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Gretchen Knudson Gee

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Brian D Silver
Major professor

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CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS IN UKRAINE

By

Gretchen Knudson Gee

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ABSTRACT

CHURCHES AS POLITICAL ACTORS IN UKRAINE

By

Gretchen Knudson Gee

This study examines the role that churches in Ukraine play in the political process. Churches are viewed not as apolitical organizations but as political actors seeking benefits from the state. These groups desire to influence the state and to influence the political attitudes of church members. Of particular interest is the effect that church behavior is having upon the political, ethnic, and geographic divisions within Ukraine.

The data come from a series of 35 qualitative interviews with church leaders, church scholars, politicians, political party workers, and journalists in three major regions of Ukraine. I hypothesize that the political activity of the central churches varies according to the ties each church had to the former Soviet state, to nationalistic organizations, and to foreign organizations.

Churches are not only major actors on the political scene, but they are also major proponents of a cultural war that is threatening the unity of Ukraine. Religious interests have exploited and exacerbated the geographic, ethnic, political and religious differences for their own purposes and have contributed to deeper and more bitter divisions within the nation. The key divide in Ukraine is between east and west, and certain churches have staked their religious and political agendas on maintaining and deepening this divide.

In the west, the churches with strong nationalistic ties were best able to influence regional and local officials to grant them the private goods they desired. In the east, strong ties to the Soviet state were the most useful. In the center, strong ties to both former Soviet officials and to nationalistic organizations enabled churches to gain special favors from the national government. In most cases, foreign ties were harmful. Eastern and western Orthodox churches are united in their attempts to pressure government to limit the religious freedoms of foreign-affiliated churches and religious groups.

Western churches also pushed their members to adopt a nationalistic identity that views Russia as an enemy who is trying to recreate the Soviet Union. Eastern churches are promoting a Slavic identity, emphasizing the historic ties binding Ukraine and Russia. Interestingly, only the Protestant churches remained separate from the east-west battle. They have no ties that enable them to influence government, so they remain apolitical and have made no effort to promote a distinct identity.

What is troublesome is the deep distrust that the two opposing sides feel towards one another. As Ukraine as a nation attempts to build her cultural and national identification, it is difficult to see how these vast differences can be overcome.

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INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The countries of the former Soviet Union beckon to social scientists. After 70 years of Communism, we are eager to look backwards and uncover the truth about the life and politics of the USSR. In the middle of their struggle to attain political and economic independence, we want to examine these nations' processes of political development. Finally, we desire to look forward and to understand where these countries will end up, and what their roles will be in the future world order.

This study examines one particular nation, Ukraine, and looks at what makes it unique from the other countries of the former Soviet Union. In my study, I incorporate the politics of the USSR, the current struggle for national identity, and the likely future results of internal divisions in Ukraine.

What sets Ukraine apart is not her politics, although they are fractious. What sets her apart is not her geography, although she is significantly positioned on the cusp between Europe and Asia. What sets Ukraine apart is not her ethnic divisions, although they are deep. What sets her apart is her religion, and the role religion, along with geography and nationality, plays in influencing and dividing the politics of Ukraine.

I examine the behavior of religious groups in Ukraine. Churches are viewed

not as apolitical organizations focused solely upon the world beyond, but as political actors seeking benefits from the state. These groups desire to influence the state, and to influence the political attitudes of church members.

Main Results

Religion in Ukraine plays a key role in political life. The political behavior of churches, on a societal level and on the individual attitudinal level, is having a strong impact upon the politics in Ukraine. In specific, the ties that the churches have to the former Soviet state, nationalist movements, and external organizations help explain the degree, direction and types of political behavior. These ties reveal and illustrate the reasons behind the political behavior and political successes or failures of Ukrainian churches. In many instances, church behavior is deepening the division between east and west Ukraine. In addition, the political activities of several churches are exacerbating tensions between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. The political successes of several churches, explained in large part by their ties to the former Soviet state, nationalistic movements, or external organizations, are even influencing the democratic development of Ukraine. Freedom of religion, official and unofficial acceptance of ethnic and religious differences, and relations with Russia and the rest of the world are all undergoing governmental reconsideration, largely as a result of church pressure and activity. The state, in turn, has an interest in moderating church pressure in a way that diffuses intra-country tensions. It is not an overstatement to say that Ukrainian churches play a very significant role in Ukrainian politics.

This study examines the nature of the relationship between religion and politics by examining the political behavior of churches. Their ties, their actions, their successes, and their hopes are all examined and placed in the context of Ukrainian political life. This sheds light on the often overlooked involvement of religious bodies on political development. The transition from an authoritarian political system is influenced by both secular and religious organizations. As Ukraine's development is examined, the important role played by religious groups in this time of political transition will be better understood.

Chapter 1
Description of Situation

History of Religion and Politics and Geography in Ukraine

Religion and politics have a long common history in Ukraine. Throughout the centuries, problems in one area have often led to conflicts in the other area. Divisions between religions have often mirrored, and contributed to, ethnic and political divisions. These two spheres of life in Ukraine have been so intertwined that it is hard to tell where one ends and the other begins.

Ukraine has long been considered a religious nation. In 988 A.D., Prince Vladimir summoned representatives of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic faiths to his palace in Kiev, and had them present their cases for each of their religions. After listening to their presentation, the Prince declared that the Kiev-Rus empire would adopt Orthodoxy, and a mass baptism of the inhabitants of Kiev was carried out in the Dnieper River.

This religious heritage has shaped Ukraine for centuries. Ukrainians have a strong orientation towards religion, and church membership has always been high relative to other countries of the former Soviet Union. Even during Soviet times, Ukrainians maintained a sense of pride in living in the birthplace of Orthodoxy.

Ukraine has been dominated by Russia, first in the form of the Russian Empire and later in the form of the Soviet Union, for 300 years. The name "*Ukraina*" means "borderland," and Ukraine has served as a frontier zone for Russia for centuries. After centuries of remaining at the intersection of continually shifting borders of

various empires, Ukraine became incorporated into Russia in the late 18th century (Motyl 1993). Culturally, religiously, economically, and socially, Ukraine lost a large degree of its individuality and became a backwater of Russia (Motyl 1993). Urbanization and industrialization flowed from Russia, and enforced Russification was pursued by the Tsarist regime. The Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War caused chaos throughout Ukraine and opened the door for a short-lived and ill-fated independence revolution in 1917. Following the establishment of the Soviet Union, Ukraine once again fell victim to a totalitarian state which carried out policies of Russification of Ukrainian language and culture.

Despite the efforts of the Tsars and the Soviets, Ukraine is and has been a divided country. For centuries, east and west Ukraine have differed dramatically from one another. The Dnieper river flows in a general north-south line through Ukraine, and divides Ukraine into eastern and western parts. There are a few specific regions that form the core of the opposing parts of the nation. In the west, the regions of Galacia, including Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, represent the heart of west Ukraine. According to data from 1989, ethnic Ukrainians make up over 90% of the population in these regions, while Russians make up less that 10%. In other western regions such as Rivne and Cherniytsi, ethnic Ukrainians constitute 70-90% and ethnic Russians less that 10% (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). In the east, the regions of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Luhansk have between 50-70% ethnic Russians, and 24-40% ethnic Ukrainians (Kuzio and Wilson 1994).

Economically, Ukraine has been known as the breadbasket of the former

Soviet Union. The western economy is largely fueled by agriculture; eastern Ukraine is heavily industrialized. The eastern cities of Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv were military-industrial cities, while Donetsk has been built around coal mining. However, the legacy of Soviet economy development has hit Ukraine especially hard. Inefficiency and stagnation in all industries, resulting from Soviet central planning, have decimated the Ukrainian economy. Inefficiencies of production, antiquated machinery, problems in distribution, and an ill-equipped and unmotivated work-force have all created huge economic dilemmas for Ukraine. Since independence in 1991, agriculture and industrial sectors have suffered greatly, but the military- and coal-dependent regions in the east have suffered the most (Motyl 1993).

In religious terms, west Ukraine has been the stronghold of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, a branch of Catholicism established during the counter-Reformation in the sixteenth century (Motyl 1993). The Greek Catholic Church is a unique mix of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox religions and shares aspects of both. It uses the Orthodox rite and the Slavonic liturgical language, but priests give allegiance to Rome (Keleher 1993). Theologically, the churches have been divided since 1054 when the Catholic and Orthodox churches split apart (Little 1991). Politically, west Ukraine is an area that has had a great deal of contact with western Europe, primarily through invasion. Poland, Germany, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, among others, have all held parts of western Ukraine. This religious makeup and political history has forged a unique outlook towards Ukrainian identification.

Historically, the church in western Ukraine has been an agent of national awakening. The Greek Catholic Church in particular has deep ties to Ukrainian nationalism, and has been a representative of independence and national identity as well as a source of resistance vis-a-vis the Russians and the Soviets (Subtelny 1994).

The Greek Catholic affiliation with the Pope inclined western Ukrainians towards the West and away from Russia. As such, they shared, with other Europeans, events such as feudalism, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment (Huntington 1993). In this manner, they also were exposed to the initial inclinations toward democratic development. However, the Greek Catholic retention of Orthodox rites made clear the national distinction between Roman Catholic Poles and Greek Catholic Ukrainians. In fact, the Greek Catholic Church has been one of the most fervent supporters of Ukrainian nationalism (Bilinsky 1964). Therefore, the Greek Catholic religious identity has been intertwined with the political identity of western Ukraine for a long time. In recent centuries, west Ukraine has been more democratic, more nationalistic, and more Greek Catholic than east Ukraine.

East Ukraine, along with the southern and central regions, has had strong ties with Russia. In religious terms, Ukrainians in these areas have overwhelmingly followed the Orthodox Church, as have their Russian cousins. In the eighteenth century, Ukrainian Orthodoxy was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church, serving to further blur the lines between Ukrainians and Russians (Motyl 1993). Politically, eastern Ukraine, like Russia, was a part of the Russian empire that was little touched by the events shaping the rest of Europe, and was little influenced by

emerging democratic principles (Huntington 1993). This religious makeup and political history combined to forge a very different outlook towards Ukrainian national identification.

By blurring the distinctions between Ukrainians and Russians, the Orthodox Church shaped an identity that joined eastern Ukrainians to Russians. The encouragement of ties between Ukrainians and Russians led some to claim that the Orthodox Church was attempting to "Russify" the population. The Soviet government in fact used the Russian Orthodox Church to force the satellite republics to adapt the Soviet model (Dunn 1994).

The violent history of the 20th century exacerbated, rather than soothed, the differences between the two regions. In west Ukraine during World War II, the struggles against an army of occupiers resulted in a scorched land and a strong sense of Ukrainian nationalism (Bilinsky 1964). In their struggles against the Poles, the Germans and the Soviets, western Ukrainians developed a sense of identity that included resistance towards their oppressors, and a strengthened attachment to the Greek Catholic Church.

West Ukraine was annexed as part of the Soviet Union only between 1939 and 1945, and only after much bloodshed. During World War II, western Ukrainians fought against both the occupying Nazis and the Soviet guerilla partisans that fought behind the lines in the Nazi-occupied territory (Armstrong 1964). Anti-Soviet feelings were based upon the deportations and executions carried out from 1939-1941, as well as the state-planned famine of 1932-33 which resulted in the deaths of millions

of Ukrainians (Subtelny 1986).

In an attempt to restore morale in the USSR during World War II, Stalin officially recognized, and gave special permissions to, the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore the west Ukrainian struggle against Soviet domination reflected the fear that their religious identity, as well as their political freedoms, would be taken away. The anti-Greek Catholic policy of the Soviet Union was a large facet of the troubled integration process of western Ukraine (Bilinsky 1964). The Greek Catholic Church, in the years during and after World War II, was the foremost institution that bound west Ukraine to western Europe and was a key player in the fight against Soviet takeover. Therefore, the dissolution of the Greek Catholic Church in 1946 by the Soviets was a severe blow to the Ukrainian nationalistic movement. In March 1946, a special meeting was called by the Soviet authorities, and the 1596 Union of Brest, which first established the Greek Catholic Church, was declared null, and all church property was handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw 1992). From this point on, the surviving members of the church and the clergy were forced underground. By destroying the church, the Soviet authorities meant to destroy the leaders of the nationalistic movement (Bilinsky 1964).

These activities did not manage to stamp out the distinctiveness of western Ukraine, however. Because they were later made a part of the Soviet Union, because nationalism had had longer to gestate and grow, and because the Greek Catholic church had been so strong a factor in the region's identity, west Ukrainians maintained a sense of uniqueness during the rule of the Soviet Union. For example,

assimilation to the Russian language occurred at much slower rates in the west than in east Ukraine. Between 1959 and 1979, assimilation to Russian proceeded rapidly in east Ukraine, but was resisted in the west. Ukrainian, rather than Russian, was maintained as the predominant language in the west (Szporluk 1979).

In addition to the Greek Catholic Church, another church has historical roots in western Ukraine. During the period 1917-1920, a group of Ukrainian Orthodox believers established the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. These Orthodox believers split with the Russian Orthodox Church over loyalty to Moscow, the continued use of the Ukrainian language, and the message of national independence (Bociurkiw 1972). This nationalist church was also purged by Stalin in 1929. It had a brief revival in 1942 during the Nazi occupation of west Ukraine, which led to charges of collaboration with the Nazis, but once again was dissolved and its buildings given to the Russian Orthodox Church (Dawisha and Parrott 1994).

While this tumult was occurring in western Ukraine, eastern Ukraine remained much more controlled by the Soviet Union. Since the eastern part of Ukraine had been firmly under the hand of the Soviets since before World War I and World War II, opportunities for, and interest in, resistance was greatly curtailed. Eastern Ukrainians identified themselves as Ukrainians, but they were little conscious of their nationality as a significant factor (Bilinsky 1964).

Current Situation

Politically, the fall of the Soviet Union and the birth of an independent Ukraine have set the stage for religion to play a key role in politics. Sparked by

Gorbachev's initial movements toward reform in the late 1980's, and by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, informal groups began to form and to push for greater freedoms and a revival of Ukrainian national traditions (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). This national revival grew and gained strength, spurred on by the decreasing hegemony of the CPSU. Demonstrations by groups such as Rukh, a political movement supporting Ukrainian independence, became larger and bolder.

The key event that propelled Ukraine out of Russia's orbit was the attempted coup of August 19-21, 1991, which tried to oust Gorbachev. Up until this time, Gorbachev had been pushing for passage of the Union Treaty, which if signed would have stated the desire of the various republics to preserve the Soviet Union. The failure of the coup, and the fact that it occurred at all, led the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to vote on August 24, 1991, by a margin of 346-1, to declare Ukraine independent. The Communist Party was banned, armed forces were placed under Ukrainian control, and a new currency was approved. On December 1, 1991, a referendum was held, and over 90% of the voters approved the declaration of independence.

The first independent Presidential election was also held on December 1, 1991, and former Soviet leader-turned nationalist Leonid Kravchuk was elected. In June 1994 new Presidential elections were held and former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma defeated the incumbent Kravchuk. From independence onward, the President has been the dominant figure in Ukrainian politics.

The Ukrainian Parliament, also known as the Supreme Soviet, had been

elected in early 1990 when the Soviets and the Communist Party were still in control. As a result, the Parliament at the time of independence was dominated by CPSU members. The first truly open Parliamentary elections took place in 1994, prior to the Presidential elections. The elections resulted in a Parliament dominated once more by ex-communists and their allies, but slightly balanced by a challenging faction of west-leaning nationalists. The huge number of parties, the vast differences between the most powerful factions, and the lack of a completed Constitution suggest ongoing struggle and deadlock.

The Chairman of Parliament, Aleksandr Moroz, is the leader of the Socialist Party and the majority Socialist/Communist bloc and a staunch foe of supreme Presidential power. In fact, he has proposed that the institution of the Presidency be eliminated (Current Digest, June 15, 1995). The power struggle between Parliament and the President is ongoing, but given the chaos reigning in Parliament, the President remains the supreme power. In June, 1995, during an argument between the Parliament and the President over extra powers to be given to the President, President Kuchma threatened to call a referendum to ask Ukrainians to choose between the President and Parliament. Opinion polls at the time showed 10 times more support for the President than for Parliament. As a result, Parliament caved in and gave President Kuchma the extra powers he wanted (Economist, July 22, 1995). The absence of an institutionalized party system means that effective Parliamentary rule is virtually impossible. The fact that the Constitution is still being drafted, combined with the continuing squabbling in Parliament, suggests that the President

will remain the key political figure (Motyl 1993).

The executive branch of the state, including the President, ministers appointed by the President, and the ministries they direct at the national, regional and local levels, are the most important governmental actors. Parliament and the legislative bodies at the regional and local levels play a much smaller role. The judiciary is still in the process of defining its sphere of influence and is exercising little power. These various branches and levels of the state all play a role in the politics of Ukraine, but it is primarily the national level executive branch, led by the President, that is the main political actor.

National Movement

Ukrainian independence brought about a renewed interest in nationalism, particularly in the west. Political movements such as Rukh held mass rallies in order to promote Ukrainian nationalism and to push for increased political rights. Rukh has campaigned hard to bring nationalists into public office and has played a large role in electing a sizeable bloc to Parliament (Subtelny 1994).

Other parties supporting nationalism has been formed, including the Congress of National Democratic Forces. Some have taken an extreme ultra-nationalist position, such as the Ukrainian National Assembly and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Several churches are closely tied to the nationalist movement. In the years prior to and during World War II, the Greek Catholic Church was heavily involved with the national resistance movement (Armstrong 1964). Recently, this church held

joint demonstrations with Rukh in western Ukraine in support of Ukrainian independence.

The UAOC and the UOC-KP in recent years have also been establishing ties with the nationalist community. In 1994 a UAOC priest ran in Parliamentary elections as a member of the Rukh party. During the recent burial of UOC-KP Patriarch Volodymyr, members of the far-right nationalist group Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization fought alongside church members for the right to bury his body at St. Sophia's Cathedral. Their combined fight against the government's refusal to allow this burial suggest a solidification of linkages between the UOC-KP and nationalist groups (Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1995).

What then is the current status of the religious and political schisms dividing Ukraine? First, it is important to take into account the dramatic events stemming from Gorbachev's reforms in the latter 1980's. Due to his program of political liberalization and to the crumbling of Moscow's political control, a waterfall of religious announcements cascaded over Ukraine in the late 1980's and early 1990's.

In the west, a massive demonstration was held in Lviv in 1989 in support of the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church. As a result of public pressure and concerted effort, in late 1989 the church was legalized and in 1991 was officially registered and recognized as an independent church (Bociurkiw 1992).

In 1990 the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine renamed itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, although it maintained its loyalty to the Russian Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was

reestablished in 1990, and in 1992 was involved in a bizarre on-again off-again union with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

In 1992 the Metropolitan (the spiritual leader of a region; next in line to the Patriarch, the highest earthly church leader) of the newly named Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Filaret, brokered an agreement joining the UAOC to a splinter group from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, creating the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP). Up until this time, Filaret had been known as a staunch opponent of the UAOC and the Greek Catholic Church. This new church, distinct from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which acknowledged the Moscow Patriarch (hereafter referred to as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)), declared complete independence from Moscow and from any form of Russian control.

The union between the two churches and the resulting new church were immediately recognized by the government and lauded as "the" true Ukrainian church by members of the government, including then President Kravchuk. The bizarre part of this story is that the leader of the UAOC, the aged Patriarch Mstyslav, appeared at first to support, and then to denounce this union. In late 1992 he addressed the President of Ukraine and argued that the dissolution of the UAOC and the creation of the new UOC-KP was done illegally and was against the will of the church leadership and church followers. At stake was the UAOC's independent existence. After decades of suppression under the Russian Orthodox Church, the UAOC was not eager to relinquish its newly-recovered independence. The result of this confusion was that

the UAOC was recognized as an independent church by no one but itself. The other Orthodox churches consider it uncanonical. Government recognition of their independence has still not been settled, although it is likely to occur within the next year.

Thus, there are three churches in Ukraine all carrying the name Ukrainian Orthodox (see Appendix A for a listing of the major churches and their current leaders)--not counting the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which has the longest history of struggling for Ukrainian national identity. In addition, a large number of indigenous and missionary churches have sprouted up all over Ukraine.

In addition to creating confusion over name changes and new churches, one of the main consequences of religious freedom has been the conflict over church property, namely church buildings, cathedrals, and seminaries. The immediate response of Greek Catholic believers following the 1989 legalization was to take over their former churches from the occupying Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw 1992). Many church buildings had belonged to the Greek Catholic Church earlier, but were taken by the Soviet government and given to the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1940's.

In addition, the newly created Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate promptly took over several churches in Kiev and some money allocated to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The heir to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, claims that it has been plundered and that many of its treasures have been taken by unscrupulous religious leaders of

other churches.

Church members are also deeply embroiled in these conflicts. Greek Catholic Church members feel they have the historical right to these churches and want to begin worshipping there again. UOC-Moscow members have been worshipping at these same buildings for the last 40 years and feel they have been good stewards of the property. To them, the churches are rightfully theirs and should remain theirs. Needless to say, tracing the true ownership of many of the buildings and the relics is a duty that would task Solomon. The government is attempting to begin to deal with these problems, but has looked more partisan than fair in its allocations. The national government has favored the UOC-KP, the regional government in the west has favored the Greek Catholic Church, and the regional government in the east has favored the UOC-MP. For the Greek Catholic, Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, UOC-MP and UOC-KP churches, the biggest conflicts between them are over property, rather than doctrine.

The regional divisions have remained, but have taken on a new flavor with the creation of the new churches. Western Ukraine remains a stronghold for the Greek Catholics, but also is the main base for the UAOC. The UOC-KP is attempting to gain a foothold in the west, primarily through its strident claims to represent nationalistic interests. The UOC-MP is the undisputed church of choice in the east and center of the country.

Various studies have examined the current religious divide. In an earlier study based on data from 1991-92 (Gee 1995), I examined the differences in religious

interest and affiliation between different regions in Ukraine. The data revealed that western Ukrainians are significantly more religious than eastern Ukrainians, and that the religious divide between western Greek Catholics and eastern and central Orthodox believers is still wide. Survey data from 1994 from the Ukrainian government indicate that the largest church in Ukraine is the UOC-MP, with most of its support in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (see Appendix B for a list of churches and their size across regions of Ukraine). The second largest church is the Greek Catholic church, with virtually all of its supporters living in the western regions of Galatia. The third largest church is the UOC-KP, located primarily in the non-Galatian regions of west Ukraine. The UAOC is a distant fourth, with all its support restricted to two regions in west Ukraine.

Ukraine is also divided across political lines. Data from the 1994 Presidential election reveal the marked divide between east and west and their support for the Presidential candidates (see Appendix E). Voters in the west overwhelmingly favored incumbent Leonid Kravchuk, who ran on a nationalist, anti-Russian program. The east voted in overwhelming numbers for challenger Leonid Kuchma, who supported closer ties with Russia. The relationship between these political and religious divisions will be fleshed out in later chapters.

Conclusion

The religious and political divisions in Ukraine are long-lived. The recent revival of religious life in Ukraine has once again thrust churches and church conflict onto center stage of political life. The arguments over church property are once again

pulling geographic, ethnic, and political concerns into the religious fray. Religious life in Ukraine has historically been distinguished by the deep impact it has had upon the politics of the country. Current events indicate that this impact continues, and that religion will continue to play a crucial role in explaining the political divisions within Ukraine.

Chapter 2
Literature Review and Theory

Introduction

This chapter contains a review of the literature and theories derived from the literature that apply to the situation in Ukraine. Throughout, I am not stating conclusions, but am applying broader theories to the specific situation in Ukraine.

My theory is that churches are political actors. Although they are sacred bodies, churches are often deeply involved in secular politics. Political activity can range from taking stances on issues, to candidate endorsements and party support, to making demands upon the state. This activity is important because it can influence the political actions of the state, the political beliefs of church members, and the national identity of a people.

It has been suggested that religion affects politics on two levels: the individual/personal and the collective/institutional (Smith 1987). Religion affects politics at the most basic, individual level, often reorienting the values and corresponding political beliefs of believers. It also affects politics collectively, by orienting these believers around an institution or a community that has a belief system, a structure, and sometimes, a political agenda.

Churches have often been at the forefront of political movements. As institutional bodies with doctrines, texts, rites and officiants, they are in a position to influence politics on both levels; they can be the channel through which religious doctrine and political direction can be communicated to the individual, and they can

act as political bodies, directly addressing political concerns.

Based upon previous research, I theorize that churches in Ukraine are interested in influencing government. Religious interests play a very important role in the politics of Ukraine. Churches are using ethnic, geographic, and nationalistic divisions within the country for their own political purposes. For a variety of reasons, these religious factions are attempting to communicate their interests to the Ukrainian government. From the perspective of the churches, their group characteristics and tactics influence how successfully their interests are communicated to the state. From the perspective of the state, group success depends upon how receptive the state and its agencies are to group demands. When a convincing group meets a receptive state, there is a chance to influence government policy.

I also theorize that churches in Ukraine are also interested in influencing the political views of their members. One of the most salient political issues in Ukraine today is the development of a national Ukrainian identity. Ukraine is undergoing a profound transformation. As a people, Ukrainians are coming to grips with how they define themselves politically and culturally, and Ukrainian churches are deeply involved in this process. The search for a national identity is tightly bound with how people view themselves, and this, in turn, can often involve considerations of religious interest and affiliation. Church and religious identity can play a role in influencing national identity. Churches are using symbols such as acquisition of property, choice of language for worship services, and orientations toward or away from Moscow to build distinctive national identities. These national identities contain

specific and significant political aspects. The direction in which this identity is developed has implications for Ukraine's behavior in the former Soviet Union and in the larger world community.

Today, Ukraine is struggling to assert her independence from Russia, and the actions of several Ukrainian churches have manifested this desire (Bociurkiw 1992). By reclaiming church property from the Russian Orthodox Church or by supporting nationalistic Ukrainian policies and candidates, leaders in Ukrainian churches are shaping and expressing national identity. Their actions can have an impact upon the way Ukrainians view themselves and how they perceive the outside world. This, in turn, can have serious implications for internal peace and external security. If Ukrainians perceive that strident nationalism is central to Ukrainian identity, relations with Russia or other countries could be seriously threatened. The political peace and security of the entire CIS would be endangered by escalations of tension between Russia and Ukraine. Currently contentious issues, such as disagreements over ownership and disposal of nuclear weapons, could become much more volatile if Ukraine slides into xenophobic nationalism. Churches in Ukraine are playing a role in this process. Their sacred and secular assertions are influencing Ukrainian identity, Ukrainian political behavior, and the stability of Ukrainian/Russian relations in a negative direction. The schisms between churches may parallel the deepening chasm between Ukrainians and Russians, and the nations of Ukraine and Russia.

Ukraine today provides an optimal place to explore the interaction of religion and politics. It has had a history of religious activism in the political realm, and

current events suggest that this religious activism is likely to continue in the future (Bilinsky 1964). Under Communism, church influence was discouraged, and church pressure upon the political system was slight and covert. Religious belief and affiliation played virtually no role in national definition. Religious groups and churches are emerging from this time of impotence and are seeking to assert their new power.

The Presidential election in 1994 provides a context for examining the political behavior of churches. The timing and nature of the election have created an environment in which churches are moving purposefully within the political arena. Over four years have passed since Ukraine declared her independence and the Soviet Union collapsed, yet the political, economic and social conditions in Ukraine have steadily grown worse. Relations between Ukraine and Russia are very tense, and ethnic and political divisions within the country are becoming more acute and contentious. The recent Presidential election magnified the inter-country tensions: eastern Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for Kravchuk, the sitting President, while western Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for Kuchma, the challenger (see Appendix E). The election of Kuchma (by a 52-48% margin), who favors increased ties with Russia and whose support base is in the Russian-speaking and Russian-oriented east, may foreshadow a period of even greater instability.

Within the context of the political, economic and social strife surrounding the election, churches have been moving deliberately to influence political outcomes. This study focuses upon the actions and intentions of the major church players in the

time surrounding the July 1994 Presidential election, and examines how the activities of these churches played off of and contributed to the divisions within the country.

Churches and Politics

It is not surprising to find churches behaving as significant institutional actors. Research on churches in the Unites States has demonstrated that churches are able to influence governmental policy (Guth et al. 1988; Hertzke 1988). As will be discussed later in this chapter, American churches are directly lobbying government in order to change public policy. Of particular interest are social issues such as abortion and education.

Not only are church able to influence policy. In Africa, churches are among the foremost institutions affecting democratic transitions. They have taken a role of direct political involvement in society. They have challenged political structures, advocated reform, and pushed for political change (Gifford 1994). In Togo, Malawi, and Zambia, mainline churches have challenged the ruling dictators in their push for reform. In Kenya they have taken strong stands on the widening gap between rich and poor, and in doing so have kept social justice issues on the national agenda (Bratton 1994).

One reason for the central role of African churches in this reform process is their strength relative to other institutions in society. Political parties and unions are very weak in Africa. Given the one-part state prevailing in many countries of Africa, churches have become the single greatest civil-society element (Gifford 1994). In Kenya, the Protestant churches are the "lead institutions" in civil society (Bratton

1994). They are among the only formal organizations with a large following, a definite structure, and an appeal that surpasses clan or class.

Ukrainian churches are just setting out to influence politics. Following 70 years of Communist rule and church impotence, their strength as political actors may take some time to develop. Their advocacy of pubic goods may, at the outset, fall prey to their desire for private goods of property and status. However, despite their inexperience and potentially selfish motives, they are becoming significant institutional actors.

Importance of Culture

The importance of culture, and particularly religion, in understanding political development is underscored by Inglehart's (1988, 1994) work. Differences in religious value systems are related to different perceptions toward democratization (Inglehart 1994), economic development, and the creation of democratic institutions (Inglehart 1988).

Samuel Huntington (1993) discussed the importance of culture, especially religion, and its role in dividing civilizations. He notes that the line dividing western Christians from eastern Orthodox believers runs right through the middle of Ukraine. This line separates Protestants and Catholics from Orthodox believers, but it also indicates a difference in economic and political orientation. Those to the west of the line share a common experience of the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, and "now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems" (Huntington 1993: 30). To the east

of the line, the people share the experience of the Tsarist empire, were little touched by the events that shaped the rest of Europe and "seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems" (Huntington 1993: 31). Therefore, the religious divisions within Ukraine are long-lived and coincide with profound economic and political differences.

Since Ukraine is in the midst of an unprecedented political transition, this is an optimal time to study churches' role in politics. With the recent flowering of religious freedom, individuals and churches are just now beginning to assert themselves and to crystallize their political stances. Since little research has been done on the specific political desires and tactics of Ukrainian churches, this study will expand our knowledge of this country as well as the role of church influence upon politics in general.

Churches as Interest Groups

A great deal has been written about the desires and tactics of interest groups and their influence on politics. Groups use their position and resources to influence policy on the macro level, and to politically socialize their members on the micro level. James Madison prefaced his description of the Constitutional structure of the United States with an extended discussion of the motives and tactics of groups. Factions, motivated by a common interest, will vex and oppress each other in trying to seek their own interests. Small groups organized around a narrow interest are likely to be more successful in their pursuits than large groups seeking a general interest (Olson 1965). Since small groups ensure that benefits will be narrowly

dispersed, members are more willing to bear the cost to achieve these benefits. Large groups pursuing public goods may find themselves forced to rely upon selective incentives in order to encourage cooperation. The consequences are that small groups organized around private interests are likely to be more successful at influencing government than large groups.

Groups also influence politics by shaping the attitudes and political views of their members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944). Primary groups can transmit norms and values and can influence the political attitudes of group members. Groups communicate with their members both directly and indirectly, and the information communicated can influence the perceived interests of the members (Moe 1980). Research has also demonstrated that attitudes in turn can have an influence upon group formation and behavior (Finifter 1974).

Churches behave in many ways like Madison's factions. Churches are likely to find themselves embroiled in conflicts for power, and their "zeal for different opinions concerning religion" (Madison: 55) will often throw them into the political arena. They will often pressure government directly in order to influence policy. Research has demonstrated that churches in the United States have begun to behave as political lobbying groups (Hertzke 1988). Church groups in the United States have become politicized to a degree where they are participating directly and frequently in the political process. As religious freedom has come to the former USSR, churches have stepped into the political fray. Previously silent churches are now expected to become key players in the political arena (Moss 1991).

