This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

A NEW MODEL OF POLITENESS IN DISCOURSE

presented by

Tae-Seop Lim

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. degree in Communication

Kathy Kellermann
Major professor

Date 7/1/88

A NEW MODEL OF POLITENESS IN DISCOURSE

By

Tae-Seop Lim

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Communication

1988

ABSTRACT

A NEW MODEL OF POLITENESS IN DISCOURSE

By

Tae-Seop Lim

This study explored Brown and Levinson's model for its adequacy in explaining politeness phenomena. Since Brown and Levinson's model revealed substantial limitations, a new theoretical model of politeness that extended Brown and Levinson's framework was proposed. This new model conceptualizes face wants and politeness more comprehensively and accounts for both positive and negative politeness manifested in performances of both face-threatening acts and non-face-threatening acts. Positive and negative politeness expressed in a message are postulated to be a function of speakers' verbal aggressiveness, empathy, and the obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively. The obligations to save positive and negative face are postulated to be a sum of the relational obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively, and the threats to positive and negative face, respectively. The relational obligation to save positive face is postulated to be positively related to the power the hearer has over the speaker, and negatively related to the relational distance between the speaker and the hearer; the relational obligation to save negative face is postulated to be positively related to both power disparity and relational distance.

Two experiments were conducted to test the adequacy of the present model in explaining politeness in discourse. Experiment 1 examined whether the present model explained adequately politeness behavior in phatic communication where no intrinsically face-threatening acts

(non-FTAs) were involved. This experiment found that even when performing non-FTAs, subjects manifested both positive and negative politeness as a function of relational distance and power disparity. Experiment 2 tested the adequacy of the present model in explaining politeness phenomena related to FTAs. This experiment found that when performing FTAs, subjects employed both positive and negative politeness as a function of relational distance, power disparity, the levels of positive and negative face-threats, and verbal aggressiveness. These results generally supported the present model and rejected Brown and Levinson's model. In addition, based on utterances generated in Experiments 1 and 2, a content coding system for politeness was developed.

Dedicated to my wife

Myung-Hee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout my graduate education, I have been fortunate enough to have several mentors and endless support from my family. The members of my dissertation committee, Drs. Kathy Kellermann, Gerald Miller, Franklin Boster, and Paul Munsell, are respected scholars. Each did hours of reading, commenting, and constructively criticizing so that this dissertation could be completed. The quality of the dissertation was enhanced by their guidance and expertise. I am grateful for their contributions to not only this dissertation but also to the general quality of my graduate education.

Dr. Kathy Kellermann, the chair of the dissertation committee, deserves additional mention. For several years she has taken an active role in my professional development. As my research team advisor she heightened my intellectual growth and productivity. She showed me a great deal of understanding that helped me adjust myself to new environments. Her tutelage and friendship have been, and will continue to be, valued by me.

Back in my country, Korea, I have four great supporters: my parents and parents-in-law. They shared my goal of completing a doctoral degree. They prayed for me at every possible moment and sacrificed their welfare to support me financially. Without their moral and financial support, this dissertation could not have been completed.

For more than five years, my wife Myung-Hee gave me endless support. When I was depressed, she cheered me up. When I needed assistance, she gave me her hand unconditionally. When I was busy working, she showed uncommon patience. Especially, she took care of our new son Jay Phil almost by herself so that I could have time to work on this dissertation. If she had been less supportive, I could not have made it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF SYMBOLS

SYMBOLS	MEANING
RO_p	Relational obligation to save positive face
RO_n	Relational obligation to save negative face
O_p	Total obligation to save positive face
O_n	Total obligation to save negative face
P_p	positive politeness
P_n	negative politeness
P_{ap}	Approach-based positive politeness
P_{vp}	Avoidance-based positive politeness
P_{an}	Approach-based negative politeness
P_{vn}	Avoidance-based negative politeness
T_p	Positive face-threat
T_n	Negative face-threat
A	Verbal Aggressiveness
E	Empathy
P	Power disparity
D	Relational distance
W_x	Relative imposition
R_x	Absolute imposition
D[S,H]	Social distance between communicators
P[H,S]	Power the hearer has over the speaker

CHAPTER I

A MODEL OF POLITENESS BEHAVIOR

INTRODUCTION

Being polite is a social value promoted by many societies, even though the social norms relating to what is and what is not considered polite behavior may vary across cultures (House & Kasper, 1981). Goffman (1967) explains the importance of politeness in social interactions in terms of face. Salient in face-to-face interactions is the social recognition of an individual's face, i.e., "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (Goffman, 1967, p. 5). Social actors who have internalized a social norm of considerateness constantly pay attention to each other's need for face-support, since failure to support each other's face results in mutual embarrassment and deterioration of their relationship. Since politeness is a means of satisfying others' need for face-support, it is crucial for preserving and developing relationships. Thus, being polite is considered a very important social value in a civilized society.

Many researchers have demonstrated an interest in the linguistic phenomenon of politeness (e.g., Brend, 1978; Brown, 1976; Clark & Schunk, 1980, 1981; Ferguson, 1976; Lakoff, 1973; Leech, 1977). Despite this extensive effort, however, the literature on politeness typically lacks any theoretical framework that can systematically and comprehensively explain how politeness manifests itself in social interactions. Most studies of politeness have focused on specific features of politeness such as <u>formulaic expressions</u> (Ferguson, 1964,

1976; Tannen & Oztek, 1981), acquisition of polite expressions (Axia & Baroni, 1985; Bates, 1976; Becker, 1982; Camras, Pristo, & Brown, 1985; Mitchell-Kernan & Kernan, 1977; Nippold, Leonard, & Anastopoulos, 1982), politeness markers (Brend, 1978; Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Gibbs, 1981, 1986; House & Kasper, 1981; Kemper & Thissen, 1981), gender differences (Baroni & D'Urso, 1984; Baxter, 1984; Brown, 1976, 1980; Kemper, 1984; Lakoff, 1975; Shimanoff, 1977), cultural differences (Bowman & Okuda, 1985; Carrell & Konneker, 1981), and situational differences in politeness (Baxter, 1984; Becker, 1982; James, 1978; Lakoff, 1972, Shimanoff, 1977). Even the effort to account for general politeness phenomena has not progressed much beyond common sense platitudes such as "don't impose," "give options," and "be friendly" (Lakoff, 1974).

An exception to this tendency is the work of Brown and Levinson (1978). In their seminal work in which they analyze polite expressions in various languages such as English, Tzeltal (a Mayan language), South Indian Tamil, Malagasy, and Japanese, Brown and Levinson propose a rational model of politeness that is alleged to be universally applicable. The alleged universal applicability of Brown and Levinson's model of politeness and the fact that it is one of the few available theoretical approaches to politeness have made their work the central explanation of politeness phenomena. Consequently, many researchers (e.g., Baxter, 1984; Craig, Tracy, & Spisak, 1986; Shimanoff, 1977; Tracy, Craig, Smith, Spisak, 1984) adopted Brown and Levinson's model to explain politeness in communicative interactions. However, these researchers found that the model did not explain politeness phenomena well, emphasizing the necessity to develop a new

theoretical model that can explain politeness more accurately and comprehensively.

This study will explore Brown and Levinson's approach for its adequacy in explaining politeness phenomena. As this exploration will reveal substantial limitations in the theoretical model, a new model that eliminates these limitations will be proposed.

BROWN AND LEVINSON'S MODEL OF POLITENESS

Face and Face-Threat

Brown and Levinson (1978) establish a model explaining how politeness manifests itself in social interactions by extending Goffman's (1967) concepts of face and face-saving. Brown and Levinson first distinguish between two kinds of face: positive and negative face. Positive face is the want to be thought of as a desirable human being, while negative face is the want not to be imposed on by others. In other words, positive face is the desire for approval while negative face is the desire for autonomy or self-determination. When engaged in social interactions, social actors are expected to save both positive and negative face of each other. One's failure to preserve any of the other's face wants will make the other embarrassed, which eventually prevents one from achieving his/her conversational goals. Thus, people strive to preserve others' face wants.

However, many communicative acts are inherently face-threatening, since those acts (e.g, orders, requests, disagreements, criticisms, apologies, threats, etc.) by nature run contrary to the face wants of either a hearer or a speaker. Positive face is threatened when speakers ignore hearers' desire to be approved and appreciated. For

example, when speakers disagree with or criticize hearers, hearers may feel that they are disapproved. Negative face is threatened when speakers violate hearers' desire to be autonomous. For example, when speakers order or command hearers to do something, hearers may feel that they are controlled by other persons.

The amount of face threatened by an FTA (face threatening act) is relative to the relationship between the social actors. In other words, the amount of face-threat carried by an FTA is perceived differently depending on the relationship the speaker has with the hearer. When the hearer has higher power than the speaker, or when the hearer is not intimate with the speaker, the speaker may feel that the amount of face-threat carried by the FTA is higher than the absolute (or objective) face-threat of the FTA, and vice versa. For example, asking a person to close the door is less face-threatening when the person is a co-worker than when the person is a superior. Brown and Levinson, therefore, propose that the amount of face-threat carried by a particular speech act in a particular situation (W_x) is a function of the social distance between the speaker and the hearer (D[S,H]); the power the hearer has over the speaker (P[H,S]); and the absolute (or objective) imposition inherent to the speech act (R_x); that is, the relative (or subjective) imposition, W_x, can be expressed as the following function:

$$W_x = D[S,H] + P[H,S] + R_x. \qquad (1)$$

Brown and Levinson suggest that function (1) applies to both kinds of face-threat, i.e., positive and negative face-threats. Regardless

of whether the face threatened is positive or negative, the relative face-threat (W_x) is computed in the same manner.

Of the three factors determining the relative face-threat (i.e., social distance, power difference, and absolute face-threat), the only one influenced by the kind of face threatened is the absolute face-threat. Brown and Levinson, therefore, suggest that by filling in the slot for the absolute face-threat with the ranking of the relevant face-threat, one can apply the model to both kinds of face-threat. Brown and Levinson explain how one can fill in the absolute face-threat (R_x) as follows:

> R_x is a culturally and situationally defined ranking of impositions by the degree to which they are considered to interfere with an agent's wants of self-determination or of approval (his negative- and positive-face wants). In general, there are probably two such scales or ranks that are emically identifiable for negative-face FTAs: a ranking of impositions in proportion to the expenditure (a) of services and (b) of goods....For FTAs against positive face, the ranking involves an assessment of the amount of 'pain' given to H's (Hearer's) face, based on the discrepancy between H's own desired self-image and that presented in the FTA. (1978, pp. 82-83)

In this conceptualization of the absolute face-threat (R_x), Brown and Levinson clearly suggest that R_x of a communicative act should be filled with either the ranking of positive face-threat or that of negative face-threat, depending on the kind of face threatened by the act. In other words, when the face threatened is positive face, R_x is replaced by the ranking of positive face-threat (i.e., the amount of pain caused by the FTA); thus, the relative face-threat of positive FTAs is computed by summing the social distance, the power difference, and the ranking of positive face-threat. When the face threatened is negative face, R_x is replaced by the ranking of negative face-threat (i.e., expenditure of services and goods caused by the FTA); thus, the

relative face-threat of negative FTAs is computed by summing the social distance, the power difference, and the ranking of negative face-threat.

Selection of Politeness Strategy

Given the concepts of face and face-threat, Brown and Levinson conceptualize politeness as the expression of the intention to mitigate face-threats carried by certain communicative acts, i.e., efforts to save the face wants of hearer or of self. Since politeness is to save others' face wants, as the threat to others' face wants increases, persons are expected to employ devices that show a higher degree of politeness. Consequently, politeness is defined as the enactment of behaviors that are referred to as "strategies" by Brown and Levinson. As multiple politeness strategies are available, Brown and Levinson propose people select a more "redressive" (or polite) strategy as the relative face-threat increases. A redressive strategy is one that "gives face" to the hearer, that is, a strategy indicating that no face threat is intended or desired (Brown & Levinson, 1978).

Brown and Levinson propose five superstrategies of politeness. The superstrategies, when presented in order from most redressive to least redressive, are (1) don't do the FTA (face-threatening act), (2) do it off-record, (3) negative politeness, (4) positive politeness, and (5) do it baldly on-record. Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram of strategy selection as a function of relative face-threat. As can be seen in Figure 1, "don't do the FTA" is the most redressive strategy, since the speaker gives up performing the FTA. This strategy is usually employed when W_x (subjective imposition of an act) is extremely high, that is, the risk of face-loss is great. With the "off-record"



Figure 1. Diagrammatic Representation of Brown and Levinson model

strategy, which is employed when W_x is very high, a speaker performs the act in a vague manner that could be interpreted by a hearer as some other act. The "baldly on-record" strategy makes no attempt to acknowledge a hearer's face wants. This strategy is used when there is no face-threat due to emergency or other acceptable reasons (e.g., military training).

While the above three superstrategies, i.e., "don't do the FTA," "off-record," and "baldly on-record," are used when the face-threat is abnormally high or low, positive politeness and negative politeness are employed when the face-threat falls in-between. Positive politeness is employed when the face-threat is moderately low, and negative politeness is employed when the face-threat is moderately high. The main function of a positive politeness strategy is to satisfy hearers' positive face (i.e, hearers' desire for approval). Brown and Levinson argue that since a positive politeness strategy is oriented toward a hearer's positive face, it is an approach-based strategy. Specifically, positive politeness "'anoints' the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respects, S (or the speaker) wants H's (or the addressee's) wants" (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 75). For example, by treating an addressee as a member of an in-group, a friend, or a person whose wants and personality traits are known and liked, a speaker can show that he/she wants what the addressee wants.

Negative politeness is purported to acknowledge hearers' negative face wants (i.e. the desire not to be imposed on). Since a negative politeness strategy is oriented toward a hearer's negative face, Brown and Levinson argue it is an avoidance-based strategy. Specifically, a negative politeness strategy "consists in assurances that the speaker

recognizes and respects the addressee's negative face wants and will not (or will only minimally) interfere with the addressee's freedom of action" (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 75). In short, as tactics listed in Table 1 show, a positive politeness strategy is purported to actively promote hearers' desire for approval, whereas a negative politeness strategy is purported to passively preserve hearers' desire for autonomy.

Brown and Levinson argue that as the relative face-threat increases, speakers would select a more redressive (or face-saving) strategy. Since a negative politeness strategy is more redressive than a positive politeness strategy, a speaker is likely to select a negative politeness strategy over a positive politeness strategy when the relative face-threat is fairly high, and a positive politeness strategy over a negative politeness strategy when the relative face-threat is low. In other words, regardless of the kind of face threatened, a speaker will select a politeness strategy that actively promotes the hearer's positive face want when the relative face-threat is low; when the relative face-threat is high, a speaker will select a politeness strategy that passively preserves the hearer's negative face want, again regardless of the kind of face threatened. Compare, for example, the following two requests:

(1) Relationship: Mutual friend with equal power

Goodness, you cut your hair!(...) By the way, I came to borrow some flour. (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 108)

(2) Relationship: Mutual stranger; hearer has more power

I just want to ask you if you could lend me a tiny bit of paper. (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 182)

Table 1. Chart of Tactics

Positive politeness

1. Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods)
2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)
3. Intensify interest to H
4. Use in-group identity markers
5. Seek agreement
6. Avoid disagreement
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground
8. Joke
9. Assert or presuppose S's knowledge of or concern for H's wants
10. Offer, promise
11. Be optimistic
12. Include both S and H in the activity
13. Give (or ask for) reasons
14. Assume or assert reciprocity
15. Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)

Negative politeness

1. Be conventionally indirect
2. Question, hedge
3. Be pessimistic
4. Minimize the imposition
5. Give deference
6. Apologize
7. Impersonalize S and H: Avoid the pronouns 'I' and 'You'
8. State the FTA as a general rule
9. Nominalize
10. Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H

Off record

1. Give hints
2. Give association clues
3. Presuppose
4. Understate
5. Overstate
6. Use tautologies
7. Use contradictions
8. Be ironic
9. Use metaphors
10. Use rhetorical questions
11. Be ambiguous
12. Be vague
13. Over-generalize
14. Displace H
15. Be incomplete, use ellipsis

Since request (1) is made to a friend with equal power, the face-threat relative to the given relationship is low, although the absolute face-threat carried by an act of requesting flour may not be very low. Thus, the speaker would employ a positive politeness strategy; that is, the speaker shows interest in the hearer by noticing that the hearer had his/her hair cut. In contrast, although the absolute face-threat is very low in request (2), since the hearer is a stranger who is higher in power than the speaker, the relative face-threat is high. Thus, the speaker would select a negative politeness strategy; that is, the speaker minimizes the imposition by using such phrases as "you could lend me" and "tiny bit of".

Tests of Brown and Levinson's Model

Since Brown and Levinson proposed their model of politeness, a number of researchers have adopted the model to explain various communicative interactions (e.g., Applegate, 1982; Baxter, 1984; Craig, Tracy, & Spisak, 1986; McLaughlin, Cody, & O'Hair, 1983; McLaughlin, Cody, & Rosenstein, 1983; Shimanoff, 1977; Tracy, 1983; Tracy et al., 1984). However, these researchers found that the model did not explain politeness phenomena accurately (Baxter, 1984; Craig, Tracy, & Spisak, 1986; Shimanoff, 1977), and that the model was too simplistic to explain effectively the way people select a politeness strategy (Baxter, 1984).

First, Craig et al. (1986) and Shimanoff (1977) found that speakers often did not restrict themselves to a single superstrategy; instead complex combinations of positive and negative politeness strategies occurred in many conversations analyzed by these researchers. Brown and Levinson's framework only permits the mixture

of superstrategies under two conditions. First, an auxiliary superstrategy can be employed to soften the tone of a main superstrategy. For example, hedges (e.g., "like," "sort of") can be used to render more vague expression of an extreme positive politeness opinion. Second, a speaker can alternate using positive politeness and negative politeness, moving back and forth between approaching and distancing in the interaction. Even in these two cases, however, Brown and Levinson permit only one main superstrategy at a time that is selected based on the relative face threat. However, the examples of mixed strategies found in Craig et al.'s (1986) and Shimanoff's (1977) studies were not as simple as Brown and Levinson suggested. Positive and negative politeness strategies were juxtaposed in the mixture rather than one used to soften the tone of the other. In other words, two main superstrategies, especially positive and negative politeness, co-occurred in many examples, which is contradictory to what Brown and Levinson delineated.

In addition, Baxter (1984) and Craig et al. (1986) found "multifunctionality" of an expression. In other words, different superstrategies were realized simultaneously in the same language. For example, "the phrase, 'Would you mind doing a favor for me?', acknowledges an imposition while suggesting that a 'favor' should be granted in this relationship unless the hearer clearly 'minds' doing so for some reason" (Craig et al., 1986, p. 452). By acknowledging an imposition, the speaker shows his/her intention to preserve the hearer's negative face; and by presuming the hearer will willingly help, the speaker promotes the hearer's positive face. These findings together suggest that Brown and Levinson's model, which conceptualizes

positive and negative politeness strategies as mutually exclusive categories, does not accurately represent the way people enact behavior in conversation.

Second, an empirical test of Brown and Levinson's model suggests that a large portion of the variance in politeness can be explained by factors other than the three predictors proposed by Brown and Levinson. Baxter (1984), using a self-report, likelihood-of-use analysis of politeness strategies, tested the effects of relational distance, power disparity, the magnitude of face-threat, and gender on use of politeness strategies. Baxter found that gender of an actor was as good a predictor of politeness as relational distance, and a better predictor of politeness than power disparity and the magnitude of face-threat. This finding suggests that Brown and Levinson's model is too simplistic to explain effectively use of politeness in social interactions.

The evidence discussed above is not enough to conclude that Brown and Levinson's model is misleading, but sufficient to establish that it has several limitations to overcome. The purpose of this study is to examine limitations of Brown and Levinson's model in detail, and develop a new model that would eliminate these limitations. This study will first discuss four major conceptual problems that limit the explanatory power of the model. Specifically, it will be shown that: (1) Brown and Levinson's model accounts for only one kind of face want at a time despite both positive and negative face being supported at the same time; (2) The model limits the scope of politeness by conceptualizing it only as a means to perform FTAs effectively; (3) The model focuses on a few nonrepresentative elements of positive and

negative face wants when conceptualizing positive and negative politeness; and (4) This nonrepresentative conceptualization of positive and negative politeness leads Brown and Levinson to the inaccurate claim that negative politeness should be used when the face-threat is high, and positive politeness should be employed when the face-threat is low. The paper then will propose a new framework that will extend Brown and Levinson's model by solving these four problems.

CRITIQUE OF BROWN AND LEVINSON'S MODEL AND DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW MODEL

Limited to One Kind of Face-Threat at a Time

Brown and Levinson's model is purported to explain only one kind of face-threat, either positive or negative, for a given act. In the discussion of how to calculate the immediate predictor of politeness, i.e., the relative face-threat (see equation 1), Brown and Levinson clearly suggest that their model is intended to account for one kind of face-threat at a time. Specifically, they propose that the absolute face-threat (R_x) of an act should be filled with either the ranking of positive face-threat or that of negative face-threat, depending on the kind of face threatened by the act. When the face threatened is positive face, the relative face-threat is obtained by summing the social distance, the power difference, and the ranking of positive face-threat; and when the face threatened is negative face, the relative face-threat is computed by summing the social distance, the power difference, and the ranking of negative face-threat.

This one-face-at-a-time approach of Brown and Levinson's model is based on the assumption that one communicative act threatens only one

kind of face, either positive or negative face. When they discuss the nature of face threatening acts, Brown and Levinson make a clear "distinction between acts that threaten negative face and those that threaten positive face" (1978, p. 70). Furthermore, Brown and Levinson present two groups of face threatening acts, one of which consists of acts threatening only positive face and the other of which consists of acts threatening only negative face. If we can assume that one act threatens only one kind of face, we can fully account for the face-threat carried by an act by explaining either positive or negative face-threat, depending on the kind of face threatened.

Many acts threaten positive and negative face at the same time. It is highly improbable that one speech act threatens only one type of face want. In fact, many speech acts threaten both types of face want at the same time. Consider, for example, the utterance "Can you do it again, please?" Brown and Levinson would argue that this utterance threatens only negative face of the hearer, since the illocutionary act (or speech act) of this utterance is a request that contradicts the hearer's desire not to be imposed on. This request, however, clearly violates the hearer's desire to be approved by implying that the work done is not satisfactory; that is, the act also threatens positive face of the hearer. Also consider the utterance "I don't think it works that way." To Brown and Levinson, this utterance should threaten only positive face of the hearer, because the illocutionary act of this utterance is a disagreement that contradicts the hearer's desire to be approved. However, this disagreement not only disapproves what the hearer said but also imposes on the hearer that he/she should adopt

what the speaker is about to say. In other words, a disagreement can threaten both face wants at the same time.

Necessity to account for both positive and negative threats at once. Since most communicative acts threaten both positive and negative face at the same time (Craig et al., 1986), the one-face-at-a-time approach is not adequate to fully account for the face-threat carried by those acts; that is, it is not realistic for Brown and Levinson to claim that, depending on the kind of face threatened by an act, the relative face-threat (R_x) should be calculated from either the ranking of positive face-threat or that of negative face-threat of the act. Instead, the relative face-threat of a communicative act should comprise both the threat to positive face and the threat to negative face carried by the act.

Given that the relative face-threat should take into account both positive and negative face-threat, advocates of Brown and Levinson's model may suggest that we should calculate the overall amount of face threat by combining the impositions caused by positive face threat and those caused by negative face threat, and then fill in the slot for the absolute face-threat with this total amount of face-threat. This suggestion, however, is not likely to work. For two different factors to be combined into a single index, it is required that these two factors represent the same underlying construct. Positive and negative face, however, represent two distinct human needs (Craig et al., 1986). As mentioned earlier, negative face is the desire for self-determination, while positive face is the desire for approval. Thus, threats to positive face refer to lack of approval while threats to negative face refer to interferences with self-determination.

Positive and negative face-threat clearly represent two different constructs. Summing positive and negative face-threat of an act, then, is as unreasonable as summing weight and height of a person.

In summary, since many communicative acts threaten both positive and negative face at the same time, we should account for both positive and negative face-threat carried by a communicative act to explain politeness properly. However, summing positive and negative face-threat to make a single index of face-threat is not reasonable. Since positive and negative face-threat do not represent the same underlying dimension, we should maintain separate indices for different kinds of face-threat when calculating the absolute face-threat or the relative face-threat of an act. Specifically, the absolute threat to positive and negative face should be measured separately, and the relative threat to positive and negative face should be computed separately from their respective absolute face-threat.

Limited to Politeness Related to FTAs

Brown and Levinson's model centers around acts that intrinsically threaten hearers' face wants, i.e., face threatening acts or FTAs. Politeness and politeness strategies are conceptualized as necessary tools to perform these FTAs successfully. Brown and Levinson explain the mechanism underlying their main proposition that a rational agent would tend to choose a more redressive superstrategy as the relative face-threat increases, as follows:

> Our MP (or model person) would not do all FTAs with the strategy of least risk because it costs more in effort and loss of clarity, because he may wish to satisfy the other perennial desire of H's -- for positive face -- but most importantly because choice of the least risky strategy may indicate to H (or hearer) that the FTA is more threatening than it actually is, since it would imply an excessively high rating of P (or power disparity) or D (or

> relational distance) or R (or absolute face-threat), or some combination. In short, our original assumptions that define our MP as a 'rational agent with face' predict that rational face-bearing agents will choose ways of doing face-threatening acts that minimize those threats, hence will choose a higher-numbered (i.e., more redressive) strategy as the threat increases. (1978, p. 88)

In this explanation, Brown and Levinson clearly show that their politeness model is primarily for those acts that threaten hearers' face wants by stating that politeness strategies are ways of doing face-threatening acts. Of the FTAs, Brown and Levinson are particularly intrigued by the speech act of a request; thus, when they need to illustrate their model, they often use requests as examples.

Politeness can be for acts other than FTAs. First, politeness does not seem to be limited to those acts that intrinsically threaten others' face, but can be found in many other social interactions. Suppose, for example, that Person A says only "see you later" to Person B who has just helped out Person A with something. Person B might think that what he/she has done for Person A is considered undesirable by Person A, since Person A did not say "thank you." Or, Person B might even think that Person A evaluates him/her as an undesirable person. In any case, Person B will lose his/her positive face and decide that Person A is an impolite person. For another example, suppose that your acquaintance ignores you and just passes by you when you try to greet him/her by saying hello. You might feel that you are disapproved, and thus will lose your face. In both of the above examples, no intrinsically face threatening act was involved; the approval expected by one party simply is not given by the other party. Many ritualized (or formulaic) exchanges of mutual approval and/or power-giving (Ferguson, 1964, 1976; Laver, 1981; Tannen & Oztek, 1981)

such as greeting, parting, appreciating, apologizing, congratulating, and other phatic communication, share this characteristic; that is, these politeness formulas are not to perform some FTAs effectively but to support or save ritualistically others' desire for approval or power. Consequently, politeness is not limited only to the performance of acts that intrinsically threaten others' face.

Second, people should be polite not only verbally but nonverbally (Lakoff, 1973). We are told, for example, to cover our mouth when we cough and stand aside as someone enters a door we are in front of. Our parents also taught us that taking an excessively relaxed posture when talking with superiors is considered impolite. This nonverbal politeness is observed in order to support or save others' desire for approval or autonomy regardless of whether we perform a face threatening act or not. For example, if we take an extremely relaxed posture in front of a person who is by far superior to us (regardless of what we are doing), the person should feel that his/her power is not properly respected and that he/she lost his/her face; that is, use of nonverbal behavior that does not provide the other with the expected level of approval or autonomy causes loss of the other's face. It seems to be that, for a given relationship, there is an expected level of approval and autonomy, and that only a certain range of nonverbal behavior, which can properly satisfy this expected level of approval or autonomy, is likely to be used (Goffman, 1967). In short, non-FTAs as well as FTAs require politeness, and nonverbal behavior as well as verbal behavior is regulated by politeness considerations.

