MSU LIBRARIES 535—. RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped beIow. Iii/“R BIG-y 5201133 THE CONGRESSIONAL CAREER OF CLARE E. HOFFMAN, 1935-63 By DonaId Edwin Walker A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University 1r: partia] fquiTIment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1982 © Copyright by DONALD mum HALKER 1982 ii ABSTRACT THE CONGRESSIONAL CAREER OF CLARE E. HOFFMAN, 1935-63 By Donald Edwin Walker Clare Eugene Hoffman ended a successful legal career at the age of fifty-nine to begin a controversial twenty-eight year career in the United States House of Representatives. The event that first brought him national attention was the l937 Flint, Michigan, sit-down strike. This episode helped to earn him the reputation as a staunch critic of labor unions. One of the fore- most adversaries of the Wagner Act, he introduced numerous bills involving labor unions. While none became law, various ideas of his were embodied in some of the most important labor legislation of the 19405 and 505, including the Taft-Hartley Act, a measure he helped draft. With the outbreak of World War II, his isolationism became increasingly evident. His views led to the accusation that he was sabotaging the nation's defense effort. Fostering this belief was the charge that he was acting in collusion with various American fascists. As chairman of the Government Operations Committee during the 80th and 83d Congresses, he led the House fight for the Donald Edwin Walker National Security Act which provided for the unification of the military. It was also Hoffman who first undertook a major inquiry into the Teamsters and Jimmy Hoffa. Outside pressure brought an end to the hearings which were uncovering evidence as important as that later revealed by the more famous investigation by the McClellan Committee. Thought to be more conservative than his constituents, accused of being a Nazi sympathizer, embroiled in controversy, attacked by magazines such as the New RepubliCLand the Ngtlgg, he won re-election thirteen times. While his electoral success was largely ’due to his being the incumbent in a heavily Republican district, his victories were also due to his willingness to serve his constit- uents and his courage in fighting for his beliefs. Hoffman illustrates how a man, despite the vast changes that had occurred both within the United States and abroad, could remain true to the l9th century way of life he experienced as a child, retaining his faith in isolationism, small government, small businesses, and small farms. DEDICATION To my wife Julie, daughter Susan, parents Carl and Verla, and my son Theodore, who wrote more of this than he knows. TH". E! by I! 1'- "E'en I we” just “.9. "1 “In, ”r555 tc fif- l‘tn who ‘5} ' 3°39!" l '1‘! ‘1‘ . "tOr all; . .\ . "k‘ . “War ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my gratitude for the assistance given me by the members of my committee: Dr. Paul A. Varg, Dr. Donald N. Lammers, and Dr. James H. Soltow. I am especially indebted to Dr. Warren 1. Cohen who graciously agreed to assume the duties of chairman just before the end of the dissertation process. His willingness to give freely of his time is sincerely appreciated. I am most grateful to Dr. Madison Kuhn who labored so diligently as the original chairman. His insightful comments, his ability as a writer, and his knowledge of the sources proved invaluable. His unfailing good humor and patience, as well as the encouragement he provided, made a difficult task much easier. Others to whom the author owes thanks include: the Kellogg Foundation for a grant making it possible for me to take a leave from Olivet College; those colleagues of Representative Hoffiman who shared their recollections and opinions about him; Helen M. Boyer, Hoffman's secretary; Betty W. Havlena of the Detroit News; and the staffs of the Michigan State University Library, the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Walter lieuther Library at Wayne State University, the Allegan Public Library Allegan, Michigan, and the Olivet College Library. .Obviously without the encouragement of one‘s family such a!) undertaking would be nearly impossible. Fortunately my family, iv ting.) at tides :"é'fenlllg thar with. though at times probably questioning the sanity of anyone who spent so much time on what must have seemed a quest for something more challenging than finding the Holy Grail, gave their wholehearted support. p l".l '2" Li ”I C 4 U 5 .. G r O tlr U 7 I Th I :z: ‘OA‘ '\ ..i \, ‘J‘r‘arJTh . '1‘; v TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER 1 0301-3th "The Black Flag of Piracy" (1875-l936) "Silence Shall Never Be My Part" (1937-39) . ”Think of America First" (l939-4l). "Don't Haul Down the Stars and Stripes" (l94l-45). “Gadzooks, That Man Is a Warrior!" (l945-48) "Died-in-the-wool Republicans of the Old School" (1949-52) The “Most Peaceful Man in Congress" (1953-54) . "An Old Candlestick Holder and Horse-and Buggy Fellow” (1955-67). BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY. vi 34 75 120 I70 216 259 302 345 INTRODUCTION Before considering the congressional career of Clare Eugene Hoffman, two areas should be discussed. One concerns his place on the political spectrum, while the second is a description of Michi- gan's 4th congressional district. One of the problems in discussing Hoffman is to characterize his political philosophy. Friendly observers tended to label him a conservative, whereas his critics (such as the New Republic, Nation, ‘EM, and lime) generally considered him to be an ultra-conservative. Accepting the definitions of conservatives for the period from the New Deal through the Eisenhower years as given by Clinton Rossiter in his book Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion, Hoffman qualified as an ultra-conservative. While noting that no sharp line divided those on the right, Rossiter listed three major categories of conservatives (he dismissed various extreme right-wing elements as being too small in number to be of importance)--the ultra- conservatives, the middling conservatives, and the liberal conser- vatives. The three groups were classified according to their support for the New Economy (the domestic New Deal as it was described in 'the Republican platforms of l956 and 1960) and the New Internation- alism (support for American membership in the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as for foreign aid). la liberal cons 5mm and the rim clearly 52mins fan in. ‘lhile E ii: amen. iiiell as Sena r7? the ultra- A’etic and fl Sign .tr Barry I p . .sentative ('3' ti. e“ and n g\ 4!»: . v ‘\ ‘ W9? I ‘Q A -T‘ EKhEP u. S. -(“:A :0 * The liberal conservatives were most inclined to embrace the New Economy and the New Internationalism with some degree of enthusiasm. Hoffman clearly was not a member of this group. The middling con- servatives favored stopping the New Economy and the New Internation- alism. While Hoffman admired some of the men Rossiter placed in this category, such as Presidents Herbert Hoover and Richard M. Nixon, as well as Senator Robert A. Taft, his views were more in harmony with the ultra-conservatives who sought to reverse the trend in domestic and foreign affairs. TWo of the people in this group were Senator Barry Goldwater, who was greatly admired by Hoffman, and Representative Noah Mason, who frequently praised Hoffman. The Chicago Tribune, a paper Hoffman read and lauded, voiced the views of this group. Among the enemies of the ultra-conservatives were President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor, Walter Reuther, and Alger Hiss, all key villains to Hoffman. Hoffman was strongly against United States membership in the UN, thought that foreign aid would