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**EXPLANATIONS AND PREDICTIONS OF POLITICAL SUCCESS
OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SINCE 1945**

By

Meeyoung Ju

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

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real power in decision-making. Mostly, they were the presidents, the prime ministers, and the general secretaries over 137 countries from 1945 to 1991 including leaders who were in office in 1991. A two-equation model, which is composed of a probit selection equation as well as an ordered probit substantive equation, is used to estimate its parameters. The results suggest that the model has not only explanatory but also predictive value.

In comparison of the reduced models (i.e., social background model, career background model, and institutional attributes model), the results reveal that the career background model best explains political survival. However, the institutional attributes model accounts for the strength of survival. Nonetheless, the overall goodness-of-fit of the interaction model is better than others. And, the regional models contribute different explanations to political survival. Finally, the descriptive analysis of personal backgrounds shows the similarities and differences of leaders using the variables that can not be included in the empirical models because of high percentages of missing data.

**To my mother and late father,
With Love and Gratitude**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I Review of the Literature on Political Leadership	8
Classical Views on Political Leadership	8
Empirical Views on Political Leadership	10
A. Great Man Theory	13
B. Social Background Theory	15
C. Trait and Personality Theory	17
D. Situation Theory	20
E. Interaction Theory	23
CHAPTER II Theoretical Perspectives of Political Success	29
A. The Concept of Political Success	33
B. The Concept of Head of Government	39
C. Theoretical Model	45
CHAPTER III Theoretical Propositions	52
A. Do Social Backgrounds of Leaders Really Matter for Their Political Survival?	56
B. Do Career Backgrounds of Leaders Have Influence on Their Political Survival?	58
C. How Do the Institutional Attributes Influence Political Survival?	63
CHAPTER IV Operationalization and Methodology	76
A. Data Collection and Operationalization	76
Data Collection	77
Operationalization	82
B. Methodology	85
Statistical Analysis	85
Descriptive Analysis	96
CHAPTER V Presentation and Discussion of Results	99
A. Statistical Analyses of the Two-Equation Model	101
Analysis of Social Backgrounds	101

Analysis of Career Backgrounds	104
Analysis of Institutional Attributes	107
Analysis of Interaction Model	114
B. Analysis of Regional Models	123
CHAPTER VI Descriptive Analysis of Personal Backgrounds	133
A. Comparisons by Region	135
B. Comparisons by Duration	145
C. Comparisons by Type of Head of Government	154
D. Comparisons by Number of Entry	159
CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION	163
APPENDICES	178
APPENDIX A. Data Sources and Data Codebook	180
APPENDIX B. Hazard Rate (Life Tables)	188
APPENDIX C. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation	189
LIST OF REFERENCES	190

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Dummy Variables	90
Table 2	Coefficient Estimates for Social Background Variables	103
Table 3	Coefficient Estimates for Career Background Variables	106
Table 4	Coefficient Estimates for Institutional Attributes	109
Table 5	Success of Prediction in Political Survival	113
Table 6	Coefficient Estimates for Interaction Model	116
Table 7	Success of Prediction in Interaction Model	120
Table 8	Goodness-of-Fit of Selection Equations	122
Table 9	Significant Variables in Regional Models	124
Table 10	Goodness-of-Fit of Regional Models	130
Table 11	Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Region	136
Table 12	Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Duration	146
Table 13	Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Type of Head of Government and Number of Entry	156
Table 14	Ordinary Least Squares Estimation	189

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Political Success	51
Figure 2	Distribution of Duration (Percentage)	78
Figure 3	Cases Excluded from the Sample	78
Figure 4	Age Groups by Region	137
Figure 5	Educational Level by Region	137
Figure 6	Majors by Region	140
Figure 7	Foreign, Military, Prison/Exile, and Pol. Activity Experiences by Region	140
Figure 8	Political Experiences by Region	142
Figure 9	Political Skills by Region	142
Figure 10	Age Groups by Duration	147
Figure 11	Entry Mode by Duration	147
Figure 12	Foreign, Military, Prison/Exile, and Pol. Activity Experiences by Duration	149
Figure 13	Political Experiences by Duration	149
Figure 14	Political Skills by Duration	151
Figure 15	Party System by Duration	151
Figure 16	Age Groups by Type of Head of Government	155
Figure 17	Political Skills by Type of Head of Government	157

Figure 18	Foreign, Military, Prison/Exile, and Pol. Activity Experiences by Number of Entry	159
Figure 19	Political Experiences by Number of Entry	160
Figure 20	Personality by Number of Entry	160
Figure 21	Hazard Rate of Total Sample (N=984)	188
Figure 22	Hazard Rate of Censored Sample (N=882)	188

INTRODUCTION

Research on political leadership has drawn upon psychological, sociocultural, historical, politicoeconomic, and philosophical concerns. Even though it has been discussed with interrelated conceptual themes (i.e., leaders, heroes, elites, exercise of influence, power, authority and control, legitimacy, etc.) and with a multidisciplinary perspective, leadership has eluded any easy and simple theoretical explanations. Assessing and measuring political leadership is very complex and difficult since almost any propositions concerning it present a series of contradictions, tensions, and antinomies. An enormous variety of new conceptual definitions, contending theories, and incongruent standards of measurement appears to have complicated rather than simplified the comparative analysis of political leadership (Edinger, 1975). Whether the study of political leadership is productive depends on the definition of political leadership and the models which the investigators choose to employ.

Political leadership is a timeless and universal phenomenon, and all societies at all times have their leaders. Political leaders come in many forms, with many styles and diverse qualities, and at different times. There are some quiet leaders and some famous or notorious leaders one can hear about even in neighboring countries. Some find their strength in eloquence, some in judgment, and some in courage. Leaders seem to be good or bad, heroes or villains; but leaders seem also to be more or less

successful, more or less effective (Blondel, 1980, p.277).

When we say 'here is an effective leader, a wise statesman, a just ruler', or, on the other hand, call a leader a tyrant, an opportunist, or a fraud, we make comparisons between what we see in a leader and what we expect of one (Edinger, 1976). Definitely, there is a need for a systematic and empirical analysis of the achievements of leaders. For example, we can find an analysis that so far has only been in a partial manner about some revolutionary leaders (Rajai and Phillips, 1979 & 1983).

When we evaluate the fitness of candidates for certain positions, judge the performance of political leaders, or compare our political leaders with those who aspire to displace them or rule other people, we usually compare and generalize the characteristics or the issues that they hold and the situation in which they are found. It will be worth comparing present political leaders against the leaders of bygone days, between different countries at different time periods, and generalizing about the features that make them successful or unsuccessful. Although psychological aspects of political success are difficult to analyze and are just beginning to be examined systematically in the context of individual leaders, it is possible to find the broader social backgrounds and career profiles of political leaders, political and social environments, as well as the characteristics of the rise or fall of leaders that have been easily documented.

In a simple and highly abstract model, a set of factors determines an outcome in terms of winning-losing or success-failure. Questions of leader's success and failure are both empirically and normatively important; yet scholarly writing in that area suffers from a lack of clear criteria (Sinclair, 1993). Political leadership of society, whether democratic, autocratic, or monarchic, at least initially derives its power and authority

from the support or acquiescence of one or more dominant segments of society. If political success is related to the concept of 'power', we can say 'tenure is power'. Some political leaders are more successful than others, while some are not successful at all. Typologizing leaders on the theoretically important dimensions of social backgrounds, career backgrounds, personality, and environmental differences, would permit explanation and prediction of leaders' performance in office on the basis of their durations of office.

Assuredly, the best leaders - perhaps the only good ones - are those who view their task as that of a moment, although perhaps a major moment, in their country's history (Blondel, 1987, p.47). However, in this dissertation, the main focus is not on whether a leader is good or bad, but on what makes him successful or unsuccessful based on his duration in office. Although there have been several arguments for explaining political success in different ways, political success based on a leader's performance might be indicated by how long the leaders stay in offices as a head of the government.

In this study, political success is viewed as political survival. The longer political leaders stay in their offices, the more successful they are, regardless of whether they exit peacefully and constitutionally or forcedly and nonconstitutionally. Some leaders with a long duration of office got out of their offices in such constitutional ways as retirement, resignation, defeat in election, or natural death.¹ At the same time, some

¹ The examples of natural death are Enver Hoxha in Albania (41 yrs), Mao Tse-Tung in China (27 yrs), Sekou Toure in Guinea (24 yrs), Seretse Khama in Botswana (13 yrs), Gamel Nasser in Egypt (15 yrs), Forbes Burnham in Guyana (14 yrs), Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya (14 yrs), Jawaharlal Nehru in India (16 yrs), Francisco Franco y Bustelo in Spain (34 yrs), Sékou Toure in Guinea (24 yrs), Chang Kai-sek in Taiwan (25 yrs) Eric Williams in Trinidad and Tobago (19 yrs), etc. And, the examples of other

leaders who stayed in office for a long period of time were deposed by coup d'etat, assassinated, or expelled by force.² In the latter case, can we consider them successful leaders? How about the leaders with a short stay and a peaceful exit? Nonetheless, considering that 'duration of office' is an element of personal position and that 'disposal of leader' is an indicator of the strength of personal position, the subject of political survival is more related to the duration of office as a general concept.

Even though it is possible to expand on several questions, this study will focus on why some leaders stay in office longer than others. Measuring success or failure is not easy; however, it is possible to see whether a leader stayed long enough to achieve satisfaction as an office holder. Whether or not a leader advances his goals is a solid initial basis for gauging degree of success or failure. In order to accomplish what he sets out to achieve, he needs to maintain his office as long as possible. The polity is managed for survival of the leadership rather than for equitable development of the polity. To hold an office longer as a top executive, political stability should be guaranteed. Even though durability is an elusive concept since relatively frequent changes of chief executive may conceal a good deal of continuity in the parties and

peaceful exit after long duration of office are Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria (36 yrs), Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland (14 yrs), Robert Menzies in Australia (16 yrs), Mathieu Kerekou in Benin (19 yrs), Ne win in Burma (19 yrs), Konrad Adenauer in West Germany (14 yrs), Tage Erlander in Sweden (23 yrs), Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Chile (15 yrs), Mathieu Kerekou in Benin (19 yrs), Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon (22 yrs), Yumjagiyn Tsendenbal in Mogolia (32 yrs), Anker Jørgensen in Denmark (17 yrs), Urho Kekkonen in Finland (16 yrs), Walter Ulbricht (21 yrs) and Erich Honecker (18 yrs) in East Germany, etc.

² The examples of forceful exit are Janos Kadar in Hungary (33 yrs), Ahmed Sukarno in Indonesia (16 yrs), Norodom Sihanouk in Kampuchea (16 yrs), Moktar Ould Daddah in Mauritania (17 yrs), Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (35 yrs), Ferninad Marcos in Philippines (20 yrs), Jaaffar el-Nemery in Sudan (16 yrs), Leabua Jonathan in Lethoso (19 yrs), Moussa Traoré in Mali (23 yrs), Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania (26 yrs), Siyad Barreh in Somalia (22 yrs), etc. Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua (19 yrs), Park Junghee in South Korea (17 yrs), Ngarta Tombala in Chad (14 yrs), Anwar el-Sadat in Egypt (11 yrs), etc. were assassinated.

personnel in power, durability of political leaders can be an indicator of political stability.

Even if we can not study political leadership and political leaders in a full sense of the word, we can limit the scope to the people in certain positions and analyze them. The sample for this dissertation will be the heads of national governments from the end of World War II to the end of 1991. While official titles differ from country to country, a head of government may be defined as a person who really has been or is in power in each country. Top executives are almost always interested in maintaining offices and the power of the purse has long been crucial in their search for security. The security of top executives is generally proportional to the length of time they hold office; newly elected leaders are the most insecure.

From 1945 to 1991, more than 1,000 individuals have been at the top at their countries. Of course, many others sought but did not achieve such a post. Some stayed in office for longer periods than others and held a position more than once. This study will include relatively large numbers of comparable cases (997 cases) which lend themselves not only to making qualitative statements but also to quantitative statements, statistical analyses, and empirical generalizations. Thus, finding a good method of classifying qualitative data for this study is very important. Modeling with the variables that imply certain characteristics, i.e., duration data, high percentage of missing data, and several dummies, should be done with care.

This dissertation will focus on the comparative analysis of political leadership across countries, combining the basic themes and questions that delineate different aspects of political success or survival. There have been a range of philosophical

opinions on political success examined by philosophers qua philosophers, over time, and in the West vs. the East. Philosophers mainly deal with depicting the nature of an ideal leader. Some philosophers focus on the nature of human beings from which the concept of political leadership derived. These fundamental philosophical perspectives on the idea of political leadership would provide the requisite attributes that an ideal leader should have.

However, I will review more recent literature on political leadership success based on more theoretical or empirical speculation. It will explicate the images that we really see in a leader. Most of the prevailing studies of political leadership are analyzed in a descriptive way. Through descriptive analyses, it is possible to identify several important factors that make leaders different or similar by comparison. Basically, examining those factors - such as social background, career background, personality and skills, and contexts - will allow us to do predictive and causal analyses on political success or survival.

The main purpose of this study, however, is to determine whether the subject of political leadership survival as indicated by political success can be studied in empirical and comparative ways. Furthermore, introducing a quantitative method with qualitative data will test how personal qualities, that is, individual differences on social and career backgrounds, and institutional differences are related to political success or survival.

Thus, this study will put emphases on models that will test: (1) What are important factors that determine political success?; (2) Do social background factors influence political success?; (3) Does political success depend on career background variables?; (4) Do situational or institutional factors have effects on political success?;

(5) What subset of factors among the above can best explain political success?; (6) If a leader is successful, what makes him or her more successful or less successful than others?; (7) Do qualities of political leaders change across the different regions or with the systematic differences in politics?; and, (8) Can we expect some individuals with some qualities would be successful political leaders in the future?

CHAPTER I

Review of the Literature on Political Leadership

In this part, I will review more recently-explored literature that focuses on theoretical or empirical aspects of political leadership instead of any specific deep philosophical reviews. Although the principles of proper political leadership are based on generalized assumptions about the nature of man, society, sovereignty, and authority emphasized by several political philosophers, those normative views focus on a question of 'who should govern'. In order to look at 'who in fact did rule', it is more appropriate to focus on empirical views that discern those characteristics of politicians that would suggest explanations and predictions of their effectiveness or success.

Classical Views on Political Leadership

Political philosophers used to be interested in ethics: What makes good leadership - for the led as well as for the leader himself? They outlined what some would label an ideal of leadership, although it is presented as a model to be emulated by ordinary people functioning in the routine circumstances of daily life. Western philosophers have never been silent on the question of leadership. From Plato's philosopher-king to Machiavelli's prince, from Hobbes' sovereignty to Nietzsche's Übermensch, philosophy has said its piece on the nature of the ideal leader (Grob, 1984, p.263).

Especially, in '*The Prince*' and '*The Discourses*', Machiavelli devotes the core of his analysis to the study of the way in which rulers should behave. His analysis is

devoted to the elaboration of technical and tactical moves designed to ensure the success of rulers and their maintenance or expansion in office. The substantial purpose of leadership is subordinated to the problems of the stability of ruler in office since, to be certain, stability is an overriding goal in politics.

Montesquieu had more interest in government that is sensitive to sociological and ecological differences of every country. Those ecological conditioning factors provided certain settings that condition political systems to be constituted properly. To him, whether it is a natural property of small states to be governed as republics, of middle ones to be governed by monarchs, or of large empires to be ruled by despots, it follows that in order to preserve the principles of any established government it is necessary to maintain the existing size of the state; and that the nature of the state will change to the extent that the state constructs or extends its limits (Corrinthers, 1977). Also, Saint-Simon emphasizes the men who are most fitted to manage the affairs of the nation and possess the most eminent, varied, and most positively useful ability for managing national interests and maintaining public order.

Later, Max Weber contributed many things to the study of political leadership, introducing three types of legitimate rule or authority. He tended to regard nonlegitimate 'power authorities' as unstable and short-lived. He was not much concerned with the specific ways in which leaders achieve power, how long they are in office or how they exit. Only to the extent that duration and exit mode may affect the legitimacy of the whole system are these problems examined especially in the context of charismatic authority.

Eastern philosophers also have been interested in political leadership. Not only

the Confucian philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius but also the Taoist, Lao Tze, proclaimed that government officials should be responsible for establishing virtue throughout the realm. Confucianism urges rule through the 'power of virtue' and moral suasion, whereas the Taoist image of leadership indicates nonleadership such that 'the greatest conqueror wins without joining issue' (Lao Tze, 1961). The idea of 'superior-man' is based on the harmony of a perfect individual and a well-ordered society to bring peace to the people.

While the Confucian tradition of rule has been regarded as the rule by men, not by law, the legalist image of leadership by the manipulation of rewards and punishments was introduced by Han Fei Tzu. Recently, Mao's political moralism (pragmatism) was rooted in ancient Chinese tradition and he, in fact, was not the first political thinker to view the moral reform of citizens as the province of political leadership. On the basis of his virtuocratic and meritocratic values, the military arts were not highly valued. Soldiers often stepped in to impose their will on a disorderly or corrupt political scene, but no cult of the warrior ever emerged to supplant the civilian values of Confucianism.

Empirical Views on Political Leadership

Modern developments - to the detriment of ethical and philosophical considerations - such as various theories, research methods, and psychological implications have had the effect of emphasizing the quasi-scientific aspect of political leadership (Hodgkinson, 1983). The focus of interests in political leadership has been shifted from theory to research. Over the past decades, political leadership or political

elites have been considered as an important issue in the area of political science. As Plato's *The Republic* or *Gorgias*, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and even Confucius' *The Analects* mainly deal with what is an ideal leadership, these recorded classics could provide some theoretical explanations.

However, we need some empirical research on action-relevant understanding, theoretical elaboration, comparison, experimentation and prediction. Even though we can set up an image of ideal political leadership, it is impossible to have those ideal leaders. We just select somebody as a likely potential winner, or preferable to others as our leaders. Nonetheless, it is not certain that leaders with ideal qualities would survive long in a very changing situation.

Research on how political figures are perceived by the public has proceeded in several aspects; citizens judge leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, by the party they represent or with which they are affiliated (Campbell, et al., 1960). The public conceptions of political leaders are associated with such diverse elements as leaders announcing positions or policies they promote or oppose (Weisberg and Rusk, 1970; Markus and Converse, 1979) or the consequences of such policies (Hibbs, et al., 1982). Also, some researchers put emphases on personal qualities such as honesty, intelligence, and integrity; or competence of the leaders such as past political experience as important characters in leader and candidate experience.

More recent leadership theory tends to be regarded as a subdivision of psychology or sociology rather than of philosophy. Burns (1979) summarized such a trend as follows:

Historians and biographers focus on the unique person with more or less idiosyncratic qualities and traits confronting particular sets of problems and situations over time. In a meanwhile, psychologists scrutinize generic factors, early intrafamily relationships widening arcs of personal interaction, changing constellations of attitudes and motivations, whereas sociologists view the developing personality as it moves through a series of social contexts - family, school, neighborhood, workplace. Political Scientists emphasize the social and political institutions impinging on developing leaders, changes in political leaders as they learn from their experience, the eventual impact of leadership on policy and on history (p.26).

The sequence of explanatory research, for instance, has been from maxims or rules of thumb through trait theory, to factor analytic trait theory (yielding the classical two dimensions of task orientation and person orientation), to situational qualifications, to interactive considerations (task plus leader, followers plus interactions), to the latter-day refined maxims of path-goal analysis, and to the current complexities of dynamic models (Rustow, 1967; Hodgkinson, 1983). Also, political scientists have proceeded far beyond Lasswell's generalizations and typologies in exploring the psychological dimensions of their subject (Rustow, 1966, p.687). A number of biographies combined political and psychological analysis with careful attention to the canons of historical evidence (Neustadt, 1960; Edinger, 1965).

Even though specific studies of political success have not been done by many scholars, there has been quite a few works closely related to this theme. If a complete answer to the question about what makes successful leadership is beyond the scope of most studies, a partial response may nevertheless be assayed. They are basically divided into two broad categories that focus on individual political leaders and institutional processes and outcomes. The first category is primarily based on individual

qualities such as social backgrounds and career backgrounds. The second deals with the analyses of the performance of political leaders in the aspect of political stability and political development.

A. Great-Man Theory

For a modern analysis of individual leaders, a parent of our modern approach to political leadership is the great-man theory discussed by Thomas Carlyle (1775-1881). According to him, the history of the world is the Biography of Great Men. As German historians saw in the human past the ever-changing manifestations of timeless national genius, Carlyle's hero worship was influenced by them. As one of the conservative theorists, Carlyle (1966) viewed democracy as the everlasting privilege of the foolish to be governed by the wise and to be guided in the right path by those who know better than they do.

His great-man resembles Plato's philosopher-king in some respects as the belief that political rule should be exercised by the man of exceptional wisdom and ability. However, a heroic leader is an indispensable agent of historical evolution and progress; his distinctive quality is the capacity for bold and audacious action based upon an initiative, rather than a philosophical grasp of historical reality. Meanwhile, his idea is close to the spirit and tradition of Machiavelli in the sense that the hero must be immersed in the equivocation and compromise of actual life. Consequently, he provides a needed emphasis on the role and importance of superior individuals in politics. He says sincerity - a deep, great, and genuine sincerity - is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic.

Most philosophical reviews on political leadership have focused on the theme similar to the great-man theory. However, the 'great-man theory' can not be easily proved in an empirical way. As an example, if Socrates' maxim "know thyself" is fundamental to leadership, the most important characteristic of leaders is that they must understand themselves before they can work on others. It seems to be a test for self-realization in leaders themselves. Whereas the 'great-man theory' asserts that leaders are born and not made, most empirical studies emphasize that leadership is almost accidental, or at least that most leaders emerge from circumstances which normally do not create them. The construction of leadership would span time, cultures, and circumstances.

'Great men' do make history, and the cause of real intended social change can be tracked back to the purposes and decisions of the most visible actors on the political stage. Carlyle's heroes, Nietzsche's great blond beast, Hegel's evoker and carrier of the spirit of the times³, and Sidney Hook's event-making man⁴ are the good examples for this theory. Basically, leadership is viewed typically in terms of the great man who shapes for a long period the destinies of mankind.

The great-man theory has influenced some scholars (Morgenthau and Hein, 1983) in the field of political leadership. The question, 'what is greatness in any man

³ Hegel (1952, p.295) asserted: " The great man of the age is one who can put into words the will of his age, and tell its age what its will is, and accomplish it. What he does is the heart and essence of his age; he actualizes his age."

⁴ Hook (1986)'s theory on political leadership is similar to Carlyle's great-man theory. However, Hook named it 'the event-making man' in history. 'The event-making man' is an eventful man whose actions are consequences of outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character rather than of accidents of position. In a meanwhile, the eventful man in history is any man whose actions influenced subsequent developments along a quite different course than would have been followed if these actions had not been taken.

and more particularly what is greatness in a statesman?' is one of their inquiries. The great man is the one who at least approaches perfection in certain qualities of mind, character, and action that illuminate the very nature of man. Those who become leaders do so by virtue of their possession in superior degree of certain personal traits - such as stamina, decisiveness, composure - which make it their fate to reach positions of leadership in their organizations or societies (Tucker, 1977). According to this theory, the characteristics of social backgrounds and attitudes might be introduced and explained as good criteria for the great-man.

B. Social Background Theory

The major reason for focusing on the social antecedents of leaders is an implicit assumption that if we know who they are, and were, and how they came to be leaders, then we already have a reliable guide to what they believe and do. According to the researchers on this theory, social origins are important, justifying their focus on arguing that social background is a useful indicator of the characteristics of a political leader (Crewe, 1974). Also, background data on the social and career characteristics of political leaders provide no infallible guide to either their attitudinal patterns or policy preferences. Biographical analysis of these characteristics can reveal much information about the nature of the political system since hypotheses concerning the functional relationship between the requirement of the political system and the social and career attributes of the political leaders (Waller, 1976, p.155).

To see what kind of man becomes a political leader, it is necessary to examine the existing theories and hypotheses concerning the social backgrounds of political

leaders. Social background theory is based on the question: Does the political leader's socio-economic status and previous life experience make any difference in the type of head of government, leadership characteristics (e.g., charisma or non-charisma), and the type of recruitment mechanism? In turn, the following questions are generated: (1) How can the study of social backgrounds and career patterns of political leaders contribute to an understanding of why recruitment arrangements function as they do?; (2) From what social positions are political leaders recruited?; (3) What are the interrelationships between their characteristics and political change or revolution?; (4) What are the effects of the characteristics of political leaders on the conduct of government?

In fact, who becomes a political leader is not just decided by elections, primaries, and voting but, rather, is also the result of a continual sifting and sorting of the citizens who enter the quest for political power. Careful research and imaginative theorizing about trends in the social backgrounds of political leaders may supply some new insight into the phenomena of social and political change. In other words, changes of the trends in their social backgrounds may be an indication of overall social, economic, and political change.

The historians, biographers, and journalists who have gathered most of the data on social backgrounds of political leaders have overlooked the universal for the unique, the general for the specific. However, what is needed to obtain a new understanding of political leaders is an approach that emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences between them. As Rustow (1967, p.684) mentioned, political writers sought to catalogue in their 'mirrors for princes' the virtues of the ideal ruler and the principles

that must guide his conduct. These ideas are less normative and more empirical than those of earlier theorists and are, in turn, the basis for more recent research in this general tradition.

Even though some researchers reject social background analyses, others (Rustow, 1966; Edinger and Searing, 1967; Farrell, 1970; Beck et al., 1973; Camp, 1979, 1980) are interested in a social background approach. Despite the masses of accumulated data and radical changes in the way in which data are collected and presented, one finds rather few general relationships between social facts and political behavior emerging from these studies.

Rustow (1966) agreed that the study of the ruler's social background is only a supplement, not a substitute, for the study of their performance in office - and of the effect of that performance on the recruitment of future rulers. Beck et al. (1973) and Farrell (1970) examined personal backgrounds and educational or career characteristics of the individual leaders in communist countries. Especially, Lane (1988), recently, analyzed the 'circular flow of power' in USSR based on social backgrounds. Camp (1979) tried to compare women political leaders with male political leaders using similar background data on recruitment and career patterns.

C. Trait and Personality Theory

Over the years, a group of social psychologists has tried to ascertain by experimental methods what are the individual traits of character associated with leadership (Truman, 1951; Gibbs, 1954; Erickson, 1958; Verba, 1961). Harold Lasswell was the first political scientist to introduce psychological explanations to political

science. He attempted to show that there are natural leaders especially equipped by personality or skill to perform important political roles. Political leaders are characterized by the possession of special personalities and skills, and an individual becomes a political leader at least in part because of certain personal qualities or traits. The same skills and traits are required to be a leader in all situations and circumstances. Burns (1977) backs up Lasswell's view explaining political leadership with more specific psychological factors, such as wants, needs, aspirations and expectations. According to Dahl (1969), political skill is generally thought to be of critical importance in explaining the power of different leaders. However, despite many attempts at analysis, from Machiavelli to the present day, political skill has remained among the more elusive aspects of power.

The trait or personality theory asserts that a prominent political figure is analyzed in order to discover the significance of his main political role in the context of his whole personality system (Lasswell, 1965; Barber, 1965; George, 1968; Greenstein, 1985). Erickson (1964) claims that the success of leaders depends on a match between their own personal characteristics and historically conditioned characteristics of their political followers. In a word, for this study, there are several personality and skills factors that may account for the personal greatness of political leaders.

Foti et al. (1982) assert that different leadership labels imply different characteristics. Mainly based on perceptual theory (i.e., social information processing), prototypical ratings generated through several items explain which of a series of trait and behavioral descriptions of national political leaders would covary with

their effectiveness. Suedfeld and Rank (1976) showed that the political fate of revolutionary leaders, that is, success or failure, was decided by the skill in adapting to the information-processing demands of the environment. For an example, long-term success for a leader would be associated with low conceptual complexity (single-minded) during the revolutionary phase, followed by a change to high complexity (graduated, flexible, and integrated) during the poststruggle phase.

Leadership is a traitlike quality possessed by certain individuals, arguing instead that leadership is an attribution made by perceivers that explains outcomes or characteristics associated with actors (Merriam, 1967; Calder, 1977; Lord & Rush, 1980; Pfeffer, 1977; Foti, Fraser and Lord, 1982). Some have advanced and developed the concept of a particular political personality or character type in pursuit of power over other values (Lasswell, 1948; Lane, 1961; Seligman, 1950). Political leadership focuses on what Easton (1953) has called the authoritative allocation of values in a community and involves both the attempt to exercise and the actual exercise of power to make policy-choices between alternative courses of action affecting this allocation of values.

Especially in case of the revolutionaries, most researchers emphasize psychological explanations. Lasswell's paradigm for power-seeking explains a contemporary mechanism for feelings of inadequacy and low self-esteem, a private need that is located on public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest. Burns (1979) focuses on the analysis of the interrelationships of persons on the basis only of power. Based on this theory, most research deals with political styles according to which the leaders are categorized.

Although both the Freudian perspectives, which emphasize a leader as a father figure, and the idea of the leader as a person who voices the ideological concerns of his followers, are persuasive, there is relatively little social psychological research that bears on either hypothesis. Childhood development, socialization, and ego psychology are the related areas with trait theory. 'Power seeker' is a person who pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation. Once in power, every leader wants to stay in office as long as possible, attempting recasting political institutions, reinterpreting and expanding the functions of existing political roles or creating new ones which fit their needs, political styles and aspirations (George, 1968).

