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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled
From Provinces of the Empire Into Nation-States:

Ethnic Transformation In the Successor States
Of the Former Soviet Union

presented by

Arunas Juska

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

Doctoral degree in Sociology

 

 

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Date August 19, 1996

 

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MSU loAn Afﬁrmative Won-l Oppodunlty Ira-tuition
mans-9.1

FROM PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE INTO NATION-STATES:
ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

By

Arunas J uska

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1 996

ABSTRACT

FROM PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE INTO NATION-STATES:
ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

By

Arunas Juska

This study examines ethnic stratiﬁcation in the non-Russian republics of the USSR
and its radical transformation since the collapse of the country in December of 1991. This
dissertation covers the events that occurred in the ethnically diverse periphery of the
Czarist and later Soviet empires since the late 19th century up until present. The analysis
focuses on three processes: (a) the disintegration of the imperial ethnic order that
promoted the dominance of ethnic Russians within the Soviet Union, (b) the consolidation
of new ethnic orders in the successor states, and (c) the patterns of transformation in
which ethnic Russians changed from majority to minority groups within the new states.

The study develops a theoretical model for the analysis of ethnic transformation
processes in the successor states of the Soviet Union. A system of empirical indicators

that enable a description of this transformation process is provided. A typology of the

Arunas J uska
ethnic transformation processes across the new states of the former USSR is developed.
A systematic description of the emerging ethnopolitical systems in the new states of the
former USSR is presented. The implications of the suggested approach for analysis of
political and economic transformations in the successor states of the former USSR are

discussed.

iv

DEDICATION

To my parents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to many people for their help and advice. In particular I am grateful
to the Chair of my committee, Vladimir Shlapentokh, who provided invaluable input and
guidance throughout all my studies at MSU and without whom this dissertation would not
have been possible. I am greatly indebted to Larry Busch for his unfailing support and
counsel, for giving me the invaluable opportunity to do social research, and introducing
me to the fascinating world of oilseed sociology. I'm grateful to Bernie Finifter for his
always very informative advice, and assistance in providing references and literature which
proved to be very helpful in the completion of my comprehensive examinations and
dissertation. Chris Vandcrpool, the Chair of the Sociology Department at Michigan State,
and a member of my committee, gave me support and advice throughout my stay at MSU,
for which I am most thankful. I am also grateful to Stan Kaplowitz who was a very
valuable member of my committee.

In addition, I would like to thank my good friends Steven Meyer, Elaine
Allensworth and Janet Cochrane for their caring friendship which helped me over many
rough spots along the way to the completion of my dissertation. Finally, I'd like to express
my deepest gratitude to Jeanne Lorentzen, who was very helpful and who was patient with

me throughout the time I have worked on this study.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................... xi
LIST OF MAPS ...................................................... xiii
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... l
1.1 Research Problem .............................................. 1
1.2 Research Objectives ............................................ 7
2. ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE USSR:
FROM THE "OLD" TO A "NEW" ETHNIC ORDER ..................... 9
2.1 The Change of Ethnic Russians' Status in the Successor States:
Coping with Plurality ........................................ 12
2.2 Ethnicity: Primordialist versus Constructivist Accounts ................ 18
2.3 Ethnicity, Ethnic group and Nation ................................ 21
2.4 From "Ethnic-Group-in-Itself“ to "Ethnic-Group-for—Itself‘ and Back ..... 22
2.5 Ethnic Transformation as a Change in the Mode of Conﬂict Resolution . . . 27
2.6 The Preparatory Phase of Ethnic Transformation ..................... 33
2.7 The Decision Stage in the Process of Ethnic Transformation ............ 35
2.7.1 The Structural Dimensions of the Decision Phase ............. 36
2.7.2 Strategic Dimensions of Ethnic Transformation ............... 43
2.8 Consolidation of the New Ethnic Order ............................. 49
2.9 Data and Methods ............................................. 51
2.10 A Note on Soviet Statistics and the Operationalization
of the Category of Ethnicity ................................... 59
3. THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN THE
PERIPHERY OF THE SOVIET UNION .............................. 60
4. THE PREPARATORY PHASE AND STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC
TRANSFORMATION ............................................. 79
4.1 The Push and Pull of Russian Migration: Between the Russian
Federation and National Republics ............................. 79
4.2 Central Asia: From Patemalistic to Rigid
Competitive Ethnic Stratiﬁcation .............................. 84
4.3 Moldova: From Rigid Competitive to Bipolar Stratiﬁcation ............. 89

vii

4.4 The Baltics under Demographic Threat ............................. 92

4.5 The Ukraine: Increasing the Regional Division ....................... 95
4.6 Migration and the Power Potential of Ethnic Communities ............. 99
5. THE DECISION PHASE: ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION AS A PROCESS OF
NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING, 1985-1991 ..................... 108
5.1 Ethnic Transformation in the Baltics: The Struggle Between Ethnic
Hegemony and Reform ..................................... 113

5.1.1 Liberalization and the Quest for Ethnic Hegemony, 1985-1989 . 115
5.1.2 The Struggle for Baltic Independence:

The Move Towards Civic Nationalism, 1989-1991 ......... 122

5.2 Moldova: Transformation through the Displacement of Non-Indigenous Elites
and the Imposition of Ethnic Hegemony ........................ 130

5.2.1 Moldova: Towards Uniﬁcation With Romania .............. 132

5.3 Central Asia: An Elite Negotiated Ethnic Transformation ............. 136

5.3.1 Negotiation Through the Imposition and Command:
Attempts to Re-enforce the Colonial Status of Ethnic

Russians in the Region, 1985-1989 ...................... 141
5.3.2 From Colonialism to Neo-colonialism: Negotiations
over Power- Sharing in the Region, 1989—1991 ....... 143
5.4 The Ukraine: Ethnic Transformation Through the
Reform/Abolition of Ethnic Hierarchy ......................... 150
5.4.1 National Protest as a Struggle against
Moscow's "Internal Colonialism":l985-l989 ........ 153
5.4.2 The Rise of National Romanticism
in the Ukraine: 1989-1991 ....................... 159
6. COLLAPSE OF THE USSR AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW ETHNIC
ORDER IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES .................................. 165
6.1 The Baltics' Independence and Ethnic Relationships: Towards "Ethnic
Democracy" .............................................. 167
6.2 Moldova: Towards an Ethno-Territorial Federation .................. 183
6.3 Russians in Central Asia: Between State Patronage and
Consociationalism ......................................... 1 89
6.3.2 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Negotiation
for the Collective Rights of Russians .................... 202
6.4 Ethnic Transformation in the Independent Ukraine ................... 212
6.4.1 The Decline of National Romanticism
and the Rise of Regional Tensions: 1992-1994 ............. 213
6.4.2 Crimean Secessionism and the Clash of Rival Nationalisms . . . . 216
6.4.3 The Donbas Region .................................... 221

6.4.4 The Decline of National Romanticism and
the Rise of Socialist Conservatism ...................... 223

viii

7. CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 227

APPENDDC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY
SAMPLES USED IN THE DISSERTATION ................................ 250

REFERENCES ....................................................... 255

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Russian Population in the Soviet Republics, 1989. ...................... 6
Table 2. Ethnicity and Knowledge of Russian/Indigenous Languages, 1989 ......... 17
Table 3. Native-Born and Immigrant Russians As a

Percentage of Total Russian Population in the Republics, 1989 ............. 38
Table 4. Origins and Formation of Ethnic Stratiﬁcation in the

Periphery of the Czarist Russia/Soviet Union ........................... 78
Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Moldova .................................... 91

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Ethnic Transformation in the Successor States of the Former USSR ....... 23
Figure 2. Phases of Ethnic Transformation and Modes of Conﬂict Resolution ....... 30
Figure 3. Patterns of Ethnic Stratiﬁcation .................................... 41

Figure 4. Direction, Modes of Ethnic Structure Transformation, and Character of
Political Systems in the Successor States of the Former USSR ............. 45

Figure 5. Major Dimensions of the Ethnic Structure Transformation
in the Successor States of the Former USSR ............................ 48

Figure 6. Russian Migration to the National Republics of the USSR, 1959-1993 ..... 80

Figure 7. Russian Migration to and From the Central Asian Republics, 1959-1993 . . . 86

Figure 8. Russian Population in the Central Asian Soviet Republics, 1959-1989 ..... 87
Figure 9. Russian Migration to the Baltics and Moldova, 1959-1993 .............. 93
Figure 10. Russian Population Growth in the Baltics and

Moldova, (pro-WWII population - 1989) ............................... 94
Figure 11. Distribution of the Russian Population Through the

National Republics of the USSR, 1989 ............................... 100
Figure 12. Russian Population in the National Republics of the USSR, 1989 ....... 101

Figure 13. Power Potential of Russian Communities in the
National Republics of the USSR, 1985-1991 .......................... 102

Figure 14. Ethnic Conﬂict Potential in the National
Republics of the USSR, 1985-1991 .................................. 104

Figure 15. Direction and Modes of Ethnic Structure Transformation
in Successor States of the former USSR .............................. 112

xi

Figure 16. Treatment of the Ethnic Minorities in Baltics. ...................... 169
Figure 17. Status of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Baltics. ......................... 169
Figure 18. Protection of Rights of Ethnic Russians in Baltics ................... 170

Figure 19. Migration of Ethnic Russians From the
Central Asian Republics, 1990-1993 ................................. 199

xii

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Moldova ....................................................... 63
Map 2. Kazakhstan with Percent of Europeans in Population by Oblast, 1989 ....... 76
Map 3. Ukraine with Percent of Russian-speakers by Oblast, 1989 ................ 97

xiii

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problem

The assent of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership and the initiation of a far-
reaching program of reforms precipitated the emergence of nationalism as a major political
force. It unleashed an unprecedented tide of mass protests and demonstrations across the
territory of the USSR, in which national grievances occupied a central place. National
protests in the ethnically diverse periphery of the country were directed against national
oppression and political and economic domination of ethnic Russians within the Soviet
empire.

Although ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union constituted barely a half of its
population by the late 19803, access to the top positions in the state and Communist party
leadership was reserved exclusively for ethnic Russians. The national republics, although
nominally equal members of the Soviet confederation, in actuality were nothing more than
administrative units. All decisions concerning the national republics were made
exclusively in Moscow. Economic policies, similarly, were implemented by the Kremlin in
the periphery of the country without consulting local authorities. Together with the
construction of new factories and whole industries, large numbers of ethnic Russian

workers were imported into the national republics, thus radically changing the

2
ethnodemographic balance. The natural resources were extracted on a massive scale
without locals having any control over the process of mineral production or over the
distribution of the revenues. Finally, Moscow's rule in the periphery of the ethnically
diverse Soviet empire, was perceived to be not only a brutal system of political oppression
and economic exploitation. For non-Russians Kremlin's rule also represented a system of
national oppression designed to Russify, and even annihilate whole nations and cultures.
Stalin's purges and mass deportations of the national political and cultural elites, the forced
agricultural collectivization that resulted in tens of thousands famine victims were
perceived by indigenous people to be acts of forcible destruction of their national
existence.

Therefore, as soon as the policies of liberalization and reform promoted by
Gorbachev allowed for articulation of national protest, demands (varying in strength) were
made to change the existing imperial ethnic order which promoted Russian domination and
redistribute power, resources and status among different ethnic groups populating the
country.

National assertiveness of the indigenous populations came as a surprise to the
ethnic Russians living in the periphery of the USSR. Ethnic Russians had been
accustomed to playing a dominant role through the periphery of the Great Russian empire.
Suddenly, almost over night, they had become foreigners in independent republics, their
status reduced to that of an ethnic minority. This change was a rude awakening for
Russians, entailing mixed feelings of resentment, dismay, incredulity and fear.

The disintegration of the Soviet empire rapidly undermined the political, economic

and cultural dominance of the ethnic Russians. The rapid decline of the Communist party

3
meant that they were losing political protection, as well as the representation of their
interests in the process of decision-making in the national republics. The majority of
Russians feared economic reform because their economic base (i.e. employment in large,
Moscow-run, industrial enterprises) was especially vulnerable to attempts of privatization
and decentralization of the republics economies. Finally, Communist ideology, which
justiﬁed and gave meaning to the social relations in which Russians played a crucial role,
was in a deep crisis. Marxism-Leninism was being discredited by revelations of glastnost
was rapidly losing its binding force. Thus, by the early 19908, Russians found themselves
in an inferior and vulnerable position compared to members of the titular nationalities of
the former Soviet republics.

As Russians became increasingly aware of their subordinate position, they were
confronted with the need to fundamentally reassess and redeﬁne their self-image, place,
and role in the national republics. Thus, the "Russian question"--a combination of
structural marginalization of Russians and their exclusion from the processes of nation-
state building in the successor states, emerged.

Consolidation of power by the new, strongly nationalistic, political elites in the
successor states furthered anti-Russian sentiment (Brzezinski, 1989; Novikov, 1992). The
sizable Russian minorities were perceived as a threat to newly acquired independence.
Therefore, legislative, administrative, and other means have been used to prevent ethnic
Russians from entering positions of power in the national republics. Citizenship Laws, for
example, denied, defacto, the right for Russians to vote in the 1992 national elections in
Latvia and Estonia, although Russians constituted about 35% and 30%, respectively, of

the populations in these republics.

4

Russians protested this situation claiming citizenship and language legislation in the
successor states excluded them from managerial and other high status positions, even
though they may be equally, or more qualiﬁed for certain jobs than individuals of
indigenous nationality. Furthermore, Russians have claimed: (a) that they have been
discriminated against in politics, employment, property ownership, access to health and
social programs, and in municipal affairs; (b) that the "maﬁa" and other sorts of "ethnic
cliques" are running the new states; (c) and that local Russians were being made into
scapegoats for all the injustice and crimes committed by the Soviet regime, and also for
the current problems of the new states.‘

It is evident that no politician in Russia will be able to ignore the plight of their
ethnic kin in the periphery of the former Great Russian state. Already the situation of the
Russian minorities is a central issue in the relations between Russia and the other
successor states, and, at times, becomes more important than economic problems. Thus,
Russia's current foreign policy, as well as its new military doctrine, have explicitly been
directed towards protection of ethnic Russians in the countries of the "nearby abroad."2

Undoubtedly, the Russian diaspora will eventually revitalize itself from its current

 

' For the comprehensive discussion of the Russian diaspora in the "nearby abroad" (in
English) see Shlapentokh et al., 1994 and Kolstoe, 1995. Among numerous publications
in Russian, see Drobizheva et al., 1992; the report on the situation of Russians in the
former Soviet republics by the Gorbachev Foundation (1993), and the writings of the ﬁrst
minister of nationalities of post-Communist Russia, Valerii Tishkov (Tishkov, 1994a;
Tishkov, 1994b).

2 For more on the role of the "Russian question" in Russia's foreign policy see, for
example, Kremenyuk, 1994; Migranian, 1994; Nikonov, 1994; and Porter and Saivetz,
1994. For a discussion of the role of Russian minorities in the military doctrine of Russia,
see the statement on the country's military doctrine by Russia's Defence Minister, Pavel
Grachev (Grachev, 1994).

5
subordinate and vulnerable situation because no post-Soviet country can be stable in the
long-term if a substantial segment of its population is denied political representation and
power-sharing. This is especially true with respect to Russians for a number of reasons.
They constitute a signiﬁcant percentage (between 10% to 37%) of the overall population
in the successor states (with the exception of the Trans-Caucasus region) (Table 1), they
are highly educated, and live primarily in urban areas. F urthennore, the majority of
successor states share territorial borders with Russia. In addition, Russia, as of early
1994, had about 200,000 troops deployed in the territory of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) (Bohlen, 1994).

Accordingly, the primary question is, how will Russians in the successor states
respond to the "Russian question?" Related pivotal questions include: What kind of new
ethnic order will emerge in the successor states? Will the policies of Russiﬁcation pursued
by the Soviet state be replaced by, for example "Estonization" or "Uzbekization" of local
Russians, or will more liberal nationality polices prevail? Will Russians be excluded from
the newly forming politics and economies, and if so, from which institutions (state
bureaucracies, National Armies, the police, education, social welfare) and to what degree?
How will the Russian communities respond, and what strategies will they employ in
adapting to the new situation? Will an ethnic or civil deﬁnition of the nation prevail in the
new states of the former USSR?

These questions constitute the research problem of this dissertation. The major
goal is to investigate (a) the dynamics of the disintegration of the Soviet ethno-political
system that had sustained ethnic Russians' dominance in all major spheres of life in the

society, and (b) the process of consolidation of the new patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation

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7

within the successor states of the former USSR, and position of Russians within it.

1.2 Research Objectives

The disintegration of the empire leﬁ Russians scattered across the republics.
These republics differ signiﬁcantly in terms of their social, political, and economic levels of
development (e.g., the westemized Baltic republics, versus the underdeveloped Muslim
Central Asia). Furthermore, Russians, by no means, represent a socially homogenous
group. It is evident that the collapse of the Soviet state, and loss of their dominant status
in the successor states, had a differential impact on the main social categories of Russians
(e.g., former party ofﬁcials and managers, versus workers).

The differences in conditions across the successor states, as well as the internal
differentiation of ethnic Russians themselves, suggest that there will be signiﬁcant
variation in the timing, degree, and modalities of (a) the process of disintegration of the
imperial ethno-political system of the Soviet state and consolidation of the new ethnic
orders in the successor states, and (b) the patterns of transformation of ethnic Russians
from majority, to minority groups. Furthermore, according to historical evidence, the

transition of Russians to the status of a minority will be a protracted and uneven process.3

 

3 There was no universal pattern in the reactions of the Germans, Hungarians or Turks
to the collapse of the, respectively, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Resistance
to downclassing ﬂared up, dissipated, and ﬂared up again. The pattern of migration to the
hinterland of the former empires was also uneven. It went from a steady trickle to no
migration at all, and then, to a sudden mass exodus. The migration and re-settlement of
Germans and Hungarians after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire continued for
about for about three-quarters of a century. For more than a century, Turks were
returning from the former periphery of the Ottoman empire to Turkey (Brubaker, 1993).

8

Therefore, the main research objectives are:

1. To provide a theoretical analysis of the notion of "ethnic transformation" and to
develop a conceptual model for the analysis of ethnic transformation processes in the
successor states of the Soviet Union.

2. To develop a system of empirical indicators that allow description of the
transformation process of ethnic Russians from majority, to minority group, in the new
states of the former USSR.

3. To determine the major factors that affect ethnic Russians' transformation from
majority to minority group across the successor states.

4. To describe the character of the emerging new ethnopolitical systems in the
new states of the former USSR, and the position of ethnic Russians in them.

This dissertation is organized in the following way: Chapter one reviews the
literature on ethnicity, ethnic conﬂict and change, including studies on the Russian
diaspora in the successor states of the former USSR. This chapter provides an outline of
the theoretical model of ethnic transformation to be used in the analysis of ethnic Russians
transformation from majority to minority group.

Chapter two presents an overview of the origins and formation of ethnic
stratiﬁcation in the periphery of the Soviet Union. Chapter three describes the changes in
the patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation as they've occurred since WWH, up until the early
19805. Particular attention is paid to the impact modernization policies had on ethnic
stratiﬁcation. Chapter four analyzes the ethnic transformation process during the period
of perestroika, and chapter ﬁve is devoted to the analysis of the ethnopolitical systems that

have emerged in the new states since the collapse of the USSR.

2. ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE
USSR: FROM THE "OLD" TO A "NEW" ETHNIC ORDER

Ethnic stratiﬁcation represents a fundamental form of social inequality. It is
expressed in an unequal access to power, resources and status among individuals of
different ethnic origins. Ethnic stratiﬁcation is achieved through, and stabilized by,
institutions, laws, norms, and values. Yet, ethnic stratiﬁcation is also inherently unstable.
Being based on unequal relationships among groups, it is subject to a process of conﬂict,
negotiation and change. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, ethnic
transformation is deﬁned as the process by which legal, political, economic and social
institutions, that uphold an ethnic order in a society, are replaced by new social
institutions. These new institutions formalize and stabilize the changes that occurred, in
access to power, resources and prestige, among individuals of different ethnic origins.

Chronologically, ethnic transformation represents the time period between the
"old" ethnic order and the "new" ethnic order. Following Rustow's (1970) example, the
process of ethnic transformation in the successor states of the Soviet Union is divided into
three stages.4

Preparatory phase of ethnic transformation process in the national republics of the
USSR began with the liberalization of the Communist regime. During preparatory stage
polarization between and among ethnic groups occurred. Ethnic polarization marked a

period of decline of Russian dominance in the ethnically diverse periphery of the Soviet

 

" Rustow developed his periodization to characterize the process of transition from
authoritarian political regime to democracy.

9

10
state. Attempts were made by subordinate ethnic groups to re-deﬁne the rules governing
access to power, status and resources in the republics. However, the strength and
character of the challenge to the superordinate Russian position varied signiﬁcantly across
the national republics of the USSR.

Ethnic polarization between indigenous populations and ethnic Russians was
occurring psychologically and socially. Psychologically, it strengthened ethnic and local
identities and rejected Soviet identity as being alien and imposed. This occurred because
the order which upheld the Soviet reality (e.g., unquestionable authority of the party, the
official Marxist-Leninist mythology, deiﬁcation of the General Secretaries and party
leaders, elaborate public rituals, etc.) was rapidly disintegrating. As a result, ethnic
Russians who overwhelmingly identiﬁed themselves as "Soviets" were increasingly
redeﬁned by the locals as "Russians," that is, as representatives and the embodiment of the
alien and repressive empire on "their land."

For ethnic Russians, such change in the attitudes towards them was quite a
surprise. They had difﬁculty in understanding how one day, so suddenly, the harmonious
inter-ethnic relationships, and the "friendship of people" could turn into hostile, suspicious,
increasingly contemptuous attitudes towards them.

Socially, ethnic polarization was expressed in the breaking down of inter-ethnic
communication and the relationships between indigenous and Russian populations (e.g.,
the refusal to speak in Russian in the streets, at work, in shops, etc.) At the same time,
individuals were retreating into ethnically homogenous environments, with decreasing
numbers of contacts and friends across ethnic lines.

This preparatory phase was followed by a decision phase during which some

ll
crucial elements of the new ethnic order in the national republics were institutionalized.
These elements of the new ethnic order included: legislation on indigenous languages that
regulated the use of indigenous and Russian languages in the territory of the republics;
legislation on the reform of the system of education that changed not only content, but the
access of people of different ethnic origins to education in the national republics; and
legislation concerning the sovereignty of the republics deﬁning who are the subjects of the
republics, and how sovereignty between the Center and the republics is to be divided.

It is important to note that the decision phase did not necessarily lead to the
institutionalization of new ethnic hierarchies, in which titular ethnic groups claimed
superordinate positions vis-a-vis ethnic Russians. There were also attempts to negotiate
political and social orders in which any type of ethnic hierarchies would be abolished.

During the ﬁnal phase of the ethnic transition process (a) the "ethnic order" was
ﬁnalized, elaborated and applied to all major spheres of life in the independent states, and
(b) the members of different ethnic groups were habituated to the "new ethnic rules."
Finalization of the new ethnic order was expressed in the adoption of the constitutions of
the new states.

At the same time, the new ethnic order was elaborated and applied to: regulations
on residency permits (Rus. propiska); participation in the privatization process;
participation in elections; access to housing; access to government employment (including
the National Armies and Police); and, to access to education and other social welfare
services. Again, there was wide variation among the successor states in the scope and
degree to which the new ethnic order promoted superordination of individuals of

indigenous nationalities, vis-a-vis individuals of non-indigenous (including Russian) ethnic

12
origins.

Chronologically, the end of the preparatory stage and the beginning of the ethnic
transformation decision phase is commonly regarded as having occurred in the late 1989,
when the ﬁrst relatively free elections were held in the country. The beginning of the
consolidation phase is commonly considered to be December of 1991, when the USSR
was officially dissolved and the Commonwealth of Independent States was created in its
place.

Of course, there is no clear cut line between different stages in the process of
ethnic transformation. Erosion of the Russians' dominant position in the national republics
of the USSR had begun long before Gorbachev started his reforms. Similarly, the
processes of consolidation of the new ethnic orders in the successor states will proceed
into the foreseeable future. Furthermore, in the different regions these periods will have
different beginning and ending dates of their own. In this dissertation, dividing the process
of ethnic transformation into three phases is done, ﬁrst of all, for analytical purposes, so as
to indicate that the processes and dynamics of ethnic transformation in any one phase are

qualitatively different from those occurring during the other stages.

2.1 The Change of Ethnic Russians' Status in the Successor States: Coping

with Plurality

In the literature that analyzes the ethnic stratiﬁcation of the Soviet Union there is
broad consensus on the description of the old ethnic order that existed during the Soviet
years. A signiﬁcant majority of research and analysis, in the West and in Russia, agree on

the characterization of the Soviet Union as an empire. In the Russian press, for example,

13
the USSR is commonly referred to as an empire.

The Soviet Union was an empire in a sense that it was (a) made up of many
peoples, and (b) was ruled by a central power representing ethnic Russians. Thus, the
Soviet empire was inherently, an inequitable political arrangement, a relationship of
subordination and superordination, which was hierarchical and usually exploitive of non-
Russian ethnic groups. Furthermore, the Soviet empire maintained relationships, between
the ruling Russian and the subordinate non-Russian ethnic groups, more by force and
violence than by consensus. The non-Russian ethnic groups had no choice but to accept a
subordinate role in the empire (Suny, 1995; Motyl, 1993, pp.33-34).

However, signiﬁcant difficulties arise when attempting to deﬁne what kinds of new
ethnic orders are emerging in the successor states. Researchers and analysts are
confronted with a multiplicity of causes and a plurality of evolving new ethnic orders.
First of all, there is great variation in ethnic dynamics across the regions of the former
USSR. Although mass-based national movements were characteristic to the European
region of the USSR and, to some degree, to Transcaucasus (e.g., Armenia, Georgia),
there were no anti-colonial or anti-Russian mass movements in Central Asia. This was the
case despite the fact that during the late 19703 a majority of experts on ethnicity in the
USSR believed that this Muslim region was most prone to anti-Russian conﬂict and
violence (d'Encausse, 1978). Instead, violent ethnic conﬂict between the indigenous
population and ethnic Russians exploded in the Moldovan republic, which is located in the
southwestern USSR.

Secondly, since independence, there were increasing differences in the situation of

ethnic Russians across successor states located in the same region. Thus, the

14
circumstances of Russians in Uzbekistan were increasingly dissimilar from those of ethnic
Russians in Kazakhstan. Even across the small Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, the situation of ethnic Russians differs dramatically. The majority of ethnic
Russians in Latvia and Estonia are still restricted in their access to citizenship of these two
countries, which is not the case in neighboring Lithuania.

The changing "trajectories" of the ethnic transformation process also represent a
signiﬁcant challenge to conceptualizing this process. With the sudden and quite
unexpected rise of mass national movements in the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, and
Georgia, a majority of commentators began to speak about underestimating the power of
ethnic sentiments and nationalism in the contemporary world (Connor, 1994; Kellas, 1991;
Laitin et al., 1992; Motyl, 1990) The production of literature on nationalism in the USSR
and in successor countries of the Soviet Union skyrocketed. However, since the early
19908, mass ethnic mobilization began to decline throughout the territory of the former
USSR. In the countries that were dominated by national movements (e.g., Lithuania,
Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) ex-Communists returned to power through
democratic elections reﬂecting the dramatic change in the mood and situation in the
successor states. Once nationalism began to decline some commentators began talking
about the overestimation of nationalism's signiﬁcance and power (Laqueur, 1994).

Finally, there were important differences in ethnic dynamics across the new states
of the former USSR. Thus, in Latvia and Estonia, tensions between the indigenous
populations and ethnic Russians seems to periodically ﬂare up, then decline, and then, rise
again. Similarly, in a "wave-like" fashion, tensions rise between Crimea, which is

p0pulated predominantly by ethnic Russians, and Ukraine prOper.

15

The literature devoted to ethnic studies has difﬁculty in dealing with the synchronic
and diachronic plurality of ethnic changes that occured throughout the former Soviet
geopolitical space. Most analyses in the ﬁeld are based on what could be called the
"deviations from ideal conditions" model. Thus, researchers are attempting to describe
ethnic transformation processes by asking such questions as: How far removed or close is
the ethnic order from the ideal of democracy?’ How big or small is the potential for ethnic
conﬂict?6

Even the most sophisticated analyses of the Russian diaspora are based on an
estimation of some kind of "deviations from an ideal condition." Thus, Kolstoe (1995)
treats the "Russian question" as if it is produced by a "mismatch" between the cultural and
political boundaries of the Russian Federation and the fourteen new successor states.
Under this assumption, it follows that a decrease in the mismatching of the political and
cultural boundaries of the titular and Russian ethnic groups would result in stabilization,
while an increase would escalate ethnic conﬂicts and instability.

Although measuring the degree to which empirical realities deviate from some
idea] condition is an appropriate research method, such an approach is inadequate because
it is primarily descriptive in character, and, therefore, has weak heuristic capacities. Using
this method, for example, one could argue that "mismatches" between the cultural and

political boundaries of the Russian and indigenous ethnic groups is of the same magnitude

 

5 See, for example, Diamond and Plattner, 1994; Khazanov, 1995; Rupesinghe and
Vorkunova, 1992; Rywkin, 1994.

6 See, for example, Buttino, 1992; Duncan and Holman, 1994; Kremenyuk, 1994 and
Kuzio, 1994.

16
in both Kazakhstan and Estonia. The size of Russian population in both countries is
approximately the same (3 0% and 37%). Russian knowledge of the indigenous language
in Estonia, although signiﬁcantly higher than in Kazakhstan (15% compared to 1% in
Kazakhstan) is still rather low (Table 2). In both states, the Russian population is
geographically concentrated in areas bordering the Russian Federation.

However, the situation of ethnic Russians in the more westemized and
economically developed Estonia is fundamentally different from the Russian situation in
the poor and relatively underdeveloped Kazakhstan (which has a clan-based social
structure). Similarly, it can be said that deviations from an ideal democratic political order
are much larger in Turkmenistan, (which is presently ruled by the neo-Stalinist regime of
President Niyazov) than in the more democratic Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, ethnic
Russians feel much safer in Turkmenistan, and migration is much lower from
Turkmenistan, than Kyrgyzstan.

There are a variety of reasons for the predominance of "deviation" models in the
analyses of ethnic transformation in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In part,
deviation models are employed due to a "predestination slant" which is deeply ingrained in
Western social and political thought. A predestination slant is expressed in assumptions
that the fundamental political, economic and social processes in Eastern Europe and the
countries of the former USSR have a direction, and are moving from "socialism to
capitalism," from "authoritarianism to democracy," and from "empire to nations."
Characteristically, the majority of former Sovietology publications were renamed as

transition journals, implying a direction to the fundamental processes occurring in Eastern

17

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18
Europe and countries of the former USSR.7

Perhaps the most vivid of such Hegelian conceptualizations of history is expressed
in Fukuyama's widely acclaimed book, "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992). In
this book F ukuyama treats the collapse of the USSR as an end of the dialectical process of
historical development. In the dissolution of socialism, the Hegelian logos ﬁnally reveals
itself in its most perfect form, a liberal-democratic state, thereby bringing an end to
history.

However, more fundamentally "deviations from ideal conditions" models are
inﬂuenced by the conceptualization of the phenomenon of ethnicity itself. What follows is
a brief description of the prevailing approaches to the analysis of ethnicity, and the
difficulties that arise when attempting to conceptualize ethnic transformation in the

successor states of the Soviet Union.

2.2 Ethnicity: Primordialist versus Constructivist Accounts

In the social sciences two major approaches towards ethnicity predominate,
primordialism and instrurnentalism. Primordialists argue that ethnic consciousness is a
part of "human nature," "a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in
the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way."

(Connor, 1994, p.92). Accordingly, the primordial perspective asserts that ethnic identity

 

7 For example, the former British "Journal of Communist Studies" was renamed the
"Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics." The World Bank publishes a
newsletter entitled, "Transitions." For a review of the "transitions" literature see section
2.5 in this chapter.

1 9
leads to the emergence of ethnic stratiﬁcation in a multicultural environment (Geertz,
1973)

Alternatively, instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a modern historical invention, the
effect of some sort of domination (Gellner, 1983; Pearson, 1993). In their opinion,
ethnicity is not a major structuring force in a society, but, rather, is a speciﬁc type of
ideology that legitirnizes or challenges the inequalities of class, power, and status in a
society.

Currently most commentators adhere to the middle ground, neo-Weberian
position, which incorporates elements of both perspectives (see, for example, Agniew,
1993; Comaroff, 1991; Smith, 1986; Smith, 1993). Although they accept the proposition
that ethnic identiﬁcation is a universal characteristic of human consciousness, ethnic
consciousness is seen only as a potentiality. Ethnic consciousness is transformed into
national identity only when it operates "in conjunction with conﬂicts arising from other
sources, most notably in economic and political spheres" (Rex, 1992, p.305).

The problem with primordialism, as asserted numerous times by its critics, is that it
reiﬁes the concept of ethnicity. Primordialism, as applied to developments in the former
USSR, suggests there was an "awakening" of ethnic sentiments and passions as soon as
Gorbachev lifted the threat of violence and repression. One problem with this primordial
interpretation is that the "awakening" of ethnicity occurred very unevenly across the
periphery of the USSR. In some regions this awakening occurred during early
perestroika, (e. g, the Baltics), in other regions it only transpired after the collapse of the
USSR, (e.g., North Caucasus), while still other regions were barely awakened at all (e.g.,

Turkmenistan). Furthermore, after being awakened, ethnic sentiments in some republics

20

declined, as occurred in Lithuania, Moldova, and Georgia, while other regions went
through periods in which such sentiments rose, declined, and then rose again (e.g., Estonia
and Latvia).8

Similarly, instrumentalism also has difficulty in dealing with the plurality of
outcomes and the changing dynamics of ethnic transformation. It does not explain why
the efforts of "ethnic entrepreneurs" sometimes lead to success, while at other times
attempts to initiate the ethnic mobilization process fail, despite exhaustive efforts. Finally,
a problem with the middle- ground, neo-Weberian position on ethnicity, is its meager
explanatory power. It is purely descriptive because it cannot describe the direction of
causal relationships.9

In Stun, the major weakness of the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches is
that they begin the investigation of ethnicity from attempts to deﬁne its essence. This
creates enormous difﬁculties when attempting to explain how the multiplicity of outcomes
were produced with the same, singular "essence" (e.g., primordial sentiments or

economic/political interests).

¥

8 For a more comprehensive critique of the primordial approach in studying ethnicity
in the USSR see, Tishkov 1991; Tishkov, 1996.

9 More on application of the concepts of instrumentalism and primordialism and their
derivatives to the analysis ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conﬂicts in the USSR, see a
sPecial issue of "Theory and Society" journal edited by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1991).

21

2.3 Ethnicity, Ethnic group and Nation

Alternatively, the problem of ethnicity can be approached by (a) asking what are
the conditions that lead to the rise and/or decline of ethnic identiﬁcation and ethnic
mobilization, and (b) by treating the ethnicity phenomenon as a continuum rather than as a
"ﬁxed essence" (Brass, 1970). A useful starting point for developing such an approach are
the Marxist notions of a "class-in-itself' and a "class-for-itself." In other words, the
relationship between ethnicity and ethnic group can be treated in a way in which class
consciousness is related to the category of class (Brass, 1980, p.3).

If the categories of an "ethnic-group-in-itself' and an "ethnic-group-for-itself' are
accepted, then ethnicity becomes characteristic of the process of self-conscious ethnic
group formation. Like class consciousness, etlmic consciousness is a continuum. On one
end of the continuum are ethnic groups as categories of academic or statistical
classiﬁcations of individuals. Ethnic groups can be statistically differentiated by a wide
range of cultural markers, for example, differences in languages among ethnic groups,
their culture, dietary habits, styles of dressing, etc.

Cultural differences among ethnic categories of people may (or may not) lead to
the formation of the communities. An ethnic community is deﬁned as a group of people
that use cultural symbols in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. The
individuals comprising an ethnic community share a common ethnic identity, that is, a
subjective self-consciousness of belonging to a group deﬁned by common cultural
symbols. Ethnic identity also involves a claim to status, or recognition by other social

groups in a society, and by the state. In its most general form, the ethnic community can

22
be compared to the interest group, which collectively acts and lobbies the government for
protection of its language and culture, an increasing share of resources, access to jobs, and
education for its members.

An ethnic community becomes politicized when it puts forward claims for control
over the territory where it resides, or the whole country, and acts upon these claims. If
the ethnic community succeeds in achieving such goals, either within the existing state or
in a state of their own, it becomes a nation. A nation may be characterized as a peculiar
type of politicized ethnic community with recognized group rights within the political

system (Brass, 1980, pp. 1-28).

2.4 From "Ethnic-Group-in-Itself" to "Ethnic-Group-for-Itself" and Back

Pursuing this Marxist line of reasoning one step further raises the following
question: what are the conditions that produce the shifts from ethnic category to ethnic
community and nationality, as well as movements in the opposite direction, i.e., from
nationality to ethnic community and ethnic category? It can be argued that movement
along the "ethnic category--nationality" continuum is produced by three, simultaneously
occurring struggles for access to power, resources and status: (a) the struggle between the
state and ethnic groups, (b) that among ethnic groups, and (c) the struggle within ethnic
groups (Figure 1) (Brass, 1985; Brubaker, 1995a). For the sake of brevity, further
reference to these three relationships will be referred to as the "triadic relationship," or

"triadic nexus."'°

 

'0 The notion of "triadic nexus" follows from Brubaker, 1995a.

23

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Figure 1. Ethnic Transformation in the Sucessor States of the Former USSR.

24

The following is a brief description of these relationships. A state's nationality
policies are crucial in an ethnic group’s formation, or, on the contrary, in the "de-
ethnization" of the population. This was especially the case in the Soviet Union where
civil society was almost non-existent and where the state had penetrated and
bureaucratized all social institutions. Although the state is usually dominated by one
ethnic group, it cannot be reduced to the role of the dominant ethnic group’s instrument.
The state acts upon many different sets of interests that usually overlap, but which do not
necessarily coincide with the interests of the dominant ethnic group. The state strives to
assure its territorial integrity, internal stability, and economic and social development. In
some cases the state's interests can be contrary to the interests of the dominant ethnic
group, as the history of the Soviet Union demonstrates. Thus, the imperial regime in
Moscow chose to ﬁnance the socio-econornic development of the periphery by channeling
resources from the Russian Federation. In addition, states usually have their own "ethnic
interests" that do not coincide with the interests of the dominant ethnic group. Thus, the
Soviet state was actively engaged in creating a supra-ethnic "Soviet" identity that was
supposed to be built on class rather than ethnic identities.

State policies have two kinds of impact on ethnic group formation (link 1, Figure
1). The state produces "vertical" social divisions within ethnic groups, and "horizontal"
social differentiation and inequalities between ethnic groups. Both types of ethnic
stratiﬁcation--vertical and horizontal--can, in turn, result from direct or indirect effects of
state policies regarding ethnic relations. The state can create social, economic, status
inequalities among ethnic groups by explicitly promoting one group's language, culture,

and its social mobility, while restricting the possibilities for the social and economic

25
advancement of other ethnic groups. The Kremlin, for example, promoted the Russian
language and culture by narrowing the functioning spheres of the indigenous languages.
Policies of Russiﬁcation (which varied in strength through time) were put in place to
promote the assimilation of non-Russian ethnic groups. The Soviet empire state also
limited the social mobility of individuals of non-Russian ethnicity, exclusively reserving the
upper levels of state hierarchy for ethnic Russians.

State policies also produce social, economic, professional and other types of
divisions within ethnic groups. Some segments of the population (e.g., those loyal to the
regime, or the intelligentsia and intellectuals) within an ethnic group might be chosen for
preferential treatment and promotion (Shlapentokh, 1990). Other groups, like the kulaks
(Rus. rich peasants) in the Soviet state, may be singled out for destruction and
armihilation. In response to the differential treatment and social and economic
opportunities, some members of ethnic groups may choose to integrate into the dominant
ethnic group, some may choose to resist, and some may just be passive and not express
any particular ethnic interests or concerns.

State's policies can also have indirect or unintended effects on ethnic group
formation. For example, policies of economic modernization and development,
urbanization, and expansion of education were designed by the Kremlin to promote social
equality, assimilation and integration of the Soviet society. However, in actuality,
modernization policies led to the consolidation of a majority of the ethnic groups
populating the USSR, heightened their ethnic identity, and increased ethnic groups'
capacities to act in defence of their collective interests (Suny, 1992).

The intersection of "vertical" inequalities (internal differentiation within an ethnic

26
group) with "horizontal" inequalities (differences in access to power, resources and status
between ethnic groups) can lead to three outcomes (Figure 1, Link #2, connecting Box A
& Box B). First, it can result in the privatization of ethnicity, in which ethnicity would
remain just a statistical or aesthetic category of individuals. Second, the intersection of
inequalities along "vertical" and "horizontal" stratiﬁcation axes can lead to the formation
of an ethnic community. Finally, under some circumstances, an ethnic community can be
transformed into a nationality or nation.

The outcome of intra- and inter-ethnic dynamics, be it ethnic category, ethnic
community or nationality, will (a) "feed back" into the state (Figure 1, Link #3) and (b)
will inﬂuence the stances taken by members of one ethnic group towards other ethnic
groups (Figure 1, Link #4). If struggles within and between ethnic groups result in the
privatization of ethnicity, then a depolitization of ethnicity will occur. In such a situation,
individuals will demand that the state protect them from ethnicity-based discrimination.
The privatization of ethnicity also indicates that a process of ethnic assimilation between
ethnic groups is under way.

If the result of struggles within and between ethnic groups is the formation of an
ethnic community, then the ethnic community will demand that the state provide for its
cultural, social, economic, and other rights. The formation of an ethnic community will
also be expressed in increased pressures to exclude from it individuals of other ethnic
origins. Finally, the formation of a nationality group will manifest itself in demands for the
state to institutionalize some form of self-rule, for example, territorial autonomy,
confederation, or succession and independence. With regard to other ethnic groups in a

society, the nationality group can engage in activities that will subordinate ethnic others.

27

2.5 Ethnic Transformation as a Change in the Mode of Conﬂict Resolution

The next step in the construction of an ethnic transformation model requires the
overlaying of two aspects of ethnic transformation: (a) the synchronic feature, which
refers to the stages of transition, and (b) the diachronic feature, which refers to the triadic
relationships (1) among state and ethnic groups, (2) between ethnic groups, and (3) within
ethnic groups (both features are described on pages 8-12). The synchronic aspect of
analysis should answer the question "why ethnic transformation is occurring," while the
diachronic should explain "how ethnic transformation is occurring."

