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FEMINIST VALUES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREFERENCES,
AND THEIR RELATION TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT ATTRIBUTIONS

presented by

Mary Sue Gilbert

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Counseling Psychology

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Date April 1, 1976

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FEMINIST VALUES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREFERENCES,
AND THEIR RELATION TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT ATTRIBUTIONS

By

Mary Sue Gilbert

A DISSERTATION

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and Special Education

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ABSTRACT

FEMINIST VALUES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREFERENCES, AND THEIR RELATION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT ATTRIBUTIONS

By

Mary Sue Gilbert

Although empiricism has been increasingly recognized as too narrow in its field of inquiry to adequately examine the complexity of human issues (Polkinghorne, 1984), empiricism remains the dominant force in Western psychology (Borgen, 1992; Unger, 1983). Many feminist psychologists are at the forefront in criticizing the tradition of empiricism as the only basis for valid knowledge and the assumption that any science is value-free (Harding, 1987; Hawkesworth, 1989; Ricketts, 1989).

The purpose of this research was to examine the effects of feminist values on epistemological preferences and the attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment. One hundred and sixty-one Ph.D. psychologists completed a mail survey. The survey included measures of feminist values: the Attitudes Towards Feminism and the Women's Movement (Fassinger, 1994), the Behavioral and Political Orientation scales of the Attributions of the Term Feminist (Ferryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985), and a statement of feminism developed for this study. All were combined in a composite feminism score. The survey also included a demographics form, the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (Royce & Mos, 1980), which measures the epistemological styles of empiricism, rationalism and social constructionism, the Helping Orientation Scale (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989), which measures four styles of attribution of responsibility based on theoretical constructs developed by Brickman et al. (1982). These models are based on whether a therapist attributes responsibility for problem development and problem solution to the client or to others. The four attribution of responsibility styles

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are: 1) the moral style, that holds individuals responsible for both problems and solutions; 2) the compensatory style, that considers people responsible for solutions, but not problems; 3) the medical style, that holds individuals responsible for neither problems nor solutions; and 4) the enlightenment style, that considers people responsible for problems, but not solutions.

Regressions on the overall model analyzing the effects of feminism level, epistemology styles and demographic characteristics on attribution of responsibility style revealed being heterosexual and male, along with low social constructionism scores and high empiricism scores, were predictive of the scoring higher in the enlightenment style. Higher scores in the medical style were predicted by being male, having an occupation other than a faculty member or a psychotherapy practitioner and having a higher empiricism score. High scores in the compensatory style were significantly predicted only by high social constructionism scores. Scoring higher in attribution of responsibility moral style was predicted by having high rationalism scores and low feminism scores. Other results of significance were also found. Overall, results were partially supportive of feminism affecting epistemological style and attribution of responsibility style, and highly supportive of epistemology affecting attribution of responsibility style.

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I would particularly like to thank my advisor and dissertation chair, Linda Forrest, Ph.D., for her continued support, assistance and encouragement. She has consistently gone the extra mile when she believed it would be helpful to me personally or in my career, and always been there when I needed her. Along with teaching me much academically, Linda has provided a positive role model of a caring, involved and available faculty member. Without her, my progress to this degree would have been very diminished, if accomplished at all. I also wish to acknowledge and thank the other members of my dissertation committee for their important assistance and support: Betsy Becker, Ph.D.; Marilyn Frye, Ph.D.; Kathryn Moore, Ph.D.; and Robbie Steward, Ph.D.

Finally, I wish to thank the family members and many good friends who have provided unique and necessary forms of support, love, encouragement, fun and escape in this process. Each has contributed greatly to this effort and is deeply appreciated.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1	1
Introduction	1
Statement of the Problem	1
Epistemology	2
Feminism	8
Purpose of the Study	11
Summary	12
 CHAPTER 2	 13
Literature Review	13
Theoretical Constructs	13
Attribution of Responsibility Models	13
Feminism	16
Epistemological Styles	16
Empiricism	17
Rationalism	21
Social Constructionism	23
Empirical Studies	32
Epistemological Values	32
Feminist Beliefs	37
Attribution of Responsibility	38
Conclusion	39
 CHAPTER 3	 40
Methodology	40
Sample	41
Demographics	43
Procedure	48
Measures	50
Reliability	61
Scale Descriptive Statistics	61
Design	63
Hypotheses	64
Analysis	64
 CHAPTER 4	 68
Results	68

Correlations	68
Demographic Variable Analyses	73
Main Analyses	73
Hypothesis 1	73
Hypothesis 2	75
Hypothesis 3	77
Hypothesis 4	78
Summary of Results	82
CHAPTER 5	84
Discussion	84
Summary of Study	84
Interrelationship Among Variables	85
Main Results	88
Limitations	97
Future Research	100
Implications and Applications	102
Appendix A	105
APA Letter Requesting Subjects	105
Appendix B	107
Demographics Questionnaire	107
Appendix C	110
Psycho-Epistemological Profile	110
Appendix D	114
Social Issues Inventory	114
Appendix E	116
Attributions of the Term Feminist	116
Appendix F	117
Helping Orientations Scale	117
Appendix G	119
Cover Letter	119
Appendix H	121
Correction Letter	121
Appendix I	122
Reminder Letter	122

List of References	123
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	
<u>Demographic Information for the Total Sample</u>	. 45-47
Table 3.2	
<u>Correlations Among Feminist Measures</u>	. 61
Table 4.1	
<u>Correlations</u>	. 71-72
Table 4.2	
<u>Regression Predicting Feminism</u>	. 74
Table 4.3	
<u>Regression for Enlightenment</u>	. 75
Table 4.4	
<u>Regression for Compensatory</u>	. 76
Table 4.5	
<u>Regression for Medical</u>	. 76
Table 4.6	
<u>Whole Model Regression on Enlightenment</u>	. 79
Table 4.7	
<u>Whole Model Regression on Medical</u>	. 80
Table 4.8	
<u>Whole Model Regression on Compensatory</u>	. 81
Table 4.9	
<u>Whole Model Regression on Moral</u>	. 81
Table 4.10	
<u>Significant Predictors for Each HOS Style</u>	. 82

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In recent years, there has been increasing interest and attention regarding the epistemological beliefs undergirding the foundations of knowledge in counseling psychology (Borden, 1992). Many counseling psychologists are beginning to recognize and admit that values are inherent in all that we endeavor to do, and starting to address the underlying effects of beliefs and values on theory, research and practice. The tradition of psychology, though, is that of an empirical science that strives for value-neutrality and objectivity (Polkinghorne, 1984). Feminism, on the other hand, is considered a value orientation with implications for action (Ricketts, 1989). Feminist psychology has stressed the importance of examining the effects our beliefs have on what we accept as constituting knowledge. Combining these two perspectives is a fundamental dilemma for feminist psychologists (Peplau & Conrad, 1989). Given these concerns, I assert there is a need for research on how feminist beliefs impact epistemology and how both affect psychological treatment.

The research problem being examined in this study is the relationship of feminism to epistemological preferences and attributions of responsibility in psychological treatment. Feminism will be discussed further below, but can be basically defined as believing that the social status of women is inferior, unjust and in need of change (Jagger, 1977). Three primary epistemological styles will be studied: empiricism, rationalism, and social constructionism. These are also discussed below. Treatment attributions refer to who a therapist believes has the responsibility for problem cause and solution. Attribution of responsibility styles

will be examined to determine if psychotherapists attribute the responsibility for the problem development and solution to the client or to someone or something other than the client. I wish to determine if there is a relationship between feminist values and choice of epistemological style, and if either or both have an effect on attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment. There has been little empirical research on these topics. As such, much of the literature referred to in this work is conceptual and should be considered so unless specifically identified as research or empirically based.

During over two decades of research, Royce and his colleagues have developed a conceptual model of three fundamental classes of knowing: rationalism, empiricism and metaphorism (Diamond & Royce, 1980; Mos, Wardell, & Royce, 1974; Royce, 1964; Royce, Coward, Egan, Kessel, & Mos, 1978). They termed these approaches to knowing "epistemic styles", which are presumed to reflect differences in the way individuals test and evaluate the validity of their beliefs. Each entails a different core criterion for truth (Lyddon, 1989). Briefly, the empirical style of knowing depends on perceptual cognitive processes and testing the validity of beliefs based on reliable correspondence to relevant observation. This style relies primarily on sense perception and is considered inductive. The rational style of knowing relies on conceptual cognitive abilities and testing the validity of beliefs based on their logical consistency. This style relies primarily on logical analysis and synthesis of information and is considered deductive. The metaphoric style (which is being considered synonymous with social constructionism for the purposes of this study) is based on symbolic cognitive abilities and testing the validity of beliefs according to their universality (ability to generalize to other areas of experience). The focus is on symbolizing and constructing new meanings, therefore metaphorism is considered an analogical style. How a person makes meaning from the combination of their

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precepts, concepts and symbols is considered one's world view. The psychological processes of perceiving, conceptualizing and symbolizing are believed to function interdependently, but people generally have one epistemological style they use most often (Royce & Powell, 1983).

My interest in this topic comes from my own feminist beliefs and my concern that psychologists have traditionally been biased in their attempts to study and understand women, along with other non majority individuals and groups. This bias is due to theory and research emanating primarily from a white, Western, heterosexual, male, privileged perspective (Brown, 1990). A major difficulty with this perspective is that any bias is usually unrecognized because of the traditional belief predominant in Western cultures that science and research are empirical, and therefore not biased or based on values (Harding, 1991; Unger, 1983).

Epistemology is relevant to counseling psychology in a number of ways. Understanding and identifying the epistemological beliefs underlying the theory, research and practice of psychology are important to gain a fuller understanding of the assumptive framework guiding the work. Borgen (1992) stated that insight in research and in therapy means understanding the embedded meanings and deep structure: the paradigm. He went on to say that it is intrinsically valuable for counseling psychology to make the implicit culture of our science explicit, which should lead to better service for clients. Kuhn (1970) stated that a discipline operates within a paradigm; a set of assumptions that are often hidden, and with covert social-cognitive motivations and beliefs. The emerging perspective of social constructionism asserts that science begins with paradigms and world views that determine what we will look for and see at the level of data (Highlen & Hill, 1984).

Traditional research methods have been found lacking in their ability to increase our knowledge of the counseling process (Borgen, 1992). Commitment

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to a particular methodology (i.e., empiricism) instead of a question sets limits on what can be investigated. In the field of counseling psychology, with human beings the subject of interest, empiricism is often too narrow in its field of inquiry to adequately examine the complexity of human issues (Polkinghorne, 1984). Borgen (1984) stated that our energy is invested in designs that do not fit our subject matter and the bulk of our research follows an obsolete view of science.

Although being challenged more in recent years, empiricism continues to be the dominant force in Western psychology (Borgen, 1992; Unger, 1983). Polkinghorne (1984) stated that the ideals of empiricism are still accepted and valued as the standards for research in psychology. Most counseling psychologists have remained deeply committed to the assumptions of empiricism and continue to believe this perspective is the one way to properly produce knowledge.

According to Polkinghorne (1984), most philosophers of science, however, view the empirical position as fundamentally untenable and inadequate. Observations do not produce "facts," but are dependent on the theories, culture and values of the observer. Neither formal logic nor pure sense data can provide an absolute foundation for knowledge. Lyddon (1989), in critiquing the domination of empiricism, noted that it is no longer justified by workable, meaningful logic. Krasner and Houts (1984) discussed the implausibility of objective observation and showed that theory and assumptions logically precede observation. They stated that "the fundamental assumption of objectivism is untenable, because it is neither physically nor philosophically possible to obtain knowledge without first choosing some assumptive framework" (p. 841). Ricketts (1989) suggested that believing in the value neutrality of science is itself merely an assumption about epistemology that arises from an empiricist world view, which is a value. Kuhn (1970) asserted that science is basically a cultural creation

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and must be understood in motivational and psychological terms. Manicas and Secord (1983) stated that most scientists, including psychologists, largely ignore the philosophical debates regarding the nature of knowledge and the need to critically examine the underlying assumptions of the constructs and theories they use. Instead, they continue to act as if science is based, without ambiguity, on the observation of data and facts, connected by complete logic to theories and hypotheses.

Others have recognized the impact of values and environment on research. Ricketts (1989) stated that to understand scientists, we need to recognize their social context and membership in groups that may hold incompatible views about what constitutes valid knowledge of reality and the nature of reality. Hubbard (1988) said that facts are not just "out there" - every fact has a maker. She questioned how people decide which aspects of the world they consider fact and which they consider fiction, and, even more important, what they do not even notice and therefore do not relegate to either fact or fiction. She also deemed it clear that making facts and making science are social enterprises. Wittig (1985) stated that reliance on traditional empiricism is debilitating to the social scientist because of the compromise that occurs when effects of values on fact-finding are ignored. She noted that the adequacy base of psychology is affected by the values of the psychologist because both the objects of research and the modes of explanation are value-sensitive.

If science is actually value-laden, then it brings into question much of the basis of our discipline and the supposed facts from which we operate. Unger (1983) argued that our models of reality influence our research in terms of question selection, causal factors hypothesized, and interpretation of data. Harding (1987) noted the importance to feminists of understanding the epistemological agendas within science because some agendas lead to distortion

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and misunderstanding of women's experiences. Longino (1989) stated that in research, a commitment to a particular model is strongly influenced by values, and the model then determines the relevance and interpretation of data. The model then affects psychological treatment, to the extent that research and theories guide psychotherapists.

Although it is not clear that psychotherapists have the same commitment to empiricism that the field of psychology in general does, counseling psychologists are trained as scientist-practitioners with the expectation that treatment methods will follow from research-based methodology (Goldfried & Padawer, 1982; Schmidt & Meara, 1984), which has been shown to be affected by values. Research indicates epistemological beliefs and values also impact the practice of psychotherapy. McGowan & Schmidt (1962) compiled the studies of various authors who extensively analyzed the issue of values in psychotherapy and concluded that it is not possible for psychotherapists to be value-free during the therapeutic interaction. Not understanding our own epistemological beliefs, or even acknowledging that they exist (namely, thinking that everything we do is value-free), could result in unknowingly treating people according to our own values rather than their needs. This is supported by research on the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) and value dimensions of the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values that produced moderately high correlations between each epistemological style and various values each style is believed to reflect, suggesting that value commitments may reflect underlying epistemologies (Royce & Mos, 1980). Mahoney and Lyddon (1988), in their review of the conceptual literature, discussed a number of differences between therapies based in rationalist and constructionist viewpoints, showing that epistemological styles do transfer to different therapist beliefs and behaviors in psychotherapy. According to Mahoney and Lyddon (1988), epistemology affects how we conceptualize client problems,

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the emphasis of our interventions, our conceptualization of affect, resistance, and relapse and regression, the view of insight, and the therapeutic relationship. Another empirical study found that a random sample of behavioral and psychoanalytic therapists showed distinct epistemological preferences based on their PEP responses. Eighty-six percent of psychoanalytic therapists preferred metaphorism, compared to 33% of behavior therapists. Behavior therapists showed a much stronger preference for empiricism than did the comparative group of psychoanalytic therapists (Schacht & Black, 1985). Hoshmand (1991) stated that one of the needs of counseling psychology is to articulate the models of knowledge implicit in approaches to the practice of psychotherapy, including their epistemological assumptions. If we accept the growing viewpoint that there is no value-free science or practice, then an understanding of epistemology and a careful examination of underlying values is necessary for evaluating theory, research, and practice in the field of counseling psychology. I assert that epistemology impacts each of these areas.

The preceding review of reasons why these issues are relevant to counseling psychology also highlights the gap in our knowledge. In my experience, I do not recall ever reading a journal article where the underlying epistemological belief was articulated. Rarely, if ever, is there even an acknowledgment of an epistemological basis to the work (Borgen, 1992). Yet, there are three predominant epistemologies frequently cited in the general literature, each espousing very different values and beliefs. Borgen (1992) noted that a typical empirical article in a journal rarely reveals the discovery context or the assumptive paradigm of the study. Psychological theories and methods of intervention are often seen as valid and reflecting "truth" without examining the underlying beliefs that led to their development, testing and implementation (Harding, 1987). Women and minority groups are often excluded from research

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leading to the development of theory and practice interventions, or studied in ways that do not capture the complexity of their experiences. Because of this, groups of underrepresented people have often been devalued or misunderstood when developing psychological theory and methods of intervention (Coan, 1979; Ricketts, 1989; Unger, 1983). Essentially, there is currently a gap in examining, identifying and even knowing how we know what we know, as well as how our values might have impacted this knowledge. More importantly, there is very little research on the effects of our epistemology on our theories, research, and treatment. I believe it is vitally important that we examine and acknowledge our values and our understanding of truth in an attempt to recognize and articulate our biases. More research will hopefully lead to a more critical evaluation of psychological theory, research and treatment, and how each can be improved.

As feminist psychology has always been explicit in acknowledging its emancipatory values and goals, the expectation of this study is that these values and goals will be reflected in psychotherapy. In fact, feminist psychology (both research and clinical practice) is typically defined by its attention to and explication of underlying beliefs rather than the use of specific methods or techniques (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Harding, 1987). Feminists are therefore at the forefront in examining epistemologies. Gergen (1985) found feminist psychologists to be among those most aware of the possibilities of social constructionism and most attracted to it as an alternative to empiricism. The empiricist orientation has advocated manipulation, suppression, and alienation of those one wants to understand, often women (Jaeger, 1983). Also from feminist perspectives, empiricism often seems to have been used by males to construct views of women that contribute to their subjugation (Bleier, 1984). Feminist psychology has criticized empirical methods in a number of ways: for neglecting women as subjects, for ignoring the effect of the sex of the experimenter on

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performance, for the tendency to make most generalizations to humans from research based only on men, for the effect of sex biases in determining specific behaviors to study with each sex, and for treating people like objects (Unger, 1983). Feminists object to the pervasive androcentrism in psychology and see the need to distinguish between knowledge and prejudice (Hawkesworth, 1989).

A primary goal of psychotherapy is to help people solve or cope with their problems (Corsini & Wedding, 1989). Brickman et al. (1982) developed models of helping and coping they hypothesized as metatheoretical assumptions based on different world views. The authors conceptualized four styles of attribution of responsibility, believed to direct therapists' behavior when attempting to help clients solve problems. Attribution of responsibility styles will be explained in detail in the next chapter. Because different styles of attribution of responsibility are representative of different beliefs and are believed to lead to different therapist behaviors, these styles will be used in this study as an outcome to determine whether feminism and epistemological styles are related to differences in attribution of responsibility style in psychotherapy.

The questions I plan to address in my study are as follows: 1) Do those scoring high in feminist values subscribe more frequently to a rationalist, empiricist, or social constructionist epistemology? 2) Does the endorsement of feminist values influence one's preferred model for attributing responsibility for client problems and solutions? 3) Does one's preferred epistemological style influence one's preferred model of attribution of responsibility, and, if so, which model of attribution of responsibility is related to which epistemological style? 4) Is there a relationship among feminism, epistemological style and attribution of responsibility style in psychological treatment?

Key variables are endorsement of feminist values, preferred epistemological style, and model of attribution of responsibility for the problem and the solution.

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I expect that feminism will affect epistemological style, and epistemology will relate to attribution of treatment responsibility. My expectations are that those endorsing feminist values will prefer social constructionism as their epistemological style, followed by rationalism and then empiricism. What little research there is on this topic suggests that this will be the order of preference (Ricketts, 1989; Unger, 1985). There does not appear to be any literature relating feminism or epistemology to a choice of attribution of responsibility models. Based on how the models distribute responsibility for the problem and the solution, my own prediction is that feminists are most likely to endorse the compensatory model, (one of the models in the attribution of responsibility being used in this study), which places responsibility for problem development with someone other than the client and responsibility for the solution with the client. This prediction is based on the criticisms feminists make of empiricism for often ignoring social context and not empowering the subject or client. In the compensatory model, social context is considered in understanding problem development and the client is empowered to make changes rather than assuming the solution to problems needs to come from a superior authority figure. This prediction is based only on my own ideas of how feminists are likely to respond, not any empirical evidence. The hypotheses will not be directional due to minimal or no empirical support for relationships among the concepts I have selected for this study.

