Q ,. A‘ h" ml?" ‘5. ' “.4 r f“ ,3", ”A with m L- “I4. noun.” 1 . u...) . ‘ fl adtigfit “‘“t‘t‘a‘w 3 . “.' 2211.3? . ' in as . - n1”; -" ~. A. . , 9: qt .r'ft: . 1.; ~ , , ‘ 1 . 4 \ I v‘ ,. 3,” . 3.. , tt- (.1 . n guarfii'“ r 'x'w gnu: 333'; ‘1' V ‘- -‘ *' ”fay H .. x‘ w, . ,. 4 n.‘ ‘ . , .5.) I . Twig-‘24“ “f .5 r'rJ-I AK HI 1 ‘ ‘ . q ' ..-, M...“ an . AG’ .| ’ 6" poi-mu . "“I ’I. 1”" ‘ .59 w,” 42.1w.» . 1» ._ a ‘ ‘ ‘ {.1 ‘ . {Us 4" n\ A.” crew 'm A L I», Ir“ '{J k. 4." wk; fig“ I. I 2V~E i l J! A. ‘ .1 M1, ‘_ .. I“. r art-9‘}? - l . z '3 . 323: 33‘: ‘ As» I 'l a .4 ‘ 9 1x1, isn‘t) .. - :‘c {13'3“ . v ”u ,n - H.u,-r ‘ ”th I\ I l ,v . "‘ t3: , ' L i v . ll . 3-? , 4 ’ . 4 "y ' 3:559} .. ,. ‘ .qi V 54‘- 1. s x ”thw'xfl ' . : ._; “3‘ . 0 ‘ .. 3;. ,sz " ‘mr THESIS llllllllllHHIlHllllHllllllHlllullUllllHIllllHHllll 3 1293 014094 LIIB+ p ARV Michigan State Unlverslty This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism, Strategic Security, and the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947 presented by Hal Marc Friedman has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degreein History M Major professor Date “/3/95 MSU i: an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 PLACENRETURN BOXMMMNMMMWM TOAVOIDFINESWnonorbdonddoduo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE —]__ n|_T—_ ——|—_ ll—ll—" ____M____ __ ::__l: MSU IoAnNflnnativo Adm/E“ OMIW W1 CREATING AN AMERICAN LAKE: UNITED STATES IMPERIALISI’I, STRATEGIC SECURITY, AND THE PACIFIC BASIN, l94S-l947 BY Hal Marc Friedman A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History I 995 ABSTRACT CREATING AN AMERICAN LAKE: UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM, STRATEGIC SECURITY, AND THE PACIFIC BASIN, 1945- i 947 BY Hal Marc Friedman US policy in the Pacific during the first two years of the postwar period constituted an Early Cold War example of “security imperialism,“ ex- pansion which was undertaken to consolidate strategic control in the region and ensure that the US never again experienced a Pearl Harbor-type attack from East Asia. While not as great a political priority as policy toward Eur- ope, the Middle East, or East Asia itself, American Pacific policy was never- theless historically significant because it was the only regional US policy which temporarily considered territorial annexation as the solution to post- war security anxieties. American Pacific imperialism was also important from an origins of the Cold War perspective because the region became in- tertwined in global political issues between the United States and the So- viet Union. in effect, the Pacific Basin became an arena for soured relations between those two powers as they disagreed about the postwar management of the world. Moreover, the author has found that policymakers, planners, and stra- tegic thinkers thought of American "national security” in a much broader, multidimensional, and comprehensive manner than is commonly character- ized by historians of American foreign relations. Disagreements with the Soviets over the postwar political status of the Pacific islands north of the Equator demonstrated to most American of f lciais that national security or “strategic security" in the region entailed absolute physical and military control over the region by the United States. Achieving this desired level of security, however, also entailed coupling the Pacific islanders' future loyal- ty to the United States by the imposition of mainland American economic and cultural practices and institutions. Copyright by HAL MARC FRIEDMAN i995 To Lisa, Jeffrey, and my two sets of parents. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS l have incurred many debts in the process of producing this disserta— tion. None of the individuals or organizations mentioned here is in any way responsible for the opinions asserted in this work. Any accountability for interpretations or errors is mine alone. However, each of the people cited assisted me in a very significant way. This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Lisa, my son Jeffrey, my parents, Irving and Elaine Friedman, and my in-laws, Ronald and Carolyn Sampsell. Each of them contributed tremendously to this work . My wife Lisa provided me with more support, comfort, and encouragement than i had a right to expect. She made life bearable through seven years of graduate study while she worked full-time, completed her own master's degree, and fulfilled the role of primary caregiver to our son. in every sense of the term, she provided me with an environment conducive to scholarly endeavor. My son Jeffrey furnished me with wondrous times of distraction, antics, love, and, most of all, perspective on the important things in life. i hope he will be able to read and appreciate this work about his country‘s past, his grandparents' generation, and his father's perspective on that time period. To my parents, lrving and Elaine Friedman, i owe more than i can ever repay. I am firmly convinced that i am become a historian, in part at least, because of my parents' past. I realized in the process of researching, writ- ng, and revising this dissertation that my fascination with American soci- ety in the l940$ began with their childhood stories about growing up during vi the Great Depression and maturing during the Second World War. l inherited their sense of politics and history, their views of labor and work, and their encouragement to pursue an advanced education. More importantly, I learned more about their world by writing this dissertation. Every generation goes through traumas of one sort or another, but their generation went through some rather extraordinary ones in the nineteen thirties and forties. Re- searching primary documents from this era showed me that the search for security that engulfed policymakers, planners, and strategic thinkers in the l9405 also enveloped my parents and their generation. i now understand their everlasting concern for money and their fatigue, both of which were, I think, results of enduring the Depression and the war at an early age. At the least, this study provided me with a brief glimpse into their world and i now understand more about their choices and decisions than at any previous time in my life. My ln-laws, Ronald and Carolyn Sampsell, provided a special kind of support as well. Their love, kindness, advice, and hospitality will never be forgetten. Over the last seven years, they furnished me with a “sanctuary“ from the stresses and strains of graduate study in history. More than that, they helped me with professional advice and instilled in me a confidence to hurdle obstacles and tackle problems. The rest of my family i thank for their patience. i could not always fully explain to them what historians do, but they waited for the results anyway. i especially thank my sister Margaret, the first in the family to at- tend graduate school, for advice about making the transition from a working class to a professional class culture; my brother Alan, for introducing me to Professor John Bowditch, formerly Chair of the History Department at the University of Michigan, and for never doubting what i was trying to accom- vii plish; and my sister Phyllis and her husband Mark for their support while conducting research in Norfolk, Virginia. Numerous acknowledgments are due the staffs of archives and libraries both east and west of the Mississippi River. i would especially like to thank James label and Edward Boone of the MacArthur Memorial Ar- chives in Norfolk; Kathy Nicostra and Jimmy Rush at the National Archives; Lynn Gamma, Essie Roberts, Anthony Wise, and Archie DeF ante at the Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama; Richard Geselbracht at the Harry S. Truman Library Institute; the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; the staff of the Library of Congress; and numerous people at the Navy Operational Archives in Washington, DC, including Dr. Dean Allard, Dr. Edward Maroida, Bernard Cavalcante, Kathy Roar, Kathy Lloyd, Michael Walker, and Regina Akers. individually, the following scholars have to be acknowledged for their interest and patience in bringing a novice along: Michael Palmer, Marc Gallicchio, David Rosenberg, Dirk Ballendorf, and Timothy Maga. These people shared their experience, insight, and knowledge about l9405 US stra- tegic thought and policy, as well as their own writings on the tapic. in ef- fect, they provided me with a “starting point“ of thought and research. To Drs. Palmer, Gallicchio, and Rosenberg, l owe a special thanks for their letting me indulge in long telephone conversations to them. At Michigan State University and the University of Michigan, 3 number of people again lent assistance throughout the process of obtaining my MA and Ph.D. degrees. To Don Lammers, thanks are due for directing me in my dissertation and providing much needed professional advice on numerous oc- cassions. To John Shy at the University of Michigan, thanks are also due for serving as my second reader and for similar kinds of professional and per- viii sonal advice at several crossroads. i am grateful to Gordon Stewart, for supporting me at critical junctures in my graduate experience and for pro- viding opportunites which assisted in my development as a teacher. Warren Cohen introduced me to what historians do. Chris Hamel taught me the “how“ and the "why” of the historian's craft and fostered a professional relationship that borders on brotherhood. Peter Levine taught me that historians can be personally and closely connected to their subjects and still produce quality, scholarly material. Michael Lewis fortunately forced me to think about refining and focusing my definition of “imperial- ism“. i would also like to thank Drs. Harold Marcus and Lewis Siegelbaum for support, financial and otherwise, during their tenures as graduate direc- tor in the History Department at Michigan State University. To Drs. Roger Bresnahan and Jeffrey Charnely of the Department of American Thought and Language, i owe a great deal for advice about my topic, my teaching, and how the two relate to one another in and out of the classroom. i would also like to acknowledge Michael Unsworth, History Bibliographer at Michigan State University, who has assisted me for the last seven years in finding govem- ment sources, tracking down secondary materials, and serving as an "idea sounding board“ whenever i was unsure. Finally, i would like to acknowledge the assistance i received from my membership in the Military Studies Group at the University of Michigan‘s Department of History. Since i joined that informal weekly group in January i99l, "MSG“ has been a forum for communicating my ideas, my writing, my hopes, and my fears concerning the dissertation and professional life. Spe- cial thanks go to Gerald Lindermann, Jonathan Marwll, Tom Collier, Saiful lslam Abdul-Ahad, David Fitzpatrick, and Paul Forage for constantly provid- ing me with ”new perspectives“ on military history and strategic thought. TABLE OF CONTENTS iNTRODUCTlON ..................................................... l A The Concepts ........................................ 2 B. Historiography ....................................... i0 C. Synopsis ............................................ 18 Chapter i. Setting the Context: The Pacific Basin as 3 Geographic, Strategic, and Human Entity ......................................... 2i A. The Geographic and Cultural Setting ................... 21 B. The Strategic and Cultural Relevance .................. 29 C. The Effect on the Population .......................... 3S 2. Offensive-Defensive Warfare, Strategic'Physical Complexes, and Strategic Denial: The “Lessons“ of the Pacific War and American Postwar Perceptions of the Pacific Basin .................... 40 A Mahanian "Of f ensive-Def ensive" Warfare and the Use of Mobile Forces in the Postwar Pacific .................. 42 B. “Strategic Physical Complexes” and “Strategic Denial“. . . . S3 C. Blanketing the Pacific ............................... 68 D. The Ambivalence of Prioritization ..................... 79 E. Conclusion ......................................... l04 3. The “Bear“ in the Pacific?: The American intelligence Picture, the Soviet Union, and the Pacific Basin ......................... 106 A The Context ........................................ l07 B. The "Bear“ in the Pacific? ............................ l09 C. An Assessement ................................... l49 4. The Limitations of Collective Security: The United States, the Allied Powers, and the Pacific Basin ........................ iS2 A The Context ........................................ iS4 B. inter-Allied Disputes ............................... iSS C. The UN and Postwar American Security in the Pacific . . . i74 D. “States Directly Concerned“ .......................... lBS E. The Pacific Islands and Soviet-American Relations ..... l9l F. “Territorial Aggrandizement" ........................ 204 6. Conclusion ........................................ 206 5. An ”Open Door“ in the Pacific?: American Strategic Security and Economic Policy toward the Pacific islands ................. 207 A The Historiographical Context ....................... 209 3. American EXCGDUOHBIISM and the Postwar Pacific ..... 210 C. Economic Security and the Postwar Pacific ............ 2i 6 D. An Open Door in the Postwar Pacific? ................. 22l E. Conclusion ......................................... 240 6. “Races Undesirable from a Military Point of View“: American Strategic Thinking, Cultural Security, and the Pacific islands ................................................. 242 A “Cultural Security“ in the Postwar Pacific ............ 244 B. Mexicans, Filipinos, and African-Americans in the Postwar Pacific ................................... 262 C. Pacific islanders as Children ........................ 276 D. Conclusion ........................................ 289 Conclusion: From the Old to the New: Continuities and Changes in American Pacific Policy .................................................... 29l BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................... ' .................... 297 A Primary Sources ......................................... 297 B. Secondary Sources ....................................... 30l C. Contextual Sources ....................................... 308 LIST OF FIGURES l. The Pacific Basin ............................................... 8 2. Pacific islands Cultural Areas .................................. 23 3. Japan And The Western Pacific .................................. 26 4. The Bonin And Volcano islands .................................. 27 5. Strategic Chart, Pacific Ocean .................................. 30 6. Naval Geography in The Pacific, l9i4 ............................ 33 7. The South Pacific .............................................. 37 8. The Mid-Pacific Route .......................................... 46 9. Strategic Chart, Pacific Ocean .................................. 58 i0. The Pacific Basin: An integrated Strategic Physical Complex ....... 59 l i. island Chain Of The South Pacific ................................ 64 l2. South Pacific islands .......................................... 70 i3. Eastern China, Korea And Japan .................................. 7i i4. The Japanese Home islands And The Kuriles ........................ 76 l5. North And South Vietnam ........................................ 8i i6. Pacific Ocean Area ............................................. 82 l7. The Marianas, The Carolines, And The Bismarck Archipelago ......... 84 l8. The South Pacific .............................................. 90 l9. Map of Atlantic And Pacific Areas ............................... 93 20. The South Pacific .............................................. 94 2| . Location Of Soviet Naval Facilities ......... . ..................... l i0 22. Airfields-North China ......................................... il3 23. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases ........................... l l6 24. The Ryukyus: Strategic Location in The Western Pacific ........... i20 25. Siberia And Alaska ............................................ i22 26. Siberia And Alaska ............................................ l28 27. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases ........................... I32 28. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases ........................... l34 29. Ranges For Guided Missiles ..................................... MI 30. Rocket Ranges Centered On Tokyo ............................... M2 3 l. The South Pacific ............................................. iS8 32. The Japanese Home Islands And The Kuriles ...................... i63 33. The South Pacific Commission .................................. i69 34. Southwest Pacific Ocean Area .................................. i72 xiii 35. 36 37. 38. 39. The South Pacific ............................................. lBB The Japanese Home islands And The Kuriles ...................... l94 Strategic Chart, Pacific Ocean ................................. 223 Micronesia ................................................... 227 Shipping Routes, Japanese Mandated islands ..................... 246 The Northern Marshall islands .................................. 248 AAC AAF ACNO AF PAC AFMIDPAC AF SHRC AF WESPAC AGF ANZAC ASF AUS BCOF CCS CINCNAVFE CINCPAC CINCPACFLT CNO COMAF 20 COMAIRDIV COMGENAIR COMINCH COMNAVJAP C SPGAR USA DCNO DDEL DNI FEA FEAF FECOM FRUS HSTL HUAC lTC JCS ABBREVIATIONS Army Air Corps Army Air Forces Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Army Forces, Pacific Army Forces, Middle Pacific Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Agency Army Forces, Western Pacific Army Ground Forces Australia-New Zealand Pact Army Service Forces Army of the United States British Commonwealth Occupation Force Combined Chiefs of Staff Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces Far East Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet Chief of Naval Operations Commanding Officer, 20th US Air Force Commander, lst Air Division Commanding General, Army Air Forces Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet Commander of Naval Activities in Japan Commander, Special Purposes Garrison, U. 8. Army Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Director of Naval intelligence Foreign Economic Administration Far Eastern Air Forces Far East Command Foreign Relations of the United States Harry S. Truman Library institute House Un-American Affairs Committee island Trading Company Joint Chiefs of Staff JIS JPWC JPS JSSC JUSSC JWPC MARBO MARC I’MRB NA NHC 0A ONI OPD OPNAV PAC DIV ATC PACUSA PHILRYCOM POA PS RA RFC RG SAC SCAP SWNCC SWPA TTPI UN USAF IK USAF NC USCC USNIP USSD NF USSTAF VCM) WPBC Zl Joint intelligence Staff Joint Post-War Committee Joint Staff Planners Joint Strategic Survey Committee Joint US Strategic Committee Joint War Plans Committee Marianas-Booms Command Micronesia Area Research Center Modern Military Records Branch National Archives Naval Historical Center Navy Operational Archives Office of Naval intelligence Operations and Plans Division Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Pacific Division, Air Transport Command Pacific Air Command, United States Army Philippines-Ryukyus Command Pacific Ocean Areas Philippine Scouts Regular Army Reconstruction Finance Corporation Record Group Strategic Air Command Supreme Commander for the Allied PoWers in Japan ‘ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Southwest Pacific Ocean Area Trust Territory of the Pacific islands United Nations United States Army Force in Korea United States Army Forces, New Calendonia United States Commercial Company United States Naval institute Proceedings Notter F lies, United States State Department United States Army Strategic Air Forces Vice Chief of the Naval Operations Western Pacific Base Command Zone of the interior INTRODUCTION Between i945 and l947, the United States embarked on an imperial course to guarantee its security in the postwar Pacific by taking direct con- trol over several island groups conquered from Japan. American policymak- ers and planners were convinced by the perceived failure of the interwar Washington Treaty System, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the costly island-hopping campaign in the central and western Pacific, and rising ten- sions with the USSR that future American security in East Asia could only be ensured by consolidating American control over the Pacific islands and turning the Pacific Basin into an “American lake." American actions in the region constituted a unique chapter in Ameri- can history f or a number of reasons. First, these actions were inconsistent with contemporary American foreign policy toward the rest of the world, at least at the rhetorical level, since that policy stressed decolonization and an abstention from “territorial aggrandizement.“ The Pacific represents the only region of the world where the United States deviated from its wartime political pledge not to obtain direct physical control over foreign territory. Accordingly, American policy toward the Pacific islands provides historians with a means by which to gauge the wartime rhetoric of cooperative inter- nationalism against the postwar realities of great power competition and Interest. Second, US policy toward the Pacific Basin represents an exception to the notion of a postwar American-led multilateral attempt at obtaining stability in the region. Far from pursuing stability through collective secu- rity arrangements, great power cooperation, or the free flow of trade and information, the United States in fact sought to create a closed and unila- teral sphere of inf iuence in the Pacific and strove to wring as many mili- tary, political, and economic advantages from the area as it could secure. Third, American Pacific policy warrants attention because it illu- strated a broadened concept of “national security“ or ”strategic security“ interests. As in previous periods of US history, American officials in the l940s assumed that the world would be a safer place if other nations and peoples adopted American political, economic, and cultural institutions and values. Strategic interests and strategic security wis- ia-w’s the intema- tional community were composed in a broad multidimensional context, the various strands of which were inseparable to policymakers and planners. American plans for the defense of the Pacific islands, for example, entailed building a permanent system of military bases to ensure physical security in the region. Those plans, however, also assumed that a system of colonial political administration, economic reorganization along quasi-capitalistic lines, and the importation of mainstream American cultural values would be equally necessary to create an “American lake effect“ in the postwar Paci- f ic. The Concepts By “imperialism”, i mean an unequal political relationship in which a great power attempts to acquire control over a less powerful nation, region, or people in order to satisfy some perceived interest. This ”control' does not necessarily have to be direct or even territorial In nature. though In the case of the islands taken from Japan direct control was the form opted for by the United States. This type of control, however, does entail the loss of autonomy by the less powerful party or, in the case of the Pacific islands, 3 continued absense of autonomy since the beginning of the modern age. i have labelled US actions "imperialistic' because the relationship was so glaring- ly unequal and because the United States exploited that imbalance in order to obtain specific advantages for the postwar period. These “advantages“ need to be clarified. imperialism by a great power does not have to entail economic exploitation per se. Empires throughout history have attempted to extend their control for a variety of reasons and US actions in the late l9403 were no different. US consolidation over the Pacific Basin, as the following chapters will demonstrate, did not take place for purposes of economic gain, but for reasons of strategic gain. im- perialism in this context meant comprehensive physical control in all of its political. economic, and cultural dimensions because American policymak- ers' ideas about the postwar Pacific Basin encompassed a broad range of measures to ensure US strategic security in a number of situations. Nor do i mean to imply that imperialism asa great power phenomenon was anything unique to the post- i 945 period of US history. The United States sought to guarantee its future national security v/s- ‘a-w’s East Asia as any other great power would have done after experiencing defeats like those suffered in the winter of 194i - i 942. The United States succeeded in guaranteeing its future security at the expense of less powerful neighbors in l945, but this was nothing new in the history of US international rela- tions. Scholars, in fact, have been studying the phenomenon of American imperialism for quite some time. There have been at least two schools of thought on the concept of an American imperialism. One group of scholars has written about American imperialism as an everyday fact of great power life which was inherent in a balance of power world. Gilbert Chinard, for instance, labelled Thomas Jefferson’s policy of expansion into Louisiana in l803 as “protective impe- rialism,“ meaning that Jefferson saw his actions as a defensive expansion- ism which was undertaken to ensure US security in North America against European colonial powers. A quarter of a century later, Gerald Stourzh found the same idea relevant to Benjamin Franklin's ideas about colonial and US expansion in North America and in the i9403 Eleanor Lattimore employed the term “security imperialism” to describe US actions in the Pacific and Soviet actions in eastern Europe, respectively. This phenomenon entailed great power expansion for purposes of national security, not economic ex- ploitation, and, according to Lattimore, the label of “national security“ al- lowed the US and the USSR to realize their strategic goals in the postwar world while continuing to criticize the western European powers for failing to grant independence to their colonies. More recently, historians such as David Pletcher and Thomas Hietala have also described US imperialism as an outgrowth of great power politics and insecurity.‘ William Appleman Williams and the Wisconsin School also used “im- perialism” as a central focus of their critique of American diplomatic his- I For the ideaof “protective imperialism“ seeeilbert Chinard. Impxeeflarsm' ”amt/ear Amer/wise) (Boston: Little, Brown, and Oompany, l929). 396-424; and Gerald Stourzh. Bar/win freak/1h aid/maria” fare/m Pal/by ( Chieagx University of Chioam Press. l954), 25i -252. For the notion of “security imperialism ." see Eleanor Lattimore. "Pacific 00am or American Lake?“ Fart'as'ta‘nSr/rwy i4 (November 7, 1945): 3i3-3l6; see also David Pletcier. f/ie Dr'a/anayo/Anmt/m: I’m m, ain't/re ”imam War (Columbia. Missouri: University of Missouri Press. i973); and Thomas Hietala. Nmrflestflwrm- Amid/s fagn’kvnmt In (omMmmA/nmw ( itiiaoa. New York: Cornell University Press. tory, but with a very different emphasis. Most of Williams' works, as well as those of his students, not only narrowly defined American imperialism as economic in nature, but employed the word as a moral judgement on US pol- icymakers and American society. i have tried to avoid moral judgements concerning this time period or any other in US history. The evidence pre- sented below has convinced me that US actions were unavoidable given the history of the interwar and wartime periods, the perceived failure of the Washington Treaty System, and the trauma of Pearl Harbor and the island hopping campaign in the Pacific War. By “unavoidable“, I do not mean to ar- gue that the history of the Pacific Basin between l945 and i947 was “inev- itable" in any way. i do believe, however, that American policymakers and planners, given their experiences, did not see any alternative to US expan- sion into the Pacific and consolidation over the region. Accordingly, i have tried to treat US actions less in a context of moral judgement over econo- mic aggressiveness and more as a historical investigation of the sources of US strategic insecurity. While my purpose has been less to judge than to learn, i am still convinced that US actions, in spite of the seemingly inno- cent motives on the part of the participants, did constitute “imperialism“ as Chinard, Lattimore, Stourzh, Pletcher, Louis, and Hietala define the term.2 The idea that American imperialism in the postwar Pacific was a multidimensional phenomenon is linked to the concept of “strategic secu- rity.” The term was coined by William Roger Louis and has been employed by 2 New Left historiography is voluminous. Three examples of the history of American expansion- ism from an economic determinisi perspective include William Appleman Williams. 7/» frmy afA/nm'cm Diplomacy ( New York: w.w. Norton a Company. 1972); Walter LaFeber. rm cam/mi literary o/Amm'am fora/m Relief/ms fire/imam»? Seam? for (newton/1y, I665- 19/3 (Cambridge. England Cambricbe University Press. l993); and Thomas McCormick. Marmara/Favor” (In/(warms rarely? Policy In 1/» am We“ (Baltimore. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Pm. l989). Emily Rosenberg and Hietala in describing the history of American expan- sionism. Louis, Rosenberg, and Hietala have all argued that American expan- sion and concepts of “national security” or “strategic security“ have tradi- tionally meant much more than just obtaining military and physical control over a region. All three historians have demonstrated with primary docu- ments that nineteenth and twentieth century American elites and common- ers concerned with providing for American security believed that the eco- nomic and cultural control over a region was intimately and inseparably linked to its physical control. Thus, the republic's strategic security de- pended not only on westward expansion to guarantee the nation from direct military attack by foreign powers, but also on conducting foreign relations in a way which ensured American economic prosperity and upheld the na- tion's image as a cultural role model for the world.3 This intimate connection between American foreign policy and the domestic polity is not a subscription to New Left ideas about the history of American foreign relations. Similar to their overconcentration on the eco- nomic dimension of US international relations, the Revisionists have con- centrated too heavily on the role of business elites in the formulation of foreign policy. American strategic policymakers and planners have histori- cally not needed the influence of big business or any other domestic group to argue for “the national interest.“ The post-World War Two period was no exception and US officials needed very little encouragement from any group 3 See Hietala. Nm/mffies‘w. passlm; Emily Rosenberg. .Sarw/mth/m Dram- A/narzwnfm'mrbma/Iwra/[xmrm 1590-1945(New York: Hill and Wm, l982); and William Roger Louis. Imperial/297i at 50x M9 Unifm'Statas M the annular/201m off/v ant/lei [mp/re, 1941- 1945' (Oxford, England The Clarenmn Press, i977). outside of the government when arguing for the creation of an American lake in the postwar Pacific.‘l While this work is not Revisionist in nature, its perception of foreign and domestic policy linkages does come closer to Michael Hogan's ideas about “corportatism” and Meivynn Leffier‘s idea about “national security”. Still, the work cannot be classified as corporatist because I have not con- centrated on studying American domestic institutions ”5- ‘a-w’s foreign policymaking. Nor have i explored domestic politics to the degree that Let f ler thought necessary in his study of the early Cold War. l have found both the Hogan and Leffier schools of thought to be extremely useful in for- mulating my own ideas about American foreign relations. However, i have been less concerned with formally labelling my work and more concerned with studying continuities and changes in American strategic thought and perceptions of the Pacific Basin. At the same time, i feel it necessary to warn the reader that although this work is concerned with American actions in an international arena, l have not set out to write a work of international history. The dissertation focuses solely on the actions, concerns, and policies of the United States government and i have written about American ideas for the postwar Pacific in the context of American history. Though this dissertation is about Cold War history and American friction with other great powers in the late l9405, I see American strategic consolidation of the postwar Pacific less as an episode in the history of international relations and more as the most recent instance of American westward expansion. 4 Ibltl $29.... 22.2w cams”. U ., £35 .90 «to; .‘z .m. 323.3% .. cg... ._ 833$ <0.mw2< 8.5 a IhDOw W... sonar“: 3 ..3. ....~. QI- n~ .- .I v “I. ... .... n. . Am C .......... 686:8 .. . ....r . 08.05.“. :am a»... ....... "......" mm... <0Em2< a we I ... . ..Euoz ...aom at... «I. . ..w.m.....u.... \/ ///,’l lli \ ‘:\AY\ // i a in / ; 7§i .\t\ . 1r / / i ii / /’ I .i \\ . 4' ll // / l " 3 \. R‘Mt/ / l . /<\ . \ ,-. . ' 3/ / _—-———i—-U‘ AUCYIALOA Figure 5. Strategic Chart, Pacific Ocean (Courtesy of the Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.) 30 Basin and sports the excellent anchorages at Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads (See Figure 5). Harbors and other places to rest men and ships, such as Pago Page In Samoa and Ulithi AtOll In the Carolines, also partially explain great power intrusion into the Basin. The imperial competition since 1500, however, had more to do with the exceptionalist thinking of the various colonizers, who seemed determined to “convert the natives“ to the Western way of life and who seemed equally determined to convince the indigenous population that conversion was for their own good. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the Pacific Basin represented a cultural and literary frontier as much as a political, military, economic, or religious one. American images of the Pacific consisted largely of scantly-clad islanders Indulging in sexual fan- tasy or sturdy Eskimos and Aleuts leading an existence as ”noble savages.“ These idyllic images were the perfect setting for an escape from the urban- Ization. commercialization, and Industrialization of Western society. In addition, the Pacific as the embodiment of both an untouched Paradise and an example of ”uncivilized people” needing guidance from the West meant that It continued to be an arena for the “rugged Individualism“ of the Ameri- can western frontier, especially for those white Americans seeking to es- cape the harsh realities of the metropole or hoping to make a name for themselves by conquering a part of the Pacific for American society. These themes, in fact, have been consistently portrayed to the American people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by such well-known authors as Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Jack London, and James Michener.l2 ‘2 See Campbell. Histwa/t/iepxiiic mm. 68-82 and 1 16- 127: see also Gibson. its?!” in Para/x. 379-409. 31 The Pacific first saw European explorers from Spain, Portugal, Hol- land, England, France, and Russia come In successive waves from the early 15005 to the late 17005. Then European and American traders on the way to China and other areas of East Asia in the late eighteenth and early nine- teenth centuries began to use the islands as rest and refitting areas for their ships and crews. By the early 18005, however, European and American traders were not stopping temporarily in the various Pacific Islands. but were staying to exploit products such as sandalwood, copra, whales, and sea otters, while missionaries by the 18205 were trying to spread the Christian religion. These waves of explorers, traders, whalers, sealers, and mission- aries were also at times followed or even preceded by their nations' farm- ers and planters, who hoped to settle in the Islands for exploitative econo- mic reasons, and by naval officers and government administrators who were intent on bringing "order and stability" to the region.“5 The result of these “waves“ of intruders was that by the late nine- teenth century most of the Basin was claimed or occupied by one great power or another. Spain controlled the Philippines and Micronesia, Japan was beginning to take control of the Ryukyus, the Bonins, the Volcanoes, and Marcus island, Britain and France controlled much of the South Pacific area, and Holland had held sovereignty over the Indonesian Archipelago since the 16005. Hawaii clung to Independence of a sort until annexed by the US in 1898, but even by the 18405 Americans had infested so much of the govern- ment, economy, and society of Polynesia that classifying Hawaii as “inde- pendent“ after 1840 is questionable.M '3 See Gibson. imkaw m pal-mix. paasim; and w. Patrick Strains. Amer/ans in pom/e, [76'3- 1642 (East Lansing. Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1963). passim. '4 See 01 iver. Pix/m- Islam. 60- 75; and Strauss. Winnie in Pam/a 43- I 06. 32 as. ...o..E.5§ /1 F5: than: 25 .962 .. é ... . ...I . . . J . ...... . . ......... .. h. .. , . .n ... . .. .. . . . 4.... a. . ... . . 5 L. ... .... .. .... . . u . . , .. . .. . .... ... .. ... . ... . a .. ... .. .qu4. O .. \POO". . ... . ., , . . .. . . ,. . 3132. a... . t: 2? , .. a .. ._ . .. . o % 32.. 54.55 1 H .. .. .. . .. . .. 93 5‘ e. ... .. ... . . . . . . .. 00 5.33.3 ~ .l .... .... e .. ... ...... ... . . ... H“ ,......... . .. ...... . .. . . .. a . r . . . U . . . .H. V3.“ .nég o .../“1» i. Q v. 2 v. ...a. l. ,. ...; i Q g it? {pi 1914 (From Edward Miller, War I 33 Figure 6. Naval Geography In The Pacific Plan Orange, Naval Institute Press. 1991) Moreover, the Basin suffered the changes brought about by interna- tional political events in other areas of the world and was itself a micro- cosm of great power imperial competition (See Figure 6). The late nine- teenth century global phenomenon of imperialism in Asia and Africa spread to the Basin, as evidenced by the US-UK-German "tangle“ over Samoa, the US annexation of Guam and the Phillipines from Spain in 1898, the German 1898 annexation of the rest of Micronesia and, In 1914, the Japanese annexation of German Micronesia. The US also sought to exploit opportunities in other areas of the Basin in these years. such as the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and the occupation of Midway, Wake, Phoenix, Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands between the 18605 and the 19305.15 The reader must realize that travel in the Basin between the 15005 and the 18003 was largely at the mercy of the currents and winds and that crossing the Basin took weeks. If not months. Even with the advent of steam-powered vessels in the latter half of the nineteenth century and coal and oil fueled ships In the twentieth century, travel from one point of the Basin to another could still take weeks because of the huge distances in- volved. The airplane reduced this time to days, but aircraft still required numerous stops on the islands for fuel, provisions, and crew rehabilitation. In short, even into the mid-twentieth century, the Pacific Basin retained its importance both because of its role as a strategic highway with way sta- tions between East Asia and the Western Hemisphere and because of its image as a difficult strategic frontier to control.“ This perceived need for bases explains much of the competition be- tween the nations in the twentieth century, especially between the US and '5 Oliver. Ibid; and Campbell. Histayart/epee/fic/s/m 136-196. '5 See Pomeroy. paw/comma paesim. 34 Japan.” Mutual animosities and fears over the possible loss of the Basin as a strategic buffer zone helped fuel suspicions over conflicting imperial spheres of influence in East Asia. By the 19405, the US, Britain, France, and Holland were fighting Japan for control of the Pac1f1c and the Pacific War had a most devestating effect on the Basin as a whole. By 1945, the floor of the Basin was littered with ships, planes, and the bodies of combatants from the various powers. In addition, the destruction of indigenous life, property, and culture was widespread throughout the entire Basin and the US, the most powerful nation at the end of the war, had to decide how to "reconstruct" the area and wield hegemony over the region so as to prevent another conflict like the Pacific War.‘6 The Effect on the Population The most obvious post-1945 effect of great power competition on the people of the Pacific Basin was the death and utter destruction which had been visited upon them. John Dower reports, for example, that an estimated fifteen million Chinese died in the Pacific War, as well as possibly four million Indonesians, over two million Japanese, twenty thousand Filipinos, thirty thousand Australians, and ten thousand New Zealanders. Micronesia, as well, suffered significant civilian casualties. According to Timothy Maga. the Guamanian population numbered 80,000 people in 1941, but It had been reduced to 60,000 people by 1945 and he asserts that other areas of 17 See Mark Peattie. Awa- Me P1319 Mia/lartmm I'll/71mm was- 1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1988); and Timothy Maga. mePrw'isa ills (In/(aware; mm, 1896- 1950 (New York: Garland Press, 1988). '3 SeePomeroy,Pxi/1battpwt. 161- 180. 35 Micronesia typically lost up to a quarter of their prewar population as well.‘9 In addition, physical devastation throughout the Basin was wide- spread and severe. Manila, for instance, was considered the second most destroyed city in the world after Warsaw, Poland. On Okinawa, forty-five percent of the population was displaced and made Into refugees either by Japanese defense preparations, which included conf Iscating land and food, or by the activities of the invading American forces. Arnold Fisch estimat- es that at least ten percent of the Okinawan population died in the battle for the island and his research also demonstrates that social and economic re- habilitation took years. Moreover, while the Okinawans before 1945 had been feudal land tenants and while the postwar American occupation author- Ities sought to turn them into Independent yeoman farmers, many Okinawans, in fact, lost their land to postwar American base sites on the island and the island’s economy was reconfigured to one which largely pro- vided services to the American military establishment on the island.20 in Micronesia at the end of the war, the islanders, numbering some 93,000 people in 1945 (not counting Guam), had to contend with the de- stroyed buildings and Infrastructure which Japan had built before 1941 and with thousands of unexploded shells and bombs which It took the US govern- ment years to remove. Micronesians had also been significantly brutalized by the Japanese as Japan came increasingly under siege in their “South Sea Islands.“ Some Micronesian men, for example, were conscripted into labor ‘9 SeeJohn Dower. War Willa/(W ma Pame- in (mm-me W (New York: Pantheon Books. 1986). 296-298. Also. see telephone interview with Dr. Timothy Maga. Senior Professor of Modern Diplomatic History. Bentley College, Waltham. Massachusetts and a recognized specialist on US-Pacific relations. February 2. 199$. 20 See Fisch. fliltttrymmt/n flieMw/sm 33-38. 42. 44-60. and 176- 1 7e 36 < _. < x '- vi 2 ( Figure 7. The South Pacific (Courtesy of the National Arcnlves II. Cpliege Park, Maryland) 37 and naval auxiliary units for service elsewhere in Japan's Pacific empire, while their fellow Micronesians had to endure increasingly scarce supplies of food, water, and medicine as the Japanese confiscated whatever was av- ailable to feed their own troops and civilian populations. Throughout Micro- nesia, as well as other Pacific Islands such as Okinawa, the first duty of the American occupation forces was the short-term one of feeding and housing large percentages of the population while the long-term goal was to facili- tate some sort of viable economic reconstruction?1 1f areas like Micronesia, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and even the Solomons were heavily damaged by the Japanese and by American liberation, much of the South Pacific (See Figure 7) went not only unscathed but also saw a great deal of economic “development“ and introduction of American and European material culture. Areas SUCh as New Calendonia, the New Hebrides, Fiji, and Samoa become the major supply bases for Allied forces fighting in New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Philippines and Indonesia. One historian even argues that American-European material cul- ture had an effect on Melanesian religion, with South Pacific Islanders em- ploying “cargo cults", or blends of traditional religion with elements of western material culture, to explain the vast changes In the Islands wrought by the war and the immediate postwar return to colonial rule or United Na- tions trusteeship.22 The United States, out of self -intere5t, self -righteousness, and the recognition of its own postwar power, felt it had to be primarily respon- sible for reconstructing the Pacific Basin. Thus, the US also had to deal with a huge region of the world which was, to a great extent, physically de- 21 See Peattie. Mum 257-320. 22 See Campbell. mama/impama/sm 183-185 and 193- 196. 38 stroyed or damaged, which had a population either displaced or stunned by their recent experiences. and which was comprised of an indigenous culture which had been "modified" by its past and recent exposure to European, American, and East Asian cultures. It is in this context that we turn to the US‘ hegemony over the Pacific Basin in order to explore the phenomenon of American Imperialism in the postwar Pacific. 39 Chapter Two Offensive-Defensive Warfare, Strategic Physical Complexes, and Strategic Denial: The “Lessons" of the Pacific War and American Postwar Perceptions of the Pacific Basin Between 1945 and 1947, the United States sought to Impose an im- perial structure over the Pacific Basin as a way to guarantee future secu- rity in the region. American strategic planners became convinced by their interwar and wartime experiences that the future security of the United States could only be guaranteed by the complete control of Micronesia, the exercise of dominating influence throughout the rest of the Pacific Basin, and the wielding of significant Influence in continental East Asian affairs.1 Most Importantly, this Imperial solution to American anxieties about national security in the postwar Pacific exhibited Itself in a bureaucratic consensus about turning the Pacific Basin Into an "American lake".2 Unlike 1 See Enclosure Draft of “Memorandum For The Secretary 01 War And The Secretary Of The Navy." part of ”Type Of Goverment To Be Established 0n Various Pacific 151m.“ JCS 1524/2. November ‘1‘: 19845. file 8-21-45 sec. 1 . JCS Geographic Files. 1942- 1945. CCS 014 Pacific Ocean Area. 21 . NA 2 Apparently, this term was first enunciated In the 19403 by eemral of the Army Douglas MacArthur in late 1945 and it was used by John Dower to describe American attempts at the unilateral postwar control of Japan and the Pacific Basin. See Dower. "Occupied Japan and the American Lake. 1945- 1950." in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden. eds. Ama‘iwIsAs/‘a DIMt/mfmmxism-Amavm Relations (New York: Vintage Books. 1971). 146-206. Bureaucratic consensus within the United States government over strategic goals in the 19405 was nevertheless accompanied by interdepartmental disau‘eeinents over tallies Interestinolv. this 40 the interwar period, when civilian and military officials clashed over the strategic efficacy of the Washington Treaty System, there was general agreement in 1945 by officials in the concerned government agencies about the need to treat the Pacific as an exclusive American strategic preserve. There was little, if any, talk of postwar arms control or multilateral agree- ments as a strategy of national security and even vocal critics of American military rule over civilian populations in the Pacific Islands, such as Harold ICKes, were not opposed to American rule per se 3 In addition. It was an accepted strategic "lesson" of the Pacific War that the solution to American security was to treat the Pacific Basin as one “integrated strategic physical complex“ and to control entire chains of is- lands with either permanent bases, mobile forces, or a combination of the two. In eff ect, pre-war Mahanian doctrine was reaffirmed by the experience of Pearl Harbor and the island-hopping campaign, but with a different em- phasis on the role WhiCh island bases would play as support infrastructures for mobile forces. While Mahan had talked about a “string“ or island bases stretching across the Pacific as a support system for the US fleet, he nev- ertheless put his emphasis on the mobile fleet itself. No longer willing to leave island bases in the Pacific ”unattended“, postwar American strategic policymakers and planners asserted that some key Islands had to be main- consensus over alals accompanied by a lack of consensus over means was not confined to Pacific policy. In fact, interdepartmental rivalry over means seems to have been the norm for American strategic policy in the late 19405. Aaron David Miller. for Instance. describes a situation In which the War. Navy. State. Interior. and Commerce Departments. as well as the President and the Conwassional foreim relations committees. agreed on the goals of a postwar American oil policy toward the Middle East but disagreed vehemently with each other over how to attain those goals. See Miller . m fa“ Sea/rity M'Arwim OIlMAmaricm Faraim Policy, 1939- 1949 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina, 1980). 7S and 78. 3 For interwar disagreements between the Navy and the State Department over Pacific policy. see Braisted, (/m‘tae’StatasAeia/ln Memorial. 1909- 1922. 580-688; and Romr Dinghan. Palm“ In 11» Par/11a: Ina myths of Mme/Arm“ imitatim. 1914-1922(C1licagp. University of Chicam Press. 1976). 41 tained as support bases for mobile forces, but then argued that entire chains of undeveloped islands also had to be occupied or “denied“ to other powers even If the United States did not intend to develop them as military bases. Still, the prewar Mahanian emphasis on mobile power as the Key to postwar Pacific defense was reasserted and was now more widely subscribed to by of fictals outside of the Navy Department. Mahanian “Offensive-Defensive“ Warfare and the Use of Mobile Forces In the Postwar Pacific The Pacific Basin constituted a strategically important area for the United States since before the 19405. Any nation with palpable interests in East Asia would find the Pacific the key to projecting power toward main- land East Asia.4 Perceived strategic interests in East Asia and the Philip- pines in i898 provided the incentive for the United States to acquire indivi- dual islands, such as Guam and American Samoa, as logistical bases for American naval forces and American naval officers expressed a desire to acquire entire chains of islands in Micronesia when opportunities presented themselves in I898 and I9 I 9. Though a variety of domestic and intema- tionai political considerations prevented naval officers from convincing policymakers to annex the islands at these times, the idea that American control was necessary for strategic security remained a constant in US naval thinking in the interwar period.5 Guaranteeing American security in 4 See Gale. Amy/mam? 01‘ Mama 4-6. 5 It is true thatAmerican naval officers in l898and i9i9arguedfor somestrormr form of American control over key Islands in Micronesia. In each case. however, political and diplomatic considerations by civilian leaders usually overrode the military services' arguments. See Pomeroy. Pair/b almost. 3-74. For a more recent viewpoint which pits Wilson's hopes for Jmanese membership in the League of Nations against the Navy Department's concerns for strategic security in the central and western Pacific. see Maga. Mammprama 78- l i2. 42 the Pacific and East Asia, however, was not merely a case of occupying is- lands and “neutralizing” them from the possibility of a hostile takeover. In- deed, strategic thought from the l898- l 941 period and wartime experienc- es combined to dictate that American defense in the post- i 945 Pacific would become synonomous with offensive base development in the western Pacific and mobile power projection toward mainland East Asia. According to Lester Brune, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan origi- nated the idea of offensive actions for defensive purposes within the United State Navy in the i890s. Mahan, searching for an alternative strategy to America's alleged policy of isolationism, argued that the Navy should be geared toward “offensive-defensive" actions.6 An "offensive-defensive“ naval strategy was one involving a blue water navy capable of patrolling global waters, supported by an overseas system of bases, and able to strike instantaneously at any enemy which threatened or seemed to threaten American strategic interests. In essense, what Mahan seemed to be sug- gesting was a strategy which bordered on continual peacetime preparations for preventive wars since even potential rivals could become enemies at any time.7 5 See Brune, mam owl-mean Milan/Swarmxpa/zm 4-6, 23. 29, 31 , and 108. 7 Ibid., 4 and 85. if Brune is correct, then Mahan. credited with begueething so much of the United States Navy's modern strategic heritage, may also have bmh responsible for starting the Navy down the road to peacetime offensive war planning. This conclusion, however, may give too much credit to Mahan. since his theories did not germinate in an intellectual vacuum but in conjunction with similar idea about strategic planning enunciated by other American naval officers in the l890s. For example, the war plans developed by Lieutenant William Kimball in case of a war with Spain were rife with ideas which could be labelled “offensive-defensive” in nature and were Kimball's creation entirely. See JAS. Grenville and George Young, Pal/718:9, Strategic ”aviary/mo Diplomacy SIM/as in Fae/'97 Policy, 167.!- 1917 ( New Haven. Connecticut: Yale University Press. i973). 267-296. The issue of preventive wars and pre- emptive strikes would reappear numerous times after Mahan's death. Perry Smith, for instance. argues that AAF postwar planners between l943 and 1945 also defined defense and deterrence in terms of immediate offensive capability and even preemptive strikes against potential enemies. in their case a resurgent postwar Japan. See Perry Smith. I’m/fir Fame P/msmspm. 1943- 1945 ( Baltimore. Maryland. Johns Hopkins University Press. l970). 48-49. if offense and 43 The Army Air Corps (AAC) also adopted a strategy of ”offensive-de- fensive" warfare in the late 19203 as a means to promote land-based air- power as the new “first line" of American defense. According to Brune, Colonel William Mitchell, fresh from his court-martial for insubordination toward War and Navy Department authorities, changed his emphasis on air- power strategy from a hemispheric defense supporting an isolationist f or- eign policy to an offensive strategy which used alrpower to actively support an assertive American foreign policy in Latin America, the Pacific, and elsewhere.8 Brune demonstrates that Mitchell, like Mahan, also walked the fine line between retaliatory strikes against a hostile nation and preemp- tive first strikes against possible enemies. At first not widely adopted by the AAC, that institution came to gradually accept the strategy of forward deployment and deterrence in the late 19305 and early 19403.9 In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the 19305 and 19405 was a breeding ground for strategic thinking which stressed a constant state of peacetime readiness and instant retaliation against enemy nations. It is inconceivable that offi- cers who were professionally trained in the parsimonious 19303 and who matured during the disasters of the early 19403 could have taken different lessons about preparedness from these events.10 defense could be intellectually merged concerning the postwar containment of Japan. then It was not a far leap to planning for preemptive military strikes against the postwar Soviet Union as a way to "keep the peace." For the issue of preventive wars in early Cold War American strategic thought. see Russell H. Buhite and William Christopher Hamel, ”War for Peace. The Question of an American Preventive War. 1945-1955." Dip/maile/sla'y 14 (Summer 1990): 367-384. 8 See Brune, mam mime-1m Mtzmalsxwrmzpa/im 92-95. 99- 102. 104- 105. 125- 131.and134-13$. 9 Ibid. ; and Jeffrey s. Underwood. 11» Wings offlemmxy rm Inflm miir PM a: 11» fw/tm/‘nismflm, 193.3- 1941 ( College Station. Texas: Texas MM University Press. 1 , passim. '0 See Michael S. Sherry. PWim/b" 11:19AM Wm Amer/m lefa“ Pasture“ Defense 1941- 1945 (New Haven. Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977), 190-238; aid Michael Schaller, Memes/m mil/perm 019mm: flavor/9111901113 aw War 1011510 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1985). 52-57. The role of island bases should be kept in perspective concerning strategies which so heavily emphasized the deployment of mobile forces. Concerns for overseas bases occupied a great deal of strategic planners' attention between 1898 and 1941. William Braisted and Donald Yerxa have demonstrated that American naval planners charged with base development in the prewar Pacific and Caribbean were very concerned with potential base sites falling to “enemy“ powers in peacetime and being used against the United States upon the initiation of war. Braisted, especially, illustrat- ed that American naval officers desired to control entire chains of Pacific islands In order to deny them to potential enemy naval powers.ll Yet because of funding limitations on base development and ship con- struction, as well as strategic-political limitations on acquiring base sites in the first place, naval officers chose to concentrate scarce resources on building large, mobile fleets of armored battleships and developing a select few base sites in the Pacific. As Braisted asserts, American naval officers detested the idea of the Japanese being allowed to exercise control over the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls after 1914 and they feared that Japan's control over these island chains would bode ill for the US In the future. Nevertheless, these officers consistently strove to limit base development to Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Subic Bay in the Philippines, confident that a strong mobile fleet supported by a few well-fortified bases along this ”Mid- ' 1 See Braisted. Unfim'Stafes'm/h ImeI'fic, 1897- 1909, 53-55, 57-63, 70-71 , 94, 100- 101 . 124-126, and 128; idem, Unitm'Sfafw/Ibwm IMPxffic, 1909-1922, 231-246, 441 -453. and 522-534; and Donald A. Yerxa. mmmwz‘mp/m 11v (/m'tao'fiatw Aim/AM 7/19 swam. 1696- 1945 (Columbia. South Carolina. University of South Carolina Press. 1991).26.36-38.39.S8-59.60.117,118,120.123-124.129-130.md131. 4S II (3 z :8. gzg-z : 02085 3 ..- a . 2" . . :. ‘8:-= ‘ “ $'g.£ :: a: 8 3' i "‘ I 3 - s z 3 : I I . o ‘g::' ’ “gt! . 0' 0. o O is v '0:;: o 3 a .9 .- .. .00.. I ' 3 - o 5:-:t 83:88: 0 0 II I I .. . .3 a 4: a a: o ‘ tth‘I l 2! I l;* - : !g‘ s I 15 - r ... I r... I L1 . . iri I 31‘” "" — 1 '4 . p 5 .;;i ‘ I ‘ I. w .. , g . a "u ‘ . ‘ oé.“.A ‘ ‘ 1 e 4 .\ g ... “V ‘: I a. I -' a ' 60?.er q' i s.— ‘ -3: 3.1- ”3" .. x . "z-fi;eu,h~ . . h _ , ' g- \ ‘- ., . - 'f‘qwlk* ‘35:“.Iz'7‘. .5 :‘tv ”3: "L ' ’ :“tA '.\. ' A. ¥A}"’t‘.;3 ##1##. ‘~“.:'.~' '9 .\.A \\o ., ‘5‘ awn" .. '3‘“ Q _ ...: ...»; « -. mxfiwg’flifilfififimg‘ t§2~ v‘ 1‘: ..-""‘.' V ~' . :- ; [rt-ab ’- ' ' “ v. ‘ -. < . ' . ‘ ‘ I . . “x" t '.‘.".’.‘-~'- “‘1'.” ‘ " 4‘: £n¢£#_‘..Om Figure 14. The Japanese Home Islands And The Kuriles (Courtesy of Marc S. Gallicchio) 76 Similar to calls in i943 by Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle for acquiring base rights by ”internationalizing“ the Kuriles, the subcommittee obviously ignored or failed to realize significant Soviet interests in that area as well as the implications of the Yalta Agreement, which had awarded the Kuriles to the USSR. The subcommittee members simply did not " . . . see how anyone could challenge our retention of authority over the area after the war.'59 The widespread idea of turning the Pacific into an American lake in order to guarantee postwar security was even subscribed to by the most vocal critic of American military rule in the Pacific islands. Harold ickes, Secretary of the Interior from March i933 to February i946, was opposed to allowing the American military to rule the Pacific islands and govern civi- lian populations. Writing in the magazine Coll/ers in August I946, Ickes accurately compared naval rule on prewar Guam and American Samoa to life aboard a battleship and he argued that intemationai trusteeship through the UN, rather than annexation of the islands, had to be pursued as a way to guarantee America's intemationai prestige as well as the human rights of the indigenous population.“ But even lckes did not question America's right to control the central and western Pacific. in fact, ickes‘ key aide while he was Secretary of the interior, Undersecretary Abe Fortas, had developed the concept of strategic trusteeship in con juction with the State Department as a way to quell military fears that a UN device would fail to secure the 59 ibid. WI 5- i0 i 6. For Berle's ideas abwt acquiring American control over the Kuriles. see T Minutes 52. July i6, i943. box 42. "Notter F iles" (Post-war Planning) of the State Department (hereafter cited as USSD NF ). Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State. National Archives, Washington, DC. (hereafter cited as R6 59, NA), as found in Louis, MIME/zen away, 88-8 i. For Truman's views on the Kuriles, see Truman to Stalin, August i7, l945, new i 45, 6:670. 25cc Harold‘L. Ickes. “The Navy at its Worst," call/ers i i7 (August 3i, i946): 22-23 and 77 region for the US. in addition, ickes and other interior Department officials made it clear that the military would have complete control over its base facilities in the islands and complete territorial control of the entire region in times of war or national emergency.“ Moreover, in December l945, ickes had written Truman to argue that placing the Pacific islands under civil administration would "strenghthen" the US‘ intemationai position and its case for a unilateral strategic trust- eeship w‘s-a‘-w;s the UN. Even after ickes resigned his cabinet post in Feb- ruary 1946, the interior Department continued to argue for civil administra- tion in the context of strengthening the US‘ concept of creating an American lake in the Pacific Basin. Interior Department officials wanted a civilian agency, rather than the military, to administer the Micronesian Islands, in- . cluding Guam, as well as Alaska, Hawaii, American Samoa, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, and Johnston Islands, and the Bonins, Volcanoes, and Ryukyus. They believed this new security zone would be enhanced if it was ruled in an “en- lightened“ manner by civilians who could integrate the Pacific islanders into American domestic life.62 in spite of the overwhelming evidence that planners and policymakers thought the entire Pacific should be “politically denied" and strategically developed, there some individuals who thought that US plans were too en- compassing. Admiral Raymond Spruance, soon after relieving Admiral 5‘ See Louis. mama/1:977 atfiiey, 480-484. See also Appendix B of “Future Administration 0f iTiSthNSt Territory Of The Pacific islands." is. file 'E.J. Sedy,” box 76, Philleo Nash Papers. L. 52 See Appendix 8, "Future Administration Of The Trust Territory Of The Pacific islands,“ file “E.J. Sady,“ box 76. Philleo Nash Papers, HSTL; and ickes. "Navy at its Worst,“ 22-23 and 67. See also ickes to Truman. December 29. 1945. file 0F 85-L. ”Trusteeship of the Pacific islands. May I945 to i950.” box 572. White House Official F iles. HSTL; and February 20. l946. “Memo for the War. New. State. and interior Department Secretaries." file "Pacific islands Commission," box i33. President's Secretary‘s F iles. HSTL. 78 Nimitz as CINCPAC in late November i945, gave two press conferences to the Associated Press in which he stated that the US should not attempt to develop military bases on Okinawa and Taiwan or maintain a large postwar fleet in the region. Spruance asserted that the US would not want military bases developed close to it borders by another power and he believed that the Soviets would f eel threatened by bases and forces which could ”block- ade" their coast. He thought the US should be more sensitive to this Soviet "sore spot” and that the US’ real mission in the East Asia was to solve prob- lems caused by the war, not create new ones because of US insecurity. Neither the point about mobile forces nor the one about bases seems to have endeared him to the Navy‘s higher leadership!” The Ambivalence of Prioritization What is significant about these early postwar plans is their very uni- versal nature. Although early plans categorized and prioritized the various sites according to strategic value, the plans were very ambiguous about these classifications and they largely failed to discuss the ease or difficul- ty of obtaining base rights from other sovereign powers. Strategic planners in a number of agencies simply laid an American carpet of bases over the Pacific in order to satisfy postwar American security requirements and they justified this blanketing of the region in terms of ensuring ”interna- tional peace and security.” This universal attitude toward Pacific base rights is interesting as well since post- l 945 documents illustrate tensions and uncertainties between providing for American security in the Pacific Basin while limiting American base requirements in the face of postwar 53 See Thomas B. Buell, wet Herr/m A aiamnyo/Adn/ramm/t .Sarm (Boston: Little, Brown, 8t Company, l974), 37 l -372. 79 budget cuts.“ While there was a willingness on the part of policymakers and planners to qualify and limit their requests, there was a simultaneous mindset that to provide for postwar security the entire Pacific Basin had to become an American lake in a comprehensive sense. Even before the war ended there was doubt about blanketing the post- war Pacific with American bases. This doubt was illustrated in a June i944 study of postwar naval base requirements which Admiral Yarnell conducted for Admiral King and Vice Admiral Frederick Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Op- erations (VCNO). Yarnell perceived a need to limit the number of postwar bases in the Pacific because of projected limited postwar funds. Because of these projected cuts, Yameil placed utmost importance in the United States acquiring firm control over Micronesia and the Bonin islands as the “mini- mum necessary“ for postwar security. At the same time, however, Yarnell believed that the United States should still insist on base rights at any lo- cation in the Pacific it thought necessary for postwar security and he called for annexation of any sites where the controlling power attempted to im- pose restrictions on US fortification and base usagelfis Conflicting ideas about America's ability to blanket the Pacific with bases becomes apparent in later documents as well. For example, by late l944 it seemed to be an accepted idea that there would be areas the US could not or would not develop as bases but would leave to be developed by 5" Perry Smith argues that the very nature of postwar planning led to plans which were too broad to ever be practical for the United States in the postwar world. He contends that in the AAF , postwar planners were encouraged to be ”creative" with their ideas and only then were budgetary constraints placed on them to bring their plans into line with funding realities. This broad, initial nature to postwar planning. followed by reductions in force and base infrastructure. could explain a great number of phenomena in the Navy's plans for the postwar Pacific as well. See Smith, Air me/wsferpm, 43 and 63. 55 See Yarnell, ”Memorandum on Post-War Far Eastern Situation,” June I6. i944, file ”intelligence. A-B," box i95. Strategic Plans. 0A. NHC. 80 ‘l , i ‘3 .- I, l _ '. ..‘ i < 2 _~ . .3 - Z i— ... -' .. . . .al : .‘t‘ ' _. ~71l .- > . , . .' \ol ,. ~ ' :J V r i- ‘6' Py’q’ ‘ il J \ ‘ .4? 8 0 g «j, \ ‘~ in 2‘17"" - ~ 2': I 'i u 4 5' ‘-"’-" ‘ 1 f P‘ i i - l \ ‘E 'i .\-\ S .. / :2. a. “I 3 f. " 5- '2 :ie’ .4 \. /P g < C ‘H / 5 --1 z . , at. < \./""¢ 3 ..i A ,5», < it V‘" = E A i— go . a Figure is. North And South Vietnam (From Roger Thompson, The Pacific Basin 5/068 I946: Longman Group Limited UK, i993) 8| i .8 Eu: . .iJ «Moi-ialiiiiiiii III . . .. ‘1 . .II/I. _. 1 .. ...-sh .u 'l'l-I-"F "Hans a J I/euoceta .. . ... ...-.0; II ”7.9% . r a. // Catt ... . . \ . r .. . e if . .2 15.2.3. \s // ...-sowoiz ”flanges; . \\\ I/ _ .ii I .. to 0....- x \ £32.22!!! _ // .. .0. s . a... . . / 632...:- ._ x .5... we... I u 3.6.2233...» //..I . ...-3:3. \ .3555... 8283:... .. . . so: I _ iilli \\\r. I .... . as: . . \. ilill . I :0 ..Olr . (xx; 3.5.20.5. 0.5.0! \\ . <€L \ . I 0 .. . . . I ... . . 2. x I 2.- ... :33: x . Illiiii . . 22!... a a»? 8. — 8n n a... >I¢=8<fi p J.o.\\ . . .1 .i\ w . \\ .. 925.... chi/VII / .. \ .. . . .. '00 I III \\ u .. .n . . . g «6 I u \il I . ‘0 b .r VIA i . t ...-a... 1 Iii I ma “WPMOI "WI. 6 ..-—---”- - ...----—---.--_-- >8 - Naval War Plan Orange; I 82 Figure i6. Pacific Ocean Area (From Edward Miller institute Press, i991) American allies for rapid use by the United States in times of international crisesfi‘i6 Naval planners, for example, now began to classify and prioritize bases according to their perceived strategic worth and foresaw "major bases“ at Pearl Harbor, Truk in Micronesia, and Tutu Bay in the Philippines, “secondary bases“ throughout the rest of Micronesia, the Philippines, the Aleutians, the Bonins-Volcanos, the Ryukyus, the South Pacific, and Marcus island, and “international bases” at Hainan, China, and Camrahn Bay, French Indochina (now Vietnam).67 (See Figure IS) This type of prioritization and proposed concentration of power at a smaller number of bases continued as the war drew to a close. Hawaii, for example, was later labelled a ”complete main naval base,” while Guam-Sai- pan became a “major naval base”, and Okinawa, Midway, Marcus, the Philip- pines, and Adak, Alaska became “secondary Operating Bases." Most of the remaining bases in Micronesia, meanwhile, were downgraded to “Fleet An- chorages with Naval Air F acilities" and locations such as Iwo Jima, Wake, and Marcus became mere “staging points” for military, naval, and civil air- craft.” Still, it should be made clear to the reader that as late as Novem- ber 1944 American naval planners continued to define the ideal postwar sit- uation as one in which American forces were present in some form at al- most every point in the Pacific. (See Figure 16) This vacillation in base planning continued after 1945. With the de- feat of Japan and American attentions becoming more focused on the Soviet Union as the main strategic threat in the Pacific, there was a decided shift in base orientation north of the Equator, a move toward eliminating bases in 66 See Edwards and Duncan to King, November 20. i944. attached study ”Post-War Naval Bases In The Pacific.“ file ”Bases General. 8-3.“ box l56. series i2. ibid 67 See "Pacific Bases." file 48- l -24. box 90. R6 80. NA 66 Ibid. 83 MARIAN A . 'ISLANDS ‘9+_ "to“ '7' "'1'... ... P H , 7' L I nun-n p I s I :4 N 5 1’... ....- ”I... “2;" \ I "'3‘ ting-u. nun I”: n. ‘ .1. J..- I“ m ' In: on... .... ' ”- nu.- \ ‘ ‘ h C A R g o L ’ N E I S L 4 N o S , I'll-AL'Y , IJLAIDI ... 9. QQ \ Figure l7. The Marianas, The Carolines, And The Bismarck Archipelago (Courtesy of the Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.) 84 the South Pacific, and a downsizing of forces throughout the Pacific. More- over, the domestic political pressure for demobilization and significant budget cuts played more than a share in the military services “rolling up“ bases in the South Pacific and reducing others that were not considered essential. For instance, in September 1945, MacArthur proposed withdrawing all Army Ground Forces (AGF) from Hawaii and predominating AAF and Army Service Force (ASF) personnel in Japan, Korea, and selected Pacific islands as part of an effort to reduce the number of Army personnel in the Pacific to 400,000. in fact, MacArthur saw the need to scale ground forces back to one regiment each in the Ryukyus and the Marianas and to order all US Army units at Manus in the Admiralty islands and Emirau Island in the Bismarck Archipelago to be withdrawn as soon as shipping for them became avail- able.69 (See Figure 17) In the fall of I945, MacArthur further elaborated on the idea of the Pacific Basin as a geographic entity which had to be defended in an inte- grated, regional, defense-in-depth manner but with a very selective choice of locations for US forces. In November, he wrote General of the Army George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, about postwar dispositions in the Pa- cific. MacArthur was primarily concerned with conducting an “active” de- fense based on land-based alrpower in the Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Mar- ianas, and the Aleutians. MacArthur envisioned an eventual US military withdrawal from Japan and Korea with the ”frontline of defense“ becoming 69 See MacArthur to Marshall, September 21 . 1945. file ”Troop Deployments,” Blue Binder Series, Record Group 4: Records of General Headquarters. U.5. Army Forces, Pacific, 1942- l947, Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia (hereafter cited as RG 4: General Headquarters. Blue Binders, MacArthur Memorial Archives). For Marshall‘s response. see Marshall to MacArthur. September 2i . l945, ibid. See also MacArthur to Nimitz. then- CINCPAC, September 2i, 1945, Plans and Operations F ile, ibid. 85 the four island groups mentioned above and the “rear area” for training and supply being focused on the Hawaiian Islands. In MacArthur's opinion, this postwar defense line would allow the US to mass offensive strength against any potential threat from East Asia and still allow for an ”economical" dis- position of forces.70 By early I946, the JCS, probably because of pressure from President Truman over the need for budget cuts and because of the Increased policy attention to Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, seemed willing to limit American base requirements in the Pacific to Micronesia, the Ryuk- yus, the Bonins, and Marcus Island. While the Joint Chiefs hoped for sover- eignty over Micronesia and strategic trusteeships in the other three areas, they were somewhat willing to settle for strategic trusteeships over all of these areas, a significant concession considering wartime planning criteria against trusteeship ideas of any kind." in January I946, General Whitehead told MacArthur that reduction of AAF forces in the Pacific made the withdrawal of Army Ground Forces nece- ssary from Iwo Jima, Saipan, and Tinian and that these locations should merely be retained on a “caretaker airdrome" status. Whitehead was very clear that he thought Okinawa was the key base to be preserved as long as the US felt it needed a striking force for intervention in East Asia and as long as the United States continued to occupy Japan and South Korea. He 70 See MacArthur to Marshall. November I , l94s, leeeooe-s, Whitehead Collection, AFSHRC. 7‘ See the JSSC to the JCS, "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,“ part of “Trusteeships For Japanese Mandated islands," JCS $70-48, January 17, 1946,0CS 360, R6 2 I 8. NA See also "Memorandum for the Secretary of State.“ part of ”Strategic Control By The United States Of Certain Pacific Areas.“ January 2i , i946. SWNOC 249/I , file l2-9-42 sec. l3. ibid See Louis. wiper/3111977 away. 68-87. 259-273. 366-377. 475-496. and 5 I 2-53l for JCS resistance to the concept of trusteeship. 86 thought that once the occupation phase ended, however, islands like Iwo Jima would resume their status as outposts covering the northern flank of the Marianas and serve, along with Alaska, as the first line of defense for American military security in the Pacific Basin.72 in February I946, Whitehead wrote General George Kenney, US Special Adviser for Military Affairs to the UN, to further embellish the def ense-in- depth concept which had become so widespread in American strategic think- ing. Whitehead, like MacArthur, saw a similar concentration in the Philip- pines, the Ryukyus, and the Marianas after the withdrawal from East Asia, with Hawaii as the region's rear area.73 The lightly garrisoned rear area would then blend into a very heavily defended line comprising the Philip- pines, the Marianas-Bonins, and the Ryukyus. In addition, many of the smaller atolls In the central and western Pacific, such as Midway, Johnston, Wake, Marcus, the Marshalls and Carolines, and South Pacific Islands such as Canton and Christmas, would comprise fighter, supply, and communication bases.“ More specifically, Whitehead believed the Philippines was " . . . the most important piece of real estate which we have . . . I regard Okinawa as a most important base and an outpost for the Philippines. In the atomic age we might lose what we have in Okinawa but with the same weapon we could prevent the enemy from using Okinawa as an air base so long as we “own the air over the Philippines.‘ As long as we own the air over the Philippines we own the Orient.“ Whitehead believed that if the US did not defend the Phili- 72 See Whitehead to MacArthur, JanuanI 30, 1946, 168.6008-I , Whitehead Collection, AF SHRC. See also Whitehew to Colonel Clarence Irivine. PACUSA Assistant Chief of Staff , June 8, l 946, ibid; and Whitehead to Major General Thomas White, PACUSA Chief of Staff , April 28, 1947, ibid. 73 See Whitehead to MacArthur, January 30, l946, l68.6008-l , ibid. 74 See Whitehead to kenney, new first Commanding General of the Strategic Air command ( sec). March I6. i946, ibid. 87 ppines with alrpower in the future, it would "lose" the islands in the next war. But if the US held those islands, " . . . no enemy can move petroleum and other supplies from the Indies to the east coast of Asia and any enemy operating from eastern Asia would be dependent upon an overland supply line 5,000 miles long."75 Similar to naval plans which began to limit and prioritize bases in I944 and I945, by the winter and summer of l946 MacArthur's headquarters saw a definite limitation of American forces in the Pacific islands to a few select areas, though MacArthur's principal subordinate commanders disa- greed on some of the details of these dispositions. MacArthur specifically saw bases limited to Hawaii, the Marianas, the Philippines, the Volcanoes, and the Ryukyus. in addition, Major General Clements McMullen, Chief of Staff of PACUSA, thought Tinian and Salpan in the Marianas should be gar- rissoned with small detachments on a ”caretaker” basis. However, McMullen, like Whitehead, continued to see Iwo Jima as the major fighter base in the area and the “north f lank" covering the approaches to the Marianas.76 Con- versely, in July I946, Lieutenant General John Hull, Commanding General, US Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC), cited both strategic and budgetary reasons for recommending the withdrawal of all but lOO men from iwo Jima and reclassifying the volcanic island from a forward fighter base to an emergency landing field with a caretaker garrison. Citing the proximity of 7'5 See Whitehead to Kenney, February 27, I946, ibid. 76 See MacArthur to Hull and Major General James Christiansen. Acting Commanding Gemral of US Army F orces, Western Pacific (AF WESPAC). July 26, l946, Record Group 9: Collections of MW ( Radiograms), Troop Deployment. MacArthur Memorial Archives: Lieutenant General Wilhelm Styer was Commanding General of AF WESPAC until July 1 946 when he left the Pacific because of ill health. Christiansen became interim commander at that time and remained so until relieved by Major General George ere in November l946. Christiansen then became Moore's chief of staff until May i 947 when he too returned to the United States for medical reasons. See McMullen to Whitehead, subj: Outgoing Messages, February 23, I946, 720. i623, AFSHRC. 88 Iwo to both Japan and the Marianas in case of a need for fast wartime aug- mentation and the stringent budget cuts coming from the War Department, Hull saw no reason to continue operating Iwo as a major airfield.77 in spite of some disagreement on how and where to reduce Army units in key areas of the northern Pacific, MacArthur and his subordinate comm- anders did agree on a systematic reduction of garrisons in the South Pacific, island bases which had proved important against Japan in l942- l 945 but which were considered questionable for use against the Soviet Union and probably frivolous during the fiscal retrenchment. Still, War Department records simultaneously suggest a general reluctance to withdraw from the South Pacific area entirely. Similar to naval officers in I944 and I945 who only slowly began to recognize the need for base limitation, some Army of- ficers in l946 and i947 seemed to think the US might still need base faci- lities in the South Pacific at some future date. For instance, in August I946 Hull recommended to Lieutenant General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of US Army Forces, Western Pacific (AF WESPAC I, that the over 500 Army personnel garrisoning Penrhyn and Aitutaki in the Cook Islands, Guadalcanal in the Solomons, ESpiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, New Calendonia, and Fiji be withdrawn as soon as base facilities and the surplus equipment at those locations were turned over to New Zealand military personnel.78 Hull saw the need for a small number of weather technicians and topographic personnel to stay temporarily in order to carry out an aerial mapping survey in conjunction with the 20th Air Force based in the Marianas, but even he continued later in the same month to C3" 77 See Hall to MaoArtiiur, July l2, l946, RG 9: itadiograms. AFMIDPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. . 78 See Hull to MacArthur, August 3. 1946; and Hull toChristiansen, August lo. i946. both in R6 9: Radiograms, Troop Deployments, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 89 - -. 'L—J" '. n. Sn I navian' l’ ’ f...-': l. I: i! :3 j: l i ‘ 7 . E 3 3 s I ig-I If H: "IIIYOIV AUSYRALIA Figure l8. The South Pacific (Courtesy of the National Archives ll, College Park, Maryland) 90 for the withdrawal of the other forces from the South Pacific bases as well as the ones at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, Tarawa in the Gilberts, and Canton and Christmas Islands.79 interestingly enough, however, Hull per- ceived the need for one Army officer to remain on each island. According to his message, garrisoned forces represented US interests in the bases and installations and Hull wanted at least one officer to remain on each island to represent the US in asserting its ”residual“ base rights and facilities.80 (See Figure I8) Roger Bell writes that by the spring of i946, American strategic pol- icy toward the South Pacific underwent a dramatic revision. Arguing that the reorientation of policy from Japan to the Soviet Union and the focus on Europe meant that the South Pacific suddenly became an unimportant back- water, Bell asserts that American planners virtually ignored the South Pac- if lc after May I946, with the exception of a proposed base on Manus Is- land.“ I would agree with Bell about the major reorientation of policy and and the withdrawal of the major portion of American forces. I would also agree with Bell that Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Bonins, Micro- nesia, and Hawaii became the major bases sites sought in the Pacific. HOW‘ 79 See Hull to Christiansen. August lo. l946. ibici 3° ibid John Dedman. a former Australian War Cabinet member during the wartime and immediate postwar periods. described “residual rights“ as special bilateral agreements between the US and various British Commonwealth nations in the South Pacific by which the US had the right to jointly use the base facilities of the host nation. Moreover, the US also had the right to take control of the bases at any time it deemed necessary and for whatever length of time it thought necessary. In addition. the US would have the right to deny the same priviledge to any other nation. Dedman erous that the US began to "back away“ from these bilateral agreements in i946 because of the strategic reorientation to the north, an unwillingness to conclude so many bilateral agree- ments without UN sanction, and Congressional funding limitations on postwar base development See Dedman, ”Encounter over Menus," 145. I48, and 149-150. 3‘ See Roger Bell, “Australian-American Discord Nemtiations For Post-War Bases And Security Arrangements In The Pacific, I944- I 946,“ MIN/1M all/ant 27 (April I973): 21—22 and 27- 28; and idem, maul/es Acclaim-American RaIaII’msA/n'me Pacific We“ (Carlton. Victoria Melbourne University Press, I977), 144-172. 9] ever, I would disagree that American planners completely ignored the South Pacific in 1946 and i947. While refraining from planning for any large de- ployments in the area outside of Manus, American Army officers continued to see the South Pacific playing a role in American Pacific policy after the summer of I946. A War Department plan of August i946 partially explains where the South Pacific fit into planners' ideas after the spring of I946 and further suggests that American officials wanted some sort of presence in the South Pacific long after the Soviet Union became the perceived threat in the Pac- Ific and East Asia. Entitled "War Department Plan For Overseas Bases“ and dated August 6, I946, the plan provided a breakdown of bases by island chain, desired force structure, civilian personnel strength, and strategic priority.82 There was a predominance of bases north of the Equator. Army ground, air, and service units, for example, were located primarily in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Ryukyus.” Most of these f or- ces, in turn, were concentrated in Hawaii and the Philippines with the Ryuk- yus and the Marianas appearing to be a second tier and the Marshalls, Bonins, Marcus, and Wake comprising a third tier of very small, low strength out- posts.“ Hawaii, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Ryukyus were all termed by the Army as ”Primary Operational Bases,“ which meant they were considered vital to the American overseas base system. The Bonins and Vol- canoes were considered “Secondary Operational Bases" while Marcus, Kwa- jalein, Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Canton were all categorized as ”Reserve 82 See 'War Department Plans For Oversea Bases (Post Occupation Period)," August 6, I946, General Files, RG 5: Records of General Headquarters. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). l945- i 95f , MacArthur Memorial Archives (hereafter cited as RG 5: SCAP, General iles . 83 ibid.. lo-l2. 84 ibid. 33-37, 48-54, and 55-56. 92 .8. .... .2. .8 .9. .8. .3. .... .8. .2. .3 .3. .9. .8 .2. .... .I .a ... ...lII-l .II.I.IUIQ\ICoI-1o£1ll}c 3.11:} I‘lpr‘lbaltlo Ellis-III): a8. .3... ......c... 1.... 92 a3... 1.1.: sF in 1.- J .. :5 1.... 1.. .4...... .. ...: l<§bc L~ksh1k Ishbq t‘huo I‘_Ql~ list-v L~§~£1u¢u° ll 87(4! UC—U<~ DE 8 >SEKE 5‘... . m n 1m ._ a. .. u . . . . . . a... ... It: . u 5 . o t . I a. \a Dar .. . . h. . .. 10. .1 .. ~ 5 ... .. . . . . .. .. ...... 1. iii... \ \. .25.: “ducts-u» I. .1. ..be ....la / . \ .llul. . :. . ..lla 1311198.... alt-v3.98 // A? o /é -. .. I! .. ... n. 2.. n. I. -. ZO_mm_EEOU OED/.... ISOm mIH no mmOUw ASMOHEME. 94 Figure 20. The South Pacific (Courtesy of the National "Archives II, College Park, Maryland) Operational.” These designations meant that the sites were important for the protection of the primary bases and important for power projection as well. Other bases in Micronesia, though deemed “non-operational," were still categorized as “Secondary Bases.” Majuro and Eniwetok in the Marshalls, Truk and Yap-Ulithi in the Carolines, and Peleliu in Belau all met these criteria.85 (See Figure 19) Numerous South Pacific bases, however, had a role to play in the War Department plan. Manus, American Samoa, Tarawa, and F una F uti in the Eli- ice islands were considered either “Secondary“ or "Subsidiary“ bases, the latter meaning a facility which increased flexibility of operations in the primary and secondary areas. in addition, Christmas Island, Morotai, Blak- Woendi, Guadalcanal-Tulagi, Espiritu Santo, New Calendonia, F i ii, and Bri- tish Samoa were all deemed “Minor Non-Operational“ bases. This designa- tion meant that they were desired for transit rights and "varying military rights“ to make the Pacific Basin base system more "flexible.“36 (See Figure 20) This continued perceived need for base rights in the South Pacific goes far in explaining War Department hesitation about completely with- drawing American garrisons in the winter of l946- l 947 and largely ex- plains Hull's order to keep at least one officer on each island to represent continuing American interest in "residual" base rights. Nevertheless, as the fall of l946 approached, there continued to be uncertainties and disagree- ments about limiting American base rights and facilities in the various areas of the Pacific. in September l946, for instance, Admiral Towers, CINCPAC, argued for a limited American presence in the area by stating to 85 ibid. l and3. 86 mug-um l. 95 President Truman and Secretary Forrestal that the Guam-Saipan-Tinian complex, in addition to the Philippines and Okinawa, were the basic neces- sities for postwar American security in the Pacific and that any additional scarce resources should be applied to maintaining a mobile carrier fleet rather than fixed bases and forces. No mention was made by Towers of the South Pacific.87 Some officers in the War Department had other ideas about the South Pacific as late as the f all of l946. In September i946, MacArthur ordered Hull to reduce the garrisons in question to "token size" but that final with- drawal could only come with permission from the War Department itself. Moreover, although Bora Bora, Aitutaki, and Penryhn had been stricken by the JCS from the list of desired bases, the other locations in the South Pacific mentioned above had apparently not been.$8 Later in the same month, MacArthur‘s headquarters and his subordinate commands seemed to come to the conclusion that the forces remaining in the South Pacific were needed primarily for the upcoming aerial mapping survey, but they were concerned that complete withdrawal of American ground forces would make temporary reentry for this survey diff icult.‘39 in spite of this concern, there were orders from Hull to his garrisons to be prepared to withdraw completely from Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, Fiji, and New Calendonia by the middle of 37 For Tower's statement to Truman, see "The President-Bases." September 30, I946. formal Dir/mess also Reynolds, WIN/Milk! 7W3, 521-522; and "Extract From Secret Information Bulletin No. i7, Battle Experience Supporting Operations For The Occupation Of The Marshall islands Including The Westernmost Atoll Eniwetok Comments by ClNCPAC-CINCPM. “Mobile Forces Versus Bases,” file "Joint Operations,“ February i946-October 1946. box 198. series I2, Strategic Plans, 0A, NHC. 38 See MacArthur to Hull, September 5. I 946, R6 9: Radiograms, Outgoing Radios (XTS), MacArthur Memorial Archives. 89 See MacArthur to Hull, September I I. 1946, ibid; see also Hull to MacArthur, October i6. l946; October 27. 1946; and October 28, 1946; all in R6 9: Radicgrams. AFMIDPAC. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 96 December 1946. Yet by that time, there were still nearly 500 US military personnel in these locations, as well as personnel on Tarawa, Canton, and Christmas Island.90 An interesting sidelight on the stringency of the budgetary situation may provide some insight to the difficulty faced in withdrawing the garri- sons. in September i946, Hull had requested the War Department to allow the garrisons to stay in the South Pacific because of a lack of surface tran- sportation, lack of funding for such transportation, and the expense of air- lifting the troops out by American Airways.” Budgetary considertations, as well as the aerial mapping survey, thus partially explain why some Ameri- can forces stayed in the South Pacific until the first months of l947, But the numerous references in the documents to “residual" base rights and in- terests suggests that some commanders on the spot still had a desire for bases and base rights at various points in the South Pacific for purposes of strategic contingency planning. This idea is evidenced by radio traf f lc between Hull and Major General Lauris Norstad, chief of the War Department's Operations and Plans Division (OPD), in November i946. The subject of the message was an American lieutenant colonel by the name of Thomas who was stationed in Syndey, Australia, and was reluctant to turn surplus American equipment and base facilities at Guadalcanal, Nanadi, Fiji, and Espirito Santo over to any foreign power until he was certain that the War and State Departments approved the action.9‘2 Colonel Thomas' confusion stemmed from his uncertainty about 90 See Hull to Commanding Officer, us Army Forces, New Calendonia (co USAFNC), November 1 i , I946; and Hull to Eisenhower, December i3. I946; both found in R6 9: Radiograms,AFMlDPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 9' See Hull to the Chief of Special Purposes Garrison. United States Armth SPGAR USA), September 21. i946. ibid 92 See Hull to Norstad, November 21, 1946, ibid. 97 whether or not Guadalcanal was on the list of "national interest airways" or civil air facilities which were to be developed after the war for joint US military-civilian use. Apparently, the f inal'provisions for the transfer of equipment stated that any transfer should in no way jeopardize future rights or negotiations by the United States government.93 A few days later, a message from Hull to Brigadier General Robert Nowland, Commanding General of the Pacific Division of the Army's Air Transport Command (PAC DIV ATC), seemed to clear up the confusion about Guadalcanal's future status in the War Department plan since it explicitly stated that garrisons could be withdrawn from Fiji, Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, Tarawa, and New Calendonia, but that token garrisons had to be main- tained at Canton and Christmas Islands because of sovereignty disputes with the British over the use of those islands. The report made it clear that ground forces were no longer necessary at these locations but that Canton at least was an important site on the list of ”national interest airways" and that some presence should be maintained.94 , That the War Department continued to have ideas about the South Pac- if ic as late as the winter of i946- I 947 was also apparent. For example, a War Department "Master Plan“ was referred to by‘HulI In early December i 946 and by Whitehead in April 1947 in contexts which still assumed some level of base construction at South Pacific locations In the Line Islands, the Admiralties, the Solomons, the Gilberts, the New Hebrides, Samoa, New Calendonia, Fiji, and the Ellice Islands.95 Still, by the first months of 1947, 93 Ibid. 94 See Hull to Nowland, November 24, 1946. R6 9: Radiograms. AFMIDPAC. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 95 See Hull to MacArthur, December 4. I946. Ibid., and Whitehead to MacArthur and Major Gemral Francis Griswold. Commanding mneml of the US 20th Air Force (COMAF 20). April I 7. i947, R6 9: Radiotrams, Air Force, Ibid. Whitehead's chanm in billet title reflected a charm in 98 strategic and budgetary considerations seem to have caught up with the War Department's base configurations, which were now very limited in extent. For example, in February i947, Major General Francis Griswold, Commanding General of the Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO), recommended putting the bulk of the aviation forces on Guam, Tinian, and Iwo Jima and limiting ground forces in the area to one division on Saipan.96 By May of 1947, most of the ground and service forces had not only been withdrawn from the South Pacific, but from the more vital northern areas as well.97 Moreover, numerous documents from March to June I947 suggest that base prioritization and budget cuts may have even forced limited coopera- tion between the War and Navy Departments over the use of facilities on Okinawa. Whitehead specifically cited considerations of “economy" In terms or acreage, base Construction, aviation SUDDHBS, air operation facilities, and storage facilities to Major General Albert Hegenberger, Commanding General of let Air Division on Okinawa (COMAIRDIV I), when discussing the two services“ decision to combine the Naval Air Facility at Nana Air Base postwar oversaw command organization within the War and Navy Departments after Jmuuy i . i947. Under pressure from the President, Congress, and the American public to eliminate waste and duplication between the services and to move toward quasi-unification of the military. the War and Navy Departments established “unified" commands throughout the world, including in the Pacific. For example. where previously commanmrs had authority only over their respective services‘ units in a geographic region, now American commanders had authority over all naval, air. and ground forces in certain demarcated geographic areas. In the Pacific, General MacArthur ceased to be in command of all US Army Forces in the Basin and became commander of all US forces. with some exceptions. in Japan. South Korea. the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and the Marianas-Bonins. Admiral Towers lost control of all naval forces in the areas under MacArthur's command. but was placed in command of all forces in the Pacific except where MacArthur commanmd See Herman Wolk, lezmmmmm IMPasMAI'r I’m I943— I947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, i984), I 58- i 60 for a complete (bscription of the unified commands in I947. 96 See Griswold to MacArthur, February 8. I947; and February 14, i947; both found in R0 9: Radiog‘ams, MARBO. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 97 See Griswold to MacArthur, May 24, I 94?. Ibid. 99 with that of AAF operations on the island in order to reduce redundancy and duplication.98 Still, the question remains as to why certain circles in the War De- partment would have wanted to retain any base rights in the South Pacific after l946? It seems ridiculous to assume that the Interest in South Paci- f ic base rights was in any way directed against a European colonial power in the region. Disagreements between the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Austrialia, and New Zealand over the postwar Pacific were many and varied during and after the war, but never to the degree of main- taining a postwar military presence in the area directed against one of those powers?9 More likely, the desire for base rights south of the Equator was con- nected to continued perceptions of Japan as a postwar menace and to grow- ing perceptions that the Soviet Union was the new "enemy“ in the Pacific. American military planners could not forget how seriously Australia, New Zealand, and the lines of communication and supply from Hawaii and the American West Coast to the South Pacific had been threatened by Japan In i94i -I942, how costly the campaign of i942-45 in the Southwest Pacific had been, or how difficult it had been to obtain base rights from the colonial powers in the area. Accordingly, if Japan was a future enemy which could rebuild and threaten the US again, then secure bases in the South Pacific were probably perceived as the next line of defense if the bases in Micro- nesia and the Ryukyus were threatened or taken. 99 Seeexchange of radio messages between Whiteheadand Hegenberger, March IS, 1947; March i7, 194?; March 29. I947;April l3, I947; andJune I3, i947; all found in R6 9: Radiograms. Air F orce, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 99 See Bell ," ”Australian-American Discord,“ l2-33; Louis, Maria/13m away, passim; and Christh Thorne. All/as a/a KIM ”U UnitaVStam firm/n, Millie Mfr 4917mm, [941- I945 (Oxford. Englantt Oxford University Press, I978). lOO If the Soviet Union was the new enemy in the postwar Pacific and if Soviet power and patterns of aggression were equated with those of prewar Japan, then the ability to occupy the South Pacific islands quickly and use them to secure the central and western Pacific would be just as important to military planners in l946 as they had been in I942. In addition, if War Department planners in i946 held the same low opinion of the European col- onial powers and their ability to defend the South Pacific as naval planners had in i944, the House Naval Affairs Committee had in i945, and Ambassa- dor Austin had in I947, then retaining base rights and a few troops in the South Pacific does not seem so peculiar. Thus, in the world of worst-case scenario planning, it is not all that strange that as the JCS in the fall of I946 was marking out “minimum“ base requirements and even emphasizing strategic denial over base develop- ment,'°° it was also still composing long lists of base sites and transit stops which were almost identical to the areas identified in the planning documents from i943 and I944. By mid- to late I946, most of the island groups which fell under foreign sovereignty were labelled “desirable“ if ob- tained, but not “absolutely necessary.“ Still, the length of the lists alone denotes a continued attitude to control as many points in the postwar Paci- fic as possible.'°l Even as late as January l947, the House Naval Affairs Committee re- commended that the US have at least “dominating control“ over the Japanese Mandates, ”substantial rights” to sites where US bases had been construc- '00 See "StrategicAreasAndTrusteeships in The Pacific,"JCS léi9/l9, September 19, i946, file I2-9-42. ccs 360. R0 2l8. NA. 10' See'Memorandum from theJCStotheSecretaryofState,” November 7,194s.mw194s, bug’s-1143mm “Memorandum from theJCStoSWNCC.“Jum5. 1946, new 1946. : 4-ll . lOl ted on the territory of allied nations, and “full title“ to bases in Manus in the Admiralty islands, Nomeau in New Calendonia, Espritu Santo in the New Hebrides, Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, and any other bases on islands mandated to or claimed by other nations")2 The attitude that the entire Pacific Basin should become an occupied American lake does not seem to have died completely.‘°3 Base planning for the postwar Pacific, however, seems to have taken one final twist as late as June i947. In that month, the ”Joint Marianas Board on the Military Development of the Marianas” issued its report and aired its ideas about base development in that strategic island group. The report is most interesting because it provides some evidence, though not entirely conclusive, that the shift In the strategic front line from Microne- sia to East Asia may not have occurred in some off icers' minds even as late as the summer of I947. For example, the Joint Board continued to refer to the Marianas as a "Primary Base Area“ and continued to see it as the major operational, train- ing, and staging area for naval, air, and ground forces to defend the western and central Pacific and to project US offensive power toward East Asia.104 While the members of the Joint Board were not entirely satisfied with con- centrating so much of the US‘ Pacific strategic power on Guam in an age of atomic alrpower, they nevertheless were so impressed with its location and potential development and they were so pressed by budgetary considerations that they were willing to centralize strategic forces on Guam and merely '°2$eePre$ Release‘l42.danuary2. l947.file 39-i-37.box 72.RG 80. NA '03 For thm various controversies and attitudes. see F oltos, “NW Pacific Barrier ," 31 7-342; and Dower, ”American Lake,” 146-206. ‘04 See “Report of the Joint Marianas Board on the Military Development of the Marianas.“ June 1, l947, 178.29l7-l , S,AFSHRC. 102 prepare Saipan and Tinian for expansion in case of war.105 No mention was made of bases in Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, or South Korea, which may seem strange except for the fact that many US military officers did not per- ceive a long-term US military committment to those East Asian positions in the spring and summer of i947. As Burton Kaufman has demonstrated, the JCS in i947 advocated withdrawing all US military forces from South Korea'06 and two members of the JCS, Eisenhower and F ieet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, exchanged memoranda in March I947 which indicated a front line of Pacific defense which began in the Marianasi On March I Ith, for example, Nimitz wrote Eisenhower about his dis- satisfaction over leaving Saipan without an Army garrison for defense. He consistently discussed, however, American military positions in the Maria- nas in terms of a “post-occupation matter“ after Scuth Korea and Japan had been evacuated by US forces. Eisenhower returned to Nimitz three days later, asserting that the Army garrison forces would not be available until after Japan and Korea were evacuated and that these forces should then be located on Guam“)7 The tactical disagreement aside, such a nonchalant as- sumption about evacuating positions in East Asia at least suggests that high-ranking military officers continued to perceive a contracted strategic perimeter which was centered in the western Pacific, not mainland East Asia. '05 ibid.9and 14. '06 See Burton Kaufman, roe Km Wm moi/m in arise, moi/rm mean/mot New York: AlfredA. Knopft, I986). I7-i8. '07 See Eisenhower to Nimitz, attached memorandum, March I I, i947; and Nimitz to Eisenhower, March H, 1947; both found in Tab "A-S" oprpendix "A" to "The Report by the Joint Marianas Board,‘ 1 78.29l 7- I , 75- 76, AFSHRC. 103 Conclusion To summarize briefly, the significant strategic "lesson" of the Paci- fic War for the United States was to provide for future American security in the region by literally blanketing the area with American-controlled bases and highly alert military forces. In numerous documents, cabinet officials, the JCS, military planners, State and Interior Department officials, and even some members of Congress all subscribed to the idea that the Pacific should be perceived as a single strategic physical entity over which the US should wield dominating, if not complete, control. While officials were willing to discuss “minimal“ base requirements in terms of the islands taken from Japan, most planning documents continued to imply as late as early and mid- i947 that the US should have carte plane/re over the entire Pacific in order to prevent the aggression of a resurgent Japan or an expansionist Soviet Union. As Braisted and Brune have argued, these ideas were not entirely new. There were prewar continuities to postwar strategic thought about defense in the Pacific. In fact, most American naval officers in the prewar period believed the United States should have taken control of Micronesia, as well as other areas, as a way to deny them to Japan and other potential naval rivals. American naval officers only reluctantly settled for limited base development at a few select points because of the policies of civilian poli- tical leaders and their perceptions about public pressure for disarma- ment.‘°8 By I945, however, neither military nor civilian planners were pre- pared to settle for what they considered to be a second-best solution to se- ‘08 See Bralsim. “MGM/in (lemme I909- I922’. DOSSIm. 104 curity threats from East Asia and all parties were advocating occupation for strategic denial at a minimum. Yet the focus on Japan as the enemy changed after i944. After that date, planning documents began to mention Japan or “any other power“ as the threat to American security in the postwar world. To be sure, post- I 945 references to “any other power” meant the Soviet Union. In effect, the Soviet Union began to be perceived as the major threat to postwar American hegemony in the Pacific and the USSR quickly replaced Japan as the most probable obstacle to the US' solution to its postwar regional security dilem- mas. IOS Chapter Three The “Bear“ In the Pacific?: The American intelligence Picture, the Soviet Union, and the Pacific Basin In the latter stages of the Second World War, American strategic planners and intelligence officers began to think about the Soviet Union as the US' next probable enemy. According to Melvyn Lef f ler, policymakers and planners in the late I940s saw the Soviets primarily as a global, but long- term, threat to US interests. Documents cited below support Lef f ler's con- tention. in most of the reports, the Soviet Union was considered to be too badly damaged from the Second World War to undertake military operations any time in the near future. Moreover, many officers who believed a Soviet- American war was probable in the near future thought it might occur more as the result of accidental or unintentional conflict rather than Soviet de- sign.1 US intelligence reports, however, confirm that between I945 and I947 Japan. indeed was replaced by the USSR as the perceived strategic threat to US security in the Pacific and East Asia. By the summer of i947, American military officials and officers saw definite Soviet air, ground, ' See Melvyn P. Leffier. ”T he American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War. 1945-1948." With? HISIw/w/RGVW 89 (April 1984): 346-400: did Leffier. PWU/PW, 3- i 0 and i06- I i4. 106 and naval threats to American positions in South Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. Given American strategic power in the Pacific and East Asia after I945, it seems implausible that American planners would recon- sider a wartime scenario in which East Asian and western Pacific positions were threatened with capture or neutralization. Still, the worst-case sce- narios about Soviet military capabilities in East Asia and the Pacific Basin suggest that American officers were sincerely concerned about having to rely on Micronesia as a major strategic complex of bases if China, South Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines were conquered or "neutraliz- ed” by Soviet actions. The Context American opposition to Soviet actions in eastern Europe after 1944 and the power vacuum accompanying the destruction of Axis military power sparked interest in war plans which perceived the Soviet Union as the next probable "enemy” of the United States. Because of Pearl Harbor, the defeats suffered in the winter of I94i - I942, and the uncertainty of the future, worst-case scenarios were part and parcel of this strategic planning.2 For example, although American officers knew the Soviet Union did not possess a substantial surface navy or strategic air force in I945, they knew it pos- sessed a large submarine force and thought it might have the industrial cap- ability to create strategic forces in the Pacific at a future date. The slightest possibility that the Soviet Union could create such forces and use 2 For general accounts of the Cold War from US and Soviet perspectives. see John Lewis Gaddis. f/Ie Unfiw'StataMt/Ie Origins oft/Ia Cir/d War, I941 - I947 ( New York: Columbia University Press, I972); and Yoj tech Mastny, Rumble/twin the w/o'Wm Da'a/mram Stratmy, mat/iv Pal/(Iwomem/Lsm, 1941— 1945' ( New York: Columbia University Press, I980), respectively. For an excellent analysis of American military planning and the role it played in the origins of the Cold War. see Leffier, ”American Cormption ," 346-400. 107 them against the United States automatically meant the USSR would be con- sidered a threat, especially to a generation of officers reared on the "fail- ure" of the Washington System, the "lessons“ of the Munich Syndrome, and the trauma of Pearl Harbor. In effect, these officials and officers were suspicious of any other power with military capabilities which might po- tentially pose a threat to the United States at any time in the future. Not surprisingly, the planning and analysis emphasized what might occur In the future rather than what was likely to occur given current Soviet capabili- ties and intentions3 In addition, documents concerned with the American position in the Pacific and East Asia were consistent with worst-case scenarios for Europe and the Middle East. The documents concerning the Pacific, in fact, are in- teresting case studies of the global viewpoint held by American strategic planners during the i945- I 947 period. Communism was seen as a mono- lithic and seemingly invincible force, the Allied position was repeatedly seen as weak and largely untenable, and “lessons learned" from interwar and wartime experiences were enunciated clearly and repeatedly. In effect, the Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power with similar capabilities and intentions to those of Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and Fascist italy.4 3 See Leffier. ”American Conception,” passim. See also Palmer. origimaff/vflr/time 5mm 7-27; and Marc S. Gallicchio, “The Kuriles Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japan Border Dispute. 1941-i956,“ Pw/flbI/I'sta'IZa/Reviw 60 (February 199i ): 69-101. For a similar phenomenon occuring in regard to American strategic planning for the postwar Middle East, see Miller, mm- .Sawn‘ty, 163-203. Miller finds that the same kind of planning, at times. reached alarming and even hysterical levels as military and civilian strategic planners equated Soviet capabilities and intentions In the Mediterranean and the Middle East with German intentions during the early 19405 and simply assumed the worst from an American strategic perspective. 4 For an account of this mental construct among American strategic planners and the general pub- lic. see Les K. Adler and Thomas 6. Peterson. ”Red Fascism: The Mermr of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, I 9303- I 9505,“ Amy/cm metrical Roy/29w 75 (April 1970): IO46-1064: reprinted in Paterson. Hart/m the army/71:9! III/wt- frumm fo/i’m (New York: Oxford University Press, I988). 3-17. in adiition, for 108 The 'Bear' in the Pacific? Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union over East Asian affairs began in the fall of 1945 when the two nations proceeded to assist “proxy“ forces in the Chinese civil war, disagreed about the future government of a reunifled Korea, and began to argue over the postwar dis- position and status of Japan. A number of incidents near the Soviet naval base at Port Arthur demonstrates how tense conditions could be in the re- gion and how deeply suspicions ran between the two nations as early as the fall of 1945. According to War Department records, in November I945 General MacArthur briefly outlined flight Instructions to Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) and United States Navy aircraft, ordering them not to fly over Sov- iet-controlled territory in the Kurile islands and placing ”restrictions” on US flights over ”foreign-owned“ territory in the area.5 Apparently, the re- strictions were not clear enough, since later that month a Navy patrol plane was fired on by a Soviet fighter plane within one mile of the Port Arthur base. (See Figure 21) According to the American naval attacfle‘ in Moscow, the Soviets fired on the plane because it did not have permission from the local military command to enter the twelve-mile coastal limit which the Soviets were enforcing around the naval base.i5 The United States Navy was not satisfied with the Soviet reply, Admiral Nimitz asserting that notice of a twelve-mile limit should have been made by the Soviet authorities at an perspectives on how worst-case scenario thinking affected the American militarys view of the Soviet Union as the major postwar threat to American interests, see Leffler, ”American Conception." paesim; Miller, Sara? fa" .Sanr/ty. 163-203; Borowski. Ami/air I’ll/wt. 9 I - 107; and Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,” Intwmflm/mrig/ 7 (Winter 1 982/1 983): I 10- 138. 5 See 0900 Report, November l, 1945. box s. 090 Diary. DDEL. 6 0900 Report, moor IS, 1945, ibid 109 ~02 >18 00 .92103. JC>CI pu.>O¢ 8 82—304 .In Illa «I...» all-... toll ”23:59! 43.38 .48. -- I Figure 21. Location Of Soviet Naval Facilities (Courtesy of the Bureau of 1 10 Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) earlier date. Nimitz also claimed that the plane had already withdrawn twenty-five miles when it was attacked.7 Regardless of Nimitz' claim, MacArthur was instructed by the War De- partment to ensure US aircraft did not violate the Soviets' twelve-mile limit.a Later events will demonstrate that even MacArthur's subsequent in- structions were violated by US aircraft flying over Soviet-controlled terri- tory in northeast Asia. What is most interesting about these incidents, however, are the suspicions they must have confirmed for both American and Soviet officers in the Pacific and East Asia. To Soviet officers, Ameri- can violations of airspace could only have meant intelligence operations of some sort. Though there is no direct evidence in primary sources that these 1945 incidents were intelligence operations, American violations of Soviet airspace for intelligence purposes quite frequently became the cause of hostile activity between the military forces of the two nations as early as the late 19405.9 It is not unreasonable to assume that American air opera- tions in East Asia between 1945 and I947 entailed similar kinds of strate- gic activity. Yet to American officers, Soviet willingness to fire live rounds could only have confirmed their worst suspicions about "aggressive” Soviet Intentions in East Asia. Unwilling to admit that the Soviets might be justified about their suspicions of foreign military activity on their peri- 7 0900 Report, February 25. 1946, ibid 8 0900 Rwort. March 23. I946. ibid 9 See Juries Bamford, Impala/spam A mtmmrzasmmmy (Hrrisonburg, Virginia: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company. 1982). 232-241 ; Seymour M. Hersh. 7m law! Is Dart/wait: What Rania/W10 F lip?! 007m Mum/name (MAM I! (New York: Random House. 1986), 16-22 and 35-43; and Jeffrey Richelson. mica? [saw AMI/awe! rm (New York: William Morrow and Company. Inc, 1987), 100- 152. 111 pheral zones, American officers instead read "evil“ intentions into the inci- dents.l° A fascinating source for this growing mindset are the periodic intel- ligence summaries from MacArthur's chief intelligence officer, Major Gen- eral Charles Willoughby, and his staff. As early as the winter and spring of 1946, Willoughby, and presumably MacArthur, were very concerned with Soviet forces In northern Korea, northern China, and the Soviet Maritime Provinces.H The reports reflect this concern and are interesting not only for their Intrinsic information but because of their shortcomings in anal- yzing Soviet military capabilities and intentions. One report on the Soviet Far Eastern air order of battle in the winter and spring of 1946 seems to typify the intelligence from MacArthur's head- quarters in 1946 and 1947. in all fairness, the report in question began with a significant qualification about the meager amounts of data on which to base the Soviet order of battle and the "questionable“ quality of informa- tion from North Korean defectors, who were allegedly prone to exaggerate Soviet strength because of their hatred for the USSR.12 Still, the report was typical for the time period in that it emphasized numbers of aircraft ‘0 i would argue that the Soviets were justified in their suspicions of other great powers in the region considering that the USSR had fought two wars defending their Koran and Monmlian borders against Japanese intrusions in the late 19303. Given these previous incidents, it is difficult to see how the Soviets could have Ignored American military deployments In the region, even if those deployments were Denim. For an account of the border wars between Japan and the Soviet Union, see Alvin Coox, Mammy/ore Small Wm f/Ie Mist-W Stag/afar Moray/mm, I938 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977); and item” Momm/m- WWW! Russia, 1939 (Stanford. California Stanford University Press. 1985) for accounts of border wars between Japan and the Soviet Union before the I 941 Soviet- Japanase Non-Aggression Pact. 1‘ See “Appendix III: Soviet Air Ortbr Of Battle.“ file “Intelligence." Special Intellimnce Bulletin. January-April 1946. Record Group 4, Records of General Headquarters, U.S. Army F orces, mm. 1942- 1947 (hereafter cited as RG 4: intelligence, USAF PAC), MacArthur Memorial ivas. ' '2 ibid. is. 112 ./ ‘y—d_f/.\L’_\‘_~ .- l . I v 1 ' l . K- 0...: 1..“!- 5 s j \‘\ .—— mt we :/ T4V \ (r_ .’ ...“ , “our N" _ Q i _, - ° E CHINA - JAPAN 1 Like mun—Inla- m mm mm "Am All! team. Our“: Figure 22. Airfields-North China (Courtesy of the Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) 113 without analyzing possible intentions for the use of such aircraft. More- over, the report insufficiently discussed military aspects such as the train- . ing level of personnel, the serviceabllity of the equipment, and the logisti- cal limitations of the Soviet Air Force.“ The report continually emphasized that the Soviets “may“ have had some 400 aircraft stationed in North Korea at the time and "possibly“ up to 2000 aircraft at their disposal for operations in East Asia.M (See Figure 22) Yet without being able to substantiate these numbers, the types of aircraft, or their serviceabllity and reliability, the report went on to claim that So- viet alrpower 1n the Far East was "considerable“ and far in excess of occu- pation needs.‘5 The report did not entertain the possibility that Soviet avi- ation forces, while large in numbers from an American perspective for mere occupation purposes, may have been necessary given the vast distances of the Soviet Far East. The report also failed to discuss the large numbers of aircraft in the context of the Soviet Union as a nation still recovering from the effects of a devastating war and still insecure about its East Asian strategic position. Numbers were also emphasized in regard to Soviet air force person- nel. Probably anquishing over a similar rapid demobilization within the United States armed forces, MacArthur's intelligence officers focused on the fact that the Soviet Air Force would reduce its active personnel from 1.5 million in July I945, but would still retain about 800,000 personnel on active service in July I946. Failing to analyze any evidence for these f ig- ures or the quality of the forces in question, the report concluded with a 13Ibid. 1410111 '5 ibid. 15-16. 114 claim that Soviet intentions were to maintain a high level of air strength in the Far East in excess of occupation duties in northern China and northern Korea. Again, the analysts did not consider factors from the Soviet point of view such as the vastness of the area to be policed or Soviet strategic per- ceptions of US military strength in the area."5 Most importantly for American bases in the Pacific and East Asia, the authors had definite ideas about how the Soviets would use their Far East- ern air force in the event of hostilities with the United States. The report did not take war entirely for granted, but it certainly gave significant capa- bilities to the Soviet Air Force and believed the very existence of those capabilities made war more probable. It was believed, for instance, that lOO-2OO medium bombers could conduct attacks against the Japanese home islands during daylight or nighttime hours. In addition, the report assumed that with a Soviet occupation of southern Korea, Soviet aircraft, including fighter escorts, could reach targets in the Ryukyus. The report even includ- ed numerous maps of East Asia outlining estimated ranges of Soviet aircraft based at Vladivostok, southern Korea, and Manchuria and estimating their ability to reach American bases throughout the region.17 (See Figure 23) in addition, American anxieties about military dispositions in East Asia were probably increased by a lack of US military strength in the area. For example, a May 1946 Fifth Air Force operational summary for General Eisenhower demonstrated with maps of East Asia that there was no early radar warning over the Korean Peninsula and that due to a lack of equipment and personnel, air traffic control and early warning of air attacks from the 16 ibid. i7. 17 Ibid 115 E CHINA - JAPAN I“, m Imm m "A?" A.” “I. want: A. “N no. MW“ . "ac-mu; .. o \ : n \ — .- d d Figure 23. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases (Courtesy of the “Bureau-of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) 116 Soviet Far East would be limited to Japanese airspace. With the mindset that the Soviets were preparing to attack US positions anyway, this real time weakness in air defense could have only intensified insecurity among US planning and intelligence officers."3 Unfortunately, the previously mentioned intelligence summary from MacArthur's command did not analyze the effectiveness or even the various types of aircraft which the Soviets were supposedly deploying. Moreover, this summary lent very little analysis to the notoriously inefficient Soviet combat supply system and its possible effects on operations. Most impor- tantly, the report also ignored the vulnerability of Soviet bases to American sea- and land-based alrstrikes.l9 Although the report was qualified in claiming that war was not Imminent, the authors' diction was contrary to the report's conclusions, which conceded significant capabilities to the So- viet military and seemed to equate capabilities with sinister intentions. For example, the words and phrases ”may," "possibly,“ and “could have“ re- peatedly appeared in the report where Soviet military intentions were being described, yet the document ultimately conveyed that Soviet intentions were probabilities, not just long-range possibilities? it is possible, since the report was a mere summary of information which had been gathered and analyzed over the past few months, that these themes had been more fully explored in the day-to-day Intelligence sheets. Nevertheless, summaries are supposed to contain the most vital information about military capabili- ties and intentions so commanding officers can digest that information and '8 See “Operational Summary Of The Situation,“ subj: Fifth Air Force Presentation for General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, May a, 1946, 730.04-4A, AFSHRC. '9 ibid 2° SaeAppendix ill, “Soviet Air Order of Battle," file 'intellimnce." Special intelligence Bulletin, Jaiuary-April I946, RG 4: USAF PAC, lntellimnce, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 117 use it as the basis for decisions. This report was sadly lacking in all of these categories. It is important to note that not every command in early 1946 perceiv- ed such an omnipotent Soviet juggernaut ready to conquer East Asia. One report by PACUSA intelligence officers specifically asserted that the Soviet Union had not expressed very aggressive intentions in Korea or East Asia and that it had stationed large numbers of forces in northern Korea either as de- fensive moves or in preparation for offensives in case of an accidental war with the US.21 The report did not discount the threatening nature of Soviet military deployments in East Asia and, similar to Willoughby's staff, credit- ed Soviet strategic forces with being able to threaten Japan, the Ryukyus, and southern Korea. Nevertheless, this report saw a US-Soviet confronta- tion resulting more from an accident or a miscalculation and the authors subscribed to the idea that the Soviets were constructing their own version of the “Monroe Doctrine" in Eurasia by surrounding themselves “with a poll- tical border of Soviet-influenced nations.” Similarly, Rear Admiral Thomas Inglis, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (DNI), subscribed to the idea of a "Soviet Monroe Doctrine“ and argued that an attack by the Soviet Union on US positions was unlikely In the near future because the Soviets lacked a strategic air force and amphibious capability and because they had suffered so greatly from wartime devastation and population dislocation?2 2' See PACUSA Report. subj: Situation Summary: Estimate of Soviet Offensive capabilities in Korea and Vicinity, April 4, 1946, 720.609-7, AF SHRC. 21’ Ibid. For the notion among American strategic planners during the early Cold War of a Soviet ”Monroe Doctrine" in Eurasia, see Leffler, “American Conception of National Security,” 359- 362 and 365. See also inglis t0 Forrestal, “Memorandum of information," January 21 , 1946, box 24, Forrestal Papers, Princeton University Library. as quoted in Barton J. Bernstein, ”American F oreim Policy and the Origins of the Cold War ." found in Berstein. ad, Pol/flats WWI/clots of (Ira frummmmilrfratim ( Chicago Quadrangle Books. 1970). 40: and cited in Thomas G. Paterson. aim/Tart: ”UM/IUDN/vw/JWJ (WW. Norton 8r 00111110le. 1979), 156. 118 PACUSA may have been a little more balanced in its estimates of So- viet ”aggressiveness“ and the onset of accidental war because of its own awareness of US violations of Soviet airspace under very peculiar condi- tions. In late April 1946, Whitehead and Major General Kenneth Wolfe, Com- manding General of the 5th Air Force, exchanged a series of letters discus- sing the possible court-martial of one First Lieutenant Alex O'Connor, a 5th Air Force transport pilot who violated orders and flew over the Soviet-con- trolled Kuriles islands. Apparently, O'Connor was transporting the public affairs officer of the 1 1th Airborne Division, one Lieutenant Reid, as well as a planeload of reporters on this excursion. Lieutenant Reid may have wanted to show of f for the reporters or the tour may have been a not so subtle cover for an intelligence operation against the Soviet bases in the area. At any rate, Reid ordered O'Connor over the Kuriles and the bases themselves and O'Connor‘s violation of Soviet airspace was just the kind of unintentional mishap which PACUSA officers were afraid would result in a war with the Soviet Union in East Asia.23 In spite of this kind of caution by some officers on the spot when it came to judging the Soviet Union, high-ranking officers in Washington us- ually perceived the worst when Its came to Soviet Intentions. in September 1946, for Instance, Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Pres- Ident and nominal Chairman of the JCS, argued to Truman that the Ryukyu is- lands should not be placed under Japanese administration and “demilitariz- ed“ as the State Department had requested. (See Figure 24) Writing for the entire JCS and equating demilitarization with Soviet control, Leahy assert- 23 See Whitehead to MacArthur, April 9. 1946;0'00nnor's statement and cover letter from Wolfe to Whitehead, April 19, 1946; and Whitehead to Wolfe. April 20. 1946; all in 168.6008-1 , Whitehead Collection, AFSHRC. 119 THE RYUKYUS . . I USSR. STRATEGIC LOCATION IN - {\j NakkAioo I THE WESTERN PACIFIC I L_.L 1 4 1 J. -’ o 500 MILES ,J I a ' SEA or JAPAN KOREA vmow SEA 4; Pusan f ,. 0 K000 Oak: We Nae-ow ; smxoxu ~ ”'"M , xvusuu Kagoshima CHINA '60 r asr CHINA o9 AMAMIO SHIMA . SEA ' . . TAIPEI a , OKINAWA SHIMA . ' - ~ . . :'-’ «On p." "'50! _ i .5. “o °° MlvAKo sr-iiMA -: .. ‘ NoNe KONG . TAIWAN I . . s, .1 3 0° LUZON Pacmc OCEAN 0 MAN , -. 9 0 (l PHILIPPINES "Seq" /. -- . ”up MINDANAO 0- _ 53- PALAU is ...?“ Figure 24. The Ryukyus: Strategic Location In The Western Pacific (From Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Nil/tary Gal/amen! m 7771? Warm Islands, 1945-1950, US. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.) 120 ed that Okinawa was a base of primary Importance and that under the con- trol of an “enemy” power it was an “open door" for challenging American power in the Pacific. More specifically, Leahy called for a strategic trust- eeship over the Islands because It would allow the US to project power to- ward northeast Asia In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it would provide a "bastion” against alleged Soviet “southward progress" toward the “Malay barrier,“ and it would deny the Soviets the use of strategic facilities which could be employed to challenge American control of the northwestern Pacific.24 To some high-ranking officers, the Soviet threat did not stop in East Asia or even the Pacific. In an exchange of radio messages in late August and early September of 1946, General Eisenhower made it clear to MacArthur that Alaska could also be threatened by the Soviet Union. in late August, for instance, Eisenhower sent MacArthur a compromise proposal for dividing command responsibilities in the Pacific between the Army and the Navy. MacArthur's responsibilities in time of war included defending Japan and South Korea and supporting US "military responsibilities“ in China and the Philippines, while the Navy's responsibilities included supporting MacArthur, defending the Pacific approaches to the American West Coast, and supporting the Army's defense of Alaska.25 (See Figure 25) A few days later, Eisenhower sent a more detailed message in which he explained how Alaska fit into his strategic perceptions. Stating that the entire Pacific Basin was a “great outpost system“ that should be oriented toward defending the US West Coast, Eisenhower went on to assert that the 24 See Leahy to Truman, September 10, 1946, file “Pacific Islands,” box 60. George M. Elsey Papers, HSTL. 25 See Eisenhower to MacArthur, August 29, 1946, Plans and Operations File. Blue Bintbr Series, RG 4: General Headquarters, USAF PAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 121 .3335: . .5513: Eur. ... €30.93 0.298 3:: 2:“. av fl? ......::.:.«> :3; .33.: 032.8 s \I M 50).. has; .... s 3.3.:- ...§::.:.a> R$8."...- ..n..:u.< \n: . fl.”- . 98a...- a:§< . Wuhan-n 14.3.: . s. r... . . I. . ... . figs-301.35.: «o. .1 5.. r ...n 5.39:3; {Sun-34.2 7 y . . 333 . . sea... sia-cast . . o f 4 .. .. 2t 3...... .23.... .2555 ... «on .3. , can... .599: . J ... «am act»: a .35 an..uu:nza.<....:.z 4.. .autn ... . h. J: 9:231:30: . . 3...: Q - .. . . . . to . .23: a . .. 803...! a ... m ..o. o ‘83:- . 098933 1..—is- 6698 by; V - _ .302 6 EU «2.3:; _ 55 Cum I03 :3.» ...-sun ' 0’ .‘n’ . J. 5qu 232 o auto—=4. .....oz 6:.“ «tun—m Figure 25. Siberia And Alaska (From 5. Frederick Starr, RussiaSAmer/cm 122 Colony, Duke University Press, 1987) Navy should control the central Pacific so that It could offer naval and logi- stical support to the Army defense of Alaska. Failing to label what he meant by ”enemy nations“ but leaving little to the imagination, Eisenhower asserted that the entire Pacific should be considered a supporting area for the Alaska-Aleutians theater and for any operations conducted in Alaska, 0n the Asian mainland " . . . [where] the strategic situation may draw us into decisive conflict . . . and in " . . . whatever theater bordering on the water areas of the Pacific . . . [where] we might become locked up with an enemy."26 Eisenhower thought the Soviet threat to Alaska and the Aleutians so great that he was willing to concede command in the central Pacific to the Navy and his message intimated that the most Immediate goal in the Pacific Basin was to defend the US West Coast and Alaska from the Soviet Union. East Asia and the western Pacific were secondary?7 MacArthur, of course, had other ideas. Opposed to the idea of divided command in the Pacific, he believed the main mission of US forces in the Pacific Basin was to support the occupation of Japan and South Korea. Ac- cordingly, he believed all US forces in the Pacific should be under his charge from Tokyo until the occupation forces were withdrawn from Japan and South Korea, at which time a new unified commander should be chosen to sit in Hawaii.28 But MacArthur did not consider the Pacific a southern flank to support Alaska. Instead, he thought the entire Pacific should be used to support the “front line" in Japan and South Korea against the Soviet Union, or as he termed it, " . . . the source from which emanates the threat. . . " MacArthur believed that if the Soviets attacked Japan and expanded into the 23S» Eisenhower t0 MacArthur, September 5. 1946, ibid ibid 28 See MacArthur to Eisenhower, September a. 1946, Ibid. 123 Pacific, the ocean area would be his “defense-in-depth.“ if the Soviets at- tacked Alaska, then MacArthur's control of the Pacific would be the ”south- ern punch“ at the Soviet “underbelly“.29 MacArthur eventually lost the fight for unified command from Tokyo, but neither officer seemed to doubt the Soviet ability to threaten US and occupied territory in the Pacific and East Asia, as well as sovereign US ter- ritory in North America. In spite of Navy operations in the Arctic In March 1946 and AAF deployments to the Arctic in the winter of 1946-1947 which Illustrated that Arctic military operations were highly Improbable at the time, both officers seemed to assume that northern operations were very viable. Of course, even after US deployments to the area demonstrated that Arctic operations were infeasible for US forces because of weather condi- tions, the level of personnel training, and the state of existing technology, most intelligence reports from this time period continued to assume that the Soviets had perfected cold weather operations}:0 Other military commands issued studies and warnings which similar- ly painted a foreboding picture for American Interests In East Asia. Radio traffic from General Wolfe to General Whitehead in late October 1946, for Instance, indicated alarm about repeated Soviet aerial intrusions Into nor- thern Japanese airspace. These activities were assumed to be some sort of strategic reconnaissance for future operations. This anxiety could not have been alleviated by the detection of a loaded Soviet troopship headed to Vladivostok in late October 1946 given that similar fleeting traces of mill- 29 ibid 30 See Appendix III, “Soviet Air Order OfBattle," no 4: USAFPAC, intelligence. MacArthur Memorial Archives; see also Borowski. lib/lair ”tract. 77-87. 124 tary deployments had preceded the Japanese attacks in East Asia In late 1941.31 In addition, officers on the spot in South Korea painted a particularly gloomy picture for the US military position there. Civil disorders, popular dissatisfaction with the South Korean government and the US Military Gov- emment, and border incidents with North Korean forces along the 38th Par- allel were taken by Lieutenant General John Hodge, Commanding General of US Army Forces In Korea (USAF IK), to mean a coordinated effort by the Sovi- ets, the North Koreans, and South Korean communists to destabilize the South Korean regime, force the US military off the peninsula, and prepare the south for a North Korean invasion. Hodge was so convinced of a coordi- nated effort that he called it the "Joint Soviet Communist Master Plan."32 Not all American officers were so alarmed by Soviet activity In East Asia as a short-term threat, but most saw a long-term threat which would have to dealt with sometime in the future. in October 1946, the JSSC wrote out a fairly elaborate postwar scenario for the State-War-Navy Coordinat- ing Committee (SWNCC) in which it claimed it was thinking in terms of American security at least one hundred years or more into the future. The JSSC envisioned an East Asia with a significant military capacity resulting from ”progressive industrialization" and the mobilization of half of the world's population. It believed this mobilization of human, industrial, and military resources would occur from the impetus of an “Asiatic-European 31See Wolfe to Whitehead, Incoming Messages, October 28, 1946; and “Message for Commander Of Naval Activities In Japan,“ October 30, 1946; both In 720.1622.AFSHRC. 31’ See Hodge to MacArthur, October 24, 1946; Colonel Leland Stranathan. commander of the 308th Bomb Wing to Wolfe. October 29. 1946; and Hodm to MacArthur, October 30, 1946; all in lb 0 125 coalition“ in which the Soviet Union was the major catalyst for military industrialization and aggression in East Asia and the Pacific.33 The JSSC further developed this scenario by imagining that China might become a communist nation and " . . . a satellite of Russia. . . ", with the Soviets pursuing " . . . their expansionist policies . . ." and the United States facing a Sino-Soviet coalition much more dangerous than the Axis alliance of 1941. With most of Asia eventually "militarized and industrial- ized” under communist control, the JSSC saw Japan, the Philippines, and American lines of communication to East Asia endangered, especially since the committee also assumed that Japan and Its outlying Islands would be demilitarized and therefore susceptible to Soviet seizure at a later date.“ This idea that American positions in East Asia were endangered and that Micronesia therefore represented the absolute final line of defense for the United States in the Pacific seemed to justify strong American control of the islands, especially since the JSSC envisioned Japan and the Ryukyus either being neutralized through American military withdrawal or becoming a major Soviet strategic complex which would allow the USSR to strike far Into the Pacific.35 The JCS asserted, however, that if the Soviet Union con- trolled mainland Asla, the United States could ensure its security in the Far East If it controlled certain regions in the Pacific, especially Micronesia, the Bonins, and the Volcanoes. It was argued, however, that If the United 33 In 1946, references to a power with "significant" naval and air capabilities in East Asia could only have meant the Soviet Union because of the destruction of Japanese naval and air forces during the war and the seriously weakened postwar condition of Great Britain, F rance, China, and the Netherlands. See JSSC to JCS, ”Strategic Areas And Trustmhips In The Pacific," JCS 1619/10, Ssgptember i9. l946,file12-9-42.CC$360.R0218.NA Ibid. ' ' 35 Ibid. 126 States did not take direct control of these Islands it would probably have to repeat the “costly process" of 1942-45 at some future dates"15 Other reports at the time were inexact about the Soviet threat but conveyed the strategic Importance of the Pacific bases for guaranteeing American security Interests In East Asia. For example, in late October 1946, General Whitehead argued to MacArthur about the Importance of the Philippines to future US security. MacArthur probably did not need the dis- sertation, but Whitehead was quick to remind him that the archipelago was the one area from which the US could stage, mount, and deploy “adequate“ forces to forestall “aggression” and control the South China Sea and south- east Asia.37 Whitehead's references to controlling aggression in the area could easily have meant controlling a future resurgent Japan, but additional documentation supports the contention that the Soviet Union had indeed be- come public enemy number one by this time. In November 1946, for instance, MacArthur asserted to Eisenhower that the occupation forces in Japan could not be further reduced without en- dangering American political objectives in occupied Japan. Soviet-Inspired communism was probably on MacArthur’s mind when he urged a direct US policy of assuring Japan and South Korea that they would not be “abandoned“ in the future to ”hostile“ elements and ideologies. More directly, MacArthur argued that the forces In the Pacific Islands were already cut to the bone, that additional troop reductions implied a future intent to abandon these strategic areas, and that withdrawal would be “disastrous“ if war again 36 ibid See also “us. Postwar Military Policy in the Far East,“ OPD Executive Files, Exec. 5. Item 21a, RG 165, MMRB, NA as found in Gallicchio, oblo'Wrflaths MAS/a 35. 37 See Whitehead t0 MacArthur, October 17, 1946, R0 9: Radiograms. Air Force. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 127 I .' n 4.33.5.2 3.1.33.5...1. ... 4.3993 i=9!— ar...x .2.“— 91 a“. 32:36; .2... . 3:3... 0:538 \ ..\ oh. .033 sae< ’ .s s .532... 5.92:5...5 5:3"...- :a..:a.< ..... (in? . .33.... 3...; \ ...-n... . .. re. . . ¢=I£JIH 84.58: . .... . as... 33.2.: no. .Juil s. r a1....§.—:..£ aus32.a.z 7 W . s can... 5 . .113 .23: x o ”I ecu... ... .....n . sen... ...—=3: 7 MW .3233 ... «am .3. ,, can... ......3. . .. .. r s . a: 5 ...? a.....a¢:23.< ......z 4.. .38...— ...— .t a .r . = We .4. new... Jae-c: \ r a. . . .. . ‘ ‘6'... 8.23883 a . .. 308.38... . m AV 0 an a. . “93.033 1.3.2 9333 $3.5 w . 3.32 «2.5:: 2.33m a»; :33 :23 . ...-sun .3qu v.83 3.3:: .....oz 9:.“ «22.3 Figure 26. Siberia And Alaska (From 5. Frederick Starr, RussiaSAmor/can 128 Colony, Duke University Press, 1987) came to the Pacific. Considering the state of political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in late l946 and the weakened mili- tary conditions of China, Japan, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands at the same time, the USSR was the only plausible strategic threat to Ameri- can East Asian interests to which MacArthur could have been alluding?!a Surprisingly, at least one commander on the spot in late l946 did not seem very concerned about near-term Soviet activity in the Pacific. Major General Joseph Atkinson, Commanding General of the Alaskan Air Command, forwarded a report by his acting ad jutant general, Major Ellis Craig, to Gen- eral Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, in mid-Nov- ember i946. The report documented Soviet aerial and maritime activity in the Alaskan Department and the Bering Sea area and noted nothing but the usual Soviet weather planes, freighters which were routinely escorted by US Navy warships, and the activities of Soviet weather observers in Siberia. Apparently, the report was written to dispell rumors in the Alaskan Com- mand about the Soviet construction of bomber bases near Alaska and alleged encounters between Soviet fighters and American bombers in Siberian and Alaskan airspace. The report painted a portrait of a very quiet "frontline‘ in the Alaskan-Siberian area.39 (See Figure 26) In spite of this instance in which American officers did not inflate Soviet activity, there is further evidence of American officials making con- nections between a rising level of Soviet-American tensions in East Asia and a “precarious“ American position in the Pacific. in a report to the JCS by the United States Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council, 38 See MacArthur to Eisenhower. November 25. 1946. R6 9: Rooiooroms. Troop Deployments. ibid i: SezAtkinson to Spaatz, subj: Russian Activity in Siberia. November 15. I946. 484.6054 . SH C. 129 the Assistant Secretary of the Committee, a man named Norris, elaborated on the value of the islands to the United States during the UN negotiations over international trusteeships in l946 and l947.4° Norris asserted that possession of the former Japanese Mandates by " . . . any other power . . ." would provide that nation with bases from which to attack or intimidate the United States or to sever it from Pacific nations with which the United States had important commercial interests. Additionally, Norris claimed that even if the islands were neutralized, the threat of seizure by an ag- gressor nation was enough to force the United States to forfeit control of its strategic approaches. Ominously, he concluded that the US " . . . cannot permit those islands to fall into the hands of any power which might ever be hostile to the United States.” Norris conveniently narrowed the possible op- tions for the United States, denied the feasibility of neutralizing the is- lands, and called for direct American control and military fortification. Though he may have written the report with a possibly resurgent postwar Japan in mind, Norris' continual references to ”any other power" strongly indicates he held the Soviet Union as the power in question.‘n Documents from MacArthur's headquarters in the summer of 1947 also illustrate the degree to which American intelligence officers were exagger- ating Soviet military capabilities and intentions. Yet these same reports are simultaneously convincing evidence that MacArthur, Willoughby, and the Army intelligence officers in the Far East Command (FECOM) sincerely be- lieved the Soviet Union represented a signficant threat to American inter- ests in East Asia and the Pacificfi2 4°SeeNorristotheJCS. February 22. 1947. file 12-9-42 sec. 29.008360. R62l8. NA. 4' ibid 42 See MacArthur to Eisenhower, May l6, l947, R6 9: Radiowams. Troop Deployments. MacArthur Memorial Archives. i30 in June l947, Willoughby's office produced a periodic intelligence summary entitled “Situation: Korea-China-Manchuria.“ This report asserted that the United States, because of " . . . confused and uncertain public opinion. . . " and the Soviet Union, because of an " . . . aggressive, unilateral and expansionist policy . . . [,i“ were the greatest obstacles to a United Na- tions solution for the civil war in China.“ The authors seemed convinced that the Soviet Union would be able to “orient“ Manchuria and all of its re- sources toward creating a Soviet military machine in East Asia which would be independent of tenuous communication links to European Russia. in a re- lated fashion, the intelligence officers were concerned that China, bereft of Manchuria, would become a “political and economic vacuum“ and would also remain “industrially backward." Combined with fears that Japan would re- main a “third rate“ power in the future, the report envisioned a worst-case scenario in which the Soviet Union held sway over large portions of conti- nental East Asia and in which there was no “Asiatic counterpoint“ to repre- sent American interests on the continent!“i Similar to earlier reports from Willoughby's office, the summary as- sumed a great many things about Soviet military capabilities in the Far East. For instance, MacArthur's intelligence officers now asserted that over 2200 aircraft were operational in the Soviet Far East, including over 400 aircraft in northern Korea, another 400 in the Liaotung Peninsula, and over lSOO aircraft in southern Siberia. (See Figure 27) The summary also claim- ed that over l700 of these aircraft were immediately available to support 43 See “Periodic inteliiwnoe Summary: Situation Korea-China-Mamhuria.” June 22. l947. 4- Sand l2. Rmde 6. RmdsofGeneral Headwaters. Far East Command. i947-i95l (hereafter cited as R6 6: F ECDM. inteliimnce). MacArthur Memorial Archives. 4" ibid.. i6. i3i E CHINA - JAPAN Hui-r1 Iain—u I-u- ( i m “A“: AIMV MOI-I. PAC!!! Figure 27. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases (Courtesy of the Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) I32 any Soviet “maneuver“ in Korea. Still, the report lacked an in-depth analysis . of the serviceabllity of the aircraft, the reliability of the Soviet supply and logistical system, and the availability of staging areas for forward deploy- ments.45 Nevertheless, these analysts assumed that the Soviet Air Force, operating from bases in Vladivostok or Wonson, North Korea, could subject the Japanese home islands to daylight and nighttime attacks, inflict haras- sing attacks on American military installations in the Ryukyus, and even strike at the US Seventh fleet in Tsingtao, China and American naval units in Japanese harbors. Soviet capabilities were seemingly all-powerful since the effects of retaliatory strikes by the United States Navy and Army Air Force were not contemplated or analyzed.46 Soviet ground units represented another threat to southern Korea. Willoughby's intelligence officers thought that the Soviet Far Eastern Army could conquer southern Korea in lo to is days, which would have created an even greater security threat to American positions in Japan and the Ryukyus because 0f the availability 0i airfields astride the Sea Of Japan. it was es- timated that the Soviets had l6$,000 troops facing the 45,000 American soldiers in southern Korea, another 75,000 soldiers in the Port Arthur area, and that a total of 872,000 ground troops would be available in the Far East thirty days after mobilization.“7 (See Figure 28) interestingly enough, over- all combat efficiency of these units was estimated to be low because of de- mobilization, but the report was confident that training exercises would make the less experienced soldiers “nearly comparable“ to the veterans they were replacing. Why the report would assume this about the Soviet Army's 45 ibid.. 4-5ono l2. 46mm. i3.l5-16.md18. 4" See "Periodic Intellimnoe Summary."June 22. 1947.4“ 6. R0 6: recon. inteiiigeme. Maoilrthur Memorial Archives. i33 LUIOI y ’— L. Figure 28. Air Radii From Principal Soviet Bases (Courtesy of the Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) l34 readiness level is unclear, since the authors must have known that the same phenomenon of demobilization was simultaneously emasculating the effec- tiveness of the United States military:i8 MacArthur's intelligence officers also assumed that any Soviet offen- sive would be assisted by guerrilla and fifth column activities. They be- lieved that a Soviet attack would coincide with riots in southern Korea, a situation which would find US troops dispersed in small groups to quell the riots instead of concentrated to repel a Soviet attack. In addition, these of - ficers seemed convinced that previous riots in South Korea were Soviet- controlled, though they could not or chose not to produce or analyze any evi- dence for these assertions. This type of thinking in the summer of l947 was also consistent with requests by General Hodge to use fighter aircraft in low-level strafing missions to quell civilian rioters in South Koreal Con- vinced that the rioters were either communist dupes, agents, or criminal elements, Hodge sought to impress the South Koreans with active demon- strations of US alrpower in order to “stabilize“ his rear area."9 Soviet naval potential was not ignored by Willoughby's staff either. There were several qualifications in the summary about this topic, however. The report, for instance, was quick to point out that a lack of warm water ports meant a ”natural“ emphasis by the Soviets on the development of their air and ground forces at the expense of their navy. Accordingly, the report continually deemphasized Soviet surface and amphibious capabilities and 43 ibid, 4. 49 ibid. 15. For Harms views diout the rioters. see Hodm to MacArthur, incoming Mm. (ntober 24, i946, 720. i622. AFSHRC. For the order to prepare combat aircraft for strafing missions, see Whitehead to MacArthur, Outgoing Meseams. November 6, i946, 720.1623, ibid For i-icdge's general imorance and paranoia about South Korean politics and society. see Bruce Cumings. f/Io (No/m oft/Io Km Mr: 1 twat/m ain't/Io [mm ”aspirate Rag/mas; 1946'- l947( Princeton: Princeton University Press, l98l ); and inn, ”var/pineal”): Km Mac- f/vkm'vmaflm 63(er ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). i35 asserted that minor operations in support of a ground invasion of South Korea were the only realistic scenarios for Soviet naval operations in the Far East.50 Still, Soviet naval pretentions were analyzed. The report claimed that the Soviet emphasis on heavy industrialization in their current f ive- year plan, as well as rumors of naval base construction in Vladivostok, meant the sure intention of a powerful navy in the Far East. Moreover, Sovi- et submarine forces were considered the most effective part of the naval arm in the region. Placing the strength of these forces at 60 to 100 boats, the report continually referred to Soviet naval potential in East Asia as “limited,“ except for submarine operations. Unfortunately, the report did not analyze the serviceabllity, technological sophistication, logistical sup- port, or level of training of these forces any more than it did for the ground and air forces in the area?” American naval planners were equally concerned with the Soviet sub- marine force in the immediate postwar period. One reason suspicions may have existed is that the Soviets, with 2i2 boats, possessed one of the lar- gest submarine forces in the world at the time. Though this force was task- ed mainly with the defense of Soviet sea approaches and was neither the most technologically sophisticated nor the most combat experienced, Navy planners, fully engaged by i946 and l947 in preparing for war with the Soviet Union, thought that Soviet submarines and surface ships could deploy from the Kurile islands and prey on allied shipping in the Pacific Ocean Navy officers, like their Army counterparts, were also convinced that the 50 See “Periodic inteiiioenee Summary," June 22. i947. 5-6. is. and lb, no 6: recon. intellilmnce, Madirthur Memorial Archives. 5' ibid i36 sea lanes around Japan were within easy striking range of Soviet airfields in the Kuriles and the Soviet Far Eastern Maritime Provinces.52 More importantly, though, the American Navy, conditioned by the events of the Pacific War as well as the Battle of the Atlantic, was ex- tremely concerned over the prospect of the Soviet submarine fleet patroll- ing the waters around Japan, the western Pacific islands, and even the West Coast of the United States. in June l947, for instance, officers of the Joint Marianas Board for the Military Development of the Marianas discussed Guam‘s vulnerability to submarine attacks, including submarines using un- derwater rocket weaponry for shore bombardment. Given the quickening pace of submarine technological development in the postwar era, it is not unreasonable to assume that American naval officers perceived a Soviet submarine threat in the Pacific similar to that which Japanese and German submarines had posed to the United States during World War Two.53 General Whitehead's communication of the War Department's Overseas Base Plan for the Far East in June 1947 to his chief of staff, Major General 51’ See Palmer, Origins of (MW/717m Strategic 31 and 37. Soviet naval strength in East Asian waters in 1946 and 1947 has not yet been determined by this author. Eric Morris asserts that in August 1945 the Soviet Pacific F ieet consisted of 2 heavy cruisers. about 20 destroyers. and diout 60 submarines. See Morris, If» Row/mm ”VI/I Wkly/alibi ( New York: Stein and Day. 1977). 25. Officers in the US. Pacific Command in August 1947 reported a similarly low surface strength of 2 heavy cruisers, 1 1-14 destroyers. and a number of smaller craft. However, they argued that the Soviets could reinforce their Pacific Fleet with battleships and heavy cruisers from their European forces by moving fleet units across the northern sea routes in the summer time. See CINCPAC Joint Staff Study "Triag'iol". (Pacific War Plan). August 1 , 1947. Post 1 January 1946 Plans File, 001. NHC. 53 For an account of Japanese submarine operations on the American West Coast. see Clark a. Reynolds. “Submarine Attacks on the Pacific Coast. 1942 ." Px/fl'c #119!qu Rey/err 33 (May 1964): 183- 193. For an equation of wartime German and misses submarine activity with a potential postwar Soviet submarine threat, see the testimony Of Secretary of the Navy Jd'in Sullivan, December 2, 1947, Air Policy Commission Papers, “USSR Submarines," McDonald to Spaatz, December 30, 1947. box 23. Carl Spaatz Pmers. Library of Congress. Washington. 0.0., as found in Daniel Yergin, ”(IMPM ”amp/mom» w/difir ( New York: Penguin Books. 1991). 338. See also ”Report of theJoint Marianas Board on the Military Development of thaMarianas." June 1, 1947, ii, 178.2917-1,AFSHRC. i37 Thomas White, seemed to support the worst fears of American naval off i- cers, as well as those of MacArthur's staff in Tokyo. Whitehead too feared attacks on American positions in the western Pacific, including Micronesia, by “enemy forces“ in the future which might be able to mount airborne in- vasions of the islands, subject these positions to atomic air attack, and even attack the islands with submarine-launched atomic weapons}54 In fact, Whitehead had consistently argued to his superiors since the summer of 1945 that the major threat to America‘s strategic position in East Asia and the western Pacific came from “strategic“ airborne invasions or the tran- sportation and resupply by air of entire enemy armies which could take and establish beachheads until relieved. Whitehead saw a Soviet strategic air- borne capability as the primary threat to US positions in Japan, South Korea, and the Ryukyus. Contrary to most naval officers, however, Whitehead be- lieved that the US position in East Asia and the western Pacific would be secure as long as the US retained its supremacy in land-based atomic air- power and dominated Pacific Basin sea and air lanes.55 By July 1947, additional intelligence summaries from MacArthur's headquarters answered more specific questions about the Soviet threat but still continued to discuss Soviet capabilities as all-powerful and continuted to intimate that there was very little that the United States military could do to counter the threat. For example, it was still assumed that the Soviets had over 2200 serviceable and useful military aircraft in the Far East and that the number in North Korea had Increased to 700. Moreover, Soviet capa- 5" See Whitehead to White. June 10. 1947. 168.6008- 1 , Whitehead Collection, AF SHRC. 5'5 ibid; and Whitehead to Colonel Clarence irvine, PACUSA Assistant Chief of Staff , June 8. 1946. ibid See also Whitehead to Kenney, subj: Airborne Forces in the United States Post-War Military Estdilishment. August 15. 1945. 730.161-3: and MD. Burnsitb to Whitehmd. Februa'y 22. 1947. 168.6008-4. both at the AF SHRC. 138 bilities were again stated in a context which denoted unquestioned certain- ty about future aggressive Soviet intentions}!6 it was still assumed, for example, that the Soviets could conquer South Korea in lO- 1 5 days with five divisions, supported by North Korean troops and "f if th column activities“ In the south. Moreover, Willoughby's intelligence officers believed that the Soviets would be able to carry out bombing attacks on the Seventh Fleet in Chinese waters, strike at American naval units in Japanese waters, and con- duct daylight and nighttime attacks on American Installations in the Ryuk- yus. In addition, these officers assumed that the 100 or so Soviet subma- rines in the Far East would prey on US shipping in the western Pacific while the 50 major and almost 500 minor Soviet surface combatants in the the- ater carried out offensive mining operations against US naval bases in Japan and tried to deny the Sea of Japan to the United States Navy.57 Other capabilities became more apparent or were at least more fully explained in this later intelligence report. For instance, Willoughby's office now reported that the Soviets had an airlift capability which would allow them to drop 38,000 paratr00pers from 3000 transports at distances of over 700 miles from Vladivostok. The report also claimed that this capability meant the Japanese home islands and all of northern China were not only susceptible to naval and air attack, but airborne invasion as well. In addi- tion, in June 1947, Rear Admiral William Smith and Marine Corps Major Gen- eral Pedro Del Valle wrote Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey, Commander-in- Chief, US Naval Forces, Far East Command (CINCNAVFE), and Senior Naval Member of the Joint Board for the Military Development of the Marianas, 55 See “Strength and Disposition of Soviet Forces," July 31 , i947, Periodic intellimnce Summary Supplement No. 3. Korea-China-Manchuria. R8 6: F ECOM. intellimnce. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 57 ibid.. iS-i6. 139 that they disagreed with the Army members' recommendation not to garri- son Tinian with ground defense forces. Both officers argued that the island was a “ready-made” base for instant combat use and could be easily seized through a surprise airborne invasion launched by a capable enemy.‘58 Since Japan had no air force in 1947 and since it was presumed that it would not have one for some time, the USSR had to have been the nation in question. Still, thoughtful and critical analysis of these alleged strategic cap- abilities was largely nonexistent. Certainly limited kinds of airborne oper- ations on the Korean peninsula made sense if Soviet intentions were to in- vade South Korea. But an airborne operation against the Japanese home is- lands seems rather far-fetched given the strength of US naval and air units In the area and the fact that Willoughby's office had previously claimed the Soviets lacked a significant amphibious lift capability to support any inva- sion of Japan. American officers should have known from Operation Market- Garden that unsupported airborne invasions make no strategic sense. More- over, it is difficult to fathom that the Soviets had acquired a large-scale amphibious lift capability to support an invasion of Japan in the one month which had elapsed since the previous report denied such a capabilityi59 53 ibid. 7 and 16. See Smith and Del Valle to Barbey, "Report of theJoint Ma‘ianas Borrd.’ June 1, 1947. 33uid35. 178.2917-1 .AFSI-IRC. 59 ibid.. 7. For an analysis of weak Soviet amphibious capabilities, see ”Periodic intelligence Summary: Situation Korea-China-Manchuria.“ June 22. 1947, R8 6: FECOM. intellimnca, MacArthur Memorial Archives. in September 1944, the western Allies trapped 35 .000 American. British. and Polish paratroopr into i-Iollaid in an attempt to capture strategic brim over the Rhine River and allow Allied armored forces to invade northern Germany. Since the Allied armored units failed to relieve the paratroopers in the two to three days estimated for the operation and since the airborne divisions rm been dropped amidst German SS panzer divisions. the airborne units took heavy casualties. with the British and Polish units taking 802 and 90: losses, respectively. it was a dewy lesson in the limitations of unsupported airborne forces. or at least it should have been to postwar American strategic planners! See Cornelius Ryan, A firm fan/as (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). 140 ‘. - .... Location ma: . i000 MILE '. E CHINA - JAPAN 2°00 mLEfiuo- '— \ m - ......V ‘ ‘ ft ‘7 f: d Figure 29. Ranges For Guided Missiles (Courtesy of the Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) i4i (5.58-43. IOI.-.. .Iv Gib 8 ...-~88 0:8 pals. 239:... ...-P 1.. ...-.86. :::< 7...»; .7: :7 . . 5.285.965:- = 3.2... do...) 5:83... .....5... 48.42.13 - mo 2.3... 20: . .‘0- o. .NMWrwar . \e- . . i.» . . .... . i... . -... ...«xxo: \ils. .\~\1rm.0( I.‘ ..‘ . ”I” s’o "|O I lot in. E . /. .. . \ _ . . . ., h /r .. \\ . . .¢ . ..t. x . o x .\ .. .\ , ..s. ._ .. mm ... J \ e... Figure 30. Rocket Ranges Centered On Tokyo (Courtesy of the Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia) 142 This latest summary does, however, offer an analysis of Soviet air- craft ranges which goes far in explaining why Micronesia still figured pro- minently in American war plans in 1946-1947 and why planners feared Sov- iet air and naval activity in the western and central Pacific if war broke out. MacArthur's intelligence officers were firmly convinced by the summer of 1947 that the Soviets had bombers capable of reaching targets in Japan and the Ryukyus. While Soviet fighter and ground attack planes were obvi- ously more limited in range and capability, these also seemed to have the range to reach targets in southern Japan if launched from bases in southern Korea.6° Moreover, American officers believed that the Soviets had even longer-ranged weapons under development, including jet aircraft, rockets, guided missiles, and atomic weapons.“ While the information on these weapons was superficial and the tone of this latest document was rather alarmist, the report still convinces this author that Far East Command in- telligence officers honestly believed that South Korea, the Japanese home islands, and the Ryukyus were endangered by present and future Soviet mili- tary capabilities. (See Figures 29 and 30) Overall, American intelligence reports seemed fairly consistent on the nature of the Soviet threat. There were, however, some significant dis- agreements between various agencies in Washington and those on the spot. For instance, the JSSC believed that China would be a “militarized and in- dustrialized" communist satellite of the Soviet Union, while MacArthur's in- telligence off Icers saw China more as a weak satrapy lacking industrial and military potential except that supplied to it by the USSR. In addition, civi- 60 See "Strength and Dispostion of Soviet Forces," July 31. l947, RG 6: FECOM. intelligence. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 5' ibid.. i3. i43 lian political leaders and the JCS, with broader views of American global policy and the military requirements of meeting policy in Europe, the Medi- terranean, and Japan, were more willing to withdraw American military forces from mainland East Asia than MacArthur and his key of f icers.62 For example, by the spring and summer of 1947, the JCS was calling for the withdrawal of the two Army divisions stationed in South Korea while MacArthur was continuing to warn of American military weaknesses in the area. As late as 1947, the JCS seemed to live up to Its 1945 pronouncement that Japan, the Philippines, and other Island groups taken from Japan needed to be occupied but that the mainland itself was expendable. This view would change after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, but it was consistent in the time period that this study is concerned with.“ Another example of these differing opinions between officials in Washington and officers on the spot concerning the number, composition, and location of base sites can be seen In the varying emphases Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Whitehead gave to the defense of the Pacific. Eisenhower, just a few months after enunciating his ideas about Alaska to MacArthur, also suggested to Secretary of War Robert Paterson that the US withdraw Its Army forces from the Philippines. Citing soured US-Philippine relations because of the basing of American troops in the Manila area, a need to con- centrate scarce Army resources in Europe and East Asia, a general US un- willingness to ensure the security of the archipelago, and the Navy's will- ingness to retain a limited number of bases in the islands, Eisenhower as- 62 SeeJSSC totheJCS, “StrategicAreasAnd Trusteeships in The Pacific,“ JCS 1619/10. September i9, i946, file i2-9-42, CCS 360, R6 2i8. NA; see also Forrestal to Marshall, September 26, i947, new i947. 6:8i7. 328$ Kaufman, flutm War, 6-7 and 17; see also Gallicchio, w/dii’rmm taxis/4 35- M4 serted that the Army should withdraw gradually from the Philippine Repub- lic. Eisenhower, in other words, seemed to be arguing for a reorientation of US defenses in the Pacific and East Asia from the Philippines and Micronesia to Alaska and the Arctic Circle. MacArthur and Whitehead, however, contin- ued to see the “frontline' of American interests in the area beginning in Japan and South Korea and then falling back to the Alaska-Micronesia-Phili- ppines line, with the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Volcanoes as the ”listening posts” of the defense line.“ Still, it should be kept in mind by the reader that in spite of these disagreements over important details of what areas to de- fend in the postwar Pacific Basin, there was no disagreement about the threat to these areas. The Soviet Union was consistently seen by most parties as a nation bent on dominating mainland East Asia, excluding the United States from the continent, and threatening American lines of com- munication in the Pacific. Regardless of the reality or unreallty of this envisioned future, it is apparent that by l946-47 the fear of Soviet naval and air power being pro- jected from the Soviet Maritime Provinces, the Kuriles, and even a Soviet- domlnated Japan-Ryukyus strategic complex toward Micronesia and the Philippines was a real one for American strategic planners. interestingly, however, ”defensive” American war plans for the Pacific and East Asia were ' 64 For Eisenhower‘s thoughts on the Philippines. seeJCS 1027/8, ”War Department Requirements For Military Bases And Rights in The Philippine islands," November 23, 1946. found in file “State Deprtment Correspondence, l946- l 947.” box 38. White House Central Files, HSTL. For the possibility that this idea may have originated with Major General Lauris Norstad, chief of the CPD, see Norstad to Brigadier General George Lincoln. head of OPD's Plans and Policy Group, November 7, 1946, file “Official-Classified, 1946-1947 (1).“ box 22, Norstad Papers. DDEL. For MacArthur‘s and Whitehead's ideas, see 0900 Report. box 5. CPD Diary, DDEL; MacArthur to Eisenhower. September 8. 1946. R8 9: Radiog‘ams. Plans and Operations File. MacArthur Memorial Archives; and Whitehead to Kenney, February 27. l946. 168.6008- 3. Whitehead Collection. AF SHRC. i45 just as aggressive as the alleged Soviet capabilities and intentions which planners' hoped to counter. Given rapid weapons development during the war, perceptions that American geostrategic advantages of distance no longer existed, and the growing mindset that the Soviet Union represented a future potential threat, very few post- l 945 American military planners were prepared to wait for a first strike on American territory without at least having modern, retalia- tory forces on alert and in forward positions. To these off icers, future mil- itary deployments were to take place as close to enemy territory as poss- ible and should deliver crippling strikes at the beginning of hostilities. in the words of Lieutenant General Whitehead as late as October 1947, the Far East Commands air forces would engage in " . . . immediate decisive combat in event of war. The number of Americans evacuated from Korea and Hokkaido would depend entirely on FEAF‘s capability to smash Soviet air at the outset."65 To meet this perceived Soviet threat, the Navy and the AAF each be- gan to work out a strategy for the northern Pacific in early 1946. in March of that year, F orrestal ordered the Navy to conduct multiship exercises in the Arctic Ocean to learn how effectively carriers and their aircraft could operate in snowy weather, icy seas, and low visibility. Operation “Frost- bite“, as the series of exercises was called, was not very successful, the Navy estimating that carrier operations in the Arctic were only “fifty per- cent“ effective at that time. Yet the operation more clearly identified the Soviet Union as the new enemy of the United States Navy since the northern 55 See Whitehead to Major General Kenneth Wolfe, com 5. October 21 , l947, 168.6008-3. AFSHRC; see also SMry, Prater/rural f/Io/lim War, pasim. i46 route was the shortest avenue of attack between the United States and the Soviet Union.“ in addition, the AAF in i946 and i947 rotated strategic bombing groups into the western Pacific, using bases in Micronesia and the Ryukyus to train their personnel in wartime operations against the Soviet Far East. Though AAF bases in Micronesia were quite far from their potential Soviet targets, complete American control over the islands allowed for secure training facilities, secure support facilities for more forward bases in areas like the Ryukyus, and eliminated the need for diplomatic permission from other nations for overflightsfil7 The Pacific also offered the AAF the opportunity to continue attempts at Arctic operations which it had begun during the war. During 1946 and 1947, for example, B-29 units rotated into Alaska and used that territory for staging purposes because of the shorter route to the Soviet Union and because the Ryukyus were already perceived to be within striking range of Soviet aircraft.68 Although Operation “Frostbite” and the AAF‘s Arctic deployments Illu- strated that operations in the northern Pacific were not yet militarily feas- able because of weather conditions. the current state of technology, and the level of personnel training, they also reinforced the axiom that the best de- fense in the Pacific was a good forward offense. Civilian policymakers, the JCS, and their subordinate committees, in fact, differed significantly from the Far East Commands intelligence picture of “gloom and doom" when it came to analyzing US and Soviet strategic capabilities in East Asia. The 66 See Commander. Carrier Division One, Operation Frostbite (March 1-28. 1946). April 13, 1946, Post 1 January 1946 Report File. 0A. NHC. as found in Palmer. alto/mo/I/ioflr/t/mo Strategic 32; see also ”Arctic Battleground," limo 47 (March 25, 1946): 25; and Davis, Pacino“ Dorm Policy, 222-223. 57 See Borowski. lib/lair forest, 72-73 and 75-77. 68 ibid.. 73 and 77-87. i47 JCS, for Instance, believed that American bombers and warships based in Japan and the Ryukyus and supported from Micronesia and the Philippines could not only have repelled potential Soviet assaults from East Asia, but could also have struck deeply into the Soviet Maritime Provinces.69 Similarly, Michael Schaller, Michael Palmer, and Marc Gallicchio have all illustrated that American ”offensive-defensive“ war plans in 1946 and 1947 did not merely call for a neutralization or occupation of Micronesia but saw Micronesia, the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan as fully deve- loped naval and air bases which could project offensive striking power to- ward the Soviet Union. All three authors cite documents in which a good of - fense Is synonomous with defense in the Pacific and their concentration on JCS documents suggests that the JCS took American retaliatory capabilities more fully into account when analyzing the Soviet Pacific threat than MacArthur‘s intelligence staff seems to have done.70 Moreover, some civilian policymakers placed great faith in American alrpower as part of the calculus of strategic power in postwar East Asia. In September 1947, Secretary of Defense Forrestal sent a memo to Secretary of State George Marshall calling for an American military withdrawal from 59 See also Schaller, Amer/om Moot/on arm, 53-57. 70 SeeJoint intelligence Staff (JIS) 80/7, October 23. 1945, file 3-27-43. 005 092. R8 218. NA; JIS 80/9. October 26. 1945, ibid , JCS 570/40. October 25. 1945. file 12-9-42. CCS 360, ibid. ; JPS 789/ 1 April 13, 1946, file 3-2-46, CCS 381 , ibid; Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) 432/7. June 13. 1946, ibid. ; JWPC 476/2. August 28. 1947, ibid; and JCS to SWNCC, September 9, 1947, films 1947, 1:366-367; all found in Schaller, Amer/om aux/ammo! cam 56. See also "Top Secret Presentation by YiceAdmirai Forrest Sherman. DCNO for Operations. to the President, Senate, and House, January 14, 1947. no. 26. box 8. series 3, Forrest Sherman Papers. 0A. NHC; andJoint Staff Study 'Triamol." October 31 . 1947.81NCPAC Command File, Plans F ile. 0A. NHC; both found in Palmer, firfirhroSt/‘otayy. 31 and 37. F inally, see “Strategic Areas And Trusteeships in The Pacific. JCS 1619/1 . May 24, 1946. SWNCC 59. SWNCC Papers, Records of the interdepartmental and intradepartmental Committees. R8 353. Memorandum of Record. George Elsey. January 29. 1946. George Elsey Papers. HSTL; Hans W. Weigert, “U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security,“ fwszf/oirs 35 (January 1947): 257; and Lester Foltos, "New Pacific Barrier." 317-342; all found in Gallicchio. "T he Kuriles Controversy.“ 88. 148 South Korea because of its ”low” strategic priority and because, F orrestal claimed, American alrpower in East Asia could “neutralize“ any strategic facilities the Soviets might be able to use in southern Korea. To be sure, the view from Washington was quite different than the one in Tokyo.71 interestingly, the JCS, the JSSC, and officials like Forrestal still ar- gued that the US only required ”occupation rights“ In Micronesia as the means by which to provide for future security in the region. Moreover, they continued to assert that funding limitations would probably preclude any significant postwar base development in the area]? in spite of these pres- sures from demobilization and lower budgetary ceilings, however, Guam continued to be developed as a major American bomber base in the postwar Pacific. This fact suggests that Cold War tensions after 1945 caused Amer- ican strategic planners to continue to place importance on Micronesia as the ultimate line of American defense in the postwar Pacific in case of a “Sov- iet-inspired“ disaster on the East Asian mainland or the “neutralization“ of Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines.” An Assessement During the Second World War, both the Navy and the AAF had largely discounted the Soviet Union as an immediate postwar threat because of its lack of a blue water navy, Its lack of a strategic air force, and military planners‘ assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly acquire these strategic forces because of the pressing demands of postwar reconstruction 7' See'rlemoranoum from tbeSecreteiyoioereneetotneSecretaryorState." September 26. 1947. new 1947, 6:817. 72 ibid. 73 Sea Gallicchio, "The Kuriles Controversy." 88. 149 and the military occupation of eastern Europe.”1 Similarly, none of the in- telligence reports in 1946 and 1947 explicitly claimed that war was immi- nent in the near future and the reports usually placed Soviet aggression in the context of ”unintentional war."75 This fact supports Melvyn Leffier's thesis that American strategic planners and intelligence officers in the late 19403 acknowledged the Soviet Union's losses in World War Two and per- ceived the USSR primarily as a long-term threat to American interests. in spite of this focus on the long-term threat, American strategic planners did not believe they had the luxury of preparing for a war sometime in the future. Most of the intelligence analysis was superficial and overly concerned with the numbers of Soviet units rather than their quality, but in intelligence analysis and strategic planning numbers were usually the means used to gauge military capabilities and Intentions. Whether or not the Soviets intended to initiate a war with the United States at any time in the late 19403 was probably immaterial to American planners. The fact that the Soviets possessed a large submarine force at Vladivostok, a sub- stantial ground force in northern Korea, and the potential for a Far Eastern strategic air force was enough to engender suspicion and fear among a gen- eration of officers who had matured in the shadow of Pearl Harbor. Most importantly. this “sudden appearance” of Soviet strategic forces in the Pacific in 1946 and 1947 was consistent with very alarmist worst- case scenario planning which became prevalent throughout the United States national security establishment in the late 19403. It would appear that by 74 See Davis. owwwmpo/icx 18; Smith, Airf'mP/ms‘fo'm $2. 69. and 81-82; and Leffler, “American Conception." passim. 75 See “Strength and Disposition of Soviet Forces," July 31 . 1947. Periodic intelligence Summary Supplement No. 3. Korea-China-Manchuria. 18. R8 6: F ECOM. Intelligence. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 150 1947 many American strategic planners thought the Soviets had indeed be- come "supermen" in the Pacific and East Asia as well as in Europe and the Middle East.76 This alarmist mentality was illustrated in intense US efforts to consolidate American control over Micronesia and other key strategic iS‘ lands. As the following chapters will suggest, American imperialism in the postwar Pacific had its roots in the history of Dre-1941 American foreign relations, but the fears and uncertainties of the early Cold War were equally important in engendering an American desire for an exclusive strategic buf- fer zone in the Pacific Basin. 75 See Borowski. lib/low forest, 91-107; Leffler, “American Conception.“ passim; and Miller. WM" Wing 163-203. 151 Chapter Four The Limitations of Collective Security: The United States, the Allied Powers, and the Pacific Basin American imperialism in the postwar Pacific was expressed most clearly during the post-1945 diplomatic negotiations between the great powers over the future disposition of conquered and colonial territory. Be- tween 1945 and 1947, American officials made it clear that the United States wanted a free hand to dictate the future strategic-political frame- work of the Pacific Basin. In addition, these negotiations illustrated a num- ber of points about American attitudes toward the US‘ wartime allies and its wartime rhetoric about postwar great power cooperation and collective security. . One, postwar relations illustrated the very low level of confidence which many American policymakers and planners had in the United Nations. Conditioned by the perceived failures of the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, and the Washington Treaty System, many American strategic planners saw UN trusteeships as a suspect and substandard way to guaran- tee that the Pacific became a postwar American lake. Historians have tra- ditionally looked at the issue of international atomic energy control to 152 demonstrate the low level of American confidence in the UN. Trusteeship negotiations provide another early example of the same phenomenon.1 Second, UN negotiations over international trusteeships became an arena for polarized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the scene for contentions between the western Allies over the future of the region. American fears about strategic security in the post- war Pacific were expressed in lobbying for a special “strategic trusteeship” over Micronesia which made a mockery of the trusteeship concept and fost- ered suspicions among other nations about American intentions in the post- war Pacific.2 F inaliy, postwar relations illustrate just how intertwined the Pacific Basin became with other areas of the world. The region has been considered an isolated and unimportant “backwater” by most Cold War historians.3 A closer look at postwar intemationai relations over the disposition of the Pacific Islands, however, suggests that the fate of the region was of great importance to the United States, the Soviet Union, and a number of European 1 See Martin Sherwin. “T he Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: US. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy. 1941-1945.” America) fireman/Review 78 (October 1973): 945- 968; Barton J. Berstein. "The Quest for Security: American Foreigi Policy and international Control of Atomic Energy, i942- i946.“ charm/o/Amov'cm filsro'y 60 (March 1974): 1003- 1044; Larry G. Gerber, “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War .“ Ono/ammo History 6 (Winter 1982): 69-95; James L. Gormly, "T he Washington Declaration and the 'Poor Relation‘: Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy. 1945- i 946 .“ DJo/anofrb/fi'sta'y 8 (Spring 1984): 125- 143: and Joseph Preston Baratta. “Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?" lota'woflmlfirsm'ykowow 7 (November 1985): 592-621. 2 See Louis. mama/rs» away, 461-573; and inis Claude. Jr.. ammo/cum rm :ggo/msmpmoflolrooflm/mizofim (New York: Raimm House. 1984). 349- 3 The literature on Cold War historiogmhy is immense Most historians of American foreim relations, however, have overlmked US policy toward the Pacific Basin as a case study or micro- cosm of US global policy during the early Cold War. important exceptions to this rule are Pomeroy. I’m/fic outcast; Maga. wfmmPrM/m; Foltos, 'T he New Pacific Barrier“ ; Gallicchio, ”The Kuriles Controversy"; Nick Cullather. “The Limits of Multilateralism: Mdti Poliw for the Philippines, i945- 1950.” lotrmtIoW/fiistaykowoir 13 (February 199 i? 70-95; and Hal M. Friednan. “The Beast in Paradise. The United States Navy in Micronesia. 1943- 1947.“ Pw/ficfl/sta'iw/Rov/oir 62 (May 1993): 173- 195. 153 powers because of the global implications of the UN trusteeship system and the interdependence of regional Issues. The Context As the following pages will demonstrate, US strategic policy toward the Pacific Basin was a “low fourth“ on the list of global objectives in 1945. United States foreign policy during the origins of the Cold War held Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia to be more important regions when it came to policy attention, resource allocation, and strategic denial from the Soviet Union. Still, to ignore US concerns about future Pacific security would be a major error for any historian studying US strategic policy in the late 1940s The region was a significant source of strategic insecurity to the United States because of interwar and wartime events and the participants involv- ed in planning future policy for the region held the construction of a Pacific shield for the republic to be one of their primary postwar goals, even if it was not the highest goal on the priority list. American plans for the postwar Pacific were dominated by fears of some hostile power acquiring control over the resources of the East Asian mainland and the strategic facilities of the Pacific islands and using these assets for military purposes against the United States. Set in the context of Pearl Harbor and the origins of the Cold War, Japan and then the Soviet Union figured prominently in American strategic thinking as possible future enemies in the Pacific. To forestall the possibility of a future surprise at- tack on the United States from East Asia, American planners sought as firm a control over Micronesia and the other Pacific island groups taken from 154 Japan as possible.4 As the following pages illustrate, however, American plans for the postwar Pacific not only provided for a postwar containment of Japan and the Soviet Union, but they were also oriented against America‘s western allies. Far from carrying out wartime pledges about postwar mul- tilateral cooperation, American officials instead sought to limit the number of nations involved in the occupation of Japan and the negotiation of Pacific Island trusteeships. inter-Allied Disputes Suspicion of allies after the Pacific War was an area of continuity with US Pacific policy after the First World War. William Braisted, for ex- ample, has demonstrated that as late as the 1919- i 922 period the United States Navy's General Board was still formulating very serious war plans for possible use against Great Britain in the Pacific regions William Roger Louis and Christopher Thorne similarly illustrated that very strained rela- tions existed between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Second World War over the postwar disposition of British colonies in the Pacific. in addition, both authors have demonstrated that Australia and New Zealand were concerned with the disposition of the former Japanese Man- dates and with American assurances of military defense in the postwar Pa- cific.6 Louis and Thorne have also shown that several of the major European govemments-in-exile, especially those of France, Belgium, and Holland, 4 See Foltos, ”New Pacific Barrier." 317-342; aid F riednm. “Beast in Paradise." 173- 195. 5 See Braisted. Uflffw'SIOIRS‘AOi’y/fl (In Pal/fic, 1909- I922. 343-688. 6 For tensions between the us. the UK. Australia. and New Zealand over the postwar disposition of the Pacific Basin. see Louis. moor/alien await 289-308. 409-432; aid Thorne. Ill/more Kim: 252-269, 364-370, 479-488. aid 645-653. 155 were opposed to American demands for a strategic trusteeship over the Japanese Mandated Islands while the US was simultaneously calling for Eu- ropean decolonization throughout the rest of the world. At the least, the European powers saw this as a hypocritical stance considering US subscrip- tions to the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 and its claims that it did not desire territorial possessions from the war.7 While documents from the 1945-1947 period do not illustrate as divisive relations as those which Braisted, Louis, and Thorne have found for the respective 1919-1922 and 1941-1945 periods. several areas of disagreement between the United States and the western allies suggest that America‘s imperial designs for the postwar Pacific left little or no room for wartime allies. Areas of con- tention included disagreements over postwar territorial and defense ar- rangements, military policy toward occupied Japan, and even allied partici- pation In postwar atomic research. Most significantly, however, these dis- agreements illustrated a general American impatience and arrogance with any other nation which hoped to wield any political influence in the postwar Pacific or hoped to place the US at any perceived position of strategic pari- ty. Much of the concern centered on anxiety over establishing diplomatic situations which might repeat disadvantageous interwar conditions for the United States. As early as March 1945, for example, Secretary of War Stimson expressed the convinction that postwar intemationai trusteeships would mean the United States having to submit to UN inspections of Micro- nesia while British, French, and Dutch possessions in the Pacific would es- ? ibid. 156 cape supervision.a Stimson's intimation more than hinted at American per- ceptions that the US had honestly abided by the Pacific demilitarization clauses of the Washington Conference while Japan had violated those agree- ments without interference from the League of Nations. His statement also seems to reiterate the point that the US was not going to tolerate any simi- lar “behavior" from any other nation in the postwar period. Suspicious allusions to an allied nation also occurred in early 1946 in reference to Australia. Secretary F orrestal asserted that Secretary of State James Byrnes‘ attempts to have President Truman offer the Japanese Mandates to the UN before a peace treaty was signed with Japan and before trusteeship provisions were completed by the UN would lead to a situation similar to 1919 when the islands north of the Equator were ‘handed over“ to Japan and those south of the Equator went to Australia. (See Figure 31) To F orrestal, Byrnes‘ idea of placing Micronesia under UN control therefore meant a repetition of the Interwar situation when the United States was “shut out“ of critical strategic areas in the western Pacific islands and denied the opportunity to prevent Japanese “militarization and aggression“ in the Pacific Basin.9 Australia was suspect in other contexts as. well. As Roger Bell has argued, Australian foreign policy from 1944 to 1946 attempted to walk a fine line between obtaining an American guarantee of defense against future aggression in the region and maintaining autonomy so Australia could be- come the South Pacific regional power after the end of the war. To Com- monwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand, postwar American ggee Stirsrestal's record of Stimson's assertion in 'Trusteaships." ”reinvents/Dimes March . 1 . 9 See "Trusteeships,“ fame/omen Januey 2i . 1946. 157 .11 1111184111111] - JliilLl1HIJxIl Hat—{an 2..., u .— I‘D?! .3: «3 5585.0... .83... .35 v33 II. 9. 5.3 0.. .5- .1......1... 14.4...Lvtindilli. . 4.. ..z a late. ...-£1. 1.... ...... 1.1.4.1111... . . e 2 (I. ...-1:32:31... soil... .1. Iliad: ..riuvleillstJ-Illiiwgijssu ...Z <_a<¢hn3< a 3. >8—.:-- 3o . . h. ....10. Figure 31. The South Pacific (Courtesy of the National Archives 11, College Park, Maryland) 158 attempts to establish a unilateral strategic trusteeship 1n Micronesia be- fore a Japanese peace treaty was signed carried serious connotations of a raft accomp/i in violation of the Australia-New Zealand (ANZAC) Pact of 1944.10 The United States had agreed with Australia and New Zealand in January 1944 to establish a mutual regional defense zone in the postwar Pacific and not to take individual action toward territories in the region before a full and comprehensive Pacific settlement was carried out. Aus- tralia and New Zealand now not only saw bad faith on the part of the United States in relation to its unilateral position on Micronesia, but they also perceived a possible American willingness to 'go it alone" in the postwar Pacific by leaving Australia and New Zealand to defend themselves against any future regional aggression.11 in addition, John Dedman argues that US-Australian relations soured when the US refused to turn Mantis island in the Admiralties back to Austra- lian control, as he intimates had been agreed to during the war. in fact, Dedman asserts that the US did not turn Mantis over to Australia until Nov- ember 1948.12 Unfortunately, Dedman, writing in 1966, was not able to substantiate his claims with documentary evidence, but the charge would be consistent with early postwar attempts by the US to blanket the Pacific with American bases and forces. Similarly, it would have also been consis- 10 See Ball, “Australian-American Discord.” 12-33. 1 1 See memorandum by Yice Admiral Richard Edwards and Rear Adniral Donald Duncan to Adniral King. November 20, 1944, attached study ”Post-War Bases in the Pacific.” file "Bases General. B-3,‘ box 156. series 12, Strategic Plans. 84. NHC. as found in Converse. “United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Military Base System .“ 91. See also note from theAustralian Ambawarnr totheAmerican Secretary of State, Jmuary 21 . 1947, new 1947. 1:260-261 ; Secretary of State to the British Ambassamr to the United States. February 12. 1947. ibid. 261 -263; did “Statement To Be Math by the Australian Delegate to the Security Council at Its Next Meeting To Consithr the United States Trusteeship Aweement for the Former W Manthted islal'ids." March 21 . 1947. ibid. 272-273. 12 See Damian, “Encounter Over Marius,“ 135- 153. 159 tent with Institutional resistance from the United States military to re- treat from its ubiquitous wartime plans for the postwar Pacific Basin. American-British Commonwealth relations over the Pacific islands seem to have eventually improved after 1946 because the United States became so much more preoccupied with policy toward Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and its Pacific bases north of the Equator. Still, Bell has demonstrat- ed that relations with the ANZAC nations became quite heated In 1945 and 1946 over Issues such as base sites, transit rights for American military forces in the South Pacific, sovereignty issues, and the costs of base deve- lopment in the area.13 Suspicions also seemed to have existed between the United States and its allies in atomic energy matters. These suspicions became intertwined with Micronesia during the planning of Operation “Crossroads." A series of atomic bomb tests conducted on selected American, German, and Japanese naval vessels at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall islands in 1946, the tests were primarily carried out in order to observe the effects of nuclear war at sea.“1 Because of the nature of the technology and its obvious military implica- tions, there was widespread interest in the tests and observers from num- erous nations eventually attended the experiments. in January 1946, Great Britain requested that a scientific team be allowed to assist in the planning of the operations. Apparently, Vice Admiral William Blandy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Special Weapons and the commander of Opera- 13 See Bell, “Australian-American Discard: 12-33. 1‘1 The main purpose of the tests was to investh the power of the atomb bomb aminst naval vessels and to analyze the woman's probable Influence on the future of naval warfare Lloyd J. Graybar suggests, however.that the tests ma/alsohavebeencarriedoutaspa‘tofthepostwa‘ interservice rivalry between the War and Navy Departments over the assimment of future roles and missions in an atomic are See Graybar, ”Bikini Revisited fir‘lita'ymfrs 44 (October 1980): 1 18-123; and idem.. "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests- Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infidtting?" arm/armmmm 72 (March 1986): 888-907. 160 tion Crossroads, had no objection and in February 1946 Blandy, along with Secretary of War Robert Paterson. Forrestal, and Bymes, recommended that the British be allowed a team of ten officers and civilians, a substantially larger number of personnel than the team of two allowed for other nations observing the tests.“ Still, Forrestal had been concerned in January with “reconciling secu- rity" with the invitations to foreign observers, even those from Great Bri- tain and Canada. While the United States continued to favor Great Britain and Canada in the number of allotted observers because of their wartime contributions to the development of the atomic bomb, by March 1946 SWNCC and the JCS informed the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington that ear- lier suggestions for British military officers being included in the planning of Operation Crossroads would no longer be possible. While SWNCC and the JCS provided the excuse that plans were too far in advance by March 1946 to include British planning officers, the exclusion of even close allies from any kind of atomic planning was consistent with American wartime and postwar suspicions of all foreign nations when it came to atomic matters.115 15 See “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President.“ £7266 1946. 1:1203. For the recommendation. see Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War. and Navy, February 5, 1946, ibid. 1203- 1204. See also ”Memorandum By The Secretaries Of War And The Navy," Appendix ”A" to swuoc 248/3. February 4, 1946, SWNCC Papers. R8 353. NA 15 For Forrestal's concern. see “Plan For Atomic Bomb Tests Aminst Naval Vessels.“ SWNCC 248, January 21 , l946, SWNCC Papers. NA For the American committment to a larmr British observation team. see "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President," March 8. 1946, mm 1946, 1: 121 7- 1218. For SWNCC andJCS determination to exclude British planners. see “Memorandum For The British Joint Staff Mission,“ Appendix “B“ to SWNCX: 248/4. March 6, i946, SWNCC Papers, RG 353. NA. F inally, for several views of American wartime and postwar suspicions of allied nations involved in atomic research. see Sherwin. "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War ," 945-968; and idem. , A Ww/dowtm Hiram/MAM foo meme-or flavors)?” (New York: Rarltbm House. 1987); Bernstein, “The Quest for Security,” 1003- 1044; Gregg Herkan, 17v Win/rim Woman: filo/flame Bomb In fl» (1710' War, I945- I950 1121" York: ’5];er Knopf , 1980); and Gormly, “The Washington Declaration and the ’Poor ation‘ ." 1 -14 . 161 Another area in which Allied disagreements were illustrated occurred between the United States and the British Commonwealth nations over the organization, command, and disposition of Commonwealth forces in occupied Japan. As John Dower has demonstrated, American policy toward Japan in- dicated that the United States preferred to go it alone in terms of occupy- ing, demilitarizing, and ”democratizing” the island empire and American control over Japan was the most important component in initiating the American lake effect in the postwar Pacific. Thus, any indication by other powers of an interest in obtaining a substantial occupation role in that country would logically have engendered suspicion on the part of the US.17 On the surface, It appears that the United States was willing to have allied forces take part in occupying Japan as long as they did not have an ex- clusive national zone or a very large contingent of forces. Documents from MacArthur's headquarters in the fall of 1945 even indicate that President Truman invited Josef Stalin to Include Soviet troops in the occupation, though he did this primarily because the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945 obligated the United States to ask for Soviet participation. Stalin's sugges- tion that the USSR occupy northern Hokkaido as a national zone was quickly rejected by Truman, but the very fact that Soviet-troops might have been tolerated is significant in itself.18 (See Figure 32) in September 1945, General Marshall made US policy on the matter of allied occupation troops clearer to MacArthur. Marshall asserted that it was US policy to have the Allied Powers “share the burden“ of occupying and '7 See Dower, "centered Japan and trieAmerican Lake," 146-206. 15 See General Marshall to General MacArthur. August 31 , 1945, R8 9: Radiorams. Troop Deployments. MacArthur Memorial Archives. See also General Thomas Handy. Acting Army Chief of Staff , to MacArthur. November 20, 1945. ibid F inally, see Handy to MacArthur, November 19. 1945; and Eisenhower to MacArthur, November 20,1945 andJanuary 20. 1946;a11 in file ”CiNCAFPAC/COM7Tl-1FLEET", box 10,8110 Dispatches. Double Zero F lies. 0A, Ni-iC. 162 0 ’ P - luau snoro .0 ‘th'dflh 4° mum-.— inur- on“... l'oicu-e lei ‘ bl flue-h t lfiu— 10‘ Hi.“ Figure 32. The Japanese Home Islands And The Kuriles (Courtesy of the Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.) 163 demilitarizing Japan and that this diffusion of responsibility meant includ- ing the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, France, Holland, and even the Philippines in occupation matters. MacArthur returned a few days later that he agreed with Marshall, but he argued that all foreign forces should be log- istically and administratively self-sufficient while completely integrated and operationally subordinate to MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Com- mander for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP).'9 These requirements about national zones, self-sufficiency, and op- erational subordination suggest subtle American tactics to exclude other nations from the task at hand. The refusal to grant a separate zone of occu- pation to the Soviets discouraged the USSR from further participation in the operation by November l94S.2° In addition, it was probably impossible for the Chinese, French, Dutch, and Filipinos to have maintained “logistical and administrative independence,“ if they could have even supplied troops in the first place. Even when it came to the British Commonwealth nations, the United States had very specific guidelines it wanted followed which clearly articulated to the other nations that the victory over Japan was perceived to be a 301er American one and that the United States alone would set the agenda for postwar Japan and the Pacific Basin. Conflicting interests over these issues were particularly serious with Australia. '9 See Marshall to Mactrthur. September is. i945; and MacArthur to Marshall. September i9. l945; both in R0 9: Radiograms, Troop Deployments, Mmthur Memorial Archives. 20 in November 1945, Stalin declined an offer by the United States to have a Soviet force partici- pate in the occupation of Japan. Though the reason was not stated, it was probably his inability to convince Truman or Byrnes that the Soviets should have an exclusive occupation zone in l-lokkaim which determined Stalin’s decision. Byrnes. like Truman. felt obliged to invite the Soviets into the occupation because of provisions in the Potsdam Aorwment. but there did not seem to be my sleep logggve‘ggie SoViet refusal. See Eisenhower to MacArthur. November 20. 1945; andJmuary 20. 164 For instance, in late September l945 Australia proposed that the Bri- tish Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan be allowed to operate a separate channel of communication with the Australian Joint Chiefs of Staff which avoided SCAP. MacArthur told Marshall that such an arrange- ment was impossible because the same thing would have to be established for the Soviets, the Chinese, or any other Allied power which might want to become involved in the occupation at a later date. To MacArthur, sole com- munication with outside authorities had to be through SCAPZl One month later, General Thomas Handy, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, in- formed MacArthur that Australia had put forth another proposal in which it accepted the requirements about operational and policy direction from SCAP as well as the conditions of administrative and logistical self-sufficiency for the Commonwealth Force. Handy told MacArthur, however, that the Aus- tralians specifically wanted the Force assigned to the Tokyo Prefecture, with Commonwealth control over local port facilities. The Australians were confident that the United States would quickly accept these provisions as evidence to the rest of the world that the British Commonwealth nations and the Americans were still joined in common efforts in spite of the con- clusion of the war.22 American officials, however, were concerned about other matters than the political image of postwar Allied unity. The War Department was more concerned about the command arrangement in Japan and moved swiftly to dispell Australian notions of geographic autonomy. In late November, Handy, now Acting Chief of Staff, informed MacArthur that the BCOF would be participating in the occupation but that it would be completely subordi- 2‘ See Hmmur to NM". Swmw 23. 1945. ibid 22 SeeHandyto MacArthur, October 23. l945, ibid l65 nate to MacArthur for operational purposes and would be assigned to any lo- cation which SCAP determined. The report denied the Australian request for an exclusive area of control in any part of Japan.” One month later, General Eisenhower, Marshall's successor as Chief of Staff, informed MacArthur that the British forces would be assigned military control of the Hiroshima Pre- fecture, not Tokyo. “Military control,” moreover, did not mean military gov- ernment functions such as operation of the public infrastructure, the purg- ing of Japanese military and government leaders, and other central admini- strative functions. BCOF functions were to be kept strictly limited to po- lice patrols of the occupied zone. The delegation of Commonwealth forces to patrolling activity also extended to the operations of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Japan.24 Moreover, the War Department‘s concern about the proportion of troops each nation maintained in Japan was evidenced in the documents. Since War Department officials perceived the number of garrisoned troops in a given area to be proportionate to that nation's political interest in the area, the Army was concerned that the United States have the largest force in Japan in order to demonstrate American military dominance in Japan dur- ing the occupation and retain dominant leverage over that nation's future.25 Eisenhower reaffirmed this strategic concern with the number and composi- tion of Allied troops in Japan when he argued that the proposed Common- wealth Force was too preponderant in alrpower and that the BCOF should not be allowed to have 43,000 of the 70,000 assigned billets?6 23 See Hm to MaMrthur. November 28, l945, ibid. 24 See Eisenhower to MacArthur, December 19. 1945, ibid 25 See Handy to MacArthur, November 20, i945, ibid 25 ibid In reality. the BCOF was never really logistically independent Becuneof a m of resources. it had to relyon the US for the logistical support of its forces in Jam. much to the 166 Eventually, the United States, Great Britain, and Australia did agree to terms by which the BCOF would be part of the occupation of Japan. MacArthur retained sole operational and policy control over the force and the only line of communication with higher US authorities. In addition, the RAF and the Royal Navy components of the force were reduced and were placed under the respective operational control of General Whitehead as Commanding General of PACUSA and Vice Admiral Robert Griffin as Comm- ander of Naval Activities in Japan (COMNAVJAP). in return for these con- cessions, the BCOF agreed to maintain administrative and logistical inde- pendence and was able to retain a line of communication with the Australian Joint Chiefs of Staff for certain political, but not operational, purposes.27 Primary sources also reveal a bone of contention between the United States and the United Kingdom about sovereignty issues over certain South Pacific islands. Though the documents are not entirely clear about the na- ture of the contest, in the summer of l946 the US and Great Britain were debating their sovereignty rights over eighteen locations south of the Equa- tor, including Christmas Island in the Line Islands. The source of the dis- pute was the US‘ desire to use Christmas Island as a future base for B-29 training flights. In July 1946, Whitehead wrote to the commander of the US 7th Air Force, Major General Thomas White, confirming for White that his report about Christmas demonstrated that the island was a “cheap place“ to build runways and that the existing wartime airfield was sufficient for disgust of officers such as General Whitehead See Whitehead to MacArthur, February 5, l946, l60.6008- l , Whitehead Collection. AF SHRC. 27 ibid. The result of Admiral Nimitz' idea to avoid interservice command friction between CINCPAC and General MacArthur during the occupation of Japan, OOMNAVJAP was oranlaed unmr CINCPAC direction for administrative purposes but was placed under MacArthur‘s direction for the operational purpom of assisting in the demobilization and demilitarization of Japan. See 0900 Reports, December I6, I945 and December 2i, 1945, OPD Diuy, box 5, DDEL. l67 B-29's.28 Christmas and Canton Islands were also on the list of postwar “national interest air routes to the South Pacific,“ or areas that the War De- partment thought could be jointly developed as military and commercial air transit points. In fact, the US delayed completely withdrawing Army garri- sons from those islands because of the airbase and transit issues.29 (See Figure 33) The controversy over South Pacific sovereignty continued in July I946 when Lieutenant General Hull advised MacArthur that the British wanted to import “native“ women from the Gilbert Islands to Christmas Is- land as companions for the male labor force constructing postwar bases there. The British work force was composed of about 60 Gilbert Islanders, but the British complained about low morale among the workers as well as a lagging copra production because of the small numbers of laborers and be- cause of the difficulty of recruiting laborers who had to leave their fami- lies behind.30 MacArthur, Hull, and the State Department were all concerned about the British being able to import Gilbert Island women to Christmas Island. To the American officials, this importation implied a permanent British presence and an attempt to change a purely labor force on a strategic island into a "colony".31 l have not yet discovered documentation which outlines how these issues were finally solved. Given the lower priority to the South Pacific bases by the United States military after the spring of l946, however, it is 28 See Dedman, “Encounter Over Menus." I41. See also Whitehead to White. 23 July 1946, 168.6008- l , Whitehead Col lection. AF SHRC. 29 See Hull to Eisenhower. November 21 . l946; and Hull to Nowland, 00 PAC on ATC, November 24. I946; both in R0 9: Radioa‘ams. Troop Deployments. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 30 See Hull to MacArthur. July 23. l946, R6 9: Radiograms, AF MIDPAC; and Hull to MacArthur, August i8. l946, ibid 1'93? Hgil‘llto MacArthur. July 23. l946; and MacArthur to Hull.August 8, I946 aidAugust 28. l68 ]. .Juilmul all} .38.: _ {I :2:.§Iy§er ...... .....ovlto. :2 a; 11.9.3qu 31. ... 7431:... «iii... ..i .....l-4.H.n..1..i..... y....11.....l...i.41~!_. .....I. 1! ..u :iu. ...... 1..}. iii]. .151..14t_....4l ..I...l..I....elq.-:.... <_._<-b.n:< Figure 33. The South Pacific (Courtesy Of the National Archives ll, College l69 Park, Maryland) probable that the bases were either stricken from the JCS list of desired bases or simply withered as the remaining garrisons were withdrawn in l947 and greater attention was paid to the bases in Hawaii, Micronesia, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus. The dispute, however, provides an additional piece of evidence that the United States wanted carte blanche in determin- ing postwar Pacific affairs in every corner of the Basin and considered Eu- ropean colonial pretentions to be strategic inconveniences, if not threats to the postwar order.~'l2 The idea that the United States had sole rights determine the future framework of the Basin was another area of postwar allied disputes because of a particular arrogance on the part of some US officers when it came to other allied nations' contributions to the defeat of Japan. Admiral Harry Yarnell, for instance, argued during the war that the United States had the right to maintain a blanket of forces and bases In the postwar Pacific because it had paid the lion's share in “blood and treasure” for the victory over Japan. The efforts of the other Allied nations during the Pacific War were virtually ignored, as was any sensitivity to other nations' sovereignty, national pride, or postwar interests-33 A postwar example of this American arrogance toward its wartime allies occurred in October 1946. At that time, General Whitehead sent in- formation to General Spaatz on Dutch reluctance to allow American aircraft landing rights in New Guinea in connection with resupplying American forces on Manus and conducting a postwar aerial survey of the Pacific 32 See Bell , “Australian-American Dim.” i2-33. 33 See Aaniral Hrry E. Yarnell. “Memorandum on Post-War Fa‘ Eastern Situation." June l6, I944, file "Intellimnce, A-8,“ box l95. Strategic Plans, 0A, NHC. l70 Ocean.“ (See Figure 34) Whitehead argued that Hollandia, a major strategic air base in New Guinea, had been liberated from Japan by American forces without any assistance from the Dutch.35 Because the US had expended sig- nificant amounts of blood and treasure building bases in the area and liber- ating the region from the Japanese, Whitehead believed that the Netherlands “owed“ the US and that the US should have “blanket" authority and air transit rights in the area for the resupply missions and the surveys"6 While Dutch imperialism in New Guinea and Indonesia cannot be con- doned any more than US imperialism in the western Pacific Islands, Whitehead's assumptions concerning US strategic prerogatives in the area appear to be particularly amiss considering that US policy was to recognize Dutch suzerainty over the indonesian archipelago regardless of the Dutch war effort. Though Whitehead was correct about the facts of liberation, he was quick to forget that northern New Guinea was sovereign Dutch territory. He also failed to acknowledge that General MacArthur, as wartime Comm- ander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Ocean Area (CINCSWPA), had made agreements with the Dutch to restore their administration over the area as soon after liberation as possible and that the Dutch were now simply exer- cising that control.37 Nor did Whitehead admit that the United States liber- ated various areas of the Pacific because of its own wartime strategic decisions and postwar strategic designs, not out of benevolence toward its European allies. 3" See Whitehead to Spaatz, October 9, 1946, R0 9: Radiowams, Air Force. MacArthur Memorial Archives. See also Whitehead to MacArthur. October l3, l946, R0 9: Radiou-ams, Air Force, ibid; and Whitehead. subj: Draft, January i0, l947, 720. i623. AFSHRC. 35 SeeWhiteheMtoSpaatz, October 9. i946; andWhitehead to MacArthur. October l3. l946; both in R0 9: Radiog‘ams, Air F orce. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 36 ibid 37 See Michael Schaller, Day/as ”MI/Ian ”U for [New We! (New York: Oxford University Press, I989). 90. l7i 0! . . a no. ... . 3.2.1.: .. .... m K of. . e... an .. ... a. (Ht-Du . 1 .A. 9 in: . I .l. (Kr! an... :1. .... ’ . . c.019000000000000000 .0 00. any. a , [/3 .23... . an: . . 9. w 31...... ... .. . . 3 . . . a .. .\ . . 33590 raisin... _ e . . 8 . .... . 3.1:..- .... . ... . ........... 33...}... ........ m ....wmmum .......... mm mm“ .................... .9. f 33.3 ., .M. Saxons... .o e... .33.... ...: e ...:3. 1.535.... x . . .. . .....s:......... .2 so 25.“ :2 s I 3.23. m. a I. $563.0 . g c- 9323 32:35 £3.33 ‘33:... 0 ‘Nu. l. c .... .. .. 25:33 - 5.6..- E a .485: .- ...» O hh‘flflfih .. 0.0 v u. . :2... ........ ...waa t ......CwmuWO‘CCOI‘O-O‘.OpOMOva O ' 0V 1 3w .0 o .7va II... . t . s I . (flu. 2 53!.3‘ 33%.. I .53.. a. 31.1. n ... 3 33. 82.6- .53... 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Southwest Pacific Ocean Area (From Me witMStates Army In War/0' War //.' The War In 7726 Pacific, Office Of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC.) l72 Still, Whitehead's assertions were not out of the ordinary. In fact, American suspicions of other western Allied powers continued during the entire timeframe of this study. As late as 1947, for example, the US Mili- tary Staff Committee to the United Nations continued to discuss the secu- rity of US possessions and base rights in the Pacific in terms of ubiquitous threats from “any other nation."~'ia it is my contention that while all other powers in the region were not always considered to be strategic threats, they were at least perceived to be “nuisances“ to the new American order in the postwar Pacific Basin. in spite of the eventual resolution of these problems, these episodes go far in demonstrating the extent to which the United States expected a free hand in “remaking“ Japan. These episodes also illustrate that relations with even the closest of allies did not preclude an arrogance on the part of the United States about its preponderant role in defeating Japan, an assump- tion that the lions' share of the victors” spoils should automatically ensue from that role, and a view of other nations with postwar pretentions in the region as potential security “obstacles“ to the postwar American order. In spite of the evidence of Allied contentions, however, the Soviet Union was perceived to be the most formidable barrier to America's position in the Pacific and primary documents reveal how intertwined Cold War ten- sions became with American policy in the Pacific region. In fact, it can be said that the Pacific Islands became a microcosm of Cold War tensions be- tween i945 and i947. Moreover, the disputes between the US and the USSR 38 See memorandum by the Chairman of SWNCC to the Secretary of State. February 26, i945, new I945, iz94; “international Trusteeships,“ February 26. 1945. SWNCC 27/i . Papers of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWWPa/IZyF/las‘, [944- I947 ( Wilmington, Delaware. Scholarly Resources. inc.. 1977); and Norris to theJCS. February 22. l947, 12-9- 42 sec. 29. 005 360. R6 218. NA i73 offer a context in which to explore American attitudes toward postwar col- lective security, the UN as an international security organization, and the Soviet Union as a Pacific Basin great power. The UN and Postwar American Security in the Pacific Larry Gerber argues that Bernard Baruch's I946 plan for the interna- tional control of atomic energy was an early example of American subver- sion of UN principles. In fact, as inIs Claude has asserted, the negotiations over trusteeships in I946 provide historians with an earlier example of American national security goals clashing with postwar collective security ideals.39 As the previous chapters demonstrated, American military plan- ners sought US sovereignty over various areas of the Pacific and a very comprehensive base system in the region, hoping this security system would allow the US to deny the area to foreign powers. Because of pressure from the Roosevelt Administration, the Truman Administration, and the State and Interior Departments, the military services eventually and begrudgingly ac- cepted the idea of strategic trusteeship over the islands taken from Japan, rather than US annexation.“o How sincere the Roosevelt Administration was in its calls for inter- national and then strategic trusteeship is a difficult question to answer. William Roger Louis asserts with considerable evidence that Undersecretary of the Interior Abe F ortas‘ first objective in introducing the idea of a stra- tegic trusteeship was to find an acceptable middle ground between the mili- 39 See Gerber, ”T he Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," 69-95; and Claude, m map/Was. 349-377. 4° For examples of this pressure on the military services from civilian planners. see Louis, Inner/elm; away, 68-87, 159- i97, 259-273, 366-377, 475-496. and S l 2-573; and Thorne, AlliesafaK/M 252-269. 371-375, 489-494, aid 654-67 I. See also. Foltos, "New Pacific Barrier ,“ 3i 7-342 i74 tary‘s demands for annexation and US wartime rhetoric against territorial aggrandizement. The bottom line, however, was still ensuring strategic se- curity for the US in the region, though Fortas linked the issue to ”intema- tional“ security as a way to make US national security goals more “palat- able“ to American and global public opinion. In spite of these rather Machia- vellian tactics on Fortas' part, Louis is convinced that officials like Roosevelt, ickes, and F ortas nevertheless saw themselves as impartial and enlightened guardians of the Pacific Islanders“ best interests!" indeed, it would be difficult not to classify Roosevelt, Ickes, and Fortas as the ”liberals“ or “progressives” in this sItutation, especially con- sidering the stance which Stimson, Forrestal, and the JCS took on annexing the Pacific Islands taken from Japan. Still, this author finds strategic trusteeship to be a rather convenient political facade and an example of the US' unwillingness and inability to admit that it was indulging in a type of security imperialism for its own selfish national interests. To be sure, the US was not conducting itself very differently than other great powers in similar circumstances. It is significant, however, that US officials never openly discussed strategic trusteeship as a great power security device, but instead linked it to the maintenance of postwar intemationai peace, the end of colonialism, and the ”development“ of the islanders. In the end, the results were not very different from traditional col- onialism. Though the UN would have the right to inspect the Islands once a year and the US was required to pay lip service to clauses calling for the eventual independence of the islands, strategic trusteeship was just one step short of annexation and it defied the ideas of postwar multilateral co- 4' See Louis, Impala/m; away, 480-485. 175 operation and collective security which had been so clearly enunciated by the US during the war.42 With Micronesia, the Ryukyus, Japan, the Philippin- es, the Bonins, the Volcanoes, and Marcus Island under firm US control or influence and with the United States Navy and the Army Air Force deployed in strength in the region, the Pacific Basin truly became an American lake and the United States, for all intents and purposes, achieved a unilateral solution to its postwar security anxieties W3-a‘-w'5 East Asia.“ Trusteeship for the Pacific, however, was still suspect to military officials who saw it as a repetition of the Washington Treaty System by which Japan allegedly used its League of Nations mandates to fortify Micro- nesia and prepare for an attack on the United States. As the following pages will suggest, many American officials charged with planning strategic poli- cy for the region never fully accepted the trusteeship concept and never vested great confidence in the UN as a guarantor of American postwar secu- rity or intemationai peace.“ Neither was this lack of confidence in UN processes and the trustee- ship concept limited to military officials and officers. in April I945, two senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan and Democrat Tom Connolly of Texas, had to be very specifically reassured by Vice Admiral Russell Willson of the JSSC 42 See Nufer, ”ma mmm Rub. 26-35. 43 See F riadnan. ”Beast in Paradise, i73- I95. 44 For the most recent of accounts dealing with M‘s alleged violations of the League of Nations Mandate Agreement. see Peattie, W. 230- 256. Perry Smith asserts that AAF planning officers were ambivalent toward the entire idea of a postwar UN-ied collective security effort. They planned for an American air force based on both the possibility of successful security cooperation among the "Big Four“ and a failure of the UN because of divergent postwar interests between the Allies. However, even their most optimistic ideas about the UN consistently saw it as a mere agency to implement American foreign policy and security goals in the postwar world The itbathatthe UN couldever acquirepower and influenceon Itsownor even beusedbyother nations against American interests apparently never occured to these officers See Smith. MM]? Plats farm I948- 1946'. 39-53 and 73-74. 176 that the US would not offer the Japanese Mandates for trusteeship until complete arrangements for administering power authority over the respec- tive trusteeships had been made with the Allied Powers and the UN.45 Willson assured Vandenburg and Connally that the US would have full veto powers in the Security Council and that nothing he foresaw in the future would prevent the US from freely negotiating treaties, acquiring strategic territory, or providing for firm American security in the Pacific after the warfl6 Even the Interior Department under Harold Ickes, whose favorable views of intemationai trusteeship were considered subversive by many mil- itary leaders, was in favor of international trusteeship for the islands taken from Japan only as a means by which to consolidate American control over the region. In the fall of l94S, ickes called repeatedly for Micronesia and the other islands taken from Japan to be placed under Interior Department civil administration. Ickes, however, foresaw the need for limited ”military reservations” under War and Navy Department control in peacetime and he acknowledged the requirement for entire island chains to come under mili- tary control in time of war or national emergency. Ickes couched his terms in humanitarian language, but he and other interior Department officials also wielded very persuasive strategic arguments to assert their case. Just a few days after the war ended, for example, Ickes wrote Truman to argue for civil administration in the islands in order to keep " . . . with the traditions of the American people . . . ', to assist in guaranteeing a per- manent peace, and to forestall charges by foreign powers that the US was 4'5 For this strange. but apparently early confidence on the part of the JSSC. see Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Unltw States Delemtion (A) held at San FPOI’ISClsm, April 26, 1945. ”MS 1945. 1:448-449. 46 Ibid. I77 governing indigenous populations in the Pacific as part of a “militaristic empire.“ Ickes especially wanted the US to be able to go the peace table demonstrating its ” . . . democratic, non-imperialistic attitude . . . toward the island peoples.”7 Later in September i945, Abe F ortas, as Acting Sec- retary of the interior, elaborated to Truman on the problem of permanent military rule in the Pacific. Fortas asserted that the US would come under a significant amount of international criticism for violating the spirit of the UN Charter if it was to maintain military rule over civilians, especially after the other trusteeships reverted to civil administration. Fortas speci- f ically put the matter in terms of preserving American wartime prestige and the political capital it had invested in the UN as world attention focused on the American administration of the Pacific Islands."8 Truman responded to the Interior Department by establishing an in- terdepartmental committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the interior to discuss the issues of strategic trusteeship versus annexation and the issue of civil versus military government. Apparently, the committee never met, but representatives of the four secretaries did.49 Still, the Pacific islands were not high on Truman‘s priority list in the fall of l945 or even much of i946. Faced with deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, crises in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and the do- mestic problems of demobilization, Truman probably had little time to spare for ISIZOG administration lSSUBS. 47$eelckestoTruman,$eptember 12.19415;meme 29. I945; both found in moor es- L.box$72.HSTL. 48 See Fortas to Truman. ibid 49$ee$ecretaiyofthe Interior Julius KrugtoSecretaryofStateGeorgeMarshall, May 3. 1947. ibid. 178 This desire to shelve the problem is evidenced by Truman's endorse- ment of Byrnes’ January l946 views on establishing a definite status for the islands. Contrary to F orrestall‘s assertion that Byrnes was prepared to “hand“ the islands over the UN in early l946 before a peace treaty had been signed with Japan, Byrnes, in fact, reminded Truman that the Potsdam Agreement stated that enemy territory was not to be disposed of until peace treaties with the defeated powers were signed. Since a Japanese peace treaty had not been signed by the beginning of 1946, Byrnes argued that the islands taken from Japan should remain under military rule until a peace conference was convened, a treaty signed, and territorial dispositions de- termined. Byrnes took his cue from the divided occupation of Germany, where four Allied zones had been created to administer the defeated nation. Byrnes apparently did not want to see any similar kind of “divided authority“ occur in Japan or the Pacific territories. Truman concurred four days later, stating that nothing could be done for some time but that plans should be made.'~50 Not much was done, however, to clarify US policy on international trusteeship and internal disunity over the "wait and see” policy continued until the fall of l946. The lack of faith in a UN-led collective security system was again expressed in April I946 when the JCS emphatically communicated to SWNCC that a comprehensive global base system, representing a blanketing of the Pacific With American forces, was " . . . an essential requirement for United States security in the event of a failure of the United Nations to preserve world peace . . . ”51 Interestingly enough, the JSSC in l946 also belied its 5° See Byrnes to Truman. January 5. I946; and Truman to Byrnes. January 9. I946. ibid; see also Forrestal to Truman, formic/Dixie: January 2 i , l946. 5‘ SeetheJCStoSWNCC.April II, 1946, F315 l946, lzll73. I79 April 1945 facade 0f confidence in the UN and strategic tr usteeship to Sen- ators Vandenburg and Connally by calling into question UN procedures and processes. For example, in June i946, the JSSC concurred with the Joint Plann- ing Staff (JSP) and the Joint Post-War Committee (JPWC) that the UN Charter allowed the US exclusive control over certain strategic areas and that the veto power in the Security Council might guarantee the US this ex- clusive control. The JSSC, however, was concerned that the veto power of the other Security Council members might prevent the US from establishing control over these strategic areas in the first place or that veto powers for Security Council members might be curtailed in the f uture.52 Accordingly, the JSSC wanted to retain sovereign control over Micronesia and saw the move as a aw'dpro qua with the Soviet Union's retention of unilateral con- trol over the Kurile islands. The committee asserted that backing away from the altruistic stance of trusteeship might harm the UN process but that the precedent had already been set by the Soviet refusal to offer the Kuriles in any form of trusteeship.53 Of course, what the JSSC did not men- tion is that the Soviets annexed the Kuriles by the terms of the Yalta Agree- ment. a document which did not stipulate trusteeship for the area. The US could not claim the same kind of diplomatic guarantee for Micronesia, but the JSSC apparently saw a very similar circumstance. Later, in September i946, Admiral John Towers, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, and Rear Admiral Charles Pownall, Commander, Naval Forces Marianas and 52 See “Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee" to the JCS. part of 'Trusteeships For geomese Mandated Islands," JCS 570/48, January i7. l946, file 12-9-42 sec. 28, (135 360. 6 2 i 8, NA. 53 ibid. For the resistance by less powerful nations to the idea of great power prerogatives in the UN Security Council. see Louis, Imm‘ia/im away. 46 I -573; and Claude. 5m Info Pm 357-377. l80 Tower's Deputy Military Governor on Guam, suggested to Truman and Forrestal that bases in the Pacific be limited to the Guam-Saipan-Tinian complex, the Philippines, Alaska, and Hawaii because of funding limitations on base development. Truman and F orrestal concurred but Truman specifi- cally mentioned the US retaining Okinawa and Micronesia on a sovereign ba- sis " . . . until the United Nations was far enough along to give us [the United States] confidence in a trusteeship system . . . " 54 This mistrust of the UN at the highest levels of policymaking became more explicit in October 1946, by which time Byrnes sought to offer the islands to the UN for trusteeship even though a peace treaty had not been signed between the Allied powers and Japan. Byrnes was probably convinced by this time that there would be no early peace treaty between the US, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Accord- ingly, he may have wanted a US-led solution in the UN to the disposition of Japan‘s territories so as to allow for sanctioned US control over the Pacific islands. Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz, however, were alarmed at Byrnes' idea and expressed a desire for the US to retain sovereignty over Micronesia until the terms of trusteeship were made more concrete. They were con- vinced that offering the islands too soon under any conditions would allow them to be “surrendered piecemeal” to the UN or to some foreign power by " . . . those responsible for the drafting.“55 Moreover, subordinate commanders in the Pacific continued to discuss American military dispositions and base construction in the region in a more unilateral context than even President Truman or the State Department were probably willing to entertain. in December 1946, by which time the US 5" See Forrestal. Towers. and Pownall. "The President-Bases." harem/Diaries Septemmr 30. i946; see also Reynolds, mire/mm 7W5, 52i —522. 55 See "Trusteeship," Parasite/Diaries October 22, l946. 18] had presented a plan for trusteeship over the Islands to the UN Security Council, General Whitehead was continuing to inform his subordinate comm- anders that the former Japanese Mandates were to come under the ”exclu- sive and permanent" control of the US as part of an American “overall base plan” for the postwar Pacific. Whitehead did not mention UN trusteeship, indicating disagreement or at least a communication gap with his superiors over the means by which he and his fellow officers were to defend and ad- minister the new Pacific empire?)6 in the same month, John Foster Dulles, head of the US Delegation re- sponsible for negotiating the trusteeships, conferred with Forrestal about the idea of demilitarizing the entire Pacific including Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Micronesia, and the Kurile-Sakhalin area. Dulles could have been referring to an idea enunciated by President Roosevelt in the mid- l9305. At that time, FDR attempted to obtain British cooperation in “neu- tralizing" the Pacific region, ”quarantining" Japan with a united Anglo- American front based on naval power, and deterring Japanese aggression. Forrestal seemed to approve of the idea as long as it was not " . . . like the old days . . . when it is all one-sided. We don't fortify the Philippines and they [Japan] did fortify the Mandates . . ."57 Clearly, these officials and offi- 55 See Whitehead to the commanding generals of the 5th. 7th. l3th. and 20th Air Forces. the Pacific Air Service Command, the First Air Division. and the Jinan, Hawaii , Philippines, and Guam Army Materiel Areas. subj: Notes on Air Defense Conference. Dumber l2. l946. 720. 1 Si -2. AFSHRC. 57 See transcript of telephone conversation between Forrestal and Dulles, December i6, l947, file 2- i -7. box i4, RG 80. NA. According to Harold Ickes, prewar cooperation was also envisioned with France and Roosevelt thought the US Navy could blockade Japan from the Aleutians, Hawaii, Howland, Wake. and Guam while the Royal Navy took over the blockading line from Singapore. In addition, Ickes recorded that Japan had its own ideas about demilitarizing the Pacific in late i940. plans which included the US agreeing not to fortify Guam or American Samoa and agreeing to demilitarlza Hawaii! See Dumber 18, i937, rmmwmaeo/Mo/dz. later Vela/7792, Me MsmSI/‘w/e, 1936- 1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, i954); and October 7, i940, Volume .3? Malawi/yam I939— /94/, ibid. See also Richard Harrison, 182 cers were all making allusions to the allegedly "foolish diplomacy“ of i919 and i922 when policymakers had agreed to Japanese administration over Micronesia and the non-fortification of Guam and the Philippines. To many military and civilian off iciais charged with strategic responsibilities in the l9405, the UN was nothing but a more recent manifestation of the League of Nations and they believed that America's position in the Pacific could be un- dermined in a way reminiscent of the interwar period. Maintaining a public facade about the efficacy of intemationai coop- eration, collective security, and trusteeship apparently continued to be im- portant, however, even as officials privately asserted that the US should annex the Pacific Island groups and ward off all intemationai attempts at administering the area. One example of this public-private disparity occur- red in March i947 when Secretary F orrestal responded to a letter from a distraught Virginia college history instructor. Ms. Lysabeth Muney of Sweet Briar College was concerned that the l946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands were being used to justify a large postwar navy, to make a mockery of the UN, and to damage the concept of collective security.58 Forrestal assured the concern- ed historian that he was fully supportive of collective security and united action as the basis for peace and that he saw the United States Navy as an integral part of an international police force “enforcing the peace”. Forrestal specifically claimed that his " . . . faith, in other words, is in the United Nations as the agency for universal peace dynamically perpetuated."59 While F orrestal did not mention the trusteeship system in the letter, one ”A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific Roosevelt andAnglo-American Cooperation. i934- l 937,“ leficfi/sfa'iw/Raviw 57 (February i988): 47-72. 53 See letter from Muney to Forrestal. March I. l947, file 39- l -37. box 72. RG 80. NA. 59 See letter from Forrestal to Muney. March l9, l947, ibid. l83 would presume that his allegedly strong support for the UN would also have included support for the concept of international trusteeship. in fact, F orrestal and many other policymakers and planners privately expressed serious reservations about the UN and believed that trusteeship was an inadequate way to provide for postwar American security in the Pac- if ic or American security anywhere else in the world. Many in the military favored the outright annexation of Micronesia and Forrestal's thinking was consistent along these lines. Although he claimed as early as the spring of i945 that he opposed the idea of annexation, his continued support of Amer- ican sovereignty over Micronesia in l946 because of a lack of confidence in the UN belied his claims of 1945 and those of the winter of I94?!” By i947, Forrestal was publicly willing to accept strategic trustee- ship over Micronesia, but he never thought of the arrangement in the context of international cooperation, collective security, or UN administration. Throughout the entire period of l94S- l 947, he privately spoke of exclusive US control, veto power for the US on the UN Security and Trusteeship Coun- cils, and complete American military, political, and economic rights over the area!" Though Forrestal was eventually willing to endure the UN facade of strategic trusteeship, what he actually had in mind and what actually resulted in I947 was a subtle subversion of UN principles in favor of Amer- ican strategic security interests. Here F orrestal's thinking was again con- 5° For F orrastal's allewd opposition to American annexation. see Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to the President, April 9, I945, £7766 1945, i:2l l-2 l 3; Memorandum by the Secretary of State. April i4, i945, ibid.. 290; and Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Unwrsecretary of State. April i8, 1945, ibid, 350. For an account from primary sources of F orrestal's actual opposition to trusteeship and his efforts to see the US annex the islands taken from Japan. see Louis. IMMIb/Ilw away. 482-483. 6' See proposed speech by Forrestal, "The United States' Role In the Trusteeship System ." February 22. i947, file 86-5-45. box l34. RG 80. NA; see also attached memo for Forrestal from Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, DCNO for Operations. February 25, l947, ibid 184 sistent with that of many officials who saw unilateral American security as a more important objective during the l9405 than proving the efficacy of UN concepts. “States Directly Concerned' This unilateralism was manifested in early efforts to limit the num- ber of nations directly involved in trusteeship negotiations. In March I945, Secretary Stimson argued that if the United States had to offer the islands in the context of intemationai trusteeships, the negotiating powers should be limited to Security Council members because " . . . the smaller numbers of the Security Council would make negotiations much less complicated."62 This attempt to make the process “less complicated“ by limiting the number of nations involved focused on the phrase ”states directly concerned.“ The term literally meant those nations which had direct concrete or perceived interests in the various trusteeships which were being organized throughout the world between i945 and l947. The meaning of the term, however, be- came the basis for a controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union as the Soviets attempted to acquire a voice in almost all trusteeship matters and the United States attempted to severely curtail the number of states directly involved in regional trusteeship negotiations. This attitude surfaced before the UN was even established at San Francisco in April i945. Stimson and F orrestal wrote Roosevelt just before he died to state their support for the trusteeships concept, but also to con- vey their desire to delay trusteeship proceedings until the end of the war. Both men claimed that negotiations in the UN might harm Allied cooperation ¥ 52 For Stimson's statement. see fowmlalD/aries March 30. i945; see also Louis. Imperialism of day. 482-496. l85 against Germany and Japan during the final stages of the war because of the divergent postwar aims of the various nations.63 While strained relations between the western Allies and the Soviet Union over events in post- i 944 eastern Europe may have vindicated their viewpoints about the tenuous na- ture of wartime cooperation, neither official argued for delay in order to foster conditions more conducive to multilateral trusteeship negotiations. In fact, delay was suggested in order to give the US a chance to gain firm unilateral control over the Pacific and present the other nations with a raft accomp/I.‘ Primary documents reveal how interdependent the Pacific became with political issues in other areas of the world. Secretary Ickes, for in- stance, linked his wartime duties as US Petroleum Administrator with his efforts to have the Pacific Islands placed under UN trusteeship and Interior Department civil administration. Before and during the war, Ickes had been attempting to formulate a coherent US strategic oil policy that would guar- antee the resources from the Middle East which were necessary for Allied victory, postwar European recovery, and American prosperity. Desiring some direct participation by the US government in the Middle East oil con- cessions, Ickes was constantly struggling against attempts by the British to exclude the US from the area. Writing Roosevelt just a few days before FDR died, ickes linked Middle Eastern oil and the Pacific Islands by arguing against American unilateral annexations of the islands. He was particularly concerned that US claims of sovereignty over the Pacific Islands might pro- vide an excuse for the British to claim the same status over their mandates 53$eeStettiniustoRoosevelt,April 9. l945. few I945, 1:212. 186 in the Middle East, annex the oil concessions, and exclude the US from ac- cess to strategic resources in the region!)4 Another example of regional linkage occured in April 1946 when Forrestal told Byrnes that it would be unwise for the United States to label itself a “state directly concerned“ in the negotiation of the four African trusteeships of the British Cameroons, Tanganyika, Togoland, and Ruanda- Urundi (now Cameroon, Tanzania, Togo, Rwanda, and Burundi, respectively). Claiming that the US had no strategic interests in those areas, Forrestal be- lieved that US actions along these lines would defeat American efforts to have the number of states directly concerned kept to an absolute minimum when it came to the negotiations over the former Japanese Mandates.65 Similarly, in May I946, John Hickerson, the State Department's Deputy Di- rector of the Office of European Affairs, suggested to G.H. Middleton, First Secretary of the British Embassy, that if the British and French govern- ments would not insist on being states directly concerned with the former Japanese Mandates then the US would likewise agree to obstaln from being a state directly concerned with the British and French Mandates in Africa.66 Again, however, the Soviet Union figured prominently as the adversar- ial power. A May 1946 SWNCC planning document-suggests that American strategic plans for a reluctantly accepted trusteeship system in the post- 64 See Ickes to Roosevelt. April 5. 1945137451945. l: i98- 199; and Section 8 from the Diary of Secretary of State Edward Stetinius, March l8. 1945-April 7, 1945, as found in EMS I945. l: l40- I4 i. For Ickes' attempts to formulate US all policy before and during the war. see Miller. Sim» Far fiat/rink, 2 l - l 49; and David S. Painter, mmrmmwm Chow/y Me Political [myafwm'e/w ol'IPo/I'cx I941 - 1954 ( Baltimore. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, i986), ii-95. . 65 See Forrestal to Byrnes. April 4. I946. mus l946. l:565-566: and Staff Committee Document SC- 192, “Policy and Procedures Concerning the Negotiation of Trusteeship Agreements.“ April i i, I946. ibid.. 567-568. 55 See Memorandum of Conversation by Hickerson. May 24, I946. FA’MS l946. l:589. See also Hickerson to Byrnes, February 23. I 946. Ibid. 562. l87 I! 31‘:- \ ... u t y 2... £616.93. .. a .55.. \LFP. \ f—Yéu. _ “i=3. a:— 0.2.3.. z...oc . ..qu. ......E1 2.. .0 50:5... 5:! .lI-b Saigon alts-7.19 (.4<¢bm3< 188 Figure 35. The South Pacific (Courtesy Of the National N‘CNVCS ll, College Park, Maryland) war Pacific assumed some cooperation between the western Allies in ad- ministering the area, but the authors completely excluded the Soviet Union from the administration of Pacific territory.67 For example, in planning for trusteeships over Micronesia, the Ryukyus, the Bonins, the Australian Man- date (Northeastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Admiralty Islands, Bougainville, and Buka), the New Zealand Mandate (Western Samoa), and the British Mandate (Naura Island), SWNCC was willing to consider a number of nations as “states directly concerned," including China, the Phili- ppines, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. How- ever, the document continually strove to keep the number of states concem- ed as limited as possible and the Soviet Union was the obvious missing great power in the list of nations since it did not appear as a state directly concerned in any of the Pacific trusteeships!58 (See Figure 35) In fact, detailed instructions about limiting the number of states directly involved were delivered the next month from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Benjamin Gerig, Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Gerig was told that in any negotiations with other Allied powers over trusteeships, especially the British, the French, and the Bel- gians, the US desired to keep the number of states directly concerned to an absolute minimum!)9 In addition, Gerig was told that “geographic propinqui- ty" should have nothing to do with this criterion, that the US merely wanted to be “consulted“ about the other trusteeships, and that the US desired to 67 See Annex to Appendix “A“, part of "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific,” May 24. l946.JCS I6l9/l .swncc 59.5wucc Papers.RG 353. NA 68 mm 69$eeAeheeon to Gerig,June 7. I946, Haw i946. uses-see. l89 stress “informal consultations" about trusteeships matters rather than of- ficial deliberations in the Security Council or General Assembly.70 An example of Soviet-American friction over these matters occurred in June I946 when Dulles asserted to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the ”states directly concerned” in the Micronesian trusteeship were the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, since those three nations were the remaining victorious Allied and Associated Powers from the Treaty of Versaillesi Gromyko countered that the USSR was directly concerned in all trusteeship matters and, in fact, in any political, economic, or geographic problem in the world. Dulles, however, argued that the State Department did not consider a nation directly concerned merely because of geographic propinquity. While he was not prepared at the time to pursue these “technical details" further, the objective of excluding the USSR from any possible voice in the Micronesian negotiations was apparent and it would reappear repeatedly throughout the negotiation process.71 This at- tempted limitation of the ”states directly concerned" as the basis for the US position in the Pacific reached an extreme In August 1946 when Acheson in- structed John Minter, the US (ca/ye” in Australia, to inform the Australian government that the US desired to be the sole state directly concerned with the former Japanese Mandates after ”consultation“ with other "interested states."72 70 Ibid. 7' See Dulles' rendition of the conversation with Gromyko in ”Minutes of the Informal Meeting of the United States Group on Trusteeship.“ June i7. l946, mus l946, l:555. 72 SeeAchesonto Minter.August 29, 1946, few l946, l:6|7. l90 The Pacific Islands and Soviet-American Relations The Soviet Union was the primary target of limiting the “states dir- ectly concerned.“ In spite of these efforts to exclude the USSR from Pacific Islands affairs, however, Pacific Island trusteeships and Soviet-American relations became intertwined in a number of areas. As early as November I944, the US position on postwar Micronesia became indirectly involved with the Soviet Union‘s interests in Europe. At that time, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed the Norwegian goverment-in-exiie's foreign minister that the USSR wanted an outright claim to Bear Island and a Soviet-Norwegian condominium over Spitsbergen Archipelago in order to guarantee postwar Soviet lines of communication north of Norway. When questioned about this request by the Norwegian minister, Molotov asserted there should be no problem with the request since the United States was doing the same sort of thing with the former Japanese Mandates in the Paci- f ic.73 Interestingly, some American planners during the war sawsimilar opportunities in linking American control over Micronesia with Soviet spheres of influence in eastern Europe. In particular, Army Lieutenant Gen- eral Stanley Embick, wartime chairman of the JSSC, pointed out in l944 the possibility of a aw‘dpro qua between the United States and the Soviet Union over Micronesia and eastern Europe, respectively. The JSSC even urged American officials to agree to cross-channel operations into France and So- viet postwar control of eastern Europe in return for Soviet entry into the 73 See conversation between Molotov and the Norwegian Foreign Minister in "Paraphrase of Top Secret Telegram No. 204.” July 5, I 945. American Ambassador. Oslo. to the Secretary of State. as found in Appendix ”A" of SWNCC 159/2, part of SWNCC i59. “Soviet Demands on Norway's Jan Mayen Island. Bear Island. and Spitzbergen Archipelago, July I945-Feb. I 947, SWNCC Pmers. SWAw‘Po/ig/Fi/as I944- I947: I977. 19] war against Japan and postwar American hegemony in the Pacific Basin.74 It would appear, however, that Embick and the JSSC were an anomaly at this time. Most planners and policymakers would not have wanted US actions in the Pacific to be approximated to those of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe given the possibly disastrous consequences for domestic political opinion from such a linkage. John Dower believes the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, expended considerable energy attempting to draw a parallel between Soviet control in eastern Europe and American control in Japan and the Pacific. Dower offers as evidence Soviet efforts to establish an Allied control com- mission in Japan which would have safeguarded American control over that country in return for American acquiescence to Soviet control of the comm- issions in eastern Europe?5 Furthermore, Dower asserts that Byrnes and Molotov came to an understanding in December I945 over Micronesia and the Kurile-Sakhalin area which complemented the Yalta Agreement made by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin the previous February. Dower thinks the United States and the Soviet Union were able to come to an agreement be- cause of their indulgence in “security imperialism,” a type of imperialism undertaken primarily for reasons of military security, not economic exploit- ation, which allowed the superpowers to realize their own geostrategic goals while continuing to criticize the European colonial powers for failing 7" For the JSSC analysis. see “Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlement,” JCS 973 and 973/1 ,July 28, I944 and August 4. I944. file 7-27-44, CCS 092, R6 2 i 8, NA. as found in Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick. the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military Vigegzo; Agnegican National Policy during the Second World War ." Dab/amm- literary 6 (Summer I I I ; I 75 See Dower. “Occupied Japan,“ i48- i 64. l92 to grant independence to their subject areas?6 The label of security impe- rialism may be apt, but there is evidence which contradicts Dower's claims about Soviet efforts at a aw‘dpro 400 or an understanding between Byrnes and Molotov as early as December 1945. Contradicting Dower's assertions, primary sources illustrate that US-Soviet relations clashed on several oc- casions when it came to the future of the Pacific Basin. Marc Gallicchio has also done much of the groundbreaking work con- cerning Soviet-American relations in northeast Asia, especially the contro- versy over the Kurile-Sakhalin area. (See Figure 36) But Gallicchio's work does not focus on Micronesia and does not explore the possibilities that some sort of aw'dpro 400 may have existed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the two areas.77 The controversy over the control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area emphasizes the importance of the Pacific to the United States and suggests a new light in which to view American percep- tions of Micronesia. This section will attempt to carry on Dower's and Gallicchio‘s work and analyze the way in which the two areas became inter- dependent in the minds of American strategic planners in the late I940s. By I946, the JSSC, which had implied during the war that an oppor- tunity for a aUI'dp/‘o qua existed between the United States and the Soviet Union over Micronesia and eastern Europe, claimed that sentiment in the country was no longer conducive to altruistic ideas about international tru- steeship in the islands and that opinion was moving toward unilateral an- nexation. The JSSC left no doubts as to why this change had occurred when it stated that an example of unilateral annexation already existed in the So- 76 ibid. For the idea of "security imperialism ," see Eleanor Lattimore, ”Pacific Ocean or American Lake?” Frfasternwrrw l4( November 7. I945): 3i3-3i6. 77 See Gallicchio. fbew/dWarflegins Wis/b. 3. S. 9. IO. 7l . 78. 80-82. and 86-88: see also Gallicchio. ”The Kuriles Controversy." 69- l O 1. I93 In. ... not a . outdo... ....I.......g Figure 36. The Japanese Home islands And The Kuriles (Courtesy of Marc S. Gallicchio) I94 viet acquisition of the Kurile Islands.78 The JCS, long opposed to a trustee- ship in Micronesia, also used Soviet control over the Kuriles to argue against offering Micronesia as an intemationai trusteeship. They asserted that American moral leadership in the United Nations would suffer if the United States cynically offered the islands for a trusteeship in which vir- tual American control was assured anyway. The Joint Chiefs claimed that if the United States simply took control on the grounds that the islands were of vital strategic importance, much as the Soviet Union had done in the Kur- iles, then American prestige in the UN would not be damaged.79 in reality, the JOIN Chiefs were hardly concerned With America‘s position w's-a‘-w‘5 the United Nations, as is apparent from their attacks on the trusteeship concept and the UN‘s alleged inability to protect American interests in the Pacific. They were interested in ensuring long-term Ameri- can security in the Pacific and they were willing to violate previous agree- ments and rhetoric about internationalism to achieve this goal. Neverthe- less, their argument Indicates the frustration they must have felt at having to witness the United States being subjected to international controls in Micronesia while the Soviet Union received a free hand in the Kurile- Sakhalin area. More importantly, these officers saw Micronesia in the context of rising tensions with the Soviet Union. They perceived strategic threats from the Soviet submarine fleet and land-based air force in the Far East, threats facilitated by unilateral Soviet control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area. In addition, they warned that the Soviet Union might be able to complement 78 See "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,“ Jcs 570/48, January l7, l946, file l2-9-42 sec. 28. cos 360. no 218. NA. 79 See Annex to Appendix “A”, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific.” May 24. I946, JCS i6i9/i , SWNCC S9, SWNCC Papers. RG 353. NA. I95 these assets by utilizing strategic facilities in northern China and southern Korea. To American military off icers, the best way to contain the Soviet threat in East Asia was to take direct control of Micronesia, use the islands as part of a deterrence system in time of peace, and develop the islands as a strategic basing system for deep strikes Into Soviet territory in the event of war. As 1946 wore on, Soviet unilateral control of the Kurile-Sakhalin area and protests over American fortification rights in Micronesia created an even more determined call in the United States for the direct annexation of Micronesia. Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, for instance, said " . . . it would be 'absurd' to talk about placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gaining complete control of the Kuriles.“3° in spite of these American lnsinuations of bad faith, the Soviets successfully deflected all efforts by the United States to obtain occupation or base rights in the Kurile-Sakhalin area. prevented the Kuriles from being established as a UN trusteeship, and continued to “intrude“ into Micronesian affairs. Soviet actions seemed particularly threatening when the USSR tried to establish itself as a “state directly concerned“ with the negotiations over the strategic trust territory of Micronesia and attempted to “interfere" in the clauses granting the United States unilateral military fortification rights in the Pacific Islands!” Not only were these actions completely con- trary to American wishes but to American officials they seemed particular- ly threatening. The United States complained that too many restrictions 30 For Byrd‘s statement. see "The Report of the Special Senate (Mead) Committee Investigating the National Defense Program ," August 31, 1946. quoted by Captain Lorenzo Sabin, January 22. l946. as found in Richard, Unitaimasllbiwmmistmm, Vol. 3. 16; see also Gale. Illa mmeetm o/mm’a 59. 8' See Memorandum by Dulles. November 30. 1946. few l946. 1:690-692. I96 were being placed on its administration in the Pacific, that the Soviets had a free hand in the Kuriles, and that the United States should have similar rights for itself in Micronesia.82 A December 1946 conversation between Byrnes and Molotov indicates the intensity of the stimulus-response men- tality which poisoned Soviet-American relations over the two areas. The conversation should also dispel any notion that efforts at accommodation were taking place at this time. Molotov told Byrnes that the Soviet Union had to be consulted about any US plans to fortify the Pacific islands. Byrnes responded that he wanted to know what the Soviets proposed to do with the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Molotov said these islands were not open to discussion because they were part of a former agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. Byrnes retorted that he regarded nothing as being subjected to previous agree- ments. Each time Molotov brought up the subject of fortifications in Micro- nesia. Byrnes inquired into Soviet Intentions in the Kuriles and Sakhalin.“ Byrnes later recounted this conversation to Forrestal and said that he was in no great hurry to see a trusteeship agreement consummated. His words imply that he was content to let the Soviet Union and the UN deal with a unilateral American consolidation in Micronesia. Subsequent to Byrnes' as- sertion, F orrestal expressed the view that " . . . any negotiations with Russia had to be predicated upon a thorough awareness of the unbending determination of the Russians to accomplish world Communizatioan‘I 82 ibid. 33 For the Byrnes-Molotov dialogue, see f/vfa'mta/wrles December 16, 1946. See also Richard. Unitao’Slates Item/Adm'msrraflmflol. 3, 28-29. Byrnes' determination not to be ”rushed” into any trusteeship agreement with the Soviet Union can also be found in Me formic! oer/as. December I6, 1946. 34 For Forrestal's linkage of the debate over the Kurile-Sakhalin area to alleged Soviet global pretensions, see The reverie/Diaries: January 21 . 1947. I97 Other geographic areas became similarly linked with the American position on Micronesia and negotiations suggest Soviet-American connec- tions between the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. For example, the So- viet Union proposed in May 1946 that it be given a unilateral trusteeship over Tripolitania (now Libya), one of the conquered territories taken from Italy at the end of the war. The JCS believed that, at most, the Soviets might be granted partial participation, but not sole administration, and so they might use this rebuff to oppose sole American trusteeship over the Japanese Mandates. Given this probability, the JCS argued that the US would be justified in annexing Micronesia in order to guarantee its Pacific position and that the US should use the precedent set by the USSR in refusing to offer the Kuriles for trusteeship as a means of defending itself against any inter- national criticismiBS Later, the Soviet position was modified during a conversation be- tween Dulles and Gromyko. Gromyko offered that the Soviet Union be con- sidered a “state directly concerned" over the disposition of the former Ital- ian colonies and Japan's Pacific territories in return for relinquishing simi- lar status over British, French, and Belgian mandates in Africa. In addition, Gromyko intimated that the USSR would be willing to relinquish this status over the mandates in New Guinea, but that they were very concerned with unilateral American fortification rights in Micronesia. Dulles linked unila- teral Soviet fortification rights in the Kuriles to a similar position for the US in Micronesia but apparently no agreement was reached on this im- passe.86 The incident, however, represents how central trusteeship matters 65 ibid. See also Edward J. Sheehy. I/ie (lm‘fav’S/afas/ibm the Nm'l'fwrm, aim/2e aw War, l945- l947tWestport. Connecticut: Greendwood Press. 1992). 21 . 26. and 2e. 86 See Memorandum by Dulles. November 30. 1946, Few 1946, 1:690-692. I98 could become to Soviet-American relations. To the Soviet leadership, the American position was probably an attempt to build bases in the USSR's “backyard” under a UN facade. To the Americans, the Soviet proposals were probably attempts tO ”interfere" in areas WhiCh the USSR had not. helped to liberate from the Japanese and which were of obvious strategic value to the US. Other issues became prevalent during the winter of 1946-1947. By the fall of 1946, Truman, though still uncertain about the efficacy of trust- eeship, was unwilling to annex Micronesia and he wanted the trusteeship issues solved quickly.87 Public opinion may have accounted for this change in attitude. Numerous letters and endorsements throughout 1946 from ma- jor American personalities and organizations, including the Congress of In- dustriai Organizations, the Lions International, the National League of Wom- en Voters, the Rotary International, and Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts in his capacity as President of the United Nations Council of Phila- delphia, are filed in Truman‘s papers, all calling for the US to place the Japanese islands under UN trusteeship. it is possible that the lack of a uni- fied policy between the executive departments and the apparent discrepancy between wartime rhetoric and postwar reality was beginning to catch up with Truman in the fall of 1946.38 Yet it is difficult to believe that American public opinion alone could have forced Truman to opt for strategic trusteeship. Lester Foltos argues that Truman had always had a prediliction for a UN solution to American se- curity anxieties in the Pacific and that he found the idea of unilateral terri- 87 See “Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation." October 25. 1946, new I946, I:66 I. 33 For an example of these letters and the lists of endormments. see file OF 8S-L. box 572. White House Official F iles, HSTL. I99 torial annexation to be “repugnant”. Unfortunately, the sources which Foltos cites are actually JCS documents which do not indicate Truman‘s opinions about the UN. F orrestal's and John Towers' September 1946 diary entries, if accurate, would tend to cast doubt on Foltos' conclusion about Truman's prediliction for a UN solution. In addition, Truman's endorsement of Byrnes' “wait and see“ policy concerning Japan and its territories and Truman's own answers to critics of military rule in the Pacific islands suggest that he had little trouble “handling” public opinion which was critical of his poli- eyes There are three other possible explanations for Truman's behavior. First, it could be that Truman had so many higher priority items to deal with that the Pacific islands took the proverbial back seat for most of 1946. After all, the islands were securely in American military hands and nothing would have changed that fact. The US could simply wait for developments which would help or hinder its position in the Pacific and East Asia and then decide on a course of action. Second, Truman may have shifted from his “wait and see” policy in the fall of 1946 because negotiations were stale- mating in the UN due to the lack of a coherent American policy. While cer- tainly concerned with American public opinion, he may have been more con- cerned with the US' emerging global image as an Imperial power stalling the UN process. Finally, by the f all of 1946, Truman had waited to see what the postwar disposition over the European Axis territories would be. Instead of a rapid settlement over the disposition of Germany, the western Allies and 3'9 See Truman's responses to critical inquiries by Anna Lord Strauss. President of the National League of Women Voters and W.L. White. editor and owner of the [mm/a mm of Emporia. Kansas. both dated February 2. 1946 and both found in file 0F 85-L. box 572, White House Official F iles, HSTL. See also. Foltos. ”The New Pacific Barrier.“ 328. F inally, see the Towers Diary. September 30. I946. folder 1 . box 2. Papers of John Towers. Manuscript Division. Library of Guineas, Washington. DC. 200 the Soviet Union had taken to haggling over reparations, postwar boundaries, and other issues related to a divided Germany. It is not difficult to envision Truman suspecting Soviet plans for dividing postwar Japan and its Pacific territories in a similar manner. Fully suspicous of Soviet intentions by the fall of 1946, Truman probably decided that there would be no early multila- teral peace treaty with Japan and that therefore the status of Its terri- tories would have to be established first. This last possibility would explain why in October 1946 American planners suddenly created and published a "Draft Trusteeship Aggreement" for the former Japanese Mandates and presented it to the Security Council for approval. The Soviets were quite disturbed by this unilateral action and communicated to Dulles their dissatisfaction with what they considered to be an American a fail accomp/z' The Soviets also stated that they did not wish to see the US carry out similar actions in regard to other Pacific Is- lands being considered f or trusteeship, such as Okinawa.9° Still, similar attempts at unilateral or near unilateral solutions to trusteeship matters continued on the part of the US. Dulles assured the British government in the same month, for example, that the US would not conduct private agreements or even prior consultations with the Soviets concerning the former Japanese Mandates or the ltalian colonies. Apparent- ly, the British were concerned with what they considered Soviet and Chinese “interference” in the negotiations of the italian trusteeships and Dulles was concerned with similar ”intrusions“ into the disposition of the Ryukyu ls- 90 See the memorandum by Alger Hise. Director of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs, to Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. December 6, 1946, HMS 1946. 1:701. See also Captain Robert Dennison. Assistant Chief of Naval Omrations (ACNO) for Politico-Military Affairs, to Forrestal . January 22, 1947, file 2-1-7, box 14, RG 80, NA. 201 lands.91 The document suggests, therefore, that In spite of Soviet protests some American officials were prepared to submit a similar kind of draft trusteeship agreement for Okinawa without prior Security Council consulta- tions. By February 1947, the Soviets acquiesced to US demands for trustee- ship over the Japanese Mandates and agreed that it would not have to await the signing of a comprehensive Japanese Peace Treaty. Inis Claude believes the USSR agreed to the unilateral American draft because the probable re- sult of continued protest would have been American annexation anyway, a situation in which the Soviets would have had absolutely no voice.” Though speculation, it may also be that Soviet knowledge of US support in the Gen- eral Assembly or fear of “unilateral“ trusteeship agreements over other areas considered more important may have given the SOVICtS the incentive to recognize the American a fail swamp/I.“ Most likely, however, the Soviets ceased to resist the idea of a pre- peace treaty trusteeship agreement because they were able to suggest changes to the draft which, if rebuffed, could lead to renewed charges of American imperialism in the Pacific. The US draft had counted on the is- lands being considered “ . . . an integral part of the United States.“ The Draft Trusteeship Agreement also stated the goal of assisting the islands in “self-government“ and asserted that the US would be the sole administering power over Micronesia with authority to veto changes to the terms of the 9' See Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles, Gerig, and Ivor Thomas of the United Kingdom, December 7, I946, FRI/51946, 1:703-704. 92 For the Soviet note to the United States government which inreed to the American conditions, see Soviet Ambassador to the United States NV. Novikum to the Secretary of State. February 29. 1947. file 2-1-7. box 14. RG 80. NA; 598 also Claim. MlnfoP/olm 373-374. 202 trusteeship.” The Soviets proposed deleting the phrase “as an integral part of the United States,“ sought to replace ”self government“ as the goal with that of “independence,“ and wanted to vest authority to change trusteeship agreements in the Security Council, not the administering authority.94 Since the JCS and other military planning bodies were still voicing concerns about the trusteeship system because of the US‘ potential future loss of veto powers and since military planners never believed the islands would be independent anyway, the US was at first only willing to consider the first Soviet proposal on Micronesia‘s exclusion as an integral part of the US.95 By the time the Micronesian trusteeship agreement was signed in April i947 and established in July 1947, however, the US had agreed to eli- minate the phrase "as an integral part of the United States“ and the agree- ment was amended to include ”independence” as an eventual political goal. in all likelihood, the US agreed to these changes because the nature of the strategic trusteeship agreement was basically synonomous with annexation anyway. However, American reservations about the concept of trusteeship and concerns about its future position in the UN never fully subsided, as evi- denced by the fact that the US retained sole rights over changes to the trusteeship agreement until the 19905.96 93 For the complete “Draft Trusteeship Agrwment" and the accompanying articles, see Press Release #142, February 25, 1947. file 2-1-7. box 14. RG 80. NA 94 For the Soviet amendments, see ”United States Position 0n Soviet Propomls For Amendment Of Draft Trusteeship Agreement.“ JCS 1619/20. March 3, 1947,1119 12-9-42 sec. 29. cos 360, R0 218. NA. 95 ibid. 95 See Nufer, Him/a umAmr/m Ala/e mim; and Jain Dorranca. M9 00/760670th f/ian/flc Islands ( Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 1992). 89-90. 203 "Territorial Aggrandizement' American concerns over being labelled an imperial power by the Sov- iet Union provide a final fascinating window through which to view to So- viet-American relations in the Pacific region. The possibility of accusa- tions was considered important by American planners, but official thoughts on the subject again illustrate the low priority intemationai cooperation and UN processes had for many American officials. Primary documents show that the United States was fully determined to gain control over the west- ern Pacific and exercise a regional hegemony over the Pacific Basin no mat- ter the objectives of other nations in the region. While trusteeship was be- ing used to deflect charges of imperialism from other nations, sources illu- strate that acquiring control over the area was the primary objective. How- ever, Soviet charges of imperialism were taken seriously by American offi- cials because of the perceived damage which could have been done to the US' international prestige if its adherence to UN principles appeared Janus-fac- ed in any way. For example, US concerns over being branded an imperial power seem- ed confirmed in March 1946 when the 50w?! Journal of Worldfconom/cs and World Politics insinuated that whatever power controlled Micronesia would have aggressive intentions in the Pacific. Though the article admitted that Germany was not able to use the islands for aggressive purposes in the Pac- if ic, linking the perceived villain of the First World War with control of the islands seemed to set the stage for accusing the US of imperial intent in its future control of Micronesia.” in addition, the article linked Japan's pos- session of Micronesia to the disruption of world peace. Though this was a 97 For Forrestal’s copy of the article and the naval some analysis of it. see "Russia- Pacific islands.“ Formerly/Dixie; March 27, 1946. 204 point most American strategic planners would have agreed with, the article then intimated that future prospects for world peace would be endangered by American control of the strategic islands. The American naval attache in Moscow reported that the article was probably the prelude to a propagan- da offensive against the US in which the Soviets would demand military withdrawal by the U393 Likewise. in November 1946. the US Ambassador and coacoe‘ in Moscow both reported to Byrnes that Soviet charges by Pravda of imperialism in the Pacific were geared toward branding the US as a militant power planning for aggrandizement in East Asia, not merely mak- ing the Pacific into a defensive buffer zone.99 Succinctly summing up American attitudes toward the whole issue, John Foster Dulles claimed in the same month that the really important matter at stake in the Pacific was not the establishment of successful tru- steeships but the guarantee of American strategic security while avoiding the charges of “colonialism“ by the Soviets. In fact, Dulles had stated that the US was fully determined to take control of Micronesia for strategic pur- poses with or without UN approval.l°° Apparently, the primary objective from the perspective of American policymakers and planners was not avoid- ing the practice 01 Imperialism but avoiding the indictment by other na- tlonlel 98 ibid. 99 See the Ww‘ to the Secretary of State. November I2. 1946. new 1946. 1:679-680. See also the Ambassador to the Secretary of State, November 21 . i946. ibid.. 681 -682. 100 For Dulles' assessment of the political situation, see “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Hiss,” November 1 , i946, ibid, 669. For Dulles' statement about American unilateral control over Micronesia. see James H. Webb. Jr.. filb/‘MIUMMS Puma/mm Amateur/hirer Me 19605 (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1974). 79. '0' For intimations that the American people would not favor ”lining up" with the ”imperial powers" in the UN, see ”Minutes of the Twenty- Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation." November 21 , 1946, new 1946, 1:684-685. 205 Conclusion Between 1945 and 1947, the United States attempted and largely succeeded in establishing a unilateral sphere of strategic influence in the Pacific islands. Though strategic trusteeship through the United Nations was a second best solution to many military planners and officials, the US nevertheless succeeded in obtaining intemationai recognition of an essen- tially imperial solution to its anxieties about postwar strategic security. The international relations which the Pacific Islands became part of between 1945 and i947 illustrated that American concerns for postwar se- curity focused primary on Japan and then the Soviet Union as the future “enemy“ in the region. Just as significantly, however, American of f iciais demonstrated that no other nation, not even the closest of wartime allies, was above suspicion when it came to the US having a free hand to recon- struct the Pacific for its own purposes. Moreover, to most officials, American security meant not having to rely on the United Nations, great power cooperation, or collective security to uphold the postwar order. By opting for strategic trusteeship, US policy- makers on numerous occasions violated the spirit, if not the letter, of war- time Wilsonlan and Rooseveltian rhetoric about national self -determination, the efficacy of intemationai law. and multilateral solutions to future secu- rity dilemmas. Of course, all nations involved in these processes exhibit a Janus-faced quality to their foreign policies. In addition, it is easy to ex- plain American actions once they are set in the context of Interwar and wartime events. But there was little, If any, recognition on the part of American officials that strategic trusteeship, because it came so close to unilateralgannexation, was itself a subtle subversion of the American- created United Nations Organization. 206 Chapter Five An 'Open Door" in the Pacific?: American Strategic Security and Economic Policy toward the Pacific Islands The US' imperial consolidation of the postwar Paolfic also included a significant economic dimension since economic control over the region was seen an inseparable strand of a broad, multidimensional national security policy. There are three aspects of this economic dimension to American pol- icy wnich are important for historians who are attempting to decipher US actions in the area during the origins of the Cold War. First, American perceptions of strategic security did not just entail military control over the Pacific Basin. Physical military control over the strategic islands was not divorced in policymakers and planners' minds from economic penetration of the region and control over its resources, har- bors, and airfields. Even military officers, strategic thinkers, and members of Congress who believed the islands held more exp10itatlve potential than high level planners did recognized that policymakers sought to penetrate the regional economy first and foremost for reasons of physical control and security, not economic exploitation per 59. Second, American policymakers and planners sought to define the meaning of the word "imperialism" along very narrow economic lines in 207 order to repel charges by other nations that the US was indulging in “terri- torial aggrandizement.” These individuals also sought to deny charges of imperialism by claiming that intemationai motives of global postwar peace and prosperity, rather than national sources of strategic insecurity, spurred the US to take control of the islands. Third, American economic policy in the postwar Pacific Islands was an exception to postwar American protestations of free trade and “Open Doorism.“ The Pacific Basin represented one area of the world in which the US did not attempt a free trade approach to postwar reconstruction.‘ While some State Department personnel argued for open areas of trade in parts of I Many historians agree that the Truman Aaninistration's foreim economic policies were oriented toward “globalizing" the Open Door. Historians disagree. however. on motive, intent. and result. Most New Left historians, such as William Appleman Williams, Lloyd Gardner. Gabriel Kolko. Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick. see American economic policy in very conspirational terms and perceive policy as a response to capitalistic greed, the interests of the American business elite. and a desire for global economic hegemony. See Williams. 7776’ Irma/America? Diplomacw New York: WW. Norton 8t Company . 1972); Gardner. fmfm/cmtsofm Dee/Dialer)” (Madison. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. I 964): Kolko. foe Pol/tics of Wan f/ie War/dam (lo/mam; Fae/m Policy, I943- I945 (New York: Pantheon Books. 1968): LaFeber. Mower/mm: Uzi/(wastes Fats/pr Policy of heme MMrwo’simr 1750 (New York: WW. Norton & Comme. I 989); and McCormick. Amev’cak/b/f-cmwry. Moderate revisionists. such as Thomas Paterson. and corporatists. such as Michael Hogan. argue that while American foreign economic policy was intellectually grounm in liberal trade doctrine. this doctrine was more a means to the goal of a strategically secure and prosperous postwar America. See Paterson, .SoV/ef-Amer/m CW/rmtatim- Partner Rmtrwflm m the wig”): oft/Ia Cir/diver (Baltimore. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and H006". My Nara/2a” pm Amer/bu. Brita/n. aid the rmstrwf/m of Western fumes, 1947- 1952 (Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press. 1987). F inallv. Dost—revisionsts. such as William Roger Louis. Emily Rosenberg. Robert Pollard. and Melvyn Leffler, assert that postwar American policy was free trade in nature but that economic power was just one of several "national security tools" available to American policymakers in their attempt to “remake" the world in the late l 9405. See Louis. Imperial/en of day; Rosenberg. Screw/lg (MA/prim 0m ; Pol lard, [We warm/AM ”76' mam Off/1e arid War ; and Leffier , A PWmo/PW. in spite of their disagreements over intent and emphasis. none of these historians questions the idea of an American promotion of free trade on a global basis after 1945. When it comes to most regions of the world. this author agrees with their syntheses'. However. American policy toward the Pacific Basin was the exception to this Open Door rule. One part of this exception was Philippine policy. which was an attempt at a unilateral economic integration rather than free trade multilateralism; see Nick Cullather, "The Limits of Multilaterialism: Méaléing ngcyégor the Philippines. 1945-1950.“ Inwmflm/fiisfwykmew 13 (February I I : - . 208 Micronesia. most American policymakers and planners had no intention of leaving the Pacific Islands ”open“ to foreign merchants of any nationality because of their perception that foreign economic penetration could be a forerunner t0 the subversion Of an American administration. The Historiographical Context For the most part, historians trying to explain American economic policy in the 19403 have either determined that the US supported a global free trade doctrine as a natural and devious capitalistic attempt to gain economic hegemony over the world2 or that American policymakers tried to use American economic power and the principles of the Open Door to secure various intemationai strategic goals and to support domestic postwar pros- perity.3 With but one exception,4 historians have not explored unilateral American policy toward the Pacific Basin as an anomaly to the rule of a glo- bal, multilateral free trade policy. Most policymakers and planners, how- ever, were advocating the construction of a closed economic zone in the Pa- cific and American policy within this vein represents another exception to the historiographical rule that post- i 945 American global policy was con- sistently based on principles of collective security, free trade, and national self -determination. Similarly, most of the historiographical literature dealing with the postwar American occupation of the western Pacific has narrowly concen- trated on military security matters.5 In a major historiographical depar- 2 See Williams, frmVafAmm/mofp/anxy; Gardner. [mole/130x15; Kolko. World Pal/7i“; LaFeber, ffleAmen’mMpe; and McCormick. Ame'IwSAe/f-mw/y. 3 See Rosenberg. Spraying ”BMW/M 0mm; Pollard. [mic mrfgz; and Leffler, PWma/PW. 4 See Cullather. “Limits of Multilateral ism .“ 70-95. 5 For just example of this literature. see Pomeroy. Paw/camber, passim. 209 ture, William Roger Louis has suggested that the islands were not viewed by American officials in a strict military sense, but that American policymak- ers and planners during the Pacific War sought postwar control of the is- lands as a means to guarantee a comprehensive, widespread, and multidi- mensional strategic security over the lines of communication to East Asia.6 The islands themselves were not seen as an economic boon but were per- ceived as a strategic link between North America and East Asia.7 American Exceptionalism and the Postwar Pacific US policymakers attempts to cast great power imperialism with as narrow a definition as possible demonstrated that post- i 945 expansion into the Pacific Basin represented both changes and continuities with earlier periods of American westward expansion. Similar to continental expansion in the 18005. Americans in the mid-19403 argued that US actions were ex- ceptional and did not entail imperialism or ”territorial aggrandizement." Expansionists in the nineteenth century, however, asserted that the US' col- onial roots and republican political system prevented It from becoming an imperialistlc nation.8 American policymakers and planners in the 1940s instead linked imperialism to economic exploitation rather than the nature of a nation's political system. The American assumption of complete economic control over Micro- nesia in 1944-45 and the repatriation of all East Asians by the end of 1947 was taken as a logical step toward ensuring American strategic security in the region. Given the degree or control which the Japanese had exercised 3 See Louis. mama/m May. 68-69. ibid. 8 See Hietala, Nmrrertoesm i 73-214. 210 over the Micronesian economy,9 economic control and repatriation were seen as a necessary means by which to eradicate Japanese influence from the is- lands. Moreover, Commander Dorothy Richard cites the JCS‘ repatriation order as evidence that security and not exploitation were paramount in American priorities. By removing all Japanese, Taiwanese, Okinawans, and Koreans from the islands, the Navy effectively removed the professional and skilled classes of interwar Japanese Micronesia,IO making it impossible to recreate the "artificial, capitalistic type of prewar economy” after 1946." The idea that American motivation was based on military security and not economic expoitation, in fact, became the main argument for American policymakers and planners who asserted that America's sphere in the post- war Pacific was inherently different from the European and Japanese impe- rialism of the past or the perceived Soviet imperialism of the present. Still. the fact of the matter was that US acquisition of the islands made Charges of “territorial aggrandizement“ by other nations very likely. This possibility prompted numerous officials to make interesting justifications about American control. These justifications reveal distinct attitudes to- ward the definition of imperialism, the role which economic exploitation plays in that phenomenon, and the recurring idea of American exceptional- ism in international relations. There was a widespread attitude among American officials that since the islands had a small population, were sparse in resources, and were commercially “primitive,“ US control did not 9 For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon. see Peattie, new. i 18- 152. '0 See Richard, Unlim'smw Miriam/winner, Vol. 2. 406. See also Dirk A Ballentbrf, ”The Japanese And The Americans: Contrasting Historical Periods Of Economic And Social Development In Paleu.“ charm/afiflapxifl‘c 500/190! (October 1988): i l ;and idem. “An Historical Perspective on Economic Develooment in Micronesia, i 783 to 1945 ." Asian ail/ture (Asian- Px/f/z' Culture?) mortar/y I 9 (Summer 1991): 54. 1' See Richard. Uniiafliafas Abra/ministration, Vol. 2. 406. 211 constitute “imperialism“ in the traditional European sense of the term be- cause the economic exploitation of a significant indigenous population was not taking place. This mindset was enunciated by numerous officials at many levels of the policymaking bureaucracy. For example, as early as June 1944 Admiral Harry Yarnell, Head of the OPNAV Special Planning Office for Postwar Demobilization, argued that the American acquisition of the Japanese Mandated Islands should not be con- sidered a violation of the August 1941 Atlantic Charter and should not set a precedent for unilaterial territorial annexations by other nations since the islands ” . . . have little commercial value and their maintenance would be a continuous source of expense."'2 The idea that the United States was not indulging in traditional imperialism because of a lack of apparent economic motive in Micronesia was asserted more clearly by Secretary of War Stimson in January 1945. Stimson added to Yamell‘s argument by claiming that US actions were not self-serving but were meant to provide stability and security for all nations in the Pacific Basin. Arguing to then-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Stimson stated that the islands should not be regarded as colonies but rather as ”defense posts“ necessary to the nation responsible for security in the area. Stimson then suggested that the United States was merely keeping the islands “in trust“ for the world and not for any national advantage.” Stimson and Forrestal again used this narrow notion of imperialism to argue to President Truman in April 1945 that US actions in Micronesia would not consititute imperialism by any standard of measurement. Like ‘2 See Admiral Harry E. Yarnell. “Memorandum on Post-War Far Eastern Situation,“ June I6. 1944, file “Intelligence. A8.“ box 195. Strategic Plans. 0A. NHC. ‘4 See Richard. (in/wastes Able/Adm'msrrai/m Vol. 2. 62: did "Trusteeships." March 30. 1945, file Fa‘res'ia/ Diaries 212 Yarnell, both men stated that the islands held no commercial value and would be a burden on the United States treasury. Both men also used this argument to conclude that there was a “fundamental difference" between the American trusteeship in Micronesia and the trusteeships being established in other nations’ colonies throughout the world. The secretaries subse- quently suggested to Truman that this difference should be emphasized to the UN as a way to lobby for comprehensive American control over the re- gion.8 Later, during the House hearings on Navy appropriations for F iscai Year 1946, F orrestal expounded on the idea that imperialism required eco- nomic motives and that American control over Micronesia did not constitute that type of situation. He claimed that the islands were nothing but " . . . sandspits in the Pacific . . . ", that they represented no great economic as- set. and therefore were “ . . . quite different from the acquisition of territory in the old imperial sense.“15 In August 1946, Forrestal even convinced Truman to keep the United States Commercial Company (USCC) under Reconstruction Finance Corpora- tion (RFC) auspices, rather than Navy control, in order to repel charges of economic aggrandizement. Charles Henderson, Chairman of the Board of the RFC. wanted the USCC transferred back to the Navy Department since the USCC. the postwar heir to the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) and 3 See “Memorandum for the President.“ April 13, 1945. fivfwmta/Dia'ia Truman may have been convinced by these arguments since he stated in July I 945 that the US was not fimting for territory or anything of a “monetary nature.“ While he refused to countenance the idea of annexing Micronesia in the end, he nevertheless supported the idea of retaining the islands on a sovereign basis until the United Nations was “fully established.“ In addition, he completely supported the idea of “strategic trusteeship ," which was virtually annexation in all but name. Sea Tom lreland, ”Will We Claim Pacific islands?”, file 48- 1-24, box 90. RG 80. NA. See also Foltos, “The New Pacific Barrier.” 317-342; and ”The President-Bases.“ September 30. 1946. file Forrestal Diaries. '5 See US Congress. House Committee on Appropriations. mmtmmwprwnaam 527m l946: hear/7w mm (he Sum/iriiteemApprmriai/m 79th Cong , lst sea. 1 945. 25. 213 the agency primarily responsible for the postwar economic welfare and re- habilitation of the islands, had originally been created, supplied, and admin- istered by the Navy. Henderson argued that RFC personnel and administra- tion created an additional layer of bureaucracy at a time of fiscal retrench- ment and that the Navy had the means to carry on the economic administra- tion of the islands itself. Forrestal countered that keeping Micronesian eco- nomic administration in the hands of a federal civilian agency would prevent the economic administration of Micronesia from appearing to the world to be an economic exploitation for the good of the United States. Truman con- curred and, though reluctant to turn the political administration of the is- lands over to the interior Department in I946, kept the USCC in charge of Micronesia‘s economic administration until 1947.16 The JCS and the JSSC continued the line of thought that the acquisi- tion of territory without apparent economic motive dispelled the notion of imperialism. Writing in January 1946, the two bodies stated that the United States had historically been an “anti-imperialistic" nation and that the ac- quisition of territory with no commercial value " . . . is not believed a substantial departure from this position.”7 The JCS even used the sparse population of Micronesia and the " . . . low state of political and economic development . . . " to justify arguing for an annexation of the islands because it was concerned about the efficacy of UN trusteeship arrangements.18 in addition. it tried to use the same arguments about population, resources, '5 See Henderson to Truman. MOUSt 18. 1946. file OF 210-8. ”United States Commercial Company.“ box 798. HSTL. See also Forrestal to Truman. August 28. 1946. ibid '7 See "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee." part of ”Trusteeships For Japanese mildew islands.“ JCS 1570/48. JOOUU‘Y 17. 1946.fI1812-9-42 sec. I3. 005 360. R6 218, 13 See Annex to Appendix “A”. part of ”Strategic Areas and Trusteeship in the Pacific.“ JCS 1619/1 .I‘1tly 24.1946.$WN(X) 59, SWNCC Papers. RG 353. NA 214 and an “underdeveloped” central government to deflect Soviet proposals to have “independence," rather than ”self government,“ established as the even- tual political goal of the Micronesian trusteeship.19 Individual members of the JCS also separately subscribed to the view that branding a nation as an imperialistic one first required some degree of economic motive or exploitative intent. Admiral Nimitz, CNO. reiterated the lack of economic advantage for the United States in Micronesia and stated that the US sought security, not “riches“, in the Pacific. Nimitz then used this justification to argue that trusteeship should not be applied to the American administration over Micronesia because the islands did not repre- sent a "colonial problem"?o Similarly, General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, denied any economic motive on the part of the United States during July 1947 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and placed American motives strictly in terms of military security.21 Cabinet officers, the JCS, and high-level planners did perceiv an eco- nomic dimension to American national security policy for the postwar Paci- fic, but they consistently denied that this dimension entailed traditional imperialism. Seeing economic penetration strictly in terms of physical military control, officials linked interwar and wartime events to the con- cept of American exceptionalism and asserted that territorial control for stricly military purposes was not imperialism as long as the economic ex- ploitation of a large indigenous population was not taking place. Officials '9 See “United States Position On Soviet Propomls For Amendment Of Draft Trusteeship Agreement.”JOS 1619/20, March 3. l947, file 12-9-42 sec. 29.005 360. R6 218. NA. 20 See “Trusteeships.” October 22, 1946, f/vfwmia/Dia‘m; and Nimitz, “The Future Eil’igloyment of Naval F orces"; as found in Richard, (In/feu'mies‘MI/idm'msmflm Vol. 3. 1 . 2' See US W855. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Trusteeship/lame?! far (he frriiay ass/11’s Pig/fic Islam Wings defeat the Maritime? Fmeim Ate/aims. 80th Cong . 1 st sass. i , i . 215 who were opposed to the idea of strategic trusteeship even linked this nar- row interpretation of great power imperialism to the concept of American exceptionalism in order to assert that the United States was justified in annexing the Pacific Islands since its motives were allegedly so pure.22 it can be easily argued that these officials were merely cynical and too knowledgable about world affairs to believe their interpretation of im- perialism. Obviously, some sort of justification had to be produced to ex- plain to the American public and to the world the wide gulf existing be- tween wartime rhetoric and postwar reality when it came to the territorial dispositions in the Pacific Islands. Yet as numerous historians or US inter- national relations have demonstrated, American exceptionalism has been a widespread and sincerely believed concept in American history, however hypocritical it appeared to foreign nationals or later generations of histori- ans23 The tone of the reports and diary entries and the repeated concerns of these officials have convinced me that these officers believed they were administering the Pacific ”in trust“ for other nations. Linking postwar in- ternational security and stability to American exceptionalism was proba- bly a sincere and, to them, honest portrayal of the US as a sacrificial great power, rather than a selfish imperialistic one. Economic Security and the Postwar Pacific Regardless of their denials of US economic aggrandizement, military officials were apprehensive about economic activity in the islands. To 22 See also Smith, Air FmP/mfor Peace, 75-83; and Converse. ”United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Military Base System ." 26 i. 23 See for example. Michael Hunt. ldmlowmo'lm FmimPo/ioy (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986). passim: Hietala. Nari/est Des/m. 173-214: and Rosenberg. Jamming lilo American Dream. 229-234. 216 these officials, any economic activity by a foreign national could potential- ly support espionage activities by foreign governments, something both the United States and Japan had been troubled over during the interwar period.“ This concern manifested itself in a disagreement between the State and Navy Departments over the transit and trade rights which foreign nationals were to have in postwar Micronesia. 0n the one hand, the disagreement was part and parcel of a rift between the two departments over the efficacy of annexation versus strategic trusteeship as the best form of American ad- ministration in the postwar Pacific. More importantly, however, the con- flict suggests the degree to which the American planners from both depart- ments perceived economic control as merely another form of physical secu- rity. in September 1946, as the US was negotiating in the UN over the es- tablishment and conditions of intemationai trusteeships in former colonial areas, the Navy and the State Department found themselves in disagreement about the inclusion of a "most favored nation“ clause in the US' proposed Draft Trusteeship Agreement. Apparently, the State Department believed "most favored nation" status Should apply to all nationals 01' all UN member nations. State Department officials argued that any limitations on econo- mic status would bring about an “unfavorable” reaction against American citizens in other nations' trusteeships if those nations' citizens were not allowed full economic rights in Micronesia. To State Department officials, “full economic rights” for foreign nationals meant the same freedom of 2" See Ballendorf, “Secrets Without Substance,“ 83- 99. 217 transit rights by land, air, and sea which American citizens in Micronesia were to en joy.25 The Navy Department's attitudes toward comprehensive security in the islands came out quite clearly in their response to the State Depart- ment. Navy officials argued that the sparseness of the population and re- sources made provisions for “free-for-all“ social, economic, and commercial exploitation unnecessary and that allegedly “subversive" activities could be undertaken under the guise of commercial development, inter-Island traffic, and "welfare“ activities. Accordingly, the Navy wanted a special status for American citizens in the islands which would clearly set them apart from nationals of other UN member nations. This security-conscious attitude on the part of the Navy was also made clear to John Foster Dulles as he nego- tiated the UN trusteeship agreements in 1946-1947. Dulles informed the US delegation in late October 1946 that the Navy wanted a trade monopoly over Micronesia in order to prevent any foreign nationals from photographing the islands or the American bases established there's"5 Apparently, the Navy got its way, since the Draft Trusteeship Agreement submitted to the UN in Oct- ober 1946 included special economic and transit rights for American citi- zens in the trust territory.27 2'5 See “Memorandum by the Ad Hoc Committee to SWNCC.“ part of ”Draft Trusteeship Agreement.“ September 10, 1946.5WNCC 59/4. SWNCC Pmers. file 12-9-42 sec. 27. G35 360. R0 218. NA 25 See Dulles to the United States Delegation for United Nations Trusteeship Negotiations, Tenth Meeting. October 25, 1946, mm 1946, 1:661. 27 See Press Release ‘142, February 25, 1947, file 2-1-7, box 14,120 80. NA. Nick Cullather's research indicates that the Navy-State rift over Micronesia was similar to disawea- ments between the State and Interior Departments over the economic future of the Philippines. The State Department wanted that newly independent nation to have an economy which was oriented toward a global free trade system . while Inteior Department officials wanted the archipelam to have a political economy which was manually an adjunct of the US‘ so that the United States could prevent the island nation from "collapsing" in a turbulent postwar world. Like the Navy in Micronesia. the Interior Department won the dispute over the Philippines. evidenced by the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 which gaveAmerican citizens speical economic status in the new 218 In addition to physical security, the economic administration of Mi- cronesia was linked at various times With larger strategic goals. For exam- ple, in October 1946 General MacArthur ordered Lieutenant General John Hull to provide assistance to fisheries experts from the Department of the Inte- rior‘s Fish and Wildlife Service who were carrying out an economic survey of Micronesia that was requested by the Navy in 1946.28 The report by the interior Department supposedly emphasized Micronesian marine production for “Asiatic“ markets and MacArthur was interested in having his subordi- nate commander assist the USCC in the survey since he believed it was pos- sible that the Caroline islands could export dried bones and shells for sale in Japan and Korea. MacArthur apparently believed this kind of economic in- teraction would assist in the “ultimate economic rehabilitation“ of both Japan and Micronesia.” nation, provided the President with veto power over Philippine monetary policy, and established a preferential trading system for the US In the islands. interestingly. Cullather finds that while the State Department put up a fight in 1945 and 1946 over Philippine policy and adherence to free trade doctrine. it later simply used that rhetoric more as a convenient tactic to secure American strategic advantages in other parts of the world than as a sincere belief in unfettered international economic intercourse. This author's research coincides with Cullather's findings. Though the State Department opposed the Navy on the issue of trade rights for foreign nationals and desired some open areas in Micronesia. State Department officials never questioned the policy of treating all of Micronesia as an essentially clwed strategic area. Department officers even assisted the interior Department In developing the concept of strategic trusteeship in order to provide the US with a secure buffer zone in the Pacific Basin while maintaining the US‘ facade of anti-colonialism in the UN. in short, while the State Department may have nomad certain unilateraiist tactics between I 945 and 1947, it never seriously questionm the goal of creating an American lake in the postwar Pacific See Cullather. ”Limits of Multilateralism.“ 70-95. 28 See MacArthur to i-lull, October s. 1946. R6 9: Radiograms, AFMIDPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 29 Ibid. Dirk Ballendorf asserts that certain items found In Micronesia. such as sea-cucumbers called (ream were popular in nineteenth century Japan. it is highly doubtful if MacArthur or his advisers were aware of this trade or made the connection to a possible postwar market for the Micronesian economy when discussing the economic survey and the problems of reconstructing a Pacific Basin political economy. Still. there may have been a connection and the fact is important enough to note in the context of this primary document. See Ballendorf, “An Historical Perspective 0n Economic Development." 49 for the Micronesian link to Japan's nineteenth century economy and 54-55 for the economic survey by the interior Department and the US Commercial Company. 219 Forrestal succinctly placed the economic control of the Pacific in an even more general strategic context, however, in February 1947 when he ar- gued in support of the US Draft Trusteeship Agreement. In a speech suppos- edly delivered to foster support for the concept of trusteeship itself, he in- stead concentrated on the provisions of the agreement which were designed to guarantee unilateral American strategic control over the region. By con- centrating on these provisions, he also enunciated Navy Department fears over foreign penetration of the region.30 Fearing foreign economic activity of any kind, Forrestal conceded that the draft agreement provided for signi- ficant participation of the islands in the intemationai economy, but he spelled out that this participation had to be fully consistent with the " . . . requirements of security." To Forrestal, these requirements meant fairly wide-ranging " . . . restrictions on the commerical and other activities of foreigners." To Forrestal, the US " . . . could not allow a national of a potential aggressor to set up even a peanut stand in the shadow of an American base."3‘ Forrestal's attitude was entirely consistent with immediate postwar knowledge of pre- 1 941 Japanese expansionism. It was common knowledge by 1945 that Japanese economic penetration of Micronesia had begun long before Japan took military control of the islands from Germany in 1914. Moreover, it was known by this time that Japan had had a significant econo- mic stake in East Asia before attempting to gain physical control over that region.32 Though paranoid in nature, F orrestal's concern about foreign eco- 30 See proposed speech by Forrestal. "The United States" Role in the Trusteeship System ," February 22. 1947. file 86-5-45. box 134. R6 80. NA; see also attached memo for Forrestal from Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, DCNO for Operations, Feburary 25, 1947, ibid 3' ibid. 32 See Michael A Bernhart. Jam Prepares for new We“: I’lio We? For [ma/b Senor/ly, [919-1941 (Ithaca. New York: Cornell University Press. 1987); and Peattie, m0. 1‘6 1. 220 nomic ventures in Micronesia was also consistent with fears that American control over the Pacific Basin might be less than complete in later years and that incomplete control might “pave the way” for foreign penetration, subversion, control of the islands by another nation, and international ag- gression similar to the events of 1941-1942.33 The best solution to Forrestal, as well as to most high-level policymakers, was to ensure other nationals did not gain any kind of political, economic, or cultural inroad to island life.34 There is no direct or indirect evidence, however, that James Forrestal had visions of dollar signs dancing in his head when it came to the economic administration of the Pacific Islands. An Open Door in the Postwar Pacific? Atthe same time, however, there were some important officials in Washington and the Pacific who hinted at a more substantial economic role for Micronesia. in addition, there were people in semi-official and unoffi- cial capacities who seemed to have an “economic vision" for Micronesia and, to some extent, for the entire Pacific Basin. These people were mostly, though not exclusively, members of the House Naval Affairs Committee and professional naval officers and the accuracy of their ideas about the econo- mic potential of the region is questionable. The accuracy of their ideas, however, is less important than the existence of their viewpoints and the attitudes that these viewpoints indicate about American perceptions of the US' “appropriate“ postwar role in the area. These individuals not only saw American economic development of the Pacific Basin as a way to eradicate 33 See Forrestal. “United States' Role in the Trusteeship System .* February 22. i947. file 86- ;;45. box i34. R6 80. M ibid. 22l foreign influence from the area, but they also saw it as a way to subsidize American administrative costs in the region. Some naval officers and mem- bers of Congress even suggested that Micronesia and other areas of the Pa- cific could be made into a profitable source of raw materials and a market for American capital and manufactures in the i940s. William Roger Louis and Elliot Converse have both shown that Presi- dent Roosevelt at times believed that military and commercial air routes could be combined at various locations throughout the Pacific Basin in order to support American economic links to the magical markets of the Orient. (See Figure 37) Roosevelt felt so strongly about using the Pacific islands as monopolized commercial transit points to East Asia for US civil airlines and shipping companies that he sent Rear Admiral Richard Byrd and a team of area experts on a tour of the South Pacific in the fall of i943 to stake out postwar sites}5 No doubt because of his audience, Byrd waxed enthusi- astic about the potential development of joint military and commercial avi- ation assets in the postwar Pacific. While Byrd‘s report is suspect because of his apparent desire to score points with Roosevelt, Roosevelt definitely saw a strategic interdependence between base development in the postwar Pacific, commercial transit routes to East Asia, the American exploitation of that potential market, and a healthy postwar American political econo- myn?’6 Even after the war was over, the idea of neatly blending postwar American military and economic goals in the Pacific was enunciated by Lieutenant General Whitehead. 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Shipping Routes, Japanese Mandated islands (UK Naval Britannic Ma jesty's Stationery Off ice, UK) the chiefs of Kusaie island in the Carolines (See Figure 39) to President Truman to make Kusaie a "permanent possession” of the United States and “forever" place the island under the flag and protection of the US. The re- quest from King John of Kusaie to Truman was witnessed by Lieutenant James Baird, Senior Naval Military Government Officer at Kusaie, and Lieu- tenant, Junior Grade, RC. Lindgren, Commanding Officer of the local Naval Military Government Ship, USS ADC 95. While the document and the signa- tures could have been forged or coerced and while the copy sent to F orrestal was an English translation, this author has found no evidence that the re- quest was anything but sincere and the request was not outlandish consider- ing the trauma the islanders had endured under Japanese administration. Moreover, interviews conducted by Dirk Ballendorf in the l9805 with Belauan survivors of the war indicate that Micronesians were sincerely im- pressed with the American war machine which had so efficiently destroyed and conquered Japanese Micronesia in only two and a half years. As one survivor told Dirk Ballendorf, “What do you call these Americans who destroy all that the Japanese built, and bring the Japanese to their knees in such a short period of time? You call them 'sir'."5 5 Of course, the US did not annex Kusaie but the matter was first referred to Forrestal and Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, then to Truman. Forrestal noted the English translation of the original message and the apparent lack of "solicitation" on the part of American officers. He then asserted that the chiefs' wishes could be assumed to represent the majority of the people of the island, though he stated that the last point had to be confirmed. Acheson merely commented that the request was part of the larger issue of determining the postwar status of the islands and Truman ordered Forrestal to inform the chiefs on Kusaie that their request had been brought to his attention, that he was happy to learn of their confidence in the U5. and that the request would receive ”due consideration.“ See King John to Truman, no date given; Forrestal to Truman, December 19, l945; Acheson to Truman, January 8. i946; and Truman to Forrestal , January 9, l946 ; all in file "State Department Correspondence, l945- l 946," box 37, White House Central F iles, HSTL. See Ballendorf, ”The Japanese And The Americans.“ 8. See also Peattie, Mama 62- 229 and 300-303 for examples of the Japanese exploitation of the Micronesians. 247 6.0.8....— =£2u§ 52:3: 2:. q .2. Ll ...: .3. do? a... :02 :3...sz 8.... 195.2 .5... ...... . T _ J . _ .. M 8.. 8. 8. 8 o Iu. F. .202 a. 302.2 :02 Mi: ms 0 A); p .302 5.5 d . a... do... 23 :07. .202. r... M :02 23(sz :0... $2: A.M.. do... @533 d... I... , it . ..v. . :0... x32 m. :02 01.02. :0... $2. :02 32.02:... ...... i. any .... ii... M... . .. . .. .< V3.52 C 4 :0... FL. :0 .. .3520: :02 .22... :02 a5... 2 >360 .026 E E202 50+ .9205 a. a: gall, 248 Figure 40. The Northern Marshall islands (From Jonathan Weis Operation CfOSS/‘OZJS; Naval institute PFBSS, i994) In addition, American influence in Micronesia was significant and could be traced back to the early nineteenth century when American whaling ships, missionaries, and consuls visited and lived on the islands. The mis- sionaries established stations on the islands and proceeded to convert the inhabitants with success. In fact, Protestant churches became established in the islands and Christian culture was fairly widespread among the Mi- cronesians.6 The strength of this Christian culture was evident in 1946 when the Navy sent Commodore Benjamin Wyatt, Chief Military Government Officer of the Marshall islands, to inform the people of Bikini Atoll (See Figure 40) that their island would have to be evacuated because of the im- pending atomic bomb tests. The team unwittingly interrupted a Sunday morning, American-style, Congregational church service. After the service, Commodore Wyatt even used a biblical analogy to convince the islanders to leave, comparing them to the “Children of lsrael" whom the United States was going to lead to the "land of salvation“ much as God had done for the Jews!7 Given this setting, Christianity and the English language were two familiar aspects of mainstream white, Anglo-American culture which were considered to be important elements in assimilating the Micronesians to US control. As early as January 1945, Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the US Fifth Fleet, remarked that Christianizing the “natives" would as- sist the United States in swaying the Micronesians away from Japanese in- 6 See Gale. immanent/m affirm/a. 22 and 25. See also Dirk Ballenmrf and William Wuarch, “Captain Samuel J. Masters, US Consul to Guun, 1854-56: Hmbinoar of American ggcgific Expansion,“ Dip/maydv Sfatmff 2 (Novemw l99i ): 306-326 and especially 308- 7 See Gale. American/27mm ormma 22 and 25. See also interview of Commodore Benjamin Wyatt. USN ( RET) by Commander Richard. May 2. I952. as found in Richard. mwmmx Adn/msrrat/m, Vol. 3. 509-5l0. 249 f iuencefi Spruance also advocated teaching English to the indigenous popu- iation, but he wanted it understood that he was not " . . . trying to put undershirts on any native belles who are not accustomed to wearing them.“9 While Spruance‘s paternalistic remark hints at an “Americanization' of Mi- cronesia through some form of social engineering, his concern over prevent- ing any Japanese influence over the Micronesians more clearly implies thoughts about the postwar military security of the islands. Moreover, his ideas about the political management of Micronesia, like those of his successor, John Towers, need to be put in proper context. Spruance and Towers both come off as the “liberal“ voices of the US naval officer corps when it came to assimilating the Micronesians to US rule. Neither particularly wanted to stifle Pacific island life by blanketing the Pacific with active bases and both sought to take measures which ensured that the economic welfare of the Micronesians and their future political loyalty was not endangered by American heavy-handedness. Spruance's con- cern that the Micronesians not be economically exploited by either American or foreign merchants caused him to close the islands to all outside comm- erce until reconstruction and some order had been restored. Towers wanted to grant citizenship to the Guamanians in l946 and 1947 as a way of silenc- ing their criticism of naval rule and coupling them to the domestic US poli- tical system. Although both off icers' reasons for such measures had very practical roots, they appear quite “enlightened“ when compared to officials such Forrestal, MacArthur, and Whitehead.‘0 3 See the letter from Spruance to OPNAV, February l4. I945, as found in Richard. m/wsmx Abra/Admhlls‘tmfm Vol. 2, 78. 9 ibid. '0 See letter bySpruanoe. cmcm-cmcm. December is. 1945. as found in ibid; seealsothe September 25.19%.me 23. i946. andFebruaryS. i947 entries in folder i.box 20f 250 Cultural security as an adjunct to physical control was also the focus when it came to discussing the islanders' political and material culture. The House Naval Affairs Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, for instance, con- curred about security being forged through various cultural links between the United States and the Pacific islands. Stating that the Micronesians should enjoy "maximum self -rule" under American encouragement as soon as possible, the subcommittee also supported the idea of teaching English as a means of linking the Micronesians to the US.ll Asserting that it was a “well established“ fact that friendly relations existed between people who spoke the same language, the subcommittee members also wanted the “natives“ in- doctrinated to the "American way of life" as soon as possible. interestingly enough, while not elaborating on what that “way of life“ entailed, the sub- committee naively suggested that this conversion should be done in a way which did not destroy the traditional customs and institutions of the indi- genous population!l2 Moreover, the subcommittee was convinced that the “natives“ would prefer American control and the American way of life be- cause of their liberation from the Japanese and an alleged American sense of ”justice” and ”fair treatment.“ This American sense of exceptionalism told the subcommittee members that the United States could never be per- ceived as imperialists by the Micronesians or the rest of the world because American administration would be benign and mutually beneficial. or course, as Timothy Maga has illustrated with the Guamanian strug- gle for American citizenship between 1945 and i950, the American sense of justice and fair treatment was seriously lacking in many respects when it the Towers Diary, John Towers Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Curves; and Reynolds, Malia/m}! 7m. 522-523. :gsmUSCongress, awn/Payee“. 1012-1013. ibid. 25! came to according equal political treatment to non-whites on a strategical- ly located island base. Measures taken by the naval military government on Guam support the conclusion that military control took precedence over “Americanizing” the Guamanians. From August l944 through May 1946, Navy authorities on the island denied such basic civil rights as the right of as- sembly, the holding of public meetings (except for religious purposes), and even the right to assemble the Guam Congressl3 Moreover, regarding land policy, the Navy had final say in all cases of land appropriation and wartime claims to damages. It could literally dictate " . . . who goes back where, how they go back, how fast they go, and on what lots they go back . . 3'14 According to Maga, this absolutist behavior by the naval leadership on the island continued after Rear Admiral Charles Pownall became Naval Gov- ernor in May l946. Pownall in particular felt it necessary to keep a tight rein on island affairs, not in order to prepare the island for integration into American political life on the basis of citizenship rights and equality before the law, but to forestall “internal Communist subversion.“ in fact, Maga demonstrates that Pownall never believed that the Guamanians were capable of independent political thought and action and he thought Guamanian calls for U3 CitiZChSth rights and land claims had to be the PCSUlt 0f communist '3 See Maga. wmmpawm. l86-2i6; and Roy E. dairies. 'T he Gum Caracas.“ Par/fic Aria/rs l9 (Dwember i946): 4i i. '4 See statement by Commander AL. O'Bannon of the Land and Claims Commission on Guam, O'Bannon Statements, Land Policy Debates. December i946, Guam Congress Transcripts, Records of the United States Naval Administration, i946- 1949,0uun (hereafter cited as NR), Micronesia Area Remarch Canter (hereafter cited as MARC). as quoted in Timothy P. Maga, "T he Citizenship Movement in Guam, l945- i 950,“ Pxff/cfi/sta‘IZa/flev/w 53 (February l984): 69. See also Maga. DEMMPJM'IIQ, i 86-2 l6. According to Gavan Daws. a similar kind of “extended“ mar- tial law and abuse of civil liberties was exercised by the United States Army over the Hawaiian is- lands between December l94i and October 1944. Long after any potential Japanem threat to the islands came to an end in the summer of 1942. senior Army officers in the islands felt the need to ensure their absolute control over almost all matters in the territory. See Daws. Mia/rim A H/myorrmmrm Islam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, l 968). 352-357. 252 fifth column activities on the island. The result of Pownail's actions was not to speed an Americanization of the island but to sow mistrust among the indigenous population because of the Navy‘s paranoia and land grabbing.‘5 Concern over the physical control of the islands also provided the im- petus to remove foreign nationals residing in Micronesia who might be “threats“ to American strategic interests in the region. in a series of let- ters between President Truman and Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York, it became clear that US citizenship was the desired nationality for missionaries working in Micronesia. In January l946, Spellman wrote Truman to protest the evacuation of missionaries of German, ltalian, and Spanish nationality. Spellman asserted that these people were not a strate- gic threat, that the Catholic missions would be hard-pressed to complete their tasks without the European missionaries, and that " . . . all the good done in the interest of Christianity will be lost and the natives will then have only one path open to them - the return to their former pagan and savage lives.”6 A few days later, Truman returned a short note to Spellman, indicat- ing that he was referring the situtation for study to the State, War, and Navy Departments.I7 SWNCC produced a study by early February which was '5 See Maga. mePMa i86-2 i 6. Amin. there is a pirallel between postwar America: behavior in Guam and postwar US adninistration of the Hawaiian islands. Daws cbmonstrates that civilian territorial officials such as Governor iniram Steinbeck. who had spearheaded the leml challenm to the Army‘s heavy-harm behavior airing the war, quickly indulmd in paranoid thinking about the internal security of the islands during the early Cold Wu: Steinbeck and others were extremely concerned about an internal Communist threat to the islands airing the late i940s and early l9505 and they cooperated both with the House Un-American Affairs Committee's ( HUAC) investigation into the possibility that Hawaii was an “outpost" of the Kremlin and into giUAC's5 investigati70ns of allemd Communist wmpathizers in the islands See Daws. Marla/film 68- Si aid 8 . '5 See Spellman to Truman. January is. l946. file ”State Department Correspondence. i946- l947." box 38. White House Central “1%. HSTL. '7SeeTrumantoSpellman.Janua‘y2l, l946, ibid 253 the result of compromise between the three departments. Apparently, soon after the war ended the JCS had not only wanted to repatriate all East As- ians from Micronesia but all non-native civilians as well. More specifically, the JCS wanted Spanish priests and nuns replaced by American priests and nuns. The State Department expressed the view that all matters should be judged on an individual basis and SWNCC came to the agreement that Ger- man, italian, and Spanish missionaries would not be removed unless they had been members of “objectionable“ organizations such as the Nazi Party. Still, SWNCC agreed that it would be “inadvisable“ to allow other people of Ger- man, ltalian, or Spanish nationality into the islands and that because of American strategic interests in the area, American missionaries should " . . . be utilized to the maximum extent possible, both for reasons of security and to further the development of native culture in accordance with US. standards.“ Truman endorsed SWNCC's recommendation a few days later and Spellman seemed to accept the policy without further protest.‘8 Concerns about the postwar physical control over the islands were also expressed in cultural terms in at least one Navy blaming document dur- ing the summer of 1946. Officers in the Navy's Strategic Plans Division, the CNO‘s major policy planning body, discussed the future security of the Mar- iana islands in blatant ethnocentric and racist terms which coincided with much of Michael Hunt's evidence that white Americans perceived non-whites in a “hierarchy“ of racial value according to their tone of skin color.19 '8 See swuoc 254/ l (Revised). February 5, l946, 'Evactuatlon or catholic Missionaries, Priests, Sisters. And Brothers From the Mission Fields Because Of Their German, Spanish 0r ltalian Nationality,” ibid. See also Truman to Spellman. February is, l946; and Spellman to Truman, March 9, 1946; both in “State Department Corrwpondeme, l946- l947,” box 38, White House Central F iles, HSTL. '9 See Philippe to Gardner, Enclosure ( B) to OP-ISo-P Memormdum,June 27. l946, file '8- 7,“ box l56, Strategic Plans, 0A, NHC. For a complete inscription aid malysis of how white 254 in June l946, Captain Richard Philipps, head of the Pacific Sub-sec- tion of Strategic Plans, sent a memo to Rear Admiral Matthias Gamder, As- sistant Chief of Naval Operations for Strategic Plans, in which Philipps de- tailed the shortage of military personnel available for base construction in the Marianas because of rapid demobilization and then suggested that poten- tial sources of labor could be imported from East Asia and used to replace demobilized American military laborers. Philipps was primarily concerned however, that the " . . . future population of the Marianas contains the least number of persons of races undesirable from a military point of view.'20 To Philipps, the ideal arrangement for base construction and maintenance " . . . would be to import U.$. laborers belonging to the White race, thereby establishing firmly a Caucasian colony of the United States.“ However, he argued that lower standards of living in Micronesia would probably prevent large scale recruitment of white American laborers from the mainland to the islands?‘ Concerning people from East Asia, Philipps thought that Chinese would be “undesirable" as base construction laborers, supposedly because of their ability to permanently establish themselves in the islands and later bring political pressure against the United States for various kinds of con- cessions. Philipps also wanted to avoid a situation he thought was similar to the immigration histories of Hawaii and California, where 'polygot" Asian communities had supposedly been allowed to settle and ”interfere” in Amer- ican foreign policy issues. Though Philipps did not detail these alleged his- Americans have historically categrized people hierarchically by tone of skin color, see Hunt, mammas imam Polity, 46-91 . 20 See Philipps to Gardner. ibid 1’1 ibid 255 torical events, the clear implication was that Chinese were potential secu- rity risks for any American administration of the islands.22 if white laborers could not be found for the islands, Japanese were preferred as temporary laborers. While the planners were concerned that the use of prisoners of war for base construction might bring Soviet charges of a “slave labor” policy upon the United States, it was nevertheless argued that Japanese prisoners WOUIG be easy to COMFOI WlthOUt arousing negative public opinion in the United States and that they were ideal for the heavy physical labor entailed in base construction.23 Filipinos, on the other hand, were seen as totally undesirable as base construction laborers because they were “ . . . by comparison [with the Japanese], as far as physical labor is concerned, . . . lazy."24 When it came to permanent settlers, as opposed to temporary labor- ers, the order of race preference changed, with whites again being the most ”preferred“ group, then Micronesians or Filipinos, and finally East Asians. " . . . [Mlembers of the Brown race would be preferable next to members of the White race . . . F llipinos . . . would be preferable to members of the Yellow race as permanent settlers.'25 Filipinos seemed to better fit the “requirements“ for permanent settlers, probably because Japanese were considered security risks and possibly because the American colonial exper- ience in the Philippines bred some sort of "familiarity‘ with F illpinos. What is fascinating is that Phillips used the words "colonlzlng' and "colonization“ so freely. While numerous public officials were denying that the United States was indulging in anything approaching ”territorial aggran- 22 ibid 23 Ibltl 24 Ibid 25 Ibid 256 dizement" and while most internal planning documents even avoided the use of imperial labels to describe US actions, Captain Philipps and his staff fully admitted that American military bases, their support facilities, and the “laboring class“ which built them constituted "colonization.“ He did not appear overly concerned with this discrepancy between wartime rhetoric and postwar realities. 'He was more concerned with ensuring that the future population of the Marianas contain a " . . . minimum of less desirable races."26 Although this document mentions establishing a Caucasian colony in Micronesia as a way to assimilate the indigenous population and consoli- date American control, the ideas of white colonization and Micronesian as- similation were decidedly secondary to the immediate security require- ments of American naval bases. The essence of the document was that any racial group except white Americans would be security risks, imparting ”subversive“ ideas to the Micronesians and frustrating American adminstra- tion and base construction.” The possibility of settling white Americans in Micronesia in order to transform the racial composition of the islands' population was apparent in at least one semi-official source as well. One Naval Reserve officer, Lieu- tenant Commander T.O. Clark, writing in the United States Naval lnstitute's Pmceed/ngs suggested just such a policy?8 While the unofficial opinion of one officer is certainly not a policy, his ideas and suggestions convey cul- tural attitudes which seemed to be fairly widespread in both official and unofficial primary sources. 26 ibid 2? ibid 28 See Lieutefmt Commantbr TD. 0131: , USNR, “The Adhihistration of the Former W Hm islands," (AW/P 72 (April 1946): 5| 1. 257 Without acknowledging the fact, Commander Clark argued that the Un- ited States should adopt an emigration policy which was surprisingly simi- lar to Japanese interwar policy in Micronesia. At that time, Japan flooded the islands with settlers in an attempt to absorb the indigenous population and couple the islands to Japan in an even more comprehensive mannerft’9 Clark believed it similarly desirable to have white American families move to Micronesia after the bases and housing facilities had been completed. Clark's idea to motivate white Americans to settle in Micronesia suggests an absorption of the Micronesians into a mainland American population, something that would not have been difficult for the US to carry out given the relatively small number of Micronesians at the time (about 150,000 people including the population of Guam). Clark also knew how to use the history of American continental ex- pansionism to stir emotional support for his idea.30 Reminding the reader of America‘s more “rustic“ days, Clark thought that '. . . only. . . those who are kindred spirits to the settlers of our one-time ever advancing western frontiers . . ." could be lured away from the high standard of living in the United States?” Accordingly, Clark envisioned a “Naval Colonizing Section“ moving into the islands to establish “colonizing“ units for naval personnel and their families, whom he labelled “typical“ American families 'ldeal" for creating a colony in the Pacific}52 Clark also perceived an opportunity to develop the resources and commerce of the islands while simultaneously coupling their sovereignty and culture to that of the United States. Thus, he 29 ibid See also Peattie, Alarm i53- l97. F inally, see Ballenrbrf, “The Japmese And The Americans." 8-9; and idem., “A Historical Perspective,“ 3?. 28m Clark. “Adninistration of the Former Japanese Mandated lslmds.” Si l. lbld 32 ibid. s i 2. 258 hoped that these naval families would elect to remain permanently, sup- porting themselves by f arming, trade, or Navy pensions.” In addition, he believed the ”natives“ would gladly “elevate” themselves to become “useful“ citizens of the United States and that the US would return the loyalty by policing the Pacific and accepting the 'manif est destiny“ it had supposedly avoided for nearly half a century},4 The bottom line in Clark's argument, however, was that ". . . the native populations are in effect children and should be treated as such . . ." Clark therefore believed that the United States should take its cue in colonial ad- ministration from the Dutch in lndonesia and that the foundation of Ameri- can policy should be to bring “ . . . the natives of these islands eventually to our own standard of living)?»5 Of course, Clark‘s idea of modelling the “American colony” on Dutch lndonesia is horrifying to anyone who is aware that the Dutch had one of the worst reputations for the exploitation of sub- ject peoples in the history of European imperialism}:6 More importantly from a strategic point of view, Clark was indulging in ideas about social en- gineering with an eye to providing for the military security of the American outposts. To Clark, Micronesia would have been much more militarily secure if it was populated by white Americans rather than “natives“ with “limited“ political, economic, and social “mentality and maturity“ or East Asians with “dangerous and subversive“ ideas?57 firemen-513. 34 ibid. s l 3. 35 Ibid. 5 l 5. 35 See Robert J. McMahon, Ctr/malls?) mw/dWm file Unlim'éMxAm'f/n Sling/e fa“ {ageing/m lmm I945- 1949(ithace, New York: Cornell University Press, l98i ), 37 See Clark. “Adhinistration ofthe Former Jmanese Haunted lslmds," Sl l-S l 3. 259 Not all American officers reacted negatively to the temporary pre- sence of East Asians in the islands. Army off icers on the spot, faced with constructing and maintaining the Army's postwar Pacific bases, reacted somewhat differently from Phillips and Clark when it came to using Chinese and Filipino laborers, though none of these officers seemed very keen on the idea of a large East Asian population in the islands either. The Army's duties in the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Ryukyus fell into three categories: construction projects for postwar bases and base facilities, depot Operations and technical services for processing war sur- plus equipment to America's allies, and housekeeping and general mainte- nance duties. To carry out these duties after the loss of so many American military personnel to demobilization, Lieutenant General Hull, AFMlDPAC, and Major General James Christiansen, Acting Commanding General of US Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) both sought to use the indigenous population for the tasks at hand.38 Hull especially, however, argued that there were too few “qualified natives“, especially on Guam, to train or exploit as a significant labor pool. Though some attempt was apparently made by Hull to recruit and train Guamanians for these tasks, both generals either'argued for the continued use of Japanese prisoners of war or for finding another labor source by re- cruiting East Asian civilian workers.” For example, in late August 1946, Hull, faced with the imminent removal of Japanese POWs, suggested using 38 See Christiansen to MacArthur, July so, 1946, R0 9: Moms, AFWESPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. See also Hull to Madtrthur, Auuist l l , i946, R0 9, Radiou‘ams. AF MIDPAC. ibid 39 See Christiansen to MacArthur, July l9. l946, andJuly 27. l946. AFWESPAC. ibid See also Hull to MacArthur, July 23, l946; andAugust ii, i946,AFMlDPAC. ibid For the continuing need for Japanese mm as manual laborers. see Whitehead to MacArthur.July l l. l946. R0 9: Radiog‘ams, PACUSA, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 260 Chinese laborers or even contracted Japanese civilians to carry out the physical labor in the Marianas. in complete contrast to the naval planners quoted above, Hull was ready to import over 2000 Chinese carpenters, ma- sons, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, and truck drivers to the islands in order to complete base construction pro jects.4° For reasons not entirely explained, MacArthur informed Hull that Chi- nese laborers could only be used in the Marianas to process the over one bil- lion dollars worth of war surplus equipment and supplies which the US was providing to the Chinese Nationalists in 1946.“1 MacArthur refused, of course, to consider using Japanese POWs or civilians for fairly obvious se- curity reasons and because he claimed that US retention of POWs would have created “political complications“ in negotiations with the Soviet Union over POW releases.42 However, MacArthur and the JCS, in complete contrast to the views of the Navy planners noted above, were willing to consider Fili- pino laborers for the Marianas. in addition, MacArthur's headquarters was willing to use Filipino laborers for various activities on iwo Jima in l947 when Major General Francis Griswold, Commanding General of the Marianas- Bonins Command (MARBO), asked for Japanese POWs to warehouse supplies, repair typhoon damage, and prepare equipment for shipment to Japan and South Korea and was told he could employ Filipinos instead.“ It must be emphasized that the ideas suggested by officers such as Philipps and Clark did not constitute an official policy toward Pacific is- 40 See Hull to MacArthur. August 22. I946. RG 9: Radiograrns, AFMlDPAC, ibid 4' See MacArthur to Hull . August 24. l946, ibid; and Pollard. [micWfiymdt/v avg/m off/re awn/a». l72. 42 See MacArthur to Hull. Novemmr l2. l946. no 9: Radiorrams. AFMIDPAC. MacArthur Memorial Archives. 43 ibid. See also Griswold to MacArthur, May i3, l947; andJune 24, i947; as well as mt?!“ to Griswold. July l2. l947; all in R6 9: Radioarans. MARBO. MacArthur Memorial V83. 26] lenders in the late l940s The author has not encountered any evidence which indicates there was ever an official policy to change the racial com- position of the islands or to settle large numbers of white Americans in Mi- cronesia. While the consolidation of American control has been attempted since i945 by teaching English to the Micronesians, importing American ma- terial goods, and implementing American-style welfare and social servic- es,44 an official cultural policy per 59 does not seem to have been at work since the end of the Pacific War. Still, even if the opinions of these offi- cials and officers did not constitute a policy, an examination of their writ- ings reveals thoughts which were antiethical to Rooseveltian national self- determination rhetoric embodied in the Atlantic Charter. Just as the world was beginning to turn toward decolonization and national self-determina- tion for non-white peoples, some American officers were willing to forego the realization of this higher ideal in order to satisfy the perceived require- ments of American strategic security in the postwar Pacific. Mexicans, Filipinos, and African-Americans in the Postwar Pacific Basin The desire to lessen the numbers 0f non-whites in the postwar Paci- f ic Islands did not stop with East Asians. in fact, documents from General MacArthur's headquarters in l946 and l947 indicate that high-ranking Army officers wanted to decrease the percentage of African-American troops serving in the postwar Pacific and replace them with white soldiers. This desire to limit non-white military participation in the region also extended to Filipinos serving in the United States Army, F ilipinoes serving in an ad- 44 See Robert J. Kiste. “Termination of the US. Trusteeship in Micronesia.“ Mm/ofo/fic History 2i (October l986): l28. 262 junct Army organization known as the Philippine Scouts (PS), and members of the 20l st Mexican Fighter Squadron, a military unit on loan from the gov- ernment of Mexico which served with the AAF during the final stages of the Pacific War. During the final months of the Pacific War, General George Kenney, then Commanding General of the US‘ Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF), made re- peated requests to General of the Army Air Forces Henry Arnold to have the 20ist Mexican Fighter Squadron relieved of its duties and sent back to North America. Kenney cited the change in the tactical situation in the Pacific as one reason for the lack of need for the squadron's services, but he also claimed that the squadron was below par in its operational and safety stan- dards and that it had experienced undue losses in training accidents. In short, Kenney did not the believe the squadron would ever be anything more than “mediocre” in combat.“ Kenney’s reasoning and that of his subordinate commanders was in- teresting from a cultural perspective. Kenney blamed the squadron‘s poor performance on “language differences“ which allegedly made training the squadron's personnel difficult and resulted in a lower standard of eff icien- cy. One month later, Brigadier General Frederick Smith, Commanding Gen- eral of the 5th Fighter Command, elaborated on Kenney's assessment. Writ- ing to the commanding general of the Fifth Air Force, Smith claimed that the squadron's deficiencies stemmed from more than just “language problems." According to Smith, the real problems were differences in experience lev- els, “speech difficulties,“ and “mental temperament.'46 45 See Kenney to Arnold. subj: Request for Release of Unit from Southwest Pacific Ocean Area. June 24. 1945. 720. iSi-2.AFSHRC. 46 See ibid; M Smith to CB Sth Air Force. July 24, i945, ibid 263 This cultural insensitivity and subtle racism toward Mexicans should not be surprising given the context of the time. The United States of the l9403 was an extremely racist society and the practically all-white offi- cer corps of the American military cannot have been expected to understand or be sympathetic to the needs of non-white military personnel under their charge. Nevertheless, primary documents on this subject provide a fasci- nating window for historians to view institutional racism and cultural ste- reotyping by white American military officers of non-white troops. The War Department Operations and Plans Division Diary is one source for investigating this phenomenon and it contains one example of Douglas MacArthur's racism vis- :a-l/is African-American soldiers. In October l945, MacArthur suggested that former Philippine Scouts who had joined the Army of the United States (AUS) during the Pacific War be retained as part of the proposed 400,000 man postwar strength of the United States Army in the Pacific in lieu of ”colored”, i.e., African-American, Army personnel. in other words, MacArthur was suggesting that demobilized African-American mili- tary personnel from the Pacific Basin be replaced with F liipinosfl" A second indication of postwar racism against African-American troops serving in the Pacific occurred In March 1946. At that time, General Whitehead reported to Undersecretary of War Kenneth Royall that PACUSA had experienced a sudden increase in venereal disease among its units. Without providing any documentary evidence, Whitehead asserted that the 47 See 0900 Reports for October is, i945; October 29, 1945; November l0. l94S; December IT, 1945; February 27, 1946; March 2i , i946; April 4, i946; and March 22, 1946; all in 0900 Reports, box 5, CPD Diary. DDEL. Filipino troops were considered "world class“ citizens in the United States Army, evimnced by MacArthur's request that 3000 white US Army officers be assimed to officer the hidler ranks of these forces Filipino officers were to be limited to the comm-grade ranks of second lieutenant, first lieutenant. and cmtain. 264 increase was particularly acute in “colored“ troops.“ Whitehead's allusion to African-American soldiers' sexual promiscuity fits a pattern of institu- tional racism against non-white soldiers in the postwar Pacific Basin com- mands. Arnold F isch, for instance, has documented that on Okinawa, Afri- can-American troops were blamed out of all proportion to their numbers for violent crimes against the Ryukyuans. Fisch documented that some white officers at times even admitted that African-American soldiers were victims of institutional racism and the Army's segregationist policies more than anything else, but these officers still consistently strove to reduce the number 0T African-American soldiers in the RYUKYUS as a 'SOiUtiOh' t0 inci- dents between US military personnel and the Ryukyuans. Moreover, F isch has shown that the same style of blame without evidence emerged after Philip- pine Scouts relieved the African-American units on Okinawa in l946-i947 and the friction between US military personnel and indigenous civilians con- tinued.49 What F isch's work demonstrates is the complexity of racial relations in the Pacific islands at this time. Though African-American troops were not the only US military offenders against the Filipinos and Ryukyuans, these indigenous peoples exhibited an extreme hostility to the presence of African-American soldiers. Moreover, the Filipinos and Ryukyuans did not coexist very well either because of Filipino perceptions of the Ryukyuans as Japanese conquerors and oppressors. Timothy Maga similarly reports a xenophobic reaction among Guamanians to the presence of African-American troops, a racist reaction of white soldiers vls- law/5 the Chamarros, and a 48 See whiteneaa to Royall. subj: Information On The Pacific Air Command. u.s. Army For The Undersecretary Of War. March IS, i946, 720.04-3. AFSHRC. 49 See Fisch, Nil/wanmmf/n ”100W Islam el -e7. 265 mutual Chamarro contempt for whites, whom they derisively called “haoles“.5° Examples of how extreme these racist stereotypes could become when combined with concerns for the cultural security of the postwar Pacific are replete in the primary documents. For instance, in early July i946, Lieuten- ant General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of AF WESPAC, and Major General Christiansen submitted a list of all-white Army units in the Philip- pines and the Ryukyus which were to be deleted and replaced by the Philip- pine Scouts because of postwar demobilization. Both generals were parti- cularly concerned about taking this action, however, claiming that Philip- pine Scouts who met certain criteria could reenlist in the Regular Army (RA) after a brief naturalization period, resulting in a situation in which the majority of the Army forces in the Pacific would soon be Filipino. Christiansen‘s staff had mistakenly typed 8% of the Philippine Scouts en- listing in the Regular Army under these conditions instead of his intended estimate of 80%. Once this correction was made, he assumed that very few white troops would remain in the western Pacific given the temptations of demobilization. Accordingly, he urged General MacArthur to " . . . avert the undesirable situation which can occur if the opportunity to enlist in RA remains open to substantial numbers of naturalized ex Philippine Scoutsfs' Even though MacArthur's headquarters assured Christiansen that ex-Phllip- pine Scouts could not legally enlist in the Regular Army under the alleged 5° ibid; see also telephone interview with Dr. Timothy Maga, Senior Professor of Modern Diplomatic History at Bentley College, Waltham, Mmachusetts, formerly Chancellor of the University of Maryland Overseas F our Campus Program an Guam, and founding president of the University of Maryland-Republic of the Marshall islands Campus, November 23, l993. 5' See Styer to MacArthur, July 6, 1946; and Christiansen to MacArthur. July 8. l946, bath found in R6 9: Radialrams. AF WESPAC, MacArthur Memorial. See also Christiansen ta MacArthur,July8, i946;andJuly is, l946, ibid 266 conditions, Christiansen continued to assert that large numbers of Filipinos would comprise the Western Pacific Base Command (WPBC) and that white troop quotas would not be filled to the maximum.52 Concern with keeping soldiers of different racial compositions com- partmentalized in certain areas of the Pacific continued to be evidenced in Army documents throughout the summer of l946. in late July i946, Mac- Arthur reminded Styer and Christiansen about Army recruiting procedures which allowed African-Americans and Puerto Ricans to be enlisted or re- enlisted only in units which had traditionally been composed of "colored“ soldiers.53 The recruiting regulations also directed that Filipinos could only be reenlisted into the Regular Army if they had prior service in that organi- zation. All newly enlisting Filipinos, therefore, could only be enlisted in the Philippine Scouts for service exclusively in the Philippine islands and that force could not exceed 12,000 men. All other enlistments for the Regular Army had to be by white male US citizens between the ages of 18 and 34.54 Once the Army determined that F ilipino soldiers would be limited to service in the Philippine Scouts or In selected Regular Army units, the em- phasis in the documents focused on the number of African-American sol- diers in the Pacific Islands. MacArthur and the War Department must have ultimately agreed with Christiansen's concerns about an “appropriate“ racial balance in the islands since on July 30, l946 MacArthur agreed to reduce the 529829 Macinthur ta Christiansen. July l0. l946; and Christiansen to MacArthur, July is, l 4 ; bi 53 in this time period, the Army considered both African-Americans and Puerto Ricans to be “colored". While there were separate units for each ethnic group, both types of Army units were labelled “colored“ in their official desimations. See Dale Wilson. “Recipe for Failure. Major General Edward M. Almond and Preparation of the US. 92nd infantry Division for combat in World War ll ." Mrm/of/‘I/I/fwy/I/sfw 56 (July I992): 473-488. 54 See MacArthur to Christiana. July 28. l946. RG 9: Radiawams. AF WESPAC. Mactrthur Memorial Archives. 267 number of African-American soldiers in AF WESPAC.55 Christiansen, how- ever, was apparently not satisfied with the numbers suggested since he radioed MacArthur several weeks later claiming that the number of African- Amerlcan soldiers remaining was still about 402 of the American troops in the Philippines and that this figure needed further downward revision.56 Arguing that the War Department, his command, and Ambassador Paul McNutt had assured Philippine President Manual Roxas that the number of African- American soldiers would be reduced to ms of the US soldiers in the Philip- pines (the natlonal percentage of African-Americans upon which the Army was basing its troop quotas), Christiansen asserted that the number of Afri- can-American soldiers had to be further reduced in order to maintain “ami- cable relations“ with the Philippine Republic.57 In effect, Christiansen was blaming soured US-Philippine relations over disagreements concerning post- war US base rights in the islands on the presence of African-American troops in the new republic. This question of postwar bases caught the attention of other officers concerned with the defense of the Pacific Basin as it became a major diplo- matic issue between the two nations in i946 and i947. In late October l946, General Whitehead wrote to Major General Otto Wayland, Assistant Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, about his concerns for American bases in the Philip- 5'5 See MacArthur to Christiulsen. July so, l946, ibid 56 See Christiansen to MacArthur, September i7. l946, ibid 57 ibid are indicated in February l 946 that “colored" soldiers would continue to be inducted into the Army at the ratio of 102, but that oversees commanders would be required to utilize a l5: ratio of “Negro“ troops As subsequent mcuments indicate, however, Christiansen, Whitehead, and other officers in the postwar Pacific continued to discuss matters in terms of the l0: quote and continued to attempt a reduction of African-American military personnel in their areas well below glgélratia For the CPD directive, see 0900 Report. February i i, l946. box 5. CPD Diary, 268 pines and to charge the Philippine government with bad faith on a wartime promise for air base rights at Nichols Field and Fort McKinley on Luzon. Whitehead asserted that the Philippines had promised the US the use of these facilities in August l945 but was now trying to “force“ the US out. Whitehead also cited the low morale of US troops stationed there because of temporary living quarters and argued that the US should either obtain the base rights or get out of the Philippines all together. He reiterated the same points to Major General Eugene Eubank, Commanding General of the i3th US Air Force, in a letter written about two weeks later.58 Christiansen also later referred to Philippine charges of the “law- Iessness" of American soldiers in the Philippines as a reason for tense US- Philippine relations. While he did not elaborate on what that behavior en- tailed, he claimed that the Filipinos largely blamed African-American sol- diers for “misbehavior“. In fact, the behavior of US military forces in the Philippines in general seems to have been atrocious. Numerous documents in General Whitehead's papers refer to American soldiers who acted autocrati- cally and arrogantly toward Filipinos, including ransacking houses, driving at unsafe speeds in crowded cities such as Manila, and commonly exhibiting drunk and disorderly conduct. One example occurred in November i946, when the officer commanding an Army truck company denied that one of his drivers was responsible for injuring Filipinos in downtown Manila. The crux of the matter, however, was that even if the driver was guilty, the company commander thought the life of a Filipino to be “worth“ the driver saving twenty minutes on a delivery runi Moreover, the situation was not helped by US soldiers deserting from their posts in the Philippines, a situation which 58 See Whitehead to Wayland. October 24. l946. leeoooe- l . Whitehead Callectian.AFSHRC. See also Whitehead to Eubank, November 7, i946, l68.6008-l . ibid 269 eventually had to be controlled by placing a curfew on US military personnel in the islands after late l946.59 More central to the theme of American cultural perceptions, the dis- agreement over base rights can be taken as a representative case study of the Army's racial policies in the I9405 and the attitudes of white officers toward African-American troops in the postwar period. In spite of this doc- umentary evidence that American forces in general could be capable of cal- lous and unprofessional behavior, high-ranking officers in the Pacific speci- fically focused their attention on the competence and professionalism of African-American soldiers. in addition, African-American units continued to be blamed for endangering future American base rights in the Philippines, evidenced by Christiansen's argument that stable Philippine-American rela- tions depended on further reducing the number of African-American soldiers in the archipelago and replacing them with white troops.6° Whitehead‘s attitudes seemed to epitomize these racist attitudes to- ward African-American soldiers. For example, he told Major General Albert Hegenberger, Commanding General of the AAF's First Air Division on Okinawa, that low morale among African-American soldiers on Okinawa was due to poor leadership and he Implied that African-American soldiers espe- cially had to be provided with strong and paternalist behavior and had to be “ . . . drilled and disciplined until they are respectable and respected units.“ He also saw problems resulting from the activities of a few ”trouble-mak- 59 ibid.. September 2i , l946. See also Major General Francis Griswold. COMAF 20. to Whitehead. Outgoing Messages, November l l , l946, 720.1623,AFSHRC; Major General Eumne Eubank , COMAF i 3, to Whitehead, ibid; and Whitehead to Eubank. October l0, l946, ibid; in adiitian, see Whitehead ta Eubank, November 7, l946, l68.6008- i , Whitehead Collection, AFSHRC; and Eubmk ta Whitehead, incoming Mm. Deameber 20, l946, 720. l622, ibid 5° See Christiansen to MacArthur, September 2i , i946, RG 9: Radiairams. AFWESPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 270 ers“ within the enlisted ranks, not from the Army's segregationist policies or the lack of recreational facilities for non-white soldiers on the island. in the end, Whitehead fatallstically told Hegenberger that the AAF was “stuck“ with a lOfB “colored“ troop quota and that the service had to get " . . . useful service out of them."61 The number of African-American soldiers in the postwar Pacific Is- lands continued to be discussed in an impersonal, yet not very surprising, context of racial quotas. in late October l946, MacArthur disapproved Christiansen's request to retrain “colored“ soldiers as antiaircraft artillery (AAA) troops because African-Americans were not enlisted into such units by the War Department and because MacArthur wanted current African- American units to count in future drawdowns mandated by Washington!52 Later in the same month, MacArthur radioed General Hull that his command had an “excess quota“ of African-American troops, that white troops only numbered 75% of the forces in the AFMIDPAC area, and that the “problem” was going to get worse since additional “colored“ troops would have to be moved from the Philippines to Hull‘s command if they were not demobilized. F rightfully, MacArthur's headquarters continually referred to the proposed transfers of African-American soldiers as “shipments of Negroes."63 The desire by the War Department and MacArthur to get African- American troops out of the Philippines by transferring them to AFMIDPAC raised objections from Hull, as well as from other subordinate commanders. 5' See Whitehead to HegenMrger. Outming Messages. October l0. l946. 720. I623; seealso Whitehew to WW. November 4, I946, 168.6008- i , Whitehm mlidim; both documents found in the AF SHRC. 51’ See MacArthur to Christiansen. October l9. i946. RG 9: Radiogams, AF WESPAC, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 53 See MacArthur to Hull, October 20. l946; andOctaber 28. l946; bath in R0 9: Radiawams. AF MiDPAO, MacArthur Memorial Archives. 27l in late November i946, Hull informed MacArthur that AFMIDPAC’s “colored“ troop strength would exceed the i073 quota when African-American soldiers from the Philippines were transferred into his charge.“ in January i947, Major General Griswold, Commanding General of MARBO, radioed Major Gen- eral George Moore, Commanding General of the Philippines-Ryukyus Comm- and (PHiLRYCOM), that the Marianas, like the Philippines, would not be a suitable location to place a large number of African-American units. Claim- ing that there were no recreational facilities f or “colored" troops and '. . . no civilian outlets . . . for them . . . ", Griswold placed the major blame for Afri- can-American troops not being welcomed in the Marianas on the indigenous population!"5 Citing conditions of alleged civilian resistance to the pre- sence of African-American soldiers, Griswold radioed Moore two days later that a large number of "Negroes“ could not be accepted because it might swell the “colored“ military population in the Marianas to more than i073. Griswold also argued that "colored” troop strength in the Marianas should be kept well below lose, that Philippine Scouts should not be used to replace demobilized white troops, and that there were "too many“ African-American and Filipino soldiers in the Marianasfii5 Subsequently, Griswold radioed MacArthur and requested that the Far Eastern Command decrease the number of African-Americansoldiers below the national lOiB quota. Although action on the request seems to have taken about two months, by April l947 MacArthur was asking Griswold for a list 5“ lbid,November 30, i946;andDecember i4. i946. 65 See Griswold ta Moore, January 26, l947, RG 9: Radiograms, mesa, MacArthur Memorial Archives. PHILRYCOM had been the AFWESPAC command until January l , l947, whereas MARBO had been the AF MIDPAC command until the same date. See Christiansen to MacArthur, May l9, l947. box i4, RG 5: Correspondence, MacArthur Memorial Archives. :3]? Griswold to Moore. Jmuary 28, i947, RG 9: Radianms, MARBO, MacArthur Memorial ves. 272 of additional ”colored“ units which could be redesignated as “white” as a way of further reducing the number of African-American units serving in the Marianas-Bonins Command.” Griswold quickly returned with a list which eliminated over 200 African-American troop billets, replaced them temporarily with Philippine Scouts, and then replaced the Philippine Scouts with more than 200 white soldiers. Griswold claimed that after all of the personnel transfers were completed only two African-American enlisted men and two enlisted Philippine Scouts would remain in Griswold's operat- ing reservel68 in spite of the widespread attempt to get African-American soldiers out of the postwar Pacific, there were certain tasks for which African- American troops were desired. “Colored“ soldiers were apparently assigned in large numbers to ammunition handling, bomb disposal, and heavy con- struction units. Accordingly, their services were at times highly desired by American commanders in the postwar Pacific who were charged with build- ing bases, clearing debris, and repairing damage in the islands. For example, in a series of radio messages in February l947, Whitehead ordered his chief of staff, Major General Thomas White, to have an overstrength unit of 300 African-American soldiers brought to the Marianas to begin bomb disposal assignments. Whitehead told White that it was " . . . essential if we are to get any work done in the Marianas that every possible action be taken to expedite the shipment. . . " of ”colored“ soldiers from the Philippines to Guam, implying that until African-American soldiers were on hand to carry 67 See Griswold to MacArthur, Januay 30. l947, ibid 68 lbld.Aprll 24, l947; andApril 26, I947. 273 out the most dangerous and physically arduous tasks, postwar base con- struction in the Marianas could not commence!’9 How are historians to interpret these documents? Are they examples of American Army officers concerned more with maintaining amiable rela- tions with the Philippine Republic and the Micronesians than with defending the rights of African-American soldiers? Or were the officers merely try- ing to place blame on the indigenous populations for the results of Army segregation policies which they either supported or could do nothing about? In the end, a definitive answer to these questions is impossible because of the complexity of racial relations noted above. A number of possible an- swers, however, are conceivable. F irst, it is slightly possible, though not very realistic, to suppose that these officers were not necessarily racists but perceived F ilipino and especially African-American soldiers merely as ”administrative inconven- iences“ which they wanted to be rid of as soon as possible. Not being able to do anything about the Army's segregationist policies, removing African- American soldiers and replacing them with white units may have been per- ceived as the route of fewest obstacles for these officers and for the United States government. in addition, indigenous racism to the presence of non-white troops was a reality. Of course, while the racism of white officers and the island populations was not mutually exclusive, William Christopher Hamel and Timothy Maga, specialists on US-Philippine and US-Guamanian relations re- spectively, have both informed this author that the Filipinos and Guamanians 69 See wnitenead to White. Outgoing masseuse. February I3, 1947; and Februay l4, l947, 720. l623; see also "The Report of the Joint Marianas Board on the Military Development of the Harlanas: June l, l947, l78.29i 7-l , 34; both documents found in theAFSHRC. 274 in particular exhibited a strong xenophobia and chauvinism toward African- American and white troops in the Philippines and Guam in the l940s There was also concern over friction between Filipinos and Micronesians, since American officers planning for the military development of the Marianas talked about a “serious racial problem" ensuing from the importation of F iii- pino workers into the Marianas.7° However, given how thoroughly racism was woven into the fabric of American society in the l940s, and especially how endemic racism was at all levels of the United States military during the Second World War," it is next to impossible not to label these incidents as blatant examples of mid- twentieth century American racism and institutional racism by high-ranking American military Officers in the postwar Pacific. As Allan Millett, Roy Talbert, and Dale Wilson have all demonstrated with internal documents from the Army and the Marine Corps, the US military throughout the twen- tieth century considered African-Americans as ”lazy”, "undependable" in combat situations, and even ”disloyal" because of past treatment by Ameri- can society and alleged ”susceptibility“ to ”left-leaning“ ideologies.72 Moreover, it ought to be remembered that MacArthur and his immedi- ate commanders viewed non-white soldiers, even‘those in US uniforms, to 7° See telephone interview with William Christopher Hanel. a specialist in US-Philippine relations andAssistant Professor of History. St. Anselm College, Manchester, New Hampshire. November l6. i993; see also November 23. i993 telephone interview with Timothy Man 7' For an example of these institutional attitudes, see Wilson, ”Recipe for Failure,“ 473-488. Also, members of the Joint Marianas Board exhibited this racist thinking in no uncertain terms in June l947 when they argued that ”significant" morale problems existed among white military personnel in the Marianas and that the low morale was inherent whenever " . . . larm numbers of young men are by circumstances denied in the main . . . their wanted social contacts with women of irgaggoe. . . "; see "Report of the Joint Marianas Board,“ June l, l947, l 78.291 7-20. 72 See Allen R. Millett, Samar Fidel/s fmfiisrayo/t/v w/tm'Mx/‘Irim am: (New York: The Free Press, l99l ), 375; Ray Talbert. Jr.. negative/”(317W f/vArmymo'f/Ie Amm’cmloff. I917— 794/ (Jackson. Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, l99i ). l l3-i l4, 243-244, 264-265, and 267-268; and Wilson, "Recipe for Failure,“ 473-488. 275 be security risks to the US' postwar strategic position in the islands. American planners in general were highly concerned with excluding East Asians from permanent residence in the islands and populating Micronesia with white Americans from the mainland. These Army officers, fully im- bued with American society's distrust of non-whites, unfortunately per- ceived African-Americans in the Pacific as similar detractors from, rather than contributors to, postwar American national security in the region. There was no conspiracy at work, however, in these matters. Because of in- herent racial prejudices already in place, there did not have to be. Pacific islanders as Children At the same time that American officers were concerned about the exclusion of East Asians and African-Americans from the postwar Pacific Islands, another interesting pattern is noticeable in regard to American cul- tural perceptions of the Micronesians themselves. if Filipinos were consid- ered lazy, Chinese were considered troublesome, Japanese were considered dangerous, and African-Americans were considered inconvenient, then Paci- fic islanders were viewed primarily as children who needed guidance and American-style reform in their lives. There is some evidence that not all Americans viewed the islanders in such innocent terms. Former Secretary of the interior Harold ickes, writing in Coll/ers“ magazine in August l946 to oppose the Navy‘s administration of the Micronesian Islands, quoted a naval officer labelling the Micronesians as “gooks' and portraying them as " . . . the dumbest, most worthless, lazy, filthy, no-good, no-account people i have ever seen.“ This officer, however, also alleged that the Micronesians lie, cheat, steal, have “no morals“, and would cut American throats if they were not " . . . afraid of American 276 planes."73 Unfortunately, Ickes did not or could not provide more informa- tion or documentation on the officer. in addition, ickes' motives are ques- tionable because of his political agenda to abolish the naval administration in Micronesia in favor of Interior Department civil administration." More- over, this is the only piece of evidence this author has encountered in which Micronesians were portrayed by Americans as dangerous or conniving. While Timothy Maga has informed me that the perception of Micronesians as 'lazy" welfare recepients was more widespread In the W405 than is commonly known,75 it seems that, for the most part, Americans viewed the indigenous population as innocent children in need of Uncle Sam‘s guidance. Robert Kiste has suggested that since the earliest days of naval con- trol in Micronesia, elements of social engineering, such as Western style education, universal medical care, and a preponderance of American materi- al goods, were introduced into the islands which had more to do with the imposition of American values than with the well-being and best Interests of the Micronesians.76 But as Emily Rosenberg asserts, imposing American cultural values and lifestyles was not seen as an imposition by many Ameri- cans but as the best way to "civilize" "premodem" or “savage“ peoples.77 Primary sources are heavily laden with these paternalistic cultural terms and assumptions. Perceptions of Pacific Islanders as helpless children who had to be guided In every action and decision permeates these sources and tells US a great deal about American cultural arrogance in the mid- i 9406. 73 See ickes, “New at its Worst,” 22-23 and 67. 74 See Louis, mama/m are”. 46 l -s7:s. 7'5 See telephone conversation with Timothy Mam, November 23. l993. 75 See Kiste. "Termination of US. Trusteeship.“ i28. See also Ballendorf. 'T he Japanese And The Americans.” 8. 77 See Rosenberg, Sammy/y (IleAma‘icm 0mm 3- i3 and 229-234. 277 Reflective of this style of cultural paternalism and racial prejudice was Captain Harry Pence. Pence, a retired naval officer recalled to active duty because of his alleged expertise in administering conquered territory and people, expressed his paternalistic attitudes toward Pacific islanders in April l943 while planning for the postwar naval control over Micronesia. Assigned in December I942 as Officer-in-Charge (OinC) of OP-l ix, the Navy's Office for Occupied Areas, Pence cited allegedly ”limited“ political maturity among the Micronesians as a reason for maintaining strong naval government in the islands after the Pacific War.78 Pence further asserted that the “native“ population possessed a “very primitive“ social organization and political tradition and that the develop- ment of the island populations along "feudallstic" family, clan, and village lines supposedly made it impossible to create any type of “republican“ form of government in the future. According to Pence, " . . . the islanders seldom comprehend or respond rationally to federations or to other features of the American-European political patterns . . . " and any sudden attempt to intro- duce “republican“ forms of government would destroy whatever "democracy' already existed. Therefore, it was thought that the interests of the Inhabi- tants would best be served " . . . by establishing in most of the islands a strong but benevolent government--a government paternalistic in character . .‘79 73 See Richard, (In/WSfaraera/Mn/msrrafm Val. l, l6; and Dine, OP-l ix Memorandum, April 22, l943 as found in ibid.. 18-20. Pence was assimed to this duty because he had been involved with American occupation duties in Trieste after the First World War. The Office of Occupied Areas was subsequently rerbsigneted the Occupied Areas Section (OP- 50E) and then the Military Government Section (OP- i3-2) in August 1944. See F Isch. Nil/(WWW! In If» Ina/kw Islam, l3. 79 See Richird, WIMStofw Abra/Administmfm, Val. i, I9. 278 One example of this paternalism is highly reminiscent of the Japanese Interwar adminstration of Micronesia from which American administration was presumed to be so different. A Navy planning document stated that “na- tives" on postwar Guam would fill all of the lesser positions such as police, clerks, stenographers, teachers, nurse‘s aids, domestics, and chauffers.Po In addition, the document outlined how the naval military government's edu- cational program throughout the rest of Micronesia would “educate” the is- landers to fill similar positions while being supervised by American naval officers and civilian specialists. While the authors of the document saw this occupational training as a means to self -government, they also empha- sized fiscal economy since it was assumed that Micronesians could be paid less than white Americans brought from the continental United States to perform the same tasksfil Apparently, most American planners during the war simply took it for granted that strong naval government would produce “happy natives“ if the Micronesians were governed by Western political and cultural standards, as the Guamanians had been since I898.82 Of course, this last assumption lg- 30 See ”Proposed Plan for Civil Government by the Navy of Certain Pacific islands Unar United States Control ," September 24, i945. box l3. series 4. Politico-Military Affairs Records. (it. NHC. See also Ballendorf, “The Japanese And The Americans,“ i0. Though his assertions were motivated by his political agenda of obtaining Interior Department administrative control over the trust territory, ickes points out that when indigenous labm‘ was used in Micronesia, laborers were paid a lower wage than white laborers from the continental US. For example, a Guananial carpenter would be paid about 43 cents an hour while a white American from the US would be paid 3 L66 an hour. Again according to ickes, white laborers received more carnpensetion in the farm of benefits, paid leave, and cammiseary privileges as well. Nothing this author had encountered in his research or in American labor historiography would refute Ickes‘ charges of monetary preference by race and ethnicity. See Ickes, “Navy at Its Worst.“ 23. This racist mindset about Pacific Islanders‘ capabilities was not limited to the Micronesians. Gemral Whitehead stated in June I947 that he believed it would take an entire mneratian to train Okinawans to (b skilled labor in areas such as technical supply and aircraft maintenancei See Whitehead to Major General Thomas White. June lo. I 947, I 68.6008- i . Whitehead Collection. AFSHRC. 3' See “Proposed Plan for Civil Government." September 24. I945. box l3. series 4. Politico- Mllitary Affairs Records. M. NHC. 82 See Richard, enumerates Mia/Adminisfmf/m Vol. l , 22. 279 nored the dissatisfaction which the Guamanians themselves had expressed over American naval rule both before and after the Pacific War. More Im- portantly, Pence‘s value judgements about “republican” f arms of government and his definition of ”primitive“ ignored the sophistication with which many Micronesians, especially the Guamanians, pursued their political and econo- mic interests within post- l 945 American administrative guidelines. As Maga has Illustrated, Guamanians were very adept at using sophisticated political logic to argue for American citizenship rights both before i94l and after I945. In addition, Jonathan Weisgall has demonstrated that the people of Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands never lost sight of their pri- mary interest in returning home after the atomic bomb tests, in spite of al- legedly “primitive“ and “irrational“ societal norms which supposedly caused them to lose sight of the ”larger issues."33 Additional evidence that the Micronesians were perceived as children who only needed to be minimally consulted about their future was evident in subsequent primary sources dealing with the Bikini atomic bomb tests. This I946 test against selected American, German, and Japanese naval vessels was meant to determine the effects of atomic war at sea.“ The fact that Bikini MO” was Chosen illustrates to What degree Micronesia was seen as a security network to be used for American strategic purposes. What Is even more interesting, however, Is how little the Interests of the inhabitants and how greatly the lack of foresight on the part of Navy officials figured in the planning of the operation. 83 See Timothy Maga. ”Demacracyand Defense" TheCase aquan, USA. I9l8-l94l ," can»! a/Pxifl'ch’llstay 20 (July I985): I56- I72; and Damml’rmim I I3- I49 aid l86- 2 I 6; see also Jonathan M. Weiwall, “Micronesia And The Nuclear Pacific Since Hiroshima.“ W/o/Amm/nla‘mf/m/ 51m Rey/air 5 (Summer-Fall I985): 4I -SS. 333‘” Graybar, ”Bikini Revisited,“ I I8- i 2:5; and idem, 'The l946 Atomic Bomb Tests,“ see- 280 According to Vice Admiral William Blandy, DCNO for Special Weapons and commander of Operation Crossroads, Bikini was chosen as the test site because it had a large anchorage, was free from violent storms, was close to American air bases in Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Roi, and had predictable winds. He did not mention that the tests took place in Micronesia because they were far enough away from the United States to dispell American pub- lic concern about the effects of the bombs blasts or radiation. Interesting- ly, but not surprisingly, he also did not mention the population of Bikini at all in his evaluation of the chosen site.85 William Shurcliff, writing the official history of the operation in I947, also cited nearby air bases, preditable winds and water currents, a protected anchorage, physical control by the United States, and the “near absence“ of people as factors In choosing the Islands. Shurcliff asserts that Bikini won out because It met all of the criteria and Its population of i62 could be moved “readily.“86 Shurcliff may have been correct about easy transfer, but Dorothy Richard and Jonathan Weisgall have shown that the solution to finding a new home for the Bikinians would plague the United States in an embarrassing way for many years to come.87 Moreover, the Navy's evacuation of the island and its attempts to find the Bikinians a new home is an interesting case study in cultural imperial- ism and undue assumptions. Richard herself accepted In I957 that the Is- land was chosen not only because of the criteria listed above but also be- 85 See Yice Admiral willlam H.P. elanw, USN, “Operation Crossroads The Story of the Air and gnar‘water Tests of the Atomic Bomb at Bikini ,“ Arm/am 3i (January-February I947): 4 l -343. 55 See William A Shurcliff, Buzzword/Hm} I’m Wale/waafmmmm (New York: W.H. Wise. l947). l7. :7 S? Ricilargslln/Mfiafxmudn/Msfmf/m Vol. 3. 507-555: and Weisgall, "Nuclear ml lo,“ 41 - . 28l cause of the assumption that the Bikinians enjoyed only a “marginal exist- ence“ on the islands.88 Richard's point, of course, seems to have been that the islanders would be able to enjoy a much more ”modem“ and “fulfilled“ existence on another island with an American infrastructure, material goods, and administrative guidance.89 Richard also accepted that the Bikin- ian reluctance to leave the island was due to their being " . . . the least cosmopolitan of the Marshallese.“ Citing a report about infrequent contact with the rest of the world, a peculiar accent, and the fact that they were the last Marshallese to be converted by missionaries, Richard subscribed to the notion that the Bikinians were “oceanic backwoodsmen" with a highly integrated society, tight kinship, and a “united front“ against the world.” Likewise, Richard cited and seemed to accept the findings of a Board of Investigation in I946 which blamed centuries of European, Japanese, and chieftain dominance for the Bikinians' alleged “vacillation", lack of decision making ability, and “lack of foresight.