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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPEN AND CLOSED BELIEF SYSTEMS
AND ACCURACY AND AFFECT IN INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION

by Selwyn N. Fidelman

The purpose of this study was to test some of the
implications of the theory of open and closed belief systems
in the affective interpersonal area. The majority of the
research under the framework of this theory has been concerned
with differences between open and closed belief systems in
conceptual. perceptual, ideological and esthetic spheres of
activity.

In an attempt to widen the applicability of the theory
to the area of interpersonal perception three general hypo-
theses were formulated. (1) People with relatively closed
belief systems will be less accurate in understanding the
feelings of others than people with relatively open belief
systems.' They will also be less accepting of them. (2) The
differences found in hypothesis one will be markedly accent-
uated when information is presented about the others which
pictures them as having an alien (incongruent) belief system
from that of the subjects. (3) Under a condition of anxiety

the accuracy and acceptance scores of the groups will again

Selwyn N. Fidelman

be differentially affected, with the relatively closed
people becoming less accurate and less accepting of the others
than the relatively open people.

Ninety-six subjects who had scored at the extreme
ends of the dogmatism scale, the measure of open and closed
belief systems, were exposed to six brief filmed interviews
of people they had never seen before. After the film Viewing
the subjects were asked to postdict how the interviewees had
responded to personality questionnaires, and were also asked
to rate the interviewees on a like—dislike dimension.

The incongruent situation was set up by first deter-
mining the subjects' beliefs on a series of issues. These
issues were tapped by means of filler questions inserted in
a random fashion within the Dogmatism Scale. Prior to
each film presentation the subjects were told that certain
of the interviewees professed strong beliefs which were known
on the basis of their responses to the filler questions, to
be either extremely incongruent or congruent to those of the
subjects.

The anxiety condition was evoked by instructions to
the subjects to the effect that accuracy in judging others
was related to intelligence. As a further measure the subjects
were also told during the course of their judging that their

scores were poor and inaccurate.

Selwyn N. Fidelman

The presentation of conditions (congruence-incongruence
anxiety-non anxiety) occurred in a counterbalanced order.
Thus both the closed and open groups were equally exposed to
all the experimental conditions, with the order of presentation
of each variable controlled.

No significant differences were found between the
groups in age, intelligence as measured by the COT, and in
similarity to the interviewees.

The results of the experiment were analyzed by the
analysis of variance technique. It was found that relatively
closed subjects were significantly less accurate in their
ability to perceive and understand the film personalities
than were relatively open subjects. The closed subjects
were also more rejecting of the film persons than were open
subjects.

The introduction of the belief incongruence condition
resulted in the predicted differential decrease in accuracy
judgment scores of the closed as compared to the open
subjects, but not to a significant extent. When the reason
for this lack of predicted significance was explored further
it was discovered that the incongruence variable was signifi—
cant only for females. This sex difference was posited as
the probable reason for the lack of significance of this

interaction. It was also found that females were generally

Selwyn N. Fidelman

more accurate in their interpersonal judgments than males.

The anxiety variable had no important effect on any
of the conditions in this experiment. This was explained
primarily as due to lack of adequate control over the intended

effect of the anxiety instructions on the subjects.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPEN AND CLOSED BELIEF SYSTEMS

AND ACCURACY AND AFFECT IN INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION

BY

\‘x
‘ r\
1“

y (
Selwyn NC Fidelman

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Psychology

1962

To my mother and my father,

and to my wife Vickala,

all of whom helped in more ways
than they are aware of

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to Dr. M.
Ray Denny who served as chairman of my Guidance Committee.
for his invaluable encouragement and support. I also wish to
thank the other members of my committee, Drs. T. M. Allen,
W. Kell, and W. F. Johnson for their assistance and helpful
criticism.

My special thanks also go to Dr. M. Rokeach for his
help in the initial stages of formulating the problem.

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Dr. J.
Lingoes, Mr. M. Weinberg, and especially to Dr. S. Brown for

their aid in bringing this research to fruition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theory of Belief System
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . .
Research Under Other Frameworks
Research Under the Open—Closed Belief
System Framework
Studies of Interpersonal Perception
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . .
Hypotheses
IV. METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scales
Dogmatism Scale
Filler Items
Criterion Instrument and Accuracy Scale
Like—Dislike Scale
Similarity Scale
Design and Procedure
General Instructions
Dogmatism Scale Instructions
Testing Procedure
Pre-Film Congruence and Incongruence
Instructions ‘
Instructions for Anxiety Conditions
Subjects
V. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accuracy Scale
Like—Dislike‘Scale
Summary of Results

iv

Page

11
16

27
29
31
31
31
31
34
38
38
38
39
39
39

42
43

47
56
6O

Chapter

VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . .

Accuracy Judgments Related to the
Dogmatism Variable

Acceptance and Rejection Related to
the Dogmatism Variable

Relationships of Dogmatism to Congruence
and the Confounding Effect of Sex

The Anxiety Condition

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . .

REFERENCES

APPENDICES

Page

63

64
69

71
74

77
81

86

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. Age and similarity scores of the high and
low dogmatic groups . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2. COT scores of the high and low dogmatic
groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy
scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4. Means and standard deviations for main effects
of analysis of variance of accuracy
scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5. Interaction of dogmatism with congruence
(accuracy scores) . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6. Dogmatism compared against sex and
congruence (means of accuracy scores) . . 52
7. Dogmatism compared against anxiety sex and
order (means of accuracy scores) . . . . 52
8. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy
scores for males . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
9. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy
scores for females . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10. Summary of analysis of variance of the like-
dislike scale (acceptance-rejection
scores) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . 57
11. Means and standard deviations for main effects
of analysis of variance of like-dislike
scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
12. Interaction of dogmatism with order

(acceptance-rejection scores) . . . . . . 58

Table Page

13. Dogmatism compared against anxiety sex
and order (means of acceptance-
rejection scores) . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
14. Dogmatism compared against anxiety sex and
congruence (means of acceptance—rejection
scores) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

vii

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page
A. Dogmatism Scale with Filler Items . . . . . . 87
B. Original Cline Scales . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
C. Revised Accuracy Scale Used in this Research. 97
D. Like—Dislike Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

E. Similarity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

see
'v'l'l'l

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the relationship between
open and closed belief systems with reference to accuracy
and affect in interpersonal perception. The idea for this
evolved from Rokeach's theory (42) and is an extension and
test of some of its implications in the affective inter—
personal area. Although the model is a cognitive one, it
does not restrict itself solely to the study of cognitive
behavior. The theory states that the belief organization is
a counterpart of the affective state and can be thought of
as isomorphic with it. Operating within a theoretical model
(that will be explained in the ensuing pages) ROkeach has
constructed a scale, which by tapping the cognitive belief
pattern, differentiates among people according to whether
they are relatively "open" or "closed" to their experiences.
The scale indicates how, through the study of people's
cognitive structures (their belief systems), valid inferences
can be made regarding their underlying emotional state.

The majority of the research on the open and closed

mind has been in the area of conceptual, perceptual and

ideological spheres of activity. This study will be an attempt
to determine how a person's emotional needs, as reflected in
his cognitive structure, manifests itself in the area of
encountering new people, and in understanding what kind of
people they are.

In day to day living it is quite obvious that some
people seem to be less aware of social nuances than others.
This must be due, at least partially, to certain kinds of
closedness, "blind spots"—-that have an emotional origin.

In this vein, three broad hypotheses will be investi-
gated. The first is: People with relatively closed systems

(as measured by the dogmatism scale) will be less accurate in

understanding (and thus in predicting) the feelings of new
others, than people with relatively open belief systems.

They will also, on the whole be less accepting of them. The
second is: The differences found in hypothesis one will be
markedly accentuated when information is presented about the
viewed subjects which pictures them as having a different and
alien belief system from the viewers. That is, the information
will have a pronounced differential effect on the two groups.
Closed people will become more "emotionally blind" so that

their accuracy of understanding will be markedly diminished,

as compared to the open minded people. The closed people

will also manifest markedly more rejection of the new

others as a result of this information. The third general
hypothesis is: That under a condition of anxiety the
differential accuracy of prediction of both groups will also
be affected, with the closed people again more adversely
affected in their accuracy judgments than the open group.
Before going any further, an understanding of the
aspects of the theory pertinent to this research should be

presented.

Theory of Belief Systems

The cornerstone of the conceptual model is the
assumption that the structure of people's beliefs are
organized into two interdependent parts: a belief system
and several disbelief subsystems, collectively called the
disbelief system. The belief system contains or represents
all the beliefs that a person has or accepts as true of his
world. This includes unconscious, pre-conscious, and con-
scious ideas, sets, and expectancies that the person has, or
those that can be inferred about him regardless whether he
is aware of them. The disbelief subsystems are conceived
as representing all the unconscious, pre-conscious and
conscious ideas, sets, and expectancies which are felt as
false and rejected, with regard to a person's total View of

the world.

As an example of the interdependent functioning of
the belief-disbelief system, let us View the beliefs of two
hypothetical people. To make the issue clear, the people
will be presented in rather extreme form, but it must be
remembered that "openness-closedness" is a relative or
continuous dimension.

Person number one believes that an extreme form of
conservative oriented Republican government is the "only right"
kind of government (belief system). Therefore, in his°dis—
belief subsystems are lumped such holders of different beliefs.
as communists, socialists, "progressive capitalists," and
even Democrats. All these systems are seen as alien and
wrong in one degree or another. A second person, also a
Republican, can accept with a relatively greater degree of
openness or flexibility that other philosophies of government
have something of relevance or truth in them. The lines of
his disbelief system are much less tightly drawn, and he
would not be as totally rejecting of the other points of
View.

Thus the interrelatedness of the belief to the
disbelief system can be seen. The more absolqte one is in
holding to his belief system and no other as the one and only
truth, the greater is the magnitude of total rejection toward

all other ways of believing or toward systems with different

points of view (disbelief systems). This holds not only

toward political ideas and philosophies but toward any kind

of belief or experience that is different (new) from one's

own belief experience rubric. There can be dogmatic socialists.
Freudians, even dogmatic "solid state" physicists, as well

as dogmatic conservatives.

Following the logic regarding the interrelatedness
of the belief to the disbelief system; the belief—disbelief
system (which contains both parts) is conceptualized as having
several other properties. It may vary in the amount of
differentiation, that is, in terms of the relative amount of
knowledge possessed. This pertains especially to knowledge
about disbelief subsystems. Thus it would be assumed that
the person in example number two above would know more about
the different political theories than person number one, who
would tend more to lump them all together as bad and unquali-
fiedly reject them.

Another way belief systems may vary is in the property
of isolation. This refers to the degree of communication
between parts of the belief-disbelief system. An important
aspect of this is the accentuation of differences, with the
Ininimization of any relatedness or similarity between belief
and disbelief systems. This serves the purpose of distancing

or isolating the belief from the disbelief systems. In the

example cited. person number one would tend to see only
differences between Republicans and Democrats. and any
similarities would be minimized or eliminated. He might be

more prone than person number two to see and accentuate
irrelevant differences to buttress his own reasoning.

From the examples it can be seen that the theory
stresses the importance of formal or structural similarities
(of belief systems) that cut across many different ideas or
contents. The scale, as an outgrowth of the theory, therefore.
measures the way one's cognitive structure is organized,
rather than specifically what one believes. It should also
indicate the manner in which other types of experiences are
approached, since, as stated earlier, the belief organization
is a counterpart of a more enduring effective state.

Finally, it is important to note that "openness"
and "closedness" are extremes on a continuum. A basic property
of all belief systems, regardless of the degree to which they
are open or closed. is that the experiencing of ideas and
people is organized along lines of belief congruence. That
is, ideas and people are more easily accepted as their
perceived similarity with the person who is experiencing them
increases. It is only as the belief system is at the closed
end of the continuum that the range of what is accepted and

what is rejected becomes significantly narrower and more

restricted.

There are other dimensions of the conceptual model,
but for purposes of the present study the relevant ones have

been noted. (For a fuller discussion see The Open and

 

Closed Mind (42).

 

Before discussing the research stemming from the
theory of belief systems relevant to this study, we will
first review other investigations bearing on the relation-
ship between personality structure and accuracy of inter-
personal perception. Following this, the literature on
methodological difficulties in the study of interpersonal

perception will be surveyed.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Research Under Other Frameworks

The idea that there are certain personality types
that tend to simplify their perceptual world, and thus operate
less effectively in their appraisal of other personalities
was shown by Gollin (23). He presented a film in which a
woman engaged in two major behavioral themes--promiscuity and
kindness. When the subjects were asked to state their
impressions of the woman's personality, three kinds of
characteristics emerged. One group of subjects attempted to
account for the different behaviors by an interrelationship
statement, another enumerated the two behaviors but did not
interrelate them within a total personality, and the third
formed a simplified impression. characterizing the woman as
either nice or immoral. The three impressions were named
respectively. related, aggregate or simplified.

Obviously the latter group by eliminating from.its
consideration a clearly present aspect of the film person's
personality, could only have a less than accurate under-

standing of the total personality. The group of subjects who

described the personality by an interrelationship statement
would appear to be, at the least. taking more significant
reality aspects of the film person into awareness. and thus
increasing their chances for accurate appraisal.

