PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MTE DUE MTE DUE DATE DUE ‘ MAGICZ M ”011999 1/” WWW“ MANAGING POLICE AGENTS By DeVere D. Woods, Jr. A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Criminal Justice College of Social Science 1 997 ABSTRACT MANAGING POLICING AGENTS By DeVere D. Woods, Jr. This study examines management issues in police departments. Agency theory is used to examine employee attitudes and to assess potential compliance or resistance to policy initiatives. The study focuses on two areas: goal congruence between officers and their chief and officers’ job satisfaction. Patrol officers, detectives, and community police officers were examined to appraise management strategies. Data were collected in two American police departments during the summer of 1997. Job assignments and demographic information were compared to scales of goal congruity and job satisfaction using chi-square, t-tests and regression analysis. The entire data set was analyzed; then each department was analyzed separately. Goal congruency with the chief was found to be associated with job satisfaction. This association holds for patrol officers, but was less important for detectives and community police officers. Detectives and community police officers had closer goal congruence with their chief than did patrol officers. Officers’ level of education had mixed associations with goal alignment and job satisfaction for each job assignment. Officers’ tenure and time in their current job assignment were found to be strongly associated with goal congruency. It was concluded that police chiefs need to reconceptualize management problems and tailor their management strategies to the characteristics of their employees. Copyrighted by DEVERE D. WOODS, JR. 1997 To Julie, Matthew and Kathleen, for their patience and support. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to the many people who assisted me in completing this study. I begin by acknowledging the efforts of Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz. He convinced me to come to the university and taught me about community policing. It was a pleasure working with him, and I am grateful for the many opportunities he offered me. His friendship, enthusiasm and vision are missed. Few struggling graduate students are lucky enough to have a dissertation chairperson like Dr. Bruce Benson. Whenever I felt the roof had fallen on me, Bruce would Show me the advantages of fresh air and natural lighting. His exceptional sense of humor and perpetual optimism guided me through an often bleak process. His assistance went far beyond the requirements of his position. I enjoyed working with all of my committee members. Dr. Dennis Payne was a constant source of support and provided many hours of stimulating conversation. Denny never talks down to his students, and he teaches lessons in life as well as the curriculum. Dr. Carol Weissert was one of my first committee members, and she continually challenged me to explore new options. Dr. Charles Corley saved my committee from floundering by stepping in to fill an unexpected vacancy. His quietly confident demeanor punctuates the importance of everything he says. I also thank Dr. David Carter for helping to administrate matters. This research could not have been completed without the unselfish participation of the officers at the research sites. I thank them for their contributions. I extend my appreciation to Chief Michael Snowden, Lt. Gregory Snider and Phyllis Taylor of the Cincinnati Police Division for their assistance. I thank Chief Lorne Kramer, Planning Director Thomas Paine and Officer Brad Wilkinson from the Colorado Springs Police Department. The task of collecting data became productive and enjoyable with their help. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the important assistance of three special individuals. Diane Steiner somehow achieved the impossible by arranging meetings for committee members who never seem to be in the same place at the same time. Her willingness to assume extra work for my benefit is greatly appreciated. Carole Maida proofread drafi after draft of what seemed to be the endless process of writing this document. Though I sometimes questioned her enthusiasm in marking up every page I wrote, her assistance and support were invaluable. I would also like to thank Margaret Bird for lending her expert editing skills to the preparation of the final document. Thank you all. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ x LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ xiv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. Overview of Study ............................................................................................. 1 1.1.1 Background to Research ..................................................................... 2 1.2 Overview of Theory ............................................................................................ 4 1.3 Research Problem and Research Question ........................................................ 10 1.3.1 The Manager’s Problem ..................................................................... 1 1 1.4 Methodology .................................................................................................... 13 1.4.1 Data Collection .................................................................................. 14 1 .4.2 Definition of Terms ............................................................................ 15 1.4.3 Delimitations of Scope and Key Assumptions .................................. 16 1.5 Justification for the Research ........................................................................... 16 1.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 19 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 21 2.2 Eras of American Policing ............................................................................... 22 2.2.1 Political Era ....................................................................................... 24 2.2.2 Reform Era. ....................................................................................... 25 2.2.3 Community Era ................................................................................. 30 2.2.4 Summary ........................................................................................... 32 2.3 Traditional Bureaucratic Model ....................................................................... 32 2.4 Principal-Agent Model ..................................................................................... 37 2.4.1 Asymmetric Information .................................................................... 41 2.4.2 Adverse Selection ............................................................................... 42 2.4.3 Hidden Information, Actions and Moral Hazard ............................... 43 2.4.4 Monitoring and Transaction Costs ..................................................... 44 2.4.5 Principal-Agent Model ...................................................................... 46 vii 2.4.6 Summary ........................................................................................................ 55 2.5 Importance of Shared Values ............................................................................ 55 2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 57 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 59 3.2 Unit of Analysis ................................................................................................ 63 3.3 Sites and Sample ............................................................................................... 63 3.3.1 Cities .................................................................................................. 64 3.3.2 Police Departments ............................................................................ 65 3.3.3 Sampling Frame and Sample Size ..................................................... 66 3.4 Data Collection Instrument ............................................................................... 68 3.4.1 Pretest ................................................................................................. 69 3.4.2 Treatment of Data .............................................................................. 69 3.4.3 Data Collection and Administration of Instrument ............................ 71 3.4.4 Statistical Techniques ........................................................................ 73 3.5 Ethical Issues ................................................................... _ ................................. 7 6 3.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 78 CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 80 4.2 Frequencies and Demographics ........................................................................ 80 4.3 Goal Alignment ................................................................................................ 86 4.4 Job Satisfaction and Commitment to the Organization .................................... 99 4.5 Goal Alignment and Job Satisfaction .............................................................. 1 11 4.6 Summary ......................................................................................................... 1 13 4.7 Regression Models ......................................................................................... 116 4.8 Using Departments as Controls ...................................................................... 122 4.8.1 Department’s Demographic Data .................................................... 122 4.8.2 Cincinnati Data Analysis ................................................................. 129 4.8.3 Colorado Springs Data Analysis ...................................................... 132 4.9 Summary ......................................................................................................... 136 4.10 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 140 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 145 5.2 Conclusions About Hypotheses and Research Questions ............................... 146 5.2.1 Goal Alignment and Job Assignment .............................................. 147 5.2.2 Job Satisfaction and Job Assignment .............................................. 150 5.2.3 Other Research Questions ................................................................ 152 viii 5.3 Conclusions About the Research Problem ....................................................... 154 5.4 Implications for Theory ..................................................................................... 155 5.5 Implications for Police Practice ......................................................................... 1 59 5.6 Implications for Future Research ....................................................................... 165 APPENDD( A Survey Instrument ............................................................................................................. 169 APPENDIX B Assigned Values ............................................................................................................... 178 APPENDD( C Supplementary Data Analysis ........................................................................................... 1 79 APPENDD( D Correlation Tables ................................................................... . ........................................ 216 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 227 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1 — Cincinnati Response .......................................................................................... 67 Table 2 — Colorado Springs Response ............................................................................... 67 Table 3 — Job Assignments ................................................................................................. 81 Table 4 - Job Assignment Acquisition .............................................................................. 82 Table 5 — Gender ............................................................................................................... 83 Table 6 — Race ................................................................................................................... 83 Table 7- Education.................................... ........................................................................ 84 Table 8 -— Job Tenure .......................................................................................................... 85 Table 9 —- Tenure in Current Assignment .......................................................................... 86 Table 10 - Difference in Goal Alignment .......................................................................... 87 Table 11 — Goal Alignment and Assignment .................................................................... 89 Table 12 — Goal Alignment and Job Acquisition ................................................................. 91 Table 13 — Goal Alignment and Gender ............................................................................. 92 Table 14 —— Goal Alignment and Race ................................................................................ 93 Table 15 — Goal Alignment and Education ........................................................................ 94 Table 16 - Goal Alignment and Job Tenure ..................................................................... 95 Table 17 — Goal Alignment and Tenure in Current Assignment ....................................... 97 Table 18 — Job Satisfaction and Commitment to the Organization .................................. 100 Table 19 — Job Satisfaction and Job Assignment ............................................................ 101 Table 20 — Job Satisfaction and Job Acquisition ............................................................ 102 Table 21 - Job Satisfaction and Gender .......................................................................... 103 Table 22 - Job Satisfaction and Race .............................................................................. 104 Table 23 — Job Satisfaction and Education ..................................................................... 106 Table 24 — Job Satisfaction and Job Tenure .................................................................... 107 Table 25 — Job Satisfaction and Tenure in Current Assignment ..................................... 109 Table 26 — Goal Alignment and Job Satisfaction ............................................................ 1 12 Table 27 — Dummy Variables & Recoding ..................................................................... 117 Table 28 — Exploratory Goal Alignment Regression ...................................................... 118 Table 29 - Goal Alignment, Department, Detective & Current Assignment .................. 119 Table 30 - Exploratory Job Satisfaction Regression ....................................................... 120 Table 31 — Job Satisfaction, Department, Female and Job Tenure ................................. 120 Table 32 — Goal Alignment Model .................................................................................. 121 Table 33 — Job Assignment by Department .................................................................... 123 Table 34 — Job Acquisition by Department ..................................................................... 124 Table 35 — Gender by Department .................................................................................. 125 Table 36 —- Race by Department ...................................................................................... 126 Table 37 — Education by Department .............................................................................. 127 Table 38 — Job Tenure by Department ............................................................................ 128 Table 39 — Tenure in Current Job Assignment by Department ....................................... 129 Table 40 — Exploratory Job Satisfaction Model for Cincinnati ....................................... 131 xi Table 41 — Job Satisfaction, Female Officers and Tenure in Cincinnati ......................... 131 Table 42 - Exploratory Model for Goal Alignment in Colorado Springs ....................... 133 Table 43 — Goal Alignment, Detectives and Tenure in Assignment Colorado Springs. 1 34 Table 44 — Goal Alignment, Detectives, Tenure in Assignment and Job Satisfaction in Colorado Springs ............................................................. 134 Table 45 — Goal Alignment in Colorado Springs ............................................................. 135 Table 46 — Exploratory Job Satisfaction Model for Colorado Springs ........................... 135 Table 47 — Job Satisfaction, Tenure and Tenure in Assignment for Colorado Springs ........................................................................ 136 Table 48 — Job Satisfaction and Tenure in Colorado Springs .......................................... 136 Table 49 — Assigned Values .............................................................................................. 177 Table 50 — Goal Alignment and Assigned/Entry Level Officers by Assignment .............. 180 Table 51 - White Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Assignment ................................ 181 Table 52 — Bachelor/Postgraduate Degrees and Goal Alignment by Assignment .......... 182 Table 53 — Six to Ten Years Experience by Goal Alignment and Assignment ................. 183 Table 54 - Some College/Associate Degree by Job Satisfaction and Assignment ........... 185 Table 55 — New Job Assignments and Job Satisfaction by Job Assignment ..................... 186 Table 56 — Long-Term Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction by Assignment .................. 187 Table 57 - Patrol Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ................................. 189 Table 58 — Volunteers/Promoted Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ........ 190 Table 59 — Males Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ................................ 191 Table 60 — White Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ................................ 192 Table 61 — Minority Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ........................... 193 xii Table 62 — Some College/Associate Degree and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction... 194 Table 63 - One to Five Years Tenure and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction ............... 195 Table 64 — Sixteen or More Years of Tenure and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction....196 Table 65 - New Assignments and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction .......................... 197 Table 66 — Patrol Data Model ........................................................................................... 198 Table 67 - Detective Data Model ..................................................................................... 198 Table 68 — Community Policing Data Model .................................................................... 199 Table 69— Goal Alignment and Race, Cincinnati Police Division .................................... 200 Table 70 —- Goal Alignment and Job Satisfaction, Cincinnati Police Division ................. 201 Table 71 — Patrol Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Satisfaction, Cincinnati Police Division .................................................................................... 203 Table 72 - Goal Alignment and Job Assignments Colorado Springs Police Department ..................................................................... 206 Table 73 — Goal Alignment and Tenure in Current Job Assignment Colorado Springs Police Department .................................................................... 208 Table 74 — White Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Assignment Colorado Springs Police Department .................................................................... 210 Table 75 — Bachelor/Postgraduate Degrees and Goal Alignment by Job Assignment Colorado Springs Police Department .................................................................... 21 1 Table 76 - Long Tenured Officers and Goal Alignment by Job Assignment Colorado Springs Police Department .................................................................... 212 xiii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 - Traditional Model ............................................................................................. 34 Figure 2 - Principal-Agent View of the Bureaucratic Model ............................................ 48 xiv Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview of Study This study explores police management issues by examining officers’ goals and job satisfaction. Its purpose is to inform decision makers by identifying potential areas of policy compliance and resistance in police organizations. Identifying potential problem areas is important because it provides insight into how policy can best be designed and implemented. An economic approach to management is used to firrther our understanding of behavior in police organizations. Economic approaches are potentially important tools for police managers. They are convenient devices that help to conceptualize the management task. Economic models help to define what policies and actions are possible and how much compliance or resistance can be anticipated. While this study will only attempt to identify potential areas of support of resistance to policy, this approach will help police managers fi'ame other important questions. What incentives or sanctions are needed? What is the cost of enforcing a policy? What resources should be allocated to obtaining feedback? If police managers better understand the complexities of the management task, they can formulate more successful policies and more effectively implement them. 2 The implementation of community policing provides an opportunity to study police management practices. Community policing has brought about a fundamental shift in policing philosophy. When police chiefs implement new programs like community policing, it is important to know what effect they will have on the organization. Police chiefs need to devise management strategies and monitoring schemes to successfully implement their new policies. Important and controversial programs, such as community policing, provide an opportunity to study police management. The research will address management issues and important implementation issues for community policing. A new and innovative perspective of police management will be presented. 