In the ethnic studies literature, the "why" and "how" of ethnic transition are usually
analyzed separately. Macro-oriented studies focus on the analysis of the synchronic aspect
of ethnic transformation (i.e., on long term change in structural conditions that underlay
ethnic transformation). Studies of political strategies and choices usually "bracket out"
structural analysis and, instead, concentrate on the diachronic aspect of ethnic
transformation.l '

Macro-theoretical approaches (e. g., the "internal colonialism" framework)
(Hechter, 1975; Hechter, 1985) or ethnic the competition approach (Belanger and Pinard,
1991; Olzak, 1992; Olzak and Nagel, 1986;) concentrate on analyses of the impacts of
modernization and development on ethnic stratiﬁcation. Among studies that focus on
political strategies and choices, applications using rational choice theory to analyze ethnic
relations are rapidly expanding (see, for example, Hechter, 1983; Hechter, 1986; Hechter

and Furtado, 1992; Motyl, 1990; Olson, 1990; Ostrom, 1991). There are also attempts to

 

” For a review of the literature on ethnic conﬂict and change see Olzak, 1983.

28

apply Hirschman's framework, which categorizes ethnic group response as "voice,"
"loyalty," and "exit," (Hirschman, 1970; Hirschman, 1981) to analysis of the ethnic
dynamics in the countries of the former USSR (e.g., Gemer and Hedlund, 1993).

Finally, to the category of literature on political process must be added the
literature that can be loosely deﬁned as "Soviet elite studies." These are studies of
personnel and personalities at the top echelon of the Soviet nomenclature (within the
Kremlin, as well as in the capitals of the national republics).'2 Authors of this literature try
to investigate (a) how ethnicity has affected (or had been used) in the internal struggle
among the elites, and (b) how leaders of various elite groups had used ethnicity, ethnic
sentiments and ancient ethnic hatreds for the purposes of political mobilization in the
national republics.'3

Most recently there was signiﬁcant expansion of the literature attempting to
integrate both the structural and political process approaches (Bova, 1991; Brubaker,

1994; Ekiert, 1991; Gordon and Pliskevich, 1996; Karl, 1990; Roeder, 1994; Rozrnan et

 

'2 The Post-Communist studies of elites have their roots in the so-called
"Kremlinology," a genre that dominated the ﬁeld of Soviet studies during the 19603 and
19703. For reviews of Sovietology, including Kremlinology, see Motyl, 1992c; Remnick,
1994.

'3 This literature is voluminous and continues to grow rapidly as the Soviet archives
are being opened, not only to domestic researchers, but also to researchers from the
West. In addition, a whole international industry emerged that is engaged in publishing
biographies and memoirs of the former Soviet apparatchiks, diplomats, Army and KGB
generals, and spies. A review of this literature would require a separate study. The
following is a list of the studies on Soviet elites that appear to be most pertinent to the
issue of ethnic transformation. For studies focusing on Central Asia, see Critchlow, 1991;
Dannreuther, 1994; Fierman, 1991 and Ro'i, 1995; for studies focusing on the Baltics see
Lieven, 1993; Scan, 1995; and Taagepera, 1993; and for studies on the Ukraine elite see,
Krawchenko, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994; and Motyl, 1993.

29
al., 1992; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993). However, most analyses concentrate on the
subject of political transition, that is, transition from authoritarian political systems to
polyarchies.” Although ethnic issues do ﬁgure within these analyses, little attention is
paid to the speciﬁcs of ethnic transformation.

The following is an outline of the framework used in this study. Although the
framework draws extensively on the political transformation literature that integrates both
the structural and political process approaches, the suggested model extends this
integrative approach to an analysis of the process of ethnic transformation.

Following Welsh (1994), it is suggested that the category in which the strategic
and structural dimensions of ethnic transformation "intersect" is a mode of conﬂict
resolution within the triadic relationships. By "mode of conﬂict resolution" we refer to
the process by which access to power, resources and status among individuals of diferent
ethnic origins is deﬁned. As the process of transformation moves from the preparatory
phase to the decision phase and then to the consolidation of the new ethnic order stage,
the mode of conﬂict resolution within the triadic relationships changes.

During the preparatory phase the triadic relationships (i.e., between state and
ethnic groups; between ethnic groups; within ethnic groups) were dominated by the Soviet
state's command and imposition mode of conﬂict resolution (Figure 2). Once
liberalization of the authoritarian regime began, there was a decline of command and
imposition as the prevailing mode of conﬂict resolution. Instead, bargaining and

negotiations emerged as key features of the transition process.

 

'4 For a comprehensive overview of the transitions literature on Eastern Europe, see
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The change ﬁ'om a command and imposition mode to a bargaining and negotiation
mode occurs because liberalization undermines the power of the Moscow's imperial rule to
impose Russian dominance on other ethnic groups. Declining power of the Center allows
the actors in the triadic relationship to challenge the dominace of the ethnic Russians
within the USSR. However, opposition to Russian dominance (despite the declining
Moscow's power) is not strong enough to displace the Center and impose new principles
of ethnic stratiﬁcation. Therefore, a period of high uncertainty ensues with regard to the
process of how power, resources, and status should be distributed among members of
different ethnic groups, and its actual results. Actors within the triadic relationships (e.g.,
the National-Communist and conservative factions within the Communist party, National
movements, dissident groups, embryonic political parties, and religious groups) can
establish a variety of coalitions within and across the ethnic divide."

The development of coalitions can rapidly change the power balance in the
republics and the country. Therefore, the bargaining and negotiation process can lead to a
wide variety of outcomes. It can produce negotiated agreements on the future status of
ethnic Russians within the republics, in the form of citizenship and language legislation, or
laws regarding a republic's territorial autonomy. The process of negotiation can also be
aborted, and attempts can be made to impose one group's domination over others.

Whatever the outcome of the decision phase, it will fundamentally shape the future

 

'5 Thus, Yeltsin made alliances with the nationalist led governments in the Baltics,
opposing the Central government. Hard-line Communist factions within the Baltic
Commmrist parties associated with the Soviet military and KGB forces. National-
communists within the republics can ally with the leadership of the National Fronts, or the
pro-reforrn Gorbachev leadership.

32
dynamics of ethnic relationships in the republics.
Finally, the mode of conﬂict resolution predominating during the consolidation

phase depends on the direction that the ethnic transformation had shifted during the

process of negotiation (Figure 2). If Russian superordination ( 5 ) was replaced by the
I

indigenous group superordination ( ) , or if ethnic Russians were able to reclaim their

tolv-I

imperial status ( ) , the consolidation process would operate through the command and

H150

imposition. If ethnic stratiﬁcation evolved from a Russian superordination-based system,
to an unranked ethnic stratiﬁcation system (M) (e. g., federal state), then the relationships
between ethnic groups would be characterized by the competition and cooperation modes
of conﬂict resolution. And, lastly, if the ethnic transformation process led to the abolition
of the ethnic divisions altogether, then a non-ascriptive class system would emerge. In
non-ascriptive class systems, ethnicity is "privatized" and becomes largely an aesthetic
category. In the remaining sections of this chapter the concepts of "mode of conﬂict
resolution" and the "triadic relationship model" are to an analysis of preparatory, decision

and consolidation phases of the ethnic transformation process.

33

2.6 The Preparatory Phase of Ethnic Transformation

During the Soviet years the most important factors in producing "vertical" (within
ethnic groups) and "horizontal" types of stratiﬁcation were the policies of the Soviet state
(Figure 1, Box A). Additionally, the Communist regime actively intervened in the process
of identity/self-organization of ethnic group formation (Figure 1, Box B).

The Soviet state affected the processes of ethnic group identity/self-organization
formation in two major ways. First, the Kremlin assumed the role of ﬁnal arbiter and
mediator in relationships among ethnic groups, as well as in the regulation of relationships
among the different strata within ethnic groups. This was achieved through: (a) a
bureaucratization and centralization of Soviet society, in which all horizontal types of
relationships characterizing civil society were transformed into vertical types of
relationships; and (b) a resolution of a majority of the conﬂicts between and within ethnic
groups through command and imposition.

Omnipotency of the Soviet empire vis-a-vis ethnic groups was expressed in its
capacity to deﬁne and rank more than 100 ethnic groups that populated the USSR. Ethnic
groups were classiﬁed into four categories decreasing in their status and administrative
autonomy. On the top of the ethno-territorial hierarchy there national republics, that were
followed by ethnic autonomous republics, ethnic autonomous oblasts' (rus. region) and
ethnic autonomus krais' (rus. county). In addition imperial Center watched and regulated
the ethnic composition (proportion of ethnic Russians in comparison to the numbers of
indigenous population) within republic level ministries, the police, Communist Party, and

in other sensitive positions. Similarly, the Center supervised the distribution of housing

34
and other scarce resources among members of different ethnic groups. If such distribution
became skewed in favor of any one group, the state would intervene to restore social
justice.

Observing that state regulated inter-ethnic relationships through command and
imposition modes, does not mean that there was no bargaining or negotiation between the
state and various actors within ethnic groups. In all authoritarian systems bargaining and
compromise are to some degree present (Welsh, 1990, p.383). Accordingly, there were
periods in Soviet history during which the indigenous elite’s administrative autonomy
increased. For example, the ﬂourishing of National Communism in the late 19203, and the
campaigns for the "indigenization of party cadres," during Khrushchev's thaw during the
late 19503 and early 19603.

However, the Communist regime pursued nationality policies, ﬁrst and foremost,
in order to strengthen the empire. Therefore, any tendencies that were considered
dangerous to the state were ruthlessly suppressed. Consequently, aﬁer periods of
increased administrative autonomy of the indigenous elites there usually followed periods
of re-centralization of the empire and increasing Russiﬁcation. Examples of such a
reaction include Stalin's purges in the early 19303, and Khrushchev's removal and
Brezhnev's ascendence to power in 1964.

The Soviet state also indirectly affected ethnic stratiﬁcation formation. Two major
factors must be taken into account in this respect. First, the policies of massive economic
and social development and modernization of the periphery (ﬁ'om WWII up until the late
19603) and, second, the Soviet society's economic and social stagnation and decline (since

the early 19703). The interaction of (a) the nationality policies pursued by the Communist

35
regime, with (b) the effects of the rapid expansion and then contraction of the Soviet
economy, had uneven and contradictory effects on the development of the indigenous
ethnic groups throughout the periphery of the USSR.

Some republics, threatened by assimilation, in-migration, and linguistic
Russiﬁcation, were consolidating ethnically (e.g., the Baltics). In the Slavic republics of
the Ukraine and Byelorussia, these same developments were, on the contrary, leading to
the acceleration of the Ukrainians' and Byelorussians' assimilation into the Russian nation.
The contradictive and uneven effects of the preparatory phase profoundly shaped the

process of ethnic transformation during the next, decision period.

2.7 The Decision Stage in the Process of Ethnic Transformation

With the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms the Soviet state's domination in the
triadic relationship began to decline. Gorbachev's reforms undermined the Central
government's powers, both horizontally and vertically. The Soviets that previously had
been rubber-stamping the decisions made in Moscow, started to accumulate power at the
expense of the Party. Moreover, political opposition to the party regime emerged.
Reforms also undermined the power of the Central government in its ability to rule
tenitorial and national units of the state. Devolution of power to localities resulted in the
"parade of sovereignties," and a "war of laws" between Moscow and the regions. Almost
all administrative units within the Sovier empire were claiming primacy of their laws
against those issued by the Central government.

As the Center continued to decline, a situation evolved in which Moscow could

36
not impose its will on the republics, yet, the republics could not set their own policies
either. Therefore, the command and imposition mode which dominated relationships
within the triadic nexus declined, and negotiation and bargaining over the "new" ethnic
order began.

The decision phase represents a crucial juncture in the process of ethnic
transformation. It is a point in history when a society is facing some, or even many,
transformations in its future. The decisions and choices made during this signiﬁcant time
period profoundly shape the subsequent future of the society. What determines the
process of negotiation and bargaining for the emergemce of a new ethnic order in a
society? What positions are taken by the major actors in the triadic nexus of relationships,
and why do they choose such positions? For analytical purposes two sets of factors can

be delineated: structural and strategic.

2.7.1 The Structural Dimensions of the Decision Phase

Structural characteristics refer to socio-historical, political, economic and other
conditions, within which a process of negotiation and bargaining occurs. The previous
history of societal development (i.e. situation as it evolved during the preparatory period)
to a large degree determines the possibilities and constraints of each actor in the triadic
relationship.

There are three dimensions of ethnic transformation involving the change of status
of ethnic Russians in the national republics: (a) the situation of ethnic Russians in the

national republic, vis-a-vis the situation and possibilities in the Russian Federation; (b) the

37

power balance between ethnic groups; and (c) the salience of ethnic stratiﬁcation. All
three of these dimensions are derived from application of the "triadic nexus model"
described in a ﬁgure 1. Thus, the variable "circumstance of ethnic Russians in the national
republics, vis-é-vis the situation and/or possibilities in the Russian Federation" represents
the outcome of the Soviet state's policies directed toward the periphery of the country.

The power balance between ethnic groups refers to the potential of the indigenous
ethnic group and ethnic Russians to impose their will on one another. The salience of
ethnic stratiﬁcation refers to the degree to which internal social divisions within an ethnic
group are stronger or weaker, vis-a-vis status differences between ethnic groups.
Collectively, these three dimensions constitute the possibilities and constraints that actors
within tiradic relationship faced during the perestroika period. The following is a brief
description of each of them.

The "Push and Pull " Between the Russian Federation and the National Republics.
The bargaining and negotiation over the future status of ethnic Russians in the national
republics has a profoundly dual character. The ethnic Russians' framework of perceptions
and actions is based on a perpetual comparison of their circumstances in the national
republic, versus the situation and/or possibilities they might encounter in the Russian
Federation. The duality of the framework is largely determined by the demographic
characteristics of the Russian diaspora. On average, about 45% of the Russian diaspora
were born in the Russian Federation, which indicates the existence of close relationships
with relatives and friends in Russia (Table 3).

Secondly, the degree of the ethnic Russian's integration into the local societies

remained low. This was especially the case in Central Asia, where the Russian

38

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community's knowledge of the local language did not exceed 5%, despite the fact that
close to 60% of the Russian diaspora were born in the region (Table 2). Lastly, the
Russian diaspora represented the most mobile segment of the Russian population.

In sum, any claims made by the local Russians in regard to their political, economic
or cultural rights need to be interpreted in the context of a comparison between: (a) the
situation in the Russian Federation and (b) their circumstances in the national republics.
Thus, if the situation was economically better in the national republics, or if there was no
place for them to return to in Russia, there would be a high likelihood that ethnic Russians
would put up with discrimination, and their level of political activism would be relatively
low.

Power balance Among Actors in a Relational Triad. Power balance can be
deﬁned as the capacity of an actor within the triadic relationship to impose its will on
another actor(s). Power balance largely determines what can be claimed in the process of
bargaining--the share of the positions controlled by an ethnic group in the government,
and local administration, regional autonomy, control over some sectors of the economy,
regions, cultural rights, preferential treatment in access to jobs, education, etc.

The power potential of an ethnic group can be deﬁned by two parameters: its size
in regard to the state size and its territorial concentration. The larger the group size in
relation to state size, the greater the likelihood that the ethnic group will claim control
over the state. And, conversly, smaller ethnic groups have neither the power, nor the
resources, to claim control over the state. The political efforts of small ethnic groups
rarely extend beyond their locality, and usually concentrate on the protection of their

cultural, economic, and political rights.

40

The power potential of the ethnic group is not only dependent on its size, but is
also determined by its geographical concentration. Political mobilization is by far most
effective among members of a geographically concentrated group. This is because the
density of the communications and interactions within an ethnic group is much higher than
the density of interaction across dispersed ethnic group. It's much more diffith to
mobilize geographically dispersed ethnic groups. And the matter is not only one of
logistics. Dispersed ethnic groups also have intensive contacts across the ethnic divide
which create "cross-cutting cleavages" and lowers the potential for ethnic mobilization.

The Saliency of Ethnic Divisions. A high power potential of one ethnic group,
vis-a-vis another, does not necessarily mean that one ethnic group will try to impose its
will on another group during the decision phase. Whether political mobilization along
ethnic lines occurs or not also depends on the saliency of ethnic divisions and the degree
of ethnic inequality in a society. The larger the ethnic inequalities in republics, the greater
the likelihood that the decline of an authoritarian regime will allow for articulation of
national protest, and the demands for a redistribution of the power, resources and prestige
among ethnic groups in a society.

The salience or centrality of ethnic stratiﬁcation depends on the intersections of
class and ethnicity in a society (Figure 3). Four types of ethnic stratiﬁcation are
discemable. They can be placed along a continuum of rigid to ﬂuid ethnic stratiﬁcation.

Thus, a society would be characterized as having a paternalistic type of ethnic
stratiﬁcation if ethnicity determines the individual's, and his/her family and children's status

for life. Under paternalistic ethnic relationships, levels of acculturation and assimilation

41

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42
are low. Ethnic competition and conﬂict are also low.16

Under rigid competitive ethnic relations, a society remains deeply divided
ethnically. Social mobility occurs primarily inside the ethnic group. However, there is an
increase in competition between groups for control over the major spheres of life in a
society. Levels of acculturation under rigid competitive ethnic relations tend to increase
signiﬁcantly, while assimilation remains low.17 In societies with rigid competitive
relations, attempts to transform ethnic stratiﬁcation also have the clearly expressed
character of class conﬂict. When warfare in such societies occurs, it takes the form of a
social revolution (Horowitz, 1985, pp.21-41).

Located between societies characterized by rigid competitive and ﬂuid competitive
patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation are so-called "bipolar" societies (with only two ethnic
groups) or "polydomainal" societies (with more than two ethnic groups). In the case of
polydomainal ethnic stratiﬁcation, ethnic groups themselves represent the incipient
societies with their separate cultural and social institutions, mass media, and patterns of
social mobility.18 Ethnic transformation in polydomainal societies usually proceeds
through the politics of inclusion or exclusion, and/or the division of control over the state.

If the negotiations over the division of sovereignty fail, then ethnic transformation tends to

 

'6 Paternalistic patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation were characteristic of the "classical"
colonial societies of the late 19th, and early 20th, centuries in Africa and Asia.

'7 Rigid competitive patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation are characteristic to relationships
between German and Turkish ethnic groups in Germany; and between Gypsies and
Slovaks, and Hungarians and Slovaks in Slovakia.

‘8 For example, ethnic stratiﬁcation in the Netherlands, Niger, Sri Lanka, and the
Congo.

43
evolve into a struggle for succession and independence (Horowitz, 1985, pp.22-23;
Lijphart, 1968).

Finally, in societies characterized by ﬂuid ethnic stratiﬁcation, the advanced
processes of assimilation and acculturation blurs the boundaries between groups.
Although ethnic differences remain a signiﬁcant characteristic of social inequality, class
differences begin to play an increasingly important role.19 In such societies ethnic
transformation is directed towards elimination of ethnically based discrimination and does

not question the legitimacy of the state as such.

2.7.2 Strategic Dimensions of Ethnic Transformation

Structural characteristics describe the lines of cleavage among the actors in the
triadic relationships wetween state and ethnic groups; between groups; and within ethnic
groups). Structural conditions also strongly inﬂuence the issues (economic, political,
cultural, etc.) that will most likely be negotiated for and bargained over. However, the
structural dimensions of analysis cannot explain what positions the actors will take, what
strategies they will chose, or how the interplay of competing strategies will evolve.

The political process within the triadic relationships can be characterized by the
following three strategic dimensions: (a) the policies of the Russian Federation towards
Russian diaspora; (b) the mode of ethnic structure transformation; and (c) the direction of

the ethnic hierarchy transformation. All three strategic dimensions were derived by

 

'9 For example, ethnic stratiﬁcation in the contemporary US; and the Irish and Scotts
in Great Britain.

44
applying the "triad struggle model" (Figure 1) to the analysis of the situation of ethnic
Russians in the national republics. The following is a brief description of each of them.

The Policies of the Russian Federation Towards Ethnic Change in the National
Republics. The process of ethnic transformation in the national republics was highly
dependent on the policies of the Center. Because of its command over the country's
power ministries and signiﬁcant resources, Moscow had a profound inﬂuence on the
process of bargaining and negotiation that occurred during the decision phase. It also had
a decisive inﬂuence on the strategies that local Russians employed in order to adapt to the
rapidly changing situation in the republics. In general, active Russian resistance to the
downgrading of their status was (and is) possible only if there is signiﬁcant political,
economic and military support from Russia. Conversely, the lack of active Moscow
backing would leave ethnic Russians politically isolated in the national republics.

The Mode and Direction of Ethnic Structure Transformation. The remaining two
strategic dimensions of ethnic transformation are plotted in Figure 4. The grid made up of
two intersecting axes--the mode and direction of the ethnic hierarchy transformation--
describes the character of the ethnopolitical system that would emerge from the process of
bargaining and negotiation. According to the ﬁgure, four types of ethno-political systems
can result from the ethnic transformation process. All four ethno-political systems are
"ideal types," therefore the lines among them in actuality are blurred.

An elite-based ethnic transformation would occur if there were changes in the
ethnic composition of the elites and the hierarchical and centralized institutions of the
Soviet state would be kept unaltered and intact. Depending on the direction of ethnic

hierarchy transformation, two kinds of elite based ethnic transformation can occur

45

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(quadrants I and IV). The replacement of ethnic Russians by the indigenous elites within
the Soviet political, economic and social institutions would result in the creation of an
ethnic authoritarian regime (quadrant I). Under an ethnic authoritarian regime, power
would be concentrated in an ethnic elite that would not be constitutionally responsible to
the people.

If changes in the elites were to occur in the direction of the abolition of ethnic
hierarchy, then ethnic transformation would produce, what A.Lijphart (Lijphart, 1968;
Lijphart, 1977) deﬁnes as a consociational regime (quadrant IV). Consociationalism
develops in ethnically divided societies when (a) none of the elites from different ethnic
groups have enough resources or power to subordinate other ethnic groups, and (b) when
each ethnic group needs their opponent's resources for their own survival. In such a
situation the elites of different ethnic groups privately agree to share the power over a
splintered society.

Reforms based ethnic transformation is directed at changing the institutions of the
Soviet state that had produced a hierarchy of ethnic groups in the ﬁrst place. In the
political sphere, reforms would mean the reorganization of politics in the national
republics under the principles of liberal democracy, (e.g., the institutionalization of
political pluralism and rule of law, and the provision of civil and political rights for the
citizens). In the economic sphere reforms presuppose the transformation of the
centralized planning system into a market based economy. In the sphere of ethnic
relations reforms would (a) curtail the policies of forceful Russiﬁcation and assimilation;
(b) provide for the protection of ethnic minorities against discrimination, while (c) creating

conditions for the preservation of their cultural uniqueness.

47

Depending on the direction of ethnic hierarchy change, reform-based ethnic
transformation can lead to the establishment of two types of ethno-political systems
(quadrants II and 111). If the reforms result in a democracy for one ethnic group, while
members of other ethnic groups are excluded from participation in the polity, economy, or
social life of the society, then a system of "ethnic democracy” would evolve in the
successor states of the USSR (quadrant II).20

Ethnic democracy, in its milder forms, denies some political, economic or civil
rights to the individual based on their ethnic origins (e. g., the right to vote in national
elections, the right to hold public ofﬁce, or to participate in the privatization of state
property, etc.) An extreme ethnic democracy can evolve into an "ethnic apartheid," a
political system based on ethnic segregation, and the political and economic discrimination
of the non-indigenous population.

If the reform of Soviet institutions were also directed towards abolition of ethnic
hierarchy and the establishment of a political system based on the rights of the individual,
(e. g., autonomy of the individual, protection of civil and political liberties, establishment of
a government based on law with the consent of the governed, and protection ﬁom
arbitrary authority) then ethnic transformation would evolve into liberal democracy.

In sum, two sets of variables describe the process and outcomes of negotiation and
bargaining that occur during the decision phase (Figure 5). Structural variables
characterize the course of actions of the major actors involved in the process of

negotiation and bargaining, over the future status of ethnic Russians in the national

 

2° For a discussion of ethnic democracy and its applicability to certain ethically divided
polities, see Smooha, 1990.

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49
republics. These are the character of ethnic stratiﬁcation, the power differentials between
ethnic communities, and the situation and/or possibilities in the Russian Federation
compared to that of ethnic Russians in the national republics.

The second set of variables are the choices made and strategies pursued by major
actors. The major actors are the Soviet state, the indigenous ethnic group, and the ethnic
Russian group. The interplay of the two sets of variables results in the institutionalization
of the crucial elements of the following four types of ethnopolitical systems: an ethnic
authoritarian regime, a consociational regime, an ethnic democracy, or a liberal
democracy. The boundaries between these types of ethnic order are blurred, and
negotiation can produce a variety of trajectories that can go back and forth, or up and

down, throughout the grid described in ﬁgure 3.

2.8 Consolidation of the New Ethnic Order

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of the former
Soviet republics, the mode of conﬂict resolution within the triadic relationships began to
change. Negotiation and bargaining would be replaced by various modes of conﬂict
resolution, that can be organized along a scale (Figure 2). On one end of the scale there
are inter-ethnic relationships characterized by the command and imposition modes of
conﬂict resolution. The other end of the scale is marked by non-ascriptive class
relationships. In the middle of the scale there are competitive and cooperation-based
inter-ethnic relationships.

The four types of ethno-political systems institutionalized during the decision

50
phase (Figure 4) can be placed along the previously described continuum. Ethnic
authoritarian systems would be characterized by a predominance of the imposition and
command mode in inter-ethnic relationships. Such type of ethnic stratiﬁcation in the
present age of nationalism and democracy is very unstable. In addition, ethnic

relationships based on one group's domination over the other are prone to conﬂict and

violence. Consequently, there is a high probability that after some time, ( i; ) and ( é )

types of ethnic stratiﬁcation will go through the process of ethnic transformation again:
that is, there'll be a preparatory phase, then a decision, and a consolidation phase.

Ethnic democracy is characterized by a mixture of the imposition and command
mode, and the competition and cooperation mode in inter-ethnic relationships. This is also
a rather unstable form of institutionalization of ethnic relationships because ethnic
democracies tend to go through cycles of rising and declining ethnic tensions. It has the
potential to peacefully evolve into M and R = I types of stratiﬁcation, or it can lapse into
an ethnocratic regime, leading to an increase in ethnic tensions and conﬂict.

Successful consociational systems are characterized by competition and
cooperation among ethnic groups. However, if the process of forming a civic nation
within consociational regimes is stalled, or if the ethno-demographic balance among
incipient ethnic societies changes, consociational systems have a tendency to evolve
towards some form ethnic democracy, or split into separate nation-states.

Finally, evolution of ethnic stratiﬁcation towards non-ascriptive class-based

relationships means that there is a decline of ethnicity as a principal of political

51
mobilization. In such societies conﬂicts among social groups become based on non-ethnic

criteria, such as class, profession, etc.

2.9 Data and Methods

In this study the ethnic transformation process is analyzed using a "most similar
systems" or "concomitant variation" design. A concomitant variation design implies that
the choice of the cases representing ethnic transformation are as similar as possible with
respect to as many features as possible (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The sample of the
cases in this study will constitute ethnic transformations in 10 national republics of the
former USSR. Among them there are the Ukraine, Moldova, the three Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the ﬁve Central Asian states of Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The republics of Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, where not included in this study because of the small size of their
Russian populations (less than 8% in each case). Byelorussia was also excluded because
of the extreme degree of assimilation of Byelorussians into the Russian ethnos. In
Byelorussia, the Russian minority as social, political, and economic problem is almost non-
existent.2| The choice of these ten republics deﬁne the scope of the study. No attempts
are being made to extend analyses carried out in this disseration beyond the borders of the
former USSR.

The similarity of ethnic transformation in the national republics of the former

 

2‘ For more on the ethnic Russians' situation in Byelorussia, see Kolstoe, 1995.

52
USSR, is due to (a) the relative uniformity of political and economic institutions
throughout the territory of the USSR (e. g., the Communist party's monopoly on political
power, and standard organizations, such as the republics' Soviets, the republics' ministries
of various sectors of the economy, and education and culture; the academies of science;
creative unions of writers, painters, and composers; the state publishing houses; and
theaters, etc.); (b) the dominant position of ethnic Russians, vis-a-vis the indigenous ethnic
groups throughout the periphery of the USSR; and (c) the similarity of the time frame and
events that shaped the process of ethnic transformation (e.g., the introduction of
perestroika, liberalization of the political system, political and economic reforms, the
collapse of the USSR, and declarations of independence). These three common systemic
characteristics are conditions which are controlled for in analyzing the process of ethnic
transformation.

The explanatory variables, in the concomitant variation design, are examined
through a comparison of the intersystemic differences within each transformation case.
This is accomplished by hypothesizing about the patterns of causal relationships within
each case. Hypothesis testing is performed though a comparison of the transformation
process across similar cases. Such a comparison enables (a) the isolation of variables that
account for the character of the ethnic transformation process (e.g., economic inequalities;
cultural homogeneity of indigenous group; language and culture differences between
ethnic Russians and the indigenous population, etc.) as well as (b) an explaination of the

diversity within the ethnic transformation outcomes (e.g., describing the set of factors

which led from the ( g) to the ( TI? ) type of ethnic transformation; describing the set of

53

factors that led from the ( ) to R=I ethnic transformation, etc.)

Hlm

The empirical basis of this dissertation is derived from two kinds of data sources.
The ﬁrst data source is comprised of the Soviet Censuses of 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, and
other official publications produced by the Soviet State Committee on Statistics (Rus.
GOSKOMSTA 7). The GOSKOMSTAT publications provided information on the major
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the indigenous and Russian
populations in each of the 10 national republics of the former USSR. This allowed me to
construct the ethnic stratiﬁcation proﬁles in ten republics and their change through this
period of time. The proﬁles are deﬁned as the inter-ethnic differences in access to power,
resources and status between ethnic Russians and indigenous populations, and are
measured by differences in: levels of education; the ratio of urban/rural populations;
degree of assimilation and acculturation; ethnic representation in different sectors of
economy (e. g., heavy industry versus the service industry), and the republic's
administration; and ﬂows of migration.

Secondary data sources were also utilized extensively. In using secondary data
sources, I relied heavily on the methodology of socio-historical research, as explained by
Theda Skocpol (1984). Skocpol, commenting on the methodological basis of historical
sociology, writes:

Because wide-ranging comparisons are so often crucial for analytical

historical sociologists, they are more likely to use secondary sources of

evidence than those who apply models to, or develop interpretations of

single cases. . . . From the point of view of historical sociology . . . a

dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation
would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical

54

research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research--and if excellent

studies by specialists are already available in some profusion--secondary

sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study.

Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of

previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew. (Skocpol, 1984, p.

382)

By combining the Census data and information contained in the secondary sources,
a historical narrative of ethnic stratiﬁcation, as it was created, evolved, and was radically
transformed in the periphery of the Czarist empire/USSR, was constructed. This narrative
covers the events that occurred since the late 19th century up until the present.

The secondary data was gathered from a variety of sources. The most important
of these were the survey and other research data published in the Soviet and Russian
Academic press, as well as those in the mass media. Over the years, the Institute of
Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Institute of Ethnography of
the USSR (both now of the Russian Federation) published a number of studies devoted to
the problems of nationalities. The results of most of these studies were published in the
journals Sociologicheskie Issledovania.

Since late perestroika, two Moscow-based polling organizations have actively
engaged in research on the Russian minorities: VTSIOM (the All-Russian Institute of
Public Opinion Research) under the leadership of Prof. Y. Levada, and the independent
polling ﬁrm, "Vox Populi" (the director is Prof. B.Grushin). In 1991, VTSIOM carried
out a survey of Russian minorities designed and coordinated by prof. V.Shlapentokh and
L.Gudkov, which, is simply reffered to as the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey in this

dissertation. The survey was conducted in 11 non-Russian republics, and 7 autonomous

non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation. More than 6,000 ethnic Russian

55
respondents participated in the survey. The survey was designed to describe the Russian
population in the former republics and examine the principal characteristics, attitudes and
relationships of Russians with the indigenous populations. This is the most comprehensive
survey of Russian minorities ever done. The data from the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey
were available in electronic form and represents the major source of information on the
Russian situation in the national republics on the eve of the USSR's collapse.22

In 1994, on the basis of the Vox Populi polling ﬁrm, the Center for Research of the
Russian Minorities in the Countries of Near Abroad was created. The Center carried out
two comprehensive surveys of Russian minorities in Kazakhstan (Gudkov 1995) and
Estonia (Grishaev 1995). Both studies were comparative in that they included 1000
respondents of Kazakh and 1000 ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, and 942 ethnic Russians
and 911 ethnic Estonians in Estonia. Both surveys examined the characteristics, attitudes
and relationships of ethnic Russians with regard to the indigenous populations.

The surveys of Russian minorities in the Baltics were also extensive. In 1993, a
comparative survey of the ethnic Russians and indigenous populations in the Baltic states
was conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Policy of the University of
Strathclyde, Scotland (Rose and Maley 1994). More than 6000 respondents participated
in the survey. The questions used in the Rose and Maley survey were standard questions
taken from the State/Market surveys of the European Center for the Study of Public
Policy, and from the New Democracies Barometer of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna.

In addition, surveys of the ethnic Russians were carried out by a variety of academic

 

22 For the description of the survey smaples the data of which were used in the
dissertation see Appendix.

56
institutions (e.g., the Universities and Institutes of Sociology of the Academies of Science
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and private polling ﬁrms, such as the VILMORUS in
Lithuania, the LASOPEC in Latvia, and the EMOR in Estonia.

There are very few surveys on ethnic Russians conducted in Central Asia (with
exception of Kazakhstan) or Moldova. Only the data of a survey (N=2,067) conducted in
Central Asia by the United States Institute of Peace, in 1993, were available. The survey
contained a block of indicators characterizing the interethnic situation in the region (see
Lubin, 1995).

For information on ethnic dynamics in the periphery of the Soviet Union since
1985, newspapers and other printed media were used as the ﬁrst line of information.
Glastnost, introduced by Gorbachev, allowed for the proliferation of numerous
publications within Russia and the national republics. Extensive coverage of the ethnic
issues can be found in such newspapers as, the Nezavisimaja Gazeta, Izvestija, Pravda,
Literaturnaja Gazeta, and Argumenty i F akty. Most of these newspapers are now
available on-line. This provides up-to-date information on the ethnic situation in Russia
and the former republics of the Soviet Union. "Thick journals" such as Znamia,
Svobodnaja Mysl' also regularly publish materials related to the problems of ethnicity and
nationalism.

In building the chronology of events describing the process of ethnic
transformation, I relied heavily on the daily Soviet (later post-Soviet) news bulletins.
Daily news bulletins have been available since the late 19803 through e-mail. Initially, they
were produced by the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Research Institute (RFE/RL).

In 1994, RFE/RL Research Institute was reorganized into the Open Media Research

57
Institute (OMRI) which continued publishing and transmitting electronic distribution of
the daily news bulletin. OMRI has an extensive network of reporters and journalists
working in all the new countries of the former USSR. In addition, OMRI regularly
publishes analytical briefs on the major economic, political, and social issues (including
ethnic issues) in the new countries of the ex-USSR.23 Since 1993, the Daily Brieﬁng on
the Post-Soviet States has also been available through e-mail from the Jamestown
Foundation, a non-proﬁt research institute on Post-Soviet states, based in Washington,
DC. The Jamestown Foundation provides a daily digest of Russia's and other successor
state's press. In addition, the Jamestown Foundation, similar to OMRI, publishes
analytical briefs on the major developments in the new countries of the ex-USSR.

A signiﬁcant source of information on ethnic issues in the successor states of the
former USSR proved to be electronic discussion groups. One of them BALT-L, is
devoted to issues relating to the Baltic states. On BALT-L, digests of the Estonian,
Latvian and Lithuanian press is distributed regularly. Reports and brieﬁngs issued by a
variety of governmental institutions, such as the Foreign Ministry, and the Baltic
parliaments, are posted. Similar to BALT-L, is an electronic discussion group devoted to
the political, economic and social issues in Central Asia (CENASIA). The developments
in Kyrgyzstan are especially well covered on CENASLA. Professors and students at the
Slavic institute in Bishkek compile a Kyrgyz digest of news and press reports. Both
electronic forums--BALT-L and CENASIA--are used extensively by the Russian

community activists in the Baltics and Central Asia, which provided excellent

 

23 For more on OMRI publications, visit the Institute's Web page at
http://www.omri.cz/Index.html.

58
opportunities for ﬁrst hand information on the situation of ethnic Russians in these two
regions.

The most valuable source of information for the completion of this study, was the
conference on "Russian minorities in the Former Soviet Republics," held May 22-24,
1992, at Michigan State University. A majority of the most renown experts and
researches on ethnicity and nationalism in the countries of the former USSR participated in
this conference. The conference provided an excellent opportunity to extensively discuss
my project with the conference participants.

In addition, during my trips to my native country, Lithuania, I conducted in-depth
interviews with ethnic Russians who live and work in the city of Klaipeda. Respondents
were selected to represent the major social categories of Russians in the city: Soviet Army
ofﬁcers, intelligentsia (teachers, engineers), retirees, sailors, and entrepreneurs. The
interviews give ﬁrst hand accounts of the situation of Russians in Lithuania.

In sum, the chronology and supporting data for the ethnic transformation process
within 10 national republics of the former USSR was established using four major data
sources: (1) the Census data and ofﬁcial statistical publications by the State Committee for
Statistics of the USSR (and later of the Russian Federation); (2) a range of supporting
data from empirical projects; (3) newspaper and electronic media reports; and (4) oral data
from interviews with ethnic Russians and insights gained from consultation with experts.
Together, these four sets of information provided a rich data base in which sources were

cross-referenced to verify the information that was emerging.

59

2.10 A Note on Soviet Statistics and the Operationalization of the Category of

Ethnicity

The ethnicity of Soviet citizens, or natsional'nost' refers to the designations
contained in the ﬁfth paragraph of Soviet internal passports. Nationality in the Soviet
Union was a quasi-ascriptive characteristic assigned by the authorities to individuals on the
basis of parental identity. For example, if both parents were designated to be Ukrainians
on their passports, so were their children, even if they had never spoken a word of
Ukrainian in all their lives. If a child's parents were of mixed origin, he/she could choose
one of their parents national identities at age sixteen, when they qualiﬁed for their own
passports. Thus, children of a mixed Kazakh-Ukrainian family could be or Kazakh or
Ukrainian, but never Russian, even if they exclusively spoke Russian at home and were
sent to Russian schools.

Considering the nature of Soviet statistics, ethnicity in this study will be deﬁned by
a combination of two indicators: passport designations and the native language of the
individual. Thus, ethnic Russians will be considered individuals whose passport designates
them as Russians and who consider Russian to be their native language. When these two
indicators do not coincide, primacy will be given to the "passport ethnicity." This is
because, the passport designation, since the 19503, had become increasingly important for

admission to schools and universities, and to hiring, ﬁring and promotion in the USSR.24

 

2‘ For more on how the Soviet census deﬁnes and accounts for ethnicity, see Anderson
and Silver, 1989; Garipov, 1989; and Rybakovskii, 1987.

3. THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN THE
PERIPHERY OF THE SOVIET UNION

An analysis of ethnic transformation cannot begin without at least brief description
of the origins and formation of the Russian/non-Russian ethnic stratiﬁcation in the
periphery of the empire. This is because the circumstances under which the Russian
diaspora came to exist had a profound impact on its position throughout the Soviet period,
and continues to shape post-Soviet developments today.

The origin of the ethnic structure, in what became the periphery of the USSR, can
be located in the late 17th century with the expansion of the Russian empire (to the west,
north and southwest) under Peter the Great. In 1721 , after the defeat of Sweden, the
territory on the coast of the Baltic Sea (the location of present day Estonia and Latvia)
was added to the Russian empire. Later, in the 18th century, Finland, Poland and
Lithuania (the location of present day Lithuania, and the Eastern parts of the Ukraine and
Belarus), Turkey (the location of present day Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) as well as the
sparcely populated territories of North Kazakhstan and Siberia, came under the rule of the
Russian Tsars. In the late 19th century, the territory in Central Asia (contemporary
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan) were also
added to the Russian empire. The last gasp of Russian (as well as European)
expansionism can be considered Khrushchev's implementation of the Virgin Lands Scheme
in Kazakhstan, during the 19505.

The character of ethnic stratiﬁcation that emerged under the impact of the

60

61

The character of ethnic stratiﬁcation that emerged under the impact of the
territorial expansion of the Russian state depended upon the following set of factors: (a)
the mode of incorporation of non-Russian territories into the Russian state; (b) the
character of the initial Russian contact with the non-Russians; (c) the cultural differences
between Russians and non-Russians in the newly acquired territories; (d) the social
composition and/or character of the Russian settlement in the new colonies. A brief
description of each of these follows.

The Mode of Incorporation of Non-Russian Territories. The three major modes
of territorial expansion by the Russian state are as follows: 1) the settling and acquiring of
the Western territories which involved a combination of warfare, dynastic politics, and
diplomacy (as in the case of the integration of the Slavs); 2) a military annexation, with or
without a co-opting alliance with the ruling strata (as in the Baltic states, the Caucasus
region, Bessarabia, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus); and 3) colonization (as in
Central Asia) (Young, 1992, p.81).

The colonization of Central Asia produced a paternalistic type of ethnic
relationship between the Russians and members of the indigenous populations. When
Czarist Russia invaded the region in the late 19th century it was at a semi-feudal level of
development. It was populated by traditional pastoral nomads, organized in clans, and, at
the higher level, into hoards.

The creation of the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Taj ik, and Turkmen nations was
largely the consequence of efforts by Soviet administrators, bureaucrats, planners,
engineers, and the military to impose workable territorial boundaries on the huge, newly

acquired territory (Lieven and McGarry, 1993). By dividing Central Asia into the

62
Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, the Center sought to pacify
the local population (according to the "divide and rule" principal) as well as to promote
economic development in the region.

Russian-led modernization and development almost totally destroyed the
traditional ways of life of the indigenous populations. As a result of forceful
collectivization (the creation of kolkhoz and savkhoz on irrigable lands, and the
nationalization of grazing lands, pastures and cattle) the majority of the indigenous
populations were not only converted into poor farmers, but also into second class citizens.
Consequently, colonization of Central Asia by the Russian empire, and later, by its
successor, the Soviet Union, led to the formation of a paternalistic or vertically integrated
ethnic structure in the region. At the top of this hierarchical structure were ethnic
Russians, while the bottom was occupied by the indigenous peoples of the region.

The 1940 military annexation of Bessarabia resulted in the emergence of a rigid
competitive pattern of ethnic stratiﬁcation in Moldova. In 1940, Stalin created Moldova
from two territories. Transnistria (Pridniestriovie in Rus.) located on the left bank of the
Dniester river (see Map 1) was part of the Ukraine. Bessarabia, the territory on the right
bank of the Dniester river, was part of Romania prior to WWII. Historically, Transnistria
had a large Slavic population. Bessarabia was populated mainly by Romanian peasants.
Since the moment of Moldavia's creation, Slavic Transnistria dominated the republic.
Transnistria controlled the republic, in part, because it was economically more developed

than rural Bessarabia.

63

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64

The Russians came to occupy the leading positions in Moldova's administration,
the Communist party, and industry, giving ethnic stratiﬁcation a rigid competitive
character. This pattern of ethnic stratiﬁcation was reinforced by Stalin's attempts to "de-
Romanianize" the Bessarabian population in order to ﬁrmly integrate the reconquered land
into the USSR. Thus, a campaign to forge a Moldavian ethnic identity different from a
Romanian ethnic identity was launched. The indigenous Romanian intelligentsia in
Moldova was wiped out by Stalin's deportations and repatriations to Romania. The
Russian Cyrillic alphabet was re-introduced in Moldova (instead of the Roman alphabet) in
1941 , and the existence of a Moldavian people, Moldavian language, Moldavian culture
and history, as distinct from Romanian, was declared.