In a later study (24) the same author used a Rokeach
task, where ten terms were presented to the aforementioned
film subjects: Buddhism. Capitalism, Catholicism, Christianity.
Communism, Democracy, Fascism, Judaism, Protestantism. and
Socialism. He found significant positive relationships
between subjects who formed related impressions to the film
personality and those who formed hierarchic concepts of the
terms. (By hierarchic is meant organizing the sub-groups
into a category such as social institutions, ways of believing.
etc.) The other two groups formed non-hierarchic concepts
or only described or named the religious or political terms.

Here we see a relation between the simplifying of a
cognitive task and a more affectively toned interpersonal
one. In both situations one group could tolerate and inte-
grate disparate features of the stimuli (both terms and film),
and another group could not.

Though these differences in the organization of
perceptions indicate differences in cognitive structures among
the three groups, they were not tied to any more unified

theory. That is, from the studies as presented, one could

10

not predict what kind of personality or what kind of cognitive
structure would tend to simplify their milieu and what kind
would tend to see the greater complexities involved.

An attempt to determine the kinds of personality
variables involved in accuracy of interpersonal perception
from a more unified theory has been done in some of the
research under the framework of the "Authoritarian Personality."
For example, E. E. Jones (29), using tapes of the voices of
a superior on navy recruits divided into authoritarians and
non-authoritarians by the F scale, found:

. . . that the authoritarians respond more to the
stimulus person's position in the military hierarchy
than to his personal qualities, whereas the non-
authoritarians are more sensitive to the psychological
cues in all their subtlety.

In another study in the same vein Scodel and Mussen
(48) placed authoritarian and non-authoritarian people (F
scale) in an interview situation with each other and predicted
that authoritarians would perceive non-authoritarians as
similar to them, whereas the non-authoritarians would be
more accurate in their ratings. Their predictions were borne
out. The rationale was that the authoritarians tend to
place people in stereotyped categories in a conventionalized.
non-personalized manner. In this case, the "placing" was

due to in—group needs. based less on the qualities of the

person as experienced, but on needs "carried into" the situation.

11

Else Frenkel—Brunswik (18, 19) studied the personality
characteristics and home backgrounds of authoritarian and
prejudiced people. Her investigations help clarify some of
the reasons for the authoritarian's lesser capacity to
accurately evaluate others.

She found that authoritarian—oriented people are
unable to tolerate good and bad qualities in the same person
(intolerance of ambiguity); they tend to make black-white
judgments. reject and accept people in an unqualified manner.
and arrive at premature closure in ambiguous situations.
These characterological mechanisms result in a simplifying
and misperception of the psychological world and, more
specifically, the world of interpersonal perception. It
would seem, therefore, that certain types of personalities
characterized by certain types of defences are less success-
ful in their ability to understand and predict how others
feel.

Research Under the Open-Closed Belief
System Framework

These investigations which began in 1951 have
recently been put into book form in The Open and Closed Mind
(42). Only those studies most pertinent to the present

research will be reported here.

12

In one group of studies the assumption was that
knowledge of the formal properties of people's belief systems
(the manner rather than the content of the beliefs) would
lead to the ability to make predictions with regard to how
cognitive. perceptual, and esthetic types of problems and
experiences would be approached.

Mikol (35) found that people with more closed belief
systems were less able to understand and appreciate new
modern music and its composers (example--Schoenberg as compared
to Brahms). than were people with more open belief systems.
They were unreceptive or closed to the differentness or
newness of the musical experience, although no difference
between the two groups was found with reference to their
appreciation of more conventional music.

Analogous results were found in an experiment by
Levy and ROkeach (32) in which significant differences appeared
in the length of time necessary for open and closed subjects
to synthesize and form new perceptual systems. No differences
were found between the groups in analytic ability. The task
was to locate simple figures within more complex designs in
the Gottschaldt embedded figures test.

The groups did differ in the tasks requiring synthesis.
that is, the integration of the perceptual stimuli into a

new field. Using the Kohs blocks (from the Wechsler Bellevue

13

Intelligence Scale) the subjects had to reproduce a standard
design with four blocks, and then reconstruct it again using
nine or sixteen blocks, with the colors reversed and the
blocks rotated 90 degrees. In this task the subjects had

to imagine or infer how the reconstructed design would look
before it was reconstructed

It would seem that the ability to break down the
initial sets, and then synthesize them into a new percept.
and the ability to go beyond the immediately "given." are
important distinctions between open and closed people.

Thus, one can ask if the closed subjects (as compared
to the open subjects) are unreceptive to the "newness" of
the musical experience; would they not also be unreceptive
to the "newness" of the experience of unfamiliar people and
thus be less capable of "feeling" or empathizing with them?
If the closed subjects have greater difficulty in synthe—
sizing ideas and going beyond the immediately given, would
they not also be less able to infer other attitudes and
feelings of people after seeing a small segment of their
behavior?

The present research deals not only with the relation-
ship of personality to accuracy of interpersonal perception,
but also with the effect of belief incongruence on these two

variables. Does belief incongruence affect the accepting

l4

and rejecting attitudes of closed more than open people?

In one study (43) the six major Christian religions
(Catholic, Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist and
Baptist) were ranked by students and clergy of these six
denominations in terms of each religion's similarity to the
other five. Then the subjects stated their preferences for
the religions on an attitude scale.

Two important findings emerged: (l) The more dis-
similar the faith, the more it was rejected by all the subjects
or clergy; and (2) when members of the different religions
were classified into high and low scorers on the Dogmatism
scale, it was found that closed subjects rejected every dis-
belief.subsystem along the similarity continuum to a greater
extent than the open subjects.

This second result is related to another study (46)
where it was found that subjects who manifested greater
rejection of Negroes also scored higher in total rejection
of whites. That is, contrary to the idea that the more one
villifies the out-group the more the in-group is glorified.
the results showed a positive correlation between the two.
The authors state that a "generalized misanthropy syndrome"
was in evidence in some kinds of people.

A third important aspect of this investigation has

to do with the dynamics of belief systems, specifically with

15

reference to the differential effect of anxiety on the
accuracy of interpersonal perception of the closed and open
subjects. A reasonable inference is that a closed belief
system is a manifestation on the cognitive level of a
network of defenses against anxiety.

Operating under this assumption deeach and Kemp
(44) hypothesized that relatively closed people should be
manifestly more anxious than relatively open people, and
found significant positive correlations between dogmatism
and anxiety (Welsh Anxiety Scale) among English subjects.
They also predicted that closed subjects had more early
experiences of anxiety. and found that high dogmatics (as
compared to low dogmatics) showed significantly more anxiety
symptoms in childhood (via a questionnaire method). such as
thumbsucking, nailbiting. bed wetting, temper tantrums, etc.
In line with Else Frenkel-Brunswik's work. the high dogmatics
revealed more glorifications of parents, with less ability
to express any kind of ambivalence toward them.

If it was indicated that an increased level of anxiety
leads to distortions of one kind or another in perception.
then it would follow that in a stressful or anxious situation
those people with a higher initial level of anxiety will be
disproportionately affected, and consequently less accurate

in their perceptions.

16

In two experiments by Smock (49, 50) on the perception
of incompletely formed and ambiguous figures, he found that
increased stress resulted in a need to preserve a "familiar"
perceptual field, and a clear tendency toward premature I
closure. (Avoiding the ambiguity of the stimulus situation,
by making a definitive response before adequate information
is available.)

Since the underlying level of anxiety of the closed
subjects has been shown to be greater than for the open
subjects, it should follow that when both groups are equally
exposed to anxiety arousing conditions, the closed subjects

should be more affected and thus less accurate in their

perceptions.

Studies of Interpersonal Perception

There is a vast literature on attempts to study inter-
personal perception (references in 4, 53). Only those more
recent studies bearing on the methodological difficulties
involved in interpersonal perception and especially those
presumed to be involved in this particular research will be
described.

A perusal of these studies points up three con-
sistently mentioned problem areas inherent in interpersonal

perception experiments. These can be listed as:

17

Generality; whether in fact a general ability to accurately

 

estimate the feelings of others. across people and measuring
instruments, does exist.

Similarity: if the success of one judging group over another

 

cannot be attributed to mere similarity between them and the
stimulus object persons,-—and the consequent projection of
that similarity, thus achieving a spuriously high "empathy"
score.

Stereotypy7 the fact that some studies have pointed up the

 

presence of an internal stereotype of the stimulus person

of which the judge is unaware. The operation of this stereo-
type makes it difficult to determine to what extent the
judgments are based on utilizable cues for the stimulus
person.

Generality: Crow and Hammond (11) question if such

 

a generalized trait exists. They asked senior medical students
who watched films of medical patients being interviewed to
predict how the patients would respond to various types of
measures. (Estimation of response to personality inventories.
estimation of group opinion, and estimation of ratings within
small groups.) The scores were intercorrelated to determine
whether or not subjects who were good (or poor) on one

measure, were good or poor on other measures. The results

‘were essentially negative. i.e., the authors found no general

18

ability across instruments.

Gage, Leavitt and Stone (22) using sound movies of
fifth grade boys and girls, asked judges to predict each
child's response (yes or no) to 100 questions of a personality
inventory, and found that reliability over children, or
generality, was insignificant. They state that accuracy was
determined by the judge's chance interaction with specific
characteristics of the child. That is. if the child's own
responses were favorable to himself. and if the judge had a
favorable impression of the child, then, and only then, would
the judge be accurate.

Kelly and Fiske (31), as part of a battery of tests
to determine the qualities necessary for future success of
graduate students in clinical psychology, asked psychology
trainees to predict inventory responses of two patients that
the authors had diagnosed. The accuracies achieved in judging
each patient were below significance.

Though these studies point to a lack of the generality
of this trait, the conflicting evidence of its presence in
other studies to be discussed calls for an explanation.
Undoubtedly some of the contradictions found may be partly
due to low reliability of the criterion instruments. It
also may stem from the different types of judgments that

are asked of the judges. the different traits being judged

19

and the different types of subjects.

For example, Cline (7) points out the methodological
differences between Crow's work and his own. He states:

Crow and Hammond used a wider variety of tasks.
including some, such as sociometric measures which seem
only remotely related to what would usually be meant
by accuracy of interpersonal perception.

In the study by Gage, he asked adults to make judg-
ments about fifth graders. Olden (38, 34) points out the
difficulties with regard to "accurate empathizing." attendant
on the introduction of age and maturational factors when the
stimulus person is below adolescence.

The fact that some authors (8, 13) have been dis-
covering personality correlates of this ability points to
their success in finding this more generalized trait.

Cline (6) used a sound film of college students in a
job interview. All of the judges performed statistically
better than chance in predicting how the interviewees responded
to personality questionnaires. Also, the composite of scores
of two of the three scales for each judge yielded a signifi-
cant intercorrelation, indicating generality over instruments.
. . . The author concluded that the judges "made predictions
based on differential cues, and a real evaluation of the

personalities in the film."

Taguiri, Blake and Bruner (54) got three discussion

20

groups together. After twelve sessions the participants were
asked to express their likes and dislikes of other members,
and to guess who liked them. The authors then constructed

a chance robot, so that each subject had a corresponding
robot with an equal number of choices, its preferences
allocated to the group at random. They found that the per—
ceptual accuracy of the subjects was significantly better
than the matched robots.

Estes (16) reports that his ten best judges in a
test of ability to rate the traits of persons depicted in
short movies were consistently more accurate than the ten
poorest judges, on all 23 variables for all eight film
subjects. The criterion of accuracy was the ratings of
clinical psychologists.

Dymond (14) found that the capable judges tended to
show less variation in the accuracy with which they could judge
subjects' self—ratings than did the poorer judges. The good)
judges seemed to show consistency in ability to judge irrer
spective of the type of subject or the type of quality being
judged. (In this study, the issue of similarity was not
dealt with;—-details in the next section.)

Gage (20) assembled judges and brought students
before them one at a time. The students went through a

series of activities such as drawing on the blackboard.

21

telling stories of their experiences, etc. The judges then
predicted the responses of the subjects to interest inventory
items. The judges' accuracy scores were significantly
better than chance.
Both groups of studies are representative of the con—
flicting results in this area. Gage and Cronbach (21) in
a review of the problems in this field point out that the
inconsistent results obtained are a function, not only of the
low reliability of the measures and the lack of standardi—
zation of tasks and subjects. but also that the criterion
for classifying the investigations has never been spelled
out explicitly enough. They suggest two continua for
classifying investigations; (a) degree of acquaintance between
the interviewee and judge, and on this basis. (b) degree of
extrapolation of judgments.
From a review of much of the material in this area.

Allport's statement (1) still seems to have much validity.
He said that the ability to judge others is neither entirely
general nor entirely specific.

It would be unreasonable to expect a judge of

people to be uniformly successful in estimating

every quality of every person. . . . It seems more

of an error, however, to consider the ability

entirely specific than to consider it entirely
general.

22

Similarity: Basic problems revolving around the
similarity issue arose from criticism of Dymond's work on
"measuring" empathic ability. She has completed various
studies in this area, but her first work which precipitated
the methodological objections was, "A Scale for the Measurement
of Empathic Ability" (12).

She had groups of people who "interacted" over a
period of time. Then they made judgments about themselves
and others in the group. The measure of empathic ability was
derived by calculating how closely a person's predictions of
another's self-rating, and his own self-rating as he thinks
the other would rate him--correspond with the actual score
of that person. She found that the number right on each of
the two types of predictions was significantly higher than
chance.

Bender and Hastorf (3) point out that in Dymond's
work, if the subject and ratee have similar self—feelings,
the subjects who project this similarity are given spuriously
high empathic ability scores. They attempted to eliminate
this with what they called a "refined empathy" score. This
involves subtracting the deviation between the subject's
predictions and object's responses (raw empathy) from his
(the subject's) projection score.

