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**DIVISION AND UNITY,
DISPERSAL AND PERMANENCE:
THE ANISHNABEG OF THE
LAKE HURON BORDERLANDS**

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Philip Curtis Bellfy

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DIVISION AND UNITY, DISPERSAL AND PERMANENCE: THE ANISHNABEG OF THE LAKE HURON BORDERLANDS

By

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ABSTRACT

**DIVISION AND UNITY,
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Many studies of the indigenous peoples of North America accept *a priori* modern political boundaries. But, rather than focusing on the Native people of a particular place under a specific political jurisdiction, the present study will look at Native people who were subjected to the policies of two differing political entities and how the imposition of a political boundary through their homeland continues to affect them.

The study area comprises all of the borderlands of Lake Huron and its connecting waters. The Native people of the region today are almost exclusively Ojibway (or Chippewa), Ottawa, or Potawatomi, collectively called the Anishnabeg. While division is an obvious theme, the study also will examine the strong links that have served to maintain unity within the Anishnabeg over the period of nearly 400 years of European contact. Common language and culture are obvious links, but the political dimensions of unity will also be explored, as well as the concept of sovereignty as it

relates to various autonomous Anishnabeg groups.

The history of the Anishnabeg is presented from the earliest pre-contact times through the French and British regimes but always striving to maintain the reporting of that history from the indigenous perspective with emphasis on the forces that kept the identity of the people intact and how they successfully resisted removal policies of the two governments. The study culminates in an analysis of over 1,500 names of treaty-signers and names of others found in U.S. and Canadian government documents of the period. The analysis uncovers a surprising number of individuals that appear to have signed treaties for the Anishnabeg with both the U.S. and Canadian governments, which, it is argued, helped them maintain a degree of autonomy and sovereignty in the face of these two alternative hegemonic forces.

The study concludes by examining how the Anishnabeg have continued their struggle to maintain their identity throughout the tumult of the 20th century. Jay's Treaty and other cross-border issues are examined within this unifying context.

To the Memory of
Apishkagogi, White Crow,
my Seventh Father

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A loon
I thought it was.
But it was
My love's
Splashing oar.

To Sault Ste Marie
That person has departed.
My love
Has gone on before me.
Never again
Can I see that person.

(Anonymous, 1910: 150-1)

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INTRODUCTION

> The area was a significant part of an empire that embraced most of the known world, transformed from a land of warring, primitive and almost entirely illiterate tribes into a united realm under an administration based on the rule of law.

The preceding is adapted from Peter Salway (1965: 1) and has been altered to excise any reference to the particular area under discussion. To anyone the least bit familiar with European imperialism since 1492, one could believe that the passage is referring to virtually any part of the planet, save Europe itself. Yet Salway is discussing the Europe of two millennia past: his is a discussion of ancient Roman experience in Britain from 43 AD to the early 5th century when the Romans withdrew, leaving the island to fall into the "province of the Dark Age historian" (Salway, 1965: 4).

Other passages from Salway further illuminate the rhetoric of imperialism, a rhetoric that applies not only to Imperial Rome (as Salway relates it) but to any of the more modern examples of European imperialism:

> The early policy of employing friendly chieftains as client "kings" was never intended to be more than a temporary expedient. The process of absorbing the tribes into the normal framework of the provincial administration greatly encouraged the adoption of "civilized" ways.
>
> Based on considerations of manpower and expense, it was decided to hold only that part

> which was reasonably easy to control and which was profitable.
>
> Considerable trouble occurred in the region before, but it paled into insignificance before the tremendous destruction wrought by a *barbaric conspiratio* when, in unnatural alliance, the tribes attacked simultaneously. The garrison fell, but it was not in fair fight. (adapted from Salway, 1965: 1-4).

The reader should keep these passages in mind as this study unfolds, as the parallels to the indigenous/imperialist encounters of a millennia and half later are obvious.

What Salway is discussing in the above passages is the Roman frontier of northern England where —centuries later— the British and Scottish interests clash. Indeed, the Roman "frontier" and the "Borderlands" (as they are now called) are virtually identical and the area of three centuries of conflict between the British and the Scots (from the 14th to the 17th centuries) (Goodman, 1992).

This introductory chapter presents terminology relative to borders, frontiers, and borderlands, and introduces the reader to examples of borderland conflicts around the world as well as borderland theory. The chapter will also discuss the study area and its geologic development. The chapter ends with a exposition of the area's first inhabitants.

Chapter 1 explores the pre-contact Anishnabeg (a self-designating collective term for the area's Native people) and presents the orthography underlying the various names that have come to be associated with these people. Some consideration is given to the Euro-centrism behind the

"common" tribal designations and the confusion engendered by these Euro-centric designations.

Chapter 2 presents the beginnings of European contact c1600 when the French first visited the area seeking mineral wealth and their subsequent exploitation of the area's enormous fur resource. The French era, lasting until the first Treaty of Paris (1763) represented a period during which the Anishnabeg enjoyed political autonomy and sovereignty over their Great Lakes homelands. The chapter also chronicles the successful defense of these homelands in the face of Iroquois and British hostilities. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Anishnabeg's defense of the Lake Huron Borderlands under the Ottawa chief Pontiac.

While Pontiac's "Conspiracy" has been misnamed and his "defeat" greatly exaggerated, this military engagement did signal the end of the French influence in the region and the ascendancy of the British. Chapter 3 explores the short but intense period of British hegemony over the whole of the Lake Huron Borderlands. While the second Treaty of Paris in 1783 formally ended the American Revolutionary War, this chapter ends (somewhat arbitrarily) with the signing of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville which is the first major treaty between the Anishnabeg and the new United States government.

Chapter 4 explores the period during which the Anishnabeg, the British, and the Americans waged a tripartite struggle for control of the Lake Huron

Borderlands and the important role that the issuance of "presents" played during this crucial period.

Chapter 5 discusses the period of the most profound changes to the Anishnabeg way of life engendered in large part by the loss of much of their traditional homeland to the governments of Canada and the United States. The chapter begins with a discussion of these land cession treaties. Concomitant with the cession of land was the threat of "removal" —coercive in the U.S., encouraged in Canada.

In the U.S., the threat of removal was to the "Indian Territory" west of the Mississippi River; in Canada, the encouragement was the formation of a "Canadian Oklahoma" on Manitoulin Island (Erdrich & Dorris, 1990: 383). The pressures to emigrate, and Anishnabeg initiatives in the face of these "removal" threats, are explored. Finally, the chapter presents the reader with the results of the analysis of over 1,500 names of treaty-signers and names of others found in government documents of the period. The analysis uncovers what appears to be a surprising number of individuals who signed treaties for the Anishnabeg with both the U.S. and Canadian governments. Other Anishnabeg "cross-border" connections are also presented. These connections between "American" and "Canadian" Anishnabeg helped them maintain a degree of autonomy and sovereignty while being faced with differing and alternative hegemonic forces for

the first time in their history.

Chapter 6 begins with a discussion of resource exploitation in the study area and how this exploitation changed —and continues to change— the Anishnabeg way of life. The chapter concludes the study by examining how the Anishnabeg have continued their struggle to maintain their identity throughout the tumult of the 20th century and in the face of two separate sets of federal "Indian" policies. Jay's Treaty and other cross-border Native issues are examined within this unifying context.

Terminology Defined

The terms of frontier, boundary (or border), and borderlands need to be clarified as they relate to this present study. The "frontier" can be defined in several ways: (1) the commercial frontier, represented by the fur trader, trapper, and hunter; (2) the military frontier represented by a line of army posts; (3) the cession frontier, marked by the limit of land acquired from the indigenous population; (4) the public land frontier marked by the limit of lands surveyed and opened for sale; and (5) the frontier of settlement, determined by the density of population (Wesley, 1976: 126). While definitions 1-3 are especially relevant to the present study (as these advancing "frontiers" were the ones that had the most profound effect on the indigenous populations of the Great Lakes Area), we need to look more closely at definition 5, as it is probably

the most widely held definition of the word. This "population density frontier" was championed by the U.S. Census Bureau and declared to be closed in 1890 (Turner, 1920: 1).

Frederick Jackson Turner expanded upon the Census Bureau definition and in 1893 he delivered a now-famous lecture in Chicago, simultaneous with the Columbian Exposition, held to honor the four-hundredth anniversary of Columbus' "discovery" (White, 1994: 7). In his essay, titled "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," Turner curiously claimed that the term *frontier* " "is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition" (Turner, 1920: 3). This lack of definition has led to no end of controversy over the concept of the frontier and its role in American history and has led to sharp criticism of Turner and his entire thesis as well. Discussion of a recent example of this criticism will help define the terminology as it relates to this present study.

Patricia Limerick in her essay "The Adventures of the Frontier in the Twentieth Century" contends the concept of the frontier, especially in the Turnerian sense, is indefensible. She states that the "F-word [has been] pummeled for its ethnocentrism and vagueness" (Limerick, 1994: 72) and sets out five arguments which challenge the validity of the F-word, summarized here: (1) the concept of the frontier is defined and defended reflexively by a

largely white, English-speaking class of historians, (2) it purports to geographically run from east to west, ignoring movements of people in the myriad of directions other than from east to west in which they moved, (3) despite Turner and the 1890 Census officials, it is virtually impossible to define the beginning or end of a frontier (assuming in the first place such a term is definable), (4) the underlying conception of a frontier tends to ignore the elements of conquest, and (5) the frontier thesis obstructs any critical understanding of the inevitable clash of cultures inherent along whatever definition of the "frontier" a researcher adopts (Limerick, 1994: 72-75). If we look to Turner's essay for examples giving rise to the above criticism (in addition to his reluctance to define the term), we see Turner state that the frontier is "the meeting point between savagery and civilization" while also stating that "The most significant thing about the American Frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land." (Turner, 1920: 3). The seemingly crucial concepts of "savagery" *versus* "civilization" and how these terms are (or are not) related to the "most significant" concept of "free land" (left also undefined) is never discussed. The present study is, in part, a reaction to, and a rebuttal of The Turnerian thesis which is valuable in one sense: it presents to the researcher a guide for what not to do in conducting border research. Turner aside, researchers and essayists do

provide positive insights into the border and frontier phenomenon.

For example, (and returning to other non-population density definitions of the frontier) Alastair Lamb explains the transition from frontier to border thus: A frontier evolves into a border when there are no more "turbulent tribes" to subdue just beyond the existing frontier line and a natural physical barrier halts the advance (Lamb: 1970: 147). Kristof further expands Lamb's frontier definition by stating that frontiers give way to boundaries when states decide that it is important to not only keep the enemy out (as Lamb would have it) but "because one's own citizens and resources have to be kept in" (Kristof, 1959: 273).

Almost by definition, the areas adjacent to the frontier/border line are zones of friction where "broad scenes of intense interactions" are often played out (Thelen, 1992: 437). These "Borderlands" are areas that "have always been peripheral to the centers of economic, cultural, and military power and authority" (Thelen, 1992: 438) and are areas where effectiveness of that central control is often tested (Kristof, 1959: 271-2).

"Old World" Examples

Since the advent of modern European imperialism, borderland frictions can be found throughout the world. In addition to the British-Scottish Borderlands mentioned above, the European continent itself has not been immune to

borderland frictions. The eastern Alps have been the scene of German-Slovene conflict for centuries (Kuhar, 1959). The situation in the former Yugoslavia today may just be the latest in these oft-recurring borderland conflicts.

In Soviet Central Asia the "Kazakh herdsmen have been pushed further out their patrimony with the ploughing of millions of acres of 'virgin and idle' lands throughout northern Kazakhstan and the resettlement there of several hundred thousand Russians and Ukrainians" (Jackson, 1962: 13). In the middle of the 19th century, the Russians and the Chinese pushed into their far east borderlands and displaced the indigenous hunter/trapper/fisher societies, and the Native peoples of central and northern Asia were crushed between the forces of Muscovy and the Chinese empire through the mid 17th century to the mid 20th century. In another Euro-Asian example, the "Slavic freebooters" were driven west by a lust for furs and possible stores of precious metals, displacing indigenous populations along the way (Jackson, 1962: 30).

In northeast India, Nagaland (under British rule) was designated as a "Backward Tract," i.e. an area where the indigenous population successfully thwarted British attempts to "administer" the area; consequently, the population remained relatively autonomous from imperial power. After India's independence from Britain in 1947, the Indian government maintained Nagaland's status as an "excluded

area" which continued its state as a "backward" area not subject to legislative act but placed directly under the rule of a governor and his council of ministers. These "tribal" people –described as "sturdy, virile people [who] enjoy life by dancing" (picture caption, Chatterjee, 1978: following page 144)– were not fully integrated into the Indian legislative order until December of 1963 (Chatterjee, 1978: 193-4).

Described as "a numerous and virile people still possessed of real tribal affiliations" (Spain, 1977: 3), the "Pathan tribal hillpeople" of the Pakistan/Afghanistan border region have been resisting incorporation into any country's national administration for 2,500 years. Fiercely imbued with attitudes of "independence, battle, and personal bravery and a deeply inbred code of honor" these indigenous people "present a very formidable problem of government indeed" and their political and military power in the service of maintaining their culture and "tribal" affiliations is still strong enough to disrupt, perhaps fatally, Pakistan's national life (Spain, 1977: 3, 22).

South Africa provides us with another example of borderlands conflict. The entire border area between the Orange Free State (of South Africa) and Lesotho (Basutoland) is claimed by both sides. The whites of the Orange Free State claim that they were the first to occupy this "terra nullius" (uninhabited region) and, consequently, it should

belong to them. The Basuto, claiming indigenous right to the disputed territory fought the whites for its control. As an expedient, the Basuto signed a "peace treaty" with the whites but they refused to abandon the territory and had no intention of adhering to the treaty provisions. The whites of the Orange Free State decided that "order, peace, and development" could only come to the region if the Basuto were driven out by force. In an interesting shift to most colonial experience, the Basuto requested British aid in keeping the marauding whites out of their homeland. This threat of British military assistance brought the Orange Free State to the bargaining table in the mid 19th century whereby they "surrendered" portions of the disputed territory to the Basuto. An 1869 treaty was designed to finally settle the border issue, but as the source for this account shows, one hundred years later, the issue is far from settled (Eloff, 1979).

Western Hemisphere Examples

A rather similar situation presents itself in South America. The borderlands between Venezuela and Guyana have been in dispute since at least 1648 and has frustrated the attempts of successive British, Dutch, Venezuelan, and Guyanan governments. This issue of borderlands "ownership" and jurisdiction has yet to be resolved, and in a telling account of the controversy by Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (1984), the area's indigenous people are not even given a

passing mention.

In sharp contrast, the January 1, 1994, uprising in the Mexican-Guatemalan Chiapas borderlands area is a wholly indigenous affair. The indigenous people of Chiapas are subjecting the Mexican central government to its strongest test in absolute proof of Thelen's statement that "Borderlands have always been peripheral to the centers of economic, cultural, and military power and authority" (Thelen, 1992: 438). The United States is certainly not immune to borderland conflicts, virtually all "frontier wars" are examples of borderland conflict between indigenous people and central colonial authority. Smuggling on both the north and south borders and "illegal" immigration in the southwest are yet other examples of borderlands conflict and the testing of the effectiveness of central control.

In further tests of central control, borderland areas have often been areas of refuge for those seeking to thwart governmental attempts to subjugate indigenous people. The U.S./Canada border is rife with examples, from the captives taken to Canada from New England (Baker, 1897) to the flight of the Nez Perce under Chief Joseph in the west (Howard, 1978) with Leonard Peltier and Sitting Bull (Utley, 1993) —among others— geographically in between.

In the Southwest, the Apache under Geronimo present the best indigenous example of the U.S/Mexico border as refuge (Griffen, 1988). Also it should be pointed out that Mexican

rebels sought refuge on the U.S. side of the border as well (Henderson, 1979), as did the Canadian Métis of Manitoba and Saskatchewan after their late 19th century resistance to Canadian central authority (Sealey & Lussier, 1975).

The above discussion should not be interpreted to imply that political activity in the borderlands is restricted to those who would challenge the central government; conflict in the borderlands may also well serve the central government. In his discussion of the British/Scottish Borderlands, Anthony Goodman points out that the efforts to keep Northern England out of the hands of the "barbarians" to the north helped mold the emerging British nation-state through the common defense of the frontier, and through this military process "war heroes" became popular figures. The process of militarization also paves the way to public order, hierarchy, and international harmony, values which are all held in high esteem in frontier societies (Goodman, 1992: 3). Even though Goodman was discussing the British general-to-politician transformation, this process has obviously been employed in the United States as well; Generals Washington, Harrison, Jackson, Grant, and Eisenhower all rode victorious military parades to the White House (the failure of General George Custer to transform military exploit into political power is the most egregious counter-example).

North American Borderlands Research

Despite the obvious cogency of worldwide borderlands research, the area presents considerable problems for researchers. While the U.S./Mexican border has been fairly widely studied, scholars in this field complain that the United State's Spanish heritage is still woefully neglected (Scardaville, 1985: 188-93). And perhaps because the U.S./Canada border is touted as the world's longest undefended border without the problems encountered along the U.S./Mexico border, the area is considered to be almost devoid of interest to borderland scholars.

Consider the following research dilemma. In 1982, the book *This Remarkable Continent: An Atlas of United States and Canadian Society and Culture* was published (Rooney, et al, 1982). One might think that, at last, a book has been published that acknowledges the common origins, history, and destiny of these two countries. But, despite the title, the book almost exclusively treats the two countries as separate entities. Even when the data being presented is virtually identical and the same map devices are used, the Atlas presents two separate maps. In the most egregious example, "Map 2-1: Expansion of Settlement, 1790-1890" (p 28) shows only the United States, while "Map 2-2B: Expansion of Settlement in Canada, 1831-1941" (p 30) deals only with Canada. Both maps utilize the identical isochronal lines to show the extent of (white) settlement. Adding to the

discrepancy, the Canada settlement map omits the U.S./Canada border, yielding a map that oddly implies that settlement did not occur south of a certain undefined area.

Rooney, et al, (1982) chose to map both countries on the same map only when discussing language, myth, and music (the last two present Native American data). Maps 1-19 to 1-28 (pp 17-19) shows the entire United States but only the border areas of Canada and display various dialectic differences and regional identification patterns (or the lack thereof). Map 11-1 presents a distribution of "North American Indian Music" (p 238) and shows the United States, Canada, and Mexico, while Map 13-1 displays the "Myth Diversity" of Native Americans for both the U.S. and Canada. Overall, the Atlas presents a preponderance of maps which show only the United States; consequently, for the researcher interested in a synthesis of U.S. and Canadian data, the Rooney Atlas —while wholly typical— is a tremendous disappointment.[1]

In yet another example of the problems facing borderlands researchers is Michael Bradshaw's *Regions and Regionalism in the United States* (1988). The book is a curiosity because it is formulated on the premise that the United States must be analyzed on the basis of *regions* wholly exclusive of State boundaries. Bradshaw states that "within each nation there are divisions into regions" (Bradshaw, 1988: 174, emphasis added). If the author felt

inclined to extend the concept of "region-hood" beyond international borders with the same enthusiasm he displayed for the dissolution of state borders, he kept these notions entirely to himself: neither Canada nor Mexico appear in the index.

The preceding examples are quite typical of the problem facing the researcher who seeks to understand a U.S./Canada borderland region; and when coupled with an interest in Native American issues, the problem is compounded. Many studies of the indigenous peoples of North America accept *a priori* modern political boundaries; consequently, when seeking information on the Native people of the Great Lakes region, one is confronted with titles such as *Indians of Ontario* (Morris, 1943) or *A Study of Some Michigan Indians* (Densmore, 1949).

Borderlands Theory

While admitting that there are many possible ways to define the concept of Borderlands, John House presents an all-encompassing definition of a borderland "as a field of forces, changeable through time, within which there is economic, social, cultural, and political interaction between contrasting States, and even differing civilizations" (House, 1982: 55). For the North American continent, the U.S./Mexico border region often has been referred to, and studied, as a distinct borderland; the border regions of the United States and Canada much less so

(McKinsey & Konrad, 1989: 6).

A reason for this disparity between US/Mexico and US/Canada borderland studies may be that the US/Mexico border region is much less diverse in its culture and environment than is the US/Canada border. Ivo Duchacek quotes Ellwyn Stoddard on this difference: "Along the more free-flowing Canadian border there is a weak or non-existent border culture whereas a strong border culture extends along the entire length of our southwestern border with Mexico (Duchacek, 1986: 266). While admitting certain similarities, Duchacek goes on to delineate the difference between the two borders by citing nine areas where the borderlands relationship between the United States and Mexico and Canada differs. Among the areas cited are differences in the federal systems of Canada and Mexico when compared to the U.S., settlement contrasts, the bitter US/Mexico past, the illegal immigration problem in the Southwest, the Quebec Question, and differing international concerns (Duchacek, 1986: 263-9).

McKinsey and Konrad counter such anti-US/Canada-borderlands arguments by claiming that while the US/Canada border may not constitute a borderlands region, the border can be viewed as divisible into several "Regional Borderlands Cultures" (McKinsey and Konrad, 1989: 7) In support of this thesis, they present six cultural landscape types which they believe are relevant to a US/Canada

borderlands paradigm. Two of these cultural types merit some discussion as they relate to this present study.

The last of McKinsey and Konrad's cultural landscape types is referred to as "Empty Areas." They have this to say about this type of borderlands region:

> These are buffer zones with few inhabitants and little cultural interaction. An empty area has no focus or core on either side. In some areas, the Yukon-Alaska border region for example, historical interaction and cultural continuity in Native settlement are the only borderlands characteristics. (McKinsey & Konrad, 1989: 13).

The above paragraph constitutes the entire discussion of this cultural landscape area. McKinsey and Konrad, as well as other researchers, may consider the Yukon-Alaska border region to be an "empty area" simply because its population densities are low and "historical interaction and the cultural continuity in Native settlement" are its "only" defining characteristic. In the present study, these very qualities —dismissed by others as insignificant— are of central importance to a discussion of the Lake Huron borderlands.

In addition to this mis-named, Native populated, cultural "empty area," a discussion of another of the McKinsey/Konrad borderlands culture types is essential. They refer to a "Divided Cultural Enclave" characterized by the existence of a culturally homogeneous region split in two by the boundary wherein the boundary comes to separate that which is Canadian from that which is American.

McKinsey and Konrad go on to state that examples "are rare because the boundary is seldom imposed in a well-established cultural region" (p.8).

From the establishment of the border through the region of the Wabenaki Confederacy in the Northeast (McGee, 1989: 141) through the Blackfoot regions of the Great Plains (Samek, 1978: 181) and ending in the Native-occupied "empty areas" of the Alaska-Yukon border, virtually the entire U.S./Canada border was established through an existing homogeneous Native cultural area. Indeed, and in perhaps its most extreme example (and using language that would be rejected by its sovereignty-minded residents), the Mohawk reserve of Akwesasne is "split" by the U.S./Canada border and occupies territory claimed by New York, Ontario, and Quebec. This is a situation quite unique among reservations along the U.S./Canada border (Slowe, 1991: 197). Certainly Akwesasne and other Native areas along the U.S./Canada border merit further examination by Borderlands researchers concerned with "divided cultural enclaves."

For reasons distinct from those cited above, other researchers tend to ignore Native peoples in the borderlands because of the problems inherent in such a discussion. Principal among these is the use of a term such as "international region" when discussing the border in any context. To use such terminology presupposes a rejection of any claims to sovereignty that might be held by that

region's Native people. Also, while maintaining a sensitivity to the Native perspective within the broader regional history, researchers also need to be sensitive to the imposition of other Euro-centric research paradigms, such as concentrating on the region's history since white contact or restricting the Native to the role of re-actor to white initiative. Harold McGee also brings up one other salient point: the complexity of Native communities.

> [A] reserve community in North America has got to be one of the most complex social structures in the world. The [researcher] has to ferret out the influences of a number of competing Christian churches, various levels of foreign governments, the imposition of international states that portions of the community do not recognize, various Native associations . . . factionalism within each of these organizations . . . and on and on it goes. (McGee, 1989: 147)

Despite these and other difficulties, other aspects of the Native experience along the U.S./Canada border support a Borderlands designation not unlike that utilized along the U.S./Mexico border. Both the U.S. and Canada have similar federal Indian policies and Native histories which are quite distinct when compared to the experiences —both historical and contemporary— of Mexican indigenous populations. Further, both the U.S. and Canadian Native people have treaties with their federal governments and distinct land bases which impart a degree of political sovereignty to their relationship to the U.S. and Canadian federal governments. This "quasi-national" quality quite obviously creates within these Native groups a measure of homogeneity

and "separateness" that can easily be viewed through a "borderlands" perspective.

Defining the Borderlands Study Area

This study recognizes the complexities delineated by McGee (quoted above) and the shortcomings of the McKinsey/Konrad borderlands culture area delineations. Nevertheless, the McKinsey/Konrad concept of the "divided cultural enclave" is explored within the context of the imposition of a Native-occupied "empty area" upon, within, and throughout the borderlands of the "international" Lake Huron border region.

While it is true that most Native populations of North America are such that the Native density in any one region is invariably quite low, and the McKinsey/Konrad "empty area" presupposes that a sparse and diffused population is one that can be readily dismissed by researchers as unimportant, homogeneity of the borderlands region's population and its distinctiveness relative to other adjoining areas can justify designating an area as a "borderland" (House, 1982: 95).

In our study region, the Native population of Michigan comprises about .6% of the State's population; in Ontario, the Native population is about 1.9% of the Province's total. An analysis of the census data for both Michigan and Ontario show that the area's Native people are more concentrated in areas that border Lake Huron than in areas further inland.

This concentration lends credence to an application of a borderlands discussion of the area.

Within our study area, thirteen of Michigan's eighty-six counties border on Lake Huron; from Chippewa County in the north, to St. Clair County at the southern terminus of Lake Huron. And while the population of the state of Michigan is only .6% Native, the percentage of Native population in these thirteen counties is 1.56%; the percentage in the fourteen counties adjacent to those bordering Lake Huron is .58%. Therefore, it can be shown that the Michigan counties that border Lake Huron boast an aggregate Native population that is nearly three times higher than both their adjacent counties and the State as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 1992: 38-47).

Breaking the data down geographically, the two northernmost counties, Chippewa and Mackinac, have Native populations of 11.0 and 15.8%, respectively, which represents a density of from two to almost three times that of their neighboring counties (which also contain Native populations significantly higher than the State as a whole). At the southern end of our study area, Sanilac and St. Clair counties, while showing Native populations slightly below the State average, still boast a Native population 1.25 and 1.35 times that of their neighboring counties. (Situated at the tip of lower Michigan's "Thumb," Huron County lies adjacent only to other counties that also border Lake Huron

and was thus excluded from this analysis.)

Comparing the remaining eight counties in the central portion of our study area to their adjacent inland counties we find that two have a lower Native population (Presque Isle and Alpena) and two have Native percentages virtually identical to their neighboring counties (Cheboygan and Iosco); the remaining four have proportions ranging from 1.2 times (Alcona County) to 1.5 times their neighbors (Arenac and Tuscola Counties).

It should be noted that there are eight federally recognized reservation areas within the thirteen counties that border Lake Huron, all but one in the Upper Peninsula, distributed as follows. In Chippewa County, the Sault Ste Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sault Tribe) maintains one reservation area within the city limits of Sault Ste Marie and two smaller areas on Sugar Island. Also in Chippewa County, the Bay Mills Indian Community maintains a reservation on Whitefish Bay just west of our study area; it too maintains a small reservation area on Sugar Island. The Sault Tribe also maintains two reservations in the eastern end of Mackinac County; one in St. Ignace township and one in Clark township. There is only one reservation area in the lower peninsula portion of our study area. This reservation is in Arenac County's Standish township and is maintained by the Saginaw Chippewa tribe which is headquartered outside of our study area in Isabella County.

Turning to the Canadian half of our study area, Ontario counties when compared to Michigan cover much greater geographic areas. (In the Ontario north, comparable political units are called districts and cover even greater areas than the counties of southern Ontario). To further complicate data comparisons, the Canadian census does not ask questions that allow the respondent to directly claim Native heritage; in many cases that information must be inferred. Furthermore, in a sovereignty-building action, many Native communities in Canada refused to participate in the federal census; consequently, in order to show the concentration of Native people in the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron borderlands, an approach different from the population analysis employed for Michigan counties is required.

U.S. federal Indian policy in the early 1800s was concerned with the assembly of Native people from a region and their concentration on few reservations, notably west of the Mississippi River. During this same period, the Canadian government also sought to assemble Native people on reservations, but their approach was not one of removal and concentration in areas far from European settlement. Instead, the Canadians permitted several small reservations where the Native people lived. As a consequence, Ontario has 116 reservations scattered throughout the province. Figure 1, which maps the area's Native communities, shows



(Adapted from Ontario, 1991; Indian Land Areas, 1971; Indian Reservations, 1941)

Figure 1: Contemporary Native Communities (U.S. and Canada)

that almost all of the reservations that are within the province's Lake Huron counties are island or shoreline communities.

While admitting that the proportion of Native people throughout the area is low, it is apparent that the area's Native people are concentrated in the Lake Huron shoreline regions directly adjacent to both the U.S. and Canadian border. In as much as a homogeneous, distinct and concentrated population residing in a region that straddles a border is one of the defining characteristics of a borderland, a borderlands approach to the study of the area's Native population seems quite justified.

In Summary: this present study, rather than focusing on the Native people of a particular place under a specific political jurisdiction, looks at the people who were, and are, affected by the imposition of a political boundary and the resulting subjugation of the people by these differing political entities. Specifically, the study looks at the Native people in the areas on either side of the United States/Canada border from Sault Ste Marie, at the foot of Lake Superior, to Walpole Island at the mouth of the St. Clair River. The study area then comprises all of the borderlands of Lake Huron and its connecting waters. See Figure 2.[2]

The area was chosen not only for its geographic integrity but also for the commonality of the Native people



(Adapted from Pincus, 1972)

Figure 2: The Study Area

that live within the region. The Native people of the region today are almost exclusively Ojibway (or Chippewa), Ottawa, or Potawatomi, using common tribal designations. Historically, these groups comprised "The Three Fires Confederacy, an alliance that appears by all accounts to have been formed in the pre-contact era, the members of which have resided in the area continuously for centuries (Clifton, et al, 1986: v). People of these three nations refer to themselves as the Anishnabeg, which in their common language means "original people."[3] The Menominee have also been referred to as members of the Anishnabeg (Hoffman, 1891) but as they reside outside of this study's area (both historically and today), scant reference will be made of them.

The study looks at the Ojibway (Chippewa), Ottawa, and Potawatomi people of the Lake Huron borderlands and how the imposition of an international border through their homeland affected them and continues to affect them. Treaties, wars, policies of the relevant political entities, and other social forces which brought about this division are also explored.

While division is an obvious theme, the strong links that have served to maintain unity within the Anishnabeg over the period of nearly 400 years of European contact are also examined. Common language and culture are obvious links, but the political dimensions of unity as well as the

concept of sovereignty as it relates to various autonomous Anishnabeg groups are probed.

The study continues chronologically, beginning with an examination of the geologic forces which formed the distinct natural features of the study area. This is necessary because the natural environment contained a multitude of resources which compelled the migrating Anishnabeg to remain in the area. These same resources formed the core of European exploitation of the region.

The remainder of this introductory chapter contains an overview of the area's "pre-historic" indigenous people. The term pre-historic is used in the sense of "pre-European contact" in as much as the area's indigenous population certainly had a "history" long before the Europeans came upon the scene, a history which has been preserved through Anishnabeg oral tradition and other sources.

The Study Area: Geological Development

The formation of the Great Lakes in their present configuration was accomplished by the action of several glaciers which carved out the lakes and established the waterways which now comprise the great inland seas of North America. The repetitive action of receding and advancing glaciers was inaugurated by an ice age that began about a million years ago in the Pleistocene era (Williams, 1970: 93). Yet, even though the Ice Age that created the Great

Lakes is over a million years old, our study area is of very recent geologic formation, perhaps only just over 2,000 years old. It was then that the waters of the melting glaciers, and the resulting drainage patterns came to resemble present mapping (Hough, 1958: 283 (Table 22)).

The northernmost point of the study area, the rapids of the St. Mary's River, was formed when the earth at this point was forced up both by the weight of the receding glacier and by sub-surface geologic forces which pushed igneous rock upward. The rise of the land was as much as 400 feet in the early post-glacial era (3000 to 1500 B.C.) and another 100 feet in places in the period from 1500 to 500 B.C. (Quimby, 1960: 52). Behind this resulting narrow (1/4 mile) rock dam lies the largest body of fresh water in North America, Lake Superior (Dickinson, 1981).

In their original state the rapids at the Sault were magnificent, rivalling those at Niagara for natural beauty. If we consider the width of the two falls in relation to their output, the falls of the St. Mary's compared favorably with those of Niagara. The width of the Rapids at the Sault is about 1300 feet; the combined widths of the Horseshoe and American Falls at Niagara totals about 3,600 feet. Over this escarpment, Niagara sends a total of 205,000 cubic feet of water every second, which then falls a distance of 180 feet to the level of Lake Ontario. Seventy-four thousand cubic feet of water per second flow over the rapids at Sault

Ste Marie, falling only 20 feet. Yet, if we divide the widths of the two sites by their output (Niagara today, the Sault before diversion), we find that both sites would discharge about 55 or 56 cubic feet of water per second per foot of width. When viewed in this historic perspective, the two sites present virtually identical water flows (Dickinson, 1981: 3; Chapman & Putnam, 1984: 150). Today, of course, the water flow over the rapids at Sault Ste Marie is greatly diminished while the Niagara flow by comparison has only been minimally diverted. (Their value to the Anishnabeg and the eventual destruction of the rapids will be discussed in a later chapter).

The other end of our study area, Walpole Island, presents an equally recent geologic history. The principal drainage pattern for Lake Huron during the formative stages of the Great Lakes, from about 6,000 years ago to the present, was through a northerly route along the present French River/Ottawa River corridor (see Figure 3, page 32). This was the general drainage pattern until very recent geologic action formed the present Great Lakes just over 2,000 years ago. Lake Erie was quite shallow during this period and sent a relatively small quantity of water over the escarpment at Niagara (Martin, 1939: 77). At this time the upper Great Lakes drained through the northern route and also sent but little water south through Lake Erie, but when the glaciers last receded and lake waters lowered to nearly



From Morse, 1979.

Figure 3: Northern Water Route to St. Lawrence River

their present levels, the northern water route through the French and Ottawa Rivers was cut off and waters from Lakes Superior, Michigan and Huron found their only outlet was to the south, through the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and Detroit River then on to Lake Erie and out to the Atlantic. The resulting water flow brought with it the soils that formed the rich and fertile estuaries and islands at the mouth of the St. Clair River (including Walpole Island) which constitute the southern terminus of our study area. Interestingly, as we shall see, long after the passing of the glacial action, early Native migrants and European explorers followed the geologically older northern water route in movements to our study area.

The geologic action which formed the Great Lakes, and the resulting cutting action of this redirected flowing water also worked to create another major geologic feature of our study area; the island chain which stretches across the North Channel of Lake Huron, from Manitoulin in the east, and up the St. Mary's River to Sugar Island near Sault Ste Marie. Although there are hundreds of Islands in this chain, the major islands are (from east to west) Manitoulin, Cockburn, Drummond, St. Joseph's, Neebish, and Sugar. Many of these islands, and Mackinac Island which lies in the strait between Lakes Michigan and Huron, will be discussed in detail as this study unfolds (see Figure 4, below).



(Adapted from Office of Tourism, c1976)

Figure 4: Upper Lake Huron and St. Mary's River Islands

The Study Area: First Inhabitants

The first evidence of human occupation in the study area has been found at the Sheguindah site located in the northeast section of Manitoulin Island. The evidence suggests first human occupation sometime between 7,000 and 6,000 B.C. Further evidence suggests that the north and south shores of what eventually became Whitefish Bay just west of the Sault Rapids supported human activities during this same period (Quimby, 1960: 38).