1.1.1 Background to Research The police are re-examining how they deliver services. The introduction of community policing has prompted the police and academic researchers to re-examine policing philosophies. This reassessment of police management practices inspired this study. Advocates are claiming that community policing is the next evolutionary step in American policing (McEwen, 1995; NIJ, 1995; Abshire, 1995; Peak, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1994; Norrnandeau, 1993; Barr, 1992; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Mott, 1987). Some scholars believe that community policing is incompatible with traditional organizational structure (Abshire, 1995; Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994; Wycoff & Skogan, 1994; Eek & Rosenbaum, 1994; Peak, 1994; McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). If this is true, police managers need to redesign their management practices. 3 Community policing advocates recommend changing problematic structures and procedures to give officers more flexibility to solve problems (McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Weisburd, McElroy & Hardyman, 1988). Traditionalists fear that loosening structural constraints will return the police to the corrupt practices of an earlier era (Redlinger, 1994; McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Mastrofski & Greene, 1993; Moore, 1992; Reicher & Roberg, 1990; Mastrofski, 1988; Bayley, 1988; Klockars, 1988; Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988). A police chief must resolve these competing demands for officer autonomy and organizational control. When implementing new policy, the chief must contend with these opposing factions and fine-tune programs to fit into the organization’s culture, The chief must loosen constraints to bring about change, yet must maintain control of his or her subordinates (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994). Chiefs are guided by observation and feedback. Monitoring, the process chiefs use to gather information, is limited by cost and effectiveness. This study explores the problems associated with forming management strategies to control employees’ behavior. The narrow focus of this study is on areas of compliance and resistance in police organizations. In that scope, the concern about loosening structural constraints to accommodate community policing will be addressed. The findings also have implications for the larger scope of policy implementation. Despite its popularity, case studies of community policing show mixed results. Why do some programs succeed while others fail? Part of the answer can be found in the policy implementation process. A new policy must achieve a threshold of acceptance in the organization. Change 4 advocates must overcome competing factions and interests in the organization. The model developed in this study will help us to better understand this process. 1.2 Overview of Theory Police administration has grown out of the Reform Model as enunciated by O.W. Wilson. Wilson (1963) inspired a control model for police administration. He based his teachings on the bureaucratic school of organization. Classic bureaucratic theorists believe that subordinates’ activity is best controlled through organizational structure (Perrow, 1986; Dessler, 1980; Weber, 1958). The reform manager treated the organization as a black box. Little interest was paid to the inner dynamics of managing police organizations. Reforrners focused on the chief and the anticipated outcomes of policy. Wilson designed structure and formalized procedures to guide police administrators, which de-emphasized the examination of specific circumstances. Community policing is inspired by other management theories. In part, successful organizational management consists of supervisors persuading employees to comply with policy. Rational theories of organization view this problem from several perspectives. Human Relations theorists contend that motives and goals shape the cooperation and compliance of subordinates (Barnard, 1962; McGregor, 195 7). Goals replace the structural constraints relied on by the reform manager. Others propose subordinates’ actions are limited by the parameters of the information and alternatives at hand (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Simon, 1976). Each of these perspectives, though, considers subordinates to be rational actors who are 5 influenced by incentives and sanctions. "Any organization must offer a continuous stream of incentives to elicit the activities that it requires from its members or other contributors . . . . " (Banfield & Wilson, 1965: 27) Successful policy initiatives modify behavior by integrating themselves into the organization’s reward and disciplinary strategies. "A new criminal justice policy will have an impact at the street level (where crimes occur) only if it effectively manages to regulate or change the conduct of the individual policeman." (Yates, 1977: 4) Police chiefs are charged with regulating this process in their organizations. To place these competing theories in perspective, this study uses Agency Theory to guide the analysis and interpretation of the data. Agency Theory provides an alternative management model for police administrators to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Wilson’s reform model. Agency Theory is useful for understanding cooperative approaches, as well as incentive and sanctioning schemes. Agency Theory will provide a bridge between traditional police management philosophies and the management proposals of community policing advocates. Control is an important element of both the Reform Model and Agency Theory. In police organizations, control is often determined through monitoring. Monitoring is an important element of the police chiefs role and is repeatedly stressed in the traditional reform model (Wilson, 1963). While traditionalists emphasize punishment, community policing advocates stress the importance of incentives. The chief, or principal, may use incentives and punishments to induce officers, or agents, to act in a desired manner. These inducements 6 are tools whose usefulness is generally evaluated through monitoring. However, when the effectiveness of monitoring is limited, other factors may be more useful. This study focuses on goals and job satisfaction as indicators of the potential compliance and resistance. Examining principal-agent relationships highlights supervisory problems and provides a framework for better problem-solving. Through Agency Theory, we can better understand the behavioral dynamics in police organizations. Two of the components of Agency Theory, adverse selection and moral hazard, are particularly appropriate to this study. Agency Theory simplifies relations in organizations to the actions of two players, principals and agents. Agency Theory has not previously been applied to police administration. The model that is developed here, while unconventional in its approach, is rooted in the vast literature of Agency Theory. Because most police administrators know little of Agency Theory, some background is now provided. The brief discussion that follows is developed more fully in Chapter 2. Organizations are viewed as a series of contracts negotiated between principals and agents. Adverse selection is the problem that confronts the principal when entering into a contract with an agent. Agents attempt to present an image that will qualify them to receive the contract. This may include exaggerating his or her level of talent or work effort. The principal can never be certain of the agent’s skills and goals until after entering into the employment contract. Moral hazard is a problem of unobservable activity. This is a particular problem for managers in occupations such as policing. Once agents are hired, much of their work is unsupervised. The principal rarely knows the full nature of the agents’ activities and 7 motivations. Most police scholars and administrators now recognize the futility of trying to account for officers’ activities by counting tickets and arrests. The proxy measures used to evaluate policing are fraught with moral hazard (Moe, 1984). Police officers, because of the unsupervised and discretional nature of their work, have ample opportunity to Shirk. Both these problems could be partially alleviated if the principal could be sure of the agents’ goals and commitment to the organization. Knowing agents’ goals does not ensure you can predict their behavior. Nonetheless, this information is useful to managers and may be a more meaningful predictor of behavior than what is now available. If agents share similar goals with their principal and are satisfied in their jobs, they are likely to have larger zones of indifference (parameters of acceptance) toward the principal’s policies and directives. When agents have larger zones of indifference, they are more likely to comply with, rather than resist, direction from their principal. Wilson used job assignments to control the work process. Police organizations are divided into specialized units. Though there are many subspecialties, two traditional units are patrol and detectives. These are well-established job assignments in traditional police agencies. Community policing redefines the role of police officers. Community police officers perform some of the functions of both patrol and detectives. We know little about how to effectively manage community police officers. Each of these job assignments will be examined using a principal-agency model to identify potential management problems. As long as police organizations are structured and administered 8 in specialized units, job assignments will be important elements of management strategies. If the managing is viewed from a principal-agent perspective, we can begin to categorize and predict possible agent behavior. First, we must view organizations as a series of contracts and negotiations where agents have hidden information and are motivated to Shirk. Goals are important because they help to diminish the risks of alleviating adverse selection and the moral hazard of unobserved activity. Knowing an agent’s goals helps to identify potential management problems. Although principal- agent theory will not help predict levels of goal alignment for different job assignments, knowing the level of goal alignment clarifies the management task. Knowing agents’ goals helps to alleviate the problem of asymmetrically distributed information. If the manager and subordinate are in close goal agreement, the manager knows that incentives being offered are sufficient, and extensive monitoring may not be necessary. If there is high goal disparity between managers and subordinates, more incentives, sanctions, and closer monitoring may be in order. Managers can then define supervisory challenges as problems associated with inducing desired behavior. Principal-agent theory may be more helpfirl in predicting levels of job satisfaction. Many factors can affect job satisfaction. Officers’ levels of job satisfaction may stem from their goal congruence with their chief. Close goal congruence may elevate job satisfaction by fostering a feeling of working toward a common cause. High levels of goal disparity may lower job satisfaction if subordinates feel frustrated because their efforts are directed toward unimportant activities. Subordinates may have high levels of 9 job satisfaction if they feel that incentives (pay, status, opportunity to Shirk, etc.) fully compensate their abilities and work effort. If incentives excessively compensate (an example of classic adverse selection) the employee, he or she should have high levels of job satisfaction. Applying this to police organizations, the model would predict detectives to have high levels of job satisfaction and patrol officers to have low levels of job satisfaction. Community police officers should fall somewhere in between. Detectives have high levels of career status and greater discretion, possess significant amounts of confidential information, and are less identifiable in public. In short, detectives receive many incentives and have more opportunity to Shirk. Patrol officers are more closely monitored by rules, report writing requirements, radio dispatch and are readily identified in public by their uniforms and marked patrol cars. Success is often defined as transferring out of patrol to a new job assignment. Patrol officers enjoy fewer organizational benefits and have less opportunity to Shirk. Community police officers have fewer constraints than patrol officers, but more than detectives. Community police officers receive more benefits than patrol, but fewer than detectives. They should be more able to Shirk than patrol officers and less able to Shirk than detectives. Ifdifferences are found between job assignments, then police chiefs can devise more appropriate management techniques. Knowing what job assignments are more likely to foster compliance or resistance to policy direction is important for developing effective management strategies. It allows managers to formulate more efficient and effective incentives, sanctions, and monitoring schemes. 10 1.3 Research Problem and Research Questions American police chiefs direct and control complex organizations and oversee a variety of social control agents. These agents, though, may have diverse and competing objectives. New programs, such as community policing, must be integrated into this organizational milieu. Once a program is in place, the executive needs to monitor activity to determine if the desired results are being achieved. Unfortunately, monitoring does not deliver perfect information to the chief. This brings us to the purpose of our research. The first question is derived from Wilson’s belief that the work process can be controlled through job specialization and the principal-agent model’s concern for negotiating compliance from subordinates. Do the goals and values of officers difler across job assignments in police organizations? If we can determine subordinates’ goals, the asymmetrical distribution of information is reduced. Administrators improve their knowledge base and can develop more effective management strategies. The second research question is also derived from Wilson’s emphasis on specialized job assignments, his concern for high morale, and principal-agent model’s recognitions of shirking, and the negotiated nature of employment contracts. Do levels of job satisfaction and commitment to the organization difler across job assignments in police organizations? Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are closely related indicators of job morale and are often measured together (Miller, 1991). If we know the levels of employees’ job satisfaction, we can better evaluate incentive schemes. 11 This study examines the relationship between job assignment and potential areas of policy resistance in police organizations. Officers’ attitudes and perceptions are measured and analyzed to detect differences associated with job assignments. Three typical job assignments in police departments are examined: patrol/traffic, community policing, and detective/investigation. If police officers comprise a single research population, we can expect these three groups will share similar attitudes. Attitudes of officers and their levels of commitment to the organization are measured and compared. If a significant variance is found among these groups, it may indicate a need for different management schemes. 1.3.1 The Manager’s Problem The purpose of this study is to help police chiefs devise more efficient and effective management schemes. In the process, resources can be more effectively utilized if chiefs better understand the motivations of their employees. This study will attempt to separate areas that may need increased monitoring from areas that require less monitoring. It will provide additional understanding of employees’ potential actions not revealed by monitoring. Traditional police administrative theory separates job assignments into semi- autonomous units, but often policy is implemented as if organizational members are cohesively uniform. If areas of potential compliance and resistance can be identified, police chiefs can more effectively design policy and manage implementation. Examining this issue as a principal-agent problem helps to conceptualize the complexities involved in managing police organizations. 12 Each action a manager takes consumes resources. Police chiefs, as public managers, must work within the restraints of their budgets. They are charged with guiding and directing their organizations through recurring, as well as unexpected, problems. Effective managers will allocate sufficient resources to solve the problem at hand. Their objective is to spend only the resources necessary to resolve the matter. Managers who expend more than needed to solve a problem are inefficient. Inefficient managers have fewer resources to allocate to organizational functions and problem solving. In short, the objective is to reduce managers’ transaction costs. Police chiefs are especially aware of the importance of controlling behavior (Goldstein, 1977, 1994; Eek & Rosenbaum, 1994; Alpert & Dunham, 1992; ; Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988; J. Wilson, 1978; O. Wilson, 1963). Chiefs know they must appear in control of their organization if they are to maintain their jobs. Where monitoring is inefficient, the police manager has little available to guide decision making. Some managers may over monitor their employees to stave off the appearance they lack control. This wastes resources. In addition to being efficient, management strategies must be effective. A chief’s concern for maintaining control narrows his or her policy alternatives. Fearing the loss of organizational stability, a chief may shun programs that lack traditional control structures. A chief, concerned with cost and effective monitoring, may forgo unproven programs. This hampers effectiveness. A chief must design effective and efficient management strategies. Monitoring increases transaction costs. Over monitoring consumes excessive resources and decreases 13 efficiency. Inappropriate incentives also reduce efficiency. To be effective and efficient, the management strategy should be tailored to the organization’s task and employees’ characteristics. 1.4Methodology This section presents a brief overview of the methodology and models used in the study. The model is more fully developed in Chapter 2. A detailed discussion of the research design is found in Chapter 3. Chiefs may mistakenly believe that all employees require similar supervision or management strategies. Tasks, working conditions and personal characteristics may create the need for different management schemes. This study will examine common job assignments in police organizations - patrol/traffic officers, detectives/investigators and community police officers - to determine their potential for compliance or resistance to policy direction. Patrol and traffic officers will serve as a bench mark for organization personnel. For much of the twentieth century, police reformers have used various monitoring techniques to control patrol officers’ behavior. Police departments have the most experience trying to regulate this group. Comparing the other groups to patrol/traffic will give perspective to the management problem. Detectives and investigators, in a traditional department, are bestowed higher status than patrol officers (Walker, 1983; Goldstein, 1977). They often have greater discretion and are subjected to fewer structural constraints. In addition, the nature of their r4 assignments allows them to circumvent aspects of the monitoring system. This increased freedom is highly valued by officers. Many officers seek assignment to a detective or investigative unit for this greater flexibility and status. This group will help us understand the problems managing elite units. Less is known about the problems managing community police officers. It is uncertain how community police officers fit into the management system. The philosophy of community policing requires that some decision making be moved down the hierarchy to these lower-level employees. It advocates giving officers greater autonomy and flexibility. However, it is uncertain what effect this has on organization control. More information is needed to determine the most effective management scheme for this group. 