



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled


Effects of Increasing Competition in the Music
Video Television Market on Diversity in
Record Sales Charts in Germany

presented by

Wolfram Kaehler

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

—M.A.— degree in Telecommunication


Major professor

Date 5/30/97



PLACE IN RETURN BOX
to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE
APR 08 1999		
MAY 09 2000		

**EFFECTS OF INCREASING COMPETITION IN THE MUSIC VIDEO
TELEVISION MARKET ON DIVERSITY IN RECORD SALES CHARTS IN
GERMANY**

By

Wolfram Kaehler

A THESIS

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

1997

ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF INCREASING COMPETITION IN THE MUSIC VIDEO TELEVISION MARKET ON DIVERSITY IN RECORD SALES CHARTS IN GERMANY

By

Wolfram Kaehler

The present study investigated diversity considering musical genres in German record sales charts relating to the emergence of increased competition in the market of music video television. In 1997, there were five different channels dedicated to music videos in Germany.

Economic theory suggested an increase in diversity because of increased competition. The top 50 songs of each year from 1985-1995 were put into musical genres and analyzed. A measure of diversity was calculated. While diversity generally increased over the years, the economic theory could not be confirmed.

To my parents, Helga and Hans-Wilhelm Kaehler.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Numerous people are involved in the success of an academic career. Among these are family, friends, professors, and university staff. Without any of them, I would not have been able to finish this thesis.

I would like to thank my thesis committee for their guidance and input, and all my professors for the knowledge they have tried to pass on to me. I would especially like to thank Dr. Everett M. Rogers at the University of New Mexico for putting me on the right track for my graduate studies. His enthusiasm and wisdom have motivated me immensely.

Above all, I would like to thank my parents, to whom this thesis is dedicated. Without their endless support, encouragement, and patience, I would not have been able to reach this far. Thank you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	viii
CHAPTER 1	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2	
PREVIOUS WORK AND RESEARCH.....	5
CHAPTER 3	
THE HISTORY AND ROLE OF THE MEDIUM MUSIC VIDEO.....	11
CHAPTER 4	
MUSIC TELEVISION IN GERMANY	
4.1 The German Media System.....	18
4.2 MTV Europe.....	25
4.3 Viva Television.....	31
4.4 Further Expansion: VH-1, Viva 2, and Onyx.....	34
CHAPTER 5	
METHODS.....	38
CHAPTER 6	
RESULTS	
5.1 The Development of Genres.....	44
5.2 Relative Entropy Index.....	47
5.3 Yearly Mean of Scores.....	49
5.4 Multiple Regression Analysis.....	51
5.5 The Hypotheses.....	53
CHAPTER 7	
DISCUSSION.....	54
CHAPTER 8	
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS.....	69
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	73

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A	
SCORING SYSTEM.....	78
APPENDIX B	
INSTRUCTIONS.....	79
APPENDIX C	
OCCURRENCE OF VARIOUS GENRES.....	81

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Beta Scores of Multiple Regression Analysis.....	52
Table 2 - Distribution of Points.....	78
Table 3 - Occurrence of Various Genres.....	81

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Development of Specific Genres.....	46
Figure 2 - Relative Entropy Index.....	48
Figure 3 - Yearly Mean of Scores.....	50

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Epochal changes in the German media system (then West Germany) during the 1980s have, indirectly, led to the direct competition of two music video television channels in the 1990s. These trends included technical innovations, system expansion, privatization, and internationalization. While the German television market was strongly regulated, and inaccessible for private companies before, the 1980s saw a change of policy that enabled private investors to participate (in the form of private channels/networks) in the German television landscape.

There were two strong and popular program services dedicated primarily to the airing of music videos. The American network Music Television (MTV) started its European service in 1987. In June 1988 MTV launched its service in Germany. The channel was based in London, England, and broadcasted one program all over Europe (exclusively in English). Viva, a German music video channel, went on the air in 1993, with the financial backing of Time-Warner, Thorn EMI, Sony Music, and Polygram. The media conglomerates

supported this project because they were dissatisfied with the programming of MTV. In 1995 both channels established additional program services, namely VH-1, and Viva 2. These programs also focused on music video, but were trying to target a more mature audience (lower/mid-twenties and up). In October 1995 an additional competitor entered the market in German music television, named Onyx. This channel was trying to find a niche market by focusing on German Schlager, Pop, Oldies, Jazz, Classical, and Country, targeting an older audience (30-55 years). While penetration was still very low (about 6 million households out of 20 million cable and satellite households in Germany in August 1996-Onyx Press release 8/96), some German households could choose between music videos on five different channels at the same time.

Germany was the third largest market for musical recordings (after the USA and Japan), in sales, and the largest in Europe. While musical recordings were advertised and diffused via many different communication channels (radio, clubs, movie soundtracks, print media, etc.), music video appeared to be one of, if not the most important one, for the mass audiences.¹ Although not every hit single was promoted through music video, it should be assumed that music video played a major role in the promotion of most hit

¹ Banks (1996), p. 36 ff.

singles. It is assumed that the majority of songs that sold many copies, thus placed in the charts, have received airplay on music video channels.

The present study provided more insight on changes of mass tastes concerning pop music, and it investigated whether the emergence of new competition in the music video sector has led to more diversity (in the charts). The investigation of popular culture and mass media remained important, not just because of the economic power of such industries. Popular music and television were very important sources of entertainment and identity for young people. A survey, conducted among German teenagers in 1995, revealed that music video was the second most popular genre of television programming, after motion pictures, before information programs, news, sports, drama series, or talkshows.² MTV as an "all encompassing mediator of pop culture" (Goodwin 1992, p. 138) was the fastest growing television network on earth with the largest audience of any television network.³

Economic theory suggested that when a new firm entered a market in the cultural industries, the result was generally greater product diversity.⁴ This theory seemed very general and has not been tested towards music video

² Schmidt (1995), p. 221.

³ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1994).

⁴ Ryan (1985), p. 101.

television in the USA or in Germany. The present study tried to investigate this theory in regard to competition in the field of music video television and diversity in the single sales charts. The present study defined diversity in a sense of musical style. While many scholars were concerned about the flow of cultural products across borders, the issues relating to national origin or the language of a musical recording were not investigated here.

The present study started out with a historical review of music video as a promotional tool, MTV's presence in Europe, and the emergence of local competition. Data collected from singles sales charts from 1985-1995 was discussed and analyzed.

Chapter 2

PREVIOUS WORKS AND RESEARCH

Previous research and literature could be divided into three groups. The first group dealt with the medium of music video, its origins (Banks 1991, Denisoff 1988, Goodwin 1992, 1993, and Pettegrew 1992), its look and style (Grossberg 1993, Kaplan 1987, and Lorch 1988), its impact on popular culture (Schlattmann & Phillips 1990, 1991, Greenberg 1986, Denisoff 1988, and Roe & Cammaer 1993), its prime carrier (MTV) and recent developments (Englis & Solomon & Oloffson 1993, Frielingsdorf & Haas 1995, Müller 1994, Roe & Wallis 1989, Schmidt 1995, and Kähler 1995).

The second group concentrated more on the economic structure of the music video industry (mainly MTV) and/or the recording industry (Banks 1995, 1996, Burnett 1993, Negus 1993, Zombik 1995).

The third group of previous research, and theoretically more important, consisted of studies dealing with the correlation of market concentration and diversity in cultural industries, mainly television and pop music

(Alexander 1996, Beebe 1977, Burnett 1992, Dominick & Pearce 1976, Lopes, 1992, Peterson & Berger 1975, 1996, Rothenbuhler & Dimmick 1982, and Ryan 1985).

Economists suggested that lack of competition was likely to result in product homogeneity. The organization was more concerned with maintaining a *status quo* than with introducing innovation and diversity (Aldrich 1979, Rogers & Rogers, 1976). When competition was weak, the company was likely to settle for the most predictable consumer tastes when introducing new products, not willing to jeopardize its market position. Increased product homogeneity would be the result.

Dominick & Pierce (1976) showed that lack of new competition lead to decreasing diversity in programming in the television market. Instead of introducing new program types, television networks concentrated on those genres and formats that have been proven and well received in the past.

Peterson & Berger (1975), et al., have conducted research dealing with the recording industry and came to similar conclusions: more competition lead to more innovation, thus increased diversity. Lack of competition was likely to trigger product homogeneity. In their study "Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music", they analyzed chart data from 1948-1973. Rothenbuhler & Dimmick (1992) followed up on the Peterson & Berger study

with data from 1974-1988, and ended up with similar conclusions relating to the degrees of diversity and market concentration. As a result of high market concentration, fewer producers put out a higher number of hit recordings. The total amount of hit recordings fell during that period of time.

Lopes (1992) argued that these above mentioned studies have ignored the structural and organizational changes in the music industry. While Lopes admitted that high market concentration and product homogeneity seemed to be (weakly) positively related, he pointed out that other factors would have to be taken into account. These factors included the change of the music industry to a more "open system of development and production" (Lopes 1992). The major record companies controlled a larger number of smaller labels that produced independently. The job of the major company has shifted towards distribution and/or financing and away from producing. The number of labels (with or without major affiliation) whose records had been present in the sales charts did not change significantly between 1969 and 1989.

Burnett (1992 & 1993) pointed out that diversity and innovation in the charts was, economically, not always in the interest of the recording industry. It was more lucrative to sell a large amount of the same recording than to sell the same total amount of units with two, three, or

more recordings. He also pointed out that the growing role of mass media channels, such as MTV or other music video channels, as a gatekeeper and promotional tool for popular music, had altered the overall structure of the recording industry. The direct influence of the recording industry of the record sales charts and consumers' tastes had been weakened.

In general, it can be summarized that more recent studies (post 1990), rejected the old simple model which was established by Peterson & Berger, pointing towards an inverse relationship between market concentration and diversity in record sales charts. The Peterson & Berger model appeared outdated due to the historical developments in the music industry (reorganization, emergence of new gatekeepers, like MTV), but also due to the increased fragmentation of tastes among the audience.⁵

While the old model of Peterson & Berger has been criticized, a new model has not yet been formulated. Therefore, the present study drew upon those old(er) arguments in the formulation of hypotheses. Considering those assumptions, the following hypotheses were tested:

H1: The degree of diversity increased slightly
after the emergence of MTV Europe in Germany (1988).

⁵ Burnett (1992), p. 108 f.

The slight increase was assumed because of new artists being featured on MTV. There should also be a change following the assumption of MTV being a powerful gatekeeper which influenced consumer tastes, thus the market. Yet, the change should not be too significant, since MTV was not accessible by many Germans at the time it started broadcasting.