bankrupt the nation, and wanted little to do with Europe. Domestically, he agreed with the ultra- conservatives in resisting new social legislation while advocating the demise of many of the existing programs, opposed civil rights acts and "socialized medicine," and favored repealing, or greatly modifying, the Sixteenth Amendment (income tax). Hoffman was not a conservative in the Burkean sense, being, as Rossiter noted, outside the mainstream of American conservatism. Like other ultra-conservatives, he rejected the social and economic changes that had become reality, preferring to return to a simpler, an idyllic in in their Social-welfar if mid of 1E5i=“=:t".m l Some :“I(.:‘ I I... wents more idyllic time. The ultra-conservatives lacked political modera- tion in their assaults against the political institutions and the social-welfare agencies, a characteristic that removed them from the world of the true conservative. Certainly this was a valid description of Hoffman. Some insight into why he was so strongly supported by his constituents can be gained by looking at the makeup of the area. The 4th district, which consisted of six counties (Allegan, Barry, Berrien, Cass, St. Joseph, and Van Buren) tucked in the southwestern corner of Michigan, was heavily rural. The area was characterized by small industries, small businesses, small farms, and small towns. Allegan, one of the state's leading farming counties, was known for its fruit production, as well as for its poultry and dairy products. Barry, Cass, and St. Joseph were areas of general farming, dairying, and livestock raising. Berrien and Van Buren, the most important fruit region in the state, were known mainly for their apples, peaches, pears, and grapes. They were also a key producer of other fruits, particularly strawberries, raspberries, and blue- berries. Benton Harbor in Berrien county was the site of one of the world's great fruit markets. The industry in the district was concentrated in Benton Harbor, St. Joseph, and Niles, all in Berrien county, which was also the county where organized labor had its greatest numerical strength. The main industries were those engaged in food processing, primary Inetals, and fabricated metal products. Benton Harbor and St. Joseph were also both lake ports, while Niles was a railroad center. The only other county with any significant amount of industry was St. Joseph, which included the industrial and trading centers of Sturgis and Three Rivers. Paper products and fabricated metal products were the main industries. In Hastings (Barry county) there were various companies related to the automobile industry. The resort trade was another prominent economic activity in the district. It was important mainly in the three counties border- ing on Lake Michigan--Allegan, Berrien, and Van Buren. The largest cities in the district were in Berrien county. In 1930 Benton Harbor was a city of 15,434, while in 1960 it had grown to 19,136. Niles went from 11,326 in 1930 to 13,842 in 1960. During that same period, St. Joseph's population increased from 8,349 to 11,755. In 1930 there were only seven towns of over 5,000 population in the district, while in 1960 the number had risen to nine. In terms of population, the district ranked as one of the smallest in the state. The residents of the 4th district were largely native born. In 1930 the percentage of foreign born ranged from a high of 13 percent in Berrien to a low of 3 percent in Barry. The per- centage of foreign born declined in subsequent years. The Germans, who were by far the most numerous foreign born group in the dis- trict, were also the main ethnic group of those native born who were either of foreign or mixed parentage. There was a sizable Dutch population in Allegan county, while Berrien contained a number of Russians and Poles. There were also some Poles in Cass and Van Buren counties. It is not surprising that the voters of the 4th district, an area not given to change, supported a conservative Representative. There was no influx of industry to divert the people from their normal agricultural pursuits, nor was there a sizable foreign born population to bring in new viewpoints. Hoffman's constituents shared a faith in the values of the l9th century. The growing role of the federal government with its various regulations, many of which affected the farmers, was seen as a dangerous trend. The rise of unions, and the resulting loss of control by the employers, concerned the farmers who were often, in their own small way, employers them- selves. As America became more urbanized, the cities gained politi- cal strength. As their political importance increased, more of the state budget was spent on the cities, which in turn required higher taxes. The rural areas naturally opposed larger state expenditures to benefit the cities. If Hoffman was, as many observers claimed, more conservative than his constituents, it was simply a matter of degree. Neither was in harmony with the political and social develop- nent of New Deal and post-New Deal America. Politically the district was solidly Republican. Only once since 1860, and only then in the depths of the Depression, did the Democrats send a Representative to Washington. After one term, the area reverted to its conservative Republican tradition, which it has renained loyal to down to the present time. During the years that Hofihan represented the district, each of the counties, almost hint excl Alfie‘s af- (MU. Huerta ' h without exception, was strongly tied to the Republican party. The people's affinity for the GOP was such that the only practical way to defeat a Republican incumbent was in the primary. ———’ CHAPTER I "The Black Flag of Piracy” (l875-l936) In 1934 at an age (fifty-nine) when many are contemplating retirement, Clare Eugene Hoffman began a new career. Although lack- ing any legislative experience and having been elected to only one Post, that of county prosecuting attorney, an office he had not held for over twenty years, he won election as the United States Represen- tative from Michigan's 4th district. He retained his seat for four- teen terms, making him, at the time of his retirement, the second longest serving member of Congress in Michigan history. During his long service he became known as a vociferous critic of big government, of social reform, of labor unions, of Conmunism, and of an active foreign pol icy. In a career that was both colorful and controversial, he "as, as the New York Times obituary concluded, "either stanchly sup- ported or heartily disliked but never ignored," a statement applica- b‘le not only to his constituents, but to persons throughout the nation Who either knew him or knew of him. It was hard to ignore a con- gressman who sent a wire to the mayor of Monroe, Michigan, offering to bring a "group of peaceably inclined but armed and well-equipped reliable citizens to aid in the defense of your city" during a labor dispute, or who wore suits without pockets. And certainly it was 7 it: is disre "ascf t ties, ‘Mfil gram Yet i ‘ QQQQ hard to disregard someone accused of being a fascist or of having fascist ties, charges which led to several appearances before a federal grand jury. Yet he was more than just colorful and controversial. He played an inportant part in some major legislation, including the Taft-Hartley Act, and the National Security Act of 1947. Twice chairman of a comittee, he utilized his position to head numerous investigations, the most significant being an inquiry into the Teamsters union and particularly into the activities of James Hoffa, a Teamster official, years before the more publicized Senate study of John L. McClellan (0, Arkansas). While in nunber his successes seem few, two points must be noted. One is that