WIIHIHHINN!MlINIIUHIWIHIHIHIlllllllHHll 128 219 THS J IIHIHWIW|||HlIHHHIHIHIlllllllllH‘lllllllllllHHl 3 1293 01409 139 This is to certify that the thesis entitled Iris Murdoch: An Ethics of Love presented by Teresa L. Crane has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for M.A. degree in Philosophy Mm— Major professor Date April 7, 1995 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution [LIBRARY Michigan State University PLACED! RETURN BOXtomnmmbchockomme TOAVOlDFlNESrotunonorbdonddoduo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU loAnNflrmntlvo Adlai/Equal Opportunly Institulon W1 IRIS MURDOCH: AN ETHICS OF LOVE BY Teresa L. Crane A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Philosophy 1995 ABSTRACT IRIS MURDOCH: AN ETHICS OF LOVE Teresa L. Crane This thesis examdnes the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch and offers it as an alternative to such ethical systems as Kantianism.and modern analytic formulations. Murdoch's system does not ignore, but rather addresses, that which is ignored by most other ethical systems, the inner life of the individual. This is because Murdoch holds that love is a central moral concept. This claim is examdned and it is revealed how loving can, using the example of parenting, lead to moral growth. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1 CHAPTER 1. MURDOCH: METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS ....................... 4 A. MURDOCH AS PLATONIST B. THE GOOD Bl. THE SUN AS A METAPHOR FOR THE GOOD BZ. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOOD 2. STEPPING FORWARD TO THE GOOD ......................... 12 A. STEPPING FORWARD TO THE GOOD THROUGH BEAUTY B. SELFLESS LOVING AS A ROUTE TO THE GOOD C. PARENTING: A WORK OF LOVE 3. A CRITIQUE: MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND KANTIANISM...25 A. THE LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN B. KANTIAN ETHICS: DUTY AS A MODE OF ETHICAL BEING C. KANTIAN ETHICS: MURDOCHIAN REPLY CONCLUSION ................................................ 38 LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................ 40 iii INTRODUCTION "It seems to me there is a void in present-day moral philosophy” says Iris Murdoch in her article "On ’God' and ’Good’.1 I am sure many of us as well have felt something important missing while reading ethical texts. To these persons Iris Murdoch offers a different style of ethical inquiry which addresses the 'deep' issues that are ignored in most ethical texts. The ’deep’ matters are those which refers to the inner and particular experiences and the conscious life of the individual. Many ethical texts construct or support an ethical system consisting of axioms or duties. These duties and axioms are supposed to apply universally prescribing public actions, they do not deal with the particular and conscious life of individuals, thereby ignoring the 'deep' issues that Murdoch finds essential to ethics. These ethical theories fail to describe what it is to be human or what human consciousness is like and how it can be changed. For these reasons these theories cannot and do not provide a moral philosophy one could live by. Because Murdoch examines the inner life of the individual and describes how human consciousness is changed- -how one can become a good person-~she calls her work a 1 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignity Of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) 46. 2 moral psychology rather than moral philosophy. In this paper I will provide an account of Murdoch's moral psychology, or an ethics that emphasizes the moral value of love as a route to the Good, and argue that her construction of ethics and ethical inquiry do not only pay attention to the 'deep' and particular but are built around them. I will be centering in on one specific concept of Murdoch’s ethics which affects the inner life of humans—- love. Love is, for Murdoch, a central concept in morals. It can bring about a change of consciousness which brings us closer to the Good. This point is made by not only Murdoch but by such diverse thinkers as Plato, Dante, and others. After my examination of Murdoch’s basic philosophy and moral psychology I will clarify the role of love in her works and in our lives. I will show that love is not philosophically irrelevant, because by examining love we can gain an understanding of ourselves, and come to see that love is an essential part of a moral life. Love can redirect and transform our thoughts, desires, actions and essentially our entire lives—-personal love and loving attention can produce moral growth. For these reasons love is essential to morality. Murdoch's moral psychology explains just how human consciousness is changed by love in general and how it brings us closer to the good. The concept of love is one of those deep matters that is either ignored or condemned by most ethical systems. In 3 fact, most ethical systems fail to see the different levels and ways we are morally involved in the world. I will also briefly examine some of the criticisms of an ethics of love and defend it. To defend this ethics I will make an appeal to my own personal experiences as a parent. Being a parent(and also being a friend) illustrates how love is a central concept of morality and also how loving is the central task of the moral agent. In the work of some other contemporary moral philosophers such as Lawrence Blum, Sara Ruddick, and Nell Noddings many of these same points are made. Through my exposition of her position and the use of my own examples and I will show that Murdochian ethics provides a moral philosophy that indeed describes what it is to be human and again makes the concept of love central, as it was during the time of Plato. CHAPTER 1 MURDOCH: METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS A. MURDOCH AS PLATONIST Iris Murdoch is a Platonist. Plato searched for the grounds of absolute knowledge. The world we perceive by the senses, he held, is constantly changing and therefore what we perceive cannot be considered knowledge but only mere opinion. The material world is less real. For true knowledge to be possible there must be something eternal and changeless. It has to be of something eternally true not true for now. What is most real, holds Plato, is not perceived by the senses like our world of appearance, but is grasped by the mind. For Plato what is the most real is the Forms or Ideas. The Forms not only make absolute knowledge possible but morality objective. The forms are