1.4.1 Deg Collection This is a study of police officers from two large US. departments engaged in community policing. These departments have distinct job classifications for community police officers, patrol officers, and investigators or detectives. Data are collected using self-administered questionnaires. The data consist of officers’ views about policing issues, their perception of their chief’s views on these issues, and their level of job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. Patrol and traffic officers are used as a base line to compare detectives and community police officers. Attitudinal responses of each group are compared to determine differences associated with job assignment. The first step is to determine if job assignment is associated with a police officer’s attitudes and attachment to the organization. It makes little difference if job assignment 15 influences attitudes, or if officers with particular attitudes seek particular job assignments. The management problem is the same. We need to know if officers’ job assignments affect the principal-agent relationship. Do officers differ in their level of goal congruence with the chief? Do they have the same level of commitment to the organization? Once we know the answers to these questions, we better understand the problems that confront managers. If officers in these job assignments differ, it may be inefficient and ineffective to treat them as if they were the same. 1.4.2 Definition of Terms Community policing is a philosophy of client-oriented service delivery aimed at improving police effectiveness and accountability. For a program to qualify as community policing, it should contain these elements: community partnership, problem solving, decentralized tasks with responsibility and accountability for outcomes resting with beat officers. To simplify the analysis, the policing function will be condensed into the role of two actors: principals and agents. In Agency Theory, the principal is a person that contracts a service. The principal employs the services of others to accomplish objectives. In this study, the principal is the chief of police. An agent is the person who is contracted to perform a task. In this study, agents are line-level officers. Agents will have job assignments such as patrol and traffic, detective and investigator, and community police officer. 16 1.4.3 Delimitations of Scop_e and Key Assumptions This study examines police offices’ attitudes and their perceptions of goal congruence with their chief. Perceptions are measured - not actual behavior. There is no attempt to evaluate the validity of these perceptions. It is assumed that increased goal congruence and higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment will lead to more compliant workers. It is presumed that perceptions guide decision making and resistance to policy. To make this study useful for scholars and police administrators interested in community policing, it was necessary to ensure that community policing is a valid variable. The sample is drawn from two police organizations. Each organization was selected for its commitment to community policing. The value of their programs is recognized and financially supported by the US. Department of Justice. Nevertheless, as with any case study data, one must be cautious in generalizing these findings to other police organizations. 1.5 Justification for the Research Since its inception in the early 19808, the popularity of community policing has continued to grow. Community policing has been proclaimed the future of American policing ( Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994; Harrison, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1994; Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994; Norrnandeau, 1993; National Institute of Justice, 1988- 1993; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Barr, 1992; Mott, 1987). Presidents Bush and 17 Clinton included community policing as an important element of US. crime policy. This stimulated the implementation of community policing throughout the country. Such a growing phenomenon places more pressure on police chiefs to implement community policing in their departments. However, police chiefs know little about how to effectively manage officers involved in these programs. Theories of police administration are shaped by urban political thought. In the recent past, reformers have focused on technocratic job definition and structural constraints to control employees. Currently, public administrators are being encouraged to move beyond regulating organizational process. The reinventing government movement (National Performance Review, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) has altered our perception of government performance. Increased attention is focused on productivity and outputs (Boschken, 1994; Walton, 1986; Peters & Waterman, 1982). Managers are now being judged on the quality of the goods and services produced. As this new political theory shapes our expectations, police chiefs will need to shift their focus from controlling behavior to improving productivity. Advocates claim community policing will address these new demands. Police chiefs face increasing pressure to innovate, but are given little direction. Chiefs will need to ensure management strategies are appropriate for these new policies. Can chiefs maintain control of their organization if employees are freed from structural constraints? To address this concern, we need to know more about the potential for policy compliance and resistance of various actors within police departments. The recent police effort to manage and control employees through organizational structure is one of many possible strategies. Behavior can also be managed and controlled through internalized values. However, the importance of values is often overlooked by policy makers accustomed to relying on structural controls. Values have many components and help to determine a person’s actions. They are often the motivation for individuals’ behavior. Values are difficult to identify and to measure. Without a true measure, a surrogate must be found. Values can be expressed in an individual’s goals and his or her satisfaction with surroundings. In this study, officers’ level goal alignment with their police chief and their level of job satisfaction are used as substitute measures of motivation or propensity to comply with or resist policy. If we can identify a person’s goals and job satisfaction, we can better determine how to formulate policy and monitor its implementation. We cannot assume that management schemes are equally effective or necessary for all employees. An individual’s place in the organization may affect his or her level of resistance or compliance. If we compare police officers in different job assignments, we may more fully understand organizational dynamics. By examining levels of organizational commitment and goal alignment associated with job assignments, we are better able to assess management requirements. This study will help identify areas of policy compliance and resistance in various job assignments throughout police organizations. It brings to police administration a new model for developing more 19 effective management schemes. This research will also address some of the concerns about managing community police officers. 1.6 Conclusion By examining police officers’ goals and levels of job satisfaction, we can formulate better management strategies. The implementation of community policing presents an opportunity to examine the concerns critics have regarding maintaining control of police organizations, as well as other important management issues. When these problems are conceptualized, using a principal-agent model, the dynamics of behavior in police organizations are better understood. This chapter presented an overview of the study and its design. It introduced the research problem and research questions. A brief methodology was presented with an overview of the principal-agent model; key terms were defined, and the limitations of the research discussed. Finally, the importance of this research was discussed. This study will follow the traditional order of presentation for dissertation research. Chapter 1 has introduced the research problem and provided an overview of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on police administrative theory and Agency Theory. Efforts to reform policing are examined, and a principal-agent model is developed. The traditional model of police administration is then examined, using the principal-agent model. Chapter 3 details the study’s design and methodology. 20 Hypotheses, data collection and statistical procedures are discussed. Chapter 4 discusses the research findings, and their implications; it begins the construction of a predictive model. In Chapter 5, conclusions are drawn from the data, and implications for future research are discussed. Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction Police managers have long struggled to monitor and control the actions of enforcement agents. Their management styles shift with political trends and ideology. The following discussion traces the development of police administrative theory and suggests how it can be improved. This presentation will address how police management theory came to its current state, its shortcomings, and the development of a new management model. It is important to understand an existing system of management before suggesting a replacement model. It makes little sense to try to replace a system you know little about. This is particularly true in policing. Police chiefs differ from many other public administrators. Police administrators tend to be conservative in their approach to management. Most have worked their way up from line-level policing, advancing through the organization they now direct. Many are college educated, with a large number of them completing their education while working as police officers. They are not an elite cadre of public administrators trained in universities before being sent into the field. Much of what they know of management was learned on the job. The police management system is second nature to them, and it influences how they conceptualize 2l 22 problems. Police managers have shown little interest in suggestions from those who have not shown that they thoroughly understand policing. To influence these administrators, one must demonstrate that one thoroughly understands what they are trying to do. Suggestions must be viable. The presentation that follows will attempt to address the concerns of police administrators. It begins with a brief history of how the current theory of police administration developed. This section will explain how police management arriVed at its current state, why police management systems do what they do, and the new challenges police administrators face. Next, a model of the traditional administrative system is constructed to demonstrate how it is supposed to operate, along with some of its shortcomings. This section will explain why police administrative systems do not work as well as intended. Finally, a new model of police administration is described. The new model is used to re-examine the traditional model and show its inherent deficiencies. This section will explain advantages of a new model for police management. 2.2 Eras of American Policing George Kelling and Mark Moore constructed a typology of American police history by examining the dominant strategies of policing (1988a, 1988b). They delineated three eras: political, reform and community. The political era, from the introduction of policing in the 18403 to the 19005, was characterized by a closeness to politicians and political machines. During this period, policing was fraught with corruption. The reform era, 19305 to the late 19703, reflected the Progressive 23 Movement’s efforts to rationalize government through bureaucratic professionalism. Reformers attempted to centralize power in the office of the chief. The community era, beginning in the late 19708, seeks to instill a client-centered approach in policing. Decision making is transferred to lower levels in the organization. Though widely cited, Kelling and Moore’s typology has drawn criticism. The critical views are best represented by Kappeler (1996) who says, “[t]his presentation of police history is far too neat, isolated and indefensible to the intellectual.” (4) In addition, he faults it for being simplistic, linear and too defined in paradigmatic shifts. Critics have called Kelling and Moore’s work an invented history (Kappeler, 1996; McDonald, 1993). These critics are demanding more from these typologies than the authors intended. Kelling and Moore did not propose their typologies to be so confining. They argue that their typology consists of the themes that dominated policing within general time periods. In addition, these themes coincide with generally accepted theories of urban politics (See Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Judd & Kantor, 1992; Yates, 1977; Banfield & Wilson, 1965; Lynd & Lynn, 1956). Kelling and Moore’s typology is a useful tool for analyzing the history of police administrative theory. By examining the political era, we can begin to understand what reformers were attempting to overcome. Examining the reform era gives us a better understanding of the dominant theory of police administration. Examining the community era will identify new challenges that confront police administrators. When we have finished, we will be better able to evaluate a new model for police administration. 24 2.2.1 Political Era Formal police organizations emerged during the political era. Patronage and political influence were common in organizations that were staffed and maintained by political machines (Kelling & Moore, 1988a; Walker, 1983; Auten, 1981). Corruption in these organizations flourished, while standards were few (Dempsey, 1994; LaGrange, 1993; Stamper, 1992; Alpert & Dunham, 1992; Kelling & Moore, 1988a, 1988b; Knott & Miller, 1987; Walker, 1983, 1984; Eldedono, Coffey & Grace; 1982; Auten, 1981; Carte & Carte, 1975). The officers were closely tied to their ward politicians (Kelling & Moore, 19883), the mayor (Flinn, 1973), and political factions (Walker, 1977). Police ' officers owed their jobs and gave their allegiance to the ward boss and police captain that chose them (Uehida, 1993; Alpert & Dunham, 1992). In return, the police helped their ward politicians stay in power (Dempsey, 1994; Holden, 1992; Hartrnann, 1988; Knott & Miller, 1987; Chapman & St. Johnston, 1962) by finding supportive voters, discouraging supporters of opponents, and helping to rig elections (Kelling & Moore, 1988b; Knott & Miller, 1987; Astor, 1971). Officers needed to make a sufficient contribution to the political party in power to be promoted to higher ranks (Astor, 1971). Precinct captains held the real power in these organizations, while police chiefs had no way to effectively supervise or control officers (Walker, 1977, 1983). Chiefs used many devices to manage and monitor employees. Uniforms were introduced to improve performance (Astor, 1971). Officers were fined or transferred for their indiseretions (Astor, 1971). Over the objections of officers, call boxes were 25 installed to reduce shirking (Walker, 1977; Astor, 1971). Efforts to end corruption and bring police organizations under control of the police chief grew into the reform era. 2.2.2 Reform Era The Progressive Movement sought to reform local government and governmental agencies such as the police (Toch, 1997; Patterson, 1995; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Hunt & Magenau, 1993; Cole, 1989; Knott & Miller, 1987; Walker, 1977). Though the Progressives had little direct effect on police organizations, their efforts did spawn the Reform Model of policing (Uehida, 1993). Reform strategies were technical and mechanistic (Stamper, 1992). The Reform Model, emanating from the work of Richard Sylvester and August Vollmer, came to fruition through the work of reformers such as O.W. Wilson (Kelling & Moore, 1988b). Reform policing began in the 19303, thrived in the 19503 and 19603, and began to decline in the late 19703 (Kelling & Moore, 1988a). Sylvester, as superintendent of the Washington, DC. Police Department and president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), encouraged professional development (Alpert & Dunham, 1992; Walker, 1983). The IACP called for civil service, centralization and strong executive leadership (Patterson, 1995). The thrust of Sylvester’s efforts was to improve the image of policing (Walker, 1977). Sylvester’s concern for professional development suggests an interest in internalizing values as a method of control. However, Sylvester focused his reforms on the chief rather than line- level officers. Vollmer, as chief of the Berkeley Police Department, expanded Sylvester’s ideas to develop a strategy that stressed education (Alpert & Dunham, 1992). Vollmer came to 26 symbolize an idealized model of professional policing (Dempsey, 1994; Klockars, 1980). He envisioned the police being deeply involved in the community, as rigorously trained, highly skilled crime fighters who used science and technology to solve social problems (Carte & Carte, 1975; Klockars, 1980). He sought middle-class, college-trained officers (Dempsey, 1994; Walker, 1983) who would remove policing from the lower-class, immigrant culture (Carte & Carte, 1975). Vollmer admired the organization skills of the professional army corps, but felt the military model to be inappropriate for police work (Carte & Carte, 1975). He feared it would inhibit officers from a close relationship with the community. Vollmer took a step toward utilizing goals and internalized values to control police behavior. He recruited middle-class officers in an effort to eliminate the values of the immigrant class. His advocacy of college education for police officers was revolutionary for its time. He believed that college educated middle-class officers would have the skills and values to elevate policing. As chief of Wichita and Chicago, as well as dean of the School of Criminology at the University of California (Alpert & Dunham, 1992; Uchida, 1993; Walker, 1983), O.W. Wilson refined Vollmer’s ideas. Wilson, a prote'gé of August Vollmer, became a leading spokesman for the Reform movement of the 19503 and 19603 (Toch, 1995; Uchida, 1993; Walker, 1977, 1984, 1993; Wrobleski & Hess, 1993; Cole, 1989; Klockars, 1980; Bopp, 1977; Carte & Carte, 1975). Wilson relied on bureaucratic structure and the principles of scientific management to shape his management philosophy. His book Police Administration became the bible of police management 27 (Dempsey, 1994; Cole, 1989; Walker, 1983, 1984). “The Wilson model emphasized the efficient use of technical skills and equipment to suppress criminal acts and became more detached from the community than Vollmer’s Berkeley model.” (Carte & Carte, 1975: 3) The reform philosophies of O.W. Wilson greatly influenced police managers. Wilson hoped to bring legitimacy to policing by transforming police departments into efficient organizations carefully controlled by the chief (Walker, 1993; O. Wilson, 1963). It is important to note, Wilson sought to maximize managerial efficiency (Dempsy, 1994). “Wilson believed that corruption was the by-product of poor organization, scant planning, and tangled lines of command.” (Holden, 1992: 69) Wilson felt that: . . . line police officers must be closely supervised, the subject of massive policy pronouncements limiting their discretion, and consistently threatened with punishment lest they misbehave. Wilson held that policemen, if not closely controlled, would avoid work, engage in extralegal behavior, and would subvert the administration’s goals. (Bopp, 1977: 134) Through strict discipline, the chief could build the esprit de corps necessary for a well functioning police organization (Wilson, 1963). Wilson thought it futile to train subordinates when greater returns were achieved training command officers (Carte & Carte, 1975; Archambeault & Weirrnan, 1983). He believed charismatic leaders could be developed from intelligent, contagiously enthusiastic, forceful men. These new leaders would use all the available talent in their organization (Wilson, 1963). 