many of his ideas concerning labor legislation later became laws, but without his name being associated with them. Secondly, being a menber of the minority for all but four of his .Years in Congress certainly limited his achievements. It is, how- ever, debatable how much more successful he would have been had he t>een in the majority more often given his personality and his set of values, values which he had learned as a child and which remained ul‘ichanged throughout his life. * His values were derived from a simple old-fashioned way of 1 'ife. Born into a Pennsylvania Dutch family on 10 September 1875, he moved with his parents Samuel D. and Mary V. and his sister Elizabeth from his birthplace in Vicksburg, Pennsylvania, to a farm par Constant gig gm hare bi, nich l! in lir‘ues C an: outing leased to te gr. inch in lithe in, hffimn I breathe to Aid but so NMnh‘ cm bush la b “A. IS )BW “Vegan 1 E? mov 5' Cf’ffce. near Constantine, Michigan, when he was about one year old. He led the same hardworking, religious life that his father and grandfather had, which is evident in several of his speeches in which he extolled the virtues of the sinple life he had experienced, and in his fre- quent quoting of the scriptures. (During World War II he noted that he used to teach Sunday school in the Lutheran church, but "I haven't gone nuch in recent years--been too busy practicing it.")3 Although his grandfather and father were both skilled crafts- men, Hoffman decided to become a doctor. After serving as an apprentice to a country doctor, he enrolled in Northwestern Medical School but soon shifted to law, graduating in 1896. Since he was too young to be admitted to the bar, he went to Valparaiso University to take business courses.4 He began his practice in Otsego, Michigan, but the offer of a job as law clerk at six dollars per week from the leading attorney in Allegan was too attractive for a young lawyer to pass up. After a brief move to Muskegon, he returned to Allegan in 1904 to open his Own office. He remained for the next thirty years with his wife Florence Wasson (whom he married in 1899) and his two sons, Leo W. and Carl 5.5 His introduction to politics was not as satisfying as his 1 ater efforts. He failed in his try to become county prosecuting attorney in 1900, but in his second attempt four years later he won the first of his two terms as prosecutor. In 1912 he ran unsuccess- fully as a mentier of the Bull Moose party, "marking the last time that a Hoffman and a Roosevelt ever had anything in conmon." Tie:i ' uy'm J a“ Though he lO Twenty-two years passed before he again sought an elective office, although he stayed in politics being both city and county GOP chair- man.6 The period between 1912 and 1934 was a successful one for Hoffiman who gained a statewide reputation as a "sharp-witted, sharp- tongued“ trial lawyer. One paper divided his legal career into three phases. In the first he won fame for handling cases of fraud against unethical horse dealers. He then concerned himself with local realtors who were selling worthless land as valuable farmland. (He claimed that, at one time or another, he had sued every realtor in 'the county.) Finally he specialized in malpractice cases against llhwsicians, doing it so effectively that he had a statewide practice arid a reputation that went beyond Michigan. Many of his real estate arid malpractice cases reached the state supreme court, causing it tc: be said that he “made as much law as any lawyer in Michigan" by establishing precedents which were still being followed at the time (Ff his retirement in 1963. He even gained some national attention iril933 through his defense of the operators of one of the country's 1"irst nudist colonies.7 This case is particularly interesting in 1 ight of his later lamentations on what he perceived to be a decline ‘ill the moral standards. His legal talents were also shown during Allegan's success- ‘fWJl eight-year fight against Consumers Power Co. over the building (31’ a municipal lighting plant. As the city's counsel he handled the entire proceedings all the way to the Circuit Court of Appeals L4 Me hi1 in: catt‘. >253 flaged Cu A Wain 3': “01 in‘ ; 311,95, L... J, 6 he Car ”A“ Acse a; ~. dbtr ll" : u': iam‘In D l w 3% ”of g ' b 1;». obr‘ ll of the United States. He also represented Paw Paw and Dowagiac in their battles against power coumanies.8 * Hoffman probably would have been content to remain a success- ful attorney had the district not gone Democratic in 1932, the first time it had done so since the Civil War. Even then, despite being “a most vocal and vituperative critic" of the New Deal, he was not inclined to run. Although drafted into the 1934 race, he neverthe- less waged what was to be the first of many vigorous campaigns.9 Contrary to the usual picture of him as an ultra-conservative, he caupaigned as one who was progressive but practical, aggressive but not intolerant, loyal to his constituents but willing to listen to others, a doer not an orator, concerned for the needy but also for the Constitution and the laws, and as one who would not take ft‘om those who had simply to give to others. Running in the strongly rural district, he attacked the needless and expensive laws dealing with farming, and advocated a protective tariff for the farmers. To show that, despite his age, he could appeal to the younger voters, he had several people in their twenties helping in his campaign.‘0 Hoffman found that canpaigning agreed with him, although at times he said he became so absorbed in the Republican cause that he neglected to mention his own candidacy. Various charges were hurled at him, including the statement that he was a drunkard (he did not drink), and that his home town would not support him. He said he "wouldn't be surprised to next hear that my wife isn't going to vote 12 for me." He easily won the Allegan vote, both the city and the county, remarking that the "home vote alone is worth all it cost to win the nomination."n He won the primary over two state senators and a widely respected physician after a "sharp" battle, partly because of his own intense cannaigning, and also because he was supported by the previous congressman, John C. Ketcham. His primary victory led one paper to predict that the general election campaign would be "one of the most spectacular" in years, since both Hoffman and his Demo- cratic opponent, the incunbent George Foulkes, were known as Fighters.12 One of Hoffman's criticisms of Foulkes concerned the congress- man's liberal use of his franking privilege, a most ironic accusa- ti on since Hoffman later became entroiled in a major controversy Over the use of his frank. He also attacked his opponent for promis- ing to support the New Deal, saying that anyone who blindly followed the administration was of no use to his district.