They found that the refined empathy score is not

23

correlated with similarity whereas the raw empathy score is.
This result points to the necessity of equating subjects on
similarity. else the empathy score loses much of its validity.

Halpern's study (25) achieved results similar to those
already noted regarding the possible confounding effect of
similarity. but he interprets it differently. He states:

The close relation between similarity and predictive
skill means that there is greater likelihood that a
person would recognize feelings in others that he has
known himself.

He goes on to say that people with broader psycho—
logical experiences and more open personality structures are
better able to experience a wider variety of feelings across
different types of people. He feels that similarity should
not be "partialled" out of empathy studies, as it is a very
crucial part of them and deserves investigation in its own
right. This may be so, but in line with Cronbach's suggestions.
the degree of similarity between subject and ratee should in
some way be noted beforehand.

In the study mentioned above by Taguiri,Blake and Bruner
(54), they found that the subjects perceived the feelings of
others in accordance with their own feelings toward them far
in excess of chance. . . . So, in fact, all of the studies

implicitly or explicitly point to the importance and

possible confounding aSpect of similarity and its attribution

24

to the rated persons in interpersonal perception studies.

Stereotypy: As a further outgrowth of Dymond's

 

work, Lundgren and Robinson (35) readministered Dymond's
scale to a similarly comprised group of subjects. As a
result of their study they posed this question: Is the
person who is doing the rating responding to his awareness
of specific others, or is he attributing his own acceptance
of some generalized cultural norm, some stereotyped concept
of how most people should or do act, on to the people that
he is rating?

They state that persons might show up as good
empathizers if they conform closely to cultural norms and
tend, then. to perceive others as conforming also. A
spuriously high accuracy score is then obtained if the other
stimulus persons are. in fact. similarly conventional.

Gage (20) obtained results pointing to the operation
of internal stereotypes affecting the interpersonal perception
process. As noted before, subjects engaged in expressive
behavior before a group of judges who then predicted their
responses to personality inventory items. A second group
of judges made their predictions before seeing the subjects.
and again after seeing them. The accuracy of the judges
who knew something about the subjects (i.e., undergraduate

social sciences majors or similar limited information). and

25

made predictions on that basis, was higher before than after
they saw the subjects.

In other words, their cultural stereotype was more
effective than their empirical observations of the stimulus
persons.

Crow (11) similarly found that response sets (composed
of three types of stereotype scores) were more consistent
over time than more generalized accuracy scores where the
stereotype factor was not taken into account. From this
study the author maintains that. "accuracy of perception
free of stereotype response sets had yet to be established."

Cronbach (10) has found that stereotypeaccuracy was
one element that should be partialled out of more global
interpersonal accuracy scores or measures. Thus one can
have a judge predict responses of several subjects, get the
average of the response on each item, and the average of the
judge's prediction on that item. Then one would have an
average profile of responses, and an average predicted profile.
The distance between them is a way of attaining a measure of
stereotype accuracy. By techniques such as these it is
[massible to obtain measures which result in a finer analysis
euui partialling out of the stereotype component.

On the other hand, Cline (6), found that when he asked

subjects to fill out questionnaires about the film subjects

26

before they saw the film, he obtained significant differences
in accuracy in favor of the viewing condition. He said this

was not based on crude internal stereotypes, but on what the

subjects (college men) were really like.

Dymond (14) using Q sorts, where counselors predicted
how their counselees would respond. found that the closer the
subject's self-sort was to the cultural stereotype, the easier
the prediction; but she also found that even when the subject
was atypical, some counselors could spot this and shift
their predictions from this stereotype.

From the gamut of studies in this area, it would
appear that although the stereotype basis for judgments seems
to play an important part in the process of interpersonal
perception, a judge may be accurate because he has an accurate
stereotype. or because he can predict differences in the way
individual people will respond based on utilizable cues
emanating from the stimulus person. or a combination of both

of these.

CHAPTER III
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Just as those people with relatively closed belief
systems manifested a "generalized misanthropy" syndrome
resulting in a greater degree of rejection of others than
people with relatively open belief systems, so is it presumed
that they have the type of underlying personality structure
which would result in an over-all lesser awareness of the new
experience of others. That is, because of closed peoples'
need for avoidance of ambiguities, their world of inter-
personal perception is much less differentiated, and thus
the subtle nuances of interpersonal experience, the "fine"
discriminations of the feelings of others is missed or lost.
One aim of the present study, then, is to explore this
presumption.

The next area for investigation has to do with the
differential effect of belief incongruence on closed and open
people. The theory of belief systems states that the mbre
closed the system, the greater is the magnitude of rejection
of all disbelief subsystems.

Why should knowledge that some specific beliefs of

28

another person are different than one's own affect estimations
of the personality of that other person in areas totally
unrelated to the beliefs, if it were not for the setting into
motion of some irrational motivation? The fact that a person
believes. say. in agnosticism, should not result in a negative
preconception of his personality as a whole (by a religious
person for example), unless in fact the agnostic does display
obnoxious traits. But since closed people reject different
beliefs and the bearers of those beliefs to a greater extent
than do open people, this preconceived negative set is pre—
dicted to result in more distortions of the closed subjects'
perceptions.

The lessened accuracy in perception of the closed
people stemming from irrational sources is pointed up by
deeach (42), he says:

The more open one's belief system, the more should
evaluating and acting on information proceed inde-
pendently on its own merits. in accord with the inner
structural requirements of the situation. Also the
more open the belief system the more should the person
be governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing
forces. and less by irrational forces. . . . Con-
versely. the more closed the belief system. the more
difficult it should be to distinguish between information
received about the world and information received about
the source (p. 58).

Finally, the effect of anxiety on the two groups

will be investigated. The theoretical model views belief

systems not only as a way of ordering one's experiences, but

29

also as a way of filtering information so as to render harmless
that which threatens the ego. Relatively closed people need

a more rigid "filtering system" than relatively open people
because the specific content of their primitive beliefs

(to a greater extent than for open people). is of the world

as a threatening and insecure place. The inferred higher

level of anxiety stemming from this was borne out in Kemp's
study. This anxiety can be seen as an important dynamic
reason behind differences in the formal qualities of

closed and open belief systems.

It is proposed that when this greater reservoir of
anxiety is tapped, it will result in the increased activation
of those structural qualities which led to their formation in
the first place. Consequently, it is presumed that a tighter
"drawing in" and narrowing of the life space of the closed
people (as compared to the open people) to all potentially
threatening stimuli will occur. This will result in de-
creased accuracy in the judging of others by the closed

people. to a greater extent than by the open people.

Hypotheses

In all experimental conditions people with relatively
closed belief systems will be less accurate than people with

relatively open belief Systems in judging others.

30

The introduction of belief incongruence will decrease
the accuracy of the relatively closed subjects. However, it
will have little effect on the accuracy of the relatively
open subjects.

The introduction of an anxiety condition will decrease
the accuracy of the relatively closed subjects. The accuracy
of the relatively open subjects will also be adversely
affected, but to a lesser degree.

In all experimental conditions people with relatively
closed belief systems will be more rejecting of others than
will the relatively open subjects.

In the condition of belief incongruence people with
relatively closed belief systems will manifest a greater
amount of rejection of others than will the relatively

open subjects.

CHAPTER IV
METHOD

Scales

The rationale for the five scales used in this research

and their description are presented below.

Dogmatism Scale

This was the instrument used to measure the degree
to which belief systems are open or closed. The theory
behind its construction has already been discussed. The
scale itself consists of forty items on which the subjects
agree or disagree, on a six point continuum ranging from
plus three (agree very much) to minus three (disagree very
much) (Appendix A). For a fuller discussion of the character-
istics of this scale see Rokeach (41), who reports split half
reliabilities of .78 and .81. Vidulich (55) reports a split
half reliability of .78. These reliabilities are sufficiently

high to indicate the use of this scale in this research.

Filler Items

Thirty-four items were randomly interspersed within
the Dogmatism Scale, giving a total of seventy-four items on

31

32

both instruments combined. The purpose of these filler items
was to determine the beliefs of the subjects most strongly
subscribed to. This permitted setting up the conditions of
congruence and incongruence.

Items were constructed from seventeen issues deemed
to be of current interest to college students. Two items
were constructed for each issue to obtain a more reliable
measure of the subjects' attitude on that issue, and to
obviate as much as possible any biasing due to response set.
Thus each one of the seventeen items whose content was ex—
pressed in a positive manner also had a "mate" that was
written in a negative way (Appendix A). This was admittedly
difficult to do, because in rewriting the items it was almost
never possible to obtain precisely the opposite meaning.

A sample pair is presented below:

"A communist victory would not be so great a
disaster as the extermination of all human life from
.the H bom 9; and its mate: "It would be preferable
to die in an H bomb attack than to live under
communism."

Some of the seventeen issues were obtained from the
attitude scale in Thurstone's The Measurement of Attitude
(55), Changing Values in College, by P. E. Jacob (27),
and from Research Methods in Social Relations, by Selitz,
.Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (47). Issues also evolved through

(iiscussions with college students. and associates of the

researcher.

33

Of the seventeen issues, one was chosen as the basis
for setting up the congruent situation, and a second as the
basis for the incongruent situation. The selection of the
two issues was based on the largest percentage of subjects
disagreeing with a particular issue (incongruence), and the
largest percentage of subjects agreeing with a particular
issue (congruence).

For the incongruent situation the issue which met
these specifications was:

"Things would be much easier for us all if our

government would make all those decisions that we
have to make for ourselves."

Over ninety-nine percent of the high dogmatics
disagreed with this, with a mean score of minus 2.68 out of
a possible total of minus three. Over ninety-nine percent
of the low dogmatics disagreed with this with a mean score
of minus 2.94.

The congruent issue selected was:

"Homosexuals need understanding of their problem
more than anything else."

Eighty-nine percent of the high dogmatics agreed
‘with this, with a mean score of plus 2.46 out of a possible
total of plus three. Ninety-six percent of the low dogmatics
agreed with this with a mean score of plus 2.53.

The small number of subjects (ten) expressing opinions

34

contrary to the rest were not asked to participate further

in the experiment.

Criterion Instrument and Accuracy Scale

A set of films and a scale based on these films
constituted the criterion instruments for measuring accuracy
of interpersonal perception in this study. Accuracy was
primarily defined as the extent to which the judges (subjects)
were able to understand or "feel themselves into" the per-
sonality of the film people, and thus predict the film
persons' response to the scale.

A sound color film method developed by Cline (7, 8, 9)
was used because it has the advantage of capturing a "dynamic
and complex interpersonal situation which holds all cues
constant for all who will make future judgments of the people
in the film" (7. p. 2).

The film and accuracy judging instruments have evolved
over four years of research in the area of interpersonal
perception. The scale has been constantly revised, attaining
successively higher reliabilities. The average reliability
of the scale was found to be .71 (8, 9).

The film and scale were constructed in this way.

Sound motion pictures of a spontaneous interview situation

(people passing by a supermarket) were taken. The interviewees

35

represented a cross section of adults in the Salt Lake City.
Utah, metropolitan area (ages seventeen to sixty-five).

A standard interview format was used, which briefly
probed the following areas: (a) personality strengths and
weaknesses. (b) personal values, (c) hobbies and activities.
(d) self-concept, (e) temper. and (f) reactions to the inter—
view. The interviewees were told that it was a research
studying judging ability and were given a five dollar
merchandise order for participating. Each interview lasted
about five minutes.

The number of films finally used was reduced from
the original twenty-five to six, on the basis of how well
they discriminated between good and poorer judges. There
were three males and three females in the final six films
used in their research.

After the filming the interviewees responded to a
series of scales which tapped. in much greater detail than
in the brief interview situation, their feelings about
themselves, their attitudes and their behaviors. Close
relatives and friends were also contacted and asked to rate
the interviewee on other scales (Appendix B). The criteria
for judging interpersonal accuracy was derived from the
responses to these scales.

Each one of theultimately selected "right" criterion

36

answers were responses that the interviewee (or relatives
and friends) had selected on three separate occasions over a
period of six months. Items which were not consistently
answered the same way were discarded. The researchers also
todk "great pains" (7, p. 8) to control for social desir-
ability on items, wherever possible.

In Cline's original Work, six separate sub-scales
were used, and the subject's task in each one was to determine,
after viewing one interview. which of the two or three
alternative attitudes or behaviors the interviewee (or
relatives and friends) has chosen as true of the film person.
A sample item from one of the sub-scales is presented below.

"Which one adjective from each of the (20) pairs
did Mr. W. choose as being descriptive of himself:
(frank - dreamy)."

It was found though, that this approach involved a
very complicated scoring system. as there were different
scoring measures for different scales. It also was more
prone to elicit the projection of stereotypes (40).

A more simplified version of the scale has been
constructed by Dr. H. C. Smith and W. J. Peiper in 1960 at
Michigan State University. Cline's data was still used but
all the sub~scales were combined into one instrument. The
judges were now required to predict which of three film

persons expressed or exhibited a particular attitude or

37

behavior. That is. instead of an absolute judgment about one
person, the judges were required to make a comparative judg-
ment after seeing three film persons. Sample item: "Which
of the three interviewees chose the word arrogant. in the
pair (arrogant - apathetic) as approximating the better
description of him (or her) self." Only one of the three

had consistently chosen that word as being self-descriptive.

The entire scale consisted of one hundred,forty-nine
items. Seventy—four pertained to the first three interviewees.
and seventy-five pertained to the second three interviewees
(Appendix C).