Military incorporation of the economically and socially advanced Western
territories of the former USSR (the Baltic states) just before WWH, produced a third,
bipolar pattern of ethnic stratiﬁcation. Before the Soviet invasion in 1940, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania were independent countries that possessed all the institutions of a modern
state. They had well developed cultures, and strong identities and their standards of living
were higher than in Russia. Despite the post-WWII Communist terror, many of the
institutions in the region that were crucial to preservation of the ethnic identities of the
indigenous populations, survived. This transpired, in part, because Moscow strived for
legitimacy in the newly conquered territories. In part, it was a consequence of the West's
position on the Baltics. The majority of the Western countries, including the US, Britain
and France never recognized the annexation of the independent states of Latvia, Lithuania

and Estonia.

65

The ethnic structure in Eastern Ukraine, and Eastern and Central Belarus can be
characterized as being ﬂuid competitive. The integration of Slavs within the Russian
empire (with the exception of Western Ukraine which, historically, was part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Austro-Hungarian empire) proceeded for more than
300 years. A variety of policies, voluntarily and involuntary, for this purpose were used.
Although administered from Moscow, Ukrainians or Byelorussians could, potentially,
secure careers up to the highest levels of the military, state and/or party bureaucracy. The
integration of the Slavs was greatly facilitated by their cultural similarity (Kiev was the
cradle of the Russian Orthodoxy). As a result of this long historical process, ethnic
boundaries between Eastern Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians became ﬂuid. The
Slavs from these three countries share all major institutions of the Russian and later Soviet
empire, and the rates of intermarriage are high.25

The Social Composition of Russian Migration. The social composition of the
Russian migration was to a large degree dependent on the mode of incorporation of the
new territories into the Russian state. For analytical purposes, Russians who settled in the
periphery of the former USSR during the Soviet era can be divided into three types of
migrants. Among the ﬁrst to move to the periphery were Soviet troops, the staff of the

apparatus of coercion (the Communist party, the KGB, the police) and members of their

 

25 Currently some three-fourths of urban Ukrainians send their children to
Russian-language schools, and most Ukrainian political, economic, and educational
institutions use Russian as their language of everyday use. The Ukrainian language is used
primarily by the rural population and writers (Motyl, 1993, p.12-13). The situation is very
similar in Belarus.

66

families.”5

After control over the new territories was assured, the next group to migrate to the
periphery were skilled workers and specialists. They usually moved to the periphery of
the USSR under a variety of state sponsored "labor conscription" programs in order to
construct industrial plants, power stations, irrigation schemes, etc. Chronologically, the
last strata of the Russian diaspora to settle in the periphery of the Soviet empire were
economic migrants. Generally, economic migrants came from underdeveloped Russian
rural areas, and went into the growing industrial employment in the cities. Migrants from
rural areas had much less education and skills than individuals from the other two groups.

The Character of the Initial Russian/non-Russian Contact. The character of the
initial contact between groups has a signiﬁcant impact on diminishing, or, on the contrary,
creating and reinforcing divisions into "us and them" in inter-ethnic relationships. Czarist

Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, both have a brutal legacy in this regard.

 

2° The number of people belonging to this category of migrants differed by region, and
by a region's particular strategic, economic and political signiﬁcance. It is estimated that
in the early 19803, about 1.25 million troops were stationed outside the Russian
Federation, the majority of them near the western border of the USSR (Greenhouse,
1993). It is difﬁcult to provide the exact numbers on Russians employed in the KGB, the
police, or the party apparatus in the republics. A guess would be that up to 15%-20% of
Russians living in the Baltics were, in one way or another, connected with the apparatus of
coercion (its staff, employees, military retirees and their families). The number was
calculated by comparing the numbers provided by a variety of sources. A.Lieven mentions
that 1/6 of the population
of the city of Liepaja, the second largest Latvian city, consists of military retirees and their
families (Lieven, 1993, p.206). According to V.Gaidys' calculations, about 7% of
Russians in Lithuania consist of army personnel (Gaidys, 1994, p.95). The Estonian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers, in the late 19808, about 90,000 to 100,000
individuals of Russian ethnic origin in the republic (close to 20% of the total Russian
population in that republic) were connected with the occupation army (From 'Estonia in
F acts.‘ January 17, 1994, posting on the BALT-L Internet Discussion List by Estonian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

67

Historically, expansion of the Russian empire proceeded through the unleashing of
mass terror by Russian troops against unarmed local populations. Mass deportations to
Siberia were often used as a strategy for breaking down any resistance to the new rulers.
Furthermore, industrialization and development carried out by the Russian empire in its
provinces rarely considered the interests of local populations.27

The brutality and inhumanity of the ethno-social experiments of the communist
regime, which were "unprecedented in their cruelty and scale since the times of the
Assyrian conquests" (Zubov, 1994, p.48) had a profound impact on the inter-ethnic
relationships between the Russians and indigenous populations in the periphery of the
empire. There is a deep seated mistrust and fear of Russians among ethnic groups living in
the periphery of the former empire. Furthermore, the collective memories of the suffering
endured under the Czarist/ Soviet regimes had become one of the central elements around
which the ethnic identities of the indigenous populations had been constructed.

Of course, the majority of Russians living in the former Soviet republics did not
participate in, or carry out, the policies of the former Communist regime. Ethnic Russians
also also had suffered enormously under the Communist regime. Nevertheless, those

ethnic Russians who settled outside Russia fulﬁlled the role of outposts of the empire even

 

27 Collectivization of agriculture is undoubtedly one of the darkest pages in the history
of the Soviet empire. In the 1930S more than half of the Kazakhs were killed, or perished
from famine, dislocation, and disease caused by forced collectivization. Without these
deaths the numbers of Kazakhs today would probably not be a mere 5.4 million, but might
be as high as 25 million (Karpat, 1992, p.321). Stalin's forced collectivization in the
Ukraine in 1932-1933, resulted in a man-made famine that led to a loss of 2 to 7 million
lives (Conquest, 1986). More than 350,000 Lithuanians, 150,000 of Latvians, and
100,000 Estonians were deported to Siberia (about a tenth of the population of the Baltic
states) after the Soviet Union annexed them (Misiunas and Taagapera, 1993).

68

if they were not directly employed in the party bureaucracy, military, police or KGB
(Starikov, 1993). Deportations of the indigenous populations, and the immigration of
Russians to take their vacated houses, property, and jobs, were part and parcel of the same
policies on nationalities carried out by the Soviet empire. Thus, the 25 million Russians
scattered over the 14 new states are part of the gruesome legacy of the Soviet regime.

Because of the enormous crimes against humanity committed by Stalin's regime,
history, during perestroika, came back to haunt the present. In some sense early
perestroika was a collective catharsis of the Soviet society--a period of re-living the
horrors of Stalinism and an attempt to come to terms with Soviet history. However, if
Stalinism was a period of mass political terror for ethnic Russians, Stalinism for non-
Russians represented a period of national extermination and genocide. These were Russian
soldiers and ofﬁcers, (with the help of local collaborators, of course) who "cleansed" the
villages and cities, made mass arrests, and packed trains with innocent people for long
journeys to Siberia. And those ethnic Russians who were to remain in the newly

independent states need to come to terms with Stalinism's legacy.28

 

2" Their dilemma is, to a large degree, similar to those of Germans who needed to deal
with the legacy of the Nazi regime after WWII. Everyone remembers how the president
of West Germany, Willy Brandt, fell to his knees before the Warsaw Ghetto monument in
1970. This gesture dramatically improved Poland-German relationships (V inton, 1994).

The nations formerly subjugated by the Soviet regime were also awaiting a similar
gesture of reconciliation from the ofﬁcials of the Russian Government, as well as from the
leaders of the local Russian communities. The Russian Government, however, unlike
West Germany after WWII, holds the position that the Russian people were the victims of
the Communist regime to the same degree as all other nations of the former USSR. They
believe what happened, happened. That it is history, and it now belongs to the historians.
Furthermore, Moscow argues, the former republics of the USSR have gained more from
investment by the Center in the past 50-70 years, than they have lost.

Despite the sometimes very heated political exchange between Moscow and its
former colonies, one should not forget that the Russian Government did make signiﬁcant

69

Perceptions of Cultural Diﬂkrences. The Russian state, in its expansion, crossed
two great divides among civilizations: the division between the Christian and Muslim
civilizations (in Central Asia) and the division between Eastern and Western Christianity
(in the Baltics and Western Ukraine). In both cases, Russia sought to justify its expansion
by alleged superiority of the Russian political system, military, technology, culture, art,
and language. However, the dynamics of inter-ethnic relationships across the
Muslim/Christian and Eastern/Western divisions differed. In part, this occurred because
the differences between Russians and non-Russians across the Eastern/Western division
were much smaller than those across the Muslim/Christian cleavage.

Shared values and a group awareness of cultural distinctiveness are the key
elements in ethnic group membership. If groups share parts of the same culture, then
some elements of their ethnic identities (such as customs, norms, beliefs, traditions) will
also be similar. When the cultures of the groups belong to different civilizations, the

cultural differences are usually large. Signiﬁcant cultural differences, depending on the

 

steps in denouncing its imperial legacy. Yeltsin's administration supported the Baltics
struggle for independence. Thus, Yeltsin in January of 1991, recognized the independence
of the Baltics. In contrast, Gorbachev earlier had imposed an economic blockade on
Lithuania. Russia did withdraw its troops from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In its
treaty on the troop withdrawal from Latvia, Russia condemned the annexation of the
Baltic states by the USSR in 1940, and the mass deportations carried out by the
Communist regime after WWII (Kalashnikova, 1994). Similarly, Yeltsin recognized the
Ukraine's independence that, de facto, put an end to the Soviet empire. Thus,
reconciliation is possible if both sides, Russia as well as the new states, accept the reality
of the imperial collapse and organize their relationships on the basis of equality and
respect.

70
circumstances, tend to strengthen the ethnocentrism of the groups.29
The Muslim/Christian Division. Divisions into "us and them" are especially
pronounced in the relationship between Russians and non-Russians in Central Asia.

However, Muslim/Christian cultural differences alone cannot explain such highly

 

29 The re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Asia (Iran,
Algeria, Egypt), Hindu radicalism in India, and nationalism in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, indicate that religion and culture are becoming the major
considerations for cooperation, coalitions and conﬂicts in the emerging post-Cold War
world order. Samuel Huntington (1993) in his highly acclaimed and debated article "Clash
of Civilization" published in Foreign Aﬂairs, goes as far as to claim that the currently
emerging world order will be deﬁned by the "clashes of civilizations."

More speciﬁcally, Huntington argues that the future line of global conﬂicts will be
between and among states belonging to different civilizations (Western, Japanese,
Confucian and Islamic). Increasing confrontation among civilizations, on the other hand,
will likely lead to the process of consolidation and cooperation among states belonging to
the same civilization. Huntington's article received a great deal of publicity in Russia
(see, for example, Kuznetcov, 1994; Puschkov, 1994; Ovlev, 1994). It was immediately
translated into Russian. All major Russian newspapers have carried excerpts or
commentaries on the article. The attractiveness of Huntington's concept to the Russian
public is that it claims to provide an explanation for the many developments in the
geopolitical space of the former USSR.

Additionally, Huntington's article appeared at a time when Russian intellectuals are
preoccupied with the debate over Russia's future. In essence, this debate is about the
following question: is it possible to create a modern economy and market in Russia
without accepting Western culture, styles of life and values? The receptiveness of Russian
audiences to Huntington's argument seems to highlight the importance of the choices that
are being made by the people in power at this critical juncture.

In choosing among alternatives, culture becomes real, since the consequences of
choices are real. Depending on the choices made in the "modernization with, or without,
Westernization" dilemma, there will be signiﬁcant differences in policy ranging from
principals of polity organization, to industry, commerce, education and culture. The elites
of the Central Asian republics, for example, chose a "modernization without
Westernization" course--that is, a course towards the creation of a secular Islamic state as
represented by Turkey. In comparison, in the Baltics, there is widespread consensus that
Westernization is the only means to modernization. The consequences of these choices
will inﬂuence the developments in these regions for a long time to come.

71
ethnocentric attitudes in the region.30 What particularly strengthens a "consciousness of
kin " in these groups is that cultural differences between them also coincide with
modern/traditional, urban/rural, parochial/cosmopolitan and class differences. Thus,
Russians represent primarily modern, urban, higher social and economic status lifestyles,
while indigenous populations live predominantly traditional, rural ways of life."
Consequently, Russians have a sense of superiority, disdain, and frequently hold arrogant
attitudes towards local "natives/blacks" Glepenko, 1993).

Russians perceive themselves as the bearers of civilization who brought more
"developed language and culture" to the region, and as people, who "by working their
ﬁngers to the bones" have made the transition of Central Asia, from feudalism to
modernity, possible (Maliagin, 1994, p.43). This is typical of the ideology of "white men's
burden." As the history of colonialism indicates, such pronounced differences in lifestyles
and the sense of superiority of colonists makes their integration in the local environment

very problematic (e. g., French in Algeria).

 

3° Several Russian sociologists and economists have noted the existence of signiﬁcant
similarities between Islam and Communist ideology. Both emphasize collectivism,
conformism, and disregard notions of individualism and freedom. In both cultures there is
a strong tradition of absolutism and authoritarianism, ritualization of behavior at the
expense of economic considerations, etc. For more on the relationship between
Communism and Islam, see Malashenko, 1992; and Poliakov, 1992.

3' The modern/traditional and urban/rural divisions include the evolution of the social
division of labor of a society, the development of occupations and professions, the
uncoupling of family and work, and family and child rearing; the evolution of the extended
family into the nuclear family; the participation of women in the labor force; increased
geographic and social mobility, etc.

72

The Eastern/Western Division.32 The cultural differences are much smaller
between Russians and non-Russians in the Baltics than in Central Asia. This is, in part,
because the Eastern/Western division is not as highly pronounced as the division between
Christian and Muslim civilizations, and, in part, because cultural clashes in the Baltics
occur in more cosmopolitan settings. Furthermore, Russian claims of superiority over the
indigenous Baltic cultures, do not have as much legitimacy as similar claims in Central
Asia.

The Russians in the Baltics, unlike their compatriots in Central Asia, did not bring
"civilization" to the Baltics. At the time of annexation this region was already at a
somewhat higher level of socio-economic development than the Soviet Union.
Consequently, the assertion of Russian superiority could not be advanced since the
standard of living in the Baltics was higher than anywhere in the USSR”. Therefore,
Russians in the Baltics justiﬁed their dominant group status primarily by identifying

themselves with the super-power--the Soviet Union--the country which was victorious in

 

32 The Eastern/Western division in Russian politics is expressed as a clash of two
ideologies: Russophilism and Westernization. Russophiles advance the uniqueness of
Russian history, culture, traditions and values that are morally superior to the decadent
and corrupt West. Westernizers, on the contrary, argue that Russia has to create
Western-type democratic institutions and to implement Western technological
developments
because the more advanced Western nations are a rough guide for Russia's own future.
For more on the debate between Russophiles and Westernizers see Shlapentokh, 1990,
especially chapters 8 and 9. From the point of view of the nations on the Western side of
the divide, stereotypical perceptions are that indigenous populations (e.g., Estonians,
Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians) represent Europe, while Russians represent Asia.

33 A signiﬁcant number of Russian migrants moved into the Baltics from
underdeveloped rural Russia to take advantage of better economic conditions. The
Russian's tongue-in-cheek nickname for the Baltics was "our West."

73
WWH, and had reached military parity with the US. Thus, there is a deep-seated
ambiguity in the attitudes of Russians towards the Balts, an incongruous combination of
feelings of superiority and inferiority."

Patterns of Russian Settlement Within the National Republics. Similar to British
and French colonists, Russians colonists settled and lived isolated ﬁ'om the endigenes.
Life for Russians in the national republics centered almost exclusively around the colonial
types of enterprises built and run by Moscow. These industrial operations usually used
local raw materials, processed them, and sent ﬁnished products back to the Russia.35

Because the factories were controlled exclusively from Moscow, Russians in the
local republics depended much more on the Central, than on the local, government.
Industrial enterprises provided housing for their employees, schools and kindergartens for
employees' children, homes for vacations, health care and medical facilities. There was
little need for Russians to interrningle with the local population, to learn their culture or
languages because of the high degree of subsistence provided by the industrial enterprises.
Furthermore, institutionalization of the Russian language as the language of the state and

public life, allowed Russians, even those in close contact with the indigenous population,

 

3" For more on this, see Lieven, 1993, chapter 7.

35 In comparison, the local population was concentrated in sections of economy that
primarily served their domestic, local markets. Because Russians were concentrated in the
huge, industrial enterprises run by the Center and oriented to distribution of their products
outside the republics, the local population perceived Russian-Centrally run enterprises as
contributing very little to the well-being of the republics, and as polluting their natural
environment, etc.

74
to remain unilingual.”

The isolation of the Russian communities from their neighbors was also reﬂected in
the identiﬁcation of the Russian minorities with the Central government and with the
Russians as a political majority in the USSR. Russians in the republics tended to regard
the Central Government, rather than the Republic Government, as their protector, and
they looked to the rest of the Russian-speaking Soviet Union for support and sympathy
when they felt their "righ " were being circumscribed.

There was also the cultural identiﬁcation of the Russian minorities with the
majority culture of the Russian-speaking Soviet Union. Russians minorities in the
republics were exposed to the same media, and identiﬁed with the same sports and
recreational events as other Russians in Russia. In addition, there were few Russians who
were functionally bilingual--that is, who were able to converse and write ﬂuently in the
various native languages--deﬁciencies which reinforced the trend of Russian isolationism.

The Russian Diaspora Produced by Border Changes. The Russian settlement in
the periphery of the country was produced not only by Russian migration. There were
important instances when a Russian diaspora was created as a result of the changes in
inter-republic borders. During the Soviet era inter-republic borders did not have any
political signiﬁcance and were used for administrative purposes only. Therefore, the inter-

ethnic dynamics, between indigenous and Russian populations, were very similar, whether

 

3‘ One of the activists of the Russian Cultural Association in Lithuania characterized
the isolation of the Russian community's institutions from their neighbors in the following
way: "Many of us (Russians) were living in Lithuania for years, but spiritually and in our
thoughts we felt ourselves as being in some place in Tombov, but not in a country that has
its own language, history, culture, and its own old traditions." (Aleksandrov, 1992, p.7)

75

they resulted from migration or administrative border changes. However, since the new
states' independence, the inter-ethnic dynamics between these two types of Russian
diasporic populations began to diverge signiﬁcantly. In all Russian territories
administratively transferred to the national republics, pro-Russian sentiment was very
strong. This generated signiﬁcant ethnic tensions and conﬂict within the new states, as
well as between the new states and the Russian Federation.

The administrative transfer of three Russian territories was most signiﬁcant. First,
there was Stalin's addition of the industrially developed Western Siberia to Kazakhstan.
Since 1920, Kazakhstan has been an autonomous republic of the USSR. In 1936, when
Kazakhstan was reorganized into a constituent republic of the USSR, Stalin decided to
add these Western Siberian oblasts to Kazakhstan to increase its economic potential.
These oblasts became known as Northern Kazakhstan (See Map. 2)

The Russian diaspora in Moldova was created as a result of Transnistria's transfer
to that republic. Before WWII, Transnistria was part of the Ukraine. In 1924, Stalin
created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in Transnistria in
order to camouﬂage his plans for the annexation of the territories lost to Romania. When,
in 1940, the USSR recovered Bessarabia, it was united with the existing MASSR, and the
Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was renamed the Moldavian Soviet
Socialist Republic (MSSR).

Crimea became part of the Ukrainian republic in 1954, when Khrushchev's decree
transferred the peninsula from the Russian Federation to Kiev's jurisdiction. Ostensibly,
the transfer of the peninsula was carried out to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the

Ukraine's uniﬁcation with Russia. Nevertheless, the circumstances and reasons that

76

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77
compelled Khrushchev to do so remain unclear to this day.

In sum, a variety of factors shaped the formation of ethnic stratiﬁcation in the
periphery of the Soviet empire. Differences in modes of incorporation, culture, the
character of initial Russian contact with non-Russians, and the social composition of
migration, produced a whole spectrum of ethnic stratiﬁcation patterns across the periphery
(Table 4). These patterns varied from the ﬂuid competitive pattern in the Ukraine, the
bipolar pattern in the Baltics, the rigid competitive pattern in Moldova and the
paternalistic pattern in Central Asia. The circumstances and process of ethnic
stratiﬁcation formation had a profound impact on the future dynamics of the Russian and

non-Russian ethnic relationships.

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4. THE PREPARATORY PHASE AND STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION

This section describes the changes to ethnic stratiﬁcation that occurred in Soviet
society since the end of WWII, up to the early 19803. The purpose of this analysis is to
characterize the background range of possibilities and constraints within which the process
of negotiation of the new ethnic order would proceed in the next phase of the ethnic
transformation process. According to the theoretical model (Figure 5) three structural
dimensions characterize the preparatory phase of ethnic transformation: (1) the differences
of the ethnic Russians' situation in the national republics as compared with Russians in the
Russian Federation; (2) the organization of ethnic stratiﬁcation in the national republics;
and (3) the power differentials between the Russian and indigenous communities. The

following brieﬂy describes each of them.

4.1 The Push and Pull of Russian Migration: Between the Russian

Federation and National Republics

As the analysis of the post-WWII Census data shows, Russian migration to the
periphery of the empire went through periods of expansion and contraction (Figure 6).
Since the end of the WWII up until the late 19605, Russian migration was increasing, and
peaked at 4 million during 1959-1969. Since the late 19603, Russian migration began to
decline rapidly. With the collapse of the USSR, Russian migration had ceased altogether.

What are the major factors explaining such pendulum-like swings in Russian

migration patterns? As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the patterns of Russian

79

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81
settlement in the national republics during the ethnic stratiﬁcation formation period were
determined mostly by the ethno-political considerations of the Soviet regime. However,
since late 1950s socio-economic factors became the driving force of Russian migration.
More speciﬁcally, it was the process of development and modernization of the periphery
of the country that had created incentives powerful enough to attract millions of ethnic
Russians. In order to identify the "pulls" of Russian migration the character of the social
stratiﬁcation of Soviet society must be examined.

Soviet society was rather weakly stratiﬁed along class lines, while social
inequalities were much more pronounced across various segments of the economy and
among population living in different spacial or geographical locations (e.g., the capitals of
republics, regional centers, and rural areas).37 The Soviet planners, obsessed with the
military superiority of the USSR, diverted a disproportionate amount of resources to the
military-industrial complex and to heavy industries (the machinery, steel, and chemical
industries). As a result, the salaries of workers employed in the machine building or
military facilities, were, on average, twice as high as the salaries of workers (with
approximately the same qualiﬁcations) working at the food processing or textile plants.

The inequalities based on one's location in various segments of the economy were
only partially expressed in the higher wages in the military/heavy industries. Those
employed in preferred sectors of the economy also had many more non-wage beneﬁts tied

to their jobs. Since the military and heavy industry enterprises were heavily subsidized by

 

’7 For more on the stratiﬁcation of the state-socialist societies as based on
spacial/geographical and segment of the economy location, see Szelenyi, 1978; and
Szelenyi, 1981.

82
the Central government, they could supply better and more housing, health care, access to
kindergartens, cultural facilities, and cars to their employees (Titma and Tuma, 1993).

Spacial/geographical differentiation was the second major dimension of social
inequality in the USSR. Because of the centralized and bureaucratized character of the
Soviet economy, residence areas in the USSR were also ranked in a steep hierarchy. At
the top of the list were Moscow or Leningrad, followed by the capitals of the national
republics and regional centers. At the bottom of the hierarchy were local regional centers,
small towns, villages and rural areas. Residents of the major cities and capitals of the
national republics enjoyed signiﬁcant economic (a better supply of food and consumer
goods; employment opportunities; higher wages) and social advantages (e.g., much better
access to education, and health care) vis-a-vis residents of the local regional centers, small
towns and villages.

Russian migration to the periphery of the empire in both the above respects,
represented acts of upward social mobility. The predominant majority of migrating
Russians were drawn by employment opportunities in the military industrial complex, and
the heavy industry factories. In addition, Russians settled almost exclusively within
capitals and/or major regional centers within the national republics. Therefore, by moving
from rural, or small town Russia to the major regional centers of the national republics,
Russians were signiﬁcantly improving their social and economic situation relative to what

their situation had been in the Russian Federation.”

 

3‘ The advantages that ethnic Russians enjoyed in the periphery of the empire, due to
their location in a particular segment of the economy and geographical space, remained
signiﬁcant up until the collapse of the USSR. The Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey of
ethnic Russians shows that 70% of respondents in the Baltics, about 60% in the Ukraine,

83

The modernization of the non-Russian republics, besides spurring massive Russian
migration, also initiated a process of rapid social differentiation in the indigenous societies.
Indigenous political elites in the national republics started to emerge. With the formation
of the indigenous working and middle classes, educated members of local populations
began to move into the professions and occupations (science, education, medicine,
management) that only Russians had occupied earlier.

A rapidly growing economy, as well as the egalitarian policies of the Communist
regime, made the Soviet society of the late 1950s and early 19603 one of the most open
and dynamic in the world. Such developments greatly facilitated the acculturation and, to
some degree, assimilation of the indigenous people into the essentially Russian "Soviet
nation."

The situation started to change in the mid 19608. Three, long-term, structural
developments were important in changing the boundaries of ethnic groups in the periphery
of the empire: (1) the decline of the growth rate of the Soviet economy, which, by the
early 19805, led to a severe economic crisis; (2) the demographic changes that occurred in
the USSR since WWII; and, (3) the development and consolidation of a sizeable number
of educated indigenous elites (national intelligentsia) in the national republics. The
downswing of the social and economic development of the country had signiﬁcantly

diminished incentives for Russian migration to the national republics. Furthermore, as a

 

50% in Moldova, and 44% in Central Asia, believed that the conditions of life are better in
the national republics than in the Russian Federation. Less than 10% of ethnic Russians,
throughout the periphery of the country, reported that the conditions of life are worse in
the national republics than in the Russian Federation.

84
result of increasing competition and scarcity of resources and jobs in the national
republics, Russian migration began to decline and, later, reversed its direction. However,
the process of economic expansion and contraction proceeded very unevenly across the

periphery of the country.

4.2 Central Asia: From Paternalistic to Rigid Competitive Ethnic

Stratiﬁcation

Death rates in Central Asia fell because of the diffusion (albeit sporadic) of medical
progress which came with development under the Soviet regime. However, reproductive
patterns did not change because large segments of the population in this region continued
to live in rural areas. Furthermore, even aﬁer the collectivization of agriculture, having a
large family remained economically desirable because of the role of the informal economy
in providing a living for the rural population39 (Lewis, 1992, Ch.9).

By the mid 19605, such discrepancies in the rates of population growth started to
generate competition for jobs between Russians and the local people in this region.
Competition was especially exacerbated by the downturn of the Soviet economy and the
increasing size of the indigenous middle classes. As the system of higher education
continued to churn out new cohorts of graduates, Russians found their opportunities for
social mobility severely diminished. Under the pressure of increasing competition for

scarce resources and jobs, and the increasing competitiveness of the indigenous

 

39 In 1989 average number of children born to a woman during her reproductive
period of life was equal 5.9 for Tajik women, 4.9 for Turkmen women, 4.8 among Kyrgyz
women, 4.7 among Uzbek women, 3.6 among Kazakh women. In comparison, average
number of children born to a Russian women was eqaul 1.9 (Khazanov, 1995, p.260)

85
populations, Russians, by the early 1970s, began to gradually leave the region (Figure 7).
By 1989, close to 750,000 ethnic Russians had leﬁ Central Asia.“

The confounded effects of (a) Russian out-migration, and (b) the rapid growth of
the indigenous populations (2-3% a year) are seen in Figure 8. As the ﬁgure illustrates,
during the last 30 years the proportion of Russians within the total population declined by
half (13.3% to 7.6%) in Tajikistan, from 13.5% to 8.3% in Uzbekistan, from 17.3% to
9.5% in Turkmenistan, from 30.2% to 21% in Kyrgyzstan, and 42.7% to 37.8% in
Kazakhstan. The out-migration of ethnic Russians signiﬁcantly diminished Moscow's
capabilities to directly control the region. In comparison, during the Brezhnev years, for
example, Central Asia's Party elite grew in strength, to the degree that they started to rule
the region like feudal lords, free to steal and spend as they wish, as long as they dispatched
the required tribute to Moscow (Olcott, 1993).

Despite momentous changes that occurred during pre-perestroika years, Central
Asia remained the most underdeveloped and poorest region of the Soviet Union. The
modernization and development carried by the Soviets was one sided and involved the
indigenous populations only to a limited extent. This was because the economy, created
by the Soviets, had a strong colonial character. Uzbekistan, the most populous republic of
the region, was essentially converted into a huge cotton plantation. The Kolkhoz system
(Rus. collective farms) was used to provide a cheap indigenous labor force for crop
cultivation and harvesting. Little of the cotton produced was actually processed in the

republic; most of it was shipped to the Russian Federation. Turkmenistan, similarly, was

 

‘° For more on the dynamics of Russian migration from Central Asia see, Drobizheva
et al., 1992; Panin, 1992; Sarnakhova, 1994; and Zorkaja and Gudkov, 1992.

86

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Figure 8. Russian Population in the Central Asian Soviet Republics, 1959-1989*

 

 

E 1959
[31970
E 1979
E1989

 

 

 

 

45-

in O
N N

wanna

Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

1959 Census; 1970 Cmsus; 1979 Census; 1989 Census.

* Som’ces

88
converted to the oil and gas colony of Russia. Crude oil was pumped and transported to
Russia for processing, while locals had neither control over the production process, nor
over distribution of the revenues. Furthermore, the industrial development that did occur
in Central Asia, as a rule, did not draw on the indigenous labor force. It was cheaper and
faster for the Center to build factories in the region and import a labor force from Russia,
than to educate and train the indigenous population. Therefore, although the strata of
indigenous elites in the region were rapidly growing, the majority of the population in
Central Asia remained rural.

In sum, Central Asia's modernization had transformed the paternalistic type of
ethnic stratiﬁcation, which existed in the region during the colonial era, into the rigid
competitive type of ethnic stratiﬁcation. Ethnic Russians continued to dominate
indigenous societies although consolidation of indigenous elites did occur. Indigenous
elites were created by the Soviets to man the colonial type state bureaucracies. At the
bottom of the hierarchy were rural masses.“l In Central Asia the indigenous working class
was numerically very small. A deep cultural division of labor, between the indigenous
population and ethnic Russians, remained the main characteristic of the economy and

society in this region.

 

4‘ In 1989 indigenous rural population acounted for 62% of the total indigenous
population in Kazakhstan, 70% in Uzbekistan, 74% in Tajikistan, 78% in Kyrgyzstan and
66% in Turkmenistan (Khazanov, 1995, p.261).

89

4.3 Moldova: From Rigid Competitive to Bipolar Stratiﬁcation

The policies of economic and social development of the periphery had also
initiated rapid social differentiation within the indigenous Moldovan society. The levels of
education of the indigenous population increased dramatically, and a rapid growth and
consolidation of the indigenous Moldovan intelligentsia occurred. The capital of
Moldova, Chisinau (Kishiniov in Rus.) located in the Bessarabia region, grew into the
major industrial, administrative, and educational center of the republic. Nonetheless, these
positive developments failed to bridge the deep ethnic, social, and economic divisions that
existed between the two parts of the Moldovan republic.

Three sets of factors account for the failure of the Soviet regime to forge a viable
nation out of a reconquered (by Stalin) Bessarabia, which was populated by ethnic
Romanians and the Slavic Transnistria. First of all, economic development was spread
very unevenly throughout the territory of the republic. Industries were built mostly on the
left bank of the Dniester river, that is, in Transnistria, while the right bank of the Dniester
was, and remained, rural.42

Because industrial development was concentrated in Transnistria, the rural
indigenous population from the Bessarabia region migrated to the cities across the
Dniester. Yet, once in Transnistria, they were forced to compete with the growing

number of immigrants from Russia. In many cases, Russian immigrants were preferred

 

‘2 About 1/3 of all industrial goods, 56% of consumer goods, and 90% of electric
power is produced on the leﬁ bank of the Dniester river. This area constitutes about 15%
of Moldova's territory and has a population of about 900,000. In addition, all the major
communication, and transportation lines connecting Moldova to the outside world are
located on the leﬁ bank of the Dniester (Kolsto et al., 1993).

90
over the Moldovans because they were better educated and had Russian language skills.
The treatment of the indigenous population as "second class" citizens in their own republic
fueled anti-Russian sentiment in the republic.

Secondly, the efforts of the Soviets to construct a Moldovan identity, as distinct
from a Romanian identity, also failed. Despite all the ofﬁcial propaganda about the
Moldovan nation as different, culturally, ethnically, and linguistically, from Romanian, it
was clear to everyone what the "Moldovan nation" stood for: it stood for Russiﬁed
Romanians. Finally, despite the growing economic potential of the Bessarabia region,
Transnistria, although much smaller in size (territorially and demographically) continued to
dominate the republic (Table 5). Adoption of the Russian language remained a
precondition for social mobility within the republic.

In sum, as a result of the Soviet policies of economic and social development, the
rigid ethnic stratiﬁcation characteristic of Moldovan society in the late 19405, began to
change. Under conditions of deep ethnic, territorial, and economic divisions, the
consolidation of a bipolar society in Moldova was occurring. The Moldovan segment of
the society, with its elites, intelligentsia, and cultural and economic institutions, was
emerging on the right bank of the Dniester river.

In Transnistria, the Russian "pillar" of Moldovan society was consolidating.
However, the ethnic divisions within the Moldovan bipolar society were much deeper than
those within the Baltics. This situation evolved because (a) each of the two ethnic groups
in Moldova had its own clearly demarcated and historically populated territorial "base",
and (b) the Russian domination over the Moldovan "pillar" was much more strongly

expressed than in the Baltics.

9]

Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Moldova (total 1989 population: 4,322,362)*

 

 

= As % of the Left Bank Right bank
Nationality group total (Transnitria) (central Bessarabia)
Romanians 64 40 71
Ukrainians 14 28 10
Russians 13 26 10

Others 9 6 9

* Source: Rywkin (1994), p. 52.

 

92

4.4 The Baltics under Demographic Threat

The development of industry in the Baltics did not generate a population explosion
as it had in Central Asia. On the contrary, the growth of cities quickly absorbed the
surplus population from the rural areas. The transfer of rural populations into industry
was accelerated by the collectivization of agriculture and mass deportations of rural
populations to Siberia. Because of the growth of cities, the expansion of mass education,
and the increasing participation of women in the labor force, by the early 19608, the birth
rates of Latvians and Estonians (and Lithuanians as well, by the early 19703) started to
decline, and became similar to the birth rates of other Western European countries.

Despite the stabilization of the size of indigenous populations, the Center
continued to build industrial and military enterprises in the region. This was done partly
because of the relatively well-developed infrastructure in the region (communications,
roads, railroads), its favorable geographic location (the Baltic seaports were the USSR's
closest, non-freezing seaports to Poland, East Germany and Western Europe), and also
because of the region's strategic military signiﬁcance.

As a result of the continuous industrial build up and the higher standard of living in
the Baltics, ethnic Russians continued to migrate to the region up until the 1991 collapse
of the USSR (Figure 9). Thus, the proportion of Russians in Latvia since WWII increased
from 10% to 34%, and in Estonia, from 8% to 30% (Figure 10). If other Slavic groups
(Ukrainians and Byelorussians) are included in calculating the size of the Russian
community in Latvia and Estonia, the percentage of Russians in Latvia increases to 40%,

and in Estonia the percentage is nearly a third of its total population. Such changes in the

93

 

 

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95
demographic situation in the Baltics heightened inter-ethnic tensions as the continuous
immigration of ethnic Russians threatened to undermine the demographic balance in the

Baltics, and convert Latvians and Estonians into ethnic minorities in their own republics.

4.5 The Ukraine: Increasing the Regional Division

During the Soviet period, the Ukraine had become one of the most industrialized
republics of the former USSR. Industrial development, however, was concentrated
primarily in the most eastern part of the Ukraine, in the Donbas region. Rich coal
deposits, salt, mercury, gas, lime, and sand resources, and the proximity to the Krivoi Rog
iron ﬁelds in Russia, made the Donbas region one of the most important centers of heavy
industry in the Soviet Union. The Western part of the Ukraine, on the other hand, is
covered with some of the world's most fertile chernozem (Rus. black, very fertile) soil.
Therefore, Moscow chose to develop this part of the Ukraine predominantly as an area of
agricultural production.

Consequently, the geographical conditions and policies of economic development
undertaken by the Center perpetuated and reinforced the historical division of the Ukraine
into its Catholic-Westem and Orthodox-Eastem parts. The western part of the Ukraine
remained primarily rural, while the eastern part increasingly became urbanized and
industrialized. Such differences in regional development had different consequences for
the patterns of inter-ethnic relations in the western and eastern parts of the Ukraine.

Industrial development in Eastern Ukraine only accelerated the process of

Russiﬁcation that had been going on in the region for centuries. A mass inﬂux of

96
Russians, as well as Ukrainians from the rural areas, into the fast growing cities of Eastern
Ukraine (which includes Lugansk, Donetsk, Khar'kov) fostered a rapid assimilation of
Ukrainians. Thus, by the late 19803 ethnic Russians constituted about 30% to 40% of the
population in Eastern Ukraine (See Map 3). The tempo of assimilation was also very fast.
In the 1970 census about 10% of Ukrainians considered the Ukrainian language to be their
native language. In the 1989 census this number increased to 25%. On the other hand,
about 30% of Russians report being able to speak Ukrainian. Currently, anywhere from a
third to half of the Ukraine's population is either ethnically Russian or Russiﬁed (Motyl,
1993, p.72).

The western part of the Ukraine--which never belonged to the Russian empire and
historically constituted a part of Central Europe--did not experience a massive inﬂux of
Russians. Russian migrants, as a rule, preferred cities with their urban styles of life, to
living in rural areas. Therefore, in Western Ukraine the number of Russians living among
the local population remained low-~1ess than 10% (Harris, 1993, p.13)

These regional economic, social, cultural and ethnic differences, to a large degree,
explain why the eastern and western parts of the Ukraine responded differently to the
policies of Russiﬁcation carried out by the Center and the indigenous elites. In the eastern
part of the Ukraine the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians brought an
increasing loss of national identity for Ukrainians, as well as their Russiﬁcation. Especially
signiﬁcant in this regard was the establishment of Russian as the language of mass media,
work, and education. The transfer of the language of the public sphere, from Ukrainian to
Russian, greatly encouraged Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russian schools so

that they could have better chances to enter universities and have successful careers. The

97

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98
situation advanced to the point where the use of the Russian language became a signiﬁer
of higher social and occupational status, mobility, and an urban way of life, while,
conversely, the use of Ukrainian became evidence of being rural, and lacking education
and culture (Sarnakhova, 1994).

Furthermore, Ukrainians had a much better chance of having careers outside their
national republic than people from the non-Slavic republics. The upper echelons of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the central apparatus of state bureaucracies, and
the military have traditionally been dominated by Slavs. Thus, the interests of the
Ukrainian political elite were tied very closely to those of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU). In comparison, the mobility of political and administrative elites in
the Baltics and Central Asia were, with very few exceptions, limited by the boundaries of
their republics. Therefore, Ukrainians had more incentive and interest in adopting the
Russian language and culture than Balts or Central Asians (Hechter and Furtado, 1992).

The situation was different in the western part of the Ukraine. Here, ethnic
Ukrainians constituted a predominant majority of the population. However, they were
exposed to signiﬁcant social and political pressure to adopt the Russian language and
culture. In a predominantly Ukrainophone environment, this pressure could not help but
generate resentment over being treated like a colony of Russia. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that Russiﬁed Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine (because of its
economic power) politically dominated the republic. Thus any social or professional
advancement of Ukrainians was associated with becoming a Russophone.

Nevertheless, ethnic tension and competition in Western Ukraine did not become

as signiﬁcant as was the case in the Baltics or Central Asia. First of all, the size of the

99
Russian population in this part of the Ukraine was relatively small. Secondly, there was
no individual discrimination of ethnic Ukrainians or restrictions on their social mobility
within the Ukraine or throughout the whole USSR. Ukrainians enjoyed country-wide

social mobility, up to the highest levels of the Soviet state and Party bureaucracy.

4.6 Migration and the Power Potential of Ethnic Communities

The combined effects of the policies of modernization pursued by the Soviet state
and the historical, cultural, economic and other factors speciﬁc to the national republics,
produced a wide variety of migration patterns. These, in turn, led to a very uneven
distribution of Russians across the national republics.

Thus, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan together accounted for about 70% of the
Russian diaspora (44.9% percent in the Ukraine and 24.6% in Kazakhstan) (Figure 11).
The next biggest concentration of Russians was in the Baltics (6.8%), Uzbekistan (6.5%),
Byelorussia (5.3%) and Kyrgyzstan (3.6%). The uneven geographic distribution of the
Russian diaspora is also reﬂected in the data on the proportion of the Russian population
within the national republics (Figure 12). Among 14 Soviet republics, Kazakhstan had the
highest proportion of Russian population--close to 40%. The second highest percentage
of Russian population was in Latvia (34%) and Estonia (30%). The Ukraine had 22%,
Kyrgyzstan 21%, and Moldova 13%, while the rest of the republics with 10% or less of
Russians comprising their pepulations.

The data on the demographic distribution and geographic concentration of

Russians within the national republics is summarized on the grid in Figure 13. The

100

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103
Russian communities which had the highest power potential are located within quadrant
II, in Kazakhstan, Estonia, the Ukraine and, to a lesser degree, in Moldova. In these
republics Russians not only constituted a signiﬁcant proportion of the republics'
population, but are also geographically concentrated (in the northern oblasts in
Kazakhstan; the north- east region of Estonia; the eastern oblasts of Ukraine; and the
Transnistria region in Moldova). Since Russians were a majority in these oblasts, they
controlled oblast level institutions (local administrations, education, etc.) that could be
used for political mobilization.

The two republics in quadrant I--Latvia and Kyrgyzstan--also have large Russian
populations. However, unlike in the previous group of republics, Russians in Latvia and
Kyrgyzstan did not control oblast level institutions. Instead, Russians in Latvia and
Kyrgyzstan lived in the major cities of the republics (Riga, Daugavpils, Liepaja in Latvia,
and Bishkek and Osh in Kyrgyzstan) where they constituted (or were very close to
constituting) absolute majorities.

Finally, in Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the power potential
of the Russian communities was relatively small. Russians in these republics comprised
about 10% of the population. Most Russians live in the major cities of the republics where
they constitute a numerical minority.