“3 Certainly Hoffman never blindly endorsed any president, Republican or Democratic. Hoffman, who "hit the political firmament--something like a r‘<)cket," defeated Foulkes by nearly 14,000 votes. While 1934 was not a good year for most Republican congressional candidates, Hoffman Was fortunate to live in Michigan, "the outstanding Republican state 0f the country," and particularly fortunate that Republican strength Was especially strong in the rural areas. Another reason for his Victory was the scandal involving Foulkes' effort to solicit fl l3 camaign funds from federal enployees in the district, which later resulted in his being sent to prison.14 After expending so much effort to win, Hoffman had second thoughts about serving, declaring that he was not going to Washing- ton. At the behest of family and supporters he decided at the last minute to do so. Thus Hoffman, a wiry man of five feet ten inches, who some thought looked like Will Rogers, and who spoke "with the twang of a Midwesterner," took his place in Congress in which his party had just 102 seats, not quite a fourth of the menhership.15 Such a small nunber was a mixed blessing, offering him the chance to become known to party leaders, while denying him the party support Necessary to enact any legislation that he might propose. Actually the situation threatened to be even less to his liking than the numbers indicated, since President Franklin D. Roosevelt was thought to have the backing of 325 House members. The Chance of a conservative coalition did not look promising, although One did begin to appear during 1935-36.16 Hoffman, a man who placed Principle above party regularity, was receptive to such a movement. Because of the paucity of Republicans, he noted that they Were begged to take several comnittee assignments. He served on three comnittees. The most important was the Expenditures in the E)cecutive Departments on which he served throughout his years in the HQuse, twice becoming its chairman. He was also a member of the War Claims and the Merchant Marine, Radio and Fisheries Comittees. while left off the more important comittees, he did not go unnoticed. From the beginning he was a "peppery, strong-willed" man who "never Bibi in the l4 stood in the middle on any subject during his 14 terms in the House."17 * One of the first issues that he faced concerned relief spend- ing. With his ultra-conservative opposition to new social legisla- tion, he scrupulously tried to hold such spending to a minimm. A vigorous watchdog of the public purse, he offered three possible ways to attain a balanced budget, an idea he championed during his twenty-eight years in the House. Congress could cut spending or raise taxes, both of which would cost members votes, or both methods Could be tried simultaneously, the position he favored.18 He advocated passing a tax measure after each appropriation bill so as not to burden future generations with the extravagances 0f the present. When questioned whether this would not bankrupt the Country, he replied that it made little difference if the government Went bankrupt now or in the future by amassing an unpayable debt. Paying as one went would cut out many needless programs which was the only way the nation could get out of the Depression.19 His aversion to spending vast sums of money as a cure for the nation's economic troubles did not mean that he opposed granting "el ief to those in need. The government should not permit anyone to starve or freeze, a statement he repeated years later regarding foreign aid, but at some point he insisted relief must be curtailed. He predicted that if the government took from those who produced to give to the needy, ultimately everyone would be on rel ief.20 1A 15 Although he voiced his concern for the needy, his voting record indicated less interest in their welfare than in avoiding deficit spending. The only major relief measures that he supported were the veterans' bonus and the home mortgage relief bill. He voted against the nearly $5 billion Emergency Relief Act, being only one of eighteen to do $0.2.l Steadfast in his belief about economy in government, he opposed, not just billion dollar appropriations, but bills such as one for $3 million for the Texas Centennial, or for $50,000 to re- move a gas tank which detracted from the beauty of the George Rogers Clark Sesquicentennial Monument. As shown many times in the future, no sum of money was too small to save. Years later he even ques- tioned the spending of $2,500 for a medal for the poet Robert Frost.22 Besides the expense of relief and what he considered to be the detrimental effect it had on the moral fibre of its recipients, he was concerned about the nature of some of the programs being supported. Hoffman cited several examples of the fatuous way relief money was being utilized. Why, he asked, did the government spend $3,993 in Richmond, Wisconsin, to improve a trout stream and increase insect life, when in East Bridgewater, Massachusetts, it spent $18,590 to drain swamps and ponds to decrease insect life? Why did the government spend $500,000 to improve bridle paths in Queens, New York?23 He favored letting the states care for their own needy, con- tHNHDQ that the position in which those in need found themselves as partly argue: the :iectfy be A undese hired. QIv’El'fnent 16 was partly due to conditions permitted by the states. He further ' argued that state and local governments could give aid more effi- ciently because they could more readily distinguish the needy from the undeserving, and could better ascertain the amount each family required. Believing that the Constitution justified the federal government's granting of aid to the states, he said that the sum given should equal the amount of assistance rendered by the states to care for their needy.24 Considering the frequency with which he opposed Roosevelt's requests for spending, it is ironic that one of the few relief measures that Hoffman supported, one which caused the "most spec- tacular difference between Congress and the President," was one that Roosevelt did not favor. Hoffman intended to fulfill his cam- paign pledge to vote for the inmediate payment of the veterans' bonus. Criticizing the Democratic leaders responsible for holding up the bill in the House because Roosevelt would veto it, he said that the veterans were willing to wait for their money if the govern- nent was trying to balance the budget, but it was not. Since the debt was already fixed, the only question was when it would be paid. "They should have it now, before we become bankrupt, before we have inflation, and they should have it in sound money." Apparently his Support for the bonus stenmed from his belief that the veterans deserved some help for their sacrifices. He said that since so many Others benefited from government, it was only proper that the former solidiers, who had earned what they were asking for, should gain as well. That he was sincere can be seen by his support of legislation to raise th lie reasons, bu lie pram ll- Glfice, if: listric 335: hat ”"3 ll‘ven t is: hence l7 legislation for the World War II veterans, including his efforts to raise the pay of the soldiers during the war.25 He fought large scale relief programs not just for economic reasons, but for political ones as well. He repeatedly charged that the programs of the administration, by attaching voters to the party in office, were in effect buying votes. Claiming that workers in his district who applied for relief were given a questionnaire which asked what their political affiliation was and how much money they had given to the Democratic party, he inquired what one's political preference had to do with either need or working ability. He blamed the political tie to relief on people like James A. Farley, the Post- naster General and Chairman of the Democratic party, and others "who lack the sense of political decency and common honesty." He noted the Republicans' dilemma. If they opposed money for relief, they were made to look indifferent to human suffering, while if they voted Such money, they were building the Democratic machine. He admonished lfis fellow Republicans not to vote another nearly $5 billion for relief as they had in 1935, since this would merely supply the Democrats with campaign funds.26 He also accused the administration of taking money from indus- trial Republican states like Michigan and giving it to Democratic States in the South and West. He predicted that "untold sums" would be used in the Republican states to win them over in the 1936 elec- lfion. Hoffman feared that this buying of votes through relief sPending might enable Roosevelt to so entrench