general concepts or universal notions. The highest form or form of forms for Plato, is the Good. As we pursue knowledge we get closer to the Good. For Plato, therefore, the Good is the aim of the good life. Murdoch, being a Platonist, asserts that the Good exists and is the aim of human life. But the Good is neither easily found nor is it definable. This is not an imperfection on part of the Good, but rather due to the S complexity of the Good and human fragility. The complexity of the Good itself leads to its indefinability in its inexhaustability. For whatever there is we say about the Good it does not and cannot provide a complete definition or description of the Good. This is why we must resort to the use of metaphor when we do talk about the Good. The mysteriousness of the Good is also due to human limitations and human fragility. We cannot accept the fact that the world is contingent and there is no external telos. Murdoch assumes that “human beings are naturally selfish” and construct lives built around illusions to deny the fact that not only is virtue pointless but so is life.2 Murdoch believes that we live in a fantasy created by our ego to save us from the contingency of the world. This life of illusion, of selfish fantasies, blinds us not only to the truth of the world, but it also veils the Good. This too is rooted in Platonic thought because according to Plato we live a life of illusion rarely penetrated by the real. The most damaging and untruthful fantasy created by the ego, according to Murdoch, is that there is a purpose to life. We try to veil the fact that there is no external telos or meaning to life except that which is found within human experience. But life is self—contained. This is because the selfish person wants to make the task of becoming virtuous and living the Good life seem.simpler than 2 Murdoch, Sovereignty 78. 6 it really is, and most importantly, wants to escape from the ultimate contingency—-death. In other words what mankind seeks is consolation. Man will go to great lengths to create and sustain the fantasy that life has an external telos or meaning. An example of this is religion, particularly Christianity. In Christianity there is a God who is a creator of all value and also guarantees a purpose for life. Because Christianity veils the real world, and offers false redemption with the idea of suffering as a way to overcome death, Murdoch finds much fault with it. But it is not only religion that supports this fantasy, for man himself, throughout the ages, according to Murdoch, has also created other systems to accomplish this. As stated above fantasies are created to veil the world of reality, the world of contingency. It is a world without purpose, with no general overall pattern. Life is a muddle. In a world of contingency there is no consolation. The truth of the world tends to break through even the most stubborn and strong fantasy. That there is no consolation, that our fantasies seem to have limits, is revealed in the tragic. The contingency must be apprehended because, according to Murdoch, it serves ”as a reminder of our fragility, of death and of the vain suffering of the frustrated ego and the emptiness of so many of its worldly desires".3 It is the 3 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin Press, 1993) 103-104. 7 tragic that forces us to apprehend this. The tragic has a special meaning, and neither real life nor religion is tragic according to Murdoch.4 Tragedy only exists in art, more specifically in the form of poetry“.5 The tragic must be powerful enough to display the horrors of life, enough to stop the ego in its tracks, revealing its futile fantasies, on this account she is much like Sartre. But for Murdoch, unlike Sartre, this experience of the tragic leads to a purification of the individual. I say purification because although the apprehension of contingency at first brings feeling of terror and horror, according to Murdoch when we properly understand it we are given a feeling of exhilaration and spiritual power.6 It is only great poetry that ”can raise language to the pitch of clarified moral intensity which enables it to display the horrors of human life in dramatic formu"7‘With great poetry we are left with the truthful vision that we cannot escape the pointless necessity of life, the horrors of human life, and the futility of selfish desires. The tragic reveals that which we most importantly want to avoid--the reality of death with no consolation. Yale ‘ Murdoch, Metaphysics 93. 5 Murdoch, Metaphysics 116. 5 Iris Murdoch, ”The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited,” Review 49 (December 1959): 268 7 Murdoch, Metaphysics 116. 8 It is easy to understand the nausea of Sartre after we View this portrait of the contingency of the world and fragility of human life presented by Murdoch. But Murdoch is not driven to create her philosophy out of a fear of the contingent. Murdoch, says Peter Wolfe in The Disciplined figapp, "harbors no nausea for the contingent world."8 Murdoch is driven by her belief in the existence of the Good. She never leaves us with this horrible picture of human life but "clearly offers something that can be offset against the cyclical nightmare of a human life. This is her concept of the good-—affirmed and denied before the world and between the rocks.'9 It is this mysterious concept of the Good, which I have thus far only mentioned briefly, which I will now try to clarify. B : THE GOOD In the above section I have referred to the mysteriousness and indefinability of the Good, Murdoch’s central concept. The concept of the Good is one that can never be fully understood. It is one of the concepts that Murdoch says "is impossible to discuss. . .without resort 8 Peter Wolfe, The Disciplined Heart (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966) 23. 9 Suguna Ramananthan, Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1990) 9. 