Most people intuitively expect leaders to have some personality traits or attributes which set them apart. However, 'trait theory' or 'personality theory' could be attacked for several reasons. According to Greenstein (1986, p.36), personality characteristics are less important than their social characteristics in influencing behavior, and individuals with varying personal characteristics will tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations.

D. Situation Theory

The political struggle for power follows the same rules in all parts of the world. Human desire to get power can be assumed to be ubiquitous, but it depends on changeable environmental conditions that individuals and groups are capable of getting power and using political institutions for their advantage. Several researchers have contributed possibilities to produce a variety of propositions about the ways executives' success related to government stability and policy leanings (Ames, 1987). Most

empirically-based studies of political development include a thesis that political stability is associated with political development.

According to the situational approaches, leadership is highly situational and contextual, and thus a leader is legitimated and gives direction to certain cultural values. It applies to other topics related to political success, i.e., government stability, regime legitimacy, modernization, or political development, cabinet durability or executive durability (Seligman, 1956; Lipset, 1960, 1963 and 1981; Hurwitz, 1973; Schumpeter, 1975; Siedman, 1978; Powell, 1982; Dodd, 1984; Lijphart, 1984, 1992; Panebianco, 1988; Mainwaring, 1992). Powell (1982) analyzed political performance as an indicator of political success based on three dimensions: citizen electoral participation, government stability, and political order. The performance of all political systems is evaluated by durability, civil order, legitimacy and decision efficiency (Eckstein, 1965).

The legitimization-crisis paradigm explains that crisis stems from the state's failure to match its capacity to respond with the level of citizen's demand and that citizens lose their political confidence in governmental leaders, particularly, top executives. The greater capacity of government in the more modernized societies would enhance executive stability and effectiveness (Almond and Powell, 1978). Variations in the exercise of leadership are associated with such contextual factors as domestic socioeconomic conditions, organizational structures, and cultural patterns, or with differences between routine and crisis situations, stable and unstable national or international conditions (Edinger, 1990).

Gurr (1974) insists that the durability (persistence and adaptability) of political systems depends upon the nature of their structures of political authority such as

typological traits, institutionalization, and internal coherence of authority structure. Persistence means how long the system exists and adaptability refers to how well the system responds to the need for changes. As a result, persistence is defined as longevity and this durability as a simple property represents whether a polity is stable. Since failures of the system are the fault of incumbent power holders the situation can be greatly improved by changing the incumbent authorities. The cure for a government and an economy that are performing poorly is a change of leadership - brought about by the democratic process (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p.390).

It seems relevant to consider some important situational factors which determine whether a person is chosen for a leadership position. Considering situational factors, several recruitment studies have discussed career patterns, opportunity structure, and social learning (Seligman, 1964a, 1964b, 1971, 1974; Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt, 1970; Wriggins, 1969; Stogdill, 1974, 1981). The behavior of political leaders will vary considerably from situation to situation. According to Fiedler (1971),

We can now see quite readily why leadership trait will not predict leadership effectiveness. If any one can be an effective leader in some situations and not in others, it is obvious that a single leadership trait or a combination of traits will not enable prediction in all situations. Such a trait or combination of traits may well predict performance in certain situations that can be specified, and this is what the contingencies model [that Fiedler presents] shows (p.15).

After examining and comparing the relationship between personality and situational explanations of political behavior, between personality and role explanations of political behavior, and between personality and cultural explanations of political behavior, he concluded that individuals' social characteristics rather than their personality

characteristics determine their political behavior.

Even though Huntington (1975, p.251) praised Ayub Khan of Pakistan for coming close "to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or Great Legislator on the Platonic or Rousseauian Model," Ayub failed to develop legitimate political institutions and to ensure meaningful participation by the people in the political process. The result was a mass upheaval which led to the disruption of the country - political decay. In developing or underdeveloped states, individual leaders tend to be far more legitimate than either existing political institutions or the institutions they may choose to fashion. However, in an ideal sense, legitimacy should reside not only in individual leaders but also in the political institutions of the state. It is much the case in the economically developed states that dominate the development indicators.

E. Interaction Theory

Recently, leadership has been based on the idea of a capable person being in the right place at the right time. It emphasizes not only individual differences but also different situational aspects. When political leadership is defined as a pattern, it becomes apparent that it is "both a function of social situation and a function of personality, as well as a function of these two in interaction (Gibbs, 1947). It shows that the qualities most valued in leaders relate to their ability to reflect the group norms and aspirations, with an added aptitude for improving the group standards and performances. This circularity in the relationships is particularly noticeable within political leadership, and can be accepted as an hypothesis in exploring the nature of leadership.

In addition, political leadership is related to personal qualities and circumstance as causative factors of the phenomenon (Dion, 1968, p.4). It can be explained not only by the conjunction of the nature of the leader (trait theory) but also by the nature of the event, problem, or task, confronting the group (situation theory). It is interesting to examine how the combinations of environmental factors and leader's backgrounds affect the perceived success of the leader.

According to this theory, a leader will emerge as the result of a good fit between the personality of the individual actor and the characteristics of the setting (Kellerman, 1986; Ballard and Suedfeld, 1988). The social structure or situation variables determine political opportunities, personality structure supplies the political motivation, and skills determine the level of political success. As a consequence of the economic, political, and technological changes, political leaders have changed from men with aristocratic, preindustrial backgrounds to businessmen and their advisors and agents, who are typically lawyers. Besides such personal attributes as the individual's ability and his educational and technical background, what environment factors influence who becomes an effective or successful leader?

The interaction theory explains the question of 'becoming political leaders' based on situation, skill, and psychology (Rajai and Phillips, 1988, p.107). It will answer three interrelated sets of questions: (1) Who are they?; (2) Why and how do they rise to leadership positions?; and (3) In what ways are they similar and how do they differ? Personality factors alone cannot determine who become a leader, especially since some of the factors which determine who becomes a leader are quite outside the individual's control. Consequently, an explanatory factor that is psychological and a control factor

that is sociological can be conceived as two different levels of description. One might regard an attitude as derivative of an objective position or status, or an objective position in society as leading to psychological processes such as attitudes.

Edinger (1964) introduced three different models for explaining political success: rational-behavior model, group-behavior model, and actor-centered personality model. Based on the first model, success as a leader is measured by the achievement of certain objectively posited goals and failure by an ability to achieve them. Functionality-dysfunctionality is perceived by the investigator in terms of the manifest end values which may be achieved by bargaining, persuasion, or coercion.

However, the second model explains that functionality-dysfunctionality is evaluated according to means rather than ends. The third model, meanwhile, simply focuses on the individual's personality need, i.e., ego satisfaction and tension reduction, in evaluating functionality-dysfunctionality. Edinger (1964) claims that leaders' role performance is evaluated by role congruence. Unless role congruence is restored by changes in the situational determinants and changes in his role performance, it is not easy for the people to agree to his role assignments and to accept him as their leader. A test of successful and effective political leadership would seem to be apparent congruence of the aspiring or actual leaders' role perception with those of his counter-players in a relevant role-set (Edinger, 1964, p.658).

Some scholars have quantified the characteristics of successful presidents and presidential greatness (Wendt and Light, 1976; Simonton, 1981, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, and 1987; Nice, 1984). Dean Keith Simonton (1984) developed an interaction theory by integrating the great-man and situational theories. According to him, the eponymic

significance or sociocultural success of a political leader is determined not only by the impact of the situational context but also by the individual attributes such as intelligence, morality, leadership qualities, productivity, aggressiveness, age, etc. Nevertheless, he concludes that a key predictor of presidential greatness, duration of time in office, may have more situational than individual causes.

However, the length of service a particular leader may depend, partly, on personal influence and, partly, on his ability to get himself renominated and reelected. Length of reign is associated not only with the possession of qualities of leadership but also with a nation's economic, political, military and even cultural well-being. Another example of the combination of situation and personal quality factors is Cell's (1974) work which has been progressive in the direction of assessing the different levels of charisma displayed by various heads of state. Stogdill (1981) is also interested in the attributes of the leaders and situations.

Blondel (1980), more concretely, analyzed political leadership using personalities, careers, socioeconomic backgrounds, and political styles based on the interactional theory. He systematically dealt with every national chief executive who held office from the end of World War II to the 1970s, although he did so to provide a purely descriptive explanation. Especially, as the question of succession related to the popularity of the leader in office and of the leader or leaders who might replace the politician in power, regularity of succession related to the strength or pull of these leaders on the population (p.102). He claims that the strength of a leader depends on various characteristics of his own personal characters as well as the political system.

Recently, Bienen and Van De Walle's (1991) approach to leadership longevity

describes and explains the patterns of risks for losing power that leaders face. Their purpose of the study is to explore the probability of a leader's loss of power over different intervals of time without relating leadership longevity to power enhancement or regime stability. Nonetheless, their models focus on individual leader traits and country traits based on the event-history approach.

The maintenance of political leadership position rests on a system of social exchange or transaction (Burns, 1976). The structure and dynamics of the relations between leaders and followers are the main themes in the transaction theory. According to Hollander (1978), when leaders are effective, they give something and get something in return. Power and conflict always exist in the relationship between leaders and followers. He combines the situational approach with a social exchange component that focuses on reciprocal influence between the leader and the followers.

Philosophical concern with conflict reaches back to Hobbes and even Heraclitus, and men who spurred revolutions in Western thought, such as Machiavelli, Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Feuerbach. The theories of Pareto, Durkheim, Max Weber and others contain many concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses which greatly influenced later writers who attempted to deal with conflict in general; and George Simmel carried theories of conflict into 20th centuries. According to Hegel, Marx, Feuerbach, conflict produces consciousness. In other words, leaders can make followers more conscious of aspects of their identity, such as sexual, communal, ethnic, class, national, and ideological, etc. Leadership style is regarded as the nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. In this sense, agents from the perspective of followers would be moral and political culture within which they operate and social formulations from

which they are drawn. Even though political leadership is explained as the interaction between leaders and followers, it is not easy to examine or demonstrate this relationship retroactively in the historical contexts with which we deal (Rajai and Phillips, 1988, p.4).

CHAPTER II

Theoretical Perspectives of Political Success

The political leadership approach suffers from argument and confusion over key terms, a relative dearth of testable hypotheses, a failure to clearly separate normative from empirical theory and, not least, the lack of a firm data base in which the latter could be solidly grounded (Mayser and Wagstaffe, 1987, p.1). The lack of conceptual focus cannot be attributed to either philosophy or method, whether verbal or quantitative, empirical or normative (Lindblom, 1968). The concepts and hypotheses of the leadership perspective on one hand, and its methods and techniques on the other, have been quite heavily criticized.

At a given point of time, each government has only one government; at the top of the government is a supreme authority - whether individual or collective - a single leader or a cabinet. Every political system must have its legitimate rulers. For instance, formal-legal authority of individuals in key policymaking positions, that is, presidents and prime ministers, depends on the question of the institutionalization of effective executive authority. Individual leadership at the top is based principally on the legitimate powers of the highest governmental positions. According to Max Weber's rules, some leaders gain legitimacy from legal-rational norms, some from traditional norms, and others from charismatic norms. Authority and legitimacy imply the recognition of a right to hold office as well as the general consent to the rules of the political system.

Legitimacy refers to the overall level of acceptance of the regime or government

throughout the polity. The legitimacy of authority in a given country has been evaluated by the legitimacy of the rulers dependent on any particular standards of righteousness or performance. There are neo-utilitarian theories that make regime legitimacy dependent on the effectiveness and efficiency of government in providing more life satisfaction for the worst part of society and, eventually, good and equal satisfaction for everyone (Handerich, 1976).

For a leader's authority as a top executive, his or her hold upon the follower's loyalty and willingness to follow, will depend in some measure upon the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the leadership performance from the follower's point of view (Tucker, 1991, pp.41-42). The effective control of political leaders requires creating a stable political order and securing the legitimacy of political rule. It is persuasively agreed that the great majority of any population has a strong tendency to see their head of government as their nation, and to give legitimacy not only to the person but to the acts of that person. The failure of political institutions to manage rapid social and economic change is viewed as a major contributor to crisis of legitimacy and national integration. And, if such failure happens, a leader might be vulnerable to reprimand.

Over the decades, political leadership has been explained by two different perspectives. One is that leaders are viewed either as heroic and famous figures (charismatic or traditional leaders). Another is that leaders are viewed as the agents from the perspective of followers (legal-rational leaders). While the former is explained by the traits, personality and skills theory, the latter is supported by the situational theory. A precise assessment on the impact of leaders can be made in two crucial respects; the popularity of leaders among the population and the attitudes of citizens to

various issues.

However, the recent trend seems to be a combination of the two perspectives. The qualities of political leaders, the immediate moral and political culture within which they operate, and the social formulations from which they are drawn are all parts of the equation. It is clear that the advantage of any particular qualities of individual leaders or situational influence varies not only from country to country, but also from time to time in any given country. As long as the exercise of power includes a relationship between those who exercise it and those who are subject to it, longevity has often been linked to stability and performance (Black, 1966; Rustow, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Eckstein, 1971).

The stability of the state and the regime and the effectiveness of the public authorities seem to depend on the way in which the institution of the chief executive is organized and fitted with the other institutions of the nation. The longevity of a chief executive is related to the legitimacy of the institution, partly because this will give stability to the institution and partly because the efficiency of the government is also at stake. The efficient institution of the chief executive will become more legitimate as time passes, while one which is inefficient will lose credibility. The 'credibility' of leaders is an essential aspect of governmental life. However, the support of a leader and his policies does not always include the gaining of legitimacy to the larger systems of the state and the lack of support for a specific leader or a policy does not always imply a lack of overall legitimacy.

No society remains unchanged throughout all time. As long as the problem of political order or stability is compounded by the problem of legitimacy, analysis of

political success should be focused on leadership performance. Moreover, the comparative approach calls for a common theoretical framework by means of which the relationship between the legitimacy aspect of leadership and the socioeconomic and political structures of several countries may be analyzed. The interaction between the approaches to legitimacy of the leaders and of the structures within which they led can be studied comparatively in order to ascertain whether or not there is a relationship between this interaction and their success or failure in maintaining legitimate authority. The nature and interrelationships of patterns of authority, levels of modernization, methods of citizen mobilization, and levels of industrialization, etc. should be considered as important factors in a political leadership equation.

The concept of legitimacy is elusive and it is not easy to operationalize. However, much literature has looked for a number of specific ingredients which could enter into the composition of legitimacy and which could be more easily operationalized (Rogowski, 1974, pp.26-27). Legitimacy and political integration are affected by variations in general social and economic conditions. If a society is static and relatively insulated from the influence of other polities, the relative strength of the regime or government will not tend to change. Where integration is high, it will remain high. Where groups and political system are not in harmony, conflict will remain high, as in plural societies.

Political instability represents a crisis for a nation and its rulers. According to Morrison and Stevenson (1971, p.348), it induces a situation in which institutionalized authority patterns in a nation break down and political violence replaces compliance with political authorities. Thus, political stability defined as the endurance and

persistence of regimes over time is measured by the length of time that particular constitutional arrangements have been in place or that modernizing leadership has been in control.

A. The Concept of Political Survival as Political Success

In a general sense, success is explained by the idea that individual decisiveness should be added to luck. Whereas luck is the probability of getting what you want without trying, success is how often one gets what one wants if one tries. However, in political leadership, much of what makes for success is out of the individual's hands. According to Lasswell and Lerner (1965), men seek to maximize 'valued outcomes' by adopting 'institutional practices' that also affect the 'resource environment.' One of the valued outcomes is 'power' outcome that includes a final decision as winning or losing an election or a war. Sinclair (1993) also claims that a solid initial basis for gauging degree of success or failure is whether or not a president advances his goals. According to one standard, if a president accomplishes what he sets out to achieve, or if he attains his own goals whatever they happen to be, he is a success.

What constitutes a 'successful leader,' is considered a matter of definition in terms of the problem under investigation. He may be a man who gets things done, such as furthering economic development or winning elections or wars; he may be a leader who maintains the 'stability' of a political system in terms of stress or who introduces major innovations into political processes (Edinger, 1969, p.10). It is clearly in accordance with the fact that successful leaders are career leaders who devote long years of careful grooming to the political roles they eventually come to assume, whereas

unsuccessful leaders are crisis leaders who are susceptible to the forefront without much preparation and typically in response to situations of national emergency. According to Fred Riggs' (1981) argument, the political leaders who fall into the successful category found their legitimacy on a mixture of norms congruent with the structures within which they led.⁵ As a result, their success is determined by the interaction of their leadership strategies, the cultural symbols that they are able to manipulate, and the institutional and social contexts within which they operate.

Support relates to legitimacy, and legitimacy stems from individual support. Where positive and passive support exceeds negative reactions, the regime can be said to be relatively legitimate; the greater the difference in favor of positive support, the higher the amount of legitimacy. This enables the public authorities to continue in office. The citizens in a constitutional state are free to criticize openly the nature of governmental decisions, to propose alternatives and to take forms of constitutionally recognized action to change laws and policies. Therefore, respect for political office and a disposition to obey must be the primary elements in political authority (Carter, 1979, p. 33). Support is explained by two issues: (1) Who wins and who loses in political competition?; and (2) Why and how do politics persist or change? (Eckstein, 1979)

Succession process is one useful way of observing the legitimacy of a system. How is political leadership transferred from one man to another and from one party to

⁵ His model is called as prismatic model that combined three norms from Max Weber such as charismatic norms, traditional norms, and legal-rational norms. If a president is a head of the party as well as a head of government, it is not a prismatic model. The criteria to evaluate the leaders successful or not are based on the combination of three norms.

another? The succession process is a useful checkpoint for looking at the question of legitimacy because when power is transferred, individuals within the system are forced to decide whether their loyalties are confined to those who have exercised authority or to the system of government itself. For example, the executives' inability to maintain consistent support has directly caused regime instability and encouraged military coups. In the case of persistent incongruence, the voters will not support the central actor, a revolution will overthrow him, his formal subordinates will fail to execute his orders (Edinger, 1964, p.659).

The hurt of withdrawal affects every leader, no matter what its cause and no matter how power passes. It does not matter if a powerholder is thrown out of office, comes to the end of a legally limited term, or leaves of his own accord; there is a feeling of emptiness and a sense of having done something wrong. Even those who seek power to accomplish a goal - and accomplish it - even they leave office with regret, a fear of boredom, and a vague sense of shame. The loss of power is the realization of how badly they had exercised it. So from a psychological aspect, the method of losing power would make a difference.

A successful leader holds a position as a chief executive until natural death or the end of a constitutional term, followed by voluntary retirement. If the nature of leadership is considered as a structured pattern of authority and subordination, the leadership is not simply a function of the leader acting by himself, but the result of an interaction with the people. A successful leader may be an individual whose role interpretations are accepted by the salient counter-players because he satisfies their expectations, or he may be a person who so clearly comprehends the political context

that he can adjust his behavior to meet the expectations of these relevant others (Edinger, 1964, p.665).

Political legitimacy is a key to creating a viable polity capable of sustaining national development and without it, development efforts are likely to be futile and their achievements in administration or any other field are apt to be short-lived. The credibility of leaders and of institutions is an essential aspect of governmental life. If people withdraw their consent from any leader, that leader could find it difficult, almost impossible, to continue in a leadership role. In the end, people remove and replace any leaders from whom they have withdrawn consent. The lack of legitimacy leads to the lack of authority on the part of the political leadership and the lack of self-compliance on the part of subject people. Nevertheless, in reality, the polity is managed for survival of the leadership rather than for equitable development of the polity.

In many societies, it seems that leadership and the use of power are inextricably woven together. Many leaders can mobilize the high legal and administrative bureaucracies of the state in massive displays of power. However, the effective use of power requires social legitimization. In all sociocultural systems, leaders should mobilize human, material, and symbolic resources of society toward specific social ends. They should have abilities to maintain their regimes. Legitimacy is threatened not so much by one who would break the rules as by one who seems to break trust in the image of the presidents or the prime ministers as dignified, plain and clean in character. A system which failed miserably would lack legitimacy and would, therefore, be a prime candidate for extinction or fundamental system change. If a nation's political performance, legitimacy, and persistence are all threatened, political

instability accrues.

Leadership success is increasingly evaluated on the basis of the fulfillment of directives. Gupta (1990) stresses two capacities to gain legitimacy among the people: the democratic form of government and the maintenance of economic prosperity. Even though executive durability is defined as the government stability in democratic regimes in most studies, especially in parliamentary government, it is possible to apply for all different government styles including communist systems. According to Lipset (1959), legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. Besides the promise of economic prosperity, leaders can hold on to power through an appeal to the national ideology.

Focused on the chief executive as a target, a measure for the evaluation of a leader's performance should be related to government stability or to the durability of a chief executive. The definition of stability demonstrates considerable staying power and a capacity to endure without great or frequent changes in pattern. All countries emphasize on economic growth and political stability, and these are main factors to prolong the leader's tenure. However, it is not right to say that a definition of stability is merely longevity, even if we would agree on just how long a democracy must endure to be considered stable. For example, the presence of short-lived governments is taken as an evidence of poor performance in all regimes. Also, the tenure of an emergent political leader is frequently short-lived. Political success can be explained by stability of political government that are measured by the tenure of a chief executive. The primary criterion for maintaining leadership position is the satisfaction of the members

of the society.

The power motive is one of the most relevant explanatories to political behavior. The desire for ego enhancement and for manipulating others have been suggested as important in understanding political orientations. All leaders seek power, and, if they get into power, they want to keep power as long as possible. Power as a head of government is a function of the leader's will to arouse and tap the needs and wants of followers and his capacity to mobilize resources to meet those needs and wants, thereby contriving to retain followers' support and to continue in power (Burns, 1978, p.386). The exercise of leadership depends more or less on his performance in the roles that an individual in a high political office may play.

According to Simonton (1986), one of the indicators of presidential success or greatness is 'years in office', a variable that is used to predict most of the variance in presidential success. It is actually based on eponym theory such that long-lived rulers may provide history with eponyms, that is, with convenient names for the epochs of history. In a narrow sense, a climb up the political ladder from lower status to national office means political success to political figures. If they become heads of government, there is no place to move up. Therefore, in a broad sense, political success means strong durability in office. Political success, that is, continued tenure in office, depends on the impression that the office-holder is handling his job competently.

Power comes with office, and leadership rests on force or on consent. It is important to combine power with authority to be an effective powerholder. Power is often treated as synonymous with 'authority', and authority is commonly referred to as 'legitimate' power. To the leaders who finish their career or their life, leadership means

the culmination of their career. Of those who come into power, some will leave it honored with the glow of a job well done and a memory of themselves carved into history. Some will leave it with a feeling of frustration and failure that can reach to the deepest levels of despair. Some will fail in the eyes of others but find a way to look upon it in another light. They succeed in not being successfully challenged before the end of their working life. If they do not succeed in staying at the head of their country until retirement, they are less successful or less fulfilled than those previously illustrated. Whether a leader is formally appointed, formally elected for a specified term of office, he has to rely on the acceptance of his acceptance by his followers.

B. The Concept of Head of Government

While Tucker (1981) argues that leadership approach to the nature of politics is distinct from power approach since leadership is a value-neutral phenomenon, Janda (1972) asserts that a positional view relates to the concept of 'power'. It is true that leadership is not identical to power. However, it is a certain kind of power, or it is the use of power in some circumstances. The individuals in political institutions and groups who exercise more influence than others on the allocation of values are considered key concepts in explaining political leadership (Huntington, 1971, p.316). According to Jennings (1960), political leadership is concentrated on formal leaders - the holders of official positions of authority, and especially those in national politics.

Political leadership, as concept and category of analysis, is constant, while its actual membership or personnel composition is variable. It varies from society to society, depending upon such factors as historical tradition, past political experience,

foreign influence, ideological predilection of society, or simple happenstance. There exist differences in forms of society-wide political leaders from a cross-cultural, historical, and evolutionary perspective. The leadership of a society is a criterion of the values by which that society lives. Also, by learning the nature of the leaders, we learn much about the nature of the society. Political leadership is a role that is understood in terms of the social and cultural context within which it is embedded and which shapes the particular forms it takes in any society.

Many political scientists also define the concept of political leader in many different ways. A leader is the one who occupies the position or fills the role that allows him or her to wield the greatest power. Dahl's professional politician, Snyder's political decision-maker, Lasswell's policy scientists and Deutsch's cybernetic leadership are other examples. In addition, more specifically, Ilchman and Uphoff's (1971) statesman is a political actor as a head of regime. Apparently, identical or similar conceptualizations are often translated into very different operational criteria for empirical research; and seemingly different ones are operationalized in much the same way (Edinger, 1969). The analyses in this study would be largely confined to the heads of government considering both positional and power-related concepts. Success of political leaders will be regarded as one of the outcomes of political leadership, since it depends on how they, as heads of government are evaluated or perceived by the people in their society.

Whatever the political system is, i.e., the Western democracies or the communist states, it is true that an individual or the collective occupies the unique position of being at the apex of the pyramid of often absolute power. The main mediator between

constitutive system and bureaucracy is the head; the head of the government; the head of state; the head of political party; the head of the armed force. Sometimes these roles are united in one person, but often they are separated so that a polity has several heads at once. In constitutional regimes, the head has a formal title, but under naked rule, the most important head could be a boss who rules from behind the scenes, while those with formal leadership titles are mere 'puppets'. For instance, the gradual displacement of dynastic rule in Europe by constitutional monarchies and republics produced a differentiation between a head of state, symbolizing the society as politically organized, and a head of government.

Among all the heads, the role of a head of government (chief executive) is the most important in practicing actual power, since the executive branch is both the prime mover and the principal regulator of governmental performance. In modern constitutional regimes, the chief executive is chosen through the constitutive system. The chief executive can be chosen by the elected assembly in a parliamentary system, by the electorate in a presidential system; or by the chairman of the party, etc. The very nature of elections - the typical process for filling political office in a democratic society - entails the selection of those with good qualifications for office. Electing someone need not imply any belief in his inherent superiority, but it does usually imply belief in competence and so the right, which stems from being qualified, of the specific individual to hold that office (Carter, 1979, p.34). Therefore, this dissertation will include the political leaders who are or were in actual power in each regime, that is, the heads of governments across the nations.

Regimes have frequently been classified by their most 'visible features', which

has meant a classification based on either the different forms or the different styles that political leadership has taken. However, traditional classification of regime type or forms of government is more or less meaningless. Even though the division based on the idea of a separation of powers, i.e., executive, legislative and judicial, applies to the presidential system, it does not fit into the parliamentary system.

Every country has someone at its head, but there are considerable variations in the extent to who is at the head. Historically, executives formed the central core or kernel of governments, out of which, separate legislative and judicial institutions progressively emerged and broke off. For an example, the term 'executive' may refer to what in Britain is usually termed 'the government' and in the U.S.A. 'the administration'. Or it may refer to an even narrower set of ruling institutions and individuals who possess ultimate decision-making power, such as the Politburo and General Secretary in the U.S.S.R and other communist states, the ruling juntas in military regimes, and, of course, presidents, prime ministers and their cabinets (Charlton, 1986, p.18). Some countries have a group of people running the countries, such as a presidium, a revolutionary council, or even a council of ministers.

A classification of contemporary types of political executives may most logically begin by focusing on heads of governments. According to Blondel (1984), they would be the 'varied and diverse' nature of executive types among contemporary regimes. They would be included in three dominant categories - monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers. The special categories of members of ruling councils and Communist party secretaries in communist states have to be added to those. It focuses on the leaders who are really in charge of the overall aspects of policy making or the overall view of

the affairs of the government. From this point of view, all formal 'heads of state' who merely symbolize the nation with pure monarchy system should be eliminated. Those nations are Afghanistan before 1973, Bhutan, Brunei, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirate. Also, the presidents of the collective council (Uruguay during 1955 - 1965) or rotating presidents (Switzerland and Yugoslavia since 1980) are eliminating from the sample.

Since most contemporary state are republics, it is not surprising to find that the largest groups of contemporary heads of government are presidents. The limited presidency is the most common form of political executive in the world today, about 52 countries having adopted it, embracing 25% of the global population. Presidential systems based on liberal-democratic ideology, imply rigid forms of succession. Those systems lead to fixed terms of office and organize a separation of powers. It does not allow a president to stay in office, even if he is popular, after a stated period because he is not normally allowed to succeed himself or to stay in office more than a limited time.

Some presidents are elected for a limited period only and may not be reelected immediately or, at most, may be reelected only once.⁶ Bans or restrictions on reelection are for a check on presidential power as well as a safeguard against an executive's self-perpetuation in office (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p.88). As the forms

⁶ In some countries such as Brazil (since 1988), Ecuador (since 1979), Guatemala (since 1986), Honduras (since 1985), South Korea (since 1988), Mauritania (since 1980), Mexico, and Uruguay, through the denial of immediate reelection, a time limit is put into presidential term. Where reelection is permitted, it is allowed only after one or two intervening terms in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Also, some countries, such as Austria, Liberia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, Taiwan, Tanzania, and U.S.A., allow just second consecutive terms. However, these constitutional restriction will be ignored for the test.

of authoritarian presidency, military rulers often introduce some forms of civilian structure in order to prolong their tenure. The form of ruling collectivities or councils is common in military regimes where the designation of one officer as chief executive frequently obscures the genuinely shared character of the executive leadership group which takes power following a coup d'état.

Secondly, historically, the prime ministers who emerged from beneath the wings of monarchs, have entrusted originally with the subordinate tasks of leading the state bureaucracy and coordinating the institutions of governmental decision-making. In a multiparty parliamentary system, it can consist of a coalition of leaders of several parties. Prime ministers emerged as the heads of the bureaucracy of the State, even though it may not always be true to say that they are always 'first among equals'. They control their party and the parliamentary majority and, if electoral support is maintained, exercise control for long periods.

