W iv. :v-x A
r. {w v-i'e ;‘

Hiy‘

J mi:

1‘

It
'7": "in,
H‘lsn 1' w
l! {

'3‘"

I .'
it" 15515.4

.-. , A
"W-‘ri-r'”
v

'-:~

a :'
'.z:-.._r

1‘!

v
u . - , ‘ H' '. a
-, .1,‘ “. .' ,;' ', L ' ' Q3 $33?"
' ‘ ‘ v . : ‘. . ‘ I u i ‘4'?“ V . , _ ‘ b‘f‘fl VF‘W‘H‘Q‘!»
. _. ‘ y “, ~ 7' , n ‘33?qu '“fi‘
' 3" , , I. 1 ‘u‘ur' ‘u Ip'xrfqv
' a 11:5 ‘J (55%!“ >
*Ecngsiéa’ '“
“JV 3“":

 

 

3' ”

‘ILI

I 3“"
.4

 

 

.k-‘e.
~I _u ,1," .

 

f:

'n-oescs

0’)?!

Date

May 20,

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

PROBLEMS TO DEVELOPMENT RADIO
BROADCASTING IN UGANDA

presented by

David Ouma Balikowa

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Artsdegree in Telecomnunications

Gain (L0

M .J} professor

 

 

 

1994

 

0-7639

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

 

 

LIBRARY

—w*

Michigan $tate

Unlverslty

 

 

PLACE III RETURN BOX to roman this chockout from your noord.

TO AVOID FINES Mum on at Mon dd. duo.

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MSU IsAn mm ActioNEmd Opportunity IN“

MI

 

PROBLEMS TO DEVELOPMENT RADIO
BROADCASTING IN UGANDA

By
David Ouma Balikowa

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunications

1994

ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS TO DEVELOPMENT RADIO
BROADCASTING IN UGANDA

By
David Ouma Balikowa

The organization and development of Radio Uganda broadeasting to supplement
the development process in a multilingual context is in crisis owing to the inherently
constrained centralized broadeast pattern. The dominant political factor perpetuates a
technocratic programming pattern manifested in the high publicity element along the
skewed content categories, which is highly at variance with the development needs
expressed by the audiences. To bring into perspective problems to development
broadcasting, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research method is
employed (triangulation method): focused synthesis of the radio broadcast infrastructure,
content analysis of the ”development program” and programming schedule, " and lastly,
an audience survey of radio use in the rural contexts. Findings of the thesis indicate that
due to acute technical constraints, preferential and urbanized program content categories,
and feedback constraints, there is a practical despite between the technocratic pattern the
centralized radio has taken and the contextual audience needs. The political factor that
permeates the texture of causal variables renders the constraints more intractable.
Evidences presented as justification for conclusions of this research reinforce the
theoretical framework for the decentralization broadcast model of radio channels in order
to deal more efficiently with the diversified development needs in a multilingual social

context.

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Telecommunication, College of
Communication Arts and Sciences, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the Master of Arts degree.

QfiQsO

Director of Thesis

Capyright by
DAVID OUMA BALIKOWA

1994

To my late father, Isaac Mugeni, who died while I was away in the USA

studying for this degree.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank those few Radio Uganda staff who, unlike others, chose not to hide behind
that insensitive bureaucratic monster and instead readily availed me “some” of the
information I required.
Special thanks go to my colleague in the pursuit of knowledge since high school
days, Moses Kalyango, for those brain-storming feats over my work. They often revived
my working spirit even when the desperations from Uganda’s economic environment

dictated otherwise.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES .................................... xi
INTRODUCTION .................................... 1
Problem .................................... 1

Study Objectives .................................. 2
Methodology .................................... 3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................. 6
Colonial Era .................................... 6
Neo-Colonial Era ................................. 9
Revolutionary Era ................................. 10
TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ......................... 13
Equipment Survey ................................. l4
Studios ................................... l4

Transmitters ............................... 15

Radio Links ................................ 17

Technical Constraint Analysis .......................... 19
Centralized Technical Infrastructure. ................. 21

Information Sector Budgeting. ..................... 22

Project Implementation. ......................... 24

Technical Innovation/Possibilities ........................ 25

PROGRAMMING PATTERN CONSTRAINTS ................... 27
The Development Program ........................... 27
Content Categories. ........................... 28
Qualitative Analysis ................................ 30
Rigid Programming. ........................... 31
Broadcast Policy Reforms. ....................... 32
Programming Schedule .............................. 36
Program Schedule Analysis. ...................... 37
Language Multiplicity and Joining Channels ................. 42
Content Categories ................................ 44
Conclusion .................................... 47
AUDIENCE INTERVENTION CONSTRAINTS .................. 48
Surveying the Audience ............................. 48
Background. ................................ 49
Survey Objective. ............................. 49
Methodology .................................... 50
Sample. ................................... 50
Survey Instruments. ........................... 50
Results and Analysis ............................... 51
Technical Constraints. .......................... 51
Program Scheduling Constraints. ................... 52

viii

Content Category Constraints. ..................... 5 3

Feedback Constraints. .......................... 55

General Opinions and Suggestions ....................... 56
Conclusions .................................... 57
CONCLUSION .................................... 58
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................. 61
APPENDIX .................................... 62
LITERATURE CITED .................................. 65
REFERENCES .................................... 67

Table 1.

Table 2.

Table 3.

Table 4.

Table 5 .

Table 6.

LIST OF TABLES
Government Recurrent Expenditure by Ministry 1984/85-1988l89 . 23

Frequency Distribution in Percentages of Story Categories in
Radio Uganda News Bulletin for 10 Days in November 1989 . . . . 29

Percentage Share of Program Categories on Each Broadcast Channel
for 1977 and 1990 .............................. 38

Percentage Share of Program Content Categories on the 4 Channels
for Years 1977 and 1990 .......................... 40

Number of Light Programs and Others in Each language on Red and
Blue Channels in 1990 .............. , .............. 41

Number of Hours Joined to Red and Blue Channels in a Weekly
Broadcasting Schedule, 1977 ........................ 42

LIST OF FIGURFS

Figure 1. Constraint Study Design ........................... 4
Figure 2. Radio Transmission Network ........................ 16
Figure 3. Technical Constraint Analysis ....................... 20
Figure 4. Percentage Share of Program Origination on the 4 Channels for

the Years 1977 and 1990 .......................... 39
Figure 5. Airtime Shrinkage Due to Joining the 4 Channels ........... 43
Figure 6. A Decentralized Model for the 4 Channel Network .......... 46

Figure 7. Satisfaction with Time of Program Scheduling by Region (1990) . . 54

INTRODUCTION
Problem

The title of this thesis presupposes two major foci: first, the organization and
development of the radio medium and, second, its intervention into the audience context
to elicit development behavioral responses. It is the position of this thesis from the onset
that the impact of radio broadcasting on the overall development process can only be
supplementary and not that of a prime mover or magic multiplier. Therefore,
considerations of direct-cost benefits accruing to this service sector against investments
in a quantitatively empiric perspective does not easily arise as a direct analysis in this
study. It is, however, of the long view that the social value of the service, in a country
where both television and the print media are confined to a few urban centers, is
undeniably great as evidenced by the constant public outcry about the current poor radio
services. Non investment in this sector can, therefore, be extraordinarily costly.

This thesis conceives the objective constraint to development radio broadcasting
in Uganda as a function of the interactions within a texture of causal factors: namely,
level of broadcast technology, the state of professionalism, political policies like finance,
the degree of bureaucracy, program pragmatic, and language multiplicity.

The supplementary development role of radio broadcasting is highly dependent
upon the level of organization and development of the medium’s technical infrastructure
(Chapter Two). This process, under the texture of causal factors above, has a direct
bearing on the program content and schedule pattern. A content analysis is then
imperative to determine the constraints to the efficient utilization of the ”development
program” in particular, and the radio medium channels in general (Chapter Three).

2

Conceived as an organized and developed medium, its potential as an instrument
to supplement social change efforts is measured among the target audience contexts to
determine the constraints along the intervention parameter (Chapter Four).

Radio broadcasting is part and parcel of the overall political, economic, and
ideological process of the society in which the medium is applied. An historical analysis
of the dynamics of this process of the state of underdevelopment provides the contextual
background to this study (Chapter One).

This thesis has chosen the constraint perspective to the study of development
broadcasting based on the strong assumption of the causal factors it brings into the
limelight as a firmer basis for a consciously planned communication arrangement. It is
with much hope that this study will provide critical insights to those seeking to generate
policies, strategies, and new approaches urgently needed to salvage the state of radio
broadcasting in Uganda.

Study Objectives

The objectives of this thesis is: first, to analyze the problems to the organization
and development of Radio Uganda and its intervention into the audience context to elicit
development behavior and, secondly, to identify policy mix alternatives leading to a more
efficient utilization of the medium broadcast capacity in the diversified social context.

The focus of the study is on problem definition gravitated towards problem
resolution. As a first detailed study of this sector in Uganda, it is imperative to identify
the causes of the problems to the utilization of radio in supplementing the development
process and then to look at feasible alternatives to salvaging the broadcast sector.

Problem definition in this study is narrowed down to the functional constraint
analysis of the broadcast sector. While it would have been possible to further narrow

down the topic to one or two constraints, the great nwd to comprehend the entirety of

3
the problems to development radio broadcasting in Uganda dictates against that logic,
especially when there is no sound research on the other constraints done to this point.
Comprehending the entirety of the principal constraints to this sector is conceived
within my original study objectives at Michigan State University which is aimed at
formulating suggestions to salvaging Radio Uganda’s broadcasting services and to

enhance its supplementary role in the nation’s development process.

Methodology

It is not possible to come up with any one comprehensive methodology in
studying problems to development broadcasting in any given social context. The study
parameters of this thesis, therefore, derive from the triangulation method of inquiry
(employing a combination of various qualitative and quantitative research methods) which
is basically gravitated towards the greater need for a comprehensive analysis of the
problems to development broadcasting. Due to the broadness of the topic, this thesis has
chosen to emphasize the horizontal program source-audience continuum as its major
study parameter (see Figure 1).

Chapter One relies mostly on literature review and secondary analysis in
providing a qualitative analysis of the historical background to the state of
underdevelopment in Uganda. This serves as the contextual background to this study.

While Chapter Two employs focused synthesis on top of the above method to
provide a technical analysis of the radio transmission infrastructure and pattern, it relies
basically on reports across institutions involved in implementing the broadcast
infrastructure, interviews of staff, and observation at the various installations.

Chapter Three is based on content analysis of programs (news program) and the
programming schedules for the year 1977 and 1990.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mm “Am

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Radio?“

 

 

 

 

 

wanna-mom

 

Figure l. Constraints Study Design

 

5
Chapter Four relies on an audience survey of four typical Ugandan rural
communication environments and the capital city to assess radio intervention constraints
in the audience environment.
Data analysis in both Chapters Three and Four is by percentage frequency
distribution to describe differences and correlation analysis in the latter chapter to
determine the magnitude of relationships between independent and dependent variables

in measuring the radio broadcast audience intervention constraints.

CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The analysis of the internal and external forces, historical and present, and how
they bear on the socioeconomic and political developments in Uganda is imperative in
comprehending the converging forces to the organization and development of radio
broadcasting and how its increased manipulation could bring to bear on the overall
development process.

Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa with an area covering 236,036 sq.
krns (147,522.5 sq. miles) and a population of 17 million people. The economy is
essentially agricultural with about 90% of the labor force engaged in agriculture which
contributes 70% of GNP and 95% of export earnings.

This thesis intends to assess the performance of radio broadcasting in Uganda
since its inception in 1953 during the colonial era. Regarded as a symbol of power in
a country characterized with political instability since independence in 1962, the national

radio station has witnessed decisive battles for control of power.

Colonial Era

At the time of state formation, when the British introduced boundaries to form
what is today known as Uganda, there were already established nationalities often
referred to as tribes at different stages of formation. These nationalities engaged in
constant battles of conquest and extension. Class differences were already in existence
(Marndan Mahmood, not dated). Taking advantage of these contradictions, the British
established colonial rule by taking sides with better organized nationalities whose pre-

7
existing administrative structures eased the entrenchment of colonial rule. The British
introduced hierarchical administrative structures, demarcating the new state into districts
as administrative units. The demarcation attempted as much as possible to approximate
the multiplicity of language groups and nationalities into viable administrative units.

The development of the colonial economy in Uganda was a result of internal and
external factors. Internally, coffee (1903) and cotton (19305) were introduced as export
crops to provide a tax base for the colonial administration. Externally, America’s
independence created a cotton famine in British textiles, forcing her to turn to her
colonies which had suitable cotton-growing climates for the supplies. This process
annexed Uganda into the international capitalist economy as a supplier of raw materials.
The prices offered to the peasant farmers were, however, not commensurate with the
human effort put into growing of the export crops. The level of industrialization was
also limited to the processing of raw materials for export. The same applied to copper
exported in its raw form. This checked the level of technology and skills transfer to the
colonial state.

Land was congested with export crops with very limited local demand, making
the colonial economy vulnerable to extemal demand and pricing systems. The colonial
economy made it mandatory for every household to plant cotton and coffee, leaving little
room for any economic, agricultural diversification. Information on agricultural
development was limited to that which elevated a coffee and cotton farmer as the right
model of a progressive farmer. .

The colonial state and its export economy were also strengthened by the
institutionalization of human resources along the geographical and cultural lines. The
South, endowed with better climatic conditions, was mapped out as a cash crop growing
region; whereas, the Northern region, whose inhabitants were considered as naturally
ruthless by Southerners, was designated as a reserve for recruiting soldiers. The South,

exposed earlier to education than the North, was not considered a fertile ground for

8
recruiting the army. The British deliberately avoided creating an army intelligent and
politically conscious to question the colonial legitimacy. This practice contributed to the
underdevelopment of the North at the expense of the South.

The introduction of religion by missionaries introduced another contradiction
where the Roman Catholic, Anglican Protestants, and Islamic denominations battled it
out to gain dominance among the population. The colonial authorities often took sides
in these conflicts, sowing intimacy between politics and religion-a legacy that afflicts the
country to date.

A civil service was also set up to administer the export crop economy and to
organize the repatriation of economic surplus to Britain (Wiebe, RD. and Dodge, CR,
1987, p. 11). Trade unions and cooperative societies, like the army, were fashioned to
serve colonial interests. The 1952 Trade Unions Ordinance banned the organization of
general trade unions, placing them under the leadership of pent-bourgeoisie with
directives to steer them away from politics (Karugire, SR, 1988, p. 28). Under the
1946 Co-operative Ordinance, cooperatives like trade unions, were marginalized.
Control of cooperative affairs were cut off from members while involvement in politics
by the managers was prohibited.

The foregoing analysis provides a historical perspective of the contextual factors
and forces responsible for the nature of development in the colonial era. At the time of
independence, Uganda’s economy had already been unfavorably drawn into the
international capitalist economy as a supplier of raw materials. Nationalities were
compartmentalized into district administrative units dominated by nationality and national
pent-bourgeoisie. The deliberate denial of political organization and less participation
at production level curtailed peasants and worker’s participation into any distinctive
national movement. The small political parties that did surface were polarized along the

existing religious and nationality contradictions.

Neo-Colonial Era

On the eve of independence, two major political parties emerged: The Uganda
People’s Congress (UPC), which identified itself with the Anglican Church, and the
Democratic Party (DP), affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church. The Kabaka Yekka
(KY), a small feudal-oriented party, drew its support from the Ghanda nationality.

The UPC, which came to power with independence following an alliance with
Kabaka Yekka, inherited a neo—colonial power and economic structure essentially
designed to fit colonial interests. The UPC manifesto was strongly in favor of defending
the country’s sovereignty; involving people in the running of the country’s day-to—day
affairs; fighting poverty, ignorance, and disease; and neo-colonialism. However, all
these goals were abandoned, in the long-run, by the UPC in a frantic effort to keep itself
in power by force. The political contradictions were further sharpened by the rise of the
national pent-bourgeoisie which used the political army to crush monarchism and to
install the 1967 republican constitution. The crisis was heightened by an attempt to move
to the left, a move that strongly threatened foreign interests in Uganda. To some extent,
this explains why Britain was among the first countries to laud Amin’s seizure of power
in 1971 .

Amin’s seizure of power brought Uganda more into the international arena,
mainly due to his wild anti-imperialist rhetoric stance. His infamous "economic war"
at home saw the expulsion of Asians and the redistribution of their properties and
businesses to his royal soldiery and close associates. This state of affairs coupled with
political ineptness and repression, mismanagement, and insecurity sent the economic
infrastructure crumbling.

The struggle for democracy entered another phase with the armed struggle against
Amin launched from Tanzania. Exiles belonging to the different political groups tried
to bury their differences under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNIF) and

together with the Tanzanian army ousted Amin from power. Efforts to govern the .

10

country under UNLF, however, gave way to the old ”sectarian” differences. Political
parties, religious differences, and the army once again bounced back on the scene, with
the former being manipulated to rig the 1981 elections in favor of the UPC, bringing
Obote again in power. This plunged the country further into a "state of blood, " with the
army being used to suppress the uprisings among the Southern and West Nile population.
External loans acquired between 1981 and 1986 were not put to much economic use,
making the war-tom country more indebted to the outside world.

The media was also a target of the repression. Some newspapers were banned,
journalists were arrested or exiled, while radio as a major state information organ was
extensively used to launch disinformation campaigns against any form of opposition.
Radio transmitters set up in the early 70s to facilitate rural broadcasts were instead
constantly ”cannibalized" to provide spare parts to the National Service Channel to enable
UPC’s unending political rallies.

This, however, proved ineffective in the face of a much stronger and reliable
interpersonal communication network popularly known as "Radio Katwe" which sprung
up in the wake of the excessive disinformation on the national radio service. News about
the heightening political crisis often spread all over the country very fast. Efforts to
suppress what the government termed "rumor” instead gave the interpersonal network

more credibility nationwide.

Revolutionary Era ‘

The rigging of elections in 1981 sparked off a protracted armed struggle-the
National Resistance Movement (NRM/NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni against the Obote
II regime, giving the struggle for democracy in Uganda a revolutionary dimension.
From the onset, the NRM conceived Uganda’s problem as being largely political and not
economic. Guided by the ”Ten Point Program” (Museveni, K.Y., no date, p. 51), the

ll
NRM sought to redefine democracy in the Ugandan context and also to redress the
sectarian politics that had dominated the past.

By introducing Resistance Committees (RCs) at the village, subocounty, and
district level representatives to the National Resistance Council (NRC), the Movement
sought to enhance popular participation and parliamentary democracy. Security and
sectarianism were defined as major problems to deal with by its administration. Under
the NRM administration, fundamental changes in the political sphere seem to be taking
place. High level cadre intelligentsia and politicization are replacing ruthlessness as a
basis for recruiting the national army.

The legislating body of the NRM, the NRC is a broadbased compository of
representatives affiliated to different political parties but not elected on party platforms.
The biggest challenge to the NRM government now seems to be how to untangle the
economic crisis resulting from the misrule and wars that destroyed the infrastructure,
productive capital, and private property. The heavy borrowing between 1981-89 that
characterized the International Monetary Fund (IMF and World Bank-administered
economic programs) have resulted in an external debt of over US$1 billion. The
country’s revenue base is critically dependent on the world coffee market prices which
fluctuate a lot. The fall of the prices in 1989 grossly affected the country’s foreign
revenue.

The foregoing scenario clearly depicts the converging internal and external
economic, political, and technological forces which the NRM government has had to
contend with and has in the process lost a great deal of its revolutionary thrust. The
promised fundamental changes have not been easy coming. Security granted, peOple are
now questioning the govemment’s ability to deliver economic goods. The economic
infrastructure, whether agricultural, trade and commerce, industry, and social services
are decimated, disorganized, and fatally incapacitated.

12
This brief but comprehensive historical analysis of the dynamics of the
underdevelopment process in general provides the contextual texture of the causal factors
of the problems to radio development broadcasting in Uganda.

CHAPTER TWO
TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

Radio broadcasting is an electronically driven mass medium to purvey social
effects. The evaluation of its technical apparatus constitutes the base line for the analysis
of the problems to the organization and development of radio and its application in the
development process.

The appraisal of technological constraints to the radio broadcast medium thus
assumes an evaluation perspective of its application in varied social contexts. This
process of technical rationalization (in the case of Radio Uganda) aims at exploring ways
how the broadcaster’s capabilities can be maximized given a technical capacity.
Technical broadcast capabilities are thus measured against program reach under certain
technical standards along the geographical and time coverage space. In this frame of
analysis, signal reach and quality must be measured against the optimal utilization of the
broadcast spectrum as a public resource in general and the broadcast technical
infrastructure in particular.

The constitutive causal effect of the technological constraint on the objective
constraint function to development broadcasting is dependent upon a number of
interacting variables, such as: (1) political and financial policies, (2) the degree of
bureaucracy, (3) ethnic-language, and (4) geographical diversity. Broadcast objectives
to transcend the latter three barriers is dependent upon the magnitude of the former two
policies. The rate at which these policies are translated into broadcast objectives is
dependent upon the degree of bureaucracy across the constitutive institutions of the

executing state policy.

13

14
Equipment Survey

Basically, radio transmission pattern is dependent upon four major components
which constitutes the technical appraisal and rationalization baseline for this study. These
are: recording and transmission studios, program links, transmitter systems, and training
of manpower. Poor signal reception and constant blackouts plus the high rate of
equipment "cannibalism” result from the constant malfunctions along the technical
coverage components.

Audio engineers at the station have argued the importance of maintaining sound
linkage between these technical components as central to the source functioning of the
radio technical structure. It is pointless to have excellent transmitters if the links are too
incapacitated to relay the programs. Without well-trained personnel to carry out
maintenance services, the linkage between studios, relay links, and transmitters cannot
be efficiently sustained (Sound Broadcasting Rehabilitation Report, 1982, Radio Uganda).
Technical problems can be simply enumerated as contained in the annual reports by audio
engineers. This synthesis must, however, be analyzed within a wider contextual

perspective, scanning the contours of the interacting causal variables.