himself in the next fun-years that in the event of the death of any of the Supreme 18 Court justices--which considering their ages, Hoffman saw as a real possibility--Roosevelt would be able to change the makeup of the Court, thereby gaining its support for the theories of government that would make him a dictator.27 It was not just through relief policies that Hoffman saw an attempt by Roosevelt to become a dictator; he saw it in the most innocuous events. Noting how the Army band and some soldiers had marched in a political parade when Roosevelt spoke, while the Marine band had been withdrawn from a meeting where the speaker was a critic of the New Deal, he said: "The Army had been used to give color to and to aid a Democratic political rally. How long will it be before it will be used to police the polling booths to determine the result of an election? How long will it be before the members of the C.C.C. cams are mobilized as a political force? Are not 28 some of them being so used at the present time?" * Hoffman was always wary that someone, or some group, was Seeking to establish a dictatorship. While he was convinced that Roosevelt was working toward this end, it was not until later that he emerged as one of the President's leading critics in the House. Instead he tended to concentrate more attention on the New Dealers, a group he differentiated from the Democrats, whom he accused of Plotting to use relief programs to achieve dictatorial control of ihe government. Lurking behind the various New Deal measures was aplan to destroy the American system of government and to "impose % mm d will 'um‘e sa-called ' lied and i 3* 0ch ti "5': latter TIME "ON 9 Dis (i Said it . hoists, . 19 upon us a dictatorship." The New Dealers were conducting a cam- paign "under the guise of being a drive for the benefit of the so-called 'forgotten man,’ but which is in reality an effort deter- mined and unrelenting to take from him the liberty which he enjoys, the opportunity which has been his, and to impose upon us a govern- ment patterned after the worst form of those oppressive administra- tions now existing in foreign lands."29 Disapproving of those who comprised Roosevelt's Brain Trust, he said it was time to "Kick out all the horde of professors, or theorists, none of whom knows the cause of sweat, the feeling of a blister or callous; none of whom ever accomplished anything of unment in industry, finance, or agriculture; all of whom believe that they are the Lord's annointed, ordained to save the world rather than America."30 The belief that the New Dealers were more impressed with the world than with the United States was noted in Hoffman's maiden Speech in the House. He said the Brain Trusters, "extending to them all charity, are exploiting America, American citizens, Ameri- can industries, for the benefit of the world at large. They have nore interest in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea than they have in American homes and American families." He then asked his colleagues to "wreck and throw on the scrap heap these governmental agencies which have no excuse for existence except the creation of jobs for the faithful Democrats and the laboratory for the trying out of the experiments of political quacks, many of whom would starve to death if thrown upon their own resources."31 tions 1 as leak 13“ the I' Ml. “is beta “Janet. EP‘MJ, “Home FICA yo lzp “ ~$il83 20 * Social security, one of the New Deal's major legislative reforms, was dismissed by Hoffman as no more than a modified Share the Wealth plan and a "mild version" of the Townsend plan. Admitting that the Republicans had not thought of it, he explained that that was because it was unnecessary when the GOP was in control of the government. The Democrats required such a program since they had repudiated their promises, platform, and principles. "The quackery practiced by your [Democratic] experts has brought on a disease which you, no doubt, believe can be cured, or at least alleviated, by this remedy. Let us hope and trust you are right," Hoffman said. "We on this side can do naught else. Let us hope and pray that the results will be no worse than your other so-called 'remedies.'" He denounced the measure for taking "from thrifty, saving Peter to Pay unfortunate Paul." While conceding that the bill contained Some good, he cautioned that it was wrapped up "with a whole lot of Other things" which would give more power to Roosevelt, weaken the state governments, and move toward dictatorship.32 It was his opposition to social security that led the authors of a book on Roosevelt and his critics to say that Hoffman "had long "33 Whether since ceased to look for any merit in New Deal proposals. tn'not that is a fair statement, it is true that he had begun to appear as a vigorous opponent of the New Deal, a role he continued to play with growing fervor. Despite his declaration of support for an old age pension, he opposed the plan proffered by a California doctor, Francis I‘lIIIIIIIIIIIII-_________________________________________._______________________4 .wsend, IIN... ' Fillatll is it was 21 Townsend, to grant benefits to the elderly. As with other relief legislation, he said he was not against caring for the needy as long as it was done properly. He labeled the Townsend plan the "grandest spending scheme of all." While its purpose, to alleviate suffering and increase happiness, was "highly laudable and justifiable," the plan was "impracticable" as well as "unjust and illegal." He pre- dicted that since the requirements for receiving money was simply age and not need, if the plan did pass, the Supreme Court would strike it down. He also criticized the Townsendites' indifference as to how the money was spent as long as it was gone by the end of the month.34 Hoffman listed three possible courses of action. Estimating that 500 of the between 1,000 and 1,200 voters in Allegan had signed a petition calling for it, the politically wise decision was to support the plan and rely on the Supreme Court to overturn it. Another politically attractive stand was to back it and await the PBturn of prosperity when the people would simply forget about it. He said, however, that he had to retain his self-respect by opposing it and risk the wrath of his constituents. His decision came despite his claim that he and his wife would benefit from the plan since he said they would receive a combined income of $4,800, more money than “my had ever had as net income. His stand showed that from the beginning of his career he was willing to adhere to his beliefs regardless of the political consequences, a trait that even his d 35 critics praise Hcl slam! the l"; he saic lilac: at 3‘ milite it *3 Mr Ms mt 1w . .. "WITCH 22 Hoffman, who regarded the plan as an "economic impossibility," claimed that no one had calculated the entire cost of the program, but he said using Townsend's own figures the cost came to over $19 billion per year. He challenged the Townsendite argument that a 2 percent transaction tax, which would be added to the cost of a product at every stage of production, would pay for the program. As a supporter of small businesses, he was disturbed by the tax because it was particularly unfair to the independent merchants whose prod- ucts went through several stages, while chain stores, having fewer production steps, could undersell them. He added facetiously that if Townsend was right that a 2 percent tax would bring such benefi- cial results, why not make the tax 10 percent or more, let everyone be eligible, and thereby make everybody prosperous?36 Although he once characterized himself as being "somewhat hasty, somewhat abrupt at times, and somewhat inclined to form quick conclusions," his objections to the Townsend proposal were based in Part on his study of the plan as a member of a special House commit- tee. The committee, the Select Committee to Investigate Old-Age Pension Organizations, commonly called the Bell Committee after its Chainman C. Jasper Bell (0, Missouri), was hostile to the Townsend Plan. One writer accused the committee of indulging "in the most Inmcrupulous brow-beating and questioning of’witnesses,“ noting that lhnfman was "particularly vitriolic and insulting." One reporter said that Hoffman was regarded as second to Bell in his opposition Kathe plan. Townsend himself later wrote that Hoffman, Scott Lucas (D.Illinois), and Bell were the most rancorous on the eight member I‘IIIIIIIIIIIII-—_________________________________________________________________ tence o te. H1 < or .ici; m-....