9 to metaphor."10 Murdoch is a Platonist, and the Good is a Platonic concept. Plato never defined the Good but used the metaphor of the Sun(as in the case of the cave myth) to illustrate what he meant by this concept. Let us examine this metaphor for clues to understand the Idea of the Good. Bl. THE SUN AS A METAPHOR FOR THE GOOD In the Republic Plato explains his metaphysical system through the Cave myth. The Good, which Plato and Murdoch assert as the sovereign concept, is explained by resort to metaphor. The sun represents or acts as a metaphor for the Good. According to Plato, it is the sun that not only causes sight but is also that which is seen by sight. What this means is that the Good gives the power of knowing to the knower and is in fact the source of all knowledge and truth. For the Platonist it is that through whose light we see the world. Murdoch uses this metaphor in her ontological proof for the Good when she states, "Good is unique, it is 'above being', it fosters our sense of reality as the sun fosters life on earth."11 The Good is unique because unlike we humans, the Good possesses necessary existence or is 'above being’. In fact it is the most real for both Plato and ” Murdoch, Sovereignty 77. “ Murdoch, Metaphysics 399. lO Murdoch.12 The metaphor of the Sun also reveals this point by asserting the necessary existence of the Good and the sovereignty of this concept. Let us now examine more closely the relation between the Good and all other concepts. B2.THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOOD I hope it is becoming clear that learning or explaining the meaning of the Good is more complex than learning other concepts. We have seen that we must resort to metaphor or risk 'a loss of substance’. The Good can also not be defined in terms of its parts. And unlike other concepts the Good cannot be ostensively defined. There are many concepts which cannot be pointed to in the world--Truth, Justice, and Courage for example. Both Plato and Murdoch remind us that asking what the Good is is different than asking what concepts like Courage or Truth mean.13 Because of the Good's special metaphysical and ethical status it effects how we answer the latter questions and must be used to explain these other concepts. Indeed these virtues themselves are inseparable from the Good. The Good alone is a central idea and the source of all other virtues. It is not only the most real object, but the most perfect. Through an acquaintance with these other virtues we can come to an ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 398. ” Murdoch, Sovereignty 98. acquaintance with the Good. Let us now examine more closely Murdoch's view of the human relation to the Good. 11 CHAPTER TWO STEPPING FORWARD TO THE GOOD The Good is not something that needs a proof to reveal its existence. This is because, says Murdoch, "We find out in the most minute details of our lives that the Good is real."“ Murdoch feels we intuit the existence of the Good in everyday life when we view imperfection and when we try to accomplish something. And Murdoch believes, it is a basic human aspiration to understand that which we intuit everyday or in other words "we long to understand a truth which we already intuit."15 We intuit the truth that the Good is real through our everyday experiences that acquaint us with the idea of perfection. For instance when I am grading papers as I read through a variety of papers that range from poor to good I hold in my head the idea of a perfect paper. Even in the simple example of someone drawing a circle as they draw they have in mind a perfect circle they are trying to copy. Just as I may never grade a perfect paper or draw a perfect circle I am acquainted with the idea of perfection in daily life. It must be noted, as Murdoch emphasizes, to intuit something and to understand something are two completely different things. “ Murdoch, Metaphysics 430. ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 398. 12 13 I-revealed at the beginning of the paper that which obstructs our comprehension of the Good—~the fantasies of our fat relentless ego. Our route to knowledge of the Good is that which strips our illusions or draws our attention away from our ego-induced fantasies and enables us to view the world as it is. I have asserted that both Plato and Murdoch connect knowledge with morality. Murdoch believes that, for the most part, as we move away from our illusions we are not only gaining knowledge about the world, we are also becoming more moral. For this reason that which provides devices for the purification of the spirit, invokes unselfish attention, and occasions for ’unselfing' are connected not only with truth but with virtue and moral growth. I must emphasize that ’unselfing' is not a complete denial of the self. It is indeed a move away from the self of the egoistic fantasies. In the process of 'unselfing' we are drawn away from.the selfish interests associated with the life of illusion.16 This does not mean we have no 'self “ Professor Judith Andre first brought to my attention the possibility of a denial of the self through the process of unselfing. She also brought to my attention that 'self—directed’ action is rarely seen as moral in the same way that 'other- directed' action is. In Speaking From the Heart: A Feminist Perspective on Ethics (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992), Rita C. Manning questions the idea of 'careful and just attention'. She questions if this does not imply being taken advantage of as well as if it implies placing the good of the other over the good of the self. These are some questions I think Murdoch needs to address, but ones that I do not see as destroying the validity of her moral philosophy. I feel and argue in the paper that Murdoch would deny any of these charges. 14 interest' though. Murdoch is no way denies the importance of self in ethics. In fact, in Murdochian ethics, as we attend to others and are absorbed in their independent existence we are learning more about ourselves. This absorption in others does not last continually, nor should it for us to be considered morally. There is always a return to the self. Selfhood, Murdoch insists, is only achieved when we are engaged with others. This engagement enhances our vision of ourselves and the world. We need only think of how important in our own lives our friends, parents, children, and/or significant others are for revealing truths about ourselves. When loved ones go through difficult times, or even worse, die, we often hear people make remarks to the effect that--'I found out what was important in my life”. The attention and love that cause ’unselfing’, or the piercing of the egoistic fantasy, also cause an increase of self-knowledge. Through the process of ’unselfing' we become more our true selves. The two major examples I will use to illustrate the concept of 'unselfing’ are beauty and love. This is not to say that nothing else can bring knowledge of the good, for, as Murdoch says, ”anything which alters consciousness in the direction of the unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue.n17 But in this paper we will see that experiences of beauty and love provide these “ Murdoch, Sovereignty 84. 