Studios. At the Broadcasting House in the capital, Kampala, there are 23 studios with
only 10 of them functional. Only four of the 13 recording studios and three of the 10
transmission studios are functional. With air conditioning facilities completely broken
down, the equipment is exposed to excess heating. ‘

The news studios located at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
headquarters, a distance of about 1.5 km from the Broadcasting House, are in skeletal
shape with only a microphone and a line amplifier connected directly to the FIT line
providing a very unreliable link with Broadcasting House.

15

Transmitters. The entire national broadcast pattern is composed of both SW and MW
transmitters, with the former receiving much emphasis given its wide technical coverage
advantage. Short wave transmitter stations have in a span of a decade been undergoing
rehabilitation from war destruction, equipment cannibalism, and years of long neglect.
Two lOKW SW and one lKW SW transmitters at Bugoloobi were commissioned in
1987. The former serves about 87% of the nation and the latter, Kampala City and its
neighborhoods with programs on the National Red Channel. This is further
supplemented with one 300-watt FM transmitter serving the capital and its neighborhoods
(see Figure 2).

The SW transmitting pattern is also supplemented with ”regional” 100KW MW
transmitters, two of them constituting independent channels (Bobi in Northern and Butebo
in Eastern Uganda). Bobi Channel also provides the signal for the Gilgil transmitter in
Northwestern Uganda (West Nile) and will be linked from Kampala either through
planned PIT microwave or directly via HF link. The station, destroyed in the 1979
liberation war that ousted Idi Amin, will now be replawd with a 10 KW MW
transmitter. Kabale Transmitter Station (Kyeriba) in Western and Mawaga in Southern
Uganda carry the same program on the Blue Channel.

Installation of most transmitters was done on "redundance principle, " running two
transmitters in parallel. Two 50KW MW transmitters combine to form a 100KW MW
station. The rationale behind the "redundance principle" basically being reliability in
terms of transmission continuity when one of the two transmitters encounters technical
mishaps.

With the exception of Mawaga Station, now reduced to 50KW MW, the other
regional MW stations remained closed down most of the time for over five years now.
They have been rendered inoperative at full capacity due to destruction by war,
equipment cannibalism, and vandalism. Equipment like PIE, studios, aerials, feeder
systems, plus test equipment tools are in a state of disrepair due to lack of spare parts.

16

 

 

  
      
      
  
   
   

 

 

/ \
~ I \ G __d / \
:f’“. .f'. .~.. \ ‘l
‘1‘ ,. !
Ii \I.
I' _ \
MM MOROTO .,
‘- GULU . \
‘II IGILI)O® O ->.<O l
(I . ‘-
"Mw 303' [E MORuLl RA ‘1
( MW )
N" O Elsw :\
DOKOLO [
MASINm SOROT
MBALE __/'
@O '../
th‘onoko
j 0 ./
r. FORTPORTAL \ ,-
i O MAWAG" KISUNJI f
: l
/./KA§ESE MW I—B—@ j
: Q. _ . [E] .
é/m MA SAKA SW~MW&FM I
I. MBARARA O . !
J LAKt VICTORIA j
IKABA’hh :.-../“ _... "_ .
who;
.J.‘ .
J KEY I
IEO) CAPITAL CITY I

i0 [OWN

EXISTING RADIO STATION

)'_( PROPOSED RADIO STATION
SCALE r=4,ooo,ooo.

' D at n

L
w

I”

 

l_._.____.

 

Figure 2. Radio Transmission Network.

 

17

Power supply also varies a lot at the transmitter sites, unequal phase voltages
resulting into trouble with transmitter fan motors and AVRS, i.e, Mawaga Station.
Butebo transmitter station is intermittently operational with one transmitter or
'redundance principle. " HT voltage constantly varies from about 7KV to 9KV due to
variations on the incoming main supply. Kabale transmission station has not had power
since 1987 due to lack of capacity at the local generating plant which is not connected
to the national grid.

Cannibalism also took a heavy toll on the External Service Station commissioned
in 1975. One of the two 250KW SW (Brown Boveri) is reported in working order,
while the other that was never commissioned is now incomplete with most of the parts
cannibalized. External service ceased six years ago and presently there are no plans to
revive it. A government that cannot provide the entire population with radio services has

no moral other than political justification to invest in external broadcast services.

Radio Links. The quality and reliability of signal propagation and reception depends on
the overall quality and dependability of the broadcasting system. In a centralized
broadcast system, radio links become vital components of the transmission pattern. In
the Uganda situation, links have suffered significant technical problems, rendering up-
country transmitters redundant most of the time. The traditional relay units have proved
very unreliable and need frequent service. This is further compounded by the location
of these units in remote locations which are difficult to service in view of the serious
administrative and transport problems. The power subsystems are also inadequate for
any kind of reliable service expected of a centralized broadcast system. The outdated
system engineering based on traditional and fragile radio links has thus significantly
degraded broadcast service in the last three decades and, therefore, needs overhauling,
especially in the face of the emerging, efficient modern link technology like microwaves

and satellite.

18

Traditional radio links have presented acute problems in attaining national radio
continuity while relaying programs from the Broadcasting House in Kampala to the
regionally located transmitters. The problem has been so tempting that in Amin’s rule
(1970s) satellite had to be used to link television and radio programs to Gilgil Transmitter
Station in Northwestern Uganda (West Nile). Both the lOKW radio and 25KW television
stations in Arua received signals from Kampala (800 km) via Intelsat at an annual cost
of US$1 million. With the fall of Idi Amin, this arrangement was abandoned for its
prohibitive costs.

The northern link to Bobi Station (583 km) is very erratic without standby
facilities like power, etc. It follows the Butebo leg on its long journey up north via the
east: Soroti, Dokolo, and Morn. Dokolo link station was hit by lightening and the
equipment was brought back to Kampala. The link is not operational and will not be
revived as the use of PTT microwaves continue to be explored.

The eastern leg link to Butebo transmitter station (250 km) had its repeater link
at Kisunji near Jinja vandalized and is beyond repair. The problem to reach Butebo
Station has been so tempting that (SW) programs have been rebroadcast from signals
monitored on a SW communication receiver. For almost five years now, Bobi and
Butebo channels have been off air with the latter intermittently repeating Blue Channel
programs using crude methods as seen above. The southwest link to Kabale (423 km)
comprising of five stages through Masaka and Mbarara was entirely destroyed by the
1979 liberation war and equipment ”cannibalism. "

The Outside Broadcasting (OB) and Mobile Recording Unit (MRU) originating
live broadcasts from sites other than the studios at Broadcast House is poorly equipped.
The Unit, which also provides coverage with public address system and recording
facilities, has for a long time had only one OB van for direct outside broadcasts from
short distances in Kampala and from such sites reasonably near post office telephone
lines. The Unit is, however, ill-equipped with only six functional Nagras to handle

19
outside recordings. Plans to buy three recording vans have since 1986 been successful
through the Central Tender Board (CT'B).

Technical Constraint Analysis

From a broad technology transfer perspective, decisions to adopt a given type of
technology are greatly dependent upon the interaction of political, financial, and
deployment patterns. Technical constraints along the transmission pattern stretch this
interaction to include other factors like the degree of bureaucracy and polylingualism,
plus the geographical factor (see Figure 3). It is beyond the scope of this study to
investigate in depth the causal context of each of the interacting factors. Instead, the
focus in this chapter will be on how this causative interaction reflect on the technical
broadcast goals.

For a great part of time, the basic technical question centers around the
centralized network’s ability to cover the entire population with programs originating
from the capital city. In the face of financial constraints, some audio engineers have
constantly urged concentrating rehabilitation resources on SW transmitters exhorting that
the two 20KW SW transmitters at Bugoloobi will cover 87 % of the nation with two
broadcast programs. This is despite the signal quality trade-off of using SW for domestic
broadcasts.

From a purely technological perspective, the rehabilitation of SW transmitters is
fascinatingly cheaper than reviving the MF transmitting stations to attain almost a similar
signal coverage area. It, however, overshadows the greater social assignment of the
medium in the development process which is dependent upon the flexibility brought by
MF and FM under the varied ethnic and language social environments.

20

 

 

 

 

 

 

\a...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bdrm
Wheat-tho - Rate
“n. ”I” / \I
am _. My
Policies,“
Techie-1m

 

 

 

 

 

 

“To“

 

7“

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3. Technical Constraint Analysis

 

 

21
This technological perspective tends to limit the generation of solutions to more
funds for equipment, spare parts, maintenance, and training of technical personnel. An
exhaustive problem analysis of these constraints must, however, explore the contextual
causative factors imposed, in part, by the political power structure and the consequent

policy formulation.

Centralized Technical Infrastructure. The political factor permeates the technical
structure and prognosis of Radio Uganda. The centralization of the medium at its time
of inception was a false start. Conceived in a centralized political framework, the
medium design and application pattern and its consequent organization and development
has tended to replicate the centralization media concept, built on the colonial political
structure promoting the politics of the core center at the expense of integrating the rural
periphery along the development message continuum. Structured to serve essentially
political interests of a centralized power structure, the transmission pattern surfaces with
inherent burdens in addressing the diversified social needs of the development process
in a diversified social context. This complexity makes it likely that technical problems
would occur, hence the widespread decay of the equipment along the transmission
pattern.

The aim of installing the five MW transmitter stations to repeat centralized
broadcasts was basically a consequence of the need to address the problem of language
diversity. Otherwise, as has been argued by audio engineers, SW would have attained
the desired coverage area with two SW programs. From a technological point of view,
MW transmitters present a technical diversity to address both language and program
diversities; this is still done in a centralized context with a high frequency of joining
channels.

This MW technological choice is tightly conceived in a political prism to address

the diversities in a centralized pattern. Political considerations in designing policies to

22
exploit broadcast technology thus constitutes a major factor in the interaction of

interrelated variables of technical constraints.

Information Sector Budgeting. In a centralized broadcast structure, technology tends
to be exploited in a rigid and technocratic manner. Causal variables to the technological
constraint in radio development broadcasting thus trickle down to the finance factor
constraint to purchase equipment, to carry out maintenance, and to develop manpower.
While decisions to adopt a type of technology depends, among others, on the mix of both
political and financial factors, the former surfaces as the prime factor conditioning
financial decisions. It is thus imperative to explore how this centralized political factor
translates into financial commitments to the organization and development of the radio
medium in terms of political decisions, sectoral prioritization, and policies.

Research carried out in different parts of the globe now show that benefits
accruing to the information sector cannot be empirically quantified in monetary values
given that development as a measure of social change has multifaceted causal factors.
Investments to this sector need not, however, be hampered by the lack of this empiricism
in the investment and social benefit considerations. It is imperative that the political
importance equated to the radio medium be reflected in the national budget sectoral
prioritization process, a factor that has been ignored in the past by successive
governments.

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB), which controls both the
only national television and radio services on top of other information services, receives
less than 0.5 % on average of the government Recurrent Expenditure each financial year
while other ministries like Finance and Defense take lion shares (see Table 1). Only
about 0.1% of the 0.5% goes to finance Radio Uganda. The expenditure on defense to
finance wars during the two decades of political chaos has depleted national resources at

the expense of other service sectors.

