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

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FROM PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE INTO NATION-STATES: ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

By

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ABSTRACT

FROM PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE INTO NATION-STATES:
ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

By

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This study examines ethnic stratification in the non-Russian republics of the USSR and its radical transformation since the collapse of the country in December of 1991. This dissertation covers the events that occurred in the ethnically diverse periphery of the Czarist and later Soviet empires since the late 19th century up until present. The analysis focuses on three processes: (a) the disintegration of the imperial ethnic order that promoted the dominance of ethnic Russians within the Soviet Union, (b) the consolidation of new ethnic orders in the successor states, and (c) the patterns of transformation in which ethnic Russians changed from majority to minority groups within the new states.

The study develops a theoretical model for the analysis of ethnic transformation processes in the successor states of the Soviet Union. A system of empirical indicators that enable a description of this transformation process is provided. A typology of the

ethnic transformation processes across the new states of the former USSR is developed. A systematic description of the emerging ethnopolitical systems in the new states of the former USSR is presented. The implications of the suggested approach for analysis of political and economic transformations in the successor states of the former USSR are discussed.

DEDICATION

To my parents.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problem

The assent of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership and the initiation of a far-reaching program of reforms precipitated the emergence of nationalism as a major political force. It unleashed an unprecedented tide of mass protests and demonstrations across the territory of the USSR, in which national grievances occupied a central place. National protests in the ethnically diverse periphery of the country were directed against national oppression and political and economic domination of ethnic Russians within the Soviet empire.

Although ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union constituted barely a half of its population by the late 1980s, access to the top positions in the state and Communist party leadership was reserved exclusively for ethnic Russians. The national republics, although nominally equal members of the Soviet confederation, in actuality were nothing more than administrative units. All decisions concerning the national republics were made exclusively in Moscow. Economic policies, similarly, were implemented by the Kremlin in the periphery of the country without consulting local authorities. Together with the construction of new factories and whole industries, large numbers of ethnic Russian workers were imported into the national republics, thus radically changing the

ethnodemographic balance. The natural resources were extracted on a massive scale without locals having any control over the process of mineral production or over the distribution of the revenues. Finally, Moscow's rule in the periphery of the ethnically diverse Soviet empire, was perceived to be not only a brutal system of political oppression and economic exploitation. For non-Russians Kremlin's rule also represented a system of national oppression designed to Russify, and even annihilate whole nations and cultures. Stalin's purges and mass deportations of the national political and cultural elites, the forced agricultural collectivization that resulted in tens of thousands famine victims were perceived by indigenous people to be acts of forcible destruction of their national existence.

Therefore, as soon as the policies of liberalization and reform promoted by Gorbachev allowed for articulation of national protest, demands (varying in strength) were made to change the existing imperial ethnic order which promoted Russian domination and redistribute power, resources and status among different ethnic groups populating the country.

National assertiveness of the indigenous populations came as a surprise to the ethnic Russians living in the periphery of the USSR. Ethnic Russians had been accustomed to playing a dominant role through the periphery of the Great Russian empire. Suddenly, almost over night, they had become foreigners in independent republics, their status reduced to that of an ethnic minority. This change was a rude awakening for Russians, entailing mixed feelings of resentment, dismay, incredulity and fear.

The disintegration of the Soviet empire rapidly undermined the political, economic and cultural dominance of the ethnic Russians. The rapid decline of the Communist party

meant that they were losing political protection, as well as the representation of their interests in the process of decision-making in the national republics. The majority of Russians feared economic reform because their economic base (i.e. employment in large, Moscow-run, industrial enterprises) was especially vulnerable to attempts of privatization and decentralization of the republics economies. Finally, Communist ideology, which justified and gave meaning to the social relations in which Russians played a crucial role, was in a deep crisis. Marxism-Leninism was being discredited by revelations of *glastnost* was rapidly losing its binding force. Thus, by the early 1990s, Russians found themselves in an inferior and vulnerable position compared to members of the titular nationalities of the former Soviet republics.

As Russians became increasingly aware of their subordinate position, they were confronted with the need to fundamentally reassess and redefine their self-image, place, and role in the national republics. Thus, the "Russian question"--a combination of structural marginalization of Russians and their exclusion from the processes of nation-state building in the successor states, emerged.

Consolidation of power by the new, strongly nationalistic, political elites in the successor states furthered anti-Russian sentiment (Brzezinski, 1989; Novikov, 1992). The sizable Russian minorities were perceived as a threat to newly acquired independence. Therefore, legislative, administrative, and other means have been used to prevent ethnic Russians from entering positions of power in the national republics. Citizenship Laws, for example, denied, *de facto*, the right for Russians to vote in the 1992 national elections in Latvia and Estonia, although Russians constituted about 35% and 30%, respectively, of the populations in these republics.

Russians protested this situation claiming citizenship and language legislation in the successor states excluded them from managerial and other high status positions, even though they may be equally, or more qualified for certain jobs than individuals of indigenous nationality. Furthermore, Russians have claimed: (a) that they have been discriminated against in politics, employment, property ownership, access to health and social programs, and in municipal affairs; (b) that the "mafia" and other sorts of "ethnic cliques" are running the new states; (c) and that local Russians were being made into scapegoats for all the injustice and crimes committed by the Soviet regime, and also for the current problems of the new states.[1]

It is evident that no politician in Russia will be able to ignore the plight of their ethnic kin in the periphery of the former Great Russian state. Already the situation of the Russian minorities is a central issue in the relations between Russia and the other successor states, and, at times, becomes more important than economic problems. Thus, Russia's current foreign policy, as well as its new military doctrine, have explicitly been directed towards protection of ethnic Russians in the countries of the "nearby abroad."[2]

Undoubtedly, the Russian diaspora will eventually revitalize itself from its current

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[1] For the comprehensive discussion of the Russian diaspora in the "nearby abroad" (in English) see Shlapentokh et al., 1994 and Kolstoe, 1995. Among numerous publications in Russian, see Drobizheva et al., 1992; the report on the situation of Russians in the former Soviet republics by the Gorbachev Foundation (1993), and the writings of the first minister of nationalities of post-Communist Russia, Valerii Tishkov (Tishkov, 1994a; Tishkov, 1994b).

[2] For more on the role of the "Russian question" in Russia's foreign policy see, for example, Kremenyuk, 1994; Migranian, 1994; Nikonov, 1994; and Porter and Saivetz, 1994. For a discussion of the role of Russian minorities in the military doctrine of Russia, see the statement on the country's military doctrine by Russia's Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev (Grachev, 1994).

subordinate and vulnerable situation because no post-Soviet country can be stable in the long-term if a substantial segment of its population is denied political representation and power-sharing. This is especially true with respect to Russians for a number of reasons. They constitute a significant percentage (between 10% to 37%) of the overall population in the successor states (with the exception of the Trans-Caucasus region) (Table 1), they are highly educated, and live primarily in urban areas. Furthermore, the majority of successor states share territorial borders with Russia. In addition, Russia, as of early 1994, had about 200,000 troops deployed in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Bohlen, 1994).

Accordingly, the primary question is, how will Russians in the successor states respond to the "Russian question?" Related pivotal questions include: What kind of new ethnic order will emerge in the successor states? Will the policies of Russification pursued by the Soviet state be replaced by, for example "Estonization" or "Uzbekization" of local Russians, or will more liberal nationality polices prevail? Will Russians be excluded from the newly forming polities and economies, and if so, from which institutions (state bureaucracies, National Armies, the police, education, social welfare) and to what degree? How will the Russian communities respond, and what strategies will they employ in adapting to the new situation? Will an ethnic or civil definition of the nation prevail in the new states of the former USSR?

These questions constitute the research problem of this dissertation. The major goal is to investigate (a) the dynamics of the disintegration of the Soviet ethno-political system that had sustained ethnic Russians' dominance in all major spheres of life in the society, and (b) the process of consolidation of the new patterns of ethnic stratification

Table 1. Russian Population in the Soviet Republics, 1989, (in thousands)*

Republic	Total Population	Russian Population	Russian Percentage of Total Population
Russian Federation	147,000	119,865	81.5
Ukraine	51,452	11,356	22.1
Kazakhstan	16,463	6,228	37.8
Uzbekistan	19,810	1,652	8.3
Belorus	10,152	1,342	13.2
Kyrgyzstan	4,258	917	21.5
Latvia	2,667	906	34.0
Moldova	4,335	562	13.0
Estonia	1,565	475	30.3
Azerbaijan	7,021	392	5.6
Tajikistan	5,093	388	7.6
Lithuania	3,675	344	9.4
Georgia	5,401	341	6.3
Turkmenistan	3,523	334	9.5
Armenia	3,305	52	1.6

* Source: 1989 Population Census

within the successor states of the former USSR, and position of Russians within it.

1.2 Research Objectives

The disintegration of the empire left Russians scattered across the republics. These republics differ significantly in terms of their social, political, and economic levels of development (e.g., the westernized Baltic republics, versus the underdeveloped Muslim Central Asia). Furthermore, Russians, by no means, represent a socially homogenous group. It is evident that the collapse of the Soviet state, and loss of their dominant status in the successor states, had a differential impact on the main social categories of Russians (e.g., former party officials and managers, versus workers).

The differences in conditions across the successor states, as well as the internal differentiation of ethnic Russians themselves, suggest that there will be significant variation in the timing, degree, and modalities of (a) the process of disintegration of the imperial ethno-political system of the Soviet state and consolidation of the new ethnic orders in the successor states, and (b) the patterns of transformation of ethnic Russians from majority, to minority groups. Furthermore, according to historical evidence, the transition of Russians to the status of a minority will be a protracted and uneven process.[3]

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[3] There was no universal pattern in the reactions of the Germans, Hungarians or Turks to the collapse of the, respectively, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Resistance to downclassing flared up, dissipated, and flared up again. The pattern of migration to the hinterland of the former empires was also uneven. It went from a steady trickle to no migration at all, and then, to a sudden mass exodus. The migration and re-settlement of Germans and Hungarians after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire continued for about for about three-quarters of a century. For more than a century, Turks were returning from the former periphery of the Ottoman empire to Turkey (Brubaker, 1993).

Therefore, the main research objectives are:

1. To provide a theoretical analysis of the notion of "ethnic transformation" and to develop a conceptual model for the analysis of ethnic transformation processes in the successor states of the Soviet Union.

2. To develop a system of empirical indicators that allow description of the transformation process of ethnic Russians from majority, to minority group, in the new states of the former USSR.

3. To determine the major factors that affect ethnic Russians' transformation from majority to minority group across the successor states.

4. To describe the character of the emerging new ethnopolitical systems in the new states of the former USSR, and the position of ethnic Russians in them.

This dissertation is organized in the following way: Chapter one reviews the literature on ethnicity, ethnic conflict and change, including studies on the Russian diaspora in the successor states of the former USSR. This chapter provides an outline of the theoretical model of ethnic transformation to be used in the analysis of ethnic Russians transformation from majority to minority group.

Chapter two presents an overview of the origins and formation of ethnic stratification in the periphery of the Soviet Union. Chapter three describes the changes in the patterns of ethnic stratification as they've occurred since WWII, up until the early 1980s. Particular attention is paid to the impact modernization policies had on ethnic stratification. Chapter four analyzes the ethnic transformation process during the period of *perestroika*, and chapter five is devoted to the analysis of the ethnopolitical systems that have emerged in the new states since the collapse of the USSR.

2. ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE USSR: FROM THE "OLD" TO A "NEW" ETHNIC ORDER

Ethnic stratification represents a fundamental form of social inequality. It is expressed in an unequal access to power, resources and status among individuals of different ethnic origins. Ethnic stratification is achieved through, and stabilized by, institutions, laws, norms, and values. Yet, ethnic stratification is also inherently unstable. Being based on unequal relationships among groups, it is subject to a process of conflict, negotiation and change. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, ethnic transformation is defined as the process by which legal, political, economic and social institutions, that uphold an ethnic order in a society, are replaced by new social institutions. These new institutions formalize and stabilize the changes that occurred, in access to power, resources and prestige, among individuals of different ethnic origins.

Chronologically, ethnic transformation represents the time period between the "old" ethnic order and the "new" ethnic order. Following Rustow's (1970) example, the process of ethnic transformation in the successor states of the Soviet Union is divided into three stages.[4]

Preparatory phase of ethnic transformation process in the national republics of the USSR began with the liberalization of the Communist regime. During preparatory stage polarization between and among ethnic groups occurred. Ethnic polarization marked a period of decline of Russian dominance in the ethnically diverse periphery of the Soviet

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[4] Rustow developed his periodization to characterize the process of transition from authoritarian political regime to democracy.

state. Attempts were made by subordinate ethnic groups to re-define the rules governing access to power, status and resources in the republics. However, the strength and character of the challenge to the superordinate Russian position varied significantly across the national republics of the USSR.

Ethnic polarization between indigenous populations and ethnic Russians was occurring psychologically and socially. Psychologically, it strengthened ethnic and local identities and rejected Soviet identity as being alien and imposed. This occurred because the order which upheld the Soviet reality (e.g., unquestionable authority of the party, the official Marxist-Leninist mythology, deification of the General Secretaries and party leaders, elaborate public rituals, etc.) was rapidly disintegrating. As a result, ethnic Russians who overwhelmingly identified themselves as "Soviets" were increasingly redefined by the locals as "Russians," that is, as representatives and the embodiment of the alien and repressive empire on "their land."

For ethnic Russians, such change in the attitudes towards them was quite a surprise. They had difficulty in understanding how one day, so suddenly, the harmonious inter-ethnic relationships, and the "friendship of people" could turn into hostile, suspicious, increasingly contemptuous attitudes towards them.

Socially, ethnic polarization was expressed in the breaking down of inter-ethnic communication and the relationships between indigenous and Russian populations (e.g., the refusal to speak in Russian in the streets, at work, in shops, etc.) At the same time, individuals were retreating into ethnically homogenous environments, with decreasing numbers of contacts and friends across ethnic lines.

This preparatory phase was followed by a decision phase during which some

crucial elements of the new ethnic order in the national republics were institutionalized. These elements of the new ethnic order included: legislation on indigenous languages that regulated the use of indigenous and Russian languages in the territory of the republics; legislation on the reform of the system of education that changed not only content, but the access of people of different ethnic origins to education in the national republics; and legislation concerning the sovereignty of the republics defining who are the subjects of the republics, and how sovereignty between the Center and the republics is to be divided.

It is important to note that the decision phase did not necessarily lead to the institutionalization of new ethnic hierarchies, in which titular ethnic groups claimed superordinate positions vis-á-vis ethnic Russians. There were also attempts to negotiate political and social orders in which any type of ethnic hierarchies would be abolished.

During the final phase of the ethnic transition process (a) the "ethnic order" was finalized, elaborated and applied to all major spheres of life in the independent states, and (b) the members of different ethnic groups were habituated to the "new ethnic rules." Finalization of the new ethnic order was expressed in the adoption of the constitutions of the new states.

At the same time, the new ethnic order was elaborated and applied to: regulations on residency permits (Rus. *propiska*); participation in the privatization process; participation in elections; access to housing; access to government employment (including the National Armies and Police); and, to access to education and other social welfare services. Again, there was wide variation among the successor states in the scope and degree to which the new ethnic order promoted superordination of individuals of indigenous nationalities, vis-á-vis individuals of non-indigenous (including Russian) ethnic

origins.

Chronologically, the end of the preparatory stage and the beginning of the ethnic transformation decision phase is commonly regarded as having occurred in the late 1989, when the first relatively free elections were held in the country. The beginning of the consolidation phase is commonly considered to be December of 1991, when the USSR was officially dissolved and the Commonwealth of Independent States was created in its place.

Of course, there is no clear cut line between different stages in the process of ethnic transformation. Erosion of the Russians' dominant position in the national republics of the USSR had begun long before Gorbachev started his reforms. Similarly, the processes of consolidation of the new ethnic orders in the successor states will proceed into the foreseeable future. Furthermore, in the different regions these periods will have different beginning and ending dates of their own. In this dissertation, dividing the process of ethnic transformation into three phases is done, first of all, for analytical purposes, so as to indicate that the processes and dynamics of ethnic transformation in any one phase are qualitatively different from those occurring during the other stages.

2.1 The Change of Ethnic Russians' Status in the Successor States: Coping with Plurality

In the literature that analyzes the ethnic stratification of the Soviet Union there is broad consensus on the description of the old ethnic order that existed during the Soviet years. A significant majority of research and analysis, in the West and in Russia, agree on the characterization of the Soviet Union as an empire. In the Russian press, for example,

the USSR is commonly referred to as an empire.

The Soviet Union was an empire in a sense that it was (a) made up of many peoples, and (b) was ruled by a central power representing ethnic Russians. Thus, the Soviet empire was inherently, an inequitable political arrangement, a relationship of subordination and superordination, which was hierarchical and usually exploitive of non-Russian ethnic groups. Furthermore, the Soviet empire maintained relationships, between the ruling Russian and the subordinate non-Russian ethnic groups, more by force and violence than by consensus. The non-Russian ethnic groups had no choice but to accept a subordinate role in the empire (Suny, 1995; Motyl, 1993, pp.33-34).

However, significant difficulties arise when attempting to define what kinds of new ethnic orders are emerging in the successor states. Researchers and analysts are confronted with a multiplicity of causes and a plurality of evolving new ethnic orders. First of all, there is great variation in ethnic dynamics across the regions of the former USSR. Although mass-based national movements were characteristic to the European region of the USSR and, to some degree, to Transcaucasus (e.g., Armenia, Georgia), there were no anti-colonial or anti-Russian mass movements in Central Asia. This was the case despite the fact that during the late 1970s a majority of experts on ethnicity in the USSR believed that this Muslim region was most prone to anti-Russian conflict and violence (d'Encausse, 1978). Instead, violent ethnic conflict between the indigenous population and ethnic Russians exploded in the Moldovan republic, which is located in the southwestern USSR.

Secondly, since independence, there were increasing differences in the situation of ethnic Russians across successor states located in the same region. Thus, the

circumstances of Russians in Uzbekistan were increasingly dissimilar from those of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Even across the small Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the situation of ethnic Russians differs dramatically. The majority of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are still restricted in their access to citizenship of these two countries, which is not the case in neighboring Lithuania.

The changing "trajectories" of the ethnic transformation process also represent a significant challenge to conceptualizing this process. With the sudden and quite unexpected rise of mass national movements in the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, a majority of commentators began to speak about underestimating the power of ethnic sentiments and nationalism in the contemporary world (Connor, 1994; Kellas, 1991; Laitin et al., 1992; Motyl, 1990) The production of literature on nationalism in the USSR and in successor countries of the Soviet Union skyrocketed. However, since the early 1990s, mass ethnic mobilization began to decline throughout the territory of the former USSR. In the countries that were dominated by national movements (e.g., Lithuania, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) ex-Communists returned to power through democratic elections reflecting the dramatic change in the mood and situation in the successor states. Once nationalism began to decline some commentators began talking about the overestimation of nationalism's significance and power (Laqueur, 1994).

Finally, there were important differences in ethnic dynamics across the new states of the former USSR. Thus, in Latvia and Estonia, tensions between the indigenous populations and ethnic Russians seems to periodically flare up, then decline, and then, rise again. Similarly, in a "wave-like" fashion, tensions rise between Crimea, which is populated predominantly by ethnic Russians, and Ukraine proper.

The literature devoted to ethnic studies has difficulty in dealing with the synchronic and diachronic plurality of ethnic changes that occured throughout the former Soviet geopolitical space. Most analyses in the field are based on what could be called the "deviations from ideal conditions" model. Thus, researchers are attempting to describe ethnic transformation processes by asking such questions as: How far removed or close is the ethnic order from the ideal of democracy?[5] How big or small is the potential for ethnic conflict?[6]

Even the most sophisticated analyses of the Russian diaspora are based on an estimation of some kind of "deviations from an ideal condition." Thus, Kolstoe (1995) treats the "Russian question" as if it is produced by a "mismatch" between the cultural and political boundaries of the Russian Federation and the fourteen new successor states. Under this assumption, it follows that a decrease in the mismatching of the political and cultural boundaries of the titular and Russian ethnic groups would result in stabilization, while an increase would escalate ethnic conflicts and instability.

Although measuring the degree to which empirical realities deviate from some ideal condition is an appropriate research method, such an approach is inadequate because it is primarily descriptive in character, and, therefore, has weak heuristic capacities. Using this method, for example, one could argue that "mismatches" between the cultural and political boundaries of the Russian and indigenous ethnic groups is of the same magnitude

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[5] See, for example, Diamond and Plattner, 1994; Khazanov, 1995; Rupesinghe and Vorkunova, 1992; Rywkin, 1994.

[6] See, for example, Buttino, 1992; Duncan and Holman, 1994; Kremenyuk, 1994 and Kuzio, 1994.

in both Kazakhstan and Estonia. The size of Russian population in both countries is approximately the same (30% and 37%). Russian knowledge of the indigenous language in Estonia, although significantly higher than in Kazakhstan (15% compared to 1% in Kazakhstan) is still rather low (Table 2). In both states, the Russian population is geographically concentrated in areas bordering the Russian Federation.

However, the situation of ethnic Russians in the more westernized and economically developed Estonia is fundamentally different from the Russian situation in the poor and relatively underdeveloped Kazakhstan (which has a clan-based social structure). Similarly, it can be said that deviations from an ideal democratic political order are much larger in Turkmenistan, (which is presently ruled by the neo-Stalinist regime of President Niyazov) than in the more democratic Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, ethnic Russians feel much safer in Turkmenistan, and migration is much lower from Turkmenistan, than Kyrgyzstan.

There are a variety of reasons for the predominance of "deviation" models in the analyses of ethnic transformation in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In part, deviation models are employed due to a "predestination slant" which is deeply ingrained in Western social and political thought. A predestination slant is expressed in assumptions that the fundamental political, economic and social processes in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR have a direction, and are moving from "socialism to capitalism," from "authoritarianism to democracy," and from "empire to nations." Characteristically, the majority of former Sovietology publications were renamed as *transition* journals, implying a direction to the fundamental processes occurring in Eastern

Table 2. Ethnicity and Knowledge of Russian/Indigenous Language, 1989*

	Indigenous Population Know Russian	Russians Know Indigenous Language
Estonia	35	15
Latvia	68	22
Lithuania	38	38
Moldova	58	12
Ukraine	72	34
Kazakhstan	63	1
Kyrgyzstan	39	1.5
Uzbekistan	23	4
Turkmenistan	29	2
Tajikistan	32	2.5

* Source: 1989 Census.

Europe and countries of the former USSR.[7]

Perhaps the most vivid of such Hegelian conceptualizations of history is expressed in Fukuyama's widely acclaimed book, "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992). In this book Fukuyama treats the collapse of the USSR as an end of the dialectical process of historical development. In the dissolution of socialism, the Hegelian logos finally reveals itself in its most perfect form, a liberal-democratic state, thereby bringing an end to history.

However, more fundamentally "deviations from ideal conditions" models are influenced by the conceptualization of the phenomenon of ethnicity itself. What follows is a brief description of the prevailing approaches to the analysis of ethnicity, and the difficulties that arise when attempting to conceptualize ethnic transformation in the successor states of the Soviet Union.

2.2 Ethnicity: Primordialist versus Constructivist Accounts

In the social sciences two major approaches towards ethnicity predominate, primordialism and instrumentalism. Primordialists argue that ethnic consciousness is a part of "human nature," "a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." (Connor, 1994, p.92). Accordingly, the primordial perspective asserts that ethnic identity

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[7] For example, the former British "Journal of Communist Studies" was renamed the "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics." The World Bank publishes a newsletter entitled, "Transitions." For a review of the "transitions" literature see section 2.5 in this chapter.

leads to the emergence of ethnic stratification in a multicultural environment (Geertz, 1973).

Alternatively, instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a modern historical invention, the effect of some sort of domination (Gellner, 1983; Pearson, 1993). In their opinion, ethnicity is not a major structuring force in a society, but, rather, is a specific type of ideology that legitimizes or challenges the inequalities of class, power, and status in a society.

Currently most commentators adhere to the middle ground, neo-Weberian position, which incorporates elements of both perspectives (see, for example, Agniew, 1993; Comaroff, 1991; Smith, 1986; Smith, 1993). Although they accept the proposition that ethnic identification is a universal characteristic of human consciousness, ethnic consciousness is seen only as a potentiality. Ethnic consciousness is transformed into national identity only when it operates "in conjunction with conflicts arising from other sources, most notably in economic and political spheres" (Rex, 1992, p.305).

The problem with primordialism, as asserted numerous times by its critics, is that it reifies the concept of ethnicity. Primordialism, as applied to developments in the former USSR, suggests there was an "awakening" of ethnic sentiments and passions as soon as Gorbachev lifted the threat of violence and repression. One problem with this primordial interpretation is that the "awakening" of ethnicity occurred very unevenly across the periphery of the USSR. In some regions this awakening occurred during early *perestroika*, (e.g, the Baltics), in other regions it only transpired after the collapse of the USSR, (e.g., North Caucasus), while still other regions were barely awakened at all (e.g., Turkmenistan). Furthermore, after being awakened, ethnic sentiments in some republics

declined, as occurred in Lithuania, Moldova, and Georgia, while other regions went through periods in which such sentiments rose, declined, and then rose again (e.g., Estonia and Latvia).[8]

Similarly, instrumentalism also has difficulty in dealing with the plurality of outcomes and the changing dynamics of ethnic transformation. It does not explain why the efforts of "ethnic entrepreneurs" sometimes lead to success, while at other times attempts to initiate the ethnic mobilization process fail, despite exhaustive efforts. Finally, a problem with the middle- ground, neo-Weberian position on ethnicity, is its meager explanatory power. It is purely descriptive because it cannot describe the direction of causal relationships.[9]

In sum, the major weakness of the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches is that they begin the investigation of ethnicity from attempts to define its essence. This creates enormous difficulties when attempting to explain how the multiplicity of outcomes were produced with the same, singular "essence" (e.g., primordial sentiments or economic/political interests).

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[8] For a more comprehensive critique of the primordial approach in studying ethnicity in the USSR see, Tishkov 1991; Tishkov, 1996.

[9] More on application of the concepts of instrumentalism and primordialism and their derivatives to the analysis ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conflicts in the USSR, see a special issue of "Theory and Society" journal edited by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1991).

2.3 Ethnicity, Ethnic group and Nation

Alternatively, the problem of ethnicity can be approached by (a) asking what are the conditions that lead to the rise and/or decline of ethnic identification and ethnic mobilization, and (b) by treating the ethnicity phenomenon as a continuum rather than as a "fixed essence" (Brass, 1970). A useful starting point for developing such an approach are the Marxist notions of a "class-in-itself" and a "class-for-itself." In other words, the relationship between ethnicity and ethnic group can be treated in a way in which class consciousness is related to the category of class (Brass, 1980, p.3).

If the categories of an "ethnic-group-in-itself" and an "ethnic-group-for-itself" are accepted, then ethnicity becomes characteristic of the process of self-conscious ethnic group formation. Like class consciousness, ethnic consciousness is a continuum. On one end of the continuum are ethnic groups as categories of academic or statistical classifications of individuals. Ethnic groups can be statistically differentiated by a wide range of cultural markers, for example, differences in languages among ethnic groups, their culture, dietary habits, styles of dressing, etc.

Cultural differences among ethnic categories of people may (or may not) lead to the formation of the communities. An ethnic community is defined as a group of people that use cultural symbols in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. The individuals comprising an ethnic community share a common ethnic identity, that is, a subjective self-consciousness of belonging to a group defined by common cultural symbols. Ethnic identity also involves a claim to status, or recognition by other social groups in a society, and by the state. In its most general form, the ethnic community can

be compared to the interest group, which collectively acts and lobbies the government for protection of its language and culture, an increasing share of resources, access to jobs, and education for its members.

An ethnic community becomes politicized when it puts forward claims for control over the territory where it resides, or the whole country, and acts upon these claims. If the ethnic community succeeds in achieving such goals, either within the existing state or in a state of their own, it becomes a nation. A nation may be characterized as a peculiar type of politicized ethnic community with recognized group rights within the political system (Brass, 1980, pp. 1-28).

2.4 From "Ethnic-Group-in-Itself" to "Ethnic-Group-for-Itself" and Back

Pursuing this Marxist line of reasoning one step further raises the following question: what are the conditions that produce the shifts from ethnic category to ethnic community and nationality, as well as movements in the opposite direction, i.e., from nationality to ethnic community and ethnic category? It can be argued that movement along the "ethnic category--nationality" continuum is produced by three, simultaneously occurring struggles for access to power, resources and status: (a) the struggle between the state and ethnic groups, (b) that among ethnic groups, and (c) the struggle within ethnic groups (Figure 1) (Brass, 1985; Brubaker, 1995a). For the sake of brevity, further reference to these three relationships will be referred to as the "triadic relationship," or "triadic nexus."[10]

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[10] The notion of "triadic nexus" follows from Brubaker, 1995a.



Figure 1. Ethnic Transformation in the Sucessor States of the Former USSR.

The following is a brief description of these relationships. A state's nationality policies are crucial in an ethnic group's formation, or, on the contrary, in the "de-ethnization" of the population. This was especially the case in the Soviet Union where civil society was almost non-existent and where the state had penetrated and bureaucratized all social institutions. Although the state is usually dominated by one ethnic group, it cannot be reduced to the role of the dominant ethnic group's instrument. The state acts upon many different sets of interests that usually overlap, but which do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the dominant ethnic group. The state strives to assure its territorial integrity, internal stability, and economic and social development. In some cases the state's interests can be contrary to the interests of the dominant ethnic group, as the history of the Soviet Union demonstrates. Thus, the imperial regime in Moscow chose to finance the socio-economic development of the periphery by channeling resources from the Russian Federation. In addition, states usually have their own "ethnic interests" that do not coincide with the interests of the dominant ethnic group. Thus, the Soviet state was actively engaged in creating a supra-ethnic "Soviet" identity that was supposed to be built on class rather than ethnic identities.

State policies have two kinds of impact on ethnic group formation (link 1, Figure 1). The state produces "vertical" social divisions *within* ethnic groups, and "horizontal" social differentiation and inequalities *between* ethnic groups. Both types of ethnic stratification--vertical and horizontal--can, in turn, result from direct or indirect effects of state policies regarding ethnic relations. The state can create social, economic, status inequalities among ethnic groups by explicitly promoting one group's language, culture, and its social mobility, while restricting the possibilities for the social and economic

advancement of other ethnic groups. The Kremlin, for example, promoted the Russian language and culture by narrowing the functioning spheres of the indigenous languages. Policies of Russification (which varied in strength through time) were put in place to promote the assimilation of non-Russian ethnic groups. The Soviet empire state also limited the social mobility of individuals of non-Russian ethnicity, exclusively reserving the upper levels of state hierarchy for ethnic Russians.

State policies also produce social, economic, professional and other types of divisions within ethnic groups. Some segments of the population (e.g., those loyal to the regime, or the intelligentsia and intellectuals) within an ethnic group might be chosen for preferential treatment and promotion (Shlapentokh, 1990). Other groups, like the *kulaks* (Rus. rich peasants) in the Soviet state, may be singled out for destruction and annihilation. In response to the differential treatment and social and economic opportunities, some members of ethnic groups may choose to integrate into the dominant ethnic group, some may choose to resist, and some may just be passive and not express any particular ethnic interests or concerns.

State's policies can also have indirect or unintended effects on ethnic group formation. For example, policies of economic modernization and development, urbanization, and expansion of education were designed by the Kremlin to promote social equality, assimilation and integration of the Soviet society. However, in actuality, modernization policies led to the consolidation of a majority of the ethnic groups populating the USSR, heightened their ethnic identity, and increased ethnic groups' capacities to act in defence of their collective interests (Suny, 1992).

The intersection of "vertical" inequalities (internal differentiation within an ethnic

group) with "horizontal" inequalities (differences in access to power, resources and status between ethnic groups) can lead to three outcomes (Figure 1, Link #2, connecting Box A & Box B). First, it can result in the privatization of ethnicity, in which ethnicity would remain just a statistical or aesthetic category of individuals. Second, the intersection of inequalities along "vertical" and "horizontal" stratification axes can lead to the formation of an ethnic community. Finally, under some circumstances, an ethnic community can be transformed into a nationality or nation.

The outcome of intra- and inter-ethnic dynamics, be it ethnic category, ethnic community or nationality, will (a) "feed back" into the state (Figure 1, Link #3) and (b) will influence the stances taken by members of one ethnic group towards other ethnic groups (Figure 1, Link #4). If struggles within and between ethnic groups result in the privatization of ethnicity, then a depolitization of ethnicity will occur. In such a situation, individuals will demand that the state protect them from ethnicity-based discrimination. The privatization of ethnicity also indicates that a process of ethnic assimilation between ethnic groups is under way.

If the result of struggles within and between ethnic groups is the formation of an ethnic community, then the ethnic community will demand that the state provide for its cultural, social, economic, and other rights. The formation of an ethnic community will also be expressed in increased pressures to exclude from it individuals of other ethnic origins. Finally, the formation of a nationality group will manifest itself in demands for the state to institutionalize some form of self-rule, for example, territorial autonomy, confederation, or succession and independence. With regard to other ethnic groups in a society, the nationality group can engage in activities that will subordinate ethnic others.

2.5 Ethnic Transformation as a Change in the Mode of Conflict Resolution

The next step in the construction of an ethnic transformation model requires the overlaying of two aspects of ethnic transformation: (a) the synchronic feature, which refers to the stages of transition, and (b) the diachronic feature, which refers to the triadic relationships (1) among state and ethnic groups, (2) between ethnic groups, and (3) within ethnic groups (both features are described on pages 8-12). The synchronic aspect of analysis should answer the question "*why* ethnic transformation is occurring," while the diachronic should explain "*how* ethnic transformation is occurring."

In the ethnic studies literature, the "why" and "how" of ethnic transition are usually analyzed separately. Macro-oriented studies focus on the analysis of the synchronic aspect of ethnic transformation (i.e., on long term change in structural conditions that underlay ethnic transformation). Studies of political strategies and choices usually "bracket out" structural analysis and, instead, concentrate on the diachronic aspect of ethnic transformation.[11]

Macro-theoretical approaches (e.g., the "internal colonialism" framework) (Hechter, 1975; Hechter, 1985) or ethnic the competition approach (Belanger and Pinard, 1991; Olzak, 1992; Olzak and Nagel, 1986;) concentrate on analyses of the impacts of modernization and development on ethnic stratification. Among studies that focus on political strategies and choices, applications using rational choice theory to analyze ethnic relations are rapidly expanding (see, for example, Hechter, 1983; Hechter, 1986; Hechter and Furtado, 1992; Motyl, 1990; Olson, 1990; Ostrom, 1991). There are also attempts to

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[11] For a review of the literature on ethnic conflict and change see Olzak, 1983.

apply Hirschman's framework, which categorizes ethnic group response as "voice," "loyalty," and "exit," (Hirschman, 1970; Hirschman, 1981) to analysis of the ethnic dynamics in the countries of the former USSR (e.g., Gerner and Hedlund, 1993).

Finally, to the category of literature on political process must be added the literature that can be loosely defined as "Soviet elite studies." These are studies of personnel and personalities at the top echelon of the Soviet nomenclature (within the Kremlin, as well as in the capitals of the national republics).[12] Authors of this literature try to investigate (a) how ethnicity has affected (or had been used) in the internal struggle among the elites, and (b) how leaders of various elite groups had used ethnicity, ethnic sentiments and ancient ethnic hatreds for the purposes of political mobilization in the national republics.[13]

Most recently there was significant expansion of the literature attempting to integrate both the structural and political process approaches (Bova, 1991; Brubaker, 1994; Ekiert, 1991; Gordon and Pliskevich, 1996; Karl, 1990; Roeder, 1994; Rozman et

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[12] The Post-Communist studies of elites have their roots in the so-called "Kremlinology," a genre that dominated the field of Soviet studies during the 1960s and 1970s. For reviews of Sovietology, including Kremlinology, see Motyl, 1992c; Remnick, 1994.

[13] This literature is voluminous and continues to grow rapidly as the Soviet archives are being opened, not only to domestic researchers, but also to researchers from the West. In addition, a whole international industry emerged that is engaged in publishing biographies and memoirs of the former Soviet apparatchiks, diplomats, Army and KGB generals, and spies. A review of this literature would require a separate study. The following is a list of the studies on Soviet elites that appear to be most pertinent to the issue of ethnic transformation. For studies focusing on Central Asia, see Critchlow, 1991; Dannreuther, 1994; Fierman, 1991 and Ro'i, 1995; for studies focusing on the Baltics see Lieven, 1993; Senn, 1995; and Taagepera, 1993; and for studies on the Ukraine elite see, Krawchenko, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994; and Motyl, 1993.

al., 1992; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993). However, most analyses concentrate on the subject of political transition, that is, transition from authoritarian political systems to polyarchies.[14] Although ethnic issues do figure within these analyses, little attention is paid to the specifics of ethnic transformation.

The following is an outline of the framework used in this study. Although the framework draws extensively on the political transformation literature that integrates both the structural and political process approaches, the suggested model extends this integrative approach to an analysis of the process of ethnic transformation.

Following Welsh (1994), it is suggested that the category in which the strategic and structural dimensions of ethnic transformation "intersect" is a mode of conflict resolution within the triadic relationships. By "mode of conflict resolution" we refer to the process by which access to power, resources and status among individuals of diferent ethnic origins is defined. As the process of transformation moves from the preparatory phase to the decision phase and then to the consolidation of the new ethnic order stage, the mode of conflict resolution within the triadic relationships changes.

During the preparatory phase the triadic relationships (i.e., between state and ethnic groups; between ethnic groups; within ethnic groups) were dominated by the Soviet state's command and imposition mode of conflict resolution (Figure 2). Once liberalization of the authoritarian regime began, there was a decline of command and imposition as the prevailing mode of conflict resolution. Instead, bargaining and negotiations emerged as key features of the transition process.

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[14] For a comprehensive overview of the transitions literature on Eastern Europe, see Lewis, 1995.



Figure 2. Phases of Ethnic Transformation and Modes of Conflict Resolution (Based on Horowitz, 1985 and Welsh, 1994).

The change from a command and imposition mode to a bargaining and negotiation mode occurs because liberalization undermines the power of the Moscow's imperial rule to impose Russian dominance on other ethnic groups. Declining power of the Center allows the actors in the triadic relationship to challenge the dominace of the ethnic Russians within the USSR. However, opposition to Russian dominance (despite the declining Moscow's power) is not strong enough to displace the Center and impose new principles of ethnic stratification. Therefore, a period of high uncertainty ensues with regard to the process of how power, resources, and status should be distributed among members of different ethnic groups, and its actual results. Actors within the triadic relationships (e.g., the National-Communist and conservative factions within the Communist party, National movements, dissident groups, embryonic political parties, and religious groups) can establish a variety of coalitions within and across the ethnic divide.[15]

The development of coalitions can rapidly change the power balance in the republics and the country. Therefore, the bargaining and negotiation process can lead to a wide variety of outcomes. It can produce negotiated agreements on the future status of ethnic Russians within the republics, in the form of citizenship and language legislation, or laws regarding a republic's territorial autonomy. The process of negotiation can also be aborted, and attempts can be made to impose one group's domination over others. Whatever the outcome of the decision phase, it will fundamentally shape the future

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[15] Thus, Yeltsin made alliances with the nationalist led governments in the Baltics, opposing the Central government. Hard-line Communist factions within the Baltic Communist parties associated with the Soviet military and KGB forces. National-communists within the republics can ally with the leadership of the National Fronts, or the pro-reform Gorbachev leadership.

dynamics of ethnic relationships in the republics.

Finally, the mode of conflict resolution predominating during the consolidation phase depends on the direction that the ethnic transformation had shifted during the process of negotiation (Figure 2). If Russian superordination $(\frac{R}{I})$ was replaced by the indigenous group superordination $(\frac{I}{R})$, or if ethnic Russians were able to reclaim their imperial status $(\frac{R}{I})$, the consolidation process would operate through the command and imposition. If ethnic stratification evolved from a Russian superordination-based system, to an unranked ethnic stratification system (R/I) (e.g., federal state), then the relationships between ethnic groups would be characterized by the competition and cooperation modes of conflict resolution. And, lastly, if the ethnic transformation process led to the abolition of the ethnic divisions altogether, then a non-ascriptive class system would emerge. In non-ascriptive class systems, ethnicity is "privatized" and becomes largely an aesthetic category. In the remaining sections of this chapter the concepts of "mode of conflict resolution" and the "triadic relationship model" are to an analysis of preparatory, decision and consolidation phases of the ethnic transformation process.