15 conversions and reveals what we call the Good or the reality of transcendent perfection. A: STEPPING FORWARD TO THE GOOD THROUGH BEAUTY Beauty, is the most obvious and easily accessible route to the Good. According to Plato in the Phaedrus, "We see and love beauty more readily than we love good, it is the spiritual thing to which we are most immediately and instinctively attracted."18 Plato believed that beauty was to be found only in nature, but Murdoch argues that beauty is also in art. Murdoch asserts that beauty in nature and art teaches us the virtues of ’just and attentive looking’. Attention is a concept Murdoch borrows from the philosopher Simone Weil. In "The Idea of Perfection" she says that she uses the term ”to express the idea of a just and loving gaze upon an individual reality". ” Let us look more closely at the concept of attention and then look at what attending properly to nature means. Murdoch asserts that much of our conduct is moved by egoistic fantasy.20 Morality must address that which can lead to the suppression of the ego and for her a technique 1’10. ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 14. ” Iris Murdoch "The Idea of Perfection," Yale Review 53, 2 (Spring 1964) 371. ” Murdoch, Sovereignty 52. 16 for doing this is attention. When we attend properly to something we ’cease to be’ by being called to reality that it separate from us. Attention is therefore, a technique for reaching the ’Good’ because it brings about a purification of consciousness. As Murdoch says, “we can all receive moral help by focusing our attention upon things which are valuable."21 Let us look at how attending properly to nature can bring about a change of consciousness. The closest I have come to the kind of experience with nature that Murdoch describes is when, one spring in the Upper Peninsula, when the snow had melted, I climbed Sugarloaf Mountain in Marquette. At the top the view of Lake Superior and the wilderness was breathtaking and in the words of Iris Murdoch “In a moment everything [was] altered."22 In experiences like this you are drawn out of yourself and are no longer seeking ego satisfaction. There is no longer a master’s thesis to be written, legs are no longer sore from the long walk up, there are no more bills to be paid, etc. Instead there is an other that exists besides me and not for me. I am drawn out of myself to an independent reality. The feelings I received from this experience were not a ’self—directed enjoyment’ but rather a ’self—forgetful pleasure’. Murdoch asserts that through experiences like this that we ’grow by looking’. ” Murdoch, Sovereignty 56. ” Murdoch, Sovereignty 84. 17 Some might be skeptical of the power of the experience of nature to make us morally better people. But think of the environmentalists who lose themselves in the beauty of nature. By attending properly to the world, with ’a just and loving gaze’, they are able to view nature as something .intrinsically valuable and with an independent existence. ’Ihe idea of attention Murdoch is recommending is one of :respect in which we attend diligently, respectfully, Ilovingly, and justly to the other. It is an attitude of :reverence for the other. If we were all to pay the sort of aattention Murdoch recommends to nature we would all be (environmentalists and our actions would have to be affected. There is another experience that I think is more powerful than that of nature. The experience of intense personal love both creates and demands this sort of (attention to a far greater extent than that of nature, or for that matter, the experience of great works of art. Plato, in The Phaedrus, reveals the connection between jpersonal love and spiritual or moral growth. Murdoch also (emphasizes how love demands the right kind of attention. Let 11s look at how personal love can lead to an awareness of ‘truth and spiritual development. I3: SELFLESS LOVING AS A ROUTE TO THE GOOD "Of course Good is sovereign over Love, as it is sovereign over other concepts, because Love can 18 name something bad. But is there not nevertheless something about the conception of a refined love which is practically identical with Goodness? Will not ’Act lovingly’ translate ’Act perfectly’, whereas ’Act rationally’ will not?"23 In this passage from "Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts" we see the importance of love for Murdoch. Love is so closely connected to the Good because of the kind and quality of attention it demands and how this kind of attention draws us away from ourselves to focus on the other. We can understand love as a mode of perception(or way of seeing people), or as a feeling or emotion which causes a different mode of perception. We not only feel differently for our loved ones than we do for others, we also View them differently as well. Love as a feeling or emotion is dependent on human beings. It is a characteristic of humans. We can see this in Murdoch’s denial of any external meaning to life. For Murdoch meaning as well as love is to be found in human relationships. Love must have an object, and in the case of personal love, it is a person it is directed at. We cannot will ourselves to love a certain person or specific object because love is non-intentional. In other words, love is something we have no control over, hence sayings like ’falling in love’. We must will ourselves to do the work of love and pay attention to our loved ones though. Because love is an involuntary emotion it is able to pull us out of B Murdoch, Sovereignty 102. Self 19 ourselves. Murdoch also draws a distinction between good love and bad love. Bad love is selfish, ego-centered and untruthful. There is little recognition or identification with the other’s interests. Good love consists of a recognition and identification with our loved one’s interests, desires, and needs. It also consists of having benevolent desires for and a recognition of the loved one as a moral being. But love is so powerful that she admits in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals that "even bad egoistic love may lead on to teach us virtuous selfless love."24 For as Ronald Suter says "you can love someone without being motivated by moral considerations...