23

 

 

 

855m Lo DEEZ .6238.

w.w~ €852 mdm fimwmo 0.5 123 wém Qomofi mom mdnm 85on 3
5; 98a o; 99% A.” nac— o; odm b; mdm aha—sotw’x S
fin 0....me m.N odmo Nd v.9: TN m.ww 5m e60 5:8: 3
fin wdmw v.m mfimo wé Qmwn 9N v.02 w.~ 06m 35:. cmmoaom 0
Yo #48 m6 owe wd 0&0 md odu 56 q: Essences 2
9e awEw we can.» se 53¢ 9.x: 993 9e 33.» Java—Em: 230

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Essa seem: .6 Esme:

$32-3va has: a ceased nausea 205598

4 Bang.

 

24
Project Implementation. Radio projects implementation have to go through the
treadmill of the bureaucratic decision-making process across a number of institutions
outside the MIB. The bureaucratic red tape has often constrained the rate of project
implementation resulting in both time and cost overruns. Implementation of projects is
often characterized with fragmented responsibility leading to inadequate implementation
and consequent interface problems.

Projects often involve more than four government institutions outside MIB which
is the broadcasting authority executing the plans. The Ministry of Finance provides the
funds and is responsible for the Central Tender Board (CI'B) through which government
purchases are made. The Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (controlling
P'IT), which is the technical communications regulatory body, provides broadcast
frequencies and program links. The Ministry of Housing carries out repair, building,
and construction work on the sites at the transmission units all over the country.

This devastating feature to broadcasting kin to political control is often in the
hands of the old and insensitive guard Often characterized with corrupt tendencies. The
uninnovative bureaucracy created to serve the colonial economy has outlived its
usefulness and is, instead, constraining the development and organization of the radio
medium. After the commissioning of transmitters at Bugoloobi station in Kampala in
1987, the installation of standby power generators component of the transmitters dragged
on for another one and a half years because the civil works for generator rooms was
delayed. Even when ready, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development responsible
for the installation of the generators was not ready to start. 9

Fund disbursement budgeted for Radio Uganda is often delayed with unexplained
reasons. In the 1989/90 financial year, Shs. 524,043,000.00 was budgeted for MIB in
June 1989 but the actual figure received by November was only Shs. 169,129,208.00.
Out of Shs. 524,043,000.00 budgeted for MIB 1989/90, only Shs. 93,880,000.00 was
for Radio Uganda and again only Shs. 27 ,831,837 .00 was disbursed by November 1989

25
(MIB proposed estimates 1990/91). This has partly contributed to the delay in the
purchase of equipment and spares. Plans to purchase OB recording vans in 1986 have
still not, after four years, materialized through the Central Tender Board (CTB). Plans
to replace teleprinters circuits linking the MIB headquarters with up—country news
gathering centers has suffered a similar fate with CTB turning down selective tendering
in favor of problem-ridden open tendering.

The economic crisis resulting from years of misrule and wars that has hurt the
implementation of government projects is further compounded by the high level of
corruption across the institutions involved in implementing radio projects. The delays
inflate the costs of project implementation.

This is further compounded by the prevalent lack of accountability even at higher
levels in the implementation process. The 1987 Auditor General’s Report found that
funds allocated to the MIB under the International Development Agency Program (IDA)
to purchase radio and television equipment were instead partly used to import personal
effects for a former minister in Obote 11 government who had personally handled the
importation of this equipment (Auditor General’s Report, 1987).

Technical Innovation] Possibilities

In the context of technology transfer, new innovations render previous
maintenance costs prohibitive as in the case of the traditional program links. Innovations
like fiber optics, microwaves, and satellite present increased alternatives to salvage radio
transmission systems. Transition, for example, to the compressed microwave technology
is not only tempting, but cost-effective in the long run, the transition costs withstanding.
Microwaves have yielded fast to compression telecommunication technology, allowing
more capacity for many channels to be squeezed on one single circuit. Radio Uganda
already has to reach the "regional" transmitters via PTI‘ microwaves radio bearers.

26
Microwaves links would eliminate the need for the costly and maintenance-intensive radio
links.

Microwave technology being deployed by the FIT all over the country provides
hope for Radio Uganda to discard the traditional links that are now beyond repair. It,
however, simply does away with the link constraint while continuing to replicate the
politically conditioned centralized transmission pattern. It also tends to overshadow the
cost consideration of renting channels for the entire 17 broadcast hours channels to the
five different "regional” transmitters. The FTP microwave project is funded with
assistance from foreign organizations and is run on cost—revenue basis. Radio Uganda
would, therefore, have to foot the market price for the channels on P'I'l‘ microwaves.

Transition costs would include acquiring ”T—off" from the nearest PT'l‘ points in
the five regions. Radio engineers have also envisaged a problem with the available PTI‘
channels since broadcasting nwd wide band channels. Multiplexing/ interface equipment
at both ends of the FIT circuits will be required.

Medium wave transmitters will also, in face of the new innovations, continue to
be expensive for its high power consumption among other inputs. In a decentralized
broadcast alternative, FM offers a far cheaper and efficient transmission pattern given
its smaller transmitter and power advantage. Its overall costs are lower than MW.
Decentralization also reduces the program link costs from the Broadcasting House in

Kampala.

CHAPTER 3
PROGRAMMING PATTERN CONSTRAINTS

The concept of development broadcasting presupposes using radio to purvey pro-
social change—oriented behavioral content. The programming factor and the audience
conteXt constitute radio’s eliciting potential of the valued social responses. Emphasis in
this chapter is on how the development aspect manifests in the content categories against
efficiency in channel utilization. The audience context, under the scope of program
intervention, will be treated in the next chapter.

Programming, measured against broadcast objectives, is dependent upon the
interaction of technological, political and policy environment, polylingualism factors, and
the broadcasters’ state of professionalism. The foregoing chapter has already
demonstrated how the technological shortcomings constrain the broadcast capability.
Emphasis here will be on the remaining three factors. This chapter will also demonstrate
how these factors affect the efficient utilization of the available radio channels.

The Development Program

Development broadcasting (a specific use of development journalist) is the
practice of mobilizing available media in support of specific nation-building programs
like health or literacy campaign (Howell, W.J., 1986, p. 186). Emerging in the era of
information societies in the West and owing to the varying practical application of the
concept in the varied three world contests, its study has not been very definitive. For
purposes of this study, we shall, however, define development broadcasting from the

point of view of its substance-as information, analysis, comment and interpretation

27

28
aimed at motivating people and policy towards issues which concern development
(Chopra, P., 1977, p. 9).

In a development perspective, the design and production of broadcast programs
is dependent upon specific programming concepts based on analysis of needs and
characteristics of the target audiences. This perspective, however, is dependent upon the
textured information model in place: the authoritarian, libertarian, totalian, or social-
responsibility model. Broadcast policies as influenced by the political power structure

is a major ingredient in the programming pattern process.

Content Categories. The new program was chosen as a unit of analysis on account of
the prominence both government and the Uganda population attach to it. Radio ranks
as the major source of news since both TV and print media are incapacitated by both
technical and finance constraints and are, therefore, confined to a few urban centers.
Objectives. The purpose of the content analysis was to identify program content
design and packaging as a constraint to integrating rural issues into development
broadcast programs. While the objective was to determine the proportion of development
content categories in news broadcasts on Radio Uganda.
Three hypotheses guided the content analysis:
1. The news program on Radio Uganda has more political than economic news
content.
2. Political leaders are still the dominant news makers.
3. News programs are dominated by urban sources than rural activities.
Methodology. News program content was categorized at two levels. Three coded
story variables: (1) political, (2) economic (agriculture, finance, health, trade, education,
etc.), and (3) social (human interest, art, and leisure) content were analyzed against the
newsmaker at two coded variables: (1) newsmakersuthe "politician” and ”others” (rural

people, opinion leaders, religious leaders, etc.) and (2) news sources—"urban" and

29
”rural” sources. All these categories were coded in terms of number of stories
broadcast.

“Hard news” broadcasts for 10 days were randomly chosen across the four weeks
of November 1989 with each week having a ”minimum" of three days. This sampling
method was chosen due to the difficulty of getting complete files of the news broadcasts.
Poor documentation at the newsroom was responsible for this anomaly.

Results and Data Analysis. Data analysis was limited to descriptive level as
indicated by percentage frequency distribution (Table 2).

Table 2. Frequency Distribution in Percentages of Story Categories in Radio Uganda News Bulletin
for 10 Days in November 1989

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political Economic Social
Local Local Local
Newsmakers Urban Rural Foreign Urban Rural Foreign Urban Rural Foreign
m 28.3% 17.6% 6.8% 25.7% 16.2% 1.4% 2.7% 1.3% 0%
Others 4.1% 2.8% 49% 11% 6.9% 4.8% 11% 6.9% 3.5%
Total 54.8% 29.7% 15.5%

 

 

 

The frequency distribution of story categories showed that there was more
political (54.8%) than economic (29.7%) and social (15.5%) news coverage. The
political category, however, was greatly weighted by the foreign news coverage without
which the economic category (56.0%) was more than the political (44.0%). At the level
of political leaders as newsmakers, there was more political (52.7%) than economic
(43.3%) and social (4.0%) news coverage. ”Political leaders” (50.7%) as newsmakers
accounted for more than ”others" (49.3 %) of the news content. At the economic
category level, the political leader (54.4 %) accounted for more than others (45.6%). The
news program was also dominated by urban (61.5%) than rural (38.5%) sources.

30

News sources compared as follows: urban (36.5%), rural (22.9%), and foreign
(40.6%), while local coverage alone was composed of more urban (61.5 %) than rural
(38.5 %) sources. Foreign stories are predominantly political (85.4 %) and then economic
(9.0%) and social (5.6%).

The difference between political and economic is not very significant at the
descriptive statistics level. The hypothesis that there is a significant frequency of
political news coverage appears to be more significant than the difference between the
two categories as assumed at the beginning of the study.

The dominance of the political content also provides an indicator of the intensity
of the political factor in the programming pattern. With the ”political leader” (54.4%)
accounting for more than ”others" (45.6%) of the economic news, the complimentary
function of radio in the development process seems to make more political than economic
logic. The significance of the hypothesis that political leaders are the dominant
newsmakers is that radio then becomes a one-way medium for issuing directives and
orders or statements on government policy.

In analyzing the news content, the level of categorization, of which this
quantification is based, is not exclusively exhaustive in the strictest sense of the lines
between political and economic content cannot be more explicit. It, however,
approximates the manifest categories of the program. Shortfalls in the exclusivity of the
levels of categorization in isolating the political factor is compensated for by the analysis
of other manifest variables like the political leader as a dominant newsmaker.

Qualitative Analysis

Interpretation and analysis of factors underlying the programming constraints
based on the above descriptive data, however, needs to be supplemented with qualitative
analysis based on personal interviews of Radio Uganda staff and others and secondary

31
resources. This will reinforce the explanations provided by the generalized manifestation
from the programming content analysis identified above in the study.

While the number of foreign political stories are relatively many in comparison
to the local political stories, the latter are often longer in length taking more air time than
the former. The local political factor in the news program is, therefore, a major
ingredient.

The flow of local stories from rural areas is erratic owing to the poor
communication infrastructure like the nonfunctioning teleprinters mentioned in the
previous chapter. Political content, especially from rural areas, is treated with maximum
delicacy for its inclusion in the news program. Where doubt is felt, stories are simply
held. On the other hand, foreign wired stories easily fill in this gap.