28 Under O.W. Wilson, police administrators retreated from Vollmer’s suggestion of managing through internalized values. For Wilson, structure, specialization, rules and close supervision were the appropriate mechanisms of control. He believed that job assignment could be used as a mechanism of control. He felt if he could focus the scope of officers’ work, he could control officers’ behavior. The tools of the reform manager were bureaucratic procedure and scientific management (Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Moore & Stephens, 1991; Kelling & Moore, 1988a, 1988b; Harring, 1984; Archambeault & Weirman, 1983; Walker, 1977; Wilson, 1963). O.W. Wilson saw these as the most effective mechanisms to control police organizations (Uchida, 1993; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Manning, 1992). Reformers tried to minimize officer discretion, centralize command, specialize and routinize work by increasing rules and the role of middle management (Toch, 1997; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Walker, 1993; Nelligan & Taylor, 1994; Kelling & Moore, 1988b; Bopp, 1977). Police organizations adopted more bureaucratic and more militaristic organizational structures to control officers ( Meese, 1993; Moore, 1992; Sparrow, 1992; Alpert & Dunham, 1992; Moore & Stephens, 1991; Klockers, 1988; Auten, 1981; Bopp, 1977; Bittner, 1970). Technology, such as two-way radios, was also introduced to control officers (Alpert & Dunham, 1992). These principles of reform became entrenched in police organizations (Archambeault & Weirman, 1983). Today, police managers continue to work among the vestiges of Wilson’s reforms. Taylor’s (1939) scientific management sought to control the work process by lirrriting worker discretion. Unfortunately, police managers are not skilled in work 29 analysis required by scientific management. Harring describes police managers as the worst in the public sector (Harring, 1981). They come through the ranks of conservative organizations, with little formal management training. Police management strategy is entangled in organization politics. The paramilitary structure creates an image of accountability, but leaves officers with considerable discretion (Mastrofski & Greene, 1993; Sykes, 1985; Manning, 1978). Taylor recognized that workers would not give their best work effort unless managers provide the proper inducement. It was the manager’s function to determine the one best method for every job (Lynch, 1986). Emphasis was placed on eliminating waste, and it was assumed that the workers and employer shared the same interests and goals (Hunt & Magenau, 1993; Taylor, 1939). Police reform attempted to subordinate officers to bureaucratic process, but ignored the functional role of policing (Sykes, 1985; Manning, 1978). Officers do not work under close supervision, and patrol cannot be made routine (Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988). Officers ". . . resent being treated as mere bureaucrats and resist the translation of their work into quotas, directives, rules, regulations, or other abstract specifications." (Klockars, 1980: 342) Police chiefs are administrators and policy makers. They need to ensure that employees respond to policy direction. Preventing negative behavior is not the same as inducing positive behavior. Reform failed to devise methods to maintain control of the organization and to overcome the strategic behavior of employees. It focused on limiting inappropriate behavior, but did not guide police chiefs in inducing officers to comply With policy initiatives. Veteran officers were seen as unproductive, with low levels of j ob 30 satisfaction (Pogrebin, 1987; Robinette, 1982; Schwartz & Schwartz, 1975). At the end of the Reform era, the management problems were changing for the police manager. In summary, the reform movement sought to remove the police from the influence of corrupt political machines. Managers focused on controlling the behavior of officers. Technology, structure and mechanistic processes were used to control subordinates’ behavior. Efficient management through organization, planning, strict lines of command, extensive rules and threats of punishment were the principal control devices. The perception of control extended to improving the image of policing and transforming it from a lower-class immigrant occupation to a middle-class profession, but the reformers failed to account for differing motivations and values of the people performing the work. 2.2.3 Cgmmmity Era In the 19803, the emphasis of policing began to shift to what is now called community policing. Community policing attempts to address the Reform Model’s failure to reduce crime and improve quality of life (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988). Civil unrest in the 19603 led to an increased research interest in policing (Patterson, 1995; Dempsey, 1994; Nelligan & Taylor, 1994; Alpert & Dunham, 1992) that helped set the stage for this new policing philosophy. Community policing also proposes new management strategies. Advocates of community policing advocated loosening structural constraints on officers to allow them to be more creative problem solvers (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994; Redlinger, 1994; Wrobleski & Hess, 1993; Sparrow, Moore & Kennedy, 1990; Weisburd, Me Elroy & Hardyman, 1988). They proposed reducing hierarchal 31 levels in the organizational structure (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994) and adopting a more collegial management style (Meese, 1993; Sunahara, 1991). The organization would become less authoritarian, with less emphasis on command and control, and have a more flexible participatory management approach that put more decision making in the hands of officers (Walsh, 1995; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994; Wycoff & Skogan, 1994; McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Murphy, 1993; Cole, 1993; Sunahara, 1991; Sparrow, Moore & Kennedy, 1990; Weisburd, McElroy & Hardyman, 1988; Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988; Kelling & Moore, 1988a). "Community policing is, therefore, as much a force for organizational and management reform as it is an attempt to reform the police role in the community." (Murphy, 1988: 180) Advocates believe that recruiting and training can be used to control officer behavior by changing the culture of organizations (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994; Redlinger, 1994; Meese, 1993). Less emphasis is placed on rule enforcement and more emphasis placed on values ( Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994; Meese, 1993; Sparrow, Moore & Kennedy, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988a). Community policing moves away from the traditional organizational theory imposed by Wilson’s reforms. It entails freeing officers from some structural constraints to be more creative (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994). Community policing embraces the theory of cooperative organization proposed by Barnard (1962). Advocates believe a common purpose will bond individuals to seek similar goals. The task itself will control the actions of officers. 32 2.2.4 Summag This section has discussed the development of police administrative theory. Attempts to control officers and reduce corruption led to rule-bound, highly structured organizations. Reformers believed the police chief, with the proper structure, could control every important organizational decision. The early reformers’ proposals to control through values gave way to the technocrats’ structures. The era of community policing brings new challenges to the police administrator. Advocates of community policing propose a re-evaluation of management strategies they believe have failed. Efforts to find new ways to oversee officers have brought renewed interest in goals and values. This suggests a need for a new management model. This section has placed the management problem into historical context. Police administrators must devise management schemes to use within the structures of the organizational environment. The new challenges of community policing present an opportunity to examine new management models. Utilizing previously overlooked factors, such as goals and values, may help us to develop more effective management strategies. 2.3 Traditional Bureaucratic Model Before turning to a new management model, the traditional model will be examined. This is the model O.W.Wilson worked to implement. It is presented here in its idealized form. Understanding how this model is supposed to work will later help us understand its deficiencies and how to remedy them. 33 Traditional managers use structure to guide subordinates (Perrow, 1986; Dessler, 1980; O. Wilson, 1963). Management analyzes the work process and directs employees’ activity. Employees execute management’s directives. To be successful, managers use the tools of bureaucracy to secure cooperative and predictable behavior from subordinates (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979). Bureaucratic organizations use a pyramidal hierarchy to transmit information from line operators to decision makers. The top of the hierarchy relies on the lower levels for detail, while the lower levels seek insight from the top (Marx, 1967). Instructions are transmitted back down the structure to direct subordinate activity. Managers formulate decisions from the information provided by subordinates. In the classic bureaucratic model (See Figure 1) information is gathered at the line level and transmitted to the top of the organization. “The essence of this theory is that organizations pursue economy and efficiency through division of labor, specialization of work, impartial treatment of clients, and, above all, a hierarchical authority structure.” (Bourns, 1995: 3) By design, all the line operator’s information is not passed upward through the hierarchy (Scott, 1986; Arrow, 1984). Transmitting all available information would overwhelm the decision maker with irrelevant detail. It is important to the principal that only relevant information is passed on. Structure is used to make the decision process more efficient by filtering information at each level of the hierarchy. Policymaking involves the choice of an option from some larger set of options. As information and advice about an advisory task flow upward, lower-level officials gradually eliminate options from further consideration. The result is that only a small subset of options may reach the director. (Hammond, 1986: 387) 34 Traditional Model Figure 1 35 Nonessential information is filtered from the process with each increasing step. The goal is to supply proper information for decision makers to direct the organization (Simon, 1976). Redundant information is deleted (Arrow, 1984; Simon, 1976; Weber, 1958). Information that merely confirms what has already been reported, especially if it pertains to routine matters, is not passed on. Only relevant information is useful. In theory, only information important to decision making is to be transmitted up the hierarchy. If the information is not relevant to the organization’s purpose, it is disregarded (Simon, 1976; Weber, 1958). Classic organizations strive for efficiency (Boums, 1995; Perrow, 1986; Dessler, 1980; Weber, 1958; Taylor, 1939). Extraneous information complicates the decision- making process. It may confuse or divert a decisionmaker’s focus from more substantive areas. To make the process efficient, information perceived to have slight value in the decision-making process may be eliminated (Arrow, 1984). If the data cannot be readily processed by organizational mechanisms, they will need to be transformed. Organizations are poorly prepared for adapting to performing new tasks and are designed to resist innovation (Wilson, 1989). Depending upon the efficiency of the transforming mechanism, important information may be lost or its meaning altered in the transformation process. Organizations divide and specialize work processes (Boums, 1995; Hummel, 1994; Dessler, 1980; Weber, 1958; Taylor, 1939;). If the data do not seem applicable to the organization’s purpose, it may be diverted to another division or another organization. As specialization increases, it becomes more difficult for a manager to integrate units into 36 an effective organization (Gruber & Niles, 1976). If the organization’s screening process is ineffective, valuable information may be transferred rather than processed. Organizations are staffed by experts, technically trained to perform organizational functions (Hummel, 1994; Weber, 195 8). However, no human organization is perfect. If a processor misinterprets the value of data, it may not be passed on to the next level. Specialization and narrow responsibility lessen the abilities of people to work together (Hummel, 1994). Important information may also be inadvertently removed from the decision process through decision error. Structure is used to direct the communication process. However, messages become distorted as they pass through many people (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989). Information transmission may be misdirected, poorly transmitted, distorted or not received (Skinner & Gilbert, 1978). To summarize, the chief executive at the top of the hierarchy receives only a portion of the information collected or generated by the organization (Arrow, 1984; Wildavsky, 1972). Each step of the hierarchy refines and tailors the information for the needs of superior levels. The chief executive analyzes the information in light of the overall mission of the organization. Decisions are reached and directions transmitted back down the hierarchy to direct the activities of organizational members. This model assumes employees at each level are acting in the best interests of the organization. 37 2.4 Principal-Agent Model It is difficult for police chiefs to monitor and evaluate their personnel. The work process and work effort of police officers are not easily measured. “Because police officers often work alone with very little direct supervision, their activities are extremely difficult to control.” (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989: 250) “[T]he work of patrolmen is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate.” (VanMaanen, 1978: 233) The complexity of police work and ambiguity of performance standards make it difficult for the chief to exercise control. (Hunt & Magenau, 1993). Because [police officers] work alone his [sic] superior can never know exactly what happened and must take either his [sic] word or the complainant’s. The patrolman necessarily exercises wide discretion, but the police administrator is obligated publicly to deny that there is much discretion in police work . . . (Wilson, 1978: 72) “Where both outputs and outcomes are unobservable there is likely to be a high degree of conflict between managers and operators in public agencies, especially those that must cope with a clientele not of their own choosing.” (Wilson, 1989: 169) When there is intense conflict in goals, it is more likely that officers will hide their activities from managers (Sherman, 1978). The monitoring problem lessens when the principal and agent share similar goals (Arrow, 1984). To compensate for the difficulty evaluating officers, managers have emphasized process measures. This has not solved the management problem. What can be easily measured (numbers of arrests, tickets, reports written, calls answered, etc.) is either easily manipulated by officers or is not a useful measure of policing performance (Trojanowicz, Bucqueroux & Sloan, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1992, 1990; Carter, 1990; 38 Goldstein, 1990; Trojanowicz, 1990; Trojanowicz & Belknap, 1986; Wycoff & Manning, 1983). Subordinates may become efficient at achieving process indicators while neglecting the underlying objectives of the organization. This process orientation provides agents opportunities to Shirk. With no reliable way to judge success, chiefs must overcome self-interest of organizational members (Kelling & Bratton, 1993). Assessing quality and quantity is often difficult for police administrators. Reporting systems that tabulate quantities are often incapable of evaluating quality. Assessing quantity is also problematic. The upper range of production is unbounded and the workers’ true opportunity to produce is seldom known. The lower limit can only be gauged by estimating or comparing to the production level of others in the work group. It may be more difficult for a police chief than for other public administrators to implement new policy. “Such characteristics of police work as discretion, authority, variety, ambiguity and danger distinguish it greatly from what most people do for a living.” (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989: 46) “The task of restructuring is more complex with police because the workflow of a police service differs markedly from other bureaucratic organizations in that the officer in the field has significant discretion to generate or not to generate work.” (Dean, 1995: 339) Agency Theory provides a useful new perspective for police administrators to conceptualize management problems. It has been used to examine relationships in many public bureaucracies, but until now it has not been applied to police organizations. Agency Theory will increase our understanding of relationships in police organizations. 39 Principal-agent models are derived from economic theory to examine hierarchical relationships ( DeGeorge, 1992; Koford & Penno, 1992; Moe, 1984, 1990; Cook & Wood, 1989; Alvi, 1988; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The principal, with goals and objectives to accomplish, enters into contracts with agents to perform specific or general tasks. Each party to the relationship has power over some aspects of the interaction. Principal-agent theory applies to circumstances when one person (the principal) arranges for another (the agent) to take an action that is beneficial to the principal but costly to the agent, under circumstances when the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly enforce an ex ante promise by the agent to act in the best interests of the principal. (McCubbins, N011 and Weingast, 1989: 433-434) Each party in the relationship has power over some aspects of the interaction. A principal’s effectiveness is determined by his or her ability to gain compliance from the agent. A principal-agent model, with its focus on information usage, is particularly appropriate for the study of information-dependent organizations, such as policing. The model recognizes that information accumulates around line functions. Those who possess information may be able to manipulate the transaction cost for others, including the principal. For the agent, work effort is determined by the task, personal objectives and opportunity to Shirk. For the principal, the focus and intensity of the work effort determine the need to monitor. These disparate motivations complicate the management process. The police use paramilitary bureaucratic devices to structure their organizations. Bureaucratic organizations are designed for efficiency. When production demands in 40 these organizations are met without completely consuming the resources allocated, the unused resources become slack. In a classic bureaucracy, slack resources are passed on to the entrepreneur. It has long been recognized, though, that managers accumulate slack resources to more effectively manage the organization (Cyert & March, 1963). Slack provides a cushion for coping with unexpected events. Though seldom discussed, employees can also accumulate and control slack. Their use of Slack bypasses the intent of bureaucratic structures. In policing, slack includes work effort, choice of activities and management of unallotted time.1 As the goals of the principal and agent become more disparate, it becomes more difficult for the principal to direct the organization. The principal-agent problem centers on the supervisory relationship. The principal is plagued by the problems which can be described as asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard and the transaction costs of monitoring. Terry Moe (1987) best summarizes the principal-agent relationship. The principal tries to control the behavior of his agent, but the agent is driven by his own interests, makes decisions on the basis of information only imperfectly available to the principal, and engages in behavior that the principal can only imperfectly observe. Because of these fundamental problems, the principal ordinarily must expect some and often a great deal of slippage between the performance he desires from the agent and the performance he actually receives. His task as a rational actor is to search among feasible structures for monitoring, rewarding and sanctioning the agent, and to employ those that seem most efficacious for minimizing the gap between desired and actual performance. (480-481) l The Detroit Police Department recently acknowledged a problem with on-duty uniformed officers shopping in malls, sitting in movie theaters and dining in restaurants several miles from the city {Robertson, B. (1996, September 28). McKinnon blasts cheating cops. Detroit Free Press, pp. 3A, 5A.} 41 Each element of the principal-agent model will now be developed in greater detail. The model will then help us identify the deficiencies of the traditional hierarchal approach to management. 2.4.1 Asymetric Information Principal-agent models recognize the asymmetric distribution of information and the need for the principal to monitor employees (Kolt & Zupan, 1990; Alvi, 1988; Ma, 1991). Without effective monitoring, agents are likely to Shirk (Azariadis, 1983). The principal must overcome the problems of an unsupervised work process and asymmetric distribution of information within the organization where monitoring is imperfect. Each party entering a contract attempts to negotiate a good deal. As a result, the principal often encounters difficulty monitoring the contract. The unequal distribution of information makes it difficult for the principal to provide incentives and share risks (Ma, 1991). "Asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort . . . " (Azariadis, 1983: 157). "The theory of principal-agent relationships would suggest that principals have an interest in designing incentive and penalty reward systems that optimally inhibit agent shirking." (Kolt & Zupan, 1990: 119, Also see Lazer, 1996) Those who possess needed information hold advantage over those requiring information. The principal must overcome this information disadvantage. A principal- agent model recognizes that information accumulates around line functions. Those who possess information may be able to manipulate the transaction cost for others, including the principal. All managers face difficult challenges monitoring employee performance. 42 [Elffort is unobservable to the firm. In such situations, it may be of mutual interest to the contracting parties to generate information that is unavailable otherwise . . . [A] greements between firms and workers are not merely risk- sharing and resource-allocating mechanisms but also information-revealing ones. Without this information-generating role, agreements do not make much sense under asymmetric information. (Alvi, 1988:133) Managers must devise management strategies to overcome these disadvantages. 