The very early occupants, those from 7,000 to 3,000 B.C., are placed in the Paleo- or Early-archaic-Indian category, while anthropologists have assigned later

occupants (from 4,000 to 1500 B.C.) to the "Old Copper" cultural mosaic (Taylor & Meighan, 1978; Quimby, 1960: 6-7). Evidence in the study area shows that Old Copper occupants resided on the northeast shore of Lake Superior in the Batchewana Bay area, about 50 miles north of Sault Ste Marie (Griffin & Quimby, 1961: 81) but abandoned the area about 1,500 B.C. as they apparently followed the receding glaciers northward (Quimby, 1960: 62).

This abandonment of the area by the Old Copper people is used to explain why, at the time of European contact, the Native people of the area knew no copper working skills and possessed no copper tools. Old Copper mining activity in the Keewenaw Peninsula in western Lake Superior continued until as late as 1000 years ago but these mines were abandoned as well and the ancient miners also left no knowledge of copper working to the subsequent inhabitants (Whittlesy, 1961: 49).

If the Old Copper people abandoned the study area sometime in the period from about 1,500 B.C to 1,000 A.D., as the archeological evidence suggests, where did the contact-era people of the region migrate from, and how and why did they come to reside in the Lake Huron borderlands region? Anishnabeg oral tradition and evidence of North Atlantic trans-oceanic contacts together provide valuable explanations for this migration.

Stephen Jett argues that certain tools and weapons of

the New World bear striking resemblance to the same artifacts of north European pedigree during the late fourth or third millennium B.C. Specifically, Jett points to New World Old Copper artifacts that resemble those of Old World copper forms (Jett, 1978: 601). This evidence suggests a trade and/or migration route from the east Atlantic coast inland to the Great Lakes.

Roland Dixon (1914: 74) claims that in pre-Columbian times the Ojibway and the Micmac lived in close proximity near the eastern seaboard and that several tribes, including the Micmac, moved north and east into the territory left vacant by the disappearance of the "Red Paint People" who were affiliated with the equally ill-fated Beothuk. Anishnabeg oral tradition states that they once lived on the Atlantic shore and migrated westward until they reached an area west of Lake Superior where they came to reside more or less permanently. Elements of the Anishnabeg settled along this route. George Quimby in his article "The Archeology of the Upper Great Lakes Area" states that the archeological evidence does not refute an Anishnabeg migration. For Quimby, the "historic period" began in 1660 and he has this to say about the Nations under discussion: "At the beginning of the historic period the Ottawa, Huron, and Chippewa were recent arrivals in the area. . . . The Potawatomi moved westward just prior to the historic period. [They are] the best suspects as a native population." (Quimby, 1952: 106).

David Brose puts the controversy in the following language: "[T]here is little assurance within the Upper Great Lakes that the ethno-historically reported groups of the mid- to late seventeenth century are necessarily related to those responsible for proximal archeological components of the early seventeenth century" (Brose, 1978: 582). As examples, the statements of both Quimby and Brose can be said to support the westward migration of the Anishnabeg. Furthermore, the pattern of settlement in those areas within the study area also support the migration: comparing the archeological sites for the periods before 1400 A.D. with those carbon-dated to the period after 1400 A.D. to contact, it can be shown that sites along the stated migration route to Sault Ste Marie and then diffusing into the Straits of Mackinac and northwest lower Michigan are especially prevalent (Brose, 1978: 570-1).

Evidence of this Anishnabeg migration exists in the form of several "migration scrolls," at least one of which has been carbon-dated to the pre-contact era (Kidd, 1981: 41). Figure 5 depicts a record of Anishnabeg migration as recorded by Sikassige, an Ojibway elder. Sikassige explains that the migration began at the eastern salt water lake, the original home of the Anishnabeg. In the tradition, the people are being led by an animal (in Sikassige's account, an otter) westward,[4] stopping when it stops, moving when it moves west (Mallery, 1972: 566). Dewdney has uncovered

several other Anishnabeg migration scrolls. In addition to their value as migration records, Dewdney reports that the scrolls record not only the migration but the Midé beliefs and rituals as well (Dewdney, 1975: 9). His informants report that "God's messenger" gave the Midé religion to the Anishnabeg on the Atlantic coast and the religion was designed to guide them west while saving the people from the ravages of disease rampant at that time. William Warren, in his *History of the Ojibways* (1957: 79), also states that disease was indeed the reason for the Anishnabeg early pre-historic migration.[5]

No direct evidence of disease ravaging the pre-contact Atlantic coast has been found, but Frederick Cartwright, in *Disease and History* (1972: 32), speculates that the great plague —The Black Death— that ravaged Europe in from 1346 to 1361 was carried to Greenland, and the weakened Greenlanders were attacked by the Eskimos who most likely were affected by the disease as well. All that is left unrecorded is the transference of the disease from either Eskimo or Norse populations to the Native peoples of the East Coast, an occurrence that seems more probable than speculative (Cartwright, 1972: 32; Clifton, et al, 1986: 76; Bolton, 1935: 60). The probable result of this plague sweeping through North America is left to the reader's imagination although this may very well explain the disappearance of the "Red Paint People."



From Mallery, 1972.

Figure 5: An Anishnabeg Migration Scroll

The circle at the top of Figure 5 represents the original home of the Anishnabeg; the curving horizontal line *b* divides the history between the pre-Midé and post-Midé periods. The dot at *c* represents the place where the Otter stopped to offer prayers and where the Otter began the journey west which the Anishnabeg followed. Other letters of Figure 5 represent places where the Otter appeared and the rites of the Midéwiwin were conducted; those indicative of places within the study area are *f*, Mackinaw, and *i*, Sault Ste Marie.[6] *Z* represents Sandy Lake, Minnesota, the last place where the Otter appeared. Designations *aa* through *dd* are not explained in the Mallery text (1972: 566-7).

The obvious implication here is that both the Anishnabeg migration and the Midé religion had their origins on the Atlantic coast and were brought about by a complex set of circumstances involving the early establishment of "Vinland" within the North American continent, the Black Plague of 14th century Europe being brought to Greenland, and the recorded contacts of Greenlanders and Eskimos during this period.

Given the evidence above, it seems unmistakable that the early Anishnabeg did indeed migrate from the east and came to settle in the Great Lakes region in pre-contact times. The scrolls and oral tradition state that along the migration route some of the Anishnabeg came to settle more or less permanently at various points, notably at Sault Ste Marie and at La Pointe at the western end of Lake Superior (Warren, 1957: 79). Potawatomi oral tradition also claims a eastern sea coast origin (Skinner, 1924: 11). Andrew Blackbird, in his history of the Odawa people, states that in the pre-contact period the Ottawa lived on the banks of the Ottawa River, although no further description of the location is given (Blackbird, 1887). Indian agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft writes that Odawa oral tradition places them originally on the St. Lawrence River (Schoolcraft, 1851-57: I: 306).

While perhaps disagreeing on certain points and admitting that the various scrolls are not identical in

their representations or interpretations, those elders charged with interpreting the scrolls seem to agree on several points: the origins of the Anishnabeg are on a saltwater shore; the Midé religion and the westward migration were Divinely and simultaneously directed; the religion and migration were both in response to some suffering that the Anishnabeg were experiencing; and the Rapids at Sault Ste Marie was an important point on the migration route both in the religious sense and the geographic sense, indeed, the two cannot be separated (Dewdney, 1975).

Also, it should be noted that these scrolls refer to a migration route that follows the drainage pattern of the ancient northern waterway from the upper Great Lakes through the French River and Lake Nipissing, then down the Ottawa River and out the St. Lawrence to the Atlantic. As mentioned earlier, this is the same route —in reverse— used by European explorers, fur traders, and voyageurs as they moved into and through the area.

NOTES

1. The most notable exception to the practice of treating the U.S. Canada separately is Helen Tanner's useful volume *The Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (1987). For my own use, the volume was not acceptable. The Sault Ste Marie and Mackinac areas invariably ended up in the crease between two pages, making reproduction impossible.

2. This map is a perfect example of the trouble the researcher encounters while doing border research. What I was looking for here was a map that merely showed the area's topography without political boundaries and treated both sides of the U.S./Canada border equally. I adapted this map from Hough (1958: vi) "Geographic Map of the Great Lakes Region, Showing Drainage." It is only a portion of this map. All of the maps in this study have been significantly altered through computer software. For this map, drainage separation lines, latitude and longitude lines, and state boundaries and names have been erased. The Hough map did not show the international border, provincial boundaries, or provincial names. Some cities have been added, others deleted.

3. Basil Johnston, author of several books and a native Ojibway speaker, gives the meaning "The Good People" to the word Anishnabeg (Johnston, 1993: 9). In a guest lecture at Michigan State University in April of 1991 he explained the term as meaning "The Good Beings," prefaced with the phrase *those who intend no harm* (Johnston, 1991).

4. Gerald Vizenor in his book *Summer in the Spring* claims that the Anishnabeg followed a miigis shell westward. The miigis shell is said to resemble the cowrie and is the symbol of midéwiwin spirit power (Vizenor, 1993: 142).

5. Robert Ritzenthaler considers it "more likely" that the Anishnabeg were driven westward by the Iroquois (Ritzenthaler, 1953: 106).

6. The oral tradition states that at Sault Ste Marie (Bawating) the three branches of the Anishnabeg split: the Ojibway went west, the Ottawa east, and the Potawatomi south (Hoffman, 1891: 166; Ritzenthaler, 1953: 106).

CHAPTER 1: THE ANISHNABEG BEFORE EUROPEAN CONTACT

As explained in the first portion of this study, the people of the area refer to themselves as the Anishnabeg, but it is necessary to trace the various historic groups that came to compose the formation now collectively called the Anishnabeg. As the migration scrolls show, the people were not at all adverse to frequent and far-reaching movements across wide territories. Establishing their location at a particular place and at a particular time can be quite problematic. For example, in Warren's recounting of the migration of the Ojibway to the Lake Superior region, he recalls the passing of nine generations since their arrival from the Atlantic coast (Warren, 1957: 90). For Warren, a generation was forty years long, consequently, his calculations showed that the Ojibway reached La Pointe, in Wisconsin, about the time of Columbus. Using a more "conventional" thirty years for a generation, the date of their arrival at La Pointe would be about 1580 —almost simultaneous with early European contact in the eastern reaches of our study area (Warren, 1957: 90). Obviously, before European contact the question of "Where were you living in the year, say, 1492?" could not have been answered.

So from where did the information come that allows us to locate these people at the time of contact? The first recorded contacts in this area came from the French missionaries and explorers of the region. It would be useful to look at a few of these accounts to establish the relative permanence of the Native people of the area in this early historic period.

The Ottawa were first met by the French explorer Samuel de Champlain in 1615 at a place which has been surmised to be along the shore of the Georgian Bay of Lake Huron east of Manitoulin Island (Cash & Wolff, 1976). He called these people the "Cheveux Relevez" —the Standing Hair People— in reference to their fashion of wearing their hair in a tall roach (Clifton, 1977: 10). In an interesting departure from accepted convention, Peter Schmalz in his book *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* consistently refers to these Georgian Bay people as Ojibway (Schmalz, 1991).[1]

Although tribal names are not given in the accounts, there can be no doubt that the French explorer Etienne Brulé visited the northern Great lakes area and travelled as far north and west as the rapids at the Sault in 1621, possibly doing so earlier in a 1618 voyage as well (Fowle, 1925: 40). In 1634, Jean Nicolet was sent by Champlain on a "peace Mission" to the Winnebago at what is now Green Bay. Nicolet was very close to the Huron and it was they who apprised Champlain of the possible disruption of the fur trade by

hostilities in the area. It was the Huron who led Nicolet to Green Bay who then became the first European recorded to have travelled the waterway into Lake Michigan.

Out of the Nicolet mission came the first extensive accounting of the tribes in the region. A discussion of the tribes mentioned as indigenous to the area is appropriate as we begin to trace the outlines of our study area and become familiar with the people who lived and still live there. (The tribal names are given with spelling changes to reflect modern convention where appropriate).

We have no account of Nicolet's journey in his own hand and must rely upon secondhand information for a recounting of the tribes he visited. Not all of the accounts agree on all points, and even some of the points agreed to by most are disputed by others. Keeping the above in mind, accounts of his trip lists the names of sixteen separate tribes. Of these, several are of scant historical importance.

The Outchougai, Mantoue, and Atchiligouan are mentioned in the accounts (references to tribes of the Nicolet journey from: Butterfield, 1881: 48-65; and Le Jeune, 1640: 413-414). These three groups appear to have been related to the Amikwa, also mentioned, who were at the time a large and powerful group closely allied with the Nipissing. The Amikwa were virtually destroyed by disease and war with the Iroquois early in the contact era and do not play any role in the historic period. It is claimed that the remnants of

the tribe merged with either the Nipissing or the Ojibway (historical references to the tribes mentioned in the Nicolet accounts taken from Hodge, 1959).

The Noquet were mentioned as living on the far north shore of Lake Michigan in what is now the Bay de Noc area. They were related to either the Menominee to the south and west or to the Ojibway to the north and east. Historically, they merged with either or both or these Nations and ceased to exist as a separate entity.

The Winnebago and the Menominee are also mentioned in the Nicolet accounts. Both are fairly large tribes that were resident in large areas along the western shore of Lake Michigan both north and south of what is now Green Bay and far inland. Wars and removal policy wreaked havoc on these people and they are too far west of our study area to be affected by the border issues under discussion.

Other tribes mentioned by Nicolet are the Baouichtigouian, the People of the Rapids at the Sault; the Ouasouarim, an Ojibway tribe of the Bullhead clan, who most likely were living in the Georgian Bay area at this time; and the Missisauga, who also lived in the Georgian Bay area, on the north shore in the vicinity of the Missisauga River and on Manitoulin Island.

For this study it is appropriate to note that the Baouichtigouian, Outchougai, Atchiligouan, Noquet, Mantoue, and Ouasouarim can all be considered "proto-Ojibway" people.

Also, the Missisauga are often classified as a division or a subtribe of the Ojibway although they have for the most part retained a separate identity (Hodge, 1959: I-909).

According to the Missisauga leader Paudash, the Missisauga were once part of the Shawnee nation and dwelt in the Ohio Valley. In turn, it is claimed, the Shawnee were a part of the Ojibway tribe of native peoples. According to this account, due to factional strife, a group of the Shawnee split and migrated northward, finally crossing at Bawating (Sault Ste Marie) and settling along the north shore of Lake Huron where they were called the Missisauga (Paudash, 1905: 7-8).

The Ottawa are again mentioned in the Nicolet accounts as being visited on his return to Quebec, as was a tribe identified as the Nassauaketon. The Nassauaketon —the People of the Fork— was a division of the Ottawa who, in 1634, probably were located on the south shore of Michigan's upper peninsula (Clifton, 1977: 10). Historians have claimed that Nicolet visited all of the tribes mentioned in his accounts. This means that all sixteen tribes had to live along the water route from Lake Nipissing to the Sault to Green Bay. There is some doubt that this is true, yet it is important historically to locate these people accurately. This brings us to a discussion of the last four of the sixteen tribes mentioned in the accounts.

The Potawatomi, Illinois, Assiniboine, and the Sioux

are all identified in the Nicolet accounts as tribes "in the neighborhood." Clifton doubts that any of theses tribes were visited by Nicolet in 1634. The Sioux, Assiniboine and the Illinois lived at too far a distance to have been visited by Nicolet, and Clifton locates the Potawatomi on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan at this time —out of the way of any direct route that Nicolet may have taken (Clifton, 1977: 14). Clifton is willing to concede that some Potawatomi and members of the other distant tribes may have been in Green Bay as it was an important trading center at the time (Clifton, 1977: 15).

Butterfield, in his account, also adds a seventeenth tribe, the Mascoutens, and locates them at a six day journey up the Fox River at Green Bay in what is now Wisconsin, but in a curious footnote adds that Nicolet never mentioned this tribe. Apparently the confusion exists over the "Mascoutens" due to a misunderstanding of the word "Rasaouakoueton" which entered the history misspelled. Early French "corrected" this error by changing the *R* to a *M* which brought the Mascoutens to Wisconsin in 1634. This only compounded the error; Tanner (1987: 2) claims the Mascoutens were in Illinois at the time, Clifton (1977: 12) places them in south-central Michigan. The word should have been spelled with an *N* which gives us *Nassauaketon* which, as we have seen, is an Ottawa division.

There is one other accounting of the tribes in the area

that we need to examine before we attempt to create a map showing tribal areas at the time of European contact. In 1671, the French administrator of Canada, Intendant Talon, sent a party to Sault Ste Marie to lay formal claim to the Upper Great Lakes. Talon was obviously aware of the English presence to the north at Hudson's Bay and the presence of the English and Spanish to the south and west of the Great lakes. He wished to formally claim the rest of North America for the French. He put a gentleman, Daumont de Saint Lusson, in charge of the expedition, and added the able explorer Nicholas Perrot to the party. Perrot's job was to travel to the far reaches of the area and secure the attendance of as many of the area's tribes as possible to witness the planting of the French flag (Winsor, 1892: 9).

Perrot and other emissaries were successful in gathering a number of tribes at the Sault. The areas represented are the same as the Nicolet journey, that is from the Green Bay area, and the northern Lake Huron/Georgian Bay region, but we see a number of tribes from the area north of Lake Superior being in attendance.

The tribes in attendance for the ceremony that we have already identified and located are the Potawatomi, Winnebago, Menominee, Amikwa, and Ottawa. The Baouichtigouian are referred to here as the Sauteurs, a French word with the same meaning —People of the Rapids. Other groups claimed to be residing at the Rapids at Sault

Ste Marie are the Achipoes, or Ojibway; the Marameg (the catfish clan of the Ojibway); and the Noquet, which in Nicolet's time were to the south and west of the Sault (Thwaites, 1883: 26-9).

Also in the Sault in 1671, from the east in what is now Canada, were the Nipissing from the extensive area around the lake of the same name; and the Huron from the south of the Nipissing people and along the north of Lake Ontario (Perrot, 1911: 224-5). From the west, generally from the Green Bay area, in addition to those mentioned above, were the Makomitek, an Algonquin group (Thwaites, 1883: 26-9).

Making quite an addition to the Nicolet lists were representatives from tribes of northern Ontario far to the north and west of Sault Ste Marie. These are the Assiniboine, Niscak, Maskegon, Monsoni, and Cree (Thwaites, 1883: 26-9). The Sauk from lower Michigan did attend, but the Fox, Kickapoo, and Miami, also from the lower peninsula of Michigan, were invited to the ceremony but did not attend (Perrot, 1911: 223). And of the Mascouten of lower Michigan, one account says they were in attendance (Thwaites) and one says they declined the invitation (Perrot, 1911: 223).

In an another account of the tribes of the region, Father Dablon claims that members of 22 nations come to the Sault to fish, four of them permanent inhabitants of the area, "the others being their as borrowers" (Dablon, 1669-

70; 196). The four permanent inhabitants are the Saulteur, Noquet, Outchibous, and Marameg, all tribes we have referenced before. Of the 22, only 9 are named. In addition to the four above, there is mention of the Atchiligouan, Amikwa, and Missisauga; all from islands in the northern Lake Huron region. The two other named groups are the Cree and the Winnebago, "wanderers" from around Lake Superior (Dablon, 1669-70: II-196).

Despite the obvious problems inherent in doing so, many researchers have drawn maps purporting to show tribal occupation at the time of contact. Figure 6 is based on a map developed by the Smithsonian Institution (Trigger, 1978: ix). The Smithsonian adds a long disclaimer which reflects the difficulty in creating such a map.[2] The map has been modified using tribal locations from the data presented above and places the various tribes of Native people in the study area as to their most likely position at the time of European contact in the early 1600s. Territorial areas are given by the Smithsonian and the names associated with these territories are in large type. The smaller type is used for those tribes added by this author.

Certain issues raised by this map need to be addressed before we return to a discussion of this early historic period. First, there are a few names on the map that have fallen into disuse and the reader should be aware of modern usage. The Nipissing are now "officially" designated as



(Adapted from Trigger, 1978)

Figure 6: Tribal Locations at Time of Contact

Dotted lines show areas of disputed occupation. See text for explanation.

(1) – Noquet
(2) – Nassauaketon (an Ottawa division)
(3) – Missisauga
(4) – Ouasouarim (in Georgian Bay area)
(5) – Shared (?) by Ottawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi.
(6) – Extent of Potawatomi territory?

(The Ojibway/Chippewa area also would include the "Proto-Ojibway" tribes –Outchougan, Mantoue, Atchiligouan, and Amikwa– as well as the Baouichtigouian in the Sault Ste Marie area).

Chippewa or Ojibway (Hodge, 1959: II-74). The Petun, located on the map just to the east of Lake Huron, are historically more commonly referred to as the Tionontati or the Tobacco Nation (Hodge, 1959): II-755-6). The Mascoutens are a bit more problematic. Alanson Skinner alludes to a popular myth that the Mascoutens comprise a "mysterious long lost tribe which had disappeared from the pages of history without leaving a trace" (Skinner, 1924: 9).

He then goes on to claim that they are not at all lost but are in truth the "Prairie Potawatomi." Clifton disputes Skinner's claim and states that "the Mascoutons were quite definitely a separate tribe which eventually merged with the Kickapoo" (Clifton, 1977: 19). To confuse matters even more, Hodge breaks the tribe into two groups and claims that the southern group did join with the Kickapoo but the northern group joined with the Sauk and Fox (Hodge, 1959: I-810-12). Fortunately, we are under no compulsion to sort out these inconsistencies; for our discussion it is sufficient to note that they appear to have merged with some other tribe and have ceased to exist as a separate entity, consequently, they cannot be said to be affected by borderlands issues.

This affected-by-borderlands criteria can also be applied to other groups on Figure 6. As discussed above, the Petun are synonymous with the Tionontati who eventually merged with the Huron. The Huron, the Neutral, and the Erie

were ravaged by the Iroquois through a series of bloody and devastating wars apparently lasting from the pre-contact era until the Iroquois were finally successful in defeating these people and driving them out of what is now Canadian territory by the mid 1600s (Tanner, 1987: 30). The dwindling Neutrals and Eries merged with the Hurons during this period. Finally, the Huron, decimated by war and in combination with the remnants of these other groups, fled to what became Michigan and came to be called, collectively, the Wyandot (Hodge, 1959: I-584-91). Further, it is claimed that the name *Wyandot* was that of still another of the "Canadian" tribes that fled before the Iroquois and joined the Huron Confederacy, with the single tribal name being applied to the remnants of the entire Confederacy (Smith, 1973). After being driven from Canada, the Wyandot lived in the vicinity of Detroit and south into Ohio. They were players in the Indian wars of the area, but they were eventually "removed" to Indian Territory in the early 19th century (Smith, 1973).

Other nations on the map are the closely related Sauk and Fox people, the Kickapoo, and the Miami. Most of the Fox were driven from the area by the Ojibway, with the remnants of the Fox allying themselves with the Sauk. Eventually the allied Sauk and Fox were forced west during the Removal period. The Kickapoo and the Miami were also forced west, with many of the Kickapoo moving to Mexican

territory (Hodge, 1959: I-684-5).

The Five Nation Iroquois, the Illinois, the Menominee, and the Winnebago of Figure 6 lived and continue to live in the region, but outside of our study area, and consequently, can be excluded from the present discussion. That leaves the Potawatomi living in the northern portion of the lower peninsula of Michigan and along the east shore of Lake Michigan, the Chippewa-Ojibway throughout northern Michigan and northern Ontario, and the Ottawa on Manitoulin Island and on the Bruce Peninsula along the east shore of Lake Huron to the south. These groups, resident but moving within the area considerably, remain throughout the historic period and become the three tribes of the area which are most affected by the eventual establishment of the U.S./Canada border in the Lake Huron area.

Orthography and Origins

In order to assure that the reader is not confused by variant spellings of tribal groups some discussion of tribal orthography is required; simultaneously, a discussion of the meanings and origins of the tribal names would be in order. Let us take the three members of the Anishnabeg in turn, starting with the Ottawa.

The Ottawa

The Ottawa do not present a very big problem as to tribal name and meaning. The word Ottawa, by all accounts

means "trader" in almost all Algonquin-based languages. Originally it was used to refer to all those Native people who travelled the Ottawa river to trade furs at the southern French posts, and it came to be applied to the "Ottawa" proper as we know them today through this usage as they were prime actors in the fur trade business (Feest & Feest, 1978: 774). As stated above, they were originally referred to as the *Cheveux Relevez*, the Standing Hair People. Historically, the spelling of the word has varied considerably. Contemporarily, the preferred tribal designation is spelled *Odawa*, which is pronounced with a long "O" and an accent on the second syllable (McClurken, 1991: 3).

The Potawatomi

According to Clifton (1977: 12), the Potawatomi are more fortunate than most by being blessed by the French with only one name throughout the early contact period –the name of *Potawatomi*, albeit with up to 140 variant spellings. The meaning of the word is less definitive. Clifton, in his book on the Potawatomi, claims that the word derives from an attempt by some Algonquin speaker to explain to a Frenchman (Nicolet?) that this particular group of people had something to do with blowing on a fire, "perhaps in irony or jest," is how Clifton puts it (1977: 17). Clifton goes on the say that these people almost always refer to themselves as "Neshnabek," meaning *People*.

The Ojibway or Chippewa

As can be seen by the various "proto-Ojibway" tribes of the early accounts and the continued usage of *Ojibway or Chippewa* in this paper, this third and final component of the Anishnabeg is more problematic. The tribal name *Outchibous*, found in the Jesuit Relation of 1640, is probably the source for the modern designation *Ojibwa*, or *Ojibway* as it is more commonly spelled. It is assumed that the designation *Chippewa* is a corruption of *Ojibway*. For example, Bishop Frederic Baraga's dictionary, first published in 1878, (considered by some to be definitive) is called *A Dictionary of the Otchipwe Language* (Baraga, 1992) so it is easy to see how the two tribal designations came to be differentiated over time. The meaning of the word and how it came to be applied to this Nation presents a much larger problem.

"Translations" of the word seem to revolve around the words "roast" and/or "pucker." For example, the word has been taken to mean "to roast until puckered up." Its association with the Ojibway is then explained by citing the supposed practice of these people to "roast" their enemies over an open fire "until they are puckered up" (Capp, 1904: 9). William Warren, in his book *History of the Ojibway Nation* lends credence to this interpretation, but his reference to the roasting of captured Fox warriors as a source of this explanation relates to a time period that is

perhaps a century after the name "Outchibous" is first recorded, as he admits (Warren, 1957: 36). In his words: the "name does not date far back" (37). Furthermore, E. S. Rogers, in his essay on the Ojibway for the Smithsonian Institution, claims that such a translation of the word is "linguistically impossible" (Rogers, 1978: 769). Lastly, Diamond Jenness in his book *The Indians of Canada* claims that the Ojibway never tortured their prisoners (Jenness, 1932: 279). One may assume that included a proscription against their "roasting."

The second meaning given to "roast until puckered up" is applied to their moccasins, which, it is claimed, have seams that are puckered. This definition is said to be taken from their own language, or alternatively from the "Algonquin language," although no evidence is ever offered to show that these people ever created puckered seams by roasting their leather or their moccasins (McLean, 1916; Swanton, 1952: 260). So, in this "translation," these are the people who wear moccasins with roasted, puckered seams. Modern tribal designations based on an article of clothing (or physical characteristic) are rare but not unheard of and are almost always names that have been bestowed upon a group by someone else, Native or non-Native, not a name a tribe would apply to themselves. It seems preposterous to believe that when asked, any group of people would refer to themselves as "The Roast Until Puckered Up" People.

Well, if not "to roast until puckered up," what then? Others have taken the single word "pucker" and attempted to find meaning behind the word *Ojibway* there. Edward Neill, in his book *History of the Ojibway and Their Connection with Fur Traders, Based upon Official and other Records* rejects the allusion to their style of moccasins but presents two other possible meanings. First, quoting a missionary, Neill posits that the designation Ojibway is related in some way to the word *shibew* which in turn is connected to the manner in which these people "draw out" the syllables producing a distinctive manner of speech (Neill, 1885: 399). His further speculation implies that this meaning may be related to a "discernible pucker in their voice" (399): he then dismisses this possibility. Instead, Neill quotes a Governor Ramsey of Minnesota:

> "[A] more natural genesis of the word could probably be derived from a circumstance in their past history. Upwards of two centuries ago [circa 1650] they were driven by the Iroquois, or Six Nations of New York, into the strait of Mackinaw, where Lake Huron, Michigan, and Superior, are "puckered" into a small channel or narrow compass (Neill, 1885: 399).

Other definitions which make no reference to "roasting" and/or "puckering" have also been found. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, the first U.S. Indian Agent at the Sault, offers this rather dubious explanation: the term Ojibway "refers to the power of *virility*" (emphasis in original) (Schoolcraft, 1851-57: 483 (note 1)). Harold Hickerson on the other hand offers the possibility that the term Ojibway

may be related to the Crane clan, which gained ascendancy at the Sault. He speculates that the word *Ojee-jok-bwa*, "Voice of the Crane," may be one way to explain the origin of the Ojibway tribal appellation (Hickerson, 1970: 44). Edmund Danziger, Jr., posits that the Ojibway name is corrupted from *o-jib-i-weg*, which he claims means "those who make pictographs" and was a name bestowed on them by "neighbors" (Danziger, 1979: 6). Helen Tanner in her *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* seems to support Danziger by claiming the word "Ojibwa" (the *Atlas* uses this spelling exclusively) refers "to the practice of recording information by drawing glyphs and signs on birch bark" (Tanner, 1986: 4).

Of the almost thirty tribes named so far in this study only one —the Outchibous— has a name which purports to refer to a piece of clothing or makes a claim to some other rather ludicrous (and unsupported) explanation. Almost all of the other tribal names mentioned in this study refer to either the place where their village lies, derives from a general description of their home territory, or is a reference to their clan affiliation (Hickerson, 1970: 44; Hodge, 1959).

So in light of the above discussion, this study's author suggests another possibility. Diamond Jenness, in his book on the Parry Island Ojibway, reports that the Ottawa of the island refer to themselves as the *Kitchibuan*, or the "Great Medicine People" (Jenness, 1935: 1). Owing to the differences in time (300 years), the lack of standards

in spelling, and the variations in the Ottawa and the Ojibway dialects (where it is not unusual for native speakers to drop either the first or the last letter from a word (Goddard, 1978: 583-4), the transition from *Outchibous* to *Kitchibuan* is not too great.

Such a self-referential name would fit well with historical usage and in the case of Sault Ste Marie we find, through the interpretations of migration scrolls, that the place Bawating has deep religious significance to the Anishnabeg of the area. A tribal self-designation that refers to this sacred place and the people who live there makes more sense than does a reference to a moccasin seam, prisoner torture, or to sexual power. Of course, the suggestion of "Great Medicine People" does not clear up the controversy over the meaning of the word *Ojibway* but merely adds another element to it. Gerald Vizenor in his book *Summer in the Spring* (1993) concludes that the designation Chippewa/Ojibway is an "invented" name (134) the true meaning of which may never be known. He is given the last word on this subject: "Once recorded in treaties the name is a matter of law" (136).

So, with no regard to meaning, the designations *Chippewa* and *Ojibway* should be considered to be synonymous throughout this study (although Ojibway is the more common term in Canada, Chippewa being more common in the United States). For consistency, the term Ojibway is used in this

study. Also, the term Odawa is preferred by the "Ottawa" when referring to themselves (Feest & Feest, 1978: 785; McClurken, 1991: 3); consequently, this study also prefers this usage. And, as mentioned, the Odawa, the Ojibway, and the Potawatomi all refer to themselves as the Anishnabeg (or a variant of this spelling). So, for this study the common term, Anishnabeg, will be used whenever a reference is being made to the three groups in general, and the designations Ojibway, Odawa, and Potawatomi will be used for reference to the groups individually when such reference is necessary.

A Brief Ethnography of the Anishnabeg

While a complete ethnography of the Anishnabeg is beyond the scope of this paper,[3] some aspects of their lifeways are quite relevant to this study and need to be discussed. Anishnabeg political structure was quite different from the European models extant at time of contact, consequently much difficulty arose due to misunderstandings on both sides. One aspect of Anishnabeg political life was virtually inconceivable to the European and that was the philosophy of individual liberty.

Among the Anishnabeg, every person was (in the European sense) "lord of the manor." Individual members of communities could not be compelled to do the bidding of any "chief" –the term and concept is of European invention, created to fit their pre-conceived notions of how societies "must" function. Furthermore, in contrast to the rigid

roles of gender-based European society, Anishnabeg society was decidedly egalitarian (Axtell, 1981: 106).

Consequently, instead of exclusively male "chiefs," the Anishnabeg relied upon the expertise of wise, experienced elders, men or women who could be counted upon to provide leadership for whatever the reason. That is, a person well-versed in the healing arts would be the medicine "chief," the best hunter would lead the hunting party, one skilled in the ways of warfare would lead the war party, etc. Individual members were expected to follow these "chiefs" only so far as their confidence in the respected person demanded (Jenness, 1932: 125). As we shall see, this concept of individual liberty, especially as it relates to warfare, proved to be problematic when the Anishnabeg were faced with British and American military threats.

The concept of individual liberty was somewhat mirrored within the community as a whole. The Anishnabeg lived most of the year in small semi-autonomous units, returning to central locations at various times of the year as social and subsistence demands warranted. These semi-autonomous communities were closely connected to others through marriage; cooperation and unselfish hospitality were the ruling forces in community relations. These small semi-autonomous units would (if conditions demanded it) be reduced to autonomous family units. These families or larger "bands" would, through custom, return to the same

areas for hunting, fishing, gathering, etc., year after year although the concept of land "ownership" as conceived of by the European was completely foreign to the Anishnabeg (Hickerson, 1970: 16, Danziger, 1979: 11). It can be readily seen that a political philosophy which embodies individual liberty and community autonomy faces certain disadvantages when faced with the monolithic concepts of "The British Empire" or the American's self-proclaimed "Manifest Destiny." These disadvantages will be made evident as this study unfolds.

Other Confusing Appellations

A *caveat* must be presented concerning other names that may be encountered while studying the Anishnabeg. Notable among the tribal groups mentioned in the early accounts are the *Pahouitingwach Irini*, which is a very bad variant spelling of *Bawatingowininwuk*, which in modern Ojibway means *People of the Rapids*. Translating this into French gives *Saulteaux* (pronounced, So-toe).

The Word French word "saut," at times spelled "sault," has several translations, such as the verbs to jump, leap, or vault; or as a noun meaning falls, as in the Saut du Ste Mary, or the Falls of the St. Mary's. Lajeunesse misapplies the verb sense of the word "saut" and ludicrously claims that the term "Saulteurs" was applied to the Native people from Sault Ste Marie because they were "constantly on the move, hopping from one place to another" (Lajeunesse, 1960:

xlv).[4] The term *Saulteaux* is now generally applied only to the Ojibway who reside in the Lake Winnipeg region of Canada.

Greenberg and Morrison argue quite perceptively that this term as applied to a group of people who now reside several hundreds of miles from the area where the term was given birth does not necessarily signify a migration of these people from the Sault Ste Marie area to Lake Winnipeg, but instead we should look upon this second use of the term Saulteaux as a "migration" of the term as Europeans misapplied it to two separate groups of people speaking a common language and possessed of the same culture (Greenberg & Morrison, 1982).

Another common tribal name may confuse the reader due to its similarity to Chippewa, and that is the tribal designation of *Chipewyan*. The Chipewyan are a rather large Athapaskan group who reside in north central Canada. The word is Cree in origin and may refer to the type of clothing these people wore —pointed skins— although the Chipewyan people believe it is a term of reproach applied to them by their Cree neighbors but subsequently adopted by common usage. They refer to themselves as the Dené (Smith, 1981: 283). Readers should be aware that when referring to contemporary peoples, the use of both the *Saulteaux* and the *Chipewyan* tribal names refer to nations that are not relevant to this present study.

Notes

1. From Schmalz (1991):
   1) quoting Champlain: " We met with three hundred men of a tribe named by us the *Cheveux Releves* or "High Hairs [Ojibwa] . . . " (p 14);
   2) Schmaltz quotes Nicholas Perrot: "I have learned from the lips of the old men among the Ottawa tribes." (p 21) then gives this explanatory note (#10 on page 271): "Ottawa" is the term used here, but it is safe to assume that these were mainly Ojibwa."
   3) ". . . Sachems of the Ottawa [mainly Ojibwa] nation." (p 31)
   4) "Ottawa Sinago [Ojibwa] chief" (from note 24, p 274).