By overlaying the power potential axis with the axis describing the character of
ethnic stratiﬁcation, a grid that describes the ethnic conﬂict potential across the national
republics was produced (Figure 14). Conﬂict potential is deﬁned in the following way: the
more comparable the power potentials of the ethnic groups, and the deeper the ethnic

inequalities, the higher is the probability that liberalization of the authoritarian political

104

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105
system will lead to ethnic conﬂict. Conversely, the more ﬂuid the ethnic stratiﬁcation, and
the wider the power differentials among ethnic groups, the lower is the potential for ethnic
conﬂict.

According to the grid, the highest ethnic conﬂict potential is in the republics
located in quadrant II--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser degree, Moldova. In
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic stratiﬁcation pattern was rigid competitive, and the
size of the Russian population was signiﬁcant. In addition, in Kazakhstan the Russian
population was highly territorially concentrated. Moldova in this respect occupied a
middle position between the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia and the countries of
Central Asia. Its ethnic stratiﬁcation was more "rigid" than in the Baltics (i.e., Russians
were of higher socio-economic status than the indigenous population), however, not to the
degree as was the case in Central Asia.

In Latvia and Estonia, although the power potential of the Russian community was
signiﬁcant, the potential of ethnic conﬂict was modiﬁed by the character of ethnic
stratiﬁcation that was less pronounced than was the case in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Moldova. Finally, in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the conﬂict potential was
low despite the rigid competitive character of ethnic stratiﬁcation, since the size of
Russian communities in these republics was small.

In sum, the analysis of the preparatory phase demonstrates that the Soviet state's
modernization policies produced two developments. First, they stimulated mass Russian
migration to the periphery of the country. Second, modernization initiated a process of
rapid social differentiation of the indigenous population, which by the early 1960s, had led

to the gradual consolidation of the new nations. Yet, the successes of the Soviet regime's

106
modernization policies also decreased the occupational, economic and educational
differences between Russians and the indigenous populations. The acculturation and
bilingualism of non-Russian groups also grew fast. However, the degree to which this
occurred varied dramatically across the regions and was highly inﬂuenced by the
circumstances under which ethnic stratiﬁcation came to be formed.

Thus, in Central Asia, ethnic stratiﬁcation evolved from a paternalistic pattern to a
rigid competitive pattern. In Moldova, bipolar stratiﬁcation was unfolded even though the
Russian incipient society still dominated the republic. In the Baltics, contrary to the
situation in Moldova, indigenous ethnic groups asserted their dominance over ethnic
Russians. This occurred because Russian migration to the region became increasingly
dominated by economic migrants. Finally, in the Ukraine, differences between its regions
became more salient than differences between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians.

The signiﬁcance of ethnic developments in the national republics became especially
vivid when the Soviet economy began to stagnate and then decline. Under conditions of
increasing scarcity of resources, the competition between ethnic groups escalated, thereby
putting more and more pressure on Russians. Thus, the unquestionable political
domination of the Russians came into contradiction with the social and economic
development of the periphery.

In the case of the Baltics, this contradiction was expressed as a heightened national
consciousness and widespread perceptions that their nations were in demographic,
cultural, linguistic and ecological danger. In Central Asia the increasing competition and
rising indigenous middle class led to an outﬂow of ethnic Russians. In the Ukraine,

regionalization of the republic occurred. Its eastern region had become increasingly

107
Russiﬁed and assimilated into Russian ethnos, while in Western Ukraine the dynamics
resembled the developments in the Baltics.

Analysis of the developments preceding Gorbachev's perestroika, depicts the major
lines of cleavage between Russians and the indigenous population as they emerged in the
periphery of the USSR. It also describes the relative positions of Russian and indigenous
groups within each of the national republics. However, patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation per
se, do not explain why and how ethnic transformation proceeded to the next (decision)
phase. This is because ethnic transformation, although shaped by political, economic and
social conditions, is ﬁrst and foremost, a political process, i.e. the outcome of actions of
multiple actors in the national republics, the Russian Federation, and the Russian
communities themselves. Therefore, the next chapter concentrates on an analysis of the
dynamics of the ethnopolitical process as it has evolved since the beginning of Gorbachev’s

reforms.

5. THE DECISION PHASE: ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION AS A PROCESS OF
NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING, 1985-1991

Russian nationalists as well as Communists usually blamed Gorbachev for his
reforms which had unleashed nationalism in the periphery of the empire. However,
although Gorbachev's reforms had weakened the Soviet state, they could not have
singularly produced such a rapid and spectacular unraveling of the centuries old empire.
Neither could the nationalist movements (that had emerged in the periphery of the
republics) alone, undermine the dominant position of ethnic Russians in the Soviet empire.

Contributing as much, and perhaps even more, to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, were the developments within the Russian Federation itself. The most important
of these developments were (a) the transformation of the consciousness of "Russia's
Russians," which was expressed in a syndrome of imperial exhaustion and Russian
isolationism, and (b) the consolidation, under leadership of Boris Yeltsin, of the Russian
state that dissociated itself from the legacies of the empire (Lapidus et al., 1992). In other
words, it was under the impact of the growing isolationism of Russia's population that the
process of ethnic transformation in the periphery of the empire progressed from the
preparatory phase to the decision phase.43 Such a rapid collapse of the USSR would have
been highly unlikely if the Russian people had remained deeply committed to preservation
of the empire. The imperial exhaustion and growing isolationism within the Russian

Federation, in turn, profoundly shaped the situation of ethnic Russians within the national

 

‘3 In terms of the ethnic transformation model (Figure 5), the above developments are
represented by the vertical strategic dimension.

108

109
republics.

Isolationist sentiments in Russia were not an entirely new phenomenon. They
existed during most of the Soviet period, as a reaction to the alleged economic, political
and cultural discrimination against Russia within the Soviet state. However, until the
beginning of perestroika, Russian separatism had not consolidated into an ideology but
had remained rather marginal.

Three developments account for a growing reception of isolationist and inward-
looking Russian sentiment. First, the deepening economic crisis resulted in an acceleration
of the struggle for scarce resources among the different republics. The Russian population
bitterly complained that the regime had turned the Russian Federation into an "internal
colony of the USSR. " According to this opinion, for decades, Russia was drained of its
ﬁnancial resources, as well as oil, gas, gold, and other raw materials, in order to
modernize and develop the periphery. Russian nationalists complained that the Russian
Federation did not have the Russian Communist party, the Russian Academy of Sciences,
or the other cultural and social institutions that the national republics had. The slogan
"Down with the sponges!" (meaning the national republics) became quite popular with the
general Russian public. These sentiments were especially strong in the case of the Central
Asian republics because they were perceived as corrupt, inefficient, and run by maﬁas
(Kortunov, 1995).

Second, isolationist sentiment grew in response to the assertion of nationalism in
the periphery of the empire. Russians were deeply offended by the "ungrateﬁrlness" of the
national republics. According to Russians, it was a sign of inexplicable and unwarranted

ingratitude to call the Soviet Union a Russian empire. The Russian population was

1 10
outraged to hear that the nationalist press in the republics were characterizing the Center's
economic policies of development, an "exploitation" of the periphery, and Moscow's rule
over the national republics as "political and national oppression and occupation." Third,
Russians looked with apprehension at the growing ﬂow of refugees, Russians and non-
Russians, into Russia“ (Zaslavsky, 1992).

Rising isolationism in the Russian Federation had profound consequences on the
situation of ethnic Russians in the national republics. By disassociating ﬁ'om the
periphery, the population in Russia was also disassociating from the fate of 25 million
Russians who lived there. Russians in the Russian Federation saw the potential mass
immigration of their compatriots from the former Soviet republics as a direct threat to

their economic interests.“5 These attitudes of "mainland" Russians profoundly shaped the

 

4‘ The signs of Russia's growing isolationism were already visible during the early
19803. Thus, after strong public pressure and protest, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party shelved the project in which Siberian rivers were to be diverted to
Central Asia. Second, there was growing opposition to Russian military involvement in
Afghanistan. Finally, isolationist sentiments came into the open in the mass protests of
Russian women. Russian women refused to let the Soviet military conscript their sons to
the regiments that were to be sent to quell the ethnic conﬂicts in the periphery of the
empire. However, it was only with the ascendence of Yeltsin to leader of the Russian
Federation that isolationism, as a mass ideology and movement for shedding the empire,
transformed Russia into a nation-state.

‘5 Characteristic in this respect, is the fate of Russian families from Kyrgyzstan who
had left this republic to settle in the southern part of Russia. The local Russian population
was very hostile to these refugees: there were cases when their houses and other property
were set on ﬁre, and their ﬁelds planted with crops, destroyed. The attitude of the locals
was that "when the Russian villages in Central Russia were dying out, when there was an
extreme shortage of specialists in industrial enterprises in Russia (this was happening in
Central Russia during the 1970s and the early 19808), there were no our [sic] compatriots
from Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan coming to help us out. And now, when the things got
rough, Russians from these republics suddenly remembered about us." As a result of the
hostility of the local population, their inability to ﬁnd jobs in their new places of

111
responses and reactions of Russians to the decline of their status in the national republics.

However, during the early perestroika period emergence of nationalism in the
periphery of the country, and growing isolationism in the Russian Federation during the
early perestroika period, had not yet consolidated into a political force strong enough to
displace the Center. On the other hand, a Center weakened by Gorbachev's reforms could
not unilaterally impose its will either. Thus, an impasse ensued, in which the old principals
of stratiﬁcation promoting Russian dominance within the Soviet state were openly
challenged, while the new principles of access to power, resources by ethnic groups had
not yet been established. As a result, the mode of conﬂict resolution within the triadic
relationships, among the state, the national republics, and Russian minorities, changed.
Instead of the imposition and command mode, bargaining and negotiation over the future
ethnic order in the republics ensued.

Depending on the goals and modes of ethnic transformation, four types of
transformation in the national republics emerged (Figure 15). In the Baltics, ethnic
transformation was characterized by attempts to impose ethnic hegemony in the republics
and to carry out profound reformations of Soviet institutions. In Moldova, ethnic
transformation proceeded by attempts to impose ethnic hegemony and replace the
Russians in positions of power and prestige, with the indigenous nationality. In Central
Asia, ethnic transformation proceeded primarily through negotiation of the elites. Finally,
in the Ukraine, ethnic transformation was characterized by attempts to reform Soviet

institutions and to abolish ethnic hierarchy altogether. What follows is a detailed analysis

 

settlement, and poverty, about 800 Russian families who had left Keminskyi raion (Rus.
county) in Kirgizstan for Russia, returned to Kirgizstan (Ivanov, 1991).

112

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113

of each of the four types of ethnic transformation.

5.1 Ethnic Transformation in the Baltics: The Struggle Between Ethnic

Hegemony and Reform

The process of ethnic transformation in the Baltics was characterized by a
perpetual vacillation between civic and ethnic strands of Baltic nationalism (Figure 15)
Thus, there were periods during which ethnic nationalism dominated the political process
in the region. The titular nationalities' struggle for ethnic hegemony was usually followed
by periods during which the civic orientation of Baltic nationalism was more prevalent.

When the Balts struggle for national rights was advancing through subordinating
the rights and interests of all residents of the republics, the ethnic tensions and conﬂict in
the region would dramatically increase. The political rhetoric in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania would escalate signiﬁcantly on both sides of the ethnic divide. Ethnic Balts
would likely accuse the Russian community of imperialism, national oppression, and
Russiﬁcation. Ethnic Russians, in return, would denounce Balt nationalists for
discrimination and violation of Russian civic and human rights, as well as accuse them of
attempting to create apartheid, or perhaps even fascism, in the region. The ethnic
divisions in the region would undoubtedly intensify and lead to ethnic mobilization and
counter-mobilization in both communities.

When the struggle for the national rights of Balts was focing on reforming the
totalitarian and oppressive Soviet political system, which had produced ethnic
stratiﬁcation in the ﬁrst place, then ethnic tensions in the region would subside. Under this

scenario, negotiation and bargaining between ethnic groups for access to power, economic

114
resources and prestige, would likely dominate the intergroup relations.

Why was Baltic nationalism undergoing such wide swings between its civic and
ethnic orientations? In part this can be explained by the bipolar ethnic structure of the
region. Developments in the Baltics, preceding perestroika, had led to a consolidation of
the two incipient ethnic societies, which, until that time had been poised for a
"showdown," as soon as the Center started to decline. The tensions between the two
communities were fueled by a rapid change in the ethnodemographic balance in the region.
By the mid-19805, uncontrolled Russian immigration into the republics was threatening to
convert indigenous populations into minorities in their own historic homelands.

Because the size of Russian communities in Latvia and Estonia was much larger
than in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia went through much wider "ethnic hegemonyucivic
nationalism" swings than Lithuania. By far, such swings proved most destabilizing in
Estonia because of the great territorial concentration of ethnic Russians in the north-
eastern part of that republic. The quest for ethnic hegemony in Estonia, therefore, often
led to the counter-demands of ethnic Russians for autonomy, and even secession, of the
north-eastem territories.

In Latvia ethnic Russians primarily lived in urban areas. Here, the potential for
Russian mobilization was lower (because of crosscutting cleavages and a higher rate of
inter-ethnic contact) and, when it did occur, was based on an interaction of ethnic,
corporate, professional, and/or class interests. Finally, in Lithuania the "swings" between
ethnic and civic orientations of Lithuanian nationalism were the smallest. In Lithuanian
only 9% of the population are ethnic Russian. Although mobilization of Russians did

occur in Lithuania, its effect on the political situation in the republics was marginal.

115
Lithuania had, and is presently having, many more problems with its Polish, rather than its
Russian, minority.

Analytically, the process of ethnic transformation in the Baltics can be divided into
two stages, depending on the degree of dominance of ethnic or civil nationalism. In the
period from 1985-1989, the political process in the region was characterized by a struggle
for nationality rights. This led to an increase in ethnic tensions and the mobilization and
counter-mobilization of indigenous and Russian ethnic communities. Since 1989, the
struggle for national rights was progressively transformed into the struggle for "state's
rights," e.g., rights for self-determination and independence of the Baltics. This led to a
decline in ethnic tensions and the de-mobilization of the ethnic Russian political movement

in the region.

5.1.1 Liberalization and the Quest for Ethnic Hegemony, 1985-1989

From 1985 to early 1990, ethnic tensions in the Baltics were rapidly increasing.
Gorbachev's reforms had liberalized the political system allowing articulation of national
protest. At the same time, the Center remained strong enough to maintain control over
the republics. As a result, national protest took form as the quest for ethnic hegemony.
Consequently, the incipient indigenous societies attempted to subordinate the Russian
segment of the population within the framework of the Soviet state. In other words,
attempts were made to promote the indigenous "cadres" within the centralized and
hierarchical institutions of the Soviet state by pushing out the "cadres" of Russian ethnicity

from positions of power and prestige. Predictably, the result was a rapid escalation of

116
ethnic tensions in the region.

These attempts to subordinate Russian segments of the population needs to be
understood, ﬁrst and foremost, as a defensive reaction of small Baltic nations to the
policies of Russiﬁcation and demographic imperialism which had threatened their ethnic
survival. However, ethnic mobilization in the Baltics was not only facilitated by the
ethnodemographic and structural characteristics of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian
societies. The rapid grass roots mobilization was also fostered by the strong ethnic
identities of the Baltic people, and their cultural traditions and historic grievances which
included lost statehood, mass terror following the end of WWII, and the brutal imposition
of an alien socio-economic system.

Especially important in the process of ethnopolitical mobilization were the cultural
traditions of the region. The regularly held national folk song and dance festivals, and the
existence of numerous cultural, grass roots organizations, provided the organizational
forms through which the intelligentsia were "connected" to the masses.“ This connection
of the indigenous intelligentsia to the community at large was a unique characteristic of
the Baltics.

Finally, the ﬁrst anti-Communist opposition groups had played a crucial role in the
organization of political and religious dissidents and the sizable communities of Baltic
immigrants in the western countries. In no other region of the former USSR (with the

exception of the Ukraine) was the dissident movement so strong and visible as in the

 

‘6 National folk song and dance festivals date back to the late 19th century. By the
late 1970s and early 19805, grass roots groups, devoted to preservation of traditional
culture, language and history, ﬂourished in the Baltics.

117

Baltics. As a result of this interplay of structural, political, ethnodemographic, cultural
and historic factors, came the creation of the so-called Baltic Popular Fronts-~the ﬁrst
independent, mass-based, political movements in the USSR.47

The ﬁrst political action of the National Fronts, that amounted to an attempt to
impose ethnic hegemony in the republics, was the promotion of indigenous language
legislation. Under strong pressure from the National Fronts, the Soviets of the republics
had quickly passed the so-called "state language laws." The laws had two major
provisions. First, they mandated the use of indigenous languages instead of Russian in all
major spheres of life in the republics. Secondly, the new laws introduced indigenous
language proﬁciency requirements for all major categories of state employees. Since only
15% of Russians in Estonia, 22% in Latvia and 37% of Russians in Lithuania, were
proﬁcient in indigenous languages, in one stroke the language laws threatened the security
of their jobs, signiﬁcantly limited their social mobility, and restricted opportunities for
education.

The passage of language legislation produced an almost instantaneous, anti-
nationalist backlash by ethnic Russians. First of all, Russians denied that the new laws had
any legitimacy. They considered the Baltics to be a part of their country, and argued that

no one had a right to convert them into second class citizens on their own land.

 

‘7 The Popular Fronts were umbrella-type organizations, embracing both Party and
non-Party members for the support of glastnost and perestroika, without directly
challenging the Party's monopoly of power. The Popular Front of Estonia held its
founding congresses in April 1988, with Latvia and Lithuania following with the
establishment of parallel organizations in May and October of that year. For more on the
National Fronts' creation, organizational structure, social base, and ideology, see Lapidus,
1992; Sedaitis and Butterﬁeld, 1991; and Trapans 1991.

 

lift

118

Secondly, Russians rejected the claim made by nationalists that the laws were
needed to protect indigenous languages and culture from assimilation and disappearance.
Rather, the Russians argued, the language laws were created as an arbitrary means to hire
and ﬁre, from jobs, any person of non-indigenous ethnicity. Russians also asserted that
the goal of the new laws was to legitimize the change-over of bureaucrats of one ethnicity
into bureaucrats of the other ethnicity, that the criteria of sufﬁcient knowledge was vague,
and that there were no institutions established to which one could appeal the results of the
language proﬁciency tests. Furthermore, Russians maintained, there were no adequate
facilities, textbooks, dictionaries, or language specialists, to effect such a massive
linguistic transition (of almost one million people) in the 5-7 years that the laws required.

Thirdly, even those Russians sympathetic to the Baltic cause were outraged by the
lack of discussion and negotiation, with the Russian community, concerning the speciﬁcs
of the laws; in particular the scheduling, and means and ways of implementing them.
Russians just woke up one morning to see the law passed.

The passage of the language laws galvanized the Russian diaspora and led to the
creation of Interfronts, which were popular movements designed to protect the rights of
ethnic Russians in Baltics.48

The Interﬁ'onts, organizations comprised of ethnic Russians, were established as a
result of the merging of (a) the interests of the colonial (primarily military-industrial) elite
in preserving the Communist system, with (b) the widespread discontent of local Russians

over the language laws. The movement's base was the All-Union factories that employed

 

‘8 Interﬁonts were established on November 12, 1988 in Lithuania; on January 7, 1989
in Latvia; and on March 14, 1989 in Estonia.

119
an almost exclusively Russian labor force.49 It was in these enterprises, which were run
from Moscow, that the political and economic interests of the colonial elite and the
majority of the Russian labor force coincided.

Sovereignization of the republics, (the language laws were the most radical
expression of this trend at the time) not only threatened replacement of managers with
indigenous cadres, but also the closure of such factories because of the possible disruption
of economic relations with the Russian Federation. Especially vulnerable to
sovereignization, were the factories of the military-industrial complex, as well as the
infrastructure and facilities serving the Soviet Army. Therefore, not surprisingly, the
Russian military was a strong supporter of the pro-Soviet party and the managerial elite
who attempted to create and lead the Interﬁ'onts. The Interﬁ'onts began their activities
with a series of demonstrations protesting the language laws and demanding their
annulment.

The creation of the pro-Center and pro-Soviet Interﬁonts was followed by a
counter-mobilization of radical nationalists in Latvia and Estonia, who recognized that
these organizations were a mortal threat to the separatist struggle. The result was the
formation of "Citizens' Committees" that received a lot of publicity in the Baltic and all-
Union press and mass media. If the National Fronts sought to unite all populations in the
region, in opposition to the Communist regime, the Citizens Committees major goal was

to exclude ethnic Russians from polity in the republics. Citizens Committees began to

 

‘9 For a proﬁle of the Interﬁont leader in Estonia see Report on the USSR, February 7,
1990, p.28. The Interﬁont headquarters in Estonia were located at the All-Union
Dvigatel enterprise, which produced a wide variety of components for military weapons
systems.

 

120
register the names of the citizens of inter-war Latvia and Estonia and their descendants, as
a means of excluding the non-indigenous population ﬁ'om participating in deciding the fate
of Latvia.’0 Committees were claiming that only citizens of the inter-war Estonia and
Latvia have the right to participate in deciding the future of the republics, thus promoting
a conception of political community ﬁrmly based on descent. In both republics the
committees succeeded in registering most of their eponymous ethnic groups."

Ethnic tensions increased even further with the 1989 Soviet-held elections in the
republic. The catastrophic defeat of the Communist parties in the republican elections
meant that the only way they could survive was by jumping on the National Fronts'
bandwagon and supporting the sovereiginization of the republics. Thus, in June 1989, in a
special congress of the Central Committee, the Lithuanian Communist party declared it's
separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The "renegade" Lithuanian
Communists had adopted an agenda that was very similar to the programs of the national

movements”. Soon, similar moves were made by the Latvian and Estonian Communist

 

5° Because of the small size of the Russian community there were no Citizens'
Committees established in Lithuania.

5' With regard to their purpose and organization, the Citizens Committees were similar
to the 'committees of correspondence' which had prepared the way for the American
Revolution in the 17705. After the Baltics regained independence, the Citizens
Committees played a crucial role in enacting Citizenship Laws that granted citizenship to
the majority of the Russian populations of these countries. For more on Citizens
Committees, see Smith et al., 1994.

’2 Thus, after the split from the CPSU, the Lithuanian Communist party adopted its
new program under the motto "Lithuania without Sovereignty is Lithuania without a
Future." Where the National Fronts and Communist Parties differed was on the speed of
sovereiginization and ways to achieve it. National-Communists argued for a more
pragmatic, peace-meal approach towards the sovereiginization of the republics. In
comparison, the National Fronts argued that the Soviet Union would never agree to letting

121
parties.

The withdrawal of the Baltic Communist parties from the CPSU, and the
consolidation of national-Communists and pro-reform intellectuals in their opposition to
Moscow, had pitted, head-to-head, two ethnic communities in the region. On one side
there were governments controlled by the nationalists and supported by the National
Fronts and Civic Committees, which had the indigenous population as their social base.
On the other side of this divide were the Interﬁonts and rump Communist parties. They
were supported by conservatives in Moscow, the military and the KGB, and the Russian
proletariat in the all-Union factories served as their social base.

The mobilization of ethnic communities on both sides of the ethnic divide led to
the increasing radicalization of political activities in the republics. Each action of the
governments controlled by nationalists was followed by counter-actions organized by the
Interﬁ-onts.53 Ethnic tensions peaked in early 1989 when the newly elected Soviets
declared the restoration of the Baltic republics' independence from the USSR?4
Declarations of independence were followed by a wave of mass political strikes of ethnic
Russians. In Estonia political strikes involved from 20,000 to 40,000 workers nationwide;

this represented about 4 to 5% of the republic's total labor force (Raun, 1994).

 

the Baltics go peacefully. Their position was to demand the restoration of independent
Baltic states on moral and legal grounds.

’3 For a detailed description of the dynamics of the political struggle between
governments controlled by nationalists in the Baltic republics and the Interfronts, see
Gemer and Hedlund, 1993, chapter 5.

5" Latvia and Estonia declared independence but immediately suspended the
declaration pending negotiation with the USSR, while Lithuania continued to hold fast to
their position of independence.

122
5.1.2 The Struggle for Baltic Independence: The Move Towards Civic
Nationalism, 1989-1991

After the summer 1989 political strikes ended, the Inter/rant movements started to
rapidly lose mass support among ethnic Russians. Although strikes and demonstrations
continued to be announced, the crowds of supporters and participants were getting smaller
and smaller. At the same time, a signiﬁcant change in the social composition of Interﬁont
supporters occurred. If, during early 1989, the workers of the large enterprises dominated
the public events called by the Interfront, by 1990, two different categories of individuals
became predominant: namely senior citizens and the Soviet military. The signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of active supporters and a change in their demography indicated an
increasing marginalization and isolation of the Intetﬁonts.

The Intetﬁont movement began to decline because of the transformation of Baltic
nationalism that occurred at the beginning of the 19905. Instead of espousing a struggle
for "ethnic hegemony," Baltic nationalism evolved into a mass movement for the
restoration of the independent Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian states, with an espoused
ideology of profound economic and political reform of the Soviet institutions in the
region.

The reasons for the transformation of Baltic nationalism and the decline of the
Interﬁonts need to be sought for in a broader political, economic and social context,
nationally as well as internationally. More speciﬁcally, the escalation of ethnic tensions in
the Baltics in the late 19805 was being produced by a liberalization of the totalitarian state,
in which one ethnic group (e. g., the Russians) was politically, economically and culturally

dominating other ethnic groups.

123

In comparison, the decline of the Interﬁ'onts and the transformation of Baltic
nationalism during this time period, needs to be understood as a reaction to the social
decomposition and economic disintegration of the Soviet state, and also to the rapidly
changing international situation.

Politically, the Center was becoming increasingly paralyzed by the internal struggle
between conservatives and Gorbachev, as well as the conﬂict between the Central
government and Russian Federation. At the same time Gorbachev was categorically
refusing to re-negotiate the Center-national republics relationship. Gorbachev's very
nonconstructive policies dealing with the restless republics led Baltic leaders to
increasingly realize that there could be no political future for the Baltics within the
USSR.55 At the same time, the decline of the Center was making independence a realistic

possibility.

 

5’ The Soviet regime's lack of understanding and disregard for ethnic aspirations was
most vividly demonstrated during Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania, in January, 1990.
Gorbachev undertook such a visit in the attempt to stem the republics drive towards
independence. However, he seemed to completely misunderstand the motives and forces
that led to the mass mobilization of the indigenous people in the republics.

During his interviews and public appearances in Lithuania, Gorbachev spoke very
little about the issues that were most important in the republic at that time, (e.g., the
circumstances of Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR in 1940, the reform of the
federal structure of the USSR, changes in the nationality policies of the Center, devolution
of the economic powers of the republics, etc.) Instead, Gorbachev spoke endlessly about
the dependence of the Baltic economy on Russian oil and energy; about the advantages
that small nations have in being constituent parts of such a big country as the USSR, etc.

Furthermore, in his dialogue with the public, journalists, and intellectuals,
Gorbachev could not articulate even one concrete proposal that would address Lithuania's
most important grievances. As a result Gorbachev's visit, only reinforced the perceptions
of the majority of the indigenous populations; that they would remain at the mercy of the
much more powerful and unpredictable neighbor unless there was a state to protect the
native language, culture and ways of life. For more on Gorbachev's fateful trip to
Lithuania, see Senn, 1995.

124

Radicalization of Baltics was also fueled by the rapid economic decline and
collapse of the centrally planned Soviet economy. Reforms had wreaked chaos on the
centralized system of production and distribution of the USSR. By the early 19905, the
centralized planned economy, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. However, any
attempt to introduce economic reforms in the Baltics was perceived as a threat to the
authority of the Center and was blocked by the conservatives in Parliament."5 With the
disastrous economic policies of the Central government, and no improvement in sight, the
population of the Baltics (including local Russians) were increasingly coming to realize
that they had little economic future in the state of the USSR.

Finally, unlike in the other republics of the USSR, the conﬂict between the Center
and the national republics in the Baltics was couched in the language of the people from
whom independence was illegally wrested. Consequently, the National Fronts strategically
organized all their major political actions so as to show the illegality of the Soviet
occupation of the Baltics. A signiﬁcant boost to the National Fronts came after the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR created a special commission to investigate the 1940

incorporation of the Baltics into the USSR. In early 1990, the commission made public

 

’6 Thus, the "IME plan"--a plan for the economic autonomy and "self-managemen " of
Estonia within the Soviet Union--was developed by Estonian intellectuals in 1986, and, for
almost three years, could not be passed through the Supreme Soviet for implementation in
the Baltics. When it ﬁnally was approved (by margin of only 2 votes!) it was too late, and
too little. Furthermore, even these modest economic freedoms that the IME allowed for
in the republics was blocked by the Central Ministries. For example, the Central Bank of
the USSR froze all the hard currency assets of the Baltic republics and demanded that all
transactions were to pass through it. There were hopes that the so-called "500 days plan,"
developed in Summer of 1990 by economist Yavlinskii, would launch radical economic
reform in the USSR. Gorbachev initially supported the plan but, by December of 1990, he
had rejected the plan as too radical (Shlapentokh, 1993c).

125

the secret clauses of the 1939 German-Soviet Pact, in which Stalin and Hitler had
partitioned Poland and gave the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Transylvania to the USSR.

The Soviet parliament's recognition of the reality of the Baltics occupation allowed
for the National Fronts to launch a call for international recognition of the Baltics and the
withdrawal of Soviet troops. "Internationalization" of the Baltics' problem had the effect
of turning the Center-republics conﬂict into a national liberation struggle against foreign
domination.

This change in the goals of the national struggle in the Baltics also meant
signiﬁcant changes in policies towards Russians. Baltic leaders in their struggle for
independence could ill- afford a restless and sizable Russian minority. In recognition of
this fact, national leaders in the republics started to actively pursue polices of
accommodation towards Russians. The new policies were based on three components.
First of all, the provisions of the language laws were modiﬁed and scaled down, and the
transitional periods from Russian to indigenous languages were extended."7

Secondly, the drive for independence was presented to ethnic Russians coupled

with a program of radical economic and political reforms. Only independence, it was

 

’7 In Latvian regions heavily populated by Russians, the language laws were declared
non-operative until 1995. In Lithuania the law speciﬁed that all public institutions can
provide services in any language acceptable to their employees. Military personnel were
exempted from any language requirements (as if such requirement could be enforced...)
Non-Lithuanian schools were allowed to keep records in their own languages. The
provision requiring that the language used for all paperwork in the All-Union enterprises
be switched from Russian to the indigenous language was dropped altogether.
Lawmakers admitted that the laws were hastily passed, and that the implementation
process had not been thoroughly thought through. Therefore, the decision was made to
ﬁrst concentrate efforts on the creation of the material base and mechanisms (textbooks,
dictionaries, language centers, testing procedures, preparation of language instructors,
etc.) needed for such a mass scale linguistic transition.

126
argued, could create the conditions needed to carry out political and economic reforms
which would allow for the elimination of all vestiges of the totalitarian system, and arrest
the precipitous decline of the economy in the region. Furthermore, the new leadership
was promising that economic reforms would soon produce the "Baltic economic miracle."
The supposed outcome was that all residents of the region, independent of their ethnicity,
would be able to enjoy civic freedoms and standards of living comparable to those in
Scandinavian countries.

Finally, a public campaign was launched to calm the fears and apprehensions
Russians had about their futures in the republics. Russian language publications were
created, and public appearances and forums of the National Fronts' leaders, government
officials and Interfront leaders were organized. Some of the rallies and demonstrations of
the Interﬁ'onts and their supporters were televised. The major thrust of such a publicity
campaign was to assure Russians that language laws would not be used to "ethnically
cleanse" Russians from positions of prestige and power. Furthermore, attempts were
made to persuade Russians that their treatment in the independent Baltics would follow
standards accepted by western countries. Although the titular nationalities would enjoy a
hegemonic position, the others would be guaranteed their place and rights in the republics,
with the whole being supervised by a general European order.

Thus, in its second congress the Latvian National Front (LNF) had modiﬁed its
program to indicate that LNF will support legislature that would provide all current
residents of the republic with Latvian citizenship independent of ethnic origins. However,
of all the Baltic republics, Lithuania went furthest in accommodating the demands of its

Russians minority. By early 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania had passed a

127
citizenship law based on the so-called 'zero-option.’ The law guaranteed citizenship in the
republic of Lithuania to all its residents.” Because of deep divisions within the Latvian
and Estonian communities, negotiation over the status of Russians, although actively
debated, did not reach the point of legislative proposals in these republics.

Moderation of the National F ronts' position towards ethnic Russians, combined
with the effects of a collapsing Soviet Union, produced two developments. First, there
was rapid decline in ethnic tensions in the republics. In a November, 1988 survey in
Latvia, 54% of Russians expressed the opinion that they were discriminated against
because of their nationality. By May of 1990, this number had dropped to about 24%
(Rosenvald, 1991, p.157).

As the importance of the nationality issue in the Baltics was declining, the issues of
work and social security (housing, food, medical care) were increasing in importance. The
Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey shows that, by August, 1991, among the most
important issues to ethnic Russians in the Baltics were increases in prices (69%), shortages
of food (3 8%), increases in ethnic tensions (37%), and the rise in crime (30%).59

At the same time, there were growing internal divisions within the Russian
community over what position to take towards the Baltics' drive for independence.
Although the language laws had threatened to convert Russians into second class citizens

in their own country, the Baltics' struggle for independence opened the possibility of

 

’8 The law excluded soldiers and ofﬁcers of Soviet Army, Interior troops, the KGB
and some other groups of individuals from acquiring citizenship. For more on Lithuanian
citizenship law, see Smith et al., 1994.

59 Respondents could indicate more than one answer.

128
becoming citizens of the independent, and possibly prosperous, Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian states. The deep economic crisis that was even more severe in Russia than in
the Baltics meant that there would be little future for them in the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, there were hopes that the economic situation in the Baltics would improve
much faster than in Russia.

Finally, Moscow‘s policies did little to encourage Russians' opposition to the
Baltics' drive for independence. On the contrary, Gorbachev's confrontational policies,
especially the use of the infamous Interior Ministry troops (OMON)60 to intimidate and
bully civil populations and the lawfully elected governments, caused a rise in anti-Moscow
feelings in the region that transcended ethnic divisions. On the wave of anti-Moscow
sentiment, the Baltics held referendums that produced a strong Russian pro-independence
vote. Approximately 30 to 35% of Russians voted "yes" to Baltic independence in early
1991.

In sum, the process of ethnic transformation in Baltics during the perestroika
period went through two phases. During the initial period of reforms, there was an
increase in ethnic tensions and conﬂict as the National Fronts attempted to take control of
the republican institutions by excluding ethnic Russians from positions of privilege and

power. However, since 1989, the ethnic tensions in the region had declined. In part, this

 

6° OMON was created by the Ministry of Interior for use against separatists and other
"law breakers." On January 1991, OMON troops killed 5 civilians in Riga, Latvia and 14
people in Vilnius, Lithuania. OMON was implicated in brutal killings of 7 Lithuanian
border guards in July 1991 , and bombing campaign aimed at stirring up local Russians and
discrediting Baltic national movements. OMON terrorized and beat draftees who refused
to go to serve in the Soviet Army, and occupied public buildings in capitals of Baltic
republics.

129
occurred because of the rapid transformation of Baltic ethnic nationalism into a struggle
for independence. The ethnic situation improved partly because of the rapid decline of the
Center, and the ensuing political and economic chaos in the Russian Federation. The
deteriorating situation in Russia and limited possibilities to return to their homeland had
signiﬁcantly weakened Russians' opposition to the Baltics' independence.

The struggle for independence made Baltic national leaders actively search for an
accommodation with the large Russian population in the region. Facing Moscow's threat
to use military force, the Baltics could ill-afford a restless and resentful Russian
population. In order to achieve Russian support for independence, Baltic leaders initiated
the process of negotiation and bargaining over the future status of ethnic Russians in the
republics. Ethnic Russians were promised citizenship, prosperity, and the protection of
their cultural rights, in exchange for their support of an independent Baltic statehood.

The change in the position of the new government, coupled with the decline of the
Center and the collapse of the economy in the country, also inﬂuenced ethnic Russians to
take a more conciliatory stance towards the issue of the Baltics' independence. The
possibilities of returning back to a Russian Federation were limited. Furthermore, higher
standards of living and the hope that economic reforms would bring prosperity faster in
the Baltics than in Russia, encouraged local Russians to seek accommodation with the
new leadership of the republics.

Because of the interests in a modiﬁed reunion on both sides of ethnic divide,
negotiation began over the future status of ethnic Russians in the region. The degree to
which negotiation and bargaining decreased ethnic tensions depended on the extent of

negotiation and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians, and on whether or not they

130
produced some agreement on the issue. In this respect, the situation improved most in
Lithuania where negotiation over the status of ethnic Russians had reached the stage of
legislative proposals and laws. In Latvia and Estonia, the negotiations did not produce a
resolution. Therefore, once Baltic independence was achieved, the "Russian question" in
Latvia and Estonia was re-opened, however, now the situation did not favor a
democratically negotiated solution.

The process of negotiation and bargaining left Russian communities divided and
ambivalent as to what position to take towards independence. In this regard, the majority
of ethnic Russians can be characterized as "reluctant loyalists." Promises by the new
leadership of full political, economic and cultural rights in the independent, and possibly
prosperous, Baltic states led to a rapid decline of the Interﬁonts. This meant that a
predominant majority of ethnic Russians in the region were ready to accept independence
and would not actively resist if it did, indeed, become a reality. But peaceful acquiescence
to Baltic independence did not mean that the Russian community wholly supported an
independent Baltic statehood either. Although approximately one-third of ethnic Russians
supported the Baltic independence, the majority of ethnic Russians were either against

independence, or did not participate in the referendum at all (Taagpera, 1993, p.194).

5.2 Moldova: Transformation through the Displacement of Non-Indigenous
Elites and the Imposition of Ethnic Hegemony

Developments in Moldova were characterized by attempts to radically transform
its ethnic structure by displacing ethnic Russians in positions of privilege and power, and

also by imposing ethnic hegemony of the titular nationality in the republics (Fig 15).

131
However, the efforts to radically change the status of ethnic groups backﬁred, leading to
an escalation of the conﬂict between Moldovans and other ethnic communities in the
republics. The Russian-Ukrainian majority in the Transnistria region of the republics, and
the Gagauz, a small Turkic-speaking, Christian-Orthodox ethnic group in the south of the
Republics, declared autonomy, and later independence, from the Moldovan republic.
Efforts to quell the drive for succession by Moldovans escalated into open military
warfare, in which the Soviet military became directly involved. The result was a defacto
partitioning of the Moldovan state along ethnic lines into an independent "Dniester Soviet
Socialist Republics" and Moldova proper.

Why did ethnic transformation in Moldova proceed through attempts to displace
non-indigenous elites, and a struggle for ethnic hegemony of the titular nationality? In
part, this happened because Moldova represents an artiﬁcial national entity. Stalin created
Moldova from two pieces of land. Transnistria, a territory on the left bank of the Dniester
river, was historically settled by Slavs, but had a signiﬁcant number of Romanian and
Jewish minorities. Bessarabia, a territory on the right bank of Dniester river, represented
an annexed piece of Romanian territory with a Romanian population which, with its
culture, economic habits, identity and traditions, belonged to central Europe.

Moscow's policies on Moldova's socio-economic development did not succeed in
forging the deep historical, linguistic, and cultural gap between the two major ethnic
groups in the republics. Slavs on the left bank of the Dniester river continued to dominate
the republic, consequently creating resentment among the indigenous population. Once
the process of liberalization of the country began, the deeply ethnically divided Moldovan

state began to quickly unravel. Its Bessarabian part was pulling the Moldovan state

132
towards uniﬁcation with Romania, while Transnistria was gravitating in opposite direction;

towards uniﬁcation with the Russian state.

5.2.1 Moldova: Towards Unification With Romania

With the introduction of reforms, nationalistic discourse in the republic began to
consolidate around two themes: the national grievances of Moldovans under the Soviet
regime, and debates about the events that led to the incorporation of Bessarabia into the
USSR and the creation of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist republics. Moldovans deeply
resented Russian dominance in the republics, uncontrolled Slavic migration into the
republic, and extensive policies of Russiﬁcation. However, what especially fueled
nationalistic passions were the debates about events surrounding the creation of the
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Glastnost allowed the Moldovan intellectuals to
openly challenge the Soviet version of Moldovan history. Once unearthed, Moldovan
history proved to be a part of Romanian history. Thus, the liberation of Bessarabia by the
Soviet Army in 1940, proved to be an imperialist annexation of the Romanian territory,
which was followed by the partitioning of Eastern Europe between Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union.

The "socialist revolution" in Moldova proved to be a wave of mass terror and
massive "voluntary relocation" of Romanian families to Siberia in order to quell any
resistance to occupation. The vacated homes, jobs and properties of deported Romanians
were taken by in-migrating ethnic Russians. The introduction of Cyrillic (instead of the

Latin alphabet) in 1941, and a declaration of the existence of a "Moldovan" language

133
distinct from Romanian, proved to be a national policy of oppression of the ethnic
Romanian population. A "Moldovan" ethnic identity was constructed and brutally
imposed on the ethnic Romanian population (by the Communist regime) as a way of
dividing the Romanian nation and legitirnating the Soviet occupation.

Thus, the merging of national grievances with the historical incorporation of
Bessarabia into the USSR led to the formation of a powerful nationalist discourse for the
re-uniﬁcation of Moldova with Romania. On one hand, this drive was stoked by the
attempts of Moldovan intellectuals to reclaim the prosecuted, Moldovan "Romanians"
who'd been driven into a social and psychological underground. On the other hand, the
Moldovan intelligentsia, by appropriating Romanian history, and Romanian national and
nationalistic ideology and mythology, were seeking to mobilize the population for the
purposes of re-uniting a nation which had been dismembered by the empire.

At this point it is appropriate to remark on the notion of re-uniﬁcation. The very
idea of re-unifying a nation divided by an oppressive foreign power is one of the most
emotionally and politically powerful ideas of nationalism. The modern German and Italian
states were created under slogans of national uniﬁcation. Furthermore, the re-uniﬁcation
of West and East Germany, and the euphoria that followed it, acted as an inspiring
example for the Moldovan nationalists to emulate.“

However, the effort to unify Moldova with Romania was categorically rejected,

 

6' Using Geertz's terminology, the Moldovan type of nationalism can also be deﬁned as
a reaction to the "political dismemberrnen " of the nation. Other examples of reactions to
the "political dismembennent" of nations are pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, etc. (Geertz,
1973, p.264).

134
not only by ethnic Russians, but also by members of other non-titular ethnic groups living
in the republic. First of all, ethnic Russians argued that the Dniester region is "chastica
Russ/cot zemli" (Rus. part of the Russian land) that never belonged to either Romania or
Moldova. Secondly, re-uniﬁcation of Moldova with Romania threatened to radically
change the ethno-demographic balance in the republic. Russians, together with other
Russophones (Ukrainians, Jews) comprised about 30% of the population in the republic
and exercised signiﬁcant clout over the Moldovan republic. In the case of uniﬁcation,
Russophones would become a numerically insigniﬁcant minority in Romania (less than 5%
of Romania's population). They would reside in a province far removed from Bucharest,
with almost no political and economic inﬂuence in the state of Romania.

Russians who occupied signiﬁcant positions of power and status in the Moldovan
republic would become simply irrelevant if the institutions of the Romanian state were to
replace Moldovan institutions. For the same reason, other Russians, and all those
employed in the all-Union factories, would most deﬁnitely lose their jobs. Furthermore,
there were other important grounds for ethnic minorities to outright reject the idea of
living in a Romanian state. Economically, Romania was even more underdeveloped, and
had a lower standard of living, than Moldova. Secondly, Romania during late 1989 was
extremely politically unstable. The anti-govemment violence that spread throughout
Romania's cities, and which resulted in the overthrow of the Chaucesku regime in 1989,
had put the country on the brink of civil war. Thirdly, the Romanian state's very poor
treatment of ethnic minorities, especially ethnic Hungarians and Gypsies, made the
uniﬁcation of Moldova and Romania simply unacceptable to the Russians.

Therefore, attempts by the Moldovan nationalists to embark on a course towards

135
reuniﬁcation with Romania led to a rapid escalation of ethnic conﬂict. In 1989, the
creation of the Popular Front by the Moldovan intelligentsia was followed by a counter
mobilization of the ethnic Russian population; namely, the creation of the Interfront and
the Joint Council of Workers Collective in order to oppose nationalization of the
republics. The declaration of the laws of language, that mandated a switch from Cyrillic
to Latin script, were met by widespread strikes throughout the republic. Approximately
80,000 people, predominantly ethnic Russians and Russiﬁed Slavs, participated in the
strikes (Fane, 1993, p.138-139).

Ethnic tensions reached the point of open confrontation when, during the 1991
August putsch, Moldova declared its independence ﬁom the USSR. In response, ethnic
Russians in Transnistria created the "Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic" (DSSR) and
declared their own independence. The Moldovan government, in turn, denounced the
Dniester's declaration of independence and called for volunteers to defend the territorial
integrity of the country. In response, the leaders of the DSSR declared the total
mobilization of their "Socialist Republic." Hostilities escalated into a sustained military
conﬂict in the early summer of 1992, when Moldovan government forces fought the
"Dniester" Army. Bloodshed was stopped only when the Soviet Army intervened in the
conﬂict on behalf of the Dniester region."2 In late summer 1992, the commander of the
14th Russian Army, Lieutenant-General Alexander Lebed, advanced his troops into the

area of ﬁghting. In this ethnic conﬂict, about 600 people were killed, and about 100,000

 

62 The 14th Russian Army provided training and supplied the "Dniester" army with
armaments. In some cases, officers and soldiers of the 14th Army actually fought on the
Dniester side against the Moldovans. For more on the involvement of the Russian military
in the Transnistria conﬂict, see Socor, 1993a.

136
of the population became refugees (for a detailed account of the conﬂict see Helsinki
Watch 1993).

In sum, the ethnic transformation process in Moldova never reached a stage of
sustained negotiations. Unlike the situation in the Baltics, the indigenous nationality's
push for ethnic hegemony was not transformed into civic nationalism when Molodva's
independence became a possibility. Instead, the weakening of the Center accelerated the
drive for Moldova's re-uniﬁcation with Romania. To ethnic Russians, the republic's
uniﬁcation with Romania was tantamount to a hijacking of the Moldovan state by
Moldovan nationalists. Once the Center that had kept the deeply ethnically divided
Moldova together collapsed the struggle for control over the state erupted. Only

deployment of the Soviet Army troops had stopped the bloodshed.

5.3 Central Asia: An Elite Negotiated Ethnic Transformation

The transformation of ethnic stratiﬁcation in Central Asia has two major
characteristics that differentiate it from similar processes which were taking place in other
regions of the former USSR. First, ethnic transformation in Central Asia occurred, and to
a large degree continues to occur, almost exclusively within the framework of the
authoritarian Soviet political system. After independence, all Central Asian republics
opted to maintain Soviet political and economic institutions. Reforms in the region
proceeded very slowly, and, in many cases, involved just cosmetic changes, e.g., renaming
of the institutions, parties, and changing personnel.

Because ethnic transformation occurred within authoritarian institutions of the

137
Soviet state, it was and remains state initiated and state controlled. Civil society in the
region is very weak. During the perestroika era, there were neither mass anti-colonial and
pro-reform, nor anti-Russian movements in the republics. After independence, there were
very few political groups or parties in the region that existed outside the state. Even in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, rather open societies by Central Asian standards, opposition
is tightly controlled by the ruling regimes and, therefore, remains very weak. Being state-
controlled, ethnic transformation in the region is aimed at the protection and consolidation
of the power of the ruling regimes.

The second feature of ethnic transformation in Central Asia is that it involves a
process of extensive elite bargaining and negotiation. Since almost no political groups and
parties exist outside the state, ethnic groups in authoritarian systems, to a large degree,
resemble corporate groups, or "special interest groups." As such, the elites of these ethnic
groups bargain and negotiate with other corporate groups for state protection, favorable
policies, favorable legislation, etc.

Why did the process of ethnic transformation in Central Asia take the form of elite
bargaining and negotiation? For the answer to this question, one needs, again, to look at
the character of social stratiﬁcation of the societies in the region, especially the structural
position of the indigenous educated classes. To grossly oversimplify, one could say that,
in Central Asia, Moscow's policies of socio-economic development led to the creation of a
peculiar type of social stratiﬁcation, in which the indigenous elites and middle classes
were, essentially, "sitting on" primarily rural-based, traditional peasant societies. Unlike in
the Baltics or Ukraine, in Central Asia indigenous working classes is numerically small.

This happened because the intelligentsia and new middle classes in the region were

138
created, ﬁrst and foremost, to serve the state and can only partially be attributed to the
process of modernization.

Because of the "underdevelopment" of the social structure, indigenous elites in the
region were positioned between the Center and the primarily rural societies which, since
the late 19705, was characterized by a continuing demographic explosion, spreading
ecological decay and a deepening economic crisis. Being so highly dependent on the
redistributive state, and especially on the Center's subsidies'53 and Russia's markets,
indigenous elites had little interest in promoting nationalism, separatism, or independence.
Rather, the Central Asian leadership chose to actively lobby the Center for increasing
subsidies and investment.

A high level of political dependence on the Center and an overwhelming economic
interest in remaining a part of the USSR, profoundly shaped the policies of the indigenous
elites towards Russian minorities. The leadership of the republics did not tolerate, and
were suppressing, any signs of anti-colonialism or anti-Russian nationalism. Furthermore,
since the Central Asian regimes were pressuring Moscow for increased investment and
appealing to the historic responsibility of Russians for the current state of affairs in the
region, they were greatly accommodating to the demands and situation of the local ethnic
Russians.

A willingness to negotiate the status of ethnic Russians can also be explained by

 

"3 In 1991 Union subsidies represented around 20% of the gross domestic product of
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Dannreuther, 1994, p.21 and Kaser and Mehrota, 1992, p.64)

139
the weak ethnic identity of the population in the region.“ Ethnicity in Central Asia was a
rather new phenomenon that emerged in the region only during the Soviet era. The
majority of Central Asia's population were living in rural areas where ethnic identity had to
compete with strong and historically formed regional, clan and religious identities. A
weak ethnic consciousness was not only characteristic of the region's rural population, but
also of the indigenous intelligentsia. The indigenous educated classes in the region were
created by Moscow to exclusively to serve the state. Unlike the intelligentsia in the
Baltics or Moldova, the Central Asian intelligentsia had only minimal links to the region's
pre-colonial history, culture and traditions. They were educated in Russia, were almost
100% Russian-speaking, and were schooled to abhor the cultural traditions of the region
as "backward," "rural," and "non-modern."

Finally, anti-Russian sentiment in Central Asia was weak. Unlike the Baltics, the
Russian population in the region did not constitute a demographic threat to the indigenous
ethnic groups. Proportionately, the Russian population in the region was on the decline
since the late 19705 because of Russian outrnigration and the higher birth rates of the
indigenous population. Moreover, since the Soviets did not destroy pre-existing ethnic

identities, the Central Asian people are, by far, less hostile to the period of imperial

 

6‘ Interesting observations on the matter of ethnic consciousness in the region are
provided by Jeffrey C. Lumpkin, an American traveler who, for some time in the early
19905, lived and worked in Central Asia. He wrote, "While living in Almaty, Kazakhstan,
1 observed that many inhabitants themselves were rather confused about where they were
living. Quite a few said they were living in the Soyuz (Rus. Soviet Union) (especially the
ones who wanted to change rubles for dollars), some in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist
Republic and very few...in the <now independent> Republic of Kazakhstan. Similarly, by
crossing the border several hours away, one was in either Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan,
and I could ﬁnd no one to accurately differentiate the two." (From a message posted on
CENASIA e-mail discussion group on October 10, 1995).

140
subjugation than most other nations of the ex-US SR. In all the Central Asian republics it
is popularly believed that Russian imperial rule had signiﬁcantly advanced the national
development of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs (Dannreuther, 1994).

In sum, elite negotiation over the status of ethnic Russians in the region were the
prevalent mode of ethnic transformation because of the signiﬁcant dependence of the
Central Asian educated classes on the Central state. Facing a continuing demographic
explosion of the rural population, spreading ecological decay and a deepening economic
crisis, the leadership of this region had and have little interest in promoting nationalism
and separatism. Instead, it chose to lobby and negotiate with the Center. Furthermore,
the ethnic grievances and consciousness of the population that proved so crucial for
political mobilization in the Baltics were rather weak.

Depending on the mode of negotiation, one can discern two periods in the process
of ethnic transformation in the region. The ﬁrst period of transformation proceeded
through the imposition and command mode of conﬂict resolution. During this stage,
which began in the early 19805 and lasted through the initial stage of perestroika, Moscow
unsuccessfully tried to reinstate the colonial status of the Russian community in the region.
Since late 1989, until the collapse of the USSR, the imposition and command mode there
was replaced by negotiation over power-sharing between the indigenous elites and the
Center. Attempts were made essentially to return to the order of things that existed
during Brezhnev's era. This meant that the Center was ready to forego some of the
collective rights of local Russians in the national republics, and give a free hand to the
local elites to rule their homelands as long as they did not challenge the Center's authority

or the territorial integrity of the Soviet state. At the same time, the loyalty of the local

141
regimes to Moscow meant that the individual political, civic, economic, social and cultural

rights of Russians would be preserved and protected by the Soviet state.

5.3.1 Negotiation Through the Imposition and Command: Attempts
to Re-enforce the Colonial Status of Ethnic Russians in the Region,
1985-1989

Gorbachev's ascendence to power was marked by a decisive attempt to strengthen
the Center's direct control over the region. The choice of such policies was motivated by
Moscow's deep dissatisfaction with the poor economic performance of the Central Asian
republics, and the widespread nepotism, clientism, corruption and incompetence of the
local party elites.

The Center was also concerned about the outﬂow of ethnic Russians from the
region. Finally, Moscow was very nervous about the spread of "unofficial" Islam among
the predominantly Muslim population of republics. The protracted war that Moscow was
losing in Afghanistan, was strengthening the fear that Islamic fundamentalism would
spread in Central Asia.

In order to discipline and "straighten up" the region, a massive anti-corruption and
anti-religious campaign was launched. In the so-called "Uzbek affair" alone (a scam
involving large-scale falsiﬁcation of cotton production ﬁgures and bribes which implicated
the highest party ofﬁcials in the republic, as well as in Moscow) more than 90% of the
entire personnel of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Uzbekistan was
replaced. Thousands of others involved in the cotton production industry were subjected

to punitive measures. Similar measures, although of lesser scale, were carried out in other

142
cadres ﬁ'om the Center-«ethnic Russians--were dispatched to Central Asia and given
substantial promotions.

The campaign of the Center to strengthen direct control over the region and clean
up corrupt indigenous elites had strong support among local Russians. Demographic
pressures, increasing competition for scarce jobs and resources, and the indigenization of
the ruling elites were pushing Russians out of the region. Russians were disgruntled
with the situation in the republic. It was typical to hear Central Asian Russians speaking
about their republics as being run by the "maﬁa," referring to the vast networks of
corruption, embezzlement and fraud inside the republican party apparatuses and republican
ministries. Therefore, the majority of local Russians perceived the new Moscow policies
as restoring "order and justice" in the region. The new policies of the Center were
promising to reverse these developments that were aversive to local Russians, and increase
Russian's roles and status in the region.

However, Moscow's heavy-handed treatment of the region backﬁred. The
replacement of indigenous ofﬁcials with ethnic Russians from the Center antagonized the
local populations who perceived such policies as one more manifestation of colonialism
and Russiﬁcation. Furthermore, in 1986, when Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh
and the ﬁrst secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist party, was replaced by the Russian,
Gennadi Kolbin, anti-Russian riots erupted in Alma-Ata.

The ethnic riots in Alm-Ata, the ﬁrst ominous sign of Russian vulnerability in
Central Asia, caused erosion of a sense of security, and bred fear. It became increasingly
evident that the Center, although in control of local Communist parties, could not protect

them from random or mob violence. The result was a growing fear for personal security

143
them from random or mob violence. The result was a growing fear for personal security

among Russians, and an acceleration of their out-migration ﬁ'om the region.“

5.3.2 From Colonialism to Nee-colonialism: Negotiations over Power-
Sharing in the Region, 1989-1991

By the late 19805 the Center had abandoned its attempts to reimpose the colonial
status of ethnic Russians in the republics. This occurred because the "clean up" of party
ofﬁcials and the imperial policing of the region had backﬁred, resulting in an escalation of
anti-colonial and anti-Moscow sentiment in the region.

Purging party officials was by no means a substitute for the structural reforms
needed to alleviate the immense problems the region was facing. Rather, the ignorant and
heavy-handed anti-corruption and anti-religious campaigns only exasperated the situation
by threatening the stability of the region and increasing ethnic tensions. Consequently,
Gorbachev recalled the party cadres that had been sent to discipline the region.

Additionally, with the Soviet economy precipitously declining, there simply were
no economic resources available to sustain direct rule over the vastly overstretched

empire. And, ﬁnally, public pressure in Russia itself was mounting for political and

 

6‘ In the decade from 1979 to 1989, the net migration of ethnic Russians from
Kazakhstan decreased from +113,000 to -394,000; in Kyrgyzstan ﬁom 0 to -70,000; in
Uzbekistan +96,000 to -124,000; in Turkmenistan from +16,000 to -3 7,000; and in
Tajikistan from +28,000 to -37,000 (%Goskomstat SSSR l990%; %Makarova 1995%;
%Topilin 1992%). Although the breakdown of etlmic Russian migration by year is not
available, most of the outﬂow from the region is accounted for in the time period since
1 985.

144

The failure of Gorbachev's attempts to reign in the Central Asian republics had
shown that the Center could not rule the region without the cooperation of local elites. At
the same time, the demographic explosion, a deepening economic crisis, and a spreading
ecological decay in Central Asia made local elites keenly aware that they could not rule
without assistance from the Center. Thus, the extensive negotiations began between the
Center and the republics over the distribution of sovereignty.

In essence, attempts were made to return to the kind of order that existed under
Brezhnev's regime. This meant a provision of signiﬁcant autonomy to the local elites in
the ﬁelds of culture, education and cadre policy, while at the same time keeping all the
major political, and economic decisions in Moscow. In return for this autonomy, local
elites were to remain loyal to Moscow, and were to clamp down on any explicit anti-
regime nationalism.

For ethnic Russians, such changes in the Moscow-republics relationships meant
that the Center was ready to forego their collective rights in the national republics (which

was understood as the participation of ethnic Russians in control over local institutions).

 

most famous dissident, Nobelist, Alexander Solzhenytsin. In his essay Solzhenytsin
argued, "We have to make a hard choice: between the empire, which has been ruining
primarily us - and the spiritual and bodily salvation of our <Russian> people....To maintain
a great empire means to bring about extinction of our own people (Solzhenytsin, l990c).

Furthermore, in his essay, Solzhenytsin argued that Russia should break from the
Central Asian republics even if the Central Asian republics did not want independence:
"we will straighten up even more without the crushing burden of our Central Asian
underbelly, so thoughtlessly conquered by Alexander H" (Solzhenitsyn, l990c). For the
majority of people in Russia, Solzhenytsin's position was accepted as a matter of common
sense (Quinn-Judge, 1990; Shlapentokh, 1993b). One can only imagine what went
through the minds of ethnic Russians in Central Asia when they were reading
Solzhenitsyn's article and following the debates on this question in the Russian mass
media...

145
Yet, as stated earlier, the loyalty of the local regimes to Moscow meant that the individual,
political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights of Russians would be preserved and
protected by the Soviet state.

However, even if Gorbachev wanted to return to the pre-perestroika order of
things, by the late 19805, it was too late. First of all, the Center's economic
disengagement from the region (which went hand in hand with the decline of the
centralized economic institutions of the Soviet state) proved to be a professional disaster
for the majority of ethnic Russians in the region. Ethnic Russians in the region served
primarily in the economic, transportation and communication infrastructure that connected
the region with the hinterland of the empire. The collapse of the uniﬁed economic system
eroded the Russians' economic base in Central Asia. Furthermore, unlike in the Baltics
and Ukraine, in Central Asia there were few alternative possibilities for employment.

Secondly, the "New Deal" negotiated by Gorbachev with the indigenous elites
resulted in the increasing political marginalization of Russians. This occurred because
Gorbachev recalled the cadres which had originally been sent to Central Asia to discipline
the region. With the departure of the Kremlin's henchmen, the struggle for the vacated
leadership positions in the region intensiﬁed.

Escalation of the intra-elite's struggle for power led to the "nativization" of politics
in the region. The new ascending leadership, in order to acquire legitimacy and mobilize
supporters, began to champion the rights of the indigenous nationalities and appeal to
local sentiments.

Thus, following the example of other republics, all the Central Asian republics

passed laws on sovereignty and indigenous languages. Despite the fact that language

146
legislation in the region represented a relatively watered-down version of similar laws
passed in the Baltics, their passage left Russians extremely irritated, angry and
uncomfortable. This was due to Russian perceptions of inferiority of the indigenous
cultures and languages vis-a-vis Russian language and culture.

Besides generating pressure of nativization, the struggle for vacated leadership
positions also led to the increasing exclusion of Russians ﬁ'om positions of power in the
region. This was due to the fact that the struggle for power among the contending elite
factions proceeded through a mobilization of support along ethnic, kinship and/or regional
lines. Once the new bosses were in place, they did everything possible to provide lucrative
and important jobs for "their people," e. g., relatives, clansmen or countrymen. Russians,
as aliens, were, of course, not among them.

Finally, the combination of effects produced by (a) Moscow's decimation of the
elites, (b) economic disengagement of the Center ﬁ'om the region, and (c) the deepening
economic crisis in the region, resulted in a weakening of republican and local governments
in their ability to govern and keep public order. Power, (especially in rural areas of the
republics), was exercised through closely connected kin and tribal networks of personal
trust, patronage and clientele. Soviets fought ﬁercely to eliminate "tribalism" and
"clannishness" in the republics, although, without much success. The crushing of the
Central Asian elites disrupted these informal networks of authority and power. As a
result, pressure from a deepening economic crisis, overpopulation, and a shortage of land,

water, and jobs, erupted into a series of violent inter-ethnic clashes and bloody pogroms

147
that shook the region.‘57

However, unlike in the Baltics or Moldova, neither the process of nativization of
the region, nor ethnic clashes led to the consolidation of anti-Russian and anti-colonial
political movements. The communal violence in Central Asia occurred primarily among
ethnic groups struggling for scarce agricultural resources, such as land, jobs, housing, and
access to water. Since more than 95% of ethnic Russians lived in cities and were
employed in industry, they were not in competition with the indigenous groups for
agricultural resources.

Similarly, the indigenous elites in region, despite their internal divisions and ﬁerce
struggles for power, also shied away from anti-Center, anti-colonial and/or anti—Russian
activities. Neither the emerging, yet weak, liberal-democratic opposition, nor the ruling
elites advocated secession of the Central Asian republics from the USSR. The liberal
intelligentsia in the region viewed the Center as the only guarantee that the Gorbachev-
initiated reforms would proceed in the republics. The communist elite considered an

alliance with the Center as a guarantee to keep Islamic activists and the liberal

 

"7 On June 17, 1989, in the F ergana region, Uzbekistan Uzbeks began pogroms against
the Meshetin Turks. More than 100 people were killed. A curfew was imposed in the
region. More than 10,000 ethnic Russians ﬂed the Fergana region for Russia.

On June 3, 1989, the Kazakhs' revolt against the Caucasian minority broke out in
Novi-Uzen, Kazakhstan.

In February 1990, pogroms and mass disorders in Dushambe, with Tajiks against
the Armenian minority, resulted in 15 deaths and hundreds wounded. A mass exodus of
Russians from Tajikistan began.

On June 4, 1990, inter-ethnic conﬂict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Osh
region left 186 dead and 1,202 wounded. A state emergency was imposed in the capital of
Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) and in Andijan, on the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border.

On July 13th and 14th, 1990, Taj iks and Kyrgyz clashed in the Isfar region of
Tajikistan, and a curfew was imposed.

148
intelligentsia under control. Therefore, nativization in region remained conﬁned to
expressions of "symbolic nationalism." Ethnic sentiments and concerns were used
primarily to legitimize the consolidation of power by the regimes, and did not have either
an anti-colonial, or anti-Russian character.

Despite an evolving consensus on power-sharing between the Center and the
indigenous elites, the negotiations failed to return the order of things to that of the
Brezlmev years. The Center's decline and its withdrawal from this region, led to the rapid
erosion of the social, political and economic base of the Russian colonial strata. At the
same time, negotiation between the Center and the republics, although precluding the
formation of anti-colonial and anti-Russian political movements, failed to provide for the
personal security and safety of local Russians.

As a result of these changes, ethnic Russians in the region found themselves in a
social and psychological limbo. Although Russians weren't publicly attacked, there was
increased hostility towards them as the competition for scarce resources in the region
escalated. Open and blatant discrimination was rare, but Russians were not even asked
their opinion when decisions and important appointments were being made. Work in
factories was disrupted and stoppages were more and more common. However, locals
seemed to care little about this since their livelihood did not depend on shipments to and
from the hinterland.

As the news and rumors of ethnic conﬂicts, and atrocities in the region spread, it
became apparent that living in the republics had become very dangerous. However,
Russians felt at a loss in understanding the "savage minds" of the locals, especially since

Russians lived isolated from the local population and only 1 to 3% of Russians could

149

speak the local languages.

The changes humiliated and frightened etlmic Russians. They deeply resented
being forced to adapt to the new, alien, unwanted and, rapidly worsening conditions.
However, there were few, if any, alternatives for etlmic Russians. The possibilities of
returning to Russia were very limited. Only younger, ethnic Russians with higher
education, skills, and connections, could get housing and jobs in Russian cities that were
overcrowded and stricken by economic crisis. Russians of older generations had neither
the energy, nor the resources to relocate; nor were there places to go to in Russia.

Secondly, to ethnic Russians it was unclear to whom they should direct their social
protest. They did not have a clearly deﬁned political opponent in Central Asia, nor an
ideology to ﬁght against. As mentioned earlier, there were no anti-colonial or anti-
Russian movements in Central Asia. Unlike in the Baltics, there was no political
opposition to the Communist regime either. Therefore, the Russian protest against
developments in the region was not articulated in either political or ideological terms, but
rather, in moral terms. What was happening in the republics was perceived by Russians as
immoral, illegal, unjust, unfair, oppressive, restrictive, alien and illegitimate. Their
consciousness was increasingly dominated by nihilism and catastrophic images. Russians
perceived their own decline as the end of society and of history itself.

Psychologically and socially, Russians found themselves in the situation of
"captives." As their colonial economic and political base eroded, they simultaneously
feared becoming victims of harassment and random mob violence, yet felt trapped in the
region. As a result of their growing maladjustment, discomfort, vulnerability, and

insecurity, all those who could leave the region packed their bags and left. In just the last

150
two years of the USSR's existence (1990-91), close to 300,000 ethnic Russians left the
Central Asian region for Russia (Makarova, 1995). The rest lived in apprehension and
waited for the outcome of the struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin which was taking

place in Moscow.

5.4 The Ukraine: Ethnic Transformation Through the Reform/Abolition of

Ethnic Hierarchy

Ethnic transformation in the Ukraine proceeded through attempts to renegotiate
the Center-republic relationship, as well as efforts to abolish ethnic hierarchy. In other
words, national and democratic protests in the Ukraine coincided. In terms of the mode of
etlmic structure transformation, the Ukraine occupies a middle position between Central
Asia and the Baltics (Fig 15).

In comparison with the Baltics, anti-Center protests and demands for reform in the
Ukraine did not go as far as in the Baltics. In the Baltics, the National Fronts wanted (a)
secession from the USSR, (b) rapid privatization and the introduction of market
relationships, and (c) integration with Western Europe.

The Ukraine, in comparison, sought not to secede, but to renegotiate the
relationship between Moscow and the republic. There was and remains strong sentiment
for the preservation of a close relationship between the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine in all major spheres of life. Moreover, unlike in the Baltics, the pressures to
reorient the Ukrainian economy, polity, and culture to Western Europe remained relatively
weak. Therefore, the Ukrainian demands for reform were focused primarily on attaining

more sovereignty and power, vis-a-vis the Center, to determine its own economic, social

151
and cultural policies.

These policies were intended to beneﬁt, ﬁrst and foremost, the entire population of
the Ukraine (both indigenous and non-indigenous groups), and not just the interests of the
centralized ministries and planners in Moscow. At the same time, the Ukraine, unlike the
Baltics, was, and remains, much more cautious with regard to the extent of political,
economic and social reforms they'd consider. The majority of the Ukrainian population
(ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians) remain conservative and deeply attached to Soviet
era values and state paternalism.

There were also signiﬁcant differences, in the character of etlmic transformation,
between the Ukraine and Central Asia. The elite negotiations in the Ukraine, like those in
Central Asia, represented a signiﬁcant element of transition, which was, by far, more
important than those in the Baltics. However, in the Ukraine, unlike in Central Asia,
ethnic transformation was not limited to elite negotiation. It was also driven by the impact
of two mass-based movements, both of which were in opposition to the Communist
regime: The Movement of Ukrainian People for Perestroika (Ukr. Rukh) and the
organized labor movement of Ukrainian miners.

Despite the rise of a mass, national movement in the Ukraine, the Rukh did not go
so far as calling for the creation of an ethnically-based state to protect Ukrainian ethnos
from demographic and cultural assimilation into the Russian nation. Why did naﬁonal
protest in the Ukraine remain democratic in character and not escalate into demands for
the ethnic hegemony of Ukrainians? The character of the national protest, to a large
degree, was determined by the interaction of two factors: (a) deep regional divisions

within the Ukrainian community (between the western and eastern parts of the Ukraine,

152
and between Crimea and the Ukraine) and (b) a high degree of inter-ethnic assimilation of
Ukrainians and Russians.

Western Ukraine, in terms of its culture, identity, and economic traditions, belongs
to Central Europe. Therefore, Western Ukrainians are much more nationalistic, anti-
communist, anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow. In contrast, the eastern part of the Ukraine
belonged for centuries to the Russian empire. The national consciousness of Ukrainians in
this region of the republic is much weaker. The populace is more Russiﬁed, conservative,
and deeply attached to Soviet style paternalism and collectivist values.

Because of the regional differences and the high degree of Russiﬁcation of Eastern
Ukrainians, boundaries between ethnic groups (deﬁned by common ancestry) do not
coincide with Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and cultural divisions in society. Thus, among
Eastern Ukrainians, the use of the Russian language among families, and in work and
education, is widespread, and they identify more strongly with the Russian than the
Ukrainian culture.68 For them, the distinction between etlmic Russians and ethnic
Ukrainians is not linguistic and/or cultural, but legal, political and administrative.

Because the Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and cultural divide runs through the
Ukrainian community itself, any assertion of Ukrainian nationalism or forceful attempts to
"Ukrainize" the population, is likely to generate resentment, protest and backlash. This
would not only be likely among ethnic Russians, but also among Russiﬁed Ukrainians.

This situation moderates demands for Ukrainian ethnic hegemony. Nevertheless, this does

 

‘8 For example, in 1979 about 34% of Ukrainians in most Russiﬁed Eastern Ukrainian
regions (Donetsk and Lugansk) reported Russian as their mother tongue (Kuzio and
Wilson, 1994, p.197).

153
not mean that there are no Russian/Ukrainian ethnic tensions in the republic. Rather,
ethnic discord was subsumed and expressed in the form of regional tensions and conﬂict.
Two "fault lines" were most pronounced in this regard: the tensions between the western
and eastern regions of the republic, and the conﬂict between the Crimean peninsula and
Ukraine proper.

Depending on the character of regional tensions, two stages in the ethnic
transformation in the Ukraine can be discerned. The ﬁrst stage is dominated by the
Ukraine's struggle against Moscow's "internal colonialism." It began in 1985, and ended
with two events: the creation of the Rukh, and the launching of massive miners' strikes in
the republic. The fact that the nationaLdemocratic movement was based in Western
Ukraine and the workers' movement emerged in Eastern Ukraine, indicates the unraveling
of regional differentiation in the republic.

The second period (1989-December 1991) can be called a period of "national
romanticism." During this stage all major political forces in the republic, including the
independent miners' labor unions, formed an alliance in opposition to the All-Union
Center. This alliance transcended ethnic differences in the republic and carried the

Ukraine to independence in December, 1991.

5.4.1 National Protest as a Struggle against Moscow's "Internal
Colonialism":l98S-l989
The major catalyst in the formation of anti-Communist and anti-Center opposition
in the Ukraine was the 1986 ecological catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

The lies and disinformation about the accident that were communicated to the populace by

154
party officials, and the selﬁshness and incompetence of the regime in Kiev, as well as that
of Moscow, in dealing with the crisis, enraged the Ukrainian public. The events in
Chernobyl resulted in an opening up of the public sphere in the Ukraine, thus allowing for
dissemination of information about the disastrous ecological situation in the republic.

Media reports and public opinion attributed the situation to the mindless
industrialization policies of the Center, and the complete disregard for the consequences of
industrial development, both to the environment and the population's health. The
resentment generated by a publicity campaign which accused Moscow of treating the
Ukraine as a colony was shared by the indigenous population and the Russians.

However, the fermenting discontent over Moscow's rule was articulated differently
in different regions of the Ukraine. In the western part of the Ukraine the dynamics of
popular mobilization closely followed the Baltic pattern. Liberalization, coupled with the
protests generated by Chemobyl's ecological disaster, led to the formation of an initially
weak, national-democratic opposition to Moscow's colonial rule in the Ukraine. Although
the Baltics articulation of national protest (by informal opposition groups) soon led to a
mass, grass roots mobilization, in the Ukraine, the national-democratic movement
remained weak and had little appeal beyond Western Ukraine.

Thus, the Rukh, created in 1989, and modeled after similar organizations in the
Baltics, was dominated by the Ukrainian intelligentsia from the western regions, especially

those from Galicia.69 The Rukh sought, ﬁrst of all, to promote democratization in the

 

"9 Thus, 85% of the delegates of the 1989 inaugural Rukh congress were ethnic
Ukrainians. Seventy-two percent of the delegates had higher education. About half of the
delegates were from Western Ukraine, even though Western Ukraine accounts for only
20% of the republic's population (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, p.111).

155
republic and to assure protection and development of the Ukrainian language and culture.
Like the National Fronts in the Baltics, the Rukh held the position that economic issues
would be resolved only when radical political changes were implemented.

However, the call for the revival of the Ukrainian language and culture did not
have any signiﬁcant appeal among Russiﬁed and Russian speaking Ukrainian workers in
the central and eastern parts of the Ukraine. Instead, in Eastern Ukraine, political
mobilization proceeded not along ethnic, but along class lines.

In Eastern Ukraine, Donbas region coal miners organized the ﬁrst major strike in
Soviet history in July, 1989 as well as the ﬁrst independent workers' trade union, which
was designated The Regional Union Strike Committee of the Donbas.7o Working
conditions in the coal mines of the Donbass were abysmal enough to constantly generate
sporadic worker protests. By late 1989, the miners' discontent over (a) the lack of safety
in the mines, (b) the almost total disregard for the health and living conditions of the
miners, and (c) the arrogance and incompetent leadership of the industry, led to numerous
strikes in the Donbass region.

The miners' agenda, unlike that of the Rukh, was limited to strictly economic
issues, e.g., better pay and working conditions, longer holidays, increased soap quotas,

priority in food supply and housing, etc. The miners protested against economic

 

7° A month later the Donbass Strike Committee became the Regional Union of
Donbass Strike Committees. In October, 1989, the Independent Workers Union was
created in Kharkiv. In November that same year, the constituent assembly of the Free
Trade Unions of the Ukraine was held in Donetsk. And ﬁnally, in February 1990,
attempts were made to launch the ﬁrst all-Ukrainian free trade union, the Iednist (Ukr.
Unity). For more on the Ukrainian miners, see Marples, 1991.

156
exploitation, the abuse of power by party officials, and wanted increased control over their
working conditions and proﬁts."

Although both the Rukh and the miners labor movement were anti-establishment,
there was little cooperation between, or coordination of, their activities. Miners were
distrustful of any political organization, especially those led by intellectuals, while the
Rukh leaders talked about workers in patronizing terms, referring to them as "Russiﬁed
Ukrainians."

The Rukh's attitude towards their brethren in the east and central Ukraine was
primarily one of highbrow contempt. The "Russiﬁed Ukrainians" had lost their "true
language and culture" making them, as far as the Rukh were concerned, "mutants" without
culture or identity. Yet, at the same time, the Rukh also considered "Eastern and Central"
Ukrainians to have been victims of the Czarist and Soviet policies of Russiﬁcation. Thus,
the most ardent nationalists in the Rukh considered it their "holy mission" to convert
Russiﬁed Ukrainians into "pure" Ukrainians. Needless to say, the workers deeply resented
such attitudes.72

Because of the regional character of Ukrainian nationalism, the Rukh was forced to
be very careful in its political activities so as not to alienate the Ukrainian population in the
eastern part of the country. Promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture by the Rukh

could not be pushed too far because it could easily provoke backlash, not only from ethnic

 

7' For more on the Ukrainian miners' organized labor movement, see Marples, 1991,
and Siegelbaum and Suny, 1994.

72 For more on the relationship between the miners and the Rukh leadership during the
early period of perestroika, see Solchanyk, 1992.

157
Russians, but also from the Russiﬁed Ukrainians. As a result, nationalization pressures on
ethnic Russians in the Ukraine were weak.

Thus, the Ukrainian language law, passed in 1989, was much less substantial in
comparison with the extensive language regulations developed in the Baltics. Although
the law promoted Ukrainian as the state language, it also guaranteed the free use of the
Russian language in "interrelations between republican and local state, party and public
bodies, enterprises, establishments..." In areas where there were large Russian minorities
(Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), Russian was permitted as a language of official
correspondence, alongside Ukrainian, and was also the language of instruction in schools.
Additionally, Russian was recognized as the official language of Crimea.

Besides deep regional divisions, the weakness of Ukrainian nationalism is also
attributable to the role of the Communist party of the Ukraine. In the Baltics the
mobilization of etlmic Russians occurred when the republican Communist parties
collapsed. The defection of national communists from the Communist parties, and their
coalition with pro-reform intellectuals in opposition to the Center, had ended, defacto, the
control of the Center over the republics. The Center could only regain control over the
region if it was willing to use military force.

Nothing of this sort had ever happened in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Communist
party had been in ﬁrm control over the republic until it was outlawed following the
collapse of the August, 1991, putsch in Moscow. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Communist
party, almost until the end, remained loyal to the Center. A number of reasons may be
suggested for this. First, the Ukrainian Communist party was not as strongly divided

along ethnic lines as was the Communist parties in the Baltics. In part, this was because

158
the Ukrainian party elite was recruited primarily from the heavily Russiﬁed eastern and
central regions of the republic. However, even more important was the fact that the
members of the highest Ukrainian Communist party echelon had always enjoyed Union-
wide mobility and careers.

In comparison, the party nomenclature in the Baltic states were denied promotions
beyond the borders of the republics. Consequently, there was much less incentive or
interest for the Ukrainian party bosses to sever links with Moscow as the Lithuanian
Communist party had done. Finally, the Communist party in the Ukraine, unlike that in
the Baltics, enjoyed widespread grass roots support, especially in the small towns and
rural areas of the republic.

Ukrainians are much more conservative in their views than Balts, and remain
deeply attachment to Soviet state paternalism and welfare values. Thus, in the 1990
republican elections, two-thirds of the seats in the republican parliament were won by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) candidates. With the pro-Soviet
Communist party in control, the Russians' position in the republics remained secure.
Being in ﬁrm control over the republic, the Ukrainian Communists had little incentive to
support ethnic Russians, or, for that matter, any other oppositional organization. Instead,
they preferred to keep the power for themselves.

Finally, the social structure in the Ukraine did not favor the kind of ethnic
mobilization that had occurred in the Baltics, and to some degree, in Moldova. The Baltic
working class was primarily recently immigrated ethnic Russians. Therefore, when the
process of sovereiginization of the republics started, the threats of nativization and factory

closure reinforced each other, that is, the ethnic and class interests of Russians coincided.

1 59

In the Ukraine, again unlike in the Baltics, the intersection of class and etlmic
stratiﬁcation was and is much more complicated. The major social divisions within the
republic did not simply follow ethnic (e.g Ukrainians-Russians) lines, but also ran through
the Ukrainian community itself. The cultural division of labor among Russians and
Ukrainians was very weak. Furthermore, Russian migrants in the Ukraine were joining the
Russian community that has deep historic roots in the Ukraine, rather than merely being
settlers in a hostile community as in the Baltics and Moldova (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).

In sum, national protest during the initial period of reforms reﬂected the speciﬁc
character of the Ukrainian social structure. Even though ethnic Ukrainians and Russians
actively participated in movements that were in opposition to the Center, the emerging
opposition in the Ukraine remained regionally and ethnically divided. National protests
were conﬁned to the western part of the Ukraine. Demands for economic reform were
limited to the Russiﬁed Eastern Ukraine. Because of regional divisions, leaders of the
Rukh worked very hard not to alienate Eastern Ukrainians and members of other ethnic
minorities. Consequently, national protest remained weak and was couched in terms of a

demand for political reform and democratization of the country.

5.4.2 The Rise of National Romanticism in the Ukraine: 1989-1991

The period of national romanticism in the Ukraine starts in the late 19805, and is
marked by a rapid merging and consolidation of the three major political forces in
Opposition to the Center: the Ukrainian National Movement Rukh, the Ukrainian national-

comrnunists, and the miners labor unions. This stage is referred to as a period of national

160
romanticism, because it is dominated by a high degree of national consensus in the
Ukraine, which transcended ethnic differences and is characterized by high emotions and
idealism, especially in regard to widespread beliefs that independence would almost
automatically bring economic prosperity, civic harmony and political freedoms to the
Ukraine. The stage of national romanticism ends with the December, 1991, referendum in
which more than 90% of the republic's population voted for the Ukraine's independence.

The merging and consolidation of the major political forces in the Ukraine was
determined by two sets of factors. First, it was stimulated by the rapid decline of the
Soviet economy and erosion of the Center's power and authority. By early 1990, among
all sectors of the population in the Ukraine, the perception became widespread that

the USSR was disintegrating as a socio-economic and political formation.

The centralized bureaucratic system...was seen as a brake on economic and

social development and modernization. Moscow had nothing to offer - it

was neither a source of technological know-how, nor an international

ﬁnancial center. It was merely an apparatus of repression and control

(Krwachenko, 1993, p.84).

Sensing the paralysis of the Center, the Rukh proclaimed, in its second congress,
that its goal was the "restoration of Ukraine's independence.” By early 1991, the miners
were also becoming increasingly radicalized. The worsening economic situation in the
coal industry and Gorbachev's failure to keep promises he'd made to the miners in 1989,
resulted in a second massive wave of strikes. Furthermore, unlike in 1989, the miners' not

only had economic demands on their agenda, but political demands as well,

e. g.,resignation of Gorbachev, and the dissolution of the all-Union Congress of People's

 

’3 The Rukh leaders were referring to the brief existence of the independent Ukrainian
People's Republic that was created in 1917, and abolished with the Bolshevik invasion in
early 1918.

161
Deputies. Such demands of the miners reﬂected a complete loss of faith in the Communist
party and in Gorbachev himself.

Finally, perceptions that the USSR was going under were also becoming
widespread among the Ukrainian Communist elite. The weakness of the Center became
especially evident after the miserable failure of the military clamp down in Lithuania and
Latvia in January, 1991. As a result, the consolidation of the National-Communist faction
within the Ukrainian Communist party began. In part the drift towards National-
Communism and the promotion of the Ukraine's sovereignty represented a strategy of self-
preservation and survival by the Communist elite. Heralding the cause of the Ukrainian
people constituted an attempt by the Communist elite to secure their positions of power in
the republic. In part, sovereiginization was used by the National-Communist faction
within the Communist party as a crisis-management strategy under conditions in which the
economy was collapsing and the Center was suffering political paralysis.

A second set of factors accounting for the consolidation of major political forces in
the republic were the moderate and ﬂexible politics of the elite leadership which sought
cooperation and peaceful conﬂict resolution. Characteristically, neither leaders of the
Rukh, nor the National Communists chose to fan nationalist ideology by demoting non-
Ukrainians to denigrated minorities. There were no calls to curtail Russian migration to
the republic. Instead, liberal nationality policies were promoted emphasizing the civic
character of opposition to the imperial Center, and the goals of economic prosperity and
democracy that the entire population of the republic held in common.

The alliance that led the Ukraine towards independence was headed by Leonid

Kravchiuk, the former ideology secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party. Kravchiuk

162
created his agenda by skillfully combining the goals and demands made by the Rukh, as
well as those made by striking miners. The result was a position which championed the
Ukraine's political independence from the old bureaucratic and repressive Center, that
carefully down-played ethnic differences. Thus, the National-Communists and the Rukh
both claimed to be seeking the Ukraine's independence for the purpose of creating a civil
society where the rights of all ethnic groups would be respected and protected. It was
emphasized, again and again, that their struggle was political (against the bureaucratic,
repressive Center symbolized by the now, widely hated Gorbachev), i.e. against the
political Oppression and economic exploitation of the Center, and not anti-Russian, nor
pro-Ukrainian.

Flexible and liberal nationality policies were very important in securing Russian
support for independence. However, more crucial in securing Russian pro-independence
vote were promises made by the reformed National—Communists, as well as by the Rukh,
to make the Ukraine into a "second" France. The ofﬁcial mass media, as well as the Rukh
in its publications, rallies, and demonstrations, were widely claiming that an independent
Ukraine had the potential to quickly perform an "economic miracle" and become
comparable to France in its economic prosperity.

A skillful campaign launched by the coalition of the National-Communists, and the
Rukh, and supported by the striking miners, had widespread support among the Ukrainians
and Russians alike. After the collapse of the August, 1991 putsch in Moscow, it was this
coalition that led the republic to the referendum on independence in which over 90% of

the population voted for an independent Ukraine.

