 

 

 

 

 

I aunt":
I . J. «5...?!

 

'L
rfL 'fh‘l'l

3&1!

 

 

”1656

,7 WC cm vans smr LIBR‘ARlES

1:1 “H Ill llllllzllllllallll l; l ‘g‘lllllll Zilllll

 

 

 

 

 

 

ll

 

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE SELF-EVALUATIVE MOTIVES
OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-ASSESSMENT
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL COMPARISON PREFERENCES
OF DYSPHORIC AND NON-DYSPHORIC COLLEGE STUDENTS

presented by
BRADLEY JACOB MILLER HACK

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

P h . D . degree in PSYChOI 09y

 

 

j rpro ssor
Galen Bodenhausen
Date August 30, 1995

 

MS U is an Afﬁrmatiw Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

 

_;

 

 

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

 

 

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove We checkout from your record.
To AVOID FINES return on or before dete due.

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MSU le An M‘Irmetlve Action/Equei Opportunity ineiituion
mm:

THE SELF-EVALUATIVE MOTIVES
OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-ASSESSMENT
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL COMPARISON PREFERENCES
OF DYSPHORIC AND NON-DYSPHORIC COLLEGE STUDENTS

By
Bradley Jacob Miller Hack

A Dissertation

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1995

ABSTRACT

THE SELF-EVALUATIVE MOTIVES
OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-ASSESSMENT
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL COMPARISON PREFERENCES
OF DYSPHORIC AND NON-DYSPHORIC COLLEGE STUDENTS

By

Bradley Jacob Miller Hack

Past research has shown that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals choose to compare
themselves with different types of people for different reasons. The self-enhancement
hypothesis posits that when dysphoric persons receive feedback inconsistent with their self-
concepts, they will compare themselves with someone who is worse off than they are on the
personality trait in question, in order to feel better about themselves. The self-assessment
hypothesis posits that in this situation, dysphoric individuals will compare themselves with
someone who is similar or better off than they are on the trait in question, in order to be
more certain about themselves. Study I sought to test these two hypotheses directly by
giving dysphoric and non-dysphoric students either positive or negative feedback, varying in
certainty, on a bogus ability test. All participants were then given the opportunity to choose
another participant (who was actually ﬁctitious) with whom to compare themselves. This
ﬁctitious participant had either performed better than, worse than, or the same as the
actual participants on the test of synthetic ability. Participants' moods were measured
following comparisons. Participants' self-certainty regarding the bogus trait of "synthetic
ability" was also measured. Results revealed that the social comparison behavior of
participants was generally consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis but not the self-
enhancement hypothesis. Study 2 sought to test whether these two hypotheses also apply
in situations of incidental social comparisons, by giving the same level of feedback (all

participants received scores of "average") on the test of "synthetic ability" to non-dysphoric

and mildly dysphoric participants. They were then told that the last participant that was
tested received a score of either below average, average, or above average on the test. This
was the incidental social comparison. Participants' mood and self-certainty were then
assessed as was done in Study 1. Results were again generally consistent with the self-
assessment hypothesis. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are

discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee chairperson, Galen Bodenhausen for his wisdom
and guidance throughout the research process. His help has been an invaluable asset to me
during graduate school. I would like to thank committee members Norman Abeles, Ann
Baumgardner, and Dozier Thornton for their encouragement and assistance during this
project. I would also like to thank Jessica Corcoran, Erika Engel, Julia Fagan, and Sarah
Rogers for their assistance in conducting the experiments. A special thanks goes to
Cassandra, my wife, who has supported and encouraged me on this project and throughout
graduate school. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Stephen, Lorraine, and my
brother, Michail Hack, for the opprotunities and support they have provided for me
throughout my life.

Chapter Ease
I. Introduction 1
Social Comparison Literature Review 5
Self-Enhancement Hypothesis 6
Self-Assessment Hypothesis 9
Summary and Goals of Current Research ........................................ 14
The Utility Question 16
Predictions
Overview 16
Self-Enhancement Predictions 17
Self-Assessment Predictions 18
II. Study 1
Theoretical Overview 20
Method 20
Pretesting 2 1
Participants 23
Procedure 24
Synthetic Ability Test 25
Test Feedback 26
Social Comparison 27
Self-Certainty and Mood Measures ....................................... 29
Results 3 1
Direction of Social Comparison 31
Magnitude of Social Comparison .......................................... 34
Positive and Negative Affect 38
Change in Positive and Negative Affect ................................ 49
Self-Certainty Scores 53
Ancillary Results 58
Discussion 6 1
III. Study 2
Theoretical Overview 68
ethod 69
Participants 69
Procedure 69
Initial Measure of Self-Certainty .......................................... 70
Test Feedback 70
Social Comparison 7 1
Final Measure of Self-Certainty and Mood ........................... 7 1
Results 72
Positive and Negative Affect Scores ...................................... 72
Change in Positive and Negative Affect ................................ 7 7
Self-Certainty Scores 79
Change in Self-Certainty Scores 8 1
Ancillary Results 83

Table of Contents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.<

Discussion

 

General Discussion

 

References

 

Appendix A

 

Stimulus Materials for Study 1
Appendix B

 

 

Stimulus Materials for Study 2

vi

 

85
88
96

104
104

133
133

W19.

TABLE 1:
TABLE 2:
TABLE 3:
TABLE 4:
TABLE 5:
TABLE 6:
TABLE 7:
TABLE 8:

TABLE 9:

TABLE 10:
TABLE 11:
TABLE 12:
TABLE 13:

TABLE 14:
TABLE 15:
TABLE 16:
TABLE 17:

TABLE 18:
TABLE 19:
TABLE 20:

TABLE 21:

LIST OF TABLES

Direction of Comparison by Level of Dysphoria
Direction of Comparison by Valence of F ’L L
Direction of Comparison by Certainty of F ’L ‘

Magnitude of Comparison by Dysphoria and Valence ........................
Magnitude of Comparison by Dysphoria, Valence, and Certainty ......
Magnitude of Comparison by Valence and Certainty ..........................
Pre-Test Positive Affectand Negative Affect Scores .............................

Post-Comparison Positive and Negative Affect Scores by Dysphoria,
Valence, and Certainty of "‘

C

Post-Comparison Positve Affect Scores by Dysphoria and Valence .....
Post-Comparison Negative Affect Scores by Dysphoria and Valence...
Post-Comparison Positve Affect Scores by Dysphoria and Certainty..
Post-Comparison Negative Affect Scores by Dysphoria and Certainty

Post-Comparison Positve Affect Scores by Dysphoria, Valence, and
Certainty

 

Change in Positive Affect Scores

 

Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Valence ...........
Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Certainty ........

Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison, Dysphoria, and

Valance

Pre-Test Positive and Negative Affect Scores

 

 

Post-Test Positive and Negative Affect Scores

Post-Test Positive Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison and

Dysnh nri a

Post-Test Negative Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison and
Dysphoria

g
CD
[0

33
34
36
36
38
39

43
44
45
46

48
5 1
54
56

57
73
74

76

76

TABLE 22:

TABLE 23:

TABLE 24:
TABLE 25:
TABLE 26:

Change in Post-Test Positive Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison
and Dysphoria 78

Post-Test Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and
Dysphoria 80

Post-Test Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison ............... 81
Change in Posttest Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison 82

Change in Post-Test Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison
and Dysphoria 83

viii

Introduction

Depression is a relatively common problem that is experienced by clinical and non-
clinical populations alike. Conservative estimates indicate that at least four percent of the
adult population is sufﬁciently depressed at any given time to warrant clinical treatment
(Lewinsohn, Antonuccio, Breckenridge, & Teri, 1984). At least twenty percent of the adult
population will have a clinically signiﬁcant episode of depression at some time in their lives
(Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1982; Myers & Weissman, 1980). About half of those who have
symptoms that warrant a diagnosis of a major depressive episode will experience another
major episode (Belsher & Costello, 1988; Spaner, Bland, & Newman, 1994). With these
ﬁgures in mind, it is not surprising that depression has been called the common cold of
mental health (e.g., Seligman, 1975). However, depression, unlike the common cold, is not
to be taken lightly. It is a particularly debilitating disorder that can exact a heavy toll on
many aspects of a person's life, including interpersonal relationships, work performance,
family relations, social interactions, and daily ftmctioning. In addition, depressed
individuals are at considerable risk for self-injurious and suicidal behavior. It has been
noted that the suicide rate for depressed patients is higher than for patients with any other
psychological disorder (Becker, 1974; Mendels, 1975), with as many as one out of every 200
depressed persons committing suicide, according to some estimates (Lehman, 1971).

There are many symptoms of depression, including a reduced rate of daily activity,
problems with social interactions that lead to feelings of loneliness, feelings of guilt for not
performing up to self-imposed expectations, and somatic complaints such as diﬁiculty
sleeping, loss of appetite, or chronic fatigue. These symptoms are likely to vary from person
to person and may or may not be evident in some depressed individuals. The feature that
is present in almost all cases, however, is dysphoria, which is described by people who

experience it as feeling sad, gloomy, worthless, or helpless. Because of the impact

depression can have on one's life, many psychological theories have attempted to explain the
mental processes that are involved in this disorder.

Early psychoanalytic theory focused on a reaction to the loss of a central source of
love and emotional security as the precipitant to depression. Freud (1917) observed that
such losses often produce severe and seemingly irrational self-criticism and castigation. He
behaved that this self-reproach is actually directed at the lost object, which has been
introjected into the depressed individual's own ego. To criticize the lost object openly would
produce feelings of guilt. Instead, the hostility is directed at the self, which results in
depression. Rado (1928) provided a variation on Freud's original hypothesis by proposing
that there exists a depression—prone personality which is dependent on approval from
others. When such an individual experiences the loss of an object of central importance, s/he
will react with anger and resentment. Realizing that such reactions will not be productive,
however, the individual will attempt to gain the object's approval (and ultimately, one's self-
esteem) through self-punishment and repentance. Such self-punishment, however, does not
accomplish these ends and instead results in depression.

Cognitive theory has also focused on the impact of a loss and the resultant negative
feelings about oneself on depressive symptomatology. Beck (1976) proposed that the
thought content of a depressed individual centers on a signiﬁcant loss that s/he perceives as
essential to her/his happiness. The individual will anticipate negative outcomes from any
important undertaking and will regard herself as deﬁcient in the attributes necessary for
achieving important goals. Beck conceives of this negative thought pattern as a cognitive
triad of negative views of oneself, one's world, and one's future. This thought pattern leads
to the negative emotions of dysphoria, dissappointinent, and apathy, and a vicious cycle is
established whereby these emotions and thoughts solidify one's negative view of life.

Kuiper, Derry, and MacDonald (1982) further propose that mildly depressed people's self-

schemata are mixed, including both positive and negative components. They reason that as

depression deepens, more of the person's negative self-schemata are activated, thereby
negatively affecting different cognitive processes such as memory, inference, and perception.

Early behavioral theories of depression (Lazarus, 1968; Skinner, 1953) regarded the
symptoms of the disorder as the result of a reduction in positive reinformcements. People
who are depressed withdraw from life because few incentives exist to become more active.
Another proposed source of depression is a deﬁciency in social skills, which prevents an
individual from interacting with others in a satisfying and rewarding manner (Coyne, 1976;
Lewinsohn & Shaw, 1969). Without the reinforcements derived from other people's interest
and concern, the individual is likely to become depressed. In addition, the individual is
likely to remain depressed until s/he can learn to elicit positive behaviors from others.
Experiencing stressful life events can also lead to depression. Such events can be major life
stressors, such as the death of a loved one, changing jobs changing one's residence, being
promoted, or they can take the form of daily hassles. In either case, these stressors interfere
with an individual's ability to carry out routine behavior patterns, which can lead the
individual to become self-critical, withdraw from others, and assume responsibility for
negative outcomes (Haber-man & Lewinsohn, 1985).

One recent theory has attempted to integrate these three different perspectives into
a coherent model of depression. The self-regulatory perseveration model (Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987) posits that a self-regulatory cycle emerges in depressed individuals that
maintains their depression. They propose that the self-regulatory cycle begins with
disruption of ongoing behavior (usually a loss of central importance to the individual), which
will create a shift in attention toward the self. This shift starts a self-evaluative process
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972) whereby one's present standing on the relevant dimension is
assessed. If this evaluation reveals that one meets or exceeds one's standards for that
dimension, then positive affect results from the self-focus. When one falls short of this self—
imposed standard, negative affect results. For example, if a tennis player self-focuses after

winning a match, she will likely conclude that she meets her standard for tennis ability and

will feel good about her performance. If the same player self-focuses aﬁer a loss, she will
likely conclude that she falls short of her standard for ability, and she will feel badly. This
negative affect will lead to behavior aimed at reducing the discrepancy, such as practicing
harder. If the attempt to reduce the discrepancy is successful, then the individual exits the
self-regulatory cycle. If the attempt at discrepancy reduction fails, then further attempts at
reduction are enacted, until the subjective probability of successful discrepancy reduction is
low (Carver & Scheier, 1981). When this point is reached the individual experiences
negative affect as a result of the self-regulatory process. If, after practicing harder, our
tennis player wins her next match, she will meet her standard and will exit the self-
regulatory cycle. If she loses her next match, she will practice harder until the discrepancy is
reduced or she behaves that she will never get better and consequently will experience
negative affect.