2.4.2 Adverse Selection Adverse selection is an advantage agents have when entering into contracts with their principal. Agents know the extent and limits of their talent, but the principal cannot be certain of the agent’s abilities until after entering into the contract (DeGeorge, 1992; Moe, 1984). It is in the principal’s best interests to hire agents who share his or her goals and objectives. A principal will attempt to employ agents who are qualified to perform necessary tasks. Agents sell their labor in a competitive market. It is in the agent’s interests to seek maximum benefits (prestige, status, income, leisure) for his or her work effort. An agent is aware of his or her own talents and limitations, but the principal cannot be certain of the agent’s skills until after entering into the contract. This uncertainty is known as adverse selection. It ". . . derives from unobservability of the information, beliefs, and values on which the decisions of others are based." (Moe, 1984: 754) Anyone who has ever experienced an employment interview can readily understand the concept. Each side attempts to discern information that is not easily verifiable. It is a problem of uncertainty and limited information (Arrow, 1984). The 43 principal hopes, and sometimes unjustifiably assumes, that agents share his or her goals and objectives. 2.4.3 Hidden Information, Actions and Moral Hazard Agents derive advantage when the work process is unsupervised. Decisions are made and actions taken outside the principal’s direct control. Moral hazard is the term applied to an agent's advantage tha ". . . arises from the unobservability of actual behavior . . ." (Moe, 1984: 755). The terrn’s meaning has been expanded beyond its origins in the insurance industry and is now commonly substituted for hidden action. Line-level policing is typically unsupervised. Police officers function with little direct supervision and are susceptible to moral hazard. “[B]y definition the agent has been selected for his [sic] specialized knowledge, and therefore the principal can never hope to check completely the agent’s performance.” (Arrow, 1984: 104) The independence and discretion of street-level bureaucrats, coupled with the weakness of field supervision, translate into relatively weak control over service delivery (Yates, 1977). Much of management’s knowledge of subordinate activity is through self- reporting. This provides subordinates an advantage in contracted interaction. As the agent becomes better informed (i.e., experience), he or she has more actions available and the number of incentive schemes available to the principal decreases (Sobel, 1993). Harmony within the organization is also important to police managers. Internal dissension can be a powerful threat to the chief (Wycoff & Kelling, 1978). Excessive complaints and low morale confound management efforts. The chief is sometimes trapped between efficiency and workplace harmony. 44 The nature of policing makes the principal-agent model useful to the study of police organizations. A principal-agent model more adequately accounts for information manipulation that is likely to occur. Past efforts have not fully accounted for these factors. 2.4.4 Monitoring and Transaction Costs While the principal attempts to direct the organization toward specific goals, agents may be pursuing other objectives. "The superior who cannot monitor the subordinate may well find out after the fact that the subordinate was pursuing his or her own interests." (Knott & Miller, 1987: 159) A problem occurs when the goals of the principal and agents are greatly dissimilar. As the goals of the principal and agent become more disparate, it becomes more difficult for the principal to direct the organization (Arrow, 1984). When officers realize they can misuse their authority or neglect their responsibility, they will; and it is the manager’s responsibility to monitor everyone (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989; Gouldner, 1954). If managers focus on production measures, “. . . employees become self-focused manipulators of production statistics.” (Wadman & Bailey, 1993: 81) Rarely can police executives directly observe officers’ activity, and they are forced to use indirect, surreptitious and sometimes distasteful means to monitor employees (Sherman, 1978). Information may come from various sources. Monitoring may be through direct observing, self-reporting, or reporting by knowledgeable third parties (Lupa & McCubbins, 1994). “The primary drawback of direct monitoring is that it consumes large quantities of time and effort that could be expended towards other, perhaps more valuable, activities.” (Lupa & McCubbins, 1994: 93) This leaves the principal with the 45 problem of selecting less costly and less effective methods. Much of the information a manager receives about subordinate activity is obtained through self-reporting of action already taken. Self-reporting suffers from the reluctance to reveal private information, while third party reporting is plagued by misrepresentation to further self-interests (Lupa & MeCubbins, 1994). Therefore, the cost of monitoring limits its effectiveness (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). The costs to the principal from contract negotiation, monitoring and enforcing are called transaction costs (Stokey, & Zeckhausser, 1978; Apgar & Brown, 1987). The opportunity cost2 to monitoring includes resources, which could have gone to service delivery, as well as the time used to acquire information, assess noncompliance and devise a strategy or punishment (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). There is also “. . . a degree of cost in enforcing the penalties.” (Arrow, 1984: 163) Transaction costs are increased by inefficiencies. Kolt and Zupan (1990) suggest that costs ensure monitoring is likely to be incomplete, thus allowing room for shirking. Restrictive budgets make this especially true in policing. Control becomes more difficult for the principal as the agent’s level of discretion and information increases. An agent's prior knowledge or expertise provides advantages and greater flexibility. “The rationality of policy under a hierarchical system is thus constantly threatened by the disjunction between power and knowledge.” (Rourke, 1984: 149) Difficulty in monitoring the actions of subordinates, asymmetric information in the form of expertise, or transaction cost in overturning the actions of 2 An economic term that includes the price forgone alternatives. 46 subordinates all can give agents some opportunity for discretion. (Songer et al., 1994:674) [A]n informed agent has more actions available than an uninformed agent. This decreases the number of incentive schemes available to the principal. (Sobel, 1993: 269) The principal must accept the unlikelihood of completely regulating the agent’s activities. Monitoring is limited by its transaction cost. The level of monitoring is generally established at the equilibrium of marginal cost and marginal benefits. Agents may structure their behavior around the effectiveness of monitoring activity. The inefficiencies of monitoring suggest the need for an alternate method of evaluating personnel. 2,4.§ Principal-Agent Model If principals and agents shared common goals, the bureaucratic model would effectively explain behavior in organizations. The principal would develop policy and agents would dutifully carry it out. The only variable would be the effectiveness of the communication system. The traditional bureaucratic model will now be viewed from a principal-agent perspective to identify its deficiencies. The principal-agent model will demonstrate how, when the goals of the principal and agents diverge, agents are able to thwart or sabotage the principal’s policy directives. Additional rules, structure or monitoring cannot completely prevent these actions. This example will demonstrate the importance of shared goals and objectives. The relatively simple process depicted in the traditional hierarchy model fails to account for important activities of employees (See Boums, 1995). Organizations are 47 replete with “. . . parochialism, possessiveness and the clutching of information as a source of power. . . .” (Sparrow, 1993: 4) “There is an area of acceptance within which the individual will behave ‘organizationally.’ When the organizational demands fall outside this area, personal motives reassert themselves . . .” (Simon, 1976: 204; Also see Perrow, 1986) A new and more effective model will now be constructed. This new model is constructed from Agency Theory, a review of police and organizational literature and observing and interacting with police officers. This model is based upon the inevitable presence of incentives and motives for agents to take actions that do not comply with their principal’s desires. In addition to the filters employed by classic bureaucratic structure, there are filters created by employees. Subordinates act strategically to protect and further their interests. Because these filters are inconsistent with the organization’s purpose, they shall be labeled self-serving filters (See Figure 2). “Clearly, the American research literature confirms the potency of the street level police culture to subvert, deflect, and distort managerially imposed structures, directions, and practices . . .” (Dean, 1995: 346) Wycoff and Kelling (1987) documented deliberate distortions of information by officers in the chain of command. Strong resistance from the rank and file can ghettoize or eviscerate an unpopular program (Buerger, 1993). Upward communication is distorted to protect the sender (Wildavsky, 1992; Sheehan & Cordner, 1989; Scott, 1986). Self-serving filters act to promote an individual's or group interest, rather than the organization's goals. Information is transmitted or blocked for personal rather than organizational reasons. Subordinates support or Oppose programs or policy while they 48 Principal-Agent View of the Bureaucratic Model Filters Self-eervlng Filters Redunda'” . . Relevance Philosophical . Political ”WW Self-interim C°""°'s'°" Interpersonal Referral Unrecognized Communication Failure lnformaton a l Propaganda -. Propaganda |. Agent l lnforrnation Figure 2 49 attempt to manipulate the organizational environment. The likelihood of improper behavior is derived from a cost calculation of possible detection, probable punishment, and divergence of principal and agent interests (MeCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). Filters have various sensitivity and threshold levels to regulate the flow of information. They are more likely to be employed when the agent perceives an activity does not serve his or her personal interest (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). To fully understand them, one must understand the goals and objectives of all the actors involved. Because of these filters, the communication flow is not as efficient nor behavior as stable as depicted in the traditional model. Personal interests compromise the organizational communication system, which is designed to carry information up the hierarchy and direction back down. Self-serving information is used to manipulate organizational processes for nonorganizational purposes. Employees may use information as propaganda to further their interests. This propaganda takes many forms and is usually dysfunctional to organizational objectives. “Hence the superior is not likely to be given information by subordinates that would lead to decisions affecting them adversely. They not only tell the superior what he or she wants to hear, but also what they want the supervisor to know.” (Whisenand & Rush, 1988: 115) Agents may emphasize or report only information that supports their positions by intentional manipulation (See Whisenand & Rush, 1988). Employees may emphasize or report only negative information about a competitor's program or activity. They may even sabotage activities they feel undercut their interests. This organizationally 50 dysfunctional activity may emanate from authority struggles. These unproductive behaviors can occur when an agent perceives that someone is exceeding his or her realm and invading the agent's turf, or when a new policy requires more work or reduces the agent's status (Gouldner, 1954). If the history of the organization does not support risk taking, the agent will find little reason to support new activity. One type of self-serving filter can be called a philosophical filter. It represents activity based on professional training, bias, ethics, equity or personal orientation. The principal and agent may differ in their philosophical orientation or beliefs. Decision making is affected by one’s belief system (Schmalleger, 1995; Bennet, 1994; DeGeorge, 1992; Wilson, 1989; Rourke, 1984, Walker, 1977; Kaufman, 1973). “Gut-level value systems automatically filter the way we view reality.” (Whisenand & Ferguson, 1996: 39) Questions of legitimacy may arise when an action does not appear consistent with past organizational practices, does not make sense to employees, or is perceived to abandon previous efforts (Clainnont, 1991; Lynch, 1986). Resisters may sincerely disagree with a policy or organizational goal (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994; Wycoff & Kelling, 1978). Similarly, actions may be accepted as legitimate, without scrutiny, if they seem to make sense and are consistent with past activity. A person’s perspective determines if he or she will recognize or understand the importance of what is being offered by another (Gruber & Niles, 1976). The communication process may be corrupted through selective perception (Whisenand & Rush, 1988). Employees may not put forth their best effort if they perceive the activity wastes their time (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). Obsolete performance criteria 51 may hamper the evaluation of new activities. The merits of the new activity may not be seen when viewed from an out-of-date perspective. Flaws may be emphasized and benefits downplayed. In these instances, ideology may supersede empirical evidence. A second filter has a political nature. A principal and agent may have different political objectives. To gain influence, power or status, subordinates use political filters. Bureaucratic organizations are all about power and the acceptance of unequal power relationships (Perrow, 1986). Employees may attempt to manipulate the environment to their advantage (Wilson, 1989; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987; Perrow, 1986; Lipsky, 1980; Kanter, 1977; Bopp, 1977; Downs, 1967; Cyert & March, 1963; Barnard, 1962). “[I]ndividuals in organizations will always be playing political games in response to incentives that they perceive.” (Knott & Miller, 1987: 187) Political actions include siding with the right people to punish enerrries and reward friends (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989). Officers may mistrust management or fear losing power or authority (Roberg, 1994; Greene, Bergman & McLaughlin, 1994; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, 1994; Sherman, 1986 Lynch, 1986; Wycoff & Kelling, 1978). They may be vengeful or hope that weakening an enemy will lead to personal advancement (Wycoff & Kelling, 1978). These actions differ from philosophical filters in that they are conscious manipulations aimed at increasing personal utility. Political filters are calculated acts. Philosophical filters, on the other hand, are the result of judgments shaped by belief. A third filter involves protecting self interest. It includes two closely related concepts: economic advancement and protecting vested interests. Agents may pursue 52 their self-interest to the detriment of the principal. Both types place individual interests above those of the organization. Economic self-interest filters are used to maximize or maintain monetary compensation, opportunity for advancement, economic benefits, resource control and allocation, or minimize or maintain levels of work effort ( Buerger, 1994; Koford & Penno, 1992; Wilson, 1989; Bombrink, 1988; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987; Perrow, 1986; Lipsky, 1980; Dessler, 1980; Cyert & March, 1963; Barnard, 1962). Agents examine policy actions to determine how they affect workloads, opportunity for additional compensation (i.e., overtime, compensatory time, allowances) or benefits. Agents also find opportunities to Shirk their responsibilities. For police officers may include cooping (resting or hiding), cruising aimlessly, extended meal breaks, and unnecessarily long conversations with merchants or residents (McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993). “Police officers have an interest in downgrading the classification of calls, in order to evade paperwork and accountability.” (Sheehan & Cordner, 1989: 57; also see Osterloh, 1975) Officers may fear that change may lead to the elimination of their jobs, positions (Wycoff & Kelling, 1978) or supplemental incomes (Buerger, 1994). Employee incentive plans, such as Scanlon Plans (DuBrin, 1985; Ouchi, 1981), are attempts to use self-serving motivations to the benefit of the organization. A closely related concept is protecting vested interests. Agents become vested in the organizational system (Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Moore & Stephens, 1991; TrOjanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Wycoff & Kelling, 1978; Sparrow, 1988; Haimann & Hilgert, 1977; Carte & Carte, 1975). Their response to change will be governed by 53 incentives (Wilson, 1989). Individuals may not act upon organizational information they do not perceive to support their interests (Perrow, 1986). Actions that lessen their opportunity to advance may be opposed (See Carte & Carte, 1975), as will actions that threaten current status or autonomy (Redlinger, 1994). Employees are also likely to highlight information that improves their standing in the organization. They have shown their ability to frustrate efforts to increase their accountability (Walker, 197 7) or redefine their role (Sadd & Grinc, 1994). Participatory management (Shafritz et al., 1992; Holzer, 1990; DuBrin, 1985;Dessler, 1980), job enrichment (Perrow, 1986; DuBrin, 1985; Dessler, 1980; Hampton, 1977), labor-management committees (Holzer, 1990; Dawson, 1990; DuBrin, 1985), quality of work-life programs (Shafritz et al., 1992; Holzer, 1990), quality circles (Shafritz et al., 1992; Dubrin, 1985; Odaka, 1986; Ford, 1983; Ouchi, 1981), management by objective (Shafritz et al., 1992; Dessler, 1980; Hampton, 1977; Carrol & Tosi, 1973) and total quality management (Shafritz et al., 1992; Walton, 1986) are examples of attempts to bring together the interests of management and employee. A fourth filter centers on interpersonal relationships. An agent may be influenced more by a social group than by his or her principal. “The evidence from the behavioral science indicates clearly that the human being is a social organism.” (McGregor, 1966: 227) “[T]he police officer becomes subjected to intense peer group influence and control.” (Barker, 1977: 50) This begins when veteran officers teach rookie officers to forget what they were taught in the academy and learn the job from eXperienced officers (Hunt & Magenau, 1993; Goldstein, 1977). “Peer expectations not 54 only affect how hard people work at their jobs; they can affect what they decide the job is.” (Wilson, 1989: 48) Interpersonal filters have a social origin. They include acceptance, recognition, loyalty, group status, norms, personality conflict, and prejudice ( McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Walker, 1993; Holden, 1992; Wilson, 1989; Wycoff & Kelling, 1987; Sherman, 1982; Carte & Carte, 1975; Osterloh, 1975; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Astor, 1971; Downs, 1967; McGregor, 1966; Cyert & March, 1963; Barnard, 1962). Officers may be reluctant to pass along negative information they fear might damage another officer’s career (McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993). Agents may become so involved in outside activities it becomes detrimental to their organizational role (Cooper, 1996). Informal groups are likely to set production rates (Roethlisberger, 1941). “Probably the strongest motivating force in a police agency is in the peer-group bonds. . . .” (Osterloh, 1975: 61) Agents may not report the transgressions of other agents (McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Astor, 1971). Agents may use information as currency in a market of social-economic exchange. When an agent performs a favor to help an associate, it can bind that associate in some firture action. Individuals may seek to make their friends look good and competitors appear unfavorably to others of importance. T-groups (Perrow, 1986; Dessler, 1980), organizational development (Dessler, 1980; Hampton, 1977) and Japanese management techniques ( Odaka, 1986; DuBrin, 1985; Ford, 1983; Ouchi, 1981) are attempts to use group socialization to facilitate organizational goals. In conclusion, police organizational structures may not operate to keep the chief fully informed. “A major communications problem, then, of the higher levels of the 55 administrative hierarchy is that much of the information relevant to the decisions at this level originates at lower levels, and may not ever reach the higher levels unless the executive is extraordinarily alert.” (Simon, 1976: 163) If we view management through a principal-agent model, we can more fully understand its complexity. If subordinates share the same goals as their manager, they are more likely to comply with policy direction rather than subvert organizational activities. If agents are reasonably satisfied in their jobs, they are less likely to be disruptive. Satisfied employees who pursue organizational goals are less likely to filter organizational processes to advance dysfunctional objectives. 2.4.6 Summm This section has introduced the principal-agent model as a tool for understanding the problems of police administration. The model was used to demonstrate the deficiencies of the traditional bureaucratic model. These deficiencies are not the product of poor implementation. The bureaucratic model will not be more successful if more rules or structure are added. A principal-agent approach to problems demonstrates the fundamental shortcomings of the traditional approach and suggests possible remedies. 