163

Thus, unlike any other national republic of the USSR, the majority of ethnic
Russians' supported the Ukraine's independence. Consider the voting statistics in the two
most Russiﬁed and industrialized areas in the Ukraine, Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts.
About 45% of population in this area was ethnic Russian. In the December 1, 1991
referendum, 84% of votes in these two oblasts voted for the Ukraine's independence
(turnout was approximately 81%). This means that about 45-50% of Russians voted for
an independent Ukraine (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).”

The Russians did not perceive Ukrainian independence as threatening to their
status. Ethnic transformation, if it were to be carried out, would be accomplished through
the reform and abolition of the ethnic hierarchy. Russians were guaranteed equal
treatment, as this was embodied by the laws of sovereignty and citizenship, as well as the
protection of their cultural rights as written in the law on language.

At the same time, Russians supported the Ukraine's independence ﬁrst of all for
economic, and to some degree, political reasons (as a protest against the bureaucratic,
repressive Center symbolized by the generally despised Gorbachev). Within the Russian
community, as well as among Ukrainians in the eastern part of the Ukraine, there was no
deep commitment to the cause of independence. Unlike in the Ukraine's western region,
in the eastern part there was little idealism, or readiness to bear sacriﬁces for the cause of
the new state. Therefore, Eastern Ukraine's commitment to independence would decline
as soon as the euphoria over independence evaporated and the expectations of economic

prosperity were dashed by the ever-worsening economic situation. This would lead to the

 

7‘ In some sources it is claimed that as many as 70% of Russians voted for Ukrainian
independence (See Kolstoe, 1995, for a discussion on this matter).

164
strengthening of a pro-Russian mood in the country, and the rise of regional, and in some

areas ethnic, tensions.

6. COLLAPSE OF THE USSR AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW ETHNIC
ORDER IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of the former
Soviet republics, the mode of conﬂict resolution within the triadic relationships began to
change once again. Whether or not the shift to the new mode of conﬂict resolution
occurred dependended on three factors: (a) the degree to which the status of ethnic
Russians was institutionalized in the form of laws and agreements during the perestroika
years; (b) the negotiations over which type of ethno-political system would replace the
previous system, and (c) on the policies of the Russian Federation towards the Russian
diaspora and the successor states.

Negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians went furthest in
Lithuania and Ukraine. In 1990 Lithuania passed a citizenship law based on the "zero
option," granting citizenship to all its residents. In the Ukraine, similarly, extensive
legislation was enacted regulating inter-ethnic relationships. Laws on state language
passed in the Ukraine in late 1990, guaranteed the use of Russian in all areas where
Russians constituted a majority of the population. Furthermore, in order to calm fears of
Ukrainization, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet extended signiﬁcant powers to local
authorities, and established the autonomous republic of Crimea within the Ukrainian
republics. As a result of agreements, ethnic tensions in Lithuania declined. Similarly,
ethnic tensions in the Ukraine also decreased. In both countries access to power,
resources, and status among ethnic groups was increasingly regulated through the

competition and cooperation mode of conﬂict resolution.

165

166

Negotiations over the status of ethnic Russians were also under way in Latvia and
Estonia. However, unlike in Lithuania or the Ukraine, negotiations did not reach the stage
of legislative proposals or laws. The collapse of the imperial Center had signiﬁcantly
changed the power balance and dynamics of the triadic relationships within these two
countries.

In Central Asia, negotiations and bargaining during late perestroika period
produced attempts to reconstitute the "old ethnic order" that existed during the Brezhnev
era. However, the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent independence of the Central
Asian republics led to a dissolution of the ethnic order characteristic of the period of
"mature socialism." Therefore, negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic
Russians in the region began anew.

The policies of the Russian Federation also continued to profoundly shape the
process of consolidation of the new ethnic orders in the successor states. Since
December, 1991, up until the November, 1993, elections to the new Russian Duma, the
foreign policies of the Russian Federation were almost exclusively devoted to relationships
with Western countries and the US, while isolationism was characteristic of policies
directed towards the near abroad.

By late 1993, Moscow began increasingly to assert its interests throughout the
geopolitical area of the former USSR. In part this occurred because exclusively pro-
Westem policies had failed. Radical economic reform in Russia had resulted in the
pauperization of broad masses of people and the sweeping criminalization of Russian
society. Promises by Western countries to provide extensive ﬁnancial, technical and

technological assistance never materialized. This led to a consolidation of nationalist and

167
communist opposition in the Duma which chose the issue of the Russian minorities as one
of the rallying points in its struggle against Yeltsin's regime.

The isolationist stance towards the former Soviet republics was also abandoned
because Russia could no longer ignore its vital political, economic and military interests in
these regions. Russian troops and military bases were scattered throughout these
territories. The political stability of the new states bordering Russia was essential to
Russian strategic interests. Russia and the new states shared electricity, transportation,
and communication networks. The new national republics represented large markets for
Russian products, raw materials and energy. Finally, there was the issue of the 25 million
strong, Russian diaspora that no one in the Kremlin could ignore. By late 1993 return
migration of ethnic Russians from the countries of the near abroad had reached such
proportions that it had become a major political, economic and humanitarian problem in
Russia. However, the policies pursued by the Russian Federation varied substantially

across the new states.

6.] The Baltics' Independence and Ethnic Relationships: Towards "Ethnic

Democracy"

From the start of independence there was increasing differentiation in the ethnic
situation across the Baltic countries. The ethnic situation in Lithuania normalized, while in
Latvia and Estonia there were surges of indigenous ethnic nationalism leading to
increasing tensions and conﬂict. The differences in the ethnic situation among the Baltic
countries was, to a large degree, dependent on how far the negotiations and bargaining

over the status of Russians proceeded in the perestroika years.

168

In Lithuania the negotiations and bargaining largely ended with the acceptance of
the "zero" option in citizenship legislation. All the residents of the republic who'd applied
for the new Lithuanian passport were automatically granted citizenship. A majority of
ethnic Russians were able to participate in the process of privatization, as well as in local
and national elections.

Since it was small in size, the Russian community did not represent a threat to
Lithuanian ethnic dominance, therefore, extensive cultural rights were extended to them
(Lakis, 1995). Consequently, since restoration of independence, ethnic tensions in
Lithuania continued to decline. Surveys conducted by various institutions consistently ﬁnd
that the degree of social adjustment of Russians in Lithuania is signiﬁcantly higher than
that of Russians in the two other Baltic countries75 (Figure 16, 17 and 18).

Finally, the balance of political forces in Lithuania favored integration of the
Russians into Lithuanian society. The 1992 elections in Latvia and Estonia brought a
coalition of the Center-Right parties into power, a political party united in their opposition
to the inclusion of ethnic Russians into the politics.

In Lithuania, unlike in Latvia and Estonia, parliamentary elections resulted in a
stunning victory for the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), a former afﬁliate to the
Communist party of Lithuania. Ethnic Russians put their support solely behind the DLP.
The DLP projected itself as a party of national unity and adopted policies favorable to
ethnic minorities. Especially important to ethnic Russians was the DLP's orientation

towards developing economic and political relations with Russia (Clark, 1995).

 

7’ See, for example, Gorbachev-Fond, 1993; Kolstoe, 1993; Kolstoe, 1995; Norgaard
et al., 1996; Rose and Maley, 1994; Shalpentokh et al., 1994.

169

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Because legislation and the political situation were favorable to ethnic Russians,
ethnic tensions in Lithuania continued to decline. Arguably, the process of forming an
"integrated Russian minority" in Lithuania is under way. By 1993, 98% of the Russian
population in Lithuania became citizens of the Lithuanian state. Ethnic Russians are
increasingly adopting a political identity as citizens of the Lithuanian state, and, at the
same time, retaining their cultural identity as Russians (Kasatkina, 1995). Attempts to
politically marginalize ethnic Russians are unlikely since Lithuania has strong left-of-
Center parties, which are lacking in Estonia and Latvia.

In Latvia and Estonia the situation of ethnic Russians was very different. In these
two countries negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians was
unexpectedly curtailed by the August, 1991 putsch in Moscow. With the collapse of the
Center, negotiations, which had been moving towards a democratic solution to the ethnic
problems, ended prematurely. The result was an increasing "ethnization" of post-Soviet
Latvian and Estonian politics and attempts to exclude local Russians from participation in
polities.

A number of factors explain the turn towards ethnic nationalism in Latvia and
Estonia. The collapse of the Center had dramatically changed the power balance between
ethnic communities in the republics. Once the imperial Center collapsed, national
governments no longer needed local Russians as allies in their struggle for independence.

Secondly, ethnic nationalism in Latvia and Estonia was fueled by widespread fears
and doubts about the commitment of the Russian population to the cause of independence.
Because ethnic Russians constituted a signiﬁcant part of the population, they could control

the power balance in the republics through democratic means. This circumstance could

172
potentially lead to an elevation of the Russian language to the status of the official state
language, as well as to the promotion of policies to integrate with the Russian Federation.
There was some basis for these arguments.

Radical nationalists were quick to point out that, although about 30-3 5% of
Russian population voted for independence, about 70%, of ethnic Russians voted against
it, or did not vote at all. Moreover, a signiﬁcant proportion of Russians in the republics
supported the Interﬁonts and "imperia " structures in the republic.

Thirdly, ethnic nationalism was also fueled by the presence of the Soviet Army in
the region. It is estimated that in 1991, there were about 145,000 Russian troops in the
region (Schmidt, 1993). About 80,000 of these troops were stationed in Latvia and
50,000 troops were stationed in Estonia (Bohlen, 1994a). Any protest action of local
Russians, especially if it was supported by the Soviet Army, could easily destabilize the
situation in the republics.

F ourthly, nationalist parties in both republics used ethnic nationalism as a strategy
in competing for electoral votes. Xenophobia, populism, and the scapegoating of etlmic
minorities, and immigrants, are tactics to get votes that work well in all societies gripped
by deep political and economic crises. Therefore, calls for the elimination of Russian
competition in government employment and state run industries appealed to the
increasingly impoverished indigenous urban middle classes. Finally, the radical nationalists
were venting claims of "Latvia for Latvians" and "Estonia for Estonians" in high hopes
that this would encourage the majority of local Russians to voluntarily leave for the

Russian Federation.

173

The imposition of etlmic dominance by the indigenous nationalities proceeded with
attempts to institutionalize an "etlmic democracy" system in the republics. Ethnic
democracy, as it emerged in Latvia and Estonia, had three major features. Firstly, the core
nations, e.g.,Estonia and Latvia, were to have full control over the state institutions in the
republic. The indigenous nationalities' control of the state was to ensure the dominance of
the Latvian and Estonian culture and language in these countries.

Secondly, certain rights were enjoyed universally, independent of the ethnicity of
individuals. These were the freedom of speech and press, rights of assembly and
association, and an independent judiciary. Thirdly, certain collective rights were extended
to ethnic Russians (e.g., the right to be educated in Russian, guarantees of state support
for Russian schools, Russian media, and Russian culture, etc.).

The imposition of "ethnic democracy" in Latvia and Estonia proceeded with the
enactment of restrictive citizenship legislation. The parliaments of Latvia and Estonia
were claiming that citizenship in their countries should be restored in the same way their
independent statehood was restored. This meant that citizenship rights would only belong
to those who were citizens of pre-War Latvia and Estonia, and their descendants, while
the Soviet era would be treated as a period of occupation.

As a result of such legislature, all the individuals who had settled in Latvia and
Estonia during the Soviet era (including their children born in the occupied countries)
were relegated to the status of foreigners, immigrants, and/or aliens. Being non-citizens,
their rights to property ownership, social welfare, employment in the public sector
(including the police force, and the army), and participation in political activities, were

restricted. In addition, the new citizenship laws caused Soviet era settlers to be subject to

174
the procedures of naturalization, which many considered deeply offensive and
demeaning."5

By October, 1991, restrictive citizenship laws were already enacted in Latvia.
Under these laws only about 25% of ethnic Russians qualiﬁed for Latvian citizenship. For
the rest of the population procedures were established that included a residency
requirement of 16 years initiated from the moment the law was enacted, a Latvian
language proﬁciency test, and an oath of loyalty to the Latvian republic.

In addition, Latvian law on citizenship established quotas on naturalization that
amounted to approximately 0.01% of the republic's population a year. This meant that
only about 2,000 non-residents could became citizens of the Latvian republic each year.
Such a quota meant essentially permanent disenfranchisement for more than 600,000
ethnic Russians in that republic.

According to the new laws in Estonia barely one-sixth of the Russian population
qualiﬁed for citizenship. Despite the smaller proportion of ethnic Russians that
automatically qualiﬁed for citizenship, the new laws were less restrictive in Estonia than in
Latvia.

Laws in Estonia required only two years of residence, a waiting period of one year,
passing the Estonian language proﬁciency test, and an oath of loyalty to the Estonian
republic. Furthermore, the Estonian parliament passed legislature that provided non-

citizens with the right to participate in local elections. This was not the case in Latvia.

 

7" For a detailed description of the Citizenship Laws in Latvia and Estonia, see the
US. Department of State reports on human rights practices (U .S. Department of State,
1994a and 1994b).

175

That the citizenship laws in Estonia were more accommodating reﬂected the fact
that the Russian community in Estonia was much stronger and more organized than in
Latvia. In Narva, Kohtla-Jarva and Sillamae, three cities in the north-eastern region of the
republic, ethnic Russians constituted 65% to 90% of their populations, and used municipal
institutions for self-organization.

In addition, ethnic Russians in North East Estonia were playing a very important
role in the energy industry in the republic. Electric power plants located in North East
Estonia provided a signiﬁcant portion of the electric power produced in the republic.

The enacted laws on citizenship allowed the creation of "ethnically pure"
parliaments in both republics. There were no ethnic Russians elected to the Estonian
parliament in 1993, despite the fact that ethnic Russians constituted a third of the
republic's population. In Latvia, only 7 ethnic Russians were elected (out of a 100
member parliament) when the Russian population constituted close to half of the republic's
population.

The disenfranchisement of the ethnic Russian population resulted in a worsening of
the ethnic situation in the republics. Thus, according to a survey of ethnic Russians
conducted by the Gorbachev Foundation, by late 1992 the number of etlmic Russians in
Latvia who held negative opinions concerning the inter-ethnic relationships rose to 80%
(Gorbachev Foundation, 1993). This is more than three times the level registered by the
Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey conducted just a year earlier.

Another survey of ethnic Russians in Latvia, conducted by VTCIOM, in 1992,
showed that about 50% of respondents expected a mass exodus of Russians from the

republic; approximately 75% said the inter-ethnic relations had worsened; 72% felt they

176
had been transformed into "citizens of the second class." (Terechov, 1993).

As a reaction to disenfranchisement, small, but vocal organizations of etlmic
Russians in Latvia began to emerge, with the intention of protecting the rights of ethnic
Russians in the republic. Russian activists in the Baltics were arguing that their treatment,
as foreigners, migrants, and/or aliens was neither legal, nor ethically based. First of all,
they contended, they could not possibly be migrants, or aliens, because they'd moved to
Latvia and Estonia when these republics were not independent, but, rather, part of the
former USSR.

Second, the policies enacted also denied citizenship rights to those individuals of
non-indigenous ethnicity who were born in Latvia and Estonia. This meant that these
individuals, born and raised in Latvia and Estonia, were being penalized for crimes
committed by the Stalinist regime just because they happen to be of non-indigenous etlmic
origin.

Wide publicity in the Baltics and abroad directed an open letter, signed by nearly
98,000 Latvian Russians, to Russian President Yeltsin. In the letter, ethnic Russians
claimed that their human rights were being violated because they could not choose their
places of residence and, therefore, they could not acquire Latvian citizenship. The letter
stated that the Latvian Parliament had not solved citizenship problems and other human
rights issues in a democratic manner (Diena, June 31, 1993).

In Estonia, ethnic relations also took a turn for the worse. Thus, in April of 1992,
in a survey of ethnic Russians conducted by the EKE ARIKO, and the Institute of
Philosophy, Sociology and Law Academy of Sciences, indicated that 42% of ethnic

Russians were interested in leaving the republic for the Russian Federation, while 22%

177
said that they had already decided to leave (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993).
By Summer, 1993, ethnic tensions in Estonia had reached the point where they threatened
the political stability of the country.

In January, 1993, the Estonian parliament started to debate the drafting of the
"Law on Aliens" which would severely restrict the possibilities of Russians obtaining
Estonian citizenship. The drafted law created a furor among local Russians in North East
Estonia. In the predominantly Russian cities of Narva and Sillamae, attempts to restrict
their rights to citizenship where met with anti-government demonstrations. According to
reports in the local newspapers, 7,000 to 15,000 people took part in these demonstrations.

These demonstrations eventually led to the organization of referendums in June,
1993, on the question of autonomy in these two cities. Narva authorities reported that
approximately 53% of the town's population participated in the referendum, with 96% of
these supporting autonomy (RFE/RL Daily Report, July 23, 1993).

As ethnic tensions in the Baltics were increasing, the Russian Federation, as well as
international organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the Helsinki Watch on Human Rights, and the
United Nations (UN) began to put increasing pressure on the Estonian and Latvian
governments to modify their citizenship legislation.

The CSCE had established a permanent office in Estonia to monitor the minority
rights situation in the Baltics. The UN sent several missions to Latvia and Estonia to
investigate the human rights situation (RFE/RL Daily Report, February 12, 1992). The
CE made non-discriminatory citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia the precondition for

acceptance of these states into the CE. The Russian Federation was actively engaged in

178
making the issue of Russians minorities in Latvia and Estonia an international issue.
Additionally, Russia used economic pressure on the Baltics and threatened not to
withdraw Russian troops from the region until the discriminatory laws against their
Russian populations were repealed.77

As a result of the protests of local Russians, international pressure, and pressure
from the Russian Federation, citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia were signiﬁcantly
modiﬁed. In Estonia all Soviet era settlers (with the exception of former Soviet military
personnel) were eligible for citizenship, provided they passed the language proﬁciency test
and took an oath of loyalty to the Estonian republic.

In Latvia, the requirements for citizenship are more complicated and restrictive,
however, beginning with the year 2003, all individuals who moved to Latvia during the
Soviet era, will be eligible for citizenship, providing they pass a language proﬁciency test
and take an oath of loyalty to the Latvian republic.78 As a result of the changes to the
"ethnic democracy" systems in Latvia and Estonia, both countries began to gradually move

towards maj oritarian democracy.79

 

77 For more on the reactions of ethnic Russians to disenfranchisement in Estonia and
Latvia, and Russia's policy towards the Baltics, see Apine, 1994; Poklad, 1994; and
Usupovskii, 1995.

7" For a detailed description of the changes in Latvia and Estonia's Citizenship Laws,
see the US. Department of State reports on human rights practices (U .S. Department of
State 1995a and 1995b). For more on amendments to the Latvian Citizenship Law, see
the RFE/RL, Daily Report, July 25, 1994.

79 As of January 1996, about 20% of 436,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia have acquired
Estonian citizenship, about 20% more have acquired citizenship of the Russian Federation.
The rest, 60% of ethnic Russians in the republic are "apartides" (a legal term denoting
individuals without citizenship in any country) Levitskii, 1996. According to the Latvian
Foreign Ministry, by March 1994, 722,486 Russians were residing in the country, and

179

Despite recent positive political developments, the dismantling of the "ethnic
democracies" in Latvia and Estonia remains a conﬂict ridden and contradictive process.
First, Latvian and Estonian political systems continue to promote explicit ethnic (Latvian
and Estonian) domination even though a signiﬁcant share of the population in these
countries are non-indigenous. Almost half of the population in Latvia and about one third
in Estonia cannot be easily "pushed" into an ethnic enclave, because interactions between
ethnic groups run though all their major political, economic and social institutions. At the
same time, as the events in Narva demonstrated, policies of exclusion, if pushed too far,
can destabilize the situation in a republic, resulting in an international scandal, and the
isolation of the Baltics from the international community. This creates instability in an
ethnic situation, and, depending on a wide variety factors, can cause ethnic tensions to
ﬂare up.80

Secondly, the system of ethnic domination in Latvia and Estonia is unstable

because, even though the indigenous populations currently enjoy almost exclusive control

 

278,087 of them (3 8%) were citizens of the republic (RFE/RL, Daily Report, March 10,
1994).

8° Most recently this happened in Latvia when the extreme nationalist party, Union For
the Fatherland and Freedom, called for a referendum on alternative citizenship law that
would permanently disenfranchise the ethnic Russian population in the region. This call
for a referendum failed, but the Union For the Fatherland and Freedom was able to collect
126,595 signatures in favor of referendum, creating fear and resentment among the local
Russian population (OMRI Daily Digest, January 17, 1996 and February 19, 1996).

Similarly, in Estonia, the Russian community was put on alert when nationalists in

the Estonian parliament began to debate the addition of a clause, to local election
procedures, that would require candidates to pass an examination in Estonian, even if they
had not been educated in that language. Although the Estonian parliament failed to pass
the clause, the issue did not contribute to an increase in etlmic peace and tolerance in the
republic (Monitor, May 17, 1996).

1 80
of these states, this situation cannot be sustained interrninably. Enfranchisement of ethnic
Russians is opening a way for them to participate in politics. This is bound to change the
balance of political forces in these countries. The change in the citizenship laws in Estonia
has already allowed for election of ten deputies who are of Russian ethnicity, in the
Estonian parliament. These ethnic Russian deputies formed a small faction in the Estonian
parliament, that became a vocal lobby for the rights of aliens and non-citizens in the
republic.

The number of Russian representatives at all levels of government in Latvia and
Estonian will continue to grow. In addition, the Russians proved to be very competitive
vis-a—vis the indigenous population. There is an overwhelming presence of ethnic
Russians in the burgeoning private businesses in the republics. Some researchers estimate
that, in Latvia, close to 60% of new businessmen are ethnic Russians and Jews. For
Estonia there are no published data, but the process taking place in this republic is quite
similar to that in Latvia (Tishkov, 1994d).

Such active engagement of ethnic Russians in private business was, in part, caused
by the policies pursued by the governments of the republics. Having been excluded ﬁ'orn
politics, the civil service, administration, the police, and army, ethnic Russians were left,
primarily, to engage in private business as a means for pursuing social mobility. If Russian
accumulation of signiﬁcant economic power were to be accompanied by continuous
exclusion from political power, it could lead to serious conﬂicts and instability in the
republics.

Finally, whether the etlmic situation in Latvia and Estonia deteriorates, or whether

it continues to move towards civic peace and stability, largely depends on the response of

181
the indigenous elites to the changing balance of power in the republics. The most
dangerous turn of events might occur should the existing law-based ethnic domination
(which is presently in the process of being dismantled) be replaced by widespread practices
of informal exclusion and administrative harassment of ethnic Russians. Activists in the
Russian community are mostly concerned, not so much about their legal status or
citizenship, but about informal discrimination and administrative harassment (Annus,
1994a; Bai, 1996; Emeljanenko, 1996). Any attempts to submit ethnic Russians to
informal practices of discrimination, force them into an ethnic underclass, or exclude them
from sharing the beneﬁts of an improving economic situation, would be ﬁ'aught with
political instability.

On the positive side, in the Baltics, unlike in any other region of the former USSR,
Russians have strong incentives to adapt to the situation, and even to assimilate. This is
partly because a majority of them came to the region as economic migrants. Therefore,
their behavior is the rather typical behavior of an immigrant group. Even in the face of
discrimination, ethnic Russians chose to stay in the Baltics because (a) in the Baltics the
standard of living is higher than in Russia, (b) there are limited possibilities to return to the
Russian Federation, and (c) the economic reform in the region is more rapid and
successful than in other parts of the former Soviet Union.

According to the most recent survey of etlmic Russians, conducted by sociologists
from Tartu University in Estonia, about 94% of respondents decided to settle in the

republic for good and do not plan on returning to Russia81 (Levitskii, 1996). Russians and

 

3' For more on the current Russian situation in Estonia, see Grishaev, 1995 and
Raskazov, 1995.

182

their children are actively learning the titular languages of the republics and are quickly
adapting to the new situation to the extent necessary for their economic advancement.82

What is the future of etlmic relations in Latvia and Estonia? It is likely that the
policies of gradual enfranchisement currently being pursued by Estonia and Latvia, and the
ethnic Russian's competitiveness and willingness to integrate into the indigenous
communities, will lead to increasing social divisions within the ethnic Russian community.
No doubt, there will be continuous growth in the size of the ethnic Russian upper and
middle classes, which will lead to their increasing integration into the indigenous societies.
At the same time, a sizable Russian ethnic underclass will develop, consisting of those who
could not manage successfully to adapt to the radical ethno-political and economic
changes in the republics, and/or those who were excluded by cultural and language
barriers. The underclass will be formed from Russian blue-color workers with low skills
and limited education, who only recently migrated to the Baltics and were stranded there
by the collapse of the USSR. These individuals constitute a sizable portion of the local
Russians in Latvia and Estonia.

According to the 1989 census, about half of the local Russian population was born
in the Russian Federation (See Table 3). That the formation of an ethnic Russian

underclass is under way is suggested by the data on unemployment. Currently, up to 70%

 

‘2 By late 1993, about 5 years since the last census, the number of Russians who can
carry on conversation in the indigenous languages increased dramatically. According to a
survey carried out in the Baltics by researchers from the University of Strathclyde,
Scotland, the proportion of ethnic Russians who could carry on conversation in the
indigenous languages had increased, in Estonia from 15% to 38%, in Latvia from 22% to
63%, and in Lithuania from 37% to 70% (Rose and Maley, 1994, p.52). For more on the
linguistic adaptation of ethnic Russians in the Baltics, see D'jachkov and Krasuhin, 1993.

183
of the registered unemployed individuals in Latvia and Estonia are etlmic Russians. The
ethnic divisions within the Baltic societies will perpetuate the conditions necessary for the
formation of an ethnic Russian underclass. It is the disproportionate concentration of
ethnic Russians in the underclass that will continue to be the cause of social and ethnic

tensions in the Baltic states.

6.2 Moldova: Towards an Ethno-Territorial Federation

Direct intervention of the 14th Russian Army into the ethnic conﬂict in Moldova,
during the Summer of 1992, dramatically changed the dynamics of ethnic transformation
in the country. Russian troops established a defacto partitioning of Moldova, and
provided legitimacy to the formation of the Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic in
Moldova's Transnistria region. Since neither Moldova nor Dniester could manage to
impose its will on the other, a stalemate ensued. Moldova could not regain control over
Transnistria since the Russian Army was protecting it. The "Dniester Soviet Socialist
Republic" could not acquire international recognition either, since it was considered a part
of the independent republic of Moldova under international law.

Due to the stalemate, Moldova abandoned its course towards uniﬁcation with
Romania. Instead of attempting to convert Russians into an ethnic minority within the
Romanian state, intensive elite negotiations began over the political autonomy of the
ethnic enclave.

Why did the Moldovan side decide to start such negotiations? First, because

Russian military intervention had changed the power balance in the republics. From mid-

184
1992, the 14th Army and its commander, General Alexander Lebed, had taken control of
the situation in the country. Moldova came out of the conﬂict in Transnistria as a loser,
facing catastrophic consequences of the drive towards uniﬁcation: partitioned territory, a
bitterly divided society, a ruined economy, loss of markets for its agricultural products in
Russia, hundreds of people killed, and thousands of refugees.

Second, the negotiations were initiated because of the change in leadership of the
Moldovan state. The devastating failure of the drive towards uniﬁcation produced a split
in the ruling elites of the republic. Agrarians and former Communists in the Moldovan
parliament formed a broad coalition in opposition to the nationalist led government. In
1992, this coalition won the elections and formed a new government under the leadership
of the former collective farm director Andrei Shangeli.

Agrarians were, by far, more willing than Moldovan nationalists to share power
with the Russian community in the country. Unlike Moldovan intellectuals, Agrarians and
former communists weren't enthralled with the idea of Moldova's uniﬁcation with
Romania. For the powerful agricultural establishment in Moldova, uniﬁcation would mean
the loss of control over the country and subordination to functionaires in Romania.

Finally, the protracted ethnic war had led to the decline of popular mass
mobilization in the republic. As the economy in the country collapsed, people became
increasingly preoccupied with day-to-day survival, exhausted and tired of the violence and
uncertainty.

In order to consolidate the independent Moldovan state, and to preserve its
territorial integrity, the new government went all the way out to accommodate its ethnic

minorities' demands. This was accomplished, ﬁrst, by including members of the ethnic

1 85

minorities in a "national consensus" government."3 The new government also began
negotiations with ethnic minorities concerning the creation of two national-territorial units,
the Transdniester and Gagauz regions, within the Moldovan state. In July, 1994, after
nearly a year of negotiations with Gagauz leaders, a law was enacted that envisioned far-
reaching devolution of Moldovan power in the autonomous national-territory of Gagauz.“

A similar plan for territorial autonomy was proposed by the Chisinau to
Transdniester, but the Transdniester leaders rejected it as insufficient. Under pressure
from Moscow, the Moldovan government agreed to upgrade the status of the
Transdniester region from "autonomous region" to the that of "autonomous republic."
Under the newly drafted law, designed speciﬁcally for Transdniester, the region was to
remain an "integral part" of the Moldovan state. At the same time, the Transdniester
region will be entitled is to have its own basic law, legislative assembly, and regional

executive government.85

 

‘3 This "national consensus" government included 8 ethnic Russians (out of 37),
including 2 deputy prime ministers (Socor, 1992, p.9).

8" According to the new law, the Gagauz region will have its own legislative and
executive authorities, will use three official languages, Gagauz/Turkish, Russian and
Moldovan/Romanian, and will be entitled to secession from Moldova in the hypothetical
case of the later's reuniﬁcation with Romania. (Socor, 1994)

85 More speciﬁcally, these powers will cover practically all aspects of government
except foreign policy, defense, security, border control, citizenship, and currency, all of
which remain within the sphere of central authority. Transdniester residents will have the
right to perform military service in the region. The republic will have it's own symbols, to
be ﬂown or displayed alongside those of the Republic of Moldova. Transdniester will have
three official languages; Moldovan/Romanian, Ukrainian, and Russian. Transdniester will
organize elections and referendums in its territory and will enjoy the right of secession
from Moldova in the hypothetical case of Moldova's reuniﬁcation with Romania
(Anonymous, 1995).

186

Finally, understanding that Russia holds the keys to the territorial integrity and
economic survival of the Moldovan state, the new Moldovan government took a course
towards the political and economic reunion with the Russian Federation. In mid-1994,
Moldova joined the Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The
Moldovan leadership hoped that by providing extensive autonomy to its etlmic minorities,
and joining the CIS, Russia would withdraw its troops from the country, and put pressure
on Transnistria to accept the plan for autonomy and re-integrate into the Moldovan state.

However, despite the extensive steps made by Moldova in seeking an
accommodation, the Dniester leaders rejected out of hand the plans for regional
autonomy. They demanded from Chisinau nothing less then confederation of two equal
states in which each "state" would to have its own army, currency, and custom posts.

Why did Transnistria reject what the Gagauz minority considered an acceptable
autonomy? There are variety of reasons that explain the Dniester position. First, during
the years of confrontation, Dniester leaders were able to institute what amounts to an
authoritarian and para-military regime on its own territory. Having created their own
government, ministries, army, and other state institutions, Dniester leaders now have
vested interests in preserving the regime and no desire to share power with the Chisinau.
Therefore, Dniester greatly preferred either membership in the CIS, or the uniﬁcation of
the region with the Russian Federation, rather than the status of an autonomous republic
within the Moldovan state.86 Secondly, rejection of Moldova's offer was possible only

because the Dniester leadership was and is actively supported by the nationalist-

 

“ If this were to happen, then Transnistria would become a non-contiguous Russian
territorial unit similar to the Kalinningrad oblast.

187
communist opposition in the Duma. The Dniester issue had become a rallying point for
the anti-Yeltsin forces. Yeltsin's policies towards Transnistria are portrayed as a sellout of
Russian interests and land, and a betrayal of ethnic Russians in the face of violence and
ethnic oppression. Being supported by the Duma, which provides economic assistance
and political support, Dniester feels that it can dictate conditions to Moldova.

Thirdly, there are signiﬁcant ideological and political differences between the sides
engaged in the conﬂict. The Dniester leadership is desperately clinging to an already dead
Soviet ideology and are upbeat in their Stalinist-Russian chauvinist rhetoric. The Dniester
Soviet Socialist Republic proudly maintains Soviet era institutions and legislature in the
region, are keeping Lenin's monuments, the red ﬂags, and celebrate Soviet era holidays
with Soviet style parades. Although claiming to be defenders of human and national
rights, the Dniester regime outlawed the Latin alphabet in the territory and subjected the
local Moldovan population to outright discrimination. At the same time, in this mixture of
historical anachronism and open Russian chauvirrism, one can see the Dniester leadership's
genuine fear of the reforms that are already under way in Moldova. Privatization and
liberalization of the economy will certainly lead to the demise of the centralized factories
and enterprises, and with them, the collapse of the Dniester regime's basis of political
power.

Finally, the rejection of the Moldovan proposals is also motivated by the
experience of a violent and protracted ethnic conﬂict in which hundreds of people were
killed. There is deep distrust and suspicion of the Moldovan motives, and its commitment

to the plan for autonomy.

188

In the end, the resolution as to which of the two options of transforming the ethnic
structure will prevail (e. g., the national-territorial autonomy of the Russian community in
Transdnistria, or some sort of political affiliation with the Russian Federation) depends on
Russia's position. The Chisinau went all the way in attempting to resolve the conﬂict.
Moldova's plan for Transnistria's autonomy was endorsed by the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and by the Council of Europe. As such, the next move would
be up to Russia.

The Moldovan national consensus government policies are genuinely supported by
a majority of the population of all ethnic groups. In Moldova, as well as Transdnistria,
people are tired of the war. The Moldovan government has made signiﬁcant progress in
privatizing and stabilizing its economy. What currently worries people most are not
ethnic, but economic and social problems, such as the lack of jobs, economic insecurity,
and poverty. Economic problems are especially pressing in Transdniester, which is much
worse off, economically, than the rest of Moldova.

However, Moscow seems to be rather ambivalent with regard to the status of this
ethnic enclave. Although it is interested in maintaining the status quo which allows Russia
to play the role of arbiter in the conﬂict, thereby controlling the situation in the region, the
preferred solution for Moscow is to acquire the right to permanently station its troops on
Moldovan territory, or "to convert" its troops into a "peace keeping" contingent (Monitor,
June 6, 1996). Russia currently seeks a peacekeeping mandate for the former 14th
Russian Army as a rationale for keeping it in Moldova. However, attempts to
permanently station Russian military troops are unacceptable to the Moldovan

government. The presence of Russian troops on Moldova's territory threatens to

189
undermine the fragile "national consensus" government by providing an opportunity for
the re-emergence and consolidation of the nationalist opposition.

Moscow is also very reluctant to endorse the partitioning and independence of
Transnistria, because this would lead to increasing tensions within the CIS, as recognition
of an independent Transnistria would open a Pandora's box of border disputes among the
former Soviet republics. Secondly, open support of Transnistria's secession would lead
members of the CIS to accuse Russia of imperialism and hypocrisy. Transnistria is part of
the internationally recognized Moldovan state just as Chechnia is part of the sovereign and
independent Russian state, and against whom Moscow recently had unleashed a brutal
war. Finally, a claim to Transnitria would subject Russia to intensive international
criticism, and isolation, and jeopardize Western economic assistance. As for now,
Moscow continues to drag out any solution, preferring to play the role of arbiter and

mediator between two parts of the divided country.

6.3 Russians in Central Asia: Between State Patronage and

Consociationalism

Since independence and up until late 1993, events in the region evolved largely
under the inertia left over from the Soviet years. The Central Asian republics neither
wanted, nor struggled for independence. Consequently, after the collapse of the USSR, all
successor states in the region chose to maintain close relationships with the Russian
Federation. Seeking to maintain good relations with Moscow, the Central Asian regimes

provided all ethnic Russians in the region with the citizenship of their respective countries.

190

However, beyond the provision of civic and political rights that citizenship in the
new countries entailed, neither the new states nor Moscow had much interest in the actual
problems and difﬁculties ethnic Russians were facing in adapting to the new situation in
the region. Central Asian elites were preoccupied with power consolidation and inter-clan
rivalry, while other issues, such as economic reform and the situation of ethnic Russians,
were of little concern. The Russian Federation, similarly, up until late 1993, expressed
little concern in the plight of their ethnic kin in the region. Russia was in its "honeymoon"
period with the West. Moscow's foreign policy was almost exclusively devoted to its
relationships with the West, and the United States. Having launched radical political and
economic reforms in attempts to Westernize Russia, Yeltsin's government had little
interest in the former Muslim "underbelly" of the empire.

The marginality of the issues concerning the Russian diaspora resulted in
increasing insecurity and the perception of many ethnic Russians that there was little future
for them in the region. If, during the last years of perestroika, Russians were debating the
question "to leave or not to leave" the region, since independence, the question became
not "to leave or not to leave," but "when to leave."" Russia's direct control over the
region was over. Although being provided with citizenship, ethnic Russians were facing

the reality of becoming culturally and socially, alien minorities in poor and underdeveloped

 

‘7 According to a survey of ethnic Russians (N =8,500) conducted by the Russian
Academy of Sciences in the summer of 1992, the number of Russians wanting to leave the
region had reached, on average, about 60%. In Tajikistan, almost 100% of ethnic
Russians wanted to repatriate to the Russian Federation (Gorbachev Fond, 1993). This
meant that, in just one year (since the summer of 1991, when the Shlapentokh/Gudkov
survey was conducted), the number of ethnic Russians wanting to leave the region more
than tripled.

191
Muslim countries. Finally, there was continuous deterioration of the economic situation
with bleak prospects for its improvement. For Central Asian Russians, ﬁnding work in the
Russian Federation was becoming as prestigious as ﬁnding a job in Western Europe was
for Russians in the Russian Federation.

Besides increasing marginalization, the region was also characterized by the rapidly
evolving differentiation of the situations of ethnic Russians across the former Soviet
republics. For analytic purposes, the Central Asian countries can be divided into two
groups. The ﬁrst group constitutes the republics created by the Soviets in the territory of
the pre-revolutionary General-Governorship of Turkestan (e. g., Turkmenistan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan.) The second group includes the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, established on the pre-revolutionary Steppe region.

Since independence, regimes ethnocratic in character were consolidating in the
states constituting the ﬁrst group (Figure 15). Thus, Russians in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan were, to a much larger degree, excluded from access to power, resources,
and status, than Russians in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the "overlay" of
the clan and state structures in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was by far
stronger than that in the later two states. In comparison, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
there was a movement towards the creation of consociational political systems, in which
elites of the indigenous and Russian ethnic groups were negotiating and (to varying
degree) sharing control over the state.

Differences in the ethno-political developments between the two groups of the new
Central Asian states can, to a large degree, be explained by the interaction of ethno-

demographic, historic and cultural factors. First, in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

192
Uzbekistan, the size of Russian communities is much smaller (8-10%) than in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan (3 8% and 22% respectively). Because of the smaller size, the power and
inﬂuence of Russian communities on the development of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan is much weaker than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Second, in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, Russians face much stronger
pressures of nativization. The indigenous societies in these republics are more traditional,
and less Russiﬁed than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.88 This is because Turkestan
historically was settled by a sedentary population, which was earlier converted to Islam
and developed a ﬂourishing medieval Muslim civilization. In comparison, the population
of the former Steppe region remained nomadic up to the early 19305, and only later
converted to Islam. In addition, Russians started to colonize the Kyrgyz steppes about a
century earlier than the desserts of Turkistan. Because of strong regional, cultural, and
religious traditions, the Russiﬁcation of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was less
signiﬁcant and the inﬂuence of Islam much stronger, than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Because of (a) the relatively small size of Russian population, (b) the higher
pressures of nativization, and (c) a stronger overlap of clan and state structures, the
degree of insecurity and vulnerability of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan was much stronger than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According to the
Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey, the perceptions of differences in ways of life,

between the indigenous population and ethnic Russians, were almost twice as high in the

 

8" According to the 1989 census, the percent of indigenous nationalities knowing the
Russian language was 27% in Turkmenistan, 22% in Uzbekistan, and 30% in Tajikistan.
In comparison, these ﬁgures in Kazakhstan were 63%, and in Kyrgyzstan 37% (Anderson
and Silver, 1989).

l 93
republics located in the former Turkestan (3 0%), than in the pre-revolutionary Steppe
region (15%). Similarly, almost twice as many respondents (15%) in Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (7%), indicated that
ethnic Russians face discrimination and pogroms.

By mid-1993, negotiations over the status of ethnic Russians in the region
intensiﬁed. This transpired because the migration of Russians from Central Asia had
reached massive proportions. In just four years, 1990 to 1993, close to 1 million ethnic
Russians had left the region (Makarova, 1995). The intensifying repatriation was making
the issue of the Russian diaspora into a serious political, economic and social problem in
the region, as well as in the Russian Federation.

The Central Asian regimes were interested in curbing migration because etlmic
Russians constituted the most educated and skilled segment of their societies. Ethnic
Russians were running sectors of the economy that were essential for the functioning of a
modern state (e. g., industry, communications, transportation, and social (education, health
care) infrastructure.) The departure of the most qualiﬁed segment of the population was
already paralyzing large sectors of the republics' economies.89

The Russian Federation was also increasingly concerned with stabilizing the
Russian population in the region. Firstly, because being in the grip of a deep economic
crisis, Russia had neither the resources, nor political will, to accept and re-integrate
massive waves of immigrants in their historic homeland. Secondly, by late 1993, the issue

of the Russian diaspora was becoming a "hot button" issue in Russian politics. In part this

 

'9 For more on the devastating consequences of the exodus of Russian specialists in
Central Asia, see Pulatov, 1990; and Tishkov, 1995.

194
occurred because of the consolidation of the Nationalist-Communist opposition in the
Duma. The Nationalists and Communists were the ﬁrst to actively exploit the issue of the
Russian minorities in their political struggle against Yeltsin's government. Most effective
in this respect was Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the so-called Liberal Democratic
Party (Bohlen, 1994; Shlapentokh, 1994). Yeltsin was forced to respond to the criticisms
and accusations of the nationalists, and pursue pro-active policy towards the Russian
diaspora in the near abroad.

For analytical purposes, one can talk about two types of Russian status
negotiations in Central Asia. Negotiation over state patronage were characteristic of the
relationships between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. As mentioned before, the Russian population in these republics is relatively
small and is dispersed geographically through the major cities of these republics. Because
of their relatively small size, Russians were not in a position to compete with the
indigenous population for control of the state, nor to have signiﬁcant impact on the
negotiation over their own future in the republics. Therefore, the ethnic transformation in
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took the form of a negotiation for state
patronage (e. g., protection of individual and collective civic, economic, social and cultural
rights of ethnic Russians.)

A second type of Russian status negotiation was characteristic of Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. In these two republics, negotiation occurred not only over the issue of state
patronage, but also over the matter of ethnic groups sharing control of the state. The
issue of ethnic groups sharing the control over the state was put on the table because of

the size of the Russian communities and their role in Kyrgyz and Kazakh economies.

