COTTON-GROWING IN CENTRAL NYANZA

PROVINCE. KENYA 1901-1939:-
AN APPRAISAL 0F AFRICAN REACTIONS
T0 IMPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY,

Déssertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
HICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
HARRY A. REED
1975

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,IA ABSTRACT

COTTON-GROWING IN CENTRAL NYANZA PROVINCE,
KENYA 1901—1939: AN APPRAISAL OF AFRICAN
REACTIONS TO IMPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY
By

Harry A. Reed

In 1901 commercial cotton cultivation was introduced into Kenya's
Nyanza Province by the British Government. It was expected that cotton
production there would produce results similar to the cotton industry
in Uganda. However, during the period 1901 to 1923, it became clear
that Kenya Africans had not enthusiastically embraced cotton growing
and that it would not become the major cash crop of Nyanza Province.
Most historians have attributed this failure to the lack of African
initiative; the high value indigenous people placed on leisure time;
to a lack of character, competence or economic sense; and to a rigid
adherence to traditional systems of agriculture.

The present study challenges the above judgements by clarifying
the motivations and the actions of the growers not only in terms of
archival data but also through oral evidence. Both sources reveal
that the Luo were more interested in maintaining the integrity of
their society than responding to government dictates. Moreover, the
blame for failure to achieve startling results must be shared by the
British Government: they lacked a rational plan for developing the
industry. A comparison of the Kenya and Uganda experiences also will

help to explain the different results.

ii

Harry A. Reed

Moreover, this dissertation examines the failure of the early
political activists during 1922-1928 to assist the farmers in
redressing their grievances with the colonial government. Without
allies and without understanding, Nyanza cotton farmers maintained
their traditional farming methods and political structure to ameliorate

the impact of imposed colonial policy.

iii

COTTON-GROWING IN CENTRAL NYANZA
PROVINCE, KENYA 1901-1939: AN APPRAISAL

OF AFRICAN REACTIONS TO IMPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY

By

Harry A: Reed

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1975

CHAPTER

II

III

IV

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Luoland: Ecology and Social Structure . . . . . . 1

The Rationale for Cash Cropping and the
Problems Inherent in Establishing
the Kenya Cotton Industry, 1901-
1915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Uganda Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The Shared Responsibility for the Limited
Success of the Cotton Industry in
Central Nyanza, 1901-1923 . . . . . . . . . . 53

Farmers Reactions and Motivations . . . . . . . . 76
Political Activity in Central Nyanza

1921-1940: A Failure to Redress

the Farmers' Grievances and the

Farmers' Modus Vivendi . . . . . . . . . . . 99

conCIUSion O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 134

Bibliography 0 C O C O O 0 O O O O O 0 O O O O O O 142

CHAPTER I

LUOLAND: ECOLOGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

History, inherently posits a relationship between two or more
groups. Too often, however, the public record has read more like a
monologue, enunciating the trials and accomplishments of the super—
ordinate power. Since the subordinate group seldom was able to
publicize its problems and anxieties the elite's view invariably
prevailed. For the European it was necessary to justify the colonial
presence in terms of progress. Most often, and on all levels, the
imperium was treated as benefiting African society.

Due to the presence of European settlers, Kenya, perhaps more than
other East Africa territories, was effected by the idea that Europeans
provided direction toward modernization.1 Any deviations or attempts
to moderate European activities or innovations were interpreted as
negative responses and as significant defects in African character.

The present study will illustrate that the colonial period
encompassed a dialogue, an interaction where the participants were
more or less equal, and where each had legitimate reasons for

following their own pathways to accomplishment.

 

1Lord Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British TrOpical Africa
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922); Elspeth Huxley, White
Man's Country; Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya 2 vols. (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1953), and No Easy way: A History of the Kenya
Farmers Association and Unga Limited (Nairobi: Kenya Farmers Association,
1957).

 

 

It will be necessary when developing this thesis to avoid
special pleading for African interests. As with any revisionist
history it will necessitate specifying weaknesses in existing scholar-
ship; the purpose always being not to access blame but to achieve a
more correct analysis. It is not the intention here to build models.
What is most important is to record and interpret events in light of
how Kenya Africans justified their reactions to the government's
cotton policy.

To set this study in a proper framework requires an examination
of Central Nyanza's geography and Luo society. Central Nyanza
Province includes the districts of Nyando, Nyahera, Maseno, Boro,
Bondo and Ukwala and stretches south and northwest around the Kavi-
rondo Gulf, the eastern-most extremity of Lake Victoria. European
travelers and historians took note of the geographical diversity of
the region upon first contact. The ecology was both a blessing and
a curse because not all zones could support cotton cultivation. Since
most Europeans, and certainly those outside the agricultural depart-
ment, knew little about the region's ecology, they treated the entire
area as one and attempted cotton husbandry throughout.

Within Central Nyanza's 1760 square miles there are four principal
zones of settlement,2 corresponding roughly to the different ecological
features. The first, and largest of these locations is the Kano Plain

or the Lake Shore Savanna (Kano Type). Ranging from 3700 feet to

 

2John C. deWilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in

Tropical Africa: The Case Studies, vol. II, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 122-23.

 

 

4,000 feet in altitude the area is characterized by deep alluvial
soils. Although the soils are more fertile than in other parts of
Central Nyanza, they are difficult to drain and work. Moreover, the
area, particularly the east Kano Plain, is susceptible to flooding from
the Nyando escarpment.

A second zone of occupation, the lakeside communities or Lake
Shore Savanna type, is confined principally to a narrow ten mile strip
running along the lakeshore. The Lake Shore Savanna complex, which
lies north of the lake, has soils with a high lateritic content and
are generally of poor quality. Those portions on the east side of
the Lake, particularly around Kusa, however, contain some of the
district's best cotton soil.3 Rainfall, as in the Lake Shore Savanna
(Kano Type), is irregular, averaging 30 to 40 inches. In addition
this enclave has been subjected to periodic droughts.

The foothill communities of the Star Grass zone comprises the
third settlement pattern in Central Nyanza. Situated at 4,500 to
5,000 feet, with soils of variable quality and with a fairly reliable
rainfall of about 60 inches annually this zone has probably the most
attractive ecological features. It is therefore the area of greatest
pOpulation density in Central Nyanza.4

A final ecological niche, the plateau community areas, on the
Higher Rainfall Savanna, has a more reliable rainfall pattern than

zone one, but the soils here tend to be less fertile than those of

 

31bid.

4Ibid., p. 124.

the Lake Shore Savanna. Thus, the natural conditions in Central
Nyanza did not offer attractive Opportunities for cash cropping.

Indigenous appraisals of the fertility of Nyanza's soils were
culture-bound and pre-scientific but sophisticated and correct.
Before European contact the Luo had named the principal soil
varieties.5 The first of these was called "anywang," a fine black
soil found mostly around the lake. A second type, "Iwala," is the
red earth soil generally found farther back from the lake. "Kwoyo,"
or sandy soil, the third variety, could be found, especially near
granite out-croppings. Murram, called "Gu" when solid, and "Ge,"
when disintegrated, comprised the fourth soil category. Finally,
stony soil requiring heavy labor was called "Kite." All of the soil
types could be found in one location, and all knowledgeable farmers
could identify them by sight.

Beyond identifying the soil types, the Luo had also devised
methods appropriate for working each. Moreover they had schematized
the land as to its crop producing capabilities.6 In the precolonial
Luo frame of reference each of the soils had some positive qualities,
and farmers naturally related their economic pursuits with the pre-
dominant soil type in his locale.

In Kano, although all soil varieties exist, the area was considered
better suited for grazing than for major cultivation. That the Luo

preferred cattle keeping to farming is without question, but the

 

5Archdeacon W.E. Owen, "Food Production and Kindred Matters
Amongst the Luo," The Journal of the East Africa and Uganda Natural
History Society, 49-50 (April-July 1933), P. 235.

6R.B. Dakeyne, "The Patterns of Settlement in Central Nyanza,
Kenya," The Austrailian Geographer, VIII (March 1962) pp. 188-89.

 

 

 

dichotomy between cattle keepers and cultivators has remained strong.7
Usually, in times of disaster, it was argued that, "cattle keepers

did not have to go to their neighbors for sustenance."8 During
inclement weather, when crOps might totally be destroyed, livestock
could be moved to higher ground. Thus, the herdsman could protect

his wealth and food supply, but large scale farming was a precarious
undertaking. The emphasis on herding and the negative weather condi—
tions did not prevent cultivation in Kano, but they limited the scope
of all farming. Farmers clearly sought to achieve marginal returns
from a variety of crops rather than to attempt large returns from a
limited number of specific crops; the emphasis was always on food crops,
and farmers concentrated on a relatively large food crop as an insurance
against hunger. With the additional pressure of human and cattle
populations there existed only a very limited margin for cash crOpping
or later expansion.

Before the establishment of EurOpean cash crops, the land-use
factor in most parts of Kano had reached critical proportions.9 To
reverse the pressure on land would have necessitated heavy government
expenditures and probably created grave conflicts for the Luo. First,
to suggest that the Luo cull their herds or move them to less favorable

locations would have embroiled the administration in an endless

 

7Yare Okoth, personal interview, Kajulu, 19 November 1973 and

Augustinus Orembo, personal interview, Usonga, 13 November 1973.

8Walter Odede, "Luo Customs with Regard to Animals (With particular
Reference to Cattle)," Journal of East Africa and Uganda Natural History
Society, XVI (February, 1942), p. 130.

9William Allan The African Husbandman (London: Oliver and Boyd,
1965) p. 351.

 

 

series of litigations. It also may possible have touched off a more
acute debate among the Luo themselves concerning the merits of
cattle keeping and farming.

Second, government had to depend on indigenous farming knowledge
and hope that some cotton would be planted. The traditional system of
scattered farmrsites made it possible for farmers to cultivate in a
variety of soils. In theory this meant that every farmer, in a
section where good soils did not predominate, would have equal access
to fertile land. Left to their own devices, farmers used all available
land to its fullest capacity for food.

The lakeside area had other disabilities. Its isolation made it
almost impossible to organize inspection and transport for cash crops.
In summary, although the lakeside communities possessed outstanding
ecological attributes, they could not be turned to the government's
advantage for cash cropping.

In the plateau communities of Central Nyanza conditions were not
conducive to cotton growing. Nevertheless cultivation was attempted
in a number of areas, with predictably unsuccessful results. Even
today small-scale cotton farming is being pursued in areas around
Nyabondo;10 The most serious detriment to establishing the crop in
areas such as Nyabondo and the Kajulu Plateau was the high altitude
and its accompanying low temperatures.

On the other hand a favorable index, high and reliable rainfall,

was present on the plateau. The Luo responded to this circumstance by

 

10Caleb Abayo Migele, Cotton Officer Kisumu District, personal

interview, Kisumu, 18 June 1973.

a general concentration on food crops. In all areas, when favorable
growing circumstances were present the Luo immediately responded by
increasing food crop acreage,ll to provide insurance against hunger.
The result was that little choice land remained for cash crop develop-
ment, and the Luo could not understand European reasons for setting
aside land for apparently non-productive pursuits such as cotton
cultivation.

Even uncultivatable land in plateau communities was used. Swamp
land and other undesirable territory were reclaimed and used for
communal grazing. When the colonial government requested land for
cash crops, these areas of marginal value invariably would be donated.
In this way the farmer was saved from disturbing his own acreage.
Moreover government initially would be satisfied, and several seasons
might pass before the unsuitability of the land was discovered.

Of all the environments in Central Nyanza, the foothill communities,
of which Kajulu is the best example, had, on the surface, the ideal
conditions for cotton cultivation. Yet these attributes were perceived
differently by the Lao and the government. The very attractiveness
of the area's ecological features acted to its detriment in the matter
of cash cropping. High and reliable rainfall and soils of generally
good to excellent quality attracted a sizeable human and animal
population. Consequently foothill area residents subjected the land
to intensive usage, and this effected yields. The soils were good but

generations of overuse had reduced their fertility,12 and given

 

11Dakeyne, "Patterns of Settlement," p. 189.

12Ezekiel Majon, personal interview, Kajulu, 10 July 1973.

population pressure they could not be taken out of production very
easily to lie fallow.

Because of human pressure on the land and the variety of soils,
crops in the foothill locations were more varied than in other Central
Nyanza communities. Yet this variety was limited to traditional
food crops,13 and farmers were conscious of the risk involved in
growing non-food items. In short even those ecological zones that
held out the possibility of successful cash-cropping were overburdened
by food production before the colonial period.

In 1884, when Europeans first entered Luo-land, they encountered
a non-Bantu speaking pOpulation of highly mobile and extremely inde—
pendent cattle—keepersi These Niiotes had migrated from a nuclear
area in the Bahr—el-Gezal on the Upper Nile, and had pushed their way
into Central Nyanza. There are significantly different interpretations
of the motivations for the migrations, the patterns of movement, and
the structure of society.14 However, three facts can generally be
discerned. One, precolonial Luo-land had numerous small, politically
autonomous units. Two, politics was fluid, complex, and reciprocity

and responsibility existed between leaders and their constituents.

 

13Hugh Fearn, An African Economy: A Study of the Economic

Development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya 1903-1953 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), p. 168.

th.P. Crazzolara, The Lwoo, 3 vols. (Verona: Missioni Africane,
1950-4); "The Lwoo People," The Uganda Journal, (July 1937); E.E.
Evans-Pritchard, "Luo Tribes and Clans," Rhodes-Livingstone Journal
7 (1949); Bethwell A. Ogot, Pegples of East Africa: History of the
Southern Luo: Migration and Settlement 1500-1900, vol. 1(Nairobi:
East African Publishing House, 1967); Michael G. Whisson, "The Rise
of Asembo and the Curse of Kakia," Conference Papers, East African
Institute of Social Research (Kampala: Makerere University College,
1961); and "The Journeys' of the Jo Ramogi," Conference Papers, East
African Institute of Social Research (Kampala: Makerere University
College, 1962).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Three, Luo society was being transformed from a society of mobile
cattle herders to sedentary, cattle-keeping farmers.

The relative position of farming in precolonial Luo society
was reflected in work patterns and tools. Farming was organized on a
family group basis, with the bulk of ongoing cultivation left to
women. Farming implements usually included a digging stick, a small
wooden plow and the hands.15

Traditional Luo economy, like most peasant economic systems, was
characterized by barter and reciprocity, and the standard of economic
value was the cow.16 Since cows could not be exchanged or bought into
every transaction the Luo worked out a system of using specified measures
of traditional food crops as a standard economic unit.

Reciprocity and communal responsibility were also major factors
in precolonial Luo economic thinking. Major projects such as building
houses or clearing large tracts of land generally required a community
effort. Feasts, beer parties and, occasionally, gifts of livestock or
fowl constituted payment for services. Social pressure required that
payment for services had to be commensurate with the task performed
and with the owner's status.17 Stinting.on rations or beer would be
severely criticized, and it might jeopardize future projects. Moreover,

once an individual had done communal labor and participated in a feast,

 

15Philip Obonyo, personal interview, Usonga, 13 November 1973.

16Michael G. Whisson, Change and Challenge: A Study of the Social

and Economic Changes Among the Kenya Luo (Nairobi: The Christian
Council of Kenya, 1964), p. 92.

17
1973.

 

 

Ex—Chief Simeon Otiende, personal interview, Kajulu, 24 August

10

the host was then under obligation for requests of labor from those
who had assisted him. In short, the Luo economic structure was flexi-
ble enough to allow for an exchange of goods and services and to
distribute the wealth of society on a fairly equitable basis through
socially conducted economic Operations.

Even chiefs and local leaders had to provide acceptable compensa-
tion for community projects. Seldom was a request for public works
participation ignored because the projects encompassed understandable
objectives. Maintaining paths and roads to favorite grazing spots and
interlocational markets enhanced the social cohesiveness. Moreover,
self-interest motivated participants in community tasks; exploitation
was minimal, and work could be viewed as meeting an individual's
responsibility for community service. Most important, the leader could
demonstrate his magnaminity in the lavishness of his rewards and com-
pensations. Thus his power and influence were enhanced.

Other economic pursuits involving community work served to increase
the chief's hegemony and sometimes even increased the wealth of
individual participants. When stolen or strayed cattle and livestock
had to be recovered the rewards could be substantial,18 according to
the status of the owner. Gifts and favors would be distributed among
the coworkers with the explicit but unspoken understanding that the
chief or leader would be expecting future support. Thus political
control and distribution of wealth were closely related factors in
precolonial Luo society.

There has been no investigation of market periodicity and the

 

18Michael G. Whisson, "The Rise of Asembo and the Curse of Kakia,"
Conference Papers East African Institute of Social Research (Kampala:
Makerere University College, 1961), p. 7.

11

place of the market in Luo economic life. Markets were, if they
existed at all, a minor detail. A rational explanation would suggest
that the material level of the society was such that few products were
available whose distribution and acquisition would be assisted by
some form of public sale or exchange. Moreover, the Luo adherence to
cattle-keeping significantly limited the need for markets. Since the
number and not the quality of cattle mattered, Luo herders seldom ever
slaughtered their cows. Once an animal was slaughtered, and this
mostly occurred on ritual occasions, every conceivable part was
utilized.19

Even though cattle were the most obvious form of wealth, their
acquisition was severely restricted. Cattle could be increased
legitimately by reproduction, inheritance and theft, the last of which
was the most widely practiced means, particularly in adjacent non-Luo
areas.20 Cattle theft required organization and the ability to coordinate
tasks and political benefits. In short, the internal features of Luo
society, its system of wealth distribution and rewards, the low level
of material desires and the particularistic ideation about cattle
eliminated the need for the formal system of exchange represented by
markets.

After cattle the other consuming interest of precolonial Luo was
local level politics. It is extremely important to establish that
political activity was local and restricted, and that no large scale,

integrative political structures were available.

 

19Odede, "Luo Customs," p. 130.

20Whisson, "Asembo," p. 8.

12

Yet even with its restricted territorial focus, Luo politics
had a complexity that requires a detailed eXplanation. Of singular
importance was the stratification of society in the clan and subclan
segments. A major requisite for power was membership in a dominant
clan or subclan in the area of residence. In practical terms this
meant that leaders could present a powerful and unified front initially
composed of his clanmates.21 An ability to rally one's own clan, while
not assuring success, was an important factor in gaining other allies.

Even though political power was closely correlated to dominant
clan membership, a man had to possess ability in war. This talent,
during times of peace, was used to maintain law and order within the
clan area. Another factor of leadership was the ability to rally
support, initially among clan members, and sometimes by extending to
other locations that wished to combine against a common enemy.

One other factor points up the asset of membership in a dominant
clan. Peace makers within the clan were automatically the senior
members of each group. These individuals also served as envoys on
peace keeping missions among the various locales. Within their own
districts the elders acted as an advisory council to the location

leader.22

 

lebid.

22Some confusion surrounds the designation of local rulers. The
Luo term Ruoth has been translated by most commentators as chief. Yet
many elderly Luo assert their were no chiefs before the Europeans came.
Whisson, "Asembo," suggests that despite the controversy over inter-
preting the term, the tenure of office Belonging to the position and
even the vagueness of whom at any given time the leader might be, the
functions performed by the Ruoth quality him to be designated as chief.

l3

Attracting support was also dependent upon the prospective
leader's wealth, which he utilized to pay his supporters by providing
feasts, beer celebrations, bridewealth and endowment for wives. Since
land was not scarce, wealth for political organization was equated in
terms of cattle and crops.

A final prerequisite for leadership and wealth was the possession
of magic or the support of a diviner. Magic, ghostly vengence and
witchcraft were major factors in Luo religion.23 Moreover they have
their expressions in political life. The "Jabilo," or magician, not
only forecast the outcome of combat and cattle raids but also provided
supernatural powers to overcome the leader's enemies. Magic in local
political affairs persisted late into the twentieth century.24

By acquiring prestige and wealth as a warrior and leader in a
strong clan or subclan and enhancing these with magic any well-placed
man could gain the chieftancy. An outstanding man could possibly
overcome less favorable birth if he attracted followers, enforced some
of his political decisions and gained support for his political decisions.

In short, ability to get tasks done was more important than any single

factor.

 

23On traditional Luo réligion, its structural complexity and
transformation during the colonial period see: E.E. Evans—Pritchard,
"Ghostly Vengence Among the Luo of Kenya," Map, 50 (1950), 86-87;
Robert A. Levine, "Witchcraft and Co-Wife Proximity in Southwestern
Kenya," Ethnology l (1962), 39-45; Audrey Wipper "The Cult of Mumbo,"
Conference Papers East African Institute of Social Research (Kampala:
Makerere University College, 1966); Nyangweso, "The Cult of Mumbo in
Central and South Kavirondo," Journal of East African and Uganda Natural
History Society, 10 (1930), 13-17 and Frederick E. Welbourn and Bethwell
A. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home: A Study of Two Independent Churches
in Western Kenya (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

 

 

 

 

 

4Whisson, "Asembo," p. 9.

14

Clearly the prerequisites for political leadership point up the
dynamism of the precolonial Luo political system. Moreover, within
its restricted territorial focus, political development was complex
and widespread. Chiefs, once they had obtained leadership, bolstered
their power by creating a local hierarchy. Each gweag, or settlement
had a subchief appointed by the Rpgph, and each subchief was assisted
by council of advisors and a police force.25 If for any reason the
Raggh lost control of his area, his supportive hierarchy would be
dismantled or transformed to meet the new leader's needs.
Clearly the Luo concentration on local area politics had provided
the means for full community participation. Since the structure was
geared to selecting leaders on the basis of general community need,
responsibilities were clearly apparent. Moreover, objective criteria
existed by which constituents could judge the leader's performance.
Every leader in effect had a mandate from the people to deal with pressing
community needs. Once this mandate had been completed, for example
threat from outside forces, if the leader possessed none of the skills
required for peace time administration an orderly transfer of power
could be arranged by his council of elders.26
Beyond the council of elders there exiSEed several other avenues
for community feedback. The administrative hierarchy provided direct
access to the chief's representatives in the precolonial structure.
It was expected that subchiefs would put forth and support the grievances

of his local people even those who because of seniority were unable to

 

25Aidan Southall, "Lineage Formation Among the:Luo," Memoranda
of the International African Institute, 26 (1952), p. 27.

26

 

E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "Luo Tribes and Customs," P. 32.

15

attend barazas could feel certain their petition would receive a
hearing.
Not all men in the locations could attend barazas. Attendance
at the sub-locational level was dependent on maturity, which in this
case was equated with marriage and the maintenance of family responsi—
bilities.27 At this lower level baraza, participants would choose
representatives who would accompany the subchief to the chief's baraza.
Consequently the system allowed participation for adult males and
provided a check on the subchief's ability to represent his constituents.
Although political competition was intense on the local levels
no Pan-Luo political structure existed. Fortunately for the colonial
government this meant the system would not present insurmountable
problems for the application of indirect rule. On the other hand,
colonial administrators misunderstood the complexity of the precolonial
structure and tended to force local political competition into new
directions and the structure itself into a new mold.28
Under the colonial government the traditional political system
therefore maintained a good deal of its dynamism. However, several
substantive changes were apparent: the British government became the
final arbiter in selecting and confirming the chief, and he became
a colonial civil servant subject to administrative control and dismissal.
For all practical purposes any degree of social control over the chief's

performance was removed from the people.

 

27Gordon M. Wilson The Luo Homestead and Family (Elgon Nyanza
District)(Nairobi: Government Archives, 1965), p. 17.

28Bethwell A. Ogot, "British Administration in the Central Nyanza
District of Kenya, 1900-60," Journal of African History, 4 (1963) p. 262.

 

 

 

16

Although wealth remained a criteria for leadership, the access
to wealth changed considerably. No longer were magic and cattle
theft the major means of obtaining wealth. They were replaced by
education, foreign language skill and the ability to function within
the new government. Not only was the acquisition of wealth changed
but also the chief's function as the major distributor of wealth was
transformed. Since tenure of office depended more on colonial admin-
istrative approval than meeting constituents' demands, feasts became
less elaborate and less frequent.29 The "income" loss from prohibited
cattle raids, court fees and social obligations were more than over—
come through manipulation of the new money economy as chiefs became
entrepreneurs.

Other features of political leadership also changed under the
colonial impact. For example, younger men became chiefs, and this led
to the anomoly of having the baraza conducted by a man who, in the
traditional system, would not even be allowed to attend because of his
youth.31 Probably the most important alteration was the creation Of
a new reservoir of potential leadership. Previously location leader—
ship encompassed the chief, his advisors and his hierarchy. Under the

British, appointed chiefs had to accomodate themselves to the fact that

 

29Chief Charles Onyango, personal interview, Kajulu, 16 October 1973.

30Barnarbus Nyangor, personal interview, Ndere, 9 November 1973.
Chiefs became the leading consumers of western goods. In 1935,
Mr. Nyangor said, Chief Amoth of Alego became the first African in the
area to purchase a motor car. Other chiefs reportedly Opened bars,
market stalls, and one even financed a house building company.