H2: The degree of diversity increased due to the emergence of Viva in 1993.

This was a test of the above mentioned economic theory relating to cultural industries, stating that increased competition lead to more innovation and diversity.⁶

H3: Styles that are heavily featured on Viva (Pop/Top40, and Techno/House) had stronger presence in the sales charts after Viva's introduction.

If the function as a gatekeeper for music video channels was as powerful as it was assumed (by Burnett 1992, or Banks 1996), this should have been the logical consequence.

It was assumed that the introduction of Viva 2 and VH-1, and Onyx led to no significant changes considering diversity (yet). All of those channels had only been launched recently, and had yet low penetration and market shares. Therefore it is doubtful, that the introduction of

⁶ Ryan (1985), Peterson & Berger (1975), et al.

these program services had any significant impact on the charts.

It is noteworthy that most studies dealing with popular culture in general, and music video and/or pop music in particular originated from the United States or England. Studies focusing specifically on Continental Europe, or Germany are rare. The bibliography listed at the end of the present study consists of more than 75% Anglo-American material. On the other hand, the correlation between increasing competition on the music video television market and diversity had not been investigated in the United States, possibly due to the fact that MTV faced no national, strong competition like it did in Germany, in the same genre.

Chapter 3

THE HISTORY AND ROLE OF THE MEDIUM MUSIC VIDEO

The medium of the music video clip emerged a long time before the actual start of music video television channels. The origins of this medium, which Greenberg defined as "a promotional device for selling singles which set a collection of visual images against the sound of a studio recording" (Greenberg 1986, p.8), can be found as far back as the late 1920s. Of course during that time, there were no video technologies or major promotional campaigns for the sale of compact discs by the music industry. In 1927 the first motion picture with a recorded music soundtrack was produced ("The Jazz Singer"). This technological innovation led to a variety of film genres, in which music was incorporated into the narrative structure.⁷

In the 1940s, so called "soundies" enjoyed a brief commercial success. These were basically traditional jukeboxes, placed in nightclubs and diners, where a customer could select a certain song. But instead of just being able

⁷ Banks (1991), p. 82 f.

to hear the song, it could also be consumed visually due to a screen on top of the box, where the artist was shown performing.⁸

Others see the 1950s theatrical films dealing with youth culture and rock 'n' roll music as the creative predecessors of today's video clips, because of similarities in aesthetics and contents. These movies include such titles as "Rock around the Clock," "Mister Rock 'n' Roll," and various Elvis Presley films.⁹

The 1960s saw the emergence of "The Beatles" and several other British acts on the American and the European scene. The film "A Hard Days' Night," which showed a day in the life of The Beatles, turned pop music into a visual experience for the first time, according to Aufderheide.¹⁰ America answered with Don Kirshner's creation of "The Monkees," a band created for American television, fitted into a sitcom format, and following mainstream moral standards. None of the bandmembers were serious musicians (studio musicians were used on recordings) when the project was launched. Therefore The Monkees were the first pop band that almost exclusively relied on audiovisuality (their television show) for promotion.¹¹

⁸ Aufderheide (1986), p. 60.

⁹ Goodwin (1992), p. 29 and Banks (1991), p. 85.

¹⁰ Aufderheide (1986), p. 60.

¹¹ Banks (1991), p. 89.

The first video clip, as we know it today, could be the six-minute piece "Bohemian Rhapsody," a number one hit by the British band "Queen".¹²

Much of the research dealing with the impact and significance of music video focused on the USA. Due to the different structures of media systems in the USA and in Germany some, but not all, of the impacts outlined in American research should be assumed for Germany.

MTV was partially credited (together with innovations like the Sony Walkman and overall economic growth) for pulling the American record industry out of recession in the early 1980s. Music video, and MTV as its prime carrier, gave pop music a visuality that was new to the business. Recording stars also became television stars, adding to their popularity and their role in pop culture. Music video helped to establish pop music as a "vital part of the culture" (Rick Sklar, quoted by Greenberg 1986, p. 21). Greenberg saw this as the as the most significant contribution of music video to popular music:

"After 30 years, rock music became acknowledged as THE pop music of America only after it became a regular fixture on television" (Greenberg 1986, p.21).

This became evident due to the increased usage of rock music in advertisement spots, the increased interest in rock by the print media, and after all, by increased record sales.¹³

¹² Goodwin (1992), p. 30.

MTV, in the USA, as well as Viva in Germany functioned in a national context. MTV Europe even in a international context. Radio usually had regional or local boundaries, music video television aired the same program at the same time throughout the country (or in the case of MTV Europe throughout several countries). This gave music video channels an edge over radio, opening new opportunities for the marketing strategies of the record industry.¹⁴ Meanwhile, in the USA, radio was the traditional and primary means of promoting and exposing rock and pop artists to the mass audience before the advent of MTV. The situation was quite different in Germany. Due to the state-controlled broadcasting systems (up into the mid 1980s, compare chapter 4.1), there was very little airtime available for pop music on the airwaves. Formatted radio stations, which were common around the USA, did not exist in Germany at that time. Therefore, it was much more difficult for record companies to introduce a musical product on the radio in Germany than it was in the United States.

While Germany, as well as many other European countries, were lacking radio slots for pop music, there was a longer tradition in the combination of pop music and television. Music video clips "were an established part of promotional strategy in the European market" (Doherty 1987,

¹³ Greenberg (1986), p. 21.

¹⁴ Grossberg (1993), p. 260.

p. 354), before music video clip channels arrived (in the USA or in Europe). Pop music shows like "Formel Eins" (ARD), "P.O.P" (Tele 5), or "Disco" (ZDF) were well accepted throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Germany. These shows also relied on music video clips, whenever an artist could not appear in person. Record companies tried to push their artists onto those shows, mainly because of the lack of commercial radio.¹⁵

Shortly after the launch of MTV in the USA, most record company managers agreed that MTV does play a major role in the selling of records.¹⁶ A Nielsen study, cited by Banks (1996), in 1982 showed that MTV was watched by the vast majority of young adults and teenagers (80%), 4.6 hours a week on average. 63% of the respondents admitted that they bought an album after being exposed to the corresponding music video clip.¹⁷

Banks noted that music videos have been used not necessarily "to boost sales of new acts immediately, but rather are used as part of a long-term promotional strategy designed to familiarize consumers with emerging artists" (Banks 1996, p. 139).

Two (American) empirical studies by Schlattman and Phillips (1990 and 1991) suggested only limited direct

¹⁵ Banks (1991), p. 96 f.

¹⁶ Denisoff (1988), p. 84.

¹⁷ Banks (1996), p. 37.

influence of MTV onto the charts. The researchers concluded that while MTV did become an important part in the marketing plan of the record industry, it was not the all-deciding force.¹⁸ The other study compared MTV airplay with corresponding chart positions directly. Schlattman and Phillips came to mixed results. While artists who made it into the charts were likely to climb even further if the single received MTV airplay, the airplay itself did not guarantee instant chart success. Similar results were found for albums. Those artists who recently received heavy airplay on MTV were more likely to have successful albums or successful follow-up singles. While the observation relating to follow-up singles would confirm Banks' argument (see above), overall it was concluded that MTV airplay might but need not automatically translate into chart success.¹⁹

The above studies were all done in the USA. No similar empirical studies seemed to exist for a German context, evaluating the direct influence of MTV, VH-1, Viva, Viva 2, or Onyx onto chart positions. Yet, record industry officials in Germany put heavy emphasis on music video, arguing that the channels influence the audience in their decision making immensely. EMI-Electrola noted a 20% increase in sales after the launch of Viva.²⁰ The overall spending of teenagers on

¹⁸ Phillips & Schlattman (1990), p. 93 f.

¹⁹ Schlattman & Phillips (1991), p. 19 ff.

²⁰ Wimmer (1995), p. 23.

musical recordings rose by six percent between 1993 and 1994. Again, industry experts credited music video television for this development. A single by the German rock band "Die Aerz̃te" ("Schrei nach Liebe") was considered a flop until it was put into rotation on Viva: In 14 days, 250,000 singles were sold. The CEO of BMG Ariola for German speaking countries, Thomas M. Stein, credited the music video channels for the making of new stars, such as Irish band "The Cranberries" or German outfit "Lucilectric".²¹ Whatever is being played on MTV (or Viva) is believed to be "in" by many, hence it will be bought.²²

²¹ Kurt (1995), p. 13 f.

²² Muench (1993), p. 56.

Chapter 4

MUSIC VIDEO TELEVISION IN GERMANY

4.1 The German Media System

The television landscape in Germany had evolved into a lively and highly lucrative market only over the past decade. Its foundations were based in post world war II policy, laid out by the Western allies (for West Germany).

The prime goals for all electronic media were:

- to serve public interest,
- federalist, decentralized structure,
- independence from governmental control and influence,
- legal and organizational independence of the stations.²³

While the goals were still valid for public broadcasters, some alterations have been made: The influence of political parties had risen and advertising was integrated in order to create revenue. Up to the middle of the 1980s, Germany only had "oeffentlich-rechtliche" (public) television stations. There were two national public programs and eight regional

²³ Schulz (1994), p. 1.

ones in 1994. The ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft oeffentlich rechtlicher Rundfunkanstalten der BRD), also known as "Das Erste" (the first), was a cooperation of eleven regional public stations, airing one national broadcast program. The ZDF (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen) went on the air in 1963. The ZDF was also a national public broadcaster, overseen by all German states. The eight regional stations which could also be watched nationally via cable or satellite, also offered a broadcast program, but tried to incorporate some regional and/or local interests.²⁴

The 1980s saw major changes in the German media system. Schulz (1993) identified four epochal trends that lead to the transformation of German media, especially television. These trends were: technological innovation, system expansion, privatization, and internationalization. Technological innovation included the emergence of a national broadband cable network (mostly built and controlled by Deutsche Telekom, then part of Deutsche Bundespost), which was capable of transmitting 24 television, 27 FM radio, and 16 digital radio signals (later expanded to 38 television and 30 FM slots). Others innovations included the wide diffusion of VCRs (approximately 40% of all households), the emergence of compact discs, direct broadcasting satellites, teletext, and

²⁴ Schulz (1994), p. 2 ff.

videotext, as well as the beginning of online data communication. Due to these innovations, traditional media were generally not substituted for, but rather were much more complemented by, which lead to a functional differentiation of available media. Traditional media only lost those functions which new media could serve better. Therefore, innovations lead to an expansion in the media market.²⁵

Information and also entertainment were not limited resources by nature: News provoked commentary, analysis, and follow-ups. Popular movies and musical hits were followed by sequels, spin-offs, and imitations. Advertising campaigns by one company forced other companies to join in similar activities. These examples show that expanding media systems had an immanent tendency to trigger further expansion.²⁶

In 1980 there were seven television programs (two national) and 31 radio programs (mostly regional). Most households could receive only three programs (ARD, ZDF, and their regional public station). At the end of the decade, there were more than twice as many television programs and more than four times as many radio programs (also still growing). This expansion was only made possible because of crucial changes in media policy. Following the takeover of parliament (Bundestag) by the Christian Democrats (CDU) in

²⁵ Schulz (1993), p. 155 f.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 156.