Necessity to account for the face-saving obligation. Clearly many politeness phenomena occur not as means to perform an FTA but as means to support the expected level of approval or autonomy that any communicator establishes when he/she is engaged in a social interaction. Thus, politeness conceptualized as an effort to mitigate face-threat carried by FTAs does not seem to reflect the rich concept of politeness fully. Moreover, since politeness is not limited to the occasions in which threats to face are involved, it is not likely that one can comprehensively explain politeness based on the concept of the relative face-threat. In order to explain politeness more comprehensively by accommodating politeness not related to FTAs, we need to extend the relative face-threat to a more general concept. Goffman's (1967) approach provides the vehicle to extend politeness to all behavior.

Goffman (1967) argued that when engaged in a social interaction, people establish an expected level of face support from the encounter. If the encounter sustains this expectation, people would have few feelings about the matter, since the sustenance has been long taken for granted. If events establish a face for people that is better than they might have expected, they are likely to "feel good;" if their ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, they will "feel bad" or "feel hurt" (Goffman, 1967). Since people recognize that others also hold this desire for approval and autonomy, they feel obliged to help others satisfy their desire. In other words, it is a mutually shared belief among people that it is their obligation to support each other's face, i.e., desire for approval and autonomy. This obligation to save face exists regardless of whether one performs a face threatening act or

not. Simply by having a relationship with another person, people incur obligations to maintain the person's desire for approval and autonomy (Goffman, 1967).

According to Goffman (1967), politeness is fulfillment of one's obligations to support the other's face. When one fails to fulfill this obligation, he/she is perceived to be inconsiderate, which will lead the other to find ways to punish him/her. Since people want to avoid being punished, they tend to conduct themselves during an interaction so as to fulfill the obligation to save others' face. In short, the obligation to save face leads people to be polite. Since the obligation to support others' desire for approval and autonomy is not limited to occasions when intrinsically face threatening acts are performed, it can explain politeness phenomena more comprehensively. When no FTA is performed, the degree of politeness to be used is a function of the obligation to maintain the hearer's face incurred by having a relationship with the hearer. For example, when we greet someone, all that matters in determining the proper level of politeness are the characteristics of the relationship. If the person has more power than us, we should maintain his/her desire for autonomy by showing deference. If the person is a friend, we may want to pay more attention to his/her desire for approval than his/her desire for autonomy. When an FTA is performed, the obligation to maintain the hearer's face incurred by doing this FTA is added to the obligation to maintain the hearer's face incurred by being engaged in the relationship. The obligation to save face in this case is the same as the concept of the relative face-threat.

In short, viewing politeness as an obligation to save face regardless of the behavior involved enables us to explain politeness phenomena more comprehensively. Earlier, it was argued that people attempt to satisfy both positive and negative face wants of their partners at the same time. In other words, people have obligations to save both positive and negative face wants of their partner in the same message. Thus, in order to account for the politeness of an act adequately, we need to assess the obligation to save positive face and that to save negative face incurred by performing the act in the given relationship.

Limited to One Side of Positive and Negative Politeness

Brown and Levinson argue that positive politeness strategies are those which save a hearer's positive face and that negative politeness strategies are those which preserve a hearer's negative face; that is, positive politeness should satisfy a hearer's desire for approval, whereas negative politeness should satisfy a hearer's desire for autonomy. However, in the process of conceptualizing the politeness strategies in detail, Brown and Levinson define positive politeness as an approach-based strategy and negative politeness as an avoidance-based strategy. In other words, positive politeness is a strategy of "minimizing social distance" and negative politeness is a strategy of "social distancing" (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 135).

Positive politeness is more than behaving informally. It is generally acknowledged that people use informal language when they want to decrease the social distance between them and the people they encounter (Scotton, 1983). Since positive politeness is intended to decrease social distance, it is characterized by informality. When

conceptualizing positive politeness in detail, Brown and Levinson argue that positive politeness is realized in forms of informal language as follows:

> ...the linguistic realizations of positive politeness are in many respects simply representative of the normal linguistic behavior between intimates, where interest and approval of each other's personality, presuppositions indicating shared wants and shared knowledge, implicit claims to reciprocity of obligations or to reflexivity of wants, etc. are routinely exchanged. Perhaps the only feature that distinguishes positive politeness redress from normal everyday intimate language behavior is an element of exaggeration... (1978, p. 106)

In this description of positive politeness, Brown and Levinson argue that positive politeness is expressed in the normal linguistic behavior between intimates. When we take into account that normal or unmarked linguistic behavior between intimates is informal language (Scotton, 1983), Brown and Levinson suggest that positive politeness is realized in informal language. The specific tactics of positive politeness that are proposed by Brown and Levinson reflect this identification of positive politeness with informality. Under the superstrategy of positive politeness, Brown and Levinson propose three major strategies: (1) claim 'common ground', (2) convey that the speaker and the hearer are cooperators, and (3) fulfill the hearer's want by giving goods, sympathy, understanding, and cooperation. These strategies all suggest that a speaker should act informally toward a hearer to be positively polite.

It is certain that some intimate linguistic behavior expresses approval of the partner. However, it is not true that all kinds of informal linguistic behavior show approval of the partner, or that only informal linguistic behavior conveys approval of the partner. First, many types of informal language suggested by Brown and Levinson as

positive politeness tactics do not necessarily approve a hearer's performances or possessions, which a genuine positive politeness strategy is supposed to do. For example, Brown and Levinson propose 'making jokes' and 'being optimistic' as positive politeness tactics. These tactics may make the speaker appear friendly; however, they do not always approve a hearer. Suppose, for illustration, that Person A makes a joke when conversing with Person B. It is likely that Person B thinks that Person A is a friendly person, but it is highly unlikely that Person B believes Person A approves any of his/her possessions or performances. Brown and Levinson also propose that use of in-group identity markers (such as mate, pal, buddy, honey, and Johnny) are a positive politeness tactic. Use of these identity markers may affirm that the speaker wants to be on friendly terms with the hearer; however, it does not necessarily entail that the hearer is evaluated as a valuable person by the speaker.

Second, and more importantly, there are many other ways to save others' positive face. We can directly approve others' possessions and performances by using formal language. For example, a student can give a compliment to one of his/her professors at the end of a term by saying "Professor Brown, I enjoyed your class very much." In this compliment, the student approves the professor's performance without using informal language. As a matter of fact, approval has no relationship with formality; people can compliment, praise, or appreciate others using formal language as well as informal language. Furthermore, we can satisfy others' positive face using avoidance-based tactics; that is, we can preserve others' desire for approval by showing that we do not have any intention to disapprove them. Suppose

that we want to disagree with others very politely. Then, we may not want to outright disagree with them; instead, we will use all kinds of devices to convey our intention that we do not want to attack their self-concept. Thus, we may want to be tentative, saying "I am not very sure, but I don't think I quite agree with you" or "Isn't there any chance that ....". We may also understate the problem, saying "I think slightly differently." Consequently, formality and approval have no relationship with each other, making Brown and Levinson's definition of positive politeness a problem.

Negative politeness is not always avoidance-based. It seems to be true that, at least in Western society, most negative politeness strategies perform "the function of minimizing the particular imposition that the FTA unavoidably effects" (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 134). However, not all negative politeness strategies are purported to prevent loss of others' negative face. Sometimes, people use negative politeness to actively promote others' negative face. For example, giving deference is a way to promote others' desire for autonomy, since deference conveys that a hearer is of higher social status than a speaker.

As a matter of fact, Brown and Levinson propose giving deference as a negative politeness tactic; however, they do not think that giving deference actively promotes hearers' negative face, but argue that "deference serves to defuse potential face-threatening acts by indicating that the addressee's rights to relative immunity from impositions are recognized -- and moreover that the speaker is not in a position to coerce the addressee's compliance in any way" (1978, p. 183). In other words, Brown and Levinson conceptualize deference as a

way to prevent loss of hearers' negative face. This conceptualization may be adequate if deference occurs only when an FTA is performed. However, people often give deference to superiors when they do not perform an FTA. For example, when people greet, talk with, or part their superiors, they may give deference using the "vous" form pronouns (Brown & Gilman, 1960) such as title plus last name (e.g., Professor Brown), sir, madam, or lady, simply to show that they recognize the superiors have more power. In this case, the function of this deference is not to protect the superiors from the threat to negative face caused by an FTA, but to promote actively the superiors' desire for power.

The main reason Brown and Levinson do not conceptualize deference as a strategy that actively promotes others' negative face seems to be that whereas negative face is the desire for autonomy, deference promotes the desire for power. Logically, however, the desire for autonomy is a part of the desire for power; that is, autonomy represents the middle of the continuum of power, the extremes of which represent dominance and submission. Submission is the state in which one's behavior is interfered with by the other due to lack of power. Autonomy refers to the state in which one is not controlled by the other because both persons are equally powerful. Dominance is the state in which one interferes with the other's behavior since he/she has more power than the other. When conceptualized more generally, therefore, negative face is the desire for power. Given this conceptualization, since deference promotes hearers' desire for power, giving deference promotes hearers' negative face.

Necessity to reconceptualize positive and negative politeness. In summary, Brown and Levinson conceptualize positive politeness as linguistic behavior promoting informality between communicators, and negative politeness as linguistic behavior protecting hearers' freedom of action, which does not fully account for their earlier conceptualization of face wants and politeness. Positive face want refers to the desire that one's possessions and performances are approved, while negative face want, when conceptualized more generally, refers to the desire that one has enough power to determine his/her own destiny. In other words, positive face is the want for approval and negative face is the want for power. Brown and Levinson define politeness as an effort to promote (or support) or protect (or save) these two face wants. Thus, positive politeness should refer to the behavior that promotes or protects hearers' wants for approval and negative politeness should refer to the behavior that promotes or protects hearers' wants for power.

Proposition Based on Inconsistent Definitions

As discussed earlier, Brown and Levinson propose that when the relative face-threat is high, speakers would choose negative politeness strategies over positive politeness strategies; and when the relative face-threat is low, speakers would select positive politeness strategies over negative politeness strategies. Notice that this proposition is not influenced by the kind of face threatened. Speakers would use strategies satisfying hearers' desire for approval when there is a small amount of negative face-threat as well as when there is a small amount of positive face-threat, and speakers would employ strategies satisfying hearers' desire for autonomy when there is a

large amount of positive face-threat as well as when there is a large amount of negative face-threat. In other words, the proposition implies that satisfying positive face nullifies a small threat to negative face, and satisfying negative face nullifies a large threat to positive face. However, it is highly unlikely that satisfying one face want nullifies threats to the other face want.

No compensation mechanism between positive and negative face. Although they do not explain how a large threat to positive face is nullified by satisfying negative face, Brown and Levinson explain how a small threat to negative face is nullified by satisfying positive face. As mentioned earlier, the positive politeness tactics proposed by Brown and Levinson are actually devices to make a relationship informal; thus, the tactics contribute to decreasing social distance. Because decreases in relational distance lead to decreases in the relative threat to negative face, the previously existing low degree of negative threat will be decreased to the level of nonexistence when the relational distance is decreased by the speaker's use of positive politeness tactics defined as informality. Thus, the speaker has no more obligation to save the hearer's negative face, and will use only positive politeness strategies in his/her request.

However, as argued earlier, defining positive politeness as informal language is misleading. When we define positive politeness considering that it involves formal approval as well as informal approval, and passive avoidance of disapproval as well as active approval, it is not likely that positive politeness decreases social distance. Thus, use of positive politeness is not expected to nullify a low level of negative face-threat.

It is more obvious that satisfying one kind of face does not nullify threats to the other kind of face when we consider the case in which a speaker performs a communicative act threatening a hearer's positive face to a large extent. Suppose, for example, that a student wants to challenge what a professor says in class. Since the hearer (i.e., the professor) has more power than the speaker (i.e., the student) and disagreement as an act carries a relatively high degree of positive face threat, the challenging behavior in the given setting should reveal a very high level of positive face-threat. Thus, following Brown and Levinson, the student would use a negative politeness strategy, saying, "I am terribly sorry (apology), but I just want to ask you (minimize the imposition) if you would allow (make minimal assumptions) me to say that what you are saying is really stupid." Notice, in this example, that the student does not make any effort to protect the professor's positive face, since Brown and Levinson propose negative politeness satisfying only negative face should be used when the face-threat is high. Although the student here tries very hard to be negatively polite, the professor must feel that he/she is disapproved by the student. The reason why the professor feels disapproved is that positive and negative face are distinct needs (Craig et al., 1986), and <u>both</u> of the face wants <u>must</u> be satisfied to avoid embarrassment during social interactions (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Craig et al., 1986). Thus, even if one face want is fully satisfied, if the other face want is violated, a hearer is likely to be embarrassed.

Necessity to save the face being threatened. Since saving one face want does not nullify the threat to the other, the threat to a given face want should be mitigated by redressing the given face want. Specifically, once there exists any threat to positive face, speakers should employ tactics that show they do not intend to disapprove hearers; and once there exists any threat to negative face, speakers should use tactics that show they do not intend to interfere with hearers' freedom of action.

Earlier, it was shown that many communicative acts threaten both positive and negative face at the same time. Given that an act threatens both positive and negative face and that threats to a given face want can be mitigated only by redressing the given face want, we can expect speakers would try to preserve both positive and negative face in the same message. While conducting a study to test Brown and Levinson's model, Shimanoff (1977) and Craig et al. (1986) found that politeness tactics employed by communicators are not restricted to a single superstrategy, but involve complex combinations of tactics from positive and negative politeness strategies. In other words, in a single message, speakers pay attention to both positive and negative face (Craig et al., 1986). Thus, we need to look at both kinds of face-saving efforts, i.e., positive and negative politeness, as well as account for both kinds of face-saving obligations.

Conclusion of Critique of Brown and Levinson's Model

Brown and Levinson's model of politeness reveals four major limitations that should be addressed to explain politeness behavior more accurately. First, the model limits its explanation to one kind of face at a time, based on the assumption that one act threatens only

one kind of face. Since social interactions threaten both positive and negative face, a new model should account for threats to both kinds of face. Second, Brown and Levinson's model centers around those acts which threaten hearers' face wants, proposing relative face-threat as the immediate predictor of politeness output. Other researchers (e.g., Ferguson, 1976; Lakoff, 1973) have shown that politeness behavior can be observed when no FTA is involved, urging us to use a more comprehensive predictor. Goffman (1967) suggests that a social relationship is characterized by the obligation to save each other's face that exists whether an FTA is performed or not. Since the obligation to save face subsumes the concept of relative face-threat as well as accounts for non-FTA related obligations, a new model should employ the concept of face-saving obligation to explain politeness output.

Third, Brown and Levinson limit positive politeness to informality devices (or approach-based tactics) and negative politeness to formality devices (or avoidance-based tactics). However, positive face can be supported by avoidance-based tactics and negative face can be supported by approach-based tactics. In order to conceptualize politeness more comprehensively, therefore, we need to redefine positive and negative politeness considering various aspects of positive and negative face wants and various ways to satisfy these face wants. Fourth, since Brown and Levinson conceptualize positive politeness as informality and negative politeness as formality, they propose that satisfying one kind of face nullifies the threat to the other kind of face. However, when we define positive and negative politeness considering various aspects of positive and negative face, a

threat to a given face want can be mitigated only by redressing the given face want. Thus, social actors need to fulfill their obligation to save both positive and negative face of each other by being both positively and negatively polite. A new model, therefore, should explain how the obligations to save positive and negative face influence the level of positive and negative politeness, respectively. Given the limitations of Brown and Levinson's model and directions for extending these limitations, the following model is proposed.

A NEW MODEL OF POLITENESS

This section will identify and define basic elements of politeness behavior and specify relationships between these elements. Certain distinctions identified by Brown and Levinson that are useful and have found supporting evidence will be included in the new model, and the four major problems of Brown and Levinson's model identified and explained in the critique will be resolved.

Face and Face-Saving Obligation

Face is defined as the positive social value persons claim for themselves. Simply speaking, therefore, face is the same concept as self-respect. Face or self-respect has at least two different dimensions: positive and negative face (Brown & Levinson, 1978). Positive face refers to the want that one is considered to be desirable by others, that is, desire for approval. The most important aspects of self that should be approved during social interactions are one's possessions and performances (Brown & Levinson, 1978). Thus, positive face is defined as a desire that one's possessions and performances are approved by others. The performances here include everything one

publicly performs or achieves. The possessions include personal traits, physical appearance, personal artifacts, personal associations (i.e., significant others), knowledge, ideas and opinions, and goals and intentions; that is, the possessions refer to literally everything one publicly possesses. Possessions and performances that are not known to others do not need to be approved, since face is publicly claimed self-image. In short, positive face is the desire that one's possessions and performances be approved, or at least not be disapproved.

Negative face is defined as the desire for power. Brown and Levinson (1978) define negative face as the want that one's actions be unimpeded by others; that is, it is the desire for autonomy or self-determination. As mentioned earlier, however, the desire for autonomy is a part of the desire for power; that is, the desire for autonomy, or the desire not to be controlled by others, is the desire to be equally powerful. When defined more generally, therefore, negative face is the desire for power. Power here does not refer to absolute social rank or social power, but refers to relational power, i.e., ability to control the partner in a given relationship. Thus, negative face is the desire to control the relational partner, or at least not to be controlled by the partner.

When engaged in social interaction, people are expected to preserve others' face and expect others to save their face (Goffman, 1967). In other words, it is a mutually shared belief among people that it is their obligation to support each other's desire for approval and power. Thus, simply by having a relationship with another person, people incur obligations to maintain the person's desire for approval

and power (Goffman, 1967). Since obligations to maintain the other's face originate from the relationship one is having with the other, the degree to which one is obliged to maintain the other's face depends on the characteristics of the relationship.

Burgoon and Hale (1984), based on a synthesis of diverse bodies of literature including anthropological and psychotherapeutic analyses of human behavior, measurement of meaning, emotional expression, interpersonal behavior, relational development, and dyadic interactions, propose seven dimensions of relational communication: power disparity (or dominance), relational distance (or intimacy), similarity, emotional arousal, composure, formality of the situation, and task-social orientation of the context. Of these seven dimensions, however, only the first three dimensions (i.e., power disparity, relational distance, and similarity) are properties of a relationship; the other four dimensions (i.e., emotional arousal, composure, formality, and task-social orientation) represent either an emotional state of a source or a characteristic of a setting. In short, power disparity, relational distance, and similarity are the most commonly explored dimensions of relationships.

Similarity, defined as the degree to which people share like attitudes, beliefs, personal characteristics, experiences, and so forth, plays an important role at an early stage of a relationship; that is, similarity promotes more communication and escalates relationships to more intimate levels (Burgoon & Hale, 1984). Similarity, however, becomes less important, as a relationship becomes more established. In established relationships, similarity is absorbed into relational intimacy; that is, similarity is considered as a

subtheme of relational intimacy (Burgoon, Pfau, Parrott, Birk, Coker, & Burgoon, 1987). Many researchers (Brown & Ford, 1961; Brown & Gilman, 1960; Brown & Levinson, 1978; Ervin-Tripp, 1972), therefore, argue that power disparity and relational distance are two of the most important factors representing a relationship. In short, the extent to which a speaker is obliged to save the partner's face is expected to be influenced by power disparity and relational distance.

When a hearer has more relational power, a speaker is expected to show more considerateness for both positive and negative face of the hearer (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Goffman, 1967); that is, one's obligation to sustain the other's desire for approval and power increases as the power the other has over one increases. A hearer with more relational power has higher expectations for approval and respect, and has more capabilities to punish a speaker in instances when the speaker does not fulfill his/her obligations. Thus, a speaker is more obliged to satisfy positive and negative face of a hearer who has more power than him/her.

While for both positive and negative face there is a positive relationship between the relational power a hearer has over a speaker and a speaker's obligation to save a hearer's face, the relationship between relational distance and the obligation to save face is different for positive face and negative face. For negative face, it is expected that as relational distance decreases, the less obligation a speaker has to save a hearer's desire for power (Brown & Levinson, 1978). As a relationship becomes closer, partners become increasingly interdependent; thus, they become more aware of the necessity for mutual assistance (Kelley et al., 1983). In other words, as a

relationship becomes closer, partners grant each other more rights to ask for assistance; thus, they tend to lower the desire not to be controlled by the other. In short, in a closer relationship, partners have less obligation to preserve each other's negative face.

As for positive face, Brown and Levinson (1978), without offering any rationale, predict a positive relationship between the relational distance and the obligation to save positive face. However, literature on interpersonal behavior suggests the opposite relationship between these two factors; that is, as a relationship becomes closer, partners are expected to have more obligations to maintain each other's positive face. Kelley (1983) argues that people expect more rewards from a close relationship than a distant relationship, since they invest more efforts in a closer relationship. When we consider that one major way to be rewarded in a social interaction is to be approved by others (Huston, 1983), it is likely that people expect more approval from those who are closer to them. Thus, as relational distance decreases, the obligation to support each other's desire for approval increases.

In summary, the obligation to save a hearer's positive face or desire for approval is positively related to the power a hearer has over a speaker and negatively related to the social distance between a hearer and a speaker. In other words, as the power a hearer has over a speaker increases and as the relational distance decreases, a speaker's obligation to save a hearer's positive face increases. The obligation to save a hearer's negative face or desire for power is positively related to both the power a hearer has over a speaker and the social distance. Thus, as the power a hearer has over a speaker increases and as the relational distance increases, a speaker's obligation to save a

hearer's negative face increases. In short, the obligation to save a hearer's face that is incurred by having a relationship with the hearer can be expressed as the following vector function:

$$\begin{bmatrix} RO_p \\ RO_n \end{bmatrix} = P \begin{bmatrix} a \\ x \end{bmatrix} + D \begin{bmatrix} -b \\ y \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} c \\ z \end{bmatrix} \qquad (2)$$

where RO_p and RO_n are the relational obligation to save the hearer's positive and negative face, respectively; P is the relational power the hearer has over the speaker; D is the relational distance between the hearer and the speaker; and a, b, c, x, y, and z are positive constants. The relational obligation to save face is always greater than or equal to zero; that is, no relationship makes people obliged to be impolite. The power disparity can be either positive or negative; when the speaker has more power than the hearer, P is smaller than zero; when the hearer has more power than the speaker, P is greater than zero; when both participants have equal power, P is zero. The relational distance by definition cannot be negative. D is zero or nearly zero when the relationship is extremely intimate. Constants a and b represent the culturally defined importance of P and D respectively in determining the relational obligation to save positive face; constants x and y represent the culturally defined importance of P and D respectively in determining the relational obligation to save negative face. Constant c represents the level of RO_p when P and D are zero; that is, c is the level of positive-face saving obligation when the speaker and the hearer have equal power and the relationship is extremely intimate (e.g., between best friends or married couples).

Constant z represents the level of RO_n when P and D are zero; that is, z is the level of negative-face saving obligation when the speaker and the hearer have equal power and the relationship is extremely intimate.

Face-Threat and Face-Saving Obligation

As Brown and Levinson (1978) argue, many communicative acts are inherently face-threatening, since those acts by nature run contrary to the desire for approval and power. Thus, when performing an FTA, a speaker is obliged to mitigate the face-threat caused by the FTA as well as fulfill the face-saving obligation incurred by having a relationship. Specifically, as the face-threat increases, people would feel more obliged to mitigate the face-threat.

Many communicative acts threaten both positive and negative face of a hearer, even though they differ in the extent to which they threaten each face. Some acts threaten one kind of face more than the other kind of face and some acts threaten both kinds of face equally. For example, disagreements threaten hearers' positive face highly by disapproving what hearers say, and threaten hearers' negative face mildly by indirectly imposing speakers' opinions on hearers. In contrast, suggestions and advice threaten hearers' negative face highly by revealing speakers' intention to control hearers, and threaten hearers' positive face mildly by indirectly disapproving hearers. Threats, warnings, and asking for corrections threaten both positive and negative face very highly by directly disapproving hearers and overtly diminishing hearers' power.

Since many communicative acts threaten both positive and negative face at the same time, when performing these acts, speakers are obliged to mitigate the threat to both kinds of face in addition to fulfilling

the obligation to preserve both kinds of face incurred by having a relationship. In other words, the total amount of obligation to save positive and negative face in performing an FTA should be a sum of the relational obligation to save positive and negative face and the obligation to save positive and negative face caused by performing the FTA. Considering that the obligation to save a face want is proportional to the extent to which the face want is threatened (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Goffman, 1967), the total face-saving obligation in performing an FTA is then a sum of the relational face-saving obligation and the amount of face-threat.

The face-threat here is a set of situationally as well as culturally defined rankings of imposition (negative face-threat) and disapproval (positive face-threat). In any culture there is a generally agreed ranking of impositions and disapproval for a given act (Brown & Levinson, 1978). For example, in the United States, everyone knows that asking others to lend ten dollars is more imposing than asking them to pass the salt. These intra-culturally defined rankings of face-threat, however, should be modified in some situations. Particularly, these rankings are influenced by the role relationship a speaker has with a hearer. When performing the FTA is the speaker's right due to the role relationship, the FTA will have a much lower level of face-threat than the normally expected face-threat (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Craig et al., 1986). For example, asking others to type a 30-page report may be highly face-threatening (at least in terms of negative face). However, a professor asking his/her secretary to type a 30-page report may not be highly face-threatening, because it is

his/her role right. In short, the total obligation to save positive (O_p) and negative face (O_p) in performing an FTA can be expressed as the following vector function:

$$\begin{bmatrix} O_p \\ O_n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} RO_p \\ RO_n \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} T_p \\ T_n \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

where RO_p and RO_n are the relational obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively; T_p and T_n are the amount of positive face-threat and the amount of negative face-threat, respectively, that are relative to the given role relationship. O_p and O_n are always greater than or equal to RO_p and RO_n, respectively, since T_p and T_n range from zero to infinity. When an act is not intrinsically face-threatening, both T_p and T_n are zero and the total obligations to save positive and negative face are equal to the relational obligations to save positive and negative face.

Politeness and Face-Saving Obligation

Just as people are expected to have desire for approval and power, so also they are expected to sustain a standard of considerateness (Goffman, 1967). They are expected to be considerate enough to fulfill the obligation to promote and preserve others' desire for approval and power willingly and spontaneously. Politeness is this spontaneous fulfillment of one's obligation to promote or preserve the other's face (Goffman, 1967; Brown & Levinson, 1978). The obligation to promote or preserve positive face, or the desire for approval, is fulfilled by being positively polite; and the obligation to promote or preserve negative face, or the desire for power, is realized by being negatively polite. Thus, the more persons are obliged to promote or preserve

others' face, the more polite expressions they would employ; that is, the degree of being positively and negatively polite is a function of the obligation to save positive and negative face, respectively.

Since the fulfillment of the face-saving obligation is based on people's considerateness, politeness is also expected to be influenced by a speaker's considerateness. When speakers are highly considerate, they will fully realize their obligation to save face, becoming highly polite; however, when speakers are highly inconsiderate, they will not fulfill their face-saving obligation at all, becoming impolite. Many factors can affect a speaker's considerateness and politeness. Most importantly, speakers' personal traits may affect their considerateness. Especially, speakers' verbal aggressiveness is expected to be negatively related to their considerateness, since verbal aggressiveness represents the tendency to attack others' self-concept (Infante & Wigley, 1986), and considerateness represents the tendency to support others' self-concept (Goffman, 1967). Thus, more verbally aggressive persons are expected to be less polite, since they have a stronger tendency to ignore their obligation to save others' face. Empathy, which is the ability to perceive from the standpoint of the other (Brown & Keller, 1973), seems to be positively related to considerateness, since both considerateness and empathy take the standpoint of the other into consideration. Thus, more empathetic persons are expected to be more polite, since they have a stronger tendency to fulfill their obligation to save others' face. In short, politeness is influenced by personal traits such as verbal aggressiveness and empathy as well as by the obligation to save face.

Specifically, the degree of positive and negative politeness can be expressed as a function of the obligation to save positive and negative face, respectively, and verbal aggressiveness and empathy as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_p \\ P_n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} O_p \\ O_n \end{bmatrix} - A \begin{bmatrix} m \\ o \end{bmatrix} + E \begin{bmatrix} n \\ p \end{bmatrix} \qquad (4)$$

where P_p and P_n are the level of positive politeness and negative politeness, respectively; O_p and O_n are the total obligation to save positive and negative face, respectively; A represents verbal aggressiveness; E represents empathy; and, m, n, o, and p are positive constants. A and E here have defined range of -1 to +1. P_p and P_n can be negative. When A is very high (near to +1) and E is very low (near to -1) and when O_p and O_n are relatively low, P_p and P_n are expected to be negative. In other words, speakers with high verbal aggressiveness and low empathy would use impolite expressions when the obligation to save face is low. Constants m and n represent the importance of A and E respectively in determining the level of positive politeness; constants o and p represent the importance of A and E respectively in determining the level of negative politeness.