2.6 The Preparatory Phase of Ethnic Transformation

During the Soviet years the most important factors in producing "vertical" (within ethnic groups) and "horizontal" types of stratification were the policies of the Soviet state (Figure 1, Box A). Additionally, the Communist regime actively intervened in the process of identity/self-organization of ethnic group formation (Figure 1, Box B).

The Soviet state affected the processes of ethnic group identity/self-organization formation in two major ways. First, the Kremlin assumed the role of final arbiter and mediator in relationships among ethnic groups, as well as in the regulation of relationships among the different strata within ethnic groups. This was achieved through: (a) a bureaucratization and centralization of Soviet society, in which all horizontal types of relationships characterizing civil society were transformed into vertical types of relationships; and (b) a resolution of a majority of the conflicts between and within ethnic groups through command and imposition.

Omnipotency of the Soviet empire vis-á-vis ethnic groups was expressed in its capacity to define and rank more than 100 ethnic groups that populated the USSR. Ethnic groups were classified into four categories decreasing in their status and administrative autonomy. On the top of the ethno-territorial hierarchy there national republics, that were followed by ethnic autonomous republics, ethnic autonomous oblasts' (rus. *region*) and ethnic autonomus krais' (rus. *county*). In addition imperial Center watched and regulated the ethnic composition (proportion of ethnic Russians in comparison to the numbers of indigenous population) within republic level ministries, the police, Communist Party, and in other sensitive positions. Similarly, the Center supervised the distribution of housing

and other scarce resources among members of different ethnic groups. If such distribution became skewed in favor of any one group, the state would intervene to restore social justice.

Observing that state regulated inter-ethnic relationships through command and imposition modes, does not mean that there was no bargaining or negotiation between the state and various actors within ethnic groups. In all authoritarian systems bargaining and compromise are to some degree present (Welsh, 1990, p.383). Accordingly, there were periods in Soviet history during which the indigenous elite's administrative autonomy increased. For example, the flourishing of National Communism in the late 1920s, and the campaigns for the "indigenization of party cadres," during Khrushchev's thaw during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

However, the Communist regime pursued nationality policies, first and foremost, in order to strengthen the empire. Therefore, any tendencies that were considered dangerous to the state were ruthlessly suppressed. Consequently, after periods of increased administrative autonomy of the indigenous elites there usually followed periods of re-centralization of the empire and increasing Russification. Examples of such a reaction include Stalin's purges in the early 1930s, and Khrushchev's removal and Brezhnev's ascendence to power in 1964.

The Soviet state also indirectly affected ethnic stratification formation. Two major factors must be taken into account in this respect. First, the policies of massive economic and social development and modernization of the periphery (from WWII up until the late 1960s) and, second, the Soviet society's economic and social stagnation and decline (since the early 1970s). The interaction of (a) the nationality policies pursued by the Communist

regime, with (b) the effects of the rapid expansion and then contraction of the Soviet economy, had uneven and contradictory effects on the development of the indigenous ethnic groups throughout the periphery of the USSR.

Some republics, threatened by assimilation, in-migration, and linguistic Russification, were consolidating ethnically (e.g., the Baltics). In the Slavic republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, these same developments were, on the contrary, leading to the acceleration of the Ukrainians' and Byelorussians' assimilation into the Russian nation. The contradictive and uneven effects of the preparatory phase profoundly shaped the process of ethnic transformation during the next, decision period.

2.7 The Decision Stage in the Process of Ethnic Transformation

With the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms the Soviet state's domination in the triadic relationship began to decline. Gorbachev's reforms undermined the Central government's powers, both horizontally and vertically. The Soviets that previously had been rubber-stamping the decisions made in Moscow, started to accumulate power at the expense of the Party. Moreover, political opposition to the party regime emerged. Reforms also undermined the power of the Central government in its ability to rule territorial and national units of the state. Devolution of power to localities resulted in the "parade of sovereignties," and a "war of laws" between Moscow and the regions. Almost all administrative units within the Sovier empire were claiming primacy of their laws against those issued by the Central government.

As the Center continued to decline, a situation evolved in which Moscow could

not impose its will on the republics, yet, the republics could not set their own policies either. Therefore, the command and imposition mode which dominated relationships within the triadic nexus declined, and negotiation and bargaining over the "new" ethnic order began.

The decision phase represents a crucial juncture in the process of ethnic transformation. It is a point in history when a society is facing some, or even many, transformations in its future. The decisions and choices made during this significant time period profoundly shape the subsequent future of the society. What determines the process of negotiation and bargaining for the emergemce of a new ethnic order in a society? What positions are taken by the major actors in the triadic nexus of relationships, and why do they choose such positions? For analytical purposes two sets of factors can be delineated: structural and strategic.

2.7.1 The Structural Dimensions of the Decision Phase

Structural characteristics refer to socio-historical, political, economic and other conditions, within which a process of negotiation and bargaining occurs. The previous history of societal development (i.e. situation as it evolved during the preparatory period) to a large degree determines the possibilities and constraints of each actor in the triadic relationship.

There are three dimensions of ethnic transformation involving the change of status of ethnic Russians in the national republics: (a) the situation of ethnic Russians in the national republic, vis-á-vis the situation and possibilities in the Russian Federation; (b) the

power balance between ethnic groups; and (c) the salience of ethnic stratification. All three of these dimensions are derived from application of the "triadic nexus model" described in a figure 1. Thus, the variable "circumstance of ethnic Russians in the national republics, vis-á-vis the situation and/or possibilities in the Russian Federation" represents the outcome of the Soviet state's policies directed toward the periphery of the country.

The power balance between ethnic groups refers to the potential of the indigenous ethnic group and ethnic Russians to impose their will on one another. The salience of ethnic stratification refers to the degree to which internal social divisions *within* an ethnic group are stronger or weaker, vis-á-vis status differences *between* ethnic groups. Collectively, these three dimensions constitute the possibilities and constraints that actors within tiradic relationship faced during the *perestroika* period. The following is a brief description of each of them.

The "Push and Pull" Between the Russian Federation and the National Republics. The bargaining and negotiation over the future status of ethnic Russians in the national republics has a profoundly dual character. The ethnic Russians' framework of perceptions and actions is based on a perpetual comparison of their circumstances in the national republic, versus the situation and/or possibilities they might encounter in the Russian Federation. The duality of the framework is largely determined by the demographic characteristics of the Russian diaspora. On average, about 45% of the Russian diaspora were born in the Russian Federation, which indicates the existence of close relationships with relatives and friends in Russia (Table 3).

Secondly, the degree of the ethnic Russian's integration into the local societies remained low. This was especially the case in Central Asia, where the Russian

Table 3. Native-Born and Immigrant Russians As a Percentage of Total Russian Population in the Republics, 1989*

	Native-Born	Immigrant
Estonia	65.1	34.9
Latvia	41.6	58.4
Lithuania	38.4	61.6
Ukraine	42.3	57.7
Moldova	43.3	56.7
Kazakhstan	46.8	53.2
Kyrgyzstan	45.3	54.7
Uzbekistan	48.3	51.7
Turkmenistan	43.3	56.7
Tajikistan	47.1	52.9

Source: Arutiunian (1992)

community's knowledge of the local language did not exceed 5%, despite the fact that close to 60% of the Russian diaspora were born in the region (Table 2). Lastly, the Russian diaspora represented the most mobile segment of the Russian population.

In sum, any claims made by the local Russians in regard to their political, economic or cultural rights need to be interpreted in the context of a comparison between: (a) the situation in the Russian Federation and (b) their circumstances in the national republics. Thus, if the situation was economically better in the national republics, or if there was no place for them to return to in Russia, there would be a high likelihood that ethnic Russians would put up with discrimination, and their level of political activism would be relatively low.

Power balance Among Actors in a Relational Triad. Power balance can be defined as the capacity of an actor within the triadic relationship to impose its will on another actor(s). Power balance largely determines what can be claimed in the process of bargaining--the share of the positions controlled by an ethnic group in the government, and local administration, regional autonomy, control over some sectors of the economy, regions, cultural rights, preferential treatment in access to jobs, education, etc.

The power potential of an ethnic group can be defined by two parameters: its size in regard to the state size and its territorial concentration. The larger the group size in relation to state size, the greater the likelihood that the ethnic group will claim control over the state. And, conversly, smaller ethnic groups have neither the power, nor the resources, to claim control over the state. The political efforts of small ethnic groups rarely extend beyond their locality, and usually concentrate on the protection of their cultural, economic, and political rights.

The power potential of the ethnic group is not only dependent on its size, but is also determined by its geographical concentration. Political mobilization is by far most effective among members of a geographically concentrated group. This is because the density of the communications and interactions within an ethnic group is much higher than the density of interaction across dispersed ethnic group. It's much more difficult to mobilize geographically dispersed ethnic groups. And the matter is not only one of logistics. Dispersed ethnic groups also have intensive contacts across the ethnic divide which create "cross-cutting cleavages" and lowers the potential for ethnic mobilization.

The Saliency of Ethnic Divisions. A high power potential of one ethnic group, vis-á-vis another, does not necessarily mean that one ethnic group will try to impose its will on another group during the decision phase. Whether political mobilization along ethnic lines occurs or not also depends on the saliency of ethnic divisions and the degree of ethnic inequality in a society. The larger the ethnic inequalities in republics, the greater the likelihood that the decline of an authoritarian regime will allow for articulation of national protest, and the demands for a redistribution of the power, resources and prestige among ethnic groups in a society.

The salience or centrality of ethnic stratification depends on the intersections of class and ethnicity in a society (Figure 3). Four types of ethnic stratification are discernable. They can be placed along a continuum of rigid to fluid ethnic stratification.

Thus, a society would be characterized as having a paternalistic type of ethnic stratification if ethnicity determines the individual's, and his/her family and children's status for life. Under paternalistic ethnic relationships, levels of acculturation and assimilation



Figure 3. Patterns of Ethnic Stratification*

* Sources: Horowitz, 1985; Shiburtani and Kawn, 1965; Van den Berge, 1978 and Wilson, 1978.

are low. Ethnic competition and conflict are also low.[16]

Under rigid competitive ethnic relations, a society remains deeply divided ethnically. Social mobility occurs primarily inside the ethnic group. However, there is an increase in competition between groups for control over the major spheres of life in a society. Levels of acculturation under rigid competitive ethnic relations tend to increase significantly, while assimilation remains low.[17] In societies with rigid competitive relations, attempts to transform ethnic stratification also have the clearly expressed character of class conflict. When warfare in such societies occurs, it takes the form of a social revolution (Horowitz, 1985, pp.21-41).

Located between societies characterized by rigid competitive and fluid competitive patterns of ethnic stratification are so-called "bipolar" societies (with only two ethnic groups) or "polydomainal" societies (with more than two ethnic groups). In the case of polydomainal ethnic stratification, ethnic groups themselves represent the incipient societies with their separate cultural and social institutions, mass media, and patterns of social mobility.[18] Ethnic transformation in polydomainal societies usually proceeds through the politics of inclusion or exclusion, and/or the division of control over the state. If the negotiations over the division of sovereignty fail, then ethnic transformation tends to

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[16] Paternalistic patterns of ethnic stratification were characteristic of the "classical" colonial societies of the late 19th, and early 20th, centuries in Africa and Asia.

[17] Rigid competitive patterns of ethnic stratification are characteristic to relationships between German and Turkish ethnic groups in Germany; and between Gypsies and Slovaks, and Hungarians and Slovaks in Slovakia.

[18] For example, ethnic stratification in the Netherlands, Niger, Sri Lanka, and the Congo.

evolve into a struggle for succession and independence (Horowitz, 1985, pp.22-23; Lijphart, 1968).

Finally, in societies characterized by fluid ethnic stratification, the advanced processes of assimilation and acculturation blurs the boundaries between groups. Although ethnic differences remain a significant characteristic of social inequality, class differences begin to play an increasingly important role.[19] In such societies ethnic transformation is directed towards elimination of ethnically based discrimination and does not question the legitimacy of the state as such.

2.7.2 Strategic Dimensions of Ethnic Transformation

Structural characteristics describe the lines of cleavage among the actors in the triadic relationships (between state and ethnic groups; between groups; and within ethnic groups). Structural conditions also strongly influence the issues (economic, political, cultural, etc.) that will most likely be negotiated for and bargained over. However, the structural dimensions of analysis cannot explain what positions the actors will take, what strategies they will chose, or how the interplay of competing strategies will evolve.

The political process within the triadic relationships can be characterized by the following three strategic dimensions: (a) the policies of the Russian Federation towards Russian diaspora; (b) the mode of ethnic structure transformation; and (c) the direction of the ethnic hierarchy transformation. All three strategic dimensions were derived by

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[19] For example, ethnic stratification in the contemporary U.S.; and the Irish and Scotts in Great Britain.

applying the "triad struggle model" (Figure 1) to the analysis of the situation of ethnic Russians in the national republics. The following is a brief description of each of them.

The Policies of the Russian Federation Towards Ethnic Change in the National Republics. The process of ethnic transformation in the national republics was highly dependent on the policies of the Center. Because of its command over the country's power ministries and significant resources, Moscow had a profound influence on the process of bargaining and negotiation that occurred during the decision phase. It also had a decisive influence on the strategies that local Russians employed in order to adapt to the rapidly changing situation in the republics. In general, active Russian resistance to the downgrading of their status was (and is) possible only if there is significant political, economic and military support from Russia. Conversely, the lack of active Moscow backing would leave ethnic Russians politically isolated in the national republics.

The Mode and Direction of Ethnic Structure Transformation. The remaining two strategic dimensions of ethnic transformation are plotted in Figure 4. The grid made up of two intersecting axes--the mode and direction of the ethnic hierarchy transformation--describes the character of the ethnopolitical system that would emerge from the process of bargaining and negotiation. According to the figure, four types of ethno-political systems can result from the ethnic transformation process. All four ethno-political systems are "ideal types," therefore the lines among them in actuality are blurred.

An elite-based ethnic transformation would occur if there were changes in the ethnic composition of the elites and the hierarchical and centralized institutions of the Soviet state would be kept unaltered and intact. Depending on the direction of ethnic hierarchy transformation, two kinds of elite based ethnic transformation can occur



Figure 4. Direction, Modes of Ethnic Structure Transformation, and Character of Political Systems in the Sucessor States of the Former USSR.

(quadrants I and IV). The replacement of ethnic Russians by the indigenous elites within the Soviet political, economic and social institutions would result in the creation of an ethnic authoritarian regime (quadrant I). Under an ethnic authoritarian regime, power would be concentrated in an ethnic elite that would not be constitutionally responsible to the people.

If changes in the elites were to occur in the direction of the abolition of ethnic hierarchy, then ethnic transformation would produce, what A.Lijphart (Lijphart, 1968; Lijphart, 1977) defines as a consociational regime (quadrant IV). Consociationalism develops in ethnically divided societies when (a) none of the elites from different ethnic groups have enough resources or power to subordinate other ethnic groups, and (b) when each ethnic group needs their opponent's resources for their own survival. In such a situation the elites of different ethnic groups privately agree to share the power over a splintered society.

Reforms based ethnic transformation is directed at changing the institutions of the Soviet state that had produced a hierarchy of ethnic groups in the first place. In the political sphere, reforms would mean the reorganization of polities in the national republics under the principles of liberal democracy, (e.g., the institutionalization of political pluralism and rule of law, and the provision of civil and political rights for the citizens). In the economic sphere reforms presuppose the transformation of the centralized planning system into a market based economy. In the sphere of ethnic relations reforms would (a) curtail the policies of forceful Russification and assimilation; (b) provide for the protection of ethnic minorities against discrimination, while (c) creating conditions for the preservation of their cultural uniqueness.

Depending on the direction of ethnic hierarchy change, reform-based ethnic transformation can lead to the establishment of two types of ethno-political systems (quadrants II and III). If the reforms result in a democracy for one ethnic group, while members of other ethnic groups are excluded from participation in the polity, economy, or social life of the society, then a system of "ethnic democracy" would evolve in the successor states of the USSR (quadrant II).[20]

Ethnic democracy, in its milder forms, denies some political, economic or civil rights to the individual based on their ethnic origins (e.g., the right to vote in national elections, the right to hold public office, or to participate in the privatization of state property, etc.) An extreme ethnic democracy can evolve into an "ethnic apartheid," a political system based on ethnic segregation, and the political and economic discrimination of the non-indigenous population.

If the reform of Soviet institutions were also directed towards abolition of ethnic hierarchy and the establishment of a political system based on the rights of the individual, (e.g., autonomy of the individual, protection of civil and political liberties, establishment of a government based on law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority) then ethnic transformation would evolve into liberal democracy.

In sum, two sets of variables describe the process and outcomes of negotiation and bargaining that occur during the decision phase (Figure 5). Structural variables characterize the course of actions of the major actors involved in the process of negotiation and bargaining, over the future status of ethnic Russians in the national

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[20] For a discussion of ethnic democracy and its applicability to certain ethically divided polities, see Smooha, 1990.



Figure 5. Major Dimensions of the Ethnic Structure Transformation in the National Republics of the USSR, 1985 - 1991

republics. These are the character of ethnic stratification, the power differentials between ethnic communities, and the situation and/or possibilities in the Russian Federation compared to that of ethnic Russians in the national republics.

The second set of variables are the choices made and strategies pursued by major actors. The major actors are the Soviet state, the indigenous ethnic group, and the ethnic Russian group. The interplay of the two sets of variables results in the institutionalization of the crucial elements of the following four types of ethnopolitical systems: an ethnic authoritarian regime, a consociational regime, an ethnic democracy, or a liberal democracy. The boundaries between these types of ethnic order are blurred, and negotiation can produce a variety of trajectories that can go back and forth, or up and down, throughout the grid described in figure 3.

2.8 Consolidation of the New Ethnic Order

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of the former Soviet republics, the mode of conflict resolution within the triadic relationships began to change. Negotiation and bargaining would be replaced by various modes of conflict resolution, that can be organized along a scale (Figure 2). On one end of the scale there are inter-ethnic relationships characterized by the command and imposition modes of conflict resolution. The other end of the scale is marked by non-ascriptive class relationships. In the middle of the scale there are competitive and cooperation-based inter-ethnic relationships.

The four types of ethno-political systems institutionalized during the decision

phase (Figure 4) can be placed along the previously described continuum. Ethnic authoritarian systems would be characterized by a predominance of the imposition and command mode in inter-ethnic relationships. Such type of ethnic stratification in the present age of nationalism and democracy is very unstable. In addition, ethnic relationships based on one group's domination over the other are prone to conflict and violence. Consequently, there is a high probability that after some time, $(\frac{R}{I})$ and $(\frac{I}{R})$ types of ethnic stratification will go through the process of ethnic transformation again: that is, there'll be a preparatory phase, then a decision, and a consolidation phase.

Ethnic democracy is characterized by a mixture of the imposition and command mode, and the competition and cooperation mode in inter-ethnic relationships. This is also a rather unstable form of institutionalization of ethnic relationships because ethnic democracies tend to go through cycles of rising and declining ethnic tensions. It has the potential to peacefully evolve into R/I and R = I types of stratification, or it can lapse into an ethnocratic regime, leading to an increase in ethnic tensions and conflict.

Successful consociational systems are characterized by competition and cooperation among ethnic groups. However, if the process of forming a civic nation within consociational regimes is stalled, or if the ethno-demographic balance among incipient ethnic societies changes, consociational systems have a tendency to evolve towards some form ethnic democracy, or split into separate nation-states.

Finally, evolution of ethnic stratification towards non-ascriptive class-based relationships means that there is a decline of ethnicity as a principal of political

mobilization. In such societies conflicts among social groups become based on non-ethnic criteria, such as class, profession, etc.

2.9 Data and Methods

In this study the ethnic transformation process is analyzed using a "most similar systems" or "concomitant variation" design. A concomitant variation design implies that the choice of the cases representing ethnic transformation are as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The sample of the cases in this study will constitute ethnic transformations in 10 national republics of the former USSR. Among them there are the Ukraine, Moldova, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the five Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The republics of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, where not included in this study because of the small size of their Russian populations (less than 8% in each case). Byelorussia was also excluded because of the extreme degree of assimilation of Byelorussians into the Russian ethnos. In Byelorussia, the Russian minority as social, political, and economic problem is almost non-existent.[21] The choice of these ten republics define the scope of the study. No attempts are being made to extend analyses carried out in this disseration beyond the borders of the former USSR.

The similarity of ethnic transformation in the national republics of the former

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[21] For more on the ethnic Russians' situation in Byelorussia, see Kolstoe, 1995.

USSR, is due to (a) the relative uniformity of political and economic institutions throughout the territory of the USSR (e.g., the Communist party's monopoly on political power, and standard organizations, such as the republics' Soviets, the republics' ministries of various sectors of the economy, and education and culture; the academies of science; creative unions of writers, painters, and composers; the state publishing houses; and theaters, etc.); (b) the dominant position of ethnic Russians, vis-á-vis the indigenous ethnic groups throughout the periphery of the USSR; and (c) the similarity of the time frame and events that shaped the process of ethnic transformation (e.g., the introduction of *perestroika*, liberalization of the political system, political and economic reforms, the collapse of the USSR, and declarations of independence). These three common systemic characteristics are conditions which are controlled for in analyzing the process of ethnic transformation.

The explanatory variables, in the concomitant variation design, are examined through a comparison of the intersystemic differences within each transformation case. This is accomplished by hypothesizing about the patterns of causal relationships within each case. Hypothesis testing is performed though a comparison of the transformation process across similar cases. Such a comparison enables (a) the isolation of variables that account for the character of the ethnic transformation process (e.g., economic inequalities; cultural homogeneity of indigenous group; language and culture differences between ethnic Russians and the indigenous population, etc.) as well as (b) an explaination of the diversity within the ethnic transformation outcomes (e.g., describing the set of factors which led from the $(\frac{R}{I})$ to the $(\frac{I}{R})$ type of ethnic transformation; describing the set of

factors that led from the $(\frac{R}{I})$ to R=I ethnic transformation, etc.)

The empirical basis of this dissertation is derived from two kinds of data sources. The first data source is comprised of the Soviet Censuses of 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, and other official publications produced by the Soviet State Committee on Statistics (Rus. *GOSKOMSTAT*). The *GOSKOMSTAT* publications provided information on the major socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the indigenous and Russian populations in each of the 10 national republics of the former USSR. This allowed me to construct the ethnic stratification profiles in ten republics and their change through this period of time. The profiles are defined as the inter-ethnic differences in access to power, resources and status between ethnic Russians and indigenous populations, and are measured by differences in: levels of education; the ratio of urban/rural populations; degree of assimilation and acculturation; ethnic representation in different sectors of economy (e.g., heavy industry versus the service industry), and the republic's administration; and flows of migration.

Secondary data sources were also utilized extensively. In using secondary data sources, I relied heavily on the methodology of socio-historical research, as explained by Theda Skocpol (1984). Skocpol, commenting on the methodological basis of historical sociology, writes:

> Because wide-ranging comparisons are so often crucial for analytical historical sociologists, they are more likely to use secondary sources of evidence than those who apply models to, or develop interpretations of single cases. . . . From the point of view of historical sociology . . . a dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical

> research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research--and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion--secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew. (Skocpol, 1984, p. 382)

By combining the Census data and information contained in the secondary sources, a historical narrative of ethnic stratification, as it was created, evolved, and was radically transformed in the periphery of the Czarist empire/USSR, was constructed. This narrative covers the events that occurred since the late 19th century up until the present.

The secondary data was gathered from a variety of sources. The most important of these were the survey and other research data published in the Soviet and Russian Academic press, as well as those in the mass media. Over the years, the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR (both now of the Russian Federation) published a number of studies devoted to the problems of nationalities. The results of most of these studies were published in the journals *Sociologicheskie Issledovania.*

Since late *perestroika*, two Moscow-based polling organizations have actively engaged in research on the Russian minorities: VTSIOM (the All-Russian Institute of Public Opinion Research) under the leadership of Prof. Y. Levada, and the independent polling firm, "Vox Populi" (the director is Prof. B.Grushin). In 1991, VTSIOM carried out a survey of Russian minorities designed and coordinated by prof. V.Shlapentokh and L.Gudkov, which, is simply reffered to as the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey in this dissertation. The survey was conducted in 11 non-Russian republics, and 7 autonomous non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation. More than 6,000 ethnic Russian

respondents participated in the survey. The survey was designed to describe the Russian population in the former republics and examine the principal characteristics, attitudes and relationships of Russians with the indigenous populations. This is the most comprehensive survey of Russian minorities ever done. The data from the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey were available in electronic form and represents the major source of information on the Russian situation in the national republics on the eve of the USSR's collapse.[22]

In 1994, on the basis of the Vox Populi polling firm, the Center for Research of the Russian Minorities in the Countries of Near Abroad was created. The Center carried out two comprehensive surveys of Russian minorities in Kazakhstan (Gudkov 1995) and Estonia (Grishaev 1995). Both studies were comparative in that they included 1000 respondents of Kazakh and 1000 ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, and 942 ethnic Russians and 911 ethnic Estonians in Estonia. Both surveys examined the characteristics, attitudes and relationships of ethnic Russians with regard to the indigenous populations.

The surveys of Russian minorities in the Baltics were also extensive. In 1993, a comparative survey of the ethnic Russians and indigenous populations in the Baltic states was conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Policy of the University of Strathclyde, Scotland (Rose and Maley 1994). More than 6000 respondents participated in the survey. The questions used in the Rose and Maley survey were standard questions taken from the State/Market surveys of the European Center for the Study of Public Policy, and from the New Democracies Barometer of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna. In addition, surveys of the ethnic Russians were carried out by a variety of academic

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[22] For the description of the survey smaples the data of which were used in the dissertation see Appendix.

institutions (e.g., the Universities and Institutes of Sociology of the Academies of Science of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and private polling firms, such as the VILMORUS in Lithuania, the LASOPEC in Latvia, and the EMOR in Estonia.

There are very few surveys on ethnic Russians conducted in Central Asia (with exception of Kazakhstan) or Moldova. Only the data of a survey (N=2,067) conducted in Central Asia by the United States Institute of Peace, in 1993, were available. The survey contained a block of indicators characterizing the interethnic situation in the region (see Lubin, 1995).

For information on ethnic dynamics in the periphery of the Soviet Union since 1985, newspapers and other printed media were used as the first line of information. *Glastnost*, introduced by Gorbachev, allowed for the proliferation of numerous publications within Russia and the national republics. Extensive coverage of the ethnic issues can be found in such newspapers as, the *Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, *Izvestija*, *Pravda*, *Literaturnaja Gazeta,* and *Argumenty i Fakty*. Most of these newspapers are now available on-line. This provides up-to-date information on the ethnic situation in Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union. "Thick journals" such as *Znamia*, *Svobodnaja Mysl'* also regularly publish materials related to the problems of ethnicity and nationalism.

In building the chronology of events describing the process of ethnic transformation, I relied heavily on the daily Soviet (later post-Soviet) news bulletins. Daily news bulletins have been available since the late 1980s through e-mail. Initially, they were produced by the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Research Institute (RFE/RL). In 1994, RFE/RL Research Institute was reorganized into the Open Media Research

Institute (OMRI) which continued publishing and transmitting electronic distribution of the daily news bulletin. OMRI has an extensive network of reporters and journalists working in all the new countries of the former USSR. In addition, OMRI regularly publishes analytical briefs on the major economic, political, and social issues (including ethnic issues) in the new countries of the ex-USSR.[23] Since 1993, the Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States has also been available through e-mail from the Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit research institute on Post-Soviet states, based in Washington, DC. The Jamestown Foundation provides a daily digest of Russia's and other successor state's press. In addition, the Jamestown Foundation, similar to OMRI, publishes analytical briefs on the major developments in the new countries of the ex-USSR.

A significant source of information on ethnic issues in the successor states of the former USSR proved to be electronic discussion groups. One of them BALT-L, is devoted to issues relating to the Baltic states. On BALT-L, digests of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian press is distributed regularly. Reports and briefings issued by a variety of governmental institutions, such as the Foreign Ministry, and the Baltic parliaments, are posted. Similar to BALT-L, is an electronic discussion group devoted to the political, economic and social issues in Central Asia (CENASIA). The developments in Kyrgyzstan are especially well covered on CENASIA. Professors and students at the Slavic institute in Bishkek compile a Kyrgyz digest of news and press reports. Both electronic forums--BALT-L and CENASIA--are used extensively by the Russian community activists in the Baltics and Central Asia, which provided excellent

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[23] For more on OMRI publications, visit the Institute's Web page at http://www.omri.cz/Index.html.

opportunities for first hand information on the situation of ethnic Russians in these two regions.

The most valuable source of information for the completion of this study, was the conference on "Russian minorities in the Former Soviet Republics," held May 22-24, 1992, at Michigan State University. A majority of the most renown experts and researches on ethnicity and nationalism in the countries of the former USSR participated in this conference. The conference provided an excellent opportunity to extensively discuss my project with the conference participants.

In addition, during my trips to my native country, Lithuania, I conducted in-depth interviews with ethnic Russians who live and work in the city of Klaipeda. Respondents were selected to represent the major social categories of Russians in the city: Soviet Army officers, intelligentsia (teachers, engineers), retirees, sailors, and entrepreneurs. The interviews give first hand accounts of the situation of Russians in Lithuania.

In sum, the chronology and supporting data for the ethnic transformation process within 10 national republics of the former USSR was established using four major data sources: (1) the Census data and official statistical publications by the State Committee for Statistics of the USSR (and later of the Russian Federation); (2) a range of supporting data from empirical projects; (3) newspaper and electronic media reports; and (4) oral data from interviews with ethnic Russians and insights gained from consultation with experts. Together, these four sets of information provided a rich data base in which sources were cross-referenced to verify the information that was emerging.

2.10 A Note on Soviet Statistics and the Operationalization of the Category of Ethnicity

The ethnicity of Soviet citizens, or *natsional'nost'* refers to the designations contained in the fifth paragraph of Soviet internal passports. Nationality in the Soviet Union was a quasi-ascriptive characteristic assigned by the authorities to individuals on the basis of parental identity. For example, if both parents were designated to be Ukrainians on their passports, so were their children, even if they had never spoken a word of Ukrainian in all their lives. If a child's parents were of mixed origin, he/she could choose one of their parents national identities at age sixteen, when they qualified for their own passports. Thus, children of a mixed Kazakh-Ukrainian family could be or Kazakh or Ukrainian, but never Russian, even if they exclusively spoke Russian at home and were sent to Russian schools.

Considering the nature of Soviet statistics, ethnicity in this study will be defined by a combination of two indicators: passport designations and the native language of the individual. Thus, ethnic Russians will be considered individuals whose passport designates them as Russians and who consider Russian to be their native language. When these two indicators do not coincide, primacy will be given to the "passport ethnicity." This is because, the passport designation, since the 1950s, had become increasingly important for admission to schools and universities, and to hiring, firing and promotion in the USSR.[24]

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[24] For more on how the Soviet census defines and accounts for ethnicity, see Anderson and Silver, 1989; Garipov, 1989; and Rybakovskii, 1987.

3. THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN THE PERIPHERY OF THE SOVIET UNION

An analysis of ethnic transformation cannot begin without at least brief description of the origins and formation of the Russian/non-Russian ethnic stratification in the periphery of the empire. This is because the circumstances under which the Russian diaspora came to exist had a profound impact on its position throughout the Soviet period, and continues to shape post-Soviet developments today.

The origin of the ethnic structure, in what became the periphery of the USSR, can be located in the late 17th century with the expansion of the Russian empire (to the west, north and southwest) under Peter the Great. In 1721, after the defeat of Sweden, the territory on the coast of the Baltic Sea (the location of present day Estonia and Latvia) was added to the Russian empire. Later, in the 18th century, Finland, Poland and Lithuania (the location of present day Lithuania, and the Eastern parts of the Ukraine and Belarus), Turkey (the location of present day Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) as well as the sparcely populated territories of North Kazakhstan and Siberia, came under the rule of the Russian Tsars. In the late 19th century, the territory in Central Asia (contemporary Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan) were also added to the Russian empire. The last gasp of Russian (as well as European) expansionism can be considered Khrushchev's implementation of the Virgin Lands Scheme in Kazakhstan, during the 1950s.

The character of ethnic stratification that emerged under the impact of the

The character of ethnic stratification that emerged under the impact of the territorial expansion of the Russian state depended upon the following set of factors: (a) the mode of incorporation of non-Russian territories into the Russian state; (b) the character of the initial Russian contact with the non-Russians; (c) the cultural differences between Russians and non-Russians in the newly acquired territories; (d) the social composition and/or character of the Russian settlement in the new colonies. A brief description of each of these follows.

The Mode of Incorporation of Non-Russian Territories. The three major modes of territorial expansion by the Russian state are as follows: 1) the settling and acquiring of the Western territories which involved a combination of warfare, dynastic politics, and diplomacy (as in the case of the integration of the Slavs); 2) a military annexation, with or without a co-opting alliance with the ruling strata (as in the Baltic states, the Caucasus region, Bessarabia, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus); and 3) colonization (as in Central Asia) (Young, 1992, p.81).

The colonization of Central Asia produced a *paternalistic* type of ethnic relationship between the Russians and members of the indigenous populations. When Czarist Russia invaded the region in the late 19th century it was at a semi-feudal level of development. It was populated by traditional pastoral nomads, organized in clans, and, at the higher level, into hoards.

The creation of the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Tajik, and Turkmen nations was largely the consequence of efforts by Soviet administrators, bureaucrats, planners, engineers, and the military to impose workable territorial boundaries on the huge, newly acquired territory (Lieven and McGarry, 1993). By dividing Central Asia into the

Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, the Center sought to pacify the local population (according to the "divide and rule" principal) as well as to promote economic development in the region.

Russian-led modernization and development almost totally destroyed the traditional ways of life of the indigenous populations. As a result of forceful collectivization (the creation of *kolkhoz* and *savkhoz* on irrigable lands, and the nationalization of grazing lands, pastures and cattle) the majority of the indigenous populations were not only converted into poor farmers, but also into second class citizens. Consequently, colonization of Central Asia by the Russian empire, and later, by its successor, the Soviet Union, led to the formation of a paternalistic or vertically integrated ethnic structure in the region. At the top of this hierarchical structure were ethnic Russians, while the bottom was occupied by the indigenous peoples of the region.

The 1940 military annexation of Bessarabia resulted in the emergence of a rigid competitive pattern of ethnic stratification in Moldova. In 1940, Stalin created Moldova from two territories. Transnistria (*Pridniestriovie* in Rus.) located on the left bank of the Dniester river (see Map 1) was part of the Ukraine. Bessarabia, the territory on the right bank of the Dniester river, was part of Romania prior to WWII. Historically, Transnistria had a large Slavic population. Bessarabia was populated mainly by Romanian peasants. Since the moment of Moldavia's creation, Slavic Transnistria dominated the republic. Transnistria controlled the republic, in part, because it was economically more developed than rural Bessarabia.

Map 1. Moldova



The Russians came to occupy the leading positions in Moldova's administration, the Communist party, and industry, giving ethnic stratification a rigid competitive character. This pattern of ethnic stratification was reinforced by Stalin's attempts to "de-Romanianize" the Bessarabian population in order to firmly integrate the reconquered land into the USSR. Thus, a campaign to forge a Moldavian ethnic identity different from a Romanian ethnic identity was launched. The indigenous Romanian intelligentsia in Moldova was wiped out by Stalin's deportations and repatriations to Romania. The Russian Cyrillic alphabet was re-introduced in Moldova (instead of the Roman alphabet) in 1941, and the existence of a Moldavian people, Moldavian language, Moldavian culture and history, as distinct from Romanian, was declared.

Military incorporation of the economically and socially advanced Western territories of the former USSR (the Baltic states) just before WWII, produced a third, bipolar pattern of ethnic stratification. Before the Soviet invasion in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries that possessed all the institutions of a modern state. They had well developed cultures, and strong identities and their standards of living were higher than in Russia. Despite the post-WWII Communist terror, many of the institutions in the region that were crucial to preservation of the ethnic identities of the indigenous populations, survived. This transpired, in part, because Moscow strived for legitimacy in the newly conquered territories. In part, it was a consequence of the West's position on the Baltics. The majority of the Western countries, including the U.S., Britain and France never recognized the annexation of the independent states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

The ethnic structure in Eastern Ukraine, and Eastern and Central Belarus can be characterized as being fluid competitive. The integration of Slavs within the Russian empire (with the exception of Western Ukraine which, historically, was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Austro-Hungarian empire) proceeded for more than 300 years. A variety of policies, voluntarily and involuntary, for this purpose were used. Although administered from Moscow, Ukrainians or Byelorussians could, potentially, secure careers up to the highest levels of the military, state and/or party bureaucracy. The integration of the Slavs was greatly facilitated by their cultural similarity (Kiev was the cradle of the Russian Orthodoxy). As a result of this long historical process, ethnic boundaries between Eastern Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians became fluid. The Slavs from these three countries share all major institutions of the Russian and later Soviet empire, and the rates of intermarriage are high.[25]

The Social Composition of Russian Migration. The social composition of the Russian migration was to a large degree dependent on the mode of incorporation of the new territories into the Russian state. For analytical purposes, Russians who settled in the periphery of the former USSR during the Soviet era can be divided into three types of migrants. Among the first to move to the periphery were Soviet troops, the staff of the apparatus of coercion (the Communist party, the KGB, the police) and members of their

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[25] Currently some three-fourths of urban Ukrainians send their children to Russian-language schools, and most Ukrainian political, economic, and educational institutions use Russian as their language of everyday use. The Ukrainian language is used primarily by the rural population and writers (Motyl, 1993, p.12-13). The situation is very similar in Belarus.

families.[26]

After control over the new territories was assured, the next group to migrate to the periphery were skilled workers and specialists. They usually moved to the periphery of the USSR under a variety of state sponsored "labor conscription" programs in order to construct industrial plants, power stations, irrigation schemes, etc. Chronologically, the last strata of the Russian diaspora to settle in the periphery of the Soviet empire were economic migrants. Generally, economic migrants came from underdeveloped Russian rural areas, and went into the growing industrial employment in the cities. Migrants from rural areas had much less education and skills than individuals from the other two groups.

The Character of the Initial Russian/non-Russian Contact. The character of the initial contact between groups has a significant impact on diminishing, or, on the contrary, creating and reinforcing divisions into "us and them" in inter-ethnic relationships. Czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, both have a brutal legacy in this regard.

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[26] The number of people belonging to this category of migrants differed by region, and by a region's particular strategic, economic and political significance. It is estimated that in the early 1980s, about 1.25 million troops were stationed outside the Russian Federation, the majority of them near the western border of the USSR (Greenhouse, 1993). It is difficult to provide the exact numbers on Russians employed in the KGB, the police, or the party apparatus in the republics. A guess would be that up to 15%-20% of Russians living in the Baltics were, in one way or another, connected with the apparatus of coercion (its staff, employees, military retirees and their families). The number was calculated by comparing the numbers provided by a variety of sources. A.Lieven mentions that 1/6 of the population
of the city of Liepaja, the second largest Latvian city, consists of military retirees and their families (Lieven, 1993, p.206). According to V.Gaidys' calculations, about 7% of Russians in Lithuania consist of army personnel (Gaidys, 1994, p.95). The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers, in the late 1980s, about 90,000 to 100,000 individuals of Russian ethnic origin in the republic (close to 20% of the total Russian population in that republic) were connected with the occupation army (From 'Estonia in Facts.' January 17, 1994, posting on the BALT-L Internet Discussion List by Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Historically, expansion of the Russian empire proceeded through the unleashing of mass terror by Russian troops against unarmed local populations. Mass deportations to Siberia were often used as a strategy for breaking down any resistance to the new rulers. Furthermore, industrialization and development carried out by the Russian empire in its provinces rarely considered the interests of local populations.[27]

The brutality and inhumanity of the ethno-social experiments of the communist regime, which were "unprecedented in their cruelty and scale since the times of the Assyrian conquests" (Zubov, 1994, p.48) had a profound impact on the inter-ethnic relationships between the Russians and indigenous populations in the periphery of the empire. There is a deep seated mistrust and fear of Russians among ethnic groups living in the periphery of the former empire. Furthermore, the collective memories of the suffering endured under the Czarist/Soviet regimes had become one of the central elements around which the ethnic identities of the indigenous populations had been constructed.

