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Wllll‘i“WWII 31293 01400 8993 This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Agricultural and rural development policies in Ethiopia: 3 case study of villagization policy among the Guji-Oromo of Jam Jam Awaraja. presented by Taddesse Berisso has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Doctoral degreein AnthropoLogy < i Majo'r professor Dateéaégil 8;. ’7‘? 5“ MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 . .——.. — ‘——-—_ H- LIBRARY Michigan State Universlty PLACE III RETURN BOX to moon thin checkout ftom your mood. TO AVOID FINES Mum on or baton duo duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE i ii I I MSU Io An Affirmative ActionIEtpol Oppottmlty Intuition mm: AGRI CULTL' STUDY OF MASK * AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ETHIOPIA: A CASE STUDY OF VILLAGIZATION POLICY AMONG THE GUJI-OROMO OF JAM JAM AWR JA BY Taddesse Berisso A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Anthropology 1995 AGRICULTL STUDY OF AWMA This tVO succe SYStems, PrivatelI it was Co focused ““th :' ‘eqime 0 thtcmgh ABSTRACT AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ETHIOPIA: A CASE STUDY OF VILLAGIZATION POLICY AMONG THE GUJI-OROMO OF JAM JAM AWRAJA BY Taddesse Berisso This is a study of agricultural policies in Ethiopia under two successive regimes with different economic and political systems. Under Emperor Haile Selasie's regime, land was privately held except in the northern part of the country'where it was communally owned. Haile Selasie‘s agricultural policies focused on raising production through commercial farms and through integrated or minimum package programs. The subsequent regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam promoted socialist agriculture through collectivization (i.e. through cooperatives, state farms, resettlement and villagization). An overview of each major policy is provided; but the study's main emphasis is the villagization policy of Mengistu's government. Through a field study of villagization among the Guji-Oromo of Jam Jam awraja, this dissertation will present an example of how and why agricultural policies were formulated and implemented, and their effects on the rural population. Findings from the case study are used to challenge Scudder and Colson's currently prevailing "relocation theory" which argues resettlei of the: zesettle. This dis: “111 be Projects circumsti Occupatjq The in govern land term the lack east.“ ‘ the “We: landwhit fecu5ed tantra“: C°nt101 ‘ result. 1 both reg Taddesse Berissoh argues that rural communities undergoing compulsory resettlement respond in the same general fashion irrespective of their sociocultural background and of policy of the resettlement authorities (e.g. Scudder andICOIson, 1979; 1982). This.dissertation.will dispute this theory, arguing that people will be affected differently by involuntary resettlement projects and will accordingly respond to their new circumstances dependent upon factors such as age, sex, occupation, and the type of resettlement itself. The study identifies three critical policy problem areas in government efforts to transform Ethiopia's agriculture: the land tenure system, lowtresource allocation to agriculture, and the lack of local participation. Both regimes failed to address these problems due to the nature of the state. Under the imperial regime, the state represented the interests of the landowning class and foreign capital. Mengistu's government focused on developing socialist economy guided by a highly centralized planning process. Socialist ideology and political control were more important than economic development. As the result, the agricultural and rural development policies under both regimes failed to transform agriculture. Copyright by TADDESSE BERISSO 1995 To the memory of my father Obbo Berisso Galchu (who passed away while I was in graduate study abroad) and to my mother aaddee Bunjo Bune. Hat. completil thank tr. elders {I Westionfll I a (ML) 09% throughmj That all lute} field we laterials recall Hi the then Ht. Endal Here and The "innant' €125.er s a 9: 0W1, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many* individuals and institutions contributed to 'the completion of this dissertation. First and foremost I wish to thank the Guji people, their peasant association leaders and elders for their hospitality, their patience in answering my questions and their keen interest in my study. I acknowledge with gratitude the diligent work of 922g, (Hr.) Desta Barisso Gillo, who worked as my research assistant throughout the field work time. Thanks are due to the Ethiopian government officials at all levels for their invaluable assistance in facilitating my field work and for furnishing important information and materials upon which this dissertation was based. I especially recall with thanks the assistance given to me by Mr. Dhugo Bire the then awrafia administrator of Bule Uraga, Mr. Shimeket and Mr. Endalkachew, then vice administrator and administrator of Bore and wadara-Adola awrajas, respectively. The members of my doctoral committee-- Professors John Hinnant, William Derman, Robert McKinley, and Larry Robbins deserve special thanks for the expert guidance given to me. I owe a great deal of professional wisdom and intellectual stimulation to them, but the shortcomings are, of course, my own. vi I and the through: all. 1 Ethiopia the opp: 'Y grad DEpartme assistan Years. The Rockefel "001d 11) f°r its . !.as- appre¢1a c°mmenti disserta ta \0 I would like to thank my friends and family in Ethiopia and the USA for their continuous support and encouragement throughout my study. I extend my sincere appreciation to them all. I also extend my special thanks to the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) of Addis Ababa University for giving me the opportunity to come to Michigan State University to pursue my graduate studies. My’ sincere thanks to Anthropology Department of Michigan State University for providing teaching assistantships which sustained me financially through my study years. The field work was made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation African Dissertation Internship. I would like to express mynsincere appreciation to the Foundation for its generous assistance. Last, but not least, I like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to Ezekiel Gebissa and Dr. Hamdesa Tuso for commenting on and editing the original draft of this dissertation. I would like to say to them galatomma, fayyaa taa. vii CHAPTER 1.11.11. CHAPTER 23456J 1 o n o 1222222 CHAPTER 12 33 List List CHAPTER I F‘HOJFIH O O O O O anaconaH I . O 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page of Tables ..................... ......... ....... ...xi of Figures ........................... ...... ..... xii INTRODUCTION ................................. ...1 Background to the Study...........................l Study Objectives..................................7 Explanations for Ethiopia's Agricultural Crisis...8 Agricultural Policy: A Conceptual Framework.....l4 Organization of the Dissertation.................19 CHAPTER II FIELD WORK AND DESCRIPTIVE BACKGROUND NNNNMNN O O O O O O O QO‘U‘LUNH O O O O I O 0 OF JAN am AWRMA ...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO... ...... 22 Introduction.....................................22 Field work.......................................22 Jam Jam: the Land and the People.................34 Socio-political and Economic Organization........4l Menelik's Conquest and its Results...............49 Results of Italian Occupation.... ...... ..........53 Guji since the 1974 Revolution ....... . ........ ...54 CHAPTER III AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. IN PRE-AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA........60 Introduction........................... ......... .60 Agricultural Policy under Haile Selasie..........60 3.2.1 Land Tenure System........................62 3.2.2 Low Investment Priority ..................70 3.2.3 Development Projects......................7l Agricultural Policy under Mengistu‘s Government..79 3.3.1. Land Reform and Peasant Associations......79 3.3.2. Cooperatives..............................82 3.3.3. State Farms...............................86 3.3.4. Marketing and Tax Policy..................88 3.3.5. Resettlement..............................90 viii 891 000 4“. 12 SS 3.4. Page 3.3.6. VillagizationOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0.0....95 conc1u81°n°.....................................112 CHAPTER IV IMPLEMENTATION OF VILLAGIZATION IN JAM JAM AWA91§..............................................116 4.1. ‘02. 4.3. 4.8. 4.9. 4.10. CHAPTER V 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. IntIOduction..........O...O...O....O...O..O.....116 Villagization...................................117 4.2.1 Concept and Historical Background........ll7 4.2.2. Relocation: Theory and Practice..........120 Implementation in Jam Jam......................127 4.3.1 Furfusa Maro: Situation Before Villagization............................l27 4.3.2 Preparation for Villagization.............131 3.2.1 Formation of VCCs..................131 Informing Farmers..................l33 Selection of PAs to be Villagized..136 Survey.............................138 Agitation..........................139 Site Selection.....................140 Designing and Demarcating Village Layout and Garden Plots ...........143 .2.8 Organization of Labor and Construction Materials.............l46 Farmer's Participation .........................151 Pace of Villagization and Achievements..........152 Implementation Problems.........................153 Life in the New Villages........................157 4.7.1 Houses and Related Facilities............157 4.7.2 Economy..................................162 4.7.3 Social Services..........................163 4.7.4 Social and Cultural Life ................164 Prospects.......................................166 The Fall of Mengistu and Villagization..........167 Conclusion.....................................168 . . . . . . 40101wa IMPACTS OF VILLAGIZATION IN JAM JAM AWRAJA.....171 Introduction....................................l7l Impacts of Villagization on Economy.............l73 5.2.1. Impacts on Crop Production...............l73 5.2.2. Impacts on Animal Husbandry..............l78 Socio-cultural and Political Impacts of Villagization............................181 5.3.1. Provision of Basic Social and InfrastructuralServices..................181 ix 5.4 5.5 CHAPTER APPENDIC Bibling. Page 5.3.2. Social and Cultural Impacts..............186 5.3.3. Political Dimension of Villagization.....195 5.4. Impacts of Villagization on Environment and Health......................................204 5.5. Conclusion.......................... ..... .......207 CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........ ................213 APPENDICESOOOOO0.0.0.0....OOOOOOOOOOOCOOOO...0.0.00.000000230 Appendix 1 Interview Schedule.......... ........ 230 Appendix 2 Guji Gada Grades....................240 Appendix 3 Organizational Charts of the A National, Regional, awraja, woreda, and PA VCCs................24l Appendix 4 NVCC :Tasks and Responsibilities....244 Bibliography..............................................245 Tat Tat Tat Tab Tat Tat Tab Tab: Tab: Tab: Table Table Table Table Table Table 4.5 4.6 5.1 LIST OF TABLES Page Basic Information about the Study Awrajas......................28 List of the Intensive Case Study and Survey Villages..............29 Distribution of Absentee Ownership.....66 Central Government Current Expenditure 1970-85 (in percentage)....7l Share of Cultivated Land by User (1984/84-1993/4 (by percent)......85 Villages Established Before the National Villagization Program........101 Pace of Villagization in Ethiopia.....110 Villagized People by Region...........111 VCCs and Sub-Committees formed in Jam Jam............................l32 PAs Selected in Jam Jam to be Villagized between January 15 to June 30, 1986.........................l37 A 5 years Plan to Villagize all PAs in Jam Jam.................... Organization of Labor into Brigades, Groups and Teams...........148 Number of People Participated in Building a Village.................148 Schedule of Activities and Time Involved in Building Villages........152 Infrastructual Facilities to be Provided to Villagers during the fiscal year July, 1986- June 1987.....183 Social Services Provided to the Study Villages....................185 ....137 xi LIST OF FIGURES Page Administrative Regions of Ethiopia........ ....... 25 Awrajas of Ethiopia........... ...... .............26 The Guji LandOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.0.0...0.0.0.0...35 The Current Administrative Map of Ethiopia.. ..... 