Politeness of a Message

Politeness of a message is defined as the extent to which the message promotes or preserves a receiver's face (Goffman, 1967). Specifically, positive politeness is the extent to which a message promotes or preserves a receiver's desire for approval, while negative politeness is the extent to which a message promotes or preserves a receiver's desire for power (Brown & Levinson, 1978).

To date, many researchers (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1978; Clark & Schunk, 1980, 1981; Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Gibbs, 1981, 1986; Kemper & Thissen, 1981) have proposed schemes for coding or quantifying politeness. However, none of these schemes are systematic and comprehensive enough to enable us to make consistent judgments on the degree of positive and negative politeness of a message. For example, the politeness strategy system proposed by Brown and Levinson, which is one of the most comprehensive systems proposed to date, simply lists output tactics which do not vary in the extent to which they support positive or negative face (see Table 1). In other words, the tactics listed under Brown and Levinson's positive and negative superstrategies are not systematically linked to an underlying continuum of politeness; thus, they do not form any scale on which we can quantify positive and negative politeness (Craig et al., 1986). Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the tactics represent only a small portion of positive and negative politeness. Specifically, tactics for positive politeness are concerned only with promoting others' desire for approval, while those for negative politeness are concerned only with avoiding interference with others' desire for power. A better scheme of quantification should include standards that can differentiate output tactics in terms of the degree of politeness, and that consider both promotion and preservation of face for each type of politeness.

People's politeness behavior seems to be governed by such principles as "if possible, perform only those acts that promote others' face" (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Goffman, 1967; Lakoff, 1972) and "if it is necessary to perform those acts that threaten others' face, then be indirect" (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Lakoff,

1972). To be positively polite, therefore, speakers directly approve hearers using such tactics as compliments, praises, and admirations; or when disapproval is necessary, they disapprove hearers as indirectly as possible. Not all tactics that approve others' possessions and performances have the same degree of positive politeness; rather, the degree of positive politeness varies depending on how directly a tactic approves a hearer. The most important standards for the directness of approval are exaggeration and confidence (Brown & Levinson, 1978). When an evaluation is positive, the more confident and/or the more exaggerated the evaluation is, the more approval it shows to a hearer. For example, "You sure did an excellent job" is more approving than "You did a good job, I guess," since the former is more confident and more exaggerating.

While approval is more direct when it is expressed in a confident and exaggerated manner, disapproval is more indirect when it is expressed in a tentative and understated manner; that is, tentativeness and understatement are two of the most important criteria for indirectness of disapproval. When an evaluation is negative, the more tentative and/or the more understated the evaluation is, the less disapproval it shows to a hearer. For example, "I'm not sure, but I guess it isn't so bad" is less disapproving than "It is terrible," since the former is more tentative (or hesitating) and understated.

To be negatively polite, people directly give power to hearers; or when interference (or taking power from hearers) is necessary, they interfere with others' freedom of action as indirectly as possible. One main way to give power to others is to use honorifics (Brown and Levinson, 1978). However, not all honorifics give the same level of

power to hearers. The level of negative politeness (or power-giving) carried by an honorific is determined by the level of deference and self-abasement associated with the honorific. In many Asian societies, people systematically vary the amount of deference and self-abasement by using different sets of honorifics; that is, there are several sets of honorifics that differ in the degree of deference, and speakers choose one that is the most appropriate to the intended level of deference and self-abasement (Magier, 1984). In these cultures, the more deference the honorific set one is using shows, the more power the other is given. In Western society, especially in the United States, the most commonly used honorific system is the pronoun system. Specifically, people use the "vous" form pronouns such as sir, madam, lady, Mr., Mrs., and Dr., when they need to show deference; and they use the "tu" form pronouns such as a first name when they do not need to show deference (Brown & Gilman, 1960). Thus, the "vous" form pronouns express more deference and give more power than "tu" form pronouns.

When exerting control over hearers is inevitable, speakers "give options" and do "not impose" in order to show that it is not their intention to interfere with hearers' freedom of action. A way to give options is to be conventionally indirect, asking questions or permissions instead of requesting or ordering (Brown & Levinson, 1978). For example, "May I have the salt?" or "Would you mind passing the salt?" gives options while "Pass the salt, please" does not. In order not to impose, speakers tend to be tentative or hesitant (Brown & Levinson, 1978); that is, they show that they know they are not supposed to exert influence. For example, "I was wondering if you can

by any chance lend me your notes" lowers the imposition by being highly hesitant. In other words, two of the most important criteria for indirectness of interference are conventional indirectness and hesitance.

In short, literature suggests that the degree of positive politeness can be determined by confidence and exaggeration shown in approval, and tentativeness and understatement shown in disapproval. The degree of negative politeness depends on the degree of deference shown in use of pronoun, and conventional indirectness and hesitance of imposition.

In summary, this paper proposes a model of politeness that explains both positive and negative politeness manifested in the same message. Positive and negative politeness expressed in a message are a function of speakers' verbal aggressiveness, empathy and the obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively. The obligations to save positive and negative face are a sum of the relational obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively, and the threats to positive and negative face, respectively. The relational obligation to save positive face is positively related to the power the hearer has over the speaker, and negatively related to the relational distance between the speaker and the hearer; the relational obligation to save negative face is positively related to both the power disparity and the relational distance.

Explanation of Previous Findings

The present model can explain many empirical findings that Brown and Levinson's model has problems with. First, Craig et al. (1986) and

Shimanoff (1977) found that speakers used complex combinations of positive and negative politeness strategies in requesting messages, and Craig et al. (1986) and Baxter (1984) found that different superstrategies (mainly positive and negative politeness) were realized simultaneously in the same language. In other words, positive and negative politeness strategies co-occurred in the same message (Craig et al, 1986). Brown and Levinson's model, which accounts for only one kind of face-threat at a time by arguing that positive and negative politeness are mutually exclusive, has difficulties in explaining these findings.

The present model, which argues people support or preserve both positive and negative face in the same message, can explain these findings without any problem. Consider, for illustration, that you want to request a friend of yours to let you stay at his/her apartment until you can get your own place to live (Craig et al., 1986). Since the person you are asking a favor of is your friend, the social distance and the power disparity are both low; that is, your obligation to promote the friend's positive face is high, and to support negative face is low. Furthermore, since requesting a friend to let you stay in his/her apartment for a couple of days threatens the friend's negative face highly, the obligation to save negative face increases very much. Overall, you may be highly obliged to support both positive and negative face of the friend. Since only positive politeness can fulfill the obligation to save positive face and only negative politeness can realize the obligation to save negative face, your message will be characterized by combinations of positive and negative politeness.

Second, Ferguson (1976), analyzing ethnographic data, found that people use ritualized verbal and nonverbal politeness formulas to support each other's face, and that use of politeness formulas varies in correlation with relational distance and power disparity. In other words, even in phatic communication where no face-threatening act is involved, people vary the degree of politeness in accordance with relational distance and power disparity. Since Brown and Levinson's model conceptualizes politeness as a means to mitigate face-threat carried by FTAs, it cannot explain politeness manifested in greetings, thank yous, wishes for health, condolences, topical blessings, etc.

The present model, however, can explain varying degrees of politeness expressed in phatic communication. Since the relational obligation to save positive face is high among intimates, the model predicts that people would be positively polite to friends more than to strangers; thus, they would tend to give more compliments and make warmer comments to those who are closer to them. Since the obligation to save negative face is high when people greet or part superiors, they should be negatively polite to superiors more than to subordinates; thus, the model predicts people would tend to show more deference to superiors. In Asian societies, for example, the degree to which one lowers his/her head when bowing is proportional to the degree of deference he/she is giving. When greeting or parting superiors, the model predicts, Asians would lower their head more than when greeting or parting subordinates. In short, the present model can explain the influences of relational distance and power disparity on the degree of politeness manifested in phatic communication.

Finally, some researchers (Baxter, 1984; Applegate, 1982) found that gender is as good a predictor of politeness as relational distance, power disparity, or relative face-threat. Specifically, females were significantly more polite than males. Since Brown and Levinson's model does not account for individual differences, it cannot explain this finding. The present model, however, can explain this gender difference in terms of verbal aggressiveness. In this society, females are expected to show more empathy and less verbal aggression in their speech than males. In other words, people believe use of verbally aggressive expressions is not appropriate for females (Lakoff, 1975). Females, therefore, are significantly lower in verbal aggressiveness than males (Infante & Wigley, 1986). Since females are less verbally aggressive, the present model predicts that females would be more polite. In short, by incorporating such personality variables as verbal aggressiveness and empathy, the present model explains gender differences in politeness.

In summary, Brown and Levinson's model reveals many conceptual problems that prevent the model from explaining politeness phenomena adequately. A new theoretical model that solves the problems of Brown and Levinson's model is proposed. The present model argues that people have obligations to preserve both positive and negative face of others regardless of the behavior involved. Thus, the model accounts for both positive and negative politeness manifested in the same message. Positive and negative politeness expressed in a message are a function of speakers' verbal aggressiveness, empathy, and the obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively. The obligations to save positive and negative face are a sum of the relational obligations to

save positive and negative face, respectively, and the threats to positive and negative face, respectively. The relational obligation to save positive face is positively related to the power the hearer has over the speaker, and negatively related to the relational distance between the speaker and the hearer; the relational obligation to save negative face is positively related to both the power disparity and the relational distance.

The present model explains well the empirical findings which Brown and Levinson's model has problems with. However, the ability to provide an ad hoc explanation does not indicate that the present model can explain politeness adequately. In order to determine the adequacy of the model, we need to test main propositions of the model directly. Thus, two experiments will be designed to test the model. Experiment one will examine whether the present model explains adequately politeness phenomena manifested in phatic communication where no intrinsically face-threatening acts are involved. Experiment two will test the adequacy of the present model in explaining politeness phenomena related to face-threatening acts.

respectively, when the interaction does not involve any face-threatening act. Furthermore, as equation 2 states, the relational obligations to save positive and negative face are a function of the relational power the hearer has over the speaker and the relational distance. Thus, when we substitute the power disparity and the relational distance for the total obligations to save positive and negative face in equation 4, we obtain the following equation for the degree of positive and negative politeness:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_p \\ P_n \end{bmatrix} = E \begin{bmatrix} n \\ p \end{bmatrix} - A \begin{bmatrix} m \\ o \end{bmatrix} + P \begin{bmatrix} a \\ x \end{bmatrix} + D \begin{bmatrix} -b \\ y \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} c \\ z \end{bmatrix} \quad (5)$$

where P_p and P_n are the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness, respectively; E represents empathy; A represents verbal aggressiveness; P is the power the hearer has over the speaker; D is the relational distance between the hearer and the speaker; and a, b, c, m, n, o, p, x, y, and z are positive constants.

Equation 5 states that positive and negative politeness manifested in a message are a function of the speaker's empathy and verbal aggressiveness, the power disparity, and the relational distance. Specifically, the speaker's empathy is positively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; the speaker's verbal aggressiveness is negatively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; the power disparity is positively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; and the relational distance is negatively related to the level of positive politeness, and positively related to the level of negative politeness. Based on the

predictions of the present model, the following hypotheses can be proposed:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Actors' empathy will be positively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing a non-FTA (non-face-threatening act).

HYPOTHESIS 2: Actors' verbal aggressiveness will be negatively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing a non-FTA.

HYPOTHESIS 3: As the power the hearer has over the actor increases, the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness the actor manifests in performing a non-FTA will increase.

HYPOTHESIS 4: As the social distance between the hearer and the actor increases, the level of positive politeness the actor manifests in performing a non-FTA will decrease and the level of negative politeness the actor manifests in performing the non-FTA will increase.

Different from Brown and Levinson's model that conceptualizes positive and negative politeness as mutually exclusive categories, the present model claims that people have obligations to save both positive and negative face in the same message, and fulfill these obligations by behaving in both a positively and negatively polite manner. Thus, the above hypotheses predict both the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness to be manifested in performing a non-FTA.

METHODS

This experiment is concerned with the effects of verbal aggression, empathy, power disparity, and relational distance on positive and negative politeness manifested in performing a non-face-threatening act. This experiment employed a message generation technique. Subjects were asked to write verbatim what they

typically say when they greet and part people. The level of positive and negative politeness manifested in these generated messages were rated by a group of judges.

Situation and Manipulation of Relational Variables

The non-face-threatening acts to be studied in this experiment are greeting and parting. The most crucial standard for distinguishing between a face-threatening act and a non-face-threatening act is intrinsicality (Brown & Levinson, 1978). An act is intrinsically face-threatening if the face-threat is a part of the act and there is no way to detach this threat from the act. A request is an intrinsically face-threatening act, because by definition exertion of control is a part of a request. There is no request that does not exert control on a hearer (Searle, 1969). An act is not intrinsically face-threatening when the face-threat is not a part of the act but caused by the speaker's abnormal conduct. When one does not greet or part the other properly, the face of the other would be highly threatened. However, this threat is not intrinsic to greeting or parting but to the user. In fact, greeting and parting actually promote people's desire for approval and power. In short, two of the most representative non-face-threatening acts are greeting and parting.

A situation in which people exchange both greeting and parting without performing an FTA is a short encounter composed of a greeting, an exchange of two or three lines of small talk, and a parting. A hypothetical situation of a short encounter was created with four different variations (see Appendix A). Participants were asked to imagine that they ran into a person they knew in a hallway, and write verbatim what they typically say and/or do to the person and what the

person typically says and/or does to them in the form of a script. Relational distance was manipulated by informing participants that the person they ran into was one they know very well (low distance) or just an acquaintance (high distance). Power disparity was manipulated by informing participants that the person they ran into was a professor (high power) or a fellow student (equal power). Specifically, the following instructions were given to subjects in the low distance/equal power condition:

> Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into a classmate (Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. Both Mike Miller and you took several courses together, and worked in the same group for one class requiring a group research project. Thus, Mike Miller and you know each other very well.
>
> You notice that Mike Miller had his hair cut during the break and wears a nice spring coat. Thus, he looks very refreshing. Since your class begins in ten minutes, you do not have a lot of time to talk with this classmate. Thus, you just want to exchange greetings and partings.
>
> What do you typically say to greet and part a classmate you know very well? What will this classmate say to greet and part you? Write verbatim what you and this classmate will say to greet and then part each other. In other words, write a script in which you and this classmate exchange greetings and then partings. You can write as many turns as you think is necessary.

For the high distance/equal power condition, the person encountered was described as an acquaintance with whom participants took a class together and were in the same group when they did group exercises in the class. Specifically, the last two sentences of the first paragraph in the above instructions were replaced with "Both Mike Miller and you took a course together last term, and were in the same group when you did group exercises in the class. Other than that, you do not know Mike Miller very well." The phrase "you know very well" in the subsequent sentences was altered into "you do not know very well." For

the low distance/high power condition, the person encountered was described as a professor from whom participants took several classes including an independent study. Specifically, the first paragraph of the above instruction was substituted with "Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into a professor (Dr. Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. You know Mike Miller since you took several classes from him; especially, you took an independent study under him last term. Thus, Mike Miller and you know each other very well."; and "classmate" in the subsequent sentences was altered into "professor." For the high distance/high power condition, the person encountered was described as "a professor (Dr. Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. You know Mike Miller since you took a class from him last term. Because you were very active in this class, the professor also learned your name. Other than that, you do not know Mike Miller very well." The phrase "you know very well" in the subsequent sentences was also altered into "you do not know very well."

Pilot Study

In order to check whether these variations of the situation could manipulate the relational variables as designed, a pilot study was performed. One hundred forty seven subjects were asked to read one of the four situational variations (i.e., high distance/high power, high distance/equal power, low distance/high power, and low distance/equal power) and rate the relational distance between them and Mike Miller on a 7-point scale (6 being very distant and 0 being very close) and also rate the power Mike Miller has over them (also on a 7-point scale: 6 being Mike Miller has much more power and 0 being both parties have

equal power). If the manipulation of relational variables was done successfully, readers of the "low distance" instructions should rate the relational distance lower than readers of the "high distance" instructions; readers of the "equal power" instructions should rate Mike Miller less powerful than readers of the "high power" instructions. Since relational variables were manipulated by the first paragraph of each hypothetical situation, the subjects were given only this part of the instructions.

Descriptive statistics for the rated social distance and the rated power disparity are shown in Table 2 and 3, respectively. Tests of homogeneity of variance for the rated variables showed that variances of the rated distance were homogeneous across the four different conditions (Cochran's C=.26, $p<.999$; Bartlett-Box $F=.06$, $p<.980$); however, variances of the rated power disparity were heterogeneous (Cochran's C=.39, $p<.020$; Bartlett-Box $F=6.04$, $p<.001$). Two-way analyses of variance yielded a significant effect of relational distance on the rated social distance ($F=58.60$, $df=1/143$, $p<.001$, $eta^2=.29$) and a significant effect of power disparity on the rated power disparity ($F=82.67$, $df=1/143$, $p<.001$, $eta^2=.36$). Specifically, subjects in the distant condition rated the relationship more distant (M=3.92, SD=.98) than subjects in the close condition (M=2.70, SD=.95); subjects in the hearer-high condition rated Mike Miller more powerful (M=2.82, SD=1.58) than subjects in the equal power condition (M=.77, SD=1.13). Other main effects and interactions effects were not statistically significant.

Since the rated power disparity showed heterogeneity of variance, two Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance were performed to test

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Distance

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 2.77 SD = .99 n = 39	M = 2.62 SD = .92 n = 37	M = 2.70 SD = .95 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 4.08 SD = .97 n = 36	M = 3.74 SD = .98 n = 35	M = 3.92 SD = .98 n = 71
		M = 3.40 SD = 1.17 n = 75	M = 3.17 SD = 1.10 n = 72	M = 3.29 SD = 1.14 N = 147

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Power

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 1.03 SD = 1.33 n = 39	M = 2.76 SD = 1.71 n = 37	M = 1.87 SD = 1.75 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = .50 SD = .81 n = 36	M = 2.89 SD = 1.45 n = 35	M = 1.68 SD = 1.67 n = 71
		M = .77 SD = 1.13 n = 75	M = 2.82 SD = 1.58 n = 72	M = 1.78 SD = 1.71 N = 147

the effects of relational distance and power disparity on the rated power disparity. The results from these analyses were not different from the results from the two-way ANOVA for the rated power. These results generally indicated that the instructions could manipulate the relational variables very effectively.

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 100 volunteers from various undergraduate courses at a large Midwestern university. Participants received extra credit points for participating in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in a 2 X 2 factorial design crossing two levels of power disparity (a hearer having more power vs. equal power) with two levels of relational distance (close vs. distant), making the sample size of each condition 25. Subjects were asked to write a script for the given short encounter situation and to complete measurement scales for verbal aggressiveness and empathy. All questionnaires were administered in class.

Instrumentation

Verbal aggressiveness was measured by Infante and Wigley's (1986) 20-item measurement scale shown in Table 4. A confirmatory factor analysis using Package (Hunter & Cohen, 1969) showed that the items in this measurement scale were internally consistent. First, the deviations between observed correlations and reproduced correlations were minute. Only two out of 190 observed correlations significantly deviated from the expected correlations at $p<.01$; no deviation exceeded 3 times the standard error (.092) of the mean correlation (.287); and no item had more than one observed correlation that deviated

Table 4. Verbal Aggressiveness Measurement Scale

Indicate how often each statement is true for you in general when you try to influence other persons.

Never true						Always true
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

1. I am extremely careful to avoid attacking individuals' intelligence when I attack their ideas.

2. I try very hard to avoid having other people feel bad about themselves when I try to influence them.

3. When people refuse to do a task I know is important without good reason, I tell them they are unreasonable.

4. When others do things I regard as stupid I try to be extremely gentle with them.

5. If individuals I am trying to influence really deserve it I attack their character.

6. When people behave in ways that are in very poor taste, I insult them in order to shock them into proper behavior.

7. I try to make people feel good about themselves even when their ideas are stupid.

8. When people simply will not budge on a matter of importance I lose my temper and say rather strong things to them.

9. When people criticize my shortcomings, I take it in good humor and do not try to get back at them.

10. When individuals insult me, I get a lot of pleasure out of really telling them off.

11. When I dislike individuals greatly, I try not to show it in what I say or how I say it.

12. I like poking fun at people who do things which are very stupid in order to stimulate their intelligence.

13. When I attack persons' ideas, I try not to damage their self-concepts.

14. When an argument shifts to personal attacks, I try very hard to change the subject.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

15. When I try to influence people, I make a great effort not to offend them.

16. When people do things which are mean or cruel, I attack their character in order to help correct their behavior.

17. I refuse to participate in arguments when they involve personal attacks.

18. When nothing seems to work in trying to influence others, I yell and scream in order to get some movement from them.

19. When I am not able to refute others' positions, I try to make them feel defensive in order to weaken their positions.

20. When individuals are very stubborn, I use insults to soften the stubbornness.

Table 5. Empathy Measurement Scale

Indicate how often each statement is true for you in general.

Never true						Always true
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

1. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

*2. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

4. I sometimes find it difficult to see thing from the other person's point of view.

5. I try to look at everyone's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

6. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his or her shoes" for a while.

7. I believe there are two sides to every question and I try to look at them both.

* Dropped out of analysis

significantly from its expected correlation. Second, the deviations of individual correlations from the mean correlation were also quite small (i.e., the matrix was flat). Only two out of 190 correlations deviated from the mean correlation at $p<.01$; and no item had more than one correlation that deviated significantly from the mean correlation. The reliability coefficient alpha for this 20-item verbal aggressiveness measure was .89.

Empathy was measured by Davis's (1983) 7-item measurement scale of empathy as perspective-taking presented in Table 5. A confirmatory factor analysis using Package showed that one of these seven items (item #2 in Table 5) did not represent the same underlying dimension. The correlations between this one item and other items were considerably lower than the mean correlation. The average correlation between this one item and other items was .14, while the mean correlation of the overall matrix was .37. Reliability analysis for this scale showed that the item-total correlation for this item (.20) was much lower than other item-total correlations (the next lowest one was .50). Thus, this item was excluded from further analyses. The reliability coefficient alpha for the 6-item empathy measurement scale was .83.

Coding

While defining positive and negative politeness, the present model suggests (1) confidence shown in approval, (2) exaggeratedness of approval, (3) tentativeness of disapproval, and (4) understatedness of disapproval as criteria for determining the level of positive politeness, and (5) frequency of "vous" pronouns or address terms, (6) conventional indirectness in influence attempts, and (7) hesitance of

Table 6. Politeness Rating Scale

Positive Politeness

I. Approval

1. How much does the speaker try to approve or appreciate the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (General approval)

2. How confidently does the speaker approve or appreciate the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (Confidence of approval)

3. How exaggeratedly does the speaker approve or appreciate the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (Exaggeratedness of approval)

II. Avoidance of Disapproval

4. How much does the speaker try to avoid criticizing or disapproving of the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (General avoidance of disapproval)

5. How hesitantly does the speaker criticize or disapprove of the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (Tentativeness of disapproval)

6. How understatedly does the speaker criticize or disapprove of the hearer's performance, possessions, or abilities? (Understatedness of disapproval)

Negative Politeness

III. Deference

7. How respectful is the speaker to the hearer? (General deference)

8. How frequently does the speaker use "vous" form pronouns or address terms? (Frequency of using "vous" pronouns)

Table 6 (Cont'd)

IV. Avoidance of Imposition

9. How much does the speaker try to avoid imposing on the hearer or interfering with the hearer's freedom of action? (General avoidance of imposition)

10. How hesistantly does the speaker impose on the hearer or interfere with the hearer's freedom of action? (Tentativeness of imposition)

11. How indirectly does the speaker impose on the hearer or interfere with the hearer's freedom of action? (Indirectness of imposition)

Global Politeness

12. How much does the speaker try to express his/her meaning politely?

imposition as criteria for determining the level of negative politeness. In order to code positive and negative politeness manifested in messages an instrument (see Table 6) was developed. This instrument included seven items that represented the above seven criteria for positive and negative politeness, four items that measured the extent to which the speaker generally (1) approves the hearer, (2) tries to avoid disapproving of the hearer, (3) shows respect to the hearer, and (4) tries to avoid imposing on the hearer, and one item that measured global politeness. In other words, positive politeness was measured by six items: three items representing the degree of approval or approach-based positive politeness (i.e., general approval, confidence of approval, and exaggeratedness of approval) and three items representing the degree of avoiding disapproval or avoidance-based positive politeness (i.e., general avoidance of disapproval, tentativeness of disapproval, and understatedness of disapproval). Negative politeness was measured by five items: two items representing the degree of power-giving or approach-based negative politeness (i.e., general respect and frequency of "vous" pronouns) and three items representing the degree of avoiding imposition or avoidance-based negative politeness (i.e., general avoidance of imposition, conventional indirectness, and hesitance of imposition). In addition global politeness asking "how polite is the speaker?" was measured.

Three judges read scripts generated by participants and rated positive and negative politeness manifested in the participants' utterances in each script based on this instrument. Of the twelve items in the instrument, three items measuring avoidance of disapproval

(i.e., general avoidance of disapproval, tentativeness of disapproval, and understatedness of disapproval; items 4, 5, and 6 in Table 6) and three items measuring avoidance of imposition (general avoidance of imposition, conventional indirectness, and hesitance of exerted control; items 9, 10, and 11 in Table 6) were excluded from further analyses since all the subjects scored zero for these categories. In other words, only approach-based positive and negative politeness were analyzed in this study. Inter-rater reliability (Cureton's reliability of average ratings) was .91 for "general approval," .88 for "confidence of approval," .86 for "exaggeratedness of approval," .88 for "general respect," and .96 for "frequency of vous pronouns or address terms." The reliability coefficient alpha was .92 for the three-item measurement of approval and the correlation between the two items in the measurement of deference was .96.

Inter-rater reliability for global politeness was very low (Cureton's reliability of average ratings was .61). Different judges seemed to focus on different dimensions of politeness. For one judge, the correlation between global politeness and positive politeness (r=.37) was higher than that between global politeness and negative politeness (r=.21), whereas the other two judges yielded higher correlations between global politeness and negative politeness (r=.42 and .33) than those between global politeness and positive politeness (r=.21 and .23). Because of low reliability, global politeness was not included in further analyses.

RESULTS

Manipulation Check

In order to check whether variations in the hypothetical situations properly manipulated the relational variables, subjects were asked to rate the relational distance and power disparity between them and Mike Miller before they wrote out the script. Five-point Likert-type scales were employed to rate these relational variables. For the measure of relational distance, "1" represented "very close" and "5" represented "very distant"; for the measure of power disparity, "1" represented "Mike Miller (i.e., the hearer) has much more power over you," "3" represented "Both of you have equal power," and "5" represented "You have much more power over Mike Miller." If the manipulation of relational variables was done successfully, subjects in the "low distance" conditions should rate the relational distance lower than subjects in the "high distance" conditions; subjects in the "equal power" conditions should rate Mike Miller less powerful (i.e., higher score on the rated power) than subjects in the "high power" conditions.

Descriptive statistics for the rated relational distance and the rated power disparity are presented in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. A two-way analysis of variance for the rated relational distance showed a significant main effect of relational distance (F=92.40, df=1/96, p<.001, eta^2=.48). Specifically, subjects in the distant condition rated the relationship more distant (M=3.46, SD=.76) than subjects in the close condition (M=2.12, SD=.63). The main effect of power disparity (F=1.67, df=1/96, p<.200, eta^2=.01) and the interaction effect between relational distance and power disparity (F=.52, df=1/96, p<.475, eta^2=.003) were insignificant. A test of

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Distance

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 2.16 SD = .69 n = 39	M = 2.08 SD = .57 n = 37	M = 2.12 SD = .63 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 3.60 SD = .65 n = 25	M = 3.32 SD = .85 n = 25	M = 3.46 SD = .76 n = 50
		M = 2.88 SD = .98 n = 50	M = 2.70 SD = .95 n = 50	M = 2.79 SD = .97 N = 100

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Power

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 3.40 SD = .50 n = 39	M = 2.40 SD = .87 n = 37	M = 2.90 SD = .86 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 3.20 SD = .41 n = 25	M = 2.52 SD = .65 n = 25	M = 2.86 SD = .64 n = 50
		M = 3.30 SD = .46 n = 50	M = 2.46 SD = .76 n = 50	M = 2.88 SD = .76 N = 100

homogeneity of variance showed that variances of the rated distance were homogeneous across the four different conditions (Cochran's C=.37, $p<.122$; Bartlett-Box $F=1.37$, $p<.251$).