In addition, churches, like other groups, can have an influence upon the micro political views of their members. They behave as socializing agencies, shaping attitudes and interests. Previous research has indicated that churches and religious groups have important contextual influences upon the political beliefs of their members (Guth et al. 1988; Jelen 1992; Leege 1992; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990; White 1968). Churches act as reference groups, transmit political information (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990), structure attitudes and behavior (Langton 1986), provide political cues (Leege 1992), and provide a normative structure (White 1968). As leaders in the church, and as respected figures within the community, the church elite are well positioned to communicate political information to their members. Due to their spiritual authority as well as their expertise in the religious arena, they are in a unique position to synthesize political issues of the day together with larger issues of spiritual concern. Church leaders can gather political information, place it in the context of a spiritual lesson, and communicate the ideas, both spiritual and political, to the church membership.

Interest group theory provides the bases for understanding the political activity of churches in Ukraine. Factions, in this case church groups, are striving to accomplish their goals in the political realm. I theorize that the pursuit of private goods is the dominant activity, with church factions fighting one another to gain exclusive property, power or position. The pursuit of public goods is expected to be much less active, since churches will have the tendency to free-ride and expect other churches to take action.

This study examines the way that churches in Ukraine act as political factions. Ukrainian churches have been involved, to different degrees, with political issues. Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches have been entangled in various political conflicts, while Protestant churches have chosen to remain distant from overtly political issues (Perebenesyk 1992). Little scholarly work has been done on the political socialization role played by churches, but historical research reveals that churches in Ukraine have influenced the nationalistic interest of Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church members (Bociurkiw 1992). Church action is shaping the political attitudes of Ukrainians and the national identity of Ukraine.

This approach is distinct because it recognizes the central political role churches are playing, and places this role in the theoretical framework of interest group activity.

How Churches Differ From Other Interest Groups

Although churches share many of the characteristics of interest groups, they are also quite distinct from other interest groups.

In one respect, churches are able to offer tremendous solidary incentives for their members to join and remain a part of the group. While other interest groups may relay upon selective incentives, churches offer the greatest solidary inventive of all...access to God. Churches members are tied to the church not simply because the church gives them material benefits, but because they provide spiritual guidance and spiritual identification. Churches can also offer material benefits. Grand church

buildings, beautiful church services, and the care and concern offered by the church leader and other church members in times of sickness are large material benefits available to church members. Few other interest groups can offer such appealing incentives.

The moral authority inherent within the church and church leaders is also distinct. No other interest group has the built-in respect and deference accorded to leaders of the church. When church leaders don their robes, ascend to the altar and proclaim God's work, they are appealing to the deepest sense of moral and spiritual authority in a church member's heart. In this situation, the leader assumes the voice of God, and is granted the corresponding respect. No leader of any other interest group can claim such authority.

Churches are also given a measure of respect by the leaders of government. As representatives of the nation's spiritual heritage, church leaders are often called upon to take part in symbolic national ceremonies. In Ukraine, high church leaders are invited to participate in official ceremonies celebrating the inauguration of a new President. Rarely are other interest groups granted such a privilege.

Churches offer a well-established hierarchy leading all the way up to God. Group mores urge church members to obey the orders of those higher in authority. In addition, churches represent a sense of stability and order in a time of change and uncertainty.

In Ukraine, the history of the church also sets it apart form other Ukrainian interest groups. The premier place granted to the Orthodox Church in the center and

east, and the Greek Catholic Church in the west by the state in marked. Before the onset of Communism, these churches were very closely aligned to the state. In west Ukraine, the Greek Catholic Church was a national church par excellence (Bilinsky 1964). The Orthodox Church, in turn, was the favored church of the Tsars, and after the creation of the USSR, was still granted special favor by the authorities. Unlike any other church, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was placed in an advantageous position simply because it was tolerated by the Soviet state (Subtelny 1994). These historical contacts provide them with current access to power. As will be discussed in great detail later in this study, the Orthodox church is still able to make use of their Soviet contacts, while the Greek Catholic Church is able to gain great power by reconstructing old nationalist contacts.

Because of these differences, churches are positioned to be significant political actors, more effective in many ways that other interest groups. Due to the benefits they offer, both solidary and material, they are likely to have an easier time drawing in and retaining members than other interest groups. The moral authority bestowed upon church leaders positions them well to successfully influence both church members and governmental decision makers. Their historical position in Ukraine, whether as the representative of a millennium of Orthodoxy or as the protector of Ukrainian nationalism, gives them a position of power and legitimacy available to few other interest groups.

The actions of non-governmental actors, especially religious groups, has often been overlooked. Just as culture has been used as an explanation of last resort (Verba

1965), non-governmental actors have been relegated to actors of last resort. In fact, religious groups and values have long influenced political outcomes, particularly in Ukraine.

However, this study does more than acknowledge the political weight of Ukrainian churches. This study places Ukrainian church political activity into a theoretical framework of interest group actions and motivations. Churches are assumed to be actors who are motivated by personal interest to seek certain goods from the state. Their success is predicted based upon their secular ties to three broad categories: the former Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalist groups and foreign groups. The political behavior of churches is examined in the context of interest group theory. Churches not only influence politics; they also follow the same behavioral patterns as other non-state actors.

Influencing the State

How Groups Reach the State

The basic assumptions underlying group influence upon government deal with the nature of the groups and the individuals who make them up. Groups are made up of selfishly interested individuals who band together to carry out their common interest. These factions will pursue government in order to satisfy this interest, without regard to the consequences for others in society. Numerous factions, therefore, will clash in the pursuit of their own interests, and cooperation that would result in the common good is foregone. It becomes the job of the state to respond to factional demands but, in doing so, it must also consider and protect the interests of

the larger society. This societal protection is motivated by the self-interest of the members of the government (Downs 1967). Privately motivated individuals will serve the public interest by their devotion to their job and by the necessity of balancing the conflicting desires of the groups if they are to keep their job.

Various structural mechanisms can be put into place to insure that groups will be listened to and that the interests of the larger society are protected. Suffrage laws insure that people can participate as voters, and representation determines that these voters, joined in factions, can influence but not completely control government. Private rights and the public good are secured against the danger of faction by the liberty to participate and the delegation of government to representatives. All voices are heard, and all interests are taken into account.

The problem is that the system does not always function this way. Often a breakdown occurs, and the interests of certain groups overwhelm the interests of the others. Instead of all selfish interests being channeled into the public good, some private interests are heard while other private interests and the larger public good are ignored. It therefore becomes possible for some groups to wield a great deal of influence.

Church groups in Ukraine function much like factions. The zeal for different opinions concerning religion will often embroil sacred organizations in secular political conflict. Today, Ukrainian churches are attempting to influence the Ukrainian state. After decades of repression, the recent freedom of religion has brought a flowering of church involvement in political issues. Churches that were

previously coopted or persecuted by the Soviet state are now turning to the government to satisfy some of their interests. Some of these interests are general, such as the passage of laws governing freedom of conscience and the simplification of procedures governing the registration of religious groups (Perebenesyk 1992). Other interests are specific, such as the quest on the part of some groups to gain autonomy and to claim property (Bociurkiw 1992). Although this church influence is relatively recent and is not extensively documented, it seems clear that some groups may be better positioned to reach the state than others. Not all groups have an equal voice in government. Some factions are better able to achieve their goals than others, due to the nature of the goods sought and the characteristics of the groups themselves.

Groups have several tactics available to influence government. The success of these tactics varies, however, with the willingness of the groups to utilize them. In Ukraine, willingness to utilize tactics may be influenced by the ability to use these tactics.

Monitoring

Monitoring is one means used to influence government. By observing the state and its actions closely, groups can determine whether or not their interests are being pursued with appropriate vigor. This tactic proves difficult for some groups because of their unwillingness to pay the information costs required to know what the state is doing. Given the inclination of many to free-ride and to expect others to pay the cost to be informed, monitoring often does not occur. Groups who are small and organized around a private interest are likely to be most effective at monitoring the

actions of government. By restricting size to the smallest number, groups can stay unified, can internally monitor free-riders, and can be much more diligent in watching government (Riker 1962). In addition, growth in group size often entails a dilution of the ideological message. Increases in size may provide greater electoral power, but this power comes at a cost of message purity (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Therefore, groups willing to pay the cost to monitor government will be well-informed, while most other groups will be ignorant. Monitoring will quickly become one-sided, in favor of small, informed groups.

Churches in Ukraine are interested in politics, and are therefore likely to be monitoring political decisions, but to different degrees. The Protestant groups in Ukraine are primarily concerned with problems of registration and legalization, while Greek Catholics and various Ukrainian Orthodox churches are concerned with inter-church fighting over property (Perebenesyk 1992). Protestant churches are involved with issues that can be considered public goods. Efforts to simplify church registration processes will benefit all religious groups, regardless of whether they were involved in the effort. The Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, however, are fighting among themselves over private goods. They are primarily concerned with ownership of church property and state recognition, so their efforts are designed to help only themselves. Therefore, it seems that while the Protestant churches are worried about collective goods, the other churches are concerned with private goods.

It is likely, given the nature of the goods under consideration, that the groups pursuing the private goods of property and official position are more likely to pay the

cost to monitor government. Since public goods cannot be divided up and benefits are shared by all, regardless of the cost paid to achieve them, it is rational for individuals and groups to free ride, allowing others to bear the cost. Therefore, groups involved with or benefitting from public goods are not likely to pay the extra resources to monitor governmental behavior. Groups benefitting from private goods, however, are very likely to monitor governmental actions. Since they only benefit to the degree that they pay the resources, they will likely be very diligent in their participation and monitoring. The Protestant churches are expected to be less involved in monitoring governmental response to their public good demands, while the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches are likely to be highly involved regarding these private goods.

Sanctions

Sanctions are a second means to influence government. If the state is not following the interests of a group, it can use sanctions to punish offenders. By doling out rewards and punishments, groups that have monitored governmental action can enforce their wishes, providing policy makers with the incentive to continue to pursue group interests with vigor. Sanctions most frequently take the form of electoral support. If a policy maker has failed to support the group, they are voted out of office, if they have pursued group interests, they are reelected.

This tactic is useful only for those groups who have paid the information costs to monitor the actions of the state in the first place and who are willing to pay the costs to make a decision regarding punishments or rewards. Since most groups and

group members are ignorant, sanctions are useful only to informed, knowledgeable groups.

Churches that are monitoring an issue are in the best position to be able to sanction governmental decision makers. Sanctioning power may be strongest among those churches with the strongest backing and the most potential voters. Since Ukrainian nationalism is a rising force in Ukraine, those churches, such as the Greek Catholic, Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches, that have a strong association with the nationalistic movement are positioned well to be able to reward and punish members of government. The Greek Catholic Church has organized joint protests, combining religious and political interests, with the powerful nationalist political party Rukh. One protest, in 1989, is credited with the removal from the Ukrainian Politburo of two hardliners who were opposed to Rukh's nationality and religious policy (Bociurkiw 1992). This sanctioning power was made possible by support from Ukrainian nationalist organizations and previous ties with the governing officials.

A problem, as already mentioned, is that an increase in size brings about a larger membership and a more diluted message (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Once the message is diluted, the salience of the issue may diminish for many members. Ideological strength and conviction may give way to apathy and a muddled message. In fact, there is some evidence that the explicitly political and divisive activities of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches have diminished the churches' sacred appeal. Their religious message has become diluted by the fervency of their

political message. For this reason, many Ukrainians are turning to less political and more purely religious Protestant churches (Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1993).

Credibility

The credibility of a group also affects the influence it will have over government. Groups may have the ability to monitor and sanction, but unless they are perceived to be willing to use these tactics, they will have little influence over governmental decision-makers. If groups attempt to influence government solely in the reactive, passive mode, as described by Becker (1988), then government is not very likely to listen. This after-the-fact response is hardly credible, simply because it comes so late and is so passive.

Credibility requires force and timeliness. The tendency to cede power to elites also undermines credibility. By relying upon information provided in the two-step flow of communication (Katz 1957) and the knowledge of political surrogates (Sowell 1980), individuals and groups give up their power and credibility. When they turn over decision-making power to others, they effectively remove themselves from the process and hand control to those who are informed. These elites now have the information, the power, and the credibility to ensure that their interests will be pursued by government.

Credibility can be broken down into several components. The first aspect involves claims to be a true representative of Ukrainian national identity. In this case, credibility would be accorded to churches with historical linkages to the national movement or the struggle for national identity. The second aspect involves the actual

influence a group has with the bureaucracy. A church with close linkages to members of key governmental agencies would have good credibility Because of their ability to contact and influence them. Finally, credibility involves the ability of a group to mobilize group members and to threaten electoral punishment. Church groups that can persuade their members to take action will be deemed credible by the members of government that can be helped or harmed by their participation.

The credibility of Ukrainian churches varies greatly. Their perceived willingness and ability to monitor and sanction is influenced by their ties to the former Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalist organizations, and organizations external to Ukraine. The authority and credibility of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (UOC-Moscow) is at an all-time low (Antic 1990). Seen as pro-Communist and anti-Ukrainian, this church is tainted by ties to the Soviet state and distance from popular Ukrainian movements (Moss 1991). They lack the legitimizing historical links to independent Ukrainian state that could help their credibility. As a result, policy makers are unlikely to view it as an entirely credible political force. However, their contacts to and influence with the bureaucracy due to their Soviet ties should help their credibility among certain decision makers.

The UOC-Kiev Patriarchate has the benefit of being viewed, by some, as a nationalistic church. Since it is a new church, it has no historical linkages to an independent Ukrainian state, but it is making the most of its ties to nationalist groups and the nationalist movement. This should gain them some credibility. However, the credibility of this church is hampered by the same ties to the Soviet state as the UOC-

Moscow Patriarchate. For policy makers with their own ties to the Soviet state, this church may be deemed credible. But to nationalists, the credibility of this church is tainted. The church will have a struggle to reconcile these opposing aspects of its identity. The credibility gained from its nationalist identity may clash with the credibility it gains from links to former Soviet bureaucrats.

The credibility of the more historically Ukrainian churches such as the Greek Catholics and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as previously discussed, is very high. They have strong support from overtly political groups and are popular with the people. They have make strong claims to represent Ukrainian nationhood, and this will be a strong draw to church members and will make them more easily mobilized. As long as the appeal of nationalism continues to grow, they are likely to be willing and able to apply political leverage.

The Protestant churches are a different story. Their credibility is strong, but they suffer from a perceived lack of willingness to act politically. The Protestants were persecuted under Communism, so their resistance to the Soviet state is well known. They have few ties with the national movement or the existing bureaucracy, so their credibility is low. Their external ties also provide them with some strength, since wealthy Western organizations are strongly connected to, and interested in the concerns of, these churches. But, their willingness and political credibility suffer because of the nature of the goods that they pursue. Protestant churches have been primarily interested in issues involving freedom of religion and religious registration. Therefore, they have been politically interested in public, rather than private, goods.

They have shown little inclination to fight politically for private goods and have, as a result, largely removed themselves from the political arena. Their own distance from many of the issues that are of concern to the other churches self-selects them out of the political picture for the most part. Since they are perceived to be unwilling to mobilize their members, their credibility suffers.

State Responsiveness

Thus far, I have examined what groups do to reach the state. Now, I would like to look more closely at the manner in which group effort affects the responsiveness of the state. Church ties to the Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalism, and external organizations have an impact upon how the churches reach the state, but ultimately their importance lies in how they affect state responsiveness to church demands.

The main factor determining state responsiveness is participation. In a democratic or near-democratic system, the participation of individuals and groups directs the activities of the state. But, as discussed earlier, not all groups participate at an equal rate, and therefore the state does not always respond in an even-handed fashion. Several churches in Ukraine are playing an active role in trying to influence governmental decisions in the area of property rights, and I want to examine what is likely to influence the response of the state to these demands.

The response of the state is likely to be determined in large part by the agency within the government that makes the relevant decisions. Literature in the United States has focused upon the problem of regulatory capture (Stigler 1988). Executive

agencies designed to make decisions that will benefit the whole society become ensnared by the very groups that they were designed to regulate. It is natural that groups will gravitate toward those governmental agencies that make decisions pertaining to their activities. These agencies become natural magnets for potentially affected groups. The problem arises when agencies begin to listen to the needs of the groups to the exclusion of the wider interest that they were designed to protect. In many ways, this regulatory attention is warranted. The interested groups are protecting their private interests, and are therefore willing to expend resources that the regulator may value, such as votes, workers, or money. The disinterested public that the regulator is supposed to protect holds much less appeal than an involved group. In the resulting filter process, the voice of the public is muted, and private groups are heard. State response to the interested group results in benefits going to the interested few while costs are incurred by the disinterested public.

Certain churches in Ukraine today are actively involved in trying to claim church property. Agencies within the Ukrainian state are responding to these demands by taking property away from some groups and giving it to others. In particular, the state is having to mediate the demands of the multiple Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. The Greek Catholic Church disputes decisions resulting from the 1946 Synod of Lviv which disbanded the Greek Catholic Church and gave their church property to the Russian Orthodox Church. They claim that they are entitled to a formal apology and, more importantly, a return of their church property. The Ukrainian Orthodox churches, as expected, argue that they

have been faithful stewards of the church property and have earned the right to continue ownership (Little 1991).

The response of the state to these conflicting demands is, in part, determined by the church characteristics mentioned earlier. The historical ties to the Soviet Union are likely to hinder the claims of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. Both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate suffer from historically strong connections to the Soviet state. While the UOC-KP has tried to downplay their Russian and Soviet ties, it has become common knowledge that Metropolitan Filaret had long-standing ties with the Soviet secret police (Motyl 1993).

The Ukrainian state, obsessed with distinguishing itself from its Soviet predecessor, is likely to view the claims of the Soviet-tied churches with suspicion. In the case of the UOC-KP, the state is faced with a dilemma. This church has attempted to position itself as the true nationalistic church of Ukraine, but the historical ties of key leaders continue to bring back associations of Soviet domination. The state responded most favorably in 1990 when councils in three provinces of the highly nationalistic western Ukraine voted to nullify the Synod of Lviv and to return all property to the Greek Catholics (Little 1991). But, it is interesting to note that when the Ukrainian state first began to take up the issues raised by the Greek Catholic church, they did not rush to fulfill all its demands. Rather, in the early stages of Ukrainian statehood, the state agencies ruled in favor of the (then) Russian Orthodox Church, demonstrating by their preferential treatment the power of past governmental

contacts.

The nationalistic bent of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is likely to register favorably with the Ukrainian agencies, particularly those located in the western portion of Ukraine. Since Ukrainian nationalism is growing in the west of the country, the members of the Greek Catholic Church are likely to be able to provide the state regulators with resources, such as votes or support, that are of great value to the regulators. As time has gone on, this issue and these ties have gained in importance, and state response may grow in reaction.

External ties have also played a role in state responsiveness. Delegations from the Vatican and from the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow met in March 1990 in order to reconcile differences between the Greek Catholic and UOC-Moscow churches. These talks broke down due to the irreconcilable demands of the two sides. The Ukrainian Catholics wanted full recognition of their church and acknowledgement of their existence and authority. The representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church refused to concede the invalidity of the 1946 Synod of Lviv that effectively wiped out the Greek Catholic Church (Little 1991). After this breakdown, relations between the two churches worsened. The influence of these external groups has likely influenced, to some degree, the response of the state to the church demands.

Conflicts exist also between the "Ukrainian" churches, namely the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, the Greek Catholic and the UOC-KP churches. Again, they are arguing over church property, and their claims to the state could be influenced by a variety of factors. Rumors alleging that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev

Patriarchate has been supported by the Soviet government have been floating around Ukraine (Little 1991). In addition, there have been allegations that the UAOC collaborated with the Nazis during WWII (Dawisha and Parrott 1994). If this was perceived to be true, the Ukrainian state might view these ties as damaging and may look more favorably upon the Greek Catholic claims.

Since these churches are strongly linked with the nationalistic movement, the state might look more favorably upon the church that could provide resources of value. Agencies of the government might choose to favor one group based upon the strength and location of votes that could be provided.

Finally, external ties might influence responsiveness. The linkage with the Vatican as well as historical Polish ties may cause the state to be suspicious of the Greek Catholic Church. If nationalism continues to grow and if it takes on an increasingly xenophobic tone, these external ties may look threatening or dangerous to the state agencies. In this case, they would likely respond more favorably to the perceived "more Ukrainian" Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

What is interesting about this whole process is the degree to which these few groups are able to influence the state. The state bodies seem to be making decisions regarding property with respect only to the interested parties, with little to no concern for other groups or the larger society. Protestant groups are in need of property in order to hold their church services, but since they have no historical governmental ties and are uninvolved with the nationalistic movement, they have few means to gain state attention. The influence of external Protestant and missionary groups may help

state responsiveness, but it is generally accepted that they are being filtered out of the process of property assignment. Since the interests of the larger society are diffuse and unarticulated, they are not considered. Little thought is being given to the best distribution of this property; rather the historical and political considerations are the determining factors.

Influencing Political Attitudes

Group leaders communicate their ideology to the new members. As membership increases, often this task become difficult, as the ideological salience of the message can begin to become diluted in the face of a growing membership (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The goal of the leadership, then, is to communicate the message clearly and to win over new contacts and keep old members.

People often look to group leaders to provide information. Since information is costly to gather and process, many people are unwilling to bear the costs themselves and turn to political surrogates, both to make decisions (Sowell 1980) and to process the information (Katz 1957). Decision making is ceded to political elites, and information dissemination is often ceded to opinion leaders. In the two-step flow of information, opinion leaders first pay the cost to gather and process the information and then they turn around and transmit it to their group. By virtue of the information that they chose to gather and the process by which they synthesize it, they become an important filter through which information flows. As they communicate their information to the people they come into contact with, they determine which information is communicated and in what manner. In this way, the opinion leaders

become important sources of information and sources of pressure to conform (Katz 1957). The transmission of information can have a strong influence upon the formation of political attitudes.

Churches and church elites influence political attitudes in much the same way. Religious affiliation has been found to be a strong determiner of party vote in Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland (Lijphart 1979). As voluntary communities, churches are found to be well suited to transmit group norms. In this manner, the theology of the community influences the individual politics of the church member (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988). Research in the United States has indicated that the more extensive the participation in the church, the more consistent the political message given in the church, and the smaller the amount of external information received, the greater the political cohesion within the church on a political issue (Wald, Owen and Hill 1990). Religious groups are able to influence the political views of their church members, and the clarity of the message as well as the agreement of the political position of other reference groups will affect the degree of political influence (Welsh and Leege 1991).

The role of the elite leaders in Ukrainian churches is not well understood. There is no question that elites play an important role in church life. Priests and pastors preach, teach, counsel and guide church members. In the course of doing this, they also can transmit political information (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990), structure attitudes and behavior (Langton 1986), and provide political cues (Leege 1992). It is not known to what degree church members in Ukraine cede power to

their leaders, or how much they follow their teachings. Therefore, we do not know how different elite interest are from member interests.

Church Types and Ties

The degree to which churches can influence the state and shape the political attitudes of church members depends, in part, upon the ties that each church has.

The following matrix (Table 1) may provide some insight into which churches will most likely succeed at influencing government. Based upon previous studies of churches and politics in the former Soviet Union, I believe that the major churches in Ukraine can be placed into four main categories according to their church type: I. Ukrainian Orthodox-Moscow Patriarchate, II. Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Ukrainian Greek Catholic, III. Baptists and other Protestants, and IV. Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate. Church type largely reflects denominational differences. Ukraine is filled with a variety of churches and denominations, but this study focuses upon these four types because the churches within them are the most populous and active in Ukraine. At the initial stages of research, the UOC-MP and UOC-KP were combined into one category, but information gathered in the course of fieldwork confirmed that they should be in separate categories. Additional information also resulted in the UAOC and Greek Catholic churches being moved from the category "moderate ties to the Soviet state" to the category "weak ties to the Soviet state", and the category "moderate ties to the Soviet state" being removed altogether.

Unfortunately, very little research has been done on the religious

demographics of Ukraine, so estimates of church membership and socio-economic and geographic characteristics are difficult. Based upon Ukrainian governmental statistics (see Appendix B), Type I churches have the largest number of adherents in Ukraine, located primarily in the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) claims a membership of 6 million within Ukraine. Type II churches are smaller and are traditionally strong in the western regions of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (UAOC) is the smallest of the Orthodox churches, and is regarded as uncanonical by the Type I churches. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Uniate) owes allegiance to Rome, but uses the Orthodox rite. Type III churches are likely the least populous, but may be experiencing the most rapid growth. They include the traditional Baptist churches as well as newer missionary Protestant churches. Type IV churches are made up of the splinter group who left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) claims a membership of 15 million in Ukraine. These numbers are somewhat suspect; one recent survey indicates that the majority of those who consider themselves Orthodox identify with the UOC--KP (Martyniuk 1994), while governmental statistics support the idea that the UOC-MP is the largest church in Ukraine.

These types of churches can be compared across three categories that measure church ties to Soviet Communism, Ukrainian nationalism, and external organizations. Church ties reflect historical, cultural and, in some cases, financial linkages. These particular linkages are chosen because they represent the most powerful forces

constraining the political activity of churches in Ukraine today. Historical ties to the Soviet state continue to provide institutional contacts as well as potentially distasteful associations with Soviet and Russian dominance. Cultural and historical linkages to the Ukrainian nationalistic movement influence the political agenda of churches, and organizational and financial links to external organizations suggest a degree of foreign influence upon domestic political actions.

TABLE 1

Churches by Types and Ties

	TIES TO EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS			
	Strong		Weak	
	TIES TO UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM			
	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong
TIES TO THE SOVIET STATE				
Strong	**Type I Churches:** Ukrainian Orthodox-Moscow Patriarchate			**Type IV Churches:** Ukrainian Orthodox-Kiev Patriarchate
Weak	**Type III Churches:** Protestant	**Type II Churches:** Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, Ukrainian Greek Catholic		

The political influence of various churches in Ukraine differs according to their position within this matrix. I believe that church ties may affect the ability of churches to influence the state and their ability to influence the political views of church members. Some churches will be in a stronger position than others, due to their matrix position, to influence politics in Ukraine at the macro and micro levels.

Influencing the State

Church ties are a resource that churches can use to get the government to do what they want. Just as interest group theory states that interest groups use the resources of members, money, size and prestige to get the government to do what they want, I theorize that Ukrainian churches use their ties to influence the state to act on their behalf. Churches exercise influence when they persuade the government to listen to them and then to do what they want. Churches have a variety of policy domains in which they have a vested interest. The disbursement of property, special status, tax policy, and laws regarding freedom of religion are but a few of the governmental decisions that affect the churches. Policies addressing private goods are expected to occupy the political interests of churches.

As a result, churches are pushing government to make decisions in their favor. The way they exercise influence is by utilizing their established ties. In some realms, certain ties bring greater influence than others. For example, I expect nationalistic ties to provide greater influence among governmental authorities in or from wester Ukraine, while Soviet ties are expected to provide little influence among these decision-makers.

Church ties are also a resource that enable churches to affect the political attitudes of church members. Churches exercise influence when they convince church members to vote a certain way, to take certain stands on issues, and to view themselves and others in a certain light. The ties that the churches have give them both a general agenda, and a platform, shaky or strong, from which to promote this agenda. For example, the Soviet ties of the UOC-MP may incline them to push for support of pro-Russian candidates, but these same ties may undermine the effectiveness of the message to their members.

Church ties are a given resource that the churches have. They either have strong ties to foreign organizations or they do not. Just as the American Medical Association can utilize its resources of money and prestige, the American Association of Retired People can use its resource of size. Churches can use their ties as their resources to influence government. This study examines how the churches use these ties to wield political influence in Ukraine, on both the macro and micro levels. Ties on their own do not ensure the ability to influence government. They must be utilized, and utilized effectively, if a church is to exert the political influence it desires.

In order to influence the state, churches must first reach the state, and then must succeed in their demands for goods. The ability to reach the state depends upon whether or not a church can gain access to people in power.

On the one hand, strong ties to the former Soviet state can hamper political influence. These ties include relationships within key governmental departments, with

decisions makers who have retained their positions. Churches that cooperated with the Soviet authorities have been seen as traitors to the people and puppets of the now-discredited Communist regime (Antic 1990). Current revelations in the popular press about high ranking priests being exposed as KGB informants have not helped matters. On the other hand, many of the people who were in high positions in government when it was the Soviet Union still hold high positions in the government of Ukraine. The first Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, is an example. He rose to power in the Soviet Union through the Communist Party system, and only abdicated his Communist Party membership when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was about to collapse.

Therefore, church groups that had access to the Soviet state have developed relationships with key governmental members who are still in power today. Many of these officials changed party labels from Communists to Democrats, but their positions and powers remain the same. Although Ukraine officially declared her independence in 1991, few governmental structures have changed since then. The official openness of the government and the society to religious groups may have increased, but the actual individuals making governmental decisions have largely remained the same. Religious groups with former ties to the Soviet state are looked down upon by many people, but they still have valuable ties that can help in their attempts to influence governmental decisions.

Ties to Ukrainian nationalistic organizations also help church groups influence government. Nationalism is a very powerful force in Ukraine today, and as economic

conditions deteriorate, this popular movement may gain more and more political power. Austerity programs instituted to reform the economy, a decline in purchasing power just as new and appealing goods flood the market, all can lead to dissatisfaction with current living conditions. In turn, this can cause people to look for a solution elsewhere. The nationalist message that blames most ills on interference from Russia can be attractive to many. As this message grows, church groups with historical ties to the nationalist movement, such as the Greek Catholic and UOAC churches, find themselves in stronger positions than other churches outside of the nationalistic camp.

Finally, external organizations provide some means of encouraging political influence. Interested organizations are able to exert political, financial and social pressure upon the Ukrainian state in order to protect the interests of the affiliated churches. Financial support and American backing of Protestant missionary churches and groups has helped the cause of several Ukrainian Protestant churches in their attempts to rent property and hold large rallies. External ties are not always positive, however. If the external agency or nation is viewed unfavorably, as is Russia and her support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, then external ties hamper political influence. The Papal ties of the Greek Catholic Church are problematic for some in Ukraine. They argue that these ties indicate that this church is a puppet of Rome.

The ability of a church to influence the state is also dependent upon the nature of the goods desired by that church. Sometimes the desired goods are public, and churches have the contrasting incentives to cooperate and to free ride. Attempts to

influence the state for these goods are cooperative. Churches have an incentive to work together in order to gain benefits common to all. Examples of public goods include laws concerning freedom of religion and the protection of church property from state taxation. The political activity of Type III Protestant churches focuses primarily around issues of public goods, and their behavior regarding the other churches follows this cooperative pattern. The pursuit of public goods is linked to attempts to bridge ethnic and cultural divides within the country.

Churches also desire private goods, and compete in an attempt to influence the state to deliver special concessions. The distribution of church property is a very contentious issue among churches in Ukraine today. The state must decide between competing claims for the same piece of land, and churches are fighting bitterly over the distribution of this private good. In addition, there is disagreement over which, if any, church should be supported by the government. It is interesting to note that the Type I, II and IV churches are the most active in this conflict. Their arguments attempt to take advantage of the political divisions within the country. Type II (UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP) churches are focusing upon their nationalistic ties in an attempt to "win" the property dispute, and in doing so, they are deepening the social and ethnic divisions within Ukraine. The quest for private goods is linked to the worsening cleavages in the country.

Church ties affect the successful acquisition of goods from the state. If the nationalistic movement continues to gain ground in Ukraine, then churches with ties to nationalistic groups will be favored when church property is distributed and state

recognition is granted. However, if the trend in Ukraine swings back to increasing ties with Russia, then those churches with strong links to the Soviet state will fare better. If economic and social conditions continue to deteriorate, Ukraine could turn its back upon the "Western" style of economic and political reform, and could revert to more insular policies. In this case, foreign, particularly Western, ties could be damaging for churches seeking goods from the state. All the churches would suffer if, in an extreme case, the government began to revert to repressive social practices, such as state control over religion and religious freedoms.

The recent elections in Ukraine cloud an already very muddy picture. Communists and their allies won the largest number of seats in the new Parliament, and deadlock, rather than clear action, is feared. The manner in which the legislature approaches relations with Russia, the perceived need for drastic economic and social measures, and the commitment to democratic principles could all influence which goods are desired and which churches are successful.