Political leaders, often city bound, influence the newsmaking process in a number
of ways. By evoking their positions in government and facilitating news staff, their
activities are given extensive coverage in the news programs. The majority of programs

also lack any flexibility considered vital in the development program perspective.

Rigid Programming. The presentation of news and information on radio is still too
rigid and formal based on selective publicity of the government perspectives on social
change. While the political content dominance could be explained by the need to
promote and heighten the political consciousness of the population, the rigid program
packaging renders the process ineffective, blurring the distinction between
'politicalization" and the essential "politicalization. " The latter is action-Oriented but is
often mistaken for the latter which is more rhetoric oriented.

Emerging media research today is emphasizing the complexity of the
communication process, and findings are in disfavor of govemment’s control of
information whose preoccupation is more gravitated towards painting the political image

than addressing themselves to people communication needs. It is, however, imperative

32
to note that "Human beings are not information processors, but code crafters. They do
not think straight, if ’straight’ is taken to adhering standards of right thinking
predetermined by some higher authority. This ambiguity is the most subtle and useful
quality we bring to the task of fashioning a creative information environment" (Dizard,
W.P., Jr., 1989, p. 11).

The prominence of political content in this case is then at variance with the
concrete needs of the target rural population. Publicity programming skewed against
rural content promotes the image of the state polity and core at the expense of the greater
rural periphery. The temptation by political leaders to use radio as a public megaphone
is greater than the case that would promote audience participation. “Emphasis in most
developing countries is always on publicity. For authorities in such countries, there is
no difference between information (provision of facts and figures) and communication
(exchange of ideas) . . . . Provisions are usually made for publicizing development plans
and objectives, but very little is done for feedback and for discussions" (Moemaka, A.
1989, p. 19). Broadcast policy reform is an imperative in this context to enable radio
supplement the development process. "Radio broadcasts have a zero effect on the
listeners if its messages are rejected, if programs are not planned to meet the
communication needs of listeners. Publicity is rejected if it is identified as such. Thus,
the imperative need for skilled and intellectual program planning" (Amjad Hussain, 1989,
p. 4).

Broadcast Policy Reforms. The importance of adequate policy to guide radio in
supplementing the development process has been compromised by lack of policy
research. The role of broadcasting is simply defined by MIB as that to inform, educate,
and entertain. These policy guidelines, while simply generalized and allowing flexibility
and creativity on the part of broadcasters, have, instead, been exploited by successive
regimes for their simply ambiguity; complicating the program decision making process.

33

For a great part of Radio Uganda’s broadcast time, interpretation of such policy
guidelines as in the case of most Third World countries is compromised by such
circumstances which make programs that are less likely to invite criticism from various
policy makers--the political powers that may be (Katzel and Wedell, 1977, p. 5). This
situation stifles the broadcaster’s freedom to reflect on society as any information analysis
or commentary is likely to be more politically motivated and, hence, individual leaders
appointing themselves the "sole interpreters of the national interest, (and) chauvinism is
compounded with a single, unquestionable political line" (Ibid, p. 5).

The above practice has further promoted only the vertical rather than the
horizontal role of radio that subjects the population to the daily ”rhetorical gimmicks”
of the ruling class. The scarce resources are deployed along those lines, with priority
in funding and facilities diminishing as the program content moves away from the
political and affluent newsmaker to others in rural environments. In Amin and Obote II
governments, political praise songs (dubbed patriotic music) competed for air time with
serious programs like health, agriculture, and education.

Everett Rogers categorizes two forms of development journalism: the critical
independent form of development news and the government controlled development
news. This distinction is based on Aggarwala’s observation that the " journalists job is
to critically examine, evaluate, and report the relevance of a developing project to
national and local needs, the difference between a planned scheme and its
implementation, and the difference between its impact on people as claimed by the
government officials and as it actually is” (Everett Rogers, 197 8, p. 69). 9

Government policy to control program content like in the news program,
projecting only the official point of view, tends to reap the very opposite. The practice
has in the past robbed the national station of audiences to the international radio stations
such as the BBC and VOA as more credible sources of news. In the long run, Radio

34
Uganda’s ability to acquire a functional role in shaping public opinion (agenda-setting)
around social activities is rendered ineffective.

As Sedney points out about broadcasting in Africa that ”programming in general
tends to be heavily colored by the concept of national building . . . literacy, civics,
public health, agricultural improvement, cultural traditions, political commentary, and
social guidance (Sedney, H.W., 1974, p. 12), this often remains in programming
schedules in Uganda for a great part of the time. Producers completely handicapped by
lack of finance, equipment, transport, and the poor communication infrastructure collect
whatever trivial (non-political) material within their proximity and simply fill the air time
scheduled for development programs.

Radio Uganda also suffers from an acute shortage of development oriented
broadcasters who are creative and flexible enough to make their work continuously
relevant and to deal with those often unexpected rural situations. Broadcasters’
performance, in most instances, reflect little basic knowledge about the existing social
relationships owing to the low level of education of most producers and lack of any
sound training after recruitment. "Rural broadcasting needs a new type of professional
man, who is beginning to appear in broadcasting and extension services. He must
combine technical knowledge of radio with a clear grasp of the rudiments of agriculture
and sympathetic approach to the problems of the primary producer" (Opuku, UNESCO,
1964-5 , p. 9).

Another problem resulting from poor state of professionalism which has been
perpetuated for lack of policy research is the persistence of lack of adequate knowledge
about gaps communication can fill in social, political, and economic development. The
existing technocratic policy, simply assumes that rural populations are always there only
to be informed, educated, or entertained.

The recruitment policy lost direction in recruiting the deserving due to hand
picking method by political stalwarts since Amin’s rule through Obote II. It is very

35
costly to maintain such staff recruited on political grounds, who in most instances do not
easily respond to any form of training. Professional ethics is sacrificed for crude
political methods, with allegiance of such staff accorded more to individuals than their
immediate heads or job description.

The remuneration under the civil service, plus the acute shortage of funds and
facilities like portable recorders and transport, make broadcasters highly susceptible to
corruption and content manipulation by outside interests. "The trend mill of broadcast
production by tenured civil servants can have a deadly effect on morale and creativeness.
It is all too easy to slip into dull, repetitive routines and to fail to make the extra effort
that alert and timely programming always demands” (Sedney, H.W., 1974, p. 350).

The administrative structure to arrest the situation is simply not available and
university graduates are technically knocked out of the service by the multitude of
anomalies. To reverse this trend, the station will have to reassess itself to determine
whether they have development orientated broadcasters to perform the development
communication role.

From the content prism, the political power structure, both by commission and
omission, constrains the developmental role of broadcasting in Uganda with more
emphasis put on using radio to paint the political image than to tackle the concrete issues
as they occur in rural areas. The roots of instability manifested in the unresolved
political questions have limited radio’s role to that of political manipulator and regime
builder. The broadcaster’s responsibility as an instrument of the undemocratic
government and the failing credibility among the audience surface as key problems to
producing programs that are both useful to attain broadcast goals and to attract the
people. Radio’s role continues to be narrowly and repressively conceived in terms of
facilitating the govemment’s image of reality. Program content is technocratically
manipulated to suit political ends than to concrete rural development needs.

36

The democratization of radio is a basic ingredient in the overall democratization
process. If radio was involved in the process of policy formulation from grassroot
structures like Resistance Committees (RCs), the situation where government would fear
criticism on its own station would not arise. A more ruralized radio concept alternative
to promote popular participation in the development process would in this context
approximate with the decentralization process of the power structure under the popular
grassroot Resistance Committees.

Govemment-dominated programs like news in the case of Radio Uganda do not
leave room for criticism that ensures participatory communication, but instead promotes
unpopular point of views about such development projects. The process of development
news would therefore demand such a democratic context that would bridge the gap

between message source and target audiences.

Programming Schedule

The programming schedule of any radio station represents its programming
pattern in terms of prioritization of broadcast variables like content categories and
language coverage in a multilingual context. The viability of the schedule in addressing
these variables, therefore, provides some measure of the programming pattern
constraints. Radio Uganda broadcasts in 20 languages, but French and Arabic have been
off-air since the collapse of the External Broadcasting Services in 1978.

The Home Service is composed of four channels: Red, national programs, Blue,
Midland (Buganda) and Western region programs, Bobi, Northern region; and Buetobo,
Eastern region programs. Buetobo, Bobi, and the extended Blue channel (Kabale) to
cover the Western region were set up to address the problem of language diversity. This
increased capacity has been compromised, however, by technical constraints to link
programs to the up—country MW transmitters. As a consequence, Bobi and Butebo
channel are off air most of the time, while Blue channel cannot link its programs beyond

37
Midland (Buganda) to the Western region station at Kabale. The technical constraint
diminishes the programming potential in terms of air time to individual languages
reduced to the few operating channels and increases congestion of the 18 languages to
the two remaining channels. As this technical link constraint intensifies, the intensity of
joining channels increases. This is further compounded by the high frequency of joining
regional channels to the national (Red) channel for a great part of the broadcast time, for
what is conceived as national programs. The resultant broadcast air shrinkage has a
decimating effect on the programming strategy of the other channels, with prominence

given to the national programs than the diverse rural languages.

Program Schedule Analysis. Programming schedules for Radio Uganda for the year
1977 and 1990 were studied with the objective of determining the magnitude of the
language congestion problem on the available channels, prominence of air time per
program category, frequency of joining channels, and changes over years in the
programming pattern (schedules).
Objectives. The objectives of the schedule content analysis was based on the
following subhypotheses:
l. The few available channels are highly congested by the many languages which
affect program category continuity.
2. The frequency of joining channels is high, decimating programming on other
designated regional channels.
3. There is more "hard news" and ”light” than "serious" (agriculture, education,
health, and finance and trade) programs.
4. There has not been much change in the programming pattern (schedule) between
1977 and 1990.
Method. Programs across the weekly schedule were categorized as follows:

”hard news," comprising of news bulletins and current affairs programs; ”light

38
programs,” including music, drama, sports, and other entertainment; “serious programs,”
including educational, agriculture, finance and trade, health, and political mobilization;
and "others, " comprising of religious content like prayers and commercials.

Content was coded in terms of the number of times each program category
occurred on the schedule. Frequency of joining channels was based on total number of
times programs and hours joined in an average broadcast day of the week.

Results. The comparative data on the number of programs broadcast on the home
service in 1977 showed that the Red channel originated 49.1% of the total broadcast
programs followed by Blue with 39.1%, Butebo with 4.9%, and Bobi with 6.9% (see
Figure 4).

Most of the news programs in 1977 were broadcast on Red (55.3 %) and Blue
(40.3%) while Bobi and Butebo only broadcasted 4.4% and 0.0%, respectively (see
Table 3). Bobi (97.24 hrs/week) and Butebo (88.00 hrs/week) joined Red (21.34
hrs/week) and Blue channels for mostly news programs in the following languages:
English, Luganda, Runyoro, Rutoro, Runyankole, Bukiga, Luo, Kiswahili, and Ateso.
This reflects the prominence given to news broadcasting and the languages which to a

certain degree reflect the regional diversity at a generalized level.

