.. mfiflfi. . , “uni-bad! M O. I C 1.9 ‘ 33:... . 3 bid...“ .17....) {x .. a}... \I. x. “Dyna . I: . £7342. ct. .. .1?.:;I3$\.3v . draw. 29.11;}; a! . ~ra¢l7£ Suxzs$ t... 1.134;} i‘lnYlI url}\‘p"fi1h‘vu K5»... A. . 5.... c . 3. c ' 2:3... .5. rtla tiOx...v\ . . 5|!!15- .Yunru.“ S (K I .s If} an 1.15.7331; L111: 1 3.5 Libtfln‘l. , ’2? hurleh; . (\h!\lvo\|\ - :. at... hvi‘i’. ta“. 1:22.19. .6 I! If 9 -2....Fx.... . , a . ~v Bile. .. 4 $1)». ....L\vv .- ).L.... .11 ) t «‘3, 4 $1.421! : iv: 3. \ .5 5 u. b. I: c ‘4). x: o v.35. [V I x CID. lllllllolllllllllzllUlllllllllUllllllllllllllllllUllllllll L 310 400 5361 TH§SIS This is to certify that the dissertation entitled A DUTIFUL READING OF KANT'I POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY presented by Edwin Nicholas Teall has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degreein Philosophy . flax/Lap}: Major ofessor Date [J91231/77( I / MS U is an Affirmative Anion/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 LIBRARY Mlchlgan State University PLACE ll RETURN BOX to move thb ohookout from your rooord. TO AVOID FINES rotum on or botoro doto duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU In An Afflrmotlvo Action/Equal Opponunlly Inotltwon W m1 A DUTIFUL READING OF KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BY Edwin Nicholas Teall A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1995 ABSTRACT A DUTIFUL READING OF KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BY Edwin Nicholas Teall A person's initial conception of Kant's political philosophy is often that it is a social contract theory which justifies a narrow or limited role of the state in civil society. The state is thought to be justified only in acting to protect the freedom of individuals. In this dissertation, I develop a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy based on the idea that the state is justified in acting on three sets of duties which are analogous to the juridical, indirect, and imperfect duties of elaborated in Kant's Metaphysics g; Morals. The first chapter examines the positions that Kant's political philosophy only justifies the actions of the state which protect the freedom of individuals. The following chapter examines four challenges to Kant's political philosophy. The first two focus on Kant's views of citizenship and rights which are sexist and elitist. The next two identify problems in the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. One claims that Kant's conception of justice is too limited. The other asserts that Kant's political philosophy cannot justify actions of the state that are intended to promote a good life for individuals. The third chapter considers the Kantian contractualist accounts of morality and justice presented by T. M. Scalon and John Rawls. I claim Scanlon's account can meet the first two challenges and Rawls' View can resolve all four challenges but neither provides an accurate account of Kant's political philosophy. The fourth chapter begins the presentation of the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy by examining several basic ideas in Kant's moral philosophy. The next chapter examines the duties elaborated in lag Metaphysics g: Morals and explains why one should consider the analogous duties of the state when evaluating Kant's political philosophy. The sixth chapter shows that the state is justified in acting to enforce the juridical duties of members of civil society, provide the conditions needed for individuals to fulfill the indirect duty to promote their own happiness, and provide the conditions needed for the enlightenment of the individuals so they may act on the imperfect duties. The final chapter shows that this broader conception of Kant's political philosophy can overcome the four challenges considered in the second chapter. Copyright by Edwin Nicholas Teall 1995 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS While writing this dissertation I benefitted from the assistance of many of the faculty and graduate students of the Philosophy Department. In particular, I would like to thank Rhoda Kotzin who served as the chairperson of my committee. Our discussions of many of the topics covered here enabled me to gain what insights I have been able to present, and the encouragement she provided made it possible for me to finish this project. I would also like to mention the faculty who served on my committee: Richard Peterson, Steve Esquith, Charles McCracken, Dean Rehberger, and Albert Cafagna. The comments made, especially those of Professors Peterson and Esquith, helped me develop several important points in this dissertation. Without the aid of these people this dissertation would not be as good as it is. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support that Lisa Romsek provided during the last several years. Only she knows what I was like during this time, and I thank her for enduring me during that time. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abbreviations ............................ i ............... viii Introduction ............................................... 1 I. The Background ..................................... 3 II. The Project to be Undertaken .................... 15 Chapter One An Initial Examination of Kant's Political PhilOSOphy ........................................... 21 I. The Purpose of Kant's Political Philosophy ....... 23 II. Civil Society and the Principle of Justice ...... 29 III. The Sovereign and the Government ............... 34 IV. Citizenship ..................................... 41 V. Rights ........................................... 44 Chapter Two Challenges to Kant's Political Philosophy..55 I. The Problem of Citizenship ....................... 57 II. A Limited View of Acquired Private Rights ....... 61 III. The Nature of Kant's Conception of Justice ..... 64 IV. Justifying Claims About the Good ................ 68 ,prhapter Three Attempts to Overcome the Challenges and “\ Guiding Ideas for Understanding Kant's Political Philosophy ........................................... 74 I. Two Versions of Kantian Contractualism ........... 75. . II. Guiding Ideas ................................... 92 ' Chapter Four Basic Ideas in Kantian Moral Theory ........ 97“ I. Kant's Theory of Human Action .................... 98 II. Rules, Maxims, Imperatives, and Laws ........... 105‘ III. Kant's Idea of Freedom ........................ 113 Chapter Five Duty, Right, and Kant's Political _ Philosophy.. .................................. ....131,; I. I_§.M§L§2_XS_§§ Q__Mg_a1§: .An Overview .......... 132 II. Law and Duty in Kant' 5 Political Philosophy. ..141, Chapter Six A Broader Conception of Kant's Political , Philosophy ................. ....... ............. .....145 I. The State and Juridical Duties .................. 149; II. The State and Indirect Duty .................... 153' III. The State and Imperfect Duties ................ 161' vi Chapter Seven Assessing the Broader Conception of Kant's Political Philosophy ................................ 171 I. Some Basic Ideas Reconsidered ................... 172 II. Reconsidering the Four Challenges .............. 180 III. Concluding Remarks ............................ 193 Bibliography ............................................. 196 vii ABBREVIAT IONS The folloWing abbreviations will be used in the text to indicate the works of Kant. The first number refers to the pages of these translations, the second to the Akademie edition. Anthro - Antrhpoloqv from a Pragmatic Pgiat sf Visa. Trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. Ed. Hans H. Rudnick. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1978. ggaflig; - anfligt sf tha Faculties. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Abaris Books, 1979. 9333 - gritigas sf Pugs Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. 92:3 - gritigaa g: Pragtigal Baasga. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1993. Enlight - "What is Enlightenment" in Egnadatigas sf Lha Mataphysigs‘gf,MQrals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1990. W-WQEWQM. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1990. viii Idea - "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in KaQLLs Pglitigal WPiLiags. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. MM — Metaphysics a: Msrals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991. PP - "Perpetual Peace" in Kant's Political Writings. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. Pal - Religion within the Limits 9: Reason Alone. Trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row, 1960. Saying - "On the Common Saying 'That May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice'" in Kant's Palitical Writings. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. ix INTRODUCT I ON Without question Immanuel Kant will always be regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the Western world. His contributions to metaphysics and epistemology are equalled only by his contribution to ethical theory. In addition to his works on these topics he has also made significant contributions in the areas of aesthetics, logic, and religion. His development of a critical philosophy, which examines the basis 0f empirical knowledge, morality, and aesthetic and teleological judgment, has become the dividing line in many of the ongoing debates throughout the philosophical community. Philosophers since Kant's own day often are divided between those who sympathetically acknowledge the influence of his thought on their own work and those trying to distance themselves from Kant and the fundamental errors they identify in his critical philosophy. Wherever these extremes are the case, as well as cases where philosophers do not think Kant has directly influenced their work, the work of Kant is always recognized. The importance of Kant's works on political philosophy have only recently begun to receive the attention they 1 2 deserve. His political philosophy may be the best formulation of liberal political philosophy and social contract theory, even if it is not the most clearly articulated example of this tradition available.1 The fact that Kant did not carry out a Copernican Revolution in political philosophy on the scale that was achieved in the Critigua sf Pass Raasgn may account for part of the reason that his political philosophy has not been considered as important as that of liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, or Mill.2 Kant's political philosophy is considered unimportant, first, because it is often considered to be simply a restatement of the basic ideas found in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and, second, because Kant did not present his ideas as eloquently as others, for example Mill. These two points alone may lead one to conclude that Kant's political philosophy can be pushed to the end of the shelf of liberal political philosophy while one spends time studying the liberal thought of those who came before him and those who could articulate it best. On such a view, Kant can be thought to be poorly restating the 1Patrick Riley, "On Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists," glitigal Ihaory 1 (1973): 450- 71. 2Beck, though, makes the argument that Kant carried out a Copernican Revolution in his moral theory. See Lewis White Beck,.A gammantary Qa Kant's "gritigaa a; Pragtigal Raassn", (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), 179. 3 ideas of others while giving an occasional insight into some of the weaknesses of those who came before him. On this view there is no "revolution" of Copernican proportions taking place in the political philosophy of Kant, so there must be nothing new arising which might once again serve to distinguish those for and against Kant. This dissertation will attempt to show that, by stressing the ideas that 1) Kant's political philosophy must be read as part of his moral philosophy and 2) the notion of duty is central in his political philosophy, it is possible to present a reading of his theory which can overcome some of the criticisms raised against it. As a means of introducing this study, we shall begin by briefly examining two preliminary topics. First, we will identify the works on political philosophy which Kant wrote during his lifetime. Second, we will consider some of the commentators who have discussed Kant's ideas. After this it will be possible to go into more detail about the aim of this project. I. The Background A. Kant's Works on Political Philosophy With the Metaphysigs sf Mgrals (1797) Kant kept his commitment to provide a metaphysics of morals. (Pasadagigas, 7/391) The Mstaphysics a: Mgrals is intended to investigate 4 the duties that can be derived for humans from the Categorical Imperative. This is not to say that this work would be able to provide an entire list of duties given by reason to humans as rational beings. Rather, it is an investigation into the principles that can be derived from the Categorical Imperative concerning the duties humans have as rational beings. Pure practical reason can investigate these principles and, independently of experience, provide laws which humans ought to follow. The Mstaphysics a: Morals is an investigation into the nature of these laws. (MM, 42/214) For humans, this investigation leads to a division of two forms of laws: Laws of Right or juridical laws and Laws of Virtue or ethical laws. These are distinguished by the fact that the incentive for obeying juridical laws can be found externally to the person, while the incentive for obeying ethical laws can only be the internal will of the person. (MM, 46/219) It is in the investigation of juridical laws, the Doctrine of Right, that we find Kant's most complete and systematic exposition of his political philosophy. In addition to this work, which Kant finished shortly before his death, we can identify several other shorter works where he develops various points of his political philosophy. In the essay "An Answer to the Question 'What is Enlightenment?'" (1784) Kant argues that the public use 5 of reason must be free. (Enlight, 85/37) Through public debate concerning public matters, civil society will be able to become enlightened and grow. Kant also presents an argument against the political philosophy of Hobbes in "On the Common Saying 'This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" (1793) and discusses the relationship of external right to freedom. (Saying, 72) Kant's most well—known political writing is Parpetaal Paaaa. (1795) This is Kant's discussion of international relations. Here he calls for non-interference from external forces in the internal workings of the state. Only when agreements between nations not to become involved in the internal affairs of each other are reached will it be possible to achieve the end of continual, peaceful existence. Recognizing that Kant considers such a variety of issues related to political philoSOphy, one should take his political philosophy seriously. While his views on politics are not as complete as the ideas developed in the gritiguas, they are still important. He spent much of his life actively engaged in debate concerning the political climate of his day. He was a concerned observer of both the American and French revolutions. It is, therefore, important to take stock of what he has to say in this area. It is unfortunate that only recently has there been a 6 revival in interest in Kant's political philosophy, but before embarking on our own investigation of it we shall briefly consider what others have said about it. B. Others' Thoughts Concerning Kant's Political Philosophy The first person of note to consider Kant's political philosophy was G. W. F. Hegel. Primarily, Hegel was concerned with Kant's ethical theory and tried to explain how this theory was inadequate. However, his comments about Kant's ethics also provided a basis for his critique of Kant's political philosophy. In a famous passage in his Philgssphy at Right Hegel asserts that specific duties...are not contained in the definition of duty itself;...all that is left to it, therefore, is abstract universality, and for its determinate character it has identity without content, or the abstractly positive, the indeterminate.3 The claim is that Kant's moral philosophy only asserts an empty formalism and does not provide any direction concerning the specific actions one ought to perform. In relation to political philosophy, Hegel questions whether or not Kant is able to provide an account of what civil society ought to be like. Since the Categorical Imperative only 3G. W. F. Hegel, Philgsgphy Qt_gtg_t, trans. T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), 89. 7 provides the form of morally right actions, and by extension legally right actions, it does not seem that Kant's political philosophy will be able to provide an account of what specific actions ought to be undertaken in civil society.‘ .After this critique, little more has been said about Kant's political philosophy until recently. A little over thirty years ago attention was given by Anglo-American philosophical scholars to the work which contains Kant's primary exposition of his political philosophy, The Metaphysics gt Morals. This attention came because of Mary Gregor's Laws at Freedom. Her primary aim in this work is "...to set forth, in so far as I understand it, the method by which Kant applies his supreme moral principle."S Gregor's purpose here is not specifically to present an investigation of Kant's political philosophy. Rather, she is trying to expound Kant's claims concerning the moral philosophy which Kant attempts to work out by applying the Categorical Imperative to the subject of ‘Timothy O'Hagan explains that Hegel criticizes Kant for the dualism.between the moral subject and the legal subject. This dualism is suspect because only when a specific content is introduced into morality can specific duties be delineated, and this is only possible in civil society. See his article "On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy," agal's Qttttgaa at Kaat, ed. Stephen Priest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 146, 153-54. §Mary J. Gregor, the Laws Qt Frsadom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), xii. 8 humans. Gregor's book considers both parts of the Mataphystss at M r ls, the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Justice. She says that her interest in the Doctrine of Right is subsidiary to her study of the Doctrine of Virtue. It is important to take account of the Doctrine of Right since understanding the duties of Right are preliminary for the investigation into the duties of ethics.6 .Although Gregor's interest is primarily focused on the Doctrine of Virtue, her book is important because it brought attention back to Kant's most systematic presentation of his political philosophy. Independently of Gregor's work, but at approximately the same time, Hannah Arendt first gave a series of lectures on Kant's political philosophy. In these she claimed that Kant's later works, the Critique Qt Jadgmaat (1790) and the political writings written after it, were an attempt to answer two questions that had been set aside when Kant turned to investigate the nature of reason during his critical period. These questions asked why men must live together and why man must exist at all.7 These questions do not ask for answers that explain the cause of man's 6Gregor, 32-33. 7HannahArendt, Lsgtaras as Kant's Palitisal Philgssphy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Harvester Press, 1982), 11-12. 9 sociability or existence, but Arendt argues that they ask for an explanation of the purpose of man's sociability and existence. This, she thinks, is to be found in the third Caitigaa and Kant‘s political writings. She believes that only in writing these works was Kant able to return to the questions which had interested him in the days prior to being awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume. In order to answer these questions Kant had to determine "...how to reconcile the problem of the organization of the state with his moral philosophy, that is with the dictate of practical 'm Based on this claim she argues that "...the reason. surprising fact is that he knew his moral philosophy could not help here."9 Based on this interpretation, Arendt turns to the third gritigaa in order to discover answers to the questions she believes always interested Kant. During the early 1970's a major work appeared which almost single-handedly brought the attention to Kant's political philosophy the attention it deserves. This is John Rawls' A,Ihsg;y Qt instiga. In this work, Rawls attempts to lay out a theory of justice based on the contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.10 Rawls' 8Arendt, 17. 9ibid. 10John Rawls, A Thegry at Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), viii. 10 work attempts to provide an account of justice that would be an acceptable view of what people in the Western world generally think justice is when they attempt to determine if a social system is just. As Rawls is quick to point out, this turns out to be a distinctively Kantian notion of justice.11 Thus, while it is the case that this work is not an attempt to present an interpretation of Kant's own ideas on political phiIOSOphy, it must be mentioned since the importance it has had in reviving the study of Kant's political philosophy cannot be underestimated. In the last twenty-five years several works have appeared in which the authors have tried to clarify and assess what Kant attempted to prdvide in his political theory. One of these is Jeffrie G. Murphy's work Mast: Pas Phtlgsgphy gt Bight. The basis of his interpretation is the idea that Kant was attempting to justify the limitation of freedom that occurs in the use and infliction of punishment.12 He presents Kant's theory in contrast to Locke's notion that upon entering society people give up the right each has to punish others for infringing on their natural rights. Entering civil society for Locke amounts to giving up the right to punish others who violate the natural 11ibid. 12Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant: Ths Philgsgphy gt Right (London: MacMillan and Co., 1970), 109. 11 law.13 On Murphy's account this amounts to a vigilante justice, and he thinks Kant's theory of politics must be understood as trying to prevent this. Kant attempts to provide an explanation of how an infringement of the freedom of a person can be justified. Murphy stresses that for Kant the Rule of Law and punishment can only be justified as a cure for violence.14 From this basic idea, Murphy then is able to give a general explication of Kant's political philosophy, a theory which Murphy believes has certain advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, Kant's version of liberal political philosophy has the insight that through procedural forms it is possible that injustices can be dealt with through a fair system of laws.15 Kant, like most other philosophers of the liberal tradition, believes that if it is possible to find an adequate political system, then it will be possible to remedy the injustices of society. What is important, then, is to attempt to discover the ideal any society ought to aim at achieving. On the other hand, Kant's views have a 13Murphy, 113. 1"Murphy, 128. In his discussion of the Universal Principle of Right, the stress on the idea of justifying coercion can also be noted in Murphy's analysis since he emphasizes that it is the basis of Kant's explanation of the right to limit the freedom of others and that it contains analytically the right to punish. (94) 15Murphy, 130. 12 serious weakness. It may be the case that existing political and social systems have certain disadvantages built into them which do not allow for certain injustices to be overcome.16 Because of this, it seems that Kant's political philosophy must fall short of the ideal necessary to resolve the injustices that exist in contemporary society. A more recent interpretation of Kant's political philosophy has been presented by Patrick Riley. He advances the belief that one must attempt to understand the purpose of Kant's political philosophy through the Critigae gt Jadgmaat.“ The emphasis in his interpretation is on trying to discover what Kant takes to be the purpose of politics. This he says ...can most reasonably be understood as something that legally realizes certain moral ends...in a way that is indeed inferior to a...universal ethical commonwealth, but that...keeps persons, the "final ends of creation," from being used as mere means to arbitrary purposes (above all war) . 1° 16Murphy, 130-2. This idea will be considered in the next chapter when the second of the three criticisms of the contractual reading of Kant's political philosophy is presented. 17Patrick Riley, Kant's Pglitigal Phil h , (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), viii. Hereafter referred to as Riley, Kant's Pglitiga; Phitgsgphy. 18Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 168. 13 On this understanding, the emphasis one can discover in Kant's political philosophy is changed. There are two purposes or ends for Kant's political philosophy: attaining peace between nations and treating the members of society as ends. Understanding that these are the fundamental purposes of Kant's political philosophy allows us, according to Riley, to recognize the importance Kant places on a republican form of civil society that ought to strive for peace. It is only in a peaceful republic that it is possible for a person to achieve the end of morality - never treating humans merely as means. This is the aim of Kant's political philosophy according to Riley's argument. This is revealed in Riley's teleological reading of Kant's political philosophy and allows him to claim that Kant's ideas are more than simply a rehash of the liberal ideas of Hobbes or Rousseau. A more traditional conception of Kant's political theory may be found in the work of Howard Williams. In Kaatts Pgltttgat Phtlgsgphy he attempts to provide a systematic account of Kant's theory of politics, beginning with a discussion of Kant's views on history and moving on to his ideas about morality and justice. From this, he provides an account of the crucial concepts of property and social contract, which are the foundations of many of Kant's ideas. It is the idea of a social contract that Williams l4 advocates as grounding Kant's justification of politics.19 People enter society in order to secure the rights one has. This can only be accomplished if a contract is made between the united will of all. In civil society these rights are secured since it is here that it can be thought that each member of society has agreed to accept the claims of others in order to secure their own rights and claims. Through the idea of a contract uniting the wills of all members of society, one can see Kant as presenting a social contract theory version of political philosophy. All members of society can be viewed as agreeing to the obligations imposed on them, obligations that are to be understood as self- imposed.20 On this view of Kant's political philosophy, each person enters civil society to secure his or her rights, and in entering civil society, each "agrees" to abide by a contract of self-imposed laws. The conception of Kant's political philosophy presented by Williams can be understood as a limited or narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. .According to this view, the justified role of the state in civil society is quite limited. This dissertation will also argue against 19Howard Williams, Kaatts Pgttttga; Philgsgphy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 97. 20Williams, 182-3. It should be noted that neither Kant nor Williams thinks such a social contract represents an historical event. 15 this limited conception of Kant's political philosophy. Below we will consider the proposal that one should understand Kant's political philosophy as presenting a broader role for the state than one might initially expect. This proposal will emphasize the duties identified in Kant's moral philosophy and how they can help identify the duties of the state. Now, we can examine the steps that must be taken to demonstrate the worth of this conception of Kant's political philosophy. II. The Project to be Undertaken Based on the brief survey just completed, it is possible to note that trying to determine the best interpretation of Kant's political philosophy is an ongoing and difficult process. Various interpretations of Kant's political theory are as fundamentally different as any of the conflicts between interpretations of his critical philosophy. Confronted with such an array of readings, it is a difficult task for anyone to come to terms with Kant's View of politics. One must make judgments concerning the point of emphasis that will ground the conception being advanced, the relationship between Kant's different works on political philosophy, and the relationship of his political philOSOphy to the other aspects of his philosophical corpus. TrYing to present a basic overview of his political l6 philOSOphy requires that one contend with these concerns, and even then the reading one gives to Kant's political philosophy will confront serious problems. This project will attempt to present a reading of Kant's political philosophy that can overcome two problems facing his political philosophy in general and two other problems confronting a narrow contractualist account of his theory. In order to provide the best reading of Kant's political philosophy, this dissertation will be divided into seven chapters. The first chapter will be an initial discussion of Kant's political philosophy. In this, it will be necessary to consider the basic ideas which most commentators have tried to recognize and clarify in their interpretations of Kant's political philosophy. These points include: the basic purpose Kant identifies for his political philosophy; the role of the basic principle of his theory, the Universal Principle of Justice; the role and aim of the sovereign and government; the idea of citizenship; and a clarification of the types of rights Kant considers. This discussion will illuminate the narrow conception of Kant's social contract theory. This conception of Kant's political philosophy stresses that the justified role of the state ought to be limited to simply protecting the rights of members of a civil society. 17 This conception of Kant's political philosophy will enable us to clarify specific issues that must be resolved if an acceptable account of Kant's political philosophy is to be presented. These issues will be the focus of the second chapter. There are four challenges we will consider. They are the claims that 1) his notion of citizenship is sexist and elitist; 2) his theory of rights is also sexist; 3) the notion of justice contained in this reading is too limited; and 4) his political philosophy is not able to justify any actions of the state that will make it possible for individuals to achieve what they understand to be a good life. These criticisms are serious concerns, and while it will be argued that they can be overcome, it is only possible to do this if Kant's political philosophy is understood as justifying a broader range of actions of the state. Clarifying such a conception will be the aim the remainder of this dissertation. In the third chapter, we will consider two alternative conceptions of Kantian contractualism. These views have been presented by T. M. Scanlon and John Rawls. The arguments of these two philosophers are important because they claim, respectively, that it is possible to present a viable contractual moral theory and theory of justice. By considering their versions of contractualism, we will be able to note how they can meet the criticisms facing the 18 narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. We will also be able to identify some limitations of their views. Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of Scanlon's and Rawls' accounts will allow us to formulate three guidelines which we shall rely on to direct our attempt to present a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy. The fourth and fifth chapters will cover several important issues related to Kant's political philosophy. These chapters examine the basic issues in Kant's moral philosophy, issues that ground not only Kant's ethical theory but his political philosophy as well. The broader conception of Kant's political philosophy stresses the importance of understanding the duties of the state in civil society. These duties of the state are analogous to the juridical, indirect, and imperfect duties of humans, so we shall need to consider the basis of these duties in Kant's moral philosophy. In the fourth chapter, we will consider Kant's theory of human action, the idea of autonomy, and the notions of law and duty. The following chapter will examine some basic topics that are crucial to Kant's political philosophy. These are a discussion of what a metaphysics of morals is for Kant, the types of duties such a metaphysics clarifies, and the relation of these types of duties to political and ethical theory. 19 The sixth chapter will bring us to the important argument of this dissertation. Here we will consider the basis for claiming that the state can be justified in taking a broader role in civil society than can be justified on the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. This role can be justified when one recognizes the duties that the state can be expected to play in civil society given the idea that the members of civil society are all free and equal moral persons. Here it will first be argued that the state has a role in protecting the individual freedom of each individual. Second, the state has a justified role in acting in ways that will secure the opportunity of every individual to pursue their own ends. Finally, the state, in order to justify the second role, has a duty to provide the conditions necessary for individuals to be capable of being actively engaged in the activities of civil society and is justified in taking this role. Finally, in the seventh chapter, we will reconsider several of the ideas crucial to Kant's political philosophy that we identified in the first chapter. These include the aim of political philosophy, the Universal Principle of Right, the role of the government, rights, and the notion of citizenship. Taking into account the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy argued for in the previous chapter will allow us to understand how the criticisms 20 against his theory can be overcome on this broader conception. Chapter One An Initial Examination of Kant's Political Philosophy The aim of this chapter will be to clarify the understanding of Kant's political philosophy that is often presented to anyone making an initial investigation of Kant's views. His political philosophy is a version of the social contract theory. After considering this conception of Kant's social contract theory, we will be able to identify four problems facing Kant's political philosophy. These problems will be considered in Chapter Two. The primary expression of Kant's political philOSOphy can be found in the Mataphystgs gt Mgrals, but there are other shorter works where Kant develops ideas that are important to consider if we are to understand his political philosophy. From a general perspective, Kant's political philosophy is grouped with the modern liberal tradition. In this sense it is one of the theories that emphasizes the protection of individual freedom.1 Furthermore, Kant's views can also be classified as a social contract theory. 