1982, the television and radio markets were opened up to private investors. The year 1984 marked the end of the monopoly of public television and radio that had lasted almost 40 years. The trend of privatization was closely linked to commercialization of programming. While the public broadcasters were (and still are) only partially dependent on advertisement sales (the other big source of income being the TV/radio fees raised from the general public), the private stations almost exclusively relied on this source of income. Due to the high levels of investments necessary for television, cross-ownership was tolerated and in some cases even welcomed.²⁷

Another prominent example for privatization in the German media system would be the Deutsche Telekom. Formerly a state-operated organization, now a business that had joined the stock market. Deutsche Telekom operated and owned the German telephone network, (most) cable networks, and other telecommunication networks. How this privatization will affect the German media system and society in the long run, considering future applications like full service networks and interactivity, has yet to be determined.²⁸

Due to technological innovations as well as the opening of the electronic media market, foreign investors and media conglomerates established a presence in Germany. One example

²⁷ Schulz (1993), p. 161.

²⁸ Der Spiegel (1996), pp. 34-50.

of this was MTV Europe which was owned by the US American media company Viacom. Other foreign channels that received slots in the German cable line-up included TV 5 (France), NBC Super Channel (USA), CNN (USA), Nickelodeon (USA, also owned by Viacom), or BBC World (GB). Some of these broadcasted in German, others in their respective language. The trend of internationalization did not only include the emergence of foreign programmers in the German market, but also the rising activity of German media companies abroad. Bertelsmann, which had its headquarters in the provincial Gütersloh was active on a global level. Also, Deutsche Telekom has been connected through partnerships with other companies in various continents.²⁹

These four trends were further modified by various circumstances. The 1980s also saw significant economic growth leaving more money to spend in consumers pockets. People were able to invest in home electronics and entertainment. Economic growth also triggered expansion of the advertising industry, which spent more money on media campaigns. This meant increased revenue for media companies.³⁰

Another historic event that contributed to the change in the media system was the opening of the Eastern block. The two German states became one which yielded a big

²⁹ Schulz (1993), p. 157.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 163.

untapped market for media companies and other industries. The geographic expansion of the German market made investments more lucrative.³¹

Some circumstances also slowed down the overall growth and transformation of German media. The decentralized and politicized structure of the governing and regulatory bodies prolonged the process of change. It was also a common belief in Germany that changes in the media and/or telecommunication systems required a legal and regulatory foundation outlining those changes beforehand. Parliamentary procedures had to lead the way for system changes, thus slowing down the process of change and/or expansion.³²

A more universal factor that influenced change was the audience. Many new innovations or programs, even when they were (subjectively) of high quality did not find their audience automatically. Just because a cable line-up offered more channels did not mean that the audience would watch more or take advantage of the new options altogether. The audience remained a hard to predict factor in mass communication. This factor of uncertainty contributed to a slowing down of the media system on a whole and certain projects in particular (e.g. the slow take-off for premium television services in Germany).³³

³¹ Schulz (1993), p. 165.

³² *ibid.*, p. 167.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 167 ff.

The procedure to license a new television channel had been very complicated and included several phases. Usually, the Deutsche Telekom, in formal agreement with the state legislature and the state media agency (Landesrundfunkanstalt), announced the availability of channel capacities. The state media agency collected the proposals and evaluated whether they fulfilled the requirements for licensing. The license could be issued by either the state media agency, the state legislature, or through consensus of programmer and state media agency (often with the influence of the state legislature). The determinants for licensing could vary and were not always consistent between states. Often political and/or economic arguments were considered. In the past, general interest programs were favored. After the licensing, the state media agency was responsible to watch out that the conditions of the license agreements were being honored (considering changes of ownership, programming content, rate and amount of advertisement).³⁴

4.2 MTV Europe

Music Television (MTV) was originally started in the USA on August 21, 1981. The channel was originally owned by Warner Cable Corporation and American Express. In 1985, Viacom took

³⁴ Schulz (1994), p. 38 f.

over the channel. Viacom encouraged MTV to develop and exploit ancillary markets. These markets included program syndication, home video sales, licensed retail products, and the internationalization of MTV. New revenues were needed by Viacom to meet current debts. Additionally, other Viacom companies could cooperate and build profitable joint ventures through synergistic strategies. Another reason for this expansion, especially internationalization, was the increasingly saturated cable television market in the USA.³⁵

MTV services were also launched in Australia, Japan, across Asia, Brazil, and Latin America. In many European countries, including Germany, this internationalization was made possible for the first time because of the crucial transformation of media systems throughout the 1980s (see chapter 4.1). Europe, with its newly opened and developed cable and satellite markets was one main focus of MTV's international operations as MTV's Tom Freston stated: "Europe is the last great frontier in the TV business, the last big game to be played" (Freston quoted by Banks 1991, p.268).

MTV did not start its European venture on its own. The original partners were British Telecom (25%) and the late Robert Maxwell (50.01%). The remainder was controlled by Viacom (24.99%). British Telecom sold its share in 1990,

³⁵ Banks (1991), p. 262 f.

followed by Maxwell in the summer of 1991, which left Viacom as the sole owner. One of MTV's strategies was to establish and exploit youth culture. MTV officials saw pop music as a global language. The same was valid for the products featured in MTV's advertisements, like Levi's, Swatch, Benneton, and Coca-Cola.³⁶

Icons of American culture were omnipresent and popular around the world. Even though discussion about cultural imperialism was still alive, European youth were strongly influenced by American consumer products.³⁷ Arnould and Wilk blamed this behavior partially on the wish to break traditional bonds and go for "alienation" instead.³⁸ Western lifestyle and the English language stood for modernization and sophistication. "The American way of life" is perceived as emblematic of modernity.³⁹ These conditions were a promising starting point for MTV when it introduced its service in Europe. It seemed that the European audience then got the chance to Americanize their lifestyles without losing their European views completely, due to the European focus of the MTV programs. When teenagers saw, for example, the popular U.S. movie character Ferris Bueller getting dressed while consuming MTV (in the motion picture "Ferris Bueller's Day Off"), they had the opportunity to follow his

³⁶ Banks (1991), p. 275.

³⁷ Englis, Solomon, Olofsson (1993), p. 23.

³⁸ Arnould & Wilk (1983), p. 748.

³⁹ Englis, Solomon, Olofsson (1993), p. 24.

example. Hollywood and the images it displayed moved closer to the lives of European youth.⁴⁰

It was MTV's goal to attract a young world audience that could be sold to international advertisers who were targeting that age category on a global basis.⁴¹

MTV Europe is based in London, England, with branch offices throughout the Continent. The program started broadcasting on August 1, 1987. The first video showed the British rock group "Dire Straits" with a song "Money for Nothing" (containing the infamous line "I want my MTV"). MTV started to bring its European service to Germany in June 1988.⁴² In 1996, the program was available in 37 countries from Scandinavia to North Africa and parts of the Middle East, from Great Britain to parts of the former Soviet Union. MTV Europe reached almost 56 million homes via cable or satellite (Astra, Thor, and Eutelsat II), in 1996, 17.3 million of these homes were located in Germany, by far MTV Europe's biggest and most important market.⁴³ In organization and politics, MTV Europe is similar to its U.S. counterpart. The station is currently headed by an American, Bill Roedy, who stated: "Although our look and attitude are the same as MTV USA's, we focus on European music, featuring European VJs and reformat just about every program we

⁴⁰ Kaehler (1995), p. 27.

⁴¹ Roe, Cammaer (1993), pp. 169-170.

⁴² Variety (1996), p. 36.

⁴³ Clark (1996), p. 54.

import".⁴⁴ The VJ lineup was made up of individuals from various European countries, who all spoke English, although some non-native speakers did so with accents, which is part of the concept. Even though no exact figures of the budget were published, it became known that the cost structure of MTV Europe exceeded that of MTV USA. This higher cost was mainly due to hardware costs, like satellite transponder charges, which were approximately seven times as great as those in the U.S. Around 90% of MTV Europe's revenues originated from airtime sales to some 200 advertisers in 1992. However, it took MTV Europe significantly longer than MTV USA to break even. This could be due to the "greater musical, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of Europe" (Roe & Cammaer, p.170). At a symposium in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 1989, then head of programming for MTV Europe Brian Diamond pointed out that the differences between the American and European markets for MTV not only reflected taste but also different patterns of diffusion. Songs broke the charts in different countries, at different times. Some songs were hits in a particular country, while they did not chart at all in others. These conditions made it more complicated for MTV programmers in Europe than for their counterparts in the U.S.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Clarke (1992), p. 36.

⁴⁵ Roe & Wallis (1989), p. 35.

Since June 1995, the free-to-air signal of MTV Europe has been digitally encrypted which led to a decrease in total audience temporarily.⁴⁶ This could be interpreted as one step towards changing MTV into a pay or a la carte service, which appeared to be Roedy's goal.⁴⁷

The fall of 1996 saw some radical changes in the programming and structure of MTV Europe. While before the channel prided itself in being a pan-European network, broadcasting one program all across Europe, MTV introduced a fragmented program, dividing Europe into three regions. Each region had different playlists tailored towards the respective audience. The regional program made up approximately 50 percent of the total programming. By abandoning the pan-European approach, MTV gave in to increased competition in local markets, especially through Viva in Germany, but also Z-TV in Sweden or The Box in the U.K. Research suggested that MTV lost ground when facing local competition.⁴⁸

In September 1996, MTV split its programming into a North, Central, and South region. This enabled the network not only to run a localized playlist for each region, but also to sell regional advertising airtime to advertisers.⁴⁹ The North region covered England, France, Benelux, Spain,

⁴⁶ Clark (1996), p. 49.

⁴⁷ Clarke (1992), p. 35 f.

⁴⁸ Clark (1996), p. 49.