[but] it is plausible to say that such love helps to give rise to morality."25 I will now look more closely at the connection between pure, refined love and the Good. Above I offered the technical definition of attention given by Iris Murdoch. For her refined love must contain this sort of attention. She is not alone. M. Scott Peck, author of The Road Less Traveled, says that "The principal form that the work of love takes is attention."26 Surprisingly he and Murdoch view this concept in much the ‘“ Murdoch, Metaphysics 16. 3 Ronald Suter, What is the Meaning Of Love (East Lansing: Published, 1993) 62. n F. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978) 120. 20 same light. For both it is a setting aside of ego- satisfaction, a widening of concerns that now embrace an other with an independent existence, and work directed towards spiritual growth.27 Both also emphasize that attention is a form of work or discipline. It is not something that comes easily, for as we have seen our egoistic fantasies are sturdily constructed. In Egg Phaedrus Plato too refers to the discipline and attention to the beloved required for the ’sprouting of wings’ or the movement of the individual towards the Good.28 It is our attention to our beloved that brings us closer to the Good. I will now examine what has caused for me personally a ’sprouting of wings’ or a movement towards the Good and that is my experience as a parent. C: PARENTING: A WORK OF LOVE Love and the work of love, attention, is an exercise of overcoming one’s self and viewing the world truthfully. It is an exercise of discipline and imagination. From our personal experiences many of us can relate to and understand how personal love can prompt these processes and bring on spiritual growth. It has been the birth of my daughter that N Peck, 121-131. “ Plato, The Sypposium and the Phaedrus: Plato’s Erotic Dialogues, trans. William S. Cobb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) 110-112, 253d-257b. 21 has lead to a suppression of the ’fat relentless ego’ and lead to awareness of not only her claims, needs, wishes, etc. but to those of others as well. I will explain how my pregnancy destroyed some of my fantasies and how parenting has lead to a widening of my view of the world, or my moral picture. In other words, being a parent has lead to a change or purification of my consciousness. Before the birth of my daughter my experiences with others were very ego-directed. I was only concerned with my happiness, needs, and desires and refused to acknowledge or respect the individual reality of others. Through my pregnancy and the birth of my daughter, my attention was drawn away from myself. My egoistic desires soon became secondary. Throughout my pregnancy I did things, not out of concern for myself but out of concern for the other that was inside me(i.e., I quit smoking, ate more nutritiously, etc.). When my daughter was an infant, and totally dependent on me for all aspects of her being, the suppression of my ego continued to a larger extent than it had been during my pregnancy. This was because during pregnancy you can still go through daily activities, such as work, school, and hobbies, without too much hinderance. But after the birth of a child her needs and claims come into conflict and impede your own directly. Throughout the few years my daughter has been alive I have been forced to recognize the reality of another that is not myself. The attention demanded and for 22 the most part, freely given, has to reshape your vision of the world and expand your moral vision. Deciding whether to go to work or school instead of staying home to raise a child is a moral decision, not merely a practical one. A failure to recognize the importance and dimensions of this dilemma and acknowledge it is a moral situation is to fail to recognize the world as it really is-—that our everyday life is saturated with moral choices. As Murdoch says, "at every moment we are ’attending’ or are failing to ’attend’.29 This does not mean that parents that choose to work are immoral, but rather parents that fail to ’attend’ properly to their child’s needs and claims and recognize the moral implications of such decisions do not have a grasp of the real or the true. I think the dilemma between staying home and working outside the home explained above illustrates that even with the most natural kind of love escaping the fantasies of the fat relentless ego is difficult and demands work. As a parent it demands a constant reflection upon your actions. For instance almost daily I must ask myself if I am forcing my daughter to do things because of benevolent desires for her best interests or if I want them out of some form of self-directed satisfaction. Phenomenologically the experience of attention for the giver is that of an examination of their beliefs and actions and willing ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 295. 23 yourself to recognize your child and their desires and interests. Of course this does not mean giving into to all their desires and interests but rather a recognition of their selfhood. Earlier in the paper I talked about how the ego constructs a fantasy world to veil the world of reality and how pervasive and strong these fantasies are. As natural as selfless love and caring for others is to parenthood, so is the infiltration of the ego in all aspects of life to personhood. Love, may be easy, the work of love is not. With parenting we can see the importance of doing this work-- raising human beings that aware of themselves as special and have an awareness of the uniqueness of others. My experience of being a parent has not only drawn me to the reality of another, which is my child, but to the claims and needs of others in general. Cliched as it may be, my relationship with my parents has been deeply affected by my becoming a parent. They are no longer Mom and Dad who I can borrow money from or who imposed cruel rules when I was a teenager, I have come to see them as persons with needs and desires that are independent of me and my life. I think the moral implications of being a parent are more far- reaching than this. As a parent, I think, you are more receptive and aware of the reality of other parents and children in not only your neighborhood or community but throughout the world. To comprehend the life of a mother who raises children in the inner—city where the chances of her 24 son dying because of violent crime before the age of 20 is fairly high or the life of the child who is severely beaten by his parents is not only to expand your moral picture but is a call to social action. To make the world a better place for your own children directly involves making the world a better place for all people. By doing this we ourselves get closer to the ’Good’. To love rightly we must constantly discipline ourselves to attend properly to the world, to truth. To do this is to come closer to truth and the Good. As Murdoch says "Human relationship is no doubt the most important, as well as the first, training and testing-ground of morality."30 Murdoch is not alone for another philosopher, Nel Noddings, both the recognition and longing for relatedness form the foundation for her moral philosophy. But for now I have shown that our relationships with persons can move us out of ourselves, force us to focus on another, expand our moral picture, and bring us closer to a true vision of the world. In another words they cause moral growth. ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 17. CHAPTER THREE A CRITIQUE: MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND KANTIANISM In the beginning of the paper I stated that Murdoch feels there is a void in present-day moral philosophy. Now that I have described in detail Murdoch’s ethics of love I think we are now ready to look at the ethical systems she criticizes. Her main criticisms are of the present-day moral philOSOphies which are a product of ordinary-language philOSOphy, or linguistic analysis. Although she herself is indebted to the work of Wittgenstein she believes that his work and theories are partly to blame for the lack of deepness in moral phiIOSOphy today. This is because she asserts that Wittgenstein denies the ’inner’ or ’conscious life’ of the individual, which is central to her conception of morality.31 She holds that Wittgenstein’s assertion in Philosophical Investigations that “An inner process stands in need of an outer criteria” implies that we can make no sense of ’inner stuff’ because we have not public criteria to judge them.32 This assertion, for Murdoch, seems to imply a denial of private coherent mental activity or claim ” It must be noted that this is not a majority opinion among Wittgensteinian scholars. Such Wittgensteinians as Elizabeth Anscombe and Ronald Suter are two who would reject the idea that Wittgenstein denied the ’inner life’ or ’inner stuff’. ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 271. 25 26 that the inner life or consciousness is irrelevant and it is only the public outward action that is morally or philosophically important. This, she holds, opens a door to other philosophers to create a moral philosophy based on outer action rather than inner reflection or change of consciousness. I also think it is inescapable in a paper dealing with ethics to discuss the work of Immanuel Kant. Again, I will not offer a indepth explanation of his entire moral system but rather a brief exposition of his major points. This should be enough to make clear Murdoch’s objections to his ethics of duty. We will see that Murdoch is not entirely hostile to Kant’s theory though. Duty, for Murdoch, is a steady moral force and helps us with our formation of moral habits.33 But duty is not enough. Duty itself cannot and does not constitute the whole of our moral life. We shall see that some of Murdoch’s criticisms apply to certain Kantian and some alleged Wittgensteinian views of moral philosophies. Both contemporary and Kantian moral philosophies, according to Murdoch, reduce morality to "isolated moments of moral choice." “ Both also deny the proper role of the conscious life of the individual in morality. But her criticisms of all moral philosophies will be on three fronts, empirical(descriptive), ethical ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 492. “ Murdoch, Metaphysics 297. 27 (prescriptive) and philosophical. On the empirical front she argues that they fail to describe how human beings are. On the ethical front she hold that they fail to describe how human beings ought to be. Lastly on the philosophical front she holds they fail to provide convincing arguments. Because I will not be going in depth into Wittgensteinian or Kantian ethics I cannot address the philosophical front. But I will show how each fails to give an adequate picture of humans and fail to give us a moral philosophy to live by. We will see that each fails to recognize that our moral lives are not only at isolated moments of choice but that our everyday life and problems are embedded with issues of morality. Each also fails to recognize that a redirection or purification of consciousness is a central issue of ethics. Therefore love, and the redirection of energy it causes, are seen as both ethically and philosophically irrelevant. A. THE LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN The void in present-day moral philosophy is due to a picture or moral psychology of a ’person’ that Murdoch feels is originated and based on the work of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein asserted a program of philosophy of which we study the ’use’ of words to determine meaning, which is called ordinary language philosophy. Although he himself did not apply this analysis to moral concepts other philosophers 28 have. The first real change in perspective in ethics, and the beginning of current moral philosophy is the transformation of the central question of ethics, brought on by G.E. Moore’s distinction of questions, from what is goodness? to what things are good? Moore offered his distinction to stop other philosophers from making the mistake of defining ’good’ with pleasure(like the utilitarians) or other entities. Murdoch, in fact agrees with Moore’s conception of the Good, but holds that his distinction created problems that he did not foresee. For the transformation of the central question, instead of clarifying the concept the ’good’, allowed other philosophers to rid ethics of the concept the ’good’ as a metaphysical entity. In modern ethics the ’good’ is no longer a metaphysical entity or transcendent reality, instead it is ”a movable label affixed to the world."35 It is us, who in the human activity of valuing, affix the label to things and actions in the world. For present-day moral philosophers, Murdoch says, "Goodness...is a function of will."36 This is not a minor problem for Murdoch. As we saw above the ’Good’ has an essential role in her moral philosophy, it is the source of all knowledge and truth, and for both Plato and Murdoch, the sovereign concept. Because ’good’ is seen as a function of the will and ” Murdoch, Perfection 3. “ Murdoch, Perfection 4. 