A two-way (relational distance X power disparity) analysis of variance for the rated power yielded a significant main effect of power disparity ($F=44.29$, $df=1/96$, $p<.001$, $eta^2=.31$). Subjects in the hearer-high condition rated Mike Miller more powerful (M=3.30, SD=.46) than subjects in the equal power condition (M=2.46, SD=.76). The main effect of relational distance ($F=.10$, $df=1/96$, $p<.752$, $eta^2=.001$) and the interaction effect between relational distance and power disparity ($F=1.61$, $df=1/96$, $p<.208$, $eta^2=.01$) were insignificant. A test of homogeneity of variance revealed that variances of the rated power disparity were not homogeneous (Cochran's C=.47, $p<.003$; Bartlett-Box $F=5.00$, $p<.002$). Two Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance were performed to test the effects of relational distance and power disparity on the rated power disparity. The results were not different from the results yielded by the two-way analysis of variance for the rated power. In short, the manipulation of the relational variables seemed to be successful.

Politeness in Performing a Non-Face-Threatening Act

One of the most basic claims of the present model is that people would try to be polite even when performing a non-face-threatening act. In order to test this claim, two one-sample t-tests were performed, one each for positive and negative politeness. Both positive (M=9.24, SD=10.24, $t=9.03$, $df=99$, $p<.001$) and negative politeness (M=1.03, SD=1.06, $t=9.73$, $df=99$, $p<.001$) were significantly different from zero or non-occurrence of politeness. In other words, even when the act

involved did not threaten the hearer's face, subjects tried to maintain positive and negative politeness, supporting the present model.

The Effects of Personality Variables

It was hypothesized that empathy would be positively correlated with positive and negative politeness (Hypothesis 1) and that verbal aggressiveness would be negatively correlated with positive and negative politeness in performing a non-FTA (Hypothesis 2).

The Effects of Personality Variables on Positive Politeness. A zero-order correlation analysis yielded statistically insignificant relationships between positive politeness and verbal aggressiveness ($r=-.13$, $p<.206$) and between positive politeness and empathy ($r=.11$, $p<.289$). Table 9 presents Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between positive politeness and verbal aggression, empathy, relational distance, and power disparity. A regression analysis of positive politeness on relational distance, power disparity, verbal aggression, and empathy revealed that none of the personality variables had a significant effect on the dependent variable. The standardized regression coefficient beta was -.07 ($t=-.69$, $df=99$, $p<.493$) for verbal aggression and was .11 for empathy ($t=1.00$, $df=99$, $p<.319$). In contrast, the two relational variables, i.e., relational distance (beta=-.21, $t=-2.19$, $df=99$, $p<.031$) and power disparity (beta=.24, $t=2.44$, $df=99$, $p<.017$) showed considerably larger effect sizes. The squared multiple regression coefficient (R^2) for these two relational variables was .10 ($F=5.09$, $df=2/97$, $p<.008$). The change in R^2 caused by adding the two personality variables was .02 ($F=1.33$, $df=2/97$, $p<.270$). In short, both verbal aggressiveness and

Table 9. Correlations between Positive Politeness and Predictors

	Verbal Aggression	Empathy	Gender	Relational Distance	Power Disparity
Empathy	-.4499				
Gender	-.3316	.2301			
Distance	.0347	-.0380	-.0210		
Power	.0163	-.1866	-.0629	.0000	
Positive Politeness	-.1275	.1071	.2046	-.2180	.2180

Table 10. Correlations between Negative Politeness and Predictors

	Verbal Aggression	Empathy	Gender	Relational Distance	Power Disparity
Empathy	-.4499				
Gender	-.3316	.2301			
Distance	.0347	-.0380	-.0210		
Power	.0163	-.1866	-.0629	.0000	
Negative Politeness	.0144	-.1980	-.0388	.1424	.8261

empathy did not show any significant relationship with positive politeness. The results did not support either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2.

The Effects of Personality Variables on Negative Politeness. A zero-order correlation analysis for negative politeness showed almost no covarying relationship ($r=.01$, $p<.887$) between verbal aggressiveness and negative politeness and a moderate negative relationship ($r=-.20$, $p<.048$) between empathy and negative politeness as presented in Table 10. However, a regression analysis of negative politeness on relational distance, power disparity, verbal aggression, and empathy revealed that the relationship between empathy and negative politeness was accounted for by the other predictors. The standardized regression coefficient beta for empathy was -.05 ($t=-.83$, $df=99$, $p<.411$). Verbal aggressiveness (beta=-.03, $t=-.44$, $df=99$, $p<.662$) also did not show any significant effect on negative politeness. In contrast, relational distance (beta=.14, $t=2.53$, $df=99$, $p<.013$) and power disparity (beta=.82, $t=14.35$, $df=99$, $p<.001$) yielded large effect sizes. The squared multiple regression coefficient for these two relational variables was .70 ($F=114.65$, $df=2/97$, $p<.001$). Addition of verbal aggression and empathy increased R^2 by less than .01 ($F=.34$, $df=2/97$, $p<.710$). In short, both verbal aggressiveness and empathy did not show any significant relationship with negative politeness. The results rejected Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.

In summary, the results altogether indicated that verbal aggression and empathy of an actor were not uniquely correlated with the level of positive and negative politeness in the message generated by the actor. Thus, Hypothesis 1, that predicted actors' empathy will

be positively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing a non-face-threatening act, and Hypothesis 2, that predicted actors' verbal aggressiveness will be negatively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing a non-face-threatening act, were rejected.

The Effects of Relational Variables

It was hypothesized that as the power the hearer has over the actor increases, both positive and negative politeness would increase (Hypothesis 3) and that as the social distance between the hearer and the actor increases, the level of positive politeness would decrease and the level of negative politeness would increase (Hypothesis 4).

The Effects of Relational Variables on Positive Politeness. In order to test the effects of relational distance and power disparity on positive politeness, the occurrence of positive politeness was assessed across the four conditions of the 2 X 2 design (i.e., high distance/high power, high distance/low power, low distance/high power, and low distance/low power). Since the effects of verbal aggressiveness and empathy on positive politeness were not statistically significant, the effects of these personality variables were not removed from the dependent variable of positive politeness. Descriptive statistics for positive politeness are shown in Table 11.

A test for homogeneity of variance showed that the variances of the four conditions were homogeneous for positive politeness (Cochran's $C=.31$, $p<.672$; Bartlett-Box $F=1.00$, $p<.391$). The results indicate that the data for positive politeness did not violate the homogeneity of

Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Positive Politeness

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 8.28 SD =10.31 n = 39	M =14.64 SD =10.95 n = 37	M =11.46 SD =11.01 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 5.76 SD = 7.75 n = 25	M = 8.28 SD =10.05 n = 25	M = 7.02 SD = 8.97 n = 50
		M = 7.02 SD = 9.12 n = 50	M =11.46 SD =10.89 n = 50	M = 9.24 SD =10.24 N = 100

Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for Negative Politeness

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer High	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = .08 SD = .28 n = 39	M = 1.68 SD = .90 n = 37	M = .88 SD = 1.04 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = .24 SD = .44 n = 25	M = 2.12 SD = .53 n = 25	M = 1.18 SD = 1.06 n = 50
		M = .16 SD = .37 n = 50	M = 1.90 SD = .76 n = 50	M = 1.03 SD = 1.06 N = 100

variance assumption of ANOVA. Thus, ANOVA was employed to examine the influences of the relational variables on positive politeness.

A two-way ANOVA for positive politeness yielded significant main effects of relational distance (F=5.10, df=1/96, p<.026, eta^2=.05) and power disparity (F=5.10, df=1/96, p<.026, eta^2=.05) and an insignificant interaction effect between these two relational variables (F=1.00, df=1/96, p<.332, eta^2=.01). Specifically, actors tended to show more positive politeness to close persons (M=11.46, SD=11.01) than distant persons (M=7.02, SD=8.97), and to powerful persons (M=11.46, SD=10.89) than to persons with equal power (M=7.02, SD=9.12). These results support Hypothesis 3 predicting a positive effect of power disparity on positive politeness and Hypothesis 4 predicting a negative effect of relational distance on positive politeness.

The Effects of Relational Variables on Negative Politeness. In order to test the effects of relational distance and power disparity on negative politeness, the occurrence of negative politeness was assessed across the four conditions of the 2 X 2 design (i.e., high distance/high power, high distance/low power, low distance/high power, and low distance/low power). Since the effects of verbal aggressiveness and empathy on negative politeness were not statistically significant, the effects of these personality variables were not removed from the dependent variable of negative politeness. Descriptive statistics for negative politeness are shown in Table 12.

A test for homogeneity of variance showed that variances of the four conditions were not homogeneous for negative politeness (Cochran's C=.60, p<.001; Bartlett-Box F=10.95, p<.001). In other words, the data for negative politeness violated the homogeneity of variance assumption

of ANOVA. Thus, Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance for ordinal scales was used to analyze the effects of the relational variables on negative politeness.

A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA of negative politeness yielded a significant effect for power disparity (chi-square=68.25, df=1, p<.001). Specifically, subjects showed more deference to the hearers with more power (mean rank=72.78) than the hearers with less power (mean rank=28.22). The effect of relational distance on negative politeness was statistically insignificant (chi-square=3.32, df=1, p<.072).

Since analysis of variance (i.e., F-test for interval scales) is robust to the violation of the equality of variances, especially when all groups have the same cell size, a two-way analysis of variance was performed for negative politeness. This analysis yielded very similar results to the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. The influence of power disparity was highly significant (F=223.71, df=1/96, p<.001) and its effect size was remarkably large (eta^2=.68). Specifically, subjects showed more deference to more powerful persons (M=1.90, SD=.76) than less powerful persons (M=.16, SD=.37). In contrast, even though the effect of relational distance (F=6.65, df=1/96, p<.011) was statistically significant, the effect size was relatively small (eta^2=.02). The interaction between relational distance and power disparity was not statistically significant (F=1.45, df=1/96, p<.232, eta^2=.01). In short, power disparity showed a strong influence on negative politeness, supporting Hypothesis 3, but relational distance showed a small effect on negative politeness, not supporting Hypothesis 4.

In sum, the results indicated that as the power the hearer had over the speaker increased, the speaker tended to show more positive and negative politeness. These findings support Hypothesis 3 that predicted the level of positive and negative politeness an actor manifests in performing a non-FTA will increase with the power the hearer has over the actor. The results also indicate that as the relational distance increased, people tended to show less positive politeness; however, the effect of relational distance on negative politeness was minute. These results partially support Hypothesis 4 that predicted the level of positive politeness the actor manifests in performing a non-FTA will decrease and the level of negative politeness the actor manifests in performing the non-FTA will increase with the social distance between the hearer and the actor.

The Effect of Gender

As Table 9 shows, gender yielded a moderate negative relationship with verbal aggression ($r=-.33$, $p<.001$) and a moderate positive relationship with empathy ($r=.23$, $p<.021$). A regression analysis of gender on verbal aggression and empathy yielded a squared multiple regression coefficient of .12 ($F=6.50$, $df=2/97$, $p<.002$). Verbal aggression was a better predictor of gender than empathy, its standardized regression coefficient beta being -.29 ($t=-2.70$, $df=99$, $p<.009$). The beta for empathy was .10 ($t=.95$, $df=99$, $p<.345$). A one-way analysis of variance also showed that verbal aggressiveness was significantly different between different genders ($F=12.11$, $df=1/98$, $p<.001$, $eta^2=.11$). Males ($M=46.23$, $SD=12.90$) were more aggressive than females ($M=36.42$, $SD=13.73$). In short, verbal aggressiveness could predict gender quite well as argued earlier.

A one-way ANOVA for positive politeness showed that males and females were different in positive politeness (F=4.28, df=1/98, p<.041, eta^2=.04). Since verbal aggressiveness was not equivalently distributed between different genders, a one-way analysis of covariance eliminating the effect of verbal aggression was performed for positive politeness. The results showed that gender was not a significant predictor of positive politeness (F=3.01, df=1/97, p<.086) any more. Negative politeness was not different between males and females. One-way analysis of variance yielded an insignificant effect of gender on negative politeness (F=.513, df=1/98, p<.476). In short, gender was not a very good predictor of politeness, and most of its effect on politeness could be explained by verbal aggressiveness.

DISCUSSION

One of the major findings of this experiment is that people make use of politeness devices even when no intrinsic face threat is involved in the intended act. Subjects in this experiment actively made use of such positive politeness devices as compliment and such negative politeness devices as "vous" form pronouns or address terms. This finding supports Ferguson's (1976) claim that people employ politeness expressions in a ritualized communication interaction as well as the present model's claim that people share obligations to be polite regardless of the kind of act they are performing.

This experiment partially confirmed the politeness model proposed in Chapter 1. First, the power the hearer has over the speaker was a good predictor of both positive and negative politeness. Speakers show more positive and negative politeness to hearers with more relational

power. In other words, people appreciate their superior's performances or possessions more than their peer's performances or possessions; people show more deference to their superior than to their peer.

Second, even though the effect size was small, relational distance between two actors turned out to influence positive politeness. Speakers show more positive politeness to friends than acquaintances. In other words, people appreciate their friend's performances or possessions more than their acquaintance's performances or possessions.

While a two-way analysis of variance yielded a small but significant effect of relational distance on negative politeness, Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance showed the effect of relational distance on negative politeness was statistically insignificant. One possible explanation for this result is that the manipulation of relational distance in this experiment is not enough to trigger differences in negative politeness. In this experiment, relational distance was manipulated by describing the hypothetical person as a classmate with whom subjects took several courses together for the close condition and a classmate with whom subjects took only one class together for the distant condition, or by describing the hypothetical person as a professor from whom subjects took several courses for the close condition and a professor from whom subjects took only one class. This distinction certainly made differences in subjects' perception of relational distance. However, it seems that because use of pronouns or address terms (which is one major criterion for negative politeness) is highly conventionalized, people may not vary the way they address others unless there is a wide difference in relational distance. In short, the manipulation of relational distance

may not be enough to cause subjects to change their behavior concerning negative politeness.

Although this experiment failed to find a significant effect of relational distance on negative politeness, the findings concerning the effect of relational distance on positive politeness and the effect of power disparity on both positive and negative politeness confirmed the predictions made by the present model. By confirming these predictions of the present model, the findings also support the claim of the model that people incur obligations to promote or save their partner's positive and negative face simply by having a relationship with the partner.

The present model's predictions concerning personality variables such as verbal aggression and empathy were not supported. The results indicated that verbal aggressiveness and empathy did not influence positive and negative politeness in non-face-threatening situations. One possible explanation for this finding is that the particular instruments measuring verbal aggressiveness and empathy employed in this experiment are devised mainly to investigate people's selection of message <u>contents</u> with different degrees of verbal aggressiveness and empathy. Thus, these instruments might not be adequate to measure differences in verbal aggressiveness and empathy in the <u>manner</u> message contents are expressed. Another possible explanation is that the relationship between personality variables and politeness is contingent on the nature of the act being performed. Greeting and parting are so ritualized that actors may not have enough opportunities to reflect their idiosyncrasies in the interaction.

Different from previous studies (Baxter, 1984; Brown, 1976, 1980; Kemper, 1984; Shimanoff, 1981), this experiment found that gender was not a very powerful predictor of politeness. Gender showed a small effect on positive politeness; however, when differences in verbal aggressiveness were removed from gender differences, the effect became statistically insignificant. Moreover, gender differences in negative politeness were insignificant.

In summary, this experiment proved that people maintain both positive and negative politeness when they perform a non-FTA. Both relational distance and power disparity were found to have significant impacts on positive and negative politeness. However, personality variables such as verbal aggressiveness and empathy did not show any significant influence on politeness.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENT 2

HYPOTHESES

The model proposed in Chapter 1 offers an explanation for politeness manifested in performing a face-threatening act as well as politeness manifested in performing a non-face-threatening act. While experiment 1 examined the adequacy of the present model in explaining politeness manifested in performing a non-FTA, this experiment tests the adequacy of the present model in accounting for politeness manifested in performing an FTA.

Equation 4 states that the degrees of positive and negative politeness are a function of the total obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively, and the speaker's verbal aggressiveness and empathy. According to equation 3, the total obligation to save positive face is a sum of the relational obligation to save positive face and the threat to positive face carried by the act; the total obligation to save negative face is a sum of the relational obligation to save negative face and the threat to negative face carried by the act. Furthermore, as equation 2 states, the relational obligations to save positive and negative face are a function of the relational power the hearer has over the speaker and the relational distance. Thus, when we substitute the threats to positive and negative face, the power disparity, and the relational distance for the total obligations to save positive and negative face into equation 4, we obtain the following equation for the degree of positive and negative politeness:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_p \\ P_n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} T_p \\ T_n \end{bmatrix} + E \begin{bmatrix} n \\ p \end{bmatrix} - A \begin{bmatrix} m \\ o \end{bmatrix} + P \begin{bmatrix} a \\ x \end{bmatrix} + D \begin{bmatrix} -b \\ y \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} c \\ z \end{bmatrix} \quad (6)$$

where P_p and P_n are the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness, respectively; T_p and T_n are the threat to positive face and the threat to negative face, respectively; E represents empathy; A represents verbal aggressiveness; P is the power the hearer has over the speaker; D is the relational distance between the hearer and the speaker; and a, b, c, m, n, o, p, x, y, and z are positive constants.

Equation 6 states that positive and negative politeness manifested in a message are a function of the threats to positive and negative face, respectively, the speaker's empathy and verbal aggressiveness, the power disparity, and the relational distance. Specifically, the threat to positive face and the threat to negative face are positively related to the level of positive and negative politeness, respectively; the speaker's empathy is positively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; the speaker's verbal aggressiveness is negatively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; the power disparity is positively related to the level of both positive and negative politeness; and the relational distance is negatively related to the level of positive politeness, and positively related to the level of negative politeness. Based on the predictions of the present model for politeness related to FTA, the following hypotheses can be made:

HYPOTHESIS 1: The threat to positive face carried by an FTA will increase the level of positive politeness manifested in performing the FTA, and the threat to negative face carried by the FTA will increase the level of negative politeness manifested in performing the FTA.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Empathy will be positively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Verbal aggressiveness will be negatively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA.

HYPOTHESIS 4: The power the hearer has over the actor will increase the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA.

HYPOTHESIS 5: The social distance between the hearer and the actor will decrease the level of positive politeness manifested in performing an FTA and increase the level of negative politeness manifested in performing the FTA.

METHODS

This experiment was concerned with the effects of face-threat carried by an act, verbal aggressiveness, empathy, power disparity, and relational distance on positive and negative politeness manifested in performing a face-threatening act. This experiment employed a message generation technique. Subjects were asked to write verbatim what they would say when they needed to perform a given act in a given situation. The level of positive and negative politeness manifested in these generated messages was rated by a group of judges.

Situations and Manipulation of Independent Variables

This experiment employed four different face-threatening acts to manipulate the degree of positive and negative face-threat. Each of

these four FTAs represented one of the four conditions of face-threat obtained by crossing two levels of positive face threat (high vs. low) with two levels of negative face-threat (high vs. low). The face-threatening act used to create the high positive/high negative face-threat condition was one that requests hearers to re-do their work due to the poor quality of their first work (i.e., "request of re-writing"). This request is high in positive face-threat because it disapproves of a hearer's performance by presupposing that the performance is of poor quality. This request is high in negative face-threat if the work to be re-done takes a lot of time and energy. Thus, the FTA used in the high positive/high negative face-threat condition was a request to re-do a difficult job.

The face-threatening act employed to create the high positive/low negative face-threat condition was one that criticizes hearers' performance (i.e., "negative evaluation"). This criticism is high in positive face-threat since it discredits hearers by expressing that their performance is of poor quality; negative face-threat of this criticism is low since hearers are not controlled by speakers.

The face-threatening act used in the low positive/high negative face-threat condition was one that requests a hearer to do (not re-do) work that requires a lot of time and energy (i.e., "request of taking over another's responsibility"). This request threatens negative face highly, but does not threaten positive face to any significant extent because it does not imply any disapproval of the person one is talking to.

The face-threatening act used in the low positive/low negative face-threat condition was one that asks others' opinions (i.e., "asking

opinion"). Asking hearers' opinions is low in both positive and negative face-threat when hearers are ready to make comments (thus, no extra effort is needed), and the issue is not directed toward some negative aspects of hearers (thus, no disapproval is intended).

In sum, four speech acts were used to create four different conditions of face-threat. Specifically, the high positive face-threat condition included "negative evaluation" and "request of re-writing"; the low positive face-threat condition included "asking opinion" and "request of taking over another's responsibility"; the high negative face-threat condition included "request of re-writing" and "request of taking over another's responsibility"; the low negative face-threat condition included "asking opinion" and "negative evaluation."

A hypothetical situation was created with sixteen possible variations, depending on the degree of positive face-threat (high vs. low), the degree of negative face-threat (high vs. low), power disparity (equal vs. hearer low), and relational distance (high vs. low) (see Appendix B). Specifically, the hypothetical scenario for the high positive/high negative face-threat, equal power, and low relational distance condition was as follows:

> Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.
>
> So, you want to ask John to re-do his part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. John will

basically have to start over again. Suppose that John is someone you regard as a good friend.

For the high positive/low negative face-threat condition, the second paragraph was rewritten as: "One day, John, who you regard as a good friend, asks you what you think about his work. Since this matter is related to the group's grade, you want to tell him that he did a poor job, hoping that he/she volunteers to re-do the work." For the low positive/high negative face-threat condition, the second paragraph was rewritten as: "Since you want a better group grade and since you think John Brown does not want to do his part of the project again, you want to ask another member of the group (Bill Jones), who you think is very actively involved in this group project, to take over and re-do John's part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. If Bill decides to take over the job, he will basically have to start over again. Suppose that Bill is someone you regard as a good friend." For the low positive/low negative face-threat condition, the second paragraph was rewritten as: "One day you run into another member of your group (Bill Jones), who you regard as a good friend. You want to know what Bill thinks of John's work. So, you decide to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. Suppose that Bill already read the opening chapter done by John."

For the high relational distance condition, the person in question (i.e., the hearer) was described as one participants do not know very well, except for project group meetings as compared to a "friend" in the low relational distance condition. For the hearer-low power disparity condition (i.e., the power a hearer has over a speaker is low), the agent (i.e., the role to be assumed by participants) was

described as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) who was in charge of a group as compared to a "group member" in the equal power condition. Specifically, the first paragraph of the scenario was replaced by the following:

> Imagine that you enrolled in an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll in the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

Pilot Study

In order to check whether these variations of the situation could manipulate the relational variables and face-threats as designed, a pilot study was performed. Two separate 2 X 2 factorial designs (i.e., one 2 X 2 design for relational distance and power disparity and one 2 X 2 design for positive and negative face-threat) were employed instead of one 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design to eliminate unnecessary interaction effects between relational variables and face-threats. Perception of relational distance and power disparity might be influenced by the type of act the speaker is performing and perception of face-threat might be influenced by the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. For example, people might perceive the same relationship more distant when they criticize their partner than when

they ask opinions of their partner; and perceived level of face-threat of criticizing the partner may be lower when the power has less power. Thus, in order to control the effects of positive and negative face-threats on perceived levels of relational distance and power disparity, subjects rated four relational variations of the same act (i.e., the levels of positive and negative face threat were set constant); and in order to control the effects of the nature of the relationship on perceived levels of positive and negative threats, subjects rated four act-type variations of the same relationship (i.e., the levels of relational distance and power disparity were set constant).

One hundred seventy six subjects volunteered to participate in this pilot study. Subjects were asked to read one of the four situational variations (i.e., high distance/low power, high distance/equal power, low distance/low power, and low distance/equal power) of the act asking the opinion of another member and rate the relational distance between them and the hypothetical actor on a 7-point scale (6 being "very distant" and 0 "very close") and also rate the power the hearer has over them also on a 7-point scale (0 being "John Brown has much less power than you" and 6 being "both of you have equal power). If the manipulation of relational variables was done successfully, readers of the "low distance" instructions should rate the relational distance lower than readers of the "high distance" instructions; readers of the "equal power" instructions should rate their hearer less powerful than readers of the "low power" instructions.

Table 13. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Distance

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer Low	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 2.39 SD = 1.17 n = 39	M = 2.36 SD = 1.14 n = 37	M = 2.38 SD = 1.15 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 4.77 SD = .89 n = 44	M = 4.32 SD = 1.18 n = 44	M = 4.55 SD = 1.06 n = 88
		M = 3.58 SD = 1.58 n = 88	M = 3.34 SD = 1.52 n = 88	M = 3.46 SD = 1.55 N = 176

Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Power Disparity

		Relational Power		
		Equal	Hearer Low	
Relational Distance	Close (Low)	M = 3.82 SD = 2.00 n = 39	M = 3.61 SD = 1.50 n = 37	M = 3.72 SD = 1.76 n = 76
	Distant (High)	M = 4.00 SD = 1.74 n = 44	M = 3.02 SD = 1.85 n = 44	M = 3.51 SD = 1.85 n = 88
		M = 3.91 SD = 1.87 n = 88	M = 3.32 SD = 1.70 n = 88	M = 3.61 SD = 1.80 N = 176

Descriptive statistics for the rated social distance and the rated power disparity are shown in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. Two two-way analyses of variance yielded a significant effect of relational distance on the rated relational distance (F=171.50, df=1/172, p<.001, eta^2=.50) and a significant effect of power disparity on the rated power disparity (F=4.84, df=1/172, p<.029, eta^2=.03). Specifically, subjects in the distant condition rated the relationship more distant (M=4.55, SD=1.06) than subjects in the close condition (M=2.38, SD=1.15); subjects in the hearer-low condition rated the hearer less powerful (M=3.32, SD=1.70) than subjects in the equal power condition (M=3.91, SD=1.87). Other main effects and interactions effects were not statistically significant. Tests of homogeneity of variance showed that variances of both the rated distance (Cochran's C=.29, p<.851; Bartlett-Box F=1.44, p<.230) and the rated power disparity (Cochran's C=.32, p<.333; Bartlett-Box F=1.24, p<.292) were homogeneous across the four different conditions.

Subjects also read the four act-type variations (i.e., asking opinion, negative evaluation, request of re-writing, and request of taking over another's responsibility) of the low distance/equal power condition and rated positive and negative face-threats carried by the acts on seven-point scales (6 representing extremely high face-threat and 0 no face-threat). If the manipulation of face-threat was done effectively, "request of re-writing" and "negative evaluation," which represent the high positive face-threat condition, should be rated higher for positive face-threat than the other two acts and "request of re-writing" and "request of taking over another's responsibility,"

Table 15. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Positive Face-Threat

		Positive Face-Threat		
		Low	High	
Relational Face-Threat	Low	M = .86 SD = 1.27 n = 39	M = 2.55 SD = 1.42 n = 37	M = 1.70 SD = 1.58 n = 76
	High	M = .89 SD = 1.32 n = 44	M = 3.11 SD = 1.71 n = 44	M = 2.00 SD = 1.89 n = 88
		M = .88 SD = 1.28 n = 88	M = 2.83 SD = 1.59 n = 88	M = 1.85 SD = 1.74 N = 176

Table 16. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Negative Face-Threat

		Positive Face-Threat		
		Low	High	
Relational Face-Threat	Low	M = 2.82 SD = 1.66 n = 39	M = 3.05 SD = 1.68 n = 37	M = 2.93 SD = 1.67 n = 76
	High	M = 4.84 SD = 1.31 n = 44	M = 4.64 SD = 1.26 n = 44	M = 4.74 SD = 1.28 n = 88
		M = 3.83 SD = 1.80 n = 88	M = 3.84 SD = 1.68 n = 88	M = 3.84 SD = 1.74 N = 176

which represent the high negative face-threat condition, should be rated higher for negative face-threat than the other two acts.

