and Beni-Chebana became a leading center since then, while the other three ex-communes became dependent from then on and lost decision-making power to the leader in most aspects of life.

The reform just worsened the situation that was already not good. The vast territory of Beni-Chebana is not generally accessible during the rainy seasons. Most of its roads are not tarred and were opened only during the war. Only one bridge exists over Bousselam River, dividing the commune into two parts. The destitute and isolated commune is 60 Km from the Daira center and around 90 Km from Bejaia center. There is no direct link between Beni-Chebana and the Wilaya center. The regrouping policy created more problems than it solved. A high level official of the Daira said that elected officials from each of the four sections were biased in favor of their own territory. A high ranking party member confirmed that 50 percent of today's communal problems would be solved should the expected communal reform become effective one day. There is a general agreement among officials and citizens underlining the urgent need for administrative reform. Just

getting together is not easy because of distance, lack of roads, transportation means, and also regional conflicts. Neither Adjissa nor Beni-Maouche sections have representatives at communal or Wilaya assemblies at the present time and before the reform. This fact is a consequence of internal conflicts between the four parts composing this commune. The new reform to be put into effect on January 1, 1985 divides Beni-Chabana into three new communes: Ait Mohli and Beni-Chebana communes becoming parts of Setif Wilaya again with Beni-Ourtilane ex-commune of Bejaia as a Daira center, and Beni-Maouche including Adjissa to stay within Akbou's Daira, Wilaya of Bejaia.

The communal charter explained the communal regrouping in terms of the following facts: The full exercise communes (FEC) had no reason to exist after the settlers' departure and the municipal centers (MC) transformed quickly by the colonial power were not generally viable because of small size, under population, little or no equipment, lack of financial resources, and lack of necessary skilled staff. The regrouping policy was intended to reduce the number of communes, lower management spending, and increase personnel and financial means of the newly created communes (Communal Charter, 28-9). This version does not reflect the real situation and the objectives could not be achieved due to lack of technical and financial means, as well as the centralist policy. Beni-Chebana has never had trained personnel, its natural resources are not exploited fully, and its income is being spent largely on state over-cost projects mainly due to long distance from material supply centers and lack of skilled and well-equipped local

enterprises in charge of project realization. Those of urban centers do not accept rural projects for the above reasons and the bad local conditions.

The New Role of the Commune

The Algerian commune is seen as a basic cell of the revolution, a source of energy, and an initiator of action, according to the communal charter which emphasized two main aspects, namely, decentralization and serving the revolutionary power. But rather, the facts show a strict centralism when it comes to practical life. The commune has no autonomy with regard to law-making and cannot initiate local development programs, nor can it decide even on how its workers are paid and how much. The Wilaya must approve and define how much the communal workers are paid. It usually keeps wages so low as to prevent skilled workers from being a part of the commune's manpower. This is in addition to payment delays caused by the bureaucratic system. The commune merely represents the central power, as indicated by the charter itself.

"The commune should be in all cases in conformity with the plan's prescription (...) when it comes to realization. The national plan is, in itself, unique and not elaborated from the communal plans as to be their total." (Communal Charter, 33)

The communal bodies can only propose and suggest any political, administrative, socio-economic, and cultural plans that may or may not be considered by the planners at the national level. This fact created a wide gap between national plans conceived mainly by expatriates and unskilled national bureaucrats and local realities. The communal role is defined, in this respect, by the charter as follows:

"The commune participates in the elaboration of the national plan through providing the state structures for national development planning with propositions and suggestions related to possible and hoped for actions with regard to different communal development programs." (Communal Charter, 33)

Thus, the commune cannot initiate programs. Its main role in effect is limited to project realization which it cannot, really, fulfill without fully taking part in the first stages of planning and having adequate means. The state is supposed, according to the charter, to intervene to either unify, complete, and perfect communal actions or to wholly take charge of project realization beyond communal capacities. The state help, however, has not come to Beni-Chebana as expected since the state enterprises do not accept work within this commune due to its isolation, lack of primary facilities, and project cost over-runs. This helpless situation is not specific to Beni-Chebana alone. Rather, it is a general characteristic of all rural Algeria.

The Helpless Commune

The current situation of helpless Beni-Chebana can be summed up as follows: 1) a lack of a skilled labor force due to rural-urban exodus and the refusal of outsiders to come in; 2) the projected communal technical commissions simply do not exist here despite being of paramount importance for the commune to work as planned; 3) there are no high schools, no hospitals, no banks, and no factories. No central administration has had a representative agency in the commune. Should these exist, their personnel could be of a great help to the administrative and political structures, as is the case in urban and suburban communes of the country.

The newly-created communal enterprise cannot solve the problem of realization because of high project costs, lack of skilled manpower, and low wages which prevent skilled workers from working with the state sector. A young skilled mason was very frustrated when he received his pay. He was paid 47 Algerian dinars (AD) (around \$9.40) per day and was required to have his own working tools, while a non-skilled worker was paid 45 (AD) per day with no requirement whatsoever. Both worked at the same building site and at the same time. The private person pays the first 150 to 200 (AD) per day plus free food. The second is paid, in the private sector, 80 to 100 (AD) per day plus free food. The public sector does not pay for skill in addition to general low wages and payment delays that may take months after due dates. One of the enterprise officials summed up the most important difficulties the enterprise is facing: lack of skilled manpower not used to modern technology, broken materials due to a lack of experience, uncontrollable worker behavior, aggravated by the intervention of parents and friends against worker sanctions, costly field training, growth in careless spirit of workers and even destruction of the state properties, a continuation from the colonial era. The official, however, recognized the respectable efforts to provide equipment for the enterprise and thanked the local elected members to the national Popular Assembly (N.P.A.) for help.

The communal helplessness is made even worse by the Daira level helplessness. The following case supports the fact of the Daira's inability to help. A delegation of health care experts was scheduled

to come to choose a health center site at one of Beni-Chebana's hamlets but failed to come due to lack of transportation from the Daira center to the hamlet. The communal secretary general had to use his own car to provide this delegation round trip transportation the next day. A site was chosen for the same purpose and by the same delegation before, but a citizen whose land was to be used to open a road to the center refused. I attended a meeting with the members of this delegation and asked about the possibility of making a reliable cost estimate by considering the real cost caused by distant supply centers. The answer was quick and simple: "We did it once and it was refused at the Daira level." I asked the same question when the Wali (governor of the Wilaya) came with the minister of public construction to visit the area. The answer was that the ministry of planning's regulations require this. It seems that a cost standard has been set for every project at the national level, regardless of specific conditions of any nature.

The Communal Working Conditions

I had the opportunity to attend an Enlarged Communal Popular Assembly (E.C.P.A.) on November 24, 1982. This kind of assembly is expected to be attended by political leaders, administrative representatives, labor union members, and representatives of other mass organizations, as well as interested citizens. The meeting I attended by mere chance had been postponed twice before because of a large proportion of absentees. Three items were on the agenda:

1. A self construction project and material distribution for it.

2. A Tarfet drinking water supply project.
3. Trouna's urbanization land reserve perimeter.

The meeting was presided over by the Kasma coordinator and held in a perfectly democratic way. Every person present had a chance to express freely and defend his viewpoint. The first item took a long time and effort because of problems experienced previously on this matter and because of the special interest on the part of the people. The second item also took considerable time and demonstrated helpless administration at both Daira and commune levels.

The story of supplying Tarfet with drinking water was very controversial as shown by the meeting debate. The commune as a whole is rich in springs but each hamlet suffers from the lack of drinking water including the communal center, Tarfet. The approved water project could not be achieved. It failed in three successive attempts to supply water. The first attempt took place in the neighboring commune territory of Beni-Ourtlane which was stopped after the team worked about one month. The reason given was that one's own resources should be used before that of neighbors. The second attempt was made within the commune but rather distant in Ait-Afif territory. The working team also was stopped for the same reason. The third attempt also failed because the hamlet cluster whose water was used for garden irrigation asked that it be shared, not just taken from them. They wanted to be provided with part because they have no running water in their homes. Unfortunately, this was not possible, according to the

officials, for two reasons: the project budget would not be sufficient to satisfy the hamlet cluster demand and it was illegal to spend Tarfet project budget on another project. The Daira informed of these difficulties approved Beni-Ourtilane's refusal, and asked to build reservoirs in order to collect all running water to satisfy everybody's need. This was not possible as just mentioned.

The first item dealt with the problem of helping residents to build their own homes and the criteria for selecting new beneficiaries among the residents. Different views were also in conflict here and it took a long debate to agree on some principles to guide the selection process. A committee was formed to survey and study applicant cases. The third item took less time than the two others, in order to approve a technical study for Trouna's urbanization perimeter. My conclusion after attending that meeting was that the local administration is helpless in dealing with many problems. The badly needed help did not come to the commune and the problems still await solutions.

The Role of the Political Structure

There are three possible and different powers in rural Algeria: 1) the Party's Kasma, representing political power; 2) the communal bodies, representing the basic administrative cell in charge of local affairs; and 3) the strictly centrally controlled agencies, representing ministries and/or national corporations when they exist. The problem within this division of labor is the lack of coordination and cohesiveness much needed to help increase effectiveness in order to create better living conditions in the rural areas.

The Kasma's role is very important. It includes such areas of orientation, animation, and control at the communal level. It can intervene in the productive units through Party cells. However, these cells do not exist within Beni-Chebana because productive units do not exist as well. The communal bodies are under direct control of the Kasma which has the right to select elected communal members, preside over its general assemblies, participate in technical commission and propose, whenever needed, partial or total dismissal of members of the communal assembly, including the president. The Kasma, however, has no direct control over central agencies or national corporations. There is no relationship between the communal bodies and centrally controlled units within the communal territory since neither side has any control over the other. This looks detrimental to local administration that has no say over the main socio-economic events within the commune. The main exception, however, is made in the agrarian sector where the (E.C.P.A.) is helped either by a technical committee or a survey commission composed of the following representatives of the communal executive members, ministry of agriculture, ministry of finance, and the ministry of hydraulics. The last three have no representatives at Beni-Chebana, a fact that makes the (ECPA) unable to realize its mission as initially defined because of its technical handicap.

The Party Members

Beni-Chebana's Kasma is composed of eight cells distributed over the communal territory in 1983 as follows:

1. Ait Mohli, one cell, 7 party members

(with a special authorization due to the

limited number of members);

2. Beni-Chebana, one cell at Ait Afif, 20 members and three cells at Tarfet, 54 members;
3. Beni-Maouche, three cells at Trouna, 77 members.

The total of party members with full membership is 158 plus 56 aspirants to full membership. The average per cell is 19.75 members, aspirants not included. This is a very low average compared to that of urban and suburban areas where the party cells are very crowded. The number, however, is not that important despite the party's policy to increase the number of its members. This policy is based on the precept that: "who is not with you is against you." It is a shift from the previous policy that considered the FLN as an elite not as a mass Party.

Beni-Chebana's Party members suffer from a large problem, namely, low educational achievement in addition to small numbers and other problems. This low achievement is shown by the following distinctions, including both aspirants and full members: college level: zero; high school: 3; middle school: 25; elementary school: 53; ability to read and write: 65 and illiterate: 68. Other major obstacles the Party members face include: advanced age, distance of residences from cell location, usually between 10 to 15 Km, and more to the Kasma, in addition to the lack of any political and ideological education. The last phenomenon is nationwide and not specific to Beni-Chebana. Night

classes could not be given due to the long distances and lack of electrical lights. The general educational level could not be improved because there are no means at all. Such educational factors as libraries, newspapers, magazines, or movie theaters are not found in the entire commune today. Radios and TVs, where electric power was recently made available to some hamlets, are the only means of contact with the outside world. The Party members, however, may receive the Party's publication.

The Kasma has also control over mass organizations at the communal level. Such organizations are the labor union, 106 adherents; the peasant national union, 1556 members; the youth union, 316 adherents; and the war veterans organizations, 123 members. A woman's national union simply does not exist in this commune. Thus, the prevailing socio-economic conditions prevent Party members, mass organizations, as well as the total citizens from doing better than they are now doing. The following chapter will explore some educational aspects at Beni-Chebana.

CHAPTER V: THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The Historical Background

The commune of Beni-Chebana, and more specifically the Beni-Maouche and Adjissa sections, were among the most favored Algerian rural areas with regard to education in the recent past. The colonial power promoted a fairly large number of elementary schools in today's Beni-Chebana territory. Most of these schools were destroyed during the liberation war and not all of them have been rebuilt after independence. Such a case is M'Zita which has been programmed for a school but it has been postponed many times, according to hamlet residents. Taguenit started building its school eleven years ago but it is not yet finished -- that is, three classrooms, two housing units, and a canteen. Taguenit residents could not wait that long, so they managed to rebuild their school through their own means, while waiting for the state to build a more modern school with adequate housing and other facilities. There were four colonial schools in this commune before the war, but the educational level rarely went beyond reading and writing skills in French. No Arabic was taught in these schools. The school teachers were sent in from outside.

Ulema's Association of Ben Badis also promoted a free school system at Taguenit, Tioual, Aguemoune, and Adjissa which were hamlets of Beni-Maouche. These private schools were entirely financed by residents. The colonial administration opposed activities of this association and persistently harassed, jailed, and fined the school teachers for one reason or another. These schools, spread nationwide,

represented a threat to the colonial presence in this country. They took a defiant stand by teaching the Arabic language that had been excluded from the colonial public schools, a democratic religion calling for individual and national freedom, and nationalism among others. Each hamlet has, in addition to the two antagonistic public and private schools, its own mosque which provides religious teaching, services, and reading and writing skills to hamlet children. The mosque's expenses including Imam's wages were provided by the hamlet residents and income from Hubs lands (lands donated by citizens to serve the mosque's activities). The European settlers did not confiscate these lands as elsewhere, notably in the colonial areas. This important source of income to support the mosque helped a lot but the local communities had to bear a heavy economic burden to keep this institution alive. The spirit of sacrifice and mutual help, fortunately, prevailed among and between hamlet residents.

The Illiteracy Level

The illiteracy rate has significantly decreased at the national level, according to Revue Statistiques. The decrease was as follows between 1977 and 1982: 39.7 percent to 20 percent for the age bracket of less than 17 years; 68.3 percent to 51.6 percent for the 17-60 age bracket; and 92.6 percent to 90.7 percent for those 60 years old and over. The decrease is generally due to the increased proportion of school age children attending school — 50.5 percent in 1966; 70.4 percent in 1977; and 77.9 percent in 1982. Rural-urban differences in this respect, however, are great. Proportions in school reached 90.6

percent in urban areas, while the proportion was only 67.0 percent in rural zones. Parents in rural areas are blamed for taking girls out of school after only two to three years of schooling, even before they mastered reading and writing skills. (Le Monde, December 31, 1983)

Beni-Chebana's statistics on education tend to confirm the above facts, with wide differences between the four parts of the commune, even within the first three years of school. The 1977 census data show a higher illiteracy rate among Beni-Chebana's residents, namely 80.8 percent. This is much higher than the national rate just mentioned. The 80.8 percent of illiterates is composed of 51.7 females and 29.1 males. (It may be useful to mention here that Beni-Chebana's sex composition is as follows, according to the 1977 census: 55.4 percent females and 44.6 percent males.) The census used classical reading and writing skills as the only illiteracy criterion. The use of a broader criterion, such as productive performance capability, would undoubtedly expand the proportion of illiteracy. The Algerian school system does not, in fact, provide any vocational training during the entire school years. School dropouts are an important phenomenon, notably in the rural areas and more specifically within the female pupils. The parents' attitude with regard to early female dropout may partly be explained by the useless role education of girls is viewed as playing within the local context.

Formal education seems useless to girls who are not allowed to work within the rural areas in general. To be more precise, we should say that there are not wage-paying jobs available for the female

population in these areas and the formal education is not helpful to females, (nor to males but to a lesser extent) since the males may expect to get non-formal education when they migrate to urban centers or find administrative work that does not require any specific training. Girls, on the other hand, have no chance for out-migration and no training is available now. Parents' negative attitude towards educating girls could be changed through providing vocational training centers which require a level of formal education but which would teach specific skills that could help in a concrete way. These centers would strengthen parents' positive attitudes and would make education fruitful. Therefore, education, even when provided, has no major consequences for girls in rural areas. Among other reasons, this would explain parents' negative attitude towards not sending girls to school at all or pulling them out earlier than boys. Beni-Chebana has no training center for either sex. A masonry center is in the process of being started at Tarfet. To say the least, illiteracy is general at Beni-Chebana, should the productive performance criterion be applied. The classical illiteracy criterion is no longer sufficient today, especially if non-formal education is to be adequately provided.

Literacy Composition

The 1977 census provides the percentage distribution of ability to read and write, by language and sex, for Beni-Chebana's population 10 year old and over. Table 2 shows this composition:

Table 2. Percent Composition of Beni-Chebana's Population 10 Year Old and Over Literate, by Language and Sex.

Language	Male	Female	Total
Arabic	2.60	0.58	3.18
French	1.45	0.24	1.69
Arabic and French	10.87	2.87	13.74
Others	0.56	0.04	0.60
Total	15.48	3.73	19.21

Source: 1977 Census of Algeria

This table shows, in addition to a high level of illiteracy in the commune studied, especially among females, a high level of bilingualism that confirms the fact of Beni-Chebana having French and Arabic schools during the colonial era, as well as after independence. It is worth noting that the Arabic percentage is higher than French. Our survey tends to confirm this trend in general but Arabic literacy percentages are higher at Adjissa and Ait Mohli. Both sections did not have French schools before independence. Beni-Maouche shows the strongest bilingualism as compared to other sections.

Table 3. Composition of Adjissa's Population of all Ages Literate, by Language and Sex.

Language	Male	Female	Total
Arabic	46.0	26.0	72.0
French	8.0	2.0	10.0
Arabic and French	18.0	0.0	18.0
Total	72.0	28.0	100.0

Source: Survey

Table 4. Percent of Ait Mohli's Population at all Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.

Language	Male	Female	Total
Arabic	55.0	14.0	69.0
French	6.0	0.0	6.0
Arabic and French	25.00	0.0	25.0
Total	86.0	14.0	100.0

Source: Survey

Table 5. Percent of Beni-Chebana's Population at all Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.

Language	Male	Female	Total
Arabic	47.0	17.0	64.0
French	15.0	5.0	20.0
Arabic and French	13.0	3.0	16.0
Total	75.0	25.0	100.0

Source: Survey

Table 6. Percent of Beni-Maouche's Population at all Ages Literate, By Language and Sex.

Language	Male	Female	Total
Arabic	22.0	10.0	32.0
French	22.0	5.0	27.0
Arabic and French	23.0	18.0	41.0
Total	67.0	33.0	100.0

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Survey.

Tables 3 to 6 clearly indicate low female literacy in the four sections of the commune. The survey data are very close to those of the 1977 census. These sections differ somewhat with regard to female and language percentages. Adjissa shows low French and bilingual

percentage with regard to both sexes. Two out of the 28 percent of the females are literate in French, with zero percent bilingual. Ait Mohli shows even lower female literacy, with zero percent literate in French and bilingual. Beni-Chebana is rather moderate as compared to other sections. Only Beni-Maouche shows relatively higher female literacy and higher bilingual percentages, with near sex equality. These differences could be due to easy geographical access to Beni-Maouche, richer agriculture, and more openness to the outside world. More French and Arabic schools were available in this section than anywhere else in the commune, during the colonial period.

The Educational Facilities and Number of Pupils

The educational facilities in Beni-Chebana are summed up as follows: There were 22 elementary schools in 1981-82. Three more schools were expected to open in the 1983-4 school year. Seventy three out of the 92 existing classrooms were functioning in 1981-82, with 82 teachers and 3,806 pupils distributed into 132 classes, according to Wilaya's education statistics of 1981-82. Thus, 19 classrooms were empty in 1981-82 school year. The number of pupils increased in the period from 1977-78 to 1982-83 and the percentage of females remained low during this period as shown by the following table:

Table 7. Sex Composition and Increase in School Attendance in Beni-Chebana, From 1977-8 to 1982-3.

School Year	1977-8	1978-9	1979-80	1980-1	1981-2	1982-3
Boys	70.0	70.0	69.0	70.0	69.0	72.5
Girls	30.0	30.0	31.0	30.0	31.0	27.5
Increase	-	8.0	7.0	3.0	3.0	5.0

Source: 1983 Wilaya's Education Statistics and 1982-83 Supervisory Reports.

Beni-Chebana's elementary schools are distributed over its four sections as follows: Adjissa 3, Ait Mohli 4, Beni-Chebana 9, and Beni-Maouche 6. The Algerian school system provides seven years of elementary schooling, but five of Beni-Chebana's schools are limited to just three years. Another terminates after the fourth year, while two others have no seventh year, according to the 1982-3 supervisory statistics. Eight schools out of 22 do not provide all teaching levels. The percentage of pupils by sex for each section is given in Table 8 for 1982-3.