Of course, the majority of Russians living in the former Soviet republics did not participate in, or carry out, the policies of the former Communist regime. Ethnic Russians also also had suffered enormously under the Communist regime. Nevertheless, those ethnic Russians who settled outside Russia fulfilled the role of outposts of the empire even

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[27] Collectivization of agriculture is undoubtedly one of the darkest pages in the history of the Soviet empire. In the 1930s more than half of the Kazakhs were killed, or perished from famine, dislocation, and disease caused by forced collectivization. Without these deaths the numbers of Kazakhs today would probably not be a mere 5.4 million, but might be as high as 25 million (Karpat, 1992, p.321). Stalin's forced collectivization in the Ukraine in 1932-1933, resulted in a man-made famine that led to a loss of 2 to 7 million lives (Conquest, 1986). More than 350,000 Lithuanians, 150,000 of Latvians, and 100,000 Estonians were deported to Siberia (about a tenth of the population of the Baltic states) after the Soviet Union annexed them (Misiunas and Taagapera, 1993).

if they were not directly employed in the party bureaucracy, military, police or KGB (Starikov, 1993). Deportations of the indigenous populations, and the in-migration of Russians to take their vacated houses, property, and jobs, were part and parcel of the same policies on nationalities carried out by the Soviet empire. Thus, the 25 million Russians scattered over the 14 new states are part of the gruesome legacy of the Soviet regime.

Because of the enormous crimes against humanity committed by Stalin's regime, history, during *perestroika*, came back to haunt the present. In some sense early *perestroika* was a collective catharsis of the Soviet society--a period of re-living the horrors of Stalinism and an attempt to come to terms with Soviet history. However, if Stalinism was a period of mass political terror for ethnic Russians, Stalinism for non-Russians represented a period of national extermination and genocide. These were Russian soldiers and officers, (with the help of local collaborators, of course) who "cleansed" the villages and cities, made mass arrests, and packed trains with innocent people for long journeys to Siberia. And those ethnic Russians who were to remain in the newly independent states need to come to terms with Stalinism's legacy.[28]

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[28] Their dilemma is, to a large degree, similar to those of Germans who needed to deal with the legacy of the Nazi regime after WWII. Everyone remembers how the president of West Germany, Willy Brandt, fell to his knees before the Warsaw Ghetto monument in 1970. This gesture dramatically improved Poland-German relationships (Vinton, 1994).

The nations formerly subjugated by the Soviet regime were also awaiting a similar gesture of reconciliation from the officials of the Russian Government, as well as from the leaders of the local Russian communities. The Russian Government, however, unlike West Germany after WWII, holds the position that the Russian people were the victims of the Communist regime to the same degree as all other nations of the former USSR. They believe what happened, happened. That it is history, and it now belongs to the historians. Furthermore, Moscow argues, the former republics of the USSR have gained more from investment by the Center in the past 50-70 years, than they have lost.

Despite the sometimes very heated political exchange between Moscow and its former colonies, one should not forget that the Russian Government did make significant

Perceptions of Cultural Differences. The Russian state, in its expansion, crossed two great divides among civilizations: the division between the Christian and Muslim civilizations (in Central Asia) and the division between Eastern and Western Christianity (in the Baltics and Western Ukraine). In both cases, Russia sought to justify its expansion by alleged superiority of the Russian political system, military, technology, culture, art, and language. However, the dynamics of inter-ethnic relationships across the Muslim/Christian and Eastern/Western divisions differed. In part, this occurred because the differences between Russians and non-Russians across the Eastern/Western division were much smaller than those across the Muslim/Christian cleavage.

Shared values and a group awareness of cultural distinctiveness are the key elements in ethnic group membership. If groups share parts of the same culture, then some elements of their ethnic identities (such as customs, norms, beliefs, traditions) will also be similar. When the cultures of the groups belong to different civilizations, the cultural differences are usually large. Significant cultural differences, depending on the

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steps in denouncing its imperial legacy. Yeltsin's administration supported the Baltics struggle for independence. Thus, Yeltsin in January of 1991, recognized the independence of the Baltics. In contrast, Gorbachev earlier had imposed an economic blockade on Lithuania. Russia did withdraw its troops from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In its treaty on the troop withdrawal from Latvia, Russia condemned the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR in 1940, and the mass deportations carried out by the Communist regime after WWII (Kalashnikova, 1994). Similarly, Yeltsin recognized the Ukraine's independence that, *de facto*, put an end to the Soviet empire. Thus, reconciliation is possible if both sides, Russia as well as the new states, accept the reality of the imperial collapse and organize their relationships on the basis of equality and respect.

circumstances, tend to strengthen the ethnocentrism of the groups.[29]

The Muslim/Christian Division. Divisions into "us and them" are especially pronounced in the relationship between Russians and non-Russians in Central Asia. However, Muslim/Christian cultural differences alone cannot explain such highly

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[29] The re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Asia (Iran, Algeria, Egypt), Hindu radicalism in India, and nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, indicate that religion and culture are becoming the major considerations for cooperation, coalitions and conflicts in the emerging post-Cold War world order. Samuel Huntington (1993) in his highly acclaimed and debated article "Clash of Civilization" published in *Foreign Affairs*, goes as far as to claim that the currently emerging world order will be defined by the "clashes of civilizations."

More specifically, Huntington argues that the future line of global conflicts will be between and among states belonging to different civilizations (Western, Japanese, Confucian and Islamic). Increasing confrontation among civilizations, on the other hand, will likely lead to the process of consolidation and cooperation among states belonging to the same civilization. Huntington's article received a great deal of publicity in Russia (see, for example, Kuznetcov, 1994; Puschkov, 1994; Ovlev, 1994). It was immediately translated into Russian. All major Russian newspapers have carried excerpts or commentaries on the article. The attractiveness of Huntington's concept to the Russian public is that it claims to provide an explanation for the many developments in the geopolitical space of the former USSR.

Additionally, Huntington's article appeared at a time when Russian intellectuals are preoccupied with the debate over Russia's future. In essence, this debate is about the following question: is it possible to create a modern economy and market in Russia without accepting Western culture, styles of life and values? The receptiveness of Russian audiences to Huntington's argument seems to highlight the importance of the choices that are being made by the people in power at this critical juncture.

In choosing among alternatives, culture becomes real, since the consequences of choices are real. Depending on the choices made in the "modernization with, or without, Westernization" dilemma, there will be significant differences in policy ranging from principals of polity organization, to industry, commerce, education and culture. The elites of the Central Asian republics, for example, chose a "modernization without Westernization" course--that is, a course towards the creation of a secular Islamic state as represented by Turkey. In comparison, in the Baltics, there is widespread consensus that Westernization is the only means to modernization. The consequences of these choices will influence the developments in these regions for a long time to come.

ethnocentric attitudes in the region.[30] What particularly strengthens a "consciousness of kind" in these groups is that cultural differences between them also coincide with modern/traditional, urban/rural, parochial/cosmopolitan and class differences. Thus, Russians represent primarily modern, urban, higher social and economic status lifestyles, while indigenous populations live predominantly traditional, rural ways of life.[31] Consequently, Russians have a sense of superiority, disdain, and frequently hold arrogant attitudes towards local "natives/blacks" (Repenko, 1993).

Russians perceive themselves as the bearers of civilization who brought more "developed language and culture" to the region, and as people, who "by working their fingers to the bones" have made the transition of Central Asia, from feudalism to modernity, possible (Maliagin, 1994, p.43). This is typical of the ideology of "white men's burden." As the history of colonialism indicates, such pronounced differences in lifestyles and the sense of superiority of colonists makes their integration in the local environment very problematic (e.g., French in Algeria).

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[30] Several Russian sociologists and economists have noted the existence of significant similarities between Islam and Communist ideology. Both emphasize collectivism, conformism, and disregard notions of individualism and freedom. In both cultures there is a strong tradition of absolutism and authoritarianism, ritualization of behavior at the expense of economic considerations, etc. For more on the relationship between Communism and Islam, see Malashenko, 1992; and Poliakov, 1992.

[31] The modern/traditional and urban/rural divisions include the evolution of the social division of labor of a society, the development of occupations and professions, the uncoupling of family and work, and family and child rearing; the evolution of the extended family into the nuclear family; the participation of women in the labor force; increased geographic and social mobility, etc.

The Eastern/Western Division.[32] The cultural differences are much smaller between Russians and non-Russians in the Baltics than in Central Asia. This is, in part, because the Eastern/Western division is not as highly pronounced as the division between Christian and Muslim civilizations, and, in part, because cultural clashes in the Baltics occur in more cosmopolitan settings. Furthermore, Russian claims of superiority over the indigenous Baltic cultures, do not have as much legitimacy as similar claims in Central Asia.

The Russians in the Baltics, unlike their compatriots in Central Asia, did not bring "civilization" to the Baltics. At the time of annexation this region was already at a somewhat higher level of socio-economic development than the Soviet Union. Consequently, the assertion of Russian superiority could not be advanced since the standard of living in the Baltics was higher than anywhere in the USSR[33]. Therefore, Russians in the Baltics justified their dominant group status primarily by identifying themselves with the super-power--the Soviet Union--the country which was victorious in

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[32] The Eastern/Western division in Russian politics is expressed as a clash of two ideologies: Russophilism and Westernization. Russophiles advance the uniqueness of Russian history, culture, traditions and values that are morally superior to the decadent and corrupt West. Westernizers, on the contrary, argue that Russia has to create Western-type democratic institutions and to implement Western technological developments
because the more advanced Western nations are a rough guide for Russia's own future. For more on the debate between Russophiles and Westernizers see Shlapentokh, 1990, especially chapters 8 and 9. From the point of view of the nations on the Western side of the divide, stereotypical perceptions are that indigenous populations (e.g., Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians) represent Europe, while Russians represent Asia.

[33] A significant number of Russian migrants moved into the Baltics from underdeveloped rural Russia to take advantage of better economic conditions. The Russian's tongue-in-cheek nickname for the Baltics was "our West."

WWII, and had reached military parity with the U.S. Thus, there is a deep-seated ambiguity in the attitudes of Russians towards the Balts, an incongruous combination of feelings of superiority and inferiority.[34]

Patterns of Russian Settlement Within the National Republics. Similar to British and French colonists, Russians colonists settled and lived isolated from the endigenes. Life for Russians in the national republics centered almost exclusively around the colonial types of enterprises built and run by Moscow. These industrial operations usually used local raw materials, processed them, and sent finished products back to the Russia.[35]

Because the factories were controlled exclusively from Moscow, Russians in the local republics depended much more on the Central, than on the local, government. Industrial enterprises provided housing for their employees, schools and kindergartens for employees' children, homes for vacations, health care and medical facilities. There was little need for Russians to intermingle with the local population, to learn their culture or languages because of the high degree of subsistence provided by the industrial enterprises. Furthermore, institutionalization of the Russian language as the language of the state and public life, allowed Russians, even those in close contact with the indigenous population,

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[34] For more on this, see Lieven, 1993, chapter 7.

[35] In comparison, the local population was concentrated in sections of economy that primarily served their domestic, local markets. Because Russians were concentrated in the huge, industrial enterprises run by the Center and oriented to distribution of their products outside the republics, the local population perceived Russian-Centrally run enterprises as contributing very little to the well-being of the republics, and as polluting their natural environment, etc.

to remain unilingual.[36]

The isolation of the Russian communities from their neighbors was also reflected in the identification of the Russian minorities with the Central government and with the Russians as a political majority in the USSR. Russians in the republics tended to regard the Central Government, rather than the Republic Government, as their protector, and they looked to the rest of the Russian-speaking Soviet Union for support and sympathy when they felt their "rights" were being circumscribed.

There was also the cultural identification of the Russian minorities with the majority culture of the Russian-speaking Soviet Union. Russians minorities in the republics were exposed to the same media, and identified with the same sports and recreational events as other Russians in Russia. In addition, there were few Russians who were functionally bilingual--that is, who were able to converse and write fluently in the various native languages--deficiencies which reinforced the trend of Russian isolationism.

The Russian Diaspora Produced by Border Changes. The Russian settlement in the periphery of the country was produced not only by Russian migration. There were important instances when a Russian diaspora was created as a result of the changes in inter-republic borders. During the Soviet era inter-republic borders did not have any political significance and were used for administrative purposes only. Therefore, the inter-ethnic dynamics, between indigenous and Russian populations, were very similar, whether

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[36] One of the activists of the Russian Cultural Association in Lithuania characterized the isolation of the Russian community's institutions from their neighbors in the following way: "Many of us (Russians) were living in Lithuania for years, but spiritually and in our thoughts we felt ourselves as being in some place in Tombov, but not in a country that has its own language, history, culture, and its own old traditions." (Aleksandrov, 1992, p.7)

they resulted from migration or administrative border changes. However, since the new states' independence, the inter-ethnic dynamics between these two types of Russian diasporic populations began to diverge significantly. In all Russian territories administratively transferred to the national republics, pro-Russian sentiment was very strong. This generated significant ethnic tensions and conflict within the new states, as well as between the new states and the Russian Federation.

The administrative transfer of three Russian territories was most significant. First, there was Stalin's addition of the industrially developed Western Siberia to Kazakhstan. Since 1920, Kazakhstan has been an autonomous republic of the USSR. In 1936, when Kazakhstan was reorganized into a constituent republic of the USSR, Stalin decided to add these Western Siberian oblasts to Kazakhstan to increase its economic potential. These oblasts became known as Northern Kazakhstan (See Map. 2)

The Russian diaspora in Moldova was created as a result of Transnistria's transfer to that republic. Before WWII, Transnistria was part of the Ukraine. In 1924, Stalin created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in Transnistria in order to camouflage his plans for the annexation of the territories lost to Romania. When, in 1940, the USSR recovered Bessarabia, it was united with the existing MASSR, and the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was renamed the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR).

Crimea became part of the Ukrainian republic in 1954, when Khrushchev's decree transferred the peninsula from the Russian Federation to Kiev's jurisdiction. Ostensibly, the transfer of the peninsula was carried out to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Ukraine's unification with Russia. Nevertheless, the circumstances and reasons that

Map 2. Kazakstan with Percent of Europeans in Population by Oblast, 1989*



* Source: Kolstoe (1995)

compelled Khrushchev to do so remain unclear to this day.

In sum, a variety of factors shaped the formation of ethnic stratification in the periphery of the Soviet empire. Differences in modes of incorporation, culture, the character of initial Russian contact with non-Russians, and the social composition of migration, produced a whole spectrum of ethnic stratification patterns across the periphery (Table 4). These patterns varied from the fluid competitive pattern in the Ukraine, the bipolar pattern in the Baltics, the rigid competitive pattern in Moldova and the paternalistic pattern in Central Asia. The circumstances and process of ethnic stratification formation had a profound impact on the future dynamics of the Russian and non-Russian ethnic relationships.

Table 4. Origins and Formation of Ethnic Stratification in the Periphery of the Czarist Russia/Soviet Union

Factors	Regions			
	Ukrainian	Baltics	Moldova	Central Asia
Mode of Incorporation	Warfare Dynastic Politics Diplomacy	Annexation	Annexation	Colonization
Level of Socio-Economic Development in Comparison to Russia	Simultaneous Development with Russia	Higher	Lower	Lower
Character of Russian Integration	Economic Migration	Colonial Apparatus/Military	Formation of Russian Diaspora Thorough Border Changes	Colonial Apparatus Specialists Economic Migrants
Cultural Differences Between Russians and Indigenous Population	Significant Overlap of Cultures	Small	Large	Large
Type of Ethnic Stratification	Fluid Competitive	Bipolar	Rigid Competitive	Paternalistic

4. THE PREPARATORY PHASE AND STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION

This section describes the changes to ethnic stratification that occurred in Soviet society since the end of WWII, up to the early 1980s. The purpose of this analysis is to characterize the background range of possibilities and constraints within which the process of negotiation of the new ethnic order would proceed in the next phase of the ethnic transformation process. According to the theoretical model (Figure 5) three structural dimensions characterize the preparatory phase of ethnic transformation: (1) the differences of the ethnic Russians' situation in the national republics as compared with Russians in the Russian Federation; (2) the organization of ethnic stratification in the national republics; and (3) the power differentials between the Russian and indigenous communities. The following briefly describes each of them.

4.1 The Push and Pull of Russian Migration: Between the Russian Federation and National Republics

As the analysis of the post-WWII Census data shows, Russian migration to the periphery of the empire went through periods of expansion and contraction (Figure 6). Since the end of the WWII up until the late 1960s, Russian migration was increasing, and peaked at 4 million during 1959-1969. Since the late 1960s, Russian migration began to decline rapidly. With the collapse of the USSR, Russian migration had ceased altogether.

What are the major factors explaining such pendulum-like swings in Russian migration patterns? As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the patterns of Russian

Figure 6. Russian Migration to the National Republics of the USSR, 1959-1993*



* Sources: 1959 Census; 1970 Census; 1979 Census; 1989 Census; Makarova (1995); Topilin (1992).

settlement in the national republics during the ethnic stratification formation period were determined mostly by the ethno-political considerations of the Soviet regime. However, since late 1950s socio-economic factors became the driving force of Russian migration. More specifically, it was the process of development and modernization of the periphery of the country that had created incentives powerful enough to attract millions of ethnic Russians. In order to identify the "pulls" of Russian migration the character of the social stratification of Soviet society must be examined.

Soviet society was rather weakly stratified along class lines, while social inequalities were much more pronounced across various segments of the economy and among population living in different spacial or geographical locations (e.g., the capitals of republics, regional centers, and rural areas).[37] The Soviet planners, obsessed with the military superiority of the USSR, diverted a disproportionate amount of resources to the military-industrial complex and to heavy industries (the machinery, steel, and chemical industries). As a result, the salaries of workers employed in the machine building or military facilities, were, on average, twice as high as the salaries of workers (with approximately the same qualifications) working at the food processing or textile plants.

The inequalities based on one's location in various segments of the economy were only partially expressed in the higher wages in the military/heavy industries. Those employed in preferred sectors of the economy also had many more non-wage benefits tied to their jobs. Since the military and heavy industry enterprises were heavily subsidized by

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[37] For more on the stratification of the state-socialist societies as based on spacial/geographical and segment of the economy location, see Szelenyi, 1978; and Szelenyi, 1981.

the Central government, they could supply better and more housing, health care, access to kindergartens, cultural facilities, and cars to their employees (Titma and Tuma, 1993).

Spacial/geographical differentiation was the second major dimension of social inequality in the USSR. Because of the centralized and bureaucratized character of the Soviet economy, residence areas in the USSR were also ranked in a steep hierarchy. At the top of the list were Moscow or Leningrad, followed by the capitals of the national republics and regional centers. At the bottom of the hierarchy were local regional centers, small towns, villages and rural areas. Residents of the major cities and capitals of the national republics enjoyed significant economic (a better supply of food and consumer goods; employment opportunities; higher wages) and social advantages (e.g., much better access to education, and health care) vis-á-vis residents of the local regional centers, small towns and villages.

Russian migration to the periphery of the empire in both the above respects, represented acts of upward social mobility. The predominant majority of migrating Russians were drawn by employment opportunities in the military industrial complex, and the heavy industry factories. In addition, Russians settled almost exclusively within capitals and/or major regional centers within the national republics. Therefore, by moving from rural, or small town Russia to the major regional centers of the national republics, Russians were significantly improving their social and economic situation relative to what their situation had been in the Russian Federation.[38]

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[38] The advantages that ethnic Russians enjoyed in the periphery of the empire, due to their location in a particular segment of the economy and geographical space, remained significant up until the collapse of the USSR. The Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey of ethnic Russians shows that 70% of respondents in the Baltics, about 60% in the Ukraine,

The modernization of the non-Russian republics, besides spurring massive Russian migration, also initiated a process of rapid social differentiation in the indigenous societies. Indigenous political elites in the national republics started to emerge. With the formation of the indigenous working and middle classes, educated members of local populations began to move into the professions and occupations (science, education, medicine, management) that only Russians had occupied earlier.

A rapidly growing economy, as well as the egalitarian policies of the Communist regime, made the Soviet society of the late 1950s and early 1960s one of the most open and dynamic in the world. Such developments greatly facilitated the acculturation and, to some degree, assimilation of the indigenous people into the essentially Russian "Soviet nation."

The situation started to change in the mid 1960s. Three, long-term, structural developments were important in changing the boundaries of ethnic groups in the periphery of the empire: (1) the decline of the growth rate of the Soviet economy, which, by the early 1980s, led to a severe economic crisis; (2) the demographic changes that occurred in the USSR since WWII; and, (3) the development and consolidation of a sizeable number of educated indigenous elites (national intelligentsia) in the national republics. The downswing of the social and economic development of the country had significantly diminished incentives for Russian migration to the national republics. Furthermore, as a

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50% in Moldova, and 44% in Central Asia, believed that the conditions of life are better in the national republics than in the Russian Federation. Less than 10% of ethnic Russians, throughout the periphery of the country, reported that the conditions of life are worse in the national republics than in the Russian Federation.

result of increasing competition and scarcity of resources and jobs in the national republics, Russian migration began to decline and, later, reversed its direction. However, the process of economic expansion and contraction proceeded very unevenly across the periphery of the country.

4.2 Central Asia: From Paternalistic to Rigid Competitive Ethnic Stratification

Death rates in Central Asia fell because of the diffusion (albeit sporadic) of medical progress which came with development under the Soviet regime. However, reproductive patterns did not change because large segments of the population in this region continued to live in rural areas. Furthermore, even after the collectivization of agriculture, having a large family remained economically desirable because of the role of the informal economy in providing a living for the rural population[39] (Lewis, 1992, Ch.9).

By the mid 1960s, such discrepancies in the rates of population growth started to generate competition for jobs between Russians and the local people in this region. Competition was especially exacerbated by the downturn of the Soviet economy and the increasing size of the indigenous middle classes. As the system of higher education continued to churn out new cohorts of graduates, Russians found their opportunities for social mobility severely diminished. Under the pressure of increasing competition for scarce resources and jobs, and the increasing competitiveness of the indigenous

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[39] In 1989 average number of children born to a woman during her reproductive period of life was equal 5.9 for Tajik women, 4.9 for Turkmen women, 4.8 among Kyrgyz women, 4.7 among Uzbek women, 3.6 among Kazakh women. In comparison, average number of children born to a Russian women was eqaul 1.9 (Khazanov, 1995, p.260)

populations, Russians, by the early 1970s, began to gradually leave the region (Figure 7). By 1989, close to 750,000 ethnic Russians had left Central Asia.[40]

The confounded effects of (a) Russian out-migration, and (b) the rapid growth of the indigenous populations (2-3% a year) are seen in Figure 8. As the figure illustrates, during the last 30 years the proportion of Russians within the total population declined by half (13.3% to 7.6%) in Tajikistan, from 13.5% to 8.3% in Uzbekistan, from 17.3% to 9.5% in Turkmenistan, from 30.2% to 21% in Kyrgyzstan, and 42.7% to 37.8% in Kazakhstan. The out-migration of ethnic Russians significantly diminished Moscow's capabilities to directly control the region. In comparison, during the Brezhnev years, for example, Central Asia's Party elite grew in strength, to the degree that they started to rule the region like feudal lords, free to steal and spend as they wish, as long as they dispatched the required tribute to Moscow (Olcott, 1993).

Despite momentous changes that occurred during pre-*perestroika* years, Central Asia remained the most underdeveloped and poorest region of the Soviet Union. The modernization and development carried by the Soviets was one sided and involved the indigenous populations only to a limited extent. This was because the economy, created by the Soviets, had a strong colonial character. Uzbekistan, the most populous republic of the region, was essentially converted into a huge cotton plantation. The *Kolkhoz* system (Rus. collective farms) was used to provide a cheap indigenous labor force for crop cultivation and harvesting. Little of the cotton produced was actually processed in the republic; most of it was shipped to the Russian Federation. Turkmenistan, similarly, was

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[40] For more on the dynamics of Russian migration from Central Asia see, Drobizheva et al., 1992; Panin, 1992; Samakhova, 1994; and Zorkaja and Gudkov, 1992.

Fig. 7. Russian Migration to the Central Asian Republics, 1959-1993*



* Sources: 1959 Census; 1970 Census; 1979 Census; 1989 Census; Makarova (1995); Topilin (1992).

Figure 8. Russian Population in the Central Asian Soviet Republics, 1959-1989*



* Sources: 1959 Census; 1970 Census; 1979 Census; 1989 Census.

converted to the oil and gas colony of Russia. Crude oil was pumped and transported to Russia for processing, while locals had neither control over the production process, nor over distribution of the revenues. Furthermore, the industrial development that did occur in Central Asia, as a rule, did not draw on the indigenous labor force. It was cheaper and faster for the Center to build factories in the region and import a labor force from Russia, than to educate and train the indigenous population. Therefore, although the strata of indigenous elites in the region were rapidly growing, the majority of the population in Central Asia remained rural.

In sum, Central Asia's modernization had transformed the paternalistic type of ethnic stratification, which existed in the region during the colonial era, into the rigid competitive type of ethnic stratification. Ethnic Russians continued to dominate indigenous societies although consolidation of indigenous elites did occur. Indigenous elites were created by the Soviets to man the colonial type state bureaucracies. At the bottom of the hierarchy were rural masses.[41] In Central Asia the indigenous working class was numerically very small. A deep cultural division of labor, between the indigenous population and ethnic Russians, remained the main characteristic of the economy and society in this region.

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[41] In 1989 indigenous rural population acounted for 62% of the total indigenous population in Kazakhstan, 70% in Uzbekistan, 74% in Tajikistan, 78% in Kyrgyzstan and 66% in Turkmenistan (Khazanov, 1995, p.261).

4.3 Moldova: From Rigid Competitive to Bipolar Stratification

The policies of economic and social development of the periphery had also initiated rapid social differentiation within the indigenous Moldovan society. The levels of education of the indigenous population increased dramatically, and a rapid growth and consolidation of the indigenous Moldovan intelligentsia occurred. The capital of Moldova, Chisinau (*Kishiniov* in Rus.) located in the Bessarabia region, grew into the major industrial, administrative, and educational center of the republic. Nonetheless, these positive developments failed to bridge the deep ethnic, social, and economic divisions that existed between the two parts of the Moldovan republic.

Three sets of factors account for the failure of the Soviet regime to forge a viable nation out of a reconquered (by Stalin) Bessarabia, which was populated by ethnic Romanians and the Slavic Transnistria. First of all, economic development was spread very unevenly throughout the territory of the republic. Industries were built mostly on the left bank of the Dniester river, that is, in Transnistria, while the right bank of the Dniester was, and remained, rural.[42]

Because industrial development was concentrated in Transnistria, the rural indigenous population from the Bessarabia region migrated to the cities across the Dniester. Yet, once in Transnistria, they were forced to compete with the growing number of immigrants from Russia. In many cases, Russian immigrants were preferred

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[42] About 1/3 of all industrial goods, 56% of consumer goods, and 90% of electric power is produced on the left bank of the Dniester river. This area constitutes about 15% of Moldova's territory and has a population of about 900,000. In addition, all the major communication, and transportation lines connecting Moldova to the outside world are located on the left bank of the Dniester (Kolsto et al., 1993).

over the Moldovans because they were better educated and had Russian language skills. The treatment of the indigenous population as "second class" citizens in their own republic fueled anti-Russian sentiment in the republic.

Secondly, the efforts of the Soviets to construct a Moldovan identity, as distinct from a Romanian identity, also failed. Despite all the official propaganda about the Moldovan nation as different, culturally, ethnically, and linguistically, from Romanian, it was clear to everyone what the "Moldovan nation" stood for: it stood for Russified Romanians. Finally, despite the growing economic potential of the Bessarabia region, Transnistria, although much smaller in size (territorially and demographically) continued to dominate the republic (Table 5). Adoption of the Russian language remained a precondition for social mobility within the republic.

In sum, as a result of the Soviet policies of economic and social development, the rigid ethnic stratification characteristic of Moldovan society in the late 1940s, began to change. Under conditions of deep ethnic, territorial, and economic divisions, the consolidation of a bipolar society in Moldova was occurring. The Moldovan segment of the society, with its elites, intelligentsia, and cultural and economic institutions, was emerging on the right bank of the Dniester river.

In Transnistria, the Russian "pillar" of Moldovan society was consolidating. However, the ethnic divisions within the Moldovan bipolar society were much deeper than those within the Baltics. This situation evolved because (a) each of the two ethnic groups in Moldova had its own clearly demarcated and historically populated territorial "base", and (b) the Russian domination over the Moldovan "pillar" was much more strongly expressed than in the Baltics.

Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Moldova (total 1989 population: 4,322,362)*

Nationality group	As % of the total	Left Bank (Transnitria)	Right bank (central Bessarabia)
Romanians	64	40	71
Ukrainians	14	28	10
Russians	13	26	10
Others	9	6	9

* Source: Rywkin (1994), p. 52.

4.4 The Baltics under Demographic Threat

The development of industry in the Baltics did not generate a population explosion as it had in Central Asia. On the contrary, the growth of cities quickly absorbed the surplus population from the rural areas. The transfer of rural populations into industry was accelerated by the collectivization of agriculture and mass deportations of rural populations to Siberia. Because of the growth of cities, the expansion of mass education, and the increasing participation of women in the labor force, by the early 1960s, the birth rates of Latvians and Estonians (and Lithuanians as well, by the early 1970s) started to decline, and became similar to the birth rates of other Western European countries.

Despite the stabilization of the size of indigenous populations, the Center continued to build industrial and military enterprises in the region. This was done partly because of the relatively well-developed infrastructure in the region (communications, roads, railroads), its favorable geographic location (the Baltic seaports were the USSR's closest, non-freezing seaports to Poland, East Germany and Western Europe), and also because of the region's strategic military significance.

As a result of the continuous industrial build up and the higher standard of living in the Baltics, ethnic Russians continued to migrate to the region up until the 1991 collapse of the USSR (Figure 9). Thus, the proportion of Russians in Latvia since WWII increased from 10% to 34%, and in Estonia, from 8% to 30% (Figure 10). If other Slavic groups (Ukrainians and Byelorussians) are included in calculating the size of the Russian community in Latvia and Estonia, the percentage of Russians in Latvia increases to 40%, and in Estonia the percentage is nearly a third of its total population. Such changes in the

Figure 9. Russian Migration to the Baltics and Moldova, 1959-1993*



* Sources: 1959 Census; 1970 Census; 1979 Census; 1989 Census; Makarova (1995); Topilin (1992).

Figure 10. Russian Population Growth in the Baltics and Moldova, (pre-WWII population - 1989)*



* Sources: 1959 Census; 1970 Census; 1979 Census; 1989 Census; Lewis et al., (1976), p.149; Lieven (1994), pp.432-444. Data on Russian population in Moldova is for 1926, for Lithuania for 1923, for Latvia for 1939, and for Estonia for 1934.

demographic situation in the Baltics heightened inter-ethnic tensions as the continuous immigration of ethnic Russians threatened to undermine the demographic balance in the Baltics, and convert Latvians and Estonians into ethnic minorities in their own republics.

4.5 The Ukraine: Increasing the Regional Division

During the Soviet period, the Ukraine had become one of the most industrialized republics of the former USSR. Industrial development, however, was concentrated primarily in the most eastern part of the Ukraine, in the Donbas region. Rich coal deposits, salt, mercury, gas, lime, and sand resources, and the proximity to the Krivoi Rog iron fields in Russia, made the Donbas region one of the most important centers of heavy industry in the Soviet Union. The Western part of the Ukraine, on the other hand, is covered with some of the world's most fertile *chernozem* (Rus. black, very fertile) soil. Therefore, Moscow chose to develop this part of the Ukraine predominantly as an area of agricultural production.

Consequently, the geographical conditions and policies of economic development undertaken by the Center perpetuated and reinforced the historical division of the Ukraine into its Catholic-Western and Orthodox-Eastern parts. The western part of the Ukraine remained primarily rural, while the eastern part increasingly became urbanized and industrialized. Such differences in regional development had different consequences for the patterns of inter-ethnic relations in the western and eastern parts of the Ukraine.

Industrial development in Eastern Ukraine only accelerated the process of Russification that had been going on in the region for centuries. A mass influx of

Russians, as well as Ukrainians from the rural areas, into the fast growing cities of Eastern Ukraine (which includes Lugansk, Donetsk, Khar'kov) fostered a rapid assimilation of Ukrainians. Thus, by the late 1980s ethnic Russians constituted about 30% to 40% of the population in Eastern Ukraine (See Map 3). The tempo of assimilation was also very fast. In the 1970 census about 10% of Ukrainians considered the Ukrainian language to be their native language. In the 1989 census this number increased to 25%. On the other hand, about 30% of Russians report being able to speak Ukrainian. Currently, anywhere from a third to half of the Ukraine's population is either ethnically Russian or Russified (Motyl, 1993, p.72).

The western part of the Ukraine--which never belonged to the Russian empire and historically constituted a part of Central Europe--did not experience a massive influx of Russians. Russian migrants, as a rule, preferred cities with their urban styles of life, to living in rural areas. Therefore, in Western Ukraine the number of Russians living among the local population remained low--less than 10% (Harris, 1993, p.13)

These regional economic, social, cultural and ethnic differences, to a large degree, explain why the eastern and western parts of the Ukraine responded differently to the policies of Russification carried out by the Center and the indigenous elites. In the eastern part of the Ukraine the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians brought an increasing loss of national identity for Ukrainians, as well as their Russification. Especially significant in this regard was the establishment of Russian as the language of mass media, work, and education. The transfer of the language of the public sphere, from Ukrainian to Russian, greatly encouraged Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russian schools so that they could have better chances to enter universities and have successful careers. The

Map 3. Ukraine with Percent of Russian Speakers by Oblast, 1989*



* Source: Kolstoe (1995)

situation advanced to the point where the use of the Russian language became a signifier of higher social and occupational status, mobility, and an urban way of life, while, conversely, the use of Ukrainian became evidence of being rural, and lacking education and culture (Samakhova, 1994).

Furthermore, Ukrainians had a much better chance of having careers outside their national republic than people from the non-Slavic republics. The upper echelons of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the central apparatus of state bureaucracies, and the military have traditionally been dominated by Slavs. Thus, the interests of the Ukrainian political elite were tied very closely to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In comparison, the mobility of political and administrative elites in the Baltics and Central Asia were, with very few exceptions, limited by the boundaries of their republics. Therefore, Ukrainians had more incentive and interest in adopting the Russian language and culture than Balts or Central Asians (Hechter and Furtado, 1992).

The situation was different in the western part of the Ukraine. Here, ethnic Ukrainians constituted a predominant majority of the population. However, they were exposed to significant social and political pressure to adopt the Russian language and culture. In a predominantly Ukrainophone environment, this pressure could not help but generate resentment over being treated like a colony of Russia. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Russified Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine (because of its economic power) politically dominated the republic. Thus any social or professional advancement of Ukrainians was associated with becoming a Russophone.

Nevertheless, ethnic tension and competition in Western Ukraine did not become as significant as was the case in the Baltics or Central Asia. First of all, the size of the

Russian population in this part of the Ukraine was relatively small. Secondly, there was no individual discrimination of ethnic Ukrainians or restrictions on their social mobility within the Ukraine or throughout the whole USSR. Ukrainians enjoyed country-wide social mobility, up to the highest levels of the Soviet state and Party bureaucracy.

4.6 Migration and the Power Potential of Ethnic Communities

The combined effects of the policies of modernization pursued by the Soviet state and the historical, cultural, economic and other factors specific to the national republics, produced a wide variety of migration patterns. These, in turn, led to a very uneven distribution of Russians across the national republics.

Thus, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan together accounted for about 70% of the Russian diaspora (44.9% percent in the Ukraine and 24.6% in Kazakhstan) (Figure 11). The next biggest concentration of Russians was in the Baltics (6.8%), Uzbekistan (6.5%), Byelorussia (5.3%) and Kyrgyzstan (3.6%). The uneven geographic distribution of the Russian diaspora is also reflected in the data on the proportion of the Russian population within the national republics (Figure 12). Among 14 Soviet republics, Kazakhstan had the highest proportion of Russian population--close to 40%. The second highest percentage of Russian population was in Latvia (34%) and Estonia (30%). The Ukraine had 22%, Kyrgyzstan 21%, and Moldova 13%, while the rest of the republics with 10% or less of Russians comprising their populations.

The data on the demographic distribution and geographic concentration of Russians within the national republics is summarized on the grid in Figure 13. The

Figure 11. Distribution of Russian Population Throughout the National Republics of the USSR, 1989 (N=25.3 Milions)*



* Source: 1989 Census

Figure 12. Russian Population in the National Republics of the USSR, 1989*



* Source: 1989 Census.



Figure 13. Power Potential of Russian Communities in the National Republics of the USSR, 1985-1991

Russian communities which had the highest power potential are located within quadrant II, in Kazakhstan, Estonia, the Ukraine and, to a lesser degree, in Moldova. In these republics Russians not only constituted a significant proportion of the republics' population, but are also geographically concentrated (in the northern oblasts in Kazakhstan; the north- east region of Estonia; the eastern oblasts of Ukraine; and the Transnistria region in Moldova). Since Russians were a majority in these oblasts, they controlled oblast level institutions (local administrations, education, etc.) that could be used for political mobilization.

The two republics in quadrant I--Latvia and Kyrgyzstan--also have large Russian populations. However, unlike in the previous group of republics, Russians in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan did not control oblast level institutions. Instead, Russians in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan lived in the major cities of the republics (Riga, Daugavpils, Liepaja in Latvia, and Bishkek and Osh in Kyrgyzstan) where they constituted (or were very close to constituting) absolute majorities.

Finally, in Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the power potential of the Russian communities was relatively small. Russians in these republics comprised about 10% of the population. Most Russians live in the major cities of the republics where they constitute a numerical minority.

By overlaying the power potential axis with the axis describing the character of ethnic stratification, a grid that describes the ethnic conflict potential across the national republics was produced (Figure 14). Conflict potential is defined in the following way: the more comparable the power potentials of the ethnic groups, and the deeper the ethnic inequalities, the higher is the probability that liberalization of the authoritarian political



Figure 14. Ethnic Conflict Potential in the National Republics of the USSR, 1985-1991

system will lead to ethnic conflict. Conversely, the more fluid the ethnic stratification, and the wider the power differentials among ethnic groups, the lower is the potential for ethnic conflict.

According to the grid, the highest ethnic conflict potential is in the republics located in quadrant II--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser degree, Moldova. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic stratification pattern was rigid competitive, and the size of the Russian population was significant. In addition, in Kazakhstan the Russian population was highly territorially concentrated. Moldova in this respect occupied a middle position between the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia and the countries of Central Asia. Its ethnic stratification was more "rigid" than in the Baltics (i.e., Russians were of higher socio-economic status than the indigenous population), however, not to the degree as was the case in Central Asia.

In Latvia and Estonia, although the power potential of the Russian community was significant, the potential of ethnic conflict was modified by the character of ethnic stratification that was less pronounced than was the case in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Finally, in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the conflict potential was low despite the rigid competitive character of ethnic stratification, since the size of Russian communities in these republics was small.

In sum, the analysis of the preparatory phase demonstrates that the Soviet state's modernization policies produced two developments. First, they stimulated mass Russian migration to the periphery of the country. Second, modernization initiated a process of rapid social differentiation of the indigenous population, which by the early 1960s, had led to the gradual consolidation of the new nations. Yet, the successes of the Soviet regime's

modernization policies also decreased the occupational, economic and educational differences between Russians and the indigenous populations. The acculturation and bilingualism of non-Russian groups also grew fast. However, the degree to which this occurred varied dramatically across the regions and was highly influenced by the circumstances under which ethnic stratification came to be formed.

Thus, in Central Asia, ethnic stratification evolved from a paternalistic pattern to a rigid competitive pattern. In Moldova, bipolar stratification was unfolded even though the Russian incipient society still dominated the republic. In the Baltics, contrary to the situation in Moldova, indigenous ethnic groups asserted their dominance over ethnic Russians. This occurred because Russian migration to the region became increasingly dominated by economic migrants. Finally, in the Ukraine, differences between its regions became more salient than differences between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians.

The significance of ethnic developments in the national republics became especially vivid when the Soviet economy began to stagnate and then decline. Under conditions of increasing scarcity of resources, the competition between ethnic groups escalated, thereby putting more and more pressure on Russians. Thus, the unquestionable political domination of the Russians came into contradiction with the social and economic development of the periphery.

In the case of the Baltics, this contradiction was expressed as a heightened national consciousness and widespread perceptions that their nations were in demographic, cultural, linguistic and ecological danger. In Central Asia the increasing competition and rising indigenous middle class led to an outflow of ethnic Russians. In the Ukraine, regionalization of the republic occurred. Its eastern region had become increasingly

Russified and assimilated into Russian ethnos, while in Western Ukraine the dynamics resembled the developments in the Baltics.

Analysis of the developments preceding Gorbachev's *perestroika*, depicts the major lines of cleavage between Russians and the indigenous population as they emerged in the periphery of the USSR. It also describes the relative positions of Russian and indigenous groups within each of the national republics. However, patterns of ethnic stratification per se, do not explain why and how ethnic transformation proceeded to the next (decision) phase. This is because ethnic transformation, although shaped by political, economic and social conditions, is first and foremost, a political process, i.e. the outcome of actions of multiple actors in the national republics, the Russian Federation, and the Russian communities themselves. Therefore, the next chapter concentrates on an analysis of the dynamics of the ethnopolitical process as it has evolved since the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms.

5. THE DECISION PHASE: ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION AS A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING, 1985-1991

Russian nationalists as well as Communists usually blamed Gorbachev for his reforms which had unleashed nationalism in the periphery of the empire. However, although Gorbachev's reforms had weakened the Soviet state, they could not have singularly produced such a rapid and spectacular unraveling of the centuries old empire. Neither could the nationalist movements (that had emerged in the periphery of the republics) alone, undermine the dominant position of ethnic Russians in the Soviet empire.

Contributing as much, and perhaps even more, to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were the developments within the Russian Federation itself. The most important of these developments were (a) the transformation of the consciousness of "Russia's Russians," which was expressed in a syndrome of imperial exhaustion and Russian isolationism, and (b) the consolidation, under leadership of Boris Yeltsin, of the Russian state that dissociated itself from the legacies of the empire (Lapidus et al., 1992). In other words, it was under the impact of the growing isolationism of Russia's population that the process of ethnic transformation in the periphery of the empire progressed from the preparatory phase to the decision phase.[43] Such a rapid collapse of the USSR would have been highly unlikely if the Russian people had remained deeply committed to preservation of the empire. The imperial exhaustion and growing isolationism within the Russian Federation, in turn, profoundly shaped the situation of ethnic Russians within the national

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[43] In terms of the ethnic transformation model (Figure 5), the above developments are represented by the vertical strategic dimension.

republics.

Isolationist sentiments in Russia were not an entirely new phenomenon. They existed during most of the Soviet period, as a reaction to the alleged economic, political and cultural discrimination against Russia within the Soviet state. However, until the beginning of *perestroika*, Russian separatism had not consolidated into an ideology but had remained rather marginal.

Three developments account for a growing reception of isolationist and inward-looking Russian sentiment. First, the deepening economic crisis resulted in an acceleration of the struggle for scarce resources among the different republics. The Russian population bitterly complained that the regime had turned the Russian Federation into an "internal colony of the USSR." According to this opinion, for decades, Russia was drained of its financial resources, as well as oil, gas, gold, and other raw materials, in order to modernize and develop the periphery. Russian nationalists complained that the Russian Federation did not have the Russian Communist party, the Russian Academy of Sciences, or the other cultural and social institutions that the national republics had. The slogan "Down with the sponges!" (meaning the national republics) became quite popular with the general Russian public. These sentiments were especially strong in the case of the Central Asian republics because they were perceived as corrupt, inefficient, and run by mafias (Kortunov, 1995).

Second, isolationist sentiment grew in response to the assertion of nationalism in the periphery of the empire. Russians were deeply offended by the "ungratefulness" of the national republics. According to Russians, it was a sign of inexplicable and unwarranted ingratitude to call the Soviet Union a Russian empire. The Russian population was

outraged to hear that the nationalist press in the republics were characterizing the Center's economic policies of development, an "exploitation" of the periphery, and Moscow's rule over the national republics as "political and national oppression and occupation." Third, Russians looked with apprehension at the growing flow of refugees, Russians and non-Russians, into Russia[44] (Zaslavsky, 1992).

Rising isolationism in the Russian Federation had profound consequences on the situation of ethnic Russians in the national republics. By disassociating from the periphery, the population in Russia was also disassociating from the fate of 25 million Russians who lived there. Russians in the Russian Federation saw the potential mass immigration of their compatriots from the former Soviet republics as a direct threat to their economic interests.[45] These attitudes of "mainland" Russians profoundly shaped the

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[44] The signs of Russia's growing isolationism were already visible during the early 1980s. Thus, after strong public pressure and protest, the Central Committee of the Communist Party shelved the project in which Siberian rivers were to be diverted to Central Asia. Second, there was growing opposition to Russian military involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, isolationist sentiments came into the open in the mass protests of Russian women. Russian women refused to let the Soviet military conscript their sons to the regiments that were to be sent to quell the ethnic conflicts in the periphery of the empire. However, it was only with the ascendence of Yeltsin to leader of the Russian Federation that isolationism, as a mass ideology and movement for shedding the empire, transformed Russia into a nation-state.

[45] Characteristic in this respect, is the fate of Russian families from Kyrgyzstan who had left this republic to settle in the southern part of Russia. The local Russian population was very hostile to these refugees: there were cases when their houses and other property were set on fire, and their fields planted with crops, destroyed. The attitude of the locals was that "when the Russian villages in Central Russia were dying out, when there was an extreme shortage of specialists in industrial enterprises in Russia (this was happening in Central Russia during the 1970s and the early 1980s), there were no our [sic] compatriots from Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan coming to help us out. And now, when the things got rough, Russians from these republics suddenly remembered about us." As a result of the hostility of the local population, their inability to find jobs in their new places of

responses and reactions of Russians to the decline of their status in the national republics.

However, during the early *perestroika* period emergence of nationalism in the periphery of the country, and growing isolationism in the Russian Federation during the early *perestroika* period, had not yet consolidated into a political force strong enough to displace the Center. On the other hand, a Center weakened by Gorbachev's reforms could not unilaterally impose its will either. Thus, an impasse ensued, in which the old principals of stratification promoting Russian dominance within the Soviet state were openly challenged, while the new principles of access to power, resources by ethnic groups had not yet been established. As a result, the mode of conflict resolution within the triadic relationships, among the state, the national republics, and Russian minorities, changed. Instead of the imposition and command mode, bargaining and negotiation over the future ethnic order in the republics ensued.

Depending on the goals and modes of ethnic transformation, four types of transformation in the national republics emerged (Figure 15). In the Baltics, ethnic transformation was characterized by attempts to impose ethnic hegemony in the republics and to carry out profound reformations of Soviet institutions. In Moldova, ethnic transformation proceeded by attempts to impose ethnic hegemony and replace the Russians in positions of power and prestige, with the indigenous nationality. In Central Asia, ethnic transformation proceeded primarily through negotiation of the elites. Finally, in the Ukraine, ethnic transformation was characterized by attempts to reform Soviet institutions and to abolish ethnic hierarchy altogether. What follows is a detailed analysis

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settlement, and poverty, about 800 Russian families who had left Keminskyi *raion* (Rus. county) in Kirgizstan for Russia, returned to Kirgizstan (Ivanov, 1991).



Figure 15. Direction and Modes of Ethnic Structure Transformation in the National Republics of the USSR, 1985-1996

of each of the four types of ethnic transformation.

5.1 Ethnic Transformation in the Baltics: The Struggle Between Ethnic Hegemony and Reform

The process of ethnic transformation in the Baltics was characterized by a perpetual vacillation between civic and ethnic strands of Baltic nationalism (Figure 15) Thus, there were periods during which ethnic nationalism dominated the political process in the region. The titular nationalities' struggle for ethnic hegemony was usually followed by periods during which the civic orientation of Baltic nationalism was more prevalent.

When the Balts struggle for national rights was advancing through subordinating the rights and interests of all residents of the republics, the ethnic tensions and conflict in the region would dramatically increase. The political rhetoric in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would escalate significantly on both sides of the ethnic divide. Ethnic Balts would likely accuse the Russian community of imperialism, national oppression, and Russification. Ethnic Russians, in return, would denounce Balt nationalists for discrimination and violation of Russian civic and human rights, as well as accuse them of attempting to create apartheid, or perhaps even fascism, in the region. The ethnic divisions in the region would undoubtedly intensify and lead to ethnic mobilization and counter-mobilization in both communities.

When the struggle for the national rights of Balts was focing on reforming the totalitarian and oppressive Soviet political system, which had produced ethnic stratification in the first place, then ethnic tensions in the region would subside. Under this scenario, negotiation and bargaining between ethnic groups for access to power, economic

resources and prestige, would likely dominate the intergroup relations.

Why was Baltic nationalism undergoing such wide swings between its civic and ethnic orientations? In part this can be explained by the bipolar ethnic structure of the region. Developments in the Baltics, preceding *perestroika*, had led to a consolidation of the two incipient ethnic societies, which, until that time had been poised for a "showdown," as soon as the Center started to decline. The tensions between the two communities were fueled by a rapid change in the ethnodemographic balance in the region. By the mid-1980s, uncontrolled Russian immigration into the republics was threatening to convert indigenous populations into minorities in their own historic homelands.

Because the size of Russian communities in Latvia and Estonia was much larger than in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia went through much wider "ethnic hegemony--civic nationalism" swings than Lithuania. By far, such swings proved most destabilizing in Estonia because of the great territorial concentration of ethnic Russians in the north-eastern part of that republic. The quest for ethnic hegemony in Estonia, therefore, often led to the counter-demands of ethnic Russians for autonomy, and even secession, of the north-eastern territories.

In Latvia ethnic Russians primarily lived in urban areas. Here, the potential for Russian mobilization was lower (because of crosscutting cleavages and a higher rate of inter-ethnic contact) and, when it did occur, was based on an interaction of ethnic, corporate, professional, and/or class interests. Finally, in Lithuania the "swings" between ethnic and civic orientations of Lithuanian nationalism were the smallest. In Lithuanian only 9% of the population are ethnic Russian. Although mobilization of Russians did occur in Lithuania, its effect on the political situation in the republics was marginal.

Lithuania had, and is presently having, many more problems with its Polish, rather than its Russian, minority.

Analytically, the process of ethnic transformation in the Baltics can be divided into two stages, depending on the degree of dominance of ethnic or civil nationalism. In the period from 1985-1989, the political process in the region was characterized by a struggle for nationality rights. This led to an increase in ethnic tensions and the mobilization and counter-mobilization of indigenous and Russian ethnic communities. Since 1989, the struggle for national rights was progressively transformed into the struggle for "state's rights," e.g., rights for self-determination and independence of the Baltics. This led to a decline in ethnic tensions and the de-mobilization of the ethnic Russian political movement in the region.

5.1.1 Liberalization and the Quest for Ethnic Hegemony, 1985-1989

From 1985 to early 1990, ethnic tensions in the Baltics were rapidly increasing. Gorbachev's reforms had liberalized the political system allowing articulation of national protest. At the same time, the Center remained strong enough to maintain control over the republics. As a result, national protest took form as the quest for ethnic hegemony. Consequently, the incipient indigenous societies attempted to subordinate the Russian segment of the population *within* the framework of the Soviet state. In other words, attempts were made to promote the indigenous "cadres" within the centralized and hierarchical institutions of the Soviet state by pushing out the "cadres" of Russian ethnicity from positions of power and prestige. Predictably, the result was a rapid escalation of

ethnic tensions in the region.

These attempts to subordinate Russian segments of the population needs to be understood, first and foremost, as a defensive reaction of small Baltic nations to the policies of Russification and demographic imperialism which had threatened their ethnic survival. However, ethnic mobilization in the Baltics was not only facilitated by the ethnodemographic and structural characteristics of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian societies. The rapid grass roots mobilization was also fostered by the strong ethnic identities of the Baltic people, and their cultural traditions and historic grievances which included lost statehood, mass terror following the end of WWII, and the brutal imposition of an alien socio-economic system.

Especially important in the process of ethnopolitical mobilization were the cultural traditions of the region. The regularly held national folk song and dance festivals, and the existence of numerous cultural, grass roots organizations, provided the organizational forms through which the intelligentsia were "connected" to the masses.[46] This connection of the indigenous intelligentsia to the community at large was a unique characteristic of the Baltics.

Finally, the first anti-Communist opposition groups had played a crucial role in the organization of political and religious dissidents and the sizable communities of Baltic immigrants in the western countries. In no other region of the former USSR (with the exception of the Ukraine) was the dissident movement so strong and visible as in the

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[46] National folk song and dance festivals date back to the late 19th century. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, grass roots groups, devoted to preservation of traditional culture, language and history, flourished in the Baltics.

Baltics. As a result of this interplay of structural, political, ethnodemographic, cultural and historic factors, came the creation of the so-called Baltic Popular Fronts--the first independent, mass-based, political movements in the USSR.[47]

The first political action of the National Fronts, that amounted to an attempt to impose ethnic hegemony in the republics, was the promotion of indigenous language legislation. Under strong pressure from the National Fronts, the Soviets of the republics had quickly passed the so-called "state language laws." The laws had two major provisions. First, they mandated the use of indigenous languages instead of Russian in all major spheres of life in the republics. Secondly, the new laws introduced indigenous language proficiency requirements for all major categories of state employees. Since only 15% of Russians in Estonia, 22% in Latvia and 37% of Russians in Lithuania, were proficient in indigenous languages, in one stroke the language laws threatened the security of their jobs, significantly limited their social mobility, and restricted opportunities for education.

The passage of language legislation produced an almost instantaneous, anti-nationalist backlash by ethnic Russians. First of all, Russians denied that the new laws had any legitimacy. They considered the Baltics to be a part of their country, and argued that no one had a right to convert them into second class citizens on their own land.

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[47] The Popular Fronts were umbrella-type organizations, embracing both Party and non-Party members for the support of *glastnost* and *perestroika*, without directly challenging the Party's monopoly of power. The Popular Front of Estonia held its founding congresses in April 1988, with Latvia and Lithuania following with the establishment of parallel organizations in May and October of that year. For more on the National Fronts' creation, organizational structure, social base, and ideology, see Lapidus, 1992; Sedaitis and Butterfield, 1991; and Trapans 1991.

Secondly, Russians rejected the claim made by nationalists that the laws were needed to protect indigenous languages and culture from assimilation and disappearance. Rather, the Russians argued, the language laws were created as an arbitrary means to hire and fire, from jobs, any person of non-indigenous ethnicity. Russians also asserted that the goal of the new laws was to legitimize the change-over of bureaucrats of one ethnicity into bureaucrats of the other ethnicity, that the criteria of sufficient knowledge was vague, and that there were no institutions established to which one could appeal the results of the language proficiency tests. Furthermore, Russians maintained, there were no adequate facilities, textbooks, dictionaries, or language specialists, to effect such a massive linguistic transition (of almost one million people) in the 5-7 years that the laws required.

Thirdly, even those Russians sympathetic to the Baltic cause were outraged by the lack of discussion and negotiation, with the Russian community, concerning the specifics of the laws; in particular the scheduling, and means and ways of implementing them. Russians just woke up one morning to see the law passed.

The passage of the language laws galvanized the Russian diaspora and led to the creation of *Interfronts*, which were popular movements designed to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in Baltics.[48]

The *Interfronts*, organizations comprised of ethnic Russians, were established as a result of the merging of (a) the interests of the colonial (primarily military-industrial) elite in preserving the Communist system, with (b) the widespread discontent of local Russians over the language laws. The movement's base was the All-Union factories that employed

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[48] *Interfronts* were established on November 12, 1988 in Lithuania; on January 7, 1989 in Latvia; and on March 14, 1989 in Estonia.

an almost exclusively Russian labor force.[49] It was in these enterprises, which were run from Moscow, that the political and economic interests of the colonial elite and the majority of the Russian labor force coincided.

Sovereignization of the republics, (the language laws were the most radical expression of this trend at the time) not only threatened replacement of managers with indigenous cadres, but also the closure of such factories because of the possible disruption of economic relations with the Russian Federation. Especially vulnerable to sovereignization, were the factories of the military-industrial complex, as well as the infrastructure and facilities serving the Soviet Army. Therefore, not surprisingly, the Russian military was a strong supporter of the pro-Soviet party and the managerial elite who attempted to create and lead the *Interfronts*. The *Interfronts* began their activities with a series of demonstrations protesting the language laws and demanding their annulment.

The creation of the pro-Center and pro-Soviet *Interfronts* was followed by a counter-mobilization of radical nationalists in Latvia and Estonia, who recognized that these organizations were a mortal threat to the separatist struggle. The result was the formation of "Citizens' Committees" that received a lot of publicity in the Baltic and all-Union press and mass media. If the National Fronts sought to unite all populations in the region, in opposition to the Communist regime, the Citizens Committees major goal was to exclude ethnic Russians from polity in the republics. Citizens Committees began to

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[49] For a profile of the *Interfront* leader in Estonia see *Report on the USSR*, February 7, 1990, p.28. The *Interfront* headquarters in Estonia were located at the All-Union *Dvigatel* enterprise, which produced a wide variety of components for military weapons systems.

register the names of the citizens of inter-war Latvia and Estonia and their descendants, as a means of excluding the non-indigenous population from participating in deciding the fate of Latvia.[50] Committees were claiming that only citizens of the inter-war Estonia and Latvia have the right to participate in deciding the future of the republics, thus promoting a conception of political community firmly based on descent. In both republics the committees succeeded in registering most of their eponymous ethnic groups.[51]

Ethnic tensions increased even further with the 1989 Soviet-held elections in the republic. The catastrophic defeat of the Communist parties in the republican elections meant that the only way they could survive was by jumping on the National Fronts' bandwagon and supporting the sovereiginization of the republics. Thus, in June 1989, in a special congress of the Central Committee, the Lithuanian Communist party declared it's separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The "renegade" Lithuanian Communists had adopted an agenda that was very similar to the programs of the national movements[52]. Soon, similar moves were made by the Latvian and Estonian Communist

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[50] Because of the small size of the Russian community there were no Citizens' Committees established in Lithuania.

[51] With regard to their purpose and organization, the Citizens Committees were similar to the 'committees of correspondence' which had prepared the way for the American Revolution in the 1770s. After the Baltics regained independence, the Citizens Committees played a crucial role in enacting Citizenship Laws that granted citizenship to the majority of the Russian populations of these countries. For more on Citizens Committees, see Smith et al., 1994.

[52] Thus, after the split from the CPSU, the Lithuanian Communist party adopted its new program under the motto "Lithuania without Sovereignty is Lithuania without a Future." Where the National Fronts and Communist Parties differed was on the speed of sovereiginization and ways to achieve it. National-Communists argued for a more pragmatic, peace-meal approach towards the sovereiginization of the republics. In comparison, the National Fronts argued that the Soviet Union would never agree to letting

parties.

The withdrawal of the Baltic Communist parties from the CPSU, and the consolidation of national-Communists and pro-reform intellectuals in their opposition to Moscow, had pitted, head-to-head, two ethnic communities in the region. On one side there were governments controlled by the nationalists and supported by the National Fronts and Civic Committees, which had the indigenous population as their social base. On the other side of this divide were the *Interfronts* and rump Communist parties. They were supported by conservatives in Moscow, the military and the KGB, and the Russian proletariat in the all-Union factories served as their social base.

The mobilization of ethnic communities on both sides of the ethnic divide led to the increasing radicalization of political activities in the republics. Each action of the governments controlled by nationalists was followed by counter-actions organized by the *Interfronts*.[53] Ethnic tensions peaked in early 1989 when the newly elected Soviets declared the restoration of the Baltic republics' independence from the USSR.[54] Declarations of independence were followed by a wave of mass political strikes of ethnic Russians. In Estonia political strikes involved from 20,000 to 40,000 workers nationwide; this represented about 4 to 5% of the republic's total labor force (Raun, 1994).

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the Baltics go peacefully. Their position was to demand the restoration of independent Baltic states on moral and legal grounds.

[53] For a detailed description of the dynamics of the political struggle between governments controlled by nationalists in the Baltic republics and the *Interfronts*, see Gerner and Hedlund, 1993, chapter 5.

[54] Latvia and Estonia declared independence but immediately suspended the declaration pending negotiation with the USSR, while Lithuania continued to hold fast to their position of independence.

5.1.2 The Struggle for Baltic Independence: The Move Towards Civic Nationalism, 1989-1991

After the summer 1989 political strikes ended, the *Interfront* movements started to rapidly lose mass support among ethnic Russians. Although strikes and demonstrations continued to be announced, the crowds of supporters and participants were getting smaller and smaller. At the same time, a significant change in the social composition of *Interfront* supporters occurred. If, during early 1989, the workers of the large enterprises dominated the public events called by the *Interfront*, by 1990, two different categories of individuals became predominant: namely senior citizens and the Soviet military. The significant decrease in the number of active supporters and a change in their demography indicated an increasing marginalization and isolation of the *Interfronts*.

The *Interfront* movement began to decline because of the transformation of Baltic nationalism that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Instead of espousing a struggle for "ethnic hegemony," Baltic nationalism evolved into a mass movement for the restoration of the independent Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian states, with an espoused ideology of profound economic and political reform of the Soviet institutions in the region.

The reasons for the transformation of Baltic nationalism and the decline of the *Interfronts* need to be sought for in a broader political, economic and social context, nationally as well as internationally. More specifically, the escalation of ethnic tensions in the Baltics in the late 1980s was being produced by a liberalization of the totalitarian state, in which one ethnic group (e.g., the Russians) was politically, economically and culturally dominating other ethnic groups.

In comparison, the decline of the *Interfronts* and the transformation of Baltic nationalism during this time period, needs to be understood as a reaction to the social decomposition and economic disintegration of the Soviet state, and also to the rapidly changing international situation.

Politically, the Center was becoming increasingly paralyzed by the internal struggle between conservatives and Gorbachev, as well as the conflict between the Central government and Russian Federation. At the same time Gorbachev was categorically refusing to re-negotiate the Center-national republics relationship. Gorbachev's very nonconstructive policies dealing with the restless republics led Baltic leaders to increasingly realize that there could be no political future for the Baltics within the USSR.[55] At the same time, the decline of the Center was making independence a realistic possibility.

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[55] The Soviet regime's lack of understanding and disregard for ethnic aspirations was most vividly demonstrated during Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania, in January, 1990. Gorbachev undertook such a visit in the attempt to stem the republics drive towards independence. However, he seemed to completely misunderstand the motives and forces that led to the mass mobilization of the indigenous people in the republics.

During his interviews and public appearances in Lithuania, Gorbachev spoke very little about the issues that were most important in the republic at that time, (e.g., the circumstances of Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR in 1940, the reform of the federal structure of the USSR, changes in the nationality policies of the Center, devolution of the economic powers of the republics, etc.) Instead, Gorbachev spoke endlessly about the dependence of the Baltic economy on Russian oil and energy; about the advantages that small nations have in being constituent parts of such a big country as the USSR, etc.

Furthermore, in his dialogue with the public, journalists, and intellectuals, Gorbachev could not articulate even one concrete proposal that would address Lithuania's most important grievances. As a result Gorbachev's visit, only reinforced the perceptions of the majority of the indigenous populations; that they would remain at the mercy of the much more powerful and unpredictable neighbor unless there was a state to protect the native language, culture and ways of life. For more on Gorbachev's fateful trip to Lithuania, see Senn, 1995.

Radicalization of Baltics was also fueled by the rapid economic decline and collapse of the centrally planned Soviet economy. Reforms had wreaked chaos on the centralized system of production and distribution of the USSR. By the early 1990s, the centralized planned economy, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. However, any attempt to introduce economic reforms in the Baltics was perceived as a threat to the authority of the Center and was blocked by the conservatives in Parliament.[56] With the disastrous economic policies of the Central government, and no improvement in sight, the population of the Baltics (including local Russians) were increasingly coming to realize that they had little economic future in the state of the USSR.

Finally, unlike in the other republics of the USSR, the conflict between the Center and the national republics in the Baltics was couched in the language of the people from whom independence was illegally wrested. Consequently, the National Fronts strategically organized all their major political actions so as to show the illegality of the Soviet occupation of the Baltics. A significant boost to the National Fronts came after the Supreme Soviet of the USSR created a special commission to investigate the 1940 incorporation of the Baltics into the USSR. In early 1990, the commission made public

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[56] Thus, the "IME plan"--a plan for the economic autonomy and "self-management" of Estonia within the Soviet Union--was developed by Estonian intellectuals in 1986, and, for almost three years, could not be passed through the Supreme Soviet for implementation in the Baltics. When it finally was approved (by margin of only 2 votes!) it was too late, and too little. Furthermore, even these modest economic freedoms that the IME allowed for in the republics was blocked by the Central Ministries. For example, the Central Bank of the USSR froze all the hard currency assets of the Baltic republics and demanded that all transactions were to pass through it. There were hopes that the so-called "500 days plan," developed in Summer of 1990 by economist Yavlinskii, would launch radical economic reform in the USSR. Gorbachev initially supported the plan but, by December of 1990, he had rejected the plan as too radical (Shlapentokh, 1993c).

the secret clauses of the 1939 German-Soviet Pact, in which Stalin and Hitler had partitioned Poland and gave the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Transylvania to the USSR.

The Soviet parliament's recognition of the reality of the Baltics occupation allowed for the National Fronts to launch a call for international recognition of the Baltics and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. "Internationalization" of the Baltics' problem had the effect of turning the Center-republics conflict into a national liberation struggle against foreign domination.

This change in the goals of the national struggle in the Baltics also meant significant changes in policies towards Russians. Baltic leaders in their struggle for independence could ill- afford a restless and sizable Russian minority. In recognition of this fact, national leaders in the republics started to actively pursue polices of accommodation towards Russians. The new policies were based on three components. First of all, the provisions of the language laws were modified and scaled down, and the transitional periods from Russian to indigenous languages were extended.[57]

Secondly, the drive for independence was presented to ethnic Russians coupled with a program of radical economic and political reforms. Only independence, it was

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[57] In Latvian regions heavily populated by Russians, the language laws were declared non-operative until 1995. In Lithuania the law specified that all public institutions can provide services in any language acceptable to their employees. Military personnel were exempted from any language requirements (as if such requirement could be enforced...) Non-Lithuanian schools were allowed to keep records in their own languages. The provision requiring that the language used for all paperwork in the All-Union enterprises be switched from Russian to the indigenous language was dropped altogether. Lawmakers admitted that the laws were hastily passed, and that the implementation process had not been thoroughly thought through. Therefore, the decision was made to first concentrate efforts on the creation of the material base and mechanisms (textbooks, dictionaries, language centers, testing procedures, preparation of language instructors, etc.) needed for such a mass scale linguistic transition.

argued, could create the conditions needed to carry out political and economic reforms which would allow for the elimination of all vestiges of the totalitarian system, and arrest the precipitous decline of the economy in the region. Furthermore, the new leadership was promising that economic reforms would soon produce the "Baltic economic miracle." The supposed outcome was that all residents of the region, *independent of their ethnicity*, would be able to enjoy civic freedoms and standards of living comparable to those in Scandinavian countries.

Finally, a public campaign was launched to calm the fears and apprehensions Russians had about their futures in the republics. Russian language publications were created, and public appearances and forums of the National Fronts' leaders, government officials and *Interfront* leaders were organized. Some of the rallies and demonstrations of the *Interfronts* and their supporters were televised. The major thrust of such a publicity campaign was to assure Russians that language laws would not be used to "ethnically cleanse" Russians from positions of prestige and power. Furthermore, attempts were made to persuade Russians that their treatment in the independent Baltics would follow standards accepted by western countries. Although the titular nationalities would enjoy a hegemonic position, the others would be guaranteed their place and rights in the republics, with the whole being supervised by a general European order.

Thus, in its second congress the Latvian National Front (LNF) had modified its program to indicate that LNF will support legislature that would provide all current residents of the republic with Latvian citizenship independent of ethnic origins. However, of all the Baltic republics, Lithuania went furthest in accommodating the demands of its Russians minority. By early 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania had passed a

citizenship law based on the so-called 'zero-option.' The law guaranteed citizenship in the republic of Lithuania to all its residents.[58] Because of deep divisions within the Latvian and Estonian communities, negotiation over the status of Russians, although actively debated, did not reach the point of legislative proposals in these republics.

Moderation of the National Fronts' position towards ethnic Russians, combined with the effects of a collapsing Soviet Union, produced two developments. First, there was rapid decline in ethnic tensions in the republics. In a November, 1988 survey in Latvia, 54% of Russians expressed the opinion that they were discriminated against because of their nationality. By May of 1990, this number had dropped to about 24% (Rosenvald, 1991, p.157).

As the importance of the nationality issue in the Baltics was declining, the issues of work and social security (housing, food, medical care) were increasing in importance. The Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey shows that, by August, 1991, among the most important issues to ethnic Russians in the Baltics were increases in prices (69%), shortages of food (38%), increases in ethnic tensions (37%), and the rise in crime (30%).[59]

At the same time, there were growing internal divisions within the Russian community over what position to take towards the Baltics' drive for independence. Although the language laws had threatened to convert Russians into second class citizens in their own country, the Baltics' struggle for independence opened the possibility of

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[58] The law excluded soldiers and officers of Soviet Army, Interior troops, the KGB and some other groups of individuals from acquiring citizenship. For more on Lithuanian citizenship law, see Smith et al., 1994.

[59] Respondents could indicate more than one answer.

becoming citizens of the independent, and possibly prosperous, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian states. The deep economic crisis that was even more severe in Russia than in the Baltics meant that there would be little future for them in the Russian Federation. Furthermore, there were hopes that the economic situation in the Baltics would improve much faster than in Russia.

Finally, Moscow's policies did little to encourage Russians' opposition to the Baltics' drive for independence. On the contrary, Gorbachev's confrontational policies, especially the use of the infamous Interior Ministry troops (OMON)[60] to intimidate and bully civil populations and the lawfully elected governments, caused a rise in anti-Moscow feelings in the region that transcended ethnic divisions. On the wave of anti-Moscow sentiment, the Baltics held referendums that produced a strong Russian pro-independence vote. Approximately 30 to 35% of Russians voted "yes" to Baltic independence in early 1991.

In sum, the process of ethnic transformation in Baltics during the *perestroika* period went through two phases. During the initial period of reforms, there was an increase in ethnic tensions and conflict as the National Fronts attempted to take control of the republican institutions by excluding ethnic Russians from positions of privilege and power. However, since 1989, the ethnic tensions in the region had declined. In part, this

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[60] OMON was created by the Ministry of Interior for use against separatists and other "law breakers." On January 1991, OMON troops killed 5 civilians in Riga, Latvia and 14 people in Vilnius, Lithuania. OMON was implicated in brutal killings of 7 Lithuanian border guards in July 1991, and bombing campaign aimed at stirring up local Russians and discrediting Baltic national movements. OMON terrorized and beat draftees who refused to go to serve in the Soviet Army, and occupied public buildings in capitals of Baltic republics.

occurred because of the rapid transformation of Baltic ethnic nationalism into a struggle for independence. The ethnic situation improved partly because of the rapid decline of the Center, and the ensuing political and economic chaos in the Russian Federation. The deteriorating situation in Russia and limited possibilities to return to their homeland had significantly weakened Russians' opposition to the Baltics' independence.

The struggle for independence made Baltic national leaders actively search for an accommodation with the large Russian population in the region. Facing Moscow's threat to use military force, the Baltics could ill-afford a restless and resentful Russian population. In order to achieve Russian support for independence, Baltic leaders initiated the process of negotiation and bargaining over the future status of ethnic Russians in the republics. Ethnic Russians were promised citizenship, prosperity, and the protection of their cultural rights, in exchange for their support of an independent Baltic statehood.

The change in the position of the new government, coupled with the decline of the Center and the collapse of the economy in the country, also influenced ethnic Russians to take a more conciliatory stance towards the issue of the Baltics' independence. The possibilities of returning back to a Russian Federation were limited. Furthermore, higher standards of living and the hope that economic reforms would bring prosperity faster in the Baltics than in Russia, encouraged local Russians to seek accommodation with the new leadership of the republics.

Because of the interests in a modified reunion on both sides of ethnic divide, negotiation began over the future status of ethnic Russians in the region. The degree to which negotiation and bargaining decreased ethnic tensions depended on the extent of negotiation and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians, and on whether or not they

produced some agreement on the issue. In this respect, the situation improved most in Lithuania where negotiation over the status of ethnic Russians had reached the stage of legislative proposals and laws. In Latvia and Estonia, the negotiations did not produce a resolution. Therefore, once Baltic independence was achieved, the "Russian question" in Latvia and Estonia was re-opened, however, now the situation did not favor a democratically negotiated solution.

The process of negotiation and bargaining left Russian communities divided and ambivalent as to what position to take towards independence. In this regard, the majority of ethnic Russians can be characterized as "reluctant loyalists." Promises by the new leadership of full political, economic and cultural rights in the independent, and possibly prosperous, Baltic states led to a rapid decline of the *Interfronts*. This meant that a predominant majority of ethnic Russians in the region were ready to accept independence and would not actively resist if it did, indeed, become a reality. But peaceful acquiescence to Baltic independence did not mean that the Russian community wholly supported an independent Baltic statehood either. Although approximately one-third of ethnic Russians supported the Baltic independence, the majority of ethnic Russians were either against independence, or did not participate in the referendum at all (Taagpera, 1993, p.194).

5.2 Moldova: Transformation through the Displacement of Non-Indigenous Elites and the Imposition of Ethnic Hegemony

Developments in Moldova were characterized by attempts to radically transform its ethnic structure by displacing ethnic Russians in positions of privilege and power, and also by imposing ethnic hegemony of the titular nationality in the republics (Fig 15).

However, the efforts to radically change the status of ethnic groups backfired, leading to an escalation of the conflict between Moldovans and other ethnic communities in the republics. The Russian-Ukrainian majority in the Transnistria region of the republics, and the Gagauz, a small Turkic-speaking, Christian-Orthodox ethnic group in the south of the Republics, declared autonomy, and later independence, from the Moldovan republic. Efforts to quell the drive for succession by Moldovans escalated into open military warfare, in which the Soviet military became directly involved. The result was a *de facto* partitioning of the Moldovan state along ethnic lines into an independent "Dniester Soviet Socialist Republics" and Moldova proper.

Why did ethnic transformation in Moldova proceed through attempts to displace non-indigenous elites, and a struggle for ethnic hegemony of the titular nationality? In part, this happened because Moldova represents an artificial national entity. Stalin created Moldova from two pieces of land. Transnistria, a territory on the left bank of the Dniester river, was historically settled by Slavs, but had a significant number of Romanian and Jewish minorities. Bessarabia, a territory on the right bank of Dniester river, represented an annexed piece of Romanian territory with a Romanian population which, with its culture, economic habits, identity and traditions, belonged to central Europe.

Moscow's policies on Moldova's socio-economic development did not succeed in forging the deep historical, linguistic, and cultural gap between the two major ethnic groups in the republics. Slavs on the left bank of the Dniester river continued to dominate the republic, consequently creating resentment among the indigenous population. Once the process of liberalization of the country began, the deeply ethnically divided Moldovan state began to quickly unravel. Its Bessarabian part was pulling the Moldovan state

towards unification with Romania, while Transnistria was gravitating in opposite direction; towards unification with the Russian state.

5.2.1 Moldova: Towards Unification With Romania

With the introduction of reforms, nationalistic discourse in the republic began to consolidate around two themes: the national grievances of Moldovans under the Soviet regime, and debates about the events that led to the incorporation of Bessarabia into the USSR and the creation of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist republics. Moldovans deeply resented Russian dominance in the republics, uncontrolled Slavic migration into the republic, and extensive policies of Russification. However, what especially fueled nationalistic passions were the debates about events surrounding the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. *Glastnost* allowed the Moldovan intellectuals to openly challenge the Soviet version of Moldovan history. Once unearthed, Moldovan history proved to be a part of Romanian history. Thus, the liberation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Army in 1940, proved to be an imperialist annexation of the Romanian territory, which was followed by the partitioning of Eastern Europe between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

The "socialist revolution" in Moldova proved to be a wave of mass terror and massive "voluntary relocation" of Romanian families to Siberia in order to quell any resistance to occupation. The vacated homes, jobs and properties of deported Romanians were taken by in-migrating ethnic Russians. The introduction of Cyrillic (instead of the Latin alphabet) in 1941, and a declaration of the existence of a "Moldovan" language

distinct from Romanian, proved to be a national policy of oppression of the ethnic Romanian population. A "Moldovan" ethnic identity was constructed and brutally imposed on the ethnic Romanian population (by the Communist regime) as a way of dividing the Romanian nation and legitimating the Soviet occupation.

Thus, the merging of national grievances with the historical incorporation of Bessarabia into the USSR led to the formation of a powerful nationalist discourse for the re-unification of Moldova with Romania. On one hand, this drive was stoked by the attempts of Moldovan intellectuals to reclaim the prosecuted, Moldovan "Romanians" who'd been driven into a social and psychological underground. On the other hand, the Moldovan intelligentsia, by appropriating Romanian history, and Romanian national and nationalistic ideology and mythology, were seeking to mobilize the population for the purposes of re-uniting a nation which had been dismembered by the empire.

At this point it is appropriate to remark on the notion of re-unification. The very idea of re-unifying a nation divided by an oppressive foreign power is one of the most emotionally and politically powerful ideas of nationalism. The modern German and Italian states were created under slogans of national unification. Furthermore, the re-unification of West and East Germany, and the euphoria that followed it, acted as an inspiring example for the Moldovan nationalists to emulate.[61]

However, the effort to unify Moldova with Romania was categorically rejected,

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[61] Using Geertz's terminology, the Moldovan type of nationalism can also be defined as a reaction to the "political dismemberment" of the nation. Other examples of reactions to the "political dismemberment" of nations are pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, etc. (Geertz, 1973, p.264).

not only by ethnic Russians, but also by members of other non-titular ethnic groups living in the republic. First of all, ethnic Russians argued that the Dniester region is "*chastica Russkoi zemli*" (Rus. part of the Russian land) that never belonged to either Romania or Moldova. Secondly, re-unification of Moldova with Romania threatened to radically change the ethno-demographic balance in the republic. Russians, together with other Russophones (Ukrainians, Jews) comprised about 30% of the population in the republic and exercised significant clout over the Moldovan republic. In the case of unification, Russophones would become a numerically insignificant minority in Romania (less than 5% of Romania's population). They would reside in a province far removed from Bucharest, with almost no political and economic influence in the state of Romania.

Russians who occupied significant positions of power and status in the Moldovan republic would become simply irrelevant if the institutions of the Romanian state were to replace Moldovan institutions. For the same reason, other Russians, and all those employed in the all-Union factories, would most definitely lose their jobs. Furthermore, there were other important grounds for ethnic minorities to outright reject the idea of living in a Romanian state. Economically, Romania was even more underdeveloped, and had a lower standard of living, than Moldova. Secondly, Romania during late 1989 was extremely politically unstable. The anti-government violence that spread throughout Romania's cities, and which resulted in the overthrow of the Chaucesku regime in 1989, had put the country on the brink of civil war. Thirdly, the Romanian state's very poor treatment of ethnic minorities, especially ethnic Hungarians and Gypsies, made the unification of Moldova and Romania simply unacceptable to the Russians.

Therefore, attempts by the Moldovan nationalists to embark on a course towards

reunification with Romania led to a rapid escalation of ethnic conflict. In 1989, the creation of the Popular Front by the Moldovan intelligentsia was followed by a counter mobilization of the ethnic Russian population; namely, the creation of the *Interfront* and the Joint Council of Workers Collective in order to oppose nationalization of the republics. The declaration of the laws of language, that mandated a switch from Cyrillic to Latin script, were met by widespread strikes throughout the republic. Approximately 80,000 people, predominantly ethnic Russians and Russified Slavs, participated in the strikes (Fane, 1993, p.138-139).

Ethnic tensions reached the point of open confrontation when, during the 1991 August putsch, Moldova declared its independence from the USSR. In response, ethnic Russians in Transnistria created the "Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic" (DSSR) and declared their own independence. The Moldovan government, in turn, denounced the Dniester's declaration of independence and called for volunteers to defend the territorial integrity of the country. In response, the leaders of the DSSR declared the total mobilization of their "Socialist Republic." Hostilities escalated into a sustained military conflict in the early summer of 1992, when Moldovan government forces fought the "Dniester" Army. Bloodshed was stopped only when the Soviet Army intervened in the conflict on behalf of the Dniester region.[62] In late summer 1992, the commander of the 14th Russian Army, Lieutenant-General Alexander Lebed, advanced his troops into the area of fighting. In this ethnic conflict, about 600 people were killed, and about 100,000

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[62] The 14th Russian Army provided training and supplied the "Dniester" army with armaments. In some cases, officers and soldiers of the 14th Army actually fought on the Dniester side against the Moldovans. For more on the involvement of the Russian military in the Transnistria conflict, see Socor, 1993a.

of the population became refugees (for a detailed account of the conflict see Helsinki Watch 1993).