Descriptive statistics for the rated positive face-threat and the rated negative face-threat are presented in Tables 15 and 16, respectively. Two two-way analyses of variance showed a significant effect of positive face-threat on the rated positive face-threat (F=81.00, df=1/172, p<.001, eta^2=.32) and a significant effect of negative face-threat on the rated negative face-threat (F=64.59, df=1/172, p<.001, eta^2=.27). Subjects in the low positive face-threat condition rated the positive face-threat lower (M=.88, SD=1.28) than subjects in the high positive face-threat condition (M=2.83, SD=1.59); subjects in the low negative face-threat condition rated the negative face-threat lower (M=2.93, SD=1.67) than subjects in the high negative face-threat condition (M=4.74, SD=1.28). No other main effects or interaction effects were statistically significant. Tests of homogeneity of variance showed that variances of both the rated positive face-threat (Cochran's C=.35, p<.069; Bartlett-Box F=1.62, p<.183) and the rated negative face-threat (Cochran's C=.32, p<.303; Bartlett-Box F=1.97, p<.117) were homogeneous across the four different conditions. These results altogether indicated that the instructions could manipulate the relational variables successfully.

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 400 volunteers from several undergraduate courses at a large Midwestern university. The participants received extra credit points for completing the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the sixteen experimental conditions in a 2

(high vs. low positive face-threat) X 2 (high vs. low negative face-threat) X 2 (equal vs. low power disparity) X 2 (high vs. low relational distance) factorial design, and asked to write verbatim what they would say to perform the given act in the given relationship. Participants were also asked to complete measurement scales for verbal aggressiveness and empathy. All questionnaires were administered in class.

Instrumentation

The same measures as in Experiment 1 were used to measure verbal aggressiveness and empathy. A confirmatory factor analysis (Package by Hunter & Cohen, 1969) for Infante and Wigley's (1986) 20-item verbal aggressiveness measure showed that the items in this measurement scale were internally consistent. The deviations between observed correlations and reproduced correlations were minute. Only one out of 190 observed correlations significantly deviated from its expected correlation at $p<.01$; no deviation exceeded 3 times the standard error (.095) of the mean correlation (.242); and no item had more than one observed correlation that deviated significantly from its expected correlation. The deviations of individual correlations from the mean correlation were also quite small (i.e., the matrix was flat). Only four out of 190 correlations deviated from the mean correlation at $p<.01$; and no item had more than one correlation that significantly deviated from the mean correlation. The reliability coefficient alpha for this 20-item verbal aggressiveness measure was .86. These results were highly consistent with the results from the validity and reliability tests of Experiment 1.

A confirmatory factor analysis (Package) for Davis' (1983) 7-item empathy measure showed that one of these seven items (item #2 in Table 5) did not represent the same underlying dimension. The correlations between this one item and other items (average correlation was .374) were considerably lower than the mean correlation (.433). A reliability analysis for this measure showed that the item-total correlation for this item (.31) was also much lower than other item-total correlations (the next lowest correlation was .45). Thus, this item was excluded from further analyses. The reliability coefficient alpha for the 6-item empathy measurement scale was .86. These results also were highly consistent with the results from Experiment 1.

Coding

The same measures for positive and negative politeness as in Experiment 1 were employed. Three judges read utterances generated by participants and rated positive and negative politeness. Of the twelve items in the instrument (see Table 6), two items measuring the degree of power-giving (items 7 and 8 in Table 6, i.e., "general deference" and "frequency of using 'vous' pronouns") were excluded from further analyses since all the subjects scored zero for these categories. Inter-rater reliability (Cureton's reliability of average ratings) was .82 for "general approval," .89 for "confidence of approval," .86 for "exaggeratedness of approval," .85 for "general avoidance of disapproval," .93 for "tentativeness of disapproval," .90 for "understatedness of disapproval," .85 for "general avoidance of imposition," .88 for "conventional indirectness," and .79 for "hesitance of imposition."

Table 17. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Positive Politeness

	Approval			Avoidance of Disapproval		
	General	Confidence	Exaggeratedness	General	Tentativeness	Understatedness
General Approval	.972					
Conf. of Approval	.933	.893				
Exag. of Approval	.937	.888	.899			
Avoid. of Disapproval	.249	.260	.151	.999		
Tent. of Disapproval	.148	.147	.079	.772	.575	
Under. of Disapproval	.284	.298	.202	.878	.610	.723
Factor 1	.988	.943	.946	.229	.130	.272
Factor 2	.261	.270	.166	.999	.749	.845

A confirmatory factor analysis using PACKAGE showed that the six items measuring positive politeness (i.e., three items for approval and three items for avoidance of disapproval) were not unidimensional. It showed that items measuring approval and those measuring avoidance of disapproval were forming two different clusters. Correlations between items in the same cluster were very high (average r=.92 for items measuring approval; average r=.75 for items measuring avoidance of disapproval), whereas those between items in the different clusters were very low (average r=.20) as Table 17 presents. The three items for approval and the three items for avoidance of disapproval as well as the three items for avoidance of imposition each seemed to be unidimensional. The reliability coefficient alpha was .97 for the three-item measurement of approval (or approach-based positive politeness), .90 for the three-item measurement of avoidance of disapproval (or avoidance-based positive politeness), and .82 for the three-item measurement of avoidance of imposition (or avoidance-based negative politeness).

Inter-rater reliability for global politeness was very low (Cureton's reliability of average ratings was .59). Similar to Experiment 1, raters focused on different dimensions of politeness to determine the degree of global politeness. One judge rated global politeness more like approach-based positive politeness (r=.37) than avoidance-based positive politeness (r=.23) or avoidance-based negative politeness (r=.29); the other two judges rated global politeness more like avoidance-based negative politeness (r=.40 and .39) than approach-based (r=.34 and .23) or avoidance-based positive politeness

(r=.21 and .28). Because of low reliability, global politeness was excluded from further analysis.

RESULTS

Manipulation Check

In order to check whether variations in the hypothetical situations properly manipulated the relational variables and face-threats, subjects were asked to rate the relational distance and power disparity between them and the hypothetical actor and positive and negative face-threats carried by the act before they wrote out the message. Five-point Likert-type scales were employed to rate these relational variables. For the measure of relational distance, "1" represented "very close" and "5" represented "very distant." For the measure of power disparity, "1" represented "John Brown has much more power over you," "3" represented "Both of you have equal power," and "5 represented "You have much more power over John Brown." For the measure of positive and negative face-threat, "1" represented "Not at all" and "5" represented "Greatly." If the manipulation of relational variables was done successfully, subjects in the "low distance" conditions should rate the relational distance lower than subjects in the "high distance" conditions; subjects in the "hearer-low power" conditions should rate their hearer less powerful than subjects in the "equal power" conditions; subjects in the "high positive face-threat" conditions should rate the positive face-threat higher than subjects in the "low positive face-threat" conditions; subjects in the "high negative face-threat" conditions should rate the negative face-threat higher than subjects in the "low negative face-threat" conditions.

Table 18. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Distance

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 2.00 SD= .50	M= 2.16 SD= .47	M= 2.04 SD= .61	M= 2.20 SD= .65	M=2.10 SD= .56
			High Low	M= 2.33 SD= .56	M= 2.08 SD= .63	M= 2.19 SD= .49	M= 2.17 SD= .48	M=2.19 SD= .54
	Distant	Power	Equal	M= 3.64 SD= .57	M= 3.76 SD= .60	M= 3.48 SD= .71	M= 3.76 SD= .72	M=3.66 SD= .65
			High Low	M= 3.56 SD= .65	M= 3.92 SD= .40	M= 3.56 SD= .58	M= 3.64 SD= .64	M=3.67 SD= .59
				M= 2.89 SD= .92	M= 2.97 SD= 1.01	M= 2.81 SD= .92	M= 2.95 SD= .98	M=2.91 SD= .96

Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Power Disparity

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 2.96 SD= .54	M= 2.92 SD= .64	M= 2.92 SD= .57	M= 3.00 SD= .65	M=2.95 SD= .59
			High Low	M= 3.54 SD= .51	M= 3.65 SD= .69	M= 3.42 SD= .86	M= 3.71 SD= .62	M=2.96 SD= .60
	Distant	Power	Equal	M= 3.00 SD= .41	M= 3.04 SD= .68	M= 2.92 SD= .70	M= 3.08 SD= .76	M=3.01 SD= .64
			High Low	M= 3.72 SD= .61	M= 3.60 SD= .82	M= 3.48 SD= .82	M= 3.88 SD= .53	M=3.67 SD= .71
				M= 3.30 SD= .61	M= 3.31 SD= .77	M= 3.19 SD= .78	M= 3.41 SD= .74	M=3.30 SD= .73

Table 20. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Positive Face-Threat

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 1.16 SD= .37	M= 3.52 SD= .77	M= 1.12 SD= .33	M= 3.44 SD= .87	M=2.31 SD=1.33
			High Low	M= 1.17 SD= .38	M= 3.53 SD= .86	M= 1.27 SD= .53	M= 3.54 SD= .59	M=2.38 SD=1.32
	Distant	Power	Equal	M= 1.40 SD= .50	M= 3.44 SD= .87	M= 1.08 SD= .28	M= 3.16 SD= .62	M=2.27 SD=1.20
			High Low	M= 1.04 SD= .20	M= 3.60 SD= .87	M= 1.04 SD= .20	M= 3.40 SD= .65	M=2.27 SD=1.35
				M= 1.19 SD= .40	M= 3.52 SD= .83	M= 1.13 SD= .37	M= 3.38 SD= .70	M=3.31 SD=1.30

Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for Rated Negative Face-Threat

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 2.08 SD= .97	M= 2.12 SD= .91	M= 3.80 SD= .87	M= 3.76 SD= 1.05	M=2.94 SD=1.28
			High Low	M= 2.25 SD= .85	M= 2.58 SD= .95	M= 4.08 SD= .89	M= 4.00 SD= .88	M=3.23 SD=1.20
	Distant	Power	Equal	M= 2.24 SD= .78	M= 2.52 SD= .92	M= 3.76 SD= .83	M= 3.76 SD= .97	M=3.07 SD=1.11
			High Low	M= 2.28 SD= .98	M= 2.28 SD= .84	M= 3.92 SD= .76	M= 3.96 SD= .79	M=3.11 SD=1.18
				M= 2.21 SD= .87	M= 2.38 SD= .95	M= 3.89 SD= .84	M= 3.87 SD= .92	M=3.09 SD=1.20

Descriptive statistics for the rated relational distance, the rated power disparity, the rated positive face-threat, and the rated negative face-threat are presented in Tables 18, 19, 20, and 21, respectively. A series of four-way (relational distance X power disparity X positive face-threat X negative face-threat) analyses of variance for the rated variables yielded significant main effects of power disparity on the rated power disparity (F=94.90, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.19), relational distance on the rated relational distance (F=672.57, df=1/383, p<.001, eta^2=.63), positive face-threat on the rated positive face-threat (F=1437.61, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.78), and negative face-threat on the rated negative face-threat (F=310.905, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.46). Specifically, subjects in the hearer-low condition rated the hearer less powerful (M=3.63, SD=.70) than subjects in the equal power condition (M=2.98, SD=.62); subjects in the distant condition rated the relationship more distant (M=3.67, SD=.62) than subjects in the close condition (M=2.15, SD=.55); subjects in the low positive face-threat condition rated the positive face-threat lower (M=1.16, SD=.38) than subjects in the high positive face-threat condition (M=3.46, SD=.77); subjects in the low negative face-threat condition rated the negative face-threat lower (M=2.30, SD=.92) than subjects in the high negative face-threat condition (M=3.88, SD=.88). No other main effects or interaction effects turned out to be significant.

A series of tests of homogeneity revealed that the variances of the sixteen conditions were homogeneous for the rated distance (Cochran's C=.10, p<.679; Bartlett-Box F=1.18, p<.279) and the rated negative face-threat (Cochran's C=.09, p<.999; Bartlett-Box F=.47,

$p<.958$); however, the variances were heterogeneous for the rated power (Bartlett-Box $F=1.76$, $p<.034$; Cochran's $C=.11$, $p<.258$) and the rated positive face-threat (Cochran's $C=.13$, $p<.014$; Bartlett-Box $F=9.73$, $p<.001$). Eight Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance were performed to test the effects of relational distance, power disparity, and positive and negative face-threats on the rated power disparity and the rated positive face-threat. The results from these analyses were not different from the results from the four-way ANOVAs for the rated power and the rated positive face-threat. These results indicate that the manipulation of the independent variables was done successfully.

Co-occurrence of Positive and Negative Politeness

One of the basic claims of the present model is that speakers would try to maintain both positive and negative politeness. In order to test this claim, the frequencies of co-occurrence of positive and negative politeness, only positive politeness, only negative politeness, and non-occurrence of any type of politeness were counted. Two hundred eighty nine out of 400 subjects showed a certain degree of both positive and negative politeness, 11 subjects used only positive politeness; 87 subjects employed only negative politeness; and 13 subjects did not show any type of politeness. A chi-square test revealed that the observed probability of co-occurrence of positive and negative politeness was significantly different from chance probability (chi-square=9.99, $df=1$, $p<.002$), supporting the present model.

The Effects of Personality Variables

It was hypothesized that empathy will be positively correlated with positive and negative politeness (Hypothesis 2) and that verbal

aggressiveness will be negatively correlated with positive and negative politeness (Hypothesis 3).

Approach-Based Positive Politeness. A zero-order correlation analysis for approach-based positive politeness (i.e., approval) and independent variables showed that verbal aggressiveness and empathy had a strong negative relationship ($r=-.54$, $p<.001$). However, as shown in Table 22, neither verbal aggressiveness ($r=-.10$, $p<.051$) nor empathy ($r=.04$, $p<.330$) yielded any significant relationship with approval. Regression of approval on the independent variables (including relational distance, power disparity, positive and negative face-threats, verbal aggressiveness, and empathy) showed that personality variables were not good predictors of approach-based positive politeness. The standardized regression coefficient beta was $-.10$ ($t=-1.78$, $df=399$, $p<.075$) for verbal aggressiveness and .001 ($t=.02$, $df=399$, $p<.987$) for empathy. These results were consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 that personality variables did not influence the level of approval shown in phatic communication.

Negative face-threat (beta=.006, $t=-.13$, $df=399$, $p<.896$) and power disparity (beta=$-.02$, $t=-.32$, $df=399$, $p<.750$) also did not predict approach-based positive politeness well. However, positive face-threat (beta=.15, $t=3.12$, $df=399$, $p<.002$) and relational distance (beta=$-.21$, $t=-4.30$, $df=399$, $p<.001$) showed stronger effects on approach-based positive politeness. Multiple R^2 for these two variables was .07 ($F=13.91$, $df=2/397$, $p<.001$), and change in R^2 by the other four variables (i.e., empathy, verbal aggressiveness, negative face-threat, and power disparity) was .01 ($F=1.15$, $df=4/395$, $p<.334$). In short, personality variables did not show any significant influence on

approach-based positive politeness, which did not support Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.

Avoidance-Based Positive Politeness. Empathy did not have any significant impact on avoidance-based positive politeness (i.e., avoidance of disapproval). The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for the relationship between empathy and avoidance of disapproval was .08 ($p<.109$) as shown in Table 23. However, verbal aggressiveness showed a statistically significant negative relationship ($r=-.17$, $p<.001$) with avoidance of disapproval even though the effect size was small. Regression of avoidance of disapproval on the independent variables yielded an insignificant effect of empathy and a significant effect of verbal aggressiveness on avoidance-based positive politeness. The standardized regression coefficient beta was -.02 ($t=-.44$, $df=399$, $p<.659$) for empathy and -.20 ($t=-4.34$, $df=399$, $p<.001$) for verbal aggressiveness.

Positive face-threat (beta=.37, $t=9.42$, $df=399$, $p<.001$), power disparity (beta=-.29, $t=-7.37$, $df=399$, $p<.001$), and relational distance (beta=-.38, $t=-9.68$, $df=399$, $p<.001$) showed very strong effects on avoidance-based positive politeness. Multiple R^2 for these three variables was .36 ($F=72.78$, $df=3/396$, $p<.001$), and change in multiple R^2 by verbal aggressiveness was .04 ($F=23.67$, $df=1/398$, $p<.001$). Negative face-threat did not show any significant effect on avoidance-based positive politeness (beta=.06, $t=1.54$, $df=399$, $p<.124$). In short, empathy did not influence avoidance-based positive politeness; that is, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Verbal aggressiveness showed a moderate effect on avoidance-based positive politeness, partially supporting Hypothesis 3.

Table 22. Correlation Analysis for Approach-Based Positive Politeness

	Relational Distance	Power Disp.	Negative Threat	Positive Threat	Verbal Aggre.	Empathy	Gender
Power Disparity	.000						
Negative Threat	.000	.000					
Positive Threat	.000	.000	.000				
Verbal Aggressiveness	-.023	-.046	.000	.000			
Empathy	.036	-.021	.000	.000	-.536		
Gender	-.125	.021	.000	.000	-.278	.175	
Approach-based Positive Politeness	-.206	-.011	-.008	.151	-.098	.045	-.007

Table 23. Correlation Analysis for Avoidance-Based Positive Politeness

	Relational Distance	Power Disp.	Negative Threat	Positive Threat	Verbal Aggre.	Empathy	Gender
Power Disparity	.000						
Negative Threat	.000	.000					
Positive Threat	.000	.000	.000				
Verbal Aggressiveness	-.023	-.046	.000	.000			
Empathy	.036	-.021	.000	.000	-.536		
Gender	-.125	.021	.000	.000	-.278	.175	
Avoidance-Based Positive Politeness	-.376	-.280	.057	.369	-.169	.080	.095

Table 24. Correlation Analysis for Avoidance-Based Negative Politeness

	Relational Distance	Power Disp.	Negative Threat	Positive Threat	Verbal Aggre.	Empathy	Gender
Power Disparity	.000						
Negative Threat	.000	.000					
Positive Threat	.000	.000	.000				
Verbal Aggressiveness	-.023	-.046	.000	.000			
Empathy	.036	-.021	.000	.000	-.536		
Gender	-.125	.021	.000	.000	-.278	.175	
Avoidance-Based Negative Politeness	.145	-.040	.521	-.080	-.140	.112	.097

Avoidance-Based Negative Politeness. A zero-order correlation analysis for avoidance of imposition (or avoidance-based negative politeness) yielded small but statistically significant effects of empathy ($r=.11$, $p<.025$) and verbal aggressiveness ($r=-.14$, $p<.005$) as Table 24 shows. However, the relationship between empathy and negative politeness turned out to be accounted for by the other predictors. Regression of avoidance of imposition on relational distance, power disparity, positive and negative face-threats, verbal aggressiveness, and empathy yielded no significant effect of empathy and a statistically significant but small effect of verbal aggressiveness. The standardized regression coefficient beta for empathy was .04 ($t=.90$, $df=399$, $p<.369$), while that for verbal aggressiveness was -.11 ($t=-2.32$, $df=399$, $p<.021$).

Positive face-threat (beta=-.07, $t=-1.80$, $df=399$, $p<.072$) and power disparity (beta=.-.04, $t=-1.06$, $df=399$, $p<.291$) also did not show any statistically significant effect on avoidance-based negative politeness. In contrast, negative face-threat (beta=.52, $t=12.50$, $df=399$, $p<.001$) and relational distance (beta=.14, $t=3.39$, $df=399$, $p<.001$) turned out to be very good predictors of avoidance-based negative politeness. R^2 for these two variables was .29 ($F=81.98$, $df=2/397$, $p<.001$), and change in R^2 by the other four variables was .03 ($F=4.00$, $df=4/395$, $p<.004$). In short, while empathy did not influence avoidance-based negative politeness, verbal aggressiveness showed a moderate influence on avoidance-based negative politeness. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported, and Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.

In conclusion, empathy did not show any significant relationship with any of the two types of positive politeness or negative politeness. Thus, Hypothesis 2 predicting a positive relationship between empathy and the levels of positive and negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA was rejected. Verbal aggressiveness showed statistically significant effects on both types of avoidance-based politeness (i.e., avoidance of disapproval and avoidance of imposition). However, the effect size was very small in both cases. Furthermore, approach-based positive politeness, i.e., approval, was not influenced by the speaker's verbal aggressiveness. Thus, Hypothesis 3, that predicted verbal aggressiveness would be negatively correlated with the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA, was only minimally supported.

The Effects of Face-Threats and Relational Variables

Test of Homogeneity of Variance. Since verbal aggressiveness had a significant effect on avoidance-based positive and negative politeness (i.e., avoidance of disapproval and avoidance of imposition), the effect was statistically removed from these dependent variables by using residuals from the regression of them on verbal aggressiveness instead of original scores for further analysis. However, because no personality variable had any significant influence on approach-based positive politeness (i.e., approval), original scores were used for this particular variable. The effect of empathy was not removed from any dependent variable since this personality variable did not have any statistically significant influence on the dependent variables.

Table 25. Means and SDs for Approach-Based Positive Politeness

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 1.64 SD= 1.94	M= 6.60 SD= 7.24	M= 6.04 SD= 6.72	M= 4.20 SD= 6.74	M=4.62 SD=6.27
			H Low	M= 1.71 SD= 1.58	M= 5.96 SD= 6.40	M= 6.42 SD= 6.39	M= 2.58 SD= 4.75	M=4.25 SD=5.55
	Distant	Power	Equal	M= .32 SD= .90	M= 5.16 SD= 3.60	M= 1.96 SD= 2.96	M= 1.40 SD= 2.92	M=2.21 SD=3.29
			H Low	M= .32 SD= .90	M= 5.52 SD= 6.26	M= 2.00 SD= 2.72	M= 1.68 SD= 4.11	M=2.38 SD=4.40
				M= .99 SD= 1.54	M= 5.81 SD= 5.97	M= 4.21 SD= 5.39	M= 2.46 SD= 4.89	M=3.39 SD=5.10

Table 26. Means and SDs for Avoidance-Based Positive Politeness *

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M= 1.17 SD= 4.45	M= 4.56 SD= 5.03	M= .96 SD= 4.13	M= 4.61 SD= 4.92	M=2.83 SD=4.91
			High Low	M=-2.18 SD= 1.25	M= 1.81 SD= 3.47	M=-1.04 SD= 1.92	M= 2.45 SD= 3.69	M= .27 SD=3.34
	Distant	Power	Equal	M=-2.13 SD= 1.30	M= .38 SD= 3.60	M=-2.02 SD= 1.28	M= 1.83 SD= 3.85	M=-.49 SD=3.22
			High Low	M=-3.27 SD= 1.05	M=-2.31 SD= 2.18	M=-3.47 SD= .57	M=-1.31 SD= 2.53	M=-2.59 SD=1.95
				M=-1.60 SD= 2.95	M= 1.12 SD= 4.42	M=-1.39 SD= 2.85	M= 1.89 SD= 4.35	M= .00 SD=4.00

* Scores are residuals from the regression of avoidance of disapproval on verbal aggressiveness

Table 27. Means and SDs for Avoidance-Based Negative Politeness *

N = 400 (n = 25 for each cell)

				Negative Threat				
				Low		High		
				Positive threat		Positive threat		
				Low	High	Low	High	
Distance	Close	Power	Equal	M=-2.26 SD= 4.65	M=-3.42 SD= 1.71	M= 2.46 SD= 3.68	M= .90 SD= 3.50	M=-.58 SD=4.22
			High Low	M=-2.30 SD= 4.25	M=-3.18 SD= 1.54	M= 1.35 SD= 4.00	M= 1.58 SD= 5.58	M=-.65 SD=4.55
	Distant	Power	Equal	M=-1.06 SD= 4.46	M=-1.45 SD= 1.28	M= 3.99 SD= 2.93	M= 2.62 SD= 4.65	M=1.02 SD=4.25
			High Low	M=-2.57 SD= 4.63	M=-2.12 SD= 1.07	M= 3.28 SD= 4.27	M= 2.59 SD= 3.72	M= .29 SD=4.51
				M=-2.05 SD= 4.47	M=-2.55 SD= 1.61	M= 2.76 SD= 3.83	M= 1.92 SD= 4.42	M= .00 SD=4.42

* Scores are residuals from the regression of avoidance of imposition on verbal aggressiveness

In order to examine the effects of face-threats and relational variables on approach-based and avoidance-based positive and avoidance-based negative politeness, four-way ANOVAs were conducted on the resultant 16 cells obtained when crossing 2 levels of positive face-threat, 2 levels of negative politeness, 2 levels of relational distance, and 2 levels of power disparity. Descriptive statistics for approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness and avoidance-based negative politeness are presented in Tables 25, 26, and 27, respectively.

Tests for homogeneity of variance showed that the variances of the sixteen conditions were not homogeneous for all three dependent variables. Cochran's C was .15 ($p<.001$) for approach-based positive politeness, .16 ($p<.001$) for avoidance-based positive politeness, and .14 ($p<.004$) for avoidance-based negative politeness; Bartlett-Box F was 15.85 ($p<.001$) for approach-based positive politeness, 14.48 ($p<.001$) for avoidance-based positive politeness, and 8.87 ($p<.001$) for avoidance-based negative politeness. These results indicate that the data for both positive and negative politeness violated the homogeneity of variance assumption of ANOVA. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance for ordinal scales was used as a main technique to analyze the effects of face-threats and the relational variables on politeness.

It was hypothesized that positive face-threat will increase the level of positive politeness and negative face-threat will increase the level of negative politeness manifested in performing the FTA (Hypothesis 1). It was also hypothesized that as the power the hearer has over the actor increases the level of both positive and negative

politeness will increase (Hypothesis 4). As for the influence of social distance, it was hypothesized that as the social distance increases the level of positive politeness will decrease and the level of negative politeness will increase.

Approach-Based Positive Politeness. A series of Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance yielded a significant effect of relational distance (chi-square=9.40, df=1, p<.003) and positive face-threat (chi-square=3.92, df=1, p<.048) on approach-based positive politeness. Specifically, subjects tended to give more approval when the hearer was more intimate to them (mean rank=216.39) than when the hearer was less intimate to them (mean rank=184.61) and when the act they were performing carried more positive face-threat (mean rank=210.35) than when the act carried less positive face-threat (mean rank=190.65). The effects of negative face-threat (chi-square=1.30, df=1, p<.258) and power disparity (chi-square=.025, df=1, p<.875) on approach-based positive politeness were statistically insignificant.

Since ANOVA is relatively robust to the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance, a four-way analysis of variance was performed for approach-based positive politeness. The four-way ANOVA for approach-based positive politeness yielded significant main effects of relational distance (F=20.10, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.04) and positive face-threat (F=10.80, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.02). In other words, people tend to give more approval to those who are closer to them (M=4.44, SD=5.91) than those who are more distant (M=2.34, SD=3.86) or when positive face-threat is higher (M=4.16, SD=5.70) than when positive face-threat is lower (M=2.62, SD=4.29). The main effects of negative face-threat (F=.02, df=1/384, p<.890) and power disparity

(F=.06, df=1/384, p<.814) on approach-based positive politeness were insignificant. These results are very consistent with the results from the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance for approach-based positive politeness.

One unexpected two-way interaction did occur; that is, the interaction between positive face-threat and negative face-threat was significant (F=48.61, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.10). In other words, the effect of positive face-threat on approval varied depending on the level of negative face-threat. Specifically, when negative face-threat was low, approval was higher when positive face-threat was high (M=5.81, SD=5.97) than when positive face-threat was low (M=.99, SD=1.54); when negative face-threat was high, approval was higher when positive face-threat was low (M=4.21, SD=5.39) than when positive face-threat was high (M=2.46, SD=4.89).

The effect of positive face-threat on approval was consistent with the predictions of the present model when negative face-threat was low, that is, when subjects did not need to ask a big favor of the hearers (when performing "negative evaluation" or "asking opinion"). Specifically, subjects tended to give more positive comments on the hearer's work when they needed to criticize the work (i.e., when performing "negative evaluation") than when they did not need to criticize the work (i.e., when performing "asking opinion"). This seems to be due to the fact that the behavior of subjects was guided mainly by the motivation to be polite. Other than this politeness goal, they did not seem to have any particular goal.