My main reason for choosing these constructs for study is my interests in feminism, epistemology, and in providing efficacious psychological treatment. I have a strong commitment to work to change the inherent biases against women and nonmajority groups in both our society and the field of counseling psychology. As has been discussed, much of counseling psychology remains committed to traditional empiricism as the only method for gaining knowledge and

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truth. Often, this leads to "truth" or knowledge that does not capture the complexity of influences many experience and is not valid and representative for all individuals. Any work that contributes to the recognition of the traditional, discriminatory values on which this field continues to be largely based will help overcome our biases and make counseling psychology more representative and valuing of all individuals. I also found Ricketts (1989) similar study very interesting and wanted to improve it. She explored the effects of values on epistemology. However, I believe her study had serious limitations that restrict its applicability. Ricketts (1989) will be examined in detail later in this work, but briefly, her study could be improved by using better measures of values and epistemology, and by adding social constructionist epistemology. Also, effects on treatment were related only to theoretical orientation rather than psychotherapists' behaviors and metatheoretical beliefs. My use of Brickman et al.'s (1982) model should show more clearly how epistemology actually affects part of the psychotherapy process by examining conceptualization of responsibility in treatment.

The purpose of this study is to expand the empirical base of information regarding the effects of feminism on epistemological style, and belief in the locus of problems in the individual or the environment, and to determine how feminism and epistemology relate to attributions of responsibility for the problem and the solution to self or others in psychological treatment.

Although there is some minor theoretical and empirical support in the literature for certain hypotheses, very little has yet been done in this area. I am therefore considering this primarily an exploratory study to gain a better understanding of the questions and relationships involved. My first hypothesis is that there will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in preferences among social constructionist, rationalist, and empiricist epistemological styles. I

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have found no literature related to my second, third and fourth hypotheses, so am unable to predict the likely order of choices. The second hypothesis is that there will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in preferred model of responsibility attribution in psychological treatment. The third hypothesis is that there will be a difference between epistemological styles in the choice of models of responsibility attribution in psychological treatment. The fourth hypothesis is that there will be a relationship between feminism, epistemological choice, and attribution of responsibility style in treatment.

Answering the questions of this study could provide a clearer understanding of certain issues and beliefs that underlie and guide treatment. The findings of this study may prompt counseling psychologists to look more closely at their undergirding values and the ways their values affect their practice. Further understanding of the relationship between epistemology and practice will help us be more ethical in claiming our biases by being explicit regarding our assumptions and how these are inherent in our work. Empirical research is needed to examine the effects of feminist values on choice of epistemological style and the effects both feminism and epistemological style have on treatment. This study will provide data to examine the relationships among these variables.

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CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

Empirical research on how beliefs impact epistemological style, and how epistemological style impacts theory, research and psychological treatment has been minimal. In this section, the theoretical constructs used in this study will be explained, followed by a review of the relevant empirical studies.

Theoretical Constructs

Attribution of Responsibility Model.

Attribution of responsibility will be assessed using models of helping and coping developed by Brickman et al. (1982). The authors hypothesized that a psychotherapist's model of responsibility is a metatheoretical assumption that supersedes or complements her or his theoretical orientation. Brickman et al. (1982) believed that judgments about whether or not people are held responsible for causing their problems and for solving these problems are functions of four different world views. This theoretical connection to world view provides some linkage for my study in relating feminism to epistemological style. Brickman et al. (1982) conceptualized and developed four models of attribution of responsibility corresponding to the four different world views they theorized. These four models of attribution of responsibility are believed to specify what form individuals' behavior will take when they attempt to help themselves or others. The essence of these models is the attribution of responsibility for a problem and for a solution to one's self or others. The moral model holds individuals responsible for both problems and solutions. Individuals need only proper motivation to change. In the compensatory model, people are considered

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responsible for solutions but not problems. They are thought to need power to change. The medical model holds individuals responsible for neither the problem nor the solution, and they are believed to need treatment to change. In the enlightenment model, people are considered responsible for problems but unable or unwilling to provide solutions. These individuals are in need of discipline to change.

In the moral model, others do not feel obligated to help or capable of helping; everyone makes their own troubles and must find their own solutions. Problems are seen as a sign of weak character requiring the use of more willpower to overcome. People are seen as lazy or unwilling to make enough effort to change, or their effort is misdirected. The individual with the problem must make any changes for her- or himself if he or she wants to. Helping consists of reminding people they are responsible for their own fate and must help themselves. If they don't like the way things are, they should recognize their responsibility for changing things, stop sitting around complaining or waiting for someone else to do something, and change things. Otherwise, they should accept the way things are, realizing they are responsible for their situation, and still stop complaining or blaming others (Brickman et al., 1982).

In the compensatory model, people are seen as having to compensate for the obstacles imposed on them by their situation with special efforts or collaboration with others. Helpers see themselves as compensating for resources or opportunities that the clients deserve but do not have. The responsibility for using this help is with the recipients. Clients are seen as suffering or deprived, not from their own deficiencies, but from the failure of their social environment to provide them with services or goods to which they are entitled. Recipients of help must be assertive to solve their problems. They may need to compel an unwilling social environment to give them necessary resources. Therapists can help train

them in assertiveness techniques and empower them to deal with their environment more effectively. Therapists ask how they can be of help and may, for a time, mobilize on behalf of the client. People are not blamed for their problems and are encouraged to direct their energies outward to solve problems through changing the environment. Clients are given credit for developing solutions to their problems (Brickman et al., 1982).

In the medical model, people are seen as victims and subject to forces that were and will continue to be out of their control. People should not be blamed for their problems or expected to develop their own solutions. Clients are seen as having an illness or being incapacitated. They are expected to accept their state, not worry about social obligations, but seek expert help. The therapist, as the expert, provides clients with solutions and clients are expected to use the therapist's help to try to get better. The responsibility for prescribing the solution and judging its success resides with the therapist. People are not expected to take care of problems by themselves; they need to depend on their therapist. Medications are often considered useful and prescribed (Brickman et al., 1982).

In the enlightenment model, people are required to accept a very negative view of themselves and submit to agents of social control to improve. People are seen as guilty or sinful, or at least as responsible, based on past behavior, for their current problems. Their own impulses are out of control and causing their problems. To control these impulses, clients must learn to submit to authoritative, moral forces of the community. Solutions to problems lie outside the person and can be maintained only as long as they maintain the relationship with external authorities (such as a therapist) or a spiritual community. Power is given to these external agents. Clients are expected to repudiate their old, evil ways and continually perform acts that show this repudiation (Brickman et al., 1982).

Feminism.

Although there are many styles and definitions of feminism, some basic commitments are common. Feminists are united in believing that the inferior social status of women is unjust and in need of change (Jaggar, 1977). Feminism is considered a system of values that challenges male dominance and advocates political, social, and economic equity of women and men in society (Riger, 1992). The primary definition of feminism in this study will be: The belief that sexism exists and is a fundamental, pervasive oppression of women, including the belief that current inequalities exist in political, social, civil and educational rights and opportunities between the sexes, along with a commitment to eradicating the ideology of male domination that permeates Western culture and the elimination of inequalities for women through legal, social, economic and educational reform to allow complete equality for women (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Kramarae & Treichler, 1985; Tuttle, 1986). In providing psychotherapy, a feminist would be expected to focus on expanding awareness of gender role socialization, social barriers and discrimination, and encourage the altering of behavior and environments (Enns & Hackett, 1990).

Examination of Epistemological Styles

Epistemology is basically defined as the science of knowledge, with the primary concerns being how knowledge is acquired and validated (Lyddon, 1989), or how we come to know what we know. Royce and Mos (1980) have developed a psychophilosophical theory of knowledge positing three basic ways of knowing: rationalism, empiricism, and metaphorism. They regard these ways of knowing as basic because of their dependence on various fundamental cognitive processes and their epistemological justifiability. Although there are other epistemological styles discussed in the literature, particularly specific feminist epistemologies, this study will only examine the global epistemological styles mentioned above.

Although I am very interested in the feminist epistemologies not contained in the categories I am studying (feminist empiricism, standpoint theory and postmodernism), I want to first examine the general epistemologies. In further research I might either develop an instrument that measures feminist epistemologies (none currently exist to my knowledge) or study feminist epistemologies using qualitative methodologies to gain a better understanding of the styles.

Empiricism.

The dominant tradition of epistemology in Western psychology has been empiricism, an objectivist epistemology based in logical positivism (Hoshmand, 1991). Empiricism restricts analysis to a few clearly observable units of behavior so that one's own beliefs are assumed to not be imposed on the organism being studied. The method of investigation and subject matter are considered independent of each other (Unger, 1983). The presumption is of a singular, stable, external reality that is accurately revealed by one's senses (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). People are assumed to be essentially passive reactors to environmental events (Ricketts, 1989). The observer, too, is believed to be passive and have a mechanistic conception of nature that functions without the intervention of the detached observer (Code, 1991). Typically, behavior is observed in a laboratory to prevent extraneous variables from influencing behavior. People are seen only as subjects by removing them from their historical and situational contexts (Unger, 1983). Empiricists believe the cause of an event can be determined by breaking down the event into its component parts and studying the relationship among those parts. They try to be ahistorical, seldom looking for the historical and cultural aspects of the lives of the human beings being studied (Sherif, 1987). There is an assumption of objectivity - observation

provides unassailable knowledge: the knowledge of facts and raw data (Krasner & Houts, 1984).

Empiricists require a total separation of intellect and emotion. The belief is that value judgments are emotive and not verifiable, and must therefore be separated from the construction of knowledge. Emotion is subjective, but perceptions of our senses feed directly into the intellect to produce objective, rational knowledge (Code, 1991).

Feminist psychologists have been at the forefront in critiquing traditional empiricism. A major area of criticism by feminists is their recognition that values are an integral part of science influencing all phases of the process. They believe values should be acknowledged and made explicit. Another major area of feminist criticism argues that the methods, language and objectives of science itself, particularly as defined by the experimental method common in empiricism, have been defined and shaped by "masculine" personalities, concerns and interests (Lott, 1985). Feminist psychologists pointed out that empiricist methodology neglected a number of important issues: women as subjects; the effect of the sex of the researcher on the subjects performance; often making generalizations from all-male data to humans as a whole, but not from all-female data; and sex bias in deciding what behavior to study with what sex (Unger, 1983).

Sherif (1987) pointed out that there is much opportunity for bias in the traditional research situation, starting when the decision is made about what to study. There are also many different points where the researcher decides how to study the subject, such as what to consider independent variables and what behavior to observe and what to ignore during the experiment. The power differential between the researcher and "subjects" are also ignored. There is typically a failure to recognize the effects of the research setting, and the effects of researcher's expectations interacting with subjects attempts to behave in

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socially desirable ways. Empiricism has also been criticized for restricting the behaviors that are examined to those that are amenable to simple observation, therefore usually devoid of much meaning to the subjects, and for elimination of actions that involve values and ideology because of their inability to be operationalized (Unger, 1983). Lott (1985) summarized many of the criticisms of empiricism by stating that "facts are always 'construed' by an active investigator/interpreter, and values (or biases) are present throughout the research process" (p. 159), and added that it is to be expected in a patriarchal culture that patriarchal values will be reflected in research. What is seen by some as "masculinity" is reflected in the emphasis of science on power and control, along with compartmentalization, separation, and the search for prime causes rather than equally valid emphases on interdependence, interaction and process (Lott, 1985).

Gergen (1988) criticized empiricism from a feminist perspective on similar accounts: the scientist and subject are considered independent, the subject matter is decontextualized from the field in which it is physically and historically embedded, the belief of value-neutrality in theory and practice, the supposed independence of "facts" from the researcher, and the belief in the superiority of the scientist over others.

Harding (1979, in Code, 1991) discussed some problems of the empiricist tradition that hide behind the guise of objectivity and impartial neutrality, such as providing justification for treating people as cases rather than active, creative and agentic. Particularly interesting is Harding's critique of classic empiricists exempting their own minds from the model they consider universally valid - that everyone is a blank tablet and no one is a self-directed agent. The authors' theoretical creativity allows them to escape the description they apply to all others. The consequence of "the empiricist model of mind ... functions as a self-fulfilling prescription beneficial to those already in power: treat people as if they

are passive and need direction from others, and they will become or remain able to be manipulated and controlled" (Harding, 1979, p. 46). Harding believed the active empiricist theorist and the passive subject model parallels the stereotype of active male and passive female, and serves to legitimate the consequences of that stereotype in androcentric power structures (Code, 1991). Both Harding (1979) and Code (1991) concluded that the sex of the knower (typically the researcher) is epistemologically significant; theories of knowledge developed by men are influenced by their sex.

Code (1991) also critiqued the supposed lack of emotion in the production of knowledge from the empiricist viewpoint. She pointed out that it is at times reasonable to feel certain emotions, and that emotions such as curiosity and interest are necessary to the construction of knowledge. In fact, "emotion and intellect are mutually constitutive and sustaining, rather than oppositional forces in the construction of knowledge" (Code, 1991, p. 47). However, the denigration of emotion is associated with the stereotype of female emotionality. Code warned that feminists must be cautious in identifying with what is believed to be irrationality (female emotionality). She noted, too, that empiricism actually is sustained by subjective forces of self-interest. The ideal of objectivity which suppresses emotionality is largely a product of subjective interests and enthusiasms. Code (1991) continued by pointing out that it is natural that epistemological ideals should derive out of human interests and implausible to believe that which is made by human cognitive agents would not. This recognition of the involvement of human interests should lead us to carefully analyze and critique that which claims to be objective and neutral (Code, 1991).

Empiricism is based in what is often considered "male" ways of knowing. Objectivity and reductionism are prized. Ways of knowing that have frequently been considered "female", such as emotional understanding, are discounted (Code,

1991). Understanding connections among individuals and how context affects behavior is ignored (Harding, 1987). The continued Western, scientific emphasis on empiricism is one way to maintain the status quo and uphold the patriarchy. By ignoring the very different contexts of women and minorities from those of the white male, which can lead to different thoughts, feelings and behaviors, differences can be attributed to transcendent categories or considered biologically natural. The need for social change is less obvious and less threatening to those in power who don't want to give up their position in society. Women and minorities can continue to be seen as the imperfect "other" compared to the white, male standard. Research that doesn't follow standard empirical procedures, and results in information that challenges previous constructions or hierarchies can be ignored as not being rigorous enough to provide accurate information. Believing in empiricism as the only way to truth allows psychologists to ignore the sociocultural, political and historical contexts of the individuals they study and treat, thereby surely ignoring much of what has made, and continues to make, people the way they are.

Rationalism.

Rationalism considers ideas the source of knowledge as opposed to experience (or the senses) which empiricism considers the source of knowledge (Harding, 1991). Rationalists agree with empiricists that the task of knowledge is to build an adequate representation of nature or reality (Benhabib, 1990). Rationalists also see reality as stable, singular and external, and representations as more or less accurate copies, corresponding to the real world (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). Rationalists also agree with empiricists about there being an ideal objectivity; seeking a disinterested, impartial stance for the knower (Benhabib, 1990). Rationalists believe you must detach from the time and place, from personal interests and prejudices, and from the object being studied (Code, 1991).

Both rationalists and empiricists argue against dependence on individuals own emotional responses or other people as a source of knowledge. Rationalists believe that the harmony of mind and nature will guarantee correspondence between the representations of each (Benhabib, 1990).

The rationalist perspective contends that thought is superior to the senses and is most powerful in determining experience (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). The rational epistemological style relies on conceptual, cognitive abilities and involves testing the validity of one's beliefs in terms of their logical consistency (Lyddon, 1989). Thus, knowledge is considered valid by logic or reason. Knowledge is authorized or justified through various methods of gaining information, such as sense experience (although this is not dominant), empirical data, science, logic and expert authority. Intellectual processes are supreme and direct actions and feelings (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988).

Many of the criticisms that apply to empiricism also apply to rationalism. Although rationalists view people as more active in construing their realities, knowledge and reality construction are still very individualistic processes. Rationalists believe in a fixed, external reality and do not recognize that reality can be construed very differently by individuals in very different contexts. They do not consider the contextual influences on thinking, or the social construction involved in what is believed to be "logical". Rationalists also focus on objectivity and believe there can be an impartial stance allowing detachment from context, self and others (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). Here, too, this belief ignores much of what is vital in the development and actions of people living in many different contexts. It seems to allow for there being a "right" way to view the world and find "truth," thereby denying the reality of many who do not fit the norm. Typically, feminists view rationalism as unacceptable because it denies emotion and experience as valid ways of knowing. Rationalism seems to parallel

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stereotypic male beliefs that only logic and reason provides knowledge, and women are too emotional to be possessors or makers of knowledge (Code, 1991).

Social Constructionism.

The foundation of social constructionism is the idea that humans actively create and construe their personal realities - each person, in conjunction with others, creates her or his own representational model of the world. This model then becomes a framework from which the person orders and assigns meaning to new experience (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). The emphasis of social constructionism is on sign-mediated transactions with knowledge constituted through interactions with others in discourse interchanges and communities (Gavalek, 1992). The primary concern of social constructionism is in explicating the processes by which people come to explain, describe, or somehow account for themselves and the world. Discourse about the world is viewed as an artifact of communal interchange - the world is understood as social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. The process of understanding is the result of a cooperative, active endeavor of individuals in relationship (Gergen, 1985).

Social constructionists believe that it is impossible to view the world objectively; our descriptions of the world provide information about ourselves as well as the world. Our research and theories tell about ourselves as well as the world, and the aspects of the world we deem to deserve scientific attention. Our perception of the world and the system of categories by which we perceive it are inseparable. The social constructionist framework chooses between competing views based on their utility; what are the consequences rather than which is correct. Due to different people having different interests, this can never be determined absolutely (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990).

Rather than believing that we discover reality, social constructionism asserts that we invent it. Our experience is an ordering, selecting and organizing of what is out there, not a direct reflection of reality. We do not passively observe reality, but actively construct the meanings we use to organize and frame our experiences and perceptions. What we understand as reality is not an exact replica, but a representation of what is out there. Representations of what we understand to be reality are shared meanings derived from shared history, language and culture. The "realities" of social life are actually products of language and meanings on which we agree (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990). Realities are believed to be individual and collective constructions to order our experience. Knowing is behavioral, emotional and cognitive, and the validity of knowledge is less important than its meaningfulness. Thought, action, and feeling are functionally and structurally inseparable. All human knowing is seen as inseparable from the experience of the knower (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988).

From the social constructionist position, all knowledge is a construction of the human mind. Sensory data are filtered through our biological apparatuses for acquiring sensory information and made into cognitions and perceptions. The mind itself is constructed in a social context, so the minds' knowledge is created in part by the cultural and social contexts in which the mind comes to know the world. The usefulness of what we come to know depends on the shared perceptions of what the "facts" are (consensual validation) and on whether or not they work for various purposes. Knowledge cannot be perceived or processed without being constrained by our beliefs - emotional responses and personal prejudices impact our knowledge of events. Individuals, including scientists, seek "facts" that fit into their world view and are congruent with prior beliefs (Scarr, 1985).

Social constructionism considers both the individual and the world, construing knowledge as a communal human construction that both forms and is formed by human beings. Making knowledge is seen as a communal rather than a private activity as advances in knowledge generally come from moving beyond or refining what is already known (Soltis, 1981). Social constructionism breaks down the individual/society dichotomy in two ways. First, it states that human action, thought and perception must be examined in terms of meanings. Second, codes, particularly language, carry meanings and are inherently intersubjective (Ingleby, 1986). According to Ingleby (1986), these codes that structure action should be the subject of psychology, not individual minds. The prominence of the individual is rejected by social constructionism. Bruffe (1986) gave what he considered a succinct summary of the social constructionist understanding of knowledge by quoting Geertz (1973), "we must learn to conceive 'of cognition, emotion, motivation, perception, imagination, memory ... whatever' - entities we normally think of as strictly individual, internal, and mental affairs - 'as themselves, and directly, social affairs'" (p. 775). Regarding scientific knowledge, Kuhn (1970) stated that it, too, is a social construct, identical with the language in which it is formulated. The community of scientists constructs knowledge essentially by arriving at a consensus.

In contrast to empiricism, social constructionist theory challenges the belief that reality is fixed and can be objectively observed. Social constructionists also challenge the belief that it is possible to distinguish facts from values, believing instead that values and attitudes determine what are to be accepted as facts. Empiricism focuses on facts and answers; social constructionism focuses on assumptions and questions. Social constructionist theory asserts that knowledge, including scientific knowledge, cannot be disinterested or politically neutral (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990).

Social constructionists believe that empiricist methods for gaining psychological knowledge are inadequate. Knowledge about behavior is constructed, not just deduced, and methods beyond those of the traditional scientific method are necessary for a more complete understanding of human behavior. Constructions of knowledge are affected by personal, social, historical and cultural contexts. Judgments of the validity, meaning and usefulness of particular analyses of behavior are themselves socially influenced. Explanations of human behavior must include knowledge of the individual's social contexts - explanations derived under controlled conditions are at best incomplete. Behavior is caused by multiple factors that change in complex ways. Methods must be sensitive to multiple and bi-directional causality and subjective meanings to help gain understanding of interactional processes. Research should be on multiple levels of inquiry and coordinate the study of psychological processes with biological and social processes (Wittig, 1985). Rather than looking for explanations for human behavior in the interior of the mind, the focus shifts to examining the processes and structures of human interaction. Social constructionism attempts to move beyond the dualism of empiricism and rationalism, placing knowledge within the process of social interchanges (Gergen, 1985). According to Bruner (1990), the basic claim of social constructionism is that "knowledge is 'right' or 'wrong' in light of the perspective we have chosen to assume" (p. 25).