Cline's original scales and the modified one were
both used by wakeley in an unpublished doctoral thesis on
"The Effects of Specific Training on Accuracy in Judging
Others" (57). He found the modified scale to be more
sensitive than the original one. attaining consistently
significant differences on the former, and none on the
latter. He also found that the modified scale was more
reliable than the Cline instrument (.66 to .79) and had
a higher internal consistency (.41 to .55) (57. p. 19).
Therefore, the modified Cline scale by Smith and Peiper was
chosen as the criterion accuracy instrument in the present

research.

38
Like-Dislike Scale

This is a nine point rating scale where the subjects
rate the film people with respect to their positive or negative
feelings toward them. "One" means "I can't see myself being

friends with such a person.’ and "nine" means "I can very
easily see myself being friends with such a person" (Appendix
D). This same scale was used in an aforementioned study (46),

where subjects reacted to race and/or belief congruent and

incongruent stimuli in terms of that scale.

Similarity Scale

This is a fifty item true-false scale based on the
MMPI, which was originally administered to the film inter—
viewees by Cline as part of his test battery. It was
administered to all the subjects in this study to evaluate
the "actual" similarity between the judges and the inter-

viewees (Appendix E).

Design and Procedure

Students in beginning psychology courses at Michigan
State University were given the Dogmatism Scale with filler
questions, followed by the Similarity Scale. The scales

were administered with the following instructions:

39
General Instructions

."Today for about fifty minutes I would like you to
fill out some personality questionnaires. Their main purpose
is to obtain some idea of your feelings and attitudes;--as
the aim of this research is to try to understand university
students a little better. Please answer all the questions as
honestly as you can., What you put down has absolutely no
connection with your grade in this class or your standing in
school. In about three weeks as a further part of this study
you will be contacted again to View a film and asked to give
your reactions to it. At that time I will give you more
details as to what this research is all about. When it is
completed I will let you know what I have found out. Are
there any questions?"

Dogmatism Scale Instructions

"The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important social and
personal questions. The best answer to each statement is
your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different
and opposing points of View; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements. disagreeing just as
strongly with others; and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement. you can
be sure that many people feel the same as you do."

Similarity Scale Instructions

"The next questionnaire has to do with your feelings
about yourself. your behavior and your attitudes."

Testing Procedure

One hundred and twenty—eight of the extreme scorers
on the Dogmatism Scale were invited to participate in the
second part of the experiment (viewing and reacting to the

film). These were divided into sixty-four high dogmatic

40

and sixty—four low dogmatic subjects. The high and low dog-
matic groups were evenly divided with regard to sex. The
subjects were then randomly assigned to either an anxious or
a non-anxious condition.

The subjects were then exposed to the congruence and
incongruence situations. Congruence refers to the labelling
or depiction of a film interviewee as having a belief similar
to that which the majority of subjects admitted to on the
filler items. Incongruence refers to the labelling or
depiction of a film interviewee as having a belief dissimilar
to that which the subjects admitted to on the filler item.

In each of the anxiety and non-anxiety conditions
half the subjects were placed in a belief congruent, viewed
first, condition, and half in a belief incongruent condition
viewed first, for the first three film interviews. The film
was then stopped, and the subjects were asked to rate the
interviewees on the Accuracy and Like-Dislike Scales. In
the second three interviews this order was reversed. That
is, the film people depicted as congruent were now presented
as incongruent, and the film people depicted as incongruent
‘were now presented as congruent.

On any one testing night sixteen subjects were
invited; eight high dogmatics comprised of four males and

four females. and eight low dogmatics comprised of four

41

males and four females. On succeeding nights similarly
comprised groups of different subjects viewed the films
until all the experimental conditions were run through in
a counterbalanced order.

The presentation of conditions was in the following
order: Night one - Anxiety, Belief Congruence first, Belief
Incongruence second; Night two - Anxiety. Belief Incongruence
first, Belief Congruence second; Night three - Non Anxiety,
Belief Congruence first. Belief Incongruence second; Night
four - Non Anxiety, Belief Incongruence first, Belief
Congruence second.

The diagram below possibly illustrates the design
more graphically.

High and Low Dggmatic

 

 

 

 

 

SS(128)
64 HiD r 64 LCD
32M 32F : 32M 32F
Anxious “""” .‘l‘ "- Non-Anxious
32 HiD I 32LoD 32 HiD I 32 LCD
16M 16FI 16M 16F 16M 16F ' 16M 16F
\ /'\

//" ‘1‘st\\ . //’ lst \\
Congruence-(3“Films)—Ihcongruence” Congruence-(3 Films)-Ificongruence
16 HiDT'16 LCD 16 HiDI 16 LCD 16 HiDl 16 LoD 16 HiDl 16 LCD
8M 8F| 8M. 8F 8M 8F| 8M 8F 8M 8F: 8M 8F 8M 8F' 8M 8F

I | I
Night ' Night Night Ni ht
I : 2nd II IIII 2nd IV
Incongurence (3 Films) Condruence Incongruence (3 Films)Congruence

 

 

 

 

As can be seen it was possible to complete the entire
testing on four nights. Due to the small projection room.
however, the number of testing nights was doubled, with nights

five through eight a replication of nights one through four.

42

Therefore, the data from night five was a replication of night
one and so the two were pooled, as was the data from nights
two and six. three and seven, and four and eight. Thus the
number of subjects tested each night was exactly half of that
shown in diagram one, or sixteen instead of thirty-two.

The testing was done during the Winter term, 1962.

Pre-Film Instructions Regarding Congruence and
Incongruence

"You are going to see a film of some people being
interviewed. It is part of one of the regular Gallup Poll
interviews* you probably all have heard of; only in this
case the interviews were also filmed. I have been able to
borrow the films from the Gallup people to further my own
research on how persons understand other persons. . . .

When the film is over I will give you some questionnaires and
will ask you to try to put yourself in the film persons'

or interviewees' shoes, so to speak. and to fill out the
forms as you think or feel they would. Also, in some

other questions you will be asked to rate them as an outside
observer, as you think their close friends and relations
might rate them.

Let me explain a little more about these films.

They are as I said, part of an actual Gallup Poll interview.
They are also used in the training of new interviewers for
the Gallup organization. Therefore, for training purposes
they conducted these interviews in a little different manner
than usual. They first asked very broad types of questions
so that when the beginning interviewer or trainee viewed

the film he could get a general idea of the interviewees'
personality. Later. the interviewee was asked his opinion
about the specific issue in the poll. . . The task of the
trainee was to figure out from watching the first general
questioning part of the film, how the interviewees would feel

 

*(A slight ruse was here perpetrated on the subjects
for purposes of making the congruence—incongruence conditions
more believable. The subjects were later informed of this.
and told the real purpose of the experiment.)

43

about the specific issue the Gallup Poll people were
investigating.

Since my research is not in the area of polls, I
am going to let you see the film, and I am going to tell
you how the interviewees answered on the particular issue
in the poll. The reason for this is that I am interested
in seeing in how much depth you can understand the people;
therefore, I want to give you all the information about them
that I can."

At this time the first three film people were des-
cribed as strong believers in one of the two issues
previously determined as having the most positive (congruent)

or negative (incongruent) valence for the subjects.

Belief Congruent Instructions

"Now the first topic had to do with how people feel
about other troubled people. All three of the people you
will see in the film felt very strongly, that understanding.
rather than any punishing attitude was one of the most
important things that homosexuals needed with regard to their
problem."

Belief Incongruence Instructions

"A second topic in the poll had to do with government
responsibility and control over our lives. All three inter-
viewees here felt very strongly that they never wanted to
bother with the task of making decisions for themselves.

They stated that they felt very strongly that the government
should be in a position to make all such decisions for them."

Instructions for the Anxiety Condition

The same as the pre—film anxiety instructions except

that two further statements will be added:

44

"By the way you might be interested in knowing why
I came to a university for subjects for this research and
not just out to the general public. Well it has been
discovered that the way one judges or 'figures out' people
is highly related to intelligence. That is. the more accurate
you are in your predictions the higher your intelligence.
The less accurate you are the lower your intelligence,——
something like an IQ test. And so I came to a university
because university students are known to be brighter than
those not having gone that far in school. And high scores
are important in this experiment."

As the first questionnaire was first being filled out.
a quick perusal of their papers was followed by:

"It's rather surprising but your scores so far are

very poor, much less accurate than those of a group of high
school students who were tested last week."*

Subjects

Of the 591 subjects to whom the Dogmatism Scale was
initially administered, 128 extreme high and low scorers
were asked to participate in the film viewing. The data of
96 of these 128 invited subjects was used in the final
analysis. An additional four subjects (two high and two low
dogmatic. comprised of one male and one female for each group)
‘were invited on each of the eight testing nights, as

attrition insurance. Thus the data in the results are based

 

*The two slight deceptions carried off here, (1) the
high relation of intelligence to the accuracy of interpersonal
perception; (2) the subjects doing poorer than high school
students. were later corrected when the subjects were informed
of the real purpose of the experiment.

45

on twelve subjects for eight nights for a total N of ninety-
six. Of those nights where more than twelve subjects showed
up. the data of the least extreme scorers on the Dogmatism
Scale were discarded. (The scores of seventeen subjects
were thus discarded.)

The high and low dogmatic subjects were equated on
age, intelligence (as measured by their College Qualification
Test scores). and similarity (as measured by the Similarity
Scale).

As can be seen from Table 1 there is practically no
difference between the high and low dogmatic groups on age
and similarity. There is a slight but non—significant difference
between the groups on intelligence, with the low dogmatics
slightly superior to the high dogmatics. The high dogmatics
mean score is 125.15, and the low dogmatics mean score is

128.06 (Table 2).

46

Table 1. Age and similarity scores of the high and low
dogmatic groups.

 

 

 

 

Age Similarity Scores
Group N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
High Dogmatic 48 18.79 1.64 30.82 4.28
Low Dogmatic 48 18.94 1.60 30.44 4.39
p N.S. N.S.

 

Table 2. COT scores of the high and low dogmatic groups.

 

 

 

Group N Mean S.D.
High Dogmatic 41* 125.15 23.16
Low Dogmatic 41* 128.06 26.31

P N.S.

 

*41 out of 48 available scores.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Accuracy Scale

Table 3 summarizes the results of the analysis of
variance of the accuracy judgments. The null hypothesis of
no difference between the closed and open subjects with
regard to their accuracy in perceiving others is rejected
(p < .02). Reference to Table 4 indicates that the means are
in the predicted direction. That is, the mean of the accuracy
scores of the relatively closed subjects is lower than the mean
of the accuracy scores of the relatively open subjects.

The congruence-incongruence variable was also found
to be significant (p < .05), indicating the adverse effect
of the belief incongruent condition on the accuracy scores
of both groups.

The interaction between dogmatism and congruence was
not found to be significant. The F of 2.55 is significant
at only the .20 level (Table 3). Although this does not
meet the generally accepted standards for statistical
significance, the difference in means was in the predicted

direction. That is, the accuracy scores of the closed

48

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy scores.
Sum of Mean
Source Squares DF Squares
Between Subjects:
Dogmatism (D) 259.0 1 259.0 6.91 .02
Anxiety (A) 37.6 1 37.6 1.00
Sex (S) 112.5 1 112.5 3.00 .10
Order (0) 3.8 1 3.8
DA 4.4 l 4.4
DS .9 1 .9
DO 14.6 1 14.6
AS 68.9 1 68.9 1.84
A0 12.5 1 12.5
80 39.4 1 39.4 1.05
DAS 3.3 1 3.3
DAO 3.8 1 3.8
DSO 6.4 l 6.4
ASO 112.6 1 112.6 3.00 .10
DASO 166 8 1 166.8 4.45 .05
Error (between) 2999.1 80 37.5
Within Subjects:
Congruence (C) 84.0 1 84.0 4.56 .05
DC 47.0 1 47.0 2.55 .20
AC 8.8 1 8.8
SC 0.0 l 0.0
0C 41.2 1 41.2 2.24
DAC 2.3 1 2.3
DSC 81.4 1 81.4 4.42 .05
DOC .1 1 .1
ASC .3 l .3
ADC 24.8 1 24.8 1.35
SOC 19.5 1 19.5 1.06
DASC 8.6 1 8.6
DAOC 18.1 1 18.1 1.00
ASOC 2.6 1 2.6
DSOC 37.5 1 37.5 2.04
DASOC .9 1 .9
Error (within) 1469.4 80 18.4
Total 5692.1 191

49

Table 4. Means and standard deviations for main effects of
analysis of variance of accuracy scores.

 

 

 

Source Mean Standard Deviation

Dogmatism

High 36.2 5.69

Low 38.5 4.98
Congruence

Congruent 38.1 5.20

Incongruent 36.7 5.65
Sex

Male 36.6 5.51

Female 38.2 6.33
Anxiety

Anxious 37.0 5.37

Non—Anxious 37.8 5.54
Order ,

First Set 37.5 5.96

Second Set 37.3 4.93

 

Table 5. Interaction of dogmatism with congruence (accuracy
scores).

 

 

High D Low D

 

Congruence 37.39 38.72

Incongruence 35.08 38.39

 

50

subjects, to a greater extent than the open subjects, were
affected in an adverse way in the belief incongruent condition.
resulting in lowered scores for that group (Table 5).

The null hypothesis could not be rejected with regard
to the main effect of anxiety. Also, although it was predicted
that the accuracy of the closed subjectS'would be more affected
by anxiety than would that of the open subjects, the non-
significant dogmatism by anxiety interaction failed to support
this prediction.