Influencing Church Members

Churches also have the desire to shape the political attitudes of their members. The causal linkage between member beliefs and church views is complicated. The church can do much to influence what its members believe. In addition, the beliefs of the members can affect the direction in which the church goes. Member attitudes likely shape the church, just as church teachings shape member attitudes. In this study, however, I focus upon the church as the shaper of the political attitudes of church members. As has been previously mentioned, studies have demonstrated that

church teachings structure attitudes and transmit political information (Langton 1986; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988, 1990). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Ukrainian religious leaders are attempting to influence the political attitudes of church members.

The ability of Ukrainian churches to shape the political attitudes of their members is linked to their church ties. Church leaders in Ukraine, to varying degrees, are interested in communicating a political, as well as spiritual, ideology to their members. Sermons linking Christ's concern for the poor with the need for the government to deal with the declining purchasing power of retirement pensions are a call to spiritual and political action. The marriage between political issues and spiritual concerns thrusts a spiritual body, such as a church, into the center of the political fray.

Strong ties to the Soviet state hamper the ability of some churches to shape the political attitudes of their members. Allegations of cooperation between high church officials in the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government have caused many members to view this church, and its leaders, with suspicion (Moss 1991). Accusations of collaboration with the Soviets has tainted the message and the influence of both the UOC-MP and UOC-KP churches.

Type I churches are in an interesting position. The UOC-Moscow is still one of the largest churches in Ukraine today. As such, it is in a position to reach a large number of people with its political message. However, the message may be clouded by suspicious ties to the Soviet state. In addition, since the UOC-Moscow does owe

its allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, any political messages are likely to be directed toward reconciliation with Russia, rather than toward rampant Ukrainian nationalism. The effectiveness of this communication may be blunted by the fact that outside of church, in the central and western regions of Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism is growing in appeal, and Russia is increasingly viewed with suspicion (Kolomayets 1993). The eastern regions, however, with their historical and cultural links to Russia, are more amenable to the message of the UOC-MP.

Ukrainian nationalistic ties enhance the political influence of churches, especially among church members in western Ukraine. Nationalism has always been strongest in west Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous and the Greek Catholic churches have had historically strong links with the nationalistic movements in the west (Bilinsky 1964). These churches have been asserting themselves by gaining legalized status and by stepping forward into their historical roles of religious defenders of Ukrainian nationalism. In the west, strong ties with nationalistic movements will give theses churches great credibility among Ukrainians concerned with the national interest and identity of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate is also trying to establish strong links with nationalist movements within Ukraine. However, among the more moderate center and the more Russian-leaning east, these strong ties to nationalistic movements are viewed with suspicion and displeasure. These churches are viewed by many as extremists and therefore hold less sway over the political attitudes of Ukrainians in the central and eastern regions of the country.

For Type II churches, particularly those located in the western regions of Ukraine, the opportunity to shape members' political views is much more likely. Since nationalism is a strong issue of interest to many in western Ukraine, it is a topic that is discussed in many areas of daily life. Given the historical link between the Greek Catholics, the UAOC and Ukrainian nationalistic movements, it is highly likely that the church interest in political issues relating to nationalism is still strong. Therefore, if church members are hearing a message promoting strong nationalism not only at church but also at work and at social gatherings, then the influence upon their personal political attitudes is much greater. These Ukrainian churches have for decades preached the message of independence for Ukraine, so the consistency of the political message is quite strong.

Ties to external organizations hamper the ability to shape political attitudes, especially attitudes about a national Ukrainian identity. In this period of nation building, many foreign organizations are either seen as meddling or harboring imperialistic aspirations. In particular, the strong ties of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow are highly problematic. To a Ukraine already disturbed by the expansionistic rumblings of politicians in Russia such as Zhirinovsky, the Russian-leaning Orthodox churches look like instruments of Russian nationalistic expression (Valliere 1992). Therefore, the political messages of the UOC-Moscow meet with great opposition among church members. The activities of many Protestant groups, particularly their strong links with Western churches and missionary groups, also hamper their ability to influence

the political attitudes of their members. Research has shown that Protestant churches are less interested in politics, and so their self-selection out of the political process, as well as suspicion surrounding their Western links, will further remove them from the political realm (Perebenesyk 1992).

In some ways, Protestant (Type III) churches are positioned to have a great deal of political influence. They fit many of the strong church characteristics described by Wald, Owen, and Hill (1990). These churches tend to encourage frequent participation in church events, including Sunday School, worship services, prayer services and small group Bible studies. The also form a tight community which is focused upon a consistent message, primarily centered upon the Bible and its guidelines for daily living. Despite these characteristics, the political influence of these churches upon the attitudes of the church members is not clearly documented. This is likely due to the fact that the Protestant churches have, for the most part, chosen to avoid issues of direct political interest. As was mentioned previously, while the direct political clout of these churches is slight now, given the opportunity and interest, it could become much greater.

Conclusion

Ukrainian churches are attempting to influence the Ukrainian government. Church types and ties, represented by the position on the matrix, have a profound impact upon church success at reaching the state and at gaining state responsiveness. Churches are seeking new alliances in order to compensate for historical ties or to strengthen their current positions. These shifting associations further muddy the

already-clouded religious picture in Ukraine and result in increased dissatisfaction and disillusionment among Ukrainian church-goers. These shifts have already been noted in Ukraine and have caused a great deal of confusion for Ukrainians and foreigners alike.

It will be interesting to witness the further developments in church and political life in Ukraine. The success of the churches at influencing government, and the willingness of the government to be influenced will continue to be shaped by the type of churches involved and the ties these churches have. The desire of groups to influence politics remains constant. The make-up of the groups, and the direction in which they desire to influence the state and the attitudes of church members, however, is constantly shifting. The pattern of political interest among the churches in Ukraine has been undergoing massive changes. This study examines which groups are winning, what basket of goods they most fervently desire, and what the outcomes of the political fights are. I also look at the extent to which churches are influencing the evolution of a Ukrainian national identity and the influence this is having upon the direction of political reform, decisions about nuclear weapons, and relations with Russia and the rest of the world.

A great deal is known of the tactics, content, and direction of church influence in the United States. In the former Soviet Union, however, much of this remains a mystery. Journalists have recorded church clashes and church/state bargaining, but little scientific analysis of the means and motivations has been done. This research provides a clearer picture of the ways that churches in Ukraine are trying to influence

politics, and the impact that this action is having upon Ukrainian politics and the formation of Ukrainian national identity. This study does not reveal all of the political interests or tactics of Ukrainian churches, nor does it document all of the intended consequences. Rather, this study provides a first cut at systematically understanding the basic political interests of the various churches, and how these interests are being pursued. The study also contributes to the growing body of literature on the role of civil society, particularly religious organizations, in political development.

Chapter 3
Research Design and Data Collection

Model and Theoretical Hypotheses

Church ties, represented by the matrix in Table 1, provide us with an independent variable. The effect of this variable can be studied in two directions. First, we can examine the effect of church ties upon the ability to influence the state. The degree of macro level influence can be broken down into the ability of the churches to reach the state, evidenced by the types of goods desired and the channels used to reach the state, and the responsiveness of the state to church demands, evidenced by the state distribution of church property. Second, we can examine the effect of church ties upon the ability to influence the political attitudes and beliefs of church members. The degree of micro level influence can be observed by the ability of the churches to influence the voting behavior and national identity of the congregations. The following model displays the expected linkages and direction of influence.



My hypotheses are that church ties have an affect on their ability to reach the state, and also upon the responsiveness of the state to church demands. Church ties (historical, cultural and financial linkages) determine, in part, which groups succeed at reaching the state, and therefore have an impact upon the degree of political involvement. The independent variable effects the types of goods sought from the state, and the types of political issues pursued. The pursuit of public goods encourages cooperation between the churches, while the pursuit of private goods induces conflict and competition.

I hypothesize that the type of church, relating to its position on the matrix in Table 1, determines the manner in which churches attempt to reach the state. Churches with ties to the Soviet state approach institutions and individuals in government who are holdovers from or sympathizers with the old Communist system. Churches with ties to nationalistic groups are likely to approach those within government who favor these policies, while external organizational ties may cause other churches to influence the state indirectly, through their affiliated organizations. The tactics used to pressure the state will vary according to church characteristics. Smaller churches, organized around a private interest, monitor the state more closely, and sanction more deliberately, than those organized around a public interest. Churches that are concerned with state recognition, such as the UOC--KP, and private property rights, participate to a greater degree in politics, and are, as a result, likely be more successful in achieving the goods they desire.

These same ties also effect the responsiveness of the state. I expect to find

that the state responds to claims for property by looking favorably upon some churches, due to their ties, and unfavorably upon others. In particular, Ukrainian (Type II) churches with strong ties to Ukrainian nationalistic organizations are likely to have a great deal of success reaching the state, namely, gaining access to people in power, and achieving the desired state response. Type I churches (UOC-Moscow Patriarchate) with strong ties to the Soviet state are likely to be able to reach the state, but may have difficulty getting the state to respond to their desires. Type IV (UOC-KP) churches may gain from their nationalistic ties, but may suffer as a result of their past affiliations with the Soviets. The position of the Protestant (Type III) churches prevents them from reaching the state or from achieving any degree of state responsiveness.

I hypothesize that the nature of the goods sought from the state, and the success at achieving these goods, also varies with church type and ties. I primarily focus upon the private good of church property. As the composition of the government shifts, the churches that share characteristics with the majority governing coalition are likely to succeed. I hypothesize that if Ukraine continues along a path of increased hostility towards Russia and growing Ukrainian nationalism, churches with few ties to Russia and strong ties to the nationalistic movement are likely to succeed in their requests for property. Type I, II and IV churches participate more in the political arena, while Type III churches remove themselves from most of the political conflict. If nationalism continues to be a powerful political force, Type II (UAOC and GCC) churches with strong nationalistic ties and few Soviet or foreign ties are

expected to "win" the battle for state allocation of property. Those churches that are affiliated with external organizations that are out of favor fail in their desire to gain access to property. Type III Protestant churches interested in achieving public goods from the state have a more difficult time achieving their goals, due to the free-riding of other "cooperative" churches.

The effect of the independent variable of church ties upon the micro dependent variable of political attitudes of church member is also studied. I hypothesize that churches, depending upon their position in the matrix, have differing degrees of influence upon political attitudes. In particular, Type II (UAOC and GCC) churches have a great deal of interest in influencing the political attitudes of their members, particularly with respect to Ukrainian nationalism, while Type I (UOC-MP) and IV (UOC-KP) churches try but are unsuccessful and Type III churches may avoid the issue all together.

I hypothesize that churches, according to their position in the matrix, differ in their attempts to shape the voting behavior and nationalistic political attitudes of their members. Since the Type II churches have had historical ties to the nationalistic movements and are strong in the nationalistically-inclined western Ukraine, they pursue the call for a strong Ukrainian identity. I expect that their influence is limited by geography, with the western Ukrainian churches being significantly more interested and successful than their central or eastern colleagues. The Russian ties and Soviet links of the Type I churches limit the success of a call to a distinct national identity, and if that call is made, it is likely to be less tinged with a nationalistic bias.

Type IV churches try to espouse a strong nationalistic message, but again, their Soviet ties may dilute the reception of the message. The Type III churches are likely to manifest a less directly political orientation, and calls for an identity may reflect a spiritual rather than a political emphasis.

Operationalization and Testable Hypotheses

The political activity of churches is studied in the context of the July 1994 Presidential election held in Ukraine. This study first examines the effect of church ties upon the macro dependent variables of group success at reaching the state (gaining access to decisions makers), and state responsiveness to group demands. The first macro dependent variable, the attempts of church groups to reach the state, focuses primarily upon group attempts to monitor, sanction, and maintain credibility with the state. This is operationalized by the specific actions taken and channels used by the churches to reach the state. In particular, this focuses upon whether the churches are seeking public or private goods, and whether they cooperate or compete with other churches to gain the desired outcome. The second macro dependent variable, state responsiveness, relates primarily to the state's distribution of public goods, namely laws concerning religious freedom and tax status, and the distribution of private goods, namely church property and official recognition. The micro dependent variable of specific political attitudes is operationalized by the attempts of church leaders to shape a Ukrainian national identity among the members of their congregation.

Hypotheses Set #1: Reaching the State

I hypothesize that in the time before and after the election, Type III Protestant churches attempted to reach the state in search of public goods such as increased religious freedom, tax status, and public policy. Their approach towards the other churches was cooperative and inclusive. Type I , II and IV churches attempted to reach the state in search of private goods such as the acquisition of church property and exclusive state recognition. Their approaches to the other churches were competitive and exclusive. Type I (UOC-MP) churches focused upon their ties with the Russian-oriented Kuchma and attempted to benefit from his connections. Type II (UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP) churches focused upon their ties with the nationalist-oriented Kravchuk and worked to exploit these connections within government.

Hypotheses Set #2: State Responsiveness

Given the bitter election conflict between the nationalist candidate Kravchuk and the Russian-oriented Kuchma, and Kuchma's narrow victory, the cleavages within the country and between the churches have grown. I hypothesize that the fight for private goods between Type I, II and IV churches has become increasingly divisive, and the post-election state is divided about who to favor. Type I churches, with their support of Kuchma, may be the immediate winners in the battle for property, but the government has likely attempted to smooth over divisions in the country by responding in a balanced fashion to the competing demands of the churches. In fact, I hypothesize that state support fluctuates between Type I, II and IV churches.

Hypotheses Set #3: Shaping the Political Attitudes of Church Members

I expect to find that, in the time leading up to the election, Type I, II and IV churches attempted to influence the political views of their members, specifically in regard to the choice of a political candidate, and generally in regard to support for Ukrainian nationalism or increased ties with Russia. Type I churches attempted to influence their members to support Kuchma and pushed their congregation to support increased ties with Russia. Type II and IV churches pushed their members to support Kravchuk and pushed for greater Ukrainian nationalism. All these churches were pointed in their political message. Type III Protestant churches, however, had little involvement in the political election and made no attempts to shape the political views of their members.

Research Design

The best manner to test the impact of church ties upon the ability to reach the state and state responsiveness was to conduct qualitative interviews with church leaders in several regions of Ukraine (see Appendix D for interview questions). I interviewed church leaders from several different denominations and from several different regions of Ukraine in order to ascertain their position in reference to the matrix and to their attempts to reach the state and the state's responsiveness. In order to determine each church's self-perceived position upon the matrix, a series of questions was asked relating to past and present links with the Soviet state, Ukrainian nationalist organizations, and external organizations. These answers provided the basis for determining each church's self-placement on the independent variable

matrix. It is important to note that I expected church leaders to be somewhat unwilling to admit to certain ties that might be perceived negatively by the general population. In particular, I expected churches to understate or deny ties to the Soviet state or to foreign organizations. Therefore, self-placement was carefully compared with placement derived from outside sources. Information gather from church scholars was especially useful in determining matrix position.

In order to understand the effect of this independent variable upon the macro dependent variables of attempts to reach the state and state responsiveness to these attempts, I asked a further series of questions. These questions dealt with both dependent variables. In relation to the dependent variable of attempting to reach the state, each church leader was asked to discuss their activity during the Presidential election. In particular, I tried to discover the goods desired by their church, the tactics used to pressure the state for these goods, the success of these tactics, and their strategies for further lobbying of the state. Information about the dependent variable of state responsiveness was gained through questions about what the churches wanted from the government and whether or not the government had responded.

It is important to note that this study focuses on a narrow domain of policy interests. Churches in Ukraine overwhelmingly are focused upon a limited range of goods, most dealing with their immediate needs, such as buildings, money, legal status, etc. Church leaders were asked, in the first interviews, about their interest in broader social policies. When asked if his church was interested in any larger governmental issues, such as abortion, a Baptist pastor responded in a telling manner.

He stated that abortion is widespread in Ukraine, that there are many different views about it, and that the church, at this time, was not addressing the state on that issue (Interview #1). The Greek Catholic Church leaders also shied away form involvement in this and other social policies. As the most likely churches to be taking public positions on this issue, their decision to stay away from this policy domain is striking. Virtually all the church leaders interviewed indicated a desire to focus on a limited range of topics for the time being, and to limit their governmental involvement to a domain that includes issues basic to their existence.

As time goes on and the basic issues of property, finances etc. get settled, will not be surprising to see churches expand their governmental requests to a broader social policy domain. Already, a few churches are beginning to consider religious-based programs in the public schools. The plans, however, are at the early stages.

As a result, this study focuses on the policy domain most important to the churches at the time of the interviews. The scope of their interests is limited, and is focused upon their attempts to establish themselves and their congregations in a newly independent Ukraine.

I also asked the church leaders a series of questions pertaining to their attempts to shape member voting behavior. These questions addressed the degree to which church leaders tried to influence the political views of their members during the Presidential election, what tactics they used, and how successful they feel they were. I used the responses from these interviews to determine the linkage between the independent and dependent variables, and to discover the degree to which church

types and ties influence the political success and failure of Ukrainian churches.

The information gained from these interviews with church leaders was bolstered by an additional series of interviews with church scholars, journalists, political party members, and political candidates. I asked them to give their perspective on the political behavior of these specific churches. In addition, I read internal church communications and newsletters, as well as articles written in the secular press to ensure a well-balanced picture of the political behavior of Ukrainian churches.

Data Collection

The primary source of data for this study came from 35 interviews held in Ukraine. These interviews were carried out between September 29, 1994 and January 1, 1995 and followed a generally fixed format. This section will describe who the interviewees were, what questions were asked of them, and the general quality of access.

In order to preserve the anonymity of the interview subjects, I have chosen not to identify any of them by name. They have been identified in the text only in general terms. In instances where I quoted directly from a subject or attributed a significant idea to them, I have identified the subject by a randomly assigned number. In order to do this, I drew numbers from a hat and assigned each interview subject, in the order in which I interviewed them, a number.

The breakdown of the people interviewed can be found in Appendix C. Out of 35 interviews, 24 (68.6%) were with Ukrainian church leaders. Four interviews

(11.4%) were with scholars who specialized in church/state relations, 3 (8.6%) were with political party workers, 1 (2.8%) journalist was interviewed, as were 3 (8.6%) government leaders. These interviews took place in 4 cities: Kiev, Lviv, Donetsk and Mykoliev. The bulk of the interviews (19 or 54%) took place in Kiev since it is the capital of Ukraine and therefore houses the majority of church leaders, political party people, etc.

Conducting the Interviews

Church leaders of all different levels and ages were interviewed. In an attempt to gain a well-rounded and balanced picture, I sought out priests from high and low positions, lay leaders, and young as well as older people

The interviews were with various people who are involved with some facet of Ukrainian church/state relations. The three scholars interviewed all are involved in studies of the relationship between church and state. One works for a governmental institute, another for a university, and the third for a private research organization. One of the political party leaders had specialized in church relations during the campaign, while the other two had no such specialization. The journalist and the governmental leaders all had extensive experience dealing with religious organizations and specialized in church/state affairs.

The interviews were all conducted face-to-face and took about an hour. The questionnaire was prepared beforehand and contained a series of questions. For the most part, the interviews followed the questionnaire. In each case an interpreter was used. I asked each question and my interpreter relayed the question in either Russian

or Ukrainian as the interviewee preferred. The answer was then interpreted from Russian or Ukrainian back into English. At times, part of the interviews were conducted completely in Russian, as I am able to speak fair Russian, but I preferred to use interpretation in order to insure complete comprehension on both sides.

I utilized the services of 5 interpreters in 3 cities. In Kiev, the bulk of the interpretation was done by one university student. In Lviv and Donetsk, personal contacts helped me arrange for interpreters who met me in the city and travelled with me to the interviews. The majority of the interpretation was of a very high quality. Four of the 5 people interpret professionally. The only interpreter who exhibited any hesitation in interpretation was the young man who worked for me in Lviv. However, once he became familiar with the specific terminology of the interviews, he became much more comfortable and proficient. Before the interview, each interpreter was carefully instructed to directly interpret my questions, and then to directly interpret the subject's answers. I briefed the interpreters on the general subject matter contained in the interview, and on the flow of the interview. Much of the terminology was specific to religious and political specializations, so I was careful to go over the language that I would be using in order to insure their comprehension. I might add that the interpreters seemed to enjoy the interviews. Each interpreter mentioned at some point after the interview how interesting the subject matter was.

During the course of the interviews I took careful written notes. I wrote down the answers to each of the questions as completely as possible, given the rapid rate of human speech. Interpretation was a great help, since I in essence heard each answer

twice, once in Russian or Ukrainian, and once in English, and this gave me more time and more material to write down. As mentioned earlier, my interpreters were specifically instructed to interpret word-for-word and to omit nothing. Therefore, my comprehension together with the interpretation enabled me to take down virtually everything that was said.

In addition to my written notes, I also tape-recorded the interviews when permission was granted. The majority of the interviews were recorded, but on several occasions permission to record was denied, or the circumstances were such that recording was impossible.

Questionnaires

Four different questionnaires were used, each containing the same basic questions and following the same general flow. Appendix E contains the 4 questionnaires. One questionnaire was used for church leaders, one for church scholars, one for political party people, and one for politicians and journalists. All the questionnaires followed the same pattern: part one contained general information on the church itself, or contact with different churches; part two asked questions about the activity of churches in politics and elections; and part three asked for information about the activity of church members in politics and elections.

As time went on, I modified the church leaders' questionnaire. My first question in part one asked the church leaders to give a brief description of the history of their church under the USSR. It quickly became apparent that this question was counter-productive. Several church leaders used this question to launch into a 45

minute discussion of the entire history of their church, many of them beginning with the decision in 988 A.D. of the Kiev-Rus empire to become Christian. This information was useful, but did not need to be solicited from every church leader I interviewed. Therefore, in later interviews I began to ask more direct questions about the relationship with their church and the government today. In addition, I used later interviews to solicit answers to specific questions that arose during the course of earlier interviews. For example, the question of where churches were getting their money, the relations between specific churches, and the language used in worship services were all asked during later interviews.

I found that certain questions were generally good while others were not particularly useful. In addition to the history question mentioned above, another not so useful question was one about the ways in which church leaders tried to influence the voting behavior or political views of church members. Time and time again in response to this question, church leaders as well as church scholars and political party people emphasized that church and state are separate in Ukraine and therefore church leaders can not and do not get involved in influencing political views. While my research demonstrates that this is patently untrue, and in fact has little to do with church/state separation, any suggestion of a relationship between religious ties and political views made many people uncomfortable. I suspect that this is due to the very young nature of Ukrainian democracy, and the lingering effects of having what was essentially a state controlled church for many years. I found it wiser to couch this question in more general terms and to ask what the church communicated to the

church members about the election.

The most useful questions were the ones that dealt in generalities rather than specifics. I set out to use the Presidential election as a touchstone from which to explore questions of churches and politics, but I soon found out that focusing on the election was more of a distraction than a help. For the most part, when the specific election was mentioned, the subjects reverted to statements about the illegality of church activity in political affairs. So, I began to speak in terms of politics in general, rather than in specific. For example, the question "How was your church able to get the candidates to listen to your interests" became "How is your church able to get the government or candidates to listen to your interests?" I found church leaders willing to answer with greater specificity when the questions were general. I retained the majority of the election questions, but when a subject demonstrated a reluctance to discuss the election, I simply made them more general or dropped them for that specific interview.

I should mention that some church leaders were very open about the political activity of their churches. I found that the higher up the leader, the more open they were with me. High church leaders, were willing to discuss their activity during the election and their desired outcomes.

Another useful question, added in the early interviewing stage, asked church leaders to describe the relations with other churches and any areas of cooperation or conflict. At first I had feared that church leaders might hesitate to answer so direct a question but, on the contrary, I found them eager to describe areas of conflict and

cooperation. They seemed most eager to talk about conflict, and I expect that this is due to the degree of jockeying for political position that is occurring now. Only a few church leaders gave me the bland answer that there is no conflict at all and that everyone gets along perfectly. These answers came in the few interviews where the people being interviewed seemed suspicious of me and of my intentions.

Finally, the question that provided me with a great deal of help was the one that asked for additional references. I asked this question at the end of every interview, and received a large number of contacts in this manner. Church leaders referred me to other church leaders, both in their church and in others, and church scholars and political party people gave me the names of other qualified people. The majority of my contacts came in this manner.

Quality of Access

For the most part, I was given tremendous access to people I wanted to speak with. The only people to whom I was unable to talk as much as I wanted were governmental officials. These people were the only ones who were too busy or unable to speak with me. I was able to telephone many of the people whose names I was given, introduce myself and explain who I was, and then set up an interview time. When I was unable to reach the very highest church leaders, I simply showed up at their offices with my interpreter, and several times was ushered in without an appointment and allowed to interview them.

My only unpleasant experience occurred in Donetsk. Due to the fact that my contact in this city was a Baptist minister who was kind enough to arrange some of

my interviews for me beforehand, the Chief of the Department of Religious Affairs decided that I was some sort of a spy for the Baptist church. I interviewed one of his subordinates in the Department and gathered a great deal of useful information. Following this interview, however, the Chief called me in and grilled me for 2 hours about the actual purpose of my visit, who I was working for, who was going to read my dissertation, and whether or not I was a Protestant spy here to undermine the Orthodox Church. The whole experience was very distressing and reminded me of the situation I faced in 1987 in Romania when I really was there as an underground missionary. The similarity between the two experiences was especially troubling since Ukraine in 1994 is supposed to be a democracy while Romania in 1987 made no such pretense, and since I was in Ukraine for the purpose of academic research. The situation spoke clearly about the current situation in eastern Ukraine; the implications will be discussed in later chapters.

In addition to this 2 hour session, the Chief then forbade any leaders of the UOC-MP in Donetsk from speaking with me, and they in turn cancelled our scheduled appointment. He also attempted to stop me from interviewing a priest from the UOC-KP and even called the young man into his office and instructed him not to meet with me. However, this priest chose not to listen to his instructions and granted me the interview. Again, the behavior of the Chief and the priests speaks volumes about the religious and political situation in eastern Ukraine and will be discussed later.

Aside from this unpleasant experience, the rest of my interviews went very

well. I even found that my age and gender, which I had suspected might hinder my research, actually seemed to help. The fact that I am young and a woman seemed to place many of the people I interviewed at ease. Perhaps because I seemed to pose little of a threat, I found that most people spoke very openly to me. Very few subjects behaved in a guarded fashion, and several of those who did seemed to become more comfortable as the interview progressed.

Chapter 4
Churches as Political Actors on the Macro Level: Ability to Reach the State

"The biggest conflicts are caused by property. Each new church wants buildings, but since the church divisions there are many new churches but not that many buildings. The conflicts are largely regional." Priest, UAOC, Interview #30

"The church doesn't have to get government to listen since it is God who works in the hearts of people. He will open the hearts of the people that are in government." Protestant leader, Interview #19

"Common danger makes people unite." Scholar, Interview #32

Churches behave as political actors when they attempt to get things from the state. This macro level political behavior involves two stages. The first stage is when the church tries to reach out to the state and make its interests known. To do this, the church must bring whatever resources it has at its disposal to convince the state to pay attention. The attempts to reach the state reveal differences in the types of goods sought, varying levels of cooperation and conflict, shifting levels of governmental and political contacts, and differences across regions. The second stage of activity is the actual response of the state to church demands which will be addressed in the next chapter.

As mentioned throughout this study, the ties of the different churches explain a large amount of their ability to reach, and their interest in reaching, the state. The ties also help account for the response of the state to the different church requests. Church linkages to the Soviet state, to nationalistic movements, and to external organizations all contribute to the unique and significant political impact that Ukrainian churches are having on Ukrainian politics.

Monitoring Efforts

Monitoring is an important component of reaching the state and making one's interests known. In order to convince the state to follow its interests, a church must first be aware of what the state is doing and whether or not its interests are being pursued. This means that the church must be willing to pay the information costs if it is to monitor government action on their own. Those churches that choose to free ride are uninformed and unable to properly monitor the government.

Monitoring Efforts

I hypothesize that church ties to nationalistic groups and to the Soviet state encourage churches to monitor government more closely in their pursuit of private goods. Some churches pay careful attention to governmental decisions, while others remain removed from, and ignorant of, state actions that affect them. Monitoring takes several forms, but entails active contact with the relevant state agency. This monitoring leads to conflict between churches in areas focused around scarce, private goods, such as church property and money. Monitoring is less vigilant, and conflict less likely, in areas dealing with public goods.

The data reveal that the nationalistic and old Soviet ties of Ukrainian churches determined the degree of monitoring. The Type II and Type IV churches (the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and UOC-Kiev Patriarchate) all share strong ties to the Ukrainian nationalistic movement. The Type I (UOC-Moscow Patriarchate) and Type IV (UOC-KP) churches share strong ties to the Soviet state. These churches, more than any others, were very

diligent in their efforts to monitor the behavior of the state, both before and after the election. In particular, current ties to nationalistic movements encouraged vigilant monitoring.

In the period leading up to the election, the incumbent (and former Communist Party leader), Leonid Kravchuk, was carefully watched by these churches. His strong support of the creation of the UOC-KP in 1992 was cause for alarm for all the other churches. For the UOC-KP, this pre-election period was one of careful, but optimistic monitoring. Due to the unique founding and strong intervention on the part of the incumbent President, this church shares with Kravchuk strong ties to both the former Soviet state and nationalistic organizations. Therefore, it monitored the state from a position of favor and power, and sought primarily to keep the status quo. Responses from UOC-KP church leaders revealed that this church alone felt that it was able to speak directly to the government and tell it what it wanted. The UOC-KP was very active and very specific about what they wanted from the election (Interview #32). The leaders kept careful watch upon the distribution of church property and upon the consequences that upcoming election results would have upon future decisions of the state. In particular, they were very vocal in church newspaper articles, official pronouncements, and church services about the politics of Ukraine in relation to Russia. In the aftermath of Kuchma's victory over Kravchuk, this concern became paramount and reflected their fear that Kuchma would favor churches that did not have affiliations with Ukrainian nationalists.

The Type II UAOC and GCC churches before the election had the benefit of

ties to Ukrainian nationalism, but suffered from a lack of old Soviet contacts who might help them. Therefore, they were torn on their reaction to Kravchuk. On the one hand, he had fashioned himself as a supporter of Ukrainian nationalism and threw his lot in with nationalists in western Ukraine, where the Greek Catholic, UAOC and UOC-KP churches are the strongest. On the other hand, Kravchuk had also made it clear that he favored the UOC-KP above any other church, and had taken drastic action against other churches by favoring this church. The monitoring efforts of these Type II churches before the election were therefore careful and concerned. For example, the Greek Catholic church has been training the members of its youth organization how to deal with government (Interview #10). The UAOC has been actively seeking people in government who will help them with their interests.

These churches were very aware of the political situation and were very concerned about Kravchuk's actions and his support of the UOC-KP. They felt that his administration was hostile to their interests. Both churches on several occasions wrote letters to Kravchuk complaining about their treatment, usually vis-a-vis the UOC-KP, but they never received any replies. But, the alternative choice in the Presidential election was also problematic. They were very concerned about candidate Kuchma, his ties to Russia, and his disinterest in nationalistic issues. Therefore, their perception was that neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma would help their church. Their position during the election was one where they were very attentive to the political situation, but felt largely excluded and powerless. The election of Kuchma has not stifled their monitoring behavior, but it has left them focusing their

attention on other, more amenable, branches of government.

The Type I churches (the UOC-MP) also carefully monitored the state, but their Soviet ties hampered some of their effectiveness. They too were concerned about Kravchuk's partiality toward the UOC-KP and were angry about his role in the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates. During the election they openly favored Kuchma, who shares their interest in continuing ties to Russia, and after the election have carefully monitored his behavior toward the churches. To their dismay, and the other churches' relief, Kuchma has seemed to distance himself from church conflicts. Several church leaders shared their perception that he is too busily engaged in the economic concerns of the country to spend time on church concerns (Interviews #23, 7). To all but the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP, this was considered welcome news. The UOC-KP feels that it has lost its favored position, while the UOC-MP seems to resent that it has not gained its rightful place with the advent of a new, Russian-oriented, President.

The Protestant churches in this study were striking in their disinterest in monitoring the behavior of the state. Overwhelmingly, the people surveyed discussed the level of political apathy apparent within the Protestant church. Church members and church leaders stayed away from politics. Several church leaders said that they feel they are ignored by the state because they are Protestants, but that they are happy that the government does not disturb them. They would never ask the government for anything like a building because they know the government would reject their claim and they have no interest in becoming involved in politics (Interview #1). With no

ties to the Soviet state or to nationalistic organizations, the Protestant churches seem to have little interest in monitoring or pursuing governmental action.