Social constructionism stresses that processes or social categories are produced through language and the selective use of evidence. In psychology, this perspective would argue that psychological phenomena need to be understood relative to their situational and historical specificity - they do not exist apart from the context in which they occur or are studied. Researchers will obtain different results depending on how they shape the context of the questions asked or frame

their questions (Unger, 1990). A social constructionist position in psychology attempts to explain rather than necessarily predict human behavior. Social constructionism does not attempt to find universal principles and deterministic laws that can be applied to essentially all of humanity. The social constructionism position attempts to account for more complex causal relationships and other aspects of human action that are often ignored in research, such as intentions, purposes, subjective meanings and values (Wittig, 1985).

Social constructionism challenges the concepts of experience and sense data basic to empiricism, suggesting that reports of experience are linguistic constructions shaped by historically contingent conventions of discourse. There is no one "truth" or method to determine "truth." Knowledge claims are to be evaluated through recognizing limitations inherent in existing constructions, current needs for systems of intelligibility, and numerous moral, political, aesthetic, and practical considerations (Gergen, 1985).

For feminist psychology, the social constructionist approach allows feminist political analysis to influence theory and practice directly rather than just through the selection of content or the problem to be studied. Current social circumstances must enter into psychological analysis, such as understanding that virtually all women exist in hierarchical societies where men are viewed as superior. This understanding helps deter believing that factors limiting women's lives and influencing their choices are "all in their heads" or caused only by female biology, rather than also related to sociopolitical circumstances (Unger, 1990).

Social constructionism is seen by many feminists as an attractive alternative to empiricism, in particular, due to its emphasis on the processes of interpretation, the communal basis of knowledge, and concern with the values which are the underpinnings of traditional scientific accounts (Gergen, 1985). Some uses feminists have made of social constructionist theory are in employing interpretive

research strategies, demonstrating the pragmatic uses of constructionist inquiry, documenting the scientific construction of gender, and exploring the foundations for constructionist metatheory (Unger, 1983). Some feminists are concerned, though, that the focus on meaning and language will deflect from a focus on the political, social and economic problems associated with women's lives (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990).

Cook and Fonow's (1990) feminist critique of epistemological beliefs of the social sciences articulated some ways that social constructionism fits epistemological principles undergirding feminist science and research. First, they support the necessity of continuously attending to the significance of gender as a basic component of all social life, including research. Women and their experiences are the focus of inquiry. Subjective experiences are not discounted, but the emotional, interior worlds of women are validated. There must be recognition that much of what is considered knowledge about human behavior is actually knowledge about male behavior, where masculine is equated with universal and women are ignored. The researcher should also be located as a gendered being whose own life and research is influenced by the social relations related to gender. Another feminist epistemological principle found in social constructionism is a challenge to the norm of objectivity that assumes personal or grounded experiences are unscientific and the subject and object of research can be separated. This leads to exploration of the fallacy that separation of researcher and subject produces more valid, legitimate knowledge. It also encourages exploration of how the research process reinforces the subordination of women participants, and leads to a critique of equating quantitative research as more objective, instead noting that quantification has inherent distortions and biases (Cook & Fonow, 1990).

The social constructionist epistemological beliefs also support feminist concerns about research in other areas. Wylie (1992) stated that women should not be objectified - the supposed separation of researcher and object of study should be abandoned, especially attempting to avoid the power differential typical of the hierarchical relationship of researcher and subject in most quantitative research. Researchers should be acknowledged as socially situated individuals whose own experience and social involvement with participants of the study inevitably affects their understanding. This makes visible the researcher's part in the construction of knowledge and allows it to be critiqued as a part of the research process. Harding (1989) added that keeping the researcher in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter allows the whole research process (such as formulation of questions and hypotheses, and methods used) to be considered for scrutiny when interpreting the results of the project. Acknowledging the personal lenses of the researcher also helps avoid false universalizing of results. With the concern of feminists to make the politics of personal life known, it is important that the position of the researcher be included throughout the research process (Scott, 1985).

The social constructionist viewpoint also meshes with feminist's admitting to political agendas (Sherwin, 1989). Feminists analyze gender critically, looking at how individual, symbolic and structural expressions of gender account for women's oppression. Through the questions posed by feminist research, and the absence of questions in certain areas that it locates, feminism places gender as central in shaping institutions, consciousness and skills along with distributing privilege and power (Lather, 1991). Feminist research recognizes that questions men have wanted answered have often been used to control or exploit women, and to glorify masculinity by seeing women as less than or deviant from men. Instead, feminist research attempts to find explanations to biological and social phenomena

that women need and want (Harding, 1989). Questions asked in feminist research primarily focus on women's experiences in political struggle because the questions of an oppressed group are not often for pure "truth" but for information about how to overcome their oppression. This challenges the traditional, empirical pretense of truth for its own sake without an agenda (Sherwin, 1989).

The focus on women's experiences as the source of problems also challenges traditional methodology by acknowledging that there is no problem without a group of people who have a problem. Traditional research ignores the relevance of the origin of problems or hypotheses in considering the value of the results. Those approaching research from a feminist perspective believe that the questions asked, and those not asked, are as important in determining the adequacy of the complete picture as results. The purposes of research and analysis are not separated from the origins of research problems (Harding, 1987). Feminist researchers openness about the process of research being affected by a theoretical framework is often seen as a threat to orthodox research (Scott, 1985).

Feminist epistemological bases for research also emphasize the plurality of women's experiences - there is no one universal woman or man to be held up as the norm (Harding, 1987). Claims of being abstract, objective or universal are explicitly avoided (Sherwin, 1989). Feminist approaches to science aim to eliminate oppression of individuals based on gender, class, race, sexuality, ableness, or nationality. "Truth" is acknowledged as partial and culture-bound (Harding, 1991). These values of feminist researchers also suggest support for the social constructionist epistemological position.

The social constructionist position seems to provide a balance between more radical views, such as empiricism and postmodernism. The emphasis on context requires multiple methods and levels of inquiry in order to have a more

complete picture of individuals and their actions. The complexity of human life is central (Harding, 1987). Yet, the social constructionist position acknowledges an ontological reality and biological constraints on development and behavior. Our realities are shaped by complex interactions between biology and contexts. Social constructionism believes that knowers both shape and are shaped by the world. This allows for a limited concept of agency. There is meaning, but it is developed with others and by consensus. Meanings are not based on biological categories or transcendental over time and cultures (Gavelek, 1992). Utility is sought rather than absolute truths. Social constructionism recognizes that values are inherent in all that we do. Science is not exempt from the influence of values (Unger, 1990). As such, "truth" that does not consider context or claims universality is questioned. This focus allows the voices and realities of all people and groups to be considered valid and important for study and understanding our societies.

Clearly, there are numerous views of how knowledge and "truth" are attained, along with what constitutes knowledge and truth. If we do not examine our own and others' epistemological styles, we are not able to recognize the world view that influences and guides theory, research and practice. Without this understanding, we are left with only partial and distorted views of what is considered valid information and beliefs. Uncritically accepting certain epistemological styles can also lead to partial and distorted views of what is reality for many individuals, especially women and minorities. Acceptance of the status quo views of science and facts must be critically examined and questioned to provide the basis for a broader understanding of the many, complex influences that shape all individuals and their realities. Only then can we develop theories, conduct research, and provide therapy in ways that reflect the multifaceted truths, needs and realities of all people.

Feminist researchers, in particular, have challenged the acceptance of traditional, androcentric scientific methodologies by explicating their flaws and biases. Feminist criticisms of epistemological styles and the methodologies that emerge from them have helped open the way for a broader understanding of the research process and how research findings affect women's lives. We can now see that there are many ways for generating acceptable "truths" and knowledge. Empiricism as the primary epistemology, and empirical methods that often ignore or distort women's concerns and lives, should not continue to be the main acceptable basis for generating "truth" and knowledge for the field of counseling psychology.

Empirical Studies

Ricketts (1989) studied female feminist psychologists to determine their epistemological values and whether or not they separated their beliefs from their choice of methods of treatment. Lesbian feminists as a group were also studied, as were groups of academic and practicing psychologists. The results revealed feminist psychologists as an overall group prefer rationalist over empiricist epistemology, and viewed science as value-laden. Lesbian psychologists were even less committed to traditional empiricist ideology than non lesbian, and academics were more committed to traditional empiricist values than practitioners.

Ricketts (1989) gave questionnaires to participants in two conferences for women in psychology. The sample consisted of 190 participants, 97% were female and 96% were white. Educational level varied from B.A.'s to Ph.D.'s. Teaching or research was the primary occupation for 40% of the sample. The remainder were providers of psychological services. Fifty-six percent of the sample was heterosexual, with the majority of the remainder describing their sexual orientation as lesbian.

Ricketts (1989) used Coan's (1979) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS) to study epistemological style. The TOS is purported to measure the contrasting epistemological styles labeled "Objectivism" and "Subjectivism". The TOS contains 32 items which are arranged into eight factor subscales. Five of these factors define the Objectivism and Subjectivism scales. The other three measure factual orientation vs. theoretical orientation, environmental determinism, and biological determinism. A second order factor is calculated to determine an exogenism vs. endogenism orientation: a person's tendency to emphasize either external, social or internal, biological sources of individual differences in behavior. A 43-item Values Survey (VS) (Krasner & Houts, 1984), with eight subscales corresponding to eight broad domains of values, was used to investigate relationships between psychologists' personal values and their assumptions about epistemology.

A major difficulty with understanding this study is Ricketts' apparent definition of rationalism. She describes rationalism as viewing individuals as active and agentic, and based on the belief that individuals construct their own reality. She used the TOS, which is supposed to represent the contrasting epistemological positions of subjectivism and objectivism. Although she was clear in considering objectivism as corresponding to empiricism, I believe she incorrectly labeled the subjectivist position as rationalism rather than social constructionism. This study was considered representative of only the current membership in certain women in psychology groups. No definition was given for feminism and the assumption was made that the subjects were feminist based on their membership in the surveyed groups. Ricketts failed to provide adequate reliability and validity information on her measures of epistemology, or sufficient general information to make them clearly understandable. Also, the author

examined only the rationalist (possibly social constructionist) and empiricist perspectives.

Unger (1985) sampled feminist psychologists and compared their world view to a sample of faculty members in psychology and students in courses studying women. The intent of the study was (a) to determine if feminists share values that differ from nonfeminists, and (b) to categorize the areas of value differences. She used the Attitudes About Reality Scale (AARS), which measures epistemological frameworks. This scale was constructed to reflect a continuum of epistemological styles between Objectivist and Subjectivist viewpoints, similar to the TOS (Coan, 1979). It consists of forty items, measured on a 7-point Likert scale, encompassing four conceptual domains: preference for biological versus. social explanations for individual and group differences; power as a personal versus. a societal construct; belief that science is value-free and objective versus. relativistic and subjective; and acceptance of the societal status quo versus. belief in the efficacy and legitimacy of individual efforts to change society. Unger surveyed 20 leaders in feminist activities for this study, and compared their AARS scores to students enrolled in college courses on women. An additional comparison group of nine individuals on the college psychology faculty was also used. Respondents self-identified as feminists.

Unger (1985) found the feminist leaders in psychology were more likely to be social constructionists in their epistemological viewpoint regarding biological vs. social causality and the nature of science than the comparison groups. The comparison groups were more similar to each other on the AARS. Feminist leaders also differed from students in their view of how science works. They were more likely to see science as a human enterprise and less fair than the students saw it. Feminist leaders were also more sensitive than students to issues involving social and personal power. They were more aware of power inequities and

viewed attempts at social change more positively. Unger concluded that feminist leaders in psychology possess a world view that differs from that of their students and probably most of their professional peers. This study had small sample sizes, a nonrepresentative sample of feminists, and did not give information on the psychometric adequacy of the scale.

Another study compared the value systems of behavioral and nonbehavioral psychologists (Krasner & Houts, 1984). Eighty-two behavioral psychologists were compared to 37 randomly selected non-behavioral psychologists. Measures used were the Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS), the Values Survey (VS), and the Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ). The ESQ is a 24-item scale that was rationally constructed to assess the three basic epistemological assumptions about science: empiricism, rationalism, and metaphorism. The ESQ was based on the conceptual work of Royce (1975), but the reliability scores for the three subscales were not adequate. Exploratory factor analysis of the ESQ revealed four factors that were labeled metaphorism, rationalism, reductionism, and antiempiricism. Metaphorism referred to an intuitive approach to science as opposed to assumptions of rational order and the primacy of data. Rationalism referred to using deductive as opposed to inductive methods. Reductionism referred to believing that psychology cannot be reduced to physical science. Antiempiricism referred to opposition to traditional empiricism.

Krasner and Houts (1984) found that different groups had very different basic assumptions about psychology and science. Behaviorists were more empirical in their epistemological style than the non behaviorists. They systematically and consistently differed from the comparison group over basic assumptions about psychology and science. Results also revealed only a few significant but weak relationships between assumptions about psychology and science and broader sociopolitical values. The authors suggested that broad

values may be only marginally related discipline-specific assumptions. These weak findings regarding assumptions about psychology and sociopolitical could relate to an expectation of my study, namely that feminist women do not separate their personal values from their work as much as other psychologists. Only six of the 119 subjects in this study were women, which may have affected the weak relationship between epistemology and sociopolitical view.

Lyddon (1989) used the three epistemological styles being used in this study to examine whether or not clients preferred a therapy style that matched their personal epistemological style. Epistemological style was measured using the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP), with the participants' epistemological style determined by their highest PEP score. Therapy style was measured by two scales developed to determine participant's evaluation of the counseling approaches in relation to themselves and in relation to others. Participants preferred the therapy approach that represented a match with their personal epistemological style, which supports that all three personal epistemology styles can be measured and may influence treatment.

In an extension of Lyddon's 1989 work, Neimeyer, Prichard, Lyddon, and Sherrard (1993) examined the relationship between epistemological style and counseling preference for rationalist, behavioral or social constructionist approaches. Participants were read a description of the type of counseling, including theoretical and practical aspects, after which they completed rating forms to indicate their preference. Participants also completed the PEP. PEP rationalism scores correlated strongest with preferences for a rationalist approach to counseling ($r = .17$). PEP empirical styles correlated strongest with a preference for behavioral counseling ($r = .28$), and metaphoric styles correlated strongest with the social constructionist approach to counseling ($r = .35$). Overall, the correlation pattern showed consistent support for the relationship

between epistemological style and client counseling style preferences (Neimeyer, et al., 1993).

Another study by Neimeyer et al. (1993) was designed to test the relationship between epistemological style and counseling theories preference among beginning graduate student counselors in training. Participants were given the PEP and a counseling theory packet which consisted of seven counseling theory approaches and questions regarding each theory, such as level of agreement with the approach. Predicted correlations based on the previous study were generally, but not strongly, supported. Rationalist epistemologies correlated most highly with preferences for rational-emotive and behavioral therapies, and metaphorical styles correlated most highly with gestalt and rational-emotive approaches (Neimeyer et al., 1993).

Also relevant to my study are several studies about the effects of feminist beliefs. Unger, Draper, and Pendergrass (1986) studied connections between personal experiences and epistemology. The authors hypothesized that social group membership may influence epistemology because oppressed minorities are likely to have life experiences that may sensitize them to aspects of reality that individuals who are not oppressed do not really perceive. It was expected that those with a relatively problem-free relationship with society would be more likely to have an empirical epistemology. Results of the study, in which the AARS was used, indicated that college students with exposure to psychology courses taught from a feminist perspective became significantly more social constructionist in their epistemological beliefs. Also, students who identified themselves as active feminists scored as much more social constructionist than other students in the sample. Unger, et al. concluded: "Thus feminists, who identify with women as a deprived group, appear to have a particularly strong disposition to endorse the view that reality is socially constructed" (p.76).

Similarly, Coan (1979), using the TOS, found connections between the theoretical orientation of psychologists and their life circumstances. Those who are more likely to have experienced a lack of accord with society are less likely to be empiricists. The author suggested that personal experience sensitizes individuals to different aspects of problems and leads them to question assumptions considered self-evident by others who lack this experience (Unger, 1983). Ricketts (1989) characterized feminism as a minority group perspective that alters values and social perceptions. This minority group perspective could be even more appropriate and accurate for lesbian women and members of racial minorities, who experience discrimination for these attributes. Ricketts (1989) also noted that lesbian women are a more stigmatized minority group than women in general, and could therefore be expected to have life experiences that sensitize them to aspects of reality of which other women may be unaware.

McGovern, Newman and Kopta (1986) used the Brickman et al. (1982) models of attributions of responsibility to assess metatheoretical assumptions of client responsibility in psychotherapy and how this might differ by theoretical orientation. To operationalize the Brickman et al. model, they used two case vignettes, each containing a psychosocial history and a description of a therapy session. The authors then rated the responses of 43 clinicians to open-ended questions concerning attribution of responsibility to place subjects in one of the models' categories. The questions used to determine attribution of responsibility were: 1) Speculate briefly on what factors may represent significant causal determinants in the patient's disorder, 2) What specifically brought about these causal factors, 3) What role would you take in the execution/attainment of the treatment goals you outlined above, and 4) What role would you expect the patient to take in the attainment of these goals. Responses to all questions were

rated on whether responsibility for problem cause and solution was considered internal or external.

Results indicated cognitive-behavioral, eclectic, and family-systems therapists clustered together on their attributional schemes. Significant differences were found with the psychodynamic therapists, who attributed less responsibility to the patient for both problem cause and change.

Conclusion

Epistemology is an important underlying issue in counseling psychology. There are three distinct epistemological styles often discussed in the literature: empiricism, rationalism and social constructionism. However, the ways in which epistemological style might effect theory, research and practice in counseling psychology have rarely been examined. Feminist psychologists have been at the forefront in acknowledging their values and challenging the empirical traditions of psychology. What little empirical evidence that exists suggests values and epistemology do have an affect on the practice of psychotherapy. Yet, historically and currently, little attention is given to examining how our beliefs impact our work and those with whom we work. This study will be at the forefront of understanding and articulating the effects of feminism on epistemology and the effects of both on treatment.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology

To begin this section, I would like to acknowledge that have I struggled at length with the conflict inherent in proposing an empirical study that will show that values impact research and that the empirical style of epistemology should not be the only one used in counseling psychology. I have based my decision to proceed with an empirical study on a number of issues. First, I believe I have acknowledged my biases clearly throughout this work, which follows feminist suggestions for research.

Second, Harding (1987) distinguished between methods and methodology in research. A method is a technique of gathering evidence, whereas a methodology is an analysis and theory of the specific way research should proceed. Epistemological issues are intertwined with both. Harding stated that methodology is one area where feminist influence is found; even though the general methods may be similar, the evidence may be gathered in different ways by feminists, such as by paying attention to women's concerns. Within a methodology that recognizes the value of women and is guided by a feminist agenda, each method must be evaluated based on how well its use fulfills the goal of uncovering and understanding the reality of those being studied. No method is in itself sexist, but rather sexism is inherent in the way it is used. Feminist research is mainly defined by an application of feminist theory. I believe my attempt to gather more information about issues that often negatively affect women and to point out the biases often underlying research about women fulfills this agenda.

Third, because there is so little work in this area, this is primarily an exploratory study. As such, I wish to first determine if my hypotheses are supported through a study of this type. If there is some support for my hypotheses, I would like to pursue more in-depth, qualitative research on this topic. And, finally, I believe there are many individuals, committed to the empiricist tradition, who ignore or give little value to research that is not empirical. I would like to use empirical methodology to provide some evidence to these individuals that values and epistemological style do affect psychological work and this underlying influence should be acknowledged.