2. The disclaimer reads as follows: "This map is a diagrammatic guide to the coverage of this volume rather than an authoritative depiction of tribal ranges. Sharp boundaries have been drawn and no territory is unassigned. Tribal units are sometimes arbitrarily defined, subdivisions are not mapped, no joint or disputed occupations are shown, and different kinds of land use are not distinguished. Since the map depicts the situation at the earliest periods for which evidence is available, the ranges mapped for different tribes often refer to quite different periods, and there may have been many intervening movements, extinctions, and changes in range. *Boundaries in the western half of the area are especially tentative for these early dates.*" (Trigger, 1978: viii; emphasis added) The western half of the map is the portion adapted for use in this study.

3. The interested reader will find several volumes on the Ojibway, Odawa, and Potawatomi in virtually any library. For a fine introduction to these Nations, refer to *The People of the Three Fires* by Clifton, et. al. (see bibliography).

4. Harry Brockel takes this "jump" translation to a loftier, more ludicrous plane. He says:
   > What we call the falls or rapids of the St. Mary's River the French identified as "Sault Ste. Marie." The literal translation of the French word *sault* is *jump*; thus did the French fur traders identify the need for

> their early flotillas of canoes or bateaux to make the "jump" up and over (or down and over) the [rapids]. (Brockel, 1981: xi-xii).

CHAPTER 2: THE FRENCH PERIOD, c1600 TO 1763

With the introduction of the European fur trade came a profound disruption of the Anishnabeg way of life. There is no doubt that trading was indigenous to tribal life long before the Europeans arrived in the Upper Great Lakes in the early 1600s. The trading of copper artifacts appeared to have been practiced in prehistoric times (Whittlesy, 1961: 52). In fact a chunk of copper taken to Champlain in the early 1600s was in part the impetus to send Brulé on his northern expedition in 1618 and again in 1621 (Fowle, 1925: 30).

The historical record shows that the French and other Europeans were concerned with more than just obtaining fur; minerals were also a large inducement to their continued and expanding presence in North America. As time passes, the Europeans look to other area resources as exploitable, including iron ore, timber, and eventually the land itself.

The French policy in North America was, from the point of view of the Native people, rather benign. It is, of course, much easier to view French policy in retrospect and in comparison to the events which followed the end of French domination, but contemporary records of the period demonstrate that most northern Native groups that the French

came into contact with were favorably disposed to them. Extensive inter-marriages also point to this compatibility. The most notable exception were the Iroquois who were allied to the British.

Shortly after the founding of Quebec in 1608, Champlain took the side of the Huron in their long standing dispute with the Iroquois. With French aid, the Huron and their fellow Algonquin allies defeated the Iroquois and thus began a century of animosity between the Iroquois and the French in addition to the long standing Iroquois/Algonquin conflicts. The French were pressed by more than the Iroquois.

The "Pageant of Saint Lusson," staged by the French at the Sault in 1671, had a two-fold purpose: to solidify the French/Indian alliance, and to "take possession of the Outaous' country" (Perrot, 1911: 222). It would be safe to assume that "the Outaous' country" here refers not to the land occupied by the Odawa proper but is in reference to the definition of the term "Ottawa," which leads to a more reasonable assumption that the French were in the Sault to "take possession of the *fur traders'* country." The French Intendant Talon realized that the English were pressing up against the French from the north at Hudson Bay as well as from the colonies to the south and that a formal claim was in order.

The French policy of settling the French only near

their posts was a weakening factor. During this period, the vast Great Lakes region was, it is true, "French," but without the stability provided by the yeoman farmer —to contrast the French with the English— and, consequently, their hold over the territory was tenuous (Winsor, 1892: 23-4). The French understood, perhaps as well as the Native population, that agriculture and industry would destroy the environment necessary for the continued production of fur-bearers and fur was the base of their New France enterprise.

It appears that the French and Native people of the region got along so well because the French were not inclined to dispossess the Native people of their homelands. The New England Native experience with other European colonizers was well known to the Anishnabeg in the Great Lakes region, which also added to their attachment to the French regime. They were not disturbed in their own country and yet they had access to European trade goods through the French fur trade regimen. Of course, at this time the English were not making territorial demands on the Great Lakes Native population, although the competition between French and English fur trade enterprises was keen. In fact it was well known among the Native people that the English were more liberal in their trading and that the English goods were of better quality than those the French supplied; in some cases the price given for peltries brought to the British would be twice that given by the French (Ray, 1974:

144). Yet, the Anishnabeg remained loyal to the French.

The Iroquois Wars: c1640 to 1667

One big problem for the Anishnabeg during this period was the Iroquois push for dominance in the region. The Iroquois had trapped out their homelands in the Hudson River valley and upstate New York by the 1640s (Tanner, 1987: 29) and were faced with the choice either to expand their territories or give up on the fur trade and the European goods that the trade brought them. Not surprisingly, they chose to expand their territory.

Their old enemy, the Huron, were the first to feel the heat of the expanding Iroquois. The Huron benefitted greatly from the fur trade regimen through control of the territory between the Great lakes and the French fur trade centers of Quebec. This territory, called "Huronia," skirted the Iroquois to the south along the St. Lawrence. The trade route —which followed the ancient waterway from the French River near the eastern end of Manitoulin Island, through Lake Nipissing and down the Ottawa River to Montreal— avoided the Iroquois as much as was possible. During this period the Anishnabeg were allies of the Huron, and the Odawa especially were firmly ensconced within the Great Lakes/Quebec trading regime (Cash & Wolff, 1976).

Although the Iroquois began raiding Huron villages in 1641, in the summer of 1648, the Iroquois launched a successful series of raids on their enemy the Huron,

destroying their villages and killing or widely dispersing the residents. The Nipissing to the north of the Huron were also attacked and dispersed by the Iroquois during this and subsequent campaigns (Trigger, 1978a: 355).

As was mentioned previously, the Huron and their Petun/Tobacco, Neutral, and Erie allies were forced out of what is now Canada by these Iroquois raids. The Odawa and the Potawatomi were also living within Huronia at the time and they too were forced to flee (Cash & Wolff, 1976). The Anishnabeg people living in the rich marsh lands around Lake St. Clair were forced out of the area by the Neutral earlier in this period of warfare; they, in turn, were expelled by the Iroquois (Trigger, 1978a: 355).

The Odawa and the Potawatomi living with their Huron allies in southern Ontario fled to the western side of Lake Michigan and took up residence there. Reports claim that many Odawa, Huron, and Neutrals took up residence at the Sault and other remnants of the tribes from southern Ontario scattered throughout the Great Lakes region (Fowle, 1925: 69). During this same period the Iroquois forced other Native residents of Michigan's lower peninsula out of the area and they too fled west to the far shores of Lake Michigan (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 602).

These disruptions caused by the Iroquois wars were widespread and long lasting, and the Ojibway and their allies at the Sault were not spared from the hostilities.

They were attacked by the Iroquois in 1650 and many fled the Sault area and joined the other Anishnabeg in the western parts of Michigan's upper peninsula and into Minnesota. Pushed from the west by their "little" enemies, the Sioux[1] and hemmed in by the Iroquois on the east, the Anishnabeg spent some uncomfortable years in the area about the western end of Lake Superior.

In 1653, a large contingent of Algonquin peoples and their allies with French support successfully defended a fur trading fort at Green Bay from invading Iroquois and drove the Iroquois east. The Potawatomi contributed about 40% of the defending force with another 40% being divided equally between the Ojibway and the Odawa (Clifton, 1977: 39). This engagement shows how far west the Iroquois had been able to push the Anishnabeg in their attempt to conquer the region.

The successful 1653 Green Bay defense and a subsequent Ojibway defeat of an Iroquois war party in 1662 at a place some 20 miles west of the Sault on the southern shore of Whitefish Bay (now called Iroquois Point) drove the Iroquois from the area (Neill, 1885: 403). Shortly after the defeat of their enemy at Iroquois Point, the Anishnabeg returned to their ancient home at Bawating. The French established a mission and trading post there in 1668, often given as the date of the establishment of Sault Ste Marie, which then uses this date to lay claim to being the third oldest city in the United States.

The Sault soon became the trading center for the entire upper Great Lakes; furs from the Cree far to the west and north found their way to the Sault for assemblage and transport to Montreal. The French were firmly in control of this trade and raised the assistance of many Native people to accompany their flotilla of canoes across the north and onto the Ottawa river to Montreal. Interestingly, of the Anishnabeg, it is reported that the Potawatomi absolutely refused to go out of fear of the Iroquois who still were in the habit of attacking the fur trade flotillas on the Ottawa River (Fowle, 1925: 68); of course this assertion makes little sense in light of the Potawatomi contribution to the defeat of the Iroquois at Green Bay. Another writer of this period rails against the Odawa for what he perceives their cowardice in travelling from the upper lakes to Montreal (Perrot, 1911: 268, 272).

Yet, through a series of military defeats, both on the Upper Great Lakes and south into New York, the Iroquois were forced into peace in 1667 (Trigger, 1978a: 356). Following the peace of 1667, the Odawa and the remaining Huron were eager to resume their "trader" roles and by 1669 they had returned to their ancient home on Manitoulin Island, (also pushed in this direction by the pressure of the Sioux in the western Great Lakes (McClurken, 1988: 32)).

The Post-Iroquois War Period

The peace of 1667 also gave the French the opportunity to solidify their hold over the Upper Great Lakes territory and the staging of the Pageant of Saint Lusson of 1671 was designed to insure the alliance of the Native people of the fur trade areas. It was held in Sault Ste Marie in recognition of its reestablished central role in the fur trade as well as a recognition of the Sault as an historic meeting place of the Anishnabeg.

With the defeat of the Iroquois by the Ojibway and the resumption of the French fur trade, life returned pretty much to normal in the Upper Great lakes, Native people returned to their traditional homelands, and the fur trade cycle was renewed; but the peace was not permanent. An example of the disruptions of Native life through European design, was the contingent raised in the upper Great lakes to aid Monsieur de la Barre in an attack on the Iroquois in their own territory. He raised troops among the Native people and collected them at Michilimackinac in 1684. Represented were warriors from the Odawa, Huron, Ojibway, Menominee, Potawatomi, Illinois, Fox, Kickapoo, and Mascouten (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 603). And even after the Odawa complained that a long absence would subject their family to possible starvation, they were apparently dissuaded from abandoning the enterprise by taunts of cowardice and reminders of their oath of loyalty to the

French (Perrot, 1911: 239). So it can be seen that many of these warriors were induced to travel a thousand miles or so to fight for a French commandant, at great personal loss; an occurrence that tells of how far both geographically and politically Native people of the region were affected by European intrigue. It should be noted that the expedition ended in disaster for the French and its Native allies.

The British established the Hudson Bay Company in 1670 to further press the French from the north and by the late 1680s, the Iroquois had resumed their forays into the upper lakes and the conflict with the British heated up; the British even managed to get eleven canoes full of trade goods to Michilimackinac in 1685, giving the Native people of the region a ready comparison with French goods and trade practices. Later in the decade and into the 1690s the French drove the British from their forts on James Bay in the far north.

But the pressure on the French was still great, and in 1689 the post at the Sault was abandoned in favor of the one at Mackinac; yet it too was soon abandoned. The abandonment of the French forts in the Upper Great Lakes was not due solely to the raiding Iroquois and British conflicts. In fact, the reasons were more economic and social than military.

Economically, the peace of 1667 gave new impetus to fur trade activity and by the latter part of the century the

warehouses at Montreal were well stocked with furs. The supply being high meant that prices were low. The Montreal merchants felt that by shutting down the northern posts, the natives would be forced to travel to Montreal to trade their peltry; the supply would be thus reduced, the middlemen eliminated and the profits of the merchants would again rise (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 604).

Socially, the Jesuits were complaining to the French authorities in Quebec that the fur trade regimen was too destructive of Native life and induced none of them to give up their idolatrous ways and become Christians. Quite the contrary, the mixture of fur traders, Natives, rum, and women was an extremely volatile mix and the Jesuits felt they had lost control over the missions in the North. They were adamant in demanding that the trading posts be abandoned (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 604). The Jesuit arguments, coupled with the Montreal merchants' desires, led to the closing of the northern posts. At the same time that the posts were closed, the licenses of all of the traders in Upper Canada were also revoked; again, the policy was intended to slow the supply of furs coming into Montreal (De Champigny, 1697: 74).

The Establishment of Detroit and French/British Conflicts

In 1701, Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac convinced the French authorities that they should give him permission

to set up a "model" fur trading post at what is now Detroit. One of the arguments in favor of setting up a post at Detroit is that by abandoning all of the posts the country would be abandoned to the English (Cadillac, c1701: 42-4). Also in 1701, a peace was concluded at Montreal between representatives of the Iroquois, Odawa, Potawatomi (also representing the Wisconsin tribes), Huron, Miami, Fox, and Ojibway, furthering a rationale for the Detroit experiment (La Potherie, 1911: 342).

Cadillac named his settlement Ponchartrain and set about to gather the Native people of the region to the settlement. Many of the Native people from the upper lakes answered Cadillac's call and many Anishnabeg found themselves far south of their usual homelands. From the north we find the Ojibway and the Missisauga, uniting it is said to form one village; the Odawa and the Huron from Michilimackinac, leaving only a few Huron and a small number of Odawa behind; and some Nipissing and Miami; the Potawatomi, Fox, and Sauk also set up villages in the Detroit area (Cadillac, 1703: 163; Stone & Chaput, 1978: 604).

This "experiment" at Detroit was an interesting and important departure for French policy in this era. The French, previously always set up posts in the Natives' own territory. As we have seen, posts were established (giving modern locations) at the Sault, Mackinac Island, St. Ignace,

Port Huron, and Niles, all of Michigan; in addition, forts were established north of Lake Superior, one at Lake Nipigon and one to the north of that on the Albany River (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 603).

Detroit was an attempt to collect the Native people from French territory in one place, a place from where (it was assumed) the French could better control it. The French also felt that they could better control the prices of fur when compared to the previous method of traders and trading posts licensed to trade throughout the territory. Finally, Native people would be better inclined to trade in Detroit with the French than to travel to the English where they could get better prices but risk losses incurred by extensive travel, even if the travel was to Montreal (Cadillac, c1701: 42-44).

The policy also included a provision for settling the Native people at Detroit, inducing them to abandon their traditional homes and establish villages near each other in a "foreign" environment (both climatic and social). The intent was to consolidate and control the region's Native people. The experiment was at first successful, as many tribes were induced to establish their villages at Detroit, including the Odawa, Miami, Huron, Ojibway ("Saulteurs"), Missisauga, and Amikwa (D'Aigremont, 1708: 431). But the success was short lived and the tribes were soon involved in various intrigues that almost always led to trouble, either

with the French or among themselves.

In 1706, some Odawa, acting upon reports that the Miami were planning to attack them while they were weakened by the outbreak of hostilities between them and the Huron, killed a missionary and a French soldier in an attack on some Miami, several of whom were also killed. The incident outraged the French whose major goal, at least as far as Native people were concerned, was to keep peace between the tribes, while at the same time keeping the French out of harm's way so that the fur trade could proceed unimpeded.

Miscouaky, an Odawa chief whose brother Jean le Blanc was involved in the incident, travelled to Detroit to present their version of what happened to the Marquis de Vaudreuil. Miscouaky presented the Odawa role and reasons for the attack in which the missionary and the Frenchman were killed. He pretty much blamed the whole incident on the treachery of the Miami and the Huron, who he claims were in league against the Odawa at the time. The arguments and Vaudreuil's answer are not that important, but what is important to our study is Miscouaky's claim to speak for all of the tribes in the area, which he lists. According to Miscouaky, the following tribes are "all of the people of the districts bordering on the lake": Odawa, Fox, Mascouten, Kickapoo, Winnebago, Menominee, Sauteurs (Ojibway), and Missisauga (Miscouaky, 1706: 294). The list, of course, excludes the Miami and the Huron, for Miscouaky

claimed he was speaking for all of the tribes and against the Miami and the Huron.

The incident passed without further bloodshed, but, in addition to the listing of the area's tribes, it is interesting for it shows clearly the problems encountered by the Native people of the region and the undercurrent of possible war that was always just at the verge of breaking out. Let us not forget that just five years earlier, the Odawa and the Huron were very strong allies living together at Michilimackinac. Also in 1706, Father Marest, the Jesuit missionary at Michilimackinac, reports that an apparent split in the Odawa tribe has at least for now been mended, having realized "the price they have had to pay for being divided" (Marest, 1706: 271). Yet in 1708, it appears that the Odawa were still divided, at least those at Mackinac were refusing to move back to Detroit to join their brethren already there (Outtavois, 1708).

A 1711 document recounts the various tribes that have been in recent conflict: the Missisauga raided the Miami; the Fox against the Miami; the Fox made attacks on the Wea and the Piankeshaw; the Wea attacked the Fox; the Fox also threatened the Huron; and finally the report makes note that the Fox and the Kickapoo were at war with the Illinois (Vaudreuil, c1711: 506).

The French explorer, Nicolas Perrot, also wrote of the conflicts among the tribes during this period, providing a

list of the tribes and the strife between them: the Odawa against the Fox who once helped the Odawa against the Miami; The Fox, who once aided the Saulteurs now war against them; the Miami, once allied with the Fox against the Sioux now are opposed; the Illinois never made war on the Kickapoo or the Fox, yet were induced to fight them at Detroit. He also wrote that the Potawatomi, also at war with the Sak and Fox, were "half Sakis; the Sakis are in part Renards (Fox); thy cousins and thy brothers-in-law are Renards and Sakis." (Perrot, 1911: 270). He concludes by citing all of the tribes that have been responsible for the deaths of Frenchmen: the Iroquois, Huron, Odawa, Ojibway (Saulteur), Missisauga, and Miami.

As can be seen, both in peace and in war, the alliances were shifting, yet another example of the disruption caused by French influence and adherence to French interests. Even during this period the French were questioning the value of Detroit and some were pressing for the abandonment of Detroit in favor of a reinvigorated post at Michilimackinac, and of course there was still a concern that the Native people at Detroit, geographically close to the English, might be induced to trade with them and abandon the French (D'Aigremont, 1711: 431).

While it is true that the French, as could be expected, blamed much of the unrest on the English, the French were not necessarily concerned with peace for its own sake; they

too seemed inclined to make war in order to "keep the peace." The most notable example of this came in 1712. During the winter, most Native people left Detroit to travel to their winter hunting grounds (as it was necessary for them to trap furs); only a few Huron remained with the French who numbered about thirty men. Late winter saw a village of Mascouten and Fox assemble outside of the French fort at Detroit. Dubuisson, the fort commander feared the worst and sent out messengers to re-assemble the tribes to defend Detroit from attack. The tribes called to defend the fort were the Huron, Odawa, Potawatomi, Sauk, Menominee, Illinois, Missouri, Osage, and "other tribes still more distant" (Dubuisson, 1712: 540). The report does not make clear just which tribes responded to the call, but it does imply that the bulk of the defenders were Odawa, Huron, Saulteurs (Ojibway from the Sault area), and Missisauga. Clifton (1977: 88) claims that the majority of fighters were Odawa and Potawatomi. There is some evidence that there were about twenty-five Iroquois in the Detroit defense assembly and some Sauk were also in the attack contingent, pointing to an obvious split in at least two tribes. It should also be noted that the enemies of a few years previous, the Odawa and Huron, were allies once again with the French against the English and their allies and that some Iroquois were defending the French at Detroit.

The Mascouten and Fox were awaiting the arrival of

their Kickapoo allies before they launched their attack. One of the reasons for the attack was that the Fox were fearful that their enemies, the Dakota Sioux to their west, would come under the French umbrella and gain access to firearms and ultimately their homeland would be further threatened. Dubuisson was convinced that the attack was orchestrated by the English and the Iroquois. After the defenders had been assembled and the strength of the "enemy" had been appraised, the Native defenders requested to be allowed within the fort. Dubuisson, "seeing that they were too excited," allows them to do so although it was his intention "to make them camp outside, near the wood, so that we should not be inconvenienced." (Dubuisson, 1712: 541). This statement may shed some light on just how the French regarded their Indian allies.

The battle finally was entered and the Mascouten/Fox village was eventually placed under a siege which lasted for nineteen days with the attackers suffering more than the defenders at first. After nineteen days, the Mascouten and Fox village was put on the run; they secured a position and withstood another siege of four days, but their new stronghold was finally overrun; "All were destroyed except the women and children whose lives were granted them. . . . That, Sir, was the end of those two wicked tribes, with such evil designs, who disturbed the whole land." (Dubuisson, 1712: 549).

Dubuisson was a bit optimistic in his claim that the tribes were annihilated; they and their allies were still a force to be reckoned with and the thought of the Fox and the Native people of the Green Bay area forming an anti-French alliance gave the French much to fear (Marest, 1712: 555). While the Fox did indeed lose this battle for Detroit, they continued to make war on the French and their Indian allies until the early 1740s. The Fox War of 1712 was fought within a much larger series of European wars which, at least for the British and the French, were ended by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

The Treaty required the French to return the James Bay trading posts to the British; further the French were afraid the British/Iroquois alliance would renew forays into the heart of French territory so they reestablished posts throughout the territory in an effort to maintain influence and control. The new commander at Detroit, de Sabrevois, proved that he was no true friend of the Native people and went so far as to threaten to execute any Indian found trading with the British (Sabrevois, 1717: 583). Many Native people (foremost among them were the Odawa and Potawatomi) were so upset with Sabrevois that they set out in seventeen canoes to travel to the British post at Albany to trade their furs. They were persuaded to go to Montreal instead and present their case to Vaudreuil, the Governor General of New France, which they did on the 24th of June,

1717 (Vaudreuil, 1717). Their complaints were well heard and Sabrevois was removed from his post at Detroit.

Other posts were established throughout the northern region as far west as Winnipeg in Manitoba and essentially covered the territory of the Ojibway, Cree, Odawa, Sioux, and Menominee (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 604). We see in this list two new names, those of the Sioux to the west and the Cree to the north, reflecting the attempt of the French to expand their sphere on influence in the face of British competition. By 1712, Mackinac once again became the center for these northern posts and the Native people of the north were encouraged to re-settle there, especially the Odawa who had been living on Saginaw Bay, away from their brethren at Detroit, both groups having been convinced to abandoned their home on Michilimackinac in the early 1700s (Marest, 1712a: 558).

Detroit was made a lesser center for the southern tribes under French influence; the Ojibway, Odawa, Potawatomi, Miami, and Shawnee were among this southern grouping. Notice that of the Anishnabeg, the Ojibway and Odawa were throughout the region while the Potawatomi were only in the south. Some of the Sauk, along with the Fox and Mascouten were still outside the French sphere of influence and a possible alliance of these tribes with the British and Iroquois still concerned the French. To further their influence and control over the southern front, in 1739 the

French mounted an expedition against the Chickasaw far to the south of the Great Lakes. The expedition was aimed at stopping the Chickasaw raiding of the French forts along the Mississippi and the ensuing disruption of trade and communication in the southern portion of the French empire in North America (Edmunds, 1978: 40).

From the north, the Ojibway, Odawa, Potawatomi, Sioux, and Nipissing were called to this service. Both the Sauk and Fox were apparently split at this time, for despite the French concerns mentioned above, some Sauk and some Fox joined in the expedition against the Chickasaw (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 605). More southerly tribes from the Great lakes New France region who joined the offensive were the Wea, Piankeshaw, Miami, and Illinois. The expedition intended to attack the Chickasaw in their homeland in western Tennessee, but the results were inconclusive. The French were fighting too many enemies on too many fronts to be effective (Edmunds, 1978: 39-58).

Of course, in keeping with tradition and policy, the French took care of the families of the warriors who accompanied them to the south. This policy, which included a large measure of "presents," was continued throughout this period and the presents were even increased in the late 1740s as the tribes became dissatisfied with the French in favor of the British. Raids into the Chickasaw territory continued into the 1750s.

The Period of French Decline

As an example of the destructive tendencies of these European induced wars and competition, the Missisauga were reported to have thrown in with the Iroquois against the French, even though their brethren, the Ojibway, seemed to be firmly in the French camp during this same period (Hodge, 1959: 909). The situation was near desperation for the French and many tribal leaders travelled to Montreal during this period to be *feted* by the French authorities and returned laden with many presents and more than a few provisions for their people in further attempts to keep the tribes under French influence (Stone & Chaput, 1978: 605).

Also due to increasing pressure from the British, the French led an expedition into the Ohio Valley in 1749 and claimed this vast area for the French. The impetus for this action was prompted by the Huron breaking with the French a decade earlier when they made peace with the Chickasaw and fought against their recent but now abandoned Anishnabeg allies. In yet another example of the complexities of Native life during this period of intense French/English rivalry, the Huron, along with the Miami, were able to lure some of the Odawa and Ojibway of Michilimackinac and Saginaw Bay into a conspiracy against the French at Detroit in 1647, a conspiracy which ultimately failed (Edmunds, 1978: 42).

The Huron "defection" brought about the establishment of a British stronghold on the shores of Lake Erie. This

Huron village was eventually replaced by one of the Miami who were also strongly pro-British. This British inroad into nominal French territory lasted until a "French" force of Odawa from L'Arbre Croche in northern Michigan with a few Potawatomi from the Detroit area managed to destroy the combined Miami/Shawnee fort in 1752. In yet another example of inter-tribal warfare, also in 1752 the French assembled a company of Potawatomi, Fox, Sauk, Dakota, Winnebago, and Menominee to assault the Illinois, then considered to be wavering in their loyalty to the French. Notice too that some Fox and Sauk —the arch enemies of the early 1700s— are now fighting *for* the French (Tanner, 1987: 46).

The British/French struggle for control of the area was manifest in the east as well, and Anishnabeg from the Great Lakes found themselves far from home fighting for the French in places like Virginia, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. Battles into these areas were fought from Montreal and many Anishnabeg never returned home for the annual hunting and trapping cycle; they were full-time mercenary soldiers (McClurken, 1988: 51).

A pivotal event in the war for domination of this eastern area came in 1757 when a group of Native warriors attacked Fort William Henry, about fifty miles north of Albany. Although the Native warriors scored a stunning victory, they did not know that the fort was suffering an outbreak of smallpox: the warriors took the disease home

with them to the Great Lakes and the effects of the ensuing epidemic were devastating. The resulting disease and the mistrust that followed in its wake led to a serious decline in the ability of the French to compete militarily with the British forces. It soon became apparent that the many Natives allied with the French did so only to drive the British from their territory, and when that was accomplished they planned to drive out the French as well.

Some Native people once allied with the French broke into open rebellion; one faction of the Menominee at Green Bay attacked the French in the winter of 1757-58, killing twenty-two (White, 1991: 246). The days of the French regime in North America were drawing to a close: Quebec City fell to the British in 1759; Montreal fell a year later. Although the war was not yet over, the British were soon to be in control of the Great lakes region, and the Anishnabeg were to fall under whatever new policies the British might impose.

The British and "Pontiac's Conspiracy"

Once the French were expelled, the British soon concluded that they would not make the same mistake that the French made by becoming allies of the Native people of the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes; instead, the British decided that they would instead become masters over them. The new plan of the British was to abandon the French policy of giving presents that insured the well-being and amity of

their Native allies. In its place, the British decided that "presents" would be made only in payment for services rendered or for items taken in trade on an equity basis.

The British also quietly instituted a policy of restricting the sale of gunpowder to the Indians (White, 1991: 259). Further, it soon became evident that despite some assurances to the contrary, the British began to man the abandoned French forts and the Native people saw their worse fears being realized —the British were surely going to seize their lands. In response, the British steadfastly maintained that their policies were designed to merely foster good trading relations which they claimed was their only goal as far as the Native people were concerned. These new policies of the British were soon proven to be costly ones.

The harmonious trade relationship never materialized; the posts were ill-stocked and prices soon rose far beyond the "official" rates and out of the reach of most Native people, quite destitute in the aftermath of the war and the disruption of trade. General Amherst, the British commander of the region, attempted to "control" the situation by restricting further the goods that could be traded. He struck scalping knives, razors, gunpowder, flints, fowling pieces, and rum from the list of trade items. The Ojibway at Sault Ste Marie killed some traders in 1762, some believe, as a direct response to this restriction in trade

(White, 1991: 265).

These many problems, coupled with a British insistence that all prisoners be returned, even those who wished to remain with their adopted Native families, eroded whatever little influence the chiefs had over increasingly dissatisfied tribal members. Inter-tribal hostility (and in many cases open warfare) and attempts to forge alliances against the British, while several of the tribes wished to forge a peace with them, led to crisis throughout the region. The lack of presents, the deterioration of the trading regimen, restricted goods, occupation of the forts, pestilence and disease all combined to form a view of the British as a malevolent force and create a nostalgia for the days when the French were the benevolent fathers to the Native children.

Into the mix of circumstance was the persistent rumor that the French would quickly return if the British could somehow be removed from the area. Of course, many hoped that the British could be forced out without facing the return of the French, but the exorcism of the British scourge became the overriding concern of the Native people throughout the region. Further complicating the situation were opposing rumors that France was not coming to the aid of the Native population but was instead going to cede Canada to the British. This was particularly appalling to the Native people of the Great Lakes. The war between the

British and the French was fought mainly in the east. The Great Lakes Indians had certainly never lost their territory to the British and it was never "French" territory in any case.

Richard White maintains that "Pontiac's Conspiracy" fell far short of a presenting a unified Native front that the concept of conspiracy certainly suggests. Rather, White argues that Pontiac merely led a local faction whose interests happened to coincide with those of other Native people throughout the region. These interests were combined into a decidedly patriotic defense of Native homelands. The disparate Native factions were far from unified and certainly lacked any central coordinating structures. Yet, that dissatisfaction with the British was widespread cannot be disputed; war belts from various tribes were in circulation throughout the lower Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. (White, 1991: 287).

By the summer of 1763, the following tribes engaged the British: the Miami, Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, Seneca, Odawa, Ojibway, Wyandot, Wea, Potawatomi, and Missisauga, but the participation of these various nations was not unanimous. The Ojibway from Michilimackinac took the fort at the straits, but the Odawa from L'Arbre Croche and St. Ignace redeemed the fort's prisoners and led them to safety in Montreal (White, 1991: 287). This demonstrates an obvious split between the Odawa of southern and central Michigan

following their chief, Pontiac, and the Odawa of northern Michigan. The tribes of the west –the Menominee, Winnebago, Sauk, Fox, and Iowa– did not join "Pontiac's Conspiracy" (White, 1991: 287).

Nor was there unanimity among those who did follow Pontiac. The Ojibway who took the fort at Michilimackinac later denounced Pontiac for inflicting cruelties that violated the Anishnabeg moral code and offended the Master of Life (White, 1991: 288). But perhaps the biggest blow to Pontiac's success came by way of the French refusal to come to the aid of the Native people besieging three important forts: Detroit, Fort Pitt, and Niagara. Without French aid the "rebellion" failed. More importantly, the French, who really were defeated by the fall of Montreal in 1760, were in the process of negotiating a peace with Britain. The 1763 *Treaty of Paris* was signed on February 10, months before Pontiac and his allies met in Detroit to plan the uprising that took place later that summer.

The 1763 Treaty did indeed require France to cede its territory in North America; the British received all of the French territory east of the Mississippi; the Spanish received the western portion of the French North American empire. The *French and Indian Wars* which began in 1754 were over, the French defeated, but their Native allies were not signatories to the Treaty signed in Paris by European diplomats.

Summary

While the French regime lasted through several generations, and the introduction of European trade goods profoundly affected Native life in the region, the final throes of the French/British struggle for Native loyalty in the fur trade devastated the area's Native population. For the first time in their history, the Anishnabeg —no strangers to war in defense of their homeland— faced the loss of their territory to a European power; a European power that never militarily defeated them. While Pontiac's action is called a "conspiracy" by western historians, Native peoples referred to it as the "Beaver War." That is, a fur trade war, albeit on a scale larger than any previous and with consequences more serious. In truth, virtually all of this period's battles, sieges, expeditions, and raids were elements of this period's one long, protracted Beaver War. Pontiac's defense was just the last of a long series.

It is important to note that at least one researcher has claimed that throughout this period the Native people of the region were always firmly in control of the fur trade, although admittedly the control passed from one Native group to another throughout the era (Schmaltz, 1991: 33). A moment's reflection on the relative numbers of British and French compared to that of the Native populations, the strength of Native resistance, the shifting alliances, and the trade with <u>both</u> the British and the French during this

period supports the validity of this notion.

In 1763 the area is already very much a "borderland" within the modern meaning of the term: the scene of intense interactions (Thelen, 1992: 437) which sorely test central (read "European") control (Owsley, 1981) punctuated by the clash of differing civilizations (House, 1982: 55).

NOTES

1. The Ojibway called the Iroquois to the east the Nadowe —the Rattlesnakes (literally, like unto the adders); by adding the diminutive, *-siw* gives the term for the Sioux, Nadowesiw —the Little Rattlesnakes. In the French spelling this *siw* becomes Sioux (Warren, 1957: 83).

CHAPTER 3: THE BRITISH PERIOD, 1763 TO 1795

Pontiac's 1763 siege of Detroit was broken on November 5, but the reprovisioning of the fort at Detroit did nothing to bring the partisans of Pontiac into the British fold and the area was far from solidly in British hands (Edmunds, 1978: 93-5). The Native people were of the mind that since the French had ceded their territory in North America, they (that is, the Native people) were sole proprietors of the land; the British had not treated for it nor purchased it from them.

So even though the lifting of the siege of Detroit signalled the end of Pontiac's uprising, continuing resistance from the Native people kept the British at bay; yet, one by one, the British made peace with the various tribes. Even Pontiac, in late 1765, came to accept the British as his "father" (White, 1991: 304). But Pontiac's capitulation did little to bring peace to the region. Native people could see that despite the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*, which forbade English settlement west of the Allegheny Mountains, many whites were indeed moving into Native territories.

To allay Native fears and to solidify their fledgling alliance, the British renewed the French policy of giving

presents and began exchanging the French medals that marked the status of chiefdom with others that marked British favor. The British policy of *choosing* chiefs did not always work toward the intended result. Pontiac himself came to believe that he was indeed the chief of the western tribes, but due to his arrogance, he was soon abandoned by his fellow Odawa. Spurned by the Odawa, he sought refuge with his relatives among the Illinois, but then greatly angered them by stabbing one of their chiefs. Finally, acting on a rumor that had him leading his (nonexistent) warriors against the Kaskaskia, Pontiac was killed by a Peoria in the French village of Cahokia in 1769.

The British plan for their new territory was to create several separate Native alliances, then arm both sides and sit back and watch the competing Native alliances destroy each other; but the plan did not work out as they proposed. The Native groups instead sought British mediation to smooth the differences between the tribes in conflict. The British found themselves in the same position as the French, distributing presents and mediating disputes but in no way did the British succeed in being the master of the Native people in the new British empire, nor could they control the flow of settlers into the "Indian Territory" west of the Alleghenies (White, 1991: 319).

This transition period was again another period of turmoil for the Anishnabeg. For over a century, the Native

and the French had developed a system that was for the most part mutually beneficial and left intact the basic village life of the Anishnabeg. In the words of one Anishnabe: They never molested the places of our dead." (qtd. in Jameson, 1943: 206). True, during the late French and Indian War many warriors found themselves away from their village for extended periods, but the understanding always was that their French "fathers" would look after their families in their absence, which was indeed the case, costly as it was to the French.

Anishnabeg Land Tenure

While it is true that a great number of Native people had been displaced by the French and the ensuing war with Britain, by the end of the wars the Anishnabeg found themselves essentially still in control of the territory in which the Europeans found them a century earlier. Actually, the Anishnabeg found themselves in control of a much larger territory than that which was held in the 1640s. Figure 7 shows the distribution of Native people in the Great Lakes region in 1768 at the beginning of the British era. Compare this to Figure 6, showing tribal distribution at the time of contact.