There were two exceptions to this, however. One leader mentioned that his church was aware of Kravchuk's one-sided protection of the UOC-KP, usually at the expense of other churches' rights, and this led them to pray for Kuchma to be elected (Interview #18). Another church leader in east Ukraine mentioned that he visited the regional President in an attempt to share the problems of the church (Interview #5). In this case, this Baptist pastor had been working in this region for over 20 years as the leader of a registered church, and, in this capacity, had developed some contacts with the Soviet leaders and their successors. Therefore, these ties with the Soviet state, for this pastor, help explain his willingness and ability to monitor state behavior. For the most part, the Type III churches, as expected, stay away from politics.

Types of Goods Sought

The degree of monitoring is related to the nature of the goods sought from the state. The churches monitoring government most closely are expected to be those seeking private goods. The nature of public goods discourages churches from maintaining a vigilant watch over government and encourages them to free ride.

As hypothesized, the churches most actively involved in the pursuit of private goods are Types II and IV. The number one private good, mentioned time and time again by church leaders and church observers, is property. Until independence, church property was owned by the state and was either allowed to fall in to disrepair;

used as museums or storehouses; destroyed; or given to the Russian Orthodox Church to use. After independence, churches came forward demanding that property be given or restored to them. Other churches demanded that the government pay them for destroyed buildings, while others felt they should be given money to construct their own place of worship. In the four years since independence, a great deal of church property has been allocated by the state, and a large number of churches are angry over the nature of that allocation. St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, a sprawling complex that includes a grand cathedral as well as a number of outer buildings and houses, is still under contention by the Greek Catholic Church and the UOC-MP. These and other church properties are desired both as places of worship and as properties of great value. Of special concern to several churches is the ancient St. Sophia's Cathedral, considered by all the Orthodox churches in Ukraine to be their special heritage. This church is extremely valuable, because of its age, historical value, size and beauty. It is one of the few surviving buildings surviving from the ancient Kiev-Rus empire, so its value, both in terms of its property and its history, is enormous. The government has decided, after much protest, to keep this as a museum and national holy site.

The Type IV UOC-KP churches believe that they are entitled to special recognition by the state, and that this recognition should extend to holy property in Ukraine. One UOC-KP priest said that since his church has played an important role in creating the independent state of Ukraine, they should be given the national church...St. Sophia's (Interview #14). This statement suggests that this church

considers itself unique among the churches of Ukraine, and that it should be rewarded for the role it has played. I argue that it is the very ties that this church has both to the previous power structure (characterized by President Kravchuk) and to the nationalistic movement that place this church in this unique position. Because of its placement, this church did sit in a position of extraordinary power under Kravchuk's administration. This position of power has led the church to make claims on property that never belonged to it in the past, since the church did not exist prior to 1992. Rather, they claim that they have rightful claim to the whole legacy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and that all property that belonged to that church should now be handed over to the UOC-KP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate 1993). They are particularly upset at governmental decisions to give church buildings to the Greek Catholic Church in west Ukraine.

Their claims for private goods, based upon their position of power, do not end with property. Again, as hypothesized, their most heart-felt desire is a special acknowledgment by the government that they are "the" Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In order for this to happen, they expect the state to help merge the various Ukrainian Orthodox churches (the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, and the UAOC) in to one church, with the UOC-KP in control (Interview #25). They state that the power of the Orthodox church can only be found through unity, and since 75% of the Ukrainian population is Orthodox, then it makes sense that they should be in one Orthodox church. More than one UOC-KP leader stated that as long as 20 million Ukrainians are under the jurisdiction of Moscow (referring to followers of the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate),

Ukraine can never be independent.

The private good that the UOC-KP most desires, therefore, is special state recognition and power, and this power will be gained when the Orthodox church in Ukraine is united under their authority. Church property is almost secondary, since it will come with the other churches when they are subsumed under UOC-KP control. Their rationale behind why the state should grant them this good is simple; it is their church that supported the independence of Ukraine (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate 1993), and "an independent Ukraine needs an independent church" (Interview #11). In terms of my analysis, their church is suited for the position of a national church because it has a support base that includes both the former Soviet officials still in power, and the nationalist movements that are gaining power. By using contacts from both of these sides, this church is able to gain from the old power structure as well as from the emerging political movements.

Type II churches are also pursuing government in the hunt for property, and they are well aware of the grand desires of the UOC-KP. For the UAOC, the maneuverings of the UOC-KP are cause for great concern. The desire for unity among the Orthodox churches was already partially recognized by the state when the UOC-KP was created. As described earlier in this paper, the UOC-KP was created by forcibly merging the UAOC and parts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. As soon as the UOC-KP declared its independence from the larger Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the government (led by Kravchuk) immediately recognized and registered this church, effectively destroying the legal right of the UAOC to exist. Ever since this

1992 event, the UAOC has been fighting to be recognized as an independent church and to receive property. For them, the most important private good is registration and legalization by the state. Following that, they want their churches, dating from the 1920's, to be returned to them.

It is interesting to note that when I arranged an interview with a high church leader of the UAOC, he had to come to me for the interview because he had no office or church in Kiev. They are monitoring the government closely on these issues. Their argument to the state is that they are a historical church that has always been associated with Ukrainian independence and that they are entitled to their official status and their property. Their ties to the nationalistic movement and their historical relationship with nationalism in Ukraine are their main tools of argument.

The other Type II church, the Greek Catholic Church, is also leery of the claims of the UOC-KP. The Greek Catholics, however, are in a stronger position than the UAOC and are monitoring and making demands of the state from a position of greater power. Due to their overwhelming strength in the western regions of Ukraine (resulting from the strength of their nationalistic ties and their political connections), the Greek Catholics have received most of the property they desire in west Ukraine. However, they are not completely satisfied. One private good that they seek is property in other parts of Ukraine, particularly in the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. In Kiev, they currently have only one church and it has neither running water nor electricity. One priest commented that the attitude of governmental officials outside western Ukraine seems to be that the Greek Catholic Church does not

need churches anywhere except in the west (Interview #29). Therefore, the church is monitoring government in an attempt to gain property in non-western regions. In addition, the GCC is pushing for an additional private good; they want the state to issue an apology for past behavior against their church. They believe that they deserve structural and political rehabilitation, and that this will occur when buildings are returned and when official apologies are made. The Greek Catholic Church did suffer tremendously under the Soviet Union, and they want this acknowledged by the state (Interview #22). Its rationale is that theirs is the historical church of western Ukraine that was persecuted because it was such a strong supporter of Ukrainian independence. Therefore, its nationalistic ties are what set it apart and cause it to deserve these private goods from the state.

Type I UOC-MP churches in Ukraine are interested in private goods, but they are also attuned to the need for public goods. I hypothesized that their search for private goods would mirror those of Type II and Type IV churches, but they seem to be less interested in property, and have little expressed or implied interest in exclusive state recognition. They too are concerned about the demands made by the UOC-KP, but the UOC-MP views these as threats not only to their church but to religious freedom in Ukraine. Where the other churches focused upon the actions of the UOC-KP almost solely in terms of how it would affect *their* property and *their* power, the UOC-MP and the Type III Protestant churches viewed these actions as a threat to the public good of religious freedom. The UOC-MP priests interviewed all addressed the conflict, sometimes in oblique terms, and expressed their concern about government

favoring one church over another (Interview #26). The goods they mentioned were freedom from government control, government favoritism, and taxes.

This relative lack of concern with the private good of property may result from the fact that the UOC-MP is still the largest church in Ukraine and has done relatively well in the distribution of church property. Since their predecessor, the Russian Orthodox Church, was the only church allowed to have property under the USSR, they have managed to maintain control over many of the churches they occupied. This is largely due to their ties to the Soviet state. Since they could operate under Communism, they were virtually the only church open for people to attend. And, since they were already in many of the churches at the time of independence, and since they had strong contacts with members of government making property allocations, they were able to do well in the property distribution. The only region in which they fared poorly was the west of Ukraine, which is predominately Greek Catholic, despite efforts by Soviet authorities to convert people to the Orthodox faith. In Kiev, however, the second and third biggest churches in the city after St. Sophia's, St. Andrew's and St. Vladimir's, have been taken from the UOC-MP and given to the UOC-KP.

The private good that they do desire involves money. When the UOC-KP was created, a great deal of money that had belonged to the UOC-MP was taken by the UOC-KP. It was in a bank account for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and when the UOC-KP was created, the money was transferred to their newly created account, with the knowledge and cooperation of the executive branch of government (Interview

#31). This still bothers many within the church, and they want the government to help them get this money back.

As hypothesized, the Type III Protestant churches are primarily concerned with public goods such as religious freedom. Several mentioned the behavior of the state in favoring the UOC-KP and expressed fear that the religious freedoms of other churches would suffer. They stated that their desire was that the existing laws would be obeyed and that the government would satisfy their legal rights to worship freely without governmental interference (Interview #19). One leader mentioned the fear that the Orthodox church would be recognized by the government as the state church and that all other churches would be suppressed (Interview #5). This concern with the public good of religious freedom and the disinterest in property is interesting since these churches have no ties with any groups within the state that could help them get property. Their only ties are to external organizations who, in some cases, help them financially. Their lack of any domestic political connections is one of the reasons they are interested only in public goods. The effect of links to the political system will be discussed further in this chapter.

Conflict and Cooperation Between Churches

In their monitoring behavior and pursuit of public and private goods, I hypothesize that these churches are engaging in cooperative and competitive behavior. The pursuit of private goods encourages conflict and competition, while the pursuit of public goods encourages cooperation. In specific, I suggest that Type III Protestant churches cooperate with other churches, while Types I, II, and IV conflict with one

another.

In fact, the behavior of the churches was much more complex than I had envisioned. While conflicts were rampant between the churches, cooperation also existed in unexpected places. The guiding principle for the churches seems to be "the enemy of my biggest enemy in this region is my friend." Churches that fight fiercely in one region can be found cooperating in another region against a larger, mutual foe. Cooperation in these cases results from the mutual quest for private and public goods against a mutually threatening opponent.

For example, in eastern Ukraine, where the UOC-MP is the undisputed power and favorite of the government, the UAOC, UOC-KP, and the GCC have all met together in an attempt to try to strengthen their position and to get the government to listen to them (Interview #35). They are concerned about the distribution of property in favor of the UOC-MP, and along with the Protestants are concerned about governmental restrictions of freedom of religion. In central regions such as Kiev, the UOC-MP, GCC, and the UAOC, together with Protestants have lodged joint complaints to the government about the UOC-KP and the preferential treatment it has received from the government (Interview #32). They are all concerned about the role the UOC-KP has played as the de facto state church under Kravchuk. These same churches banded together in their successful effort to disband the Council on Religious Affairs, which was seen by all to benefit the UOC-KP above all other churches. The common danger of Metropolitan Filaret and the threat that his church posed to the other churches and to freedom of religion were sufficient to cause these

churches to cooperate and work together (Interview #30).

Fluctuating alliances also formed around private goods. In Kiev, the largely marginalized UAOC and GCC have worked together to support each other in their claims for property (Interview #22). When the GCC approached the Kiev city government in an effort to receive church property, the UAOC in Kiev signed a petition supporting their claim to the church building. In addition, these churches have together proclaimed their concern about future ties with Russia and the fear of Russification. They have loudly and frequently claimed that they are the only churches in a position to truly represent and support an independent Ukraine. They point to their long history of support for the nationalistic movement, and their lack of any ties to the Soviet power structure (a claim that UOC-KP cannot make). Therefore, they are worthy of special recognition, if not a special place in Ukrainian society.

However, cooperation between churches can quickly turn to conflict. For example, the cooperation between the GCC and the UAOC in the center and east where they are both weak turns to outright conflict in the west where the Greek Catholics are the most powerful church. The areas in which the churches come into conflict involve property, state recognition and church independence, church language, and rights of evangelization. In these areas, the patterns are as hypothesized. Types I, II and IV churches are bitterly fighting, while Type III churches are largely on the side lines, removed from the conflict.

In the fight for property the conflicts follow this basic regional pattern; in the

west it is everyone against the Greek Catholics, in the center it is everyone against the UOC-Kiev Patriarchate and Metropolitan Filaret, and in the south and east it is everyone against the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is the one non-Protestant church in the study that has no position of supremacy anywhere in the country and is therefore always fighting from a position of weakness. While many property decisions have already been made, churches are fighting the decisions and petitioning government to amend their decision. In many cases the government has taken buildings away from one church and given them to another, and the excluded church has continued to hold services outside the building as a form of protest. Church leaders in both Kiev and Lviv discussed their involvement in this form of protest behavior (Interviews #6, 7). In Lviv, the church had been given to the GCC, and in Kiev the churches had been given to the UOC-KP. The overwhelming feeling in each region is that one church has been favored by the state, so the other churches must join together and fight against this church to protect their personal rights to property.

The conflict over church independence and state recognition is focused around the UOC-KP. The UOC-MP is angry about the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, and blames the state and Metropolitan Filaret for instigating the split. These churches argue about who is subservient to whom, to whom buildings, icons, and money belong, and who is the mother church. Their fight for the ascendent position is an argument over the private goods of power and property. The other churches view this as an internal matter that does not merit

their intervention.

The conflict over exclusive state recognition, however, concerns them all. As mentioned earlier, Kravchuk's support for the UOC-KP angered all the churches. His instant recognition of the UOC-KP, and the resulting legal disappearance of the UAOC, sparked an ongoing bitter fight between the UOC-KP and the UAOC over the right of the UAOC to exist. The UAOC claims that the activities of the UOC-KP were illegal and unwarranted and that they are a legal independent church, while the UOC-KP claims that their activities were legal and that the UAOC simply no longer exists. The UAOC points to its historical ties with the nationalistic movement and to the Soviet ties of the UOC-KP to bolster its claim.

The conflict over church language also divides these churches. This conflict pits the churches with nationalistic ties, Types II and IV, against Type I churches with Soviet ties. Type II churches have always used Ukrainian in their services, while the UOC-KP, after its creation in 1992, hastily followed Kravchuk's lead by proclaiming Ukrainian to be the language of choice. The UOC-MP, however, following the tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church, has used Old Church Slavonic in its services for centuries. One UOC-MP Bishop (Interview #15), spoke of Slavonic as the high church language, suitable for discussions with and about God. He referred to Ukrainian as the language of the street, suitable only for commerce. He suggested that those who support the use of Ukrainian in church services are interested only in their political image and the political gain that can be made from this issue. The other churches, however, bristle at the categorization of Ukrainian as a lower

language and defend the right of people to worship God in their own language.

An interesting conflict over the right of (primarily) Protestant churches to evangelize involves private and public goods. For the Protestant churches, the issue is one of religious freedom, and they are fighting for the public good of freedom of speech and religion. For the churches pitted against the Protestants, chiefly the UOC-KP and to a lesser extent the UOC-MP, these activities amount to the invasion of foreigners and foreign beliefs. A priest of the UOC-KP (Interview #14) stated the commonly held belief that Ukraine is an Orthodox nation, and therefore to be Ukrainian is to be Orthodox. Anyone who attempts to "pull" Ukrainians away from their spiritual heritage is harming the nation. Protestants as well as Greek Catholics were included in this category. Other Orthodox leaders went even farther and suggested that the government place restrictions upon the activity of "foreign" influenced groups. They argue that foreign-inspired missionaries are aggressors and are ignoring the 1000 years of culture that connects Ukraine and the Orthodox church (Interview #3).

In an interesting twist, while the leaders of the UOC-KP and Protestant churches in the south and east are concerned about and cooperating to protect religious freedoms, stemming from restrictions placed against them, leaders of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP in the west and center are working together to try and stop the religious freedoms of the Protestants. This suggests that for the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP, religious freedom is a private, rather than a public, good. For many within the Orthodox church, the state should protect the rights of their church,

while restricting the rights of churches with foreign ties. In a conference in Kiev entitled "Freedom of Conscience: Church and State in Ukraine" held September 28-30, 1994, several well-known Ukrainian scholars and church leaders justified this view by stating that in this time of social and political development, it is natural for the state to favor the historic church in an attempt to shepherd and encourage the correct spiritual development of the society. According to this view, the foreign ties of Type III Protestant churches disqualify them from enjoying religious freedom.

Overall, the churches followed the patterns expected when monitoring the government, making claims for private and public goods, and cooperating or fighting. As expected, Type I, II, and IV churches monitored most closely, were concerned with private goods, and engaged in a great deal of inter-church conflict. Also, the churches cooperated a great deal, although this cooperation was in a self-interested manner and dissolved into conflict the minute one church gained a position of ascendancy. The issue of religious freedom is also more complex than initially expected. These freedoms are viewed as a public good by the Type III Protestant churches, but Type I and Type IV churches are opposed to then and are pushing for selective religious rights.

Sanctioning Behavior

Churches also use sanctions to reach the state. By rewarding officials who follow their wishes, they encourage future cooperation. By punishing people who act contrary to their interests, they demonstrate their power and create incentives to behave in a pleasing manner. Sanctioning includes electoral support, civil action, and

direct confrontation. I hypothesize that churches with strong ties to the nationalistic movement are in the strongest position and are most willing to sanction governmental decision makers. Churches pursuing private goods are also expected to sanction more deliberately than those pursuing public goods because they are securing private goods by excluding others.

Sanctioning Behavior

Types I and IV (UOC-MP; UOC-KP) churches were very active in sanctioning government. As expected, the nationalistic ties of Type IV churches encouraged their sanctioning behavior. Type I churches somewhat surprisingly were also very active in sanctioning, although they did not seem to be monitoring government as diligently as Type IV churches. The nationalistic ties of the Type II (Greek Catholic and UAOC) churches, however, surprisingly constrained their sanctioning behavior. Not surprisingly, the Protestant churches did very little sanctioning.

The UOC-KP church was the most vigorous in its support of incumbent Leonid Kravchuk and it opposition to candidate Leonid Kuchma. Due to the strong support they received under Kravchuk, they were eager to support his bid for reelection and they were quite active in their support for him. As one leader mentioned, Kravchuk was known and tried, and therefore should be supported (Interview #14). Church officials admitted that they supported Kravchuk but said that they only told their church members to vote for "the nationalistic candidate" or "true democrats", in both cases clearly referring to Kravchuk (Interview #25). Given that Kravchuk was a strong supporter of their desire for property and state recognition, it

was only natural that they should reward his help with strong electoral support.

The story was quite different for Types I and II churches. For all these churches, Kravchuk's strong support for the UOC-KP, and the harm they had suffered as a result, provided strong ammunition for their opposition to him. For the UOC-MP, the choice was clear. They were angry at Kravchuk for the role he played in the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and held him responsible for the loss of their property. In addition, they disliked the way their church had been painted as a tool of Russian domination by nationalist Kravchuk. Therefore, they came out strongly for candidate Kuchma, who took a much less active stand on church-state affairs and who decried the pro-Kiev Patriarchate decisions of Kravchuk's administration. In addition, Kuchma and the UOC-MP share strong ties to Russia; the Patriarch of the UOC-MP is in Moscow, and Kuchma campaigned on the need to work closely with Russia. Kuchma's ties to Russia as well as his apparent support for religious freedoms attracted the strong support of the UOC-MP.

For the Type II churches, the choice was less clear. On the one hand, Kravchuk had done much to alienate these churches. The UAOC blamed Kravchuk directly for their unregistered and illegal status, while the GCC could point to a dearth of churches anywhere outside of west Ukraine. Kravchuk's behavior in preventing them from acquiring the desired private goods certainly deserved sanctioning. On the other hand, Kuchma's strong pro-Russian views went against everything these churches had ever stood for. Since their creation, both the UAOC and the GCC had fought against Russian and Soviet domination of Ukraine, so it was

virtually impossible for them to support a candidate who sought to tie Ukraine closer to Russia. Their sanctioning behavior during the election, therefore, was somewhat muted. Kravchuk had done much to harm them, but in the words of one scholar, "the Greek Catholic Church had no choice but to support Kravchuk; Kuchma's pro-Russian stand was too much for them to even consider" (Interview #32). Therefore, in weighing their nationalistic ties and history against damage done to their religious freedoms, the nationalistic considerations won out. This ambivalence, however, was reflected in their very muted support for Kravchuk. Church leaders and organizations were forbidden by order of the Cardinal Lubachevsky to engage in any sort of political behavior. This behavior likely reflects an unwillingness to support any candidate as much as it does a respect for separation of church and state.

The other Type II church, the UAOC, found itself in the same position. Kravchuk had badly damaged this church, but their nationalistic ties made it all but impossible for them to support the challenger Kuchma. In interview after interview, UAOC leaders presented Kravchuk as the enemy acting in concert with Filaret of the UOC-KP. They spoke of Kravchuk's Communist past and his ties to the Soviet government that destroyed their church in the 1920s and 1940s. As one UAOC priest put it, they told their members not to vote for the "people of yesterday, for example, people who used to be Communists and who still see things the same way" (Interview #30). Their sanctioning of Kravchuk included protests and picketing, to the point of being attacked and beaten by the militia. However, they also spoke disparagingly of the challenger Kuchma as a supporter of the UOC-MP. They were very fearful of his

ties with Russia. As one scholar stated, "Kravchuk for them was the enemy, but Kuchma was not even an option" (Interview #31). Therefore, they were in the position of sanctioning both candidates for their ties to the Soviet state or to Russia. That left them with no one to support in the Presidential race.

The Type III Protestant churches took part in very limited sanctioning behavior. One pastor told me that his church prayed for Christians running for office to win, and mentioned praying for Kuchma to win because Kravchuk so strongly favored the UOC-KP (Interview #18). Prayer seemed to be the extent of any sanctioning behavior on the part of these churches. The majority of church leaders simply said that they stayed out of the conflict and took no part in the election. Kravchuk's disregard for the public good of interest to them--religious freedom--sparked spiritual, rather than political, sanction.

Level of Government Approached and Links to the Political System

An important component of sanctioning is the ability to connect with some level of government. Depending upon their ties, churches used their contacts at different levels of government to try to accomplish their goals. By using their links to the system to sanction and reward behavior, these churches can focus their energies upon the most productive and responsive areas of government.

My research revealed an interesting and unexpected pattern of sanctioning; each of the churches had a distinct level of government that they dealt with, and their sanctioning behavior focused upon this particular level. In addition, the churches focused these attentions upon a specific geographic area of government. The two

churches with strong ties to the Soviet state, Types I (UOC-MP) and IV(UOC-KP) , both concentrated their attention on the national level. Type II (UAOC and GCC) churches, with their strong nationalistic ties, focused on regional and local levels of government. Type III Protestant churches, with weak ties to the former Soviet authorities and to the up-and-coming nationalist groups, abstained from political involvement.

A large number of leaders of Ukraine under the Soviet Union remain in power today, particularly at the national level. The former President Kravchuk, many members of the Supreme Soviet, and a large number of bureaucrats in the national ministries all maintained their positions after Ukraine declared her independence from the Soviet Union. Many of these people had held high positions in the Communist Party, and then renounced their CPSU membership in the turmoil surrounding independence. Therefore, it is not surprising that the UOC-KP, with its strong ties to the former Soviet state, should focus its attentions upon governmental officials at the national level. As far as many are concerned, the national government, led by Kravchuk, essentially assisted in the creation of this church, so it is no surprise that it has been willing to listen to the requests of this church above the others.

In addition to well-established links with President Kravchuk, the UOC-KP is said to have strong connections with members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Interview #32). During the election, candidates for national office visited Metropolitan Filaret to ask for his support. At this meeting, Filaret was able to explain what he wanted from the candidates. Political leaders from the major parties

also visited UOC-KP Patriarch Vladimir to tell him their positions and also to show loyalty to this church (Interview #20). This church's strong position with respect to the former Soviet power base, as well as its position as a church that represents an independent and nationalistic Ukraine, places it in a position of political power today. It can claim strength from both the old guard and the newly emerging nationalist forces. Its political power, especially on the national level, accounts for a great deal of the attention that it receives from governmental officials. As a result, it is in a strong position to be able to sanction effectively.

This type of personal treatment was not enjoyed by any of the other churches. While the UOC-MP also focused upon the national level, there is no indication that it received the same response as the UOC-KP. The association of the UOC-MP with Russia, especially for nationalist or pseudo-nationalist politicians, is a huge liability. Therefore the potentially beneficial linkages with holdovers from the Soviet Union are damaged by this foreign association. While the church is still trying to court national political attention, many of its national connections are disappearing. This has led to a decrease in sanctioning and political participation, according to one scholar, because the church has no one to support (Interview #31). They had high hopes for newly elected President Kuchma, since he shares their close ties to Russia, but so far Kuchma has had little concern or time for these religious questions. However, its contacts with the Soviet/Communist majority bloc in the Supreme Soviet remain strong. The important decisions are now being shifted to different levels of government. The hope for the UOC-MP was that this President would provide them

with the contacts that they desire, but his lack of interest may dash these hopes. However, it is important to remember that this church is still the largest in Ukraine and has a huge degree of potential influence.

The Type II churches also have a great deal of potential influence, and they are actively working to use and increase that influence. Due to their lack of ties and their historical antagonism with the Soviet state, there seem to be few national political contacts for either the Greek Catholic or the Ukrainian Autocephalous churches. Instead, their power bases are in the regional government of west Ukraine, or in regional representatives working in Kiev.

A great deal of the political power of the Greek Catholic Church has been ascribed to the regional and local governments in west Ukraine (Interview #20). While officials in other regions of Ukraine are perceived to be hostile and indifferent to the needs of the Greek Catholic Church (Interviews #29, 22), west Ukrainian officials are very favorably inclined toward the GCC. In fact, according to one scholar, "the authorities (in west Ukraine) are not neutral but have made it so the GCC wins on the local oblast level" (Interview #31). These regional ties extend to a deputy in Parliament who is the head of a regional administration. This man is working to gather funds and to get the government to restore a monastery to the GCC. The same Greek Catholic priest who shared this information with me went on to say that "the church has more of its contacts at the local and regional level... the national government is not very helpful" (Interview #4). Some contacts exist at the national level, however. The deputies to the national Supreme Soviet from western

Ukraine are overwhelmingly Greek Catholic (Interview #7), so they provide the church with some national connections. These few national contacts, including the Ukrainian Vice-Premier, are bolstered by very strong local and regional contacts. Given the depth of the historical association between the Greek Catholic Church, the national independence movement in west Ukraine, and their resistance to the Soviet state, it is not surprising that the GCC church is the politically dominant force in west Ukraine. It is also not surprising that their sanctions at the local and regional levels are much more effective than they are at the national level.

The other Type II church, the UAOC, also has a paucity of links to the national political system. Unlike the GCC, however, they are not in a strong position in any region. Their strongest base of support is the west Ukraine, but the power of the GCC dwarfs their efforts to gain power on the local or regional level. Their strongest contacts are at these levels, but they are always fighting the influence of the Greek Catholic Church.

As a result, the UAOC seems to be trying to create their own power base on the national level, among nationalists who fear the Soviet ties of former Communist politicians. This small but vocal group is made up of young leaders who have had little to no ties with the Communist power structure. These people have tried to position themselves as nationalists who are not tainted by the practices of the former Soviet government. A leader of this group, and a loud defender of the UAOC, is Serhei Holovaty, member of the Ukrainian Parliament. He has been a staunch ally of this church, to the point of giving a press conference accusing Kravchuk and members

of the national government of violating the human rights of UAOC believers and violating the freedom of religion in Ukraine (Holovaty 1993). A priest of the UAOC ran as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet because he "was worried about the tendency (he saw) leading to the resumption of the USSR...and to let(ing) the Communists back into office" (Interview #30). He said that the church fears both the ex-Communists and the ex-Soviets currently in power and is trying to get democratic forces in control of the government. In these attempts, the UAOC has a wide range of contacts with nationalistic political parties in Ukraine. He ran as a candidate of the Rukh party, and the church has published letters of support from the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine.

Although it is by far the weaker church, the UAOC alone seems to be positioning itself to directly challenge the UOC-KP for national political power. The UOC-MP has become politically isolated, the Greek Catholic Church is focused almost exclusively upon west Ukrainian politics, and the Protestants are largely politically dormant. That leaves the UOC-KP, by far the most powerful church, and the UAOC, the weaker but very politically active challenger.

Type III churches have few links to people in government. Since the majority of Protestant churches were persecuted and existed underground under Soviet times, they have few historical contacts with governmental officials, and current relations are strained. The general consensus among church leaders was that they do not ask government for anything and do not expect any response. As expected, the lack of monitoring by these churches has led to a lack of sanctioning.

As hypothesized, different ties led churches to different levels of government. Ties to the Soviet state led to the national level while ties to nationalistic groups led to regional and local levels of government. Type IV churches sanctioned most vigorously and directly and focused their efforts on the national level of government. Type II churches sanctioned rather feebly during the Presidential election, due to a lack of enthusiasm for either candidate. Their general links to the political system are potent, however. The GCC has strong ties to the regional and local administrations in west Ukraine and wields a great deal of power over this level of government. The UAOC is focusing its attention upon the national level, trying to establish a base of power among political groups that fear Russia and former Communists. Their ability to sanction at this level is still weak, but is expected to grow. The Type I and III churches both participated in little sanctioning behavior. The UOC-MP seems to have been largely marginalized by its ties with Russia, while the Protestant churches show no interest in governmental activities at any level.

Credibility

The credibility of a church affects its ability to reach the state. Credibility stems from both popular support and elite support. In this study it is measured in no concrete way but is assessed based upon information gained in the interviews. Based upon this information, groups that are passive in their response to the government and that cede power to elites will have less credibility than those who actively respond to government and gather information themselves.

As mentioned earlier, credibility has some additional components. A church

with legitimate claims to be a representative of Ukrainian national statehood has a great deal of credibility. This leads me to hypothesize that ties to the nationalist movement will help church credibility, while foreign or Soviet times will harm credibility. Actual influence with members of the government helps credibility. Therefore, I hypothesize that Soviet ties will help credibility. Finally, the ability to mobilize members to threaten electoral punishment enhances credibility. Churches with national ties are expected to gain from this credibility.

In net, this results in some contradictions. First, Soviet ties in one instance hamper credibility while in another they help credibility. I suggest this is because in the first instance, Soviet ties hamper credibility among the populous, while in the second instance they help credibility among decision-making elites in government. In addition, the UOC-KP has ties to both the nationalist movement and the Soviet state. Therefore, they may have a hard time gaining credibility based upon their claim to be an authentic representative of Ukrainian nationhood.

It is important to note that regional differences have a strong impact on credibility. My research demonstrates that ties enhancing credibility in one region decrease credibility in other regions. In particular, historical claims of national statehood will rarely enhance credibility in east Ukraine. The drastic differences between regions are reflected in the divergent responses to church ties.

Credibility

An unanticipated factor influencing credibility surfaced immediately. For many people in Ukraine, the Orthodox church is considered to be the true church of

Ukraine. Ukraine has been an Orthodox country since 988 A.D. when Prince Vladimir, in Kiev, deliberately chose Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism and Islam (Nielsen 1994). Many of the people interviewed mentioned that this religious identification is an important part of Ukraine's national identity. Therefore, any of the three Orthodox churches--the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, or UAOC--are deemed by many to be more credible. The other churches are viewed by these same people as foreign churches that are somehow harming the national development of Ukraine.

As hypothesized, the UOC-KP is making the most of its claim to be a nationalistic church. This claim, together with its tangible and formidable ties to leaders from the Soviet state, has made it a church that is taken very seriously. Leaders from the UOC-KP were the only ones who spoke of being satisfied with what the government has done for them. One Bishop explained that the church speaks to the government and explains what it wants and "the church is glad that the government is understanding and tolerant of the problems of the church" (Interview #25).

However, several factors may be harming the credibility of this church. The ties of the church, and of its leader, Metropolitan Filaret, to the Soviet state, are damaging. To many people, Filaret is the personification of the UOC-KP, and they speak interchangeably of him and the church. Whatever he has done or whatever characteristics he has are ascribed to the larger church. While Filaret has worked to quiet discussion of his past, there is evidence that he collaborated with the KGB (Motyl 1993). For many, especially nationalists, this is a damning information. The

former Patriarch of the UAOC, Mystaslav, said "it is not only the matter of Filaret's connections with Communist Party structures and the KGB. God is his judge here" (Holovaty 1993). These connections undermine his credibility, especially among those who did not cooperate with the authorities and were persecuted for their beliefs.