Sample

To choose the participants in this study, a random sample of full members from certain Divisions and job areas was obtained from the American Psychological Association [APA] membership records. Randomly selecting the sample is an accepted method for providing variability in age, race, geographical region, and other demographic variables (Glass & Hopkins, 1984). Only individuals who were full members in the APA were selected to control for educational level because full membership requires a doctoral degree. To obtain a sample that could reasonably be expected to be involved in either academic positions (including researchers) or practice positions, along with attempting to provide subject variability in race and sexual orientation, only members of certain Divisions of the APA were considered potential subjects. These Divisions were: 12 - Clinical, 17 - Counseling, 35 - Psychology of Women, 44 - Gay and Lesbian Issues, and 45 - Ethnic Minority Issues. A letter was sent to APA (Appendix A), following their guidelines for information needed for approval of research projects on APA members. Included were specifications for sampling, such as division membership, no overlapping members, equal amounts of men and women, and sorting by only those with clinical and counseling psychology degrees. I

requested and received 600 name and address labels, 120 from each of the above listed divisions.

Sample size was determined by first deciding on a .05 alpha level for two-tailed statistical analyses. Although this could be considered somewhat stringent for an exploratory study, I hoped to show significant results at the level typically accepted in social sciences research. As effect size was unknown, it was difficult to determine an adequate number of subjects. However, an acceptable critical effect size was determined to be .30, which is often used in social science research not considered to have a major impact on society. I then chose an 80% power level, again often considered adequate for social science research. This would have resulted in a necessary sample size of 83 subjects per group (feminist versus nonfeminist) (Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987). Utilizing scores above and below the mean to determine identification as feminist versus nonfeminist (Enns & Hackett, 1990), 85 participants scored as more feminist and 76 scored as less feminist. The final, usable sample size of 161 (26.8% response rate for correctly completed surveys) was not as large as hoped for or expected, but I was unable to further increase response rate. Due to the amount of variables in my study, and the desire to keep power high, I had determined the desired sample size to be an expected minimum of 200. Recent research on response rates to mail survey research found a median response rate of 63.7% across 34 studies using various survey procedures (Weathers, Furlong & Solorzano, 1993). Due to the length and timing of my study, I expected around a 33% response rate, though I was hopeful that Ph.D. psychologists, having done dissertations themselves, would be more responsive. Although division membership varies widely by size (Division 12 = 6,667, Division 17 = 3279, Division 35 = 6042, Division 44 = 962, and Division 45 = 874) (Personal communication, APA, 1995), I purposely oversampled from Divisions 44 and 45 to gain greater diversity in race and sexual orientation than

would otherwise be expected. The response rates from the divisions sampled are as follows: Division 12, 33 responses (20% rate); Division 17, 39 responses (24% rate); Division 42, 29 responses (18% rate); Division 44, 34 responses (21% rate); and Division 45, 25 responses (16% rate). The division of one respondent was not able to be determined.

I received a total of 175 survey responses. Of those, 161 were completed and able to be used in the analyses. Fourteen of the responses were unusable due to the respondent only partially completing the survey. I did not indicate that each page needed to be turned over, and all partial completions had neglected the back pages of the survey. One of the 161 respondents with usable results completed all instruments, but did not complete the demographic form so all sample characteristics will be reported on 160 subjects (except in certain cases where an occasional demographic response was omitted).

Demographic description of the sample. Various demographic characteristics were collected from the study respondents and are reported in Table 3.1. The sample consisted of almost equal numbers of men and women. There was a wide variation in age, with most of respondents ranging between 30 and 60 years of age. The great majority of subjects are Caucasian, with only a few respondents in other racial categories. In the area of sexual/affectional orientation, no one identified as strictly bisexual according to the Kinsey (1953) scale used. Slightly over one-fourth of the respondents self-identified as totally or primarily lesbian or gay and almost three-fourths self-identified as totally or primarily heterosexual. The majority of the respondents are either married or in a committed partnership. The great majority of the individuals earn a relatively high income, with over one third earning more than \$100,000 per year. A large majority of the subjects live in an urban or suburban area. Almost all of the respondents received their degree in either counseling or clinical psychology. The majority of the participants work

as clinicians, with some faculty members and administrators. The individuals in this sample tend to have many years of clinical practice experience, with the majority having over 10 years of experience and ranging to over 40 years of experience. Theoretical orientation varied, but the largest group was composed of those who identified as eclectic, with many respondents also identifying as cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic.

Table 3.1

Demographic Information for the Total Sample

Variable	N	%
<u>Sex</u>		
Women	83	52
Men	77	48
<u>Age</u>		
20-29	2	1.3
30-39	32	20
40-49	75	47
50-59	29	18
60-69	17	11
70-79	4	2.5
Over 80	1	.6
<u>Race</u>		
African-American	6	3.8
Asian	5	3.1
Caucasian	142	88.8
Hispanic	4	2.5
Native American	2	1.3
Other	1	.6
<u>Sexual Orientation</u>		
Exclusively homosexual	16	10
Predominantly homosexual	22	13.8
Preference for homosexual	3	1.9
Equal interest	0	0
Preference for heterosexual	3	1.9
Predominantly heterosexual	19	11.9
Exclusively heterosexual	95	59.4

Table 3.1, continuedRelationship status

Committed partnership	42	26.3
Divorced	15	9.4
Married	85	53
Separated	3	1.9
Single	11	6.9
Widowed	3	1.9

Income

Less than \$30,000	3	1.9
\$30,000-\$39,000	7	4.4
\$40,000-\$49,000	8	5
\$50,000-\$59,000	11	6.9
\$60,000-\$69,000	18	11.3
\$70,000-\$79,000	18	11.3
\$80,000-\$89,000	15	9.4
\$90,000-\$99,000	18	11.3
Over \$100,000	61	38

Residence Area

Rural	23	14.4
Suburban	76	47.5
Urban	61	38

Area of Degree

Counseling Psychology	60	37.5
Clinical Psychology	95	59.4
School Psychology	3	1.9

Area of Employment

Faculty	28	17.5
Administrators	10	6.3
Clinicians	103	64.4
Other	14	8.8

Table 3.1, continuedYears of Clinical Experience

0-4	6	3.8
5-9	27	16.9
10-14	36	22.5
15-19	32	20
20-24	24	15
25-29	19	11.9
30-34	8	5
35-39	3	1.9
Over 40	5	3.1

Primary Theoretical Orientation

Behavioral	4	2.5
Cognitive	1	.6
Cognitive-Behavioral	38	23.8
Client-Centered	4	2.5
Family Systems	7	4.4
Eclectic	57	35.6
Humanistic	11	6.9
Psychodynamic	25	15.6
Other	6	3.8

Procedure

All 600 individuals identified by the APA random search were sent the demographic form (Appendix B) and measurement materials (Appendixes C - F) with a cover letter (Appendix G), a stamped, self-addressed post card, a stamped, addressed return envelope, and a computer answer sheet. The post card could be used to request omission from the survey or to request the results. Directions were given in the cover letter. The cover letter also briefly explained the purpose of the study (discovering if certain beliefs affect how the subjects conceptualize client problems and ways of helping clients), assured confidentiality, and requested their participation. Additionally, participants were informed of their rights and given my phone number to contact me if they had any questions. The information given in the cover letter was fairly nonspecific regarding the purpose of the study to guard against influencing the results. Informed and voluntary consent was assumed when the questionnaire packet was returned. Participants were asked to complete, on the computer answer sheet, the questionnaire packet that included: a demographic form, the Psycho-Epistemological Profile, the Social Issues Inventory, the Behavioral and Political Orientation scales of the Attributions of the Term Feminist instrument, and the Helping Orientations Scale. They were also told that completion of the materials should take approximately 15-20 minutes, based on the average completion time of five volunteers who pretested the instruments. As an incentive for responding, the cover letter informed participants that they would be eligible for a \$100 prize, which would be drawn from identification numbers of completed, returned surveys, when their survey packet was returned. Upon completing the packet, the participant was asked to return the computer answer sheet and the demographics form to me in the stamped, addressed envelope provided. Computer forms and demographic sheets were stapled together to increase the likelihood of participants returning

the correct forms. To do the follow-up mailings and draw for the \$100 financial incentive, each questionnaire packet was numbered and a list was maintained with numbers matched to names of those chosen for the study. Following the procedures recommended by Dillman (1978) and Weathers et al. (1993) for questionnaire surveys, I signed the cover letter, used first class postage on the surveys and return envelopes, included an incentive, and intended to make a minimum of requests for participation. Continuing to follow their suggestions, it was my intent to send a follow-up letter approximately one week after the surveys were sent. Unfortunately, an error was discovered two days after mailing the initial survey packets. The paragraph describing how to code answers at the top of the first page of the instruments correctly identified the meaning of responses coded 0 through 4. However, the graph following the explanation was incorrectly labeled. 0 was labeled "CD" for complete disagreement, 1 was labeled "MD" for moderate disagreement, 2 was labeled "N" for neutral, 3 was incorrectly labeled "CA" for complete agreement (but should have been "MA" for moderate agreement) and 4 was incorrectly labeled "CD" for complete disagreement (but should have been "CA" for complete agreement). As soon as the error was discovered, I developed a postcard (Appendix H) explaining the error and the corrections, asked respondents to inform me of how they had responded to questions (e.g., according to the paragraph or the graph), along with encouraging those who had not yet responded to do so immediately. This postcard was sent out three days after the surveys were mailed. Participants were very helpful in understanding and responding to my error. I received 155 responses, with all 155 saying they understood how the answers were supposed to be coded and responded based on the paragraph directions, not the error. Given this 100% correct usage of the numerical responses, the fact that psychologists are very familiar with how Likert scales are supposed to be used, and everywhere else on

the survey the graph was correct, all 161 completed survey responses were used in the analyses. Additionally, approximately three weeks after the mailing of the survey packets, a second follow-up postcard (Appendix I) was mailed to those who had not yet responded. I extended the deadline for the monetary incentive and again asked for their participation in the survey. I also increased the information given regarding the purpose of the study in the hopes of generating more interest in responding, and added my school affiliation and advisor's name in response to some criticism from earlier respondents.

Demographic Form

All respondents were asked to complete a demographic information form (Appendix B). Demographic information included: age, sex, race, income, urban, suburban or rural community, area of psychology degree, relationship status, theoretical orientation, years of clinical practice experience, and primary type of work (academic or practitioner). Participants were also asked to identify their sexual/affectional orientation, which was assessed with the Kinsey Scale (1953). This scale is a single item, seven point scale that asks respondents to choose one of seven categories that best describes their preference for sexual involvement with members of the same sex, opposite sex, or both.

Measures

Psycho-Epistemological Profile.

The key construct of epistemology was operationalized and measured by the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) (Royce & Mos, 1980) (Appendix C). The primary reason for using the PEP is that it is the only available measure that categorizes respondents into all epistemological styles being examined. The PEP is an empirically based method for assessing the epistemological dimensions of empiricism, rationalism, and metaphorism.

Royce and Mos use the label metaphorism which is synonymous with social constructionism. Royce (1975) described the symbolizing in metaphorism as "constructed productions' offered as representations of reality" and "internally generated forms" (p.23). These meanings are checked for their universality rather than idiosyncrasy. This description parallels the basic description of social constructionism with its emphasis on the construction and transformation of personal meanings in conjunction with a social community. Also, Lyddon (1989) considered metaphorism and social constructionism as the same concept and used them interchangeably. The three styles of knowing are based on different ways of interpreting the world, including different truth criteria, that are theorized to lead to different world views (Royce & Mos, 1980). The PEP profile provides scores for all three epistemologies. The subscale with the highest score is considered the participant's dominant epistemological style (Royce & Mos, 1980).

The PEP is self-administered and consists of 90 items, 30 measuring each epistemological style. Respondents answer each question on a five point Likert scale which ranges between complete disagreement (1) and complete agreement (5). The PEP has gone through five revisions. The current version, Revised Form IV, was standardized on a junior college population of 925 male and 417 female students 19 to 24 years of age. The mean scores for female and male subjects are similar on all three dimensions, however, there are between-sex differences in percentages of preference for each dimension. For the entire population, 36% prefer metaphorism, 33% prefer rationalism, and 31% prefer empiricism. Among females, 40% prefer metaphorism, 47% rationalism, and 13% prefer empiricism. Of the males, 34% prefer metaphorism, 26% rationalism, and 40% prefer empiricism.. The authors state that there are no extreme scores in the norming population, which suggests there is no consistent preference for any one way of knowing in this heterogeneous population (Royce & Mos, 1980).

The epistemological dimensions measured by the PEP are independent of each other in the sense that a value assigned to an item measuring one dimension does not affect the value assigned to items measuring the other two dimensions (Royce & Mos, 1980). The possible range of scores for each dimension is 30-150. The means and standard deviations of the normative sample are as follows: For 925 males, $\underline{M}$ = 89.49, $\underline{SD}$ = 9.06 for metaphoric; $\underline{M}$ = 90.01, $\underline{SD}$ = 9.92 for rational; and $\underline{M}$ = 90.61, $\underline{SD}$ = 9.18 for empirical. For 417 females, $\underline{M}$ = 102.42, $\underline{SD}$ = 11.29 for metaphoric; $\underline{M}$ = 103.04, $\underline{SD}$ = 11.13 for rational; and $\underline{M}$ = 100.85, $\underline{SD}$ = 10.34 for empirical. No attempt was made to determine what should be considered high and low scores, but T-scores and percentiles based on same-sex responses of those scoring at the same raw score are given. For the purposes of this study, the scores on each epistemological style will be used as continuous variables and the highest profile score will be used to determine the respondents preferred epistemological style.

Royce and Mos's (1980) review of the PEP literature provided extensive evidence for concurrent and construct validity. Concurrent validity was established by various studies contrasting different student, occupational and professional groups theoretically expected to represent certain epistemological profiles. Construct validity was established by a number of studies which analyzed the theoretically predicted relationships between the PEP and frequently-used occupational interest scales and personality assessments which were believed to represent certain epistemological styles. Item factor analysis was also consistent with the hypothesized three-dimensional structure.

Reliability for the PEP is acceptable. Item analysis using 130 subjects shows that every item of each dimension is positively correlated with the total score for each dimension. Split-half reliability was demonstrated with odd-even correlations for 137 students, with correlation coefficients all ranging from .75 to

.88. Nine-month test-retest reliability was obtained for a sample of 43 college students. The correlations were .68 for rationalism, .66 for metaphorism, and .87 for empiricism. Due to the small sample size and reliability being partially a function of sample size, it was expected that the correlations would be in the .80 to .90 range as N increased (Royce & Mos, 1980).

Attribution of Responsibility.

Attribution of responsibility will be operationalized and measured by the participant's responses to the Helping Orientations Scale (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989) (Appendix F). This scale was developed based on the Brickman et al. (1982) conceptual model of the attribution of responsibility into four orientations (moral, compensatory, medical, and enlightenment). The HOS was developed to test Brickman et al.'s (1982) conceptual model as previous empirical support was considered weak (Rabinowitz, 1978), and provide statistical evidence of the existence of Brickman et al.'s four orientations (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989). The four Brickman et al. (1982) styles of attribution of responsibility were renamed in the HOS, but I have used the corresponding original style names developed by Brickman et al. throughout this work to increase clarity.

The Helping Orientations Scale (HOS) (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989) was developed in three phases. In the first phases, 25 to 30 items for each of the four orientations were given to 15 subjects for face validation. Only those items that were correctly sorted into the intended orientation category were used in the second phase. Each orientation was represented by at least 19 items. The 83 items that were retained were administered to a convenience sample of 430 college students with a mean age of 26. They were asked to indicate their agreement with statements using a five-point scale. A 25-item scale was developed from this study based on factor analysis, reliability measures, and inter-factor correlations and was administered to a target group of 300 employed

subjects with a mean age of 32. Coefficients of congruence between these two studies on the four factors were .93, .97, .93 and .82 for medical, enlightenment, moral and compensatory orientations, respectively. Factor analysis from both studies supports the existence of the four distinct, yet overlapping orientations. In the authors' research in two studies, the medical style scores correlated .47 and .42 with enlightenment, -.31 and -.25 with moral, and -.44 and -.19 with compensatory. Alpha levels for the medical style were .81 and .42. Enlightenment correlated .07 and -.06 with the moral style, and -.13 and -.17 with compensatory. Alpha levels for the enlightenment style were .70 and .76. Moral style correlated with compensatory style .46 and .09, with alphas of .70 and .65. Compensatory alpha levels were .71 and .60. Factor patterns for each orientation are relatively strong. Overall, items had their highest loading on the factor for which they were written. There is consistency across studies for both configuration and magnitude of loadings. The combined means and standard deviations for both of the above studies were also reported. For the medical style, $\underline{M} = 2.36$, $\underline{SD} = .16$. For the enlightenment style, $\underline{M} = 2.48$, $\underline{SD} = .13$. For the moral style, $\underline{M} = 3.63$, $\underline{SD} = .25$. For the compensatory style, $\underline{M} = 3.72$, $\underline{SD} = .30$ (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989).

The Helping Orientation Scale (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989) consists of 25 statements reflecting general attitudes toward problems and their solutions. Subjects are asked to indicate their level of agreement to the statements using a five-point scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). A profile is then developed from respondents' scores on each scale.

Feminism Measures

Feminist values will be measured using the Attitudes Towards Feminism and the Women's Movement (FWM) embedded in the Social Issues Inventory (SII) (Fassinger, 1985a, as revised by Enns & Hackett, 1990, Appendix D), the

Behavioral and Political Orientation scales of the Attributions of the Term Feminist instrument (Ferryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985, Appendix D), and a statement of feminism developed for this study.

Attitudes Towards Feminism and the Women's Movement in the Social Issues Inventory.

Before developing the Attitudes Towards Feminism and the Women's Movement (FWM), Fassinger examined 16 scales that measured attitudes toward feminism. These scales were found to suffer from one or more of the following inadequacies: 1) too long or focused on superfluous detail, or extreme brevity, 2) a confusing mixture of beliefs about gender specific domestic roles, attitudes toward feminist philosophy, and social behavior, 3) a ceiling effect that created difficulty in discriminating between feminists and nonfeminists, and 4) outdated items that did not reflect the rapid social change since the development of the scale (Fassinger, 1985a). In my search for a measure of feminist attitudes, I found these same difficulties. Simple inspection of other available scales indicated the likelihood of a ceiling effect, particularly with the highly educated, professional sample of this study. Some examples of typical questions from other scales are as follows. "Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to college than daughters" (Attitudes Toward Women, Spence & Helmreich, 1978). "Almost any woman is better off in her home than in a job or profession" (Attitudes Toward Sex Roles, Larson & Long, 1988). "A working woman who sends her six month old baby to a daycare center is a bad mother" (FEM Scale, Smith, Ferree, & Miller, 1975). I believed it would be likely very few, if anyone, would score as nonfeminist in this sample if these types of questions were used.

Fassinger (1985a) designed the feminist measure embedded in the SII, originally called the Attitudes Toward Feminism/Women's Movement scale, now the FWM, to measure global attitudes towards the women's movement and

feminism. She believed there was a need for a brief, easily used measure of affective responses to feminism and the women's movement that was not subject to social desirability effects (Fassinger, 1994). The FWM is purposely nonspecific as to type of feminism because it is assumed that affective responses to feminism can be largely independent of specific political and philosophical principles (Enns, 1993; Fassinger, 1994)).

The FWM was developed by first developing and testing equal-appearing intervals, then establishing reliability and validity of the rating scale. The scale is based on an original item pool of 84 attitude statements, either adapted from books and magazines, generated through statements and ideas from colleagues and students of the author, or modified from other attitudinal scales. The author included statements reflecting a wide range of affective attitudes that could be clearly discriminated along a continuum of favorable to unfavorable. Items were constructed on the basis of measurement criteria regarding grammar, language, and ambiguity (Fassinger, 1994).

The original items were sorted into nine "equal appearing intervals" or categories ranging from "Extremely Unfavorable" (category 1) to "Neither Favorable Nor Unfavorable" (category 5) to "Extremely Favorable" (category 9). Based on proportions, cumulative proportions, frequencies, medians, scale values, and Q values, 18 items (two from each category) were selected. The items selected represented the greatest consistency in category assignment. The items were then administered to ten female subjects who verbally reported a range of feminist attitudes. Based on mean scores, those items scoring in the top 25% and bottom 25% were used as criterion groups for final item selection. Eight items that did not adequately discriminate among subjects were deleted. Six of the final items represent favorable attitude statements and four represent unfavorable statements. The items included on the final 10-item scale are those that best

discriminated between individuals endorsing feminist and nonfeminist attitudes. Each of the 10 items are responded to with a Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). To further test consistency and determine their relationship to direct self-statements about attitudes towards feminism, the whole original scale and the final 10 item scale was then administered to 12 subjects and compared to a third, single-item scale asking each participant to rank their attitudes toward feminism and the women's movement. Some validity was established by the strong consistency between the mean scores measured by these three scales ($M_s = 6.35$ [$SD = .78$], 6.35 [$SD = .72$], 6.25 [$SD = 2.0$], respectively) (Fassinger, 1994).