The Sauk, Fox, Mascouten, and Kickapoo, resident in lower Michigan at the time of contact, were pushed to the west by the century of conflict and French policy. In 1768 the Sauk and Fox are found in an area inland west of Lake



(Adapted from Tanner, 1986; Trigger, 1978)

Figure 7: Native Land Tenure, c1768.

Michigan in territory that a century earlier was occupied by various other tribes (Sioux, Iowa, Winnebago, and Menominee). In 1768 we find the remnants of the Huron Confederacy, now called the Wyandot, holding a small enclave on the Canadian side of the Detroit river in extreme southwestern Ontario, as well as a more sizable holding along the south shore of Lake Erie and inland.

The Menominee and the Winnebago still occupy their homelands of a century ago, albeit on a smaller scale; some of their land now being held by the Odawa and the Potawatomi. The Miami have been pushed out of the northern areas of their contact era holdings and now occupy a larger area further to the south. The Illinois lost quite a bit of their territory to the Potawatomi, Kickapoo, and Mascouten.

Turning now to the Anishnabeg, we find that the Potawatomi abandoned their northern Michigan territory and took control of a wide belt of land that stretched all across southern Michigan, northern Ohio, Indiana, northeastern Illinois, and along the west Lake Michigan coast; an area that stretched from Detroit to nearly Green Bay. At time of contact, this land was occupied by the Kickapoo, Mascouten, Miami, Illinois, and Winnebago.

The Ojibway and their close relatives, the Missisauga, also expanded their territory considerably, occupying the whole of the Ontario peninsula as well as northern Ontario, Michigan's upper peninsula, and the eastern portion of

Michigan's lower peninsula. The Ojibway also expanded their territory to the west and southwest of Lake Superior, land once held by the Dakota.

The third branch of the Anishnabeg, the Odawa, regained their home on Manitoulin Island and expanded into territory once occupied by their Potawatomi brethren in the western portion of Michigan's lower peninsula. They also occupy land all along the northern shore of Lake Michigan, including the Door Peninsula east of Green Bay. And to the south, they can be found along the Maumee River in northwest Ohio.

In summary, all of the territory that the Anishnabeg (including the Menominee) held at the time of contact was still firmly in their control as well as large tracts of land abandoned, or forcefully vacated, by their 1640 neighbors. In 1768, the Anishnabeg occupy all of what is now Michigan, all of what is now Ontario except areas in the far east (Algonquin) and the far north (Cree), much of northern and eastern Wisconsin, northern Minnesota, some areas of northern Ohio and Indiana, and northeast Illinois. They occupy almost all of the land which borders on the five Great Lakes excepting the area to the south of Lake Ontario and a portion of southern Lake Erie, both held by the Iroquois, and small areas along the Detroit River and on the south shore of Lake Erie held by the Wyandot.

Despite the fact that the Anishnabeg are firmly in

control of virtually the entire Great Lakes watershed, the British and the Anishnabeg viewed the areas through completely different lenses. The British were making attempts at control of the area, but these attempts for the most part were failures. The traders who were supposed to obtain licenses from the British and then only trade with British merchants were in open revolt. Many refused to cooperate with the British at all and obtained their permits from the Canadian authorities and then traded freely in the British Great Lakes area (Haldimand, 1782). Most traders sent their furs south through the Mississippi valley to New Orleans rather then send them by the more costly route across land to British ports in the east. At the same time the French traders, at times with evidence of British support, traded throughout the region (White, 1991: 319).

The Anishnabeg and the Struggle for Control of the Ohio Valley

Besides the obvious trouble with trade was the equally troublesome problem of settlers moving across the Appalachians. Despite attempts by the British to evict these settlers, more came in their wake. The *Royal Proclamation of 1763* set up a system of British monopoly in both trade and in land, but the actions of settlers soon negated the Proclamation. This proved very costly to the British. The revenue from the fur trade was supposed to finance the expensive system of military posts and trading

centers as well as pay for the presents given to chiefs for distribution in efforts to assure their loyalty to the Crown. The restriction on settlers was designed to maintain the Natives in their hunting grounds so as to keep a steady supply of furs entering the British trading system. The plan was, in one sense, quite simple and essentially a British adaptation of the French system. But the British were not the French and their view of the Native people was not the same.

The French were quite content to live with and marry into the Native tribes, but the British were deathly afraid of this possibility because they believed that it would then be impossible to control these people as British subjects. They would "go Native." One more problem that was rampant on the frontier was the wholesale murder of Native people by white settlers, only rarely were these murderers ever brought to court under British law, and, of course, Native revenge murder came into play as well. Native revenge murder *was* often punished by British authorities, leading to more friction between the Native population and the British authorities (White, 1991: 347).

Another of the British problems was the expense generated by the *French and Indian War* and the cost of maintaining the empire in North America. As was mentioned, the fur trade was supposed to pay for much of the costs to the Crown. But for the colonists, land was the valuable

commodity, not peltry, and the rich Ohio valley, off limits according to the Proclamation of 1763, was a prize too precious to ignore. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix, signed in 1768 by the British and the Iroquois, appeared to grant the British rights to Kentucky, despite the claims of the Delaware and Shawnee who actually lived there (White, 1991: 352).

The Fort Stanwix Treaty, the first breach of Indian land since the Proclamation of 1763 was issued, showed that the tide of emigrants could not long be held back. The British *Quebec Act* of 1774 again moved the border of the Indian Territory, this time west to the Ohio River, but reaffirmed that the area to the north and west of the River was an Indian State and declared that all Indian sales of land in this territory were invalid (McClurken, 1988: 56). This was designed to placate the Native people who grew weary of the colonist's encroachment upon their lands; but to the colonists who demanded that the whole of the territory be opened to settlement it was one more "Intolerable Act" which only fomented more discontent with British rule. And when Britain imposed a tax on the colonies to defray the costs of defending the Indian territory against settler depredations, they rebelled.

The Revolutionary War and the Anishnabeg

The Anishnabeg of the region played a role, albeit a small one, in the Revolutionary War. Potawatomi warriors

from southwest Michigan were reluctant partisans after 1780, and Odawa and Ojibway warriors from both Detroit and Michilimackinac took part in some engagements (White, 1991: 367). The Missisaugas also played a role in the War, fighting on the British side. Although the Native role in the Revolutionary War was slight, when they did fight it was almost exclusively on the side of the British, and not one member of the Algonquin Nation (which included all of the Anishnabeg) could be found that was friendly to the American cause.

Indian agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft gives the number of Native warriors from the Upper Great Lakes that fought in the Revolutionary War as follows: Ojibway, 5,000; Odawa, 450; Potawatomi, 450; and Missisaugas, 250. He further made mention of the fact that all of these Native warriors were from "Canadian" territory. Of course, all of British North America could be considered "Canadian" before the Revolutionary War, and Schoolcraft makes no distinction as to whether these warriors were exclusively from territory that subsequent to the War was designated as Canadian as distinct from the territory of the emerging United States (Schoolcraft, 1851-57).

The fact that the area's Native people fought on the British side should not be construed as a great love for the British but merely reflected a greater fear of the Americans. They fought with the British against the

Americans with the same fervor as they did with the French against the British —in defense of their homeland and hoping to eventually oust all non-natives. Certainly one outcome of British behavior during the war was of benefit to the Native People of the region. The British came to rely more and more on the old patterns established under the French regime. The concept of masters and subjects gradually gave way to one of alliance. Presents were freely given to solidify allegiance, chiefs were chosen for their loyalty to the British and they too were lavished with extra gifts, councils were held, disputes were mediated, more gifts were distributed, warriors and their families were fed and clothed at the forts, and gunpowder and shot were again freely distributed (White, 1991: 404).

By 1782, the British were suing for peace and had informed their Indian allies to return to their villages and engage in defensive measures only (De Peyster, 1783). The Native people, whose attitude toward the war was one mainly of two brothers fighting, were apprehensive about the terms of peace. Certainly for the Anishnabeg of the Great Lakes region, suing for peace was a mystery; they had not been conquered by the Americans and were afraid of betrayal at the hands of the British (De Peyster, 1783a; 1783b). The Native/European experience following the French and Indian War was repeating itself.

Put into the florid translation of an Odawa chief, the

following speech was delivered to Captain Robertson at Michilimackinac on the sixth of July, 1783: The Odawa chief told Robertson that "he was afraid the Tree was fallen on the wrong side, and that [it] ought to have been laid before them, and [then] perhaps the Tree would still be standing straight. They are told the Five nations will keep the door shut . . . but I believe that all of you have been telling us *lies*, but this is our Ground, etc. etc." (Robertson, 1783: 361). The chief was obviously referring to the recent peace overture of the British to the Americans. A modern interpretation of the speech might be: "If you (the British) had been willing to allow us (Odawa) to continue our war against the Americans, we and the Five Nations could have held the Americans back, but you have given up the fight and now we are afraid you will betray our lands to the Americans."

A Wea Indian delivered the following speech in Detroit on June 28, 1783: "We are informed that instead of prosecuting the War, we are to give up our lands to the Enemy, which gives us great uneasiness —in endeavoring to assist you it seems we have wrought our own ruin." Major De Peyster's reply was to the effect that had they not gone to war the Americans would have taken the lands anyway, and besides, he did not yet know of the terms of peace, the implication being that the Native people might yet keep their lands (Indian Council, 1783). The universal British

response to the Native people was an admonition to keep the peace "until told the contrary by their Fathers" (Robertson, 1783: 361).

The Second Treaty of Paris

The actual treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain ending the Revolutionary War, drawn up in Paris and signed on September 3, 1783, —the Second Treaty of Paris— did not treat the Native people badly, at least on paper. The Native people were to remain in control of their territory and the Americans would treat with them for their land or purchase it —they were assured that they could not be forced off their land— and they would not be punished for their role in the recent war. Furthermore, the British were allowed to maintain their posts in the Great Lakes until some later and indefinite date. This was an important consideration as the post at Mackinac was handling as much as three-fifths of all of the trade in Canada's Upper Country. Throughout these peace negotiations, the British assured their Indian allies that the British would not allow them to be molested by the Americans and that the British still considered them to be the King's children (Dorchester, 1796: 116).

Part of the reason for Britain's seeming harsh line against the Americans is that the Americans were still a very weak confederation without the ability to impose their will on the large and hostile Natives of the vast western

Indian Territory, for despite the cessions of the Fort Stanwix Treaty, this was still considered to be Indian Country. The Native people of the western region still refused to accept the concept of Indians as "conquered people" and were adamant that the land was their's and not the American's (McKee, 1785).

The treaty of peace that ended the Revolutionary War was essentially a treaty of peace between the new United States and Great Britain; the Native people felt less restrained and continued to attack white settlements all across the frontier. Great Britain was still acting the Father role as late as 1786, when they were attempting to broker a peace between the Ojibway and various other nations of the west through the issuance of presents and through the admonition that they were all still Children of the same Father and should not fight among themselves, mainly because it disrupted trade upon which they all relied (Committee of Merchants, 1786).

Other actions of the British show that they had not given up on their claim to the area. For example, in 1781, the Ojibway and the Odawa did "surrender and yield up . . . forever, the Island of Michilimackinac" to the British. Quite clearly, the island lies within the territory claimed by the new United States.[1] Obviously, the northern Anishnabeg were still firmly within the British sphere of influence. Furthermore, the Sioux, Winnebago, and the

Menominee pledged their loyalty to the British at this time (Magnaghi, 1984: 25).

The Northwest Ordinance and its Effect on Native People

During this same period of turmoil the United States certainly understood that its hold over the Northwest Territories was tenuous at best. The discussion in the Introduction to this study presented various frontier formulations and hypothesis, but the one document affecting the new nation's "frontier" and the Native people living within this region needs discussion here. The fledgling U.S. government passed the Northwest Ordinance in 1787 setting out the process by which the new territory would be divided into states and how these new states would be admitted to the Union.

The problem, of course, was that the U.S. had no control over these lands which were quite firmly in the hands of their original inhabitants —the Native people— who were in turn widely supported by Britain. The U.S., strapped with enormous debt from the Revolution, could not purchase the lands from the Native people (assuming they would sell) (Rakove, 1988: 16), yet they saw the sale of the Northwest Territory lands as a source of revenue (Stewart, 1988: 33). The problem, then, was obvious: how the obtain the lands from the Native people at the lowest cost. The Ordinance purported to set out an orderly, non-military, process by which the lands would become part of the

expanding American empire. Article Three of the Ordinance (dealing with education and the treatment of the Indians) reads, in part:

> The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress (Taylor, 1987: 61-62).

Government policy underlying the article was to encourage a gradual movement of the frontier west, slowly opening the land to settlement, with the Native people gradually moving west behind this advancing frontier until the day when they would all simply disappear into Canada or west of the Mississippi (Rakove, 1988: 18). The options of forced removal or conquest were unrealistic from both a military and a financial perspective (Williams, 1988: vii-viii). So when viewed by skeptical observers, this article appears to be "more a blueprint of political and social conquest" (Clayton, 1987: 3) than a basically humane policy of "good faith" and voluntary "consent" (Rakove, 1988: 17). In fact, Robert M. Taylor, Jr., characterizes Article Three as "at best ironic and at worst hypocritical" (Taylor, 1987: 62). The Native people of the region were wholly opposed to further expansion of American settlements. Those Native people directly affected, ie., the Delaware, Shawnee, and Miami who lived just north and west of the Ohio had been already pushed out of Pennsylvania and were adamant in their

refusal to be pushed further (Clayton, 1987: 4). These tribes, their Iroquois brethren to the east, and the Anishnabeg to the northwest —indeed, all the "Western Indians" understood all too well that the dispossession of their homelands was the foundation of the Northwest Ordinance.

The Continuing Struggle for the Ohio Valley

In defense of their homelands, virtually all of the "western" Indian Nations entered into a confederation. The Great Lake Anishnabeg were a valuable component of this confederacy. In addition to the Six Nation Iroquois, the confederation sent warriors into the field from the following Nations: Cherokee, Ojibway, Delaware, Five Nations (Iroquois), Huron, Kickapoo, Mascouten, Miami, Mingo, Munsee, Odawa, Piankeshaw, Potawatomi, Sauk, Shawnee, and Wea (Indian Speech, 1786; White, 1991: 440). This was a much wider and more solid confederation than that assembled by Pontiac two decades earlier. This confederation lit their Council Fire at Brownstown at the mouth of the Detroit River, which is on the U.S. side.

The major impetus behind the confederation was the necessity of presenting a united front to the Americans, and the confederacy's driving force was Joseph Brant, the celebrated Mohawk chief, and the model was the Iroquois Confederacy. While the confederacy did indeed represent virtually all of the tribes of the still nominal "Indian

Territory" and the major tenet was that the land west of the Ohio belonged to *all* of the Native people and could not be sold or treated for unless *all* of the tribes agreed, the power of the confederacy to hold sway over each individual tribe and each "chief" and warrior was tenuous at best.

So, in spite of confederacy agreements, small village chiefs did sign treaties with the new U.S. government. The Americans then claimed this newly ceded territory, although the wider confederacy members viewed such cessions as invalid (Indian Speech, 1786). Eventually, a major breach of the confederacy was opened by the Huron/Wyandot members. They resented the supremacy of the Iroquois due to their historic, mutual animosity, and in 1788, the Huron made a bid for leadership. While Brant was negotiating with the Americans to assemble a council to discuss peace and land cessions, the Huron unilaterally accepted the American offer and set up their own treaty process. The Huron/U.S. negotiations yielded the Treaty of Fort Harmar in 1788.

The Fort Harmar treaty essentially ratified the earlier land cession treaties entered into by village chiefs without the consent of the entire confederation, and like the earlier village chief treaties, the wider confederacy also repudiated this treaty, even though it was signed by a large number of tribal representatives, including (in addition to the Huron) representatives from the Delaware, Odawa, Ojibway, Potawatomi, Munsee, and Sauk. But none of the

signatories were important tribal leaders and for the most part, they were not even close to being possessors of the land being ceded. The situation was so untenable that even the leading Huron chief refused to sign the treaty (White, 1991: 446).

The Huron stratagem to achieve ascendancy at the cost of the Iroquois had failed, and as a consequence, both tribes were discredited in the eyes of those western tribes that had no part –and wanted no part– in the negotiations. The confederation itself was not destroyed by the Huron action in 1788, but the leadership did change, evolving to the Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware who were most affected by the land cessions agreed to by the Fort Harmar Treaty. It should have came as no surprise that these Native people would emerge as the most militant within the confederation; it was they who were most reluctant to accept the "peace" of 1783 and they were the tribes poised to be first in the line of unauthorized western settlement (De Peyster, 1783b).

While the Native people entered into their confederacy, and the British were attempting to foster better relationships with the upper Great Lakes Native people, the Americans were not sitting idly by. The Americans did send troops into the region in attempts to subdue the Native people who were raiding the settlements in southern Ohio and Kentucky. In 1790, a U.S. expedition led by General Harmar was ambushed by warriors and the American expedition was

destroyed. A year later, General St. Clair led another American force into the same area with even more disastrous results: over six hundred killed and nearly three hundred wounded. While the total number of troops deployed is in some dispute, with estimates ranging from 1400 men (White, 1991: 454) to 3000 (Billington, 1974: 218), accounts agree on the number of casualties. The defeat of St. Clair was a stunning blow to the Americans and a glorious victory for the Native warriors.

In spite these victories, the Harmar and St. Clair battles showed the weakness of the Indian Confederacy: they could not keep the warriors in the field for any sustained engagements. These were Native warriors, not army regulars, and when the battle was over they went home, and while they were on the battle field it was a serious problem to keep them supplied. The British also recognized this weakness and became the supplier for the Native troops in the field, further drawing the purely Native confederacy into British/American disputes and the British influence within the confederacy grew (White, 1991: 404). Another problem grew out of the Native concept of individual liberty discussed above. Native warriors were free to follow their war chief or abandon him as they evaluated the conflict: they could not be compelled to act.

After the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair, both sides, that is the American and the Indian, sought peace. The

Americans for their part accepted the fact that the Indian nations had not been defeated and that the Americans could not take possession of their territory without their agreement. The Indian people were prepared to make peace with the Americans only if they could insure that no colonizing settlements would be allowed within their territory. The only sticking point to the negotiations was where the boundary between the two nations would be drawn: the confederacy demanded the existing Ohio River boundary, the Americans pressed for a Muskingum boundary that would have given them eastern Ohio; this was essentially the position agreed to by the Huron-brokered Treaty of Fort Harmar in 1788. It seems that the only thing both parties could agreed on was that the "permanent" Indian boundary set out in the Proclamation of 1783 was no longer the Appalachian Mountains. Disagreements among the Native people themselves as to where the boundary should be located created rifts in their solidarity and widened their dependency on the British.

The situation came to a head in 1794 when an advancing American troop under General Anthony Wayne routed a badly divided confederacy and the British did not come to the aid of their supposed Indian allies and left the Ohio Indians to fight Wayne's troops alone (Wise, 1953: 43). Many Anishnabeg from the Upper Great Lakes were part of the Indian force that met General Wayne late in 1794 (Edmunds,

1978: 130). After the *Battle of the Fallen Timbers*, many groups of Native people reconciled themselves to making peace with the Americans (White, 1991: 472).

In the aftermath of Fallen Timbers, General Wayne negotiated the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. The negotiations contained assurances that the United States agreed that the lands west of the Ohio were sovereign Indian territory and that the Americans held no claim to them other than that which would be freely granted by the Native people to the U.S. through treaty and purchase, which was essentially the same provisions agreed to by the British and the Americans earlier. In return, the U.S. demanded that the Indians recognize that the United States was to be their "protector" and the Indians could only treat with the U.S. if they wished to cede lands. So the compromise was struck; the Indian territory was exclusively Native but the United States was now the Indian's new "Father" and they must deal only with them. The transfer of power from the British to the Americans appeared to be firm and irrefutable.

Summary

The Native/American conflicts and "peace" treaty experience seems to anticipate the Basuto/white settler conflict in South Africa mentioned in the beginning of this study. Recall that the Basuto relied upon the expedient of a treaty to maintain control of their land and that the Orange Free State subsequently decided that the indigenous

population had to be driven out in order that "peace and development" could be instituted in the region (Eloff, 1979: 21). Much the same pattern of response emerged in the Great Lakes region following the Treaty of Greenville.

Certainly the Greenville Treaty gave little advantage to any side —British, American, or Native. It was essentially a document that recognized the fact of stalemate. A line was established that separated the Indian from the settler, the Native People of the Great Lakes still controlled their territory, and the British, while certainly chastised, bought some time to salvage what they could of their fur trade monopoly. The following chapter examines the devolution of this stalemate.

NOTES

1. This treaty is given the designation "#1" in the three volume set of treaties printed by the Canadian Government (Canada, 1973: 1).

CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIVISION OF THE ANISHNABEG HOMELAND

Presents and British Posts

The British did agree to abandon their American posts with "convenient speed" in the 1783 Treaty of Paris which ended the Revolutionary War, but "convenient speed" in this case was decidedly slow. The British were still in possession of their posts in the Upper Great Lakes in 1795 when the Americans were pressing their case at Fallen Timbers. The American success led them to again demand that the posts be abandoned.

The U.S. objection to the posts was manifold. First, the new government wished to open the Ohio valley to settlement and to use the proceeds from the resultant land sales to help retire the new nation's debt. Second, the U.S. hold on the territory was tenuous at best. The Native people of the region maintained that the recent war between the Americans and the British was a fight between brothers and their peace treaty was simply that; it was not a land cession treaty that the Native people had any part of. And despite the Treaty of Greenville, the Native people still held out hope for the Fort Stanwix Treaty line as the valid eastern boundary of their "Indian Territory." They looked

to the British to help them maintain their hold on the territory and keep the Americans out, and although the British were not anxious for another war with the Americans, the presence of British forts gave tacit support to the Native claim over the territory.

Third, and in recognition of their tenuous hold on the territory, the Americans complained that the British forts were being used to supply the Native people with guns and ammunition which obviously posed a continuing threat to their interests in the region, and this was indeed true. Part of the reason for Britain's seeming harsh line against the Americans is that the Americans were still a very weak confederation without the ability to impose their will on the large and hostile Natives of the vast western Indian Territory. Consequently, the British were not quite ready to relinquish their commercial interests in the area and it was true that the Native people of the region still held the balance of power; to maintain Native loyalty and alliance was to maintain hegemony over the area (Wise, 1953: 38).

The British sought to maintain the loyalty of their Indian allies through the French practice of distributing presents. In 1794 presents were distributed by the British at Swan Creek, south of Detroit —which was ostensibly U.S. territory— to people from the following tribes: Nanticokes, Duquanias, Cayuga, Tuscarora, Mingo, Oneida, Mohawk, Delaware, Connoy, Munsey, Cherokee, Mahican, Delaware,

Shawnee, Miami, Pickaway, Kickapoo, Maquitch, Waliatamaki, Chillicothe, and Odawa (NAC, 1794).

The "Indian Buffer State"

The region in question, now called the Old Northwest, was declared to be "Indian Territory" by the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix (Tanner, 1987: 11), yet the 1783 Treaty of Paris did not reassert the Fort Stanwix Indian Territory provisions and this omission gave the Native people of the region a reason to suspect British motives and loyalties.

The British Governor John Graves Simcoe, appointed in 1791, sought to placate the Indians by holding the posts in hopes of averting an Indian uprising against the British for their betrayal (Wise, 1953: 38). The British proposed to the Americans that the region in question should be set aside as an "Indian Buffer State" the maintenance of which would continue to serve British commercial interests. The British merchants and their Canadian counterparts understood that the new American government wished to open the Great Lakes area to settlement, an action which would inevitably destroy the Native hunting grounds and would, of course, seriously impair the fur trade (Bemis, 1962: 157). This Indian Buffer State would obviously require a redrawing of the boundary between the U.S. and British North America established after the Revolution which would not only reduce U.S. territory but interpose another "state" between the two.

According to early British designs, the Indian Buffer State would include all of that area now defined as the "Old Northwest" as well as an area that would give Britain access to a navigable portion of the Mississippi River and include much of the Great Plains to the Rocky Mountains (Atcheson, 1815). A map that shows the boundaries of the United States, Canada, and a scaled down Indian Buffer State as actually proposed by British officials is shown in Figure 8. Of course, the British proposed as well that the Indian Buffer State be under their protection, hence the necessity of maintaining their posts in the area.

Jay's Treaty

A further complication came in the form of "Jay's Treaty," named after its chief negotiator, John Jay, the nation's first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (the treaty's official title is *The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation)*. Negotiated in the midst of the battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, Jay's Treaty was designed to settle the differences not resolved by the Treaty of Paris which ended the American Revolution. Article III relates to traders and the Native people of the region and is significant in the context of the continuation of the British posts. It states:

> It is agreed that it shall at all times be free for His Majesty's subjects, and to citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into

(Adapted from White, 1965)

Figure 8: Proposed Indian Buffer State

> the respective territories and countries of the two parties, on the continent of America, (the country within the limits of the Hudson's Bay Company also excepted,) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other. . . . No duty of entry shall ever be levied by either party on peltries brought by land or inland navigation into said territories, nor shall the Indians passing or repassing with their own proper goods and effects of whatever nature, pay for the same any impost or duty whatever. But goods in bales, or other large packages, unusual among Indians, shall not be considered as goods belonging bona fide to Indians.

This early "North American Free Trade" agreement was in conflict with the Treaty of Greenville. In the effort of the U.S. to gain control over the lucrative fur trade, the Fort Greenville treaty stipulated that the traders in the Upper Great Lakes needed a license from the U.S. government. This stipulation was in obvious conflict with the provision of the Jay Treaty quoted above which allowed citizens of both countries and the Native people to pass freely and trade throughout the territory (Dorchester, 1796: 116). The British used this discrepancy to again refuse to abandon their posts in the Upper Great Lakes. By maintaining their posts, the British insured that the lucrative fur trade of the Upper Great Lakes was firmly in their hands and the area's Native people remained, despite the Greenville Treaty, firmly within the British sphere.

In short, for the United States, the situation was completely unacceptable: The British were still in possession of their forts throughout the territory which, in

theory, belonged to the US; the fur trade was still firmly in British hands; and, due to continuing Indian land claims and their opposition to the new U.S. government, the area could not be opened for settlement. The War of 1812 was the nearly inevitable result.

The Anishnabeg and the War of 1812

Just as Pontiac has come to be associated with the major action of the French and Indian Wars, Tecumseh is considered to be the key Native leader in the War of 1812. Tecumseh was a Shawnee, who, with his brother Tenskwatawa (The Shawnee Prophet), reassembled the members of the earlier pan-Indian confederacy in the Old Northwest. Tecumseh and many other Native leaders never accepted the terms of the Treaty of Greenville. Their position, based on the provisions of the earlier Confederacy, was that all tribes of the region would have to agree to the cession for it to be valid, and his position was supported by a great number of Native groups (Edmunds, 1984: 109).

The involvement of the Anishnabeg in this confederation was not insignificant. A document published in 1812 prior to the outbreak of hostilities recounts that "considerable numbers" of Potawatomi, Odawa, and Ojibway were with Tenskwatawa at the confederacy's village at Prophetstown in Indiana (Committee on Ind. Affairs, 1812: 12). The Report further claims that presents "more abundant than usual" were being accumulated at Fort Malden which was just south of

what is now Windsor, Ontario, and Indians from the north and south of Detroit were repairing to the Fort. The Report also claimed that many Indians including the Sauk were visiting the British at St. Joseph Island at the far end of Lake Huron (Committee on Ind. Affairs, 1812: 3). Apparently the U.S. government used this reported increase in present-giving activity as justification for its pre-emptive raid on Prophetstown in 1811 (the report was, of course, not made public until after the raid) (Committee on Ind. Affairs, 1812).

Many Anishnabeg fought with Tecumseh and the British in the course of the war. While the Anishnabeg considered the British their enemy only a generation earlier, in the eyes of the Native people the Americans now displaced the British as the enemy for exactly the same reasons: the British post-Pontiac presents policy was redesigned to follow the French example, while the American policy was the mirror of the old British policy of granting presents only as payments for debts. Furthermore, the British policy of "disguised exploitation" was less harsh than the American policy of displacing Native people with white settlers (Gilpin, 1958: 26).

Over 300 Odawa, under the Odawa chief Amable Chevalier from Lower Canada, were especially instrumental in the taking of the fort at Michilimackinac, one of the few Great Lakes posts that the British did abandon in favor of the

Americans (Cruikshank, 1896: 327). Other Native people from the Sault area were also involved in the attack on Michilimackinac which was deployed from St. Joseph Island. Notable among the raiders were two white fur traders from Sault Ste Marie, John Johnston and Charles Ermatinger. Both Johnston and Ermatinger were married into influential Native families. Johnston married a daughter of Waubojeeg, a notable Sault chief (one of their daughters married Indian agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft[1] (Newton, 1923: 101)); Ermatinger was married to Charlotte Katawabide,[2] "the daughter of an Ojibway chief" (MacDonald, 1981: 23; McDonald, 1980: 30).

While Johnston, Ermatinger, and the others were on their raid to Mackinac, the U.S. Army seized Ermatinger's property, and "plundered and destroyed" the property of John Johnston in retaliation. As a result of the war, Charles Ermatinger moved to the north shore of the St. Mary's River where he set up a new trading post in violation of American Fur Trading Company policy (that is, he held no license from the company), while John Johnston rebuilt his post on the south side of the river (MacDonald, 1981: 24, 55). It has been reported that Johnston, Ermatinger, and the Native people assembled on St. Joseph Island for the Mackinac raid were present at the behest of the traders of the Southwest Fur Company and the Northwest Company, more evidence supporting the notion that the War of 1812 was a fur trade

war fought for reasons of commerce (Cruikshank, 1896). Records show that Shingwauk, the Ojibway chief from the Sault fought with Tecumseh, and other Sault Ojibway lost their lives at the Thames River battle where Tecumseh also fell (Schoolcraft, 1851: 119).

The Post-War Period

There is ample evidence that the British used Native fear of the American's desire for Native land to exhort the warriors to fight for the "British" cause as it was indeed their cause as well. In this vein, British Lt. Col. McDonald delivered a rousing speech to the Native chiefs assembled at Mackinac, portions of which follow:

> You have now proved that you merit the benevolence and friendship which your Great Father [the British King] has always treated you; be assured that the interests of his Red Children will never be forgotten by him, that he will keep his word and the promises which he has made to you, my children. . . . The Great Spirit smiles on our just cause, but frowns on that of the deceitful Americans because they have cruelly oppressed you [and if they win] you will be gradually driven beyond the Setting Sun. (McDonald, 1814: 272-273).

But in what seems a running commentary, the Native people of the region again sided with the losing faction in the war. And as we have seen in the past, the Native people themselves were not conquered by the "winning" side, and they remained (or so they believed) in sole possession of their territory. Again, the words of Lt. Col. McDonald are instructive in this matter:

> Should the King, your Great Father, deign to listen to the proposal which the enemy have made for peace, it will be on the express condition that your interests shall be first considered, your just claims admitted, and no infringement of your rights permitted in [the] future. My Children, doubt not that this will be the case . . . . He will never abandon his Red Children. (McDonald, 1814: 274)

And after the war of 1812, the Anishnabeg were indeed still in control of all of the Upper Great Lakes territory (Tanner, 1978: 123 [Map 22]); yet, despite assurances by McDonald and others, they could not trust the British to represent their interests in negotiations with the Americans. But this time the area was in fact ceded to the new U.S. government and the British abandoned the posts that were on U.S. soil. In return for their loyalty to the British, the Native people were instructed to "be on good terms with our neighbors, the Big Knives" and treat the American traders with respect (McKay, 1817). The McDonald speech quoted above was delivered to a contingent of "western Indians" which included Winnebago, Sauk, and Fox warriors. Speaking in response was the Sauk chief Black Hawk, who stated, in apparent reference to the Americans, that since the British made peace with the United States "a black cloud is overrunning our country" (Black Hawk, 1817).

As was mentioned, the Ojibway and the Odawa ceded Mackinac Island to the British in 1781 and the British maintained their presence there until 1796 (prodded by the Jay Treaty) when they moved their operations to St. Joseph's

Island, at the western end of Lake Huron's North Channel. In 1797, the annual distribution of presents took place there. St Joseph's Island was ceded by the Ojibway to the British in 1798 and it was, for a period of time, the main British post for distribution of presents as well as serving as the supply point for combined British and Native forces in the War of 1812.

After the war of 1812, the British again returned to Mackinac Island (Cook, 1896), but the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which formally ended the War of 1812, stipulated that the British must again abandon their fort at Mackinac. The British presence on Mackinac was considered by Governor Cass to be of the utmost urgency and he petitioned the Secretary of War to mount a naval blockade of the Island to starve out the British and harm their Indian allies. In his words, one good reason to blockade Michilimackinac was to disrupt the distribution of presents there:

> A great proportion of the Ottawas with nearly the whole of the numerous Nation of the Chipeways are hostile . . . restless, turbulent and insubordinate. . . . [The blockade] would at all events prevent the accustomed supply of Indian goods and would destroy the influence, which distribution of presents is ever calculated to produce over venal savages. (Cass, 1815: 508)

The blockade was never mounted, and the British eventually abandoned Mackinac on July 18, 1815. Consequently, as the area was still strategically very important to the British, they were faced with the problem of re-establishing a post in the region, for the following reasons. First, thousands

of Native people, some from as far away as the U.S. Mississippi River Basin and the Red River area of Manitoba, were accustomed to report to the area for their annuities. Second, the British strongly desired to maintain their Native alliance which was in large part sustained by the annual distribution of presents and this in turn required a convenient post (Cook, 1896: 30). And lastly, the Native people of the area still were considered to hold the balance of power in the region. Presents helped maintain loyalties.

Due to considerations of convenience, the Sault was eliminated as a possible site for a fort. Problems with the previous site on St. Joseph's Island sealed its fate as well. The British commander at Mackinac, Lt. Col. McDonall, settled on Drummond Island, stating that: "The situation combines several important advantages, viz., an admirable harbor, proximity to the Indians, and will enable us also to command the passage of the detour . . ."(Cook, 1896: 35) (see Figure 4, page 34). In his book *Drummond Island: The Story of British Occupation: 1815-1828*, Samuel Cook states that the island "for military purposes was well nigh useless, but as a rendezvous from which to retain influence over the Indians [it] was admirably chosen" (Cook, 1896: 36). Here too, the Treaty of Ghent was unclear as to the ownership of Pontaganipy, the Native name for Drummond Island, but for the sake of propriety, McDonall had Nebawgnaine, an Ojibway chief from Saginaw and still loyal

to the British, cede the Island to the British.

Consequently, the British resumed their annual distribution in 1816 on Drummond Island (Chute, 1986: 436 [note 37]). This was of course necessitated by the peace between the two countries and no distribution of British presents could take place on American territory, which Mackinac Island irrevocably now was (British Indian Office, 1816).

In 1818, this time at a Native council on Drummond Island attended by 350 representatives of the Odawa, Ojibway, and the Winnebago, the Odawa chief Ocaita complained that "bad spirits" –that is, Americans– were taking over Odawa land without treating with them for it, and that furthermore, the British were not keeping the Americans from these seizures despite their earlier promises to protect the rights and lands of the Native people. Ocaita further complained that the Americans "treat us worse than dogs" and that the British have abandoned us and "delivered us up to their mercy" (that is, to the Americans) (JLC, 1847; Ocaita, 1818).

In an earlier council, the British heard the complaints of other Native leaders. A Winnebago chief stated that the Native people did not make peace with the Americans and the British had no right to give their land to the Americans. The cession of Mackinac Island in particular was greatly protested. Makataypenesee, the Odawa chief form L'Arbre

Croche called the Island "the most important place this side of Quebec" and pleaded with the British to retain the island, offering in its place land on the mainland for the American fort, suggesting as well that the border between the two interests be drawn through the Straits of Mackinac (Minutes..., 1818) [The recorded date of this council, which took place on Michilimackinac, appears to be error; the place and the context would place it prior to the abandonment of the Island by the British].