Table 3. Percentage share of program categories on each broadcast channel for 1977 and
1990.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hard News Serious Programs Light Programs Others
Channels 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990
Red 55.3 62.1 41.5 44.4 44.8 49.6 54.2 49.0
Bobi 4.4 — 3.0 - 6.6 -— 3.4 -
Blue 40.3 37.9 47.4 55.6 33.6 50.4 40.7 51.0
Butebo 0.0 - 8.1 -— 15.0 - 1.7 -

 

 

 

39

 

 

 

    

532". 46-87°
1 990

 

 

 

 

Red channel Blue channel

 

  

Red channel Bobi

3 m Butebo channel

 

Blue channel 1977

 

Figure4. PercentageShareof ProgramOrientationonthe4ChannelsfortheYears
1997 and 1990.

 

40

The hard news category dominates the four channels. Red channel, which
originated the most programs (49.1%), was dominated in 1988 by hard news (45.0%)
followed by light programming (32.6%); serious programs, excluding hard news,
(14.2%); and others, religious, commercials, etc., (8.2%) (see Table 4). In 1990 hard
news again dominated at 47.1% followed by light programming (17.8%), serious
programs (21.4%), and others (13.7%). Light programming declined on the Red channel
to accommodate more serious programs originated by the Bobi and Butebo channels
which were off air in 1990. The Blue channel, which originated 39.1% of broadcast
programs in 1977, was almost affected by the same pr0portion of changes of category

distribution as on Red (see Figure 4).

Table 4. Percentage Share of Program Content Categories on the Four Channels for Years
1977 and 1990.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Program Red Bobi ' Blue Butebo
Content '
Moria, 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990
11:11de 45.0% 47.1% 35.9% - 41.2% 32.6% 0.0% -
1‘31“ 32.6 17.8 48.8 - 30.7 20.6 78.2 -
pmsmms
Serious

14.2 21.4 10.2 - 20.4 36.6 20.0 .-
Programs
Others 8.2 13.7 5.1 - 7.7 16.2 1.8 -

100% 100% 100% - 100% 100% 100% -

   

An analysis of the program schedule for the two years indicates that the
programmatics of the developmental role of radio have not been grasped and integrated,
resulting in structural constraints in the utilization of the broadcast capacities available

on the four channels.

41

Table 5. Number of Light Programs and Others“ in Each Language on Red and Blue
Channels in 1990.

Red Channel Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

English 4 5 2 4 4 3 4 29
Swahili - - - - - l 1 2
Madi - - - - - - - -
Lugbara - 1 - - - - 1 2
Lwo l 1 1 l 1 l 5
Ateso 1 3 - l 1 - l 7
Kakwa - - - - 1 - - l
Karamojong - - - - - - - -
Alur - - - - - - -

Blue Channel

Luganda - 4 l 4 2 1 4 l8
Lugwere l - - - - l 1 3
R/RIR/R 1 4 2 - l 2 1 12
LIL/L - - - - - - - -
Kupsabiny - - - - - - - -
Lusoga - - - - ~ - 1 l
Rwamba - - - - 1 - - l
LuyiralLukon - - - - l - 1 2
20

Dhapadhora - - - - 1 - - -
TOTAL 84

 

 

*Others include commercials and religious content.

Source: Derived by analysis from Radio Uganda proposed 2 Channel program schedule
No. 22.

 

 

42
Language Multiplicity and Joining Channels
Radio Uganda’s program schedule, in the situation of language multiplicity (18
broadeast languages, see Table 5), does not seem to highlight consistence of
programming strategies. The high frequency of joining channels to the national programs
in a few languages further decimates both air time broadcast eapacity and the already
language-segmented audiences (see Table 6).

Table 6. Number of Hours Joined to Red and Blue Channels in a Weekly Broadcasting

  

 

 

 

 

Channel Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Total
Bobi-Red 13.32 14.22 13.42 14.22 13.42 14.42 13.02 97.24
Butebo-Red 10.07 9.57 10.07 9.57 9.27 9.57 8.42 66.14
Blue-Red 1.52 3.37 3.22 3.37 3.37 3.37 1.52 21.34
Butebo-Blue 3.53 2.23 2.38 3.53 1.08 2.23 3.38 19.56
Total 29.24 30.19 29.49 31.49 27.54 30.39 27.14 207.08

 

   

 

Source: by analysis fro weekly program schedule Saaturdy 2 December todFriay-
30 December 1977

Joining the other three channels to the national programs on Red channel in a few
major languages, such as English, provides an alternative for reaching the literate public
strewn across the vastly multilingual barriers. But, the assumption is that at the time of
joining a minority public is greater in importance than the predominantly illiterate
majority who would instead feel comfortable with more local programs on their channels
unjoined.

Joining channels then has had a disadvantage of compressing radio’s ability to
cross the vast linguistic barriers and address the development needs manifested in the
content categories. As a result of joining channels, 54.2% of the air time broadeast
capability is unutilized yet burning the same transmitter power as would be the ease at
full utility when not joined (see Table 6 and Figure 5).

 

43

 

channels

Number of

I.)

Channels

Red
Blue
Bobi

Butebo

4 channels cumplt'lls joint-(l

F
F ’.
a a
“:1
I.
- a
2’. :
a a
= .55
U: c
c ':
v
“-0
s
3 ‘l.
O
- p
F s
L 5'
3 0‘
'0 f“ s
v

r.-

airtime utility

‘normul curw 1 no joining)

\

 

 

\

54.2".

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l7

hhnnbcr

of

hours

34

per day

SI

68

 

Figure 5. Air Time Shrinkage Due to Joining the 4 Channels.

 

44

Furthermore, the underlying temptation to perceive audiences as masses and the
desired social action in its aggregate renders radio content too general for the already
segmented audiences. While this lack of specificity diminishes content relevancy, the
consequent variance of program content eategories with concrete rural issues also renders
the medium’s potential to elicit pro social change responses impotent.

The technical failure of Bobi and Butebo channels intensified the decimating effect
of joining channels, compressing the broadcast capacity to deal with content categories
and language variables (see Table 6).

The foregoing analysis provides a strong case for more flexibility in responding
to the contextual factors for the efficient utilization of broadeast technology. The nwd
to forge a national public and national broadcast language conflicts with the more
essential need for radio to attain acceptability among the vastly rural multilingual
population. Improving on broadcasts in the various local languages then becomes an
imperative. It is unlikely that Uganda will in the near future adopt such a language
policy that would provide an alternative to polylingual broadcasting. The congestion of
the 18 languages on the existing four centralized channels reflect the wide ranging ethnic
pride and status which makes the issue more political than what communication pedagogy

ean offer.

Content Categories

With all the four channels operational in 1977, light programming ranked second
to the hard news category (see Table 3). Butebo (78.2%) and Bobi (48.8%), up—country
designated channels, were dominated by light programming in comparison to 20.0% and
10.2% , respectively, of the serious programming category. Also, as already. pointed out,
scheduled serious programs, due to lack of funds, are instead filled with low-cost light
and talk programs. Continuity of themes in the serious programs is further decimated

as content is handled on a situational basis, reflecting inconsistency of strategy in the

45
development component reflected in this eategory on radio. Pragmatic programming is
a function of such a complexity of inferences that have not been integrated into the
programming strategy of Radio Uganda.

A common assumption is Radio Uganda’s wider audience is due to its unequaled
reach compared to both print and television. But the common temptation such an
assumption brings to radio broadcasting is to use this banded listenership as a raw
measure of the fulfillment of the broadcast objectives. A fact that must be grappled with
is to balance between interesting (light programming) and developmental (serious
programs) and to improve on radio’s interactive potential. The challenge then is for
broadcasters to attain a reasonable blend between the two, not to produce a program for
its sake, but to exploit all that makes programs interesting to deliver developmental
messages.

For the radio medium to attain the functional role of supplementing development,
content categories must be reflective of the burning needs of the audience contexts. The
political image painting role must be balanced with the development needs of the rural
people by allowing the broadcaster to explore the professional freedoms to reflect
objectively on society. The politieal factor variable must be reduced to the minimum of
its positive ingredient.

Policies must also be devised to allow for the efficient utilization of broadeast
capability on the available channels, to address the problem of dealing with content
categories and language diversities. The unutilized air time capacity (54.2%, see Figure
5) must be utilized efficiently by allowing the up—country designated channelsuBlue,
Butebo, and Bobi (and others to be installed in the future like Gilgili)-to originate their
own programs in the various local languages in a decentralized context as proposed in
this model (Figure 6).

 

 

BLUE 303'

(enllaliled model

 

joined air time

 

unjoimd air litm-

BOB]

     
 

lkcrutralized model

BUTE 80

RED

 

figure 6. A Decentralized Model for the 4 Channel Network.

 

47
Conclusion

The aim of carrying out program content and schedule analysis is specifically
aimed at identifying structural constraints and making suggestions to restructuring,
harmonizing, and rationalizing the development program and the use of radio channels.

The development communication approach to media requires a systematic and
efficient use of communication resources like radio channels. The programming schedule
with the development program must both highlight consistency of interaction between the
broadcaster, development agent, and the audience.

To elicit rightly considered action demands prescription of right ideas by the
broadcaster. Yet when technocratically done under strict government control, the
impracticality of the ideas, plus lack of reinforcement, breeds frustration. Whoever then
elects himself as a rightful authority to prescribe the regardedly right ideas must first
conform to the democratic process of generating ideas or else credibility is lost on part
of the communicator caused by the frustrated actors (audiences).

The democratic ingredient in the design and production of programs is dependent
upon a democratic programming concept based on the concrete analysis of the needs and
characteristics of the target audience. This democratic process thrives best in a broadcast
system which, while maintaining some degree of verticality, promotes the horizontal
process of rural radio communication. The decentralization of radio broadcasting (see
Figure 6) presents a more flexible environment that makes it possible to attain a
participatory communication process. Short of this possibility, the variance between the
programming component and the target audience will keep widening.

CHAPTER 4
AUDIENCE INTERVENTION CONSTRAINTS

The most critical point along the message source-audience continuum is the
medium intervention process. The preceding chapters (Two and Three) have with
empiric data, although vastly descriptive, attempted to reinforce the theoretical
framework for the decentralization model of radio communication channels to address
the diversified needs in varied social contexts. More evidence on the practical aspects
between the technocratic pattern radio has taken in rural areas and the real impressions
of the audience’s opinions on the programming pattern and content variables becomes
even more critical to reinforce the decentralization model. In short, an audience research
in a constraint perspective sets out to identify possible evidence about the medium’s

intervention problems and suggestions to the alternative solutions.

Surveying the Audience

Ideal communication policy research attempts to combine a number of different
research methods (triangulation method). The previous chapters relied mostly on focused
synthesis (Chapter Two) and content analysis (Chapter Three) in providing technical
analysis of the problems to the organization and development of radio broadcasting in a
development perspective.

To underscore the importance of policy research and the various constraints it
brings into the limelight, this chapter will rely on data collection by survey method

across Ugandans varied audience contexts.

48

49

Background. The degree to which radio communication has taken in Uganda’s rural
context is still a subject of speculation based mostly on mere assumptions about audience
characteristics. The crucial question of how radio enters the social communication
networks of the rural areas has not been addressed mainly due to lack of policy research
in dealing with rural communities. The last and perhaps only audience survey lirrrited
to demographic facts is said to have been done in 1963, although there is no record of
it at MIB.