2.5 Importance of Shared Values Critics of classic organizational theory have long recognized the economic nature of organizational behavior. Douglas McGregor (1966) believed that human relationships are transactional. Elton Mayo, a founding force behind Human Relations 56 theory of management, believed “. . . each individual acts according to calculations of his or her own self-interests. . . .” (Perrow, 1986: 60) “Police departments are powerfully influenced by their values.” (Wasserman & Moore, 1988: 1) "[H]ow an organizational culture responds to change will depend on the meaning and values carried by its members." (Crank, 1996: 266) "[O]ur value system assists us in making decisions. Conversely, when two or more of us possess different values, we are apt to conflict with one another." (Whisenand & Ferguson, 1996: 40) Values act as filters (Whisenand & Rush, 1988). The task of managers is " . . . to seek to create conditions (an organizational environment) such that members of the organization at all levels can best achieve their own goals by directing their efforts toward the goals of the organization." (McGregor, 1966: 212) When managers and subordinates share goals and objectives, many of the management problems are lessened. "[W]hen the exchange of values for values is simultaneous or nearly so, the contracts may almost be self-enforcing." (Arrow, 1984: 163) "Some analysts warn that only when the formal values espoused by today’s innovative police administrators begin to match those of rank-and-file officers can any police organization begin to be high performing." (Schmalleger, 1995: 202) " Values clarification is the main hope today for keeping the police workforce united." (Whisenand & Ferguson, 1996: 17; also see Stephens, 1994; Hunt & Magenau, 1993; Couper & Lobitz, 1993; Sheehan & Cordner, 1989) When organizational values influence behavior, actions are more coherent and predictable, and there is less need for strong control (Wasserman & Moore, 1988). It should now be apparent that the 57 principal’s management problems are greatly reduced when the principal and agent share common goals. 2.6 Conclusion Sadd and Grinc (1996) spoke of the difficulty police managers have in communicating their goals to employees. Management initiatives are given little credibility by the rank and file. The chief needs to address this when devising management strategies. Where there is great disparity in goals between principal and agent, management becomes more challenging. It is more difficult for the principal to induce compliance and to monitor behavior. Policymakers may overlook the complexity of management if they do not consider the issue of goal congruence. Classic bureaucratic theory does not fully explain subordinate behavior. The mechanistic efficiency envisioned by the bureaucratic model is rarely achieved. Interactions are not rigidly controlled by organizational structure. Each actor influences transactions. Reporting and communications are filtered. Organizational actors manipulate the information system. When employee evaluating and monitoring are imperfect, the challenge to managers increases. To direct the organization and to implement policy, managers must rely upon supporters and overcome resisters. A principal-agent approach helps to identify the difficulties confronting managers. Managers who can identify areas of support and resistance can formulate more efficient and effective policies. 58 Adopting a principal-agent perspective allows us to reconceptualize the management problems in police organizations. The first step is to search for areas of compliance and resistance within the traditional structure of police organizations. We can then determine if job assignment is related to officers’ attitudes and attachment to the organization. 13 job assignment related to the level of goal congruence with the chief? Do officers in different job assignments have the same levels of commitment to the organization? Once these questions are answered, we can better address management problems. If officers in particular job assignments differ, it may be inefficient and ineffective to treat them as if they were the same. Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction Police departments are complex organizations whose management requires the continual attention of police administrators. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, subordinates have the means to manipulate organizational systems (See Chapter 2). This becomes a problem for the organization if principal and agents do not share the same goals and values. Agents may be able to further their own interests at the expense of the organization, while shielding their activities from their principal. Chapter 3 defines a methodology to explore potential conflict and how it affects a police chiefs management strategy. Classic bureaucratic theory does not sufficiently explain behavior in police organizations. The assumptions of classic hierarchical theory are problematic. A hierarchical structure assumes that agents will readily provide the proper information when the principal needs it for decision making. Common experience teaches that this may not be so. Policy resistance may include the manipulation of information. Resisters may use active methods: blocking, obstructing or sabotaging information delivery. Or, resisters 59 60 may be more passive, failing to report the noncompliance or the overt disobedience of others. The method of resistance is chosen through a calculation of benefits, risk and opportunity. This study explores relationships between police personnel. Its purpose is to provide insight into the relationship between police chiefs and their employees. It will help guide police chiefs to manage subordinates by investigating whether policy resistance is more likely in certain job assignments. As with any inquiry, it begins with certain assumptions. The first assumption is that actors behave rationally. A principal-agent model incorporates the concepts of economic incentives and rational behavior. Actors are assumed to be utility maximizers, although models have been developed to represent utility stabilizers (Rogerson, 1985). The use of rational actor models does not rule out altruistic behavior. Such activity appears in these models as a stochastic component. The theory proposes that altruistic behavior is exceptional and that most organizational behavior is best modeled by a rational actor metaphor. It is further assumed that when agents’ goals are closely aligned with their principal’s goals, there is less need to monitor behavior (Arrow, 1984). This assumption is derived from the premise that agents who are pursuing the same goals and objectives as their principal will require fewer incentives than agents who pursue goals and objectives different from those of their principal. This inquiry begins with the null hypothesis that the goal congruence between police chiefs and subordinates is independent of job assignment. This hypothesis stems 61 from the Reform Model’s reliance on structure and the principal-agent model’s concern for control. Ho: Job assignment is unrelated to the goal alignment of principal and agents. If there is no relationship between job assignments and goal alignment, then the management problem for the principal may be the same for each job assignment. However, if the level of goal alignment varies significantly for different job assignments, then the principal may need to design management strategies for each group. Police managers have long recognized the need to closely monitor and control the behavior of their employees (See Wilson, 1963 and Goldstein, 1977), but community policing brings new challenges for the police chief. We know little about how to effectively manage community police officers. The chief may need to devise very different management strategies for community police officers if their attitudes and goals differ significantly from other officers. The second hypothesis deals with employees’ job satisfaction and commitment to the organization that employs them. In this study, organizational commitment refers to the employee’s likelihood of remaining in the organization and the employee’s perception that his or her future is linked to the organization. More committed employees are less likely to disrupt organizational activity. When commitment levels are high, officers have a larger zone of indifference for the policies of their chief. In other words, they are less likely to challenge their chief s policy. These employees are more likely to accept their chier authority and act to further their chiefs objectives. It is presumed that employees with greater attachment to the organization are less likely to jeopardize their investment 62 in the organization. These employees are more likely to conform to their principal’s desires and are less likely to subvert or sabotage policy. An employee’s commitment to an organization is often closely related to his or her level of job satisfaction. This study will combine measures of organizational commitment and of job satisfaction into a scale of employee satisfaction. The null hypothesis, proposed for subordinates in different job assignments, stems from O.W. Wilson’s concern for esprit de corps and Agency Theory’s focus on negotiating acceptable contracts. 11,: Job assignment is unrelated to levels of organizational commitment or job satisfaction. If no relationship is found between job assignment and levels of organizational commitment and job satisfaction, then the principal’s inducement strategies may be equally effective for each job assignment. However, if commitment and satisfaction levels vary across job assignments, then the principal may need to adjust inducement schemes for each job assignment. Once again, we know little about the incentives required to motivate community police officers. The chief may need to be less concerned about the actions of community police officers if it is shown they are more satisfied and more committed to the organization. Or, the chief may need to more closely monitor and offer greater inducements to community police officers if it is shown they are less satisfied and less committed to the organization. A principal-agent model helps to clarify the chief’s management problems by bringing the effects of incentives on behavior to the forefront. The model makes certain assumptions. It assumes that common goals, values, job satisfaction and commitment to 63 the organization will result in less policy resistance. As employees become more motivated and contented in their jobs, they need fewer inducements and less monitoring. This study explores some of the secretive aspects of the principal-agent relationship. 3.2 Unit of Analysis Though data are collected in two police departments, the unit of analysis of this study is individual officers. The research focuses on three job assignments: patrol, detectives and community police officers. Each category presents unique challenges for police managers. Patrol is the most prevalent classification and has received the most attention from police reformers. Detectives hold the most status in traditional organizations, and the extra perks and fringe benefits (flex-time, weekends off, decreased accountability through paper work, and increased discretion) they receive, confounds attempts to monitor them. Community police officer is a new job classification and little is known about how to effectively manage these officers. The increased discretion and decision-making power granted community police officers are a concern for many police managers. 3.3 Sites and Sample Data were collected in two regionally diverse American police departments. The departments were selected for their reputed commitment to community policing. Both departments have community policing programs fimded, in part, by the Department of Justice and are well respected in the policing community. In addition, both departments 64 have an adequate number of officers assigned to community policing to provide a sufficient sample for that job description. A sample of at least thirty community police officers was sought to provide a statistically large sample and avoid the inherent problems of small sample size. .3_._3_-1C_it.i2§ The first research site is Cincinnati, Ohio. It is a Midwestern industrial city located on the Ohio-Kentucky border. Its location also makes it a gateway to the South. Cincinnati is racially diverse with a population of 358,170. The city is energetic and shares the complexity and challenges of other cities its size. Colorado Springs, the second research site, is located adjacent to the Rocky Mountains in central Colorado. A city with a population of 316,48, it thrives on tourism, high technology and its close proximity to several military installations. Similarities and differences between these two cities are evident from US. Census Bureau data (1996). Cincinnati is ranked 46‘" in p0pulation. Colorado Springs is ranked 51’t in population. Cincinnati’s population is contained within 77.2 square miles, while the population of Colorado Springs is spread over 183.2 square miles. In Cincinnati nearly forty percent (37.9%) of the population is African American and less than one percent (0.7%) is Hispanic. In Colorado Springs seven percent (7%) of the population is African American and nine percent (9.1%) is Hispanic. Cincinnati is experiencing a decline in population, while Colorado Springs’ population is growing. Though similar in size, Cincinnati is more densely populated with a large minority population. Colorado 65 Springs, on the other hand, is a growing and more spacious city with a smaller minority population. 3.3.2 Police Departments The Cincinnati Police Division has 962 sworn officers. Thirty-three officers (33) are assigned to community policing in the Community-Oriented Policing Unit. The racial composition of the department is sixty-four percent (64.3 %) white, nearly thirty-five percent (34.7 %) Afiican American, less than one tenth percent (0.1%) Hispanic and one percent (1%) Oriental (Reaves & Smith, 1995). The gender composition is eighty-four percent (84.3%) male and nearly sixteen percent (15.7%) female (Reaves & Smith, 1995). The Colorado Springs Police Department has 512 sworn officers. There are twenty-four (24) community policing officers assigned to the Neighborhood Policing Unit. The racial composition of the department is nearly eighty-five percent (84.8%) white, five percent (5.1%) Afiican-American, nine percent (9.3%) Hispanic and four tenths percent (0.4%) Oriental (Reaves & Smith, 1995). The gender composition is eighty-nine percent (89.2%) male and nearly eleven percent (10.8%) female (Reaves & Smith, 1995). The 1997 Preliminary Budget Report for the Colorado Springs Police Department uses a summary of US Census Bureau and Department of Justice information to highlight the differences between the two departments. Cincinnati has 2.72 officers per 1000 population and 82.09 crimes per 1000 population. In Colorado Springs, there are 1.49 officers per 1000 population and 65.78 crimes per 1000 population. Though similar in 66 population size, Colorado Springs enjoys a lower crime rate and employs fewer police officers. 3.3.3 Sampling Frame and Sample Size The sample consists of police officers from departments engaged in community policing. These departments have distinct job descriptions for community police officers (CPO), patrol officers and investigators or detectives. Most of the data were collected during a two-week period in July 1997, to limit the influence of historical effects and other stochastic factors. Some data were also collected in August 1997 (See section 3.4.3). Two hundred thirty-eight officers (238) were surveyed in the Cincinnati Police Department. One hundred eighty-two (182) usable surveys were returned for a response rate of seventy-six percent (76%). The race of respondents was: 126 (69.23%) white, 45 (24.73%) African American, 2 (1.1%) Hispanic, 1 (0.55%) Oriental, 3 (1.65%) other, and 5 (2.75%) did not respond to the race question. The gender of the respondents was 144 (79.12%) males, 37 (20.33%) females and 1 (0.55%) did not respond to the gender question. 67 Table 1— Cincinnati Response Job Assignment Surveys Distributed Usable Surveys Returned Patrol 166 118 Detectives 40 36 Community Police 32 23 Nonspecified 6 Total 238 182 One hundred sixty-six (166) surveys were sent to officers at the Colorado Springs Police Department. One hundred fifty-three (153) usable surveys were returned for a response rate of ninety-two percent (92%). The races of the respondents were 122 (79.74%) white, 7 (4.58%) African American, 17 (11.11%) Hispanic, 3 (1.96%) Oriental and 4 (2.61%) other. The gender of the respondents was 127 (83.01%) males and 26 (16.99%) females. Table 2— Colorado Springs Response Job Assignment Surveys Distributed Usable Surveys Returned Patrol 100 93 Detectives 45 41 Community Police 21 19 Total 166 153 68 3.4 Data Collection Instrument A self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data. The instrument consists of four parts. Data in the first three sections are used to create scales. The final section uses a multiple-choice format to collect demographic information. The instrument was distributed to officers at their roll calls or line-ups. Once completed, officers sealed the instruments in the provided envelope and returned them. Sections One through Three consist of responses on Likert-style scales or feelings thermometer. Section One consists of the officer’s reaction to statements about issues in policing. It measures officers’ reactions to issues confronting policing. It consists of ten questions. The questions touch on courtesy, accountability, bending rules, use of force, misleading the public, the image of policing, decision making, loyalty to the organization, uses of time and the influence of coworkers. These topics cover a wide range of policing issues. Section Two asks the officer to respond as his or her chief to the questions in Section One. It solicits officers’ perceptions of their police chiefs views. This section contains the same ten questions as Section One, but the respondent is instructed to indicate his or her chief’s opinion on these issues. The section provides a subtle opportunity for officers to express their support or displeasure with the views of their chief. Section Three collects data on the individual’s job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. Section Three measures job satisfaction and the officer’s level of commitment to the organization. The section contains 18 questions drawn from 69 Schuessler’s job satisfaction survey and from the Science Research Associates Attitude Survey. Both surveys have been shown to have high reliability and validity (Miller, 1991) Section Four collects demographic information. The seven questions cover job classification, how the assignment was obtained, gender, race, level of education, length of job tenure, and tenure in current assignment. A copy of the questionnaire is included in Appendix A. 3.4.1 Pretest The survey instrument was pretested three times with officers of the Bay County Sheriff 3 Department, Bay City, Michigan. Each test was timed and followed by a debriefing of the participants. These sessions helped to clarify the survey questions and remove ambiguity from the instrument. In its final form, the survey could readily be completed in less than ten minutes. It was important to limit the time required to complete the instrument. Understandably, administrators at the survey sites did not want the research process to unduly disrupt officers’ duties. 3.4.2 Treatment of Data Sections One through Three collect discrete, interval data to be used to construct scales of attitudes and values. Of interest is the difference between officers’ views on the issues and their perceptions of their chief‘s views on the issues. Section One collects officers’ views on issues. The questions in Section One were composed after a review of policing issues in the literature. Three panels of police officers examined the questions and helped to refine them. Section Two collects officers’ perception of their chief’s 70 views on these issues. The responses from Sections One and Two were used to make a scale of goal alignment. Each question in Section Two is subtracted from its counterpart in Section One. The absolute values of the difference in each question were summed to create the variable differ. This variable is a measure of goal alignment between officers and their chief. It is this perception of goal alignment that influences an agent’s response to his or her principal’s directives. “[H]uman behavior is seldom a direct response to objective reality, but is rather a response to the individual’s perception of that reality.” (McGregor, 1966: 216) These perceptions determine an agent’s zone of indifference, compliance levels, and strategies. The responses in Section Three comprise a scale of j ob satisfaction and commitment to the organization. The questions were drawn from previously successful surveys of job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Some of the questions were selected from the job satisfaction sections of Schuessler’s Social Life Feelings Scales which have been found to have a good alpha reliability of .75 (Miller, 1991). Other questions were selected from the Science Research Associates Attitude Survey which as been found to have a good product-moment correlation of .89 (Miller, 1991). Some of the questions are written as negative indicators of commitment and job satisfaction. Questions 1-5, 12-13 and 15 were reeoded to make them positive indicators. After recoding these questions, responses were totaled to become variable satcom. Missing data is a problem when constructing scales. Scales are meaningless unless participants respond to the same number of questions. The researcher is confronted 71 with the options of disregarding cases that have missing data or coding missing responses to utilize as much data as possible. I chose the latter option. On some questionnaires a question was skipped or, in a couple of incidents, a page missed. For these cases, the value of the mean for that department (rounded to the closest discrete value) was substituted for the missing value. Using the mean value is an appropriate substitution value for interval data (Babbie, 1979). This procedure is a conservative approach that supports the null hypotheses of no difference between job assignments. It will require a larger effect to reject the null hypotheses. A summary of the recoding of missing data can be found in Appendix B. 3.4.3 Dena; Collection and Administration of Instrument Data were collected during the summer of 1997. The survey instrument, instructional sheet and a return envelope were distributed to officers (See Appendix A). Officers were asked to complete the questionnaire and place it in the provided envelope. In Cincinnati, surveys were distributed through the interoffice mail system of the Cincinnati Police Division. Responses were gathered from each police district. Questionnaires were sent to officers assigned to work on the dates of data collection. The police division is decentralized into five stations dispersed geographically throughout the city. It would have been very difficult to attend roll calls at each division in the time allotted to collect data. The surveys were distributed and returned by the Community- Oriented Policing Unit located in the headquarters building. This method of data collection has been successfully used in previous research projects. 72 One hundred ninety-one (191) surveys were returned from the Cincinnati Police divisions, but nine (9) surveys were unusable. Nine (9) surveys were determined to be duplicates of an original community police officer’s questionnaire. The original questionnaire was retained in the sample. The nine copies were discarded. This deception was troublesome because of the necessity of procuring a sufficient sample of community police officers. Most of the Colorado Springs data were collected in the third week of July 1997. Questionnaires were distributed and collected at patrol roll calls or line-ups. This method proved very tedious. Officers in Colorado Springs work ten-hour shifts, and their starting times are determined by computer analysis of the projected workload. Unlike most departments that have one roll call at the beginning of a shift, in Colorado Springs each shift has multiple roll calls. Some roll calls may have nine or ten officers and other roll calls only two or three officers. Many times there were very few officers attending roll calls because of training, vacation, and court schedules. This made it difficult to obtain a sufficient sample. Despite this problem, all but two roll calls were surveyed in the three police divisions over the four-day research period. For roll calls I could not attend, questionnaires were left with the shift supervisor to distribute and collect. The hectic pace of attending patrol roll calls made it impossible to attend detective roll calls. Surveys were left with supervisors of detective units to distribute and collect. I later retrieved these from the supervisors. The community police officer sample was particularly difficult to collect. About a month before my research visit, the Neighborhood Policing Units (N PU) were 73 temporarily disbanded and their officers assigned to patrol duties. The community police officers were needed to assist patrol officers with the increased complaint volume for the summer months. Officers were scheduled to return to the NPU units two weeks after the research period. The importance of collecting a sufficient sample of community police officers necessitated adjusting the survey procedure. 1 arranged to have NPU supervisors distribute questionnaires to the NPU officers missed in the first survey. The NPU supervisors distributed and collected questionnaires after the units were restaffed. Sixteen (16) surveys were completed and returned to me in mid-August. Officers of the Colorado Springs Police Department returned one hundred fifty- five (155) surveys. One blank survey was returned in a sealed envelope, and another returned with no responses to questions on pages one through five. Both surveys were discarded for a total of one hundred fifty-three (1 5 3) usable surveys. 3.4.4 Statistical Techniques The two scale variables, differ and satcom, are the focus of data analysis. These variables are comprised of interval data collected on Likert scales. Later these variables will be collapsed into ordinal data so they can be used in contingency tables. Job assignments and the demographic data are examined to determine if they help to predict an individual’s placement on these scales. Patrol and traffic officers will comprise a baseline group. Detectives will represent elite assignments, and community police officers will compose the final group. Attitudinal responses of the groups will be compared to determine differences associated with job assignment. Data from each of the first three sections will comprise scales of 74 officers’ views, perceptions of their chief’s views, and job satisfaction and organizational commitment levels. Data from Section Four will be used as controls. Four common techniques are used to report data: contingency tables, chi-square, measures of association (Cramer’s V and Kendall’s tau-b and tau-c), and t-tests. Each contributes to our understanding of the data in a unique way. Contingency tables show relationships between two variables that have been classified into mutually exclusive categories (Pagano, 1986). Contingency tables and measures of association are appropriate techniques to study cross-sectional data (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995; Norusis, 1993; Babbie, 1979). Chi-square is an appropriate statistic for examining nominal data and is usually used with contingency tables (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995; Norusis, 1993; Lapin, 1993; Vito & Latessa, 1989; Babbie, 1979). “The chi-square test for independence provides a standard for deciding whether two variables are statistically independent.” (Reynolds, 1984: 15) It is the “. . . inference test most often used with nominal data . . .” (Pagano, 1986: 376). This technique is useful to test for independence, to compare several population proportions and to compare qualitative variables (Lipin, 1993). Chi-square measures the difference between expected and observed frequencies and allows the probability of a Type I error to be determined (Lipin, 1993). “It is an extremely popular statistic because it has very few assumptions. It’s a nonparametric statistic that allows the researcher to calculate statistical significance with nominal level data.” (Vito & Latessa, 1989: 96) Chi-square is appropriate for an exploratory study of this type because of its 75 non-parametric nature, its usefulness for comparing qualitative variables, and its usefulness in identifying the distribution of variables. Cramer’s V is a sensitive measure of association useful for exploratory studies of nominal level data (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995; Norusis, 1993). It is a symmetric measure used to detect the strength of associations. Though sensitive, the measure rarely obtains a level greater than .80 (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995). Kendall’s tau is an appropriate measure of association for ordinal level data. Tau-b is useful with square tables, and tau-c is appropriate for rectangular tables (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995; Norusis, 1993). Chi-square and contingency tables can be influenced by how the data is aggregated (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995). To overcome the problem of collapsing interval data into ordinal data, t-tests of mean values will also be performed to confirm chi-square findings. T-tests will be conducted on the mean value of each variable attribute to determine possible significance. This is an exploratory study and begins with no assumptions of causality, linearity or distributions of variables. However, if the data analysis suggests ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis may be productive, a regression model will be developed. OLS is useful for evaluating the influence of multiple independent variables on the dependent variable and building predictive models (Norusis, 1993; Lapin, 1993; Vito & Latessa, 1989; Pagano, 1986). It should be noted beforehand that regression analysis is most appropriate when dependent variables consist of continuous data (Babbie, 1979). The data in this study is discrete. 76 The primary focus of this study is the variable job assignment and its relationship to goal congruence and job satisfaction. However, the job assignment variable may reach statistical significance because of its association with some other factor. The demographic variables consist of factors commonly proposed as influencing police behavior (job selection process, gender, race, education, job tenure and length of job assignment). These variables will be used as controls. Findings will not be considered significant unless they achieve a ninety-five percent (95%) confidence level. This study is designed to solicit sensitive information about police officers’ acceptance of the policies pursued by their chief. Other methods could be used to collect this data, but they may be less efficient. Personal interviews might be revealing if one could overcome the native suspicions of the survey subjects. It would most likely take considerable time at the research site to develop the rapport necessary for the researcher to collect the data. Telephone interviews are another possibility, but it is unlikely they would be productive. Direct observation would be useful, but very time intensive. Outsiders often find it difficult to gain acceptance in police organizations. Participant observation might be useful, but the researcher would need to already be a member of the organization. The research method employed in this study allows officers to indirectly question the positions of their chief and remain anonymous. 3.5 Ethical Issues It is important that research efforts cause no harm to the participants. This study examines employees’ potential noncompliance to the policies of their managers. It is 77 likely that both police chiefs and officers consider this sensitive information. This necessitates protecting the confidentiality of the participants’ responses. The first precaution taken was the mandatory review of the survey procedure and instrument by the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects at Michigan State University. This committee examines research proposals to ensure they do not harm participants. This study was submitted to the Committee and passed its review procedures. The instructions, attached to the survey instrument, pledged confidentiality. The responses of participants remained anonymous. An envelope was provided with each survey so participants could conceal their response after completing the questionnaire. No one in the officer’s police department viewed the completed surveys. The surveys were not viewed until I opened envelopes upon returning to Michigan. Anonymity will also be protected when reporting the data. The data have been aggregated for analysis. The data will not be reported in a manner that will allow individual respondents to be identified. Respondents participated voluntarily. Surveys were completed while the officers were on duty to limit intruding into their private lives. No one was required to complete the survey. If an officer felt pressured by peers or supervisors to participate, he or she could place a blank survey in the sealed return envelope (as did one Colorado Springs officer). Participants were told the nature of the research. In both the instructional sheet and my introduction, respondents were told I was a police officer conducting research for 78 my dissertation. I attribute the high response rate and high level of support I received from both police departments to my status as a police officer. 3.6 Conclusions The purpose of this research is to examine areas of potential compliance and resistance to policy direction. The relationship between police chiefs and their officers is examined. This study begins with the assumption that higher levels of goal alignment and greater job satisfaction are characteristic of more policy compliant agents. It is assumed that agents’ perceptions of goal alignment with their chief are associated with their level of job satisfaction and influence their levels of compliance and resistance to policy. This study is limited by the size of the sample. Only two police departments were surveyed. More study sites are always welcome. Though nothing was found to indicate these departments are atypical of departments their size, replication of this study in other police departments is encouraged. This research would also have benefitted from extended direct observation at the study sites and the inclusion of extensive interviews of the research subjects. The time constraints of this unfunded research did not allow for these additions. The effect of reassigning Colorado Springs NPU officers to patrol duties is unknown. This may have caused NPU officers to respond more like patrol officers. The timing of this redeployment was one of the unfortunate consequences of real world research. 79 The effect that the duplicate surveys submitted by Cincinnati Police Division community police officers had on the study is unknown. More confidence could be placed in the research findings if the community police officer sample was larger. However, the incident is a useful research lesson and may say something about the need to monitor community police officers. Chapter 4 interprets and discusses the data. A detailed account of the data analysis is presented. The major findings and their implication for police chiefs’ management schemes are discussed. Chapter 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Introduction The discussion now turns to an analysis of the data and the implications of the findings. Evidence is found to reject the first null hypothesis of no association between officers’ job assignment and their level of goal congruency with their chief. The second null hypothesis of no association between job assignment and officers’ job satisfaction and commitment to the organization cannot be rejected. The entire data set is examined, and then the data for each department is examined separately. This process revealed interesting and unexpected findings. 4.2 Frequencies and Demographics An effective supervisor finds a proper technique to manage the situation at hand. The challenge is to properly assess what is needed to motivate subordinates. This study examines the attitudes and values of police officers to help managers identify areas of potential policy compliance and resistance. Knowing where policy compliance or resistance is likely to come helps managers assess implementation problems. If the police administrator views management problems from a principal-agent perspective, the value of this information becomes clear. The police administrator can use this information to formulate more effective management strategies. Three hundred thirty-five usable 80 81 surveys were collected (n = 335). The data from Sections One through Three were used to construct scales of officers’ attitudes, values and perceptions. Section Four of the questionnaire collected demographic information to test the null hypotheses and to control for alternative explanations. The principal research concern is the effect of job assignment on officers’ attitudes and values. Data were collected in three categories: patrol, detectives and community police officers. Table 3 shows how the job assignments were distributed among the participants in this study. Table 3 — Job Assignments Frequency Valid Percent‘ Patrol 211 64.0 Detective 77 23.3 Community police officer 42 12.7 Total 330 100.0 Missing 5 Total 335 By design, most of the respondents (64.0%) were patrol officers. Patrol serves as a benchmark to compare the other two job assignments, detectives (23.3%) and community police officers (12.7%). ' Valid percent is the percentage of responses after missing responses are removed. 82 The remaining variables in Section Four are used as controls or alternative explanations to reject or support the hypotheses. For convenience, they are called demographic variables. The first variable measures how the officer acquired his or her assignment. Two possibilities were measured. Officers can be assigned their job position or acquire it upon entering the department. Or, officers can volunteer for a job position or achieve it through promotion. Table 4 — Job Assignment Acquisition Frequency Valid Percent Assigned or entry level 205 61.4 Volunteer or promotion 129 38.6 Total 334 100.0 Missing 1 Total 335 Table 4 reflects the unbalanced sampling scheme. As seen in the previous table, most of the participants (64.0%) are assigned patrol. Officers begin their careers in patrol assignments and serve apprenticeships to prove their worth. It is not surprising that most of the respondents report they have an assigned or entry level position (61.4%). Nearly thirty-nine percent (38.6%) of officers volunteered or were promoted to their positions. A person’s gender may influence how he or she feels about certain issues. Males dominate the policing workforce. The sample is composed of eighty-one percent (81.1%) males and nearly nineteen percent (18.9%) females. 83 Table 5 — Gender Frequency Valid Percent Male 271 81.1 Female 63 1 8.9 Total 334 100.0 Missing 1 Total 335 Race may also influence views and opinions. The questionnaire asked participants to identify their race. The majority (75.2%) of the participants were Table 6 - Race Frequency Valid Percent White/non-Hispanic 248 75.2 Afiican American 52 15.8 Hispanic 19 5.8 Asian 4 1 .2 Other 7 2. 1 Total 330 100.0 Missing 5 Total 335 84 white/non-Hispanic. African Americans represented nearly sixteen percent (15.8%) of the sample. Hispanics (5.8%), Asians (1.2%), and others (2.1%) comprised the remainder of the sample population. Education is thought to influence a person’s attitudes and beliefs. Four levels of education were measured. Most of the respondents have some level of college education. Ten percent (10.2%) of the sample had only a high school education. The largest group Table 7 - Education Frequency Valid Percent High School or GED 34 10.2 Some college/associate 180 53.9 Bachelor’s degree 106 31.7 Postgraduate degree 14 4.2 Total 334 100 Missing 1 Total 335 of respondents (53.9%) had taken some college course or earned an associate’s degree. The next largest portion (31.7%) consists. of respondents who earned a bachelor’s degree. A few of the respondents (4.2%) had earned postgraduate degrees. The data show the majority of police officers (89.8%) have taken some college classes or have earned a college degree. 85 The experience of policing is thought to make officers suspicious and cynical. The length of police service or job tenure was measured to examine its influence. This variable requested the respondents’ total police experience, including prior experience with other police departments. Table 8 — Job Tenure Frequency Valid Percent Less than 1 year 13 3.9 1 to 5 years 92 27.7 6 to 10 years 83 25.0 11 to 15 years 40 12.0 16 or more years 104 31.3 Total 332 100.0 Missing 3 Total 335 The largest segments consist of officers with either one to five years of experience (27.7%) or sixteen or more years of experience (31.3%). The next largest group had six to ten years of experience (25.0%). There were few officers with less than one year experience (3.9%), and a small group had eleven to fifteen years of experience (12.0%). Officers’ attitudes may be influenced by the length of time they spend in a job assignment. They may also be excited or apprehensive about a new assignment. They 86 may become comfortable or bored with a long-term job assignment. Tenure in the officers’ current assignment was measured in four levels. Table 9 — Tenure in Current Assignment Frequency Valid Percent Less than 1 year 66 19.8 1 to 2 years 81 24.3 3 to 4 years 62 18.6 5 or more years 124 37.2 Total 333 100.0 Missing 2 Total 335 The largest group consists of officers who have held their current assignment for five or more years (37.2%). The next largest segment has been in their assignments for one to two years (24.3%). Nearly equal groups have been in their current assignment for less than a year (19.8%) or three to four years (18.6%). 4.3 Goal Alignment If pockets of potential policy compliance and resistance can be identified in an organization, administrators can formulate more effective management schemes. The first step is to determine goal alignment between police chiefs and officers. To measure goal alignment, officers’ attitudes and opinions on important issues were measured. 