Although no hypothesis was made with regard to sex
and accuracy, it can be seen (Table 3) that a sex difference
was found (p < .10), with females attaining higher accuracy
scores than males (Table 4). Similar findings have been
reported by other investigators (5, 13, 28, 30), indicating
slight to significant superiorities of females over males in
accuracy of interpersonal perception.

Two of the twenty-six interactions were significant
at the .05 level. The two were: Dogmatism by Sex by Con-
gruence. and Dogmatism by Anxiety by Sex by Order (Table 3).
such significant interactions indicate that some caution
should be exercised in the interpretation of the significant
main effects reported above.

Let us look at the third order interaction, Dogmatism

by Sex by Congruence. comparing Dogmatism against Sex and

51

Congruence (Table 6). From this table we can see that in the
belief incongruent condition the discrepancy between high

and low female dogmatics is much larger than the discrepancy
between high and low dogmatic males. It can also be seen
that the female high dogmatics' accuracy scores decrease

from the congruence to the incongruence condition, while the
female low dogmatics' scores increase from congruence to
incongruence. Both the closed and open male's scores

however, decrease in accuracy from congruence to incongruence.

It is this non-unidirectionality between the sexes
within the congruence-incongruence condition that more than
likely accounts for the failure of significance of the predicted
Dogmatism by Congruence interaction.

Table 7 presents the means of the more complex Dog-
matism by Anxiety by Sex by Order interaction. It is to be
noted that five out of the eight pairs of means are in the
expected direction, with open subjects attaining higher
accuracy scores than closed subjects. On two of the eight
means there is no essential difference between the groups,
and one pair is in the "wrong" direction, but only slightly
so.

Further examination of the means summarizing this
interaction led to no clear interpretation. It indicates.

again, that the relations among these factors were not the

52

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6. Dogmatism compared against sex and congruence
(means of accuracy scores).
High D Low D
Male, Congruence 36.04 38.54
Male, Incongruence 35.04 36.91
Female, Congruence 38.75 38.91
Female, Incongruence 35.12 39.87
Table 7. Dogmatism compared against anxiety, sex, and order
(means of accuracy scores).
High D Low D
Anx., Male, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 34.33 39.41
Anx., Male. Incong. lst-Cong. 2nd 36.50 36.91
Anx., Female, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 36.91 38.75
Anx., Female, Incong. lst-Cong. 2nd 34.83 38.00
NonAnx., Male, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 38.58 37.41
NonAnx., Male, Incong. lst—Cong 2nd 33.58 37.16
NonAnx., Female, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 35.41 40.33
NonAnx., Female, Incong. lst-Cong. 2nd 40.58 40.50

 

53

same for the two sexes. Therefore, the data of the males and
females were subjected to separate analyses of variance.

A glance at Tables 8 and 9 indicates that for both sexes
the main effect of dogmatism is significant at the .10 level.
Since we have already shown the dogmatism variable to be
significant in the main analysis of variance, we can see that
the reduced sample size inherent in the present analysis
resulted in the lowering of the significance level. The
data, then, seem to support the over-all prediction of greater
accuracy for the open as compared to the closed subjects for
both sexes.

For males the interaction of Order by Anxiety with
Dogmatism was found to be significant at the .10 level. For
the females the main effect of congruence was significant at
the .10 level. No other main effect or interaction was
significant at beyond the .10 level.

The crucial interaction of Dogmatism by Congruence
was not found to be significant for the males, but for the
females it is now found to be at the .005 level. Thus we
see that the introduction of the belief incongruence variable
had a significant effect on the female high dogmatic subjects.
resulting in a decrease in their accuracy scores.

Although the high dogmatic males were, in an over-all

way less accurate than the low dogmatic males, they were

54

Table 8. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy scores
for males.

 

 

 

 

 

Sum of Mean

Source Squares DF Squares F P
Between Subjects
Dogmatism (D) 114.8 1 114.8 3 o < .10
Anxiety (A) 2.3 1 2.3
Order (0) 33.8 1 33.8
DA 7.6 1 7.6
DO 0.9 l 0.9
A0 25. 1 25.1
DAO 110.5 1 110.5 2 9 < 10
Error (between) 1522.7 40 38.1
Within Subjects
Congruence (C) 41.3 1 41.3
DC 2.4 l 2.4
AC 3.1 1 3.1
OC 58.6 1 58.6
DAC 10.0 1 10.0
DOC 17.5 1 17.5
AOC 5.4 l 5.4
DAOC 12.7 1 12.7
Error (within) 913.5 40 22.8
Total 2882.2 95

 

55

Table 9. Summary of analysis of variance of accuracy scores
for females.

 

 

 

 

Sum of Mean

Source Squares DF Squares F P
Between Subjects
Dogmatism (D) 145.0 1 145.0 3.93 < .10
Anxiety (A) 104.1 1 104.1 2.82 < .20
Order (0) 9.3 1 9.3
DA 0.1 1 0.1
DO 20.3 1 20.3
AO 100.3 1 100.3 2.71 < .20
DAO 60.0 1 60.0
Error (between) 1476.3 40 36.9
Within Subjects
Congruence (c) 42.6 1 42.6 3.06 < .10
DC 126.1 1 126.1 9.07 < .005
AC 6.1 1 6.1
cc 2.1 1 2.1
DAC 1.0 1 1.0
DOC 20.1 1 20.1
AOC .21.9 1 21.9
DAOC 6.1 1 6.1
Error (within) 556.0 40 13.9

 

Total 2697.3 95

 

56

less affected by the introduction of incongruence than were
the high dogmatic females. It appears that the predicted
effect of incongruence on high dogmatics holds primarily only

for women.

Like—Dislike Scale

Reference to Table 10 informs us that there is a
difference in the amount of acceptance or rejection of the
film personalities between the closed and open subjects that
approaches significance (p < .10). A comparison of the mean
scores of the two groups (Table 11) indicates that the closed
subjects were more rejecting of the film personalities than
were the open subjects.

The congruence condition had a significant (p < .01)
effect on both groups, resulting in lowered scores for the
incongruence condition. The interaction between Dogmatism
and Congruence was not found to be significant, and neither
the sexxunranxiety variables had any significant effect on
this scale (Table 10).

The interaction between Dogmatism and Order was signifi—
cant at the .05 level. Table 12 shows that the acceptance-
rejection scores of the closed subjects was less in the
condition where incongruence was presented first and congruence

second than when this Order was reversed: i.e., they were more

Table 10.

57

Summary of analysis of variance of the like—
dislike scale (acceptance-rejection scores).

 

 

Source

Sum of
Squares DF

Mean
Squares

 

Between Subjects

Dogmatism (D)
Anxiety (A)
Sex (S)

Order (0)

DA
D8
D0
AS
AO
SO
DAS
DAO
DSO
ASO
DASO

Error (between)

U1

\)N

'NHN

O‘C)k3h'h‘¢~01U1k)k)k)O\C>b-O o
mla(chtncaxoxotntn~3aae»hlm,o
OldididFJFJFJF‘F‘P‘k‘F‘F‘P'H H

p..-
w
U'l\lb
(I)

U1

'Nl-‘N \IN
O

Ol—‘meOKOQUlUTQCDDE-‘(DO

p.
\JC)NDF‘F‘¢»0\UINJN)NJG\C>h~O o

I-‘\l

4.27

 

Within Subjects

Congruence (C)

DC
AC
SC
OC
DAC
DSC
DOC
ASC
AOC
SOC
DASC
DAOC
ASOC
DSOC

DASOC
Error (within)

be #10
C>u>a>e-0(m<3

sh<3<fiubkoko(fi(n(h<DtOtO~d(DthO(D

NJ
orarekaenw(arek4k4k-Htarek4haw

i-‘Ol-‘NOQI—‘flool

CA
to
CD

l-‘O‘

H

\JOHNOQHQOO‘OCAm-bOUIO
\OOUIDKOKOUIO‘O‘ONNQOI-‘Nm

 

Total

2480.7 191

 

58

Table 11. Means and standard deviations for main effects of
analysis of variance of like-dislike scale.

 

 

 

Source Mean Standard Deviation

Dogmatism

High 15.07 3.52

Low 16.09 3.63
Congruence

Congruent 16.15 3.38

Incongruent 15.02 3.78
Sex

Male 15.44 ' 3.72

Female 15.73 4.29
Anxiety

Anxious 15.53 3.67

Non-Anxious 15.64 3.55
Order

First Set 15.63 3.78

Second Set 15.54 3.44

 

Table 12. Interaction of dogmatism with order (acceptance—
rejection scores).

 

 

High D Low D

 

Congruence lst. Incongruence 2nd 15.49 15.58

Incongruence lst. Congruence 2nd 14.50 16.75

 

59

rejecting in the former condition. When we look at the scores
of the open subjects we see. first, that in both conditions
their scores are higher. They were more accepting than the
closed subjects. Secondly, we note that the pattern of the
open subjects' scores was the reverse of the closed subjects.
That is, the scores of the open subjects' increased when the
incongruent condition was presented first.

Since the lowest mean score in the table was for the
closed subjects in the condition where incongruence was
presented first, it would seem that for them, an initial
exposure to people of incongruent beliefs had a "carry over”
effect to the congruence condition resulting in an over—all
lowering of their acceptance scores. This was not true of
the open subjects.

The significance of the two fourth order interactions;
Dogmatism by Anxiety by Sex by Order (.05) and Dogmatism by
Anxiety by Sex by Congruence (.10) are indicative of the
lack of clear pattern of the higher order interactions of the
accuracy scores. Therefore they will be discussed only
briefly.

With regard to the Dogmatism by Anxiety by Sex by
Order interaction. reference to Table 13 shows us that on six
out of the eight pairs of means, the open subjects were more

accepting of the film personalities than were the closed

60

subjects. On one pair there was no essential difference.
and one pair was in the "wrong" direction.

In the Dogmatism by Anxiety by Sex by Congruence
interaction (Table 14), again, the open subjects attained
higher scores than the closed subjects on six of the eight
pairs of means. When congruence is used as the pivot for
comparisons we see that the closed subjects have a uniformly
lower score than the open subjects in the belief incongruence
condition on all four pairs of means where congruence and
incongruence are compared.

The open subjects were more variable, with half their
scores higher when congruence was present and half when
incongruence was present. Thus the presence of incongruence
seems to have a more far—reaching effect on the closed
subjects with regard to their acceptance or rejection of the

film personalities.

Summary of Results

Closed subjects were found to be significantly less
accurate in their ability to perceive and understand the
film personalities than were the open subjects. They were
also more rejecting of them than were the open subjects.

The congruence-incongruence variable had a significant

effect on both the accuracy and acceptance-rejection measures

61

Table 13. Dogmatism compared against anxiety. sex. and order
(means of acceptance-rejection scores).

 

 

High D Low D

 

Anx., Male, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 13.66 16.41
Anx., Male, Incong. lst-Cong. 2nd 15.00 16.00
Anx., Female, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 14.58 16.91
Anx., Female, Incong. lst-Cong. 2nd 16.75 14.08
NonAnx., Male, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 14.91 18.41
NonAnx., Male, Incong. lst—Cong. 2nd 14.75 14.33
NonAnx., Female, Cong. lst-Incong. 2nd 14.83 15.25
NonAnx., Female, Incong. 1st-Cong. 2nd 15.25 17.33

 

Table 14. Dogmatism compared against anxiety. sex and
congruence (means of acceptance—rejection scores).

 

 

 

High D Low D
Anx., Male, Cong. 15.83 16.16
Anx., Male, Incong. 12.83 16.25
Anx., Female, Cong. 16.50 15.75
Anx., Female, Incong. 15.65 15.25
NonAnx., Male, Cong. 15.25 17.33
NonAnx., Male, Incong. 14.41 15.41
NonAnx., Female, Cong. 16.08 16.25

NonAnx., Female, Incong. 14.00 16.33

 

62

of the closed and open subjects. with decreased accuracy
and increased rejection characteristic of both groups in the
belief incongruent condition.

Sex differences were found between the open and closed
subjects in their accuracy ratings, but none were evidenced
on the acceptance—rejection measure. When these sex dif-
ferences were explored further it was discovered that while
the closed male subjects were only slightly more adversely
affected by the incongruence condition in their accuracy
ratings than were open males, the closed females'accuracy
scores were lowered to a significant extent.

Thus while the Dogmatism by Congruence interaction was
in the predicted direction, i.e., closed subjects' accuracy
scores more adversely affected than open subjects by the
belief incongruent condition, the effect was significant only
for women. Also, females as a whole were more accurate in
their judgments of the film personalities than were the
males.

No differences were found with regard to the Dogmatism
by Congruence interaction on the acceptance—rejection measures.
The Dogmatism by Order interaction was significant at the .05
level.

The anxiety variable had no important effect on the

accuracy or acceptanceerejection scores for either the closed

or open groups.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

In previous research relatively closed people have
been shown to differ consistently from relatively open people
in the way they approach conceptual, perceptual, ideological
and esthetic experiences and situations. The results of the
analysis of both scales in the present study lend support to
a widening of the applicability of the openness-closedness
concept to the affective interpersonal area.

The trend of the results point to consistent differences
between the two groups, with the closed subjects less accurate
in their judgments of others, and on the whole manifesting
less acceptance of them, as compared to the open subjects.
This finding is in line with the above noted research in that
the differences between the open and closed groups in those
studies was always in the direction of the closed subjects
manifesting a lesser capacity to "entertain" different systems
of beliefs, of their approaching new experiences with more
rigidly preconceived sets and thus with relatively lesser

flexibility.

63

64

Accuracy Judgments Related to the
Dogmatism Variable

Let us first look a little more closely at the
accuracy judgments. The subjects were required to view a
brief filmed bit of behavior of people they had never seen
before, and were then asked to "put themselves in the shoes"
of these people. The subjects were then required to predict
how the film people responded or felt about a wide range of
situations not included in the small segment of behavior seen
in the film.

This task can be seen as involving the collaboration
of at least three processes. First, it is necessary to be
able to "take in" or consider all the significant reality
aspects of the behavior that actually occurred. The less
need there is to narrow the perceptual field, the more infor-
mation will be available on which to base an accurate judg-
ment. Second, some capacity for putting oneself in the others'
place must be present. The more one is able to temporarily
adopt the film person's frame of reference and~way of
believing, the better one should be able to accurately pre-
dict how that person will react or feel. Third, the greater
the capacity to synthesize the information received and then
make inferences based on the seen behavior, but necessarily

going beyond it, the more accurate should be the judgments

65

or predictions.

With reference to the first process, we have seen
in the aforementioned Gollin (23) experiment, that certain
types of personalities or cognitive structures have a
tendency to eliminate from their consideration certain clearly
present aspects of the behavior they have seen, whereas other
kinds of personalities seem to be able to be more compre-
hensive in their perceptions. In Else Frenkel—Brunswik's
analysis she pointed out the need of high authoritarian people
to simplify their milieu because of intolerance of ambiguity.
For example, in both the Jones (29) and Scodel and Mussen
(48) researches the high authoritarian subjects brought a
high degree of pre—conceived notions of the stimulus subjects
with them, and projected them into the experimental situation.
This hampered their ability to experience the many sidedness
of the persons they encountered. One result of this was a
lessened accuracy in interpersonal perception for the high
as compared to the low authoritarian subjects.

In the theory of the open and closed mind, which is
an extension and broadening of the work on the"Authoritarian
Personalityfl'similar kinds of narrowing processes for closed
as compared to open subjects are presumed to occur.

In Mikol's experiment (35) certain portions of the

new (musical) experience were not "seen" or attended to, to a

66

greater extent for closed as compared to open subjects.

In another study (45) where a hypothetical "Denny Doodlebug"
was placed in a world which was governed by rules different
from the everyday world, closed subjects had much greater
difficulty than open subjects in accepting all the rules

by which the "Doodlebug" was governed. They eliminated a
part of stimuli, i.e., those rules which they had difficulty
in integrating with their own belief system.

The above can thus be used as a framework for explain—
ing the obtained differences in accuracy of interpersonal
perception appearing in this research. The structural personality
qualities which necessitated greater reliance on a more narrow
filtering system resulted in the increased probability of
greater perceptual simplification and distortion of the segments
of behavior seen in the film, for closed as compared to
open subjects.

We now turn to the second process which involves
temporarily adopting a different way of thinking so as to
"empathize" more effectively with the other person.

In discussing the gamut of experimental problems to
which the open and closed subjects were exposed, Rokeach, in
partial summary, stated:

. . . All these different tasks are seen to have

something structural in common. They all involve a new
belief system that is at odds with a previously held

67

belief system. To deal with such tasks in terms of
intrinsic requirements entails a willingness to relin-
quish old systems, and a capacity to entertain and enjoy
new systems. . . . (42, p. 286).

He goes on to say that the nature of open belief
systems as compared to closed belief systems, is that open
systems seem to be characterized by more willingness to
"play along" or entertain new systems of thought or experience
to a greater extent than closed systems.

Another factor posited as a hinderance in the capacity
to temporarily take another point of View is the amount of
predisposition toward isolation within a system. The greater
the isolation of beliefs within a system the smaller is the
possibility of positive transfer from one system to another.
This greater degree of isolation within belief systems has
been noted as one of the defining characteristics of closed
subjects.

A more speculative point arises. Halpern's study
(25) concluded that people with broader psychological experiences
and more open personality structures are better able to ex-
perience a wider variety of feelings across different types
of people. If it follows that closed people have a generally
narrower range of potential for experiencing new phenomena,
then their capacity to understand and "feel with" a broad

range of people should be less than those mone open in their

personality structure.

68

Finally we turn to the synthesis and inference process
posited as a third factor involved in making accurate inter-
personal judgments.

In the aforementioned experiment with the Doodlebug.
subjects were presented with a series of hints to help them
determine how the bug arrived at a certain location. In
order for them to solve the problem it was necessary for them
to synthesize each hint so as to form a new but internally
consistent belief system. The open and closed groups differed
significantly in this ability to integrate or synthesize the
hints. with the open subjects more effective than the closed
subjects.

In the study by Levy (32) it will be recalled that
the subjects had to infer or imagine how the reconstructed
design would look before it was reconstructed. With the
intelligence factor controlled, significant differences
between the groups were found in favor of the open subjects
in solving this task. That is, the closed subjects had
greater difficulty than the open subjects in going beyond
the immediately given, and in making the necessary inferences.

In summary it can be seen that in the light of the
present analysis of the posited factors involved in the
accuracy judging task, the findings in this research are

consistent with the weight of previous experimental evidence

69

and in general accord with theoretical expectations.

Acceptance and Rejection Related to the
Dogmatism Variable

On the acceptance-rejection measure the results indicate
-that the closed subjects.have a greater tendency to reject
the film personalities than the open subjects.

In one respect this is inconsistent with the theory
of belief systems. For the theory states that it is only as
the belief system is engaged, i.e., exposed to incongruent
beliefs, that the relatively greater stress on protective
mechanisms of the closed subjects becomes activated. It
is possible that the findings on the acceptance—rejection
measure can be accounted for by some unanalyzed difference
in questionnaire or test (scale) responding behavior between
the open and closed groups.

On the other hand this difference in scale responding
behavior must be related to some personality factors. Recall
that in the Mikol experiment the open subjects seemed to
"enjoy" the new music to a greater extent than the closed
subjects. In the Doodlebug problem open subjects seemed
to "enjoy" the problem more than closed subjects. The
closed subjects spontaneously verbalized more negative remarks
about the task. In another study already noted (45) a

."generalized misanthropy syndrome" involving a greater

70

rejection of others was in evidence. These all point to
increased rejection by the closed subjects as compared

to the open subjects without specifically invoking incongruent
beliefs.

It is possible that the unfamiliarity or newness of
the stimulus people or tasks. in themselves. resulted in
some way, in engaging the dynamics of the closed subjects'
belief systems in a negative way to a greater extent than for
the open subjects.

Further evidence for this line of reasoning is that
in the Mikol experiment the closed subjects responded to the
composer in essentially the same negative way as they
responded to the composer's music. That is, if the music
was new or contemporary, both the music and its composer were
reacted to in a rejecting way.

If the closed subjects viewed the composer in a
negative manner solely on the basis of his music, this
linkage in belief and feeling might manifest itself in
other ways. In the present research it is conjectured that
the greater rejecting feelings on the part of the closed
subjects, as compared to the open subjects toward new others.
resulted in the activation of more interfering sets for them.
This is a possible added factor in the lessened accuracy in

judgment of the closed subjects.

71

Relationships of Dogmatism to Congruence
and The Confounding Effect of Sex

One of the most crucial variables in terms of bearing
out predictions from the theory of belief systems with regard
to accuracy of interpersonal perception, is the relationship
of dogmatism with congruence. If the theoretical formulations
are correct, the differences in accuracy of perception between
the open and closed groups should widen when they are exposed
to persons known to have beliefs incongruent to their own.

The closed subjects should become markedly less accurate while
the open subjects should be only minimally adversely affected.
This did not occur to any extensive degree. The differences
while in the expected direction. were significant at only the
.20 level.

In an attempt to understand this a finding emerged
that had not heretofore been considered in the theoretical
formulations. It was discovered that although the closed
subjects' accuracy scores were more adversely affected than
the open subjects by the belief incongruent condition. the
effect was significant only for women. In a separate
analysis of variance for males and females, the dogmatism by
congruence interaction was not found to be significant for
males. but was highly significant for females (.005).

The setup of the present design precluded a clear

72

answer to the question as to whether this finding is a result

of the dogmatism factor, or more associated with the inter-
personal perception variable. More probably it is a combination
of both, but the relative contribution of each factor was not
determined by this research.

The finding that women are generally more "empathic"
than men has appeared in the literature for some time.
Jenness (28) reports a significant superiority of females over
males in judging emotional expressions using the Rudolph
poses. (An atlas containing 680 drawings of faces modified
from poses by a German actor.) Other authors (5, 13, 28, 30)
also report slight to significant differences in inter—
personal accuracy judgments favoring females.

This information of male—female differences points to
the wisdom of separating the sexes in any future studies
involving the relationship of cognitive style to accuracy
of interpersonal perception.

In light of the findings already discussed it is
somewhat surprising to discover that the interaction of dog-
matism with congruence on the acceptance-rejection measure
was not found to be significant. This means that the intro-
duction of the belief incongruent condition did not result in
the predicted increase in rejection of the film personalities

by the closed as compared to the open subjects.

T‘- :A 3:554n-Q1L § AAAAAAA J— cnu J—L‘.~ AHA “AR-:k1t‘

73

explanation emerges if we look at the level of significance

of the congruence-incongruence variable for the Like-Dislike
scale. It is significant at the .01 level, indicating that
both the open and closed groups tended to rate the interviewee
in a less positive or accepting manner when they learned

that his (or her) beliefs were incongruent to their own.

In this vein it is important to remember one of the
premises of the theory of belief systems that was stated at
the outset. It pertains to the non-dichotomous or relative
nature of the concept openness-closedness. More specifically.
it is related to the fact that all belief systems are organized
along the lines of belief congruence regardless of the degree
of openness or closedness.

Therefore, with reference to the non-significance of
this interaction, it may be that the incongruence instructions
were perceived in a more intensely negative way by the open than
by the closed subjects. Some slight support of this is
seen in the fact that the mean disagreement score (on the
issue chosen to arouse incongruence) for the closed subjects
was minus 2.68 out of a total of minus three, as compared to
the mean disagreement score of minus 2.94 for the open sub-
jects. It is possible that with a numerically larger step

scale this difference might have approached significance.

74

If. in fact, open subjects do have stronger negative
feelings on the issue chosen in this research as the incon-
gruence measure, then the relative engagement of the open
subject's belief systems would have been proportionately
greater. This conceivably could have affected their ratings
of the film personalities in such a way as to vitiate the
effectiveness of the dogmatism by congruence interaction.

Since this points to a lack of clear specificity of the meaning
of the incongruence factor for both groups, the above can
only be considered speculative. It is another area which is

suggestive of further research.

The Anxiety Condition

Finally let us look at the anxiety variable. Con-
trary to prediction it had no important effect on the accuracy
or acceptance-rejection scores for either the open or closed
group. In the respect that anxiety is presumed to have a
disrupting effect on accuracy judgments and to result in a
tendency toward increased rejection of others, this finding
indicates a lack of corroboration of the research of Kemp
and Rokeach (44).

Results similar to the findings of this study with
respect to the anxiety variable have been reported by Koons

(33). Using the Denny Doodlebug problem, no significant

75

differences were found between open and closed subjects on the
integration of beliefs into a new system in an experimentally
induced anxiety situation. It is possible then, that the
manifestation of the hypothesized differences in anxiety between
the two groups is dependent on the specific processes involved
in the experimental problem. That is, the groups may differ
in level of anxiety present, and yet performance on a particular
cognitive or perceptual task may not be adversely affected by
this difference. This is partially borne out by the fact
that in the Koons study the closed subjects admitted to
significantly more anxiety in the problem—solving situation
than did the open subjects, and yet no differences between
the groups appeared in the performance of his experimental
task, or in the accuracy judgments in the present research.
Two alternative explanations though, are also tenable.
First, it may be that the instructions did not. in fact.
arouse anxiety. The subjects were invited to record spon—
taneous comments about any facet of the experiment. There
were five comments (three by open, two by closed subjects)
which pertained to the subjects' lack of acceptance of the
credibility of «the anxiety instructions. The references
revolved around this theme: "Did you really test high

school students last week?” It is possible that other subjects

76

had similar feelings about this which they did not express.*

A second alternative revolves around the problem that
the intended effect of anxiety may result in an increased
involvement to do better, rather than in any disruption of
adequacy of performance.

Alper (2) and others state that although the experi-
menter attempts to orient his subjects toward some particular
type of involvement ("ego, task or anxiety"), by the nature
of his instructions, he cannot guarantee that the specific
type of involvement that was intended will occur.

The fact that the anxiety variable was not adequately
controlled then, leaves open too many alternative possibilities
for the assertion of any relatively definitive statement
with regard to the relationship between the findings of this

study and Kemp and Rokeach's work.

 

*These five comments were the only indications that
the subjects had any question about the credibility of any
of the conditions of the experiment.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine and test
some of the implications of the theory of open and closed
belief systems in the affective interpersonal areas. A
fundamental assumption of this theonz is that knowledge of
the structure of people's belief systems will lead to an
understanding of how many varied types of problems and
experiences are approached and dealt with. The majority of
the research under this framework has been concerned with
differences between open and closed belief systems in con-
ceptual, perceptual, ideological and esthetic spheres of
activity.

The present study is an attempt to widen the appli-
cability of the theory to the area of interpersonal perception.
In this vein three general hypotheses were formulated.