In sum, the ethnic transformation process in Moldova never reached a stage of sustained negotiations. Unlike the situation in the Baltics, the indigenous nationality's push for ethnic hegemony was not transformed into civic nationalism when Molodva's independence became a possibility. Instead, the weakening of the Center accelerated the drive for Moldova's re-unification with Romania. To ethnic Russians, the republic's unification with Romania was tantamount to a hijacking of the Moldovan state by Moldovan nationalists. Once the Center that had kept the deeply ethnically divided Moldova together collapsed the struggle for control over the state erupted. Only deployment of the Soviet Army troops had stopped the bloodshed.

5.3 Central Asia: An Elite Negotiated Ethnic Transformation

The transformation of ethnic stratification in Central Asia has two major characteristics that differentiate it from similar processes which were taking place in other regions of the former USSR. First, ethnic transformation in Central Asia occurred, and to a large degree continues to occur, almost exclusively within the framework of the authoritarian Soviet political system. After independence, all Central Asian republics opted to maintain Soviet political and economic institutions. Reforms in the region proceeded very slowly, and, in many cases, involved just cosmetic changes, e.g., renaming of the institutions, parties, and changing personnel.

Because ethnic transformation occurred within authoritarian institutions of the

Soviet state, it was and remains state initiated and state controlled. Civil society in the region is very weak. During the *perestroika* era, there were neither mass anti-colonial and pro-reform, nor anti-Russian movements in the republics. After independence, there were very few political groups or parties in the region that existed outside the state. Even in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, rather open societies by Central Asian standards, opposition is tightly controlled by the ruling regimes and, therefore, remains very weak. Being state-controlled, ethnic transformation in the region is aimed at the protection and consolidation of the power of the ruling regimes.

The second feature of ethnic transformation in Central Asia is that it involves a process of extensive elite bargaining and negotiation. Since almost no political groups and parties exist outside the state, ethnic groups in authoritarian systems, to a large degree, resemble corporate groups, or "special interest groups." As such, the elites of these ethnic groups bargain and negotiate with other corporate groups for state protection, favorable policies, favorable legislation, etc.

Why did the process of ethnic transformation in Central Asia take the form of elite bargaining and negotiation? For the answer to this question, one needs, again, to look at the character of social stratification of the societies in the region, especially the structural position of the indigenous educated classes. To grossly oversimplify, one could say that, in Central Asia, Moscow's policies of socio-economic development led to the creation of a peculiar type of social stratification, in which the indigenous elites and middle classes were, essentially, "sitting on" primarily rural-based, traditional peasant societies. Unlike in the Baltics or Ukraine, in Central Asia indigenous working classes is numerically small. This happened because the intelligentsia and new middle classes in the region were

created, first and foremost, to serve the state and can only partially be attributed to the process of modernization.

Because of the "underdevelopment" of the social structure, indigenous elites in the region were positioned between the Center and the primarily rural societies which, since the late 1970s, was characterized by a continuing demographic explosion, spreading ecological decay and a deepening economic crisis. Being so highly dependent on the redistributive state, and especially on the Center's subsidies[63] and Russia's markets, indigenous elites had little interest in promoting nationalism, separatism, or independence. Rather, the Central Asian leadership chose to actively lobby the Center for increasing subsidies and investment.

A high level of political dependence on the Center and an overwhelming economic interest in remaining a part of the USSR, profoundly shaped the policies of the indigenous elites towards Russian minorities. The leadership of the republics did not tolerate, and were suppressing, any signs of anti-colonialism or anti-Russian nationalism. Furthermore, since the Central Asian regimes were pressuring Moscow for increased investment and appealing to the historic responsibility of Russians for the current state of affairs in the region, they were greatly accommodating to the demands and situation of the local ethnic Russians.

A willingness to negotiate the status of ethnic Russians can also be explained by

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[63] In 1991 Union subsidies represented around 20% of the gross domestic product of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Dannreuther, 1994, p.21 and Kaser and Mehrota, 1992, p.64)

the weak ethnic identity of the population in the region.[64] Ethnicity in Central Asia was a rather new phenomenon that emerged in the region only during the Soviet era. The majority of Central Asia's population were living in rural areas where ethnic identity had to compete with strong and historically formed regional, clan and religious identities. A weak ethnic consciousness was not only characteristic of the region's rural population, but also of the indigenous intelligentsia. The indigenous educated classes in the region were created by Moscow to exclusively to serve the state. Unlike the intelligentsia in the Baltics or Moldova, the Central Asian intelligentsia had only minimal links to the region's pre-colonial history, culture and traditions. They were educated in Russia, were almost 100% Russian-speaking, and were schooled to abhor the cultural traditions of the region as "backward," "rural," and "non-modern."

Finally, anti-Russian sentiment in Central Asia was weak. Unlike the Baltics, the Russian population in the region did not constitute a demographic threat to the indigenous ethnic groups. Proportionately, the Russian population in the region was on the decline since the late 1970s because of Russian outmigration and the higher birth rates of the indigenous population. Moreover, since the Soviets did not destroy pre-existing ethnic identities, the Central Asian people are, by far, less hostile to the period of imperial

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[64] Interesting observations on the matter of ethnic consciousness in the region are provided by Jeffrey C. Lumpkin, an American traveler who, for some time in the early 1990s, lived and worked in Central Asia. He wrote, "While living in Almaty, Kazakhstan, I observed that many inhabitants themselves were rather confused about where they were living. Quite a few said they were living in the *Soyuz* (Rus. Soviet Union) (especially the ones who wanted to change rubles for dollars), some in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and very few...in the <now independent> Republic of Kazakhstan. Similarly, by crossing the border several hours away, one was in either Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan, and I could find no one to accurately differentiate the two." (From a message posted on CENASIA e-mail discussion group on October 10, 1995).

subjugation than most other nations of the ex-USSR. In all the Central Asian republics it is popularly believed that Russian imperial rule had significantly advanced the national development of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs (Dannreuther, 1994).

In sum, elite negotiation over the status of ethnic Russians in the region were the prevalent mode of ethnic transformation because of the significant dependence of the Central Asian educated classes on the Central state. Facing a continuing demographic explosion of the rural population, spreading ecological decay and a deepening economic crisis, the leadership of this region had and have little interest in promoting nationalism and separatism. Instead, it chose to lobby and negotiate with the Center. Furthermore, the ethnic grievances and consciousness of the population that proved so crucial for political mobilization in the Baltics were rather weak.

Depending on the mode of negotiation, one can discern two periods in the process of ethnic transformation in the region. The first period of transformation proceeded through the imposition and command mode of conflict resolution. During this stage, which began in the early 1980s and lasted through the initial stage of *perestroika*, Moscow unsuccessfully tried to reinstate the colonial status of the Russian community in the region. Since late 1989, until the collapse of the USSR, the imposition and command mode there was replaced by negotiation over power-sharing between the indigenous elites and the Center. Attempts were made essentially to return to the order of things that existed during Brezhnev's era. This meant that the Center was ready to forego some of the collective rights of local Russians in the national republics, and give a free hand to the local elites to rule their homelands as long as they did not challenge the Center's authority or the territorial integrity of the Soviet state. At the same time, the loyalty of the local

regimes to Moscow meant that the individual political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights of Russians would be preserved and protected by the Soviet state.

5.3.1 Negotiation Through the Imposition and Command: Attempts to Re-enforce the Colonial Status of Ethnic Russians in the Region, 1985-1989

Gorbachev's ascendence to power was marked by a decisive attempt to strengthen the Center's direct control over the region. The choice of such policies was motivated by Moscow's deep dissatisfaction with the poor economic performance of the Central Asian republics, and the widespread nepotism, clientism, corruption and incompetence of the local party elites.

The Center was also concerned about the outflow of ethnic Russians from the region. Finally, Moscow was very nervous about the spread of "unofficial" Islam among the predominantly Muslim population of republics. The protracted war that Moscow was losing in Afghanistan, was strengthening the fear that Islamic fundamentalism would spread in Central Asia.

In order to discipline and "straighten up" the region, a massive anti-corruption and anti-religious campaign was launched. In the so-called "Uzbek affair" alone (a scam involving large-scale falsification of cotton production figures and bribes which implicated the highest party officials in the republic, as well as in Moscow) more than 90% of the entire personnel of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Uzbekistan was replaced. Thousands of others involved in the cotton production industry were subjected to punitive measures. Similar measures, although of lesser scale, were carried out in other

cadres from the Center--ethnic Russians--were dispatched to Central Asia and given substantial promotions.

The campaign of the Center to strengthen direct control over the region and clean up corrupt indigenous elites had strong support among local Russians. Demographic pressures, increasing competition for scarce jobs and resources, and the indigenization of the ruling elites were pushing Russians out of the region. Russians were disgruntled with the situation in the republic. It was typical to hear Central Asian Russians speaking about their republics as being run by the "mafia," referring to the vast networks of corruption, embezzlement and fraud inside the republican party apparatuses and republican ministries. Therefore, the majority of local Russians perceived the new Moscow policies as restoring "order and justice" in the region. The new policies of the Center were promising to reverse these developments that were aversive to local Russians, and increase Russian's roles and status in the region.

However, Moscow's heavy-handed treatment of the region backfired. The replacement of indigenous officials with ethnic Russians from the Center antagonized the local populations who perceived such policies as one more manifestation of colonialism and Russification. Furthermore, in 1986, when Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh and the first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist party, was replaced by the Russian, Gennadi Kolbin, anti-Russian riots erupted in Alma-Ata.

The ethnic riots in Alm-Ata, the first ominous sign of Russian vulnerability in Central Asia, caused erosion of a sense of security, and bred fear. It became increasingly evident that the Center, although in control of local Communist parties, could not protect them from random or mob violence. The result was a growing fear for personal security

them from random or mob violence. The result was a growing fear for personal security among Russians, and an acceleration of their out-migration from the region.[65]

5.3.2 From Colonialism to Neo-colonialism: Negotiations over Power-Sharing in the Region, 1989-1991

By the late 1980s the Center had abandoned its attempts to reimpose the colonial status of ethnic Russians in the republics. This occurred because the "clean up" of party officials and the imperial policing of the region had backfired, resulting in an escalation of anti-colonial and anti-Moscow sentiment in the region.

Purging party officials was by no means a substitute for the structural reforms needed to alleviate the immense problems the region was facing. Rather, the ignorant and heavy-handed anti-corruption and anti-religious campaigns only exasperated the situation by threatening the stability of the region and increasing ethnic tensions. Consequently, Gorbachev recalled the party cadres that had been sent to discipline the region.

Additionally, with the Soviet economy precipitously declining, there simply were no economic resources available to sustain direct rule over the vastly overstretched empire. And, finally, public pressure in Russia itself was mounting for political and

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[65] In the decade from 1979 to 1989, the net migration of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan decreased from +113,000 to -394,000; in Kyrgyzstan from 0 to -70,000; in Uzbekistan +96,000 to -124,000; in Turkmenistan from +16,000 to -37,000; and in Tajikistan from +28,000 to -37,000 (%Goskomstat SSSR 1990%; %Makarova 1995%; %Topilin 1992%). Although the breakdown of ethnic Russian migration by year is not available, most of the outflow from the region is accounted for in the time period since 1985.

The failure of Gorbachev's attempts to reign in the Central Asian republics had shown that the Center could not rule the region without the cooperation of local elites. At the same time, the demographic explosion, a deepening economic crisis, and a spreading ecological decay in Central Asia made local elites keenly aware that they could not rule without assistance from the Center. Thus, the extensive negotiations began between the Center and the republics over the distribution of sovereignty.

In essence, attempts were made to return to the kind of order that existed under Brezhnev's regime. This meant a provision of significant autonomy to the local elites in the fields of culture, education and cadre policy, while at the same time keeping all the major political, and economic decisions in Moscow. In return for this autonomy, local elites were to remain loyal to Moscow, and were to clamp down on any explicit anti-regime nationalism.

For ethnic Russians, such changes in the Moscow-republics relationships meant that the Center was ready to forego their collective rights in the national republics (which was understood as the participation of ethnic Russians in control over local institutions).

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most famous dissident, Nobelist, Alexander Solzhenytsin. In his essay Solzhenytsin argued, "We have to make a hard choice: between the empire, which has been ruining primarily us - and the spiritual and bodily salvation of our <Russian> people....To maintain a great empire means to bring about extinction of our own people (Solzhenytsin, 1990c).

Furthermore, in his essay, Solzhenytsin argued that Russia should break from the Central Asian republics even if the Central Asian republics did not want independence: "we will straighten up even more without the crushing burden of our Central Asian underbelly, so thoughtlessly conquered by Alexander II" (Solzhenitsyn, 1990c). For the majority of people in Russia, Solzhenytsin's position was accepted as a matter of common sense (Quinn-Judge, 1990; Shlapentokh, 1993b). One can only imagine what went through the minds of ethnic Russians in Central Asia when they were reading Solzhenitsyn's article and following the debates on this question in the Russian mass media...

Yet, as stated earlier, the loyalty of the local regimes to Moscow meant that the individual, political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights of Russians would be preserved and protected by the Soviet state.

However, even if Gorbachev wanted to return to the pre-*perestroika* order of things, by the late 1980s, it was too late. First of all, the Center's economic disengagement from the region (which went hand in hand with the decline of the centralized economic institutions of the Soviet state) proved to be a professional disaster for the majority of ethnic Russians in the region. Ethnic Russians in the region served primarily in the economic, transportation and communication infrastructure that connected the region with the hinterland of the empire. The collapse of the unified economic system eroded the Russians' economic base in Central Asia. Furthermore, unlike in the Baltics and Ukraine, in Central Asia there were few alternative possibilities for employment.

Secondly, the "New Deal" negotiated by Gorbachev with the indigenous elites resulted in the increasing political marginalization of Russians. This occurred because Gorbachev recalled the cadres which had originally been sent to Central Asia to discipline the region. With the departure of the Kremlin's henchmen, the struggle for the vacated leadership positions in the region intensified.

Escalation of the intra-elite's struggle for power led to the "nativization" of politics in the region. The new ascending leadership, in order to acquire legitimacy and mobilize supporters, began to champion the rights of the indigenous nationalities and appeal to local sentiments.

Thus, following the example of other republics, all the Central Asian republics passed laws on sovereignty and indigenous languages. Despite the fact that language

legislation in the region represented a relatively watered-down version of similar laws passed in the Baltics, their passage left Russians extremely irritated, angry and uncomfortable. This was due to Russian perceptions of inferiority of the indigenous cultures and languages vis-á-vis Russian language and culture.

Besides generating pressure of nativization, the struggle for vacated leadership positions also led to the increasing exclusion of Russians from positions of power in the region. This was due to the fact that the struggle for power among the contending elite factions proceeded through a mobilization of support along ethnic, kinship and/or regional lines. Once the new bosses were in place, they did everything possible to provide lucrative and important jobs for "their people," e.g., relatives, clansmen or countrymen. Russians, as aliens, were, of course, not among them.

Finally, the combination of effects produced by (a) Moscow's decimation of the elites, (b) economic disengagement of the Center from the region, and (c) the deepening economic crisis in the region, resulted in a weakening of republican and local governments in their ability to govern and keep public order. Power, (especially in rural areas of the republics), was exercised through closely connected kin and tribal networks of personal trust, patronage and clientele. Soviets fought fiercely to eliminate "tribalism" and "clannishness" in the republics, although, without much success. The crushing of the Central Asian elites disrupted these informal networks of authority and power. As a result, pressure from a deepening economic crisis, overpopulation, and a shortage of land, water, and jobs, erupted into a series of violent inter-ethnic clashes and bloody pogroms

that shook the region.[67]

However, unlike in the Baltics or Moldova, neither the process of nativization of the region, nor ethnic clashes led to the consolidation of anti-Russian and anti-colonial political movements. The communal violence in Central Asia occurred primarily among ethnic groups struggling for scarce agricultural resources, such as land, jobs, housing, and access to water. Since more than 95% of ethnic Russians lived in cities and were employed in industry, they were not in competition with the indigenous groups for agricultural resources.

Similarly, the indigenous elites in region, despite their internal divisions and fierce struggles for power, also shied away from anti-Center, anti-colonial and/or anti-Russian activities. Neither the emerging, yet weak, liberal-democratic opposition, nor the ruling elites advocated secession of the Central Asian republics from the USSR. The liberal intelligentsia in the region viewed the Center as the only guarantee that the Gorbachev-initiated reforms would proceed in the republics. The communist elite considered an alliance with the Center as a guarantee to keep Islamic activists and the liberal

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[67] On June 17, 1989, in the Fergana region, Uzbekistan Uzbeks began pogroms against the Meshetin Turks. More than 100 people were killed. A curfew was imposed in the region. More than 10,000 ethnic Russians fled the Fergana region for Russia.

On June 3, 1989, the Kazakhs' revolt against the Caucasian minority broke out in Novi-Uzen, Kazakhstan.

In February 1990, pogroms and mass disorders in Dushambe, with Tajiks against the Armenian minority, resulted in 15 deaths and hundreds wounded. A mass exodus of Russians from Tajikistan began.

On June 4, 1990, inter-ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Osh region left 186 dead and 1,202 wounded. A state emergency was imposed in the capital of Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) and in Andijan, on the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border.

On July 13th and 14th, 1990, Tajiks and Kyrgyz clashed in the Isfar region of Tajikistan, and a curfew was imposed.

intelligentsia under control. Therefore, nativization in region remained confined to expressions of "symbolic nationalism." Ethnic sentiments and concerns were used primarily to legitimize the consolidation of power by the regimes, and did not have either an anti-colonial, or anti-Russian character.

Despite an evolving consensus on power-sharing between the Center and the indigenous elites, the negotiations failed to return the order of things to that of the Brezhnev years. The Center's decline and its withdrawal from this region, led to the rapid erosion of the social, political and economic base of the Russian colonial strata. At the same time, negotiation between the Center and the republics, although precluding the formation of anti-colonial and anti-Russian political movements, failed to provide for the personal security and safety of local Russians.

As a result of these changes, ethnic Russians in the region found themselves in a social and psychological limbo. Although Russians weren't publicly attacked, there was increased hostility towards them as the competition for scarce resources in the region escalated. Open and blatant discrimination was rare, but Russians were not even asked their opinion when decisions and important appointments were being made. Work in factories was disrupted and stoppages were more and more common. However, locals seemed to care little about this since their livelihood did not depend on shipments to and from the hinterland.

As the news and rumors of ethnic conflicts, and atrocities in the region spread, it became apparent that living in the republics had become very dangerous. However, Russians felt at a loss in understanding the "savage minds" of the locals, especially since Russians lived isolated from the local population and only 1 to 3% of Russians could

speak the local languages.

The changes humiliated and frightened ethnic Russians. They deeply resented being forced to adapt to the new, alien, unwanted and, rapidly worsening conditions. However, there were few, if any, alternatives for ethnic Russians. The possibilities of returning to Russia were very limited. Only younger, ethnic Russians with higher education, skills, and connections, could get housing and jobs in Russian cities that were overcrowded and stricken by economic crisis. Russians of older generations had neither the energy, nor the resources to relocate; nor were there places to go to in Russia.

Secondly, to ethnic Russians it was unclear to whom they should direct their social protest. They did not have a clearly defined political opponent in Central Asia, nor an ideology to fight against. As mentioned earlier, there were no anti-colonial or anti-Russian movements in Central Asia. Unlike in the Baltics, there was no political opposition to the Communist regime either. Therefore, the Russian protest against developments in the region was not articulated in either political or ideological terms, but rather, in moral terms. What was happening in the republics was perceived by Russians as immoral, illegal, unjust, unfair, oppressive, restrictive, alien and illegitimate. Their consciousness was increasingly dominated by nihilism and catastrophic images. Russians perceived their own decline as the end of society and of history itself.

Psychologically and socially, Russians found themselves in the situation of "captives." As their colonial economic and political base eroded, they simultaneously feared becoming victims of harassment and random mob violence, yet felt trapped in the region. As a result of their growing maladjustment, discomfort, vulnerability, and insecurity, all those who could leave the region packed their bags and left. In just the last

two years of the USSR's existence (1990-91), close to 300,000 ethnic Russians left the Central Asian region for Russia (Makarova, 1995). The rest lived in apprehension and waited for the outcome of the struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin which was taking place in Moscow.

5.4 The Ukraine: Ethnic Transformation Through the Reform/Abolition of Ethnic Hierarchy

Ethnic transformation in the Ukraine proceeded through attempts to renegotiate the Center-republic relationship, as well as efforts to abolish ethnic hierarchy. In other words, national and democratic protests in the Ukraine coincided. In terms of the mode of ethnic structure transformation, the Ukraine occupies a middle position between Central Asia and the Baltics (Fig 15).

In comparison with the Baltics, anti-Center protests and demands for reform in the Ukraine did not go as far as in the Baltics. In the Baltics, the National Fronts wanted (a) secession from the USSR, (b) rapid privatization and the introduction of market relationships, and (c) integration with Western Europe.

The Ukraine, in comparison, sought not to secede, but to renegotiate the relationship between Moscow and the republic. There was and remains strong sentiment for the preservation of a close relationship between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine in all major spheres of life. Moreover, unlike in the Baltics, the pressures to reorient the Ukrainian economy, polity, and culture to Western Europe remained relatively weak. Therefore, the Ukrainian demands for reform were focused primarily on attaining more sovereignty and power, vis-á-vis the Center, to determine its own economic, social

and cultural policies.

These policies were intended to benefit, first and foremost, the entire population of the Ukraine (both indigenous and non-indigenous groups), and not just the interests of the centralized ministries and planners in Moscow. At the same time, the Ukraine, unlike the Baltics, was, and remains, much more cautious with regard to the extent of political, economic and social reforms they'd consider. The majority of the Ukrainian population (ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians) remain conservative and deeply attached to Soviet era values and state paternalism.

There were also significant differences, in the character of ethnic transformation, between the Ukraine and Central Asia. The elite negotiations in the Ukraine, like those in Central Asia, represented a significant element of transition, which was, by far, more important than those in the Baltics. However, in the Ukraine, unlike in Central Asia, ethnic transformation was not limited to elite negotiation. It was also driven by the impact of two mass-based movements, both of which were in opposition to the Communist regime: The Movement of Ukrainian People for *Perestroika* (Ukr. Rukh) and the organized labor movement of Ukrainian miners.

Despite the rise of a mass, national movement in the Ukraine, the *Rukh* did not go so far as calling for the creation of an ethnically-based state to protect Ukrainian ethnos from demographic and cultural assimilation into the Russian nation. Why did national protest in the Ukraine remain democratic in character and not escalate into demands for the ethnic hegemony of Ukrainians? The character of the national protest, to a large degree, was determined by the interaction of two factors: (a) deep regional divisions within the Ukrainian community (between the western and eastern parts of the Ukraine,

and between Crimea and the Ukraine) and (b) a high degree of inter-ethnic assimilation of Ukrainians and Russians.

Western Ukraine, in terms of its culture, identity, and economic traditions, belongs to Central Europe. Therefore, Western Ukrainians are much more nationalistic, anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow. In contrast, the eastern part of the Ukraine belonged for centuries to the Russian empire. The national consciousness of Ukrainians in this region of the republic is much weaker. The populace is more Russified, conservative, and deeply attached to Soviet style paternalism and collectivist values.

Because of the regional differences and the high degree of Russification of Eastern Ukrainians, boundaries between ethnic groups (defined by common ancestry) do not coincide with Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and cultural divisions in society. Thus, among Eastern Ukrainians, the use of the Russian language among families, and in work and education, is widespread, and they identify more strongly with the Russian than the Ukrainian culture.[68] For them, the distinction between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians is not linguistic and/or cultural, but legal, political and administrative.

Because the Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and cultural divide runs through the Ukrainian community itself, any assertion of Ukrainian nationalism or forceful attempts to "Ukrainize" the population, is likely to generate resentment, protest and backlash. This would not only be likely among ethnic Russians, but also among Russified Ukrainians. This situation moderates demands for Ukrainian ethnic hegemony. Nevertheless, this does

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[68] For example, in 1979 about 34% of Ukrainians in most Russified Eastern Ukrainian regions (Donetsk and Lugansk) reported Russian as their mother tongue (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, p.197).

not mean that there are no Russian/Ukrainian ethnic tensions in the republic. Rather, ethnic discord was subsumed and expressed in the form of regional tensions and conflict. Two "fault lines" were most pronounced in this regard: the tensions between the western and eastern regions of the republic, and the conflict between the Crimean peninsula and Ukraine proper.

Depending on the character of regional tensions, two stages in the ethnic transformation in the Ukraine can be discerned. The first stage is dominated by the Ukraine's struggle against Moscow's "internal colonialism." It began in 1985, and ended with two events: the creation of the *Rukh*, and the launching of massive miners' strikes in the republic. The fact that the national-democratic movement was based in Western Ukraine and the workers' movement emerged in Eastern Ukraine, indicates the unraveling of regional differentiation in the republic.

The second period (1989-December 1991) can be called a period of "national romanticism." During this stage all major political forces in the republic, including the independent miners' labor unions, formed an alliance in opposition to the All-Union Center. This alliance transcended ethnic differences in the republic and carried the Ukraine to independence in December, 1991.

5.4.1 National Protest as a Struggle against Moscow's "Internal Colonialism":1985-1989

The major catalyst in the formation of anti-Communist and anti-Center opposition in the Ukraine was the 1986 ecological catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The lies and disinformation about the accident that were communicated to the populace by

party officials, and the selfishness and incompetence of the regime in Kiev, as well as that of Moscow, in dealing with the crisis, enraged the Ukrainian public. The events in Chernobyl resulted in an opening up of the public sphere in the Ukraine, thus allowing for dissemination of information about the disastrous ecological situation in the republic.

Media reports and public opinion attributed the situation to the mindless industrialization policies of the Center, and the complete disregard for the consequences of industrial development, both to the environment and the population's health. The resentment generated by a publicity campaign which accused Moscow of treating the Ukraine as a colony was shared by the indigenous population and the Russians.

However, the fermenting discontent over Moscow's rule was articulated differently in different regions of the Ukraine. In the western part of the Ukraine the dynamics of popular mobilization closely followed the Baltic pattern. Liberalization, coupled with the protests generated by Chernobyl's ecological disaster, led to the formation of an initially weak, national-democratic opposition to Moscow's colonial rule in the Ukraine. Although the Baltics articulation of national protest (by informal opposition groups) soon led to a mass, grass roots mobilization, in the Ukraine, the national-democratic movement remained weak and had little appeal beyond Western Ukraine.

Thus, the *Rukh*, created in 1989, and modeled after similar organizations in the Baltics, was dominated by the Ukrainian intelligentsia from the western regions, especially those from Galicia.[69] The *Rukh* sought, first of all, to promote democratization in the

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[69] Thus, 85% of the delegates of the 1989 inaugural *Rukh* congress were ethnic Ukrainians. Seventy-two percent of the delegates had higher education. About half of the delegates were from Western Ukraine, even though Western Ukraine accounts for only 20% of the republic's population (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, p.111).

republic and to assure protection and development of the Ukrainian language and culture. Like the National Fronts in the Baltics, the *Rukh* held the position that economic issues would be resolved only when radical political changes were implemented.

However, the call for the revival of the Ukrainian language and culture did not have any significant appeal among Russified and Russian speaking Ukrainian workers in the central and eastern parts of the Ukraine. Instead, in Eastern Ukraine, political mobilization proceeded not along ethnic, but along class lines.

In Eastern Ukraine, Donbas region coal miners organized the first major strike in Soviet history in July, 1989 as well as the first independent workers' trade union, which was designated The Regional Union Strike Committee of the Donbas.[70] Working conditions in the coal mines of the Donbass were abysmal enough to constantly generate sporadic worker protests. By late 1989, the miners' discontent over (a) the lack of safety in the mines, (b) the almost total disregard for the health and living conditions of the miners, and (c) the arrogance and incompetent leadership of the industry, led to numerous strikes in the Donbass region.

The miners' agenda, unlike that of the *Rukh*, was limited to strictly economic issues, e.g., better pay and working conditions, longer holidays, increased soap quotas, priority in food supply and housing, etc. The miners protested against economic

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[70] A month later the Donbass Strike Committee became the Regional Union of Donbass Strike Committees. In October, 1989, the Independent Workers Union was created in Kharkiv. In November that same year, the constituent assembly of the Free Trade Unions of the Ukraine was held in Donetsk. And finally, in February 1990, attempts were made to launch the first all-Ukrainian free trade union, the *Iednist* (Ukr. Unity). For more on the Ukrainian miners, see Marples, 1991.

exploitation, the abuse of power by party officials, and wanted increased control over their working conditions and profits.[71]

Although both the *Rukh* and the miners labor movement were anti-establishment, there was little cooperation between, or coordination of, their activities. Miners were distrustful of any political organization, especially those led by intellectuals, while the *Rukh* leaders talked about workers in patronizing terms, referring to them as "Russified Ukrainians."

The *Rukh*'s attitude towards their brethren in the east and central Ukraine was primarily one of highbrow contempt. The "Russified Ukrainians" had lost their "true language and culture" making them, as far as the *Rukh* were concerned, "mutants" without culture or identity. Yet, at the same time, the *Rukh* also considered "Eastern and Central" Ukrainians to have been victims of the Czarist and Soviet policies of Russification. Thus, the most ardent nationalists in the *Rukh* considered it their "holy mission" to convert Russified Ukrainians into "pure" Ukrainians. Needless to say, the workers deeply resented such attitudes.[72]

Because of the regional character of Ukrainian nationalism, the *Rukh* was forced to be very careful in its political activities so as not to alienate the Ukrainian population in the eastern part of the country. Promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture by the *Rukh* could not be pushed too far because it could easily provoke backlash, not only from ethnic

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[71] For more on the Ukrainian miners' organized labor movement, see Marples, 1991, and Siegelbaum and Suny, 1994.

[72] For more on the relationship between the miners and the *Rukh* leadership during the early period of *perestroika*, see Solchanyk, 1992.

Russians, but also from the Russified Ukrainians. As a result, nationalization pressures on ethnic Russians in the Ukraine were weak.

Thus, the Ukrainian language law, passed in 1989, was much less substantial in comparison with the extensive language regulations developed in the Baltics. Although the law promoted Ukrainian as the state language, it also guaranteed the free use of the Russian language in "interrelations between republican and local state, party and public bodies, enterprises, establishments..." In areas where there were large Russian minorities (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), Russian was permitted as a language of official correspondence, alongside Ukrainian, and was also the language of instruction in schools. Additionally, Russian was recognized as the official language of Crimea.

Besides deep regional divisions, the weakness of Ukrainian nationalism is also attributable to the role of the Communist party of the Ukraine. In the Baltics the mobilization of ethnic Russians occurred when the republican Communist parties collapsed. The defection of national communists from the Communist parties, and their coalition with pro-reform intellectuals in opposition to the Center, had ended, *de facto*, the control of the Center over the republics. The Center could only regain control over the region if it was willing to use military force.

Nothing of this sort had ever happened in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Communist party had been in firm control over the republic until it was outlawed following the collapse of the August, 1991, putsch in Moscow. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Communist party, almost until the end, remained loyal to the Center. A number of reasons may be suggested for this. First, the Ukrainian Communist party was not as strongly divided along ethnic lines as was the Communist parties in the Baltics. In part, this was because

the Ukrainian party elite was recruited primarily from the heavily Russified eastern and central regions of the republic. However, even more important was the fact that the members of the highest Ukrainian Communist party echelon had always enjoyed Union-wide mobility and careers.

In comparison, the party nomenclature in the Baltic states were denied promotions beyond the borders of the republics. Consequently, there was much less incentive or interest for the Ukrainian party bosses to sever links with Moscow as the Lithuanian Communist party had done. Finally, the Communist party in the Ukraine, unlike that in the Baltics, enjoyed widespread grass roots support, especially in the small towns and rural areas of the republic.

Ukrainians are much more conservative in their views than Balts, and remain deeply attachment to Soviet state paternalism and welfare values. Thus, in the 1990 republican elections, two-thirds of the seats in the republican parliament were won by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) candidates. With the pro-Soviet Communist party in control, the Russians' position in the republics remained secure. Being in firm control over the republic, the Ukrainian Communists had little incentive to support ethnic Russians, or, for that matter, any other oppositional organization. Instead, they preferred to keep the power for themselves.

Finally, the social structure in the Ukraine did not favor the kind of ethnic mobilization that had occurred in the Baltics, and to some degree, in Moldova. The Baltic working class was primarily recently immigrated ethnic Russians. Therefore, when the process of sovereiginization of the republics started, the threats of nativization and factory closure reinforced each other, that is, the ethnic and class interests of Russians coincided.

In the Ukraine, again unlike in the Baltics, the intersection of class and ethnic stratification was and is much more complicated. The major social divisions within the republic did not simply follow ethnic (e.g Ukrainians-Russians) lines, but also ran through the Ukrainian community itself. The cultural division of labor among Russians and Ukrainians was very weak. Furthermore, Russian migrants in the Ukraine were joining the Russian community that has deep historic roots in the Ukraine, rather than merely being settlers in a hostile community as in the Baltics and Moldova (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).

In sum, national protest during the initial period of reforms reflected the specific character of the Ukrainian social structure. Even though ethnic Ukrainians and Russians actively participated in movements that were in opposition to the Center, the emerging opposition in the Ukraine remained regionally and ethnically divided. National protests were confined to the western part of the Ukraine. Demands for economic reform were limited to the Russified Eastern Ukraine. Because of regional divisions, leaders of the *Rukh* worked very hard not to alienate Eastern Ukrainians and members of other ethnic minorities. Consequently, national protest remained weak and was couched in terms of a demand for political reform and democratization of the country.

5.4.2 The Rise of National Romanticism in the Ukraine: 1989-1991

The period of national romanticism in the Ukraine starts in the late 1980s, and is marked by a rapid merging and consolidation of the three major political forces in opposition to the Center: the Ukrainian National Movement *Rukh*, the Ukrainian national-communists, and the miners labor unions. This stage is referred to as a period of national

romanticism, because it is dominated by a high degree of national consensus in the Ukraine, which transcended ethnic differences and is characterized by high emotions and idealism, especially in regard to widespread beliefs that independence would almost automatically bring economic prosperity, civic harmony and political freedoms to the Ukraine. The stage of national romanticism ends with the December, 1991, referendum in which more than 90% of the republic's population voted for the Ukraine's independence.

The merging and consolidation of the major political forces in the Ukraine was determined by two sets of factors. First, it was stimulated by the rapid decline of the Soviet economy and erosion of the Center's power and authority. By early 1990, among all sectors of the population in the Ukraine, the perception became widespread that

> the USSR was disintegrating as a socio-economic and political formation. The centralized bureaucratic system...was seen as a brake on economic and social development and modernization. Moscow had nothing to offer - it was neither a source of technological know-how, nor an international financial center. It was merely an apparatus of repression and control (Krwachenko, 1993, p.84).

Sensing the paralysis of the Center, the *Rukh* proclaimed, in its second congress, that its goal was the "restoration of Ukraine's independence."[73] By early 1991, the miners were also becoming increasingly radicalized. The worsening economic situation in the coal industry and Gorbachev's failure to keep promises he'd made to the miners in 1989, resulted in a second massive wave of strikes. Furthermore, unlike in 1989, the miners' not only had economic demands on their agenda, but political demands as well, e.g.,resignation of Gorbachev, and the dissolution of the all-Union Congress of People's

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[73] The *Rukh* leaders were referring to the brief existence of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic that was created in 1917, and abolished with the Bolshevik invasion in early 1918.

Deputies. Such demands of the miners reflected a complete loss of faith in the Communist party and in Gorbachev himself.

Finally, perceptions that the USSR was going under were also becoming widespread among the Ukrainian Communist elite. The weakness of the Center became especially evident after the miserable failure of the military clamp down in Lithuania and Latvia in January, 1991. As a result, the consolidation of the National-Communist faction within the Ukrainian Communist party began. In part the drift towards National-Communism and the promotion of the Ukraine's sovereignty represented a strategy of self-preservation and survival by the Communist elite. Heralding the cause of the Ukrainian people constituted an attempt by the Communist elite to secure their positions of power in the republic. In part, sovereiginization was used by the National-Communist faction within the Communist party as a crisis-management strategy under conditions in which the economy was collapsing and the Center was suffering political paralysis.

A second set of factors accounting for the consolidation of major political forces in the republic were the moderate and flexible politics of the elite leadership which sought cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution. Characteristically, neither leaders of the *Rukh*, nor the National Communists chose to fan nationalist ideology by demoting non-Ukrainians to denigrated minorities. There were no calls to curtail Russian migration to the republic. Instead, liberal nationality policies were promoted emphasizing the civic character of opposition to the imperial Center, and the goals of economic prosperity and democracy that the entire population of the republic held in common.

The alliance that led the Ukraine towards independence was headed by Leonid Kravchiuk, the former ideology secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party. Kravchiuk

created his agenda by skillfully combining the goals and demands made by the *Rukh*, as well as those made by striking miners. The result was a position which championed the Ukraine's political independence from the old bureaucratic and repressive Center, that carefully down-played ethnic differences. Thus, the National-Communists and the *Rukh* both claimed to be seeking the Ukraine's independence for the purpose of creating a civil society where the rights of all ethnic groups would be respected and protected. It was emphasized, again and again, that their struggle was political (against the bureaucratic, repressive Center symbolized by the now, widely hated Gorbachev), i.e. against the political oppression and economic exploitation of the Center, and not anti-Russian, nor pro-Ukrainian.

Flexible and liberal nationality policies were very important in securing Russian support for independence. However, more crucial in securing Russian pro-independence vote were promises made by the reformed National-Communists, as well as by the *Rukh*, to make the Ukraine into a "second" France. The official mass media, as well as the *Rukh* in its publications, rallies, and demonstrations, were widely claiming that an independent Ukraine had the potential to quickly perform an "economic miracle" and become comparable to France in its economic prosperity.

A skillful campaign launched by the coalition of the National-Communists, and the *Rukh*, and supported by the striking miners, had widespread support among the Ukrainians and Russians alike. After the collapse of the August, 1991 putsch in Moscow, it was this coalition that led the republic to the referendum on independence in which over 90% of the population voted for an independent Ukraine.

Thus, unlike any other national republic of the USSR, the majority of ethnic Russians' supported the Ukraine's independence. Consider the voting statistics in the two most Russified and industrialized areas in the Ukraine, Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. About 45% of population in this area was ethnic Russian. In the December 1, 1991 referendum, 84% of votes in these two oblasts voted for the Ukraine's independence (turnout was approximately 81%). This means that about 45-50% of Russians voted for an independent Ukraine (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).[74]

The Russians did not perceive Ukrainian independence as threatening to their status. Ethnic transformation, if it were to be carried out, would be accomplished through the reform and abolition of the ethnic hierarchy. Russians were guaranteed equal treatment, as this was embodied by the laws of sovereignty and citizenship, as well as the protection of their cultural rights as written in the law on language.

At the same time, Russians supported the Ukraine's independence first of all for economic, and to some degree, political reasons (as a protest against the bureaucratic, repressive Center symbolized by the generally despised Gorbachev). Within the Russian community, as well as among Ukrainians in the eastern part of the Ukraine, there was no deep commitment to the cause of independence. Unlike in the Ukraine's western region, in the eastern part there was little idealism, or readiness to bear sacrifices for the cause of the new state. Therefore, Eastern Ukraine's commitment to independence would decline as soon as the euphoria over independence evaporated and the expectations of economic prosperity were dashed by the ever-worsening economic situation. This would lead to the

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[74] In some sources it is claimed that as many as 70% of Russians voted for Ukrainian independence (See Kolstoe, 1995, for a discussion on this matter).

strengthening of a pro-Russian mood in the country, and the rise of regional, and in some areas ethnic, tensions.