With the election of Kuchma, the general perception of the church that so strongly supported Kravchuk may be tarnished. Indeed, there is a suggestion that the UOC-KP has greatly restricted its political demands since the election and has been much quieter (Interview #31). If Kuchma gains the country's approval, then the credibility of the church that stood against him so strongly may be severely damaged. If Kuchma fails, and anti-Russian nationalism becomes even more powerful, the UOC-KP is one of the churches that stands to gain.

The UOC-MP, as hypothesized, has indeed suffered from its strong ties to the Soviet state and to Russia. Under Kravchuk's administration, these ties to Russia were used as justification for an informal informational blockade where they were stopped from broadcasting their services or programs on TV (Interview #31). Metropolitan Sobodan was personally treated poorly by Kravchuk (Interview #3). The ties to Russia were judged to be a threat, and the UOC-MP was seen as a puppet of Russian imperialistic ambitions. Priests of the UOC-MP fear that they are being branded as agents of Moscow (Interview #28). This has greatly lessened the credibility of this church.

In addition, the UOC-MP has withdrawn from politics to some degree, and this is likely to hamper its credibility. The ruling body of the church met in Moscow

and ruled that the church and clergy are not allowed to participate in politics. This neutrality, if followed, will lessen the credibility and political power of the church.

However, other unexpected factors have bolstered the credibility of the UOC-MP. As every UOC-MP priest pointed out to me, their church is by far the largest in Ukraine, in terms of believers as well as property. And, in the center and east of the country, this church is growing. As it gains adherents, it gains credibility. In addition, Kuchma's election potentially strengthens the position of the UOC-MP. If Kuchma is perceived to favor this church (which is possible since they both share the same strong ties to Russia), then the credibility of this church will increase. If Kuchma continues to stay away from the religious question, however, this church's credibility will continue to slide. For this church, the ties to Russia can either harm or help its credibility, depending upon the political climate within the country.

The credibility of the Greek Catholic Church is high, as hypothesized, due to its long history supporting the nationalist movement in Ukraine. This church is recognized by many as one of the main forces resisting the Communist takeover of western Ukraine in the 1940s. Its staunch support for an independent Ukraine has provided it with impeccable nationalistic credentials. However, the GCC suffers from its affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church. To some, the GCC is a tool of Rome that should be regarded with suspicion (Interview #21). This is used as justification for decisions that deny the church any property beyond the western regions of Ukraine. In addition, old Soviet accusations of Greek Catholic collaboration with the Nazis during World War II have resurfaced, and this too has been used as a reason to

deny requests of the church (Interview #29).

These accusations have damaged the credibility of the church, especially in the central regions of Ukraine. This low level of credibility is reflected in the treatment that GC churches in Kiev receive from the state. The perception of one Greek Catholic priest in Kiev is that the government is hostile and "still acts like it did under the Russian empire and the USSR--they think that there is just one Orthodox church and that all the others are foreign" (Interview #22).

This church is not an Orthodox church, although it uses the Orthodox rite, so the movement against non-Orthodox churches harms it. The official proclamation of Cardinal Lubachevsky during the Presidential election forbidding churches or church leaders from taking sides in the election also will likely hamper their credibility in national elections in the future.

The most credible church in Ukraine may very well be the other Type II church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Like the Greek Catholic Church, the UAOC shares strong historical ties with nationalistic groups in Ukraine. Its resistance to and suppression by the Soviet authorities proves the lack of potentially damaging ties to the Soviet state. In addition, the UAOC is an Orthodox church and can claim the spiritual heritage of the Slavic people dating back to 988 A.D. when Prince Vladimir decided that the Kiev-Rus Empire would be Christian. The only external ties of this church are to the Ukrainian diaspora, located primarily in Canada and the United States. Given all these factors, the UAOC has a great deal of credibility in Ukraine, particularly among the nationalist groups.

However, their small size and lack of ties to governmental officials have hampered their credibility among many decision makers in government. During UAOC protests of the actions of President Kravchuk, church members and church leaders were beaten by the police (Interview #30). When former Patriarch Mystaslav returned from the United States in November 1990 to be enthroned as Patriarch of the UAOC and to take up residence in Kiev, the government and the KGB allegedly put a multitude of obstacles in his way, including delaying him at the airport, refusing him permission to get an apartment, etc (Interview #24). In addition, the current Patriarch, Dmitri, has no office or church building in Kiev. Finally, the church still has no official status and at the time of the interviews was still not recognized as a church in Ukraine.

All of the factors suggest that to the government of Kravchuk, this church had little to no credibility. Now that his administration is gone, the situation may change. The last UAOC priest interviewed displayed optimism that the church will soon be registered. This church's active involvement with politics will likely increase its credibility with governmental decision makers. The willingness of church leaders to take political positions and to back up those positions with protests and marches suggests that they should be taken seriously as a political force. In interviews with church leaders from the UAOC, they seemed to recognize that they are currently in a weak position, but they also seem certain that they have a strong power base and will increase their power. In the words of a UAOC priest, although the government in the past has favored the UOC-KP, "this cannot keep the UAOC out of political power.

We still have the influence, even though at the moment it is minor. Our church has power with the nationalist forces and if our influence today is limited, then it may grow in the future" (Interview #30) This confidence may go a long way to increasing the credibility and political clout of the UAOC.

The least credible of the churches, due to their lack of interest in politics, are the Type III churches. As hypothesized, these churches are interested primarily in public goods, are not monitoring or sanctioning government to any degree, and therefore lack any political credibility. Time and time again, church leaders acknowledged that politics is never mentioned in their churches, that the church doesn't need government to listen to it since it is God who works in peoples' hearts, and that the church should play no role in influencing the voting behavior of church members. These attitudes have lessened the credibility of these churches.

In addition, the ties of these churches to western organizations and to non-Orthodox confessions strongly hampers their credibility. These churches, with their Protestant religion and contacts with foreign missionaries, are seen as a threat to Ukraine's spiritual heritage. According to one UOC-KP priest, Ukraine is an Orthodox nation, and the people of this country should not be pulled away by these "foreign" organizations or churches (Interview #14). Many Protestant church leaders feel that they are being singled out for persecution by the state because they are not Orthodox, and this leads them to distance themselves further from the state (Interview #19). Since the government does not listen to them, they stay away from contacts with the government and are most happy when the government does not disturb them

(Interview #1). This creates an interesting cycle where lack of credibility leads to decreased political involvement which leads to a decrease in credibility.

What is interesting is that, as hypothesized, there is still a large degree of potential credibility within the Protestant churches. Because of their lack of involvement in the politics of Ukraine, these churches are perceived by many to be more trustworthy and "clean" than other churches in Ukraine (Interview #20). One government administrator said that the Protestant church has a great deal of influence because they kept themselves "pure" under Communist times and now. As a result, they are widely respected (Interview #17). There has been a great interest in religion in the past few years, and the Protestant churches have been growing at a very rapid rate. Therefore, while these churches are largely apolitical and have little credibility among decision makers, they are well positioned to have a great deal of credibility if they do decide to enter the political arena.

In sum, the most potentially credible churches may be the Protestant churches. Should they choose to more vigorously enter the political fray, their apolitical history and lack of compromising ties will likely give them great credibility among citizens. The most currently credible church is probably the UAOC. Particularly in the west and center it is seen as an uncompromising supporter of an independent Ukraine, untarnished by damaging ties to the USSR or Russia. The UOC-KP still has a great deal of credibility in the center and west, as does the UOC-MP in the east, but neither can escape their ties to the former Soviet Union which included, in many cases, cooperation with the Soviet KGB.

Credibility matters both to governmental officials and to the general population. A loss of credibility among the public may lead to a corresponding loss of credibility among decision makers. An executive-level ministry may perceive the UOC-KP to be less credible, although they share the same Soviet ties, if the general perception of this church has become more negative among the general population.

Regional Differences

Credibility was not only influenced by church ties or by Orthodox affiliation. Huge differences in credibility between the regions of Ukraine were also discovered. The credibility of a church to west Ukrainian officials and people was much different from the credibility to east Ukrainian officials and people. The perception of church ties varied markedly between regions. For example, in west and central Ukraine, ties to nationalistic groups were positive and increased credibility. In east Ukraine, however, these same ties were negative and decreased credibility. Therefore, it is difficult to describe a pattern that fits the whole country.

In the west, the single most important factor enhancing credibility is commitment to Ukrainian nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kravchuk, the nationalist candidate, received the overwhelming majority of votes in west Ukraine. The single most detrimental factor to credibility is ties to Russia. Therefore, the churches sharing strong ties to nationalism, Types II (UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP), are the most credible. The church with strong ties to Russia, Type I (UOC-MP), has very little credibility at all. A Bishop of the UOC-MP church in Lviv (western Ukraine) described his position in this city as being a

"persona non grata" (Interview #8). He went on to compare himself to a fighter in the middle of enemy controlled territory. In fact, Type I churches are few and far between in the west, particularly in the Galacian regions of Lviv, Ivano Frankivsk, and Ternopil (see Appendix B).

People in west Ukraine refer to the UOC-MP as the Russian Orthodox Church, obviously insinuating that it is a foreign-controlled church. One Greek Catholic Church priest described a dinner celebrating the 50 year anniversary of an important GCC priest where all the "Ukrainian" (UAOC, UOC-KP) churches were invited, but the "Russian" (UOC-MP) church leaders were not (Interview #4).

Of the churches with strong ties to Ukrainian nationalism, the general consensus is that the Greek Catholic Church has the most adherents, the most influence, and the most credibility. It is understandable that the overwhelming size of the church in Galacia contributes to its credibility. Contrary to expectations, larger size has not diluted the message or influence of the GCC, but has lent it greater power and authority. This power has led to a great deal of influence in western Ukraine.

The UAOC and the UOC-KP are also strong in the west, but their credibility and influence are less than that of the GCC. Their smaller size translates into less power in the west. It is generally acknowledged that the larger size of the GCC has helped them in the hunt for property (Interview #23). Although they fight over property, these churches share the same commitment to using Ukrainian as the language in church services, to Ukrainian nationalism, and to fighting against

cooperation with Russia.

Since Protestant churches lack the positive ties with nationalistic groups and negative ties with Russia, they seem to be regarded in a neutral fashion. All information indicates that they possess little influence or credibility in the west.

In east Ukraine, the patterns of influence are reversed. The strong ties of Types II and IV churches to nationalism are viewed in a negative fashion, while Type I churches' ties to Russia are viewed favorably. It is not surprising that Kuchma, the candidate who emphasized his ties to Russia, received the bulk of the vote in the east. The UOC-MP is overwhelmingly powerful, in terms of size and influence in the east. Metropolitan Sobodan of the UOC-MP, viewed with fear and suspicion by many in the west, is revered and respected in the east (Interview #3). The Russian-speaking, Russian-leaning population here has strong ties with the UOC-MP and Russia and views the nationalistic fervor of the west with some trepidation. As one scholar in east Ukraine stated, they do not want the USSR again and they want an independent Ukraine, but they also want to keep the spiritual and cultural ties with Russia (Interview #3). This church is referred to in this region as the Russian Orthodox Church, but no negative connotations are intended. Rather, the name refers to the ancient Kiev-Rus empire. For them, referring to this church as the Russian church has no ethnic implications; the people in the east are indifferent to the question (Interview #35). It is striking how the same reference to this church can have such divergent meanings in two regions of Ukraine.

The UOC-KP is viewed by the UOC-MP and the government of east Ukraine

as a nationalistic organization, according to a UOC-KP priest (Interview #2). This decreases the credibility of this church in the east, and negatively influences their ability to reach the state. As this same priest states, they have tried to contact the government to make their requests known, but they have had no response from the state. The Type II churches who share interests in nationalism are so small that they virtually do not exist in east Ukraine. There is one Greek Catholic congregation in the eastern city of Donetsk, but it is quite small and has no church building. Services are held in a small house that serves as parish, office and church building. These churches are largely marginalized, due to their size and their unsavory ties to the nationalist movement in Ukraine.

The Protestants in the east behave in much the same fashion as they do in the west. For the most part, they do not hold any political opinions and focus their attention on religious, rather than secular, interests.

In eastern Ukraine, the church is in a totally different position from the rest of the country, because the eastern region is totally different from the rest of the country. In the east, the country looks much the same as it did under Communism. The same statues of Lenin still stand, streets are still named after the October Revolution, and the same people are in power at all levels of government. As a result, the churches are still very weak and are very dependent upon the same Communist authorities for help. When I requested an interview with a representative of the UOC-MP, they checked with the local Department of Religious Affairs and when the head of the department said no, they refused to meet with me. In many

respects, the churches still function as though the Soviet Union still exists.

The interrogation I underwent by the Chief of the Department of Religious Affairs in Donetsk spoke volumes about the lack of change in east Ukraine. Not only are former Soviet officials still in place, but their former Soviet-style practices continue. Protestant church leaders told me about continued harassment by regional authorities, including the denial of visas for foreign visitors unless bribes were paid. The fact that the Chief accused me of being a Protestant spy highlights the continued state paranoia and state intrusion into religious affairs in this region.

Religious roots in this region are weak, and there is a weak religious tradition in this area. Churches are very weak, and not very politically oriented. The overall attitude is that people are not eager to discuss the relationship between churches and the government, and they are very suspicious of the questions and the questioner.

The central regions of Ukraine, including the capital city Kiev, are the least lopsided. In these regions, the UOC-KP and UOC-MP are pitted against one another in the fight for supremacy. The UOC-MP is strong in this area, but the UOC-KP has been fighting hard for power and influence. According to one scholar, Filaret and his church have been gaining ground against Sobodan and the UOC-MP (Interview #31). The UOC-KP is well positioned here to use its ties with former Soviet officials still in power while also playing the nationalistic card. However, historical affiliation to the UOC-MP has provided this church with a large base of support that the UOC-KP must contend with. Again, the size of the UOC-MP is an asset in the search for credibility. With Kravchuk out of power, the UOC-KP may find that it has lost some

of its most important contacts in this region, and as a result, lost some of its credibility. Given the current lack of GC or Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches in the center of Ukraine, any loss of credibility of the UOC-KP will likely help the UOC-MP.

In sum, my hypotheses largely were correct in explaining credibility. Ties to nationalistic organizations improve credibility, while ties to the Soviet state help church credibility among decision makers but hamper credibility among much of the general public. Ties to foreign organizations, whether to the Roman Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, or western Protestant churches, largely harm church credibility. What was not expected was the lack of credibility accorded to any non-Orthodox church. The perception of Ukraine as an Orthodox country that should remain Orthodox was much more widespread than anticipated, and those churches that are Orthodox are granted a great deal of preference and credibility.

With all of these things considered, the church that emerges as the most potentially credible is the UAOC. It has credibility from being Orthodox, having strong nationalistic ties, and having no ties to the Soviet state. The next most credible church is the UOC-KP. This Type IV church has strong nationalistic ties and is Orthodox, but suffers from ties to the Soviet state. During the time of the interviews, the UOC-KP decidedly had the edge on credibility, particularly among decision makers. But, many factors suggested that, in the future, the UAOC may gain a more credible position, both among decision makers and the general public.

The regional differences in Ukraine are great. Ties that help a church in one

region harm that church in another region. No church is positioned to straddle the differences and appeal to each region. Rather, the Greek Catholics have the strongest position in the west, while the UOC-MP has the dominant position in the east. The UOC-KP is strong in the center and is trying to challenge both churches in their respective regions. Short of a unification between the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP, no church looks likely to gain a country-wide position of power.

Conclusion

Churches were concerned with influencing a limited range of governmental policies. The majority pursued private goods, including ownership of property, special recognition and position, money, and a formal state apology. The public goods most mentioned were laws governing freedom of religion, and laws governing religious groups special status for taxation purposes. As expected, the private goods were pursued with much more vigor than the public goods.

As mentioned earlier, the realm of government policies in which the churches were interested remains quite narrow. There appeared to be little to no interest in trying to influence social policy. Interest in foreign policy, as will be discussed in later chapters, was limited to a general view on relations with Russia and the west. Given the limited amount of time that churches have been free to engage in politics, it is not surprising that they are focusing on a limited range of policies. It is likely that their activities will expand into other realms of public policy in the future.

When churches try to reach the state, combined ties to the Soviet power structure and nationalistic organizations are the most helpful. Ties to the Soviet state

provide important high level contacts, while ties to nationalistic organizations provide legitimacy. The UOC-KP is the only church with both these ties, and therefore it is in the best position to reach the state. This church is primarily interested in the private goods of state recognition and property. It is strong in the center and west of Ukraine, but is making a concerted effort to gain power in the east of the country.

However, the position of the UOC-KP is not unassailable. Their Soviet ties help their access, but harm their credibility, especially among citizens in west and central Ukraine. Churches with strong nationalistic qualifications, such as the Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches, have legitimacy and credibility, but lack strong national contacts. This well may change, as newer governmental leaders emerge who did not work within the Soviet system. Therefore, Type II churches may be positioned well for future influence. Currently theses churches are pursuing the private good of property and are strong in the western areas of Ukraine. Their best contacts are on the regional and local levels, although the UAOC is working to develop national level connections.

Type I UOC-MP churches are in a difficult position; their ties to the Russian Orthodox Church are harmful to them in the regions outside of eastern Ukraine. They have tried to overcome this drawback by using their ties to national ex-Soviet leaders, but all indications suggest that they have not been very successful. While they are in a weak position, it is important to remember that they are a weak Goliath. The UOC-MP is still the largest church in Ukraine and has a large number of followers, particularly in the east. In the west, they are virtually non-existent. Their

pursuit of private goods is subdued, perhaps because they have a great deal of property already, or because they recognize that they are in no position to make strong demands. In time, they may actually welcome a union with the UOC-KP, but on their own terms. If the churches did unite, then the UOC-MP could benefit from the nationalistic ties of the UOC-KP, while keeping their own huge properties and adherents.

The Protestant churches maintained their distance from the state and are doing little to reach the state. Their interests are in public goods, and they have no regional power base. As a result, they are largely marginalized in the political process.

In general, the characteristics that help a church reach the state are varied. It helps if the church is Orthodox, has no ties to Russia or to foreign organizations, and has strong ties to Ukrainian nationalism. When all these factors are considered, the only church that qualifies is the UAOC. Therefore, it is expected that this church may gain in power and influence in Ukraine in the years to come.

Next, I consider the response of the state to the demands of the churches. In order to influence politics, churches must first reach the government, and then the government must choose whether or not to respond. The following chapter examines which churches succeed in getting the state to grant their requests.

Chapter 5
Churches as Political Actors on the Macro Level: State Response

"Everything the Greek Catholic Church has, it got from the elections in 1989. The officials in west Ukraine have done more for them than for the Orthodox. In the east and south, local officials have made obstacles to the UAOC and the UOC-KP." Scholar, Interview #20

"If the UOC-MP and UOC-KP join then this would be a powerful consolidation of forces and this would likely suppress the Protestant churches." Protestant pastor, Interview #5

"Ukraine is an Orthodox nation, and people should not be pulled away by these foreign organizations or churches." Priest, UOC-KP, Interview #14

The first phase of church political activity on the macro societal level is reaching the state. In order to influence politics, churches must first get the government to listen to their requests. After this, it is up to the state to decide whether or not to respond to church requests. This response by the state is the second phase of macro level political activity. The state will agree to grant the desires of some churches and will refuse the requests of other churches. As hypothesized throughout this paper, the ties of the churches have a significant impact upon the responsiveness of the state. This chapter examines the effect of participation upon state response, and then discusses specific instances of state response to church demands. In addition, this section takes a close look at the response of the state to church demands for a religious monopoly, and the consequences that this, and other decisions for specific goods, have for Ukraine.

Participation

The main factor determining state responsiveness is participation. In the

developing democracy of Ukraine, the participation of churches has an effect upon the decisions of the state. However, it is important to consider that not all churches are participating at the same rate. I hypothesized that churches that participate frequently receive their desired state response while churches that participate rarely do not receive what they desire from the state. Specifically, I hypothesized that Types I, II, and IV churches participate more, and Type III churches less. In addition, the part of government targeted is an important component of state response. Churches gravitate toward those areas of government that make the key decisions pertaining to their activities. State response reflects the "capture" of parts of government by interested churches. The private interests of these churches are victorious in the battle for state response over the general interests of the larger church population.

The data reveal that political participation by churches varied across church type. As expected, Types II and IV churches participated vigorously and Type III churches largely stayed out of politics. However, it was surprising to find that Type I churches did not participate as frequently as hypothesized.

The political participation of the Type IV UOC-Kiev Patriarchate churches was overt and vigorous. While church leaders usually described their own participation in oblique terms, it is clear that this church was very politically active. During the Presidential election, this church openly supported Kravchuk (Interview #9), even to the point of speaking about him in their services (Interview #21). By taking a stand, they made clear that they were for one specific candidate and that they would use their influence to get others to support this candidate. In addition to supporting

Kravchuk, they were very vocal in their support of several Supreme Soviet candidates that they perceived to be helpful to their cause (Interview #32). According to their own publication, they welcomed certain political candidates to their seminary to talk about their programs. Students from this seminary also were reported to be very active during the election (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate 1994).

Their participation took other forms as well. The UOC-KP addressed the state directly in reference to important issues. In one case, the church spoke to the state about tax rates and explained that since the church is a moral institution, rather than a commercial structure, it should be taxed at a lower rate (Interview #25). In addition, they approached Kravchuk many times to try to win concessions for their church and to solidify their ties to his administration (Interview #33).

Type II churches also participated frequently. The Greek Catholic Church was lukewarm in its support for Kravchuk during the Presidential election, but was very active in other forms of participation. The church has been vigorous in confronting the state with alleged abuses. One priest in Kiev showed me a sheaf of letters that he had sent to the Parliament in his attempt to get a church building (Interview #22). He also described protest behavior where his church continued to hold services in the street outside of a church that the government had refused to give them. The church pursued personal meetings with then-President Kravchuk to emphasize their desire for a state apology for past mistreatment (Interview #13). Other meetings were held with governmental leaders to try to get the state to lower tax rates on churches.

Participation also took more direct forms during the elections. In regional

elections, the church specifically named the candidates that their members should vote for (Interview #32). The GCC has been a strong supporter of nationalist candidates (Interview #31). In a youth magazine, the editors showed who the "good" candidates were and told the readers that these were good Christians who were doing good things (Interview #10).

The UAOC participated in several direct ways. In their most direct attempt, a priest of the UAOC ran for election to the Supreme Soviet. He stated that he hoped that the problems of political and financial support of the church would be fixed by his election (Interview #30). In addition, leaders of this church took part in civic rebellion. They picketed, marched, and generally called attention to their desire for legalization and registration. According to one priest, the only thing they gained from this activity is that their leaders are now officially invited with other churches to national gatherings. As a result, they are included in meetings with political leaders where they can communicate their interests. Other church leaders wrote letters to Kravchuk requesting assistance with property (Interview #7).

In sharp contrast, the Type III Protestant churches largely did not participate in politics. These churches stayed away from politics and the government (Interview #19), and tried not to be directly involved in governmental affairs. In fact, several churches seemed proud of the fact that they do not have any government contacts. An exception to this was the activity of a Baptist pastor in east Ukraine. This pastor described visits to the regional President and letters sent to the Parliament to try to lower tax rates (Interview #5). Interestingly, a member of the Rukh political party in

south-east Ukraine recruited and paid a group of Baptists to work on behalf of the party. These people hung up posters and went door to door to canvass for support (Interview #9). According to this party worker, these church members would work only for his candidate because all the other candidates were socialists and communists. However, he went on to say that these same Baptists did nothing to influence the voting behavior of church members. Therefore, while there is some participation, the overall pattern is one of passivity and lack of participation.

The Type I UOC-MP churches participated more than the Protestant churches, but less than the Type II and IV churches. It is clear that the UOC-MP was not as passive as the Protestants. They were active in battles over property; they wrote letters, met with government officials, and even held services in the street to protest government decisions (Interview #6). But, their activity was not as extensive or as focused as that of the Type II and IV churches. The UOC-MP seemed more inclined to keep somewhat at a distance. According to the interviews, the church was somewhat muted in its support for Kuchma, although it clearly favored him over Kravchuk (Interview #21). Now that Kuchma has been elected, the church may begin to step up its activity (Interview #31).

Level of Government

The part of government contacted also influences state response. Church ties affect level of government approached, and level of government in addition to rates of participation influence state responsiveness. Churches try to focus their attention on the parts of government that can best assist them. As mentioned in Chapter 4,

churches gravitated to distinct levels of government. By narrowing the focus of their participation to the part of government that is most favorably disposed to them, they make the most of their efforts.

The UOC-KP and the UOC-MP both focused their attention upon the national level. Since the UOC-KP is participating much more actively than the UOC-MP, then it seems likely that they are doing a better job of wooing and capturing decision makers at that level. For both churches, this is the level where they are most likely to get decisions makers to listen to them. Again, the ties of both churches to the former Soviet state give them contacts to key people at the national level, while the nationalistic ties of the UOC-KP give them contacts within the nationalist community. The UAOC has been diligent in participating and trying to gain support on the national level.

The Greek Catholics have focused upon the regional level and have been very active and successful in gaining positive state response. The Protestant churches have no specific level of government that they are focusing upon, and when combined with their lack of participation suggests that they elicit little state response.

It is clear that most of the churches participated in politics, but the degree of participation and the goods sought are very different. Every type of church participated to try to get the government to rule favorably with respect to a public good. Tax policy was a common concern, and all the churches took political action to get the government to make a decision to lower the tax rates on churches. Participation levels differed in all other situations. The Type II and IV churches

participated frequently, and were trying to convince the government to grant the private goods, such as political favor, state apologies, property, and legalization. Type I churches participated less regularly, but when they did they were interested in private goods. Type III churches rarely participated in areas outside of the pursuit of public goods. Participation was aimed at specific levels of government in order to make the most of political connections.

State Response

Churches participate in politics at different rates. As discussed above, Types II and IV participate more than Types I and III. I hypothesize that state response varies according to rate of participation and church ties. Greater levels of participation combined with "favorable" state ties to nationalistic groups lead to favorable state response. Low levels of participation combined with negative ties to foreign organizations lead to the lack of state response to church demands. Interested groups pursuing private goods receive the benefits desired. In the following section, general state decisions are examined first, followed by a discussion of specific decisions involving property.

General decisions

This section examines the general state response to church demands. I hypothesized that churches that are more actively involved in politics and have favorable ties are more successful in getting what they want from the state. Those that participate less and have less favorable ties do not receive what they want from the state. Type II UAOC and GCC churches with high participation rates and strong

ties to Ukrainian nationalism are expected to have success achieving desired state response. Type IV UOC-KP churches benefit from these same high rates of participation and ties and have additional ties to the Soviet state. I hypothesized that these Soviet ties harm them, as they harm the attempts of Type I churches. Type I UOC-MP churches are also hampered by lower levels of participation. Type III Protestant churches participate little and have no ties that can encourage state response.

It became immediately apparent that ties to the Soviet state currently are an asset, rather than a hindrance, to achieving desired state response. My hypothesis suggesting that Soviet ties were negative was incorrect. The majority of power in Ukraine still lies in the hands of former Soviet officials, so churches with connections to these people have a better chance to convince the state to act in their favor than those without any former Soviet connections. The close relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state gives these churches an edge in current state relations. In this respect, the UOC-KP and UOC-MP churches are positioned well to use their contacts for their benefits. However, three factors combine to explain why the UOC-KP has been much more successful in achieving state response that the UOC-MP. In the first place, the UOC-KP participated much more vigorously in politics and spent more time and effort communicating their interests to government. Therefore, the state is not only better informed, but is more aware of the ability of this church to sanction their actions. According to other religious leaders, priests from this church are listened to more carefully by governmental leaders (Interview

#19). This church was aggressive in presenting its interests and position to the government, and this resulted in state action (Interview #33). Several UOC-KP leaders expressed a degree of satisfaction that they had spoken to the state and that the state had listened and granted their requests (Interviews #11, 25).

In the second place, nationalistic ties together with Soviet ties have positioned the UOC-KP as the church of Kravchuk and his people, so while he was in power, the state was very inclined to respond to the wishes of the UOC-KP. The desire for extensive and favorable media coverage following the creation of the UOC-KP was fulfilled when the government instituted an informal media ban which gave television coverage exclusively to the UOC-KP (Interviews #15, 20). According to one Greek Catholic priest in Kiev

> the government invented the UOC-KP and they want to protect this church. They don't just help this church more than the others--they give this church everything it has. Kravchuk gave a large amount of public money to Filaret, and there has been no talk about the church giving it back (Interview #22).

Even the meeting of church leaders in 1992 that resulted in the creation of the UOC-KP is attributed to Kravchuk and his interference. According to a UOC-MP Bishop, the meeting "did not take place according to the law, but was under the direct influence of government on church affairs" (Interview #8). Now, even though Kravchuk is gone, his people are still in power and are able to carry out his preferential policies (Interview #24).

In the third place, the ties of the UOC-MP to Russia hamper both their efforts to reach the state and the state's inclination to respond favorably to UOC-MP demands in regions outside of east Ukraine. Kravchuk in particular spoke out against this church because of their ties to Russia, and took action to suppress their activity. According to one church scholar, Kravchuk's negative attitude toward the UOC-MP came out of his bad relations with Russia (Interview #31). His concern was that Russia wants to bring Ukraine back under the Russian sphere of control. The UOC-KP has capitalized on these Russian ties and talks about Ukraine's need to be independent and the desire of their church to be free from Moscow's control (Interview #14).

The election of pro-Russian Kuchma may change the balance of influence between these two churches. Until his election, the UOC-KP was overwhelmingly favored by the state (Interview #32). Now that he is in power, things seem to be changing. The Russian ties of the UOC-MP are not as officially disdained, and the government is stepping back from direct involvement in church affairs. Some even feel that Kuchma is now favoring the UOC-MP, but there is no clear evidence supporting this claim (Interview #30). In fact, Kuchma is perceived as a leader who has no prejudice against one confession or another and is interested in fulfilling freedom of conscience (Interview #3). At the very least, this suggests that Presidential state policy will cease openly favoring the UOC-KP above all others. In fact, Kuchma's preoccupation with economic affairs is considered a welcome sign that the state will back off from its direct meddling in inter-church affairs. The

Committee on Religious Affairs has been disbanded and replaced by the Committee on Nationality, Immigration and Cults. (The use of the word "cult" in the title, rather than the word "religion" seems purposeful but not as pejorative as it would be in English. Usage of this word may be intended to include groups that do not fall within the narrow traditional band of recognized churches or religions.) Since the Committee on Religious Affairs was widely viewed as a vehicle for favoring the UOC-KP, its replacement is a welcome sign (Interview #28).

The lack of Soviet ties for the remaining churches limited positive responses by the state on their behalf. For Type II churches, the positive responses they did receive came about because of their vigorous participation and their ties to nationalistic organizations. As mentioned earlier, the GCC received favorable state response in the western area of Ukraine (Interview #29). These state decisions were made by regional and local level government officials who favored Ukrainian nationalism. For example, the regional youth department in west Ukraine is paying 35% of the bills of a Greek Catholic youth organization called Ukrainian Youth for Christ (Interview #10). The Greek Catholic Church's positive state response, however, seems to be limited to regional administrations. National governmental bodies have continued in their negative attitudes toward the GCC. The foreign ties of the church to the Holy See are considered dangerous by some and the church is seen as a tool of Rome, especially by Orthodox nationalists (Interview #21). Under Kravchuk's administration, the church would speak to Kravchuk but would receive no answer, even at personal meetings (Interview #13).

The UAOC has participated fiercely, but has not achieved the state response it desires. Letters to Kravchuk have gone unanswered (Interview #7) and in its fight for state recognition it has not been officially accepted by the state (Interview #21). It has demanded financial support from the state, including subsidies to rebuild churches destroyed under the USSR, but has not received any compensation (Interview #30). They have also been denied access to radio and TV (Interview #24). This suggests that their nationalistic ties and high rate of participation have not been sufficient to gain state response. A critical feature that has helped the GCC gain desired response that the UAOC lacks is the strong linkages with regional and local governmental officials. As discussed earlier, in Chapter 4, the UAOC is pursuing linkages at the national level, but has not yet gained a strong enough foothold to merit favorable state response.