However, inconsistent with the predictions of the present model, when negative face-threat was high, that is, when subjects wanted to

ask a big favor of hearers (i.e., when performing "request of re-writing" or "request of taking another's responsibility"), they tended to give many more compliments to the hearers when hearers did not do anything wrong (i.e., when performing "request of taking another's responsibility") than when hearers did something wrong (i.e., when performing "request of re-writing"). Specifically, subjects tended to emphasize that the hearer had abilities to do a good job or that the hearer performed very well with his/her earlier job when they do not have to criticize the hearer's performances. However, when they needed to criticize the hearer and ask a big favor of the hearer at the same time, they did not use a lot of positive comments. Such a result might stem from subjects being guided by the motivation to achieve their request goal as well as the motivation to be polite. Subjects might have thought that when the hearer did not do anything wrong, encouraging the hearer to accept their request by approving the hearer was a better way to achieve their request goal, while when the hearer made some obvious mistakes, obligating the hearer to correct the mistake by not approving the hearer very highly was a better way to achieve their request goal. Other interactions were not statistically significant.

In short, the results supported Hypothesis 1 that predicted positive face-threat will increase the level of positive politeness and Hypothesis 5 predicting that as the social distance between actors increases the level of positive politeness will decrease. However, Hypothesis 4, which predicted that as the power the hearer has over the actor increases the level of positive politeness will increase was not supported.

Avoidance-Based Positive Politeness. A series of Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance yielded significant effects of relational distance (chi-square=63.68, df=1, p<.001), power disparity (chi-square=31.91, df=1, p<.001), and positive face-threat (chi-square=53.72, df=1, p<.001) on avoidance-based positive politeness. Subjects made more effort to avoid disapproving of the hearer when the hearer was more intimate to them (mean rank=246.62) than when the hearer was less intimate to them (mean rank=154.38), when the hearer had more power over them (mean rank=233.15) then when the hearer had less power (mean rank=167.85), and when the act they were performing carried more threat to the hearer's desire to be approved (mean rank=242.86) than when the act carried less threat to the hearer's desire to be approved (mean rank=158.14). The effect of negative face-threat (chi-square=2.13, df=1, p<.144) was statistically insignificant.

A four-way ANOVA (for interval variables) for avoidance-based positive politeness showed significant main effects of relational distance (F=94.50, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.15), power disparity (F=53.95, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.08), and positive face-threat (F=89.05, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.14) and an insignificant effect of negative face-threat (F=2.38, df=1/384, p<.123). Specifically speaking, the speaker tended to employ more avoidance-based positive politeness when the relational distance was low (M=1.55, SD=4.38) than when the relational distance was high (M=-1.54, SD=2.86), when the hearer's power was high (M=1.17, SD=4.46) than when the hearer's power was low (M=-1.16, SD=3.08), and when positive face-threat was high (M=1.50, SD=4.39) than when positive face-threat was low (M=-1.49,

SD=2.89). The level of avoidance-based positive politeness did not vary as a function of negative face-threat. In other words, Brown and Levinson's claim that people use positive politeness to mitigate negative face-threat was not supported. These results from the four-way ANOVA were very consistent with the results from Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. No interaction effect was statistically significant.

In short, the results supported Hypothesis 1 that predicted as positive face-threat increases the level of positive politeness will increase and Hypothesis 5 predicting that as the social distance between actors increases the level of positive politeness will decrease. In addition, different from approach-based positive politeness, avoidance-based positive politeness was influenced by power disparity. Thus, Hypothesis 4, which predicted that as the power the hearer has over the actor increases the level of positive politeness will increase, was supported.

Negative Politeness. A series of Kruskal-Wallis one-way analyses of variance showed significant effects of relational distance (chi-square=9.58, df=1, $p<.002$) and negative face-threat (chi-square=130.35, df=1, $p<.001$). Specifically, subjects made more effort to avoid imposing on the hearer when the hearer was less intimate to them (mean rank=218.39) than when the hearer was more intimate to them (mean rank=182.61) and when the act they were performing carried more threat to the hearer's desire for power (mean rank=266.49) than when the act carried less threat to the hearer's desire for power (mean rank=134.51). The effects of power disparity

(chi-square=1.61, df=1, p<.204) and positive face-threat (chi-square=2.42, df=1, p<.120) were insignificant.

A four-way ANOVA for avoidance-based negative politeness yielded significant main effects of relational distance (F=11.61, df=1/384, p<.001, eta^2=.02) and negative face-threat (F=154.32, df=1/384, P<.001, eta^2=.28). In other words, actors tended to show more negative politeness to distant persons (M=.66, SD=4.39) than close persons (M=-.61, SD=4.38) and when negative face-threat is high (M=2.35, SD=4.14) than when negative face-threat is low (M=-2.30, SD=3.35). In contrast, the main effect of positive face-threat was not significant (F=3.21, df=1/384, p<.074). In other words, the level of avoidance-based negative politeness did not vary as a function of positive face-threat; that is, Brown and Levinson's claim that negative politeness is employed when positive face-threat is high was not supported. The main effect of power disparity was also statistically insignificant (F=1.16, df=1/384, p<.282). These results were the same as the results yielded by Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. All interaction effects were not statistically significant. In short, the results supported Hypothesis 1 that predicted negative face-threat will increase the level of negative politeness and Hypothesis 5 predicting that as the social distance between actors increases the level of negative politeness will increase. However, Hypothesis 4, which predicted that as the power the hearer has over the actor increases the level of negative politeness will increase, was not supported.

In sum, the results generally indicated that as the level of positive face-threat increased, the level of both approach-based

positive politeness and avoidance-based positive politeness increased and that as the level of negative face-threat increased, the level of avoidance-based politeness increased. These findings altogether supported Hypothesis 1 stating that the threat to positive face carried by an FTA will increase the level of positive politeness manifested in performing the FTA, and the threat to negative face carried by the FTA will increase the level of negative politeness manifested in performing the FTA. The results also indicated that as social distance increased, both approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness decreased and avoidance-based negative politeness increased. The findings support Hypothesis 5 predicting a negative influence of social distance on the level of positive politeness manifested in performing an FTA and a positive influence of social distance on the level of negative politeness manifested in performing the FTA. The findings concerning the influence of power disparity on positive and negative politeness is not conclusive. Power disparity influenced avoidance-based positive politeness significantly, but did not show any impact on approach-based positive politeness and avoidance-based negative politeness. Thus, Hypothesis 4 stating the power the hearer has over the actor will increase the level of positive politeness and the level of negative politeness manifested in performing an FTA was not supported.

The Effect of Gender

As Table 23 shows, gender yielded a moderate negative relationship with verbal aggression ($r=-.28$, $p<.001$) and a moderate positive relationship with empathy ($r=.18$, $p<.001$). A regression analysis of gender on verbal aggression and empathy yielded a squared multiple regression coefficient of .08 ($F=16.80$, $df=2/397$, $p<.001$). Verbal

aggression was a better predictor of gender (beta=-.26, t=-4.52, df=399, p<.001) than empathy (beta=.04, t=.65, df=399, p<.518). A one-way analysis of variance also showed that verbal aggressiveness was significantly different between different genders (F=33.23, df=1/398, p<.001, eta^2=.08). Males (M=40.53, SD=12.46) were more verbally aggressive than females (M=33.33, SD=12.01).

A one-way ANOVA for positive politeness showed that males and females were not different in approach-based positive politeness (F=.018, df=1/398, p<.894). The effects of gender on avoidance-based positive politeness (F=3.62, df=1/398, p<.058) and on avoidance-based negative politeness (F=3.75, df=1/398, p<.053) were very close to the level of being statistically significant. However, since verbal aggressiveness was not equivalently distributed between different genders, a one-way analysis of covariance eliminating the effect of verbal aggression was performed for positive politeness. The results showed that gender was not a significant predictor of avoidance-based positive politeness (F=1.02, df=1/397, p<.312) or avoidance-based negative politeness (F=1.48, df=1/397, p<.225) any more. These findings concerning gender were highly consistent with the findings of Experiment 1. In short, gender was not a very good predictor of politeness, and most of its effect on politeness could be accounted for by verbal aggressiveness.

DISCUSSION

One of the major findings of this experiment is that people want to save or promote both positive and negative face of their hearers. In other words, speakers employ both positive and negative politeness

in the same message although the degrees of positive and negative politeness are contingent on the relational variables and the levels of face-threats. This finding supports one of the main claims of the present model and indicates that Brown and Levinson's model, which conceptualizes positive and negative politeness as mutually exclusive strategies, has a crucial limitation in explaining politeness phenomena.

Another significant finding of this experiment is that positive politeness is not a unidimensional but bidimensional construct. Specifically, approach-based positive politeness (or approval) and avoidance-based positive politeness (or avoidance of disapproval) form different dimensions from each other. Even though the relationship between approach-based negative politeness (or deference) and avoidance-based negative politeness (avoidance of imposition) was not examined, there is a high probability that these two types of negative politeness will represent two different dimensions. Brown and Levinson conceptualize politeness as a bidimensional construct; however, the findings from this experiment indicate that politeness is at least a three-dimensional, and possibly four-dimensional, construct.

In chapter one, while critiquing Brown and Levinson's conceptualization of politeness strategies that positive politeness is an approach-based and negative politeness is an avoidance-based strategy, the present model argues that both positive and negative politeness can be either approach-based or avoidance-based, proposing four different types of politeness. However, the present model did not predict that these four types of politeness would form separate

dimensions. Thus, some minor changes in the present model seem to be needed to accommodate these findings.

This experiment mostly confirmed the politeness model proposed in Chapter 1. First, as predicted by the model, the relational distance between a speaker and a hearer was a good predictor of approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness and negative politeness. Speakers show more approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness and less negative politeness to persons who are closer to them. This finding is consistent with the prediction made by the present model and inconsistent with Brown and Levinson's prediction. Brown and Levinson predict that speakers will show less positive politeness to those who are closer to them, which is exactly opposite to what this experiment found.

Second, the level of positive face-threat was a good indicator of the level of positive politeness and the level of negative face-threat was a good indicator of negative politeness. For both approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness, as positive face-threat increased, positive politeness increased; for avoidance-based negative politeness, as negative face-threat increased, negative politeness increased. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the present model and inconsistent with Brown and Levinson's model. Brown and Levinson predict that regardless of the type of face-threat, as face-threat increases, the level of negative politeness increases; as face-threat decreases, the level of positive politeness increases. Thus, according to Brown and Levinson, high positive face-threat can be mitigated by negative politeness and low negative face-threat can be mitigated by positive politeness. However, this experiment revealed

that in a normal situation, only positive face-threat affected the level of positive politeness and only negative face-threat influenced the level of negative politeness.

This study found that when negative face-threat was high (i.e., when asking a big favor) subjects used more approach-based positive politeness (i.e., approval) when positive face-threat was low (i.e., when no criticism is intended) than when positive face-threat was high (i.e., when criticism is intended). In other words, when subjects wanted to ask a big favor of a hearer, they approved the hearer more when they did not need to criticize the hearer than when they needed to criticize the hearer. As discussed earlier, one possible explanation for this finding is that when people want to ask others to do them a big favor their behavior is guided by the motivation to achieve their request goal in addition to the obligation to be polite. One strategy people often use when they need to gain compliance of others is the "liking principle" (Cialdini, 1988) that expresses their approval of the receivers.

In the high negative-face condition (i.e., when asking a big favor), the subjects' behavior was guided by a compliance-gaining goal; and in order to increase the probability to gain compliance, the subjects may have been motivated to utilize this liking principle. However, when the subjects needed to criticize a hearer (i.e., when positive face-threat was high) as well as gain compliance of the hearer, they could not use the liking principle very often, since their intention to criticize the hearer could not be clearly expressed if they used the liking principle excessively. Consequently, the subject who needed to criticize the hearer used the liking principle (i.e.,

expressed approval) less frequently than the subject who did not have to criticize the hearer. In other words, when compliance-gaining is the primary goal, subjects used more approach-based positive politeness (i.e., liking) when positive face-threat was low than when positive face-threat was high.

This finding that subjects showed a high degree of approval (i.e., approach-based positive politeness) when negative face-threat was high and positive face-threat was low is inconsistent with Brown and Levinson's prediction. Brown and Levinson predict that speakers would use more approval when negative face-threat is lower (i.e., when making a relative small request). In contrast, this experiment found that speakers used more approval when negative face-threat was high and positive face-threat was low (i.e., asking a big favor) than when both negative and positive face-threats were low (i.e., asking opinions).

The results concerning the effect of power disparity are not conclusive. Power disparity was a good predictor of only avoidance-based positive politeness. Speakers made more effort to avoid disapproving of hearers with more relational power. However, power disparity was not a good indicator of approach-based positive politeness and avoidance-based negative politeness. One possible explanation for these results is that power disparity was not manipulated well. In this experiment, power disparity was manipulated by describing both the speaker and the hearer as students taking the same course (the equal power condition) or by describing the speaker as a undergraduate teacher's assistant of a class and the hearer as a student taking the class (the hearer low condition). Although there was a statistically significant difference in perceived power disparity

between these two conditions, it might not have been enough to make the speaker to change their politeness behavior.

Another possible explanation is that power differences in this country are not a deciding factor for people's language use any more. Brown and Gilman (1960) argue that power disparity once was a powerful factor underlying people's use of language. However, as the egalitarian ideology expanded, power disparity began to lose its influence and relational distance became a more powerful factor. Thus, power disparity may not be a powerful predictor of people's language use in a highly egalitarian society such as the United States. In other words, in this country, speakers do not tend to be concerned about the power disparity unless the disparity is too huge to be ignored. Given this, the power disparity between a student and an undergraduate teacher's assistant was not large enough to make subjects take the disparity into consideration when they generated messages.

Consistent with Experiment 1, the effect of empathy on politeness and the effect of verbal aggressiveness on approach-based positive politeness were insignificant. Verbal aggressiveness, however, showed significant effects on both avoidance-based politeness, i.e., avoidance of disapproval and avoidance of imposition. In other words, verbal aggressiveness seems to decrease the level of effort to avoid threatening hearers' positive and negative face, while it did not influence use of approach-based tactics such as approval and deference.

Also consistent with Experiment 1, the effect of gender on positive and negative politeness was trivial. While gender did not influence use of approach-based positive politeness in performing an FTA, it showed a marginally significant effect on avoidance-based

positive and negative politeness. However, as argued in Chapter 1, this effect could be well accounted for by the actor's verbal aggressiveness. After removing the differences in verbal aggressiveness from differences in gender, gender did not have any significant influence on politeness.

In summary, this experiment found that people employed both positive and negative politeness in the same message. Approach-based positive politeness showed a positive relationship with positive face-threat and a negative relationship with relational distance. Avoidance-based positive politeness revealed positive relationships with positive face-threat and power disparity and negative relationships with relational distance and verbal aggressiveness. Avoidance-based negative politeness had positive relationships with negative face-threat and relational distance and a negative relationship with verbal aggressiveness.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT CODING SYSTEM

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

To date, several researchers (e.g., Clark & Schunk, 1980; Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Francik & Clark, 1985; Gibbs, 1981, 1986; House & Kasper, 1981; Kempter & Thissen, 1981) have proposed content coding systems for politeness. However, none of these coding systems are comprehensive enough to code politeness behavior manifested in various social interactions (Baxter, 1984; Craig et al., 1986; Shimanoff, 1977). Two major reasons exist for this absence of a comprehensive categorical coding scheme. First, no theoretical framework conceptualizing politeness adequately has guided the development of past coding systems. In order to develop an adequate coding system for a certain construct, the construct should be defined properly. To date, however, most researchers defined politeness as "indirectness of imposition," which is only a part of negative politeness, missing many other important aspects of politeness such as approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness and approach-based negative politeness. Thus, the existing coding systems include only those linguistic devices that express certain degrees of "indirectness of imposition."

Second, most researchers based their coding scheme on the observation of one homogeneous group's (usually, college students) performance of a single act (typically, simple request such as asking a piece of information). Different social groups may have different

repertoires of politeness expressions and different types of acts might be expressed in different sets of politeness devices. Thus, a coding system composed of politeness devices identified from the observation of one group/act would not be applied to a study of another group/act. In short, to generate a comprehensive coding scheme, many different types of acts performed by various social groups should be observed.

Since the present model provides a comprehensive definition of politeness, the first problem discussed above (i.e., lack of proper definition of politeness) can be easily resolved. However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the second problem (i.e., lack of observations of multiple acts performed by multiple groups) in a few studies, because it requires a series of observations to examine politeness devices employed by different social groups in performing different types of acts. The most practical solution for this problem might be accumulating single studies that identify politeness devices used by a few groups in performing a few acts and generate a content coding system for the given data, and then developing a more general content coding system by synthesizing these linguistic devices identified in different studies.

Given this, the purpose of this chapter is to conduct a study that will become a building block for developing a general content coding system for politeness. Specifically, this chapter will identify politeness devices that are used by the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 in performing five different acts (i.e., greeting-and-parting, asking opinions of others, negative evaluation, request of re-writing, and request of taking over another's responsibility) and examine the

degree to which each device represents the relevant dimension of politeness.

Review of Literature

As mentioned earlier, none of the existing content coding systems for politeness include those linguistic devices that vary in positive politeness or approach-based negative politeness; all of these coding systems focus on a single dimension of negative politeness, namely, avoidance-based negative politeness. Furthermore, these coding systems do not cover all aspects of avoidance-based negative politeness; they are concerned with only one aspect of avoidance-based negative politeness, that is, "avoidance of imposition" and ignore the other aspect of avoidance-based negative politeness, that is, "hesitance of imposition."

Of these coding systems for "avoidance of imposition," perhaps the most systematic one is a six-category coding system proposed by Ervin-Tripp (1977). When listed from the most imposing (i.e., the least polite) to the least imposing (i.e., the most polite) form, the categories are (1) personal need or desire statement (i.e., stating what the speaker needs; e.g., I need a match), (2) imperatives (i.e., direct order; e.g., Give me a match), (3) imbedded imperatives (i.e., question-asking with desired acts specified; e.g., Can you give me a match?), (4) permission directives (i.e., asking permission; e.g., May I have a match?), (5) question directives (i.e., question-asking with desired acts omitted; e.g., Have you got a match?), and (6) hints (i.e., requiring inferences; e.g., The matches are all gone).

Clark and Schunk (1980) elaborate on Ervin-Tripp's "imbedded imperatives" and subdivide this category into (1) obligation (i.e.,

reminding the hearers of the obligation to grant the request; e.g., Shouldn't you give me a match?), (2) commitment (i.e., asking the hearers whether or not they will commit themselves to granting the request; e.g., Will you tell me...?), (3) memory (asking the hearers whether or not they can remember whether the speaker asked them earlier for the object of the request; e.g., Have I already asked you...?), (4) ability (giving the hearer the opportunity to deny the questioned ability; e.g., Can you tell me...?), and (5) imposition (admitting that the speaker is imposing on the hearer e.g., Would you mind...?).

"Personal need statement" is primarily directed downward to subordinates and "imperative" is usually directed to subordinates or familiar equals. "Ability" statements allow the hearers to avoid the embarrassment of being asked a request they could not comply with, while "imposition" statements offer the hearer the authority to say that the request imposes too much. A "question directive" is not in the form of a request; rather, it is often identical with an information question and misunderstanding is possible. A hint is employed when the speakers can rely on shared rules in structured situations in offices and classroooms, and on shared understanding of habits and motives in living groups and families.

In short, the literature on politeness shows that there are ten distinct linguistic devices that vary in the degree of "indirectness of imposition." However, the literature on politeness does not provide any categorical coding scheme for other dimensions of politeness. In order to develop content coding systems for various dimensions of politeness, this chapter will design a study that identifies linguistic devices that vary in approach-based and avoidance-based positive and

negative politeness and examines the extent to which these devices represent the given dimension of politeness.

As argued in Chapter 1, approach-based positive, avoidance-based positive, and avoidance-based negative politeness are each measured by two different criteria and approach-based negative politeness is measured by a single criterion. Specifically, the level of approach-based positive politeness is determined by (1) confidence of approval and (2) exaggeratedness of approval; the degree of avoidance-based positive politeness is decided by (3) tentativeness of disapproval and (4) understatedness of disapproval; the level of approach-based negative politeness is decided by (5) the degree of deference expressed in the use of address terms; and the level of avoidance-based negative politeness is determined by (6) hesitance of imposition and (7) indirectness of imposition. Thus, this study will identify a set of politeness devices for each of these seven criteria and examine the extent to which these devices satisfy each criterion.

METHODS

Coders read messages generated by participants in Experiments 1 and 2 and identified unique linguistic devices that expressed varying degrees of the given politeness criteria. Through a collapsing process, a set of politeness devices was generated for each of the seven criteria of politeness. A group of judges rated the extent to which each device satisfied the given criterion.

Sample Utterances

Messages analyzed in this study were 100 greeting-and-parting scripts generated by participants in Experiment 1 and 400 utterances

generated by participants in Experiment 2. Included in the 400 utterances generated in Experiment 2 were 100 utterances asking opinions of others, 100 negative evaluations, 100 requests of re-writing, and 100 requests of taking over another's responsibility.

Identification of Unique Politeness Devices

For each of the seven criteria of politeness (i.e., confidence of approval, exaggeratedness of approval, tentativeness of disapproval, understatedness of disapproval, deference shown in the use of address terms; hesistance of imposition, and indirectness of imposition), three coders independently identified all politeness devices that more or less satisfied the given politeness criterion, and made a list of unique politeness expressions for the criterion by eliminating all duplicates. Three different lists of unique expressions made by three coders were combined; and again, duplicates were eliminated, which generated a list of politeness devices for each of the seven criteria of politeness. Then, the coders together read the list of devices for each criterion and collapsed similar devices into broader categories. When collapsing categories, coders used a very strict categorization process in which only very similar politeness devices were collapsed into broader categories and no collapsing was done when coders failed to reach a consensus. Through these procedures, a set of unique linguistic devices for each of the seven politeness criteria were generated.

Rating of Politeness

Judges employed in this study were 110 volunteers from several undergraduate courses at a large Midwestern university. The participants received extra credit points for participating in the

experiment. For each criteria of politeness, judges were asked to read the list of linguistic devices and rate the degrees to which the devices satisfy the criteria on a 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10. The lower extreme on this scale (i.e., 0) denotated that the device did not satisfy the criteria at all, whereas the higher extreme (i.e., 10) signified that the device satisfied the criteria very highly.

RESULTS

Confidence of Approval

Six categories of politeness devices emerged for "confidence of approval" as presented in Table 28. When listed from the most confident to the least confident approval, these categories were (1) absolute confidence, (2) realization, (3) belief, (4) inference, (5) supposition, and (6) appearance. Linguistic devices categorized into "Absolute confidence" (e.g., It is evident...) showed an extremely high degree of confidence, not allowing any chance that what was said might be wrong. Devices in "realization" (e.g., I realize) expressed that the speakers recently got to know what they were saying. A "belief" statement specified that what the speaker thought was generally true. While an "inference" statement implied that what was said was one's personal judgment, a "supposition" implied what was said was simply a guess. Devices in the "appearance" category expressed what was said was based on a superficial observation.

Judges' ratings for the six categories in this category system revealed that the categories varied widely in the degrees to which they manifested confidence of approval. The category "absolute confidence," which was rated the most confident, was very close to the upper limit

of the scale (i.e., "10"); the category "appearance," which was judged the least confident, was not very far from the lower limit of the scale (i.e., "0"). This category system also showed fine gradations of the means of the categories, implying people can make fine distinctions in confidence of approval based on linguistic devices. Except for "absolute confidence," the difference between any two neighboring means was approximately 1.

Exaggeration of Approval

Eleven different categories were obtained for "exaggeration of approval" as shown in Table 29. When listed from the most exaggerating to the least exaggerating form, these categories were (1) fantastic, (2) exceptional, (3) outstanding, (4) lovable (e.g., I love it), (5) excellent, (6) great, (7) good, (8) impressive, (9) fine, (10) likable (e.g., I like it), and (11) okay.

Most linguistic devices showing more or less exaggeration of approval were adjectives modifying the nouns or pronouns that represented the hearer's performance or possession. Judges' ratings of exaggeration of approval revealed that these categories were not evenly distributed. Except for the category "okay," all categories were rated higher than 5 (i.e., the midpoint of the scale). In addition, the means of the first six categories from the highest exaggeratedness of approval (i.e., fantastic, exceptional, outstanding, lovable, excellent, and great) did not vary a lot. These results suggest that persons have few linguistic means of expressing mild levels of approval; consequently, the use of "okay" seems to be a clear marker of barely acceptable approval.

Table 28. Content Coding Scheme for Confidence of Approval

Mean/SD	Category	Examples
8.87/0.14	1) Absolute Confidence	It is evidence I know It is clear I am sure I have faith/confidence
6.12/2.41	2) Realization	I (can) see I realize
5.45/2.64	3) Belief	I trust I believe I can tell
4.23/3.71	4) Inference	I think I find I notice I feel
3.11/2.04	5) Supposition	I suppose I guess
2.03/2.26	6) Appearance	It seems/looks/sounds It seems/looks/sounds like It seems/looks/sounds as though

Table 29. Content Coding Scheme for Exaggeratedness of Approval

Mean/SD	Category	Examples
9.45/0.56	1) Fantastic	It is fantastic
9.33/1.01	2) Exceptional	It is exceptional
9.12/1.79	3) Outstanding	It is outstanding
8.72/3.01	4) Lovable	I love it
8.45/2.06	5) Excellent	It is excellent It is the best
8.12/2.45	6) Great	It is great
6.86/2.23	7) Good	It is good It is done well
6.23/6.23	8) Impressive	I am impressed by It is impressive
5.32/2.14	9) Fine	It is fine It is better It is clear It is interesting
5.27/4.40	10) Likable	I like it
3.32/2.74	11) Okay	It is okay

Tentativeness of Disapproval

The collapsing process for the devices in "tentativeness of disapproval" yielded ten different categories presented in Table 30. When listed in the decreasing order of tentativeness of disapproval, these categories were (1) probability, (2) appearance, (3) understanding, (4) supposition, (5) apology, (6) inference, (7) retreat, (8) clarification, (9) no offense, and (10) face defense. A "probability" device implied that what was said has a chance to be true. An "understanding" statement expressed that the speaker understood why the hearer did not perform very well. An "apology" showed that the speakers were regretful about their criticism of the hearer, while a "retreat" admitted that the speakers were too critical. With a "clarification," a speaker specified which part of the hearer's performance they did not want to criticize. A "no offense" device expressed the speaker's hope that the hearer would not be offended by the criticism, and a "face defense" implied that the speaker was not an undesirable person. As in the category system for "confidence of approval," devices in "appearance" expressed what was said was based on a superficial observation; a "supposition" implied what was said was not based on facts; and an "inference" statement implied that what was said was a personal judgment.

Judges' ratings revealed that the ten categories varied widely in the degrees to which they manifested tentativeness of disapproval. The category "probability" was rated extremely tentative (M=9.42, SD=3.04) and the category "face defense" was judged very low in tentativeness (M=1.72, SD=2.12). In addition, the ten categories were distributed relatively evenly over the continuum of tentativeness of disapproval,

implying that persons can use linguistic devices to state fairly exactly their tentativeness of disapproval. Roughly, three different types of linguistic devices appeared in this category: hedges (i.e., devices implying that what is said is true only in certain respects such as devices in the category "probability"), disclaimers (i.e., devices implying that the speaker does not have an intention to harm the hearer such as the categories "retreat," "clarification," "no offense," and "face defense"), and subject + verbs (such as devices in "appearance," "supposition," and "inference"). Among these three types of devices, hedges were rated the most tentative and disclaimers were rated the least tentative. It appeared that hedges were rated more tentative because they implied the disapproval might not be true and that disclaimers were rated less tentative since they were employed to indicate that disapproval was coming up.