While research is acknowledged as important by MIB, it has for decades received
lip service. In the circumstances, broadcasters depend mostly on intuition to anticipate
audience responses. The gap between broadcasters and audiences has kept widening as
the former is not constantly kept abreast of the changing audience needs. Part of the
reasons owe to the influence of the political factor on the existing policy flaw already
explored in the previous chapters and can be crystallized in Sedney’s general observation
on broadcasting in Africa, "officials of some governments still tend to regard
broadcasting as a one-way medium. They see it as a way of issuing directives, orders,
flats, or edits rather than as a means of establishing dialogue. They see it as a way of
imposing conformity rather than a means of developing consensus, as a weapon of
propaganda rather than as an avenue of enlightenment. Such officials use the national
broadcasting service as a personal megaphone rather than a device for responding to the
wants and needs of the receiving ends” (Sedney H. 1974, p. 321).

Survey Objective. To suggest optimum policy mix that will enable Radio Uganda to
attain optimal utilization of its broadcast channels.
Focus. Listenership habits and feedback flow constraints all over the country.
Major Hypothesis. Due to the technical constraints, preferential program
scheduling, urban nature of program content, and feedback flow constraints; radio’s

potential to elicit pro social change behavior is greatly constrained.

50
Sub-hypotheses.
1. Constant technical failures constrain the effective listenership of Radio Uganda.
2. Due to preferential program scheduling, less people listen to programs in their
individual languages.
3. Much of the current program content (urban) is at variance with desired content
by rural audiences.
4. Due to feedback constraints, radio is likely to elicit less rural program

participation.

Methodology

The survey was carried out between the months of April and May 1990. Due to
linguistic barriers, coders with knowledge in local languages from sampled areas were
employed to administer the questionnaire under supervision. The survey was self-funded

and was, therefore, implemented on the most minimum budget.

Sample. The “effective” sample size (n = 150) composed of a variation of ages (over 18
years), sex, and occupation was randomly drawn from villages in five different regions
of Uganda: Western (Kabale district: Butobere and Katuba), Eastern (Tororo district:
Luyehe in Bunyore), Northern (Nebbi district: Nebbi, Erusi, Kuchiny), Buganda
(Mukono district: Nakisuna), and Central (Kampala district: capital city center and
suburbs).

A non response expectation sample (n= 160) was taken. The non-response rate
on a majority of questions registered a high of three respondents in an individual region,

with such an occurrence often limited to one or two of the five regions.

Survey Imtruments. The questionnaire measured both demographic (sociological) and
psychographic (psychological) phenomenon regarding media use;-the major focus was,

51
however, on the latter. The instrument design was aimed at determining the significance
of differences within and correlation between the independent and dependent variables.
The independent variables were: technical constraints, preferential program scheduling,
content categories variance, and feedback constraints. The dependent variables were:
radio signal reception and quality, satisfaction with number of programs across individual
languages, congruence of radio content and desired content, and frequency of program

participation plus reasons for non participation.

Results and Analysis

Technical Constraints. The technical constraint variable was measured at two levels:
technical quality of programs and the frequency of technical failures registered by the
respondents. Respondents who said technical failures were frequent were 94.7 % , while
87.9% described the technical quality of Radio Uganda as poor.

Listening to foreign radio stations plus ”reasons” for the practice were used as
proxy variables to determine the impact of the technical constraint variable on
listenership behavior and radio medium use. The difference between those who listened
to foreign radio stations (75 .8 %) and those who did not (24.0%) was significant at the
level of percentage frequency distribution. Reasons for listening to foreign radio stations
varied from hard news (77.5%), light programs (16.7%), and others banded reasons
(5.8%). The proxy variables thus expressed the significant radio use potential.

The high magnitude of the technical constraint is expressed in the significant
correlation [r=0.6, see Appendix 1(a)] between the frequency of technical failure and
technical quality variable as expressed by the respondents. while the significant but weak
correlation [r=0.2, see Appendix l(b)] between the frequent technical failures and
listening to foreign stations shows that there are other influential variables that the

technical constraint in explaining the frequency of listening to foreign stations.

52
The implications of these results conform to the hypothesis that due to technical

constraints, the desired reception and thus effective reception is not attained.

Program Scheduling Constraints. A two-point scale was used to determine the
satisfaction of respondents with the ”time programs" in "their language” come to them.
The difference between those who expressed satisfaction (44.4 %) and dissatisfaction
(53.1%) was not very significant. The importance of this variable, however, derives
from the mere occurrence of this significant dissatisfied group (53.1%) of respondents.
Variance within each of the two groups on the scale was significant; those who
expressed satisfaction (yes), v=36.6 (SD=6), and dissatisfaction (no), v=34 (SD=5 .8).

Dissatisfied respondents indicated time preferences for programs in their
languages: AM (14.9%), PM (56.4%), and AM and PM (28.7%). More respondents
desired daily (72.7%) than weekly (14.9%) and biweekly (12.4%) scheduling of
programs in their local languages. This contrasts greatly with the current preferential,
uneven content category and language scheduling with a few languages given prominence
in the afternoon and evening.

Respondents were in an open-ended question asked to give reasons for the desired
frequency of program scheduling. The three categories of expressed reasons as proxy
variables indicate the inherent effectiveness (evidence) of the expressed responses in the
dissatisfaction variable. Serious programs (including hard news) registered 66.7%; light
programs (music, art, and leisure), 18%; and others, 15.3% of the total respondents.

The desired time preference and scheduling frequency variables are also implicitly
expressed in the program time satisfaction variable scale. Policy adjustment to eliminate
variations within the group of respondents expressing satisfaction and attain a significant
satisfaction rating against dissatisfaction across all the regions presents itself as the
inevitable policy task to attain a more even program category and language scheduling.

This policy adj ustrnent would in the long run eliminate the dissatisfaction gap and

53

consequently increase the satisfaction gap (Figure 7). For example, Alur programs
(N orthern/ N ebbi) are scheduled in the morning while the surveyed preference time is
significantly in the afternoon onwards. Western programs (Kabale—R/R/R/R) are
scheduled in the most preferred time, explaining the significant satisfaction percentage
distribution from this region. The majority of respondents (rural farmers) are only at
home in the afternoon onwards and urban workers in the evening; thus, the expressed
strong preference for this time (Figure 7).

Much of this analysis of the preferential program scheduling across languages
through the proxy variable reasons for the desired change in scheduling indicates the
respondents strong desire for serious content (66.7%). We need to look at other
variables to determine whether this expressed desire (reasons) is ever matched by Radio
Uganda.

Content Category Constraints. Data on this variable to an extent reinforces the
findings in the content analysis (Chapter Three) of the development program and
programming schedule. The composition of content categories across current schedules
appears to be at variance with that desired (reasons) by the respondents.

A situational question was used to measure respondents impressions of content
priority on a three-point scale: rural development issues, urban political issues, and
both. Rural development issues registered a significant majority (74%), urban and
political issues a mere 6% , and the both group registered 20% .

Desired feedback by the respondents was categorized at two levels: serious
development issues (agriculture, health, education, trade, etc.) and non-development

issues (mostly entertainment). The difference between the two was significant: 93 % and

7% , respectively.

54

 

 

respondents

of

Number

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

an
30 1
/ \r-s Satisfied cs
25 .. N \u disalislicd / :2
/\ / .
20 .. 'f I \ j/m
4 \ r
IS 3 / E
;L // \M
'0 - \K/ \
/ V \
5 . N N N ‘N \V\0
., e % /// .7 7
Kcocmrporlrlo Mukono Nebhi/Norm Tom/r};N Kabul/west

Bugondc

 

Figure 7. Satisfaction With Time of Program Scheduling by Region (1990).

 

55

To further isolate the urban nature of the significant political content variable as
in the hard news category (see Chapter Three), the level of information received on local
political organization (Resistance Committees, RCs) was measured on a three-pointed
scale: a lot (5%), little (30%), and not at all (65%). These findings further reinforce
the argument that radio media is basically a one-way medium in its current use,
purveying only political interests of the core power structure.

The relationship between the respondents’ impressions of content priority, rural
development issue (74 %), and desired feedback content, serious development issues
(95 %), was significant though weak [r=0.2l, see Appendix 1(0)]. While the correlation
between the desire for development-oriented feedback and the complete (not at all) lack
of radio information on RCs was significantly moderate [r=0.48, see Appendix 1(d)].
An increase in the number of respondents along the development-oriented feedback
content category negatively correlates with the respondents increase in the expressed
"complete” lack of radio information on local political organization (RCs) variable. The
weak correlation coefficient presupposes the existence of other influencing variables than
that expressed in this study.

One clear inference arises from the analysis of the constraint parameters expressed
in the preferential content category which is at variance with the respondent’s expressed
impression about the expected radio medium use. This medium use ”expectation” is
further reinforced by the significantly high possession of radio sets in the sampled
households (72 %).

Feedback Constraints. Respondents who have ever participated in a radio program
(15%) contrasted highly against those who have never (85 %). Reasons for non
participation were categorized: first, lack of means to participate (not approached, radio
station very far) 88% and, second, other reasons than lack of means to participate 12%.

—'

56
Correlation between frequency of participation (never participated) and reasons
for non participation (lack of means to participate) was significant and strong [r=0.87,
see Appendix 1(e)]. To determine the effectiveness of the significance of the expressed
non participation frequency (i.e. whether it expresses real desire to participate),
correlation was performed with desired development-oriented feedback content category.
The relation was significant but moderate [r=0.5, see Appendix 1(1)].

General Opinions and Suggestions

Respondents were, outside the structured questionnaire, also given a chance to
give their views as regards problems associated with radio services in their areas. Those
from Nebbi responded most with general opinions and suggestions. Their major
complaint was the poor radio signal quality and constant blackout and requested the
restoration of Gilgili MW Station which at the time of the survey was being revived.
Others requested for reassumption of satellite radio services and introduction of FM
transmitters which were abandoned with the fall of Idi Amin from power (see Chapter
Two).

Complaints were also raised about the little air time allocated to programs in Alur
(local area) language requesting for the introduction of news in Alur to be scheduled
immediately after Luo language news bulletin, claiming that not all the majority of Alur
understand Luo language. Luo is taken as a northern regional language by Radio
Uganda. The implicitly ethnic identity forces on the national radio program scheduling
cannot be overlooked in this expressed request.

A significant number also complained about the poor program production,
especially the skewed content often dominated by foreign and capital city issues while
ignoring local issues like RCs affairs.

Kabale respondents requested for Radio Uganda to open up an office in the area
to handle their responses and channel their views to the Broadcasting House. While

57
Mukono respondents complained about leaving them out in the cold with regard to
program content participation.

Conclusions

Findings of this survey are expressed in the leit—motif of the four sub-hypotheses.
Constant technical failures constrain the effective listenership of the radio medium. The
potentially ”effective" listenership expressed along the content categories and language
diversity variables are in turn constrained by the preferential (skewed) program
scheduling across these same variables which to date is significantly at variance with
nwds of rural audiences. The audience, owing to feedback constraints, are in this

variant context reduced to dotted, cheerless spectators.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Putting into perspective the problems to development broadcasting is a complex
undertaking given the intricate texture of the causal variables on one hand and the
multifaceted nature of the development process on the other. This thesis as a technical
analysis has examined the factors underlying the problems to development radio
broadcasting in Uganda.