195
6.3.1 Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan: Negotiation for the
State's Patronage

Of all the former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan went
the furthest in accommodating the demands of the Russian Federation, with regard to
legislative protection of their Russian minorities. Accordingly, Russia has already
concluded bilateral agreements with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that provide
dual citizenship to local Russians (Terechov, 1993; RFE/RL Daily Report, July 19, 1994;
OMRI Daily Digest, July 11, 1995). In comparison, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, despite
signiﬁcant pressure from Moscow, rejected the idea of dual citizenship outright. Almaty,
the capital of Kazakhsta, and Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, assumed that large
numbers of Russian Federation citizens, in their respective countries, would create
conditions for internal instability in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Kozlov, 1994a).

There are a number of reasons why Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
accommodated the Russian Federation's demands for the protection of local Russians.
First, because the political weight of ethnic Russians in the republics was small, the
regimes in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not feel threatened by the
provision of additional rights to ethnic Russians. At the same time, the signiﬁcant
economic role of ethnic Russians warranted additional rights so as to stem their migration
back to Russiaf'0

Second, the expanding of legislative and political protection of ethnic Russians was

 

9° Turkmenistan agreed to dual citizenship for its Russian diaspora in order to protect
its gas industry. In Turkmenistan, Russians constitute only about 8% of the population,
however, they run the country's gas industry that provides for more than 70% of
Turkmenistan's GNP (Gorbachev Foundation, 1993).

196
also an outcome of the vulnerability of the Central Asian republics to the political,
economic and military pressure of the Russian Federation. This is especially true in the
case of Tajikistan. The Tajikistani government, highly dependent on Russia for economic
aid, and on the Russian military for internal and external security, made numerous
concessions to Russian-speakers. Besides dual-citizenship, the Tajik regime offered ethnic
Russians posts in government and industry, and made numerous changes in language
policies (RFE/RL Daily Report, June 20, 1994).

The high degree of legal accommodation to the demands of etlmic Russians in
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seems to be paradoxical, when taking into
account the previous characterization of the regimes in these former Soviet republics as
ethnocratic. However, the paradox dissolves if one takes into account the clan-based
social structure of Central Asian societies. Power in Central Asia functions not so much
through the law, but through the regional and/or kinship networks of patronage, personal
loyalty, and nepotism. It is not the state, but the networks of kinship and patronage that
provide security, support, and protection for their members. Consequently, whatever laws
and rights are accorded to ethnic Russians, they, as inordosty (Rus. foreigners), are
excluded from power, their position in the republics is insecure, and their social mobility is
blocked.

In sum, the formal civil, political and/or legal rights accorded to ethnic Russians in
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had relatively little impact on the dynamics of
ethnic transformation in the republics. Thus, although Russians in Tajikistan were
accorded the most liberal and favorable treatment of local Russians in these republics, the

rate of Slavic migration from this republic is the highest in all the Central Asian republics.

197
Russian journalists reporting from the region observe that soon there will be no ethnic
Russians in Tajikistan to enjoy the laws that were written speciﬁcally for them. Because
of exclusion from the clan structure, the extension of formal legal and political rights to
Russians has had little impact on stemming their repatriation to the Russian Federation, or
encouraging them to integrate into the republics. Instead, resolving the question of
whether they would stay in the republics, or choose to repatriate back to the Russian
Federation depended on three factors: their personal security and the security of their
families; the political stability and economic future of the republics; and the possibilities of
integrating into the indigenous societies.

Paradoxically, the situation of Russians in Turkmenistan, which has devised the
fewest reforms, seems to be most favorable to Russians staying. The neo-stalinist rule of
T urkmenbashi"l Saparmurad Niyazov,92 assures the stability of public order in the
republics. In this republic there is relatively little informal, or administrative harassment of
ethnic Russians. All organizations in Turkmenistan, based on ethnicity, or national
criteria, are outlawed. At the same time, there are high hopes that the gas riches in the

republics will soon become a second Kuwait. Furthermore, Russians feel that they will be

 

9' Turkmenbashi is Turkmen for "father of all Turkmen."

92 Other titles that the Turkmen press use in addressing Niyazov, are "great leader,"
"great helmsman" and even "dweller in heaven" (Moroz, 1995). Niyazov's rapidly
evolving personality cult is characterized by an eclectic mixture of features of Stalinism,
and the traditional patriarchy of the Turkmen tribal culture. There is only one political
party in the country, the former Communist party (which was simply renamed) and no
political opposition. The internal Security (the KGB merely renamed) reigns ﬁ'ee in the
country. The major cities have Niyazov's statues erected. In all government offices, in
place of Lenin's and Brezhnev's portraits, Niyazov's portraits are displayed. Niyazov is
considered to be one of the richest people in Central Asia. For more on Nyiazov's rule,
see Solomonov, 1994.

198
able to share the economic beneﬁts of the coming gas boom with the Turkmenistan titular
nationality. These factors, to a large degree, explain the relatively low migration ﬁom the
republic, a mere 2 to 3% of its total Russian population a year (Figure 19).

It is in Tajikistan that the situation of ethnic Russians is most precarious. Ethnic
Russians had already begun to leave the republic in 1989, after the Tajik youth had
instigated violent pogroms of the Armenian minority in the Tajikistan capital, Dushambe.
In 1990, fearing that the communal violence could spill over, about 81,000 ethnic Russians
left this republic, about 20% of the total Russian population (Chasanova, 1994). The
Russian outrnigration surged again in 1992, when civil war erupted in the country, pitting
the former Communist establishment against an Islamic opposition operating from the
Afghanistan territory.93

The rise of the Islamic opposition, especially its ability to mobilize the rural poor
and the disaffected urban youth, was an ominous sign to all aliens, especially non-Muslim
Europeans. Fearing for their lives, about 67,000 ethnic Russians (17% of the pre-
independence population) left the country in 1992. Sixty-three thousand more Russians
left Tajikistan in 1993. Overall, it is estimated that by late 1994, of 380,000 Russians in
Tajikistan, 300,000 had already left the country (Tishkov et al., 1994).

By 1996, more than 30-thousand people had been killed in the Tajik civil war, and
a large portion of the total population of six-million have been forced to ﬂee their homes
(Pannier, 1996). The presence of a large Russian troop contingent in the country,

estimated to be up to 20,000 soldiers and ofﬁcers, failed to provide security for the local

 

93 For more on the civil war in Tajikistan, see Dannreuther, 1994, Ch. 2.; and Pannier,
1996.

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200
Russians (RFE/RL Daily Report, June 20, 1994). Hope for a political settlement in the
country remains slim, and soon, there will be very few ethnic Russians left in Tajikistan.

The situation in Uzbekistan lies somewhere between that of Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan, similar to Turkmenistan, is rather politically stable. Yet,
ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan are experiencing strong pressures of nativization. This is
partially because Uzbekistan is the most populous republic of the region and tries to
project itself as the leader of the region. Historically, Uzbekistan and its capital Tashkent,
were treated as the hub of the region by Czarist Russia, and later by the USSR as well.
Most of the scientiﬁc, educational and industrial potential of the region (excluding
Kazakhstan) is concentrated in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, two great historic centers of
Islamic culture, Samarkand and Bukhara, both of which are considered foundations of
Turkic identity, are located in the territory of Uzbekistan (Starr, 1996).

For ethnic Russians, Uzbekistan's ambitions to regional leadership had two
consequences. First, Uzbekistan was aggressively pursuing policies that would reduce
economic and military reliance on Moscow, and forge closer relationships with Turkey,
Pakistan, and China, as well as some Western countries. Reorientation of the country's
industrial, communication, and transportation infrastructure, from the north, to the south
and the west meant increasing isolation from the Russian Federation for local Russians.

Second, state policies directed at Uzbek identity construction very often turned
into strong pressure to assimilate. Those Russians who have left Uzbekistan indicate that
the major reason for their departure was bytovoi nationalism (rus. informal harassment)
(Ivanov, 1994). In this category ethnic Russians include arbitrary enforcement of Uzbek

language laws. Using lack of ﬂuency in Uzbek as a reason, local bureaucrats can hire and

201
ﬁre most ethnic Russians since less than 5% of ethnic Russians speak Uzbek.

Many of the migrants complain also about the vulnerability of Russians in the
streets, and shops, to harassment by Uzbek youth. In addition, the promotion of Uzbek as
a state language is narrowing opportunities for education in Russian. Most of the
universities and other educational institutions are in the process of switching from Russian
to Uzbek (Dunlop, 1994).

All these factors continue to sustain ethnic Russian migration from the country.
Since early 1990, the yearly migration rate of Russians from Uzbekistan has been equal to
about 5% of the Russian population size in this republic. The most recent data on Russian
migration indicates a continuation of this trend. During the ﬁrst nine months of 1994
(J anuary-September), close to 70,000 ethnic Russians leﬁ the country (Ivanov, 1994).

In sum, ethnic transformation in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan so far,
operates through the repatriation of ethnic Russians back to the their historic homeland.
Whatever legal or political rights they are accorded, the bottom line for ethnic Russians is
that they were transformed into small ethnic minorities in underdeveloped, poor, and
primarily rural, Muslim countries, that, from the Russian viewpoint, posses an alien and
inferior culture and way of life. The state (with the exception of Turkmenistan under
Niyazov) in the region is too weak to protect ethnic Russians, and the ethnic Russian
communities are too small to represent a signiﬁcant political force.

Unless there is improvement in the economic situation, repatriation of Russians
from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will most likely continue at an unabated rate in the near
future, despite the lack of opportunities in the Russian Federation. Russians from the

region are also being pushed by political instability, the rapidly growing indigenous

202
populations, and a catastrophic ecological situation. The Russian community in Tajikistan
will soon become just a fact of history. Arguably, stabilization of the Russian population
in Uzbekistan can be expected, but only after most of the younger, better educated, and
more highly skilled individuals leave for Russia.

It seems that the Central Asian republics can do little to stem the migration.
Therefore, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are sending thousands of students to Turkey and
afﬂuent Arab countries so as to prepare replacement for the departing ethnic Russians
(Dunlop, 1994). It appears that the outrnigration of its most energetic, educated and
skilled members will rapidly push the Russian community to the fringes of Uzbek society.

Although in Turkmenistan the situation of ethnic Russians is more favorable, its
long term stability is questionable, since it overwhelmingly depends on the will of just one
individual, namely President Niyazov. If something were to happen to Niyazov (there've
already been rumors about his failing health), the dynamics of ethnic relations in

Turkmenistan could change dramatically.

6.3.2 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Negotiation for the Collective
Rights of Russians
Because of the signiﬁcant size of the Russian population, the negotiation dynamics
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differed from those in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan, in at least in two respects. First, the issues being raised extended far beyond
matters of state patronage and included questions concerning the collective rights of etlmic
Russians, such as proportional representation in the parliament, and in local and national

administration. Second, unlike in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Russian

203
minorities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan ﬁgured more prominently in the arbitration over
their future status.

For analytical purposes the factors that account for the evolution of
consociationalism in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can be divided into two groups, internal
and external. First, unlike in Uzbekistan (or, for that matter in the Baltics) the ruling
regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were striving to create not ethnic-based, but civic-
based, inclusive nations.

The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, actively pursued the creation
of a supra-ethnic "Kazakhstani" nation, united by political patriotism. His policies directed
towards the various nationalities seem to be following the Soviet state model. Thus,
Nazarbayev wanted to instill a sense of nationhood among the population of Kazakhstan,
while preserving the ethnic diversity of the country. His solution to the ethnic problems is
to develop the Kazakhstan population's identity, which would, ideally, be "ethnic in form,
Kazkahstani in content" (Nazarbayev, 1996). The President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar
Akayev, similarly, claims to be striving to convert Kyrgyzstan into the "Switzerland of
Central Asia. "

Second, leaders of both countries are opening state and local administrations to
ethnic Russians. Russian representation is especially visible in Kazakhstan. For example,
in 1994, 28% of the Kazakhstani Supreme Kenges (Kaz. parliament) were ethnic Russians
(they comprise 38% of the population) (RF E/RL Daily Report, March 19, 1994). In
1995, in the Kazakhstani government, there were 9 non-Kazakh ministers (out of 21); 7
heads of regions (out of 19) are non-Kazakhs; and in 5,000 of the country's high schools

(out of 8,500) teaching is conducted in Russian. The Russian language is the Iiguafranca

204
of the country's mass media, and is the official state language (Makarov, 1995)

A third feature of the ethno-political systems evolving in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, concerns the role of the state in the domain of etlmic relations. Nazarbayev
and Akayev project the state as being in the position of standing above the interests of any
one group, be it ethnic, regional, or kinship based. The purpose of the state, in its neutral
capacity, is to mediate and resolve conﬂict among various segments of society.

Despite similarities, there are also signiﬁcant differences in the ethnic policies
pursued by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Nazarbayev's major goal, in forging
consociationalism, is to avoid ethnic conﬂict because it could potentially lead to the
partitioning of the Kazakhstani state. The Kazakh and Russian communities in the country
are of about equal size; therefore, because neither has more power, conﬂict could easily
lead to a partitioning of the country. Furthermore, a predominant majority of ethnic
Russians live in the northern oblasts, while the Kazakhs dominate the southern part of the
country (See Map 2).

In addition, ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan have their own re-emerging diasporic
identity, the Kozachestvo (Rus. the Cossack movement). The Cossack identity, although
currently weak, could possibly be used to underpin the Northern Kazakhstan secessionist

claims.“ Finally, the radical Nationalist and Communist opposition in the Duma are

 

9‘ Signiﬁcantly, in almost all incidents involving Kazakh/Russian skirmishes, the
Cossacks ﬁgured prominently (Dave, 1995; Kozlov, 1994; Yemelyanenko, 1994). The
major difﬁcultly in resurrecting the Kozachestvo is represented by the fact that the
Cossack movement was historically based, in rural, para-military, agricultural
communities. However, the predominant majority of contemporary Russians in
Kazakhstan live in cities and are engaged in industry. Therefore, the imagery of the free
Cossacks, riding on horseback, dressed in uniforms, and armed with the sabres, has little
appeal to more cosmopolitan and urbanite Russians.

205
openly supporting the secessionist claims emanating from Northern Kazakhstan.”

In Kyrgyzstan, unlike in Kazakhstan, the Russian community does not represent a
secessionist threat. Although share of the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan is signiﬁcant,
about 20%, Russians primarily live in cities and do not have their own "territorial base."
The Russian community's lever in securing their collective rights in the country is based on
two "trump cards": (a) the crucial role of Russians in the Kyrgyz economy, and (b) their
role in the inter-clan struggle and politics.

In both of the above respects, the support of the ethnic Russian community is
crucial for Akayev. Since Kyrgyz constitutes barely more than half of the population in
the republics, Russian backing is critical for any of the Kyrgyz clans engaged in the
struggle for power. Kyrgyzstan is deeply divided between its northern and southern parts
(Bajalinov, 1994; Maliagin, 1994). Akayev, a representative of the northern clans, is
lobbying for the Russian community's support which would allow him to increase his
leverage against the southern clans. Furthermore, Akayev's legitimacy as president of the
country, to a large degree, depends on the success of his economic reform. Active
participation of ethnic Russians in economic reforms is essential for their implementation.
This largely explains Akayev's energetic lobbying for the extension of ethnic Russians'

rights and protection in the Zhogorku Kenesh (Kyr. parliament) of Kyrgyzstan.96

 

95 In early June, 1996, Duma voted on Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s
proposal to return northern Kazakhstan, the eastern oblasts of Ukraine, and the Crimea to
their former position "under the wings of the Russian two-headed eagle." The vote was
only 24 votes short of passing as a resolution (OMRI Daily Digest, June 12, 1996)

9° For more on Kyrgyzstan politics and the role of ethnic Russians, see, for example,
Dubnov, 1994; Pavlova-Silvanskaja, 1994; and Razguliaev, 1994.

206

In terms of their stance on external relations, both Akayev and Nazarbayev
espouse strong pro-Russian policies. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the only CIS
countries (with the exception of Belarus) that have signed the customs union with Russia.
Both countries have their electric power systems combined with that of Russia.
Agreements were reached on transmission of Russian state television and radio broadcasts
to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently Kyrgyzstan signed a series of agreements with
Moscow that would increase Kyrgyzstan's and Russia's cooperation in economic, ﬁnancial,
and defense spheres (OMRI Daily Digest, March 29, 1996).

Kazakhstan's cooperation with Russia is even more extensive than Kyrgyzstan's
(Kangas, 1996). Kazakhstan acquired access to Russia's oil export pipeline network,
which was vital to Kazakhstan's oil industry. An agreement between Russia and
Kazakhstan has been ratiﬁed on the legal status of the citizens of either country who
permanently reside on the other's territory. Among other provisions, the agreement
speciﬁes that Russian citizens in Kazakhstan are entitled to hold posts in the country's
government agencies (Monitor, June 7, 1996). A legal framework is being developed for
joint industrial ventures. Finally, Kazakhstan acceded to Russian's rental of the former
Soviet military testing grounds in Kazakhstan (Monitor, March 21, 1996).

The strong pro-Russian policies directed at close political, social and cultural
cooperation with the Russian Federation are essential in keeping the deeply ethnically
divided societies, Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani, together. On one hand, economic and
political cooperation with the Russian Federation undercuts the Russian nationalist and
secessionist claims in the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the afﬁliation of

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Moscow means patronage of the Russian state is

207
extended to the Russian diaspora.

Furthermore, the bifurcated borders between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and Russia
and Kazakhstan also provide psychological reassurance to the Russian diaspora, that they
will not be cut oﬁ‘ and isolated from Russia, and will have the possibility to leave and
return to the region, at any time, without restriction.

Finally, the Russian Federation also acts as the stabilizer of the emerging
consociationalism in Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan. Despite protests from the radical
nationalist and Communist opposition, most of the political forces in the Russian
Federation are genuinely interested in the stability of the deeply ethnically divided
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Russian Government, as well as the general public in
Russia, remain terriﬁed by the idea that there could be a mass exodus of ethnic Russians
from Central Asia into Russia. Therefore, although Russia advocates more rights and
protection for the Russian diaspora, it is also very strongly against any Russian
secessionist claims, or sentiment, in these two republics.

How successful were the consociational policies pursued by Nazarbayev and
Akayev? First, the policies of both leaders enjoyed the widespread support of their
Russian communities. Nazarbayev was regarded by Kazakhs and Russians alike as the
guarantor, even the personiﬁcation, of stability and inter-ethnic harmony. Secondly,
Nazarbayev's and Akayev's policies actually resulted in a decline of etlmic tensions. The
most recent survey of ethnic Russians (N =1000) conducted in Kazakhstan in 1995, has
shown that Russians are most concerned about the decline in the standard of living (66%),
the future of their children (53%), the rise in crime (52%), and unemployment (24%), and

a decline in education and health care (20%). Concern over ethnic tensions came in 6th

208
place, and was regarded as important by 16% of respondents (Gudkov, 1995, p.6).

Thirdly, at least in Kazakhstan, there were signs of stabilization of the Russian
population.97 In Kazakhstan, the proportion of those who had decided to stay in the
county increased from 56% in 1991, to 65% in 1995. Although the percent of those who
had decided to leave Kazakshtan also rose from 11% in 199198 to 18% in 1994, the
number leaving remained signiﬁcantly lower than in either Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.
Furthermore, among those who decided to leave the country, only 1% made this decision
because of Kazakh hostility. The predominant majority reported that they were returning
to the Russian Federation for economic reasons (Gudkov, 1995, p.34).

Kyrgyzstan has been less successful in stabilizing its Russian population. Since
1990, the Russian emigration rate has been continuously increasing. In 1993, close to
10% of the Russian population leﬁ the country.

Why was the situation in Kyrgyzstan less favorable to ethnic Russians? First,
because economic conditions in Kyrgyzstan were much worse than in Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest republics of the Soviet Union. It does not have either
the industrial potential, or the wealth of natural resources of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan

the economic situation was somewhat better, and unemployment was much lower, in part,

 

97 According to the most recent OMRI report, Russian migration ﬁom Kazakhstan is
on the decline. Citing Kazakhstani First Deputy Labor Minister, Alikhan Baymenov, the
news service reports that the country's increasing political and economic stability has led
to a sharp decline in the number of people emigrating from Kazakhstan. About 309,000
people left Kazakhstan in 1995, compared with 480,000 the previous year. At the same
time, the number of people arriving in Kazakhstan is steadily increasing since 1991, and by
1994, had reached 122,000 people. About 1/3 of the immigrants were ethnic Kazakhs and
the rest were Russians and Ukrainians (OMRI Daily Digest, June 21, 1996).

98 Data from the Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) study.

209
because of the lower pace of economic reforms in the country.99

Secondly, in Kyrgyzstan, the linguistic situation was very different from the
language situation in Kazakhstan. The status of the Russian language did not decline
substantially in Kazakhstan, because of the high degree of Russiﬁcation of Kazakhs. Only
about half of ethnic Kazakhs can speak Kazakh effectively (U .S. Department of State,
1994). Almost all educated Kazakhs are Russophones. Kazakh is the language of the
rural population. By default, Russian in Kazakhstan remains the primary language. In
Kyrgyzstan, Russiﬁcation levels are lower, and the size of the Russian population is much
smaller, which translates into the much higher proﬁle of the Kyrgyz language.

The stability of the ethnic situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan depends on a
variety of factors. Perhaps the most important among them is improvement in the
economic situation. The delicate balance of internal and external factors, that has upheld
the movement towards consociationalism, cannot be maintained for long if the populations
of both countries become increasingly impoverished. As was already mentioned, the
failure of the Kyrgyz economy, to a large degree, accounts for the relative lack of success
that Akayev's nationality policies have had in stemming Russian migration.

The stability of both countries will also depend on the degree of inter-clan and
inter-elite conﬂict. Continuation of the current nationality policies in Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan are highly dependent on two individuals, Nazarbayev and Akayev. If they

 

99 In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan had a per capita income of just $820 per year, half of
that in Kazakhstan ($1680). In 1994, the gross domestic product of Kyrgyzstan fell by
almost a third compared to 1993, while unemployment grew to 229,000 in a country with
a population of just 4.6 million (Dzharnagulov, 1994). Data from the CD-ROM "The
World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995," Softkey: Cambridge, Mass.

210
were replaced in the process of an inter- or intra-clan struggle, the situation might change
dramatically. This possibility is especially likely in Kyrgyzstan, which is characterized by a
high level of intra-clan rivalry and ﬁghting.

A third major threat to Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's ethnic stability are rapidly
developing ethno-demographic changes. In this respect, the position of the Russian
community in both countries will continue to weaken as the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs
and Kyrgyz grows. In part, this is likely to occur because of the much higher birth rates of
the Kyrgyz and Kazakh, than of the ethnic Russians. The region's indigenous population
grows on average, at 2-3% a year. In addition, in Kazakhstan the proportion of Russians
will also decline because of the return of ethnic Kazakhs to their homeland from abroad.
The government of Kazakhstan is actively encouraging such migration. Thus, in 1992-
1993, 43,000 Kazakhs arrived in Kazakhstan from Mongolia, 20,000 from Russia, and
25,000 from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states (Dunlop, 1994, p. 210). As the
ethnic demography changes, so will the power balance between etlmic communities, which
could lead to attempts, by indigenous ethnic groups, to claim exclusive control over the
state.

If there is no improvement in the economic situation in the near future, arguably,
we will see the gradual gravitation of Kyrgyzstan towards a mild ethnocratic regime
(towards quadrant I in Figure 15). No or little economic improvement will mean a
continuous migration of Russians back to the Russian Federation. This will lead to an
erosion of the consociationalist features of the Kyrgyzstani political system, and evolution

into state paternalism, as was the case in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan.

211

In Kazakhstan, too, the etlmic assertiveness of Kazakhs will grow. The question
is, will it undermine the evolving consociationalism, or will it remain within tolerable limits
that is, not turn into an ethnocratic regime producing explosive polarization?

There are a variety of factors that favor the preservation of consociationalism in
Kazakhstan. The demography of the country is such that the eventuality of the Kazakhs
politically marginalizing the ethnic Russian community is unlikely. The Kazakhs do not
even constitute half of the country's population. Furthermore, 62% of the Kazakhs still
live in rural areas. Whatever the arguments of the indigenous intelligentsia about the
virtues of peasants in preserving the culture and language of the ethnic group, the appeal
of nationalism in traditional rural societies is low. Nationalism is primarily an urban
phenomenon and has as its base in the urban middle classes. The Kazakh urban middle
classes are highly Russiﬁed and numerically weak.

Additionally, Kazakh nationalism is hindered by (a) the clan based social structure
of the Kazakh society, (b) the size of the country (the area of Kazakhstan is equal to that
of Western Europe), and (c) the underdeveloped infrastructure of communication and
transportation. Finally, the institutionalization of consociationalism in the country, and
especially Kazakhstan's integration with the Russian Federation, has proceeded too far to
radically reverse the process.

Unless Russia actively promotes secessionism in Northern Kazakhstan, the process
of etlmic transformation in the country will most likely ﬂuctuate within quadrant IV, in a
"wave pattern" similar to that of the Ukraine or Baltics (Figure 15). Thus, one could
expect time periods during which the ethnic assertiveness of Kazakhs will increase,

especially if there were changes in Kazakhstani leadership, or a lapse into a deep and

212
protracted economic crises. During such periods the ethnocratic features of the
Kazakhstani state will become more prominent. On the other hand, economic
improvement, combined with the Russian Federation's demands for protection of ethnic
Russian minorities, and a high degree of political and economic dependence on Russia,

will constrain the development of ethnocratism in Kazakhstan.

6.4 Ethnic Transformation in the Independent Ukraine

The ﬁrst years of the Ukraine's independence were characterized by a decline of
national romanticism and an increase in regional tensions. Among Crimea's predominantly
ethnic Russian population, a secessionist movement was gathering strength, which led, in
late 1992, to a potentially violent confrontation between Kiev and Sirnferopol. Centrifugal
tendencies also increased in the predominantly Russian Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine.

In 1994, the situation in the Ukraine began to change. Presidential elections held
in July, 1994, ushered in a period of "socialist conservatism" in the Ukraine. The election
of relatively pro-Russian, Leonid Kuchma, as the Ukrainian president, indicated a growing
skepticism among the Ukrainian population over the beneﬁts of independence. The
nostalgia for the Soviet past, its safety and security, was on the rise. The new Ukrainian
leadership had reoriented the country's policies towards an economic, and, to some
degree, political, reunion with the Russian Federation. The result was a decline in regional

and ethnic tensions in the Ukraine.

213
6.4.1 The Decline of National Romanticism and the Rise of Regional
Tensions: 1992-1994

Since the declaration of independence, the spirit of national romanticism, which
had united ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, began to decline. Three sets of factors account
for this development.

First, the hope that independence would bring rapid improvement of the economic
situation in the Ukraine was dashed. Instead of bringing prosperity, independence had
brought dramatic deterioration of the economic situation, leaving a majority of the
population impoverished and much worse off than under the Soviet regime. In part, the
economic situation deteriorated because of the inept economic polices of the ﬁrst
Ukrainian government. However, the rupture of Ukrainian economic relations with
Russia proved more important. The Ukraine's economy was highly dependent on energy
and oil imports from Russia, and on Russian markets for Ukrainian goods. Radical
economic reforms launched in Russia simultaneously led to a rise in energy prices and to
the collapse of markets for Ukrainian products in Russia. This brought the Ukrainian
economy to a standstill. Inﬂation reached 40,000% a year. Economic hardships
strengthened Ukrainian pro-uniﬁcation sentiments, since the economic situation was much
better in Russia than in the Ukraine. This was especially the case in the eastern and
southern regions of the Ukraine, that were rather "mild" in their commitment to
independence in the ﬁrst place.

Regionalization of Ukraine was also fueled by the serious conﬂicts and tensions in
Russian-Ukrainian state relations. First, there was the thorny issue of the Black Sea Fleet

and the status of Sevastopol, headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. After independence,

214
the Ukraine unilaterally claimed the Black Fleet for its own, thus creating a furor in
Moscow. Kiev's plans to create a large, national military force (targeted to reach
250,000-400,000 personnel) also did little to contribute to the trust in Ukraine's and
Russia's relationship (Wilson and Bachkatov 1992, p.231).

Russia, on its part, was constantly meddling in Ukrainian affairs. Using the
Ukraine's weak economic situation, Russia applied political and economic pressure, and
exploited the Ukraine's dependence on Russia's energy exports to force the Ukraine to
enter political, economic, and military agreements in the Russian dominated CIS. Moscow
strived to make the Ukraine accept bilingualism and to provide dual citizenship for the
Russian-speakers in the country. Nationalist factions in the Russian parliament openly
threatened the Ukraine's sovereignty by promoting territorial claims and supporting
secessionist movements on its territory. And ﬁnally, the majority of Russian politicians
could not reconcile themselves to the existence of an independent Ukraine. The Ukraine's
statehood was widely thought to be just a temporary phenomenon that should not be
taken seriously. It was believed that the Ukraine's declaration of independence was
invented by the former Communist bosses in order to preserve their power and positions,
and, therefore, as soon as economic hardships increased, the Ukraine would ask to be
taken back into the fold of Mother Russia. Needless to say, Russia's political and
economic pressure, combined with such arrogant, condescending and patronizing attitudes
towards the Ukraine, only fueled Ukrainian nationalism.100

Finally, the decline of Ukrainian national romanticism, was also stimulated by the

 

'00 For more on the Russian-Ukrainian relationship during the ﬁrst years of
independence, see Moshes, 1994; and Motyl 1993.

215
nation and state building policies promoted by the ﬁrst Ukrainian government. President
Kravchiuk, a representative of the more nationalistic western part of the Ukraine, pursued
active policies directed at reducing the Ukraine's dependence on Russia and the Ukraine's
integration into Central and Western Europe.

This curtailing of the Ukrainian/Russian relationship led to a rise of anti-Kiev
sentiment in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine that, historically, had strong ties with Russia.
Kravchiuk also adopted policies enhancing the prestige of the Ukrainian language (and its
use) and culture in all spheres of life in the Ukraine. As a result of these policies, the
assimilation processes between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians slowed down. The use of
the Ukrainian language, vis-a-vis Russian, was expanding (albeit modestly)(Kaminski,
1995). Promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture put pressure on ethnic Russians
and Russiﬁed Ukrainians (Popova, 1994). In the eastern part of the Ukraine, this created
resentment over Western Ukraine's domination, and raised fears of a possible wave of
Ukrainization.

As a result of (a) economic hardships, (b) conﬂicts and tensions in Ukrainian-
Russian state relations, and (c) the Kiev policies which attempted to strengthen the role
and prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture, the regional tensions in the Ukraine
increased signiﬁcantly. Consequently, two major "fault lines" of differentiation in the
Ukraine emerged. The ﬁrst was between the primarily ethnic Russian enclave on the
Crimean peninsula and the Ukrainian mainland. The second was between the western and

eastern regions of the Ukraine.

216

6.4.2 Crimean Secessionism and the Clash of Rival Nationalisms

The situation in Crimea represents a particularly striking example of how
escalation of regionalism can lead to the rise and clash of rival nationalisms, even in areas
of longstanding Ukrainian-Russian ethnic harmony. The Crimean peninsula's population in
1989 was 67% percent Russian, 26% Ukrainian. This oblast was transferred ﬁom Russia
to the Ukraine in 1954, by Nikita Khrushchev's decree commemorating the 300th
anniversary of the Ukraine's incorporation into the Russian empire.

Despite the province's formal Ukrainian status, up until the collapse of the USSR,
the peninsula remained more economically, socially and culturally integrated with Russia
than with the Ukraine. Crimea had a massive presence of military structures, ofﬁcers'
organizations, and armed forces. Sevastopol was the chief base of the Soviet Black Sea
Fleet, and a major military outpost of the Soviet Union.

Economically, Crimea's development was directly regulated by the Central
authorities in Moscow. Because of Crimea's status as an "all-union health resort," all
levels of Central, and regional authority in Russia (the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, the Komsomol,‘01 the Labor Unions, ministries, industrial enterprises,
etc.) heavily invested in Crimean infrastructure developments, summer vacation homes,
hospitals, etc.

Crimea's ties to Russia were much stronger than to the Ukraine also because of the
peninsula's demographics. Close to 90% of Crimea's population consisted of post WWII

immigrants (Guboglo and Chervonnaia, 1995). A Majority of these individuals were

 

'°' Komsomol is the All-Union Young Cormnunists Organization.

217

former residents of Russia's central regions, who had moved to the region because of its
depopulation after the war.102

Because they were recent immigrants without historical roots in the peninsula, the
Russian population in the Crimea functioned socially and culturally as an "extension" of
the Russian federation. Finally, ethnic Russians in the region and in Russian Federation
exhibit a complex of strong psychological and emotional prejudices and notions that
Crimea constitutes a primordial Russian land which is an inseparable part of Russia. For
many Russians the area has glorious associations with Russian history and culture (the
conquest of Crimea in the 18th century, the defeat of the Turks, the Sevastopol naval
base, Crimea as the vacationing place for Russian Czars and famous Russian writers, etc.)
The power of these sentiments is what is fueling Russian nationalism and chauvinism on
the peninsula and in the Russian Federation.‘°3

In many respects the developments on the Crimea peninsula are similar to those in
Transnistria, Moldova. Both areas were Russian enclaves more integrated with Russia
than the republic to which they formally belong. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR was
particularly difﬁcult to adjust to for the population of enclaves.

However, the tensions in Crimea did not rise to the point of military conﬁ'ontation,

 

"'2 In 1945, Stalin forcefully deported Crimean Tatars, the indigenous population of
the region, to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The
Crimean Tatar's massive return to their historic homeland complicates the ethnic tensions
in the region even further (Guboglo and Chervonnaia, 1995).

‘03 Most recently Russia's Duma took up a pr0posa1 by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of
ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, that the Duma request the government of the
Ukraine to call for a referenda on Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine concerning "returning to
Russia those primordial Russian lands." The resolution failed to pass only because of the
lack of a quorum. (Monitor, A Daily Brieﬁng on the Post-Soviet States, June 7, 1996).

218

as it did in the Dniester region. First, ethnic Ukrainians, unlike the Moldovan peasants in
Transnistria, lacked historic roots in the peninsula. The majority of Ukrainians settled on
the peninsula under the "labor conscription" program, initiated in 1954 when the Crimean
oblast was handed to the Ukraine. Being highly Russiﬁed‘“ and relatively new to the area,
the Ukrainian population remained rather passive and ambivalent about the future status of
the peninsula. This feature of the Ukrainian settlement provides the Crimean conﬂict with
more political, than ethnic character.

The escalation of violence in Crimea, unlike Moldova, was also precluded by
Kiev's very ﬂexible position towards the restless Crimean region. Russian nationalist
passions in Crimea were on the rise since the late 1980s, especially aﬁer the Ukraine had
passed the law on language. In order to calm fears of nativization, in 1991, the Ukrainian
government granted Crimea the status of autonomous republic. This provision of
autonomy reassured the regional Communist nomenclature that it would not be displaced
by reforms coming from Kiev. This diffused the tensions between Kiev and the Crimean
government in Simferopol.

However, tensions between Kiev and Simferopol began to rise again in early 1992.
Four major causes contributed to Crimean radicalization and its drive towards
reuniﬁcation with Russia. First, the drafting of the Crimean constitution resulted in
conﬂicts between Kiev and Simferopol over the delineation of authority between the
Central and regional governments.

Second, there was dramatic deterioration of the economic situation on the

 

'04 Forty-seven percent of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea are Russian speaking (Shaw,
1 994).

219
peninsula that left the region on the verge of ﬁnancial collapse and resulted in critical food
shortages. Crimea's population attributed the disastrous economic situation to the
breakdown of traditional ties with Russia and the inept economic policies of Kiev.
Economic hardships led not only to the rise of mass dissatisfaction, but also strengthened
the perceptions among the peninsula's population that there is little economic future for
the area if it remained part of the Ukraine. Third, there was rise of Russian nationalism on
the peninsula, especially among the Sevastopol population and ofﬁcers of the Black Sea
Fleet. Russian nationalist passions in the "city of Russian military glory" were ﬁreled by
the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conﬂict over the status and division of the Black Sea Fleet.
A majority of the Black Sea Fleet ofﬁcers categorically refused to give an oath of loyalty
to the Ukraine, or serve under the Ukrainian ﬂag.

Finally, Nationalist and Communist factions in the Duma openly supported if not
Crimea's secessionism, then at least, granting Russian control to the Sevastopol city.
Numerous Duma delegations shuttled between Sevastopol and Moscow with highly
inﬂammatory speeches and claims to promote resolutions on Crimea and Sevastopol's
return to the Russian Federation. As a result of these efforts, in 1993 the Duma adopted a
resolution declaring Sevastopol a Russian city, and ordered a review of the legality of the
1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine.

In an atmosphere of rising economic discontent and Russian nationalism, in May,
1992, the Crimean parliament declared independence from the Ukraine, which was to be
conﬁrmed in a referendum. Relations between Crimea and Kiev sharply deteriorated.
Ukrainian nationalists accused President Kravchiuk of being "soft" on Crimea and began

to demand the introduction of presidential rule in the autonomous republic, the dissolution

220
of the Crimean parliament, and the arrest of Crimean leaders on charges of "treason. "
Rumors spread in Crimea that detachments of the Ukrainian National Guard were heading
for Simferopol. In Crimea, self-defence units formed in order to stand against Ukrainian
aggression. The relations between the Ukrainians and Russians, especially in Sevastopol
and Simferopol, worsened dramatically. Russian Black Sea Fleet ofﬁcers threatened to
intervene in the conﬂict. The events on the peninsula started to resemble Bosnia's
situation in the early 19903.

However, last minute negotiations between president Kravchiuk and the Crimean
parliament diffused tensions. The Crimean parliament agreed to rescind its declaration of
independence and cancel the referendum. In return, Crimea was granted far-reaching
powers which covered most aspects of internal, social and economic policies, with the
exception of security and foreign affairs.

Despite the agreement, political confrontation between Kiev and Simferopol left
the peninsula increasingly ethnically divided. There were attempts to organize the
Ukrainian minority, concentrated in the northern region of Crimean, in its opposition
towards Crimea's independence, or uniﬁcation with the Russian Federation. On the other
hand, there was also a dramatic rise in radical Russian nationalism and strong anti-
Ukrainian sentiment among many of the residents of Sevastopol, encouraged, in turn, by

radical nationalists in Russia itself (Kuzio, 1994).

221

6.4.3 The Donbas Region

In the early 19903, centrifugal tendencies were also gathering strength in two
Ukrainian oblasts, Donetsk and Luhansk, in the Donbas region. Donetsk and Luhanks are
heavily industrialized and Russiﬁed. In 1989, 45% of the population in Luhansk, and 44%
of the population in Donetsk, was ethnic Russian. Most of the industry in the region is
non-economic, environmentally hazardous and is being threatened with closure.

The pro-Russian drift of both territories was caused by the same factors
accounting for the rise of separatism in Crimea. Disengagement from the Russian
Federation had disrupted the regional economy, which was more integrated into the
Russian, than Ukrainian, economy.

Especially irritating, ﬁ'ustrating and inconvenient to the local population, was the
construction of Ukrainian/Russian border customs posts and other border installations.
The state border lines, accompanied by the introduction of visa and tariff regulations, put
limitations on the movements of people, capital, labor, and goods between areas that, for
centuries, had been a part of the same social, cultural, administrative and economic space.
Not only did the borders not make sense to the local population, and harmed them
economically. Custom posts were notorious for their corruption and were perceived, by
the population, as beneﬁting only the corrupt bureaucrats in Kiev.

Secondly, the assertion of pro-Russian sentiment in Luhansk and Donetsk was also
caused by the threatening policies of Ukrainization and reform that were coming from
Kiev. Ethnic Russians were especially wary of the Laws of Language that envisioned a

gradual Ukrainization of the state administration and education. Finally, nationalist

222
factions in the Russian parliament were encouraging anti-Kiev sentiments in Eastern
Ukraine by lobbying for dual citizenship for the ethnic Russian population and introduction
of bilingualism in the country.

The Conﬂict between Kiev and Luhansk and Donetsk reach a high point in March
of 1994, when the oblasts Soviets decided to carry out a consultative referendum. Four
questions were included in the plebiscite querying the following issues; 1) should the
Russian language be made the second ofﬁcial language of the Ukrainian state, 2) should
the Ukraine be organized on federative principles, 3) should the Russian language be made
the language of ofﬁcial business, education and science, and 4) should the Ukraine become
a ﬁill member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (RF R/RL March 16, 1994).
The plebiscite produced massive votes in the region in favor of closer ties with Russia and
the CIS, as well as limiting the gradual Ukrainization of these regions (RF R/RL March 29,
1994)

However, tensions between Kiev and Donbas never reached the point of a
potentially violent eruption, as in Crimea. First of all, Kiev, ﬁightened by the centrifugal
tendencies in the region, speeded up economic cooperation with Russia. As a result of
Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, agreements were reached on a free customs zone,
liberalized banking regulations, and the free movement of labor in ten border regions
(Stewart, 1995). The liberalization of goods, labor and capital movement across the
Ukrainian/Russian border defused the tensions between Kiev and the restless Crimean
region.

Secondly, the conﬂict between Donbass and Kiev, unlike the conﬂict in Crimea,

was much weaker in that it did not threaten the Ukraine's sovereignty and tenitorial

223
integrity. The Luhansk and Donetsk economies, unlike that of Crimea's, relied heavily on
Ukrainian government subsidies for the continuous operation of its coal mines and steel

mills. This moderated the claims made by the oblasts on Kiev.

6.4.4 The Decline of National Romanticism and the Rise of Socialist
Conservatism
The widening regional divisions and tensions in the Ukraine became especially
visible during 1994 presidential elections. Incumbent President Kravchiuk's supporters
were concentrated in the western regions of the country. His appeal in Eastern Ukraine
was very limited. Kravchiuk had run on an election platform that gave priority to the
political stability of the country and the strengthening of Ukrainian statehood.
Kravchiuk's major rival, Leonid Kuchma, was a representative of Eastern Ukraine's
industrial establishment.” Kuchma, unlike Kravchiuk, based his electorial campaign on
three issues: the reform of the economy, the normalization of relationships with the
Russian Federation, and the promotion of Russian as the second state language in the
Ukraine. Kuchma's electorate was in Eastern Ukraine and he had little support in the
more nationalist western oblasts.‘06
Kuchma had won the election, in part, because he successfully tapped the mood of

an increasingly tired, impoverished, and nostalgic (about the good old Soviet days)

 

'05 Leonid Kuchma is a former director of a nuclear missile factory in Eastern Ukraine.

"'6 For more on the Ukraine regional divisions and electorial politics during the ﬁrst
presidential elections in the country, see, Fedarko, 1994; and Portnikov, 1994.

224
Ukrainian public.107 This mood may best be described as a return of "socialist
conservativism." Its major components were: a disappointment in the realities of
independence, in liberalism and in Western aid, by a majority of the country's population;
the pragmatism and primacy of economic over political issues; and, a longing for law and
order, and a strong state's protection.

Kuchma's election was crucial to the decline of regional tensions and consolidation
of the Ukrainian nation. Western Ukraine's political elites acquiesced to their defeat. This
led to a peaceful power transfer to Eastern Ukraine's elites. Ascendance of the Eastern
Ukrainian elites to power demonstrated to ethnic Russians and Russiﬁed Ukrainians, that
their concerns and their voice mattered. It reassured them that the Ukrainian state is also
their state (Furman, 1995). Such developments in the Ukraine contrast very favorably
with the situation in the Russian Federation, which, with every new election, seems to be
on the verge of civil war, and has yet to undergo a peaceful transfer of power from one
political group to the other.