1For a concise statement of the role of liberty and freedom in liberal political philosophy see James P. Sterba, "From Liberty to Welfare," Ethics 105 (1994): 66. 21 22 On this view, the power of the sovereign is grounded on the idea of a contract between the members of society. The justification of the state is thought to rest on the consent of the people who will be ruled by that state.1 When introduced to Kant's political philosophy, students are usually presented with a narrow conception of the scope of the justified actions of the state. It is against this conception of Kant's political philosophy that many criticisms have been directed. In this chapter we will briefly cover this conception of Kant's political philosophy, an understanding which stresses the role of the Universal Principle of Right and the protection by the state of individual rights. This will involve, first, briefly discussing the general purpose of Kant's political philosophy. Based on this discussion it will be possible to clarify why Kant can be viewed as a social contract theorist. Next, we will look at the reason why Kant thinks a civil society is necessary and why the Principle of Right is important for justifying the role of the state in civil society. Third, our discussion will focus on the role of the sovereign in civil society. This will include looking 1For an excellent introduction to social contract theory in general see Chapter One, "How Coherent is the Social Contract Tradition?" in Patrick Riley, Will aag Pglitigal Litgitmagy, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982), 1-22. 23 not only at the nature of the sovereign but also the form the government should take. Fourth, Kant's understanding of citizenship will be considered. Finally, we will examine the role of rights in Kant's political philosophy. I. The Purpose of Kant's Political Philosophy If one tries to determine why Kant would spend time developing his views on political philosophy, onw will need to determine the aim or purpose of Kant's theory. One might think that the aim of political philosophy is to present a description of what a theorist believes would be the best society that can be actualized. On this View, political philOSOphy is supposed to provide a description of what civil society can be like in its best condition. This understanding of political philosophy provides an account of what the theorist thinks can be realized given her view of human nature. Another purpose of political philosophy might be to present a theory that can be used to provide an explanation of the problems confronting an existing society. On this View, the purpose of political philosophy is to provide a theory that can serve as the basis for empirical analysis of existing civil societies in order to determine what might be the cause of problems confronting a particular society. This would include an empirical theory about the nature of civil societies, and a means for determining what 24 members of a particular society believe is problematic. Neither of these, though, specifies the aim of political philosophy for Kant. For Kant, the aim of political philosophy is to provide an ideal that can be used to judge whether existing civil societies are just and to evaluate whether a society might be improving. This ideal is provided by the idea of a social contract. He says, The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the Idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state. (MM, 127/315) Through the idea of a social contract one is able to determine the nature and structure of a society that is just, since one can determine if an existing state would fulfil the requirements of an original contract.2 The views Kant presents concerning the nature and structure of civil society are intended to serve as an ideal or standard that one can use to judge both whether the existing and proposed laws of a society are just and whether a society is making progress towards becoming more just. To understand how Kant's theory can serve as an ideal or standard, we must 2See Williams, 166, where he stresses the point that what Kant considers important is not the historical formation of the state, but the ethical foundation of the state. Thus, one must recognize that the social contract discussed by Kant is not an historical event. Also see Mulholland, 289-93. 25 first consider what is to be understood by use of the idea of a social contract. Initially, Kant considers what a society would be like in a state of nature in which each person acted on egoistic impulses. In such a situation the freedom of each person could not be ensured. Given such a condition, civil society would be entered into in order to protect one's freedom, and they can be thought of as making a contract in order to try to protect their freedom.3 Kant asserts that ...in the rational Idea of such a condition...that before a public lawful condition is established, individual men, peoples, and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another's Opinion about this.' So,...the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature,...and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognized as belonging to it is determined by law and is allotted to it by adequate power (not its own but an external power); that is to say, it ought above all else to enter a civil condition. (MM, 124/312) Prior to the existence of any civil society, a society based on the rule of law, humans can be imagined to live in a state of nature. Kant is not claiming that such a state of nature was real; it can only be thought of as a postulate of 3Roger Sullivan, Ag Intrgductign tg Kant's Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 10-11. 26 reason.‘I In such a condition, disputes between individuals would in most cases be resolved through violence. Faced with such a situation, reason would determine that humans ought to leave this state and enter civil society where disputes over what each person thinks he possesses could be resolved fairly and where an external power could enforce these resolutions. In entering such a society, each person seeks to protect his ability to determine what he thinks is his own good, and in so doing, he makes an agreement with all other members of a society not to interfere with their ability to choose what they think is their own good. It is the idea of such an agreement that is Kant's conception of a social contract, and it is what can be used as a standard to judge the laws of a civil society and the progress a society may or may not be making towards becoming more just.5 In relation to the idea of political philosophy serving as a test for particular legislation, Kant states, in "On ‘See Williams, 169. He refers to a passage in Kant's Reflections on the 1211119519211 9.: Eight where he says, "Philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the supposed state of nature, provided they allow it to be a mere philOSOphical fiction, which never had, and never could have any reality." HAt the risk of being repetitive, I will again stress that the idea being discussed here is only that: an idea of reason. The idea of a contract signed in a state of nature must not be understood as an event which has taken place. For additional assertions of this point see MM, 147-48/339- 40, and "Theory and Practice," 79. 27 the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'," It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation.... (79)6 The laws which may be enacted in a particular society are acceptable if they can be thought of as proceeding from the will of every member in society. The reason for entering society, as noted above, is to protect one's freedom. Any law enacted in civil society would be acceptable to each member if the law is intended to protect the ability and freedom of each member of society to determine his own good. This protection is what each member wills when entering into civil society, and each could accept any laws which he could think of as expressions of his will. The idea of the social contract is discovered by reason in its recognition that each person must leave a state of nature and enter civil society if one is to secure the ability to determine his own good. Laws can be judged on the basis of whether or not they will, in fact, secure this ability for each member of a civil society, and this is the first way the idea of a 6In the Mataphystss gf,M r l , Kant explains that the Doctrine of Right will attempt to show how one can judge whether particular legislation is right or just. (55/229-30) See also Murphy, 110-1. 28 social contract can be used as a standard to test the legitimacy of civil society. Given the idea that humans enter civil society in order to secure their ability to determine what they think is their own good, it is also possible to judge whether a society as a whole is improving. Kant holds that a just society is one that secures the freedom or liberty of its members. If a society is improving, the freedom of its members will be secured to a greater degree than was previously the case. This is the case since one can examine a particular society and determine whether or not it is actualizing the idea of the social contract by securing the ability of its members to determine what each thinks is his own good. The most pressing problem Kant identifies for the human species is reaching a civil society that can ensure the freedom of its members under external laws. (Idea, 45) It is ensuring this freedom that is recognized as the motivation for entering civil society and the basis of the idea of the social contract. Because of this, the ideal of reason of realizing this end is the basis of judging whether a society is improving. In the QQQIILQL.Q£.L£§ Pagaltias, Kant clarifies this notion of an idea as the basis for judging the progress of a society when he says, The Idea of a constitution in harmony with the natural right of man, one namely in which the citizens obedient to the law, besides being 29 united, ought also to be legislative, lies at the basis of all political form; and the body politic which, conceived in conformity to it by virtue of pure concepts of reason, signifies a Platonic Ideal (respublica noumenon), is not an empty chimera, but rather the eternal norm for all civil organization in general, and averts all war. (Conflict, 163-65/90-91) Based on the idea of an agreement between members of a society, Kant thinks it is possible to determine what a society would be like which can realize the aim of that agreement. The political philosophy outlined by Kant is an attempt to clarify this ideal of civil society, and this ideal can be used to determine whether an existing political system is coming closer to expressing the ideal of protecting the freedom of the members of that society since it presents a standard for comparison. The ideal presented in Kant's political philosophy, thus, serves the additional role of being the basis for judging whether a particular society is moving toward realizing the ideal of protecting individual freedom. We will now turn to an examination of the points of Kant's political philosophy which clarify this ideal of reason. II. Civil Society and the Principle of Justice The fundamental principle of Kant's political philosophy is the Principle of Right. In order to understand Kant's conception of political philosophy as it 30 is grounded on this principle, it is important, first, to consider in more detail why he thinks that there is a need in human society for a political system at all. To clarify this point it is necessary to turn to some of the non- political works of Kant. In Paligign Within tha Limits gt Raasgn.Atgaa, Kant points out a crucial factor about humans and why they need' to enter into a civil society. According to him, humans have a tendency to be self-centered and driven by the non- rational element of their nature. Each person strives to reach what he thinks is his own good based on the non- rational or animal element of his nature and will act in any way(s) that he feels will allow him to reach his own conception of the good. This is the natural propensity to evil or radical evil that humans have as a result of their freedom to choose the maxims of their actions. (Pal, 27-8)7 Because of this tendency, there is always the threat of interference by others who are trying to act according to the non-rational element of their nature and gain what they think is good. Since this threat exists, it is necessary 7Denis Savage writes that the radical evil Kant discusses is the fact that humans have a tendency to make their moral decisions on the pleasure/pain principle. See Denis Savage, "Kant's Rejection of Divine Revelation and His Theory of Radical Evil," Kant's Philgsgphy gt Raligign Rasgastgatad, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1991), 68. 31 for people to form civil societies, even though doing so places additional constraints on the actions they may take to gain what they perceive to be their own good. These constraints are the laws and the threat of punishment that one must consider when choosing a course of action, constraints which are not present in a state of nature. This need to enter into society is referred to by Kant as the "unsocial sociability" of humans. (Idea, 44) Individuals enter civil society acknowledging the legitimacy of political systems which are created in order to protect their chances of securing what each takes to be his own good. Each individual joins society while continuing to attempt to secure what he takes to be the good for himself. The drive to come together in society occurs even though doing so may limit their opportunity to reach their own conception of the good. Humans become socialized even though the non-rational element of their nature directs people to be unsocial. Recognizing the facts of human radical evil and their "unsocial sociability," Kant attempts to present his political philosophy as a contract between individuals which is intended to assure all individuals the ability to pursue their ends in light of these facts. The expression of this contract is found in the Universal Principle of Right. This is the fundamental principle which grounds Kant's political philosophy. It 32 states that "[a]ny action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law." (MM, 56/230) This is directly related to the Categorical Imperative in the sense that it states the universal conditions of an action that is right. This principle differs from the Categorical Imperative since it focuses not on the motive of one's action but on the action that a person may choose to carry out in pursuit of his or her ends. This principle states the condition which must hold if one's action is right in the sense of being legally permissible. For Kant, an action is right or just in the legal sense if carrying out the action does not interfere with the actions that others may choose for themselves. To decide whether an action is just, it is necessary to determine whether it is the case that the freely chosen action of a person leaves open the possibility that others will have the same freedom to choose their own good.8 8This, it seems to me, states what Kant believes is the sufficient condition of a just act and the sufficient condition of a just society. What is questionable is whether this is really a sufficient condition and not rather a necessary condition. It seems to me that this is a necessary condition of justice, and in fact the primary condition of justice. This question is important when trying to determine whether or not Kant has an overly narrow conception of justice. It should also be noted that Murphy's reading of the 33 It is in this respect that it differs from the determination of a moral action since an action is morally right if the person's motive for the action is that it is one's duty to perform the action.9 The Categorical Imperative and Principle of Right each focus on a different element of human action, the motive of one's action and the action itself, respectively. Understood in this way, the Principle of Right expresses the condition that must be met if one's free actions are to be considered just, while the Categorical Imperative expresses the condition for any action to have moral worth. The condition of justice obtains when one's acts do not encroach on the free actions that others may choose in pursuit of their ends. The Principle of Right expresses the idea of a social contract, and the enforcement of the Principle of Justice leads us Principle of Justice expresses a necessary and sufficient conditional. See Murphy, 103. 9When judging the matal worth of an action, acting from the motive of duty is both the necessary and sufficient condition for an action to be judged morally right. This distinction then further clarifies the difference between the Principle of Right and the Categorical Imperative since the former states the sufficient condition for a (legally) right action and the later states the necessary and sufficient conditions of a (morally) right actions. It is important to recognize that for Kant an action may be juridically right but not have moral worth since it could be the case that an action is not performed from the motive of duty but still meet the requirements of justice. 34 directly to Kant's formulation of what the aim or purpose of government should be. III. The Sovereign and the Government In order to clarify the ideal political system which Kant presents in his political philosophy, it is important to first clarify the role of the sovereign and the government. The sovereign is the supreme authority of a civil society.10 This is the element of civil society which determines what ought to be done in society since it is the ruling power of a society. (PP, 100-01) The government, on the other hand, refers to the actual political institutions of a particular society. The sovereign is distinguished from the government because the government is the system that is supposed to carry out the aim of the sovereign. The government is the means through which the end of the sovereign is achieved in civil society. We must consider both of these elements of civil society to have a clear conception of Kant's political philosophy. Reason claims we must enter into society in order to protect each individual's ability to freely determine his own good. Protecting the freedom of each individual is the 10Williams, 173. 35 primary aim of Kant's political philosophy.11 Because each individual's freedom is at stake, the supreme authority in civil society is the united will of all the members of that society. The united will of all is, for Kant, the sovereign of a state. (MM, 147/339) The sovereign has the role of assuring that the actions carried out by the government are intended to assure that each individual's freedom is protected. According to Kant, the sovereign or the supreme authority of a state is a "pure Idea of a head of state" and is actually a "thought-entity." (MM, 146/338) The sovereign does not actually exist except as an idea of reason. As an idea of reason the sovereign can only have an effect on the members of a society if it corresponds to an actual person or body which represents the will of the people. For Kant, the sovereign is represented by the legislative authority of the government. The state, then, has the responsibility to ensure that the Principle of Justice, which expresses the united will of the members of society, is both enacted into law and enforced through these laws. The responsibility of the government is to enact the will of the sovereign. The will of the sovereign is the 11In the present context, the discussion of freedom centers on external freedom. Where this is not the case I indicate the change in emphasis. 36 protection of the ability of individuals to freely carry out the acts they have chosen as necessary for reaching the ends each desires.12 This ability can only be assured if one of two conditions hold.13 It would be assured if all members of the society respect the freedom of others and do not act in ways that limit the freedom of others to freely act. This, unfortunately, will rarely, if ever, take place. It is necessary, therefore, for the government to guard against possible violations of individual freedom by being a threat against anyone who might act in ways that limit another's freedom. It is this condition which characterizes Kant's political philosophy. The possibility of punishment being inflicted by the government on a person is a threat against any individual who might violate another's freedom. This is a deterrence based on what Kant calls the sensible grounds one has for actions; that is, one is deterred from interfering with the freedom of others through the feelings of aversion to unpleasant physical suffering one has. (MM, 46/219)“ 12I do not go into detail on this point, but the right of punishment possessed by the sovereign mentioned under the discussion of public right below is directly related to this point. The threat and use of punishment by the sovereign is analytically contained in the Principle of Right according to Kant since any hindrance to a hindrance of freedom is just. (MM, 57/231) 13Williams, 188. 37 Punishment will be an unpleasant sensible experience which most people will desire to avoid. Because of this possibility, most people will not interfere with the freedom of others. Unlike the first possibility where individuals do not violate the freedom of others because of a self- imposed motive, this second possibility appeals to one's desire to avoid the threat of retribution that may be brought by the government as the motive for not interfering with the freedom of others. (MM, 46/219) Because of this threat, people will usually acknowledge the freedom of others and not interfere with the expression of it, and this is the primary role that the government must fulfill. One point can be noted about this conception of the role of the government. .According to Kant, a just society is possible even if a society is populated by a race of devils. (PP, 112-13) What the Principle of Right emphasizes is that individuals have the right to determine what is their own good, and this right ought not be interfered with by another's actions, but the reason or motive for limiting one's actions to meet this condition is not under consideration. A.moral person may limit his actions to protect the potential of others to freely choose their ends and actions because it is his ethical duty, but an immoral person would not. If there existed a society of only 1‘See also Gregor, 24. 38 immoral people, such a society could still be a just society if each person's actions did not interfere with the freedom of others to choose their actions.15 The motive for such restraint does not have to be a sense of duty. If duty is not the motive of a person, he would not be performing morally right actions, but his actions would still be just. As long as individual external freedom is protected, a society is just. Even though it is possible according to Kant that a race of devils may form a just society, this society would still demonstrate certain characteristics. The first characteristic would be that the laws enacted by the government aim at ensuring that the Principle of Right directs the actions of individuals. If the government does not attempt to carry out the Principle of Right, it would not be possible for a society to be just since the external freedom of individuals would not be protected. Secondly, Kant stresses that a society would most likely be just if the government takes a republican form.16 In a republican 15This clarifies the reading of the Principle of Right as expressing a sufficient condition since in holding that a race of devils could form a just society, there are no other necessary conditions needed. Kant has left open the possibility that a society of moral people could form.a just society without considering or acting on the Principle of Justice. 16It is, of course, possible that an active society with a republican form of government may not be just if 39 form of government, the legislative and executive powers are separated. (MM, 148/340, and PP, 101) Only in a republican form of government would it be possible for the sovereignty of a society to be expressed and for the protection of the freedom of individuals to be the condition for any coercion by the state. By separating the power of the government which enforces the particular laws, the executive branch, from the power which creates the laws that apply to all people, the legislative branch, it is possible to limit some of the abuses by the government against some individuals.17 What we must consider is how the sovereign can be expressed in the government through the legislative branch. A few additional comments will help clarify the importance of a republican form of government. A civil society will be a just society only when it is the case that the legislative authority of a civil society is based on the united will of all the people. This means individual freedom is not protected. As we will see below, however, it is only through a republican form of government that members can conceive of the laws as self-imposed and thus binding. It must be recognized that Kant is presenting the formal conditions for a just society, and that empirical conditions may differ from the ideal form. Because of this fact there is the real possibility for abuse in a republican society, but the point which must be recognized is that Kant believes that only in a republican form of government is the ideal of justice a possibility. 17Williams, 173-4. Kant discusses the legislative authority of the state resting with the "united will" of all at MM, 125. 40 that the sovereign must be expressed by the government. This will be the case if it is possible for each person to recognize that the law can be viewed as an expression of his will.18 The supreme authority of civil society is the members of that society and as rational beings they are driven to gain protection for their ability to determine their own good. If a society is able to protect this ability it is a just society. This will be the case if each person can think of the laws as an expression of his will, since, if the law is prescribed by oneself for oneself, then it cannot be wrong. Kant says, Now, when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself. (MM, 125/313) A republican form of government will more likely assure that this is the case because only in this form of government is it possible for one to have expression in the legislative process and, thus, make laws for himself. Rational individuals will only consent to positive laws which are intended to protect their freedom, and in this way these 18When Kant changes focus from the discussion of the Principle of Right and begins to examine the foundation of laws in a civil society, it should be noted that he considers laws to be based on the will of the male members of society. This will be noted by the use of the male personal pronoun. More importantly, it is the basis of the first two criticisms I will consider below. 41 laws can be understood as being based on the consent of the members of a society. Only in a society characterized by these three points would it be possible for a race of devils to exist in a just society. Understood in this way, Kant's ideal of political philosophy can be used to judge whether the laws of a society are just and whether the society is improving. This is the case because only in a society such as the one described will the laws express the united will of its members and make it possible for greater freedom of its members. IV. Citizenship One final point that must be clarified before turning to the delineation of the specific rights Kant presents is the notion of citizenship. Citizens are the members of a state "...who are united for giving law...." (MM, 125/314) To clarify what a citizen is, we must consider the attributes which Kant claims citizens have. The attributes of citizenship are the rights possessed by all members of a state. These are lawful freedom, civil equality, and civil independence. (MM, 125/314) Freedom is the attribute of obeying only the laws to which one has given his consent. Equality is the right of each person of not having to recognize any member of society as morally superior and possessing the moral authority to bind others 42 unilaterally. Independence is the attribute of being able to rely on one's own rights and powers for one's existence instead of relying on the support of other members of society. Based on these attributes, we can recognize that citizens are those people who can claim that they are protected from the abuses that may occur as a result of the actions of other members of the civil society. Each member can claim, by virtue of citizenship, that his or her freedom, moral authority, and rights as a tatignal being in a civil society be protected by the government. This is the reason for entering civil society, and what the ideal of the social contract dictates is that the attributes of the members of society ought to be protected. In addition to specifying the attributes of a citizen in general, Kant draws a distinction between active and passive citizens. For him, all members of society who meet the requirements for voting are to be considered active citizens. (MM, 126/314) These are the members who possess the quality of independence. Passive citizens are those people who, presumably meet other qualifications, but are not independent and cannot vote.19 In "On the Common 1"Kant is not clear about the relationship between the rights and attributes of a citizen in general and the attribute of independence as the qualification for being an active citizen. It seems that a passive citizen has the attributes of freedom and equality, but not independence. .As a passive citizen, he or she can make claims of freedom 43 Saying," Kant clarifies what it means to be independent. A person who is independent is one who is his own master. .According to this claim, Kant means that the person must be a male property holder who can support himself with the property he possesses by selling what is his. (Saying, 78) A man can sell things he owns or things that he can produce, and by this act he would be able to support himself. Such a person would not be relying on the support of others nor under his control, but he would be expressing his own will through his actions.20 In this way, independence demonstrates that a person will be able to conceive of the laws of civil society as expressing his own will and can be an involved member in the sovereignty of the state. Passive citizens are the members of civil society who can claim that others in the state treat them in accordance with the Principle of Right and not interfere with their and equality, but cannot claim to have a right to vote because he or she does not possess the attribute of independence. The confusion here will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. ‘mThe idea here according to Susan Mendus is that Kant wishes to ensure that each individual expresses his will through voting and is not acting in accord with the will of some superior. See her article "Kant: An Honest but Narrow- Minded Bourgeois?" Essays ga Kant's Pglitigal Philgsgphy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992), 170. 44 freedom.21 Passive citizens are, thus, co-beneficiaries of the protection of freedom offered by the state, but they cannot be involved in the making of the laws of the state. (Saying, 77) Here Kant also stresses that it is possible for passive citizens to acquire property and become voting members of civil society. By pointing out that it is possible for a passive citizen to become an active citizen, Kant is clarifying what he takes to be the eligibility requirements for voting and becoming an active citizen. (MM, 126/314, and Saying, 78)22 Having clarified who the members of civil society are, we will now consider what rights Kant thinks are to be protected in civil society. V. Rights Our previous discussion focused on Kant's ideas concerning the basic principle of Right and how this principle can be realized in civil society. In presenting an explanation of Kant's political philosophy we have been giving a reading of it as a version of a social contract 2lAllen D. Rosen, Kant's Ihsgry gt Jastigs, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993), 35. ‘”Of course, Kant does not think that women can own property, and because of this fact they would not be able to become active citizens. Kant makes a parenthetical remark that independence is the only requirement for active citizenship "apart, of course, form being an adult male" which clearly indicates that women cannot be active citizens. See Mendus, 172-4. 