(1) People With relatively closed belief systems will be less
accurate in understanding the feelings of others than people
with relatively open belief systems. They will also be less
accepting of them. (2) The differences found in hypothesis

one will be markedly accentuated when information is presented

77

78

about the others which pictures them as having a different
and alien (incongruent) belief system from that of the
subjects. (3) Under a condition of anxiety the accuracy
and acceptance sources of the groups will again be dif-
ferentially affected, with the relatively closed people
becoming less accurate and less accepting of the others
than the relatively open people.

Ninety—six subjects who had scored at the extreme
ends of the dogmatism scale, the measure of open and closed
belief systems, were exposed to six brief filmed interviews
of people they had never seen before. The films were pre-
sented on eight separate nights. After the film viewing
the subjects were asked to predict (or more accurately
postdict) how the interviewees had responded to personality
questionnaires, and were also asked to rate the interviewees
on a like—dislike dimension.

The congruence-incongruence situations were set up
by first determining the subjects' beliefs on a series of
issues. These issues were tapped by means of filler
questions inserted in a random fashion within the dogmatism
scale. Then, prior to each film presentation the subjects
were told that certain of the interviewees professed strong
beliefs which were known to be either extremely incongruent

or congruent to those of the subjects. This was determined

79

on the basis of the subjects' responses to the filler questions.

The anxiety condition was evoked by instructions to
the subjects to the effect that accuracy in judging others
was related to intelligence. As a further measure the subjects
were also told during the course of their judging that their
rating scores were quite poor and inaccurate.

The presentation of conditions (congruence-incongruence
and anxiety—non anxiety) occurred in counterbalanced order.
Thus both the closed and open groups were equally exposed to
all the experimental conditions, with the order of presentation
of each variable controlled.

No significant differences were found between the
groups in age, intelligence as measured by the COT. and in
similarity to the interviewees.

The results of the experiment were analyzed by the
analysis of variance technique and by t—tests. It was found
that relatively closed subjects were significantly less
accurate in their ability to perceive and understand the
film personalities than were relatively open subjects. The
closed subjects were also more rejecting of the film persons
than were the open subjects.

The introduction of the belief incongruence condition
resulted in the predicted differential decrease in accuracy

judgment scores of the closed as compraed to the open

80

subjects, but not to a significant extent. When the reason
for this lack of predicted significance was explored further
it was discovered that the incongruence variable was signifi—
cant only for females. This sex difference was posited as
the probable reason for the lack of significance of this
interaction. It was also found that females were generally
more accurate in their interpersonal judgments than males.

The anxiety variable had no important effect on any
of the conditions in this experiment. This was explained
primarily as due to lack of adequate control over the intended
effect of the anxiety instructions on the subjects. More
specifically, it was suggested that certain of the subjects
possibly became more motivated, rather than more disrupted
in their performance. The fact that this may have affected
the closed and open groups in an uncontrolled way made it
difficult to relate the findings of this research to other
studies bearing on this question.

In conclusion, Rokeach has stated that he believes
the dogmatism scale to be a measure of the extent to which
the total mind is an open or closed one. This study
generally lends support to the extension of the concept of

openness-closedness to the area of interpersonal perception.

10.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DOGMATISM SCALE WITH FILLER ITEMS* (STARRED)

88

LAST NAME FIRST NAME AGE

 

 

The following is a study of what the general public thinks
and feels about a number of important social and personal
questions. The best answer to each statement below is your
personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and
opposing points of View; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements. disagreeing just as
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement you can be
sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how
much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.
Write +1+2+3 or -1 -2 —3 depending on how you feel in each
case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE —2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

l. A person who thinks primarily on his own happiness

is beneath contempt.

2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do
something important.

3.* The best way to raise children is with the least
amount of parental interference.

4. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat
myself several times to make sure I am being under-
stood.

5. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

6.* I feel strongly for admitting Red China into the
United Nations.

7.* Things would be much easier for us all if our
government would make all those decisions that we
have to make for ourselves.

8. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish
if he considers his own happiness primarily.

9.*

10.*

11.

12.

13.

14.*

15.

l6.*

17.

18.*

19.

20.*

21.

22.*

89

The only way to make sure that certain crimes are
not committed again and again is to punish the
offender with the death penalty.

Modern abstract painting is a different form of
expression than the styles of the old masters, but
is as truthful and as meaningful as they were.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived.

Those freedom riders deserve to be thrown in jail.

I'd like it if I should find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

Europeans criticize the U.S. and its materialism. but
such criticism is only to cover up their realization
that American culture is far superior to their own.

Of all the different philosophies which have existed
in this world there is probably only one which is
correct.

The John Birch society is as wrong as McCarthy was.

It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or
a cause that his life becomes meaningful.

A man's moral decisions should be based on what he
feels is right. and not on any outside authority
such as the church.

There are a number of persons I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for.

I believe that socialists are at the very least.
misguided. and are probably close to being fanatic.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can
know what is going on is to rely on leaders or
experts who can be trusted.

The U.S. must bow to the rulings of the United Nations
even if it means changing our way of looking at things.

23.

24.

25.*

26.

27.*

28.

29.*

30.

31.*

32.

33.

34.*

35.

36.*

37.

90

There is so much to be done and so little time to do
it in.

It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

There is something very wrong about a white person
who marries a negro.

A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion
among its members cannot exist for long.

A communist victory would not be so great a disaster
as the extermination of human life from the H bomb.

It is only natural that a person should have a much
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than
with ideas he opposes.

Homosexuals should have the severest kind of punish—
ment.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself
I sometimes have ambition to become a great person.
like Einstein, or Beethoven. or Shakespeare.

Students in American schools are too pampered and
are never made to work hard.

Though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth-
while goal it is unfortunately necessary at times
to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing

at all."

Teen-agers should earn all or almost all of their
college expenses.

Most people just don't give a "damn" about others.

They should make laws restricting labor unions much
stricter.

A person who gets enthusiastic about a number of
causes is likely to be a "wishy-washy" sort of person.

38.*

39.

40.

41.*

42.

44.

45.*

46.*

47.

49.

50.

51.*

91

Children should be taught unquestioning obedience
to their parents.

To compromise our political opponents is dangerous
because it usually leads to a betrayal of our own
side.

If given the chance I would do something of great
benefit to the world.

Cradle to the grave security provided by the govern-
ment is wrong because it results in loss of desire
to do things for yourself.

In times like these it is necessary to be more on
guard against ideas put out by certain people or
groups in ones' own camp than by those in the
opposing camp.

I feel strongly against admitting Red China into the
United Nations.

In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed
in what I am 901ng to say that I forget to listen to
what the others are saying.

There is no crime that deserves the death penalty.

Modern abstract painting is just a big meaningless
splotch of colors.

Once I got wound up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

The freedom riders are doing an important and
useful work.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those
who are on the side of truth and those who are
against it.

Man on his own is a hopeless and miserable creature.

The John Birch society is a truly patriotic organization.

A man's moral decision can only be based on what his
church tells him to believe.

53.

54.

55.*

56.*

57.

58.

60.*

61.

62.*

63.

64.*

65.

66.*

92

The U.S. and Russia have just about nothing in
common.

In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers.

Socialism is becoming more and more evident in this
country. and I believe that this is a sign of real
progress.

No world organization like the United Nations should
have the right to tell Americans what they can or
cannot do.

The highest form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of a democracy is a government run
by those who are most intelligent.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is the future that counts.

If a white person loves and then marries a negro,
that person has earned my respect and admiration.

It would be preferable to die in an H bomb attack
than to live under communism.

Unfortunately. a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems
don't really understand what is going on.

Homosexuals need understanding of their problem
more than anything else.

Fundamentally the world we live in is a pretty lonely
place.

It is not necessary to give students as much home—
work as they do.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's
going on until one has had a chance to hear the
opinions of those one reSpects.

Teen—agers have too many other interests to worry
about earning money for their college education:
that's the parents responsibility.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

93

The worst crime a person can commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same thing
he does.

They should make laws restricting business corpor-
ations much stricter.

Although the U.S. has more material things. the
Europeans really have the more mature and
advanced culture.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are
the same as ones' own.

Most of the ideas which get published nowadays aren't
worth the paper they are printed on.

It is only natural for a person to be rather
fearful of the future.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses
to admit he's wrong.

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion
we must be careful not to compromise with those who
believe differently from the way we do.

APPENDIX B

ORIGINAL CLINE SCALES

REV.

95

POSTDICTION No. 5: Mr. G. Guess which way Mr. G.
»behaves in real life.
Check the one right answer
for each item.

 

In his social life he:
(a) enjoys "dress-up" parties.
(b) entertains informally frequently at home.
(c) is rather inactive and only rarely goes to
social activities.

People who know him describe him as being:
(a) easy to get along with.
(b) somewhat irresponsible.
(c) somewhat dominating.

He tends to be:

(a) quite ambitious.

(b) above average in this regard.
(c) somewhat indifferent and lazy.

5

he gets in an argument with his wife he:

(a) shouts loudly and obscenely at her.

(b) may occasionally strike her.

(c) raises his voice a little but maintains good
control.

e

 

In handling his 12-year-old son he is:
(a) rather strict.

(b) fairly easy going.

(c) not too interested.

 

When he goes to a party he:
(a) tends to flirt with women other than his wife.
(b) enjoys himself but is not much noticed.
(c) sometimes gets drunk and then becomes the life
of the party.
When it comes to money:

(a) he buys mainly with cash.

(b) he buys a great deal on credit, but keeps his
payments up.

(c) he buys a great deal on credit and is often
late with his payments.

 

96

Judge Name or No. Person Rated

 

 

THE PERSONALITY TRAIT SCALE

 

Instructions: Below are listed 25 personality traits which
can be used to describe people. Read each
trait below and then check (V) the appropriate
response as it applies to the person you are
rating.

For example: Let's start with the first

trait below: COOPERATIVE. If the person you
are rating is very cooperative and this is

very like him then check under the very like
column, No. 1. If he is actually just the
opposite or very UNcooperative. then check under
the very UNlike column, No. 6.‘ If he is
somewhere in-between (as most people are)

then check one of the in-between or middle

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

columns.
1 2 3 4 , 5 6
Vgry Rather A LittleA Little Rathe' Very
Like Like Like UNlike UNlik UNlike
1. COOPERATIVE I I I l l I I
2 CONFIDENT I I l I I I I
3 NERVOUS I L l I J I I
4. UNGRATEFUL Li. I I I I I I
5. ENERGETIC I I I I I I I
6. IMPATIENT Li I I I g] I I
7. A LEADER I I I I I 1 _AJ
8. METHODOICAL I I l I 1' ’1 l
9- MEEK l l L l | l l
10. EGOTISTICAL I I I L I l I
11. PERSISTENT j I
12. FRIENDLY | I
13. AGGRESSIVE I I
14. DULL [ | | l |
15. HAPPY | | j | l
16. AMBITIOUS | | l | I

 

 

 

97
_ 1 2 3 4 5 > 6

IVeryIRatherIA LittlelA.Little Rather I very
e

l

_

 

 

 

 

Lik Like Like ‘ UNlike UNlike , UNlike -
17. EFFICIENT I I I
18. ORIGINAL I I I
19. FAIRMINDED I I I

 

 

 

20. INHIBITED I I

 

 

 

 

 

I
21. ANXIOUS I I I
22. FRANK I I _J
23. LAZY l_ I

 

24. IMPULSIVE I I
25. AFFECTIONATEI I

 

 

 

 

__fl>

 

ACL FILM No.

5: Mr. G

 

Mr. G. has checked one adjective from each pair of adjectives
You are to check
the one (in each pair) you think he checked.

below as being descriptive g; himself.

1. (a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

10.

II II II II H H II H II II

 

tense
changeable

contented
forceful

easy-going
handsome

mannerly
friendly

painstaking
good natured

superstitious
dependent

moderate
artistic

charming
practical

witty
relaxed

steady
spunky

ll.

12.

l3.

14.

15.

l6.

17.

18.

19.

20.

II (I II II II II II II II II

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

ingenious
tolerant

foolish
cynical

capable
polished

affectionate
quick

impatient
emotional

forceful
warm

clever
reasonable

suggestible
fussy

robust
stable

soft-hearted
high—strung

99

OPS Film No. 5

‘fig. 9. answered true or false to each of the questions

below.

YOU are to guess how he answered each question

about himself. Circle T (for true) or F (for false).

1.

F 2

3.

F 4.

T F 5
T F 6.
F 7

8.

T 9
T F 10
ll.

12.

T F 13
T F 14
T F 15
T F l6
17.

18.

I do not always tell the truth.

It takes a lot of argument to convince most people
of the truth.

I worry over money and business.

Even when I am with people I feel lonely much of
the time

I have had periods in which I lost sleep over

worry.

I find it hard to set aside a task that I have
undertaken, even for a short time.

I enjoy children.
Sexual things disgust me.

My parents were too strict with me when I was a
child.

I seldom have quarrels with the members of my
family.

I hate to have to rush when working.

When someone annoys me I don't mind telling him
what I think of him.

I have had more unusual experiences than most
people.

I take a pretty easygoing and light-hearted
attitude toward life.

I would not be afraid to talk back to my boss if
I thought he was criticizing me unfairly.

My hardest battles are with myself.
I like to read adventure stories.

I enjoy bull sessions where everyone talks about
sex.

100

T F 19. I have sometimes refused to do something for some—
one, not because it amounted to much, but because
of the principle of the thing.