38 Traditional Guji Social Organization.............44 Organizational Chart of National Villagization Coordinating Committee.........................241 Organizational Chart of Regional Villagization Coordinating Committee.........................241 Organization Chart for Awraia and wereda Villagization Construction Coordinating com1ttee8.0000COOOOOOOOOOOC00.00.00.0000000000242 Organization Chart for PA Villagization Construction Coordinating Committees...........242 xii AEPA AMC AVCC CSO CADU CPP EPID FFYP MPP MOA NVCC OLF ONCCP PA PCs REWA REYA SFYP SCs SIDA TYPP TFYR USAID USDA UDA VCC WVCC WPE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS All Ethiopian Peasant Association Agricultural Marketing Corporation Awraja Villagization Coordinating Committee Central Statistical Office Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit Comprehensive Package Program Extension and Project Implementation Department First Five Year Plan Minimum Package Program Ministry of Agriculture National Villagization Coordinating Committee Oromo Liberation Front Office of the National Commission for Central planning Peasant Association Producers' Cooperatives Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association Second Five Year Plan Service Cooperatives Swedish International Development Authority Ten Year Perspective Plan Third Five Year Plan United States Agency of International Development United States Department of Agriculture Urban Dwellers' Association Villagization Coordinating Committee Woreda Villagization Coordinating Committee Workers Part of Ethiopia xiii capitaII: Particui Vital s: Colossa; Ofsuch the 11v I SDuthern It Prov: accounts “ten,“ agr°‘Dro experts (CfoeQ a ahd abOv rapidly g 198537). Pre‘ solutIon has beefi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. Background to the Study Ethiopia over the last 50 years has experimented in both capitalist and socialist strategies of economic growth, particularly in agriculture. Most objective economic and other vital statistical indicators reveal that both experiments were colossal failures. This dissertation will assess the impacts of such policy failures (villagization policy'in particular) on the lives of the Guji-Oromo of Jam Jam agraja (province), southern Ethiopia. Agriculture is the prime mover of development in Ethiopia. It provides employment for 85 percent of the labor force. It accounts for nearly 50 percent of the GDP and supplies raw materials to the industrial establishments, many of which are agro-processing in nature (ONCCP, 1984:37). Agricultural exports constitute 90 percent of Ethiopia's foreign exchange (coffee alone accounts for about 60‘ of total export earnings), and above all agriculture provides food for the large and rapidly growing population (ONCCP, 1984 :11; Griffin and Ray, 1985:37). Previously, industrialization had been perceived as the solution to rural poverty; but, over the past two decades there has been an increasing recognition that the economic l transforma'l development development taiwan, an productive question 0: Ethiopia 51' Country d9; 0“ broad-b4 inmovement Ethiopian p standard of Ethio; son,” She atotal a: cultivation Generally agric“lture 2 transformation of low-income countries depends on the development of the agricultural sector and on broad-based rural development (Colburn, 1982:437-38). Countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have demonstrated the value of a productive rural sector for a dynamic national economy. The question of transforming agriculture is, thus, crucial for Ethiopia since the economic, social, and political life of the country depends on development of the agricultural sector and on broad-based rural development. It is only when a visible improvement is made in the agricultural sector that the Ethiopian people as a whole can ever hope to attain a better standard of living. Ethiopia is a country with rich agrarian potential. Land surveys show that 78.9 million hectares (64.7 percent) out of a total area of 122 million hectares are suitable for cultivation and pasture (ONCCP, 1984:15). The country has generally fertile soils, sufficient rainfall and water resources, and a wide variety of climates and elevations, although some regions are drought-prone. Yet Ethiopia's agriculture was unable to produce enough food to keep up with the nation's increasing demands. There have been at least four major famines in the last four decades. Haile Selasie's government (1930-1974) had applied an agricultural development policy that sought to introduce large- scale commercial farms and comprehensive or minimum package programs based on modern technology, especially after World War II. this ' ot attatni developmen years of characterl: (Ioderniza' investment Desoite in living of In "let i c POVerty' ta HM fall on the 1m“? Of t for female: 19h Infant Eternal de. the least phmcian D 3 II. This ”Green Revolution” approach was envisioned as a means of attaining rapid agricultural modernization and economic development. The major development trend of the last 25-30 years of the pre-1974 socialist revolution period was characterized by privatization of land and capitalization (modernization) of agriculture with increasing foreign investment and public participation (Makonen, 1987:1-2). Despite initiating growth- oriented changes, the "Green Revolution" approach was not success in raising the standard of living of most Ethiopian peasant farmers. Rather it resulted in eviction of peasant farmers, increasing unemployment, poverty, famine, and social unrest that helped precipitate the down fall of the imperial regime in 1974. On the eve of the 1974 revolution the over-all standard of living of the population, by any indicator, was astonishingly low. Life expectancy was low, 37.5 years for males and 40.6 for females. This low life expectancy was accompanied by a high infant mortality'rate (178 per 1000 live birth) and a high maternal death rate (20 per 1000 births). Ethiopia had one of the least favorable ratios of doctors to population (one physician per 75,320 people) and the lowest rate of calory consumption per capita (1754) of any country on the earth (Griffin, 1992:1). Only 15 per cent of the population had access to medical facilities (ONCCP, 1984:11). About 85 percent of the population lived in rural areas, yet 90 percent of the rural people lived in shelters that offered it 1992:1). | my sate‘ Nearly 58 than 30 kl. third of NH cent lore 1 schools an country as to safe "a: “Sistance Consumption (Griffin, 1 labor, SUpp pmductlvtt Thg P “namely Pt Income Der y 59 found an) HQnQISt [comlttul unde”Yin? 8913512.: 3': ownership al “warble 4 offered minimal protection against the weather (Griffin, 1992:1). Housing was shared with domestic animals and posed many safety and health hazards, especially for children. Nearly 58 per cent of the total area of the country was more than 30 kilometers away from any type of road. More than two- third of the population must walk more than one day and 40 per cent more than three days to reach public facilities such as schools and health institutions (Mulatu, 1982:30). In the country as a whole, only'6 percent of the population had access to safe water and most people had to work and live without the assistance of mechanical or electrical power (energy consumption per capita was only about 20 kg of coal equivalent) (Griffin, 1992:1). The economy had to rely largely on human labor, supplemented by animal draft power, and consequently the productivity of labor was very low. The population as a whole was both illiterate and extremely poor. Prior to the revolution of 1974, about 93 per cent of the total population was illiterate (ONCCP, 1984:11). Income per head, at roughly US 8120, was about as low as could be found any where (World Bank, 1985). Mengistu's military government (also known as the 93:3 [committee], 1974-1991) was categorical in attributing the underlying cause of Ethiopia's underdevelopment to Haile Selasie's agricultural policies. It argued that private land ownership and the resultant structural distortions were responsible for the persistent degradation and impoverishment ot Ithiop 5 of Ethiopian society. It thus maintained that meaningful social change would necessarily require the abolition of that retrograde structure by means of changing the agrarian social relations (Makonen, l987:2). Socialist.philosophy'was believed as the only route to attain this goal and following the overthrow of Haile Selasie's regime, it was adopted as the guiding principle of policy formulation and implementation. Various radical measures were taken as part of the strategy for transforming the rural socio-economic structure. The most significant step in this direction was the nationalization and distribution of rural land to peasant farmers. Concomitantly the military government established and consolidated peasant associations (PAs), service cooperatives (SCs), collective farms (producers' cooperatives (PCs!) and agricultural marketing and pricing policy at a national level. In addition, programs such as the formation of state farms and resettlement schemes were undertaken. Finally, the government moved to reconstitute scattered peasant residences into new nucleated hamlets under the Villagization program. In general, sincerthe revolution of 1974, Mengistu's government embarked on a consistent policy’ of ”socialist transformation of agriculture" modeled after East European countries. The military government succeeded in eliminating the mmnarchy, the landlord class, and in initiating a number of structural changes in the economy, polity and society. It abolished the oppressive and exploitative feudal system trreversi unthinkat‘. claimed it. wealth, in In additi c campaigns result, 51 GIOpped fr 1984:11). per cent t. covered by 43 per Cent also Iade E “Exp not {Ur} 1974. I 6 irreversibly and a return to the pre-1974 situation seemed unthinkable. It redistributed land to peasant farmers with the claimed intention of bringing about a major redistribution of wealth, income and social power in the Ethiopian countryside. In addition, the government initiated a series of mass literacy campaigns in an attempt to develop human resources. As a result, since 1979 the rate of illiteracy is claimed to have dropped from 93 per cent to 37 per cent by 1984 (ONCCP, 1984:11) . The primary school enrollment rate increased from 19 per cent to 48 per cent and the proportion of the population covered by basic health services also rose from 15 per cent to 43 per cent over the same period. A supply of clean water was also made accessible to about 10 per cent of the population (ONCCP, 1984:11). However, economic conditions under the military government were not fundamentally different in most respects from those of 1974. The agricultural growth record was disappointing to say the least. In fact, there are some indications that agricultural productivity and output have actually declined. The annual growth rate of total agricultural production dropped from 2.1 per cent between 1965 and 1973 to 0.6 per cent between 1973 and 1980 to minus 2.1 per cent between 1980 and 1987 (World Bank, 1989:222). It is thus difficult to argue, following the end of the military rule in May 1991, that the Ethiopian revolution has been a change for the better for most Ethiopians, while the 1970s and 19803, were decades of a series of famine alone, a r foreign as (iohannis, evidence 3 1.2. The i agricultur: the Haile the Study 1- Tc- Pollc4 in or; Throud Oromo of how inplen popula 7 of famines in some parts of the country. Between 1984-86 alone, a million Ethiopians starved to death, and only massive foreign assistance prevented theideath of.another eight million (Yohannis, 1993:83; Colburn, 1991:570). This was a clear evidence that the country had failed to feed itself. 1.2. Study Objectives The general objective of this study is to examine the agricultural and rural development policies of Ethiopia under the Haile Selasie and Mengistu regimes. More specifically, the study has the following objectives: 1. To present the agricultural and rural development policies of Raile Selasie's and Mengistu's governments in order to evaluate their effects on rural societies. Through the case study of villagization among the Guji Oromo of Jam Jam awraja, this study provides an example of how and why agricultural policies were formulated and implemented, and evaluates their effects on rural population. 2. To investigate why the agricultural policies of Haile Selasie and Mengistu Haile Mariam's governments were not successful in transforming agriculture and in raising the standard of living of the rural population. 3. To suggest what could be done to improve the situation in order to meet the basic needs of rural Ethiopians. HY policies the latter field stuJ in Jan Jar should be aillicultur Itisnyh developnen 1.3.1 8 My intention is to evaluate Ethiopia's agricultural policies in general and villagization policy in particular. The latter intention would be accomplished in part based on a field study of one intensive case study and 32 survey villages in Jam Jam awraj . The knowledge generated in this research should be of interest to policy and decision-makers planning agricultural and rural development and to future researchers. It is my hope that the findings from this study could initiate debate on future approaches to rural and agricultural development in Ethiopia. 