Kuchma's elections also marked a decline in Russian-Ukrainian tensions. The
Ukraine had joined the economic union of the CIS, and, as a result, economic cooperation
between Russia and the Ukraine increased. Kuchma's foreign policy rejected Kravchiuk's
pro-European policies, and tried to maintain the delicate balance between Russia and
Europe. Kravchiuk's Ukrainization policies were abandoned. At the same time, Kuchma
proved to be a staunch supporter of the Ukraine's sovereignty which gained him support

of the western regions who had voted against him in the presidential elections. Finally,

 

"'7 For more on the Ukrainian elections and the importance of the east and west
division in Ukrainian politics, see Tikhiy, 1994; and Pogrebinskii and Shakina, 1994.

225
Kuchma has been surprisingly successful in implementing delayed economic reforms in the
country (Mroz and Pavliuk, 1996).

As a result of the changes in the Ukraine that followed the 1996 presidential
elections, anti-Kiev sentiments in the Eastern Ukraine declined. It seems that the Ukraine
is heading towards the creation of an integrated and stable polity. The results of a 1995
survey conducted among ethnic Russians in Kharkiv, a large industrial city in the Eastern
Ukraine, are very interesting in this respect. It shows that fundamental shifts in the
identity of the Ukraine's ethnic Russians are occurring. Despite the fact that a majority of
respondents were nostalgic about the Soviet past, less than 5% of them were for the
Ukraine's reuniﬁcation with Russia, or for the incorporation of Eastern Ukraine into
Russian.

Similarly, an insigniﬁcant proportion of respondents wanted to acquire Russian,
instead of Ukrainian citizenship. By far, the majority of respondents (more than 70%)
identiﬁed themselves as Ukrainian citizens. At the same time, close to 90% of
respondents wanted closer Russian and Ukrainian cooperation in political, economic and
social spheres, as well as "transparent borders" that would allow people, goods, capital
and information to move unhindered between the two countries.

Although recent developments have led to Eastern Ukraine's stabilization, in
Crimea, the situation remains complicated. Despite many agreements, issues regarding the
division of the Black Sea Fleet are not resolved. Neither is there an agreement on the
future status of Sevastopol city (Liubarskii, 1994).

When Yeltsin sent troops to quell separatism in Chechnia, the Ukraine moved

quickly to abolish the Crimean constitution and peninsular presidency. Russia did not

226

protest, because the Ukraine's actions in Crimea were undertaken under the same premise
as was Russia's in Chechnia, that is, for the purposes of protecting territorial integrity and
in defence of the constitution of the country (Tikhiy, 1995).

More recently the tensions over Crimea have been rising again. First, because
presidential elections heightened the nationalist rhetoric in Russia. Even Russia's prime
minister Chernomyrdyn, openly reiterated the claims that Sevastopol is "a part of the
sacred Russian land" (Monitor, April 15, 1996). Secondly, there was an increase in
tensions between Simferopol and Kiev as the Ukrainian parliament began debating the
draft of the new Ukrainian constitution. Ukrainian nationalists are eager to limit the
powers of the Crimean parliament. The Crimean parliament, alarmed by such
developments, threatened to call "an all-Crimean referendum on the fundamental principles
of the constitutions of the Ukraine and Crimea," implying that Crimea might once again
attempt to assert independence (Monitor, June 7, 1996).

As events since the Ukraine's independence has shown, regional tensions, although
political in character, can very oﬁen lead to a rise in etlmic tensions and discord. This was
especially the case in Crimea, which came very close to a potentially violent eruption of
etlmic war. The analysis of the Ukrainian/Russian ethnic dynamics has also shown that
liberal practices concerning ethnic minorities in the country are not enough to provide for
ethnic peace and stability. For normalization and stability of Russian/Ukrainian etlmic
relations, closer political, economic and social relationships between the two countries are

also necessary.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed the spectacular unraveling of
the Soviet empire. Four features characterized the process of disintegration of the
imperial ethnic order that had promoted Russian domination in the USSR. First, there was
a signiﬁcant variation in the outcomes of ethnic transformation. In the Baltics, Russian
dominance was transformed into Russian exclusion from participation in the polities. In
Moldova, attempts were made to convert ethnic Russians into the ethnic minority of the
Rumanian state. In Central Asia, the colonial ethnic order, which had promoted the
dominance of ethnic Russians, was gradually replaced by a clan-based social structure.
Finally, in the Ukraine, in place of Russian hegemony, liberal policies towards ethnic
minorities were instituted. In addition, a territorially-based conception of the Ukrainian
nation was actively promoted.

The second feature of the transformation of the imperial ethnic order was its
changing "trajectories." Thus, during the late 19808, the political process in Moldova was
dominated by policies directed towards the uniﬁcation of the republic with the Rumanian
state. However, by the early 19908, the drive towards Moldova's uniﬁcation with
Romania was abandoned. Instead, liberal policies on the nationalities were promoted,
including the creation of ethnically based autonomous regions within the Moldovan state.
In the Baltics the process of ethnic transformation was characterized by conﬂict and
tensions between the two strands of Baltic nationalism: civic and ethnic. There were

periods in the Baltic struggle for independence in which attempts were made to elevate the

227

228
status of the indigenous ethnic groups by subordinating the interests and rights of other
residents in the republics. There were also time periods when civic nationalism (e.g., the
defence of human rights, freedom of religion, support for political pluralism and rule of
law) was prevalent. In Central Asia, too, there were changes in the direction of ethnic
transformation. Thus, after independence, the ethnocratic regimes in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan were gravitating towards a consociational constitution in these two new
countries.

Thirdly, the ethnic transformation across the periphery of the USSR was
characterized by the changing intensity of the ethnic mobilization process. During the late
1980s, there was a surge in ethnic mobilization throughout the periphery of the USSR
(with the exception of Central Asia). However, by the mid-19903, the ethnic mobilization
wave had dissipated, ushering in a period of social conservatism. The mobilizing power of
ethnic concerns (the defence of national rights, the reversing of the effects of decades of
Russiﬁcation, and the promotion of the indigenous language and culture) even in republics
previously shaken by nationalist fever, had declined. Instead, people, independent of their
ethnic origins, were increasingly preoccupied with economic and social problems (e.g.,
fear of unemployment, declining standards of living, poverty, lack of medical care, crime,
corruption, etc.). In some republics there was also a rise in nostalgia and longing for the
"good old days" when the Soviet state provided security and protection to all its citizens.

Finally, the process of ethnic transformation was profoundly shaped by the
developments in the Russian Federation. Two developments are most important in this
respect. First, transformation of Russian national consciousness. There was a rise of

isolationism in Russia that was expressed as a syndrome of imperial exhaustion. The

229
imperial periphery was increasingly considered, by the majority of Russia's population, to
be a major cause of the deep economic and political crisis in the USSR, while its
abandonment, was viewed as a solution to the crisis. Second, there was the emergence of
the Russian state which dissociated itself from the legacy of the Empire. The dissociation
of the Russian state from the periphery of the Empire turned out, in many respects, to also
be a dissociation from the 25 million ethnic Russians stranded in the newly foreign
countries after the collapse of the Empire. Such a rapid and relatively bloodless
disintegration of the USSR would not have been possible if the Russian people had
remained committed to the preservation of the Empire.

The prevailing approaches in the ﬁeld of ethnic studies proved to have weak
explanatory power when dealing with the plurality of ethnic transformation outcomes in
the successor states of the former USSR. The major drawback of the existing
conceptualizations of the ethnic transformation process is that they are purely descriptive.
The ethnic transformation process is investigated primarily in terms of a "deviation from
ideal conditions" paradigm. Attempts are made to measure and rank the former Soviet
republics according to (a) the degree to which political institutions in the successor states
resemble the institutions of the liberal democratic state (e.g., in terms of civic and human
rights protection and provisions for cultural rights of ethnic minorities); (b) how big/small
is the ethnic conﬂict potential; and (c) how big/small is the "mismatch" between the
political and cultural boundaries between the new states and ethnic groups that populate
them.

The weakness of the above approaches is that they do not provide a substantial

description of the emerging new ethnic orders. More speciﬁcally, such models do not

230

provide a systematic characterization of the new ethnic institutions and mechanisms that
came to replace the Soviet era imperial ethnic order. Thus, analysis based on deviation
models may be expected to proceed by arguing that, for example, that Uzbekistan is less
democratic than Kyrgyzstan, and that the treatment of ethnic minorities is better in the
later than in the former. Then the factors that account for "more democracy" in one
country versus the factors that account for "less democracy" in the other would be
described.

However, characterization of an ethnic order by the degree to which it
approximates the democratic ideal is a formal rather than a substantial description.
Without substantive characterization, researchers are handicapped in interpreting the
"deviations" from ideal conditions and their change through time. This is because different
types of institutions (e.g., legal, administrative, political, economic, informal, etc.) and/or
their combination, can produce the same deviation from the ideal condition.

In this dissertation a theoretical model is developed that goes beyond the
descriptive characterization of the process of ethnic transformation. It is argued that the
weak heuristic capacities of the existing deviational approaches are caused by two
underlying assumptions. First, the deviational approaches, implicitly or explicitly, imply
that the process of ethnic transformation in the successor states has a direction, e.g.,
evolution from an Empire into democratically constituted nation-states.

The second fault lies in their conceptualization of ethnicity. In the social sciences,
ethnicity tends to be deﬁned not as a characteristic of social relations, but as a nominal
phenomenon having its existence outside social relations. Thus, the primordialist

approach suggests that ethnicity is an inborn characteristic of human beings.

231
Constructivist approaches argue that ethnicity is derivative from "more basic" political or
economic interests. Both approaches are deﬁcient in that they ﬁrst deﬁne the "essence" of
ethnicity, and then apply the category to analyze empirical phenomenon. However, such
conceptualizations of ethnicity create enormous difﬁculties when attempts are made to
interpret multiple outcomes of the process of etlmic transformation. This is because
multiple explanations should be derived ﬁ'om the same singular "essence" of ethnicity.

It is argued that both assumptions--with regard to the process of ethnic
transformation having direction, and the "nature" of ethnicity--should be signiﬁcantly
modiﬁed. Instead of a transition from an etlmic order based on Russian dominance to the
democratically constituted nation states, etlmic transformation should be interpreted as an
open-ended process, "in which the introduction of the new elements takes place most
typically with adaptations, rearrangements, permutations, and recombination of already
existing institutional forms" (Bryant and Mokrzycki, 1994, p.4). In other words, the
conceptualization of ethnic transformation should account for more than just "forward"
movement in the process of ethnic transformation, (e.g., in the case of the developments
evolving from the shiﬁ from Empire to a liberal-democratic state). It should also provide
explanations for the "backward" shiﬁs of etlmic transformation, to primitive ethnocracies,
as well as movements "sideways" towards the creation of a variety of "hybrid" ethnic
orders constituted from a mixture of elements of traditional, Soviet and new institutions.

Similarly, "essentialist" interpretations of ethnicity should be abandoned. Instead,
it is suggested, the problem of ethnicity should be approached by asking following
questions: What are the conditions leading to the formation of social groups based on the

perceptions of their common cultural (e.g., language, culture, history and traditions)

232
interests? Why were social groups formed on the basis of common culture, rather than on
the basis of class, regional, professional, or religious interests, or their combination?

In order to answer these questions, analysis should go beyond an investigation of
the inter-ethnic relationships, which is not normally the case in analyses of the process of
ethnic transformation. More speciﬁcally, etlmic transformation should be understood as
the outcome of a triadic struggle/relationship: (a) between ethnic groups; (b) between the
state and ethnic groups; and (c) among social stratas within an ethnic group. Analysis of
internal ethnic group dynamics is necessary since different strata within the same ethnic
group have different interests in keeping or transforming the existing etlmic order.
Similarly, inclusion of the "State" category in the model is also essential because in the
Soviet Union, civil society was almost non-existent and the state penetrated and
bureaucratized all social institutions.

It is argued that, during different time periods, the relationships within the triad,
described above, were characterized by different modes of conﬂict resolution in the
struggles for access to power, resources and status among members of different ethnic
groups. During the pre-perestroika years, the Soviet state dominated the triad through the
imposition and command mode. Thus, the Soviet state deﬁned and ranked the more than
100 ethnic groups populating the Empire, into a rigid hierarchy. At the top of this etlmic
hierarchy were ethnic Russians, while the rest were ascribed varying subordinate roles.
The state also acted as a mediator and ﬁnal arbiter in inter-ethnic relationships and
conﬂict.

During the perestroika period initiated by Gorbachev, policies of liberalization

undercut state power. As the institutions that upheld the imperial order in the USSR

233
declined, the dominant role of ethnic Russians was increasingly challenged. However, the
emerging nationalist opposition to Moscow's rule was not strong enough to displace or
subordinate etlmic Russians. Consequently, the command and imposition mode of conﬂict
within the triadic relationships, declined. Instead, the bargaining and negotiation mode, in
terms of deﬁning access to power, resources and prestige among members of different
ethnic groups, became most prevalent.

Once in the process of bargaining and negotiating, the elements of the new ethnic order
are deﬁned, and the mode of conﬂict resolution among the triadic relationships begins to
change again. It changes because the process of ethnic transformation enters a stage of
consolidation of the new ethnic order (e.g., the habituation of the social actors to the new
rules of access to power, resources and prestige). The mode of conﬂict resolution that
prevails in the consolidation phase is dependent on the outcome of bargaining and
negotiations during the previous stage of ethnic transition process. It can evolve into the
command and imposition mode if, for example, one of the groups engaged in bargaining
and negotiations is able to impose its will on the other. Bargaining and negotiations can
also lead to the competition and cooperation mode if groups agree to share control of the
state and access to resources. Finally, bargaining and negotiations can result in the
institutionalization of non-ascriptive, class-based principles of relations among members of
different ethnic groups.

The triadic relationships model in the dissertation is operationalized using two sets
of variables: structural and strategic. Structural variables deﬁne the positioning of the
major actors within the triadic relationships, and describe the range of possibilities and

constraints that actors, within the triadic relationships, face in the process of negotiating

234
the new ethnic order. The strategic dimensions provide the major characteristics of the
political process through which the elements of the new ethnic order are institutionalized.
Depending on the direction and mode of the etlmic hierarchy transformation, four types of
new ethnic order were discerned: ethnocracy, ethnic democracy, consociationalism and
liberal democracy.

In the empirical part, the proposed model was applied in an analysis of the process
of ethnic transformation in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Four different
types of imperial ethnic order transformation were found.

Ethnic transformation in the Baltic republics functioned through attempts to
simultaneously reform the political and economic institutions of the Soviet state, and to
impose the ethnic hegemony of indigenous groups in the republics vis-a-vis local ethnic
Russian populations. The result of such a course of ethnic transformation was the creation
of conﬂict ridden "ethnic democratic" regimes (with the levels of conﬂict varying in
strength) which excluded ethnic Russians from participation in Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian polities.

"Ethnic democracy" in the Baltics proved to be unstable in that it went through
repeated cycles in which it would get stronger and then decline. During periods in which
the ethnic features of the "ethnic democracy," became stronger, attempts were made: to
push ethnic Russians from positions of power and status; to assure the dominance of the
indigenous languages and culture by limiting the use of Russian in the public sphere; and
to exclude ethnic Russians from participation in politics, and the process of state property
privatization. Such developments would lead to a rise in ethnic tensions and conﬂict in the

region.

235

During periods in which the democratic features of the emerging new
etlmopolitical system became stronger, ethnic tensions and conﬂict would subside.
Attempts were made to assure that ethnic Russians: would not be excluded ﬁ'om
participation in the local, regional and national institutions; that their collective cultural
and social rights would be protected; and that they would not be excluded from sharing
the beneﬁts of higher standards of living in the region.

The contradictive character of the ethnic transformation process in the Baltics was,
to a large extent, determined by the bipolar character of ethnic stratiﬁcation of Estonian,
Latvian and Lithuanian societies. Development in the Baltics, preceding perestroika, had
led to the consolidation of two incipient ethnic societies, which were posed for a
"showdown" as soon as the Center began to decline. The major causes of the inter-ethnic
tensions between these two incipient societies were the forceful policies of Russiﬁcation,
and the uncontrolled Russian migration into the region which threatened to convert
indigenous populations into minorities in their own historic homelands.

The rapidly changing ethno-demographic balance generated widespread fears of
the decline and irreplaceable loss of not only national cultures and language, but also the
disappearance of nation itself. This fed the nationalist passions in the republics and
produced attempts to exclude and marginalize ethnic Russians.

The democratic impulses of the Baltic struggle for independence were based on the
culture and political traditions of the region, and a history of independent statehood.
National movements created in the region called for the defense of human and civic rights,
the freedom of religion, support for political pluralism and the rule of law. Civic

nationalism was also fostered by the aspirations of the Baltic people to re-integrate into

236
the economic, political and social institutions of Western Europe, from which Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania had been excluded as a result of Soviet occupation.

During the early period of perestroika, ethnic nationalism dominated the political
process in the region. Since no systemic reforms of political institutions were possible
during the early stage of reforms, pro-reform Communist party leadership and intellectuals
in the national republics focused on the struggle for nationality rights within the
framework of existing Soviet institutions. Attempts were made to subordinate the Russian
segment of population by promoting indigenous cadres within the centralized and
hierarchical institutions of the Soviet state, while pushing out etlmic Russians ﬁom
positions of privilege and power. The result was an escalation of etlmic tensions, and the
political counter-mobilization of ethnic Russians in defense of their status.

During the late perestroika period, the struggle for nationality rights was
transformed into the struggle for Baltic independence. With this change in the Baltic
political agenda, ethnic nationalism began to decline leading to the strengthening of the
democratic character of Baltic nationalism. In a struggle for political independence form
Moscow, Baltic leadership could ill-afford the restless, sizeable Russian minorities.
Therefore, Russian communities in the region were promised extensive political, economic
and cultural rights in exchange for supporting Baltic independence.

The ﬁrst years of independent statehood were characterized by a rise in ethnic
nationalism. In Latvia and Estonia, attempts were made to exclude Russians from
participation in polities. It was feared that Russian communities because of their size,
could, through democratic means, undermine the consolidation of independent statehood

by promoting policies aimed at Latvia's and Estonia's reintegration with the Russian

237
Federation.

However, these policies directed towards etlmic Russians' disenfranchisement
backﬁred. Firstly, they antagonized the Russian population and threatened the political
stability of these two countries. Secondly, the international community criticized Latvia
and Estonia, and made changes in policies towards etlmic Russians a necessary condition
for Latvia and Estonia's integration into Western European institutions. Finally, the
Russian Federation exerted signiﬁcant political and economic pressure on Latvia and
Estonia to make changes in their citizenship laws. As a result, the discrimination policies
towards etlmic Russian are currently being dismantled.

What will the ethnic dynamics in the region be in the future? Arguably, the ethnic
transformation process in the region will be dominated by the struggle between
nationalism and liberalism without a decisive prevalence of one or the other. Policies of
enfranchisement will most likely lead to the emergence of a sizeable Russian middle and
upper class, which will adapt, and, to some degree, assimilate into the indigenous
societies. Two factors favor such a development. First, a majority of ethnic Russians
came to the region as economic migrants, and second, ethnic Russians proved to be
economically very competitive, vis-a-vis indigenous entrepreneurs and businessman.
Therefore, they will be willing to adapt to the conditions necessary for their social
mobility.

At the same time, there will be formation of a sizeable etlmic Russian underclass,
especially in Latvia and Estonia. These will be individuals who could not manage to
successfully adapt to the radical ethno-political and economic changes and/or were

excluded by cultural and language barriers. The underclass will be formed from less

238
educated, low-skilled, blue-collar Russians, who only recently moved to the region and
were stranded in it by the collapse of the USSR. The sizeable ethnic Russian underclass
will be concentrated in the major cities in Latvia and Estonia, and will remain the major
source of ethnic tensions and instability in the region.

The second type of etlmic transformation, which was characteristic to Moldova,
proceeded through attempts to displace ethnic Russians from positions of privilege and
power, and to impose the ethnic hegemony of Rumanians in the republic, through
Moldova's uniﬁcation with Romania. The result was the creation of an unstable
ethnocratic regime, the policies of which led to the escalation of violent conﬂict between
ethnic Moldovans and ethnic Russians, and later, to a partitioning of the country along
ethnic lines.

This violent character of ethnic transformation can be accounted for by the
artiﬁcial character of the Moldovan state and by the failure of MoscoW's nation-building
policies in the republic. Moldova was created from two ethnically different regions--
Bessarabia and Transnistria. Bessarabia was historically populated by ethnic Rumanians,
and, up until 1940, was part of the Romanian state. Transnistria was part of Slavic
Ukraine. Moscow's policies on Moldovan nation-building had failed to bridge the deep
ethnic, economic and social differences between Romanian Bessarabia and Slavic
Transnistria. Through all the Soviet period the Slavic minority concentrated in
Transnistria continued to politically, economically, and culturally dominate the republic.
The whole process of Moldovan nation-building was essentially reduced to the policies of
a forceful Moldovan Russiﬁcation. Once the power of the Center, that held the two parts

of Moldova together, declined, the Moldovan state began to quickly unravel. The

239
Bessarabian part of the republic was pulling the state towards uniﬁcation with Romania.
Transnistria gravitated in the opposite direction- towards uniﬁcation with the Russian
state. The consequence was a rapid escalation of ethnic conﬂict into military warfare.

In 1992, the dynamics of ethnic transformation changed dramatically when Russia
intervened on behalf of the rebellious Slavic region. Russian troops were deployed to
separate the two warring factions. At the same time, Moscow put signiﬁcant political and
economic pressure on the Moldovan government. More speciﬁcally, oil and gas supplies
were cut, paralyzing the republic's economy. Furthermore, Russia closed its markets to
Moldovan agricultural goods on which the whole Moldovan economy was dependent.
Politically, Chisinau was pressured to abandon its drive towards uniﬁcation with Moldova
and to join the Russian dominated CIS. The Dniester regime was propped up by military
and economic assistance.

Under the impact of the catastrophic consequences of the Moldovan drive towards
uniﬁcation, a change in the Moldovan government occurred. Moldovan nationalists were
replaced by Ex-Communists and representatives of the powerful agricultural sector. The
new government abandoned its course towards uniﬁcation with Romania. In order to
preserve the sovereignty of the country, Chisianu had little choice but to start negotiations
over power sharing with the ethnic minorities. Consequently, Chisinau offered extensive
political, economic and cultural autonomy to the break-away Slavic region. This resulted
in a radical change in the process of ethnic transformation in Moldova.

However, in the current situation, it is not Chisinau, but Moscow, that dictates the
conditions of ethnic settlement in Moldova. The Kremlin seems to be interested in

preserving the current situation in which it plays the role of mediator between two sides of

240
the divided country. First, because such a situation allows for Moscow to retain its
military presence in the region. Second, Moscow delays solving the Transnistria problem
because the situation in the region remains a "hot button" issue in Russia's domestic
politics. Any attempts by Moscow to ofﬁcially disengage itself from the region will be
portrayed by nationalist and Communist opposition as a sell-out of Russia's land, and
interests, and an abandonment of its brethren in the face of ethnic oppression and
discrimination.

At the same time, Moscow's overwhelming military presence in Moldova is not
conducive to the stabilization of the country either. Moscow's active interference in
Moldova's internal affairs can unravel the new Moldova's government and lead to a
consolidation of Moldova's nationalist opposition. It is difﬁcult to talk about future ethnic
developments in the country. The best case scenario would be if the situation were to
stabilize in the form of an ethno-territorial constitution of the Moldovan state. Three
conditions seem to be essential for such a development: (a) economic improvement in the
country, (b) the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the country, and (c) the
development of a close bilateral relationship between Moldova and Russia, similar to the
type of relationships being developed between Kazakhstan and Russia, and Kyrgyzstan
and Russia. No autonomy of the rebellious Dniester region within Moldova will work
without a clear separation of the borders between Moldova and Russia.

The third type of etlmic transformation--elite negotiated--was characteristic of the
Central Asian republics. Unlike in the Baltics, Moldova, or the Ukraine, in Central Asia
there were no mass based nationalist, anti-colonial or anti-Russian movements. Therefore,

ethnic transformation proceeded within a framework of un-reformed Soviet institutions.

241
Elite negotiations led to the consolidation of two types of ethno-political order in the
region. Ethnocratic regimes (of varying strength) were emerging in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, consociationalism was evolving, with
indigenous elites agreeing to share control over the state with the ethnic Russians.

Absence of nationalist opposition to the Communist regime in Central Asia can, to
a large degree, be explained by the character of the social stratiﬁcation of the indigenous
societies. Although the process of modernization had produced local educated classes and
political elites, the lives of the rest of the population in the region were changed little by
Moscow's policies of development. The majority of Central Asia's population remained
rural, with relatively unchanged Islamic culture and ways of life of the traditional peasant
society. The indigenous working class was small. The industrial and technological
infrastructure in the region was managed primarily by ethnic Russians.

Indigenous elites "sandwiched" between the imperial Center and the primarily rural
population of the region, had little economic or political interest in promoting separatism
or nationalism. First, because their existence was highly dependent on the functioning of
the centralized imperial bureaucracies. Second, the local elites were interested in
remaining part of the USSR because of the deepening economic, ecological and
demographic crisis in the region. Therefore, instead of promoting nationalism and
separatism, indigenous elites chose to lobby Moscow for increasing investment in the
region.

Finally, the absence of mass based nationalism and separatism in this region can
also be partially accounted for by the weakness of anti-Russian sentiment. Ethnicity was a

rather new phenomenon in the region, brought in and constructed predominately by the

242
Soviets. Because Moscow had not destroyed pre—exiting ethnic identities in the Central
Asia, its rule was perceived much more favorably in this part of the country than in the
Baltics or Moldova. In addition, the Russian population did not represent a demographic
threat to the indigenous populations as the size of the Russian communities had been
declining since the early 19703.

Since there were no anti-colonial, or anti-Russian movements in Central Asia, the
major factor affecting the situation of local etlmic Russians was not the policies of the
indigenous elites, but the change of Moscow policies in the region. Since the late 19805,
the Kremlin was increasingly disengaging from the region. Under conditions of an ailing
Soviet economy there were simply no more economic resources available to rule the vastly
overstretched Empire. In addition, public pressure was rising, in Russia itself, for
dissociation from the poor and underdeveloped Central Asia. The majority of Russia's
population perceived Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
as corrupt, inefﬁcient, and ruled by criminal maﬁas. Moscow's retreat from Central Asia
undermined the economic and political base of the Russian colonial strata in the region. In
addition, Moscow's withdrawal had led to an escalation of the struggle for power among
different clans and factions within the republics. This weakened the local authorities'
capacities to maintain public order, and led to a number of mass communal violent
outbursts. Although violence was not directed against ethnic Russians, bloody inter-ethnic
clashes increased fears for the personal safety and security of local Russians. Inter-
communal clashes demonstrated the vulnerability of the etlmic Russians. Increasing
insecurity and the loss of the economic base in the region led to a rise in the outﬂow of

ethnic Russians from the region.

243

Since independence, the ethno-political systems in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan were evolving towards "patriarchal statism." Patriarchal statism constitutes an
ethno-political system characterized by a large degree of overlap of state and clan
structures, and the exclusion and marginalization of all non-clan members, including
inorodsy from participation in state power.

Because the Russian population size is small in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, while their economic role is signiﬁcant, the regimes in these countries
provided extensive legal and other collective rights to ethnic Russians. However, formal
rights in clan-based traditional societies have little meaning, since it is not the state, but the
networks of kinship, clientele and patronage that provide the protection and security for
the individual. It is the political, economic and social marginalization of ethnic Russians in
poor, underdeveloped and rather traditional Muslim societies, that is pushing Russians out
of the region. Among ethnic Russians there is widespread fear for personal safety and
security as the state (with exception of Turkmenistan) is too weak to protect them. Many
ethnic Russians see little future for themselves or their children, as opportunities for
education and social mobility are limited.

Unless there is a signiﬁcant improvement in the economic situation, ethnic
Russians will continue to leave Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of the
raging civil war, almost all ethnic Russians have left Tajikistan. The situation of ethnic
Russians is more favorable in the politically stable, but least reformed, Turkmenistan,
which is endowed with enormous gas and oil resources. For now, the neo-Stalinist rule of
Turkmen president Niyazov is able to assure the protection and security of the ethnic

Russians, while gas and oil riches of the country hold promise in converting Turkmenistan

244
into a second Kuwait. In Uzbekistan the stabilization of the etlmic Russian population will
most likely occur only when most of the best educated, younger and higher-skilled ethnic
Russians have left the region. The process of pauperization will push the Russian
population to the fringes of Uzbek society.

Developments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan led to the institutionalization of some
features of consociational ethno-political systems. In these two countries indigenous and
Russian ethnic groups were sharing (to varying degrees) control over the state. Three
major factors explain the development of consociationalism in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. First, the size of the Russian population in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was
much large than in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of the signiﬁcant
size, Russian communities could not be easily pushed to the ﬁinges of Kazakhstani and
Kyrgyz societies, especially because of their crucial role in the economies of both
countries. Second, the degree of ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz Russiﬁcation was much
higher than in the other three Central Asian republics. In addition, nationality policies in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were directed towards the creation of territorially based
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz nations. Finally, Kazakh and Kyrgyz regimes agreed to share
control of their states with etlmic Russians because of Moscow's political pressure and
Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's extreme economic and political dependence on the Russian
Federation.

The consociational policies pursued by Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani regimes were
rather successful in stabilizing the ethnic situation in these two new countries. This was
especially the case in Kazakhstan. How stable the consociational features of the

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will be in the long run, will depend on a variety of factors.

245
Unless there is improvement in the economic situation, there will be a decline in the
consociational features of the ethno-political system in Kyrgyzstan. Because of the
poverty and continuous decline of the Kyrgyz economy, Russian repatriation back to the
Russian Federation continues unabated. Migration will diminish the size and socio-
economic status of the Russian community in this country. The declining size of the
Russian community, combined with a high degree of inter-clan rivalry and conﬂict in
Kyrgyzstan, will most likely lead to a consolidation of the ethnocratic regime similar to the
situation in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

Unless Russia actively promotes secessionism in Northern Kazakhstan, the process
of ethnic transformation in the country will most likely ﬂuctuate between ethnocratic and
consociationalist features without a decisive prevalence of one or the other. If there are
changes in the current top leadership of Kazakhstani, or if Kazakhstan lapses into a deep
and protracted economic crisis, the etlmic assertiveness of Kazakhs and Russian
separatism will most likely increase. On the other hand, economic improvement,
combined with the Russian Federation's demands for protection of ethnic Russian
minorities, and a high degree of political and economic dependence on Russia, will
constrain the development of ethnocratism in Kazakhstan.

The fourth and ﬁnal type of ethnic transformation is characteristic of development
in the Ukraine. In the Ukraine attempts were made to abolish not only Russian
domination, but any form of ethnic domination altogether. Modest attempts were also
made to reform the political and economic institutions of the republic. The creation of a
territorially-based inclusive Ukrainian nation was actively promoted. The result was the

development of the liberal-democratic regime in the Ukraine.

246
The character of ethnic transformation in the Ukraine can be explained largely by
the combination of three factors: (a) the deep regional divisions within the country; (b) the
high degree of assimilation between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians; and (c) the
ﬂexible and liberal policies of Ukrainian political elites.

Because of high degree of assimilation of Ukrainians, the Russian-Ukrainian etlmic
divide (deﬁned by common ancestry) did not coincide with Russian-Ukrainian linguistic
and cultural divisions. This mismatch between the Ukrainian-Russian ascriptive and
linguistic-cultural boundaries had two consequences. First, it moderated attempts of the
Ukrainian nationalists to assert Ukrainian ethnic hegemony because forceful attempts of
"Ukrainization" would likely generate resentment, protest and backlash, not only among
ethnic Russians, but also among Russiﬁed Ukrainians. Second, it "subsumed" and
expressed ethnic discord in the country in the form of regional tensions and conﬂict. Two
regional "fault lines" emerged in Ukraine: (a) one between the nationalistic, anti-Moscow
and anti-Communist Western Ukraine and the more Russiﬁed and conservative Eastern
Ukraine; and (b) one between the ethnic Russian enclave in the Crimean peninsula and
Ukraine proper.

The policies of liberalization introduced by Gorbachev resulted in the creation of
two mass based oppositional groups. In Western Ukraine, the national-democratic
movement Rukh, modeled after the Baltic national fronts, was created. The Rukh sought
to promote democratization in the republic and assure the protection and development of
the Ukrainian language and culture. In Eastern Ukraine, mobilization proceeded not along
ethnic, but along class lines. In Eastern Ukraine, the Donbas region miners organized the

ﬁrst independent labor union in the Soviet Union. The miners agenda was limited strictly

247
to economic issues. Although both groups were in opposition to the Communist party,
there was little cooperation between them.

Since early 1990, regionally fragmented opposition in Ukraine began to
consolidate under the leadership of the National-Communist faction within the Ukrainian
Communist Party. Skillful policies of the National-communists leadership were able to
moderate nationalist demands promoted by the Rukh. At the same time, Communist
leadership was successful in assuring the support of the miners by promising economic
prosperity to the entire population in the independent Ukraine. The result was the
creation of wide political opposition to Moscow’s colonial rule, which led the Ukraine to
independence.

However, the dramatic deterioration of the economic situation during the ﬁrst
years of independence had unraveled the miners/Rukh/National Communists coalition. In
Russiﬁed regions there was a rise of pro-Russian sentiments. This was especially the case
in Crimea in which the leadership took a course towards uniﬁcation with the Russian
Federation. As the political conﬂict between Kiev and Crimea escalated, ethnic tensions
between Ukrainians and Russians increased, especially in Sevastopol city, in which the
Russian Black Sea ﬂeet is based. Military skirmishes between the Ukrainian and Russian
para-militaries were avoided only through last minute negotiations. Pro-Russian
sentiments were also on the rise in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, they did not
reached as high a point as in Crimea, because Kiev reacted very quickly in addressing the
complaints of the restless oblasts.

Since the 1994 elections, ethnic tensions in the Ukraine have declined. This

happened in part because the elites from the Russiﬁed Eastern Ukraine took control over

248
the government. The new Ukrainian administration pursued closer cooperation with the
Russian Federation.

Developments in the Ukraine remain a vivid example of how the political tensions
in areas characterized by ethnic harmony, can lead to a rise in inter-ethnic tensions. It also
indicates that liberal nationality policies are not enough to preserve ethnic stability in the
Ukraine. Establishment of close economic, social and cultural relationships between
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and the Russian Federation is also necessary.

What are the implications of the proposed approach to the analysis of the massive
process of transformation and change that is currently under way in the countries of
Eastern Europe and the former USSR? First of all, the results of this study suggest the
need to modify the prevailing approaches that are used in the ﬁeld. We need to move
beyond the analytical and theoretical apparatus, prevalent since the Cold War era, that
interprets change in terms of binary categories, e.g “socialism/capitalism," "state planned
and state owned/market economy," and “totalitarianism/democracy."

What the researchers are currently confronted with is the contradictive,
fragmented, and rapidly changing reality, that does not neatly ﬁt into the categories
designed for Cold War realities. Elements of traditional, Soviet, and new institutions mix
together producing "hybrid" types of political, economic and social institutions. Many of
them are unstable, fall apart and rise again in different forms.

This unstable and changing situation requires a relational and dynamic
conceptualization of the transformation processes itself. Thus, instead of asking “Is this
capitalism or socialism?”, or “How far from democracy is the current political system?”, it

would be more useful and productive to ask “Why have these particular forms of political,

249
economic and social life, and not others, emerged in the process of transformation and
change? Why and how do these institutions change throughout time?”

It seems, currently, it is not the lack of empirical data, but the theoretical weakness
of the ﬁeld of post-Soviet studies which hinders its development. More and more research
is being done in the countries of the former USSR. Archives are being opened for study
that have never been available before. However, the research that is done remains a-
theoretical and mostly descriptive. The purpose of this study was to address the lack of
theoretical developments in the ﬁeld and to suggest that a relational/dynamic approach
could proceed beyond "binary" and "deviational" types of analyses so prevalent in the
ﬁeld.

As this study has shown, any theoretical attempt to move beyond the Cold War era
categorical and analytical apparatus, should simultaneously include three aspects:
historical, comparative and empirical. Analysis of the process of transformation and
change in the region is barely possible without a thorough knowledge of the history of the
region. Second, studies that attempt to provide theoretical conceptualization of the
process of transformation should be comparative in character. Finally, they should also be
empirical. Only through a dialectic unity of the historic, comparative and empirical
moments can the ﬁeld of post-Soviet studies move from its current state of "theoretical

stagnation."

APPENDIX

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY
SAMPLES USED IN THE DISSERTATION

Shlapentokh/Gudkov Survey Sample.

Data for the survey was collected by the Public Opinion Research Center,
Moscow, August through November of 1991, in 18 regions of the former Soviet Union.
The survey was prepared by professor Vladimir Shlapentokh of Michigan State University
and Mr. Lev Gudkov of the Public Opinion Research Center. A total of 6585 ethnic
Russian respondents participated in the survey.

The sample was drawn using a two-stage cluster sampling technique. During the
ﬁrst stage of the sample, the settlements selected for the survey were drawn from an
overall list of settlements in the national republics. Settlements were ranked into 4
categories according to the size of their population. Settlements had a probability of being
chosen for the survey in proportion to their population size. The second stage of the
sample drawing was based on the age structure of the total population of national
republics. For this purpose a list of addresses of ethic Russians in each of the republics
was compiled using information from the bureaus of addresses and the lists of registered

votes. The individual was identiﬁed as a Russian if he/she had a Russian family name. In

250

25 1

the case in which a respondent had a Russian name but identiﬁed himself/herself as other
than an ethnic Russian, interviewers had instructions to decline the interview and to
choose a substitution randomly from the pool of addresses. The names of individuals for
the interviews were systemically selected so that the age structure of the sample would
correspond to the age structure of the total population of each national republic. There
were 346 interviewers engaged in the survey. Each interviewer had in his/her disposition
form 10 to 30 questionnaires. The questionnaire contained 149 indicators. A total of
6648 respondents participated in the survey. 3606 questionnaires were completed through
interviews. 3042 questionnaires were completed by the respondents themselves in the
presence of the interviewer. 18.7% of individuals approached by interviewers refused to
participate in the survey. Interviewers were unable to locate 33.3% of individuals from
the initial list of ethnic Russians -- they were absent at the addresses indicated by the
bureaus of addresses. Such a high rate of nonresponse was attributed, by the researchers,
to the very complicated political and inter-ethnic situation in the national republics at the
time of the survey. Failure to collect data from such a high percentage of those selected to
be in a sample represents a major source of survey error. Because the 1989 census of the
USSR does not provide statistics for the Russian population living outside Russia, there is
no direct way to identify the biases associated with such a high rate of nonresponse. The
researchers believe that, in general, Russians with greater education are over-represented
in the total sample.

To adjust the sample distribution to reﬂect the total Russian population
distribution in the national republics of the USSR, a post-selection stratiﬁcation technique

(Kalton, pp.74-75) was utilized. Accordingly, each element of the national republics' sub-

252
samples was weighted to conform the entire sample distribution to the actual Russian
population distribution in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The data of from the

weighted sample was used in this dissertation.

Nationalities in the Baltic States Survey Samples.

The survey conducted in September-October 1993 in the Baltics by the University
of Strathclyde Center for the Study of Public Policy is a highly reliable source of
sociological data on nationalities in the region. Sampling design and procedures used in
this survey are extensively described in the publication of the Centre for the Study of
Public Policy, “Nationalities in the Baltics States: A Survey Study” written by Richard
Rose and William Maley (1994). The following is a description of the major
characteristics of the sample.

Sample design was based on 1989 census data from the 3 Baltic republics. Each
country was stratiﬁed into ﬁve regions: the capital, the largest cities, towns, country
towns, rural centers, and small villages. Within towns, addresses were selected by a
random route procedure starting from ﬁxed address. Within the household the person
having the next birthday (age 18 or older) was selected as the respondent. Ifthis person
was not at home, or refused an interview, the interviewer had to call back twice. If there
was still no answer, an additional household was drawn by the random route method.

Because Russians in Estonia and Latvia are widely distributed throughout the
territory of both countries, there was no need to draw separate samples of persons of

Russian ethnic origin. Russians are not equally distributed throughout the population of

253

Lithuania. Therefore an additional sample was specially drawn for ethnic Russians in this
country. Russians were selected randomly from the electorial lists. The criteria used for
ethnic identiﬁcation of respondents were (a) their names and names of their fathers, and
(b) the use of Russian as their home language.

In Estonia and Latvia the target was 1,000 interviews, in Lithuania the total target
was 700. The rate of refusals (about 13%) was highest in Latvia. In Estonia the rate of
refusals was 8%, in Lithuania 3%. A total 987 ethnic Russians were interviewed in

Estonia, 967 in Latvia and 717 in Lithuania. The sample error for the survey equals :1:S%.

Survey samples used by the Center for Study of Russian Minorities in the

Countries of the Near Abroad, Moscow.

In 1995, the Center, under the leadership of prof. Boris Grushin, carried out
surveys of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Kazakhstan. The results of the surveys were
published in two publications: “Russians in Estonia” by LA. Grishaev (1995), and
“Russians in Kazakhstan” by Lev Gudkov (1995). However, in both publications the
description of the sampling procedures, and characteristics of the sample are lacking. It is
only mentioned that the survey in Estonia was carried out in its 10 oblasts (regions) and
that Russians were interviewed in 22 tochkach otchiota (rus. geographical locations). In
Kazakhstan the interviews were carried out in 22 geographical locations. This suggests
that the samples in both Estonia and Kazakhstan were geographically stratiﬁed, similarly
to the sampling procedures of Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey.

Analysis of the summary data reveals the existence of at least three types of

systemic errors in the survey samples. First, women in Estonian and Kazakhstani data are

254
overrepresented (62% in Estonian and 59% of Kazakhstani sample). Second, in the
Estonian sample individuals with higher and college education are overrepresented (close
to 50% of respondents had higher levels of education). Finally, in both samples, the
proportion of individuals without a permanent job at the time of the survey (45% in
Kazakhstan and 42% in Estonia) was unusually high. Ofﬁcial rates of unemployment in
Estonia is 7-8%, and in Kazakhstan it’s even less, about 4-5%. Neither Gudkov, nor
Grishaev, the authors of the reports, specify how the ambiguous category “not working
individuals” is deﬁned. Are these individuals classiﬁed as unemployed that cannot ﬁnd
work according to their specialty? Are these individuals primarily women taking care of
little children? Unforetunately, there’s no way of knowing.

Such characteristics of the Estonian and Kazakhstani samples suggests that
individuals of some social categories were overrepresnted in these surveys (e.g., a greater
proportion of women because they could be found at home during the day, as well as
those who did not have jobs), while working ethnic Russians are underrepresented.
Second, such a high proportion of people with college and university education suggests
there is a “self-selection” bias in the Estonian sample. For some reason, individuals with a
high level of education wanted to talk to interviewers. The above systemic sampling
errors require cautious use and interpretation of the Estonian and Kazakhstani surveys

data.

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