While it is true that the British had abandoned their War of 1812 allies on what then became U.S. territory, they did not abandon their Native allies entirely. In their attempts to solidify their alliance, the British continued to deliver presents to them without regard to their residence, and virtually all of Native people from the newly ceded Old Northwest were eligible. As early as 1808, an accounting of the presents distributed at the Grand River in Ontario, shows the breakdown of Native people from U.S. territory and compares it with those resident in Canada: 1,924 from Canada, 2,292 from the U.S. (Claus, 1808: 249). This shows the obvious importance of the "American" Native people to British interests.

Other accounts of present distributions show a greater delineation of recipients. In addition to the members of the Six Nations, a June 1814 accounting of presents distributed at the Grand River in Ontario (the home of the

Six Nations) shows that the following First Nations were represented: Shawnee, Kickapoo, Munsey, Moravian, Sauk and Fox, Delaware, Seneca, Cayuga, Odawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi. Of these, the Odawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi were included under one count and, when considered as a unit (as the British did), they constitute the largest group outside of the Six Nations themselves: of the 830 men who travelled to the Grand River for presents, 428 were Odawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi. Obviously these men and their families were a long distance from their homelands in the western Great Lakes region (NAC, 1814). At another distribution later in the year, the same pattern holds; of the Nations travelling to the Grand River for presents, the Anishnabeg constitute the largest group (NAC, 1814a).

It should be pointed out that it was fairly common practice for Native people to collect presents from both the Americans and the British, and at several locations if possible, perhaps claiming to be Ojibway at one post, Odawa at another, and Potawatomi at still a third. Furthermore, it should be pointed out, the distribution of presents was not totally one-way. The visiting Native people supplied the garrisons with foodstuffs and, importantly, traded their furs as well, and furs were still the primary reason the British were in the region at all. Sometimes the question of loyalty was openly broached by the Native people themselves in an effort to gain greater concessions from one

side or another (McClurken, 1988: 241).

The 1820 Treaty of Sault Ste Marie and American Control over the Area

In the face of this continuing British/Native relationship, the new U.S. government attempted to establish control over the area, manning the abandoned British posts at Detroit and Michilimackinac. Sault Ste Marie, at the northern terminus of our study area, was never the home of a British fort and proved to be a difficult area for the Americans to secure. In 1815, according to George Johnston, son of the fur trader John Johnston and interpreter for the government:

> [T]he Indians were lords of the soil, free and independent, and fierce as the northern autumnal blast. At this time the Indians were numerous and yet still hostile to the Americans, from the fact of their having lost many of their friends and relatives during the war with England which broke out in 1812. Their wounds were not yet healed, nor was their aversion to the American name lessened, and . . . the least pretext would have called forth the tomahawk and scalping knife to avenge the deaths of their relatives killed in the war. (Johnston, 1815: 606).

Into this situation stepped a contingent of U.S. Army soldiers intent upon showing the flag and surveying the new U.S. holdings. After arriving at the Sault, word was received by the soldiers that the Indians were planning to raid their camp that night. Sentinels were posted and though they were not molested in any way, when day broke, "it was considered most prudent" that the general and his soldiers leave the area immediately and give up on their

plans to visit Lake Superior (Johnston, 1815: 607).

In July of the following year, a group of Native people attacked another army contingent under General McComb as it made its way to visit Lake Superior after an uneventful stay of several days in the Sault. This party also "thought it advisable to put about and return. . . . So ended the expedition." (Johnston, 1816: 608). So we see that once in 1815 and again in 1816, U.S. Army patrols were prevented from passing beyond the rapids at the Sault by hostile Native forces. In 1818 the U.S. was again fired upon, this time while they were above the rapids (Schoolcraft, 1851-57: IV: 398). (This was occurring at the same time that Ocaita, in the council cited above, was complaining to the British about American activities in the area).

It wasn't until 1820 that again the Army attempted to secure the area for the U.S. government. This time, along with the contingent of soldiers with their general, the company was accompanied by the territorial Governor, Lewis Cass. In 1819, Governor Cass feared that the Great Lakes Native people were still under the influence of Tecumseh's brother, Tenskwatawa (The Shawnee Prophet), and were plotting at the Malden gifts distribution to re-form the Confederacy and resume their attacks on the United States. Cass included the Sioux, Sac, Winnebago, Shawnee, Kickapoo, Menominee, Potawatomi, Odawa, and Ojibway as members of this new "conspiracy" which was purported to be planning an

offensive for the spring or fall of 1820 (Cass, 1819).

So in the very midst of this possible "conspiracy" Cass travelled to the Sault to secure a land cession from the Ojibway in order to erect a fort there. A council was called for the purpose of discussing the particulars although subsequent events proved that the important Native leaders did not attend.

Among those who did assemble was the Ojibway "young chief" Sessaba, who apparently lost a brother at the Battle of the Thames and was still loyal to the British cause (Johnston, 1820: 609; Schoolcraft, 1851: 119). At the very start of the council, Sessaba upbraided the assembled sub-chiefs when they set about to smoke the tobacco that was thrown on the ground to them by an Army interpreter —an obvious insult. Sessaba immediately left the council room and returned to the village where he raised the British flag. Word of his action touched off a potentially serious confrontation and the "treaty" council disbursed.

The elder chiefs were not present at this council, and when word of the threatened hostilities between Sessaba and his followers and the army reached the elder chiefs they were urged to confront Sessaba and put a stop to his protest and threats of violence. The chief chosen to confront Sessaba was Shingwaukonce (Little Pine). Shingwaukonce was an important ally of the British and fought with them throughout the war of 1812, including the siege of Detroit.

He had lived in various places throughout the upper Great Lakes including Portage Lake on Michigan's Keewenaw peninsula; at Bay de Noc on the Upper Peninsula's Lake Michigan shore; Grand Island, off of what is now Munising (also in the Upper Peninsula); at Saginaw in the lower peninsula; and most often on the northern shore of the St. Mary's River at Sault Ste Marie (Chute, 1986).

Shingwaukonce as well as his son, Ogista, were signatories to the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw whereby the Ojibway ceded the remaining southeast portion of Michigan's lower peninsula not ceded in 1807 comprising all of the lands surrounding Saginaw Bay and extending into central south Michigan. The 1819 treaty was also negotiated by Cass. Both Shingwaukonce and his son were living on the Canadian side at the time of the signing (Chute, 1986: 464 [note 33]). They are listed in the treaty registry as "Shingwalk" and "Shingwalk, jun." (Kappler, 1972: 187). (Shingwauk himself preferred "The Pine" without the "Little" and that is the usage that will be adopted for the remainder of this study [Jameson, 1943: 221]).

Shingwauk, although suffering a blow from Sessaba's war-club, managed to secure a peaceful end to the crisis. The British flag was struck and the flag of the U.S. hauled up in its place and the council proceeded. Cass extracted a cession of sixteen square miles from the Ojibway (his instructions were to obtain a maximum of ten square miles)

(Cass, 1820: 36). The Ojibway reserved the right to fish in the rapids and to maintain an encampment along the shores for this purpose. They also wished to retain a small section within the ten square mile area which was their burial ground, and (in the words of Lewis Cass) "they regard with peculiar veneration. . . . It contains the bones of their ancestors, objects of great solicitude, mingled with religious feelings . . . ." (Cass, 1820: 37).

Cass' letter to the Secretary of War in which the above quote appears is instructive in other respects, most notably this statement: "I did not require the Indians to cede to us a larger tract, . . . because it is important to our character and influence among them, that our *first* demand should be distinctly marked with moderation." (emphasis added) (Cass, 1820: 36). This statement makes clear that the 1820 Treaty was not the only cession that Cass wished to extract from the Ojibway of the Upper Great Lakes. Also, there is no mention in the letter of the problems that Cass encountered and certainly nothing in the treaty itself revealed Cass' close encounter with disaster on the shores of the St. Mary's at the hands of obviously still hostile Ojibway people.

It is noteworthy that Shingwauk signed the 1820 treaty as "Augustin Bart," his French name, and after the treaty-signing, he resumed his residence on the "British" side of the St. Mary's River (Schoolcraft, 1851: 248; Petrone,

1983). Other accounts have him signing as "Lavoine Bart" which is apparently another of Shingwauk's pseudonyms; Shingwauk's son "Ogista/Shingwalk, jun." also signed Canadian treaties as "Augustin" (MacDonald, 1981: 53; Chute, 1986; 99; Canada, 1973: 261, 301, 140).

In 1822, it was reported that the Native people who were travelling to British forts from American territory for their presents were being threatened by U.S. authorities with imprisonment and beatings if they were to pass by Michilimackinac on their way. As the presents were distributed at Drummond Island, the Native people of the area were justifiably concerned. The British authorities on Drummond were quick to assure the Native people that they would protect them if the Americans tried to carry out their threat (McKay, 1822).

It may very well have been Governor Cass who was responsible for this threatened hostility on the part of the U.S. authorities. In 1820, Lewis Cass wrote to the Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that:

> The farther I penetrate into the Country [the Upper Great Lakes], the more apparent are the effects produced upon the feelings of the Indians by the prodigal issue of presents to them at the British Posts of Malden and Drummonds Island. . . . there will neither be permanent peace nor reasonable security upon this frontier, until this intercourse is wholly prevented." (Cass, 1820: 37).

In spite of Cass' securing of a land cession at the Sault for a military fort and his reports of Native hostilities

toward the surveyors years after the war with Britain had been concluded, the federal government had still not appropriated monies for a military defense of the area (Cass, 1825a). And yet another attack on surveyors, this in the winter of 1824, was reported by Cass to the Secretary of War. As related by Cass, the surveyor reported "that the Indians during the whole winter have appeared unfriendly, that they have taken up his posts and obliterated his marks and numbers upon the trees, that they forbade his proceeding, and that finally they attacked and fired upon his men . . . . He left his work the day after this attack." (Cass, 1825b: 663).

So within the context of these recurrent attacks upon the government's surveyors, Cass considered the Old Northwest frontier to be "the weakest and most exposed in the Union" and admonished the Secretary of War for his plan to withdraw the military garrison from Michilimackinac for "Large bodies of Indians are always found here during the summer season . . . stopping here on their way to and from Drummonds Island" (Cass, 1825: 665). In reference to the situation at Detroit, he states that British Indian Headquarters, "where their presents are distributed and the influence and operations of the department [are] concentrated and directed," is directly opposite Detroit (that is, at Fort Malden), and "almost all of the Indians on this side [the U.S. side] of the Mississippi resort annually

to this post. British counsels and presents are freely distributed, and the effect may be traced in all our disputes with the Indians from the treaty of 1783 to this day." Further in this dispatch to the Secretary of War, Cass makes special mention of the "Potawatamies, Ottawa, and Chippewas, amounting . . . to about twenty thousand" and claims that "garrisons four or five hundred miles from them can neither control nor restrain them. . . . and if there be no force stationed upon the boundaries of their Country, nor in its interior, there is nothing to produce an effect upon them" (Cass, 1825: 664). Apparently making no distinction between Michigan's upper and lower peninsulas, and disregarding the 20,000 Anishnabeg living "upon this peninsula," Cass calls for the protection of "the whole population [which] does not exceed eleven thousand," by informing the Secretary that he has ordered the garrison at Mackinac to remain in place, because he is convinced that "some unfortunate occurrence will demonstrate the impropriety of the evacuation" (Cass, 1825: 664-5).

In Lower Michigan, Cass was pressing for a fort to be built on the Saginaw river to counter the threat of the Ojibway there "who have proved themselves more troublesome than any other Indians . . . always unquiet and insolent." Cass claimed that the Ojibway have always been loyal to the British and "present formidable obstacles to the progress of settlement" (Cass, 1822: 236).

After the securing of the cession at the Sault, the U.S. government installed Henry Rowe Schoolcraft as Indian Agent in 1822. He was instructed to foster good relations with all of the area's important Native leaders without regard to their residence, that is, without regard to whether they lived on the American or the Canadian side of the border (Chute, 1986: 30). It should be pointed out that at this time the border through the upper St. Mary's was still in dispute; essentially, the British and U.S. officials could not agree on ownership of Sugar Island (also known as St. George's Island). According to the official instructions, the border was to follow the usual shipping lanes in order to avoid any party been forced to intrude on the territory of the other while navigating the Great Lakes system; it was at Sugar Island that this precept was put to the test. In the book *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party* this wording concerning Sugar Island and the Treaty of Ghent deliberations is found:

> [the boundary line passes] to the north and east of Isle a la Crosse, and of the small islands numbered 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, and to the south and west of those numbered 21, 22, and 23, until it strikes a line . . . passing across the river at the head of St. Joseph's Island, and at the foot of the Neebish rapids, which line denotes the termination of the boundary directed to be run by the sixth article of the treaty of Ghent. (Moore, 1898: 170)

The "line passing *across* the river [denoting] the *termination* of the boundary" (emphasis added) is simply the



From Moore, 1898: Vol. 6, map #25.

Figure 9: Disputed Boundary in St. Mary's River

obfuscating language of diplomacy. A more faithful rendering would state the obvious: we can't agree on where the boundary goes after this point, so the boundary ends here; pick it up at the other end of St. George's Island (Sugar Island). (See Figure 9: Disputed Boundary in St. Mary's River, above). The instructions to Schoolcraft in part may have been a reflection of this border ambiguity; as Sugar Island contained large Native settlements, it was not clear whether these people were "American" or "Canadian" Indians, hence, it was better to treat all of the Native people equally. It should be pointed out that the British were still honoring their earlier commitments to Native people and maintaining their alliance through the distribution of presents and, as the continuing attacks on the surveyors shows, the area was far from being firmly under U.S. control.

Presents Redux

Following the War of 1812, the annual distribution of presents was resumed on Drummond Island in June of 1816. The conduct of this 1816 Indian Council is instructive on the point of loyalties and presents. Consider the speech of Shouapaw, a Winnebago: "The Saux [Sak], Renards [Fox], Agovois [Odawa], Kickapoos, Fallavoines [Menominee], Chippewas, and the Winnebagos have entered into a league not to suffer any encroachments to be made on our lands, at the same time, we will wait a little time for an answer from our

great Father, before we have recourse to violent measures." (Shouapaw, 1816: 484). Several other chiefs spoke in the same manner to the British military men, who in their turn, gave the chiefs no encouragement in their threatened hostilities against the Americans. But again, as we saw several times in the past, Native people formed a confederation to defend their homeland. And although the Potawatomi are not listed in the speech above, the Anishnabeg have always played a significant role in these confederacies.

Despite the establishment of the anti-American, pro-British, pan-Native confederacy cited above, a series of "peace" treaties were negotiated by the U.S. government in 1815 whereby various "western" tribes agreed "to be under the protection of the United States, and of no other nation, power, or sovereign whatsoever" (Kappler, 1972: 113). Four of these treaties were signed by various bands of Sioux, and at this 1816 distribution, the Sioux delegation received a scant portion of presents from their British "Fathers." Their chief, Little Crow, understood the meaning behind this slight (in fact, so did all the other assembled tribes) and the Sioux soon left the council and the island, ending the relationship between the British and the Sioux Nations (McCall, 1944: 380). The War against the Americans was over but the consequences of making a choice between the British and the Americans were evident to all the indigenous Nations

in attendance.

The Americans too sought to gain the loyalty of the Anishnabeg of the upper Great Lakes and Schoolcraft, as Indian Agent, began his own gift distribution. The important Native leaders present at Schoolcraft's first presents allotment were the chiefs Shingabawassin (Image Stone), Shewbeketone (Man of Jingling Medals), Kaugaosh (Bird in Eternal Flight), and Wayishkee (First Born Son) (Schoolcraft adds that "others of minor note" were also in attendance) (Schoolcraft, 1851: 117). All of these chiefs were signatories to the 1820 land cession treaty extracted by Governor Cass mentioned above (Kappler, 1972: 187-8). Shingabawassin was also a signatory to the 1825 treaty with the Sioux which established peace between them and several tribes of the Great Lakes region. He was referred to as the "1st chief of the Chippewa nation." Three of these same four chiefs (Kaugaosh excepted) also signed the Butte des Morts treaty in 1827. Kaugaosh was represented on the 1836 Michigan land cession treaty "by Maidysage" (Kappler, 1972: 454). These were important chiefs indeed, but the absence of Shingwauk at this first distribution is a notable exception considering his role in the 1820 Cass land cession treaty mentioned above.

In Schoolcraft's words, Shingwauk was "a person of some consequence among the Indians. . . . His residence is . . . for the most part, on the British side of the river, but he

traces his lineage from the old Crane Band here" (Schoolcraft, 1851: 110). The mention of Shingwauk's Crane clan affiliation and his link to the Sault area is significant. According to the oral tradition of the Anishnabeg, Kitchi Manitou (the great Spirit) made a bird and sent it down from the sky to make its abode on earth. The bird was endowed with a loud and far-sounding cry which was heard by all. Seeing the Rapids (Bawating) and its multitude of fish, this Crane decided to make its home here. The Crane sent out a loud cry and the Bear clan, Catfish clan, Loon clan, and Marten clan all gathered at Bawating. The Rapids then became the gathering place for the five major clans[3] of the Ojibway Nation, and the Crane clan (the Echo Makers) was chosen to preside over all councils (Sault Tribe, 1993: 11).

Thus, Schoolcraft is not only alluding to Shingwauk's importance as a Native leader, he is also making two other important statements. The first is in his phrase, "for the most part," which, of course, implies that Shingwauk does on occasion reside on the American side of the St. Mary's river. The second is the reference to Shingwauk's Crane clan membership which places him *here* —one may assume, that is in Sault Ste Marie, on the *American* side. The implication is that *lineage* is as important —and perhaps more important— as is *residence* in the determination of leadership and identity associated with a *place*.

In addition to living on both sides of the St. Mary's River, Shingwauk was known to have resided at Portage Lake in the Keewenaw, on Grand Island off of Munising, at Bay De Noc on Lake Michigan's north shore (all in Michigan's upper peninsula), and on the Saginaw Bay in Michigan's lower peninsula. As a consequence of his diverse residence sites, his children can be shown to have been born in areas that came to be separated by the U.S./Canada border. Also, by marriage he had formed alliances that stretched from Little Current on the east end of Manitoulin Island through Sugar Island and Sault Ste Marie and on to L'Anse in the central portion of Michigan's upper peninsula (Chute, 1986). As we have seen, Shingwauk and the other Sault area chiefs mentioned above, at one time or another signed treaties at Saginaw, Prairie du Chien, the Butte des Morte, and Fond du Lac, in addition to those signed at the Sault. Also, it can be shown that chiefs from the Sault area travelled to Detroit and Washington, D.C., to negotiate U.S. treaties (Kappler 1972).

When viewed in the context of the above discussion, "residence" must be viewed as a flexible circumstance, and Shingwauk's biography (while far from complete at this point in our study) is probably little different from that of most of the area's Native population. Practical aspects of Native life in the area dictated seasonal moves. Notably the people's hunting grounds were from the St. Mary's River

north to the Hudson's Bay, and their summer camps were generally maintained in the southern areas (Chute, 1986: 231). Any attempt to designate an individual Upper Great Lakes Native person as "American" or "Canadian" at this point (the early 1820s) —especially when the border had not yet been decided— was at best merely an academic exercise.

Drummond Island

Although the 1816 resumption of annuity distributions took place on Drummond Island, due to the ongoing boundary discussions and questions concerning the Island's future, the British never really developed Fort Drummond, and in 1822 Drummond Island was granted to the U.S. The circumstances surrounding Drummond Island's award to the United States are in dispute. The popular story of the Americans getting the British party drunk and then tricking them into accepting that the main shipping channel was to the east of Drummond Island, thus granting Drummond to the U.S., cannot be substantiated (Fraser, 1989: 112). C. Colton in *Tour of the American Lakes, and Among the Indians of the Northwest Territory, in 1830* posits that St. Joseph Island was an American possession and that it was traded to the British in exchange for Drummond Island (Colton, 1972: 69). This explanation also fails to fit the facts.[4]

Whatever the nature of the grant of Drummond to the U.S., the fort was not abandoned until 1828, and so for over ten years it served as the prime British post in the Upper

Great Lakes region and the focus of the Anishnabeg in their relations with the British.

Presents and the Incentive to Emigrate

While the British may have abandoned their posts on American soil after 1828, they did not abandon the area nor the Great Lakes Native people. Also, the American border posts were not completed until 1826, so there was a long period following the Revolution where there was only token U.S. military presence in the area, and the British/Native alliance, with its focus at Mackinac Island and later at Drummond Island, was still very strong (Magnaghi, 1984).

In addition to Drummond, the British maintained several posts in the Upper Great Lakes, the most important being Fort Malden, near the present Windsor, Ontario. The British policy of distributing presents in the Upper Great Lakes was a part of their regime since 1759, and at these and other posts the British continued to distribute presents to the area's Native people long after the American Revolution (JLC, 1847).

The Americans strongly protested these annual presents. The Americans claimed that as long as the British were distributing presents to Native people who lived on U.S. soil "there will be neither permanent peace nor reasonable security upon this frontier" (Cass, 1820: 37).

The Drummond Island distribution served an average of 4,500 Native people per year (Cook, 1896). In contrast, it

was claimed that about 3,000 Ojibway came to the Sault for Schoolcraft's annual distribution (Catlin, 1965: 161). This is not to say that when Native people came to Schoolcraft for presents he was not above admonishing them for travelling to British forts as well (Magnaghi, 1984: 45). His notes show that the notable area chiefs Oshawano, Wayishkee, Neegaubeyun, Kabamappa, and Keewikonce were among the many Native people that he admonished (Schoolcraft, 1851: 249).

From the view of the Americans, this attempt at dissuasion met with little success; for the most part, the area's Native people merely received presents on both sides of the border. James Clifton in his manuscript for Parks Canada, "Visiting Indians in Canada," (1979) further claims that some Native people received presents at several locations, claiming to be Ojibway at one, Odawa at another, and perhaps Potawatomi at a third (Clifton, 1979: 27).

The British for their part set up two categories of Native people that were eligible for presents: Resident and Visiting. The "Resident" category was for those Native people who lived in Canada; "Visiting" was the category for those Native people who resided in the U.S. but travelled to Canada for their annual presents.

After abandoning the fort on Drummond Island, Britain's most northern Great Lakes post was at Penetanguishene at the extreme southeast corner of the

Georgian Bay. Accustomed to visit the British either at Mackinac or Drummond, the area Native people found travel to Penetanguishene difficult. For those in the northern Lakes, travel to Penetanguishene considerably increased the distance that they had to travel. Others, who found the waters unfamiliar, and those who chose to cross the width of Lake Huron in fragile canoes, travel was a considerable danger. The distance of this post and the danger in travelling there acted as a further inducement for northern Anishnabeg to settle in Canada.

Entering into the picture was a suggestion by President Monroe in 1825 to "remove" some of the area's Native people to an area north of Illinois and west of Lake Michigan with others being sent west of the Mississippi to "shield them from impending doom [and] promote their welfare and happiness." (Schoolcraft, 1851-57: 407). Native people from the American areas of the Old Northwest felt the tug of loyalty to Britain and the push of Monroe's removal policy forcing them to decide between emigration to Canada or removal by the U.S. to strange lands west of the Mississippi (Bauman, 1952).

The choice between Canada and the U.S. was not an event unique to the Anishnabeg of the upper Great Lakes; in 1784, following the Revolutionary War, the Six Nations leader, Joseph Brant, led a sizable portion of his people to Canada where they established a reserve on the Grand River (JLC,

1858). Joseph Brant and his Six Nations followers were not the only Native people from the region that chose to voluntarily "remove" to British territory before the advent of Monroe's policy. Before the Revolution, some Native groups, forced off of their land by American settlers, moved to Ontario and Quebec for refuge (Clifton, 1979: 8). Immediately following the Revolution, Ojibway, Odawa, Delaware, and Wyandot peoples also emigrated to Canada (Frideres, 1983: 57). A group of Munsee made this choice in 1800 and moved to an area on the Thames River (JLC, 1858). A Potawatomi band whose leader fought with the British in the War of 1812 moved to Canada after the war and settled in the Lake Simcoe area in southern Ontario (Jenness, 1935: 6). Many Anishnabeg who found themselves in southern Ontario after the War of 1812 chose to stay on Canadian soil, most settling on or near Walpole Island (Clifton, 1975; Matheson, 1931). And in 1818, the Odawa sought assurances from the British authorities that they could return to Manitoulin Island if they chose to do so (Wightman, 1982: 10).

As early as 1795, in the aftermath of the Fallen Timbers battle, the British began to associate their annual distribution with hints of migration to Canada for those Native people who received presents (Clifton, 1979: 37). While many Native people left the U.S. for Canada immediately following the Revolutionary War, permanent settlement of Native people from the U.S. to Canada

continued long after the war. In 1793, Lenni Lenapé (Delaware) from Ohio moved to Canada; in 1800 other Delaware followed their brethren (JLA, 1858). As was mentioned, the British authorities were differentiating between those receiving presents who were "visiting" from the States and those that were permanently "resident" in Canada. These visiting Indians included many Anishnabeg, but also included Huron, Seneca, Delaware, Shawnee, Sauk, Fox, Miami, Kickapoo, Sioux, Winnebago, Menominee, Nanticoke, Peoria, Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Missouri, Osage, Otoe, and "smaller numbers of visitors from the northeastern states and from New York and Pennsylvania" (Clifton, 1979: 6). After the abandonment of Drummond, the British posts where these annual distributions took place were at Amherstburg (near Windsor), Penetanguishene, York (Toronto), and Kingston (at the far northeastern end of Lake Ontario). These posts are listed in order of their importance to the annual gift allotment, with York and Kingston playing quite a minor role in this activity (Clifton, 1979: 7).

Also, the Native people at the annual distributions were further divided into two classes, one designating "deserving chiefs and warriors" and the other designating "common warriors." This was in reference to their military status achieved during war with the Americans; the "common" category was for the families of those who fought for the British, while the "deserving" category included the

families of those wounded or killed in action against the Americans.

After time, and with the decline of the ranks of "deserving" Indians, virtually all of the "common" warriors came to be included in the Deserving class which entitled them and their families to receive a greater portion of goods, and often goods of better quality. "Common" then became the designation for all other Native people, many of whom were too young to have served the British militarily but eventually constituted a growing constituency (Clifton, 1979: 25). Table 1, giving the totals for the British post at Amherstburg in 1824, presents a typical accounting. The numbers of Table 1 show the Anishnabeg accounting for 80% of all people receiving presents at Amherstburg in 1824, the post most active in this annual distribution. The second most active was at Penetanguishene, and as this post is closer to the Anishnabeg homelands, we could safely assume that they would easily constitute this post's majority as well, showing the importance of the Anishnabeg in both the historic and post-war British/Native alliance.

A later accounting, this for Manitoulin Island in 1838, reflects the additional breakdown for those Natives considered American and those considered British. Table 2 presents this data.

Within the material used to compile Table 2 (showing the presents distribution for Manitoulin Island on August

Table 1: Number of Native People Receiving Presents at Amherstburg, 1824

NATIONS	CATEGORY I[1]	CATEGORY II[2]
Chippewa	47	2223
Potawatomi	28	1492
Ottawa	32	1081
Munsee & Moravian	32	282
Huron (Wyandot)	11	261
Six Nations	8	237
Shawnee	8	225
Sauk and Fox	5	69
Miami	1	34
Kickapoo	0	34
Delaware	0	14
	Total = 6,131	

[1]Category I = Deserving Chiefs, Warriors, Wives, and Widows.
[2]Category II = Common Warriors, Women, and Children.
(Adapted from Clifton, 1979)

20, 1938) it can be found that the "British Nations" include the Ojibway & Odawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibway. The listing of the Ojibway twice, once in combination with the Odawa, reflects the residency aspects of the British accounting; the Ojibway and the Odawa live together at some reserves in Canada, but at Saugeen and at Owen Sound there are no Odawa residing with the Ojibway. The "American Nations" include Ojibway from Sault Ste Marie, Bay de Noc, Drummond Island, St. Ignace, and Grand Traverse; Odawa from "Wau-qui-huc-see" (L'Arbre Croche; Hodge, 1959: II-170), and Menominee from Green Bay (NAC, 1838: 7).

The circumstances surrounding this 1838 accounting of

Table 2: Number of Native People Receiving Presents at Manitowaning, August 20, 1838

From the British Nations:

Deserving			Common		
Chiefs	Warriors	Wives	Chiefs	Warriors	Women
13	6	10	17	492	501

Plus boys and girls to a total of 1749.

From the American Nations:

Deserving			Common		
Chiefs	Warriors	Wives	Chiefs	Warriors	Women
2	4	0	5	219	285

Plus boys and girls to a total of 848.

Total of all Native people receiving presents = 2,597.
(Data from NAC, 1838)

presents distributed on Manitoulin Island requires a bit of explanation. During the 1836 presents distribution on Manitoulin, the Lt. Governor of Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head, declared that in three years visiting Indians must become residents of Canada in order to continue receiving their presents (Head, 1836: 90). The 1838 distribution represented this third year (a fuller explanation of the Manitoulin experience will be presented later in this study).

Head explained that this change in policy was necessary for two reasons; first, visiting Indians were subjects of another state (the U.S.) and Canada should not have to

support foreign subjects; and secondly (reflecting U.S. objections), part of the annuity included guns and ammunition and it was not in keeping with international rules that Britain continue to arm American subjects who might then turn those arms against the United States. This reasoning of Head was no doubt met by amazement by many Anishnabeg who considered themselves to be loyal *Anishnabeg* and not "British" or "American." Regardless, Sir Bond Head declared that three years hence, 1836 included, all those Native people who wished to continue to receive presents must become residents of Canada (JLC, 1844-45). (The annual distribution of gunpowder was in fact continued until 1844 (JLA, 1858)).

Sir Bond Head did not tell the assembled Native people some of the other reasons for the new presents policy. Foremost among these was the simple fact that the annual distribution was a costly affair and represented a financial burden that the government wished to reduce. Also, by the late 1820s Britain no longer harbored illusions of fighting a border war with the United States and by the early 1830s it was evident to both the Americans and the British that the Native people of the Old Northwest were no longer the military threat they once were (Dickason, 1992: 234, 238).

Summary

The period from about 1820 to the 1836 announcement on Manitoulin represented an unusually turbulent period in the

lives of the Anishnabeg. If the British and the Americans easily recognized the decline of Native power in the area, the Native people themselves certainly must have felt an increasing inability to control their own destiny. As an example, let us take a look at the movements of Shingwauk, admittedly one of the most respected chiefs in the region, as an example of shifting loyalties during this period. (In the following chapter, we will also recount his "loyalties" *vis-a-vis* various Canadian and U.S. treaties).

Prior to the incident at the Sault with Governor Cass in 1820, Shingwauk lived on the American side of the St. Mary's River; after 1820, he moved to the Canadian side; in 1826, he moves back to the U.S. side, reminding Schoolcraft that he helped Cass in a very delicate situation and assures Schoolcraft that he is to "live permanently on the American side of the river and put himself under [Schoolcraft's] protection" (Schoolcraft, 1851: 249); in 1827, the British ask him to return to the Canadian side; in 1836, while living on the American side, Shingwauk is recognized by the British as chief of all the Ojibway from Thessalon to Goulais Bay; in 1838, he is recognized by the British as the leader of all the Western Indians at the annual distribution on Manitoulin Island; in 1841, he leaves American soil and lives for a year at Manitoulin; in 1842 he returns to Garden River; and finally, in 1845 he re-asserts his loyalty to the British (Chute, 1986).

While some of the above accounting occurs during periods yet to be discussed in this present study, this brief accounting of the movements of Shingwauk clearly points to the difficulties for Native people during this period. Nothing they had faced was more difficult than the impending land cession and removal period. The next chapter presents a more thorough examination of the events of this climactic period.

NOTES

1. Waubojeeg's daughter, Oshawuscodawaqua, married Irish fur trader John Johnston. Their eldest daughter, Obabahonwahgezhegoqua (The Sound which Stars Make Rushing Through the Sky), who became Schoolcraft's wife in 1823, was also known as Jane (Paterson, 1936: 32, 39).

2. McDonald spells her name as Kalawabide (1980: 30); MacDonald as Katawabide (1981: 23), which is more likely. The letter "L" is not found in the language of the Anishnabeg; it is a borrowed sound (Rhodes, 1985: xlii)

3. William Warren in his *History of the Ojibway People* lists 21 clans, some of only remote importance. Warren gives a short account of how the five clans as listed in the Sault Tribe account came into being but lists six major clans (which he claims make up 80% of the total), adding the Wolf clan to the original five (Warren, 1957: 45).

4. C. Colton claims in his book *Tour of the American Lakes, and Among the Indians of the Northwest Territory, in 1830*, published in 1833, that the question of Drummond settled the boundary between Great Britain and the United States in this region. This, of course, is not true. The disposition of Sugar Island was not settled until 1842. See map, Figure 9, page 145.

CHAPTER 5: ANISHNABEG TREATY-MAKING AND THE REMOVAL PERIOD

Land Cession Treaties

We have already seen how the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 and the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 threatened the integrity of the Native homelands in the Great Lakes area. Over time, virtually all of the Native lands in the area were ceded. Our concern is with Anishnabeg lands in the Lake Huron borderlands and the cessions through which they lost control over most of these borderlands. A chronological recounting of the land cession treaties, without regard to the political signatory (U.S. or Canada), follows.

The first treaty directly affecting the Anishnabeg homeland was concluded between the Ojibway and the British authorities in 1781. By this treaty, which is labeled "No. 1" in the Canadian government's treaty books (i.e., the first treaty between the British/Canadian government and Native people following the American Revolution), the Ojibway cede to the British "the Island of Michilimakinak or as it is called by the Canadians La Grosse Isle (situate in the Strait which joins the Lakes Huron and Michigan)" (Canada, 1973: 1). It is interesting to note that in 1781 Michilimackinac Island is clearly within the territory

claimed by the United States, yet the Ojibway "who have or can lay claim to the hereinmentioned Island" (Canada, 1973: 1) cede the island to the British authorities who quite obviously ignore any probable American objections. Four years later, in 1785, the U.S. government signed a treaty with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ojibway, and Odawa wherein they "reserved to the sole use of the United States . . . . the post of Michillimachenac with its dependencies, and twelve miles square about the same" (Kappler, 1972: 8). Although it appears that this does not refer to Michilimackinac *Island* but to the *fort* on the tip of Michigan's lower peninsula which shares the same name, the situation makes clear the conflicting territorial claims to the area.

Helen Tanner, in her book *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*, states that "In 1785 the British acquired control of the Severn River route from Lake Simcoe to Matchedash Bay, a southeastern arm of Georgian Bay" (Tanner, 1986: 155). This would, chronologically, be the next cession affecting the Anishnabeg. Curiously, the Canadian government's three volume set *Indian Treaties and Surrenders* (Canada, 1973) makes no mention of this treaty.

The next treaty of this period is another Canadian one; the 1790 treaty with "the principal Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of Detroit" whereby the Native people cede the extreme southwest portion of the Ontario peninsula to the

British authorities (Canada, 1973: 1). Note that this treaty is between the British government and the village and war chiefs of *Detroit*. Again we see the Anishnabeg and the British authorities essentially ignoring U.S. political claim to the area in these early years of the Republic.

The fourth treaty affecting the area is also Canadian, this one signed by the Ojibway in 1796 where the land lying east of, and adjacent to, the lower half of the St. Clair River is ceded to Canada. The next treaty again is Canadian, signed in 1798 with the Ojibway whereby they ceded the "Island known by the name of the Island of St. Joseph and also by the name of Cariboux Island and in the Ojibway language by the name of Payentanassin, situate, lying and being in that strait which joins the Lakes Superior and Huron" (Canada, 1973: 27). We have already seen the role that St. Joseph Island played during the War of 1812. Small portions adjacent to southeastern Georgian Bay in Canada were ceded in 1798, and 1815 by the Ojibway.

The 1795 Treaty of Greenville, the 1807 Treaty of Detroit, and the 1815 Treaty of Spring Wells were all instrumental in ceding that portion of lower Michigan which contains Detroit and the surrounding area. The 1815 treaty was merely a reaffirmation of the Greenville treaty with added provisions deemed necessary to restore "the relations of peace and amity" between these tribes and the U.S. government that existed before the war. In the context of

our discussion of the Anishnabeg, it is interesting to note that the 1815 treaty makes reference to "the Chippewa, Ottawa, and Potawatomi *tribes*" as well as "*certain bands* of the Wyandot, Delaware, Seneca, Shawnee, and Miami tribes." This distinction between tribes and bands makes it obvious that the Anishnabeg were the major players "associated with Great Britain in the late war" (Kappler, 1972: 117 [emphasis added]).

In 1819, the Ojibway signed a major land cession treaty whereby they ceded the central portion of lower Michigan as well as the area bordering the lower half of Lake Huron to the United States. In 1820, the U.S. asserted its sovereignty over its claimed portion of the Sault Ste Marie area when the Territorial Governor, Lewis Cass, travelled to Sault Ste Marie to establish a fort and raise the U.S. flag. As we have seen, after a serious threat of hostilities, the Native people were persuaded to sign a treaty ceding land for an American fort. Also in 1820, the Odawa and the Ojibway cede the Saint Martin Islands (small islands in the Straits of Mackinac area) to the U.S.

The Ojibway ceded to the Canadian government the remaining portion of the Ontario peninsula, excepting the Bruce Peninsula, and the territory to the south of the Bruce Peninsula which borders Lake Huron in three treaties signed in 1822, 1827, and 1836. The 1836 treaty through which the Ojibway surrendered the "Saugeen Tract" of 1.5 million acres

(607,057 hectares) was, and is, surrounded by controversy. It appears that no Native people with authority signed the treaty and the Anishnabeg circulated war belts, prepared to fight for their lands (Dickason, 1992: 238). The threat of Native uprising over the Saugeen lands was lost in the Rebellion of 1837 with some Ojibway even volunteering to fight for the government (Dickason, 1992: 236). ?? Following the rebellion, the Saugeen Ojibway continued the fight for their lands, this time through legal channels, and in 1846 they received some compensation for the ceded lands along with an annuity, a few small reserves, and a deed to 450,000 acres on the Bruce Peninsula, just north of their homelands (Schmalz, 1991: 139).

Also in 1836, the Odawa and Ojibway ceded to the United States their remaining portion of Michigan's lower peninsula as well as the eastern portion of the State's upper peninsula. In another interesting example of the ongoing U.S./Canada dispute over the border in this area, the treaty uses the "boundary line in Lake Huron between the United States and the British province of Upper Canada . . . as established by the . . . treaty of Ghent" (Kappler, 1972: 450) as the boundary for the land cession, notwithstanding the fact that the boundary line was not yet finalized. In fact, Sugar Island is reserved for the use of the Ojibway in the 1836 U.S.treaty even though the island has not yet been declared to be U.S. or Canadian territory.

A very instructive incident is related by Schoolcraft involving this 1836 treaty as it relates to the seeming invisibility of the border in the Sault area. Schoolcraft's brother James was in charge at the Sault during the period when several Native chiefs were in Washington for negotiations. James Schoolcraft relates that "since Whaiskee's departure the whole Sault has been troubled" (Schoolcraft, 1851: 533). In response, a council was held, led by the *British chief* Gitshee Kawgaosh. Kawgaosh complained that it was not right that Whaiskee was sent to Washington to represent "the ancient band of red men whose *totem* is the lofty crane" when he is not even from the area ancestrally, but from La Pointe (Schoolcraft, 1851: 533 [emphasis in original]). It is clear from the council and the events surrounding it that the Anishnabeg of the area around Sault Ste Marie recognized the authority of the traditional clan structure and were quite prepared to ignore the "authority" of the federal governments in the area.

Lending itself to further confusion, consider that the name of the "British chief" Kawgayosh appeared on the 1836 U.S. treaty through the following language: "Kawgayosh, of Sault Ste Marie, by Maidosagee, his x mark" (Kappler, 1972: 456) (Whaiskee is shown signing under his more formal name of Jauba Wadic [Kappler, 1972: 456; Tanner, 1974: 15]). Maidosagee is also listed as a signer to the aforementioned the 1798 treaty with the Canadian government as

"Meatoosawkee" (Canada, 1973: 28). The significance of these "cross-border" signings will be further discussed at the end of this chapter.

Also in 1836, the Odawa and the Ojibway agree with the Canadian government that Manitoulin and its adjacent islands be set aside as a common reserve for all of the "many Indians who wish to be civilized" (Canada, 1973: 112), in hope of establishing a kind of Canadian "Oklahoma" (Erdrich & Dorris, 1990: 383). Sir Francis Bond Head, the lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada at the time felt that the "greatest kindness we can perform toward these Intelligent, simple-minded people is to remove and fortify them as much as possible from all Communication with the Whites" (qtd. in Dickason, 1992: 237). The treaty also contained a provision whereby the British withdrew any claim that they may have to these islands. This is obviously not a "land cession" treaty but is included here for reasons which will later become apparent.

The next major land cession treaties in the area were the Robinson Treaties of 1850 between the Canadian Government and the Ojibway people of Northern Ontario. The negotiations took place between the government and two separate Ojibway leaders, one under Peau de Chat representing the Ojibway of Lake Superior, the other under Shingwauk and Nebenaigoching representing the Ojibway of Lake Huron.

Various circumstances surrounding the activities of these two Lake Huron chiefs is worth reporting in some detail. In November of 1847 Denis-Benjamin Papineau, the Commissioner of Crown Lands sent to the Sault area to gather information prior to the treaty negotiations, claimed that the bands in the Sault area did not inhabit the north shore of the St. Mary's before the Conquest of 1763 (i.e., before the defeat of the French in the region) and therefore could not be considered the "original inhabitants" of the region. The Commissioner also determined that the bands were too loosely organized to be considered a "nation." Together, these two assertions led Papineau to declare that the bands represented by Shingwauk and Nebenaigoching had no right to their land (Ellwood, 1977). Furthermore, it was cited that the chiefs Shingwauk and Nebenaigoching were both once residents of the United States who only recently emigrated to Canada (Chute, 1986: 230; Strachan, 1835).

The chiefs reply to these arguments were that their forefathers had hunted the land in question since time immemorial and they were indeed entitled to them. Furthermore, in a letter to the Governor in Montreal, Shingwauk countered:

> When your white children first came into this country, they did not come shouting the war cry and seeking to wrest this land from us. They told us they came as friends to smoke the pipe of peace . . . at the time we were strong and powerful, while they were few and weak. But did we oppress them or wrong them? No! . . . Time wore on and you have become a great people, whilst we have

> melted away like snow beneath an April sun [and] you have hunted us from every place as with a wand, you have swept away all our pleasant land, and like some giant foe you tell us "willing or unwilling, you must go from amid these rocks and wastes, I want them now! I want them to make rich my white children, whilst you may shrink away to holes and caves like starving dogs to die." Yes, Father, your white children have opened our graves to tell the dead even they shall have no resting place. . . . Drive us not to the madness of despair. (Petrone, 1983: 59-60)

Perhaps it was despair that led Shingwauk (who had earlier threatened a land surveyor) and Nebenaigoching to lead a band of about 30 to 100 men to a mining settlement on Mica Bay (some 200 miles north of the Sault on Lake Superior) where they attacked and drove off the miners in November of 1849. The chiefs, along with two white and two Métis raiders, were subsequently arrested for this raid and taken to jail in Toronto. All were later released and then pardoned in time for the treaty negotiations which took place in the fall of 1850 (Koennecke, 1984; Elgin, 1849: 1485-6).

In 1845 when Shingwauk reaffirmed his loyalty to the British Crown he asserted as well his willingness to go to war if necessary, with the obvious implication that the U.S. would be the nation warred against (Chute, 1986: 217). And in what was perhaps the last gasp of Canadian military bravado directed against the Americans, in 1846 the British Indian superintendent George Ironsides (whose mother was Native) openly broached a plan to arm Britain's Indian allies throughout the Upper Great Lakes and launch a war

against the U.S. with the first goal being the "recapture" of Michilimackinac (Brown, et al, 1976: 407; Cook, 1896: 121). But in the end, the 1849 raid led by Shingwauk and Nebenaigoching may very well have been the final military action of the Lake Huron Borderlands Anishnabeg.

Yet in spite of the obvious difficulties, the Robinson treaties were signed on Sept. 7 and Sept. 9, 1850. By these treaties, the Ojibway ceded to the Canadian government all of the land adjacent to the northern and eastern shore of Lake Superior and adjacent to the northern shore of Lake Huron "inland to the height of land which separates the territory covered by the charter of the Honorable Hudson's Bay Company from Canada" (Canada, 1973: 149). In the first of the two Robinson treaties, the land ceded by the Lake Superior Ojibway under Peau de Chat extended as far west as the Pigeon River, which forms the U.S./Canada border at the northwest end of Lake Superior. Shingwauk and Nebenaigoching are the first two names on the second, that is, the Lake Huron Robinson Treaty (Canada, 1973: 151).

The extent of the land ceded under this second Robinson Treaty is still in dispute. The Teme-augama Anishnabe have laid a claim for about 10,000 square kilometers (about 3,900 square miles). They propose joint control over 3,100 square kilometers and exclusive control of another 7,300 square kilometers (Henton, 1992). The Teme-augama Anishnabe claim that the 1850 Robinson treaty land cession extended east

only as far as French River/Lake Nipissing/Ottawa River waterway. The Canadian government interprets the treaty differently. It is their claim that the Teme-augama chief Nebenegwune met Robinson on Manitoulin Island a few days after the treaties were concluded at Sault Ste Marie and that at that meeting Nebenegwune accepted $25. It is alleged that this acceptance represented an acceptance of the land cession now claimed by the government. But as early as 1877, the Teme-augama were asserting that they did not come under the provisions of the 1850 Robinson treaties. (Henton, 1991: 12A). To further complicate the Temagami claim, a map titled *Indian Treaties* and published by the Canadian Government in 1970 (revised in 1977) shows the disputed land to have been ceded under a 1923 treaty (Indian and Northern Affairs, 1970). Furthermore, a recent Ontario government publication shows the land to have been ceded by "Pre-Confederation Treaties" (this same publication shows Manitoulin Island as part of the Robinson Treaty cession, which, as shall be shown, is not the case) (Ontario, 1991: 269). Other maps show the area as ceded under the Robinson treaties. Tanner's *Atlas* shows the area as unceded (Tanner, 1987: 57 [Map 30]).

Robinson treaty language does state that the cession includes "The eastern and northern shores of Lake Huron from Penetanguishene to Sault Ste Marie" and includes all land north and east to that claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company

(Canada, 1973: 149). But in the schedule of reserves set aside for those bands represented at the signing, virtually all are Lake Huron shoreline communities; the exceptions are in the Lake Nipissing area. Clearly, there was no representation of the inland Teme-augama at the Robinson Treaty negotiations. While admitting that the Teme-augama were not signers of the Robinson Treaty nor any other treaty, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled against their land claim. The Court claimed that by accepting annuities and a reserve they had relinquished any claim they may have had (Barnes, 1992; Temagami Band..., 1991: 1A+). As of this writing (Fall, 1994), the Teme-augama Anishnabe continue to press their claim for lands in the interior of Ontario east of Georgian Bay. They are negotiating with the Ontario government (Temagami Band..." 1991).

The Bruce Peninsula, which forms the western boundary of the Georgian Bay was not part of the 1850 Lake Huron Robinson treaty: it was ceded by the Ojibway during the period from 1854 to 1857.

The last major cession in the area came in 1862 when most of Manitoulin Island and the other islands of the North Channel were ceded to the government by "Chiefs and Principal Men of the Ottawa, Ojibway and other Indians occupying the said islands" (Canada, 1973: 235). Remember that this is the same territory that in 1836 was set aside as a "Canadian Oklahoma" for all of the Indians that wished

to settle there and "be totally separated from the whites" (Canada, 1973: 112). This "Indian Territory" plan was part of Head's 1836 announcement that in order for Native people to receive presents from the Canadian Government they had to become residents of Canada. The plan was to settle them on the Manitoulin Island chain.

The 1836 Manitoulin Treaty contained this language:

> . . . various circumstances have occurred to separate from your Great Father many of his red children, and as an unavoidable increase of white population, as well as the progress of cultivation, have had the natural effect of impoverishing your hunting grounds it has become necessary that new arrangements should be entered into for the purpose of protecting you from the encroachments of the whites. In all parts of the world farmers seek for uncultivated land as eagerly as you, my red children, hunt in your forest for game. . . . but uncultivated land is like wild animals, and your Great Father, who has hitherto protected you, has now great difficulty in securing it for you from the whites, who are hunting to cultivate it. (Canada, 1973: 112)

But by 1862, it was clear to the Canadian government that white encroachments on Manitoulin were only going to increase and that the Native people would have to be forced to give up their lands in return for small reserves. In the language of the 1862 treaty: "it has been deemed expedient . . . to assign to the Indians now upon the island certain specified portions . . . and to sell the other portions thereof fit for cultivation to settlers" (Canada, 1973: 235). The Native people living in the far eastern end of the island were quite adamant in their rejection of the government's proposal to cede the entire island and after

much intense negotiation and threats of hostilities, they succeeded in retaining the eastern end of the Island for unrestricted Native use and occupancy (Morris, 1880: 22). This area is now the Wikwemikong Unceded First Nation, designated by the Canadian government as Indian Reserve Number 26 (Ontario, 1991: 258).

Although the Anishnabeg on both sides of the border saw their land bases diminished further in the years following, the 1862 treaty essentially ceded the last major expanse of land to the two governments. Also it is quite important to note that in both U.S. land cession treaties and those of Canada in addition to "reserving" some areas for Native use the Native people retained "the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until the land is required for settlement" in the words of the 1836 U.S. treaty (Kappler, 1972: 454). The 1850 Robinson treaty uses the following wording to grant the Native people the same rights as retained above by their U.S. brethren:

> Her Majesty and the Government of this Province, hereby promises and agrees . . . to allow the said chiefs and their tribes the full and free privilege to hunt over the territory now ceded by them, and to fish in the waters thereof, as they have heretofore been in the habit of doing, saving and excepting such portions of the said territory as may from time to time be sold or leased to individuals or companies of individuals and occupied by them with the consent of the Provincial Government. (Canada, 1973: 149)

Figure 10 on the following page shows the lands ceded by the



(Adapted from Tanner, 1987)

Figure 10: Study Area Land Cessions

treaties cited above. Land cessions outside of the Lake Huron Borderlands are not shown.

The U.S. Removal Period and its Effects on the Anishnabeg

Occurring simultaneously with these land cessions was the implementation of the U.S. policy of Removal. The idea of removal was first broached by President Jefferson in 1803 who later suggested that the land from the Louisiana Purchase be set aside for the Indians removed from the east (Horsman, 1969: 6). Twenty years later, in 1825, President Monroe added to Jefferson's notion the suggestion that Native people should be "removed" to "shield them from impending doom [and] promote their welfare and happiness" (Qtd. in Schoolcraft, 1851-57, VI: 407). Monroe suggested the area west of Lake Michigan and north of Illinois as a removal location for some Native people. The effects of the removal period on the Five Civilized Tribes of the southeast is well documented and need not be recounted here (see Foreman, 1972), but less well known are the effects of removal on Great Lakes Native people, both in the United States and Canada. Our discussion begins with an examination of this period for Native people in Canada.

The Canadian "Removal" Period

In our discussion of Canadian land cessions above, the Manitoulin "experiment" presented the policy of isolating Native people from white society. This philosophy (as

quoted above) was the policy of Bond Head who was Lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada for only two years (from 1836 to 1838). The Rebellion of 1837 proved to be Head's undoing. The 1837 Rebellion, and the role of the Anishnabeg in it, deserves some discussion. The Rebellion broke out in Montreal (Quebec was called Lower Canada at the time) over the rising power of the oligarchy and was led by "reformers" fighting to install an American style republic (Burns, et.al., 1987:9).

Bond Head, in his capacity as Lt. Governor of Upper Canada (Ontario), sent the provincial militia to Montreal to support the government. In his absence, William Lyon Mackenzie led an ill-prepared attempt to take Toronto (Burns, et.al, 1987: 11). Native people in Upper Canada were of two minds: stay adamantly neutral, or support the British Canadian government. Indian agent J.B. Clench wrote "I rejoice to be able to bear testimony to [the] devoted loyalty [of] the Munsees, Moravians, and Chippewas [who are] to a man . . . ready and willing to take the field (Clench, 1837: 326). Despite this claim by Clench, the St. Clair Chippewa recommended that "it [would be] best to spread our matts [sic] to sit-down & smoke our pipes and . . . remain quiet . . . we can gain nothing by fighting . . . . [Furthermore, we] cannot be compelled to go & fight for any party, [we] are free men and under the control of no one" (Wawanosh, et.al., 1837: 326-7). Clench, in response, wrote

that the "sentiments (of the St. Clair Chippewa) [are] so selfish, unfeeling and disloyal that the parties deserve . . . the severest censure " (Clench, 1837: 326). Despite all the recriminations and council both for and against involvement in the Rebellion, Native people were never called into duty in 1837 and in no case could it be found that Native people supported the rebels (Read & Stagg, 1985: lxxx).

The 1837 Rebellion in Upper Canada was quickly quelled and many rebels fled to the United States where they found willing allies. These "Patriots" as they were called, composed of both 1837 rebels and Americans who wished to see British rule overthrown in Canada, led a series of raids into Canadian territory from the U.S. in the summer of 1838. The Patriots raided Ontario from Windsor in the west to Prescott in the east, all along the border between Canada and the United States (Burns, et.el., 1987: 13). Native people (with the exception of those who again remained neutral) supported the British, and in 1838 they were used militarily by the government. The Mohawks were called out in the east; in the west the defenders included Delaware, Chippewa, and Potawatomi (Fryer, 1987: 23, 46, 67, 89; Anderson, 1837: 189).

Besides militarily defending Canada from the Patriots in 1838, the Native people served another less overt purpose throughout the crisis. Many Canadians, who may have felt

only mild sympathy for the rebel cause, fell prey to rumors of an impending "Indian Uprising" or, barring that, "revenge killings" against those whose loyalties the government suspected (Read, 1982: 19, 105). These people organized local militia to defend themselves from Native people who were rumored to be "Breaking into people's houses stealing guns and committing other outrages" while they proclaimed support for the rebels. Furthermore, it was claimed that these "Patriot" Indians were from Michigan (Ferrie, 1837: 333). Rebels used these fears of Indian Uprising as a recruiting tool, and in an almost self-fulfilling prophesy, these defense militias were then seen as being treasonous (Read, 1982: 105). Accounts of the 1837-38 crisis report very little Native activity. In the 1837 phase, Native people (including Anishnabe Chippewa and Potawatomi) were called out but not deployed (Anderson, 1837: 189; Read, et.al., 1985: lxxx). Mary Fryer, in her book *Volunteers, Redcoats, Rebels, and Raiders: A Military History of the Rebellion in Upper Canada*, reports that Native warriors were among the defenders in the Windsor Border area (Fryer, 1987: 74). Colin Read reports one incident where Indians in the Western and London districts, under the command of Colonel Maitland did shoot and kill one Nathan Allen, a "notorious horse thief" and suspected rebel (Read, 1982: 147). Although Read and Fryer do mention the role of Native people (however briefly), judging from the overwhelming silence on

the subject, it would be safe to assume that the role of Native people in the Rebellion was of scant importance and played no significant part in the military defense of Canada during this crisis. This gave British Canadian government officials irrefutable evidence in support of their growing belief that the Native people of the Great Lakes were no longer a military threat, and, hence, Bond Head's suggestion that annual gift distributions be ended became reality.

While a portion of Head's Indian policy was confirmed, criticism surrounding his conduct during the Rebellion led to his resignation in 1838 and his dreams for an Oklahoma-style Manitoulin were fairly well abandoned as he faded from power. Instead, the Canadians returned to their policy of establishing "model villages" based on the supposed "civilizing" effects of a Christian farming life (Dickason, 1992: 234). The policy dictated that the cost of these model villages would be paid out of funds acquired through the sale of ceded Native lands. As a consequence of this assimilating policy, Native people in Canada were able to resist Bond Head's removal scheme and manage to retain title to small reserves throughout Canada. Figure 1, page 25 above, shows the results of this policy in the Lake Huron borderlands —a rather large number of reserves throughout the area, many in areas coveted by the advancing European agriculturalists. Keep in mind, though, that while the Canadian Anishnabeg were able to resist removal, they could

not resist dispossession. A complete transformation of their traditional hunting-fishing-gathering life was the eventual price they paid for retaining their small reserves. Vast tracts of land, and the life-sustaining natural resources embodied within it, were ceded. The dispute over the Temagami region cited above is the one place where the history of dispossession is still being challenged. We now return to the U.S. Native experience, beginning in the southern reaches of our study area.

Lower Great Lakes Removal Era Migrations: The Potawatomi.

As was mentioned above, some Potawatomi from lower Michigan were removed, but most were reluctant, preferring to stay in the Great Lakes area, either quietly on their traditional homelands (in the U.S.) or moving to Canada. For the Potawatomi, moving to Manitoulin Island under the Canadian plan was unacceptable. They complained that they were not accustomed to canoes and fishing, and were instead used to horses and hunting and they would prefer the more hospitable environment of Walpole Island (Keating, 1845: 139).

Walpole Island had been created as a reserve for loyal Native people shortly after the American Revolution by British Superintendent-General Alexander McKee in 1794 (Bauman, 1949: 91). This was done mainly to accommodate the many Native people from the U.S. that felt threatened by the

American forces in the lower Great Lakes. At the time, it was estimated that as many as three thousand Odawa and Ojibway may have been preparing to move from the U.S. to the Walpole Island area (McKee, 1795).

These post-Revolution refugees joined the Huron, Potawatomi, Sauteur (Ojibway from Sault area), and Missisauga that lived on Walpole since the early 1700s who were induced, in part, to move there by Cadillac who attempted to assemble the Great Lakes Native people in the Detroit area (Leighton, 1986).

Other reasons for preferring the alternative offered by migration to Walpole was the hope that Walpole would be a sanctuary for Potawatomi cultural survival. Other factors were their old Potawatomi/British alliance, their antipathy toward the U.S. government, and their need for goods in the form of presents (Clifton, 1975). Clifton claims that of the approximately 9,000 Potawatomi in the U.S. in the 1830s, about 3,000 came to settle permanently in Canada in the decades that followed (Clifton, 1975: 34). Many others managed to escape removal or migration and remained on their traditional lands in Michigan and Wisconsin, often merging with their Anishnabeg brethren on lands reserved for the Odawa and the Ojibway (Clifton, et.al., 1986: 64). Often, in their migration to Canada, the Potawatomi also merged with their Anishnabeg kin and settled in virtually every reserve along Lake Huron from Spanish in the North Channel

to Walpole Island in the south. In every case, their migration to Canada was as refugees; they could lay claim to no homelands east or north of the Great Lakes (Clifton, 1975).

Major Richardson (1924) claims that before 1837, that is before the Canadian government announced its presents policy as an inducement for Native people to move to Canada, about 300 mostly Ojibway people attended the distribution of presents on Walpole Island. In 1842, over 1,100 were in attendance and the breakdown of those receiving presents is presented in Table 3. Richardson's account does not make clear where the Ojibway immigrants were from but it is quite clear that the Odawa and the Potawatomi were from Michigan, displaced by the U.S. Removal policy.

The period of 1837 to 1843 saw the greatest numbers of Potawatomi migration to Walpole Island (Jacobs, nd). It has been claimed that following migration, the Potawatomi sometimes returned to the U.S. side to hunt but did so at their own risk as the American authorities did not allow such cross-border hunting (Richardson, 1924: 108).

Parry Island and Christian Island were other reserves which saw a number of Potawatomi immigrants during the U.S. removal period. Historic accounts claim that Christian Island was the original destination and in about 1865 these former Michigan residents finally moved to Parry Island. In 1935 Parry Island had a Native population of about 250,

Table 3: Number of Native People Receiving Presents at Walpole Island, 1842.

Chippewas, old residents	319
Chippewas, arrived within the year	197
Potawatomis and Ottawas from Michigan	507
Others "on their way to settle"	117
Total	1140

(From Richardson, 1924: 107)

about 100 of whom were Potawatomi descended from the Michigan Anishnabeg (Jenness, 1935: 1).

Other Potawatomi migrated to the Owen Sound and Saugeen reserves during this period (JLC, 1844-45). The Ojibway of Rama welcomed their fellow Anishnabeg and a band of Potawatomi from Drummond Island settled there (Copway, 1850: 191). In July of 1837, approximately 300 Potawatomi from the Chicago area moved to Manitoulin (McClurken, 1988: 206). It has been claimed that Potawatomi from Wisconsin also petitioned the Canadian government for permission to move to Canada during this period (Jarvis, 1837: 101).

Lower Great Lake Removal Era Migrations: The Odawa.

Northern Ohio was squarely in the midst of the wars and the turmoil which followed the 1795 Greenville treaty-signing. This gave the Odawa from this area an early impetus to move to Canada, and as was mentioned, many Odawa did move to Canada following the Revolutionary War (McKee,

1795). Also, following the War of 1812 and the implementation of the Removal policy, many more Odawa did indeed move to Walpole. Table 3 reports this evidence.

Other Odawa, from both Michigan and Ohio, did remove to Kansas in the 1830s, but by the late 1830s an early 1840s most had left there and migrated back to the area and to Walpole Island in particular (Bauman, 1949: 105). In as late as 1864, the Odawa of Kansas petitioned the Anishnabeg of Walpole to set aside land for them; in 1869, the Walpole Natives did allow for the Kansas Odawa re-settlement (Jacobs, nd). In 1949 it was claimed that the Odawa descendants made up the majority of the Native people on Walpole Island (Bauman 1949: 109).

The Odawa also joined their Anishnabeg brethren on Christian Island. These Odawa migrants, moving to Canada in the mid 1850s, were from the Lake Michigan area and were under the impression that the U.S. government was about to cease paying the Odawa their annuities and remove them to the west. Instead, they preferred to migrate back to their ancient homelands, the islands of the Georgian Bay (JLC, 1858). McClurken, in his discussion of the Odawa during this period claims that these northern Michigan Odawa were mainly Catholic and had split from their Anishnabeg kin in southern Michigan who were either Traditionalists or Protestants. The southern Odawa resisted Removal for the most part and many managed to remain in Michigan on lands

bought with their own funds (McClurken, 1991: 21).

Lower Great Lake Removal Era Migrations: The Ojibway.

The 1807 treaty ceding the vast area surrounding Detroit contained provisions for certain Ojibway to remain on reserves set aside for their use in the area north of Detroit. In 1836, another treaty was signed by these "Swan Creek" and "Black River" Ojibway residing in which they ceded other reserved portions of land within the 1807 cession area. This treaty, negotiated by Indian Agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, was not a removal treaty, but in 1839 he recommended several changes without consultation with the affected tribes. Schoolcraft endorsed several harsh provisions that were designed to force the removal of these Ojibway. Among these was a provision that if the Native people went to Canada for presents, their U.S. annuity payments for ceded lands would cease. Schoolcraft further decided that these annuities would only be made in Kansas, not at Port Huron, Michigan, as was the custom, and the cost to the government for their removal would be deducted from their payments as well (Sturm, 1985: 22).

Although some Ojibway did remove to Kansas, it appears that many of these Ojibway chose Canada instead, because on the other side of the international boundary, the Ojibways of the St. Clair reserve in Ontario saw a doubling of their pre-Removal population in the period immediately following

(Copway, 1850: 183).

Furthermore, in 1839, Schoolcraft reported that a group of Saginaw Chippewas —who generally resisted removal west— with 22 orphans were on their way to Manitoulin Island (Sturm, 1985: 22; Schoolcraft, 1851: 658). Table 3 (above) reports that 197 Ojibways came to Walpole island in the early 1840s.

Upper Great Lake Removal Era Migrations

Returning to the northern reaches of our study area, we turn now to a discussion of the effects of Removal on the Anishnabeg of the northern reaches of the study area and how the Canadian "Manitoulin Experiment" fits into this discussion.

The 1836 land cession treaty of northern Michigan previously mentioned contained no "Removal" language as originally negotiated. It is doubtful that the Anishnabeg would have agreed to move west. But the treaty, being considered by the U.S. Senate for ratification, was "amended" by that body to conform with the U.S. Federal Government's plan to move all Native people to western land considered unsuitable for white settlement. This amended 1836 treaty stipulated that the reserves granted to the Anishnabeg were "to be held in common . . . for the term of five years from the date of the ratification of this treaty, and no longer; unless the United States shall grant them permission to remain on said lands for a longer period"

(Kappler, 1972: 451).

The language of the treaty said "as soon as the said Indians desire it, a deputation shall be sent to the southwest of the Missouri River, there to select a suitable place for the final settlement of said Indians. . . . When the Indians wish it, the United States shall remove them" (Kappler, 1972: 453).

In the mid 1830s, some Anishnabeg did send delegations west to view lands that the government deemed suitable, but this surveying of western lands can be seen merely as a diversion; very few were favorably impressed (McClurken, 1988: 211). Of the approximate 8,000 Great Lakes Anishnabeg who were "encouraged" to remove, only 651 actually left their homelands (Neumeyer, 1971: 278). As was mentioned, most of those removed were Potawatomi from southern Michigan, and their experience with a violent military removal served as a lesson to all Anishnabeg from the Great Lakes area (Sturm, 1985: 22). The Anishnabeg of the Sault, in strict interpretation of the amended 1836 treaty, did not "desire it" nor "wish it" and refused to even send delegations to the west, instead vowing not to "remove" under any circumstances (Neumeyer, 1971: 280).

While the American government and the Anishnabeg were struggling with removal in the northern Great Lakes and the increasing encroachment of settlers on land still designated as "Indian Territory," on the other side of the border, the

Canadian government was also struggling with two simultaneous pressures forming its Indian policy. One came from the U.S. government which was insisting that Canada cease its aid to "American" Indians in the form of presents which included guns and ammunition. The other pressure came from the Canadian government itself. In its view, Native people no longer represented the balance of military power in the region and the expense of annual presents was becoming an increasing financial burden (Head, 1836: 91).

Also, the Canadian government had no further geo-political interest in the United States and felt that they would lose little by refusing to give presents to "their" Indians. It was also claimed that the presents, once distributed, were immediately traded for other goods near the trading grounds, and that rum was one of the hottest items of trade (Head, 1839: 8). At the time, the average number of visiting Indians was put at 3,270 with residents numbering 6,500, and the annual costs were estimated at £8,500 (Head, 1839: 7). Head estimated annual savings "of say £4,000" if the government would eliminate presents to visiting Indians (Head, 1839: 8).

So, within the Canadian Government, two factions fought over whether or not to continue presents as usual or eliminate them altogether. In 1836, a compromise was struck. At the annual Manitoulin gift distribution, the Canadians announced that after three years, annual presents

would no longer be issued to any Native person who was not a resident of Canada. Furthermore, the Canadian policy was formulated in such a way to induce all of the region's Native people –both American and Canadian– to come to reside on Manitoulin Island as that was designated as the only place they would distribute presents (Head, 1839: 12).

As we have seen, this idea of a Canadian "Oklahoma" was presented to the Native people as a means to isolate them from the predations of whites who were "hunting" for farm land. But Sir Bond Head also suggested that the land of those Native people who could be induced to Manitoulin Island could be sold and the proceeds be used to offset the cost of the annuities (Head, 1836: 92). In other words, the Canadian government proposed that the Indians pay for their own presents out of the proceeds from the sale of their ceded land.

As part of the plan, Head stated his desire to have the Odawa and Ojibway grant Manitoulin for his experiment in order to settle all of Canada's "Indians who are now impeding the progress of civilization in Upper Canada." He went on to explain that no whites would want the Island chain and it was well suited to the habits of Native people "as it affords fishing, hunting, bird-shooting, and fruit" (Head, 1838: 180).

At first glance it appears that Head's encouragement of "visiting Indians" to migrate to Manitoulin would increase

the costs to the government over time, but consider this statement by him: "I feel certain that though a few would at first immigrate to Canada, they would not long remain there. . . . We have only to bear patiently with them for a short time and . . . their unhappy race, beyond our power of redemption, will be extinct." (Head, 1839: 12-13).

Although originally objecting to Head's plan as being contrary to American interests in the area (McClurken, 1988: 206), U.S. Indian agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft also saw the Head plan as ultimately failing, although not necessarily through the extinction of the area's Native people. Schoolcraft thought the plan would fail because the area's Native people were so enamored of the presents given to them by the U.S. government that they would not risk losing these presents by moving to Manitoulin Island. As for the Island itself, Schoolcraft perhaps understood the appeal of Manitoulin to Native people due to its natural bounty, but argued that Head's plan was further doomed by the island's poor agricultural prospects. His advice to the Anishnabeg was that if they wanted fertile land, they should accept the U.S. government's offer of land west of the Mississippi (Schoolcraft, 1851-57: VI-463).

The Manitoulin Experiment was further predicated in part upon the idea that an adherence to a Christian religion was perhaps the most effective method of civilizing "wild Indians" (Brough, 1956: 66). Other "civilizing" effects

were thought to derive from western agricultural methods, which necessarily kept Native people from their seasonal migrations and consequently not far from the missionaries. So, Christianity and the pursuit of agriculture were seen as "the key to the civilization, if not the very survival, of the [Manitoulin] tribes" (Bleasdale, 1974: 149).

A quote from a missionary on Walpole Island is quite indicative of this attitude: While stating that hunting and fishing are "fascinating to the human mind" and saying that agriculture and mechanical trades are in comparison "disagreeable labor," the Rev. James Coleman goes on to pose the following question:

> How then is it to be expected that the Indian . . . will, in favorable situations for success [in agriculture], relinquish his former enjoyments of hunting and fishing, for those which are less profitable to him, and attended with, to him, much greater fatigue? . . . I observed, that until game became so scarce in the neighborhood . . . they did not apply with any energy to agriculture. [Therefore] it is necessary that the Indian youth should be prevented from becoming hunters or fishers, and this can be alone done, by locating the village where there are no facilities for either. . . . Christianity and civilization have made much more rapid and effectual progress [where] there is no game. (Coleman, 1977: 10)

The analysis of Rev. Coleman is applicable to the Manitoulin Experiment. Despite the glowing reports of the abundance of game on Manitoulin cited earlier, the plan certainly was to establish an agricultural community on the island. And yes, game was becoming more scarce on Manitoulin as more Native people moved there, but no, this had only limited success in

convincing the Anishnabeg to become Christian farmers; they simply expanded their hunting and gathering activities, which in turn kept them from the island for longer periods of time. Of course, this was exactly the opposite of the original intent (Bleasdale, 1974: 147).

Due to its historical antecedents and the annual distribution of presents, Manitoulin Island was indeed an important Anishnabeg center in the early 1800s. Head's plan to assemble all Great Lakes Native people there permanently added to that importance. But all Anishnabeg were not in agreement. At the 1836 council on Manitoulin, Shingwauk made an impassioned speech calling for the council fire to be moved to the Sault and declared that he would not move to Manitoulin (Jameson, 1943: 246). Shingwauk returned to Garden River and launched a plan for a pan-Ojibway settlement there.

As part of his plan, Shingwauk worked with all of the Upper Great Lakes Anishnabeg chiefs to build and maintain a loyalty to the British crown. As we have seen, he had established alliances through marriage with the Anishnabeg from Little Current in the east to L'Anse in the west and at the 1838 distribution of presents, Shingwauk was recognized by the British as the leader of all the "Western" bands (comprising all of the Upper Great Lakes Native people) (Chute, 1964: 160).

But unity among the Anishnabeg was not necessarily the

order of the day due to overt attempts by both governments to keep the American Indians out of Canada; concentrating the Native people in any one place —whether in the U.S. or in Canada— was considered potentially dangerous by both governments. Also, both the U.S. and Canadian authorities tried to divide the people along the lines of religious affiliation. We have seen were denominationalism served in part to divide the Odawa of Michigan (McClurken, 1991: 25-7).

Due to the early French influence, Roman Catholics could be found throughout the study area. But after the Jesuits were suppressed in France in 1761 and the assumption of British rule in Canada in 1763, the Catholics in Canada were subject to fierce opposition (Claspy, 1966: 7). This opposition took the form of missionaries from the Church of England, which enjoyed some small success on Manitoulin, and others. The Methodists were active among the Ojibway of the Saugeen, at Sarnia, at Owen Sound, at St. Clair, and on Walpole, Rama, and Snake Islands (Indian Affairs Branch, 1966). In the U.S., Ojibway as well were at times split by Protestant/Catholic rivalries, while other reports indicate that the Potawatomi were the least susceptible to Christian conversion and are rarely associated with any of the various denominations and are at times referred to as "heathen" Potawatomi (Bleasdale, 1974: 147; Indian Affairs Branch, 1966).

George Copway, a Christian Ojibway missionary, while admitting that Roman Catholics have made inroads throughout the Native communities of both the U.S. and Canada, presents a different picture of success for other denominations. In the mid 1840s, Methodist missions in Canada outnumbered those in the U.S. by nearly a three to one ratio, while the Presbyterians and the Baptists in the U.S. had no Canadian counterparts. On the other hand, Episcopalians enjoy a six to one advantage in Canadian versus U.S. missions (Copway, 1850: 178).

Also, it should not be assumed that most of the Anishnabeg became Christians. A 1858 report on the religious affiliation of residents of Walpole Island shows that over 40% were not associated with any Christian denomination (Hedley, 1992).

While large numbers of Anishnabeg affiliated with no Christian denomination, the religious differences were real and persistent and did have serious effects on people's lives. McClurken claims that the Anishnabeg were often willing to admit an adherence to a particular mission for the simple reason that a rejection of Christian tenets could easily translate into open opposition from the resident agent resulting in a failure to secure rations, annuities, blacksmith help, etc. (1988: 327, 338-9, 345). Andrew Blackbird (1887: 64) reports that while the Odawa at L'Arbre Croche were mostly Roman Catholic, he led a dissident group

of Protestants and was ostracized by the Catholic community many of whom moved to Manitoulin Island. In a discussion of the Manitoulin experiment, Bleasdale (1974: 156) states that religious denominationalism disrupted the harmonious lives of the Island's Native population and it became necessary to establish separate communities on the island for the various denominations, which essentially meant keeping the Roman Catholics and the Protestants apart. The Potawatomi on the Island set themselves apart from the Ojibway, partly (it may be assumed) due to religious differences; "The resident missionary having been unable to induce them to listen to his instructions." (JLA, 1858).

Copway, the Ojibway missionary, claims that the Canadian government refused to grant him any annuities "for several years . . . because I had been *too much with the Americans*" (Copway, 1850: 202 [emphasis in original]). At Garden River, Shingwauk complained to the Reverend O'Meara that he and his band were being "annoyed" by the efforts of Baptists and Methodists in an effort to draw them from their adherence to the Church of England (O'Meara, 1846: 30). Despite this complaint to O'Meara, Shingwauk was not a religious partisan; in fact he steadfastly worked to maintain unity among the Anishnabeg in the face of active government and church attempts to use religion to divide the people (Chute, 1986: 149).

Movements to Manitoulin Island

As we have seen, shortly after the War of 1812, the Odawa were openly discussing their possible return to Manitoulin Island with Canadian authorities (Wightman, 1982: 10). In a visit in 1835, Captain Thomas G. Anderson, Canadian Superintendent of the Western Tribes, visited the Odawa and other Anishnabeg in Michigan and along the North Shore of Lake Huron and found that many expressed a willingness to move to Manitoulin Island. Furthermore, he found the Odawa of northern Lake Michigan preparing for removal to the Island (Bleasdale, 1974: 147). It is most probable that these Odawa were the same as those who requested permission to re-emigrate to Manitoulin in 1818. And again most probably, these Odawa were under the direction of J. B. Assikinock, an influential Odawa chief from L'Arbre Croche (Brown, et al, 1976: 9-10).

Schoolcraft reported in 1839 that Chingossamo, a Ojibway chief from the Cheboygan area, left for Manitoulin with 13 families comprising about 80 people, leaving about 45 Anishnabeg remaining in the Cheboygan area (Schoolcraft, 1851: 658), and in 1845 a group of about eight families from the north shore of Lake Michigan went to Manitoulin (Magnaghi, 1984: 50).

In early 1850, a group of about 100 Roman Catholic Indians requested permission to settle on the west end of Manitoulin Island claiming to have always been attached to

the British Government (Bruce, 1850). There is no indication in the correspondence of the U.S. location of the petitioners. The reply, from George Ironsides, Indian superintendent at Manitowaning, was that Manitoulin Island was reserved for Native people from the north shore of Lake Huron and that American Indians would therefore be interfering with the rights of British Indians (Ironsides, 1850). This is in obvious contradiction to the original intent of the Manitoulin Experiment which was to concentrate all Native people there (Head, 1838: 180). Furthermore, there is no indication in this record whether or not these petitioners ever moved to Manitoulin, but it has been claimed that the government felt that it would be easier to control the Ojibway if they remained divided (Chute, 1986: 526 [note 48]). In view of the fact that the Manitoulin Experiment was by 1850 in serious trouble and the reported declining Native population there would seem to indicate that these people did not emigrate to the Island (Bleasdale, 1974: 155).

The End of the Manitoulin Experiment

The final breakup of the Manitoulin Experiment was an ugly affair. At a treaty council in October of 1861, the island's Native people rejected the government's cession terms:

> "The whites should not come and take our land from us: they ought to have stayed on the other side of the salt water to work the land there. . . . This

> land of which I speak, I consider my body; I don't want one of my legs or arms to be taken from me. I am surprised to hear you say the island belongs to white men . . . (qtd. in Bleasdale, 1974: 155-56).

The divisions on the Island were geographic and religious with the two main settlements on the Island being: 1) Manitowaning, the main government outpost and site of the annual gift giving which was exclusively affiliated with the Church of England, and 2) Wikwemikong, the predominantly Roman Catholic settlement at the eastern end of the Island. As mentioned previously, the treaty of 1836 set aside the entire Island chain for the use of all interested Native people; the 1862 treaty ceded most of the island to the Canadian government. It was this 1862 treaty which caused the turmoil on the island and further divided the loyalties of the island's Anishnabeg.

The chiefs at Wikwemikong claimed that the signatories to the 1862 treaty reported to be representing them were either appointed illegally or did not have the authority to represent them. Consequently, they never recognized the validity of the 1862 treaty and in July of 1863, they ejected a white family and some Native people from the community, and chief Tehkummeh, a signatory to the 1862 treaty, was forced to seek refuge at Manitowaning (Brown, et al, 1976: 407-8). They also harassed the government surveyors (Bleasdale, 1974: 156). The end result of all these troubles was that the east end of Manitoulin Island

remained "unceded Indian territory" (a status which it enjoys to this day), but most of the remaining land was eventually surveyed, and in 1866 was sold, and Head's "Manitoulin Experiment" came to an inglorious end; (Ontario, 1991: 258; Erdrich & Dorris, 1990: 383).

Initially, many Native people did move to the Island, but the bulk of these were those surveyed by Anderson in 1835, along with a few Potawatomi from the St. Clair Reserve in southern Ontario (Bleasdale, 1974: 149). But within a few years, many drifted back to their homelands (either in the U.S. or in Canada) while many "American" Indians remained in Canada but left the Island. James Clifton in "Visiting Indians in Canada" claims that the total number of "visiting Indians" that remained in Canada during this period was between five and nine thousand (Clifton, 1979: 44). Many of the Potawatomi returned to the St. Clair River area and some Ojibway left for Lake Michigan in the early 1840s. Later, others left to join the Newash band on the Bruce Peninsula while still others joined Shingwauk at Garden River (Bleasdale, 1974: 155).

In the final analysis, as a "Canadian Oklahoma" the Manitoulin policy was a failure, although this may not have been that big of a disappointment to the Canadian Government. In 1838 Head wrote: "I do not think the Indians of the United States could or would complain of the above arrangements, and I feel certain, that though a few would at

first probably emigrate to Canada, they would not long remain there." (Head, 1836: 91). He was right.

Canada to U.S. Migrations

Virtually all of the Anishnabeg migrations as discussed above were from the United States to Canada, but a discussion of Native migrations would not be complete without citing the few examples of migrations from Canada to the U.S. that were found. The Journals of the Legislative Council of the Province of Canada for 1858 reported that the population of the Sarnia Reserve had declined due to removals to the United States, although no numbers are given (JLC, 1858). Bleasdale, in describing the exodus of Native people from Manitoulin Island in 1841, reports "some Ojibway . . . left for Lake Michigan" (Bleasdale, 1974: 152).

Although not concerning the Anishnabeg, another report shows that "several members" of the Wyandots living in Anderon Township in southern Ontario "removed to Missouri where they received money and grants of land from the United States Government" (Indian Affairs Branch, 1966: 20). The same source claims that Moravian Indians, originally from Pennsylvania, "surrendered much of their land in 1836 to make way for incoming setters and in 1837, 230 Indians from Fairfield [Ontario] went to Missouri" (Indians Affairs Branch, 1966: 28). Other Moravians had earlier left Canada to return to the U.S. (Smith, 1799). In 1840, some Wyandots who had earlier moved from the U.S. to southwest Ontario

left Canada for Missouri. It was claimed that some Native people from Sarnia moved to the U.S. "some years past" (JLA, 1858).

Shingwauk, Garden River, and a Pan-Ojibway Settlement

In the midst of the debacle that Manitoulin was becoming, as was mentioned, Shingwauk was still actively pursuing his own version of a pan-Ojibway settlement at Ketegaun Sebee (Garden River). While Copway claims that some Garden River people moved to Manitoulin Island into the care of an Episcopal mission there (Copway, 1850), we saw above where some migrants moved *from* Manitoulin *to* Garden River, while others also moved to Garden River.

In 1845 Blackbird and Neokema, Ojibway chiefs from La Pointe representing about 500 Anishnabeg, requested permission to emigrate to Canada citing mistreatment by U.S. officials who referred to them as "English Indians" and tried to deprive them of their English medals and flags (Blackbird & Neokema, 1845). The Canadian government replied that if they came over for presents, they must come as residents; "visiting Indians" could no longer receive presents from the Canadian government, a policy which ended in 1843 (Anderson, 1845; Clifton, 1979: 40).

As a further reflection of their changing policy, in 1840 the Canadian Government added a third category to the presents regime –that of "wandering Indians." This category was used to reflect those Native people who had moved to

Canada from the U.S. but had yet to permanently settle at a particular reserve or mission (Clifton, 1979: 3). This mission or reserve requirement reflected the "civilizing" component of Indian policy mentioned above.

In 1847, Shingwauk and three other chiefs signed a petition to the Canadian government asking that Anishnabeg from the U.S. be allowed to move to Canada. In conjunction with the above discussion concerning Kawgaosh and the reference to Crane Clan chiefs only being allowed to represent the Anishnabeg of the Sault area, it is important to note that all four of these chiefs are Crane Clan members. The reason given for the proposed move was that the Native's land was being sold by those "who were satisfied to renounce the fostering care of England for the cold hearted policy of the United States" (Council Report, 1847: 6193).

Later, a petition signed by Lake Superior Ojibway chiefs from Leech Lake, Red Lake, Chippewa River, Lac du Flambeau, Trout Lake, Grand Portage, Lac Chelec, Ontonagon, Bad River, Pigeon River, and Fond du Lac requested permission to settle on Native lands in the Canadian Sault area (American Indians, 1852). Up to 2000 Native people were represented by these petition signers (Chute, 1986: 518 [note 84]). There is no indication of whether or not this request was granted, but the 1850 incident cited above showed that the Canadian government was not always inclined

to welcome Native people from the United States.

By the late 1850s the Manitoulin Experiment was considered no longer viable, and the government seemed to give its assent to Shingwauk's plan for a pan-Ojibway settlement at Garden River when it negotiated a treaty with the other Ojibway in the Sault area. In 1859 the Batchewana and Goulais Bay Bands agreed to cede the land reserved for them under the 1850 Robinson treaty (excepting small islands used as fishing stations) in return for land on the Garden River reserve (Canada, 1973: 227-9). Just over half of the Anishnabeg displaced by this 1859 treaty did settle at Garden River, the rest were scattered throughout the area (Dept. of Indian Affairs, 1899).

In early 1855, sixteen chiefs petitioned Washington to remain on ancestral lands in upper Michigan: "We love the spot where our forefathers bones are laid, and we desire that our bones may rest beside theirs also." Ever since the 1830s the Anishnabeg had been struggling against Removal and in the 1854 Treaty of La Pointe and the 1855 Treaty of Detroit, both with the Ojibway, the government finally acceded to the Anishnabeg and the threat of removal was lifted from their lives (Neumeyer, 1971: 285, 287). The motivation to move to Garden River or to Manitoulin was eased as well.

In the midst of all these movements and intrigues, the Canadian government ended the distribution of presents to

all Native people in 1856. In its stead the government considered the annuities from the ceded lands to be sufficient support. While the government was discussing this policy, the Odawa chief Assikinock reminded them of their perpetual obligation and threatened that without presents he might return to American loyalty (Clifton, 1979: 40).

As a final précis of this period, a summary of Native people receiving presents from the Canadian government may be instructive here. Overall, the number of Native people receiving presents throughout Upper Canada was at its lowest in 1837, that is in the year following Head's announcement. The 1837 number was 7,706. The highest number was in 1842 when 14,670 Native people received presents from the British regime. This difference showing an increase of over 7,000 is no doubt due in large measure to migrations, largely expanded due to the threat of Removal from the United States (JLC, 1847).

It should be obvious that the "American" Indians of the Lake Huron Borderlands saw this period as one of enormous upheaval. The 1836 Canadian announcement of the elimination of presents for "visiting" Indians and the simultaneous implementation of the U.S. policy of removal worked in sinister synchrony to profoundly disrupt the Anishnabeg way of life.

Before moving to the final section of this chapter, an

important U.S. treaty must be discussed –the 1855 Treaty of Detroit between the Odawa and the Ojibway and the U.S. government. This treaty was previously mentioned because it eliminated the threat of removal for the Upper Great Lakes Anishnabeg, but it is important to this study for other reasons as well.

In the Council Proceedings conducted in Detroit prior to the 1855 treaty signing, Ossagon from Cheboygan asked about the annuities to "our Indians [who] went over to Canada" (United States, 1855: 15), and the Sault Ste Marie chief Waubogeeg brought up an issue of concern to the "Garden River Chief," namely, the fact that in a recent annuity payment the Garden River people received but half of what other (presumably American) people received. The response was that Agent Sprague had instructions not to pay them but in view of their (ie, the Canadian Indians) "urgent . . . request" they were paid $4 per head, when "they ought not to have received anything." Agent Gilbert continued his reply with this: "It is just such a case as occurred at Mackinac last fall, when I was applied to and did pay Canada Indians small sums of money" (United States, 1855: 17-18).

In the next statement by Waubogeeg, he declares that the Sault Indians no longer wish to be considered as being associated with the Odawa, as they were in the 1836 treaty. So what we see here is the Sault chief Waubogeeg representing the Garden River Ojibway while simultaneously

disassociating himself and the Sault Ojibway from the Odawa, their ancient allies and fellow members of the Three Fires Confederacy. These statements by Waubogeeg should not be construed as relating mainly to Odawa disassociation but should be viewed instead for the support given to his fellow Ojibway across the river at Sault Ste Marie.

As far as this study is concerned, the Garden River connection cited above is of great concern to the concept of "Nation-hood" in the Lake Huron Borderlands. The 1855 Treaty of Detroit, Article 1, Section 8, contains the following clause:

> The benefits of this article will be extended only to those Indians who are at this time actual residents of the State of Michigan . . . but this provision shall not be construed to exclude any Indian now belonging to the Garden River band of Sault Ste. Marie. (Kappler, 1972: 727)

The Council Proceedings do not contain any discussions that in any way refer to the question of whether of not "Canadian" Indians can be accommodated within the language of this U.S. treaty, but it is obvious that such accommodations were made when the treaty was finally signed.

As was discussed early in this chapter relative to Kawgayosh and the 1836 land cession Treaty of Washington, this 1855 treaty again shows that the ties which bind the Anishnabeg to each other are strong, while the ties binding the Anishnabeg to the governments of either Canada or the United States appear to be very weak indeed. By these examples, and the several others which follow, it should be

clear that the loyalties of the Anishnabeg are *Anishnabeg* loyalties akin to the modern concept of nationalism. The following section will explore the concept of Anishnabeg Nationalism through an analysis of the signatories to U.S. and Canadian treaties.

U.S./Canada/Anishnabeg Treaty Connections

As stated earlier several treaties were signed by the Anishnabeg with both the U.S. and with British authorities wherein all sides showed a decided lack of concern for political boundaries. An analysis of these and other treaties as well as other relevant documents (both U.S. and Canadian) reveals further examples of the porosity and the nebulous character of the "international" border during this period of land cessions and treaty-making which lends supports to a continuing existence of an Anishnabeg Nation State in the Lake Huron borderlands.

Through a comparison of those individuals who were either treaty-signers or were mentioned in both U.S. and Canadian Lake Huron borderland treaties, it can be shown that some specific individuals were involved in the treaty-making processes on both sides of the border. Such connections would seem to imply that the designators of "Canadian" or "American" are in many cases irrelevant to those individuals choosing Anishnabeg leaders —and to those so chosen— to represent them at treaty negotiations with agents of either the U.S. or Canada.

But before we discuss the results of this analysis, presented in Table 4, the reader should be appraised of the process by which this table was assembled. The names of all signers, or those mentioned, in Lake Huron borderlands treaties (both U.S. and Canadian) were entered into a computer along with a code for the treaty where the name was found. Names from other non-treaty sources were also added. The resulting list contains over 1500 names. This list was then sorted alphabetically and examined for names that appeared in both U.S. and Canadian sources.

Many duplicate sets of names that were found are not included in Table 4 due to a perceived geographic or chronological distance that rendered their inclusion suspect. Rather than include sets of names with dubious integrity, it was considered more prudent to include only those names which would withstand close scrutiny.

The reader should also be aware that the wide variations in the spelling of names as they appear in treaty documents makes the process of comparison quite difficult and as a result, many other seemingly duplicate sets of names were also omitted from the Table. As an example, the Potawatomi chief Topinabee (to use the post office spelling of the extant Michigan village) was signatory to several treaties and is found to be listed as: Thupenebu (1795) (treaty years in parentheses from Kappler, 1972), Tuthinpee (1803), Topanepee (1805), Toopinnepe (1814), Topeeneebee

(1815), Tuthinepee (1818), Topennebee (1821), Topnibe (1822), Topenibe (1826), Topenebee (1828), and Topenebe (1846).

Also, on many occasions the spelling of a person may vary within the same document. For example, in a 1833 treaty, we find Topenebe, Topenebee, and the probable misspelling "Jo-pen-e-bee" (Kappler, 1972: 410). So, for the 15 references to Topinabee (including the modern village name), we find 13 spelling variations; and this is for a name whose spelling does not appear to present any great difficulties in comparison, as we shall see.

Throughout this study, the most common spelling of a name has been the one most often used. But in Table 4, and Table 5 which follows, the spellings are given as they appear in the cited source. In these tables, the name of the individual is followed by a number which designates the year of the treaty or the source, with "A" for the United States, "C" for Canada. The "S" designation refers to the source of the information: 1839-S refers to the Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll of 1839 from the Schoolcraft Papers, 1985-S and 1991-S are referenced in Table 4. 1850-V refers to the Robinson Treaty Voucher #2 from Sault Ste Marie, Canada, and represents individuals who where paid by the Canadian government for cessions in the Huron-Robinson Treaty of 1850. An explanation of these references, treaty descriptions, and other sources mentioned are in the Appendix.

Table 4: Anishnabe Canada/U.S. Treaty Signers

Sheganack	1817-A	N. Ohio
Sigonak	1819-A	Saginaw
Assekinack	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Assikinock	1850-C	Sault Ste Marie
Assiginack	1862-C	Manitoulin Island
Chemokcomon	1817-A	N. Ohio
Kitchmookman	1819-A	Saginaw
Chemogueman	1820-A1	L'Arbre Croche & Mackinac
Kitchemokman	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Gitchy Mocoman	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Keezhigo Benais	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Keghikgodoness	1862-C	Manitoulin Island
Keywaytenan	1790-C	Detroit
Kewaytinam	1819-A	Saginaw
Kimewen	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Kimmewun	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Kemewan	1839-S	Ottawa/Chippewa list.
Macounce	1796-C	Thames River
Macquettequet	1807-A	Detroit
Eshtonoquot	1836-A1	Wash. DC (St.Clair region)
"Little Bear"	1985-S	(Sturm, 1985: 22)
Ishtonaquette	1991-S	(Schmalz, 1991: 134)
Meatoosawkee	1798-C	St. Joseph Island
Maidosagee	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Magisanikway	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Mahgezahnekwa	1859-C	Garden River.
Megissanequa		Moved to Garden River by 1840 (Chute, 1986: 488 [note 94]).
Mosaniko	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Mosuneko	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Nanguey	1795-A	Greenville
Nangee	1796-C	Thames River
Nangy	1800-C	Windsor
Nawogezhick	1855-A	Detroit
Nawwegezhick	1855-A1	Sault Ste Marie
Nawwegezhick	1855-A2	Detroit (Sault cession)
Nahwegezhig	1859-C	Garden River
Naway Kesick	1867-C	Garden River

Table 4 (cont'd)

Negig	1796-C	Thames River
Nekiek	1805-A	Fort Industry (N. Ohio)
Negig	1807-A	Detroit
Negig	1827-C	Amherstburg
Nemekass	1795-A	Greenville
Annamakance	1796-C	Thames River
Nemekass	1807-A	Detroit
Animikince	1827-C	Amherstburg
Nimekance	1991-S	"Chief of Sarnia Band" (Schmalz, 1991: 23, 114)
Paanassee	1815-A	Spring Wells
Panaissy	1850-C	Sault Ste Marie
Paimausegai	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Pamossegay	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Shawanoe	1820-A1	L'Arbre Croche/Mackinac
Kewayzi Shawano	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Oshawano	1850-C	Sault Ste Marie
Shawano	1855-A	Detroit
Oshawano	1855-A	Detroit
Oshawawno	1855-A2	Detroit (Sault cession)
Ouitanissa	1790-C	Detroit
Wetanasa	1789-A	Fort Harmar
Penash	1790-C	Detroit
Penosh	1814-A	Greenville
Penashee	1832-A	Tippecanoe
Penashi	1842-A	LaPointe
Penashe	1859-C	Garden River
Peyshiky	1796-C	Thames River
Peeshickee	1826-A	Fond du Lac
Sagunosh	1819-A	Saginaw
Shaganash	1820-A1	L'Arbre Croche/Mackinac
Saganash	1827-C	Amherstburg
Chigenaus	1836-C	Manitoulin Island
Saganosh	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Saugassauway	1819-A	Saginaw
Sagawsouai	1822-C	Thames River

Table 4 (cont'd)

Shawanapenisse	1798-C	St. Joseph Island
Shawunepanasee	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Sawanabenase	1807-A	Detroit
Shawanipinissie	1827-C	Amherstburg
Shawshauwenaubais	1819-A	Saginaw
Shashawinibisie	1827-C	Amherstburg
Shashawaynaybeece	1855-A2	Detroit (Sault cession)
Shebense	1790-C	Detroit
Chebaas	1818-A1	St. Mary's, Ohio
Chebause	1832-A	Tippecanoe
Ghebause	1832-A	Tippecanoe (variant spelling?)
Shinguax	1817-A	Miami River, Ohio
Shingwalk	1819-A	Saginaw
"Augustin Bart"	1820-A	Sault Ste Marie
Shinguakouce	1850-C	Garden River
Shingwahcooce	1859-C	Garden River
"Shingwalk, jr."	1819-A	Saginaw
Ogista	1859-C	Garden River
Augustin	1867-C	Garden River
Augustin	1873-C	Garden River
Tegose	1855-A1	Detroit
Tagoush	1867-C	Garden River
Tegouche	1873-C	Garden River
Waubogee	1826-A	Fond du Lac
Waub Ogeeg	1836-A	Wash. DC (N. MI-EUP cession)
Waubooge	1859-C1	Garden River
Wawbowjieg	1854-A	LaPointe
Waubojick	1855-A	Detroit
Wawbojieg	1855-A1	Sault Ste Marie
Wawbojieg	1855-A2	Detroit (Sault cession)
Wauweeyatam	1819-A	Saginaw
Wawiattin	1822-C	Thames River
Wacheness	1795-A	Greenville
Wittaness	1796-C	Thames River
Wetanis	1800-C	Windsor

Three important leaders known to be associated with the Sault Ste Marie area can be found in the Table 4: Shingwauk, Oshawano, and Waubojeeg.

We have already encountered Shingwauk in our discussion of the 1820 cession at Sault Ste Marie. He was also a signer of the 1817 and 1819 lower Michigan cession treaties, the 1850 Robinson land cession treaty, and other treaties associated with his Garden River reserve near Sault Ste Marie. His son, Augustin, who was listed in the 1819 Michigan treaty as "Shingwalk, jun." (Kappler, 1972: 187), was also a signatory to several Garden River treaties. The Table shows that Tagoush, another son of Shingwauk, also signed treaties for both the U.S. and Canada.

Oshawano was another important chief from the northern reaches of our study area. His grandfather, Kichiokamichide, was the first chief at Bawating (the Sault) and his father was Auchaswanon (Chute, 1986: 66). Oshawano's first name was Kasakoodangue (or Cassaquadung) and he also used the name Weenikiz. He was also known to add "Kewazee" to the name of Oshawano, which can be translated as "son of Oshawano" (Tanner, 1974: 16 [note 40]; Chute, 1986: 273; Schoolcraft, 1851: 249). In addition to the American treaties listed, his name was added to the 1850 Robinson treaty band rolls (Chute, 1986: 273). (Oshawano also plays a major role in events which will be presented later in this study.)

The third great Ojibway chief from the Sault area to appear in Table 4 is Waubogeeg. He was signatory to several U.S. treaties from 1826 to 1855, and, like Oshawano, was placed on the 1850 Robinson rolls (Chute, 1986). This chief should not be confused with Waubejejauk who was also an influential area chief. Waubejejauk fell at the Battle of Thames in 1814 and his son, Nebenaigoching (of the 1850 Robinson treaty), was vested by the British in 1819 with the chiefdomship at Sault Ste Marie (Chute, 1986: 100).

Another set of names of which there can be no dispute is that of the Odawa Jean Baptiste Assikinock, a British partisan in the War of 1812 (Brown, et al, 1976: 9). In the 1817 U.S. treaty his name appears as "Sheganack, or Black Bird" (Kappler, 1972: 151). Assikinock signed several treaties in the U.S. but left for Canada during the removal period where he was joined by a Canadian Ojibway chief, Aisance, where together they established a power base at Penetanguishene (Chute, 1986: 153). J. B. Assikinock is listed as being the interpreter for several of the northern Lake Huron Canadian treaties, including the 1850 Lake Huron Robinson treaty, and was a signer of both the 1836 and the 1862 Manitoulin treaties. F. Assikinock, the son of J. B. Assikinock who was also an interpreter for the Canadian government, can also be found as a participant in several treaty negotiations (Brown, et al, 1976: 9-10; Canada, 1973: 228, 230, 231).

Furthermore, J. B. Assikinock should also not be confused with Andrew J. Blackbird, another important northern Michigan chief and treaty signer whose name appears as Mukaday Benais in the 1836 Michigan land cession treaty (Kappler, 1972: 456). Andrew J. Blackbird, in his book *History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan* mentions that his uncle is named Ausegonock, clearly a reference to J. B. Assikinock (Blackbird, 1887). Lastly, none of these men should be confused with still another notable chief named "Maw-caw-day-pe-nay-se (Blackbird)" who was a treaty signer from the western Lake Superior region (Kappler, 1972: 651) (see Table 5).

The inclusion of the entries for Kimewen and Kimmewun is supported by the reference to Kemewan's Band as being among those emigrants to Canada struck from a payroll list (McClurken, 1988: 224).

Turning to Chemokcomon in Table 4; in the 1817 U.S. treaty his name is translated as the "American" (Kappler, 1972: 151); for 1820, the listing is "Chemogueman, or Big Knife" (Kappler, 1972: 188). The "Americans" and the "Big Knives" are apparently synonymous. Despite this variation in translation and others in spelling, the geographic and chronological unity of Chemokcomon's five entries leads to the conclusion that the entries are for the same person.

There is no evidence that the other names listed in Table 4 are necessarily those of the same person signing

treaties on both sides of the border, but the arguments of geography, chronological unity, and the similarities of the names —as in the case of Chemokcomon— are again cited to support the inclusion of these other names. As was mentioned, several sets of duplicate names are not included due to confusing spelling variations or insupportable geographic or chronological differences.

Table 5 presents the names of other individuals who, while not signing both a U.S. and a Canadian treaty, did sign at least one, and other information which links those individuals to the other country.

Table 5: Other Anishnabeg/Canada/U.S. Treaty Connections

Akosa Aquasa	1836-A 1850-V	On Robinson Treaty Voucher (Voucher, 1850).
Anewaba Aneuwaybe	1819-A 1850-V	On Robinson Treaty Voucher (Voucher, 1850).
Chingassamo	1836-A	Moved from Cheboygan area to Canada; left power vacuum that Schoolcraft had to mediate (Schoolcraft, 1851: 658).
Kagegabe Kawgagawbwa	1850-V 1855-A	On Robinson Treaty Voucher (Voucher, 1850).
Kawgayosh	1836-A	Referred to by Schoolcraft as Gitshee Kawgaosh, a British Chief (Schoolcraft, 1851: 583).
Kaybaynodin Kebaynodin	1855-A	Signed Sault area petition to Canadian government (Chute, 1986: 489 [note 106])
Keneshteno Kenishteno	1847-A 1854-A	Moved to Canada (Chute, 1986: 288).
Makitewaquit Mukutay Oquot Muckadaywacquot	1800-C 1836-A 1836-A	Signed Canadian Deed of Sale. From Grand River, western MI. From SSM (see text)
Matwaash Matawaash	1817-A 1850-V	On Robinson Treaty Voucher (Voucher, 1850).
Muckuday peenaas Mawcawdaypenayse	1826-A 1854-A	Moved to Canada (Blackbird, 1845).
Mizi Mezye	1842-A 1847-A	Moved to Canada (Chute, 1986: 110, 138).
Nebenaigoching	1850-C	With Shingwauk, moved to Canada and became chief of"western" Sault area and other major 1850 Robinson treaty signer.
Ogemawpenasee Ogemahbenaissee	1839-S 1859-C	On Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll of 1839 (US).

Table 5, cont.

Paybaumogeezhig Pawpomekezick	1826-A	Petitioned to move to Canada in 1850s (Chute, 1986: 516 [note 68]).
Pasheskiskaquashcum Pazhekezkqueshcum Bauzhigiezhigwaeshikum	1815-A	Moved to Walpole Island in 1820s (Leighton, 1986). On Walpole Island c1845 (Schmalz, 1991: 169).
Pensweguesic Penaysewaykesek Penasewegeeshig	1817-A 1819-A 1845	"Deserving Chippewa Warrior" at Port Sarnia in 1845 (Richardson, 1924: 101).
Piawbedawsung Piawbedawsung	1855-A 1855-A1	Shingwauk's son-in-law; lived on Sugar Island; was also a signer of petition to Canadian government asking that Garden River be made a pan-Ojibway settlement (Chute, 1986: 118); referred to as the chief of the Garden River band (Pitezel, 1857: 358)
Sabo Saybo Saboo	1819-A 1819-A	Signed Sault area petition to Canadian government (Chute, 1986: 489 [note 106]).
Shawanoe	1814-A	Moved to Walpole Island Bauman, 1949: 109).
Shaniwaygwunabi Shawunegonabe	1836-A 1850-V	On Robinson Treaty Voucher (Voucher, 1850).
Tagawinini	1850-C	lived at Saginaw; moved to Canada (Chute, 1986: 153-4).
Toposh Toposh	1832-A 1845	"Common Potawatomi Chief" on Walpole Island in 1845 (Richardson, 1924: 100).
Waanoos Wawanosh	1785-A	Fort MacIntosh Early 1800s chief of the Canadian Saugeen Chippewa (St. Clair region) (Schmalz, 1991: 136). "Deserving Chippewa Chief" on Walpole Island in 1845 (Richardson, 1924: 101).
Wasson Wasson	1790-C 1796-C	Identified as Michigan Ojibway by Schmalz (1991: 72).

The names in table 5 are given with the reason for their inclusion. For example, Toposh, listed as a "Common Potawatomi Chief" at Port Sarnia, Ontario, in 1845, was also a signatory to the Potawatomi/U.S. treaty of 1832. Of course, given the claim of Clifton (1975) that no Potawatomi could claim historic residence in Canada, any Potawatomi who signed one of their six treaties with the Canadian government could be listed in Table 5, as all could be construed as being an "American" Indian or a direct descendant. It was decided that inclusion in Table 5 required a more substantial U.S./Canada link.

The inclusion of Makitewaquit as an 1800 Canadian deed signer and the two different names mentioned in the 1836 U.S. treaty presents a different problem. The 1836 treaty makes it very clear that Mukutay Oquot and Muckadaywacquot are two different people from two different places. It cannot be determined whether or not Makitewaquit of the 1800 deed is one or the other of these 1836 leaders, but given that this period is noted for the extensive movement of Native people throughout the Lake Huron area, the possibility must be entertained.

Other possible connections are not included. For example, the name of "Paybahmesay" is found in the Council Proceedings of July 25, 1855, in Detroit, where he is identified as the "Grand River Chief" (United States, 1855: 2). This would place him in the west central area of

Michigan's lower peninsula. In the Proceedings he argued for the Native right to remain on their lands and obtain a clear title to them. Four years later, the name "Babahmesay" appears as an 1859 treaty signer for the Thessalon River band located on the Georgian Bay North Channel (Canada, 1973: 231). Given that "P" and "B" are somewhat interchangeable in the common Anishnabeg language (Rhodes, Richard, 1985: xliii; Blackbird, 1887: 27), these names are no doubt the same, but they were not included in Table 5 because it seemed unlikely that in 1855 Paybahmesay would be arguing for a permanent home in lower Michigan and then four years later (as Babahmesay) would be signing a treaty for a Canadian band. The mere similarity in the name in this and several other cases was not sufficient to be included when considered in historical context.

In discussing the treaty signers found in Tables 4 and 5, a modern comparison may be made between the United States and its treaty negotiators relative to the North American Free Trade agreements with the Canadian and Mexican governments. As a sovereign nation, the United States would not feel obligated to send only certain "Canadian-Americans" to negotiate with Canadian representatives, nor would it be likely that only "Mexican-Americans" would be sent to negotiate with the Mexican government. Consequently, in the historic setting of the 18th and 19th centuries, it appears that the Anishnabeg did not always send only "American

Indians" to treat with the agents of the U.S. government, nor send only "Canadian Indians" to treat with Canadian negotiators.

Anishnabeg unity at treaty negotiations was not the only point where leaders on both sides of the border acted independently of third forces. James Clifton reports that following the signing of a land cession treaty by Ojibway of Chenail Escarte near present-day Wallaceberg, Ontario, many Ojibway from the American side of the border came to Canada and demanded "their fair share" of the proceeds of that land cession (Clifton, 1979: 26). In another example (this from the early 1850s), Native leaders from the Sault area petitioned the Canadian government for title to (fur trader) Ermatinger's property on the Canadian side of the Rapids. Of the many Native signers, only three were Canadian (Shingwauk, Mishkeash, and Nowquagabo), the rest American and, as we have seen, included chiefs who signed U.S.treaties (Chute, 1986: 489 [note 106]). Clearly, being Anishnabe was the most important identifier for these people; being "American" or "Canadian" or "British" was decidedly of minor concern —if considered at all.

Summary

Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the analysis of U.S./Canada/Anishnabeg treaties from the 1790s to the 1870s; an interval which obviously spans several distinct historical periods, covering many wars, the Removal era,

assimilation, religious denominationalism, the Manitoulin experiment, etc. The treaties examined cover a wide range of changing government and Native policies, first under French and British influence, later under U.S. and Canadian influence.

The result of these "foreign" policies and variant treaty-making is that the Anishnabeg did become, in one sense, a divided people, with Ojibway/Chippewa, the Ottawa/Odawa, and the Potawatomi living on both sides of an international border in the Lake Huron borderlands —from Walpole Island in the south, to the area around the Sault in the north, with dozens of small reserves along the shores of Lake Huron in between.

Yet in another sense, the Anishnabeg, even in the face of —or perhaps in spite of— the differences being interposed between them by other governments, the Anishnabeg sought to maintain an identity —and their loyalties— as Anishnabeg first and foremost. The last chapter of this study will examine the 20th century Anishnabeg and explore their continuing success in the maintenance of this Anishnabeg identity.

CHAPTER 6: 20th CENTURY CONDITIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Rapids and the Study Area in its Modern Context

Anishnabeg oral tradition attributes the creation of the rapids at Sault Ste Marie to a man who, wishing to entrap beaver, built a great stone dam across the St. Mary's River and went off in search of his prey. While absent he had his wife guard the dam. But it so happened that Manaboozho was chasing a deer in the area and the deer jumped into the big pond behind the man's dam. Manaboozho begged the woman to help him catch this deer, a request the woman felt obliged to fulfill. With the woman helping Manaboozho and leaving the dam unguarded, the beaver saw their chance to escape and in the process destroyed the man's dam. The stones fell into the river and created the rapids (Capp, 1904: 25).

This retelling of the Rapids creation story cannot match the drama and tragedy of the real life destruction of these same rapids. As we saw in the Introduction, the Rapids of Bawating are the essential reason that the Anishnabeg came to reside in the area and the reason for their centuries old residence in the area. But the natural resources that the rapids and surrounding area held are also the reasons that led the Europeans to covet this area as

well.

The rapids' once-abundant whitefish resource —the resource that sustained the Anishnabeg for centuries— was depleted after the area came under control of the United States. That process, started in 1820 by Governor Cass, was essentially completed by the 1855 Detroit treaty through which the U.S. wrested ultimate control of the rapids from the Ojibway. The 1855 treaty is barely a page in length but has resulted in controversy that could fill books and has not been quieted by the passage of nearly one and a quarter centuries.

The land ceded by the 1855 *Treaty with the Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie* is the same land that the Anishnabeg retained in the 1820 cession to Cass which states: "The United States will secure to the Indians a perpetual right of fishing at the Falls of St. Mary's, and also a place of encampment upon the tract hereby ceded, convenient to the fishing ground . . . " (Kappler, 1972: 188). The "encampment," containing 36 acres, thus retained that most important resource —access to the rapids and its fish (Warner & Groesbeck, 1974: 329).

But the rapids was "an impediment to progress," as ships laden with the copper of Michigan's Upper Peninsula had to be unloaded above the Falls and the cargo reloaded below the Falls. Or entire ships had to be "portaged" from Lake Superior to the St. Mary's River. A shipping lock was

deemed essential. Work on the Sault's first lock, being built by the State of Michigan, was began in 1853 and was completed two months *before* the 1855 Detroit treaty was signed (Warner & Groesbeck, 1974: 339).

As was stated, this 1855 treaty remains controversial and the controversy cannot be more clearly represented than by quoting at length from an affidavit by Charlie Shawano, grandson of Oshawano, whose name appears on the 1855 treaty. The affidavit is dated August 21, 1935, and was filed with the Chippewa County Probate Court in Sault Ste Marie:

> My Grandfather, O-shaw-waw-no-Ke-wan-ze, attended and aided in executing the treaty [in Detroit] on July 31st., 1855. My said grandfather, together with nearly all of the Indians returned to their homes on Lake Superior, and two days later, on August 2, 1855, the treaty was re-enacted by two or three who had remained, and they signed the names without any authority, signing away the most valuable rights of the Indians of the Lake Superior country. The treaty of August 2nd., 1855 was a well known fraud perpetrated upon the Indians, one of the greatest crimes ever committed upon the Indians, one of the great crimes ever committed under authority of a great nation. . . . I solemnly state upon my oath that my grandfather, the said O-shaw-waw-no-Ke-wan-ze, made a statement to me in the presence of my father, Ed Shawano, that he did not sign the treaty of August 2, 1855 . . . and that his signature was a forgery . . . . I heard my grandfather repeatedly saying that he never signed the treaty . . . . and it was known at the time that some of these Indians [who signed the treaty] had been dead for some time when their names were attached to the second treaty (Shawano, 1935).

While it is obviously true that anyone can swear an affidavit to support any "fact," the circumstances of the second Detroit treaty would seem to led credence to Charlie

Shawano's —and to his grandfather's— version of events surrounding the destruction of the fishing grounds and the loss of the fishing resource to the Anishnabeg people. The physical process of building the locks destroyed much of the Rapids, which were then further destroyed by the 20th century construction of two hydro-electric power stations, both utilizing water diverted from the Rapids. In addition to the construction of shipping canals and hydro-power canals on both the U.S. and Canadian sides of the Rapids, "compensating gates" were built across the remaining Rapids area. Every inch of the Rapids is now under human control and the resultant human activity has reduced the Rapids to a mere trickle and destroyed the fishery.

But the fishing resource of Bawating and the Rapids themselves were not the only resources to fall prey to the advances of "progress." The Upper Great Lakes was a virtual treasure trove of natural resources: fur, fish, copper, iron ore, and lumber to the value of several billions of dollars were extracted from these areas; little of any of these resources remain (Bellfy, 1981). For a Map of the study area in its modern context, see Figure 11.

The Jay Treaty Revisited (Nation-Building)

The building of the locks in 1855, accelerated the exploitation of the area's natural resources, and following 1855, the Anishnabeg's main struggle was to simply exist. And while the passage of time and the obvious difficulties



From Office of Tourism, c1976.

Figure 11: The Study Area in Modern Context

engendered by serving two masters (the U.S. and Canadian Governments) has eroded the solidarity of the Anishnabeg, a common language, a common history, and a common culture still serve to identify these people as one. Most notable among the 20th century unifying forces is the 1794 Jay Treaty.

The importance of the Jay Treaty to Native people has been discussed above, and the passage of two centuries has not diminished the relevance of this document to the Anishnabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands. Although both the Canadian and the U.S. Governments do now refuse to recognize the provisions of the Jay Treaty which gave Native people the right to "freely pass and repass" the border between the two countries exempt from custom duties, Native people continue to claim that right. The assertion of Jay Treaty rights is a most visible exercise in Native sovereignty.

The Jay Treaty between the United States and Great Britain mentions by name three distinct segments of the North American population: British subjects, citizens of the United States, and "Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line." It has been argued since at least 1795 that such recognition, when added to the volume of treaties by the Canadian and U.S. governments with Native Nations, is tacit recognition of the sovereignty of Native peoples (AIM, 1973: 18).

Canada has long maintained that no right to free

border-crossing exists, and the U.S. government, while admitting that the right of Native people to freely pass and repass the border does indeed exist (McCandles, 1928: App. 6), contends that there is no right to duty-free "importation" of goods by Native people. Both governments contend that the provisions of the Jay Treaty were never implemented through specific enabling legislation and, consequently, the Treaty provisions as laid out are moot. Both governments further contend that even if the Jay Treaty was in effect in 1794, Native participation in the War of 1812 was a tacit abrogation of the Treaty. This supposed abrogation brought about by the war of 1812 is claimed in spite of the fact that the Treaty of Ghent (which ended the War of 1812) specifically mentions that Native people are to be restored to all of the rights that they held prior to the war. It is assumed that this would include the provisions of the Jay Treaty (AIM, 1973: 11; and S-Mehta, 1972: 12-14; for the official Canadian position see THRC, 1979).

Despite the ambiguous international legal status of the Jay Treaty provisions, it is important to take a look at how Native people have exercised the rights granted to them under the Treaty —whether those rights are recognized by third-party governments or not. The obvious consequences of the assertion by Native people of assumed Jay Treaty rights is a plethora of court cases in both the U.S. and in Canada.

A significant U.S. case occurred in 1930 when a St.

Regis Mohawk (whose reservation straddles the border) was denied the right to pass personal goods duty free from Canada into the United States. The duty-free right was denied based on the War of 1812 abrogation argument, despite the fact that the U.S. had included Jay Treaty language relative to Native rights into its various Tariff Acts for over a century. The *Tariff Act* of 1897 was the first U.S. Tariff Act to not include a Jay Treaty Indian exemption.

In Canada the decisive Court case was *Louis Francis v. the Queen*. In 1956 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in *Francis* that there was no existing law or treaty which exempted Native people from the payment of duties on goods brought into Canada from the United States by Native people (Slattery & Stelck, 1987: 150-182; THRC, 1979: 14). The official legalistic position of the two countries has not changed since these court cases.

In spite of these court cases, Native people from all areas of the U.S./Canada border have forcefully asserted their rights to duty-free crossing, most notably at the St. Regis Reservation in 1968 where the Mohawk residents of the reserve mounted two blockades of the Bridge crossing the St. Lawrence river (AIM, 1973: 17, App. 9).

Although Canadian Courts maintain that Native people have no rights to duty-free passage (Tuck, 1993: 1B), the Anishnabeg residing in Canada, with the full support of their "American" brethren, continue to press for the

recognition of those rights (Storey, 1993: 1A). In August of 1992, Anishnabeg from the area around Sault Ste Marie and many more from other parts of Michigan and Ontario, Manitoba, and Wisconsin, occupied the International Bridge between the two Saults to demonstrate their claim to rights granted by the Jay Treaty. As many as 2,000 Native people participated in the protest which included "importation" into Canada of goods purchased on the American side without payment of Canadian customs duties (U.S. & Canadian, 1992: 1). This author participated in another of these actions in August of 1994 at Sault Ste Marie; one of a series of Jay Treaty right assertions planned by the Anishnabeg of the Upper Great Lakes.

In addition to the above discussion, Anishnabeg assertion of Jay Treaty rights are not restricted to duty-free passage. In 1928 a Native of Walpole Island, claiming a right to pass freely across the border to seek employment in Algonac, Michigan, was denied entry on the grounds that he could neither read nor write. After a spirited protest to Washington, the U.S. government allowed for his free passage (Chauvin, 1929). In 1974 a federal district judge in Maine ruled that the Jay Treaty and a 1928 immigration statute gave Native people born in Canada the right to live and work in the United States "to preserve the aboriginal right of American Indians to move freely throughout the territory originally occupied by them on either side of the

U.S. and Canadian border. . . ." (Indian News, 1974: 1)

The non-Native population does not always see the issue in the same light. William Johnson, in a *Montreal Gazette* editorial entitled "Historical Falsehoods," claimed the Jay Treaty "made an exception for Indians because they were considered too primitive to be bound by the rules of civilized states" (Johnson, 1993: B3). Johnson goes on to assert the "historic falsehood" that the Treaty was abrogated by the War of 1812.

What apparently bothers many people is that Jay Treaty "protests" of the Anishnabeg (and other Native groups) are an obvious affront to the effectiveness of central control. In the words of Mike Waterman, a Seneca from New York who took part in a Jay treaty protest at the Windsor/Detroit border: "We pay no taxes, we pay no duty, we pay no bridge toll . . . ." (Waterman, 1993: A3). This quote was taken from an article in the *Windsor Star* titled: "Indians Win Border Skirmish with Canada Customs" (Cross, 1993: A8). The article's headline clearly points out that what is being discussed here is a modern "frontier war" —in this case, a peaceful "war" in the cause of Native sovereignty. Not all of these actions are peaceful: along the U.S./Canada/Mohawk/ N.Y/Ontario/Quebec border it is estimated that 50,000 cartons of untaxed cigarettes were crossing the border into Canada before that government lowered its tax in an attempt to reduce the flow of tax-free cigarettes into the country.

The very lucrative "smuggling" trade[1] had given rise to an increasingly violent cadre of pirates along this international waterway (Farnsworth, 1994).

Conclusion

John Price, in his book *Native Studies: American and Canadian Indians*, argues that forceful assertion of a Native right to unimpeded border-crossing "violates the values of both laws and nationalism of Americans and Canadians, but their claim of a right to do this is one of the few things which sets Native people apart from all others. To Natives it is a symbolic act which validates their identity [and creates] a new proud ideology and social cohesiveness" (Price, 1978: 227). One might add that Great Lakes Native people appear to realize that the boundary of a country is only as viable as the people being separated allow it to be; the central government's job is to attempt to maintain that division, unnatural as it may appear at times. Furthermore it appears that the boundary "is far removed from the changing desires and aspirations of the inhabitants of the Borderlands" (Kristof, 1959: 272) and when culture and autonomy are involved, the border is very often ignored.

For example, the thrust towards greater Anishnabeg cultural unity can be seen in the return of traditional societies throughout the borderlands area. The Three Fires Society, active among the Anishnabeg of Ontario, Manitoba, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, is but one

representation of this movement. Members of this re-formed society follow the teachings of the Midéwiwin; among their prophetic beliefs is that:

> In the time of the Seventh Fire a new people will emerge, to retrace their steps and history, to find what was left by the trail. . . . Their task is not easy. It will take time, hard work, perseverance and faith. The new people must remain strong in their quest, but in time there will be a rebirth, and a rekindling of the sacred fire which will light the Eighth and Final Fire of eternal peace, understanding and acceptance over the entire world. (retold in Smith, 1993: 6-7).

The belief holds that this is the time of the Seventh Fire, and the return to the more traditional ways of the Anishnabeg are an important element of what it means to be Anishnabe and the importance of that belief for the future. Yet in an echo of the older concepts of individual autonomy, although a return to these traditions can be found throughout the Lake Huron borderlands, many adherents do not recognize the Three Fires Society (Smith, 1993: 176).

But the thrust to unity is not only spiritual; political unions are fast becoming an Anishnabeg hallmark. By 1986, 46 Ojibway and Cree bands (including bands along the U.S./Canada border) had formed the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation; nine Ojibway, Potawatomi, and Missisauga bands in Ontario's northern cottage country formed an alliance in 1989; seven Ojibway bands along the Georgian Bay North Channel formed the North Shore Tribal Council in 1991; Ojibway bands on the Bruce Peninsula presented a united front in fishing rights confrontations in 1992 (Smith, 1993:

103, 125, 136); the Inter-Tribal Council, headquartered in Sault, Michigan, represents all of Michigan's recognized Native tribes. Cooperation among these organizations is high, and if, as we've seen, the Native people of Canada under the authority of the North Shore Council organize a Jay Treaty border crossing protest they can be assured of support from their fellow Anishnabeg from the United States (Storey, 1993: 1A).

Returning to the political arena; in another example of the assertion of Anishnabeg sovereignty came in the summer of 1993 when the Walpole Island Indian Band —comprised of Ojibway, Odawa, and Potawatomi Indians— declared that they are imposing a $24 fishing fee on all Lake St. Clair anglers without regard to the international border, claiming that the entire area is unceded "Indian Territory" and consequently subject only to band sovereignty and regulation (Schabath, 1993: 1C). In part, the Walpole Island Indian Band may have taken their fishing fee action due the fact that the land of the Walpole Island Indian Reserve (Canadian government No. 46) lies in Lake St. Clair waters that are claimed by both the United States and Canada (St. Clair Flats, Mich.—Ont., 1968). In any case, the imposition of a fishing fee represents an assertion of the sovereignty of Walpole Island as an independent Native Nation. The Band Council's decision to impose taxes is a practical application of a right that any sovereign nation enjoys.

Additionally, and perhaps in response to the fact that Walpole Island lies in the territorial waters claimed by both Canada and the United States, cross-border "smuggling" as reported earlier is not restricted to the Akwesasne area along the St. Lawrence River. Gerald Volgenau reports in the *Detroit Free Press* that a "smuggler's paradise" exists in the St. Clair River area north of, and bordering, Walpole Island (Volgenau, 1993: 12A). Volgenau argues that the traffic goes both ways: cigarettes and whiskey are brought into Canada while undocumented immigrants (mostly from the Caribbean and Asia) are brought into the United States. Furthermore it is claimed that arrest records point to Walpole Island Native people as being the most active actors in this cross-border traffic (Volgenau, 1993: 12A).

The question of sovereignty is a legal one and invariably couched in terms of international law and precedent. According to Michael Mason (1983), the question of sovereignty is different for both "American" and "Canadian" Native people. In North America, Indians have what is described as "sovereignty-at-sufferance." "That is, tribes have retained whatever degree of control over their people and territory Parliament or Congress permits" (Mason, 1983: 423). Mason maintains that through history and precedent, the Native people in Canada "have only the slightest residual governmental powers" (423) while the Native people of the United States have "theoretical

sovereignty and some self-governing powers" (424).

Despite Mason's pessimistic outlook *vis-a-vis* Native people in Canada and their push for sovereignty, the emerging territory of Nunavut gives lie to that pessimism. Scheduled to be a fully self-governing Canadian province, Nunavut —which means "Our Land" in the Inuit language of the Canadian far north— will be a uniquely indigenous Canadian province which will enjoy an unprecedented measure of self-rule while rejecting colonial interference from Ottawa (Robertson, 1991; Kadlum, 1990). Nunavut represents the "aspirations of [all] Native people in Canada [with] the status of 'nations within' Canada with an inherent right to self-determination through self-government" (Fleras & Elliot, 1992: 21).

Nunavut is controversial even among Native groups. Many maintain that sovereignty is not something that can be granted by or negotiated through agreements with a federal government. A Canadian Native rights group states the issue in this way: "The First Nations will not allow the question of their self-determination to become a domestic issue for Canada to resolve, and they will not abandon or compromise their international standing" (Fleras & Elliot, 1992: 25). The obvious implication here is that sovereignty exists outside the bounds of any strictly "Canadian" context. Yet other Native leaders are quick to point out that the push for Native sovereignty and self-government are to be placed

clearly within the existing framework of the Canadian federal system (Fleras & Elliot, 1992).

Although the quote above citing the international standing of First Nations mentioned the "mini-states" of Monaco and San Marino, few are willing to toy with ideas of complete independence and sovereignty outside of the framework of either the United States or Canadian federations. An exception is Mohawk writer and broadcaster, Brian Maracle. He argues that the solution to the "problem" of Akwesasne —the Mohawk reserve at St. Regis which straddles the U.S./Canada border and which has been the sight of gambling, cigarette smuggling and Jay Treaty protests— is sovereignty for its Mohawk people (Maracle, 1990). Maracle suggests that the Canadian border be drawn along the north of the reserve, the U.S. border along the southern edge, creating a North American San Marino or Monaco complete with "tourism, the sale of postage stamps ... a duty free zone [and] a centre for international business and banking .... Anything else will guarantee only continued confrontation" (Maracle, 1990: A17).

In the early 16th century, a Spanish theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, argued that occupation of a territory imputes to the occupants a right to that soil, and that there is an implicit right to sovereignty over the territory through that occupation. Scholars seem to agree that the legal rights of indigenous people to sovereignty and self-

government as an inherent right has remained remarkably intact since the 16th century Vitoria opinion (Davies, 1991: 20). In fact, the Canadian Constitution guarantees the "inherent rights" of Native people. In the U.S. it has been argued that the Supreme Court ruling which set the stage for the abrogation of Native rights to the soil (and the sovereignty implicit in that right) was the case of *Johnson v. McIntosh*. At issue in the case was ownership of land that had been granted to Johnson and Graham by the Cherokee in 1773 and 1775. This same land was claimed by McIntosh who held a U.S. patent to it, obtained after a Cherokee land cession (Shattuck & Norgren, 1991: 34). In this landmark case, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that Native people held an inherent right to the soil and that this right could only be extinguished by Federal prerogative. In other words, Native people's rights to the soil could only be transferred to the Federal Government; they could not alienate that right to any individual or to any other entity (Wilkinson, 1987: 39-40).

But Maureen Davies in her article "Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in International Law" argues that the abrogation of Indigenous rights to the soil declared in the *Johnson* decision was based in large part on military conquest, not on the claimed European right to the soil by virtue of discovery. The decision contains this wording: "These claims [to Indian lands] have been maintained and

established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword. . . . The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force." (Prucha, 1975: 36). Such military conquest may be a valid argument when applied to a British claim or to a French claim by the Americans, but it does not seem to be valid in the case of the Cherokee as was ruled (Davies, 1991: 39-40).

Furthermore, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the notion that the Anishnabeg lost their inherent rights to sovereignty to the Canadian and U.S. governments through military defeat is also not a valid one. Recall the speech of the Ojibway chief, Minnehaha: "Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you have not yet conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and mountains, were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with them to none" (qtd. in Henry, 1901: 44). This was the sentiment of the Anishnabeg following the defeat of the French by the English; the sentiment was repeated after the defeat of the British by the Americans. It could be argued that the passage of time has not dampened the spirit of the Anishnabeg as stated by Minnehaha. Indeed, Canadian Native leader Elijah Harper was recently quoted as saying: "We were never a conquered people. . . . We have never agreed to relinquish that right to govern ourselves. . . . many Canadians are ignorant of that history." (qtd. in Byrne, 1994: A3)

Other legal scholars have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831) which contained the oft-quoted description of Indians as "domestic dependent nations" as an argument for the curtailment of their rights could just as easily be re-interpreted to allow a much greater measure of self-determination and self-government for Native people (Fleras & Elliot, 1992: 169).

In Canada, many have argued that the limited re-affirmation of inherent Native rights found in the recent *Sparrow* decision, could be extended to grant individual bands the inherent right to self-government (Smith, 1993: 128). In fact, across Canada sovereignty in the form of self-government agreements has been sought by at least 45 separate bands, including at least 17 from the Lake Huron borderlands (Smith, 1993: 24, 47, 103).

These court decisions form the basis for the "nations within" arguments set out previously when discussing the territory of Nunavut; that is, a relatively autonomous self-governing indigenous governments within a Canadian Federation. The same argument obviously would apply to First Nations within the U.S. context.

There seems to be more sentiment in the Anishnabeg community for the "Nunavut approach" with less discussion of the "San Marino solution" to Native sovereignty. But the above discussion of the Temagami land claim, the continued assertion of Jay Treaty rights, and the Walpole Island brand

of sovereignty does typify the prevailing mood and thinking of the Anishnabeg in their slow —one may even say conservative— push for unity, a national identity, and a measure of sovereignty and self-government. They may be divided by a line on a map, and they may be living in relatively isolated small communities throughout what was once their much more vast homeland, but they were never vanquished, they are not divided, nor are they dispersed.

The history of the Anishnabeg is replete with references to their cultural unity. Edmund Danziger, in his essay "Canada's Urban Indians: The Detroit-Walpole Connection" (1984), states that during the 1900s thousands of Native people moved from the Island to the Detroit area, bolstering the view that the Anishnabeg felt not only comfortable on both sides of the international border but would find a ready social structure to welcome them. In support of arguments for seamless connections between Anishnabeg on both sides of the border, Danziger points to the case of Martin Kiyoshk who was born on Walpole Island, went to school at the Shingwauk boarding school in Sault Ste Marie, Ontario, and lived most of his life in Detroit (Danziger, 1984).

The Potawatomi Canada/U.S. connection is wide-ranging. Everett Claspy, in his book on the Potawatomi Indians of Southwestern Michigan, claims that late into the 20th century these Native people maintained close ties with the

Anishnabeg of Walpole Island (Claspy, 1966: 13). A resolution of the Chicago City Council adopted on July 31, 1990, supports the claim of two to three thousand Potawatomi who fled to Canada after their refusal to sign a Removal treaty in 1833 (Resolution, 1990). It would be hard to explain this resolution in any other manner except through continuing ties between the Potawatomi of Canada and the remnants of the Potawatomi in the Chicago area. Furthermore, relative to this same Potawatomi claim, it has been argued that the Potawatomi may have legal standing to sue the U.S. and Canadian governments under provisions of the International Joint Commission which was established to "settle all questions [involving] the rights, obligations, or interests . . . of the inhabitants of the other [country], along their common border (Baca, 1986: 23). This Potawatomi claim has been active in the courts and in the U.S. Congress since at least 1864 (Johnson, 1989). The persistence of the Potawatomi and the continuing support they receive from their Anishnabeg brethren throughout the region speaks to the unity of these people.

Court cases are not the only place where the interests of the Anishnabeg are dissolving borders. At any pow-wow held in the Great Lakes area, including areas well beyond the Lake Huron borderlands, the Grand Entry always includes veterans carrying the flags of both the United States and Canada.[2] These are not the "standard" flags of these

countries though. Known as "Indian" flags, they show an image of an Native warrior superimposed over the Stars and Stripes and the Maple Leaf.[3] These veterans and these flags are present at all area pow-wows and are a vivid symbol of the commitment of the Anishnabeg to protect and be loyal to their country —but in this case their commitment is to the country of the United Anishnabe of the U.S. and Canada (Gravelle, 1991: 4A).

Showing the growing pan-tribal character of Great Lake area pow-wows, Native people from over 40 different Nations including Sioux, Delaware, Navajo, and Hopi joined their Anishnabe brethren at a pow-wow on Walpole Island in July of 1990 (Dozier, 1990: 8F). In a further display of pan-tribal solidarity, participants at this Walpole Island pow-wow collected money and petition signatures in support of Mohawks then in a standoff with the Canadian military at Oka, Quebec (Dozier, 1990: 8F).

Through these flags, the numerous and ongoing pow-wows, the strong ties of family and clan, the Jay Treaty protests, the return of a strengthened Midéwiwin and Three Fires Society, and the maintenance of their language and culture, the Anishnabeg are emerging as a strong Lake Huron Borderlands sovereign Nation with a profound sense of unity and a persistent cultural sense of being Anishnabe despite many centuries of assault.

NOTES

1. Central government failure to control smuggling along the border by Native people is not a late 20th century phenomena. Records of officials decrying Native "smuggling" on the border can be traced back to at least the 1830s (Chute, 1986: 149).

2. The discussion of pow-pows that follows is based in large part on the personal experiences of this author.

3. A photograph by Alan R. Kamunda (1995) with an "American" Indian flag can be seen on the front page of the *Detroit Free Press*, March 27, 1995, accompanying an article which outlines the economic wealth of the Sault Ste Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. The flag is in the background of a picture of the Sault Tribe chairman, Bernard Bouschor.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Explanation of Treaties and Dates Cited in Tables 4 & 5.

1785-A Jan 21.
Fort MacIntosh - Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa.
Attempt to fix line separating Indian nation from U.S., with cession of some Native land.
(Waanoos)

1789-A Jan. 9.
Fort Harmar - Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Sac.
Confirmation of 1785 Fort MacIntosh treaty with further cession of lands retained by Indians in that treaty.
([C][1] Wetanasa)

1790-C May 19.
Detroit - Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Huron.
Cession of Essex County except Anderon Twp. and part of West Sandwich; Kent County except Zone Tsp. and Gores of Chatham and Camden; Elgin County except Bayham Twp. and parts of South Dorchester and Malahide; in Middlesex County, Delaware and Westminster twps. and part of North Dorchester.
([C] Ouitanissa, Wasson; [P] Penash, Keywaytenan, Shebense)

1795-A Aug. 3.
Greenville - Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Miami, Eel River, Wea, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, Kaskaskia.
Establish peace between the government and the Indians of the western regions; establish a "Indian Territory."
([P] Wacheness, [C] Nanguey, Nemekass)

[1] If denominated within the treaty or reference, the names of signers are preceded by a [C] for Chippewa or Ojibway, [O] for Odawa, and [P] for Potawatomi.

1796-C Sep. 7.
River Thames - Chippewa.
Cession of London Township and part of North Dorchester, Middlesex County; part of North Oxford Township, Oxford County.
(Nangee, Peyshiky, Negig, Macounce, Annamakance, Wittaness, Wasson)

1798-C June 30.
St. Joseph Island - Chippewa
Cession of St. Joseph, Cariboux or Payentanassin Island, between Lakes Huron and Superior.
(Meatoosawkee, Shawanapenisse)

1800-C Sep. 11.
Windsor, Ontario - Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, & Wyandot
Deed of sale; Huron Church Reserve.
(Makitewaquit, Nangy, Wetanis) (see Deed, 1800, in Bibliography)

1805-A July 4.
Fort Industry - Wyandot, Ottawa, Munsee and Delaware, Shawnee, Chippewa, Potawatomi.
Cession to U.S. for a Connecticut land company in northern Ohio.
([O] Nekeik; [C] Macquettoquet (Little Bear))

1807-A Nov. 17.
Detroit - Ottawa, Chippewa, ,Wyandot, Potawatomi.
Treaty adjusts Greenville treaty line separating "Indian territory" for the lands of the U.S.
([C] Sawanabenase, Negig, Macquettequet, Nemekas)

1814-A July 22.
Greenville - Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Seneca, Miami, with mention of Potawatomi, Ottawa, Kickapoo, Eel River, and Wea.
Post War of 1812 peace treaty.
([P] Penosh, Shawanoe [listed as Miami, but Bauman, 1949: 109, claims he was Odawa])

1815-A Sep. 8.
Spring Wells - Wyandot, Delaware, Seneca, Shawnee, Miami, Chippewa, Ottawa, Potawatomi.
Following War of 1812, treaty establishes peace

and affirms the 1795 Greenville Treaty.
([C] Pasheskiskaquashcum, Paanassee)

1817-A Sep. 29.
On the Miami River (Ohio) - Wyandot, Seneca, Delaware, Shawnee, Potawatomi, Ottawa, Chippewa.
Cession of land in northern Ohio.
([C] Shinguax, Pensweguesic, Chemokcomon, Sheganack, Matwaash)

1818-A Oct. 2.
St. Mary's (N. Ohio) - Potawatomi.
Northern Ohio land cession.
(Cheebaas)

1819-A Sep. 24.
Saginaw - Chippewa.
Cession of remaining portion of southeast Michigan.
(Wauweeyatam, Sagunosh, Sigonak, Saugassauway, Kewaytinam, Penaysewaykesek, Kitchmookman, Shingwalk, "Shingwalk, jr" (Augustin), Shawshauwenaubais, Aneuwaybe)

1820-A June 16.
Sault Ste Marie - Chippewa.
Cession of 16 square miles at Sault Ste Marie to Governor Cass for military fort. The Ojibway chief, Shingwauk signed under his French pseudonym.
("Augustin Bart" [Shingwauk])

1820-A1 July 6.
L'Arbre Croche and Michilimackinac - Ottawa and Chippewa.
Cession of St. Martin Islands in the Straits of Mackinac area.
(Shawanoe, Shaganash, Chemogueman)

1822-C July 8.
River Thames - Chippewa.
Cession of 580,000 acres lying on the north side of the River Thames in the London and Western districts of Ontario.
(Sagawsouai, Wawiattin)

1826-A Aug. 5.
Fond du Lac - Chippewa.
The Chippewa recognize the authority and the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and agree to allow the U.S to explore and mine any minerals in their country.
(Peeshickee, Waubogee, Muckuday Peenaas)

1827-C July 10.
Amherstburg - Chippewa.
Cession of 10,280 acres, adjoining Lake Huron and the St. Clair River in the Gore and Home Districts of Ontario.
(Shashawinibisie, Negig, Shawanipinissie, Saganash, Animikince)

1832-A Oct. 27.
Tippecanoe River - Potawatomi.
Cession of Potawatomi lands in Indians, Illinois, and Michigan south of the Grand River.
(Toposh, Penashee, Chebause, Ghebause)

1836-C Aug. 9.
Manitoulin Island - Ottawa, Chippewa.
Agree to set aside Manitoulin Island chain for use of all Indians who wish to reside there.
(Chigenaus, Kitchemokman, Assekinack, Paimausegai, Kimewen, Mosuneko)

1836-A Mar. 28.
Washington - Ottawa and Chippewa.
Cession of the northwest portion of Michigan's lower peninsula and the eastern half of the upper peninsula.
(Keezhigo Benais, Waub Ogeeg, Saganosh, Chingassamo, Kewayzi Shawano [in Sched. 1], Mosaniko, Pamossegay, Gitchy Mocoman, Maidosagee, Kimmewun, Shawunepanasee, Kawgayosh, Mukutay Oquot [from Grand River; in Sched. 1], Mukudaywacquot [from Sault Ste Marie; in Sched. 2], Akosa, Shaniwaygwunabi [Sched. 3])

1839-S
Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll, 1839.
From the Schoolcraft Papers (HRSP).
(Kemewan, Ogemawpenasee)

1842-A Oct. 4.
LaPointe - Chippewa
Cession of the western half of Michigan's upper peninsula and areas of northern Wisconsin.
(Mizi, Penashi)

1845
Walpole Island and Sarnia, Ontario - Chippewa, Potawatomi.
Mentioned in account of Presents distribution on Walpole Island and at Sarnia, Ontario. In 1844 all distribution of presents by Canadian government to "Visiting Indians" ceased. This 1845 list then implies that listed individuals are residents of Canada.
([C] Penasewegeeshig, [P] Toposh) (Richardson, 1924)

1847-A Aug. 2.
Fon du Lac - Chippewa
Cession of land in central Minnesota.
(Mezye, Keneshteno)

1850-C Sep. 7 & 9.
Sault Ste Marie, Ontario - Ojibway.
The "Robinson Treaties": two treaties that ceded the north shore of Lake Superior from the U.S./Canada border at Minnesota to Lake Huron and the Georgian Bay to Penetanguishene to the height of land which separates Ontario from the lands of the Hudson's Bay Company. (The names listed are all from the Lake Huron portion of the treaty).
(Panaissy, Oshawano, Tagawinini, Nebenaigoching, Shinguakouce, Assikinock [listed as interpreter])

1850-V September 7.
Sault Ste Marie, Ontario - Ojibway
As part of the Robinson Treaty negotiations, payments were made the affected Native people, whose names (and amounts paid) were entered on vouchers. Voucher #2 lists native people from Sault Ste Marie affected by the Robinson-Huron Treaty (Voucher, 1850).
Anewaba, Kagegabe, Aquasa, Shawunegonabe, Matawaash.

1854-A Sep. 30.
La Pointe - Chippewa
Cession of land in the far northeast of Minnesota.

(Mawcawdaypenayse, Wawbowjieg, Kenishteno)

1855-A July 31.
Detroit - Ottawa and Chippewa.
This treaty eliminated the threat of removal from the remaining Ottawa and Chippewa people of Michigan and granted them allotments of land within those areas they already held by virtue of the 1836 treaty. The treaty also contained a clause that expressly included the members of the Garden River band, ie, Canadian residents who may have been signatories to the 1836 treaty.
(Oshawano, Tegose, Piawbedawsung, Nawogezhick, Kawgagawbwa, Waubojieg [also listed as Waubojick])

1855-A1 (June 27, 1856)
Sault Ste Marie - Chippewa.
Local ratification of the 1855 Treaty of Detroit.
(Wawbojick, Nawwegezhick, Piawbedawsung, Tegose)

1855-A2 Aug. 2.
Detroit - Chippewa.
This treaty cedes to the U.S. the right of fishing and the encampment granted the Chippewa in the 1820 treaty. (See text for further discussion of this treaty).
(Shashawaynaybeece, Nawwegezhick, Oshawwawno, Wawbojieg)

1859-C June 10.
Garden River - Ojibway.
Cession of Laird, Macdonald, and Meredith Twps. and land on Echo Lake and Garden River; also Squirrel Island in Lake George.
(Shingwahcooce, Nahwegezhig, Ogemahbenaissee, Ogista)

1859-C1 July 29.
Gros Cap (near the Sault) - Batchewana and Goulais bands.
Cession of reserves set aside in 1850 Robinson treaty with the exception of Whitefish Island in the Rapids which is used as a fishing station.
(Waubooge)

1859-C2 June 11.
Bruce Mines - Ojibway
Cession of land at Thessalon and agreement to move to Garden River.

(Penashe, Nahwegezhig, Ogemahbenaissee)

1862-C Oct. 6.
Manitoulin Island - Ottawa, Chippewa, and other occupants.
Cession of Manitoulin Island except for certain reserves; also Barrie and Cockburn Islands.
(Assiginack (not as interpreter), Keghikgodoness)

1867-C July 9.
Garden River - Ojibway.
Cession of a block of land on Peltier River, near Garden River, for grist mill.
(Augustin, Naway Kesick, Tagoush)

1873-C May 20.
Garden River - Ojibway.
Cession of land for erection of church.
(Augustin, Tegouche)

Unless otherwise referenced, all U.S. treaty data is taken from Kappler, 1972; all Canadian treaty data from Canada, 1973.

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MG, Manuscript Group (NAC).
MPHC, *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*.
NAC, National Archives of Canada (Ottawa).
RG, Record Group (NAC).
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