31Whisson, "Asembo," p. 17.

17

the elders, formerly advisors to the chief, maintained a high degree
of political influence32 through direct contact with European adminis-
trators.

The viability of precolonial Luo politics therefore survived,
throughout the colonial period for two basic reasons. One, the
adjusted system continued to respond to traditional political problems
such as security, law and order, maintaining the standard of living
and providing a mechanism for distributing wealth and services. Second,
the system was flexible enough to allow for changes and the colonial
administration's restrictions were not greatly at variance with pre-
European practices.

In summary, the Luo area of settlement presented a host of
political and ecological problems that would severely restrict the
establishment of an African-based cotton industry without massive
inputs Of men, money and material. Moreover, the Luo had successfully
adapted to the geographical limitations of Central Nyanza.

But the precolonial Luo political structure, with its absence of
widespread integration did facilitate the colonial government. The
focus on local level problems and administration made the system
adaptable to British concepts of indirect rule. It therefore maintained
its viability so that Luo political energies continued to have essential
outlets.

While adapting to the imposition of the new integrative structure

the political/social system provided a format for change. The

 

32John M. Lonsdale A Political History Of Nyanza 1883-1945,
Unpubl. Ph.D. diss. (Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1964),
p. 26.

 

l8

ambivalences of the Luo problem are immediately apparent. The thesis

to be developed in this study is that the Luo political/social constructs
eased the inevitable change brought about by colonialism. More
importantly the Luo assessment of the inherent value of their parti-
cular system dictated the speeds, the direction and the level at which

they responded to the colonial system.

CHAPTER II

THE RATIONALE FOR CASH CROPPING
AND THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ESTABLISHING

THE KENYA COTTON INDUSTRY, 1901-1915

One of the problems that faced the British Government in the
administration Of the East African Protectorate, was how to shift the
costs of railway maintenance, military pacification, and general
administration from the imperial exchequer to the protectorate.l In
other colonies or protectorates, especially in Uganda, a system of
agricultural cash cropping had served to generate the needed revenues.
Cash cropping, it was argued, would have the advantage of producing a
taxable income for the local population while allowing it to pursue
its customary vocation of farming. A money income would eliminate
in-kind tax payments and would allow the colonial peOple to purchase
British products. Therefore, both colonizer and colonized would reap
the benefits of the new economic system.

It will be argued here that the above premises constituted little
more than general policy guidelines. While they allowed for freedom

of action, they were ineffectiVe. as administrative Operating procedures.

 

1Richard D. Wolff, "Economic Aspects Of British Colonialism in
Kenya, 1895 to 1930," The Journal of Economic History, xxx (1970),
p. 275.

 

19

20

Clearly stated goals were lacking. For example, in relation to cotton,
the ability of the land in Nyanza to sustain the crop's growth was
unknown, and no provisions were made to ascertain the carrying capa—
city of the land. Moreover it will be shown that the guidelines

failed to provide a framework for coordinating the various groups
interested in establishing the cotton industry. The agricultural
department, railroad Officials and British businessmen seldom supported
the Others' plans. The result was, in the years 1901 to 1915, an

ad hoc approach to and the limited success of cotton cash cropping.

In the early twentieth century the British textile industry
needed the fiber from its colonial territories because demand for the
product considerably exceeded America's supply ability. Therefore
it appeared as if cotton would be a marketable and profitable commodity.
Further beneficial effects would possibly accrue to Britain from the
establishment of a commercial sector within the East African Protec-
torate. Since Africans had not acquired the requisite entrepreneurial
skills, this expertise must perforce come from settler population,
from other colonies, or the metropole.

The tentative beginnings of European economic planning for Western
Kenya can be seen in the efforts of District Commissioner H.B. Partington.
One of the pioneer staff persons in the protectorate, Partington,
without benefit of a definite administrative policy, conceived of
setting in motion those processes that would stimulate economic and

Political development. In 1901, be distributed cotton, vegetable, and
Oilseeds to people living in Kisumu and around the Kibos River. The

Kibos River scheme merits special attention since it contains several

21

of the elements involved in transforming territories into viable
economic entities.

Around 1900, a group of Indians,.formerly laborers on or in
some capacity connected with the building of the railroad, were
settled by the British government along the banks Of the Kibos
River. This settlement had two purposes: one, to provide a military
buffer between the victorious Luo who occupied Kajulu location and
their defeated Nandi neighbors. The Asians, who were armed by the
protectorate government, were employed to deter any Nandi attempts
to reopen hostilities and regain their lost territory. Secondly, the
community was to engage in farming and in irrigating the areas around
the Kibos River. They, it was envisioned, would be innovators,
ostensibly introducing new crOps and techniques and thereby creating
an impetus for change in the surrounding African communities.2 The
colonial government felt they had guaranteed the Asian communitys'
enthusiastic participation by giving them homesteads, seeds, and
preferential treatment. The reasoning from the government's point of
view appeared sound. In the Asian Kibos settlement, the administration
had a western-oriented, homogeneous community with some familiarity
in peasant farming techniques.

Any blame for the failure of the Kibos scheme to generate economic
development within the surrounding African communities must be shared
equally by the government and the local farmer: Nairobi's paternalism
lacked clear cut goals and failed to provide clear economic incentives.

The African farmers, on the other hand, disrespected the agricultural

 

2C.O. 544, E.A.P., Dept. of Agriculture, B.E.A. Annual Administra-

tion Reports (1903-1904), p. 6.

 

22

innovations introduced by the new community, since they were distrust-
ful of foreigners and felt that indigenous farming techniques did
not require changes, particularly those generated by foreigners.

Even in Kisumu, where there were no foreign innovators, some
of the same reservations prevented Africans from enthusiastically
pursuing cotton cash cropping. In Kisumu the government was even more
lax in their paternalism. NO records exist detailing where, to whom
and how much seed was distributed; of more importance in the failure
of those two efforts is the fact that Africans did show an interest
in modernization.

A progressive tendency can clearly be discerned in the schemes
of Wadegu, Chief Of E. Seme location, who volunteered workmen as
laborers to the railroad. The impetus may have come from wishing to
familiarize the community with this new force, to gain a money income
or to appease the new government, or to keep the EurOpeans from
penetrating the interior and distrubing community life; or to insure
that E. Seme be given some preferential recognition should the govern—
ment move into the area. The last possibility must be given serious
consideration when evaluating African motivations since the Luo of
Seme were one of the few Central Nyanza communities with direct
knowledge of European fire power. Wadegu might have been willing,
therefore, to employ placatory methods rather than confront the new
government. Even if British occupation could not be delayed by such
ingratiating acts, the chief was hOpeful Of becoming government's
acknowledged representative. In short, Wadegu showed himself ready

to adapt to the political realities.3

 

3Otieno Otite, personal interview, East Seme, 15 August 1973.

23

Nevertheless, the low status of money in the African value system
is evident in this and subsequent activities in E. Seme. The railroad
workers returned to the location, but their experiences and their
rewards did not stimulate any sizable influx of people into Kisumu to
pursue wage labor; nor did the workers spread the ideas Of growing
cotton. To the consternation of C.W. Hobley and Partington, they
apparently never even noticed the new farms or the new crops.
Moreover, government héd not provided the necessary economic infra-
structure to aid the farmer in this new venture, and they had failed
to offer real economic incentives to the farmer. No roads had been
built, nor had any attention been given to constructing a purchasing
center in proximity to the growing areas. In addition, no attempt
had been made by government to teach the proper techniques for the
planting and care of cotton. As a result the crop was picked, but
left to rot in storage, when the farmers refused to head load it
twenty-six miles into Kisumu.5 Without substantial financial assistance,
the peasant farmer withheld his cooperation in Order to retain his
autonomy. Since Nairobi had neither finances nor direction it was
unable to interest the farmer or London in a cotton campaign.
Consequently assistance was sought from private sources.

In 1905, Sir Donald Stewart, Commissioner of the Protectorate,
corresponded with members of the British Cotton Growing Association

concerning the possibilities for growing the crap in the territory;

 

4CO 544, Ibid, p. 7.

5Zekayo Ongeso, personal interview, Kombewa, 26 July 1973.

24

he wondered if the association would be interested in joining the
government in the maintenance and administration of an experimental
farm at Malindi.6 Stewart's proposal represented the beginning of
the period of businessmen's influence in the protectorate. Stewart
sought their assistance because he lacked confidence in the abilities
of the settlers as well as the African farmers.7 Responding to
Stewart's invitation, British businessmen, particularly those
associated with the British Cotton Growing Association, commenced a
program of lobbying that gave them the initiative for planning the
cotton industry in the East Africa Protectorate.

An Opening movement was initiated by Joseph Foulkes, President,
B.C.G.A., in his correspondence with Lord Elgin, the Under-Secretary
of State for Colonies. In 1905, Foulkes requested a land grant of
twenty to forty thousand acres of prime land for cotton cultivation
and asked that B.C.G.A. be given a monopoly in the development of the
crop.8 The letter specified no particular area, but it was understood
by all parties that the land would be in the coastal areas because
of the existing facility at Malindi and the proximity Of dependable
transport. Foulkes' request was transmitted to Commissioner J. Sadler
Hayes, who had assumed the position after Stewart's death. Hayes

responded with a favorable evaluation of cotton prospects in the

 

6C.O. 533, Stewart to British Cotton Growing Association, Mombasa,

3 April 1905, E.A.P., Commissioners Dispatches (1905), p. 280.

 

7G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912: The Establishment
of Administration in the East Africa Protectorate (Oxford, at The
Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 116.

8C.O. 533, Foulkes to Lord Elgin, London, 26 May 1905, E.A.P.,
Ipdividual Dispatches, 1905 (Vol. 10) p. 281.

 

25

protectorate. He also suggested the suitability of widespread
cultivation in the Kavirondo District, an area not previously
mentioned. He intimated, however, that government could handle
develOpment of the crop.9 For his assertion Hayes received a mild
reprimand concerning his lack of sensitivity to the association's
public spirit. Hayes therefore was forced tO state he would be
happy to leave the commercial development of cotton to the British
concern.

With this mild impediment out of the way, the businessmen moved
to develop the industry as they wished. Late in 1906, Arthur Bolton,
Vice Chairman of the B.C.G.A., escalated the pressure on the colonial
secretary. This time the association also requested approval of
plans to establish their own seed farm.10 Bolton further suggested
that government assign a cotton expert to the protectorate who would
work closely with the association; and that an annual grant of L 1500,
for three years, should be given as government's share in the under-
taking. It was broadly hinted that the enterprise would provide
employment for Africans, would ensure that quality control standards
in seed distribution be maintained, and that instruction and also
some missionary work would be commenced among workers in the areas.

Government approved only one of the association's requests. It
was granted L 1000 per year for three years. Such modest government
support, however, did not demonstrate the real or potential influence

of the British entrepreneur. His importance can be more readily seen

 

9C.O. 533, Hayes to Lord Elgin, Nairobi, 10 May 1906, E.A.P.,
Commissioner's Despatches, 1906 (Vol. 14) p. 281.

10C.O. 533, Bolton to Lord Elgin, London, 14 March 1906, E.A.P.,
Original Correspondences (Miscellaneous Individuals A-C) (Vol. 24)
1906, p. 117.

 

 

26

in the reorganization of the Protectorate's Agriculture Department,
which coincided with the agitation of the B.C.G.A., and which allowed
for the inclusion of the views of the commercial sector. The changes
suggest that entrepreneurial interests were strong enough to influence
governmental decision—making. 'Further it points up the close
relationship between government and commercial interests, a factor
that was not lost on settler businessmen at a later date.

B.C.G.A. did become involved with the government's Kibos experi-
mental farms. Its major contribution was in the field of experimental
cotton techniques and production studies. In 1908 the association
found that, with proper husbandry, rainfall, and seed variety, one
acre could produce 610 pounds Of seed cotton.11 After the 1908
experiments, the association's role in Nyanza became minimal in part
because the periodic flooding in the province had negated much of
the pioneering work commenced by the corporation.

Later in 1912, at a time when African agriculture was sadly
neglected because of government's policy of develOping the settler
areas only, John Ainsworth, the PrOvincial Commissioner Of Nyanza,
introduced major agricultural schemes.12 Among these were sim sim,
mdize, groundnut and cotton, the last not as a new crop but signifi-
cantly extended in cultivation. Ainsworth realized that the potential

for development lay with the African farmer. Ecological conditions,

 

11Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Nyanza Province Annual Report

 

1907-1908, p. 22.

12Bethwell A. Ogot "British Administration in the Central Nyanza
District of Kenya, 1900-60," Journal of African History, IV (1963),
p. 255.

 

27

he suggested, would militate against a large settler population in
Kavirondo. Moreover, if real economic development were to be
accomplished, then Nyanza Province could not be viewed as a labor
reservoir for settlers. Though Ainsworth was to change his percep-
tions about settler labor requirements, his early attempt to limit
wage labor migration from Nyanza meant that the area would not be
drained of manpower, its most vital resource. At the time, Ainsworth
was strongly condemned by many of his European colleagues as being
pro-African.

The new crops introduced by Ainsworth generally were not
successful. Groundnuts became extensively cultivated only on the
Nyakach Plateau, and even there it was not accepted fully until the
middle 1920's. Much of the crop's final success must be assigned to
the efforts of local leaders such as Andrea Okal and Mathayo Otieno,
who used their own personal influence and lobbied among farmers for
a united effort to request a more stable governmental program for the
crop. More importantly, by the mid 1920's the farmers were more
interested in pursuing a money income, and peanuts required fewer
man hours than did cotton, a fact not lost on the cultivator. More
significantly, other cash crOps were also food crOps that could have
been worked into the daily diet had the Luo been so inclined. The
slow African response to crops more attractive than cotton should have
alerted government to the continuing problems that cotton cultivation
would have to endure. Ainsworth, however, may be credited for the
enlightened manner in which he attempted to stimulate the economic

growth of the province.

28

Among the administrative devices introduced by Ainsworth, none
was more important than the assignment of administrative personnel to
assist agricultural department members in their daily responsibilities.
In the period 1908 through 1920, the Agricultural Department in
Nyanza was woefully understaffed, and if the program of introducing
cotton as a cash crOp were to be successful, manpower would be required,
even if lacking agricultural expertise. Of the more pressing needs,
none was more important, in the early years, than maintaining liason
with local Africans, if only to ensure that the crop would be planted
at all.

However, it was not always possible to coordinate the comings
and goings of extension workers with the availability Of the provincial
officers. It was possible for campaign schedules to become lost in
bureaucratic mismanagement with the result being that an extension
worker could appear at a location to find the farmers uninformed about
any scheduled meeting and his administrative counterparts absent. In
such cases it was only possible for the extension worker to continue
his rounds unassisted and with little or no cOOperation from farmers
in the locations. Having faced the unpreparedness of the farmer alone,
the situation was exacerbated when the extension worker returned to the
administrative center. There he would be met with reprimands about
encroaching on administrative prerogatives by independently touring
the locations and with complaints about disregarding schedules and
with wasting valuable government time.

Nor was the problem of lack of manpower resolved even with the
permanent assignment to Kibos, in 1904, of Mr. H.B. Holder, to work

as an agricultural inspector and teacher among the Nyanza farmers.

29

Although delighted by Holder's appointment, the district commissioner
stressed that "the country is, however, large enough for the employ-
ment of half a dozen such men, . . . one man's progress is very slow."13
As a Trinidadian, Holder had been chosen not only because he had been
trained in tropical agriculture but also because he was black. It

was felt that the African farmer would respond more readily to a

black man and because "climatic conditions were such [in Kibos] that

14 Although Holder's

Europeans cannot be employed all the year round."
assignment at Kibos can be seen as part of a positive effort to
implement economic proposals, it brought into sharper focus the
problems of the manpower shortage. From the beginning it was Obvious
in some quarters that successful economic development would depend
largely on African participation. However, trained African personnel
was not available to serve as local level administrators. The
provincial staff,therefore, welcomed the opening of missionary

schools in Nyanza, in anticipation of having a trained group Of
indigenous people to relieve the strain of administration.

In 1902, the American Friends located their mission at Kaimosi,
slightly to the northwest of Kisumu, in Abaluyia country. Although
located outside of Luo, its successful establishment set the precedent
for missions in Central Nyanza prOper. With the attendent favorable
publicity about Kaimosi, in 1904, the Mill Hill Fathers found ready

acceptance when they Opened their mission and schbol at Kisumu. Probably

the most successful of the mission enterprises was the Church Missionary

g

13K.N.A., Nyanza Province Annual Report 1909, p. 14.

140.0. 544, E.A.P., Dept. Agriculture B.E.A., Annual Administration

Reports 1907-1908, p. 2.

 

 

 

30

Society School at Maseno. Opened in 1906 under the directorship of
Bishop J.J. Willis, Maseno immediately attracted a fair-sized student
body composed of the sons of chiefs and other prominent men from
neighboring communities.

In addition to preparing Africans for the civil service, the
Mission schools also sought to develop a EurOpean work ethic among
their pupils. Along with reading, writing, and numbers, punctuality,
accurateness and cleanliness were taught. Protectorate authorities
viewed this training as conditioning the Luo to accept the European~
presence and fostering their active participation in the process.
Moreover, entry level clerks were seen as invaluable adjuncts to the
local indigenous authorities. Through these clerks it would be
possible to institute record keeping procedures and to have close at
hand, in local affairs, an African owing loyalties not to the area
chief but to the colonial government. The benefits of a trained
African staff is readily apparent in the following assessment of the
ability of traditional rulers to meet the needs of modern administration.

In a very few instances it is found possible to make use

of the more intelligent chiefs and headmen in the admin-

istration of the country. Unfortunately, however, such

chiefs are extremely few in number. We have in actuality

no reliable native administration to assist us in this

Province, the consequence being that nearly every matter

of importance and indeed many matters of very small

importance, required to be enquired into by an officer

of the administration. 15

The importance of mission education was underlined by the 1912

promulgation of the Native Authority Ordinance, which outlined working

—~

15K.N.A., "Report on the Progress and Condition of the Kisumu
Province for 1907—08 (ending 31 March 1908)," Nyanza Province Annual
Report 1907—1908, p. iv.

31

orders for chiefs, with direct supervision by the district commissioner.
Not only was the chief's responsibility made clear, but his power was
also institutionalized and thereby enhanced. As he was allowed to
create his own local administrative hierarchy and have it recognized,

if not totally accepted by government, the chief was able to consoli—
date his leadership to a degree that was unattainable in precolonial
Luo society. As he could now only be removed by Naitobi, the democratic
participation of the community was eliminated more through colonial
administrative needs than through the desires of the people.

The ordinance did not create new areas Of responsibility for
chiefs, it simply codified already established practices. Five areas
of primary responsibility were contained in the statute. First,
and probably among the most important, was the task of tax collection.
Chiefs had been given this responsibility early on, and in 1908, they
had been instructed by Ainsworth to use a portion of the hut tax
collection to purchase seeds to grow export commodities.

Second, the construction and maintenance of roads in the reserve
was a major responsibility which entailed the organization and super-
vision of working parties composed Of all available able-bodied adults.
The third requirement was directly tied to number two, since chiefs
were expected to encourage men in the reserve and, to a lesser extent,
outside the reserve, to undertake wage labor, particularly on govern-
ment work projects such as railroad maintenance and civil and municipal
construction.

In the long run the fourth responsibility, the supervision of

the planting of cash crOps, was probably the most important. As the

32

reluctance to pursue cotton growing manifested itself, supervision
eventually occupied a major portion of the chief's energy and time.
Most chiefs continued their own demonstration plots, sometimes of
considerable acreage, on which they utilized unpaid community labor.
It appears that the British administrative staff was not aware of
this mechanism, but it seems doubtful that they would have rushed to
eliminate the practice. Nothing in the ordinance forbade chiefs to
use communal working parties or to have their own cash cropping plots.
Furthermore, demonstration plots were welcomed for teaching purposes,
and no doubt were encouraged by government as long as complaints and
malpractices did not manifest themselves.

Finally, chiefs conducted arrests and trials for misdemeanors,
and even this legal chore directly contributed to the economic
development of Central Nyanza. It was possible to discipline
malingerers and others who objected too strenously to the introduc-
tion of cotton and other cash crops. Acting with swiftness and using
public corporal punishment, a chief could minimize objections while
demonstrating to his constituents that he had the authority to enforce
his pronouncements.

In order to administer more efficiently, chiefs found it necessary
to recruit local level administrators. Among these functionaries were
the chief's clerk and the headmen Of location subdivisions. Every
headman in turn had his own helpers which made for a simple, but
widespread network of control. The clerk's position was more cere-
monial than powerful. However, because the clerk was present at all
functions and operated at the seat Of power he enjoyed much prestige

and influence.

33

The system did not, however, fully meet the requirements of the
British Government. Theoretically local government should have eased
the burdens Of the short-handed provincial staff. Instead the bur-
geoning local structure created new problems because a significant
number of local administrators had priorities that conflicted with
protectorate aims.16 The problem of supervision was more acute than
it had been before the ordinance. One compensating factor for the
colonial authorities was the fact that some chiefs ambitiously
pursued their responsibilities, and in the case of Owiti in Kano his
diligence was producing cotton and creating an atmosphere for the
introduction of other cash crops.

Thus, during the years 1901-1912, a piecemeal approach to the
introduction of cotton was utilized by all the principals involved,
the Protectorate Government, the African peasant farmer and the
European business community. Because of various contradictions, each
group hesitated fully to promote or accept the crop. Although the
primary direction of economic development was government's responsi-
bility it was forced into facillating, nonproductive action. Nairobi
lacked a rational development plan and did not have the requisite
finances nor manpower for economic development. During this period
the most positive economic inputs came from John Ainsworth, who,
beginning in 1908, saw the necessity of protecting Nyanza's labor force
from European encroachments. In order to protect the province's

population, Ainsworth introduced export crops, including cotton. He

 

16Allois Laja, personal interview, Nyakach, 18 September 1973.

Mr. Laja, a respected elder in his locatidn reported that chiefs were
diligent in the collection of taxes but generally ignored other duties
that required time—consuming work: cash cropping policy was only
adhered to when authorities had easy access to an area.

 

34

must be given full credit for conceptualizing a program that might
have stimulated economic growth in the province, and his failure to
achieve his aims cannot detract from his extraordinary vision.

From the perspective of the EurOpean business community, Nyanza
offered great but untested potential. Rather than plunge ahead,
British entrepreneurs lobbied successfully for partial government
financial support. However, government grants were no guarantee of
establishing a cotton industry. As it developed, the British Cotton
Growing Association had little more than a desire to contribute to
the territory's financial develOpment. Initially requesting an
enormous land grant, a yearly operations grant, and the use of the
government facility at Mazeras Experimental Farm, the corporation
ended by accepting a lower yearly grant and a working arrangement with
the recently established Kibos experimental farm. Since they did not
have the expertise available for developing the industry, much of
their activity was given over to publicizing the social welfare aspects
of their program. A more business-like approach would have focused on
potential yields, the increase in foreign exchange, and the future
successful economic develOpment of the country.

With the other principals displaying varying degrees of reluctance
about the establishment of a cotton industry, the African farmers'
unwillingness to adopt cotton growing is put in context. In terms Of
their subsistence economy, many farmers seemed to be arguing that they
were wealthy enough, and that physical exertion in pursuit of an
exotic crop within an unknown structure, the money economy, seemed
unnecessary, if not foolish. None of the African arguments, however,

was to prevail. Essential to the continued pursuit of establishing

35

the Kenyan cotton industry was the fact that by 1912 the outlines of
the potential success of Uganda's cotton experiment were being
discerned. Not only did this stimulate the efforts in Kenya, but

it also affected, years later, the interpretation and comparisons of

the Kenya and Uganda industries.

CHAPTER III

THE UGANDA CASE

As stated previously, current comparisons of the Uganda and Kenya
cotton industries are misleading because they uncritically designate
the Uganda case as the more successful experiment. While valid, this
conclusion has been determined without considering the socio-
political perceptions of the participating peasants.1

The economic indices, yield per acre, total acreage, the suppor-
tive infrastructure, acquisition of capital and consumer goods,
increased government revenues and the growth of foreign earnings are
important. They do not, however, explain differential responses to
basically the same stimulus. When assessing peasant reaction to
imposed government policy, it is important to understand how the new
Iideas were perceived, how the cultivators intended to use the produce,
and how they fitted into a transitional society.