The Protestant churches lack any characteristics that might encourage state response. They have low rates of participation, have few ties to the Soviet state, and have no ties to nationalistic organizations or any particular levels of government. In addition, their ties to foreign organizations are seen as troublesome. Accordingly, Protestant churches are not receiving what they would like from the state. A Baptist pastor detailed government attempts to interfere with church affairs and to control the activities of the church (Interview #5). Another bemoaned the fact that laws governing freedom of religion are not applied to them, and that they do not have the freedoms they should have by law (Interview #19). Given the fact that these churches "have been traditionally neutral and are not involved in politics" (Interview #31), it is

not surprising that they have not received what they want from the state.

General state response hinges on several factors. Participation is an important component, but is not sufficient to cause the state the respond favorably. Ties to government officials, whether to former Soviet officials on the national level or to regional and local administrators, in concert with high levels of participation, are found to be related to desired state response. Low levels of participation, and ties to Russia, particularly during the Kravchuk administration, are negatively related to state response. State response depends upon more than nationalistic ties, as originally hypothesized. In addition, high levels of participation are not sufficient on their own to bring about desired state response. Rather, Soviet ties, ties to a specific level of government, and high levels of participation all contributed to positive state response during the Kravchuk administration.

It is important to note that the new President, Kuchma, is very different from his predecessor, so future state responses may hinge on entirely different factors. Given his strong affiliation with Russia, I hypothesize that, in the future, church ties to Russia may cease to be as negative a factor as they were earlier, at least to members of Kuchma's administration. Over time, the power of the nationalistic ties of Type II churches may wax and the power of Soviet ties may wane as new people, without Soviet government experience, join the government.

Property decisions

State allocation of property is a highly contentious issue in Ukraine, and churches are battling to get the state to respond to their property demands. I

hypothesized that state decisions regarding property follow the composition of the government. Under Kravchuk, ties with Russia, the Soviet state, and foreign organizations negatively influenced state response. Ties with nationalistic organizations positively influenced state response. Under Kuchma, ties with Russia become a positive force. In short, I hypothesized that state response fluctuates between Types I, II and IV churches as they all fight for property.

Again, a clear error in these hypotheses was the assumption that Soviet ties have a negative influence on state response. The research demonstrated that ties to the former Soviet state continue to be an asset rather than a liability. As discussed earlier, these ties provide access to governmental decision makers. However, the Soviet ties of the UOC-MP, when combined with their ties to Russia and their lower levels of participation, do not help them that much. The UOC-KP has benefited from its Soviet ties because it combines these connections with the legitimizing ties to nationalistic organizations and high levels of participation. This is demonstrated by a conflict with the UOC-MP over the Solomonskaya Church in Kiev. Both churches claimed it, but the UOC-MP had been holding services in it. According to the UOC-MP priest who had been the main priest of that church, representatives of the UOC-KP came in during the service, kicked out the priests and parishioners of the UOC-MP, and took the church by force. They then immediately got it officially registered by the state as their church. Both churches had ties to the Soviet state, but the UOC-KP was better positioned to get the state to respond favorably because of its additional nationalist ties in Ukraine. The UOC-MP took the conflict to trial, but the state court

ruled in the favor of the UOC-KP once again. The UOC-MP is reduced to carrying out their service in the street in front of the church in order to show their protest and to try to get the church back (Interview #6). In another case, governmental authorities reportedly spoke out against the UOC-MP, telling people that if they were against the UOC-KP they were against an independent Ukraine, and that the priests that remained with the UOC-MP are supporters of Russia (Interview #8).

Another error was the assumption that state response fluctuated between Types I, II and IV churches. Under Kravchuk, the state consistently responded favorably to Type IV churches on the national level, to the Greek Catholic Church on the regional level in the west only, and to the UOC-MP on the regional level in the east. When the UOC-KP was formed in the first place, the government took measures to transfer property from the larger Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the UOC-KP. The rationale was that this property should be in Ukrainian, rather than Russian (UOC-MP) hands (Interview #7). In west Ukraine, a compromise was reached between the UAOC and the Greek Catholic Church over a contested church. The churches were to share the building and to alternate their services. However, when the UAOC priest handed the church over to the GCC for their turn, the Greek Catholic people took it over, made new keys and locked the other church out. The regional authorities did nothing to rectify the situation when contacted by the UAOC (Interview #7). According to a scholar, the authorities in west Ukraine are not neutral but have made it so the GCC wins on the local and regional level (Interview #31). One reason for this is "the winners of the conflicts depend upon who has the largest number of people"

(Interview #23). In this case, size is not a negative factor as suggested in the literature, but a positive one. More members means more potential voters and more power. In east Ukraine, the state has fewer churches and has been slower to allocate them, but the large monastery in the area has already been given back to the UOC-MP (Interview #35). In addition, the regional and local authorities have funded a new UOC-MP cathedral being built in Donetsk (Interview #2). According to a scholar in that city "cooperation with politicians is still needed and without it the church cannot survive" (Interview #3). As mentioned several times, the UOC-MP is the largest church in the country, and in the south and east it dwarfs all other churches. Again, its large size is an asset in getting the state to respond favorably.

For the rest of the churches, and in the rest of the regions, no significant allocations of property were made by the state. When a UOC-MP priest spoke to the national government about getting a church building in west Ukraine, he was told that there was nothing they could do to help (Interview #8). Metropolitan Sobodan of the UOC-MP has repeatedly requested that the state cease renting out buildings in the sacred Pechirskaya Lavra to commercial firms and foreign diplomats. As it stands now, part of the Lavra is owned by the church and is used as a seminary and church headquarters. The other part, housed in buildings dotted throughout the seminary, is rented by people selling souvenirs, food, or carrying on official embassy business for various foreign countries. The church claims this presence is offensive to the church and believers, but the government is steadfast in its desire to claim the hard currency gained from the rentals.

In east Ukraine, the Greek Catholic church had to fight for over a year to get property to build their first church in Donetsk. Their difficulties from the government were only recently solved (Interview #16).

In Kiev, a Greek Catholic priest was told that he could not have a church building because they would be taking the place of another church (Interview #22). In every region except the west, they have problems getting the state to seriously consider their claims for property (Interview#29).

The Protestants have received no help from the government. One church leader described the difficulty in getting land to build their cathedral stemming from problems with the state bureaucracy (Interview #19). Another Baptist leader, in an informal conversation, explained that state aid was simply impossible to acquire, so their church turned to private funds solicited from churches in the U.S. and western Europe to build their church.

Under Kuchma, the early patterns seem to reflect little involvement in religious affairs, and the state has been quiet in its responses to church demands. One of his few actions was his purported promise to register the UAOC as a legal church in December 1995 (Interview #7). This action suggests his interest in rectifying past governmental favoritism. Consistency, rather than fluctuation, seems to mark the pattern of state response.

This objectivity in religious affairs was put to a dramatic test in August 1995. Patriarch Volodymyr of the UOC-KP died of a heart attack on July 14, 1995, and an immediate conflict arose over where he was to be buried. The UOC-KP petitioned

the government to allow Volodymyr, who had served 19 years in Soviet prison camps, to be buried inside the ancient and revered St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kiev. This 11th century cathedral, one of the greatest architectural and spiritual monuments in Ukraine, was promised to the UOC-KP by Kravchuk when he was President (L.A. Times, August 7, 1995). However, when Kuchma was elected President, the cathedral was designated as a national museum and holy place, angering the UOC-KP. Based upon the church's special status, the national government refused the request of the UOC-KP to bury Volodymyr there.

Defiantly, church officials organized a funeral procession to the cathedral's walls. At the gate, mourners and members of a sympathetic extreme nationalist group known as the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization (UNSO) began to pound through the asphalt sidewalk and dig a grave. Just as Volodymyr's coffin was lowered into the makeshift grave, squads of riot police appeared and attacked, beating mourners, priests, and para-military members. A riot ensued between the police and the UOC-KP supporters. More than 70 people were injured (Washington Post, July 23, 1995).

An official investigation by the government into the disturbance is underway, but no official statements have been issued by President Kuchma, either deploring the violence or calling for a solution. This has led to renewed charges by nationalists and the UOC-KP that Kuchma is a supporter of the UOC-MP and is deliberately working against the UOC-KP. The bold bid of the UOC-KP to gain access to St. Sophia's failed, but has resulted in a public relations disaster for the state, and an increase in

attention focused upon the UOC-KP and its claims.

Patriarch Volodymyr remains buried in a sidewalk grave outside the walls of St. Sophia's. His grave is piled high with flowers as trolley busses and cars zip by on the street a few feet away.

The important factors influencing state allocation of property were Soviet ties and nationalistic ties and the impact these ties had upon governmental linkages. The UOC-KP has strong ties with former Soviet leaders and with the nationalistic movement, and has used these ties to develop healthy linkages at the national level of government. The GCC has used its strong nationalistic ties and its large size in west Ukraine to develop healthy linkages with regional and local authorities in west Ukraine. The UOC-MP used its Soviet ties and large size in east Ukraine to maintain healthy linkages with local and regional authorities in east Ukraine. Therefore, large size, like a high degree of participation, enhances the effectiveness of church ties.

State-Sanctioned Religious Monopolies

An unforeseen battle is raging between several churches. Besides arguing over taxes, property, or money, various churches are pushing the state to extend special status to their church and their church alone. The state, in turn, has responded and has taken action that grants favor to certain churches.

As discussed in Chapter 4, not all churches have sought after special status vis-a-vis the state. The Ukrainian Orthodox churches, Moscow Patriarchate and Kiev Patriarchate, have pushed the hardest for special status, claiming that Orthodoxy is the true religion of Ukraine. The UAOC has been in no position to push for special

status since it still lacks true legal status, but it joins with the other Orthodox churches in arguing for limitations on the activities of "foreign" churches and groups. The Greek Catholic Church is sometimes a target, but more often these attacks are aimed at Protestant churches and groups. According to the Orthodox churches, foreign groups are interfering with the true religious life of Ukraine and should be banned or restricted. The claim of the Ukrainian churches for special status leads into their desire that other churches be controlled. They not only want special rights for themselves, they want restricted rights for other churches. The state, in turn, has responded to some of these demands.

Special Status

According to some, the state is interested in having its own state church, and the Orthodox church is the favorite (Interview #21). For centuries the Orthodox church and the state in Russia and Ukraine have had a special relationship. The church historically has provided legitimation to the regime in exchange for state protection of the church's monopoly over religious affairs (Little 1991: 17). According to one 14th century Russian church Patriarch, "the state and the church are closely united and it would be impossible to separate them one from another" (Little 1991: 17). This mindset lives on and is reflected in the current behavior of church leaders.

When Ukraine became independent, several religious organizations saw the opportunity to gain power. The Orthodox church, in particular, saw the chance to resume their special place and become the state church. This desire, however, has

led to conflict within the church, resulting in the split within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The battle therefore, is primarily between the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP.

During Kravchuk's presidency, the state took action that placed the UOC-KP in an exalted position. This church was treated by the state and perceived by society as the de facto state church (Interview #32). The close links between Filaret and Kravchuk, resulting from their shared historical ties to the Soviet state and their common desire to present themselves as nationalists and supporters of an independent Ukraine, led to Kravchuk's strong support for the creation of the UOC-KP. He in turn directed state structures, such as the Committee on Religious Affairs, to take actions necessary to register this church quickly (Interview #6). The UOC-KP was given exclusive access to television and allowed to broadcast their programs and agenda (Interviews #15, 20). They were allowed extensive access to President Kravchuk and had opportunity to "connect the church to the President" (Interview #33). In addition, the state supported the acquisition of several church buildings, primarily from the UOC-MP. According to church leaders who had buildings taken from them, the allocation of churches to the UOC-KP is further evidence that this church got more than it deserved because of overly favorable state support (Interview #30).

State support under Kravchuk overwhelmingly favored the UOC-KP, and this escaped no one's attention. By acting in a manner that favored this church over all the others, the state made clear that it considered this church to be special and worthy of special favor. This was perceived by many as a covert expression by the state that

this church was considered the state church. This tactic garnered religious support for Kravchuk, at least from UOC-KP members, and political credibility and power for the church.

At no time, however, did the state take the action most desired by the UOC-KP that would have solidified their position as the state church. Despite numerous requests, the state did nothing to unite the UOC-KP and UOC-MP under the leadership of the UOC-KP. The firm position of church leaders is that "the power of the Orthodox religion in Ukraine will only be found through unity" (Interview #25). Had the state granted this request, the new church would have unquestionably been the biggest and most powerful church in the country. It would have gained its power by means of state action, but it would keep its power by means of its enormous size. As a journalist stated, "if (these two churches were) united then the government would have to listen to it" (Interview #21). Since the state chose not to grant this request, the position of the church has not solidified but has remained fluid, particularly in light of the 1994 election results. Despite this, UOC-KP leaders continue to claim that their church has taken the position of the national Ukrainian church (Interview #14).

Even with Kravchuk's loss in the Presidential election, there is concern that "the government favors the UOC-KP, but now it is not so open but is hidden and is still there" (Interview #1). Kravchuk's people are still in power, and they still want to influence church-state affairs (Interview #24). Kravchuk has remained vocal in his support of the UOC-KP since he has left office. He officially supported the request

of the UOC-KP to bury Patriarch Volodymyr at St. Sophia's Cathedral (Washington Post, July 23, 1995). The appearance of Kuchma alongside the Patriarch of the UOC-KP at a ceremony opening St. Sophia's Cathedral as a national holy place has some worried that state support of the UOC-KP will continue (Interview #28).

Others contend that the situation has indeed changed. Now that Kravchuk is out of power, there is concern that the state under Kuchma is now moving to favor the UOC-MP. Metropolitan Sobodan has reportedly renewed his claim that Ukraine should have a state church and that the UOC-MP should be it (Interview #31). Evidence that the state is responding to this request is scarce, but concern is high, especially among nationalist churches like the UAOC. Any move toward the UOC-MP, whether to redress previous imbalances or to redirect state favor, is sure to cause an uproar.

Under Soviet rule, the forbearer of the UOC-MP, the Russian Orthodox Church, was given special status. This church, following the centuries-old tradition of cooperation between the church and state, collaborated with Stalin in his attempts to use religion to Russify the republics of the USSR. The Russian Orthodox Church was given a restricted role in creating a centralized Russian-Communist state. The role involved cooperating as the Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were liquidated or "reunified" into the Russian Orthodox Church (Little 1991: 16). The result was that the ROC was allowed to exist and function, though tightly controlled by the state, while the other churches were destroyed. This has led some to state that the ROC was the religious branch of

government in the USSR (Interview #23).

In the east there is indication that little has changed and that the state considers the UOC-MP to be the true state church and has taken action supporting it. According to a Baptist pastor in Donetsk, state support of the UOC-MP in his region is so strong that it suggests that Orthodoxy is the state religion (Interview #5). In this respect, the regional government of eastern Ukraine is functioning much as it did under Soviet times. The Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate is given strong state support, while other churches are subject to varying degrees of state harassment. In east Ukraine the UOC-MP appears to have the monopoly on power, while in the rest of the country it is battling the UOC-KP for supremacy. Its strength in east Ukraine is not surprising, given the strong ties of the UOC-MP to Russia and to Soviet authorities, and the corresponding ties of east Ukraine to Russia and the large numbers of former Soviet bureaucrats still in power in east Ukraine.

In a few regions of west Ukraine, particularly the Galacian regions of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, the balance of power is held by the Greek Catholic Church. Due to the overwhelming size of the church in these regions, it is accorded a special place by the local and regional authorities (Interview #7). Church size has swelled astronomically ever since it resumed functioning in 1989 (Bociurkiw 1992). The nationalistic ties of this church and the strong nationalism in the region explains a great deal of this favored behavior.

Throughout Ukraine, the state has responded to the desires of several churches for special status. As a consequence of this, other churches have been singled out for

restrictions. In particular, Protestant churches throughout Ukraine and Greek Catholic churches outside Galacia have borne the brunt of negative state response.

Anti-Protestant and Anti-Foreign State Action

There is a great deal of concern within the Protestant community that the establishment of one of the Orthodox churches as a state church will harm their freedom of religion. The call for a national church is usually accompanied by rhetoric decrying the influence that foreign churches have had upon the spiritual development of the nation. The message of the UOC-KP has been that Ukrainians need to unite their spiritual and their national identity, and this makes some Protestant churches nervous. According to a Protestant leader, they do not like the idea that nationalists are proposing that the country should unite around this national identity because whether a person is Ukrainian or Russian or other is not important (Interview #19). This issue was addressed by the Minister of Education. In a memorandum speaking against the activity of western Protestant groups in Kiev, he stated that "with the help of religion the national identity and spirituality of every nation can be changed slowly and obscurely" (Talanchuk 1994). He went on to state that saving Ukraine's spirituality would come about as a result of the unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy "on the basis of the Ukrainian people's faithfulness to Holy Orthodoxy which was accepted by Kiev-Rus during Great Prince Vladimir's reign."

These statements show the support within the state for a special place for Orthodoxy in Ukraine. For many within the state, the Orthodox church is worthy of special protection because it is the ancient, historical church of Ukraine, and "saving"

the spirituality within this country requires special protection. Coupled with this special protection is suppression of groups that might challenge Orthodoxy for the hearts and souls of Ukrainians. Later in the same document Talanchuk accused Protestant churches of working within the shadow of the Orthodox churches and of ignoring the contribution of the Orthodox churches to the development of Ukraine. The implication is that to be Ukrainian is to be Orthodox, and that Protestant churches are undermining the developing national identity. The state, according to this document, needs to step forward and take action that will support the Orthodox churches and contain the Protestants.

The Greek Catholic Church has also suffered from these same problems. Because of their ties with Rome and with their non-Orthodox religion, they are viewed by other churches as a foreign church. The perception is that they are allowed to operate in west Ukraine, since this in considered their stronghold, but outside of that region, they are not welcome (Interview #29).

For both these groups of churches, their foreign ties and their non-Orthodox religion place them on the negative side of the state. As some churches receive special consideration from the state, other churches suffer setbacks. The UOC-KP has received special state status from the government on the national level, the UOC-MP has received special status in the east, and in the west the Greek Catholic Church has been accorded special favor. Throughout the country, Protestants have recently seen some of their religious freedoms dwindle, due to their non-Orthodox status. And, in the country outside of western Galacia, the Greek Catholic Church has

suffered.

Consequences for Ukraine

The behavior of the state in response to church demands has serious consequences for Ukraine's future stability and peace. State action in religious conflicts has the potential to threaten newly established religious freedoms, upset an already unstable political system, and exacerbate existing ethnic, political, and social cleavages in Ukraine. State activity in the religious sphere is influencing the political future of Ukraine.

Freedom of Religion

Under Kravchuk's administration, religious freedoms flowered despite governmental favoritism. Few limitations were placed upon groups or churches that wished to meet for worship, print literature, or proclaim their message. While the state was widely seen as supporting the UOC-KP, the restrictions placed upon the other churches infringed upon their claims to property or television air time, not upon their basic freedom to worship. This open attitude has begun to change.

The spiritual vacuum left by 80 years of Communist control was quickly filled, in the late 1980's and 1990's, by hordes of religious adherents. People in Ukraine and the other countries of the former Soviet Union were confronted by a spiritual smorgasbord, ranging from the revival of traditional Slavic Orthodoxy to western Protestantism to eastern mysticism. At first this rush was met with enthusiasm, but in recent years this enthusiasm has begun to sour. The benign attitude on the part of the government has also begun to change. Reasons for this change in attitude include

satiation with spiritual things, hard economic times that leave some with a limited interest in and limited time for religious pursuits, and a growing materialist orientation. In addition to these larger, abstract, factors, a very specific and concrete event took place in Ukraine that I believe marks a turning point in the attitude of the state and the society toward religious, particularly foreign, groups.

This watershed event took place in the summer and fall of 1993 in Kiev. A group calling itself the Great White Brotherhood had been gathering converts from Russia and Ukraine over the past few years. Led by a woman calling herself Maria Devi Kristos who claimed to be the messiah, this group staged a series of demonstrations and marches in Kiev and managed to frighten the entire city. This group was considered very worrisome on two fronts. First, the leader claimed that she would stage her own crucifixion and resurrection in Kiev, outside the historic St. Sophia's Cathedral. Masses of her followers were flocking to Kiev to witness this and to allegedly take part in a mass suicide pact that would result in their resurrection from the dead as well (New York Times, November 7, 1993). Second, the cult was reputed to be a magnet for runaway children, especially troubled teens. These revelations caused widespread panic among parents in Ukraine, and led to state radio broadcasts in Kiev, warning parents to keep their children off the streets (New York Times, November 7, 1993).

The chaos, fear and uncertainty culminated in firm state action. Alarmed by the escalating tensions, police began to detain cult members in jails, send them to psychiatric wards, deport them, and confiscate posters and pamphlets. Over 800 cult

members were detained (New York Times, November 12, 1993). State run television programs showed testimonies from tearful parents whose children had joined the group. Finally, on November 10, 1993, Maria Devi Khristos and 60 of her followers were arrested in Kiev as they tried to occupy St. Sophia's Cathedral in anticipation of the November 14th crucifixion, mass suicide, and mass resurrection (New York Times, November 7, 1993).

This strong state action signalled a sea change in the attitude to many to religious freedoms. Following the White Brotherhood scare, foreign religious groups began to be viewed with much greater suspicion. This is rather ironic, since the White Brotherhood was an indigenous Orthodox heresy and not a foreign religious movement as suggested by some (Nielsen 1994). Regardless of this fact, the state began to take action against foreign groups. According to information gathered at the International Conference "Freedom of Conscience: Church and State in Ukraine," held September 28-30, 1994, specific steps were taken to restrict the religious freedoms of various foreign groups. In the city of Lviv, local laws were passed that allowed the Jehovah's Witnesses to be considered and treated like the White Brotherhood. This presumably placed them in the category of a dangerous group whose actions could be restricted to protect the general public. Registration of foreign churches and groups by the state began to be delayed and rejections became more frequent. If not properly registered, churches and religious groups are not able to issue invitations to foreigners, rent buildings, hire staff, etc. Visa restrictions began to become based on religious considerations. In Kiev, a law was passed in

1994 that requires religious organizations to get a permit to hold religious events. Permission was much easier to obtain for some than for others. This has resulted in many Protestant churches failing to get the required permit to rent halls and to hold meetings. One Protestant church I visited was forced out of the hall that it had been renting into another smaller hall that was insufficient for their needs. Church leaders were very concerned that they would soon lose their ability to rent even the small hall, and were trying to get permission to rent another location. Because they had a long history of working with foreign missionaries, they felt they were being denied the required permits to meet. According to Lauren Homer, an American lawyer specializing in legal and religious rights in the former Soviet Union, in an informal conversation, this regulation of religious organizations is being used as a vehicle for the selective removal of religious rights.

It is important to note that the groups losing some of their religious freedoms are almost exclusively foreign or foreign-affiliated groups. Spurred on by the events of the summer and fall of 1993, more and more scholars and government leaders are calling for restrictions on the religious activities of foreigners. Dmytro Stepovyk of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences stated at the above-mentioned conference of Freedom of Conscience in Ukraine that the Ukrainian church is weak from being underground and therefore should be protected from foreigners coming in and winning people over. Others have called for restrictions on the "open season mentality" of foreign missionaries in order to even the playing field and protect the domestic churches (Interview #29). One Bishop of the UOC-MP went so far as to

state that religious freedom is not good for Ukraine. He said that religious freedom may work in the US and France, but that Ukraine needs more controls over who could come and speak about religion, and this means less missionaries (Interview #8).

The potential result of this shift in state attitude and behavior is selective freedom of religion, determined by certain organs of the state. Currently the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Culture and the unfortunately-named Ministry of Nationalization, Immigration and Cults (the heir of the dissolved Ministry of Religious Affairs) all are dealing with issues of religious freedoms. Groups as varied as the Mormons, mainline Protestants, and the Moonies have been facing increased restrictions on their activities. In informal conversations with members of these groups, I found that they had been denied permission to rent buildings for worship or administration and had seen increased difficulties in obtaining visas for non-Ukrainian members of their group. These restrictions seem to be coming from the national level, rather than the local level, which often welcomes or is indifferent to their religious activities. While these are bothersome restrictions, they are minor compared to what has been suggested.

Church leaders of indigenous Orthodox churches have called for the state to place restrictions upon the right of other churches to proselytize. Again and again they speak about the need for the state to limit the activity of foreign groups that pull Ukrainians away from the "true" Ukrainian church, although they differ over which church *is* the true Ukrainian church. Interestingly, the attitude of many Orthodox leaders seems to be that the Greek Catholics are welcome in the western regions of

Ukraine, but that any additional incursion in other regions of Ukraine is unwelcome (Interview #29). Leaders of Ukrainian Protestant and Greek Catholic churches are concerned about these threats. They fear that their religious freedoms are threatened because they are non-Orthodox and because they are affiliated with foreign groups (Interview #1).

The loss of religious freedoms for foreign affiliated churches would be gain for Ukrainian churches, namely Types I, IV, and the UAOC. If these churches could get the state to restrict further the freedoms of the "foreign" churches, then they would benefit from the departure of the competition. This explains why, according to one scholar, the biggest Ukrainian churches (UOC-MP and UOC-KP) are not very interested in freedom of conscience as a principle (Interview #1). The non-appearance of high officials of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP at the International Conference of Freedom of Conscience has convinced others that this demonstrates their lack of interest in the issues of freedom of religion (Interview #1). These churches are more interested in pursuing selective religious freedoms.

The consequences of current and proposed state actions are serious, not only for foreign affiliated churches, but for all religious organizations. What many of the churches do not perceive is that if selective religious freedoms become accepted, then today's winners may become tomorrow's losers. When the state begins selectively to restrict religious rights based upon pressure exerted by interested groups, then when the pressure shifts, so too will state restrictions.

Russia provides us with an example of how selective religious freedoms might

be enacted. The Russian Orthodox Church in 1992, led by Patriarch Aleksii II, brought pressure to bear on the Russian Parliament to create legislation restricting the activity of foreign religious organizations on Russian territory (Walters 1994). The pressure of the ROC resulted in a law passed in June 1993 that regulated the freedom of religious confessions. The law divided groups into two categories: foreign agencies and indigenous ones, and placed onerous restrictions on the foreign groups (Nielsen 1994). In order for the foreign groups to operate, they would have to be affiliated with an indigenous, meaning Russian Orthodox, church or obtain state accreditation. If the churches did not do this, they could not undertake missionary work, publishing, business deals, or advertising (New York Times, July 16, 1993). The law was never signed by Yeltsin, and when he shut down Parliament by force it was no longer on the table. However, it is likely to be revived (Nielsen 1994). The policy has a clear beneficiary, the ROC, and clear losers, all other churches and religious groups.

In Ukraine, the situation is similar because the suggested policies would favor the Orthodox churches and limit the freedoms of all others. Religious freedoms would be selectively awarded. However, the situation is also quite different, because in Ukraine no single church holds the majority of power. Since the largest churches have split and are competing with one another, there is no religious hegemony as in Russia. The schisms between the churches have resulted in an unstable balance of religious power.

Surprisingly, the fact that Ukrainian church power is split may very well be

the best defense against restrictions on religious freedoms. Although the government is taking some steps to constrict the rights of foreign groups, it has not acted to the same degree as the Russian government. I argue that the greater appreciation for religious freedoms displayed by the Ukrainian government is due to the fractures within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the resulting pressures brought to bear by the different churches on the state. I think it is unlikely that the state will enforce more severe selective religious freedoms as long as the largest churches remain at odds with one another. Since the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP are fighting among themselves for power and position, neither is in a position of absolute power. Therefore, no one church can claim to speak for all of Ukraine and for the state to listen to. Since the churches are splintered and fighting, there is no united front to present to government. Both are lobbying government, the UOC-KP to a greater degree than the UOC-MP, but their power is divided, so the state has no one clear voice to listen to. Neither church can reasonably claim to be the national church of Ukraine.

In this respect, a divided Orthodox church in Ukraine is good for religious freedom in the country. If the Orthodox churches were united, then the government would be more likely to listen to them and there would be the possibility of a national church being created. This in turn could lead to the imposition of restrictions on foreign-affiliated churches. This explains one central reason behind the stated desire of the UOC-KP and UOC-MP to unite, despite their fierce hatred of one another. By splitting up, they have lost the power that they could have over the state. Their

division means that there are many voices calling on the state, so the power of any one church is diminished. But, this diminishment in power means greater protection of religious rights for everyone else.

Foreign groups, Protestants, and the Greek Catholics benefit from the fighting between the UOC-MP, the UOC-KP, and to a much smaller degree the UAOC. Separately, no one church has the large membership, government ties, and national message that it would take to sway government. So, as long as the divisions remain, there are likely to be only limited restrictions placed on the religious freedoms of foreign-affiliated churches.

However, of great concern to many is the possibility that the UOC-KP, UOC-MP, and the UAOC might merge. Although this is unlikely to happen in the near future, it is the stated desire of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP (Interviews #11, 32). The largest factors hindering such a union appear to be the presence of Metropolitan Filaret of the UOC-KP, and the Russian ties of the UOC-MP. When Filaret is off the scene, and if the UOC-MP can somehow modify its allegiance to Russia, or if this becomes less of an issue, then union would be likely. The Orthodox churches would have much to gain from such a union. Their influence over the state would increase exponentially. If this became the case, then foreign-tied churches would have much to worry about. According to one scholar, if the Orthodox church of Ukraine were united, the government would have to listen to it, and all reforms would be solved in a way that this one church would like (Interview #32). Religious rights could become private goods, available only to this one church.

Cleavages in Ukraine

In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that state support would fluctuate between Types I, II and IV churches. In fact, the state under Kravchuk responded much more favorably to Type IV (UOC-KP)churches than any others, and the current administration seems to be neutral at the Presidential level. Decision makers at other levels have indeed accorded favor to different churches. What is clear is that no one church is in a position of absolute power vis-a-vis the state. In addition, I hypothesized that these churches would use their gains and their losses to further their calls for increased divisions within Ukraine. As the following discussion indicates, this is indeed occurring.

The actions of the Types I, II and IV churches are contributing to ethnic and political divisions within Ukraine. As election data indicate, the country was polarized during the 1994 Presidential election over the candidates, each of whom represented diametrically opposed viewpoints (see Appendix E). Kuchma favored integration with Russia, identification with Russians as fellow Slavs, and the Russian language. Kravchuk favored integration with western Europe, Ukrainian nationalism, and the Ukrainian language. The election results reveal that the west overwhelmingly favored Kravchuk and his message, while the east and south favored Kuchma and his message. Religious affiliations not surprisingly follow the same divide (compare Appendices B and E).

In the Galacian regions of the west, where the Greek Catholic Church is the most popular and where the UOC-KP and the UAOC have their own strongholds,

Kravchuk won by a landslide of 94% to 4%. In the non-Galacian western regions of Chernivtsi where the UOC-MP is the largest but the UOC-KP still has a large following, Kravchuk still won, but by less (62%-35% and 87%-11%). In the central regions where the UOC-KP is strong but second in size to the UOC-MP, Kravchuk gained the majority, but by a greatly reduced margin (60%-36%, 54%-42%, 55%-41% and 57%-39%). In the east where the number of religious organizations is smaller and the UOC-MP is the undisputed power, Kuchma won by a huge margin (79%-18% and 68%-30%). In the south, where it appears the UOC-KP is establishing a few more churches but the UOC-MP is by far the largest, Kuchma won by a slightly smaller margin (53%-45% and 67%-29%). The parallels between voting behavior and religious affiliation suggest that they are related.

I argue that church behavior influenced voting behavior, and that the religious divisions between the warring churches are contributing to the existing ethnic, geographic and political divisions. In an earlier paper (Gee, 1995) I examined the linkage between ethnicity, geography and religious affiliation in Ukraine and found a very strong relationship between choice of religion and region and between choice of religion and nationality. Greek Catholics were strong only in the west, and were of Ukrainian nationality, while the Orthodox Church was strong in the east and these believers were of Russian nationality. The matching fault lines between religious affiliation, geography and political behavior are not accidental. Rather, churches are playing a key role exacerbating these existing divisions.