Owing to its centralized nature, Radio Uganda’s broadcast structure and pattern
is inherently constrained in attaining optimum medium utilization, especially in the rural
contexts. The survey of the audiences listenership habits and feedback flow constraints
reinforces the findings in both the focussed synthesis (Chapter Two) and contents analysis
(Chapter Three). Audiences are highly dissatisfied with both the technical quality and
content categories. Coupled with feedback flow constraints, radio’s potential to facilitate
rural change is greatly constrained.

The political factor surfaces as a major constraint in the development and
organization of radio broadcasting in Uganda. Secondary constraints such as lack of
finance, the bureaucratic decision making, poor state of professionalism, and failure to
integrate rural populations in the design of content categories have served to widen the
gap between the broadcasting institution, its envisaged audiences, and development
objectives. Broadcasting has been technocratically conceived basically from the political

perspective manifested in the high publicity element of the content categories.

58 I

59

This scenario and its negative implications can best be summarized in Amjad’s
observations:

“People in power want radio to prevent the breakdown of their

communication in terms of public service. Such a society compels radio

to indulge in over publicity of their rulers and succeeds in only distancing

them from the people. They have little understanding that broadcasts can

be productive to limit. Perhaps that is why one experienced media man

was heard to say that it is the policy makers who should be given training

on the effects of mass communication to enable society to avoid cognitive

dissonance. When the source of news does not enjoy credibility, how can

the message be sold?” (Amjad Hossein, 1989, p. 4).

This thesis reinforces, with both qualitative and empirical data, the
decentralization theoretical framework and model as an alternative to restructuring,
harmonizing, and rationalizing of Radio Uganda’s communication channels to provide
an environment where policy makers, development agents, program producers, and the
audience can interact more conveniently. In this framework, the broadcast authorities
would be more able to predict conditions whereby radio broadcasting may best facilitate
the development process. It offers more opportunities to increase content categories and
language variable shares where more broadcast hours are left to the regional channels.
More important, fewer hours of joining channels reduces the link costs and ensures
broadcast continuity (see Figure 6).

These findings have both political and statistical significance. The political
significance of the findings is the greater democratic decentralization framework through
which the radio medium can be exploited optimally to benefit both the political system
and the population. The decentralization model presents numerous opportunities to
enhance local political organization through grassroot institutions like RC8 and enables
radio to play a larger role of in policy formulation than the presently limited one-way
policy implementation flow envisaged by the government.

The development and organization of radio broadcasting in the Uganda context
will thus greatly depend on how the government handles the political question. The

1981-86 revolution provides a clear example that genuine power rests among the

60
consensus of the people. Rural peasants defeated a neo-colonial army, demystifying the
power of the gun that ravaged the lives of simple citizens for over a decade.

This transformation process for democracy, however, presents even more
challenges of fundamental changes to demystify the colonial and neo—colonial legacy of
radio being a preserve of the political powers that may be. Until then, radio will
continue to sound strange and meaningless to the rural populations who produce more

than 80% of the GNP and remain entrenched in poverty, disease, and ignorance.

CHAPTER 6
RECOMMENDATIONS

The desire to undertake this study was based on the strong hope that decision
makers would use these findings to guide them in reaching long lasting solutions to the
state of broadcasting in Uganda. The reorganization and development of the radio
medium is fundamental to the overall national development effort.

The need for more pragmatic and action-oriented recommendations for alleviating
the problems to development broadcasting become a policy imperative. A policy
framework must, however, be first put in place to guide the development of a more
efficient program strategy to reduce the current variance between the programming
pattern and the multilingual audience needs.

The varied and strong ethnic pride element manifested in the current language-
strained programming pattern is, owing to nationality political pressure groups, likely to
persist. In this context, any restructuring of the broadcasting sector sensitive to these
contextual variables would find such policies for attaining optimum utilization of the
radio medium in the decentralization broadcast model. Other alternatives like
privatization and parastatal options would find room along this model in the long run.

Lastly, this study has emphasized the scope rather than the depth aspect of the
constraints to development radio broadcasting. I suggest that each of the causative
variables be studied in depth, plus the implementation parameters of addressing these
constraints in a decentralization framework (using other comparative research techniques

where possible).

61

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

 

x Y (x53 on?) (x502 (Y—‘Yiz (moor-Y)
Tororo 23 26 -4.6 -2.8 21.16 7.84 12.88
Mukono 30 29 2.4 0.2 5.76 0.04 0.48
Kampala 23 29 -4.6 0.2 21.16 0.04 0.92
Kabale 30 31 2.4 2.2 5.76 4.84 5.28
Nebbi 32 29 4.4 0.2 19.36 0.04 0.88

 

 

2: (x-fo—i') 18.6 0.6

r: = =

mpg): my): m

1(1))

 

 

 

 

X Y (X-E (Y3) (xi? rat-W (x3106?)
Tororo 23 25 -4.6 1.8 21.16 3.24 - 8.28
Mukono 30 15 2.4 -8.2 5 .76 67.24 -22. 14
Kampala 23 20 -4.6 -3.2 21.16 10.24 14.72
Kabale 30 27 2.4 3.8 5.76 14.44 9.12
Nebbi 32 29 4.4 5.8 19.36 33.64 25.52
73.2 _ 7 _18A'__ _

     

 

i=27.6 2:232 _ _
2 (X-XXZ-Z) = 18.94

Jm-rr az-az m g 0'2

 

 

r:

 

62 '

     

63

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

x Y arc-i) (Y-YL (x502 tit-W (X-fitY-Yr

Tororo 21 27 -2 -2.8 4 7.84 5.6

Mukono 30 20 7 0.2 49 0.04 1.4

Kampala 2O 31 -3 1.2 9 1.44 -3.6

Kabale 16 30 -7 0.2 49 0.04 -1.4

Nebbi 28 31 5 1.2 25 1.44 6.0
136 10.8 8.0

Y=23 Y=29.8

r = 2 (X—X)(Y-Y) g 8.0 = 021
«ta-:62 we m
1(d)
X Y

Tororo 21 27 6.6 -2 4 43.56 -13.2

Mukono 30 12 -8.4 7 49 70.56 -58.8

Kampala 20 14 -6.4 -3 9 49.96 19.2

Kabale 16 26 5.6 -7 49 31.36 -39.2

Nebbi 28 23 2.6 5 25 6.76 13.0
136 202.2 -79

i=23 ‘z'=24.4

r __ 2 (X-X)(Z—Z) _ 79 = —0. 48
[£05.52 £(z-f)2 (202.2 x 136

 

 

 

 

 

 

1(9)
x Y (gr-E drill (x312 (tr-Y? (xiv-1‘0
Tororo 24 22 -3.4 -2 11.56 4 6.8
Mukono 31 31 3.6 7 12.96 49 25.2
Kampala 25 19 -2.4 -5 5.76 25 12.0
Kabale 28 23 0.6 -1 0.36 1 - 0.6
Nebbi 29 25 1.6 1 2.56 1 1.6
33.2 80 45

 

 

 

= 2: (Ir-1")(z-i) 3 45 = 0.8.,
Myra—01 212.51 J33.2 x 80

 

1(0

 

 

 

 

X Y (X-E (Y 5?)
Tororo 27 24 -2.8 -3.4 7.84 11.56 9.56
Mukono 3O 31 0.2 3.6 0.04 12.96 0.72
Kampala 31 25 1.2 -2.4 1.44 5.76 -2.88
Kabale 30 28 0.2 0.6 0.04 0.36 0.12
Nebbi 31 29 1.2 1.6 1.44 2.56 1.92
10.8 33.2 9.4

X=29.8 Y=27.4

r g E (x-xxr-r) = 9.4 = 0.5

{23.52 207.5: m

 

LIST OF REFERENCES

LITERATURE CITED

Amajad, Hossain AKM. 1989. "What Does Radio Do?" in Overseas Broadcasters,
Sept. 1989, printed by BBC Wood Worton.

Chopra, Pran. 1979. ”Obligation and Responsibilities, " Asia-Pacific Institute for
Broadcasting Development, Regional Seminar on Broadcasting Development fiom
June 25th-July 6th, 1979. Compiled and edited by Patrick Keith and G.F.
Brickenden.

Dizard, Wilson, P., Jr. 1989. The Coming Information Age: An Overview of
Technology, Economics, and Politics, Longman.

Everett, Rogers A. 1979. ”The Rise and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm” in Journal
of Communication Vol. 28, 1974.

Howell, MJ. 1986. World Broadcasting in the Age of Satellite; Comparative Systems,
Policies and Issues in Mass Telecommunication, Apex Publishing House
Corporation.

Karugire, Rubaraza S. 1988. Roots of Instability in Uganda. The New Vision Printing
and Publishing House Corporation, Entebbe.

Katz and Wedell. 1977 Broadcasting in the Third World. Howard Press.

Mamdan, Mahmood. (not dated). The Nationalin Question in a Neo—colony: An
Historical Perspective. African Research and Publications Project, Inc.
Ministry of Finance. 1989. Government Recurrent Expenditure by Ministry of Finance

1984/85—1988/89.

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 1990/91. MIB Proposed Estimates 1990/91 .

Ibid. 1982. Sound Broadcasting Report 1982, Radio Uganda, MIB.

65

66

Moemeka, Andrew. 1989. ”Perspectives on Development Communication" in Africa
Media Review 1989, Vol. 3, Number 3, African Council on Communication
Education.

Museveni, Kaguta Y. (not dated). Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War.
NRM Publication.

Opuku, A.A. 1964/65. An Afiican Experience in Radio Forum for Rural Areas.
UNESCO.

Sedney, Head W. (ed.). 1974. Broadcasting in Africa; A Continental Survey of Radio
and Television. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Uganda Government. 1987 . Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the Accounts
of the Uganda Government for the Financial Year Ended 30th June 1987.
Published Authority, Printed by the Government Printer, Entebbe, Uganda.

REFERENCFS

Blakely, Robert J. 1971. The People ’s Instrument: A Philosophy of Programming for
Public TV. A Charles F. Kettering Foundation Report published by Public
Affairs Press.

Bredin, Andrew. October 1982. ”His Master’s Voice," Radio and TV in Africa in
Index on Africa. Vol. II, No. 5.

Bryant, Jannings and Zillman, Dolf (eds). 1986. Perspectives on Media Effects.
Lauwence Erlbaun Associates, Inc.

Des, Wilson. 1989. "Toward a Diachromic-Sychronic View of Future Communication
Policies" in Africa Media Review. Vol. 3, No. 2, 1989. African Council on
Communication Education.

Jassawala, M. and Ebensfield, H. (eds.). 1984. Communication and Information
Economics--New Perspectives. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

Kulakow, Allan M. 1979. Rural Radio in the Sahel: A Survey of Six Countries.
African Programs Academy for Educational Development, Inc.

Stevenson, Robert L. 1988. Communicating, Development and the Third World: The
Global Politics of Information. Longman, New York.

Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) Manifesto 1980.

Warford, Jeremy J. and Bjorn, Wellenius. 1983. Telecommunication and Development.
A World Bank Publication, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.

Wimmer, Roger D. and Dominick, Joseph R. 1987. Mass Media Research: An

Introduction. Wordworth, Inc.

67

68
World Bank. 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable GrowthuA Long
Term Perspective Study. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/The World Bank, Washington DC, USA.

"llllllllllllllllllllll