⁴⁹ *ibid*, p. 49.

and Scandinavia. It was operated from London. The Central region covered Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, and the Eastern European countries. The Central headquarters were located in Hamburg, Germany. The South region covered Italy and was based in Milan. It should be pointed out, that the MTV language used in all regions remained English, regardless of the circumstances. So far the regional feeds concentrated exclusively on music video programming. The schedule for the non-music program (e.g. Real World, Beavis & Butthead, MTV Sports, etc.) remained the same all over Europe. One music program, called "HOT", is produced regionally, and it is supposed to employ "different presenters and subtle differences in tone, pace, and content for each service" (Bill Roedy, President of MTV Europe in Clark-Meads, 1996).⁵⁰

4.3 Viva Television

After MTV was well established throughout Europe (in some countries more than in others), major record labels voiced their dissatisfaction with the music video selection of the channel. These companies thought MTV would neglect the continental market, especially Germany, which had become the biggest market for pre-recorded music in Europe.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Clark-Meads (1996), p. 60.

⁵¹ Banks (1996), p. 80.

This dissatisfaction occurred at a time, when in Germany, some people started discussing MTV's neglect of German talent openly from a more cultural perspective. Dieter Gorny, an active figure in the German music scene spearheaded and directed these thoughts. Gorny had worked for the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen in an agency that tried to promote local talent ("NRW Rockbuero"). He also invented and established the annual Popkomm tradefair and convention in Cologne which had evolved into one of the biggest events for the music industry over the years. Gorny saw the need for a specific German medium, a Germany based music video channel, due to the lack of opportunities on other German channels and the evident neglect of MTV. Most German channels had dropped their weekly music magazines, e.g. "Formel Eins" (ARD), "Ragazzi" (RTL), or "P.O.P." (Tele 5), mainly due to the emergence of MTV.⁵² From the beginning on, Gorny received support from the industry as well as the regulatory state agencies.⁵³ Definite plans for Viva were first announced to the public and the industry in August 1992, appropriately at the Popkomm fair.⁵⁴

The licensing procedure went relatively smooth, although the "Bundeskartellamt" (the federal German antitrust authority) investigated. The issue was the

⁵² Campillo-Lundbeck (1993), p. 38.

⁵³ Muench (1993), p. 57.

⁵⁴ Clark-Meads (1996), p. 4.

involvement of major record companies and the resulting effects on competition. However, the authority argued that since only four out of five of the major record companies were involved with Viva, the channel would not be subject to regulation or prohibition. The four record companies involved were Sony, Polygram, Thorn EMI, and Warner Music Germany. Each company held 19.8% of the shares. Another 19.8% were controlled by Frank Otto who had been active in the German private radio business. One percent is held by Viva itself. The license was granted for a "musikorientiertes Jugendspartenprogramm" (music-oriented youth-specific program) by the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1993.⁵⁵

After postponing the actual launch-date several times, Viva went on the air December 1, 1993 via cable and satellite (Eutelsat).⁵⁶ Viva gained wide range cable penetration rather quickly because in most systems it received the slot that was previously held by Einsplus (a program service of the ARD, focusing on program recycling) that was dropped earlier in 1993.⁵⁷ The Viva operation proved to be quite successful, so that a break-even was announced in 1995 (about two years earlier than originally expected). Viva claimed to reach about 18.8 million homes in

⁵⁵ Müller (1994), p. 49.

⁵⁶ Campillo-Lundbeck (1993), p. 38, and Viva press release (8/96).

⁵⁷ Müller (1994), p. 50.

Germany (plus 2.7 million homes in Austria and Switzerland).⁵⁸

Unlike MTV, Viva broadcasted in German. It claimed that at least 40% of its playlist was dedicated to German talent (the rest displaying the general Anglo-American mainstream). However, this had not been measured objectively, yet. It was also unclear what exactly Viva considered German. Many German acts sung in English, some acts were produced (geographically speaking) in Germany but the actual musician or vocalist was from somewhere else. It was not easy to define. While Viva admitted to have problems in filling those 40% with German artists in the beginning, it argued that due to the new outlet that Viva provided, more videos were produced for German talent which made filling those slots no problem as time went on.⁵⁹

4.4 Further Expansion: VH-1, Viva 2, and Onyx

Similar to the expansion of MTV in the USA with the launch of VH-1, MTV Europe and Viva both saw room for expansion on the German market trying to target a more mature audience (25-49 years of age).

MTV USA launched VH-1 in 1985. In the USA, VH-1 was partially established because potential competitors were

⁵⁸ Viva press release (8/95) and (8/96).

⁵⁹ Clark-Meads (1996), p. 101.

voicing plans to enter the music video television market. By going ahead and putting a second full time music video channel on the market, MTV surpassed the competition. VH-1 served "as a barrier to prevent any direct competition to MTV" (Banks, 1996, p.53) in the USA.

In Germany, a direct competitor had already emerged by the time plans for VH-1 were announced. Yet, it can be argued that VH-1 (as well as Viva 2) was established to control the market even further by putting up higher barriers of entry for other competitors on the already very crowded cable networks of Germany.⁶⁰

MTV and Viva, both announced their plans to launch additional services at the same time, in November 1994. MTV planned to introduce VH-1 (which was already made available in England the previous year) exclusively for the German speaking market (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland) using German speaking VJs. The concept and production of the channel was developed and implemented by Hamburg-based company Me, Myself & Eye (MME) which had been contributing strongly to the original format of Viva. The programming targeted an audience between 25 and 49 years of age. MME's operating director, Michael Oplesch, was one of the founding fathers of Viva. VH-1 and MTV were owned entirely by Viacom.⁶¹ VH-1 was based in Hamburg which since 1996 also

⁶⁰ Watson (1995), p. 44.

⁶¹ Kurt (1995), p. 10 ff.

housed the MTV operations office for its central European region. VH-1 started broadcasting May 4, 1995. In 1996 VH-1 could be watched in six million homes and in ten (out of 16) German states via cable and satellite. VH-1, as well as MTV, also became part of the first German digital television package, DF-1, operated nationally by the Munich-based Kirch Group.⁶²

Viva decided to introduce a second channel also targeting the more mature pop music consumer. The channel was named Viva 2. Viva 2 had the same ownership structure as Viva, being backed by Sony, Polygram, EMI-Thorn, Warner, and Frank Otto. Viva 2 was originally developed, in part, by Steve Blame who was brought in by Dieter Gorny, the CEO of Viva. Blame used to be the managing editor of news for MTV in London, before switching fronts. Viva 2 was launched on March 21, 1995.⁶³ It claimed to reach 12.2 million homes altogether, 9.9 million of which were cable households in Germany, 600,000 cable in Switzerland, 200,000 cable in Austria, and 1.5 million via Eutelsat. In 1996, after only one year of operation, Viva 2 received a major facelift by changing the program schedule, the channel's logo and look.⁶⁴

⁶² MTV/VH-1 press release (8/96).

⁶³ Kurt (1995), p. 10 ff.

⁶⁴ Viva/Viva 2 press release (8/96).

Both channels, VH-1 and Viva 2, struggled for wider distribution. In 1996 many cable networks offered only one of the two, leaving little space for direct competition. VH-1 was not available via cable anywhere in Nordrhein-Westfalen, the homebase and stronghold of Viva, by 1996.⁶⁵

While MTV and Viva were busy trying to find wider distribution for their sister services, a new, independent competitor emerged. Onyx was a music video television channel, also trying to target the older music consumers. The channel was owned by the British Capitol Music Group.⁶⁶ Compared to VH-1 and Viva 2, Onyx saw a niche in taking the level of "maturity" even further, also incorporating musical styles like classical, country, or German Schlager. The target audience was 30-55 years of age. Onyx was licensed through the state of Rheinland-Pfalz but had its main offices in Dortmund, an industrial city in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Onyx was launched October 16, 1995. Its distribution has been growing slowly but steadily over the months. In the summer of 1996, 6.1 million homes (1.7 million of those were in Nordrhein-Westfalen) were able to tune in (4.3 million via cable, 1.8 million via Eutelsat).⁶⁷

Due to these developments, Germany now had five different full-time music video services competing for

⁶⁵ MTV/VH-1 press release (8/96) and Viva/Viva 2 press release (8/96)

⁶⁶ Clark-Meads (1996), p. 98.

⁶⁷ Onyx press release (8/96).

limited cable space and audiences. However, in many German markets these five services did not compete head to head, yet.

Chapter 5

METHODS

The fifty most popular singles in Germany of each year, from 1985 to 1995, were encoded for their musical style. The top 50 appeared to be an accurate and operationable measure, including all major hits of the respective year, thus portraying tastes of the mass audience.

Whenever one particular record appeared in the yearly charts of two different years, the record was not considered for analysis in that year where it placed in a lower chart position. In that case the record in position number 51 took the place of the dropped one, so that 50 records were still analyzed for each year.

The yearly charts were calculated from weekly sales charts, published by Media Control, by Arne Rueter, a mathematics student at the University of Oldenburg, Germany. This particular set of charts was chosen for the following reasons. First, its availability. Popular trade magazines like Billboard which were the authority when it comes to record charts in the United States, did not publish annual

charts from Germany (only a limited weekly chart). Also, these charts were available free of charge through the internet, and could therefore be accessed easily for further investigation or secondary analysis by any interested scholar. Second, the annual charts were calculated on the basis of the weekly Media Control charts.⁶⁸ These weekly charts were well respected and widely accepted throughout Germany as the most accurate measure for consumer tastes.

Three hand-picked encoders (who were knowledgeable enough to participate in the study), independently, put each song into one of the following musical categories: Rock, Pop/Top40, Techno/House, Soul/R'n'B, HipHop, Reggae, and Schlager/Volksmusik. These categories were chosen by the researcher because they appeared to be general enough to fit all the songs represented in the charts, yet they were specific, so that all represented music styles were treated fair and not put together into vague groups. The one and only determinant for categorization was musical content, not national origin or the language used. While the first six styles were played heavily on music video television, the last category, Schlager/Volksmusik, was generally ignored by the channels (with the exception of Onyx), because of its music style and image (conservative, anti-rock/pop, traditional, German) and audience (mature, arguably less

⁶⁸ For a detailed description of the method of calculation, see Appendix A.

"hip"). This situation was similar to the treatment of country music by MTV in the United States (large quantities of sold records, yet no videos on MTV). However, different from Germany, there were two video music channels dedicated to country music in the United States (CMT and TNN).

The first five categories were used in a previous study by Kaehler (1995) to encode music videos played on MTV USA and MTV Europe. The "Rock" category included those songs that were predominately played with a classic rock'n'roll line-up (electric guitar, bass, drums). This category was more album oriented, and also had a traditional focus on live-performance. This category also included all those songs which might have been labeled "Alternative" by others. The present investigator did not consider "Alternative" to be a specific music style, and so this categorization was not used.