The self-regulatory perseveration model provides a convenient tool for understanding
why and how depressives engage in the self-regulatory cycle. The process of comparing one's
current standing with one's desired standing on an attribute is a central component of this
cycle. This process of self-evaluation can have a powerful effect on depressives' positive and
negative feelings about themselves. Another method for self-evaluation, however, is
comparing one's own standing on an attribute with someone else's standing on that
attribute. The information gained from this process of social comparison can have as much
of an impact on depressives' feelings about themselves as "self-comparison." It has been
shown that depressives compare themselves socially on a daily basis (Wheeler & Miyake,
1992), and the information gained from these comparisons is an integral part of their self-
concepts. Since these comparisons can be so inﬂuential, it becomes important to understand
why depressives make social comparisons, whom they compare themselves to, and how
these comparisons affect their feelings about themselves. Equipped with such an
understanding, it becomes possible to intervene in the depressive syndrome by using the

social comparison process to develop cognitive techniques to alleviate depression.

Social C ' l " ‘ Review

Festinger, in his seminal work on social comparison theory (1954), proposed that
people have a need to have stable, accurate appraisals of themselves. Usually, they prefer
objective, non-social standards for these self-appraisals, but if such information is not
available, people will compare themselves with others. They engage in this process when
they are unsure of their abilities or opinions. Lack of certainty concerning one's standing on
a particular dimension can be precipitated by a threat to one's notion of where he or she
stands on that dimension. If the dimension is central to one's self-concept, this constitutes a
threat to one's self-esteem. By engaging in social comparison, however, people can evaluate
the validity of the threat, as well as the certainty of their abilities and opinions. Preferably,
this comparison is with a person who is similar on the attribute in question. According to
Festinger (1954), this provides maximum information for the self-evaluation. For example,
a bodybuilder might socially compare with another bodybuilder of similar height and weight,
and who has trained for about the same number of years, to evaluate how her/his muscle
development is progressing. In Festinger's original work, he described a "unidirectional
drive upward," by which he meant that people strive to be more capable than their current
level of performance. One way the unidirectional drive upward is exercised is by socially
comparing to those who are slightly better off on the speciﬁed attribute (Wheeler, 1966).
These types of comparisons have been referred to as upward comparisons. However, others
(Sula, 1977) have suggested that this "unidirectional drive upward" can involve strivings to
appear more capable than others, which could be better accomplished by comparing oneself
with others who are worse off on the attribute in question. These kinds of comparisons have
been termed downward comparisons. A third type of comparison involves measuring oneself
against a target who is similar on the speciﬁed trait, which has been referred to as lateral

comparisons.

 

an"- In L L :1 L1.

In addition to Festinger's notion of self-evaluation, Wills (1981, 1987) notes that a
second goal of social comparison is self-enhancement through downward comparison.
Previously, these two motives for engaging in social comparison have been treated relatively
independently in the literature, with some recent exceptions (Sedikides, 1993; Swann,
Pelham, 8; Krull, 1989). In Wills's theory of downward social comparison (1981, 1987), he
states that behavior patterns under natural conditions will exhibit both self-evaluative and
self-enhancing comparisons. Under normal conditions, self-evaluation should predominate,
but as psychological distress increases so does self-enhancement. A principle of this theory
posits that people who experience negative affect or a decrease in subjective well-being are
more likely to engage in downward social comparison. Negative life events trigger disruption
and distress in people that, in turn, create a threat to self-esteem. To fend off this threat,
people will use coping mechanisms to reduce the distress and threat. One way of doing this
is to engage in downward social comparison. This process is said to increase subjective well-
being by comparing oneself with a less fortunate other. To maximize self-enhancement and
minimize the ego threat, the target of comparison should be a person who has a problem
similar to the distressed individual but who is worse off due to inadequate coping or because
of less favorable status on other dimensions (Wills, 1981). Downward comparisons can be
passive, such as "coincidental occurrence of a comparison target," in which the individual
happens to read or hear about a "worse off other" and this other becomes the target for
comparison. Downward comparisons can also be active, such as the derogation of others
who are inferior or worse off on a particular dimension or trait.

Consistent with Wills's theory, a number of studies have shown that downward
comparison can indeed reduce distress and increase life satisfaction and positive affect.
Crocker and Gallo (1985) found that participants who were induced to compare downward
showed an increase in subjective ratings of life-satisfaction, decreased anxiety, and a

reduction in depressed mood. Conversely, those induced to compare upward did not show

these effects. Other research has examined the effects of self-esteem threat on participants'
desires to socially compare. Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) examined cancer patients
(a population that experiences a constant threat to well-being), and found an overwhelming
preponderance of spontaneous downward comparisons with worse off others during the
course of individual 2-hour interviews. Similar ﬁndings from cancer patients (Taylor, Falke,
Shoptaw, & Lichtman, 1986; Collins, Dakof, and Taylor 1988) and from Rheumatoid
Arthritis patients (DeVellis, Holt, Renner, Blalock, Blanchard, Cook, Klotz, Mikow &
Herring, 1990) have been uncovered. This set of ﬁndings is highly consistent with Wills's
theory of downward comparison. Apparently, people who experience threats to their self
esteem are likely to fend off the threat by engaging in downward comparisons for the
purposes of self-enhancement. Presumably, by doing this they feel better about themselves
because they defended against the ego threat. They remind themselves that there are worse
off others in the world, and simply knowing this seems to have the effect of improving their
mood and possibly their self-image, at least temporarily.

A population that seems particularly apt to use se1f~enhancing downward social
comparisons to its advantage are depressed and dysphoric individuals. Indeed, people with
these characteristics have received attention in the literature concerning their preferences for
social comparison. This category of people is also viewed as having chronically low self-
esteem, negative affect, and is particularly vulnerable to threats to self-esteem. According to
Wills (1981, 1987), people who experience negative affect and a low sense of well-being are
more likely to engage in downward comparison. Additionally, according to Gibbons (1986),
depressed and dysphoric participants engage in downward social comparison for the
purposes of self-enhancement much like the cancer and RA patients did. Speciﬁcally,
Gibbons (1986) found that depressed participants (as identiﬁed by the Beck Depression
Inventory, BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) induced into a negative
mood were signiﬁcantly more likely to request negative information about another

participant. In addition, aﬁer reading about the distressed participant, these participants

reported feeling better. Depressed participants in a positive mood and non-depressed
participants in either a positive or negative mood did not make the same downward
comparisons.

Similarly, Aspinwall & Taylor (1993) reported that low self-esteem participants
(LSE's) induced into a negative mood were far more likely to indicate that a forced
downward comparison with another student, who was adjusting poorly to college, increased
positive mood and led to greater hope for future success. This effect was not obtained for
ISE's in a positive mood or high self-esteem participants (HSE's) in either a positive or
negative mood. Gibbons and McCoy (1991) reported that after receiving negative feedback
on a bogus test of social awareness (threat condition), low self-esteem participants showed
an improvement in mood after listening to a tape of a troubled student, whereas high self-
esteem participants did not. This effect did not occur when participants received positive
feedback (no threat condition). Like depressed participants, those low in self-esteem who
are threatened feel better knowing that there is another student who is worse off than they
are.

Several other investigators have shown corroborating evidence, including ﬁndings
that depressed participants report a desire to afﬁliate with other depressed people
(Funabiki, Bologna, Pepping, & Fitzgerald, 1980), prefer interacting with others who are
unhappy (Coates & Peterson, 1982), and are more likely to have best friends who are
depressed (Rosenblatt and Greenberg, 1991). In addition, Rosenblatt and Greenberg
(1991) found that depressed participants felt signiﬁcantly worse than non-depressed
participants after talking to non-depressed targets. Non-depressed participants, on the
other hand, felt signiﬁcantly worse than depressed participants aﬁer talking to depressed
targets.

In sum, these studies reveal a consistent set of ﬁndings: across all of these
investigations, depressed, dysphoric, and low self—esteem participants preferred downward

social comparison and in many cases showed self-enhancement as a consequence. In other

A

words, depressed participants felt better after reading about or interacting with worse off,
depressed participants than they did aiter interacting with non-depressed, better-off people.
Based on Wills's (1981) theory, we would expect this pattern of ﬁndings. By engaging in
downward social comparisons, depressives see themselves in a more positive light because
they are better than someone on the trait in question, and this makes them feel better

about themselves.

an]: A L 1’" LL

Downward comparisons, however, may not always make people feel better.
Although the self-enhancement ﬁndings show that downward comparisons can improve the
moods of dysphoric participants, Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van Yperen, & Dakof (1990) and
Aspinwall & Taylor (1993) found that downward comparisons do not necessarily beneﬁt
depressed participants. They may also increase negative mood. Buunk et al. have
suggested that this is because there are two outcomes that can result from making a
downward comparison: (1) people ﬁnd out that they are better off than the target, but (2)
they realize that it is possible for them to fall to the level of the target. Take the example of
a cancer patient in remission. She can compare herself with a cancer patient whose cancer
is spreading, and realize that she is better off, yet she can also realize that she can
deteriorate to the level of the other patient. Buunk et a1. (1990) also address upward
comparisons and the fact that two outcomes are possible in these as well: (1) Individuals
realize that they are inferior to the target on this trait, but also that (2) it is possible to
improve on this characteristic. Buunk et a1. (1990) found that cancer patients' aﬁ'ect differed
after making either upward or downward comparisons, depending on the piece of
information to which they attended. Downward comparisons did not always lead to positive
aﬁ'ect; they also led to negative affect. Similarly, upward comparisons did not always lead
to negative affect; they also led to positive affect or a sense of hopefulness that they might

achieve or surpass the level of their comparison target. Thus, it seems possible that in some

10

situations, participants who are dysphoric or depressed might be motivated to engage in
upward comparisons and might experience positive affect aﬁer doing so.

There has been another pattern of ﬁndings in the social comparison literature that is
similar to this proposition. This set of ﬁndings is generally consistent with the notion of self-
evaluation, as outlined by Festinger (1954), but also more speciﬁcally with the idea of self-
assessment as outlined by Trope (1983, 1986). Research by Trope and colleagues shows
that people strive to be accurate in their views of the world and of themselves. They select
tasks that will diagnose their abilities and often do so even when the outcome is likely to be
unfavorable. In relation to social comparisons, this means people will make a lateral or
upward comparison despite the possibility that they will experience negative affect as a
result. According to this view, the motivation for accurate self-assessment is greater than
the motivation for self-enhancement. Presumably, the purpose for comparing oneself with
one who is similar or better off is to accurately evaluate one's standing relative to others, not
to improve one's view of oneself or increase subjective well-being. This assumption is
consistent with Festinger's original proposition that social comparison serves to help
individuals evaluate themselves in comparison with others when they are uncertain about
the correctness of their self-evaluations, attitudes, and judgments.

Evidence suggests that depressed people are more likely to experience this type of
uncertainty than people who are not depressed. Investigators have suggested that people
who have negative self-concepts (e.g., depressed people) are also quite uncertain of their own
self-worth (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Baumgardner, 1990; Baumgardner,
Kaufman, & Levy, 1989; Pelham & Swarm, 1989). Others have suggested that because
depressed people have a low sense of control over their lives (Warren & McEachren, 1983),
they experience chronic heightened uncertainty associated with exposure to these
uncontrollable life events (Abramson, Seligman, Teasdale, 1978; Weary, Elbin, & Hill,

1987). It has been proposed that this uncertainty is aversive and can lead to negative affect

(Baumgardner, 1990). Depressed people, therefore, would seem to be motivated to reduce

11

this uncertainty. To accomplish this reduction, it would seem that depressed people should
be motivated to engage in lateral or upward comparisons for the purposes of self-
assessment. Consistent with this proposition, Weary et al. (1987) reported that, compared
with non-depressed participants, depressed participants evaluated a confederate more
positively when he made attributional judgments similar to theirs, but more negatively
when his judgments were dissimilar. It has been hypothesized that similarity in
attributions leads to uncertainty reduction (Byrne, 1971). Based on this proposition, it was
concluded that depressed participants' attempts to evaluate their own judgments in
comparison to someone else's were driven by a motivation to reduce uncertainty about these
judgments. When their uncertainty was reduced (i.e., when the confederate made a similar
attribution), they were more conﬁdent about where they stood on the trait in question, and
they evaluated the confederate more favorably.