“ Richard would not or could not take into account the fact that the United States had promised the Bikinians an island on which life would be easier, that the United States was not able to deliver on that promise, and that the Bikinians were accordingly very deci- sive about returning to the atoll. if there was any “Ignorance“ on the part of the Bikinians, it was Ignorance shared by American officials about the dis- astrous long-term effects of nuclear radiation on the bombed atoll.9l 33 See P. Drucker, "T he Ex-Bikini Occupants of Kill ." enclosure ( I) to F ieloT erPacIs. wrial 580 as found in Richard, (lm’tw'Sfotetr Abra/Adm'nistraflm Vol. 3, 507-508. 89 Ibid., 507-555. 90 See Drucker, “Ex-Bikini Occupants," 507-508. Ibid. 9‘ For an example of this ignorance, see the report by Howard G. McMillan, USCC Awicultural Production Specialist, Pacific Ocean Area, entitled "Rehabilitation for the Marshallese Natives of Ronaorik ," Exhibit 4 to Records of Proceedings of a Board. . . to investigate the Proposed Resettlement of the Bikini-Rangerik Natives,“ encl (A) to GovMarshalls letter, September 26, I947 as found in Richard, Unltm'Statme/Adn/Mstraflm Vol. 3, 522. 524; see also Weismll, “Nuclear Pacific,“ 4i -55. 282 The perception of innocent children In island paradises who craved f or the "benefits" of American civilization continued to be enunciated after the war in other contexts and by other officials. in December l945, Secretary of the Interior Ickes wrote Secretary of State Byrnes that civil administra- tion of the islands by the interior Department would " . . . assist the natives of the islands toward a better way of life within the limits of their capabilities and the potentialities of their environment."92 lckes‘ August I946 Collie/s article also fully subscribed to perceptions of the Micrones- Ians which confirm a great deal of Rosenberg‘s assertions that Americans have constantly viewed the world In terms which mirror their own domestic culture. For example, ickes' denunciation of naval military government and naval civil administration for the Micronesians was based on his perception that the Micronesians were "just like" Americans In that they " . . . are born, grow up, play baseball, get married, raise families and die, just as we do here In America. in short, they are people."93 ickes' choice of words is in- teresting. They Imply that "people" or "human beings“ are those populations whose cultures and lifestyles resemble or equate with continental American tastes and values. Moreover, he criticized naval administration on the grounds that most Americans In the United States would not want to live under a similar system. Since Micronesians supposedly had similar values, or would so after US attempts at assimilation, a military system would be just as obnoxious to them. Ickes then summed up his argument for civilian rule of the Islands by explicitly comparing autocratic naval rule on Guam and American Samoa 91’ See ickes to Byrnes. December 29. l945, file 0F 85-L, "Trusteeship Of The Pacific Islands, may 1945 to 1950." box 572. White House Official F iIBS. HSTL. 93 See ickes, "Navy at Its Worst." 22. 283 from i898 to I946 with allegedly enlightened rule by US civil authorities in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands, as well as among American Indian tribes in the continental US.94 Completely Ignor- Ing the complex histories of American military and civil administration of these areas and their indigenous populations, ickes left the impression that American military rule over civilian populations was “bad“ because it was “Uh-American“ but that civil administration would be benign and enlighten- ed. What ickes failed to realize or refused to admit Is that American civil administration of non-white peoples could be just as negative and Insensi- tive as direct military rule. The most interesting perspective about the article, however, Is that ickes did not oppose the Idea of the UN strategic trusteeships in the Pacific Basin in l946. At various points in this article, he described UN trustee- ships as devices to guarantee US security, Micronesian human rights, and in- temationai confidence in the UN process.95 Of course, this fact should not be surprising considering that the Interior Department under Ickes“ leader- ship joined with the State Department in the last months of the war to de- vise the strategic trusteeship concept as a means to alleviate military op- position to a minimal UN role in the postwar Pacific. Still, for all of his op- position to naval civil administration in postwar Micronesia, Ickes was really not that far from the Navy‘s position. His disagreements with naval officials had more to do with differences over means to an end rather than goals themselves. it appears from this evidence that both Ickes and Ameri- can naval officials beiieved American security in the postwar Pacific could 94 Ibid. 67. 95 ibid, 22-23 and 67. 284 be buttressed by inculcating the indigenous population with American cul- tural values. The perception of the islanders as children who had to be guided by Uncle Sam continued to be cited as the trusteeship negotations came to an end in the fall of I946 and the winter of i947. Senator Warren Austin, in his speech to the UN Security Council in support of the US Draft Trusteeship Agreement of October l946, stressed high-minded ideals such as maximum self -govemment, economic self -suff iclency, and ”social progress" as a way to market the agreement to the Security Council. Austin, however, asserted that these goals could not be undertaken within the context of an "undeve- lOped" central government. The lack of a centralized government, similar to that of "modern" nations, seemed to make the Micronesians unfit to rule themselves in any manner.96 American policymakers continued to play upon this theme of politi- cal "immaturity" and asserted that they were ruling in the best interests of the Pacific islanders. In I947, for example, Secretary of the Navy F orrestal testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the best in- terests of the Micronesians were in mind when the Navy asked for Senate approval of the UN Trust Territory Agreement. In‘contrast to his private emphasis on the security aspects of the UN agreement and his private mis- givings about strategic trusteeship, Forrestal wrote and spoke publicly about the American presence in the islands in terms of political and social obligations to the UN and the Micronesians rather than the national Interests of the United States.” Not denying the Islands' paramount importance to 95 SeeAustin to the UN Security Council, February 26, I947, file 2-I-7, box I4, RG 80, NA; see also "United States Position Oil Soviet Proposal F or Amendnent Of Draft Trusteeship Aweement.“JCS l6l9/20. March 3. I947. file I2-9-42 sec. 29. CCS 360. RC 2l8. NA 97 See us Senate, frwmwmmf far (he lawman/re Pacific Islam. I s. 285 the United States as security outposts, he now suggested that the major ad- ministrative goal would be to guarantee the Micronesians maximum self - govemment, basic civil rights and freedoms, and American citizenship. In effect, Forrestal made It sound as if the United States was undertaking strategic trusteeship in the Pacific for altruistic missionary, not military, reasons. Again, however, most Americans may not have considered the two aspects to be separate or exclusive.98 Julius Krug, ickes“ successor as Secretary of the Interior, visited many of the islands In February and March of i947 and his report is also re- plete with cultural assumptions, value judgements, and prejudices about the islanders and their role In an American sphere. Not surprisingly, Krug's con- clusions were that the Islanders hoped to achieve something akin to a do- mestic American lifestyle. Krug began his report with the assertion that military rule should be curtailed immediately and replaced by civil admini- stration so that the US did not appear hypocritical and so that the islands could be held out as an International showcase displaying the "American way of life.“ Krug went on to explain that civil administration should stress educational programs designed to " . . . assist these island peoples In raising themselves to a reasonably modern social and cultural level." Though Krug admitted that some aspects of "native culture" should be preserved, he felt the US had a responsibility to do more than " . . . preserve them as an exhibit of bygone or 'primitive' culture."99 Concerning the people of Guam, for In- stance, Krug asserted that naval administration had taught the Guamanians 98 See proposed speech by Forrestal, "The United States' Role in the Trusteeship System .- February 22, I947, file 86-5-45, box l34, RG 80, NA; see also memo for Forrestal from Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman. DCNO for Operations, February 25, I947. ibid 99 See "Report To The President: Pacific Island inspection Tour Of JA Krug. Secretary Of The Interior, February-March I947," file OF 85-L, box 572. HSTL. 286 the general principles of the American way of life and that the Guamanians were ready for autonomy since they " . . . speak our language with facility,- they understand our political philosophy and have the same social organization and institutions that we have on the mainland. They have been devout Christians for generations and their loyalty to the United States is attested to in suffering and bloodshed."100 Krug then discussed the people of American Samoa by dividing them into two groups. "Those who live in and around Pago Pago and have worked and associated with the American naval and civilian colony speak our language, practice our religions and social forms, and have a good understanding of our political philosophy." Samoans of the "back country," however, still lived in a “native" society and economy, retained their tribal customs and language, and retained what Krug considered a crude form of political governance called the ”fono". An annual meeting of chiefs and of- ficials employed as advisers by the naval government, Krug did not believe the “fono' was anything more than a "semblance" of a "truly democratic" leg- islative body. Apparently, the "f ono" was too prone to be dominated by chiefs and family heads, but Krug was certain that with " . . . experience in the use of the franchise, American Samoans would soon adapt themselves to democratic institutionsf'IOi Krug's views on the intimate relationship between interior Depart- ment civil administration, the creation of American showcase societies In the Pacific, and postwar American security in the region were also quite evident In the report. Remarking about Micronesia itself, Krug argued that '00 ibid '01 ibid 287 " . . . a local society of self-respecting human beings, Imbued with the love for democracy which comes to those who enjoy its benefits and who themselves perpetuate its existence, can be the greatest asset to our own security and [a] forward bulwark of the American way of life." Moreover, Krug thought it particularly important that civil administration be institut- ed on Okinawa, which was fast becoming one of the forwardmost American strategic bases. He believed that the "form" and “words” of "our way of life" had to be established on Okinawa as " . . . proof to the peoples Of the Far East that democracy is suited to oriental peoples living in an oriental economy. A truly democratic Okinawa and Japan, lying as they do Off the mainland of Asia, can serve as a spearhead of our way of life."l°2 Because of the seeming mix of cynical strategic interest and miss- Ionary concern evident throughout these sources, it Is appropriate to close with evidence which combines a highly paternalistic cultural arrogance with a simultaneous and awkward attempt to pay a compliment to the Paci- fic Islanders. Retired naval officer Vice Admiral Carleton Wright, Deputy Commander of US forces in the Marianas, wrote to Proceedings about the administrative problems the Navy encountered in the islands. Wright ended his article on a positive note, summing up his argument that no matter what the adversity, anyone who knew the " . . . intelligent and competent brown skinned folk of Micronesia admire the way that they have adapted themselves to their surroundings.‘103 Given the cultural attitudes express- ed by American officials toward Pacific lslanders and East Asians, It is not surprising to find that racial overtones were evident in "compliments" such '02 ibid. '03 See ViceAdnlral Carleton H. Wright. USN (RET), "Trust Territory or The Pacific islands.” (AW/P 74 (November I948): l34l. 288 as these. Still, the incident reveals to what extent a cultural arrogance permeated planning documents and unofficial sources in the I940s and how these cultural assumptions effected strategic thinking about the postwar Pacific Islands. Conclusion American cultural attitudes and assumptions in the l940s were not only directed toward the Japanese in a vindictive manner, but also toward Pacific Islanders, other East Asians, and African-Americans in especially arrogant and patemallstic manners. Though there seemed to be a more posi- tive attitude toward Pacific islanders than toward Japanese, Chinese, Fili- pinos, or African-Americans, the islanders were still perceived as a primi- tive, childish, and immature people who were unfit to rule themselves. At first glance, the motivations of American strategic officials con- cerning "cultural security" may appear to be very ambiguous. On the one hand, both official and unofficial sources advocated a specific cultural or- ientation for the indigenous population as a way to couple the islands to the United States and secure them from covert "foreign subversion.“ At the same time, the idea of using white settlement, American-style Protestant- ism, and the English language might have been one method for creating an intemationai cultural showcase for postwar American development. While military security and a showcase environment for the postwar world were probably not entirely mutually exclusive to their advocates, it is this au- thor‘s opinion that the former objective was the primary one of importance to strategic policymakers and planners in the late I940s. If motivations were not crystal clear, however, the cultural percep- tions of American strategic planners toward Pacific Islanders at least illu- 289 strate a number of concerns and patterns. Clearly, ideas about culturally converting the Pacific into an American lake suggests how prevalent fears were about guaranteeing the future territorial security of the region. In ad- dition, the effects which the Interwar, Pacific War, and early Cold War per- iods had on American strategic thinking are quite evident given that a cul- tural dimension to national security policy was so seriously and so often discussed by policymakers, planners, and strategic thinkers. » 290 Conclusion From the Old to the New: CODUDUIUES and Changes in American Pacific Policy American strategic policy toward the Pacific Basin between I945 and I947 constituted an Imperial solution to the US‘ anxieties about postwar security In the region as well as the most recent example of American westward expansionism. in addition, as Micronesia and other areas of the Pacific became entangled in Cold War International relations during the final months of the Roosevelt Administration and the first two years of the Truman Administration, American policy witnessed a number of continuities and changes from the pre- l 941 period. Similar to earlier periods of American diplomacy, US perceptions of national security were broad and multidimensional in nature. American policy toward the postwar Pacific was a microcosm of American expansion as Samuel F lagg Bemis, Emily Rosenberg, William Roger Louis, and other historians have depicted it.I To be absolutely sure about postwar security, American officials sought not only physical control In the region through military means, but they also wanted to buttress that physical control with ' See Bemis, lam/imam” Policyo/f/ie UniMStatas; 73-97; Hietala, rim/fart Der/m, 6; Rosenberg. (Samoa/w (Inner/am 0mm 3- I 3; Costigliola, Awkmoamhim, 9- l O ind I5- I 6; and Louis, Imperialism away, 68-69. 29l the economic penetration of the Basin and the importation of American cul- tural values to the Pacific islanders. Also similar to earlier periods of US International relations, Ameri- can strategy toward the postwar Pacific demonstrated a significant gap be- tween rhetoric and reality. While Rooseveltian rhetoric about collective se- curity, free trade, and national self -determination cannot be taken too seri- ously, the Pacific was the one area of the world where American policymak- ers and planners first and consistently disregarded even superficial adher- ence to Internationalist thinking and great power cooperation. In effect, American officials during both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations made it clear to other nations that the Pacific Basin was to be considered the US' strategic preserve by ensuring that the US had unilateral control over the occupation of Japan, the administration of Japan's Pacific posses- sions, and the fortification of the Pacific Islands north of the Equator. There were, however, significant changes in the postwar period. Un- like the Interwar period when the Navy and State Departments disagreed over the terms of the Washington Treaty System, a consensus about strate- gic security in the postwar Pacific was evident In the United States govern- ment. The dispute over annexation, trusteeship, and civil administration be- tween the War and Navy Departments on the one hand and the State and Inte- rlor Departments on the other was not about questioning the right of the United States to dominate the postwar Pacific. To my knowledge, no of f i- cial in the State or interior Departments questioned the need for the US to create an American lake as a means of guaranteeing future strategic secu- rity. Indeed, the situation had changed greatly since the I92'Os when naval 292 officers were alone In arguing for unilateral US control in Micronesia and abstention from the Washington System? Similarly, while the Army and Navy squabbled over the means of ac- cupying, defending, and administering the region, their respective strategic ideas for the area were quite similar and had more to do with arguing over means than ends. Whether control was maintained by carrier fleets or stra- tegic bombers, military officers were convinced that the Pacific Basin should become an "American lake.” Although Interservice rivalry was seri- ous and divisive In the late I940s, Its affect on the formulation of US Pa- cific policy should not be exaggerated. When It came to postwar disposi- tions in the Pacific, officers from the two departments merely disagreed over tactics, not strategy. This short time period also witnessed a recognition by American pol- icymakers and planners that the prewar military doctrine based on a con- centrated Pacific fleet and control over a number of individual islands strewn across the Pacific Basin was only partially sufficient as a means by which to dominate the Pacific and influence events in East Asia. The Japa- nese offensives of i94l - I 942 and the subsequent American offensives of l942- I 945 reaffirmed the Mahanian faith in mobile forces among US naval officers and spread that gospel to officials throughout the executive and legislative branches of the US government. While the war also convinced American officials that the military development of entire island groups which could act as mutually supporting "strategic physical complexes" was also a necessary part of the national security equation, mobile forces re- mained paramount. When budgetary restrictions forced reductions across 2 See Braisted. mmmmm Momma, 1909- 1922, sea-sea. 293 the board, key officers such as John Towers were able to assert that mili- tary base development was of secondary importance to mobile f orce pro- curement and the "strategic denial” of islands to "any other power." The emphasis on the location of bases also changed. There were no plans made between I945 and 1947 for resurrecting the prewar idea of Alaska-Hawali-Panama as a defensive line for the Western Hemisphere. By i947, Micronesia and the other Pacific Island groups taken from Japan were no longer considered the first line of defense In the Pacific nor even a sec- ond line of defense In case of a disaster In East Asia. Instead, Micronesia, the Bonins, the Volcanoes, Marcus Island, and the Aleutians became the “ul- timate“ or "final“ line of American defense In the Pacific behind which there was to be no peacetime “retreat" on the order of I898, I9 I 9, or l922. Base configurations also steadily progressed westward toward the shores of East Asia as the United States became more Involved in mainland affairs by I947. The role of Micronesia is Indicative of this westward pro- gression. Between i942 and I945, strategic planners looked on Micronesia as the first line of territorial defense for the United States against a po- tentially resurgent postwar Japan. Yet between I945 and l947 the trans- formation of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar rivalry meant a transformation of Ameri- can strategic plans. Sometime after I944 and definitely by l946, Japan ceased being the potential enemy of primary concern In the Pacific while the Soviet Union took on that role. The documents simultaneously indicate the formation of a rough strategic perimeter in the Pacific and East Asia 294 based on the defense of Japan, the Philippines, and China, rather than the western Pacific Islands}5 By I947, China seems to have been replaced by French Indochina and South Korea as the American outposts on the East Asian mainland.‘‘ The in- creasing f allure of the Nationalist cause meant a shift north and south In American attention toward the mainland, with the Pacific Islands taking on a new support role for US forces In East Asia. Still, the evidence is not en- tirely conclusive that the strategic perimeter shifted althogether to main- land East Asia by l947. Assertions by Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Whitehead, as well as Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Board on the Military Development of the Marianas, suggests that high-ranking officers were planning on an evacuation of South Korea and Japan and the construction of a constricted strategic defense perimeter based on Alaska, Micronesia, and the Philippines as late as the summer of I947. To be sure, the Pacific was also a case study of Interwar "strategic lessons” applied to the postwar period. The fact that American planners were still placing importance on Micronesia and even wartime bases In the South Pacific suggests the power of worst-case scenario thinking on Amer- Ican officials in the late l940$ and the trauma wrought on them by Pearl Harbor and the defeats of early I942. Melvyn Lef f ler has found that Ameri- can Intelligence estimates of Soviet power In Europe and the Middle East at 3 Michael Schaller and John Lewis Gadiis both perceive a strategic perimeter forming after I 947. Schaller sees the perimeter forming in East Asia after the "reverse course" in Japan, while Gatiis argues that the perimeter originated in the Pacific and moved west toward the East Asian mainland as the US became more involved In that region. Conversely, I have asserted from War and Navy Department documents that strategic planners perceived a defense perimeter for the Pacific Basin long before I94? and long before the East Asian mainland began to take on "frontiine" importance. Seleaschaller. Amwiam mil/perm arm, passim; and Gaddis. "The Strategic Perspective." 6 I - 4 See Robert Blum, Draw/7y (Ital 7m Me main arm/am aorta/mt Policy in female (New York: Norton Publishers, l982). 295 this time began to equate Soviet power with prewar German capabilities and intentions.5 In a similar fashion, Soviet forces in East Asia were equated with prewar Japanese capabilities and intentions and some planners in Washington and Tokyo envisioned having to repeat a Pacific War-like retreat to Micronesia or even the South Pacific In the face of a future Soviet on- slaught Into the Pacific Basin. While these reports now appear to to be f an- tastic, to officers who witnessed the “disarmament“ of the l9205, the “ap- peasement" of the 19305, and the trauma of Pearl Harbor, Soviet power was a very sincerely feared future prospect. The ultimate value of studying US Pacific policy in the late l9405, however, rests upon the fact that these sources of American strategic Inse- curity eventually equated to regional hegemony and great power Imperial- ism. Given that “imperialism” has had such a negative connotation In Amer- ican thought and given that the region was both a microcosm and an anomaly of American foreign policy, the Pacific Basin is still a window through which to view very characteristic and mainstream currents of thought in the histories of US International relations, American expansionism, and the exportation of American values. 5 In “American conception of National Security,” Leffier argued that the Cold War begun in the American mind sometime between i945 and I948. In ”Mme/Pm, he asserted that the Cold War began very specifically In i946. Though Leffier's thinking on the timing of Cold War’s origins has changed over time. he still sees American intellimnce analysis in the late 19403 as alarmist and largely inaccurate when It comes to investigating massive Soviet military intentions. Sea Leffier. ”American Conception of National Security.“ 346-400; and Idem. , PWmo/PM, l00- I40. 296 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources The following are the major and minor collections of archival ma— terials which I employed to analyze US strategic policy toward the Pacific Basin In the l940s The most useful collections Included the Strategic Plans Division Records at the Navy Operational Archives, the Records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff at the National Archives, the Papers of Harold Ickes and John Towers at the Library of Congress, the White House Central and Official Files at the Harry S. Truman Library, the Pre-Presiden- tial Papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the Collections of Messages (Radiograms) at the MacArthur Memorial, and the Ennis Whitehead Collection and Pacific Air Command, United States Army records at the Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Agency. Also heavily consulted were the mi- crof I lm version of Me Forresta/wanes, the F905 United Nations volumes for I945, l946, and l947, and Commander Dorothy Richard's three-volume administrative history of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. A complete list of the manuscript collections and other primary sources fol lows: ”30056710119 andArc/u‘va/ Records Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC. Strategic Plans Division Records 297 Records of the Office or Chief or Naval Operations (Double Zero) Records of the Politico-Military Affairs Division Post-I January I946 Command File Post-I January l946 Report File Papers of Louis E. Denfield Officer Bio Collection National Archives, Washington, DC. RG 2 I 8: Records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff RG 80: General Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy RG 59: Records of the Department of State RG 48: Records of the Department of the Interior RG I26: Records of the Office of Territories Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Papers of Harold Ickes Papers of Julius Krug Papers of William Leahy Papers of Carl Spaatz Papers of John Towers Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri White House Central F IIes White House Official Files President's Secretary's F I les Papers of George Elsey Papers of PhIIeo Nash Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas Pre-Presidential Papers Papers of Lauris Norstad War Department Operations and Plans Division Wartime Diary MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia RG 4: Records of the General Headquarters, US. Army Forces, Pacific RG 5: Records of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan, I94S- I 9SI RG 6: General Records of the Headquarters, U.S. Far Eastern Command, i947- I 9SI RG 9: Collections of Messages (Radiograms), l94S-I9SI Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Agency, Montgomery, Alabama Ennis Whitehead Collection ( l68.6008-I, I68.6008-3, 168.6008-4) 298 Report of the Joint Military Board for the Military Development of the Marianas (178.29 I 7-1) Pacific Air Command, United States Army records (720.04-3, 720. 151-2, 720.609-7, 720. I 622, 720. I 623) Fifth Air Force records (730.04-4A, 730. I 61-31 Records on Soviet Activity In Siberia (484.605-1) Microfilm Collections Papers of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. State-War- iVavy Coordinating Committee Policy Files, l944- 1942 WI 1- mlngton, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc, I977. Micro- film. Papers of James V. F orrestaI. fne Forrestal Diaries, I944- I949 Washington, D.C.: NPPSO-Naval District Washington Microfilm Section, 1973-1979. Microfilm. United States Bovemment Pool/cations United States Department of State. F905 (Foreign 9elations of the United States). F905, l945: Vol. I. General,- fne 0nitediVations. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967. F905, 1946, Vol. I. General; l'ne United/Vations Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972. F905; 1947, Vol. I. General; Tne 0niteoWations Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973. F905, 1947} Vol. 6. The FarFast. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972. United States Congress. House. Committee on Naval Affairs. Stony of Pacific Bases: A 9eport oy tne Soocommittee on Pacific Bases. 79th Cong, Ist Sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945. United States Congress. House. Committeeon Appropriations. Natal Department Appropriation Bill for l946- Hearings Before l'ne Soocommittee on Appropriations. 79th Cong, lst Sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945. United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. ”310/ Department Appropriation Bill for 7942- Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriations. 79th Cong, lst Sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946. United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Maia! Department Appropriation Bill for 7943- Hearings Before tne Subcommittee on Appropriations. 80th Cong, lst Sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, I947. ‘ United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Trusteeship Agreement for Me Territory of Me Pacific islands' 299 Hearings Before tne Commitee on Foreign 9elations 80th Cong, Ist Sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947. Commander Dorothy E. Richard, USNR. 0niteuStates iVaval Admini- stration Of Me frust Territory Of Me Pacific islands Vols. 1- 3. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957-1963. interviews William Christopher Hamel, Telephone Interview, November 16, 1993. Timothy P. Maga, Telephone Interview, November 23, 1993 and February 2, 1995. Contemporary Publications Clark, TO. “The Administration Of The Former Japanese Mandated Is- lands." USN/P 72 (April 1946): 51 1-515. Emerson, Rupert. "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies.“ Pacific Affairs 20 (September 1947): 259-275. James, Roy E. "The Guam Congress.“ Pacific Affairs 19 (December 1946): 408-413. Ickes, Harold L. “The Navy at Its Worst.“ Colliers 1 17 (August 31, 1946): 22-23 and 67. Lattimore, Eleanor. "Pacific Ocean or American Lake?“ FarFastern Survey 14(November 7, I945): 313-316. Mcintosh, KC. ”The Road Ahead.” 0SMP 71 (November 1945): 1283- 1293. Richards, Guy. “Pacific Briefing.“ USiV/P 71 (February 1945): 156- I71. Rowcliff, G.J. ”Guam,“ USN/P 71 (February 1945): 781-793. Rowe, David Nelson. “Collective Security In The Pacific: An American View.“ Pacific Affairs (March 1945): 5-21. ShurcI Iff , William A. Bomos at Bikini:- l'ne Official 9eport of Opera- tion Crossroads New York: W.H. Wise, 1947. Wright, Carleton. “Trust Territory Of The Pacific Islands.“ USN/P 74 (November 1948): 1333-1341. 300 Secondary Sources 1 have chosen to divide my remaining sources Into two categories. The following is a complete list of secondary sources which were either central to the main ppints enunciated In the dissertation or were very sig- nificant for setting the context. Many of these works are also represented in my MA. thesis, which was the intellectual and historiographical starting point for this dissertation. Adler, Les K. and Thomas G. Paterson. “Red Fascism: The Merger of NaZI Germany and Soviet Russia In the American Image of Totalitarianism, 19303-19505.“ American Historical 9eview 75 (April I970): 1046- 1064. Ballendorf, Dirk A. “Secrets without Substance: US. Intelligence In the Japanese Mandates, 1915-1945.“ Journal ofPacifi'c History 19 (April 1984): 83-99. ---------------- . ”The Japanese And The Americans: Contrasting Histori- caI Periods Of Economic And Social Development In Palau.“ Journal of Me Pacific Society 1 I (October I988): 7-13. ---------------- . “Interpreting The Cultures Of Micronesia: Three Paradigms Of Pacific Historiography.“ Journal of Me Pacific Society 13 (July 1990): 1-8. ---------------- . “An Historical Perspective On Economic Development In Micronesia, 1783 to 1945.“ Asian Culture (Asian-Pacific Culture) Duarter/y 19 (Summer 1991): 47-58. Bamhart, Michael A. Japan Prepares for fatal Wan l'ne Searcn for Fconomic Security, i9i9- i941. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. Bell, Roger. “Australian-American Discord: Negotiations For Post-War Bases And Security Arrangements In The Pacific, I944-1946.“ Aus- tralian Outlook 27 (April 1973): 12-33. Bem Is, Samuel F Iagg. Jays Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy. .New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1923. --- —=. Pinckneys Treaty: America 's Advantage from Furope s Distress New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1926. . fne tat/n American Policy of Me United States An Historical interpretation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1943. - . Jonn Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1949. 301 Borowsm, Harry R. “Air Force Atomic Capability from v-J Day to the Berlin Blockade-Potential or Real?“ Nili'taorAffairs 44 (October 1980): 105-1 10. ----------------- . A Hollow fnreat: Strategic Airpower and Contain- ment Before Korea Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982. Braisted, William R. lne 0ni'ted States ”814’ in Me Pacific, lB97- i 909 Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1958. ----------------- . fne United States Navy in Me Pacific, i909- l922 Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1971. Brands, HW. Bound to Empire: fne United States and toe Poi/ippines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Brune, Lester H. fne Origins of American National Security Policy- Sea Power, Air Power, AndForeign Policy, i900- l94l. Manhattan, Kansas: MA/AH Publishing, Sunflower University Press, 1981. Buel 1, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power: A Biograpny of Fleet Admiral Ernest J King Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980. Buhite, Russel H. and William Christopher Hamel. “War for Peace: The Ques- tion of an American Preventive War, I94S- I 955.“ Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 367-384. Campbell, I.C. A History of Me Pacific islands Berkeley, California: University of California Press, I989. Chinard, Gilbert. fnomas Jefferson: fne Apostle of Americaan Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929. Claude, In i 5, Jr. Swords into P/owsnares- fne Prep/ems and Progress of in- ternational Organizations. New York: Random House, 1984. Colletta, Paolo E. "Rear Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger, Commander Patrol Wing Two and General Frederick L. Martin, Air Commander, Hawaii.” In William B. Cogar, ed., New interpretations in Naval Histom Select- ed Papers from tne Fi'gntn Naval History Symposium Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Converse, Elliot V. ”United States Plans For A Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948.“ Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1984. Cost Igl Iola, Frank. A wkward Dominion: American Political, Fconomic, and Cultural 9eiations wit/i Furepe, i9/9- i931 Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984. Cullather, Nick. ”The Limits of Multilateralism: Making Policy for the Philippines, I94S- I 950.“ international History 9eview 13 (February 1991): 70-95. Cum Ings, Bruce. l'iie Origins of Me Korean Wan t i'oeration and toe [mer- gence of Separate 9egin7es; l945- i947. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981. . fne Origins of Me Korean Wan fne 9oaring of the 302 Cataract, I947-1950 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990. Davis, Vincent. Postwar Defense Policy and tiie US Navy, 1943- 1946 Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Daws, Gavan. Snoal of 717176!“ A History Of Me Hawaiian islands Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1968. Dedman, John J. “Encounter over Manus.” Australian Outlook 20 (August 1966): 135-153. Dingm an, Roger. Power in Me Pacific- fne Origins of Naval Arms 1 imita- tions 1914- 1922 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Dorrance, John C. fne United States and Me Pacific islands Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1992. Dower, John W. “Occupied Japan and the American Lake, I945-SO.“ In Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds, America'sAsia- Dissenting Fssays on Asian-American 9eiations New York: Vintage Books, 1971. ------------- . War wi'tnout i‘iercy: 9ace and Power in Me Pacific War New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. F Iscn, Arnold 0., Jr. rill/tary Government in Me 9yukyus, 1945-195a Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center for Military History, 1988. Foltos, Lester J. “The New Pacific Barrier. America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945- l 947.“ Diplomatic History (Summer 1989): 317- 342. Friedman, Hal M. “Islands and Admirals: The United States Navy, Micronesia, and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947.“ MA thesis, Michigan State University, 199 I ). Friedman, Hal M. “The Beast in Paradise: The United States Navy in Micronesia, 1943-1947." Pacific Historical 9eview 62 (May 1993): 173-195. Gaddis, John Lew is. Me United States and toe Origins of Me Cold War; 1941-1942 New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. ----------------- . “The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the 'Defensive Perimeter‘ Concept, I947- I 951.” In Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds, Uncertain rears.- Ciiinese-American 9eiations, 1947-195.1 New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 6319, Roger. fne Americanization of NlC/‘ODOSI'a: A Story of tne Consolida- tion of US 9ule in Me Pacific Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979. Gal I Icchio, Marc. fne Cold War Begins in Asia: American Fast Asian Policy and toe Fall of the Japanese [mp/re. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. --------------- . "The US. and the Kuriles Controversy: Strategy and 303 Diplomacy In the Sov1et-Japan Border Dispute, I941 - l 956.” Pacific Historical9eview 60 (February 1991): 69-101. Gardner, Lloyd. Aoproacning Wet/1392‘ From World War 11 tnrougn DiorioionOnO New York: w.w Norton & Company, 1988. Gibson, Arrell Morgan and John S. Whitehead. Yankees in Paradise Tne Pa- cific Basin Frontien Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1993. Herkan, Gregg. The Winning Weapon- fne Atomic Bomb in Me Cold War, 1945-1950 New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1980. Herzog, James H. Closing tne Open Door? American -Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations 1936-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Hi eta I a, Thom as. Manifest Design: AflX/OUS A ggrandIZement in tate Jackson/an America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. Hirama, YoIchI. "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Two.“ Naval War College 9eview 44 (Spring 1991): 63-81. Hogan, Michael. fne Narsnall Plan: America, Brita/17, and toe 9econstruction ofEurope, i947-1952 Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Horsm an, Reginald. 9ace and/‘iam'fest Destiny: fne Origins of American 9aci'al Anglo-Saxoni'sm Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. Hunt, Michael. ideology and US Foreign Policy. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987. Iriye, AkIra. Power and Culture: fne Japanese -American War, 1941- 1945 Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. ---------- . fne Camori'dge History of American Foreign 9eiations, Volume 111- Me Gloom/“Zing of America, 1913-1945. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Isley, Jeter and Philip Crowl. Me 05 i‘farines andAmpnioious Wan its fneory and its Practice in Me Pacific. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951. Kamow, Stanley. in Our image: America '3 Empire in Me Poi/ippines. New York: Ballantine Books, 1989. LaF eber, Wal ter. 7716’ Cambridge History of American Foreign 9eiations, Volume 11' Me American Searcii for Opportunity, 1865- 1913. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, I993. Leff I er, Melvyn. fne E iusive Ouest- America s Pursuit of European Staoi'li‘ty andFrencn Security, 1919- 193.1 Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1979. - — . "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, I94S- I 948.“ American Historical 9eview 304 89 (April 1984): 346-400. - . A Preoonderance of Power: national Security, tne Truman Administration andtne Cold Ivar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992. Louis, William Roger. imperialism at Bay l'ne (Jilted States And fne De- colonization Of flie Britisii Empire, 1941-1945 Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, I 977. Maga, Timothy P. "The Citizenship Movement In Guam, l946-1950.“ Pacific Historical 9eview 53 (February 1984): 59-77. -------------- . Defending Paradise: fne United States and Guam, 1B9B- 1950 New York: Garland Press, 1988. Mastny, Vo ] tech. 9ussi'a s 9oad to toe Cold War: Diplomacy, Strategy, and toe Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. McCormick, Thomas. America s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in Me Cold War. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989. McMahon, Robert J. Colonialism and Cold War: lne United States And Me Struggle For indonesian independence, 1945 - 1949 Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, I981. Merk, Frederick. fne i‘ionroe Doctrine and American Expansion, 1B43- 1B49 New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Miller, Aaron David. Search For Security: Saudi Araoi'an Oil And American Foreign Policy, 1939- 1949 Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: fne US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1B9?- 1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Millet, Allan R. Semper F idelis- l‘ne History of Me United States i‘iarine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Millis, Walter and Eugene Duf f ield, eds, l'ne ForrestaiDiaries New York: The Viking Press, 1951. ' Nufer, Harold F. Micronesia Under American 9ule: An Evaluation of the Stra- tegic Perspective, l947-1977. Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1978. Oliver, Douglas. fne Pacific islands, erEdition. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. Painter, David S. Oil and toe American Century.- l’ne Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Palmer, Michael. Origins of tne Maritime Strategy: fne Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945-1955 Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 305 Paterson, Thomas G. Soviet -A'meri'can Confrontation: Postwar 9econstruc- tion and the Origins of tbe Cold War. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. —— — . On Every Front: Tne Making of too Cold War. New York: WW. Norton & Company, 1979. Peattie, Mark R. Nanyo: Tne 9i'se andFall of Me Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1988. Pletcher, David M. Tne Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and toe Mexican War. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1973. Pollard, Robert A Economic Security And Tne Origins Of Tne Cold War, 1945-195a New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. Pom eroy, Earl S. Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam andMicrones- ia Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: Tne Untold Story of Pearl Harbor New York: Penguin Books, 1981. Price, Willard. Japan's islands of Mistery. New York: The John Day Company, 1944. Reynolds, Clark 6. “Submarine Attacks on the Pacific Coast, 1942.“ Pacific Historical 9eview 33 (May 1964): 183-193. --------------- . Admiral Jonn H T owers: Tbe Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. --— —— . Tne Fast Calf/PIS Tne Forging of an Air Nani. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Rosenberg, David Alan and Floyd 0. Kennedy, Jr. History Of Me Strategic Arms Competition, 1945- 1972 Supporting Study: US Aircraft Carriers In the Strategic Role, Part I-Naval Strategy In a Period of Change: Interservice Rivalry, Strategic Interaction, and the Develop- ment of a Nuclear-Attack Capability, I94S- I 951. Falls Church, Virginia: Lulejian and Associates, 1975. Rosenberg, Emily. Spreading tbe American Dream- American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945. New York: Hill and Wang, I982. Schaller, Michael. ”Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia." Journal ofAmerican History 69 (September 1982): 392-414. -- --. Tbe American Occupation of Japan: We Origins of tbe Cold War in Asia New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. ---------------- . Douglas MacArtnur: Tiie Far Eastern General New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Schroeder, John H. Snaping a Maritime Empire.- Tbe Commercial and Diplomatic 9ole of tbe American Nani, 1629- 186 l (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985). Sheehy, Edward J. Tne United States Nam tne Mediterranean, and toe Cold 306 War: 1945-1947. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992. Sherry, Michael S. Preparing For Tne Next War American Plans For Postwar Defense, 1941-45 New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977. Smith, Perry A. TneAi'rForce Plans For Peace Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Sto I er, Mark A. Tbe Politics Of Tiie Second Front: American Military Plann- ing and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941 - 1941 Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977. ------------- . “The 'PacifIc-First' Alternative in American World War II Strategy.“ intemationai History9evi’ew 2 (July 1980): 432-452. ------------- . “From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War.“ Diplo- matic History 6 (Summer 1982): 303-321. Stourzh, Gerald. Benjamin Franklin andAmerican Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. Strauss, W. Patrick. Americans in Polynesia, 17BJ-1B42 East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1963. Stuart, Reginald. Tne Half- Way Pacifist.- Tnomas Jefferson s Views of Wan Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. --------------- . War and American Tbougiit: From Me 9evoiution to tbe Monroe Doctrine. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1982. Talbert, Roy, Jr. Negative intelligence: Tiie Army and toe American t eft, 1917-1941. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, I991. Thorne, Christopher. Allies of a Kind- Tiie United States, Britain, and the war against Japan, 1941-1945 Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1978. Webb, James H., Jr. Micronesia and US Pacific Strategy.- A Blueprint for Me 1960s New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. White, Richard. Tne Middle Ground: indians, Empires, and 9epubiics in Me Great taxes Peg/on, 1650- 1815 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Wilson, Dale. "Recipe for Failure: Major General Edward H. Almond and Pre- paration of the US. 92nd Infantry Division for Combat In World War II.“ Journal ofMilitaryHi'story 56 (July 1992): 473-488. Yergin, Daniel. Snattered Peace: Tne Origins of the Cold War New York: Penguin Books, 1991. Yerxa, Donald A Admirals and Empire Tne United States Navy and Tbe Caribbean, 1898-1945 Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 307 Contextual Sources The following list represents primary and secondary sources which were utilized to write the MA. thesis, but were only lightly consulted or in- frequently cited In the dissertation. In spite of their peripheral role In the dissertation, these works helped provide context to such an extent that I felt It necessary to cite them for the reader, since these works may be starting p0Ints for other students Investigating US policy in the Pacific Basin since 1800. Albion, Robert. Makers of Naval Policy, 179B- 1947. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Alcalay, Glenn H. "Maelstrom In The Marshall Islands: The Social Impact of Nuclear Weapons Testing.“ In Catherine Lutz, ed., Micronesia As Stra- tegic Colony: Tiie impact of US Policy On Micronesian Healtii and Cui- ture Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cultural Survival, Inc., 1984. Allard, Dean. “La Battaille Du Potomac.“ Paper delivered at the 1988 Paris naval history conference “Les Marines De Guerre Du Dreadnought Au Nucleaire,“ 1-39. Ballendorf, Dirk A. ”A Historical Perspective on the Adaptlon and Addiction of Western Technology and Its Transfer In Micronesia.“ Asian Culture (Asian -Pacific Culture) Ouarterly 18 (Autumn 1990): 33-44. ---------------- . “Captain Samuel J. Masters, US Consul to Guam, 1854- 56: Harbinger of American Pacific Expansion.“ Diplomacy& State- craft 2 (November 1991): 306-326. Bamford, James. Tne Pu2'21e Palace- A 9eport on America s Most Secret Agency Harrisonburg, Virginia: RR. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1982. Baratta, Joseph P. “Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal for World Government?“ intemationaiHistory9ew‘ew 7 (November 1985): 592-621. Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946.' Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): 1003-1044. Blackburn, Paul P. "Oil To Burn?“ USN/P 74 (December 1948): 1487-1489. Blandy, W.H.P. “Operation Crossroads: The Story of the Air and Underwater Tests of the Atomic Bomb at Bikini.“ Army Ordnance 31 (January- February 1947): 341 -343. Blum, Robert. Drawing tne /. me: Me Origin of American Containment Policy in East Asia New York: Norton Publishers, 1982. 308 Braisted, William R. “The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898- I 909.“ Mississippi Valley Historical 9eview 41 (June 1954): 21 -40. Brune, Lester H. “Considerations of Force In Cordell Hull's Diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, I941.“ Diplomatic History 2 (Fall 1978): 389- 405. Burns, Richard Dean. “Inspection of th Mandates, I919-I94I.“ Pacific His- torical9eview 37 (November 1968): 445-462. Caraley, Demetrios. Tne Politics of Military Unification- A Stum/ of Con- flict And Me Policy Process New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Carano, Paul and Pedro C. Sanchez. A Complete History of Guam .Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1964. Chambliss, W.C. ”Base Nonsense.“ USN/P 71 (February 1945): 202-207. Coletta, Paolo. “The Defense Unification Battle, I947- I 950: The Navy.“ Prologue: Tne Journal of tbe National Arc/lives 7 (Spring 1975): 6- l7. ------------- . Tbe United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947- 1951 Newark, New Jersey: University of Delaware Press, 1981. Coox, Alvin. The Anatomy of a Small War: Tne Soviet -Japanese Struggle for Cnangkufeng/Knasan, 193B Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977. ---------- . Nomonban: Japan Against Puss/a, 1939 Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1985). Cranwell, John Philips. “Sea Power And The Atomic Bomb.“ USN/P 72 (October I 946): 1267- l 275. Davis, Vincent. Tiie Admirals’iobby Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1967. DeSm i th, Stanley A. Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America '5 Pacific islands and Otiier Minute Territories New York: New York University Press, 1970. Dorw art, Jeffrey M. Conflict of Duty: Tbe US Navys intelligence Dilemma, l9l9-194S Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Ethzold, Thomas H. and J0hn Lewis Gaddis, eds, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-195a New York: Columbia University Press, I978. Evangelista, Matthew A. “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised.“ intemation- al Security 7 (Winter I982- I 983): 1 10-138. Evatt, Herbert V. “The Future of the Pacific." Pacific Historical 9eview 14 (June 1945): 145-156. Farrell, James J. “The Crossroads of Bikini.” Journal of American Culture 10 (Summer 1987): 55-66. F lrth, Stewart. “The Nuclear Issues In the Pacific Islands” Journal of Pacific History 21 (October 1986): 202-216. 309 Forsyth, W.D. ”Stability In The Pacific: Australia's Position.“ Pacific Affairs 16 (March 1943): 7-18. Gerber, Larry G. "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War." Dip/o- matic History 6 (Winter 1982): 69-95. Gordon, Leonard. “American Planning for Taiwan, l942-I945.“ Pacific His- torical9eview 37 (August 1968): 201-228. Gormly, James L. “The Washington Declaration and the 'Poor Relation': Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945-46.“ Diplomatic History 8 (Spring 1984): 125- 143. Graybar, Lloyd J. "Bikini Revisited.“ MilitaryAffairs 44 (October 1980): 1 18-123. -------------- and Ruth Flint Graybar. America Faces The Atomic Age: 1946.“ Air University 9eview 35 (January-Feburary 1984): 68-77. -------------- . "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Inf Ighting?“ Journal ofAmerican History 72 (March 1986): 888-907. -------------- . “The Buck Rogers of the Navy: Admiral William HP. Blandy,“ In William P. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, eds, New inter- pretations in Naval History.- Selected Papers from tne Nintn Naval HistorySymposium Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Greenman, William G. “The Armed Services In Relation To A National Oil Policy.“ USN/P 72 (May 1946): 643-647. Grenville, JAS. and George Young. Politics, Strategr, andAmerican Diplo- macy: Studies in Foreign Policy 1B7J- 1912 New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1973. Haight, John M., Jr. “Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan.“ Pacific Historical 9eview 40 (May 1971): 203-226. Harrington, Daniel F. “A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941 ." Pacific Historical 9eview 48 (May 1979): 217-238. Harrison, Richard. "A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific: Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation, 1934-1937." Pacific Historicai9eviow 57 (February 1988): 47-72. Haynes, Richard F. ”The Defense Unification Battle, l947- I 950: The Army.“ Prologue: Tne Journal of Me National Arcnlves 7 (Spring 1975): 27- 31. Heine, Carl. Micronesia at Me Crossroads: A 9eappraisal of tne Micronesian Political Dilemma. Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii, 1974. 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