The final type of contemporary political leaders are first or general secretaries of ruling Communist parties. Since communist states are led by a Communist party which is viewed as the vanguard of the nation, the leader of the Communist Party - nominally the first or general secretary - is in effect the country's leader. The Party Secretariat has, as one of its many executive functions, the duty to oversee and supervise the 'state' bureaucracy which is formally headed by a prime minister or a president in the communist countries. He embodies the permanent legitimacy of the nation. The communist leader is chosen from among existing leaders, normally concentrated in the politburo and the Secretariat such as the hierarchical structures in which the decisions of higher bodies places major decision-making powers in the

topmost organs of the Party. As far as authority or legitimacy implies recognition of a right to hold office and implies general consent to the rules of the political system, in a situation, in which a leader is the main beneficiary of popular authority in the nation, this leader is at liberty to organize his government as he chooses (Blondel, 1982, p.27)

C. Theoretical Model

We generally speak of a government as an institutionalized pattern of rule. The rules or governs may constitute a vast and complicated design, as in modern constitutional regimes, or they may be monocratically arraigned in one simple hierarchy, as in aristocratic regimes, including totalitarian dictatorship. Every political system may contain some institutionalized means of recruiting leaders. Also, every political system may have overall ethical evaluation of the quality of their rule.

The normative question 'who should rule?' indicates 'on the basis of what principle of selectivity should political leaders be chosen?' However, for the empirical aspect, it is important to examine the leaders who in fact did rule. As far as the concept of political leadership is narrowed to 'heads of government' or 'chief executives', the political leadership can be explained in a certain view. When we evaluate some leaders **successful** or **unsuccessful**, we can focus on **how long a leader has been in his/her office**. In general, longer the leader stays, the more successful his/her rule is.

As discussed in the literature review, the interaction theory has dealt with the combination of traits and situation, social backgrounds and situation, or traits and social

backgrounds. However, theoretical development for the analysis, here, employs a combination of the social background theory and the situation theory except the personality and skills theory. We can cast the search in the light of the interaction theory of political leadership stressing the interplay of two approaches described above. The scientific development of political leadership studies - ranging from initial conceptualization through creation, operationalization, and testing of hypotheses to rigorous theoretical integration at the highest reaches of mathematical imagination - will be promoted by pursuit of a multimodal research strategy. Nonetheless, in the descriptive analyses, personality and skills variables are used for comparison.

The problem of keeping a leadership position is complicated because the leader's authority does not derive solely from the political organization. Authority does not just flow from the top down. Rather, a primary criterion for maintaining the leadership position is how much people are satisfied with their leader. Whether a leader is formally appointed, or formally elected for a specified term of office, he has to rely on the acceptance of his authority by people. As a result, leaders' success in their offices result from the attitude of the people toward them. The leaders' social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and situational factors are considered as main criteria by which people evaluate their leaders.

This study will focus on predictive and causal analyses. Basically, the analyses are not only the specification of leadership outcomes that are the object of prediction but also the specification of different backgrounds that are hypothesized to predict leadership outcome, that is, duration in office, and the specification of the theoretical linkages among independent variables and dependent leadership outcome. The social,

economic, and cultural characteristics of the society in which the organization is embedded are also critical influences on the nature of leadership. As a result, the main research is concerned with the relationship between political leaders' success and their social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and situational factors. Whether or not a leader becomes successful depends on the possession or acquisition of certain key attributes and experiences.

Here, this study tries to get some answers for the possibilities of the research on political leadership. The variable items are adapted from several general pieces of literature of leadership analysis. The variables to be considered are based on scholarly consensus. The variables for which data are collected interrelate to a large extent since demographic, ideological, attitudinal, psychological, and situational variables not only cohere as distinct groups, but also intersect at many points. Hypotheses about political behavior that were 'tested and proven' valid at one moment in history need to be rechecked constantly against the changes of time and circumstances.

The models include several different possible explanations: (1) the leader's social and career backgrounds; (2) the causes of stability and instability of types of government in the contemporary world; (3) the governmental policies; and (4) the country characteristics, etc. These anticipatory variables simply alert attention to things that may help to describe, explain, predict, evaluate, and intervene. A theoretical model is constructed as follows:

$$\text{Political Success} = f(\text{Individual Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, Institutional Attributes}).$$

However, as an indicator of political success, duration of office, has somewhat different roles to evaluate political leadership. 'Duration of office' decides whether a leader stayed for a 'SHORT' or a 'NOT-SHORT' period, that is, political survival. After that, it can examine whether he is more successful than others, that is, strength of political survival. Inclusion of the leaders who are still in power into the analysis will need some manipulation in order to reduce misspecification errors. The specification of the model is :

$$\text{Pr(Duration of Office)} = f \text{ (Individual Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, Institutional Attributes).}$$

Truly, one of the most difficult tasks in measuring and evaluating performance of political leaders is the task of trying to look at the elements that make up political success. The dependent variable in the theoretical model denotes the leadership outcome, whereas a variety of causative factors that extend from very general explanations to highly specific reasons are regarded as the independent variables. Various measures of selected independent variables contribute importantly to the explanation of variance in measures of duration of office. Independent variables are divided into three different subsets: demographic attributes, career attributes, and institutional attributes.

Individuals' personal backgrounds are divided into two groups, demographic or social attributes and career attributes, with the former being caused by nature and the latter being caused by experiences. Political scientists on political leadership assume that research on this subject should focus on the behavior or attitudes of political

leaders. Therefore, interviews or surveys with them would be the best way to get the data for the research.

However, political leaders, as heads of government, especially at the international level, are quite often inaccessible, and attitudinal information is therefore difficult to obtain. There are relatively few variables which are susceptible to quantification that are of greater concern to the political scientists than those describing the backgrounds of political leaders. Even though it is possible to appreciate on a cumulative basic changes that are occurring in the characteristics that define political leaders worldwide, if possible, information on political leaders should be kept and analyzed as qualitative data.

The demographic (social background) backgrounds consist of age, place of birth, education, major, father's occupation, and father's SES, which are considered as family legacy and political socialization. The career backgrounds are represented by political ideology, party membership, experience in congress, experience as a Minister, previous occupation, military experience, experience in prison or exile, political activity, long-term foreign experience, enter mode, and numbers of entry as a head of government. These variables could be the criteria for evaluating whether a leader has enough qualification for handling the office as a head of government.


Personal disposition variables imply the aggregate characteristics such as personality and skills that define a unique human individual (physiological factors; psychological factors, etc.). Even though the role of personality appears to be large, there still exist difficulties in measuring and assessing. A lot of studies of personality have dealt with a number of elements such as energy, courage, intelligence, etc.

However, this study, relating to the concept of 'power', just focuses on 'psychological traits' and 'task-oriented' traits. Oral skills, organization skills, and language skills, physiological status, loss of parents or separation from parents in early age, and power connection are included in this subset.

Based on a theory of democratic development, institutional, socioeconomic and cultural aspects are very important. As institutional variables, several country characteristics and political systematic variables such as population density, homogeneity index, freedom status, party system, economic freedom, literacy rate, type of head of government, and region as cultural difference, and etc. are used for the models. In an institutional aspect, the degree of individual freedom and participatory rights, competitiveness in party system capable of aggregating diverse interests should be considered as main indicators for evaluating leader's performance. Developments in education (literacy rate) and economic freedom as criteria for industrialization are also indicators for a nation's social and economic achievements. Homogeneity index and population density are more related to governability that a leader can handle problems of his own country.

While all variables in personal background attributes may possibly be used in descriptive analyses in order to compare the leaders across the different aspects, some selected variables are included in a statistical model based on certain theoretical perspectives and some variables are deliberately combined for certain roles. The following diagram (Figure 1) shows the model in a very clear manner.

Figure 1 Political Success



CHAPTER III

Theoretical Propositions

Legitimacy is an idea of central importance in political thought and science although the concept has proven difficult to use in comparative politics. If a polity lasts for a long time without disruptive changes, it is considered durable. Furthermore, a polity's legitimacy is likely to be enhanced by its longevity. Among the changes, a change in the formal power of a top executive, or the government as a whole is considered major. Legitimacy is gained or lost through the performance of incumbent political leaders. Unless a top executive who fails conspicuously in action as a leader manages to conceal the failing the political community - as some tyrannical leaders have done, at least until their death or overthrow - that leader's authority is likely to suffer as a consequence of the perceived failure (Tucker, 1981, p.42).

To achieve any lasting improvement in the polity, whether it be economic development, a sense of nationhood, or an equitable society, a leader must obtain popular support for his goals, and to do this requires strong leadership. Regime legitimacy, in effect, goes beyond the performance of a particular incumbent leader and his or her popularity. The legitimate authority of the government and the support for the incumbent government is narrowly circumscribed as to its functions and largely stripped of the personal features of ascriptive authority. The sources of legitimacy serving as the basis for authority can derive from the forces of tradition, from charismatic, or from an institutional rational-legal system of government.

People tend to understand regime legitimacy questions largely as confidence in

particular office-holders and what they do (Lane, 1979, pp.63-64). The importance of legitimacy is considered a precondition for political stability. To a large extent, legitimacy depends on a social and economic system. In general, personal popularity of a president or a prime minister over a relatively short period (e.g. 2 yrs) will contribute fewer positive flows to the stock of regime legitimacy than an economic crisis over a long period (8 - 10 yrs) under different governments will generate negative flows.

The object is to explain why some political leaders stay in office for a short period and others do not, or why some individuals demonstrate more successful leadership than others. In every society there are definable paths to political success. The requirements for personal success as political performance in office might vary in a corresponding fashion. 'Years in office' result from popularity and performance which are multicausal. The reasons can be explained by several components. In the aspect of social and economic environment of the society, conditions of wealth, equality, and shared cultural values, etc. influence the sources of variation in political performance, that is, duration of office. Moreover, the personal qualities that the leaders are expected to have are pretty different to the people in each country. The motivation of being or keeping power longer is one of the reasons as well.

In looking at what causes leaders to succeed or fail, one crucial point is how they use the power that accrues to them in the role of leader. Some use of power is clearly necessary for a leader's own survival, as well as to produce changes, as we witness the fate of leaders who failed to use power at critical times. There also is personal power that is not necessarily linked to office in intelligence, knowledge, and

experiences in a specific area. Some possess a deliberate manner of expression as well as a way of holding one's self in public. Rarely be that as it may be, some have physical attributes such as tall, big, and handsome. While physical factors of stature are easy to trivialize, they are after real and significant determinants of success because there are fairly clear cultural expectations of physical ideals and what we want our leaders to represent in relation to them.

The main research is concerned with the relationship between the variances in successful and unsuccessful leadership characteristics and the variances in what it takes to be a long-term political leader. All leaders who keep power do not share the same experience partly because there are all different degrees of power and success, partly because of the differences between individuals in character and backgrounds, and partly because of the differences of situation. In an effort to find common denominators or common determinants of the dependent variable, considerable attention should be devoted to the family backgrounds and early histories, career backgrounds, and situations.

The major reason for focusing on the elements above is the implicit assumption that if we know who they are, and were, and how they became political leaders, then we evaluate what they do. A sequence of innate and inchoate forces within the human organism epigenetically emerge during the development of individuals in their proximal contacts in families and other natural groups and in their distal contacts with economic, social, and political habits, customs, institutions, and values as these develop *pari passu* with and within individuals.

The social characteristics of the leaders vary from one political system to

another. There are many examples to show how the conditions and requisites for entry into political leadership vary from country to country and in different periods. It is because each society has its own social values that political leaders should have and its principle of legitimacy, which guides the actions of the political leaders and expresses a body of values and ideas accepted by the people. There are relationships between personal backgrounds of political leaders and performance of political leaders. Social origins are important, justifying their focus by arguing that social background is a useful indicator of political success. Leaders need to possess a large array of personal attributes if they are to be successful. The career backgrounds of the leaders play a major role in the determination of policy goals and general orientation of political life in a country. Background data on the social and career characteristics of the leaders provide no infallible guide to either attitudinal patterns or policy preferences.

Leaving aside for the moment such personal attributes as the individual's ability, his educational and technical background, what environmental factors influence leader's survival? It seems relevant to consider some important situational factors which determine whether a person is chosen to be a head of government. While the behavior of men or of social systems may be described, and perhaps even predicted, without recourse to personality and skills variables, no satisfactory explanation is possible until we understand the psychological link which joins man to his sociopolitical environment, and through which each impinges on the other. As a result, for the lack of consistent or trustful information on personality and skills, the propositions on those elements are excluded from a theoretical model. Specific propositions on the basis of social and career backgrounds as well as situational attributes will be discussed in this chapter.

A. Do Social Backgrounds of the Leaders Really Matter for Their Political Survival?

The study of social backgrounds can furnish clues for a study of political performance, but the first cannot substitute for the second (Lasswell and Lerner, 1965). The analysis of social background data still performs important functions for socialization and recruitment. A person of a certain age, educational attainment and social status is more likely to be successful in his office. He may be liked, trusted, and respected within the society in which he exists. He should have abilities to attract dedicated followers as well as abilities to command loyalty and dedicated service from a comparatively small group of intimates.

The demographic variables are based on the concept of naturalness. When people are born, they get certain social status, gender, age, etc., from their parents. Parents and schools have emphasized the importance of achieving social prominence or social dominance. They contribute socialization process to the young children to learn what an individual is prepared, with varying degrees of success, to meet requirements laid down by other members of society for his behavior in a variety of situations.

Proposition 1: Long-lasting leaders are younger on reaching office.

Generally, age forms the basic criteria which determine eligibility for specific roles. Without laws to make precise the obligations of office and fix the tenure of heads of government, it is universally acknowledged that leaders will hold power as long as their prestige lasts and with little regard to senility. According to gerontocracy thesis, respect for the aged has been at work in most societies although it has been more

common in East rather than in West. In some societies, leadership capacity often makes its appearance relatively late in life, in the form of a strong personality or a strong ego. The leader is either an elder or is assimilated to elders even if he is young. However, the seniority system has its drawback especially in the political arena.

As a result, as far both life expectancy and seniority system are working together, if the leaders become top executives at middle age, they stay longer than those at young age. Political leadership correlates positively with middle age (Blondel, 1980). It would seem to be 'natural' for leaders to be relatively old with a certain tendency for the age distribution of the population. However, considering human's life expectancy, long leaders are younger on reaching office. In this study with continuous age variable, the proposition should be that the leaders who reached their offices at younger age everywhere are more successful.

Proposition 2: Leaders who were born and raised in urban areas are more likely to stay in office longer.

Political success correlates with the exposure to urban life. This variable indicates the social environment that the political leader has been raised in. Urban-born and raised in urban area influence the leader get more exposed to politics and media. The first role perceived by children tends to be a top political executive - the president, prime minister, or general secretary, etc. In early childhood, they have tendency to identify a top political executive as a parent figure. So they become more successful than those from rural or rural-lived.

Proposition 3: Highly educated leader tends to have a longer tenure in office.

Educated persons are more aware of the impact of government on their lives and pay more attention to politics. It is because people who have a strong sense of personal effectiveness also tend to feel politically effective. Personal and political efficacy are strongly related to education (Campbell, et al., 1960). Intellectuals play a vital role in formulating, disseminating, or sustaining idea that influences both the theory and practice of politics in most societies.

Tucker (1977, p.384) argues that trained and sophisticated insight, the capacity to judge situations accurately that comes from experience and intellect, are characteristics of an effective leader and are particularly vital requisites for political leadership in the extremely complex world of today. Formal education is the single most important entrance requirement into the higher circles. Political leaders are among the most educated of all occupational groups. The more highly educated people tend to develop the characteristics of trust, satisfaction, and competence that go with democracy. It is a common place to note that educational levels are the highest in socially favored categories.

B. Do Career Backgrounds of the Leaders Have Influence on Their Political Survival?

Most leaders of the contemporary world have had a 'normal' career. The majority have been ministers or congressmen before becoming the head of government. Also, most leaders have been involved in party activities. Competence of the leaders includes references of each person's past political experience, ability as a head of government, and his intelligence. Considering the fact that the leaders must be

absolutely dedicated to the cause and able to demonstrate that commitment by giving time and effort to it, risking their lives, undergoing imprisonment, exile, persecution, and continual hardship, etc. are very influential to leader's political survival.

Proposition 4: The greater the involvement in a political collectivity, such as parliaments or congresses, ministries, and political parties, the greater the support for the leadership, that is, the political rule of the game.

Ambition theory (Schlesinger, 1966) presupposes a rational assessment by the prospective leaders of their opportunities for success. For the most part, political leaders are far from common men in either their origins or their achievement. Political experience is the best teacher of the art of politics, and the accumulated experiences of generations, concentrated into streams of traditions which flow into and through institutions, such as lineages, professions and schools, colleges and universities, are the sources of the knowledge which enables political classes to be successful (Shils, 1982, p.17). If they have experiences in politically related areas such as parties, congresses, or cabinets, it is easier to ascend to a head of government. To pursue a political career an aspirant must conform to a recruitment process which rather rigidly prescribes his role as a candidate for parliament and a member of the ministry (Edinger, 1964, p.663). Highly experienced public officials are more likely to be selected as potential chief executives.

Proposition 5: The successful leaders are likely to be found in law, politics, civil service or military, that is, political sectors that would be regarded as upper-status occupations.

The correlation between social status and political power, though consistently positive, is not a ground for assuming that the former is a sufficient or necessary condition for the latter (Prewitt, 1970). Also, there is a tradition of respect for the individual, regardless of his rank and wealth in Western political thought. Nevertheless, higher social status is necessary in order to have higher political opportunities. Political job-chances of those with high social status are considerably better than those with average or low prestige.

The primary occupations of the leaders prior to seizing power or assuming highest office are rather diverse. Also, children can be influenced by their father's occupation in developing their political views. The successful leaders tend to have higher status fathers from the upper and middle class holding such positions as landed gentry, big businessmen, government officials, lawyers, military officers, and politicians. However, the leaders had more politically related professions than their fathers did. While fathers' occupations provided better chances (high social status or wealth) to enter the realm of politics, the leaders themselves established their careers and used them as stepping-stones to the highest political jobs.

Proposition 6: Leaders with foreign experiences, i.e., foreign education and work in foreign countries, are more likely to stay in office for a long period.

Foreign experience contributes the leaders ability to develop cosmopolitanism. Abroad, they see different level of development and understand of foreign affairs. Most leaders will tend to heighten their cosmopolitanism by greater foreign travel, foreign study, exposure to various societies and cultures, and maintenance of foreign contacts.

They are guided by the idea of adopting and adapting modernized technology through foreign education or foreign experiences. They contribute to making society stable, and, of course, successfully accomplish more. General knowledge is associated with foreign language ability and with understanding of foreign affairs. However, this tendency depends on the level of development of country or reign of country.

Proposition 7: If a leader comes to his office in a peaceful way, he is more likely to stay in office longer.

In general, some political leaders come to office as a head of government through peaceful processes, whether appointive or elective, while others in violent ways. Some scholars (Rajai and Phillips, 1988) identify these two groups of individuals as follows: The former are 'loyalists' and the latter are 'revolutionaries'. Since, in this study, just the leaders in single leadership would be discussed, entry mode as an appointment mechanism can be a variable to influence political leadership in republics, presidential or military presidential, and prime ministerial systems. Even though party secretary or general secretary in Communist system is not real single leadership, they are normally stronger than the prime minister.

Political leaders, having been chosen and exercising their functions in accordance with these rational-legal procedures, can enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. In addition, they need not worry about being humiliated, executed, put in jail, or forced into exile after an overnight coup. Removal from office through constitutional due process or assassination are the major and constant risks to their political survival. If legitimacy is defined in terms of established rules, a government which has come to

power by civil war, revolution or coup d'état can not immediately claim legitimacy, although it may claim authority by virtue of its ideology, goals and popular support, by providing its effectiveness in meeting the country's needs and by demonstrating the qualities of the new leaders (Carter, 1979, p.51).

Proposition 8: Leaders of the right, such as the conservatives, tend to stay longer than those of the left, such as the liberals.

While the political left has higher levels of tolerance for democratic liberties than those on the right, the political right is less supportive of democratic norms. It is important to pay attention to the beliefs and values of political leaders, particularly as they relate to sweeping ideological and intellectual movements. Political leaders always possess some sets of philosophical and political convictions that are his own. In order to legitimize any type of regime, the leaders of the regime must devise a political formula and political ideology that gains acceptance among the people at large.

Ideology plays a significant part in the life of most parties, both symbolic and practical. They try to shape political institutions in ways consonant with his own political philosophy, even though the goals of the leaders are not necessarily identical to those of the followers and intermediate leaders. They generally identify themselves with the ideologies⁷ of the right (conservative), the center, or the left (liberal) in terms of their stances toward the size of government, the equalization of social conditions, and the social and economic issues in a country.

Ideologies of the left have tended to favor a larger role for government, greater

⁷ Right means traditional conservative and populist (even if it is a kind of left).

equalization of income, government-supported welfare programs, and a minimization of unemployment. Meanwhile, the right has tended to favor a more restrained role for government, maintenance of existing income distribution, private welfare, and a minimization of inflation, even at a cost to employment. Usually, the more conservative the ideology of a political leader, the longer he stays in office. It is because social and economic resources based on conservative ideology induce politically stable situations. The promise of radical change in the social, economic, and political fabric, is threatening to political stability.

C. How Do the Institutional Attributes Influence Political Survival?

Geographical environments, economic systems, social structures and cultural differences provide some assistance to explain political success on a macro level. Geography and demography would be considered as physical attributes of countries. Thus, size of country⁸, population size, and age of nations might be the main indicators for both attributes and these variables imply governability or viability, legitimacy of the countries, or vulnerability of the nations. The duration of the country, the unity and the characteristics of the political culture are the indicators for national identity. It is difficult to handle and almost impossible to quantify.

Proposition 9: Leaders in densely populated countries are more likely to stay in office for a short period.

⁸ According to de Blij (1967, p.41), states exceeding one million square miles are generally described as very large, while those under 10,000 square miles are referred to as very small. The category of the size of nation is as follows: Very small (- 10,000), small (10,000 - 60,000), medium (60,000 - 140,000), and large (140,000 -).

There may be considerable variation in the potential contribution of geographical elements in achieving the basic objectives that usually underlie state interventions: (1) the provision of security and order, related to the defense of a territory; (2) the stimulation of economic growth and well-being; and, (3) the guarantee of social justice, etc. Geographical space can fulfill the realm of government actions, demonstrating the rationale of functions on the grounds of either efficiency or equity criteria. In addition, the application of policies requires some spatial considerations for the same purpose to get efficiency or equity.

The problems of size as related to effective national control and politico-territorial organization are nothing new in the history of state evolution. As seen in the literature review, Montesquieu already mentioned the regime types based on the size of country. According to the previous cross-national studies, population size has an influence on government performance or government stability since it affects overall rates of political change. As a result, the more densely populated countries are more unstable because high level of population density becomes a main source of change and social dislocation.

Consider the redistributive element of public programs, where the spatial distribution of benefits to individuals and household ought to be in accord with population - which is in fact the case for education, health, housing, and income-maintenance benefits. Governments of small countries have to deal with qualitatively less heterogeneous societies - similar attitudes, values, and beliefs. In a general sense, a chief executive in a country with small population is more likely to be successful in office.

Actually, country sizes run the gamut from the minute Vatican - less than one-sixth of a square mile - to that of the giant former Soviet Union, over 8.5 million square miles prior to the collapse of the Eastern Block. With respect to country size, it is easier to keep order in smaller nations (Lijphart, 1977; de Blij, 1967). In a small nation it is easier for authorities to perceive when discontent is smoldering and to act to prevent its outbreak, either through suppression or by alleviating its causes. Meanwhile, in large nations, the information processes work less well, and control is more difficult; hence, outbursts are more likely. Small countries offer better requisites for the creation of the spirit of cooperativeness and an accommodation, which is crucial for the maintenance of democracy (Lijphart, 1977, p.65). In such countries, it is probable that the political leaders will be more united through personal acquaintance and interaction.

Proposition 10: In older countries, leaders tend to have longer duration in office.

As one of the indicators for legitimacy, age of nationhood is very important. An older country is more likely to have achieved a high level of national identity than a newer country. An older country is stronger, having usually lived through a number of crises. The political leaders in the older countries are likely to be more successful since those countries tend to have institutional stability and political tranquillity. It is because opportunities for succession are more numerous in older countries. Irregularities of succession are rare among very new countries.

This proposition is pretty much related to colonial experience of the country. Colonial experience in each country's history reflects the establishment of her own background. Even though one country is located in a certain region and has been

sharing same cultural influence in that region, if she has been affected by foreign power, her own culture should have been changed in some degree. The new states were handed down the political and administrative structure of the imperial nations.

For example, the British built up a fairly well-functioning administrative system in the colonies, imposing a kind of indirect rule. France, meanwhile, applied a markedly centralized administrative system, which was sustained in all essentials by officials from the home country. Thus, the population of the French colonies became less involved in the exercise of authority. As a result, the states which the British left behind would, for these reasons, be better equipped for democratic government than those which had belonged to France. The impact of colonialism on the traditional societies of Asia and Africa is significant.

Low modernization is associated with low participation, low competitiveness, and fewer political parties. Lower levels of modernization are related to a party system which is relatively less complex and characterized by low competitiveness where a single party has been established as the dominant one (Huntington, 1968). As indicators of structural attributes, we may use party system, economic system, and cabinet size may be formally used.

The issue of political success is related to whether the political leaders have legitimacy and efficiency. An efficient institution of a chief executive will become more legitimate as time passes, while one which is inefficient will lose credibility. To keep a position as a prime minister or a president, an individual must have a strong desire for office and a willingness to do whatever the system requires to reach the top. If legitimacy entails the involvement of many groups in the selection of the chief

executive as well as in the decision-making process, the result may be a reduction in efficiency through instability or indecisiveness.

Proposition 11: The more fragmented the party system, the more unstable we expect the government to be; and the shorter the leader stays in office. As a result, government stability is negatively correlated with the number of parties in the government.

Another line of inquiry focused on the impact of the party system in maintaining political stability (Pridham, 1990). The stability of political leadership depends on party activities in the electoral and legislative arenas. Political parties play a leading role everywhere in legitimizing and institutionalizing the paths of political careers, not only as an instrument for winning and administering power but also as an instrument best adapted to political struggle. We know that some parties adapt very easily to open competition and the peaceful transfer of political power while others are exclusive and seem unable to react to power alternatives, with the exception of violence. The more diffuse are the party roles, and the more variegated the career paths, the more diverse the people selected thereby. Parties are two-way means of communication of influence between rulers and population.

Party system is related to the degree of national integration and dimension of the process of national development and modernization. Economic development is more likely to be realized, given one dominant political party, or a pair of parties, each strongly committed to economic development, as opposed to a multiplicity of parties (Lerner, 1957). The number of parties affects democratic stability (Lipset, 1960; Blondel, 1968; Tylor and Herman, 1971; Sanders and Herman, 1977; Dodd, 1976;

Fisichella, 1984). If party systems are highly fractionalized, government tends to form in unstable and conflictory political systems.

Competitive party systems ensure relatively high levels of turnover in government (Mishler and Hildreth, 1984). A multiparty system tends to depress people's support for a leader. Meanwhile, a single party system sees itself as synonymous with the entire people and offers less political opportunity and higher political risk than parties in a competitive system. Consequently, leaders in a single party system or a single-party dominated system are more likely to stay longer in office than their counterparts in competitive party systems. A single party system usually leads to a totalitarian system in which the government nevertheless strives to achieve mass political support on the basis of a powerful, visionary ideology.

However, a stable multi-party presidential democracy is more difficult to achieve than a two-party presidential democracy or a multi-party parliamentary system (Lijphart, 1992, p.116). Countries with at least one effective governing party are more likely to deal successfully with the problem of succession than are countries where parties are not present. While governing juntas of bureaucrats and military men are rarely prepared for the politics of peacefully electing their own leader or of having leadership peacefully pass from one person to another, at least parties are experienced in the art of internal elections.

The strength of environment promotes leader's success. For example, prosperous economic periods give heads of government more chances to obtain their success. Economic development fosters democratic political stability; the state's capacity to promote economic effectiveness is itself a key ingredient in Lipset's

formulation of stability. The economy's infrastructure such as wealth, industrialization, education (literacy), and urbanization, leads to the emergence of viable political performance (Lipset, 1981, pp.27-86).

Long leadership tends to exist in countries where the extent of social and economic change is low. If the freedom of social, political, and economic areas is guaranteed, the changes will be less. Thus, the society tends to very stable and the political leader will stay in office longer. Economic freedom, freedom index as a combination of political right index and civil right index, homogeneity index, urbanization, and literacy are used as indicators of economic and sociopolitical development for the hypotheses testing.

Proposition 12: The lower the extent of social and economic change, the longer the leadership will tend to prevail.

The level of economic freedom depends on what economic system the society is in. While economic systems vary considerably among cultures, they can generally be analyzed by looking at who manages the system and how, and upon what basis the goals are distributed. Democracy is associated with a certain form of economic organization, namely capitalism. Capitalism promoted a dispersion of power in society which creates a favorable basis for political democracy.

Meanwhile, under socialism, a strongly concentrated, organizationally coherent economic and political power breeds passivity and fear among both the citizens and potential opposition parties. No one dares to seriously resist the political leaders who control his livelihood (Schumpeter, 1975). Especially, in the turbulent politics of

developing nations, leaders can never take tenure for granted. Political survival must be actively pursued by manipulating public policy to construct supporting coalition.