1.3. Explanations for Ethiopia's Agrarian Crisis A large number of internal and external factors are believed to have contributed to Ethiopia's agrarian crisis, and thus various explanations have been offered. In this section I will briefly review successively the explanations ascribing Ethiopia's agricultural crisis to multiple factors. These include the scarcity of factors of production, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, wars, operation of the world economic system, and government policies that have militated against agricultural development. There are those who relate Ethiopia's agricultural crisis to the scarcity of factors of production (see for example, ONCCP,1984: 46-48). Among the many identified scarce factors of production are capital, technology, and skill. Obviously, many factors of production are limited in Ethiopia, as in other itrican c rudimenta‘ agricuitu conparisc. ranked th carcass t extension Particular capital we Protection PIOper p01 amen“ cc ”“1 Ethic; “Proved 1 There il’istance H Caught In 9 African countries. Farming methods have essentially remained rudimentary. Peasant farmers continue to use archaic agricultural methods and antiquated farm implements. In comparison with eight other East African countries, Ethiopia ranked the lowest in grain yields, fertilizer use per hectare, carcass weight of slaughtered animals, availability of extension workers, and the level of agricultural investment, particularly in the public sector (Brietzke, 1976:638). Capital was, and still is, scarce. Peasant farmers have little protection against pests and natural calamities. But, with proper policies these factors could be changed and thus their absence could not explain the crises fully. The question of why Ethiopia, despite its adequate natural resources, has not improved its capital, technology and skill needs exploration. There aretothers, especially'government officials (see for instance Mengistu 1988; RRC, 1985), who argue that Ethiopia is caught in a serious environmental crisis, a Malthusian trap, and internal and external wars from which it had difficulty extricating itself. According to this argument, Ethiopia has been. devastated by‘ serious eco-disasters which reduced a technologically backward people to helpless victims of starvation. The proximate cause of the agrarian crisis, according to this view, is either dangerously' precarious environmental conditions or an imbalance between an agricultural economy and its environment. It is true that the mountainous topography of the country in which traditional agricultu technolog pressure highlands degradati Acco Constitut total are land 6 hi and 13.0 in than 50 ailicuitm 1988), I; rate Ethic “11d. demand f0: pf growth The l tuture “j emotions “Gt a rem, of land ‘- Petcent CORSQIVat 9 daily be Est mated 10 agriculture has been practiced for centuries, the ox-plow technology of Ethiopian agriculture as well as population pressure have turned the highlands, especially the northern highlands, into areas with the worst features of soil degradation (Mulugetta, 1992:145). According to Mulugetta, the highlands as a whole constitute 53.6 million hectares or roughly 44 percent of the total area of the country. Of the 53.6 million hectares of land 6 million are highly degraded, 8.5 million are degraded and 13.0 million are moderately'degraded. This means that more than 50 percent of the highland area is unsuitable for agricultural production (Mulugetta, 1992:146; also see Assefa, 1988). In addition to this, at an annual 3 per cent growth rate Ethiopia's population is one of the fastest growing in the world. Population increase obviously has an impact on the demand for food and calls for a commensurate and sustained rate of growth of food production. The statistical indicators reviewed above promise a bleak future with little hope for recovery. Nevertheless, the enormous natural resources that Ethiopia possesses, recovery'is not a remote possibilityu At present only 9.5 million hectares of land are under crop production which is roughly about 8 percent of the land area (Mulugetta, 1992:148). By conservative estimates, the land area under cultivation can easily be doubled since reliable estimates indicate that an estimated 19 million hectares can be classified as suitable for can not overpopul is only 3 regard t ll crop production (Mulugetta, 1992:148). This potential offers scope for revitalizing the agricultural system. With.regard.to population pressure, the fact that Ethiopia can :not feed itself does not prove that the’ country is overpopulated. The average population density of the country is only 35 per sq. km.(cso, 1984). There is no reason, with regard to population pressure, why China with average population density of 100 per sq. km. and India with 225 per sq. km. are self sufficient in terms of food while Ethiopia is not. Thus, the eco-disaster and Halthusian explanations cannot explain Ethiopia's agrarian crises fully. It is also evident that the chronic internal conflicts and border wars with Somalia that have plagued the country contributed directly to the stagnation of the country's agriculture (see Eshetu, 1988b for an assessment of wars on the economy). In the late 1980s, more than 65 per cent of the national budget was devoted to military expenditure, depriving the rural areas of essential investment resources without which it is not possible to talk about a sustained growth of agricultural sector (Mulugetta, 1992:144). Ethiopia has also accumulated an enormous debt burden (mostly from the purchase of military hardware) which diminished the prospects of economic recovery because debt servicing is an enormous drain to dwindling foreign exchange resources. According to the World Bank report, debt servicing which claimed 1.2 per cent of the GDP or 11 per cent of export in 1970 had increased to 3.2 per cent (World Ba members 3 economic destructi country's 35 i prlncI reveal the agricultuzl W the 24' internal J “mug?! mi other: adVerse fe Pint“, 19 9 upon of continm2 t {lament C111 deteriorat1 on inputted internatlon 12 per cent of GDP or 26 per cent of export earnings in 1986 (World Bank, 1988b:252). Horeover, the armed forces drew their members almost exclusively from rural areas, disrupting rural economic activities. The disruption of economic activities and destruction of property by wars have, in turn, aggravated the country's overall economic ills. Yet, treating internal strife as a principal cause of Ethiopia's agricultural crisis fails to reveal the truth. There were actually very few battles in the agriculturally rich areas. Besides, one could legitimately ask why the Ethiopian government has not solved war (especially internal war) problems through political means rather than through military ones. Others have attributed Ethiopia's agricultural crisis to adverse features of the international economic system (e.g. Fantu, 1990). They argue that countries dependent on the export of primary agricultural commodities will inevitably continue to suffer low per-capita incomes, extreme balance-of- payment difficulties, foreign-exchange shortages, and acute deterioration of public and private sector services that depend on imported inputs. It is true that adverse features of the international economic system have tremendous effects on the economic development of developing countries. But, this perspective has one critical shortcoming: it does not enable us to understand extraordinary differences in economic performance, particularly among countries that have a fairly similar assortment of exportable commodities and food staples (Lofchie, by its ve it then, while 2th provide a The: governmem Dessalegny Strategiegj Iismanage: and Belg- kills the debatable institutio other fact doubt that 13 (Lofchie, 1989212). The international economic environment is, by its very nature, common to entire sets of countries. Why is it then, for example, kenya is a food self-sufficient country while Ethiopia is not? Adverse international market do not provide a full explanation. There are still others who see the crisis in terms of government policies (see for instance, Clapham, 1988 chapter 7; Dessalegn, 1994). These include inappropriate development strategies, policies that discriminate against agriculture, mismanagement of the economy by an incompetent, exploitative, and self-serving bureaucracy, and a misguided ideology that kills the peasant-farmers initiatives to produce more. It is debatable to what extent wrong economic policies and institutions have contributed to the crisis in relation to other factors reviewed here. However, there can be little doubt that in Ethiopia inappropriate agricultural policies have in most cases, significantly contributed to the crisis as will be shown latter. Each of these explanations does make substantial contribution towards understanding agrarian crisis in Ethiopia. Each could claim some correspondence to the reality of the country. However, when taken by itself each explanation is only partially correct and could be misleading if used as a guide for designing policy. The situation is normally complex and different combinations of these factors are usually at work. It can be said however that one explanation of the several 4‘ Under the. this stu {actors a With pro; causes of linlmlzed received agricultu; 1.4. 14 several causative factors stands out as the most influential. Under the Haile Selasie and Mengistu regimes, it is argued in this study, that government policies loom over all other factors as the cause of the agricultural crisis in Ethiopia. With proper government policies, in my opinion, most of the causes of agricultural crises reviewed above could fairly be minimized, if not solved. However, the policy factor has not received the attention it deserves from students of Ethiopian agriculture. 1.4. Agricultural Policy: A Conceptual Framework Anthropology, while very rich in social and cultural theories, seems to have lagged in the formulation of development theories. Anthropologists who work on agricultural and rural development policies may be forced to borrow conceptual frameworks from other sister disciplines in the social sciences. Economics and political science are the likely candidates, since "in no other field of the social sciences are politics and economics so closely intertwined as in the study of development" (Bates, 1988:1). In developing countries, agricultural transformation is now seen as essential for successful economic development. Yet, agricultural development policies .pursued by such countries in general and Sub-Saharan African states in particular have failed to address critical issues of wunderdevelopment among the masses of the rural poor. Research throuqho poncies tenets countries PIOduce , '“anful “”9 and . 15 throughout Sub-Saharan African states suggests that government policies tend to be antithetical to the interests of most farmers and constitute a major reason for low levels of food production (see for instance, World Bank [the Berg Report], 1981; USDA, 1981; Bates, 1981; De Wilde, 1984; Lofchie, 1989). Bates (1981, 1984, 1988), for example, argues that Sub Saharan African governments (and governments in most developing countries) tend to lower the prices farmers receive for produce. They tend to shelter domestic manufacturers from meaningful levels of economic competition originating both at home and abroad, thereby raising the prices farmers must pay for consumer items. While governments often subsidize the price of farm inputs, these subsidies, according to Bates, tend to be captured by the large farmers. The incomes of most farmers are thus adversely affected by the agricultural policies of these governments. Moreover, Bates argues, when governments do emphasize production, they attempt to secure higher output by building projects rather than by raising prices. And when governments do offer positive incentives for increased production, they tend to do so by lowering costs rather than by increasing gross revenues, that is, by subsidizing the prices of farm inputs rather than by raising the price of commodities. Government policies thus tend to weaken production incentives for farmers. Given this fact, one key question then arises: why do governments in developing countries persist in pursuing failed policies negative? economist a‘Jenciegs Pelicy is secure 50 ailricultuI f0: inve5«l 910mm. 1 interest 1 behavmr 1: objectm. H°Vev1 obserVed b leant to m.