Table 8. Percent in School Attendance, By Section and Sex.

Section	Male	Female	Total
Adjissa	72.0	28.0	100.0
Ait Mohli	87.0	13.0	100.0
Beni-Chebana	71.0	29.0	100.0
Beni-Maouche	60.0	40.0	100.0

Source: Statistics and 1982-83 Supervisory Reports.

Table 8 shows a large proportion of school children to be males. The lowest female percentage is found in Ait Mohli; while Beni-Maouche shows more sex balance as compared to other sections. As for the distribution of school attendance between the four sections, the 1982-83 statistics of education give the following proportions for each section: Adjissa 11 percent, Ait Mohli 15 percent, Beni-Chebana 37 percent, and Beni-Maouche 37 percent. The 1981-82 statistics show a slightly different distribution than depicted in Table 8.

The distribution of pupils, according to grade level, shows an important dropout rate for the last two years of school. The total

number of children in school grew from 3,806 in 1981-82 to 3,945 in 1982-83 and the proportions attending school by grade level are as follows:

Table 9. Proportions of Beni-Chebana's School Attendance by Grade Level for 1981-82 and 1982-83.

Grade Level	1981-82	1982-83
1	22.0	22.0
2	21.0	19.0
3	16.0	17.0
4	15.0	15.0
5	12.0	12.0
6	9.0	10.0
7	5.0	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics and 1982-83 Supervisory Reports.

Class size differs within Beni-Chebana schools depending upon population density. Commune schools are, however, well below urban schools with regard to crowding in classrooms. Urban schools are, effectively, very crowded and forced to sometimes practice double and even triple scheduling. The average number of pupils per classroom goes beyond 50 in the urban areas. Elementary schools receive, in fact, between 500,000 to 600,000 newcomers each year. Attempts are being made recently to stabilize the rapid demographic growth, seen as an obstacle to teaching democratization in Algeria. This is, however, true only within urban areas. The rural areas are not, generally, in the same situation, as Beni-Chebana's educational statistics show with regard to average number of pupils per classroom by grade level in 1981-82.

Table 10. Average Number of Pupils per Classroom by Grade Level at Beni-Chebana, for 1981-82.

Grade Level	Average Number of Pupils
1	30.46
2	31.75
3	27.34
4	27.22
5	23.05
6	22.60
7	12.80

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

Beni-Chebana's classrooms are simply not crowded compared with most urban center schools. Not only is there a low average of pupils, but also 19 classrooms were empty in 1981-82 at Beni-Chebana. Tables 11-14 indicate number of pupils by sex for each section in the 1981-82 school year.

Table 11. Number of Pupils in Adjissa's Schools by Sex, for 1981-82.

School	Total Pupils	Male	Female
Aourir	211	70.0	30.0
Tala-Tinzar	101	84.0	16.0
Tiksarine	109	66.0	34.0

Source: Wilaya's Statistics for 1981-82

It is worthwhile to note that Aourir's pupils increased by four percent by 1982-83 while its grade levels decreased from 7 to 6. Tala-Tinzar pupils also increased by four percent in the same time and its grade levels increased from 6 to 7. Tiksarine saw a decrease of nine percent in number of pupils and lost one grade level. Its four levels in 1981-82 were reduced to three the next year. Little change occurred in the proportion of girls and boys at Adjissa despite

different changes between its three schools movements. Aourir, the largest, gained pupils and lost a level, contrary to Tala-Tinzar which gained as much as Aourir in number of pupils and gained one grade level. Tiksarine, meanwhile, suffered a double loss of nine percent of its pupils and one grade level. The reason is unknown. Tiksarine's female proportion is slightly higher than that of Aourir because high class level pupils go to Aourir school, a phenomenon which may have prevented girls from doing so because of the relatively long distance between the two hamlets. Table 12 shows Ait Mohli's pupil numbers for the 1981-82 school year.

Table 13. Number of Pupils in Ait Mohli's Schools by Sex, for 1981-82.

School	Total Pupils	Male	Female
Agueni Foughal	174	90.0	10.0
Ahfir	186	98.0	2.0
Amezough	85	93.0	7.0
Tichy	53	49.0	51.0

Source: Wilaya's Statistics for 1981-82.

This table shows extremely low proportion of female pupils in the three largest schools, while the smallest school has almost equal sex proportions. There was little change in 1982-83, except for Tichy where the proportion changed from 49 percent males and 51 females in 1982-82 to 70 percent males and just 30 percent females. Another no less striking phenomenon is the extremely high increase of pupils in all Ait Mohli's schools in 1982-83. Agueni Foughal which kept its seven grade levels of 1981-82, saw pupils increase by 26 percent in 1982-83. Ahfir also kept its seven grade levels and gained 19 percent

in pupil numbers in the same period. Amezough, however, increased 20 percent in pupils by 1982-83 while the number of grade levels decreased from five to three. The tiny school of Tichy gained 16 percent in pupils and the number of grade levels also gained one by 1982-83. It changed from two to three levels between 1981-82 and 1982-83, according to the same official statistics referred to in all four sections of Beni-Chebana. Table 13 shows number of pupils in the sections of Beni-Chebana for the 1981-82 school year.

Table 13. Beni-Chebana's School Size by Sex for 1981-82.

<u>School</u>	<u>Total Pupils</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Beni-Djemati	263	75.0	25.0
Boundjih	184	76.0	24.0
El-Maissen	180	63.0	37.0
Ighil-Ali	143	63.0	37.0
Illilten	92	67.0	33.0
Ismamen	121	61.0	39.0
Laazib	68	69.0	31.0
Taurirt	112	85.0	15.0
Tarfet	315	74.0	26.0

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

The proportion of male pupils is very high in some schools of Beni-Chebana since four out of nine schools have two-thirds of their pupils males. Taourirt has 85 percent male pupils. Three schools have close to 40 percent females. Grade level and pupil changes are as follows: Beni-Djemati had a two percent increase in pupils and kept its seven grade levels. Boundjih lost two percent of its pupils but kept its seven grade levels in 1982-83. El-Maissen lost 16 percent of its pupils and one of its four grade levels in 1982-83. Ighil-Ali

gained three percent in pupils but lost one of its seven grade levels. Illilten also gained two percent in pupils and had an increase of one grade level (four in 1982-83). Ismamen had a 21 percent increase in pupils and gained two grade levels, that is, an increase from five to seven between 1981-82 and 1982-83. Laazib went the opposite way when it lost 12 percent of its pupils and lost two grade levels. The number was reduced from seven to five levels. Taourirt lost ten percent of its pupils but kept its seven levels for the same period. Tarfet, the largest school of Beni-Chebana, gained four percent of its pupils in 1982-83 and kept its seven grade levels. There is a need to know the reason or reasons for these exceptional losses and gains in a single year. It may also be interesting to know how a specific group of pupils is dealt with when a school loses one or two of its grade levels. Table 14 will show Beni-Maouche case of school size and change.

Table 14. Beni-Maouche School Size by Sex for 1981-82.

<u>School</u>	<u>Total Pupils</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Aguemoune	467	52.0	48.0
Djabia	145	56.0	34.0
Taguenit-Ighil	138	67.0	33.0
Tioual	150	69.0	31.0
Tizekht	74	61.0	39.0
Trouna	431	61.0	39.0

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya Statistics.

The proportions of female pupils in Beni-Maouche are very high as compared to those of the other three sections. Aguemoune represents the top among Beni-Maouche schools with regard to high female school

attendance (52 percent males and 48 percent females). No school of Beni-Maouche has less than 31 percent females. This trend remained unchanged or little changed in 1982-83. Some increases and decrease in number of pupils as well as grade levels occurred between 1981-82 and 1982-83. Aguemoune's pupils increased by only one percent while its seven levels remained unchanged. This situation is ideal not only at Beni-Chebana commune level but may be nationwide, both in terms of pupil increase and female proportion. This school is the largest in the entire commune. Djabia lost 21 percent of its pupils and its seven grade levels went down to six in 1981-82. Taguenit-Ighil gained four percent in pupils and kept its seven grade levels. Tioual lost nine percent of its pupils and kept its seven grade levels. Tizekht lost four percent in pupils as well as one of its four grade levels. Trouna, the actual communal center of Beni-Maouche after the new 1985 administrative reform, is the second largest school of Beni-Chebana. It gained 15 percent in pupils and kept its seven grade levels.

The 1981-82 Wilaya's statistics on education show the three largest schools, in order, to be: Aguemoune, Trouna, and Tarfet. They are also ranked first, second, and third in female proportions. The 1982-83 supervisory reports which allowed us to see comparative changes show that these three leading schools maintained their grade levels and increased their student numbers (1, 15 and four percent). They all maintained their proportion of females. Thus, Beni-Chebana's schools generally are very small due to dispersed residence clusters. As seen here, size plays a major role in the provision of grade levels. Large

dropouts at the end of school years create no need to maintain all grade levels in the very small schools. This could be the main reason (if not the only one) to cause a decline in number of pupils and grade levels in Beni-Chebana's nine schools.

The big problem in the educational situation is that hamlet clusters are far from each other and there is no school bus system that would allow last year's school children to go where qualified teachers and all grade levels are to be found. It seems impossible now to provide each school with sufficient number of skilled teachers for all levels because of the limited number of pupils at each level. Adjissa as a whole has only a total of 39 pupils in the fifth level, 38 in the sixth, and just four in the seventh. Ait Mohli has 31 pupils in the sixth level and 39 in the seventh. Beni-Chebana has 137 pupils in the sixth level and only 38 in the seventh. Beni-Maouche has 173 pupils in the sixth level and 66 in the seventh. To sum up, Beni-Chebana's commune has only 380 pupils in the sixth grade and just 147 in the seventh grade levels. In addition, pupils whose schools stop teaching at the third or fourth level, usually stop going to school due to a lack of transportation, among other reasons. It goes without saying that not only girls but also boys are victims of this situation.

Among many educational obstacles, the following seem to be the more important: First, a deficiency of skilled and stable teachers, for example, only one specialized teacher for the handicapped; second, school size which limits the number of grade levels; third, insufficient supervisory system; fourth, lack of school busing; fifth, absence

of middle and high schools within the communal territory. Except for Trouna middle school which opened two years ago, no school is provided with a library, reading room or reading materials. Further, there is no waiting room in any school and pupils go straight from the classroom to the street and vice-versa. The existing canteens can satisfy only 1,050 pupils out of some 4,000, many of whom come from distant hamlets and cannot afford to go back home for lunch and return to school. The canteen seems to be a necessity in the parents' eyes. A parent told a school director: "You can do anything you want to my child but never try to prevent him from going to canteen." It is also known that some parents in rural Algeria send their children to school primarily for food, not for education.

Higher Education

While Beni-Chebana's children have limited chances to get elementary school education, they face even more obstacles in completing higher educational levels. The survey, however, counted around 506 middle school pupils in Beni-Chebana in 1982-83. They attended, in addition to Trouna's middle school which opened only in 1982-83, outside middle schools such as Beni-Ourtilane, Sidi-Aich, Amalou, Akbou, and Seddouk. Some 107 pupils are in high schools and around 20 are in colleges. Tarfet's middle school pupils and those of the surrounding hamlets are provided with busing to the Beni-Ourtilane middle school, but those from Beni-Maouche, Adjissa, and Ait Mohli were being sent to different middle schools at their parents' expense. Trouna's middle school solved, at least partially, the section problems

facing parents and pupils. Still, pupils from Adjissa, Aguemoune, Djabia, Taguenit-Ighil, and others need to walk long distances every day to and from school. A girl from Aguemoune waited five years after successfully passing an exam in order to enter a middle school class, according to Trouna's middle school director. Teachers' housing units were not ready when the school opened, but the parent association was of great help to this school after it opened.

The conditions just mentioned create a low educational output when government spending on this sector is considered. A substantial proportion of the national income is, in fact, spent on education, but spending alone seems unlikely to make the system work. The rural school dropout rate is very high for the above reasons, but the same phenomenon is found in the urban areas. The difference, however, is that urban dropouts are dominated by exclusions rather than withdrawals, due to lack of capacity at the end of each educational level. Forty nine percent of pupils in the sixth and seventh grades of elementary schools in 1978-79 were excluded at national level. Seventy three percent of fourth year middle school pupils were excluded in 1982 nationwide. Seventy nine percent of third year high school students were excluded in 1982-83. The problem is very serious since the failure rate is rising every year at the end of high school studies. Only 30.7 percent of all high school students succeeded in their exams in 1982 but this rate dropped sharply to only 15 percent in 1983 nationwide. What a dismal success rate after 13 or 14 years of schooling subsidized at a high cost. Despite this low rate of success

in allowing students to continue college education, new barriers have recently been put forward, in university planning to restrict college enrollments. Those excluded from continuing their education are forced to join the job market without any specific vocational skills.

Teachers' Conditions

The number of teachers at Beni-Chebana fluctuated between 82 and 139 between 1978-79 and 1982-83, and it was expected that there would be 165 in the 1983-84 school year, according to supervisory reports of 1982-83. The following figures, however, indicate that the number of teachers did not increase regularly, according to the area's need:

Year	Number of Teachers
1977-78	85
1978-79	82
1979-80	86
1980-81	95
1981-82	82
1982-83	139
1983-84	165

The steadily increasing number of pupils is not matched by an increase of teachers due to local educational problems, notably lack of housing units which numbered only 41 for 82 teachers in 1981-82. The 1981-82 Wilaya's statistics of education show a single female teacher at Beni-Chebana's communal schools for the last six years. She came back to her father's native hamlet of Aguemoune from Sidi-Aich where the father migrated. He got married and lived there until his daughter was educated. She came back to the family when the father died.

Teachers range from low level of education (without a middle school degree), middle (with that degree), and high (with a high school degree). Both lower categories could be promoted to higher levels with special exams and some vocational training. The 1981-82 Wilaya's statistics show the size of each category, according to language spoken, as indicated by Table 15.

Table 15. Beni-Chebana's Teacher Categories, by Language Spoken, for 1981-82.

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Arabic</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Total</u>
Low	15	6	21
Middle	45	5	50
High	11	0	11
Total	71	11	82

Source: 1981-82 Wilaya's Statistics.

Table 15 clearly indicates the low level of Beni-Chebana's teachers, with 26 percent in the lowest level, 61 percent in the middle, and just 13 percent in the high level. The last two level teachers may or may not have completed middle and high school education. The number of teachers could be easily increased to cope with the quantitative aspect of the problem, but the qualitative aspect would not be easily solved.

The elementary teaching supervisor, who took office on November 1980 with residence for the first time in the neighboring commune of Beni-Ourtilane, best expresses Beni-Chebana's teaching conditions. The supervisory district, including both communes of Beni-Chebana and Beni-Ourtilane, is too vast with its 43 elementary schools and 325 teachers in 1983-84. Its 80 Km of communal roads are in bad condition. A

serious teacher vacancy rate is noted every school year when classes start in September and lasts up to the end of November. New teachers then are recruited from among youth expelled from middle schools, after failing to pass high school exams or to meet required average points. They come to teaching as temporary employees only when they fail to find other available jobs. They are given classes with no previous training at all. The proportion of such teachers ranges between 20 to 40 percent every year. The supervisor assistant spends most of his time with this category to the detriment of other categories who are in utmost need for training and help. The 1982-83 supervisory reports suggested the creation of a second supervisory district or to employ at least a second supervisory assistant to help achieve at least a minimum of needed work.

Why are Beni-Chebana's teachers unstable and what is needed to improve stability? Such stability is required to allow teachers to learn teaching skills before an acceptable educational output is possible. The biggest problem educators face in Algeria is low wages in this sector as compared with other sectors of national activities. Teaching is, effectively, taken as a temporary job, as already mentioned, and in the absence of better wage-paying jobs. The situation is even worse for the outside teachers coming into the area. They lack the necessary and adequate living conditions, such as proper housing units, water at home, food stores, electric power, means of transportation, etc. Rare are those outsiders who bring their families to live with them. Rather, they prefer living alone since most of them

are not yet married, because of their young age, and coming mostly from middle schools. They have no intention of staying for a long period. They are in a waiting situation before they are called upon for national service or find a better wage-paying job. The pupils, then, are simply sent back home for an unknown amount of time. These inexperienced young adults live on a day-to-day basis and have nothing to keep them from moving away. Rural schools have no cultural or recreational activities. No school in Beni-Chebana, to my knowledge, has any meaningful library, sports field or other means of entertainment.

Rural teachers undergo deep suffering. They live as beggars, a school director said, referring to outside teachers. We are trying to help them as much as we can, he said, but they are really miserable. I have personally witnessed a case when a rural teacher came and asked his local colleague for food, saying that he was starving. The hamlet where this was observed has, as many other hamlets, no public food sources, such as a bakery, food store, or restaurant. Some of these teachers are forced to take their teaching as a second activity while they try to increase their income otherwise, as is the case of a school director who used his own car for public transportation. The villagers call him anytime a ride was needed. His pupils were sent home when he transported passengers. Teacher absenteeism is an every day reality. Pupils used to ask at the end of each day whether they will have class next day or not because they often come to find the teacher absent, noted a school director.

Such problems must be solved, if not at once, in the near future in order to attract and keep fairly good teachers in the areas. To do

this, extra pay is suggested by a high Daira official. The idea, however, is not new since old French school teachers already receive extra pay for serving remote areas, as in the case of Aguemoune, Taguenit and Tarfet, which were considered remote areas during the colonial era, but not now remote as compared to today's more distant schools whose teachers do not benefit from this extra pay. This is true despite the new Algerian worker charter that provides for such extra pay. But a wide gap seems to separate theory and practice. The colonial spirit is still alive after 22 years of independence. President Chadli said once that when the government approves a law, it should be applied in each sector nationwide, but this is not the case of Beni-Chebana's teachers.

Extra pay would not be enough to attract qualified teachers when living conditions are not improved. Improved conditions include adequate housing, running water, light, means of transportation, sports and cultural facilities. The commune can do much to ease problems teachers face. Most, if not all, schools have no running water, no light, and no restrooms are usable due to lack of water which is available, in some cases, only at one or two hundred meters. Many schools visited are really miserable. I found, in one school, two teachers living together in a single room with a large hole in the roof allowing rain to come through. Offenders many times destroyed, in the same school, the tools and materials needed in the classrooms. The commune authorities in charge of school maintenance failed to prevent destruction. The relatively large number of schools and their

remoteness from the administrative center may have prevented adequate care taking. The hamlet residents' help may be of great importance if sought, but it seems that is not the case here.

Non-formal Education

Unlike formal education, the Algerian government has provided little support for non-formal education in the rural areas. Beni-Chebana, in fact, has never had a vocational training center for the commune's youth. Such a center would be of a great help to Beni-Chebana youngsters since there is no need for high educational attainment in order to achieve and improve vocational skills and productive performance. Only lately a masonry training unit has been built at Tarfet, which trainees from other sections cannot attend for lack of transportation and lack of internships.

The ministry of vocational training planned to build some 273 new training centers at the national level, during the first five-year plan (1980-84). The training capacity would increase from 27,000 to around 130,000 trainees per year, should these centers be built as scheduled. Five other centers for trainers were also planned for this period. The training capacity is very limited considering training demands. Around 300,000 pupils every year leave elementary and middle schools, in addition to some 55,000 students excluded from high schools each year. This is to say nothing about the large illiterate population of working ages as well as a large non-working female population. Some 260,000 female requests for vocational training are received every year. The demands are much higher than can be satisfied. The need for trainees

is estimated by the first five year plan to be around 673,000, of which 403,000 are skilled workers and 186,000 are technicians (AA., January 7-13, 1982).

The available data show clearly that formal as well as nonformal education is not playing its expected role in the economy. A wide gap between economic activities and the teaching system recently emerged. A great gap separates education and employment. Some 1,100,000 youth between 15 to 20 years old are "nowhere" -- not at school and not at work, noted A. Brahimi, prime minister of Algeria. (AA., June 12-18, 1980)

Since the government has been unable to satisfy the national need in non-formal education, it recently resorted to the private sector for help. It is thought that crafts are disappearing in Algeria. If each craftsman could take charge of only one trainee each year, then around 100,000 youth could be trained every year. A law was introduced to help achieve this goal of paramount importance to the national economy as well as to social and political stability. Vocational training has been carried out in Algeria by specialized training centers under direct supervision of the ministry of vocational training, national corporations and ministries training their own workers. The government made it possible for the first time, for the private sector to take part legally in the training with the state's financial support. Some saw this initiative as a sellout of manpower to the private sector. The common people, however, expressed doubts about putting this law into practice for different reasons. Below is the private sector's attitude on the subject.