Understatedness of Disapproval

Seven categories of linguistic devices emerged for the criterion of "understatedness of disapproval" as shown in Table 31. When listed from the most understated to the least understated, the categories were (1) off-topic, (2) not good enough, (3) unsteady, (4) not good, (5) irrelevant, (6) not right, and (7) poor. Devices in the "off-topic" category expressed what the hearer had done was different from what the speaker had in mind. The "not good enough" category showed that what the hearer had done might or might not be good but that it was not good enough for the standard the speaker had in mind. Devices in the "unsteady" category implied that the hearer's work showed some inconsistency in it, while the "not good" category expressed the hearer's performance was not good in an absolute sense. An

Table 30. Content Coding Scheme for Tentativeness of Disapproval

Mean/SD	Category	Examples
9.42/3.04	1) Probability	maybe perhaps might/may possibly/by chance
8.13/1.94	2) Appearance	It seems/looks/sounds It seems/looks/sounds like It seems/looks/sounds as though
7.65/3.12	3) Understanding	I know you have been busy with other things
6.55/2.99	4) Supposition	I suppose I guess
5.33/3.99	5) Apology	I am sorry to say this
3.12/2.04	6) Inference	I think I feel I find I notice
3.04/3.03	7) Retreat	Maybe I am too critical
2.50/3.78	8) Clarification	I am not saying you are a bad writer
1.91/2.54	9) No offense	I hope you don't take offense at this
1.72/2.12	10) Face Defense	I don't want to sound like a real jerk

Table 31. Content Coding Scheme for Understatedness of Disapproval

Mean/SD	Category	Examples
7.12/5.34	1) Off-Topic	It is not what we need It is not what we had in mind It is not what the teacher wants
5.78/6.04	2) Not good enough	It is not good enough It is not strong enough It is not sufficient enough
5.12/5.17	3) Unsteady	It is shaky It is off-base
3.12/4.26	4) Not good	It is not clear It is not good It is not convincing It is not strong It is not well-researched
1.85/1.64	5) Irrelevant	It is irrelevant to ... It is unsupportive of ...
1.23/0.53	6) Not right	It is not done right It is not addressed right
0.12/0.14	7) Poor	It is poor It is of poor quality

"irrelevant" device showed that a part or all of the hearer's work is irrelevant to the hearer's goal. A "not right" statement implied that the hearer did the assignment wrong, while a "poor" statement bluntly expressed that the quality of the hearer's performance was poor.

Judges' ratings of understatedness of disapproval showed that these categories were not evenly distributed over the continuum of understatedness of disapproval. The means of the categories ranged from 0.12 to 7.12. In other words, the category system did not include any category that showed a very high degree of understatedness, implying it is very difficult to truly understate one's disapproval. Generally speaking, devices stating that the hearer's performance or possession was not desirable (e.g., It is not good) were rated more understated than devices saying that the hearer's performance or possession was undesirable (e.g., It is poor). This finding seems to be due to the fact that saying something is not good allows for it being not bad, either.

Hesitance of Imposition

As can be seen in Table 32, nine categories of devices were obtained for "hesitance of imposition." When listed in decreasing order of hesitance of imposition, these categories were (1) uncertainty, (2) probability, (3) appearance, (4) empathy, (5) supposition, (6) favor, (7) willingness, (8) inference, and (9) awareness. An "uncertainty" statement showed that the speakers were uncertain about the hearer's willingness or ability to do what they would ask the hearer to do. An "empathy" statement showed that the speaker knew the feelings of the hearer. With a "favor" statement, the speakers indicated they would ask a favor of the hearer. A

Table 32. Content Coding Scheme for Hesitance of Imposition

Mean/SD	Category	Examples
8.89/3.71	1) Uncertainty	I wonder I was wondering I was curious
8.58/3.43	2) Probability	maybe perhaps might/may possibly/by chance
7.98/2.98	3) Appearance	It seems/looks/sounds It seems/looks/sounds like It seems/looks/sounds as though
6.38/4.44	4) Empathy	I know it's asking a lot I know this may be inconvenient I know this will take a great part of your time You may be mad and feel it's a lot of work
6.12/3.14	5) Supposition	I suppose I guess
5.92/2.89	6) Favor	I have a real important/big favor to ask of you
3.81/4.02	7) Willingness	take/have time to do ... try to do ... consider doing ... be willing to do ... be interested in doing ...
3.12/2.04	8) Inference	I think I feel I find I notice
2.77/3.75	9) Awareness	Do you know that we need to re-do John's part

Table 33. Content Coding Scheme for Indirectness of Imposition

Mean/SD	Category		Examples
9.34/0.14	1)	Hint	If you would like, I am more than happy to help
9.03/1.08	2)	Possibility	Is there any way/possibility you can/could do ...?
8.87/2.19	3)	Permission Directives	Can I ask you to do ...? Could I ask you to do ...? May I ask you to do...?
8.12/3.19	4)	Imposition	Would/do you mind doing ...? Would it be too much to ask you ...?
7.78/2.33	5)	Ability/ Commitment + please	Could you please do ...? Would you please do ...?
6.78/2.36	6)	Self-Assessment	Do you think you can do ...? Do you think you could/would do ...?
6.23/5.03	7)	Leading Hesitance	Perhaps/maybe/I guess you can do ... Perhaps/maybe/I guess you could do .
5.78/2.19	8)	Wish	I hope/wish you can do ... I hope/wish you could/would do ...
5.34/4.27	9)	Conditional	If you could/would do ..., I will appreciate it If you could/would do ..., it will give you a better grade.
4.98/2.50	10)	Ability	Can you do ...? Could you do ...?
4.48/3.09	11)	Commitment	Will you do ...? Would you do ...? Would you like to do ...?
4.12/2.76	12)	Please + Imperatives	Please do ...

Table 33 (Cont'd)

2.33/2.00	13)	Suggestion	I suggest that you do ... It would be a good idea to do ... I would like ask/invite you to do .. Why don't you do ...?
1.21/1.69	14)	Imperatives	Do it
0.99/1.27	15)	Need Statement	I need/would like/want you to do .
0.87/0.14	16)	Obligation	You should/have to/go it over You need to go it over It should/has to be ... You owe it to us to do ... It's only fair if you do ...

"willingness" device asked the hearers' willingness to do what the speaker requested them to do, while an "awareness" device asked whether or not the hearers were aware of the situation which the speaker was in. The functions of the categories of "probability," "appearance," "supposition," and "inference" were the same as in "tentativeness of disapproval."

Judges' ratings revealed that these categories were distributed quite evenly on the continuum of hesitance of imposition; however, no category represented either extreme of the continuum. Except for the relatively large gap between the categories "favor" and "willingness," the means of the categories showed fine gradations. The results also indicate that people have many ways of being hesistant so as not to impose on others through inclusion of modifiers (e.g., "probability") and disclaimers (e.g., "empathy").

Indirectness of Imposition

As presented in Table 33, sixteen categories of politeness devices emerged for "indirectness of imposition." This category system

included eight out of ten categories proposed by Ervin-Tripp and Clark and Schunk (i.e., hint, permission directives, imposition, ability, commitment, imperatives, need statement, and obligation). The category of "memory" proposed by Clark and Schunk and "question directives" proposed by Ervin-Tripp were not used in any of the 100 greeting-and-parting scripts generated in Experiment 1 or the 400 utterances generated in Experiment 2.

In addition to the eight categories proposed by Ervin-Tripp and Clark and Schunk, the present study identified eight more frequently used categories: suggestions, please + imperatives, conditionals, wishes, leading hesitance, self-assessment, ability/commitment + please, and possibilties. A "suggestion" (e.g., It would be a good idea to do...) suggests or recommends the hearer to do the action desired by the speaker. It was rated more indirect than imperative and less indirect than "please + imperatives." A "please + imperative" (e.g., please do...) was rated more indirect than suggestion and less indirect than a "commitment." A "conditional" (e.g., If you could do..., I will appreciate it) states that if the hearers could/would do what the speakers want them to do, some positive outcomes will be obtained. This form of request was rated more indirect than an "ability" statement and less indirect than a "wish" statement.

A "wish" statement (e.g., I wish you can do...) simply states the speaker's wish. It was rated more indirect than a "conditional" and less indirect than a "leading hesitance." A "leading hesitance" (e.g., Perhaps you can do...) shows a certain degree of hesitance, but it tends to lead the hearers to doing what the speaker wants them to do.

It was rated more indirect than a "wish" statement and less indirect than a "self-assessment." A "self-assessment" (e.g., Do you think you can do...?) asks whether hearers think that they have abilities to do what the speaker asks them to do. It was rated more indirect than a "leading hesitance" and less indirect than an "ability/commitment + please." An "ability or commitment + please" (e.g., Could/would you please do...?) adds "please" to "ability" or "commitment." This form of request was rated more indirect than a "self-assessment" and less indirect than an "imposition." Finally, a "possibility" statement (Is there any possibility you can do...?) asks whether or not there is any chance that the hearers can do what the speaker asks them to do. It was rated more indirect than a "permission directive" and less indirect than a "hint."

When compared to other criteria of politeness, indirectedness of imposition yielded many more categories. In other words, it appeared that people had more politeness devices available when they want to impose on others indirectly than when they want to approve or disapprove of others. One reason for this finding might be that people impose on others much more frequently than they approve or disapprove of others. Thus, people have more chances to develop devices to impose on others subtlely. Judges' ratings showed that the categories in the coding system were distributed very evenly from one extreme to the other extreme of the continuum of indirectness of imposition. This coding system also showed fine gradations of the means of the categories.

Deference Shown in Use of Address Terms

In both experiments, the types of relationships analyzed were limited in number. In both Experiments 1 and 2, relational distance and power disparity had only two different levels; that is, both experiments employed four different types of relationships. Consequently, the participants in the experiments did not use a variety of address terms. Only four different types of address terms emerged in Experiment 1: Mr. + last name, Dr. + last name, Professor + last name, and first name. In Experiment 2, participants used only one type of address term, i.e., first name. Because of the limited number of different types of address terms, a categorical coding system was not developed for this particular criterion.

DISCUSSION

This study developed a categorical coding system for each of six criteria for positive and negative politeness (i.e., confidence of approval and exaggeratedness of approval for approach-based positive politeness; tentativeness of disapproval and understatedness of disapproval for avoidance-based positive politeness; and hesistance of imposition and indirectness of imposition for avoidance-based negative politeness). The category system for "confidence of approval" showed that the devices in the "absolute confidence" category (e.g., it is evident) manifested the highest degree of confidence in approval; the category system for "exaggeratedness of approval" revealed that the category of "fantastic" approved the hearer the most exaggeratedly. Thus, a combination of these devices, e.g., "It is evident that you did a fantastic job," carries the highest degree of approach-based positive

politeness. In contrast, the "appearance" category (e.g., it seems like) manifested the lowest degree of confidence of approval; the "okay" category showed the lowest degree of exaggeratedness of approval. Thus, a combination of these devices, e.g., "It seems like you did O.K.," carries the lowest degree of approach-based positive politeness.

For avoidance-based positive politeness, the category "probability" (e.g., maybe) expressed the highest degree of tentativeness of disapproval, while the category "off-topic" (e.g., it is not what we need) manifested the highest degree of understatedness of disapproval. In contrast, the category "face defense" (e.g., I don't want to sound like a real jerk) showed the lowest degree of tentativeness of disapproval, while the category "poor" manifested the lowest degree of understatedness of disapproval. Thus, a combination of the categories of "probability" and "off-topic," e.g., "Maybe it is not what we need," is much more polite than a combination of the categories of "face defense" and "poor," e.g., "I don't want to sound like a real jerk, but you did a poor job."

For avoidance-based negative politeness, "uncertainty" devices (e.g., I was wondering) expressed the highest degree of hesitance of imposition and "possibility" devices (e.g., Is there any possibility you could do it?) showed the highest degree of indirectness of imposition except for a "hint." Thus, a combination of these two types of devices, e.g., "I was wondering if there is any possibility you could do it," expresses a very high degree of avoidance-based negative politeness. The category "awareness" (e.g., Do you know that we need to rewrite the first chapter?) showed the least hesitance in

imposition; the category "obligation" (e.g., You should do it) was the most direct in imposition. Thus, a combination of these two categories, e.g., "Do you know that we need to rewrite the first chapter? You should do it," is very low in avoidance-based negative politeness.

Three categories, i.e., "appearance," "supposition," and "inference," appeared in three different coding systems, i.e., confidence of approval, tentativeness of disapproval, and hesitance of imposition. Because the category "appearance" showed the least confidence of the three categories, its mean score was the lowest of the three for confidence of approval and the highest for tentativeness of disapproval and hesitance of imposition; because the category "inference" showed the most confidence of the three categories, its mean score was the highest of the three for confidence of approval and the lowest for tentativeness of disapproval and hesitance of imposition. Consequently, "appearance" showed more intention to avoid disapproval or imposition, while "inference" expressed more approval. In other words, "appearance" was more polite when used with disapproval or imposition than "inference"; and "inference" was more polite when used with approval than "appearance."

When we compare the content coding system for exaggeration of approval (Table 29) with that for understatedness of disapproval (Table 31), it is noticeable that all categories in the coding system for understatedness of disapproval express less approval than any category in the coding system for exaggeratedness of approval. "Off-topic" (e.g., It's not what the teacher wants), which is the most approving category for understatedness of disapproval, does not show as much

approval as "okay" (e.g., It's okay), which is the least approving category for exaggeratedness of approval.

However, the fact that categories for exaggeratedness of approval show more approval does not imply that they are more polite. The devices in the category system of exaggeration of approval are employed to approve hearers when they performed their job successfully, whereas the devices in the category system of understatedness of disapproval are used to avoid disapproving of hearers when they failed to perform their job successfully. The politeness of a device in the category system of understatedness of disapproval depends on the extent to which it avoids disapproving of a hearer, whereas the politeness of a device in the category system of exaggeratedness of approval depends on the degree to which it approves a hearer. Thus, some devices in the category system of understatedness of disapproval are more polite than some devices in the category system of exaggeratedness of approval.

As mentioned earlier, the only criterion for politeness that has any existing content coding system is "indirectness of imposition." Thus, it is impossible to compare the coding systems developed by the present study with other coding systems for such criteria as "confidence of approval," "exaggeratedness of approval," "tentativeness of disapproval," "understatedness of disapproval," and "hesitance of imposition." For the criterion "indirectness of imposition," the present study generated 16 categories of linguistic devices, whereas Ervin-Tripp (1978) and Clark and Schunk (1980) together proposed 10 categories of linguistic devices. Two out of these 10 categories (i.e., "memory" of Clark and Schunk and "question directive" of Ervin-Tripp) did not emerge as unique categories and 8 unique

categories that are not included in either of Ervin-Tripp or Clark and Schunk emerged in this study.

The reason for these differences between the present study and previous studies seems to be that the acts analyzed in the present study were different from the acts analyzed by Ervin-Tripp or Clark and Schunk. Both Ervin-Tripp's and Clark and Schunk's work focused on a simple request that asks for some information or an easily obtainable object. Thus, a "memory" statement (e.g., Did I already ask you about it?) or a "question directive" (e.g., Do you gotta match) turns out to be frequently used by speakers. However, since the present study focused on requests that asked the hearers to perform certain acts, these categories were not employed at all; rather, some more active categories such as "possibility" (e.g., Is there any way you could do it?) or "self-assessment" (e.g., Do you think you can do it?) emerged as major categories.

As mentioned earlier, the content coding systems developed in this study are not exhaustive. The number of acts analyzed and the number of social groups observed in this study were limited. Different social groups might use different sets of politeness devices and the same group of people use different sets of politeness devices when they perform different types of acts. Thus, in order to make the coding systems more comprehensive, categories developed based on some other groups' (e.g., older or younger generations than college students or non-college students) performance of other important communicative acts (e.g., disagreement or apology) should be added.

Although the category systems developed here are not exhaustive, they are more comprehensive than any other category system. This study

analyzed more acts and observed more actors than any other study. Specifically, this study analyzed five different acts (i.e., greeting-and-parting, request of re-writing, request of taking over another's responsibility, negative evaluation, and asking opinions of others) performed by 500 participants. Thus, as shown in the comparison between the present study and Ervin-Tripp's and Clark and Schunk's studies, the present study proposes a much more comprehensive category system than previous studies.

In conclusion, this study showed that people used various linguistic devices to express politeness and were able to recognize the differences in the degree of politeness among these devices. Thus, it is clear that we can use category coding systems composed of linguistic devices with varying degrees of politeness to analyze politeness behavior. It is also clear that a relationship exists between linguistic devices and politeness; that how we use language determines how polite we will be judged to be.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The Present Model vs. Brown and Levinson's Model

There are five major differences between the present model and Brown and Levinson's model. First, Brown and Levinson's model accounts for only one kind of face want at a time, whereas the present model explains both positive and negative face-threats at the same time. Second, Brown and Levinson's model limits politeness to the phenomena in which speakers want to mitigate face-threat carried by face-threatening acts, while the present model claims speakers strive to be polite even when they perform non-face-threatening acts. Third, Brown and Levinson predict that regardless of the type of face-threat, speakers will employ positive politeness when face-threat is low and negative politeness when face-threat is high. In contrast, the present model predicts that speakers will increase positive politeness when positive face-threat increases and increase negative politeness when negative face-threat increases. Fourth, Brown and Levinson predict that as relational distance increases, both positive and negative politeness will decrease. The present model predicts that as relational distance increases, positive politeness will increase and negative politeness will decrease. Finally, Brown and Levinson's model does not include personality variables, whereas the present model includes two personality variables, i.e., verbal aggressiveness and empathy.

The results from the two experiments support the present model in four out of these five contrasts. First, both experiments proved that speakers attempted to be positively and negatively polite in the same message. Experiment 1 revealed that both positive and negative politeness were significantly different from zero, and Experiment 2 showed that most messages manifested both positive and negative politeness. Second, Experiment 1 showed that speakers attempted to be polite even though they did not perform any intrinsically face-threatening act. Even in greeting and parting others, people were compelled to promote others' face wants.

Third, Experiment 2 showed that as negative face-threat increased, the level of negative politeness increased; as positive face-threat increased, the levels of approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness increased. However, except when a compliance-gaining goal was more important than the politeness goal, negative face-threat did not influence the level of positive politeness and positive face-threat did not affect the level of negative politeness. Even when a compliance-gaining goal was the primary goal, the way positive politeness compensated for negative face-threat was different from what Brown and Levinson predict. Brown and Levinson predict that more positive politeness would be employed when negative face-threat is low. In contrast, Experiment 2 found that subjects employed more positive politeness when negative face-threat was high. This finding can be explained in terms of a "solidarity move." When people think that their relationship with hearers is too distant to make a highly imposing request (i.e., act with high negative face-threat), they want to make the relationship closer by behaving in the manner in which

persons in a close relationship behave. Consequently, people show more positive politeness when they ask a big favor of an acquaintance than when they ask a small request of an acquaintance.

Finally, both experiments demonstrated that as relational distance increased, approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness decreased and negative politeness increased, which is opposite of Brown and Levinson's claim. For these four crucial reasons, the present study rejects Brown and Levinson's model and adopts the present model's perspective.

FTA vs. Non-FTA

Experiment 1 examined people's politeness behavior in performing a non-FTA and Experiment 2 examined people's politeness behavior in performing FTAs. A comparison of the results from these two experiments indicates that people's politeness behavior is different in two respects when they perform a non-FTA and when they perform an FTA. First, non-FTAs and FTAs can be distinguished by performances that exhibit invariance along different dimensions of politeness. When performing a non-FTA, subjects across different conditions manifested the same degree of avoidance-based politeness. The reason that avoidance-based politeness was invariant across conditions in Experiment 1 seems to be that when the acts performed (i.e., greeting and parting) did not threaten the hearer's face, the speaker did not have to employ politeness devices expressing that no offense was intended. However, when performing an FTA, subjects showed varying degrees of avoidance-based politeness.

In addition, subjects in Experiment 2 manifested the same degree of approach-based negative politeness. This invariance of

approach-based negative politeness is due to the way power disparity was manipulated in Experiment 2. Different from Experiment 1, where the power of the hearer was either higher than or equal to the speaker, the power of the hearer was either lower than or equal to the speaker in Experiment 2. In this society, people generally use the same set of address terms ("tu" pronouns) for both peers and subordinates (Ervin-Tripp, 1972). Thus, the use of address terms in Experiment 2 was invariant across different power conditions.

A second difference in the performance of FTAs vs. non-FTAs is that relational distance is a more important predictor of politeness in performing FTAs, whereas power disparity is a better predictor of politeness in performing non-FTAs. In a modern egalitarian society, power disparity is not as powerful a predictor of people's linguistic behavior as it once was; in contrast, relational distance is a more powerful predictor of linguistic behavior than it once was (Brown & Gilman, 1960). Thus, relational distance is expected to be a better predictor of politeness than power disparity as was found in politeness behavior in performing FTAs. However, the way the relational variables affect politeness behavior in greeting and parting others (i.e., acts used in Experiment 1) seems to be different from the way they influence politeness behavior in requesting, criticizing, or question-asking, because the nature of a greeting or a parting is different from the nature of a request, criticism, or question-asking. Greetings and partings are highly ritualized acts, while requests, criticisms, and question-askings are not. Usually ritualized acts (e.g., ceremony and religious rituals) seem to emphasize giving proper respect to

authority. Power disparity, therefore, appears to remain a good predictor of people's linguistic behavior in ritualized acts.

Relative Importance of Determinants of Politeness

Experiments 1 and 2 found that some factors are more important than others in determining the degree of politeness. First, except for approach-based negative politeness in Experiment 1, relational distance was a better predictor of politeness than power disparity. As mentioned in the discussion of differences in politeness behavior between an FTA and non-FTA, the egalitarian movement in Western society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries influenced people's linguistic behavior. Before the movement, "power semantic" (Brown & Gilman, 1960) was so strong that when people were engaged in a conversation with a superior, they had to reflect in their utterances their respect for the superior. After the movement, however, "solidarity semantic" (Brown & Gilman, 1960) became so important that people in a close relationship began to ignore the "power semantic." Consequently, relational distance became a more important characteristic of a relationship, in an egalitarian society.

Second, negative face-threat was a more important determinant of negative politeness and positive face-threat was a more important determinant of positive politeness. As argued in Chapter 1, because positive and negative face-wants are distinct human desires, saving others' positive face (i.e., being positively polite) does not compensate for their loss of negative face; and saving their negative face (i.e., being negatively polite) does not compensate for their loss of positive face. People should save positive face to mitigate a threat to positive face and save negative face to mitigate a threat to

negative face. Consequently, positive face-threat was a better predictor of positive politeness and negative face-threat was a better predictor of negative politeness.

Finally, situational variables such as relational distance, power disparity, positive face-threat, and negative face-threat were found to be more important determinants of politeness than personality variables. These findings are inconsistant with the findings of compliance-gaining research that personality variables were better predictors of compliance-gaining message selection. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that the present study did not test the effects of all possible personality variables on politeness. Only verbal aggressiveness and empathy were examined in this study. Thus, there is a possibility that some personality variables that are good predictors of politeness may emerge. Another possible explanation is that personality variables may be good predictors of selection of the message content, but are not good predictors of the way in which the content is expressed. In any society, being polite is considered as a rule to be observed and individuals may not be allowed to freely select their own way of expressing the content. Thus, the influence of personality variables on politeness behavior seems to be limited.

The Role of Gender

Another important finding of this study is that gender did not influence any dimension of politeness. In Chapter 1, it was argued that the effect of gender could be explained in terms of verbal aggressiveness. Both experiments showed that verbal aggressiveness is a good predictor of gender. The correlation between verbal aggressiveness and gender was -.33 for Experiment 1 and -.28 for

Experiment 2. Specifically, males were more verbally aggressive than females. In Experiment 1, males were found to be less polite in terms of approach-based positive politeness. However, when the effect of verbal aggressiveness was removed, the effect of gender on approach-based positive politeness became insignificant.

Except for approach-based positive politeness in greeting and parting, the effect of gender failed to reach any significant level. Gender did not influence approach-based negative politeness in Experiment 1 and did not show any significant influence on any type of politeness in Experiment 2. These findings are highly inconsistent with Baxter's (1984) finding that gender was one of the best predictors of politeness.

Baxter employed a single speech act to analyze politeness. The act Baxter used in her study was "request of re-writing," which was one of the five acts used in the present study. Thus, the difference in findings between these two studies does not seem to be due to the difference in the type of act analyzed. One possible explanation for inconsistency is that social desirability might have influenced Baxter's study. Baxter employed a message selection technique that presented a set of politeness tactics to subjects and asked them to rate their likelihood to use each of the tactics. Since using impolite tactics is not "acting like a lady," females might have tended to rate tactics with higher degrees of politeness as more likely to use.

Another possible explanation is that the present study and Baxter's study employed different means of measuring politeness. Baxter generated a list of politeness tactics based on Brown and Levinson's list of politeness tactics. Baxter grouped these tactics

into three basic categories based on an exploratory factor analysis: functional face threat, positive politeness, and negative politeness. By adopting Brown and Levinson's proposition, Baxter assumed that negative politeness was more polite than positive politeness which in turn is more polite than functional face threat. Baxter concluded that females were more polite than males since they tended to use negative politeness more often than males.

In contrast, the present study does not assume that all positive politeness or all negative politeness devices have the same degree of politeness or that negative politeness is more polite than positive politeness. The present study conceptualized positive and negative politeness as mutually independent dimensions and examined the effect of gender on these dimensions separately. The categorical coding systems developed in Chapter 4 support the perspective of the present study. Positive politeness was just as polite as negative politeness and not all tactics for each type of politeness were judged to be the same in politeness. Thus, the findings of the present study appear to be more reliable.

The Role of Personality Variables

The only area in which the present model failed to be supported is in terms of the role personality factors play in determining positive and negative politeness of utterances. Both experiments showed that empathy was a poor predictor of both positive and negative politeness. The reason that empathy did not show any effect on politeness seems to be that "putting oneself in others' shoes" or understanding others' feelings does not necessarily mean that one recognizes others' desire to maintain face. In other words, understanding of others' face wants

is not a crucial outcome of empathy. Thus, a highly empathetic person may understand others' emotional states very well but may not be highly aware of others' face wants.

The experiments also revealed that verbal aggressiveness did not influence the levels of approach-based positive and negative politeness. The finding that approach-based politeness was not influenced by verbal aggressiveness seems very reasonable. The verbal aggressiveness measure employed in this study measures one's tendency to attack others' self-concept (Infante & Wigley, 1986) and is not concerned with one's tendency to promote others' self-concept. Approach-based politeness focuses on the way one is promoting others' face and is not concerned with the way one is attacking others' face. People's tendency to attack others' self-concept may influence the way they criticize or impose on others; however, it may not influence the way they promote others' self-concept. Consistent with this explanation, Experiment 2 found that avoidance-based politeness was influenced by verbal aggressiveness.

Dimensionality of Politeness

Both Brown and Levinson's model and the present model conceptualized politeness as a two dimensional construct (i.e., the positive politeness and negative politeness dimensions). However, Experiment 2 showed that approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness formed different dimensions, resulting in three different dimensions of politeness, i.e., negative politeness, approach-based positive politeness, and avoidance-based positive politeness.

Even though there is no direct evidence, it is likely that approach-based and avoidance-based negative politeness would form

different dimensions. Approach-based negative politeness refers to deference shown in the use of address terms, while avoidance-based negative politeness refers to avoidance of imposition. As these two different types of negative politeness are very different in nature, there is no theoretical reason for us to assume that they covary. In fact, Experiment 2 revealed that approach-based negative politeness was invariant across different situations, while avoidance-based negative politeness varied significantly across different situations. In short, Experiment 2 suggested that politeness is a four dimensional contruct comprising approach-based positive, avoidance-based positive, approach-based negative, and avoidance-based negative politeness.

One possible counter-argument against the claim that these four different types of politeness form different dimensions is that the four types of politeness represent the four quadrants of two different dimensions, i.e., positive-negative dimension and approach-avoidance dimension. However, it is not likely that negative politeness and positive politeness together form one dimension and that approach-based politeness and avoidance-based politeness together form another dimension. In order for positive and negative politeness to form a single dimension, as positive politeness increases, negative politeness should decrease. But, there is no reason that we should assume that the more people satisfy others' desire for approval (i.e., positively polite), the less they satisfy others' desire for power (i.e., negatively polite). Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis among items in positive and negative politeness in Experiment 2 showed that the correlations between the factors of approach-based positive politeness and negative politeness ($r=-.101$, $p<.290$) and

avoidance-based positive politeness and negative politeness (r=.003, p<.999) were not significantly different from zero.

In order for approach-based and avoidance-based politeness to form a single dimension, as approach-based politeness increases, avoidance-based politeness should decrease. However, it appears to be unreasonable to assume that the more people approve others (i.e., more approach-based positive politeness), the less they try to avoid disapproving of others (i.e., less avoidance-based positive politeness) or that the more deference people show to others (i.e., more approach-based negative politeness), the less they try to avoid imposing on others (i.e., less avoidance-based negative politeness). Moreover, a confirmatory factor analysis of positive politeness in Experiment 2 showed that the correlation between the factors of approach-based positive politeness and avoidance-based positive politeness was not negative but positive (r=.24, p<.025). Thus, the claim that the four types of politeness represent the four quadrants of the positive-negative dimension and the approach-avoidance dimension is not plausible.