- Veaken pro! inc“fitted i Mghgr D! it 16 policies whose effects on agricultural production are obviously negative? There are three competing political economy approaches (models) that address the issue of government behaviors: ”governments as agents of the public interest;" "governmants as agents of private interests;" and "governments as agencies that seek to retain power.” The first approach is the one most often adopted by economists (e.g. Okun, 1975). It treats governments as agencies whose job is to maximize the social welfare. Public policy is viewed as a set of choices made by governments to secure society's best interests. Governments intervene in agricultural production and marketing in order to raise revenue for investment in industry for the sake of rapid economic growth. In poor societies, this approach holds, the public interest is best served by development, and the governments' behavior is analyzed in terms of its impact on this overriding objective. However, this approach lacks explanatory power, as observed by Bates (1984, 1988). If government objectives are meant to maximize social welfare, then policies that tend to weaken production incentives should be avoided. To secure increased food production, for example, governments could pay higher prices to farmers expending the same amount of resources as on food production projects like state farms. Under most circumstances, the former would be more efficient in securing this social objective, but more often governments tend to chose the latt securing low food incentiv prices (E agricultc industry, sr‘e'manclere “'35. the Projects aPikoach interest ! 17 the latter (Bates, 1984:155). In addition, in the name of securing social objectives governments often strive to impose low food prices. Such policy choices, however, weaken economic incentives and result in lower production and higher food prices (Bates, 1984:155). Moreover, resources extracted from agriculture have not necessarily accrued to developing industry. In Ethiopia, for example, precious resources were squandered on such unproductive schemes as the stock piling of arms, the ostentatious consumption of the ruling class, and on projects unrelated to industrial development. Thus, any approach that treats governments as agents of the public interest should be regarded as a normative enterprise rather than as an effort at explanation (Bates,l984; Schultz, 1976). The second approach maintains that agricultural policy emanates from the political competition among organized interest groups. It sees governments as arenas for competing interest groups. Often urban based interest groups use their geopolitical and organizational advantages to dictate policies that serve (protect) their interests, especially to ensure a continuous supply of cheap food (for a discussion of urban bias theory'see Lipton (1977), Bates, (1981, 1988), Lofchie, (1989). Thus, they force governments to systematically and "rationally” (i.e. in response to particular interests) pursue policies that are generally harmful to agriculture (interpreted as peasant farmers). In Ethiopia, the fact that agricultural policies were biased t! Selasie‘s Mengistu agricultr However, political policies Ialority The i to stay 1 agricultu;l ”dating Integrity 18 biased towards private interests can clearly be seen from Haile Selasie's land tenure policy (see chapter 3), and from Hengistu's consistent policy of lowering the price of agricultural products to feed urban population and the army. However, the interest-group approach too, fails to explain the political survival of governments that continue to implement policies antithetical to the interests of the African farmer majority (Bates, 1988:351). The third approach views governments as agencies that seek to stay in power indefinitely. To that end, they introduce agricultural and rural development policy measures aimed at reducing regional discontent, increasing the security' and integrity of the state, and strengthening the position of the central government (Hopkins, 1991:279). ‘Thus, when such governments reinvest resources in the agricultural sector, they do so to build support for the ruling elite. This approach underscores the features of agricultural programs that allows governments to expand and bolster their political base while undercutting the support the opposition might enjoy in rural areas (Bates, 1984). The model, according to Bates, stresses two general points: that economic inefficiency could be politically useful and that government-controlled markets and government initiated projects could be employed as instruments for political power. He writes: What appears as economic costs may often offer political benefits: non-competitive rents or inefficient projects, for example, may be politically attractive in 19 that they offer tools for building loyal organizations .... What economists may evaluate as bad policy, then,is not necessarily the result of poor training, obduracy, or other deficiencies on the part of policy’makers. Rather, policy makers may simply be solving a different problem than are economists (Bates, 1984:159). This approach explains several otherwise puzzling agricultural policies such as villagization in Ethiopia. Hy data suggest that politicians in Ethiopia chose agricultural policies not out of regard for their economic merit but out of a regard for their political utility. Thus, a ”rational choice" perspective of political economy school‘ - - which conceives agricultural policy as a solution to political problems, better explains policy choices in Ethiopia than the perspective which conceives agricultural policy'as the result of efforts to maximize social welfare. The Ethiopian government formulated and implemented agricultural policies for the purpose of state maintenance: including guaranteeing a high standard of living for interest groups such as the royal family, the landlord class, and government officials; for the benefits of urban consumers and the army; and for retaining political power indefinitely. 1.5. Organization of the Dissertation The first part of chapter two presents a description of research method and field work experience. The second part is 1. The most prominent representative of this theory in African studies is Robert Bates. general 1 the Guji- villagiza on Guji L ore-villa socio-eccl Chap policies Haile Sell Chapi deals tilt backgmun inV°1untai ilplenenta It distuss level In t mums f. been handl Chant “113912“; "mp1. e; the ruta1 firests Of Chapter. imtulitura 20 general information about Jam Jam awraja (study area) and about the Guji-Oromo who live there. In order to understand the way villagization was implemented at a local level and its effects on Guji life, it is important to describe Guji land, history, pre-villagization land-use and settlement pattern, and their socio-economic and political organizations. Chapter three presents a comparative perspective on policies and performance of the agricultural sector under the Haile Selasie and Mengistu regimes. Chapter four is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the concept of villagization and its historical background as well as with the theory and practice of involuntary resettlements. The second part deals with the implementation of the villagization program in Jam‘Jam gwraj . It discusses the ways the program was implemented at a local level in terms of government objectives. It also presents the problems faced in the implementation process and how these have been handled, and achievements. Chapter five is the analysis of the impacts of the villagization program in Jam Jam agraja. Villagization had multiple effects on the economy, social and political life of the rural population as well as on the environment. These effects of villagization on local life are discussed in this chapter. In the final chapter, a summary of Ethiopia's rural and agricultural development problems is presented along with a suggeste< situatio: 21 suggested approach about what should be done to improve the situation. PIEi 2.1 This BXperienc introduct Processes 0f Jam J knowledge sEttlemen ”gamut addition' the chan lnCOIDOIat 0: last Ce revolutiOn 2.2 CHAPTER 11 FIELD WORK AND DESCRIPTIVE BACKGROUND OF JAM JAN AWRAJA 2.1 Introduction This chapter presents a description of field work experience, methods of data collection, and a general introduction to the Guji-Oromo of Jam Jam awraja. The processes and effects of the villagization program on the Guji of Jam Jam awraja cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of Guji land, history, pre-villagization land-use and settlement patterns, and their socio-political and economic organizations. These are reviewed in this chapter. In addition, this chapter presents a description and analysis of the changes the Guji have experienced due to their incorporation into the Ethiopian empire during the second half of last century, and the consequences for them of the 1974 revolution. 2.2 Field work Before' arriving in Ethiopia, I had already’ selected villagization as a field problem. My objective was to examine the way villagization was implemented at a local level. I was particularly interested in examining its original objectives and to analyze the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the program on a rural population. Later I realized that the 22 villagiza the lam; inplenen; in a broa- a simple I Villagiza Illlions Jan aura-4 in this il- language, °19anizat "Search, 6““ in 1 f“HY and 1933s 1985 — —— — Hist 0n amenity! for “the Third, Haber land I L000 1991) . 23 villagization program cannot be understood in isolation from the larger set of agrarian and rural development policies implemented in Ethiopia. I thus decided to place the program in a broader context in which the interpretation extends beyond a simple reporting of findings in the villages. I had numerous choices of societies for my study since villagization was a nation-wide program.affecting the lives of millions of Ethiopians. But I selected the Guji-Oromo of Jam Jam gggaja for various reasons. First, I was born and grew up in this awrajg and have a good knowledge of the Guji: their language, history, pattern of settlement, socio-economic organization, and their customs. Previous to the current research, I conducted a three month long field-work among the Guji in 1982, and wrote a BA thesis on their marriage and family'and an HA.thesis on their traditional warfare (Taddesse, 1983; 1988). Second, to date no academic research on villagization has been conducted in this aggaja and only a few written sources exist on Ethiopia's villagization program in general. This dissertation contributes to Ethiopian studies and to the small but growing literature on villagization. It should also serve for future comparative studies in this region. Third, there is a relatively substantial amount of ethnographic materials on the Guji (see for instance, Haberland, 1963; Hinnant, 1972; 1977; Lonfernini, 1984; Van de Loo, 1991). These materials are important to understand Guji lite bet the revo Pin and crop a wide Opportun diverse low land, their 11‘. I have rele lost Ethil Jam 8Wthern Ethiopi a .: ““3 (K1 we % (c Shakiso, a th 8%I “pirated 0003th is t he Pilzpos 24 life before villagization and to trace what has changed due to the revolution in general and villagization in particular. Finally, the Guji have a mixed economy of animal husbandry and crop cultivation in the fertile land which stretches over a wide variety of altitudes. This case study provides an opportunity'to examine how villagization was implemented under diverse ecological settings (high land, medium altitude, and low land) and among a group that depends on a mixed economy for their livelihood. The findings from Guji area are believed to have relevance to other parts of the country since the life of most Ethiopians depend on mixed economy. Jam Jam is located in Sidamo Administrative Region, Southern Ethiopia (see the maps on page 25 and 26 for Ethiopia's Administrative Regions and Awrajas). Its capital, Adola (kibre-Hengist) is about 490 kms. from. Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa. This awrajg used to be divided into six woredas (districts) known as Bore, Uraga, Adola, Wadara, Odo Shakiso, and Aroressa before Hengistu's government dissolved the woreda structure by the new legal administration enacted in January 1989. In the new structure, Aroressa woreda was separated from Jam Jam. Bore, Bule-Uraga, wadera-Adola, and Odo-shakiso woredas were each upgraded to became awrajas. For the purpose of this research, Jam Jam refers to these four awrajas. The field work upon which the writing of thisidissertation is based was conducted in Bore, Bule-Uraga, and Wadara-Adola 25 Ethiopia é Asmara. Khartoum '\ V 4' I \fl'}fi~'\\\ Old-a TIOIAY \fi \ I .Mokole "’f: OOH :5 '_ ‘.-‘-I' o D" )f\ {"32 I ‘1 . ~ ‘- . O J h!”- ' ,' "tr '1' Gouda: C \l" ”;"-..-..-, .S‘ifi“ ‘. ' 2‘ A ' angst”: ‘19"??? 25°” 7:. Patsffl’r' ‘2 "5:: 3 "‘° OJD'OU I”, , 4... s-o '- v- A .- F -u‘), “o b R \/‘\\ "~"“4‘*’-’3‘7~:-‘"é “ £53,3-... *,e£:;-.;;.5{§§.:tg;ssr #3479”. ..~.. c’"~*..'n.:...:3-r.~ C O J A I \Y/ . D O l l. — 1:2&$:31::’513;‘2§352fi?{" ’30. ...g a, ) Dottouuko J... Jgf‘:{rw4 ' a . La ‘ , / OI" Dawn wuuA {Aur- Ahab-’1 0. Hot-nee. £1 "".' vav‘ ) SWIVA// \ an: (J 7 { ungr- /..\ o 1 nausea! V “union/J... , J an: d \ -\ /‘ dun {'V\ '90- I "' Arb‘ ‘ \ I all. .? 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Odo-Shakiso was excluded because only a few villages were built there and even those built were, in most cases, abandoned by farmers before I was in the field. Some basic information regarding the study awrajas are given in table 2.1. In general, one intensive case study and 32 survey villages were selected for investigation from a total of 144 PAs Villagized in the three awrajas. 