__...fl__.__————4- *7 7" 7 '7" _‘__'_‘_A,A¥Ai,,, 23 committee: "no one could have tempered the actions of this clique." Townsend, angered by the treatment he received from the committee, walked out during his third day of testifying, resulting in a sen- tence of thirty days in jail plus a fine for contempt of the commit- tee. Hoffman, who, despite his personal opposition to Townsend (he criticized him for making money off the elderly and accused him of having "delusions of grandeur," envisioning himself as a presiden- tial candidate), had no desire to see the seventy year old doctor go to jail, offered a resolution to suspend the sentence and waive the fine. Townsend was later pardoned by Roosevelt.37 * Although he said little about his position concerning the major areas of labor, agriculture, and foreign affairs, he did begin to outline his views. While labor was to become an overwhelming interest of his, it was a minor issue in his first term. He did comment on a taxi strike in Washington, D.C., wondering whether "with all the power which has been granted to the Federal Government during the past 2 years," it was not possible to maintain order as an example 1”or the rest of the nation. Unwilling to ask the government to force people back to work, he believed that those who wished to return to Work should not be prevented from doing so by those supporting the Strike.38 Here is an early statement of a position that he repeated "lany times in his career. While claiming to be a defender of unions iand their right to strike, he was an even more vigorous exponent of the rights of those who did not wish to join unions. Considering the difficulty of a union functioning under the terms he set, it is clear that denied it, Al hinting favoring 11 I3 I15 lrc NIIM' union, 3 ~ ill-en N the? fore Emil/ed uUIlhleS w 2‘ A .I Jig): th‘ “'3 "lid f. 24 clear that the description of him as anti-union, however much he denied it, was valid. Although from an agrarian district, and despite owning and operating farms, Hoffman opposed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, favoring what he termed "legitimate" aid for farmers. He thought it was wrong to practice scarcity, lose foreign markets, limit pro- duction, and then pay millions to reclaim land. In an article in the Allegan Gazette he deprecated the AAA for costing the farmers their foreign markets without bringing prosperity at home. As he perceived it the AAA was established under the pretense of aiding the farmers, but it was actually an attempt to buy the farm vote.39 It was certainly easier for him to oppose the AAA since the act did not cover fruit, an important commodity in his district. However, since the act was aimed mainly at commercial farmers who raised sizable cash crops, his opposition was also in keeping with llis support of small business, small farming, and small government.40 He remained a firm opponent of government subsidies to farmers, though, as will be seen, he was not averse to helping them in other |Willis. He was also upset by the inconsistency of Roosevelt's farm p01 icies which to Hoffman typified the whole New Deal. He noted how, when the government paid the farmers to limit production, it a 1 1 owed the inportation of food and spent money for irrigation proj- 41 Qt: ts which resulted in additional farmland. He could not support he hat he considered such contradictory and poorly conceived schemes. U isolation iii vote tie into 25 Despite being well known later in his career as a leading isolationist, he gave little evidence of this in his first term. He did vote for the Neutrality Act of 1936, and he put a newspaper arti- cle into the Congressional Record praising various critics of the World Court, but there were few indications of his strong isolationist views that made him a center of controversy during World War II.42 * At the end of the 74th Congress, one could begin to discern the positions that Hoffman would take in the future, although the intensity of his views in certain areas had yet to become clear. To solve the economic problems, he favored government regulation of big business, but not in a manner that would destroy small businesses, opposed the government's attempt to control nature and crop produc- tion, and criticized it for unfairly taxing those who wanted to work and pay their own way. He advocated the virtues he learned as a Cfliild: the value of hard work, self-reliance and a largely laissez- f’iiire role for the federal government. He seemed more interested i" the long run consequences of actions rather than in the immediate prOblems. Too much deviation from the policies of rugged individual- ? Sm, too much reliance on alphabet agencies rather than private e""‘l‘-erprise, while perhaps meeting a present need, would ultimately prove more detrimental than positive. He sumped up his overall OD ~inion of the Roosevelt administration by saying: "Flying the flag OP humanity, preaching the doctrine of charity and of helpfulness, 0 IF kindliness, of justice and equality, this administration's army ii office. are group 26 of officeholders, marching under the black flag of piracy, has robbed l one group of taxpayers to seduce another."43 If his views were not fully known, he had made his positions l on some issues clear enough to cause someone to send him a threaten- He thought the letter, from a "K.K.K. Member," could It read: I ing letter. possibly have been sent by someone in the Black Legion. "You saps . . . are all going to have a green place two by six before many months unless you get doing something for the people." He was warned that if he did not start soon, the Ku Klux Klan "will give you a ride." The writer, saying that he would like "to punch that dirty mug of yours," called Hoffman a "traitor" who was "not fit to represent a dog house." Hoffman showed his courage by criticizing the Black Legion the next day in a House speech.44 His courage and willingness to do what he thought was right even if it was not the politically expedient decision, were traits he exhibited during his twenty-eight years in the House. The wisdom of such behavior was tested in his first try at re-election when both he and Roosevelt sought approval for their policies. * While it was uncertain what the voters thought of his efforts, various district newspapers praised his actions during his first term. The Cassopolis Vigilant said that he made a greater impres- s ‘i on than the typical first termer, which may have been true, but certainly it was correct in predicting that if retained, "it is an The Allegan E‘5555l‘r9d fact that he "111 grow in power and influence." E, in E tising Oil has of 1 his actior Ti lAIS, gas hill, “'91 Nils-on n '27 News, in endorsing his re-election, said that "it is the best adver- tising our county could possibly have to appear constantly in the press of the nation."45 (Such publicity was mainly the result of his actions concerning the Townsend plan.) The main primary