29 not a metaphysical entity, moral propositions are separated from factual propositions. Some ordinary language philosophers, in particular R.M. Hare, hold that moral propositions are prescriptions about how we ought to behave, not factual statements. They also hold that we cannot derive values from facts. The diminishing of ’good’ from transcendent reality to a function of will has, in effect for Murdoch, eliminated metaphysics from ethics. Morality is not explained in terms of meta- physical concepts such as the rational will, nor in terms of psychological concepts, such as moral feelings. It is not pictured by the philosopher, nor defended by philosophical arguments, as being attached to any real natural or metaphysical structure. It is pictured without any transcendent background. It is presented simply in terms of exhortation and choices defended by reference to facts.37 Not only does modern moral philosophy have no transcendent background but the ’inner life’ or consciousness of the person is either absent or plays no part in its ethics. As the ’good’ is understood as a function of the will it is the outward movement of the will that is morally important not the level or state of consciousness. As we have seen Murdoch traces this back to Wittgenstein’s assertion in Philosophical Investigations that "An inner process stands in need of an outer criteria".38 Murdoch calls this the aspect of present-day moral philosophy the elimination of ” Iris Murdoch, "Metaphysics and Ethics", The Natgre of Metaphysics, ed. D.F. Pears (London: Macmillan, 1957) 105. ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 271. 30 the ’self’. This is because the individual is a person of action and not an individual with an inner life in these philosophies. As she states in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, they "dismiss our confused inner reflections, or flow of consciousness, as irrelevant to our outward procedures of human life."39 Both the elimination of metaphysics and the elimination of the self in present-day moral philosophy are incompatible with Murdoch’s conception of morality. Because of the elimination of metaphysical concepts, such as the ’good’, morality is no longer attached to the substance of the world. When ’good’ is made a function of the will and becomes an empty action word the inner life of the individual is also gotten rid of. The individual, which for Murdoch requires the idea of consciousness and inwardness, is eliminated. For Murdoch we are not left with an ’individual’ or ’person’ once consciousness is eliminated. Present-day moral philosophy is therefore incompatible with Murdoch’s conception of morality as the purification of consciousness aimed at knowing the ’Good’. B. KANTIAN ETHICS: DUTY AS A MODE OF ETHICAL BEING Although Murdoch is not a Kantian she has much less problems with Kantian ethics than she does with modern ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 156. 31 ethics. Contrary to her total rejection of the usefulness of the latter in teaching us to lead the good life, with Kant she does find much of moral value in his work. I will briefly outline Kantian ethics and Murdoch’s criticisms. We will see that there is no place for love in Kant’s conception of morality and there is no place for emotions or feelings because of his belief that morality is an enterprise of reason.40 Kant denies our feelings and emotions have any moral value. Although Kant also pays attention to consciousness it is only in its general aspects.41 Morality is not about a change of quality of consciousness for Kant, it is about doing your duty out of respect for the law. Kant developed an ethics which provides a rational basis for moral rules. Moral rules, he held, must be universalizable--they must be able to apply to all persons at all times. These moral rules are not merely moral advice about how to lead the good life, they are obligations. The basis of the validity of moral rules, for Kant, is pure reason. It is by reason alone all humans can know these moral obligations, or duties. To be moral it is not enough that our actions conform to these duties, our motives for these actions must be out of respect for our obligation. I “ Lawrence Blum, FriendshipI AltruismI and Morality (Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1980) 2-3. “ Murdoch, Metaphyics 231. 32 only act morally when I act for the sake of duty and recognize that duty demands I act this way. For example, if both Bob Smith and I stop to help a family whose car has died on the side of the road, and I help because I recognize it as my moral obligation and Bob Smith does it out of sympathy for the family, only I am acting morally. According to Kant reason alone leads you to the realization of your moral duties. And these moral duties are the only moral motives permitted by Kant. As we saw with the example above, sympathy or emotion is not a legitimate motive for a moral act. This is because Kant's emphasis in his ethics is on impartiality on one hand, and universability, on the other. The moral agent has to be impartial to all and cannot act so as to prefer their own or that of loved ones interests. To act out of love or sympathy is to act out of special concern for an individual, it is not acting impartially. The moral principles implied by our actions done out of feelings or emotions are not universalizable, according to Kant. They cannot be valid for all persons at all times because emotions are one, transitory, meaning they can change, two, they are uncontrollable, meaning we do not choose the feelings and emotions we have--they are not a product of willing. For Kant these characteristics of emotions, which reveal their distinctness from reason, prove their unreliability as moral motives. Love, and all other emotions are not only of no 33 moral significance they can also cloud our moral judgment. For these reasons emotions and feelings, or more specifically for my goals, Love, can play no role in morality or moral motivation. C. KANTIAN ETHICS: MURDOCHIAN REPLY I have said that Murdoch does not completely reject Kantian ethics and finds moral value in his theory. I will quickly review some of the positive points, for Murdoch of Kant’s moral philosophy. But I will conclude by explaining why, although Kant describes one mode of ethical being, he fails to grasp the depth and multi-layeredness of morality. Kant’s emphasis on duties is beneficial for us in that they reveal to us that we are morally required to do things we may not be inclined or want to do.