There were a number Of preconditions in Buganda which allowed for

greater acceptance of cotton. There was a centralized state with a

 

1C.C. Wtigley's outstanding work on the precOlonial Buganda
economy does not include an appraisal of the Baganda personality.
For a discussion of the Baganda character see John Allen Rowe, Revolu—
tion in Buganda 1856-1890 Part One: The Reign of Kabaka Mukabya Mutesa
1856-1884, unpubl. Ph.D. diss. (University of Wisconsin, 1966), ppt-26-
32; John Roscoe, "Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the
Baganda," Journal of the Anthropological Institute, xxxii (1902),
pp. 46-48; and Martin Southwold, "Ganda," in James L. Gibbs, ed.,
Peoples of Africa (New York, 1965).

 

 

 

36

37

responsive civil service that quickly and efficiently could be
mobilized; and there existed a desire and an aptitude for moderni-
zation and a rudimentary money economy. Another factor was the
intense Baganda political and social consciousness operating within
an acquisitive and highly material society. Since all of these
conditions were absent in Nyanza, the Luo responded more slowly to
cotton cash cropping. Hopefully this comparative analysis will
clarify the Kenya situation for future researchers.

In the early fifteenth century a governing structure began
evolving in the area that later became Buganda.2 At that time, Kintu,
legendary founder and first kabaka, attempted to exert hegemony over
the dispersed Bantu-speaking agriculturalists. Although unsuccessful,
he began the process whereby the monarchy and centralization became
the most important features of the Baganda state.

Governmental activities were organized through a hierarchy of
appointive territorial officials. Three basic units comprised the
civil service, the bakunga (saza or county chiefs), the batongole
(the king's personal liason to the bakunga) and the bataka (clan heads).
The bakunga, ten in all, one for each county, remained in residence
in the capital.3 It was, therefore, possible to issue clear and
concise orders to functionaries at the same time, thus minimizing, if

not eliminating, different and conflicting interpretations. The

 

2Sir Apolo Kagwa, The Customs of the Baganda, translated by
Ernest B. Kalibala and edited by May Mandelbaum Edel. (New York, 1934),
p. 18.

3P.C.W. Gutkind, "Notes on the Kibuga of Buganda," The Uganda
Journal, 24 (1960), p. 30.

 

38

structure provided easy access to leaders, dissemination of informa-
tion and a system of checks and balances.4

The centralization of Buganda significantly aided the acceptance
of cash crOpping. From 1901 to 1903 European commercial interests
benefitted from using this structure. Mr. Kenneth Borup, an industrial
missionary of the Church Missionary Society, held extensive discussions
with the chief ministers Of Buganda about the possibility of intro-
ducing commercial cotton-growing. Because of these discussions, it
appeared to peasant farmers that the power constellations - the kabaka,
the lukiiko (Buganda's parliament), the British Government and the
missionaries - had all approved of cotton cultivation.

.Unlike the trial and error process in Kenya, cotton's introduction
in Uganda proceeded in a rational, businesslike manner. In 1903
Borup imported sixty-two bags of cotton seed donated by British
businessmen.5 Seed was distributed to selected farmers for planting,
and the trials proved so successful that government in 1905 issued a
ton of Black Rattler seed in Buganda, Busoga, Bunyord and Ankole.

Borup's judicious planning lessened the idea that the Baganda
were faced with a fait accompli. Moreover, the lukiiko's cooperation
was assured. Not only were the parliament's ideas accepted but it also
was allowed to disseminate the completed plans to the selected areas.

This created the impression favored and fostered by the Baganda that

 

4Elizabeth Colson, "The Role of Bureaucratic Norms in African
Political Structures," Systems of Political Control and Bureaucraoy in
Human Societies, Verne F. Ray, ed. (Seattle, 1958), p. 47.

5H.B. Thomas and R. Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University
Press, 1935), p. 127.

 

39

they were the leading force in the campaign to establish cotton as a
cash crOp. In turn this prOpaganda worked to assure the fullest
compliance at the local level and to deter negative responses because
proclamations emanating from Kampala were difficult to ignore. Since
traditional civil servants could be removed at the pleasure of the
king, it behooved them to respond positively to his suggestions.6
Thus Borup's decision to distribute suggestions via the indigenous
government's communication system was inspired.

Utilization of the Baganda communications network meant that
only a small number of European civil servants were required. On the
other hand, the decentralized nature of Luo polities in Kenya neces-
sitated not only large numbers of colonial supervisors, but also a
variety of approaches to meet local, particular needs. The multiplicity
of plans resulted in a correspondingly higher level of resistance and
failure than was encountered in Uganda. Not only was there an absence
of an overall responsible political structure, but also local political
rivalries were more significant than compliance with colonial govern-
ment directives.

Unlike the Buganda case, where colonials took on a semi-Official
status7, Europeans entering Luo society were regarded as foreigners,
and they remained outsiders. Far from absorbing colonials into their

political structure, the Luo mostly tried to ignore the newcomers'

 

6J.H..M. Beattie, "Checks on the Abuse of Political Power in Some
African States: A Preliminary Framework for Analysis," Sociologus 9
(1959), p. 101.

7Alexina Harrison, editor, A.M. MacKay, Pioneer Missionary of the
Church Missionary Society to Uganda (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1892), p. 80.

 

 

40

presence. For example, even though C.W. Hobley was the personal
friend of several important local leaders around the Kano Plain,8
this relationship did not give him status with chiefs around the Seme
area. Hobley was faced with the necessity of cultivating each local
administrator whose territory he reached. This task was made more
complex by the ad hoc nature of Luo community leadership. The exis-
ting Luo political structure did not provide immediately easy entry
for EurOpeans nor did it appear on its own to be readily adaptable
to colonial administrative manipulation.9 To be effective, most
colonial policy required the presence of European supervisory staff.
Some Luo areas around the lake engaged in active military confron-
tation with the British. Typical of these brief but sharp and decisive
skirmishes was the fight at Southeast Kano around 1889. The British
advance party led by Hobley was accompanied by Swahili Askaris acting
as interpreters and guides. In December 1889 several askari entered
one of the villages on the southeast border of Chief Kitoto's territory.
The facts are sufficiently confused to make it impossible to determine
if these men were acting under orders or simply under their own
authority. They began rounding up fowl, eggs, goats and other consum-
able items. There was, Of course, some hostility but nothing serious,
until one askari attempted to appropriate a cow belonging to Abougi,

a community war leader who had a reputation as an able fighter.10 An

 

8C.W. Hobley Kenya: From Charted Company to Crown Colony, 2nd
edition, (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1970), p. 127.

9Ibid., p. 129.

10Hezron Onganjo, personal interview, West Kano, 10 September 1973.
Mr. Onganjo's grandfather, Chore, took part in this fight.

41

argument developed over the askari's right to the cow, which quickly
accelerated into a general confrontation over the soldier's right of
appropriation. A pushing match started, a shot was fired, and in the
ensuing melee one askari was speared to death and another seriously
wounded. His companions beat a hasty retreat.

Quickly realizing the magnitude of the event, the community
mobilized for war. Women, children and cows were packed off to the
swamps, and the men awaited the return of the soldiers. Meanwhile,
the deafeated troops had returned to Kisumu and reported the incident.
C.W. Hobley organized a small expedition which contained fewer than
twenty-five men, only three Of whom were Europeans. Their movements
were observed, and upon reaching the village, they sighted Luo warriors
drawn up and seemingly ready for battle. Since both sides appeared
reluctant to initiate hostilities, Hobley decided that the guilty party,
and this was believed to be Abougi, should be turned over to him.

From this point on the sequence of events is unclear. It seems,
however, that the villagers continued to press their idea of the
illegality of the askari's search and seizure tactics. Also as a
warrior, Abougi was interested in matching his skills against new-
comers. Tempers grew heated, and the two groups separated. Finally
the Luo rushed forward to launch spears, only to be met by rifle fire.
Never before had the villagers faced gunfire, and its effect was
devastating, not only physically, but also psychologically. Over-

whelmed by the noise and the ease with which the soldiers could administer

pain and death the Luo broke and chaotically retreated towards the
swamps. The deadly accuracy of gunfire is still a vivid memory to

surviving eyewitnesses: "They were far away and yet the noise killed

42
Abougi and my grandfather. The noise made everybody run."ll

Several months later in February 1890, a second sharp encounter
took place at another village northwest of Kano. In this clash, the
circumstances leading to hostilities differed but the conclusions
were the same. A messenger from South East Kano has been selected by
Hobley to act as his guide in exploring the remainder of Luo country
up to the Tanganyika border. Upon reaching Seme the guide refused to
accompany the British any farther, and he was aided in this insubordina-
tion by warriors from a village in West Seme.12 Once the opposing
sides had arranged themselves and negotiations seemed at an impasse the
Luo launched their spears. The sharp retort resulted in two deaths,
the wounding of several others and the scattering of LuO forces.

For all practical purposes these two conflicts represented the
pacification of Luo land. The defeats signaled to both the Luo and
the British that major adjustments would have to be accomplished on
both sides in order to affect an orderly transition to colonial
government. Moreover, the defeats pointed up the segmented nature Of
Luo society and its inability to mobilize in an integrated fashion to
repell the British. Finally these two encounters demonstrated the
inability of the Luo political system, unlike that of Buganda, to
adapt to new conditions.

Closely associated with the centralized political structure and

increasingly important to the positive response to cotton cultivation

 

11Andrew Awuor Ngoya, personal interview, West Kano, 7 August 1973.

12Josha Anya, personal interview, West Seme, 14 August 1973.

 

OJ

 

a“
v.

43

is what David Apter described as the Bagandas' aptitude for moderniza-
tion.13 Nowhere is the trait more clearly demonstrated than in the
Baganda response to a money economy. They not only accepted the idea

of purchasing goods with money, but also began quickly to extend

beyond mere exchange into other economic exercises. Most notably the
Baganda began to hire labor and pay money wages. In fact the wages they
paid compared favorably with settler wages in Kenya. Other economic
pursuits rapidly followed, and the sale of land was accelerated.

Although real estate had not previously been an economic entity
in Buganda, land speculation grew enormously between 1908 and 1923.
Proceeds from land sales extended the economic Opportunities of
Baganda individuals. For example, monies gained from land contracts
were used to extend acreage under cultivation, to increase the size
of the work force, to buy capital equipment, and to make investments.14
Eventually the money initially gained in land speculation provided the
economic basis for some Baganda to agitate against their exclusion
from the processing and marketing of cotton.

In 1929, Yusufu Bamuta, a former clerk in the colonial service,
attempted unsuccessfully to buy a cotton gin. Representing a group of
Africans that had acquired enough investment money to buy a gin, Bamuta
applied to the colonial government for a license. To say that the
colonial business establishment was stunned is an understatement.

Through their influence, the question of Bamuta's application reached

 

13David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in

Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961),
p. 8.

14O.K. Okereke, "Co-operative Development in Uganda 1900—1939,"
East African Journal of Rural Development, 1 (1968), p. 65.

 

44

the legislative council (legco), and feelings ran high against
granting a license to an African group.

It was not the first time that Bamuta had occupied the attention
of legco. As early as 1922 he had submitted a petition asking for
equality of housing grants for African staff.15 Initially government
responded favorably, but several members of legco took the Opportunity
to criticize Africans, in general, and African civil service personnel,
in particular, for their pretensions to equal status. The governor
then stipulated that the law should be modified so that the dual
benefits scale be retained and that its duality be more clearly
stated. Before Bamuta's request could be granted, legco met again,
and decided to rescind the earlier approval because there were rumors
that other African civil servants were going to follow Bamuta's
example.16 His earlier brush with the settlers and the colonial
administrative staff may have prejudiced his chances in 1929.

Eventually Bamuta was forced to go to London, where for several
months he lobbied with members of parliament to bring pressure on the
protectorate government. The parliamentarians, however, were unable
to force the colonial government to reopen the issue. Apparently
London was satisfied with Entebbe's assertion that the country had
reached its ginning capacity and let the matter drop.

The racist attitudes that were partly responsible for the denial

of Bamuta's application are beyond the scope of this work. Only two

 

15Colonial Office 429 Uganda Reports, Minutes of Legislative

Council 1922, p. 157.

16Ibid., p. 217.

 

45

arguments are made here: one, that Bagandan's adapted positively to
the newly—imposed economic system. Indeed they exhibited a remarkable
talent for manipulating the new money economy far beyond the desires
or expectations of the colonial business community. Two, the charge
that Africans possessed neither the entrepreneural skills nor the
resources17 to enter the financial side of the industry is not
sustained by an examination of the Yusufu Bamuta case. Another and
final indication of African response to the European economic system
is that Bamuta had the capital and the desire to invest in a business
venture just when the depression began manifesting itself to the
international business community.

Clearly Luo society did not respond so rapidly nor so positively
to the imposed economic structure as did the Baganda. During the
colonial period no Luo individual or organization came forward to
challenge the economic position of the settler business community.
Indeed in the mid-1920's, when problems of a business nature did
arise, the Luo community in Central Nyanza organized itself along lines
similar to the European business community's institutions.

Organized in 1925 by John Paul Olola, the Native Chamber of
Commerce18 not only channeled Luo business aspirations away from a

confrontation with European interests, but also weakened the thrust

 

l7Cyril Ehrlich, The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda, 1900—1950:
A Study of Colonial Government Economic Policy, unpubl. Ph.D. diss.
(University of London, 1958), p. 181. And Walter Elkan, "A Half
Century of Cotton Marketing in Uganda," Indian Journal of Economics,
XXXVIII (1958), p. 227.

18

 

Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, (London: Heinemann, 1968), p. 67.

 

46

of the growing political movement.19 Although Olola was intimate
with the details and the leaders of early Luo opposition he chose to
establish his own organization. The new group siphoned off potential
members from the early political activists, and also facilitated
Nairobi's schemes to undercut political agitation. Government let it
be known that questions of concern to the community, so long as they
were not of a political nature, should be debated within Local Native
Councils, and that questions pertaining to business should properly be
dealt with through N.C.C.20 Moreover, the Native Chamber Of Commerce
did not agitate for substantive changes in the settler economic thinking
and advocated channeling African business aspirations only within the
confines of the African community.

As late as 1931, even though some Africans became paid agents
Of the Kenya Farmers Association (K.F.A.) and bought cotton from the
growers without exploitation, this shift was a settler concession,
not a fundamental economic change. The agents were given only the
responsibility of buying and were never hired as permanent K.F.A. staff.21

Compared to Bamuta, the Luo challenge to European economic dominance

was limited and conservative.

 

19My informants displayed a grudging admiration for Olola because

of his personal bravery in confronting government staff. Olola appears
to have been motivated by self-interest and never fully supported the
Young Kavirondo Association or the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Associa-
tion (see chapter 6), but he was not adverse to being identified as a
member of those groups. For example, many farmers thought Olola was

a founder of YKA, but all the officers of the association denied he
even had membership until 1935.

200.0. 544, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Native Affairs
Department Annual Raport l924-2§,p. 34.

21

 

Zablon Aduo, personal interview, Kisumu, 15 October 1973.

47

Unlike the Luo, the Baganda enjoyed a natural political conscious-
ness. While the Luo found it difficult to accept cash cropping, the
Baganda accepted cotton growing as much for political motives as
for economic gain.22 Some Buganda minor civil servants donated their
farm as demonstration plots. From this action they gained not only
agricultural experience, but also influence within their particular
locales. They were perceived as interpretors of government policy as
well as individuals with power, influence and knowledge of how to
manipulate the system.23 Simultaneously government was using the more
ambitious civil servants to staff positions that were nominally the
posts of Europeans. Unlike the Central Nyanza case where a non—
indigenous black man had to be assigned the task of agricultural
extension worker, more than enough Baganda were available and willing
to accept such a job.

In early twentieth century Buganda, any western accoutrement
could be used for political advantage. Among the benefits accuring
to politically-conscious and innovative chiefs were freehold titles
to all land brought under cultivation and political dominion over those
who worked the land. Moreover, the Uganda Company assisted this
process by granting written contracts to certain leading chiefs.24

Among the first of these was Chief Samuel Makasa of Bulemezi.

 

22Lucy P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London:
Routledge, 1934), p. 96.

23Kenneth J. King "The Young Baganda Association: Some Notes on
the Internationalism of Early African Politics in Buganda," Journal
of African and Asian Studies (Autumn 1969), p. 2.

24C.C. Wrigley, "Buganda: An Outline Economic History," Economic
History Review, 4 (1956), p. 75.

 

 

48

In 1904 he was given a contract to plant and deliver cotton to the
company for processing and export. Even as late as the middle 1920's
the reforms brought about by the Bataka Movement25 did not significantly
diminish the chief's ability to manipulate the government emphasis on
cotton for his own political ends. Even though land was being redis-
tributed, the chiefs maintained control over uncultivated/unallocated
land and could utilize this acreage to extend political power bases.
In short, in the 1920's the highly charged atmosphere made the
political position Of cotton crystal clear. The importance was demon-
strated not only in the Bataka movement and the manipulation of the
chiefs, but also in Yusufu Bamuta's reaction to government's denial
of his request to purchase a ginnery. Bamuta traveled to England and
attempted to use parliament as leverage against the colonial govern-
ment. After failing in London, Bamuta returned to Buganda and became
an active member of the Young Baganda Association. Among several
nationalist groups that grew up in the wake of World War I, the Y.B.A.
advocated not only economic, but also political independence.26
Unlike the Baganda case, in Kenya, even during a period of
intense nationalism, cotton remained an irritating but minor political/
economic problem. In the early 1920's, Luo nationalists concentrated
on constitutional issues, even demanding a separate Luo legislature

and a paramount chief. Another resolution requested that Kenya retain

 

25C.C. wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Buganda (Kampala: East
African Institute Social Research, 1959), P. 18.

26

 

King, "The Young Baganda Association," p. 4.

49

its protectorate status rather than become a colony. At the time
economic issues could be listed under the rubric of wages because
European employers had successfully reduced African pay.27 Two
demands were made for better salaries; one sought increased wages for
chiefs and another for workers. Unfortunately, Luo political aware-
ness, unlike the Baganda, was not combined with economic ambition.

Even the question of land did not assume significant economic
interest in Western Kenya because it was seen in political and not
economic terms. The overriding concern of most Of the Luo leaders
was to protect the land from European encroachement. Nevertheless,
there was considerable Opposition among the activists themselves how
this best could be done. An overwhelming number felt that individual
titles to land would be the most secure method of retaining the land.

Other influential Luo, like Jairo Owino, however, agitated
against individual land titles. In 1923, Owino was the senior African
Civil Servant in Nyanza Province. He had been employed in 1902 as
clerk and interpretor by the provincial commissioner's Office. Owino
took the tack of appealing to the elderly and suggested that title
deeds were contrary to Luo custom and would severely limit a farmer's
control over his own land. Since the nationalists were uncertain
of the level of support coming from the elderly Luo community, the
issue over land titles never was intensively exploited.

Perhaps a clear indication of the reasons for the differential

responses to cotton cash crOpping can be discerned by contrasting

 

27George Bennett, "The Development of Political Organizations in
Kenya," Political Studies, v. 20, (June 1957) p. 27.

 

50

the material level of the precolonial societies. In Buganda, there
existed an acquisitive, highly material culture prior to the coming

of the European. Within Buganda a large range of consumer items were
in existence, among them household utensils, ceramic containers, a
variety of sizes and shaped mallets for working barkcloth, wooden
chests, bracelets and other items of jewelry.28 During the precolonial
period many craftsmen traditionally were non-Baganda, with the Banyoro
being especially appreciated as iron workers and smiths.

The material level of pre-colonial Luo society was not so
impressive as that of Baganda society. Prior to the European presence,
luxury items, with the single exception of animal skin robes for
certain classes of community leaders, were not in evidence, nor were
iron utensils available except in the form of spears. Soon after the
coming of the European, the 12222, a short-handled iron hoe was
introduced. Before then, the Luo carried out farming operations with
a wooden digging stick. An explanation for the lack of material
wealth in Luo society derives from the desire to maintain all at a
common level.3o Items of conspicuous consumption, with the exception
of cattle, whose consumption was rigorously controlled, were simply

not present in precolonial Luo society.

 

28Margaret Trowell, "Some Royal Craftsmen of Buganda," The Uganda
Journal, VIII (January, 1941) p. 47.

29C.C. Wrigley, "The Changing Economic Structure Of Buganda,"
The Kingfs Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of
Independence, edited by L.A. Fallers (London: Oxford University Press,
1964), p. 25.

30Michael G. Whisson, Change and Challenge, p. 45.

 

 

51

Whether the Luo were as ambitious, as modern, as acquisitive,
as politically conscious as the Baganda are not important factors.
What has been demonstrated here is that the two groups were motivated
by different cultural constructs that significantly determined the
way in which they responded to the EurOpean economic system. In the
Luo case, these included an adherence to local, politically autonomous
units, a low level of material acquisitions, an economic system
based on barter and exchange which was slow to change, a preference
for cattle keeping over agriculture, a reluctance to take on foreign
accoutrements, and a sense that Luo society was wealthy and complete
without imposed European standards. Within this conclusion, the
Luo achievement, modest though it was in comparative terms, was
remarkable. The Luo, it seemed, more than the Baganda, appreciated
their traditional society and resisted changing it to conform to
European ideas. Many Luo farmers spoke of feeling themselves wealthy
enough in traditional terms. They needed a European system of exchange
only to pay taxes and to purchase manufactured goods. The prevailing
attitude among the Luo seemed to be that some ways of changing society
were going to be destructive rather than progressive. Further, the
Luo farmer seemed content to examine the ideas introduced by the
colonials before supporting any particular program. Contrary to
existing scholarship, which weighs only economic indicators, the
modest achievements of the Kenya cotton industry can be attributed to
socio—political factors, not lack of eocnomic sense.

In short, the Baganda cultural constellations, its centralized

government, the high level of precolonial material possessions, the

 

31Lucy Mair An African People, p. 23.

52

aptitude for modernization and their extreme political consciousness
provided a more flexible situation than did Kenya for the introduction
of cotton cash cropping. Although these same characteristics were
absent in Kenya, the Luo did adapt to cotton cash cropping. Certainly
the process was slower and more difficult than in Uganda, but the
differences can be attributed to the Luo desire to maintain as much

of the integrity of his own society than to his lack of economic
sense. Buganda was a special case, for the reasons suggested above,
and future comparisons of the Kenya achievement should be seen in

this light. Bearing in mind the sophisticated and lengthy intro-
duction procedures of Mr. Borup in Buganda, it should be profitable

to examine in detail the process of introducing cotton in Kenya to

see how both the government and the peasant farmer contributed to the

difficulty of establishing the crop in Kenya.

CHAPTER IV

THE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
LIMITED SUCCESS OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY IN

CENTRAL NYANZA, 1901-1923

During the years 1901-1908, the British Government attempted
in a variety of ways to introduce cotton cash cropping. Most of
these attempts had limited success, and the African farmer generally
received most of the blame. Indigenous peOples, it was argued,
placed a high value on leisure time, and their tastes were confined
by tradition or ignorance largely to the goods they could provide
for themselves.1 While some of this assessment is apparently true,
it presents an incomplete picture. A fuller explanation should in-
clude the ways in which lack of government insight and planning were
also to blame. An attempt to delineate the shared responsibility of
the government and the farmer will be made here.

In 1901 the Partington Plan (See above Chapter 11) failed
miserably to stimulate African interest in growing cotton. Instead
of meeting directly with representatives of the various African

communities, Partington decided to utilize the small Asian enclaves

 

1Hugh Fearn, "Cotton Production in the Nyanza Province of Kenya
Colony, 1908-1954," The Empire Cotton Growing Review, 33 (1956),
pp. 126-127. See also K.D. Frederick, "The Role of Market Forces and
Planning in Uganda's Economic Development, 1900-1938," Eastern Africa
Economic Review, 1 (June, 1956), p. 47.

 

53

54

as agricultural innovators. His reasoning, while sound at one level,
that Asians were more western in both their economic and agricultural
orientations, displays a distinct lack of confidence in the ability of
the African to adapt to cash cropping. Six years later, in 1907, the
Partington Plan became official, though shortlived, policy.

We are locating small colonies of agricultural Swahilis

and Indians at different points where small areas of land

area available. These people agree to plant economic

products. As they do so they will be an object lesson

for the different natives near them, and the influence

will spread. 2

Since African farmers around Kibos had not been approached
directly they felt under no real Obligation to follow the new practices
of the Asian community. Seldom did Africans even inquire about or

' stated one

go to observe the new techniques or crops. "We were,’
African informant, "too busy trying to reestablish our own community
to pay attention to what the Indians or British were doing. Besides,
they were both intruders."3 Moreover, the government failed to meet
individually with the two communities and take them into its confidence.
Such a plan might have interested the farmers and thereby provided a
network for exchanging ideas.

Actually the Luo and Asian communities did meet over an issue
introduced by the British Government, but it had little to do with the
exchange of agricultural information. Some Luo were forced to seek
employment with Asians to acquire hut tax money. Such contact was

neither intimate nor long enough to establish ties and create a basis

for stimulating the African farmer.

 

ZNyanza Province Annual Report 1907-1908, p. xxxii.