issue was the Townsend plan. The Townsend- ites, eager to defeat him for his role in the investigation of the plan, urged the election of Felix A. Racette, a Paw Paw dental surgeon who had sought Townsendite backing for a year. Some dis- trict papers claimed that the race was being watched both throughout the state and the nation as a test of Townsendite strength. It would have been difficult to find a more bitter congressional opponent of the plan running against a supporter of it. Racette also ran on the National Union for Social Justice platform and, according to one paper, was endorsed by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the head of the movement.46 With Racette wooing the Townsendite vote, Hoffman had to clarify his position on old age pensions. Declaring his support fOr the concept of such pensions, he favored a maximum payment of 1945 per month for the elderly based on need, of which a maximum of $30 should be paid by the state and $15 by the federal government. When a heckler interrupted Hoffman to ask for the microphone for two minutes, Hoffman retorted: "You're like the Townsendites--on the give me end every time." Stating that the plan could not pass, he asked if it was not preferable to have a candidate working for the people "instead of someone who would be chasing rainbows. "47 28 Hoffman, who, according to one newspaper, entered the race with the odds apparently against him, won a "memorable primary achievement." His "flattering" vote of over 20,000 was almost 9,000 more than Racette's. In commenting on his win, he noted the sizable number of voters who did not realize that the slogan "'something for nothing,‘ if followed to its logical end, will ruin the country." He urged those who voted against him to unite to fight the important issue: "Shall our country continue under the Constitution, or shall we have a government of men, rather than of law?"48 To Hoffman this was a sincere question and a major concern. Considering that the leading Democratic candidate, Guy M. Tyler, polled just over 4,000 votes, it seemed that Hoffman would have little trouble in November, although because of the Townsendite opposition, he privately noted that it was not going to be easy. His concern was justified as this election was the closest of his career. He defeated Tyler by just over 5,000 votes (49,461 to 44,365). Part of his problem arose because, unlike 1934, Michigan was in step with the national trend toward the Democratic party. iAlso Racette, who ran in the general election, polled over 4,000 votes which may have held down Hoffman's total. One paper wrote ‘that there was no event more puzzling in the election than his \Iictory considering the strong vote for Roosevelt and the Democratic state ticket. The paper concluded that the answer was that he was "czandid, frank, forceful and fearless. The voters know where he stands." He "says what he means and means what he says. It must be that they '1ike that kind of a guy. ...49 ill iisnungi his villin lies with his hens. 29 Although he once admitted that it was "heartbreaking and discouraging to attempt to follow one's convictions while voting," his willingness to say what he thought and to vote for his princi- ples with little concern for the consequences never diminished in his twenty-eight years in the House.50 Footnotes Chapter 1 1Charles W. Schull, "The Tenure of Michigan in the Congress of the United States," Michigan History 49 (June l965):l72. 25 November 1967; Con ressional Record, 75:1 (28 June 1937) p. 6466, hereafter cited as Ca 3CR, 86:2 (25 May 1960) p. 11067: CR, 82:1 (8 March 1951) p. 2147; Volta Torrey, "Clare Hoffman Looks Bad to You--but Here's How He Looks to the Home Folks," PM's Sunday Picture News, 12 September 1943, p. 4 in the file of Helen Boyer, Allegan, Michigan, hereafter referred to as HBF. “ca. 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14370. 5CR, 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14369. Goa, 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14369. 7CR, 87:2 (20 July 1962) pp. 14369-70. 80R, 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14367; political ad in Hoffman Scrapbooks in the Allegan Public Library, Allegan, Michigan, here- after cited as HS. 90R, 90:1 (13 November 1967) p. 32208; CR, 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14369. 10James C. Duran, "Supreme Court Packing and the New Deal. 'The View from Southwestern Michigan," Michigan History 52 (Spring 1968): 13; CR, 90: 1 (13 November 1967) p. 32208. nUnidentified article, 18 September 1934 in HS; campaign iid in HS; Orville E. Atwood, comp., Michi an Official Director and Legislative Manual, 1935- 36 (State of Michigan, 1935), p. 213, here- after cited as Michigan Manual 12Bentgn Harbor News-Palladium, 9 November 1940 and 8 November 1 944'. unidentified articles 4 and 18 September 1934. All items in lhlii. 13Campaign ad; reprint of a letter from Hoffman to various newspapers. Both items in HS. 30 'l'hiczr - ya. ‘. - 131: t 111; 4'; \‘m ier lsél 31 ‘4Benton Harbor News-Palladium, 8 November 1944 in HS; Michi an Manual‘1935-36, p. 271; Detroit Free Press, 8 November 934; New York Times, 24 November 1935. 'sca, 87:2 (20 July 1962) p. 14370: New York Times, 5 Novem- ber 1967. 16James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: the Growthiof the Conservative Coalitionjn_C0ngress, 1933- 1939(University Press ofKentucky, 1967), pp. 33, 38. 1708, 83:1 (20 June 1953) p. 7367: New York Times, 5 Novem- .ber 1967. ‘BCR, 74:2 (24 February 1936) p. 2687. ‘9cn, 74:2 (24 February 1936) p. 2689. zoca, 74:2 (24 February 1936) p. 2687. z‘ca, 74:2 (10 January 1936) p. 291: 68, 74:1 (12 March 1935) p. 3479; CR, 74:1 (24 January 1935) p. 942. 220R, 74:1 (21 June 1935) p. 9879; 68, 74:1 (15 July 1935) p. 11195; CR, 87:1 (7 March 1961) pp. 3378-79. 23011, 74:2 (24 February 1936) p. 2687. 2‘08, 74:2 (8 January 1936) p. 171: ca, 74:2 (17 June 1936) p. 9765. 25E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the Seventy-fourth Congress, January 3, 1935, to August 26, 1935," American Political Science Review 29 (Deceuber 1935):993-94; CR, 74:1 (13 May 1935) p. 7415; CR, 74:1 (19 March 1935) pp. 4030-31. For some of his veterans' 1e islation see CR, 77:2 (18 March 1942) p. 2675; CR, 77:2 (8 June 1942? p. 5015; CR, 78:1 (22 September 1943) pp. 7758-59; and New York Times, 22 December 1943. 260R, 74:2 (25 March 1936) pp. 4331-32. 270R, 74:2 (17 June 1936) pp. 9818-19. 280R, 74:2 (17 June 1936) pp. 9819-20. 29CR, 74:1 (21 August 1935) p. 14021. CR, 74:2 (17 June 1936) p. 9820. CR, 74:1 (13 March 1935) p. 3554. 30 31 11. 92-91 13:: 1 VJ] . 18:130n‘: ii. 618', 1 ‘15 ”111" 1.\ Mimi 1 (55051511 32 320R, 74:1 (18 April 1935) p. 5983; CR, 74:1 (24 Apri1 1935) p. 6310. 33George Holfskill and John A. Hudson, All but the Peo 1e: Franglin D. Roosevelt and His Critics, 1933-39 (Macmillan, 1969), p. 2 6. 340R, 74:2 (17 June 1936) p. 9765; CR, 74:2 (6 January 1936) pp. 92-93; CR, 74:2 (27 January 1936) p. 1071. 350R, 74:2 (6 January 1936) pp. 93-94: CR, 74:2 (27 January 1936) p. 1071. For an example of praise from a critic see Drew Pearson's column in the Detroit Free Press, 20 March 1962. 36New York Times, 19 June 1936; CR, 74:2 (17 January 1936) p. 618; CR, 74:2 (20 January 1936) pp. 759-61. 370R, 74:2 (7 May 1936) p. 6858; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 551-52; Abraham Ho??man, T e ownsend Movement: A Political Study (Bookman Associates, 1963), p. 161; unidentified and undated article in HS; Francis E. Townsend, edited by Jesse George Murray, New Horizons: An Autobio ra h (J. L. Stewart, 1943), pp. 200-12; CR, 74:2 (17 June 1936) p. 9965; New York Times, 19 June 1936; CR, 74:2 (16 March 1937) p. 2259. 38CR, 74:1 (10 June 1935) p. 9009. 