"Pop/Top40" included those artists which were directly targeting high chart positions, focusing strongly on single sales. Sometimes an album may not have even existed. Many, but not all, of these songs, could be classified as the "fast food" of popular music (e.g. artists like DJ Bobo, Roxette). However, no quality judgment was made if a song was put into this, or any other category. The music in the "Pop/Top40" category usually contained elements from various other categories, mixed up in each song (e.g. Michael

Jackson used elements from "Soul/R'n'B" as well as "HipHop" or "Rock"). Another characteristic of this category was that many of the artists or the producers behind it (they are usually the masterminds in this category) targeted a younger, teenage audience (e.g. Take That, East 17, or Caught In The Act). Many of the so-called "one-hit-wonders" occurred in this category.

"Techno/House" contained songs that were predominantly produced for the dancefloor, using electronic/digital equipment, and featuring a strong beat (~120 beats per minute and up). This musical style was only developed in the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Very often the traditional structures of a song (two to three verses and a chorus) were neglected. Many of these songs were instrumentals or contained only very few lyrics. It should be pointed out that songs which were generally known as "Kirmestechno" (A German term that would translate into "carnival techno") or "handbag" (British term), a more commercial, more melodic, arguably washed out, cheap form of Techno/House music, were put into this category.

"Soul/R'n'B" included everything that is also generally known as "urban contemporary" or "black music" (Boyz II Men or TLC would be prominent examples for this category). However, the color of skin of the artist or producer was not a factor for this or any other categorization. Soul/R'n'B is

a melodic, tuneful music that regularly focused on a strong vocal performance. While this music is often rhythmic, it is considerably slower than, for example, techno/house. The instruments used for the recordings of this category often included strings or pianos.

"HipHop" was the category of music where a major part of the lyrics were rapped instead of sung. The music was rhythmic and dynamic, sometimes aggressive. Another characteristic of this style was that the music was often put together from already existing recordings via sampling technology. Many times, vocal pieces from speeches or other recordings were thrown in, too.

"Reggae" is a musical style that originated from the Caribbean, and was widely diffused throughout the world by the success of Bob Marley in the 1970s and 1980s. While the traditional style of reggae (roots reggae) was characterized by a jumping beat and tuneful singing, modern variations (dancehall or raggamuffin) became more aggressive, and incorporated elements from the HipHop genre. However, these songs were also put into the reggae category. Instrumentation was usually similar to rock but modern styles could have included digital equipment.

All encoders were instructed to, ultimately, use their own judgment.⁶⁹ Written musical categories were not always

⁶⁹ For a copy of the instructions, see Appendix B.

exclusive to one another, many songs cross over from one genre into another. The encoders were also advised that they were not asked for a quality judgment. Personal tastes should not have been a factor. If two encoders put a song in one category and the third encoder put the same song into another, the song went into the category for which it received two votes. Out of 550 songs, 242 were decided in consensus, 264 by a 2:1 decision. In the case of a tie breaker, when all the encoders differed in their decision, the final decision was made by the researcher. Out of the 550 categorized songs, 44 were decided by a tie break. A tie break had to decide for those songs that could have been put into more than one category. For example, the track "Informer" by "Snow" was put into HipHop, Pop/Top40, and reggae by the encoders. The track is a classic Reggae-HipHop cross over, yet it is produced in a very clean manner which triggered a high chart position. In the end, the song was put into Reggae, considering the overall output of the artist. Fortunately, there was no song that was not remembered by any of the three encoder. Thus, no song was categorized by the researcher alone.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ For more specific information about particular songs and their categorization, contact the author.

Chapter 6

RESULTS

6.1 Development of Genres

By looking at Figure 1, it was easy to track down the variations over the years considering musical genres. During the second half of the 1980s, Pop/Top40 was the all-dominating category (the overall share for Pop/Top40 was 56.2%, including the first half of the 1990s). It peaked in 1986 with a share of 80%. After that, the overall development was a decline with two more (smaller) peaks in 1989 (68% market share) and in 1993 (48% market share). Pop/Top40 had its weakest presence in the last encoded year, 1995 (30% market share).⁷¹

Overall, Rock was the second largest genre with a share of 14.9% overall. The yearly share ranged from 6% (1990) to a record 30% (only two years later in 1992). In the last two encoded years, Rock held on to a share of around 10%.

Techno/House was the third strongest genre with a share of 13.6% overall. Because Techno/House was a genre that was

⁷¹ To look at the development of genres in numbers, please see Appendix C.

basically invented and introduced in the later half of the 1980s, it had no presence in the charts of 1985 and 1986. Starting in 1987 (with a minimal 2% share, which equals one song), it grew steadily and quickly (exception was 1991 when Techno/House had a share of 8% while in 1990 and 1992 it had a share of 14%). After 1992, Techno/House grew very quickly. It passed Rock in 1994 (with a share of 38%), and Pop/Top40 in 1995 (with a share of 40%). The last encoded year, 1995, marked the only year when Pop/Top40 was not the dominating genre.

The remaining genres had an overall share of 5.1% (HipHop), 4.4% (Soul/R'n'B), 4.2% (Schlager/Volksmusik), and 1.6% (Reggae). HipHop peaked in 1991 with 16%, Soul/R'n'B scored highest in 1988 with a share of 10%, Schlager/Volksmusik had its peak in 1990 with 12%, but had no occurrence in 1989, 1993, and 1994. Reggae scored highest in 1993 with 8% (there were only nine Reggae songs overall, 4 of which fell into 1993).

Taking an overall look at graph one, one would suspect a general trend towards greater diversity during the encoded eleven years.




Figure 1: Development of Specific Genres over Time.

6.2 Relative Entropy Index

From the gathered data a numerical degree of diversity was calculated for each year.⁷² The index yielded an overall increase of diversity from 1986 to 1992 (see Graph 2). Diversity decreased prior 1986. Of the encoded years, the all-time low occurred in 1986 with an index value of .3539 (1.0 would be maximum diversity). Diversity increased after 1986 and reached an outbreak peak in 1988 (the year MTV started its service in Germany) with a value of .691. the index reached its overall peak in 1992 with .7871. After 1992, the index decreased steadily and fell to .5956 in 1995.

⁷² The calculation was done by using the Relative Entropy Index that was used in several other studies dealing with diversity in television (Ishikawa et al. 1994, Litman et al. 1994). The formula for this index is:

$$\text{The sum of: } \frac{(-a) \times \log_2 a}{\log_2 b}$$

(a is the probability of a genre, b is the total number of genres).




Figure 2: Relative Entropy Index.

6.3 Yearly Mean of Scores

The charts that were used in the present study were based on a scoring system that considered the respective chart position in the weekly chart, as well as the length of stay in the weekly charts of a single record, in a non-linear fashion. From those scores a mean was calculated for each year (see Graph 3). The mean was the lowest in 1986, then steadily increased and peaked in 1993. The mean declined again in 1994 and 1995.




Figure 3: Yearly Mean of Scores.

6.4 Multiple regression analysis

To identify the relationship between the variables (point score, genre, year), several multiple regression analyses were done. Purpose of the regression was to establish that year and not variation in genre contributed to diversity. The point score (of each song) was used as the dependent variable, the years 1988 and 1993 (the years MTV and Viva, respectively, entered the market) were used as dummy coded independent variables in block 1, in block 2 the independent variables were the genres. The control for year was 1985-1987, 1989-1992, and 1994-1995. The control for genre was Pop/Top40 (see Table 1). The year 1993, with a Beta score of .12 was the best predictor for score. The multiple r in Block 1 was .13, r square was .017. In Block 2, r was .156, r square .024. Whatever caused 1993 to be different or relevant here, will be discussed in the following chapter.

Other regressions were analyzed to try to obtain a better prediction of "score", including lagging the year (1989 and 1994) and using another control genre (Rock). None of these other analyses had a higher explained variance.

Table 1: Beta Scores of Multiple Regression

		Block 1	Block 2
Year:			
	1988:	-0.043	-0.042
	1993:	0.121	0.110
Genre:			
	HipHop:		0.014
	Reggae:		0.075
	Rock:		0.009
	Schlager/Volksmusik:		0.024
	Soul/R'n'B:		-0.021
	Techno/House:		0.025
R square:		0.017	0.024

6.5 The Hypotheses

The mentioned results meant the following for the hypotheses.

H1: The degree of diversity increased slightly after the emergence of MTV Europe in Germany in 1988.

Following the relative entropy index, diversity increased significantly during 1988 (compare Figure 2). H1 was accepted.

H2: The degree of diversity increased due to the emergence of Viva in 1993 (1994).

Looking at the relative entropy index, this was not true. The index decreased in 1993 and also in 1994. H2 was rejected.

H3: Styles that were heavily featured on Viva (Pop/Top40 and Techno/House) will have a stronger presence in the sales charts after Viva's introduction.

While this was not true for Pop/Top40, it was definitely true in the case of Techno/House which became the most popular genre in 1995, after increasing its share the four preceding years. H3 was partially accepted.

Chapter 7

DISCUSSION

By looking at the development of the seven genres over time, two major trends were obvious. First, the overall decline of Pop/Top40, and second, the emergence and takeover of Techno/House which became the most popular genre in 1995. Both of these genres were more geared towards the dancefloor (Techno/House almost exclusively, Pop/Top40 to a major part). It was no coincidence that those two genres were so dominant. Germany had a long tradition in the popularity of dance music. Starting in the 1970s , German producers like Harold Faltermeyer, Georgio Moroder, or Sylvester Levey became brand names. Germany liked to dance: 6.5 million people visited clubs every week on average (in 1992).⁷³ While other countries, especially the United States, but also Great Britain, have a long tradition in rock'n'roll, it seemed that this foundation was lacking in Germany. Germany was never a country that produced major rock bands and stars (there are a few exceptions, e.g. "The Scorpions"). It was

⁷³ Spahr & Pride (1993), p. 12.

more known for its producing skills, most notably in dance music, where the producer usually played the most prominent role. This conformed with Michael Kreissl, head of programming for Viva, who was quoted that (German) producers "figure out what works and then put something together quickly" (quoted by Hils, 1996, p. S35). The result was a product that aimed for instant chart success and sold many records (not just in Germany). These records regularly featured artists that did not last over time. Prominent examples were "Haddaway", "Culture Beat", or just recently "La Bouche".