To attempt to establish reliability of the FWM, the scale was administered to 117 undergraduate psychology students at a large, public university. Undergraduate students were purposely chosen to provide consistency in interpretation and permit comparison to other instruments and studies. The sample contained 76 women and 41 men, and was 57% Caucasian, 16% African-American, 4% Hispanic, 17% Asian-American, and 5% Mideastern or other. The mean score for this population was 35.17 out of a possible 50, with a standard deviation of 6.61. Full scale reliabilities were .90 for men, .87 for women, and .89 for the total sample. Full scale reliabilities for other instruments used to establish construct validity ranged from .67 to .94. Only one 25 item scale, that showed a reliability of .94, was higher than that of the FWM (Fassinger, 1994). The FWM was correlated with other feminism instruments to establish discriminant and convergent reliability. Significant positive correlations were found between the FWM and all instruments used to establish convergent validity. Discriminant validity was also supported by finding the expected correlations with other measures (Fassinger, 1994). Fassinger (1994) reported that the FWM has been used successfully in a number of empirical studies to discriminate between

feminist and nonfeminist men and women, and found to be a valid and reliable measure of attitudes towards feminism. Parker (1995) compared the FWM to the Attitudes Toward Women scale, the FEM scale and the Feminism scale and determined the FWM to be the best of the four scales based on construct and criterion-related validity.

The 10 specific FWM items were embedded in 22 masking items about attitudes toward social issues (Enns & Hackett, 1990). Pilot research on 150 undergraduate women demonstrated a two-week test-retest reliability on the FWM of .81. The FWM correlated .68 with a subjective identification with feminism three-item scale, .51 with interests in feminist activities, and .38 with involvement with feminist activities. One question in the original FWM was found to have a .02 correlation between testing sessions and was determined to be unable to discriminate between feminist and nonfeminist attitudes. As a result, this item was dropped and an additional item tapping subjective identification with feminism was added (Enns & Hackett, 1990). Only the final nine FWM items are scored in the SII.

Attributions of the Term Feminist.

Berryman-Fink and Verderber (1985) sought to clarify the meaning of the term feminist through a factor analytic development of a measuring instrument, Attributions of the Term Feminist (ATF) (Appendix E). Ninety-six college students were asked to indicate all words and phrases that came to mind when thinking of the word feminist. Frequently repeated terms were constructed as semantic differential items. This resulted in a 91-item, 5-point semantic differential test of the attributions of the term feminist. This test was then given to 768 undergraduate students (407 females, 361 males). Factor analysis was done to reduce the items, leaving five factors defined by 54 semantic differential items.

Factor II, labeled Behavioral, and Factor III, labeled Political Orientation, will be used in this study. Factor II is defined by 20 scale items that are attributions of specific behaviors and activities of feminists. Factor II accounted for 19.6% of the variance and had a reliability coefficient of .86. Factor III is defined by seven scale items that reflect agreement with specific political ideologies, groups or issues. This factor resulted in a .60 theta reliability coefficient and accounted for 3.8% of the variance. Factor analysis on split halves of the test resulted in an 86% reliability. Validity information was not reported.

In political beliefs, based on the above test, a feminist is defined as supporting the following issues for women: equal wages, reform, liberation, equal rights, NOW, women's liberation and the ERA. A feminist is also defined by this test as having numerous specific behavioral attributes (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985). The Behavioral and Political Orientation factor scales have been used (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Hackett, Enns & Zetzer, 1992), in conjunction with the SII to measure feminism. In the above studies, the instructions were revised by asking participants to indicate whether the items described themselves or not, which is how it was used in this study.

Statement of Feminism.

Although there are many types and definitions of feminism, for the purposes of this study, the following statement of feminism was used: I believe that sexism exists and is a fundamental, pervasive oppression of women. I agree that there are current inequalities in political, social, civil and educational rights and opportunities between the sexes. I am committed to eradicating the ideology of male domination that permeates Western culture and the elimination of inequalities for women through legal, social, economic and educational reform to allow complete equality for women (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Kramare & Treichler, 1985; Tuttle, 1986). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement

with the above statement of feminism based on their personal beliefs, using a Likert scale of one through five with 1) representing strongly disagree and 5) representing strongly agree. This statement was developed by including basic elements that were common to the definition of feminism in A Feminist Dictionary (Kramarae & Treichler, 1985) and in the Encyclopedia of Feminism, (Tuttle, 1986), as well as including basic components of liberal and radical feminism because definitions of liberal and radical feminist have been used in previous research (Enns & Hackett, 1990). The statement was purposely developed to be extreme to avoid ceiling effects and social desirability responses. This feminist statement was more specific about political and philosophical beliefs than the nonspecific FWM. By providing a specific definition of feminism, different understandings of the term should be reduced. Based on all feminism measures and the response to the statement of feminism, a composite score of feminist values was obtained by aggregating scores. A composite score should measure multiple types of feminist values.

To examine the effect of multiple measures of feminism on this sample, correlations were computed among the different measures. These correlations are reported in Table 3.2. The statement of feminism is highly correlated with both the FWM and the ATF political orientation scale. The FWM is also highly correlated with the ATF political orientation scale. These correlations appear to indicate that similar values of feminism are being measured by the statement of feminism, the ATF political orientation scale and the FWM. Lower correlations among the ATF behavioral scale and the other measures may indicate that this scale is capturing a different aspect of feminism, possibly an action component not directly measured by the other scales.

Table 3.2Correlations Among Feminist Measures

	Behavioral	Political	FWM
Statement	.19*	.61***	.58***
Behavioral		.18*	.11
Political			.69***

Key: Statement = Statement of feminism, Behavioral = ATF behavioral scale, Political = ATF political orientation scale and FWM = FWM scale.

* = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .001$

Reliability

Before analyses were performed, reliability information on the instruments used in this study was computed for this sample population. The alpha coefficient for the FWM was .82. Adding the statement of feminism developed for this study, the alpha coefficient increased to .84. The alpha coefficient for the behavioral scale of the ATF was .81; and, for the political orientation scale of the ATF, was .79. The overall reliability coefficient for the composite feminism score was .85. Reliability for the PEP rationalism scale was .70. The alpha coefficient for PEP social constructionism was .72, with the alpha for PEP empiricism at .68. The alpha coefficients for the HOS styles were: medical, .67; enlightenment, .69; moral, .68; and compensatory, .69. Overall, all reliabilities were acceptable, with feminism having the strongest reliability and HOS scores the weakest. The reliabilities were also similar to previous studies reliabilities on these measures, as has been reported.

Scale Descriptive Statistics

The feminism composite score has a range of 37 - 185, with a mean total score of 143.71 and a standard deviation of 13.39 for this sample. The mean on

the score scale was 3.88. No previous mean and standard deviation is available on this composite feminism score. Previous researchers using a composite score for feminism have identified scores above the mean as feminist and below the mean as nonfeminist (Enns & Hackett, 1990). This method identified 85 participants above the mean and 76 below the mean. As the mean score is nearly in the moderately agree category, I checked this categorization by also using one self-report item as a determinant of feminism category. Subjects were asked to respond "yes", "no" or "uncertain" to a question directly asking the individual whether or not he or she considered him or herself a feminist. Utilizing this coding, 98 respondents identified as feminist, 32 as nonfeminist, and 23 as uncertain of feminist identification. This method identifies more individuals as feminist, however, I believe the composite feminism score is more valuable for use in the analyses. The composite score is not categorical, so less information is lost in analyses. Also, some individuals may self-identify as feminist if they view feminism as socially desirable. By masking some of the items in the composite feminism score, there is less likelihood of social desirability responses. Definitions of feminism vary widely (Enns & Hackett, 1990), so utilizing specific items that have been determined to be components of feminism also provide knowledge of specifically what is being measured as feminist.

Each PEP scale has a range of 30 - 150. Means of average scores were computed. For this sample, PEP rationalism had a mean of 73.76 and a standard deviation of 9.41. Empiricism had a mean of 64.41 and a standard deviation of 9.30. Social constructionism had a mean of 77.94 and a standard deviation of 9.98. All PEP means were substantially lower (rationalism: $\bar{M}$ = 96.52; empiricism: $\bar{M}$ = 95.73; social constructionism: $\bar{M}$ = 95.95) than the combined means for each sex on the normative sample of the PEP. Standard deviations were similar for this sample and the PEP normative sample. PEP scores were

ranked to determine the amount of individuals having their highest score in each style, but all PEP scores were used in the regressions. Thirteen individuals had empiricism as their highest score, 45 had rationalism as their highest score, and 113 had social constructionism as their highest score. Eight individuals had a tie score between two styles and were therefore coded as scoring highest in each tied style.

HOS scales have the following ranges: medical, 6 - 30; enlightenment, 7 - 35, moral, 7 - 35, and compensatory, 5 - 25. Means of item average scores were computed. For this sample, HOS medical had a mean of 2.13 and a standard deviation of .49. HOS enlightenment had a mean of 2.06 and a standard deviation of .50. HOS moral had a mean of 3.41 and a standard deviation of .54. HOS compensatory had a mean of 3.78 and a standard deviation of .49. This sample had fairly similar mean scores and somewhat higher standard deviations than those reported earlier on the HOS normative sample. HOS styles were also ranked according to the amount of individuals having their highest score in each style. Both the enlightenment and medical styles had only one individual each with these styles as their highest score. Forty-nine participants scored highest in the moral style, and 116 scored highest in compensatory style. Subjects had scores in each style, though, and regressions were run using all HOS scores, not just highest style scores.

Design

The basic design of this study is a passive-observational study. This study attempted to infer causal processes based on observations in natural settings without deliberate manipulation and controls (Cook & Campbell, 1979). The continuous variable of endorsement of feminist values was compared to scores on the three epistemological styles. Choice of epistemological style was then analyzed to see if it related to attribution of responsibility in treatment. Due to

the type of questions being studied, the use of continuous variables, and the exploratory nature of this study without a treatment being applied, the passive-observational study design appears most appropriate. At this early point in the research, basic information is needed regarding whether the data support different beliefs about feminism leading to different epistemological styles, and different epistemological styles leading to different effects on treatment in the area of attribution of responsibility. Also, due to the preliminary type of data sought in this study, no treatment was done, so quasi-experimental design was not appropriate for use.

Hypotheses

- 1) There will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in preferences for social constructionist, rationalist, and empiricist epistemological styles.
- 2) There will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in their style of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment.
- 3) There will be a relationship between the subjects' epistemological style and the style of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment.
- 4) There will be a relationship among feminism, epistemological style, and attribution of responsibility in treatment.

Analysis

All instrument data were transformed from scores of zero through four (necessary for computer sheet coding) to one through five to correspond to conventional score values on each scale. Then, all data were checked for accurate coding and errors were corrected. Initially, an intercorrelation matrix of all variables under investigation was computed to insure that the independent variables and the demographic information were not excessively correlated.

42

Coefficients of .8 or above among independent variables indicate multicollinearity (Lewis-Beck, 1980).

The primary method of analysis in this study was stepwise multiple regressions. According to Glass and Hopkins (1984), "Much - if not most - behavioral research that employs multiple regression equations utilizes 'stepwise' multiple regression computer programs to show the increment added by each predictor" (p. 137). By utilizing this method, all variables were able to be entered into each regression equation and those that were significant were identified. All variables are continuous. A correlation matrix was completed before the stepwise multiple regressions were computed. Age and experience were highly correlated ($r = .78$), so only experience was used in the regression analyses. Demographic variables (experience, sexual orientation, occupation, race, area of degree, and sex) and main variable scores (PEP and feminism) were entered in stepwise regressions with HOS scores as dependent variables to test the overall model to determine the predictive utility of feminist values and epistemological preference on attribution of responsibility in treatment. A stepwise regression was performed on all demographic variables listed above and PEP scores with feminism as the dependent variable of interest to determine which variables contributed to feminist identification. Stepwise regressions were performed with the HOS scores as dependent variables, with demographic data and feminism scores (without PEP scores) as independent variables, to determine the predictive value of feminist identification apart from epistemological style. For the regressions, sex, sexual orientation, race, occupation, and type of degree were all coded as dummy variables. As all variable scores could be made categorical as well as continuous variables, certain univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) computations were also performed on main scale scores and demographic variables. Multi-factor analysis of variance was not used due to the fairly small sample size. If numerous

cells were used with the variables of interest proportioned by more than two factors, most cell sizes would have been extremely small. There is minor empirical support for primary type of employment (academic vs. practitioner) and sexual/affectional orientation being related to epistemological style choice (Ricketts, 1989), plus theoretical orientation being related to attribution of responsibility in treatment (McGovern et al., 1986). Therefore, these variables were checked with one-way ANOVAs. All results were checked for statistical significance. Although significance was originally set at $p < .05$, due to the number of variables in each equation the significance level was lowered to $p < .01$ for the correlations and the regressions to decrease the probability of Type I error in the regression equations. Specific methods and results for each hypothesis and the demographic variables tested will be reported in chapter 4.

Stepwise multiple regression is considered an appropriate method for studying the collective and separate contributions of independent variables to the variation of the dependent variable (Wampold & Freund, 1987). Through the use of continuous variables, less information is lost and hence the analysis is more powerful than by unnecessarily making the variables categorical and using a different type of analysis. Stepwise multiple regression allows for determining the predictive value of each of the variables being tested, including the proportion of variance accounted for at each step above what was accounted for by variables entering the equation earlier (Wampold & Freund, 1987). With variables also able to be made categorical and tested with other continuous variables, particularly in regard to demographic variables, ANOVAs were useful in gaining further information from the data. As only one-way ANOVAs were run, the significance level for ANOVAs was kept at $p < .05$.

These methods of analysis are also appropriate based on meeting the required assumptions for multiple regression and ANOVA (Polkosnik &

Wisenbaker, 1986). The theoretical assumptions of ANOVA and regression include: a) a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables, b) homoscedasticity, and c) normality of errors. These assumptions were checked with visual inspections of histograms and scatter plots before the actual regressions were run. All assumptions were met.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a description of all instruments used in this study. The procedures used in this study and the sample demographics were described. Reliabilities and sample characteristics on the main variables were provided, and study design and methodology explained. In the following chapter, results of the data analyses will be provided.

CHAPTER 4

Results

In this chapter, the results of the data analyses conducted in this study will be reported. Initially, the correlations between demographic variables, scores for the composite feminism score, the Helping Orientations Scale (HOS) and the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) will be reviewed. Analyses of demographic variables will then be presented, followed by the results of analyses computed for each hypothesis.

Correlations

The main purpose of this study was to test for possible relationships among feminist values, epistemological styles, and attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment. Initially, an intercorrelational matrix was completed on all variables to check for significant correlations and correlation coefficients of .8 or over, that would indicate multicollinearity which would need to be controlled for in the analyses. No demographic variables correlated above .8 with the scores for feminism, the PEP, or the HOS, nor did any of the subscales among these instruments correlate above .8 with each other. There was a significant inverse relationship of $-.92$, ($p = .000$) between the indicators for degrees obtained in counseling and in clinical psychology. This finding was expected given respondents would have received their degree in only one area. Respondents who received their degree in school psychology formed too small a category to be included in the correlational analysis, accounting for the lack of a perfect negative correlation. Age was highly correlated with experience ($r = .78$), so only experience was included in the regression analyses.

Among the main variables, some significant correlations were found. HOS enlightenment was significantly correlated at the $p < .001$ level with HOS moral and medical ($r = .29$ and $.49$, respectively). HOS moral was significantly inversely correlated at the $p < .001$ level with compensatory ($r = -.26$). HOS compensatory was significantly correlated ($p < .001$) with both PEP social constructionism ($r = .33$) and feminism ($r = .25$). PEP empiricism correlated at the $p < .001$ level with PEP social constructionism ($r = .41$), PEP rationalism ($r = .69$), and feminism ($r = .26$). PEP social constructionism correlated significantly ($p < .001$) with PEP rationalism ($r = .37$) and feminism ($r = .40$). PEP rationalism also correlated significantly ($p < .001$) with feminism ($r = .27$). These significant correlations between main variables, especially those of the PEP, though not multicollinear, make it more difficult to determine the actual affect of scores in the multiple regression equations using all variables of interest. Among HOS variables, compensatory style was the only style significantly correlated with feminism and social constructionism, which was predicted. Although social constructionism was the highest of the PEP styles correlated with feminism, the other two styles were also significantly correlated. This is supportive of the expectation that social constructionism is related to feminism, but does not support social constructionism as the only epistemological style related to feminism.

Among significant demographic variables, being lesbian or gay is negatively correlated with scoring as enlightenment style on the HOS ($p < .01$, $r = -.23$), and rationalist in style on the PEP ($p < .05$, $r = -.19$), and positively correlated with high feminism scores ($p < .001$, $r = .27$). Being male is positively correlated with the medical ($p < .01$, $r = .23$) and enlightenment styles ($p < .01$, $r = .20$). Being male is inversely related to feminism ($p < .01$, $r = -.19$). Caucasians are less likely to be rationalists on the PEP than nonwhites ($p < .01$, $r = -.22$). Experience is

positively correlated with all PEP styles. Other correlations of significance can be found in the correlation matrix of all variables, Table 4.1.

Table 4.1

CorrelationsMain Variables

	enlig	comp	med	mor	emp	s.c.	rat	fem
enlig	---	-.18	.49b	.29b	.17	-.15	.10	-.19a
comp		---	.08	-.26b	.07	.33b	.03	.25b
med			---	-.05	.18	-.04	.06	-.04
mor				---	.18	.12	.23a	-.07
emp					---	.41b	.69b	.26b
s.c.						---	.37b	.40b
rat							---	.27b

Table 4.1, continued

Main Variables with Demographic Variables

	enlig	comp	med	mor	emp	s.c.	rat	fem
age	.07	.11	.02	.07	.15	.19a	.18	.08
sex	.20a	-.07	.23a	.11	.14	.03	.18	-.19a
race	.00	-.11	.07	-.14	-.11	-.05	-.22a	-.08
sexor	-.23a	.19a	-.11	-.06	-.14	.13	-.19a	.27b
dcli	.03	.12	.03	.05	.09	-.08	.03	-.06
dcou	-.04	-.04	-.02	-.09	-.09	.11	-.04	.06
clin	-.08	.05	-.13	-.01	.03	.09	-.04	-.07
fac	.06	.05	-.03	.10	-.01	-.03	.11	-.03
occ	.10	-.06	.22a	-.09	-.04	-.13	-.09	.02
incm	-.17	-.03	-.20a	.01	-.10	.04	-.10	.08
expe	.12	.13	.12	.02	.17	.19a	.17	.14

Table 4.1 (cont.)Demographic Variables

	dcou	clin	fac	occ	incm	expe	race	sexor	sex	age
dcli	-.92b	.11	-.12	-.01	.19a	.08	-.15	.17	-.02	-.03
dcou	---	-.12	.15	.00	-.21a	-.10	.16	-.17	.00	.01
clin		---	-.61b	-.56b	.08	-.10	.17	.02	-.13	-.03
fac			---	-.19a	-.13	.00	-.14	-.09	.12	-.06
occ				---	.04	.14	-.01	.04	.07	.14
incm					---	.04	.08	-.03	-.05	.04
expe						---	.04	.03	.33b	.78b
race							---	-.06	.03	.07
sexor								---	-.11	-.03
sex									---	.24
age										---

Key: enlig = HOS enlightenment, comp = HOS compensatory, med = HOS medical, mor = HOS moral, emp = PEP empiricism, s.c. = PEP social constructionism, rat = PEP rationalism, fem = composite feminism score, dcli = degree in clinical, dcou = degree in counseling, clin = clinician, fac = faculty, occ = not clinical or faculty, race = race, sexor = sexual orientation, incm = income, expe = years of clinical experience, age = age, sex = sex.

Variable coding: dcou = 0, dcli = 1; nonwhite = 0, white = 1; female = 0, male = 1; heterosexual = 0, gay or lesbian = 1; not clin = 0, clin = 1; not fac = 0, fac = 1; not clinical or faculty = 0, other occupation = 1.

a = $p < .01$, b = $p < .001$

Demographics Variable Analyses.

Theoretical orientation is a categorical value and was unable to be included in the correlation analyses. Therefore, one-way ANOVAs were performed on PEP scores by theoretical orientation. Theoretical orientations were grouped together for this analysis based on similarities between theoretical orientations (e.g., cognitive and behavioral orientations were grouped together with cognitive-behaviorists). A significant difference was found only in social constructionism PEP style, where humanists were significantly different ($p < .05$, $M = 3.98$) from other theoretical orientations: cognitive-behaviorists ($M = 3.58$), eclectic ($M = 3.67$), psychodynamic ($M = 3.71$) and other ($M = 3.84$).

Main Analyses

Hypothesis 1

There will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in preferences for social constructionist, rationalist, and empiricist epistemological styles.

One-way ANOVAs were run using the combined total feminism scores and the highest rank PEP category. No significant differences were found in these three ANOVAs. There was, though, a strong significant correlation ($r = .40$) between the composite score for feminism and social constructionism. The correlations between the composite score of feminism and rationalism and empiricism were also significant, but lower ($r = .27$ and $.26$, respectively). However, the different levels of correlation were not enough to prove significant in ANOVA analyses. Hypothesis 1 was largely unsupported by these data.

As another way to further test the first hypothesis, stepwise regressions were run with demographic variables (years of clinical practice experience, occupation, sex, sexual orientation, race and area of degree), and PEP style scores entered as independent variables and the composite feminism score used as the dependent variable of interest. This equation was computed to determine what

variables predicted feminism. PEP social constructionism entered the equation first and accounted for 15% of the variance ($R^2 = .15$, Standardized Beta [B] = .27). Sexual orientation entered the equation next and increased the variance accounted for to 20% ($R^2 = .20$, $B = .26$). Third was PEP rationalism scores ($R^2 = .25$, $B = .25$), and fourth to enter the equation was sex ($B = -.22$), with 28% of the variance now accounted for by this equation. See Table 4.2. This equation indicates that those higher in PEP social constructionism and rationalism scores, female, and gay or lesbian are higher in composite feminism scores. These data partially support the prediction of hypothesis 1 that there are differences among level of feminism identification and PEP styles by showing that social constructionism and rationalism are related to feminism.

Table 4.2

Regression Predicting Feminism

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Social Constructionism	.008	.002	.27	.15	.15
Sexual Orientation	.21	.06	.26	.05	.20
Rationalism	.009	.003	.25	.05	.25
Sex	-.16	.05	-.22	.03	.28

Hypothesis 2

There will be differences between feminists and nonfeminists in their style of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment.

Four stepwise multiple regressions were performed with demographic data (years of clinical practice experience, occupation, sex, sexual orientation, race and area of degree) and the composite feminism score as independent variables on HOS styles as the dependent variables to test the predictive value of feminism on attribution of responsibility without PEP style scores. For the enlightenment style, sexual orientation entered the equation first and accounted for 23% of the variance ($R^2 = .05$, $p = .0038$, $B = -.21$). Sex entered the equation as the second and final variable, with 8% of the variance now accounted for ($R^2 = .08$, $p = .0012$, $B = .17$). This equation indicates that heterosexuals are more likely to have higher enlightenment scores than gays and lesbians, and men are more likely than women to have higher enlightenment scores. See Table 4.3.

Table 4.3

Regression for Enlightenment

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<i>B</i>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Sexual Orientation	1.66	.61	-.21	.05	.05
Sex	1.21	.54	.17	.03	.08

For the compensatory style, only feminism score entered the equation as significant ($p = .0008$). This variable accounted for 7% of the variance ($R^2 = .07$,

$B = .26$). Those with higher feminism scores are more likely to score higher in the compensatory style. See Table 4.4.

Table 4.4

Regression for Compensatory

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Feminism	1.80	.53	.26	.07	.07

For the moral style, no variables entered the equation as significant.

For the medical style, sex entered the equation first and accounted for 5% of the variance ($R^2 = .05$, $p = .0037$, $B = .19$). Having an occupation other than clinician or faculty member entered the equation as the next and final variable. Nine percent of the variance is now accounted for ($R^2 = .09$, $p = .0008$, $B = .22$). Men are more likely than women to score higher in the medical style, as are those who are in an occupation other than clinician or faculty member. See Table 4.5.

Table 4.5

Regression for Medical

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Sex	1.54	.64	.19	.05	.05
Other occupation	1.26	.45	-.22	.04	.09

Level of feminism was only significant in the compensatory style. Feminism is also significantly positively correlated with compensatory style ($p < .001$, $r = .25$). None of the other HOS styles is significantly correlated with feminism. This hypothesis was tested further in stepwise regressions on the whole model reported under hypothesis 4. Whole model regression analyses found low feminism scores to be a predictor of scoring as moral in HOS style. However, feminism was not significant in regressions on the enlightenment, medical and compensatory styles. The regressions and correlations partially support this hypothesis by showing that those who are more identified as feminist score higher in HOS compensatory style. However, whole model regressions that included PEP scores do not support feminism as a significant predictor of the compensatory style. They do support low feminism as predictive of the moral style. This hypothesis was partially supported by the data.

Hypothesis 3

There will be a relationship between the subject epistemological style and the style of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment.

Three one-way ANOVAs were performed by highest ranked PEP category on HOS style scores to examine differences in these groups. PEP empiricists were not significantly different from other PEP styles in enlightenment, compensatory, or moral styles, but were significantly different in medical style scores ($p < .05$). Empiricists scored higher in the medical style ($M = 2.40$, $SD = .50$) compared to other PEP styles ($M = 2.10$, $SD = .48$). PEP rationalists were not significantly different from other PEP styles in medical or moral styles. However, rationalists were significantly higher ($p < .05$) in enlightenment scores ($M = 2.20$, $SD = .46$) than other PEP styles ($M = 2.01$, $SD = .51$), and lower ($p < .01$) in compensatory scores ($M = 3.58$, $SD = .50$) compared to empiricists and social constructionists ($M = 3.86$, $SD = .47$). Social constructionists were significantly different from

other PEP styles only on compensatory styles. Social constructionists scored significantly ($p < .001$) higher ($M = 3.88$, $SD = .47$) than other PEP styles ($M = 3.57$, $SD = .49$) in compensatory scores. Empiricists are most likely to be medical in HOS style, rationalists are most likely to be enlightenment in HOS style and least likely to be compensatory, and social constructionists are most likely to be compensatory in HOS style. This hypothesis is supported by the data.

Hypothesis 4

There will be a relationship among feminism, epistemological style, and attribution of responsibility in treatment.

Regression analyses of this hypothesis were computed to check the model as a whole on the complete sample. Four stepwise multiple regressions were run with demographic variables (years of experience, occupation, sex, race, sexual orientation, and area of degree), total feminism score, and PEP scores entered as independent variables with the four mean HOS style scores as the dependent variables. Each stepwise regression will be described separately below.

Enlightenment.

Stepwise regression on the whole model with enlightenment style as the dependent variable produced significant predictors of higher enlightenment style scores. Sexual orientation entered the model first and accounted for 5% of the variance ($R^2 = .05$, $p = .0038$), indicating heterosexuals were more likely to score higher in enlightenment style than gays and lesbians ($B = -.14$). Sex entered the equation in the second step, with 8% ($R^2 = .08$, $p = .0012$) of the variance accounted for and showing that males are more likely to score as higher in enlightenment style than females ($B = .15$). The third variable entering the equation was PEP social construction scores, with 11% of the variance ($R^2 = .11$, $p = .0005$) now accounted for, and indicating social constructionists are less likely to score high in enlightenment style ($B = -.27$). PEP empiricism scores entered

the equation as the fourth and final variable. The total variance accounted for by this equation was 16% ($R^2 = .16$, $p = .0000$). Beta (.25) indicates those with higher empiricist scores are more likely to score high in enlightenment. In the enlightenment style, sexual orientation and sex are significant demographic predictors. Of the main variables being examined in this study, PEP social constructionism and empiricism scores are predictive of higher enlightenment style scores. See Table 4.6.

Table 4.6

Whole Model Regression on Enlightenment

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<i>B</i>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Sexual orientation	-.16	.09	-.14	.05	.05
Sex	.15	.07	.15	.03	.08
Social constructionism	-.01	.003	-.27	.03	.11
Empiricism	.01	.004	.25	.05	.16

Medical.

The same overall stepwise regression with the medical style as the dependent variable found sex entering the equation first and accounting for 5% ($R^2 = .05$, $p = .0037$) of the variance, with men more likely to score higher in medical style than women ($B = .19$). The second variable entering this equation was having an occupation other than academic or clinical indicating higher medical scores ($B = .20$). Therefore, those who do not work as either a psychotherapy clinician or a faculty member score higher in the medical style.

The equation now accounts for 9% of the variance ($R^2 = .09$, $p = .0008$). PEP empiricism scores entered the equation as the third and last variable, with 10% of the variance now accounted for ($R^2 = .10$, $p = .0003$) and indicating higher empiricism scores predict higher medical style scores ($B = .16$). Significant demographic variables were sex and occupation. PEP rationalism was the only significant main variable. See Table 4.7.

Table 4.7

Whole Model Regression on Medical

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>R² Change</u>	<u>R²</u>
Sex	.19	.07	.19	.05	.05
Other occupation	.27	.11	.20	.04	.09
Empiricism	.007	.003	.16	.01	.10

Compensatory.

Stepwise regression of the whole model with HOS compensatory style scores as the dependent variable found PEP social constructionism scores was the only variable to enter the model and accounted for 12% ($R^2 = .12$, $p = .0000$) of the variance. Beta (.34) indicates higher social constructionism scores predict higher compensatory style scores. See Table 4.8.

Table 4.8Whole Model Regression on Compensatory

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<i>B</i>	<u>R²</u> Change	<u>R²</u>
Social Constructionism	.01	.003	.34	.12	.12

Moral.

Stepwise regression of the whole model with HOS moral style scores as the dependent variable found PEP rationalism scores entering the model first and accounting for 6% ($R^2 = .06$, $p = .0029$) of the variance. The composite feminism score entered the model as the other variable of significance, with 8% ($R^2 = .08$, $p = .0017$) of the variance now accounted for. Therefore, two main variables, higher PEP rationalism scores and lower feminism scores were predictive of higher moral scores ($B = .28$ and $-.16$, respectively). See Table 4.9.

Table 4.9Whole Model Regression on Moral

Variables	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<i>B</i>	<u>R²</u> Change	<u>R²</u>
Rationalism	.01	.004	.28	.06	.06
Feminism	-.24	.12	-.16	.02	.08

In summary, the results of the analyses of hypothesis 4 indicate the following. For the HOS enlightenment style, regressions on the model as a whole and the full sample found the main variables of PEP epistemological styles social constructionism and empiricism significant, along with the demographic variables of sex and sexual orientation. In the medical style, only PEP rationalism was a significant predictor among the main variables, along with the demographic variables of sex and occupation. For those in the compensatory style, only the main variable of social constructionism was a significant predictor. The moral style had two main variable predictors, rationalism and feminism and no significant demographic variables. See Table 4.10 for a summary of the results of the various significant predictors in each group for hypothesis 4.

Table 4.10

Significant Predictors for Each HOS Style

<u>Enlightenment</u>	<u>Medical</u>	<u>Compensatory</u>	<u>Moral</u>
+ heterosexual	+ male	+ social construct.	+ rationalism
+ male	+ other occupation		- feminism
- social construct.	+ empiricism		
+ empiricism			

Key: + = this variable increases likelihood of scoring in this category, - = this variable decreases likelihood of scoring in this category, social construct. = social constructionist.

Summary of Results

Hypothesis 1 was partially supported by the data. Although ANOVAs to compare differences between level of feminism and highest ranked PEP style did not produce significant results, the strongest correlation among feminism and the

PEP epistemological styles was between feminism and social constructionism. Also, a stepwise regression computed to determine predictors of feminism found two epistemological styles to be significant.

Hypothesis 2 was partially supported by the data. Feminism was significantly positively correlated with compensatory style. Stepwise regressions without PEP scores found higher scores in feminism predictive of higher compensatory scores. Low feminism scores were found to be a significant predictor of scoring as moral in HOS style.

Hypothesis 3 was supported by the data. All three epistemological styles were significant predictors of HOS style of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment.

Hypothesis 4 was largely supported by the data. Certain demographic variables, as discussed, were found to be significant predictors of HOS style, along with main variables. As shown in Table 4.10, often the main variables being studied in this research were also significant. For the HOS enlightenment style, two epistemological styles (social constructionism and empiricism) were significant. For the HOS medical style, one epistemological preference (empiricism) was a significant predictor. For the HOS compensatory style, the epistemological style of social constructionism was a significant predictor. For the HOS moral style, both feminism and one epistemological style (rationalism) were significant predictors.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion

In this final chapter, the purpose of the study will be summarized, followed by a summary and interpretation of the results of data analyses. Limitations of the study will be addressed, followed by future research directions. Finally, implications and applications of this research will be discussed.

Summary of the study

Although many areas of scientific study have come to recognize that the epistemological style of empiricism is only one way to understand truth and knowledge, counseling psychology as a field has remained largely committed to empiricism as the only way to obtain useful and valid knowledge (Borgen, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1984). Feminist psychologists have been at the forefront in criticizing the empirical method as limiting the knowledge that can be gained from research and the understanding of the complexity of truth from the perspective of women and nonmajority groups (Borgen, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1984). Many scientists, along with many feminists, now contend that values impact all areas of research by defining, directing and limiting what we look for and see as "truth" (Harding, 1987; Hubbard, 1988; Longino, 1989; Unger, 1983). Feminism is by definition a set of beliefs, or a value orientation (Ricketts, 1989). Counseling psychologists are trained in the scientist-practitioner model and encouraged to understand client issues from the perspective of a proven theoretical lens, as well as use techniques in psychotherapy that are supported with empirical evidence (Goldfried & Padawer, 1982; Schmidt & Meara, 1984). I believe our choice of epistemological style effects our research, theory and practice, but is rarely

recognized or acknowledged as so doing. The purpose of this study was to utilize the acknowledged values of feminism and examine the relationship of feminism to epistemological style and to psychotherapists' style of attribution of responsibility for problem development and problem solution in psychotherapy treatment.

Instruments were chosen to measure feminism, epistemological styles, and attribution of responsibility style. Two fairly widely used measures of feminist identification, along with a specific statement of feminism that encompasses the basic tenets and was developed for this study, were used to identify level of support for feminist values. There are three major epistemological styles often discussed in the literature; empiricism, rationalism and social constructionism. Utilizing the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) (Royce & Mos, 1980), which measures these three epistemological styles, dominant epistemological style and scores for each style were determined. The Helping Orientations Scale (HOS) (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989), which was developed to categorize individuals' style of attribution of responsibility in helping others based on Brickman et al. (1982), was utilized to determine predominant style of attribution of responsibility and scores for each style. Demographic data from the random sample of psychologists studied for this research was also gathered.

Interrelationships Among the Variables

An initial stage of data analysis consisted of determining correlations among the predictor and demographic variables. Certain demographic variables were significantly correlated with the main variables of this study. Being of a nonwhite race was significantly correlated with rationalism. This is somewhat surprising as theory would suggest that those who are in a nonmajority group would be more likely to identify with social constructionism (Unger, 1983). Possibly rationalism taps some area that nonwhites particularly relate to or identify with. This correlation could relate to rationalists viewing reality as

external and fixed (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988), and nonwhites often experiencing discrimination from external, societal forces that do not appear to change quickly or easily. It has been suggested that nonwhite women often feel excluded from the women's movement and feminism, so may not personally identify with feminism (Smith, 1990). However, this study did not support that suggestion as there was not a significant correlation between race and feminism. Perhaps other factors, such as a high level of education, makes this group different from others of a nonwhite race who may react negatively to feminism. Another possibility, given the small number ($N = 16$) of nonwhites who responded to this survey, is that perhaps racial minorities identified this research as related to feminism and therefore decided not to participate because of negative feelings about the term or the women's movement.

An interesting lack of an expected correlation was between epistemological preference and area of employment. Ricketts (1989) found practicing clinicians were less committed to empiricism than academics. For this sample, there were no significant correlations between either academics or clinicians and epistemological style or preferred helping orientation. Perhaps for this sample, empiricism is no longer the epistemology of choice, even for academics conducting research. Lack of support for the empiricist style is suggested by PEP ranking, in which only 13 participants had empiricism as their highest epistemological score. Or, it may be that participants responded based on general beliefs that do not generalize to how they conduct scientific research. Also, Ricketts (1989) findings may be specific only to her sample and not generalizable. In particular, Ricketts sample consisted of only women, so male responses included in this sample may have decreased the correlations. Ricketts sample also varied widely by education. Possibly, as one's level of education increases, one's epistemology is less connected to occupation.

Sexual orientation was inversely correlated with the enlightenment style of attribution, indicating those who are gay or lesbian are less likely to agree with the enlightenment style of helping. The enlightenment style expects helpees to accept a negative view of themselves (e.g., as sinful or guilty), see themselves as causing their own problems and submit to agents of social control to solve their problems (Brickman, et al., 1982). Given this negative view of self and positive view of society as the helper, gay and lesbian professionals with a positive view of self would be more likely to reject this view of treatment. Lesbians and gays strive to view themselves positively and overcome the many problems caused by societal stigma and discrimination (Pharr, 1988). Being gay or lesbian is positively correlated with a compensatory style. This style sees society as responsible for many of the problems individuals face and views helpers as empowering clients to change the environment (Brickman et al., 1982). Being lesbian or gay was negatively correlated with the epistemological style of rationalism. Possibly, the personal reality of lesbians and gays changed when they identified their sexual orientation, so they no longer see reality as external and stable. However, if this were the explanation for this result, I would expect that there would also be a negative correlation with empiricism and a positive correlation with social constructionism, which was not the case. Being gay or lesbian correlated highly with having strong feminist beliefs. This was expected as gays and lesbians in particular usually do not follow the traditional roles society proscribes for the sexes. Lesbian women do not have intimate relationships with men from which they gain power and tend to support women's rights to be totally equal (Pharr, 1988).

Sex of the participant was significantly correlated with medical and enlightenment styles, with men scoring higher than women in these styles of attribution of responsibility. Traditionally, men are more likely to be in positions

of power in our society and therefore to view society more positively than women who may see societal structure as contributing to their problems. Given the definitions of these styles, which see society positively and the individual as flawed and in need of expert help, I find it reasonable that men would be more likely to fit these styles than women. Or, these results may relate to the "take charge" attitude suggested by both these styles. Men are often seen as being responsible and needing to get things done, which is captured by these styles (Dugger, 1991).

Main Results of the Analyses

In this section, the main results of the analyses will be summarized, followed by a discussion of plausible explanations for the results. Analyses of these data suggest a limited relationship between level of identification with feminist values and epistemological style scores, and between feminism and attribution of responsibility style scores. Correlations between epistemological style and feminism found all three PEP styles significantly correlated with feminism, but the social constructionism correlation was .14 and .13 higher than empiricism and rationalism, respectively. These correlations indicate that feminism is more strongly related to social constructionism. The high correlations between feminism and all epistemological styles may be related to those willing to stand up for their feminist beliefs being also willing to clearly support other beliefs related to epistemological style. However, with the strong criticisms of empiricism and rationalism made by many feminists (Code, 1991; Harding, 1991), I find it surprising that feminism is positively correlated with these epistemological styles. Perhaps only certain types of feminists, not able to be determined with the measures currently available, are social constructionists. Certainly, there are those who identify themselves as feminist empiricists (Harding, 1987). Although contrary to my expectations, another possibility is that

the typical lack of discussion and exploration in the field of psychology regarding how our values may impact other beliefs (Borgen, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1984) may indicate the professionals in this sample have not seriously considered how their feminist values relate to epistemological beliefs.

In the interest of determining what variables contributed to high endorsement of feminist variables, a stepwise regression was performed. This regression supported higher social constructionism and rationalism scores as predictors of high feminism scores, along with being female and gay or lesbian. Previous research in this area has used only women as subjects, so comparisons between men and women were not possible. I believed that women would support feminist values more often than men, as I think that women are most negatively affected by the results of sexism and men often believe they gain from sexist beliefs and practices (Code, 1991). Unger et al. (1986) found that feminists who identify with women as a deprived group were more likely to view reality as socially constructed. Coan (1979) found that those who have experienced a lack of accord with society are less likely to be empiricists. Feminist women and lesbians often appear to experience a lack of accord with society (Ricketts, 1989; Unger et al., 1986). Level of feminist identification not predicting PEP epistemological rank in the ANOVAs may have been related to the data that are lost when categorizing variables. Each participant had scores on all epistemological styles, sometimes similar scores. Including all PEP scores as continuous variables in the regression may have allowed the connection between feminism and epistemology to be more clearly determined.

Although the correlations discussed earlier are strong, regression results indicate that feminism identification is not a particularly strong predictor of epistemological style. Perhaps beliefs and values such as feminism are not carried over into action, which is a large part of what the PEP measures. This possibility

is also supported by the low correlation between the behavioral subscale of the ATF with the other components of the composite feminism score. Also, Unger et al. (1986) found that subjects who identified themselves as active feminists scored higher on social constructionism than nonactive feminists. Or, possibly feminism is only minimally related to epistemological style. Perhaps beliefs and values related to feminism do not lead to certain beliefs and values about how we come to know and understand truth. Although the conceptual literature suggests that our values will be reflected in other beliefs (Borgen, 1992; Harding, 1991; Unger, 1983), the connection may not be consistently supported by empirical research. Another possibility is that this empirical research was not able to capture the complexity of feminist meanings and values that might be found to be connected to epistemological beliefs through qualitative analysis. Feminism was related most strongly to social constructionism, however feminism was also correlated with all epistemological styles, so there is only limited support for feminism being related to epistemological style.

Regarding the connection between level of feminism and styles of attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment, higher feminism scores were significantly positively correlated with higher compensatory style scores. Based on the definitions of feminism and the compensatory style, this outcome was expected. Although there is no previous research to support this relationship, I predicted that feminists would support the compensatory view that society has a role in the development of problems and the belief that clients should be supported and empowered to help themselves find solutions to problems. The enlightenment style was negatively related to feminism. Feminists strive to see women in a positive, powerful manner and tend to see society as causing many of the problems women face (Code, 1991), contrary to the beliefs in the enlightenment style. Also, the feminist statement used in this study particularly

labeled society as problematic and in need of change, so those endorsing feminist values would not be expected to also endorse society as it is currently structured as the provider of solutions to problems.

Regressions without PEP scores found higher feminism scores predictive of higher compensatory style scores, and lower feminism scores predictive of higher moral style scores. However, whole model regressions found only higher social constructionism scores predictive of higher scores in the compensatory style. Contrary to my expectations, feminism was not found to be a significant predictor of compensatory style in this regression. It appears that feminism, although somewhat related to compensatory styles in other analyses, was not a strong enough component of compensatory style scores to be significant in stepwise regressions that included epistemological scores.

Results of these analyses suggest level of feminist identification is somewhat related to the compensatory, enlightenment and moral styles. Perhaps compensatory style is related in this sample to feminist values and beliefs, yet those with lower endorsement of feminist beliefs do not subscribe to one attribution of responsibility style over another. Possibly feminism is not a good predictor of attribution of responsibility style except for partially predicting higher compensatory style scores. Other styles may not be strongly enough related to feminism for feminist identification to be of value in predicting attribution of responsibility style. Or, again, it may be that the methodology and measures used in this study do not adequately capture the complexity of issues involved in these concepts. The pattern of these results suggests that the compensatory style is most strongly related to feminism, however, epistemology appears to be a more important predictor of attribution of responsibility scores than feminism.

A stronger pattern of connection was found in the analyses of the relationships between epistemological style scores and attribution of responsibility

style scores. Higher empiricism scores were found to be significantly predictive of higher medical and enlightenment style scores than social constructionism and rationalism scores. Empiricists tend to believe in a singular, stable, external reality that is accurately revealed by one's senses (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988) and that individuals are essentially passive reactors to environmental events (Ricketts, 1989). This view fits well with the medical style beliefs that people are victims of forces out of their control and should not be blamed for their problems or expected to solve them (Brickman et al., 1982). Instead, there is one reality that exists to which people simply react.

Higher rationalism scores were found to be significantly predictive of higher enlightenment and moral style scores and significantly predictive of lower compensatory style scores than the other two epistemological styles. Rationalists, too, believe in a fixed, external reality, and do not consider contextual influences on the perception of reality. They also believe in detachment from others (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). In contrast, the compensatory style suggests context is important in the development of problems and suggests close involvement with those one is helping (Brickman et al., 1982). The enlightenment style expects people to accept a negative view of themselves and seek expert help (Brickman et al., 1982). Higher enlightenment style scores might be explained by rationalists and empiricists taking the expert position with clients which keeps the therapist in a more detached role than the role other therapists might choose. Perhaps also this negative view of self expected in the enlightenment style would be perceived by rationalists and empiricists as reflective of reality; social context does not influence problem development, so the person him or herself must be the problem. In the moral style, people are considered responsible for their own problems and their own solutions - others are not expected to help (Brickman et al., 1982). The relationship between rationalism and the moral style seems somewhat surprising

given that rationalists tend to view reality as external and fixed (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988), which would seem to indicate they would not consider clients responsible for their own problems. However, rationalists also believe there can be an impartial stance that allows detachment from context and others (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). This view would fit with seeing the clients themselves, rather than their context, as contributing to problem development, as well as allow a detachment and lack of expectation of needing to help the client. Overall, though, I find it somewhat surprising that psychologists score as moral given that the field is largely based on helping others. Once again, possibly beliefs about how truth and knowledge are determined don't transfer to styles of helping as much as I expected from the theoretical concepts. Also, psychologists have been shown to have many different beliefs (Krasner & Houts, 1984; Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988; Ricketts, 1989), and some of these differences are apparent in the differing epistemological and attribution of responsibility styles found in this study. However, when ranked by highest PEP style, the overwhelming majority of the sample were social constructionist. This provides support for the possibility that psychology may no longer be strongly based in empiricism.

Higher social constructionism scores were significantly predictive of higher compensatory style scores. This result fits with my expectation that compensatory style and social constructionism would be related. Again, my thinking was that social constructionists would support the compensatory style because social context is considered in attempting to understand problem development. With the great majority of this sample scoring high in social constructionism and compensatory, the results of this study provide support for psychologists tending to strongly consider sociocultural context in how they define knowledge and truth, and how they think about problem development and solution.

More variables of significance were found in the whole model regressions than in the ANOVAs that examined the relationship between epistemology and attribution of responsibility. This, again, may relate to the data that are lost when variables are made categorical. These data provide fairly strong support for the relationship between epistemological style and attribution of responsibility style.

Some of the HOS scales were significantly correlated with each other, suggesting that although one style of helping may dominate, other styles are also used, possibly with different types of clients or problems, or in different situations other than psychotherapy. These correlations also concur with the normative scores of the HOS that suggested the styles overlapped (Michlitsch & Frankel, 1989). All PEP epistemological styles were also significantly correlated with each other. As with HOS styles, this indicates overlap among styles. Again, it may be that although one style is dominant, others are also used, and may differ depending on the situation. Perhaps, in considering responses to both the PEP and the HOS, participants were answering based on broader sociopolitical contexts versus specific decisions they may make about psychological treatment issues. Or, therapists may use different styles of both epistemology and attribution of responsibility with different clients in unique situations.

To this point, the discussion has focused on interpretations of the empirical data in a traditional manner. I will now briefly discuss this study from a social constructionist perspective. To begin with, I will highlight some ways research from a purely social constructionist perspective would have been conducted differently. First, standardized tests would have been unlikely to be used. Second, although demographic data allow for some sense of the context of the individuals participating, much more attention would have been given to each participants personal, sociohistorical context. Third, data would have been gathered about what each question meant to the respondent, such as how each

person interpreted the meaning of each question and what factors she or he considered in responding to each question. Fourth, the complexity of meaning involved in each individual's responses to questions would have been considered in much more depth. This type of information would have allowed for greater understanding of the meaning of responses from participants by knowing how respondents contextualized their answers. And fifth, emotions that may have arisen when responding to certain questions would have been taken into account in considering the meaning of the response to the individual. Primarily, this research would have been much more personalized in approach with fewer questions and the meaning of each question pursued with each participant at a deeper, fuller level that considered each individual's personal context.

The above type and depth of information would have allowed a more complex, clearer understanding of the meaning of the results. Social constructionists believe that meaning is constructed at a community level versus an individual level. Although this study attempted to address that level to some extent by determining demographic characteristics and focusing on a community of psychologists and the tendency of members of this profession to endorse a certain epistemological style (empiricism), each respondent is a member of various communities and sociohistorical contexts. Demographic characteristics and one's profession do not capture all of these communities and contexts, nor their meaning to the individual. From a social constructionist perspective, discussion of possible meanings of results would be developed from gaining more indepth information from each participant about the personal contexts and meanings of answers. Generalizations from the data available from this study as it was conducted would be very tentative, if done at all, because individual and social group contextualization and interpretation of questions and answers is largely

unknown and highly influenced by power based on who has control over determining the dominant narrative.

The significant correlations between HOS styles and PEP styles may have been explainable by social constructionist methods. Perhaps individuals use all styles of helping and epistemological styles depending on what type of situation they are in or dealing with, which further examination of the context of the response to questions in these areas could have determined. In this way, specific information about how therapists determine truth in psychological treatment and choose their method of helping clients, and whether this differs among clients, may have been understood. How and why feminism correlates with each epistemological style may have been more clear. Theoretical literature (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Enns, 1993) suggests that there are different types of feminism which are not able to be determined by measures currently available. A social constructionist methodology and analysis of results would have provided more detailed information and understanding of respondents personal understandings and meanings of the term feminism, along with how they view their beliefs about feminism affecting their understanding of truth. Similarly, results indicating sexual orientation, racial minority group, and sex of the respondent correlate significantly with certain epistemological and helping orientations, as well as significantly contribute to predicting epistemological or helping orientation style, could be better understood and causes delineated by understanding personal understandings of the influences of sex, racial group and/or sexual orientation, as well as dominant group narratives about these aspects of self and social group. Each individual's understanding of how her or his epistemological beliefs influences his or her helping style could also have been more clearly determined. Essentially, the meaning and interpretation of all responses of significance would be understood from the point of view of the respondents.

Personal, contextual influences on responses to a mail survey questionnaire, such as used in this research, are unable to be determined to any meaningful extent. Therefore, the depth and complexity of meanings of responses is not able to be fully understood. Social constructionist interpretations of data must recognize that each individual is actively construing a personal reality in a unique sociohistorical context with a dominant narrative and developing that personal reality in conjunction with others in communities. One objective, external reality does not exist. There are, therefore, many interpretations and meanings to results of data analyses. Utilizing empirical methods as a starting point, this study has attempted to begin the search for understanding the influence of some contextual issues on important aspects of psychology.

Overall, many results of significance were found, but other expected results were not found. The lack of some expected results may be because many expectations were based only on theoretical speculations rather than previous empirical support. This lack may also relate to the design of this study in choosing to attempt to quantify complex, contextually based issues in primarily empirical, rather than social constructionist, research. These data do suggest some links between the concepts studied in this research that should be pursued in future research.

Limitations

There are several limitations of this research design and methodology. Multicollinearity was not a problem, but certain variables computed in the same regressions were fairly highly correlated. Type I error increases with multiple comparisons, and most stepwise multiple regression equations were run with eight variables. The sample size was not as large as hoped and some groups were very small, particularly PEP empiricists and two HOS styles, which could decrease the likelihood of finding significant results when using highest ranked style in

analyses, or render the results nearly meaningless. However, continuous scores for each style of both the PEP and HOS were used in all regression equations. This was not an experimental study, which limits its rigor and precludes cause-effect. Effects of self-selection and background variables may have confounded the results. There is a lack of adequate prior research to suggest confounding variables for which to control. However, demographic data found to be highly correlated for this sample (age and experience), was controlled for in the regressions. There is also the lack of proven test-retest reliability for the statement of feminism I developed from the literature, though the statement did increase the reliability of the composite feminism score for this sample. Generalizability was somewhat dependent on those responding to the survey, but results may be generalizable to psychologists who are similar to this sample. However, even with attempts to increase demographic variability, the great majority of the sample was composed of Caucasians.

A major concern in the area of internal validity is the threat of selection by history interaction. Other confounding events in a person's history, rather than just feminist beliefs, could have led to the selection of certain epistemological styles or treatment attribution models. Theoretical orientation could have had an effect on incorporation of values into treatment, but again, Enns and Hackett (1990) noted that feminist therapy is primarily distinguished by its value orientations and philosophical assumptions, rather than any particular type of therapeutic techniques, and theoretical orientation was found to be significant only for humanists. Among the literature, there is limited support for suggesting that minority group status (mainly having a lesbian sexual orientation) and major career emphasis (academic vs. practitioner) may be confounding variables. These variables did not prove to be confounding in this research. This study attempted to identify and analyze possible confounding variables that will need to be

controlled for in future research, but only age and experience were highly correlated, and this correlation would logically be expected.

Selection bias was also a threat to internal validity. Individuals may have inappropriately selected their level of endorsement of feminist values because they were essentially self-selecting rather than being randomly assigned. Yet, selecting the appropriate personal level of feminism is also an integral part of this study. The specificity and strength of the definition, plus the masking of feminism items in the SII, and the composite score for feminist values were an attempt to control for ceiling effects or social desirability responses in the feminism scores.

Instrumentation is another possible threat to internal validity. The PEP has not been widely used and reported on in the literature, so some questions about its adequacy as a measure of epistemological styles remain. The authors of the instrument, however, report extensive testing of the measure. Questions could also be raised about whether or not metaphorism is truly the same as social constructionism. The HOS has also not been widely used or reported on in the literature, although reliability is acceptable based on the authors' research. None of the measures used in this study give any information related to previous use with psychologists, so results on this population could be different than established norms. Experimental mortality may have also been a threat to internal validity. Different response rates from the groups being compared might have a meaning that influenced the results. An example is feminists possibly responding in higher numbers because of an interest in research that is examining the feminist perspective and a desire to have the feminist perspective heard., and there was quite a high level of endorsement of feminist values. An attempt to control as much as possible specific groups, such as feminists, responding more than others was be made by choosing participants randomly from the subject pool and some item-masking (SII). The inferential power was increased by obtaining as large of

a stratified random sample as reasonably possible, but, again, the response rate and sample size were lower than what was anticipated.

External validity would appear to be fairly good, but each participant responded to the survey and measures in her or his own choice of setting, frame of mind, and length of time. These external arrangements were not able to be controlled for with the methods of this study, but attempting to obtain a larger, randomly chosen group was deemed more important than studying a specific group in one setting.

Future Research

The results of this research suggest some future directions for inquiry. As noted previously, there is a lack of research on how values impact theory, research and practice in psychology, yet I believe this area is vitally important in its implications for the field as a whole and how we treat the clients we serve. As this study was exploratory and no previous work has been done that combines all the variables used in this study, a replication of this research study would be useful for determining if similar results would again be found. A larger and more racially varied sample size would provide more data and show whether similar results are again found. More sophisticated statistical analyses, such as determining interaction effects through MANOVAs, could be computed with a larger sample. Different results might be found with analyses that were able to control for the fairly high correlations between all epistemological styles and some of the attribution of responsibility styles that were identified through this research. A similar study could also be conducted on a sample that included different levels of education to see if educational level may have affected these results. Another similar study could be conducted with other social scientists, such as social workers, to determine how training and work in psychology may have had an effect on results. Values other than feminism could be used to see if or how they

relate to epistemological style and attribution of responsibility style. Another possibility would be to examine a different affect on treatment than attribution of responsibility.

One interesting area for further study might be to examine the unexpected correlation between nonwhite race and rationalism to determine what might contribute to this finding as it was contrary to expectations based on theoretical literature. Another interesting study might try to determine if gays and lesbians in a different sample were only related to low rationalism scores, and not low empiricism scores along with high social constructionism scores, as could be theoretically expected.

Replication research would be useful to determine if similar results were found in the types of epistemology styles and demographic variables that were predictive of the attribution of responsibility styles. Further research might also provide more information about why feminist values were typically not related to attribution of responsibility style as might theoretically be expected.

Further testing should be done on whether or not there are differences between academics and clinicians in epistemological style because these findings were different from prior research. If, in fact, the majority of psychological researchers are no longer strongly committed to the empiricist tradition, it may be that the empiricist basis of psychology has changed and future research utilizing other methodology will be more widely accepted.

Future research might also focus on instrument development. The PEP is quite long and is rarely used in published research. Similarly, the HOS has rarely been used in research. More data on each of these instruments could lead to their improvement. The FWM has only recently been published, so more future use of this instrument could provide more information about its value as a measure of feminism. Another possibility for instrument development would be an effective

measure of different types of feminism. Though this research supports the use of a composite score of feminism versus one measure of feminism, the effects of the use of a composite score of feminism could also be more clearly determined and supported with additional research. In general, the use of these concepts in research is at the very beginning and it would seem that any research that studies how our values affect our definition of truth and knowledge and how each of these relate to client treatment, theory development or research practices would be very beneficial.

Implications and Applications

The results of this study have implications for how we perceive and deal with the impact of values on the theory, research and practice of psychology and psychotherapy. This study has provided at least initial support for some of the hypotheses developed from the literature. This study has also provided some interesting results that should be considered when working with clients in psychotherapy and in research. A possible relationship between attribution of responsibility and sexual orientation needs to be considered when working with gay and lesbian clients. Any theory, research or psychotherapy that implies the lesbian or gay individual should have a negative view of self and a positive view of society is likely to be strongly rejected and future work would probably not continue. This is particularly important as many psychologists are not adequately trained in working with gays and lesbians, and often tend to still believe there is actually something wrong with the client's sexual orientation (Carl, 1990). The therapist may need to examine both his or her own epistemological beliefs and style of attribution of responsibility to adequately work with lesbian and gay clients who tend to believe society has contributed to their problems and want to be empowered and supported to change both themselves as necessary and society.

Differences between the sexes should also be considered in theory development, research practices and psychotherapy. Men and women need to be aware of their attribution of responsibility style tendencies, and recognize they are often different from each other, thus it is necessary for each sex to consider how these differences might affect their work in each of the above areas. Males are particularly more likely than women to ignore the effects of social context. This could lead to very different views of reality which will impact any work with women, possibly leading to some distortion of women's' realities and an inability to most effectively theorize, research or provide therapy to women. Men are also much less likely to be feminist in their values than women. Males must be careful not to impose sexist values on women with whom they do therapy or conduct research. Feminists strive to see women in a positive, powerful manner, and society as causing or contributing to many of the problems women face. All therapists need to be aware of these feminist views when working with feminist clients. Therapists need to also be aware that gays and lesbians, and probably especially lesbians, tend to support feminist values which need to be respected in therapy.

Understanding that individuals tend to use all epistemological styles and attribution of responsibility styles could be useful for therapists and researchers in realizing that they can utilize different styles of understanding and behavior for different situations and clients. If we begin to pay attention to our underlying beliefs in these areas, we may better understand our own response tendencies in certain situations and develop the ability to be more flexible in employing different beliefs and responses based on the needs of the individual or situation rather than our own beliefs. This will ultimately benefit both clients and research findings. Similarly, recognizing that one probably has a dominant epistemological style, and each epistemological style has a preferred attribution of responsibility style, can

help psychologists begin to be more aware of and recognize their personal styles and therefore some typical or likely ways of thinking and behaving. This awareness and understanding can increase one's ability to choose how to respond rather than react based on underlying beliefs.

Beginning to recognize and acknowledge what this study has largely supported, namely that values do often have an affect on how we do the work of psychology, is an important step in starting to examine our own underlying epistemological and attribution of responsibility beliefs and those inherent in the theories and research on which we base our work. The impact of how we define and determine truth, along with how we believe others problems developed and should be solved, are integral to all of psychology. We cannot continue to largely ignore this basis of the field of psychology. These beliefs and their effect must be examined both individually and collectively, then identified and acknowledged. Only then can we make theories, research and clinical practice in psychology truly representative of all the complexities of life that individuals face. This research has provided another step in that direction.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

APA Letter Requesting Subjects

April 18, 1995
114 Parkwest Dr., 2E7
Lansing, MI 48917
(517) 321-7643

Dear APA ODEER:

I am writing to request your approval of using APA members as subjects in my **dissertation** research. Per your guidelines:

1. Copies of all instruments and the cover letter are enclosed. These are in final form **except** for the removal of the appendix designation.

2.a. My target population is full members and fellows of APA (not associates), in **Divisions** 12 (Clinical), 17 (Counseling), 42, (Psychologists in Independent Practice), 44 (**Gay** and Lesbian Issues) and 45 (Ethnic Minority Issues). I want a random sample of **members** in each of these five divisions. My goal is to gain a sample of psychologists **likely** to have experience and/or knowledge of psychotherapy, with some being **practitioners** and others professors. I also hope to have a range of racial minorities and **sexual** orientations.

2.b. The procedures will be a mail survey including the cover letter, demographics form, **the** instruments enclosed, a coding/answer sheet, a self-addressed, stamped postcard (**blank**, except for ID number), and a self-addressed, stamped envelope. A follow-up **postcard** will be sent approximately two weeks after the initial mailing of the survey to **remind** those who have not responded. Surveys will be coded for the purpose of payment **of** the monetary incentive for participating in the survey, for follow-up with those who **have** not responded, to omit those who have requested omission, and to send results to **those** requesting them. All data will be kept confidential. Once all completed surveys **have** been received, data entered into the computer and the monetary incentive paid, the **original** coding sheet will be destroyed. There will then be no way to individually identify **subjects** and all data will be presented in an aggregate manner, with no way to associate **specific** subjects with specific responses, thereby assuring confidentiality. The surveys will **be** sent within one-two weeks of receiving your approval for this project, hopefully mid to **late** May, 1995.