Swallow and Kuiper (1992) reported that dysphoric participants made a large
number of social comparisons when they received either favorable or unfavorable feedback
about another participant's performance, relative to their own, on a numerical sequence
recall task. In contrast, non-dysphoric participants made a signiﬁcantly smaller number of
social comparisons following negative feedback, but an equal amount following positive
feedback. If dysphoric participants were motivated to self-enhance, we would expect them to
make a greater number of downward comparisons after negative feedback than after
positive feedback. This, however, was not the case. Dysphoric participants were just as
likely to make downward comparisons after negative as after positive feedback.
Additionally, Swallow and Kuiper (1993, Study 1) found that both dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants preferred comparing themselves to better off others when they
received positive feedback concering their performance on a number recall task. When non-
dysphoric participants received unﬂattering feedback, however, they preferred comparisons
with worse off others. Dysphoric participants, on the other hand, preferred comparisons

with similar oﬁ' others when they received unﬂattering feedback. The investigators

12

interpreted these ﬁndings as evidence for dysphoric participants' engaging in self-
assessment and non-dysphoric participants' engaging in self-enhancement. Similarly,
Ahrens (1986) found that when participants were given a choice between comparing
themselves with a target who had done better or one who had done worse than they had on
a task, depressed participants made judgments based on a succcessful (better off) target
whereas non-depressed participants made judgments based on an unsuccessful (worse off)
target. Based on these ﬁndings, Swallow and Kuiper (1992) have proposed that the
cognitive motive for accurate self-evaluative feedback outweighs the aﬁ'ective motive for self-
enhancing feedback in dysphoric participants. They believe that, consistent with Weary et
al. (1987), dysphorics engage in self-assessment for the purposes of reducing heightened
uncertainty that surrounds their beliefs about their abilities and judgments.

In a separate study, Ahrens (1991) found that when both groups of participants
were given feedback that was either favorable (information regarding a poor performance by
another participant) or unfavorable (information about a participant who did well) regarding
their perfomance on a spatial abilities test, there were no differences between the two
groups in their estimation of how well they performed relative to other participants. When
they received mixed information (evidence that one other participant did well and one did
poorly), however, non-dysphorics estimated their performance asifjhey had only received
evidence that another participant did poorly and, in essence, self-enhanced. They ignored
the other piece of information and estimated their performance to be quite good. Dysphoric
participants, on the other hand, did the opposite. They estimated their performance asjf
they had only received unfavorable feedback (that the other participant did well), and, in
essence, self-assessed. Consequently, they estimated their performance to be quite poor.
Thus, dysphorics and non-dysphorics combine information differently. The manner in which
they do this is consistent with the other evidence that dysphorics make comparisons with

similar or better off others, consistent with the self-assessment perspective, but that non-

13

dysphorics make comparisons with worse off others, consistent with the self-enhancement
position.

In summary, the self-assessment ﬁndings outlined here seem to indicate that when
both dysphoric and non-dysphoric persons are not threatened with negative feedback, their
social comparison behavior is similar: they tend to compare themselves to better off others.
When they are threatened with negative feedback, however, non-dysphorics respond by
comparing themselves to worse off others, presumably in an attempt to reduce the threat
and protect their egos. This self-protective strategy is consistent with work detailing self-
serving social cognitive biases in non-dysphoria (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Abramson & Alloy,
1981, Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Lewinshon, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980;
Tabachnik, Cracker, & Alloy, 1983; Taylor & Lobe], 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Dysphoric participants, however, respond to negative feedback by comparing themselves
with similar and better off others, which may provide more accurate, albeit less ﬂattering,
feedback regarding their abilities. This inability to utilize self-protective strategies is
consistent with work that suggests this type of behavior may maintain or even exacerbate
negative self-evaluations that dysphorics usually have (Ahrens, Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988;
Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Pinkley, Laprelle, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 1988; Tabachnik
et al., 1983). Making upward comparisons, however, may not necessarily be detrimental, as
Buunk et al. (1990) have noted. In addition, self-assessment theory proposes that dysphoric
participants have heightened uncertainty and have a strong need to reduce this uncertainty.
By reducing this uncertainty, (via lateral or upward comparisons), dysphorics can increase
their sense of control over future outcomes by pursuing those they know they are competent

in and by avoiding those they know they are incompetent in (Baumgardner, 1990).

 

Summary and Goals of the Current Research

The two diverging patterns of ﬁndings reviewed above are nicely explained by the
two diﬁ'erent processes of self-evaluation. On one hand, the self-enhancement motivation
explains the studies showing that, when under threat, depressed participants prefer to
compare themselves to targets who are worse off, and they feel better after they do so,
whereas non-depressed participants prefer to compare themselves with better off others and
feel better after these comparisons. The self-assessment motivation explains the studies
showing that depressed and dysphoric participants prefer to compare themselves with
similar and better oﬁ‘ others when under threat, but non-depressed participants prefer to
compare themselves with worse off others when under threat. Depressed participants
engage in upward comparisons presumably to obtain maximally diagnostic feedback and
reduce their uncertainty. Neither set of ﬁndings exhibited these effects in the absence of
threat. Thus, there are two different sets of ﬁndings from studies attempting to examine
the same phenomena of social comparison tendencies in depressed and dysphoric people.
Each one is explained well by a separate self-evaluation hypothesis. A logical next question
is: "Which hypothesis best describes the social comparison behavior of dysphorics?" In other
words, which one is right? What remains to be done is to provide a direct test of these two
explanations.

Prior to addressing this question, however, a conceptual distinction must be made
between dysphoria and depression. Many of the studies mentioned above label their
participants as "depressed" based on their Beck Depression Inventory scores. There is
evidence, however, that such a label is a misnomer (Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen,
Ingram, 1987). These researchers distinguish between depression as a symptom, a
syndrome, and a nosological category. As a symptom, depression can merely be a feeling of
sadness. As a syndrome, depression is a constellation of signs and symptoms that cluster

together (e.g. sadness, negative self-concept, sleep and appetite disturbances). Finally, for

14 ,
A

15

depression to be a nosological category, careful diagnostic procedures, such as those in a
clinical interview, must be followed to rule out other possible diagnoses (Kendall, et al.,
1987). According to these distinctions, Kendall et al. state that the BDI is an instrument
that measures depression at its syndromal level. They further recommend that because the
ED] is not sufﬁcient to diagnose depression as a discrete nosological entity, participants who
score in the "depressed" range should be referred to as "dysphoric" and not as “depressed."
This deﬁnition will be followed by the current research for the remainder of this manuscript.
Returning to the descriptive question raised above, reducing this critical question to
"self-enhancement versus self-assessment," may oversimplify a complex process. This
simpliﬁcation seems inappropriate, given the strength of the ﬁndings outlined above. It
does not seem to be merely a question of which motivation is the "true" or "dominant"
motive. It seems clear that both motivations operate for both dysphorics and non-
dysphorics. Rather, a more interesting and appropriate question to ask is when will self-
enhancement be dominant and when will self-assessment be dominant? An individual
difference variable that might help to answer this question is how certain participants are
about where they stand on the dimension of interest. Different levels of certainty can be
created experimentally that either lead participants to be certain or uncertain that they are
high or low on the trait in question. Recall that when participants are not certain about
their standing on an attribute, they should self-assess (Festinger, 1954; Trope, 1983, 1986),
which in turn promotes a sense of control over future outcomes, thus generating positive
affect and conﬁdence in the self (Baumgardner, 1990). If the self-assessment hypothesis is
valid, than participants' level of certainty regarding the dimension of interest should
inﬂuence their social comparison choices and the impact these comparisons have on
participants. If the self-enhancement hypothesis is valid, then certainty should not inﬂuence

participants.

In addition, the current research also seeks to assess the utility of the social
comparison process. That is, why in one situation is self-enhancement crucial for dysphorics
when in another situation self-assessment is? Much of the past research has focused on
determining which self-evaluative motive might be leading participants to compare in a
certain direction. The explanations for why participants self-enhanced or self-assessed, and
the utility that social comparisons had for the participants, were left to post-hoe discussions
and have not been tested directly. In attempting to answer these questions, dependent
variables designed to assess changes in affect and self-certainty have been included into the
design of the current research. Incorporating these pre- and post-comparison measures will
help to understand the utility of self-enhancing or self-assessing by measuring the impact

these comparisons have on the participants.

Overview and Predictions of the Current Research

The purpose of the current research was two-fold. First, the research provided a
direct test of the self-enhancement and self-assessment hypotheses concerning the social
comparison behavior of dysphoric as compared with non-dysphoric participants in an
attempt to assess when each motive will be dominant. This test was accomplished by
informing participants that the experimenters were interested in a number of different
personality traits and that participants would be taking tests of these traits. One of these
traits was ﬁctitious ("synthetic ability"), and thus the test of this trait was contrived, while
the others were actual tests of personality traits. These served as ﬁller tests, while the test
of synthetic ability was the stimulus of interest. Participants took the contrived test,
received feedback about their performance, were provided with an opportunity for social
comparison, were given a measure of their self-certainty for the ﬁctitious trait, and were

given a measure of their affect. Two of the independent variables were valence of feedback

16

17

(positive vs. negative) and certainty of feedback (high vs. low). The participants were
induced to think either that they were low or high on the desirable trait and that the
experimenters were certain or uncertain about their performance on the test of synthetic
ability. Major dependent variables included the type of target they chose for social
comparison (a better off, similar, or worse off target), their ratings of self-certainty regarding
the trait, and self-ratings of pre- and post-comparison affect.

The second purpose of this research is to attempt to identify an individual difference
variable that may inﬂuence the social comparison process. The variable of interest is the
amount of certainty expressed in the test feedback regarding participants' standing relative
to others on the ﬁctitious trait. The self-assessment hypothesis expects that participants
made to feel uncertain will be motivated to compare themselves with similar or better off
others to obtain maximally diagnostic information to reduce this uncertainty. This
hypothesis also expects that a post-comparison measure of uncertainty will show that
participants given uncertain feedback, who should make lateral or upward comparisons, will
be more certain about themselves in regard to the trait in question than participants given
uncertain feedback who prefer downward comparisons, or participants given certain
feedback who prefer downward or upward comparisons. The self-enhancement hypothesis
does not incorporate the notion of uncertainty and for this reason does not offer ﬁrm

predictions regarding the impact of the certainty variable or participants' social comparisons.

un-n L r11 J- .-

Regarding the valence of feedback, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicts that
only when dysphoric participants are given negative feedback about their performance will
they make downward comparisons and experience an improvement in mood following this
comparison. Based on the ﬁndings in the literature and the assumption made by Aspinwall
and Taylor (1993) that hath negative affect and a threat to self-esteem are necessary for

self-enhancement to occur, it was predicted that these effects would not occur when

18

dysphoric participants were given positive feedback. For the same reasons, it was predicted
that these effects would also not occur when non-dysphoric participants were given either
positive or negative feedback. The self-enhancement hypothesis does not make any
predictions regarding the certainty of feedback variable and its impact on dysphoric or non-
dysphoric participants. The self-enhancment hypothesis does not confer importance to the
participants' level of uncertainty. If dysphoric participants are given both negative and
uncertain feedback, the self-enhancement position predicts that they will make downward
comparisons and experience an improvement in mood, but only because of the presence of

the negative feedback.

anpr rm J' L-

The self-assessment hypothesis predicts that when dysphoric participants are given
negative or uncertain feedback, they will engage in lateral or upward comparisons and
experience a decrease in uncertainty and an improvement in mood following this comparison.
This is because when participants are not certain about their standing on an attribute, they
will be likely to self-assess (Festinger, 1954; Trope, 1983, 1986), which in turn promotes a
sense of control over future outcomes, thus generating positive affect and conﬁdence in the
self (Baumgardner, 1990). When dysphoric participants are given both negative and
uncertain feedback, it was predicted that a multiplicative effect would occur. Speciﬁcally,
this hypothesis implies that dysphorics receiving negative and uncertain feedback will make
even greater upward and lateral comparisons, to experience greater self-certainty and a
better mood, than when given certain feedback. This prediction is based on the expectation
that uncertain feedback will add to the pool of uncertainty that the negative feedback and
dysphoric mood have created. In addition, the self-assessment hypothesis predicts that non-
dysphoric participants will engage in downward comparisons after receiving negative
feedback and will experience an improvement in mood following this comparison, but not a

reduction in uncertainty. Recall that this is based on the ﬁndings that non-dysphorics tend

to self-enhance after receiving negative feedback (Ahrens, 1986; 1991; Swallow & Kuiper,
1993, Study 1) and which is also consistent with work detailing self -serving social cognitive
biases in non-dysphoria (Alloy 8r. Ahrens, 1987; Abramson & Alloy, 1981, Alloy & Abramson,
1979, 1982; Lewinshon, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980; Tabachnik et al., 1983; Taylor
& Label, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Finally, based on the ﬁndings outlined above that
are consistent with Festinger's "unidirectional drive upward," this perspective predicts that
either dysphoric or non-dysphoric participants receiving positive, certain, or both types of
feedback will exhibit a pattern of lateral or upward comparisons.

The current research thus adds to the existing literature by providing a direct test of
these two hypotheses and their explanation for the comparison behavior of dysphoric and
non-dysphoric participants. These two hypotheses have been tested simultaneously
(Sedikides, 1993) but not with a dysphoric population. Also, the addition of the post-
comparison measures of affect and self-certainty allowed for more deﬁnitive conclusions as to
why participants were making certain types of comparisons. That is, did they feel better
after making downward comparisons (consistent with self-enhancement) or did they feel
better and more certain after they made upward comparisons (consistent with self-
assessment)? The assessment of these dependent variables had not been done in previous
research. Rather, much of the research had focused on the descriptive question: What is the
pattern of comparison for dysphorics and non-dysphorics? The utility question, (what
function does this pattern serve for participants?), had been leﬁ; to speculative conclusions in
the post-hoc discussion of the ﬁndings. The current research sought to test these post-hoe
explanations in order to begin to answer the utility question. Including these dependent

measures helped to accomplish this goal.