87 Next, officers’ perceptions of their chief’s views were measured. Their divergence was then calculated. The variable difler represents the sum of the absolute values of each officer’s response to questions in Section One subtracted from the corresponding question in Section Two. If there is total goal congruence between the officers and his or her chief, the values of each question in Section Two would be the same as in Section One. The difference for each question would be zero. The sum of the ten questions would be zero for the variable difler. If there is no goal agreement, the value of difler would be ninety. The maximum goal disagreement for each question is nine. That would result if the officer indicated a response of one (no agreement) and also indicated a response of ten (high agreement) for his or her chief. When the question in Section Two is subtracted from the corresponding question in Section One, the goal difference for that issue is nine. The absolute value of the difference was used to construct the scale, so the reverse of this example also equals a goal difference of nine. If the officer responded to each question in this manner, the total for the ten questions would be ninety. This constitutes a theoretical range of ninety for this variable. Table 10 — Difference in Goal Alignment Total Mean Std.Error Median Std. Range Deviation Differ 335 20.5463 .6394 20.00 1 1.7025 64.00 88 The mean value (20.5463) and mode value (22) are in the lower end of the theoretic range. The actual range (64) is only seventy-one percent (71.1%) of the theoretical range. This data is used to test the first null hypothesis. Ho: Job assignment is unrelated to the goal alignment of principal and agents. To test this hypothesis, the interval data collected in variable difi’er must be collapsed into ordinal data to construct contingency tables. The variable differ was reeoded into three levels. Approximately the first third of the scale (0 to 35.2% of the cumulative percentage) was categorized as low. The approximate upper third of the scale (65.7% to 100% of the cumulative percentage) was categorized as high. The approximate middle third of the scale was categorized as moderate. This reeoded variable, difler] , was used for contingency tables and chi-square tests. The next step is to determine if any of the variables in Section Four are associated with the level of goal congruence, difiier . Each variable was tested with difler] as the dependent variable. 89 Table 11 — Goal Alignment and Assignment Patrol Detective CPO Total Low 62 37 16 1 1 5 Difference 29.4% 48.1% 38.1% 34.8% Moderate 72 16 13 101 Difference 34.1% 20.8% 31.0% 30.6% High 77 24 13 1 14 Difference 36.5% 31.2% 31.0% 34.5% Total 21 l 77 42 330 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% X2=9°714 df=4 p<.046 Cramer’sV=.121 Returning to the focus of this study, the first variable to be tested was job assignment. The association for job assignment and goal alignment is found to be significant (x2 = 9.714, df = 4, p < .046), though the strength of the relationship is modest (Cramer’s V = .121). Nearly half of the detectives (48.1%) perceived themselves to be in close goal alignment with their chief. Detectives (48.1%) and community police officers (3 8.1%) were more likely than patrol officers (29.4%) to be closely aligned with their chief. Patrol officers (34.1%) and community police officers (31.0%) are more likely to have moderate levels of goal disagreement than detectives (20.8%). Patrol officers (36.5%) are slightly more likely than detectives (31.2%) and community police officers (31.0%) to have high levels of goal disagreement with their chief. Overall, detectives and 90 community police officers feel more closely aligned to the goals of their chief than do patrol officers. Next, the mean values for each group were examined; patrol (21.6398), detectives (18.1039) and community police officers (19.5000). Patrol officers were found to have higher levels of goal discrepancy with their chief than did detectives (t = 2.31, df = 286, p < .021). The mean values of community police officers were not found to be significantly different from those of patrol officers or detectives. In summary, detectives have a significantly higher level of goal congruence with their chief than do patrol officers. Community police officers are spread more uniformly through the goal alignment scale. Community police officers fall somewhere between detectives and patrol officers in their levels of perceived goal congruity with their chief. The null hypothesis is rejected for goal alignment and job assignment. Now it needs to be determined if other variables are associated with goal alignment. 91 Table 12 - Goal Alignment and Job Acquisition Assigned/Entry level Volunteer/Promoted Total Low 72 46 1 18 Difference 35.1% 35.7% 35.3% Moderate 63 39 1 02 Difference 30.7% 30.2% 30.5% High 70 44 l 14 Difference 34.1% 34.1% 34.1% Total 205 129 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x2 = .013, df= 2, p < .994 Before we can be confident of an association for goal alignment and job assignment, additional factors must be explored. There may be other variables affecting this association. The manner in which a job assignment was acquired (assigned/entry level or volunteer/promoted) was tested for an association to goal alignment. A chi- square test of this relationship showed no significance. The mean values of the assigned/entry level group (20.8049) and the volunteer/promotion group (19.7974) were not significantly different (t = .78, df = 332, p < .436). The manner in which appointments are made was not significantly related to the officers’ levels of goal congruence with their chief. Though their numbers continue to grow, there are still relatively few women in policing. Gender was tested for an association to goal alignment. The question is, do 92 men and women share similar views about policing issues, and do they have similar levels of goal congruence with their chief? Table 13 — Goal Alignment and Gender Male Female Total Low 96 22 1 18 Difference 35.4% 34.9% 35.3% Moderate 84 18 102 Difference 3 l .0% 28.6% 30.5% High 91 23 1 14 Difference 33.6% 36.5% 34. 1% Total 271 63 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 12:.231, p<.89l The chi-square test revealed no significant association for gender and goal alignment. The mean values for males (20.2915) was not significantly different from the mean values for females (20.9524) in the t-test (t = -.41, df = 332, p < .681). Gender is not associated with goal alignment. Race was the next variable examined. Because of the small number of Asians in the sample, the race variable was recategorized to place Asian officers in the other category. No significance was found for race using chi-square (x2 = 7.052, 93 df = 6, p < .316) or t-test (White, 20.4374; African American, 19.5385; Hispanic, 21.0000; or Other, 17.7273). This variable had three cells with an expected count of less than fivez. Race was then reeoded into two categories white and other. No Table 14 — Goal Alignment and Race White Other Total Low 83 35 1 18 Difference 33.5% 42.7% 35.8% Moderate 81 21 102 Difference 32.7% 25.6% 30.9% High 84 26 1 10 Difference 33.9% 31.7% 33.3% Total 248 82 330 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x’ = 2.541, df= 2, p < .281 significant association was found for race and goal alignment using chi-square (x2 = 2.541, df = 2, p < .281) or t-test of mean values (White, 20.4274; Other, 19.6341; t = .55, df= 328, p < .585). 2 Though it is recommended that expected frequencies be kept to 5 or more for each cell, several authors now believe that standard is too stringent and can be relaxed (N orusis, 1993; O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1995; Reynolds, 1984). 94 Because so few officers had postgraduate degrees ( 14), the variable measuring education was reeoded to combine bachelor degrees and postgraduate degrees. This new variable was then examined for an association with goal alignment. Table 15 - Goal Alignment and Education High School Some College/ Bachelor/ Total Associate Degree Postgraduate Low 10 70 38 118 Difference 29.4% 38.9% 31.7% 35.3% Moderate 10 46 46 102 Difference 29.4% 25.6% 38.3% 30.5% High 14 64 36 114 Difference 4.2% 35.6% 30.0% 34.1% Total 34 180 120 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x2 = 6.505, p < .164 No significant association was found for level of education and perceived goal alignment with the chief (x2 = 6.505, df = 4, p < .164). T-test of the mean values high school (22.8824), some college/associate degree (20.2056) and bachelor/postgraduate (20.0333) did not significantly different from one another. The experience of policing may change officers’ perspectives. Are the stages of an officer’s career associated with his or her goal alignment with the police chief? 95 Oflicers’ level of experience was analyzed to determine if there was an association with goal alignment. Table 16 - Goal Alignment and Job Tenure <1 yr. 1-6 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-15 yrs 216 yrs Total Low 8 36 26 10 38 118 Difference 61.5% 39.1% 31.3% 25.0% 36.5% 35.5% Moderate 5 26 29 14 27 101 Difference 38.5% 28.3% 34.9% 35.0% 26.0% 30.4% High 0 30 28 16 39 113 Difference .0% 32.6% 33.7% 40.0% 37.5% 34.0% Total 13 92 83 40 104 332 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x’ =11.697, df= 8, p < ,165 The tenure of police officers was not found to be significantly associated with the perception of goal congruency (x2 = 11.697, df = 8, p < .165). Though no significant association was found, it should be noted that the small sample of officers with less than one year experience showed close congruence with the police chief. The majority (61.5%) were in the low category and the remaining (38.5%) were in the moderate category. None of these officers registered in the high category. Next, the mean values for the five categories of experience were examined: less than one year (11.8462), one to five years (20.1196), six to ten years (20.9518), eleven to fifteen years (22.7500), and sixteen or more years (20.2308). The t-test determined that officers with less then one 96 year experience perceived themselves to be more closely aligned with their chief than did officers with one to five years (t = -.391, df = 27.8, p < .001), officers with six to ten years (t = -2.89, df = 94, p < 005), officers with eleven to fifteen years (t = -3.36, df = 51, p < 001) and officers with sixteen or more years (t = -4.12, df = 24.28, p < .0001). None of the other tests of mean values were significant. Though it cannot be determined if this is a selection or maturation effect, officers with one year of experience or more did not perceive such close goal alignment with their chief. A similar concern can be raised for an officer’s tenure in his or her job assignment. Do levels of goal alignment change as officers gain experience in a job assignment? The amount of time that an officer has occupied his or her current assignment was examined for its association to goal alignment. The purpose of this variable is to measure for a honeymoon-effect stemming from appointment to new assignments. Are officers in new assignments more receptive to the direction of their chief? Do officers become bored or fi'ustrated in their job assignments and become less receptive to the direction provided by their chief? 97 Table 17 — Goal Alignment and Tenure in Current Assignment < 1 yr 1-2 yrs 3-4 yrs 5 or more yrs Total Low 31 30 22 35 118 Difference 47.0% 37.0% 35.5% 28.2% 35.4% Moderate 17 29 21 35 102 Difference 25.8% 35.8% 33.9% 28.2% 30.6% High 18 22 19 54 113 Difference 27.3% 27.2% 30.6% 43.5% 33.9% Total 66 81 62 124 333 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x2 = 11.555, df= 6, p < .073 No significant association was found for tenure in a job assignment and the perception of goal alignment with the police chief (x2 = 11.555, df = 6, p < .073). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that forty-seven percent (47%) of officers with less than a year in their current assignment were in the low diflerence category, and over forty-three percent (43.5%) of the officers with five or more years in their current assignment were in the high difference category. The mean values for tenure in job assignment categories were examined: less than one year (17.2879), one to two years (19.6667), three to four years (20.1452), and five or more years (22.5242). Officers with less than one year in their current job assignment were aligned significantly closer to the goals of their chief than were officers with five or more years in their current job assignment (t = -3.18, df = 188, p < .002). Again, it cannot be determined if this is a selection or maturation effect. 98 However, the close goal alignment between officers in new job assignments and their chief progressively declined after the first year. To summarize, job assignment is associated with officers’ level of goal alignment with their chief. Detectives are the most closely aligned with their chief. Patrol officers have high levels of goal disparity with their chief. Community police officers’ levels of goal congruity fall between detectives and patrol officers. First-year officers and officers in their first year of a job assignment were also more closely aligned with the goals of their chief than were officers with more tenure. It should be remembered that first-year officers are assigned to patrol; so depending on the rate of hire, many of the officers in new assignments may also be in patrol. Further analysis of the data set (See Appendix C) produced these additional frndings: - Assigned Ofi‘icers and Goal Alignment. Officers assigned (rather than volunteer/promoted) to detective and community policing jobs have higher levels of goal congruence with their chief. - Race and Goal Alignment. White detectives are the most likely to be closely aligned with the goals of their chief. - Education and Goal Alignment. For officers with bachelor’s or postgraduate degrees, detectives were likely to be closely aligned and patrol officers moderately aligned with the goals of their chief. 99 - Tenure and Goal Alignment. Officers with less than one year of police experience are more closely aligned to the goals of their chief than are more experienced officers. - Tenure in Job Assignment and Goal Alignment. Officers in their first year of a job assignment are more closely aligned to the goals of their chief than are officers who have held their assignment for five or more years. 4.4 Job Satisfaction and Commitment to the Organization If subordinates have high levels of j ob satisfaction and commitment to the organization, they are less likely to disrupt organizational activities. If they have low levels of job satisfaction and commitment to the organization, the principal may need to monitor them more closely or offer more incentives. It is likely that different management strategies are necessary for each of these situations. Section Three of the survey measured officers’ job satisfaction and level of commitment to their organization. The interval data collected in Section Three was totaled to become the variable satcom. The theoretical range of the variable satcom is 18 (a lack of job satisfaction and commitment to the organization) to 180 (very satisfied with the job and committed to the organization). The observed range was 52 to 140, about fifty-four percent (54%) of the theoretical range. 100 Table 18 - Job Satisfaction and Commitment to the Organization Total Mean Std.Error Median Std. Range Deviation Satcom 335 96.4269 .751 1 97.0000 13 .7466 88.00 This variable needed to be transformed to be used in contingency tables. The variable satcom was then collapsed into three categories of ordinal data to create the variable satcom] . Approximately one third of the response totals were assigned to each category. The lower third of the range of responses was categorized as low (0 to 33.4% of the cumulative percentage). The middle third of the range of responses was categorized as moderate (35.5% to 65.4% cumulative percentage). The highest third of the range of responses was categorized as high (67.5% to 100%). Next the variable satcom] and job assignment were examined to determine if there is an association between the job assignments of officers and their levels of job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. This data is used to test the second null hypothesis. H,: Job assignment is unrelated to levels of organizational commitment or job satisfaction. 101 Table 19 - Job Satisfaction and Job Assignment Patrol Detectives CPO Total Low 66 27 16 109 Satisfaction 31 .3% 35.1% 38.1% 33.0% Moderate 60 3 1 l 5 1 O6 Satisfaction 28.4% 40.3% 35.7% 32.1% High 85 19 1 l 1 15 Satisfaction 40.3% 24.7% 26.2% 34.8% Total 221 77 42 330 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x’ = 8.246, df= 4, p < .083 No significant association was found between job assignment and job satisfaction (x2 = 8.246, df = 4, p < .083). T-tests were conducted on the mean values for patrol officers (97.3602), detectives (95.2857) and community police officers (94.5238). No significant associations were found. The second null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The method of job acquisition was examined for its association to officers’ job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. It was assumed that officers who volunteered or were promoted to their assignments would have higher levels of j ob satisfaction. 102 Table 20 — Job Satisfaction and Job Acquisition Assigned/Entry Level Volunteer/Promotion Total Low 67 44 1 1 1 Satisfaction 32.7% 34. 1% 33.2% Moderate 59 48 1 07 Satisfaction 28.8% 37.2% 32.0% High 79 37 l 16 Satisfaction 38.5% 28.7% 34.7% Total 205 129 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x’ = 4.018, df= 2, p < .134 No significant association was found for the method of job acquisition and officers’ level of job satisfaction (x2 = 4.018, df = 2, p < .134). Volunteers and promoted officers were no more satisfied with their jobs than were entry level and assigned officers. The mean values of assigned or entry level officers (96.8488) and volunteer or promoted officers (95.8140) were compared using a t-test. Again, no significance was found (t = .669, df = 332, p < .504). It is sometimes proposed that employing more female officers could help to soften the adversarial relationship many departments have with the public. At the same time, many feel that a male dominated occupation, such as policing, is a hostile work environment for women. Are women comfortable in this organizational environment? 103 There appears to be some support for this concern. Women do not seem to find as much satisfaction in their jobs. Gender was found to be a significant factor. Table 21 — Job Satisfaction and Gender Male Female Total Low 81 30 111 Satisfaction 29.9% 47.6% 33.2% Moderate 93 14 107 Satisfaction 34.3% 22.2% 32.0% High 97 19 116 Satisfaction 35.8% 30.2% 34.7% Total 271 63 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x2 = 7.636, df = 2, p < .022, Cramer’s V = .151 Female officers were found to be significantly less satisfied with their jobs than male officers (x2 = 7.636, df = 2, p < .022). Nearly half (47.6%) of the female officers had low levels of job satisfaction compared to nearly thirty percent (29.9%) of male officers. Seventy percent (70.1%) of male officers had moderate or high levels of job satisfaction compared to only slightly more than half (52.4%) of female officers. The strength of this association is modest (Cramer’s V = .151). The mean value for male officers (97.2657) was also found to be significantly higher than that of female officers (92.9365) in t-tests (t = 2.263, df =332, p < .024). 104 Police organizations have made considerable strides since the civil unrest of the 19603, when white males dominated policing. Today, police departments more closely reflect the racial diversity of the communities they serve. This change brings new questions. Does this diversity affect management and officers’ perception? Do police organizations address the needs and aspirations of all their members? Does the organization treat everyone fairly? Race was next examined for an association to job satisfaction. Because few were found in the sample, Asians were reeoded and added to the other category. No significance was found for race and its association with job satisfaction (x2 =8.75 8, df = 6, p < .188). T-tests were performed on the mean values of the categories White (96.3065), Afi'ican American (98.1731), Hispanic (94.2632), and Other (96.0000) and no significance was found. Table 22 — Job Satisfaction and Race White African American Hispanic Other Total Low 85 13 9 ’ 2 109 Satisfaction 34.3% 25.0% 47.4% 18.2% 33 .0% Moderate 77 18 4 7 106 Satisfaction 31.0% 34.6% 21.1% 63.6% 32.1% High 86 21 6 2 115 Satisfaction 34.7% 40.4% 31 .6% 18.2% 34.8% Total 248 52 19 11 330 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x2 = 8.758, df= 6, p < .188 105 The race variable was then reeoded into two categories: White and Other. Once again, no significance was found for race and job satisfaction (x2 = .834, df = 2, p < .659). T-tests were then conducted on the mean values of the categories White (96.3065) and Other (96.9756). No significant difference was found (t = -.384, df = 328, p < .701). Since the time of August Vollmer, reformers have advocated higher levels of education to improve the competence and professionalism of the police. One purpose of education is to change the way people perceive events and problems. It remains unclear how these more educated officers fit into police organizational structure. Officers’ level of education was compared to their level of job satisfaction to determine if they are associated. Levels of education did not appear to affect officers’ job satisfaction. 106 Table 23 — Job Satisfaction and Education High School Some College/ Bachelor/Post- Total Associate graduate Low 1 1 66 34 11 1 Satisfaction 32.4% 36.7% 28.3% 33.2% Moderate l 1 57 39 107 Satisfaction 32.4% 31.7% 32.5% 32.0% High 12 57 47 116 Satisfaction 35.3% 3 l .7% 39.2% 34.7% Total 34 180 120 334 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% x’ = 2.700, df= 4, p < .609 No significance was found for officers’ level of education and their level of job satisfaction (x2 = 2.700, df = 4, p < .609). 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