Modification of the Present Model

In summary, both Experiments 1 and 2 proved that the present model predicted politeness behavior more accurately than Brown and Levinson's model. In addition, these experiments indicated that the present model had three problems that need to be resolved. First, politeness is a four dimensional construct rather than a two dimensional construct. Second, empathy is not a factor determining the level of politeness. Finally, verbal aggressiveness influences only avoidance-based

politeness behavior. Consequently, the present model needs to be modified to resolve these three problems.

To accommodate the findings of this study, the model proposed in Chapter 1 will be modified. First, politeness is conceptualized as a four dimensional construct. In other words, politeness is not a vector of positive politeness and negative politeness but a vector of approach-based positive politeness, avoidance-based positive politeness, approach-based negative politeness, and avoidance-based negative politeness. Second, empathy is eliminated from the model. Finally, the influence of verbal aggressiveness on both approach-based positive and negative politeness was eliminated.

These changes do not affect such variables as relational distance, power disparity, and the obligations to save positive and negative face, since the influences of these variables are expected to be the same for both approach-based and avoidance-based politeness. Thus, Equations 2 and 3 in Chapter 1 (see Table 34) do not need to be modified. The only equation that includes such variables as politeness, verbal aggressiveness, and empathy is Equation 4. Thus, Equation 4 is modified as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_{ap} \\ P_{vp} \\ P_{an} \\ P_{vn} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} O_p \\ O_p \\ O_n \\ O_n \end{bmatrix} - A \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ m \\ 0 \\ n \end{bmatrix} \qquad (7)$$

where P_{ap}, P_{vp}, P_{an}, and P_{vn} are approach-based positive, avoidance-based positive, approach-based negative, and avoidance-based negative politeness, respectively; A represents verbal aggressiveness

Table 34. Equations in the Final Model

Final Model

$$\begin{bmatrix} RO_p \\ RO_n \end{bmatrix} = P \begin{bmatrix} a \\ x \end{bmatrix} + D \begin{bmatrix} -b \\ y \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} c \\ z \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} O_p \\ O_n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} RO_p \\ RO_n \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} T_p \\ T_n \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_{ap} \\ P_{vp} \\ P_{an} \\ P_{vn} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} O_p \\ O_p \\ O_n \\ O_n \end{bmatrix} - A \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ m \\ 0 \\ n \end{bmatrix} \quad (7)$$

RO_p : Relational obligation to save positive face
RO^p_n : Relational obligation to save negative face
O_n : Total obligation to save positive face
O^p : Total obligation to save negative face
P^n : Approach-based positive politeness
P^{ap} : Avoidance-based positive politeness
P^{vp} : Approach-based negative politeness
P^{an} : Avoidance-based negative politeness
T^{vn} : Positive face-threat
T^p : Negative face-threat
A^n : Verbal Aggressiveness
E : Empathy
P : Power disparity
D : Relational distance

of the speaker and has a defined range of +1 to -1; and m and n are positive constants. The differences between Equation 4 and Equation 7 are (1) empathy is dropped out of Equation 4; (2) both positive and negative politeness are subdivided into approach-based and avoidance-based politeness in Equation 7; and (3) in Equation 7, the constants for verbal aggressiveness (i.e., A) are 0 when calculating the level of approach-based politeness.

The Influences of Different Goals

The predictions of the present model tested in Experiments 1 and 2 were based on the assumption that people are striving to be polite. Typically, one of the primary goals people have in social interaction is to behave politely. Sometimes, however, people have a more important goal than the politeness goal such as a relational goal or a compliance-gaining goal. In these cases, people might act differently from what the present model would normally predict. For example, when people want to show off their power, they might show less positive and negative politeness than the present model would normally predict; when people want to act friendly to someone, they might show more positive politeness and less negative politeness than the present model would normally predict.

The present model can predict the level of positive and negative politeness when the speaker's behavior is guided by a relational goal. The relational distance and power disparity in these cases should be the ones that the speaker has in mind, not the ones assumed by both the speaker and the hearer. Suppose, for example, that a speaker and a hearer have regarded each other as casual friends and that since the speaker does not like the hearer, the speaker wants to make the

relationship more distant (i.e., wants to consider the hearer an acquaintance). In this case, the speaker's politeness behavior can be predicted in the same way in which politeness behavior of a typical acquaintanceship is predicted. In short, the relational distance and power disparity are based on the relationship that is projected by the speaker.

Compliance-gaining goals seem to influence people's politeness behavior. As discussed earlier, for example, when speakers want to gain compliance from an acquaintance, they use a high degree of positive politeness to make the relationship closer. In contrast, when gaining compliance is taken for granted due to an emergency situation, speakers are expected to use less polite expressions (such as orders). The present model, however, does not explain the influence of compliance-gaining goals very well.

The present model also has a problem in explaining the influences of situationally induced aggressiveness. Lim (1988) suggest when speakers realize that their compliance-goal is blocked, they become verbally aggressive out of frustration. Thus, it is expected that when speakers are frustrated because of a blocked goal, they become less polite. The present model can explain the influence of verbal aggressiveness as a trait; however, it cannot explain the effect of situationally induced verbal aggressiveness, or more generally, the effect of the speaker's emotional state. Thus, future research should be directed so that these limitations of the present model can be extended. This future research should focus on "goal-frustration" and "goal-presumption" as possible additional determinants of politeness

under the thesis that frustration and presumption decrease exhibited politeness.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study examined the adequacy of Brown and Levinson's model of politeness. The examination showed that Brown and Levinson's model had at least four crucial conceptual problems. First, Brown and Levinson's model accounts for only one kind of face want at a time despite both positive and negative face being supported at the same time. Second, the model limits the scope of politeness by conceptualizing it only as a means to perform FTAs effectively. Third, the model focuses on a few nonrepresentative elements of positive and negative face wants when conceptualizing positive and negative politeness. Finally, this nonrepresentative conceptualization of positive and negative politeness leads Brown and Levinson to the inaccurate claim that negative politeness should be used when the face-threat is high, and positive politeness should be employed when the face-threat is low.

To eliminate the shortcomings of Brown and Levinson's model, this study proposed a new politeness model that accounted for both positive and negative politeness manifested in the same message, explained politeness phenomena which are not related to performing a face-threatening act, and conceptualized politeness more systematically by examining approach-based positive politeness (approval), avoidance-based positive politeness (avoidance of disapproval), approach-based negative politeness (deference), and avoidance-based negative politeness (avoidance of imposition). This model argued that the immediate predictors of politeness were the total obligations to be

positively and negatively polite; the total obligations to be polite are a sum of the relational obligations to be positively and negatively polite and the positive and negative face-threats carried by the act; and the relational obligations to be polite are a function of the relational distance between the hearer and the speaker and the power the hearer has over the speaker.

Two experiments were conducted to test the adequacy of the model proposed in this study. Experiment 1 tested whether the present model made adequate predictions concerning the politeness manifested in performing a non-face-threatening act. This experiment showed that people tended to be polite by using approach-based positive and negative politeness even when they performed an intrinsically non-face-threatening act such as greeting and parting. Experiment 1 also revealed that the levels of positive and negative politeness manifested in performing a non-FTA were influenced by relational distance and power disparity.

Experiment 2 tested whether or not the present model made adequate predictions concerning the politeness manifested in performing a face-threatening act. This experiment showed that people attempted to be polite both positively and negatively in the same message. Three factors turned out to be good predictors of positive and negative politeness. First, relational distance had a positive impact on avoidance-based negative politeness and a negative influence on both approach-based and avoidance-based positive politeness. Second, the level of positive face-threat had a positive effect on the level of both types of positive politeness. Finally, the level of negative face-threat had a positive impact on the level of avoidance-based

negative politeness. Power disparity was not a good predictor of approach-based positive politeness and avoidance-based negative politeness, but a good predictor of avoidance-based positive politeness.

Different from expectations, verbal aggressiveness and empathy of a speaker did not have any substantive influence on any of the politeness types. However, the results from these two experiments generally supported the model proposed by the present study and yielded considerable evidence againt Brown and Levinson's model.

In addition, to develop categorical coding systems for the criteria of politeness, this study identified unique politeness devices employed by participants in Experiments 1 and 2 and examined the degree to which each device represented the given criteria. Although the categorical coding systems proposed in this study are not complete because of the limited number of acts examined, they appeared to be highly usable at least for the acts observed in these experiments. In order to develop a more comprehensive coding system, however, more categories exhibited in performance of different acts needed to be added to the present coding system.

The results from this study have many implications. First, a comprehensive theoretical framework that can explain a variety of politeness phenomena is established. While Brown and Levinson limit politeness phenonena to some special situations in which speakers attempt to perform a face-threatening act effectively, the present model includes all the phenomena that show any emblem of "facework." Second, this study establishes a systematic explanatory scheme for politeness phenomena. Most of the previous studies on politeness,

including Brown and Levinson's work, focus on some particular aspect of politeness behavior such as politeness strategies or some particular factors influencing politeness such as gender or power differences. In contrast, this study attempts to explain politeness systematically by including all the crucial factors influencing politeness and by looking at all the aspects of politeness phenomena.

Two major aspects of the present model are yet to be tested. First, each equation should be tested individually. The present model proposes three equations: Equation 7 proposes positive and negative politeness are a function of the total obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively: Equation 3 proposes the total obligations to save positive and negative face are a sum of the relational obligations to save positive and negative face, respectively, and positive and negative face-threat, respectively; Equation 2 proposes the relational obligations to save positive and negative face are a function of the relational distance and the power disparity. Since this study tested a combination of the three equations, two important elements of the model, i.e., total face-saving obligation and relational face-saving obligation, were not included in any of the hypotheses. In order to know the effects of these face-saving obligations, each equation needs to be tested individually. Second, more studies need to be done to examine whether this model can explain the influences of relational goals (e.g., to make the relationship closer) and task goals (e.g., compliance-gaining goals). If necessary, new factors should be added to explain politeness behavior guided by such interaction goals as relational goals or compliance-gaining goals.

In short, more studies are need to test the adequacy of the model completely.

This study has two limitations. First, the utterances analyzed in this study were not sampled from natural conversations, but generated based on hypothetical situations. The underlying assumption of this method was that people's linguistic behavior is guided by higher level knowledge structures such as schemata. Thus, it was assumed that people can realistically simulate their linguistic behavior in laboratory situations. However, there is a possibility that people may generate a more polite message in a laboratory situation than in an actual interaction situation, because the laboratory situation allows them enough time to monitor their message. There also is a possibility that people act less polite in a laboratory than in an actual interaction, since they do not have to be concerned with the hearer's response. This message generation technique also ignores politeness expressed through nonverbal channels (e.g., pitch, intonation, gestures, etc).

Second, this study measured politeness by means of multiple ratings. Generally, a judge's rating can be more subjective than coding unitized content based on a categorical coding system. One main reason that the present study did not use categorical coding systems is that there was no established categorical coding system that has been proven valid and reliable. However, this study developed relatively comprehensive coding schemes for six different criteria of politeness. Although the reliability and validity of these coding schemes were not tested, they can potentially be useful tools for future research.

In conclusion, this study proposed a systematic and comprehensive explanatory scheme for politeness and most of the predictions made by the model were supported. However, the results are not conclusive by any means. More studies analyzing natural conversations using categorical coding schemes seem to be needed.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1

Low Distance/Equal Power

Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into a classmate (Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. Both Mike Miller and you took several courses together, and worked in the same group for one class requiring a group research project. Thus, Mike Miller and you know each other very well.

You notice that Mike Miller had his hair cut during the break and wears a nice spring coat. Thus, he looks very refreshing. Since your class begins in ten minutes, you do not have a lot of time to talk with this classmate. Thus, you just want to exchange greetings and partings.

What do you typically say to greet and part a classmate you know very well? What will this classmate say to greet and part you? Write verbatim out what you and this classmate will say to greet and then part each other. In other words, **write a script in which you and this classmate exchange greetings and then partings.** You can write as many turns as you think is necessary.

High Distance/Equal Power

Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into an acquaintance (Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. Both Mike Miller and you took a course together last term, and were in the same group when you did group exercises in the class. Other than that, you do not know Mike Miller very well.

You notice that Mike Miller had his hair cut during the break and wears a nice spring coat. Thus, he looks very refreshing. Since your class begins in ten minutes, you do not have a lot of time to talk with this acquaintance. Thus, you just want to exchange greetings and partings.

What do you typically say to greet and part a fellow student you do not know very well? What will this acquaintance say to greet and part you? Write verbatim out what you and this acquaintance will say to greet and then part each other. In other words, **write a script in which you and this acquaintance exchange greetings and then partings.** You can write as many turns as you think is necessary.

High Distance/Hearer-High Power

Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into a professor (Dr. Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. You know Mike Miller since you took a class from him last term. Because you were very active in this class, the professor also learned your name. Other than that, you do not know Mike Miller very well.

You notice that Mike Miller had his hair cut during the break and wears a nice spring coat. Thus, he looks very refreshing. Since your class begins in ten minutes, you do not have a lot of time to talk with this professor. Thus, you just want to exchange greetings and partings.

What do you typically say to greet and part a professor you do not know very well? What will this professor say to greet and part you? Write verbatim out what you and this professor will say to greet and then part each other. In other words, **write a script in which you and this professor exchange greetings and then partings.** You can write as many turns as you think is necessary.

Low Distance/Hearer-High Power

Imagine that after a two week term break, a new term begins today. Also imagine that on your way to a class, you run into a professor (Dr. Mike Miller) whom you have not seen for a while. You know Mike Miller since you took several classes from him; especially, you took an independent study under him last term. Thus, Mike Miller and you know each other very well.

You notice that Mike Miller had his hair cut during the break and wears a nice spring coat. Thus, he looks very refreshing. Since your class begins in ten minutes, you do not have a lot of time to talk with this professor. Thus, you just want to exchange greetings and partings.

What do you typically say to greet and part a professor you know very well? What will this professor say to greet and part you? Write verbatim out what you and this professor will say to greet and then part each other. In other words, **write a script in which you and this professor exchange greetings and then partings.** You can write as many turns as you think is necessary.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2

Low Distance/Equal Power/Low Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day you run into another member of your group (Bill Jones), who you regard as a good friend. You want to know what Bill thinks of John's work. So, you decide to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. Suppose that Bill already read the opening chapter done by John.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill to know what he thinks of John's work.

Low Distance/Equal Power/High Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

So, you want to ask John to re-do his part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. John will basically have to start over again. Suppose that John is someone you regard as a good friend.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask John to do his work again. In other words, write out what you will say to John to motivate him to do his part of the project again.

Low Distance/Equal Power/High Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day, John, who you regard as a good friend, asks you what you think about his work. Since this matter is related to the group's grade, you want to tell him that he did a poor job, hoping that he volunteers to improve his work.

Write verbatim the comment you will make on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to John in order to let him know that he did a poor job.

Low Distance/Equal Power/Low Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

Now, since you want a better group grade and since you think John Brown does not want to do his part of the project again, you want to ask another member of the group (Bill Jones), who you think is very actively involved in this group project, to take over and re-do John's part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. If Bill decides to take over the job, he will basically have to start over again. Suppose that Bill is someone you regard as a good friend.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill to take over John's part of the project. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill.

High Distance/Equal Power/Low Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day you run into another member of your group (Bill Jones), who you do not know very well except for project group meetings. You want to know what Bill thinks of John's work. So, you decide to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. Suppose that Bill already read the opening chapter done by John.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill to know what he thinks of John's work.

High Distance/Equal Power/High Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

So, you want to ask John to re-do his part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. John will basically have to start over again. Suppose that you do not know John Brown very well except for project group meetings.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask John to do his work again. In other words, write out what you will say to John to motivate him to do his part of the project again.

High Distance/Equal Power/High Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day, John, who you do not know very well except for project group meetings, asks you what you think about his work. Since this matter is related to the group's grade, you want to tell him that he did a poor job, hoping that he volunteers to improve his work.

Write verbatim the comment you will make on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to John in order to let him know that he did a poor job.

High Distance/Equal Power/Low Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you are involved in a group research project that will solely decide your course grade in a class where you very much want to get a high grade. Naturally, you are one of the more enthusiastic members of the group. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of your research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in this member's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, thus weakening the validity of the arguments.

Now, since you want a better group grade and since you think John Brown does not want to do his part of the project again, you want to ask another member of the group (Bill Jones), who you think is very actively involved in this group project, to take over and re-do John's part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. If Bill decides to take over the job, he will basically have to start over again. Suppose that you do not know Bill very well except for project group meetings.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill to take over John's part of the project. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill.

Low Distance/Hearer-Low Power/Low Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day you run into another member of your group (Bill Jones), <u>who you regard as a good friend</u>. You want to know what Bill thinks of John's work. So, you decide to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. Suppose that Bill already read the opening chapter done by John.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill to know what he thinks of John's work.

Low Distance/Hearer-Low Power/High Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

So, you want to ask John to re-do his part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. John will basically have to start over again. Suppose that John is someone you regard as a good friend.

Write verbatim the request or utterance you will make to ask John to do his work again. In other words, write out what you will say to John to motivate him to do his part of the project again.

Low Distance/Hearer-Low Power/High Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day, John, who <u>you regard as a good friend</u>, asks you what you think about his work. Since this matter is related to the group's grade, you want to tell him that he did a poor job, hoping that he volunteers to improve his work.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the comment you will make on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to John in order to let him know that he did a poor job.

Low Distance/Hearer-Low Power/Low Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

Now, since you want a better group grade and since you think John Brown does not want to do his part of the project again, you want to ask another member of the group (Bill Jones), who you think is very actively involved in this group project, to take over and re-do John's part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. If Bill decides to take over the job, he will basically have to start over again. Suppose that <u>Bill is someone you regard as a good friend</u>.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill to take over John's part of the project. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill.

High Distance/Hearer-Low Power/Low Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day you run into another member of your group (Bill Jones), <u>who you do not know very well except for project group meetings</u>. You want to know what Bill thinks of John's work. So, you decide to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. Suppose that Bill already read the opening chapter done by John.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill's opinion on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill to know what he thinks of John's work.

High Distance/Hearer-Low Power/
High Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

So, you want to ask John to re-do his part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. John will basically have to start over again. Suppose that <u>you do not know John Brown very well except for project group meetings</u>.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the request or utterance you will make to ask John to do his work again. In other words, write out what you will say to John to motivate him to do his part of the project again.

High Distance/Hearer-Low Power/High Positive Threat/Low Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

One day, John, who you do not know very well except for project group meetings, asks you what you think about his work. Since this matter is related to the group's grade, you want to tell him that he did a poor job, hoping that he volunteers to improve his work.

Write verbatim the comment you will make on John's work. In other words, write out what you will say to John in order to let him know that he did a poor job.

High Distance/Hearer-Low Power/Low Positive Threat/High Negative Threat

Imagine that you enrolled an independent study to work as an undergraduate teacher's assistant (UTA) for a class taught by a professor you respect very much. Since you did well when you took this class last year, you are allowed to enroll the independent study to be a UTA of this class. As one of five UTAs in this class, your duty involves taking charge of seven students who are working together on a group research project. Your grade for the independent study as well as the course grade of these students will be decided solely based on the group's performance in the project. You very much want to get a high grade, because you want to be a UTA for this class again next term. In your view, one of the group members (John Brown) has done his part of the project very poorly. John was supposed to write the opening chapter of the group's research report. The opening chapter was expected to make three major arguments. In order to do this properly, John should have found enough evidence to prove these three important points of the chapter. However, evidence provided in John's writing is mostly irrelevant to the issues, weakening the validity of the arguments.

Now, since you want a better group grade and since you think John Brown does not want to do his part of the project again, you want to ask another member of the group (Bill Jones), who you think is very actively involved in this group project, to take over and re-do John's part of the project in the remaining time before the final project is due. If Bill decides to take over the job, he will basically have to start over again. Suppose that <u>you do not know Bill very well except for project group meetings</u>.

<u>Write</u> <u>verbatim</u> the request or utterance you will make to ask Bill to take over John's part of the project. In other words, write out what you will say to Bill.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Applegate, J. (1982). Construct system development and identity-management skills in persuasive contexts. Paper presented at the meeting of the Western Speech Communication Association.

Axia, G., & Baroni, M.R. (1985). Linguistic politeness at different age levels. Child Development, 56, 918-927.

Baroni, M. R., & D'Urso, V. (1984). Some experimental findings about the question of politeness and women's speech. Language in Society, 13, 67-72.

Bates, E. (1976). Language and context: The acquisition of pragmatics. New York: Academic Press.

Baxter, L. A. (1984). An investigation of compliance-gaining as politeness. Human Communication Research, 10, 427-456.

Becker, J. A. (1982). Children's strategic use of requests to mark and manipulate social status. In S. A. Kuczaj, II (Ed.), Language development (Vol. 2): Language, thought, and culture (pp. 1-35). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Boster, F. J. (1986). Determinants of the persistence and content of compliance-gaining behavior. Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Communication Association, Chicago, Illinois.

Bowman, J., & Okuda, T. (1985). Japanese-American communication: Mysteries, enigmas, and Possibilities. Bulletin of the Association for Business Communication, 48, 18-21.

Brend, R. M. (1978). Politeness. International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching, 16, 253-256.

Brown, P. (1976). Women and politeness: A new perspective on language and society. Reviews in Anthropology, 3, 240-249.

Brown, R., & Ford, M. (1961). Address in American English. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 375-385.

Brown, R., & Gilman, A. (1960). The pronouns of power and solidarity. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Style in language (pp. 253-276). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Brown, C. T., & Keller, P. W. (1973). Monologue to dialogue: An exploration of interpersonal communication. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Brown, P. & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena. In E. Goody (Ed.), Questions and Politeness: Strategies in social interaction (pp. 56-289). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burgoon, J. K., & Hale, J. L. (1984). The fundamental topoi of relational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 193-214.

Burgoon, J. K., Pfau, M., Parrott, R., Birk, T., Coker, R., & Burgoon, M. (1987). Relational communication, satisfaction, compliance-gaining strategies, and compliance in communication between physicians and patients. Communication Monographs, 54, 307-324.

Camras, L. A., Pristo, T. M., & Brown, M. J. K. (1985). Directive choice by children and adults: Affect, situation, and linguistic politeness. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 31, 19-31.

Carrell, P. L., & Konneker, B. H. (1981). Politeness: Comparing native and nonnative judgments. Language Learning, 31, 17-30.

Cialdini, R. B. (1988). Influence: Science and Practice. Glenview, IL.: Scott, Foresman and Co.

Clark, H. H., & Schunk, D. H. (1980). Polite responses to polite requests. Cognition, 8, 111-143.

Clark, H. H., & Schunk, D. H. (1981). Politeness in requests: A rejoinder to Kemper and Thissen. Cognition, 9, 311-315.

Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, M. L. (1985). The situation as a construct in interpersonal communication research. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication (pp. 263-312). Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.

Craig, R. T., Tracy, C., & Spisak, F. (1986). The discourse of requests: Assessment of a politeness approach. Human Communication Research, 12, 437-468.

Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. Journal of personality and social psychology, 44, 113-126.

Ervin-Tripp, S. (1972). On sociolinguistic rules: Alternation and concurrence. In J. J. Gumperz, & D. Hymes (Eds.), Directions in socioliguistics (pp. 213-250). NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Ervin-Tripp, S. (1977). Wait for me, roller skate. In S. Ervin-Tripp & C. Mitchell-Kernan (Eds.), Child discourse (pp. 165-188). NY: Academic Press.

Ferguson, C. A. (1964). Root-echo responses in Syrian Arabic politeness formulas. In D. S. Stuart (Ed.), Linguistic study in memory of R. Slade Harrell (pp. 37-45). Georgetown University Press.

Ferguson, C. A. (1976). The structure and use of politeness formulas. Language in Society, 5, 137-151.

Gibbs, R. W. (1981). Your wish is my command: Convention and context in interpreting indirect requests. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 431-444.

Gibbs, R. W. (1986). What makes some indirect speech acts conventional? Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 181-196.

Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books.

House, J., & Kasper, G. (1981). Politeness markers in English and German. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech (pp. 157-185). The Hague: Mouton.

Hunter, J. E., & Boster, F. J. (1987). A model of compliance-gaining message selection. Communication Monograph, 53, 61-69.

Hunter, J. E., & Cohen, S. H. (1969). Package: A system of computer routines for the anlysis of correlational data. Educational Psychological Measurement, 29, 697-700.

Huston, T. L. (1983). Power. In Kelley, H. H., Berscheid, E., Christensen, A., Harvey, J. H., Huston, T. L., Levinger, G., McClintock, E., Peplau, L. A., & Peterson, D. R. (Eds.), Close relationships (pp. 169-219). NY: W. H. Freeman And Company.

Infante, D. A., & Wigley, C. J. (1986). Verbal aggressiveness: An interpersonal model and measure. Communication Monograph, 53, 61-69.

James, S. L. (1978). Effect of listener age and situation on the politeness of children's directives. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 7, 307-317.

Kelley, H. H. (1983). Love and commitment. In Kelley, H. H., Berscheid, E., Christensen, A., Harvey, J. H., Huston, T. L., Levinger, G., McClintock, E., Peplau, L. A., & Peterson, D. R. (Eds.), Close relationships (pp. 169-219). NY: W. H. Freeman And Company.

Kelley, H. H., Berscheid, E., Christensen, A., Harvey, J. H., Huston, T. L., Levinger, G., McClintock, E., Peplau, L. A., & Peterson, D. R. (1983). Close relationships (pp. 169-219). NY: W. H. Freeman And Company.

Kemper, S. (1984). When to speak like a lady. Sex Roles, 10, 435-443.

Kemper, S., & Thissen, D. (1981). Memory for the dimensions of requests. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 552-563.

Lakoff, R. T. (1972). Language in context. Language, 48, 907-927.

Lakoff, R. T. (1973). The logic of politeness; or minding your p's and q's. In C. Colum et al. (Eds.), Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 292-305). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

Lakoff, R. T. (1975). Language and women's place. NY: Harper and Row

Laver, J. D. M. H. (1981). Linguistic routines and politeness in greeting and parting. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech (pp. 289-304). The Hague: Mouton.

Leech, G. N. (1977). Language and tact. Papers of linguistic agency, University of Trier, Series A, Paper No. 46.

Lim, T. (1988). The influences of receivers' resistance on persuaders' verbal aggressiveness. A paper presented at the annunal convention of the International Communication Association, New Orleans.

Magier, M. (1984). Systems of deference in Rajasthani. Paper presented at the 36th annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C.

Marwell, G., & Schmitt, D. R. (1967). Dimension of compliance-gaining behavior: An empirical analysis. Sociometry, 30, 350-364.

McLaughlin, M. L., Cody, M. J., & O'Hair, H. D. (1983). The management of failure events: Some contextual determinants of accounting behavior. Human Communication research, 9, 208-224.

McLaughlin, M. L., Cody, M. J., & Rosenstein, N. E. (1983). Account sequences in conversations between strangers. Communication Monographs, 50, 102-125.

Mitchell-Kernan, C., & Kernan, K. (1977). Pragmatics of directive choice among children. In S. Ervin-Tripp & C. Mitchell-Kernan (Eds.), Child discourse (pp. 198-208). NY: Academic Press.

Nippold, M. A., Leonard, L. B., Anastopoulos, A. (1982). Development in the use and understanding of polite forms in children. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 25, 193-202.

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Scotton, C. M. (1983). The negotiation of identities in conversation: A theory of markedness and code choice. International Journal of Sociology of Language, 44, 115-136.

Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shimanoff, S. B. (1977). Investigating politeness. In E. O. Keenan & T. L. Bennet (Eds.), Discourse across time and space (pp. 213-241). Los Angeles: University of Southern California.

Tannen, D., & Oztek, P. C. (1981). Health to our mouth: Formulaic expressions in Turkish and Greek. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech (pp. 37-53). The Hague: Mouton.

Tracy, K. (1983). The issue-event distinction: A rule of conversation and its scope condition. Human Communication Research, 9, 320-324.

Tracy, K., Craig, R. T., Smith, M., & Spisak, F. (1984). The discourse of requests: Assessment of a compliance-gaining approach. Human Communication Research, 10, 513-538.

Williams, D. L., & Boster, F. J. (1981). The effects of beneficial situational characteristics, negativism, and dogmatism on compliance-gaining message selection. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota.