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CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS IN UKRAINE
By

Gretchen Knudson Gee

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1995

ABSTRACT
CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS IN UKRAINE
By

Gretchen Knudson Gee

This study examines the role that churches in Ukraine play in the political
process. Churches are viewed not as apolitical organizations but as political actors
seeking beneﬁts from the state. These groups desire to inﬂuence the state and to
inﬂuence the political attitudes of church members. Of particular interest is the effect
that church behavior is having upon the political, ethnic, and geographic divisions
within Ukraine.

The data come from a series of 35 qualitative interviews with church leaders,
church scholars, politicians, political party workers, and journalists in three major
regions of Ukraine. I hypothesize that the political activity of the central churches
varies according to the ties each church had to the former Soviet state, to nationalistic
organizations, and to foreign organizations.

Churches are not only major actors on the political scene, but they are also
major proponents of a cultural war that is threatening the unity of Ukraine. Religious
interests have exploited and exacerbated the geographic, ethnic, political and religious
differences for their own purposes and have contributed to deeper and more bitter
divisions within the nation. The key divide in Ukraine is between east and west, and
certain churches have staked their religious and political agendas on maintaining and

deepening this divide.

In the west, the churches with strong nationalistic ties were best able to
inﬂuence regional and local ofﬁcials to grant them the private goods they desired. In
the east, strong ties to the Soviet state were the most useful. In the center, strong ties
to both former Soviet ofﬁcials and to nationalistic organizations enabled churches to
gain special favors from the national government. In most cases, foreign ties were
harmful. Eastern and western Orthodox churches are united in their attempts to
pressure government to limit the religious freedoms of foreign-afﬁliated churches and
religious groups.

Western churches also pushed their members to adopt a nationalistic identity
that views Russia as an enemy who is trying to recreate the Soviet Union. Eastern
churches are promoting a Slavic identity, emphasizing the historic ties binding
Ukraine and Russia. Interestingly, only the Protestant churches remained separate
from the east-west battle. They have no ties that enable them to inﬂuence
government, so they remain apolitical and have made no effort to promote a distinct
identity.

What is troublesome is the deep distrust that the two opposing sides feel
towards one another. As Ukraine as a nation attempts to build her cultural and
national identiﬁcation, it is difﬁcult to see how these vast differences can be

OVCI‘COIIIC .

Copyright by
GRETCHEN KNUDSON GEE

1995

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my committee for guiding me, my husband for encouraging and

supporting me, and the people of Ukraine for inspiring and assisting me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ix

INTRODUCTION 1
Problem Statement 1
Main Results 2

1. DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION 4
History of Religion and Politics and Geography in Ukraine 4
Current Situation 10
National Movement 13
Conclusion 18

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 18
Introduction 18
Churches and Politics 24
Importance of Culture 25
Churches as Interest Groups 26
How Churches Differ From Other Interest Groups 29
Inﬂuencing the State 32
How Groups Reach the State 32
State Responsiveness 41
Inﬂuencing Political Attitudes 46
Church Types and Ties 48
Inﬂuencing the State 52
Inﬂuencing Church Members 57
Conclusion 61

IH. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 64
Model and Theoretical Hypotheses 64
Operationalization and Testable Hypotheses 68
Hypotheses Set #1: Reaching the State 69
Hypotheses Set #2: State Responsiveness 69
Hypotheses Set #3: Shaping the Political Attitudes of Church Members 70
Research Design 70
Data Collection 73

vi

Conducting the Interviews 74
Questionnaires 76
Quality of Access 79

IV. CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS ON THE MACRO LEVEL:

ABILITY TO REACH THE STATE 82
Monitoring Efforts 83

Monitoring Efforts 83

Types of Goods Sought 87

Conﬂict and Cooperation Between Churches 94
Sanctioning Behavior 100

Sanctioning Behavior 101

Level of Government Approached and Links to the Political System 104
Credibility 110

Credibility 111

Regional Dijﬂrences 119
Conclusion 125

V. CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS ON THE MACRO LEVEL:
STATE RESPONSE 128
Participation 128
Level of Government 132
State Response 134
General Decisions 134
Property Decisions 140
State-Sanctioned Religious Monopolies 146
Special Status 147
Anti-Protestant and Anti-Foreign State Action 152
Consequences for Ukraine 154
Freedom of Religion 154
Cleavages in Ukraine 163
Conclusion 170

VI. CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS ON THE MICRO LEVEL 172

Inﬂuence on the Political Attitudes of Church Members 173
Who Has Inﬂuence and Who Does Not 173
How Churches Play a Role 176

Development of a National Ukrainian Identity 181
Nationalistic Identity 182
Slavic Identity 188
Neutral Identity 191

Implications 191

vii

VII. CONCLUSION 199
Role of Religion in the Politics of Ukraine 200
Church Activity on the Macro Level 203
Church Activity on the Micro Level 207
Future Research 209
Divided Ukraine 209

APPENDICES 214

BIBLIOGRAPHY 222

viii

LIST OF TABLES

. Churches by Types and Ties. 51
. Religious Organizations in Ukraine by Region. 215
. Interview Subjects by City and Category. 216

. 1994 Presidential Election Results, by Region. 221

ix

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The countries of the former Soviet Union beckon to social scientists. After 70
years of Communism, we are eager to look backwards and uncover the truth about
the life and politics of the USSR. In the middle of their struggle to attain political
and economic independence, we want to examine these nations’ processes of political
development. Finally, we desire to look forward and to understand where these
countries will end up, and what their roles will be in the future world order.

This study examines one particular nation, Ukraine, and looks at what makes it
unique from the other countries of the former Soviet Union. In my study, I
incorporate the politics of the USSR, the current struggle for national identity, and the
likely future results of internal divisions in Ukraine.

What sets Ukraine apart is not her politics, although they are fractious. What
sets her apart is not her geography, although She is signiﬁcantly positioned on the
cusp between Europe and Asia. What sets Ukraine apart is not her ethnic divisions,
although they are deep. What sets her apart is her religion, and the role religion,
along with geography and nationality, plays in inﬂuencing and dividing the politics of
Ukraine.

I examine the behavior of religious groups in Ukraine. Churches are viewed

2

not as apolitical organizations focused solely upon the world beyond, but as political
actors seeking beneﬁts from the state. These groups desire to inﬂuence the state, and
to inﬂuence the political attitudes of church members.
Main Results

Religion in Ukraine plays a key role in political life. The political behavior of
churches, on a societal level and on the individual attitudinal level, is having a strong
impact upon the politics in Ukraine. In Speciﬁc, the ties that the churches have to the
former Soviet state, nationalist movements, and external organizations help explain
the degree, direction and types of political behavior. These ties reveal and illustrate
the reasons behind the political behavior and political successes or failures of
Ukrainian churches. In many instances, church behavior is deepening the division
between east and west Ukraine. In addition, the political activities of several
churches are exacerbating tensions between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians.
The political successes of several churches, explained in large part by their ties to the
former Soviet state, nationalistic movements, or external organizations, are even
inﬂuencing the democratic development of Ukraine. Freedom of religion, ofﬁcial and
unofﬁcial acceptance of ethnic and religious differences, and relations with Russia and
the rest of the world are all undergoing governmental reconsideration, largely as a
result of church pressure and activity. The state, in turn, has an interest in
moderating church pressure in a way that diffuses intra-country tensions. It is not an
overstatement to say that Ukrainian churches play a very signiﬁcant role in Ukrainian

politics.

3

This study examines the nature of the relationship between religion and politics
by examining the political behavior of churches. Their ties, their actions, their
successes, and their hopes are all examined and placed in the context of Ukrainian
political life. This sheds light on the often overlooked involvement of religious
bodies on political development. The transition from an authoritarian political system
is inﬂuenced by both secular and religious organizations. As Ukraine’s development
is examined, the important role played by religious groups in this time of political

transition will be better understood.

Chapter 1
Description of Situation
History of Religion and Politics and Geography in Ukraine

Religion and politics have a long common history in Ukraine. Throughout the
centuries, problems in one area have often led to conﬂicts in the other area.

Divisions between religions have often mirrored, and contributed to, ethnic and
political divisions. These two spheres of life in Ukraine have been so intertwined that
it is hard to tell where one ends and the other begins.

Ukraine has long been considered a religious nation. In 988 A.D., Prince
Vladimir summoned representatives of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic
faiths to his palace in Kiev, and had them present their cases for each of their
religions. After listening to their presentation, the Prince declared that the Kiev-Rus
empire would adopt Orthodoxy, and a mass baptism of the inhabitants of Kiev was
carried out in the Dnieper River.

This religious heritage has Shaped Ukraine for centuries. Ukrainians have a
strong orientation towards religion, and church membership has always been high
relative to other countries of the former Soviet Union. Even during Soviet times,
Ukrainians maintained a sense of pride in living in the birthplace of Orthodoxy.

Ukraine has been dominated by Russia, ﬁrst in the form of the Russian Empire
and later in the form of the Soviet Union, for 300 years. The name "Ukraina" means
”borderland," and Ukraine has served as a frontier zone for Russia for centuries.

After centuries of remaining at the intersection of continually shifting borders of

various empires, Ukraine became incorporated into Russia in the late 18th century
(Motyl 1993). Culturally, religiously, economically, and socially, Ukraine lost a
large degree of its individuality and became a backwater of Russia (Motyl 1993).
Urbanization and industrialization ﬂowed from Russia, and enforced Russiﬁcation was
pursued by the Tsarist regime. The Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War caused
chaos throughout Ukraine and opened the door for a short-lived and ill-fated
independence revolution in 1917. Following the establishment of the Soviet Union,
Ukraine once again fell victim to a totalitarian state which carried out policies of
Russiﬁcation of Ukrainian language and culture.

Despite the efforts of the Tsars and the Soviets, Ukraine is and has been a
divided country. For centuries, east and west Ukraine have differed dramatically
from one another. The Dnieper river ﬂows in a general north-south line through
Ukraine, and divides Ukraine into eastern and western parts. There are a few speciﬁc
regions that form the core of the opposing parts of the nation. In the west, the
regions of Galacia, including Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and T ernopil, represent the heart
of west Ukraine. According to data from 1989, ethnic Ukrainians make up over 90%
of the population in these regions, while Russians make up less that 10%. In other
western regions such as Rivne and Cherniytsi, ethnic Ukrainians constitute 70-90%
and ethnic Russians less that 10% (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). In the east, the regions
of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Luhansk have between 50—70% ethnic Russians, and
24~40% ethnic Ukrainians (Kuzio and Wilson 1994).

Economically, Ukraine has been known as the breadbasket of the former

6

Soviet Union. The western economy is largely fueled by agriculture; eastern Ukraine
is heavily industrialized. The eastern cities of Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv were
military-industrial cities, while Donetsk has been built around coal mining. However,
the legacy of Soviet economy development has hit Ukraine especially hard.
Inefﬁciency and stagnation in all industries, resulting from Soviet central planning,
have decimated the Ukrainian economy. Inefﬁciencies of production, antiquated
machinery, problems in distribution, and an ill-equipped and unmotivated work-force
have all created huge economic dilemmas for Ukraine. Since independence in 1991,
agriculture and industrial sectors have suffered greatly, but the military- and coal-
dependent regions in the east have suffered the most (Motyl 1993).

In religious terms, west Ukraine has been the stronghold of the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church, a branch of Catholicism established during the counter-
Reformation in the sixteenth century (Motyl 1993). The Greek Catholic Church is a
unique mix of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox religions and shares aspects of both.
It uses the Orthodox rite and the Slavonic liturgical language, but priests give
allegiance to Rome (Keleher 1993). Theologically, the churches have been divided
since 1054 when the Catholic and Orthodox churches split apart (Little 1991).
Politically, west Ukraine is an area that has had a great deal of contact with western
Europe, primarily through invasion. Poland, Germany, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia, among others, have all held parts of western Ukraine. This religious
makeup and political history has forged a unique outlook towards Ukrainian

identiﬁcation.

7

Historically, the church in western Ukraine has been an agent of national
awakening. The Greek Catholic Church in particular has deep ties to Ukrainian
nationalism, and has been a representative of independence and national identity as
well as a source of resistance vis-a-vis the Russians and the Soviets (Subtelny 1994).

The Greek Catholic afﬁliation with the Pope inclined western Ukrainians
towards the West and away from Russia. AS such, they shared, with other
Europeans, events such as feudalism, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment
(Huntington 1993). In this manner, they also were exposed to the initial inclinations
toward democratic development. However, the Greek Catholic retention of Orthodox
rites made clear the national distinction between Roman Catholic Poles and Greek
Catholic Ukrainians. In fact, the Greek Catholic Church has been one of the most
fervent supporters of Ukrainian nationalism (Bilinsky 1964). Therefore, the Greek
Catholic religious identity has been intertwined with the political identity of western
Ukraine for a long time. In recent centuries, west Ukraine has been more
democratic, more nationalistic, and more Greek Catholic than east Ukraine.

East Ukraine, along with the southern and central regions, has had strong ties
with Russia. In religious terms, Ukrainians in these areas have overwhelmingly
followed the Orthodox Church, as have their Russian cousins. In the eighteenth
century, Ukrainian Orthodoxy was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church,
serving to further blur the lines between Ukrainians and Russians (Motyl 1993).
Politically, eastern Ukraine, like Russia, was a part of the Russian empire that was

little touched by the events shaping the rest of Europe, and was little inﬂuenced by

8

emerging democratic principles (Huntington 1993). This religious makeup and
political history combined to forge a very different outlook towards Ukrainian national
identiﬁcation.

By blurring the distinctions between Ukrainians and Russians, the Orthodox
Church Shaped an identity that joined eastern Ukrainians to Russians. The
encouragement of ties between Ukrainians and Russians led some to claim that the
Orthodox Church was attempting to "Russify" the population. The Soviet government
in fact used the Russian Orthodox Church to force the satellite republics to adapt the
Soviet model (Dunn 1994).

The violent history of the 20th century exacerbated, rather than soothed, the
differences between the two regions. In west Ukraine during World War II, the
struggles against an army of occupiers resulted in a scorched land and a Strong sense
of Ukrainian nationalism (Bilinsky 1964). In their struggles against the Poles, the
Germans and the Soviets, western Ukrainians developed a sense of identity that
included resistance towards their oppressors, and a strengthened attachment to the
Greek Catholic Church.

West Ukraine was annexed as part of the Soviet Union only between 1939 and
1945, and only after much bloodshed. During World War 11, western Ukrainians
fought against both the occupying Nazis and the Soviet guerilla partisans that fought
behind the lines in the Nazi-occupied territory (Armstrong 1964). Anti-Soviet
feelings were based upon the deportations and executions carried out from 1939-1941,

as well as the state-planned famine of 1932-33 which resulted in the deaths of millions

of Ukrainians (Subtelny 1986).

In an attempt to restore morale in the USSR during World War II, Stalin
ofﬁcially recognized, and gave special permissions to, the Russian Orthodox Church.
Therefore the west Ukrainian struggle against Soviet domination reﬂected the fear that
their religious identity, as well as their political freedoms, would be taken away. The
anti-Greek Catholic policy of the Soviet Union was a large facet of the troubled
integration process of western Ukraine (Bilinsky 1964). The Greek Catholic Church,
in the years during and after World War II, was the foremost institution that bound
west Ukraine to western Europe and was a key player in the ﬁght against Soviet
takeover. Therefore, the dissolution of the Greek Catholic Church in 1946 by the
Soviets was a severe blow to the Ukrainian nationalistic movement. In March 1946,
a special meeting was called by the Soviet authorities, and the 1596 Union of Brest,
which ﬁrst established the Greek Catholic Church, was declared null, and all church
property was handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw 1992). From
this point on, the surviving members of the church and the clergy were forced
underground. By destroying the church, the Soviet authorities meant to destroy the
leaders of the nationalistic movement (Bilinsky 1964).

These activities did not manage to stamp out the distinctiveness of western
Ukraine, however. Because they were later made a part of the Soviet Union, because
nationalism had had longer to gestate and grow, and because the Greek Catholic
church had been so strong a factor in the region’s identity, west Ukrainians

maintained a sense of uniqueness during the rule of the Soviet Union. For example,

10

assimilation to the Russian language occurred at much slower rates in the west than in
east Ukraine. Between 1959 and 1979, assimilation to Russian proceeded rapidly in
east Ukraine, but was resisted in the west. Ukrainian, rather than Russian, was
maintained as the predominant language in the west (Szporluk 1979).

In addition to the Greek Catholic Church, another church has historical roots
in western Ukraine. During the period 1917-1920, a group of Ukrainian Orthodox
believers established the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. These Orthodox
believers split with the Russian Orthodox Church over loyalty to Moscow, the
continued use of the Ukrainian language, and the message of national independence
(Bociurkiw 1972). This nationalist church was also purged by Stalin in 1929. It had
a brief revival in 1942 during the Nazi occupation of west Ukraine, which led to
charges of collaboration with the Nazis, but once again was dissolved and its
buildings given to the Russian Orthodox Church (Dawisha and Parrott 1994).

While this tumult was occurring in western Ukraine, eastern Ukraine remained
much more controlled by the Soviet Union. Since the eastern part of Ukraine had
been ﬁrmly under the hand of the Soviets since before World War I and World War
II, opportunities for, and interest in, resistance was greatly curtailed. Eastern
Ukrainians identiﬁed themselves as Ukrainians, but they were little conscious of their
nationality as a signiﬁcant factor (Bilinsky 1964).

Current Situation
Politically, the fall of the Soviet Union and the birth of an independent

Ukraine have set the stage for religion to play a key role in politics. Sparked by

ll

Gorbachev’s initial movements toward reform in the late 1980’s, and by the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, informal groups began to form and to push for greater
freedoms and a revival of Ukrainian national traditions (Kuzio and Wilson 1994).
This national revival grew and gained strength, spurred on by the decreasing
hegemony of the CPSU. Demonstrations by groups such as Rukh, a political
movement supporting Ukrainian independence, became larger and bolder.

The key event that propelled Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit was the attempted
coup of August 19-21, 1991, which tried to oust Gorbachev. Up until this time,
Gorbachev had been pushing for passage of the Union Treaty, which if Signed would
have stated the desire of the various republics to preserve the Soviet Union. The
failure of the coup, and the fact that it occurred at all, led the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet to vote on August 24, 1991, by a margin of 346-1, to declare Ukraine
independent. The Communist Party was banned, armed forces were placed under
Ukrainian control, and a new currency was approved. On December 1, 1991, a
referendum was held, and over 90% of the voters approved the declaration of
independence.

The ﬁrst independent Presidential election was also held on December 1,
1991 , and former Soviet leader-turned nationalist Leonid Kravchuk was elected. In
June 1994 new Presidential elections were held and former Prime Minister Leonid
Kuchma defeated the incumbent Kravchuk. From independence onward, the
President has been the dominant ﬁgure in Ukrainian politics.

The Ukrainian Parliament, also known as the Supreme Soviet, had been

12

elected in early 1990 when the Soviets and the Communist Party were still in control.
As a result, the Parliament at the time of independence was dominated by CPSU
members. The ﬁrst truly open Parliamentary elections took place in 1994, prior to
the Presidential elections. The elections resulted in a Parliament dominated once
more by ex-communists and their allies, but slightly balanced by a challenging faction
of west-leaning nationalists. The huge number of parties, the vast differences
between the most powerful factions, and the lack of a completed Constitution suggest
ongoing struggle and deadlock.

The Chairman of Parliament, Aleksandr Moroz, is the leader of the Socialist
Party and the majority Socialist/Communist bloc and a staunch foe of supreme
Presidential power. In fact, he has proposed that the institution of the Presidency be
eliminated (Current Digest, June 15, 1995). The power Struggle between Parliament
and the President is ongoing, but given the chaos reigning in Parliament, the
President remains the supreme power. In June, 1995, during an argument between
the Parliament and the President over extra powers to be given to the President,
President Kuchma threatened to call a referendum to ask Ukrainians to choose
between the President and Parliament. Opinion polls at the time Showed 10 times
more support for the President than for Parliament. As a result, Parliament caved in
and gave President Kuchma the extra powers he wanted (Economist, July 22, 1995).
The absence of an institutionalized party system means that effective Parliamentary
rule is virtually impossible. The fact that the Constitution is still being drafted,

combined with the continuing squabbling in Parliament, suggests that the President

13
will remain the key political ﬁgure (Motyl 1993).

The executive branch of the state, including the President, ministers appointed
by the President, and the ministries they direct at the national, regional and local
levels, are the most important governmental actors. Parliament and the legislative
bodies at the regional and local levels play a much smaller role. The judiciary is still
in the process of deﬁning its sphere of inﬂuence and is exercising little power. These
various branches and levels of the state all play a role in the politics of Ukraine, but it
is primarily the national level executive branch, led by the President, that is the main
political actor.

National Movement

Ukrainian independence brought about a renewed interest in nationalism,
particularly in the west. Political movements such as Rukh held mass rallies in order
to promote Ukrainian nationalism and to push for increased political rights. Rukh has
campaigned hard to bring nationalists into public ofﬁce and has played a large role in
electing a sizeable bloc to Parliament (Subtelny 1994).

Other parties supporting nationalism has been formed, including the Congress
of National Democratic Forces. Some have taken an extreme ultra-nationalist
position, such as the Ukrainian National Assembly and the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists.

Several churches are closely tied to the nationalist movement. In the years
prior to and during World War II, the Greek Catholic Church was heavily involved

with the national resistance movement (Armstrong 1964). Recently, this church held

14

joint demonstrations with Rukh in western Ukraine in support of Ukrainian
independence.

The UAOC and the UOC-KP in recent years have also been establishing ties
with the nationalist community. In 1994 a UAOC priest ran in Parliamentary
elections as a member of the Rukh party. During the recent burial of UOC-KP
Patriarch Volodymyr, members of the far-right nationalist group Ukrainian National
Self-Defense Organization fought alongside church members for the right to bury his
body at St. Sophia’s Cathedral. Their combined ﬁght against the government’s
refusal to allow this burial suggest a solidiﬁcation of linkages between the UOC-KP
and nationalist groups (Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1995).

What then is the current status of the religious and political schisms dividing
Ukraine? First, it is important to take into account the dramatic events stemming
from Gorbachev’s reforms in the latter 1980’s. Due to his program of political
liberalization and to the crumbling of Moscow’s political control, a waterfall of
religious announcements cascaded over Ukraine in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.

In the west, a massive demonstration was held in Lviv in 1989 in support of
the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church. As a result of public pressure and
concerted effort, in late 1989 the church was legalized and in 1991 was ofﬁcially
registered and recognized as an independent church (Bociurkiw 1992).

In 1990 the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine renamed itself the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, although it maintained its loyalty to the Russian Orthodox Patriarch

in Moscow. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was

15

reestablished in 1990, and in 1992 was involved in a bizarre on—again off-again union
with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

In 1992 the Metropolitan (the spiritual leader of a region; next in line to the
Patriarch, the highest earthly church leader) of the newly named Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, Filaret, brokered an agreement joining the UAOC to a Splinter group from
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, creating the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev
Patriarchate (UOC-KP). Up until this time, Filaret had been known as a staunch
opponent of the UAOC and the Greek Catholic Church. This new church, distinct
from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which acknowledged the Moscow Patriarch
(hereafter referred to as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-
MP)), declared complete independence from Moscow and from any form of Russian
control.

The union between the two churches and the resulting new church were
immediately recognized by the government and lauded as " the " true Ukrainian church
by members of the government, including then President Kravchuk. The bizarre part
of this story is that the leader of the UAOC, the aged Patriarch Mstyslav, appeared at
ﬁrst to support, and then to denounce this union. In late 1992 he addressed the
President of Ukraine and argued that the dissolution of the UAOC and the creation of
the new UOC—KP was done illegally and was against the will of the church leadership
and church followers. At stake was the UAOC’s independent existence. After
decades of suppression under the Russian Orthodox Church, the UAOC was not eager

to relinquish its newly-recovered independence. The result of this confusion was that

16

the UAOC was recognized as an independent church by no one but itself. The other
Orthodox churches consider it uncanonical. Government recognition of their
independence has still not been settled, although it is likely to occur within the next
year.

Thus, there are three churches in Ukraine all carrying the name Ukrainian
Orthodox (see Appendix A for a listing of the major churches and their current
leaderS)--not counting the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which has the longest
history of struggling for Ukrainian national identity. In addition, a large number of
indigenous and missionary churches have sprouted up all over Ukraine.

In addition to creating confusion over name changes and new churches, one of
the main consequences of religious freedom has been the conﬂict over church
property, namely church buildings, cathedrals, and seminaries. The immediate
response of Greek Catholic believers following the 1989 legalization was to take over
their former churches from the occupying Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw
1992). Many church buildings had belonged to the Greek Catholic Church earlier,
but were taken by the Soviet government and given to the Russian Orthodox Church
in the 1940’s.

In addition, the newly created Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate
promptly took over several churches in Kiev and some money allocated to the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The heir to the Russian Orthodox Church, the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, claims that it has been plundered

and that many of its treasures have been taken by unscrupulous religious leaders of

17

other churches.

Church members are also deeply embroiled in these conﬂicts. Greek Catholic
Church members feel they have the historical right to these churches and want to
begin worshipping there again. UOC-Moscow members have been worshipping at
these same buildings for the last 40 years and feel they have been good Stewards of
the property. To them, the churches are rightfully theirs and should remain theirs.
Needless to say, tracing the true ownership of many of the buildings and the relics is
a duty that would task Solomon. The government is attempting to begin to deal with
these problems, but has looked more partisan than fair in its allocations. The national
government has favored the UOC-KP, the regional government in the west has
favored the Greek Catholic Church, and the regional government in the east has
favored the UOC-MP. For the Greek Catholic, Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox,
UOC-MP and UOC-KP churches, the biggest conﬂicts between them are over
property, rather than doctrine.

The regional divisions have remained, but have taken on a new ﬂavor with the
creation of the new churches. Western Ukraine remains a stronghold for the Greek
Catholics, but also is the main base for the UAOC. The UOC-KP is attempting to
gain a foothold in the west, primarily through its strident claims to represent
nationalistic interests. The UOC-MP is the undisputed church of choice in the east
and center of the country.

Various studies have examined the current religious divide. In an earlier study

based on data from 1991-92 (Gee 1995), I examined the differences in religious

18

interest and afﬁliation between different regions in Ukraine. The data revealed that
western Ukrainians are signiﬁcantly more religious than eastern Ukrainians, and that
the religious divide between western Greek Catholics and eastern and central
Orthodox believers is still wide. Survey data from 1994 from the Ukrainian
government indicate that the largest church in Ukraine is the UOC-MP, with most of
its support in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (see Appendix B for a list
of churches and their size across regions of Ukraine). The second largest church is
the Greek Catholic church, with virtually all of its supporters living in the western
regions of Galatia. The third largest church is the UOC-KP, located primarily in the
non-Galatian regions of west Ukraine. The UAOC is a distant fourth, with all its
support restricted to two regions in west Ukraine.

Ukraine is also divided across political lines. Data from the 1994 Presidential
election reveal the marked divide between east and west and their support for the
Presidential candidates (see Appendix E). Voters in the west overwhelmingly favored
incumbent Leonid Kravchuk, who ran on a nationalist, anti-Russian program. The
cast voted in overwhelming numbers for challenger Leonid Kuchma, who supported
closer ties with Russia. The relationship between these political and religious
divisions will be ﬂeshed out in later chapters.

Conclusion

The religious and political divisions in Ukraine are long-lived. The recent

revival of religious life in Ukraine has once again thrust churches and church conﬂict

onto center stage of political life. The arguments over church property are once again

19

pulling geographic, ethnic, and political concerns into the religious fray. Religious
life in Ukraine has historically been distinguished by the deep impact it has had upon
the politics of the country. Current events indicate that this impact continues, and
that religion will continue to play a crucial role in explaining the political divisions

within Ukraine.

Chapter 2
Literature Review and Theory
Introduction

This chapter contains a review of the literature and theories derived from the
literature that apply to the Situation in Ukraine. Throughout, I am not stating
conclusions, but am applying broader theories to the speciﬁc situation in Ukraine.

My theory is that churches are political actors. Although they are sacred
bodies, churches are often deeply involved in secular politics. Political activity can
range from taking stances on issues, to candidate endorsements and party support, to
making demands upon the State. This activity is important because it can inﬂuence
the political actions of the state, the political beliefs of church members, and the
national identity of a people.

It has been suggested that religion affects politics on two levels: the
individual/personal and the collective/institutional (Smith 1987). Religion affects
politics at the most basic, individual level, often reorienting the values and
corresponding political beliefs of believers. It also affects politics collectively, by
orienting these believers around an institution or a community that has a belief
system, a structure, and sometimes, a political agenda.

Churches have often been at the forefront of political movements. As
institutional bodies with doctrines, texts, rites and Ofﬁciants, they are in a position to
inﬂuence politics on both levels; they can be the channel through which religious

doctrine and political direction can be communicated to the individual, and they can

20

21

act as political bodies, directly addressing political concerns.

Based upon previous research, I theorize that churches in Ukraine are
interested in inﬂuencing government. Religious interests play a very important role in
the politics of Ukraine. Churches are using ethnic, geographic, and nationalistic
divisions within the country for their own political purposes. For a variety of
reasons, these religious factions are attempting to communicate their interests to the
Ukrainian government. From the perspective of the churches, their group
characteristics and tactics inﬂuence how successfully their interests are communicated
to the State. From the perspective of the state, group success depends upon how
receptive the state and its agencies are to group demands. When a convincing group
meets a receptive state, there is a chance to inﬂuence government policy.

I also theorize that churches in Ukraine are also interested in inﬂuencing the
political views of their members. One of the most salient political issues in Ukraine
today is the development of a national Ukrainian identity. Ukraine is undergoing a
profound transformation. As a people, Ukrainians are coming to grips with how they
deﬁne themselves politically and culturally, and Ukrainian churches are deeply
involved in this process. The search for a national identity is tightly bound with how
people view themselves, and this, in turn, can often involve considerations of
religious interest and afﬁliation. Church and religious identity can play a role in
inﬂuencing national identity. Churches are using symbols such as acquisition of
property, choice of language for worship services, and orientations toward or away

from Moscow to build distinctive national identities. These national identities contain

22

speciﬁc and Signiﬁcant political aspects. The direction in which this identity is
developed has implications for Ukraine’s behavior in the former Soviet Union and in
the larger world community.

Today, Ukraine is struggling to assert her independence from Russia, and the
actions of several Ukrainian churches have manifested this desire (Bociurkiw 1992).
By reclaiming church property from the Russian Orthodox Church or by supporting
nationalistic Ukrainian policies and candidates, leaders in Ukrainian churches are
shaping and expressing national identity. Their actions can have an impact upon the
way Ukrainians view themselves and how they perceive the outside world. This, in
turn, can have serious implications for internal peace and external security. If
Ukrainians perceive that strident nationalism is central to Ukrainian identity, relations
with Russia or other countries could be seriously threatened. The political peace and
security of the entire CIS would be endangered by escalations of tension between
Russia and Ukraine. Currently contentious issues, such as disagreements over
ownership and disposal of nuclear weapons, could become much more volatile if
Ukraine Slides into xenophobic nationalism. Churches in Ukraine are playing a role
in this process. Their sacred and secular assertions are inﬂuencing Ukrainian
identity, Ukrainian political behavior, and the stability of Ukrainian/Russian relations
in a negative direction. The schisms between churches may parallel the deepening
chasm between Ukrainians and Russians, and the nations of Ukraine and Russia.

Ukraine today provides an optimal place to explore the interaction of religion

and politics. It has had a history of religious activism in the political realm, and

23

current events suggest that this religious activism is likely to continue in the future
(Bilinsky 1964). Under Communism, church inﬂuence was discouraged, and church
pressure upon the political system was slight and covert. Religious belief and
afﬁliation played virtually no role in national deﬁnition. Religious groups and
churches are emerging from this time of impotence and are seeking to assert their new
power.

The Presidential election in 1994 provides a context for examining the political
behavior of churches. The timing and nature of the election have created an
environment in which churches are moving purposefully within the political arena.
Over four years have passed since Ukraine declared her independence and the Soviet
Union collapsed, yet the political, economic and social conditions in Ukraine have
steadily grown worse. Relations between Ukraine and Russia are very tense, and
ethnic and political divisions within the country are becoming more acute and
contentious. The recent Presidential election magniﬁed the inter-country tensions:
eastern Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for Kravchuk, the sitting President, while
western Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for Kuchma, the challenger (see Appendix E).
The election of Kuchma (by a 52—48% margin), who favors increased ties with Russia
and whose support base is in the Russian-Speaking and Russian-oriented east, may
foreshadow a period of even greater instability.

Within the context of the political, economic and social strife surrounding the
election, churches have been moving deliberately to inﬂuence political outcomes.

This study focuses upon the actions and intentions of the major church players in the

24

time surrounding the July 1994 Presidential election, and examines how the activities
of these churches played off of and contributed to the divisions within the country.
Churches and Politics

It is not surprising to ﬁnd churches behaving as signiﬁcant institutional actors.
Research on churches in the Unites States has demonstrated that churches are able to
inﬂuence governmental policy (Guth et a1. 1988; Hertzke 1988). As will be discussed
later in this chapter, American churches are directly lobbying government in order to
change public policy. Of particular interest are social issues such as abortion and
education.

Not only are church able to inﬂuence policy. In Africa, churches are among
the foremost institutions affecting democratic transitions. They have taken a role of
direct political involvement in society. They have challenged political structures,
advocated reform, and pushed for political change (Gifford 1994). In Togo, Malawi,
and Zambia, mainline churches have challenged the ruling dictators in their push for
reform. In Kenya they have taken strong stands on the widening gap between rich
and poor, and in doing so have kept social justice issues on the national agenda
(Bratton 1994).

One reason for the central role of African churches in this reform process is
their strength relative to other institutions in society. Political parties and unions are
very weak in Africa. Given the one-part state prevailing in many countries of Africa,
churches have become the Single greatest civil-society element (Gifford 1994). In

Kenya, the Protestant churches are the " lead institutions" in civil society (Bratton

25

1994). They are among the only formal organizations with a large following, a
deﬁnite Structure, and an appeal that surpasses clan or class.

Ukrainian churches are just setting out to inﬂuence politics. Following 70
years of Communist rule and church impotence, their strength as political actors may
take some time to develop. Their advocacy of pubic goods may, at the outset, fall
prey to their desire for private goods of property and status. However, despite their
inexperience and potentially selﬁsh motives, they are becoming Signiﬁcant institutional
actors.

Impgrtance of Culture

The importance of culture, and particularly religion, in understanding political
development is underscored by Inglehart’s (1988, 1994) work. Differences in
religious value systems are related to different perceptions toward democratization
(Inglehart 1994), economic development, and the creation of democratic institutions
(Inglehart 1988).

Samuel Huntington (1993) discussed the importance of culture, especially
religion, and its role in dividing civilizations. He notes that the line dividing western
Christians from eastern Orthodox believers runs right through the middle of Ukraine.
This line separates Protestants and Catholics from Orthodox believers, but it also
indicates a difference in economic and political orientation. Those to the west of the
line share a common experience of the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, and
"now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to

the consolidation of democratic political systems " (Huntington 1993: 30). To the east

26

of the line, the people share the experience of the Tsarist empire, were little touched
by the events that shaped the rest of Europe and " seem much less likely to develop
stable democratic political systems " (Huntington 1993: 31). Therefore, the religious
divisions within Ukraine are long-lived and coincide with profound economic and
political differences.

Since Ukraine is in the midst of an unprecedented political transition, this is an
optimal time to study churches’ role in politics. With the recent ﬂowering of
religious freedom, individuals and churches are just now beginning to assert
themselves and to crystallize their political stances. Since little research has been
done on the speciﬁc political desires and tactics of Ukrainian churches, this study will
expand our knowledge of this country as well as the role of church inﬂuence upon
politics in general.

Churches as Interest Groups

A great deal has been written about the desires and tactics of interest groups
and their inﬂuence on politics. Groups use their position and resources to inﬂuence
policy on the macro level, and to politically socialize their members on the micro
level. James Madison prefaced his description of the Constitutional structure of the
United States with an extended discussion of the motives and tactics of groups.
Factions, motivated by a common interest, will vex and oppress each other in trying
to seek their own interests. Small groups organized around a narrow interest are
likely to be more successful in their pursuits than large groups seeking a general

interest (Olson 1965). Since small groups ensure that beneﬁts will be narrowly

27

dispersed, members are more willing to bear the cost to achieve these beneﬁts. Large
groups pursuing public goods may ﬁnd themselves forced to rely upon selective
incentives in order to encourage cooperation. The consequences are that small groups
organized around private interests are likely to be more successful at inﬂuencing
government than large groups.

Groups also inﬂuence politics by shaping the attitudes and political views of
their members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944). Primary groups can transmit
norms and values and can inﬂuence the political attitudes of group members. Groups
communicate with their members both directly and indirectly, and the information
communicated can inﬂuence the perceived interests of the members (Moe 1980).
Research has also demonstrated that attitudes in turn can have an inﬂuence upon
group formation and behavior (Finifter 1974).

Churches behave in many ways like Madison’s factions. Churches are likely
to ﬁnd themselves embroiled in conﬂicts for power, and their "zeal for different
opinions concerning religion" (Madison: 55) will often throw them into the political
arena. They will often pressure government directly in order to inﬂuence policy.
Research has demonstrated that churches in the United States have begun to behave as
political lobbying groups (Hertzke 1988). Church groups in the United States have
become politicized to a degree where they are participating directly and frequently in
the political process. AS religious freedom has come to the former USSR, churches
have stepped into the political fray. Previously silent churches are now expected to

become key players in the political arena (Moss 1991).

28

In addition, churches, like other groups, can have an inﬂuence upon the micro
political views of their members. They behave as socializing agencies, shaping
attitudes and interests. Previous research has indicated that churches and religious
groups have important contextual inﬂuences upon the political beliefs of their
members (Guth et al. 1988; Jelen 1992; Leege 1992; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988,
1990; White 1968). Churches act as reference groups, transmit political information
(Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990), structure attitudes and behavior (Langton 1986),
provide political cues (Leege 1992), and provide a normative structure (White 1968).
As leaders in the church, and as respected ﬁgures within the community, the church
elite are well positioned to communicate political information to their members. Due
to their spiritual authority as well as their expertise in the religious arena, they are in
a unique position to synthesize political issues of the day together with larger issues of
spiritual concern. Church leaders can gather political information, place it in the
context of a spiritual lesson, and communicate the ideas, both Spiritual and political,
to the church membership.

Interest group theory provides the bases for understanding the political activity
of churches in Ukraine. Factions, in this case church groups, are striving to
accomplish their goals in the political realm. I theorize that the pursuit of private
goods is the dominant activity, with church factions ﬁghting one another to gain
exclusive property, power or position. The pursuit of public goods is expected to be
much less active, since churches will have the tendency to free-ride and expect other

churches to take action.

29

This Study examines the way that churches in Ukraine act as political factions.
Ukrainian churches have been involved, to different degrees, with political issues.
Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches have been entangled in various political
conﬂicts, while Protestant churches have chosen to remain distant from overtly
political issues (Perebenesyk 1992). Little scholarly work has been done on the
political socialization role played by churches, but historical research reveals that
churches in Ukraine have inﬂuenced the nationalistic interest of Greek Catholic and
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church members (Bociurkiw 1992). Church
action is shaping the political attitudes of Ukrainians and the national identity of
Ukraine.

This approach is distinct because it recognizes the central political role
churches are playing, and places this role in the theoretical framework of interest
group activity.

How Churches Differ From Other Interest Groups

Although churches share many of the characteristics of interest groups, they
are also quite distinct from other interest groups.

In one respect, churches are able to offer tremendous solidary incentives for
their members to join and remain a part of the group. While other interest groups
may relay upon selective incentives, churches offer the greatest solidary inventive of
all. . .access to God. Churches members are tied to the church not simply because the
church gives them material beneﬁts, but because they provide Spiritual guidance and

Spiritual identiﬁcation. Churches can also offer material beneﬁts. Grand church

30

buildings, beautiful church services, and the care and concern offered by the church
leader and other church members in times of sickness are large material beneﬁts
available to church members. Few other interest groups can offer such appealing
incentives.

The moral authority inherent within the church and church leaders is also
distinct. No other interest group has the built-in respect and deference accorded to
leaders of the church. When church leaders don their robes, ascend to the altar and
proclaim God’s work, they are appealing to the deepest sense of moral and spiritual
authority in a church member’s heart. In this situation, the leader assumes the voice
of God, and is granted the corresponding respect. No leader of any other interest
group can claim such authority.

Churches are also given a measure of respect by the leaders of government.
AS representatives of the nation’s spiritual heritage, church leaders are often called
upon to take part in symbolic national ceremonies. In Ukraine, high church leaders
are invited to participate in ofﬁcial ceremonies celebrating the inauguration of a new
President. Rarely are other interest groups granted such a privilege.

Churches offer a well-established hierarchy leading all the way up to God.
Group mores urge church members to obey the orders of those higher in authority.
In addition, churches represent a sense of Stability and order in a time of change and
uncertainty.

In Ukraine, the history of the church also sets it apart form other Ukrainian

interest groups. The premier place granted to the Orthodox Church in the center and

31
east, and the Greek Catholic Church in the west by the State in marked. Before the

onset of Communism, these churches were very closely aligned to the state. In west
Ukraine, the Greek Catholic Church was a national church par excellence (Bilinsky
1964). The Orthodox Church, in turn, was the favored church of the Tsars, and after
the creation of the USSR, was still granted special favor by the authorities. Unlike
any other church, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was placed in an advantageous
position simply because it was tolerated by the Soviet state (Subtelny 1994). These
historical contacts provide them with current access to power. AS will be discussed in
great detail later in this study, the Orthodox church is still able to make use of their
Soviet contacts, while the Greek Catholic Church is able to gain great power by
reconstructing old nationalist contacts.

Because of these differences, churches are positioned to be signiﬁcant political
actors, more effective in many ways that other interest groups. Due to the beneﬁts
they offer, both solidary and material, they are likely to have an easier time drawing
in and retaining members than other interest groups. The moral authority bestowed
upon church leaders positions them well to successfully inﬂuence both church
members and governmental decision makers. Their historical position in Ukraine,
whether as the representative of a millennium of Orthodoxy or as the protector of
Ukrainian nationalism, gives them a position of power and legitimacy available to few
other interest groups.

The actions of non-govermnental actors, especially religious groups, has often

been overlooked. Just as culture has been used as an explanation of last resort (Verba

32

1965), non-governmental actors have been relegated to actors of last resort. In fact,
religious groups and values have long inﬂuenced political outcomes, particularly in
Ukraine.

However, this study does more than acknowledge the political weight of
Ukrainian churches. This study places Ukrainian church political activity into a
theoretical framework of interest group actions and motivations. Churches are
assumed to be actors who are motivated by personal interest to seek certain goods
from the state. Their success is predicted based upon their secular ties to three broad
categories: the former Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalist groups and foreign groups.
The political behavior of churches is examined in the context of interest group theory.
Churches not only inﬂuence politics; they also follow the same behavioral patterns as
other non-state actors.

Inﬂuencing the State
How Groups Reach the State

The basic assumptions underlying group inﬂuence upon government deal with
the nature of the groups and the individuals who make them up. Groups are made up
of selﬁshly interested individuals who band together to carry out their common
interest. These factions will pursue government in order to satisfy this interest,
without regard to the consequences for others in society. Numerous factions,
therefore, will clash in the pursuit of their own interests, and cooperation that would
result in the common good is foregone. It becomes the job of the state to respond to

factional demands but, in doing so, it must also consider and protect the interests of

33

the larger society. This societal protection is motivated by the self-interest of the
members of the government (Downs 1967). Privately motivated individuals will serve
the public interest by their devotion to their job and by the necessity of balancing the
conﬂicting desires of the groups if they are to keep their job.

Various structural mechanisms can be put into place to insure that groups will
be listened to and that the interests of the larger society are protected. Suffrage laws
insure that people can participate as voters, and representation determines that these
voters, joined in factions, can inﬂuence but not completely control government.
Private rights and the public good are secured against the danger of faction by the
liberty to participate and the delegation of government to representatives. All voices
are heard, and all interests are taken into account.

The problem is that the system does not always function this way. Often a
breakdown occurs, and the interests of certain groups overwhelm the interests of the
others. Instead of all selﬁsh interests being channeled into the public good, some
private interests are heard while other private interests and the larger public good are
ignored. It therefore becomes possible for some groups to wield a great deal of
inﬂuence.

Church groups in Ukraine function much like factions. The zeal for different
opinions concerning religion will often embroil sacred organizations in secular
political conﬂict. Today, Ukrainian churches are attempting to inﬂuence the
Ukrainian State. After decades of repression, the recent freedom of religion has

brought a ﬂowering of church involvement in political issues. Churches that were

34

previously coopted or persecuted by the Soviet state are now turning to the
government to satisfy some of their interests. Some of these interests are general,
such as the passage of laws governing freedom of conscience and the simpliﬁcation of
procedures governing the registration of religious groups (Perebenesyk 1992). Other
interests are speciﬁc, such as the quest on the part of some groups to gain autonomy
and to claim property (Bociurkiw 1992). Although this church inﬂuence is relatively
recent and is not extensively documented, it seems clear that some groups may be
better positioned to reach the state than others. Not all groups have an equal voice in
government. Some factions are better able to achieve their goals than others, due to
the nature of the goods sought and the characteristics of the groups themselves.

Groups have several tactics available to inﬂuence government. The success of
these tactics varies, however, with the willingness of the groups to utilize them. In
Ukraine, willingness to utilize tactics may be inﬂuenced by the ability to use these
tactics.
Monitoring

Monitoring is one means used to inﬂuence government. By observing the state
and its actions closely, groups can determine whether or not their interests are being
pursued with appropriate vigor. This tactic proves difﬁcult for some groups because
of their unwillingness to pay the information costs required to know what the state is
doing. Given the inclination of many to free-ride and to expect others to pay the cost
to be informed, monitoring often does not occur. Groups who are small and

organized around a private interest are likely to be most effective at monitoring the

35

actions of government. By restricting size to the smallest number, groups can stay
uniﬁed, can internally monitor free-riders, and can be much more diligent in watching
government (Riker 1962). In addition, growth in group size often entails a dilution of
the ideological message. Increases in size may provide greater electoral power, but
this power comes at a cost of message purity (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).
Therefore, groups willing to pay the cost to monitor government will be well-
informed, while most other groups will be ignorant. Monitoring will quickly become
one-sided, in favor of small, informed groups.

Churches in Ukraine are interested in politics, and are therefore likely to be
monitoring political decisions, but to different degrees. The Protestant groups in
Ukraine are primarily concerned with problems of registration and legalization, while
Greek Catholics and various Ukrainian Orthodox churches are concerned with inter-
church ﬁghting over property (Perebenesyk 1992). Protestant churches are involved
with issues that can be considered public goods. Efforts to simplify church
registration processes will beneﬁt all religious groups, regardless of whether they
were involved in the effort. The Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, however,
are ﬁghting among themselves over private goods. They are primarily concerned
with ownership of church property and state recognition, so their efforts are designed
to help only themselves. Therefore, it seems that while the Protestant churches are
worried about collective goods, the other churches are concerned with private goods.

It is likely, given the nature of the goods under consideration, that the groups

pursuing the private goods of property and ofﬁcial position are more likely to pay the

36

cost to monitor government. Since public goods cannot be divided up and beneﬁts
are shared by all, regardless of the cost paid to achieve them, it is rational for
individuals and groups to free ride, allowing others to bear the cost. Therefore,
groups involved with or beneﬁtting from public goods are not likely to pay the extra
resources to monitor governmental behavior. Groups beneﬁtting from private goods,
however, are very likely to monitor governmental actions. Since they only beneﬁt to
the degree that they pay the resources, they will likely be very diligent in their
participation and monitoring. The Protestant churches are expected to be less
involved in monitoring governmental response to their public good demands, while
the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches are likely to be highly involved regarding
these private goods.
Sanctions

Sanctions are a second means to inﬂuence government. If the state is not
following the interests of a group, it can use sanctions to punish offenders. By doling
out rewards and punishments, groups that have monitored governmental action can
enforce their wishes, providing policy makers with the incentive to continue to pursue
group interests with vigor. Sanctions most frequently take the form of electoral
support. If a policy maker has failed to support the group, they are voted out of
ofﬁce, if they have pursued group interests, they are reelected.

This tactic is useful only for those groups who have paid the information costs
to monitor the actions of the State in the ﬁrst place and who are willing to pay the

costs to make a decision regarding punishments or rewards. Since most groups and

37

group members are ignorant, sanctions are useful only to informed, knowledgeable
groups.

Churches that are monitoring an issue are in the best position to be able to
sanction governmental decision makers. Sanctioning power may be strongest among
those churches with the strongest backing and the most potential voters. Since
Ukrainian nationalism is a rising force in Ukraine, those churches, such as the Greek
Catholic, Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox churches, that have a strong association with the nationalistic
movement are positioned well to be able to reward and punish members of
government. The Greek Catholic Church has organized joint protests, combining
religious and political interests, with the powerful nationalist political party Rukh.
One protest, in 1989, is credited with the removal from the Ukrainian Politburo of
two hardliners who were opposed to Rukh’s nationality and religious policy
(Bociurkiw 1992). This sanctioning power was made possible by support from
Ukrainian nationalist organizations and previous ties with the governing ofﬁcials.

A problem, as already mentioned, is that an increase in size brings about a
larger membership and a more diluted message (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).

Once the message is diluted, the salience of the issue may diminish for many
members. Ideological strength and conviction may give way to apathy and a muddled
message. In fact, there is some evidence that the explicitly political and divisive
activities of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches have diminished the churches’

sacred appeal. Their religious message has become diluted by the fervency of their

38

political message. For this reason, many Ukrainians are turning to less political and
more purely religious Protestant churches (Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1993).
Credibility

The credibility of a group also affects the inﬂuence it will have over
government. Groups may have the ability to monitor and sanction, but unless they
are perceived to be willing to use these tactics, they will have little inﬂuence over
governmental decision-makers. If groups attempt to inﬂuence government solely in
the reactive, passive mode, as described by Becker (1988), then government is not
very likely to listen. This after-the-fact response is hardly credible, simply because it
comes so late and is so passive.

Credibility requires force and timeliness. The tendency to cede power to elites
also undermines credibility. By relying upon information provided in the two-step
ﬂow of communication (Katz 1957) and the knowledge of political surrogates (Sowell
1980), individuals and groups give up their power and credibility. When they turn
over decision-making power to others, they effectively remove themselves from the
process and hand control to those who are informed. These elites now have the
information, the power, and the credibility to ensure that their interests will be
pursued by government.

Credibility can be broken down into several components. The ﬁrst aspect
involves claims to be a true representative of Ukrainian national identity. In this
case, credibility would be accorded to churches with historical linkages to the national

movement or the struggle for national identity. The second aspect involves the actual

39

inﬂuence a group has with the bureaucracy. A church with close linkages to
members of key governmental agencies would have good credibility Because of their
ability to contact and inﬂuence them. Finally, credibility involves the ability of a
group to mobilize group members and to threaten electoral punishment. Church
groups that can persuade their members to take action will be deemed credible by the
members of government that can be helped or harmed by their participation.

The credibility of Ukrainian churches varies greatly. Their perceived
willingness and ability to monitor and sanction is inﬂuenced by their ties to the
former Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalist organizations, and organizations external to
Ukraine. The authority and credibility of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine
(UOC-Moscow) is at an all-time low (Antic 1990). Seen as pro-Communist and anti-
Ukrainian, this church is tainted by ties to the Soviet State and distance from popular
Ukrainian movements (Moss 1991). They lack the legitirnizing historical links to
independent Ukrainian state that could help their credibility. AS a result, policy
makers are unlikely to view it as an entirely credible political force. However, their
contacts to and inﬂuence with the bureaucracy due to their Soviet ties Should help
their credibility among certain decision makers.

The UOC-Kiev Patriarchate has the beneﬁt of being viewed, by some, as a
nationalistic church. Since it is a new church, it has no historical linkages to an
independent Ukrainian state, but it is making the most of its ties to nationalist groups
and the nationalist movement. This should gain them some credibility. However, the

credibility of this church is hampered by the same ties to the Soviet state as the UOC-

40

Moscow Patriarchate. For policy makers with their own ties to the Soviet state, this
church may be deemed credible. But to nationalists, the credibility of this church is
tainted. The church will have a struggle to reconcile these opposing aspects of its
identity. The credibility gained from its nationalist identity may clash with the
credibility it gains from links to former Soviet bureaucrats.

The credibility of the more historically Ukrainian churches such as the Greek
Catholics and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as previously
discussed, is very high. They have strong support from overtly political groups and
are popular with the people. They have make strong claims to represent Ukrainian
nationhood, and this will be a strong draw to church members and will make them
more easily mobilized. As long as the appeal of nationalism continues to grow, they
are likely to be willing and able to apply political leverage.

The Protestant churches are a different Story. Their credibility is strong, but
they suffer from a perceived lack of willingness to act politically. The Protestants
were persecuted under Communism, so their resistance to the Soviet State is well
known. They have few ties with the national movement or the existing bureaucracy,
so their credibility is low. Their external ties also provide them with some strength,
since wealthy Western organizations are Strongly connected to, and interested in the
concerns of, these churches. But, their willingness and political credibility suffer
because of the nature of the goods that they pursue. Protestant churches have been
primarily interested in issues involving freedom of religion and religious registration.

Therefore, they have been politically interested in public, rather than private, goods.

41

They have shown little inclination to ﬁght politically for private goods and have, as a
result, largely removed themselves from the political arena. Their own distance from
many of the issues that are of concern to the other churches self-selects them out of
the political picture for the most part. Since they are perceived to be unwilling to
mobilize their members, their credibility suffers.

State Resmnsiveness

Thus far, I have examined what groups do to reach the state. Now, I would
like to look more closely at the manner in which group effort affects the
responsiveness of the state. Church ties to the Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalism,
and external organizations have an impact upon how the churches reach the state, but
ultimately their importance lies in how they affect state responsiveness to church
demands.

The main factor determining state responsiveness is participation. In a
democratic or near-democratic system, the participation of individuals and groups
directs the activities of the State. But, as discussed earlier, not all groups participate
at an equal rate, and therefore the state does not always respond in an even-handed
fashion. Several churches in Ukraine are playing an active role in trying to inﬂuence
governmental decisions in the area of property rights, and I want to examine what is
likely to inﬂuence the response of the state to these demands.

The response of the state is likely to be determined in large part by the agency
within the government that makes the relevant decisions. Literature in the United

States has focused upon the problem of regulatory capture (Stigler 1988). Executive

42

agencies designed to make decisions that will beneﬁt the whole society become
ensnared by the very groups that they were designed to regulate. It is natural that
groups will gravitate toward those governmental agencies that make decisions
pertaining to their activities. These agencies become natural magnets for potentially
affected groups. The problem arises when agencies begin to listen to the needs of the
groups to the exclusion of the wider interest that they were designed to protect. In
many ways, this regulatory attention is warranted. The interested groups are
protecting their private interests, and are therefore willing to expend resources that
the regulator may value, such as votes, workers, or money. The disinterested public
that the regulator is supposed to protect holds much less appeal than an involved
group. In the resulting ﬁlter process, the voice of the public is muted, and private
groups are heard. State response to the interested group results in beneﬁts going to
the interested few while costs are incurred by the disinterested public.

Certain churches in Ukraine today are actively involved in trying to claim
church property. Agencies within the Ukrainian state are responding to these
demands by taking property away from some groups and giving it to others. In
particular, the state is having to mediate the demands of the multiple Ukrainian
Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. The Greek Catholic Church disputes
decisions resulting from the 1946 Synod of Lviv which disbanded the Greek Catholic
Church and gave their church property to the Russian Orthodox Church. They claim
that they are entitled to a formal apology and, more importantly, a return of their

church property. The Ukrainian Orthodox churches, as expected, argue that they

43

have been faithful stewards of the church property and have earned the right to
continue ownership (Little 1991).

The response of the state to these conﬂicting demands is, in part, determined
by the church characteristics mentioned earlier. The historical ties to the Soviet
Union are likely to hinder the claims of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. Both the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church-Kiev Patriarchate suffer from historically strong connections to the Soviet
state. While the UOC-KP has tried to downplay their Russian and Soviet ties, it has
become common knowledge that Metropolitan Filaret had long-standing ties with the
Soviet secret police (Motyl 1993).

The Ukrainian state, obsessed with distinguishing itself from its Soviet
predecessor, is likely to View the claims of the Soviet-tied churches with suspicion.
In the case of the UOC-KP, the state is faced with a dilemma. This church has
attempted to position itself as the true nationalistic church of Ukraine, but the
historical ties of key leaders continue to bring back associations of Soviet domination.
The state responded most favorably in 1990 when councils in three provinces of the
highly nationalistic western Ukraine voted to nullify the Synod of Lviv and to return
all property to the Greek Catholics (Little 1991). But, it is interesting to note that
when the Ukrainian state ﬁrst began to take up the issues raised by the Greek Catholic
church, they did not rush to fulﬁll all its demands. Rather, in the early stages of
Ukrainian Statehood, the state agencies ruled in favor of the (then) Russian Orthodox

Church, demonstrating by their preferential treatment the power of past governmental

contacts.

The nationalistic bent of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is likely to
register favorably with the Ukrainian agencies, particularly those located in the
western portion of Ukraine. Since Ukrainian nationalism is growing in the west of
the country, the members of the Greek Catholic Church are likely to be able to
provide the state regulators with resources, such as votes or support, that are of great
value to the regulators. As time has gone on, this issue and these ties have gained in
importance, and State response may grow in reaction.

External ties have also played a role in state responsiveness. Delegations from
the Vatican and from the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow met in March 1990 in
order to reconcile differences between the Greek Catholic and UOC—Moscow
churches. These talks broke down due to the irreconcilable demands of the two sides.
The Ukrainian Catholics wanted full recognition of their church and acknowledgement
of their existence and authority. The representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church
refused to concede the invalidity of the 1946 Synod of Lviv that effectively wiped out
the Greek Catholic Church (Little 1991). After this breakdown, relations between the
two churches worsened. The inﬂuence of these external groups has likely inﬂuenced,
to some degree, the response of the state to the church demands.

Conﬂicts exist also between the "Ukrainian" churches, namely the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox, the Greek Catholic and the UOC-KP churches. Again, they
are arguing over church property, and their claims to the State could be inﬂuenced by

a variety of factors. Rumors alleging that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev

45

Patriarchate has been supported by the Soviet government have been ﬂoating around
Ukraine (Little 1991). In addition, there have been allegations that the UAOC
collaborated with the Nazis during WWII (Dawisha and Parrott 1994). If this was
perceived to be true, the Ukrainian state might view these ties as damaging and may
look more favorably upon the Greek Catholic claims.

Since these churches are strongly linked with the nationalistic movement, the
State might look more favorably upon the church that could provide resources of
value. Agencies of the government might choose to favor one group based upon the
strength and location of votes that could be provided.

Finally, external ties might inﬂuence responsiveness. The linkage with the
Vatican as well as historical Polish ties may cause the state to be suspicious of the
Greek Catholic Church. If nationalism continues to grow and if it takes on an
increasingly xenophobic tone, these external ties may look threatening or dangerous to
the state agencies. In this case, they would likely respond more favorably to the
perceived "more Ukrainian" Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

What is interesting about this whole process is the degree to which these few
groups are able to inﬂuence the state. The State bodies seem to be making decisions
regarding property with respect only to the interested parties, with little to no concern
for other groups or the larger society. Protestant groups are in need of property in
order to hold their church services, but since they have no historical governmental ties
and are uninvolved with the nationalistic movement, they have few means to gain

state attention. The inﬂuence of external Protestant and missionary groups may help

46

state responsiveness, but it is generally accepted that they are being ﬁltered out of the
process of property assignment. Since the interests of the larger society are diffuse
and unarticulated, they are not considered. Little thought is being given to the best
distribution of this property; rather the historical and political considerations are the
determining factors.

Influencing Political Attitudes

Group leaders communicate their ideology to the new members. As
membership increases, often this task become difﬁcult, as the ideological salience of
the message can begin to become diluted in the face of a growing membership
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The goal of the leadership, then, is to communicate
the message clearly and to win over new contacts and keep old members.

People Often look to group leaders to provide information. Since information
is costly to gather and process, many people are unwilling to bear the costs
themselves and turn to political surrogates, both to make decisions (Sowell 1980) and
to process the information (Katz 1957). Decision making is ceded to political elites,
and information dissemination is often ceded to opinion leaders. In the two-step ﬂow
of information, opinion leaders ﬁrst pay the cost to gather and process the information
and then they turn around and transmit it to their group. By virtue of the information
that they chose to gather and the process by which they synthesize it, they become an
important ﬁlter through which information ﬂows. As they communicate their
information to the people they come into contact with, they determine which

information is communicated and in what manner. In this way, the opinion leaders

47

become important sources of information and sources of pressure to conform (Katz
1957). The transmission of information can have a strong inﬂuence upon the
formation of political attitudes.

Churches and church elites inﬂuence political attitudes in much the same way.
Religious afﬁliation has been found to be a strong determiner of party vote in
Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland (Lijphart 1979). AS voluntary
communities, churches are found to be well suited to transmit group norms. In this
manner, the theology of the community inﬂuences the individual politics of the church
member (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988). Research in the United States has indicated
that the more extensive the participation in the church, the more consistent the
political message given in the church, and the smaller the amount of external
information received, the greater the political cohesion within the church on a political
issue (Wald, Owen and Hill 1990). Religious groups are able to inﬂuence the
political views of their church members, and the clarity of the message as well as the
agreement of the political position of other reference groups will affect the degree of
political inﬂuence (Welsh and Leege 1991).

The role of the elite leaders in Ukrainian churches is not well understood.
There is no question that elites play an important role in church life. Priests and
pastors preach, teach, counsel and guide church members. In the course of doing
this, they also can transmit political information (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990),
structure attitudes and behavior (Langton 1986), and provide political cues (Leege

1992). It is not known to what degree church members in Ukraine cede power to

48

their leaders, or how much they follow their teachings. Therefore, we do not know
how different elite interest are from member interests.
Church Types and Ties

The degree to which churches can inﬂuence the state and shape the political
attitudes of church members depends, in part, upon the ties that each church has.

The following matrix (Table 1) may provide some insight into which churches
will most likely succeed at inﬂuencing government. Based upon previous studies of
churches and politics in the former Soviet Union, I believe that the major churches in
Ukraine can be placed into four main categories according to their church type: I.
Ukrainian Orthodox-Moscow Patriarchate, H. Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and
Ukrainian Greek Catholic, III. Baptists and other Protestants, and IV. Ukrainian
Orthodox Church—Kiev Patriarchate. Church type largely reﬂects denominational
differences. Ukraine is ﬁlled with a variety of churches and denominations, but this
Study focuses upon these four types because the churches within them are the most
populous and active in Ukraine. At the initial stages of research, the UOC-MP and
UOC-KP were combined into one category, but information gathered in the course of
ﬁeldwork conﬁrmed that they Should be in separate categories. Additional
information also resulted in the UAOC and Greek Catholic churches being moved
from the category "moderate ties to the Soviet state" to the category "weak ties to the
Soviet state", and the category "moderate ties to the Soviet state" being removed
altogether.

Unfortunately, very little research has been done on the religious

49

demographics of Ukraine, so estimates of church membership and socio-economic and
geographic characteristics are difﬁcult. Based upon Ukrainian governmental statistics
(see Appendix B), Type I churches have the largest number of adherents in Ukraine,
located primarily in the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. The Ukrainian
Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) claims a membership of 6 million
within Ukraine. Type II churches are smaller and are traditionally strong in the
western regions of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (UAOC) is the
smallest of the Orthodox churches, and is regarded as uncanonical by the Type I
churches. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Uniate) owes allegiance to Rome,
but uses the Orthodox rite. Type III churches are likely the least populous, but may
be experiencing the most rapid growth. They include the traditional Baptist churches
as well as newer missionary Protestant churches. Type IV churches are made up of
the splinter group who left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) claims a membership of
15 million in Ukraine. These numbers are somewhat suspect; one recent survey
indicates that the majority of those who consider themselves Orthodox identify with
the UOC--KP (Martyniuk 1994), while governmental Statistics support the idea that
the UOC-MP is the largest church in Ukraine.

These types of churches can be compared across three categories that measure
church ties to Soviet Communism, Ukrainian nationalism, and external organizations.
Church ties reﬂect historical, cultural and, in some cases, ﬁnancial linkages. These

particular linkages are chosen because they represent the most powerful forces

50

constraining the political activity of churches in Ukraine today. Historical ties to the
Soviet state continue to provide institutional contacts as well as potentially distasteful
associations with Soviet and Russian dominance. Cultural and historical linkages to
the Ukrainian nationalistic movement inﬂuence the political agenda of churches, and
organizational and ﬁnancial links to external organizations suggest a degree of foreign

inﬂuence upon domestic political actions.

TABLE 1

Churches by Types and Ties

51

 

TIES TO THE
SOVIET STATE

Strong

Weak

TIES TO EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

 

Strong

Weak

TIES TO UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

 

Weak

Type I
Churches:
Ukrainian
Orthodox-
Moscow
Patriarchate

Type III
Churches:
Protestant

Strong Weak

Type 11
Churches:

Ukrainian
Autocephalous
Orthodox,
Ukrainian Greek
Catholic

Strong

Type IV
Churches:
Ukrainian
Orthodox-
Kiev
Patriarchate

 

52

The political inﬂuence of various churches in Ukraine differs according to
their position within this matrix. I believe that church ties may affect the ability of
churches to inﬂuence the state and their ability to inﬂuence the political views of
church members. Some churches will be in a stronger position than others, due to
their matrix position, to inﬂuence politics in Ukraine at the macro and micro levels.
Inﬂuencing the State

Church ties are a resource that churches can use to get the government to do
what they want. Just as interest group theory states that interest groups use the
resources of members, money, size and prestige to get the government to do what
they want, I theorize that Ukrainian churches use their ties to inﬂuence the state to act
on their behalf. Churches exercise inﬂuence when they persuade the government to
listen to them and then to do what they want. Churches have a variety of policy
domains in which they have a vested interest. The disbursement of property, Special
status, tax policy, and laws regarding freedom of religion are but a few of the
governmental decisions that affect the churches. Policies addressing private goods are
expected to occupy the political interests of churches.

AS a result, churches are pushing government to make decisions in their favor.
The way they exercise inﬂuence is by utilizing their established ties. In some realms,
certain ties bring greater inﬂuence than others. For example, I expect nationalistic
ties to provide greater inﬂuence among governmental authorities in or from wester
Ukraine, while Soviet ties are expected to provide little inﬂuence among these

decision-makers.

53

Church ties are also a resource that enable churches to affect the political
attitudes of church members. Churches exercise inﬂuence when they convince church
members to vote a certain way, to take certain Stands on issues, and to view
themselves and others in a certain light. The ties that the churches have give them
both a general agenda, and a platform, shaky or strong, from which to promote this
agenda. For example, the Soviet ties of the UOC-MP may incline them to push for
support of pro-Russian candidates, but these same ties may undermine the
effectiveness of the message to their members.

Church ties are a given resource that the churches have. They either have
strong ties to foreign organizations or they do not. Just as the American Medical
Association can utilize its resources of money and prestige, the American Association
of Retired People can use its resource of Size. Churches can use their ties as their
resources to inﬂuence government. This study examines how the churches use these
ties to wield political inﬂuence in Ukraine, on both the macro and micro levels. Ties
on their own do not ensure the ability to inﬂuence government. They must be
utilized, and utilized effectively, if a church is to exert the political inﬂuence it
desires.

In order to inﬂuence the state, churches must ﬁrst reach the state, and then
must succeed in their demands for goods. The ability to reach the state depends upon
whether or not a church can gain access to people in power.

On the one hand, strong ties to the former Soviet state can hamper political

inﬂuence. These ties include relationships within key governmental departments, with

54

decisions makers who have retained their positions. Churches that cooperated with
the Soviet authorities have been seen as traitors to the people and puppets of the now-
discredited Communist regime (Antic 1990). Current revelations in the popular press
about high ranking priests being exposed as KGB informants have not helped matters.
On the other hand, many of the people who were in high positions in government
when it was the Soviet Union still hold high positions in the government of Ukraine.
The ﬁrst Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, is an example. He rose to power in
the Soviet Union through the Communist Party system, and only abdicated his
Communist Party membership when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was
about to collapse.

Therefore, church groups that had access to the Soviet state have developed
relationships with key governmental members who are still in power today. Many of
these ofﬁcials changed party labels from Communists to Democrats, but their
positions and powers remain the same. Although Ukraine ofﬁcially declared her
independence in 1991, few governmental structures have changed Since then. The
ofﬁcial openness of the government and the society to religious groups may have
increased, but the actual individuals making governmental decisions have largely
remained the same. Religious groups with former ties to the Soviet state are looked
down upon by many people, but they still have valuable ties that can help in their
attempts to inﬂuence governmental decisions.

Ties to Ukrainian nationalistic organizations also help church groups inﬂuence

government. Nationalism is a very powerful force in Ukraine today, and as economic

55

conditions deteriorate, this popular movement may gain more and more political
power. Austerity programs instituted to reform the economy, a decline in purchasing
power just as new and appealing goods ﬂood the market, all can lead to dissatisfaction
with current living conditions. In turn, this can cause people to look for a solution
elsewhere. The nationalist message that blames most ills on interference from Russia
can be attractive to many. As this message grows, church groups with historical ties
to the nationalist movement, such as the Greek Catholic and UOAC churches, ﬁnd
themselves in stronger positions than other churches outside of the nationalistic camp.

Finally, external organizations provide some means of encouraging political
inﬂuence. Interested organizations are able to exert political, ﬁnancial and social
pressure upon the Ukrainian state in order to protect the interests of the afﬁliated
churches. Financial support and American backing of Protestant missionary churches
and groups has helped the cause of several Ukrainian Protestant churches in their
attempts to rent property and hold large rallies. External ties are not always positive,
however. If the external agency or nation is viewed unfavorably, as is Russia and her
support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, then external ties
hamper political inﬂuence. The Papal ties of the Greek Catholic Church are
problematic for some in Ukraine. They argue that these ties indicate that this church
is a puppet of Rome.

The ability of a church to inﬂuence the state is also dependent upon the nature
of the goods desired by that church. Sometimes the desired goods are public, and

churches have the contrasting incentives to cooperate and to free ride. Attempts to

56

inﬂuence the state for these goods are cooperative. Churches have an incentive to
work together in order to gain beneﬁts common to all. Examples of public goods
include laws concerning freedom of religion and the protection of church property
from state taxation. The political activity of Type III Protestant churches focuses
primarily around issues of public goods, and their behavior regarding the other
churches follows this cooperative pattern. The pursuit of public goods is linked to
attempts to bridge ethnic and cultural divides within the country.

Churches also desire private goods, and compete in an attempt to inﬂuence the
state to deliver special concessions. The distribution of church property is a very
contentious issue among churches in Ukraine today. The state must decide between
competing claims for the same piece of land, and churches are ﬁghting bitterly over
the distribution of this private good. In addition, there is disagreement over which, if
any, church should be supported by the government. It is interesting to note that the
Type I, II and IV churches are the most active in this conﬂict. Their arguments
attempt to take advantage of the political divisions within the country. Type H
(UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP) churches are focusing upon their nationalistic
ties in an attempt to "win" the property dispute, and in doing so, they are deepening
the social and ethnic divisions within Ukraine. The quest for private goods is linked
to the worsening cleavages in the country.

Church ties affect the successful acquisition of goods from the state. If the
nationalistic movement continues to gain ground in Ukraine, then churches with ties

to nationalistic groups will be favored when church property is distributed and state

57

recognition is granted. However, if the trend in Ukraine swings back to increasing
ties with Russia, then those churches with strong links to the Soviet State will fare
better. If economic and social conditions continue to deteriorate, Ukraine could turn
its back upon the "Western" style of economic and political reform, and could revert
to more insular policies. In this case, foreign, particularly Western, ties could be
damaging for churches seeking goods from the state. All the churches would suffer
if, in an extreme case, the government began to revert to repressive social practices,
such as state control over religion and religious freedoms.

The recent elections in Ukraine cloud an already very muddy picture.
Communists and their allies won the largest number of seats in the new Parliament,
and deadlock, rather than clear action, is feared. The manner in which the legislature
approaches relations with Russia, the perceived need for drastic economic and social
measures, and the commitment to democratic principles could all inﬂuence which
goods are desired and which churches are successful.

Inﬂuencing Church Members

Churches also have the desire to shape the political attitudes of their members.
The causal linkage between member beliefs and church views is complicated. The
church can do much to inﬂuence what its members believe. In addition, the beliefs of
the members can affect the direction in which the church goes. Member attitudes
likely shape the church, just as church teachings shape member attitudes. In this
Study, however, I focus upon the church as the shaper of the political attitudes of

church members. As has been previously mentioned, studies have demonstrated that

58

church teachings structure attitudes and transmit political information (Langton 1986;
Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that
Ukrainian religious leaders are attempting to inﬂuence the political attitudes of church
members.

The ability of Ukrainian churches to shape the political attitudes of their
members is linked to their church ties. Church leaders in Ukraine, to varying
degrees, are interested in communicating a political, as well as spiritual, ideology to
their members. Sermons linking Christ’s concern for the poor with the need for the
government to deal with the declining purchasing power of retirement pensions are a
call to Spiritual and political action. The marriage between political issues and
spiritual concerns thrusts a spiritual body, such as a church, into the center of the
political fray.

Strong ties to the Soviet state hamper the ability of some churches to shape the
political attitudes of their members. Allegations of cooperation between high church
ofﬁcials in the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government have caused
many members to View this church, and its leaders, with suspicion (Moss 1991).
Accusations of collaboration with the Soviets has tainted the message and the
inﬂuence of both the UOC-MP and UOC-KP churches.

Type I churches are in an interesting position. The UOC-Moscow is Still one
of the largest churches in Ukraine today. As such, it is in a position to reach a large
number of people with its political message. However, the message may be clouded

by suspicious ties to the Soviet State. In addition, since the UOC-Moscow does owe

59

its allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, any political messages are
likely to be directed toward reconciliation with Russia, rather than toward rampant
Ukrainian nationalism. The effectiveness of this communication may be blunted by
the fact that outside of church, in the central and western regions of Ukraine,
Ukrainian nationalism is growing in appeal, and Russia is increasingly viewed with
suspicion (Kolomayets 1993). The eastern regions, however, with their historical and
cultural links to Russia, are more amenable to the message of the UOC-MP.
Ukrainian nationalistic ties enhance the political inﬂuence of churches,
especially among church members in western Ukraine. Nationalism has always been
Strongest in west Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous and the Greek Catholic
churches have had historically strong links with the nationalistic movements in the
west (Bilinsky 1964). These churches have been asserting themselves by gaining
legalized Status and by stepping forward into their historical roles of religious
defenders of Ukrainian nationalism. In the west, strong ties with nationalistic
movements will give theses churches great credibility among Ukrainians concerned
with the national interest and identity of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-
Kiev Patriarchate is also trying to establish strong links with nationalist movements
within Ukraine. However, among the more moderate center and the more Russian-
leaning east, these strong ties to nationalistic movements are viewed with suspicion
and displeasure. These churches are viewed by many as extremists and therefore hold
less sway over the political attitudes of Ukrainians in the central and eastern regions

of the country.

60

For Type II churches, particularly those located in the western regions of
Ukraine, the opportunity to shape members’ political views is much more likely.
Since nationalism is a strong issue of interest to many in western Ukraine, it is a topic
that is discussed in many areas of daily life. Given the historical link between the
Greek Catholics, the UAOC and Ukrainian nationalistic movements, it is highly likely
that the church interest in political issues relating to nationalism is still strong.
Therefore, if church members are hearing a message promoting strong nationalism not
only at church but also at work and at social gatherings, then the inﬂuence upon their
personal political attitudes is much greater. These Ukrainian churches have for
decades preached the message of independence for Ukraine, so the consistency of the
political message is quite strong.

Ties to external organizations hamper the ability to shape political attitudes,
especially attitudes about a national Ukrainian identity. In this period of nation
building, many foreign organizations are either seen as meddling or harboring
imperialistic aspirations. In particular, the strong ties of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church-Moscow Patriarchate to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow are highly
problematic. To a Ukraine already disturbed by the expansionistic rumblings of
politicians in Russia such as Zhirinovsky, the Russian-leaning Orthodox churches look
like instruments of Russian nationalistic expression (Valliere 1992). Therefore, the
political messages of the UOC-Moscow meet with great opposition among church
members. The activities of many Protestant groups, particularly their strong links

with Western churches and missionary groups, also hamper their ability to inﬂuence

61

the political attitudes of their members. Research has Shown that Protestant churches
are less interested in politics, and so their self-selection out of the political process, as
well as suspicion surrounding their Western links, will further remove them from the
political realm (Perebenesyk 1992).

In some ways, Protestant (Type HI) churches are positioned to have a great
deal of political inﬂuence. They ﬁt many of the strong church characteristics
described by Wald, Owen, and Hill (1990). These churches tend to encourage
frequent participation in church events, including Sunday School, worship services,
prayer services and small group Bible studies. The also form a tight community
which is focused upon a consistent message, primarily centered upon the Bible and its
guidelines for daily living. Despite these characteristics, the political inﬂuence of
these churches upon the attitudes of the church members is not clearly documented.
This is likely due to the fact that the Protestant churches have, for the most part,
chosen to avoid issues of direct political interest. AS was mentioned previously,
while the direct political clout of these churches is slight now, given the opportunity
and interest, it could become much greater.

Conclusion

Ukrainian churches are attempting to inﬂuence the Ukrainian government.
Church types and ties, represented by the position on the matrix, have a profound
impact upon church success at reaching the state and at gaining state responsiveness.
Churches are seeking new alliances in order to compensate for historical ties or to

strengthen their current positions. These shifting associations further muddy the

62

already-clouded religious picture in Ukraine and result in increased dissatisfaction and
disillusionment among Ukrainian church-goers. These Shifts have already been noted
in Ukraine and have caused a great deal of confusion for Ukrainians and foreigners
alike.

It will be interesting to witness the further developments in church and
political life in Ukraine. The success of the churches at inﬂuencing government, and
the willingness of the government to be inﬂuenced will continue to be shaped by the
type of churches involved and the ties these churches have. The desire of groups to
inﬂuence politics remains constant. The make-up of the groups, and the direction in
which they desire to inﬂuence the state and the attitudes of church members,
however, is constantly shifting. The pattern of political interest among the churches
in Ukraine has been undergoing massive changes. This study examines which groups
are winning, what basket of goods they most fervently desire, and what the outcomes
of the political ﬁghts are. I also look at the extent to which churches are inﬂuencing
the evolution of a Ukrainian national identity and the inﬂuence this is having upon the
direction of political reform, decisions about nuclear weapons, and relations with
Russia and the rest of the world.

A great deal is known of the tactics, content, and direction of church inﬂuence
in the United States. In the former Soviet Union, however, much of this remains a
mystery. Journalists have recorded church clashes and church/state bargaining, but
little scientiﬁc analysis of the means and motivations has been done. This research

provides a clearer picture of the ways that churches in Ukraine are trying to inﬂuence

63

politics, and the impact that this action is having upon Ukrainian politics and the
formation of Ukrainian national identity. This study does not reveal all of the
political interests or tactics of Ukrainian churches, nor does it document all of the
intended consequences. Rather, this study provides a ﬁrst cut at systematically
understanding the basic political interests of the various churches, and how these
interests are being pursued. The study also contributes to the growing body of
literature on the role of civil society, particularly religious organizations, in political

development.

Chapter 3
Research Design and Data Collection
Model and Theoretical Hypotheses

Church ties, represented by the matrix in Table 1, provide us with an
independent variable. The effect of this variable can be studied in two directions.
First, we can examine the effect of church ties upon the ability to inﬂuence the State.
The degree of macro level inﬂuence can be broken down into the ability of the
churches to reach the State, evidenced by the types of goods desired and the channels
used to reach the state, and the responsiveness of the state to church demands,
evidenced by the state distribution of church property. Second, we can examine the
effect of church ties upon the ability to inﬂuence the political attitudes and beliefs of
church members. The degree of micro level inﬂuence can be observed by the ability
of the churches to inﬂuence the voting behavior and national identity of the
congregations. The following model displays the expected linkages and direction of

inﬂuence.

Independent Variable
_

Church Type and Ties

Dependent Variable-Micro Level Dependent Variable-Macro Level
‘ Political Attitudes of Ability to Reach the State and
* Church Members . ‘ - ’ 7 . ' State Responsiveness , ' '

64

65

My hypotheses are that church ties have an affect on their ability to reach the
state, and also upon the responsiveness of the state to church demands. Church ties
(historical, cultural and ﬁnancial linkages) determine, in part, which groups succeed
at reaching the state, and therefore have an impact upon the degree of political
involvement. The independent variable effects the types of goods sought from the
state, and the types of political issues pursued. The pursuit of public goods
encourages cooperation between the churches, while the pursuit of private goods
induces conﬂict and competition.

I hypothesize that the type of church, relating to its position on the matrix in
Table 1, determines the manner in which churches attempt to reach the state.
Churches with ties to the Soviet State approach institutions and individuals in
government who are holdovers from or sympathizers with the old Communist system.
Churches with ties to nationalistic groups are likely to approach those within
government who favor these policies, while external organizational ties may cause
other churches to inﬂuence the state indirectly, through their afﬁliated organizations.
The tactics used to pressure the state will vary according to church characteristics.
Smaller churches, organized around a private interest, monitor the state more closely,
and sanction more deliberately, than those organized around a public interest.
Churches that are concerned with state recognition, such as the UOC—-KP, and private
property rights, participate to a greater degree in politics, and are, as a result, likely
be more successful in achieving the goods they desire.

These same ties also effect the responsiveness of the state. I expect to ﬁnd

66

that the State responds to claims for property by looking favorably upon some
churches, due to their ties, and unfavorably upon others. In particular, Ukrainian
(Type II) churches with strong ties to Ukrainian nationalistic organizations are likely
to have a great deal of success reaching the state, namely, gaining access to people in
power, and achieving the desired state response. Type I churches (UOC-Moscow
Patriarchate) with strong ties to the Soviet State are likely to be able to reach the state,
but may have difﬁculty getting the state to respond to their desires. Type IV (UOC-
KP) churches may gain from their nationalistic ties, but may suffer as a result of their
past afﬁliations with the Soviets. The position of the Protestant (Type HI) churches
prevents them from reaching the state or from achieving any degree of state
responsiveness.

I hypothesize that the nature of the goods sought from the state, and the
success at achieving these goods, also varies with church type and ties. I primarily
focus upon the private good of church property. As the composition of the
government shifts, the churches that Share characteristics with the majority governing
coalition are likely to succeed. I hypothesize that if Ukraine continues along a path of
increased hostility towards Russia and growing Ukrainian nationalism, churches with
few ties to Russia and strong ties to the nationalistic movement are likely to succeed
in their requests for property. Type I, II and IV churches participate more in the
political arena, while Type III churches remove themselves from most of the political
conﬂict. If nationalism continues to be a powerful political force, Type II (UAOC

and GCC) churches with strong nationalistic ties and few Soviet or foreign ties are

67

expected to "win" the battle for state allocation of property. Those churches that are
afﬁliated with external organizations that are out of favor fail in their desire to gain
access to property. Type III Protestant churches interested in achieving public goods
from the state have a more difﬁcult time achieving their goals, due to the free-riding
of other " cooperative " churches.

The effect of the independent variable of church ties upon the micro dependent
variable of political attitudes of church member is also studied. I hypothesize that
churches, depending upon their position in the matrix, have differing degrees of
inﬂuence upon political attitudes. In particular, Type H (UAOC and GCC) churches
have a great deal of interest in inﬂuencing the political attitudes of their members,
particularly with respect to Ukrainian nationalism, while Type I (UOC-MP) and IV
(UOC-KP) churches try but are unsuccessful and Type HI churches may avoid the
issue all together.

I hypothesize that churches, according to their position in the matrix, differ in
their attempts to shape the voting behavior and nationalistic political attitudes of their
members. Since the Type II churches have had historical ties to the nationalistic
movements and are strong in the nationalistically-inclined western Ukraine, they
pursue the call for a strong Ukrainian identity. I expect that their inﬂuence is limited
by geography, with the western Ukrainian churches being Signiﬁcantly more
interested and successful than their central or eastern colleagues. The Russian ties
and Soviet links of the Type I churches limit the success of a call to a distinct national

identity, and if that call is made, it is likely to be less tinged with a nationalistic bias.

68

Type IV churches try to espouse a strong nationalistic message, but again, their Soviet
ties may dilute the reception of the message. The Type IH churches are likely to
manifest a less directly political orientation, and calls for an identity may reﬂect a
Spiritual rather than a political emphasis.
Operationalization and Testable Hypotheses

The political activity of churches is studied in the context of the July 1994
Presidential election held in Ukraine. This Study ﬁrst examines the effect of church
ties upon the macro dependent variables of group success at reaching the state
(gaining access to decisions makers), and state responsiveness to group demands.
The ﬁrst macro dependent variable, the attempts of church groups to reach the State,
focuses primarily upon group attempts to monitor, sanction, and maintain credibility
with the state. This is operationalized by the speciﬁc actions taken and channels used
by the churches to reach the state. In particular, this focuses upon whether the
churches are seeking public or private goods, and whether they cooperate or compete
with other churches to gain the desired outcome. The second macro dependent
variable, state responsiveness, relates primarily to the state’s distribution of public
goods, namely laws concerning religious freedom and tax status, and the distribution
of private goods, namely church property and ofﬁcial recognition. The micro
dependent variable of speciﬁc political attitudes is operationalized by the attempts of
church leaders to shape a Ukrainian national identity among the members of their

congregation.

69

Hymtheses Set #1: Reaching the State

 

I hypothesize that in the time before and after the election, Type IH Protestant
churches attempted to reach the state in search of public goods such as increased
religious freedom, tax Status, and public policy. Their approach towards the other
churches was cooperative and inclusive. Type I , II and IV churches attempted to
reach the state in search of private goods such as the acquisition of church property
and exclusive state recognition. Their approaches to the other churches were
competitive and exclusive. Type I (UOC-MP) churches focused upon their ties with
the Russian-oriented Kuchma and attempted to beneﬁt from his connections. Type II
(UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP) churches focused upon their ties with the
nationalist-oriented Kravchuk and worked to exploit these connections within
government.

Hypotheses Set #2: Stage Responsiveness

Given the bitter election conﬂict between the nationalist candidate Kravchuk
and the Russian-oriented Kuchma, and Kuchma’s narrow victory, the cleavages within
the country and between the churches have grown. I hypothesize that the ﬁght for
private goods between Type I, II and IV churches has become increasingly divisive,
and the post-election state is divided about who to favor. Type I churches, with their
support of Kuchma, may be the immediate winners in the battle for property, but the
government has likely attempted to smooth over divisions in the country by
responding in a balanced fashion to the competing demands of the churches. In fact,

I hypothesize that state support ﬂuctuates between Type I, II and IV churches.

70
Hypotheses Set £3: Shaping the Political Attitudes of Church Members

I expect to ﬁnd that, in the time leading up to the election, Type I, II and IV
churches attempted to inﬂuence the political views of their members, speciﬁcally in
regard to the choice of a political candidate, and generally in regard to support for
Ukrainian nationalism or increased ties with Russia. Type I churches attempted to
inﬂuence their members to support Kuchma and pushed their congregation to support
increased ties with Russia. Type II and IV churches pushed their members to support
Kravchuk and pushed for greater Ukrainian nationalism. All these churches were
pointed in their political message. Type HI Protestant churches, however, had little
involvement in the political election and made no attempts to shape the political views
of their members.

Research Design

The best manner to test the impact of church ties upon the ability to reach the
state and state responsiveness was to conduct qualitative interviews with church
leaders in several regions of Ukraine (see Appendix D for interview questions). I
interviewed church leaders from several different denominations and from several
different regions of Ukraine in order to ascertain their position in reference to the
matrix and to their attempts to reach the state and the state’s responsiveness. In order
to determine each church’s self-perceived position upon the matrix, a series of
questions was asked relating to past and present links with the Soviet state, Ukrainian
nationalist organizations, and external organizations. These answers provided the

basis for determining each church’s self-placement on the independent variable

71

matrix. It is important to note that I expected church leaders to be somewhat
unwilling to admit to certain ties that might be perceived negatively by the general
population. In particular, I expected churches to understate or deny ties to the Soviet
state or to foreign organizations. Therefore, self-placement was carefully compared
with placement derived from outside sources. Information gather from church
scholars was especially useful in determining matrix position.

In order to understand the effect of this independent variable upon the macro
dependent variables of attempts to reach the State and State responsiveness to these
attempts, I asked a further series of questions. These questions dealt with both
dependent variables. In relation to the dependent variable of attempting to reach the
state, each church leader was asked to discuss their activity during the Presidential
election. In particular, I tried to discover the goods desired by their church, the
tactics used to pressure the state for these goods, the success of these tactics, and
their strategies for further lobbying of the state. Information about the dependent
variable of state responsiveness was gained through questions about what the churches
wanted from the government and whether or not the government had responded.

It is important to note that this Study focuses on a narrow domain of policy
interests. Churches in Ukraine overwhelmingly are focused upon a limited range of
goods, most dealing with their immediate needs, such as buildings, money, legal
status, etc. Church leaders were asked, in the ﬁrst interviews, about their interest in
broader social policies. When asked if his church was interested in any larger

governmental issues, such as abortion, a Baptist pastor responded in a telling manner.

72

He stated that abortion is widespread in Ukraine, that there are many different views
about it, and that the church, at this time, was not addressing the state on that issue
(Interview #1). The Greek Catholic Church leaders also shied away form
involvement in this and other social policies. AS the most likely churches to be taking
public positions on this issue, their decision to stay away from this policy domain is
striking. Virtually all the church leaders interviewed indicated a desire to focus on a
limited range of topics for the time being, and to limit their governmental
involvement to a domain that includes issues basic to their existence.

As time goes on and the basic issues of property, ﬁnances etc. get settled, will
not be surprising to see churches expand their governmental requests to a broader
social policy domain. Already, a few churches are beginning to consider religious-
based programs in the public schools. The plans, however, are at the early stages.

As a result, this study focuses on the policy domain most important to the
churches at the time of the interviews. The scope of their interests is limited, and is
focused upon their attempts to establish themselves and their congregations in a newly
independent Ukraine.

I also asked the church leaders a series of questions pertaining to their attempts
to shape member voting behavior. These questions addressed the degree to which
church leaders tried to inﬂuence the political views of their members during the
Presidential election, what tactics they used, and how successful they feel they were.
I used the responses from these interviews to determine the linkage between the

independent and dependent variables, and to discover the degree to which church

73

types and ties inﬂuence the political success and failure of Ukrainian churches.

The information gained from these interviews with church leaders was
bolstered by an additional series of interviews with church scholars, journalists,
political party members, and political candidates. I asked them to give their
perspective on the political behavior of these speciﬁc churches. In addition, I read
internal church communications and newsletters, as well as articles written in the
secular press to ensure a well-balanced picture of the political behavior of Ukrainian
churches.

Data Collection

The primary source of data for this study came from 35 interviews held in
Ukraine. These interviews were carried out between September 29, 1994 and January
1, 1995 and followed a generally ﬁxed format. This section will describe who the
interviewees were, what questions were asked of them, and the general quality of
access.

In order to preserve the anonymity of the interview subjects, I have chosen not
to identify any of them by name. They have been identiﬁed in the text only in
general terms. In instances where I quoted directly from a subject or attributed a
signiﬁcant idea to them, I have identiﬁed the subject by a randomly assigned number.
In order to do this, I drew numbers from a hat and assigned each interview subject, in
the order in which I interviewed them, a number.

The breakdown of the people interviewed can be found in Appendix C. Out of

35 interviews, 24 (68.6%) were with Ukrainian church leaders. Four interviews

74

(11.4%) were with scholars who specialized in church/state relations, 3 (8.6%) were
with political party workers, 1 (2.8%) journalist was interviewed, as were 3 (8.6%)
government leaders. These interviews took place in 4 cities: Kiev, Lviv, Donetsk and
Mykoliev. The bulk of the interviews (19 or 54%) took place in Kiev since it is the
capital of Ukraine and therefore houses the majority of church leaders, political party
people, etc.
Conducting the Interviews

Church leaders of all different levels and ages were interviewed. In an attempt
to gain a well-rounded and balanced picture, I sought out priests from high and low
positions, lay leaders, and young as well as older people

The interviews were with various people who are involved with some facet of
Ukrainian church/state relations. The three scholars interviewed all are involved in
studies of the relationship between church and state. One works for a governmental
institute, another for a university, and the third for a private research organization.
One of the political party leaders had specialized in church relations during the
campaign, while the other two had no such specialization. The journalist and the
governmental leaders all had extensive experience dealing with religious organizations
and specialized in church/state affairs.

The interviews were all conducted face-to-face and took about an hour. The
questionnaire was prepared beforehand and contained a series of questions. For the
most part, the interviews followed the questionnaire. In each case an interpreter was

used. I asked each question and my interpreter relayed the question in either Russian

75

or Ukrainian as the interviewee preferred. The answer was then interpreted from
Russian or Ukrainian back into English. At times, part of the interviews were
conducted completely in Russian, as I am able to speak fair Russian, but I preferred
to use interpretation in order to insure complete comprehension on both sides.

I utilized the services of 5 interpreters in 3 cities. In Kiev, the bulk of the
interpretation was done by one university student. In Lviv and Donetsk, personal
contacts helped me arrange for interpreters who met me in the city and travelled with
me to the interviews. The majority of the interpretation was of a very high quality.
Four of the 5 people interpret professionally. The only interpreter who exhibited any
hesitation in interpretation was the young man who worked for me in Lviv.

However, once he became familiar with the speciﬁc terminology of the interviews, he
became much more comfortable and proﬁcient. Before the interview, each interpreter
was carefully instructed to directly interpret my questions, and then to directly
interpret the subject’s answers. I briefed the interpreters on the general subject matter
contained in the interview, and on the ﬂow of the interview. Much of the
terminology was speciﬁc to religious and political specializations, so I was careful to
go over the language that I would be using in order to insure their comprehension. I
might add that the interpreters seemed to enjoy the interviews. Each interpreter
mentioned at some point after the interview how interesting the subject matter was.

During the course of the interviews I took careful written notes. I wrote down
the answers to each of the questions as completely as possible, given the rapid rate of

human speech. Interpretation was a great help, since I in essence heard each answer

76

twice, once in Russian or Ukrainian, and once in English, and this gave me more
time and more material to write down. As mentioned earlier, my interpreters were
speciﬁcally instructed to interpret word-for-word and to omit nothing. Therefore, my
comprehension together with the interpretation enabled me to take down virtually
everything that was said.

In addition to my written notes, I also tape-recorded the interviews when
permission was granted. The majority of the interviews were recorded, but on
several occasions permission to record was denied, or the circumstances were such
that recording was impossible.

Qpestionnaires

Four different questionnaires were used, each containing the same basic
questions and following the same general ﬂow. Appendix E contains the 4
questionnaires. One questionnaire was used for church leaders, one for church
scholars, one for political party people, and one for politicians and journalists. All
the questionnaires followed the same pattern: part one contained general information
on the church itself, or contact with different churches; part two asked questions
about the activity of churches in politics and elections; and part three asked for
information about the activity of church members in politics and elections.

As time went on, I modiﬁed the church leaders’ questionnaire. My ﬁrst
question in part one asked the church leaders to give a brief description of the history
of their church under the USSR. It quickly became apparent that this question was

counter-productive. Several church leaders used this question to launch into a 45

77

minute discussion of the entire history of their church, many of them beginning with
the decision in 988 AD. of the Kiev-Rus empire to become Christian. This
information was useful, but did not need to be solicited from every church leader I
interviewed. Therefore, in later interviews I began to ask more direct questions about
the relationship with their church and the government today. In addition, I used later
interviews to solicit answers to Speciﬁc questions that arose during the course of
earlier interviews. For example, the question of where churches were getting their
money, the relations between Speciﬁc churches, and the language used in worship
services were all asked during later interviews.

I found that certain questions were generally good while others were not
particularly useful. In addition to the history question mentioned above, another not
so useful question was one about the ways in which church leaders tried to inﬂuence
the voting behavior or political views of church members. Time and time again in
response to this question, church leaders as well as church scholars and political party
people emphasized that church and state are separate in Ukraine and therefore church
leaders can not and do not get involved in inﬂuencing political views. While my
research demonstrates that this is patently untrue, and in fact has little to do with
church/state separation, any suggestion of a relationship between religious ties and
political views made many people uncomfortable. I suspect that this is due to the
very young nature of Ukrainian democracy, and the lingering effects of having what
was essentially a state controlled church for many years. I found it wiser to couch

this question in more general terms and to ask what the church communicated to the

78

church members about the election.

The most useful questions were the ones that dealt in generalities rather than
speciﬁcs. I set out to use the Presidential election as a touchstone from which to
explore questions of churches and politics, but I soon found out that focusing on the
election was more of a distraction than a help. For the most part, when the speciﬁc
election was mentioned, the subjects reverted to statements about the illegality of
church activity in political affairs. So, I began to speak in terms of politics in
general, rather than in Speciﬁc. For example, the question "How was your church
able to get the candidates to listen to your interests" became "How is your church
able to get the government or candidates to listen to your interests?" I found church
leaders willing to answer with greater speciﬁcity when the questions were general. I
retained the majority of the election questions, but when a subject demonstrated a
reluctance to discuss the election, I simply made them more general or dropped them
for that speciﬁc interview.

I should mention that some church leaders were very open about the political
activity of their churches. I found that the higher up the leader, the more open they
were with me. High church leaders, were willing to discuss their activity during the
election and their desired outcomes.

Another useful question, added in the early interviewing stage, asked church
leaders to describe the relations with other churches and any areas of cooperation or
conﬂict. At ﬁrst I had feared that church leaders might hesitate to answer so direct a

question but, on the contrary, I found them eager to describe areas of conﬂict and

79

cooperation. They seemed most eager to talk about conﬂict, and I expect that this is
due to the degree of jockeying for political position that is occurring now. Only a
few church leaders gave me the bland answer that there is no conﬂict at all and that
everyone gets along perfectly. These answers came in the few interviews where the
people being interviewed seemed suspicious of me and of my intentions.

Finally, the question that provided me with a great deal of help was the one
that asked for additional references. I asked this question at the end of every
interview, and received a large number of contacts in this manner. Church leaders
referred me to other church leaders, both in their church and in others, and church
scholars and political party people gave me the names of other qualiﬁed people. The
majority of my contacts came in this manner.

Qﬂliﬂ of Access

For the most part, I was given tremendous access to people I wanted to speak
with. The only people to whom I was unable to talk as much as I wanted were
governmental ofﬁcials. These people were the only ones who were too busy or
unable to speak with me. I was able to telephone many of the people whose names I
was given, introduce myself and explain who I was, and then set up an interview
time. When I was unable to reach the very highest church leaders, I simply Showed
up at their ofﬁces with my interpreter, and several times was ushered in without an
appointment and allowed to interview them.

My only unpleasant experience occurred in Donetsk. Due to the fact that my

contact in this city was a Baptist minister who was kind enough to arrange some of

80

my interviews for me beforehand, the Chief of the Department of Religious Affairs
decided that I was some sort of a spy for the Baptist church. I interviewed one of his
subordinates in the Department and gathered a great deal of useful information.
Following this interview, however, the Chief called me in and grilled me for 2 hours
about the actual purpose of my visit, who I was working for, who was going to read
my dissertation, and whether or not I was a Protestant spy here to undermine the
Orthodox Church. The whole experience was very distressing and reminded me of
the situation I faced in 1987 in Romania when I really was there as an underground
missionary. The similarity between the two experiences was especially troubling
since Ukraine in 1994 is supposed to be a democracy while Romania in 1987 made no
such pretense, and Since I was in Ukraine for the purpose of academic research. The
Situation spoke clearly about the current situation in eastern Ukraine; the implications
will be discussed in later chapters.

In addition to this 2 hour session, the Chief then forbade any leaders of the
UOC-MP in Donetsk from speaking with me, and they in turn cancelled our
scheduled appointment. He also attempted to stop me from interviewing a priest from
the UOC-KP and even called the young man into his ofﬁce and instructed him not to
meet with me. However, this priest chose not to listen to his instructions and granted
me the interview. Again, the behavior of the Chief and the priests speaks volumes
about the religious and political situation in eastern Ukraine and will be discussed
later.

Aside from this unpleasant experience, the rest of my interviews went very

81

well. I even found that my age and gender, which I had suspected might hinder my
research, actually seemed to help. The fact that I am young and a woman seemed to
place many of the people I interviewed at ease. Perhaps because I seemed to pose
little of a threat, I found that most people spoke very openly to me. Very few
subjects behaved in a guarded fashion, and several of those who did seemed to

become more comfortable as the interview progressed.

Chapter 4
Churches as Political Actors on the Macro Level: Ability to Reach the State

"The biggest conﬂicts are caused by property. Each new church wants buildings, but
since the church divisions there are many new churches but not that many buildings.
The conﬂicts are largely regional. " Priest, UA 0C, Interview #30

"The church doesn ’t have to get government to listen since it is God who works in the
hearts of people. He will open the hearts of the people that are in government. "
Protestant leader, Interview #19

"Common danger makes people unite. " Scholar, Interview #32

Churches behave as political actors when they attempt to get things from the
state. This macro level political behavior involves two stages. The ﬁrst stage is
when the church tries to reach out to the state and make its interests known. To do
this, the church must bring whatever resources it has at its disposal to convince the
state to pay attention. The attempts to reach the state reveal differences in the types
of goods sought, varying levels of cooperation and conﬂict, shifting levels of
governmental and political contacts, and differences across regions. The second stage
of activity is the actual response of the State to church demands which will be
addressed in the next chapter.

As mentioned throughout this Study, the ties of the different churches explain a
large amount of their ability to reach, and their interest in reaching, the State. The
ties also help account for the response of the state to the different church requests.
Church linkages to the Soviet State, to nationalistic movements, and to external
organizations all contribute to the unique and significant political impact that

Ukrainian churches are having on Ukrainian politics.

82

83
Monitoring Efforts

Monitoring is an important component of reaching the state and making one’s
interests known. In order to convince the state to follow its interests, a church must
ﬁrst be aware of what the state is doing and whether or not its interests are being
pursued. This means that the church must be willing to pay the information costs if it
is to monitor government action on their own. Those churches that choose to free
ride are uninformed and unable to properly monitor the government.
WELLS.

I hypothesize that church ties to nationalistic groups and to the Soviet state
encourage churches to monitor government more closely in their pursuit of private
goods. Some churches pay careful attention to governmental decisions, while others
remain removed from, and ignorant of, State actions that affect them. Monitoring
takes several forms, but entails active contact with the relevant state agency. This
monitorng leads to conﬂict between churches in areas focused around scarce, private
goods, such as church property and money. Monitoring is less vigilant, and conﬂict
less likely, in areas dealing with public goods.

The data reveal that the nationalistic and old Soviet ties of Ukrainian churches
determined the degree of monitoring. The Type II and Type IV churches (the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and
UOC-Kiev Patriarchate) all share strong ties to the Ukrainian nationalistic movement.
The Type I (UOC-Moscow Patriarchate) and Type IV (UOC-KP) churches share

strong ties to the Soviet state. These churches, more than any others, were very

84

diligent in their efforts to monitor the behavior of the state, both before and after the
election. In particular, current ties to nationalistic movements encouraged vigilant
monitoring.

In the period leading up to the election, the incumbent (and former Communist
Party leader), Leonid Kravchuk, was carefully watched by these churches. His strong
support of the creation of the UOC-KP in 1992 was cause for alarm for all the other
churches. For the UOC-KP, this pro-election period was one of careful, but
optimistic monitoring. Due to the unique founding and strong intervention on the part
of the incumbent President, this church shares with Kravchuk strong ties to both the
former Soviet state and nationalistic organizations. Therefore, it monitored the State
from a position of favor and power, and sought primarily to keep the status quo.
Responses from UOC-KP church leaders revealed that this church alone felt that it
was able to speak directly to the government and tell it what it wanted. The UOC-KP
was very active and very speciﬁc about what they wanted from the election (Interview
#32). The leaders kept careful watch upon the distribution of church property and
upon the consequences that upcoming election results would have upon future
decisions of the state. In particular, they were very vocal in church newspaper
articles, ofﬁcial pronouncements, and church services about the politics of Ukraine in
relation to Russia. In the aftermath of Kuchma’s victory over Kravchuk, this concern
became paramount and reﬂected their fear that Kuchma would favor churches that did
not have afﬁliations with Ukrainian nationalists.

The Type II UAOC and GCC churches before the election had the benefit of

85

ties to Ukrainian nationalism, but suffered from a lack of old Soviet contacts who
might help them. Therefore, they were torn on their reaction to Kravchuk. On the
one hand, he had fashioned himself as a supporter of Ukrainian nationalism and threw
his lot in with nationalists in western Ukraine, where the Greek Catholic, UAOC and
UOC-KP churches are the strongest. On the other hand, Kravchuk had also made it
clear that he favored the UOC-KP above any other church, and had taken drastic
action against other churches by favoring this church. The monitoring efforts of these
Type II churches before the election were therefore careful and concerned. For
example, the Greek Catholic church has been training the members of its youth
organization how to deal with government (Interview #10). The UAOC has been
actively seeking people in government who will help them with their interests.

These churches were very aware of the political situation and were very
concerned about Kravchuk’s actions and his support of the UOC-KP. They felt that
his administration was hostile to their interests. Both churches on several occasions
wrote letters to Kravchuk complaining about their treatment, usually vis-a-vis the
UOC-KP, but they never received any replies. But, the alternative choice in the
Presidential election was also problematic. They were very concerned about
candidate Kuchma, his ties to Russia, and his disinterest in nationalistic issues.
Therefore, their perception was that neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma would help their
church. Their position during the election was one where they were very attentive to
the political situation, but felt largely excluded and powerless. The election of

Kuchma has not stiﬂed their monitoring behavior, but it has left them focusing their

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attention on other, more amenable, branches of government.

The Type I churches (the UOC-MP) also carefully monitored the state, but
their Soviet ties hampered some of their effectiveness. They too were concerned
about Kravchuk’s partiality toward the UOC-KP and were angry about his role in the
breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates.
During the election they openly favored Kuchma, who shares their interest in
continuing ties to Russia, and after the election have carefully monitored his behavior
toward the churches. To their dismay, and the other churches’ relief, Kuchma has
seemed to distance himself from church conﬂicts. Several church leaders shared their
perception that he is too busily engaged in the economic concerns of the country to
Spend time on church concerns (Interviews #23, 7). To all but the UOC-KP and the
UOC-MP, this was considered welcome news. The UOC-KP feels that it has lost its
favored position, while the UOC-MP seems to resent that it has not gained its rightful
place with the advent of a new, Russian-oriented, President.

The Protestant churches in this Study were striking in their disinterest in
monitoring the behavior of the state. Overwhelmingly, the people surveyed discussed
the level of political apathy apparent within the Protestant church. Church members
and church leaders stayed away from politics. Several church leaders said that they
feel they are ignored by the State because they are Protestants, but that they are happy
that the government does not disturb them. They would never ask the government for
anything like a building because they know the government would reject their claim

and they have no interest in becoming involved in politics (Interview #1). With no

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ties to the Soviet state or to nationalistic organizations, the Protestant churches seem
to have little interest in monitoring or pursuing governmental action.

There were two exceptions to this, however. One leader mentioned that his
church was aware of Kravchuk’s one-sided protection of the UOC-KP, usually at the
expense of other churches’ rights, and this led them to pray for Kuchma to be elected
(Interview #18). Another church leader in east Ukraine mentioned that he visited the
regional President in an attempt to share the problems of the church (Interview #5).
In this case, this Baptist pastor had been working in this region for over 20 years as
the leader of a registered church, and, in this capacity, had developed some contacts
with the Soviet leaders and their successors. Therefore, these ties with the Soviet
state, for this pastor, help explain his willingness and ability to monitor state
behavior. For the most part, the Type III churches, as expected, stay away from
politics.

Types pf Sims Spught

The degree of monitoring is related to the nature of the goods sought from the
state. The churches monitoring government most closely are expected to be those
seeking private goods. The nature of public goods discourages churches from
maintaining a vigilant watch over government and encourages them to free ride.

As hypothesized, the churches most actively involved in the pursuit of private
goods are Types II and IV. The number one private good, mentioned time and time
again by church leaders and church observers, is property. Until independence,

church property was owned by the State and was either allowed to fall in to disrepair;

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used as museums or storehouses; destroyed; or given to the Russian Orthodox Church
to use. After independence, churches came forward demanding that property be given
or restored to them. Other churches demanded that the government pay them for
destroyed buildings, while others felt they should be given money to construct their
own place of worship. In the four years since independence, a great deal of church
property has been allocated by the state, and a large number of churches are angry
over the nature of that allocation. St. George’s Cathedral in Lviv, a sprawling
complex that includes a grand cathedral as well as a number of outer buildings and
houses, is still under contention by the Greek Catholic Church and the UOC-MP.
These and other church properties are desired both as places of worship and as
properties of great value. Of Special concern to several churches is the ancient St.
Sophia’s Cathedral, considered by all the Orthodox churches in Ukraine to be their
special heritage. This church is extremely valuable, because of its age, historical
value, Size and beauty. It is one of the few surviving buildings surviving from the
ancient Kiev-Rus empire, so its value, both in terms of its property and its history, is
enormous. The government has decided, after much protest, to keep this as a
museum and national holy site.

The Type IV UOC-KP churches believe that they are entitled to special
recognition by the state, and that this recognition should extend to holy property in
Ukraine. One UOC-KP priest said that since his church has played an important role
in creating the independent state of Ukraine, they should be given the national

church...St. Sophia’s (Interview #14). This Statement suggests that this church

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considers itself unique among the churches of Ukraine, and that it should be rewarded
for the role it has played. I argue that it is the very ties that this church has both to
the previous power structure (characterized by President Kravchuk) and to the
nationalistic movement that place this church in this unique position. Because of its
placement, this church did Sit in a position of extraordinary power under Kravchuk’s
administration. This position of power has led the church to make claims on property
that never belonged to it in the past, since the church did not exist prior to 1992.
Rather, they claim that they have rightful claim to the whole legacy of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and that all property that belonged to that church should
now be handed over to the UOC-KP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kiev Patriarchate
1993). They are particularly upset at governmental decisions to give church buildings
to the Greek Catholic Church in west Ukraine.

Their claims for private goods, based upon their position of power, do not end
with property. Again, as hypothesized, their most heart-felt desire is a Special
acknowledgment by the government that they are ”the” Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
In order for this to happen, they expect the state to help merge the various Ukrainian
Orthodox churches (the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, and the UAOC) in to one church, with
the UOC-KP in control (Interview #25). They state that the power of the Orthodox
church can only be found through unity, and since 75 % of the Ukrainian population is
Orthodox, then it makes sense that they Should be in one Orthodox church. More
than one UOC-KP leader stated that as long as 20 million Ukrainians are under the

jurisdiction of Moscow (referring to followers of the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate),

Ukraine can never be independent.

The private good that the UOC-KP most desires, therefore, is special state
recognition and power, and this power will be gained when the Orthodox church in
Ukraine is united under their authority. Church property is almost secondary, Since it
will come with the other churches when they are subsumed under UOC-KP control.
Their rationale behind why the state Should grant them this good is simple; it is their
church that supported the independence of Ukraine (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev
Patriarchate 1993), and "an independent Ukraine needs an independent church”
(Interview #11). In terms of my analysis, their church is suited for the position of a
national church because it has a support base that includes both the former Soviet
ofﬁcials still in power, and the nationalist movements that are gaining power. By
using contacts from both of these sides, this church is able to gain from the old power
Structure as well as from the emerging political movements.

Type II churches are also pursuing government in the hunt for property, and
they are well aware of the grand desires of the UOC-KP. For the UAOC, the
maneuverings of the UOC-KP are cause for great concern. The desire for unity
among the Orthodox churches was already partially recognized by the state when the
UOC-KP was created. AS described earlier in this paper, the UOC-KP was created
by forcibly merging the UAOC and parts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. As
soon as the UOC-KP declared its independence from the larger Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, the government (led by Kravchuk) immediately recognized and registered this

church, effectively destroying the legal right of the UAOC to exist. Ever Since this

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1992 event, the UAOC has been ﬁghting to be recognized as an independent church

and to receive property. For them, the most important private good is registration
and legalization by the State. Following that, they want their churches, dating from
the 1920’s, to be returned to them.

It is interesting to note that when I arranged an interview with a high church
leader of the UAOC, he had to come to me for the interview because he had no ofﬁce
or church in Kiev. They are monitoring the government closely on these issues.
Their argument to the state is that they are a historical church that has always been
associated with Ukrainian independence and that they are entitled to their ofﬁcial
Status and their property. Their ties to the nationalistic movement and their historical
relationship with nationalism in Ukraine are their main tools of argument.

The other Type II church, the Greek Catholic Church, is also leery of the
claims of the UOC-KP. The Greek Catholics, however, are in a stronger position
than the UAOC and are monitoring and making demands of the state from a position
of greater power. Due to their overwhelming strength in the western regions of
Ukraine (resulting from the strength of their nationalistic ties and their political
connections), the Greek Catholics have received most of the property they desire in
west Ukraine. However, they are not completely satisﬁed. One private good that
they seek is property in other parts of Ukraine, particularly in the central and eastern
regions of Ukraine. In Kiev, they currently have only one church and it has neither
running water nor electricity. One priest commented that the attitude of governmental

ofﬁcials outside western Ukraine seems to be that the Greek Catholic Church does not

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need churches anywhere except in the west (Interview #29). Therefore, the church is
monitoring government in an attempt to gain property in non-western regions. In
addition, the GCC is pushing for an additional private good; they want the state to
issue an apology for past behavior against their church. They believe that they
deserve structural and political rehabilitation, and that this will occur when buildings
are returned and when ofﬁcial apologies are made. The Greek Catholic Church did
suffer tremendously under the Soviet Union, and they want this acknowledged by the
state (Interview #22). Its rationale is that theirs is the historical church of western
Ukraine that was persecuted because it was such a strong supporter of Ukrainian
independence. Therefore, its nationalistic ties are what set it apart and cause it to
deserve these private goods from the state.

Type I UOC-MP churches in Ukraine are interested in private goods, but they
are also attuned to the need for public goods. I hypothesized that their search for
private goods would mirror those of Type II and Type IV churches, but they seem to
be less interested in property, and have little expressed or implied interest in exclusive
state recognition. They too are concerned about the demands made by the UOC-KP,
but the UOC-MP views these as threats not only to their church but to religious
freedom in Ukraine. Where the other churches focused upon the actions of the UOC-
KP almost solely in terms of how it would affect their property and their power, the
UOC-MP and the Type III Protestant churches viewed these actions as a threat to the
public good of religious freedom. The UOC-MP priests interviewed all addressed the

conﬂict, sometimes in oblique terms, and expressed their concern about government

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favoring one church over another (Interview #26). The goods they mentioned were
freedom from government control, government favoritism, and taxes.

This relative lack of concern with the private good of property may result
from the fact that the UOC-MP is still the largest church in Ukraine and has done
relatively well in the distribution of church property. Since their predecessor, the
Russian Orthodox Church, was the only church allowed to have property under the
USSR, they have managed to maintain control over many of the churches they
occupied. This is largely due to their ties to the Soviet state. Since they could
operate under Communism, they were virtually the only church open for people to
attend. And, since they were already in many of the churches at the time of
independence, and Since they had Strong contacts with members of government
making property allocations, they were able to do well in the property distribution.
The only region in which they fared poorly was the west of Ukraine, which is
predominately Greek Catholic, despite efforts by Soviet authorities to convert people
to the Orthodox faith. In Kiev, however, the second and third biggest churches in the
city after St. Sophia’s, St. Andrew’s and St. Vladimir’s, have been taken from the
UOC-MP and given to the UOC-KP.

The private good that they do desire involves money. When the UOC-KP was
created, a great deal of money that had belonged to the UOC-MP was taken by the .
UOC-KP. It was in a bank account for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and when
the UOC-KP was created, the money was transferred to their newly created account,

with the knowledge and cooperation of the executive branch of government (Interview

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#31). This still bothers many within the church, and they want the government to
help them get this money back.

As hypothesized, the Type III Protestant churches are primarily concerned
with public goods such as religious freedom. Several mentioned the behavior of the
state in favoring the UOC-KP and expressed fear that the religious freedoms of other
churches would suffer. They stated that their desire was that the existing laws would
be obeyed and that the government would satisfy their legal rights to worship freely
without governmental interference (Interview #19). One leader mentioned the fear
that the Orthodox church would be recognized by the government as the state church
and that all other churches would be suppressed (Interview #5). This concern with
the public good of religious freedom and the disinterest in property is interesting since
these churches have no ties with any groups within the state that could help them get
property. Their only ties are to external organizations who, in some cases, help them
ﬁnancially. Their lack of any domestic political connections is one of the reasons
they are interested only in public goods. The effect of links to the political system
will be discussed further in this chapter.

W

In their monitoring behavior and pursuit of public and private goods, I
hypothesize that these churches are engaging in cooperative and competitive behavior.
The pursuit of private goods encourages conﬂict and competition, while the pursuit of
public goods encourages cooperation. In speciﬁc, I suggest that Type III Protestant

churches cooperate with other churches, while Types I, II, and IV conﬂict with one

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another.

In fact, the behavior of the churches was much more complex than I had
envisioned. While conﬂicts were rampant between the churches, cooperation also
existed in unexpected places. The guiding principle for the churches seems to be "the
enemy of my biggest enemy in this region is my friend." Churches that ﬁght ﬁercely
in one region can be found cooperating in another region against a larger, mutual foe.
Cooperation in these cases results from the mutual quest for private and public goods
against a mutually threatening opponent.

For example, in eastern Ukraine, where the UOC-MP is the undisputed power
and favorite of the government, the UAOC, UOC-KP, and the GCC have all met
together in an attempt to try to strengthen their position and to get the government to
listen to them (Interview #35). They are concerned about the distribution of property
in favor of the UOC-MP, and along with the Protestants are concerned about
governmental restrictions of freedom of religion. In central regions such as Kiev, the
UOC-MP, GCC, and the UAOC, together with Protestants have lodged joint
complaints to the government about the UOC-KP and the preferential treatment it has
received from the government (Interview #32). They are all concerned about the role
the UOC—KP has played as the de facto state church under Kravchuk. These same
churches banded together in their successful effort to disband the Council on
Religious Affairs, which was seen by all to beneﬁt the UOC-KP above all other
churches. The common danger of Metropolitan F ilaret and the threat that his church

posed to the other churches and to freedom of religion were sufﬁcient to cause these

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churches to cooperate and work together (Interview #30).

Fluctuating alliances also formed around private goods. In Kiev, the largely
marginalized UAOC and GCC have worked together to support each other in their
claims for property (Interview #22). When the GCC approached the Kiev city
government in an effort to receive church property, the UAOC in Kiev signed a
petition supporting their claim to the church building. In addition, these churches
have together proclaimed their concern about future ties with Russia and the fear of
Russiﬁcation. They have loudly and frequently claimed that they are the only
churches in a position to truly represent and support an independent Ukraine. They
point to their long history of support for the nationalistic movement, and their lack of
any ties to the Soviet power structure (a claim that UOC-KP cannot make).
Therefore, they are worthy of special recognition, if not a Special place in Ukrainian
society.

However, cooperation between churches can quickly turn to conﬂict. For
example, the cooperation between the GCC and the UAOC in the center and east
where they are both weak turns to outright conﬂict in the west where the Greek
Catholics are the most powerful church. The areas in which the churches come into
conﬂict involve property, state recognition and church independence, church
language, and rights of evangelization. In these areas, the patterns are as
hypothesized. Types I, II and IV churches are bitterly ﬁghting, while Type III
churches are largely on the Side lines, removed from the conﬂict.

In the ﬁght for property the conﬂicts follow this basic regional pattern; in the

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west it is everyone against the Greek Catholics, in the center it is everyone against the
UOC-Kiev Patriarchate and Metropolitan Filaret, and in the south and east it is
everyone against the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is the one non-Protestant
church in the study that has no position of supremacy anywhere in the country and is
therefore always ﬁghting from a position of weakness. While many property decisions
have already been made, churches are ﬁghting the decisions and petitioning
government to amend their decision. In many cases the government has taken
buildings away from one church and given them to another, and the excluded church
has continued to hold services outside the building as a form of protest. Church
leaders in both Kiev and Lviv discussed their involvement in this form of protest
behavior (Interviews #6, 7). In Lviv, the church had been given to the GCC, and in
Kiev the churches had been given to the UOC-KP. The overwhelming feeling in each
region is that one church has been favored by the state, so the other churches must
join together and ﬁght against this church to protect their personal rights to property.

The conﬂict over church independence and state recognition is focused around
the UOC-KP. The UOC-MP is angry about the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox
church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, and blames the state and Metropolitan
Filaret for instigating the Split. These churches argue about who is subservient to
whom, to whom buildings, icons, and money belong, and who is the mother church.
Their ﬁght for the ascendent position is an argument over the private goods of power

and property. The other churches View this as an internal matter that does not merit

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their intervention.

The conﬂict over exclusive state recognition, however, concerns them all. AS
mentioned earlier, Kravchuk’s support for the UOC-KP angered all the churches. His
instant recognition of the UOC-KP, and the resulting legal disappearance of the
UAOC, sparked an ongoing bitter ﬁght between the UOC—KP and the UAOC over the
right of the UAOC to exist. The UAOC claims that the activities of the UOC-KP
were illegal and unwarranted and that they are a legal independent church, while the
UOC-KP claims that their activities were legal and that the UAOC simply no longer
exists. The UAOC points to its historical ties with the nationalistic movement and to
the Soviet ties of the UOC-KP to bolster its claim.

The conﬂict over church language also divides these churches. This conﬂict
pits the churches with nationalistic ties, Types II and IV, against Type I churches with
Soviet ties. Type II churches have always used Ukrainian in their services, while the
UOC-KP, after its creation in 1992, hastily followed Kravchuk’s lead by proclaiming
Ukrainian to be the language of choice. The UOC-MP, however, following the
tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church, has used Old Church Slavonic in its
services for centuries. One UOC-MP Bishop (Interview #15), Spoke of Slavonic as
the high church language, suitable for discussions with and about God. He referred
to Ukrainian as the language of the street, suitable only for commerce. He suggested
that those who support the use of Ukrainian in church services are interested only in
their political image and the political gain that can be made from this issue. The

other churches, however, bristle at the categorization of Ukrainian as a lower

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language and defend the right of people to worship God in their own language.

An interesting conﬂict over the right of (primarily) Protestant churches to
evangelize involves private and public goods. For the Protestant churches, the issue
is one of religious freedom, and they are ﬁghting for the public good of freedom of
Speech and religion. For the churches pitted against the Protestants, chieﬂy the UOC-
KP and to a lesser extent the UOC-MP, these activities amount to the invasion of
foreigners and foreign beliefs. A priest of the UOC-KP (Interview #14) stated the
commonly held belief that Ukraine is an Orthodox nation, and therefore to be
Ukrainian is to be Orthodox. Anyone who attempts to "pull" Ukrainians away from
their spiritual heritage is harming the nation. Protestants as well as Greek Catholics
were included in this category. Other Orthodox leaders went even farther and
suggested that the government place restrictions upon the activity of "foreign"
inﬂuenced groups. They argue that foreign-inspired missionaries are aggressors and
are ignoring the 1000 years of culture that connects Ukraine and the Orthodox church
(Interview #3).

In an interesting twist, while the leaders of the UOC—KP and Protestant
churches in the south and east are concerned about and cooperating to protect
religious freedoms, stemming from restrictions placed against them, leaders of the
UOC-KP and the UOC-MP in the west and center are working together to try and
Stop the religious freedoms of the Protestants. This suggests that for the UOC-KP
and the UOC—MP, religious freedom is a private, rather than a public, good. For

many within the Orthodox church, the state should protect the rights of their church,

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while restricting the rights of churches with foreign ties. In a conference in Kiev
entitled ”Freedom of Conscience: Church and State in Ukraine" held September 28-
30, 1994, several well-known Ukrainian scholars and church leaders justiﬁed this
view by Stating that in this time of social and political development, it is natural for
the state to favor the historic church in an attempt to shepherd and encourage the
correct spiritual development of the society. According to this view, the foreign ties
of Type III Protestant churches disqualify them from enjoying religious freedom.

Overall, the churches followed the patterns expected when monitoring the
government, making claims for private and public goods, and cooperating or ﬁghting.
As expected, Type I, II, and IV churches monitored most closely, were concerned
with private goods, and engaged in a great deal of inter-church conﬂict. Also, the
churches cooperated a great deal, although this cooperation was in a self-interested
manner and dissolved into conﬂict the minute one church gained a position of
ascendancy. The issue of religious freedom is also more complex than initially
expected. These freedoms are viewed as a public good by the Type III Protestant
churches, but Type I and Type IV churches are opposed to then and are pushing for
selective religious rights.
Sanctioning Behavior

Churches also use sanctions to reach the state. By rewarding officials who
follow their wishes, they encourage future cooperation. By punishing people who act
contrary to their interests, they demonstrate their power and create incentives to

behave in a pleasing manner. Sanctioning includes electoral support, civil action, and

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direct confrontation. I hypothesize that churches with Strong ties to the nationalistic
movement are in the strongest position and are most willing to sanction governmental
decision makers. Churches pursuing private goods are also expected to sanction more
deliberately than those pursuing public goods because they are securing private goods
by excluding others.

Muslim

Types I and IV (UOC-MP; UOC-KP) churches were very active in sanctioning
government. AS expected, the nationalistic ties of Type IV churches encouraged their
sanctioning behavior. Type I churches somewhat surprisingly were also very active
in sanctioning, although they did not seem to be monitoring government as diligently
as Type IV churches. The nationalistic ties of the Type II (Greek Catholic and
UAOC) churches, however, surprisingly constrained their sanctioning behavior. Not
surprisingly, the Protestant churches did very little sanctioning.

The UOC-KP church was the most vigorous in its support of incumbent
Leonid Kravchuk and it opposition to candidate Leonid Kuchma. Due to the strong
support they received under Kravchuk, they were eager to support his bid for
reelection and they were quite active in their support for him. As one leader
mentioned, Kravchuk was known and tried, and therefore should be supported
(Interview #14). Church ofﬁcials admitted that they supported Kravchuk but said that
they only told their church members to vote for "the nationalistic candidate" or ”true
democrats", in both cases clearly referring to Kravchuk (Interview #25). Given that

Kravchuk was a strong supporter of their desire for property and State recognition, it

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was only natural that they should reward his help with strong electoral support.

The story was quite different for Types I and II churches. For all these
churches, Kravchuk’s strong support for the UOC-KP, and the harm they had suffered
as a result, provided strong ammunition for their opposition to him. For the UOC-
MP, the choice was clear. They were angry at Kravchuk for the role he played in the
breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and held him responsible for the loss of
their property. In addition, they disliked the way their church had been painted as a
tool of Russian domination by nationalist Kravchuk. Therefore, they came out
strongly for candidate Kuchma, who took a much less active stand on church-state
affairs and who decried the pro-Kiev Patriarchate decisions of Kravchuk’s
administration. In addition, Kuchma and the UOC-MP share strong ties to Russia;
the Patriarch of the UOC-MP is in Moscow, and Kuchma campaigned on the need to
work closely with Russia. Kuchma’s ties to Russia as well as his apparent support for
religious freedoms attracted the strong support of the UOC-MP.

For the Type II churches, the choice was less clear. On the one hand,
Kravchuk had done much to alienate these churches. The UAOC blamed Kravchuk
directly for their unregistered and illegal Status, while the GCC could point to a
dearth of churches anywhere outside of west Ukraine. Kravchuk’s behavior in
preventing them from acquiring the desired private goods certainly deserved
sanctioning. On the other hand, Kuchma’s strong pro-Russian views went against
everything these churches had ever stood for. Since their creation, both the UAOC

and the GCC had fought against Russian and Soviet domination of Ukraine, so it was

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virtually impossible for them to support a candidate who sought to tie Ukraine closer
to Russia. Their sanctioning behavior during the election, therefore, was somewhat
muted. Kravchuk had done much to harm them, but in the words of one scholar, "the
Greek Catholic Church had no choice but to support Kravchuk; Kuchma’s pro-
Russian stand was too much for them to even consider" (Interview #32). Therefore,
in weighing their nationalistic ties and history against damage done to their religious
freedoms, the nationalistic considerations won out. This ambivalence, however, was
reﬂected in their very muted support for Kravchuk. Church leaders and organizations
were forbidden by order of the Cardinal Lubachevsky to engage in any sort of
political behavior. This behavior likely reﬂects an unwillingness to support any
candidate as much as it does a respect for separation of church and state.

The other Type II church, the UAOC, found itself in the same position.
Kravchuk had badly damaged this church, but their nationalistic ties made it all but
impossible for them to support the challenger Kuchma. In interview after interview,
UAOC leaders presented Kravchuk as the enemy acting in concert with F ilaret of the
UOC-KP. They Spoke of Kravchuk’s Communist past and his ties to the Soviet
government that destroyed their church in the 19203 and 1940s. AS one UAOC priest
put it, they told their members not to vote for the "people of yesterday, for example,
people who used to be Communists and who still see things the same way” (Interview
#30). Their sanctioning of Kravchuk included protests and picketing, to the point of
being attacked and beaten by the militia. However, they also spoke disparagingly of

the challenger Kuchma as a supporter of the UOC-MP. They were very fearful of his

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ties with Russia. As one scholar stated, "Kravchuk for them was the enemy, but
Kuchma was not even an option" (Interview #31). Therefore, they were in the
position of sanctioning both candidates for their ties to the Soviet state or to Russia.
That left them with no one to support in the Presidential race.

The Type III Protestant churches took part in very limited sanctioning
behavior. One pastor told me that his church prayed for Christians running for office
to win, and mentioned praying for Kuchma to win because Kravchuk so strongly
favored the UOC-KP (Interview #18). Prayer seemed to be the extent of any
sanctioning behavior on the part of these churches. The majority of church leaders
Simply said that they stayed out of the conﬂict and took no part in the election.
Kravchuk’s disregard for the public good of interest to them--religious freedom--
sparked spiritual, rather than political, sanction.

Level of Gpvernment Approaghed and Links to the Pplitical System

An important component of sanctioning is the ability to connect with some
level of government. Depending upon their ties, churches used their contacts at
different levels of government to try to accomplish their goals. By using their links
to the system to sanction and reward behavior, these churches can focus their energies
upon the most productive and responsive areas of government.

My research revealed an interesting and unexpected pattern of sanctioning;
each of the churches had a distinct level of government that they dealt with, and their
sanctioning behavior focused upon this particular level. In addition, the churches

focused these attentions upon a speciﬁc geographic area of government. The two

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churches with strong ties to the Soviet state, Types I (UOC-MP) and IV(UOC-KP) ,

both concentrated their attention on the national level. Type II (UAOC and GCC)
churches, with their strong nationalistic ties, focused on regional and local levels of
government. Type III Protestant churches, with weak ties to the former Soviet
authorities and to the up-and-coming nationalist groups, abstained from political
involvement.

A large number of leaders of Ukraine under the Soviet Union remain in power
today, particularly at the national level. The former President Kravchuk, many
members of the Supreme Soviet, and a large number of bureaucrats in the national
ministries all maintained their positions after Ukraine declared her independence from
the Soviet Union. Many of these people had held high positions in the Communist
Party, and then renounced their CPSU membership in the turmoil surrounding
independence. Therefore, it is not surprising that the UOC-KP, with its strong ties to
the former Soviet state, Should focus its attentions upon governmental ofﬁcials at the
national level. AS far as many are concerned, the national government, led by
Kravchuk, essentially assisted in the creation of this church, so it is no surprise that it
has been willing to listen to the requests of this church above the others.

In addition to well-established links with President Kravchuk, the UOC-KP is
said to have strong connections with members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
(Interview #32). During the election, candidates for national ofﬁce visited
Metropolitan Filaret to ask for his support. At this meeting, Filaret was able to

explain what he wanted from the candidates. Political leaders from the major parties

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also visited UOC-KP Patriarch Vladimir to tell him their positions and also to Show
loyalty to this church (Interview #20). This church’s strong position with respect to
the former Soviet power base, as well as its position as a church that represents an
independent and nationalistic Ukraine, places it in a position of political power today.
It can claim strength from both the old guard and the newly emerging nationalist
forces. Its political power, especially on the national level, accounts for a great deal
of the attention that it receives from governmental ofﬁcials. As a result, it is in a
Strong position to be able to sanction effectively.

This type of personal treatment was not enjoyed by any of the other churches.
While the UOC-MP also focused upon the national level, there is no indication that it
received the same response as the UOC-KP. The association of the UOC-MP with
Russia, especially for nationalist or pseudo-nationalist politicians, is a huge liability.
Therefore the potentially beneﬁcial linkages with holdovers from the Soviet Union are
damaged by this foreign association. While the church is still trying to court national
political attention, many of its national connections are disappearing. This has led to
a decrease in sanctioning and political participation, according to one scholar, because
the church has no one to support (Interview #31). They had high hopes for newly
elected President Kuchma, since he shares their close ties to Russia, but so far
Kuchma has had little concern or time for these religious questions. However, its
contacts with the Soviet/Communist majority bloc in the Supreme Soviet remain
strong. The important decisions are now being shifted to different levels of

government. The hope for the UOC-MP was that this President would provide them

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with the contacts that they desire, but his lack of interest may dash these hopes.
However, it is important to remember that this church is still the largest in Ukraine
and has a huge degree of potential inﬂuence.

The Type II churches also have a great deal of potential inﬂuence, and they
are actively working to use and increase that inﬂuence. Due to their lack of ties and
their historical antagonism with the Soviet State, there seem to be few national
political contacts for either the Greek Catholic or the Ukrainian Autocephalous
churches. Instead, their power bases are in the regional government of west Ukraine,
or in regional representatives working in Kiev.

A great deal of the political power of the Greek Catholic Church has been
ascribed to the regional and local governments in west Ukraine (Interview #20).
While ofﬁcials in other regions of Ukraine are perceived to be hostile and indifferent
to the needs of the Greek Catholic Church (Interviews #29, 22), west Ukrainian
ofﬁcials are very favorably inclined toward the GCC. In fact, according to one
scholar, "the authorities (in west Ukraine) are not neutral but have made it so the
GCC wins on the local oblast level” (Interview #31). These regional ties extend to a
deputy in Parliament who is the head of a regional administration. This man is
working to gather funds and to get the government to restore a monastery to the
GCC. The same Greek Catholic priest who Shared this information with me went on
to say that "the church has more of its contacts at the local and regional level... the
national government is not very helpful" (Interview #4). Some contacts exist at the

national level, however. The deputies to the national Supreme Soviet from western

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Ukraine are overwhelmingly Greek Catholic (Interview #7), so they provide the
church with some national connections. These few national contacts, including the
Ukrainian Vice-Premier, are bolstered by very strong local and regional contacts.
Given the depth of the historical association between the Greek Catholic Church, the
national independence movement in west Ukraine, and their resistance to the Soviet
state, it is not surprising that the GCC church is the politically dominant force in west
Ukraine. It is also not surprising that their sanctions at the local and regional levels
are much more effective than they are at the national level.

The other Type II church, the UAOC, also has a paucity of links to the
national political system. Unlike the GCC, however, they are not in a strong position
in any region. Their strongest base of support is the west Ukraine, but the power of
the GCC dwarfs their efforts to gain power on the local or regional level. Their
Strongest contacts are at these levels, but they are always ﬁghting the inﬂuence of the
Greek Catholic Church.

As a result, the UAOC seems to be trying to create their own power base on
the national level, among nationalists who fear the Soviet ties of former Communist
politicians. This small but vocal group is made up of young leaders who have had
little to no ties with the Communist power structure. These people have tried to
position themselves as nationalists who are not tainted by the practices of the former
Soviet government. A leader of this group, and a loud defender of the UAOC, is
Serhei Holovaty, member of the Ukrainian Parliament. He has been a staunch ally of

this church, to the point of giving a press conference accusing Kravchuk and members

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of the national government of violating the human rights of UAOC believers and
violating the freedom of religion in Ukraine (Holovaty 1993). A priest of the UAOC
ran as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet because he "was worried about the
tendency (he saw) leading to the resumption of the USSR...and to let(ing) the _
Communists back into ofﬁce" (Interview #30). He said that the church fears both the
ex—Communists and the ex-Soviets currently in power and is trying to get democratic
forces in control of the government. In these attempts, the UAOC has a wide range
of contacts with nationalistic political parties in Ukraine. He ran as a candidate of the
Rukh party, and the church has published letters of support from the Congress of
Ukrainian Nationalists and the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine.

Although it is by far the weaker church, the UAOC alone seems to be
positioning itself to directly challenge the UOC-KP for national political power. The
UOC-MP has become politically isolated, the Greek Catholic Church is focused
almost exclusively upon west Ukrainian politics, and the Protestants are largely
politically dormant. That leaves the UOC-KP, by far the most powerful church, and
the UAOC, the weaker but very politically active challenger.

Type III churches have few links to people in government. Since the majority
of Protestant churches were persecuted and existed underground under Soviet times,
they have few historical contacts with governmental ofﬁcials, and current relations are
strained. The general consensus among church leaders was that they do not ask
government for anything and do not expect any response. As expected, the lack of

monitoring by these churches has led to a lack of sanctioning.

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As hypothesized, different ties led churches to different levels of government.

Ties to the Soviet state led to the national level while ties to nationalistic groups led to
regional and local levels of government. Type IV churches sanctioned most
vigorously and directly and focused their efforts on the national level of government.
Type II churches sanctioned rather feebly during the Presidential election, due to a
lack of enthusiasm for either candidate. Their general links to the political system are
potent, however. The GCC has strong ties to the regional and local administrations in
west Ukraine and wields a great deal of power over this level of government. The
UAOC is focusing its attention upon the national level, trying to establish a base of
power among political groups that fear Russia and former Communists. Their ability
to sanction at this level is still weak, but is expected to grow. The Type I and III
churches both participated in little sanctioning behavior. The UOC-MP seems to have
been largely marginalized by its ties with Russia, while the Protestant churches Show
no interest in governmental activities at any level.

Credibility

The credibility of a church affects its ability to reach the State. Credibility

stems from both popular support and elite support. In this study it is measured in no
concrete way but is assessed based upon information gained in the interviews. Based
upon this information, groups that are passive in their response to the government and
that cede power to elites will have less credibility than those who actively respond to
government and gather information themselves.

As mentioned earlier, credibility has some additional components. A church

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with legitimate claims to be a representative of Ukrainian national Statehood has a
great deal of credibility. This leads me to hypothesize that ties to the nationalist
movement will help church credibility, while foreign or Soviet times will harm
credibility. Actual inﬂuence with members of the government helps credibility.
Therefore, I hypothesize that Soviet ties will help credibility. Finally, the ability to
mobilize members to threaten electoral punishment enhances credibility. Churches
with national ties are expected to gain from this credibility.

In net, this results in some contradictions. First, Soviet ties in one instance
hamper credibility while in another they help credibility. I suggest this is because in
the ﬁrst instance, Soviet ties hamper credibility among the populous, while in the
second instance they help credibility among decision-making elites in government. In
addition, the UOC-KP has ties to both the nationalist movement and the Soviet state.
Therefore, they may have a hard time gaining credibility based upon their claim to be
an authentic representative of Ukrainian nationhood.

It is important to note that regional differences have a strong impact on
credibility. My research demonstrates that ties enhancing credibility in one region
decrease credibility in other regions. In particular, historical claims of national
statehood will rarely enhance credibility in east Ukraine. The drastic differences
between regions are reﬂected in the divergent responses to church ties.

Crgibiligz
An unanticipated factor inﬂuencing credibility surfaced immediately. For

many people in Ukraine, the Orthodox church is considered to be the true church of

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Ukraine. Ukraine has been an Orthodox country since 988 AD. when Prince
Vladimir, in Kiev, deliberately chose Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism and Islam
(Nielsen 1994). Many of the people interviewed mentioned that this religious
identiﬁcation is an important part of Ukraine’s national identity. Therefore, any of
the three Orthodox churcheS--the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, or UAOC--are deemed by
many to be more credible. The other churches are viewed by these same people as
foreign churches that are somehow harming the national development of Ukraine.

As hypothesized, the UOC-KP is making the most of its claim to be a

nationalistic church. This claim, together with its tangible and formidable ties to
leaders from the Soviet state, has made it a church that is taken very seriously.
Leaders from the UOC-KP were the only ones who spoke of being satisﬁed with what
the government has done for them. One Bishop explained that the church speaks to
the government and explains what it wants and "the church is glad that the
government is understanding and tolerant of the problems of the church” (Interview
#25).

However, several factors may be harming the credibility of this church. The
ties of the church, and of its leader, Metropolitan F ilaret, to the Soviet state, are
damaging. To many people, Filaret is the personiﬁcation of the UOC-KP, and they
Speak interchangeably of him and the church. Whatever he has done or whatever
Characteristics he has are ascribed to the larger church. While F ilaret has worked to
quiet discussion of his past, there is evidence that he collaborated with the KGB

(Motyl 1993). For many, especially nationalists, this is a damning information. The

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former Patriarch of the UAOC, Mystaslav, said "it is not only the matter of F ilaret’s
connections with Communist Party structures and the KGB. God is his judge here"
(Holovaty 1993). These connections undermine his credibility, especially among
those who did not cooperate with the authorities and were persecuted for their beliefs.
With the election of Kuchma, the general perception of the church that so
strongly supported Kravchuk may be tarnished. Indeed, there is a suggestion that the
UOC-KP has greatly restricted its political demands since the election and has been
much quieter (Interview #31). If Kuchma gains the country’s approval, then the
credibility of the church that stood against him so strongly may be severely damaged.
If Kuchma fails, and anti-Russian nationalism becomes even more powerful, the
UOC-KP is one of the churches that stands to gain.
The UOC-MP, as hypothesized, has indeed suffered from its strong ties to the
Soviet State and to Russia. Under Kravchuk’s administration, these ties to Russia
were used as justiﬁcation for an informal informational blockade where they were
stopped from broadcasting their services or programs on TV (Interview #31).
Metropolitan Sobodan was personally treated poorly by Kravchuk (Interview #3).
The ties to Russia were judged to be a threat, and the UOC-MP was seen as a puppet
of Russian imperialistic ambitions. Priests of the UOC-MP fear that they are being
branded as agents of Moscow (Interview #28). This has greatly lessened the
credibility of this church.
In addition, the UOC-MP has withdrawn from politics to some degree, and

this is likely to hamper its credibility. The ruling body of the church met in Moscow

114

and ruled that the church and clergy are not allowed to participate in politics. This
neutrality, if followed, will lessen the credibility and political power of the church.

However, other unexpected factors have bolstered the credibility of the UOC-
MP. As every UOC-MP priest pointed out to me, their church is by far the largest in
Ukraine, in terms of believers as well as property. And, in the center and east of the
country, this church is growing. AS it gains adherents, it gains credibility. In
addition, Kuchma’s election potentially strengthens the position of the UOC-MP. If
Kuchma is perceived to favor this church (which is possible since they both share the
same strong ties to Russia), then the credibility of this church will increase. If
Kuchma continues to stay away from the religious question, however, this church’s
credibility will continue to Slide. For this church, the ties to Russia can either harm
or help its credibility, depending upon the political climate within the country.

The credibility of the Greek Catholic Church is high, as hypothesized, due to
its long history supporting the nationalist movement in Ukraine. This church is
recognized by many as one of the main forces resisting the Communist takeover of
western Ukraine in the 1940s. Its staunch support for an independent Ukraine has
provided it with impeccable nationalistic credentials. However, the GCC suffers from
its afﬁliation with the Roman Catholic Church. To some, the GCC is a tool of Rome
that should be regarded with suspicion (Interview #21). This is used as justiﬁcation
for decisions that deny the church any property beyond the western regions of
Ukraine. In addition, old Soviet accusations of Greek Catholic collaboration with the

Nazis during World War II have resurfaced, and this too has been used as a reason to

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deny requests of the church (Interview #29).

These accusations have damaged the credibility of the church, especially in the
central regions of Ukraine. This low level of credibility is reﬂected in the treatment
that GC churches in Kiev receive from the State. The perception of one Greek
Catholic priest in Kiev is that the government is hostile and "still acts like it did under
the Russian empire and the USSR--they think that there is just one Orthodox church
and that all the others are foreign” (Interview #22).

This church is not an Orthodox church, although it uses the Orthodox rite, so
the movement against non—Orthodox churches harms it. The ofﬁcial proclamation of
Cardinal Lubachevsky during the Presidential election forbidding churches or church
leaders from taking sides in the election also will likely hamper their credibility in
national elections in the future.

The most credible church in Ukraine may very well be the other Type II
church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Like the Greek Catholic
Church, the UAOC shares strong historical ties with nationalistic groups in Ukraine.
Its resistance to and suppression by the Soviet authorities proves the lack of
potentially damaging ties to the Soviet State. In addition, the UAOC is an Orthodox
church and can claim the spiritual heritage of the Slavic people dating back to 988
AD. when Prince Vladimir decided that the Kiev-Rus Empire would be Christian.
The only external ties of this church are to the Ukrainian diaspora, located primarily
in Canada and the United States. Given all these factors, the UAOC has a great deal

of credibility in Ukraine, particularly among the nationalist groups.

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However, their small Size and lack of ties to governmental ofﬁcials have
hampered their credibility among many decision makers in government. During
UAOC protests of the actions of President Kravchuk, church members and church
leaders were beaten by the police (Interview #30). When former Patriarch Mystaslav
returned from the United States in November 1990 to be enthroned as Patriarch of the
UAOC and to take up residence in Kiev, the government and the KGB allegedly put a
multitude of obstacles in his way, including delaying him at the airport, refusing him
permission to get an apartment, etc (Interview #24). In addition, the current
Patriarch, Dmitri, has no office or church building in Kiev. Finally, the church still
has no official status and at the time of the interviews was still not recognized as a
church in Ukraine.

All of the factors suggest that to the government of Kravchuk, this church had
little to no credibility. Now that his administration is gone, the situation may change.
The last UAOC priest interviewed displayed optimism that the church will soon be
registered. This church’s active involvement with politics will likely increase its
credibility with governmental decision makers. The willingness of church leaders to
take political positions and to back up those positions with protests and marches

suggests that they should be taken seriously as a political force. In interviews with
Church leaders from the UAOC, they seemed to recognize that they are currently in a
weak position, but they also seem certain that they have a strong power base and will
increase their power. In the words of a UAOC priest, although the government in the

past has favored the UOC-KP, ”this cannot keep the UAOC out of political power.

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We still have the inﬂuence, even though at the moment it is minor. Our church has
power with the nationalist forces and if our inﬂuence today is limited, then it may
grow in the future" (Interview #30) This conﬁdence may go a long way to increasing
the credibility and political clout of the UAOC.

The least credible of the churches, due to their lack of interest in politics, are
the Type III churches. As hypothesized, these churches are interested primarily in
public goods, are not monitoring or sanctioning government to any degree, and
therefore lack any political credibility. Time and time again, church leaders
acknowledged that politics is never mentioned in their churches, that the church
doesn’t need government to listen to it Since it is God who works in peoples’ hearts,
and that the church should play no role in inﬂuencing the voting behavior of church
members. These attitudes have lessened the credibility of these churches.

In addition, the ties of these churches to western organizations and to non-
Orthodox confessions strongly hampers their credibility. These churches, with their
Protestant religion and contacts with foreign missionaries, are seen as a threat to
Ukraine’s spiritual heritage. According to one UOC-KP priest, Ukraine is an
Orthodox nation, and the people of this country should not be pulled away by these
"foreign" organizations or churches (Interview #14). Many Protestant church leaders
feel that they are being singled out for persecution by the state because they are not
Orthodox, and this leads them to distance themselves further from the State (Interview
#19). Since the government does not listen to them, they stay away from contacts

with the government and are most happy when the government does not disturb them

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(Interview #1). This creates an interesting cycle where lack of credibility leads to
decreased political involvement which leads to a decrease in credibility.

What is interesting is that, as hypothesized, there is still a large degree of
potential credibility within the Protestant churches. Because of their lack of
involvement in the politics of Ukraine, these churches are perceived by many to be
more trustworthy and "clean” than other churches in Ukraine (Interview #20). One
government administrator said that the Protestant church has a great deal of inﬂuence
because they kept themselves "pure" under Communist times and now. As a result,
they are widely respected (Interview #17). There has been a great interest in religion
in the past few years, and the Protestant churches have been growing at a very rapid
rate. Therefore, while these churches are largely apolitical and have little credibility
among decision makers, they are well positioned to have a great deal of credibility if
they do decide to enter the political arena.

In sum, the most potentially credible churches may be the Protestant churches.
Should they choose to more vigorously enter the political fray, their apolitical history
and lack of compromising ties will likely give them great credibility among citizens.
The most currently credible church is probably the UAOC. Particularly in the west
and center it is seen as an uncompromising supporter of an independent Ukraine,
untarnished by damaging ties to the USSR or Russia. The UOC-KP still has a great
deal of credibility in the center and west, as does the UOC—MP in the cast, but neither
can escape their ties to the former Soviet Union which included, in many cases,

cooperation with the Soviet KGB.

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Credibility matters both to governmental ofﬁcials and to the general
population. A loss of credibility among the public may lead to a corresponding loss
of credibility among decision makers. An executive-level ministry may perceive the
UOC-KP to be less credible, although they share the same Soviet ties, if the general
perception of this church has become more negative among the general population.
Regioml Differences

Credibility was not only inﬂuenced by church ties or by Orthodox afﬁliation.
Huge differences in credibility between the regions of Ukraine were also discovered.
The credibility of a church to west Ukrainian ofﬁcials and people was much different
from the credibility to east Ukrainian ofﬁcials and people. The perception of church
ties varied markedly between regions. For example, in west and central Ukraine, ties
to nationalistic groups were positive and increased credibility. In east Ukraine,
however, these same ties were negative and decreased credibility. Therefore, it iS
difﬁcult to describe a pattern that ﬁts the whole country.

In the west, the single most important factor enhancing credibility is
commitment to Ukrainian nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kravchuk,
the nationalist candidate, received the overwhelming majority of votes in west
Ukraine. The single most detrimental factor to credibility is ties to Russia.
Therefore, the churches Sharing strong ties to nationalism, Types II (UAOC and
GCC) and IV (UOC-KP), are the most credible. The church with strong ties to
Russia, Type I (UOC-MP), has very little credibility at all. A Bishop of the UOC-

MP church in Lviv (western Ukraine) described his position in this city as being a

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"persona non grata" (Interview #8). He went on to compare himself to a fighter in
the middle of enemy controlled territory. In fact, Type I churches are few and far
between in the west, particularly in the Galacian regions of Lviv, Ivano Frankivsk,
and Ternopil (see Appendix B).

People in west Ukraine refer to the UOC-MP as the Russian Orthodox
Church, obviously insinuating that it is a foreign-controlled church. One Greek
Catholic Church priest described a dinner celebrating the 50 year anniversary of an
important GCC priest where all the "Ukrainian" (UAOC, UOC-KP) churches were
invited, but the "Russian” (UOC—MP) church leaders were not (Interview #4).

Of the churches with strong ties to Ukrainian nationalism, the general
consensus is that the Greek Catholic Church has the most adherents, the most
inﬂuence, and the most credibility. It is understandable that the overwhelming Size of
the church in Galacia contributes to its credibility. Contrary to expectations, larger
size has not diluted the message or inﬂuence of the GCC, but has lent it greater
power and authority. This power has led to a great deal of inﬂuence in western
Ukraine.

The UAOC and the UOC-KP are also Strong in the west, but their credibility
and inﬂuence are less than that of the GCC. Their smaller size translates into less
power in the west. It is generally acknowledged that the larger Size of the GCC has
helped them in the hunt for property (Interview #23). Although they ﬁght over
property, these churches Share the same commitment to using Ukrainian as the

language in church services, to Ukrainian nationalism, and to ﬁghting against

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cooperation with Russia.

Since Protestant churches lack the positive ties with nationalistic groups and
negative ties with Russia, they seem to be regarded in a neutral fashion. All
information indicates that they possess little inﬂuence or credibility in the west.

In east Ukraine, the patterns of inﬂuence are reversed. The strong ties of
Types II and IV churches to nationalism are viewed in a negative fashion, while Type
I churches’ ties to Russia are viewed favorably. It is not surprising that Kuchma, the
candidate who emphasized his ties to Russia, received the bulk of the vote in the east.
The UOC-MP is overwhelmingly powerful, in terms of size and inﬂuence in the east.
Metropolitan Sobodan of the UOC-MP, viewed with fear and suspicion by many in
the west, is revered and respected in the east (Interview #3). The Russian-speaking,
Russian-leaning population here has strong ties with the UOC-MP and Russia and
views the nationalistic fervor of the west with some trepidation. AS one scholar in
east Ukraine stated, they do not want the USSR again and they want an independent
Ukraine, but they also want to keep the spiritual and cultural ties with Russia
(Interview #3). This church is referred to in this region as the Russian Orthodox
Church, but no negative connotations are intended. Rather, the name refers to the
ancient Kiev-Rus empire. For them, referring to this church as the Russian church
has no ethnic implications; the people in the east are indifferent to the question
(Interview #35). It is Striking how the same reference to this church can have such
divergent meanings in two regions of Ukraine.

The UOC-KP is viewed by the UOC-MP and the government of east Ukraine

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as a nationalistic organization, according to a UOC-KP priest (Interview #2). This
decreases the credibility of this church in the east, and negatively inﬂuences their
ability to reach the state. AS this same priest States, they have tried to contact the
government to make their requests known, but they have had no response from the
state. The Type II churches who share interests in nationalism are so small that they
virtually do not exist in east Ukraine. There is one Greek Catholic congregation in
the eastern city of Donetsk, but it is quite small and has no church building. Services
are held in a small house that serves as parish, ofﬁce and church building. These
churches are largely marginalized, due to their size and their unsavory ties to the
nationalist movement in Ukraine.

The Protestants in the east behave in much the same fashion as they do in the
west. For the most part, they do not hold any political opinions and focus their
attention on religious, rather than secular, interests.

In eastern Ukraine, the church is in a totally different position from the rest of
the country, because the eastern region is totally different from the rest of the
country. In the east, the country looks much the same as it did under Communism.
The same statues of Lenin still stand, streets are still named after the October
Revolution, and the same people are in power at all levels of government. As a
result, the churches are still very weak and are very dependent upon the same
Communist authorities for help. When I requested an interview with a representative
of the UOC-MP, they checked with the local Department of Religious Affairs and

when the head of the department said no, they refused to meet with me. In many

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respects, the churches still function as though the Soviet Union still exists.

The interrogation I underwent by the Chief of the Department of Religious
Affairs in Donetsk spoke volumes about the lack of change in east Ukraine. Not only
are former Soviet ofﬁcials still in place, but their former Soviet-style practices
continue. Protestant church leaders told me about continued harassment by regional
authorities, including the denial of visas for foreign visitors unless bribes were paid.
The fact that the Chief accused me of being a Protestant spy highlights the continued
state paranoia and state intrusion into religious affairs in this region.

Religious roots in this region are weak, and there is a weak religious tradition
in this area. Churches are very weak, and not very politically oriented. The overall
attitude is that people are not eager to discuss the relationship between churches and
the government, and they are very suspicious of the questions and the questioner.

The central regions of Ukraine, including the capital city Kiev, are the least
lopsided. In these regions, the UOC-KP and UOC-MP are pitted against one another
in the ﬁght for supremacy. The UOC-MP is strong in this area, but the UOC-KP has
been ﬁghting hard for power and inﬂuence. According to one scholar, F ilaret and his
church have been gaining ground against Sobodan and the UOC-MP (Interview #31).
The UOC-KP is well positioned here to use its ties with former Soviet ofﬁcials still in
power while also playing the nationalistic card. However, historical afﬁliation to the
UOC-MP has provided this church with a large base of support that the UOC-KP
must contend with. Again, the size of the UOC-MP is an asset in the search for

credibility. With Kravchuk out of power, the UOC-KP may ﬁnd that it has lost some

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of its most important contacts in this region, and as a result, lost some of its
credibility. Given the current lack of GC or Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
churches in the center of Ukraine, any loss of credibility of the UOC-KP will likely
help the UOC-MP.

In sum, my hypotheses largely were correct in explaining credibility. Ties to
nationalistic organizations improve credibility, while ties to the Soviet state help
church credibility among decision makers but hamper credibility among much of the
general public. Ties to foreign organizations, whether to the Roman Catholic Church,
the Russian Orthodox Church, or western Protestant churches, largely harm church
credibility. What was not expected was the lack of credibility accorded to any non-
Orthodox church. The perception of Ukraine as an Orthodox country that Should
remain Orthodox was much more widespread than anticipated, and those churches that
are Orthodox are granted a great deal of preference and credibility.

With all of these things considered, the church that emerges as the most
potentially credible is the UAOC. It has credibility from being Orthodox, having
strong nationalistic ties, and having no ties to the Soviet state. The next most credible
church is the UOC-KP. This Type IV church has strong nationalistic ties and is
Orthodox, but suffers from ties to the Soviet state. During the time of the interviews,
the UOC-KP decidedly had the edge on credibility, particularly among decision
makers. But, many factors suggested that, in the future, the UAOC may gain a more
credible position, both among decision makers and the general public.

The regional differences in Ukraine are great. Ties that help a church in one

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region harm that church in another region. No church is positioned to straddle the
differences and appeal to each region. Rather, the Greek Catholics have the strongest
position in the west, while the UOC-MP has the dominant position in the east. The
UOC-KP is Strong in the center and is trying to challenge both churches in their
respective regions. Short of a uniﬁcation between the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP, no
church looks likely to gain a country-wide position of power.

Conclusion

Churches were concerned with inﬂuencing a limited range of governmental
policies. The majority pursued private goods, including ownership of property,
special recognition and position, money, and a formal state apology. The public
goods most mentioned were laws governing freedom of religion, and laws governing
religious groups special status for taxation purposes. AS expected, the private goods
were pursued with much more vigor than the public goods.

AS mentioned earlier, the realm of government policies in which the churches
were interested remains quite narrow. There appeared to be little to no interest in
trying to inﬂuence social policy. Interest in foreign policy, as will be discussed in
later chapters, was limited to a general View on relations with Russia and the west.
Given the limited amount of time that churches have been free to engage in politics, it
is not surprising that they are focusing on a limited range of policies. It is likely that
their activities will expand into other realms of public policy in the future.

When churches try to reach the state, combined ties to the Soviet power

Structure and nationalistic organizations are the most helpful. Ties to the Soviet state

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provide important high level contacts, while ties to nationalistic organizations provide
legitimacy. The UOC-KP is the only church with both these ties, and therefore it is
in the best position to reach the state. This church is primarily interested in the
private goods of state recognition and property. It is strong in the center and west of
Ukraine, but is making a concerted effort to gain power in the east of the country.

However, the position of the UOC-KP is not unassailable. Their Soviet ties
help their access, but harm their credibility, especially among citizens in west and
central Ukraine. Churches with strong nationalistic qualiﬁcations, such as the Greek
Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches, have legitimacy and
credibility, but lack strong national contacts. This well may change, as newer
governmental leaders emerge who did not work within the Soviet system. Therefore,
Type II churches may be positioned well for future inﬂuence. Currently theses
churches are pursuing the private good of property and are strong in the western areas
of Ukraine. Their best contacts are on the regional and local levels, although the
UAOC is working to develop national level connections.

Type I UOC-MP churches are in a difﬁcult position; their ties to the Russian
Orthodox Church are harmful to them in the regions outside of eastern Ukraine.
They have tried to overcome this drawback by using their ties to national ex-Soviet
leaders, but all indications suggest that they have not been very successful. While
they are in a weak position, it is important to remember that they are a weak Goliath.
The UOC-MP is still the largest church in Ukraine and has a large number of

followers, particularly in the east. In the west, they are virtually non-existent. Their

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pursuit of private goods is subdued, perhaps because they have a great deal of
property already, or because they recognize that they are in no position to make
strong demands. In time, they may actually welcome a union with the UOC-KP, but
on their own terms. If the churches did unite, then the UOC-MP could beneﬁt from
the nationalistic ties of the UOC-KP, while keeping their own huge properties and
adherents.

The Protestant churches maintained their distance from the state and are doing
little to reach the state. Their interests are in public goods, and they have no regional
power base. As a result, they are largely marginalized in the political process.

In general, the characteristics that help a church reach the state are varied. It
helps if the church is Orthodox, has no ties to Russia or to foreign organizations, and
has strong ties to Ukrainian nationalism. When all these factors are considered, the
only church that qualiﬁes is the UAOC. Therefore, it is expected that this church
may gain in power and inﬂuence in Ukraine in the years to come.

Next, I consider the response of the state to the demands of the churches. In
order to inﬂuence politics, churches must ﬁrst reach the government, and then the
government must choose whether or not to respond. The following chapter examines

which churches succeed in getting the state to grant their requests.

Chapter 5
Churches as Political Actors on the Macro Level: State Response

"Everything the Greek Catholic Church has, it got from the elections in 1989. The
oﬂicials in west Ukraine have done more for them than for the Orthodox. In the east
and south, local oﬁicials have made obstacles to the UAOC and the UOC—KP. "
Scholar, Interview #20

"If the UOC-MP and UOC-KP join then this would be a powerful consolidation of
forces and this would likely suppress the Protestant churches. " Protestant pastor,
Interview #5

"Ukraine is an Orthodox nation, and people should not be pulled away by these
foreign organizations or churches. " Priest, UOC-KP, Interview #14

The ﬁrst phase of church political activity on the macro societal level is

reaching the state. In order to inﬂuence politics, churches must ﬁrst get the
government to listen to their requests. After this, it is up to the state to decide
whether or not to respond to church requests. This response by the state is the
second phase of macro level political activity. The state will agree to grant the
desires of some churches and will refuse the requests of other churches. As
hypothesized throughout this paper, the ties of the churches have a signiﬁcant impact
upon the responsiveness of the state. This chapter examines the effect of participation
upon State response, and then discusses speciﬁc instances of state response to church
demands. In addition, this section takes a close look at the response of the state to
church demands for a religious monopoly, and the consequences that this, and other
decisions for speciﬁc goods, have for Ukraine.

Participation

The main factor determining state responsiveness is participation. In the

128

129

developing democracy of Ukraine, the participation of churches has an effect upon the
decisions of the state. However, it is important to consider that not all churches are
participating at the same rate. I hypothesized that churches that participate frequently
receive their desired state response while churches that participate rarely do not
receive what they desire from the state. Speciﬁcally, I hypothesized that Types 1, II,
and IV churches participate more, and Type HI churches less. In addition, the part of
government targeted iS an important component of state response. Churches gravitate
toward those areas of government that make the key decisions pertaining to their
activities. State response reﬂects the " capture " of parts of government by interested
churches. The private interests of these churches are victorious in the battle for state
response over the general interests of the larger church population.

The data reveal that political participation by churches varied across church
type. As expected, Types II and IV churches participated vigorously and Type III
churches largely stayed out of politics. However, it was surprising to ﬁnd that Type I
churches did not participate as frequently as hypothesized.

The political participation of the Type IV UOC-Kiev Patriarchate churches was
overt and vigorous. While church leaders usually described their own participation in
oblique terms, it is clear that this church was very politically active. During the
Presidential election, this church openly supported Kravchuk (Interview #9), even to
the point of speaking about him in their services (Interview #21). By taking a stand,
they made clear that they were for one speciﬁc candidate and that they would use

their inﬂuence to get others to support this candidate. In addition to supporting

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Kravchuk, they were very vocal in their support of several Supreme Soviet candidates
that they perceived to be helpful to their cause (Interview #32). According to their
own publication, they welcomed certain political candidates to their seminary to talk
about their programs. Students from this seminary also were reported to be very
active during the election (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate 1994).

Their participation took other forms as well. The UOC-KP addressed the state
directly in reference to important issues. In one case, the church spoke to the state
about tax rates and explained that since the church is a moral institution, rather than a
commercial structure, it should be taxed at a lower rate (Interview #25). In addition,
they approached Kravchuk many times to try to win concessions for their church and
to solidify their ties to his administration (Interview #33).

Type H churches also participated frequently. The Greek Catholic Church was
lukewarm in its support for Kravchuk during the Presidential election, but was very
active in other forms of participation. The church has been vigorous in confronting
the state with alleged abuses. One priest in Kiev showed me a sheaf of letters that he
had sent to the Parliament in his attempt to get a church building (Interview #22). He
also described protest behavior where his church continued to hold services in the
street outside of a church that the government had refused to give them. The church
pursued personal meetings with then-President Kravchuk to emphasize their desire for
a state apology for past mistreatment (Interview #13). Other meetings were held with
governmental leaders to try to get the state to lower tax rates on churches.

Participation also took more direct forms during the elections. In regional

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elections, the church speciﬁcally named the candidates that their members should vote
for (Interview #32). The GCC has been a strong supporter of nationalist candidates
(Interview #31). In a youth magazine, the editors Showed who the " good " candidates
were and told the readers that these were good Christians who were doing good things
(Interview #10).

The UAOC participated in several direct ways. In their most direct attempt, a
priest of the UAOC ran for election to the Supreme Soviet. He stated that he hoped
that the problems of political and ﬁnancial support of the church would be ﬁxed by
his election (Interview #30). In addition, leaders of this church took part in civic
rebellion. They picketed, marched, and generally called attention to their desire for
legalization and registration. According to one priest, the only thing they gained from
this activity is that their leaders are now ofﬁcially invited with other churches to
national gatherings. AS a result, they are included in meetings with political leaders
where they can communicate their interests. Other church leaders wrote letters to
Kravchuk requesting assistance with property (Interview #7).

In Sharp contrast, the Type III Protestant churches largely did not participate in
politics. These churches stayed away from politics and the government (Interview
#19), and tried not to be directly involved in governmental affairs. In fact, several
churches seemed proud of the fact that they do not have any government contacts.

An exception to this was the activity of a Baptist pastor in east Ukraine. This pastor
described visits to the regional President and letters sent to the Parliament to try to

lower tax rates (Interview #5). Interestingly, a member of the Rukh political party in

132

south-east Ukraine recruited and paid a group of Baptists to work on behalf of the
party. These people hung up posters and went door to door to canvass for support
(Interview #9). According to this party worker, these church members would work
only for his candidate because all the other candidates were socialists and
communists. However, he went on to say that these same Baptists did nothing to
inﬂuence the voting behavior of church members. Therefore, while there is some
participation, the overall pattern is one of passivity and lack of participation.

The Type I UOC-MP churches participated more than the Protestant churches,
but less than the Type II and IV churches. It is clear that the UOC-MP was not as
passive as the Protestants. They were active in battles over property; they wrote
letters, met with government ofﬁcials, and even held services in the street to protest
government decisions (Interview #6). But, their activity was not as extensive or as
focused as that of the Type H and IV churches. The UOC-MP seemed more inclined
to keep somewhat at a distance. According to the interviews, the church was
somewhat muted in its support for Kuchma, although it clearly favored him over
Kravchuk (Interview #21). Now that Kuchma has been elected, the church may begin
to step up its activity (Interview #31).

level of Government

 

The part of government contacted also inﬂuences State response. Church ties
affect level of government approached, and level of government in addition to rates of
participation inﬂuence state responsiveness. Churches try to focus their attention on

the parts of government that can best assist them. As mentioned in Chapter 4,

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churches gravitated to distinct levels of government. By narrowing the focus of their
participation to the part of government that is most favorably disposed to them, they
make the most of their efforts.

The UOC-KP and the UOC-MP both focused their attention upon the national
level. Since the UOC-KP is participating much more actively than the UOC-MP,
then it seems likely that they are doing a better job of wooing and capturing decision
makers at that level. For both churches, this is the level where they are most likely
to get decisions makers to listen to them. Again, the ties of both churches to the
former Soviet state give them contacts to key people at the national level, while the
nationalistic ties of the UOC-KP give them contacts within the nationalist community.
The UAOC has been diligent in participating and trying to gain support on the
national level.

The Greek Catholics have focused upon the regional level and have been very
active and successful in gaining positive state response. The Protestant churches have
no speciﬁc level of government that they are focusing upon, and when combined with
their lack of participation suggests that they elicit little state response.

It is clear that most of the churches participated in politics, but the degree of
participation and the goods sought are very different. Every type of church
participated to try to get the government to rule favorably with respect to a public
good. Tax policy was a common concern, and all the churches took political action
to get the government to make a decision to lower the tax rates on churches.

Participation levels differed in all other Situations. The Type H and IV churches

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participated frequently, and were trying to convince the govermnent to grant the
private goods, such as political favor, state apologies, property, and legalization.
Type I churches participated less regularly, but when they did they were interested in
private goods. Type IH churches rarely participated in areas outside of the pursuit of
public goods. Participation was aimed at speciﬁc levels of government in order to
make the most of political connections.
State Response

Churches participate in politics at different rates. As discussed above, Types
II and IV participate more than Types I and IH. I hypothesize that state response
varies according to rate of participation and church ties. Greater levels of
participation combined with " favorable " state ties to nationalistic groups lead to
favorable state response. Low levels of participation combined with negative ties to
foreign organizations lead to the lack of state response to church demands. Interested
groups pursuing private goods receive the beneﬁts desired. In the following section,
general state decisions are examined ﬁrst, followed by a discussion of speciﬁc
decisions involving property.
warm

This section examines the general state response to church demands. I
hypothesized that churches that are more actively involved in politics and have
favorable ties are more successful in getting what they want from the state. Those
that participate less and have less favorable ties do not receive what they want from

the state. Type II UAOC and GCC churches with high participation rates and strong

135

ties to Ukrainian nationalism are expected to have success achieving desired state
response. Type IV UOC-KP churches beneﬁt from these same high rates of
participation and ties and have additional ties to the Soviet state. I hypothesized that
these Soviet ties harm them, as they harm the attempts of Type I churches. Type I
UOC-MP churches are also hampered by lower levels of participation. Type III
Protestant churches participate little and have no ties that can encourage state
response.

It became immediately apparent that ties to the Soviet state currently are an
asset, rather than a hindrance, to achieving desired state response. My hypothesis
suggesting that Soviet ties were negative was incorrect. The majority of power in
Ukraine still lies in the hands of former Soviet ofﬁcials, so churches with connections
to these people have a better chance to convince the state to act in their favor than
those without any former Soviet connections. The close relationship between the
Orthodox Church and the Soviet state gives these churches an edge in current state
relations. In this respect, the UOC-KP and UOC-MP churches are positioned well to
use their contacts for their beneﬁts. However, three factors combine to explain why
the UOC-KP has been much more successful in achieving state response that the
UOC-MP. In the ﬁrst place, the UOC-KP participated much more vigorously in
politics and Spent more time and effort communicating their interests to government.
Therefore, the state is not only better informed, but is more aware of the ability of
this church to sanction their actions. According to other religious leaders, priests

from this church are listened to more carefully by governmental leaders (Interview

136

#19). This church was aggressive in presenting its interests and position to the
government, and this resulted in state action (Interview #33). Several UOC-KP
leaders expressed a degree of satisfaction that they had spoken to the State and that the
state had listened and granted their requests (Interviews #11, 25).

In the second place, nationalistic ties together with Soviet ties have positioned
the UOC-KP as the church of Kravchuk and his people, so while he was in power,
the state was very inclined to respond to the wishes of the UOC-KP. The desire for
extensive and favorable media coverage following the creation of the UOC-KP was
fulﬁlled when the government instituted an informal media ban which gave television
coverage exclusively to the UOC-KP (Interviews #15, 20). According to one Greek
Catholic priest in Kiev

the government invented the UOC-KP and they want to protect this

church. They don’t just help this church more than the others-they

give this church everything it has. Kravchuk gave a large amount of

public money to Filaret, and there has been no talk about the church

giving it back (Interview #22).

Even the meeting of church leaders in 1992 that resulted in the creation of the UOC-
KP is attributed to Kravchuk and his interference. According to a UOC-MP Bishop,
the meeting "did not take place according to the law, but was under the direct
inﬂuence of government on church affairs" (Interview #8). Now, even though
Kravchuk is gone, his peOple are still in power and are able to carry out his

preferential policies (Interview #24).

137
In the third place, the ties of the UOC-MP to Russia hamper both their efforts

to reach the state and the state’s inclination to respond favorably to UOC—MP
demands in regions outside of east Ukraine. Kravchuk in particular spoke out against
this church because of their ties to Russia, and took action to suppress their activity.
According to one church scholar, Kravchuk’s negative attitude toward the UOC-MP
came out of his bad relations with Russia (Interview #31). His concern was that
Russia wants to bring Ukraine back under the Russian sphere of control. The UOC-
KP has capitalized on these Russian ties and talks about Ukraine’s need to be
independent and the desire of their church to be free from Moscow’s control
(Interview #14).

The election of pro-Russian Kuchma may change the balance of inﬂuence
between these two churches. Until his election, the UOC-KP was overwhelmingly
favored by the state (Interview #32). Now that he is in power, things seem to be
changing. The Russian ties of the UOC-MP are not as ofﬁcially disdained, and the
government is stepping back from direct involvement in church affairs. Some even
feel that Kuchma is now favoring the UOC-MP, but there is no clear evidence
supporting this claim (Interview #30). In fact, Kuchma is perceived as a leader who
has no prejudice against one confession or another and is interested in fulﬁlling
freedom of conscience (Interview #3). At the very least, this suggests that
Presidential state policy will cease openly favoring the UOC-KP above all others. In
fact, Kuchma’s preoccupation with economic affairs is considered a welcome Sign that

the State will back off from its direct meddling in inter-church affairs. The

138
Committee on Religious Affairs has been disbanded and replaced by the Committee

on Nationality, Immigration and Cults. (The use of the word "cult" in the title, rather
than the word "religion" seems purposeful but not as pejorative as it would be in
English. Usage of this word may be intended to include groups that do not fall within
the narrow traditional band of recognized churches or religions.) Since the
Committee on Religious Affairs was widely viewed as a vehicle for favoring the
UOC—KP, its replacement is a welcome Sign (Interview #28).