2.c. The intent of this study is to explore empirically the hypothesis that underlying beliefs **impact** the theories, research, practice and psychological treatment done by psychologists. **The** general purpose of this study is to examine the possible relationships between feminist **values**, epistemological styles and attribution of responsibility in psychological treatment. **Those** interested in the practice of psychology and understanding the value basis of much

of the work done in the field of psychology should benefit from the results of this work. **Many** consider psychology an empirical science not influenced by values or epistemological beliefs. This research project will examine the accuracy of those tenets of psychology and provide valuable new information on whether or not they are correct.

2.d. Analyses of information will primarily consist of a series of multiple hierarchical regressions. My current plans for the information are to use the data to complete my dissertation. I also hope to attempt to publish articles and give presentations on the materials after completion of the dissertation, but have no specific details of publications or presentations at this time.

2.e. I do not have any outside funding to help support this research. I will be using my income from employment and student loans.

3. Enclosed is a copy of the approval letter of my dissertation proposal from my university's (Michigan State University) human subjects committee.

I am requesting random sampling of full APA members in Divisions 12, 17, 42, 44, and 45 with 120 subjects selected from each of these five divisions, for a combined total of 600 subjects. I would like the division each is in to be recorded on the information I am given. **I would** also like them to be selected/sorted for an equal number of men and women from each division. I would also like the random sample of each division (particularly 44, and 45) to be sorted to include only Clinical Psychology and Counseling Psychology Ph.D. or Psy. D. degrees (I'm not interested in degrees where clinical practice is not possible), and sorted so that there are no overlapping members from different divisions. If possible, I would like those currently holding administrative or agency director positions excluded from the sample. I would also like two copies of the mailing labels of the final sample.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or need further information.
Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Mary S. Gilbert

Appendix B

Demographics Questionnaire

(Please return this portion of the survey with your coding sheet)

Please provide the following information to assist in my data analysis. (Continue coding **responses** on the answer sheet.)

175. Age:

- 0. 20-29
- 1. 30-39
- 2. 40-49
- 3. 50-59
- 4. 60-69
- 5. 70-79
- 6. Over 80

176. Sex:

- 0. Female
- 1. Male

177. What is your racial/ethnic background?

- 0. African-American
- 1. Asian American
- 2. Caucasian
- 3. Hispanic
- 4. Native American
- 5. Other, please specify (write in): _____

178. Please select the category which best describes your sexual orientation.

- 0. Exclusive preference for sexual relations with members of the same sex, and no interest in sexual relations with members of the opposite sex.
- 1. Predominant preference for sexual relations with members of the same sex, with only incidental interest in sexual relations with members of the opposite sex.
- 2. Clear preference for same-sex sexual relations, with a lesser but still active interest in sexual relations with members of the opposite sex.
- 3. Approximately equal interest in sexual relations with members of the opposite sex and members of the same sex.
- 4. Clear preference for opposite-sex sexual relations, with a lesser but still active interest in sexual relations with members of the same sex.
- 5. Predominant preference for opposite-sex sexual relations, with only incidental interest in sexual relations with members of the same sex.
- 6. Exclusive preference for sexual relations with members of the opposite sex and no interest in sexual relations with members of the same sex.

179. What is your current relationship status?

- 0. Committed partnership
- 1. Divorced
- 2. Married
- 3. Separated
- 4. Single
- 5. Widowed

180. What is your current household income, per year, before taxes?

- 0. Under 30,000
- 1. 30,000-39,999
- 2. 40,000-49,999
- 3. 50,000-59,999
- 4. 60,000-69,999
- 5. 70,000-79,999
- 6. 80,000-89,000
- 7. 90,000-99,000
- 8. Over 100,000

181. How would you describe the area in which you live?

- 0. Rural
- 1. Suburban
- 2. Urban

182. In what area of psychology did you get your degree? (write in answer)

183. Please describe your current occupation.

Title:(write in answer) _____

Current primary job function:

- 0. Faculty member
- 1. Administrator
- 2. Clinician
- 3. Other (please specify) _____

184. Approximately how many years of clinical experience do you have?

- 0. 0-4
- 1. 5-9
- 2. 10-14
- 3. 15-19
- 4. 20-24
- 5. 25-29
- 6. 30-34
- 7. 35-39
- 8. Over 40

185. What is your primary theoretical orientation?

- 0. Behavioral
- 1. Cognitive
- 2. Cognitive-behavioral
- 3. Client-centered
- 4. Family systems
- 5. Eclectic
- 6. Humanistic
- 7. Psychodynamic
- 8. Other, please specify: _____

186. Do you consider yourself a feminist?

- 0. No
- 1. Yes
- 2. Uncertain

187. Please respond to the following paragraph based on your personal beliefs. (Code the number corresponding to your response).

I believe that sexism exists and is a fundamental, pervasive oppression of women. I agree that there are current inequalities in political, social, civil and educational rights and opportunities between the sexes. I am committed to eradicating the ideology of male domination that permeates Western culture and the elimination of inequalities for women through legal, social, economic and educational reform to allow complete equality for women.

--0-----1-----2-----3-----4			
S trongly	Disagree	Neither Agree	Agree
S trongly			
D isagree		Nor Disagree	Agree

Appendix C

Psycho-Epistemological Profile

Directions: For each of the following statements, you are to indicate your personal agreement or disagreement on the coding sheet. 0='CD' and means complete disagreement with the statement, 1='MD' and means moderate disagreement, 2='N' and means neutral, 3='MA' and means moderate agreement, and 4='CA' and means complete agreement. Your personal preference alone is required. There are no right or wrong responses. It is necessary, however, that you answer all of the questions. Be sure to clearly mark the appropriate space for each question. Use a pencil and erase any extra marks. Trust your first impression.

--0-----1-----2-----3-----4
CD MD N MA CA

1. A good teacher is primarily one who has a sparkling, entertaining delivery.
2. The thing most responsible for a child's fear of the dark is thinking of all sorts of things that could be "out there".
3. Most people who read a lot, know a lot because they come to know of the nature and function of the world around them.
4. Higher education should place a greater emphasis on fine arts and literature.
5. I would like to be a philosopher.
6. A subject I would like to study is biology.
7. In choosing a job I would look for one which offered opportunity for experimentation and observation.
8. The Bible is still a best seller today because it provides meaningful accounts of several important eras in religious history.
9. Our understanding of the meaning of life has been furthered most by art and literature.
10. More people are in church today than ever before because they want to see and hear for themselves what ministers have to say.
11. It is of primary importance for parents to be consistent in their ideas and plans regarding their children.
12. I would choose the following topic for an essay: The Artist in an Age of Science.
13. I feel most at home in a culture in which people can freely discuss their philosophy of life.
14. Responsibility among individuals requires an honest appraisal of situations where irresponsibility has transpired.
15. A good driver is observant.
16. When people are arguing a question from two different points of view, I would say that the argument should be resolved by actual observation of the debated situation.
17. I would like to visit a library.
18. If I were visiting India, I would be primarily interested in understanding the basis for their way of life.

0-----	1-----	2-----	3-----	4
CD	MD	N	MA	CA

19. Human morality is molded primarily by an individual's conscious analysis of right and wrong.
20. A good indicator of decay in a nation is a decline of interest in the arts.
21. My intellect has been developed most by learning methods of observation and experimentation.
22. The prime function of a university is to teach principles of research and discovery.
23. A good driver is even tempered.
24. If I am in a contest, I try to win by following a pre-determined plan.
25. I would like to have been Shakespeare.
26. Our understanding of the meaning of life has been furthered most by mathematics.
27. I like to think of myself as a considerate person.
28. I would very much like to have written Darwin's "The Origin of Species".
29. When visiting a new area, I first try to see as much as I possibly can.
30. My intellect has been developed most by gaining insightful self knowledge.
31. I would be very disturbed if accused of being insensitive to the needs of others.
32. The kind of reading which interests me most is that which creates new insights.
33. The greatest evil inherent in a totalitarian regime is alienation of human relationships.
34. Most atheists are disturbed by the absence of factual proof of the existence of God.
35. In choosing a job I would look for one which offered the opportunity to use imagination.
36. In my leisure I would most often like to enjoy some form of art, music, or literature.
37. The kind of reading which interests me most is that which stimulates critical thought.
38. I prefer to associate with people who are spontaneous.
39. In my leisure I would like to play chess or bridge.
40. Most people who read a lot, know a lot because they develop an awareness and sensitivity through their reading.
41. When visiting a new area, I first pause to try to get a "feel" for the place.
42. Many T.V. programs lack sensitivity.
43. I like to think of myself as observant.
44. Happiness is largely due to sensitivity.
45. I would be very disturbed if accused of being inaccurate or biased in my observations.
46. A good teacher is primarily one who helps his students develop their powers of reasoning.
47. I would like to be a novelist.
48. The greatest evil inherent in a totalitarian regime are restrictions of thought and criticism.
49. More people are in church today than ever before because theologians are beginning to meet the minds of the educated people.
50. The most valuable person on a scientific research team is one who is gifted at critical analysis.
51. Many T.V. programs lack organization and coherence.
52. I like country living because it gives you a chance to see nature first hand.

0-----	1-----	2-----	3-----	4
CD	MD	N	MA	CA

53. Upon election to Congress I would endorse steps to encourage an interest in the arts.
54. It is important for parents to be familiar with theories of child psychology.
55. The prime function of a university is to train the minds of the capable.
56. I would like to have written Hamlet.
57. Higher education should place a greater emphasis on mathematics and logic.
58. The kind of reading which interests me most is that which is essentially true to life.
59. A subject I would like to study is art.
60. I feel most at home in a culture in which realism and objectivity are highly valued.
61. The prime function of a university is to develop a sensitivity to life.
62. When playing bridge or similar games I try to think my strategy through before playing.
63. If I were visiting India, I would be primarily interested in noting the actual evidence of cultural change.
64. When buying new clothes I look for the best possible buy.
65. I would like to visit an art gallery.
66. When a child is seriously ill, a good mother will remain calm and reasonable.
67. I prefer to associate with people who stay in close contact with the facts of life.
68. Many T.V. programs are based on inadequate background research.
69. Higher education should place greater emphasis on natural science.
70. I like to think of myself as logical.
71. When people are arguing a question from two different points of view, I would say that each should endeavor to assess honestly his or her own bias before arguing further.
72. When reading an historical novel, I am most interested in the factual accuracy found in the novel.
73. The greatest evil inherent in a totalitarian regime is distortion of the facts.
74. A good driver is considerate.
75. Our understanding of the meaning of life has been furthered most by biology.
76. I would like to have been Galileo.
77. My children must possess the characteristics of sensitivity.
78. I would like to be a geologist.
79. A good indicator of decay in a nation is an increase in the sale of movie magazines over news publications.
80. I would be very disturbed if accused of being illogical in my beliefs.
81. Most great scientific discoveries come about by thinking about a phenomenon in a new way.
82. I feel most at home in a culture in which the expression of creative talent is encouraged.
83. In choosing a job I would look for one which offered a specific intellectual challenge.
84. When visiting a new area, I first plan a course of action to guide my visit.
85. A good teacher is primarily one who is able to discover what works in class and is able to use it.

- 86. Most great scientific discoveries come about by careful observation of the phenomena in question.
- 87. Most people who read a lot, know a lot because they acquire an intellectual proficiency through the sifting of ideas.
- 88. I would like to visit a botanical garden or zoo.
- 89. When reading an historical novel, I am most interested in the subtleties of the personalities described.
- 90. When playing bridge or similar games I play the game by following spontaneous cues.

Appendix D

Social Issues Inventory

Please indicate your opinion on each of the following statements by filling in the appropriate space on your coding sheet.

---0-----1-----2-----3-----4
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree

91. The civil rights movement was one of the most positive occurrences of this century.
92. Welfare programs should not be provided to people who refuse to take responsibility for themselves.
93. The leaders of the women's movement may be extreme, but they have the right idea.
94. Although some war protesters may be overly radical, they successfully point out the absurdity of achieving peace through war.
95. Affirmative action programs for minorities hurt the career options of the majority.
96. There are better ways for women to fight for equality than through the women's movement.
97. A strong national defense is the only way to assure that individual freedom will be preserved.
98. More people would favor the women's movement if they knew more about it.
99. Every person should be guaranteed access to adequate food, housing, and other basic necessities.
100. The civil rights movement has helped Americans eliminate their stereotypes and prejudices.
101. Right wing political groups pose a major threat to our freedom.
102. The women's movement has positively influenced relationships between men and women.
103. Welfare programs are contributing to the downfall of the American family.
104. Instead of criticizing our nation, we should be proud of its contributions to freedom and world peace.
105. Our nation has an obligation to provide adequately for the poor, disabled, elderly, and homeless.
106. The women's movement is too radical and extreme in its views.
107. Civil rights leaders should spend more time solving problems, rather than talking about prejudice.
108. Feminists are too visionary for a practical world.
109. Political liberals are naive to think that welfare programs will help people become self-sufficient.
110. Opponents of our government's policies have destructive influences on our society.
111. Feminist principles should be adopted everywhere.

112. I am excited that the civil rights movement has helped minorities gain more power in our society.
113. A powerful defense is the only way to ensure our nation's survival and strength.
114. Feminists are a menace to this nation and the world.
115. We must make a strong commitment to eradicating poverty in our country before intervening in the affairs of other nations.
116. Most people who get involved in peace marches are too idealistic for the real world.
117. I am overjoyed that women's liberation is finally happening in this country.
118. The application of civil rights principles in all aspects of work and social life is our only hope for full equality between people.
119. I consider myself to be politically conservative.
120. I am supportive of the aims of the civil rights movement.
121. I consider myself a feminist and supportive of the women's movement.
122. I favor political activism as an appropriate response to injustice.

Appendix E

Attributions of the Term Feminist

For each of the following items, please indicate the degree to which the following words do or do not describe you by filling in the answer on your coding sheet based on the following scale:

---0-----1-----2-----3-----4
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree

Behavioral Characteristics

- 123. Aggressive
- 124. Extrovert
- 125. Passivist
- 126. Very likely to be working
- 127. Not at all opinionated
- 128. Not at all domineering
- 129. Very forceful
- 130. Ambitious
- 131. Dependent
- 132. Very career oriented
- 133. Passive
- 134. Weak
- 135. Nonconformist
- 136. Very motivated
- 137. Submissive
- 138. Assertive
- 139. Busy
- 140. Very talkative
- 141. Very energetic
- 142. Subordinate

Political Orientation (regarding women's issues)

- 143. Against reform
- 144. For equal wages
- 145. Against liberation
- 146. For equal rights
- 147. Supports NOW
- 148. Against women's lib
- 149. For ERA

Appendix F

Helping Orientations Scale

The following statements reflect general attitudes towards problems and their solutions. There are no correct or incorrect responses. Please respond to each statement by indicating your level of agreement with that statement. 4 means you strongly agree, 3 means you agree, 2 means you neither agree nor disagree, 1 means you disagree and 0 means you strongly disagree. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by marking the appropriate response on your coding sheet.

---0-----1-----2-----3-----4
SD D Neutral A SA

- 150. People's biggest limitation is their unwillingness to accept proper moral guidelines.
- 151. If you want to get something done, the biggest problem is finding the right person to tell you how to do it.
- 152. Often people do not solve their own problems because they are held back by circumstances.
- 153. It's silly to rely upon oneself when there are so many more knowledgeable people.
- 154. When things are tough, people have to rely on themselves and try harder.
- 155. People need the cooperation of others to compensate for the obstacles imposed upon them by their situations.
- 156. Life's problems are too complicated. People have to rely upon skilled people for proper assistance and/or treatment.
- 157. There is always a right way and wrong way to do things.
- 158. It is foolish to expect people to be able to solve their problems alone when there are so many specialists.
- 159. People should help others help themselves.
- 160. Whoever has the problem has the responsibility to make it right.
- 161. For society to function well, people need to be told what to do by those who know what is proper.
- 162. Life requires people to take a stand when dealing with the problems they created.
- 163. Without the guidance that social norms provide, people would amount to nothing.
- 164. Often people are not given an opportunity to solve their own problems.
- 165. If people were not fearful of rejection by others, they wouldn't try to do what is right.
- 166. Sheer determination will do a lot more for people than relying on others to solve their problems.
- 167. For the best results, people should rely upon experts to solve their problems.
- 168. People are ultimately responsible for the problems they have.
- 169. People would be a lot better off if they followed the advice of experts.
- 170. People must submit to others' ideas about proper behavior if they are going to resolve their problems.

- 171. The real solution to people's problems must come from them.
- 172. Rather than assessing blame, people should be concerned with helping others overcome limitations imposed on them by society.
- 173. Behind every problem faced is someone not doing something they should have.
- 174. Life requires people to work for what they want because there is nothing in their way but themselves.

Appendix G

Cover Letter

May 12, 1995

Dear Psychologist;

Your name was chosen from among a list of psychologists. I hope you will choose to participate in a research project by filling out the enclosed forms. I am working on a dissertation that explores whether or not certain beliefs affect how psychologists conceptualize client problems and ways of helping clients. This information could be valuable in exploring the relationship of values to psychological treatment.

Your participation in this study is voluntary, but would be very much appreciated. You may choose not to participate at all or to end your involvement at any time without penalty. You may refuse to answer any question, however, all questions are important to gain a full understanding of the issues being studied and to ensure that I can use your responses.

It should take approximately 15 - 20 minutes to complete the entire survey. In return for your time and help by completing the enclosed survey, I will enter you in a drawing for a cash prize of \$100.00. Your chances of winning will be approximately 1 in 200-250. All of your responses will be kept totally confidential. Results will only be reported in group terms, not individually. Your survey will have an identification number on it for follow up purposes and to enter you in the \$100 drawing. No one other than myself will have access to your name and it will be destroyed as soon as data gathering is complete. Please do not put your name anywhere on the answer sheet or survey. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (517) 321-7643.

To participate in this study, please use a Number 2 pencil to fill in the blanks on the coding (answer) sheet that represent your answer and corresponds to the question number in the survey. Please return only your completed coding sheet and the demographics section of the survey in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. I have also enclosed a self-addressed, stamped post card. If you would like to be withdrawn from the survey, please write your name and "omit" on the card and return it to me. If you would like a copy of the results of this survey, please write your name, address and "results" on the card and return it to me. I would greatly appreciate your timely response. In order to be eligible for the \$100 drawing, please return your survey no later than June 5, 1995. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

You indicate your voluntary agreement to participate by completing and returning this questionnaire.

Sincerely,

Mary S. Gilbert

Appendix H

Correction Letter

Dear Psychologist;

Recently you received a survey in the mail that explores the relationship of values to psychological treatment. Unfortunately, after what seemed like hundreds of reviews to make sure it was correct, I found it contains an error. The opening paragraph on the first page describes the answer scale correctly, but the graph on that page is wrong. The number "3" should equal "MA" (moderate agreement) and the number "4" should equal "CA" (complete agreement). If you have not responded yet, please correct the graph on the first page as stated above and make a note on your demographics sheet that you responded based on the corrections. If you have already responded, I would greatly appreciate it if you would use the postcard I included in the packet to briefly let me know what you did when answering (e.g., used the written directions and corrected your scale, responded as the scale was written, etc.) Because of my error, much of the data will be unusable without knowing what you meant when answering. Also, if you have not yet responded, I would much appreciate your taking a few minutes to do so. I'm sure you remember what it's like to try and finish your dissertation and without a large, corrected response to my survey, I'm in serious trouble. (Plus, you could win \$100!). Thank you again.

Sincerely,

Mary S. Gilbert

Appendix I

Reminder Letter

Dear Psychologist:

I am writing to remind you of the survey on values in psychology that you received about 3 weeks ago. I am finishing my Ph.D. in counseling psychology at Michigan State University and need your help to complete my dissertation. Although many people have kindly responded, I am still many short of the number that I need to complete my analyses. Therefore, I am extending the deadline for being eligible to win the \$100 by completing and returning my survey. You will also be able to receive the results if you wish. I believe this is an important area in psychology that has not been adequately explored. I am again asking for your assistance so that this work can continue. I would greatly appreciate you taking some of your time to complete the survey and return it as soon as possible. If you have misplaced your survey, but would be willing to assist me, I'll gladly send you a new packet. Please drop me a note or call me collect at (517) 321-7643.

Sincerely,

Mary S. Gilbert

Linda Forrest

Dissertation Chair

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
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