13 of these villages were from Bore aflaja, 15 from Bule-Uraga, while 5 were from Wadara- Adola awrgja’ (see table 2.2 for the list of the selected villages, their population, and the kind of altitude they are located in). An exclusive concentration on a single intensive case study village was deliberately avoided. This is because: (1) concentration on a single village will not allow us to know (or estimate) the number of social services the government has provided to the awraja's population. The provision of social services to rural population had been one of the major objectives of the villagization program. (2) The effects of villagization usually vary from village to village and from farm to farm. Thus concentration on a single village would not allow us to know how the program was implemented in different ecological zones (usually under different leadership) and how the’people in different villages were affected by the program, and (3) It will not allow broad and varied opinions about the program. Thus, the selection of as many survey villages as could be handled during the fieldwork was a conscious decision. table 2. Io Awra 28 Table 2.1 Basic Information about the Study Awrajag No Awrajas Area in popul- No. Ho.of No. No. of sq.km ation of PAs of villgs. PAs villg villgs. studied 1 Bore 1189.19 71,692 65 39 70 13 2 Bule- 2036.91 203,681 132 97 158 ? 5 Uraga 3 Wadera- 2977.41 84,458 56 8 l2 7 5 Adola Total 6203.51 358,831 253 144 240 33 Source: Compiled by the author from various sources To make the study representative, the survey villages were selected by stratified random sampling method. Awr a officials supplied me with the list of PAs and villages in their respective areas. With the help of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, awraja representatives and PA leaders the Villagized PAs were divided into three categories on the basis of the availability/absence of social services such as schools, clinics, potable water. . . etc; ecological zone (high land, medium altitude and low land); and distance from ‘the nearby towns. .After grouping the Villagized PAs into these categories, random sampling was used to select the desired number of villages for investigation. Twenty knowledgeable individuals from the intensive case study village and seven from each survey village were selected and interviewed. These constitute a total of 244 interviews. Table 2. to: "£1 —-— H O Box I ...- Bor 29 Table 2.2 List of the Intensive Case Study and Survey Villages. Intensive Case Study Village Name of Name of Population Type of Awrajas villages M P zone 1. Bore Purfusa Maro 203 208 highland Survey Villages l Bore 1. Gossa Wotiye 608 594 highland 2. Alayu Dhibba 374 417 highland 3. Sutta Dhibba 321 304 highland 4. Anno Qeransa 547 515 highland 5. Qale Kuku 250 402 highland 6. Dale Salato 556 527 highland 7. Borotu Chichu 568 527 medium altitude 8. 801010 Qobo 578 543 medium altitude 9. Yirba Buliyo 460 425 highland 10. Ajerssa Kalacha 415 445 highland ll. Kara Qulubi 241 235 highland 12. Hiyo Komole 326 290 medium altitude 2 Bule- 1. Layo Taraga 709 801 medium altitude Uraga 2. Songole kalato 504 499 highland 3. Songole Hora 484 518 highland 4. Dida Hora Burga 765 683 medium altitude 5. Tebe Solamo 580 558 highland 6. Tebe Haro Wato 871 1016 highland 7. Gadiyo Curatu 593 624 highland 8. Burssa Dhokatta 822 870 highland 9. Afale Kola 717 737 highland 10. Ballo Hangu 519 556 highland ll. Elalicha Dansuma 799 689 highland 12. Guticha 292 330 highland l3. Lubo Dama 471 510 highland l4. Kochore 1014 966 highland 15. Andegna 0kolu 643 648 highland 3 Wadara- 1. Dole 1000 888 medium altitude Adola 2. Darartu 1391 1510 medium altitude 3. Gobicha 534 524 medium altitude 4. Koba Sorssa 567 594 medium altitude 5. Antarara 1404 1383 medium altitude Source: Population Figures from (CSO) 1989, W". 90-92 and 97. Va study. Bthiopi intervie villager test, th the lace. then used selected SChedulei OtheJ I lived 1 to-day ac “Dderstan t“ Vin. distancE' 30 various methods of data collection were involved in this study. A review of literature was made both in the US and in Ethiopia to write a proposal and an interview schedule. The interview schedule was designed and pre-tested among the villagers. Based on the responses obtained during the pre- test, the interview schedule was revised and translated into the local language, Oromo. ‘The final draft of the schedule was then used for conducting interviews among the informants in the selected study villages (see Appendix 1 for the interview schedule). Other research methods include participant observation. I lived in close contact with the Guji and observed their day- to-day activities, their interactions at various settings to understand their culture, and their views and attitudes about the villagization program. flapping and measurement of distance, time, and areas were also undertaken in the selected villages. Besides this, a house to house census was conducted in the intensive case study village (see chapter 4 for the results). As a "native anthropologist"-- one who studies his own culture, I had some advantages over foreign anthropologists. IFor instance, I suffered little or no culture shock. I gained acceptance and trust relatively easily and did not have to study a new language. I was both participant and observer, often emotionally and intellectually involved in the subject I ‘was studying. In the latter case there was a danger of having gch biase anthropolog‘ detacheent a be as object! the Guji as field work replicabllit In the the “Veg 0 peasant {all invitation; intlnded to: discussions neighboring question“. can. and tol‘ fro. Prob}. 31 gm biases (my own prejudices as a native). But, my anthropological training provided me with a certain degree of detachment and objectivity that most natives lack. I tried to be as objective in describing and analyzing villagization among the Guji as I am analyzing it in other communities. During the field work and when writing, I was careful to ensure the replicability of my findings. In the field, I was given open access to villages and to the lives of villagers. After visiting and interviewing peasant farmers in a few villages, I soon was overwhelmed by invitations from the inhabitants of villages that were not included for the study. When I sometimes arranged group discussions in the selected villages, people from the excluded neighboring villages did come and participate in answering my questions‘. At other times individuals from different areas came and told me about their views regarding the program. Host villagers considered me as a man who was there to liberate them from problems inflicted upon them by the unpopular villagization program, although I repeatedly told them that my work was purely academic. Some people came to me with lists of livestock and property they lost during the implementation of the program. Others came with stories about how their houses were pulled down or burned to the ground, or how they were punished (both financially and physically) for not dismantling 1. Group interviews were used to cross-check individuals responses and to obtain some general information. because of any other t Earlie; a sensitive ‘01 Opposin 32 their houses and moving to new villages within a given time. Still others came to tell me how their life was disrupted because of villagization and how it was worsened more than at any other time in their recent history. Earlier, and even during my fieldwork, villagization was a sensitive issue. Individuals could be imprisoned or fined for opposing or speaking against the program, or for refusing to join‘villagese Farmers in the study area, however, were not afraid of telling me about the damages the unpopular program has done to them. They were so bitter about the program that they did not even care about being imprisoned or punished. I met several people who were emotionally washed by tears when talking about the program. In addition to the data collected by interview methods, discussions, and participant observation in villages, I carried out in-depth formal and informal discussions with administrative officials, PA leaders, authorities in the .Hinistry of Agriculture, and the secretariats of villagization coordinating committees at various levels. I have also tried to obtain written information such as reports and publications concerning the program. Literature on villagization is rare in :Ethiopia since villagization was, at the time of fieldwork, only about 5 years old and the full impact of the program was not yet clear. In addition to this, the sensitive (political) nature of the program and the undeveloped research tradition of the country due to shortage of research man power and inadequate the literat- Still to :esearch Program '1 announced b Party lembe POMCIQS of c°°P¢raUVQ 129% 92 1“RI noti "“1913th 3 "113 izati WOVIncial cadres, am Who “are ‘ ”Ogram' guideline-51 33 inadequate research infrastructure did not allow the growth of the literature on the subject. Still worse, the available literature was not accessible to researchers, probably to discourage further criticism of the program. The major policy statement about villagization was announced by Mengistu Haile Mariam, at the second meeting of party members in the summer of 1985. But unlike other major policies of the government (e.g. land reform, establishment of cooperatives...) no separate proclamation was issued in the Negarit Gazetta, the official government news paper on which legal notices and proclamations are published. Instead Mengistu's statement was followed by a booklet called Villagization Guideline. This booklet was distributed to provincial and district administrators, party officials, cadres, and agricultural extension agents. Except for those who were directly involved in the implementation of the program, the booklet (and other successive guidelines/directives) were not widely circulated even in Ethiopia. I had a difficult time obtaining these and other important documents from the uncooperative staff of the villagization coordinating committee at the national level. At the local level, however, I faced no problem in obtaining the guidelines and other related documents. The Awrajg Ministry of Agriculture offices were my main sources of documents on villagization and on basic information about the study areas. My assistant and I worked in villages, observing and intern docuuents h night. 8 information livestock establ ishme 34 and interviewing villagers by day and copying selected documents obtained from MOA offices in different agggjgg, by night. Some PAs and villages also possessed important information about the size of their landholding, human and livestock population, dates and years of villages establishment, and the like. 2.3 Jam Jam: The Land and the People The Guji (also known as Jam Jam or Jam-Jamtu by some of their neighbors) are one of the many branches of the Oromo that live in Southern Ethiopia, predominantly’in‘the«central part of the Sidamo Administrative Region. They belong to the Eastern Cushitic language family and speak Oromo, one of the most widely spoken languages in Ethiopia. ‘They have a population of more than half a million people with an approximate density of thirty persons per sq. km.. The boundaries of their territory are Lake Abaya to the west and the Genale Guda River to the east. In the north the boundary is an imaginary line that unevenly stretches between the towns of Bore and Agere-Salam. In the south the boundary is slightly north of the town of Megele Borana. Outside of these boundaries, small groups of Guji live in Wondo Genet near Awassa town, in Wolayta awraja, in the Gamu Gofa Administrative Region and in Bale, across the Genale River (see the map on page 35). Regarding the map, it should be noted that some of the territorial boundaries of the Guji Gossa (phratries) and that W 35 A M A a a o ,..°'-f-';;. Haberland's map of the Guji and their neighboring groups (Elke Haberland, Galla Sud-Athigpieps, 1963). oi the qro hati phrat into and t Hard expans neighbors ( ovm Populat Accord the Points they ham 1 "lth his u M the far Setued i1 ”Mucus “Mung, was 331:) 1 this land! ““0113 G: today tra. Gitia -._ ‘ the dean! ”0k“ regi GU10, “hi father ~- This 36 of the group as a whole, are now significantly changed. The Mati phratry have made major inroads into the territory of the Hoku and the Guji as a whole continued their long-term south ward expansion due to a push from their northern and western neighbors (Sidamo and Gedeo) and due to the increase in their own population. According to Guji tradition, Adola and its environs were the points of origin of the Guji and other groups with whom they have lived. In mythic time, they say, a man named Gujo with his three sons (Urago, Mati, and Hoku) and other members of the family left Dararitu. They moved northeastward and settled in a place called Girja. There, they lived as prosperous cattle herders and barley farmers for many generations. With this long and prosperous stay at Girja it was said that they developed a strong emotional attachment to this land, an attachment which even today is expressed through various Guji songs. This seems to be the reason why most Guji today trace their origin to this land calling themselves Guji Girja -- Guji who originated in Girja. According to tradition, the descendants of Gujo later moved to the Uraga, Mati, and Moku regions which they named after the first three sons of Gujo, while their collective name remained that of the founding father-- Gujo, later to become Guji. This Guji tradition of their cradle land is in complete agreement with recent reconstruction of the origins of Oromo as a whole. Based on historical linguistics, oral traditions, and I .m—w- cultural d originated Guji, Borax Lewis, 1966 the Ora-0 1 seventeenth BthIOpia's Today, constitutim if! found ; Midpiais I “Wity in GOVanlent 0 the country Org.