 

3Daniel Omer, personal interview, Kadero, Kajulu, 30 July 1973.

55

While Partington's insight and initiative are commendable, the
plan lacked any rational methodology to insure its success. Even
though he was correct in his determination about the entrepreneurial
ability of the Asian community, he miscalculated in thinking the
settlements would take total direction from the government. Instead
the Asian enclaves began to act on their own. They grew not only for
their own needs but also in terms of the large Kisumu market.

Originally the Asians had been settled along the Kibos as a
peace-keeping force.4 The circumstances surrounding this need will
demonstrate the fragmented nature of African polities in Western Kenya
and give further clues to problems underlying the establishment of
the cotton industry. In 1885, while on a hunting expedition, C.W.
Hobley discovered abandoned farms and homesteads encompassing an area
from the Kibos River to the Nandi foothills. When he asked about the
deserted villages and their vanished inhabitants the following story
emerged.

As early as the 1850's, Kajulu covered all of the present expanse
of Kisumu east of Kisian Market,5 and western boundary with the Kano
Plain followed the present Nairobi Road. Peoples from other parts of
Kenya intruded, absorbed the Kajulians and incorporated large portions
of Kajulu territory. Eventually in the early 1870's a serious quarrel
developed between the Kajulians and the neighboring Luo on the Kano
Plain. While the causes of the war are not very clear, the Kajulians

lost. Not only was their leading fighter, Omer, killed, but the

4See below section on Kano—Kajulu and Kajulu-Nandi Wars.

5Gideon Siru, personal interview, Kamsunga, Kajulu, 3 August 1973.

56

Kajulians were also scattered. Many sought refuge in other parts of
the widespread territory under Kajulian control. They, however, were
subjected to ridicule because of their defeat.

One enterprising group of refugees sought sanctuary with the
Nandi, who occupied what is now the present site of Kajulu location.6
Smarting from their defeat and Nandi discrimination the Luo soon
began to agitate. The particular issue which led to war was a theft
of cattle from one of the Luo leaders. Such acts had happened before,
but they had never reached serious proportions. An important factor
escalating this incident into war may have been the desire to avenge
the death of Omer. His son, Okal, was the victim of the cattle theft,
and he seems to have acted precipitOusly in inciting others to attack
the Nandi.

Apparently the Nandi were not without some feelings of Kajulu
duplicity and had established relations with other Luo communities
with an eye toward possibly having to fight the Kajulians. Unknown to
Okal, several communities awaited the Nandi call for assistance. In
the first engagement Okal was killed, whereupon most of the remaining
Kajulians tried to sue for peace. But the Nandi allies, having been
activated, wanted to fight, and the Kajulians were forced to flee.7
On this occasion, in late 1884, the Kajulians returned to live in
their former homes in the Kano Plain.

In 1885, the Kajulians were still living there when Hobley

 

6Musa Midigo, personal interview, Kadero, Kajulu, 12 July 1973.

7Samwel Ada, personal interview, Nyabongo, Kajula, 10 July 1973.
Although Okal was killed in the first encounter, the Kajulians
apparently fought well enough to drive the Nandi to the Hills behind
the location.

57

discovered their Old, deserted homesteads. The Nandi had not
returned since the war, but continued to occupy the hills. Chief
Kitoto of Kano, with whom Hobley had established good relations,
took the responsibility of rounding up the Kajulians to hear Hobley's
proposals for their return home. Not everyone shared Kitoto's
enlightened view. Only the stature of Kitoto and Hobley made it
possible for the Kajulians to begin to return. Even so it took
almost three months of rounding up Kajulians and convincing them that
it was safe to return to their community in the Nandi foothills.
Among the Kano hierarchy, however, were individuals such as Okwach,
who hoped to keep the Kajulians captive on the Kano Plain.

Even after the Kajulians received a safe conduct from Kitoto
they were trailed by Okwach's armed band. Hurling insults and occas—
ionally beating up stragglers, they followed the group until it reached
Wathorego, site of the present market. While the Kajulian leader,
Wayamba, prepared to make the fire celebrating the first night in the
new homestead several fights broke out. The remainder of the night
passed without incident. Unfortunately, the the morning Okwach pushed
his claim that the Kajulians were his slaves. Hostilities flamed
again in which Wayamba was struck on the head. He did not retaliate,
but suggested that Hobley should come to arbitrate the dispute. In
three days Hobley arrived, whereupon the matter was settled and the
Kano people withdrew.

Later in 1911, the antagonisms created by the above events
surfaced again. In that year, the Kajulians seemingly enthusiastically
embraced cotton growing. Clearly part of this new enthusiasm had to

do with developing cotton on unoccupied and uncultivated border areas

58

between Kano and Kajulu. Using the new lands meant that the Kajulu
farmer did not have to disturb his community acreage. It meant in
effect, that his food crop was secure and that he could comply with
government directives with a minimum of problems. Actually the Kano,
particularly Okwach, had no intention of letting Kajulians cultivate
that area. With several hundred followers he confronted the Kajulians
at the present Kibos Road. Chastened by their earlier defeats and
since they were unarmed the Kajulians withdrew. Apparently Okwach
had gained considerable local autonomy since Kitoto had died and
Owiti, his successor, took more and more interest in cotton as a cash
crop.

Clearly the historical animosities between neighboring Luo
communities had prevented an exchange of information about cash-
cropping cotton, just as had the differences between the Luo and Asian
communities. Actually some Luo in close proximity to the Kibos Asian
settlements began to plant cotton, but it took two years before they
voluntarily took up the Asian example. In 1903, however, government
lacked the initiative and the personnel for follow-up. In short, a
series of unfortunate and crippling incidents, among these the govern-
ment's own lack of direction, prevented the smoOth acceptance of the
introduction of cotton.

During 1901 to 1903 another disabling factor in establishing the
cotton industry in Western Kenya was the absence of a non-governmental
agency to promote the enterprise. Unlike Uganda, where the Uganda
Company combined with government and the missionaries to propagandize

the African community, in Kenya British entrepreneurs were conspicuous

59

by their absence. Such activities as did take place between European
businessmen and government could be interpreted more properly as the
machinations of lobbyists rather than the deliberations of serious
businessmen. Since preferential treatment and a paternalistic
government seem to be necessary ingredients in establishing colonial
agriculture the wisdom Of their lobbying cannot be criticized. What
is apparent, however, is that British businessmen such as Joseph
Foulkes only had selfish dimensions to their plan. When the government
failed to give the requested grant-in-aid and the large land grant,
the colonial businessmen played no other role in getting the industry
started.

Eventually two factors introduced by government, the Kibos
experimental farm and Mr. H.H. Holder, did directly benefit the
African farmer. In 1903 the Kibos experimental farm was opened
principally to serve as a series of demonstration plots for farmers to
view. Seldom were large numbers of Africans present, however, to
observe new agricultural procedures, and the value of Kibos was not
fully exploited until the advent of Mr. H.H. Holder.

He arrived at Kibos in 1907. His primary responsibility was to
instruct African farmers in new agricultural practices for the cash
crops, among which cotton was given a very high priority. The first
of Holder's tasks was to meet chiefs and local personalities. His
home, situated on the border between Kano and Kajulu,9 gave Holder

quick access to two of the friendlier chiefs in the area. Chief

 

9Holder's home still exists, although it has been abandoned for
many years. A portion of his former large farm is now the site Of
the Salvation Army School for the Blind.

60

Awuor Otiende of Kajulu was not only amiable toward the British, but
he also worked to persuade his peOple to follow his example. During
the years 1905-1935, Awuor kept good relations with the British. He
provided a positive atmosphere for the introduction of cotton, and
also gave Holder full access to the location.

Holder was also busy getting to know Chiefs Kitoto and Owiti of
Kano. Kitoto, whose reign ended about 1908, already had demonstrated
his openness to the British in his relations with C.W. Hobley. When
Holder arrived, Kitoto was old and not the outstanding figure he had
been. Wisely Holder began cultivating the friendship of Owiti, who
seemed to be Kitoto's logical successor. Even though Owiti served
only briefly from 1908 to 1913, he gave dynamic leadership to Kano.10
Before his death, Owiti, with Holder's assistance, had set the future
pattern for cotton in Kano.

Holder also gained the confidence of the people by soliciting the
sons of chiefs and other prominent community leaders for the purpose
of education. Among those who first reported to Holder for schooling
were Simeon Otiende, the son of Chief Awuor, and Samwel Ada. In 1935,
Simeon Otiende succeeded his father and served as Kajulu's Chief for
twenty-five years. Samwel Ada served for a period of time with the
agricultural department and became a respected elder. Beyond academic
work in writing and arithmetic, Holder also gave his pupils language
training in English and Swahili.11 Moreover, he taught them the

rudiments of western farming. For example, the use of the iron hoe

 

10Kisumu District Annual Report, 1913, p. 3.

 

11Musa Midigo, personal interview, Kadero, Kajulu, 12 July 1973.

61

and a technique for planting in straight and spaced rows was demon-
strated. Such procedures as banking soils, to reduce root soakage
and soil runoff, were also shown, as was the proper husbandry of
cotton. It was hoped that this training would perpetuate itself
when Ada and Otiende returned to the location to teach others. This
recycling did not occur.

Both Ada and Otiende were teenagers who did not feel they could
simply begin teaching or talking about their training to the community-
at—large. They had to await the invitation of the elders to share
their knowledge. Such an invitation was not forthcoming because a
significant number of elders were Opposed to any changes in traditional
farming practices.12 Furthermore, the younger element also resisted
the new learning. In face of such general Opposition, Otiende and
Ada practically ceased using the new techniques. Instead they concen—
trated on learning and using the rudimentary academic training
provided by Holder.

While busy with his teaching and his program of meeting chiefs,
Holder did not neglect the entire community whose fullest energies he
hoped to involve. Soon after arriving in Kibos he began attending
barazas, where, accompanied by an administrative staff member, he
attempted to persuade farmers to pursue cotton cash cropping. Holder
would demonstrate new growing techniques, and he would speak to the
issue of acquiring money to purchase clothes, pay school fees and

meet tax requirements. Usually barazas at which Holder appeared were

 

12T.T. Kennedy, "Study of Economic Motivation Involved in Peasant
Cultivation of Cotton," East African Institute of Social Research
Conference Proceedinga (January, 1964), p. 6.

 

 

62

well attended. This may have been due as much to his personality
which was open and friendly as to the novelty of seeing a black man
not only in a position of authority but also riding a horse and
speaking several foreign languages.13 Seldom, however, did parti-
cipants at the Baraza demonstrate great enthusiasm for pursuing
Holder's suggestions.

Unlike the Uganda case, where great enthusiasm and a fully
staffed agricultural department existed, Holder's problems were
compounded, by the small number of men assigned to African agriculture.
All efforts to get cotton introduced in Central Nyanza rested with
Holder, and though he was energetic and responsible, his effort alone
was not sifficient. In 1913, six years after his arrival, Holder
was still struggling, alone, to make cotton a viable cash crOp for
Central Nyanza.

A certain amount of success has resulted but not what

we wish to see. Our difficulty in this connection

is that we have no staff available to continually keep

the native cultivations interested in the crap. The

Agricultural Department has loaned to the administration

a West Indian instructor. His services, however, are

only available for limited periods. The one man cannot

under any circumstances influence any large areas. 14
There was, however, some progress in the Kano Plain develOpment.

In December 1911, Holder happily reported to the district
commissioner that he had inspected plots belonging to Chief Owiti

and his headmen, Athembo, Moga, Ondiek, Ajumbo, Agolo and Ogada.

 

13Daniel Omer, Ex—Chief Simeon Otiende, Samwel Ada and others

spoke of their amazement at Holder's ability with languages. Holder
became quite a legend. He is remembered as a Zulu, a Nusu—Nusu
(Swahili, mixed racial heritage) or an Egyptian.

14Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1913, p. 50.

 

63

He described them as being in a fairly clean condition generally and
as the result of the favorable growing weather ". . . the plants had
made strong healthy growth."15 Picking had already commenced at the
time of Holder's visit, but some problems were apparent. He reported
seeing dirty cotton stored in the granaries, and he noted a high
percentage of weak fibers among the stored cotton as compared with
strong white cotton growing in the fields. Holder continued, "I
took the opportunity of instructing the people into the proper methods
of picking and particularly pointed out to them the importance of
keeping the clean and stained cotton separate."l6
Holder was so concerned about quality control that he sent one
of the "trained boys" from Kibos to aid in prOper picking methods.
Further to stimulate the farmer's interest in bringing a clean crop
to market, Holder took several samples into the Kisumu Ginnery.
There, Mr. Pannett of the British East Africa Corporation assured him
that top prices would be paid for all cotton as good as the sample.
Another circumstance leading to poor quality cotton was revealed
by Holder's letter. He found that a high percentage Of stained cotton
resulted from poor storage facilities and from pre-harvest exposure
to rain. On a more positive note, Holder calculated that the thirty
acres planted should yield approximately 350 to 400 pounds Of seed
cotton per acre.
Comparatively speaking the Kano yields were not so impressive as

those achieved early by B.C.G.A. at the Kibos experimental farm. In

 

15Kisumu District Qoarterly Report, December 31, 1911, p. 23.

16Ibid.

 

64

1908, the association's intensive efforts produced 610 pounds of seed
cotton per acre.17 But as noted by Holder, the Kano figures were
remarkable on three accounts. First, the Kano people did less
cultivation in their area in comparison to some of the communities
closer to the lake and the hills. Second, the less favorable cli—
matic conditions of the plains made even traditional farming very
risky. Third, the difficult nature of Kano's soil was a major deterrent
to the introduction Of new crOps.

Holder's letter, therefore, concluded that great possibilities
existed for the industry in Kano, a consideration reflected by the
fact that the harvest was even better than his estimates.

. . . The Kano people [produced] about 18,000 pounds

of seed cotton. This is the first time that the

natives have made any real move in the matter of

cotton growing. The results are for a start quite

promising. 18
This achievement can be directly attributed to the leadership of
Chief Owiti. Most of his time during that growing season was spent
encouraging his follOwers to plant and follow proper husbandry.
Apparently unknown to the British, Owiti was using forced labor,
which might account for the high yields and the good condition of the
crop. Supervision of the work force was more intensive than could be
achieved by government. Additionally, on the part of the workers,
some degree of self-interest was operating: they were associated with

an experiment that government had sanctioned and in which the community

was interested. Nairobi probably would not have prevented his resort

 

l7Annual Administrative Reports 1907-1908, p. 113.

 

1SNyanza Province Annual Report 1912 and the Kisumu District
Annual Report, p. 35..

 

65

to forced labor since they condoned its usage in road maintenance,
bridge—construction and the making of shambas.19 Utilizing forced
labor does not detract from Owiti's accomplishment, but it may
explain in part why such high yield figures were not attained in
other locales. A case-in-point are the disappointingly low yields
from all areas in Central Nyanza at a later date. In 1917—1918,
cotton growth reportedly did not fulfill expectations. Although some
damage was done by excessive rain, only fourteen tons were harvested

from 200 acres. The 200 pounds per acre yield was described as "a

low figure even for native cotton."20

In fact low returns may have had little to do with forced labor
and probably more to do with a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the
government and farmers. Whenever the experimental stage of local
introduction was completed problems immediately occurred. Of most
importance were the procedural discrepancies surrounding actual seed
distribution. Most peOple came to the distribution area with a
container of some sort. Many carried Old sacks, homemade baskets,
water jugs and some had discarded pieces of clothing to wrap the seed
in.

On the other hand, the government was equally lax. No written
records were ever kept; nor were guidelines of amounts to be distri-
buted correlated to actual acreage to be planted, and no civil servant

took the responsibility to see how much of the seed was actually

planted. Clearly without such checks and supervision the results were

 

19Kisumu District Annual Raport 1914, p. 9.

20Kisumu District Annual Report 1917-1918, p. 6.

66

going to be far from desirable.

Another device used by government after the experimental stage
was equally flawed. If the community did not seem ready for indivi-
dual planting, group plots were initiated. At first the location
elders were asked to donate available community land for cultivation.
Many who responded to this request were themselves opposed to cotton—
growing. They,therefore, offered swamp land or some other uncultiva-
tible areas. Seldom did an administrator examine this land, and,
by the time the situation could be rectified, the growing season was
over.21 Apparently as in the Gem case, there was a hint of collusion
to defraud the government between the elders and some local headmen.
In early 1917, Onduso,22 the probationary headman in Gem, resigned and
his place was taken by Ndeda, a former headman and native agent.
There were strong hints that Ondoso generally had not been careful in
discharging his duties, and that he had not examined plots volunteered
for communal farms.

In the eventtthat farmers failed to Offer voluntary plots, then
it was left to Holder to select areas for planting. During these
selection tours, Holder would confer more with the local headmen than
with the farmers whose plots he was subdividing. Among the criteria
for choosing a particular plot was ease of supervision.

Throughout the first twenty years of establishing cotton in

Central Nyanza the idea of crop supervision had been uppermost in the

 

21Kisumu District Annual Raport 1917-1918, p. 5.

22John M. Lonsdale, A Political History of Nyanza 1883—1945,
Unpubl. Ph.D. diss. (Cambridge University), p. 179. Onduso, along with
Daniel Odindo and several others, were the first pupils at CMS
Maseno in 1906.

 

67

government's mind. In 1917 a special scheme of roadside planting
was organized by Mr. Pedraza, the Assistant District Commissioner of
Kisumu. Under this plan, sixty-five two acre plots were planted
along the Kisumu-Nyakach Road,23 but the flooding of the Kibigori River
and the overflow of the lake destroyed 30 percent of the cotton
planted. Padraza, sadly, but correctly, concluded that "this mis—
fortune added to the natives' genuine dislike for the crop [and]
is likely to be increased when no monetary return is obtained for the
labor they have spent on the crop."24 Finally, as late as 1928, crop
supervision was still a major problem for the administration.
Reporting on the Northern Kavirondo District, a senior member of the
agricultural department reported that "On May 23rd, I arrived in the
Malikisi area where I was joined by Mr. Norman, Assistant District
Commissioner. We found that in the area between Jairo's and Mwinjaro's
that nothing had been done since we left a month before."25 No amount
of coordination, it seems, was really sufficient to provide continuous
supervision.

As a last resort the government tried in various ways to build a
supervisory element into cotton cultivation. In 1921, the following
was suggested as a method of coping with low yields and supervision

problems.

 

230.0. 544, E.A.P., Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Administration
Reports 1917—1918, p. 28.

24Ibid.

25K.N.A. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, "Nyanza Cotton:
Cultivation and Crop," Senior Commissioner's Report 1925, p. l.

 

 

 

68

"To succeed in affecting a substantial improvement

in native agricultural practice and in increasing

production a large number Of instructors will be

required. Native instructors are likely to succeed

where Europeans would fail, and the cost would be

incomparably much smaller with the use of the

farmer, but it will doubtless be found necessary

to have European supervisors directing the efforts

of native instructors." 26

Quite aside from supervision the problems manifested in African
agriculture were two, lack of monetary return from cotton cultivation
and the government's emphasis on European farming. Any clear economic
gain to the African farmer was limited after Ainsworth's policy of
encouraging peasant farming lapsed. With the onset of World War I
Ainsworth's energies were directed elsewhere. Following the war, in
1921, a growing disinclination on the part of the Nyanza farmer to
plant cotton was reported. Anger and resentment came principally
because Of "low prices that have prevailed for a considerable period."27
A further complication derived from the fact that "bad seasons require
a greater area be used for the production of food and the total area
Of production [had] declined during the war."

Prices paid for cotton were hardly calculated to stimulate
Africans to grow the crap. During the eight seasons, 1923-24 to
1930-31, the price paid to the grower drOpped about 66 percent from

30 cents per pound in 1923-24, to 10 1/2 cents per pound in 1930-31.28

 

26C.0. 544, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Dept. of Agriculture,
Annual Report 1930-31, p. 27.

27Ibid., p. 30.

28Hugh Fearn, An African Economy, p. 168.

 

 

69

Since Ainsworth's policy of stimulating Nyanza's agricultural
economy was never national policy, it did not effect the manpower
allocations of the agricultural department. Although important,
staff allocation was only part of the larger consideration of the
government's preferential treatment of European agriculture. The
administration's and settlers' interests coincided in most facets of
economic development, particularly concerning Africans.

Since the Nyanza administrators could expect little help from
government, they had to provide their own solutions to the vexing
manpower shortage. Almost immediately, existing chiefs were tapped
to supply local level administrations. The tactic itself had via—
bility at least in the eyes of Nairobi. It was after all logical,
that when government personnel were not available, to institute some
form of indirect rule. In Nyanza, however, during the first cotton
phase, 1910-1923, the results of indirect rule were far from satis-
factory. Only in those cases where chiefs were as strong and motivated
as Owiti of Kano, Nyangaga of Seme and Kara of Nyakach did the system
work well. Even in the case of Owiti, during his great growing season
of 1911-1912, abuses occurred.

As chiefs established their local hierarchies they sometimes
tended to terrorize their constituency. For the victims of strong arm
tactics seldom was redress of grievances available. "When my step-
father, Orony, was an Mlango he held meetings in our home to tell

"30

people about cotton. The farmer continued, "This was around 1922-

 

29Roger M.A. Van Zwanenberg, The Agricultural History of Kenya
to 1939 (Nairobi: East African Printing House, 1972), p. 28.

30Simeon Oyare, personal interview, South East Kano, 19 July 1973.

 

70

1923 and if anyone complained about cotton he was caned and sometimes
given extra work to do." Protests were stifled on the spot and few
men were courageous enough after punishment to persist in carrying a
grievance to higher authority.

Without sufficient guidelines for selecting working parties,
local leaders generally rounded up all available ambulatory adults
and children to work community plots. Not only did work on cotton
plots require a considerable adjustment to the male way of life, but
it also involved men in community group planting which was anathema
to Luo farming practices.31 Moreover the continued use of forced
labor caused the Nyanza farmer to associate cash cropping cotton with
the dreaded work of community road building and maintenance. Several
things stand out about community forced labor.

One, in the matter of road building, even children and pregnant
women were made to work. In most cases few tools were supplied by
the administration. This meant that road building, like cotton
husbandry, was labor intensive. The exploitation of women and children
in roadwork aroused Luo communities more than did other kinds of
forced labor. There seemed to be a realization that better roads
could lead to more British personnel and therefore increased exploi—
tation.32 In 1923, ironically, road building on a community basis
was discontinued due to nationalist political pressure. But forced
work on communal cotton plots continued until the post-World War II

period.

 

3¥Hugh7Fearn, An African Economy, p. 77.

32Bishop Simeon Nyende, personal interview, Gem, 25 September 1973.

 

71

Two, community forced labor meant that government investment in
creating the necessary economic infrastructure for African agriculture
was minimal. In contrast, a rational system of road development was
pursued in European agricultural areas. Payment for roads in these
areas was met by the colonial government, but roads built in African
locations were paid for by taxes raised locally and by labor forcibly
supplied by local people.33 The lack of expenditure on roads points
up an unwillingness to assist the African farmer in real economic
terms and also indicates the intimate relationship between the
settlers' economic aspirations and those of the colonial government.

Moreover, the close association of settlers and government
imposed severe economic constraints on African farmers. In the 1930's
the machinations of the Kenya Farmers Association, which forced
legislation to set up control of African maize production and sale,
were not lost on Nyanza farmers. When KFA realized that African:
growers were not only supplying the domestic maize market but also
realizing greater returns than were being obtained on the international
market, they acted. By 1936 a new marketing law forced Africans to
sell their maize to accredited government agents (K.F.A. representa-
tives). Then, all African maize was graded and a portion sold on the
international market. This circumlocution, of course, allowed
European maize to be sold on the higher priced domestic market.34
The African producer felt that cotton's price derived from a conspiracy

between the buyers and government.

 

33van Zwanenberg, agricultural History of Kenya, p. 26.

 

34Ibid., p. 21.

72

One incident will suffice to illustrate how easily suspicions
could be aroused and seemingly confirmed. In 1912, farmers in the
510 area experienced a tremedous drop in cotton prices. A rumor
spread that buyers were cheating farmers and if the cotton could be
sold outside the territory a better price could be realized. Several
farmers in the area held back their crop and formulated plans to
sell it at the Uganda port of Mijanji. There they found the same
price, but they sold their produce in disgust, and refused to replant
in the following season.

Far from stimulating African interest in cotton-growing, the
settler-administration constellation left the actual supervision of
the crop to the elements least likely to affect positive responses.
Not only did the local hierarchies lack expertise about cotton, but
they also had lost a measure of prestige within the location. After
becoming government functionaries it was no longer necessary for
chiefs and headmen to pay close attention to the needs and grievances
of their constituency. Moreover, once a chief had received adminis-
trative approval, it was practically impossible to remove him from
office. In the pre-colonial decentralized Luo polities the system of
office-holding and leadership had been inherently democratic. Any
leader's security of tenure-in-Office depended upon his ability to
meet the needs of the community. With the removal of power from the

people to the colonial government, it was nearly impossible to check

 

35Hugh Fearn, "Cotton Production in the Nyanza Province of Kenya
Colony 1908-1954," The Empire Cotton Growing Review, 33 (1956),
p. 124.