45 theory. We still need to consider the various rights Kant presents in the "Doctrine of Right" in the Mataphystgs gt Matals. To understand Kant's views on rights within the context of a social contract theory, we will cover three points. First, we shall consider in more detail why people enter into society and the contract they Can be thought to be creating in the agreement to enter civil society. Second, we will clarify the division of rights found in civil society. Finally, the specific rights discussed by Kant will be discussed. Up to this point our discussion of Kant has been taken to present individuals as being motivated to enter civil society in order to secure their freedom. Each is free by virtue of his being a rational being, and each has the ability to freely choose the ends he desires and the means he believes are necessary to reach that end. The idea of a social contract expresses the idea of the motivation for entering into civil society: in order to secure one's ability to act freely a person can be thgaght to make an agreement with others to not interfere with each other's ability to act freely. Since humans, by virtue of their being rational beings, have the ability to act freely, they can make claims against others to act in ways that do not interfere with their own freedom. That is, each person can claim that others have an obligation not to interfere with 46 one's ability to act freely. The moral capacity for being able to put others under obligation is what Kant calls a right. (MM, 63/237) The social contract can be understood as an agreement between individuals to live in civil society in order to protect each person's claim to have the ability act freely in order to determine his own good and to have a recourse against those who might interfere with this claim. By entering into civil society, individuals are able to secure their rights, i.e. the ability to put others under obligation. This is possible in a civil society where laws are enacted according to the united will of all and are enforced by the government. The legislation enacted in a civil society and enforced by the government is intended to secure each person's ability to act freely. The agreement to live under the united will of all is made in exchange for the protection and enforcement of the claims an individual can make to have the ability to act freely. The social contract, then, is an agreement between members of a society to recognize the rights each member has against the other members. Since Kant's political philosophy is based on the idea of an agreement between members of society to recognize each other's claims of rights, we must consider the rights that are to be secured in a civil society. In a state of nature, a.person can claim that others have an obligation not to 47 interfere with the ability of a person to act freely in pursuit of his own good. The exercise of this ability is the basis of private or natural rights; they are the claims of obligation anyone has whether or not he is in a civil society. (MM, 67/242) Securing these rights is the reason for a person to enter civil society. In contrast to the private rights of a person, there are also public or civil rights. These are the rights that are held by the united will of all and express the obligations which can be created by civil society. Public rights, because they are based on public law, can only be enforceable obligations of a civil society. (MM, 67/242) These include the obligations members of civil society accept in exchange for securing their right to act freely. In addition to the rights of civil society against its members, every civil society can also make claims against other societies. We will now turn to a consideration of the specific rights under the headings of private and public rights that Kant identifies. A. Private Rights Kant identifies two sorts of private rights, innate and acquired. Considering innate right first, Kant identifies only one innate right: external freedom. (MM, 63/237) As rational beings, all humans possess the capacity of freedom. Because they possess this capacity, it is necessarily the 48 case that all humans have a right to exercise this freedom. Every person, then, can obligate all other people not to interfere with the expression of this capacity by their actions. In claiming that humans have the innate right of external freedom, Kant says that humans can make several additional claims against others by virtue of this right. The three claims any person can make based on the innate right he has are: (a) innate equality, (b) being his own master, and (c) being authorized to do anything to other individuals as long as it does not take away anything they possess. (MM, 63/237—38) The first claim is that each person is equal in the sense that all are rational beings. Each person can claim to be recognized by all others as equal to everyone else because they have the same rational nature. This leads to the second claim. Since each person must be recognized as equal to every other person, each individual possesses the quality of not having another as his master or superior. Being one's own master means that a person can choose whatever he will do as long as it does not interfere with the claim of equality of others. This leads to the third claim. Since a person is equal to all others and his own master, he can do and possess whatever he thinks will help him reach his own good, if it does not interfere with another person's freedom. Because of the innate right, 49 a person can acquire and possess other objects.23 This brings us to the claims of rights to acquired objects which is the other set of private rights considered by Kant. Kant's begins his consideration of Private (Acquired) Rights by discussing the basis of the acquired rights. These are the rights that a person has to external objects, and they are distinguished by the sorts of objects a person can claim to possess. These objects are things or property, another's choice to perform an action, and another's status. Each type of object is the basis of the specific rights of property right, contract right, and rights to persons akin to things, respectively. Property rights are more generally called a right to a thing. This is defined by Kant as "...a right to the private use of a thing of which I am in (original or instituted) possession in common with all others." (MM, 82/260-61) Kant is primarily considering the idea of possession of land. A.person gains a right to land through an original act of taking possession. By an act of choice, a person makes a unilateral expression of his will to take control of the land. (MM, 84/263) Such an act secures a 23The sense of 'possession' used here is physical possession. Intelligible possession is necessary for holding an object while not in the physical presence of it. This distinction is not covered in this dissertation but is an important contribution by Kant to the theory of property. 50 piece of land for a person, but only provisionally. Only in civil society, through a united act of the will for giving law, is the right to property secured. (MM, 85/264) The right to property, the foremost right in Kant's mind, is what prompts everyone to move into civil society. Only in this setting can a person obligate others to not interfere with his possession and use of an object. Protecting the acquired right to property, then, is the primary motivation for entering civil society. The ability to determine the actions of another is contract right. It is possible to acquire the action or deed of another by transferring the claim to an object of one person to another. ’Specifically, what is acquired is a right to coerce a person to perform a specific action. (MM, 90—91/271) In a contract, a person makes a promise to . perform some action, and another person by this promise receives a right to force the person to carry out the action agreed to by both parties. This is a right against the person and not a right to a thing since it is a claim against the performance of a specific action of the person. (MM, 93/273-74) Contract rights can be secured by virtue of the agreement individuals make to perform certain deeds. The third of the private rights delineated by Kant is the right to persons akin to rights to things, or what can generally be referred to as domestic rights. A.person has a 51 right against other people outside of his family not to interfere with the relations and claims he has concerning the other members of his household. (MM, 95/276)“ These include the rights of a man to acquire a wife, a couple to acquire children, and a family to acquire servants. The head of the household holds rights regarding the relations between himself and his wife, children, and servants, rights that others outside of the household must respect. He has these rights related to his domestic existence not through an action or contract but because of the principle that there is a Right of humanity in one's own person which grounds the acquisition of these relations. (MM, 95/276) This does not mean that the head of the household acquires the peOple who are his wife, children, and servants, but that he gains the right of non-interference by others in his relations with these people. And, according to Kant, as the head of the household he gains the right to represent them due to his relationship with them. 2"This seems to be best understood as a potential right that males have. It is an actual right when a man is the head of his own household, but adult males have the potential to claim this right as soon as they are married and have their own household. 52 B. Public Rights Property, contract, and domestic rights - along with the innate right to freedom — form the set of private rights Kant discusses. The private rights are those which a person can claim in a state of nature. (MM, 67/242) In addition to the private rights, Kant also considers public right. Kant provides a definition of public right in the opening section of his discussion of this topic. He says, The sum of the laws that need to be promulgated generally in order to bring about a rightful condition is public Right. Public Right is therefore a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of men, or for a multitude of peoples, that, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution (constititio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right. This condition of the individuals within a people in relation to one another is called a civil condition (status civilis), and the whole of individuals in a rightful condition , in relation to its own members, is called a state (civitas). (MM, 123/311) This indicates two things. First, public right should delineate the laws which express the private rights individuals possess, and second, the constitutional rights which states possess that clarify the right form of civil society as stated in a constitution. (MM, 121/306):25 The laws of a particular civil society, as we saw in the above discussion of the basis of the sovereign, are supposed to be 25Mulholland, 308-9. 53 understood as expressions of the united will of the members of society. Each person ought to be able to consider the laws enacted by the legislature as self-imposed. Such laws would only be ones that express the Principle of Right. These, therefore, must be expressions of the protection of private rights. Enacting such laws and enforcing them is the primary function of the state in a civil society.26 The other aspect of public right is the constitutional right of the state which concern the form of the state itself. These include the right to enforce the laws through punishment, to grant clemency, to impose taxes and require military service, and to judge when disputes between individuals arise.27 Justifying these public rights rests 26In order to ensure that the state is able to enact and enforce the laws needed to secure the freedom of individuals, the state is justified in requiring that the members of civil society provide the support needed to perform this function. This support can included the payment of taxes and performing military service. (MM, 136/326) 27I have not discussed the ideas of the right of nations nor cosmopolitan right. The first is a discussion of the rights which states have regarding their relationships among each other. These include the rights states have to make war on other states (MM, 152-3/346), rights during and after war (MM, 153-4/347), and the right to peace. Cosmopolitan right is the right to peaceful relations between states. As these deal with rights concerning the international relations between states and not with the rights and justice within a state, it gets us beyond the question of what the idea of a state is that can serve as the basis of judging whether a state is just. Granted, a just state will recognize the relations of other states and the right to peaceful coexistence of states in 54 on a public constitution which states the form of the government of the civil society and the actions the state is justified in taking. It is for this reason that Kant includes a description of the best form of government in the section of public right, a topic discussed above. What has been sketched here is a conception of Kant's political philosophy which stresses the importance of promoting individual rights. The social contract, on this View, is understood as providing justification for the actions of the state to the extent that these actions are intended to protect the private rights of individuals. This is the view that is usually taught to students first being introduced to Kant's political theory. In the next chapter we will consider four criticisms that can be made of this 'version of Kantian contractualism. With these criticisms in mind we can attempt to determine if it is possible to retain the essential structure of Kant's political philosophy while meeting the criticisms that have been advanced against it. the world, but our primary concern is the ideas of Kant's political philosophy as they relate to the idea of judging a particular state. It seems at this point in time that no state can even reach the ideal of a just state sketched by Kant in terms of its own internal affairs, let alone in its relationship with other states. For this reason, the discussion of these rights will be not considered. Chapter Two Challenges to Kant's Political Philosophy Having completed our initial examination of Kant's political philosophy, the task at hand is to consider some of the criticisms that might arise under this conception of Kant's political philosophy. As was noted in the Introduction, little attention was paid to Kant's political philosophy by the Anglo—American philosophical community until relatively recently. While there has been an increase in the interest in his views, much of the interest consists of negative comments pointing out the bourgeois, sexist slant of his political philosophy. While I do not deny that Kant's political philosophy can be negatively characterized, I believe that it is possible to present a different conception of Kant's political philosophy which can, at least partially, escape certain objections to his work. In this chapter, four objections will be considered. The first criticism notes that Kant limits the role of active citizenship to male property holders. This is obviously a sexist and discriminatory view of the nature of 'citizenship that we would reject today. Second, the particular acquired rights that Kant insists the state must 55 56 protect are, by today's standards, objectionable because the property and domestic rights of women are restricted. These two criticisms are not specifically directed at Kant's contractualism, but they identify two points in Kant's political philosophy in general that seem to be grounds for rejecting his views. Third, the nature of justice which can be derived from the limited conception of Kant's contractualism is too narrow in scope. Kant focuses only on the condition of protecting an individual's freedom from external coercion as the sufficient condition of justice, and this seems to leave out other conditions people believe are necessary for a society to be just. Fourth, one can question Kant's ideal because of its emphasis on the neutrality of the political system. As a liberal political philosophy which only emphasizes the protection of individual freedom as the justification of the state, Kant's contractualism cannot justify actions of the state which would promote certain conditions necessary for people to live agood life. Many people believe that a just society should also be one which promotes a good life for its members. As a liberal political philosophy, Kant's ideal cannot make such claims, so one can wonder if it is tenable ideal. These are serious difficulties for Kant's political philosophy, and we must consider them in more detail: 57 I. The Problem of Citizenship In the previous chapter, we noted that the only requirement that must be met for gaining the status of active citizen is possessing the ability to vote. (MM, 126/314) For Kant this means that males who possess their own property or business and can, by this possession, support themselves are eligible to be voting members of a society. This is the quality of independence. All other people in a society, children, females, or those who work for another person, do not meet the requirement of independence because they rely on others for their welfare and protection. Because of this situation they are not able to take an active role in the decisions of a society. According to Kant, individuals cannot qualify for the status of active citizenship simply by virtue of their possession of natural freedom.1 One should immediately be struck by any claim that only male property holders can become citizens in a society and have a role in determining the laws and structure of a society. Kant does respond that anyone who does not possess property is free to attempt to gain it. (MM, 126/314) In so 1Kant does not clarify his reasoning for this claim; he simply says that it does not follow from the possession of natural freedom that one has the right to manage the state itself even though the laws passed in a society must not interfere with this natural freedom. (MM, 126/314) 58 doing he would have the chance to become self-supporting and become an active citizen who can be involved in the lawmaking decisions of the state. This requirement for gaining the status of an active citizen is dubious since it bases eligibility requirements for active citizenship on the external social status of the individual. The possession of property may make it possible for a person to support himself, but this should not be the basis for considering a person for active citizenship in civil society. Using a property requirement to distinguish active citizens from passive citizens is irrelevant because becoming an active citizen might require conditions to be met which the person cannot control. Even more unusual is the point that no women can, according to Kant, be active citizens of a society. ("Theory and Practice," 78) Women as humans who are rational beings ought to have the same private rights as men by virtue of their status as rational beings. However, women are denied the right to possess property and, thus, cannot meet the requirement for active citizenship. By denying women this right they are relegated to a lower status than even passive citizens who are males.2 They have no opportunity to move up to a higher status and become active citizens of the ZMendus, 174. 59 state. Their status as women seems to prevent them from being, or ever becoming, active citizens in the civil society. The problem with Kant's statements about citizenship appears to rest on his failure to clearly recognize two distinct elements of the concept of citizenship. On the one hand, it is possible to identify what one takes to be the primary characteristics of a citizen. For Kant these are the three attributes of innate freedom, civil equality, and civil independence. These are the attributes which each person as a citizen of a state can claim to possess. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify the requirements that a person must meet to be a citizen. This, according to Kant, is the eligibility to vote, which we noted is based on a person's being independent. One of the attributes of a citizen that Kant identifies, then, is also the eligibility requirement for being a voting member or active citizen of society. However, active citizenship is limited to only a select group of people who can really be true citizens since only certain people - male property holders - can possess the attribute of independence which is also the eligibility requirement for being an active citizen. For Kant, then, active citizenship is based on civil status and not the status of being a rational being, and this contradicts what one would expect when considering a political philosophy 60 that is grounded on protecting the individual freedom of rational human beings. Part of the difficulty with Kant‘s independence requirement for active citizenship is due to the ambiguous nature of the notion of 'independence'. One sense of 'independence' would mean that a person can be described as independent if he or she is able to think and reason for themselves. In this sense the idea is that a person is an autonomous rational being. A different sense of 'independence' can mean that a person is able to survive without the aid of any other individual. This sense of the term 'independence' means that a person does not have to rely on the aid of others for his or her welfare. The difficulty for Kant arises because he is not clear that these two senses of independence are not related. It is questionable to think that any person is independent in the second sense since we rely on exchange and cooperation for our material well-being. Even the person who is independently wealthy will rely on others to provide the goods and services he might require. Since Kant fails to recognize this clarification he seems to think that being independent in the second sense is a mark of independence in the first sense. Due to this ambiguity Kant makes some questionable claims about the requirements for active citizenship. 61 II. A Limited View of Acquired Private Rights A second general difficulty that can be identified in Kant's political philosophy centers on the conception of the acquired rights individuals have. The acquired private rights discussed by Kant are problematic because of the limited nature of these rights. His view is limited because property and domestic rights can only be possessed by males. In this section we will consider this claim. Acquired rights are the claims of obligation against others that one can make concerning the possession of the sorts of objects a person thinks are necessary for gaining what he considers to be his own good. A person can make claims against others that they not interfere with his possession and use of these types of things. The sorts of things considered by Kant are property, the deeds of others gained through contracts, and the relations the head of a household has with the other members of his household. For Kant, it is securing these rights which is the motivation for individuals to enter civil society. These rights are only limited by the condition that the possession and use of the things do not interfere with the freedom of others to secure what they think is their own good. Initially, this conception of acquired rights is plausible, but these rights are only secured for a certain segment of society - men. Just as women are excluded from 62 becoming active citizens, they are excluded from claiming that they have property and domestic rights. In the first place, Kant implicitly claims that only men can acquire property in civil society. Women are not allowed to gain land or possess their own business according to Kant.3 Women are, thus, excluded from being able to make any claims to property rights. Second, Kant stresses that it is the male who heads a household and can obligate individuals outside of the household not to interfere with the relationship he has with the other members of his household. The male, as head of the household has a natural superiority over the "...wife in his capacity to promote the common interest of the household...." (MM, 98/279) In a marriage, the wife is subservient to the husband. The husband, while equal to his wife, possesses the domestic rights in a household when there is a question about who can make claims against members of society outside of the household. The acquired private rights of property and domestic relations are limited to only the males of society, and this seems to be a questionable view of rights. 3This can be inferred from Kant's claim, in "Theory and Practice," (78) that women cannot be active citizens since it appears that they are precluded from acquiring property needed to meet the independence requirement for active citizenship. See Mendus, 173-74. 63 Up to this point, the criticism against Kant's political philosophy are due to his sexist, elitist attitude. Because of these, one has grounds for questioning whether Kant's political philosophy is an ideal we would really want to use when judging whether or not the laws of a society are just or if that society is becoming more just. Any ideal of society which limits the opportunity for citizenship to property holders and limits the rights of women is not a very persuasive ideal. These two criticisms are addressed to claims made by Kant about the nature of who ought to be able to make claims of being an active citizen and of possessing certain acquired rights. The difficulty being addressed concerns the nature of the people who can make these claims. Kant allowed certain prejudices of his day to influence his thought, and it is necessary to consider what he thought counted as relevant in his conception of a bearer of rights. If we are able to clarify this, these criticisms can be overcome. Before turning our attention to resolving this problem, there are two other criticisms which point to serious problems with the narrow conception of the scope of Kant's contractualism. We will turn to these now. 64 III. The Nature of Kant's Conception of Justice According to the narrow conception of Kant's political phiIOSOphy, the justification of society rests on the protection of the rights, especially the acquired rights, one has. This is the motivation for entering civil society. The acquired rights, while not analytically derived from the innate right to freedom, are based on that right. Each person has a right to possess the objects he thinks are necessary for reaching his own good. A law or a civil society is just to the extent that it protects each person's right to freedom, whether that is the innate right to freedom or the acquired rights one has as an expression of that freedom. A just society will be one that secures the acquired rights that a person could only provisionally possess in a state of nature. This conception of justice is characterized by the condition that a person's actions do not limit the freedom of others. The objection to this conception of justice is that it is too limited. On this view of justice, what is required is only that the freedom of individuals is protected. If this condition is met, the society or law is to be considered just. This conception of justice only protects the freedom of choice to act in ways that will provide the means to acquire what a person conceives to be his good. However, if protecting this freedom is all there 65 is to the concept of justice, it may be the case that the actions of individuals may alter the structure of society, resulting in a society where the realistic choices of other individuals may be limited. The freedom of others to choose their own actions may still be protected, but the options available to these others may not be the same. This problem can be clarified by considering it in relation to modern capitalism. On Kant's model, a person is free if he can make a free choice without interference from others. A.society which ensures this is just. What this model fails to recognize is that the economic conditions of modern capitalism preclude the possibility that many members of civil society will ever be able to have the same freedom of choice as the members of society who possess the means of production in modern capitalismn‘ While the possession of the means of production does not interfere with the freedom of others to determine what is their own good, it is the case that each person does not have the same ability to acquire the means of production. While it is the case that each member of society has the potential to express his freedom, even when ‘This criticism is based on Marx's criticism of Kant's practical philosophy as presented by William James Booth in "The Limits of Autonomy: Karl Marx's Kant Critique," Kant and Pglitigal Philgsgp_y, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1993), 245— 75. 66 some members of society possess certain objects, the freedom each member possesses is not really the same freedom. It is a different freedom because it is the freedom to contract one's labor and in doing so one loses his independence.5 .A person who possesses the means of production is able to act freely in his possession and use of these objects, and his actions will not interfere with the freedom of others since they can have the same freedom to acquire the means of production and the freedom to choose to work for a person who possesses this form of property. Anyone who does not own the means of production has a choice to work in order to survive or to not work at all. On this view a person can choose to work or not work; this is freedom from coercion. In his era, Kant recognized that an individual was often born to the land and considered part of the property that another person possessed. Such an individual would not have any freedom as he would be forced to live and work for the feudal lord whose land the peasant occupied. Such conditions violated the innate right of the peasant members of society since they had no choice concerning how they would or could reach their conception of the good. The 5Booth, 263. Again we can note that Kant has failed to recognize the ambiguity in the term 'independence'. .A person may have to work for another person to support herself and family and would be relying on the aid of others for her welfare. But that does not mean that she would not be an independent autonomous individual. 67 freedom of choice to contract one's labor, however, simply masks that fact that a person has no real, i.e. effectual, freedom to pursue his conception of the good, since his choice is to relinquish his freedom to the will of another or perish.6 .A society is just as long as there is freedom of choice, regardless of the reality of the options. Meeting this condition does seem to be a condition of justice, but meeting it alone is not sufficient for one to claim that a society is just. This form of justice, though, is acceptable on the narrow contractual conception of Kant's political philosophy, and it is because of this that one can question the ideal Kant presents. Understood as a sufficient condition, an action is to be judged as just if other individuals possess the ability to exercise their freedom. The narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy stresses that the role of the state is to ensure that this condition exists, and a society which meets this condition is to be considered just. This is a questionable conception of justice because it accepts as justified the possession and use of certain objects, i.e. means of production, which may alter the structure of 6Booth, 264. Of course, Kant can respond that people who act as subcontractors are independent since they own their businesses, but this does not respond to the charge that many people must work for others and, on Kant's view, are not independent. 68 society. The result of this could be that the only freedom some people are left with is the choice between relinquishing one's will or facing almost certain physical hardship or worse. This is a limited view of the nature of justice, and it is a conception of justice which many people today would reject. This is a serious problem for Kant because the nature of justice is crucial for his political philosophy. By pointing out the possibility that it allows conditions to exist which may not be what we would consider ideally just, this is an important challenge to Kant's political philosophy conceived as a narrow contractualism. IV. Justifying Claims About the Good The criticism that Kant's theory of justice is based on a narrow, limited conception of justice leads to a further challenge to Kant's political philosophy. The focus of this challenge is the problem that Kant's political philosophy, like other liberal philosophies committed to protecting the freedom of individuals, cannot support any claims about what should be the good life of its members. Understood as a political theory that conceives of the justification for the actions of the state as resting only on protecting individual freedom, a just state cannot promote any conditions which dictate what individuals ought to do. This conception of justice supports the idea that the state must 69 remain neutral in terms of what the good life ought to be.7 Since a just society in Kant's view is one that protects individual freedom, one can wonder if there are any grounds for claiming that certain actions ought to be taken or not taken by all the members of society beyond what is necessary to protect the freedom of the members of the society. This challenge can be further clarified by considering what some people think is the consequence of the neutrality that characterizes a liberal political philosophy such as Kant's. On the narrow reading of Kant's political philosophy, a just society is one which protects each person's ability to choose freely the actions he thinks are necessary to secure his conception of the good life. As humans continue to progress, we have begun to recognize that there are multiple ways a person can lead a fulfilling life. We have also come to recognize that there is no known way to order these and determine what is "the good life" everyone should try to live. Every person, as a free and rational being, should be allowed to determine what the good life is for themselves. This is stressed by the narrow understanding of Kant's political philosophy because it holds that individuals ought to have the freedom to pursue what they think is their own good. The state is only justified in securing the 7Charles E. Larmore, Patterns gt Mgral ggmplaxity, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 43-45. 70 conditions that make it possible for each person to determine what the good life is for himself. The difficulty one might find with this conception of the relationship between the good life and Kant's political philosophy is that it may be understood as supporting a relativistic moral view. Since each person must determine for himself what the good life is, he alone can be the sole judge for determining what actions are right. Because of this, there is no basis for claiming that certain actions which do not interfere with anyone's freedom, nevertheless, ought or ought not to be done by all people. The actions necessary for every person to reach their own conception of the good are different for each person. What is right, other than actions prescribed by statutory laws, are the actions a person takes to secure his conception of the good life. What is right will depend on each person's conception of the good life. Thus, there can be no basis for claiming that certain actions are what every person morally ought to do.8 8This point is based on the Charles Taylor's assessment of the criticisms of the ideal of authenticity. While I do not think that liberal neutrality necessarily supports a relativistic moral view, I do think that any political philosophy based on the idea liberal neutrality, which I believe Kant's is, must answer the charge that it cannot support claims about what actions are right in any sense except legally right. For Taylor's comments see Chapter Two of Tha Ethigs gt Authsntigity, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991), 13-24. 