“ (Oren put9015 es . Gujilan- zones 0n the altitude, an! 37 cultural data, many scholars have concluded that the Oromo originated in and around the areas nowadays inhabited by the Guji, Borana, and Arsi (see Haberland, 1963; Fleming, 1964; Lewis, 1966; Asmarom, 1973; Tesema, 1986). From these areas the Oromo launched their vast expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to occupy nearly half of the present-day Ethiopia's surface. Today, the Oromo are the single largest ethnic group, constituting over 40 percent of Ethiopia's population. They are found in twelve out of thirteen (Eritrea excluded) of Ethiopia's Administrative Regions, as a majority in seven and minority in the rest (Tilahun, 1989:i). The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) now drafted a new political map of the country (see page 38). All Oromo groups are included in Oromia (oromo land/region) for political and administrative purposes. Gujiland can be divided into three distinct ecological zones on the basis of differences in altitude: lowland, medium altitude, and highland. The lowlands are found in the Rift valley, in the western part of their countryu The temperature in this areas ranges from about 20 to 31 degree centigrade, ‘while its upper boundary lies 1500 meters above the sea level. th has low average annual rainfall and suffers from periodic drought. In the lowlands the population is spread thinly over ‘vast savanna land, subsisting predominantly' on livestock herding and a minimal cultivation of maize. When the grass 38 Unofficial sketch map of the current (1992) Administrative Regions of Ethiopia ERITREA ADOIS ABA8~ l4 Ifi yw kg BA 1° ‘ Source: From Bulletins of the Election Commission (1992). vithers in as to non kinship ti land areas heavy rain ‘the in", above sea 1 of 14 to 2 land lying 1 “5t and be 0f Borana a Vegetation than in th: of “Vesta villagizat as ext",81 The t country, c haVe an 39 withers in the dry season, the option of those in the lowland was to move their herds to the middle zones where they had kinship ties. Likewise individuals from the middle and high land areas often utilize the lower elevation when there is heavy rain in their respective areas. The middle altitude, lying between 1500 and 2500 meters above sea level, has a maximum average annual temperature range of 14 to 20 degree centigrade. This area includes the vast land lying betweentKibre Mengist and Megele Borana towns in the east and between Wonago through Yirga Chafe down to the borders of Borana area in the west. This land is ever green with lush vegetation and forests. Population is denser in this region than in the lowland areas and people practice a mixed economy of livestock herding and crop cultivation including coffee. Villagization has been established in this zone, but it was not as extensive as it was in the highland areas. The highlands are located in the northern part of Guji country, covering muchnof the Mati and Uraga land. ‘These areas have an altitude of over 2500 meters above sea level. The average annual temperature rises to 14 degree centigrade. Rainfall is more frequent and there is widespread cultivation of barley. People are permanently settled and density is relatively high. Except in areas where they are bound by hostile ethnic groups, where houses were clustered together for mutual protection against raids, the Guji used to live in olla (neighborhc villagizat: single hous separated and/or graz family and however, ha head of a p °V¢l differ Prevent fig “flint are Uhllke group/“cu independant and Roe“ (a) big "u'etlca by Itsel f 11 “OYQBtU. 40 (neighborhoods) of dispersed homesteads before the villagization program. A typical neighborhood contained a single house, or a cluster of two or three round straw houses separated from each other by a cattle kraal, and by crop, and/or grazing land (Hinnant, 1977). It was quite common for family and lineage members to live next to each other. This, however, has not always been the case. In previous days the head of a polygynous family used to spread his family members over different ecological zones totdisperse his herd and /or to prevent fights among co-wives. Young men were also sent to distant areas to graze cattle, sometimes over years. Unlike some other Oromo groups that constitute a single group/section, the Guji form a confederation of three independent but closely related groups known as Uraga, Mati, and Koku (also known as gagana sadi). In fact, Uraga is very big numerically and formed a separate group called Aladu, which by itself is a confederation of two group known as Hallo and Woyestu. ‘There are also two other smaller groups--the Selo and Otu, that live deep in the Sidamo territory (see the Map above). They adopted many cultural elements from the people with whom they came in contact and therefore have slightly diverged from Guji culture. The areas now occupied by Selo and Otu mdght have been places reached by the Guji during the great Oromo expansion, from where the main group may have been pushed back to their present territory, most probably under pressure from their neighbors the tact ti Bansa, Dad territorie' during pral' Getachew (3' the Guji 1.1 The i dissertatio there Was ‘ help each rituals to them him and Settle comOn bet 41 neighbors (Sidamo and Gedeo). This view can be supported by the fact that some old shrines of the Guji such as Dama, Dara, Bansa, Dadoy and so forth, which are now in Sidamo and Gedeo territories are often included with shrines now in Guji land during prayers. Moreover, Sidamo oral tradition collected by Getachew (1970) and Hamer (1987:25) indicate the presence of the Guji in many parts of the present day Sidamo land. The Uraga, Mati, and Hoku-- the focus of this dissertation-- regard each other as blood relations. Although each group had its own territorial boundaries and g§g§_leaders, there was mutual interdependence. They act together in wars, help each other during economic crises, and conduct g;d_a_ rituals together. There are few cultural difference between them. Indeed, individuals or families from one group can move and settle in another's territory. Intermarriage is fairly common between them. 2.4 Socio-political and Economic Organizations The traditional socio-political organization of the Guji society was dominated by two cross-cutting organizations with g_a_l_1£ (supreme religious leader) at the top. The bases of their social structure are: l. moiety-clan-lineage structure and 2. the ggg§_system The Guji ggg§_system was intensively studied by Hinnant, (1977), and on the basis of this study its main structural and 42 functional features may be summarized as follows: 1. §§d§_divides the stages of life, from.childhood to old age into a series of formal steps. There are 13 such steps in the contemporary Guji case (see Appendix 2). Transition ceremonies make the passage from one stage to the next. Within each stage activities and social roles are formally defined, both in terms of what is permitted and what is forbidden. For instance, soluda herd small animals, Kussa participate in organized war practices, gagg_grade administer the country ...etc. 2. Recruitment into the gag; system is based not upon biological age as in an age set system, but upon the requirement that one remains exactly five stages (ideally forty years) below one's father. It was based on the maintenance of one socially defined generation between father and son, which prevents adjacent generation from competing for status. All of a man's sons occupy'the same grade regardless of their age. 3. The ideal length of time in one rank is eight years (see some variations from Appendix 2). 4. Gag; is a male institution. Women's participation in this institution is very much limited. Girls are said to be the daughters of their father's gag; grade and women are referred to as the wives of their husband's grade. Regarding function, the gagg_grade that assumes office once every eight years was the most important grade in the gada cycle. The were resp assistantsI of the ; reconsidegj I the countr] number of d to select mt" ass "soonsmj 5Y3ten in < There 43 cycle. The gall; and other lineage leaders at the clan level were responsible for selecting the Abba Gada and their assistants (yea). After assuming office, the major activities of the gag; grade were: to administer the country, to reconsider old Guji laws in the g_a_d_a_ assembly, to move about the country according to the prescribed calendar performing a number of different ceremonies at various sacred shrines, and to select abba dgla (war leaders). In the past, the gag system assumed military, economic, legal and arbitrational responsibilities. Currently, however, the function of g;d_a_ system in Guji has been reduced to ritual activities. There were two non-exogamous moieties known as Kogtomg and Darimu in Guji. Under these moieties there are seven non- totemic and exogamous clans in Uraga and Hoku phratries each, and three in Mati‘. Each clan is divided into a variable number of segments called mag; (house), which in turn is divided into a great number of patrilineages. For over all structure of Guji social organization see the chart on page 44. The Guji family was an extended patriarchal family before villagization. An ideal family contains a husband, several wives, and as many children as nature allows. A man, if he is the eldest son, along with his spouses and children is expected ‘. An elderly informant told me that the Mati phratry, like the Uraga and Hoku phratries, used to have seven clans and the Guji as a whole were known as ”Guji fine to;ba"-- Guji of seven house (clans). According to this informant, four of the Mati phratry were wiped out by the war with the neighboring Arsi-Oromo long time ago. to live Wl seels appr however, c With the vzl has been four. Chart "0127133 I'KONTOHA AWNH U7 ZDARHU Harriet to live with or near his parents. seems appropriate to them. however, consists of a husband, 44 Younger sons live where it The family of most ordinary men, a wife and their children. With the villagization program the structure of the Guji family has been affected (changed) as will be discussed in chapter four. Chart 2.3: Traditional Guji Social Organization "0137183 I I I 1.KONTOMA 2.DARHU Marr iage is , I ’ ’ ’ URAEA ABBA GADA I l unaca panama! i I URAGA crms I I I 1. corn 2. SARBORTU 3. MALLO 4. GALALCHA 5. AGAHITU 6. DARARTU 7. WESITU / 1. 2. 3. in most cases, CALLU ’/:\\ I I HATI ABBA GADA I I HAT! PHRATRY I I HATI CLANS I I I HIRKARTU INSALEE HANDOHA based on self \ HOKU ABBA GADA I I HOKU PHRATRY I I HOKU CLANS I I I l. GALALCHA 2. OBORRA 3. BALA'A 4. HERRA 5. BUNDHITU 6. NICHILLE 7. KINO'O selection (hawadi) or arranged by the agreement between the groom's and br ide ‘s families (kadha) . Bride wealth is paid by the groom's family to the bride's family in the form of cattle and honey in old days, and money currently. Although the number of cattle paid for African h each other blood pri are pract carriage without hi Iarriage 5 The Cl cultivatior and 9% their cattl Centered 1 cmilitated 1‘ “Portal ilpoztant 1 pm”) anon cattle that pus°“- Ri T1mm; year) anQ 45 paid for bride wealth was small in comparison to some East African herders like the Muer, family and lineage members help each other in the payment as they do in the case of homicide or blood price. There are also two other types of marriages that are practiced very rarely: b_ut_i_ (abduction) and adibanna, marriage in which case the girl goes to the groom's house without his knowledge to offer herself in marriage (for Guji marriage see Minnant, 1981; Taddesse, 1983). The Guji have a mixed economy of animal husbandry and crop cultivation. They subsist mainly by cultivating grain, pulses and M (false banana). But their real wealth consists in their cattle, sheep, goats, and horses. Emotions and pride are centered in stock. People who do not own cattle are not considered to be proper Guji (Baxter, 1991:9). Cattle herding is important not only for economic purpose, but is also important in social and ritual life. The social status of a person among the Guji finds its expression in the number of cattle that one owns. The owner of many cattle is a respected person. Ritually, cattle are used for sacrificial purposes. Traditionally, if two hundred heifers (one hundred each year) gave birth to calves within two consecutive years, the owner had a right of holding a kuma gate (discarding the lOOOth) ceremony. In this ceremony