The lack of Soviet ties for the remaining churches limited positive responses
by the state on their behalf. For Type H churches, the positive responses they did
receive came about because of their vigorous participation and their ties to
nationalistic organizations. AS mentioned earlier, the GCC received favorable state
response in the western area of Ukraine (Interview #29). These state decisions were
made by regional and local level govermnent ofﬁcials who favored Ukrainian
nationalism. For example, the regional youth department in west Ukraine is paying
35% of the bills of a Greek Catholic youth organization called Ukrainian Youth for
Christ (Interview #10). The Greek Catholic Church’s positive state response,
however, seems to be limited to regional administrations. National governmental
bodies have continued in their negative attitudes toward the GCC. The foreign ties of
the church to the Holy See are considered dangerous by some and the church is seen
as a tool of Rome, especially by Orthodox nationalists (Interview #21). Under
Kravchuk’s administration, the church would speak to Kravchuk but would receive no

answer, even at personal meetings (Interview #13).

139

The UAOC has participated ﬁercely, but has not achieved the state response it
desires. Letters to Kravchuk have gone unanswered (Interview #7) and in its ﬁght for
state recognition it has not been ofﬁcially accepted by the state (Interview #21). It
has demanded ﬁnancial support from the state, including subsidies to rebuild churches
destroyed under the USSR, but has not received any compensation (Interview #30).
They have also been denied access to radio and TV (Interview #24). This suggests
that their nationalistic ties and high rate of participation have not been sufﬁcient to
gain state response. A critical feature that has helped the GCC gain desired response
that the UAOC lacks is the strong linkages with regional and local governmental
ofﬁcials. AS discussed earlier, in Chapter 4, the UAOC is pursuing linkages at the
national level, but has not yet gained a strong enough foothold to merit favorable state
response.

The Protestant churches lack any characteristics that might encourage state
response. They have low rates of participation, have few ties to the Soviet state, and
have no ties to nationalistic organizations or any particular levels of government. In
addition, their ties to foreign organizations are seen as troublesome. Accordingly,
Protestant churches are not receiving what they would like from the state. A Baptist
pastor detailed government attempts to interfere with church affairs and to control the
activities of the church (Interview #5). Another bemoaned the fact that laws
governing freedom of religion are not applied to them, and that they do not have the
freedoms they should have by law (Interview #19). Given the fact that these churches

"have been traditionally neutral and are not involved in politics" (Interview #31), it is

140

not surprising that they have not received what they want from the state.

General state response hinges on several factors. Participation is an important
component, but is not sufﬁcient to cause the state the respond favorably. Ties to
government ofﬁcials, whether to former Soviet ofﬁcials on the national level or to
regional and local administrators, in concert with high levels of participation, are
found to be related to desired state response. Low levels of participation, and ties to
Russia, particularly during the Kravchuk administration, are negatively related to state
response. State response depends upon more than nationalistic ties, as originally
hypothesized. In addition, high levels of participation are not sufﬁcient on their own
to bring about desired State response. Rather, Soviet ties, ties to a Speciﬁc level of
government, and high levels of participation all contributed to positive state response
during the Kravchuk administration.

It is important to note that the new President, Kuchma, is very different from
his predecessor, so future state responses may hinge on entirely different factors.
Given his strong afﬁliation with Russia, I hypothesize that, in the future, church ties
to Russia may cease to be as negative a factor as they were earlier, at least to
members of Kuchma’s administration. Over time, the power of the nationalistic ties
of Type II churches may wax and the power of Soviet ties may wane as new people,
without Soviet government experience, join the government.

Propgm decisions
State allocation of property is a highly contentious issue in Ukraine, and

churches are battling to get the state to respond to their property demands. I

141

hypothesized that state decisions regarding property follow the composition of the
government. Under Kravchuk, ties with Russia, the Soviet state, and foreign
organizations negatively inﬂuenced state response. Ties with nationalistic
organizations positively inﬂuenced state response. Under Kuchma, ties with Russia
become a positive force. In Short, I hypothesized that state response ﬂuctuates
between Types 1, II and IV churches as they all ﬁght for property.

Again, a clear error in these hypotheses was the assumption that Soviet ties
have a negative inﬂuence on state response. The research demonstrated that ties to
the former Soviet state continue to be an asset rather than a liability. As discussed
earlier, these ties provide access to governmental decision makers. However, the
Soviet ties of the UOC-MP, when combined with their ties to Russia and their lower
levels of participation, do not help them that much. The UOC-KP has beneﬁted from
its Soviet ties because it combines these connections with the legitirnizing ties to
nationalistic organizations and high levels of participation. This is demonstrated by a
conﬂict with the UOC-MP over the Solomonskaya Church in Kiev. Both churches
claimed it, but the UOC-MP had been holding services in it. According to the UOC-
MP priest who had been the main priest of that church, representatives of the UOC-
KP came in during the service, kicked out the priests and parishioners of the UOC—
MP, and took the church by force. They then immediately got it ofﬁcially registered
by the state as their church. Both churches had ties to the Soviet state, but the UOC—
KP was better positioned to get the state to respond favorably because of its additional

nationalist ties in Ukraine. The UOC-MP took the conﬂict to trial, but the state court

142
ruled in the favor of the UOC-KP once again. The UOC-MP is reduced to carrying

out their service in the street in front of the church in order to Show their protest and
to try to get the church back (Interview #6). In another case, governmental
authorities reportedly Spoke out against the UOC-MP, telling people that if they were
against the UOC-KP they were against an independent Ukraine, and that the priests
that remained with the UOC-MP are supporters of Russia (Interview #8).

Another error was the assumption that state response ﬂuctuated between Types
I, II and IV churches. Under Kravchuk, the state consistently responded favorably to
Type IV churches on the national level, to the Greek Catholic Church on the regional
level in the west only, and to the UOC-MP on the regional level in the east. When
the UOC-KP was formed in the ﬁrst place, the government took measures to transfer
property from the larger Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the UOC-KP. The rationale
was that this property should be in Ukrainian, rather than Russian (UOC-MP) hands
(Interview #7). In west Ukraine, a compromise was reached between the UAOC and
the Greek Catholic Church over a contested church. The churches were to share the
building and to alternate their services. However, when the UAOC priest handed the
church over to the GCC for their turn, the Greek Catholic people took it over, made
new keys and locked the other church out. The regional authorities did nothing to
rectify the situation when contacted by the UAOC (Interview #7). According to a
scholar, the authorities in west Ukraine are not neutral but have made it so the GCC
wins on the local and regional level (Interview #31). One reason for this is "the

winners of the conﬂicts depend upon who has the largest number of people "

143

(Interview #23). In this case, size is not a negative factor as suggested in the
literature, but a positive one. More members means more potential voters and more
power. In east Ukraine, the state has fewer churches and has been slower to allocate
them, but the large monastery in the area has already been given back to the UOC-
MP (Interview #35). In addition, the regional and local authorities have funded a new
UOC-MP cathedral being built in Donetsk (Interview #2). According to a scholar in
that city "cooperation with politicians is still needed and without it the church cannot
survive" (Interview #3). As mentioned several times, the UOC-MP is the largest
church in the country, and in the south and east it dwarfs all other churches. Again,
its large size is an asset in getting the state to respond favorably.

For the rest of the churches, and in the rest of the regions, no signiﬁcant
allocations of property were made by the state. When a UOC-MP priest Spoke to the
national government about getting a church building in west Ukraine, he was told that
there was nothing they could do to help (Interview #8). Metropolitan Sobodan of the
UOC-MP has repeatedly requested that the state cease renting out buildings in the
sacred Pechirskaya Lavra to commercial ﬁrms and foreign diplomats. As it stands
now, part of the Lavra is owned by the church and is used as a seminary and church
headquarters. The other part, housed in buildings dotted throughout the seminary, is
rented by peOple selling souvenirs, food, or carrying on ofﬁcial embassy business for
various foreign countries. The church claims this presence is offensive to the church
and believers, but the government is steadfast in its desire to claim the hard currency

gained from the rentals.

144

In east Ukraine, the Greek Catholic church had to ﬁght for over a year to get
property to build their ﬁrst church in Donetsk. Their difﬁculties from the
government were only recently solved (Interview #16).

In Kiev, a Greek Catholic priest was told that he could not have a church
building because they would be taking the place of another church (Interview #22).
In every region except the west, they have problems getting the state to seriously
consider their claims for property (Interview#29).

The Protestants have received no help from the government. One church
leader described the difﬁculty in getting land to build their cathedral stemming from
problems with the state bureaucracy (Interview #19). Another Baptist leader, in an
informal conversation, explained that state aid was simply impossible to acquire, so
their church turned to private funds solicited from churches in the US. and western
Europe to build their church.

Under Kuchma, the early patterns seem to reﬂect little involvement in
religious affairs, and the state has been quiet in its responses to church demands.
One of his few actions was his purported promise to register the UAOC as a legal
church in December 1995 (Interview #7). This action suggests his interest in
rectifying past governmental favoritism. Consistency, rather than ﬂuctuation, seems
to mark the pattern of state response.

This objectivity in religious affairs was put to a dramatic test in August 1995.
Patriarch Volodymyr of the UOC-KP died of a heart attack on July 14, 1995, and an

immediate conﬂict arose over where he was to be buried. The UOC-KP petitioned

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the government to allow Volodymyr, who had served 19 years in Soviet prison
camps, to be buried inside the ancient and revered St. Sophia’s Cathedral in Kiev.
This 11th century cathedral, one of the greatest architectural and spiritual monuments
in Ukraine, was promised to the UOC-KP by Kravchuk when he was President (L.A.
T irnes, August 7, 1995). However, when Kuchma was elected President, the
cathedral was designated as a national museum and holy place, angering the UOC-
KP. Based upon the church’s special status, the national government refused the
request of the UOC-KP to bury Volodymyr there.

Deﬁantly, church ofﬁcials organized a funeral procession to the cathedral’s
walls. At the gate, mourners and members of a sympathetic extreme nationalist group
known as the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization (UNSO) began to pound
through the asphalt sidewalk and dig a grave. Just as Volodymyr’s cofﬁn was
lowered into the makeshift grave, squads of riot police appeared and attacked, beating
mourners, priests, and para-military members. A riot ensued between the police and
the UOC-KP supporters. More than 70 people were injured (Washington Post, July
23, 1995).

An ofﬁcial investigation by the government into the disturbance is underway,
but no ofﬁcial statements have been issued by President Kuchma, either deploring the
violence or calling for a solution. This has led to renewed charges by nationalists and
the UOC-KP that Kuchma is a supporter of the UOC-MP and is deliberately working
against the UOC-KP. The bold bid of the UOC-KP to gain access to St. Sophia’s

failed, but has resulted in a public relations disaster for the state, and an increase in

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attention focused upon the UOC-KP and its claims.

Patriarch Volodymyr remains buried in a sidewalk grave outside the walls of
St. Sophia’s. His grave is piled high with ﬂowers as trolley busses and cars zip by
on the street a few feet away.

The important factors inﬂuencing state allocation of property were Soviet ties
and nationalistic ties and the impact these ties had upon governmental linkages. The
UOC-KP has strong ties with former Soviet leaders and with the nationalistic
movement, and has used these ties to develop healthy linkages at the national level of
government. The GCC has used its strong nationalistic ties and its large size in west
Ukraine to develop healthy linkages with regional and local authorities in west
Ukraine. The UOC-MP used its Soviet ties and large size in east Ukraine to maintain
healthy linkages with local and regional authorities in east Ukraine. Therefore, large
size, like a high degree of participation, enhances the effectiveness of church ties.
State-Sanctioned Religious Monopolies

An unforeseen battle is raging between several churches. Besides arguing over
taxes, property, or money, various churches are pushing the State to extend special
status to their church and their church alone. The State, in turn, has responded and
has taken action that grants favor to certain churches.

As discussed in Chapter 4, not all churches have sought after Special status
vis-a-vis the state. The Ukrainian Orthodox churches, Moscow Patriarchate and Kiev
Patriarchate, have pushed the hardest for Special status, claiming that Orthodoxy is

the true religion of Ukraine. The UAOC has been in no position to push for special

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Status since it still lacks true legal status, but it joins with the other Orthodox
churches in arguing for limitations on the activities of " foreign" churches and groups.
The Greek Catholic Church is sometimes a target, but more often these attacks are
aimed at Protestant churches and groups. According to the Orthodox churches,
foreign groups are interfering with the true religious life of Ukraine and should be
banned or restricted. The claim of the Ukrainian churches for Special status leads
into their desire that other churches be controlled. They not only want special rights
for themselves, they want restricted rights for other churches. The state, in turn, has
responded to some of these demands.
Sﬂial Status

According to some, the state is interested in having its own state church, and
the Orthodox church is the favorite (Interview #21). For centuries the Orthodox
church and the state in Russia and Ukraine have had a special relationship. The
church historically has provided legitirnation to the regime in exchange for state
protection of the church’s monopoly over religious affairs (Little 1991: 17).
According to one 14th century Russian church Patriarch, " the state and the church are
closely united and it would be impossible to separate them one from another" (Little
1991: 17). This mindset lives on and is reﬂected in the current behavior of church
leaders.

When Ukraine became independent, several religious organizations saw the
opportunity to gain power. The Orthodox church, in particular, saw the chance to

resume their Special place and become the state church. This desire, however, has

148
led to conﬂict within the church, resulting in the split within the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church. The battle therefore, is primarily between the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP.

During Kravchuk’s presidency, the state took action that placed the UOC-KP
in an exalted position. This church was treated by the state and perceived by society
as the de facto State church (Interview #32). The close links between Filaret and
Kravchuk, resulting from their shared historical ties to the Soviet state and their
common desire to present themselves as nationalists and supporters of an independent
Ukraine, led to Kravchuk’s strong support for the creation of the UOC-KP. He in
turn directed state structures, such as the Committee on Religious Affairs, to take
actions necessary to register this church quickly (Interview #6). The UOC-KP was
given exclusive access to television and allowed to broadcast their programs and
agenda (Interviews #15, 20). They were allowed extensive access to President
Kravchuk and had opportunity to " connect the church to the President " (Interview
#33). In addition, the state supported the acquisition of several church buildings,
primarily from the UOC-MP. According to church leaders who had buildings taken
from them, the allocation of churches to the UOC-KP is further evidence that this
church got more than it deserved because of overly favorable state support (Interview
#30).

State support under Kravchuk overwhelmingly favored the UOC-KP, and this
escaped no one’s attention. By acting in a manner that favored this church over all
the others, the state made clear that it considered this church to be special and worthy

of special favor. This was perceived by many as a covert expression by the state that

149

this church was considered the state church. This tactic garnered religious support for
Kravchuk, at least from UOC-KP members, and political credibility and power for the
church.

At no time, however, did the State take the action most desired by the UOC-
KP that would have solidiﬁed their position as the state church. Despite numerous
requests, the state did nothing to unite the UOC-KP and UOC-MP under the
leadership of the UOC-KP. The ﬁrm position of church leaders is that "the power of
the Orthodox religion in Ukraine will only be found through unity " (Interview #25).
Had the State granted this request, the new church would have unquestionably been
the biggest and most powerful church in the country. It would have gained its power
by means of state action, but it would keep its power by means of its enormous size.
As a journalist stated, " if (these two churches were) united then the government
would have to listen to it" (Interview #21). Since the state chose not to grant this
request, the position of the church has not solidiﬁed but has remained ﬂuid,
particularly in light of the 1994 election results. Despite this, UOC-KP leaders
continue to claim that their church has taken the position of the national Ukrainian
church (Interview #14).

Even with Kravchuk’s loss in the Presidential election, there is concern that
"the government favors the UOC-KP, but now it is not so open but is hidden and is
still there" (Interview #1). Kravchuk’s people are still in power, and they still want
to inﬂuence church-state affairs (Interview #24). Kravchuk has remained vocal in his

support of the UOC-KP since he has left ofﬁce. He ofﬁcially supported the request

150
of the UOC-KP to bury Patriarch Volodymyr at St. Sophia’s Cathedral (Washington

Post, July 23, 1995). The appearance of Kuchma alongside the Patriarch of the
UOC-KP at a ceremony opening St. Sophia’s Cathedral as a national holy place has
some worried that state support of the UOC-KP will continue (Interview #28).

Others contend that the situation has indeed changed. Now that Kravchuk is
out of power, there is concern that the state under Kuchma is now moving to favor
the UOC-MP. Metropolitan Sobodan has reportedly renewed his claim that Ukraine
should have a state church and that the UOC-MP should be it (Interview #31).
Evidence that the state is responding to this request is scarce, but concern is high,
especially among nationalist churches like the UAOC. Any move toward the UOC-
MP, whether to redress previous imbalances or to redirect State favor, is sure to cause
an uproar.

Under Soviet rule, the forbearer of the UOC-MP, the Russian Orthodox
Church, was given special status. This church, following the centuries-old tradition
of cooperation between the church and state, collaborated with Stalin in his attempts
to use religion to Russify the republics of the USSR. The Russian Orthodox Church
was given a restricted role in creating a centralized Russian-Communist state. The
role involved cooperating as the Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church were liquidated or "reuniﬁed" into the Russian
Orthodox Church (Little 1991: 16). The result was that the ROC was allowed to
exist and function, though tightly controlled by the state, while the other churches

were destroyed. This has led some to State that the ROC was the religious branch of

151

government in the USSR (Interview #23).

In the east there is indication that little has changed and that the state considers
the UOC-MP to be the true state church and has taken action supporting it.

According to a Baptist pastor in Donetsk, state support of the UOC—MP in his region
is so strong that it suggests that Orthodoxy is the state religion (Interview #5). In this
respect, the regional government of eastern Ukraine is functioning much as it did
under Soviet times. The Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate is given strong state
support, while other churches are subject to varying degrees of state harassment. In
east Ukraine the UOC-MP appears to have the monopoly on power, while in the rest
of the country it is battling the UOC-KP for supremacy. Its strength in east Ukraine
is not surprising, given the strong ties of the UOC-MP to Russia and to Soviet
authorities, and the corresponding ties of east Ukraine to Russia and the large
numbers of former Soviet bureaucrats still in power in east Ukraine.

In a few regions of west Ukraine, particularly the Galacian regions of Lviv,
Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, the balance of power is held by the Greek Catholic
Church. Due to the overwhelming size of the church in these regions, it is accorded
a special place by the local and regional authorities (Interview #7). Church size has
swelled astronomically ever since it resumed functioning in 1989 (Bociurkiw 1992).
The nationalistic ties of this church and the strong nationalism in the region explains a
great deal of this favored behavior.

Throughout Ukraine, the state has responded to the desires of several churches

for special status. AS a consequence of this, other churches have been singled out for

152

restrictions. In particular, Protestant churches throughout Ukraine and Greek
Catholic churches outside Galacia have home the brunt of negative state response.
Anti-Protestant and Anti-Foreign State Action

There is a great deal of concern within the Protestant community that the
establishment of one of the Orthodox churches as a state church will harm their
freedom of religion. The call for a national church is usually accompanied by
rhetoric decrying the inﬂuence that foreign churches have had upon the spiritual
development of the nation. The message of the UOC-KP has been that Ukrainians
need to unite their Spiritual and their national identity, and this makes some Protestant
churches nervous. According to a Protestant leader, they do not like the idea that
nationalists are proposing that the country should unite around this national identity
because whether a person is Ukrainian or Russian or other is not important (Interview
#19). This issue was addressed by the Minister of Education. In a memorandum
speaking against the activity of western Protestant groups in Kiev, he stated that "with
the help of religion the national identity and spirituality of every nation can be
changed slowly and obscurely" (Talanchuk 1994). He went on to state that saving
Ukraine’s spirituality would come about as a result of the uniﬁcation of Ukrainian
Orthodoxy "on the basis of the Ukrainian people’s faithfulness to Holy Orthodoxy
which was accepted by Kiev-Rus during Great Prince Vladirnir’s reign. "

These statements Show the support within the state for a special place for
Orthodoxy in Ukraine. For many within the state, the Orthodox church is worthy of

special protection because it is the ancient, historical church of Ukraine, and " saving "

153

the spirituality within this country requires Special protection. Coupled with this
special protection is suppression of groups that might challenge Orthodoxy for the
hearts and souls of Ukrainians. later in the same document Talanchuk accused
Protestant churches of working within the shadow of the Orthodox churches and of
ignoring the contribution of the Orthodox churches to the development of Ukraine.
The implication is that to be Ukrainian is to be Orthodox, and that Protestant
churches are undermining the developing national identity. The State, according to
this document, needs to step forward and take action that will support the Orthodox
churches and contain the Protestants.

The Greek Catholic Church has also suffered from these same problems.
Because of their ties with Rome and with their non-Orthodox religion, they are
viewed by other churches as a foreign church. The perception is that they are
allowed to operate in west Ukraine, Since this in considered their stronghold, but
outside of that region, they are not welcome (Interview #29).

For both these groups of churches, their foreign ties and their non-Orthodox
religion place them on the negative side of the State. AS some churches receive
special consideration from the state, other churches suffer setbacks. The UOC-KP
has received Special state status from the government on the national level, the UOC-
MP has received special status in the east, and in the west the Greek Catholic Church
has been accorded special favor. Throughout the country, Protestants have recently
seen some of their religious freedoms dwindle, due to their non-Orthodox status.

And, in the country outside of western Galacia, the Greek Catholic Church has

154

suffered.
Consequences for Ukraine

The behavior of the state in response to church demands has serious
consequences for Ukraine’s future stability and peace. State action in religious
conﬂicts has the potential to threaten newly established religious freedoms, upset an
already unstable political system, and exacerbate existing ethnic, political, and social
cleavages in Ukraine. State activity in the religious sphere is inﬂuencing the political
future of Ukraine.

Freedom of Religion

Under Kravchuk’s administration, religious freedoms ﬂowered despite
governmental favoritism. Few limitations were placed upon groups or churches that
wished to meet for worship, print literature, or proclaim their message. While the
state was widely seen as supporting the UOC-KP, the restrictions placed upon the
other churches infringed upon their claims to property or television air time, not upon
their basic freedom to worship. This open attitude has begun to change.

The spiritual vacuum left by 80 years of Communist control was quickly ﬁlled,
in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, by hordes of religious adherents. People in Ukraine
and the other countries of the former Soviet Union were confronted by a spiritual
smorgasbord, ranging from the revival of traditional Slavic Orthodoxy to western
Protestantism to eastern mysticism. At ﬁrst this rush was met with enthusiasm, but in
recent years this enthusiasm has begun to sour. The benign attitude on the part of the

government has also begun to change. Reasons for this change in attitude include

155

satiation with spiritual things, hard economic times that leave some with a limited
interest in and limited time for religious pursuits, and a growing materialist
orientation. In addition to these larger, abstract, factors, a very speciﬁc and concrete
event took place in Ukraine that I believe marks a turning point in the attitude of the
state and the society toward religious, particularly foreign, groups.

This watershed event took place in the summer and fall of 1993 in Kiev. A
group calling itself the Great White Brotherhood had been gathering converts from
Russia and Ukraine over the past few years. Led by a woman calling herself Maria
Devi Kristos who claimed to be the messiah, this group staged a series of
demonstrations and marches in Kiev and managed to frighten the entire city. This
group was considered very worrisome on two fronts. First, the leader claimed that
she would stage her own cruciﬁxion and resurrection in Kiev, outside the historic St.
Sophia’s Cathedral. Masses of her followers were ﬂocking to Kiev to witness this
and to allegedly take part in a mass suicide pact that would result in their resurrection
from the dead as well (New York Times, November 7, 1993). Second, the cult was
reputed to be a magnet for runaway children, especially troubled teens. These
revelations caused widespread panic among parents in Ukraine, and led to state radio
broadcasts in Kiev, warning parents to keep their children off the streets (New York
Times, November 7, 1993).

The chaos, fear and uncertainty cuhninated in ﬁrm state action. Alarmed by
the escalating tensions, police began to detain cult members in jails, send them to

psychiatric wards, deport them, and conﬁscate posters and pamphlets. Over 800 cult

156

members were detained (New York Times, November 12, 1993). State run television
programs showed testimonies from tearful parents whose children had joined the
group. Finally, on November 10, 1993, Maria Devi Khristos and 60 of her followers
were arrested in Kiev as they tried to occupy St. Sophia’s Cathedral in anticipation of
the November 14th cruciﬁxion, mass suicide, and mass resurrection (New York
Times, November 7, 1993).

This strong state action signalled a sea change in the attitude to many to
religious freedoms. Following the White Brotherhood scare, foreign religious groups
began to be viewed with much greater suspicion. This is rather ironic, since the
White Brotherhood was an indigenous Orthodox heresy and not a foreign religious
movement as suggested by some (Nielsen 1994). Regardless of this fact, the state
began to take action against foreign groups. According to information gathered at the
International Conference " Freedom of Conscience: Church and State in Ukraine,"
held September 28-30, 1994, speciﬁc steps were taken to restrict the religious
freedoms of various foreign groups. In the city of Lviv, local laws were passed that
allowed the Jehovah’s Witnesses to be considered and treated like the White
Brotherhood. This presumably placed them in the category of a dangerous group
whose actions could be restricted to protect the general public. Registration of
foreign churches and groups by the state began to be delayed and rejections became
more frequent. If not properly registered, churches and religious groups are not able
to issue invitations to foreigners, rent buildings, hire staff, etc. Visa restrictions

began to become based on religious considerations. In Kiev, a law was passed in

157

1994 that requires religious organizations to get a permit to hold religious events.
Permission was much easier to obtain for some than for others. This has resulted in
many Protestant churches failing to get the required permit to rent halls and to hold
meetings. One Protestant church I visited was forced out of the hall that it had been
renting into another smaller hall that was insufﬁcient for their needs. Church leaders
were very concerned that they would soon lose their ability to rent even the small
hall, and were trying to get permission to rent another location. Because they had a
long history of working with foreign missionaries, they felt they were being denied
the required permits to meet. According to Lauren Homer, an American lawyer
specializing in legal and religious rights in the former Soviet Union, in an informal
conversation, this regulation of religious organizations is being used as a vehicle for
the selective removal of religious rights.

It is important to note that the groups losing some of their religious freedoms
are almost exclusively foreign or foreign-afﬁliated groups. Spurred on by the events
of the summer and fall of 1993, more and more scholars and government leaders are
calling for restrictions on the religious activities of foreigners. Dmytro Stepovyk of
the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences stated at the above-mentioned conference
of Freedom of Conscience in Ukraine that the Ukrainian church is weak from being
underground and therefore should be protected from foreigners coming in and
winning people over. Others have called for restrictions on the "open season
mentality" of foreign missionaries in order to even the playing ﬁeld and protect the

domestic churches (Interview #29). One Bishop of the UOC-MP went so far as to

158
state that religious freedom is not good for Ukraine. He said that religious freedom

may work in the US and France, but that Ukraine needs more controls over who
could come and speak about religion, and this means less missionaries (Interview #8).

The potential result of this shift in State attitude and behavior is selective
freedom of religion, determined by certain organs of the state. Currently the Ministry
of Justice, Ministry of Culture and the unfortunately—named Ministry of
Nationalization, Immigration and Cults (the heir of the dissolved Ministry of
Religious Affairs) all are dealing with issues of religious freedoms. Groups as varied
as the Mormons, mainline Protestants, and the Moonies have been facing increased
restrictions on their activities. In informal conversations with members of these
groups, I found that they had been denied permission to rent buildings for worship or
administration and had seen increased difﬁculties in obtaining visas for non-Ukrainian
members of their group. These restrictions seem to be coming from the national
level, rather than the local level, which often welcomes or is indifferent to their
religious activities. While these are bothersome restrictions, they are minor compared
to what has been suggested.

Church leaders of indigenous Orthodox churches have called for the state to
place restrictions upon the right of other churches to proselytize. Again and again
they speak about the need for the State to limit the activity of foreign groups that pull
Ukrainians away from the "true " Ukrainian church, although they differ over which
church is the true Ukrainian church. Interestingly, the attitude of many Orthodox

leaders seems to be that the Greek Catholics are welcome in the western regions of

159

Ukraine, but that any additional incursion in other regions of Ukraine is unwelcome
(Interview #29). Leaders of Ukrainian Protestant and Greek Catholic churches are
concerned about these threats. They fear that their religious freedoms are threatened
because they are non-Orthodox and because they are afﬁliated with foreign groups
(Interview #1).

The loss of religious freedoms for foreign afﬁliated churches would be gain
for Ukrainian churches, namely Types 1, IV, and the UAOC. If these churches could
get the state to restrict further the freedoms of the "foreign" churches, then they
would beneﬁt from the departure of the competition. This explains why, according to
one scholar, the biggest Ukrainian churches (UOC-MP and UOC-KP) are not very
interested in freedom of conscience as a principle (Interview #1). The non-
appearance of high ofﬁcials of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP at the International
Conference of Freedom of Conscience has convinced others that this demonstrates
their lack of interest in the issues of freedom of religion (Interview #1). These
churches are more interested in pursuing selective religious freedoms.

The consequences of current and proposed state actions are serious, not only
for foreign afﬁliated churches, but for all religious organizations. What many of the
churches do not perceive is that if selective religious freedoms become accepted, then
today’s winners may become tomorrow’s losers. When the state begins selectively to
restrict religious rights based upon pressure exerted by interested groups, then when
the pressure Shifts, so too will state restrictions.

Russia provides us with an example of how selective religious freedoms might

160
be enacted. The Russian Orthodox Church in 1992, led by Patriarch Aleksii H,

brought pressure to bear on the Russian Parliament to create legislation restricting the
activity of foreign religious organizations on Russian territory (Walters 1994). The
pressure of the ROC resulted in a law passed in June 1993 that regulated the freedom
of religious confessions. The law divided groups into two categories: foreign
agencies and indigenous ones, and placed onerous restrictions on the foreign groups
(Nielsen 1994). In order for the foreign groups to operate, they would have to be
afﬁliated with an indigenous, meaning Russian Orthodox, church or obtain state
accreditation. If the churches did not do this, they could not undertake missionary
work, publishing, business deals, or advertising (New York Times, July 16, 1993).
The law was never signed by Yeltsin, and when he shut down Parliament by force it
was no longer on the table. However, it is likely to be revived (Nielsen 1994). The
policy has a clear beneﬁciary, the ROC, and clear losers, all other churches and
religious groups.

In Ukraine, the situation is similar because the suggested policies would favor
the Orthodox churches and limit the freedoms of all others. Religious freedoms
would be selectively awarded. However, the situation is also quite different, because
in Ukraine no Single church holds the majority of power. Since the largest churches
have split and are competing with one another, there is no religious hegemony as in
Russia. The schisms between the churches have resulted in an unstable balance of
religious power.

Surprisingly, the fact that Ukrainian church power is split may very well be

161

the best defense against restrictions on religious freedoms. Although the government
is taking some steps to constrict the rights of foreign groups, it has not acted to the
same degree as the Russian government. I argue that the greater appreciation for
religious freedoms displayed by the Ukrainian government is due to the fractures
within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the resulting pressures brought to bear by
the different churches on the state. I think it is unlikely that the state will enforce
more severe selective religious freedoms as long as the largest churches remain at
odds with one another. Since the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP are ﬁghting among
themselves for power and position, neither is in a position of absolute power.
Therefore, no one church can claim to speak for all of Ukraine and for the state to
listen to. Since the churches are splintered and ﬁghting, there is no united front to
present to government. Both are lobbying government, the UOC-KP to a greater
degree than the UOC-MP, but their power is divided, so the state has no one clear
voice to listen to. Neither church can reasonably claim to be the national church of
Ukraine.

In this respect, a divided Orthodox church in Ukraine is good for religious
freedom in the country. If the Orthodox churches were united, then the government
would be more likely to listen to them and there would be the possibility of a national
church being created. This in turn could lead to the imposition of restrictions on
foreign-afﬁliated churches. This explains one central reason behind the stated desire
of the UOC-KP and UOC-MP to unite, despite their ﬁerce hatred of one another. By

splitting up, they have lost the power that they could have over the state. Their

162

division means that there are many voices calling on the state, so the power of any
one church is diminished. But, this dirninishment in power means greater protection
of religious rights for everyone else.

Foreign groups, Protestants, and the Greek Catholics beneﬁt from the ﬁghting
between the UOC-MP, the UOC-KP, and to a much smaller degree the UAOC.
Separately, no one church has the large membership, government ties, and national
message that it would take to sway government. So, as long as the divisions remain,
there are likely to be only limited restrictions placed on the religious freedoms of
foreign-afﬁliated churches.

However, of great concern to many is the possibility that the UOC-KP, UOC-
MP, and the UAOC might merge. Although this is unlikely to happen in the near
future, it is the stated desire of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP (Interviews #11, 32).
The largest factors hindering such a union appear to be the presence of Metropolitan
Filaret of the UOC—KP, and the Russian ties of the UOC-MP. When Filaret is off the
scene, and if the UOC-MP can somehow modify its allegiance to Russia, or if this
becomes less of an issue, then union would be likely. The Orthodox churches would
have much to gain from such a union. Their inﬂuence over the state would increase
exponentially. If this became the case, then foreign-tied churches would have much
to worry about. According to one scholar, if the Orthodox church of Ukraine were
united, the government would have to listen to it, and all reforms would be solved in
a way that this one church would like (Interview #32). Religious rights could become

private goods, available only to this one church.

163
Cleavages in Ukraine

In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that state support would ﬂuctuate between Types
1, H and IV churches. In fact, the State under Kravchuk responded much more
favorably to Type IV (UOC-KP)churches than any others, and the current
administration seems to be neutral at the Presidential level. Decision makers at other
levels have indeed accorded favor to different churches. What is clear is that no one
church is in a position of absolute power viS-a-vis the State. In addition, I
hypothesized that these churches would use their gains and their losses to further their
calls for increased divisions within Ukraine. As the following discussion indicates,
this is indeed occurring.

The actions of the Types 1, II and IV churches are contributing to ethnic and
political divisions within Ukraine. As election data indicate, the country was
polarized during the 1994 Presidential election over the candidates, each of whom
represented diametrically opposed viewpoints (see Appendix E). Kuchma favored
integration with Russia, identiﬁcation with Russians as fellow Slavs, and the Russian
language. Kravchuk favored integration with western Europe, Ukrainian nationalism,
and the Ukrainian language. The election results reveal that the west overwhelmingly
favored Kravchuk and his message, while the east and south favored Kuchma and his
message. Religious afﬁliations not surprisingly follow the same divide (compare
Appendices B and E).

In the Galacian regions of the west, where the Greek Catholic Church is the

most popular and where the UOC-KP and the UAOC have their own strongholds,

164

Kravchuk won by a landslide of 94% to 4%. In the non-Galacian western regions of
Chernivtsi where the UOC-MP is the largest but the UOC-KP Still has a large
following, Kravchuk still won, but by less (62%-35% and 87 %-11%). In the central
regions where the UOC-KP is strong but second in size to the UOC-MP, Kravchuk
gained the majority, but by a greatly reduced margin (60%-36%, 54%-42%, 55%-
41% and 57%-39%). In the east where the number of religious organizations is
smaller and the UOC-MP is the undisputed power, Kuchma won by a huge margin
(79%-18% and 68 %-30%). In the south, where it appears the UOC-KP is
establishing a few more churches but the UOC-MP is by far the largest, Kuchma won
by a Slightly smaller margin (53 %-45% and 67 %-29%). The parallels between voting
behavior and religious afﬁliation suggest that they are related.