A coppersmith expressed his viewpoint as follows: "No, the truth is elsewhere. How can somebody ask to learn a difficult job when he has nowhere to live? I would not refuse to take charge of someone, should the state fulfill its promise. The training should not become a burden for some and a source of profit for others." A small clothing industry employer commented as follows: "I will do it with a condition that the newcomer will work with me as any other employee. I am a clothing industry employer not a vocational training school director." A third person from the building sector simply refused the idea by saying, "It is up to national corporations or state sector to take charge of the trainees, not me. I pay workers whom I ask to work" (AA., January 7-13, 1982).

Thus, the attitude of the private sector is, generally, negative towards this law trying to get the private sector to share some burden of vocational training but this sector has many reasons not to deal with the problem in the government's terms. The law enforcement will simply be hampered because of its cost to individual persons to do a government job in sharing some educational burden deemed as the state's responsibility. This is the case even though the government offers to pay trainees while they are working for the craftsmen's benefit. The private trainers were not satisfied because dealing with government regulations is not like freely dealing with private individual citizens.

It is worthwhile noting that Beni-Chebana's youth, as well as most rural youth of Algeria, have no opportunities within the rural communes

and they cannot easily join urban areas where this possibility still exists. Urban youth may not feel great enthusiasm to obtain training in the crafts field for limited job opportunities in the sector. We can say briefly that education in Algeria, and more specifically in rural areas, is not in satisfactory shape despite heavy spending in the sector. Adequate solutions should be sought to improve investment output in education and, consequently, help national economic growth since both sectors are closely related to each other as will be seen in the following chapter on Beni-Chebana's economy.

The Subsistence Level

Beni-Chebana's residents, traditionally, gained a living from agriculture and a small number of livestock. As all people of the traditional sector in Algeria, they used to live on these poor lands where each household had to provide livelihood for itself by working on family land. Manpower was plentiful as compared to other farming inputs: land, water, draught animals, tools, and seeds. Consequently, labor intensive agriculture was generally practiced. Because of land shortage all possible tillable land was brought under control through different kinds of sharecropping systems. The old rich and prestigious families were those having relatively large plots of land and enough family labor to work them. Both landless families and those owning land but without enough labor force could, however, manage to get a living from available lands, through a fairly equitable sharecropping system called "Khemmassah". This system took into consideration five farming elements: manpower, draught animals, land, working tools, and seeds which were equally valuable. The system provided multiple combinations with regard to providing or sharing any one of these elements. Farming outputs were divided, as a consequence, according to each element that a partner provided. No industry existed at Beni-Chebana. Only lately a small scale stone-crushing mill has been built by the commune to provide this material for its own concrete block small industry. Some private individuals started to build their own

mills recently because of the high cost and shortage of crushed stones in the region. Private and communal needs are far from being satisfied with the existing mills' output.

The 1977 census data show a strong agricultural sector in Beni-Chebana, as compared to other sectors of activity. The active male population six years old and over was distributed, according to economic activity and juridic sector, as follows: 56.04 percent in agriculture, 5.72 percent in industry (all kinds of industry included), 15.34 percent in the building sector, 16.84 percent in administration and services, and 4.45 percent non-specified. The above totals 98.43 percent of the active population. The female active population represents only 1.57 percent of the workforce distributed as follows: 0.36 in agriculture, 1.11 percent in industry (transformation), 0.07 in services, and 0.03 percent non-specified. These data emphasize the low rate of female economic activity, well below that of the national active female rate. Ninety-eight point forty-three percent of Beni-Chebana's females are housewives whose economic participation is not recognized.

The census data indeed, may well convey a misleading idea that Beni-Chebana is an agrarian commune since more than 50 percent of its active population is occupied in agriculture and less than seven percent in industry. The truth is that all those who could not be classified elsewhere by the census, are seen as Fellahs (peasants) because, as just mentioned, every household with rare exceptions should have at least a small plot of land where some working days each year

are spent during different seasons. The overwhelming majority of the peasants left agriculture and the only activity that is still going on in this sector is collecting figs, olives, and other fruits where they exist. Some gardening, however, is still practiced in some parts of the commune. The Kasma coordinator, effectively, expressed the need to change the commune's unrealistic agrarian image to that of an industrial one. This seems unlikely given Beni-Chebana's economic situation today, but it is very possible, should a good industrial program, based upon the commune's rich potential be put into practice.

An Agrarian Commune

To refer to an agrarian commune may seem contradictory, but different sources of information confirm this situation. Djenadi, for instance, in 1976 confirmed that industry does not exist in the commune except for some artisan units. But he does not say that agriculture prevails; rather, he reported that 90 percent of the active population was unemployed at that time, the majority of whom migrated abroad (Djenadi, 2) Beni-Chebana's temporary urbanization perimeter (PUP) classified the commune in the eighth rank among Akbou Daira's nine communes with regard to economic activity and 23rd among the Bejaia Wilaya's 28 communes. The (PUP), using 1979 regional statistics, distributed the communal manpower (excluding some 1050 workers who migrated) as follows (PUP, 11):

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Number of Jobs</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Primary	5,230	75.40
Secondary	1,501	21.60
Tertiary	209	3.00
Total	6,940	100.00

These figures and percentages are unlikely to be correct for the following main reasons: 1) the statistical concepts are not well defined to fit into the existing conditions of this area, 2) those in charge of collecting census data, notably for yearly regional statistics, are unable to do the job correctly. Their time, educational level, and daily obligations do not allow them, in my view, to do the task correctly, given the local context, 3) for 75.40 percent of the labor force to be in the primary sector would suggest that this sector has been growing and that trend is not in keeping with the general trend of rural outmigration. In addition, people generally fear that census could be used against their interest, as was the case in the 1971 land census intended to limit the size of land holdings. The peasants, generally, lowered their landholdings to escape confiscation, while they tended to increase them when a minimum of five hectares of land was required to purchase tractors.

The person in charge of regional statistics at the Ministry of Planning recognized these facts when we talked about them. Beni-Chebana's agriculture has been declining since the liberation war that destroyed Algerian rural areas and no other activities that could fit into the primary sector (such as mining or fishing) existed in this commune. The unemployment rate of 90 percent is another amazing fact reported by Djenadi. How, in fact, can such a claim be made while no jobless persons are reported at Beni-Chebana where no employment office exists. The commune has been exporting its youth for a long time. Even the Wilaya statistics are surely not correct. They asserted that

77 percent of Beni-Chebana's lands are being used in farming, which is the communal essential economic activity, employing 75 percent of its manpower. This should not be accurate as reported by (PUP, 12). The following data will show the most important agricultural features in this commune and will allow us to evaluate the truth of the above statements.

Most of the land in Beni-Chebana is very steep, with mountains representing 50 percent of the area. About 15 percent are classed as foothills, 25 percent as plains and 10 percent as non-specified, according to the 1979 regional statistics. The physical nature of the land, therefore, is not favorable to extensive farming since tillable lands are limited. Two climates dominate the commune, namely, mediterranean and continental. That is, snow in winters and extreme heat in summers are typical. The rainfall season usually starts in September and ends near the end of May, with an average of 1,200 mm of rain per year. Temperature varies between (-8) and (+30) centigrade. The commune has three categories of soil: humid clay on the plains, muddy sands on the banks of river, and calcareous clay on hilltops. Erosion takes a good proportion of fertile soils every year. The Bousselam river divides the commune into two parts: Beni-Chebana on one hand and Adjissa, Ait Mohli, and Beni-Maouche on the other. An electric power dam was started by the French but was abandoned at the beginning of the liberation war.

Underground water is plentiful but not tapped. Each hamlet has its own spring or springs. Adjissa River is less important than

Bousselam. Both, however, flow all year. Irrigation is limited to small size gardens, most of which are disappearing for different reasons. A project of irrigating the plains of Agradou (Beni-Chebana), Ires and Andeless (Beni-Maouche) was approved by Setif Wilaya but abandoned when Beni-Chebana left Setif to become a commune of the newly created Wilaya of Bejaia. Agradou's part of this project was reconsidered in 1975 and its realization started in 1983 (Djenadi, 6).

Tillable surfaces of Beni-Chebana differ from one source to another. The 1979 regional statistics made the following distribution: 40% tillable, 5% forest, 20% bush and 35% pasture. The commune estimated the area to represent 12,075 hectares, while the cadaster registered 14,220 hectares. Djenadi reported the following land surface figures: total agricultural surface, 18,256 ha.; useful agricultural surface, 15,816 ha.; vegetal production, 13,457 ha.; and others 2,359 ha. The Wilaya's statistics of agriculture estimated the private lands, including pastures, as being 11,281 ha. (1 hectare = 2.47 acres). The total lands in 1980-81 were distributed into three categories with regard to usage:

1. Cultivated lands, including winter cereals, 730 ha.; dry legumes 90 ha.; and artificial foraging, 100 ha.;
2. Idle lands, 5,932 ha.; the existing plantations, 1,218 ha.; the planned plantations, 31 ha.; total tillable lands, 8,104 ha. of which only 3 ha. are irrigated;
3. Pastures, 3,177 ha.; including forest and non-cultivated lands.

The above official statistics, obviously are not in conformity with other mentioned sources, despite the fact that only private lands, were considered and their total was 19,382 ha. The public sector, however, is not that significant in Beni-Chebana. There is no way to know which one of these sources is correct. The Wilaya's statistics may have been more likely to represent the truth but they contain some contradictions with regard to irrigated surfaces (3 ha. in the first summary page, then 13 ha. when details are given in pages 3 and 5 on gardening.) Arboriculture here accounts for only one hectare. This does not concur with that of Djenadi, as well as with the hand written statistics made available to me with 45 ha. Djenadi's crop production figures for Beni-Chebana give still other data shown below:

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Area in Ha.</u>
Barley	200
Dry legumes	1,530
Fig trees	2,000
Fruit trees	3,660
Gardening (poly. cul)	50
Hard wheat	720
Olive trees	1,600
Total	9,760

The Wilaya director of agriculture made available hand-written agricultural statistics for 1980-81. These data show the following different figures, notably between the private and public sectors:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Tillable area</u> <u>in ha.</u>	<u>Forest</u>	<u>Total</u>
Private	10,852	276	11,128
Agrarian Reform	153	2,039	2,192
Non productive	0	900	900
Total	11,005	3,215	14,220

Economically, olive and fig trees are the most important crops in this commune. The climate favors them and they require little labor. There are around 40,000 producing olive trees, according to the 1980-81 agricultural statistics, in addition to some 51,000 young, growing trees. The production varies, however, according to climatic conditions. Fig quality from the Adjissa and Beni-Maouche is very famous nationwide, but production has decreased sharply. Due to socio-economic conditions, notably abandoned farming, the agricultural production has, effectively, declined dramatically. Arboriculture has suffered even more and its decline started during the liberation war. Recently, olive products have been in a difficult marketing position, since Algeria has been importing olive oil from Greece and other kinds of oil products from the industrial nations. Figs suffered to a lesser extent from a marketing crisis, because its production was even shorter. Arboriculture needs less labor, as just mentioned, but requires on-going care.

The Landholding Size

The conflicting estimates of land size are meaningless if other farming conditions are not examined. Elements such as landholding size, level of family dependency on living from agriculture, and farming inputs use and availability are extremely important within the rural economy.

The official statistics of agriculture made no specific mention about these factors which are necessary for agriculture to develop and play its great role in the rural and national economy. Only a few statistical estimates as to fertilizer availability and need are available with regard to Beni-Chebana. Our survey data, collected from 37 major hamlets of Beni-Chebana's 64 hamlets indicate that very small size of landholding dominates the commune, as shown below:

<u>Size of Landholding</u> (in Ha.)	<u>Percent</u>
10+	2.0
5-9	9.0
1-4	40.0
-1	22.0
Zero	27.0
Total	100.0

All four sections of Beni-Chebana are well represented here. The data clearly indicate a small size of landholdings that is well below the national required 10 ha. per family in non-irrigated areas (the case for Beni-Chebana). Only two percent of the families would be able to depend on farming for a living, should the national criterion of landholding be applied here. Almost 50 percent of the households are landless or own less than one hectare of land. Eighty-nine percent of households own less than five hectartres each, of which 27 are landless.

Not only is there shortage of land, but its poor quality denies the importance of agricultural activities as reported by the statistics.

The Farming Inputs

Not only is land scarce in Beni-Chebana, but modern farming inputs are almost non-existent. Our survey shows low use of inputs for many

reasons. Only three percent of Beni-Chebana's peasants use very limited quantities of fertilizers, while insecticide and pesticide users represent about one percent each. These inputs are mainly restricted to gardening areas where irrigation is available. Non-use is explained by the peasants as being due to: unavailability of markets and expensive when found, abandoned farming due to low outputs, outmigration, and lack of knowledge on how and when to use inputs. Many who used fertilizers in dry lands burned their crops. There are no farming experts to advise Beni-Chebana's peasants and help them with the new farming and animal husbandry technologies. The Communal Cooperation of Agriculture and Common Services (CAPCS) created within the agrarian reform system of 1971 with intent to provide both the state and private sectors with multiform technical assistance and farm products marketing could not do so, because of lack of means. This is true in Beni-Chebana, as well as nationwide.

The 1980-81 Wilaya's census shows no available fertilizers and pesticides at Beni-Chebana. The needed quantities were to be ordered, including 2,077 quintals of fertilizers and 330 Kg. of pesticides. No special seeds are used for the above reasons. Organic fertilizers, used before the war, are no longer available. The Trouna's CAPCS officer summed up the difficulties his unit is facing. There are three main problems: lack of technical and skilled administrative staff, lack of large size trucks which would have saved drivers' time and made more product quantities available, and non availability of consumer goods, notably barley and other animal feed. A contradiction, however,

is noted between the CAPCS and the census estimates of fertilizers needed. The CAPCS officer mentioned 200 quintals per year, while the census mentioned 2,077 quintals as Beni-Chebana's need each year.

Farming not only requires land, water, fertilizers, and other inputs, but modern agriculture needs more than that. Factors such as marketing, transportation, storing facilities, financial support, supply centers, knowledge, etc. cannot be ignored by modern agriculture, mainly based on knowledge and mechanization. Beni-Chebana's traditional farming benefitted from cheap plentiful manpower and available draught animals. Only oxen are used to till lands in this region, but their number dropped dramatically from around 968 pairs before the revolution of 1954 to some 204 pairs today, according to the survey. The number of tractors, however, jumped from two to 25 in the same period of time. Tractors could not compensate for the loss of oxen, not just because of their limited number but also because most farm lands of this commune are not accessible to tractors due to lack of farm roads. In addition, most private tractors are used to transport building materials rather than in farming, while those of the CAPCS are broken most of the time. Five out of six of Agradou's CAPCS tractors were broken when I paid a visit to this unit and there was nobody to repair them. A young man from Boubirek hamlet was hired for this purpose but left because he was unhappy with the wages he was paid. The CAPCS (intended to provide multiform assistance to both public and private sectors) was the main feature of the Algerian agrarian reform program, but it could not carry out its mission adequately.

Even though tractors are expensive and do not fit into Beni-Chebana's typical agriculture, they are not easily obtained in Algeria, due to a short supply. Ten ha. in farm size is required in order to apply for a tractor. The Algerian National Bank (BNA), in charge of financing and supplying farming equipment and working with Party, peasant union, and administrative representatives, distributes tractors and provides loans whenever necessary, according to certain rules, among which is landholding size. Not many of Beni-Chebana's peasants can apply for tractors because of small farm size and even when this condition is met, a peasant may need to wait years to get one.

The Bejaia's director of (BNA), when asked about peasant awareness of the available loans, asserted that his bank is doing well within its limited potential. A single notice, he said, was sufficient to get more applicants than could be satisfied. The landholding criterion was lowered to five hectares and even less to allow more peasants to apply for tractors which are much preferred over oxen because they can be used for transportation rather than tilling the lands.

Beni-Chebana's peasants do not think of bank loans as a major obstacle in farming. However, very few applicants loans were satisfied lately, according to survey data. The reasons for not applying are various. Among those reasons are hopelessness in obtaining loans, lack of farm roads, lack of inputs, giving up farming, low outputs, and ignorance, for some, of the existing opportunity. Akbou's BNA agency made available information on the amounts of loans allocated to private

people of Beni-Chebana between 1977 and 1981. The loans were allocated to serve four specific purposes which are: draught animals, breeding, traction, and hydraulic as shown below:

Table 16: Bank Loans to Beni-Chebana's Private Peasants in 1977-1981
By Purpose and Number of Recipients (in Algerian Dinar,
R = Recipient, A = Amount).

Year	Draught Animals		Breeding		Tractor		Hydraulic		Total	
	R.	A.	R.	A.	R.	A.	R.	A.	R.	A.
1977	4	29,000					1	10,000	5	39,000
1978	7	70,000	1	20,000			3	30,000	11	120,000
1979	5	50,000			2	67,879	3	40,000	10	157,879
1980	5	50,000			2	76,677	1	15,000	3	91,677
1981	1	12,000			8	221,836			9	233,836
Total	17	161,000	1	20,000	12	366,393	8	95,000	38	642,393

Source: Akbou's BNA Agency

The above table shows only a modest effort in making loans to private peasants. The number of people served each year over the five-year period was not high, starting with five people in 1977 and fluctuating between three in 1980 and 11 in 1978 with a total of 38 loan recipients in the entire period. The amount of loans are not great. The amount started with a low of 39,000 AD in the first year and reached a peak of 233,836 AD in the last year of the period. The total amount of allocated loans in five years is not a great help to farm investment. The average per year is just too low to do any meaningful improvement in farming. This average of 120,479 AD would not buy much, should high cost of equipment be considered. These loans, looked at from the purpose served, show a clear shift from draught animals to traction through the entire period. Loans for

draught animals took a lead in 1977 with four persons served to one in hydraulic, and none in breeding and traction. The second year draught animals improved as did hydraulic with only one breeder and no traction. The shift for tractors started in 1979 to prevail over all other loan purposes with the one-and-only draught animal borrower in 1981. The Bejaia's BNA director, asserting that peasants are more interested in tractors rather than animals, is confirmed here. This shift does not mean that agriculture is being mechanized because tractors are bought for another main purpose, namely, transportation.

This summary represents the state effort in private sector financing. As for the individuals themselves, their effort is no better. The following example may indicate a general trend toward abandonment of farming. A peasant from Aourir, Adjissa who was the only one to possess a pair of oxen in this hamlet, explained how costly it was to buy feed and to keep oxen today while output is very poor. He was going to get rid of them and abandon farming, as he said, because even if a tractor is provided, which is not the case, there would be no way to get it to his hands due to lack of farm roads. The problem is complicated because nobody would allow any one else to open a road through his land. Only the state authorities have the power to do so and this has not yet happened. Peasants did not feel any need for road opening before because they used to get into their lands through very narrow and non-tractor-usable roads. A pair of oxen would cost between 20,000 and 30,000 AD in 1981-82 while a tractor, with a state subsidy, would cost only 20,000 AD. Hence, beside the high cost,

care, and less use of oxen from which there is less output, the peasants choose to buy tractors whenever available. This is a wise and economic decision the peasants have made.

Beni-Chebana's peasants as well as others, are not stupid, backward-looking, or making illogical decisions or behaving in a non-economic way. They try hard to modernize but get no help. Only three percent of applicants for farm equipment were approved recently at Beni-Chebana. Others, who are still doing part-time farming, resort to traditional ways. In regard to farm training, the survey shows 27 of the peasants received some kind of training, but this seems unlikely to happen here since no training center for farming has existed at Beni-Chebana. Those peasants receiving training, however, appear only at Ait Mohli and this fact was not mentioned in any other of the three communal sections. Modern farming simply has not yet existed at Beni-Chebana.

A high level Party member, a school director commented on Beni-Chebana's farming conditions in these terms, briefly reported: All problems come from bad planning imposed from above. Local needs are not seriously taken into account. The large and expensive tractors do not fit into our mountainous lands, rather small size and cheaper tractors would be welcome. They cannot be used for transportation as is the case of larger ones. Machinery and other farm inputs are distributed to non-peasants. Water for drinking and irrigation is in short supply. The CAPCS does not market farm products such as olives and figs. The peasants are facing market difficulties, notably olive

products. Consequently, farming is being abandoned, the cost of which is larger than its output. The peasant takes into account manpower costs and other expenses that prevent him from staying in the farm business. Wage-paying activities are preferred, in other words, to poor and high risk farming.

The Farm Income

Agricultural production may help to define the size of income from farming within Beni-Chebana and show the importance with regard to other sources of income. Four different sources of data are used for this purpose. The sources are: 1) Djenadi for 1976; 2) regional statistic of 1979; 3) Wilaya's statistics of agriculture for 1980-81; and our own survey for 1983. Table 17 represents farm production according to these four sources and years. Quantities are given in quintals, with the exception of olives in the survey that are given in liters of oil.