‘2 Duties are an imposition on our egoistic desires. These duties can tear holes in the veil of our fantasies. Both Murdoch and Kant believe that our everyday awareness is superficial, that we often fail to recognize the deeper reality. Murdoch holds that duties force us to acknowledge this deeper reality. Duties, like Murdoch’s attention, cause us to move out of ourselves. As I have asserted above, the concept of an individual requires an idea of consciousness for Murdoch. Kant too ” Murdoch, Metaphysics 492. 34 recognizes this point. We have seen that the consciousness or state of consciousness of the individual is an important part of determining if an action is moral. The person not only must act according to duty, the person must act out of respect and obligation for duty. Their mind must be in a certain state for their act to be moral. In this way Kant recognizes that consciousness plays a necessary and important role in ethics. Duties cause us to become more moral because they act as ’a steady moral force’ in our lives. They help to introduce order and calmness in a chaotic world. They help us, while children and young adults, with the formation of moral habits. We need only think of the young child being taught their first moral lessons. The young child is taught duties such as ’Do not lie’, ’Do not hit’, etc. These duties provide an introduction into morality and what Murdoch calls "a good habit of life“.43 But although duties are important morally we must not make the mistake that Kant does and see them.constituting the whole of moral life. Although duty comes first and cannot be reduced away in ethics, it is not the whole of morals. As Murdoch says our moral life is not just those moments in which duties are imposing on us, or ’isolated moments of moral choice’. When we reduce morality to these moments of action, as Kant does according to Murdoch, we have I'thereby ignored are the ways 43Murdoch, Metaphysics 492. 35 in which, in so many moments and levels of our experience, we are morally involved.'“ To illustrate this point, we need only think of a dutiful person, or one who out of respect always does his duty but shows no compassion or emotion for any person in his life. We can imagine this person taking care of his elderly mother out of a sense of duty but with no compassion nor love for her. According to Kant if he does his duty and takes care of her, he is a moral person. But I am sure most of us would say that his actions alone do not make him a moral person, that he must be capable of empathy and care to be considered a truly moral person. A moral person not only acts different from a less moral person, but sees the world and people in different ways. In Murdochian terms, the moral person has a different quality of consciousness. Although Kant does make the state of a person’s consciousness important for determining if the person is moral, his concept of consciousness is too narrow to include an idea of inwardness that truly recognizes its relatedness to others as essential to its moral growth. We have seen that Murdoch finds duty, and the state of consciousness that must accompany it, in Kantian ethics morally important but argues that we must see our moral life in a much wider landscape than the picture Kant describes. I have shown by appealing to our own common-sense concept of a “ Murdoch, Metaphysics 494. 36 moral person, that Murdoch seems to have a valid point. We need not have such a harsh view of Kant. It is not that Kant denies emotions any moral value or importance but he fails to give not see picture Murdoch consist them the appropriate value Murdoch wants. We need Kant as a cold, inhuman philosopher to show that his of the moral life needs to be examined and expanded. expands it with the assertion that morality must of not only rational reflection, which Kant labels the whole of morality, but also feeling, which Kant denies any moral value, is one that is closer to our intuitions and our shared beliefs about what a moral person is. CONCLUSION We have seen that for Murdoch the Good exists absolutely and necessarily.45 In our daily experience we receive intimitations of this transcendent reality. But because the reality of human life—~there is no telos and no consolation--is so frightening we construct egoistic fantasies to protect ourselves from the muddled life. In protecting ourselves from the contingent world we are also' veiling our own understanding and connection with the Good, or Idea of Perfection. Murdoch connects knowledge with virtue so by living a life of illusion we are also not living a virtuous life. We must struggle and discipline ourselves to escape the fat relentless ego but there are experiences, such as that of beauty in nature and art or personal love, that can help us in our struggle to see the world as it really is and grow as moral beings. I have examined Murdoch’s ethics and its central moral concept of love. We have seen that love is morally valuable and that it can bring us closer to truth and the Good. Love is one of the deep issues that is ignored not only by traditional ethics but also by most contemporary ethics. Through my private experiences as a parent we have seen that “ Ramananthan 3. 37 38 love can indeed move us away from.our egoistic fantasies and expand our moral horizons. I have also shown that Murdoch is not alone, that other contemporary moral philosophers call for a return of love and emotions to ethics as well. This return to love and move away from.wholly rational systems in moral philosophy that Murdoch advocates speaks to what it is to be human and what it is to live truthfully. LI ST OF REFERENCES List of References Blum, Lawrence. FriendshipI Altruism, and Morality. Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1980. Murdoch, Iris. “The Idea of Perfection.“ Yale Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 342-80. ——-,'Metaphysics and Ethics.“ The Nature of Metaphysics. Ed. D.F. Pears. London: Macmillan, 1957. ---, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. New York: Penguin Press, 1993. --—, The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. ---, 'The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited." Yale Review 49 (December 1959): 247-71. Peck, F. Scott. The Road Less Traveled. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Plato. The Symposium and The Phaedrus: Plato’s Erotic Dialogues. Trans. William S. Cobb. Albany: State University Press of New York, 1993. Ramananthan, Saguna. Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good. Basingstoke: Macmillan 1990. Wolfe, Peter. The Disciplined Heart. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966. 39 "ITllllllllll’llllf