one of these heifers was firmly tied and taken into the forest where it was left as an offering to wild animals. This was an indication that the man has reached the ultimate level of herd development for which he would be Guji desir | Culti I who worked not have cultivatio A gree Gull and f accepted p. I and more hiilhland 31' “d IIiddle . “1% tree have m aYeci Vtry “lit ‘ other “Ono iron, “the the gun in 46 would be widely known after this ceremony. It also indicates Guji desire to keep large numbers of cattle. Cultivation of land was despised in earlier days. People who worked the land were called gagurtu or gag; (those who do not have knowledge of cattle breeding). Today, however, cultivation of land has gained greater importance among most Guji and farming combined with herding and bee keeping is the accepted pattern. A great variety of crops are {grown in different altitudes of the Guji land. Corn and t_e_f_f_ are predominant in the lowland and middle altitude, while barley is the main crop in the highland areas. Bee keeping is common, especially in the high and middle altitudes where flowering atame, badessa, §_e_n_r_:_i_,and £213.01 trees proliferate. Hunting and gathering, which might have played a substantial role in previous days, serve only a very limited function in Guji society as a source of food. Other economic activities such as trade and handicrafts were not appreciated, but even before Menelik's conquest of Southern Ethiopia, there existed small scale local trade of cattle, iron, garments, tobacco, magado (earth salt), and ivory between the Guji and their neighboring groups in the form of barter. Local trade increased through time and now there are a few Guji who own shops and who are engaged in cattle and crop trades. Guji's relation with neighboring groups was not always harmonious. In earlier days, warfare was endemic, generally taking the form of raids against the various Oromo and non- Oromo eth 1977:21). tor econor with conplex se Consent tn lay very undertakin in abstrac Vested In “3°“! so: “Ava evuYthing, t° have liv deeds and 1 “”9810“. [aft/u), WI) 47 Oromo ethnic groups bordering the Guji territory (Minnant, 1977:21). The hunting of big game animals used to be important for economic and trophy (social status) purposes. With regard to religion, the Guji have developed a very complex set of beliefs and practices” I agree with Haberland's comment that more than any other people in Ethiopia, the Guji lay very great emphasis on augury, by which most of their undertakings are governed (Haberland, 1963:783). They believed in abstract concepts and physical objects as well as in power vested in certain individuals and families. I will briefly discuss some of these here. 2399_ (high god/ sky), who is said to have created everything, is at the center of Guji religion. He is believed to have lived among humans until he was annoyed by their evil deeds and finally moved to the sky where he is living now in seclusion. The Guji also believe in the existence of setana (devil), whose main function is said to instigate people to do something bad/wrong. Me is believed to possess individuals and make them suffer from unexplainable illnesses which might be cured by wara waga or wara ayana (cults). There is also a concept called kayyo, which has several interrelated aspects. JFor the purpose of this dissertation we need only to know one aspect of m. w, is a symbolic representation of good or revil.that manifests itself in bird calls, in other animals like snakes, and persons. The good and bad aspects of Lexy; are interpreted by knowledgeable individuals. Guji huntl: holdil caret! cases, they 1 < under sacred such a hole t Adola 'Yth ¢ Shrine ‘11 ov Perfor ‘1tua1 hunt I their and "1 until Rigat Inhere hat. 0 48 It is important to know that every major undertaking of Guji is governed by m. Before going out for wars and hunting, requesting a girl for marriage, building a house, holding certain important ceremonies... etc, people have to carefully examine Lam. If it is said to be bad, they in most cases, postpone or cancel their plans. If the Layla is good, they know that all will be well. Guji also have what is known as M (sacred shrines) under which prayers and sacrifices were made for me. These sacred shrines are associated with some important Guji rituals such as the 9951; system or with the myths of origin. The mea boko tree, where important g§_¢_l_a_ rituals take place and w_oyy_g_ Adola (the Adola holy land/shrine) which is associated with the I myth of origin are popular among many such shrines. These shrines were common property of the whole group and were found all over the Guji territory, covering vast areas of land. Guji performed pilgrimages to these sites for gm and other rituals. It was taboo to cut trees, destroy forests, or to hunt in these areas. Guji used these areas only for grazing their livestock. Because of this religious devotions, forests and wild life in and around holy shrines were well protected until this Guji tradition was undermined by conquest and the privatization of their land. Certain individuals and families are believed to posses inherent or acquired power through which they could do good or harm others. The gallu (supreme religious leader) and abba in wars, h as a whol Power to c to create to be (,0. falllles’ and stout! There "ith the .t I is believed and falfai . are thug Co We sowed, Dopu I128! Chang 49 gage, who are respectively considered to be m (holy) and W (virile family) are among these individuals. Their curses are feared like a poisonous snake bite, while their blessings are said to be'important for individual success in wars, hunting, good life, and for the society's well-being as a whole. The Shabola families, who are believed to have power to control lightning and the Dallacha, who are believed to create internal problems for individuals are also considered to be m. Guji are very careful not to offend these families, because of the fear of the consequences, lightning and stomach troubles, that are believed to follow. There are also two groups of individuals, 929; (people with the evil eye) and falfala (sorcerers). The former power is believed to be inherited while the latter is acquired. 3111i. and 153113;; are said to have negative effects on victims and are thus condemned. 2.5 Menelik's Conquest and its Results The Guji were conquered by Menelik II's forces in 1890s. Their conquest and incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire caused profound changes in their lives. Their indigenous land holding system was changed, the seeds of urbanization were sowed, population increased, and cultural changes occurred. These changes in turn caused tremendous effects on Guji socio— economic life and on the environment (see Taddesse, 1992). Following the conquest, the vast territory over which the Guii once illnnant expropriat considered given as soldiers 4 cases, Guj occupied b1 NY event Addltional When the G interest, “‘PEHQd 1 This g the gout“ settler8 t Bliste- "as % We "a! “QB it slaughtEr ’ 50 Guji once moved freely with their herds was expropriated. Hinnant (1977, 21-25) recorded three methods of land expropriation: a) those areas which no Guji could claim were considered to be government land. Of this, large tracts were given as freehold to the new administrators and to those soldiers who preferred to settle in Guji land; b) In some cases, Guji were offered the opportunity to keep the land they occupied by paying guarantees or taxes, and those who failed to pay eventually found themselves without land; and c) Additional land was alienated from the Guji by townspeople who loaned money to them, demanding land (or cattle) as collateral. When the Guji borrower was unable to pay the principal and interest, which was as much as 100 percent a year, he was compelled to forfeit his collateral. This way, a large area of land came under the ownership of the government, church, administrators, soldiers, and other settlers from the north and the ngftegga-gabpgg (serfdom) system was established. Under the pagtegna-gabbar system, the naftegna was supported by a number of indigenees (gabbars) . It was required that the ggbpa; provided grain and animals for slaughter, along with labor in the field and households of the naftegna (Minnant, 1977: 21-25). The naftegna established virtually a colonial relationship over the native Guji, taking their lands and imposing an alien rule on them. In addition, taxes were collected from each area, part of which were sent to Menelik's central treasury and part were kept t balabai system peace a the ads Th system in Guj landlor during PIOblem land (H °V¢I~cuL areas H) in the fol! town, 3‘ mute] °°ntr01 collectc ”enelik. lilltarl 0f the u ”late“ 51 kept by the local officials. At the bottom level, Guji bglgbats. m and M were incorporated into the system of nggtgggg domination, to collect taxes, to maintain peace and administer the law within territories designated by the administration. The naftegna-gabbar system also restricted the old Guji system of seasonal transhumance. A very large amount of land in Guji was controlled either by nggtggggg, or by Guji landlords, necessitating the payment of fees for use of grass during seasonal migration, and in addition causing numerous problems in the transporting of herds across other people's land (Hinnant, 1977). This forced some Guji to overgraze and over-cultivate certain areas or to move to fragile lowland areas which were often easily degraded. An important aspect of Menelik's policy of expansion was the formation of garrison towns in the conquered areas. These towns served as centers from which further expansion could be undertaken. The towns housed soldiers needed to maintain control of the region, along with officials such as tax collectors, judges, and local governors (Hinnant, l977fi. Thus, Menelik's efforts to promote urbanization were motivated by military and political factors, and therefore, the development of the urban centers was not a genuine drive to build an urban system. Consequently, his effort did not create cities that were economically viable; rather it left the legacy whereby a new type of economically oriented urban system was super imposed on the tr thus high] for their wood and e In ad establish felt in (1 increase, \ IHIIO Here pr°9ressiv 1960's in ”Whaler“ Mtaraya n Side“ am lllitary q Populatmn “United “Woven“ livestOCk 52 on the traditional structure (Mulatu, 1982). These towns were thus highly dependent on the exploitation of farmer's produce for their survival and on the surrounding forests for fire- wood and wood for construction. In addition to changes in the land tenure system and the establishment of garrison towns, increase in population was felt in Guji land after the conquest. Besides the natural increase, settlers from the north and from neighboring groups (who were settled on Guji land by naftegna landlords) have progressively increased population in Guji land. Between late 1960's and early 1970's, for example, Haile Selasie's government had settled about 5000 Gedeo individuals on Mount Anfarara near Kibre Mengist. Moreover, the southward expanding Sidama and Gedeo and a recent resettlement schemes by the military government (see below) have put Guji under relative population pressure. The population growth rate is now estimated to be about 3 percent annually. And more recently, improvement in veterinary service has steadily increased livestock population, resulting in a heavy concentration on the available grazing land. Menelik also made it a policy to spread the culture of his own ethnic group, the Amhara, among the Guji and other conquered peoples of the south. Two of the most important aspects of this culture are Christianity and the Amharic language. Menelik and his generals built churches in all the conquered provinces as centers for Christianizing the "pagan" and Husli peoples w spread el gradually and adop institutio conquerors HaileP started byl and economl ”filers “I After the dealt a de Immune“ “Wards th educauoh' were Intro “Mitotic gm""‘llflent 2.5 a initiated E 990131 98 o f s 53 and Muslim inhabitants. Often, too, Amhara and other converted peoples were planted in the conquered areas as colonists to spread elements of Amhara culture. Thus the conquered peoples gradually abandoned many aspects of their traditional culture and adopted the religion, the social and political institutions, language, food, and clothing of their Amhara conquerors. Haile Selasie's government accelerated what had been started by Menelik's administration. Imperial land alienation and economic exploitation continued and more and more northern settlers were brought into the conquered regions of the south. After the brief period of Italian occupation (see below), which dealt a death blow to regional feudal lords, Haile Selasie's government intensified the centralization of administration. Towards this end, modern bureaucracy, a standing army, modern education, and modern transportation and communication systems were introduced. Mengistu's government further expanded these institutions and the infrastructure. This enabled the government to penetrate further into local life and cultures. 