Study 1

Wars

The current research was carried out in two separate experiments. Study 1 involved
an examination of the social comparison preferences of mildly dysphoric and non-dysphoric
participants. This ﬁrst study was concerned with the descriptive question as it applies to
different levels of dysphoria: "Which self-evaluative motive explains what dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants do in the face of negative and uncertain feedback?" This experiment
attempted to resolve the self-enhancement vs. self-assessment dispute as they relate to
dysphoria. Study 1 also addressed the question of when will non-dysphoric and mildly
dysphoric participants make downward, lateral, and upward comparisons? More
speciﬁcally, when someone receives certain as opposed to uncertain feedback, will s/he be

more likely to make downward comparisons, as the self-assessment hypothesis predicts?

Method
(hands!

The procedure for Study 1 involved some elements of the classic social comparison
paradigm, originally designed by Hakmiller (1966), but also incorporated additions to the
typical procedure. Prior to this procedure, participants were selected based on their scores
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1961), and the Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale (Crowns & Marlowe, 1960), which they completed at a pre-testing session.
At the experimental session, participants were told that the experimenters were interested
in "participant demographics" on a number of different personality traits as well as their
reactions to the tests that measure these traits. As such, they ﬁlled out a "personal

background" questionnaire to assess demographic characteristics, and they also took a

20

21

number of brief personality tests and gave their reactions to each test. They were assured
that all of the information collected was anonymous. Each participant was given a numeric
code that was not traceable to the student's identity. Before beginning the experiment,
however, they were told that, as part of a separate and unrelated experiment involving
peoples' feelings, they were to complete 2 forms designed to assess their moods.
Participants were given the Beck Depression Inventory to measure their level of dysphoria
and the Positive and Negative Aﬂ’ect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988),
which provided an initial measure of their mood. These questionnaires were followed by the
administration of the personality tests. Participants were told that they would be taking
two tests, the ﬁrst of which was a test of "synthetic ability." Following this test,
participants were given feedback regarding their performance on the test. They were told
that they were either in the "very high range" (positive feedback condition) or in the "below
average range" (negative feedback condition) on this trait. In addition, part of this feedback
explained that the scorer of the test was either certain or uncertain of their standing on this
trait. Following this feedback, they were asked to choose among targets, who varied in
performance level, with whom to compare themselves. The performance of the other person,
or target, was constructed by the experimenter. After viewing the feedback that the
ﬁctitious comparison target received, the participants were asked to complete the PANAS
again, as well as a measure of self-certainty for the trait of synthetic ability. Thus, the
design of Study 1 was a 2 (feedback valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (feedback certainty:
certain vs. uncertain) X 2 (level of dysphoria: dysphoric vs. non-dysphoric) factorial design
with social comparison preference as the primary dependent variable, and affect and self-

certainty as secondary dependent variables.

haunting
With the pretense that researchers were seeking normative information on several

psychological scales measuring moods and attitudes, 344 female undergraduates enrolled in

22

Introductory Psychology completed the EDI and the Marlowe~Crowne Social Desirability
Scale at pro-test sessions. Male participants were not asked to complete the pretests for
two reasons: First, there is a greater prevalence of dysphoria among women as opposed to
men (Achtimen & Joukamaa, 1994; Spaner, Bland, & Newman, 1994), and second, there is
a greater number of females enrolling in Introductory Psychology classes. To maximize the
likelihood that adequate numbers of dysphoric participants would be recruited, only females
were asked to participate. Previous research has not found any gender effects in social
comparison processes (Gibbons,1986; Weary et al., 1987; Swallow & Kuiper, 1993;
Tabachnik et al., 1983). A maximum of four participants were pre-tested at any one time.
The BDI is a widely used self-report questionnaire consisting of 21 clusters of statements
that tap different characteristics that have been associated with depression, such as
sadness, sense of failure, guilt, self-dislike, suicidal ideation, insomnia, and changes in
appetite. Previous research with the BB! (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978; Oliver &
Burkham, 1979) provides evidence that this measure is valid and reliable in the detection of
dysphoria among college students. Participants are asked to circle the one statement (from
among four) that best describes how they have been feeling in the past week. Each
statement corresponds to a number (0-3) with higher numbers representing more serious
symptomatology. The sum of the statements“ numeric values provides the BDI score.
Finally, participants were asked to indicate on the pre-test questionnaire if they would like
to participate in another research project in the near future.

There is some evidence to suggest that low scores on the BDI may not reﬂect
psychological health but rather "illusory mental heal " (Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993;
Study 3) or "denial of distress" (Joiner, Schmidt, & Metalsky, 1994). Shedler et al. (1993)
found that some low scorers on the BDI were actually engaging in the denial of distress, as
determined by clinician ratings of psychological health and physiological measures of
arousal. The low and speciﬁcity of the BDI was also brought into question when Joiner et al.

(1994) found that people who received a score of "0" or "1" on the BDI were signiﬁcantly

23

more likely to be high in the denial of distress, as evidenced by endorsing at least 5 items on
the MMPI-L scale and receiving a negative score on the (MMPI-F - MMPI-K) scale. In an
eﬁ'ort to alleviate this problem of including people who deny their distress in the non-
dysphoric group, participants were asked to complete the Marlowe-Crowne scale (see
Appendix A). Empirical evidence from Weinberger, Schwartz, 8: Davidson (1979) suggests
that the Marlowe-Crowne scale can, for low scorers on the BDI, distinguish between people
low and high in the denial of distress. In an attempt to acheive a purer non-dysphoric
sample, low scores on the Marlowe-Crowne scale were used as an additional criterion in

selecting the non-dysphoric sample.

B . .

Participants who scored between 0-9 on the BDI and who scored below 20 on the
Marlowe-Crowne scale were classiﬁed as non—dysphoric, while participants who scored
between 10 and 17 on the BDI were part of the dysphoric sample. These BDI cutoffs for
non-dysphoria and mild dysphoria have been speciﬁed by Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen &
Ingram (1987) and have been used in several prior studies (e.g., Ahrens, 1991; Ahrens,
Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Colin & Terrell, 1977; Hammen & Krantz,
1976; Nelson & Craighead, 197 7; Tabachnik, Cracker, & Alloy, 1983; Teasdale, 1978) .
The cutoff score of 20 for the Marlowe-Crowne scale represents approximately one standard
deviation above the mean, with higher scores representing a greater need for social approval,
(the mean score for college students on the social desirability scale is 13.72, with a standard
deviation of 5.78; Marlowe & Crowne,1960). From this initial pool of 344 pre-test
participants, 100 non-dysphoric and 88 dysphoric female participants were selected to
participate in the experimental session based on their BDI and Marlowe-Crowne scores.

A certain number of the participants taking the pre-test did not end up satisfying
the inclusion criteria. Of the original pool of 344 pro-test participants, 61 with elevated

Marlowe-Crowns scores and 42 with elevated BDI scores were not called back for

24

participation in the experimental session. In addition, 53 participants scoring in the non-
dysphoric range on the pre-test were not asked to participate in the experimental session
because appropriate cell sizes had been reached for this group of participants. Of the 188
participants selected for participation in the experimental session, 15 dysphorics were
excluded from the ﬁnal analyses because their scores fell into the non-dysphoric range upon
retesting, while 6 non-dysphorics were excluded because their scores fell into the dysphoric
range upon retesting. Thus, the ﬁnal sample included 85 non-dysphoric and 82 dysphoric
participants. The scores on the BDI for non-dysphoric participants ranged from 0-9 with a
mean of 5.81, while the scores for the dysphoric sample ranged from 10- 17 with a mean of
12.54. The scores on the Marlowe-Crowne for non-dysphorics ranged from 6-19, with a
mean of 14.78 while the scores for dysphorics ranged from 2-20, with a mean score of 13.16.
In an effort to avoid identifying individuals, participants were not asked to indicate their age

or ethnicity.

Procedure

Participants who satisﬁed the selection criteria and who indicated that they would
be interested in participating in future research were contacted by phone and asked to
participate in another research project involving personality traits and moods. Those who
agreed to participate were tested in small groups of three or less. Each participant was
seated in a separate enclosed cubicle to ensure privacy and silence. The groups were
homogenous with respect to their level of dysphoria. All participants were told that they
would be participating in 2 unrelated experiments. They were informed that the ﬁrst
experiment involved answering a few different anonymous surveys about their mood. At this
point they were given the BDI again, to eliminate participants who may only have been
experiencing a transient depressed state at pre-testing (Sacco, 1981). They were also given
the PANAS to complete. This latter mood measure consists of a list of 20 different feelings

and emotions. Participants were asked to rate how much they were feeling each emotion, at

i

25

that moment, on a scale of 1 "very slightly or not at all" to 5 "extremely," (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). After participants completed these two scales, they were asked to place
them in a box in the front of the room.

Next, participants were given instructions regarding the "second" experiment. The
instructions explained that the investigators were interested in the backgrounds of people
who possess certain personality traits. They went on to explain that after ﬁlling out a
background information survey, they would take a number of self-report personality tests.
The instructions further explained that after they completed the ﬁrst test, the experimenter
would collect the tests and they would then be given to a graduate student in psychology
who would score the tests and provide written feedback for the participants. They continued
to read that while the ﬁrst tests were being scored, the participants would take the next
test, and once these were completed, they would be collected and scored also. After the
second set of tests were collected, participants would receive results from their ﬁrst test and
so on.

Alter reading these instructions that provided an overview of the experiment,
participants then ﬁlled out the brief demographic survey that asked for their year in school,
college major, hometown population, and other general information, but none of which could
identify an individual participant. Participants were told that this survey and the
personality tests were anonymous and conﬁdential and that the experimenters were
interested in group characteristics and not individual characteristics. The true purpose of

the demographic survey was to enhance the credibility of the cover story.

5 l . El '1' I

Participants then received instructions about the ﬁrst personality test, which was
said to measure "synthetic ability." This test consisted of 20 analogies of varying difﬁculty.
For example, one analogy read: "Train is to Track as Gondola is to (canal, air, ocean, or

hangar)." Ten of the analogies were unsolvable. These were the items that were marked

26

incorrect when participants were given feedback on their performance. Aﬂzer participants
completed this test, the experimenter collected the tests and informally introduced the
graduate student in psychology who scored the tests. It was explained to the participants
that frequently, participants in psychology experiments do not learn anything from them,
often because they are not interested in the particular subject matter of the experiment or
they do not ﬁnd it personally meaningful. It was explained that in an attempt to alleviate
this problem, the experimenters would provide participants with the results of their test and
what these scores mean. It was also made clear to the participants that they would receive
feedback on their performance but that the correct answers to the questions would not be
revealed. The reason, participants were told, was that often times people will take
psychological tests more than once, and if for any reason they have to take this test in the
future, knowing the correct answers would unfairly bias their future test protocol. After this
explanation, the graduate student left the room, ostensibly to go score the synthetic ability
tests, while the experimenter passed out the second test. In actuality, he randomly

assigned each of the participants to a feedback condition.

Whack

After about 10 minutes had elapsed, the graduate student re-entered the room and
told the experimenter that the ﬁrst tests had been scored. Participants were ﬁnished with
the second test by that point. The graduate student then collected the second set of tests
from the experimenter and left the room again. The experimenter explained that
participants would be allowed to view their test scores and feedback forms. The
experimenter distributed the feedback forms to the participants based on the numeric code
on the top of the page, and allowed the participants a few minutes to look them over. The
pro-written, bogus feedback forms indicated to participants that they either received a score
of "7" and were in the "very high" range (positive feedback condition) or that they received a

score of "3" and were in the "below average" range (negative feedback condition) for this trait

27

(see Appendix A). In addition, the feedback forms had all of the analogies reprinted on them
so the experimenter was able to indicate which ones participants got wrong. Participants in
the positive feedback condition had 4 of the analogies marked wrong on the feedback forms
while participants in the negative feedback condition had 10 of the analogies marked wrong.
It was explained that each item on the test was worth a different value. Some easy items
were worth only three-tenths of a point while some difficult items were worth a full point.
They were told that when the point values are summed, the highest possible score is a "10"
while the lowest possible score is a "0".

The feedback forms also stated that the test scorer was either "certain" or
"uncertain" about the participant's score. For those in the "high certainty" condition, it was
explained that, based on their pattern of responses, the scorer was certain of the
participant's level of synthetic ability. That is, based on the questions the participant got
right and wrong, the scorer was 95% certain that their score on this test is the participants'
true level of synthetic ability. Participants in the "low certainty" condition read that, based
on their pattern of responses, the scorer was not entirely certain of their level of synthetic
ability. That is, based on the questions the participant answered correctly and incorrectly,
the scorer was only 50% certain that the participant's score on this test represents the
participant's true level of synthetic ability. It was further explained to participants in both
conditions that sometimes the pattern of responses a particular participant gives yields a
very easily interpretable proﬁle of synthetic ability and other times it doesn't. The high
certainty participants read that, based on their pattern of responses, their proﬁle was easily
interpreted, while low certainty participants read that, based on their responses, their

proﬁle was not easily interpreted.