I argue that church behavior inﬂuenced voting behavior, and that the religious
divisions between the warring churches are contributing to the existing ethnic,
geographic and political divisions. In an earlier paper (Gee, 1995) I examined the
linkage between ethnicity, geography and religious afﬁliation in Ukraine and found a
very strong relationship between choice of religion and region and between choice of
religion and nationality. Greek Catholics were strong only in the west, and were of
Ukrainian nationality, while the Orthodox Church was strong in the east and these
believers were of Russian nationality. The matching fault lines between religious
afﬁliation, geography and political behavior are not accidental. Rather, churches are
playing a key role exacerbating these existing divisions.

For the most politically active Ukrainian churches (Types 1, II and IV ), a

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deeply divided Ukraine provides them with a solid base of support and an effective
rallying cry. For the UAOC and the GCC, the west is their only stronghold. For the
UOC-MP, the east and south are their strongest areas, while the UOC-KP looks to the
west and center. The clearest divide is between east and west. But, numbers alone
are not important to these churches. In many respects, church participation in the
cleavages of Ukraine gives a spiritual voice to the concerns of the people. For
western Ukrainians, their faith is an expression of their desire for independence. For
eastern Ukrainians, their faith is a means of expressing their 1000 year-old spiritual
union with their Russian brothers. Churches on both sides realize the interests of
their regional strongholds and exploit them for their own beneﬁt. The divisions in the
country provide the churches with a clear message to convey and a clear enemy to
attack.

In the west, there is a greater degree of church involvement in politics
(Interview #34), and church people are more politicized than in other regions of
Ukraine (Interview #23). The churches provide a moral voice to express anger at the
outrages suffered at the hands of the Soviets, and by extension, at the hands of the
Russians. Along with independence has come the "process of spiritually releasing
(Ukrainian) churches from the Moscow Patriarchate" (Interview #11). There is great
concern among the western churches that Russian inﬂuence is Still a great threat. The
UOC-MP is feared as a vehicle that is working to bring Russia and Ukraine back
together under Russian control. As a result, these western churches accuse the

eastern churches of trying to align people with Russia. According to one Greek

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Catholic lay leader, in east and south Ukraine the UOC-MP is encouraging citizens to
elect members of government who will create greater connections to Russia (Interview
#23). The return of the USSR in some form is of great concern (Interview #7), and
Communists in Ukraine are seen as a threat. The old Communist Structure, which is
still in place in eastern Ukraine, is very worrisome. According to a UOC-KP priest,
the uniﬁcation of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP churches under the leadership of the
UOC-KP would be a threat to the Communists because it would undermine their
attempts to recreate a form of the Soviet Union (Interview #14).

Rather than join with Russia, western churches give voice to the desire of
western Ukrainians to align themselves with western Europe. Leaders of the church
speak of Ukrainians as Europeans, and they argue that they need to position
themselves as Europeans in order to join the world of independent nations (Interview
#25). Other church leaders base their support for economic reforms by stating that
they must occur if Ukraine is to join with western Europe (Interview #13).

In the east, religious voices support a far different political path. It is
generally understood that there is a smaller degree of religious inﬂuence and that the
church plays a smaller role than in the west (Interview #35). Eastern Ukrainians are
more apathetic to religious questions. The region of Donetsk was referred to as a
spiritual desert by a Greek Catholic priest trying to start a church there (Interview
#16). The fact that eastern Ukraine is much less religious than the west is due, in the
theory of one scholar, to the longer occupation by the Bolsheviks (Interview #27).

They had been in Ukraine Since 1917 and had carried out a great deal of destruction

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of both church buildings and personal beliefs. They only occupied the west beginning
in 1939, so there was simply more time and opportunity for them to tear down
religious beliefs in the east. The region itself was settled much later than the west,
and so there are few deep roots, religious or otherwise (Interview #35). In addition,
democratic reforms have only lightly touched the east, and the old Soviet mentality of
strong state control, especially over religious affairs, still holds sway.

For leaders of the UOC-MP in particular, the activities of church leaders and
politicians in western Ukraine are troublesome. They capture the concerns of many
Ukrainians, particularly those in the south and east of the country, when they decry
the inﬂuence of "radical" nationalists, complain about enforced Ukrainiazation of
language, and mourn the potential loss of their traditional ties to Russia and
Orthodoxy.

The church in the south and east has led the charge against the strong
nationalistic movement in the west. UOC-MP leaders time and again referred to
nationalists as radicals who are under the inﬂuence of foreigners (Interview #8). The
fact that the west is more politically active and that the Greek Catholic Church is the
major religious power in the west has led many in the rest of the country to claim to
fear their actions and the inﬂuence of a "foreign" church. Heightened tensions within
the country and with Russia are blamed on the overly aggressive tactics of the
nationalists. In particular, western politicians are blamed for using the GCC as a
weapon of politics in the ﬁght against Russiﬁcation (Interview #28).

For many in east and south Ukraine, Russiﬁcation is not an evil inﬂuence

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since they are ethnic Russians. Rather, the forced switch to the Ukrainian language is
of great concern. Many people have spoken Russian for generations and have lost
their ability to speak Ukrainian and are threatened by the possibility that they may be
forced to speak Ukrainian in school or work. The move by the government to
conduct classes, at the elementary, secondary, and university levels, in Ukrainian has
caused a great deal of concern. Although this policy is being implemented at
different rates around the country, it is very worrisome to people who have no
knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

The UOC-MP has taken up this issue, especially as it relates to worship
services. They have always held their church services in old church Slavonic, and
are outspoken in their desire to continue to do so. It is highly unlikely that the
government would take a position forcing their churches to use Ukrainian, but they
have latched onto this issue none the less and are speaking out against any perceived
pressure to use Ukrainian. Church leaders emphasize the long history of using
Slavonic (Interview #15) and the fact that it is the language of worship used by all
Orthodox churches in the world (Interview #28). By taking a stand against those who
"want the church to use the language of the people in the street" (Interview #15), the
UOC-MP aligns itself with Ukrainians who are fearful of being forced to abandon the
language they consider their own. By arguing for the continuation of Slavonic in the
churches, they are voicing the concerns of many who are arguing for the continuation
of Russian in schools and the workplace. Both groups are united in their concern as

they look at the west and the radical demands they see emerging.

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Just as those in the west emphasize the importance of ties with western
Europe, many people in the south and east emphasize the importance of ties with
Russia. In these regions, Russia is seen not as the enemy but as the brother. Leaders
of the UOC-MP champion this cause when they speak of the 1000 years of shared
history with Russia. They discount fears of control by Moscow and instead point to
the fact that "there is just one universal Orthodox church" (Interview #8). The
Spiritual ties shared over centuries are vital, and attempts to discount or discontinue
them are viewed as attempts to destroy their cultural and spiritual heritage (Interview
#3). In fact, the participation of the state in the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates is seen as exactly such a move.
Political interests and aggressive nationalism are blamed for the fact that the churches
have split at all. In addition, the inﬂuence of the west is not welcomed by all but is
seen as potentially harmful. According to one scholar, if those in west Ukraine get
their way and ties with western Europe are given priority, then their Orthodox
heritage will disappear under an avalanche of American and western commercialism
(Interview #3). While this is highly unlikely, it is cause for concern for many in the
east and south.

Therefore, not only are the regions very different in their orientations and
interests, but the churches are highlighting and reenforcing these differences.
Churches in the west point to the eastern church (the UOC-MP) and label it a puppet
of Moscow that wants to continue to keep Ukraine subservient to Russia. The UOC-

MP in turn points to the activities of the western churches and accuses them of rabid

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nationalism that seeks to deprive Ukrainians of their millennium-old heritage and to
tie them to foreign countries. It is clear that the churches have given voice and
spiritual ﬂavor to the divisions existing in Ukraine. By tying spiritual concerns to
geographic and ethnic divisions, churches have become central actors in the political
battles separating Ukraine. They are at the forefront of the debate over which
direction Ukraine should incline, toward Russia or western Europe. They are
intimately involved in the argument over language policy in the country, and over the
degree to which nationalism Should be an identifying feature of national identity.
Their activities have deepened the cleavages within Ukraine.

Conclusion

State response to churches, as we have seen, depends upon several factors.
High rates of participation, use of contacts at key levels of government, ties to the
Soviet state and nationalistic organizations, and large size all contribute to positive
state response. Ties to Russia, to foreign organizations or countries, and the absence
of any of the above mentioned factors contributes to negative state response. The
churches who received the property, money, and state favors that they desired got
them because of these factors.

Of Special concern to non-Orthodox churches with strong foreign ties is the
tendency of the state to limit their religious freedoms. This state response is due to
the favorable ties of the Orthodox churches and the unfavorable ties of the Protestant
churches in particular. By restricting the rights of foreign churches and placing the

Orthodox churches in a favored position, the state is responding to the demands of the

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well-connected churches. Freedom of religion has begun to suffer as the state has
responded selectively to church demands. However, I suggest that more severe
restrictions are unlikely due to the divided nature of Orthodox church life in Ukraine.
Because the Orthodox church is divided and ﬁghting and because the President does
not appear to have a predisposition toward any particular church, the state is unlikely
to be pressured into granting a religious monopoly to any church. Competition
among the churches should preclude the establishment of any state church.

However, this has not stopped the churches from ﬁghting for power. The
political, ethnic, and geographic divisions between east and west Ukraine provide the
most political churches with the ammunition and battle ground to war with one
another. Types H and IV churches have staked out the west as their home base and
are accusing the east and the UOC-MP of trying to bring Ukraine back under the
control of Russia. The UOC-MP in the east in turn points to the west and the Types
II and IV churches and attacks the actions of radical nationalists who are attempting to
stamp out any traces of Slavic history and brotherhood. Their battle is deepening the
divisions in the country.

The next chapter looks more closely at the involvement of Ukrainian churches
in the politics of national identity. The behavior of church is having an impact upon

the way Ukrainians View themselves, their country, and their political future.

Chapter 6
Churches as Political Actors on the Micro Level

"The UAOC, GCC and the UOC-KP were all very active in inﬂuencing their members
(during the Presidential election). " Scholar, Interview #31

"The church members are concerned about. . .the problem of national identity. There
is also the problem of the restoration of the Communist Party. Many are afraid that
the old rule will come back. " Priest, Greek Catholic Church, Interview #4
"Protestant churches. . . take a very individualistic approach. The main number of
Protestant churches just tell people to be good citizens. " Government worker,
Interview #35

Churches inﬂuence politics on the macro societal level, ﬁrst by reaching out to
government, and then by getting the government to respond to church demands. In
addition to this, churches also inﬂuence politics on the micro attitudinal level by
communicating political messages to church members. AS discussed in Chapter 2,
church leaders are well positioned to inﬂuence the political attitudes of their
followers. They ﬁlter and transmit political information, structure attitudes, and
provide political clues. Their standing in the community provides them with a moral
authority that lends weight to their religious and political pronouncements.

This chapter begins with a look at the inﬂuence of church leaders on the
political attitudes of their congregations. I examine who has the greatest inﬂuence,
and how they use this inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, I examine church attempts to Shape
attitudes relating to the 1994 Presidential election. Next, I examine the role of

churches in shaping a national political identity. Three different national identities,

and the churches that promote them, are studied. Finally, the implications of church

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inﬂuence on political attitudes, including attitudes toward a national identity, are
discussed.
Inﬂuence on the Political Attitudes of Church Members

The ability of Ukrainian churches to inﬂuence the political attitudes of church
members is linked to church ties. I hypothesized that ties to the Soviet state and to
external organizations hampered the ability of churches to inﬂuence political attitudes,
while nationalistic ties enhanced church leaders’ political inﬂuence. In particular,
church members who heard political messages both at church and at work and in
social gatherings are more likely to be inﬂuenced.

The data for this chapter, as for the entire dissertation, come from interviews
with church leaders, scholars, government workers, and others. Therefore, the
answers reﬂect their perspective on the degree of inﬂuence church leaders have over
the political attitudes of church members. Their insight provides us with an
interesting, albeit limited, insight into church inﬂuence on member attitudes.

Who Has Inﬂuence and Who Does Not

Type HI Protestant churches with ties to foreign organizations Showed virtually
no interest in inﬂuencing the political attitudes of their members. However, this lack
of interest is likely due to their stated desire to Stay out of politics rather than to their
foreign ties. Protestant churches in Ukraine, as discussed earlier, are maintaining
their distance from political ﬁghts and issues in Ukraine. When asked what they
communicated to their members about politics, one Protestant leader explained that

politics in their church is a taboo subject (Interview #18). When another Protestant

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leader was asked whether or not the church tried to inﬂuence the political views of its
members, he stated that the church feels that the people Should decide for themselves
(Interview #19).

Type I UOC-MP churches with ties to Russia were equivocal about their
efforts to inﬂuence member attitudes. They denied any active attempts, but then
made reference to political issues that they mentioned to their congregation. These
churches made oblique reference to attempts to shape member attitudes, but would not
directly address which political issues were of concern to their congregation. As with
their level of participation on the macro level, their micro level political activity is
more pronounced than that of Type IH churches, but is less than that of Type H and
IV churches.

Churches with ties to nationalistic organizations have a greater degree of
inﬂuence over church member attitudes. Since these churches are actively involved in
politics themselves, they are also more active in trying to involve their members in
the political battles. Leaders of these churches Spoke of the strong political feelings
of their members, on issues ranging from relations with Russia to opinions about
members of government. Since these Type II and IV churches are strongest in the
west, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that the most politically active church members were
in the most politically active region of Ukraine-the west (Interview #23). While
UOC-MP church leaders in the center and east described their inﬂuence upon their
members’ attitudes, they acknowledged that churches in the west have a more

politicized population with which to work (Interview #15).

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The difference is particularly striking between east and west Ukraine. Western
Ukrainians are both more politicized and more religious than eastern Ukrainians
(Interview #20). There are fewer believers in the east, and religious issues are of less
importance (Interview #9). For western Ukrainians, to be religious and politically
active is normal, while in the east it is unusual. AS a result, western Ukrainians are
indeed likely to be receiving political messages at a variety of locations throughout
their day and are likely to be more exposed and receptive to political messages from
their church. Eastern Ukrainians, however, are less receptive, largely because
political and religious apathy is the norm in that region. Religious interest is
discouraged by the intrusive nature of regional state activity. Following the Soviet
pattern, the regional authorities have continued their heavy-handed involvement in
religious affairs. This has not encouraged the religious participation of eastern
Ukrainian Christians. From the information gathered in these interviews, virtually all
churches in the west had a high degree of inﬂuence upon the political views of their
members, while virtually all churches in the east had a lower degree of inﬂuence.
This leads me to the conclusion that the political environment of the different regions
has the highest degree of impact upon church inﬂuence over member political
attitudes. The highly politicized nature of western Ukraine causes most church
members to be more politically astute and aware and causes most churches to be
politically active. AS a result, churches in the west have more inﬂuence over
members’ attitudes. Since the nationalistic Type II and IV churches are all based in

the west, it is not surprising that they have the most inﬂuence over the political

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attitudes of their members. Even the UOC-MP priest interviewed in west Ukraine
was extremely political and open about the ways that he has communicated political
messages to his congregation (Interview #8). The more politically apathetic nature of
eastern Ukrainians and of eastern churches results in a lower level of member interest
and church inﬂuence. Leaders of the normally politically active UOC-KP were
surprisingly apolitical and demonstrated little interest in communicating political
messages to their congregation in the eastern city of Donetsk (Interview #2).

Therefore, while church ties play a role in determining the degree of church
inﬂuence over member political attitudes, the regional environment seems to be much
more important. The politically active culture of the west opens church members up
to political church messages, while the apathetic and oppressive culture of the east
dampens church leaders’ and members’ interest in political messages. In addition, the
degree of church involvement on the macro level is a better predictor of inﬂuence on
members attitudes than church ties alone. Church ties inﬂuence the degree of macro
level church involvement, which in turn partially determines micro-level church
activity. In this respect, church ties are an indirect indicator of church attempts to
inﬂuence the political attitudes of their members.
How Churches Play a Role

I hypothesized that Types 1, II and IV churches made speciﬁc attempts to
Shape the political views of their members, particularly with reference to the 1994
Presidential election. I suggested that Type I UOC-MP churches tried to sway their

members to support Kuchma, while Types H (UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP)

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tried to get their congregations to support Kravchuk. I also hypothesized that these
churches were all very pointed and direct in communicating this political message.

My initial hypotheses were correct in that all these churches did try to
inﬂuence the political attitudes of their members. However, I was incorrect in
thinking that Type II and IV churches all supported Kravchuk, and that all the three
types of churches were equally direct in their political messages.

Testimony from church leaders and church observers conﬁrms that Types 1, II
and IV churches all took steps to inﬂuence the political views of their members
during the Presidential election, but in different directions and to varying degrees.
The Type IV UOC-KP churches were once again the most open about and fervent in
their activities. As expected, the church leaders strongly urged their followers to
support President Kravchuk’s bid for reelection (Interview #9). The inﬂuence came
in several forms. The most common seems to have been speaking about him in their
services and urging the listeners to vote for him (Interview #21). According to one
church scholar, church leaders were very open in their statements to their followers
(Interview #31). Church leaders themselves phrased it in a more oblique manner;
they told their members to vote for nationalists who are interested in the future of
Ukraine (Interview #25). It is unlikely that they were this oblique with their
congregations.

The Type II churches were also active in their attempts to inﬂuence member
attitudes, but different considerations held them back from behaving as overtly and

directly as the UOC-KP. The UAOC found itself at a loss as to whom to support in

178
the election. Kravchuk’s open support of the creation of the UOC-KP had directly

resulted in the ofﬁcial dissolution of the UAOC, and their struggle to regain their
legal status had been hampered by both the UOC-KP and Kravchuk. According to
one leader of the UAOC, the church told church members that Kravchuk did nothing
for the church and that he was the reason many problems still existed with the church
(Interview #7). Kuchma, on the other hand, was a supporter of ties with Russia, a
position that is anathema to the nationalistic UAOC. The end result was that neither
candidate was at all acceptable to the church. This placed the UAOC in an interesting
position, because church leaders were very open about the political content of their
sermons and about their desire to Shape the political views about their members
(Interview #30). They were positioned and prepared to have a great deal of inﬂuence
over the political attitudes and actions of their members, but they had no candidate to
support. Therefore, much of their energy went into supporting candidates for the
Supreme Soviet, telling members that they "Should not vote for people of yesterday,
for example people who used to be Communists and who still see things the same
way" (Interview #30).

Interestingly, this warning could also apply to both Presidential candidates,
again emphasizing the church’s dissatisfaction with both the choices for President.
When asked what issues were most important to church members, one UAOC leader
immediately mentioned the need to have access to TV and radio so that the church
can spread its views out to the people. From the context of the interview, it was

clear that he was referring to political as well as to religious views. The end result

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was that their inﬂuence over their members’ attitudes for the 1994 Presidential
election was muted, due to the lack of a suitable candidate to support. In the future, I
expect this church to be very active and direct in their attempts to get their church
members to support a particular presidential candidate.

The Greek Catholic Church also was more restrained than the UOC-KP,
although for different reasons than the UAOC. For the most part, the GCC threw its
support behind Kravchuk’s bid for reelection. However, Kravchuk’s behavior toward
the UOC-KP caused some resentment, particularly in non-western regions. One GC
priest in Kiev communicated his resentment at being kicked out of his church in order
to accommodate the UOC-KP by telling his congregation during the election that they
knew who was to blame for the fact that they were holding their services out in the
Street in ~20 degrees Celsius weather (Interview #22). The rest of the church leaders,
primarily those in the west, did not say the name Kravchuk inntheir services, but told
the members that they Should vote for the candidate who supported nationalism
(Interview #31). Even in these subtle terms, the message was clear. The leader of
the church, Cardinal Lubichevsky, wrote a letter forbidding priests from directly
mentioning any candidate by name in their services (Interview #4). It seems that this
was done to prevent any accusations of improper church-state relations that might
damage pending property claims (Interview #13). Despite this limitation, church
groups got around this by telling their church members to support good Christians
who want to protect an independent Ukraine (Interview #10), or by talking about the

qualities of the candidates that they should elect (Interview #16). In this manner, the

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church was active, although somewhat discreet, in its attempts to shape the political
attitudes and voting behavior of church members.

The Type I UOC-MP churches were also active in their attempts to shape
member attitudes. According to a political party worker in south Ukraine, priests
from the UOC-MP had the strongest inﬂuence over their members’ views because
they told their followers directly whom to vote for--candidate Kuchma (Interview #9).
Priests from this church, however, were very reluctant to discuss any inﬂuence they
might have over their members’ political views. One priest would only say that
unofﬁcially, church leaders cannot be stopped from expressing their opinions
(Interview #9). In the opinion of one scholar, local priests of the MP had a great deal
of inﬂuence, not just telling the members who to vote for, but also which political
issues they should follow (Interview #31). Other church leaders also stated that
priests of the UOC—MP told their members whom to vote for (Interview #23). One
high UOC-MP leader stated that it is not the church’s job to make propaganda for one
candidate, but then in the next sentence stated that if a candidate said they were an
Orthodox believer (and in his mind the UOC-MP is the only true Orthodox church in
Ukraine), then this would make the church and the people sympathetic and vote for
him (Interview #26). As is apparent, Kuchma was the only candidate belonging to
the UOC-MP. The UOC-MP was more restrained than the UOC-KP, but their
sympathies lay without question with candidate Kuchma, and they communicated this
to their church members.

Finally, the Type HI churches did little to shape the political attitudes of their

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members. Overwhelmingly, church leaders as well as church scholars commented on
the apolitical nature of these churches. A political party worker attests to the fact that
the Baptists, unlike the UOC-KP, UOC-MP and the UAOC, were silent during the
Presidential election (Interview #9). According to a Protestant deacon, the only
political message that was communicated was that voting had a very high role and that
members should not take this duty lightly (Interview #19). These churches, alone
among the others, seemed to view vote choice as an individual decision in which the
church plays little or no role (Interview #1).

During the Presidential election, the churches followed the basic patterns
hypothesized. Type IV churches were very active in trying to shape member
attitudes, and they were open in their support for President Kravchuk. One Type II
church, the Greek Catholics, also supported Kravchuk, but they were somewhat more
restrained in inﬂuencing their members. The other Type II church, the UAOC,
unexpectedly did not support either candidate, and although it was positioned and
prepared to strongly try to Shape the views of her members, there was no candidate to
support. The UOC-MP, as expected, urged members to vote for Kuchma, but in a
restrained fashion. As hypothesized, the Type III Protestant churches made no
attempts to get their congregations to vote for one candidate or another, but instead
emphasized the importance of voting and making an individual choice.

Development of a National Ukrainian Identity
In addition to shaping political attitudes regarding vote choice, I hypothesized

that churches were interested in shaping a broader political identity among their

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members. Speciﬁcally, I suggested that Types II and IV churches push their members
to support a nationalist political identity, while Type I churches encouraged their
members to develop an identity that included strong ties with Russia. Type IH
churches were expected to ignore the issue.

In fact, the push for a distinct national identity was one of the strongest areas
of church involvement in the political arena. As I have mentioned throughout
previous chapters, various churches have latched onto speciﬁc messages of national
identiﬁcation and have made them part of church identiﬁcation. This section takes a
closer look at the messages that the churches are trying to convey to their followers
and examines the reasons behind their choice of national identity.

The churches can be divided into three general categories describing their
basic identity. First are the churches that are pursuing a nationalist identity; second
are the churches supporting a Slavic identity; and third are the churches that have a
neutral identity.

Nationalistic Identig

AS hypothesized, Types II and IV churches communicated a strong message of
nationalism to their members. Leaders of the UOC-KP, UAOC, and Greek Catholic
churches all mentioned, at various times, the need for their followers to support a
strong, independent Ukraine. AS a GC priest stated, "the issue most important to
church members is to have an independent Ukraine" (Interview #22).

In addition, they stressed the danger of continued ties with Russia. This seems

to be a key aspect of the nationalistic churches’ call for a distinct Ukrainian identity.

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As one UAOC priest put it

The big issues that (the church members) are worried about is the

inﬂuence of Russia and Russiﬁcation. If you look at Russian history,

the church has been submitted to the state, and the state has controlled

the church as a political instrument. Ukraine has had to deal with the

inﬂuence of Tsarist Russia, and has always had its national traditions

suppressed. The national characteristics of churches in Ukraine were

destroyed and the church was Russiﬁed. (Interview #30).

A Greek Catholic priest pointed out that the members of his church consider
the UOC-MP to be associated with the historical persecutions of the Soviet State
(Interview #29). In this respect, part of the national identiﬁcation is anti-Russian and
anti-Soviet. The evils carried out by the Soviet Union have become imputed to
Russia and to any groups with ties to her. Therefore, anger towards the non-existent
USSR can now be directed toward the nation of Russia or any church or organization
accused of having ties with Russia. Church members are interested in having
independence from Moscow politics (Interview #34).

In addition, these churches share other components of their national identity.
All see Ukraine focused towards western Europe (Interview #23). Ukrainians must
look to Europe, rather than to Russia to succeed, and identiﬁcation as Europeans is an
important part of that success. In addition, these churches see the Ukrainian language
as a key indicator of national identiﬁcation. Ukrainian is emphasized as an integral

part of their worship services. The fact that the UOC-KP, UAOC, and the GCC all

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use Ukrainian as the language in their worship services has an inﬂuence upon the
mentality of the people going to church.

What is interesting is that each of these churches is incorporating speciﬁc
demands into their call for a nationalistic identity. In their exhortations to church
members to support an independent Ukraine and to ﬁght against Russian
expansionism, they include speciﬁc, additional demands that must be met. By
rallying their members around abstract concepts, such as Ukrainian nationalism, as
well as concrete symbols, church leaders are providing tangible issues upon which to
focus. Church members, as a result, have shorter term goals to work on and concrete
symbols to rally around.

Churches are focusing on different symbols around which to build their case.
The UAOC has centered its message upon its desire to become legally registered and
ofﬁcially recognized. Church members are urged to keep this ongoing Struggle in the
forefront of their minds (Interview #21). Registration is vital to their cause, because
their current status is that of a non-existent church. Without recognition, they have a
very difﬁcult time gaining church property and have only a limited platform to
express their views and gain new members. The fact that Kravchuk’s government
played a key role in restricting their registration gives this church a legitimate
persecution complex. This has enabled them to blame the state and the UOC-KP for
meddling in church-state affairs and strengthens their claim to be the only pure church
that wants independence for themselves and for the nation of Ukraine (Interview #24).

They claim that they only want to establish a Ukrainian church without governmental

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inﬂuence (Interview #7). Their call for a nationalistic political identity is legitimized
and strengthened by the current troubles they are facing.

The Greek Catholic Church has grabbed onto the symbol of an ofﬁcial State
apology for past Soviet behavior (Interview #20). Members have been encouraged to
focus upon the need for the current Ukrainian state to apologize to the church for
actions taken by the Soviet government in the 1930’s and 1940’s, culminating in the
1946 Council that forcibly "self-liquidated" the GCC. This deep concern about an
apology for past wrongs is viewed by members as a sort of moral reparation
(Interview #29). By acknowledging the wrongs done to this church by the Soviet
government, the current Ukrainian state would bestow an intangible asset upon the
Greek Catholic Church. Although most churches suffered under the Communists, an
ofﬁcial acknowledgement by the state would bolster the credibility and establish the
moral high ground of this church.

The UOC-KP is trying to blend the historical heritage of Orthodoxy with the
new move for Ukrainian nationalism. By calling itself Orthodox, the church
incorporates the Orthodox rite, tradition, and history, albeit in the Ukrainian
language. By siding with the nationalists, it gains credibility and favor in the new
independence-leaning political climate. The UOC-KP has made the uniﬁcation of the
Ukrainian Orthodox churches its symbolic nationalistic rallying cry. According to
church leaders, the independent nation of Ukraine needs an independent church, and
church life will be renewed when the Orthodox church is brought back together under

the leadership of the UOC-KP (Interview #11). Members are urged to support this by

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the rhetorical question: if 20 million people in Ukraine are committed to a church
based in Russia (the UOC-MP), then is Ukraine really an independent country? In
this respect, this church positions itself as the church representing an independent,
nationalistic Ukraine. Russia, as well as churches like the UAOC that want
independence, are painted as obstacles to a strong state church. Unity, under the
headship of the UOC-KP, would be the religious fulﬁllment of a truly independent
Ukraine. As one UOC-KP Bishop put it " (our) ﬁrm position is that the power of the
Orthodox religion in Ukraine will only be found through unity " (Interview #25).
From the perspective of this church, the UOC-KP was created as part of the
movement for the independence of Ukraine, so national identiﬁcation as a patriotic
Ukrainian committed to an independent country should coincide with religious
identiﬁcation as a member of the UOC-KP (Interview #14).

The existence of a Ukrainian church that has its headquarters and Patriarch in
Russia is exploited by the UOC-KP as dangerous to an independent Ukraine. Church
leaders point to decades of enforced Russiﬁcation under the Communists and warn
that Russia is again hungry to dominate Ukraine. In addition, they point to
documented cases where leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church collaborated with
the KGB, and warn that this type of behavior could happen again. What the UOC-KP
fails to mention is that many of its own leaders were formerly priests in the Russian
Orthodox Church and are vulnerable to the same claims. In fact, Metropolitan Filaret
of the UOC-KP was a high ranking priest in the Russian Orthodox Church who has

been accused of long-term collaboration with the KGB (Little 1991; Motyl 1993).

187
An additional symbol, coveted by both the UAOC and the UOC-KP, is

ownership of the Cathedral of St. Sophia. This ancient cathedral has Stood for
centuries as a testimony to Ukraine’s religious heritage, hearkening back to the year
988 AD. when Prince Vladimir declared, in Kiev, that Christianity would be the
religion of the Kiev-Rus empire. Declared to be a national historical site by the
government, these two churches continue to ﬁght bitterly to try to gain ownership
over it. The stakes are high, for whichever church owns this cathedral could lay
claim to its historical legacy and would become heir of its legitirnizing nationalistic
past. This is why church leaders put such great importance upon obtaining the rights
to this church, and why calls to get this church sound so frequently in discussions of
national identity.

The three churches with strong ties to nationalistic organizations are pursuing
the active development of a nationalistic identity among their church members. The
Types II and IV churches agree on a few components of this identity. It is focused
around an independent Ukraine, with few or no ties to Russia. Western Europe,
rather than Russia, is the desired partner, and Ukrainian, rather than Russian, is the
desired language. They differ on the speciﬁc components, however. The UAOC
sees its ﬁght against the state for registration as a testimony to its position as the
"pure" and politically untarnished church. The Greek Catholic Church in its hunt for
a state apology is focusing upon the wrongs done in the past by the state and an
acknowledgment by the state of these wrongs. The UOC-KP has positioned itself as

the church most closely identiﬁed with an independent Ukraine, and is trying to make

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support for the one accordingly mean support for the other.
Slavic Identity
[hypothesized that Type I UOC-MP churches urged their members to support
candidate Kuchma, and that they pushed their congregations to support increased
linkages with Russia. This indeed occurred, but took on an added dimension. The
UOC-MP churches strongly encouraged their members not just to be friendly to
Russia but to develop a Slavic national identity. In this manner, they were able to
balance anti-Russian calls by Ukrainian nationalists with the assertion that these
nationalists were ignoring the true historical heritage of the Ukrainian people. In
addition, they accused these nationalists of trying to use the church for their political
purposes. According to a UOC-MP priest, these people did not realize that the
"church cannot be nationalistic or a state church, but should belong only to God"
(Interview #33). Rather than focusing upon Russians as conquering imperialists,
priests from the UOC-MP focused upon the millennial-long history shared by
Orthodox believers in Ukraine and Russia. The mutual religion shared by Russia and
Ukraine provides stability in their relationship (Interview #8).
The symbolic issue around which they build their argument is, ironically, the
same as the issue used by the UOC-KP. These churches share the strong belief that
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should not be split up, but they disagree vehemently
about why they should be joined and who should have the ascendent position. The
UOC-MP has made a strong case among its members that the church should not be

split, and the members have rallied behind the idea that there should be one church

 

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with its head in Moscow (Interview #31). According to church leaders, the division
itself was provoked by nationalist political forces in Ukraine who wanted to encourage
nationalism in the population by severing as many connections to Russia as possible
(Interview #8). By creating a new Ukrainian Orthodox church with its leadership in
Kiev out of whole cloth, they did just this. To the UOC-MP, this action represents
the worst kind of state manipulation of the church, and in this case also conveniently
ignores the 1000 year old bond between the Orthodox Slavs in ancient Russia and
Ukraine. In fact, evidence strongly suggests that the creation of the UOC-KP was a
politically motivated move, masterminded by President Kravchuk and Metropolitan
Filaret. Kravchuk saw the opportunity to create a church that would share his
nationalistic views and not condemn his Soviet ties, while Filaret, under ﬁre from the
Russian Orthodox Church, saw his chance to grab a great deal of power by creating a
new church with himself at the head.

Hence, the strong cry of the UOC-MP has been for its members not to forget
their spiritual heritage and to protest against state interference in church affairs by
ﬁghting against the artiﬁcial breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Instead of
calling for the state to step in to force uniﬁcation, as the UOC-KP does, the UOC-MP
is calling for the State to remove itself from the issue altogether (Interview #26).
Religious identiﬁcation with their forefathers, rather than political identiﬁcation with
the newly independent Ukraine, is the key to their Slavic identity. In this respect, ties
with Russia are not shameful or dangerous, but natural. Since these two countries’

religious traditions are so intertwined, it is only natural that such close relations

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should continue.

Another symbol used to reinforce this Slavic identiﬁcation is the use of old
church Slavonic in church services. As already mentioned in earlier chapters, church
leaders are making the choice of language in worship a very big issue, in large part to
emphasize the historical legacy of their church. Several UOC-MP church leaders
mentioned the 1000 years of tradition of the Slavonic language, and emphasized that it
is the language used by all Orthodox churches in the world (Interview #28, 15).
Language has become another means of identifying this church with its ancient
traditions and history.

What this church does not acknowledge is the bitterness, felt by many, due to
collaboration between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet state. It had acted
as an imperial arm of the Soviet empire and had collaborated with the CPSU (Kuzio
and Wilson 1994). These bitter feelings toward the Russian Orthodox Church and
towards Russia herself are not easily overcome, and the tendency of the UOC-MP to
dismiss such concerns does not bode well for the church in the nationalistic center and
west of Ukraine. To many, the historical legacy of ties to Russia is painful rather
than nostalgic.

The UOC-MP is trying to build a strong Slavic identity among its followers.
By focusing upon their ancient ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and with the
other Orthodox churches of the world, they hope to dampen concerns about ties to
Russia. Also, by decrying state inﬂuence in the creation of the UOC-KP, they hope

to position themselves as the alternative to this allegedly nationalist- and State-

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controlled church.
Neutral Identig

I hypothesized that Type III Protestant churches made no attempts to inﬂuence
the political views or identity of their members. In fact, I found this to be an
incorrect hypothesis. While these churches did little to inﬂuence the speciﬁc political
views of their church members, they did communicate a certain type of political
identity, which I have called a neutral identity. This neutral political identity involves
an individualistic attitude toward politics. While speciﬁc political issues were rarely
discussed in the church, church leaders did work to build a political identity that
encouraged each member to decide political questions themselves and to take
responsibility as an individual for their voting behavior (Interviews #19, 1). Church
members were urged to take part in the political process and to be good citizens of
Ukraine, while the churches themselves stayed on the sidelines (Interview #35). The
process of politics was often pictured as dirty and distasteful, so members were urged
to be careful in their political involvement and to keep a measure of distance
(Interview #35).