Table 17: Beni-Chebana's Farm Production for 1976, 1979, 1981, and 1983 in Quintal With That Olive Oil in Survey in Liter.

<u>Product</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1983</u>
Barley	500	380	5,000	2,360
Dry Legumes	9,900	200	514	
Figs	1,245	830	8,050	3,268
Gardening (poly cul.)	1,200	-	9,515	-
Olives	1,390	3,220	20,000	190,300 (L)
Other fruits	2,580	-	180	-
Wheat (hard)	1,450	4,700	10,000	1,769

Sources: Djenadi, Regional and Wilaya St. Survey.

The data in Table 17 are rough estimates of the main farm products destined mostly for family consumption. The limited amounts prove that

agriculture is not of such great size as to allow saying that Beni-Chebana's people are living from agriculture. If we divide the oil liters over the 1977 population, the results will be as follows: $190,300 - 23306 = 8.2$. This is eight liters per year per person. This is less than one person could consume in the entire year. Yet, olive oil is the most important farm product of Beni Chebana, followed by figs, and other products. Only olives and figs could be partially marketed by a limited number of households, wherever there is excess of production. Statistical differences between the four sources could be due to yearly variations in part and also to different methods of data collection and presentation. The Wilaya statistics of agriculture reported three figures with regard to figs, for instance: the total of fresh figs was 8,050 quintals, 620 quintals of which were dried, while the rest, 7,430 quintals, were freshly consumed. It is true that families consume a large part of fresh figs, but attempts to estimate the consumed quantities may lead nowhere since no one can make a serious estimate of how much of the crop is consumed fresh.

Olive production may be the most important of all as just mentioned, but it is also subject to large seasonal variations. The Wilaya statistics reported 20,000 quintals of olives. The 1979 regional statistics reported only 3,220 quintals. The problem here is that even the peasants themselves do not know, with some exceptions, the amount of their production, especially that amount consumed by the family members. There is still another problem with olives reported here in quintals, while peasants, in general, use liters. The Wilaya

used both measures with olives and gave 20,000 quintals and 3,600 hectoliters of oil. This is, 360,000 liters as compared to the survey's 190,300 liters. The use of liters, therefore, is more likely to reflect the reality with this product because families need a number of containers the size of which is known to keep oil production each year. No other farm product can satisfy the family consumption needs.

The Livestock

Domestic animals represent an important part of the rural economy. They provide different services and raw materials such as draft, meat, leather, wools, milk, etc. Beni-Chebana's commune does possess a number of types of domestic animals as shown in Table 18, according to data from several sources. The figures are given in number of head of each type.

Table 18: Number of Domestic Animals (and Honeycombs) in Beni-Chebana for Selected Years.

<u>Animals</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1983</u>
Bovines	350	510	580	349
Donkeys		2,913		1,105
Goats	20,000	5,213	5,250	2,200
Honeycombs		350		229
Horses		354	252	138
Poultry				
farming		851	30,000	3,700
Rabbits				1,250
Sheep		708	900	1,945

Sources: Djenadi, regional and Wilaya's Statistics, Survey.

These statistics should not be taken as representing the entire reality, but rather, they should be taken as rough estimates, subject to all types of statistical errors. Some numbers seem highly

exaggerated such as Djenadi's 20,000 goats or the Wilaya's 30,000 chickens. The survey's figures here and elsewhere should, however, be multiplied by 1.5 to 2 to represent the total of hamlets. Djenadi, for instance, considered sheep as virtually non-existent because no herd is seen there, but the Wilaya's statistics reported 900 head and the survey almost double that figure. Such large differences are due to the estimating errors not to any exceptional events as the following facts show. Djenadi estimated no less than six chickens per household but gave no figure for the commune. The Wilaya's cattle figures are from sheer imagination. While over 3,500 cows are mentioned, the fact is that we can find no more than two cows in most hamlets, and none in many of them. Cows are owned by rich families. The number of oxen is decreasing and the cost of keeping cows is high. Rather, most households own goats and sheep. The total for bovines is most likely to be 580 as cited in Table 18.

The State Sector

The private agricultural sector, commonly called "traditional", could not survive at Beni-Chebana. The weak and almost non-existent public sector did not emerge to fill the gap and replace the vanishing private farming. The state sector, as represented by self-managed farms, does not exist at all at Beni-Chebana, because the self-managed farms are those previously owned by the settlers or their allied, rich, Algerian families who left after independence; but no such farms exist in Beni-Chebana since no settlers lived there. Another semi-public sector has emerged as a consequence of the 1971 Agrarian reform

program. This includes the state nationalized private lands, mosques' lands, and under used lands of the self-managed sector organized under a cooperative system. The agrarian reform faced tough and multiple problems, nationwide and could not survive. The reform of the reform started some two years ago. The new idea behind it was to include the agrarian reform sector into the self-managed one. Small sized units, which are easily manageable, better equipped, and with qualified staff members, were thought to be more productive farms. The program called "restructuration" reached both industry and agriculture nationwide. Consequently, the agrarian reform program just disappears and even the socialist villages built by the state will be sold to their residents at a symbolic price, as pointed out by officials.

The restructuration of agriculture has been carried out according to the motto "small is more productive". The cost in money, skilled personnel, and equipment, apparently, is not taken into account. There is a big difference between strictly dividing labor in order to increase productivity and the act of destroying relatively large farms to make smaller ones. Beni-Chebana got no cooperative, and around ten people obtained, separately, plots of land within the agrarian reform program. Officer of this reform at Bejaia Wilaya level mentioned 72 agrarian reform beneficiaries. The ten found are distributed as follows: Adjissa, 2; Ait Mohli, none; Beni-Chebana, 5; and Beni-Maouche, 3. Mostly illiterate and without adequate means, the peasants generally have abandoned their plots. The CAPCS, however, has been given some support but could not fully play its role within the

commune. The following shows the state support to Beni-Chebana's CAPCS composed of two branches: Agradou and Trouna. The help is represented by Akbou's BNA loans whose total reached 1,445,722 AD in a six-year period. The yearly average of 240,953.66 AD is almost double of that allocated to the private sector. The state policy clearly favored collective institutions over individuals in the past at least, because this policy shifted sharply lately to the private sector of agriculture, notably in Southern Algeria. The state loans are, according to Akbou's BNA Agency:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount of Loan in AD.</u>
1976	303,717
1977	83,282
1978	44,615
1979	414,075
1980	382,367
1981	217,666

This relatively important amount of financial effort went nowhere because of non-favorable local conditions and lack of incentives. This was not enough because of larger needs, distant hamlets from both CAPCS branches, notably that of Agradou situated between hamlets, and non-effective management of the available resources and potentials. Akbou's BNA branch sent an accountant to Agradou's CAPCS, but he left one month later. He could not stand living conditions there, according to the bank representative who mentioned this case, which indicates again that spending alone cannot solve the problems or improve living conditions in rural Algeria. A genuine socioeconomic program is needed to make the financial effort fruitful.

The Multi-Sources of Income

A legitimate question may be asked at this point in analyzing Beni-Chebana's economic situation, "What are the possible income sources if neither agriculture nor industry has developed enough to retain people in the area?" Answering this question is really not easy in part due to lack of adequate data. This fact, however, would not prevent us from taking a brief look into the main sources of income for this commune. Agriculture has been presented as the main income source by the 1979 regional statistics, since the primary sector alone absorbs 75.4 percent of the communal manpower. The secondary sector accounts 21.6 percent and the tertiary accounts for only 3.0 percent. These percentages do not seem to reflect the real situation, as our own data show. The survey, in fact, shows a completely different situation whereby agriculture represents a very small percentage as compared with other more important sources, as the following tabulation shows:

<u>Income Sources</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agriculture alone	4.0
Agriculture + others	37.0
Free occupations (agri.excluded)	3.0
Private wage laborers	16.0
Public workers	10.0
Retirements from abroad	13.0
Retirements (national)	2.0
Traders	4.0
War allowances	11.0
Total	100.0

The above percentages show part-time farming dominant, with 37 percent of the manpower, while agriculture alone represents only four percent. A second remark concerns the importance of income originating

from outside the commune in the form of retirements, pensions, and state allowances to war veterans and widows. These three sources together account for 26 percent of the total income. This equals both private and public wage-paying workers. The very profitable retail trade with prices well beyond urban prices is strongly held by four percent of the manpower in Beni-Chebana. There is no wholesale trade in the commune. Many small retailers buy from local retailers to sell at the hamlet level which fact makes prices even higher. Most of them have no means to buy at wholesale prices. Third, there is a large difference between those who have retirement from abroad with 13 percent and national retirees with only two percent. That is to say, that job opportunities for the Algerian proletariat were available in France rather than in Algeria during the colonial war.

Artisan activities economically are very important since most, if not all, socioeconomic needs had been locally satisfied during the colonial past. Such activities include: clothing, blankets, containers and tools, etc. The survey shows that only around 35% households today still make limited handicrafts, notably, wool articles done by women. Imported and national industrial goods consequently have destroyed the rural economy in Beni-Chebana, without replacing those activities of the traditional handicrafts by a more sophisticated type of production. This fact forced rural people out to seek other income sources.

Income From Outmigration

The large majority of Algerian rural migrants went to France, attracted by job market opportunities, and this was the case for

Beni-Chebana. The Algerian colonial economy could not absorb the rapidly growing rural labor force since not one of the three sectors — industry, agriculture, and services — had developed enough to provide sufficient needed jobs. Only when the French economy needed cheap manpower was it that a great stream of migrants to France started at the beginning of this century. A counter-stream of money took place from France to Algeria, and more specifically to rural areas, the home of the migrants. The money was being sent to families left behind.

Income from outmigration is much more important than all other sources together. The survey, in fact, shows 15 percent of the people receiving their main income from retirement. The 1979 regional statistics show the following figures of money flowing into Beni-Chebana from outside for that year only: 5,840,804 AD from abroad and 15,481,011 AD from within the national territory. It is worth noting that no cent of these amounts was sent abroad and 110,240.50 AD were sent into other national regions. This large amount shows to what extent Beni-Chebana's residents depend for their living on money sent by outmigrants and received as retirees.

It is of utmost importance to note, however, that Algerian migrants abroad, notably to France, have practically stopped sending their saving through remittances as they formerly did. Rather a steadily growing black market money exchange emerged after 1969 when the French Franc (FF) was devalued. This market has reached its highest point of growth, when Algerian private citizens have been, officially, allowed to import cars without permission to export the

necessary funds to buy them. It was a boon to migrants abroad. The Algerian financial system does not allow Algerian export of currency and no money exchange is allowed beyond the present 1,000 AD once a year per person travelling abroad.

This policy was intended to favor car imports, with no foreign currency spent by the national corporation holding the state monopoly of car imports and to encourage outmigrants to transfer their savings into their country with the highest rate of exchange never reached before. Despite the low rate of FF, this is: $FF1=AD\ 0.62$ during the beginning of the second half of 1984, the FF was exchanged at 2.50 AD on the black market. Due to FF low rate, only social security money is received in Algeria from France. Some retirees even stopped receiving their allowances in Algeria and asked to be paid in France instead. This is more profitable to the retirees but very detrimental to the national economy. The government had to intervene to stop the phenomenon by allocating some compensations so as to keep some kind of balance between the values of AD and FF before, and even after, the system of car imports was introduced.

The price encouragement system did not work. Only a single remittance of 200 AD was received at Ait Mohli's post office agency between 1977 and 1983. It was a gift from an outmigrant to a grandparent. The fact is that workers as well as retirees found themselves losing by sending their savings to Algeria, as shown by the following case at Trouna's post office. A remittance arrived at Trouna from France in February 1985. It was sent by the French Social

Security and taken by mere chance among many others. Its amount was FF 9,124.84 and its value in Algerian Dinar was 4,718.25. The added compensation was 1,909 AD. This made the total paid to the receiver: 6,627.25 AD and the loss is 2,502.59 FF. The value of this remittance should it be exchanged on the black market is: 22,824.60 AD. The value of French Franc in the black market is 2.50 AD. as practiced today, if not more. Another factor that helped to stop the sending of migrants' savings was family migration increase, beside importing goods to sell at five or more times French prices. A retiree told Trouna's post office officer: "You have stolen my money", when he knew the difference between the amount sent to him in FF and that received in AD.

This does not mean that Algeria has stopped receiving any money from France. Rather, a growing flow of goods and funds is taking place between the two countries as shown by the steadily growing amounts received at Bejaia Wilaya level from both national and international migrants between 1978 and 1983:

Table 19: Flow of Money Into Bejaia's Wilaya in 1978-1983 by National and International Categories (in AD).

<u>Year</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>International</u>
1978	239,904,931	124,354,108
1979	287,903,328	145,562,201
1980	372,884,685	161,742,886
1981	404,946,261	171,272,353
1982	618,629,702	181,778,115
1983	643,754,831	188,608,030

Source: Bejaia's Post Office Statistics, 1984.

The amounts shown in Table 19 are those coming from outmigrants or received by them through the post office system at Bejaia Wilaya. As

for Beni-Chebana, the figures available do not cover the entire commune because because no amounts were available for Beni-Chebana's section an only totals wre provided for Adjissa and Beni-Maouche. Statistics of the commune were sent to Bejaia and destroyed after a period of time. Adjissa and Beni-Maouche together received 33,228,985.31 AD from abroad and 36,787,333.10 AD from within the national territory, during the 1979 and 1984 period. The international amount of 33 million AD included 10 million AD of compensation. Twenty out of 36 million AD received from within the national territory, were pensions. The money received at Ait Mohli from outmigrants is shown in Table 20 below:

Table 20: Ait Mohli's Income from Outmigrants in 1977-1981, by National and International Categories (in AD).

<u>Year</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>International</u>
1977	476,813.18	160,560.90
1978	878,016.60	448,048.73
1979	1,277,002.48	784,202.65
1980	1,509,081.10	709,319.79
1981	1,685,239.52	739,443.37

Source: Ait Mohli's Post Office Agency, 1982

The above figures confirm the fact that Beni-Chebana as well as the Wilaya of Bejaia as a whole are centers of outmigration. This large-scale outmigration is due to three main factors: 1) a poor and backward agrarian sector; 2) a lack of industry; and 3) inadequate living conditions. The migrants send money to their families left behind and prepare to come back home in most cases. This is true for both national and international migrants. The important amounts of money would suggest a large-scale outmigration of manpower forced out of underdeveloped rural areas.

Income from outmigrants is not only important at communal or Wilaya levels, but also at the national level, even though not all outmigrants' savings are sent home. The migrants' nominal value transfer passed from AD 1.199 billions in 1970 to AD 1.807 billions in 1980. The consistent value should have been AD 3.787 billions in 1980, the lack of transfer would be AD 7.783 billions between 1970 and 1980, since the migrants' saving capacity was AD 5.160 billions in 1980. The total amount of non-transferred funds and material goods was 31.875 AD billions for the same period, according to a study of A. Chaker (AA., February 17-23, 1983).

The Role of Women

This section focuses on the role of women in socioeconomic development, with an emphasis on the commune of Beni-Chebana. At the same time, some consideration will be given to a broader view of the economic role of Algerian women in general.

Women in Algeria are legally equal to men. All state laws and principles give women an equal right to work, to education, and to political, and social participation. The National Charter, based on socialist principles, put much emphasis on woman's essential place as a mother, spouse, and citizen within the family cell. A woman should be able to work and be paid according to the work done. The constitution essentially prohibits any discrimination based on sex, race, or profession. These policy principles and laws are, unfortunately, not effectively put into practice.

Algerian society is, in fact, a male dominated society. Even if social rules are made by political, legislative, or administrative

authorities, they may not work because of man's power, based on some religious tenets and deep cultural traditions. New laws will not succeed in making radical changes overnight. Man's powerful position is within the family cell and laws are almost useless in this case because no one can enter households to tell them what or what not to do. Only when a case is brought into public hands can the laws be enforced. Even then, women usually submit to men who are in charge of them as mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. This has been religiously established with the family system and firmly strengthened by the dominant socioeconomic conditions of underdevelopment and rigidity of traditions.

Social facts such as divorce, for instance, show to what extent women are forced to submit completely to male authority in Algeria. Early marriage associated with religion and local conditions, is a form through which men take control of women. Young girls used to get married as early as 13 or 14 years of age. They have no chance to get a good level of education or vocational skill at this early age, and no chance is offered later on to do so. The 1984 family law made a good step forward by prohibiting female marriage before the age of 18. Married women without education or job skills depend completely on husbands' attitude toward them. Husbands have an absolute right to divorce whenever they desire and without being seriously forced to justify their behavior. A judge cannot stop a divorce, the only choice he has is to ratify the husband's decision of divorce.

It is true that the Muslim dominated male societies take from religion only what most serves men as opposed to women because in the

case of divorce, the Prophet provided women with divorce-sharing rights when this condition is mentioned in a marriage contract. This possibility has never come to be widely known or put into practice in most, if not all Muslim societies. Rather it is meaningless to give a completely dependent and disarmed wife a right to divorce which she may never be able to use. Another religious right given to wives is the choice to stay or go when a husband marries a second wife. The Koran, effectively, allows men to have as many as four wives at the same time, with conditions which would make a second wife almost impossible if correctly followed. These conditions are never made clear to the public. Polygamy seems widespread in Algeria where a fairly large proportion of married men (70,000 according to 1977 general census) have a second wife. The real and tough problem is not that of legal or religious right in the first place but it is, rather, that of improving female socioeconomic status because a disarmed and dependent wife will not benefit from divorce or refusing to stay with her husband's second wife. The original wife's family would accept her back, this is at least what prevailed in recent past, but never with her children for whom she has the right of custody. The only choice left for a wife in this case is to stay with the husband and accept his rules.

Still another case of female submission to men is that concerning the right to work. The Algerian women are generally not allowed to work, even if they had worked before marriage. This is contrary to Islamic law allowing women to take part in socioeconomic activities and prevent the husband to stop his working wife, should they marry while

she works. This is to say briefly that religious laws are not strictly followed in Muslim societies. Rather, religion has been misused to repress females. The new Algerian family law of 1984 gave women working rights. The problem is aggravated by the fact that even educated female workers of the urban areas are not participating fully in the job market. Their participation rate was 1.66 percent in 1966 but went down in 1977 to 1.62 percent. So, women's education is not profitable to the national economy and inequality did not distinguish between educated and non-educated women. Rather, it equally dealt with female categories representing more than 50 percent of the total population.

An increased percentage of working women has been sought recently by the government, not only as a means of socioeconomic, political, and cultural emancipation, but also as a channel of birth control. It is thought that educated working women would tend to have fewer children because of the difficulty of working and simultaneously rearing children. These remarks apply to Algerian women as a whole while the rural women are even more depressed. Can their status be improved?

A clear distinction should be made from the beginning between urban and rural women. The two cases are different in many respects. Traditionally, rural women were very active in contributing to the family economy, especially when this was a subsistence economy in which they played a major role. But when the economy expands new economic and social activities, the traditional ones are transformed and their relative importance is reduced, as Boserup asserts. This is to say

that the traditional economy could not resist the western economic invasion. The colonized people, notably women, could not participate in the colonial economic system due to, among other reasons, a lack of skills. Not only were women but also men as well were put aside during the colonial era. More important is the fact that rural women were the first victims of the post independence development of the developing nations. Women in Algerian rural development program were simply ignored. All the agrarian reform charter had said was that a wife of a beneficiary from the reform has the right to receive her husband's pay when he dies. Only his oldest boy can replace him. Here we are in a dangerous situation of division of labor between sexes: while men are sent to work on the farm, women are kept home. Women in other words are not allowed to do farm work as they used to, within the subsistence economy. Not just female labor is lost but children's participation is also lost. The system destroyed the very effective family labor force by allowing only males to be members of an agrarian cooperative. The Tanzanian Ujamaa woman by comparison is very burdened. She has to work her own private land, husband's private land, do the job of a Ujamaa member, and home chores, as the Tanzanian women's delegation to the September 1982 African Women's Seminar held in Algiers reported. These are two extreme cases with regard to rural women in developing nations.

Beni-Chebana's women not only are prevented from education and work activities, but they are also not even allowed to be seen in public under any circumstance. Very few women except some very old and poor women can go out of their homes. Only during harvesting seasons

can Beni-Chebana women go out to help male workers. This is not, however, the case for all parts of rural Algeria, but rather most other regions allow women to take part in family farming as well as to hold wage-paying work, such as in Eastern Algeria, Aures, greater Kabylia and Southern parts. The rural female population is not allowed to migrate city-ward unless the purpose is to join her husband.

It is true that men are in charge of women and dependent children, in which situation the family can survive when the husband works even with low income. The problem becomes critical for widows, divorced, or non-married women. They, then must support themselves and their dependent children without being previously and adequately prepared. Consequently, rural women suffer more from social constraints and underdevelopment than any other social category. The national plans overlooked the rural female population in many developing countries. The United Nations Economic Commission recognized the importance of polygamy in traditional economy as follows:

"A man with several wives commands more land, can produce more food for his household, and can achieve a high status due to the wealth he can command." (Boserup, 1970, 37)

The female labor force here is a source of wealth for male exploiters.

Among other factors that place women as inferior to men in economic activity is physical strength. Presumably this fact made for sex differences in primitive agriculture. This difference was expected to narrow when human muscle-power was no longer necessary, but this did not take place everywhere. Rather, technology influenced men who were

able to learn how to use tools, while women, during the transformation period, want either to abandon farming and retire to domestic life, or to leave for town. (Boserup, 1970, 53) Boserup, a leading economic scholar, clearly blamed Western colonialism for women's deteriorating status in the previously colonized nations:

"European settlers, colonial administrators, and technical advisers are largely responsible for deterioration in the status of women in the agricultural sectors of developing countries. It was they who neglected the female agricultural labour force when they helped to introduce modern commercial agriculture to the overseas world and promoted the productivity of male labour." (Boserup, 1970, 53-4)

This remark does not seem to apply to Algeria, because the European settlers did not make such a choice. Both men and women were driven away. Rather, over-mechanization characterized colonial farming in this country. It was a shame even for Algerian men to work with the settlers during the whole colonial era. Each community was closed to the other. Only recently has poverty pushed the most destitute and landless peasants to accept work with the settlers on a small scale. Consequently, it seems unfair to accuse Western colonialism of every kind of problem the developing countries are now facing. This, however, may be true in other parts of the world.

Women to Take Over Men's Jobs

The developing countries are faced with a hard question, namely, whether to employ women when men cannot find jobs, or to discriminate against females in order to provide males with jobs. Or is it possible to encourage sex-free competition in the job market? Boserup calls for

female employment in urban centers of the developing countries, despite the fact that large scale unemployment may be unavoidable because large number of villagers are pushed from their homes for lack of employment or lacking land to cultivate (Boserup, 1970, 196). So, employment of women will have two positive benefits, according to this idea: improvement of family income and also stopping rural exodus because no jobs are available for rural-urban migrants. A third positive benefit, consequently, is that this policy of limiting rural migration, will make more food available. The rural people who cannot migrate to cities should produce more food, according to Boserup's theory of urban female employment. This does not seem to work in rural Algeria now because even those who could not leave the area are moving away from unprofitable farming. The Algerian peasants tend, effectively, to prefer wage-paying work over poor farming.

A second obstacle opposing this theory is that for women to fill urban jobs is not easy, either because of personal choices, skills, or conveniences. Rural poverty will only increase when migrants cease sending money from urban centers, while the rural areas are not yet developed since neither urban men or women are willing to work in rural areas. This is very true in the Algerian case as well as in other developing nations. The International Labor Organization (ILO) asserts that:

"Educated women are unwilling to accept jobs as teachers, nurses, social workers, etc. either because of their family attachment in town or because of a general desire to live in towns."
(Boserup, 1970, 197)

It also seems too simplistic to think that rural-urban migration will stop if only urban women take up available urban jobs, which is unlikely to happen anyway. Rural people will resort to many means to get jobs even if there are not any. This is not an easy question, and there are no easy solutions to it, because going straight from one extreme to another will not be an answer. It will be very damaging to prevent rural people from moving city-ward without making jobs and other services available to them. Wage-paying opportunities need to be made available to rural-urban people of both sexes. No one would disagree with Boserup that girls should be educated and be consequently allowed to perform productive activities, but it seems equally illogical to favor urban rather than rural residents. Rural-urban exodus is damaging to both areas in Algeria and its solution may be sought through providing more decent living conditions and the creation of job opportunities within the countryside. The more advanced nations are experiencing large counter-streams and the large cities are even losing portions of their population due to favorable rural living conditions.

Boserup's viewpoint of the high cost of urbanization in developing countries and its proposed solution are amazingly oversimplified. To quote Boserup:

"In most villages, people provide the infrastructure they need, or most of it, by their own efforts without burdening public investment budget. Villagers in developing countries usually build their own homes of local materials, supply themselves with water, light, and fuel, arrange their own local transportation by carrying head-loads or use donkeys or carts. In towns by

contrast, public investment budgets are burdened by investment costs to provide migrant families with dwellings, light, water, sanitation, schools, hospitals, etc." (Boserup, 1970, 206)

The above descriptions were once, in fact, correct but they are no longer valid today. The rural people of developing countries went to war when they could not bear any longer what they were forced to bear. They went into war to free themselves from the burdens they had to bear under the colonial powers and free their countries from western exploitation. They cannot accept today what they fought against years ago and paid for heavily. To propose going back to the colonial era situation seems to be unwise and fruitless. The governments of developing countries may consider two possible choices: to provide infrastructures either in urban areas (which would only worsen the bad situation of overcrowding and high costs as Boserup rightly mentions), or in rural areas where the people may even get involved to lower the cost and probably solve or at least ease the rural-urban exodus problem. Boserup also suggested restricting town entry to rural people as was the case of the colonial era, when only single male workers were allowed to come to work and were cheaply housed, or there were use restrictions as in some socialist countries such as People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. These restrictions are hard to impose in developing nations and would not be accepted by the rural people who may feel oppressed and frustrated again and this time by their own governments. These restrictions would be accepted only if deemed just and necessary to serve the general interest, that is when people feel

that they are getting their share of the national income and services. This is the case of the socialist countries. People do not seem to feel discriminated against. The other viewpoint, in contrast, to that of stopping rural-urban migration by allowing women to take over urban jobs or just restricting city entry, is to encourage women to stay home in order to provide men and especially young men with more job opportunities. This view also looks too simplistic and gives credence to those who are against female education. It would be a terrible waste of money, time, and effort to educate women without allowing them to contribute to socioeconomic development of their country and benefit from their education.

This chapter allowed us to briefly look at Beni-Chebana's subsistence economy. The role of women in economic development was discussed. The problem of male-female employment and rural-urban migration was also examined, a subject closely related to the following chapter on population and social amenities.

Demographic Phenomena

The intent here is to examine some major demographic phenomena and how they are related to the socioeconomic, cultural, and historical situation of Algeria as well as the local level. Population phenomena, especially growth, are very important indeed in today's developing countries where poverty and hunger threaten social and political stability. Some argue that family planning is being suggested by demographers and politicians because of the rapid population growth of the developing world as compared to that of advanced countries. High birth rates are seen as an obstacle to socioeconomic development which should be removed before any hope for development can succeed. In spite of theories, both pessimistic and optimistic, many developing nations are experiencing starvation, notably in Africa, today. The problem is that birth control is not an easy solution because it requires a number of conditions to fully succeed and these are not readily available in developing countries.

These conditions, according to Karmeyer, are:

- 1) awareness by political leaders that excessive population growth may be detrimental to well-being;
- 2) availability of contraceptive technology;
- 3) necessary social scientific knowledge for dispensing such technology; and
- 4) change in the social structure so as to people to receive social rewards for not having children. (Karmeyer, 141-3)

These conditions are not met in the Algerian case mainly because of the prevailing socioeconomic, historical, religious, and political conditions. From an historical viewpoint, Algeria had to be pronatalist because of the colonial exploitation, as Sauvy mentions, the colonial aim was:

"To extract wealth, products or even men from the new territories. Since there was an ample provision of men for the market, at very low purchase prices, it was profitable to treat them more cruelly than animals. The new rulers, both in Asia and in Africa, were thus regardless of the numbers of their subjects." (Sauvy, 108)

Consequently, the settlers paid no attention to population growth because the colonized sector was dealt with as a commodity. The more people, the cheaper they seem to be. The subjected people could not accept any policy of population control, because their only defense was to increase their numbers. The increase in numbers can become a reason for concern when extra subjects are a burden and a threat to rulers. Those, in fact, who cannot find a place within the existing economic framework will inevitably rise up. Thus, there was no population policy during the colonial era:

"...The French governors showed no interest in any form of census. Not until 1947 was the problem of population formulated clearly enough for forecasts to be made and plans to be laid down to deal with the probable increase." (Sauvy, 109)

The pronatalist ideology of Islam also helped to maintain traditions of family and childbearing deeply rooted in the local culture. The sacred marriage is aimed mainly at childbearing. In the words of the prophet: "Get married, get children, I will be proud of

you, among nations, on resurrection day." Add to this the Koran's warning not to refrain from having children out of fear of hunger since God provides both parents and children with needed wealth. For the pronatalists, prevention of childbearing is killing, while it is not for those Muslims supporting contraceptive use when needed. The latter do not regard abortion before a certain period of gestation as murder. Muslims are opposed to abortion unless the mother's life is in danger.

The Islamic Superior Council of Algeria in 1968 issued a Fetwa (religious authorization) for contraceptive use but only at an individual level. This means, in other words, denying the political power any right to impose a general birth control rule deemed against the spirit of Islam. The main rationale of the religious men is that God has created enough wealth for man's needs and if there is poverty, it is not due to economic development potentials but rather to social and structural inequality. This comes close to the early Marxist viewpoint concerning this subject.

Marx, in fact, reacted violently against the Malthusian theory asserting that human misery stemmed from population growth and uneven economic growth. This theory was considered as class selfishness that reversed the real responsibility. The apparent over-population is due, according to Marxists, to private property and there would be no population problem in a socialist regime, especially not over-population (Sauvy, 524). The Marxists took this position on the ground that for the working classes, numbers are essential in the struggle for freedom. The Marxist stand, however, changed over time

since abortion and contraceptives are allowed in the Soviet Union and divorce is easy. There is equality among the sexes and women must work. These policies serve to reduce the growth rate in that country. China also recently adopted the one-child family as policy.

Today's over-population is a mere aspect and consequence of underdevelopment, according to Sauvy. A country, such as Switzerland, with 375 inhabitants per square mile, would be extremely poor and would suffer cruelly from hunger and cold if deprived of equipment or education. Food shortage is not due to excessive numbers in many developing countries but to existing underdevelopment. These countries can improve their conditions substantially by a better use of agricultural land, better prospecting for mineral resources, creation of industry, etc. The fundamental condition of this is the proper training of the population. (Sauvy, 421)

Population Policy

Algerian history is characterized by wars and uprisings, notably the liberation war that killed about 1.5 million people. Because of the threats by neighbors over colonial borders, and in order to strengthen the power of the elite, the leaders sided with the pronatalist position. The colonial policy of non-intervention was continued up to 1980. The late president Boumediene declared in 1979:

"We do not favor false solutions such as birth control. We consider that this would suppress difficulties instead of adequately solving them. We believe, in fact, that the real solutions are within development framework even if more time and efforts are required." (AA., January 28-February 3, 1982)

This has been the official population policy since independence up to the fourth session of the FLN (the governing Party) Central Committee, held in June 1980. This policy required no action. It was in perfect agreement with that position expressed by religious men.

The same governing Party shifted its policy just after Boumediene died in 1979. The Central Committee expressed concern over the rapid growth rate of the population that reached as high as 3.2 percent a year and called for a vast program of information and education. Necessary financial, material, and human means were promised to undertake birth control programs for the first time in national history. The program, however, did not significantly succeed because the means made available were not sufficient and the programs faced stiff resistance from those who were expected to help, namely, teachers, parents, and religious institutions. Hence, the goals were not achieved. Birth spacing, as officially called, was seen as contrary to the Koran and consequently rejected. Some successful steps, however, were made. Birth spacing centers, for instance, jumped from around 10 in 1970 to 300 in 1980. But much was needed in the areas of research and technology as well as in campaigns to convince resisters of its usefulness and necessity. Not only were a large proportion of citizens not fully convinced but adequate means were not available to those who needed them. Negative effects of the use of the pill were also used by the opponents to stop the program. It was not until 1984 that a relatively serious effort was made. The Party launched an information program through different media.

Characteristics of the Algerian Population

We first examine some characteristics of the Algerian population in order to better understand the demography of a developing country. We will then turn to the Beni-Chebana case. The following table shows the size of the resident population and percent increase, by sex, and sex ratio from 1977 to 1980.

Table 21: The Resident Population of Algeria, by Sex, 1977-80.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Percent Increase</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Percent Increase</u>	<u>Sex Ratio</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent Increase</u>
1977	8,305,564	—	8,462,734	—	98.1	16,768,298	—
1978	8,578,187	3.3	8,724,057	3.1	98.3	17,302,244	3.2
1979	8,846,360	3.1	8,987,310	3.0	98.4	17,833,670	3.1
1980	9,117,199	3.1	9,258,107	3.0	98.5	18,315,306	3.0

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981

The data in Table 22 show an annual rate of increase in excess of 3.0. The rate is declining slightly in the three periods shown. Note that there is a consistent low sex ratio, i.e. an excess of females over males. The high rate of growth in Algeria, as shown Table 21, is due to the combination of a high birth rate and a greatly reduced mortality. Therefore, the rate of natural increase is substantial, as shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Algerian Crude Birth Rate and Natural Increase Rate, 1977-79.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Crude Birth Rate</u>	<u>Natural Increase Rate</u>
1977	46.02	31.66
1978	43.67	30.87
1979	44.02	31.29

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

These rates, which have decreased slightly since 1977, are still very high in comparison to those of advanced countries which are better able to handle demographic growth. The crude birth rate levels may be used to measure the development level as between advanced and developing countries. It will take much more time for Algeria to attain the low level of birth rates of the developed nations or even those developing nations that have moved further in modernization. The important fact is that child-elderly dependency ratios are very high in Algeria, consequently, making an excessively heavy burden with regard to schooling, infant and maternal health care, housing, and provision of food.

Too high population growth rate is in part due to a low crude death rate. The Algerian crude death rate is, in fact, decreasing as shown below according to 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning (32):

Year	Male	Female	Total
1977	14.67	14.07	14.37
1978	13.30	12.30	12.22
1979	13.23	12.22	12.73

Infant death rates likewise are decreasing in the same period, according to the same source of data (34):

Year	Male	Female	Total
1977	128.00	127.11	127.56
1978	114.60	110.21	112.41
1979	117.16	113.20	115.18

The above figures need no further explanation. Life expectancy also has improved and its level compares favorably with other

developing nations such as the neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. The gap, however, is still wide between Algeria and advanced nations as Table 23 shows:

Table 23: Comparative Life Expectancy of Selected Countries by Sex.

Country	Year	Male	Female	Total
Algeria	1979	55.50	58.21	56.85
Argentina	1970-75	56.16	71.38	68.27
Cuba	1970	68.50	71.80	70.15
France	1974	69.00	76.90	72.95
Morocco	1970-75	51.40	54.50	52.95
Syria	1970	54.49	58.73	56.61
Tunisia	1970-75	52.50	55.70	54.10
Yugoslavia	1970-75	65.42	70.22	67.82

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

The Population Reference Bureau in 1985 reports the most recent life expectancy data for the countries in Table 24 as follows: Algeria, 60; Argentina, 70; Cuba, 73; France, 75; Morocco, 58; Syria, 64; Tunisia, 61; and Yugoslavia, 70.

With regard to death rates, Algeria stands midway between the more advanced and less advanced nations, as the following death rates indicate: Algeria, 1979: 12.73; Argentina, 1974: 8.80; Cuba, 1976: 5.50; France, 1977: 10.10; Morocco, 1974: 15.70; Syria, 1974: 15.40; Tunisia, 1974: 13.80; and Yugoslavia, 1977: 8.40. (Ministry of Planning, 1981, 42)

Another important characteristic of the Algerian population is its youthfulness, as shown by the proportion of children under 15 years old, from 1977 to 1980:

Year	Proportion Under 15
1977	47.2
1978	47.1
1979	46.8
1980	46.6

Despite very slight, steady decreases, these proportions are still very high as compared to those of developed countries, such as France with 25.4 and Sweden with 22.0. The child-aged dependency ratios for Algeria are shown below for 1977-80 (number of persons under 15 plus numbers of persons 65 and over, divided by number of persons 15-64, multiplied by 100):

Year	Dependency Ratio
1977	105.9
1978	105.1
1979	103.5
1980	102.3

These ratios calculated from resident population tables, show a high but slightly declining load of dependency. However, dependency would be much higher if those persons under 18 are added to the non-active population. The proportion of active population from 15 to 18 years old has been estimated to represent only 7.46 males and 1.57 females in 1980. These percentages show extremely low economic activity for this age bracket. Those under 18 are not, legally, eligible for jobs unless under certain circumstances. Female participation, of course, is very low both in this age bracket as well as in the total female population of all ages, as shown below, according to 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning (18):

Year	Percent of Active Female Population
1977	4.3
1978	4.8
1979	4.7
1980	4.9

The dependency ratios would be even higher if young people 19-24 years old who have not yet entered the labor force were to be taken into account. In 1980, the 19-24 year old age group amounted to 10.5% of the total population. The age group was composed of about 40,000 more males than females.

Another no less important characteristic of the Algerian population is its low level of education, and high level of illiteracy, among the registered marriages in 1978, notably, among married females. This is shown below, according to the 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning (46):

Level of Education	Male	Female	Average
Illiterate	57.4	80.8	69.0
Elementary education	27.7	14.2	21.0
Secondary education	12.5	4.3	8.4
College education	2.4	0.7	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Beni-Chebana's Population Characteristics

Beni-Chebana's population characteristics are similar to those of the national population, with only slight differences. The problem here is that available data at a communal level does not allow us to make in-depth analysis. We may be sure that the population of our commune is very young. The 1977 census shows some differences between the two populations. Beni-Chebana's dependency ratios have been higher

(108.65) than the nationwide ratio (105.90). The proportion of children under 15 is lower (46.45) at the communal level than nationwide (47.25). This indicates that the communal population is older than the national level. The communal elderly-child ratio confirms that fact since it is higher (12.18) in 1977 than at the national level. The elderly-child ratios for Algeria ranged from 8.8 to 8.5 between 1977 and 1980. This seems to indicate that the countryside may have more retirees and disabled old people that go back to rural areas to spend the rest of their lives than the proportion who stayed in the urban areas.

It is worthwhile to note that when the value of the elderly-child ratio is under 15, it describes populations as being young (e.g., India 7.5, Honduras 5.1; Syria 10.1; Chile 10.8) and the value of 30 and above can describe populations as old (e.g., France 47.8, Sweden 54.4, and Soviet Union, 20.5) (Stockwell, 133). Using this indication, both national and local populations are young, but the local one is older. The proportion of aged persons or elderly ratio makes a clear difference between national and local populations. The local is undoubtedly older as the following tabulation for the total Algerian population shows.

Year	Ratio
1977	4.17
1978	4.11
1979	4.03
1980	3.95

Beni-Chebana's elderly ratio calculated for 1977 was 5.65, considerably higher than the national one going even lower between 1977 and 1980.

However, both are very young as compared to international elderly standard, (France 12.1, Sweden 12.0). The ratio under five percent indicates younger population (Honduras 2.4, Syria 4.7, India 3.1, Chile 4.3) (Stockwell, 133).

Child-mother ratio, another demographic measure, shows the difference between national and local populations. The national ratio was reported in the 1981 demographic study of the Ministry of Planning and the local ratio is calculated from survey. The data clearly contradicts the usual assumption that rural women have higher birth rates than urban women. Below are shown child-mother ratios locally and nationally (28).

Year	Local Ratio	National Ratio
1977	-	7.30
1978	-	6.92
1979	-	7.05
1980	5.12	-

Beni-Chebana's child-mother ratios for 1981 are, separately, as shown below for each section:

Section	Child-Mother Ratio
Adjissa	5.40
Ait Mohli	4.74
Beni-Chebana	4.65
Beni-Maouche	5.69
Average	5.12

Still another important demographic aspect that could be calculated from census data is sex ratio excess-deficit. Beni-Chebana, as well as all other communes of the Wilaya, exhibit male deficits due to losses in the liberation war and large male outmigration. None of the Wilaya's 28 communes has a male excess; rather they all have a male

deficit ranging from less than 0.80 percent in Bejaia commune to less than 14.56 percent in Akfadou commune. Beni-Chebana is midway between the largest and smallest male deficit (a deficit of 5.68 percent), seemingly due to two main factors, as already mentioned, war losses and outmigration of male population. Women do not migrate alone as is the case in Latin American and Asian countries. Only when the whole family migrates are females included among migrants.

Beni-Chebana's sex ratios for the four sections are also provided by the survey for 1983, except for Ait Mohli whose sex ratio is provided by 1983 communal census. These ratios follow:

Section	Ratio
Adjissa	95.10
Ait Mohli	122.62
Beni-Chebana	98.00
Beni-Maouche	92.33
Average	102.01

The notable phenomenon here is Ait Mohli's sex excess contrary to all other communal sections as well as to those of the whole Wilaya. In fact, I had to use the communal census that showed lower sex ratio of only 122.62, because the survey showed an even larger ratio of 146.62. There must be some reasons which are not clear for this exceptional case.

As for marital status, the 1977 census reported that 38.3% of Beni-Chebana's population was married. Widowed persons accounted for 5.8%, 0.5% were divorced, and 0.1% were separated. The remainder, or 55.3% were reported as single.

The survey also collected partial figures for Beni-Chebana war losses, which are distributed as follows according to sex, age, and

cause of death (The French Army and the National Liberation Army). The total number distributed is 925:

Cause of Death	Sex-Age	Percent
French Army	Men	70.70
	Women	7.57
	Children	12.65
ALN	Men	8.54
	Women	0.54
	Children	0.00
Total		100.00

Beni-Chebana's population pyramid shows two important features. These is a deficit of males that is clearly apparent between the ages of 30 onward and the youthfulness of this population as compared to that of more developed nations. Their negative effects are felt at local and national levels. Out-migration of young men has drained available manpower which is hardly needed to put government and local programs into effect. The need for formal and non-formal education is growing. The youth are not taken care of with regard to different aspects of modern life. They feel frustrated and abandoned.

The age structure of Beni-Chebana's population in 1977 is shown in Figure 1. (See page 166).




Figure 1. Age-Sex Structure of Beni-Chebana's Population, 1977.

The Outmigration Phenomenon

Algeria has been characterized since the beginning of the colonial era by outmigration. It was stimulated by the French settlers during the entire colonial period. It was first oriented toward neighboring and other Arab countries before it took a major shift at the beginning of the twentieth century, toward France in need of manpower following the destruction from World War I and II. The outmigration to France was characterized by single male migration until national independence in 1962. Family migration started from that time onward. It has had a fluctuating history until officially stopped by the Algerian government in 1973 due to worsening political and economic relationships between the two governments. The non-official outmigration, however, continued in one form or another as the statistics in Table 24 show. Outmigration, in fact, more than doubled each year from 1977 to 1979. Neither the French nor the Algerians know the exact figures of Algerians in France. They represent a source of external income for Algeria, means by which the French government can exert pressure, target for killing for French right wing extremists, and subject of legal problems. Table 24 shows outmigration flows by sex from 1977 to 1979:

Table 24: In- and Out-Migration and Net Migration for Algeria, by Sex, in 1977-79.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Sex</u>	<u>In-Migration</u>	<u>Out-Migration</u>	<u>Net Out-Migration</u>
1977	M	623,902	627,522	3,620
	F	293,942	295,647	1,705
	T	917,844	923,169	5,325
1978	M	653,343	660,801	7,458
	F	307,812	311,326	3,514
	T	961,155	972,127	10,972
1979	M	1,190,423	1,207,365	16,942
	F	560,848	568,831	7,983
	T	1,751,271	1,776,196	24,925

Source: Ministry of Planning, 1981.

Following this general characterization of the Algerian population's outmigration, we now turn to an explanation of Beni-Chebana's outmigration.

Beni-Chebana's Out-migration

Beni-Chebana's available data are limited and will not allow us to go in as much depth as we would like. Two sources of data are used with regard to the subject of outmigration, namely, the 1977 census data and the survey. The first source is not detailed at the communal level and the second could not be as exhaustive as desired. The census data are not highly reliable as will be shown. The following information may provide a base before treating outmigration.

Beni-Chebana's total population was 23,602 residents according to the 1977 census. Of that total 11,130 were males and 12,472 were females. The population density was 112 inhabitants per square Km, according to the 1966 census. The two density extremes were Bejaia commune with 539 inhabitants per square Km. and Taourirt-Ighil with

only 34 inhabitants per square Km. Thus, Beni-Chebana ranks 16th among the other 28 communes with regard to population density. The 1977 census distributed this population as follows, according to density, into census districts: Tarfet, the communal center, 1,326 residents; seven secondary agglomeration districts, 8,824 residents, and around 31 sparsely populated districts with some 13,452 residents. The census counted 744 visitors and 1,273 outmigrants for the entire commune. There were 3,892 households and 4,990 housing units, therefore 1,098 housing units were not occupied. They are, most probably, outmigrants' homes used only occasionally during vacations.

From these data some estimates of outmigrants can be calculated. The average size of each household is 6.1. This number multiplied by the number of empty homes would make the total of outmigrants around 6,698. Homeless outmigrants, however, represent a large proportion of outmigrants who lost their homes during the war. At least four hamlets were completely destroyed, namely, Boubirek, Mzita, Taourirt, and Tizekht. Many others were partially destroyed and never rebuilt. Each household has at least two, and sometimes more, outmigrants. These added would total 7,784 more migrants if multiplied by just two. The number of outmigrant births may have largely exceeded the number of those who left Beni-Chebana as some cases confirm. The total number of outmigrants must at least be equal to the total of residents at census time. The census figure of 1,273 outmigrants is ridiculously low. The number of international migrants would exceed or equal the number of households, if only one migrant per household is counted — this is

3,892 migrants instead of 1,273. Our survey is limited to around 37 hamlets from among 64 and shows the following numbers of outmigrants by communal section:

Section	Number of Out-migrants
Adjissa	1,205
Ait Mohli	629
Beni-Chebana	1,234
Beni-Maouche	879
Total	3,947

Errors may derive not only from counting but also from the concept of outmigration itself. The 1977 census, for instance, reported 20 outmigrants for Amegroud, Adjissa but our survey counted 280 migrants to France alone. The census may have counted only family heads and single outmigrants. The survey included men, women, and children. The problem here is not easy to solve since many outmigrants have left many years ago and have rarely visited the areas. They are not known to the new generations. Only recent outmigrants would be known and counted by those now living in the hamlets. Some of these long-time outmigrants left single, but they married later and now have many children, as is the case of an outmigrant from Boubirek-Beni-Maouche hamlet. He left in the 1930's and rarely visited his original hamlet. He was single when he left for France but now the family numbers 25, including wife, children, grandchildren, and daughters-in-law. They are all, legally, Algerian outmigrants, yet nobody can know this without meeting this person as I did by chance during one of the visits to the hamlet.

Beni-Chebana's outmigrants represent the following percentages of migrants by type, according to the survey: 11 percent single; 30

percent international; and 59 percent internal. The total counted was 13,236 outmigrants. Yet, the real total of outmigrants is still to be determined by proper techniques. The amount of money sent back home is an indicator, among others, that shows the importance of Beni-Chebana's outmigration as well as that of the Wilaya level. Yet, not all migrants send their savings home, due to recent family outmigration and the low exchange rate of the French Franc in recent years. The poor and underdeveloped Wilaya of Bejaia was reported to have 50,000 international migrants. But this figure may not represent more than a small proportion of its international migrants, should Beni-Chebana's case be applied to the Wilaya level. This is very likely to be true at Bejaia level as well as in other Algerian rural areas characterized by rapid demographic growth. Hence, there were large proportions of manpower moving out in order to improve their living conditions.

Causes and Destination of Out-migrants

Regardless of the outmigrant numbers, which are very large, the important aspect here concerns causes and effects, as well as destinations of Beni-Chebana's outmigrants. The right question to ask is why do people migrate and where they go? There is no way to answer these two questions in depth for Beni-Chebana. This would not, however, prevent us from taking a brief look into what causes outmigration, what its effects are, as well as where they go. The survey shows outmigration causes as expressed by hamlet residents to be mainly lack of jobs, inadequate housing, poor educational and health care services, and poor living conditions. In other words, migrants want to get away from rural underdevelopment and to secure their future through retirement allowances and better education for their children.

Outmigrants also expressed some negative aspects of migration faced by outmigrants and their families. This includes unfit housing in Algerian urban areas and high cost of transportation to and from home with regard to internal migrants. The international migrants suffer harsh effects of leaving the family abandoned in some cases, racial segregation, inadequate education for the young, change of traditions, and forced citizenship change. The temporary residence permit is another problem. Algerian outmigrants to France are pressured by all available means to get French citizenship in order to benefit from full social services. They live under permanent threat of being expelled at any time, should their timed stay permit expire and not be renewed. Even those who spent their whole lives working for the benefit of the French economy may lose part of their rights when retired without French citizenship. They are also a target of extremist attacks from the right. In short, many legal and political problems emerged over Algerian outmigrants to France.

The French economy benefitted from the abundant and cheap Algerian manpower since World War I, and the same phenomenon occurred in Algeria after independence. Rural-urban exodus seemingly was caused by the employment policy of national corporations. It is, in fact, no secret that the Algerian pattern of development has favored industry against agriculture, which was concentrated in the northern urban areas to which manpower has been attracted. This served to empty the rural areas of their skilled as well as unskilled labor. Oil development as well as managers' own interests helped to hire large numbers of

seasonal workers, in both agricultural and industrial state owned sectors, from the poor rural areas such as Bejaia Wilaya. This happened notably in Algiers, the capital city where overcrowding reached an alarming level recently. The housing crisis led these low wage earners to live in inadequately prepared garages and shantytowns. Their poverty and unhealthy conditions made of them a threatening situation. The government had to take the dramatic decision to clean up Algiers and other major cities. The decision was to use the army to send the inhabitants of shantytowns to their communes of origin and to destroy illegally built shantytowns in the first stage that took place in 1983-84. The second stage was planned to destroy illegally and randomly built homes notably those built in farm lands. It started at the end of 1984 but stopped shortly thereafter. The home owners' pressure was very strong, unlike the poor who were driven away. They are thought to be small traders, army officers, and international migrants who are the only categories able to build expensive houses. The following are the Algerian cities where Beni-Chebana's internal migrants went, seeking jobs, as the survey of 6,242 migrants shows:

City	Percent
Algiers	86.42
Bejaia	6.73
Annaba	2.74
Skikda	2.37
Sidi-Aich	1.06
Southern Algeria	0.46
Setif	0.11
Tizi-Ouzou	0.11
Total	100.00

The Return of Outmigrants

Not all outmigrants are planning to come back to Beni-Chebana. Both internal and international migrants are largely planning to stay or join Algerian urban centers. They have no reason to go back to undesired living conditions. But a good proportion of them are already back home again, as shown by the important amounts of money received in this commune from abroad as well as from the national territory. The survey counted 586 outmigrants who came back and they are distributed among Beni-Chebana's four sections as follows: Adjissa, 34.0; Ait Mohli, 4.0; Beni-Chebana, 21.0; and Beni-Maouche, 41.0 percent. It is very rare to find a male adult who has not had outmigration experience.

There are many outmigrants who regularly pay visits to their families left behind. Both married and single persons, whether abroad or in national territory, return to visit. The 1977 census, as just mentioned, counted 744 visitors and the survey estimated the number of visitors to be 2,307. The frequency of visits is as follows:

Frequency of Visits	Percent
Less than a month per visit	10.0
Monthly	14.0
Every quarter	14.0
Every six months	11.0
Once a year	33.0
More than a year	18.0
Total	100.0

These visits are very costly in time, money, and effort. But they are much needed, especially for married men with children as well as newly married ones. The lack of means of transportation and the high cost make such visits scarcely affordable. Ait Mohli's workers in

Bejaia city prefer to walk long distances every week than to pay illegal private transporters 60 AD weekly. Those coming from Algiers and who represent 86.42 percent of internal migrants, pay a much higher price just to see the family. The other cost is rural workers' high proportion of absenteeism within the productive units caused by visiting families far away. Their absenteeism is said to be much higher than that of their urban colleagues.

In-migrants to Beni-Chabana are very few. Only three physicians from Egypt, India, and Tizi-Ozou-Algeria, and a limited number of teachers, as well as a few temporary workers, now building electric power facilities are in-migrants.

Social Amenities

Social amenities are very important to socio-economic development and stability and they are essentially lacking in the underdeveloped areas of developing countries. The survey covered this dimension as well as those areas previously discussed. With regard to news media, the survey counted around 3,157 radio sets and some 496 TV sets. Almost every household owns a radio set but not necessarily all households possess them. Some households have more than one radio and others do not have any at all. Television sets are mainly found at the hamlets of Beni-Chabana and Beni-Maouche which recently got electric power (Beni-Maouche in December 1982). Only a very few TV sets are operated by motors in some other hamlets of the commune still without electric power. Only one person receives a daily newspaper in the entire commune and no one receives a magazine in a regular way. There

is no public library. The party's Kasma in 1981 received some books as a gift from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism but found no place where they could be used by the public. Sport activities simply do not exist because of lack of facilities. A soccer stadium, however, is under construction at Tarfet but it will take a long time before it is achieved and will be useful only to the people of the surrounding hamlets, unless some transportation arrangements are found. There is no movie theater or cultural center at Beni-Chebana commune.

The telecommunication facilities are in poor repair and cannot, correctly, play their role. The Wilaya director of post offices, during a meeting with him in 1981, made the following comments: "The commune of Beni-Chebana is well served with regard to telecommunication. It is provided with five post offices for its 25,000 inhabitants (one agency per 5,000 people), a good rate in a developing country." This self-satisfying declaration does not see the whole reality but only part of it. The truth, however, is that the communal post offices do exist, in fact, but are hardly doing the job they are expected to do. It may be useful to mention here before going into other details that the Algerian postal system inherited from the French is different from that of the U.S.A. It does include, among other postal services, banking and telephones. There is no bank in Beni-Chebana or in surrounding communes. Only two of these five are able to provide full services, others of lower administrative level cannot do so. These five post agencies are not properly equipped to adequately serve their users. Those of Adjissa and Ait Mohli simply do not have telephone

service for themselves or for the public. I could never make a telephone call from Tarfet post office, one of the two full-level in Beni-Chebana serving the communal center, during my visits (1981-84) period. I was told, every time I tried, that the telephone was broken. Trouna's first post office in the commune and one of the two high grade level is better off, despite the fact that its telephone is very often damaged. Aguemoune's post office agency is not different from the other two low-level cases.

There are 11 personal telephone lines in the whole commune and some 500 individuals have applied for telephones but have not yet had a response. The Party's Kasma receives its telegrams from the security unit of Beni-Ourtilane. To make a phone call one needs to travel long distances outside the commune's territory. The City Hall and its four agencies cannot call each other. The polyclincial center also cannot reach by telephone its dependent health units or a hospital in an emergency. No ambulance is available for call in emergency cases from any hamlet. The telephone is one of the most modern necessities that is not fully provided within Beni-Chebana. Even the post office's own offices are not yet built. That of Trouna was planned in 1968 but has not yet been launched by the end of 1984. A private builder took charge but different reasons forced long delays which made it impossible for him to complete it. The transportation cost and price of materials as well as wages have risen many times since 1968 when the project was approved. The Wilaya director of post offices refused to make cost corrections and the builder could not achieve the project in

1984 with 1968 prices. The case was taken to justice, I was told. Besides, the post office agencies do not have means of transportation or mailmen going to hamlets. Consequently, the mail may wait several days at the post office before distribution is made, including telegrams and express mail. The commune is, briefly, under-served by the post office system.

Health facilities are now improving markedly as compared to the situation some years ago. The 1979 regional statistics mention the existence of a poly-clinic at Tarfet and four other first hand health rooms throughout the communal territory. The polyclinic suffers from a lack of skilled staff. Only one generalist physician from India has been working at this polyclinic which looks and works just like a private health office with a single physician. The Indian physician with whom I talked was not happy about staying when he first arrived, but has since changed his mind. A communal official reported that the physician desires to renew his expiring contract. Akbou hospital, which controls this polyclinic, offered Beni-Chebana's young girls training as nurses to work in this polyclinic and got no satisfaction, since no applications were made by the female population. Outsiders did not agree to come to Tarfet.

The Algerian medical personnel, generally, do not go to rural areas such as Beni-Chebana. Two other physicians joined Trouna, Beni-Maouche in 1983. An Egyptian was hired by the government and an Algerian has opened the first private medical office in the commune. The commune, therefore, is improving but still needs much to be done

with regard to the health sector. There is no ambulance service, as previously mentioned, in the commune for emergency cases. The commune, however, owns an ambulance but it is used for other purposes, such as personnel transportation. The polyclinic does not benefit all inhabitants because of long distances to be travelled. Also, a single general physician is not sufficient medical personnel. Specialist physicians are needed to alleviate the heavy burden of having to go to Akbou or Bejaia hospitals. It is very costly and a great waste of time to go to these cities for every health check-up. Akbou is 50 to 75 Km., and Bejaia is around 90 to 100 Km. A round trip to any of these cities would cost, in a private car, between 300 to 500 AD (around \$60 to \$100). Repeated visits may easily destroy a family's savings.

To fully understand Beni-Chebana's health situation, we need to look briefly into prevailing health conditions at the national level and the Party's policy in the area. In order to satisfy large health needs, the National Charter proposed the achievement of the following goals:

"Increase necessary hospitals, socio-medical centers and laboratories everywhere in the country and particularly in rural zones. Adequate distribution of medical and para-medical staff nationwide. Accentuation of educational effort of physicians and paramedical personnel. A medical team for every small commune and quarter of urban centers. Development of Infant and Maternal Protection (IMP), job medicine..." (AA., April 24-30, 1980)

The government issued a free health ordinance on December 23, 1973 which faced fierce resistance from medical staff used to the private

and liberal health system. The Party's Central Committee put much emphasis on democratic and effective health care in its 1981 health resolution. But in addition to medical staff resistance against free public health care, the process of building more health facilities was very slow. Hence, only 45,000 hospital beds existed in 1982 nationwide for around 20 million people. This represents an average of two beds per 1,000 inhabitants, three times lower than the normal average of six beds per 1,000 inhabitants. There were 223 polyclinics and 741 health centers at that time. These all together could not adequately provide basic health care. Not only was the number of health facilities limited but the situation was worsening because of mismanagement of the existing facilities as A. Abbas reported: "Some transformation took place in Eastern Algeria: laboratory into a meeting room, polyclinic into a guest house, and hospital of 1,000 beds into an institute." (AA, January 14-20, 1982)

More than 1,000 physicians and more than 5,000 para-medical technicians graduate every year from educational institutions in Algeria. Yet there were only 8,000 physicians and 34,500 paramedical staff in Algeria in 1972. This is well below the hoped for one physician per 500 inhabitants and one para-medical per 400 inhabitants at national level. Yet, Beni-Chebana has one physician per 10,000 inhabitants should its population reach in 30,000 people in 1985: The question here is where are all the graduated Algerian physicians? Most physicians working in the countryside are foreigners from many countries over the world as Beni-Chebana's case itself shows, with its

three physicians from India, Egypt, and Algeria. One of the Algerian physicians is not in the public but rather in the private sector. Only foreigners are found in most Algerian rural areas, while some of these physicians are unemployed. (AA, January 14-20, 1982).

Around 7,000 Algerian physicians have left the country after graduating. They are educated at state expense but are unable to stay and work within local conditions. Those who stayed are powerless and work only half a day in the mornings. The National Federation of Health Workers (N.F.H.W.) pointed out:

"Before discussing the possibility of working after 4:00 p.m., let's work up to 4:00 p.m. Today, full time is expected but not yet a reality. Most structures are not working the whole day but only mornings. Full time has been reaffirmed by the Health Minister, the Committee Central resolution requires it, and people's health needs impose it. The state should command the staff it educated...to make the structures more profitable, polyclinics and health centers should open 24 hours a day and University Hospital Centers should achieve their first vocational goal. There is a need to secure housing, transportation, restauration, para-medical decent wages, research and serious recycling conditions in order to increase human potential output." (AA., January 14-20, 1982)

These are demands of the public health sector workers aimed at keeping this sector alive, but the private sector seems to prevail in the present policy of health, contrary to old and many times confirmed health care policy. Some 161 physicians, 139 dentists, and 180 pharmacists have been authorized between January 23 and April 24, 1980 to do private business (AA, April 24-30, 1980). This is a total of 480 authorizations issued in just three months. The private sector seems

to be leading the public sector since that time. Physicians in the private sector work up to 9:00 p.m. while those of the public sector, officially, work up to 4:00 p.m. The truth is that service is never rendered beyond 12 noon of each working day. Just getting an appointment requires to be at the hospital as early as 5:00 a.m. The reason for overcrowded health structures in Algeria is that nobody is in charge of them. The private people are incited by material gains and profits. This is why Beni-Chebana got a private physician for the first time in its history.

Beni-Chebana's transportation system also is not adequate. In 1981-82, the commune could have three buses for public transportation for the first time. One of the bus drivers and his assistant were international migrants. They lived in France and came back to work at home and live with their families. The driver told me that he came back on a contract signed with Setif Wilaya to train bus drivers. The problem was that he could not find a place to live at Setif city while his family lived at Trouna, Beni-Maouche. Thus, he preferred to work as a bus driver and come home at the end of the day rather than to work as a bus driving trainer unable to see his family only once in a while. The communal buses did not run for long, due to lack of adequate maintenance, non-tarred roads, and unavailable spare parts. One bus was used as a source of parts to repair the others. The bus driver mentioned he became a truck driver when his bus broke down.

The three buses did not benefit the entire population of Beni-Chebana when they were running because of their itineraries. One

was making Ait-Mohli, Trouna, Tarfet and vice-versa. It served better Ait-Mohli and the neighboring commune of Semaone. Adjissa's people were unhappy because the bus did not make their three hamlets in its schedule. They needed to walk a good distance to catch it. The second bus was making Beni-Djemati, Tarfet, Beni-Ourtilane and vice-versa. It could serve the most distant and more isolated area of Beni-Chebana. It also served as a school bus to pupils admitted at Beni-Ourtilane middle school. The third bus was serving Tarfet, Beni-Maouche, Akbou, and vice-versa. Some of Beni-Maouche's residents expressed their unhappiness with the whole system, because the only bus interesting to them was the last one going to Akbou, through Seddouk, where some students were admitted. This bus almost always runs full and does not take Beni-Maouche riders.

In 1979 there were no taxicabs in the commune, according to the 1979 regional statistics. Now, there are 14, according to the survey, in addition to around 308 private vehicles. There are no school buses, despite the long distances between hamlets where school classes stop at a certain level. Pupils have to walk to other schools to continue their formal education.

Electric power did not exist at Beni-Chebana until very recently. Tarfet, the communal center, got electricity some five years ago. Part of Beni-Maouche hamlets got it in December 1982. Some others got their projects started in 1983-84 while others are still waiting.

Running water is another major problem of this commune despite the large potential available. The survey showed that each hamlet has at

least one or two springs. Some others have more than two springs in addition to two perennial rivers. It is very easy to collect water into reservoirs and distribute it for drinking and irrigation purposes. Some projects are under way, as Akbou's hydraulic officer said. Such a project is that of Tarfet whose cost was 760,000 AD, mentioned in Chapter IV to show some problems the commune is facing. The second water project is Beni-Djemati's whose cost up to now is 1,140,000 AD and which is about 80% completed. The third is Trouna-Laazib's with a cost of 770,000 AD and which is now 95 percent achieved. The fourth is Adjissa's, 100 percent completed, but Adjissa's residents face a severe drinking water shortage, as I witnessed during my visits there.

It is worthwhile to note why Adjissa's residents are facing a drinking water shortage. As just mentioned, Adjissa has its own completed water supply project, according to Akbou's official hydraulic data. The problem, however, emerged when the water pump broke apart in 1982, according to hamlets' residents and the person in charge of the pump before it broke. The commune bought another pump but never put it to work for lack of an expert to do it. It could not be installed by anyone out of fear it would break again. It is now more than a year since the pump broke. The hope was that the communal officials would find an expert to do the job but no expert has been found. Even the person in charge of daily water supply was not paid for more than four months when I met him in the summer of 1983.

The fact is that those in charge of water supply resorted to technology without preparing skilled workers to manage it and deal with

its problems. The hamlet residents of Adjissa mentioned the possibility of water supply without a pump at all. There are springs, they say, that could be collected with no need for technology not available locally. The experts, who planned Adjissa's water supply project, were not, seemingly, aware of the existence of these springs that could be brought to the hamlets without using a pump.

This assumption is confirmed by Taguenit's case. Taguenit's spring is most likely the strongest spring of all in Beni-Chebana. Gardens are irrigated simply and directly with its running water, since no collection system is used and without any cost. Still, Taguenit residents have no running water in the homes. The spring is a half mile from the hamlet built on top of a hill, making one of the daily chores of hamlet residents that of fetching water. The same hamlet could be very easily provided with water from other springs by just a simple collecting system at very low cost. Their first spring would then be used, if a large reservoir is built, to supply other residents with drinking water and to irrigate large and fertile surfaces of land. Akbou's hydraulic officer, asked about it, recognized that he was not aware of these potentials. Tarfet sanitation system is under construction at a cost of 600,000 DA, but that of Adjissa is not working for lack of water.

A large number of people stand in line day and night, notably, during summers, to fill up their water containers at Adjissa, Trouna and other hamlets. Hedid hamlet residents, Beni-Chebana, hire a year-round employee at 400 AD a month to maintain the water rationing

system. El-Maissen hamlet, provided with drinking water just before independence, is suffering water shortage because the system was not being maintained adequately. A four-year-old child died by falling into one of the uncovered water facilities.

Beni-Chebana's most important water supply project concerns irrigation with an initial cost of 2,800,000 AD, 10 percent of which is achieved. Due to lack of field work experience, the project was stopped pending the arrival of new techniques and adequate funds. The project is that of Agradou, Beni-Chebana. The water supply is not just a local problem in Algeria but it is a national one as well, despite the large amounts of rain. Some 72 billion cubic meters fall every year but not much of it is being retained by the existing dams. This sector has been underdeveloped and the government has started recently to take care of this much needed aspect of the infra-structure. Many small and large dam projects are under construction as well as drilling, especially in southern Algeria. Many of Beni-Chebana's residents spent relatively large amounts of money drilling for water but few have succeeded.

The many problems taken together make living rather hard at Beni-Chebana, and force its residents to seek alternatives. Rural-urban and even international migration will continue unless radical development measures are soon taken.

CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Peasant Definition

This final chapter will sum up the main features of each chapter and make some conclusions concerning concepts and issues related to the subject of peasants, underdevelopment, dependency, and development programs applied to underdeveloped areas of developing countries and their implications.

This study has tried, in the foregoing chapters, to explore peasant definitions, movements, and roles in different countries through different historical periods up to the present. This task was deemed necessary to help understand the present rural development failures in the newly independent nations, which are suffering severe socio-economic problems, such as absolute poverty, starvation, and political unrest. Peasants throughout the world, in fact, felt social injustice and led revolts against local and foreign oppressors. The struggle took passive, underground, and often armed resistance forms. Many peasant wars are not widely known, while others are famous worldwide, notably, those of post-World War II that took place in developing countries in which we are now interested. Algeria is among those countries and shares with them underdevelopment characteristics.

Peasants, who are they? They are, according to different viewpoints, the forgotten social category, primitives, rural residents aspiring to city life, poor land owners, farm decision-makers. They are also those who lost control over land and their own labor and their

surpluses are transferred to dominant and exploiting rulers. They restrict themselves, with regard to level of living, to a subsistence economy, contrary to farmers who are wide open to the market competition and maximum returns, or agricultural workers who do not own lands. They live in isolated societies for some, but they are part of the larger societies which are part of the world system for others. The areas in which they live represent, according to dependency theory, the periphery of Periphery countries the lower level of developing nations. Consequently, they are doubly exploited and subjugated. This leads to the conclusion that peasants today exist only in developing nations.

Are Peasants Revolutionary?

It seems that only the Marxists have paid serious attention to peasant analysis even though Marx himself was not much interested in s that only the Marxists have paid serious attention to peasant analysis even though Marx himself was not much interested in s that only the Marxists have paid serious attention to peasant analysis even though Marx himself was not much interested in he criterion of wealth: rich, middle, and poor. He was interested in each sub-group posi ion with regard to bourgeois revolution and struggle for socialism. Mao Tse-Tung spoke of five peasant categories to be organized in a single body: landlords, semi-landlords, sharecroppers, farm laborers, and handicraftsmen. Mao's definition looks more comprehensive by including wealth, land ownership, and handicrafts. All of these share rural living conditions which may induce them to take the same position with regard to democratic revolution.

It is true that world peasants have always had a sharp sense of injustice and awareness of their depressed situation, which led them to endless uprisings and revolts throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Many of these revolts were short lived, others made major breaks in the history of their societies and even left international effects. Such revolts, among others, were: the French, Russian, and that of Cuba, Algeria, Viet Nam, and Nicaragua, etc. Both capitalism and socialism helped to open peasants' eyes to see their rights, capacities, and the pressing need to seek political power and restore democracy. Feudalism and colonialism kept peasants under control for a long time before recovery from political torpor and religious stupor. Peasant revolts started as early as the seventh century of this era and they are still going on today. It is needless to ask whether peasants are revolutionary any longer. The Algerian peasants were no exception in both pre-colonial Algeria and during the whole colonial era. The scope, success, or failure of each revolt depended on local and international conditions. Emiliano Zapata may have briefly but clearly expressed the revolutionary peasant ideology: "Seek justice from tyrannical governments not with your hat in your hands but with a rifle in your fist." (Millon, 11)

The success of peasant revolts needed more elements than injustice and suffering since the Spanish peasants' suffering was the most tragic in Europe, but it did not bring them to the front of the revolution. The French, Russians, English and Germans made their revolts famous. Lenin and Mao differed on whether the poor peasants or urban

proletariat are more revolutionary. While Lenin favored the urban proletariat, Mao took the opposite stand by giving poor peasants seven points out of ten and rated urban dwellers and the military only three points toward accomplishment of the democratic revolution. Both believed that even the rich peasants could be enticed to participate in the early phase of the revolution. The truth is that the urban proletariat provided peasants with the most important condition of success, namely, leadership. Rural leadership, in fact, rarely went beyond certain limits as was the case of Algerian revolts from the colonial conquest until the liberation war of 1954 in which peasants and urban proletariat joined forces and could win. Peasants are more likely to use cleansing violence than the proletariat and middle classes who started to get profit at a discount from the colonial set up. They remain disciplined and altruistic in their spontaneous movements. They put individual standards aside in favor of the community. Ibn Khaldun expressed a viewpoint similar to Fanon's with regard to rural-urban behavior and ethics. The rural toughness precedes softness of city life.

Rural clergymen also sided with the poor peasant revolts and provided leadership to their movements, contrary to their town colleagues who usually opposed egalitarianism as it was seen to be against nature. This explains why peasants were against church as well as feudal masters in their revolts. Martin Luther, for instance, inspired the German peasant revolt before becoming their first enemy. Islam, likewise, has been used in both ways: to keep backward regimes

alive and to strengthen democracy, egalitarianism, and national liberation in the Muslim world. Among the most known modern democratic religions Muslim leaders were Ben Badis of Algeria and Djamal Eddin of Afghanistan. Modern experiences such as living in town or abroad, army service, wars, etc., played major roles in waking up world peasants. Radicalization of means and goals, however, would occur only after much frustration and violence had first been used by the dominant groups.

Colonial and Dependency Effects

The colonial underdevelopment just worsened after independence in developing countries due to strong unequal interrelationships between the mother country and its previous colony. Not much changed after independence. These relationships were established in a way that benefitted the advanced countries, while placing constraints on the development of developing countries in order to control them through dependency-creating programs. The unbalanced interrelationships between developed and developing nations are seen by dependency theorists as the major cause of developing countries' socio-economic problems. It is asserted that a fundamental error is committed when a developing world phenomenon is studied by seeking its cause from within, rather than situating it within the world system dialectic. This holds true in the Algerian case where neither industry nor agriculture has developed enough to satisfy national economic needs. The facts show a general dependency of the country both in spite of its tremendous wealth and because of it.

The Algerian dependency has been strengthened by the helpless colonial educated elite who helped to maintain the country under

growing dependency. This elite lost self-confidence as well as confidence in national experts, with regard to planning and realization of programs. Algeria has resorted to expatriates and imports in a major way, although it was possible to rely on national potentials in many cases. International technical assistance was sought to conceive, finance, provide equipment, and even co-manage national development programs. The negative effects of the still growing dependency are devastating. Programs are conceived so as to increase the importation of equipment as well as raw materials. Wool factories of Tiaret, in the West, and Biskra, in the East, are good examples of this case. The first has been importing wool despite being built in an area where wool is available, but the private breeders refused to accept the low prices offered. The second imports much of its 500 tons of wool consumed per year. Factories are, sometimes, built where not needed, such as the Sidi-Aich's modern olive mill. Achieved in 1970, the mill has never been operated. S. Saadi, Minister of Agriculture, ordered that it be dismantled in 1983 and that its equipment be distributed among other units in need (Al-Ch-Chaab, May 5, 1983).

Dependency is not limited to poor industrial planning, rather agriculture has suffered more than other sectors. Colonial agriculture remained intact but it lost its high level of output and the market privileges it enjoyed during the colonial era. The country was transformed after the conquest, from exporting food into importing four fifths of the needed foodstuffs in 1984, according to some experts. The rich, ex-colonial export sector was transformed into a self-managed

sector, playing the same role as before but without adequate means available and without easy access to European and world markets as in the past. The second was that of rich but limited scope held by Algerians. The third was the poor traditional sector where the overwhelming majority of Algerians lived and which was over-looked.

Peasants are accused of resisting change and modernization. This is not the case in Algeria where they resisted colonial plans intended to keep them under control, but the post-colonial programs were no better. The main colonial characteristics of elitism, centralization, and paternalism were maintained as strong as before in addition to a weak administrative and bureaucratic system. The 1971 agrarian reform was not based on serious socio-economic studies and did not take into account peasant economic conditions and needs. The on-going program of restructuring seems to go the same way as before, because no scientific studies have been undertaken prior to program implementation. The social sciences of Algerian universities are not involved in the process of changes. International experts could be involved. Thanks to income from energy exports, Algeria is not suffering famine as are many developing nations which do not have the same resources as Algeria. Many African countries as is well known, do experience food shortages and famine. Food prices in Algeria may be the highest in the world. The rural poor are suffering much more than other population categories due to low wages, lack of urban facilities such as storage, transportation, and the abandonment of local agriculture.

Financial dependency is another aspect of a general dependency in Algeria. Foreign loans are promoted to serve the capitalist market and

increase financial dependency on the more advanced nations. International loans, in fact, serve to buy highly costly and job saving technology and pay very costly technical assistants. Because of the high cost of exporting energy, Algeria was losing some \$3.5 million a day at the end of the 1970's. International trade favors growing dependency of developing countries like Algeria. Algerian industry did not take off as expected, despite consuming the largest proportion of the national income. This industry has been planned and controlled by international experts so as to serve industrial nations. Spare parts were not allowed to enter Algeria as was the case of gas burners which were part of the contract signed by Algeria and its international partners. Industrial units faced growing market difficulties, lack of proper maintenance, and unavailable spare parts that caused low rates of productivity. Only 20 percent of capacity was reached in some cases. However, most of the industry units depended on the state budget to defray their operating costs.

The main external income comes from western capitalist nations who are receiving Algerian natural gas, the main source of external income sold at low prices. Gas, in fact, is increasingly replacing oil export. Energy export, with 98 percent of all exports, has become the single product Algeria relies on. This puts the country's economy in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis the strongest economies of the Algerian partners, as shown by the current gas prices. It is selling at a cheaper price than any other in the world, except for the Soviet Union. Besides dependence on mono-product export and high cost of technical

assistance, Algeria had to pay a \$16.3 billion debt between 1979 and 1982.

The Algerian workers and staff felt uneasiness and frustration as they compare their wages, social conditions, and power of decision making, to technical assistants whom they have to teach before they become bosses. Hence, while Algerian energy is gone, frustration takes place among Algerians. It should not be true that "the poor are poor because they are poor." The country has abundant manpower, rich lands, and capital but its colonial legacy and present dependency have prevented any serious and real local control. Dependency, however, is not limited to the above aspects only, because other dependency, including cultural, military, and most of all mental, are not less important. The national colonial educated elite look down on the national culture, values, and language. Their behavior is not much different from that of the colonial masters. The fight to restore national language is far from over, because of their fierce resistance. This is to say, briefly, that Algerian dependency is deep and strongly maintained by this elite to the point of losing any real control over national socio-economic development programs, as shown by such phenomena as wasteful spending, low rates of factory output, poor planning, low rate of project realization, a large food deficit, housing crisis, and over-crowded urban areas due to lack of adequate development of rural areas. Dependency is the main cause of abandonment of rural areas because industrial nations, the main economic partners, are not interested in promoting a genuine economic

development which ought to include the rural areas where more than 6 percent of Algerians now live.

Colonial Reconstruction

Western colonialists recognized widespread poverty within the rural areas of their colonies which they, unsuccessfully, tried to remedy. It took western scholars, involved in the development of developing countries, several decades to change their position as to local people's knowledge. They were denying the people's ability to take care of their own development. F.L. Brayne's rural development philosophy was based on knowledge acquisition and reforming villagers' vicious habits. He suggested that the colonial officer be converted into a guide, philosopher, and friend of villagers. The post-colonial development programs, led by western scholars, also maintained the old assumption of rural ignorance. The community development projects resorted to creating a leadership system represented by outside Village Level Worker (VLW) to help implement, initiate, and bring local people to participate in development programs. Today, this position has changed as W. Blaisdell expressed: "Ask the villagers how to proceed and succeed." The truth, in my view, is that local people possess the knowledge but are limited by their economic base and low level of living, as Beni-Chebana's case shows.

Beni-Chebana's Administrative and Political Systems

The Beni-Chebana case study was designed to examine within a dependency framework the effects of national dependency on the under-developed areas of the country. It is assumed that international unequal relationships would produce negative socio-economic and cultural effects within the Periphery of periphery countries. The

study focuses on a number of dimensions deemed more important than others. These dimensions give a general picture of the Algerian rural areas after 22 years of independence and 13 years of the agrarian reform intended to make radical changes within the Algerian rural world.

The first dimension dealt with was the administrative and political structures. The study shows that rural areas of Algeria have been under-administered from the colonial era until the present time. The colonial power was, in fact, neither capable of, nor interested in, direct management of these vast rural areas. Rather, a multiform communal system was set up to serve the colonial minority interests. Not until 1956 was the communal system standardized and made similar to the French system. It was then too late for the civilians to take control of, and the military became dominant again. The Caidal system was restricted, in rural areas, to tax collection, civil registration, and keeping watchful eye on behalf of the rulers. It had no way of providing local communities with any service. The communities had to rely on self-help in the absence of central assistance. This fact, however, strengthened local autonomous councils and community solidarity which helped to play a major role both in local affairs and during the liberation war later on.

The post-colonial communal legislation came very slowly. Rather, it took a step backward in 1963 -- one year after independence -- by reducing the number of communes from 1,576 to just 676. The reasons for this policy were as follows: 1) the colonial communes of full

exercise had no reason to exist after the settler's departure; 2) the mixed communes were quickly transformed by the colonial power and were, generally, not viable because of being too small, not enough populated, ill-equipped, without financial resources, and lacking necessary staff. The reductionist policy, effectively lowered management spending but without improving either skilled personnel or financial support. The colonial self-help situation that prevailed in most of the Algerian countryside was not possible any longer in post-independence time, because people were expecting and hoping for radical change to take place after the liberation. A strong, democratic, and popular commune was needed to replace the previous weak helpless colonial system. The destruction from war increased the need for socio-economic justice and made for elevated expectations.

The long colonial deprivation, elitism, centralization, and paternalism changed little. The fighters' slogan, "by the people to the people" was a dream that could not become a reality after independence. Even the late colonial communal reform was not taken realistically by the regime dominated by the Caidal family members who mostly opposed the revolution. But the state had to rely on them after the departure of French settlers, because they were the only educated category of the population with some administrative experience. The idea was that if we are to rely on foreign assistance, we should use available national potential first. Consequently, those who benefitted from colonial education have given a chance to lead local and national administration during the independence era. Since their number was

limited, it was necessary to limit administrative offices to their size, as shown by the communal reform policy of 1963.

The regrouping action of the previous communes into a "manageable size" of only 676 communes was an error which caused grave damage to the countryside. The characteristics were: a long history of under-administration, under-development, long distances between population clusters and hamlets, lack of roads and means of transportation, non-existence of a communication network, and lack of skilled staff before as well as after the regrouping policy took place, in addition to the war years that destroyed most of the few existing facilities.

The negative results of the regrouping policy could be summed up as follows: a persistent centralism that ran against the long cherished popular democracy at the village level. This was even contrary to the state's declared policy of popular assemblies supposed to involve large popular masses in the development process. But elitism prevented popular participation; the regrouping further widened the gap between citizens and administration which only increased the size of communal problems. Unskilled administrators were put in different management and planning positions without adequate means. The local people felt abandoned by the central power, after all the sacrifices they paid during the war. While injustice was felt again, little support, coupled with a good organization and popular participation, could have solved difficult problems of local communities as well as many rural-urban related issues. The abandoned and frustrated rural people assumed the same negative attitudes they had before with the colonial administration.

Rural-urban exodus and all its negative aspects were consequences of centralism and dependent planning policy. The rural areas of Algeria are empty of valid and skilled manpower, while urban centers are unable to satisfy the ever-growing needs of migrants including the provision of decent living conditions. The rural poor could have stayed in their areas and could have participated in development of these areas, as Beni-Chebana's residents did before independence and after. After independence, Taguenit-Ighil and Tizkht residents rebuilt their own schools by their own means. Modern mosques are being built at residents' expense in almost every hamlet. The residents of Beni-Chebana section lately helped to build electric power facilities in the area. The old self-help spirit is still present. Those who were forced to leave the area and live in urban shantytowns got the feeling of frustration and injustice sharpened by poor living conditions. M. Clinard wrote:

"Although the slum is characterized by inadequate housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding, and congestion, it involves much more than these elements. Sociologically, it is a way of life, a sub-culture with a set of norms and values, which is reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behavior, and characteristic attributes of apathy and isolation. People who live in slum areas isolated from the general power structures are regarded as inferior and slum dwellers, in turn, harbor suspicions of the outside world." (Allochi, 6)

Beni-Chebana's commune was made up of four once mixed communes: Adjissa, Ait-Mohli, Beni-Chebana, and Beni-Maouche. Its underdevelopment only worsened when three of the communal centers lost

power and became dependent agencies in charge of civil registration. Even this very simple charge could not be adequately carried out for lack of means. Trouna's secretary used many means just to obtain registrar books, not available in this agency. Adjissa's civil registrations such as birth certificates, required for many social benefits, may take more than two weeks after they are ordered. The person in charge of the signing may not come before that specified time. The commune has no trained personnel and its budget is spent on state project over-runs caused by distant supply centers. The commune cannot initiate development programs but can only suggest to national planners who may or may not consider them. They are more interested in large programs, because they are dealing with the international money lenders, technology market, and expatriate experts who are not interested in small-sized projects more needed for the local economy. Even when the regional balance policy was initiated to help the poorer areas of Algeria, its large budgets did not reach rural communes. Wilaya and Daira levels took the most benefit of it. The state promised help did not come. Rather, the state corporations do not, in fact, accept work within Beni-Chebana because of its isolation, lack of primary facilities, and project cost over-runs. This helpless situation, however, is not specific to Beni-Chebana alone, but rather it is a general characteristic of rural Algeria as a whole.

Beni-Chebana's political power is hampered because of the same difficult local conditions. The very sheer act of getting together is not easy for the Party members whose low level of education and

political formation do not allow them to go beyond certain limits or adequately lead communal activities. Local Party members cannot solve local problems, even if they do know how, for lack of means and limited skills. Outside help is needed to make cohesive and genuine plans to serve short- as well as long-term purposes. Narrow interests prevailed in many cases of development programs.

Beni-Chebana's Education

Beni-Chebana, notably, Beni-Maouche and Adjissa have enjoyed a relatively good education ever since the colonial era and more specifically when Ulema Association of Ben Badis emerged in the 1930's and later expanded. Four private schools were built and successfully managed by local people led by this Association. This is more than the French could do in this area during the whole colonial era. Mosques, the old traditional schools, played a major role in teaching reading and writing skills in Arabic. Illiteracy, however, is widespread now, locally and nationwide, as shown by the 1977 census and the survey as well. Female illiteracy is much higher than male. The illiteracy rate would be even higher, if productive performance capability is used instead of reading and writing classical skills. Non-formal education did not exist in this commune, with the exception of a recently built small masonry unit. Education seems useless for both sexes but to a lesser extent for males, because females are not allowed to work for wages. Bilingualism dominates among Beni-Chebana's literates, Arabic comes second and French third. Arabic, however, dominates at Adjissa, Ait-Mohli, and Beni-Chebana sections when taken separately. No French

schools existed there before the liberation war. Female literates in Ait-Mohli represent zero in both French and bilingualism.

Beni-Chebana's present teaching system is characterized by small school size due to sparse hamlets and relatively distant residence clusters. There were 22 schools distributed among the four communal sections in 1981-82 including 92 classrooms, 19 of which were empty this year. Grade levels varied from one school to another. Six out of 22 schools stop teaching at the fourth level and two others have no seventh grade. Only 14 schools provide all seven grades and consequently allow pupils to get the needed reading and writing skills. Female school attendance is very low except at Beni-Maouche, where both sexes have almost equal chance to go to school. Large proportions of pupils are found at the first grade levels, which fact does not allow pupils to escape illiteracy. Consequently, not only are those who could not go to school illiterates, but also large proportions of those who attend elementary schools are illiterates as well. Rural classrooms are not as overcrowded as the urban and suburban ones.

Trouna's unique middle school of the commune may encourage both pupils and parents to do more in order to get more education. People will see educational advantages available to them at no cost any longer. This should be followed by a high school in the near future, within the communal territory in order to alleviate the heavy burden of having to go farther to get high school education.

The situation for teachers is really harsh. In order to increase the number of teachers so as to cope with large numbers of students,

local amenities must be improved. Their number fluctuated between 85 and 165 in 1977-78 and 1983-84 period. There were only 82 in 1981-82. They experience, in addition to low education and low status. Teachers are highly mobile, caused by poor living conditions and low wages. A serious teacher vacancy rate is noted every school year starting from September up to the end of November. Twenty to forty percent of these temporary young teachers leave their duties each year. Classes are then given to newly recruited teachers with no prior vocational training. Such poor conditions are: lack of proper housing, running water, food stores, electric power, means of transportation, cultural opportunities, sport activities, etc.

Poor planning is a major obstacle in providing skilled teachers for rural schools. Bejaia's Institute of Education is unable to satisfy rural needs because 90% of its patrons are females who are paid to "walk in Bejaia city streets" according to a high official. They do not agree to go to rural schools and nobody blames them since even their male colleagues dislike joining rural areas.

Unlike formal education, the Algerian policy has provided little support for non-formal education in the rural areas. Beni-Chebana has never had a vocational training center. Its youngsters are victims of this policy. Many non-formal educational studies show no need for higher education in order to succeed in this field. Non-formal training is much needed in rural areas and it could have compensated or poor formal education. Most training centers are concentrated within the urban and suburban areas to which youth are attracted. Unable to

satisfy large proportions of applicants, the government, lately, resorted to the private sector for help.

Government efforts, consequently, failed to achieve planned goals in education. It is a worrisome rather than an optimistic situation that prevails today in Algeria. Both rural formal and non-formal education is poor, or non-existent. Even urban education is in bad shape, considering the declining rates of success in high school that went as low as 31.0% in 1982-83. This rate dropped sharply to only 15% in 1983-84 nationwide. One of the reasons could be overcrowded classrooms. That problem may be solved through the development of rural education and economy to keep rural residents where they are. This, however, is not the only reason for low learning achievement, because other elements such as overcrowded homes, lack of libraries, poor pedagogic organization, inadequate social environment, and teachers' problems are preventing better educational achievement. Rural schools share these problems with urban schools with the exception of overcrowding. Poor living conditions, however, are the main rural issues to be dealt with as soon as possible to attract and keep fairly good teachers in order to improve educational investment output.

Beni-Chebana's Economy

Beni-Chebana's residents gained a living from agriculture and artisan activities as was characteristic of the Algerian traditional sector during the colonial era. People used to live on these small poor plots of land, on which each family had to provide a livelihood by

working on family lands and raise a small number of livestock. Abundant family labor helped in the practice of labor-intensive agriculture. Both landless families and those without sufficient labor force could, however, manage to get a living from available lands, through a very equitable sharecropping system known as Khemmassah in which five farming inputs were equally considered: manpower, draft animals, land, working tools, and seeds. The system provided multiple combinations with regard to providing or sharing any of these inputs. The output is shared, according to what a partner has provided. No industry existed at Beni-Chebana. Not until recently were some small stone-crushing mills built as well as a communal concrete block unit. Local needs, however, are far from being satisfied by these units which could be easily expanded so as to satisfy local needs and even neighbors' needs with these rare and highly expensive materials. A truck load of crushed stones, three cubic meters, costs around 500 to 600 AD (\$100 to \$120) with transportation costs, while the material itself costs only 80 to 120 AD.

The 1977 census shows a strong agricultural sector but the survey as well as other data sources consider these statistics as simply not correct and misleading for the following reasons: 1) the statistical concepts are not well defined to fit into local conditions; 2) those in charge of collecting census data are unable to do the job correctly; 3) local people do not give right figures to government officials out of fear the figures will be used against them, as was the case with land census; 4) the survey managed to get more accurate data that

contradicted the census results. Consequently, Beni-Chebana is not an agrarian commune.

The survey confirms, in fact, that land is short at Beni-Chebana and land shortage is not compensated for by modern inputs. Only two percent of households own 10 ha. or more of land. Beni-Chebana's subsistence and traditional economy could not survive and modernization failed to take place. Peasants just abandoned farm work even if they stayed in the area. They buy their own food and resort to out-migration or hold other occupations.

Beni-Chebana's sources of income are derived from out-migration as the main source and from part-time farming and war allowances. Farm income is very limited because of the abandonment of farm work and animal husbandry. Artisan activities have disappeared and no modern production takes place. International migrants receive large amounts of money sent by French Social Security to Algerian retirees who have returned home. Other migrants stopped sending their savings to Algeria when a black market emerged in 1969 when the French Franc was devalued. This market reached its peak when the Algerian government allowed its citizens to import cars without allowing the export of funds. These migrants also resorted to importing goods for sale at extremely high prices.

The Role of Women

Rural women had an important role in Algeria within the traditional economy. Artisan activities were mainly women's work. In addition to the home economy, they helped with farm work, notably food

processing and animal husbandry. They also carried water, maintained the home, and reared the children. Algerian rural women, generally, lost their roles and retired to the household. Artisan activities disappeared and they were not allowed to hold wage-paying jobs. They are even prevented from being seen in public and in Beni-Chebana's case less than two percent of the female population performs economic activities. Algerian rural planning simply ignores more than half of the manpower available. Family labor was very important before independence and children were heavily involved in productive activities. Like women, they are no longer involved. This makes women non-productive and puts them in a "home arrest" situation. They are really prisoners at Beni-Chebana. Education is useless to them. Boserup suggested the integration of women in development of the developing countries, through providing training skills for young girls, which opportunity does not exist for both sexes in the commune. Some specialists on employment express fear that allowing women to perform productive activities may increase male unemployment in developing countries. But this is contrary to the very economic and social basics, namely, educating women and preventing them from work. Boserup, however, went far by suggesting giving urban women jobs as a way of increasing family income and stopping rural-urban migration when no jobs are available for rural migrants in urban centers. This would also increase food production because of manpower available in rural areas. This seems to be an urban bias since keeping rural males from migrating, would also make it harder for rural women to enter the job market and, consequently, to benefit from education.

Beni-Chebana's Population

Algeria has been pronatalist because of religion, colonial history, post-independence threats, and national economic development potentials. These potentials were so great that no over-population was expected. Consequently, no population policy was formulated either during the colonial era nor after. Not until recently has a birth control program been launched by the Party. Religious men's position on the subject is very similar to that of the Marxists who violently react against the pessimistic Malthusian theory. Misery stems from inequality and underdevelopment and the solution to demographic growth is development, as the late president Boumediene pointed out. This is also Sauvy's opinion about over-population in developing nations.

Sauvy maintained that food shortage is not due to excessive numbers in many developing countries but to underdevelopment. These countries could improve their conditions substantially by a better use of agricultural land, better prospecting for mineral resources, creating industry, etc. The fundamental condition of this being the proper training of the population. What Sauvy forgets is that underdevelopment has not come only from the lack of training. Education, when affordable in developing countries, is made useless in these nations as the Algerian case shows. The Algerian experts in many fields are misused as shown by just one single case, the Algerian physicians. More than one thousand physicians graduate every year; still Algeria has only 8,000 and rural areas are served by expatriates.

The main characteristics of the Algerian population, as well as Beni-Chebana's, are: rapid growth, youthfulness, large dependency

ratios, lowered death rates that increase life expectancy. Beni-Chebana's population is older than the national average with a large deficit of males. Child-mother ratios are lower than the national average, contrary to the usual assumption. Beni-Chebana's age pyramid shows two important facts, that is, a deficit of males, clearly apparent between the ages of 30 onward, and the youthfulness of this population as compared to that of more developed countries.

Out-migration

The out-migration phenomenon has characterized Algeria beginning in the colonial era up to now. It started with flight from the colonial penetration into neighboring and other Arab countries, strengthened during and after World War I, and peaked after World War II. Out-migration to France started at the beginning of the twentieth century and fluctuated since then until it was officially stopped in 1973 by Algeria, but it has never stopped in practice.

Beni-Chebana has, in fact, been a center of out-migration, because it has nothing other than its youth to export. Out-migration started by being movement of single males and later became largely family migration after independence. The 1977 census counted 1,273 out-migrants for the whole commune. The survey, however, found this number ridiculously low by any standard. Errors may have come not only from counting but also from the concept itself because the census may have considered only international migration and omitted national migration. Only 20 out-migrants were reported at Aourir, Adjissa, for instance, while the survey counted 280 to France alone. Only family

heads may have been counted by the census. The survey included men, women, and children. Another factor in making for error is that a large number of out-migrants left the area a long time ago and they are not known to the new generations as the Boubirek case shows.

Around one third of Beni-Chebana's out-migrants are international, two thirds are national. Bejaia's Wilaya international migrants numbered 50,000 in 1977, but the number would be much larger should Beni-Chebana's case be applied to the whole Wilaya territory. The out-migration causes are: lack of jobs, inadequate housing, poor education, health care services, and living conditions. The negative aspects of out-migration in Algeria are: unfit housing and high costs of transportation to and from home. The international migrants often suffer harsh effects from abandoning their families, racial segregation, inadequate education for the young, change of traditions, and forced change of citizenship, in addition to the temporary residence permit. They are also targets for attacks by right extremists. In short, many legal and political problems emerge from Algerian out-migration to France.

Beni-Chebana's national migrants are found in major industrial areas, notably Algiers city with more than 86%. Some old migrants are already back home, others have planned to go to urban areas of Algeria. Family visits range from at least once a month to once in more than a year.

Social Amenities

Social amenities are poor in Beni-Chebana, including all sectors, news media, culture, sports, postal services, health care (despite

relatively recent improvements), transportation, electric power, running water, etc. All these could be improved with probably less than current cost, should the population become involved in local development programs. Beni-Chebana's residents have in the past and even today shown a strong spirit of sacrifice, mutual help, and solidarity, as their recent participation in the electric power program realization shows. They provided free labor, free food for outside technicians working on the project, and transportation of materials where trucks could not move. This free and benevolent participation would make the program's realization cheaper and reduce the time required. This is just the opposite of what all Algerian programs are experiencing. This self-help should serve as a lesson not only in Algeria, but in all other developing countries as well.

The rural poor are ready, as they were before, to participate in programs intended to serve them when they are given a chance to get involved. They are known for their sacrifice and unselfishness. Even living in urban shantytowns is a kind of sacrifice for the family as a whole. They individually suffer from poor living conditions, but family members do get benefits from services not available in the countryside such as health care, education, relatively high wages, etc. They say: we are now suffering but at least our children will not suffer as we do. Shantytown dwellers, however, could follow Zapata's advice when the time comes anywhere in developing nations. They feel themselves isolated, forgotten, and unequally served. Their sense of injustice is very deep as expressed by some now living in Algiers city.

They are very aware of the shantytown advantages and disadvantages and have accepted the risks.

Development Suggestions

The following is an attempt to respond directly and briefly to the questions asked in Chapter One, (page 5), of this study:

1. The facts show that Algeria is forced to import much of its foodstuff because of dependent development programs. Algerian planners, in the post-independence era, lost development control to the benefit of multinational corporations which are motivated by profit rather than adequately dealing with local socio-economic problems. Energy and heavy industry are the main foci of the Algerian pattern of development and both primarily serve industrial nations. Agriculture has been overlooked despite its enormous development potential. The rapid demographic growth adds to an abandonment of traditional agriculture, and the intact out declining excolonial system are the reasons for the massive import of foodstuff;
2. The persistent rural exodus is due to uneven rural-urban development in Algeria. The rural areas experienced near complete underdevelopment during the colonial era and not enough attention has been paid to these areas after independence. Rural people are forced to move city-ward where job opportunities,

social amenities, and more adequate living conditions are available. Rural-urban exodus has had very negative effects on both areas. While rural areas are emptied of their labor force, urban areas are now overcrowded. These unfavorable conditions may bring about social unrest in Algeria;

3. The agrarian reform program has had no significant positive effects on rural living conditions as expected. Imposed from above, it could not provide any meaningful help to the rural economy. It was limited to rich suburban areas and lacked adequate means within the rural world. Real local conditions were so poor that their improvement needed a strong program based on empirical studies, skilled technical staff, and adequate equipment. A sound rural development program should include small scale industry;
4. The general socio-economic conditions improved a great deal in many respects as compared to the time of independence, but much still needs to be done;
5. Peasant attitudes regarding the existing living conditions are, however, characterized by a deep frustration and sharp sense of injustice. They feel abandoned because pre-independence expectations were so high.

The two parts of this study may appear to have no relation to each other. The fact, however, is that they are highly related since the

history of peasants around the world shows their common exploitation, injustice, and subjugation as well as their violent reaction against both national and international oppressors. They share poverty conditions and lack of participation. The developing countries' increasing dependency is expected to increase peasant poverty which would lead, sooner or later, to class struggle and peasant wars within the dependent nations.

It seems important to make a final quote from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations that defined the goals of agrarian reform and rural development as being:

"transformation of rural life and activities in all their economic, social, cultural, institutional environmental, and human aspects. National objective and strategies to achieve this transformation should focus on eradication of poverty, including nutritional improvement, and be governed by policies for attaining growth with equity, redistribution of economic and political power, and people's participation." (FAO, 1981, 6)

This quotation is closely related to our study. The real question is how to transform rural life and activities. Are equity, redistribution of economic and political power, and people's participation possible in a developing country? Most, if not all, rural programs fail to achieve development goals in developing nations, because one aspect or another of rural life is omitted. Many programs were conceived as a kind of charity as was the case with the Algerian reform. Nice, well-furnished houses, built fully at state expense were handed free to peasants who could not believe what had just happened. Years later, they left farm work and kept their houses, because better wages

and working conditions were offered by other administrative or economic sectors. Lawlessness became a pattern since they have no right to do what they did. The purpose of building socialist villages — that is, farming — is no longer served.

In addition to non-productive considerations negative international effects were ignored by some rural development theorists, as was the case with F.L. Brayne's philosophy suggesting rural education as a major need for underdeveloped areas. Rural people needed to learn how to avoid wasteful spending and to improve farm practices. Dependency theorists consider the unequal world system as the main cause of underdevelopment in developing countries. Local participation is required by all development theories, but getting people's involvement and participation requires a set of conditions among which are knowing local needs, through serious, consistent, empirical social research, and making necessary material, financial, and technical means available.

The previous two conditions require, in the Algerian case as in many others, putting an end to or at least decreasing dependency creating programs, taking rigorous measures against wasteful spending of national corporations, improve industrial outputs, and use of national technical potentials, instead of systematically resorting to expatriates. Algerian universities, however, are not serving national development as they should. Rather, these universities provide more service to the more developed nations than to Algeria because more and more educated people leave the country for one reason or another. The

university generally is not involved in intensive, consistent, empirical studies to help improve development programs. University programs in this area are alien to Algerian reality and needs. They are conceived by expatriates ignoring or not concerned about local problems. The national educated elites have the same ideals, interests, and behavior as these expatriates whom they asked for help.

Rural Algeria, as Beni-Chebana's case shows, is under-administered; still no university program is available in this field. The National School of Administration is not able to satisfy national administration needs. It is a very selective institution but its resources do not allow the training of a large number of administrators. Hence, many university students are not prepared to serve in the administrative sector, much in need of skilled personnel. Both rural and urban administration as well as students themselves would benefit joint university and administration school programs. This would allow universities to directly serve specific national needs, help students to find jobs, but also to put an end to elite education. Training in administration is not an isolated case, rather, it is a general pattern in Algerian college education which has been inherited from the French. Practical, applied education is carried out by national schools such as that in administration, agriculture, and demography. Universities then teach theoretical subjects that are not much related to applied socio-economic problems.

Consequently, university education is not doing much to enhance national development. Field research has not developed because of this

separation between practical and specialized teaching on one hand, and the general and theoretical college education on the other. Executive bodies are not equipped to do their own research and are not compelled to ask for university or other help. This lack of real knowledge of local needs is a primary cause of rural development failure. Local participation can, as in Beni-Chebana's electric program, become real when the programs serve real needs. The 1971 agrarian reform was limited to the richer, more accessible, and suburban areas of Algeria. The poor areas are still waiting.

The whole issue of the redistribution of economic and political power in developing nations remains an unsolved problem. Peasants do not need charity programs, but rather political and economic decentralization enabling rural people to fully participate in all development stages: defining needs, conceiving, and realizing programs. Beni-Chebana has great development potential, including its manpower, lands, and even capital. Modern farm inputs, irrigation, and farm roads, need to be provided. Small industry could be developed to help agriculture and promote part-time farming with adequate equipment. Social amenities need to be improved, especially to allow skilled people to stay in the area. No single magic action can solve the issues of underdevelopment in developing nations. Rather, integrated programs are needed. The people to be served must be allowed to take part in all development stages.

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