Proposition 13: More divisions or cleavages of race, language, and religion in society increase instability. Therefore, the leader who is in the more homogeneous society is more likely to stay in office longer since the society is more likely to be stable.

Ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences are inescapable facets of politics within as well as between countries; internal conflict and instability flow from tensions and processes of mobilization. In deeply divided societies (Lorwin, 197; Nordlinger, 1972), increased political consciousness, as the result of social mobilization, could be expected to strain or destroy the cohesion of states (Deutsch, 1961). The homogeneity index implies a measurement for social and political cleavages. As cleavages increase, so does political instability. A lack of homogeneity in the population contributes to increased political violence, i.e., political instability. If all population had the same political choices, the task of political job would be much easier. Where social cleavages are deep, the legitimacy of the social arrangements is low, and leadership is less likely to emerge unchallenged.

Political cleavages result from a set of attitudes that divides the nation's citizens into major political groups based on religion, language, race and tribe. Those cleavages represent a sense of distance between factions and causes fear, distrust, and hostility between them. It becomes the source of major conflict and leads to low integration. To that extent, loyalty to country or a head of government itself is dispersed. Political tensions and conflicts arising from social cleavages can seriously affect national

political instability and the capacity of governments to control their territories. As a result, the greater the homogeneity in a society, the more executive stability given the problem of issue bargainability. In a democratic society - religio-ethno-linguistically homogeneous - or alternately which provides a great deal of economic mobility - large degrees of economic inequality will be tolerated.

Proposition 14: As one of the social mobilization indicators, a higher literacy rate results in a higher level of political stability, and, therefore, the leaders in that society stay in office for a long period.

Countries with modernized social structures and developed, industrial economies are expected to have a higher level of stable and effective government, for the indicators of modernization, urbanization and literacy rate are important (Lerner, 1957; Lipset, 1960; Deutsch, 1961). An urban and industrial society makes democracy possible by providing a fair distribution of wealth, a public with a sense of political efficacy and the time and inclination to participate in politics. Literacy and urbanization pertain to a development away from a life of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy, and into a different life of broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life, including potential and actual involvement in mass politics. However, urbanization is not included in the test since it may be highly correlated with populated density.

The literacy rate is indicative of the level of aspirations and expectations in society. It broadens outlooks, increases tolerance, reduces extremism, enhances belief in democratic values and practices, develops a capacity to make rational electoral choices, and reflects greater skills and specialization (Lipset, 1960). Greater literacy

promotes openness and a deeper insight into political issues and contributes to increased participation. The literacy rate, by specifying the proportion of population which can read in one language, gives a fair picture of national participation in the whole cultural sector. According to Lerner (1957), literacy around the world correlated at .84 with per-capita income and at .87 with industrialization.

Proposition 15: Leaders in the countries with high levels of freedom status are more likely to have longer durations in office.

As far as a definition of democracy can be incorporated into a concept of stability or institutionalization, which refers to the degree to which the political system may be expected to remain in existence, political democracy is associated with freedom of the individual. The degree of repressiveness imposed by a government indicates not only the extent to which a system of governance will tolerate its political challengers, but the plan of a coercive compliance structure. Political freedom is a combined index that political right and civil right indices that are measured by a government's regulations which deprive basic human and political rights. If a society does not assure a degree of equality and participation, pressures that may undermine stability can be generated. The cost factor of political participation is directly linked to the extent of a government's coercive activities, that is, the probability of getting caught as well as the severity of punishment.

In a nondemocratic nation, that is to say, a nation with low political rights and civil rights, even though it is more likely to be unstable, the leaders can hold power long since the government sanction is too extreme and the cost of participation is too

high. However, sometimes there have been exceptions: for example, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Amin in Uganda, Marcias in Equatorial Guinea, and Bokassa in Central Africa, all ignored social and economic policy-making because they were able to avoid pressure for social and economic development only if the aspiration of their citizens were extremely low (Blondel, 1987, p.71).

Nonetheless, even in a society with high political and civil right indices, where political institutions are relatively weak, leaders also can not stay longer, because the cost of participation is low and leadership is more likely to be vulnerable. The leaders in the society have less political power over the nonleaders. It increases the likelihood of political instability by exacerbating political divisions and conflicts and by encouraging criticism of the incumbent regime.

Proposition 16: A presidential system based on elections has a longer duration of office than prime ministers through selection systems. In general, presidential systems are more stable - as measured by the tenure of the chief executive - than prime minister systems. The greater and more autonomous presidential resources make such stability likely.

The basic constitutional rules by which political leaders are chosen and authoritative decisions are made should be considered. They can be operationalized by systems of executive leadership or institution of the executive. It explains the executive-legislative relations how independent a chief executive is from congress. Even though the position of prime ministers or general secretaries as collegial leadership is not as strong as the position of the president, they are still the most prominent figure in certain ways. Selection results in nomination to office, while election results in the holding of office. Prime ministers are less personality-oriented

and less focused on public image. In collegial leadership, the members of party or the members of politburo elect a top executive.

Proposition 17: Cultural patterns based on regional differences, once established, possess considerable autonomy and can influence subsequent political and economic events, i.e., democracy (regime type) and economic development. Political culture plays an important role in the development and maintenance (or failure) of democracy.

Based on regional comparisons, cultural difference should be considered as a control variable. Countries which have a common culture can be categorized, and these categories used in comparisons will then be likely to carry the same or similar meanings in each political system, such as Latin America, Europe, Asia, Oceania, the Arab Middle East, and Africa. Each political culture, as well as each region of the world differs somewhat in the typical backgrounds of its rulers. Political culture refers to widespread ideas, habits, norms, symbols, and practices that are politically relevant to a given system, especially as they relate to the legitimate use of power. Since the traditional culture of the period stressed obedience, respect, and deference to authority, there was a tacit general acceptance of the principle of government by men rather than laws.

Alongside legitimation based on public consent, there are vestigial expectations about political leadership which are derived from the mixed Western heritage of monarchy, aristocracy, and the like. For example, while the path to democracy in Europe and the Anglo-American nations that were protestant resulted in higher levels of economic development and stabilization of democratic government, Asian countries followed Confucianism as an alternative road to democratization (Diamond, 1993).

However, one would hardly expect to find either democratic cultures or stable representative, liberal, constitutional regimes in Latin America or Africa. Without the Protestant tradition, there are likely to be unstable or perhaps ephemeral. The authoritarian, hierarchical, monistic cultural heritage of Latin America has greatly diminished the prospects for liberal democracy (Inglehart, 1990).

If there were cultural differences in the perception of political leaders and leadership, then one might reasonably anticipate that the cross-cultural validity of the findings associated with research on implicit leadership theory would be affected. Different cultural values affect the acceptability of ideas and practices associated with political leadership across the nations. Dispositions toward authority are different in each political culture.

Western democratic political culture denies faith in powerful leaders, that is, authoritarian personalities, while common tendencies in Asia are more focused on loyalty to the collectivity over individual freedom and needs as well as on respect for paternalistic authority relations (Pye, 1984, pp.184-185). Even after the independence from a colonial control, cultural renewal is first and foremost the job of top political leadership. Cultural values should be exemplified by top leaders to provide supreme examples for others to follow.

CHAPTER IV

Operationalization and Methodology

In the theoretical parts in the previous chapter, 17 propositions relating to a leader's political survival were presented. In this chapter, first of all, data collection and sample selection will be discussed. Second, all independent variables and a dependent variable for testing the 17 hypotheses will be discussed and operationalized. Finally, with those operationalized variables, the most appropriate method for the research and its interpretation will be introduced and discussed.

A. Data Collection and Operationalization

Nation states arise from the time that they achieved independence as sovereign political units. The victory of the democracies in 1945 seemed to open a new era for political progress, with the United Nations as the symbol of the optimism. Between 1945 and 1991, almost 98 former dependencies joined the ranks of independent actors on the world stage. Nonetheless, of the approximately 175 independent countries that exist in the world today, more than 130 governments can be considered nondemocratic.

The popular political system, that is, presidential or parliamentary, can not be applied to all independent countries. The large majority of third world countries function under a system which does not fall within the province of these two systems of government, and, definitely, communist countries operate under quite a different model. In modern constitutional regimes, a chief executive is chosen through each constitutive system. Some become presidents by referendum in general elections, some

by national assemblies, or some by coups or violence. Along similar lines, the communist leaders, i.e., the General Secretaries, are elected by the party in a one-party system, whereas the prime ministers also would be the heads of the government by the elected assembly or by a chairman of the party in the parliamentary system.

Data Collection

The sample in this research is composed of the political leaders who actually had been heads of government from 1945 to the end of 1991. 997 leaders from 147 countries including those who were still in power in 1991 when the data were collected are included. Among all the heads, the role of a head of government is most important in decision-making. As mentioned earlier, since ruling monarchs have gradually shrunk since World War II, those are excluded from the samples. Also, all collective regimes are eliminated.⁹ However, even stop-gap, interim leaders, who are the truly temporary appointment of men chosen because they hold a neutral position in the political spectrum, are included in the sample. They usually would continue to be in these offices since they used to be vice presidents or deputy prime ministers before getting into interim positions.

Considering both left and right time limits, some manipulations for data selection are needed. If a leader had entered his office before 1945 and got out of his office before 1992, he or she is included in the sample. However, although a leader became a head of government during that period and was still in power, it is not certain whether he can not be included in a target sample for the analyses since it is not possible to

⁹ See p.43 in CHAPTER II.

Figure 2 Distribution of Duration (Percentage)





Figure 3 Cases Excluded from the Sample



know his exit mode and correct duration of office. The plot of the frequency distribution of durations seems to be an exponential specification showing that it reveals a large concentration of shorter durations with the numbers of cases diminishing as durations become more lengthy (see Figure 2); high percentages of the distributions of 0-2 years exist in all leaders as well as the leaders out of office. In order to reduce missing data that represents the duration of leaders (115 leaders) who were still in office, 13 leaders who were in the duration of 0-2 years are deleted from the whole population. In other words, the leaders excluded from the sample are those who got into office since 1989 but just had been in office for less than 3 years. The leaders who were still in office, but had been in power longer than 2 years will be included in the statistical analyses (102 cases).

Although longevity of a top executive has been theoretically explained by governmental stability or durability, it is, in a direct sense, a matter of personal survival, not governmental durability. To measure the length of his service is to measure the length of time that any one person holds office at a single stretch. Therefore, discontinuous terms of each individual leader are counted separately. Similarly, each regime of a country can be taken as a separate historical instance, i.e., as an individual case. When a national election is held, if an incumbent is reelected, the government is assumed to be the same government as the previous one. However, if a same leader became a top executive not in a consecutive terms, he is coded as a different case.

There is nothing inherent in nonquantitative methods of political analysis that would prevent their application to the study of political leadership. The discovery or neglect of political leadership as a subject for political inquiry could not be attributed

primarily to the presence or absence of a commitment to quantitative scientific methods. New methods and facilities for collecting quantifiable data have provided scholars with an unexpected amount of information in the area of leadership research in part as well as in the modern societies. However, its selection of data has to be based on a previously established general theory. It should keep an eye on not only the problems of relevancy, but also the problems of validity. In fact, the problems of conceptualization and operationalization are not easy.

In most research on political leadership, biographies have been regarded as the main data sources. A political biography is a case history which should move us toward comparative generalizations about the success or failure of similar individuals in different situations and different individuals in similar situations (Edinger, 1964, p.671). However, the use of the biography is vulnerable to scholarly criticism. For example, according to Sidney Lee (1928):

....True biography is no handmaid of eternal instruction. Its purpose is not that of history. It does not exist to serve biological or anthropological science. Any assistance that biography renders these three great interests - ethical, historical, and scientific - should be accidental; such aid is neither essential nor obligatory.

Subjectivity of biographical use results from several aspects. First, unsuccessful leaders tend to be slighted, because material on their lives is frequently far less readily available than it is for their more successful rivals. Second, the operational criteria seem to be determined as much by the author's personal inclination as by the cultural climate in which he writes.

Most political biographies have collected information from several sources. The

directories with short articles on each man are more inclusive in their coverage but contain only a minimum of information. The best source of information about the lives of political leaders is the popular biography. The daily, weekly, and monthly press both in the United States and abroad contains a tremendous amount of biographical information.

Some popular biography is indexed and readily available to the researchers. Also, although not all materials are indexed, some biographical information is most available in newspaper obituary columns. Since the evaluation of their performance is different, their backgrounds might not be recorded in an objective manner. Even though the use of a number of different sources yields conflicting facts and conclusions, those are, in fact, minor problems.

Rather, political biographies have tended to fall into certain categories which are marked by how much significance is attributed to the subject's personality or to his socio-political environment. The creative or literary biography is more deliberate in the selection and organization of data. The data on personal background and skills and personality of the political leaders can be collected from several kinds of sourcebooks (see APPENDIX A).

For example, a *Who's Who* type of source is descriptive material about the incumbents of elite positions from which the more comparative studies attempt some sort of configurative analysis of elite attitudes and behavior. The gathering of social background data on political leaders should go hand in hand with the examination of the historical, situational, social, and psychological conditions under which they have emerged. These endeavors involve close scrutiny of primary and secondary sources

with heavy reliance on biographical materials, obituaries, and historical dictionaries, to the extent that these are available.

Operationalization

In a strict sense, the duration of political office as a head of government takes place within an institutional framework which is determined in principle. Even though it is determined by an institutional or structural (constitutional) aspect, in the behavioral aspect, it is dependent on the effectiveness or performance of political leaders. It provides a test of the extent to which the arrangements are applied in practice and of the indication of the strength and authority of both the chief executives and of the political system. And, it suggests whether certain types of arrangement are generally more successful than others.

The duration of chief executives in office is the most single important characteristic for evaluating their survival or success; it relates in part to the structures of the office itself, as some forms of government restrict the period during which the chief executive can stay in office. At least, we can compare the characteristics of the leaders who have succeeded in staying in office for one or more decades with those of 'ordinary' heads of government in terms of their social and career background and their environment. In measuring a duration of office, if the duration is less than 6 months, it is counted as 0, and whenever the duration includes more than 6 months with some whole years, it is rounded off to a year. As a result, the unit of measurement is 'year'.

So, it is possible to obtain information on the composition and duration of the political leaders and, thus, have a clearer picture of the event and type of experiences

which are shared by the rulers of different countries. Qualitative data on the backgrounds of political leaders can provide information about their origins and experiences. Biographical or historical materials are usually quantified as nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales. A nominal scale, however, does not properly involve a quantitative dimension, since its numbers serve only to identify qualitatively distinct entities. The social background variables such as age, birth place, and educational level, as well as the career variables such as political experience, previous occupation, foreign experience, and party ideology, will be tested for the hypotheses.

Profiles of political leaders do not yield any common threads. Institutional settings are so dissimilar that we are unable to formulate a set of common assumptions that apply to every situation. There are no precise solutions to a process that seems to be based on the personality of the individual, the collective culture of a group, and the situation at hand.

Keeping attention to the question "who should rule?", it is important to think about what principle of selectivity should be used to choose political leaders. Who becomes a political leader is not just decided by elections, primaries, and voting but, rather, is also the result of a continual sifting and sorting of the citizens who enter the quest for political power. Furthermore, there are many examples to show how the conditions and requisites for entry into the political class vary from country to country and in different historical periods: Wealth, birth, and individual merit.

The social background study provides possibilities to salvage the postulate of class interest by applying it not to individuals but to large numbers. It is also possible to shift the emphasis from the social or class origins of political leaders to their

education, training, and other formative experiences. Comparisons over time and among countries can greatly help in the formulation of such suggestions and hypotheses.

The variables in this group are mostly personal backgrounds, that is, social background variables and career variables. These are very influential to political orientation on each area. For examples, family socialization depends on the social status of their fathers, the occupation of their fathers, and the place of birth. School socialization depends on educational backgrounds, major at schools and involvement in activities at school. Other sources for political orientation are traveling abroad, career attributes and military experiences, etc. Age, gender, and residence often have as great an influence on political opportunities as the class structure.

The strength of a leader depends on various characteristics of a purely 'personal' character. A political leader is almost always possessed of some set of philosophical and political convictions that he has, for one reason or another, made his own. As much might be said of almost every political leader who makes any pretense at ideological sophistication. For the most part in the studies of political leadership (psychological approaches), traits have been based on the (often expressed) assumption that the same skills and traits are required to be leader in all situations and circumstances. Desire, skill, and endurance are most necessary to succeed in a political career before someone can expect to be a political leader.

Some ad hoc procedures definitely will be necessary to estimate the values of the explanatory variables at the times of events. For the institutional or country data, the time when the leaders became heads of government should be considered carefully.

On the other hand, some country variables such as population density, urbanization, literacy, freedom index, etc., are considered as time varying, others, such as country size, cabinet size, party system, economic system, homogeneity index, etc., are relatively constant or the same over time. Time varying variables are usually measured at the year when the leaders became chief executives. The sources of data collection and all variable lists for the research are in APPENDIX A.

B. Methodology

Statistical Analysis

When all units are in the data set and all explanatory variables are observed, yet some values of the dependent variable are unobserved, those unobserved cases are censored intentionally. To drop the censored observations from the analysis is not only to discard useful information, but also to create predictable biases. Thus, in an effort to minimize the missing specification errors as much as possible, manipulation for data selection was introduced earlier in this chapter.

Also, if the dependent variable (Y_i), duration of office, is considered as a continuous variable, a linear regression model may be possible. However, for certain theoretical purposes, the dependent variable is divided into 4 categories, and if it is limited in some way, the bias that arises from using least squares becomes a serious problem. Using regression estimates with a qualitative dependent variable can lead to serious errors in inference (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, p.9). The least squares criterion is inappropriate or difficult to apply, since it can not easily be applied to variables that are ordinal or categorical in nature.

As seen in the previous theoretical part, a theoretical model was introduced based on 'duration of office' as a dependent variable and three groups of exogenous variables, such as social, career backgrounds, and institutional characteristics, that included up to 27 dummy variables and 5 continuous variables (see Table 1). Thus, the analyses at first, will be preceded by three reduced models in order to test how each exogenous variable group relates with a dependent variable, and finally, by a grand model to examine the interactive effects of social and career backgrounds as well as the institutional characteristics.

Based on the individual unit of analysis, a theoretical model with 'duration of office' will be tested by a two-equation model that comprises a selection model equation including 984 cases with a two-category dependent variable, and a substantive model which will be applied to only 581 cases which are selected as a 'NON-SHORT' category of the dependent variable, 'SURVIVAL', in order to test the strength of political survival.

The data for this research, as was mentioned above, are not from a random sample. Instead, the research attempts to examine the entire population of relevant data for the theoretical perspective, and, therefore, the violation of one of the assumption underlying a nonlinear probability model (probit or ordered probit) should not be a concern. Probit parameters are estimated by a method called Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). MLE is different from OLS in that it does not have unbiasedness, efficiency, and normality with a small sample. However, in the case of large sample, it exhibits the asymptotic properties of unbiasedness, efficiency and normality. The main goal in using a two-equation model is based on stochastic censoring. The two-

equation model is specified as a probit in the selection equation and an ordered probit in the substantive equation.

Selection Equation:

As a dependent variable, SURVIVAL (Y_{ii}) is a binary variable. A probit model is appropriate for a test using a dichotomous dependent variable based on the Bernoulli distribution. Y_{ii} has two values (0,1) and there will be only one threshold ($\mu=0$).

$$Y_{ii} = \alpha + \sum \beta_k X_{ki} + u_i \quad u_i \sim N(0, \delta^2 I)$$

$$Y_{ii} = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ (SHORT)} & \text{if } 0 \leq \text{duration} \leq 2 \\ 1 \text{ (NOT-SHORT)} & \text{if duration} \geq 3 \end{cases}$$

Unobserved theoretical dependent variable, Y_i^* , satisfies

$$Y_i^* = \sum \beta_k X_{ki} + u_i \quad u_i \sim N(0, \delta^2 I)$$

where the independent variables (X_i s) are as followings (See Table 1):

X_1 = AGE	X_9 = POLTWO	X_{17} = CONSERV	X_{25} = PARTFREE
X_2 = COLLEGE	X_{10} = POLALL	X_{18} = OLD	X_{26} = FULLFREE
X_3 = URBAN	X_{11} = FORSTUD	X_{19} = PREZ	X_{27} = ECONFREE
X_4 = LAWPOL	X_{12} = FORWORK	X_{20} = SINGLEP	X_{28} = ASIA
X_5 = CIVSERV	X_{13} = FORBOTH	X_{21} = MULTIP	X_{29} = AFRICA
X_6 = MILITAR	X_{14} = NCONSTI	X_{22} = HOMOGEN	X_{30} = MIDEAST
X_7 = LIBTECH	X_{15} = LIBERAL	X_{23} = POPDEN	X_{31} = EURNAME
X_8 = POLONE	X_{16} = CENTRE	X_{24} = LITERACY	X_{32} = LATIN

In this formulation, the function of probability of getting value $Y_{ii} = 1$ (NOT-SHORT) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable Y_i^* .

$$\begin{aligned}
P(Y_{1i} = 1) &= P(Y_i^* > 0) = P(u_i > -\sum \beta_k X_{ki}) \\
&= P(u_i < \sum \beta_k X_{ki}) = P(u_i < Z_i) \\
&= F(Z_i) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{Z_i} e^{-t^2/2} dt .
\end{aligned}$$

To obtain an estimate of the index Z_i , the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function, $F^{-1}(P_i)$, can be applied.

The selection equation with a two-stage procedure is to estimate the probit function determining whether a leader stayed in office 'SHORT ($Y_{1i}=0$)' or 'NOT-SHORT ($Y_{1i}=1$)'. Basically, for this function, we need to assume that we observe Y_{2i} (STRENGTH of survival) when $Y_{1i} > 0$. The main goal of this function is to get a value of λ_i (hazard rate) for each observation in a substantive equation, which comes from the sample selection procedure. Using the selection equation, we get an estimated value of $Z_i = -BX_i$ for every case and calculate a hazard rate (λ_i) by $\phi(Z_i) / 1 - \Phi(Z_i)$. Then, we use λ_i as one of the explanatory variables in a substantive equation.

The λ_i has a similar function as a z-score and monotone decreasing function of the probability of the observations selected. It is the probability that observation i has data for Y_{2i} (STRENGTH). $\Phi(Z_i)$ and $\phi(Z_i)$ respectively are the density and distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The hazard rate has the following two characteristics (Heckman, 1976, p.479). First, its denominator is the probability that an observation i has data Y_i ; secondly, the lower the probability that an observation has data on Y_i the greater the value of λ_i for that observation.

Substantive Equation:

In a substantive equation, STRENGTH (Y_{2i}) is used as a dependent variable. As mentioned above, 581 cases in the NOT-SHORT category of SURVIVAL are analyzed with 3 categories: 1 (3-6) with 357 cases, 2 (7-12) with 131 cases, and 3 (13 +) with 93 cases. Even though the same independent variables are included in this model, the hazard rates obtained from the selection model are used as one of the independent variables in the substantive model. The model specification is as follows:

$$Y_{2i} = \alpha + \sum \beta_k X_{ki} + u_i \quad u_i \sim N(0, \delta^2 I)$$

$$Y_i^* = \alpha + \sum \beta_{jk} X_{jki} + u_i \quad u_i \sim N(0, \delta^2 I)$$

$$y_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu_{j-1} < Y_i^* \leq \mu_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

for $i = 1, \dots, n$

$j = 1, \dots, M$

$M = \text{The number of categories}$

$$Y_{2i} = \begin{cases} 1 & (3 - 6) & \text{if } Y_i^* < 0 \\ 2 & (7 - 12) & \text{if } 0 \leq Y_i^* < \mu_2 \\ 3 & (13 +) & \text{if } \mu_2 \leq Y_i^* \end{cases}$$

* () indicates the duration of office for each category.

Since 'STRENGTH', like 'NOT-SHORT', is divided into 3 categories, the linear regression model can not be used since the dependent variable is not continuous. The duration of office becomes a discrete ordered categorical variable. Based on an ordered polytomous dependent variable, the ordered probit model will be appropriate. The observed variable, Y_{2i} , is an ordinal variable. Thus, we assume that the variable of theoretical interest, Y_i^* which is unobserved and should be interval, fits a normal

Table 1 Dummy Variables

Demographic Attribute	Career Attribute	Institutional Attributes
Place of Birth (BPLACE)	Previous Career (CAREER)	Region (REGION)
URBAN = Urban+Capitol [Rural+Foreign]	LAWPOL = Lawyer/Party Off./ Pol. Activist	ASIA = Asia
	CIVSERV = Civil Service	AFRICA = Africa
Educational Level (DEGREE)	MILITAR = Military	MIDEAST = Middle East
COLLEGE = Above College [Below High]	LIBTECH = Liberal/Business/ Own Farm/Tech.	EURNAME = Europe/N.Amer
	[Laborer/Small Wage/Farmer/ Agriculture]	LATIN = Latin America [Oceania]
	Long-term Foreign Experiences (FOREIGN)	Type of Head of Government) (LEADTYPE)
	FORSTUD = Study	PREZ = President/Military
	FORWORK = Work	[Prime Mini./Gen. Sec.]
	FORBOTH = Both	
	[NONE]	Party System (PARTYSYS)
Political Ideology (PID)		SINGLEP = Single Party
LIBERAL = Liberal		MULTIP = Multiparty
CENTRE = Ind/Cent		[No Party]
CONSERV = Conservative		
Political Experience (POLEXP)		Status of Freedom (FREESTAT)
POLONE = Party or Ministry or Congress		PARTFREE = Partly Free
POLTWO = Party+Ministry/ Ministry+Cong/ Party+Cong		FULLFREE = Free
POLALL = Party+Mini.+Cong		[Not Free]
Mode of Being a Leader (ENTRY)		Country Age (COAGECAT)
	NCONSTI = Nonconstitutional [constitutional]	OLD = 31 + Years [0 - 30 Years]

[] is the category that is omitted from each variable in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity.

distribution.

The relationship between the categories of Y_{2i} and the values of Y_i^* is specified based on the threshold values. Even though Y_{2i} is ordinal, it can be represented as a series of dichotomous variables. Since the dependent variable, in this test, is categorized into three categories (1 - 3), there will be two thresholds (μ_1, μ_2) to be estimated with $\mu_1=0$. The estimation for the model will be based on the log likelihood function to use maximum likelihood method, which is concerned with picking estimates that imply the highest likelihood of having obtained the observed sample of the dependent variable.

All independent variables in both the selection and the substantive equations are the same. Most personal background variables and institutional characteristics are nominal in the model. However, AGE and some institutional variables such as HOMOGEN, LITERACY, POPDEN and ECONFREE, are continuous. The independent variables for the models are not difficult to operationalize. Each category of the nominal exogenous variables is considered as a dummy independent variable. The specific operationalization for the categorical variables is shown as Table 1 (also, see APPENDIX A).

Interpretation of Results

Estimates for the probit model are developed by the method of maximum likelihood. A probit analysis yields estimates that are true probabilities and which lie in the appropriate range (Aldrich and Cnudde, 1975, p.581). Consequently, it is possible to more accurately reflect the qualitative choice being made and how it has been measured. In a **probit model (selection equation)**, estimated coefficients reflect the **effect** of a change in an independent variable upon the inverse of the normal CDF.

However, the coefficients should not be interpreted as straightforward as with regression coefficients (Aldrich and Cnudde, p. 580). The amount of the increase in the probability depends upon the original probability and, thus, upon the initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.

An increase or decrease of one standard deviation in each independent variable has effect on $\Pr(Y_{1i} = 1)$, assuming that all other variables are currently at their mean (at $Z = 0.0$ and probability = .5). The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the change the magnitude depends upon $F(Z_i)$, and reflects the steepness of the CDF at Z_i . The steeper the CDF, the greater the impact of a change in the value of an explanatory variable. Meanwhile, the estimated standard errors indicate the usual measure of the likely variation in the estimated coefficients that one anticipates to arise from sample to sample. In terms of importance, variables with relatively large coefficients (in absolute value) have the potential to have the greatest impact on the outcome of political survival. They can potentially have the greatest influence on the estimated probability of whether the dependent variable takes on the value of 0 or 1.

The individual coefficient estimates in a probit model measure the relationship between the exogenous variables, X_i s, and the endogenous variable, Y_i . The t-score is used for testing the H_0 that a coefficient (β_k) is 0. The test-statistic is defined as $t_k = \beta_k/s_k$ and is used to see whether the null hypothesis can be rejected. For the test of the significance of individual coefficients, such as individual hypotheses testing, standard normal tests (t-statistics) can be applied just as with OLS regression.

For the analysis of the substantive equation (**ordered probit**), as for the selection equation (dichotomous probit), the standard coefficient (β_{jk}^*) represents the

number of standard deviations of change in the dependent variable (Y_i^*), duration indicator, brought about by a change of an standard deviation on the independent variable. Thus, it allows one to compare the strength of different variables in the same equation. The Y_i^* change with the independent variables according to the sign and magnitude of the corresponding coefficients; and the magnitude of the change is constant at all levels of the independent variables.