This identity has no symbols to rally around. The main component is the role
of the individual and the need to be involved in, and suspicious of, the political
process.

Implications
The inﬂuence of churches on micro level political attitudes and national

identities has serious implications for the future development of Ukraine. This

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political involvement is often subtle and difﬁcult to observe, but it is also potentially
very inﬂuential. AS church leaders shape the political views of their members, they
inﬂuence who gets elected and what policies are past. As they mold the national
identity of their congregation, they affect how these Ukrainians View themselves, their
world, and Ukraine’s place in the world.

As the number of churches in Ukraine continues to grow, and as the size of
congregations swell (Beletsky 1994), more and more people will be in a position to
hear the religious and political messages given by church leaders. Therefore, it is
important to understand the implications of these messages, especially as they involve
relations with Russia and the West.

The churches that are best positioned or have done the most to try to inﬂuence
the political views of their members are the churches with strong nationalistic ties; the
UOC-KP, the UAOC, and the Greek Catholic Church. These churches all have an
active political agenda, and are willing to communicate this agenda to their followers.
Within this group, however, there is variation. The UOC-KP by far has the clearest
record of overtly trying to inﬂuence members’ views, and leaders have no hesitation
in reafﬁrming their intention to continue doing so. The UAOC is eager and open
about their attempts to communicate political messages to their members, but the past
election demonstrates that when they have no one to support, their activity is mufﬂed.
The Greek Catholic Church is the most restrained of this group, but while they may
mask their political message, the mask is transparent and the message is clear.

These most active churches are all committed to developing a nationalist

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identity among their members. Their high level of interest in communicating this
message suggests that they are likely to be quite successful. As this happens,
religious identity becomes ever more intertwined with political and nationalistic
considerations (Little 1991). Religious identiﬁcation with any of these churches is
becoming synonymous with support for an independent, western leaning Ukraine. In
addition, membership in these churches has begun to imply a negative, almost
paranoid view toward Russia. In informal conversations with members of these
churches, the viliﬁcation of Russia and the conviction that, if given the chance,
Russia would take over Ukraine, was striking. This is the fruit of the micro level
attitudinal inﬂuence of these churches.

AS these churches continue to disseminate political messages from the pulpit
that paints Russia as the enemy and all things Ukrainian as the standard, then Ukraine
will ﬁnd herself becoming more and more isolated in the world community.
Although these messages encourage orientation toward western Europe, they also
implicitly paint their national culture as the highest, and all others as inferior. For
example, the western concept of freedom of religion is held as a worthy principle, but
then in the next breathe, special consideration for Ukrainian religions is demanded.
In the attempt to distance themselves from Russia and to identify themselves as non-
Russians, nationalists are burning some potentially vital bridges behind them. Anti-
Russian rhetoric is widespread and is doing great damage to Ukrainian-Russian
relations. Since Ukraine has no natural gas deposits, she continues to rely upon

Russia for shipments of gas. However, chilliness in the relationship, due both to

194

balance of payment problems and to escalating attacks on Russia, has resulted in
serious heat shortages during Ukrainian winters.

The larger world community is also affected by this tension. In 1992 then-
President Kravchuk decided to halt the planned removal of nuclear weapons from
Ukraine to Russia for destruction (Motyl 1993). While Ukraine had some valid
concerns about the fate of these weapons once they were in Russian hands, and they
saw the strategic beneﬁts of holding on to the weapons, this decision continues to
cause security concerns for the rest of the world. Given the unstable nature of the
armed forces in Ukraine, and the continuing tensions between Ukraine and Russia, the
existence of nuclear arms in this country is cause for concern.

The most serious consequence of nationalistic church messages is the damage
it is doing to Ukrainian national unity. The pro-Ukrainian anti-Russian message being
preached by many of these churches is exacerbating the already deep and troublesome
division between east and west Ukraine. AS the voting results from the 1994
Presidential election reveal (see Appendix E), the country is split down the middle
politically. As religious demographics demonstrate, religious differences follow the
same basic patterns (see Appendix B). As these churches strengthen the bonds uniting
religion to political and nationalistic agendas, the two regions will be pulled even
farther apart. Already the differences are marked by symbols appropriated by the
churches. The three churches all have their highest leaders located in west and
central Ukraine. These leaders are all Ukrainians who make a point of speaking

Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language itself is the dominant language in west Ukraine

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and is fast becoming the language used in all schools and universities. Street names
and statues honoring Russian or Soviet heroes have been changed or torn down, and
new ones honoring Ukrainians have replaced them.

AS these churches continue to preach their political messages, eastern
Ukrainians are frequently branded with the same iron as the Russians. By virtue of
being ethnic Russians, speaking Russian rather than Ukrainian, or especially
belonging to the UOC-MP, eastern Ukrainians are accused of being under Russia’s
inﬂuence and acting as tools of Russiﬁcation (Interview #30). Also, they are accused
of supporting unity with Russia, supporting Communism, and working to bring the
USSR back to power (Interview #11). This sort of rhetoric ampliﬁes the differences
between the regions by painting eastern Ukrainians as enemies who are trying to hurt
western Ukrainians. By demonizing those who are not ethnically Ukrainian, not
nationalists, do not speak Ukrainian, and are not members of the nationalist churches,
church leaders are contributing towards to fracturing of Ukraine.

Churches with ties to Russia are also contributing to the growing divide
between east and west Ukraine, but in a less concerted manner. The UOC-MP
churches are taking some Steps to inﬂuence the political views of their members, but
they are less aggressive and less vocal than the Types II and IV churches. Their
message, while relayed somewhat less openly, is still quite important, for it is the
mirror opposite of the nationalist churches. In these churches, religious and national
identity are also combined, but in a way that embraces their Slavic heritage and their

connections to Russia.

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A part of their message is that the churches who espouse Ukrainian
nationalism are fanatics who want Ukrainians to deny their heritage. They point
particularly at west Ukraine and refer to people there as political and nationalistic
radicals and extremists (Interview #28). They want to pursue continued ties with
Russia, their brother Slavs.

The implications of their Slavic-oriented identity is that the eastern region,
where the UOC-MP is the undisputed power, has made much less progress towards
independence. On the surface, very little has changed in eastern Ukraine since
Ukraine declared her independence. Former Soviet ofﬁcials maintain their positions.
Few streets have been renamed, and statues of Lenin still abound. There is little
western European or American investment. Russian is the language spoken on the
street, at home, and in schools and universities. When these people look at what is
going on in western Ukraine, they feel as if they are under siege by politicians trying
to make a name for themselves by using the church to gain power (Interview #15).
Russia, accordingly, looks like a refuge where their language, religion, and ethnic
origin are not under attack. Russia has made noises about protecting ethnic Russians
living in the non—Russian former USSR, and it is possible that She could begin to
make noises about protecting the rights of Russians living in eastern Ukraine. In any
case, the perceived persecution of eastern Ukrainians can only Strain Russian-
Ukrainian relations.

For their part, the UOC-MP churches are behaving in a manner that is

worsening east-west Ukrainian relations. According to one scholar, the UOC-MP is

197

trying to divide the country by encouraging the east to focus upon Russia rather than
Europe (Interview #23). While their rhetoric is not as loud, and their inﬂuence on
member attitudes not as strong, their viliﬁcation of western Ukrainian activity only
broadens the divide between the regions. It also alienates church members from the
national government in Kiev, since the capital city is often lumped in with
generalizations about the western regions of Ukraine. This results in eastern members
of the UOC-MP identifying more and more with Russia, rather than with Ukraine.

AS citizens of the same country begin to identify themselves this differently, ﬁnding
common unifying ground may become increasingly difﬁcult.

Finally, the churches who have done the least to inﬂuence the political Views
of their members may have the most politically healthy message. As the Protestant
churches largely remove themselves from the political process, they urge their
members to take part and to make their decisions based upon their individual
preferences. Church members, therefore, may be avoiding some of the divisive
rhetoric and may be making more balanced political choices. The growth of the
Protestant churches may, in this respect, prove to be beneﬁcial for the national
political climate in the future.

Despite this small glimmer of optimism, the dueling national identities
promoted by the major churches do not bode well for the future stability of Ukraine.
By focusing upon themes that, at the very least, magnify the differences between the
regions and the religious confessions, churches are whipping up the ﬁres of

divisiveness. As they encourage their members to see themselves in one light, and

198

those who live in a different region, follow a different church, and speak a difference
language in another, negative light, then reconciliation between the two Sides is
unlikely.

The opposing national identities also promote opposing foreign policies.
Although church activity in this policy realm is limited to the broad and general
assertions discussed in this chapter, churches are inﬂuencing foreign policy by their
calls to orient Ukraine towards or away from Russia. Churches are pulling the state
in diametrically opposed directions regarding Russia. Relations with this country are
at a critical stage, and the opposing advice the government is receiving from the

churches is not helping mend relations.

Chapter 7
Conclusion

"(Are) there religious and political differences between east and west Ukraine? It is
natural that there are. There was a strong Ukrainian church in the west, but the
Russian church was strong in the east. " Greek Catholic lay leader, Interview #23
"Now religion plays both a divisive and a unifying role. Both in the east and west
there is opposition to atheism and in this all confessions are united. But when
religion is used by political groups, then it divides. (It is not) religion that divides,
but rather it is politicians that divide. " UOC-MP priest, Interview #28

This study began by asserting that Ukraine is unique because of the ongoing
part that religion has played, together with geography and nationality, in both
inﬂuencing and dividing the politics of Ukraine. As the data demonstrate, churches
are not only major actors on the political scene, but they are also major proponents of
a cultural war that is threatening the unity of Ukraine. Churches and religions all
over the world have varying degrees of inﬂuence over politics, but in Ukraine
religious concerns and conﬂicts are central to and indistinguishable from the political
battles being waged. As Ukraine struggles, with increasing acrimony, to deﬁne
herself and her place in the world, key churches are ﬁghting one another for the right
to create and direct this deﬁnition.

Interest group theory provides the framework to understand the activities and
goals of Ukrainian churches. By studying churches as interest groups in church of
public and private goods, and by viewing them as political actors demanding goods

from the state, I was able to examine their role in Ukrainian politics in a new way.

The theoretical framework of interest group activity in large part explained the

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200

overwhelming pursuit of private goods by the majority of the churches examined.
Property, Special position, and power, particularly in certain regions, are the primary
political interests of most Ukrainian churches today. Those few churches seeking
public goods are small and lack political contacts and power. When churches are
placed within the theoretical framework of public goods and interest group theory,
their activities within the public realm take on a whole new dimension. N 0 longer are
churches only religious bodies; they are revealed to be political bodies, deeply
involved in ﬁghting for their interests in the secular realm. These interests, as with
most interest groups, revolve around private goods, and they pursue them by means
of competition, contacts, and constituency. Churches compete with one another for
scarce resources such as church buildings, money, and special status. They use their
contacts within government to get what they want. They also make use of their
constituency, in other words their congregations, ﬁrst by shaping their political
attitudes, and then by mobilizing them to pressure decision makers.

Although churches are sacred bodies, they use many of the same tactics
employed by secular groups. Interest group theory reveals these tactics and creates a
framework within which to examine the political behavior of Ukrainian churches.
Role of Religion in the Politics of Ukraine

Ukraine indeed is a country divided across geographic, ethnic, political, and
religious lines. This study has focused upon the way religious interests have exploited
and exacerbated these differences for their own purposes and how their activities have

contributed to deeper and more bitter divisions within the nation.

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The key divide in Ukraine is between west and east. On the one side are the
Ukrainian-speaking nationalists, and on the other are the Russian speakers who want
to continue their linkages with Russia. This division is also a religious one. The
nationalist Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Greek Catholic Church are all on one side,
while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate is on the other. There is
some inﬁghting among the nationalist churches, but their conﬂicts pale in comparison
to the enmity between them and the Russian-leaning UOC-MP. The Ukrainian
nationalist vs. Russian friendship disagreement captures the central debate between the
churches, and within the nation as a whole.

The churches on the two opposing Sides of this issue have been active and
effective in their attempts to inﬂuence political life in Ukraine. In order to do this,
they have made use of their ties to the former Soviet state and Ukrainian nationalists.
The UOC-MP has utilized its strong ties to the former Soviet State to maintain its
contacts to former Soviet bureaucrats and decision makers still in power in Ukraine.
This has proved to be particularly effective in east Ukraine where the vast majority of
former Communist ofﬁcials continue to hold their old positions. The UOC-KP has
also made use of these contacts, and has bolstered them by their contacts within the
nationalist community. Not only do they have strong ties to the Soviet system, they
also have embraced the nationalist message and are very strongly connected with the
Ukrainian nationalist movement, based in the west of Ukraine. The Ukrainian

Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches both were forced underground

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during the Soviet period, so they have no contacts to the former Soviet state. They
do, however, have extensive, long-term contacts and impressive credentials with the
nationalist community. These ties have provided these churches with the
opportunities to inﬂuence politics on both the macro societal and micro attitudinal
levels. Overwhelmingly, these churches have pursued private goods and have
competed vigorously for scarce resources. Cooperation occurred only when banding
together against a larger foe. Public goods were rarely mentioned, and free riding
was generally the rule.

A different group of churches has taken a divergent path and has chosen to
remain largely separate from politics. The Protestant churches examined in this study
were striking in their interest in staying as far away from politics as possible. Having
neither the beneﬁcial ties to the former Soviet state nor to the nationalistic movement,
these churches are not positioned well to have political inﬂuence. The only possible
connections that might have helped them are their ties to foreign organizations, but
the fact that these are overwhelmingly western, Protestant organizations harms them
in the eyes of many decision makers. Except for when their religious rights are
threatened, they have remained out of the political fray.

The politically active churches have worked on two different levels to
accomplish their goals. On the macro societal level, they have tried to reach the state
and have fought for positive state response. On the micro attitudinal level, they have
worked to inﬂuence the political attitudes, especially the national identity, of their

church members. The result of much of their activity has been increasing

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divisiveness between the two parts of the country and growing enmity towards citizens
of other regions and members of other churches. The bitter fruit of church activity in
the politics of Ukraine is a torn and hostile nation.

Church Activity on the Macro Level

One aspect of church political behavior is the desire to gain things from the
state. This societal level political activity involves two stages: reaching out to the
state to make their interests known, and then having the State respond to their
demands.

I hypothesized that the churches’ ability to reach the state would be determined
by the ties that they had, particularly to the Soviet state and to nationalistic
organizations. In fact, the combined strong ties of the UOC-KP to both the Soviet
state and to nationalistic organizations gave them high-level contacts, the ability to
sanction effectively, and credibility among decisions makers. Their credibility among
the general population, however, suffered because of their Soviet ties. The churches
with strong ties to the nationalistic organizations were free from the taint of Soviet
complicity, but they also lacked the high-level national contacts needed to get things
done their way. While the Greek Catholic Church has successfully courted the local
and regional governmental organizations, and the UAOC has worked to gain contacts
on the national level, both churches are currently relegated to a lower level of
inﬂuence on the national level. The UOC-MP has strong contacts from the Soviet
period, but in the west and center they are in a constant Struggle to counter negative

perceptions about their strong ties with Russia. This has hampered their political

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effectiveness. The Protestant churches did virtually nothing to reach out to the state,
except in defense of public goods such as religious freedom. The other churches
were far more concerned with reaching government in order to gain private goods
such as ownership of disputed church buildings. In addition, the UOC-KP and the
UOC-MP were heated in their desire to get the government to limit the religious
rights of non-Orthodox churches.

What is striking about the attempts to reach the state is that the ties that help a
church in one region do great harm in another region. In the west, ties to nationalist
organizations are very helpful and are, in fact, necessary, especially in terms of
legitimacy and credibility. Soviet ties are helpful to the degree that they provide
access to key decision makers, but their general perception is negative among the
public and among the nationalists in particular. Ties to Russia are particularly
distasteful and greatly harm a church’s ability to reach the state. In the east, the
situation is reversed. Ties to nationalistic organizations are viewed with great
suspicion, while ties to the Soviet state and to Russia are acceptable, legitimate, and
very useful. Given these great differences between the regions, it is unlikely that any
one church could appeal to and be successful in both regions. Therefore, it appears
that one group of churches will be powerful in the west, while another is powerful in
the east. Since the strongest churches in the opposing regions are the UOC-KP and
the UOC-MP, it appears that the inter-Orthodox struggle will continue as they both
attempt to inﬂuence the governments of their respective regions and of the nation as a

whole. Their divergent agendas will continue to clash and to pull the country in

205

opposing directions.

I hypothesized that state response would depend upon the ties of the churches.
As expected, strong ties to former Soviet ofﬁcials and to nationalistic groups
encouraged state response, while ties to external organizations hindered position state
response. High rates of church participation combined with favorable ties to
governmental ofﬁcials, both former Soviets and current nationalists, enabled churches
to receive property from the state. The UOC-KP used its ties to the Soviet state and
to nationalists to get the national government to give it a great deal of property,
particularly in the center and west regions. The Greek Catholic Church used its
contacts with nationalists at the local and regional levels to get a great deal of
property in west Ukraine. In the east, the UOC-MP used its Soviet ties to gain a
virtual monopoly on property. While the UAOC has strong nationalistic ties, it does
not have sufﬁcient contacts with any particular level of government to get the state to
respond to its property demands. In addition, its lack of formal status hinders its
claims. The Protestants have low levels of participation and have no useful contacts,
so they have largely been ignored in the state allocation of property.

An unexpected type of state response was the special recognition accorded a
few churches. In the center of the country, the UOC-KP has achieved special
treatment by the national government, due to its strong ties, shared by President
Kravchuk, to both the Soviet state and the nationalist movement. In the west, the
nationalist ties and the Strong connections with local and regional government of the

Greek Catholic Church have enabled this church to be placed in a position of power.

206

In the east, the Soviet ties together with the strong linkages to Russia have given the
UOC-MP a special position vis-a—vis the regional government.

As different parts of government favor different churches, Ukraine is
becoming more deeply divided. A Balkanized Ukraine, divided largely along
religious lines, does not bode well for political stability or continued religious
freedoms. Already, the largest churches are pushing the level of government that
favors them to restrict the religious rights of other churches. Under particular attack
are western, especially Protestant, churches. Due to their non-Orthodox nature, they
are accused of bringing in foreign inﬂuences and undermining the spiritual heritage of
the country. Since these churches have no area in which they are strong, they are
vulnerable on all sides to calls to limit their ability to proselytize, invite in foreign
missionaries, and hold meetings.

The Greek Catholic Church is also susceptible to these claims since it is a non-
Orthodox religion whose head is in the west. But, however much it suffers in the rest
of Ukraine, it is still the largest and most powerful church in the west, and its
position in this region is, for the time being, quite secure. If the UOC-KP is able to
gain a strong foothold in the west, and if the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP do unite,
then the religious rights of all of the non-Orthodox religions will be greatly at risk.
For the time being, however, the status quo is largely being maintained. Various
state agencies are beginning to take some actions that make it more difﬁcult for some
Protestant groups to operate, and this is causing some concern. If this activity

continues, and if President Kuchma weighs in to the debate on the side of one church

207

or another, then I expect religious rights in general to be restricted while certain
speciﬁc churches gain power exponentially. Doubtless, this will increase tension
between the major churches and escalate their regionally divisive rhetoric.
Church Activity on the Micro Level

Another aspect of the political behavior of churches involves the orchestration
of church members’ political attitudes. Church leaders are well positioned to
inﬂuence what political issues church members think about, and what positions they
take. In particular, this study examined the way church leaders inﬂuenced attitudes
about whom to vote for in the Presidential election, and what type of a national
identity to take on. I hypothesized that the more political churches would take strong
and speciﬁc positions in the Presidential election. In large part, this hypothesis was
supported. With the exception of the UAOC, the most politicized churches (the
UOC-KP, UOC-MP and GCC) all supported the anticipated Presidential candidate and
took active roles in communicating this information to their congregations. The
UAOC found itself in a position where it could support neither candidate, so it was
largely silent about who its members should vote for. The Protestant churches, as
expected, were Virtually silent about member vote choice in the election.

An unanticipated facet of the micro-level political behavior of churches was
the strong emphasis on developing a distinct national identity. All of the churches
were active in trying to inﬂuence the national identity of their followers. The national
identities espoused by the different churches reinforce and justify the divisive

positions taken on the macro, governmental level.

208

The churches with nationalistic ties all strongly pushed a message of a
nationalistic Ukrainian identity. The UOC-KP, UAOC, and the Greek Catholic
Church all urged their members to push for an independent Ukraine, oriented toward
the West, with few ties to Russia. Russia is painted as the enemy who is trying to
recreate the Soviet Union or the Russian empire by Russifying Ukraine and bringing
her once again under the Russian sphere of inﬂuence. The UOC-MP is painted as a
tool of Russia, and eastern Ukrainians are viewed as sympathizers with Russia. The
UOC-MP, for its part, is active in promoting a Slavic identity that emphasizes the
ancient ties that bind Russia and Ukraine as Slavic siblings. It is pushing for closer
cooperation with Russia, and bristles at attempts to push Ukrainian as the language of
the workplace and schools. Church leaders, in turn, point to the nationalists in
western Ukraine and brand them as radical extremists who are trying to destroy
Ukraine’s ancient heritage.

Not surprisingly, these two national identities are in direct opposition to one
another and are feeding the regional and religious differences within the country. By
making opposition to another part of society a central part of one’s national
identiﬁcation, the churches are further dividing the people of Ukraine into opposing,
hostile, camps. The political positions of the churches are strengthened as more and
more members buy into their message of national identiﬁcation, but the nation suffers
as the polarization becomes more and more entrenched in society.

The national identity preached by the Protestant churches is much more

general and benign. Protestant leaders encouraged their members to take a neutral

209

identity and to view politics almost as a necessary evil. No Speciﬁcs were mentioned,
but members were told to make their voting decisions carefully, and to participate out
of a sense of duty and obligation. While this national identity is extremely vague, it
contains none of the divisive components of the nationalistic or Slavic identities. In
this respect, it is the least inﬂammatory and holds the greatest promise for promoting
internal peace and Stability in Ukraine.
Future Research

Several areas of future study await scholars of Ukraine. First, as churches
settle the fundamental issues of establishment and survival, they may become more
active in the policy realm. It should prove interesting to study which policy areas the
churches launch into, and in which ways they try to inﬂuence public policy. Second,
little is known about the ways religious attitudes inﬂuence political attitudes in
Ukraine. It would be fascinating to study the linkage between degree and type of
religious afﬁliation and political attitudes towards political candidates, political issues,
and social issues. Distinctions between attitudes of western and eastern Ukrainians
would be especially interesting, as would differing perceptions towards Russia, the
west, and democratization.
Divided Ukraine

The theme that runs throughout this work is the divide separating east Ukraine
from west Ukraine. While the churches on each of the respective sides are by no
means united with one another, they do Share a common enmity and orientation. What

is worrisome is not that the two sides have such differing orientations: west Ukraine

210

towards western Europe, and east Ukraine towards Russia. Such differences can be
overcome and common ground discovered. What is particularly troublesome is the
deep distrust and hatred that the two sides feel towards one another. As Ukraine as a
nation attempts to build her cultural and national identiﬁcation, it is difﬁcult to see
how these vast differences can be overcome. The political activities of certain
churches seem focused upon deepening the divide between east and west, between
ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, between those oriented to west Europe and Russia,
and between followers of one church and another.

As the political and religious battles rage between the two sides, it is
troublesome to see some of the developments emerging as the government tries to
keep its balance. In seeming reaction to demands of the Orthodox churches on both
sides of the divide, restrictions on religious freedoms are beginning to be instituted.
Although they are more of a nuisance at the present time, they may be the ﬁrst moves
in a strategy that will eventually restrict the activities and rights of non-Orthodox
churches and groups in Ukraine. These types of restriction would not bode well for
the democratic development of this nation. In addition, governmental movement
towards one Side or the other, especially in the antagonistic climate created by the
most active churches, could spark serious reaction from the disaffected regions. Civil
war is a distant possibility at this moment, but the depth of the differences between
the opposing regions and the escalation of rhetoric may eventually lead to Violent
conﬂict. Finally, the tensions in this country over relations with Russia have

consequences far beyond the borders of Ukraine. AS the second largest country in the

~

211

former Soviet Union, Ukraine’s actions are given great consideration by other former
republics. Hostility on Ukraine’s part towards Russia may provide encouragement to
other newly independent nations. Increased tensions in this area of the world, already
fraught with destabilizing economic transitions and ethnic conﬂicts, are very
worrisome. The presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and other nations is also of
great concern to the entire world community. While it is unlikely that Ukraine would
ever ﬁre these weapons at Russia, the existence of these weapons in a nation
undergoing profound political and economic turmoil is far from comforting.

The prognosis is not completely grim. While the conﬂicts between the
churches do exacerbate existing divisions within Ukraine, they also are protecting
general religious freedoms in the country. In addition, continued ﬁghting places the
State in a favorable position and encourages democratic development.

Church conﬂict is preventing any church from becoming the established state
church in Ukraine. This protects the proliferation of churches and religious groups
and fosters civic development. With many religious interests operating in the societal
framework, other groups can develop and ﬂourish.

Continued conﬂict also requires the warring churches to deal with one another.
Since the state is not stepping in and deciding the outcome, the churches must
compromise, to some degree, with one another. This, in turn, encourages the future
depoliticization of the conﬂict.

Next, as long as the churches are ﬁghting over which should be the established

church, the state can remain above the fray by refusing to take sides. AS the

212

churches go on battling one another, other institutions, such as political parties, may
have the time to gain strength. Over a period of time, as other institutions develop
and gain power, churches may become less powerful political actors. As a result,
their conﬂicts may matter less and less and they may have a decreasing impact on the
divisions within the country. If the state can ignore the establishment claims, it can
keep church problems from dominating the political scene.

In this respect, it is in the state’s interest for the churches to continue their
conﬂict, and especially to arrive at a stalemate or balance of power situation. The
alternative of establishing one church as the state church is simply too dangerous.
Granting one church an ofﬁcial position would dramatically worsen the regional
conﬂict; the church not chosen would certainly explode with anger and would have
fertile ground to whip up the fury of their members and their home region. Given the
already-tense Situation between regions, the state has no interest in making it worse.
Therefore, the best option may be continued conﬂict. It may, in the long run, be best
for continued democratic development in Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country divided by political orientation, language, ethnicity,
geography, and religion. She is unique because of the integral role religion is playing
in determining and exacerbating these divisions. As this study demonstrates, churches
are among the most inﬂuential actors on the political scene. Their actions, on both
the macro societal and the micro attitudinal levels, are inﬂuencing what the state does,
who people vote for, and who the citizens consider themselves to be. AS they do

this, the most politically active churches are also dividing Ukrainians from one

LL

213

another. The chasm separating east Ukrainians from west Ukrainians is growing
deeper, thanks largely to the concerted actions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-
Kiev Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, the Greek
Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. These
churches have made speciﬁc political and ethnic identiﬁcation an integral part of
identiﬁcation with their church. To be a member of one of these churches is no
longer matter of religious identity alone. N ow there is an extensive political and
ethnic agenda that has been incorporated into the religious agenda. The adversarial
nature of this agenda bodes ill for the healthy and peaceful development of the
Ukrainian polity. It will be interesting to see how the state behaves in this conﬂict
and whether church action is allowed to lead to democratic development or political

devolution.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
Church leaders in Ukraine
(* indicates an interview subject)

Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (U OC-MP)
Alexis-Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church, located in Moscow.
*Volodymyr Sobodan-Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine, located in Kiev.

Designated Metropolitan on May 27, 1992.

This church was known as the Russian Orthodox Church for centuries, and

only renamed itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1990. This church gives
allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and recognizes the Moscow

Patriarch Alexis.
Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (U OC-KP)

Volodymyr Romaniuk—Patriarch, crowned October 24, 1993, located in Kiev..
*Filaret—Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine, located in Kiev.

This church is an offshoot of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and was formed
in 1992 when Metropolitan Filaret, at that time a leader of the UOC-MP in Ukraine,
announced the creation of a new church—-the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev
Patriarchate. This church was created by a merger of dissenting members of the

UOC-MP and the historic Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. It appears that this
merger came about as a result of the political maneuvering of Filaret and President

Leonid Kravchuk, both to gain clerical power for Filaret and to solidify Ukrainian
political opposition to Moscow (Dawisha and Parrott 1994). Filaret is widely
recognized as the true power behind the throne. The UAOC leadership almost
universally disputes the merger and claims independence for itself. The government,
however, recognizes only the UOC-KP and does not acknowledge the independent

existence of the UAOC.

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)
*Dmitri-Patriarch, crowned October 14, 1993.

As mentioned above, this church is embroiled in a conﬂict with the UOC-KP.
At the current time, it is recognized by no other church, nor by the government.

Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (GC)
Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky-Cardinal of Ukraine, relocated from Rome to Lviv in

1991 .
This church was legalized in 1989 and in 1991 was ofﬁcially recognized by the

government .

214

Appendix B

Table 2

Religious Organizations in Ukraine by Region

 

 

Region UOC-MP UOC-KP UAOC UGCC
West
Lviv 81 444 222 1302
Ivano-Frankivsk 18 389 0 622
Ternopil 136 416 0 690
Chernivtsi 352 72 0 13
Rivne 422 128 0 1
Total (west) 1009 1449 222 2628
Center
Kiev 249 159 9 3
Vinnytsia 564 33 0 3
Zhytomyr 340 15 0 0
Khmelnytsky 542 4 27 4
Total (center) 1695 211 36 10
East
Donetsk 160 3 1 4
Dnipropetrovsk 135 5 5 0
Total (east) 295 8 6 4
South
Mykoliev 100 28 1
Odessa 285 6 0 1
Total (south) 385 34 1 3
Total (all) 5763 1892 281 2897

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: The Institute of Strategic Studies, Kiev, January 1, 1994.

Appendix C
Table 3

Interview Subjects by City and Category

 

CATEGORY
TOTAL

Priests and Church Leaders
Ukr. Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate
Ukr. Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate
Ukr. Autocephalous Orthodox Church
Ukr. Greek Catholic Church
Protestant churches
Misc.

Church Scholars
Political Party People
Journalists
Government Ofﬁcials

TOTAL

 

CITY
Kiev Lviv Donetsk/
Mykoliev
4 1 1 6
2 l l 4
2 1 O 3
2 3 1 6
3 0 1 4
O 1 O 1
3 0 1 4
l 1 1 3
1 O O l
l O 2 3
19 8 8 35

 

216

Appendix D
Interview Questionnaires
(+ indicates questions added over time, - indicates questions deleted)

Church Scholars

Introduction: Please tell me your name, ofﬁcial position, and afﬁliation.

1. Church description
(-)A. Please comment on my matrix describing churches by types and ties.

II. Churches and the election
A. What issues in the election was each church interested in? Were some

churches more interested in politics than others?
B. Did they ﬁght or cooperate with other churches to get what they wanted?

C. How did they get the government to listen to them?
D. Which churches have been getting what they want from the government,

and why?
III. Church members and the election
A. How have the different churches tried to inﬂuence the political views of

church members?
B. What issues are the most important to church leaders and church

members?
C. Did the churches take an ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial position in the election?

D. If so, how was the message communicated to the members?
(+) F. Would you say that churches are contributing to, or decreasing, divisions

within Ukraine?

IV. Could you suggest any other scholars or church leaders I could speak with?

217

‘

 

 

 

 

218

Church Leaders

Introduction: Please tell me your ofﬁcial position within the church and how long
you have been afﬁliated with this church.

I. Church description
A. Please give a brief description of your church, especially its history under

the USSR and any connections to other churches, political groups, or foreign
organizations.

(-)B. How have these relationships changed over time?

(+)C. Please describe the relationship between your church and the government.

(+)D. Are there any particular political issues that your church is interested in?
(+)E. Please describe the relations between your church and other churches. Is

there cooperation or conﬂict?

II. Churches and the election
A. What issues in the election were important to your church?

B. How was your church able to get the government and the candidates to
listed to these interests?
C. Does your church feel it has received what it wanted? Why or why not?
( +)D. If your church could get the government to do one thing, what would that

be?

III. Church members and the election
A. What did your church communicate to the church members about the

election?
B. What issues are most important to church members?

C. Did the church take an ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial stand in the election? Why or
why not?

IV. Could you suggest any other people I could meet with?

219
Politicians, Governmental Employees and Journalists

Introduction: Please state your name and ofﬁcial position.

I. Basic information
A. Please describe the contact you have with churches.

B. Which churches are the most politically active?
C. What do the churches want, and how do they try to get what they want?
D. Hoe are the churches inﬂuencing the political situation in Ukraine?

11. Churches and the election
A. What issues were important to the churches during the election?

B. How did they get you to listen to their interests?
C. Which churches got what they wanted from the election?

III. Church members and the election
A. Which churches tried to inﬂuence the voting behavior or political views of

church members?
B. Did any churches take an ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial position in the election?

C. What political issues were most important to church members?

IV. Can you suggest any other people I could meet with?

220

Political Party Workers

Introduction: Please state your name, ofﬁcial position, and afﬁliation.

I. Basic information
A. Please describe which religious issues your party is interested in.

B. Which particular churches did you deal with? Did you receive support
from any certain churches or religious organizations?

II. Churches and the election
A. What were the different churches most interested in during the election?

B. How did the churches convince you to listen to their interests? Do some
churches have special contacts or connections?
C. Which churches got what they wanted from the election?
(+)D. Which churches are the most politically active?
(+)E. What do they want, and how do they try to get it?
(+)F. How are churches inﬂuencing the political situation in Ukraine?

IH. Church members and the election
A. Which churches tried to inﬂuence the voting behavior or political views of

church members? How did they do it, and what direction did they inﬂuence them?
B. Did any churches take an ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial position in the election?
C. What political issues were most important to church members?

IV. Could you suggest any other people I could meet with?

Appendix E
Table 4

1994 Presidential Election Results, by Region

 

 

 

 

 

 

Region Kuchma Kravchuk
(%) (70)
West
Lviv 3.9 93.8
Ivano-Frankivsk 3.9 94.5
Ternopil 3.7 94.8
Chernivtsy 35.3 61.8
Rivne 10.9 87.3
Average (west) 10.4 87.4
Center
Kiev 35.6 59.7
Vinnytsia 42.3 54.3
Zhytomyr 41 .6 55 .6
Khmelnytsky 39.2 57.2
Average (center) 42.4 54.1
East
Donetsk 79.0 18.5
Dnipropetrovsk 67 .8 29.7
Average (east) 75.6 21.9
South
Mykoliev 52.8 44.7
Odessa 66.8 29.2
Average (south) 72.5 24.8
Average (all) 52.1 45.1

 

Source: Arel, Dominique, and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back to
Eurasia? " RFE/RL Research Report 3 (1994): 1-12.

221

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