The Techno/House genre followed similar patterns (strong focus on the producer), but those songs were almost exclusively written for the dancefloor. Keeping the popularity of dance music in mind, it was no surprise that Techno/House was so well accepted by the audience once it gained wide spread diffusion. The fact that Techno/House passed Pop/Top40 in popularity in 1995 might also be founded on the switch of some Pop/Top40 producers into this genre because of its market success.

Techno/House started off in the late 1980s with the so-called "Acid-House" wave that was imported to Germany from England. By the early 1990s (around 1991/92), a domestic scene was established with labels, clubs, producers, DJs,

and its own media.⁷⁴ Viva focused strongly on this emerging scene right from its start. Viva aired one weekly magazine-type show for underground techno and house, hosted by well known domestic DJs. The more commercial Techno/House (artists like "Marusha", "U96", or "Das Modul") were strongly featured in its rotations. While Viva did not create the Techno/House phenomenon in Germany, it strongly reinforced the trend and helped to diffuse the genre to a wide audience.⁷⁵ This would partially confirm H3, considering the Techno/House genre only. In the hypotheses it was expected that Pop/Top40 would also benefit from the emergence of Viva. This was not the case. It appeared that Techno/House became so strong that it took away from the Pop/Top40 market.

Rock always had a consistent presence in the German charts throughout the 1980s with a slight decline (1985: 18%, 1990: 6% --its lowest score). Rock was particularly strong in the years 1991, 1992, and 1993 (overall peak in 1993 with 20%). This peak was directly related to successful releases by artists such as "Guns'n'Roses" who had three singles in the charts in 1991 and 1992. Other rock bands that experienced chart success over this period of time included "Scorpions" (two hits in 1991, including the number one single of the year, "Wind of Change"), "Ugly Kid Joe"

⁷⁴ Niemczyk (1995), pp. 220-225.

⁷⁵ Compare Spex (1996), p. 59.

(two hits), and "Bon Jovi" (two hits). These years also marked the advent of the so-called "alternative" bands in the German charts, such as "Nirvana" (1992), "Red Hot Chili Peppers" (1992), "Soul Asylum" (1993), or "Spin Doctors" (1993). All of these bands were originally from the United States and received heavy airplay on MTV, in the USA and in Europe.

The other genres peaked in various years (see Chapter 6) but remained at a marginal level overall. The genre "Schlager/Volksmusik" peaked in 1990 (12% market share). Schlager/Volksmusik was the only genre that could be put exclusively in a national context. All of the songs were produced in Germany and sung in German. The year 1990 was the first year after the Berlin Wall came down which, ultimately, lead to the reunification of West and East Germany. This historical event might have triggered a more patriotic climate that contributed to the success of songs that were more traditional and sung in German. After 1990 however, the popularity of the genre declined again.

While a look at Figure 1 already yielded some information about the overall development of diversity, the relative entropy index was the most precise measure of diversity, as it was defined in the present study. The relative entropy index was also the measure that was used for the adoption and rejection of H1 and H2. H1 stated that

diversity would increase after the introduction of MTV in Germany in 1988. The year 1988 marked an outbreak peak of the index (see figure 2). Thus, H1 was confirmed. Whether the introduction of MTV could be blamed exclusively for this peak was questionable. MTV was not widely distributed at the time. Cable penetration was still growing. However, it could be assumed that MTV did make an impact. In the early stages of MTV Europe (similar to early MTV USA), MTV's programming was not as sophisticated. It did not pay as much attention to other countries charts (including Germany), as it does now. Hence, there were many titles on the playlist that were not hits in Germany.⁷⁶ This could have contributed to the increase of diversity, because the audience (as long as they had access to MTV) was exposed to a wider variety of music.

The highest degree of diversity was reached in 1992, a year where there was no new market entry in music video television in Germany. In 1992, Pop/Top40 had its second lowest share overall (compare figure 1), and Rock its all-time high. It also marked a year where all seven genres appeared in the yearly charts. This had its effect on the relative entropy index score for 1992.

It was obvious that the index decreased every single year after 1992. Thus, H2 had to be rejected. By looking exclusively at the diversity index, the emergence of Viva in

⁷⁶ Boehm (1996), p. 52.

December 1993, but also the launch of VH-1, Viva 2, and Onyx in 1995, did not contribute to diversity positively.

This might have something to do with the programming of Viva itself. MTV was playing a trans-European playlist which meant that the German audience saw many clips that they would not have seen or heard anywhere else. A song that charted high in the British charts, for example, was very likely to appear in MTV's rotation, regardless of its success elsewhere.⁷⁷ Viva was more focused on Germany. While this focus contributed to the success with the German audience, it meant less in the sense of diversity. Viva was reinforcing current local trends, playing what they knew the audience wanted to hear or what they thought the audience wanted to hear/see. Viva worked with five different rotations for its general programming (excluding specialty shows). The first three rotations were exclusively based on the German charts. The so-called "A rotation" consisted of about 15 titles from chart positions 1 to 20. The "B rotation" contained titles from chart positions 21 to 40. The "C rotation" included titles from lower chart positions. One rotation featured new titles which had not charted before. The fifth rotation was primarily for nighttime programming. In the general programming, Viva played about

⁷⁷ Clark-Meads (1996), p. 101.

80 different clips per week.⁷⁸ This meant that there was not much room for adding diversity.

It should be pointed out that the relative entropy index might have its limitations when measuring diversity. The index was very sensitive to the non-occurrence of a genre. Also, and probably more important, the index did not consider change from one year to another. For example, if two genres in the present study, would have simply switched positions from one year to the next (*ceteris paribus*), the index would not have changed. Diversity via the relative entropy index looked at each year exclusively. Whether such a switch, as described above, could be interpreted as a change in diversity could be argued.

It would have been beneficial for the present study to incorporate the development of audience ratings of the relevant channels into the discussion. Unfortunately, neither Viva nor MTV, were ever a part of the rating system published by the Gesellschaft fuer Kommunikationsforschung (GfK) which was the widely accepted authority for ratings in the German television market. Instead, both channels tried to prove their success, to the audience and advertisers, by contracted or independent research studies.⁷⁹

Hence, a comparison between the audience's acceptance for both channels (as well as VH-1, Viva 2, and Onyx) and

⁷⁸ Martens (1996), p. 39.

⁷⁹ Molner (1995), p. 42 f.

the diversity index was not possible at this time. However, the latest numbers saw Viva in a slight lead over MTV. Out of 1830 Germans, aged 14-24, 16.8% replied that they had watched Viva the previous day, 16.7% replied that they had watched MTV. The numbers for the other channels (whose target audience was not completely captured by the sample) were significantly lower (2.9% Viva 2, 1.9% VH-1, 0.8% Onyx).⁸⁰

Chapter 6 also included the development of the yearly mean of the point scores. This measure was not related to musical genre. Hence, it yielded no further information relating to the development of diversity. The point system used in the yearly charts awarded points in a non-linear fashion, awarding more points to songs that climbed higher (see appendix A). The development of the mean of scores slightly resembled the development of the relative entropy index. Yet, the graphs measured two different things. The mean of scores increased steadily from 1986 to its peak in 1993. After 1993 it declined again (the relative entropy index declined in 1992 and then declined).

While one could argue that a higher mean could be interpreted in a sense that more songs reached higher positions thus gaining more points (due to the non-linear scoring system), another interpretation would be that the

⁸⁰ Der Spiegel (1997), p. 126.

songs stayed in the charts for a longer period of time, gaining more points. The first interpretation could mean more diversity (not necessarily in a musical sense) because of more commotion in the charts. The second interpretation would make a case against diversity because it means that the charts were more homogeneous from week to week. Neither of these interpretations considered musical genre directly.

The second interpretation would confirm with the development of the German record industry considering sold volumes. It would make sense that in years when people buy more records the charts were more stable (different people buy the same record over an extended period of time, causing the song to stay in the charts longer, compare Greenberg 1986). This would mean that the mean of scores would be more of an economic measure than a diversity measure. However, since the prime concentration of the present study was on diversity considering musical genres, these interpretations were not analyzed more detailed.

The year 1993 was the best predictor for score in the multiple regression analysis (see chapter 5.4). It was the year after the peak of the relative entropy index and the year when the mean of point scores reached its peak. It was also the year when Viva entered the market (in December 1993). It is questionable what caused 1993 to be different, mainly because of the dependent variable, point score. It

would be easy to argue that the start of Viva impacted the charts, but this assumption appeared vague. Viva launched its service in December 1993, the possible impact on that year was minimal. If Viva's emergence had impacted this particular analysis significantly it should have shown in 1994, too. Another vague interpretation could be that the expected launch of Viva already had an impact. However, there is no proof or supporting literature for this argument. Altogether, those analyses that directly involved the significance of the point score or its mean raised more questions than they yielded answers. Further research is needed.

As it was already mentioned in chapter three, music video might have been the most important media channel in the diffusion of hit singles, but it was by no means the only one. Hence, there were other determinants that played a role in the development of diversity over the years.

Radio did play a role, although not nearly as prominent as it had been in the United States. What was said for the German television system (Chapter 4.1), had also been valid for radio. The broadcasting system was state controlled with very few slots for popular music. This had only changed with the policy changes in the mid-1980s which caused the emergence of regional and local private radio stations.

Formatted radio was yet the exception in Germany. Most stations were conservative in their playlists, focusing on "nice, comforting music, or proven hits" (MCA Germany's head of promotion Katharina Landahl, quoted by Watson 1994, p. 70). Still, as long as radio was a medium that played popular music,, it remained an influence on the German charts. Also, more open-minded and formatted stations were gaining popularity, such as OK Radio (Hamburg) or Radio Fritz (Berlin).⁸¹

Another traditional channel of diffusion was the music press. Germany did not have the same tradition with weekly papers such as New Musical Express or Melody Maker in Great Britain or the bi-weekly Rolling Stone in the United States. The strongest publications (considering circulation) like Bravo (1.3 million copies) or Pop Rocky (228,000 copies) targeted the younger teenage audience, and also incorporated fashion and lifestyle advice. Other magazines like Metal Hammer (91,000 copies) or Frontpage focused predominantly on specific genres (heavy metal and techno/house, respectively). Other prominent publications were Musik Express/Sounds (108,000 copies), a more conservative pop/rock magazine, mainly targeting a non-teenage audience, and, starting in fall 1994, a German edition of the American Rolling Stone (with mainly original content). Also, some of

⁸¹ Watson (1994), p. 70.

the retailers published their own magazines that were distributed free of charge through their stores. World of Music (WOM), a large national retail chain with stores in most larger cities (19 throughout Germany) published the WOM Journal (300,000 copies). Karstadt, a national department store chain published Karstadt Journal (200,000 copies).⁸² Overall it could be assumed that the German music press did play a role in creating interest and excitement about some artists, especially among the teenage readership of Bravo or Pop Rocky.

As mentioned, clubs were very popular among Germans. The club also served as a place where people were exposed to new records. Club DJs often took pride in playing specific records before anybody else did. Thus, the club served as an additional channel for the diffusion or promotion of hit singles, especially for genres such as Techno/House, Hiphop, Soul/R'n'B, but also Pop/Top40, Reggae, or Rock.

Besides these more traditional channels, there might have been some other determinants. For example, it is very common for Germans to go on vacations during the summer months. Often they picked up a song that is popular in those holiday locations and bring it back (or buy it after their return) to be reminded of their vacation. Examples for such summer or holiday hits might include the song "Lambada" by

⁸² Spahr (1994), p. 70 f.

"Kaoma" (number two in 1989) or "Holiday Rap" by "MC Miker G. & DeeJay Sven" (number ten in 1986).

A prominent example for alternative ways for a single to reach a high chart position would be the song "Conquest for Paradise" by "Vangelis", the number one single of 1995. This song was made popular by German boxer Henry Maske, who used it as his theme before a championship fight in one of the major television events in Germany in 1995.⁸³

One recent trend in record sales was the increase of German productions in the charts. In 1993, 27.3% of the singles sold in Germany were produced there. By 1995, this figure rose to 41.3%.⁸⁴ This could have impacted diversity in the charts in a way that styles that were more popular with German producers (mainly Pop/Top40 and Techno/House) received more attention. The industry had various explanations for the rising popularity of local products. Historically, German product had gained ground because of increased quality. More producers/artists released more records that could live up to international standards over the years.⁸⁵ This trend in production was amplified by Viva and its policy to include around 40% of German productions in its playlist. Following Viva's example, many radio stations opened up their formats and paid more attention to

⁸³ Spahr (1995), p. 70.

⁸⁴ Hils (1996), p. S35.

⁸⁵ Spahr (1996), p. 40 f.

German talent.⁸⁶ Relating to this issue, Viva had lived up to the industry's expectations. The investments that were made by the industry into Viva paid off, since one of their prime goals was to strengthen local products in the German market.⁸⁷ To what degree an overall shift in the social and political climate towards a more patriotic agenda (possibly because of the German reunification) had played a role in this development remained unknown.

During the encoded time period, the overall market for musical recordings in Germany had grown immensely. In 1985 the market yielded a turnover of 2.215 million German marks. This figure grew steadily and reached 4.660 million German marks in 1994. While only a fraction of this figure is generated through the sale of singles (~10%), it was argued that the single remained the most important trend indicator in the market.⁸⁸

An overall growth of the market could have influenced the degree of diversity in the charts. When more people buy more records, as it was the case, it was likely that a wider variety of music was chosen. During the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, the market was not dominated by a singular trend anymore, as it happened in the 1960s or 1970s. Various trends influenced the market at the same time.⁸⁹ Music video

⁸⁶ Spahr (1996), p. 50.

⁸⁷ Hennessey (1993), p. GSA 7.

⁸⁸ Zombik (1995), p. 497 f.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 501 f.

was widely credited for this massification of popular music which helped the industry to boost its sales.

Because of MTV, popular music moved up on the cultural (and economic) agenda in the United States.⁹⁰ The same should be assumed for Germany. Hence, the music video channels did not just influence diversity directly by the titles that were played in its programming, but by expanding the market itself, which in return might have impacted diversity again.

⁹⁰ Greenberg (1986), p. 21.

Chapter 8

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The present study was able to identify an overall trend towards more diversity in the German record sales charts in an ever expanding market between 1985 and 1995.

It was assumed that the emergence of music video channels had contributed in a major way to this development due to its role in the promotion of records and its popularity among the audience (compare Chapter 3). MTV had added to diversity because of its transnational approach. The German audience was exposed to a wider variety of music. The emergence of Viva had no positive impact on the relative entropy index. While Viva might not have contributed to diversity in the same way as MTV did, it reinforced current local trends and helped to diffuse the Techno/House genre among the mass audience. Viva might have added less to diversity as the present study defined it, but it helped to increase the share of domestic products in the charts (not necessarily recordings in the German language) and to enlarge the retail market for musical recording altogether.

In what way this development has impacted diversity remained questionable, especially since the diversity index decreased after 1992.

However, both channels, as well as VH-1, Viva 2, and Onyx (to a lesser degree), contributed to the massification of popular music, similar to Greenberg's findings in the USA. Music video transformed recording stars into television star. Big names became bigger. The total turnover of the German recording industry had more than doubled in the analyzed time period.

Going back to the theoretical foundations of the present study (Chapter 2), the classic assumption that more competition would lead to more diversity in cultural markets⁹¹, was only partially confirmed. Diversity increased due to the emergence of music video television, but did it increase when competition rose? By looking at the relative entropy index the answer would be no. But even if Viva (and the newer services) did not increase diversity even further, it kept the level of diversity well above the level when there was no music video television at all (1985-1987). During the time when there was no music television the index had values of .4241 (1985), .3539 (1986), and .4165 (1987). In 1995, even after three years of decline, the value was still .5956. Yet, the theory clearly suggested an increase

⁹¹ Ryan (1985), Peterson & Berger (1975), Rothenbuhler & Dimmik (1982), et al.

in diversity due to new market entries. This did not take place.

However, the head to head competition of MTV and Viva only started in 1993. Other competitors entered the market in 1995. It would be necessary to continue the investigation in the future to identify long-term developments. Also, the relative entropy index decreased over the last three recorded years. Whether this was a short-term development or the start of a long-term trend will have to be identified later. This leaves much room for further investigation.

Other topics worthwhile to follow up on include an investigation that would define diversity in a different way. Diversity could also relate to the national origin of a recording, or the language used on a recording (as long as it is not an instrumental). Diversity could also be defined by record label affiliation, or the total number of records that entered the charts in any given year.

Additional research could incorporate ratings (in case these will become available), viewership patterns (who watches and when?), or playlists (do they influence the charts or do the charts influence them?) of the music video services.

With five existing music video channels and the advent of digital television and other new media services around

the corner, the subject should remain interesting for years to come.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aldrich, Howard E. (1979): Organizations and Environments. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.
- Alexander, Peter J. (1996): Entropy And Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular Music Recording Industry. American Sociological Review, Feb., pp. 171- 174.
- Arnould, Eric J. & Wilk, Richard R. (1983): Why Do the Natives Wear Adidas? Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 11, pp. 748-752.
- Aufderheide, Pat (1986): Music Videos-The Look of Sound. Journal of Communication, Vol.31, N. 1, pp. 57-78.
- Banks, Jack E. (1996): Monopoly Television-MTV's Quest to Control the Music. Boulder, CO. Westview Press.
- Banks, Jack E. (1995): Does the World Want Its MTV? A Historical Survey of MTV's Quest to Build a Global Audience. Paper presented at the International Communication Association, May 25-29.
- Banks, Jack E. (1991): The Historical Development of the Video Music Industry: A Political Economic Analysis. Ph.D. Dissertation. Eugene, OR; University of Oregon.
- Beebe, Jack H. (1977): Institutional Structure And Program Choices in Television Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCI, pp. 15-37.
- Boehm, Erich (1996): MTVE Prexy Hears World Beat. Variety, Nov.11, p. 52.
- Burnett, Robert (1993): The Popular Music Industry in Transition. Popular Music & Society, pp. 87-114.
- Burnett, Robert (1992): The Implications of Ownership Changes on Concentration and Diversity in the Phonogram Industry. Communication Research, Vol. 19, N. 6, pp. 749-769.
- Campillo-Lundbeck, Santiago (1993): Pop-TV im Stau. Journalist, 12/93, pp. 38-41.
- Clark, Steve (1996): Singled Out-MTVE Still Tapping a Euro Pulse. Variety, Nov.11, p. 52.

- Clark-Meads, Jeff (1996a): MTV Regions Become Real. Billboard, Sept. 14, pp. 60 f.
- Clark-Meads, Jeff (1996b): Viva and Onyx Combine Their Music -TEV Expertise. Billboard, Aug. 31, p. 98.
- Clark-Meads, Jeff (1996c): Germany's Viva Caters to Local Vid Tastes. Billboard, Aug. 17, pp. 4 & 97.
- Clarke, Steve (1992): Rock Conquers Continent. Variety, Nov. 16, pp. 35 f.
- Denisoff, R. Serge (1988): Inside MTV. New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction.
- Dominick, Joseph R. & Pearce, Millard C. (1976): Trends in Network Prime-Time Programming, 1953-74. Journal of Communication, Winter, pp. 70-80.
- Englis, Basil G; Solomon, Michael R; Olofsson, Anna (1993): Consumption Imagery in Music Television: A Bi-Cultural Perspective. Journal of Advertising, Vol.22, N.4, pp. 21-33.
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1994): MTV zwischen Pay-TV Plaenen und neuer Konkurrenz. Sept. 8.
- Frielingsdorf, Britta & Haas, Sabine (1995): Fernsehen zum Musikhoeren. Media Perspektiven, N.7/95, pp. 331-339.
- Goodwin, Andrew (1993): Fatal Distractions: MTV Meets Postmodern Theory. In Frith, Simon; Goodwin, Andrew; Grossberg, Lawrence (eds.): Sound & Vision: The Music Video Reader. New York, Routledge.
- Goodwin, Andrew (1992): Dancing in the Distraction Factory: Music Television and Popular Culture. Minneapolis, MN. University of Minnesota Press.
- Greenberg, Steve (1986): Music Video and the Remassification of the Pop Music Audience. Paper presented at the International Communication Association, May 22-25.
- Grossberg, Lawrence (1993): MTV: Swinging on the (Postmodern) Star. In Frith, Simon; Goodwin, Andrew; Grossberg, Lawrence (eds.): Sound & Vision: The Music Video Reader. New York, Routledge.
- Hennessey, Mike (1993): Rebuked By Radio's Cold Shoulder, Domestic Artists Await Viva and "Changed Attitude". Billboard, Dec. 4, pp. GSA 2 & 7.
- Hils, Miriam (1996): Techno Rules Record Charts. Variety, May 27, pp. S35 f.
- Ishikawa, S.; Leggatt, T.; Litman, B.; Raboy, M.; Rosengren, K.E., and Kamabara, N. (1994): Diversity in Television Programming. Comparative Analysis of Five Countries. Studies of Broadcasting, Vol.30, pp. 155-170.
- Kaplan, E. Ann (1987): Rocking around the Clock: Music television, Postmodernism & Consumer Culture. New York, Routledge.

- Kaehler, Wolfram (1995): One World-Different MTV's: A Comparative Study of MTV USA and MTV Europe. Honors Thesis. Albuquerque, NM. University of New Mexico.
- Kurt, Erbil (1995): Braucht das Land neue Musik-Sender? TV Spielfilm, July, pp. 10-14.
- Litman, B.; Hasegawa, K.; Shrikhande, S., and Barbatsis, G. (1994): Measuring Diversity in U.S. Television Programming. Studies of Broadcasting, Vol.30, pp. 131-151.
- Lopes, Paul D. (1992): Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 to 1990. American Sociological Review, Vol.57, pp. 56-71.
- Lorch, Sue (1988): Metaphor, Metaphysics, and MTV. Journal of Popular Culture, Vol. 22, N.3, pp. 143-155.
- Martens, Rene (1996): Viva-Musik am Strang. Spex, March 96, pp. 36-40.
- Mollner, David (1995): MTVE, Viva Stoke Rating War. Variety, Jan. 30, pp. 42 f.
- Mueller, Stefan (1994): 'Lost in Music' und 'Viva'-Zwei Junge Beispiele fuer Popmusik im Fernsehen. Medium, N.1/94, pp. 48-50.
- Muench, Michael (1993): Nutzoberfläche Pop. Musiksender Viva: MTV Konkurrenz aus NRW? Agenda, 7/93, pp. 56-57.
- MTV Europe/VH-1 (1996): Press Release. Published at Popkomm, Cologne, Germany, August.
- Negus, Keith (1993): Global Harmonies and Local Discords: Transnational Policies and Practices in the European Recording Industry. European Journal of Communication, Vol.8, pp. 295-316.
- Niemczyk, Ralf (1995): Laengst Ueber den Regenbogen. In: Anz, P. & Walder, P. (ed.): Techno. Zuerich, Switzerland, Verlag Ricco Bilger.
- Onyx (1996): Press Release. Published at Popkomm, Cologne, Germany, August.
- Peterson, Richard A. & Berger, David G (1996): Measuring Industry Concentration, Diversity, and Innovation in Popular Music. American Sociological Review, Feb., pp. 175-178.
- Peterson, Richard A. & Berger, David G. (1975): Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music. American Sociological Review, Vol. 40, pp. 158-173.
- Pettegrew, John (1992): A Post-Modernist Moment: 1980s Commercial Culture & the Founding of MTV. Journal of American Culture, Vol.15, N.4, pp. 57-65.
- Phillips, Dennis D. & Schlattman, Tim (1990): Stripmining for Gold and Platinum: Record Sales and Chart Performance Pre- and Post MTV. Popular Music & Society, Vol.14, N.1, pp. 85-95.

- Roe, Keith & Cammaer, Gerda (1993): Delivering the Youth Audience to Advertisers: Music Television and Flemish Youth. Communications, Vol.18, N.2, pp. 169-177.
- Roe, Keith & Wallis, Roger (1989): 'One Planet-One Music': The Development of Music Television in Western Europe. Nordicom Review, N.1/89, pp. 35-40.
- Rogers, Everett M. & Rogers, Rehal-Agarwala (1976): Communication in Organizations. New York, Free Press.
- Rothenbuhler, Eric W. & Dimmick, John W. (1982): Popular Music: Concentration and Diversity in the Industry, 1974-1980. Journal of Communication, Winter, pp. 143-148.
- Rueter, Arne (1996): Top 100. <http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/~guardian/charts/>.
- Ryan, John (1985): The Production of Culture in the Music Industry. Lanham, MD. University Press of America.
- Schlattmann, Tim & Phillips, Dennis D. (1991): MTV and the New Artist. Popular Music & Society, Vol.15, N.4, pp. 15-25.
- Schmidt, Claudia (1995): Fernsehverhalten und politische Interessen Jugendlicher und junger Erwachsener. Media Perspektiven, N.5/95, pp. 220-227.
- Schulz, Winfried (1994): Gesellschaftliche Verantwortung des Fernsehens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Unpublished manuscript. Nuernberg, Germany.
- Schulz, Winfried (1993): Die Transformation des Mediensystems in den Achtzigern. Epochale Trends und modifizierende Bedingungen. In Kutsch, A (ed.): Rundfunk im Wandel der Zeit-Beitraege zur Medienforschung. Berlin, pp. 155-171.
- Spahr, Wolfgang (1996a): German Exports. Billboard, Nov.30, pp. 40-46.
- Spahr, Wolfgang (1996b): Radio Makes the Domestic Difference. Billboard, Nov. 30, p. 50.
- Spahr, Wolfgang (1995): Germany's Music Makers '95. Billboard, Nov. 18, pp. 67-70.
- Spahr, Wolfgang (1994): Mag bag: Music Weighs in Heavy at the Newstand. Billboard, Dec. 3, pp. 70-72.
- Spahr, Wolfgang & Pride, Dominic (1993): After the Decades, German dance Music Still Floors the World. Billboard, Dec. 4, pp. GSA 12-18.
- Spex (1996): Viva. Jan. 96, p. 59.
- Der Spiegel (1997): Zwei Kommen Durch. 16/97, p. 126.
- Der Spiegel (1996): "Ich Mach das Anders", 47/96, pp. 34-50.
- Variety (1996): MTV Europe Timeline. Nov. 11, p. 52.

- Viva/Viva 2 (1996): Press Release. Published at Popkomm, Cologne, Germany, August.
- Viva/Viva 2 (1995): Press Release. Published at Popkomm, Cologne, Germany, August.
- Watson, Mirinda (1995): Germans Getting More Music TV. Billboard, March 25, pp. 44 & 47.
- Watson, Mirinda (1994): Radio Blues. Billboard, Dec. 3, p.70.
- Wimmer, Fred (1995): Die Musikkanaele MTV und VIVA. Medien + Erziehung, 1/95, pp.23-25.
- Zombik, Peter (1995): Tonträger im Markt der Zukunft. Media Perspektiven, 10/95, pp.496-511.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Scoring System

The yearly charts that were used in the present study were calculated with the following scoring system. From 1985-August 7, 1989, the charts were based on the weekly Top 75. After that date the new weekly Top 100 was used. Each song received points for each week it placed in the charts. The points were distributed as follows:

Table 2: Distribution of Points.

TOP 75 (until Aug.7, 89) **TOP 100** (after Aug.7, 1989-1995)

<u>Position</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Points</u>
75-66	1	100-81	1
65-61	2	80-71	2
60-56	3	70-61	3
55-51	4	60-51	4

TOP 50 (for all)

<u>Position</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Points</u>
50-49	5	18	34
48-47	6	17	36
46-45	7	.	.
44-43	8	.	.
42-41	9	.	.
40	10	11	48
39	11	10	50
38	12	9	55
37	13	8	60
.	.	7	65
.	.	6	70
.	.	5	75
21	29	4	80
20	30	3	85
19	32	2	90
		1	100

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

Instructions

Please put each song in only one of the following categories by putting the corresponding letter after the song title onto the chart sheets. If you do not know one of the songs, leave the space blank. These definitions are not absolute. Music is often very hard to define and categorize. Popular music is sometimes not pure in its style. Please consider your own judgment and knowledge. Keep in mind that you are not asked for a quality judgment of a song.

The Categories:

A: Rock

Music that is recorded with a classic rock'n'roll line-up (amplified guitars, bass, drums, vocals). Traditionally this category is more album oriented, and also has a traditional focus on live performance.

B: Pop/Top40

Music that is specifically tailored for mass consumption. Often various other musical styles are incorporated into one song. This category relies strongly on single sales. Sometimes an album may not even exist. Other indicators of this category may include: The specific targeting of teenage audiences by "designing" artists on the drawing board, or the importance of the producer over the actual performer. Also many of the so-called "one hit wonders" occur in this category.

C: Techno/House:

Musical style that was developed in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s by using strictly artificial sounds generated by synthesizers, computers, or samplers. The music of this category has a strong focus on the dance floor with a rhythm that usually ranges from 130 beats per minute (bpm) to 160 bpm or faster. Very often the traditional structures of a song (2-3 verses and a chorus) are neglected. Many of these songs are instrumentals or contain only very few lyrics. It should be pointed out that also songs that are considered "Kirmes Techno" ("carnival techno", a more commercial, more melodic, arguably washed out, cheap form of Techno/House Music) by many are to be put into this category.

D: Soul/R'n'B:

Melodic, tuneful music that regularly focuses on strong vocal performances. While this music is often rhythmic, it is considerably slower than for example Techno/House. The instruments used for these recordings often include pianos or strings.

E: Hiphop

Rhythmic, dynamic music that can be differentiated by the fact that the lyrics are not sung but rapped. Another characteristics of this style is that the music is often put together from already existing recordings (through sampling), and/or has added vocal parts or noises from other artists (also through sampling).

F: Reggae

Musical style that originated from the Caribbean, and was wildly diffused throughout the world by the success of Bob Marley in the 1970s and 1980s. While the traditional style of reggae (roots reggae) is characterized by a jumping beat and tuneful singing, modern variations (dancehall, or raggamuffin) are more aggressive, and also use elements from Hiphop. However, these songs should be put into the reggae category, not Hiphop or any other. Instrumentation is similar to Rock, but modern styles may include samplers or synthesizers.

G: Schlager/Volksmusik:

Traditional German music style that targets a more mature audience. The music relies on easy to recognize melodies and harmonies. Often a marching rhythm is used. Instrumentation can be similar to Rock or Pop/Top40 (Schlager) or it can consists of a whole marching band or traditional instruments like the accordion (Volksmusik).

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

Occurrence of Various Genres

Table 3: Occurrence of Various Genres (in percent).

Year	Pop/Top	Rock	Techno/Ho	HipHop	Soul/R'n'B	Schlager	Reggae	Sum
1985	72	18	0	0	8	2	0	100
1986	80	14	0	2	2	2	0	100
1987	74	14	2	0	6	4	0	100
1988	60	10	6	4	10	8	2	100
1989	68	10	10	6	6	0	0	100
1990	60	6	14	4	2	12	2	100
1991	46	20	8	16	0	10	0	100
1992	38	30	14	8	2	6	2	100
1993	48	20	18	2	4	0	8	100
1994	42	10	38	6	4	0	0	100
1995	30	12	40	8	4	2	4	100

Note: For the absolute amount of songs in each year of each genre, just divide the above numbers by two.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293015577798