 

73

the abuse of power by some chiefs.

Among the most frequent abuses were forced labor at the govern-
ment experimental farm, Kibos. Some confusion surrounds these charges.
For example, an interviewee remembered that in 1918 he was taken to
Kibos every morning, weather permitting, to work on the cotton plots.36
No wages were received for this employment. According to Mr. Oloya,
however, chiefs and milango received funds for supplying and supervising
workers. But the information of Apiyo Gari Agumba conflicts with that
of Janes Oloya. As a young man prior to World War I, Mr. Agumba
recalled working in Kibos and receiving five shillings per month in
wages.37 Young peOple, according to this informant, were put to work
weeding, pulling out dead plants and, in general, keeping the plot
clean. The wage scale for adults was slightly higher and there was
no physical abuse involved in Obtaining people for work.38 Even in
the confusion one fact stands out: the system and government direction
was sufficiently flexible to allow a chief to manipulate it for his
own ends.

Protests that did occur against chiefs were usually met by resort
to corporal punishment. Seldon did the colonial government seem to

be aware of the nature of local inducements. And when incidents were

brought to the administration's attention, they were treated lightly

 

36Janes Oloya, personal interview, Kawuonda, West Kano.

37Apiyo Gari Agumba, personal interview, Kapiyo, West Kano,
11 September 1973.

38The discrepancies in the two interviews may be explained as follows:
Although both men identified the work site as Kibos Experimental Farm,
it is probably that Apiyo Gari Agumba was working on H.H. Holder's
private farm which was located in close proximity to the government farm.
Holder's association with both may have caused problems in identification.

74
as "an overzealous pursuit Of the duties of office."39 During the
period 1903 to 1923, the most often used form of compulsion was
caning. Farmers would be caned for a variety of Offences, particul-
arly when they refused to grow cotton or to maintain the crop.

Failure to report to the communal work plots seems to have been
considered a minor offense, probably because milango would accept
small bribes in lieu of punishment. Once having been corrected by
public caning, most farmers curtailed their opposition to cotton
policy. For those who persisted in opposing government's agricultural
plans local leaders would resort to threats and social ostracism.
Apparently being publically labeled "jalundha," or traitor, was a
sufficient deterrent to continued refusal to cooperate.40 Moreover
farmers seemed incapable or unwilling to organize themselves to
protest cotton policy or the local African administrators' abuse of
power.

In short, the period from 1901 to 1923 was a time of experimen-
tation in trying to start an African cotton industry in Nyanza
Province. Characterized by a lack of direction and clearly stated
goals the government program fed into the reluctance of the Luo farmer
to pursue a new, non-food crop. Within this disoriented framework,
the government seemed to work at cross purposes. There was an ack-
knowledged lack of technical and supervisory personnel for African

agriculture. Moreover government expenditures to meet the requisite

 

39K.N.A., Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, "Nyanza Cotton,"
Senior Commissioner's Report 1925, p. 12.

4OMathayo Orego, personal interview, Kamenya, Kajulu, 30 August
1973.

75

needs of establishing the industry were inadequate. Culpability for
the failure to establish a viable cotton industry in the years 1903—

1923 must be shared by government and the farmers.

CHAPTER V

FARMER'S REACTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS

As has been demonstrated both government and African farmers
probably share responsiblity in the failure of the Kenya cotton
industry. In the government case lack of direction toward establish-
ing a viable industry is the outstanding criticism. Included under
the heading would be failure to allocate sufficient agricultural
department personnel for African farming. In addition, extreme
parsimony seemed to dictate the government's distribution of funds
to construct a workable infrastructure for the new enterprise. And,
finally, the government was haunted by its own appraisals of the
African's inability to respond positively to a new economic stimulus.
Thus, in the years 1901 to 1923, the government's assistance and
leadership of the cotton industry was characterized by piece-meal
trial and error. It remains then to deduce the African farmers'
response to Nairobi's attempts to establish the new industry.

Their initial reaction to the new crop was suspicion. This
chapter will describe the manifestations of this suspicion. After
the farmers' reactions have been thoroughly discussed, an attempt will
be made to illuminate peasants motivations for resisting the intro-

duction of cotton.

76

77

It was found that a pattern of reaction and sub rosa resistance,
not mentioned in existing research,1 could be discerned and categorized.
It became clear from documentary sources and field interviews that
levels of participation could be judged. Maximum response has the
connotation that most adult males planted enough cotton to deter
negative administrative measures. Minimum participation denotes
significant problems for local and colonial administrators. Three
patterns of reactions were noted.

One, there were areas of maximum compliance. This positive
reaction seemed correlated to a number of variables. Proximity of the
location to an administrative center seemed important, as did control
by chiefs who concentrated on cash-cropping directives without using
unnecessary force. In locations where good relations existed between
British administrators and local peOple, satisfactory results were
obtained. And finally high compliance was achieved in locations where
farmers did not wish to jeopardize their traditional wealth by opposing
governmental orders.

Two, negligent responses to government's cotton policy also
occurred. These reactions occurred primarily in areas where chiefs
and milango used extreme force in getting the crop planted. Negligence
of cotton husbandry was experienced also in places where natural

conditions were not conducive to maintaining the crop. Lack of

 

1None of the general works in Kenya Agriculture have utilized
field interviews. Thus the pattern of African resistance has not been
thoroughly researched. See L. Winston Cone and T.F. Lipscomb, eds.,
The History of Kenya Agriculture (Nairobi: University Press of Africa,
1972). The same criticism must be made of all Hugh Fearn's work on
Western Kenya. Even the Marxist historian Roger M.A. van Zwanenberg,
The Agricultural History of Kenya to 1939 (Nairobi: East African
Printing House, 1972), focuses principally on the farming activities
of non-Africans in Kenya.

 

78

attention to the crop occurred also in locations where minimum surplus
land was available, but where money for taxes could be raised by
selling excess food crops.

Three, absolute refusal to grow did occur but in a minimum
number of locations. Such rejections correlated with legitimate
grievances. For example, in the years 1921 to 1935, even Nairobi
recognized that buying facilities were too far from growing sites for
Alego farmers. Accordingly no penalties were inflicted when farmers
in the area stopped growing cotton. In 1935, however, when the dis-
crepancy had been corrected, government insisted that cotton be grown.2
Some farmers refused to grow cotton in locales where the possibility
of pursuing non-farming alternatives existed: in lakeside communities,
it was possible to engage in commercial fishing to raise necessary
money. Finally, in at least one sub-area, the refusal to grow cotton
can be attributed to the presence of a strong community leader. It
must be noted, however, that the initial thrust of leadership was
political agitation, not objection to cotton policy. Further, the
leader's effect was severely restricted in the case cited; only the
Regea area of Gem location successfully boycotted growing cotton for
a number of years.

Suffice it to say that farmers let their self—interest dictate
their level of response to government cotton-growing directives.
Moreover the initial decision was not necessarily binding on the
individual or the location over the longer run. Certainly most farmers

fluctuated between compliance and negligence depending upon their

 

2Benjamin Owuor Gumba, personal interview, East Seme, 8 August
1973, and Golam Husein, personal interview, Ndere Ginnery, 5 November

1973.

79

expectation of government retaliation or dissatisfaction over prices.
This checkerboard response, however, can only be clearly understood by
detailing particular cases.

Without a doubt, compliance, at least initially, seems directly
correlated to the proximity of an administrative office and therefore
supervision. Kano and Kajulu figure prominently in the early cotton
plans precisely because they were familiar to administrators, and
campaigns there could be mounted with a minimum of interdepartmental
coordination. Indeed by 1912, the round trip to Kajulu, Kano, Kibos,
and Kibigori could be accomplished in a single day. Consequently
these areas saw a disprOportionate number of administrators and became
the focal point for a variety of schemes to stimulate the industry.

Low profile criticism was often made of the continuing presence
of colonial civil servants in the locations.3 In 1913, during the
political infighting to oust the successor to Chief Owiti, Amimo was
grudgingly admired for his ability to seek amicable relations with
the British. But he was also saddled with the responsibility for
their overwhelming presence. Ironically the Opponents of Amimo
accused the incumbent, Akwama, of failing to maintain good relations
with the British.4

Unlike Amimo who was motivated by his own self-interest, Akwama's
supporters responded out of ignorance when the British were coming

to the location. Clearly, Akwama's supporters rationalized that even

 

3Norman Anyumba, personal interview, Masogo, West Kano, 28 August
1973.

4‘Mirasi Cheroli see Central Kavirondo District Political Records
Ex-Chiefs and Headmen 1911-1915, "Kano Political Records," p.2.

 

 

8O

feigned adherence to cotton policy meant that government had a less
disruptive effect on community life.5 In short, farmers in those areas
easily accessible to government servants made an effort to comply

with cotton directives. It was, they felt, easier to plant an eighth
of an acre and keep it clean than risk reprisals.

Similarly acceptance of orders to grow cotton were experienced
in areas where people did not wish to jeopardize their traditional
forms of wealth by opposing government. Some farmers in West Kano,
among them Jacobo Jakoyo, were debating as late as 1923 their opposition
to cotton. They reasoned as follows: "Before the EurOpean came we
had land, cattle, women and food. We were wealthy enough and did not
need their money for growing cotton."6 Even though verbally placing
himself in defiance of government policies, Mr. Jakoyo nonetheless
grew cotton. He, in fact, reported that his clan, Kanyambok, continued
to grow cotton in group plots from 1929 through 1945.

Mr. Jakoyo's paradoxical response derived from the threat of
collective fines of cattle, goats and poultry that could be levied for
refusal to adhere to cotton policy. Such a system of reprisals meant
in effect that Mr. Jakoyo and his clanmates might have lost their store
of traditional wealth. Chiefs eventually suggested to the authorities
a method of maintaining fines while foregoing cattle confiscation. By

1914 fines were apportioned in terms of goats and poultry, if not

—‘

SAndrew Awuor Ngoya, personal interview, Masogo, West Kano,
3 July 1973.

6Jacobo Jakoyo, personal interview, West Kano, 6 September 1973

81

levied in cash. Government also had its own reasons for not levying
cattle fines againSttthe Luo.

During 1886-1905, the period of pacification in Western Kenya,
collective fines, usually of cattle and other livestock, were levied
on recalcitrant groups to pay for the cost of military operations.
John Ainsworth, who had the responsibility for directing Central
Nyanza's early economic develOpment, did not wish to attach the stigma
of conquered peOples to the Luo, and he argued persuasively against
taking cattle as fines.8 In short, the colonial administration, for
reasons of its own, also acted to protect traditional forms of wealth.

Unlike Jakoyo's opposition in West Kano, some areas in Central
Nyanza responded negatively to government by first planting the crop
and then neglecting its husbandry, as was the case in South East Kano.
In 1914, the area under the Headman Juombo had the worst production of
any location under Chief Amimo. Most of Juombo's problems stemmed
from his temper and frequent resort to the cane.10 Several young but
influential men in the community who were caned by Juombo conspired to
effect his dismissal. Wade, the brother of Steven Okelo, Otieno Cake
and Oduongo Omolu were caned for refusing to carry out the necessary
operations to achieve a good yield. They had tried to explain to
Juombo that experience had shown that the return of the crop in the
form of better yield was not large enough to justify weeding the plots

twieec~ "Seldom", they pointed out, "did anyone in the location even

 

8C.0. 544, E.A.P., Minutes of the Executive Council 1908, p. 17.

 

9A recent designation; until 1965 this area was a part of West
Kano prOper.

10Stevan Okelo, personal interview, South East Kano, 18 July 1973.

82

do a competent first weeding."ll Juombo was not swayed by this practical
farming approach and applied the cane. Unfortunately for Juombo, the
three young men had voluntarily organized community road building,

which had increased the stature of Chief Amimo with the administration.
Within months Juombo was demoted and later was shipped off to the

Carrier Corps.

Apparently the device of planting but not maintaining the crop
became standard procedure in South East Kano. As late as 1942, Stevan
Okelo, made use of the practice. Before his subterfuge was discovered
he had given all indications of following the recommendations of the
cotton campaign for that season. First, he appeared at the seed
distribution and was given his allocation. Next, he turned his land
over but never planted. By the time his duplicity was discovered he
had already been appointed a locational judge for land disputes and thus
was saved from punishment.12

Between the years 1928 and 1937 Chief Opiyo of Nyakach attempted
unsuccessfully to deal with crop neglect. Succeeding the amiable
and popular Chief Kere would have created problems for any administrator,
but certainly for one of Opiyo's temperament. He began his tenure
first by purging Kere's staff, and then announced that cotton would be
tried again in the area. Apparently he attributed the failure of the
first introduction to the community's laxity and to its ability to
manipulate Kere. From 1913 through 1919 cotton was planted in Kere's

area, but achieved poor yields. Many members of the community,

 

11Ibid.

12Silphano Osoro, personal interview, at Ahero Multi-purpose

Center, South East Kano, July 19, 1973.

83

including Kere, stated that the area was too chilly to be good for the
plant.13

Meanwhile the government's experiments at Sango near Kusa, close
to the lake, were proving successful. At last in 1919, government
discontinued the attempts at Kere's and concentrated on their success
at Sango. Even the fact that government had tired of trying to grow
cotton successfully on the plateau did not deter Opiyo.

Yet Opiyo's determination was not enough to establish the crop.
By 1930 Kere's old staff had combined with some of the more political
members of the community to offer an alternative to government. Among
the suggestions was one for growing coffee on the plateau. Another
option called for the intensification of a ground nut scheme that had
been started as early as 1919.14 In short, Opiyo was opposed by three
forces that he could not overcome. One, the organizational ability
and popularity of former Chief Kere's aides and relations. Two, his
oq§>temperament and the harsh attempts he had made to reestablish

cotton growing. And three, the government's reluctance to push hard

for the industry in an area that seemed unsuitable for the crop.

 

l3Johanna Ogodo, personal interview, South Nyakach, 24 October

1973. Mr. Ogodo served as Clerk to Chief Kere throughout his entire
reign, 1908-1928. Chief Owuor, the first Chief of South Nyakach and
the father of Kere, was also Ogodo's grandfather. He was among the
first of Kere's staff to be removed by Opiyo.

14Wilfred Achila, personal interview, Nyakach, 5 November 1973.
A nephew of Chief Kere, Mr. Achila implied that the coffee plan was a
scheme for getting government to accede to groundnut. He stated that
people were aware that coffee was a "EurOpean" crop and only Kissi
had been given special compensation to grow it. Achila and his group
reasoned that if they approached government solely about groundnuts a
great deal of foot—dragging could be expected. Making it look as
though they were ready to mobilize politically for a coffee scheme
forced the administration to act with dispatch.

84

Refusal to grow cotton did occur in a minimum number of locations.
Two patterns of refusal can be seen, one geared to the existence of
strong community leaders Opposing cotton, and a second occurred when
the conditions of the industry were so poor that farmers could make
and adhere to a collective decision.

In 1922, at the height of nationalist agitation, Rev. Simeon
Nyende15 of Gem, Regea, was persuaded to grow cotton for an exhibit at
the 1923 Maseno Show. For his crOp he received twenty shillings, and
like others, Nyende was incensed by the poor returns of the crOp. A
community leader by virtue of his position within the church and by
his political activities, he was looked to by farmers for direction.16
In this instance he counselled that the location should refuse to plant”
cotton in the coming season.

Actually, and this fact escaped Rev. Nyende's immediate attention,
the farmers were concerned more specifically about the price than
about a general boycott against cotton.17 The boycott, however,
remained in effect, not in the whole of Gem but only in Nyende's
location, Regea. Only part of its success could be attributed to
Nyende's leadership. The farmers in Gem, Regea, had intense personal
loyalty to Rev. Nyende and for a period they dominated the Local

Native Council, and forestalled government reprisals. Until 1935

 

15Rev. Nyende's nationalist political activity will be more
fully develOped in Chapter VI.

16Rev. Simeon Nyende, personal interviews, Gem, 25 September
1973 and 29 October 1973.

17Ibid.

85

Nairobi refused to directly confront Regea farmers on their rejection
of cotton. In that year, however, agricultural staff persuaded farmers
in the location, including Nyende, to replant on the basis of an
expected price rise.

An important consideration in Nairobi's decision to pressure
Regea was the waning influence of Nyende's leadership. In 1934 he
became embroiled in a dispute with Chief Ogada over the rights to a
shamba in Marenyu.18 Not only did the conflict siphon off some of
Nyende's followers, but it also revealed the declining influence of
the early nationalists. At this point government deéided to propagan—
dize his location once again.

In short, a favorable set of circumstances for the farmer in Gem;
the presence of Nyende's leadership; 3 critical attitude on the part
of farmers; a willingness to air their grievances; and, a hands off
attitude by government set the conditions for a successful boycott.

Simultaneously with the Gem boycott, farmers in Alego were also
successfully ignoring government cotton policies. Their recalcitrance
had little to do with the rise of a strong community leader. From
about 1911 to 1922 cotton growing in Alego moved along unsteadily.
There were many complaints about the chiefs and milango exploiting the
farmer. During the first three years of cotton's introduction, when
planting was done in groups, farmers received no proceeds from growing

the crop.19

 

' 18K.N.A., E.A.P. Central Kavirondo District Political Records 1935,

 

p. 7.

19Barnabas Nyangor, personal interview, Ndere Ginnery, 9 November
1973.

86

It was rumored, however, that Chief Oganda was receiving money
for having the crop planted in the location. The process of growing,
harvesting, storing and selling cotton during those years in Alego
was sufficiently confusing to make it difficult to determine whether
the chief was selling the cotton himself and keeping the proceeds; or,
as was rumored, he was being given incentive bonuses by ginnery owners.
And finally there were accusations that Holder, who came to inspect
the harvest and provided transport for the crOp, was paying the chief.

Whatever the truth of the stories they had enough credibility to
be taken seriously by Alego cotton farmers. Before the colonial
government prohibited the practice, some chiefs did force community
people to grow cotton without remuneration. And ginnery owners found
very early that it was to their advantage to provide chiefs with
"production presents."20 The story with the least basis in fact is
that Holder was paying the chief for the cotton. How this came about
can be illustrated by describing the peculiar system of selling cotton
at that period in Alego.

Before 1935, since there was no ginnery closer than a fifty-mile
round-trip, buyers would bring portable scales to the location and
purchase cotton on the spot. Since all the cotton was stored at the
chief's house, buying was a simple process and did not require the
presence of the growers. In the years 1911-1914, Holder, it seems,
was present checking the quality and quantity of the harvest. Since

1lewas also involved in the organization of headload transport to the

 

 

20Golam Husein, personal interview, Ndere Ginnery, 5 November 1973.

gin:
Iher
pra:
ti

ant

she

BE

01

87

ginnery, he was included by the farmers in the chain of exploitation.
There is, however, no reason to believe that Holder was personally
profiting from cotton. Nonetheless, he doubtlessly knew about incen-
tive bonuses to chiefs and milango because the practice was widespread
and condoned by government.

After 1914 group planting, limited to the chief's and milango
shambas, was discontinued. Threatened by the resentment being expressed
by farmers, Oganda instituted a new growing design. Group planting
was continued,22 but individual plots were emphasized. However, because
of the adverse publicity attached to the earlier selling process each
man was permitted to sell his cotton to the buyers. The process of
weighing and paying for yields from numerous 1/4 and 1/8 acre plots
was cumbersome, time consuming and did not justify the expense of
on-the~spot buying. Instead cotton-growers had to head—load their
harvest twenty-five miles to Victoria Ujuanga near Mumias.

Prior to 1935 the location of the ginnery was the most important
prohibitive factor in growing cotton in Alego. Depending on weather
conditions, the trip sometimes required three days, and often payments
were delayed.23 By 1922 cotton growing in Alego had virtually ceased.

A few hardy souls seldom grew more than 1/2 an acre per season.

¥

21Agabitus Muyama, personal interview, Siaya, West Alego,
12 November 1973.

22There are several advantages to group planting. Most important,
61 farmer did not have to disturb his food crop acreage if he planted
on donated community land.

23Lutt Odhiambo Ademson, personal interview, Central Alego,
14- November 1973. Mr. Ademson stated that his father, Isiah Adem,
COIItinued to grow cotton from 1914 to 1917. It was a losing prOposition
beczause for two seasons he was unable to transport his crOp to Victoria
Ujuanga and it rotted in his granary. Finally in 1918, the last year
he £301d, the proceeds were so low that he did not return to cotton-

SI‘OWing until 19 36 .

88

Actually the establishment of the Ndere ginnery brought about
conditions in which the peOple of Alego suffered some land appropria-
tions. In 1934 Mr. Metha of the Uganda Sugar Company, Jinja began
looking in Alego for land to open a ginnery. There was no crown land
available to be purchased, and Metha had to think of purchasing or
otherwise obtaining a site. There were no farmers eager to donate
any land, and after four months of reconnoitering the area without
convincing anyone to sell, Metha decided on the site he desired and
opened direct negotiations for the land with Chief Amoth.

The chief had been in office only three years and was well liked
by the British but generally feared by his constituents.24 Within
two months, by a variety of threats and promises, Amoth had convinced
the farmers to give up some of their land for the ginnery. William
Oyugi's mother was persuaded to exchange her land for a promise of
an equal amount in another section of the location.25 Oyugi claims
that his mother thus was given undesirable land and some peOple re-
ceived no land at all. Amoth promised the ginnery would make it possible
for everyone to make money growing cotton, and those who objected to
giving up their land were sometimes personally caned by the chief.
Some were forced to concede their land by a whispering campaign that

accused them of being "fitina" (politicians) and not having the good

24Following the death of Chief Nunga in 1929, Ahenda became
¢3hief of Alego. About 1930, Alego was divided into East and West
Sactions, with Amoth becoming Chief of West Alego. At Ahenda's death
111 1931, the district was reconsolidated, and Amoth became Chief of
all Alego.

25William Oyugi, personal interview, West Alego, 12 November 1973.

89

of the community at heart.26 Eventually the land was obtained, and
Ndere Ginnery opened. Since it was no longer necessary to make that
fifty mile round trip to sell, people enthusiastically returned to
growing cotton.

Unlike the Ndere example, enthusiasm for cotton was not
characteristic of the farmers' response. Ironically during the early
years of cotton's introduction there were no areas of total defiance
or total compliance. Reasons for this, in addition to the already
discussed patterns of response, can be discerned by revealing the
farmer's rationales for opposing cotton policy.

Farmers seemed to be motivated negatively toward cotton growing
for the following reasons. One, low price accounted for most resis-
tance to cotton growing. Two, cotton was a non-edible agricultural
product and this severely limited its acceptance. Three, the method
of introducing cotton in Central Nyanza was, from the farmers' point
of view, cruel and contrary to traditional farming practices. Four,
in addition to low prices being paid for cotton, farmers also felt
they were being exploited in a variety of ways at buying centers.
Five, cotton required greater labor inputs than did traditional food
crOps. Six, in the early years of cotton cash cropping, there seemed
to be little incentive or need for farmers to acquire money.

"We never received a prOper price for our cotton and so we stopped
growing. The government did not do anything but that may have been

because of the War."27 Everywhere farmers were dissatisfied with the

 

26Lutt Odhiambo Ademson, personal interview, Central Alego,

14 November 1973, and Jacobo Halowe, personal interview, Central Alego,
14 November 1973.

27Norman Anyumba, personal interview, West Kano, 28 August 1973.

90

low monetary returns from cotton. While few farmers, if any, kept
written records they were aware that other products were bringing a
better return. Leon Adus Ondondi, a mlango in West Kisumu under

Chief Johanno Ouko, vividly remembered that, in 1926, peeple in the
location rejected cotton because of better prices for maize. Mr.
Ondondi, who approved of the use of force to get cash crops planted,
reported "the people were not against cash cropping, but wanted to plant

]."28 He, however, did cane those

the best one [in terms of salebility
who wished to substitute maize for cotton because Chief Ouko ordered
it and because both believed that European ideas were progressive.
The British government was aware that cotton had the least
attractive price of all the products being grown by Nyanza farmers.
In 1925 the price for the best seed cotton varied, over the buying
season, from 19 to 25 cents. The low prices paid resulted in the
planting of much smaller acreage in 1926.29
Government could observe the burgeoning shift to maize. For a
few months in 1929, the maize requirements for almost the whole colony
were supplied by the Kavirondo Reserves; "a considerable profit must

"30 The uncertainty

have accrued to the native agriculturalists.
expressed by government over the profit margin of African maize was

understandable. Never had the administration paid particular attention

 

28Leon Adus Ondondi, personal interview, West Kisumu, 14 August

1973.