71 While the consequence of this view of liberal political philosophy may be questioned, what it does point out is that one should be concerned whether it is possible for a conception of civil society on the narrow understanding of Kant's political philosophy to support any notions that the life of the members of the civil society should be moral. This is a concern that Hegel raised, and we should consider what this means for understanding Kant's contractualism.9 The concern one ought to have about the life of the members of a civil society comes to mind as soon as a person begins to reflect on Kant's claim that a race of devils could form a just society. Provided that a society of immoral people never acted in ways that interfered with the actions of others, the society they created would be an ideally just society according to narrow conception of Kant's theory. A just society is one in which each person is free to pursue his own conception of the good as long he does not interfere with the freedom of others to pursue their own conception of the good. One can wonder if this is the ideal of society that accurately describes an ideal to be used to judge whether a society is just or progressing towards becoming more just. It seems, then, that it is important to have an element of morality in society if we 9Hegel, 76, sect. 108, and 103—4, sect. 141. 72 are to have a just society. If we consider the distinction between a just action and a moral one, we will be able to see that morality is not a necessary condition of a just society and why no claims about moral actions can be justified on the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. For Kant a moral action is one that is done because of the self-imposed motive that it is the action one ought to do. The motive is what is important. Justice, on the other hand, focuses on the result of one's action, specifically that it does not interfere with another's freedom to choose his action. A just society, then, is one in which members do not interfere with each other. However, one can be and is justified in expecting that life in civil society be more than a series of non-interfering relationships. A.just society does not seem to be simply one in which the actions people carry out are motivated only because of a threat of punishment. A.just society, many people would claim, is one where at least some of the actions people undertake are because they believe that it is the morally right thing to do. What is missing is the idea that people in a just society should have a more positive relationship to each other. If a political philosophy is committed to liberal neutrality it seems that there can be no justification for the state to act in ways that will foster these positive relationships. This would be a moral claim about what 73 people ought to do. If Kant's political philosophy is based on the idea of liberal neutrality, then it cannot support any claims about what actions of the state are justified except those that ensure individuals' attempt to secure a good life. These criticisms and concerns present serious challenges for the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism if it is conceived as justifying only a narrow set of actions of the state. In fact, they may force a person to reject any attempt to try to salvage a Kantian version of the social contract theory. In order to determine whether or not we should abandon the Kantian project of political philosophy, it may be helpful to consider some attempts to present a version of Kantian contractualism which might be able to respond to these criticisms and concerns. That will be the topic of the next chapter. Chapter Three Attempts to Overcome the Challenges and Guiding Ideas for Understanding Kant's Political Philosophy The previous chapter focused on four criticisms that can be leveled against Kant's political philOSOphy. As his theory was presented in the first chapter, the state is only justified in acting to secure the freedom of the individuals who live in civil society who are rational beings. Kant's political philosophy faces challenges concerning the nature of citizenship, the protection of individual rights, the nature of justice, and the conception of the good. The first two of these criticisms identifies problems in Kant's political phiIOSOphy generally, and the other two focus on the particular formulation of contractualism we have considered. They are all serious concerns for anyone who might be committed to the Kantian ideals of autonomy and universality as the basis for justifying a political philosophy. In this chapter, we will consider the attempts by two Kantian contractualists in order to determine whether their attempts can respond to the criticisms we have considered. 74 75 In the first section of this chapter, we will consider the versions of Kantian contractualism presented by T. M. Scanlon and John Rawls. Scanlon attempts to argue that a version of Kantian contractualism can provide a better account of "moral wrongness" than can utilitarianism, and Rawls has endeavored to show that his version of Kantian contractualism can provide a more adequate conception of justice than can be found on a utilitarian model. By examining these two attempts at providing a version of Kantian contractualism and the limitations of them, we will be able to present a set of guidelines that will direct our undertaking of providing a conception of Kant's contractualism which can overcome the challenges facing the narrow conception of his contractualism. This will be the focus of the second part of this chapter. I. Two Versions of Kantian Contractualism In the previous twenty-five years, there has been a resurgence in the Anglo-American philosophical schools in the belief that some version of Kantian contractualism can provide an alternative to the trend towards utilitarianism in moral and political philosophy. While this is a positive development in the study of these areas, one should still question the developments in Kantian theory in order to determine whether or not they can meet the challenges facing 76 his political philosophy and the narrow conception of his contractualism. In this section, we will look at two versions of Kantian contractualism in order to judge whether théy can meet the challenges identified in the previous chapter. The first version is presented by T. M. Scanlon, and it is an attempt to present a contractarian version of ethics. Secondly, we will consider the theory of justice presented by John Rawls. A. Scanlon One attempt to present a contractual based Kantian position which might overcome the challenges facing the initial reading of Kant's political philosophy has been made by T. M. Scanlon. He believes that a contractualist moral theory is able to provide a better account of moral belief, argument, and motivation than can a utilitarian moral theory.1 While he does not fully develop his idea of a contractualist moral theory, he does provide enough of an introductory account to allow us to determine whether a contractualist account of moral theory can overcome the 1T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," Utilitarianism aag Bayong, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 109. 77 challenges facing Kant's political philosophy that we have considered.2 On Scanlon's account of contractualism, he defines moral wrongness in the following way. He says, An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.3 An action is morally wrong, according to this View, if it would be forbidden by a set of rules that no person could reject. We can gather that an action would be morally right when it is done according to a set of rules that do not require others to accept rules they would have reasonable grounds for rejecting. Scanlon conceives that the justification for a moral theory rests on the consent which can be derived from determining whether any person in a different social position has grounds for rejecting a proposed set of rules which would allow the action.4 If 2We should note that Scanlon is presenting a moral theory and not a political philosophy. While Scanlon's argument does not directly address the concern of this dissertation, we will be able to gain some insight into the use of a contract theory in general. This will help when considering a wide conception of Kant's contractualism. 3Scanlon, 110. 4Scanlon, 117. This is only a rough guide for Scanlon, but it points out that the idea of consent can be understood as the basis for justifying a moral theory. 78 there is no one who has reasonable grounds for rejecting a set of rules that prohibit the action, the action would be morally right. Scanlon thinks that the contractualist account of moral theory is an attractive alternative to a utilitarian moral theory because it can better account for an element of moral motivation. Specifically, the motivation provided on the contractualism account rests on the recognition of the importance of considering the well-being of the individual.5 A utilitarian account stresses that one should consider the total well—being of the whole community, however this may be defined, and not the well-being of each particular individual. By recognizing that the consent of each individual must be considered, the contractualist account stresses the equality and importance of every individual. It is this point which often is the basis for rejecting a utilitarian moral theory, and Scanlon uses this to demonstrate the strength of the contractarian moral theory. We can note that Scanlon's account of a contractually based moral theory can provide the basis for responding to two of the four criticisms confronting Kant's political philosophy. The first two of the criticisms claim that Kant's views on citizenship and the protection of rights SScanlon, 119. 79 were either sexist or elitist or both. According to Kant, neither men who do not possess property nor women can be active citizens, and the rights of women were limited. Both of these claims could not be justified on the version of contractualism presented by Scanlon. A system of rules which supported these sexist and elitist biases could reasonably be objected to by those who would be excluded from making claims of being active citizens and of having equal private acquired rights as other members of a civil society. Such individuals would not consent to any conditions in which they were treated differently than other members of a society. On this ground, Scanlon can argue that the questionable claims about citizenship and rights can be met on a contractualist account. By keeping in mind the idea that a contractual theory must take into account whether every individual would have grounds for withholding their consent to a given set of proposed rules, it is possible to overcome the two general criticisms facing Kant's political philosophy. The other two criticisms considered claimed that the narrow version of Kant's contractualism only supported a limited conception of justice and that it could not justify any claims by the state concerning what should be included in a conception of the good life in civil society. If we 80 consider how Scanlon might respond to these, we will only be able to find a partial response. The first point that should be recognized is that Scanlon's version of contractualism is a moral theory. His theory only provides an account of what criteria makes an action morally wrong. A concept of justice, though, should provide at least a minimal conception of what ought to be done in civil society. Because Scanlon does not provide any account of what ought to be done in civil society, there is no account of a concept of justice. It is, therefore, an open question whether his views could provide a more acceptable account of justice. If we consider the criticism that Kantian contractualism can make no claims about the conditions of the good, Scanlon provides at least a partial response. On his account of moral wrongness, if a person can reasonably reject a system of rules that allows certain actions, then the action would be morally wrong. Putting this idea into practice, it may be possible for the state to consider certain actions it may take for the purpose of securing the conditions in order to allow individuals to achieve their conception of the good life. The state may also take actions to rectify situations that someone may consider unjust, even if the action goes beyond the justified action of protecting individual freedom. If it can be thought that 81 no one could reasonably object to the rules that allowed such actions, then the actions would be justified. The problem is that Scanlon never clarifies what is meant by reasonable objection.6 What one must wonder is what the standards of "reasonableness" are that can be used as grounds for rejecting a set of rules that allow or prohibit certain actions. For example, not every person can be thought to agree about what constitutes the good life. Therefore, claims about the conditions needed to achieve the good life could reasonably be consented to by some and rejected by others. Without the notion of "reasonableness" being clarified we only have the beginning of a response to these two criticisms. There is one additional point we should note about Scanlon's version of contractualism. On his account, the determination of the moral wrongness of an action is based on whether or not it would be based on a set of rules which "no one could reasonably reject." By resting his claims on this point he has moved away from the Kantian basis of moral wrongness: the idea that an action is morally right if the maxim it is based on could serve as a law — the idea of contradiction. (Fgangatigns, 38-41/421-424) Kant's ethical 6Jean Hampton "Feminist Contractarianism," A Mth at Qns's an: Feminist Essays ga Rsasgn aad ijegtivity, ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 237. 82 theory is not based on the idea of a contract even though his political philosophy, which is part of his moral philosophy, is based on the idea of a social contract. But, even though Scanlon's contractualism does not accurately describe Kant's ethical theory, we should recognize one point. It will be helpful when considering Kant's political philOSOphy to consider its relationship to his ethical philosophy. If we consider the relationship between his ethical and political philosophies, we might be able to discover how certain claims about what ought to be the aims of society can be justified on his political philoSOphy. B. Rawls John Rawls presents a theory of justice that he terms justice as fairness. In general, he is advancing a theory of the principles which should serve as the basis of any society which will provide the most equitable distribution of the primary social goods throughout a society. If we are to evaluate Rawls' claims about the nature of justice and determine whether or not his theory can meet the challenges facing Kant's political philosophy, we will have to review the basis of his theory of justice. In order to support his conception of justice, Rawls proposes that a thought experiment be undertaken. In this experiment we are to conceive of individuals in an original 83 position. These people are behind a veil of ignorance which means they have no knowledge of their social status, race, or membership in any particular group in society.7 What we do know about the individuals is that they are rational and mutually disinterested.8 These individuals are to be understood as free and equal persons as conceived "...in the political culture of a constitutional democratic regime...."9 Given this conception of individuals in the original position and behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls proceeds to clarify what these people are to do. In the original position, these individuals are charged with choosing the principles which will serve as the basis of the social and political institutions of a society. They can select from any available set of principles that have been advanced as candidates for the organization of civil society and the distribution of primary goods in that society. Rawls continues by claiming that as rational and mutually disinterested persons, they will choose the 7Rawls, Qastiga, 137. 8Rawls, Qastiga, 143. It should be clear that Rawls does not think that he is presenting a metaphysical conception of the individuals in the original position. What he claims he is presenting is that he is providing a political conception of the individuals. See John Rawls, Pgtit'gal Liberalism, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993), 18n and 29-35. Hereafter referred to as Rawls, Libaralism. 9Rawls, Libatalism, 34. 84 principles which will ensure them the highest level of primary social goods given the possibility that they may be in the least advantaged social position in the society. This means they will choose according to the "maximin" rule.10 Based on this rule, the individuals will choose two principles as the basis for the state which will ensure a just distribution of the primary goods. The first principle focuses on the distribution of the basic liberties which all the people in any society might claim. This principle states that "...each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."11 This is the principle of equality. According to this principle, the basic liberties or freedoms of society should be distributed so that all members have the highest level of liberties compatible with the liberties of all other members. In this way, everyone should have equal liberty to such things as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and occupation of office. These liberties are to be limited only in the sense that each person cannot interfere with another person's right to enjoy the same liberty. Thus, a person cannot have the right on the basis of freedom of religion to kill 10Rawls, gasttga, 152-53. 11Rawls, Qastige, 70. 85 someone in a sacrifice since that limits the other person's liberties. Rawls's claim is that in a just society each person is entitled to the most extensive liberties that are compatible with the same liberties of all others. The second principle in Rawls' theory considers the distribution of the other social goods such as wealth. According to Rawls these should be distributed according to the following principle: "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all."12 This is the difference principle. The social goods are the economic wealth and other resources present in a society. Unlike the social liberties addressed in the first principle, an equal share of the social goods is not to be had by all. Based on this second principle, it is possible for a society to be just if the unequal distribution works to the advantage of the least well off. What this means is that it is just for a single person to have a greater amount of social goods such as wealth, if it is the case that this person uses this wealth to increase the wealth of the people who have the least amount. A person can have more wealth according to this principle provided that the person makes use of this 12Rawls, Justice, 60. 86 wealth to raise the level of others. In this way, people who have the least amount of social goods will be able to benefit from the unequal distribution since their share of the goods will be raised by the efforts of those who have a greater distribution of the social goods. On Rawls's view, a society that is based on these two principles would be characterized as having distributive justice. Rawls' attempt to present a theory of justice is remarkable and interesting. His work is an attempt to provide an adequate theory for justifying the idea of justice he believes would be accepted by most people in the western democratic world. The two principles of justice that are at the heart of his views are justified because each person in the original position would consent to them. In order to secure the best minimum conditions in society, a person would opt for the principle of equality and the difference principle in order to secure the best possible condition, assuming that they would be in the least advantageous position in a society. Based on these principles, we can now consider whether Rawls' theory is able to meet the four challenges facing Kant's political philosophy. Based on the equality principle, it would be possible for Rawls to respond to the criticisms that Kant's political philosophy is sexist and elitist with regard to the 87 possession of certain rights and claims of citizenship. These are the first two criticisms we considered in the previous chapter. According to this principle, a person would only consent to a society based on the idea that liberties and rights must be equal for all members. On a sympathetic reading of Rawls, if a person is behind a veil of ignorance and ignorant of her social position, she would want to insure that no matter what social position she was in, she would have the same claims to citizenship and equal rights as every other person. Recognizing that a person could only consent to principles of a just society that secure equal political liberties, only a civil society and state based on such a principle could be justified. By incorporating this principle into his theory of justice, Rawls can argue that the first two criticisms can be overcome. The third criticism we considered claimed that the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism expressed a limited conception of justice. The narrow reading was understood as containing a limited conception of justice because it emphasized only the non-interference of freedom as the condition of justice. By including the difference principle in his theory of justice, Rawls is able to show that an adequate conception of justice should reflect more than just ensuring that the freedom of each individual is 88 secured. The difference principle broadens the conception of justice because it emphasizes that the notion of distributive justice should apply to the distribution of social goods in addition to securing equal levels of liberty for all individuals. Thus, where the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism can be criticized for not recognizing a broader concept of justice, Rawls' difference principle can be understood as justifying an expanded concept of justice. The final concern confronting Kant's political philosophy conceived narrowly is that there can be no justified claims about what conditions of a good life should be advanced in civil society. This criticism can also be overcome by Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls claims that his theory of justice is able to support the second formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative: "act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (Pgaagattgns, 46/430) This is the case because the principles of justice would be selected because they would not justify a society in which a person could be used by others in their attempt to reach their desired ends. .According to Rawls, one of the desirable features of his conception of justice is that it publicly expresses the respect humans ought to have for one 89 another.13 A society based on the two principles of justice would consider every person's mutual benefit. This amounts to treating every person never merely as a means because the good of every individual must be taken into account. The contractual account presented by Rawls supports this claim about the nature of a just society because every person in the original position would support a specific conception of an end that society ought to achieve. This end does not directly relate to protecting the ability of individuals to reach what they conceive to be the good life, but it informs us about the nature of the relationships people ought to have with each other. Based on the consent that would be provided by anyone in the original position, it is possible to justify claims about what should be a morally good end a society ought to strive to achieve. As we can see, Rawls is able to present a version of Kantian social contract theory which can respond to the four criticisms confronting the narrow conception of Kantian contractualism. In the original position, individuals would select the principle of equality and the difference principle as the basis for the structure of a society which could be considered just. These principles could be thought to be consented to by anyone who is in the original 13Rawls, Justice, 179. 90 position. This would seem to provide us with an adequate version of Kantian contractualism which can meet the four criticisms we considered in the previous chapter. Unfortunately, Rawls' contractualism is limited in one important respect: the justification of the principles of justice can be thought to apply only to certain societies. Rawls claims in.A Thagry gt Jasttga the principles of justice can be thought to be universally applicable.“ However, Rawls has retreated from this claim. In Pglitigal Libsralism, Rawls claims that the original position models what we would consider fair conditions and supports a conception of justice we could accept here and now.15 He also has conceded that his conception of a theory of justice can only be justified for people of modern democratic societies who can conceive of themselves as free.16 It is no longer the case, then, that Rawls' claims that his conception of justice can be thought to be universally applicable. But this is the standard which Kant had set in his moral theory and political philosophy.17 The universal nature of justice is important if we are to be able to 1“Rawls, fiasttga, 132. 15Rawls, Libsralism, 25-26. 16ibid, 34. 17Sanford Lakoff, "Autonomy and Liberal Democracy," The Reviaw gt Pglitics 90 (Summer 1990): 383. 91 justify claims about the nature of civil society and the actions of the state in other times and places and not just in our current situation. In clarifying the basis for choosing the two principles of justice, Rawls is able to justify why they would be selected and others rejected. This was the difficulty facing Scanlon's contractualism. But this has come with a price; the principles of justice cannot be thought to be universally applicable. Rawls may be pessimistic about the prospect of this possibility, but Kant was not. We should, therefore, look at what his claims are about this possibility. To do this we will have to consider the basis of universal moral claims, the idea of autonomy. As a version of Kantian contractualism Rawls' position is the most adequate conception currently available in the Anglo-American tradition. Having examined it we were able to discover that a version of Kantian contractualism can meet the criticisms facing our initial examination of Kant's political philosophy. What we also recognized is that Rawls' attempt cannot support a universal claim about the nature of justice. Because of this point, one can still question if it is possible to present a more distinctive Kantian contractualism which can meet the criticisms facing his political philosophy. If it is to be shown that Kant's political philosophy can meet the challenges facing it on 92 its own, we must remain focused on Kant's own ideas concerning political philosophy. This will be possible if we stress a reading of Kant's political philosophy that emphasizes the role it takes in his moral theory. This reading would not have to rely on assumptions that cannot be identified in Kant's own works in order to support a Kantian conception of contractualism which can meet the criticisms leveled against it. This view of Kant's social contract theory will be directed by the points we have identified in considering the attempts of Rawls and Scanlon to present a Kantian contractualism which can overcome the criticisms raised in the previous chapter. Taking these into account, we can identify three guidelines for reading Kant's political philosophy. Keeping these in mind will allow us to present an interpretation of Kant's political philOSOphy which can meet the challenges facing it and still be distinctively Kantian. II. Guiding Ideas In order to present a conception of Kant's contractualism that can overcome the criticisms facing it, it will be helpful to clarify several general ideas about the nature of Kant's political philosophy that should be kept in mind when reexamining the social contract theory presented by Kant. Considering these points will provide 93 certain guidelines about how one ought to approach an investigation that will attempt to clarify Kant's contractualist theory. There are three points that should be kept in mind when rereading Kant. These may seem obvious, but I believe they are important enough to warrant an explicit statement before we begin reconsidering Kant's political philosophy. These points are: (1) Kant's political philosophy is an element of his moral philosophy; (2) like his moral philosophy, which is an examination of duty, the political philosophy ought to be read as an explication of duty in some sense; and (3) Kant only provides a formal outline of a political philosophy that is based on the Categorical Imperative. The first point that must be kept in mind is that Kant's political philosophy is an element of his moral philosophy. Moral phiIOSOphy is the study of a QElQLl moral laws and rules.18 When these laws and rules are applied to humans, two divisions of duties are revealed.19 One is Law, which looks at the duties that can be performed independently of the motive of the agent. The other is Ethics, which examines the duties that require a person to possess a moral attitude in addition to carrying out the 18Gregor, 9. 19ibid, 19. 94 action called for by the duty. These two sets of duties are both part of the moral philosophy of Kant which is based on the supreme moral principle, the Categorical Imperative. Recognizing that Kant's political philosophy, the system of duties of Law, is one set of duties that can be derived by applying the Categorical Imperative to humans as rational beings, we are reminded that Kant's political philosophy is based on claims about what morally ought to be done in a particular society. The second point that should be kept in mind is that since Kant's political philosophy presents a system of duties that are given through Law, a rereading of it should emphasize its nature as an exposition of duties. This is an important point to keep in mind as an evaluation of Kant's discussion of rights is being made. When an investigation of a rights theory is undertaken, there is a tendency to read the theory as emphasizing only that a person is justified in claiming certain protections from others and their actions. But this seems to me to be a one-sided view of the notion of rights. Whenever a right is claimed, there is also a corresponding claim that others have a legal or juridical duty that must be done.20 This dual nature of 20Thomas E. Hill, Jr., emphasizes this in presenting his discussion of Kantian duties in Dignity aag Pragtigal Rsasga ta Kant's Moral Th r , (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992), Chapter 8, 147-75. See also Gregor, l9. 95 rights, i.e. that they assert a person's claim and assert a corresponding duty for others, is important to remember since it forces us to recognize that rights are not claims that can be understood as being isolated from the actions of others. If the stress is laid on the duty side of rights, it is possible to understand Kant as trying to point out what people and the state in civil society ought to consider as the limits of their actions in two ways. It is, therefore, important to recognize that what Kant is attempting to clarify is not simply what one can claim on the grounds of being a rational being, but what duties one has as a member of a society of rational beings and what responsibilities the state has in civil society. The third point that should be emphasized is that Kant's political philosophy is an outline of the formal structure of a political philosophy insofar as it can be derived from the Categorical Imperative through the Principle of Right. What Kant provides in his political theory is not the entire structure of any particular political system as it will be found in the world. He is, rather, presenting an ideal of what any political society ought to strive to realize. One point should be noted about this outline. Since the emphasis of Kant's political philosophy is on protecting the freedom of each person, the political system being 96 described must account for the role of the freedom of the individual in civil society. Since the freedom an individual has is an expression of the autonomy humans possess as rational beings, it is necessary that, in reconsidering Kant's political philosophy, we indicate how the protection of individual freedom is an element of his political philosophy. This, then, gives us an indication of where we must begin our rereading; we must first investigate Kant's idea of freedom of human action, and that is the topic of the next chapter. Chapter Four Basic Ideas in Kantian Moral Theory In this chapter, the emphasis will be on clarifying certain general issues that are the foundations of Kant's moral theory. Clarifying this material is important because I am arguing that by taking into account more of the ideas concerning Kant's moral philosophy as a whole, it is possible to present an understanding of his contractarian political philosophy that is both consistent with his own thoughts and can meet the objections raised in the second chapter. This understanding emphasizes the role of duty in understanding his political philosophy, especially what duties the state has. By identifying the duties of the state, it will be possible to justify certain actions of the state which could not be justified on the narrow contractualist account of Kant's political philosophy. In order to fully develop my claims about Kant's political philosophy, it is important to understand certain points of Kant's moral philosophy. These are points which have a direct influence on the conception of Kant's political philosophy I will present in Chapters Six and Seven. In this chapter, we will consider three basic ideas 97 98 in Kant's moral theory that are important to clarify my conception of Kant's political theory. The first section will briefly consider Kant's theory of human action. The fundamental question of Kant's moral theory is, "What makes an action morally right?" The answer to this is important for our consideration of his political philosophy since he holds that politics is part of ethics. (MM, 35/205) The second section will examine the types of rules which can direct the rational actions of humans. Third, we will consider Kant's idea of freedom. This will include looking at the idea of autonomy and also the concepts of internal and external freedom. Freedom is important for any understanding of Kant's political philosophy, so it is important to clarify what is meant when we discuss the idea of freedom. With a clear understanding of these points it will be easier to understand the broad reading of Kant's political philosophy we will develop in the next chapters. I. Kant's Theory of Human Action Kant clarifies his idea of autonomy in his practical philosophy. In this, Kant investigates the ability of humans to reason practically or to think about how to act and act on that basis.1 If humans are able to deliberate on 1Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Thagry (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 23. Hereafter 99 a course of action and determine their actions by such deliberation, they must be free. To understand this freedom we shall first examine Kant's theory of action. Initially, we must note that Kant never explicitly presents a theory of human action, although he does discuss his views on the subject in several places. He believes that such a theory is simply a piece of empirical psychology that has no place in an examination of pure practical reason. Kant does not think that it is necessary to present a complete theory of human aCtion. (gPt_, 9n/9n)2 .An investigation intended to determine whether reason could be practical must be independent of psychology as an empirical science since this would preclude the possibility of the element necessary for morality - freedom. Empirical psychology explains actions in terms of given desires, feelings, and other empirical factors related to humans. As given experiences of humans they are subject to the laws of nature including the law of causality. Because of this, if human actions are understood from the perspective of theoretical reason, then the possibility of freedom is eliminated from consideration. To avoid any such misconception, Kant explicitly states that he cannot provide referred to as Sullivan, Moral Theory. 