T F 20. I am often the center of attention at a party.

APPENDIX C

REVISED ACCURACY SCALE

USED IN THIS RESEARCH

102

You are going to see five minute film interviews with
Mrs. P., Mr. W., and Mrs. N. When the film is over you will
be asked questions about their behavior and attitudes. When
you answer the questions on the IBM sheets use only spaces
1, 2, and 3. The numbers correspond to the order in which
the interviews appeared. That is Mrs. P. (1), Mr. W. (2),
and Mrs. N. (3). In other words if the answer to a particular
statement is Mr. W. or the person in the second interview,
mark the space 2 on the answer sheet. Do all the items and
try not to leave any blank.

 

(1) Mrs. P., (2) Mr. W., (3) Mrs. N., filled out a rating
scale showing their agreement or disagreement with a series
of statements about religious questions. Which person
fits the following statement?

1. Most strongly agreed that "God will punish those who
disobey his commandments and reward those who obey
Him (either in this life or in a future life)."

2. Most strongly agreed with the statement "no one who has
experienced God like I have could doubt his existence."

3. Believed that "after death we will ultimately regain
our bodies and in a real sense be resurrected."

4. Strongly agreed that "When in doubt, I have usually found
it best to stop and ask God for guidance."

5. Most strongly disagreed that "I'm unable to accept the
idea of 'life after death' at least not until we have
definite evidence there is such a thing."

6. Would also disagree with the above statement.

7. Strongly agreed that "I have sometimes been very conscious
of the presence of God."

8. Would also agree with the above statement.
9. Agree that "While I am responsible for my own actions.

I feel that God has some definite purpose or role for me
to fulfill in life."

103

(1) Mrs. P., (2) Mr. W., (3) Mrs. N. were each given

pairs of words and asked to select the one which they thought
was a better description of themselves. Who made the follow-
ing choices?

10.

ll.

12.

l3.

14.

15.

l6.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

Efficient. in the pair efficient - precise.

Loyal, in the pair loyal - sophisticated.

Arrogant, in the pair arrogant - apathetic.
Practical, in the pair practical — wholesome.
Reliable, in the pair reliable - feminine.
Determined, in the pair determined - relaxed.
Egotistical, in the pair egotistical — stingy.
Nervous, in the pair nervous - selfish.

Rational, in the pair rational - painstaking.
Courageous, in the pair courageous - rational
Assertive, in the pair assertive — reckless.
Tactful, in the pair tactful — enthusiastic.
Conservative, in the pair conservative - excitable.
Conscientious, in the pair conscientious - excitable.
Dependable, in the pair dependable - excitable.
Unselfish, in the pair unselfish — cool.

Mannerly, in the pair mannerly - humorous.
Complicated, in the pair complicated - hasty.
Moody, in the pair moody - complaining.

Warm, in the pair warm - reflective.

Contented, in the pair contented — progressive

104

31. Understanding, in the pair understanding - timid.
32. Restless, in the pair restless - unemotional.
33. Snobbish, in the pair snobbish - hostile.
34. Appreciative, in the pair appreciative — sharp witted.
35. Severe, in the pair severe - hard headed.
36. Cool, in the pair cool - timid.
37. Capable, in the pair capable - obliging.
38. Poised, in the pair poised - moderate.
39. Active, in the pair active - artistic.
(1) Mrs. P., (2) Mr. W., (3) Mrs. N. were given a series
of incomplete sentences. Which of the three completed each

of the following sentences in the way underlined?

40. Sex is too often considered filthy.

 

41. When I'm criticized I appreciate it.

 

42. I felt most dissatisfied when I didn't do the right thing.

 

(1) Mrs. P., (2) Mr. W., (3) Mrs. N. were given a series
of true—false items. Who answered true to these items?

43. My daily life is full of things that keep me interested.

44. At parties I am more likely to sit by myself or with just
one other person than to join in with the crowd.

45. I believe a person should never take an alcoholic drink.
46. I am happy most of the time.

47. I seem to be about as capable and smart as most others
around.

48. Policemen are usually honest.

49. Sometimes I enjoy hurting people I love.

105

50. I like to Visit places where I have never been before.

51. I find it hard to set aside a task that I have under—
taken, even for a short time.

52. I like to read adventure stories.

53» I am nearly always on time for appointments.

54. I enjoy bull sessions where everyone talks about sex.
55. I fall in love rather easily.

(1) Mrs. P., (2) Mr. W., and (3) Mrs. N. were rated by
their friends on a series of personality traits. Which was
rated as follows?

56. least cooperative
57. most unfriendly
58. least affectionate
59. least rebellious
60. most practical
61. least ambitious
62. least careful
Friends of (1) Mrs. P., Mr. W., and (3) Mrs. N. also

gave thumbnail sketches of them. Who was described by friends
as follows?

63. "Somewhat insecure and highstrung"

64. "Exceptionally hard working and energetic"

65. "In a state of rebellion against all religions"
66. "Very conscientious and responsible"

67. "Handles money and budgets it extremely well"

68. "Maintains quite firm and strict discipline with children"

106

69. "Rather fussy about what he (or she) eats and how it is
prepared"
70. ”Avoids emotional scenes because they make this person

feel most uncomfortable"

7l. "Always on time"

72. "Unselfish and interested in pleasing others"

73. "Most enjoys creating floral displays and artistic work"
74. "Generous and warm hearted"

You are now going to see three more interviews - with
Mr. Z. (1), Mr. G. (2), and Mrs. D. (3). You will then
be asked questions similar to those in the first part.

 

(1) Mr. 2., (2) Mr. G., (3) Mrs. D. filled out a rating
scale showing their agreement or disagreement with a series
of statements about religious questions. Which person fit
the following statement?

75. Least agreed that "God will punish those who disobey
his commandments and reward those who obey him (either
in this life or in a future life)."

76. Most strongly disagreed that "If there is a 'God' it
is only an impersonal creative force in the universe."

77. Most strongly disagreed that "People don't necessarily
need to believe in God in order to live good lives and
have a high system of ethics and morals."

78. Most strongly agreed that "While God may exist it is
quite difficult for me to accept such a fact without some
definite proof."

79. Least disagreed that "I am unable to accept the idea of
'life after death' at least not until we have definite
evidence there is such a thing."

80. Most strongly agreed that "God does marvelous things which
are called miracles by some."

81.

82.

83.

84.

107

Least agreed that "God does marvelous things which are
called miracles by some."

Most strongly disagreed that "I have sometimes been very
conscious of the presence of God."

Most strongly agreed that "I have sometimes been very
conscious of the presence of God."

Most strongly disagreed that "While I am responsible for
my own actions, I feel that God has some definite purpose

or role for me to fulfill in life."

(1) Mr. 2., (2) Mr. G., (3) Mrs. D. were each given pairs

of words and asked to select the one which they thought was
a better description of themselves. Who made the following

choices?

85. Versatile, in the pair versatile - witty.

86. Ambitious, in the pair ambitious - charming.

87. Easy going, in the pair easy going - handsome.
88. Honest, in the pair handsome - honest.

89. Peaceable, in the pair enterprising - Peaceable.
90. Kind, in the pair insightful - kind.

91. Modest, in the pair modest — resourceful.

92. Practical, in the pair charming — practical.

93. Relaxed, in the pair witty - relaxed.

94. Steady, in the pair steady - spunky.

95. Interests wide, in the pair efficient — interests wide.
96. Original, in the pair quiet - original.

97. Talkative, in the pair boastful - talkative.

98. Foolish, in the pair foolish — cynical.

99. Capable, in the pair capable — polished.

108

100. Forgiving, in the pair forgiving - witty.

101. Serious, in the pair flirtatious - serious.

102. Forgetful, in the pair forgetful — initiative.

103. Shy, in the pair shy - assertive.

104. Individualistic, in the pair conservative - individualistic.

105. Spontaneous, in the pair spontaneous - attractive.

106. Adventurous, in the pair adventurous - bossy.

107. Sincere, in the pair sincere - original.

108. Cooperative, in the pair cooperative — charming.

109. Strong, in the pair wise — strong.

110. Impulsive, in the pair forgetful — impulsive.

111. Stable, in the pair robust - stable.

112. Mannerly, in the pair mannerly - versatile.

113. Helpful, in the pair helpful - painstaking.

114. Considerate, in the pair considerate — sharp witted.
(1) Mr. 2., (2) Mr. G., (3) Mrs. D. were given a series

of incomplete sentences to complete. Which of the three

completed each of the sentences in the way underlined?

115. When it comes to jokes I can't remember them.

116. If I can't get what I want I wait.

117. When they offered me help I accepted.

118. I felt my lack of success was due to not getting along
well with people.

 

119. I enjoy sports.

 

120. I enjoy being withgpeople.

121.

122.

123.

124.

of true-false items.

125.

126.

127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

134.

135.

136.

137.

138.

109

When they didn't invite me I knew they had a reason.

I am most anxious about world peace.

 

I am most anxious about my personality.

 

Religion seems to me necessary and important.

(1) Mr. Z., (2) Mr. G., (3) Mrs. D. were given a series

Who answered true to these items?

take orders from someone who did
I did.

I have often had to
not know as much as

My mother or father
thought that it was

often made me obey even when I
unreasonable.

I have had periods in which I lost sleep over worry.
A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct.

It makes me uncomfortable to have a lot of people
around me.

I am happy most of the time.

I like to visit places I have never been before.
My hardest battles are with myself.

Policemen are usually honest.

Who answered fglge to the following items?

At times I have a strong urge to do something harmful
or shocking.

I hate to have to rush when working.
Sometimes I enjoy hurting people I love.

I would not be afraid to talk back to my boss if I
thought he was criticizing me unfairly.

It is easy for me to talk to strangers.

their

139.

140.

141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.

110

(1) Mr. Z., (2) Mr. G., (3) Mrs. D. were described by
friends. Who was described as follows?

"Emotionally possessed of considerable mood swings
(happy or unhappy)."

"Loyal, honest, and kind."

"Raises voice a little but maintains control in family
arguments."

"Is shy and reserved at parties."

"Does quite poorly in speaking to groups."

"Is a rather quiet and humble person."

"Helps people with their problems quite often."
"Resents family criticism and gets upset."

"At parties has a good time but is not much noticed."

"Doesn't want to be just ordinary, so 'writes'.

"Prefers going steady with one person."

APPENDIX D

LIKE-DISLIKE SCALE

112

In addition to figuring out what kind of person the film
interviewee is, we would also like you to express your own
feelings with regard to how he impresses you personally.

That is, to what degree you can see yourself as being friends

or not being friends with that particular person. . .

Below is a scale numbered from 1 — 9 which you are to use as

a guide. Circle the number which best expresses your perference
for each of the six film interviewees.

 

 

 

 

 

I can't see I can very easily
myself being friends see myself being friends
with such a person. with such a person.
Mrs P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mr.W
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mrs N
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mr.Z
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mr.G
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mrs. D 1

 

APPENDIX E

SIMILARITY SCALE

114

LAST NAME FIRST NAME AGE

 

 

This questionnaire has to do with your feelings about
yourself and your behavior. Circle T (for True) of F (for
False), depending on whether you feel the statement is mostly
true or mostly false for you. Please answer each one even
if it is difficult to make a choice on some of the questions.
T F 1. My daily life is full of things that keep me interested.
T F 2. I worry over money and business.

T F 3. I am happy most of the time.
T F 4. I easily become impatient with people.

T F 5. I seem to be as capable and smart as most others
around.

T F 6. When I am feeling very happy and active, someone
who is blue or low will spoil it all.

T F 7. I have had periods in which I lost sleep over
worry.
T F 8. I like to visit places where I have never

been before.

T F 9. I find it hard to set aside a task that I have
undertaken even for a short time.

T F 10. A large number of people are guilty of bad
sexual conduct.

T F 11. I sometimes keep on at a thing until others lose
patience with me.

T F 12. I frequently ask people for advice.

T F 13. I have never been in love with anyone.

T F 14. Sometimes I enjoy hurting people I love.
T F 15. At times I think I am no good at all.

T F 16. My relatives often take my side in arguments.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23°

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

115

I have had more unusual experiences than most
people.

I like to read adventure stories.
I enjoy reading about history.

If a friend asked me for something I didn't have,
I would just tell him I didn't have it.

I have nightmares every few nights.

I have often had to take orders from someone who
did not know as much as I did.

It takes a lot of argument to convince most people
of the truth.

No one cares much what happens to you.

At times I have a strong urge to do something harm-
ful or shocking.

My mother or father often made me obey even when
I thought it was unreasonable.

I believe that a person should never take an
alcoholic drink.

I practically never blush.

When someone annoys me I don't mind telling him
what I think of him.

I hardly ever get excited.
I do not always tell the truth.

I find it hard to set aside a task I have under-
taken even for a short time.

Sexual things disgust me.

I hate to have to rush when working.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

116

I take a pretty easy-going, light—hearted attitude
toward life.

I have had more unusual experiences than most
people.

Even when I am with people I am lonely much of
the time.

I enjoy bull sessions where everyone talks about
sex.

I seldom have quarrels with members of my family.
My hardest battles are with myself.
I have a good appetite.

I refuse to play some games because I am not good
at them.

I enjoy children.

It makes me uncomfortable to have a lot of people
around me.

It is easy for me to talk to strangers.
I don't like it when people don't notice me.

If a person has enough money he can fix anything
with the law courts.

I like to be the center of attention.
Policemen are usually honest.

My parents were too strict with me as a child.

nan-w
11’

 

 

 

 

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