Instead of using an estimated R^2 as a goodness-of-fit measure as in the OLS, the likelihood-ratio test statistics will be used for the probit model. While likelihood-ratio is usually used as a test statistic for overall significance of the model, it actually takes on the role as a goodness-of-fit measure. A test of the overall significance of the independent variables ($H_0 : \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \dots = \beta_k = 0$) can be based on the different log likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio is defined to be:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta &= L(\theta')/L(\theta) \\ \Delta^* &= -2 \log \Delta = -2 [L^*(\theta') - L^*(\theta)] \\ &= -2 (LLR_0 - LLR_1) .\end{aligned}$$

While $L^*(\theta)$ ($= LLR_1$) is the log of the likelihood function for the full model as fitted and evaluated at point θ with all the parameters, $L^*(\theta')$ ($= LLR_0$) is the log of the likelihood function evaluated at point θ' with a constant term (intercept) only (restricted model). Δ^* ($= -2LLR$) is tested by the chi-square distribution with the number of coefficients as the degrees of freedom. $-2LLR$ yields a measure of the statistical significance of the improvement over another model, but does not give any direct indication of the model's overall ability to explain variation in Y_i . The higher the

likelihood, the better the estimations.

For a goodness-of-fit measure, R^2 is not recommended, even though it can be used in the case of a binary dependent variable. In ordered probit analysis, R^2 is only an estimate of the true R^2 because we cannot observe either the residual about the regression plane or even the deviations of the dependent variable about its mean (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975, p.112). However, several pseudo- R^2 have been introduced in order to provide a measure of goodness of fit.¹⁰

According to Hagle and Mitchell (1992, p.774), it is better to use Aldrich and Nelson's measure, $\text{pseudo-}R^2 = -2LLR / (N - 2LLR)$, because of its computational ease, lower standard errors, and higher R^2 's when regressed on the OLS R^2 . Furthermore, even a correction for the Aldrich and Nelson pseudo- R^2 is introduced. However, in this research, any of these R^2 's will not be used as a measure of goodness of fit because the model itself is composed of probit models as well as ordered probit models. Although pseudo- R^2 can be applied to test a goodness of fit of a probit model, it is useless in the test of an ordered probit. There is no obvious intuitive meaning one can attach to this measure.

It is necessary to predict the probability that the dependent variable is in each of 3 categories for any combination of the independent variables. Since both predicted and actual values of the dependent variable are ordinal variables, it is easy to determine the strength of association between the two. As a result, accuracy can be evaluated either

¹⁰ McKelvey-Zavoina (1976), Aldrich-Nelson (1984), and Dhrymes (1986) were compared and evaluated in Hagle and Mitchell (1992)'s work.

in terms of the fit between the two or in terms of the model to forecast observed Y_{2i} . With a success table, it is also possible to compare the improvement of prediction.

For a goodness-of-fit of the model, it is frequently worthwhile to report the in-sample predictive success of the model, that is, the number of correct predictions, where a prediction is correct when $\hat{P}_i \geq .5$ and $Y_{1i}=1$ or $\hat{P}_i < .5$ and $Y_{1i}=0$ in the case of probit model. In other words, a useful summary of the predictive ability of the model is a 2 x 2 table of the success and failure of the prediction rule. Similarly, for the ordered probit model (substantive model), a 3 x 3 table of success and failure can be set up based on its prediction rule.¹¹

Though not as common as other measures of goodness-of-fit, proportional reduction error (ROE) is sometimes available. The Goodman and Kruskal (1954) λ ¹² is a measure of the reduction in predictive error in one class due to knowledge of a second class (Weisberg, 1978; Liebetrau, 1983, pp.16-24; Kay, 1991, pp.128-130). It is a measure of a multivariate model's improvement over a selected baseline, rather than a general model's performance. Thus, the usual baseline is the modal category.

The procedure of getting ROE is almost the same as other measures in the crosstabulations. In the crosstabulation of nominal variables, the degree of association

¹¹ The prediction rule for the dependent variable (Y_{2i}) with 3 categories is shown as:

$$p1 = \Pr(Y_{2i} = 1) \quad p2 = \Pr(Y_{2i} = 2) \quad p3 = \Pr(Y_{2i} = 3)$$

$$\text{Prediction} = 1 \quad \text{if } [(p1 \geq p2) \& (p1 \geq p3)]$$

$$\text{Prediction} = 2 \quad \text{if } [(p2 > p1) \& (p2 \geq p3)]$$

$$\text{Prediction} = 3 \quad \text{if } [(p3 > p1) \& (p3 > p2)]$$

¹² Reduction of Error (ROE) is calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{ROE (\%)} = 100 \times \frac{\% \text{ correctly predicted} - \% \text{ modal}}{100 - \% \text{ modal}}$$

is described by how well one can make predictions about the values for members on one variable based on their values on the other variable. The measure is defined as the proportion of errors reduced made, when information on the independent variable is used instead of ignored in making the predictions. Thus, the magnitude of measure of association may be interpreted as the proportional reduction in error. An error consists of a misclassification of a member on the dependent variable. The larger the relative reduction in error, the better the dependent variable can be predicted using the independent variable and the stronger the association between the variables.

Descriptive Analysis

First of all, in order to find what the similarities and differences between political leaders as heads of government are, the definition of cleavage or heterogeneity or fragmentation should be introduced. Especially, in regard to their social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and personality or skills, it is possible to compare the variation based on homogeneity scores. Homogeneity scores based on personal background characteristics will be compared by the groups that indicate systematic differences such as duration, type of removal, region, type of head of government, and number of entry.

Although the sample is a nonrandom purposive sample of political leaders with possibilities as well as limitations, it is possible to develop, consistent with canons of contemporary social science, descriptive - historical statements - or "modal models" - of leader traits and skills, and their social and career backgrounds. In order to make the data from diverse cultures and time periods functionally equivalent, the information of ethnocentric or otherwise biased materials must be minimized as much as possible.

The sample (882) representing the leaders who are out of office is used for the analyses with duration of office and type of removal, whereas the whole sample (997) including the present leaders, is used for the other analyses such as region, type of head of government, or number of entry. It is based on the descriptive statistical method of summarizing the information through crosstabulations. Some variables used in the descriptive analysis are collapsed into different categories for different purposes.

Rae and Taylor (1970, pp.26-33) introduced how to measure the homogeneity index. However, Kim and Patterson (1991, p.198) modified Rae's formula for the fragmentation score, since different background characteristics are coded in different numbers of categories and it is impossible to compare the scores across variables. Especially with a data set which includes several missing values in some variables¹³, a certain effort is needed to utilize available data without discarding all cases with missing cases values. Some social background variables, such as SES and father's occupation, have been omitted from the inferential models because those variables have higher percentages of missing cases. However, they are included in the descriptive analyses as important elements.

Considering that the cases are divided equally between n categories¹⁴, the

¹³ In this study, some personal variables have relatively high percentages of missing data: place of birth (7.9%), major (2.6%), SES (35.9%), father's occupation (40.9%), and orals skills, organization skills, language skills, parents' death/separation in early age, physical deformity, and power connection (22.3%). Also, there are some other personal variables that have small percentages of missing data such as age (.8%), education (1.0%), foreign experience (.9%), prison/exile experience, political activity, military experience, previous career (.8%), experience in congress (2.1%), experience in party (2.0%), experience in ministry (1.8%). In case of the institutional variables, homogeneity index (5.1%), party system (.2%), and literacy (1.0%) have missing values.

¹⁴ The range of F score is 0 to 1. If each individual is in a category by himself ($N=n$), the upper bound for F is 1.

formula for Rae's fragmentation score should be modified. The measure of homogeneity score (H) = $1 - F'$, where F'^{15} is the adjusted fragmentation score. For an example, if SES of the Asian leaders (114 cases) is divided into 3 categories [low (27), middle (23), high (64)], $F_{\max} = 114 \times (3 - 1) / (114 - 1) \times 3$ and $F = (27^2 + 23^2 + 64^2) / 114^2$. As a result, the homogeneity score on SES of the Asian leaders is .123. Thus, when interpreting this score, it is not important what category has the highest or lowest frequencies. Rather, it just indicates how similar or different the leaders in a certain group are on a certain variable.

¹⁵ $F' = F/F_{\max}$, where F is Rae's fragmentation score and F_{\max} is the maximum score an index can attain given its number of categories. The formulas for F and F' are as follows:

$$F = 1 - \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^n f_i (f_i - 1)$$

$$F_{\max} = N(n-1)/n(N-1)$$

CHAPTER V

Presentation and Discussion of Results

As discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV, 984 top executives (heads of governments) across 147 countries were selected by some manipulation and 17 propositions were introduced. A two-equation model is composed of 32 independent variables (5 continuous variables and 27 dummy variables). The dependent variable, 'duration in office', is used according to two different perspectives. For the selection equations, it is categorized into either 'SHORT (0-2 years)' or 'NOT-SHORT (3 + years)'. 'NOT-SHORT' is coded as 1 (581 cases) and 'SHORT' as 0 (403 cases). However, in the substantive equations, only 'NOT-SHORT' (581 cases) is included for testing and analyzed as three different categories: 1 (3 - 6 years), 2 (7 - 12 years), and 3 (13 years +).

In this chapter, first of all, in order to test the propositions on social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and institutional variables, the results of each reduced model will be discussed. With the reduced models, it is predicted to see whether social, or career backgrounds, or institutional attributes as an individual subgroup is a valid predictor of political survival as political success. Second, an interaction model scrutinizes interactional effect after combining all three subgroups together. Being different from the results of the reduced models, it will present different explanation and prediction.

Although the career background model (64.7%) among the reduced models indicates the best goodness-of-fit for predicting political survival (Selection equation), the interaction model (66.55%) shows a better fit than others. Meanwhile, in case of

the substantive equation (the strength of political survival), the institutional model (64.65%) has the highest percentage correctly predicted, but the interaction model (64.74%) surpasses the institutional model (64.65%) in prediction by a shade of difference. Therefore, interpretations of the results from the interaction model will be more emphasized and examined according to each hypothesis.

Finally, at the end of this chapter, the interaction model will be tested by regional differences. In the previous tests, the regional dummies do not show any significance. Therefore, in order to see the regional effect, it is worth while dividing the sample into different regional groups and testing each interaction model. Even though Oceanic countries are excluded from the interpretation for the lack of enough cases, it is possible to find the preferences on political leaders in each region. Personal backgrounds have greater impact on political survival in Latin America in comparison with other regions. However, for explaining the strength of political survival, more personal background variables have significant impact in both the African model and the Middle Eastern model.

According to the goodness-of-fit measures for the regional models, the Middle Eastern model (83.33% correctly predicted) explains leaders' duration, short or long, whereas the European model shows the lowest fit (67.69%). In contrast, for the strength of political survival, the African model (53.61%) indicates the lowest fit and the Middle Eastern (83.97%) and Latin American (87.16%) models indicate better fits than others.

A. Statistical Analysis of the Two-Equation Model

Based on the theoretical propositions mentioned in Chapter III, variables are operationalized and tested for each hypothesis. The results from the OLS model, which is based on continuous duration data do not differ much from those in the substantive equation of the interaction model (see APPENDIX C). The independent variables that are significant in the OLS model are also significant in the ordered probit model. Foreign experiences, ideology, and party system variables turn out to be different. While both SINGLEP and MULTIP are significant in the ordered probit, only MULTIP is significant in the OLS model.

In the OLS model, R^2 , the goodness-of-fit measure comes out to be .20 (corrected R^2 is .17) which is not good enough. Except R^2 statistics, there is nothing else to evaluate a model as a whole. Thus, as far as similar results on significance tests can be seen later in the ordered probit model, the OLS can not be interpreted in any other way. Therefore, this section presents the results of a two-equation model with both the selection (dichotomous probit) and the substantive equations (polychotomous ordered probit), which utilize the same operationalized variables as used in the OLS. In fact, before scrutinizing the whole model (Interaction model) itself, the results from each reduced model will be discussed step by step.

Analysis on Social Backgrounds

The results of both the selection (probit) and the substantive (ordered probit) equations, which estimate a dependent variable, SURVIVAL, with just social background variables, are given in Table 2. Both equations are composed of three independent

variables, but the substantive equation has one more exogenous variable, the hazard rate (λ_i), which is calculated from selection equation in order to adjust for selection bias.

Selection Equation :

$$\text{SURVIVAL} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{AGE} + \beta_2 \text{COLLEGE} + \beta_3 \text{URBAN} + u_i$$

Substantive Equation :

$$\text{STRENGTH} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{AGE} + \beta_2 \text{COLLEGE} + \beta_3 \text{URBAN} + \text{haz} + u_i$$

In the selection equation, whether the estimated R^2 turns out to be significant or not, it is not used as a measure of goodness of fit. This model predicts 61.17% of the durations correctly. The model as a whole, using an analog to F-statistics, -2LLR, is easily significant at the .001 level with a value of 70.48. Nonetheless, actually, the substantive equation has a better fit than the selection equation since the percentage correctly predicted (62.12 %) and -2LLR (96.28) is higher in the substantive equation.

In terms of the individual coefficients, all three of the social backgrounds are significant: AGE and URBAN are significant at .05, and COLLEGE at .10. Surprisingly, however, the directions of URBAN and COLLEGE are different from the predicted ones. In other words, these three social background variables have significant relationships with whether leaders stay in office for 'SHORT' or 'NOT-SHORT', but, in fact, the leaders who had degrees above college and were born in urban areas less more likely to stay in office for longer periods.

The negative sign and relatively weak significance of COLLEGE suggests that military education is considered as a category of above college, and that usually military

leaders are more likely to stay in office shorter because they are coup d'état leaders, transitional or care-taker leaders. Even though URBAN has a significant effect on whether the leader stays in office for a short period or not, unexpectedly, the direction of the relationship turns out to be opposite. The greater chance to be exposed to politics and media in urban areas does not have any roles on political socialization.

Table 2 Coefficient Estimates for Social Background Variables

Selection Equation				Substantive Equation			
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL				Dependent Variable: STRENGTH			
Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score	Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score
Constant	1.274	.247	5.167***	Constant	.017	.102	0.163
AGE	-.112	.040	-3.029***	AGE	.706	2.066	0.342
COLLEGE	-.238	.131	-1.813*	COLLEGE	.560	1.886	0.297
URBAN	-.224	.086	-2.603***	URBAN	-7.960	20.228	-0.394
				haz	5.814	11.965	0.486
				μ	.764	.061	12.552***
% correctly predicted		61.17		% correctly predicted		62.12	
-2 x LLR		70.48***		-2 x LLR		96.28***	
N		904		N		557	

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

With the data (581 cases) from the selection equation, the same independent variables are tested with three categories of duration (DURATION) in order to test the relationships between the social background variables and the strength of political survival. The most interesting finding is that all the exogenous variables are not significant in the substantive equation. Hence, those three social background variables

really matter with whether the leaders stay in office for a short time or not, but do not influence the strength of political survival at all beyond this point.

As a result, these social background variables are very important elements not for the leaders to hold their power longer, but for the people when they elect or choose their leaders. It suggests that after a certain period, i.e. a honeymoon period, the social backgrounds are not considered as significant requirements for the leaders' maintenance in office. During the honeymoon period, the leaders with a peculiar blend of activism and inexperience, prepare to build up new policies and try to mount desires for innovation at precisely the time expertise is lacking as a weapon for survival.

Analysis on Career Backgrounds

Selection Equation :

$$\text{SURVIVAL} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{LAWPOL} + \beta_2 \text{CIVSERV} + \beta_3 \text{MILITAR} + \beta_4 \text{LIBTECH} + \beta_5 \text{POLONE} + \beta_6 \text{POLTWO} + \beta_7 \text{POLALL} + \beta_8 \text{FORSTUD} + \beta_9 \text{FORWORK} + \beta_{10} \text{FORBOTH} + \beta_{11} \text{NCONSTI} + \beta_{12} \text{LIBERAL} + \beta_{13} \text{CENTRE} + \beta_{14} \text{CONSERV} + u_i$$

Substantive Equation :

$$\text{STRENGTH} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{LAWPOL} + \beta_2 \text{CIVSERV} + \beta_3 \text{MILITAR} + \beta_4 \text{LIBTECH} + \beta_5 \text{POLONE} + \beta_6 \text{POLTWO} + \beta_7 \text{POLALL} + \beta_8 \text{FORSTUD} + \beta_9 \text{FORWORK} + \beta_{10} \text{FORBOTH} + \beta_{11} \text{NCONSTI} + \beta_{12} \text{LIBERAL} + \beta_{13} \text{CENTRE} + \beta_{14} \text{CONSERV} + \text{haz} + u_i$$

Among the previous occupations in which the leaders were involved, the politically related fields, such as lawyers, political activists, party officials, as well as civil servants (ministry jobs) have great impact on leaders' political survival. Even though liberal occupation, technical business, etc. are significant at the .10 level (Table 3), military jobs are not crucial to decide their survival at all. However, contrary to the

theoretical expectations, the relationships between politically related jobs (LAWPOL and CIVSERV) and political survival are negative.

Political experiences, whether they had experience only in party, ministry, or congress, are necessary requirements for the leaders to stay in office longer. The *degree* of political experience or its experience in some special places, in fact, does not matter, but the leaders should have at least some political experience. In case of foreign experiences, working in foreign countries itself does not have any impact on political survival. However, studying in foreign countries has significant role in deciding whether or not a leader stays in office for a shorter period.

According to socialization theory, political socialization is more effective at schools than at work areas. Especially, most jobs in foreign countries are military attaché, diplomatic mission, business, and so on. Thus, foreign experiences in those jobs would not have limited impact on new political socialization. However, when leaders were studying abroad, they would acquire certain political perspectives and develop their own views on politics. For example (see Figure 7), high percentages of leaders except in North American and European countries had foreign experience. This trend indicates that leaders from underdeveloped or developing countries would go to foreign countries to obtain advanced education and they have more opportunities to see all different aspects of politics in countries other than their own.

As for the hypothesis on entry mode (NCONSTI), it is expected that leaders by nonconstitutional entry are more likely to stay shorter. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the t-score of NCONSTI is lower than its critical value, while means that nonconstitutional entry does not have any relationship with political survival at all.

Table 3 Coefficient Estimates for Career Background Variables

Selection Equation				Substantive Equation			
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL				Dependent Variable: STRENGTH			
Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score	Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score
Constant	-0.335	0.347	-0.968	Constant	0.473	3.707	0.127
LAWPOL	-0.598	0.246	-2.433**	LAWPOL	-1.171	2.494	-0.470
CIVSERV	-0.600	0.267	-2.244**	CIVSERV	-1.459	2.504	-0.583
MILITAR	-0.217	0.268	-0.811	MILITAR	-0.608	0.987	-0.616
LIBTECH	-0.445	0.243	-1.828*	LIBTECH	-1.004	1.893	-0.530
POLONE	0.513	0.247	2.077**	POLONE	0.509	1.725	0.295
POLTWO	0.643	0.269	2.390**	POLTWO	0.504	2.260	0.223
POLALL	0.609	0.271	2.246**	POLALL	0.408	2.118	0.193
FORSTUD	0.243	0.103	2.351**	FORSTUD	0.601	0.964	0.623
FORWORK	0.189	0.122	1.554	FORWORK	0.323	0.769	0.420
FORBOTH	0.328	0.139	2.350**	FORBOTH	0.485	1.327	0.366
NCONSTI	-0.101	0.131	-0.773	NCONSTI	0.320	0.428	0.748
LIBERAL	0.381	0.178	2.142**	LIBERAL	0.747	1.490	0.501
CENTRE	-0.046	0.233	-0.197	CENTRE	0.372	0.341	1.092
CONSERV	0.505	0.173	2.921***	CONSERV	0.939	1.991	0.472
				haz	-1.328	5.715	-0.232
				μ	0.734	0.058	12.636***
% correctly predicted				% correctly predicted			
-2 x LLR				-2 x LLR			
N				N			
	64.70				61.82		
	98.40***				73.34***		
	949				571		

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

With the exception of most military leaders, almost all leaders should represent their political ideologies in their elections or in their decision-making processes. The results show that the leaders whose ideologies are liberal or conservative are more likely to stay in office longer. The direction of the relationship between LIBERAL and political survival is positive although it would be expected to be negative.

Just as for the social background variables, all career background variables do not have any relationships with political survival in the substantive equation, supporting the previous argument that the same career backgrounds as personal attributes are significant in explaining political survival, i.e., SHORT or NOTSHORT rather than the strength of political survival. In the case of career backgrounds being different from the social background variables, the selection equation (64.7% correctly predicted and with -2LLR (98.40)) shows a better fit than the substantive equation (61.82% correctly predicted and with -2LLR (73.34)). While the selection equation explains better in career backgrounds than in social backgrounds, the substantive equation has a better fit in social backgrounds. From these results, it is apparent that career backgrounds are more important in deciding whether a leader survives beyond a short period, but they do not affect how long the person stays in office after that initial test period.

Analysis on Institutional Attributes

Selection Equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SURVIVAL} = & \alpha + \beta_1\text{OLD} + \beta_2\text{PREZ} + \beta_3\text{SINGLEP} + \beta_4\text{MULTIP} + \beta_5\text{HOMOGEN} + \beta_6\text{POPDEN} \\ & + \beta_7\text{LITERACY} + \beta_8\text{PARTFREE} + \beta_9\text{FULLFREE} + \beta_{10}\text{ECONFREE} + \beta_{11}\text{ASIA} + \\ & \beta_{12}\text{AFRICA} + \beta_{13}\text{MIDEAST} + \beta_{14}\text{EURNAME} + \beta_{15}\text{LATIN} + u_i \end{aligned}$$

Substantive Equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{STRENGTH} = & \alpha + \beta_1\text{OLD} + \beta_2\text{PREZ} + \beta_3\text{SINGLEP} + \beta_4\text{MULTIP} + \beta_5\text{HOMOGEN} + \beta_6\text{POPDEN} \\ & + \beta_7\text{LITERACY} + \beta_8\text{PARTFREE} + \beta_9\text{FULLFREE} + \beta_{10}\text{ECONFREE} + \beta_{11}\text{ASIA} + \\ & \beta_{12}\text{AFRICA} + \beta_{13}\text{MIDEAST} + \beta_{14}\text{EURNAME} + \beta_{15}\text{LATIN} + \text{haz} + u_i \end{aligned}$$

Again, the independent variables that turn out to be significant in the selection equation become insignificant in the substantive equation. Like personal variables (social and career), institutional variables do not explain the strength of political survival, although some of them are significant in deciding whether leaders stay in office for a short period or not.

Country age (OLD) is an important element for political survival and its direction of the relationship is expected to be positive, but it comes out negative. Thus, leaders in older countries are more likely to stay only a short time in office. As far as political stability and tranquility are concerned, the leader in old countries can maintain his power longer.

Nonetheless, while European and North American countries have stable liberal parliamentary democracies, and Latin American countries often have had military regimes, those political systems which lead to frequent leadership succession. Meanwhile, African countries and several Asian countries are young, having only been independent since the 1960s. If a leader was a founder or a first leader in those countries, they were often top leaders for a long time until their new political regimes become stable or developed in a certain degree.

Presidential system (PREZ) supports leaders to stay longer than parliamentary systems (and general secretaries). Presidential systems guarantee constitutional terms (4-6 yrs). Under prime minister systems, top executives confront elections whenever

Table 4 Coefficient Estimates for Institutional Attributes

Selection Equation				Substantive Equation			
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL				Dependent Variable: STRENGTH			
Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score	Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score
Constant	-0.195	0.381	-0.511	Constant	2.331	2.756	0.846
OLD	-0.264	0.124	-2.134**	OLD	-0.989	0.772	-1.280
PREZ	0.589	0.124	4.763**	PREZ	1.369	1.755	0.780
SINGLEP	0.388	0.186	2.089**	SINGLEP	1.233	1.187	1.039
MULTIP	-0.055	0.167	-0.327	MULTIP	-0.344	0.253	-1.359
HOMOGEN	-7.5e-05	2.3e-04	-0.331	HOMOGEN	-2.7e-4	3.1e-4	-0.858
POPDEN	-7.8e-05	2.8e-04	-0.282	POPDEN	2.2e-4	3.8e-4	0.596
LITERACY	0.008	0.024	3.246***	LITERACY	0.020	0.230	0.872
PARTFREE	0.139	0.157	0.885	PARTFREE	0.228	0.459	0.497
FULLFREE	0.737	0.209	3.530***	FULLFREE	1.127	2.189	0.515
ECONFREE	-0.135	0.060	-2.245**	ECONFREE	-0.279	0.399	-0.700
ASIA	0.041	0.265	0.156	ASIA	-0.092	0.332	-0.276
AFRICA	0.037	0.276	0.133	AFRICA	0.086	0.327	0.262
MIDEAST	-0.166	0.269	-0.617	MIDEAST	-0.583	0.593	-0.983
EURNAME	-0.278	0.235	-1.182	EURNAME	-0.630	0.892	-0.706
LATIN	-0.231	0.251	-0.923	LATIN	-1.284	0.774	-1.658*
				haz	-3.245	4.191	-0.774
				μ	0.843	0.666	12.649***
% correctly predicted				62.62			
-2 x LLR				92.70***			
N				947			
% correctly predicted				64.65			
-2 x LLR				165.44***			
N				563			

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

parliamentary members vote no confidence, sometimes as frequently as every other year. Even though general secretaries in communist countries are similar to prime ministers in terms of the selection process, they usually stay in office until their deaths.

SINGLEP is significant at the .05 level and it supports the relationship between party system and political survival that we expected earlier, whereas MULTIP is not significant. Single-party systems are stable only in the formal sense that a single party remains in power for decades. The impact of parties is considered as strengthening the link between rulers and the population. However, although it is believed that some countries are officially based on multiparty systems, only one party always takes the initiative in politics. In this case, the party system should be considered as a monopolized one-party system in reality. In order to have better outcomes from this model, more careful inspections of party systems are required.

One of the most unexpected results is generated from HOMOGEN and POPDEN, which fail to support our expectations about relationship between political stability and leadership durability. The indicators of governability, the homogeneity index and the population density were expected to be significant on political stability, and, ultimately, on the leader's durability. Unexpectedly, however, there are no relationships between political survival and any of them.

Considering on the freedom status, not only in political and civil rights but also in economic field, FULLFREE and ECONFREE are proven to be significant. While freer societies, in the terms of political and civil rights, allow their leaders to stay longer, high economic freedom (ECONFREE) has a role against the leaders' longevity. If officials employ force, that fact directly reflects a loss of power regardless of any legal

justification that those officials are able to invoke. As a result, those who rely primarily on force are likely to be politically unsuccessful, whether or not they assumed office through a military coup. Successful regimes, military or otherwise, are those that are capable of exercising power. The repeated invocation of force is evidence of a loss of power and it accrues to the level of freedom guaranteed.

Meanwhile, the economy with high level of freedom is inherently unstable; economic growth is constantly disrupted by crises. In a country with low economic freedom, intervention in the economy and other spheres grows and draws attention to the issues of choice, planning and control. So, the 'hand of the state' is more visible and intelligible than 'the invisible hand' of the market. Consequently, as long as the governments take on responsibility for more and more areas of the economy, governments can avoid economic and political crises and finally leaders would keep their offices longer.

Regional difference as a control variable, in effect, does not show any significance in explaining political survival. However, in the substantive equation, only LATIN is significant at the .10 level. Furthermore, it has a negative relationship to the strength of survival, indicating that the level of longevity can be explained better in Latin America, and that the Latin American leaders are more likely to stay in office shorter. Apparently, in Latin America, we see quite a few leaders who just stayed in office as coup d'état leaders for a short period or were themselves overthrown again by the military. Also, by constitution, several countries in this area do not allow the same leaders to be elected in a consecutive term or their tenure is limited to a certain period (see note 6).

In general, the statistics for testing a whole model with the institutional attributes show the same tendencies as shown in the previous social and career background models. The independent variables that are significant in the selection equation become insignificant in the substantive equation (Table 4). Both the selection and substantive equations, as a whole, are significant at the .01 level. However, the substantive equation (64.65%) has a higher proportion of prediction than the selection equation (62.62%). The institutional model itself explains the strength of political survival better than political survival.

Comparisons of the Reduced Models on Political Survival

Analyses of the success tables generated from the results are presented only for explaining political survival. In principle, those success tables of the strength of political survival (substantive equations) should be 3 x 3 tables, but the results show 3 x 2 tables because the models do not predict the second category (7 - 12 years). Thus, it is not reasonable to compare the predictions for the substantive equations. Also, in order to use the statistics, i.e., ROE (Reduction of Error), it is better to focus on 2 x 2 tables, that is, the success tables in the selection equations.

In Table 5, it is possible to see how the composition of the success of prediction is composed of. In the case of the social background model, the category of SHORT has a big reduction, 31.8% (38.4% → 6.6%) and NOTSHORT has a big improvement, 33.6% (61.6% → 95.2%). In the case of the career background model, the SHORT category shows a 13.9% of reduction of prediction, while NOTSHORT is improved by 30.2%. Moreover, the institutional model indicates an 11.1% reduction in predicting SHORT, and

Table 5 Success of Prediction in Political Survival

Social Backgrounds

		ACTUAL		
		0 SHORT	1 NOT-SHORT	ROW TOTAL
PREDICT	0 SHORT	23 6.6	27 4.8	50 5.5
	1 NOT SHORT	324 93.4	530 95.2	854 94.5
	COLUMN TOTAL	347 38.4	557 61.6	904 100.0

Career Backgrounds

		ACTUAL		
		0 SHORT	1 NOT-SHORT	ROW TOTAL
PREDICT	0 SHORT	98 25.9	55 9.6	153 16.1
	1 NOT-SHORT	280 74.1	516 90.4	796 83.9
	COLUMN TOTAL	378 39.8	571 60.2	949 100.0

Institutional Attributes

		ACTUAL		
		0 SHORT	1 NOT-SHORT	ROW TOTAL
PREDICT	0 SHORT	113 29.4	83 14.7	196 20.7
	1 NOT-SHORT	271 70.6	480 85.3	751 79.3
	COLUMN TOTAL	384 40.5	563 59.5	947 100.0

a 25.8% improvement in predicting NOTSHORT.

As can be seen in each reduced table, and in Table 8, the career background model represents the best goodness-of-fit among the reduced models. Its proportion correctly predicted is 64.7% and ROE is 11.37. In other words, in order to explain political survival itself, it is better to use the career background model. However, in terms of only the percentage of correctly predicted, the institutional attribute model (64.65%) can predict the strength of political survival better than the other two models social background (62.12%) and career background (61.82%). Nonetheless, all two-equation reduced models have a common tendency: some variables that are significant in the selection equation lose their influence in the substantive equation.

Analysis on Interaction Model

Selection Equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SURVIVAL} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{AGE} + \beta_2 \text{COLLEGE} + \beta_3 \text{URBAN} + \beta_4 \text{LAWPOL} + \beta_5 \text{CIVSERV} + \beta_6 \text{MILITAR} \\ & + \beta_7 \text{LIBTECH} + \beta_8 \text{POLONE} + \beta_9 \text{POLTWO} + \beta_{10} \text{POLALL} + \beta_{11} \text{FORSTUD} + \\ & \beta_{12} \text{FORWORK} + \beta_{13} \text{FORBOTH} + \beta_{14} \text{NCONSTI} + \beta_{15} \text{LIBERAL} + \beta_{16} \text{CENTRE} + \\ & \beta_{17} \text{CONSERV} + \beta_{18} \text{OLD} + \beta_{19} \text{PREZ} + \beta_{20} \text{SINGLEP} + \beta_{21} \text{MULTIP} + \beta_{22} \text{HOMOGEN} + \\ & \beta_{23} \text{POPDEN} + \beta_{24} \text{LITERACY} + \beta_{25} \text{PARTFREE} + \beta_{26} \text{FULLFREE} + \beta_{27} \text{ECONFREE} + \\ & \beta_{28} \text{ASIA} + \beta_{29} \text{AFRICA} + \beta_{30} \text{MIDEAST} + \beta_{31} \text{EURNAME} + \beta_{32} \text{LATIN} + \mu_i \end{aligned}$$

Substantive Equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{STRENGTH} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{AGE} + \beta_2 \text{COLLEGE} + \beta_3 \text{URBAN} + \beta_4 \text{LAWPOL} + \beta_5 \text{CIVSERV} + \beta_6 \text{MILITAR} \\ & + \beta_7 \text{LIBTECH} + \beta_8 \text{POLONE} + \beta_9 \text{POLTWO} + \beta_{10} \text{POLALL} + \beta_{11} \text{FORSTUD} + \\ & \beta_{12} \text{FORWORK} + \beta_{13} \text{FORBOTH} + \beta_{14} \text{NCONSTI} + \beta_{15} \text{LIBERAL} + \beta_{16} \text{CENTRE} + \\ & \beta_{17} \text{CONSERV} + \beta_{18} \text{OLD} + \beta_{19} \text{PREZ} + \beta_{20} \text{SINGLEP} + \beta_{21} \text{MULTIP} + \beta_{22} \text{HOMOGEN} \\ & + \beta_{23} \text{POPDEN} + \beta_{24} \text{LITERACY} + \beta_{25} \text{PARTFREE} + \beta_{26} \text{FULLFREE} + \beta_{27} \text{ECONFREE} \\ & + \beta_{28} \text{ASIA} + \beta_{29} \text{AFRICA} + \beta_{30} \text{MIDEAST} + \beta_{31} \text{EURNAME} + \beta_{32} \text{LATIN} + \text{haz} + \mu_i \end{aligned}$$

In the case of the selection equation (Table 6), the results show that AGE,

URBAN, CONSERV, PREZ, LITERACY, and ECONFREE are significant at the .05 level, and that COLLEGE, POLALL, LAWPOL, FORSTUD, FORBOTH, and PARTFREE are significant at the .10 level. Except NCONSTI, OLD, HOMOGEN, POPDEN, and regional dummies, at least one of the dummies in each variable turns out to be significant, supporting the relationships between these variables and political survival. As seen in the previous three reduced models, the directions of some variables are opposite to those expected (COLLEGE, URBAN, LAWPOL, and ECONFREE).

Some differences will now be discussed based on the comparisons between selection and substantive equations, as well as between the reduced models and the interaction model. First of all, in the case of the selection equation, in comparison with the reduced models, the significance of CIVSERV, LIBTECH, POLONE, POLTWO, LIBERAL, OLD, and SINGLEP had disappeared. However, as shown in Table 8, the proportion correctly predicted (66.6%) is higher than those (61.17% for social backgrounds, 64.70% for career backgrounds, and 62.62% for institutional attributes) in each reduced model.

Secondly, in the reduced substantive equations, all significant variables in the selected equations became insignificant in the substantive equations. Meanwhile, some variables stay the same and even new ones such as CIVSERV, LIBTECH, FORWORK, OLD, SINGLEP, and MULTIP become significant in the substantive equation of the interaction model. Instead, the relationships of POLALL, PARTFREE, and ECONFREE with the strength of political survival have disappeared in the substantive equation.

All social background variables, AGE, COLLEGE, and URBAN have great impact on both political survival and the strength of political survival, indicating the following

Table 6 Coefficient Estimates for Interaction Model

Selection equation				Substantive equation			
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL				Dependent Variable: STRENGTH			
Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score	Variable	MLE	S.E.	t-score
Constant	0.300	0.598	0.503	Constant	6.005	2.703	2.221**
AGE	-0.014	0.005	-2.915***	AGE	-0.071	0.026	-2.718**
COLLEGE	-0.304	0.157	-1.935*	COLLEGE	-1.050	0.570	-1.842*
URBAN	-0.194	0.010	-2.004**	URBAN	-0.791	0.355	-2.228**
LAWPOL	-0.524	0.284	-1.845*	LAWPOL	-1.822	0.992	-1.838*
CIVSERV	-0.459	0.307	-1.495	CIVSERV	-2.226	0.925	-2.407***
MILITAR	-0.063	0.309	-0.205	MILITAR	-0.249	0.321	-0.777
LIBTECH	-0.364	0.278	-1.308	LIBTECH	-1.453	0.722	-2.011**
POLONE	0.369	0.292	1.264	POLONE	0.985	0.710	1.387
POLTWO	0.499	0.309	1.614	POLTWO	1.244	0.921	1.350
POLALL	0.591	0.312	1.894*	POLALL	1.515	1.066	1.421
FORSTUD	0.232	0.120	1.930*	FORSTUD	1.085	0.443	2.449**
FORWORK	0.083	0.136	0.613	FORWORK	0.484	0.237	2.037**
FORBOTH	0.275	0.154	1.783*	FORBOTH	1.077	0.520	2.072**
NCONSTI	-0.151	0.156	-0.965	NCONSTI	-0.431	0.332	-1.296
LIBERAL	0.270	0.209	1.292	LIBERAL	0.826	0.554	1.491
CENTRE	-0.068	0.266	-0.255	CENTRE	0.187	0.396	0.471
CONSERV	0.477	0.200	2.384**	CONSERV	1.768	0.900	1.963**
OLD	-0.210	0.135	-1.549	OLD	-1.003	0.402	-2.496**
PREZ	0.694	0.138	5.041***	PREZ	2.194	1.265	1.735*
SINGLEP	0.083	0.243	0.341	SINGLEP	0.865	0.352	2.457**
MULTIP	-0.260	0.222	-1.169	MULTIP	-0.933	0.547	-1.707*
HOMOGEN	9.7e-05	2.7e-04	0.356	HOMOGEN	1.6e-04	3.5e-04	0.466
POPDEN	-6.5e-06	3.0e-04	-0.022	POPDEN	4.2e-04	3.5e-04	1.205
LITERACY	0.007	0.003	2.659**	LITERACY	0.027	0.013	2.025**
PARTFREE	0.073	0.177	0.411	PARTFREE	0.305	0.246	1.243
FULLFREE	0.731	0.242	3.027***	FULLFREE	1.956	1.367	1.431
ECONFREE	-0.115	0.696	-1.654*	ECONFREE	-0.366	0.225	-1.622
ASIA	0.311	0.295	1.054	ASIA	0.774	0.632	1.225
AFRICA	0.105	0.306	0.343	AFRICA	0.152	0.376	0.404
MIDEAST	-0.019	0.294	-0.064	MIDEAST	-0.342	0.346	-0.988
EURNAME	0.014	0.257	0.055	EURNAME	0.101	0.300	0.338
LATIN	0.174	0.281	0.617	LATIN	-0.374	0.428	-0.874
				haz	-4.258	2.503	-1.701*
				μ	0.905	0.073	12.441***
% correctly predicted				% correctly predicted			
-2 x LLR				-2 x LLR			
N				N			
66.55				64.74			
165.20***				207.52***			
861				536			

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

relationships:

1. The younger the leaders are upon entering office, the longer they stay in office.
2. Leaders with more educations (above college) are less likely to stay in office longer.
3. Leaders who were born and raised in urban areas tend to stay in office shorter than those from rural areas.

Among the career background variables in the selection equation, only entry mode (NCONSTI) does not have any influence on explaining the relationship with political survival, whereas, in accounting for the strength of political survival, all political experiences as well as entry mode, regardless of what offices they had been in previously, do not explain the strength of political survival at all. On the contrary, foreign experiences strongly account for the relationships with the strength of political survival.

Career background variables in the interaction model indicate somewhat different results. Actually, the results represents more obvious explanations from a theoretical perspective. Among the previous occupations, only LAWPOL is significant and, among the political experiences, only POLALL. The most interesting finding concerns leaders' ideology. Whether a leader is liberal or conservative has a great impact on the leader's political survival in the reduced model. However, in the interaction model, the outcome really supports the proposition that leftist (Liberal) parties tend to be more willing to change priorities than rightist ones, primarily because change is a more legitimate enterprise to the left than it is to the right. The relationships of career backgrounds to

political survival are explained as follows:

4. Except military professions, leaders with politically related occupations such as political activists, lawyers, party officials, civil servants, as well as even liberal and technical professions and business, are less likely to stay in office longer. Meanwhile, in explaining political survival itself, only leaders who were lawyers or politicians before, are less likely to stay in office longer.
5. While a part of political experiences (POLALL) explains political survival, there are no relationships between political experiences and the strength of political survival. Especially, foreign study is very important for political survival.
6. Whatever the purpose of foreign experience is, they have great impact in accounting for the degree of political survival.
7. Entry mode does not matter with political survival or the strength of political survival.
8. With regard to the political ideology, conservative leaders are more likely to stay in office longer.

In terms of the coefficients for the institutional characteristics, it is apparent that there are several changes from the selection equation to the substantive equation. Country age in the reduced model (Institutional model) is significant, but, in the interaction model, it does not account for its relationship with political survival (t-score (= -1.549) is not large for being significant.). However, it shows a strong significance in accounting for the strength of political survival. Interestingly, the type of head of government (PREZ) is very important in determining whether or not a leader stays in office for a short period. However, while still significant at the .10 level, it is not as strong as it is in explaining the length of his survival after the initial period.

Party system does not give an explanation of political survival itself (short or long), whereas it clearly proves the relationships with the strength of survival. With

respect to the Freedom index as a combination of political rights and civil rights, the leaders in fully free societies (FULLFREE) stay in office longer, but the strength of survival is not explained by it at all. In contrast, in countries where the governments guarantee more economic freedom, the leaders are less likely to stay in office longer. In the model for the strength of survival, even though its t-score is almost close to the significance level, it is not enough to explain the relationship. Finally, it is interesting to speculate that regional difference does not expound political survival itself as well as the degree of durability. As a result, the interaction model shows the following outcomes:

9. Leaders in old countries are less likely to stay in office longer, whereas county age does not matter much with respect to political survival itself.
10. The type of head of government is much more important in deciding political survival rather than the strength of political survival, although it still accounts for the strength.
11. Party system is not related to political survival, but it has a great influence on the strength of survival. Leaders from single party systems stay in power longer, whereas those from multiparty systems stay in office shorter.
12. There is no relationship between the degree of homogeneity of society (HOMOGEN) and political survival or the strength of survival.
13. Population density (POPDEN) does not matter for political survival or the degree of political survival.
14. In terms of LITERACY, leaders from societies with high levels - used as an indicator of modernization - are more likely to stay in office longer.
15. Freedom status as a combination of political and civil rights has a positive influence on political survival but no influence on the degree of durability.
16. Great economic freedom influences whether leaders stay in office short or not, but does not matter with the degree of their longevity beyond the initial trial period. The less economic freedom, the longer the leader stays.

Table 7 Success of Prediction in Interaction Model

Political Survival (Selection Equation)

		ACTUAL		
PREDICT		0 SHORT	1 NOT-SHORT	ROW TOTAL
	0 SHORT	122 37.5	85 15.9	207 24.0
	1 NOT-SHORT	203 62.5	451 84.1	654 76.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	325 37.7	536 62.3	861 100.0

Strength of Political Survival (Substantive Equation)

		ACTUAL			
		1 (3 - 6)	2 (7 - 12)	3 (13+)	ROW TOTAL
PREDICT	1 (3 - 6)	298 92.3	93 75.6	41 45.6	432 80.6
	2 (7 - 12)	7 2.2	8 6.5	8 8.9	23 4.3
	3 (13+)	18 5.6	22 17.9	41 45.6	81 15.1
	COLUMN TOTAL	323 60.3	123 22.9	90 16.8	536 100.0

17. In the case of regional differences, each region does not show any significant relationships with both political survival and the degree of survival.

In the substantive equation with the selected sample (563), some variables gain significance and some lose it. While CIVSERV, LIBTECH, OLD, SINGLEP, and MULTIP are shown to be significant, POLALL, FULLFREE, and ECONFREE become insignificant in the substantive equation. In addition, although PREZ is significant at the $\alpha = .10$ level, the test level gets weaker ($.001 \rightarrow .10$). Overall, the selection equation obtains 66.6% correctly predicted, and the substantive equation predicts 64.7% correctly. Generally, the two-equation interaction model has a pretty good performance in explaining the relationships between exogenous variables and political survival on the one hand, between the exogenous variables and the strength of political survival on the other hand. Therefore, the results of the interaction model are best for interpreting the main substantive findings of our study.

As shown in Table 7, among the correctly predicted cases (66.6%), the interaction model performed better at predicting 'SHORT (0)' outcomes. The model predicted or correctly classified 84.1% of the 'NOT-SHORT (1)' leaders and 37.5% of the SHORT leaders. While the SHORT category does not have a big improvement (2% reduction), NOT-SHORT has 21.8% ($62.3\% \rightarrow 84.1\%$) of improvement. In the case of the substantive equation, all three categories show different aspects: category 1 (3 - 6 yrs) had 32% of improvement and category 3 (13 + yrs) does 28.8% of improvement, whereas category 2 (7 - 12 yrs) has rather 16.4% of reduction. All together, the proportion of the correctly predicted cases is 64.7%. The results indicate that the model

might be more reasonable to predict 'SHORT' or 'NOT-SHORT' than to predict the degree of political survival. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 8, the interaction model (66.55% correctly predicted and ROE = 11.39) was the best predictor among all the models, even though its ROE is a little bit higher than career backgrounds (ROE = 11.37).

Table 8 Goodness-of-Fit of Selection Equations

Model	% Modal	% Correctly Predicted	ROE
Social Background	61.62%	61.17%	-1.17
Career Background	60.17%	64.70%	11.37
Institutional Attributes	59.45%	62.62%	7.82
Interaction	62.25%	66.55%	11.39

B. Analyses of Regional Models

As regional dummies, none of them show any significant impact on political survival or the strength of survival in both the reduced models and the interaction model. It is worth breaking the interaction model down region by region in order to see better regional or cultural effect. As seen in Table 9, the results provide different explanations of political survival and the strength of survival. According to the logic of the European mind, every territory should fall under some sovereignty, and all people in the same geographic location should have a common loyalty and the same legal obligation (Pye, 1985, p.86).

If the data is analyzed by looking at different regions of the world, it can be found that different groups of countries show very different patterns (see Table 9). Most of the quantitative explanatory research compasses all or most countries simultaneously. We offer a note of caution about interpreting these results too critically, especially if the researcher has not broken the countries down into types or regional clusters.

In Asia, among the personal characteristics, only the educational level is important in explaining whether or not a leader stays in office for a short period. So, especially, the leader with above college degree is more likely to stay in office for 0 - 2 years. While the leader in a highly homogeneous society and economically free society is less likely to survive for long, the leader in a society with high literacy rate stays in office longer. In developing countries, such as Asian and Latin American countries, capitalism is equally unsuited to the goals of the revolution since it sows the seeds of conflict and antagonism.

Table 9 Significant Variables in Regional Models

Region	Selection Equations	Substantive Equations
Asia	URBAN(*), LITERACY(*), ECONFREE(*) HOMOGEN(**)	FULLFREE (*)
Africa	LIBERAL(**), CONSERV(**), ECONFREE(**),	AGE(**), URBAN(**), LAWPOL(**), CIVSERV(**) MILITAR(**), LIBTECH(**), POLTWO(*), POLALL(*), FORWORK(**), FORBOTH(*), LIBERAL(**), CONSERV(**), OLD(**), PREZ(**), SINGLEP(**), POPDEN(*), LITERACY(**), HOMOGEN(**), FULLFREE(**), ECONFREE(**)
Middle East	AGE(**), CONSERV(*), SINGLEP(**), MULTIP(**), HOMOGEN(**),	AGE(*), COLLEGE(*), URBAN(*), LAWPOL(*), MILITAR(*), LIBTECH(*), FORSTUD(**), OLD(**), SINGLEP(*), POPDEN(*), PARTFREE(*), FULLFREE(*), LITERACY(*)
Europe/N. America	URBAN(*), FORBOTH(**), PREZ(*) CONSERV(**)	MULTIP(*)
Latin America	AGE(**), POLTWO(*), POLALL(*), FORSTUD(**), FORBOTH(*), NCONSTI(*) HOMOGEN(*), ECONFREE(*), POPDEN(*)	PARTFREE(*)
Oceania	NONE	NONE

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

Thus, the higher the economic freedom, the shorter the leader's duration. They need an appropriate path where all elements participating in the process of production can meet, capable of supplying society with all the energies enabling it to rebuild its life on the basis of a carefully studied and comprehensive plan. These are very contradictory outcomes that, theoretically, we did not expect. Most of the countries in South and Southeast Asia which gained political independence since 1945, have in common not only political orders but also economic and social orders which have been stripped of their previous leadership. Independence has necessarily meant a change in political and governmental leaders. Unlike its Western counterpart, some factors that are main causes for democracy and modernization may operate as obstacles to economic development. Nonetheless, even those relationships disappear in the model for the strength of political survival, only FULLFREE is significant at the .10 level.

In the African countries, whether a leader's ideology is liberal or conservative, he should identify his ideology in order to keep his office longer. Also, in a society with a high level of economic freedom, a leader is more likely to survive long. In the substantive equation for testing the relationships between each independent variable and the strength of political survival, most null hypotheses are rejected at the .10 or .05 levels except COLLEGE, FORSTUD, NCONSTI, CENTRE, MULTIP, and PARTFREE, although the directions of the relationship of those variables are different from the expected ones.

The outcome indicates that a leader with foreign experience or more political experience has a tendency for staying in office shorter, and that all dummy career backgrounds in the model have a negative relationships with strength of political survival. It is a quite unusual result that has not been found in any other regions. Since achieving

independence after World War II, most of the countries have experienced at least one coup d'état or one civil war, resulting in profound instability. However, the results from the regional models (Africa and the Middle East) confirm the proposition about country age, such that the leaders in old countries are more likely to stay longer in office.

The most distinctive finding from the Middle Eastern model is that, for the first time, COLLEGE, turns out to be significant at the .10 level, showing that the more educated (above college education), the longer the duration. Another encouraging result is that a leader in a more homogeneous society stays in office long and longer. As similar as the trends in African leaders, more experience in the political arenas as well as foreign experience are not the supportive qualities for maintaining their power.

POPDEN has never been significant in any other models except the substantive equations in Africa and the Middle East. Many of the underdeveloped or developing areas have become the most densely populated regions on earth because of the introduction of modern medical and health-related practices into the societies. Thus, the region becomes a main source of change and social dislocation. It supports the proposition on governability such that a leader in a sparse area is not easily threatened by political instability and thus is able to acquire efficiency and equity. The size of a country will have a direct bearing upon the kind of power structures that develop there. To be more specific, the smaller the country, the more concentrated its power structure is likely to be.

Next, in case of the European and North American countries, FORBOTH and CONSERV have significant impacts on explaining political survival. Western countries are characterized by a high degree of internalized control and a low degree of

externalized control. Therefore, it is not expected that foreign experiences are important for the leaders in this region because most of the countries are already politically and economically developed enough. URBAN and PREZ are shown to be significant, even at the .10 level. Urban born, as an indicator of political socialization, has a negative relationship with political survival, whereas leaders as presidents are more likely to have relatively long duration.

As to the strength of political survival, being different from Africa or the Middle East, almost all exogenous variables except MULTIP do not have any influence on it. A multiparty system has a negative effect on how much longer a leader can stay in office. In this region, like in Asia, AGE is not explained by a life expectancy theory, but rather by a gerontocracy thesis. The seniority system effect indicates that power, prestige, and wisdom accrue to age. Seniority is a major repository of the experience and knowledge of society and is treated with the utmost respect and deference.

The most distinctive difference in Europe and North America, HOMOGEN does not explain anything on political survival or its strength. Heterogeneity in society is an inescapable facet of politics within as well as between countries; internal conflict and instability and external conflict and war often flow from ethnic, linguistic, and religious tensions and processes of mobilization. Nonetheless, in this region, heterogeneity will recede in importance as the modernization process accelerates. The example for this phenomenon that accounts for an increasing share of non-revolutionary violence and non-violent movements are: the Basques in Spain, the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium, the Bretons in France, the British Celtic in Scotland, North Ireland and Wales, and the French in Quebec.

In Latin America, the more political experiences and foreign experiences, the longer the duration. In comparison with other regions, more personal variables have an influence on explaining political survival (SHORT or NOTSHORT). The social and cultural matrix within which Latin American leaders operate at present is such that effective and representative popular democracy is, with really few exceptions, not a feasible alternative (Tannenbaum, 1966, p.144). Thus, the personalist state tends to be governed by a single caudillo-type ruler.

The archetypical examples of personalist states include Cuba's Batista, Venezuela's Jimenez, the Dominican Republic's Trujillo, Paraguay's Stroessner, and the Somoza's Nicaragua. For the institutional type, the state is essentially an instrument of class domination and often the military serve as proxy rulers for the economic leaders (elites). El Salvador and Guatemala fit into this pattern.

The autonomous institutional state has a highly developed infrastructure of party or government. In Mexico, the leaders' ideologies are required objective environmental factors. Thus, leaders of institutions should be open to suggestions regarding efficiency in order to seek ways to enhance institutional viability. The political pendulum swung from Aleman (1946-1952) on the right, Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) on the right, Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) on the left, Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) on the right, de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) on the left, and so on.

Considering the frequent military regimes in this area, it is natural to see that leaders with unforceful entry are more likely to stay in office for a short period. Thus, shortly after the coups, they are withdrawn by other coup leaders, or they serve as transitional roles and transfer the power to civilian leaders. In addition, POPDEN has a

negative relationship with political survival. While some variables shown above at least explain political survival, for the strength of survival the only one of the freedom index is important, although it (PARTFREE) is significant at the .10 level.

Finally, the leaders in Oceania are tested, and none of the variables are shown to be significant in either the selection equation or the substantive equation. The sample size of Oceania is not large enough to use a maximum likelihood estimation and, thus, the analysis on a model in this region is not appropriate. In the typical ML estimation procedure, a large sample size is needed because the desirable properties of the MLE are justified only in large sample situations (Eliason, 1991, p.8).¹⁶

In regional comparison with the selection equations in the interaction model (Table 10), a log likelihood ratio (-2LLR) is used as a criterion for overall significance of the equations, while the percentage of correctly predicted and ROE are available for a test for the goodness-of-fit of the model (See Table 8). Except Oceania, these statistics can be applied. Since the substantive equation includes just 27 cases and the selection equation is composed with 41 cases, its analyses are excluded. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the selection equations are significant at the .01 level, whereas the selection equation for the Middle East is significant at the .05 level and Europe and North America at the .10 level.

Among all regions, the Middle Eastern model represents considerably the best goodness-of-fit (ROE = 60.46) and 83.3% correctly predicted. On the contrary, the Latin American model shows the lowest goodness-of-fit (ROE = 14.47). However,

¹⁶ It is not specified how large a sample size is enough for MLE. Considering degrees of freedom and α level, a sample size of more than 60 is usually large enough. If d.f. = 60 and α = .05, student-t and the standard unit normal are 2.00 and 1.96 respectively.

Table 10 Goodness-of-Fit of Regional Models

Political Survival (Selection Equations) :

Region	N	Modal for NOT-SHORT (%)	% Correctly Predicted	ROE	-2LLR
Asia	120	62.50	76.67	37.79	66.04***
Africa	145	67.50	73.79	19.35	65.98***
Middle East	102	57.84	83.33	60.46	53.44**
Europe/N. America	229	56.33	67.69	26.01	42.56*
Latin America	224	66.07	70.98	14.47	82.56***

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

Strength of Political Survival (Substantive equations) :

Region	N	% Correctly Predicted	-2LLR
Asia	75	65.33	50.68**
Africa	97	53.61	50.10**
Middle East	56	83.93	77.99***
Europe/N. America	129	66.67	59.02**
Latin America	148	87.16	162.70***

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

among the substantive regional models, the Latin American model (87.16%) and the Middle Eastern model (83.93%) have a better goodness-of-fit than the other models according to the percentage of correctly predicted. However, only one variable (PARTFREE) is significant in the substantive equation of the Latin American model. In the case of the African model, the substantive equation represents several significant exogenous variables, although the model itself shows the lowest percentage of correctly predicted (53.61%).

Conclusion

The reduced models represented the effect of each variable in three subgroups (social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and institutional attributes). In all three reduced models, the exogenous variables, which had significant effect on political survival, lost their influence on the strength of political survival. Prior to the interactional effect, each reduced model shows a different aspect of goodness of fit.

While the social background model and the institutional attributes model improved their goodness-of-fits, the career background model reduced its percentage of correctly predicted. In other words, the career background model explained best for political survival (SHORT or NOT-SHORT), whereas the institutional model accounted for the strength of political survival better than others. As a result, the previous political careers and political activities are very important to the leaders when they are elected as top executives, but maintaining office longer depends on institutional attributes rather than their personal qualities.

In the interaction model, we could see the different results in comparison with

those in the reduced models. Although the interaction model showed better goodness-of-fit than the reduced models, the relationships of the personal backgrounds and institutional attributes to political survival and the strength of political survival did not appear as much clearly as in the reduced models. Rather, the results presented one interesting finding. The characteristics of political system, i.e., party system and type of government, are more important for the degree of survival rather than situational condition such as freedom status and economic freedom.

The regional models provided some different interpretations the we could not find in the two-equation interaction model. In the African and the Middle Eastern models, similar independent variables have significant influence on both political survival and the strength of political survival due to the cultural similarities and regional closeness. However, the goodness-of-fit measures indicated that the Middle Eastern model predicted leaders' duration much better than the African Model. It implicated that Middle Eastern countries are more stable than African countries.

In the Latin American model, more independent variables had impact on political survival rather than the strength of political survival. Those variables are definitely related to the number of coup d'etat in that area. Meanwhile, in the case of European and North American model, its goodness-of-fit is lower than other regions since most countries in that areas are liberal democratic. A slight increase of prediction in the strength of political survival stemmed from the inclusion of the communist countries.

CHAPTER VI

Descriptive Analysis of Personal Backgrounds

In general, most descriptive statistical analyses employ graphical, tabulated, and numerical techniques for summarizing the information in a collection of data. Sample description is an essential task. We can not really explain or predict something unless we can describe it clearly and accurately. In this study, even though a few of the personal background variables are ordinal, most of them are nominal and the strength of the association is explained by *Goodman and Kruskal's tau*, *lamda* or *Cramer's V^2* , etc. In addition, in the case of the tables with ordinal variables, other statistics such as *gamma*, *Kendall's tau*, or *Somer's d* , etc. are available for the relationships.

However, the main reason to employ descriptive analyses here is to compare personal characteristics based on institutional and systematic differences, rather than to examine whether those variables have significant relationships or how strong they are. For this reason, especially in this study, calculating homogeneity scores as well as using graphical comparisons are more helpful to cut through the superficial idiosyncratic nature of the group to uncover the personal characteristics of leaders by typologizing leaders on the theoretically important dimensions such as region, type of head of government, duration of office, and number of entry.

Here, the descriptive analyses focus on the elements that contribute to political success and give the details of specific factors. This endeavor yields discussions about what kinds of social backgrounds political leaders have and what the similarities and

differences are. By using homogeneity scores for the personal background variables such as education, occupation, father's occupation, age, etc., chief executives can be compared across different regions or different institutions. Many scholars assert that political leaders differ from the rest of the population of the world by their social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and personality and skills.

However, it is argued that political leaders themselves have several similarities. Based on group comparisons rather than individual comparisons, we can test the hypothesis that chief executives are everywhere significantly homogeneous. Calculating mean scores of homogeneity in each group of personal backgrounds, it is possible to compare similarities and differences on the basis of different dimensions.

There are four-dimension comparisons in homogeneity scores, accompanied by graphical analyses. They include categories of duration, region, type of the head of government, and the number of entry. Also, in each dimension, it is feasible to compare three different personal backgrounds: social backgrounds, career backgrounds, and skills and personality. In fact, even though personality and skills data should not be included in a quantitative empirical method, that is, a previously discussed two-equation model, these variables can be analyzed without considering validity issues in this part for a descriptive perspective or for the readers' interest. Considering the logic of homogeneity scores, even though the percentage of missing data for certain variables is very high (see note 13), comparisons are possible without losing those variables.

A. Comparison by Region

Regional comparisons reflect cultural differences. There exists an attitudinal link between leadership and followership that depends on national character and political culture. Followership in different countries is more or less determined by prevailing norms concerning the exercise of political leadership. Culture is defined as the set of properties we attribute to the system by observing the distribution of psychological attributes among the individuals who comprise the system (Singer, 1968, p.141). For example, even though North America is located in a different region from Europe, it is included in the European cultural background. North America was at one time a British colony. Canada has retained its connection with Britain and also certain aspects of the British constitution, while the U.S. constitution has reflected the political climate in 18th century France.

The homogeneity scores of leaders' age in Asia and Europe presented in Table 11 are higher than other regions since more leaders from those areas became heads of government in their 50s and 60s. However, in Africa and Oceania, younger (less than 50s) leaders had more chances to become heads of government. Gerontopolitics effect is applied better to the former areas because leaders of new countries are somewhat younger than leaders of older countries. Generally speaking, middle age (40s and 50s) is the most popular age for being a head of government in all regions (see Figure 4).

Latin American leaders have the highest score on place of birth because a higher proportion of leaders come from urban areas rather than rural areas. More interestingly, while leaders in Asia (57.9%), Africa (58.9%), and Oceania (58.1%), are more likely to come from rural areas, those in Europe (57.3%) and Latin America (69.0%) come

Table 11 : Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Region

Characteristics	Homogeneity Scores for:					
	Asia	Africa	Middle East	Europe	Latin Amer.	Oceania
Social Background :						
Age	.101 (145)	.041 (149)	.041 (111)	.131 (247)	.083 (292)	.051 (45)
Place of Birth	.032 (140)	.079 (148)	.009 (107)	.032 (238)	.148 (242)	.050 (43)
SES	.130 (115)	.043 (80)	.020 (75)	.025 (181)	.072 (165)	.052 (20)
Father's Occupation	.083 (108)	.095 (76)	.105 (72)	.129 (172)	.156 (136)	.104 (21)
Education	.651 (144)	.289 (150)	.675 (111)	.458 (246)	.794 (292)	.354 (44)
Major	.123 (138)	.066 (130)	.094 (104)	.214 (215)	.120 (279)	.203 (35)
Mean Score	.195	.110	.171	.173	.255	.146
Career Backgrounds :						
Foreign Experience	.147 (144)	.397 (150)	.131 (111)	.030 (246)	.044 (293)	.225 (44)
Military Experience	.424 (142)	.085 (150)	.097 (111)	.889 (245)	.113 (296)	.834 (45)
Prison/Exile	.094 (142)	.117 (150)	.108 (111)	.255 (245)	.266 (296)	.683 (45)
Political Activity	.071 (142)	.211 (150)	.059 (111)	.062 (245)	.486 (296)	.757 (45)
Previous Occupation	.082 (144)	.225 (150)	.148 (111)	.083 (245)	.144 (294)	.122 (45)
Experience in Congress	.232 (145)	.023 (149)	.016 (111)	.800 (245)	.013 (281)	.548 (45)
Experience in Ministry	.470 (145)	.394 (149)	.511 (111)	.349 (243)	.226 (288)	.531 (43)
Party Membership	.451 (145)	.142 (149)	.202 (111)	.952 (245)	.249 (282)	.548 (45)
Entry Mode	.317 (145)	.009 (150)	.097 (111)	.921 (247)	.148 (297)	.766 (47)
Mean Score	.255	.178	.152	.483	.188	.559
Skills and Personality :						
Oral Skills	.159 (128)	.413 (133)	.291 (81)	.129 (201)	.213 (199)	.231 (33)
Organization Skills	.023 (128)	.153 (133)	.031 (81)	.042 (201)	.154 (199)	.032 (33)
Language Skills	.435 (128)	.802 (133)	.291 (81)	.597 (201)	.533 (199)	1.000 (33)
Party ID	.120 (145)	.126 (150)	.168 (111)	.140 (247)	.112 (295)	.199 (47)
Parents' Death/Separate	.795 (128)	.699 (133)	.688 (81)	.537 (201)	.548 (199)	.587 (33)
Physical Deformity	.395 (128)	.514 (133)	.404 (81)	.354 (201)	.449 (199)	.501 (33)
Power Connection	.520 (128)	.472 (133)	.648 (81)	.942 (202)	.640 (199)	.886 (33)
Mean Score	.345	.448	.350	.373	.361	.474
Total Mean Score	.267	.246	.212	.373	.252	.435

Figure 4 Age Groups by Region [() is total number of leaders in each region.]





Figure 5 Educational Level by Region



from urban areas. In the case of the leader's SES, Asian leaders are more homogeneous than leaders in other regions. European leaders are more likely to come from lower classes, whereas Asian and Latin American leaders come from upper classes. Looking at father's occupations, we can better explain the previous trend. Even though fathers of the leaders in all regions used to be in liberal professions or own business, especially in Asia and Latin America, they worked as party officials, politicians, liberal professions, owners of big farm and ranch, or businessmen, whereas those in Europe and Oceania are more in the area of labor works and farming.

In the case of the educational backgrounds (Figure 5), leaders in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, are more likely to be highly educated and represent higher homogeneous scores. Furthermore, they possess a higher percentage of military degrees. Meanwhile, in Africa, even though there are higher percentage of high school and below degrees (23.3%), there also exist a higher proportion of military degrees (29.3%). The low homogeneity scores in Europe (16.3%) and Oceania (18.2%) indicate that there are higher percentage of leaders with high school degree and below.

While leaders in all regions had majored in law, political science, or public administration, at college or university, there are higher percentages of such leaders especially in Europe (55.8%) and Oceania (51.4%) (Figure 6). Exceptionally, there are more leaders who went to military schools in the Middle East (33.7%) and the high percentage of leaders with military school degrees are found in Asia (18.8%), Africa (33.1%), and Latin America (31.5%).

Career backgrounds can also provide some explanation of cultural differences. Among the regions that have relatively higher homogeneity scores on career variables,

Africa has more leaders whose occupations were civil servants, militaries, liberal professions, or owners of big business or ranches. Conversely, leaders in Europe and Oceania are more likely to be in liberal professions or big business rather than in the political arena. The reason for the lowest score for Europe is that the percentage of lawyers and laborers or farmers is much higher than for other regions. Overall, as a unit of occupation, lawyers represent as a stepping-stone for being a top executive.

Leaders in Europe (97.7%) and Oceania (93.6%) became top executives through constitutional ways, whereas leaders in Africa (40.1%), the Middle East (35.1%), Latin America (31.0%) and Asia (22.1%) have lower homogeneity scores since higher percentage of leaders acquired power by forceful manners. Simply, it reflects that European countries are politically more stable and developed, and Oceanic countries are politically influenced by the European culture.

In explaining foreign experience, professional military experience, prison/exile, and political activity, higher homogeneity scores mean that the percentage of 'Yes' category is lower. A smaller proportion of European and Latin American leaders had foreign experience than leaders in other regions because it results from whether the countries were colonized before (Figure 7). These European and Latin American countries had been independent, but those in other regions were under colonization by some major powerful countries.

The regions that had been under colonization or wars, such as Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, also include a higher percentage of political leaders who had participated in political activities and experienced in prison or exile. Nonetheless, the reason why political leaders in Europe (38.0%) were involved in political activities

Figure 6 Majors by Region





Figure 7 Foreign, Military, Prison/Exile, and Pol. Activity Experiences by Region



did not result from the independence movements but from the underground activities or resistance movements, such as those against Nazism or Communism. As easily as can be predicted, Europe and Oceania prefer civilian leaders, but there are very high percentages of professional military leaders in Africa (36.0%), the Middle East (35.1%), and Latin America (33.4%).

Unlike the previous career experiences, in the case of political experiences, the higher the homogeneity scores, the more 'Yes' categories. Congressional experience shows a comparatively much higher proportion in Europe (.800) and Oceania (.548) than other regions. However, even though there exist differences between homogeneity scores in ministerial experiences, generally most regions indicate almost the same tendencies (Figure 8). The score for Latin America is a little bit lower than others since there were more professional military men who became heads of government by force. If we consider the inclusion of Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, or Chief of Commander into ministry position, there might be more sudden coups in Latin America.

Europe (98.8%) and Oceania (86.7%) have a higher percentage of leaders who have party experience due to systematic recruitment of political leaders, that is, parliamentary system, prime minister system, or general secretary system. However, leaders in Africa (68.5%), the Middle East (72.1%), and Latin America (74.8%) do not have as much in the way of party membership as the other regions above. This is because they have been young political systems and, thus, have not established strong party systems. In addition, professional military leaders did not need to be in a party in order to reach to a top executive position.

Theoretically, the primary resources for developing political institutions in any

Figure 8 Political Experiences by Region





Figure 9 Political Skills by Region



country is the political skills of its politicians. The political skills needed for developing a viable and self-sustaining political system involve the ideological commitment, the capacity to respond to a new challenge, and the arts of administration, negotiation, and representation. The lower the homogeneity scores for skills and personality (Table 11), the more leaders are included in 'Yes' categories. However, it is shown that theory does not always match with reality.

In Figure 9, relatively more leaders in Europe (32.3%) and Asia (30.5%) have oral skills than those in Africa (18.0%), the Middle East (23.5%), Oceania (27.3%), and Latin America (27.1%). In the case of organizational skills, Africa and Latin American leaders have higher scores (i.e. more leaders without organizational skills) because they have more military leaders. Exceptionally, many leaders in the Middle East have organizational skills (43.2%) and language skills (23.5%).

While the leaders in Asia and Africa have relatively more physical deformity and family/power connection, European and Latin American leaders had been more influenced by the fact that their parents died while they were young or that they were separated from their parents early in life. On the contrary, family or power connection is pretty influential in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not at all in Europe and the Middle East. Although, in most regions, leaders manifest their party identification, in Africa, party identification is not as important as much as other regions.

By and large, regional comparison shows several interesting findings. First of all, Latin American leaders are the most homogeneous in their social backgrounds, rendered by place of birth (urban), father's occupation (politicians, landowners) and education (above college including military). Secondly, in the case of career

background, Oceanic and European leaders have relatively higher homogeneous scores than those in other regions. It means that countries in both regions have mostly parliamentary systems and, therefore, the peaceful exit mode is more common. While leaders in these regions do not have foreign or military experience, they have experience in political areas, particularly, congress and party.

In the aspect of skills and personality, Oceanic and African leaders usually do not have major skills and some sources for establishing their leadership personality. In the case of Africa, a main reason for the higher homogeneous score is that all three skills indicate the lowest percentages compared to other regions. In addition, although the proportions of oral skills and organizational skills are higher, language skills are the main contributor to a higher homogeneous score. In sum, Oceanic leaders are the most homogeneous leaders in their social, career backgrounds, and personality and skills. Since low score represents that the leaders have certain skills, high homogeneous score should be interpreted that there are no skillful leaders. European leaders rank the second in terms of homogeneity which indicates that leaders from parliamentary political systems come from similar social and career backgrounds.

B. Comparisons by Duration

Based on the highest homogeneous score in age in Table 12, the leaders who stayed very long (21 +) are more likely to become heads of government during their 40s. This can be explained by the age effect (see figure 10). If someone starts his leader's position at younger age, he is more likely to stay in office longer. In the case of birth place, while shorter leaders came from urban area, leaders who came from rural area tended to stay in office longer. In a same fashion, SES, education, and father's occupation can be explained easily. The longest leaders seem to be from lower classes because their fathers' occupations were mostly those of laborers or farmers (44.4%). As a result, these leaders could not get higher educations. Among other social background variables, educational degree shows an interesting point in that the longest leaders are likely to have less than high school degrees (36.4%) even though college degrees almost seem to be a requirement.

In explaining career backgrounds, all outcomes seem to be easily predicted by common sense. The reason why leaders with the duration of 3 to 10 years got into office through constitutional ways depends on the limited tenure of political requirement. Some countries allow the leaders to stay just one term (4 - 6 yrs), while other countries allow them two sequential terms (8 - 12 years) (see APPENDIX B). Many of the shortest (0 - 2 yrs) leaders acquire power by force or coup d'état, and such an entry must be regarded as illegitimate (Figure 11). As a result, those leaders just stay for a while to transfer power to another regime or be replaced by another coup. To give a man a lifetime in which to accumulate power is dangerous. A lifetime tenure might even be enough to establish a dynasty - sickness, senility, degeneration, insanity

Table 12 : Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Duration

Characteristics	Homogeneity Scores for:				
	0 - 2	3 - 5	6 - 10	11 - 20	21 +
Social Background :					
Age	.064 (394)	.080 (257)	.053 (124)	.086 (97)	.185 (22)
Place of Birth	.037 (346)	.022 (242)	.013 (120)	.123 (72)	.077 (22)
SES	.043 (206)	.044 (176)	.012 (98)	.057 (60)	.152 (20)
Father's Occupation	.093 (186)	.097 (156)	.107 (93)	.064 (56)	.220 (18)
Education	.652 (394)	.648 (255)	.445 (125)	.349 (72)	.116 (22)
Major	.106 (360)	.092 (242)	.109 (110)	.086 (61)	.121 (19)
Mean Score	.190	.178	.130	.131	.143
Career Backgrounds :					
Foreign Experience	.010 (393)	.050 (257)	.148 (125)	.289 (72)	.172 (22)
Military Experience	.288 (396)	.391 (255)	.229 (125)	.462 (72)	.432 (22)
Prison/Exile	.252 (396)	.228 (255)	.095 (125)	.090 (72)	.077 (22)
Political Activity	.247 (396)	.283 (255)	.095 (125)	.041 (72)	.045 (22)
Previous Occupation	.096 (396)	.107 (256)	.073 (123)	.106 (72)	.098 (22)
Experience in Congress	.103 (384)	.285 (256)	.166 (125)	.163 (72)	.330 (22)
Experience in Ministry	.316 (387)	.431 (255)	.482 (125)	.234 (72)	.330 (22)
Party Membership	.287 (386)	.585 (254)	.377 (123)	.489 (72)	.834 (22)
Entry Mode	.178 (400)	.436 (258)	.346 (125)	.234 (72)	.172 (22)
Mean Score	.197	.310	.223	.234	.258
Skills and Personality :					
Oral Skills	.263 (261)	.261 (203)	.199 (114)	.064 (67)	.243 (22)
Organization Skills	.165 (261)	.025 (203)	.108 (114)	.020 (67)	.045 (22)
Language Skills	.692 (261)	.513 (203)	.547 (114)	.349 (67)	.329 (22)
Party ID	.045 (398)	.153 (258)	.153 (125)	.187 (72)	.311 (22)
Parents' Death/Separate	.618 (261)	.646 (203)	.627 (114)	.679 (67)	.243 (22)
Physical Deformity	.392 (261)	.471 (203)	.341 (114)	.284 (67)	.432 (22)
Power Connection	.719 (262)	.646 (203)	.654 (114)	.542 (67)	.684 (22)
Mean Score	.388	.379	.373	.302	.327
Total Mean Score	.246	.296	.246	.227	.258

Figure 10 Age Groups by Duration





Figure 11 Enter Mode by Duration



have tenured good leaders into evil ones; yet an executive appointed for life might not yield power gladly and might have too much power to be dispossessed without violence (Lijphart, 1992, p.60). In reality, even though most countries put a constitutional limitation on tenure of head of government, it is not prone to be effective.

Civil servants and professional militaries, or liberal professions and business are the most common professions found among the leaders regardless of duration. However, a higher percentage (27.3%) of laborers and farmers is shown in the longest survivors. Also, leaders who have foreign experiences stayed longer. Since the proportion of non-experiences on professional military, prison/exile, and political activity is higher than the proportion of experiences in each duration category, the lower homogeneity score means more experienced (Figure 12). Consequently, the categories of longer durations (lower homogeneity scores) indicate that there are relatively more leaders who had experiences in prison/exile, and political activities than leaders with shorter durations. In short, graphical presentation shows the leaders with foreign, prison/exile, and political activist experiences except military experiences have tendencies to survive longer.

Granting that experiences in congress, ministry, and party are prerequisite for a top executive position, they are needed to be examined in detail. Whether the leaders are short-survivors or long-survivors, remarkably higher proportion of leaders in each duration category had been in political areas prior to their top positions. Nonetheless, there exist some differences to be mentioned. As shown in Figure 13, the leaders who stayed short (less than 2 years) have less experiences in congress (65.9%). In the case of experiences in ministry, the leaders who stayed for medium range of periods (3 - 5

Figure 12 Foreign, Military, Prison/Exile, Pol. Activity Experiences by Duration





Figure 13 Political Experiences by Duration



years, and 6 - 10 years) are more likely to have ministerial experiences.

Among the political experience variables, only the party membership indicates a trend of increasing with longevity. The homogeneity scores of the experience in party are usually higher than any other variables. However, the longest leaders (21 +) have the highest homogeneity scores on party membership. 21 out of 22 leaders in that duration have party membership. It is because most leaders in this duration are general secretaries in communist countries.

As for skills and personality (Figure 14 and Table 12), with the exception of party ideology, a lower homogeneity score means that there is a higher proportion of 'Yes' in skills and personality variables. The leaders (38.8%) who stayed for 11 through 20 years tend to have more oral skills than those in other categories. And, in the case of organizational skills and language skills, there are more talented people among the leaders who stayed longer. Distinctively, among the longest survived leaders, there is a higher proportion (27.3%) of leaders whose parents died or separated when the leaders themselves were young. The sources that shaped leaders' personality have focused on their undernourished relationship with their parents, and an emotional emptiness and thirst for power stemmed from that relationship. For the explanation of party identification, the leaders with conservative party identification are likely to stay longer. In comparison to the leaders in other categories, the leaders with short duration (0 - 2 yrs), are more likely to be non-partisan, independent, or central for party ideology. This is because most of them are military leaders who have never joined parties.

Besides social and career backgrounds as well as skills and personality variables,

Figure 14 Political Skills by Duration





Figure 15 Party System by Duration



some country variables are related with leader's longevity. Usually, 1/4 or 1/5 of the countries without parties are mostly traditional systems dominated by absolute or near-absolute monarchies, and military regimes set up against parties. However, in this study, they are mostly military regimes, since monarchies were excluded from the sample. Leaders in multiparty systems are likely to stay for shorter durations, while those in single-party systems tend to stay longer (Figure 15). Within single party system, the political career and political roles are very risky because there is 'no place to go' outside the party. Only through the party can a political career be achieved, and dismissal from the party is oblivion, purgatory, or worse. High political risk and high rewards attract the ambitious and compel their compliance. The functions of nominating and electing candidates for political office are attributed exclusively to political parties. The degree of competition and monopoly in party systems affects political turnover and the circulation of leadership.

Especially, most countries with single-party systems are the Communist regimes and some Third World countries (i.e. Ivory Coast, Kenya, Guinea, Zambia, Tanzania, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, etc). Therefore, in socialist economic system, leaders tend to stay longer. Even though capitalist economic systems are popular in other categories of duration, the shortest duration is likely to have the highest percentage of capitalist economic system. As a result, if a society has more freedom in politics or economy, leaders in that society tend to stay shorter. It is interesting to find an extraordinary case such that the shortest leaders are found in high level of political right index (40%) as well as low level (36.8%).

In comparison of homogeneity scores on personal variables by duration, the

shortest leaders (0 - 2 years) represent the highest similarity on social backgrounds, whereas leaders in 3-5 years are relatively similar in career backgrounds. However, except for party ideology, the longer-survived leaders have lower homogeneity scores in skills and personality because they possess more skills and personality segments than others. Total mean scores finally indicate there is not much difference between the degrees of similarity of the leaders.

C. Comparisons by Type of Head of Government

Among the 997 top executives since 1945, there are only 12 females and 60% of them (7 leaders) are prime ministers and the others (5 leaders) are presidents.¹⁷ None of the female leaders were ever general secretaries. Even though they were elected by national assembly or national election, some of them had filled the place of their late husbands or some were offsprings of well-known former prime ministers. However, more than one-half of them had been elected through a competition with male candidates. Surprisingly, it is rare to find female head of governments in advanced liberal democracies, but rather they are mostly from developing or underdeveloped countries. Exceptionally, until now, there are no female leaders found in African countries.

According to the homogeneity scores in Table 13, especially with respect to the social background variables, presidents and prime ministers have similar characteristics, but general secretaries require different explanations. General secretaries are more likely to be older when they arrive at the top (Figure 16). Even though the scores of birth place are same for all types of leaders, general secretaries (56.3%) are from rural areas and others (55.2% for Presidents and 52.2% for prime ministers) from urban areas.

While most presidents (40.4%) and prime ministers (44.7%) came from upper

¹⁷ Female top executives are Isabella Peron (1974 - 1976) in Argentina, Lidia Guelier Tejada (1979) in Bolivia as an interim leader, Mary Eugenia Charles (1980 -) in Dominica, Indira Ghandi (1967 - 1977, 1980 - 1984) in India, Golda Meir (1969 - 1974) in Israel, Agatha Barbara (1982 - 1989) in Malta, Violeta Chamorro (1990 -) in Nicaragua, Gro Harlem Brundtland (1981, 1986 - 1989) in Norway, Benezir Bhutto (1988 - 1991) in Pakistan, Corazon Aquino (1987 - 1992) in Philippines, Sirimavo Bandarike (1960 - 1965, 1970 - 1977) in Sri Lanka, and Margaret Thatcher (1979 - 1990) in England.

classes, general secretaries (61.9%) had lower class backgrounds since their fathers' occupations were mostly laborers or farmers (65.8%). They could not get as much support for education by their fathers as other types of leaders. Consequently, high school degrees are more common among general secretaries (35.4%), whereas the others have more college degrees. There is a high percentage of militarily educated presidents (33.1%). Because military leaders are included in presidents, there are more nonconstitutional exits than other types. Most leaders, regardless of types of leadership, study political science, law, or public administration. However, interestingly, medicine or engineering (34.3%) are found just as much as aforementioned among general secretaries.

Among the different occupations previously mentioned, liberal professions or business owners are commonly found in all types of head of government. Actually, civil

Figure 16 Age Groups by Type of Head of Government





Table 13 : Homogeneity Scores in Social Backgrounds, Career Backgrounds, and Skills and Personality By Type of Government and Number of Entry

Characteristics	Homogeneity Scores for:				
	President	Prime Minister	General Secretary	Once	2 +
Social Background :					
Age	.038 (562)	.077 (379)	.131 (48)	.045 (861)	.165 (128)
Place of Birth	.013 (506)	.005 (364)	.036 (48)	.004 (793)	.036 (125)
SES	.014 (340)	.041 (254)	.210 (42)	.010 (542)	.090 (94)
Father's Occupation	.093 (303)	.080 (244)	.375 (38)	.082 (499)	.096 (86)
Education	.630 (562)	.548 (377)	.104 (48)	.561 (860)	.587 (127)
Major	.094 (524)	.185 (342)	.124 (35)	.085 (786)	.150 (115)
Mean Score	.166	.169	.156	.147	.199
Career Backgrounds :					
Foreign Experience	.085 (563)	.020 (377)	.082 (48)	.050 (860)	.086 (128)
Military Experience	.077 (563)	.810 (378)	.771 (48)	.258 (861)	.613 (128)
Prison/Exile	.153 (563)	.347 (378)	.023 (48)	.222 (861)	.078 (128)
Political Activity	.258 (563)	.180 (378)	.063 (48)	.209 (861)	.105 (128)
Previous Occupation	.140 (563)	.089 (378)	.102 (48)	.134 (861)	.108 (128)
Experience in Congress	.004 (553)	.689 (376)	.695 (47)	.111 (849)	.532 (127)
Experience in Ministry	.351 (557)	.487 (376)	.024 (46)	.315 (851)	.663 (128)
Party Membership	.173 (553)	.818 (376)	.844 (48)	.344 (850)	.821 (127)
Entry Mode	.068 (568)	.755 (381)	.572 (48)	.225 (869)	.638 (128)
Mean Score	.145	.466	.354	.207	.404
Skills and Personality :					
Oral Skills	.263 (421)	.149 (309)	.235 (45)	.241 (670)	.075 (105)
Organization Skills	.138 (421)	.021 (309)	.027 (45)	.063 (670)	.075 (105)
Language Skills	.499 (421)	.630 (309)	.683 (45)	.610 (670)	.574 (105)
Party ID	.101 (566)	.140 (381)	.947 (48)	.100 (867)	.118 (128)
Parents' Death/Separate	.634 (421)	.620 (309)	.548 (45)	.641 (670)	.515 (105)
Physical Deformity	.479 (421)	.361 (309)	.324 (45)	.444 (670)	.262 (105)
Power Connection	.604 (421)	.737 (310)	.834 (45)	.670 (671)	.659 (105)
Mean Score	.375	.372	.538	.384	.319
Total Mean Score	.216	.364	.361	.243	.326

servants or military professions (42.3%) are the most popular for the presidents, whereas lawyers (23.3%) are second most for the prime ministers and laborers or farmers (27.1%) for the general secretaries. Regardless of the types of leaders, there are more leaders with foreign experience than those with nonexperience. Experience in prison/exile (52.1%) seems to be common to the general secretaries and it results from frequent political activities (60.4%).

In comparison of political experience, working in congress seems to be very important to the leaders who want to be prime ministers or general secretaries. Meanwhile, although being a congressman seems to be a springboard to political success, working as a Minister is more important in presidential systems and prime

Figure 17 Political Skills by Type of Head of Government



minister systems. Of course, party membership is very important in all types of leadership, but in a presidential system its significance is reduced because military coup leaders easily become top executives.

Comparisons of skills and personality do not provide any significant differences of homogeneity scores. Nevertheless, more prime ministers (30.0%) have oral skills, general secretaries (53.3%) have organizational skills, and presidents (14.3%) have rather language skills (Figure 17). In terms of the personality variables, general secretaries have more than other types, especially physical deformity and separation or death of parents. However, presidents had more power/family connection than other types. Party identification does not explain much at all since general secretaries are from the systems mainly controlled by communist parties.

Overall comparisons indicate that overall social backgrounds do not provide any serious impacts on leaders' similarities, that prime ministers and general secretaries are more similar in their career backgrounds, and that general secretaries have relatively higher homogeneous scores on skills and personality than other types of heads. In general, presidents are more heterogeneous than prime ministers or general secretaries. With respect to the electoral procedure of top executives, people may choose more diverse leaders by direct popular elections or national assemblies, whereas indirect electoral systems generally prefer top executives with similar backgrounds.

D. Comparisons by Number of Entry

In this part, the homogeneity scores of Table 13 provide the comparisons between the leaders who became heads of government only once and those who did so more than twice. Number of entry does not give as much in terms of the difference as other factors that are compared previously. However, it is necessary to check out some variables that contribute some influence on their similarities.

In case of the social background variables, there does not exist much difference between the two groups of leaders. The leaders who became top executives more than twice have higher scores on age, since they started during their 40s for the first time and thus for subsequent terms their ages are getting older than the first time. There are more leaders from upper class (50.5%) among the leaders who have been in office more than twice.

Figure 18 Foreign, Mil., Prison/Exile, and Pol. Act. Exp. by Number of Entry




Figure 19 Political Experiences by Number of Entry





Figure 20 Personality by Number of Entry



On the contrary, it is easy to find significant differences with career backgrounds. The reason why the leaders who have been in office more than twice have higher scores on constitutional exit mode is that previously experienced leaders might have gotten out of office in peaceful ways and thus got into office for the second time or more via constitutional ways. Quite a few of one-term leaders have gotten into office through coups or forceful ways. It purports other trends: the scores on military experience is low for the leaders who have been in office once, since many of them got there by forceful ways.

In the opposite to military experience, prison/exile experience or political activity seems to be a big advantage to be in office again (Figure 18). Also, leaders with more than two terms have more experience in congress, ministries, and parties (Figure 19). As a result, to be a head of government more than twice is related to political experiences or political activities rather than military experiences.

While the leaders who became top executives more than twice have more oral skills than the leaders who did once, the other skills (organizational skills and language skills) do not show much difference. However, the leaders with more than twice have a relatively higher proportion of all three personality characteristics, i.e., parents' death or separation, physical deformity, and power/family connection (Figure 20).

Here again, the similarities in career as well as social backgrounds are easily found among the leaders who became top executives more than twice. Nonetheless, even though the leaders who were in office only once possess higher similarities, those similarities are toward the direction of non-possession of skills and personality. In other words, as we assumed, the leaders with more than two terms comparatively have

more skills and the causes of personality formation. Above all, the homogeneity scores of the leaders based on number of entry tell us that leaders with more than two terms are more similar to each other than one-term leaders.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The decline of authoritarian rule in Southern Europe, Latin America, and other regions in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, may represent the most significant and encouraging historical trends of the turbulent and often tragic twentieth century. Authoritarianism is now on the wane and democracy on the rise across the globe in spite of widespread mid-century pessimism about the prospects for democratic governance (Rustow, 1990). As the expectation for the rise of civilian and constitutional rule grows, leadership change may be an important prospect in political science.

As mentioned by Huntington (1991, p.315), the two key factors affecting the future stability and expansion of democracy are economic development and political leadership. Democracy contributes to stability by providing regular opportunities for changing political leaders and changing public policies. An institutional or tactical analysis of political development is usually related to a crucial problem for leaders - how to survive in power. As long as politics is defined as a process that is deeply and intricately interwoven between governing and power struggle, political leadership may be explained rationally based on the stability and security of the system and irrationally on the basis of motivation for getting into top positions in politics. Thus, the chief executive is the lead actor in the political drama of contemporary society, since the position refers to the political head of government rather than to the ceremonial chief

of state.

According to Confucius' thought and the pre-Christian philosopher's perspectives, "If the ruler is virtuous, the people will also be virtuous." Even though classical literature has provided several qualities and conditions for ideal leaders, the image of political leaders has changed over the years. The qualities of leaders definitely are no longer important for their successful survival. As long as the selection procedures are democratic, people choose their leaders by participating in elections. In addition, political culture is better conceived not purely as the legacy of the communal part but as a geological structure with sedimentary deposits from many historical ages and events (Diamond, 1993, p.412). In each new historical period, new value orientations have partially displaced but not completely erased preexisting ones.

As one of the dimensions on political performance, durability as a concept of stability should be considered. Especially in political leadership, that is, a position of a head of government, its stability definitely relates to its longevity. If political stability is defined as stability and continuity of basic political institutions and processes themselves, institutional longevity which measures the long-term stability of political structures should be based on the leaders' longevity. The length and terms of tenure must be sufficient to permit the holders to perform their offices, but not so long as to permit tenure to become entrenchment in office. They must be secure enough to permit incumbents to govern, but not so secure as to encourage complacency or corruption in office.

The study of political stability does not require justification in terms of the importance of the phenomena related to it. Rather it requires some establishment of

boundaries within which the process of interest can be studied. Sometimes it will be shown that the most stable systems, whether domestic or international, are at the same time the most predictable ones in a very simple sense - the ability based on performance to predict the performance of that system at the same future time. Political Success, actually, depends on performances in office as well as "rally-around-the-flag effects" from international crises. Being the right person is almost as important as "being in the right place at the right time" (Simonton, 1984, p.165).

However, since failures of the system are fault of incompetent power-holder, the situation can be greatly improved by changing the incumbent authorities. The resulting stability in the administrative structure makes it possible to have the everyday lives of ordinary citizens to remain largely unaffected even by the changes of national leaders.

Therefore, the power of the people to control government is the negative power to remove a government from office and replace it. As Simon mentioned (1965), "Political leadership is like a bus driver whose passengers will leave him unless he takes them in the direction in which they wish to go, they leave him only minor discretion as to the road to be followed." As a result, nondemocratic structure may frequently be relatively stable. In case of the democratic structure, it is definitely true that being a great power is no longer fun (Schoenbaum, 1973).

The effort to base legitimacy on performance sometimes gives rise to what can be termed the performance dilemma. Indeed, predictions on duration in office can be different from legal duration even where leaders are elected for a fixed term, especially in constitutional presidencies. For example, in many Latin American countries, presidents often have to resign or are dismissed by coups before the end of their legal

term. In addition, it is possible to see more changes of top executives in countries whose political institutions are less stable.

Meanwhile, the length of a particular presidency may depend partly on personal influence, namely on the president's ability to get himself renominated and reelected. No American president in nearly half a century, not even Eisenhower, managed to sustain such high level of public trust. Reagan was the first president since Eisenhower to finish eight full years in office and the first one since Andrew Jackson to leave office safe in the knowledge that his vice president had been elected to succeed him (Etheredge, 1993, p.149). Sometimes, the transfer of political power never resulted from a set of accepted, well-defined, institutionalized procedures. For example, in China prior to 1949, the individuals in collective leadership - and hence the serious contenders for Mao's mantle of power - had to possess some particular qualifications.

The main answers for this study in empirical aspects would be focused on two possibilities: (1) Is it possible to employ personal characteristics as well as situational characteristics to construct a composite profile of individuals who, in a given society, are likely to be successful leaders (SHORT or NOT-SHORT) ?; (2) Is it possible to utilize them to arrive at a composite profile of individuals who turn to be the different level of successful leaders (Who are more successful? or How longer do leaders stay?) ? In addition, through descriptive analyses, similarities and differences on personal characteristics of the leaders, including skills and personalities, have been discussed on the basis of region, duration, type of head of government, and number of entry.

In this study, 17 hypotheses have been tested using a two-equation model in an effort to see the relationships between personal backgrounds and institutional

characteristics and political survival and its strength as political success. Three reduced models - social background model, career background model, and institutional model - were examined to see the effect of independent variables in each model and to compare which model explains and predicts better for political survival. An interaction model, which includes all explanatory variables from all three reduced models, has been tested for finding which makes leaders stay in office for a short period or not (selection equation) and for how long (substantive equation). Even though 17 hypotheses are mainly tested, actually each model has more tests since several dummies are included because most independent variables are nominal.

All models have evaluated what elements are appropriate for explaining and predicting duration of office as the indicators for political survival of heads of government across the countries since 1945 until 1992. Predictability is confined to the large aggregates of data over long time periods. Whereas all selection equations contain 984 leaders after data manipulation, only 581 leaders are included in all substantive equations after the selection procedure. In addition, regional models have been tested to see cultural effects.

In each reduced model, some independent variables proved statistically significant or possibly significant only in the selection equation, that is political survival. However, none of them proved significant in the substantive equation for the strength of political survival. Meanwhile, in the interaction model, more independent variables turned out to be significant in the substantive equation than in the selection equation. All individual effects on political survival in each reduced model are almost similar to those in the interaction model. So, in this conclusion, the discussion will be

focus on the individual effects from interaction model.

One of the most interesting findings concern the vanishing effect of significant independent variables when explaining the strength of political survival in all three reduced models. The reason why some independent variables explain only political survival and not the strength of political survival is due to honeymoon effects that all political leaders face. New leaders do plan to affect public policy during their honeymoons because they have the desire and the capacity to do so during their terms. Therefore, after a certain short period (0 - 2 years), known as the honeymoon period, social and career backgrounds of the leaders definitely tend to be less important as much as in election times or the selection procedures. Those personal backgrounds seemed to be crucial for the people to elect or select the leaders on the basis of the leaders' image established by their personal characteristics, not based on their political performance, that is, institutional characteristics.

In general, in explaining political survival (selection equation) itself, at least one of the dummy variables for each of the independent variables on social and career backgrounds, except entry mode (NONCONSTI) proved statistically significant for the hypothesis testing. Conversely, most institutional characteristics, such as country age (OLD), party system (SINGLEP and MULTIP), homogeneity index (HOMOGEN), population density (POPDEN) and region did not prove significant at all. Those variables which were found to explain best why leaders stay short or not, are mostly personal backgrounds of the leaders before entering their top executive office.

All three social backgrounds, such as age, education, and birth place were statistically significant, although directions of the relationships were opposite to the

expected for college degree and urban born. As one would expect, at least one of the dummies of career backgrounds, i.e., political experience (POLALL), foreign experience (FORSTUD and FORBOTH), and political ideology (CONSERV) were proven to be significant, but previous occupation (LAWPOL) had a negative relationship with political survival. Those who had been lawyers and politicians before entering into a top executive position are probably more vulnerable to withdrawal by sudden military coups. Moreover, those professions are more favorable in liberal democracies with prime minister systems in which leadership transfers are very frequent.

Type of government (PREZ) as an indicator of institutional difference and literacy rate (LITERACY), freedom status (FULLFREE), and economic freedom (ECONFREE) as the indicators of modernization proved statistically significant or possibly significant. Surprisingly, economic freedom is yet negatively related to political survival. Perhaps, as an indicator of modernization, it tells instead that leaders in the societies with low economic freedom are more likely to stay in office longer since those societies are not economically stable, and, thus, leaders tend to remain in power until they boost the economy up to a certain stage that makes the polity stable both economically and politically.

Nonetheless, in comparison with other two reduced models (selection equations), the career background model shows the best goodness-of-fit. In other words, in order to explain and predict whether leaders stay in office for a short period (0 - 2 Yrs.) or not, the previous experiences in foreign countries and political arenas as well as political ideology, that is, orientations toward politics, are the most important factors. Even though each three reduced model proved significant for the test of the whole

model using -2LLR in both selection model and substantive model, the hypotheses testing on each independent variable are not available in the substantive equation of each reduced model.

Consequently, in order to find the relationships with a number of the indicators above and the strength of political survival (substantive equation), the results from the interaction model are inspected. While social background variables did not show any difference from the selection equation, some in career backgrounds and some in institutional attributes provide somewhat different outcomes. When comparing the findings of the selection equation with those from the substantive equation, the following structure of results could be observed.

First of all, all dummies concerning political experience in career backgrounds did not prove statistically significant at all. To the leaders who already have spent two more years in office, political experience is irrelevant to the prediction of the strength of political survival. Instead, their political performance during their tenure is probably much more vital. Second, country age and party systems became important in explaining the strength of political survival. The findings indicate that the leaders in young countries and in single party systems are more likely to maintain power longer. By and large, the young countries have not been in a firm base of political stability since their independence from colonization, and usually a founder of the national party or a first leader of the country would have maintained his office until the new country was settled down as a stable polity.¹

²¹ For examples, they are Pindling in Bahamas (1967 -), Khama in Botswana (1966 - 1980), Ahidjo in Cameroon (1960 - 1982), Pereira in Cape Verde (1975 -), Gouled Aptidon in Djibouti (1977 -), Jawara in Gambia (1965 -), Sekou Toure in Guinea (1958 - 1984), Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast

Third, freedom status and economic freedom indicating situational differences have lost their significance and thus could not predict the strength of political survival any more. The leaders who already have stayed in office over 2 years might be exempted from the threat of political and economic instability. Rather, more institutional factors, as mentioned earlier, such as country age, party systems, and type of head of government, are very supportive in predicting the strength of political survival.

Above all, the interaction model showed the best goodness-of-fit among the models that have been discussed in both the selection equation and the substantive equation. Additionally, it is more possible to test the relationships between independent variables and political survival and the strength of political survival, which the substantive equation in each reduced model by itself could not find. However, based on the success table (Table 7) as well as the percentage of correctly predicted, the model itself might be more desirable to predict political survival than to predict the strength of political survival.

Although regional dummies have never been significant in the models, dividing the interaction model by region has shown different findings. African and Latin American models include mainly more personal variables which are significant when explaining political survival, whereas for the strength of political survival Middle Eastern and African models showed several significant indicators not only for personal background but also for institutional attributes. Overall, while the Middle Eastern

(1960 -), Kenyatta in Kenya (1964 - 1978), Banda in Malawi (1964 -), Senghor in Senegal (1960 - 1981), Pinto da Costa in Sao Tome and Principe (1975 -), Nyerere in Tanzania (1961 - 1985), Lini in Vanuatu (1980 -), Kaunda in Zambia (1964 -), etc.

model has the best goodness-of-fit in explaining political survival itself, the Latin American and Middle Eastern models are proven to be the best in accounting for the strength of political survival.

The question, whether the data from diverse cultures and time periods are functional, should be overcome by minimizing as much as possible the introduction of ethnocentric or otherwise biased materials. However, justification of gathering social information for the comparative study of political leadership seem to withstand most criticisms on empirical inefficiency. In contrast to the general elite studies, it is much easier and more possible to collect reliable social background and career paths of the leaders as heads of government since they are much better known and publicized than other elites groups. The only one problem is that it is very difficult to collect and operationalize psychological information. While it is possible to find leaders' personal histories, past achievements, and basic political philosophies, their skills or personalities, such as hobbies, habits, and weak points, do not receive much attention, and, therefore, it is not easy to find some crucial psychological factors. Hence, it is not easy to identify the individual traits that contribute to leader's success.

Many scholars believe that the study of political leadership as we find it in the context of contemporary social psychology is no longer a study of the mighty, of the personalities and behaviors of the outstanding figures of modern society, but of the many minor heads, bosses, and superiors of everyday, mainly institutional, life. If 'fitness' for a certain position becomes less evolutionary and more social, reputation or status - family and class background, education, profession, money, etc. - are substitutes for real competitive proofs. By 'worth' is meant that set of qualities and conditions that

society values in assigning social class rank; it is what the electorate admires. For example, those that in the past have rated highest are; in China, scholarly learning and prowess at killing games; in India, Brahman birth; in Europe, royal birth (Girvin, 1989). However, instead of parents' worth, personal worth, that is recognized socially as personal attributes, is included in the new formula for worth.

Some background characteristics have more relevance than others for political success within same political systems. A priori use of background characteristics as explanatory variables has different effects for different types of heads of government in different regions of the world. However, gross similarities between the social backgrounds or career backgrounds of heads of government can not be used as proof of political success or failure and the degree of their success. Significance of those backgrounds for political success is greater in developing societies than in societies with more stable political institutions. Therefore, the impact of social and career backgrounds on political success remains plausible, but ambiguous and unsubstantiated.

It would seem that long leadership will tend to prevail in countries where the extent of social and economic change is low. Elsewhere, the occurrence of long leadership would hinge on the presence of special conditions countering the propensity of leaders to be rapidly weakened by social change. Even though biographies often endeavor to give descriptive accounts of the personality characteristics of the political leaders, it is premature to begin discussing the impact of personality as we did not know which 'traits' were relevant to political success.

Like any quantitative researches, in this study, we can find that measures of duration of office are limited to the year unit and typically insensitive to some validity

problems. By nature, the sample, here, is a censored sample in which some observations on the dependent variable corresponding to known sets of independent variables are not observable. Using the duration of office as the dependent variable poses new problems. First, the value of the dependent variable is unknown or censored for the leaders who are not out of office during the observed period. The second problem is how to include explanatory variables that change in value over the observation period. There is no satisfactory way of incorporating time-varying explanatory variables in a multiple regression predicting time of an event.

As a solution for the former problem, in order to reduce the problem of missing data on duration office resulted from censoring, the leaders who are still in office during the observed period need to be given elaborate consideration. They make up 11.5 % (115 cases) of the total leaders examined (997 cases) and excluding them from the analysis is not a reasonable solution. Thus, considering the theoretical aspects, only the short durations (0 - 2 yrs) during the observed period are excluded. It is not a perfect solution for missing data, but at least it prevents from losing many available information.

Most situational explanatory variables incur the second problem stated above since their value are changing over time. If continuous variables themselves, such as freedom status, economic freedom, literacy, population density, age of country, etc., are considered as annual data, the measurements of the year when the leader became a head of government are used. However, the unavailable data are replaced with the values of the closest year even though they are not accurate. However, in case of the stationary variable, i.e., homogeneity index, it is reasonable to use given values of a

certain year when the leader started his office as a head of government since its change over the years is not seriously enormous.

Although we investigate as many potential causes of successful political leadership as the available data allowed, some important variables - SES, father's occupation, major in school, or skills and personalities - have undoubtedly been omitted from the causal system. If something related to them could be found, it might be general enough across time and space to lend itself to predictive testing when applied to contemporary and future leaders, men for whom extensive biographical data would not be available, but for at least some of whom sufficient articulated data might be. Thus, these data are just analyzed in a descriptive way.

If the results of the estimation provide justification or corroboration for theoretical perspectives on political survival, then it could be argued that this model has led to some progress in the field. Not only disproof, invalidation, lack of progress, but also satiation due to overresearching an area are the most frequent motives for the discontinuous nature of historical change in the sciences. Many people assert that the greatest weakness of research in this field has not been a lack of facts but the disparity between theory and empirical research. Despite masses of accumulated data, it is necessary to find rather few general relationships between demographic, career background, and situational factors and political survival as political success. Andreas Pickel (1989, p.90) asserts, "We should try to improve and expand our knowledge by criticizing rather than by justifying our theories, by searching for refutations rather than confirmations." Even though some stand up more successfully to criticism than others, and this is why they can be considered closer to the truth than others, constructive

search for refutation still forces us to develop new and better theories.

The study of political survival as political success based on leader's duration in office is important in at least a couple of reasons. First, individual leaders have different qualities associated with being top executives which people expect, despite social backgrounds or career backgrounds. Second, polities differ in the economic and political output of the government, such as economic freedom, political system, freedom index, party system, type of head of government, and so on. Therefore, as Rousseau mentioned, it is true that the strongest is never strong enough to always be the master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty.

Finally, there is some motivation that individual leaders need to stay longer as top executives. However, these psychological aspects can not be generalized by some collected biographical information because of the lack of validity and reliability of the sources. Personal attributes of leaders have a large effect. They relate to deeper elements of the personality or to events that occurred in childhood. Leaders have to be able to grasp what is important and what is trivial, to weigh alternatives, to foresee possible outcomes. Decision-making a matter of will power and courage, the leader has to have the emotional ability to stop the debate in his mind and take a particular side.

RECOMMENDATION

If it is possible to find other information on certain background variables, such as birth order, sibling combination, religion, and ethnicity, etc., it will provide an even more interesting explanation on political success. According to Stewart (1977), the relationship between birth order and political Zeitgeist is explained as follows: First-

born may have superior odds of success in times of crisis, with the proviso that middle children be more disposed toward political leadership (They are more likely to lead in periods of calm.) and later-born children toward revolution. These tendencies may arise from childhood patterns of sibling relationship (Galton, 1874: Rejai and Phillips, 1983).

As Weber repeatedly emphasized, it is not necessarily what the leader is but how he is perceived by his followers that is decisive for the validity of charisma (Willner, 1968, p.4). In so far as charisma can be seen as a quality of an individual, it lies in his capacity to project successfully an image of himself as an extraordinary leader. In other words, charisma is a certain quality of an individual personality. In biographies or the documents about the political leaders, it may not be difficult to find the description indicating charismatic personality - acuteness, eye for detail, ideological 'founding father' or 'initially' charismatic leader, discriminatory powers of the observer and recorder, nonverbal behavior. With this subject, the research should be narrowed down to the certain limited target population.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Data Collections and Data Codebook

A. Data Sources

The most important data sources for collecting information on the leaders as heads of government in each country and their duration of office are *Heads of State and Government* (1985), *Elections since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium* (1989), *World Atlas of Elections 1986* (1987), *The International Almanac of Electoral History* (1991), etc.

The main sources of social background variables are *Current Biography*, *New York Times Biographical Edition* that accumulates the articles of *Man of the News*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *Current World Leaders* (1960 -), *Almanac of Current World Leaders*, *Encyclopedia of World Biography*, *Who's Who in the World*, *International Who's Who*, *The Annual Obituaries* (1980 -), *The Britannica Yearbook*, *Who's Who in Modern World: 1860 - 1980*, *Historical Dictionary* series of each country, and several biographies from some specific regions or countries, such as *Biographical Dictionary of Latin American And Caribbean Political Leaders*, *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, *Encyclopedia of Latin America*, *Who's Who in Africa*, *Makers of Modern Africa*, *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, *Who' Who in Australasia and Far East*, etc.

The sources for institutional data are *World Quality of Life Indicators*, *World Development Report*, *Britannica World Data*, *Political Parties of the World*, and *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948 - 1982*, *World Urbanization:*

1950 - 1970, Freedom in the World, 1974 - 1990, The New Book of World Rankings,
and etc.

B. Operationalization and Measurement

Dependent Variable

Duration of Office (DURATION or DURACAT) : For a two-equation model, duration of office as a continuous variable is divided into 4 categories (**DURACAT**). And, for the descriptive analysis, it is categorized into 5 values (**DURATION**).

DURATION :

0 = 0 - 2
1 = 3 - 6
2 = 7 - 12
3 = 13 +
4 = 21 +

DURACAT :

0 = 0 - 2
1 = 3 - 5
2 = 6 - 10
3 = 11 - 20

Independent Variables

(a) Social Backgrounds of Individual Leaders

Age (when the person became a leader)(AGE or AGECAAT) : Age is used as a continuous variable in the two-equation model, whereas it is categorized for the descriptive analysis.

0 = Under 40
1 = 40 - 49
2 = 50 - 59
3 = 60 and Over

Place of Birth (BPLACE):

0 = Rural + Foreign Country
1 = Urban (Cosmopolitan areas) + Capitol

Father's SES (SES):

0 = Low
1 = Middle
2 = Upper

Degree of Education (DEGREE): It is operationalized in two different ways:

DEGREE (1) for the descriptive analysis and **DEGREE (2)** for the two-equation model.

DEGREE (1)

- 0 = Below High School
- 1 = Coll./Univ. (BA, BS, LLB)
- 2 = Master's (MA, MS)
- 3 = Doctorate (LLD, MD, PhD)
- 4 = Military

DEGREE (2)

- 0 = Below High School
- 1 = Above College

Major of Education (MAJOR):

- 0 = Law/PLS/Diplomacy/Public Administration
- 1 = Medicine/Pharmacy/Engineering/Natural Science/Agriculture
- 2 = Journalism/Language/Education/Social Science/Theology
- 3 = Business/Accounting/Finance/Economics
- 4 = Military

Father's Occupation (FATHOCCU): Since it is very difficult to collect the information of father's occupation, 'Not Available' is included as one of the categories of the variable.

- 0 = Lawyer
- 1 = Civil Servant/Military
- 2 = Party official/Politician/Political Activist/Union Activist
- 3 = Journalist/Teacher/Professor/Liberal Profession/
Business/Own Farms /Technical/White Collar/Medical Doctor/
Engineer/Accountant
- 4 = Manual Laborer/Small Wage Earner/Farmer/Agriculture
- 5 = Not Available

(b) Career Backgrounds

Party Membership (PARTEXP): If a leader had joined in a party, it is coded as 1.

- 0 = No
- 1 = Yes

Experience of Ministerial Position or a Chief of Staff (MINIEXP): If someone has been in office as a minister of a certain department or in almost the same level of a powerful position such as a Chief of Staff in military or a Commander of army, it is coded as 1.

- 0 = No
- 1 = Yes

Experience in Congress (CONGEXP): Regardless of the differences between lower and upper house or senators and congressmen, if someone has been elected for Congress, it is coded as 1.

- 0 = No
- 1 = Yes

Political Experience (POLEXP):

- 0 = None
- 1 = Party or Congress or Ministry Only
- 2 = Party + Congress/Party + Ministry/Ministry + Congress
- 3 = Party + Congress + Ministry

Career before getting into Politics (CAREER):

CAREER (1) for the two-equation model

- 0 = Lawyer
- 1 = Civil Servant/Military
- 2 = Party Official/Politician/Political Activist/Union Activist
- 4 = Manual Laborer/Small Wage Earner/Farmer/Agriculture

CAREER (2) for the descriptive analysis

- 0 = Lawyer/Politician/Political Activist
- 1 = Civil Servant
- 2 = Military
- 3 = Journalist/Teacher/Professor/Liberal Profession/
Business/Own Farms /Technical/White Collar/Medical Doctor/
Engineer/Accountant
- 4 = Manual Laborer/Small Wage Earner/Farmer/Agriculture

Experience in Prison or Exile (PRISEXIL): If a leader had experience in prison or in exile for political reasons, and not for personal reasons, it is coded as 1.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Military Service (MILEXP): Even though someone had been in obligatory military service, he is included in 'no experience' category. The leader who was a professional military, is coded as 1.

0 = No

1 = Professional Military

Political Activity (POLACT): It decides whether someone participated in underground movements, political activity at schools, or other activities related to politics.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Entry Mode (ENTRY): Constitutional way of entry includes the entry by the national referendum, by a council or committee, or an elected chamber or majority vote in parliament, whereas non-constitutional way comprises self-appointment (Usurpation) or military coup.

0 = Constitutional

1 = Non-Constitutional

Foreign Experience (FOREIGN): Measurement rule depends on whether someone has been abroad for studying, working, travelling, or living for a long term. FOREIGN (1) for the descriptive analysis and FOREIGN (2) for the two-equation model.

FOREIGN (1)

0 = No

1 = Yes

FOREIGN (2)

0 = None

1 = Study in Foreign Countries

2 = Work in Foreign Countries

3 = Both

(c) Institutional Attributes

Region (REGION): It is based on geographical division as well as historical or cultural similarities. As a result, even though North African countries are located in Africa, they are included in Arabic territory. North American countries are combined with European countries.

- 0 = Asia
- 1 = Africa
- 2 = Middle East
- 3 = Europe/North America
- 4 = Latin America
- 5 = Oceania

Party System (PARTYSYS):

- 0 = No Party
- 1 = One Party
- 2 = Multi-Party

Type of Head of Government (LEADTYPE):**LEADTYPE (1)**

- 0 = President/Military
- 1 = Prime minister
- 2 = General Secretary

LEADTYPE (2)

- 0 = Prime Minister/Gen. Sec.
- 1 = President/Military

Economic Freedom (ECONFREE):

- 1 (Not Free) - 5 (Fully Free)

Population Density (POPDEN): The unit of population density as a continuous variable is 1,000 per Sq. Km. Since it is changing year by year, the value of population density is based on the year when a leader became a head of government.

Homogeneity Index (HOMOGEN): It is an index that combines racial, religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity. The data during 1960 to 1965 is used since there is no big change in values.

Country Age (COAGECAT):

0 = Independent Since 1960 (0 - 30)

1 = Independent Before 1960 (31 +)

Freedom Status (FREESTAT): It is an index of combination of political rights and civil rights indices.

0 = Low

1 = Medium

2 = High

Urbanization (URBAN): It is related to the process of mobilization: we can divide the countries into small-states, industrialized, and developed countries. It is measured by percentage of population in cities of over 100,000 people or more. It also changes year by year.

Literacy (LITERACY): Data for most countries relate to populations aged 15 and over; but in some cases, the figures are based on population over age 6. It is widely used for determining social and cultural development.

d) Personal Dispositions

Oral Skills (ORAL): If leaders are described by the words such as eloquent speaker, master of persuasion, brilliant orator, powerful voice, or ability to quickly grasp oral and written arguments, they have oral skills.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Organizational Skills (ORG): If leaders are described by the words such as disposition to command with influencing purpose and boundless energy, or a man of true ability, they have organizational skills.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Language Skills (LANG): If they speak more languages other than their native language, they have language skills.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Political Ideology (PARTYID) : A political leader is almost always possessed of some set of philosophic and political convictions that he has, for one reason or another, made his own. It is usually the same as the ideology of the party that he joins.

0 = None

1 = Liberal

2 = Independent (Center)

3 = Conservative

Physical Deformity (PHYSDEF): If a leader has physiological disposition or bad health, his personality development is influenced by it.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Parental Death or Separation in Early Age (FADIESE):

0 = No

1 = Yes

Family or Power Connection (FAMCONN):

0 = No

1 = Yes

(d) **Exit Mode (REMOVAL):** The constitutional exit includes the cases that are not involved in forceful removal, while non-constitutional exit means forceful removal from the office. The former category has automatic rule (end of term), completion of special task, defeat in election, natural death, and voluntary resignation or retirement. The latter includes the leaders who are assassinated, and deposed by military coup or other ways. Death, if nonviolent, may safely be counted as 'extra-political', but illness is often political face-saving device for an

involuntary replacement. If prime ministerial changes are to be taken into account, the most straightforward criterion is to count all of them without trying to measure the exact degree to which an illness may be political (Lijphart, 1984, pp.268-269). Nonetheless, natural deaths or illness is counted as constitutional for the study.

0 = Constitutional

1 = Non-constitutional

APPENDIX B

Hazard Rate (Life Table)

Figure 21 Hazard Rate of Total Sample (N=984)





Figure 22 Hazard Rate of Censored Sample (N=882)



APPENDIX C

Table 14 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation

Dependent Variable: DURATION			
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Statistic
Constant	10.13656	2.54477	3.98330***
AGE	-0.11623	0.02114	-5.49769***
COLLEGE	-1.08637	0.64495	-1.68444*
URBAN	-1.04769	0.41331	-2.53484**
LAWPOL	-3.38199	1.13111	-2.98997***
CIVSERV	-4.27806	1.24275	-3.44242***
MILITAR	-1.50243	1.23204	-1.21946
LIBTECH	-3.31387	1.10553	-2.99753***
POLONE	0.40314	1.30247	0.30952
POLTWO	0.85451	1.37807	0.62008
POLBOTH	0.81863	1.38737	0.59006
FORSTUD	1.23355	0.51625	2.38945**
FORWORK	0.59810	0.58392	1.02428
FORBOTH	1.50344	0.65585	2.29236**
NONCONSTI	0.33858	0.66742	0.50729
LIBERAL	2.08950	0.90527	2.30814**
CENTRE	1.75370	1.15409	1.51955
CONSERV	2.92347	0.86769	3.36928***
OLD	-1.49812	0.57361	-2.61174***
PREZ	1.90623	0.56955	3.34689***
SINGLEP	3.27892	1.04722	3.13107***
MULTIP	-0.09300	0.96138	-0.09673
POPDEN	0.00078	0.00094	0.83106
HOMOGEN	-0.00044	0.00108	-0.40554
LITERACY	0.02031	0.01151	1.76524*
ECONSTAT	-0.33774	0.28799	-1.17277
PARTFREE	0.66352	0.75779	0.87560
FULLFREE	1.09754	1.01599	1.08027
ASIA	0.99248	1.23797	0.80170
AFRICA	0.09237	1.28693	0.07178
MIDEAST	-0.44012	1.25672	-0.35021
EURNAME	1.37779	1.09892	1.25377
LATINAME	-0.36371	1.18041	-0.30812
Number of Observations		871	
R-squared		0.20412	
Corrected R-squared		0.17373	
Sum of Squared Residuals		27714.8	
Standard Error of the Regression		5.75087	
Durbin-Watson Statistic		1.85944	
Mean of Dependent Variable		5.25373	

* significant at .10

** significant at .05

*** significant at .01

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