2.6 Results of Italian Occupation During their occupation between 1936-1941, the Italians initiated a number of changes. They abolished the gafteggg- ggppag system and land tax in the south. Guji (with the other peoples of the south) were given greater freedom to conduct their traditional socio-economic and political practices. Most J of the so« the nafte Henelik’s one of the hidhe hidhe halur Becad 1Mtiated the Brltls | Italian 51 M 1' other land were their ten Italian pr 54 of the southern peoples including the Guji retaliated against the neftegngs for their mal-administration of the south after Menelik's conquest. The action taken is clearly mentioned in one of the Guji songs: hidhe nu hikka Atalan we were jailed and released by Atala (Guji balabat) hidhe nu dhanna habbashan we were jailed and beaten by habashas (Amharas) halun soon bate barana now it is our time. We have the opportunity to retaliate against them. Because their occupation was short, the changes Italians initiated were short lived. When Haile Selasie came back with the British army to liberate Ethiopia, a few Guji fought on the Italian side against the reinstatement the oppressive yoke of naftegna rule. Other noteworthy effects of the Italian occupation of Guji land were the construction of two north-south roads through their territory and the establishment of lumber mills, by Italian prisoners of war who decided to live in Jam Jam after the war. The two roads which the Ethiopian government later upgraded ended Guji isolation and integrated them into the national and international economy. 2.7 Guji since the 1974 Revolution Since the 1974 revolution, the Guji have experienced various changes. Every reform introduced and implemented elsewhere in Ethiopia by Mengistu's government (except the formation of state farms) has also been implemented in Guji land, wlttl retou oi retors am. exploitat‘ land and . (like an that had 1 thereforn Other feud the taforn tum up a resistanc‘ landlords bedeSent flung in w a ”Elba, 1 9 COWIitted 55 land, with varying degrees of success and impact‘. The land reform of 1975 (with the formation of PAs) was the most popular reform among the Guji. It liberated them from age-old feudal exploitation and oppression by abolishing private ownership of land and landlord-tenant relations. Guji farmers were happy (like all landless tenants of the south) to get back the land that had been expropriated by naftagns. Indeed, even before the reform some militant Guji farmers had appropriated land and other feudal properties in some areas. Just a few months after the reform, they fought bloody wars with feudal landlords who took up arms and went into Jam Jam forests to offer armed resistance against the land refornu The heavily'armed gagteggg landlords massacred hundreds of Guji farmers. This is yet to be described and analyzed. The dispossessed landlords were not alone in massacring Guji farmers, they’ were assisted by gaftegna administrators of the region at that time (see Dada Melba, 1988:95). Yohannes Noggo also recorded an atrocity committed against Guji farmers in one incident as follows: The most savage and brutal massacre in living memory took place in September 1975 where troops carried out a most inhuman and atrocious genocide of thousands of Guji Oromo peasants in the Sidamo Region; property and cattle were destroyed and hundreds of militant peasant leaders were executed. In one district of flagere Mariam in one incident alone at least 300 ‘. See chapter 3 for an extensive«discussion of Mengistu's agricultural policies such as the land reformtand formation of peasant associations, cooperatives, resettlement, villagization and others. Iili exec prov petrq Desp retorl ac The next as Inch participat they were Servi farmers 1 Consumer "Pensive Close; to of 900d: 1 elect ed the maj 011 | ¢°°Deratyw were fewer did not he worked on t their Prod livestOCk “urinary better for 56 militant peasant leaders were first arrested and then executed, at the order and personal participation of the provincial administrator and their crops sprayed with petrol and burnt (Yohannes, 1986:215). Despite these atrocities, the Guji welcomed the land reform act and fought to the end for its proper implementation. The next set of government reforms did not impress Guji farmers as much as the land reform program. Consequently their participation in the implementation was minimal, except when they were forced. Service Cooperatives (SCs) were acceptable to Guji peasant farmers in principle. They provided members with basic consumer goods. Consumer goods prices in SCs were less expensive than in the open markets and SC shops are located closer to members than urban private shops. However, shortage of goods in SC shops, mishandling of the members capital by elected peasant officials, corruption and nepotism in distribution of goods,... greatly reduced the confidence of the majority of farmers in this institution. Due to peasant farmers' resistance, very few producers' cooperatives (PCs) were established in Jam Jam awraja. There were fewer than 20 PCs in the awraja as a whole and thus they did not have much effect on Guji life. Most Guji farmers worked on their small family holdings and were able to increase their productivity to a large extent. The number of their livestock also increased due to land reform and improved veterinary services. According to my informants, life was much _ better for Guji farmers after the revolution until the government jeopardize A fer after the centers in the claime Citizens. b19 sche resettleme tam-'15 wh fro: the 0. the Count' Sufficientl a...” at The role "as Ian.“ a Quota to ti 57 government finally introduced the villagization program which jeopardized all their gains from the land reform. A few resettlement schemes were established in Jam Jam after the revolution. Unemployed people from various urban centers in the region and poor Guji farmers were resettled in the claimed attempt to make them productive and self-sufficient citizens. These resettlements were later organized into three big schemes (Chembe, Tesfa. le gibrina, and Wadara resettlements) to accommodate Somali war victims and peasant farmers who fled the villagization program and came to Jam Jam from the Oromo and Guraghe regions of Shewa. Like elsewhere in the country, these resettlement schemes were not self sufficient and depended on the government for food and other things at the time of my field work. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation's (AMC) official role was to establish prices (substantially lower than the market) and require all farm households to deliver a grain quota to the state. This resulted in the exploitation of the Guji farmers, as was the case with peasant farmers all over the country. In addition, high land use taxes and the so called voluntary contributions drained whatever farmers had gained from the land reform. But no more government program was destructive and disruptive to Guji farmers than the villagization program. Other notable changes are in the areas of education and religion. After the 1974 revolution, many elementary schools were Ope: forgotten their chi and unabl considera schools. I In the vs; People to A3 I test: ”mph in Indicates SChools , mt“: Hut and inadeq I“! not I There Christianil revolutmnj 1"Vision of to soklla S YQars 58 were opened throughout the country, including the hitherto forgotten Guji areal This permitted some Guji farmers to send their children to schools. However, drafted into the militia and unable to pay an annual tuition fee of 10-15 big, a considerable number of young people were not able to attend schools. In addition to this, the discovery of alluvial gold in the vast area of Guji land attracted a number of young people to work on it "illegally" instead of going to school. As a result, there was a big decline in the number of young people in schools. My interviews with school principals indicates that the decline was as high as 30 percent in some schools. Besides formal education, a literacy campaign was also launched in Guji area, as was the case in other parts of the country. Some Guji farmers had learned how to read and write. But, owing to shortage of teaching materials, teachers, and inadequate follow- up, the vast majority of Guji farmers were not remain literate. There was a mass conversion of Guji farmers to Islam and Christianity (Catholic, protestant, and pentecostal) after the revolution. The conversion to Islam was related to the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977/78. A substantial number of Guji farmers (mostly from southern areas of Guji land) were driven to Somalia by the war and when they returned to Ethiopia after some years they came back with the new religion‘. At about ‘. However, there were a few Guji who have already been converted to Islam even before the Ethio-Somali war due to their contacts with the neighboring Borana and Arsi Oromos, who the same the north policies young pe' conversio religions I solidar it i 59 the same time Christian missionaries were doing their jobs in the northern part of the Guji land. Frustrated by government policies such as military recruitment and villagization, many young people joined these new religions en masse. The conversion of Guji into two different (and sometimes opposing) religions may in ‘the long run destroy ‘their traditional solidarity of working together under the gada system. in most cases are Moslems. 3.1 This developme ilpacts 0 land was country develop“ C0Mercia ‘Inllum p agricultu establish and Prod“ and tax “1139123 point Out In traHSf CHAPTER III AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN PRE-AND POST- REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA 3.1 Introduction This chapter presents Ethiopia's agricultural and rural development policies and programs in order to analyze their impacts on the rural population. Under the imperial regime, land was privately held except in the northern part of the country where it was communally owned. The agricultural development policies focused on raising production through commercialized (mechanized) farms, and through integrated and Iminimum package programs. Under Mengistu's regime, socialist agriculture was promoted through land reform and the establishment of peasant associations, development of service and producers' cooperatives, state farm formation, marketing and tax control policies, and through resettlement and villagization schemes. Attempts are made in this chapter to point out the reasons why these policies were not successful in transforming agriculture in Ethiopia. 3.2 Agricultural Policy under Haile Selasie Ho Ethiopian had ever laid out a well-defined economic policy until the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1974 Haile Selasie's government attempted to address the country's economic growth 60 through a three fivI Plan (PPYI iear Plan Third Five was later I I based on t the View Capital Creation urban 1a 19873:“ ) . Infrastru Oriented insufgic1 large Paas 3)’ tn Plans were 61 through a series of national development plans. Accordingly, three five year plans were introduced: the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) covered the period 1957 to 1961; the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) covered the period 1962 to 1967; and the Third Five Year Plan (TFYP) covered the period 1968 to 1973 and was later extended to 1974. The overall planning approach was based on the development theories of the 1950s, which advanced the view that economic growth was inextricably linked to capital accumulation for investment in industry and the creation of large-scale commercial farms to feed the growing urban labor force and generate export earnings (Cohen, l987a:41). Hence the first two plans favored investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and technology, and in export- oriented commercial farms. As such, these plans gave insufficient emphasis to agriculture in general and to the large peasant sector in particular‘. By the late 1960s the adverse effects of the previous two plans were being increasingly felt. Cereal production lagged behind population growth and the country became, for the first time in its modern history, a net food importer (Dejene, 1990:49). This problem with the criticism of the "industry first” development strategy of the 1950s and donors pressure made Haile Selasie's government realize the importance of ‘. The peasant sector accounted for more than 90 per cent of the agricultural population and produced more than 94 per cent of the total agricultural production of the country (see ONCCP, 1984). peasant a Thus, the types of package I comercie system, 1 nature c Progress the peasa 3.2. 62 peasant agriculture to the development of the national economy. Thus, the Third Five Year Plan provided for promotion of two types of rural development projects, comprehensive and minimum package programs, besides the promotion of large-scale commercial farms. However, because of l) the land tenure system, 2) low investment priority in agriculture, and 3) the nature of the