2Sullivan, Moral Theory, 24. 100 a theory of human action that might be thought to be theoretical. Kant's aim in the gttttgaa gt Ptagttga; Baasgn is to demonstrate that reason can be practical, i.e. that reason alone can determine the will of a person. (gPt_, 15/15, 46/44) By will, Kant means the ability of rational beings, including humans, to act according to a conception of law. This is not a law of nature discovered through experience, but is one given by reason alone.3 If this conception of law is self-imposed, and it is the basis of her action, then she is autonomous. Since Kant does not explicitly lay out his theory of human action we must piece it together if we are to hope to understand what he means by autonomy. On Kant's View, humans are not simply rational beings. Like non-rational beings who are subject to desires and impulses, some of their actions are determined by their physical or animal nature. As physical beings who have certain requirements that must be met if they are to survive, they need food and shelter in order to continue to live. These needs produce desires and impulses, and these must be satisfied through different actions. Actions based on these desires and impulses are directed by the sensory 3Beck, gommantary, 38. 101 appetite for pleasure.4 These actions are the result of their desires, impulses, and feelings which are the antecedent causes of such actions. The actions of humans in such cases are not based just on the rational nature of humans but also on their animal nature. Taking into account this empirical aspect of humans, their actions may be theoretically explained as arising from their animal nature, and they can be understood in terms of this nature and the laws of nature which apply to all empirical objects. Human actions, though, are not simply understood as the result of desires and feelings and subject to the laws of nature; human action can also be understood as intentional. The actions of humans, then, can be understood from a different perspective: as the actions of rational beings. Because humans possess reason, they can formulate rules which explain the connection between an action and the end a person desires. (CPt_, 62/60) It is from this viewpoint that human action can be said to be based on a conception of laws. (Egandatigns, 29/419)!5 Unlike animals which may determine some of their actions because of past experiences, humans can determine their actions by the rules they can formulate about the connection between actions and the 4Savage, 55. 5Beck, Commentary, 36. 102 consequences of the actions. Formulating a rule that directs rational human action is possible because humans possess reason. Because humans possess reason, their actions can be understood as being directed by their rational faculty. However, humans are not infinitely or wholly rational, so their actions can be described from the two perspectives just considered.6 It may be described as simply the result of the desires and impulses that arise because of their 6The debate surrounding Kant's idea of the dual conception of human action, i.e. whether it is possible to understand human action from both empirical and rational standpoints, is quite extensive. I will not specifically address that debate here, but there is one comment I will make. The idea of considering human action from two different viewpoints should not strike the average person as unusual. Kant's theory of human action is supposed to be a general conception that is held by the average person, so judged from this standpoint, the idea of understanding actions from two different viewpoints is not as problematic as might at first seem. When the average person is asked why they did something, the response given will often be one that stresses the antecedent events that caused the action. The explanation given concerns the action as it appears, both to the agent and to others. However, when a person is in the process of choosing how to act the situation is different. The concern is not with providing an explanation of why the action took place previously but with a decision about which action will have the desired consequences. In the first case the action is looked at retrospectively, but in the latter it is action as it is happening or will happen in the future. An individual can take both standpoints in relation to their action, and when this is recognized Kant's basic theory of human action should not be thought to be as problematic as it might initially appear. For a more complete examination of the current debate surrounding this topic see Onora O'Neill, Construgtigns gt Reason: Explgratigns gt Kant's Pragtigal Phitgsgphy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 66-77. 103 animal nature, or it may be explained as a result of their ability to deliberate about the ends they hope to achieve with their actions. As a rational agent, a human's action is different than those of a being without an animal nature because some of their actions can be based on an end the person sets for herself. (Foundations, 54/437) The actions of rational human agents are not simply responses to existing conditions. Rational agents have the ability to deliberate or think about the effects of certain actions and consider different possible courses of action that might lead to the end the person hopes to achieve. Humans, as rational beings, have the ability to consider how they might act in a given situation and evaluate what the effects of their actions will be. The deliberation that a rational being makes concerning a possible course of action is not done in isolation or without regard to the individual's own preferences. It focuses on the end the agent wants to achieve. This end may be an object or a certain state of affairs desired by the agent. An agent may hope to get some money or to satisfy her hunger. The end of an agent may also be the action itself. For example, a person may aim at increasing her knowledge, and this end is reached only through the action itself. This and is not distinguished from the action itself. A rational agent will consider the courses of 104 action open to her and try to determine which action will lead to the end she hopes to achieve. The rationally guided actions of humans are intended to reach certain goals, and determining how to reach these goals is the basis of their deliberations.7 In deliberating about a course of action, rational agents determine a rule that will guide their actions in order to reach a desired end. When acting as rational agents, humans act on rules concerning the connections between actions and their consequences. They use these rules to determine what course of action ought to be taken to reach the end they desire.8 This is possible for rational beings because they have the ability to form a conception of the connection between actions and the consequences of these actions and take this conception into account when they act. Considering the different types of rules which Kant believes direct the actions of rational humans will make it easier to understand his argument for the freedom of the will. 7Sullivan, Mgral Thegry, 25. 8ibid, 28. 105 II. Rules, Maxims, Imperatives, and Laws Kant's argument for the freedom of the will rests on showing that humans, as rational beings, can act on a conception of law. In order to understand what Kant means by a conception of law that directs human action, it is necessary to examine the different forms of rules that direct rational human action. Kant does not give an exact definition of what he means by 'rule', but, following Beck, we can say that rules express what is generally the right course of action, given a specific aim of a person. They are not exact nor do they hold without exception. Instead they specify what one should usually do given the general purpose of a person in a given situation.9 The rules that direct a person's actions are determined by the practical principles they have. Practical principles are "...propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules." (QPt_, 17/18-19) These are fundamental propositions which express the fundamental and longstanding policies a person will generally act upon in similar situations.” Principles are statements of the elements of a person's life she believes should always be sought, and 9Beck, gammantary, 79. ”ibid, 78, and Henry E. Allison, Kant's Thagry gt Fr m, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 87-88. 106 they are expressible as universal propositions. Examples of such statements could be any of the following: try to be happy, do what will help the most people, ease the suffering of others. These general propositions can guide a person by being the source of specific rules that will direct the person in any given situation. The nature of these derived rules may differ, and how they differ is important for understanding how a person can act according to a conception of laws. Before considering the rules which may direct the actions of humans, it will help to clarify the idea of the "determination of the will." For Kant, the will and practical reason are the same thing. (Fgungations, 24/412) Clarifying what is meant by "the determination of the will" will require that we understand how reason can be practical and direct a person's actions. In simple terms, the determination of the will is, then, the intention of a rational being. To say that a practical principle determines the will is to say that the agent intends to take some action.11 In most situations in everyday life, a person will desire a specific end, object, or state of affairs. When this is the case, the person will determine herself to act in such a way as she deems necessary to reach 11Onora Nell, Agting ga Pringipla: As Essay 9a Kantian Ethigs (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975), 40. 107 that end. The action intended by the agent is usually based on the present situation of the person and her past experiences. Given these two pieces of information she can formulate a rule which she believes will allow her to reach that end. She determines her will and the course of action by what she intends to accomplish. This is reasoning practically, and it is what is meant by willing, according to Kant.” Returning to the consideration of the rules which direct human action, the usual and most concrete form of a rule that is derived from a principle is a maxim. A.maxim is a statement of a general rule about what action the person should take in a particular situation. Maxims are subjective principles, which are principles that are thought to be applicable only for the person who directs her actions according to the principle. Maxims are subjective principles that an agent holds as being applicable for herself in her particular situation. (Pgaadatigns, 37n2/420n2, and CPrR, 17/19)13 Maxims are thought by a ”Beck, Cgmmsntaty, 75-76. Beck provides the clearest account of determination of the will I have been able to find. 13I am relying on the second definition of maxim Kant presents in the Fgangatigns to explain what one should understand by a maxim being valid for one's own will. My reading of this passage is reading maxim as a "mere maxim" as clarified by Beck, Commentary, 81-81. Allison points out a limitation of this reading. (88-89) 108 person to express the action she must take in order to carry out her principles. Because a person possesses the faculty of reason, she can formulate the maxims which determine what course of action ought to be taken to fulfil one's principles. All human actions are based on maxims according to Kant's theory of rational action, but because maxims are subjective rules, they cannot be thought to hold for all rational beings. This aspect of Kant's theory of human actions does not explain how action can be based on a conception of law. To understand this, it is necessary to examine a different form of rule that can direct a person's actions. For actions to be based on laws, it must be the case that a person can hold that the principle on which her action is based must be applicable for all rational wills; such a principle would be objective. As objective principles, they are principles which any rational person would act on if she acted only in accord with reason. (ngagatigas, 37n2/420n2) Objective principles which function as grounds for determining the will of a person are imperatives. (Patagatagas, 29/412-13) These principles are characterized by the form that they take; an imperative is "...characterized by an 'ought,‘ which expresses the objective necessitation of the act and indicates that, if reason completely determined the will, the action would 109 without exception take place according to the rule." (saga, 18/20) Imperatives direct a person by stating what actions ought to be undertaken if a desired end is to be reached. Imperatives can be said to be laws because they are both universal and necessary in nature. They command what ought to be done by anyone who wants to reach the end in question. They are necessary because the action called for is judged to be the cause of the desired result or state of affairs. Imperatives, in general, state what ought to be done by a rational agent who desires some good. Imperatives are further classified by Kant as being of one of two types: hypothetical and categorical. Both express that an action that should be carried out if reason could completely determine the agent's will and action. They differ, however, with regard to the relationship between the action called for by the imperative and the end that is to be reached by the action. The passage in the gtitigaa gt Ptagttga; Paasga where Kant distinguishes the two types of imperatives reads as follows: Imperatives determine either the conditions of causality of a rational being as an efficient cause only in respect to its effect and its sufficiency to bring this effect about, or they determine only the will, whether it be adequate to the effect or not. In the former case, imperatives would be hypothetical and would contain only precepts of skill; in the latter, on the contrary, they would be categorical and would alone be practical laws. (gPr , 18/20) 110 The two types of imperatives are distinguished by different relationships. Hypothetical imperatives express a relationship between a rational being and her actions as a possible cause of a desired effect, while categorical imperatives express only a determination of a rational agent's will. The first expresses an efficient causal relationship, and the latter contains no claim about the causal relationship between the action and some other desired end or good. Examining this distinction will help clarify the different types of imperatives Kant identifies. Hypothetical imperatives are principles which express what action must be done in order to reach a certain end. When a rational being desires a certain result, reason can formulate the connection between the result desired and which actions of the agent will cause that result to occur. These actions are the "necessary steps" that must be taken if it is to be possible for the end to be reached. (Pgaagattgas, 33-34/417)“ Hypothetical imperatives, then, determine the actions of any rational being who intends to reach a specific end.15 Hypothetical imperatives are, 1“See Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Universal Law," Pacifig Philgsgphigal Qaartsrly 66 (1985): 37-38, for a more detailed explanation of the relationship of means to ends in hypothetical imperatives. 15Hypothetical imperatives are objective principles because they can be thought to be valid for all rational beings. However, since the determination of will is based 111 therefore, objective principles understood as rules determining the actions sufficient for reaching a desired end. Categorical imperatives express a rule of determination of the will of a rational being. This is not an expression of a sufficient relationship between the will of the agent and a certain end. Categorical imperatives do not determine the actions of an agent as a means to an end; they determine the will of the agent in the sense of what she ought to do. 'Determine' is to be understood as specifying the state of one's own will concerning the action called for in the imperative. The rule entailed by a categorical imperative makes no assertion about whether the action is sufficient for bringing about a specific end.16 The distinguishing feature of a categorical imperative is that its form is that of a universal and necessary statement.17 All that is on a specifically desired end they are not laws. They express what ought to be done by any rational being who desires the specific end. They cannot be laws because they do not determine the action which will cause the desired end since the success of bringing about the end is dependent on the existing empirical conditions and the skill of the agent. It is for this reason that Kant calls them practical precepts and not laws. For further discussion of this point see Beck, pp. 85-6. 16It should be noted that, for Kant, there is only one Categorical Imperative. Here I am just trying to clarify the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives in general. 112 entailed by the rule of a categorical imperative is that an action ought to be done...period. (Pgaagattgas, 32/416) Because the categorical imperative says what ought to be done without regard to a further end, it places before the will a rule to be acted upon in all similar situations by all rational beings. By this rule, the will becomes resolved to act on the rule for its own sake and not for some end. Thus, a categorical imperative is distinguished from a hypothetical imperative in that the former asserts that the action ought to be taken without regard to the end desired, while the latter claims that the action ought to be done in order to reach a certain end. We can now understand what Kant means when he claims that rational beings, including humans, can act from a conception of laws. Unlike non-rational animals whose actions take place according to the laws of nature, people, as rational animals, are able to formulate rules that direct their actions. These rules determine the actions of a person in the sense that they express what ought to be done if a certain end is to be reached. The rules can be formulated to take into account the end desired by the person as well as what she knows about the world. When 17H. J. Paton, The Cataggrisal Imparativs: A Study _f Kant's Mgral Phil so h , (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 115. 113 these rules are held by the person as being applicable only for herself, they are maxims. However, it is also possible for certain rules to hold for all people. These are objective rules. They express an action which all humans, as rational beings, ought to perform if they wish some desired end or good. These rules are imperatives. Determining one's actions by an imperative is to act according to a conception of laws; it means acting on a universal and necessary rule that applies for all rational beings. Being able to act on a conception of laws is the basis for Kant's claim that humans, as rational beings, are free. It is this claim that we will investigate now. III. Kant's Idea of Freedom In the previous section, we considered how humans can conceive of their maxims as laws. This brings us to the point where we can examine Kant's views about the freedom of the will. The Idea of freedom is a central topic in Kant's moral and political philosophy. As we noted in our initial consideration of Kant's political philosophy, it is possible to understand his views as emphasizing the point that protecting the freedom of individuals is the sufficient condition of justice. Conceptualizing Kant's political philosophy in this way led to two criticisms - that his views support a limited conception of justice and that the 114 state cannot be justified in acting to secure conditions which promote any conception of the good life of the members of civil society. If we are to determine whether a different conception of Kant's political philosophy can be discovered, we will need to investigate what his claims about freedom are. In this section, we will examine two topics related to Kant's idea of freedom. The first will focus on the proof Kant provides for human freedom. This is his argument for autonomy. Second, we will consider the notions of internal and external freedom and how they relate to the idea of autonomy. A. The Argument for Autonomy At this stage, we have examined how humans can conceive of their maxims as laws. However, this alone does not show how these laws can determine the will of a person. Only by showing that maxims can be conceived as laws that determine the will of a person would Kant be justified in claiming that the will of humans is free. This is the problem he identifies in section five of the Critigas gt Ptagtigal Baasga, the "Principle of Pure Practical Reason." (CP;_, 28/28) In this passage Kant asks what the character of a will which is determined a maxim conceived as a universal and necessary law will be. In the Crittgaa gt Ptagttga; Reason Kant is trying to determine the conditions of moral 115 experience, and to do this asks the following question: "can reason be the ground or basis of determining one's will?" (QP;_, 46/44) Reason can determine a person's will if the will possesses freedom as autonomy. This Idea of freedom rests on the Idea of transcendental freedom Kant first examined in the Critigua gt Pats Paasga, but more is contained in the Idea of autonomy than conceiving of a will as not being subject to the law of causality only.18 It must be shown that the will can be subject to self—imposed laws. Kant's argument for claiming that reason can determine the will is the transcendental deduction of autonomy presented in the second Qritigua. To understand the conclusion Kant hopes to demonstrate in this argument, it is necessary to examine the initial form of freedom identified by Kant in his critical works. The conclusion Kant is attempting to demonstrate is that a will can be autonomous or determine the actions of a 18The primary idea of freedom in this paper will be what Kant calls the positive conception of freedom - freedom as autonomy. The negative conception of this is presented in the gtittgaa gt Para Paasga as part of the solution to the third antinomy. (GRUB: 464-79/A532-58/B560-86) The focus in this passage is on the possibility of freedom being consistent with the necessity of universal laws of nature. In the second gritigaa Kant proposes to demonstrate more than just the possibility of freedom being consistent with natural law; he hopes to show that transcendental freedom is real. (gPr , 3/3) Since the purpose of this paper is to examine the conception of freedom Kant relies on in his political theory, most of the discussion will be on the positive conception of freedom. 116 person by principles alone. (Cgattlgt, 27/43) For this to be the case, it must be shown that the will can be subject to a self-imposed law. This self-imposed law is the moral law. The moral law is characterized by its legislative form. This form is that of a categorical ought statement which asserts that an action must be done universally and necessarily by all rational beings. (gPt_, 30-32/30-31) A will subject to laws in this sense is said to be determined according to laws, but in a different sense of the term "determined" than is associated with events in nature. Events in nature are said to be determined in that the appearances must correspond to the laws given by reason; they are determined to occur because they are experienced as given according to the laws of nature. A will can be said to be determined by laws given by reason commanding what gaght to be willed by all rational beings independently of any end they desire. If it is possible to conceive of a maxim as a law, then it must be the case that the maxim has a universal and necessary form and is independent of any material aspect of the maxim. A will acting on a maxim which can be conceived as having the legislative form of a universal law would be free from the empirical conditions given in appearances. Being free from such conditions, it is free from the laws associated with those empirical conditions - the laws of nature and in 117 particular the law of causality. (QPPP 49-50/47-48) This independence is the idea of freedom discovered in the resolution to the third antinomy in the gttttgaa gt Puts Rsasgn. (£22., 409-413/A444-51/B472-79, and 464-479/A532— 58/B560-86) This is freedom from empirical conditions, or what Kant calls transcendental freedom. This is the negative conception of freedom. In order to understand Kant's full argument for the Idea of freedom, we have to consider his argument for the positive freedom of autonomy. It was noted above that humans act according to maxims and that these maxims, when they express the actions necessary for everyone who desires a specific end, are objective principles or imperatives. These may be hypothetical imperatives, which are nothing more than precepts of skill dictating what ought to be done to reach a specifically desired end. However, we have also noted that some maxims can be conceived as applicable for all rational beings. Such imperatives cannot be based on a specific material end which is desired, since reaching that end will call for different actions in different situations; the imperative would not express what must be done necessarily and universally by all rational beings. Therefore, since the material of an imperative cannot be the basis of a categorical imperative, only the form remains. The form of a maxim is what allows a person to conceive of it as a law. 118 Now, if one can act on a maxim that could hold for all rational beings, the maxim could be thought to be an expression of a universal law. The maxim would then be acted upon, not because of its material, but because of its form - it could be thought to serve as a law for all rational beings. This is what is expressed in the moral law, the Categorical Imperative. (CP;_, 30-31/30-31) The idea of autonomy is expressed through the Categorical Imperative because only by conceiving of one's maxims as applicable for all rational beings can it be thought to be a self-imposed law. The principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative, is the expression of independence from the material aspect of a law. (§P£_, 33/33) This expresses the idea of the negative concept of freedom, transcendental freedom. The positive concept of freedom, autonomy, is expressed through the moral law because the law directing the will is a legislative act of reason alone. The moral law is independent of any empirical conditions and must, therefore, be given by reason alone. Laws of nature are also given by reason and determine any empirical objects which can be known by theoretical reason. This is what is examined in the gritigaa gt Pats Raasgn. Human action can be conceived as determined according to laws of nature, but it is possible for humans to conceive of their actions in a 119 different way. The rational abilities of humans allow them to conceive of laws not related to any empirical conditions. If a maxim of one's action is considered to be applicable for all rational beings, it can be conceived of as a law. Such a maxim would be considered a law which is self- imposed. These are based only on the form of law, i.e. they apply to rational beings universally and necessarily. This is what the moral law expresses, and the ability to conceive of maxims in such a way is the autonomy of the will. A will subject to the moral law, then, is free in two senses: 1) it is free from material conditions and 2) it is free to act on its own conception of laws.19 19Kant's distinction between the negative and positive conceptions of freedom rests on what I have think is a difference between "from" and "to". Sullivan also draws a similar distinction in Intrggagtign, 126. The idea of freedom frgm is that one can be free in the sense of being free from impediments, restrictions, or other determining factors. On this view, a person is free is they are not constrained to act in a certain way - no one makes them do something, they are not restricted by laws, etc. This would be the idea of freedom most often associated with soft determinism in the sense that a person is free from external constraints and acts according to her own inner nature. This is similar to what Kant clarifies with the idea of transcendental freedom or negative freedom. Here freedom is thought to be freedom £19m empirical conditions or factors which determine the action of a person. (Note: this is different than traditional soft determinism in that Kant denies that one's actions are determined according to internal determination of previous causes, but this idea of freedom ftgm is still present and can be the basis for claiming that Kant is a soft determinist) On the other hand, there is the view of freedom as the freedom to do something. In this sense, freedom refers to an ability or power of a person to actually do something. 120 One additional concept that should be considered is the idea of heteronomy. This is contrasted with autonomy. Where autonomy is the ability of the will to determine itself according to maxims which can be conceived as laws, heteronomy is the condition of the will to choose the hypothetical imperative which gives directions that may make the attainment of a desired end possible. This choice involves following the laws of nature or pathological laws in order to reach a desired end. (gPt_, 34/33) These are laws of nature concerning the desires of a person, and they dictate the actions necessary to satisfy a desire. Heteronomy of the will is the act of choice of the means to reach a desired end. The principles of heteronomy of the will are principles since they vary according to the material end desired. Heteronomy of the will, since it deals with the material of a principle, is subject to the laws of nature, including the law of causation. Humans, understood from the perspective of their sensuous or empirical nature, are subject to the empirical laws of This is what the libertarian position asserts when it claims that a person is able to be the initial cause in a course of action(s). To be free tg is to be able to have the power to be a first cause in a series. This is an ability that a person might possess. Understanding freedom in this way then refers to a power or ability that one might possess and is quite different than freedom from something. This seems to be what Kant is trying to bring out with the idea of autonomy or positive freedom, to be the first cause in a causal series - freedom as causality. 121 nature. When the actions of humans are understood from this perspective, the perspective reflects the heteronomy of humans. (CP£_, 44/43) Human will can, therefore, be considered from the perspectives of autonomy and heteronomy. This dual perspective was considered above and brings us to the conclusion of this part of our discussion.” B. Internal and External Freedom and the Autonomy of the Will In Its Metaphysiss gt Morals Kant distinguishes two forms of freedom, internal or inner freedom and external or outer freedom. Both internal and external freedom may characterize a specific aspect of human action, and understanding how they relate to human action is crucial for clarifying the distinction between them. But, even though these two notions of freedom can be shown to characterize specific aspects of human action, it must be recognized that there is only one positive "Idea" of freedom according to Kant - autonomy. As the distinction between these two forms of freedom is examined, we will clarify how they relate to the Idea of autonomy as expressions of this freedom. It will also be noted how we can understand the heteronomous actions of humans as free in the external sense of freedom. ”See note 6 of this chapter. 122 The ideas of internal and external freedom rest on different aspects of human action and will. This form of freedom is the ability of a person to determine her own intentions or goals. Mary Gregor asserts that this is the freedom to determine the maxim on which a person will act.21 This is the freedom of a person to set what will be the basis of her actions independently of the given material conditions; it is the freedom to decide what the motive or intention of her action will be. The choice is one of self— determination since it involves deciding on the reasons why the person herself will undertake a certain action. A person can be thought to possess this ability by virtue of her possession of reason. Exercising a free choice of the end of one's action through the power of reason is an activity which cannot be observed in the empirical world but must be understood as taking place in the intelligible world of reason. An act of choice of ends is an internal act which cannot be affected by external empirical conditions. One's ability to determine her ends is free because her ends can only be set by herself. By being able to set her own ends, a person is able to possess self-constraint and is not required to act on ends given by her animal nature. (MM, 185-6/380) This 21Gregor, 27. See also "Translator's Introduction" to m, 5- 123 self-constraint through a determination of one's own ends is internal freedom. External freedom is distinguished from internal freedom because it involves a choice. This is a choice of action to reach a specific end. This form of freedom relates to the choice a person makes concerning the means to reach a desired end. Such a choice is free when a person is not forced by external factors to act in a specific way. This is freedom from compulsion.” Freedom, in this sense, is external because it is freedom from conditions in the external world that limit the possible courses of action a person may think are necessary to perform in order to reach a desired end. This form of freedom is related to the external circumstances surrounding the person. Freedom, in this sense, is the lack or absence of external circumstances which compel a person to act in a specific way. This does not mean that there are no external constraints on the choice of a person; all people are subject to their existing empirical nature and the empirical conditions of the external world. External freedom is being free from the will of other beings who might force a person to carry out an act she might or might not choose for herself. People have external freedom when they can choose a course of 22Gregor, 27. 124 action in an attempt to reach a specific end they have set for themselves. If the actions one chooses are not the result of compulsion by factors external to an individual's will, then the action can be said to be free. Having clarified the distinction between internal and external freedom, it is important to examine how they are related to freedom as autonomy. Internal freedom relates directly to the autonomy of the will, but as we shall note, external freedom can be thought to express this Idea of freedom in both autonomous and heteronomous actions. What this will clarify is that the expression of external freedom is possible only if internal freedom is possible. Since internal freedom is directly related to the autonomy of the will, we shall consider this relationship first. Internal freedom is the conception of freedom that expresses the ability of humans, as rational beings, to determine their own ends. These are not given to a person but can be set by the person herself. A person can determine her own ends because she possesses reason. Since humans can act according to self-imposed laws and independently of empirical conditions, the ends they aim toward are not necessarily determined by their animal nature. Their intention can be an end other than the satisfaction of given desires or inclinations. If the end of a person is based on given desires or inclinations, it 125 would not be a chosen end but one determined by the empirical nature of a person. Ends determined by reason and the rational faculty of a person are free because they are chosen, not as a result of a material end, but because of the ability of humans as rational beings to act on a maxim that is chosen by virtue of its form alone. Only in such a case is an action done not for the sake of a separate end but because it is what ought to be done. An act based on the autonomy of the will must aim at some end, but this end is the performance or completion of the act because reason demands that it ought to be done. It is the ability to choose an end on the grounds that reason alone demands it; this is internal freedom. Internal freedom is characteristic of the autonomy of the will because the autonomy a person possesses is the positive freedom to determine her ends independently of any material conditions. In summary, one can understand internal freedom as the expression of the autonomy of the will when a person determines her own end independently of the given empirical conditions. Explaining why external freedom is an expression of autonomy as freedom is not as easily clarified as the relationship between internal freedom and autonomy. This is the case because a person can express their autonomy as external freedom whether they are acting autonomously or 126 heteronomously. Since external freedom is a characteristic of the action a person might carry out in order to reach a certain end, we should consider what Kant says about the ends of human action. First, it is important to note that Kant claims throughout his moral works that all actions are done in order to reach a specific end. (9223, 34/34, MM, 189/384-85) .Actions are undertaken in order to bring about a particular state. This is true for both moral and non-moral actions. Moral actions, of course, are not judged on their success at bringing about the specific state, but it is, nevertheless, the case that all actions aim at some end.” What is important about this point is that there is an important link between the action and the end intended by the agent. This end is what one uses to explain the actions of others. Recognizing this link is crucial when explaining the relationship between autonomy and external freedom. ”One may think that the end of a moral actions is a bit mysterious since even in moral actions one hopes for something to be achieved through the action. However, what must be recognized is that the motive in a moral action is not some end other than the actions itself. The motive is carrying out the action. It is acting for the sake of the action alone which Kant understands as acting according to duty. The end of a moral action is the action itself even though the agent may hope for other consequences to occur. It is the idea of having the end of an action as the motive for actions and not acting because it will bring about a certain state of affairs which characterizes moral actions, i.e. actions based on the Categorical Imperative. 127 The actions a person takes in order to reach an end are limited by the intention of the agent. In order to reach a specific end, it is necessary for certain actions to be taken in order to bring about certain consequences. The end set will limit the choice of the means necessary to bring about that end. The action is undertaken in order to reach the desired end, and it is understood in terms of the end. The course of action a person may take to reach a desired end is determined by the end intended by the person. In a heteronomous action, the act needed to reach the desired end is determined because certain events need to occur if the end is to be produced. In such cases, the action is determined by the material conditions the person is in and the end desired. Autonomous actions are also determined by the end, but the end is set by the person as a rational being. In both cases, though, the action is still free if there is nothing external which interferes with the choice of the course of action taken. In either the case of heteronomous or autonomous actions, the choice of the means to reach an end can only be free if it is based on the inner power of the person - reason. Such a choice is the expression of the will. Any choice based on reason is the practical expression of reason, and this is the autonomy of the will. The expression of external freedom is possible 128 because of the autonomy of the will. In this way, external freedom is related to the autonomy of the will. Both internal and external freedom can be seen, then, to be related to the Idea of freedom as autonomy since they each express the autonomy of the will of a person but in different ways and in relation to different aspects of an action. Internal freedom directly expresses the freedom of autonomy through the power to set the ends which specify the intentions of the agent. The ability to freely choose one's ends is possible only because humans, as rational beings, possess the freedom to determine the intentions of their own actions. Internal freedom is the ability to choose ends that are determined by reason as an end they ought to try to achieve and not an end they must aim toward because of their animal nature. This directly expresses the freedom of autonomy of a person when she acts on a categorical imperative. External freedom, on the other hand, is only an indirect expression of the autonomy of the will of a person. This is the case because external freedom characterizes an action that is determined by the reason of a person alone. Such actions are said to be free because they are free from external compulsion. The presence of external freedom is dependent on the lack of external compulsion on the agent, and it is possible only if a person can make a choice that is based on her own powers. This 129 choice is possible because of the human possession of reason, the autonomy of the will. Internal and external freedom are, therefore, related to the autonomy a person possesses as a rational being. This discussion should make it Clear that internal and external freedom should not be thought to be unrelated. Both are expressions of the freedom as autonomy possessed by humans because of their nature as rational agents. They are different expressions of this autonomy because they relate to different aspects of human action. Internal freedom is a characteristic of the intentions of an agent, while external freedom may characterize the actual action carried out by the agent. Since both the intention and the action must be taken together in understanding any human action, it would not make sense to claim that a person is free regarding their ends and not the action or vice versa. The freedom a person possesses is the autonomy she has as a rational agent. What must be stressed is that external freedom can only be actualized if it is the case that internal freedom is possible. .As an expression of the Idea of autonomy, external freedom is the ability to choose the actions that are determined by reason to be what ought to be done, whether it is the actions prescribed by a hypothetical imperative or the Categorical Imperative. If one could not determine by reason alone her own ends, it would not be 130 possible to claim that she could freely choose her actions by reason alone. This shows that external freedom rests on the possibility of internal freedom. This concludes the examination of the basic ideas of Kant's moral philosophy. One final point that should be mentioned is that the freedom of the will considered by Kant is based on a conception of humans as rational beings. As rational beings, all humans are to be considered as moral equals since all are subject to the moral law of the Categorical Imperative. This means that any person should be treated equally and be able to make the same claims on others as they can be made on her. Recognizing this point provides us with a basis for overcoming the criticisms of Kant and his political philosophy that it is sexist and elitist. Before we develop a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy which can meet these and the other criticisms, we should consider what duties Kant thinks humans have. These duties will be the basis of our broader conception, and we will consider them in the next chapter. Chapter Five Duty, Right, and Kant's Political Philosophy The conception of Kant's political philosophy which will be presented in the following chapter will focus on the duties that the state can be thought to have. In order to clarify this conception, it will be necessary to consider the duties that can be identified in Kant's moral philosophy. By identifying the duties that humans have as finitely rational beings, i.e. as beings who have both a rational nature and an animal nature, we should be able to identify the duties that the state in human civil society ought to have. Once the duties of the state have been clarified, it will be possible to determine what actions of the state would be justified. In this chapter we will consider two topics that will help clarify the issues related to the conception of Kant's political philosophy to be advanced in the following chapter. First, a brief overview of Kant's Mataphystgs gt Mgrals will be given. This is the work in which Kant clarifies the different duties first identified in the Egangattgns Q£.Lh§ Mataphysigs gt Mgrals. (Fgangatigns, 38/421) In this section we will also consider the types of duties identified 131 132 by Kant that are important for the conception of Kant's political philosophy to be advanced. Second, a brief discussion of the idea of duties of the state will be completed. I. The Metaphysics gt Matats: An Overview When confronted by a work of Kant's containing the word 'metaphysics' one might be thoroughly confused since it is well documented that metaphysics, as it was conceived by most people in his day, was not well received by Kant. Why he would write a book on the metaphysics of morals (or natural sciences) would seem strange. What one must recognize is that Kant identifies three types of metaphysics, two of which are detrimental to reason. The two destructive forms are what Kant refers to as speculative and dogmatic metaphysics. Speculative metaphysics is the attempt to gain knowledge of objects which cannot be experienced. (gPa_, 24-25, 30/Bxxi-xxii, xxix-xxx) Dogmatic metaphysics is the view that it is possible to gain knowledge through pure reason alone without evaluating the limits of pure reason. (£223, 32/Bxxxv) Speculative and dogmatic metaphysics lead to the conflicts of reason - the paralogisms, antinomies, and ideals of pure reason. Kant attempted to expose and resolve these in its Ctitigas gt Pare Raason. Metaphysics in the legitimate sense, the third 133 form, involves the investigation of the a pttgti principles which guide a material science. Such an investigation is what Kant intends to undertake in its Matapnystgs gf_Mgtats. Before looking at the specifics of this work, we will look more closely at what a Kantian metaphysical examination is. According to Kant, all rational knowledge is of one of two types. It can be either formal or material. If it is the former, its focus is on the necessary laws or forms of the understanding or reason. (FQMndations, 3/387) Formal knowledge is not based on experience, but rests on the universal and necessary forms of thought. The discipline which make up this division of knowledge is the science of logic. Material knowledge is distinguished from formal knowledge by the fact that material knowledge deals with a particular subject matter. (Fgangatigns, 3/387)1 In other words, material knowledge is about some object. Material, knowledge, though, also has a second component; this is the 1The two areas of material knowledge identified by Kant are those of physics and ethics. One should also recognize that pure geometry is an area of material knowledge, but there is no object of this discipline in the same sense that physics and ethics have objects. Applied geometry can have an object, but this object depends on the particular application in question, e.g. building a house, determining the size of a field, etc. Because there is no definite object which is dealt with there is no metaphysics of geometry. Physics and ethics deal with definite objects, motion and humans, respectively. Therefore, it is possible to undertake a metaphysical investigation of the a prigri laws of these disciplines. 134 a priori laws to which the object is subject. This element determines the knowledge gained about the subject matter of a material science. The study of the a pttgti element of a material science is what Kant terms its metaphysics. (Foundations, 4/388)2 A.metaphysics is an examination of the guiding principles of a particular science; it focuses on the specific a priori element of a science - the laws which determine the object. As Kant has shown in Its ri i gt Pats Reason, without this element we can never have knowledge of objects of experience since only a collection of representations of an object are given. These can only be related to one another through an act of understanding. (gPa_, 660-1, A842-4/B870-2)3 In the material science of morals, the a prigri component brought to the object is the Categorical Imperative. It is this principle that guides any investigation in morals. Since this principle can apply to all rational beings, it is necessary to examine the particular subject of this version of a metaphysics of morals - humans. (MM, 44/216-17) 2See CPaP, 658-60, A840-2/BB68-70, for Kant's earlier statement of this discussion. 3Here Kant points out that there are two elements of knowledge under consideration (660, A843/BB71) and that philOSOphical (scientific) knowledge is derived from a prigri concepts (661, A844/BB72). 135 The object of a metaphysics of morals is humans considered as humans.“ Since the Categorical Imperative is the guiding principle of ethics for all rational beings, one can investigate how this principle applies to a specific group of rational beings insofar as they are rational. In Tha Mataphysigs gt MQIEIS Kant is investigating the application of this principle as it relates to humans as rational beings. Humans are rational natural beings. (MM, 185/379) Kant's conception of humans is that they are finitely rational beings or beings who have both a rational nature and a natural or animal nature. As we discussed in the previous chapter, human actions, unlike those of nonrational animals, are not simply determined by empirical impulses but are subject to the reason possessed by humans. Humans as finitely rational beings are not simply beings subject to the conditions of an animal nature, but they do not always act according to the dictates of reason either. Conceiving of humans as possessing a nature that is partially animal and partially rational is crucial for Kant's investigation into the metaphysics of morals because when the Categorical Imperative is applied to such beings two divisions of duties can be explicated: the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue." They are divided by “Gregor, l4. 136 the source of those laws which determine the duties one can have. The "Doctrine of Right" examines the duties which can be given by external laws, and the "Doctrine of Virtue" focuses on duties that can only be given internally. (MM, 185/379) The first part of Its Metaphysigs gt Mgrals is the "Doctrine of Right", and it clarifies the duties that can be given through external legislation. These duties are those which individuals can be externally constrained to follow.5 Duties examined in the "Doctrine of Right" are those a person can be induced by natural means to follow. (MM, 187/381) This means that a government has the right to use punishment (or the threat of it) to get members of a civil society to carry out certain duties. (MM, 140/331) The "Doctrine of Right" is an examination of the principles Kant believes should be the basis of the laws of society, and for this reason the "Doctrine of Right" is read as Kant's primary statement of his formulation of political philosophy. The other division of a metaphysics of morals, according to Kant's formulation, is the "Doctrine of Virtue". This is the set of human duties which one cannot 5I will leave the question of whether or not it is possible for there to be exteranl laws that one should not be forced to follow. This is a problem for Kant's political theory, but it is not a crucial question in this project. 137 be constrained to do. Unlike the system of duties in the "Doctrine of Right", the duties explicated in the "Doctrine of Virtue" concern the ends that individuals should set for themselves, ends based on pure reason. (MM, 186/381) Since it is the case that the ends a person sets for herself cannot be determined by others, and the duties of the "Doctrine of Virtue" call for specific ends that humans should set for themselves as rational gaings, it would be self-contradictory to think one could be externally constrained to set certain ends for herself. (MM, 187/381) Thus, duties in the "Doctrine of Virtue" are those duties which, unlike those in the "Doctrine of Right", people cannot be forced to do by external constraint but only by the internal constraint of a person's will. Associated with these two divisions of duties, Kant discusses two types of duties. Each one of these is found in one of the two divisions. The first type of duty considered is the perfect duties towards others. (MM, 65/240)6 These are the juridical duties that Kant clarifies in the "Doctrine of Right." It is a duty of every individual to recognize the ability of GInIheEeundatiQnsnftheMetanhxaicsanLaJrl and tha Mataghysigs gt Mgrals Kant also consideres perfect duties to oneself. (Fggngatigns, 38-39/421-22, and MM, 65/240) I shall not discuss this type of duty since it is not crucial for the conception of Kant's political philosophy to be outlined in the next chapter. 138 others to exercise the external freedom of choice of actions they deem necessary for reaching their ends. Because the actions take place in the external world there is the possibility that the actions of one person will interfere with the choice of others to act as they choose. Since this is the case, it is also necessary to recognize that there must be limits to the actions one can carry out in pursuit of their ends. It should also be noted that the juridical duties are narrow duties. As a narrow duty, an action that violates the duty is morally wrong. (Fgandatigns, 41/424)7 The juridical duties are narrow duties because they do not allow any latitude in the action which a person may take. They either demand or prohibit a specific action. The "Doctrine of Right" clarifies these duties, and it is the perfect duties which give rise to rights claims. The enforcement of these duties is the focus of the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. The second type of duty discussed by Kant are the imperfect duties. These are the ethical duties considered in the "Doctrine of Virtue." The imperfect duties do not specify what specific actions ought to be taken but what ends humans ought to set for themselves. (MM, 188/382-83) 7Sullivan, Kant's Moral Theory, 57. 139 The imperfect duties are duties to adopt certain ends which will be the object of one's actions. These are moral ends given to humans by pure practical reason and are not ends adopted because of the sensible nature of humans. (MM, 190/385) These are ends that are duties, and Kant considers two imperfect duties. The first end that is also a duty identified by Kant is one's own perfection. Kant says, "This duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's capacities (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is understanding...." (MM, 191/387) This duty consists of both rising above the crude animal nature of humans and to develop one's will with a virtuous disposition. The second end that is also a duty is the duty to promote the happiness of others. This is the duty that a person ought to make the ends of others her own end. (MM, 192/388) This means that, within the limits of the juridical duties, a person has an obligation to help promote the happiness of others by acting in ways that will help them secure what they take to be good for themselves. It also means that in some cases a person may try to limit others from securing ends that they think will make them happy but the person does not. In these ways, there are duties to help others when they need it and protect them when they may not be helping themselves. 140 The two imperfect duties considered in the "Doctrine of Virtue" are wide duties of obligation. What Kant means by this is that since the imperfect duties prescribe only the ends which ought to be adopted by humans, a person has the latitude of free choice to decide how to act in order to reach those ends. (MM, 194/390) Imperfect duties do not specify particular actions which must be done or which are prohibited. What is called for is that a person adopt certain ends, but the actions determined by these end may vary. There is no specific action necessary to reach these ends, so a person is able to choose different courses of action to reach them. There is one additional type of duty Kant considers in the Metaphystgs gt Mgrals; this is the indirect duty to promote one's own happiness. This is an end which a person would not have to be constrained to adopt since this an end every person will adopt. (MM, 190/386) Because a person does not have to be constrained to adopt this end, it cannot be considered under the concept of duty. However, Kant does claim that if a person is happy, then she will be more able to do her duty. In this way, adopting the end of promoting one's own happiness is indirectly a duty.8 8For a more detailed discussion of the role of happiness in Kant's ethics see Victoria 8. Wike, Kant ga Happinass ta Ethigs (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1994). 141 These are the duties considered by Kant in the MELQELXSLQS gt Mgrals. Humans, as rational beings, ought to act on these duties, and in the case of juridical duties they can be constrained to act in accordance with them. We have considered the types of duties discussed in Kant's Mataghysigs gt Mgrals because the concept of right can only be explicated through the moral imperative which commands duty. (MM, 64/239) Since it is duty that grounds the claims of obligation of others or rights, it seems that it will be helpful to consider what the duties are which can be expected of humans and the state in civil society. Before considering these in detail, it will be useful to consider the reason why duty will be the focus of our conception of Kant's political philosophy. II. Law and Duty in Kant's Political Philosophy The conception of Kant's political philosophy we will consider in the next chapter stresses the importance of duty in understanding his views on political theory. If we consider what Kant says about the role of duty in relation to the concept of right, we will begin to understand why it is important to emphasize the importance of duty when considering Kant's political philosophy. If we consider what Kant says about duty and right we will notice two important passages in the Mataghysigs gt 142 Mgrals. Kant defines the concept of duty as that "...of a necessitation (constraint) of free choice through the law." (MM, 185/379) This law may be self-imposed or externally imposed, but all duties are based on the concept that one is constrained to act or not act in a certain way. The notion of constraint is an important point in Kant's moral theory. If the constraint to act in a certain way is external, it is possible to identify duties of Right; if the constraint is internal, the duties identified are those of virtue. What is important to recognize is that the claims of obligation one can make on others and can have enforced in civil society are based on juridical duties. The second passage to consider is in the "Doctrine of Right." Here Kant stresses that the concept of right is tied to the concept of duty when he says that it is "...only through the moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of right, can afterward be explicated." (MM, 64/239) For this reason the entire doctrine of morals, including the "Doctrine of Right," is referred to as a doctrine of duties. By beginning with the idea that the justification of the actions of the state is based on the enforcement of the juridical duties, we can note that the state is charged with a responsibility to enforce these duties and make decisions 143 between conflicting rights claims of individuals. The actions of the state are justified to the extent that this responsibility is discharged. It seems that, based on this initial View of the role of the state to enforce the juridical duties of members of civil society, the state can be understood as having certain "duties" it is expected to perform. What this indicates is that it may be useful to consider the role of the state, not just from the perspective of protecting the rights of individuals, but from the perspective of other responsibilities of the state. What appears to be a promising approach to examining Kant's political philosophy is to consider the role of the state in terms of the legitimate expectations of the members of civil society. Instead of simply examining what Kant's political philosophy tells us about the role of the state in terms of protecting the rights of individuals, we might examine the responsibilites that the state is expected to discharge considering the ends humans will and ought to try to reach. Through the institutions and agents of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, the state can be held accountable for ensuring that certain conditions exist in civil society. These responsibilities can be understood as the duties of the state. From this view, Kant's political philosophy would no longer be understood just as providing justification for a 144 state that acts as a guardian of individual rights but for a state with important roles in the development of humans as finitely rational beings. By examining the role of the state from the perspective of its responsibilites, the state can be understood as having what we shall call duties. Based on the idea of the duties of the state we will be able to develop a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy. This will involve looking at Kant's political philosophy as an attempt to justify the roles and actions of the state in relation the duties humans have as finitely rational beings. We have briefly examined the role and actions of the state in relation to the juridical duties. Humans, though, also have imperfect duties and the indirect duty to promote one's own happiness. We should, therefore, consider the role of the state in relation to these additional duties in order to determine what duties the state has. By doing this, we would be able to consider three different roles of the state and can try to justify different actions of the state based on these duties and responsibilities. Chapter Six A Broader Conception of Kant's Political Philosophy We are now in a position to reconsider Kant's political philosophy. This reexamination will be based on the ideas related to Kant's moral theory that we have focused on in the last two chapters. It is my position that by taking into account these ideas we are able to present a more accurate conception of Kant's political philosophy. The actions of the state justified on this conception are broader than those justified on the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. Furthermore, this broader conception of Kant's political philosophy is able to meet the criticisms confronting our initial examination of Kant's political philosophy and is able to do this and still be universally applicable. In this chapter we will consider the argument for claiming that Kant's version of the social contract theory should be understood as justifying a broader role for the state than is thought to be justified on our initial examination of his political philosophy. This argument will attempt to demonstrate that by identifying the duties of the state, it is possible to both determine what actions the 145 146 state can justifiably take and why these actions can be thought to be justified. There are three sets of duties we can identify for the state which are the basis for justifying certain actions of the state. The argument presented in this chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part of the argument examines the duties of the state regarding the enforcement of the juridical duties identified by Kant. Justifying the actions of the state in carrying out this duty is the focus of the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. Second, we will examine the part of the argument concerning the duties the state has in relation to duties that are indirectly related to the juridical duties. This portion of the argument demonstrates that certain actions of the state are justified when they are intended to ensure an equal opportunity for all individuals to freely attempt to gain their own happiness. Finally, we will turn to the duties of the state in providing the conditions for the rational well-being of the members of civil society. What should become clear is that in the first two parts of this argument, the state is understood as having a role in securing the opportunity for happiness of individuals. The justification for this role rests on that fact that humans can be thought to enter civil society in order to secure the conditions they believe are necessary in order to satisfy their animal nature. 147 Justifying the third role of the state focuses on the consent one can understand people giving to the state to secure the conditions for their rational development. This last role is crucial, and without justifying it is not possible to justify any role for the state other than protecting individual freedom. Before turning to these three areas, it is important to consider the general idea of why it is important to take into account the duties of the state when attempting to justify the actions of the state. Focusing on the duties of the state that one can identify is important because in being able to identify the duties of the state we would be able to more fully articulate the justified claims of obligation which the state can make on members of civil society. These claims are rights of the state and are expressed in the Public Right. Public Right is "...a system of laws for a people...that, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution (constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right." (MM, 123/311) Any claims of obligation made by the state are to be understood as duties which individuals can be forced, by an external power, to perform. This does not mean they are juridical duties or perfect duties towards others. The duties of the state we are 148 considering are analogous to the duties humans have, according to Kant. Our consideration of Kant's political philosophy focuses on three duties. Humans have juridical duties, an indirect duty to promote their own happiness, and imperfect duties to themselves and others. Corresponding to these duties is the basis of claims of obligation which the state can make on members of civil society. Since any claim of obligation made by the state is one which individuals can be forced to undertake, it is necessary to justify these claims. In order to justify these claims and the actions of the state, we must recognize an important point. Any claims of right made by anyone or by the state carry with them reciprocal claims of coercion and right, and only in the recognition of the reciprocal coercion are rights possible. (MM, 58/232) Because the state is making claims on the members of civil society, these individuals can make claims on the state as well. It is the claims of the individuals which are the duties of the state. Understood in this way, we should look for the duties that the state can be expected to perform in order to determine what actions might be justified. In this chapter we will consider three sets of duties. Only by the state attempting to carry out these sets of duties can it be thought that individuals could give their consent to the actions of the state. We will now consider the three sets of duties of the state. 149 I. The State and Juridical Duties The first set of actions of the state that can be justified is the enforcement of the juridical duties or perfect duties toward others. (MM, 65-66/239-41) Juridical duties are the duties that a person has to refrain from preventing another person from exercising her freedom to pursue her own ends. They are also duties that others can claim a person must perform, and because of this, it can be said that a right corresponds to these duties. It is the enforcement of rights that sits at the heart of the justification of the state on the narrow view of Kant's political philosophy, but it is only one of the three sets of duties of the state identified on the broader conception. On both conceptions, the actions of a state are justified if the rights of individuals are fairly enforced. As members of a civil society, individuals can be understood as recognizing the power of the state to act in ways that will secure the freedom of all the members of civil society. Members of civil society can be understood as relinquishing to the state their individual claims to a right to enforce their claims of obligation against others, and the state is charged with securing these rights. In order to secure them, the state is justified in making certain claims on the individuals in civil society. 150 The obligation which individuals have with regard to the state and its role in enforcing the juridical duties is the obligation to support the state in its attempts to secure the freedom of individuals. The state can make justified claims of obligation on its members in exchange for securing their individual freedom. These claims take the form of taxes and military support. (MM, 135-36/325-26) The claims that a state is justified in making are limited to those that are necessary to perform its role in securing the rights and freedom of the members of civil society. The state is, then, justified in providing police and military forces to secure the freedom of individuals, and all members of society have a duty to provide the support for these through taxes or direct service. In addition to the state providing the security necessary to protect individuals' rights, the state is also charged with and justified in resolving disputes between the rights claims of individuals. The state is charged with the duty of securing the freedom of the individuals through setting up courts that will allow it to judge between the conflicting claims of individuals. (MM, 113-22/296-308) Again, in order to perform this duty the state is justified in requiring the members of civil society to support its efforts by requiring taxes be paid or jury service be performed. 151 The duty of the state we have considered to this point express the limits of the justified actions of the state on the narrow reading of Kant's contractualism. Everything considered up to this point is quite acceptable to a person who holds that the narrow reading is an accurate understanding of Kant's views. Such a person would hold that taxes and military service and other duties imposed on individuals are justified if they are necessary for securing the freedom of all the members of civil society. These can be justified on a contractual basis since each person could be thought to agree to make a "small" sacrifice in order to secure her freedom. The sacrifice is limited to only what is necessary to secure the freedom of individuals, and this should be limited to the smallest sacrifice necessary for the state to perform its duty. Anything beyond what is necessary to secure individual freedom is unjustified and should not be done. The duty of the state to enforce the juridical duties of its members is similar to the juridical duties individuals have to each other. In this role, the state is charged with protecting the freedom of individuals, but the state also has a duty not to interfere with the external freedom of its members. Understood in this way, we can recognize a limit to the power of the state. Any actions which begin to interfere with the freedom of individuals is 152 not justified and would be a violation of a duty of the state. In this way, the duty of the state to secure the freedom of members of the civil society is analogous to the juridical duties people have to each other. The state has a duty to act so that it does not infringe upon the freedom of members of civil society. What is important to recognize is that the idea of freedom Kant understands as the basis of the justification of civil society is external freedom. This is the freedom of the individual to choose the actions necessary to reach the ends she desires. As beings who possess an animal nature, humans desire the satisfaction of natural drives, and these can only be satisfied by reaching the specific ends each individual desires. Reaching the ends a person desires will allow them to be happy, and this is possible only if the freedom of a person is secure from the interference of others. The actions of the state concerning its duty to secure the freedom of each individual's freedom are justified because each person can be thought to agree to the state acting in ways that will secure claims individuals can only make provisionally outside of civil society. This is the idea of the social contract. What we should realize is that this is not all that is required for a person to reach the ends she desires. By recognizing this point, we can 153 identify a second set of duties the state has, duties not stressed on the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. II. The State and Indirect Duty The second set of duties that justify certain actions of the state can be identified when we consider what Kant thinks is the end all humans will strive to achieve - gaining one's own happiness. What one should recognize about Kant's notion of human action is that one of the motives humans have for acting is to secure their own happiness.1 Part of being able to secure one's own happiness is to be able to act freely to secure what a person takes to be her own good. Securing this freedom is the basis of the social contract, but it might also be expected that the state act to ensure that it will be possible for the members of a civil society to have an equal opportunity to gain their own happiness. To understand how this can justify certain actions of the state we will have to consider what Kant says about the pursuit of one's own happiness. 1We should also recognize that humans may also act to secure the happiness of others with whom they might have a special relationship with such as family and friends. What I will be saying about the pursuit of one's own happiness would also apply to the happiness of others whom a person has close personal relationships with. 154 One possible candidate which Kant considers as a duty humans have as rational beings is the promotion of their own happiness. However, since humans unavoidably adopt the promotion of their own happiness as one of their ends, they would not have to be constrained to adopt it. It cannot, therefore, be a duty. (MM, 190/386) However, Kant goes on to claim that humans have an indirect duty to promote one's own happiness in order to remove any obstacles which might hinder one's being moral. (MM, 192-93/388) One's own happiness is recognized by Kant as a legitimate end that a person should try to achieve. Based on this, we can now identify a second duty of the state; the state has a duty to ensure that the conditions exist in civil society for each individual to pursue her own happiness.2 For Kant the only unconditionally good thing is a moral will. (Fggngatigns, 9/393) .A good will is one that acts on the moral law, and this would be made easier if the happiness of humans could be secured. (MM, 192-93/388) It is not, however, possible to know what will secure the 2It should be clear that this does not mean that the state has the duty to ensure the happiness of members of a, civil society, only that the state seems to have a role in securing the opportunity for happiness of individuals. Kant's claim is that the well-being of the state does not involve the welfare or happiness of the citizens of the state. The well-being of the state is found in its conforming to the principles of Right. (MM, 129/318) 155 happiness of all humans, but there are certain things that might be done to ensure the opportunity for happiness for all humans in a civil society. .A state, in order to provide the possibility for humans to develop a good will, would be justified in attempting to secure the conditions for each person to gain her own happiness. In a world populated by other humans, it will happen that the attempts by some individuals to secure their own happiness will interfere with other individual's pursuit of happiness. In order to reduce the possible obstacles to people developing a good will, the state can be charged with securing the conditions in which all members of a civil society will have an equal chance, as autonomous individuals, to pursue their own happiness. One condition necessary for this is protecting the freedom of individuals. More than being free is required, however, if people are to be able to pursue their own happiness. The state can be understood to have the following duty: the state should act in ways that will ensure the free and equal opportunity of each person to pursue her own happiness in order to develop a good will. It is possible to identify two types of actions that a state would be justified in carrying out with regards to the indirect duty of promoting one's happiness. The first type of action a state is justified in taking is actions intended to ensure that the conditions exist in which there are free 156 and equal contractual relationships between members. For Kant, the primary conception of relationships is that of a contractual relationship. The relationships between individuals often involve an agreement to perform a task, service, or good in exchange for some other service or good. This even includes the marriage relationship which Kant thinks is modelled on a contractual relationship.3 In all such cases, the state has a role to ensure that each person is freely and equally able to enter into agreements which will allow all involved to have a chance to secure what each thinks is her own good. Each person in a contractual agreement, whether in marriage or a labor agreement, is a moral equal and should be treated as equals because all people possess rational autonomy. In order to ensure that every person in civil society has an equal opportunity for happiness, the state has a duty to examine the structure of society and the relationships between the members to ensure that each member is free and equal. Only by acting to ensure the free and equal status of all members of civil society will it be possible for each person to pursue her own happiness. 3For Kant, sexual union that takes place in accordance with principle is marriage. This is a contract for the "...lifelong possession of each other's sexual attributes." (MM; 96/277) 157 The second set of actions that relate to the duty of the state to ensure the free and equal opportunity of all the members of a society to pursue their own happiness involve ensuring the health and safety of the people. These activities are in addition to the preventative role of making sure that people do not interfere with the freedom of others. It is this active role that opens the possibility for justifying several important actions of the state. Among these actions is setting up and maintaining various facilities that may aid individuals in their particular pursuits for happiness but which may not be fairly maintained by an individual or small group. Such facilities include roads, research facilities, hospitals, and parks that people use in the pursuit of their happiness. Understood in this way, the state is justified in taking actions which promote the health and safety of the members of civil society. A different type of action of the state that would ensure the health and safety of people is enacting and enforcing certain regulations of different activities. Such regulation can be understood as limiting certain practices which may not directly affect a person's freedom but would affect her opportunity for pursuing her happiness. The state has a duty to enact and enforce regulations that set limits on business practices, determine the fair and equal 158 use of technology, or specify illegal actions regarding the environment. Such regulations are intended to make it possible for all the members of a civil society to have the opportunity to pursue their own happiness. The justification for the these types of actions by the state rests on providing the opportunity for individuals to pursue their happiness in order to aid people in their attempt to develop a good will. However, the state can only be justified in acting to secure the opportunity of all peOple to pursue their own happiness if it knows what individuals need to be happy. However, this presents a problem because Kant claims that it is not possible to know what will make every person happy. (QPt_, 9n/9n, and MM, 43— 44/215-216) Therefore, any public institutions or regulations aimed at securing the possibility of this end can only be justified by taking into account what individuals have learned will be able to make them happy. This points to a requirement that the state must meet if these types of actions are to be justified. If these actions are supposed to secure the opportunity for individuals to achieve their own happiness and only they know what this will require, it is necessary for the state to have everyone involved in the creation and maintenance of public institutions and in the process of enacting the various regulations. This involvement can be understood as 159 taking two different forms. On the one hand, the members of a civil society must directly support the state's efforts by obeying the laws intended to secure the opportunity for happiness of individuals. As members of a civil society everyone ought to act in ways which will ensure that equal opportunity is possible. This means that citizens should obey any laws intended to secure the opportunity for happiness of all the members of civil society and play a role in identifying instances where such laws may be violated.“ The members also are obligated to provide the support for the enforcement of such legislation just as they are for the enforcement of the juridical duties. This support is usually the services or taxes that can be demanded by the state in order to discharge its duty to secure the opportunity of each member to attain her happiness. Such support would be in addition to the support that is justified for ensuring the non-interference of the freedom of individuals. On the other hand, there is a non-enforceable duty that the members of a civil society have in relation to securing the conditions necessary for the equal opportunity for “As legal and external legislation a person can be constrained by external forces to obey these laws. (MM, 64/239) What one must consider is whether they are justifiable laws, and the justification for them is only partially discovered here. 160 happiness. This is the duty they have to be actively engaged in the process of deciding what institutions and regulations should be maintained and enforced by the state. This is the duty of people to be citizens who are actively involved in the affairs of the civil society. This does not imply that each member should have a direct role in the day to day operation of the state, but it does mean that each person has a duty to be engaged in and be aware of the affairs of the state. These are what are traditionally referred to as the civic duties. As good citizens people have duties to vote, to express their opinions on issues, to understand the role of the state, and generally be aware of the activities of the state. The state can only be justified in acting in ways that secure the conditions to provide all people with the opportunity for happiness when it can be thought that the state has acted in ways to secure the consent of the people. This can only be ensured when the members of society are prepared to be good citizens. This, though, raises a serious difficulty for understanding Kant's political philosophy from the perspective of outlining the duties of the state. Being a good citizen requires that individuals set a certain end as the motive for their actions, but it is not possible to force peOple to adopt certain ends. (MM, 186/381) A person may be externally constrained to act in 161 ways that conform to a law, but they cannot be externally constrained to adopt certain ends. The duty of individuals to take an active role in the affairs of civil society and be good citizens requires that they adopt this end as their own end, and they cannot be constrained to do this. This is an indirect duty because it specifies what a person ought to do in order to fulfil other duties one has as a member of civil society and as a rational being. This, however, creates a dilemma for this broader conception of Kant's political philosophy. It is possible to justify the actions of the state in its attempt to secure the conditions which would make it possible for individuals to pursue their own happiness only if the members of the civil society perform their indirect civic duties, but the state cannot force people to undertake these duties. If these actions are to be justified, it is necessary to show that the state encourages people to become good citizens. This brings us to a third set of duties of the state. III. The State and Imperfect Duties In the previous section we discovered a dilemma. If the state is to be justified in acting in ways that are intended to provide the conditions needed for individuals to have the opportunity for happiness, then it is necessary that the people in civil society be good citizens. However, 162 this requires that individuals adopt a certain end, and the state cannot require that such an end be adopted. What must be discovered is a basis for justifying the role of the state in getting individuals to adopt certain ends that are related to being good members of a society. This can be justified by examining the role of individuals in the state, the imperfect duties, and what Kant says about enlightenment. Developing this theme will complete our consideration of the broader reading of Kant's social contract theory. Kant's political philosophy begins from the idea that the freedom of each individual can only be secured in a civil society which is based on a system of laws. This system of laws is supposed to embody the juridical duties everyone has regarding the freedom of the other members of society. This is the initial basis of the social contract because the actions of a state can be justified if the actions are intended to protect the freedom of all the members. In a civil society where the provisional rights are secured by a power adequate for this there is, according to Kant, distributive justice. (MM, 124/312-13) There must be a state with the power to secure these rights, but this is not all that is required of the state, nor does it represent the limit of the power of the state. In the previous section, we discussed that the state has a duty to 163 provide the conditions needed for individuals to pursue their own happiness. The state can be justified in acting on this duty if the members of civil society are involved in the affairs of the state. In order to determine what this requires of the state, we will need to consider what is required for people to be good citizens. If a state is to be justified in having the power necessary to secure the provisional rights people have in a state of nature and the opportunity of each person to pursue their own happiness, then it ought, ideally, be the case that each person be enlightened in order for her to understand the claims that each person can make. For Kant, enlightenment is the ability of each person to think for herself. (Enlightenment, 83/35) Being "enlightened" includes being able to determine what is in one's own best interest; how one fits into the roles she has in society both privately and publicly; what one thinks society ought to strive to become; and to be able to form a thoughtful conception of the good. These are issues directly related to the conception of what it means to be a good citizen, and it is expected that humans, as rational beings, be able to consider these questions. Being able to consider such questions and think for oneself requires that a person be able to develop her capacities as a rational being. This is one of the 164 imperfect duties that Kant identifies in the "Doctrine of Virtue." Kant says, "This duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's capacities (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is understanding...." (MM, 191/387) This duty consists of both rising above the crude animal nature of humans and to develop one's will with a virtuous disposition. As enlightened members of a civil society, people are expected to be able to reflect on the nature of their actions, their goals, the places in society they occupy, and what they think ought to be the direction society should take. This involves thinking for oneself or enlightenment. The ideal of the enlightenment can be understood as the development of one's capacities, and this is an imperfect duty that humans have as rational beings but also as citizens of civil society. Enlightenment will also lead to considering and promoting the happiness of others. This is important because it will only be possible, given the animal and rational capabilities of humans, that if they have happiness, at least in the sense of survival, it will be possible to develop one's capacity as a rational being. It is necessary, then, to consider what will promote the happiness of others, and this is part of what enlightenment 165 means.5 Understood in this way, the imperfect duty of promoting the happiness of others is an element that is necessary for people to develop their rational capacity and enlightenment. We are now in a position to recognize a justified role of the state regarding the imperfect duties that Kant identifies. If it is the case that the imperfect duties are crucial elements in the process of enlightenment of humans and being enlightened is what is required for humans to be good citizens, then it is justified that the state carry out actions that will promote the performance of these imperfect duties in order to bring individuals to the stage of enlightenment. Actively involved citizens are a crucial element in any truly just society, and the state must attempt to provide the conditions in civil society which will foster the development of such individuals. This means that the state must provide the conditions needed to develop their rational capacities including providing them with the facilities to learn how to think for themselves. This might include the operation of schools, the release of information, and sponsorship of cultural activities. The state also must attempt to provide the members of civil 5By getting people to throw off their self-imposed tutelage and think for themselves, they will be able to make use of their reason in pursuing secure their own happiness. 166 society with services that will promote their happiness. The activities of the state which aim at the ends of promoting the happiness of others and the development of the capacities of individuals are justified to the extent that these activities lead to the end of enlightenment. Considered as rational beings, even if only finitely rational, all humans can be thought to consent to actions by the state which promote their rational nature. The activities carried out by the state, in order to be able to complete these imperfect duties, are justified by considering what all humans, as rational beings, ought to aim to achieve. A state where these ends are pursued can be considered just. With the ideas related to the imperfect duties and the justified role of the state regarding them, we are taken well beyond what is thought to be justified on the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. We are now able to recognize how the role of the state in Kant's political philosophy is not as limited as what one might initially believe. The justified actions of the state are not limited to that of a police officer who attempts to make sure the freedom of people is not interfered with by others. Without question, that is one of the duties that the state has, but it is not the only one. The state also has duties regarding 167 the development of citizens who will be actively involved in the activities of civil society. This involves providing the conditions for promoting the happiness of the members of civil society and for developing their capacities. The state is also justified in attempting to provide the regulations that will allow each person the opportunity to pursue her own happiness. All of these activities should be recognized as justified by Kant's contractualism. Before considering whether or not this conception of Kant's political phiIOSOphy is able to meet the four challenges which were considered in Chapter Two, it might be helpful to reiterate several points related to position sketched here. The first point that should be stressed is that the duties of the state which have been delineated reflect what actions the state should take given the conception of humans as finitely rational beings or beings who possess both an animal and a rational nature. Because humans possess both of these natures, there are two different types of actions which they will take. On the one hand, as beings with an animal nature, they will attempt to act in ways which will secure their own happiness. They will try to satisfy their desires and meet their bodily needs. In order for them to reach this end, they must be free from external constraint to as great a degree as possible and the conditions must exist in the 168 world for them to be able to pursue their own happiness. Taking this into account, one can recognize that there would be a role for the state in securing individual freedom and promoting the conditions necessary for people to pursue their own happiness. On the other hand, humans also have a rational nature. Taking into account this side of the nature of humans, we can identify certain imperfect duties that humans have. Specifically, humans have imperfect duties to promote the happiness of others and develop their own capacities. Recognizing that humans ought to set these ends for themselves, it is possible to understand that the state has a duty to act in ways that will secure the conditions needed for individuals to act on these duties. By taking into account the rational nature of humans, we are able to identify the actions of the state that are necessary for the members of civil society to become good citizens. Second, a brief comment should be made about the relationship between the three sets of duties of the state. What should be noted is that the second and third sets of duties are thought to be identified in Kant's political philosophy as being additional duties of the state above and beyond the first set of duties. The second set of duties, those analogous to the indirect duty to promote one's happiness, more fully develop the duty to enforce the 169 juridical duties. This set of duties of the state fill out the state's role in making it possible for individuals to secure their own happiness. Individuals need to be free in order to do this, but certain additional conditions must exist if a person is to promote their own happiness. The third set of duties of the state is understood as an additional set of duties of the state because this set specifies the actions of the state that are necessary in order for individuals to fully develop their own autonomy. The first set of duties is focused on securing the freedom of individuals, while the third set of duties specify actions of the state that will promote the individual development of autonomy. This is done by getting individuals to recognize the ends which they ought to set for themselves through enlightenment. Understood in this way, the third set of duties of the state develop the basis of the freedom which is to be protected by the state. Finally, it should be noted that the duties of the state being considered here are analogous to the juridical, indirect, and imperfect duties which humans have. By understanding what actions are called for by these duties for humans, it is possible to identify what actions the state ought to take in order to get individuals to do their duty. By identifying the duties of humans, we are able to identify the duties that the civil institutions have. These 170 duties are similar to those of humans, but not identical. For example, it is not possible for a state to act on juridical duties, nor is it possible for a state to develop its own capacities. The duties of the state here identified correspond to the duties that humans as rational beings have, and it is believed that by taking these into account it is possible to provide a conception of Kant's political philosophy that is able to meet the challenges facing a narrow conception of his political philosophy. We can now consider whether this is the case. Chapter Seven Assessing the Broader Conception of Kant's Political Philosophy In the previous chapter we considered what actions of the state could be thought to be justified by a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy. It was shown why the state can be justified in acting to 1) secure the freedom of members of civil society, 2) provide the conditions for the opportunity for people to pursue their own happiness, and 3) ensure that the conditions exist for the enlightenment of the individuals in society. We focused on the duties of the state because, if the state is to be able to claim that individuals have obligations which they can be forced to meet, then, reciprocally, these individuals also have rights against the state and can expect the state to have and perform certain duties. Based on this idea we were able to identify several actions the state could be justified in taking. Our discussion will now consider a few final points. There are two main topics of discussion we will consider. First, it is important to reconsider some of the basic ideas of Kant's political philoSOphy we considered 171 172 when the narrow conception of Kantian contractualism was presented. In particular, it is important to reconsider the aim of Kant's political philosophy, the Universal Principle of Justice, and the notion of citizenship. Secondly, we should make explicit why the broader view of Kant's political philosophy can meet the criticisms of his theory understood as a narrow social contract theory. Having completed the clarification of what can be the justified actions of the state on this broader conception, it should be clear that there are obvious responses to some of these criticisms. It is still important to clearly explain, at least briefly, what the responses would be. .After completing the discussion of these two areas, a few concluding comments will be made. I. Some Basic Ideas Reconsidered In order to develop the idea of a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy, it will be useful to clarify some of the same basic issues examined when we presented the narrow contractualist conception of Kant's political philosophy. Because the broader conception holds that the duties of the state recognized by the narrow conception are still a portion of the duties of the state, it should be expected that there will be some similarities between these two views. In particular, Kant's claims about the sovereign 173 and government and the private rights of individuals remain essentially the same.1 This leaves the ideas of the aim of Kant's political philosophy, the understanding of the Universal Principle of Justice, and the notion of citizenship as topics which should be clarified. A. The Aim of Kant's Political Philosophy The first point that we should recognize when reconsidering the aim of Kantis political philosophy is that the aim is still understood as providing an ideal that can be used to judge whether or not civil societies and the laws found in them are just. Kant's conception of political philosophy is that it ought to be recognized as presenting an ideal for at; societies to strive to achieve. On the narrow conception, this ideal is thought to focus only on securing the freedom and rights individuals provisionally possess in a state of nature. This ideal could be used to judge any laws that might be adopted by a society and the condition of the civil society as a whole because it identifies what the state ought to do to secure the freedom of individuals in society. Laws and societies which protect 1Of course, the sexist and bias nature of private rights is not thought to be justified on the broader conception. This point will be taken up in the second section of this chapter. 174 the rights of individuals are to be judged just; those that do not are unjust. By emphasizing private rights one can easily come to believe that the only duty of the state is to ensure that these rights are secured. The narrow conception is focused on ensuring that the perfect or narrow duties are carried out. This serves as the basis for justifying the actions of the state and is the basis of the ideal presented by Kant's political philosophy. The broad conception expounded in this dissertation also holds that this is an important part of the ideal, but it tries to show that any judgment about particular laws or societies cannot rest solely on the protection of individual rights. Taking into account that Kant believes humans possess both an animal nature and rational nature, we were able clarify two sets of duties that the state can be understood to have in addition to the duty of protecting individual freedom. One of these duties concerns securing‘the opportunity for each person to pursue her own happiness. The duty to protect the freedom of individuals is also important for securing this opportunity because only individuals who are free will be able to secure their own happiness. Both of these sets of duties focus on providing the conditions for a people to act freely and equally on their animal nature. The third set of duties concerned the 175 state's role in providing the conditions needed for individuals to carry out their imperfect duties. This meant that some of the actions of the state will focus on the development of the rational nature of the members of the civil society. The state is justified in acting on these three sets of duties, and because of this point, the ideal contained in Kant's political philosophy is much broader than may be initially thought. There is now a basis for judging many more of the actions of the state than was possible on the narrow conception. With this broader ideal we can recognize that more must be done if a society is to be judged as just. B. The Universal Principle of Right The Universal Principle of Right was thought, on the narrow contractualist account, to provide support for claiming that the ideal of Kant's political philosophy focused strictly on issues related to protecting individual freedom. This principle states that "[a]ny action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law." (MM, 56/230) On the narrow conception, this principle expresses the sufficient condition of justice, and this was thought to be the only condition that 176 had to be met for a law or society to be just. This led to the problem that Kant's political philosophy supported a limited view of justice. We should, therefore, reexamine this principle in light of the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy. One way of understanding the Principle of Right is to consider it as the basis for judging whether laws or societies are just. On this reading, the principle states what enforceable protections individuals ought to have and the Claims states should enforce. Understood in this way, it stresses the wrong that others would do to a person if they interfere with her freedom. (MM, 56/230) By protecting the freedom of individuals, the sufficient condition for a law or society to be just can be met. No other actions by the state are required for justice to be present in society.2 The Principle of Justice can be understood differently when we consider the duties that the state has in civil society. Instead of being understood as presenting the conditions of the basis of the idea of justice, it should be thought that the principle states the formal condition of just actions, whether they are those of individuals or of 2Rawls himself would insist that the institutions in the society also must function according the difference principle as well as the principle of equality. 177 the state. What the broader conception tries to identify are other actions that the state is obligated to perform given the nature of humans. Where the narrow conception sees the sufficient condition for an act to be just as being also the sufficient condition for a society to be judged, the broader conception understands the principle as only stating the condition necessary to judge whether actions are just. In order to be able to judge whether a society is just, we need to consider not just whether the actions of individuals and the state are just, but also what the actions undertaken by the state ought to be trying to achieve. It is easy to think that Kant holds a limited conception of justice, but what we have tried to show on the broader conception is that it is necessary to consider what actions ought to be taken by the state. Only by considering these actions and the end that ought to be realized is it possible to develop a more accurate conception of justice. The Principle of Justice, then, can be understood as stating the condition that must be met if these actions are themselves just and not what the entire conditions of justice are. C. Citizenship Finally, the notion of citizenship in Kant's political philosophy ought to be reconsidered. As we noted in Chapter 178 Two, this is the area of Kant's political philosophy that give rise to the most obvious criticism.3 .A brief word about the people who ought to be considered members of civil society, i.e. who ought to be citizens, should be able to clarify a more acceptable account of citizenship in Kant's political philOSOphy. The basis for Kant's claims about the duties humans have, both of Law and Ethics, is the fact that all humans are rational beings. All humans possess reason, and this makes it possible for them to be free. In order to secure their ability to exercise this freedom, humans enter civil society. Their ability to act freely cannot be assured in a state of nature because each person would have to rely on her own abilities to secure the opportunity. According to Kant, reason demands that we enter civil society and require that all others do likewise. (MM, 124/312) We should think, then, that the possession of reason ought to be the primary condition for being a citizen. Even though the possession of reason can be thought to be the fundamental ground for any claim that a person can be a citizen in a civil society, there may be other requirements for being an active citizen in a particular 3It should be noted that the problem of Kant's restricted view of citizenship is one that faces any reading of Kant's political philosophy. 179 society. In any civil society there are eligibility standards beyond the possession of reason which must be met if a person is to be an active member of the civil society. Being an active citizen means that a person has the ability to directly express their will in the political process through voting or being a member of the government. For Kant, the eligibility requirement for active citizenship is the possession of a type of object, either property or skill, which assures that a person is independent. What Kant should have recognized was that the eligibility requirements for active citizenship must be indicators of the possession of reason. He should have recognized this because reason is what demands that a person enter civil society, and it is the possession of reason that gives a person her rights. Recognizing this, we can assert that the eligibility requirements should be requirements which demonstrate that one has the ability to exercise reason. In our society, there is the perception that when a person reaches a certain age she advances to the status of being an active citizen. In other societies, the demonstrations of possession of reason may be some particular rite of passage.“ Since the requirements must “I have been considering the citizenship status of people who are born into a particular society. A.person may, however, move from one society to another and have to meet requirements for being a naturalized citizen. These 180 demonstrate the possession of reason, it would not be possible to justify claims that are based on a person's social status, sex, income, membership in a particular religion, or speaking a particular language. These conditions are independent of a person possessing reason and can, by this test, be eliminated from consideration as eligibility requirements. This would also express a condition which all people could be thought to give their consent. Recognizing this would allow us to overcome the problems facing Kant's views on citizenship because there would no longer be any basis for indiscriminately excluding particular groups of peOple in a society from becoming active citizens. II. Reconsidering the Four Challenges In the previous chapter we considered a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy that can be explicated by taking into account the duties a just state is expected to fulfill. These are the duties to enforce the juridical duties of the members of the state, secure the requirements may be above and beyond those requirements a natural born citizen must meet to gain the status of being an active citizen, but they should not conflict with the claim that a person who possesses reason has an innate claim to citizenship. For example, a person may be required to make a statement to abide by the laws of the society she desires to join and relinquish all civil ties to her former society. 181 opportunity for each member to pursue her own happiness, and enable the members to recognize and act on the imperfect duties they have as rational beings. In presenting this conception of Kant's political theory, we have become aware that the idea of a just society on Kant's view may not be as limited as what might initially be expected. In general, Kant's political philosophy is confronted by two problems and understanding it as a narrow contractualist theory gives rise to two other challenges. These difficulties may give a person serious grounds for rejecting Kant's political philosophy. One of the advantages of the broader conception of his political philosophy is that it can overcome these challenges. In this section, we will briefly consider how these criticism can be met. A. The Problem of Citizenship The initial problem we considered was that Kant's views concerning who could be an active citizen in civil society were sexist and elitist. We discovered that Kant claims that all women and any males who do not own property were not entitled to vote and could not be active citizens. Kant's claim is based on the idea that it is necessary for a person to be independent in order to be able to express his own will through voting. Only males who own property are independent on Kant's account, so only they could vote. 182 This seems to be a discriminatory policy which cannot be justified. Because of these claims, any conception of Kant's political philosophy will face an immediate challenge. When we considered this criticism in Chapter Two, we noted that there is an ambiguity associated with the term independence.5 Independence may mean that a person is able to think and reason for himself or herself, or it may mean that a person does not have to rely on others for his or her welfare. It seems that in holding that independence as the requirement for active citizenship, Kant has managed to link the two together. Being able to provide for one's own well— being somehow came to be an indication of being able to think and reason for oneself or to be rational. Humans, as beings who live in a world populated with other humans, have come to rely on others in our economic, social, political, cultural, and private lives. Kant was aware of this since he repeatedly stressed the need to live in a civil condition, even if there is an anti-social tendency conflicting with this interdependence. (Idea, 44, and MM, 123-24/312) Because of the nature of the world we live in, we have become increasingly interdependent with each other. Even individuals who possess large amounts of 5See above, 60. 183 property or economic wealth have come to rely on others to serve them to secure the life they lead. Because of the level of interdependence in our lives, it can be seriously doubted that few, if any, members of a particular civil society are able to be independent in the sense of not having to rely on the aid of others for their well-being. Because of the nature and structure of most societies in the world, it would seem that the requirement of independence, understood in this sense, is not a condition that could be met by many people. Because of his lifelong belief in the rationality of humans, it seems likely that Kant was instead pointing to the idea that independence was supposed to be the fact that people could think and reason for themselves. If humans are thought to be rational, they would be able to express their will independently of other people or things. Expression of one's will would mean that a person has formed a conception of what ought to be done independently of any external and empirical conditions. In this sense, a person would be independent from the influence of all conditions except their own reason and what reason claims ought to be done. This form of independence is possible for any person because she is a rational being, and it does not depend on being able to provide for one's own physical well-being. In order to show why we should focus on the view of humans as 184 independent because they are rational beings, we should look at the basis of consent that justifies the actions of the state. The consent for the actions of the state is based on the fact that the members of civil society could be thought to impose on themselves the laws through which the state acts. If a law can be thought to be one that is self- imposed, it cannot be thought to do harm to the individual. (MM, 125/313) The idea that a law can be thought to be self-imposed is only possible if those who are thought to impose the law on themselves are rational beings. Only rational beings are capable of acting according to a conception of laws, laws which dictate what they ought to do independently of any empirical conditions. Two points should be recognized about this view of independence. First, the notions of what actions the state can be justified in taking must be only those things that the peoplethemselves can be thought to be capable of imposing on themselves. These are the three sets of duties we identified on the broader conception as the basis of the justified actions of the state. Secondly, these can only be thought to be laws imposed on members of civil society if they are thought to be rational beings. Only rational beings can be thought to act according to a conception of laws, so only they can be thought to impose laws on 185 themselves. This is how laws and actions of states can be justified, and this requires us to cOnceive of the members of civil society as independent because they are rational beings. Having now considered the rational independence of humans, self—imposed laws, and duties, one may wonder what this has to do with the idea of citizenship. The justification of the actions of a state can only be justified by appeal to the idea that the members of civil society as rational beings could impose laws of the state on themselves. Since this is the case, the condition for citizenship must be that of rational independence. Since all humans, by definition, are rational beings, they cannot be excluded from the possibility of being active citizens on grounds which violate this condition. Both males who do not own property and women are all rational beings, so they cannot be justifiably excluded from the possibility of gaining the status of active citizenship. This would not be a law that could be considered to be self-imposed, and so must be rejected. B. A Limited View of Acquired Private Rights The second criticism facing Kant's political philOSOphy was that it contained questionable assertions about who could claim certain private rights against others. Based on 186 what Kant says, we would have to think that Kant supports a sexist and paternalistic view of the rights of women. There are passages where Kant makes claims about the limits of private rights which women may claim that seem to reflect the biases of his day. It may be that Kant was attempting to justify the status quo of his day on philosophical grounds. This is a question that we will not consider here. Instead, we will consider a response that we could make on the basis of the broader conception of his political philosophy. Being able to make claims of obligation against others requires a condition of reciprocity because the claims of a person to put others under obligation can only be justified if others are able to be put the person under similar obligations. This is most clearly stated in his discussion of property rights where Kant claims that the intellectual possession of property can only be justified if the claims made by others are also recognized. (MM, 77/255) This indicates that all the individuals who may make rights claims recognize other individuals as moral equals. Investigating the basis of this status as moral equals will allow us to overcome this criticism. A person is able to make claims of obligation on others about the possession of objects if she is a rational autonomous being. This is the case because the claim of 187 taking possession of an external object is an expression of one's will to have the object under her control. This indicates that a person would be wronged if she was prevented from using the object, whether or not she is in direct physical possession of the object. (MM, 71/249) This is not possible except by appealing to an idea of reason. (MM, 74/254) Acting on an idea of reason indicates that a person would have to be a rational being. If it is to be claimed that this idea of reason is to be the basis for claims against others, then it must be the case that the others who are put under obligation are also rational beings. All humans are rational beings. As rational beings they can be put under obligation by others through claims of private acquired right. This right is claimed against all humans including women. Since the claims of obligations can only be made by rational beings against other rational beings, it must be the case that anyone who is put under obligation must be able to put others under obligation. We must conclude, then, that all people have equal claims to private acquired rights since they are all equals as rational beings. In this way, we can see that the broader conception of Kant's contractualism, since it appeals to the consent of humans as rational beings who are all equal, 188 ought to support claims that every person can claim the same private acquired rights. C. Nature of Kant's Conception of Justice The first criticism that directly confronted the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism was the claim that Kant's theory supported a limited view of the nature of justice. According to this criticism, the notion of justice supported by Kant's political philosophy only focused on securing the freedom of the members of civil society from interference by other members or other external powers. A society would be just if it secured the freedom of its members. No other conditions had to be met for a society to be just. This was an extremely limited view of the nature of justice, and one that many peOple would think unwarranted. The response that can be made to this has partially been given in our development of the broader conception of Kant's contractualism. On this view, we identified three sets of duties which the state can be understood as having. These included not only securing the freedom of the members of the civil society, but it also included providing the opportunity for the members to secure their own happiness and providing the conditions for the members to undertake their imperfect duties. In recognizing these three sets of 189 duties, we were able to determine the types of actions the state would be justified in taking since the members, as finitely rational beings, could be thought to give their consent to the state to take these actions. What was important about showing that these actions could be justified was recognizing the nature of humans and considering what conditions would be necessary to satisfy their animal nature and develop their rational nature. On the broader conception, these three sets of duties had to be performed by the state in order for the conditions of justice to be met. For Kant, public justice is defined as follows: A rightful condition is that relation of men among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to enjoy his rights, and the formal condition under which this is possible in accordance with the Idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice. (MM, 120/305-06) As we tried to clarify in the previous chapter, it is not enough for the state to secure the freedom of each person in order to enjoy his or her rights. It is also necessary for the state to attempt to secure the conditions needed for the opportunity to pursue one's own happiness, develop one's capacities, and promote the happiness of others. For justice to exist in a civil society it is necessary that these three conditions exist, and only through bringing 190 about these conditions is there justice on the broader conception. The idea of justice supported by Kant's political philosophy, then, is not as limited as one may think. D. Justifying Claims About the Good Life We now have come to the fourth criticism raised against the narrow conception of Kant's contractualism. .According to this claim, Kant's political philosophy, as a liberal political philosophy, is unable to make claims about what the good life of individuals is. Kant echoes this claim when he says that the conditions which will make a person happy can only be discovered by the person herself. If the state cannot be justified in determining what the good life of the individual is, then there is the possibility that the only justified claims about the good life in civil society having a moral aspect would be those that support relativistic moral position. While one may not think a liberal political philosophy must support a relativistic moral stance, one still may be concerned that there is no way to include a moral component into the public life of the members of a civil society. This is a concern for Kant's political philosophy. The broader conception of Kant's contractualism can meet this criticism because it considered the moral duties 191 of humans and the role these play in Kant's political philosophy. In order to determine the actions and duties the state has in civil society, we examined what Kant's conception of humans is and what he claimed they ought to do. In the Mataghystgs gt,M r l , Kant is considering the duties that humans have as finitely rational beings. As rational beings, they have perfect and imperfect duties, and as beings with an animal nature, they have an indirect duty to gain their own happiness. Of these duties, only the perfect duties can provide us with an explicit statement of the action that must be performed if the duty is to be fulfilled. By investigating the other duties, though, we were able to identify certain conditions that would make it possible for the imperfect and indirect duties to be fulfilled. This means that there are certain limited claims and actions of the state which are analogous to the duties humans have. These would provide the members of civil society with the conditions needed to pursue their conception of the good life, and the actions of the state which are intended to provide these conditions would be justified.6 6It should be noted that I am not claiming here that the state can in any way get people to perform their moral duties. For an action to be morally right, it is necessary that a person act from a sense of duty, and a person cannot be forced to do this. What I am claiming is that on the broader conception, it is possible that some of the actions 192 By considering the nature of humans, it is possible to identify some of the conditions that the state is justified in trying to provide for the members of civil society. Taking into account the animal nature of humans, the state is justified in providing the conditions for members to fulfill their indirect duty to gain their own happiness. This would involve enforcing the conditions needed to secure the freedom for all members and enacting and enforcing regulations that would ensure the conditions for all the individuals to have an equal opportunity for happiness. Considering the rational nature of humans, the state is justified in providing the conditions needed for the enlightenment of individuals. These actions are not intended to impose a single conception of what the good life is on all members of society. What is the good life for each individual cannot be determined except by the individual herself: What can be determined are the basic conditions required for a good life of a being who has both an animal and rational nature. Understood in this way, the state can be justified in securing the basis of the good life of the members of civil society, including some elements of a moral life, but what the good life would be of the state which support the conditions for a person leading a moral life are justified. 193 for each individual person cannot be determined by the state. III. Concluding Remarks Having now considered how the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy can meet these criticisms, we are initially able to claim that this view of Kant's political philosophy is a potentially useful conception of politics. On this conception of Kant's political philOSOphy, we have tried to investigate the actions of a state which can be justified according to the ideas Kant presents in his moral theory. The justification of these actions rests on the duties of humans that can be identified given a conception of humans as finitely rational beings. Humans, considered as rational beings who possess an animal nature, can be thought to have certain duties they ought to perform, and by considering the duties they have, we were able to identify analogous duties that a state has and is justified in acting to fulfill these duties. This only provides a minimal sketch of what a state and civil society would be like in the world today if it is to be considered just. Identifying the difficulties that would have to be overcome would give us a place for a new beginning. There are many other issues which this conception of Kant's political philosophy would have to 194 consider. One of these topics would include trying to determine what is necessary for there to be a free and open discussion of what each person takes to be needed for her to gain her own happiness. We discovered that this is a necessary condition for justifying the regulatory actions of a state, but we never considered how this would be possible in the world today. .A second concern that would have to be addressed is how we are to understand the power that the state has. It is necessary to consider this because on the broader conception of Kant's contractualism, the power of the state is not simply that of keeping people from doing certain things and forcing them to do others. The state is now understood as having justified powers for creating certain conditions in civil society, and this view of power moves Kant's contractualism beyond what is simply thought to be power in the liberal state. What effects this may have should, surely, be considered. Third, one may question, in light of the many activities of the state today, where does the state as a public institution end and the private realm of individuals who live in a civil society begin. Increasingly, the state has taken a more active role in the lives of individuals, and it is important to consider where the private life of people ends and the public life of civil society begins. 195 These are all areas of concern and interest to any person who is interested in the role the state plays in her life. Each area and many more are grounds for assessing and evaluating the role and actions of the state in civil society, and each of these can provide a new beginning for further investigations. What we have with the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy is a basis for trying to determine whether the actions of a state, any state, are justified. If this can serve as grounds for investigation into the activities of the state, then we can begin investigating the world in which we live. BIBILIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Allison, Henry E. Kant's Thggry gt Ptaaggm. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990. Arendt, Hannah. Lagtgrgs gg Kant's Pglitigal Philgsgphy. Ed. Ronald Beiner. Chicago: Harvester Press, 1982. Baynes, Kenneth. "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract." The Monist 72 (1982): 433-453. Beck, Lewis White. A.ggmmentary ga Kant's "gritigua gt Practigal Reasgn". Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960. Booth, William James. "The Limits of Autonomy: Karl Marx's Kant Critique." Kant aad Pgttttga; Philgsgphy. Ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1993. Gregor, Mary J. Laws gt Fraaggm. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963. Hampton, Jean. "Feminist Conractarianism." A Ming gt Qas's Qua: Feminist Essays gn Paasga aag ijsgtivity. Ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt. San Franscisco: Westview Press, 1993. Hegel, G. W. F. Phitgsgghy gt Bight. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Hill, Thomas E., Jr. Dignity agg Pragtigal Kaasgn ta Kant's Mgta; Thsgry. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992. Kant, Immanuel. Antrllnalngx __Q_fr m a PM EQ__tin 9f V__1e_' w. Trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. Ed. Hans H. Rudnick. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1978. Kant, Immanuel. gonfligt gt ths,Paggtttgs. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Abaris Books, 1979. Kant, Immanuel. gritiggs gt Pars Ksasga. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. 196 197 Kant, Immanuel. Ctitigga gt Pragtiga; Paasg_. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1993. Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of.Morals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1990. Kant, Immanuel. Kaatts Pgttttgat Writings. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. Kant, Immanuel. Mataghystgs gt_Mgrals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991. Kant, Immanuel. Paltgtga within ths Limits gt Ksasga.Algne. Trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row, 1960. Korsgaard, Christine M. "Kant's Formula of Universal Law." Pagifig Philgsophical Quarterly 66 (1985): 24-47. Lakoff, Sanford. "Autonomy and Liberal Democracy." Tha Reviaw gt Pglitigs 90 (Summer 1990): 378-396. Larmore, Charles E. Pattgtas gt Mgral ngplsxity. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987. Mendus, Susan. "Kant: An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bourgeois?" Essays on Kantls Political Philosophy. Ed. Howard Williams. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992. Mulholland, Leslie Arthur. Kant's Systsm gt Kignts. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990. Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kagt: Ths Phitgsgghy gt Right London: MacMillan and Co. 1970. Nell (O'Neill), Onora. Agttag ga Pringtgla: Ag Essay ga Kaatian Ethigs. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975. O'Hagan, Timothy. "On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy." Hagsl's gttttgga gt Kant. Ed. Stephen Preist. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. O'Neill, Onora (Nell). anstrggtigns gt Paasga: Eagtgtattgas gt Kant's Pragtigal Philgsgghy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989. 198 Paton, H. J. Thg Catggorical Imparativa: A Stggy gt Kant's Mgral Philgsgphy. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. Rawls, John. A Thsgry gt Qastigs. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971. Rawls, John. Pglitigal Liberalism. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993. Riley, Patrick. Kant's Pglitigal Philgsgphy. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983. Riley, Patrick. "On Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists." Pgltttgal Ihsgry 1 (1973): 450- 71. Riley, Patrick. Will aag Pglitiga; Lagitimagy. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982. Rosen, Allen D. Kant's Theory gt Qasticg. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993. Savage, Denis. "Kant's Rejection of Divine Revelation and His Theory of Radical Evil." Kaat's Philgsgphy gt Raligiga Raggnsigarad. Ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1991. Scanlon, T. M. "Contractualism and Utilitarianism." Utilitarianism aag,Psygag. Ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990. Sterba, James P. "From Liberty to Welfare." Ethigs 105 (1994): 64-98. Sullivan, Roger. Ag Inttggagttgn tg Kant's Ethigs. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994. Sullivan, Roger J. Immaags; EQDLL§.MQLQL Thagry. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989. Taylor, Charles. Ths Ethigs gt Attaaatigity. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991. Wike, Victoria S. Kant ga Mapptagss ta Ethtgs. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1994. Williams, Howard. Kaat's Pgltttgat Phitgsgphy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 199 General References Ameriks, Karl. Kant's Theory of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Ansbro, John J. "Kant's Limitations on Individual Freedom." Thg Naw Sghglastigism 47 (1973): 88-99. Beck, Lewis W., ed. Kant Stagias ngay. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969. Benson, Peter. "External Freedom According to Kant." Qgtgmbta Law Rgvtsw 87 (1987): 559-79. Bird, Graham. Kant's Thagry gt Knowledge. New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Cassier, Ernst. Iha ngstign gt Qean-Jaggggs Kggssaag. Trans. Peter Gay. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1963. Fletcher, George P. "Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective." Qgtgmgta Law Review 87 (1987): 533-58. Gregor, Mary. "Kant's Theory of Property." Reviaw gt Matagaystgs 41 (1988): 757-87. Guyer, Paul. Its gamgttgga ggmganign tg Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Guyer, Paul. Kaat,agg ths Exparianca gt Frssggm. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993. Hill, Thomas E., Jr. Agtgngmy aag galf-Raspagt. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991. Howard, Dick. "Kant's Political Theory: The Virtue of His Vices." Kavisw gt_Mstagtystgs 34 (1980): 325-50. Howard, Dick. Ihs Pglittgs gt Critigua. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988. Kemp, John. Iha Philgsgghy gt Kant. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. Ludwig, Bernd. "'The Right of a State' in Immanuel Kant's MD 1" ofEioht." 119.1%leth Histomot Philgsgphy 28 (1990): 403-15. 200 Rosen, Allen D. Kant's Theory gt Justice. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993. Ryan, Alan. Prgparty ang Political Thsgry. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Walsh, W. H. Kant's gritigism gt Mataghysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1975. Wike, Victoria S. Kant's Antingmiss gt Reason. Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of American, 1982.