For the most politically active Ukrainian churches (Types I, II and IV), a

deeply divided Ukraine provides them with a solid base of support and an effective rallying cry. For the UAOC and the GCC, the west is their only stronghold. For the UOC-MP, the east and south are their strongest areas, while the UOC-KP looks to the west and center. The clearest divide is between east and west. But, numbers alone are not important to these churches. In many respects, church participation in the cleavages of Ukraine gives a spiritual voice to the concerns of the people. For western Ukrainians, their faith is an expression of their desire for independence. For eastern Ukrainians, their faith is a means of expressing their 1000 year-old spiritual union with their Russian brothers. Churches on both sides realize the interests of their regional strongholds and exploit them for their own benefit. The divisions in the country provide the churches with a clear message to convey and a clear enemy to attack.

In the west, there is a greater degree of church involvement in politics (Interview #34), and church people are more politicized than in other regions of Ukraine (Interview #23). The churches provide a moral voice to express anger at the outrages suffered at the hands of the Soviets, and by extension, at the hands of the Russians. Along with independence has come the "process of spiritually releasing (Ukrainian) churches from the Moscow Patriarchate" (Interview #11). There is great concern among the western churches that Russian influence is still a great threat. The UOC-MP is feared as a vehicle that is working to bring Russia and Ukraine back together under Russian control. As a result, these western churches accuse the eastern churches of trying to align people with Russia. According to one Greek

Catholic lay leader, in east and south Ukraine the UOC-MP is encouraging citizens to elect members of government who will create greater connections to Russia (Interview #23). The return of the USSR in some form is of great concern (Interview #7), and Communists in Ukraine are seen as a threat. The old Communist structure, which is still in place in eastern Ukraine, is very worrisome. According to a UOC-KP priest, the unification of the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP churches under the leadership of the UOC-KP would be a threat to the Communists because it would undermine their attempts to recreate a form of the Soviet Union (Interview #14).

Rather than join with Russia, western churches give voice to the desire of western Ukrainians to align themselves with western Europe. Leaders of the church speak of Ukrainians as Europeans, and they argue that they need to position themselves as Europeans in order to join the world of independent nations (Interview #25). Other church leaders base their support for economic reforms by stating that they must occur if Ukraine is to join with western Europe (Interview #13).

In the east, religious voices support a far different political path. It is generally understood that there is a smaller degree of religious influence and that the church plays a smaller role than in the west (Interview #35). Eastern Ukrainians are more apathetic to religious questions. The region of Donetsk was referred to as a spiritual desert by a Greek Catholic priest trying to start a church there (Interview #16). The fact that eastern Ukraine is much less religious than the west is due, in the theory of one scholar, to the longer occupation by the Bolsheviks (Interview #27). They had been in Ukraine since 1917 and had carried out a great deal of destruction

of both church buildings and personal beliefs. They only occupied the west beginning in 1939, so there was simply more time and opportunity for them to tear down religious beliefs in the east. The region itself was settled much later than the west, and so there are few deep roots, religious or otherwise (Interview #35). In addition, democratic reforms have only lightly touched the east, and the old Soviet mentality of strong state control, especially over religious affairs, still holds sway.

For leaders of the UOC-MP in particular, the activities of church leaders and politicians in western Ukraine are troublesome. They capture the concerns of many Ukrainians, particularly those in the south and east of the country, when they decry the influence of "radical" nationalists, complain about enforced Ukrainiazation of language, and mourn the potential loss of their traditional ties to Russia and Orthodoxy.

The church in the south and east has led the charge against the strong nationalistic movement in the west. UOC-MP leaders time and again referred to nationalists as radicals who are under the influence of foreigners (Interview #8). The fact that the west is more politically active and that the Greek Catholic Church is the major religious power in the west has led many in the rest of the country to claim to fear their actions and the influence of a "foreign" church. Heightened tensions within the country and with Russia are blamed on the overly aggressive tactics of the nationalists. In particular, western politicians are blamed for using the GCC as a weapon of politics in the fight against Russification (Interview #28).

For many in east and south Ukraine, Russification is not an evil influence

since they are ethnic Russians. Rather, the forced switch to the Ukrainian language is of great concern. Many people have spoken Russian for generations and have lost their ability to speak Ukrainian and are threatened by the possibility that they may be forced to speak Ukrainian in school or work. The move by the government to conduct classes, at the elementary, secondary, and university levels, in Ukrainian has caused a great deal of concern. Although this policy is being implemented at different rates around the country, it is very worrisome to people who have no knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

The UOC-MP has taken up this issue, especially as it relates to worship services. They have always held their church services in old church Slavonic, and are outspoken in their desire to continue to do so. It is highly unlikely that the government would take a position forcing their churches to use Ukrainian, but they have latched onto this issue none the less and are speaking out against any perceived pressure to use Ukrainian. Church leaders emphasize the long history of using Slavonic (Interview #15) and the fact that it is the language of worship used by all Orthodox churches in the world (Interview #28). By taking a stand against those who "want the church to use the language of the people in the street" (Interview #15), the UOC-MP aligns itself with Ukrainians who are fearful of being forced to abandon the language they consider their own. By arguing for the continuation of Slavonic in the churches, they are voicing the concerns of many who are arguing for the continuation of Russian in schools and the workplace. Both groups are united in their concern as they look at the west and the radical demands they see emerging.

Just as those in the west emphasize the importance of ties with western Europe, many people in the south and east emphasize the importance of ties with Russia. In these regions, Russia is seen not as the enemy but as the brother. Leaders of the UOC-MP champion this cause when they speak of the 1000 years of shared history with Russia. They discount fears of control by Moscow and instead point to the fact that "there is just one universal Orthodox church" (Interview #8). The spiritual ties shared over centuries are vital, and attempts to discount or discontinue them are viewed as attempts to destroy their cultural and spiritual heritage (Interview #3). In fact, the participation of the state in the breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates is seen as exactly such a move. Political interests and aggressive nationalism are blamed for the fact that the churches have split at all. In addition, the influence of the west is not welcomed by all but is seen as potentially harmful. According to one scholar, if those in west Ukraine get their way and ties with western Europe are given priority, then their Orthodox heritage will disappear under an avalanche of American and western commercialism (Interview #3). While this is highly unlikely, it is cause for concern for many in the east and south.

Therefore, not only are the regions very different in their orientations and interests, but the churches are highlighting and reenforcing these differences. Churches in the west point to the eastern church (the UOC-MP) and label it a puppet of Moscow that wants to continue to keep Ukraine subservient to Russia. The UOC-MP in turn points to the activities of the western churches and accuses them of rabid

nationalism that seeks to deprive Ukrainians of their millennium-old heritage and to tie them to foreign countries. It is clear that the churches have given voice and spiritual flavor to the divisions existing in Ukraine. By tying spiritual concerns to geographic and ethnic divisions, churches have become central actors in the political battles separating Ukraine. They are at the forefront of the debate over which direction Ukraine should incline, toward Russia or western Europe. They are intimately involved in the argument over language policy in the country, and over the degree to which nationalism should be an identifying feature of national identity. Their activities have deepened the cleavages within Ukraine.

Conclusion

State response to churches, as we have seen, depends upon several factors. High rates of participation, use of contacts at key levels of government, ties to the Soviet state and nationalistic organizations, and large size all contribute to positive state response. Ties to Russia, to foreign organizations or countries, and the absence of any of the above mentioned factors contributes to negative state response. The churches who received the property, money, and state favors that they desired got them because of these factors.

Of special concern to non-Orthodox churches with strong foreign ties is the tendency of the state to limit their religious freedoms. This state response is due to the favorable ties of the Orthodox churches and the unfavorable ties of the Protestant churches in particular. By restricting the rights of foreign churches and placing the Orthodox churches in a favored position, the state is responding to the demands of the

well-connected churches. Freedom of religion has begun to suffer as the state has responded selectively to church demands. However, I suggest that more severe restrictions are unlikely due to the divided nature of Orthodox church life in Ukraine. Because the Orthodox church is divided and fighting and because the President does not appear to have a predisposition toward any particular church, the state is unlikely to be pressured into granting a religious monopoly to any church. Competition among the churches should preclude the establishment of any state church.

However, this has not stopped the churches from fighting for power. The political, ethnic, and geographic divisions between east and west Ukraine provide the most political churches with the ammunition and battle ground to war with one another. Types II and IV churches have staked out the west as their home base and are accusing the east and the UOC-MP of trying to bring Ukraine back under the control of Russia. The UOC-MP in the east in turn points to the west and the Types II and IV churches and attacks the actions of radical nationalists who are attempting to stamp out any traces of Slavic history and brotherhood. Their battle is deepening the divisions in the country.

The next chapter looks more closely at the involvement of Ukrainian churches in the politics of national identity. The behavior of church is having an impact upon the way Ukrainians view themselves, their country, and their political future.

Chapter 6
Churches as Political Actors on the Micro Level

"The UAOC, GCC and the UOC-KP were all very active in influencing their members (during the Presidential election)." Scholar, Interview #31

"The church members are concerned about...the problem of national identity. There is also the problem of the restoration of the Communist Party. Many are afraid that the old rule will come back." Priest, Greek Catholic Church, Interview #4

"Protestant churches...take a very individualistic approach. The main number of Protestant churches just tell people to be good citizens." Government worker, Interview #35

Churches influence politics on the macro societal level, first by reaching out to government, and then by getting the government to respond to church demands. In addition to this, churches also influence politics on the micro attitudinal level by communicating political messages to church members. As discussed in Chapter 2, church leaders are well positioned to influence the political attitudes of their followers. They filter and transmit political information, structure attitudes, and provide political clues. Their standing in the community provides them with a moral authority that lends weight to their religious and political pronouncements.

This chapter begins with a look at the influence of church leaders on the political attitudes of their congregations. I examine who has the greatest influence, and how they use this influence. Specifically, I examine church attempts to shape attitudes relating to the 1994 Presidential election. Next, I examine the role of churches in shaping a national political identity. Three different national identities, and the churches that promote them, are studied. Finally, the implications of church

influence on political attitudes, including attitudes toward a national identity, are discussed.

Influence on the Political Attitudes of Church Members

The ability of Ukrainian churches to influence the political attitudes of church members is linked to church ties. I hypothesized that ties to the Soviet state and to external organizations hampered the ability of churches to influence political attitudes, while nationalistic ties enhanced church leaders' political influence. In particular, church members who heard political messages both at church and at work and in social gatherings are more likely to be influenced.

The data for this chapter, as for the entire dissertation, come from interviews with church leaders, scholars, government workers, and others. Therefore, the answers reflect their perspective on the degree of influence church leaders have over the political attitudes of church members. Their insight provides us with an interesting, albeit limited, insight into church influence on member attitudes.

Who Has Influence and Who Does Not

Type III Protestant churches with ties to foreign organizations showed virtually no interest in influencing the political attitudes of their members. However, this lack of interest is likely due to their stated desire to stay out of politics rather than to their foreign ties. Protestant churches in Ukraine, as discussed earlier, are maintaining their distance from political fights and issues in Ukraine. When asked what they communicated to their members about politics, one Protestant leader explained that politics in their church is a taboo subject (Interview #18). When another Protestant

leader was asked whether or not the church tried to influence the political views of its members, he stated that the church feels that the people should decide for themselves (Interview #19).

Type I UOC-MP churches with ties to Russia were equivocal about their efforts to influence member attitudes. They denied any active attempts, but then made reference to political issues that they mentioned to their congregation. These churches made oblique reference to attempts to shape member attitudes, but would not directly address which political issues were of concern to their congregation. As with their level of participation on the macro level, their micro level political activity is more pronounced than that of Type III churches, but is less than that of Type II and IV churches.

Churches with ties to nationalistic organizations have a greater degree of influence over church member attitudes. Since these churches are actively involved in politics themselves, they are also more active in trying to involve their members in the political battles. Leaders of these churches spoke of the strong political feelings of their members, on issues ranging from relations with Russia to opinions about members of government. Since these Type II and IV churches are strongest in the west, it is not surprising to find that the most politically active church members were in the most politically active region of Ukraine--the west (Interview #23). While UOC-MP church leaders in the center and east described their influence upon their members' attitudes, they acknowledged that churches in the west have a more politicized population with which to work (Interview #15).

The difference is particularly striking between east and west Ukraine. Western Ukrainians are both more politicized and more religious than eastern Ukrainians (Interview #20). There are fewer believers in the east, and religious issues are of less importance (Interview #9). For western Ukrainians, to be religious and politically active is normal, while in the east it is unusual. As a result, western Ukrainians are indeed likely to be receiving political messages at a variety of locations throughout their day and are likely to be more exposed and receptive to political messages from their church. Eastern Ukrainians, however, are less receptive, largely because political and religious apathy is the norm in that region. Religious interest is discouraged by the intrusive nature of regional state activity. Following the Soviet pattern, the regional authorities have continued their heavy-handed involvement in religious affairs. This has not encouraged the religious participation of eastern Ukrainian Christians. From the information gathered in these interviews, virtually all churches in the west had a high degree of influence upon the political views of their members, while virtually all churches in the east had a lower degree of influence. This leads me to the conclusion that the political environment of the different regions has the highest degree of impact upon church influence over member political attitudes. The highly politicized nature of western Ukraine causes most church members to be more politically astute and aware and causes most churches to be politically active. As a result, churches in the west have more influence over members' attitudes. Since the nationalistic Type II and IV churches are all based in the west, it is not surprising that they have the most influence over the political

attitudes of their members. Even the UOC-MP priest interviewed in west Ukraine was extremely political and open about the ways that he has communicated political messages to his congregation (Interview #8). The more politically apathetic nature of eastern Ukrainians and of eastern churches results in a lower level of member interest and church influence. Leaders of the normally politically active UOC-KP were surprisingly apolitical and demonstrated little interest in communicating political messages to their congregation in the eastern city of Donetsk (Interview #2).

Therefore, while church ties play a role in determining the degree of church influence over member political attitudes, the regional environment seems to be much more important. The politically active culture of the west opens church members up to political church messages, while the apathetic and oppressive culture of the east dampens church leaders' and members' interest in political messages. In addition, the degree of church involvement on the macro level is a better predictor of influence on members attitudes than church ties alone. Church ties influence the degree of macro level church involvement, which in turn partially determines micro-level church activity. In this respect, church ties are an indirect indicator of church attempts to influence the political attitudes of their members.

How Churches Play a Role

I hypothesized that Types I, II and IV churches made specific attempts to shape the political views of their members, particularly with reference to the 1994 Presidential election. I suggested that Type I UOC-MP churches tried to sway their members to support Kuchma, while Types II (UAOC and GCC) and IV (UOC-KP)

tried to get their congregations to support Kravchuk. I also hypothesized that these churches were all very pointed and direct in communicating this political message.

My initial hypotheses were correct in that all these churches did try to influence the political attitudes of their members. However, I was incorrect in thinking that Type II and IV churches all supported Kravchuk, and that all the three types of churches were equally direct in their political messages.

Testimony from church leaders and church observers confirms that Types I, II and IV churches all took steps to influence the political views of their members during the Presidential election, but in different directions and to varying degrees. The Type IV UOC-KP churches were once again the most open about and fervent in their activities. As expected, the church leaders strongly urged their followers to support President Kravchuk's bid for reelection (Interview #9). The influence came in several forms. The most common seems to have been speaking about him in their services and urging the listeners to vote for him (Interview #21). According to one church scholar, church leaders were very open in their statements to their followers (Interview #31). Church leaders themselves phrased it in a more oblique manner; they told their members to vote for nationalists who are interested in the future of Ukraine (Interview #25). It is unlikely that they were this oblique with their congregations.

The Type II churches were also active in their attempts to influence member attitudes, but different considerations held them back from behaving as overtly and directly as the UOC-KP. The UAOC found itself at a loss as to whom to support in

the election. Kravchuk's open support of the creation of the UOC-KP had directly resulted in the official dissolution of the UAOC, and their struggle to regain their legal status had been hampered by both the UOC-KP and Kravchuk. According to one leader of the UAOC, the church told church members that Kravchuk did nothing for the church and that he was the reason many problems still existed with the church (Interview #7). Kuchma, on the other hand, was a supporter of ties with Russia, a position that is anathema to the nationalistic UAOC. The end result was that neither candidate was at all acceptable to the church. This placed the UAOC in an interesting position, because church leaders were very open about the political content of their sermons and about their desire to shape the political views about their members (Interview #30). They were positioned and prepared to have a great deal of influence over the political attitudes and actions of their members, but they had no candidate to support. Therefore, much of their energy went into supporting candidates for the Supreme Soviet, telling members that they "should not vote for people of yesterday, for example people who used to be Communists and who still see things the same way" (Interview #30).

Interestingly, this warning could also apply to both Presidential candidates, again emphasizing the church's dissatisfaction with both the choices for President. When asked what issues were most important to church members, one UAOC leader immediately mentioned the need to have access to TV and radio so that the church can spread its views out to the people. From the context of the interview, it was clear that he was referring to political as well as to religious views. The end result

was that their influence over their members' attitudes for the 1994 Presidential election was muted, due to the lack of a suitable candidate to support. In the future, I expect this church to be very active and direct in their attempts to get their church members to support a particular presidential candidate.

The Greek Catholic Church also was more restrained than the UOC-KP, although for different reasons than the UAOC. For the most part, the GCC threw its support behind Kravchuk's bid for reelection. However, Kravchuk's behavior toward the UOC-KP caused some resentment, particularly in non-western regions. One GC priest in Kiev communicated his resentment at being kicked out of his church in order to accommodate the UOC-KP by telling his congregation during the election that they knew who was to blame for the fact that they were holding their services out in the street in -20 degrees Celsius weather (Interview #22). The rest of the church leaders, primarily those in the west, did not say the name Kravchuk in their services, but told the members that they should vote for the candidate who supported nationalism (Interview #31). Even in these subtle terms, the message was clear. The leader of the church, Cardinal Lubichevsky, wrote a letter forbidding priests from directly mentioning any candidate by name in their services (Interview #4). It seems that this was done to prevent any accusations of improper church-state relations that might damage pending property claims (Interview #13). Despite this limitation, church groups got around this by telling their church members to support good Christians who want to protect an independent Ukraine (Interview #10), or by talking about the qualities of the candidates that they should elect (Interview #16). In this manner, the

church was active, although somewhat discreet, in its attempts to shape the political attitudes and voting behavior of church members.

The Type I UOC-MP churches were also active in their attempts to shape member attitudes. According to a political party worker in south Ukraine, priests from the UOC-MP had the strongest influence over their members' views because they told their followers directly whom to vote for--candidate Kuchma (Interview #9). Priests from this church, however, were very reluctant to discuss any influence they might have over their members' political views. One priest would only say that unofficially, church leaders cannot be stopped from expressing their opinions (Interview #9). In the opinion of one scholar, local priests of the MP had a great deal of influence, not just telling the members who to vote for, but also which political issues they should follow (Interview #31). Other church leaders also stated that priests of the UOC-MP told their members whom to vote for (Interview #23). One high UOC-MP leader stated that it is not the church's job to make propaganda for one candidate, but then in the next sentence stated that if a candidate said they were an Orthodox believer (and in his mind the UOC-MP is the only true Orthodox church in Ukraine), then this would make the church and the people sympathetic and vote for him (Interview #26). As is apparent, Kuchma was the only candidate belonging to the UOC-MP. The UOC-MP was more restrained than the UOC-KP, but their sympathies lay without question with candidate Kuchma, and they communicated this to their church members.

Finally, the Type III churches did little to shape the political attitudes of their

members. Overwhelmingly, church leaders as well as church scholars commented on the apolitical nature of these churches. A political party worker attests to the fact that the Baptists, unlike the UOC-KP, UOC-MP and the UAOC, were silent during the Presidential election (Interview #9). According to a Protestant deacon, the only political message that was communicated was that voting had a very high role and that members should not take this duty lightly (Interview #19). These churches, alone among the others, seemed to view vote choice as an individual decision in which the church plays little or no role (Interview #1).

During the Presidential election, the churches followed the basic patterns hypothesized. Type IV churches were very active in trying to shape member attitudes, and they were open in their support for President Kravchuk. One Type II church, the Greek Catholics, also supported Kravchuk, but they were somewhat more restrained in influencing their members. The other Type II church, the UAOC, unexpectedly did not support either candidate, and although it was positioned and prepared to strongly try to shape the views of her members, there was no candidate to support. The UOC-MP, as expected, urged members to vote for Kuchma, but in a restrained fashion. As hypothesized, the Type III Protestant churches made no attempts to get their congregations to vote for one candidate or another, but instead emphasized the importance of voting and making an individual choice.

Development of a National Ukrainian Identity

In addition to shaping political attitudes regarding vote choice, I hypothesized that churches were interested in shaping a broader political identity among their

members. Specifically, I suggested that Types II and IV churches push their members to support a nationalist political identity, while Type I churches encouraged their members to develop an identity that included strong ties with Russia. Type III churches were expected to ignore the issue.

In fact, the push for a distinct national identity was one of the strongest areas of church involvement in the political arena. As I have mentioned throughout previous chapters, various churches have latched onto specific messages of national identification and have made them part of church identification. This section takes a closer look at the messages that the churches are trying to convey to their followers and examines the reasons behind their choice of national identity.

The churches can be divided into three general categories describing their basic identity. First are the churches that are pursuing a nationalist identity; second are the churches supporting a Slavic identity; and third are the churches that have a neutral identity.

Nationalistic Identity

As hypothesized, Types II and IV churches communicated a strong message of nationalism to their members. Leaders of the UOC-KP, UAOC, and Greek Catholic churches all mentioned, at various times, the need for their followers to support a strong, independent Ukraine. As a GC priest stated, "the issue most important to church members is to have an independent Ukraine" (Interview #22).

In addition, they stressed the danger of continued ties with Russia. This seems to be a key aspect of the nationalistic churches' call for a distinct Ukrainian identity.

As one UAOC priest put it

> The big issues that (the church members) are worried about is the influence of Russia and Russification. If you look at Russian history, the church has been submitted to the state, and the state has controlled the church as a political instrument. Ukraine has had to deal with the influence of Tsarist Russia, and has always had its national traditions suppressed. The national characteristics of churches in Ukraine were destroyed and the church was Russified. (Interview #30).

A Greek Catholic priest pointed out that the members of his church consider the UOC-MP to be associated with the historical persecutions of the Soviet state (Interview #29). In this respect, part of the national identification is anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. The evils carried out by the Soviet Union have become imputed to Russia and to any groups with ties to her. Therefore, anger towards the non-existent USSR can now be directed toward the nation of Russia or any church or organization accused of having ties with Russia. Church members are interested in having independence from Moscow politics (Interview #34).

In addition, these churches share other components of their national identity. All see Ukraine focused towards western Europe (Interview #23). Ukrainians must look to Europe, rather than to Russia to succeed, and identification as Europeans is an important part of that success. In addition, these churches see the Ukrainian language as a key indicator of national identification. Ukrainian is emphasized as an integral part of their worship services. The fact that the UOC-KP, UAOC, and the GCC all

use Ukrainian as the language in their worship services has an influence upon the mentality of the people going to church.

What is interesting is that each of these churches is incorporating specific demands into their call for a nationalistic identity. In their exhortations to church members to support an independent Ukraine and to fight against Russian expansionism, they include specific, additional demands that must be met. By rallying their members around abstract concepts, such as Ukrainian nationalism, as well as concrete symbols, church leaders are providing tangible issues upon which to focus. Church members, as a result, have shorter term goals to work on and concrete symbols to rally around.

Churches are focusing on different symbols around which to build their case. The UAOC has centered its message upon its desire to become legally registered and officially recognized. Church members are urged to keep this ongoing struggle in the forefront of their minds (Interview #21). Registration is vital to their cause, because their current status is that of a non-existent church. Without recognition, they have a very difficult time gaining church property and have only a limited platform to express their views and gain new members. The fact that Kravchuk's government played a key role in restricting their registration gives this church a legitimate persecution complex. This has enabled them to blame the state and the UOC-KP for meddling in church-state affairs and strengthens their claim to be the only pure church that wants independence for themselves and for the nation of Ukraine (Interview #24). They claim that they only want to establish a Ukrainian church without governmental

influence (Interview #7). Their call for a nationalistic political identity is legitimized and strengthened by the current troubles they are facing.

The Greek Catholic Church has grabbed onto the symbol of an official state apology for past Soviet behavior (Interview #20). Members have been encouraged to focus upon the need for the current Ukrainian state to apologize to the church for actions taken by the Soviet government in the 1930's and 1940's, culminating in the 1946 Council that forcibly "self-liquidated" the GCC. This deep concern about an apology for past wrongs is viewed by members as a sort of moral reparation (Interview #29). By acknowledging the wrongs done to this church by the Soviet government, the current Ukrainian state would bestow an intangible asset upon the Greek Catholic Church. Although most churches suffered under the Communists, an official acknowledgement by the state would bolster the credibility and establish the moral high ground of this church.

The UOC-KP is trying to blend the historical heritage of Orthodoxy with the new move for Ukrainian nationalism. By calling itself Orthodox, the church incorporates the Orthodox rite, tradition, and history, albeit in the Ukrainian language. By siding with the nationalists, it gains credibility and favor in the new independence-leaning political climate. The UOC-KP has made the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches its symbolic nationalistic rallying cry. According to church leaders, the independent nation of Ukraine needs an independent church, and church life will be renewed when the Orthodox church is brought back together under the leadership of the UOC-KP (Interview #11). Members are urged to support this by

the rhetorical question: if 20 million people in Ukraine are committed to a church based in Russia (the UOC-MP), then is Ukraine really an independent country? In this respect, this church positions itself as the church representing an independent, nationalistic Ukraine. Russia, as well as churches like the UAOC that want independence, are painted as obstacles to a strong state church. Unity, under the headship of the UOC-KP, would be the religious fulfillment of a truly independent Ukraine. As one UOC-KP Bishop put it "(our) firm position is that the power of the Orthodox religion in Ukraine will only be found through unity" (Interview #25). From the perspective of this church, the UOC-KP was created as part of the movement for the independence of Ukraine, so national identification as a patriotic Ukrainian committed to an independent country should coincide with religious identification as a member of the UOC-KP (Interview #14).

The existence of a Ukrainian church that has its headquarters and Patriarch in Russia is exploited by the UOC-KP as dangerous to an independent Ukraine. Church leaders point to decades of enforced Russification under the Communists and warn that Russia is again hungry to dominate Ukraine. In addition, they point to documented cases where leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church collaborated with the KGB, and warn that this type of behavior could happen again. What the UOC-KP fails to mention is that many of its own leaders were formerly priests in the Russian Orthodox Church and are vulnerable to the same claims. In fact, Metropolitan Filaret of the UOC-KP was a high ranking priest in the Russian Orthodox Church who has been accused of long-term collaboration with the KGB (Little 1991; Motyl 1993).

An additional symbol, coveted by both the UAOC and the UOC-KP, is ownership of the Cathedral of St. Sophia. This ancient cathedral has stood for centuries as a testimony to Ukraine's religious heritage, hearkening back to the year 988 A.D. when Prince Vladimir declared, in Kiev, that Christianity would be the religion of the Kiev-Rus empire. Declared to be a national historical site by the government, these two churches continue to fight bitterly to try to gain ownership over it. The stakes are high, for whichever church owns this cathedral could lay claim to its historical legacy and would become heir of its legitimizing nationalistic past. This is why church leaders put such great importance upon obtaining the rights to this church, and why calls to get this church sound so frequently in discussions of national identity.

The three churches with strong ties to nationalistic organizations are pursuing the active development of a nationalistic identity among their church members. The Types II and IV churches agree on a few components of this identity. It is focused around an independent Ukraine, with few or no ties to Russia. Western Europe, rather than Russia, is the desired partner, and Ukrainian, rather than Russian, is the desired language. They differ on the specific components, however. The UAOC sees its fight against the state for registration as a testimony to its position as the "pure" and politically untarnished church. The Greek Catholic Church in its hunt for a state apology is focusing upon the wrongs done in the past by the state and an acknowledgment by the state of these wrongs. The UOC-KP has positioned itself as the church most closely identified with an independent Ukraine, and is trying to make

support for the one accordingly mean support for the other.

Slavic Identity

I hypothesized that Type I UOC-MP churches urged their members to support candidate Kuchma, and that they pushed their congregations to support increased linkages with Russia. This indeed occurred, but took on an added dimension. The UOC-MP churches strongly encouraged their members not just to be friendly to Russia but to develop a Slavic national identity. In this manner, they were able to balance anti-Russian calls by Ukrainian nationalists with the assertion that these nationalists were ignoring the true historical heritage of the Ukrainian people. In addition, they accused these nationalists of trying to use the church for their political purposes. According to a UOC-MP priest, these people did not realize that the "church cannot be nationalistic or a state church, but should belong only to God" (Interview #33). Rather than focusing upon Russians as conquering imperialists, priests from the UOC-MP focused upon the millennial-long history shared by Orthodox believers in Ukraine and Russia. The mutual religion shared by Russia and Ukraine provides stability in their relationship (Interview #8).

The symbolic issue around which they build their argument is, ironically, the same as the issue used by the UOC-KP. These churches share the strong belief that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should not be split up, but they disagree vehemently about why they should be joined and who should have the ascendent position. The UOC-MP has made a strong case among its members that the church should not be split, and the members have rallied behind the idea that there should be one church

with its head in Moscow (Interview #31). According to church leaders, the division itself was provoked by nationalist political forces in Ukraine who wanted to encourage nationalism in the population by severing as many connections to Russia as possible (Interview #8). By creating a new Ukrainian Orthodox church with its leadership in Kiev out of whole cloth, they did just this. To the UOC-MP, this action represents the worst kind of state manipulation of the church, and in this case also conveniently ignores the 1000 year old bond between the Orthodox Slavs in ancient Russia and Ukraine. In fact, evidence strongly suggests that the creation of the UOC-KP was a politically motivated move, masterminded by President Kravchuk and Metropolitan Filaret. Kravchuk saw the opportunity to create a church that would share his nationalistic views and not condemn his Soviet ties, while Filaret, under fire from the Russian Orthodox Church, saw his chance to grab a great deal of power by creating a new church with himself at the head.

Hence, the strong cry of the UOC-MP has been for its members not to forget their spiritual heritage and to protest against state interference in church affairs by fighting against the artificial breakup of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Instead of calling for the state to step in to force unification, as the UOC-KP does, the UOC-MP is calling for the state to remove itself from the issue altogether (Interview #26). Religious identification with their forefathers, rather than political identification with the newly independent Ukraine, is the key to their Slavic identity. In this respect, ties with Russia are not shameful or dangerous, but natural. Since these two countries' religious traditions are so intertwined, it is only natural that such close relations

should continue.

Another symbol used to reinforce this Slavic identification is the use of old church Slavonic in church services. As already mentioned in earlier chapters, church leaders are making the choice of language in worship a very big issue, in large part to emphasize the historical legacy of their church. Several UOC-MP church leaders mentioned the 1000 years of tradition of the Slavonic language, and emphasized that it is the language used by all Orthodox churches in the world (Interview #28, 15). Language has become another means of identifying this church with its ancient traditions and history.

What this church does not acknowledge is the bitterness, felt by many, due to collaboration between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet state. It had acted as an imperial arm of the Soviet empire and had collaborated with the CPSU (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). These bitter feelings toward the Russian Orthodox Church and towards Russia herself are not easily overcome, and the tendency of the UOC-MP to dismiss such concerns does not bode well for the church in the nationalistic center and west of Ukraine. To many, the historical legacy of ties to Russia is painful rather than nostalgic.

The UOC-MP is trying to build a strong Slavic identity among its followers. By focusing upon their ancient ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and with the other Orthodox churches of the world, they hope to dampen concerns about ties to Russia. Also, by decrying state influence in the creation of the UOC-KP, they hope to position themselves as the alternative to this allegedly nationalist- and state-

controlled church.

Neutral Identity

I hypothesized that Type III Protestant churches made no attempts to influence the political views or identity of their members. In fact, I found this to be an incorrect hypothesis. While these churches did little to influence the specific political views of their church members, they did communicate a certain type of political identity, which I have called a neutral identity. This neutral political identity involves an individualistic attitude toward politics. While specific political issues were rarely discussed in the church, church leaders did work to build a political identity that encouraged each member to decide political questions themselves and to take responsibility as an individual for their voting behavior (Interviews #19, 1). Church members were urged to take part in the political process and to be good citizens of Ukraine, while the churches themselves stayed on the sidelines (Interview #35). The process of politics was often pictured as dirty and distasteful, so members were urged to be careful in their political involvement and to keep a measure of distance (Interview #35).