29C.0. 544, Kenya Departmental Reports, Department of Agriculture
Annual Report 1926, p. 19.

30C.0. 544, Kenya Departmental Reports, Native Affairs Department
Annual Report 1929, p. 18.

 

 

91

to African crops whose use was limited to the domestic market. When,
in the 1930's prices for domestic maize exceeded those of European
maize being sold on the international market, then government and
settler farmers became interested.

Certainly Africans reacted rationally to fluctuations in cotton
prices. In 1929, following the record harvest of 1928, prices dropped
drastically. During 1928, the harvest totalled 2,256,497 pounds of
seed cotton, and prices ranged from 17 to 18 cents throughout the
buying period.31 The following year, however, prices were a dis-
appointing 13 cents at ginneries and 12 cents at buying posts. Towards
the end of the buying season the price rose slightly, to 15 cents
and 13 cents respectively.32 By 1930 dissatisfaction with 1929 prices
had led to a dramatic reduction in cotton acreage.

Earlier, in 1920, the manager of Kibos experimental station
reported a growing disinclination on the part of the Kavirondo to
produce cotton. His assessment was that "the low prices which have
prevailed for a considerable period are almost certainly the reason."33
Bureaucratic optimism, however, prevailed, and campaigns to keep
farmers planting cotton were accentuated. The abnormally high prices
for raw materials paid during World War I had created false hopes that

prices would remain high, and a number of new settlers had arrived to

 

31Ibid., p. 61

320.0. 544, Kenya Departmental Reports, Department of Agriculture
Annual Report 1930, p. 41.

33C.O. 544, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Dept. of Agriculture,
Annual Administration Report 1921, p. 30.

 

92

take up agricultural holdings. Under the Discharged Soldiers Settle-
ment Ordinance it was hoped that new capital would be introduced.34

In spite of government's optimism and increased pressure on
cotton, Nyanza farmers continued to hold back as long as low prices
prevailed. Ex-Chief Simeon Otiende of Kajulu expressed the dilemma
of government and the farmer in the following terms:

In the 1930's the greatest dissatisfaction was low price.

But the British Government could never insist that only

cotton be grown or that considerably larger areas of cotton

be cultivated. They stressed it but were also concerned

about famine after Omodho [1931] so they urged that food

crops be continued. 35

Omola Ojuka, whose first cotton crop was planted in 1925, remem-
bered 1931 with mixed feelings. It gave him, he said, the opportunity
to leave cotton growing without government reprisals. In the six
growing seasons before the famine he never planted more than a 1/4
acre plot nor received more than 105 shillings for his crop,36 and
that amount was received the first growing season. By 1927 the
steadily dropping price of cotton had reduced his annual proceeds from
the crop to 30 shillings. After the 1927 harvest, Mr. Ojuka had
considered expanding his acreage, but his return was so low that he

looked for the earliest opportunity to stop growing the crap.37

 

34Ibid., pp. 10-11.

35Ex-Chief Simeon Otiende, personal interview, Kajulu, 24 August
1973.

36Omola Ojuka, personal interview, Kajula, 23 August 1973.

37

12.12-

93

Omodho presented such an Opportunity and he took employment as a
common laborer working on a section of Kakemega road. The terms of
employment were unusual. Only supervisory personnel were paid wages,
and all common laborers were paid in weekly provisions of flour, meat
and sometimes vegetables. The work therefore amounted to a form of
famine relief. From 1932 to 1935 Mr. Ojuka was a laborer for 12
shillings a month on a European farm in Muhuroni.

The second most frequently heard but least understood complaint
against cotton was that it was non-edible. Many western academicians
have used this point to demonstrate the non-economic nature of African
thinking. Contrary to these interpretations, African reaction was
based firmly in economic evaluations. In peasant societies dependent
on subsistence agriculture, the response to new food products may be
very slow, and non—food crops may be rejected very strenously. More-
over, non-edible crops in marginal areas involved considerably more
risk than any knowledgeable peasant would care to face. Minimizing
the risk of a short-fall food cr0p is more important and equally
valid to peasant cultivators as is the European emphasis on maximizing
profit.38

Actually Nyanza farmers had to achieve a delicate balance between
their own traditional economic concepts and those being imposed by the
colonial government. In areas where there existed enough indices that

the farmer could understand he actually did pursue profits. For

 

38Daryll Forde and Mary Douglas "Primitive Economics," Tribal
and Peasant Economies: Reading in Economic Anthropology, Edited by
George Dalton (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press,
1967). P. 27.

 

94

example, if the crop were familiar and its uses known to the farmer,
it would be planted primarily for sale. And if the final stage in
the exchange [rocess could be understood, then the farmer displayed
little hesitation in growing for the market.39

Certainly the British Government was aware, even though belatedly,
in the case of maize in the 1930's that Nyanza farmers were interested
in profit. Practically the only point raised at any baraza was that
of the market price, in some cases with people pointing out that cotton
compared unfavorably with sim—sim as a profit yielding crop. In
1925, Nyanza's provincial commissioner reported that, "the trading,
agricultural and commercial intelligence shown by many natives was

‘1 Even earlier, in 1912, the then Director of Agriculture,

surprising.“
A.C. MacDonald, understood that one of the greatest obstacles to the
enthusiastic growing of cotton was low price.

When caught between the farmers' sophisticated economic reasoning
and the government's needs, British administrators were instructed to
"instill into the native mind the economic value of cotton to the
empire."42 In short, the ability of the Nyanza farmer to make rational
economic decisions was never lost on the colonial government, but the

farmer was forced to give precedence to Nairobi's need for foreign

exchange.

39George Dalton "Traditional Production in Primitive African
Economies," Ibid., p. 76.

40K.N.A., Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Senior Commissioner's

Report 1925, p. 15.

4llbid.

42Ibid., p. 17.

95

The fact remained that farmers knew and understood that the
monetary returns on cotton did not justify their whole-hearted
adoption Of the crop. It was clear to cotton cultivators that if
cotton was economically viable EurOpeans also would have been involved
in growing the crop. In 1920 the report from the Kibos government
experimental farm, stated "heretofore cotton was not considered a
suitable crop for European cultivation in the Province, owing to the
very low prices . . . but at present prices -- 15 to 18 cents per
pound for clean unginned cotton -- the cultivation Of this crop in
suitable parts would appear to have become worthy of close attention."43

This optimism continued the following year when the new Director
of Agriculture, Alex Holm, included in his annual report an obser-
vation that high prices in 1919 and early 1920 would induce European
farmers to plant the crop. Apparently they knew better or were cer-
tainly very cautious about the crop's potential. Not only did
established European farmers continue to ignore cotton, but also none
Of the new settlers under the Settlement Scheme seriously considered
its cultivation.

A third major item Of resistance to cotton growing was the
African farmers' Objection to the method of the crop's introduction.
Not only was it cruel but it was also contrary to traditional farming
practices. In peasant agriculture where family holdings not communal
plots, were the norm, immediate issues Of confrontation arose. Caning
and other forms Of corporal punishment accompanied the government's

efforts tO introduce cotton. Finally, all people, including women,

‘—

43C.O. 544, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Dept. of Agriculture,

5553931 Administration Rgport 1920, p. 122.

 

96

children, and the ill but ambulatory, were sometimes forced to
grow in group plots. Only after World War II did government reduce
the use of forced cotton planting.

In addition to other economic consideration, a fourth factor
around which Nyanza farmers responded negatively was the perceived
exploitation at the buying centers. They were so organized as to be
structured unfairly. Of greatest importance was the fact that the
buyers were Asian. Until Zablon Aduo was employed by the Kenya
Farmers Association in 1937, no Africans were licensed to purchase
cotton from growers. Even if Asians had not constituted a despised
minority, their sharp business practices would have caused at least
negative comments. Seldom were receipts issued, and when they were,
they simply contained the amount of money given the farmer.44

Immediately upon cotton's introduction a fifth negative factor
about the crop was articulated by the farmer. It was, they stated,
a crop that required greater labor than did traditional food crops.
Such an assertion was easily demonstrated.45 Extensive preparation
of the land was required before cotton could be planted. The field
had tO be turned over and cleaned, and then the plot had to be
harrowed smooth and large stones removed. And in areas where mounds
were utilized, these could be built during the second preparatory step.
Next came the planting. Instructions were to plant in straight rows

a specified number of feet apart, not only between the rows but also

 

4Hezron Onganjo, personal interview, West Kano, 10 September 1973,
and Zablon Aduo, personal interview, Kibos-Kakemega Junction, 12
October and 17 October 1973.

45T.J. Kennedy,"Study of Economic Motivation Involved in Peasant
Cultivation of Cotton," East African Institute of Social Research
Proceedings (January 1964), p. 9.

97

between the plants. Once planting had been accomplished, continuing
husbandry necessitated weeding at the prOper times.

Proper harvesting required as precise a method as had preparation
and planting. Further problems were created by the need to store
cotton until it could be sold. Finally when harvesting was completed,
farmers had to chOp down and burn cotton stalks. Usually farmers met
the extra labor requirement of cotton by utilizing all hands, parti-
cularly for major operations.

A sixth and final negative consideration turned the Nyanza
farmer against cotton planting. In the years 1901 to 1939, there
seemed to be little incentive or need for farmers to acquire money
through cash cropping. His low annual money expenditures were spread
out over the year. Small cash outlays for taxes, school fees, and
equipment replacement did not call for major fund-raising efforts.

And almost every extended family had at least one member skilled in
making baskets, household utensils and stools from materials which were
close at hand.

Contributing significantly to the LuO attitude to money was the
fact that money and material were not values in precolonial society.
Barter remained in existence many years. Even in 1939, on the eve of
World war II, it was possible for farmers in Nyanza to pay for many
services, which in an industrialized nation required money, by an ex-
change of produce or items from family industries. Among the services
that could still be acquired through barter were payments to traditional

doctors48, partial remuneration to skilled craftsmen, hiring of draft

 

48Josef Omodhi Chadha, personal interview, Kajulu, 27 July 1973.
Mr. Chadha is a traditional medical practitioner, world traveler and
a musician of considerable talent.

98

animals and transportation.

Clearly the above ideas illustrate the farmers' reasons for
resisting government's cotton policy. Overall, the peasant culti-
vators Of Central Nyanza met the demands Of the British Government's
directives to plant cotton. Even in those areas where the conditions
seemed present for sustained and successful resistance, some farmers
continued to grow cotton. The major and continuing form Of defiance
of government policy by the farmer was to plant the minimum acreage
in cotton. Modifying standard cotton husbandry enabled the farmer to
satisfy the authorities while leaving some time free for other
economic and leisure pursuits.

The resistance of farmers mostly can be attributed to peasant
economic views that scarcely meshed with western industrial thinking.
Although farmers had, in their terms, strong economic reasons for
resisting cotton as a cash crop, they were never successful in organi-
zing or finding allies to support their cause. We will next examine
the rise of the nationalist movement in Nyanza and try to discern
if there were any connections between the farmers' grievances and

nationalist agitation.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL NYANZA
1921-1940: A FAILURE TO REDRESS FARMER'S

GRIEVANCES AND THE FARMER'S MODUS VIVENDI

A review of the first two decades Of African cotton cultivation
in Central Nyanza reveals three distinct facts. One, individual
farmers were highly critical of the crOp itself and of the British
Government's insistence that cotton be grown. Two, individual
resentment never crystalized into a cohesive Opposition to Nairobi's
agricultural policy. Three, no farmers' organization arose during the
period that was either broadly or narrowly representative of the
farmers' interests. This lack of organized defiance Of the colonial
government may be traced to the decentralized, self-sufficient and
wholly autonomous nature of local polities in pre-colonial Luo society.
The fact remains, however, that there did exist in Western Kenya an
issue, cotton growing, around which general resentment was widespread
and around which a potentially large membership for an anti-government
organization could be organized.

Despite their peasant farming origins, the early nationalists
never succeeded fully in organizing the farmers' discontent. The
farmers mostly did not rush to seek membership in the movement, even
though they were attracted by the symbols of opposition. Nor did

they present their ideas to be molded into a program by the new

99

100

political leaders. Not only was there a failure by both groups to
support each other, but also there were specific points at which
Very strong antagonisms were revealed. This chapter will examine the
political activities of the early nationalists and their failure to
achieve a redress of the cotton farmers' grievances.

In 1921, despite the farmer's continuing economic problems, the
impetus for establishing a mass-based political organization came
from another quarter. During November and December, the Church Missionary
Society School at Maseno (hereafter C.M.S. Maseno) was the scene
of unusual agitation. Like several other missionary schools in
Nyanza, C.M.S. Maseno had been designed to train readers and low-
grade clerks for the local civil service.1 During the agitation in
1921, it was obvious at least in the case of Maseno that the system
had created an educated elite which could organize an opposition to
government. It was in fact the members of the first class in 1906,
now faculty members, who were inciting the agitation. Among these
were Jonathan Okwirri of Uyoma, Simeon Nyende of Gem Regea, Benjamin
Owour Gumba (hereafter Benjamin Owour) of Seme, Reuben Omulo of Gem
Marenyo, Ezekiel Apindi of South Nyanza, George Samwel Okoth of Alego,
Joel Meshak Omino of Kisumu, Mathayo Otieno and Michael were. Three
of the participants, Jonathan Okwirri, Simeon Nyende and Benjamin
Owour later formed the nucleus of early political leadership in
Nyanza.

Jonathan Okwirri, who, in 1921 was undergoing teacher training

at C.M.S. Maseno, became Chairman of the Young Kavirondo Association,

 

1K..M. Okaro-Kojwang,"0rigins and Establishment of the Kavirondo
Taxpayers Welfare Association," Ngano (Nairobi: East African Publish-
ing House, 1969), p. 112.

101

(hereafter YKA) the pioneer Luo political party. Much confusion
surrounds Okwirri's tenure of Office. He claims to have been given
the position fOr twenty years, but voluntarily left the organization
in 1933.2 Simeon Nyende on the other hand contends, and the record
seems to bear him out, that Okwirri left the office in 1923 to become
a teacher at C.M.S. Maseno. In 1939 Okwirri became chief of Uyoma
and was commended by government in 1946. At age 92, Jaduong3 Okwirri
is retired but maintains an interest in Kenya politics and is even
informed about black Americans.

In 1921, Simeon Nyende was also undergoing teacher training.
Like Okwirri, he had been a student with Benjamin Owuor at C.M.S.
Maseno earlier. He became the first treasurer of YKA. As late as
1963, Rev. (now BishOp) Nyende's criticism Of the colonial government
caused him to be censured by the Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza.

By 1921, Benjamin Owuor had completed eight years of study at
C.M.S. Maseno. Leaving Maseno in 1916, he had secured immediate
employment as a clerk in the office Of Provincial Commissioner John
Ainsworth. In 1917, when Ainsworth left Nyanza for military duty,
he secured a position for Owuor as a clerk in the Carrier Corps.
Demobilized in 1918, Owuor spent two years as a medical trainee in
Nyanza General Hospital Kisumu. In 1921 he was working as a foreman
at a sisal plantation near Maseno that served as the site for the
secret meetings. He became the first Secretary of YKA and remained

in that position in the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association until

 

2Jonathan Okwirri, personal interview, Uyoma, 27 September 1973.

3A Luo term of respect for elders.

102

1927. Aster 1927 he held no Offices in the association and left
active public life in 1935 due to poor health.4

In 1921, at a sisal plantation near Maseno, Okwirri, Nyende and
Owuor organized a series of secret meetings to discuss assertions
made by Daudi Bassude,5 a politically conscious Baganda employed at
the school. He had reported that impending legislation concerning
identity cards (Kipande) and Kenya's change Of status from protectorate
to colony meant the ascendency of settler politics and the more
complete exploitation of Kenya Africans.

The first item of business at the secret meetings was the creation
of the Young Kavirondo Association.6 The group became better known

as Piny Owacho, a Luo phrase whose exact meaning is difficult to pin

 

down. For some people it meant the "World Says," in contrast to the

government's formal heading on directives, "Serikal nasema" (the

 

4Partially blind now, Jaduong Owuor lives in retirement in East
Seme. Because of his delicate health and the esteem with which he is
held by his people, the whole community seems engaged in protecting
his privacy. He was the most difficult of the early activists to find.
But once he granted the interview he was informative, animated and
altogether charming. Despite his poor health, Mr. Owuor maintains an
active interest in Kenyan and African politics.

5Daudi Bassude was a telegraph operator at Maseno from 1918 to
1922. He was also editor of a vernacular newspaper, Sekanyolyg, and
a founder Of the National (Buganda) Federation of Bataka, a group Of
farmers agitating against the prOperty distribution of the 1900 Uganda
Agreement. His criticism of British policy was discovered and he
was fired by school officials. Apparently the Bassude dismissal was
handled so skillfully that none of the faculty members whom he had
turned into agitators were aware that the administrators knew of
his role.

 

6Some confusion surrounds this designation. Jonathan Okwirri, the
first president of the organization, insisted that it was never called
Young Kavirondo Association, but always Pipy Owacho. Neither Simeon
Nyende nor Benjamin Owuor agreed with Okwirri. The designation is,
however, the one used by scholars and will be used hereafter in this
work.

 

103

government says). To others it meant "the people say," or the "Voice
of the People,"7 the latter claimed by Okwirri and Nyende. It was,
they said, a way of making government feel that the association had

a mass base and reflected the will of the people. Equally it kept
officialdom from learning the name of the leaders and taking reprisals.
Benjamin Owuor, however, contended the meaning Of Piny Owacho was the
"World Says," but his reasoning is similar to that of Okwirri and
Nyende. Not only was the will Of the people being expressed but

also the right of a foreign dictatorial government was being challenged
by a greater force. "Serakal would tremble when confronted by the
World." Whatever the case, the phrase was meant to legitamize the
movement, elicit support from the masses and probably also to keep

the leaders' identities secret.

Eventually the meetings led to a petition of grievances scheduled
to be presented publically at a mass meeting on 23 December 1921. This
gathering hopefully would crystalize support for the criticisms and,
more importantly, put government on notice that the peOple desired
change. The full bill of particulars was not publicized until the
actual meeting. But the general outline of the petition was distri-
buted to prominent community leaders as far away as South Nyanza.
Excatly how people were notified is not precisely clear but informants
report that messages were carried to elders, whose support was
solicited. Benjamin Owuor and Simeon Nyende contend that students

were requested to submit names of potential leaders in their community

‘

7See Bethwell A. Ogot,"British Administration in the Central
I\ijanza District of Kenya, 1900-60," Journal of African History, (1963),

E3. 7.

8Benjamin Owuor, personal interview, East Seme, 8 August 1973.

104

who could be used to publicize the meeting as well as to indicate their
responses to the items on the petition. All who were involved in the
sisal plantation meetings knew the importance of the support of the
elders.

Thus selected students would return to their locales carrying
by word-of—mouth particular articles of Opposition and asking the
Old men to foster community support for the plan. Jonathan Okwirri,
however, stated that no student was given such responsibilities, and
claimed that he never sought the support of people in his location.
His version is that chiefs were contacted and then asked to spread
the word to their respective locations. Because the chiefs themselves
were vulnerable they were told to pass the message as quickly and
quietly as possible and not to take a leading role in the public
meeting.9

Clearly the organizational ability and the secrecy maintained
during this early stage are outstanding. Although government was
aware of the impending meeting they had no idea of the particulars or
the scope of the organization's appeal. Government Obtained its
information about the Lundha meeting from at least two sources. One,
Chief Muganda wished to ingratiate himself with government, hOping it
would in turn support him in acquiring and maintaining a hegemony
over his area similar to that held for so many years by Mumia. A
second lead of the association's plan can be attributed to Jairo
Owino, an interpretor in the provincial commissioner's office. Owino,

in point of service and rank, was the senior African official in

 

9Jonathan Okwirri, personal interview, Uyoma, 27 September 1973.

105

Nyanza. His dictatorial and officious personality made him unpOpular
with other Luo. But his language and administrative abilities, not
to mention his loyalty made him a favorite with British administrators.

Always in a position to know, through his judicious use of patron-
age, the currents of the community, Owino vaguely understood that
some Opposition to government was planned. He erroneously informed
provincial headquarters that a major military confrontation was about
to take place. A brief clash between the small government force and
participants at the meeting did take place. The Luo objected to
government's presence and especially to the armed police. A few harsh
words were exchanged and things seemed on the verge of hostilities
when Mr. Montgomery, D.C. for North Nyanza, intervened. Well—liked
by the residents of North and Central Nyanza, Montgomery ascertained
from the meeting's organizers that no violence was anticipated and
then effected the withdrawal of the British personnel. Jairo Owino
was left as an observer.

On 23 December 1921, the attendants of the Lundha meeting, who
have been estimated variously at 8,000 to 40,00010 participants,
discussed the full range of grievances and charges against government.
Acting in his capacity as chairman, Jonathan Okwirri led the dis-
cussion that resulted in a ten point memorandum to be presented to

government. The following demands were drawn up:

 

loOkarO-Kojwang, "Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association," p. 115,
quotes Rev. Reuben Omulo, a participant, as having calculated the
lower number. Jonathan Okwirri, in his interview on 27 September
1973, used the higher figure. Government used an even lower figure
than Omulo, citing 1000 persons, mostly young and mission trained.

106

(1) Establishment of a separate legislature for Nyanza as
an autonomous administrative unit, with an elected
African president at its head, so as to avOid the
reasons and abuses of direct administration.

(2) Abolition Of the kipande (identity card) which was
regarded as a denial of freedom of movement, thereby
tying peOple to undesirable jobs on European farms.

(3) Reduction Of the but and poll taxes with a view toward
excluding women from taxation.

(4) Building of a government school in Central Nyanza, and
the general improvement of educational facilities in
the whole province.

(5) Revocation of the crown colony status, with Kenya to
remain a protectorate.

(6) Increase of wages for Africans in general, and for
chiefs in particular.

(7) Abolition of indiscriminate forced labor, especially
among women, children and old peOple.

(8) Dissolution of the labor camps which had been set up
at Nyahera, Rabour, Yale and Pap Onditi -- these
being the source Of much hardship and the reason for
frequent raids into villages by government officials
in search of workers and free food, with resulting
corporal punishment.

(9) Granting of individual title-deeds to land to allay
the fear of possible EurOpean settlement in Nyanza,
some Nyanza land having been alienated for settlement
at Muhoroni.

(10) Creation of a paramount chief for the Central Nyanza
and South Nyanza Districts, similar to Mumia in
North Nyanza. 11

The meeting had two immediate objectives: to organize the community

and to elicit a response from government. The desired scenario

 

11There is no existing copy of the ten point memorandum. The
above has been constructed from personal interviews, government
documents and most importantly, Okaro-Kojwang's "Kavirondo Taxpayers
‘Welfare Association." Also a short list Of "complaints" are contained
:1n the Central Kavirondo District Annual Report for Kisumu, 1922,

p. :3.

107

foresaw an invitation from Nairobi to Piny Owacho's leadership to

 

discuss the prOposals. Such an eventuality, however, was not
immediately forthcoming.

Certain aspects of the Lundha meeting are worthy of more detailed
investigation. None of the resolutions directly concerned cotton

farmers' problems. All of Pipy Owacho's organizers had had less than

 

favorable experiences with cotton and should have been cognizant of
farmers' dissatisfactions. In explanation, Jonathan Okwirri asserted:
"We knew all about problems with cotton and we were going to do
something about them. But they weren't the most important problems."
Moreover, according to Okwirri, if the Luo could have successfully
extablished a separate legislature, many positive initiatives could
have taken, among them a redirection of agricultural priorities. The
overemphasis on settler agriculture to the detriment of African agri-
culture would have been reversed through the political process. In
this assessment Okwirri received at least partial support from
Benjamin Owuor, whose father had had early distasteful experiences
with cotton.

Owuor conceived of Piny Owacho as a direct political challenge

 

to settler politicians, such as William Grogan and Lord Delamere.
Consequently the farmers' most pressing issue had to defer to
political considerations. Another and even more candid justification
was given by Rev. Simeon Nyende. He claimed everyone was aware of

the farmers' plight, but those who participated in the secret meetings
were workers, like Owuor, or teachers and students. The lack of a

farmers' representative meant that their views were not included in

108

the resolutions. Nyende also suggested that at the meeting, the
farmers themselves were swept along by the political issues and
never stated their own particular concerns.

Perhaps the very attention to the political issues is a mark Of

the degree of alienation Of Piny_0wacho's leadership from their

 

constituents. It appears therefore that concentration on abstract
political considerations rather than on concrete local issues may
have impeded the organization's impact. Actually the enthusiasm
of the Lundha meeting indicated strong agreement with the associa-
tion's aims. But inherent contradictions between the organization
and its largely peasant constituency would manifest itself during
the political struggle.