S . l C .
The experimenter then explained that in previous experimental sessions,

participants had expressed some curiosity about how they performed on the test relative to

28

other participants. Because of the prevalence of these requests and the experimenter's goal
of having participants learn something that is meaningful to them, it was explained that
this had been incorporated into the experimental protocol. The experimenter explained that
participants were permitted to look over the feedback form of another, anonymous
participant. This provided participants with the comparison target’s performance as well as
which questions the comparison target answered incorrectly. The questions that the
comparison target got right and wrong were marked but the speciﬁc answers the comparison
target gave for each analogy were not circled on the feedback form. At this point, the
experimenter again reminded participants that the correct answers would not be on any of
the feedback forms they looked at in order to prevent learning the test in case the
participants should ever need to take this test in the future. Participants then indicated on
a sheet attached to the feedback form whom they wanted to compare their performance
with: someone who performed better than they did, someone who performed worse than they
did, or someone who performed the same as they did. They indicated this also by circling
the test score, on an 11-point (0- 10) scale, of the participant with whom they wanted to
compare themselves. This provided a measure of the magnitude of the comparison.
Participants then handed back their social comparison preferences sheets to the
experimenter. The experimenter then selected the requested feedback sheet for each
participant to compare their performance with, based on the number they circled. There
were 11 comparison feedback sheets in all, one for each possible test score the participants
could choose. Comparison feedback was classiﬁed according to category: "Superior" (scores of
8, 9, or 10), "very high" (scores of 7), "average" (scores of 6, 5, or 4), "below average" (scores
of 3), and "very poor" (scores of 2, 1, or 0). Participants in the positive feedback condition
who chose to make an upward comparison saw the feedback form of a participant who
demonstrated "superior" performance. The actual test score they saw corresponded to the
score they selected. Participants in this condition who chose to make a lateral comparison

(selected a comparison score of 7) saw the feedback form of a participant who demonstrated

29

"very big " performance. Participants in this condition who made a downward comparison
either read about a participant who demonstrated "average" performance (if they selected a
comparison score of 6, 5, or 4), a participant who demonstrated "below average" performance
(if they selected a comparison score of 3), or a participant who demonstrated "very poor"
performance (if they selected a comparison score of 2 or less). Participants in the negative
feedback condition who chose to make an upward comparison saw the feedback form of a
participant who demonstrated "average" performance (if they selected a test score of 4, 5, or
6), "very high" performance (if they selected a test score of 7), or the feedback form of a
participant who demonstrated "superior" performance (if they chose a comparison test score
of 8, 9, or 10). Participants in this condition who chose to make a lateral comparison
(selected a test score of 3) saw the feedback form of a participant who demonstrated "below
average" performance, and participants in this condition who made a downward comparison
read about a participant who demonstrated "very poor" performance (if they selected a
comparison score of 0, 1, or 2) . The experimenter then handed out the bogus comparison

feedback sheets and allowed the participants a few minutes to look them over.

While participants viewed the "other participant's" results, the graduate student re-
entered the room with the second set of scored personality tests, handed them to the
experimenter and then leﬂ: the room. The experimenter collected the bogus comparison tests
that the participants were looking over and passed out a post-test questionnaire which
included the PANAS and a self-certainty measure. She explained to the participants that
the experimenters were interested in their reactions to each personality test and that after
they completed this brief questionnaire, she would distribute the second set of feedback
forms. They were instructed to complete the mood scale based on how they were feeling
"right now," and they were told that their answers may or may not be the same as when

they ﬁrst responded to this scale. Participants were also asked to assess their level of

30

synthetic ability in relation to others in the general population by providing three ratings on
a scale of 0 percentile to the 100th percentile. This part of the procedure was based on a
technique used by Baumgardner (1990). The ﬁrst rating they were asked for was what
percentile they thought they were in on this trait, relative to the general population. This
number could range from 0-100. Then they were asked for the latitude surrounding that
judgment by indicating the percentile they were certain they were above (bottom of the
interval) and the percentile they were certain they were below (top of the interval). For
example, if a participant estimated herself to be at the 75th percentile, she may have
estimated further that she was deﬁnitely below the 87th percentile but deﬁnitely above the
60th percentile. This provided a numerical estimate (a latitude of 27%) of how self-certain
she is regarding this trait. The latitude between the highest and lowest ratings served as
the measure of self-certainty: The greater the distance between the two ratings, the less
self-certainty, while the smaller the distance between the two ratings, the greater the self-
certainty. Finally, participants were asked to respond to a questionnaire designed to assess
their notions of what the experiment was about. This measure simply asked them to
report, in an open-ended fashion, what they thought the purpose of the experiment was.
This was incorporated to assess whether any of the participants suspected the true purpose
of the experiment. After collecting the questionnaire, the experimenter explained that the
study was over, at which point the graduate student re-entered the room to debrief the
participants thoroughly.

The debrieﬁng involved an extensive explaination of the purpose of the study, the
logic behind deceiving participants about the true nature of the experiment, and the reason
for giving false test feedback. Participants were probed for any negative feelings about the
deception. They were reassured that the intent was not malicious but rather done in the
pursuit of sound scientiﬁc experimentation. They were also told that the test of synthetic
ability is not a real test and that they should not infer anything about themselves based on

their test feedback. Further, they were told that half of the items on the test were

31

unsolvable. The graduate student was prepared to help any negatively affected participant
to cope with their feelings and also to provide appropriate referrals in the unlikely event that
it became necessary. Four of the participants indicated that they were experiencing negative
feelings as a result of the experiment. All of them expressed these feelings after the post-
test was collected but prior to the debrieﬁng. Once these participants were debriefed, they
stated that they understood the experiement and were no longer experiencing negative

feelings about it.

Results

The main dependent variable in Study 1 was the social comparison preferences of
the participant sample. This variable was measured and analyzed at two levels: the
direction of the comparison preferences (upward, downward, or lateral) and the magnitude of
difference between the score the participant received and the score the participant chose to
compare herself with. In regard to the direction of social comparison preference, there
existed a clear preference for upward comparisons among the participant sample tested. A
two-tailed chi-square test on the number of cases observed versus the number of cases
expected for each type of comparison revealed a highly signiﬁcant difference between the
comparison preferences of the participants, X (2, N=167) = 94.65, p < .0001. Of the 167
participants in Experiment 1, 113 or 68% of them made upward comparisons, 40 (24%)
made lateral comparisons, and 14 (8%) made downward comparisons.

It was hypothesized that there would be differences between dysphorics and non-
dysphorics on the direction of their social comparsion preferences. The self-enhancement
hypothesis expected dysphorics to make a signiﬁcantly greater number of downward
comparisons than lateral or upward comparisons, and non-dysphorics to make a greater

number of upward comparisons than downward comparisons. The self-assessment

32

hypothesis predicted the opposite: that dysphorics would make a signiﬁcantly greater
number of upward or lateral comparisons than downward comparisons and that non-
dysphorics would make a greater number of downward comparisons than upward
comparisons. Inspection of the values in Table 1 shows that about equal numbers of
dysphorics and non-dysphorics made downward and upward comparisons, whereas slightly
more non-dysphorics made lateral comparisons. A two-tailed chi-square test was used to
test for signiﬁcant differences between the number of cases observed and number of cases
expected for each type of comparison choice for dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants.
The chi-square value was not signiﬁcant, X (2, H = 167) = 1.86 p > .10, indicating that level

of dysphoria did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the types of comparisons that participants

made.
Table 1
Direction of Comparison by Level of Dysphoria
D' | . E D .
. Hammad Hazard Lateral
N on-dypshoric 7. 1% 64.7% 28.2%
Dysphoric 9.8% 70.7% 19.5%

Additional two-tailed chi-quare tests were conducted to test for main effects of the
other independent variables of valence and certainty of feedback. For the valence of
feedback variable, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicted that participants receiving
negative feedback would make more downward comparisons than upward or lateral
comparisons. The self-assessment hypothesis predicted that participants receiving negative
feedback would make more lateral and upward comparisons than downward comparisons.
Inspection of values in Table 2 reveals that participants receiving negative feedback made

more upward comparisons, fewer downward comparisons, and about the same number of

33

lateral comparisons as participants receiving positive feedback. A two-tailed chi-square test
was used to test for signiﬁcant differences between the number of cases observed and
number of cases expected for each type of comparison choice for participants receiving
positive and negative feedback. The chi-square value for valence of feedback on direction of
comparisons was not signiﬁcant, X (2, H = 167) = 3.68, p > .10, indicating that valence did

not signiﬁcantly hpact participants' social comparison choices.

Table 2
Direction of Comparison by Valence of Feedback

11' . E D .
Dnrrmrard Unnard Lateral

llalenceniEaedhack
Positive 11.9% 61.9% 26.2%
Negative 4.8% 73.5% 21.7%

For the certainty of feedback variable, the self-assessment hypothesis predicted that
participants receiving uncertain feedback would make more lateral and upward comparisons
than downward comparisons while the self-enhancement hypothesis, which does not
address the role of certainty in making comparisons, did not make any predictions
concerning this variable. Inspection of values in Table 3 shows that participants receiving
uncertain feedback actually made fewer upward and more downward comparisons than
participants receiving certain feedback, which is inconsistent with the self-assessment
predictions. Participants receiving uncertain feedback did, however, make a greater number
of lateral comparisons than those receiving certain feedback, which is consistent with the
self-assessment hypothesis. A two-tailed chi-square test was used to test for signiﬁcant
differences between the number of cases observed and number of cases expected for each
type of comparison choice for participants receiving certain and uncertain feedback. The

chiosquare value for certainty of feedback on direction of comparisons again was not

signiﬁcant, X (2, N = 167) = 5.17, p > .10, indicating that certainty did not signiﬁcantly

inﬂuence participants' social comparison choices.

Table 3
Direction of Comparison by Certainty of Feedback

11' . E Q .
Mustard Harland Lateral

WW
Certain 6.0% 75.9% 18.1%
Uncertain 10.7% 59.5% 29.8%

In sum, while there was a highly signiﬁcant difference between the social comparison
preferences for all of the participants tested, the predicted main effects for level of dysphoria,
valence and certainty of feedback, did not materialize, failing to corroborate either the self-
enhancement or the self-assessment hypotheses' predictions for the direction of comparison
variable. Contrary to the ﬁndings in the social comparison literature, participants in this
sample overwhelmingly preferred making upward comparisons, regardless of their level of
dysphoria or the type of feedback they received. One possibe reason for the preponderance of
upward comparisons could be that participants believed, despite instructions to the
contrary, that they would learn the correct answers from the feedback form of a participant
who did very well. Despite possible biases in reporting one's motivations, informal
interviewing during the debrieﬁng indicated that this was probably not the case. Other
possibilities for this ﬁnding include the possibility that participants were engaging in self-
assessment regardless of level of dysphoria or valence of feedback, or that they were
attempting to gain information, such as which questions were more valuable, so they could

improve any future performances on the synthetic ability test.

34

35

The second level of the main dependent variable examined the magnitude of the
comparison that participants made by subtracting the score of their social comparison
preference from their own score on the Synthetic Ability test. For example, if a participant
received feedback indicating that she got a "3" on the Synthetic Ability test, she could make
an upward comparison with a magnitude of 1 if she chose to compare herself with a
participant who received a "4" or she could make an upward comparison with a magnitude
of 5 if she selected a comparison score of "8". This indicates not only the direction but also
the size of the upward or downward comparison being made.

The self-enhancement hypothesis predicted a two-way interaction between valence of
feedback and level of dysphoria such that dysphoric participants receiving negative feedback
would make greater downward comparisons than dysphoric participants receiving positive
feedback, or non—dysphoric participants receiving either positive or negative feedback. The
self-assessment hypothesis predicted a two-way interaction between valence of feedback and
level of dysphoria, but expected non;dysphoric participants who received negative feedback
to make greater downward comparisons than non-dysphoric participants who received
positive feedback, or dysphoric participants who received positive or negative feedback. In
addition, this hypothesis also predicted that dysphoric participants receiving negative
feedback would make greater mud and lama] comparisons than participants in the
other conditions. Finally, the self-assessment hypothesis also predicted a three-way
interaction between dysphoria, valence, and certainty of feedback such that dysphoric
participants receiving negative and uncertain feedback would make the greatest upward
comparisons, and then dysphorics receiving negative and certain feedback the next greatest
compared with participants in the other conditions.

A univariate analysis of variance was performed on the magnitude of comparison
variable with level of dypshoria, valence, and certainty of feedback serving as between-

participant factors. It is clear that the two-way interaction between dysphoria and valence

was not signiﬁcant E(1, 159) < 1.0, ns. The self-assessment hypothesis also predicted a 3-

way interaction between dysphoria, valence, and certainty, but this interaction was not

signiﬁcant, KG, 159) < 1.0, an. The means for these predicted interactions are presented in

Tables 4 and 5, respectively.

Table 4
Magnitude of Comparison by Dysphoria and Valence

Whack
E . | . H | .
Exclaim
Non-dysphoric 0.95 2.7 7
(41) (44)
Dysphoric 1.47 2.84
(43) (39)

Note. Positive values indicate upward comparisons, negative values indicate downward
comparisons, and a value of 0 indicates lateral comparisons. Values in parentheses
represent the number of participants per cell.

Table 5
Magnitude of Comparison by Dysphoria, Valence, and Certainty

W
Certain Uncertain

. E .I . H | . E .I . II | .
121312119218

Non-dysphoric 1.27 2.58 0.58 2.78

(22) (19) (19) (25)

Dysphoric 1.86 2.76 1.09 3.04

(21) (21) (22) (18)

Note. Positive values indicate upward comparisons, negative values indicate downward
comparisons, and a value of 0 indicates lateral comparisons. Values in parentheses
represent the number of participants per cell.

36

37

A main effect for valence of feedback, E(1,159) = 26.28, p < .0005, emerged on the
magnitude of comparison variable, but main effects for level of dysphoria E(1, 159) < 1.0, ns,
and certainty of feedback E(1, 159) < 1.0, ns, did not. The valence of feedback variable
produced greater magnitudes of upward comparisons for participants receiving negative
feedback (M = 2.81) than participants receiving positive feedback (M = 1.21). Both of these
are in the upward direction, consistent with the earlier ﬁnding of a strong preference for this
type of comparison. This main effect is consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis,
which states that negative feedback produces uncertainty which participants will attempt to
reduce by making upward comparisons. It is inconsisitent, however, with the self-
enhancement hypothesis which states that negative feedback will produce a decrease in
well-being, which participants will attempt to reduce by making downward comparisons.

As for the level of dysphoria variable, dysphorics (M = 2.09) made upward
comparisons of about the same magnitude as non-dysphorics (M = 1.93). Because the
predicted main effects for this variable did not occur, magnitudes of comparison were
collapsed across level of dysphoria to examine the resulting two-way interaction between
valence and certainty of feedback. This interaction turned out not to be signiﬁcant, E(1,

159) = 2.39, n > .10. It is apparent from looking at the cell means in Table 6, however, that
they are directionally consistent with the tenets of the self-assessment hypothesis and
directionally inconsistent with the self-enhancement hypothesis. These non-signiﬁcant
trends indicate that receiving negative and uncertain feedback led participants to make
large upward comparisons, and receiving negative and certain feedback led to the next
largest upward comparisons, presumably to reduce the level of uncertainty that this type of

feedback causes.

Table 6
Magnitude of Comparison by Valence and Certainty

Whack
Certain Uncertain
llalenceofEeedhack
Positve 1.56 0.85
(43) (41)
Negative 2.67 2.93
(40) (43)

Note. Positive values indicate upward comparisons, negative values indicate downward
comparisons, and a value of 0 indicates lateral comparisons. Values in parentheses
represent the number of participants per cell.

In sum, the predicted interactions for the magnitude of comparison variable were not
statistically signiﬁcant, failing to corroborate the self-enhancement or the self-assessment
hypotheses. A main effect for valence of feedback emerged, however, consistent with the self-
assessment hypothesis' predictions that negative feedback would lead to upward and not
downward comparisons. In addition, some of the non-signiﬁcant trends among the means on
the comparison magnitude variable were also directionally consistent with the self-

assessment predictions but directionally inconsistent with the self-enhancement predictions.

The second dependent variable of interest was the participants' affect, both before
and after receiving feedback Positive and negative affect was measured using the Positive
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). It was predicted that pre-test positive affect scores for
dysphorics would be lower than for non-dysphorics, and that negative affect scores for
dysphorics would be higher than for non-dysphorics. An analysis of variance on participants'
pro-test positive affect scores was conducted with level of dysphoria, valence, and certainty of
feedback serving as between-participant factors. As can be seen in Table 7, consistent with

predictions, dysphorics had signiﬁcantly lower positive effect than non-dysphorics, E(1, 159)

38

39

= 8.50, p < .005. An analysis of variance was also conducted on participants' pre-test
negative affect scores, with level of dysphoria, valence, and certainty of feedback serving as
between-participant factors, and it was again consistent with predictions: Dysphorics had
signiﬁcantly higher pre-test negative affect scores than non-dysphorics, E(1, 159) = 29.34, p
< .0005. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the BDI cutoffs used for the dysphoric and non-dysphoric
samples in Study 1 are valid, and that dysphoric participants were indeed feeling less

positive and more negative than non-dysphoric participants.

Table 7
Pretest Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scores

E .I. Eml H I. Eﬁll
Exclaim
Non-dysphoric 30.98 14.12
(85) (85)
Dysphoric 27.43 18.71
(82) (82)

Nate. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

The second set of analyses on participants' affect involved differences in means on
post-comparison positive and negative affect scores. Main effects for level of dysphoria,
valence of feedback, and certainty of feedback emerged on these post-comparison affect
scores. It is apparent from Table 8 that, consistent with ﬁndings for pre-test positive affect,
dysphorics still experienced signiﬁcantly less positive affect than non-dysphorics at post-test,
E(1, 159) = 7.34, n_< .008, as well as signiﬁcantly greater negative affect than non-
dysphorics at posttest, E(1, 159) = 17.37, p < .0005. Manipulation checks using post-
comparison affect also reveal that participants receiving negative feedback experienced
signiﬁcantly greater negative effect than participants receiving positive feedback, E(1, 159) =

15.69, p_< .0005, and also experienced less positive affect than participants getting positive

Table 8
Post-Comparison Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scores by Dysphoria,
Valence and Certainty of Feedback

2 .I. Em I H I. 531 I
W
Non-dysphoric 29.86 13.49
(85) (85)
Dysphoric 26.29 17.20
(82) (82)
E .I. 533 I H I. in] I
Wham
Positive 29.05 13.60
(84) (84)
Negative 27. 16 17 .05
(83) (83)
E .I. 583 I H I. in} I
Whack
Certain 29.18 14.94
(83) (84)
Uncertain 27.05 15.68
(84) (83)

Note. Values in parenthesis inidicate the number of participants per cell

40

41

feedback, although non-signiﬁcant, E(1, 159) = 1.93, n > .10. In addition, and somewhat
consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis, participants receiving uncertain feedback
experienced marginally less positive affect than participants receiving certain feedback, E( 1,
159) = 3.31, p < .071, but there were no differences between certainty conditions for
negative affect, E(1, 159) < 1.0, ns. In sum, on post-comparison affect, dysphorics
experienced signiﬁcantly greater negative affect and signiﬁcantly less positive aﬂ'ect than
non-dysphorics, participants receiving negative feedback experienced signiﬁcantly greater
negative affect than participants receiving positive feedback, and participants receiving
uncertain feedback experienced marginally signiﬁcantly less positive affect than participants
receiving certain feedback. These ﬁndings indicate that the valence of feedback
manipulation was successful in Study 1 and they also support the ﬁnding reported earlier

indicating that the BDI cutoffs used in Study 1 were valid.

In addition to these main effects, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicted a three-
way interaction between participants' level of dysphoria, valence of feedback, and the
direction of comparison they made. Although the direction of comparison measure served as
a dependent variable in the experimental design, it is possible to use this variable as a
between-participant factor in the analyses to determine the impact of making a social
comparison on subsequent affect that participants' experience. Speciﬁcally, the self-
enhancement hypothesis predicted that dysphoric participants receiving negative feedback,
and who also made downward comparisons, would feel better (experience greater positive
affect and less negative affect) than dysphorics receiving negative feedback who made lateral
or upward comparisons and better than non-dysphorics receiving negative feedback and
making downward comparisons. This predicted effect would not occur, however, when
dysphorics received positive feedback. Instead, dysphorics receiving positive feedback, who

also made a downward comparison would not necessarily feel any better than when

42

making a lateral or upward comparison. Also, that non-dysphorics who made upward
comparisons after either positive or negative feedback would feel better than if they had
made downward comparisons. A univariate analysis of variance was performed on both
positive and negative affect scores with level of dysphoria, valence of feedback, and direction

of comparison serving as between participant factors. The predicted interaction between
these three variables was not signiﬁcant for positive affect, E(2, 144) < 1.0, m, or for

negative affect, E(2, 144) < 1.0, us. The cell means are presented in Tables 9 and 10.

 

The self-assessment hypothesis also predicted a three-way interaction between level
of dysphoria, valence of feedback and direction of comparison, but differed from the self-
enhancement hypothesis such that when dysphoric participants received negative feedback,
they would engage in lateral or upward comparisons and experience greater positive affect
and less negative affect than if they had made downward comparisons, and greater positive
and less negative affect than non-dysphorics making lateral or upward comparisons. As
stated earlier, this interaction was not signiﬁcant for positive, E(2, 144) < 1.0, as, or
negative affect E(2, 144) < 1.0, ns. Again, the cell means are presented in Tables 9 and 10.

The self-assessment hypothesis also predicted another three-way interaction
between level of dysphoria, certainty of feedback, and direction of comparison, such that
when dysphoric participants receive uncertain feedback, they will engage in lateral or
upward comparisons and experience greater positive affect and less negative affect than they
would if they made a downward comparison. This interaction was also not signiﬁcant, E(2,

144) < 1.0, as. The cell means are presented in Tables 11 and 12.

Table 10
Post-Comparison Negative Affect Scores by Dysphoria and Valence

For Downward Comparisons:

InlenmLEeedhack
Bonﬁre W
Lclclnlianhmia
Non-dysphoric 11.40 18.00
(5) (1)
Dysphoric 16.80 21.67
(5) (3)
For Upward Comparisons:
llalcncufl'lecdhack
Ronnie W
W
Non-dysphoric 12.32 14.55
(22) (33)
Dysphoric 14.23 20.75
(30) (28)
For Lateral Comparisons:
IalencsnfEeedhack
Bonﬁre Negaﬁrc
laxelnfstphnria
Non-dysphoric 12.64 14.40
(14) (10)
Dysphoric 15.75 15.88

(8) (8)

Hate. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

44

47

A marginally signiﬁcant three-way interaction between level of dysphoria, valence,
and certainty of feedback emerged on the post-comparison positive affect scores, E(1,144) =
3.74, p_< .055, that was not predicted but that is generally consistent with the self-
assessment hypothesis. In general, dysphorics experienced slightly less positive affect than
non-dsyphorics in each valence and certainty condition. Examining the cell means in Table
13 more closely, it is apparent that dysphorics who received positive feedback experienced
very similar levels of post-comparison affect in the certain and the uncertain conditions.
Dysphorics receiving negative feedback felt about the same in the certain as in the uncertain
conditions and overall, felt slightly worse than those receiving positive feedback. Post-hoc
comparisons of the cell means indicated that the source of the interaction comes from the
non-dysphoric sample. There was little difference between the positive affect scores for non-
dysphorics who received positive feedback whether in the certain or the uncertain condition,
E(1, 39) < 1.0, us. For non-dysphorics receiving negative feedback, however, those also
receiving certain feedback reported signiﬁcantly greater positive affect than those receiving
negative and uncertain feedback E(1, 42) = 11.04, p < .001. Thus, dysphorics felt slightly
worse in the negative feedback condition than in the positive feedback condition, regardless
of level of certainty. Non-dysphorics' positive affect, however, was aﬁ'ected by the certainty of
the feedback they received. When receiving positive feedback, they felt about the same
regardless of the certainty condition. When they received negative feedback, however, those
in the certain condition experienced signiﬁcantly greater positive affect than those in the
uncertain condition. So for non-dysphorics, knowing for certain that they did poorly is less
upsetting than not knowing for sure that they did poorly. The increased uncertainty had the
effect of lowering positive affect for non-dysphorics, when coupled with negative feedback.
This is generally consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis' assertion that uncertainty
is upsetting to people and leads to lower positive affect than being certain. In the current

example, however, this effect only occured for non-dysphorics. The self-assessment

hypothesis expected it to occur for dysphorics as well. When receiving negative feedback,

dysphorics' level of positive affect was unaﬁ'ected by certainty.

Table 13
Post-Comparison Positive Affect Scores by Dysphoria, Valence and Certainty

When Receiving Certain Feedback:

Yalcnmfﬁccdhack
E .I. H I.
W
Non-dysphoric 30.45 33.32
(22) (19)
Dysphoric 28.29 25.00
(21) (21)
When Receiving Uncertain Feedback:
W
E .I. H I.
Wane
Non-dysphoric 30.89 25.92
(19) (25)
Dysphoric 26.77 24.89
(22) (18)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

In sum, the signiﬁcant ﬁndings on post-comparison positive and negative affect
scores are generally consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis. The marginally
signiﬁcant main effect of certainty on positive aﬁ'ect scores is consistent with this hypothesis.
Those participants receiving uncertain feedback experienced less positive affect than those
receiving certain feedback. In addition, the marginally signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between
level of dysphoria, valence, and certainty of feedback is also generally consistent with the

self-assessment perspective: Non-dysphorics receiving negative and certain feedback felt

48

49

better than when receiving uncertain feedback. There were no statistically signiﬁcant main

effects or interactions that were consistent with the self-enhancement perspsective.

Cl 'E'I' ilI 'Eﬂil

The last level of the affect variables that was examined was the change in positive
and negative affect scores between the pre-test and post-test administrations. Computing
change scores from two samples that have different initial baseline rates, however, invokes
Lord's Paradox (Lord, 1967; Wainer, 1991). Such was the case for the dysphoric and non-
dysphoric samples: each sample had a signiﬁcantly different baseline positive affect score
and negative affect score. To make a causal inference and say the change from pro-test to
post-test was due to the stimulus (the independent variables of valence and certainty of
feedback) would be fallacious because it ignores the initial baseline differences. Wainer
(1991) points out that this paradox is minimal if certain assumptions can be made. He
states that a causal inference can be made if it is reasonable to assume that the dependent
variable in question (positive and negative affect) "...would have been the same at post-test
as at baseline, had there been no stimulation" (W ainer, 1991, p. 149). This is a reasonable
assumption to make for Study 1. Therefore, in computing positive and negative affect
change scores for dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants, it was assumed that their
positive and negative affect scores would have been the same at pre-test as at post-test, had
they not been exposed to the independent variables in Study 1.

The change in both positive and negative effect was computed by subtracting
participants' pre-test scores from their post-test scores. For the change in positive affect,
negative values indicate a reduction in positive affect (participants felt worse) while positive
values indicate an increase in positive affect (participants felt better). For negative affect,
negative values indicate a reduction in negative affect (participants felt better), while
positive values indicate an increase in negative affect (participants felt worse). A univariate

analysis of variance was conducted on both affect variables with level of dysphoria, valence

SO

and certainty of feedback, and direction of comparison serving as between-participant
factors. Consistent with earlier ﬁndings, a main effect for valence of feedback emerged on
positive affect such that participants receiving negative feedback (M: -1.9) experienced a
signiﬁcantly greater reduction in positive affect than participants receiving positive feedback
(M: -0.36), E(1, 144) = 5.1, n < .025. A main effect for valence of feedback also emerged on
negative affect, such that participants receiving negative feedback experienced a signiﬁcantly
greater increase in negative affect (M=O.39) than participants receiving positive feedback
(M: -2.49), E(1, 144) = 13.95, p < .0005. Main effects for level of dysphoria and certainty of
feedback were not signiﬁcant, E's < 1.0.

These main effects were qualiﬁed by a two-way interaction which emerged between
level of dysphoria and certainty of feedback on the change in positive affect, E(1, 144) = 6.01,
p_< .015, but not on negative affect, RU, 144) < 1.0, us. The cell means for this interaction
are presented in Table 14. Post-hoe analyses of the cell means for simple effects indicates
that non-dysphorics receiving certain feedback experienced very little change in positive aﬂ'ect
but when exposed to uncertain feedback, they experienced a large, though non-signiﬁcant,
reduction in positive affect, E(1, 83) = 2.85, p < .095. The opposite pattern emerged for
dysphorics: when receiving certain feedback they experienced a large reduction in positive
affect but very little reduction in positive affect when receiving uncertain information,
although this difference was not signiﬁcant, E( 1,80) = 1.64, p, > .10. Thus, despite the
absence of signiﬁcant simple effects, uncertainty had the effect of reducing positive affect for
non-dysphorics but not for dysphorics. This ﬁnding is consistent with the three-way
interaction between dysphoria, valence and certainty of feedback on post-comparison
positive affect mentioned above. It is also generally consistent with the self-assessment
hypothesis' tenet that uncertainty leads to less positive affect. It would have been even
more speciﬁcally consistent with this hypothesis, however, if this pattern emerged for
dysphorics as it did for non-dysphorics. This reasoning follows the self-assessment assertion

that dysphorics tend to be uncertain about their abilities to begin with, (which is associated

51

with less positive affect), so uncertain information would just add to their already uncertain
state, whereas certain information should reduce uncertainty and consequently increase
positive affect. This situation did not occur, however, in this case.

One explanation for this interaction could be that the dysphorics in the current
sample interpreted the uncertain feedback positively. That is, they may have interpreted
the uncertain feedback to mean that perhaps they did even better than the feedback
indicated, which would lead to less of a reduction in positive affect than if they received
certain information. They may have thought to themselves: "I got a 3 which isn't very good,
but the experimenter wrote that he wasn't entirely sure about this, so maybe I did even
better." It might also be that the non-dysphorics did the opposite: they may have
interpreted the uncertain feedback negatively, or as meaning that they might have
performed even worse than the feedback indicated, which would lead to greater uncertainty
and a reduction in positive aﬁ‘ect. This possibility could mean that uncertain feedback

activates a negativity or pessimistic schema in non-dysphorics but a positivity or optimistic

schema in dysphorics.
Table 14
Change in Positive Affect Scores
Whack
Cumin mm
W
Non-dysphoric -0.17 -2.00
(41) (44)
Dysphoric -1.90 -0.32
(42) (40)

Note. Values represent the change in positive affect between the pre-test and post-test
measurements. Negative values indicate a reduction in positive affect while positive values
indicate an increase in positive affect. Values in parentheses represent the number of
participants per cell.

52

To test this possibility, a variable was created that measured the difference between
the participants' point estimate of their synthetic ability and the feedback that they
received. The feedback was given on an 11-point scale, from 0 to 10, while the self-certainty
point estimate was made on a 101-point scale, from 0 to 100. The variable was computed
by multiplying the point estimate by 0.1 and then by subtracting this value from the value
on the participants’ feedback sheet, either a "3" or a "7". A positive value means that
participants estimated their ability to be less than what their feedback indicated, while a
negative value means that they estimated their ability to be greater than what their
feedback indicated, and a "0" means that their point estimate was consistent with their
feedback. Since the feedback was the only information available about the ﬁctitious ability,
any difference between the feedback and participants' point estimates would indicate a
positivity or negativity bias. If the certainty variable was differentially affecting dysphorics'
and non-dysphorics' interpretations of the feedback, a two-way interaction between level of
dysphoria and certainty of feedback would occur. An analysis of variance was conducted on
this variable with level of dyspohoria, valence and certainty of feedback serving as between-
participant factors. It is apparent that the interaction between dysphoria and certainty was
not signiﬁcant E(1,112)=2.36, p> .10. In addition, the possibility raised above seems
unlikely. Examination of the cell means indicate that when receiving certain feedback, both
dysphorics (M: -0.06) and non-dysphorics (M: -0.11) estimated their synthetic ability to be
about the same as their feedback indicated. When receiving uncertain information, non-
dysphorics (M: -0.97) estimated their ability to be greater than the feedback indicated,
whereas dysphorics (M: 0.26) estimated thier ability to be about the same as the feedback
indicated. Thus, the opposite of the possibility raised above occured, as non-dysphorics, not
dysphorics, exhibited a positivity bias, which is consistent with previous ﬁndings in the

literature.

W8

The scores on this variable were computed by subtracting participants' highest
estimate of their level of synthetic ability from their lowest estimate, thus creating a single
number which represents their self-certainty. Higher numbers indicate a wider range
between estimates and thus greater uncertainty whereas lower numbers indicate a smaller
range and greater certainty. As a manipulation check on the certainty of feedback
conditions, it was predicted that certain feedback would lead to greater post-test self-
certainty (smaller values) and uncertain feedback would lead to less self-certainty (larger
values). A univariate analysis of variance was performed on the self-certainty variable with
level of dysphoria, valence, and certainty of feedback serving as between-participant factors.
Consistent with predictions, a main effect for certainty emerged, E(1,144) = 9.24, p < .003,
such that participants receiving uncertain feedback experienced signiﬁcantly less self-
certainty (M=34.5) than participants receiving certain feedback (M=26.64). This conﬁrms
that the certainty of feedback manipulation in Study 1 was successful. Main effects for
dysphoria, valence of feedback, and direction of comparison were not signiﬁcant, all E's <
1.0.

Only the self-assessment hypothesis made predictions concerning participants' self-
certainty scores because the self-enhancement hypothesis does not incorporate certainty into
its position regarding social comparison. The self-assessment hypothesis predicted two
different two-way interactions on the self-certainty variable. The ﬁrst was between valence
of feedback and direction of comparison such that, of the participants receiving negative
feedback, those who made lateral and upward comparisons would experience greater self-
certainty than those making downward comparisons. This situation was predicted because
the negative feedback should increase their uncertainty about how much synthetic ability
they have and making an upward or lateral comparison should help to reduce this
uncertainty but downward comparisons should not. For participants receiving positive

feedback, the self-assessment hypothesis predicted that the levels of self-certainty would be

53

about the same for those making downward, lateral, or upward comparisons. Positive
feedback would not have the effect of increasing uncertainty as negative feedback did, and

thus the direction of comparison effect should not be pronounced.

Table 15
Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Valence

D“ . E Q .
Menard llmard Lateral
Whack
Positive 26.50 27.48 34.82
(10) (52) (22)
Negative 47.50 32.77 25.56
(4) (61) (18)

Note. Larger values represent less self-certainty while smaller values represent greater
certainty. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

A univariate analysis of variance was conducted on the self-certainty variable with
level of dysphoria, valence and certainty of feedback, and direction of comparison serving as
between-participant factors. The predicted two-way interaction between valence of feedback
and direction of comparison was signiﬁcant, F.( 1, 144) = 3.05, n < .05. The cell means for
this interaction are presented in Table 15. Post-hoc analyses were conducted on the cell
means and from these results, it is clear that the self-assessment hypothesis was accurate
in its predictions. The ﬁndings for participants receiving negative feedback are as follows:
those making upward comparisons reported signiﬁcantly greater self-certainty than those
making downward comparisons, [(1, 63) = 17.88, p < .0005, those making lateral
comparisons also reported signiﬁcantly greater self-certainty than those making downward
comparisons, E(1, 21) = 19.03, p, < .0005, and those making lateral comparisons
experienced signiﬁcantly greater self-certainty than those making upward comparisons,

E(1,7 8) = 4.73, n < .05. For participants receiving positive feedback, those making

54

55

downward comparisons reported about the same level of self-certainty as those making
upward comparisons but experienced signiﬁcantly greater self-certainty than those making
lateral comparisons, E(1, 31) = 7.95, p < .01. Thus, consistent with the self-assessment
hypothesis, alter participants received negative feedback, making lateral comparisons was
associated with the greatest level of self-certainty, upward comparisons the next greatest,
while downward comparisons led to uncertainty. Thus, lateral comparisons are the most
effective at reducing uncertainty after receiving negative feedback. This ﬁnding adds greater
speciﬁcity to the self-assessment hypothesis which predicted either upward or lateral
comparisons would reduce uncertainty after receiving negative feedback. Apparently, lateral
comparisons have the largest effect. When receiving positive feedback, there was little
difference between downward and upward comparisons on participants' self-certainty, but
lateral comparisons led to slightly greater uncertainty after positive feedback.

The second two-way interaction predicted by the self-assessment hypothesis was
between certainty of feedback and direction of comparison. It was predicted that
participants receiving uncertain feedback would experience greater self-certainty after
making lateral or upward comparisons than after making downward comparisons. For
participants receiving certain feedback, there would be little difference between the the three
comparison directions. Results from the analysis of variance described above indicate that
this interaction was not signiﬁcant, E(1, 144) < 1.0, n5. The cell means are presented in
Table 16.

The two-way interaction between valence of feedback and direction of comparison on
self-certainty scores is qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant three-way interaction between level of
dysphoria, valence of feedback, and direction of comparison, E(2, 144) = 3.09, p < .05. The
cell means for this interaction are presented in Table 17. Post-hoe analyses of the means

indicates that the source of the three-way interaction lies within the dysphoric sample.

Table 16
Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Certainty

D' . E Q .
Downward Mani Lateral
WW
Certain 22.20 27.46 24.67
(5) (63) (15)
Uncertain 38.22 33.96 34.24
(9) (50) (25)

Km. Larger values represent less self-certainty while smaller values represent greater
certainty. Values in parentheses indicate the number of participants per cell.

The direction of the interaction is consistent with self-assessment predictions. A simple
interaction between valence of feedback and direction of comparison emerged for the
dysphoric sample, E(2, 76) = 4.20, p < .02. Speciﬁcally, for dysphorics receiving negative
feedback, those who made a lateral comparison experienced marginally signiﬁcantly greater
self-certainty than those making a downward comparison, E(1, 10) = 4.44, p, < .065, and
those making an upward comparison also experienced signiﬁcantly greater self-certainty
than those making a downward comparison, E( 1, 29) = 4.31, p < .05. Hence, making a
downward comparison after receiving negative feedback had the effect of reducing self-
certainty for dysphoric participants, but making an upward or lateral comparison after
getting negative feedback increased self-certainty for dysphorics. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the self-assessment hypothesis and the aforementioned ﬁnding. It must be noted,
however, that the cell means for downward comparisons are very small, thereby making any
conclusions somewhat tentative. This problem was corrected in Study 2. There were no
simple effects among the cell means for non-dysphorics. Combining these ﬁndings, it is
apparent that after dysphorics receive negative feedback, making an upward or lateral
comparison is associated with greater self-certainty than making a downward comparison,

which is entirely consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis.