39CR, 74:2 (8 January 1936) p. 168; CR, 74:2 (6 January 1936) p. 92: CR, 74:2 (25 March 1936) p. 4330. 40Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade:I_From New Era through New Deal, 1929-1941 (Harper 8 Row, 1947): p. 208. 41CR, 74:1 (2 August 1935) p. 12320. “gnaw York Times, 5 November 1967; CR, 74:1 (11 March 1935) pp. 3414-15. 43CR, 74:1 (10 April 1935) p. 5385; CR, 74:2 (25 March 1936) p. 4330. 44New York Times, 28 May 1936; CR, 74:2 (28 May 1936) pp. 8244-45 . 45Cassopolis Vigjlant, 18 June 1936; Allegan News, as quoted ‘in an undated political adll Also see the editorial From the Decatur Rajublican reprinted in the Allegan Gazette, 30 April 1936. A11 newspapers in HS. 1 fie-d and 1936', E 1 flea" and l livers C: ‘19 I ___,_._ 41/;711 ~ 4 (Erion Br sentley H 155111; 11 11 1018.05 51 435111 Pal 33 46Benton Harbor News-Palladium, 16 September 1936; unidenti- fied and undated article; South Haven Dail Tribune, 16 September 1936; Hartford Day Spring, 16 §eptember 1936. A11 newspapers in HS. 47Benton Harbor News-Palladium, 16 September 1936; unidenti- fied and undated article. Both items in HS. 48Benton HarborNews-Palladium, 16 September 1936; Three Rivers Commercial, 16 September1936; Michi an Manual, 1937-38, p. 217; A11egan News, 16 September 1936. All newspapers in HS. 49Hoffman to Hilber Marion Brucker, 23 September 1936, Hilber Marion Brucker Papers, Box 3, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, hereafter Cited as BHL; Michi an Manual, 1937-38, pp. 217, 278; Hartford Day Spring, 11 November 1 in HS. 5°Hoffman to C. A. French, 27 April 1937, Ernest James McCall Papers, Box 1 in BHL. CHAPTER 2 "Silence Shall Never Be My Part" (1937-39) It was in his second term that Clare E. Hoffman first gained significant national attention as an anti-labor congressman because of his vigorous condemnation of the sit-down strikes in Flint, Michigan, as well as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and its head, John L. Lewis. According to the Detroit News, by the end of this term his views on organized labor had earned him a position on every union's purge list and resulted in his being ranked as "Enemy No. l" on union lists until supplanted by Fred A. Hartley (R, New Jersey) in 1947.1 The labor issue dominated the remainder of his congressional career. * If Republicans were disturbed by their party's weakness in the 74th Congress, then the 75th Congress must have been a traumatic experience, especially for the conservatives. With only eighty-nine Republicans in the House, of whom eighty were considered conserva- tive, their opportunities to affect legislation were never less Promising.2 Aided by the shortage of Republicans which made receiving a (:hoice committee assignment easy, Hoffman was appointed to a major 34 35 committee, and, considering the makeup of his district, a logical one.3 He was now on the Agricultural Committee, while he continued his service on the Expenditures in the Executive Departments and the Har Claims Committee. His tenure on the Agricultural Committee was short, however, as his interests were more in the labor area as this term clearly showed. * The first session of Congress was described by the New York 11m§§_as the "stormiest and the least productive in recent years."4 Hoffman may or may not have contributed to the lack of productivity, but his remarks, especially those regarding the sit-down strikes, certainly helped make it stormy. The sit-down tactic first became prominent during the six week strike at the General Motors plant in Flint, beginning on 31 December 1936. During much of the strike Democratic Governor Frank Murphy, who, along with Labor Secretary Frances Perkins tried to end the dispute, remained in almost daily contact with the Roosevelt administration.5 After the police failed to drive the strikers from the plants, many people favored mobilizing the state militia to oust the workers. Murphy, despite believing that the strike was illegal, refused, preferring persuasion and behind-the-scenes maneuvering tn a bloody confrontation. He defended his actions on the ground ‘that had he acted otherwise the result would have been the loss of 'life and the destruction of both democratic values and industrial progress. He on history as "1100 While 01 111116), the :01 “91511108 :1 WM. hirph‘ mession of 19 Hoffman t1135011311n0r, Situation the S Saying, to a bi Plesidem, Grow in (mp5. Hh & Why, he mu to a M Mandi-ha“ 1° 5€tt1e the He C11 2163 had Die: the 36 progress. He once told a friend that he was not going down in history as "Bloody Murphy."6 Hhile the public originally approved his handling of the problem, the spread of sit-downs across the country weakened his early support and became an important issue in his 1938 re-election attempt. Murphy lost, although whether it was the sit-downs or the recession of 1937-38 that cost him a second term is debatable.7 Hoffman was not one to join in the numerous accolades for the Governor. When asked if he would not have managed the Flint situation the same way Murphy had, he replied that he would not, saying, to a burst of applause, that he would have acted like President Grover Cleveland in the Pullman strike of 1894 and sent in troops. Hhen the idea of behaving like Cleveland was suggested to Murphy, he tersely remarked: "But this is not 1894.“ Hoffman wrote to a friend saying he wished he were governor of Michigan for two-and-a-half days, adding that he might not even need half-a-day to settle the dispute.8 He disagreed with those who maintained that Murphy's poli- cies had precluded bloodshed. Conceding that it was true in Flint, he insisted that Murphy had encouraged incidents elsewhere, citing 9 His contention seems to be at the spread of sit-downs in Detroit. least partially valid. The number of sit-downs did increase. The question remains, however, what the repercussions would have been had numerous deaths resulted from an effort to forceably eject the Strikers from the factories. Adopting a peaceful policy allowed people to reflect on the sit-down tactic, with sentiment growing hamstit to Mdmuc mmum Nued,u0u1d Claim' 14111110910 File,“ he won idnstthe 5 5111011 given “WMHm 10' rammed 1911831 in 19 Tm he saw a MFE11111511 111mm ”Off: 37 against it to the point where it was rarely used. That the popular- ity of the tactic would have diminished sooner had there been blood- shed may be true, but the cost in other ways, ways that Murphy feared, would seem to have been far more damaging. Claiming that the lack of action by either Roosevelt or Murphy meant that they were "permitting, if not sanctioning, mob rule," he wondered if Murphy's refusal to enforce a court order. against the strikers was payment for the political and financial support given to the Democrats by the CIO. He also speculated as to whether Murphy, a former Governor General of the Philippines who had returned to the United States to run for governor at Roosevelt's request in 1936, had been brought back to do "his master's bidding." That he saw a master-servant relationship is clear in his remark of 23 February 1939 when he called Murphy Roosevelt's Charlie McCarthy. 1 O Hoffman, whom historian Sidney Fine called "the most vocif- erous Congressional critic of the sit-down from the very outset," raised the issue of the strikes in his first speech in the new Congress. He claimed that the strike was a direct result of the President's teachings and the encouragement given by Roosevelt to John L. Lewis, the president of the C10, and his followers. Later he said that GM owned the factories and no one had the right to take them away, a view shared by many, including persons generally in favor of labor's position in the strike, such as Perkins.n The New York Times credited Hoffman with bringing the sit-