This identity has no symbols to rally around. The main component is the role of the individual and the need to be involved in, and suspicious of, the political process.

Implications

The influence of churches on micro level political attitudes and national identities has serious implications for the future development of Ukraine. This

political involvement is often subtle and difficult to observe, but it is also potentially very influential. As church leaders shape the political views of their members, they influence who gets elected and what policies are past. As they mold the national identity of their congregation, they affect how these Ukrainians view themselves, their world, and Ukraine's place in the world.

As the number of churches in Ukraine continues to grow, and as the size of congregations swell (Beletsky 1994), more and more people will be in a position to hear the religious and political messages given by church leaders. Therefore, it is important to understand the implications of these messages, especially as they involve relations with Russia and the West.

The churches that are best positioned or have done the most to try to influence the political views of their members are the churches with strong nationalistic ties; the UOC-KP, the UAOC, and the Greek Catholic Church. These churches all have an active political agenda, and are willing to communicate this agenda to their followers. Within this group, however, there is variation. The UOC-KP by far has the clearest record of overtly trying to influence members' views, and leaders have no hesitation in reaffirming their intention to continue doing so. The UAOC is eager and open about their attempts to communicate political messages to their members, but the past election demonstrates that when they have no one to support, their activity is muffled. The Greek Catholic Church is the most restrained of this group, but while they may mask their political message, the mask is transparent and the message is clear.

These most active churches are all committed to developing a nationalist

identity among their members. Their high level of interest in communicating this message suggests that they are likely to be quite successful. As this happens, religious identity becomes ever more intertwined with political and nationalistic considerations (Little 1991). Religious identification with any of these churches is becoming synonymous with support for an independent, western leaning Ukraine. In addition, membership in these churches has begun to imply a negative, almost paranoid view toward Russia. In informal conversations with members of these churches, the vilification of Russia and the conviction that, if given the chance, Russia would take over Ukraine, was striking. This is the fruit of the micro level attitudinal influence of these churches.

As these churches continue to disseminate political messages from the pulpit that paints Russia as the enemy and all things Ukrainian as the standard, then Ukraine will find herself becoming more and more isolated in the world community. Although these messages encourage orientation toward western Europe, they also implicitly paint their national culture as the highest, and all others as inferior. For example, the western concept of freedom of religion is held as a worthy principle, but then in the next breathe, special consideration for Ukrainian religions is demanded. In the attempt to distance themselves from Russia and to identify themselves as non-Russians, nationalists are burning some potentially vital bridges behind them. Anti-Russian rhetoric is widespread and is doing great damage to Ukrainian-Russian relations. Since Ukraine has no natural gas deposits, she continues to rely upon Russia for shipments of gas. However, chilliness in the relationship, due both to

balance of payment problems and to escalating attacks on Russia, has resulted in serious heat shortages during Ukrainian winters.

The larger world community is also affected by this tension. In 1992 then-President Kravchuk decided to halt the planned removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia for destruction (Motyl 1993). While Ukraine had some valid concerns about the fate of these weapons once they were in Russian hands, and they saw the strategic benefits of holding on to the weapons, this decision continues to cause security concerns for the rest of the world. Given the unstable nature of the armed forces in Ukraine, and the continuing tensions between Ukraine and Russia, the existence of nuclear arms in this country is cause for concern.

The most serious consequence of nationalistic church messages is the damage it is doing to Ukrainian national unity. The pro-Ukrainian anti-Russian message being preached by many of these churches is exacerbating the already deep and troublesome division between east and west Ukraine. As the voting results from the 1994 Presidential election reveal (see Appendix E), the country is split down the middle politically. As religious demographics demonstrate, religious differences follow the same basic patterns (see Appendix B). As these churches strengthen the bonds uniting religion to political and nationalistic agendas, the two regions will be pulled even farther apart. Already the differences are marked by symbols appropriated by the churches. The three churches all have their highest leaders located in west and central Ukraine. These leaders are all Ukrainians who make a point of speaking Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language itself is the dominant language in west Ukraine

and is fast becoming the language used in all schools and universities. Street names and statues honoring Russian or Soviet heroes have been changed or torn down, and new ones honoring Ukrainians have replaced them.

As these churches continue to preach their political messages, eastern Ukrainians are frequently branded with the same iron as the Russians. By virtue of being ethnic Russians, speaking Russian rather than Ukrainian, or especially belonging to the UOC-MP, eastern Ukrainians are accused of being under Russia's influence and acting as tools of Russification (Interview #30). Also, they are accused of supporting unity with Russia, supporting Communism, and working to bring the USSR back to power (Interview #11). This sort of rhetoric amplifies the differences between the regions by painting eastern Ukrainians as enemies who are trying to hurt western Ukrainians. By demonizing those who are not ethnically Ukrainian, not nationalists, do not speak Ukrainian, and are not members of the nationalist churches, church leaders are contributing towards to fracturing of Ukraine.

Churches with ties to Russia are also contributing to the growing divide between east and west Ukraine, but in a less concerted manner. The UOC-MP churches are taking some steps to influence the political views of their members, but they are less aggressive and less vocal than the Types II and IV churches. Their message, while relayed somewhat less openly, is still quite important, for it is the mirror opposite of the nationalist churches. In these churches, religious and national identity are also combined, but in a way that embraces their Slavic heritage and their connections to Russia.

A part of their message is that the churches who espouse Ukrainian nationalism are fanatics who want Ukrainians to deny their heritage. They point particularly at west Ukraine and refer to people there as political and nationalistic radicals and extremists (Interview #28). They want to pursue continued ties with Russia, their brother Slavs.

The implications of their Slavic-oriented identity is that the eastern region, where the UOC-MP is the undisputed power, has made much less progress towards independence. On the surface, very little has changed in eastern Ukraine since Ukraine declared her independence. Former Soviet officials maintain their positions. Few streets have been renamed, and statues of Lenin still abound. There is little western European or American investment. Russian is the language spoken on the street, at home, and in schools and universities. When these people look at what is going on in western Ukraine, they feel as if they are under siege by politicians trying to make a name for themselves by using the church to gain power (Interview #15). Russia, accordingly, looks like a refuge where their language, religion, and ethnic origin are not under attack. Russia has made noises about protecting ethnic Russians living in the non-Russian former USSR, and it is possible that she could begin to make noises about protecting the rights of Russians living in eastern Ukraine. In any case, the perceived persecution of eastern Ukrainians can only strain Russian-Ukrainian relations.

For their part, the UOC-MP churches are behaving in a manner that is worsening east-west Ukrainian relations. According to one scholar, the UOC-MP is

trying to divide the country by encouraging the east to focus upon Russia rather than Europe (Interview #23). While their rhetoric is not as loud, and their influence on member attitudes not as strong, their vilification of western Ukrainian activity only broadens the divide between the regions. It also alienates church members from the national government in Kiev, since the capital city is often lumped in with generalizations about the western regions of Ukraine. This results in eastern members of the UOC-MP identifying more and more with Russia, rather than with Ukraine. As citizens of the same country begin to identify themselves this differently, finding common unifying ground may become increasingly difficult.

Finally, the churches who have done the least to influence the political views of their members may have the most politically healthy message. As the Protestant churches largely remove themselves from the political process, they urge their members to take part and to make their decisions based upon their individual preferences. Church members, therefore, may be avoiding some of the divisive rhetoric and may be making more balanced political choices. The growth of the Protestant churches may, in this respect, prove to be beneficial for the national political climate in the future.

Despite this small glimmer of optimism, the dueling national identities promoted by the major churches do not bode well for the future stability of Ukraine. By focusing upon themes that, at the very least, magnify the differences between the regions and the religious confessions, churches are whipping up the fires of divisiveness. As they encourage their members to see themselves in one light, and

those who live in a different region, follow a different church, and speak a difference language in another, negative light, then reconciliation between the two sides is unlikely.

The opposing national identities also promote opposing foreign policies. Although church activity in this policy realm is limited to the broad and general assertions discussed in this chapter, churches are influencing foreign policy by their calls to orient Ukraine towards or away from Russia. Churches are pulling the state in diametrically opposed directions regarding Russia. Relations with this country are at a critical stage, and the opposing advice the government is receiving from the churches is not helping mend relations.

Chapter 7
Conclusion

"(Are) there religious and political differences between east and west Ukraine? It is natural that there are. There was a strong Ukrainian church in the west, but the Russian church was strong in the east." Greek Catholic lay leader, Interview #23

"Now religion plays both a divisive and a unifying role. Both in the east and west there is opposition to atheism and in this all confessions are united. But when religion is used by political groups, then it divides. (It is not) religion that divides, but rather it is politicians that divide." UOC-MP priest, Interview #28

This study began by asserting that Ukraine is unique because of the ongoing part that religion has played, together with geography and nationality, in both influencing and dividing the politics of Ukraine. As the data demonstrate, churches are not only major actors on the political scene, but they are also major proponents of a cultural war that is threatening the unity of Ukraine. Churches and religions all over the world have varying degrees of influence over politics, but in Ukraine religious concerns and conflicts are central to and indistinguishable from the political battles being waged. As Ukraine struggles, with increasing acrimony, to define herself and her place in the world, key churches are fighting one another for the right to create and direct this definition.

Interest group theory provides the framework to understand the activities and goals of Ukrainian churches. By studying churches as interest groups in church of public and private goods, and by viewing them as political actors demanding goods from the state, I was able to examine their role in Ukrainian politics in a new way. The theoretical framework of interest group activity in large part explained the

overwhelming pursuit of private goods by the majority of the churches examined. Property, special position, and power, particularly in certain regions, are the primary political interests of most Ukrainian churches today. Those few churches seeking public goods are small and lack political contacts and power. When churches are placed within the theoretical framework of public goods and interest group theory, their activities within the public realm take on a whole new dimension. No longer are churches only religious bodies; they are revealed to be political bodies, deeply involved in fighting for their interests in the secular realm. These interests, as with most interest groups, revolve around private goods, and they pursue them by means of competition, contacts, and constituency. Churches compete with one another for scarce resources such as church buildings, money, and special status. They use their contacts within government to get what they want. They also make use of their constituency, in other words their congregations, first by shaping their political attitudes, and then by mobilizing them to pressure decision makers.

Although churches are sacred bodies, they use many of the same tactics employed by secular groups. Interest group theory reveals these tactics and creates a framework within which to examine the political behavior of Ukrainian churches.

Role of Religion in the Politics of Ukraine

Ukraine indeed is a country divided across geographic, ethnic, political, and religious lines. This study has focused upon the way religious interests have exploited and exacerbated these differences for their own purposes and how their activities have contributed to deeper and more bitter divisions within the nation.

The key divide in Ukraine is between west and east. On the one side are the Ukrainian-speaking nationalists, and on the other are the Russian speakers who want to continue their linkages with Russia. This division is also a religious one. The nationalist Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Greek Catholic Church are all on one side, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate is on the other. There is some infighting among the nationalist churches, but their conflicts pale in comparison to the enmity between them and the Russian-leaning UOC-MP. The Ukrainian nationalist vs. Russian friendship disagreement captures the central debate between the churches, and within the nation as a whole.

The churches on the two opposing sides of this issue have been active and effective in their attempts to influence political life in Ukraine. In order to do this, they have made use of their ties to the former Soviet state and Ukrainian nationalists. The UOC-MP has utilized its strong ties to the former Soviet state to maintain its contacts to former Soviet bureaucrats and decision makers still in power in Ukraine. This has proved to be particularly effective in east Ukraine where the vast majority of former Communist officials continue to hold their old positions. The UOC-KP has also made use of these contacts, and has bolstered them by their contacts within the nationalist community. Not only do they have strong ties to the Soviet system, they also have embraced the nationalist message and are very strongly connected with the Ukrainian nationalist movement, based in the west of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches both were forced underground

during the Soviet period, so they have no contacts to the former Soviet state. They do, however, have extensive, long-term contacts and impressive credentials with the nationalist community. These ties have provided these churches with the opportunities to influence politics on both the macro societal and micro attitudinal levels. Overwhelmingly, these churches have pursued private goods and have competed vigorously for scarce resources. Cooperation occurred only when banding together against a larger foe. Public goods were rarely mentioned, and free riding was generally the rule.

A different group of churches has taken a divergent path and has chosen to remain largely separate from politics. The Protestant churches examined in this study were striking in their interest in staying as far away from politics as possible. Having neither the beneficial ties to the former Soviet state nor to the nationalistic movement, these churches are not positioned well to have political influence. The only possible connections that might have helped them are their ties to foreign organizations, but the fact that these are overwhelmingly western, Protestant organizations harms them in the eyes of many decision makers. Except for when their religious rights are threatened, they have remained out of the political fray.

The politically active churches have worked on two different levels to accomplish their goals. On the macro societal level, they have tried to reach the state and have fought for positive state response. On the micro attitudinal level, they have worked to influence the political attitudes, especially the national identity, of their church members. The result of much of their activity has been increasing

divisiveness between the two parts of the country and growing enmity towards citizens of other regions and members of other churches. The bitter fruit of church activity in the politics of Ukraine is a torn and hostile nation.

Church Activity on the Macro Level

One aspect of church political behavior is the desire to gain things from the state. This societal level political activity involves two stages: reaching out to the state to make their interests known, and then having the state respond to their demands.

I hypothesized that the churches' ability to reach the state would be determined by the ties that they had, particularly to the Soviet state and to nationalistic organizations. In fact, the combined strong ties of the UOC-KP to both the Soviet state and to nationalistic organizations gave them high-level contacts, the ability to sanction effectively, and credibility among decisions makers. Their credibility among the general population, however, suffered because of their Soviet ties. The churches with strong ties to the nationalistic organizations were free from the taint of Soviet complicity, but they also lacked the high-level national contacts needed to get things done their way. While the Greek Catholic Church has successfully courted the local and regional governmental organizations, and the UAOC has worked to gain contacts on the national level, both churches are currently relegated to a lower level of influence on the national level. The UOC-MP has strong contacts from the Soviet period, but in the west and center they are in a constant struggle to counter negative perceptions about their strong ties with Russia. This has hampered their political

effectiveness. The Protestant churches did virtually nothing to reach out to the state, except in defense of public goods such as religious freedom. The other churches were far more concerned with reaching government in order to gain private goods such as ownership of disputed church buildings. In addition, the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP were heated in their desire to get the government to limit the religious rights of non-Orthodox churches.

What is striking about the attempts to reach the state is that the ties that help a church in one region do great harm in another region. In the west, ties to nationalist organizations are very helpful and are, in fact, necessary, especially in terms of legitimacy and credibility. Soviet ties are helpful to the degree that they provide access to key decision makers, but their general perception is negative among the public and among the nationalists in particular. Ties to Russia are particularly distasteful and greatly harm a church's ability to reach the state. In the east, the situation is reversed. Ties to nationalistic organizations are viewed with great suspicion, while ties to the Soviet state and to Russia are acceptable, legitimate, and very useful. Given these great differences between the regions, it is unlikely that any one church could appeal to and be successful in both regions. Therefore, it appears that one group of churches will be powerful in the west, while another is powerful in the east. Since the strongest churches in the opposing regions are the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP, it appears that the inter-Orthodox struggle will continue as they both attempt to influence the governments of their respective regions and of the nation as a whole. Their divergent agendas will continue to clash and to pull the country in

opposing directions.

I hypothesized that state response would depend upon the ties of the churches. As expected, strong ties to former Soviet officials and to nationalistic groups encouraged state response, while ties to external organizations hindered position state response. High rates of church participation combined with favorable ties to governmental officials, both former Soviets and current nationalists, enabled churches to receive property from the state. The UOC-KP used its ties to the Soviet state and to nationalists to get the national government to give it a great deal of property, particularly in the center and west regions. The Greek Catholic Church used its contacts with nationalists at the local and regional levels to get a great deal of property in west Ukraine. In the east, the UOC-MP used its Soviet ties to gain a virtual monopoly on property. While the UAOC has strong nationalistic ties, it does not have sufficient contacts with any particular level of government to get the state to respond to its property demands. In addition, its lack of formal status hinders its claims. The Protestants have low levels of participation and have no useful contacts, so they have largely been ignored in the state allocation of property.

An unexpected type of state response was the special recognition accorded a few churches. In the center of the country, the UOC-KP has achieved special treatment by the national government, due to its strong ties, shared by President Kravchuk, to both the Soviet state and the nationalist movement. In the west, the nationalist ties and the strong connections with local and regional government of the Greek Catholic Church have enabled this church to be placed in a position of power.

In the east, the Soviet ties together with the strong linkages to Russia have given the UOC-MP a special position vis-a-vis the regional government.

As different parts of government favor different churches, Ukraine is becoming more deeply divided. A Balkanized Ukraine, divided largely along religious lines, does not bode well for political stability or continued religious freedoms. Already, the largest churches are pushing the level of government that favors them to restrict the religious rights of other churches. Under particular attack are western, especially Protestant, churches. Due to their non-Orthodox nature, they are accused of bringing in foreign influences and undermining the spiritual heritage of the country. Since these churches have no area in which they are strong, they are vulnerable on all sides to calls to limit their ability to proselytize, invite in foreign missionaries, and hold meetings.

The Greek Catholic Church is also susceptible to these claims since it is a non-Orthodox religion whose head is in the west. But, however much it suffers in the rest of Ukraine, it is still the largest and most powerful church in the west, and its position in this region is, for the time being, quite secure. If the UOC-KP is able to gain a strong foothold in the west, and if the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP do unite, then the religious rights of all of the non-Orthodox religions will be greatly at risk. For the time being, however, the status quo is largely being maintained. Various state agencies are beginning to take some actions that make it more difficult for some Protestant groups to operate, and this is causing some concern. If this activity continues, and if President Kuchma weighs in to the debate on the side of one church

or another, then I expect religious rights in general to be restricted while certain specific churches gain power exponentially. Doubtless, this will increase tension between the major churches and escalate their regionally divisive rhetoric.

Church Activity on the Micro Level

Another aspect of the political behavior of churches involves the orchestration of church members' political attitudes. Church leaders are well positioned to influence what political issues church members think about, and what positions they take. In particular, this study examined the way church leaders influenced attitudes about whom to vote for in the Presidential election, and what type of a national identity to take on. I hypothesized that the more political churches would take strong and specific positions in the Presidential election. In large part, this hypothesis was supported. With the exception of the UAOC, the most politicized churches (the UOC-KP, UOC-MP and GCC) all supported the anticipated Presidential candidate and took active roles in communicating this information to their congregations. The UAOC found itself in a position where it could support neither candidate, so it was largely silent about who its members should vote for. The Protestant churches, as expected, were virtually silent about member vote choice in the election.

An unanticipated facet of the micro-level political behavior of churches was the strong emphasis on developing a distinct national identity. All of the churches were active in trying to influence the national identity of their followers. The national identities espoused by the different churches reinforce and justify the divisive positions taken on the macro, governmental level.

The churches with nationalistic ties all strongly pushed a message of a nationalistic Ukrainian identity. The UOC-KP, UAOC, and the Greek Catholic Church all urged their members to push for an independent Ukraine, oriented toward the West, with few ties to Russia. Russia is painted as the enemy who is trying to recreate the Soviet Union or the Russian empire by Russifying Ukraine and bringing her once again under the Russian sphere of influence. The UOC-MP is painted as a tool of Russia, and eastern Ukrainians are viewed as sympathizers with Russia. The UOC-MP, for its part, is active in promoting a Slavic identity that emphasizes the ancient ties that bind Russia and Ukraine as Slavic siblings. It is pushing for closer cooperation with Russia, and bristles at attempts to push Ukrainian as the language of the workplace and schools. Church leaders, in turn, point to the nationalists in western Ukraine and brand them as radical extremists who are trying to destroy Ukraine's ancient heritage.

Not surprisingly, these two national identities are in direct opposition to one another and are feeding the regional and religious differences within the country. By making opposition to another part of society a central part of one's national identification, the churches are further dividing the people of Ukraine into opposing, hostile, camps. The political positions of the churches are strengthened as more and more members buy into their message of national identification, but the nation suffers as the polarization becomes more and more entrenched in society.

The national identity preached by the Protestant churches is much more general and benign. Protestant leaders encouraged their members to take a neutral

identity and to view politics almost as a necessary evil. No specifics were mentioned, but members were told to make their voting decisions carefully, and to participate out of a sense of duty and obligation. While this national identity is extremely vague, it contains none of the divisive components of the nationalistic or Slavic identities. In this respect, it is the least inflammatory and holds the greatest promise for promoting internal peace and stability in Ukraine.

Future Research

Several areas of future study await scholars of Ukraine. First, as churches settle the fundamental issues of establishment and survival, they may become more active in the policy realm. It should prove interesting to study which policy areas the churches launch into, and in which ways they try to influence public policy. Second, little is known about the ways religious attitudes influence political attitudes in Ukraine. It would be fascinating to study the linkage between degree and type of religious affiliation and political attitudes towards political candidates, political issues, and social issues. Distinctions between attitudes of western and eastern Ukrainians would be especially interesting, as would differing perceptions towards Russia, the west, and democratization.

Divided Ukraine

The theme that runs throughout this work is the divide separating east Ukraine from west Ukraine. While the churches on each of the respective sides are by no means united with one another, they do share a common enmity and orientation. What is worrisome is not that the two sides have such differing orientations: west Ukraine

towards western Europe, and east Ukraine towards Russia. Such differences can be overcome and common ground discovered. What is particularly troublesome is the deep distrust and hatred that the two sides feel towards one another. As Ukraine as a nation attempts to build her cultural and national identification, it is difficult to see how these vast differences can be overcome. The political activities of certain churches seem focused upon deepening the divide between east and west, between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, between those oriented to west Europe and Russia, and between followers of one church and another.

As the political and religious battles rage between the two sides, it is troublesome to see some of the developments emerging as the government tries to keep its balance. In seeming reaction to demands of the Orthodox churches on both sides of the divide, restrictions on religious freedoms are beginning to be instituted. Although they are more of a nuisance at the present time, they may be the first moves in a strategy that will eventually restrict the activities and rights of non-Orthodox churches and groups in Ukraine. These types of restriction would not bode well for the democratic development of this nation. In addition, governmental movement towards one side or the other, especially in the antagonistic climate created by the most active churches, could spark serious reaction from the disaffected regions. Civil war is a distant possibility at this moment, but the depth of the differences between the opposing regions and the escalation of rhetoric may eventually lead to violent conflict. Finally, the tensions in this country over relations with Russia have consequences far beyond the borders of Ukraine. As the second largest country in the

former Soviet Union, Ukraine's actions are given great consideration by other former republics. Hostility on Ukraine's part towards Russia may provide encouragement to other newly independent nations. Increased tensions in this area of the world, already fraught with destabilizing economic transitions and ethnic conflicts, are very worrisome. The presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and other nations is also of great concern to the entire world community. While it is unlikely that Ukraine would ever fire these weapons at Russia, the existence of these weapons in a nation undergoing profound political and economic turmoil is far from comforting.

The prognosis is not completely grim. While the conflicts between the churches do exacerbate existing divisions within Ukraine, they also are protecting general religious freedoms in the country. In addition, continued fighting places the state in a favorable position and encourages democratic development.

Church conflict is preventing any church from becoming the established state church in Ukraine. This protects the proliferation of churches and religious groups and fosters civic development. With many religious interests operating in the societal framework, other groups can develop and flourish.

Continued conflict also requires the warring churches to deal with one another. Since the state is not stepping in and deciding the outcome, the churches must compromise, to some degree, with one another. This, in turn, encourages the future depoliticization of the conflict.

Next, as long as the churches are fighting over which should be the established church, the state can remain above the fray by refusing to take sides. As the

churches go on battling one another, other institutions, such as political parties, may have the time to gain strength. Over a period of time, as other institutions develop and gain power, churches may become less powerful political actors. As a result, their conflicts may matter less and less and they may have a decreasing impact on the divisions within the country. If the state can ignore the establishment claims, it can keep church problems from dominating the political scene.

In this respect, it is in the state's interest for the churches to continue their conflict, and especially to arrive at a stalemate or balance of power situation. The alternative of establishing one church as the state church is simply too dangerous. Granting one church an official position would dramatically worsen the regional conflict; the church not chosen would certainly explode with anger and would have fertile ground to whip up the fury of their members and their home region. Given the already-tense situation between regions, the state has no interest in making it worse. Therefore, the best option may be continued conflict. It may, in the long run, be best for continued democratic development in Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country divided by political orientation, language, ethnicity, geography, and religion. She is unique because of the integral role religion is playing in determining and exacerbating these divisions. As this study demonstrates, churches are among the most influential actors on the political scene. Their actions, on both the macro societal and the micro attitudinal levels, are influencing what the state does, who people vote for, and who the citizens consider themselves to be. As they do this, the most politically active churches are also dividing Ukrainians from one

another. The chasm separating east Ukrainians from west Ukrainians is growing deeper, thanks largely to the concerted actions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, the Greek Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. These churches have made specific political and ethnic identification an integral part of identification with their church. To be a member of one of these churches is no longer matter of religious identity alone. Now there is an extensive political and ethnic agenda that has been incorporated into the religious agenda. The adversarial nature of this agenda bodes ill for the healthy and peaceful development of the Ukrainian polity. It will be interesting to see how the state behaves in this conflict and whether church action is allowed to lead to democratic development or political devolution.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
Church Leaders in Ukraine
(* indicates an interview subject)

Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)
Alexis-Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church, located in Moscow.
*Volodymyr Sobodan-Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine, located in Kiev.
Designated Metropolitan on May 27, 1992.

This church was known as the Russian Orthodox Church for centuries, and only renamed itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1990. This church gives allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and recognizes the Moscow Patriarch Alexis.

Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP)
Volodymyr Romaniuk-Patriarch, crowned October 24, 1993, located in Kiev..
*Filaret-Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine, located in Kiev.

This church is an offshoot of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and was formed in 1992 when Metropolitan Filaret, at that time a leader of the UOC-MP in Ukraine, announced the creation of a new church--the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate. This church was created by a merger of dissenting members of the UOC-MP and the historic Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. It appears that this merger came about as a result of the political maneuvering of Filaret and President Leonid Kravchuk, both to gain clerical power for Filaret and to solidify Ukrainian political opposition to Moscow (Dawisha and Parrott 1994). Filaret is widely recognized as the true power behind the throne. The UAOC leadership almost universally disputes the merger and claims independence for itself. The government, however, recognizes only the UOC-KP and does not acknowledge the independent existence of the UAOC.

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)
*Dmitri-Patriarch, crowned October 14, 1993.

As mentioned above, this church is embroiled in a conflict with the UOC-KP. At the current time, it is recognized by no other church, nor by the government.

Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (GC)
Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky-Cardinal of Ukraine, relocated from Rome to Lviv in 1991.

This church was legalized in 1989 and in 1991 was officially recognized by the government.

Appendix B

Table 2

Religious Organizations in Ukraine by Region

Region	UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UAOC	UGCC
West				
Lviv	81	444	222	1302
Ivano-Frankivsk	18	389	0	622
Ternopil	136	416	0	690
Chernivtsi	352	72	0	13
Rivne	422	128	0	1
Total (west)	1009	1449	222	2628
Center				
Kiev	249	159	9	3
Vinnytsia	564	33	0	3
Zhytomyr	340	15	0	0
Khmelnytsky	542	4	27	4
Total (center)	1695	211	36	10
East				
Donetsk	160	3	1	4
Dnipropetrovsk	135	5	5	0
Total (east)	295	8	6	4
South				
Mykoliev	100	28	1	2
Odessa	285	6	0	1
Total (south)	385	34	1	3
Total (all)	5763	1892	281	2897

Source: The Institute of Strategic Studies, Kiev, January 1, 1994.

Appendix C

Table 3

Interview Subjects by City and Category

	CITY			
CATEGORY	Kiev	Lviv	Donetsk/ Mykoliev	TOTAL
Priests and Church Leaders				
Ukr. Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate	4	1	1	6
Ukr. Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate	2	1	1	4
Ukr. Autocephalous Orthodox Church	2	1	0	3
Ukr. Greek Catholic Church	2	3	1	6
Protestant churches	3	0	1	4
Misc.	0	1	0	1
Church Scholars	3	0	1	4
Political Party People	1	1	1	3
Journalists	1	0	0	1
Government Officials	1	0	2	3
TOTAL	19	8	8	35

Appendix D
Interview Questionnaires
(+ indicates questions added over time, - indicates questions deleted)

Church Scholars

Introduction: Please tell me your name, official position, and affiliation.

I. Church description
(-)A. Please comment on my matrix describing churches by types and ties.

II. Churches and the election
A. What issues in the election was each church interested in? Were some churches more interested in politics than others?
B. Did they fight or cooperate with other churches to get what they wanted?
C. How did they get the government to listen to them?
D. Which churches have been getting what they want from the government, and why?

III. Church members and the election
A. How have the different churches tried to influence the political views of church members?
B. What issues are the most important to church leaders and church members?
C. Did the churches take an official or unofficial position in the election?
D. If so, how was the message communicated to the members?
(+) F. Would you say that churches are contributing to, or decreasing, divisions within Ukraine?

IV. Could you suggest any other scholars or church leaders I could speak with?

Church Leaders

Introduction: Please tell me your official position within the church and how long you have been affiliated with this church.

I. Church description

A. Please give a brief description of your church, especially its history under the USSR and any connections to other churches, political groups, or foreign organizations.

(-)B. How have these relationships changed over time?

(+)C. Please describe the relationship between your church and the government.

(+)D. Are there any particular political issues that your church is interested in?

(+)E. Please describe the relations between your church and other churches. Is there cooperation or conflict?

II. Churches and the election

A. What issues in the election were important to your church?

B. How was your church able to get the government and the candidates to listed to these interests?

C. Does your church feel it has received what it wanted? Why or why not?

(+)D. If your church could get the government to do one thing, what would that be?

III. Church members and the election

A. What did your church communicate to the church members about the election?

B. What issues are most important to church members?

C. Did the church take an official or unofficial stand in the election? Why or why not?

IV. Could you suggest any other people I could meet with?

Politicians, Governmental Employees and Journalists

Introduction: Please state your name and official position.

I. Basic information
   A. Please describe the contact you have with churches.
   B. Which churches are the most politically active?
   C. What do the churches want, and how do they try to get what they want?
   D. Hoe are the churches influencing the political situation in Ukraine?

II. Churches and the election
   A. What issues were important to the churches during the election?
   B. How did they get you to listen to their interests?
   C. Which churches got what they wanted from the election?

III. Church members and the election
   A. Which churches tried to influence the voting behavior or political views of church members?
   B. Did any churches take an official or unofficial position in the election?
   C. What political issues were most important to church members?

IV. Can you suggest any other people I could meet with?

Political Party Workers

Introduction: Please state your name, official position, and affiliation.

I. Basic information

A. Please describe which religious issues your party is interested in.

B. Which particular churches did you deal with? Did you receive support from any certain churches or religious organizations?

II. Churches and the election

A. What were the different churches most interested in during the election?

B. How did the churches convince you to listen to their interests? Do some churches have special contacts or connections?

C. Which churches got what they wanted from the election?

(+)D. Which churches are the most politically active?

(+)E. What do they want, and how do they try to get it?

(+)F. How are churches influencing the political situation in Ukraine?

III. Church members and the election

A. Which churches tried to influence the voting behavior or political views of church members? How did they do it, and what direction did they influence them?

B. Did any churches take an official or unofficial position in the election?

C. What political issues were most important to church members?

IV. Could you suggest any other people I could meet with?

Appendix E

Table 4

1994 Presidential Election Results, by Region

Region	Kuchma (%)	Kravchuk (%)
West		
Lviv	3.9	93.8
Ivano-Frankivsk	3.9	94.5
Ternopil	3.7	94.8
Chernivtsy	35.3	61.8
Rivne	10.9	87.3
Average (west)	10.4	87.4
Center		
Kiev	35.6	59.7
Vinnytsia	42.3	54.3
Zhytomyr	41.6	55.6
Khmelnytsky	39.2	57.2
Average (center)	42.4	54.1
East		
Donetsk	79.0	18.5
Dnipropetrovsk	67.8	29.7
Average (east)	75.6	21.9
South		
Mykoliev	52.8	44.7
Odessa	66.8	29.2
Average (south)	72.5	24.8
Average (all)	52.1	45.1

Source: Arel, Dominique, and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?" RFE/RL Research Report 3 (1994): 1-12.

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