6. COLLAPSE OF THE USSR AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW ETHNIC ORDER IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of the former Soviet republics, the mode of conflict resolution within the triadic relationships began to change once again. Whether or not the shift to the new mode of conflict resolution occurred dependended on three factors: (a) the degree to which the status of ethnic Russians was institutionalized in the form of laws and agreements during the *perestroika* years; (b) the negotiations over which type of ethno-political system would replace the previous system, and (c) on the policies of the Russian Federation towards the Russian diaspora and the successor states.

Negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians went furthest in Lithuania and Ukraine. In 1990 Lithuania passed a citizenship law based on the "zero option," granting citizenship to all its residents. In the Ukraine, similarly, extensive legislation was enacted regulating inter-ethnic relationships. Laws on state language passed in the Ukraine in late 1990, guaranteed the use of Russian in all areas where Russians constituted a majority of the population. Furthermore, in order to calm fears of Ukrainization, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet extended significant powers to local authorities, and established the autonomous republic of Crimea within the Ukrainian republics. As a result of agreements, ethnic tensions in Lithuania declined. Similarly, ethnic tensions in the Ukraine also decreased. In both countries access to power, resources, and status among ethnic groups was increasingly regulated through the competition and cooperation mode of conflict resolution.

Negotiations over the status of ethnic Russians were also under way in Latvia and Estonia. However, unlike in Lithuania or the Ukraine, negotiations did not reach the stage of legislative proposals or laws. The collapse of the imperial Center had significantly changed the power balance and dynamics of the triadic relationships within these two countries.

In Central Asia, negotiations and bargaining during late perestroika period produced attempts to reconstitute the "old ethnic order" that existed during the Brezhnev era. However, the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent independence of the Central Asian republics led to a dissolution of the ethnic order characteristic of the period of "mature socialism." Therefore, negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians in the region began anew.

The policies of the Russian Federation also continued to profoundly shape the process of consolidation of the new ethnic orders in the successor states. Since December, 1991, up until the November, 1993, elections to the new Russian Duma, the foreign policies of the Russian Federation were almost exclusively devoted to relationships with Western countries and the U.S., while isolationism was characteristic of policies directed towards the near abroad.

By late 1993, Moscow began increasingly to assert its interests throughout the geopolitical area of the former USSR. In part this occurred because exclusively pro-Western policies had failed. Radical economic reform in Russia had resulted in the pauperization of broad masses of people and the sweeping criminalization of Russian society. Promises by Western countries to provide extensive financial, technical and technological assistance never materialized. This led to a consolidation of nationalist and

communist opposition in the Duma which chose the issue of the Russian minorities as one of the rallying points in its struggle against Yeltsin's regime.

The isolationist stance towards the former Soviet republics was also abandoned because Russia could no longer ignore its vital political, economic and military interests in these regions. Russian troops and military bases were scattered throughout these territories. The political stability of the new states bordering Russia was essential to Russian strategic interests. Russia and the new states shared electricity, transportation, and communication networks. The new national republics represented large markets for Russian products, raw materials and energy. Finally, there was the issue of the 25 million strong, Russian diaspora that no one in the Kremlin could ignore. By late 1993 return migration of ethnic Russians from the countries of the near abroad had reached such proportions that it had become a major political, economic and humanitarian problem in Russia. However, the policies pursued by the Russian Federation varied substantially across the new states.

6.1 The Baltics' Independence and Ethnic Relationships: Towards "Ethnic Democracy"

From the start of independence there was increasing differentiation in the ethnic situation across the Baltic countries. The ethnic situation in Lithuania normalized, while in Latvia and Estonia there were surges of indigenous ethnic nationalism leading to increasing tensions and conflict. The differences in the ethnic situation among the Baltic countries was, to a large degree, dependent on how far the negotiations and bargaining over the status of Russians proceeded in the *perestroika* years.

In Lithuania the negotiations and bargaining largely ended with the acceptance of the "zero" option in citizenship legislation. All the residents of the republic who'd applied for the new Lithuanian passport were automatically granted citizenship. A majority of ethnic Russians were able to participate in the process of privatization, as well as in local and national elections.

Since it was small in size, the Russian community did not represent a threat to Lithuanian ethnic dominance, therefore, extensive cultural rights were extended to them (Lakis, 1995). Consequently, since restoration of independence, ethnic tensions in Lithuania continued to decline. Surveys conducted by various institutions consistently find that the degree of social adjustment of Russians in Lithuania is significantly higher than that of Russians in the two other Baltic countries[75] (Figure 16, 17 and 18).

Finally, the balance of political forces in Lithuania favored integration of the Russians into Lithuanian society. The 1992 elections in Latvia and Estonia brought a coalition of the Center-Right parties into power, a political party united in their opposition to the inclusion of ethnic Russians into the polities.

In Lithuania, unlike in Latvia and Estonia, parliamentary elections resulted in a stunning victory for the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), a former affiliate to the Communist party of Lithuania. Ethnic Russians put their support solely behind the DLP. The DLP projected itself as a party of national unity and adopted policies favorable to ethnic minorities. Especially important to ethnic Russians was the DLP's orientation towards developing economic and political relations with Russia (Clark, 1995).

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[75] See, for example, Gorbachev-Fond, 1993; Kolstoe, 1993; Kolstoe, 1995; Norgaard et al., 1996; Rose and Maley, 1994; Shalpentokh et al., 1994.

Figure 16. Nationality Minorities are Badly Treated Here (Strongly Agree & Agree; Sept-Oct., 1993; N=6136)*



Figure 17. Current Relations Between Ethnic Russians and Indigenous Nationality Are Good and Very Good (Sept-Oct., 1993; N=6136)*



* Source: Rose and Maley (1994).

Figure 18. Would you say that our current system is better, much the same, or worse than the old Soviet System in protecting rights of ethnic Russians in this country, (Sept-Oct., 1993; N=6136)*?



* Source: Rose and Maley (1994).

Because legislation and the political situation were favorable to ethnic Russians, ethnic tensions in Lithuania continued to decline. Arguably, the process of forming an "integrated Russian minority" in Lithuania is under way. By 1993, 98% of the Russian population in Lithuania became citizens of the Lithuanian state. Ethnic Russians are increasingly adopting a political identity as citizens of the Lithuanian state, and, at the same time, retaining their cultural identity as Russians (Kasatkina, 1995). Attempts to politically marginalize ethnic Russians are unlikely since Lithuania has strong left-of-Center parties, which are lacking in Estonia and Latvia.

In Latvia and Estonia the situation of ethnic Russians was very different. In these two countries negotiations and bargaining over the status of ethnic Russians was unexpectedly curtailed by the August, 1991 putsch in Moscow. With the collapse of the Center, negotiations, which had been moving towards a democratic solution to the ethnic problems, ended prematurely. The result was an increasing "ethnization" of post-Soviet Latvian and Estonian politics and attempts to exclude local Russians from participation in polities.

A number of factors explain the turn towards ethnic nationalism in Latvia and Estonia. The collapse of the Center had dramatically changed the power balance between ethnic communities in the republics. Once the imperial Center collapsed, national governments no longer needed local Russians as allies in their struggle for independence.

Secondly, ethnic nationalism in Latvia and Estonia was fueled by widespread fears and doubts about the commitment of the Russian population to the cause of independence. Because ethnic Russians constituted a significant part of the population, they could control the power balance in the republics through democratic means. This circumstance could

potentially lead to an elevation of the Russian language to the status of the official state language, as well as to the promotion of policies to integrate with the Russian Federation. There was some basis for these arguments.

Radical nationalists were quick to point out that, although about 30-35% of Russian population voted for independence, about 70%, of ethnic Russians voted against it, or did not vote at all. Moreover, a significant proportion of Russians in the republics supported the *Interfronts* and "imperial" structures in the republic.

Thirdly, ethnic nationalism was also fueled by the presence of the Soviet Army in the region. It is estimated that in 1991, there were about 145,000 Russian troops in the region (Schmidt, 1993). About 80,000 of these troops were stationed in Latvia and 50,000 troops were stationed in Estonia (Bohlen, 1994a). Any protest action of local Russians, especially if it was supported by the Soviet Army, could easily destabilize the situation in the republics.

Fourthly, nationalist parties in both republics used ethnic nationalism as a strategy in competing for electoral votes. Xenophobia, populism, and the scapegoating of ethnic minorities, and immigrants, are tactics to get votes that work well in all societies gripped by deep political and economic crises. Therefore, calls for the elimination of Russian competition in government employment and state run industries appealed to the increasingly impoverished indigenous urban middle classes. Finally, the radical nationalists were venting claims of "Latvia for Latvians" and "Estonia for Estonians" in high hopes that this would encourage the majority of local Russians to voluntarily leave for the Russian Federation.

The imposition of ethnic dominance by the indigenous nationalities proceeded with attempts to institutionalize an "ethnic democracy" system in the republics. Ethnic democracy, as it emerged in Latvia and Estonia, had three major features. Firstly, the core nations, e.g.,Estonia and Latvia, were to have full control over the state institutions in the republic. The indigenous nationalities' control of the state was to ensure the dominance of the Latvian and Estonian culture and language in these countries.

Secondly, certain rights were enjoyed universally, independent of the ethnicity of individuals. These were the freedom of speech and press, rights of assembly and association, and an independent judiciary. Thirdly, certain collective rights were extended to ethnic Russians (e.g., the right to be educated in Russian, guarantees of state support for Russian schools, Russian media, and Russian culture, etc.).

The imposition of "ethnic democracy" in Latvia and Estonia proceeded with the enactment of restrictive citizenship legislation. The parliaments of Latvia and Estonia were claiming that citizenship in their countries should be restored in the same way their independent statehood was restored. This meant that citizenship rights would only belong to those who were citizens of pre-War Latvia and Estonia, and their descendants, while the Soviet era would be treated as a period of occupation.

As a result of such legislature, all the individuals who had settled in Latvia and Estonia during the Soviet era (including their children born in the occupied countries) were relegated to the status of foreigners, immigrants, and/or aliens. Being non-citizens, their rights to property ownership, social welfare, employment in the public sector (including the police force, and the army), and participation in political activities, were restricted. In addition, the new citizenship laws caused Soviet era settlers to be subject to

the procedures of naturalization, which many considered deeply offensive and demeaning.[76]

By October, 1991, restrictive citizenship laws were already enacted in Latvia. Under these laws only about 25% of ethnic Russians qualified for Latvian citizenship. For the rest of the population procedures were established that included a residency requirement of 16 years initiated from the moment the law was enacted, a Latvian language proficiency test, and an oath of loyalty to the Latvian republic.

In addition, Latvian law on citizenship established quotas on naturalization that amounted to approximately 0.01% of the republic's population a year. This meant that only about 2,000 non-residents could became citizens of the Latvian republic each year. Such a quota meant essentially permanent disenfranchisement for more than 600,000 ethnic Russians in that republic.

According to the new laws in Estonia barely one-sixth of the Russian population qualified for citizenship. Despite the smaller proportion of ethnic Russians that automatically qualified for citizenship, the new laws were less restrictive in Estonia than in Latvia.

Laws in Estonia required only two years of residence, a waiting period of one year, passing the Estonian language proficiency test, and an oath of loyalty to the Estonian republic. Furthermore, the Estonian parliament passed legislature that provided non-citizens with the right to participate in local elections. This was not the case in Latvia.

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[76] For a detailed description of the Citizenship Laws in Latvia and Estonia, see the U.S. Department of State reports on human rights practices (U.S. Department of State, 1994a and 1994b).

That the citizenship laws in Estonia were more accommodating reflected the fact that the Russian community in Estonia was much stronger and more organized than in Latvia. In Narva, Kohtla-Jarva and Sillamae, three cities in the north-eastern region of the republic, ethnic Russians constituted 65% to 90% of their populations, and used municipal institutions for self-organization.

In addition, ethnic Russians in North East Estonia were playing a very important role in the energy industry in the republic. Electric power plants located in North East Estonia provided a significant portion of the electric power produced in the republic.

The enacted laws on citizenship allowed the creation of "ethnically pure" parliaments in both republics. There were no ethnic Russians elected to the Estonian parliament in 1993, despite the fact that ethnic Russians constituted a third of the republic's population. In Latvia, only 7 ethnic Russians were elected (out of a 100 member parliament) when the Russian population constituted close to half of the republic's population.

The disenfranchisement of the ethnic Russian population resulted in a worsening of the ethnic situation in the republics. Thus, according to a survey of ethnic Russians conducted by the Gorbachev Foundation, by late 1992 the number of ethnic Russians in Latvia who held negative opinions concerning the inter-ethnic relationships rose to 80% (Gorbachev Foundation, 1993). This is more than three times the level registered by the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey conducted just a year earlier.

Another survey of ethnic Russians in Latvia, conducted by VTCIOM, in 1992, showed that about 50% of respondents expected a mass exodus of Russians from the republic; approximately 75% said the inter-ethnic relations had worsened; 72% felt they

had been transformed into "citizens of the second class." (Terechov, 1993).

As a reaction to disenfranchisement, small, but vocal organizations of ethnic Russians in Latvia began to emerge, with the intention of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in the republic. Russian activists in the Baltics were arguing that their treatment, as foreigners, migrants, and/or aliens was neither legal, nor ethically based. First of all, they contended, they could not possibly be migrants, or aliens, because they'd moved to Latvia and Estonia when these republics were not independent, but, rather, part of the former USSR.

Second, the policies enacted also denied citizenship rights to those individuals of non-indigenous ethnicity who were born in Latvia and Estonia. This meant that these individuals, born and raised in Latvia and Estonia, were being penalized for crimes committed by the Stalinist regime just because they happen to be of non-indigenous ethnic origin.

Wide publicity in the Baltics and abroad directed an open letter, signed by nearly 98,000 Latvian Russians, to Russian President Yeltsin. In the letter, ethnic Russians claimed that their human rights were being violated because they could not choose their places of residence and, therefore, they could not acquire Latvian citizenship. The letter stated that the Latvian Parliament had not solved citizenship problems and other human rights issues in a democratic manner (Diena, June 31, 1993).

In Estonia, ethnic relations also took a turn for the worse. Thus, in April of 1992, in a survey of ethnic Russians conducted by the EKE ARIKO, and the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law Academy of Sciences, indicated that 42% of ethnic Russians were interested in leaving the republic for the Russian Federation, while 22%

said that they had already decided to leave (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). By Summer, 1993, ethnic tensions in Estonia had reached the point where they threatened the political stability of the country.

In January, 1993, the Estonian parliament started to debate the drafting of the "Law on Aliens" which would severely restrict the possibilities of Russians obtaining Estonian citizenship. The drafted law created a furor among local Russians in North East Estonia. In the predominantly Russian cities of Narva and Sillamae, attempts to restrict their rights to citizenship where met with anti-government demonstrations. According to reports in the local newspapers, 7,000 to 15,000 people took part in these demonstrations.

These demonstrations eventually led to the organization of referendums in June, 1993, on the question of autonomy in these two cities. Narva authorities reported that approximately 53% of the town's population participated in the referendum, with 96% of these supporting autonomy (RFE/RL Daily Report, July 23, 1993).

As ethnic tensions in the Baltics were increasing, the Russian Federation, as well as international organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the Helsinki Watch on Human Rights, and the United Nations (UN) began to put increasing pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments to modify their citizenship legislation.

The CSCE had established a permanent office in Estonia to monitor the minority rights situation in the Baltics. The UN sent several missions to Latvia and Estonia to investigate the human rights situation (RFE/RL Daily Report, February 12, 1992). The CE made non-discriminatory citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia the precondition for acceptance of these states into the CE. The Russian Federation was actively engaged in

making the issue of Russians minorities in Latvia and Estonia an international issue. Additionally, Russia used economic pressure on the Baltics and threatened not to withdraw Russian troops from the region until the discriminatory laws against their Russian populations were repealed.[77]

As a result of the protests of local Russians, international pressure, and pressure from the Russian Federation, citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia were significantly modified. In Estonia all Soviet era settlers (with the exception of former Soviet military personnel) were eligible for citizenship, provided they passed the language proficiency test and took an oath of loyalty to the Estonian republic.

In Latvia, the requirements for citizenship are more complicated and restrictive, however, beginning with the year 2003, all individuals who moved to Latvia during the Soviet era, will be eligible for citizenship, providing they pass a language proficiency test and take an oath of loyalty to the Latvian republic.[78] As a result of the changes to the "ethnic democracy" systems in Latvia and Estonia, both countries began to gradually move towards majoritarian democracy.[79]

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[77] For more on the reactions of ethnic Russians to disenfranchisement in Estonia and Latvia, and Russia's policy towards the Baltics, see Apine, 1994; Poklad, 1994; and Usupovskii, 1995.

[78] For a detailed description of the changes in Latvia and Estonia's Citizenship Laws, see the U.S. Department of State reports on human rights practices (U.S. Department of State 1995a and 1995b). For more on amendments to the Latvian Citizenship Law, see the RFE/RL, Daily Report, July 25, 1994.

[79] As of January 1996, about 20% of 436,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia have acquired Estonian citizenship, about 20% more have acquired citizenship of the Russian Federation. The rest, 60% of ethnic Russians in the republic are "apartides" (a legal term denoting individuals without citizenship in any country) Levitskii, 1996. According to the Latvian Foreign Ministry, by March 1994, 722,486 Russians were residing in the country, and

Despite recent positive political developments, the dismantling of the "ethnic democracies" in Latvia and Estonia remains a conflict ridden and contradictive process. First, Latvian and Estonian political systems continue to promote explicit ethnic (Latvian and Estonian) domination even though a significant share of the population in these countries are non-indigenous. Almost half of the population in Latvia and about one third in Estonia cannot be easily "pushed" into an ethnic enclave, because interactions between ethnic groups run though all their major political, economic and social institutions. At the same time, as the events in Narva demonstrated, policies of exclusion, if pushed too far, can destabilize the situation in a republic, resulting in an international scandal, and the isolation of the Baltics from the international community. This creates instability in an ethnic situation, and, depending on a wide variety factors, can cause ethnic tensions to flare up.[80]

Secondly, the system of ethnic domination in Latvia and Estonia is unstable because, even though the indigenous populations currently enjoy almost exclusive control

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278,087 of them (38%) were citizens of the republic (RFE/RL, Daily Report, March 10, 1994).

[80] Most recently this happened in Latvia when the extreme nationalist party, Union For the Fatherland and Freedom, called for a referendum on alternative citizenship law that would permanently disenfranchise the ethnic Russian population in the region. This call for a referendum failed, but the Union For the Fatherland and Freedom was able to collect 126,595 signatures in favor of referendum, creating fear and resentment among the local Russian population (OMRI Daily Digest, January 17, 1996 and February 19, 1996).

Similarly, in Estonia, the Russian community was put on alert when nationalists in the Estonian parliament began to debate the addition of a clause, to local election procedures, that would require candidates to pass an examination in Estonian, even if they had not been educated in that language. Although the Estonian parliament failed to pass the clause, the issue did not contribute to an increase in ethnic peace and tolerance in the republic (Monitor, May 17, 1996).

of these states, this situation cannot be sustained interminably. Enfranchisement of ethnic Russians is opening a way for them to participate in politics. This is bound to change the balance of political forces in these countries. The change in the citizenship laws in Estonia has already allowed for election of ten deputies who are of Russian ethnicity, in the Estonian parliament. These ethnic Russian deputies formed a small faction in the Estonian parliament, that became a vocal lobby for the rights of aliens and non-citizens in the republic.

The number of Russian representatives at all levels of government in Latvia and Estonian will continue to grow. In addition, the Russians proved to be very competitive vis-á-vis the indigenous population. There is an overwhelming presence of ethnic Russians in the burgeoning private businesses in the republics. Some researchers estimate that, in Latvia, close to 60% of new businessmen are ethnic Russians and Jews. For Estonia there are no published data, but the process taking place in this republic is quite similar to that in Latvia (Tishkov, 1994d).

Such active engagement of ethnic Russians in private business was, in part, caused by the policies pursued by the governments of the republics. Having been excluded from politics, the civil service, administration, the police, and army, ethnic Russians were left, primarily, to engage in private business as a means for pursuing social mobility. If Russian accumulation of significant economic power were to be accompanied by continuous exclusion from political power, it could lead to serious conflicts and instability in the republics.

Finally, whether the ethnic situation in Latvia and Estonia deteriorates, or whether it continues to move towards civic peace and stability, largely depends on the response of

the indigenous elites to the changing balance of power in the republics. The most dangerous turn of events might occur should the existing law-based ethnic domination (which is presently in the process of being dismantled) be replaced by widespread practices of informal exclusion and administrative harassment of ethnic Russians. Activists in the Russian community are mostly concerned, not so much about their legal status or citizenship, but about informal discrimination and administrative harassment (Annus, 1994a; Bai, 1996; Emeljanenko, 1996). Any attempts to submit ethnic Russians to informal practices of discrimination, force them into an ethnic underclass, or exclude them from sharing the benefits of an improving economic situation, would be fraught with political instability.

On the positive side, in the Baltics, unlike in any other region of the former USSR, Russians have strong incentives to adapt to the situation, and even to assimilate. This is partly because a majority of them came to the region as economic migrants. Therefore, their behavior is the rather typical behavior of an immigrant group. Even in the face of discrimination, ethnic Russians chose to stay in the Baltics because (a) in the Baltics the standard of living is higher than in Russia, (b) there are limited possibilities to return to the Russian Federation, and (c) the economic reform in the region is more rapid and successful than in other parts of the former Soviet Union.

According to the most recent survey of ethnic Russians, conducted by sociologists from Tartu University in Estonia, about 94% of respondents decided to settle in the republic for good and do not plan on returning to Russia[81] (Levitskii, 1996). Russians and

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[81] For more on the current Russian situation in Estonia, see Grishaev, 1995 and Raskazov, 1995.

their children are actively learning the titular languages of the republics and are quickly adapting to the new situation to the extent necessary for their economic advancement.[82]

What is the future of ethnic relations in Latvia and Estonia? It is likely that the policies of gradual enfranchisement currently being pursued by Estonia and Latvia, and the ethnic Russian's competitiveness and willingness to integrate into the indigenous communities, will lead to increasing social divisions within the ethnic Russian community. No doubt, there will be continuous growth in the size of the ethnic Russian upper and middle classes, which will lead to their increasing integration into the indigenous societies. At the same time, a sizable Russian ethnic underclass will develop, consisting of those who could not manage successfully to adapt to the radical ethno-political and economic changes in the republics, and/or those who were excluded by cultural and language barriers. The underclass will be formed from Russian blue-color workers with low skills and limited education, who only recently migrated to the Baltics and were stranded there by the collapse of the USSR. These individuals constitute a sizable portion of the local Russians in Latvia and Estonia.

According to the 1989 census, about half of the local Russian population was born in the Russian Federation (See Table 3). That the formation of an ethnic Russian underclass is under way is suggested by the data on unemployment. Currently, up to 70%

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[82] By late 1993, about 5 years since the last census, the number of Russians who can carry on conversation in the indigenous languages increased dramatically. According to a survey carried out in the Baltics by researchers from the University of Strathclyde, Scotland, the proportion of ethnic Russians who could carry on conversation in the indigenous languages had increased, in Estonia from 15% to 38%, in Latvia from 22% to 63%, and in Lithuania from 37% to 70% (Rose and Maley, 1994, p.52). For more on the linguistic adaptation of ethnic Russians in the Baltics, see D'jachkov and Krasuhin, 1993.

of the registered unemployed individuals in Latvia and Estonia are ethnic Russians. The ethnic divisions within the Baltic societies will perpetuate the conditions necessary for the formation of an ethnic Russian underclass. It is the disproportionate concentration of ethnic Russians in the underclass that will continue to be the cause of social and ethnic tensions in the Baltic states.

6.2 Moldova: Towards an Ethno-Territorial Federation

Direct intervention of the 14th Russian Army into the ethnic conflict in Moldova, during the Summer of 1992, dramatically changed the dynamics of ethnic transformation in the country. Russian troops established a *de facto* partitioning of Moldova, and provided legitimacy to the formation of the Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic in Moldova's Transnistria region. Since neither Moldova nor Dniester could manage to impose its will on the other, a stalemate ensued. Moldova could not regain control over Transnistria since the Russian Army was protecting it. The "Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic" could not acquire international recognition either, since it was considered a part of the independent republic of Moldova under international law.

Due to the stalemate, Moldova abandoned its course towards unification with Romania. Instead of attempting to convert Russians into an ethnic minority within the Romanian state, intensive elite negotiations began over the political autonomy of the ethnic enclave.

Why did the Moldovan side decide to start such negotiations? First, because Russian military intervention had changed the power balance in the republics. From mid-

1992, the 14th Army and its commander, General Alexander Lebed, had taken control of the situation in the country. Moldova came out of the conflict in Transnistria as a loser, facing catastrophic consequences of the drive towards unification: partitioned territory, a bitterly divided society, a ruined economy, loss of markets for its agricultural products in Russia, hundreds of people killed, and thousands of refugees.

Second, the negotiations were initiated because of the change in leadership of the Moldovan state. The devastating failure of the drive towards unification produced a split in the ruling elites of the republic. Agrarians and former Communists in the Moldovan parliament formed a broad coalition in opposition to the nationalist led government. In 1992, this coalition won the elections and formed a new government under the leadership of the former collective farm director Andrei Shangeli.

Agrarians were, by far, more willing than Moldovan nationalists to share power with the Russian community in the country. Unlike Moldovan intellectuals, Agrarians and former communists weren't enthralled with the idea of Moldova's unification with Romania. For the powerful agricultural establishment in Moldova, unification would mean the loss of control over the country and subordination to functionaires in Romania.

Finally, the protracted ethnic war had led to the decline of popular mass mobilization in the republic. As the economy in the country collapsed, people became increasingly preoccupied with day-to-day survival, exhausted and tired of the violence and uncertainty.

In order to consolidate the independent Moldovan state, and to preserve its territorial integrity, the new government went all the way out to accommodate its ethnic minorities' demands. This was accomplished, first, by including members of the ethnic

minorities in a "national consensus" government.[83] The new government also began negotiations with ethnic minorities concerning the creation of two national-territorial units, the Transdniester and Gagauz regions, within the Moldovan state. In July, 1994, after nearly a year of negotiations with Gagauz leaders, a law was enacted that envisioned far-reaching devolution of Moldovan power in the autonomous national-territory of Gagauz.[84]

A similar plan for territorial autonomy was proposed by the Chisinau to Transdniester, but the Transdniester leaders rejected it as insufficient. Under pressure from Moscow, the Moldovan government agreed to upgrade the status of the Transdniester region from "autonomous region" to the that of "autonomous republic." Under the newly drafted law, designed specifically for Transdniester, the region was to remain an "integral part" of the Moldovan state. At the same time, the Transdniester region will be entitled is to have its own basic law, legislative assembly, and regional executive government.[85]

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[83] This "national consensus" government included 8 ethnic Russians (out of 37), including 2 deputy prime ministers (Socor, 1992, p.9).

[84] According to the new law, the Gagauz region will have its own legislative and executive authorities, will use three official languages, Gagauz/Turkish, Russian and Moldovan/Romanian, and will be entitled to secession from Moldova in the hypothetical case of the later's reunification with Romania. (Socor, 1994)

[85] More specifically, these powers will cover practically all aspects of government except foreign policy, defense, security, border control, citizenship, and currency, all of which remain within the sphere of central authority. Transdniester residents will have the right to perform military service in the region. The republic will have it's own symbols, to be flown or displayed alongside those of the Republic of Moldova. Transdniester will have three official languages; Moldovan/Romanian, Ukrainian, and Russian. Transdniester will organize elections and referendums in its territory and will enjoy the right of secession from Moldova in the hypothetical case of Moldova's reunification with Romania (Anonymous, 1995).

Finally, understanding that Russia holds the keys to the territorial integrity and economic survival of the Moldovan state, the new Moldovan government took a course towards the political and economic reunion with the Russian Federation. In mid-1994, Moldova joined the Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Moldovan leadership hoped that by providing extensive autonomy to its ethnic minorities, and joining the CIS, Russia would withdraw its troops from the country, and put pressure on Transnistria to accept the plan for autonomy and re-integrate into the Moldovan state.

However, despite the extensive steps made by Moldova in seeking an accommodation, the Dniester leaders rejected out of hand the plans for regional autonomy. They demanded from Chisinau nothing less then confederation of two equal states in which each "state" would to have its own army, currency, and custom posts.

Why did Transnistria reject what the Gagauz minority considered an acceptable autonomy? There are variety of reasons that explain the Dniester position. First, during the years of confrontation, Dniester leaders were able to institute what amounts to an authoritarian and para-military regime on its own territory. Having created their own government, ministries, army, and other state institutions, Dniester leaders now have vested interests in preserving the regime and no desire to share power with the Chisinau. Therefore, Dniester greatly preferred either membership in the CIS, or the unification of the region with the Russian Federation, rather than the status of an autonomous republic within the Moldovan state.[86] Secondly, rejection of Moldova's offer was possible only because the Dniester leadership was and is actively supported by the nationalist-

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[86] If this were to happen, then Transnistria would become a non-contiguous Russian territorial unit similar to the Kalinningrad oblast.

communist opposition in the Duma. The Dniester issue had become a rallying point for the anti-Yeltsin forces. Yeltsin's policies towards Transnistria are portrayed as a sellout of Russian interests and land, and a betrayal of ethnic Russians in the face of violence and ethnic oppression. Being supported by the Duma, which provides economic assistance and political support, Dniester feels that it can dictate conditions to Moldova.

Thirdly, there are significant ideological and political differences between the sides engaged in the conflict. The Dniester leadership is desperately clinging to an already dead Soviet ideology and are upbeat in their Stalinist-Russian chauvinist rhetoric. The Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic proudly maintains Soviet era institutions and legislature in the region, are keeping Lenin's monuments, the red flags, and celebrate Soviet era holidays with Soviet style parades. Although claiming to be defenders of human and national rights, the Dniester regime outlawed the Latin alphabet in the territory and subjected the local Moldovan population to outright discrimination. At the same time, in this mixture of historical anachronism and open Russian chauvinism, one can see the Dniester leadership's genuine fear of the reforms that are already under way in Moldova. Privatization and liberalization of the economy will certainly lead to the demise of the centralized factories and enterprises, and with them, the collapse of the Dniester regime's basis of political power.

Finally, the rejection of the Moldovan proposals is also motivated by the experience of a violent and protracted ethnic conflict in which hundreds of people were killed. There is deep distrust and suspicion of the Moldovan motives, and its commitment to the plan for autonomy.

In the end, the resolution as to which of the two options of transforming the ethnic structure will prevail (e.g., the national-territorial autonomy of the Russian community in Transdnistria, or some sort of political affiliation with the Russian Federation) depends on Russia's position. The Chisinau went all the way in attempting to resolve the conflict. Moldova's plan for Transnistria's autonomy was endorsed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and by the Council of Europe. As such, the next move would be up to Russia.

The Moldovan national consensus government policies are genuinely supported by a majority of the population of all ethnic groups. In Moldova, as well as Transdnistria, people are tired of the war. The Moldovan government has made significant progress in privatizing and stabilizing its economy. What currently worries people most are not ethnic, but economic and social problems, such as the lack of jobs, economic insecurity, and poverty. Economic problems are especially pressing in Transdniester, which is much worse off, economically, than the rest of Moldova.

However, Moscow seems to be rather ambivalent with regard to the status of this ethnic enclave. Although it is interested in maintaining the status quo which allows Russia to play the role of arbiter in the conflict, thereby controlling the situation in the region, the preferred solution for Moscow is to acquire the right to permanently station its troops on Moldovan territory, or "to convert" its troops into a "peace keeping" contingent (Monitor, June 6, 1996). Russia currently seeks a peacekeeping mandate for the former 14th Russian Army as a rationale for keeping it in Moldova. However, attempts to permanently station Russian military troops are unacceptable to the Moldovan government. The presence of Russian troops on Moldova's territory threatens to

undermine the fragile "national consensus" government by providing an opportunity for the re-emergence and consolidation of the nationalist opposition.

Moscow is also very reluctant to endorse the partitioning and independence of Transnistria, because this would lead to increasing tensions within the CIS, as recognition of an independent Transnistria would open a Pandora's box of border disputes among the former Soviet republics. Secondly, open support of Transnistria's secession would lead members of the CIS to accuse Russia of imperialism and hypocrisy. Transnistria is part of the internationally recognized Moldovan state just as Chechnia is part of the sovereign and independent Russian state, and against whom Moscow recently had unleashed a brutal war. Finally, a claim to Transnitria would subject Russia to intensive international criticism, and isolation, and jeopardize Western economic assistance. As for now, Moscow continues to drag out any solution, preferring to play the role of arbiter and mediator between two parts of the divided country.

6.3 Russians in Central Asia: Between State Patronage and Consociationalism

Since independence and up until late 1993, events in the region evolved largely under the inertia left over from the Soviet years. The Central Asian republics neither wanted, nor struggled for independence. Consequently, after the collapse of the USSR, all successor states in the region chose to maintain close relationships with the Russian Federation. Seeking to maintain good relations with Moscow, the Central Asian regimes provided all ethnic Russians in the region with the citizenship of their respective countries.

However, beyond the provision of civic and political rights that citizenship in the new countries entailed, neither the new states nor Moscow had much interest in the actual problems and difficulties ethnic Russians were facing in adapting to the new situation in the region. Central Asian elites were preoccupied with power consolidation and inter-clan rivalry, while other issues, such as economic reform and the situation of ethnic Russians, were of little concern. The Russian Federation, similarly, up until late 1993, expressed little concern in the plight of their ethnic kin in the region. Russia was in its "honeymoon" period with the West. Moscow's foreign policy was almost exclusively devoted to its relationships with the West, and the United States. Having launched radical political and economic reforms in attempts to Westernize Russia, Yeltsin's government had little interest in the former Muslim "underbelly" of the empire.

The marginality of the issues concerning the Russian diaspora resulted in increasing insecurity and the perception of many ethnic Russians that there was little future for them in the region. If, during the last years of *perestroika*, Russians were debating the question "to leave or not to leave" the region, since independence, the question became not "to leave or not to leave," but "when to leave."[87] Russia's direct control over the region was over. Although being provided with citizenship, ethnic Russians were facing the reality of becoming culturally and socially, alien minorities in poor and underdeveloped

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[87] According to a survey of ethnic Russians (N=8,500) conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in the summer of 1992, the number of Russians wanting to leave the region had reached, on average, about 60%. In Tajikistan, almost 100% of ethnic Russians wanted to repatriate to the Russian Federation (Gorbachev Fond, 1993). This meant that, in just one year (since the summer of 1991, when the Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey was conducted), the number of ethnic Russians wanting to leave the region more than tripled.

Muslim countries. Finally, there was continuous deterioration of the economic situation with bleak prospects for its improvement. For Central Asian Russians, finding work in the Russian Federation was becoming as prestigious as finding a job in Western Europe was for Russians in the Russian Federation.

Besides increasing marginalization, the region was also characterized by the rapidly evolving differentiation of the situations of ethnic Russians across the former Soviet republics. For analytic purposes, the Central Asian countries can be divided into two groups. The first group constitutes the republics created by the Soviets in the territory of the pre-revolutionary General-Governorship of Turkestan (e.g., Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.) The second group includes the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, established on the pre-revolutionary Steppe region.

Since independence, regimes ethnocratic in character were consolidating in the states constituting the first group (Figure 15). Thus, Russians in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were, to a much larger degree, excluded from access to power, resources, and status, than Russians in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the "overlay" of the clan and state structures in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was by far stronger than that in the later two states. In comparison, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there was a movement towards the creation of consociational political systems, in which elites of the indigenous and Russian ethnic groups were negotiating and (to varying degree) sharing control over the state.

Differences in the ethno-political developments between the two groups of the new Central Asian states can, to a large degree, be explained by the interaction of ethno-demographic, historic and cultural factors. First, in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan, the size of Russian communities is much smaller (8-10%) than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% and 22% respectively). Because of the smaller size, the power and influence of Russian communities on the development of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is much weaker than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Second, in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, Russians face much stronger pressures of nativization. The indigenous societies in these republics are more traditional, and less Russified than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.[88] This is because Turkestan historically was settled by a sedentary population, which was earlier converted to Islam and developed a flourishing medieval Muslim civilization. In comparison, the population of the former Steppe region remained nomadic up to the early 1930s, and only later converted to Islam. In addition, Russians started to colonize the Kyrgyz steppes about a century earlier than the desserts of Turkistan. Because of strong regional, cultural, and religious traditions, the Russification of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was less significant and the influence of Islam much stronger, than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Because of (a) the relatively small size of Russian population, (b) the higher pressures of nativization, and (c) a stronger overlap of clan and state structures, the degree of insecurity and vulnerability of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan was much stronger than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According to the Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) survey, the perceptions of differences in ways of life, between the indigenous population and ethnic Russians, were almost twice as high in the

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[88] According to the 1989 census, the percent of indigenous nationalities knowing the Russian language was 27% in Turkmenistan, 22% in Uzbekistan, and 30% in Tajikistan. In comparison, these figures in Kazakhstan were 63%, and in Kyrgyzstan 37% (Anderson and Silver, 1989).

republics located in the former Turkestan (30%), than in the pre-revolutionary Steppe region (15%). Similarly, almost twice as many respondents (15%) in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (7%), indicated that ethnic Russians face discrimination and pogroms.

By mid-1993, negotiations over the status of ethnic Russians in the region intensified. This transpired because the migration of Russians from Central Asia had reached massive proportions. In just four years, 1990 to 1993, close to 1 million ethnic Russians had left the region (Makarova, 1995). The intensifying repatriation was making the issue of the Russian diaspora into a serious political, economic and social problem in the region, as well as in the Russian Federation.

The Central Asian regimes were interested in curbing migration because ethnic Russians constituted the most educated and skilled segment of their societies. Ethnic Russians were running sectors of the economy that were essential for the functioning of a modern state (e.g., industry, communications, transportation, and social (education, health care) infrastructure.) The departure of the most qualified segment of the population was already paralyzing large sectors of the republics' economies.[89]

The Russian Federation was also increasingly concerned with stabilizing the Russian population in the region. Firstly, because being in the grip of a deep economic crisis, Russia had neither the resources, nor political will, to accept and re-integrate massive waves of immigrants in their historic homeland. Secondly, by late 1993, the issue of the Russian diaspora was becoming a "hot button" issue in Russian politics. In part this

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[89] For more on the devastating consequences of the exodus of Russian specialists in Central Asia, see Pulatov, 1990; and Tishkov, 1995.

occurred because of the consolidation of the Nationalist-Communist opposition in the Duma. The Nationalists and Communists were the first to actively exploit the issue of the Russian minorities in their political struggle against Yeltsin's government. Most effective in this respect was Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the so-called Liberal Democratic Party (Bohlen, 1994; Shlapentokh, 1994). Yeltsin was forced to respond to the criticisms and accusations of the nationalists, and pursue pro-active policy towards the Russian diaspora in the near abroad.

For analytical purposes, one can talk about two types of Russian status negotiations in Central Asia. Negotiation over state patronage were characteristic of the relationships between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As mentioned before, the Russian population in these republics is relatively small and is dispersed geographically through the major cities of these republics. Because of their relatively small size, Russians were not in a position to compete with the indigenous population for control of the state, nor to have significant impact on the negotiation over their own future in the republics. Therefore, the ethnic transformation in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took the form of a negotiation for state patronage (e.g., protection of individual and collective civic, economic, social and cultural rights of ethnic Russians.)

A second type of Russian status negotiation was characteristic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In these two republics, negotiation occurred not only over the issue of state patronage, but also over the matter of ethnic groups sharing control of the state. The issue of ethnic groups sharing the control over the state was put on the table because of the size of the Russian communities and their role in Kyrgyz and Kazakh economies.

6.3.1 Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan: Negotiation for the State's Patronage

Of all the former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan went the furthest in accommodating the demands of the Russian Federation, with regard to legislative protection of their Russian minorities. Accordingly, Russia has already concluded bilateral agreements with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that provide dual citizenship to local Russians (Terechov, 1993; RFE/RL Daily Report, July 19, 1994; OMRI Daily Digest, July 11, 1995). In comparison, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, despite significant pressure from Moscow, rejected the idea of dual citizenship outright. Almaty, the capital of Kazakhsta, and Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, assumed that large numbers of Russian Federation citizens, in their respective countries, would create conditions for internal instability in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Kozlov, 1994a).

There are a number of reasons why Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan accommodated the Russian Federation's demands for the protection of local Russians. First, because the political weight of ethnic Russians in the republics was small, the regimes in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not feel threatened by the provision of additional rights to ethnic Russians. At the same time, the significant economic role of ethnic Russians warranted additional rights so as to stem their migration back to Russia.[90]

Second, the expanding of legislative and political protection of ethnic Russians was

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[90] Turkmenistan agreed to dual citizenship for its Russian diaspora in order to protect its gas industry. In Turkmenistan, Russians constitute only about 8% of the population, however, they run the country's gas industry that provides for more than 70% of Turkmenistan's GNP (Gorbachev Foundation, 1993).

also an outcome of the vulnerability of the Central Asian republics to the political, economic and military pressure of the Russian Federation. This is especially true in the case of Tajikistan. The Tajikistani government, highly dependent on Russia for economic aid, and on the Russian military for internal and external security, made numerous concessions to Russian-speakers. Besides dual-citizenship, the Tajik regime offered ethnic Russians posts in government and industry, and made numerous changes in language policies (RFE/RL Daily Report, June 20, 1994).

The high degree of legal accommodation to the demands of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seems to be paradoxical, when taking into account the previous characterization of the regimes in these former Soviet republics as ethnocratic. However, the paradox dissolves if one takes into account the clan-based social structure of Central Asian societies. Power in Central Asia functions not so much through the law, but through the regional and/or kinship networks of patronage, personal loyalty, and nepotism. It is not the state, but the networks of kinship and patronage that provide security, support, and protection for their members. Consequently, whatever laws and rights are accorded to ethnic Russians, they, as *inordosty* (Rus. foreigners), are excluded from power, their position in the republics is insecure, and their social mobility is blocked.

In sum, the formal civil, political and/or legal rights accorded to ethnic Russians in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had relatively little impact on the dynamics of ethnic transformation in the republics. Thus, although Russians in Tajikistan were accorded the most liberal and favorable treatment of local Russians in these republics, the rate of Slavic migration from this republic is the highest in all the Central Asian republics.

Russian journalists reporting from the region observe that soon there will be no ethnic Russians in Tajikistan to enjoy the laws that were written specifically for them. Because of exclusion from the clan structure, the extension of formal legal and political rights to Russians has had little impact on stemming their repatriation to the Russian Federation, or encouraging them to integrate into the republics. Instead, resolving the question of whether they would stay in the republics, or choose to repatriate back to the Russian Federation depended on three factors: their personal security and the security of their families; the political stability and economic future of the republics; and the possibilities of integrating into the indigenous societies.

Paradoxically, the situation of Russians in Turkmenistan, which has devised the fewest reforms, seems to be most favorable to Russians staying. The neo-stalinist rule of *Turkmenbashi*[91] Saparmurad Niyazov,[92] assures the stability of public order in the republics. In this republic there is relatively little informal, or administrative harassment of ethnic Russians. All organizations in Turkmenistan, based on ethnicity, or national criteria, are outlawed. At the same time, there are high hopes that the gas riches in the republics will soon become a second Kuwait. Furthermore, Russians feel that they will be

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[91] *Turkmenbashi* is Turkmen for "father of all Turkmen."

[92] Other titles that the Turkmen press use in addressing Niyazov, are "great leader," "great helmsman" and even "dweller in heaven" (Moroz, 1995). Niyazov's rapidly evolving personality cult is characterized by an eclectic mixture of features of Stalinism, and the traditional patriarchy of the Turkmen tribal culture. There is only one political party in the country, the former Communist party (which was simply renamed) and no political opposition. The internal Security (the KGB merely renamed) reigns free in the country. The major cities have Niyazov's statues erected. In all government offices, in place of Lenin's and Brezhnev's portraits, Niyazov's portraits are displayed. Niyazov is considered to be one of the richest people in Central Asia. For more on Nyiazov's rule, see Solomonov, 1994.

able to share the economic benefits of the coming gas boom with the Turkmenistan titular nationality. These factors, to a large degree, explain the relatively low migration from the republic, a mere 2 to 3% of its total Russian population a year (Figure 19).

It is in Tajikistan that the situation of ethnic Russians is most precarious. Ethnic Russians had already begun to leave the republic in 1989, after the Tajik youth had instigated violent pogroms of the Armenian minority in the Tajikistan capital, Dushambe. In 1990, fearing that the communal violence could spill over, about 81,000 ethnic Russians left this republic, about 20% of the total Russian population (Chasanova, 1994). The Russian outmigration surged again in 1992, when civil war erupted in the country, pitting the former Communist establishment against an Islamic opposition operating from the Afghanistan territory.[93]

The rise of the Islamic opposition, especially its ability to mobilize the rural poor and the disaffected urban youth, was an ominous sign to all aliens, especially non-Muslim Europeans. Fearing for their lives, about 67,000 ethnic Russians (17% of the pre-independence population) left the country in 1992. Sixty-three thousand more Russians left Tajikistan in 1993. Overall, it is estimated that by late 1994, of 380,000 Russians in Tajikistan, 300,000 had already left the country (Tishkov et al., 1994).

By 1996, more than 30-thousand people had been killed in the Tajik civil war, and a large portion of the total population of six-million have been forced to flee their homes (Pannier, 1996). The presence of a large Russian troop contingent in the country, estimated to be up to 20,000 soldiers and officers, failed to provide security for the local

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[93] For more on the civil war in Tajikistan, see Dannreuther, 1994, Ch. 2.; and Pannier, 1996.

Figure 19. Migration of Ethnic Russians From the Central Asian Republics, 1990-1993*



*Sources: Makarova (1995) and Topilin (1992).

Russians (RFE/RL Daily Report, June 20, 1994). Hope for a political settlement in the country remains slim, and soon, there will be very few ethnic Russians left in Tajikistan.

The situation in Uzbekistan lies somewhere between that of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan, similar to Turkmenistan, is rather politically stable. Yet, ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan are experiencing strong pressures of nativization. This is partially because Uzbekistan is the most populous republic of the region and tries to project itself as the leader of the region. Historically, Uzbekistan and its capital Tashkent, were treated as the hub of the region by Czarist Russia, and later by the USSR as well. Most of the scientific, educational and industrial potential of the region (excluding Kazakhstan) is concentrated in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, two great historic centers of Islamic culture, Samarkand and Bukhara, both of which are considered foundations of Turkic identity, are located in the territory of Uzbekistan (Starr, 1996).

For ethnic Russians, Uzbekistan's ambitions to regional leadership had two consequences. First, Uzbekistan was aggressively pursuing policies that would reduce economic and military reliance on Moscow, and forge closer relationships with Turkey, Pakistan, and China, as well as some Western countries. Reorientation of the country's industrial, communication, and transportation infrastructure, from the north, to the south and the west meant increasing isolation from the Russian Federation for local Russians.

Second, state policies directed at Uzbek identity construction very often turned into strong pressure to assimilate. Those Russians who have left Uzbekistan indicate that the major reason for their departure was *bytovoi nationalism* (rus. informal harassment) (Ivanov, 1994). In this category ethnic Russians include arbitrary enforcement of Uzbek language laws. Using lack of fluency in Uzbek as a reason, local bureaucrats can hire and

fire most ethnic Russians since less than 5% of ethnic Russians speak Uzbek.

Many of the migrants complain also about the vulnerability of Russians in the streets, and shops, to harassment by Uzbek youth. In addition, the promotion of Uzbek as a state language is narrowing opportunities for education in Russian. Most of the universities and other educational institutions are in the process of switching from Russian to Uzbek (Dunlop, 1994).

All these factors continue to sustain ethnic Russian migration from the country. Since early 1990, the yearly migration rate of Russians from Uzbekistan has been equal to about 5% of the Russian population size in this republic. The most recent data on Russian migration indicates a continuation of this trend. During the first nine months of 1994 (January-September), close to 70,000 ethnic Russians left the country (Ivanov, 1994).

In sum, ethnic transformation in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan so far, operates through the repatriation of ethnic Russians back to the their historic homeland. Whatever legal or political rights they are accorded, the bottom line for ethnic Russians is that they were transformed into small ethnic minorities in underdeveloped, poor, and primarily rural, Muslim countries, that, from the Russian viewpoint, posses an alien and inferior culture and way of life. The state (with the exception of Turkmenistan under Niyazov) in the region is too weak to protect ethnic Russians, and the ethnic Russian communities are too small to represent a significant political force.

Unless there is improvement in the economic situation, repatriation of Russians from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will most likely continue at an unabated rate in the near future, despite the lack of opportunities in the Russian Federation. Russians from the region are also being pushed by political instability, the rapidly growing indigenous

populations, and a catastrophic ecological situation. The Russian community in Tajikistan will soon become just a fact of history. Arguably, stabilization of the Russian population in Uzbekistan can be expected, but only after most of the younger, better educated, and more highly skilled individuals leave for Russia.

It seems that the Central Asian republics can do little to stem the migration. Therefore, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are sending thousands of students to Turkey and affluent Arab countries so as to prepare replacement for the departing ethnic Russians (Dunlop, 1994). It appears that the outmigration of its most energetic, educated and skilled members will rapidly push the Russian community to the fringes of Uzbek society.

Although in Turkmenistan the situation of ethnic Russians is more favorable, its long term stability is questionable, since it overwhelmingly depends on the will of just one individual, namely President Niyazov. If something were to happen to Niyazov (there've already been rumors about his failing health), the dynamics of ethnic relations in Turkmenistan could change dramatically.

6.3.2 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Negotiation for the Collective Rights of Russians

Because of the significant size of the Russian population, the negotiation dynamics in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differed from those in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in at least in two respects. First, the issues being raised extended far beyond matters of state patronage and included questions concerning the collective rights of ethnic Russians, such as proportional representation in the parliament, and in local and national administration. Second, unlike in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Russian

minorities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan figured more prominently in the arbitration over their future status.

For analytical purposes the factors that account for the evolution of consociationalism in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can be divided into two groups, internal and external. First, unlike in Uzbekistan (or, for that matter in the Baltics) the ruling regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were striving to create not ethnic-based, but civic-based, inclusive nations.

The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, actively pursued the creation of a supra-ethnic "Kazakhstani" nation, united by political patriotism. His policies directed towards the various nationalities seem to be following the Soviet state model. Thus, Nazarbayev wanted to instill a sense of nationhood among the population of Kazakhstan, while preserving the ethnic diversity of the country. His solution to the ethnic problems is to develop the Kazakhstan population's identity, which would, ideally, be "ethnic in form, Kazkahstani in content" (Nazarbayev, 1996). The President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, similarly, claims to be striving to convert Kyrgyzstan into the "Switzerland of Central Asia."

Second, leaders of both countries are opening state and local administrations to ethnic Russians. Russian representation is especially visible in Kazakhstan. For example, in 1994, 28% of the Kazakhstani Supreme Kenges (Kaz. parliament) were ethnic Russians (they comprise 38% of the population) (RFE/RL Daily Report, March 19, 1994). In 1995, in the Kazakhstani government, there were 9 non-Kazakh ministers (out of 21); 7 heads of regions (out of 19) are non-Kazakhs; and in 5,000 of the country's high schools (out of 8,500) teaching is conducted in Russian. The Russian language is the *ligua franca*

of the country's mass media, and is the official state language (Makarov, 1995)

A third feature of the ethno-political systems evolving in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, concerns the role of the state in the domain of ethnic relations. Nazarbayev and Akayev project the state as being in the position of standing above the interests of any one group, be it ethnic, regional, or kinship based. The purpose of the state, in its neutral capacity, is to mediate and resolve conflict among various segments of society.

Despite similarities, there are also significant differences in the ethnic policies pursued by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Nazarbayev's major goal, in forging consociationalism, is to avoid ethnic conflict because it could potentially lead to the partitioning of the Kazakhstani state. The Kazakh and Russian communities in the country are of about equal size; therefore, because neither has more power, conflict could easily lead to a partitioning of the country. Furthermore, a predominant majority of ethnic Russians live in the northern oblasts, while the Kazakhs dominate the southern part of the country (See Map 2).

In addition, ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan have their own re-emerging diasporic identity, the *Kozachestvo* (Rus. the Cossack movement). The Cossack identity, although currently weak, could possibly be used to underpin the Northern Kazakhstan secessionist claims.[94] Finally, the radical Nationalist and Communist opposition in the Duma are

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[94] Significantly, in almost all incidents involving Kazakh/Russian skirmishes, the Cossacks figured prominently (Dave, 1995; Kozlov, 1994; Yemelyanenko, 1994). The major difficultly in resurrecting the *Kozachestvo* is represented by the fact that the Cossack movement was historically based, in rural, para-military, agricultural communities. However, the predominant majority of contemporary Russians in Kazakhstan live in cities and are engaged in industry. Therefore, the imagery of the free Cossacks, riding on horseback, dressed in uniforms, and armed with the sabres, has little appeal to more cosmopolitan and urbanite Russians.

openly supporting the secessionist claims emanating from Northern Kazakhstan.[95]

In Kyrgyzstan, unlike in Kazakhstan, the Russian community does not represent a secessionist threat. Although share of the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan is significant, about 20%, Russians primarily live in cities and do not have their own "territorial base." The Russian community's lever in securing their collective rights in the country is based on two "trump cards": (a) the crucial role of Russians in the Kyrgyz economy, and (b) their role in the inter-clan struggle and politics.

In both of the above respects, the support of the ethnic Russian community is crucial for Akayev. Since Kyrgyz constitutes barely more than half of the population in the republics, Russian backing is critical for any of the Kyrgyz clans engaged in the struggle for power. Kyrgyzstan is deeply divided between its northern and southern parts (Bajalinov, 1994; Maliagin, 1994). Akayev, a representative of the northern clans, is lobbying for the Russian community's support which would allow him to increase his leverage against the southern clans. Furthermore, Akayev's legitimacy as president of the country, to a large degree, depends on the success of his economic reform. Active participation of ethnic Russians in economic reforms is essential for their implementation. This largely explains Akayev's energetic lobbying for the extension of ethnic Russians' rights and protection in the Zhogorku Kenesh (Kyr. parliament) of Kyrgyzstan.[96]

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[95] In early June, 1996, Duma voted on Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's proposal to return northern Kazakhstan, the eastern oblasts of Ukraine, and the Crimea to their former position "under the wings of the Russian two-headed eagle." The vote was only 24 votes short of passing as a resolution (OMRI Daily Digest, June 12, 1996)

[96] For more on Kyrgyzstan politics and the role of ethnic Russians, see, for example, Dubnov, 1994; Pavlova-Silvanskaja, 1994; and Razguliaev, 1994.

In terms of their stance on external relations, both Akayev and Nazarbayev espouse strong pro-Russian policies. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the only CIS countries (with the exception of Belarus) that have signed the customs union with Russia. Both countries have their electric power systems combined with that of Russia. Agreements were reached on transmission of Russian state television and radio broadcasts to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently Kyrgyzstan signed a series of agreements with Moscow that would increase Kyrgyzstan's and Russia's cooperation in economic, financial, and defense spheres (OMRI Daily Digest, March 29, 1996).

Kazakhstan's cooperation with Russia is even more extensive than Kyrgyzstan's (Kangas, 1996). Kazakhstan acquired access to Russia's oil export pipeline network, which was vital to Kazakhstan's oil industry. An agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan has been ratified on the legal status of the citizens of either country who permanently reside on the other's territory. Among other provisions, the agreement specifies that Russian citizens in Kazakhstan are entitled to hold posts in the country's government agencies (Monitor, June 7, 1996). A legal framework is being developed for joint industrial ventures. Finally, Kazakhstan acceded to Russian's rental of the former Soviet military testing grounds in Kazakhstan (Monitor, March 21, 1996).

The strong pro-Russian policies directed at close political, social and cultural cooperation with the Russian Federation are essential in keeping the deeply ethnically divided societies, Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani, together. On one hand, economic and political cooperation with the Russian Federation undercuts the Russian nationalist and secessionist claims in the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the affiliation of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Moscow means patronage of the Russian state is

extended to the Russian diaspora.

Furthermore, the bifurcated borders between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and Russia and Kazakhstan also provide psychological reassurance to the Russian diaspora, that they will not be cut off and isolated from Russia, and will have the possibility to leave and return to the region, at any time, without restriction.

Finally, the Russian Federation also acts as the stabilizer of the emerging consociationalism in Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan. Despite protests from the radical nationalist and Communist opposition, most of the political forces in the Russian Federation are genuinely interested in the stability of the deeply ethnically divided Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Russian Government, as well as the general public in Russia, remain terrified by the idea that there could be a mass exodus of ethnic Russians from Central Asia into Russia. Therefore, although Russia advocates more rights and protection for the Russian diaspora, it is also very strongly against any Russian secessionist claims, or sentiment, in these two republics.

How successful were the consociational policies pursued by Nazarbayev and Akayev? First, the policies of both leaders enjoyed the widespread support of their Russian communities. Nazarbayev was regarded by Kazakhs and Russians alike as the guarantor, even the personification, of stability and inter-ethnic harmony. Secondly, Nazarbayev's and Akayev's policies actually resulted in a decline of ethnic tensions. The most recent survey of ethnic Russians (N=1000) conducted in Kazakhstan in 1995, has shown that Russians are most concerned about the decline in the standard of living (66%), the future of their children (53%), the rise in crime (52%), and unemployment (24%), and a decline in education and health care (20%). Concern over ethnic tensions came in 6th

place, and was regarded as important by 16% of respondents (Gudkov, 1995, p.6).

Thirdly, at least in Kazakhstan, there were signs of stabilization of the Russian population.[97] In Kazakhstan, the proportion of those who had decided to stay in the country increased from 56% in 1991, to 65% in 1995. Although the percent of those who had decided to leave Kazakshtan also rose from 11% in 1991[98] to 18% in 1994, the number leaving remained significantly lower than in either Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Furthermore, among those who decided to leave the country, only 1% made this decision because of Kazakh hostility. The predominant majority reported that they were returning to the Russian Federation for economic reasons (Gudkov, 1995, p.34).

Kyrgyzstan has been less successful in stabilizing its Russian population. Since 1990, the Russian emigration rate has been continuously increasing. In 1993, close to 10% of the Russian population left the country.

Why was the situation in Kyrgyzstan less favorable to ethnic Russians? First, because economic conditions in Kyrgyzstan were much worse than in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest republics of the Soviet Union. It does not have either the industrial potential, or the wealth of natural resources of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan the economic situation was somewhat better, and unemployment was much lower, in part,

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[97] According to the most recent OMRI report, Russian migration from Kazakhstan is on the decline. Citing Kazakhstani First Deputy Labor Minister, Alikhan Baymenov, the news service reports that the country's increasing political and economic stability has led to a sharp decline in the number of people emigrating from Kazakhstan. About 309,000 people left Kazakhstan in 1995, compared with 480,000 the previous year. At the same time, the number of people arriving in Kazakhstan is steadily increasing since 1991, and by 1994, had reached 122,000 people. About 1/3 of the immigrants were ethnic Kazakhs and the rest were Russians and Ukrainians (OMRI Daily Digest, June 21, 1996).

[98] Data from the Shlapentokh/Gudkov (1991) study.

because of the lower pace of economic reforms in the country.[99]

Secondly, in Kyrgyzstan, the linguistic situation was very different from the language situation in Kazakhstan. The status of the Russian language did not decline substantially in Kazakhstan, because of the high degree of Russification of Kazakhs. Only about half of ethnic Kazakhs can speak Kazakh effectively (U.S. Department of State, 1994). Almost all educated Kazakhs are Russophones. Kazakh is the language of the rural population. By default, Russian in Kazakhstan remains the primary language. In Kyrgyzstan, Russification levels are lower, and the size of the Russian population is much smaller, which translates into the much higher profile of the Kyrgyz language.

The stability of the ethnic situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan depends on a variety of factors. Perhaps the most important among them is improvement in the economic situation. The delicate balance of internal and external factors, that has upheld the movement towards consociationalism, cannot be maintained for long if the populations of both countries become increasingly impoverished. As was already mentioned, the failure of the Kyrgyz economy, to a large degree, accounts for the relative lack of success that Akayev's nationality policies have had in stemming Russian migration.

The stability of both countries will also depend on the degree of inter-clan and inter-elite conflict. Continuation of the current nationality policies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are highly dependent on two individuals, Nazarbayev and Akayev. If they

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[99] In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan had a per capita income of just $820 per year, half of that in Kazakhstan ($1680). In 1994, the gross domestic product of Kyrgyzstan fell by almost a third compared to 1993, while unemployment grew to 229,000 in a country with a population of just 4.6 million (Dzhamagulov, 1994). Data from the CD-ROM "The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995," Softkey: Cambridge, Mass.

were replaced in the process of an inter- or intra-clan struggle, the situation might change dramatically. This possibility is especially likely in Kyrgyzstan, which is characterized by a high level of intra-clan rivalry and fighting.

A third major threat to Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's ethnic stability are rapidly developing ethno-demographic changes. In this respect, the position of the Russian community in both countries will continue to weaken as the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz grows. In part, this is likely to occur because of the much higher birth rates of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh, than of the ethnic Russians. The region's indigenous population grows on average, at 2-3% a year. In addition, in Kazakhstan the proportion of Russians will also decline because of the return of ethnic Kazakhs to their homeland from abroad. The government of Kazakhstan is actively encouraging such migration. Thus, in 1992-1993, 43,000 Kazakhs arrived in Kazakhstan from Mongolia, 20,000 from Russia, and 25,000 from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states (Dunlop, 1994, p. 210). As the ethnic demography changes, so will the power balance between ethnic communities, which could lead to attempts, by indigenous ethnic groups, to claim exclusive control over the state.

If there is no improvement in the economic situation in the near future, arguably, we will see the gradual gravitation of Kyrgyzstan towards a mild ethnocratic regime (towards quadrant I in Figure 15). No or little economic improvement will mean a continuous migration of Russians back to the Russian Federation. This will lead to an erosion of the consociationalist features of the Kyrgyzstani political system, and evolution into state paternalism, as was the case in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan.

In Kazakhstan, too, the ethnic assertiveness of Kazakhs will grow. The question is, will it undermine the evolving consociationalism, or will it remain within tolerable limits that is, not turn into an ethnocratic regime producing explosive polarization?

There are a variety of factors that favor the preservation of consociationalism in Kazakhstan. The demography of the country is such that the eventuality of the Kazakhs politically marginalizing the ethnic Russian community is unlikely. The Kazakhs do not even constitute half of the country's population. Furthermore, 62% of the Kazakhs still live in rural areas. Whatever the arguments of the indigenous intelligentsia about the virtues of peasants in preserving the culture and language of the ethnic group, the appeal of nationalism in traditional rural societies is low. Nationalism is primarily an urban phenomenon and has as its base in the urban middle classes. The Kazakh urban middle classes are highly Russified and numerically weak.

Additionally, Kazakh nationalism is hindered by (a) the clan based social structure of the Kazakh society, (b) the size of the country (the area of Kazakhstan is equal to that of Western Europe), and (c) the underdeveloped infrastructure of communication and transportation. Finally, the institutionalization of consociationalism in the country, and especially Kazakhstan's integration with the Russian Federation, has proceeded too far to radically reverse the process.

Unless Russia actively promotes secessionism in Northern Kazakhstan, the process of ethnic transformation in the country will most likely fluctuate within quadrant IV, in a "wave pattern" similar to that of the Ukraine or Baltics (Figure 15). Thus, one could expect time periods during which the ethnic assertiveness of Kazakhs will increase, especially if there were changes in Kazakhstani leadership, or a lapse into a deep and

protracted economic crises. During such periods the ethnocratic features of the Kazakhstani state will become more prominent. On the other hand, economic improvement, combined with the Russian Federation's demands for protection of ethnic Russian minorities, and a high degree of political and economic dependence on Russia, will constrain the development of ethnocratism in Kazakhstan.

6.4 Ethnic Transformation in the Independent Ukraine

The first years of the Ukraine's independence were characterized by a decline of national romanticism and an increase in regional tensions. Among Crimea's predominantly ethnic Russian population, a secessionist movement was gathering strength, which led, in late 1992, to a potentially violent confrontation between Kiev and Simferopol. Centrifugal tendencies also increased in the predominantly Russian Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine.

In 1994, the situation in the Ukraine began to change. Presidential elections held in July, 1994, ushered in a period of "socialist conservatism" in the Ukraine. The election of relatively pro-Russian, Leonid Kuchma, as the Ukrainian president, indicated a growing skepticism among the Ukrainian population over the benefits of independence. The nostalgia for the Soviet past, its safety and security, was on the rise. The new Ukrainian leadership had reoriented the country's policies towards an economic, and, to some degree, political, reunion with the Russian Federation. The result was a decline in regional and ethnic tensions in the Ukraine.

6.4.1 The Decline of National Romanticism and the Rise of Regional Tensions: 1992-1994

Since the declaration of independence, the spirit of national romanticism, which had united ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, began to decline. Three sets of factors account for this development.

First, the hope that independence would bring rapid improvement of the economic situation in the Ukraine was dashed. Instead of bringing prosperity, independence had brought dramatic deterioration of the economic situation, leaving a majority of the population impoverished and much worse off than under the Soviet regime. In part, the economic situation deteriorated because of the inept economic polices of the first Ukrainian government. However, the rupture of Ukrainian economic relations with Russia proved more important. The Ukraine's economy was highly dependent on energy and oil imports from Russia, and on Russian markets for Ukrainian goods. Radical economic reforms launched in Russia simultaneously led to a rise in energy prices and to the collapse of markets for Ukrainian products in Russia. This brought the Ukrainian economy to a standstill. Inflation reached 40,000% a year. Economic hardships strengthened Ukrainian pro-unification sentiments, since the economic situation was much better in Russia than in the Ukraine. This was especially the case in the eastern and southern regions of the Ukraine, that were rather "mild" in their commitment to independence in the first place.

Regionalization of Ukraine was also fueled by the serious conflicts and tensions in Russian-Ukrainian state relations. First, there was the thorny issue of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Sevastopol, headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. After independence,

the Ukraine unilaterally claimed the Black Fleet for its own, thus creating a furor in Moscow. Kiev's plans to create a large, national military force (targeted to reach 250,000-400,000 personnel) also did little to contribute to the trust in Ukraine's and Russia's relationship (Wilson and Bachkatov 1992, p.231).

Russia, on its part, was constantly meddling in Ukrainian affairs. Using the Ukraine's weak economic situation, Russia applied political and economic pressure, and exploited the Ukraine's dependence on Russia's energy exports to force the Ukraine to enter political, economic, and military agreements in the Russian dominated CIS. Moscow strived to make the Ukraine accept bilingualism and to provide dual citizenship for the Russian-speakers in the country. Nationalist factions in the Russian parliament openly threatened the Ukraine's sovereignty by promoting territorial claims and supporting secessionist movements on its territory. And finally, the majority of Russian politicians could not reconcile themselves to the existence of an independent Ukraine. The Ukraine's statehood was widely thought to be just a temporary phenomenon that should not be taken seriously. It was believed that the Ukraine's declaration of independence was invented by the former Communist bosses in order to preserve their power and positions, and, therefore, as soon as economic hardships increased, the Ukraine would ask to be taken back into the fold of Mother Russia. Needless to say, Russia's political and economic pressure, combined with such arrogant, condescending and patronizing attitudes towards the Ukraine, only fueled Ukrainian nationalism.[100]

Finally, the decline of Ukrainian national romanticism, was also stimulated by the

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[100] For more on the Russian-Ukrainian relationship during the first years of independence, see Moshes, 1994; and Motyl 1993.

nation and state building policies promoted by the first Ukrainian government. President Kravchiuk, a representative of the more nationalistic western part of the Ukraine, pursued active policies directed at reducing the Ukraine's dependence on Russia and the Ukraine's integration into Central and Western Europe.

This curtailing of the Ukrainian/Russian relationship led to a rise of anti-Kiev sentiment in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine that, historically, had strong ties with Russia. Kravchiuk also adopted policies enhancing the prestige of the Ukrainian language (and its use) and culture in all spheres of life in the Ukraine. As a result of these policies, the assimilation processes between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians slowed down. The use of the Ukrainian language, vis-á-vis Russian, was expanding (albeit modestly)(Kaminski, 1995). Promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture put pressure on ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians (Popova, 1994). In the eastern part of the Ukraine, this created resentment over Western Ukraine's domination, and raised fears of a possible wave of Ukrainization.

As a result of (a) economic hardships, (b) conflicts and tensions in Ukrainian-Russian state relations, and (c) the Kiev policies which attempted to strengthen the role and prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture, the regional tensions in the Ukraine increased significantly. Consequently, two major "fault lines" of differentiation in the Ukraine emerged. The first was between the primarily ethnic Russian enclave on the Crimean peninsula and the Ukrainian mainland. The second was between the western and eastern regions of the Ukraine.

6.4.2 Crimean Secessionism and the Clash of Rival Nationalisms

The situation in Crimea represents a particularly striking example of how escalation of regionalism can lead to the rise and clash of rival nationalisms, even in areas of longstanding Ukrainian-Russian ethnic harmony. The Crimean peninsula's population in 1989 was 67% percent Russian, 26% Ukrainian. This oblast was transferred from Russia to the Ukraine in 1954, by Nikita Khrushchev's decree commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Ukraine's incorporation into the Russian empire.

Despite the province's formal Ukrainian status, up until the collapse of the USSR, the peninsula remained more economically, socially and culturally integrated with Russia than with the Ukraine. Crimea had a massive presence of military structures, officers' organizations, and armed forces. Sevastopol was the chief base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and a major military outpost of the Soviet Union.

Economically, Crimea's development was directly regulated by the Central authorities in Moscow. Because of Crimea's status as an "all-union health resort," all levels of Central, and regional authority in Russia (the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Komsomol,[101] the Labor Unions, ministries, industrial enterprises, etc.) heavily invested in Crimean infrastructure developments, summer vacation homes, hospitals, etc.

Crimea's ties to Russia were much stronger than to the Ukraine also because of the peninsula's demographics. Close to 90% of Crimea's population consisted of post WWII immigrants (Guboglo and Chervonnaia, 1995). A Majority of these individuals were

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[101] Komsomol is the All-Union Young Communists Organization.

former residents of Russia's central regions, who had moved to the region because of its depopulation after the war.[102]

Because they were recent immigrants without historical roots in the peninsula, the Russian population in the Crimea functioned socially and culturally as an "extension" of the Russian federation. Finally, ethnic Russians in the region and in Russian Federation exhibit a complex of strong psychological and emotional prejudices and notions that Crimea constitutes a primordial Russian land which is an inseparable part of Russia. For many Russians the area has glorious associations with Russian history and culture (the conquest of Crimea in the 18th century, the defeat of the Turks, the Sevastopol naval base, Crimea as the vacationing place for Russian Czars and famous Russian writers, etc.) The power of these sentiments is what is fueling Russian nationalism and chauvinism on the peninsula and in the Russian Federation.[103]

In many respects the developments on the Crimea peninsula are similar to those in Transnistria, Moldova. Both areas were Russian enclaves more integrated with Russia than the republic to which they formally belong. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR was particularly difficult to adjust to for the population of enclaves.

However, the tensions in Crimea did not rise to the point of military confrontation,

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[102] In 1945, Stalin forcefully deported Crimean Tatars, the indigenous population of the region, to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The Crimean Tatar's massive return to their historic homeland complicates the ethnic tensions in the region even further (Guboglo and Chervonnaia, 1995).

[103] Most recently Russia's Duma took up a proposal by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, that the Duma request the government of the Ukraine to call for a referenda on Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine concerning "returning to Russia those primordial Russian lands." The resolution failed to pass only because of the lack of a quorum. (Monitor, A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, June 7, 1996).

as it did in the Dniester region. First, ethnic Ukrainians, unlike the Moldovan peasants in Transnistria, lacked historic roots in the peninsula. The majority of Ukrainians settled on the peninsula under the "labor conscription" program, initiated in 1954 when the Crimean oblast was handed to the Ukraine. Being highly Russified[104] and relatively new to the area, the Ukrainian population remained rather passive and ambivalent about the future status of the peninsula. This feature of the Ukrainian settlement provides the Crimean conflict with more political, than ethnic character.

The escalation of violence in Crimea, unlike Moldova, was also precluded by Kiev's very flexible position towards the restless Crimean region. Russian nationalist passions in Crimea were on the rise since the late 1980s, especially after the Ukraine had passed the law on language. In order to calm fears of nativization, in 1991, the Ukrainian government granted Crimea the status of autonomous republic. This provision of autonomy reassured the regional Communist nomenclature that it would not be displaced by reforms coming from Kiev. This diffused the tensions between Kiev and the Crimean government in Simferopol.

However, tensions between Kiev and Simferopol began to rise again in early 1992. Four major causes contributed to Crimean radicalization and its drive towards reunification with Russia. First, the drafting of the Crimean constitution resulted in conflicts between Kiev and Simferopol over the delineation of authority between the Central and regional governments.

Second, there was dramatic deterioration of the economic situation on the

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[104] Forty-seven percent of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea are Russian speaking (Shaw, 1994).

peninsula that left the region on the verge of financial collapse and resulted in critical food shortages. Crimea's population attributed the disastrous economic situation to the breakdown of traditional ties with Russia and the inept economic policies of Kiev. Economic hardships led not only to the rise of mass dissatisfaction, but also strengthened the perceptions among the peninsula's population that there is little economic future for the area if it remained part of the Ukraine. Third, there was rise of Russian nationalism on the peninsula, especially among the Sevastopol population and officers of the Black Sea Fleet. Russian nationalist passions in the "city of Russian military glory" were fueled by the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict over the status and division of the Black Sea Fleet. A majority of the Black Sea Fleet officers categorically refused to give an oath of loyalty to the Ukraine, or serve under the Ukrainian flag.

Finally, Nationalist and Communist factions in the Duma openly supported if not Crimea's secessionism, then at least, granting Russian control to the Sevastopol city. Numerous Duma delegations shuttled between Sevastopol and Moscow with highly inflammatory speeches and claims to promote resolutions on Crimea and Sevastopol's return to the Russian Federation. As a result of these efforts, in 1993 the Duma adopted a resolution declaring Sevastopol a Russian city, and ordered a review of the legality of the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine.

In an atmosphere of rising economic discontent and Russian nationalism, in May, 1992, the Crimean parliament declared independence from the Ukraine, which was to be confirmed in a referendum. Relations between Crimea and Kiev sharply deteriorated. Ukrainian nationalists accused President Kravchiuk of being "soft" on Crimea and began to demand the introduction of presidential rule in the autonomous republic, the dissolution

of the Crimean parliament, and the arrest of Crimean leaders on charges of "treason." Rumors spread in Crimea that detachments of the Ukrainian National Guard were heading for Simferopol. In Crimea, self-defence units formed in order to stand against Ukrainian aggression. The relations between the Ukrainians and Russians, especially in Sevastopol and Simferopol, worsened dramatically. Russian Black Sea Fleet officers threatened to intervene in the conflict. The events on the peninsula started to resemble Bosnia's situation in the early 1990s.

However, last minute negotiations between president Kravchiuk and the Crimean parliament diffused tensions. The Crimean parliament agreed to rescind its declaration of independence and cancel the referendum. In return, Crimea was granted far-reaching powers which covered most aspects of internal, social and economic policies, with the exception of security and foreign affairs.

Despite the agreement, political confrontation between Kiev and Simferopol left the peninsula increasingly ethnically divided. There were attempts to organize the Ukrainian minority, concentrated in the northern region of Crimean, in its opposition towards Crimea's independence, or unification with the Russian Federation. On the other hand, there was also a dramatic rise in radical Russian nationalism and strong anti-Ukrainian sentiment among many of the residents of Sevastopol, encouraged, in turn, by radical nationalists in Russia itself (Kuzio, 1994).

6.4.3 The Donbas Region

In the early 1990s, centrifugal tendencies were also gathering strength in two Ukrainian oblasts, Donetsk and Luhansk, in the Donbas region. Donetsk and Luhanks are heavily industrialized and Russified. In 1989, 45% of the population in Luhansk, and 44% of the population in Donetsk, was ethnic Russian. Most of the industry in the region is non-economic, environmentally hazardous and is being threatened with closure.

The pro-Russian drift of both territories was caused by the same factors accounting for the rise of separatism in Crimea. Disengagement from the Russian Federation had disrupted the regional economy, which was more integrated into the Russian, than Ukrainian, economy.

Especially irritating, frustrating and inconvenient to the local population, was the construction of Ukrainian/Russian border customs posts and other border installations. The state border lines, accompanied by the introduction of visa and tariff regulations, put limitations on the movements of people, capital, labor, and goods between areas that, for centuries, had been a part of the same social, cultural, administrative and economic space. Not only did the borders not make sense to the local population, and harmed them economically. Custom posts were notorious for their corruption and were perceived, by the population, as benefiting only the corrupt bureaucrats in Kiev.

Secondly, the assertion of pro-Russian sentiment in Luhansk and Donetsk was also caused by the threatening policies of Ukrainization and reform that were coming from Kiev. Ethnic Russians were especially wary of the Laws of Language that envisioned a gradual Ukrainization of the state administration and education. Finally, nationalist

factions in the Russian parliament were encouraging anti-Kiev sentiments in Eastern Ukraine by lobbying for dual citizenship for the ethnic Russian population and introduction of bilingualism in the country.

The Conflict between Kiev and Luhansk and Donetsk reach a high point in March of 1994, when the oblasts Soviets decided to carry out a consultative referendum. Four questions were included in the plebiscite querying the following issues; 1) should the Russian language be made the second official language of the Ukrainian state, 2) should the Ukraine be organized on federative principles, 3) should the Russian language be made the language of official business, education and science, and 4) should the Ukraine become a full member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (RFR/RL March 16, 1994). The plebiscite produced massive votes in the region in favor of closer ties with Russia and the CIS, as well as limiting the gradual Ukrainization of these regions (RFR/RL March 29, 1994).

However, tensions between Kiev and Donbas never reached the point of a potentially violent eruption, as in Crimea. First of all, Kiev, frightened by the centrifugal tendencies in the region, speeded up economic cooperation with Russia. As a result of Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, agreements were reached on a free customs zone, liberalized banking regulations, and the free movement of labor in ten border regions (Stewart, 1995). The liberalization of goods, labor and capital movement across the Ukrainian/Russian border defused the tensions between Kiev and the restless Crimean region.

Secondly, the conflict between Donbass and Kiev, unlike the conflict in Crimea, was much weaker in that it did not threaten the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial

integrity. The Luhansk and Donetsk economies, unlike that of Crimea's, relied heavily on Ukrainian government subsidies for the continuous operation of its coal mines and steel mills. This moderated the claims made by the oblasts on Kiev.

6.4.4 The Decline of National Romanticism and the Rise of Socialist Conservatism

The widening regional divisions and tensions in the Ukraine became especially visible during 1994 presidential elections. Incumbent President Kravchiuk's supporters were concentrated in the western regions of the country. His appeal in Eastern Ukraine was very limited. Kravchiuk had run on an election platform that gave priority to the political stability of the country and the strengthening of Ukrainian statehood. Kravchiuk's major rival, Leonid Kuchma, was a representative of Eastern Ukraine's industrial establishment.[105] Kuchma, unlike Kravchiuk, based his electorial campaign on three issues: the reform of the economy, the normalization of relationships with the Russian Federation, and the promotion of Russian as the second state language in the Ukraine. Kuchma's electorate was in Eastern Ukraine and he had little support in the more nationalist western oblasts.[106]

Kuchma had won the election, in part, because he successfully tapped the mood of an increasingly tired, impoverished, and nostalgic (about the good old Soviet days)

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[105] Leonid Kuchma is a former director of a nuclear missile factory in Eastern Ukraine.

[106] For more on the Ukraine regional divisions and electorial politics during the first presidential elections in the country, see, Fedarko, 1994; and Portnikov, 1994.

Ukrainian public.[107] This mood may best be described as a return of "socialist conservativism." Its major components were: a disappointment in the realities of independence, in liberalism and in Western aid, by a majority of the country's population; the pragmatism and primacy of economic over political issues; and, a longing for law and order, and a strong state's protection.

Kuchma's election was crucial to the decline of regional tensions and consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. Western Ukraine's political elites acquiesced to their defeat. This led to a peaceful power transfer to Eastern Ukraine's elites. Ascendance of the Eastern Ukrainian elites to power demonstrated to ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians, that their concerns and their voice mattered. It reassured them that the Ukrainian state is also their state (Furman, 1995). Such developments in the Ukraine contrast very favorably with the situation in the Russian Federation, which, with every new election, seems to be on the verge of civil war, and has yet to undergo a peaceful transfer of power from one political group to the other.

Kuchma's elections also marked a decline in Russian-Ukrainian tensions. The Ukraine had joined the economic union of the CIS, and, as a result, economic cooperation between Russia and the Ukraine increased. Kuchma's foreign policy rejected Kravchiuk's pro-European policies, and tried to maintain the delicate balance between Russia and Europe. Kravchiuk's Ukrainization policies were abandoned. At the same time, Kuchma proved to be a staunch supporter of the Ukraine's sovereignty which gained him support of the western regions who had voted against him in the presidential elections. Finally,

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[107] For more on the Ukrainian elections and the importance of the east and west division in Ukrainian politics, see Tikhiy, 1994; and Pogrebinskii and Shakina, 1994.

Kuchma has been surprisingly successful in implementing delayed economic reforms in the country (Mroz and Pavliuk, 1996).

As a result of the changes in the Ukraine that followed the 1996 presidential elections, anti-Kiev sentiments in the Eastern Ukraine declined. It seems that the Ukraine is heading towards the creation of an integrated and stable polity. The results of a 1995 survey conducted among ethnic Russians in Kharkiv, a large industrial city in the Eastern Ukraine, are very interesting in this respect. It shows that fundamental shifts in the identity of the Ukraine's ethnic Russians are occurring. Despite the fact that a majority of respondents were nostalgic about the Soviet past, less than 5% of them were for the Ukraine's reunification with Russia, or for the incorporation of Eastern Ukraine into Russian.

Similarly, an insignificant proportion of respondents wanted to acquire Russian, instead of Ukrainian citizenship. By far, the majority of respondents (more than 70%) identified themselves as Ukrainian citizens. At the same time, close to 90% of respondents wanted closer Russian and Ukrainian cooperation in political, economic and social spheres, as well as "transparent borders" that would allow people, goods, capital and information to move unhindered between the two countries.

Although recent developments have led to Eastern Ukraine's stabilization, in Crimea, the situation remains complicated. Despite many agreements, issues regarding the division of the Black Sea Fleet are not resolved. Neither is there an agreement on the future status of Sevastopol city (Liubarskii, 1994).

When Yeltsin sent troops to quell separatism in Chechnia, the Ukraine moved quickly to abolish the Crimean constitution and peninsular presidency. Russia did not

protest, because the Ukraine's actions in Crimea were undertaken under the same premise as was Russia's in Chechnia, that is, for the purposes of protecting territorial integrity and in defence of the constitution of the country (Tikhiy, 1995).

More recently the tensions over Crimea have been rising again. First, because presidential elections heightened the nationalist rhetoric in Russia. Even Russia's prime minister Chernomyrdyn, openly reiterated the claims that Sevastopol is "a part of the sacred Russian land" (Monitor, April 15, 1996). Secondly, there was an increase in tensions between Simferopol and Kiev as the Ukrainian parliament began debating the draft of the new Ukrainian constitution. Ukrainian nationalists are eager to limit the powers of the Crimean parliament. The Crimean parliament, alarmed by such developments, threatened to call "an all-Crimean referendum on the fundamental principles of the constitutions of the Ukraine and Crimea," implying that Crimea might once again attempt to assert independence (Monitor, June 7, 1996).

As events since the Ukraine's independence has shown, regional tensions, although political in character, can very often lead to a rise in ethnic tensions and discord. This was especially the case in Crimea, which came very close to a potentially violent eruption of ethnic war. The analysis of the Ukrainian/Russian ethnic dynamics has also shown that liberal practices concerning ethnic minorities in the country are not enough to provide for ethnic peace and stability. For normalization and stability of Russian/Ukrainian ethnic relations, closer political, economic and social relationships between the two countries are also necessary.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed the spectacular unraveling of the Soviet empire. Four features characterized the process of disintegration of the imperial ethnic order that had promoted Russian domination in the USSR. First, there was a significant variation in the outcomes of ethnic transformation. In the Baltics, Russian dominance was transformed into Russian exclusion from participation in the polities. In Moldova, attempts were made to convert ethnic Russians into the ethnic minority of the Rumanian state. In Central Asia, the colonial ethnic order, which had promoted the dominance of ethnic Russians, was gradually replaced by a clan-based social structure. Finally, in the Ukraine, in place of Russian hegemony, liberal policies towards ethnic minorities were instituted. In addition, a territorially-based conception of the Ukrainian nation was actively promoted.

The second feature of the transformation of the imperial ethnic order was its changing "trajectories." Thus, during the late 1980s, the political process in Moldova was dominated by policies directed towards the unification of the republic with the Rumanian state. However, by the early 1990s, the drive towards Moldova's unification with Romania was abandoned. Instead, liberal policies on the nationalities were promoted, including the creation of ethnically based autonomous regions within the Moldovan state. In the Baltics the process of ethnic transformation was characterized by conflict and tensions between the two strands of Baltic nationalism: civic and ethnic. There were periods in the Baltic struggle for independence in which attempts were made to elevate the

status of the indigenous ethnic groups by subordinating the interests and rights of other residents in the republics. There were also time periods when civic nationalism (e.g., the defence of human rights, freedom of religion, support for political pluralism and rule of law) was prevalent. In Central Asia, too, there were changes in the direction of ethnic transformation. Thus, after independence, the ethnocratic regimes in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were gravitating towards a consociational constitution in these two new countries.

Thirdly, the ethnic transformation across the periphery of the USSR was characterized by the changing intensity of the ethnic mobilization process. During the late 1980s, there was a surge in ethnic mobilization throughout the periphery of the USSR (with the exception of Central Asia). However, by the mid-1990s, the ethnic mobilization wave had dissipated, ushering in a period of social conservatism. The mobilizing power of ethnic concerns (the defence of national rights, the reversing of the effects of decades of Russification, and the promotion of the indigenous language and culture) even in republics previously shaken by nationalist fever, had declined. Instead, people, independent of their ethnic origins, were increasingly preoccupied with economic and social problems (e.g., fear of unemployment, declining standards of living, poverty, lack of medical care, crime, corruption, etc.). In some republics there was also a rise in nostalgia and longing for the "good old days" when the Soviet state provided security and protection to all its citizens.

Finally, the process of ethnic transformation was profoundly shaped by the developments in the Russian Federation. Two developments are most important in this respect. First, transformation of Russian national consciousness. There was a rise of isolationism in Russia that was expressed as a syndrome of imperial exhaustion. The

imperial periphery was increasingly considered, by the majority of Russia's population, to be a major cause of the deep economic and political crisis in the USSR, while its abandonment, was viewed as a solution to the crisis. Second, there was the emergence of the Russian state which dissociated itself from the legacy of the Empire. The dissociation of the Russian state from the periphery of the Empire turned out, in many respects, to also be a dissociation from the 25 million ethnic Russians stranded in the newly foreign countries after the collapse of the Empire. Such a rapid and relatively bloodless disintegration of the USSR would not have been possible if the Russian people had remained committed to the preservation of the Empire.

The prevailing approaches in the field of ethnic studies proved to have weak explanatory power when dealing with the plurality of ethnic transformation outcomes in the successor states of the former USSR. The major drawback of the existing conceptualizations of the ethnic transformation process is that they are purely descriptive. The ethnic transformation process is investigated primarily in terms of a "deviation from ideal conditions" paradigm. Attempts are made to measure and rank the former Soviet republics according to (a) the degree to which political institutions in the successor states resemble the institutions of the liberal democratic state (e.g., in terms of civic and human rights protection and provisions for cultural rights of ethnic minorities); (b) how big/small is the ethnic conflict potential; and (c) how big/small is the "mismatch" between the political and cultural boundaries between the new states and ethnic groups that populate them.

The weakness of the above approaches is that they do not provide a substantial description of the emerging new ethnic orders. More specifically, such models do not

provide a systematic characterization of the new ethnic institutions and mechanisms that came to replace the Soviet era imperial ethnic order. Thus, analysis based on deviation models may be expected to proceed by arguing that, for example, that Uzbekistan is less democratic than Kyrgyzstan, and that the treatment of ethnic minorities is better in the later than in the former. Then the factors that account for "more democracy" in one country versus the factors that account for "less democracy" in the other would be described.

However, characterization of an ethnic order by the degree to which it approximates the democratic ideal is a formal rather than a substantial description. Without substantive characterization, researchers are handicapped in interpreting the "deviations" from ideal conditions and their change through time. This is because different types of institutions (e.g., legal, administrative, political, economic, informal, etc.) and/or their combination, can produce the same deviation from the ideal condition.

In this dissertation a theoretical model is developed that goes beyond the descriptive characterization of the process of ethnic transformation. It is argued that the weak heuristic capacities of the existing deviational approaches are caused by two underlying assumptions. First, the deviational approaches, implicitly or explicitly, imply that the process of ethnic transformation in the successor states has a direction, e.g., evolution from an Empire into democratically constituted nation-states.

The second fault lies in their conceptualization of ethnicity. In the social sciences, ethnicity tends to be defined not as a characteristic of social relations, but as a nominal phenomenon having its existence outside social relations. Thus, the primordialist approach suggests that ethnicity is an inborn characteristic of human beings.

Constructivist approaches argue that ethnicity is derivative from "more basic" political or economic interests. Both approaches are deficient in that they first define the "essence" of ethnicity, and then apply the category to analyze empirical phenomenon. However, such conceptualizations of ethnicity create enormous difficulties when attempts are made to interpret multiple outcomes of the process of ethnic transformation. This is because multiple explanations should be derived from the same singular "essence" of ethnicity.

It is argued that both assumptions--with regard to the process of ethnic transformation having direction, and the "nature" of ethnicity--should be significantly modified. Instead of a *transition* from an ethnic order based on Russian dominance to the democratically constituted nation states, ethnic transformation should be interpreted as an open-ended process, "in which the introduction of the new elements takes place most typically with adaptations, rearrangements, permutations, and recombination of already existing institutional forms" (Bryant and Mokrzycki, 1994, p.4). In other words, the conceptualization of ethnic transformation should account for more than just "forward" movement in the process of ethnic transformation, (e.g., in the case of the developments evolving from the shift from Empire to a liberal-democratic state). It should also provide explanations for the "backward" shifts of ethnic transformation, to primitive ethnocracies, as well as movements "sideways" towards the creation of a variety of "hybrid" ethnic orders constituted from a mixture of elements of traditional, Soviet and new institutions.

Similarly, "essentialist" interpretations of ethnicity should be abandoned. Instead, it is suggested, the problem of ethnicity should be approached by asking following questions: What are the conditions leading to the formation of social groups based on the perceptions of their common cultural (e.g., language, culture, history and traditions)

interests? Why were social groups formed on the basis of common culture, rather than on the basis of class, regional, professional, or religious interests, or their combination?

In order to answer these questions, analysis should go beyond an investigation of the inter-ethnic relationships, which is not normally the case in analyses of the process of ethnic transformation. More specifically, ethnic transformation should be understood as the outcome of a triadic struggle/relationship: (a) between ethnic groups; (b) between the state and ethnic groups; and (c) among social stratas within an ethnic group. Analysis of internal ethnic group dynamics is necessary since different strata within the same ethnic group have different interests in keeping or transforming the existing ethnic order. Similarly, inclusion of the "State" category in the model is also essential because in the Soviet Union, civil society was almost non-existent and the state penetrated and bureaucratized all social institutions.

It is argued that, during different time periods, the relationships within the triad, described above, were characterized by different modes of conflict resolution in the struggles for access to power, resources and status among members of different ethnic groups. During the pre-perestroika years, the Soviet state dominated the triad through the imposition and command mode. Thus, the Soviet state defined and ranked the more than 100 ethnic groups populating the Empire, into a rigid hierarchy. At the top of this ethnic hierarchy were ethnic Russians, while the rest were ascribed varying subordinate roles. The state also acted as a mediator and final arbiter in inter-ethnic relationships and conflict.

During the perestroika period initiated by Gorbachev, policies of liberalization undercut state power. As the institutions that upheld the imperial order in the USSR

declined, the dominant role of ethnic Russians was increasingly challenged. However, the emerging nationalist opposition to Moscow's rule was not strong enough to displace or subordinate ethnic Russians. Consequently, the command and imposition mode of conflict within the triadic relationships, declined. Instead, the bargaining and negotiation mode, in terms of defining access to power, resources and prestige among members of different ethnic groups, became most prevalent.

Once in the process of bargaining and negotiating, the elements of the new ethnic order are defined, and the mode of conflict resolution among the triadic relationships begins to change again. It changes because the process of ethnic transformation enters a stage of consolidation of the new ethnic order (e.g., the habituation of the social actors to the new rules of access to power, resources and prestige). The mode of conflict resolution that prevails in the consolidation phase is dependent on the outcome of bargaining and negotiations during the previous stage of ethnic transition process. It can evolve into the command and imposition mode if, for example, one of the groups engaged in bargaining and negotiations is able to impose its will on the other. Bargaining and negotiations can also lead to the competition and cooperation mode if groups agree to share control of the state and access to resources. Finally, bargaining and negotiations can result in the institutionalization of non-ascriptive, class-based principles of relations among members of different ethnic groups.

The triadic relationships model in the dissertation is operationalized using two sets of variables: structural and strategic. Structural variables define the positioning of the major actors within the triadic relationships, and describe the range of possibilities and constraints that actors, within the triadic relationships, face in the process of negotiating

the new ethnic order. The strategic dimensions provide the major characteristics of the political process through which the elements of the new ethnic order are institutionalized. Depending on the direction and mode of the ethnic hierarchy transformation, four types of new ethnic order were discerned: ethnocracy, ethnic democracy, consociationalism and liberal democracy.

In the empirical part, the proposed model was applied in an analysis of the process of ethnic transformation in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Four different types of imperial ethnic order transformation were found.

Ethnic transformation in the Baltic republics functioned through attempts to simultaneously reform the political and economic institutions of the Soviet state, and to impose the ethnic hegemony of indigenous groups in the republics vis-á-vis local ethnic Russian populations. The result of such a course of ethnic transformation was the creation of conflict ridden "ethnic democratic" regimes (with the levels of conflict varying in strength) which excluded ethnic Russians from participation in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian polities.

"Ethnic democracy" in the Baltics proved to be unstable in that it went through repeated cycles in which it would get stronger and then decline. During periods in which the *ethnic* features of the "ethnic democracy," became stronger, attempts were made: to push ethnic Russians from positions of power and status; to assure the dominance of the indigenous languages and culture by limiting the use of Russian in the public sphere; and to exclude ethnic Russians from participation in politics, and the process of state property privatization. Such developments would lead to a rise in ethnic tensions and conflict in the region.

During periods in which the *democratic* features of the emerging new ethnopolitical system became stronger, ethnic tensions and conflict would subside. Attempts were made to assure that ethnic Russians: would not be excluded from participation in the local, regional and national institutions; that their collective cultural and social rights would be protected; and that they would not be excluded from sharing the benefits of higher standards of living in the region.

The contradictive character of the ethnic transformation process in the Baltics was, to a large extent, determined by the bipolar character of ethnic stratification of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian societies. Development in the Baltics, preceding perestroika, had led to the consolidation of two incipient ethnic societies, which were posed for a "showdown" as soon as the Center began to decline. The major causes of the inter-ethnic tensions between these two incipient societies were the forceful policies of Russification, and the uncontrolled Russian migration into the region which threatened to convert indigenous populations into minorities in their own historic homelands.

The rapidly changing ethno-demographic balance generated widespread fears of the decline and irreplaceable loss of not only national cultures and language, but also the disappearance of nation itself. This fed the nationalist passions in the republics and produced attempts to exclude and marginalize ethnic Russians.

The democratic impulses of the Baltic struggle for independence were based on the culture and political traditions of the region, and a history of independent statehood. National movements created in the region called for the defense of human and civic rights, the freedom of religion, support for political pluralism and the rule of law. Civic nationalism was also fostered by the aspirations of the Baltic people to re-integrate into

the economic, political and social institutions of Western Europe, from which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been excluded as a result of Soviet occupation.

During the early period of perestroika, ethnic nationalism dominated the political process in the region. Since no systemic reforms of political institutions were possible during the early stage of reforms, pro-reform Communist party leadership and intellectuals in the national republics focused on the struggle for nationality rights within the framework of existing Soviet institutions. Attempts were made to subordinate the Russian segment of population by promoting indigenous cadres within the centralized and hierarchical institutions of the Soviet state, while pushing out ethnic Russians from positions of privilege and power. The result was an escalation of ethnic tensions, and the political counter-mobilization of ethnic Russians in defense of their status.

During the late perestroika period, the struggle for nationality rights was transformed into the struggle for Baltic independence. With this change in the Baltic political agenda, ethnic nationalism began to decline leading to the strengthening of the democratic character of Baltic nationalism. In a struggle for political independence form Moscow, Baltic leadership could ill-afford the restless, sizeable Russian minorities. Therefore, Russian communities in the region were promised extensive political, economic and cultural rights in exchange for supporting Baltic independence.

The first years of independent statehood were characterized by a rise in ethnic nationalism. In Latvia and Estonia, attempts were made to exclude Russians from participation in polities. It was feared that Russian communities because of their size, could, through democratic means, undermine the consolidation of independent statehood by promoting policies aimed at Latvia's and Estonia's reintegration with the Russian

Federation.

However, these policies directed towards ethnic Russians' disenfranchisement backfired. Firstly, they antagonized the Russian population and threatened the political stability of these two countries. Secondly, the international community criticized Latvia and Estonia, and made changes in policies towards ethnic Russians a necessary condition for Latvia and Estonia's integration into Western European institutions. Finally, the Russian Federation exerted significant political and economic pressure on Latvia and Estonia to make changes in their citizenship laws. As a result, the discrimination policies towards ethnic Russian are currently being dismantled.

What will the ethnic dynamics in the region be in the future? Arguably, the ethnic transformation process in the region will be dominated by the struggle between nationalism and liberalism without a decisive prevalence of one or the other. Policies of enfranchisement will most likely lead to the emergence of a sizeable Russian middle and upper class, which will adapt, and, to some degree, assimilate into the indigenous societies. Two factors favor such a development. First, a majority of ethnic Russians came to the region as economic migrants, and second, ethnic Russians proved to be economically very competitive, vis-á-vis indigenous entrepreneurs and businessman. Therefore, they will be willing to adapt to the conditions necessary for their social mobility.

At the same time, there will be formation of a sizeable ethnic Russian underclass, especially in Latvia and Estonia. These will be individuals who could not manage to successfully adapt to the radical ethno-political and economic changes and/or were excluded by cultural and language barriers. The underclass will be formed from less

educated, low-skilled, blue-collar Russians, who only recently moved to the region and were stranded in it by the collapse of the USSR. The sizeable ethnic Russian underclass will be concentrated in the major cities in Latvia and Estonia, and will remain the major source of ethnic tensions and instability in the region.

The second type of ethnic transformation, which was characteristic to Moldova, proceeded through attempts to displace ethnic Russians from positions of privilege and power, and to impose the ethnic hegemony of Rumanians in the republic, through Moldova's unification with Romania. The result was the creation of an unstable ethnocratic regime, the policies of which led to the escalation of violent conflict between ethnic Moldovans and ethnic Russians, and later, to a partitioning of the country along ethnic lines.

This violent character of ethnic transformation can be accounted for by the artificial character of the Moldovan state and by the failure of Moscow's nation-building policies in the republic. Moldova was created from two ethnically different regions--Bessarabia and Transnistria. Bessarabia was historically populated by ethnic Rumanians, and, up until 1940, was part of the Romanian state. Transnistria was part of Slavic Ukraine. Moscow's policies on Moldovan nation-building had failed to bridge the deep ethnic, economic and social differences between Romanian Bessarabia and Slavic Transnistria. Through all the Soviet period the Slavic minority concentrated in Transnistria continued to politically, economically, and culturally dominate the republic. The whole process of Moldovan nation-building was essentially reduced to the policies of a forceful Moldovan Russification. Once the power of the Center, that held the two parts of Moldova together, declined, the Moldovan state began to quickly unravel. The

Bessarabian part of the republic was pulling the state towards unification with Romania. Transnistria gravitated in the opposite direction-- towards unification with the Russian state. The consequence was a rapid escalation of ethnic conflict into military warfare.

In 1992, the dynamics of ethnic transformation changed dramatically when Russia intervened on behalf of the rebellious Slavic region. Russian troops were deployed to separate the two warring factions. At the same time, Moscow put significant political and economic pressure on the Moldovan government. More specifically, oil and gas supplies were cut, paralyzing the republic's economy. Furthermore, Russia closed its markets to Moldovan agricultural goods on which the whole Moldovan economy was dependent. Politically, Chisinau was pressured to abandon its drive towards unification with Moldova and to join the Russian dominated CIS. The Dniester regime was propped up by military and economic assistance.

Under the impact of the catastrophic consequences of the Moldovan drive towards unification, a change in the Moldovan government occurred. Moldovan nationalists were replaced by Ex-Communists and representatives of the powerful agricultural sector. The new government abandoned its course towards unification with Romania. In order to preserve the sovereignty of the country, Chisianu had little choice but to start negotiations over power sharing with the ethnic minorities. Consequently, Chisinau offered extensive political, economic and cultural autonomy to the break-away Slavic region. This resulted in a radical change in the process of ethnic transformation in Moldova.

However, in the current situation, it is not Chisinau, but Moscow, that dictates the conditions of ethnic settlement in Moldova. The Kremlin seems to be interested in preserving the current situation in which it plays the role of mediator between two sides of

the divided country. First, because such a situation allows for Moscow to retain its military presence in the region. Second, Moscow delays solving the Transnistria problem because the situation in the region remains a "hot button" issue in Russia's domestic politics. Any attempts by Moscow to officially disengage itself from the region will be portrayed by nationalist and Communist opposition as a sell-out of Russia's land, and interests, and an abandonment of its brethren in the face of ethnic oppression and discrimination.

At the same time, Moscow's overwhelming military presence in Moldova is not conducive to the stabilization of the country either. Moscow's active interference in Moldova's internal affairs can unravel the new Moldova's government and lead to a consolidation of Moldova's nationalist opposition. It is difficult to talk about future ethnic developments in the country. The best case scenario would be if the situation were to stabilize in the form of an ethno-territorial constitution of the Moldovan state. Three conditions seem to be essential for such a development: (a) economic improvement in the country, (b) the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the country, and (c) the development of a close bilateral relationship between Moldova and Russia, similar to the type of relationships being developed between Kazakhstan and Russia, and Kyrgyzstan and Russia. No autonomy of the rebellious Dniester region within Moldova will work without a clear separation of the borders between Moldova and Russia.

The third type of ethnic transformation--elite negotiated--was characteristic of the Central Asian republics. Unlike in the Baltics, Moldova, or the Ukraine, in Central Asia there were no mass based nationalist, anti-colonial or anti-Russian movements. Therefore, ethnic transformation proceeded within a framework of un-reformed Soviet institutions.

Elite negotiations led to the consolidation of two types of ethno-political order in the region. Ethnocratic regimes (of varying strength) were emerging in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, consociationalism was evolving, with indigenous elites agreeing to share control over the state with the ethnic Russians.

Absence of nationalist opposition to the Communist regime in Central Asia can, to a large degree, be explained by the character of the social stratification of the indigenous societies. Although the process of modernization had produced local educated classes and political elites, the lives of the rest of the population in the region were changed little by Moscow's policies of development. The majority of Central Asia's population remained rural, with relatively unchanged Islamic culture and ways of life of the traditional peasant society. The indigenous working class was small. The industrial and technological infrastructure in the region was managed primarily by ethnic Russians.

Indigenous elites "sandwiched" between the imperial Center and the primarily rural population of the region, had little economic or political interest in promoting separatism or nationalism. First, because their existence was highly dependent on the functioning of the centralized imperial bureaucracies. Second, the local elites were interested in remaining part of the USSR because of the deepening economic, ecological and demographic crisis in the region. Therefore, instead of promoting nationalism and separatism, indigenous elites chose to lobby Moscow for increasing investment in the region.

Finally, the absence of mass based nationalism and separatism in this region can also be partially accounted for by the weakness of anti-Russian sentiment. Ethnicity was a rather new phenomenon in the region, brought in and constructed predominately by the

Soviets. Because Moscow had not destroyed pre-exiting ethnic identities in the Central Asia, its rule was perceived much more favorably in this part of the country than in the Baltics or Moldova. In addition, the Russian population did not represent a demographic threat to the indigenous populations as the size of the Russian communities had been declining since the early 1970s.

Since there were no anti-colonial, or anti-Russian movements in Central Asia, the major factor affecting the situation of local ethnic Russians was not the policies of the indigenous elites, but the change of Moscow policies in the region. Since the late 1980s, the Kremlin was increasingly disengaging from the region. Under conditions of an ailing Soviet economy there were simply no more economic resources available to rule the vastly overstretched Empire. In addition, public pressure was rising, in Russia itself, for dissociation from the poor and underdeveloped Central Asia. The majority of Russia's population perceived Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan as corrupt, inefficient, and ruled by criminal mafias. Moscow's retreat from Central Asia undermined the economic and political base of the Russian colonial strata in the region. In addition, Moscow's withdrawal had led to an escalation of the struggle for power among different clans and factions within the republics. This weakened the local authorities' capacities to maintain public order, and led to a number of mass communal violent outbursts. Although violence was not directed against ethnic Russians, bloody inter-ethnic clashes increased fears for the personal safety and security of local Russians. Inter-communal clashes demonstrated the vulnerability of the ethnic Russians. Increasing insecurity and the loss of the economic base in the region led to a rise in the outflow of ethnic Russians from the region.

Since independence, the ethno-political systems in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were evolving towards "patriarchal statism." Patriarchal statism constitutes an ethno-political system characterized by a large degree of overlap of state and clan structures, and the exclusion and marginalization of all non-clan members, including *inorodsy* from participation in state power.

Because the Russian population size is small in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while their economic role is significant, the regimes in these countries provided extensive legal and other collective rights to ethnic Russians. However, formal rights in clan-based traditional societies have little meaning, since it is not the state, but the networks of kinship, clientele and patronage that provide the protection and security for the individual. It is the political, economic and social marginalization of ethnic Russians in poor, underdeveloped and rather traditional Muslim societies, that is pushing Russians out of the region. Among ethnic Russians there is widespread fear for personal safety and security as the state (with exception of Turkmenistan) is too weak to protect them. Many ethnic Russians see little future for themselves or their children, as opportunities for education and social mobility are limited.

Unless there is a significant improvement in the economic situation, ethnic Russians will continue to leave Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of the raging civil war, almost all ethnic Russians have left Tajikistan. The situation of ethnic Russians is more favorable in the politically stable, but least reformed, Turkmenistan, which is endowed with enormous gas and oil resources. For now, the neo-Stalinist rule of Turkmen president Niyazov is able to assure the protection and security of the ethnic Russians, while gas and oil riches of the country hold promise in converting Turkmenistan

into a second Kuwait. In Uzbekistan the stabilization of the ethnic Russian population will most likely occur only when most of the best educated, younger and higher-skilled ethnic Russians have left the region. The process of pauperization will push the Russian population to the fringes of Uzbek society.

Developments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan led to the institutionalization of some features of consociational ethno-political systems. In these two countries indigenous and Russian ethnic groups were sharing (to varying degrees) control over the state. Three major factors explain the development of consociationalism in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. First, the size of the Russian population in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was much large than in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of the significant size, Russian communities could not be easily pushed to the fringes of Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz societies, especially because of their crucial role in the economies of both countries. Second, the degree of ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz Russification was much higher than in the other three Central Asian republics. In addition, nationality policies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were directed towards the creation of territorially based Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz nations. Finally, Kazakh and Kyrgyz regimes agreed to share control of their states with ethnic Russians because of Moscow's political pressure and Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's extreme economic and political dependence on the Russian Federation.

The consociational policies pursued by Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani regimes were rather successful in stabilizing the ethnic situation in these two new countries. This was especially the case in Kazakhstan. How stable the consociational features of the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will be in the long run, will depend on a variety of factors.

Unless there is improvement in the economic situation, there will be a decline in the consociational features of the ethno-political system in Kyrgyzstan. Because of the poverty and continuous decline of the Kyrgyz economy, Russian repatriation back to the Russian Federation continues unabated. Migration will diminish the size and socio-economic status of the Russian community in this country. The declining size of the Russian community, combined with a high degree of inter-clan rivalry and conflict in Kyrgyzstan, will most likely lead to a consolidation of the ethnocratic regime similar to the situation in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

Unless Russia actively promotes secessionism in Northern Kazakhstan, the process of ethnic transformation in the country will most likely fluctuate between ethnocratic and consociationalist features without a decisive prevalence of one or the other. If there are changes in the current top leadership of Kazakhstani, or if Kazakhstan lapses into a deep and protracted economic crisis, the ethnic assertiveness of Kazakhs and Russian separatism will most likely increase. On the other hand, economic improvement, combined with the Russian Federation's demands for protection of ethnic Russian minorities, and a high degree of political and economic dependence on Russia, will constrain the development of ethnocratism in Kazakhstan.

The fourth and final type of ethnic transformation is characteristic of development in the Ukraine. In the Ukraine attempts were made to abolish not only Russian domination, but any form of ethnic domination altogether. Modest attempts were also made to reform the political and economic institutions of the republic. The creation of a territorially-based inclusive Ukrainian nation was actively promoted. The result was the development of the liberal-democratic regime in the Ukraine.

The character of ethnic transformation in the Ukraine can be explained largely by the combination of three factors: (a) the deep regional divisions within the country; (b) the high degree of assimilation between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians; and (c) the flexible and liberal policies of Ukrainian political elites.

Because of high degree of assimilation of Ukrainians, the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic divide (defined by common ancestry) did not coincide with Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and cultural divisions. This mismatch between the Ukrainian-Russian ascriptive and linguistic-cultural boundaries had two consequences. First, it moderated attempts of the Ukrainian nationalists to assert Ukrainian ethnic hegemony because forceful attempts of "Ukrainization" would likely generate resentment, protest and backlash, not only among ethnic Russians, but also among Russified Ukrainians. Second, it "subsumed" and expressed ethnic discord in the country in the form of regional tensions and conflict. Two regional "fault lines" emerged in Ukraine: (a) one between the nationalistic, anti-Moscow and anti-Communist Western Ukraine and the more Russified and conservative Eastern Ukraine; and (b) one between the ethnic Russian enclave in the Crimean peninsula and Ukraine proper.

The policies of liberalization introduced by Gorbachev resulted in the creation of two mass based oppositional groups. In Western Ukraine, the national-democratic movement Rukh, modeled after the Baltic national fronts, was created. The Rukh sought to promote democratization in the republic and assure the protection and development of the Ukrainian language and culture. In Eastern Ukraine, mobilization proceeded not along ethnic, but along class lines. In Eastern Ukraine, the Donbas region miners organized the first independent labor union in the Soviet Union. The miners agenda was limited strictly

to economic issues. Although both groups were in opposition to the Communist party, there was little cooperation between them.

Since early 1990, regionally fragmented opposition in Ukraine began to consolidate under the leadership of the National-Communist faction within the Ukrainian Communist Party. Skillful policies of the National-communists leadership were able to moderate nationalist demands promoted by the Rukh. At the same time, Communist leadership was successful in assuring the support of the miners by promising economic prosperity to the entire population in the independent Ukraine. The result was the creation of wide political opposition to Moscow's colonial rule, which led the Ukraine to independence.

However, the dramatic deterioration of the economic situation during the first years of independence had unraveled the miners/Rukh/National Communists coalition. In Russified regions there was a rise of pro-Russian sentiments. This was especially the case in Crimea in which the leadership took a course towards unification with the Russian Federation. As the political conflict between Kiev and Crimea escalated, ethnic tensions between Ukrainians and Russians increased, especially in Sevastopol city, in which the Russian Black Sea fleet is based. Military skirmishes between the Ukrainian and Russian para-militaries were avoided only through last minute negotiations. Pro-Russian sentiments were also on the rise in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, they did not reached as high a point as in Crimea, because Kiev reacted very quickly in addressing the complaints of the restless oblasts.

Since the 1994 elections, ethnic tensions in the Ukraine have declined. This happened in part because the elites from the Russified Eastern Ukraine took control over

the government. The new Ukrainian administration pursued closer cooperation with the Russian Federation.

Developments in the Ukraine remain a vivid example of how the political tensions in areas characterized by ethnic harmony, can lead to a rise in inter-ethnic tensions. It also indicates that liberal nationality policies are not enough to preserve ethnic stability in the Ukraine. Establishment of close economic, social and cultural relationships between Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and the Russian Federation is also necessary.

What are the implications of the proposed approach to the analysis of the massive process of transformation and change that is currently under way in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR? First of all, the results of this study suggest the need to modify the prevailing approaches that are used in the field. We need to move beyond the analytical and theoretical apparatus, prevalent since the Cold War era, that interprets change in terms of binary categories, e.g "socialism/capitalism," "state planned and state owned/market economy," and "totalitarianism/democracy."

What the researchers are currently confronted with is the contradictive, fragmented, and rapidly changing reality, that does not neatly fit into the categories designed for Cold War realities. Elements of traditional, Soviet, and new institutions mix together producing "hybrid" types of political, economic and social institutions. Many of them are unstable, fall apart and rise again in different forms.

This unstable and changing situation requires a relational and dynamic conceptualization of the transformation processes itself. Thus, instead of asking "Is this capitalism or socialism?", or "How far from democracy is the current political system?", it would be more useful and productive to ask "Why have these particular forms of political,

economic and social life, and not others, emerged in the process of transformation and change? Why and how do these institutions change throughout time?"

It seems, currently, it is not the lack of empirical data, but the theoretical weakness of the field of post-Soviet studies which hinders its development. More and more research is being done in the countries of the former USSR. Archives are being opened for study that have never been available before. However, the research that is done remains a-theoretical and mostly descriptive. The purpose of this study was to address the lack of theoretical developments in the field and to suggest that a relational/dynamic approach could proceed beyond "binary" and "deviational" types of analyses so prevalent in the field.

As this study has shown, any theoretical attempt to move beyond the Cold War era categorical and analytical apparatus, should simultaneously include three aspects: historical, comparative and empirical. Analysis of the process of transformation and change in the region is barely possible without a thorough knowledge of the history of the region. Second, studies that attempt to provide theoretical conceptualization of the process of transformation should be comparative in character. Finally, they should also be empirical. Only through a dialectic unity of the historic, comparative and empirical moments can the field of post-Soviet studies move from its current state of "theoretical stagnation."

APPENDIX

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY SAMPLES USED IN THE DISSERTATION

Shlapentokh/Gudkov Survey Sample.

Data for the survey was collected by the Public Opinion Research Center, Moscow, August through November of 1991, in 18 regions of the former Soviet Union. The survey was prepared by professor Vladimir Shlapentokh of Michigan State University and Mr. Lev Gudkov of the Public Opinion Research Center. A total of 6585 ethnic Russian respondents participated in the survey.

The sample was drawn using a two-stage cluster sampling technique. During the first stage of the sample, the settlements selected for the survey were drawn from an overall list of settlements in the national republics. Settlements were ranked into 4 categories according to the size of their population. Settlements had a probability of being chosen for the survey in proportion to their population size. The second stage of the sample drawing was based on the age structure of the total population of national republics. For this purpose a list of addresses of ethic Russians in each of the republics was compiled using information from the bureaus of addresses and the lists of registered votes. The individual was identified as a Russian if he/she had a Russian family name. In

the case in which a respondent had a Russian name but identified himself/herself as other than an ethnic Russian, interviewers had instructions to decline the interview and to choose a substitution randomly from the pool of addresses. The names of individuals for the interviews were systemically selected so that the age structure of the sample would correspond to the age structure of the total population of each national republic. There were 346 interviewers engaged in the survey. Each interviewer had in his/her disposition form 10 to 30 questionnaires. The questionnaire contained 149 indicators. A total of 6648 respondents participated in the survey. 3606 questionnaires were completed through interviews. 3042 questionnaires were completed by the respondents themselves in the presence of the interviewer. 18.7% of individuals approached by interviewers refused to participate in the survey. Interviewers were unable to locate 33.3% of individuals from the initial list of ethnic Russians -- they were absent at the addresses indicated by the bureaus of addresses. Such a high rate of nonresponse was attributed, by the researchers, to the very complicated political and inter-ethnic situation in the national republics at the time of the survey. Failure to collect data from such a high percentage of those selected to be in a sample represents a major source of survey error. Because the 1989 census of the USSR does not provide statistics for the Russian population living outside Russia, there is no direct way to identify the biases associated with such a high rate of nonresponse. The researchers believe that, in general, Russians with greater education are over-represented in the total sample.

To adjust the sample distribution to reflect the total Russian population distribution in the national republics of the USSR, a post-selection stratification technique (Kalton, pp.74-75) was utilized. Accordingly, each element of the national republics' sub-

samples was weighted to conform the entire sample distribution to the actual Russian population distribution in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The data of from the weighted sample was used in this dissertation.

Nationalities in the Baltic States Survey Samples.

The survey conducted in September-October 1993 in the Baltics by the University of Strathclyde Center for the Study of Public Policy is a highly reliable source of sociological data on nationalities in the region. Sampling design and procedures used in this survey are extensively described in the publication of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, "Nationalities in the Baltics States: A Survey Study" written by Richard Rose and William Maley (1994). The following is a description of the major characteristics of the sample.

Sample design was based on 1989 census data from the 3 Baltic republics. Each country was stratified into five regions: the capital, the largest cities, towns, country towns, rural centers, and small villages. Within towns, addresses were selected by a random route procedure starting from fixed address. Within the household the person having the next birthday (age 18 or older) was selected as the respondent. If this person was not at home, or refused an interview, the interviewer had to call back twice. If there was still no answer, an additional household was drawn by the random route method.

Because Russians in Estonia and Latvia are widely distributed throughout the territory of both countries, there was no need to draw separate samples of persons of Russian ethnic origin. Russians are not equally distributed throughout the population of

Lithuania. Therefore an additional sample was specially drawn for ethnic Russians in this country. Russians were selected randomly from the electorial lists. The criteria used for ethnic identification of respondents were (a) their names and names of their fathers, and (b) the use of Russian as their home language.

In Estonia and Latvia the target was 1,000 interviews, in Lithuania the total target was 700. The rate of refusals (about 13%) was highest in Latvia. In Estonia the rate of refusals was 8%, in Lithuania 3%. A total 987 ethnic Russians were interviewed in Estonia, 967 in Latvia and 717 in Lithuania. The sample error for the survey equals ±5%.

Survey samples used by the Center for Study of Russian Minorities in the Countries of the Near Abroad, Moscow.

In 1995, the Center, under the leadership of prof. Boris Grushin, carried out surveys of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Kazakhstan. The results of the surveys were published in two publications: "Russians in Estonia" by I.A. Grishaev (1995), and "Russians in Kazakhstan" by Lev Gudkov (1995). However, in both publications the description of the sampling procedures, and characteristics of the sample are lacking. It is only mentioned that the survey in Estonia was carried out in its 10 *oblasts* (regions) and that Russians were interviewed in 22 *tochkach otchiota* (rus. geographical locations). In Kazakhstan the interviews were carried out in 22 geographical locations. This suggests that the samples in both Estonia and Kazakhstan were geographically stratified, similarly to the sampling procedures of Shlapentokh/Gudkov survey.

Analysis of the summary data reveals the existence of at least three types of systemic errors in the survey samples. First, women in Estonian and Kazakhstani data are

overrepresented (62% in Estonian and 59% of Kazakhstani sample). Second, in the Estonian sample individuals with higher and college education are overrepresented (close to 50% of respondents had higher levels of education). Finally, in both samples, the proportion of individuals without a permanent job at the time of the survey (45% in Kazakhstan and 42% in Estonia) was unusually high. Official rates of unemployment in Estonia is 7-8%, and in Kazakhstan it's even less, about 4-5%. Neither Gudkov, nor Grishaev, the authors of the reports, specify how the ambiguous category "not working individuals" is defined. Are these individuals classified as unemployed that cannot find work according to their specialty? Are these individuals primarily women taking care of little children? Unforetunately, there's no way of knowing.

Such characteristics of the Estonian and Kazakhstani samples suggests that individuals of some social categories were overrepresnted in these surveys (e.g., a greater proportion of women because they could be found at home during the day, as well as those who did not have jobs), while working ethnic Russians are underrepresented. Second, such a high proportion of people with college and university education suggests there is a "self-selection" bias in the Estonian sample. For some reason, individuals with a high level of education wanted to talk to interviewers. The above systemic sampling errors require cautious use and interpretation of the Estonian and Kazakhstani surveys data.

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