While the consensus lasted the leadership accelerated their attack.
Shortly after the Lundha meeting, a delegation headed by Benjamin
Owuor met with Provincial Commissioner H.R. Tate, and demanded that
the governor meet with them to discuss ways of implementing the resolu-
tions. Tate had ideas on his own about the resolutions and attempted
to dissuage the group from seeking a direct confrontation with Nairobi.
Since the point would not be dropped tate suggested a mass meeting
at which some agreements could be worked out. Owuor's impression was
that the proposed meeting would work out the details as well as a
tentative agenda for the audience with Governor Northey.12

On 7 February 1922, much to the consternation of the assembled
Africans, P.C. Tate continued his attempt to negotiate the demands and

to assure the Luo that their problems were being brought to the

 

12Benjamin Owuor, personal interview, East Seme, 8 August 1973.

109

government's attention. This meeting convinced Tate that the African
leadership was indeed determined to continue its agitation. "The
attitude of the natives," it was reported, "was not all together
respectful."13 In spite of the disgruntled feelings on both sides,
one positive result was accomplished. Nairobi not only received a
COpy Of the Lundha meeting resolutions, but also heard lengthy African
feelings about the important issues. Assertions were made that the
Luo "were being treated as dogs" when forced to wear the kipande.14
There were also accusations that the colonial government's system on
taxation was unfair and that chiefs were paid such poor wages that
they were in danger of losing prestige among their peOple.

By 11 March 1922, when no further word was received from Tate,
an executive committee, again headed by Benjamin Owuor, drafted a
letter to the p.c. insisting on meeting with the governor. The
administration, however, wished to try one more placatory gesture,
and a third mass meeting was scheduled for Nyahera. At the 25 May
1922 meeting, the Chief Native Commissioner met with the leaders and
several thousand Africans. His attempts to assure the gathering
that his department was concerned and was the proper avenue for their
complaints was greeted with derision. In general tone the meeting
was respectful, but the Luo were no longer deferential in their
public behavior towards high—ranking British officials. Immediately

after the 25 May meeting, Piny Owacho__held a series of strategic

 

meetings with full publicity to apprise Central Nyanza that the

 

13Central Kavirondo District Annual Report for Kisumu (1922), p.2.

14Daniel Omer, personal interview, Kajulu, 30 July 1973.

110

governor was ignoring their just demands. Such was the nature of
public meetings at Lundha, Yale and Maseno during the month of June
1922. Central Nyanza was a beehive of political activity.

Simultaneously, selected young chiefs continued their political
activity. In late 1921, Chief Paul Moyi of Uyoma allegedly advised
his men to evade the payment of but tax. It was later established that
he had only failed to assist in collecting the hut—tax. Another chief,
Mugenya Of South Ugenya, reportedly was collecting fees to engage a
firm of advocates to represent his claims in regard to a boundary
question. By so doing he had ignored the proper channels provided by
the District Commissioner's Office. Finally Chief Daniel Odindo Of
Asembo had conducted a series of secret night meetings with other
chiefs in his area. Coinciding as it did with the emergence of

Pipy Owacho, the chief's machinations made it appear as if the admin-

 

istration would soon come under concerted attack. "It is notable that
these .,. . are among the younger chiefs and Mission boys."15 And
it could have been added that these men derived from the same elements

that constituted Piny Owacho's leadership. The outward appearance

 

of consensus represented by the Association's seemingly inexhaustible
ability to organize mass meetings; the aggressive demeanour of the
crowds and their vociferous advocacy of the resolution; the total
dedication of the leadership to the necessity of presenting their
grievances to the highest level of the colonial government; the
manifestation of growing political consciousness on the part of some

African administrators who could be seen as potential allies to the

 

15Kisumu District Annual Report (1921), p. 6.

 

lll

Opposition, caused the colonial administration to reconsider its
decision Of not having the governor appear before the group.
Eventually, on 8 July 1922, at Nyahera, Governor Sir Edward
Northey convened a meeting with the association's leadership and
thousands of supporters, some from as far away as Karachwonyo in
South Nyanza. For ten hours, broken only for the governor's lunch
break of slightly more than an hour, the resolutions and government's
intended actions were debated. At the outset the governor indicated
his willingness to deal with all save two issues. He claimed he did
not have the authority to alter Kenya's current status as a crown
colony, nor could he change the method of issuing title deeds. Those
issues would have to be handled by the home government in London.
Once the meeting got down to specifics, it became clear that the

consensus Obtained by Piny Owacho was ephemeral. Around the issue

 

of paramount chief, the various undercurrents in the Luo community
arose. Ultimately the issue became so exasperating that it allowed
the governor to close the meeting before substantive changes could be
agreed on. Subsequently, and as a direct consequence Of animosities
revealed in the meeting, every shade of opinion in Opposition to the
association was aired publically.

In particular the chiefs' caution gave away to their individual
political ambitions. In the confused and often acrimonious debates
which ensued it was revealed that almost every senior chief had made
representations to P.C. Tate concerning his own competence to fill
the position. Among these, Chief Amimo seems to have been the most

active prior to the meeting and the most aggressive during its

112

proceedings. Amimo asserted that he was the greatest of the LuO
Chiefs and should be given the position. By so doing, he had broken
a cardinal Luo political rule: those desiring political appointments
and advancementswere expected to be more circumspect about revealing
such ambitions. Amimo's candidacy was therefore hooted down, accom-
panied by the derisive ritualized chanting of "Amimo is Dead." Not
silenced, however, by the rebuke, Amimo prOposed that Central Nyanza
be given two paramount chiefs. He, of course, nominated himself
for the proposed western division and Chief Ogada of Uyoma for the
eastern portion.l6

Unfortunately Amimo's outburst did not end the discussion before
further debilitating exchanges occurred. Among these was the hosti-
lity unleashed toward the choice of Ihnjamin Owuor as paramount chief.
Owuor's name had been suggested by the governor as a compromise when
his first candidate, Ogutu Gor, was rejected by the assembly. Owuor
was rejected for three reasons. First, the chiefs objected to his
youth and the fact that he was not royalty, meaning that neither
Owuor's father nor grandfather had been important chiefs. Second, he
was not a well known and prominent personality. This was really an
omnibus criticism that also encompassed the fact that he had not

entered the traditional political structure of elders and advisors

 

l6Even interviewees who had not attended the 8 July 1922 Nyahena

meeting rembered stories of Amimo's embarrassing conduct there.
The account of the meeting contained here was drawn in the main from
interviews with the following:

Abrahim Kayi, personal interview, West Kano, 21 August 1973;
Benjamin Owuor, personal interview, E. Seme, 8 August 1973; Rev.
Simeon Nyende, personal interview, Gem Uyoma, 25 September 1973;
Barnabas Nyangor, personal interview, Ndere, 9 November 1973.

113

to chiefs. And finally large numbers Of Luo were suspicious Of

Owuor's and, indeed, the whole of the Piny Owacho leaderships'

 

western education.

Behind all of the objections to Owuor can be discerned the
political anxieties in the Luo community resulting from the imported
system of indirect rule. Traditional political leaders, elders,
counselors and advisors generally had, been relegated to a ceremonial
position by British—appointed chiefs. The latter, in turn, had
constructed their own hierarchy which, in most instances, ignored
traditional Office holders. Already sufficiently isolated in their
contacts with the colonial government the elders saw no reason to
offer the "new men" entree into the political structure.17 In the
period between the first Lundha meeting on 23 December 1921, and the
8 July 1922 meeting, an intense whisper campaign had been mounted

against the possible nomination of any Piny Owacho Official for para—

 

mount chief. Like the organization's inability to articulate the
cotton farmers grievances, its failure to provide a consensus candidate
for this sensitive position exhibited its lack of political integra-
tion. The association's leaders were victims of the Luo political
heritage and a lack of western political SOphistication. On the one
hand the inherently democratic LuO traditional political structure
allowed for long, exhaustive public discussions and negotiations
involving the whole community before an issue was resolved. Western
practice; on the other hand, had little patience with "palaver" and

its accompanying excitability, violent gestures and §d_hominem

 

17John M. Lonsdale, A Political History of Nyanza 1883-1945,
Unpubl. Ph.D. Diss. (Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1964),
p. 118.

114

arguments. Luo political practices could encompass these lengthy
practices, but the meeting with Governor Northey was not timed for
Luo political techniques.

At least one other issue surfaced during the meeting that turned

out to be detrimental to Piny Owacho's intentions. Around the item

 

of title deeds further splits develOped, with Jairo Owino again
causing considerable problems. Capitalizing on the fear of change
that he knew most farmers felt, Owino suggested that title deeds

would destroy the fabric Of Luo society. It would be, he asserted,
impossible for a man to use his property in any way he saw fit.
Further, consolidation would involve endless litigation resulting from
explOitation in exchanging land with one's neighbor. Although the
leadership understood that title deeds were basically insurance against
settler expropriation, they let the issue drOp in the face of
Objection by the older farmers. Simeon Nyende reasoned that the
farmers could see that EurOpeans did not seem to be that interested

in acquiring land in Nyanza and therefore were not very excited by

the resolution.18 Significantly the 8 July 1922 meeting represents

a watershed in Piny Owacho's authority. Not only did they lose

 

publicly and for the first time to government but also questions arose
concerning their ability to lead the Luo community.

Thereafter slow descent of Piny Owacho began, but it had accomplished

 

much in its brief life. In the space of eight months a group of
individuals with no previous political experience had conducted an

organized campaign that had resulted in an Open air confrontation with

 

18
1973.

Rev. Simeon Nyende, personal interview, Gem Regea, 29 October

115

the highest official in the colonial administration. They had
displayed a dedication and singleness of purpose to which the group
would never be able to return. Not only did they turn aside ploys
such as discussions with P.C. Tate and the Chief Native Commissioner,
but they also maintained their solidarity even when government
pressured them. For example, Benjamin Owuor, Simeon Nyende and
Jonathan Okwirri were all threatened with arrest. In fact, warrants
for their arrest were being held by local authorities but were never
executed.

The early nationalists won concessions on two of the more visible
colonial Oppressions. By the second meeting with P.C. Tate, labor
camps had been abandoned; those already in existence were to be turned
to other uses, and those scheduled for construction like Rabour were
simply discontinued. The camps represented the immediate threat from
government and symbolized its omnipresent authority. As annoying as
the camps, and resulting from them, was the practice of the adminis-
tration and construction crews of appropriating all materials, even
those currently in use. Particularly galling was the confiscation
of gate posts, which resulted in the loss of livestock.19 Chickens,
vegetables, and local products such as baskets and cooking and storage
utensils were also likely articles for appropriation. Thus, causing
the abandonment of the labor camps was a major accomplishment.

Beyond ending the labor camps, compulsory labor was abolished in
law, if not completely abandoned until 1945. No longer could women,

children and the ill be required to work at road maintenance or on

 

19Okwaka Wadakaya, personal interview, Usonga, 13 November 1973.

116

other government-inspired community work projects. Ironically the
one area in which forced labor was continued was cotton—growing. The
reasons for this are complex and will be discussed below. Suffice it
to say that the association's leaders were ambivalent about cOtton,
which apparently they accepted as a desirable westernism while simul—
taneously resisting its method of introduction and the continuing low
price.

Possible the most important concession won from government was
the restructuring of the tax system. Taxes were reduced, with women
receiving total exemptions. The importance of securing a tax reduction
is thrown into sharper perspective when it is remembered that in the
1920's African wages were cut by one-third to one-half.20 Such a clear
cut victory, however, was no assurance of continuing support for the
association. As it developed most constituents, because of the

attendant publicity on such issues as kipande, were not aware that

Pipy Owacho had achieved a more equitable standard of taxation. Most

 

Luo assumed that government benevolence, in conjunction with their
lowered wages, just naturally brought about the lowered taxes. Again
the association's lack of political expertise was demonstrated: at

no point were they able to capitalize on their triumphs. Indeed there
seemed to be little effort at publicizing its successes, instead,
according to one local representative, "we had to use all of our

energies to get people tO continue fighting kipande."21

 

20Roger M.A. vanZwanenberg, The Agpicultural History of Kenya
to 1939 (Nairobi: East African Printing House, 1972), p. 25.

 

21Janes Oloya, personal interview, West Kano, 31 August 1973.

117

Unfortunately Pipy Owacho's leadership was unable to build a

 

sustained, politically active organization. By failing to identify
the day-to-day issues, particularly with regard to farmers and cotton
policy, the organization dissipated its energies trying to resolve
complex political/constitutional issues. A central focus around which
the majority of the community could coalesce was missing, and a

few years later the organization's leadership scattered around the
country. Several of the better leaders were coopted into government
service as representatives of the local native councils, thus causing
them to be alienated from the community. The elders who had opposed

them as Piny Owacho's leaders now viewed the young politicians as

 

opportunists. Similarly, as representatives of government their
credibility as critics of the administration was severely compromised.
In July 1923, they approached Archdeacon Owen of C.M.S. Maseno
with an Offer to become Life President and Guardian of the Association.
Owen had impressed the association's leaders by his sympathetic
response to their cause and also because as a European he understood
the government and was not subject to the same restrictions as Africans.
For example, in the 1920's, few Africans possessed bank accounts and
Owen arranged for an organizational account with his name as a sponsor.
By September, Owen had accepted the position and was ready to create
major changes in the organization's focus and activities. Immediately
the association's name was changed. In keeping with Owen's ideas of

a loyal Opposition and his assessment of the needs of the Luo community

 

22Jonathan Okwirri, personal interview, Uyoma, 27 September 1973
and Rev. Simeon Nyende, personal interview, Gem, 29 October 1973.

118

it became the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association. Owen suggested
the name would point to them as law-abiding citizens who were interes-
ted in assisting the government to be more rational and equitable
in its approach. If any politics at all were contemplated, it would
be accomplished through Archdeacon Owen's lobbying efforts with the
administration and public officials. For all practical purposes KTWA
would have the dual function of making community representations to
government, while advising the community in matters of thrift, hygiene,
home management and dietary education. In 1926, even though later the
colonial government became seriously concerned about Owen and, by
implication, all missionaries, he was given a commendation by the
Nyanza Province administration. By 1928, the administrators could
report that due to domestic rivalries and internal dissentions, "the
Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association . . . would seem to be almost
moribund."23
Earlier, in the years 1924 through 1927, a tremendous period of
factionalization ensued which further dissipated the political energies
of the Luo community. In 1924, the Native Catholic Union was formed
with the same policies as the KTWA. The rationale for this duplication
of organizations can be attributed to Catholic feelings of being
excluded from decision—making positions in KTWA.24 A full discussion

Of the Native Catholic Union is not within the scope of the work. Its

organization, however, signaled a splintering trend away from the

 

23C.O. 544, Native Affairs Department Annual Report 1928, p. 3.

24Jacobo Jakoyo, personal interview, West Kano, 6 September 1973.

119

earlier, if limited, consensus established by Piny Owacho. Between

 

1925 and 1927, other organizations, some substantial, some rather
ephemeral, continued to draw support away from KTWA. Such factional-
ization allowed every shade of personal and political Opinion to
surface and be expressed.

Even when KTWA had established a meaningful set of Operational
procedures and a staff for its implementation, personal, ethnic and
locational animosities interferred. During its existence, the KTWA
offi-e of inspector succumbed to intra-tribalism. Created in early
1923 the office of inspector had the responsibility for visiting and
coordinating all the district and locational committees. Due to
government attempts to limit the influence of the organization this
Officer was the only African leader with the right to visit all
locations.

His efforts were relentlessly resisted by Luo farmers. Shadrack
Osewe, Of Alego, the only person to hold office of inspector, was
continually thwarted in his efforts to exercise one of his primary
tasks, laison with cotton farmers. Osewe, in the company of John
Paul Olola, at the time senior African agricultural staff member, was
to listen to and coordinate farmers' complaints about cotton. But he
was also to instruct the barmers in basic husbandry to improve their
yield and thereby increase their income. His efforts generally met
with derision and indignant suggestions that he return to Alego and

25

teach his own location how to deal with its "jungle." By 1926, accor-

ding to Simeon Nyende, then President of KTWA, Osewe was so disheartened

 

25Rev. Simeon Nyende, personal interview, Gem Uyoma, 29 October

1973.

120

by his continuing failure to work with cotton farmers, then he asked
to be relieved Of his duties, and the position was quietly discontinued.
Thus ended the only substantive effort by the early nationalists to
assist cotton farmers. Ironically its failure had not been achieved
by government but by the lack of responsiveness on the farmers' part.
With the discontinuance of Osewe's office the one link that the
organization had with the larger LuO community was broken. The dis-
ruption meant that the organization's effective power resided in
Archdeacon Owen and that its influence was generally confined to the
immediate area of Maseno and its environs.

Without Osewe's office, there was no control or coordination of
the local representatives. Always a sore point, because of dissatis-
factions over duties and remuneration, after 1926 the local represen-
tatives' structure ceased to function.26 Many agents expected to be
paid for their services, and when salaries were not forthcoming, they
ceased their duties but maintained the office. Structurally, weak
the KTWA could not deal with disaffection and therefore limited its
protests to petitions to the Chief Native Commissioner in Nairobi.

As late as the mid-1930's, even the energetic Zablon Aduo could
not reverse the trend. Aduo began serving as KTWA President in 1955,
an office he still holds with the organization. In the 30's, he

must have been one of the most widely-traveled individuals in Nyanza

 

26This controversy was reliably reported by Arahim Kayi, Janes

Oloya and Jacobo Jakoyo, all of West Kano. Bishop Simeon Nyende,
long time Chairman of KTWA, affirmed their accounts. But Jonathan
Okwirri stated the problem did not occur over salaries but because of
religious differences. He acknowledged, however, that the local
representatives were seldom effective.

121

Province. He was Secretary of KTWA, the first African agent of the
Kenya Farmers' Association, a prominent member of the Nyanza branch

of the African Chamber of Commerce and a businessman; his various
positions and interests allowed him to travel extensively without
government restriction. He was known throughout Nyanza in the African,
European and Asian communities. Yet he was unable to reverse the
apathy of the organization's local leadership. "PeOple were," he said,
"afraid of political activity, especially outside their location."27
He might even have added that most people in the locations by the
mid-1930's, had a variety of political organizations to choose from.
This made it particularly difficult to achieve a consensus on any
sensitive issue. Moreover, peOple outside the urban-administrative

areas had difficulty keeping the various organizations separate in

their minds. Ironically the memory of Piny Owacho remained strong,

 

at least in terms of rhetorical attractiveness, if not because of its
program. Further this memory did little to orient the Luo community

toward KTWA, the direct descendent of Piny Owacho.

 

In summary, between 1921-1923, although Piny Owacho captured the

 

imagination of the community, some Luo, particularly older farmers,
avoided strongly identifying with the movement. The reasons seem to
be that the association attacked political/constitutional issues with
more vigor than they attacked everyday economic problems. Moreover,
the new nationalists were an unknown quantity and their challenge to
existing leadership was not welcomed. Because of their youth, western

education and new religious ideas they generated resentment, particularly

 

27Zablon Aduo, personal interview, Kisumu, 12 October 1973.

122

from chiefs serving the colonial government and from locational

elders who were nominally community leaders. Equally detrimental to
the organization's aspiration was the lack of political SOphistication
Of the early leadership. Almost immediately some leaders were coopted
into government positions. Simultaneously the organization began to
rely on outside advice. Once dependent on the advice of liberal
Europeans, the leaders accepted a change in the group's orientation.
By September 1923 the priorities of the association were social rather
than political in nature. Finally around 1925, the association's
deterioration was hastened by the factionalization of the nationalists
into rival groups. In short, the farmer was left to devise his own
method of resisting government policy without incurring government
wrath.

Without benefit of allies and lacking a rational direction from
government, the Nyanza farmer without seeming to Oppose cotton
directives, had to construct his own system of dealing with government's
demands. Essentially the cultivator presented the illusion of meeting
administrative requirements while remaining free to pursue his own
designs.

Certainly he relied on his own cultural norms in regard to cotton.
First, and most important, he continued to use traditional farming
practices. Second, his major forum for complaint was a ritualized
demonstration at buying centers. Third, farmers dealt with African
functionaries and just another intragroup rival. A fourth, and final
device involved cooperating with nationalist agitators but on specific

local issues.

123

Once the farmer understood that government would respond favorably
to appearances the rest seemed easy. Moreover, planting cotton with
other crops assured that government pressure would subside because the
crop had been planted. Beyond that, the idea provided its own rational
support system. It meant not only using the broadcast method of
planting but also interplanting cotton with food crOps; relegating
cotton husbandry to indigenous schemes completed the process. The
method assured a minimum of government contacts. "They were interested
in cotton being grown and would show us the right way time after time.
But if you did not plant at all, they caned you."28 During the years
1919 to 1934, Mathayo Odindo satisfied government by cultivating cotton
using the broadcast method. Even in 1938, when he became an agricul—
tural extension worker, he continued its use.

Sowing seed broadcast was the traditional method of planting.29
Seed would be scattered about, and covered, hopefully, well enough
for germination. Some cotton could always be germinated by this
technique. Although the resultant spacing contributed to low yield,
this too was to the farmer's advantage since he could spend less time
on the crop.

Beyond the savings in time spent to harvest the crop, broadcasting
eliminated the time-consuming specifics of proper planting, but it

used seed at a faster rate and was wasteful by design.30 Most of the

 

28Mathayo Odindo, personal interview, West Kano, 20 November 1973.

29Archdeacon W.E. Owen,"Food Production and Kindred Matters Amongst

the Luo," Journal of the East African and Uganda Natural History Sociepy,

30Okelo Oluoch, personal interview, Nyakach, 31 October 1973.

124

seed would be scattered as quickly as possible without concern for
its growing. That the wastage was purposeful is evidenced by the
fact that all farmers could recite proper spacing and planting
techniques, but few were seriously enough attached to growing cotton
to pursue prOper procedures.

Not only were the labor requirements of cash cropping more ex—
tensive and intensive than established practices but also the value
of increased labor inputs had little meaning for African farmers.
Working extra man-hours on maize or simesim, particularly following
a disaster, has some utility: to stave off starvation. Growing cotton
for export made little social or economic sense.31 It did not produce
food as insurance against locusts or drought, and cotton could not be
used to fulfill social obligations. It was, in short, equated with
labor for EurOpeans with few benefits accruing to the farmer.32

Seldom, although they had been instructed Otherwise, did farmers
refrain from interplanting cotton with food crops. It made no sense
to most Luo farmers to let the land "go to waste."33 Even when
government threatened, and sometimes carried out the threat, to uproot
food crops the practice never has been fully discontinued.

Possibly interplanting cotton and food crops was the most frus-
trating experience for African field workers. "In 1932," Jacobo

Halowe reported, "I selected one of the best farmers in the area

 

31George Dalton,"Traditional Production," Economic Anthropology,
p. 76.

 

32Andrea Okal, personal interview, Nyakach, 31 October 1973.

33Gilbert Ngige, personal interview, Kajulu, 12 July 1973.

125

34 Later when

[Alego] to help me demonstrate the way to grow cotton."
making an inspection tour with his supervisor, Halowe was dismayed

to find his demonstrator had planted maize between cotton rows. Only
when threatened with physical punishment did the farmer consent to
uproot the maize.

Several explanations for the continuing practice can be suggested.
Combining cultivation in one field meant that maintenance for both
food and cash crops could be done simultaneously. Invariably farmers
would adhere to the schedule Of simesim, or maize, and do cotton with
that crop since traditional food crops seldom required more than one
weeding.

Probably the most important reason for mixing cotton with another
crop was the fear of famine. Historically Central Nyanza experienced
recurrent natural disasters, which resulted in some degree of malnu-
trition. From the precolonial period, several older respondents
remembered flooding, drought and locusts,35 and during the early
colonial period other catastrophies occurred. All resulted in a number
of deaths, and all consequently effected agriculturalaoutput.

In April 1907 an acute food shortage provided the impetus for a
four day conference in Kisumu. Under discussion were methods for

handling future problems of communicable diseases and food scarcity.36

 

35Daniel Omer, personal interview, Kajulu, 30 July 1973; Yare
Okoth, personal interview, Kajulu, 19 November 1973; Elijah Nam,
personal interview, West Kano, 12 September 1973; and Josha Anya,
personal interview, West Seme, 14 August 1973.

36K.N.A., Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1907, p.

126

Those attending included C.W. Hobley, H.B. Partington and M.R.
McClellan, the Acting Provincial Commissioner. Of the pressing
problems none was more important than ensuring that the year's
cotton crop would be planted. However, none of those attending was
optimistic about significantly increasing cotton acreage that year.

In 1908, the following year, bubonic plague struct Central Nyanza
District, necessitating quarantine restrictions for four and a half
months.37 In 1912, the plague was even more devastating.

The outbreak of plague has shown no signs Of abatement.

Besides the cases in the township, there is little doubt

that there are a considerable number of deaths in the

Reserve. The natives, however, conceal these last to the

best of their ability. 38
By 1915 better health services controlled the dimensions of the
epidemics, but natural disasters continued to decrease crop output.
The peasant responded in a rational manner since his actions were
motivated more toward survival than the high cotton yields which
maximized profits.39 Even if the farmer had been oriented toward
profits, frequent catastrOphies forced him to neglect cash crops.

The Nyanza cotton farmer registered his disinterest in the crop

by the variety of ways in which he simply ignored cotton maintenance.

Few if any farmers admitted doing two preparations of the ground.

 

37K.N.A., Nairobi, Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1909, p. 12.

 

38K.N.A., Kisumu District Quarterlijeport, (Ending 30 September
1912), p. 101.

39See William O. Jones."Economic Man in Africa," Food Research
Institute Studies, 1, 2, (May 1960), passim; T.J. Kennedy "Study of
Economic Motivation Involved in Peasant Cultivation of Cotton,"
East African Institute of Social Research Conference Proceedings
(Kampala: East African Institute on Social Research, 1964), passim.

 

 

 

 

127

Moreover, even the most advanced farmers seldom weeded at the proper
time without coercion. Also the correct number of weedings were
neglected. But the most hated task was the requirement to burn and
destroy all cotton residue after the harvest. This procedure entailed
extra work and diminished, in the farmer's eyes, the crop's value.

The residue of traditional food crOps were always utilized for
building material or livestock fodder.

The second major method Opposing government entailed demonstrations
at buying centers. These usually took the form of ritualized yelling
and threats to the Asian buyers. The impetus for the disturbances were
of course low prices and unfair treatment at the Centers.

To understand the last charge it is necessary to detail the
selling procedures in Central Nyanza. Between 1916 and 1923 Samwel
Ada headloaded his cotton into Kisumu for sale. There he saw hundreds
of farmers milling about, gesturing, talking, and complaining. In
the Open square were several scales, beside each were an Asian buyer
and an African worker. The buyer would weigh the cotton and give each
man a slip of paper to be taken to the cashier for payment. The
African worker would haul the purchased cotton off for storage. He
would also, when directed by the buyer, pull out several handsfull
of cotton for inspection.

If it were discovered that several grades of cotton were in the
same container the farmer was ordered to separate them. This involved
taking the cotton to a special area. There the bag was spilled onto
empty mats, and under the watchful eye of the buyer's assistant, the

contents that farmers consciously mixed the grades in an attempt to

128

get more money for their crop.

Farmers disliked regrading their cotton, but their major criticism
focused around price and the practices involved in payment. First
farmers were never told how many pounds of cotton they had and at
what price it was being purchased. Secondly, receipts were seldom
issued. For example during the years 1918 through 1943, Johanna
Otiro claims never to have received a receipt.l'1 If vouchers were
given they simply told how many shillings were to be paid by the
paymaster.

Usually the paymaster's station was a scene of confusion. Here
disgruntled farmers would vent their anger over the system. Curses,
name calling and threats were made. While there is no record of actual
violence at buying centers, demonstrations would sometimes last several
hours.

In retrospect this action was least likely to produce needed
change. As long as cotton was being sold, government would probably
not respond to such disorganized protests. Moreover, government was

assisted in its laissez faire attitude by the farmers themselves.

 

The demonstrations had no long term effects because once the farmers
left the buying center their protests ended. And never were farmers
criticized for their behavior by either European or African officials.
Apparently government looked on the demonstrations as legitimate
safety valves for the farmers' resentment. Beyond stationing a few
police at strategic centers, no other action was anticipated or taken.

In short, buying center agitation was a finely choreographed exercise

 

41Johanna Otiro, personal interview, Siaya, 6 November 1973.

129

in which the farmer clearly understood his range of action.
Eventually some Asian buyers did respond to complaints. For
example, Musa Ramji, part-owner of the Kisumu Cooperative Ginnery,
made several tours of locations trying to explain the nature of
cotton pricing, and in 1936 he appeared at a baraza in West Kisumu to
discuss prices for the next season.42 Ramji's actions, however,
were not duplicated by other buyers.
Beyond treating cotton as a traditional crOp and demonstrating
at buying centers, the farmers tried other means of resisting cotton

policy. In a third method of achieving his modus vivendi the farmer

 

devised a way of neutralizing the power of local officials, who
occasionally were more aggressive than the colonials, but who were also
more Open to compromise.

Most farmers admitted that a system of small but judicious bri-
bery was practiced in the reserve. SO long as the practice did not
become blatant and a reasonable work standard was maintained, higher
authorities, it seemed, ignored the bribes.

Some farmers used physical assault or the threat of violence to
moderate the power of local officials. While never a widespread
practice, beatings seemed to be a particularly effective weapon against
staff who worked outside their residential area. Such assaults seemed
to have the tacit consent of the area chief.43 After an attack,

extension workers seldom found it difficult to transfer to new

 

42Otieno Otite, personal interview, West Kisumu, 15 September

1973.
43Leo Ajumba Asewe, personal interview, West Kisumu, 9 August
1973.

130

assignments. Most assaults took place at night so that assailants
were not readily identifiable. Sometimes the intended victim would
be invited to participate in a beer party,44 once inebriated he would
be set upon by farmers.

Although not substantiated, homicides against African agricul-
tural agents were reported. There were many rumors of poisonings, and
at least one worker, Augustinus Angwech, reported being threatened
with poisoning.

Among other devices for controlling African officials, farmers
made public accusations. Most Luo desired to avoid being charged
partly because it meant the whole community could criticize the
individual. Whether the charges could be proven or not hardly seems
to have mattered. ". . . in some 20 cases heard and dismissed it
was proved that either the charges were without foundation Of the
cattle claimed had been taken by headmen in carrying out the judgements

"45 What mattered was that administrative

of the Native Tribunals.
staff members' competence had been ridiculed.

Not even chiefs were exempt from accusation. In 1923 and 1924 a
large number of cases were heard in Central Kavirondo District courts
charging chiefs with malfeasance of office. As late as 1937 Simeon
Otiende was accused by one of his constituents of not requiring

Kajulu farmers to plant more cotton.46 Clearly the itent was to

embarass Otiende before the British authorities.

 

4Augustinus Orembo, personal interview, Usonga, 13 November 1973.

45K.N.A., Annual Report Central Kavirondo District 1924, p. 2.

 

46Misak Okwirri, personal interview, Kajulu, 7 November 1973.

131

Usually as a last resort farmers planted the minimum acreage
possible. Without adequate supervisory personnel, government could
do little more than to accept farmers actions in this regard. While
trying to carry out his duties even to the extent of physically
punishing farmers, Gideon Siru admitted that government was fighting
a losing battle. Interestingly enough Mr. Siru asserted that most
agricultural workers knew that the cotton farmer was being exploited,
but, as government employees they had to carry out policy.47 In the
years 1935 to 1949, when Siru was a locational headman in Kajulu, his
goal was to get everyone to plant some cotton. After this had been
done Siru claimed to have relaxed his surveilance.

Beyond manipulating African staff and taking advantage of the
shortage of supervisory personnel, farmers frequently combined with
the nationalists in more organized protest. In 1938 Zablon Aduo,
then General Secretary of the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association,
worked with farmers from West Kisumu to prevent abuses at Kisian
Market. C.G. Punjani, an Asian buyer, had acquired the reputation
for short—weighting farmers. Aduo convinced Major Campbell, District
Officer, West Kisumu, that the charges were serious enough to warrant
action. Campbell acted in part out of his close friendship with Aduo
and Yonah Orao, who became Chief of West Kisumu in 1940.

Before the sale Aduo and Campbell weighed all cotton. After the
sale they compared receipts with their own figures and confronted

Punjani.48 He was later reported to the provincial commissioner, and

 

47Gideon Siru, personal interview, Kajulu, 3 August 1973.

48Jaoko Elisha Wagude, personal interview, West Kisumu,

9 August 1973.

132

his license was revoked.

Unfortunately the success Of this venture had limited effects.
The government considered the Punjani affair a minor detail. A
brief motion of the case appeared in the first quarterly report for
1938, but no notice was taken of the incident in the annual report
for Kisumu District or Central Nyanza Province.

Unfortunately, the farmers also seemed unimpressed. None of
the principals involved, with the exception of Zablon Aduo, attempted
to organize subsequent actions, and he achieved limited success for
his efforts. A partial explanation for this failure may be the
waning power of all the nationalist organizations after 1930. A
farmer in Nyakach added the following observations.

In 1938 Nyangweso [locusts] destroyed cotton and people

were afraid to plant. I did not plant in 1936 and 1937.

In 1938 I planted a half acre because I needed the money.

I heard about Pipy Owacho but it was a long time ago.

The only man helping us in 1938 was Chief Issak Ogoma, I
did not see anyone else. 49

 

The nationalist political structure was defunct, and Aduo's ability
to organize was restricted to those with whom he had personal relation-
ships.
In conclusion, the Nyanza peasant farmer shrewdly appeared to
be meeting government regulations. In reality he was maintaining
his conservative agricultural practices. This analysis in no way
suggests that cultivators were stagnant, unchanging or unable to
adapt to new conditions. Their adjustments, however, were dictated

more by their own needs than by the desires of the British Government

 

49Pancraseus Onduru, personal interview, South Nyakach, 29
October 1973.

133

or the machinations of the international commodity market.

During the years 1922 to 1939, after the nationalists failed to
pursue a strong program of ameliorating the farmers' situation, the
growers devised their own system of interacting with government.
Essential to the scheme was a transformation of the whole structure
surrounding cotton. Cotton was subjected to peasant agricultural
techniques, giving work on the crop a degree of relevance, but not
so much that its maintenance could not be relegated to food crop
husbandry. Although farmers disliked the crOp they adjusted to its
presence and simultaneously maintained some of the integrity of their

social structure. And two, their modus vivendi did significantly

 

limit the frequency of government and protected the farmer from open
confrontation.

Seen in this light the farmers' response to cotton must be
adjudged rational and legitimate. Given this level of technology
and low economic requirements, the Nyanza farmer opted for his own

preferences over those of the imperial government.

CONCLUSION

In a recent article, D. Anthony Low characterized a new approach
in African history as a "view from the other side of the hill or
lower colonialism, colonialism at the grass-roots level."1 This
revisionary idea argues for a new synthesis that concerns itself
more with African social and economic history than with European
activities during the same period. It sees a necessity to under-
stand colonialism and its impact by explaining the reactions,
adjustments, and accomodations made by Africans to an alien hegemony
and administration, a view strongly argued by J.F.A. Ajayi in
"Colonialism An Apisode in African History," in L.H. Gann and Peter
Guignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa,yl870-l960, The History and
Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1969).

My study of the Nyanza cotton industry hassstressed the new
approach, and therefore, provides a more viable synthesis than Hugh
Fearn's "Cotton Production in the Nyanza Province of Kenya Colony,
1908-1954," The Empire Cotton Growing Review, 33 (1956), and Ag;
African Economy: A Study of the Economic Development of Nyanza

Province of Kenya, 1903-33 (London, 1961); and L. Winston Gone and

 

J.F. Lipscomb, ed., The History of Kenya Agriculture (Nairobi, 1972).

 

lD. Anthony Low, "Middle Colonialism," Journal of African History,
xii, 1 (1971), p. 160.

134

135

All three studies are important contributions to African history,
but they suffer from serious weaknesses.

Fearn's work provides favorable appraisals of African efforts on
the most basic level of agricultural production. No attention is
given, however, to African political agitation and its effect on the
farmers' response to growing cotton. The impression is conveyed of
a faceless mass of humanity content with limited economic responsi-
bility and limited financial returns.

Gone and Lipscomb's study suffers from three major faults. First,
its principal focus is the activity of non—Africans in Kenya. Second,
the analysis minimizes African efforts by failing to discuss the
effect of African activity on economic policy. The third serious
difficulty stems from the editors unwillingness to deal realistically
with racism in Kenyan agriculture.

Other publications about Kenya portray the African in paternal-
istic terms or view him as a non-economic man. Such stances are
basically anti-intellectual and reveal a variety Of fundamental racism.
The present study, however, has appraised African activities in more
objective terms and challenges other misconceptions found in Hugh
Fearn's "The Diverse Pattern of African Agriculture in the Nyanza

Province of Kenya," Natural Resources, Food and Population in Inter—

 

Trppical Africa, L. Dudley Stamp, ed. (London, 1955); in A.M. O'Connor,

 

An Economic Geography of East Africa- (London, 1966); and C.N. French,

 

Report on the Cotton Growing Industry in Uganda, Kenya and the Mwanza

District of Tanganyika (London, 1925).

 

The years 1901 to 1930 were characterized by extreme ambiValence

136

toward the Nyanza cotton industry by government and the farmers.
Neither of these groups could organize a rational plan for achieving
their goals. Nairobi could not coordinate the men, money or material
to construct the required economic infrastructure to support the new
enterprise. The farmers exhibited an equal uncertainty about accepting
or rejecting the crop. Initially, the farmers' resistance seemed
little more than peasant suspicion and conservatism toward new
innovations. Upon closer examination it appears that the farmers'
rejection of cotton was more complex and was founded on a very real
difference of perceptions between their needs and the government's
economic reasoning.

Unlike the Europeans, Luo farmers were more a-tuned to minimizing
the risk of starvation than by considerations of finance. Luo farmers
concentrated on food crops, and the normal surplus was utilized in
ways sanctioned by society. While the excess could be used to barter
for other products it could not be used to achieve a material advan-
tage over clanmates. Goods and services in traditional society
depended not on an individual's wealth but on the distributive network
within a given clan or polity. Status and class stratification were
evident in Luo society, but chiefs and prominent people were forced
to share their wealth. Thus, a money economy had little attraction
for Nyanza farmers. Moreover, as several informants indicated, money
was introduced by EurOpeans to pay for innovations (taxes, school
fees, licenses, etc.) introduced by Europeans.

Even if Luo farmers had responded positively to money, they did

not have enough fertile land to waste it on a non-food crop. Whenever

137

land of high carrying capacity was discovered, the Luo utilized it to
the fullest. The pattern of settlement and the classification of
soils as to type and workability suggests that Luo farmers made a
better assessment and use Of their land than is generally acknowledged.
The traditional system of land distribution and ownership took
cognizance of the lack of uniformity in Nyanza's soils. Like the
distribution of wealth, farm sites were spread among the different
soils in the area, thus assuring that all farmers theoretically had
equal access to good soil. Strip farming, however, was not conducive
to cash-cropping, particularly cotton. Moreover, Nyanza farmers
demonstrated an extreme reluctance to change their system of land
holding.

Similarly traditional agricultural techniques did not allow for
the easy introduction of cotton. Food crop technology was geared to
achieving small returns from a variety of crops. To this end planting
and husbandry practices were neither so demanding nor so time consum-
ing as for cash crops. Not only did food crops require less work but
also its residue, stalks, branches, and seeds were valuable. Cotton
plants, on the other hand, had to be burned after harvest, considerably
adding to work.

When group planting was introduced, partly to insure that the
necessary husbandry would be maintained, farmers inaugurated methods
of counteracting Nairobi's wishes. Initially farmers gave the
appearance of compliance but tended to neglect cotton as much as
possible. Contrary to the findings of existing scholarship, the

farmers knew that, given their level of technology, cotton was not

138

economically viable. The greatest percentage of informants complained
about low prices for cotton and their concern is reflected in govern-
ment documents. Yet government continued to push for more cotton
production. Caught between Nairobi's insistence on establishing the
cotton industry and his own Observations about cotton, the farmer
opted to placate government but to slow the pace of inevitable change.

Although the early political activist failed to achieve a redress
of the farmers' grievances they did, ironically, both preserve and
transform traditional society. Despite their Opposition to Nairobi
the activists were also the first large segment of society to use
western political techniques. Their Opposition forced them to organize,
and in the attempt to unify Nyanza they adapted a new political style.
Establishing a politically oriented association and presenting petitions
of grievances to the colonial government went significantly beyond the
old political practices. The African Opposition had to utilize
writing, oratory and parliamentary procedure, in other words, those
skills introduced by the colonialst..

Not only did the early political activity legitimize the British
Government, but also it revitalized the political awareness of the Luo.
The colonial government generally was considered an irritating but
inevitable imposition; most farmers, at least, attempted to ignore
British presence as much as possible. Even the local administrative
hierarchy, whose alligence was to Nairobi and not to the people, did
not fundamentally alter the old ways. Incompetent or over-zealous
African functionaries were either tolerated or dealt with as another
intragroup rival. The elders, who enjoyed real influence in tradi-

tional society, were still the effective community force in the early

139

years of indirect rule. When, however, Piny Owacho challenged the

 

colonial regime, the traditional elements mobilized as much to
protect their own power as to Oppose the British.

As the young western educated leaders began cutting across
regional and class lines, the elders reasserted themselves. They
were Opposed to two vital issues of the association: land consoli-
dation and titles and the position of paramount chief. Shortly after
the elders demonstrated their rejection of the new leaders, political
activity in Luoland rapidly developed. While the proliferation of
political and business associations indicated the weakness of Pipy_
Owacho, it also demonstrated the vitality of Luo political energy.

Faced with the intense political activity, the colonial government
was forced to accomodate Luo political aspirations. Local Native
Councils and the Native Affairs Department were quickly established to
provide legitimate channels for the new activity. The major trans-
formation in Luo society under the impact of colonialism was therefore
in the political and social spheres but not in the economic section.
Politics encompassed not only new regional boundaries but also
included non-traditional groups. The larger political arena,
paradoxically, was the result of both Opposition and accomodation to
the imperial government.

Simultaneously, some measure of control was returned to the Luo
rank and file as the result of the change in politics. Prior to
1922, and the early Opposition, the chief, who functioned as a civil
servant, was beyond traditional sanctions and could act with impunity

in matters of local concern. After 1925, however, with the variety

140

of politically oriented associations and government councils chiefs

had to be more circumspect in their exercise of authority. In short,
the Luo maintained some measure of traditional values in a new

context; and the renewed vitality can be attributed, at least partially,
to the EurOpean imposition.

In the perspective of current research concerning the impact of
colonialism on African societies this study is an investigation of
micro-level interactions between Africans and EurOpeans. The concen—
tration has been on Central Nyanza Province, and only concerns the
cotton industry. Other studies of this nature are Margaret Hay's
"Luo Women and Economic Change During the Colonial Period,"2 and
Carolyn Barnes' current research on "The Socio-Economic History of
Coffee Growing Among the Gusii of Kenya." These works focus on the
innovations of African participants in an imposed and restrictive
economic system.

Important areas for future research revealed by this study are
the need for economic histories of the develOpment of selected
communities in Central Nyanza. For example, Kajulu, because of its
proximity to the colonial administrative headquarters and its long
periods Of rule under stable chiefs, would provide extensive materials
for a case study Of socio-economic change during colonial rule. At
least one of the chiefs, Simeon Otiende, would be an excellent subject
for a biographical treatment. Otiende was one of the first young men

in Central Nyanza to receive estern teachings, prior to the establishment

 

2Margaret J. Hay, "Luo Women and Economic Change During the
Colonial Period," paper given at the African Economic History Workshop,
University of Wisconsin, Madison (Summer 1974).

141

of mission education in the area. Research on his tutor, H.H. Holder,
would also provide an opportunity to study a little known colonial
phenomenon: a black man, also Of colonial background, with expertise,
functioning in a position usually reserved for whites. Of special
interest in the Holder case would be the fact that he had been given

a position of more trust, authority and high visibility than he

could possibly have attained in his native Trinidad. These proposed
research topics would add, considerably, to the more positive approach
which has already been tested successfully in some non-historical
studies: Margret Katzin, "The Role of the Small Entrepreneur," in

M.J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz, ed., Economic Transition in Africa

 

(London, 1964); Polly Hill "A Plea for Indigenous Economics: The West

African Experience," in Economic Develppment and Social Change (1966);

 

and William 0. Jones' "Economic Man in Africa," Food Research Institute

 

Studies, 1, 2 (May; 1960).

The present study provides an overdue analysis of the significant
initial stages of economic and political agitation in Kenya. It also
has disclosed information about the economic aspects of African reaction
to colonial policies which limited indigenous opportunities. By so
doing, this project attempts to fill a definite need. It furnishes
documented evidence of African attempts to adjust to an imposed
economic system. It also supplies insights into African attempts to
compete in a limited industrial economic system and still maintain the

integrity of their traditional structures.

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146

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C. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Achila, Wilfred, Nyakach, 5 November 1973.

Ada, Samwel, Kajulu, 10 July 1973.

Ademson, Lutt Odiambo, Alego, 14 November 1973.
Aduo, Zablon, Kisumu, 10 and 13 October 1973.
Agira, Thomas, Nyakach, 24 October 1973.
Agumba, Apiyo Gari, West Kano, 11 September 1973.
Ajowi, William, West Kano, 7 August 1973.
Akal, Seferinus, Siaya, 12 November 1973.
Alal, Kola, Kajulu, 8 September 1973.

Amolo, Haron, West Kano, 4 August 1973.
Angwech, Augustinus, Kajulu, 2 August 1973.
Anya, Josha, West Seme, 14 August 1973.
Anyumba, Norman, West Kano, 28 August 1973.
Asewe, Leo Ajumbo, West Kisumu, 9 August 1973.
Ayim, Jonathan, West Kano, 23 August 1973.
Chadha, Josef Omodhi, Kajulu, 27 July 1973.
Halowe, Jacobo, Alego, 14 November 1973.
Husein, Golam, Ndere, 6 November 1973.

Jakoyo, Jacobo, West Kano, 6 September 1973.
Jalango, Pilipo, West Kano, 6 September 1973.
Kayi, Abrahim, West Kano, 21 August 1973.

Laja, Allois, Nyakach, 18 September 1973.

149

150

Likung, Erasto, Nyakach, 2 November 1973.
Magak, Jeremiah, East Kano, 22 August 1973.
Mbayi, Okoth, Kajulu, 27 July 1973.

Midigo, Musa, Kajulu, 12 July 1973.

Muga, Nathaniel, West Kano, 23 August 1973.
Muyama, Agabitus, Alego, 12 November 1973.

Nam, Elijah, Southeast Kano, 12 September 1973.
Ngige, Gilbert, Kajulu, 12 July 1973.

Ngoya, Andrew Awor, West Kano, 7 August 1973.
Nyambok, Mikaya, Nyakach, 21 September 1973.
Nyangor, Barnabas, Ndere, 9 November 1973.
Nyende, Rev. Simeon, Gem, 25 September and 29 October 1973.
Obonyo, Philip, Usonga, 13 November 1973.

Obura, Shem, West Kano, 2 July 1973.

Odeny, Sire, West Kano 16 August 1973.

Odengo, Joseph, Nyakach, 2 November 1973.

Ogila, Abrahim, East Seme, 13 August 1973.
Ogodo, Johanna, Nyakach, 27 October 1973.

Ogola, Thadeus, Siaya, 9 November 1973.

Ogongo, Augustinus, West Kano, 20 November 1973.
Ojanja, Nyakuno, Kajulu, 10 September 1973.
Ojuka, Omola, Kajulu, 2 August 1973.

Okal, Andrea, Nyakach, 31 October 1973.

Okelo, Stevan, Woutheast Kano, 18 July 1973.
Oker, Mathayo, West Kisumu, 9 August 1973.

Okoth, Yare, Kajulu, 19 November 1973.

151

Okwiri, Mijak, Kajulu, 7 November 1973.
Okwirri, Jonathan, Gem, 27 September 1973.
Oloya, Janes, West Kano, 3 August 1973.
Oluoch, Okelo, Nyakach, 31 October 1973.
Omega, Daniel Okoth, West Kano, 4 August 1973.
Omer, Daniel, Kajulu, 30 July 1973.

Omondi, Esekia, Nyakach, 24 October 1974.
Ondondi, Leon Adus, West Kisumo, 14 August 1973.
Onduru, Pancraseus, Nyakach, 30 October 1973.
Onganjo, Hezron, West Kano, 10 September 1973.
Ongonga, James, Kajulu, 31 July 1973.

Opamo, Joshua, Kajulu, 16 October 1973.

Orego, Mathayo, Kajulu, 30 August 1973.
Orembo, Augustinus, Usonga, 13 November 1973.
Osoro, Silphano, Southeast Kano, 19 July 1973.
Otiende,mSimeon, Kajulu, 24 August 1973.
Otiro, Johanna, Siaya, 6 November 1973.

Otite, Otieno, East Seme, 15 August 1973.
Owino, Obondo, Kajulu, 11 July 1973.

Owuor, Benjamin, East Seme, 8 August 1973.
Oyare, Simeon, Southeast Kano, 19 July 1973.
Oyuga, Sije, Kajulu, 28 July 1973.

Siru, Gideon, Kajulu, 3 August 1973.

Wadakaya, Okwako, Usonga, 13 November 1973.
Wagude, Jaoko Elisha, WesttKisumo, 9 August 1973.

wangulu, Absalom, West Kano, 12 September 1973.

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"11111111117171111711“