56

Table 17
Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison, Dysphoria, and Valence

For Dysphoric Participants:
Whack
29311119 Nagaﬁya
D . |° EC .
Downward 25.00 53.33
(5) (3)
Upward 27 .93 29.86
(30) (28)
Lateral 36.25 25.25
(8) (8)
For Non-dysphoric Participants:
Wash
11' . [Q . m 13mm
Downward 28.00 30.00
(5) (1)
Upward 26.86 35.24
(22) (33)
Lateral 34.00 25.80
(14) (10)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

Ancillmﬂeﬂnlta

There has been considerable controversy in the literature concerning depression
research methodology recently (Tennen, Hall, & Afﬂeck, 1995; Weary, Edwards, & Jacobson,
1995; Kendall & Flannery-Schroeder, 1995). Some criticisms have been raised by Tennen et
al. (1995) about the quality of research being conducted using depressed and dysphoric
participants. Tennen et al. (1995) address their own criticisms by offering three
recommendations to improve the quality of depression reserarch methodology. First, they
suggest using multiple depression assessment periods to address the transitory nature of
depression. As described earlier, Study 1 adhered to this ﬁrst recommendation, which is
also the recommendation originally presented by Kendall et al. (1987 ). Second, they
recommend using multiple assessment methods, not just the BDI, with preference given to
structured interviews such as the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS). Their reasoning is
that elevated BDI scores may be due to physical illness or drug use, which the BDI doesn't
take into account but which the DIS does, and thus, participants scoring high on the BDI
may not be "truly" depressed. Study 1 did not follow this recommendation, however, for
three reasons: First, Studyl was investigating dysphoria and not nosological depression,
which Kendall et al. (1987) state is sufﬁciently measured by the BDI alone. Second, this
recommendation itself is not an ideal solution, and in fact is problematic because of the
possibility of interview bias when using the DIS or other structured interview, which may
compromise the integrity of the sample populations, the strong empirical evidence of
construct validity associated with the BDI, and the possibility that self-report biases (e.g.
social desirability and negative response set) may also operate during interviews (Weary et
al. 1995). Third, while the PANAS is not designed to measure dysphoria at its syndromal
level, it does provide a well validated measure of general positive and negative affect. The
ﬁndings of a signiﬁcant positive correlation between negative affect and BDI scores, (I =
.441, p < .01, two-tailed), as well as a signiﬁcant negative correlation between positive affect

and BDI scores (1; = -.297, p < .01, two-tailed), provide corroborating evidence from a

58

59

separate affect assessment measure that the BDI was adequately detecting dysphorics in
the participant sample. For these reasons, using only the BDI as a measure of participants'
dysphoria is not considered a shortcoming of Study 1.

The third recommendation that Tennen et a1. make is to include comparison groups,
such as those exhibiting other kinds of psychopathology, like anxiety, in addition to the
typical non-depressed group. They make this recommendation because of the possibility
that participants who score a 10 or more on the BDI can do so without endorsing items
which convey the DSM IV depression prerequisites of sad mood, loss of pleasure or interest
(items 1, 4, 8; 12 respectively). Thus, participants may be placed into the dysphoric sample
when they are not dysphoric at all, but rather are exhibiting symptoms of anxiety or general
distress. To address this concern, the BDI's of the dysphoric participants in Study 1 were
re-examined for endorsement of items 1, 4, and 12. It was found that of the 82 dysphoric
participants in Study 1, 75 or 91% endorsed at least one of these items. This ﬁnding
conﬁrms that virtually all of the participants labelled dysphoric in Study 1 were in fact,
dysphoric. Tennen et al. also make recommendation number three because of the high
correlation between anxiety and depression in both self-report and clinical diagnoses
(Barlow, 1988; Breier, Charney, & Heninger, 1985; Dobson, 1985; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).
Essentially, Tennen et al. state that because of these high correlations, participants scoring
high on the BDI may not be dysphoric or depressed, but may instead be exhibiting anxiety
or general distress.

To test this possibility, the PANAS was used to create two groups within the
dysphoric sample based on Tennen et al's recommendation: an anxious group scoring high
on the positive affect scale, and a dysphoric group scoring low on positive affect (Clark &
Watson, 1991; Laurent & Stark, 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992; Watson, Clark, & Carey,
1988). High scores on the positive affect scale were deﬁned as those in the top 25% of the
dysphoric sample and low scores on this scale were deﬁned as those in the bottom 25% of

the dysphoric sample. Analyses of variance were conducted to compare these two groups on

60

the main dependent variables of interest (positive affect, negative affect, self-certainty, and
magnitude of comparison,) with level of dysphoria/anxiety, valence, and certainty of feedback
serving as between-participant factors. Any signiﬁcant main eﬁ’ects or interactions involving
the level of dysphoria/anxiety would indicate that the distinction between anxious and
dysphoric participants within the dysphoric sample was meaningful. Looking ﬁrst at the
affect variables, it is apparent that a main effect emerged for level of dysphoria/anxiety on
post-comparison positive affect, E(1, 33) = 92.5, n < .0001. This ﬁnding was expected,
however, because the anxious and dysphoric groups were created based on their pre-test
positive affect scores. Pre-test and post-test positive affect scores were signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with one another (1 = .808, n < .01), and thus, one would expect this
main effect to emerge. One expects this ﬁnding not because the distinction between the
anxious and dysphoric is meaningful but because of how these groups were deﬁned. There
were no interaction effects on post-comparison positive affect involving the level of
dysphoria/anxiety variable, all F's < 1.0. There were no main eﬂ‘ects or interactions
involving this variable on post-comparison negative affect, all E's < 1.0. Looking next at the
self-certainty variable, there were no main effects or interactions involving the level of
dysphoria/anxiety variable on participants' self-certainty ratings, all E's < 1.0. Finally,
there were no main effects or interactions for level of dysphoria/anxiety on the magnitude of
comparison variable E's < 1,0. Thus, the distinction between anxious and dysphoric
participants in Study 1 was not signiﬁcant. The recommendation by Tennen et al. (1995) to
include an anxious comparison group has been followed but the presence of anxiety does not
appear to have had an impact on the social comparison process. In addition, it appears
that the possibility of having anxious participants in a dysphoric sample deﬁned by BDI
scores is not a risk in social comparison research. Further research with multiple a priori

assessments for anxiety should be conducted, however, to conﬁrm this initial ﬁnding.

Discussion

The goals of Study 1 were to answer the question of when will dysphorics and non-
dysphorics make downward, lateral, or upward comparisons? In the presence of positive or
negative feedback, and/or in the presence of certain or uncertain feedback? Also, to answer
the utility question of why do dysphorics and non-dysphorics make certain types of
comparisons in certain situations? To improve their affect, to increase their self-certainty, or
both? Study 1 was designed to provide a direct test of the self-enhancement and self-
assessment hypotheses' answers to these questions. Each self-evaluative hypothesis made
opposing predictions for the effects of the independent variables of level of dysphoria, valence
of feedback, and certainty of feedback on the dependent variables of the direction and
magnitude of social comparison, post—comparison affect and self-certainty.

Neither hypothesis was accurate in explaining dysphoric and non-dysphoric
participants' preferences for the digestion of comparisons they made. The majority of
participants, regardless of their level of dysphoria, made upward comparisons. The self-
assessment hypothesis was somewhat accurate, however, in predicting the relative
magnitude of dysphorics' comparisons. For example, those participants receiving negative
feedback made large upward comparisons and those receiving positive feedback made small
upward comparisons. In addition, while none of the interactions predicted for magnitude of
comparison on the basis of this hypothesis were statistically signiﬁcant, the trends among
the cell means were almost unifomly consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis and
inconsistent with the self-enhancement hypothesis. The self-assessment hypothesis best
answered the question of when participants will make certain types of comparisons. When
dysphorics receive negative feedback alone or negative feedback coupled with uncertain
feedback, they make large upward comparisons. Non-dysphorics tend to make smaller
upward comparisons when given negative feedback, but make upward comparisons

nonetheless.

61

62

This pattern of dysphorics and non-dysphorics making upward comparisons after
negative feedback is inconsistent, however, with previous ﬁndings that participants who
receive negative feedback or who are low in self-esteem avoid potentially unfavorable social
comparisons (i.e. upward comparisons) in an attempt to be ”self-protective" (Baumeister,
Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Gibbons, Gerrard, Lando, & McGovern, 1991; Gibbons, Benbow, &
Gerrard, 1994; Pyzsczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Smith & Insko, 1987 ; Wood,
Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994). Apparently, the self-protective motive
these authors describe was not operating for the participants in the Study 1. One
possibility for the discrepancy may be that a particular feature of the current experimental
procedure led to a minimization of self-protective motivations. Perhaps receiving negative
feedback was not threatening enough to participants in Study 1 to evoke self-protective
strategies. This possibility seems unlikely, however, as the procedure closely mimicked the
classic social comparison paradigm and is very similar to the procedures used in some of the
conﬂicting studies cited above. In addition, participants who received negative feedback
experienced less positive affect and signiﬁcantly greater negative affect than participants
getting positive feedback. This ﬁnding indicates that the negative feedback that
participants received had the intended affective consequences. A second possibility is that
there is a gender difference in self-protective motives. The studies cited above used both
genders as participants, whereas the current study used only females. Perhaps females
exhibit less self-protective strategies when engaging in social comparisons than males. No
evidence exists, however, that indicates that males are more self-protective after receiving
negative feedback than are females (Gibbons et al., 1994).

A third possibility explaining the preponderance of upward comparisons is
somewhat consistent with Trope and Neter's (1994) ”self-control" approach to making social
comparisons. These authors state that receiving negative feedback about one's abilities is
incompatible with self-enhancement motives. Finding out that one did poorly on a task does

not enhance one's self. They also state that negative feedback can be compatible, however,

63

with self-assessment motives if the feedback is diagnostic. If negative feedback tells one
what skills are needed to improve on a task or what tasks they will do well on, one can
learn more about oneself. The authors go on to state that sometimes people will exhibit
"self-control" and tolerate the negative affective consequences of receiving negative feedback
when it is diagnostic and satisﬁes the need for self-assessment. In relation to Study 1,
making an upward comparison is one way of choosing to receive negative feedback. In Trope
and N eter's terms, it appears participants in Study 1 exhibited self-control, tolerated the
negative affective consequences of making upward comparisons to satisfy their need to self-
assess. Apparently, something about the situation led them to override the need for self-
enhancement.

In answering the utility question of why dysphorics and non-dysphorics prefer these
types of comparisons, the self-assessment hypothesis was more accurate than the self-
enhancement hypothesis in explaining post-comparison affect as an indicator of what
motivated a certain type of comparison. Only the self-assessment hypothesis was
corroborated by statistically signiﬁcant results, as it was accurate in postulating the effect of
uncertain feedback on the resulting positive affect for non-dysphoric participants: when they
received negative and certain feedback, they felt signiﬁcantly better than when receiving
negative and uncertain feedback. Certainty had an impact on their positive affect,
regardless of what direction of comparison they made. Additional evidence emerged that
certainty of feedback had an impact on the change in positive affect for non-dysphorics.

Level of certainty differentially effected dysphorics' and non-dysphorics' change in positive
affect such that uncertainty for non-dysphorics led to a reduction in positive affect but certain
feedback for dysphorics led to a reduction in positive affect. It would have been a stronger
corroboration of this hypothesis had both of these effects occurred for dysphorics as well.
Thus, consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis, level of certainty of feedback

moderated non-dysphorics' positive affect regardless of what type of comparison they made.

64

Perhaps making any type of social comparison is sufﬁcient to activiate this effect for
certainty.

In addition, the self-assessment hypothesis was quite accurate in expecting self-
certainty to be effected by the type of social comparisons that participants made. Both the
two-way and three-way interactions were consistent with the self-assessment predictions:
After dysphorics received negative feedback, making an upward or lateral comparison was
associated with greater self-certainty than making a downward comparison. After non-
dyshporics received negative feedback, however, a downward comparison was associated
with a slightly greater level of self-certainty than an upward comparison. In addition,
evidence from the two-way interaction indicated that making a lateral comparison after
receiving negative feedback was associated with the greatest level of self-certainty, an
upward comparison the next greatest, while making a downward comparison after receiving
negative feedback was associated with uncertainty. These ﬁndings provide the strongest
corroborating evidence found in Study 1. Apparently, making lateral and upward
comparisons increases dysphorics' self-certainty, as the self-assessment hypothesis
predicted. Perhaps the need to increase self-certainty was an overriding factor in
participants' social comparison preferences for upward and lateral comparisons. In
addition, these results add greater speciﬁcity to the self-assessment hypothesis by showing
empirically that lateral comparisons are associated with greater of self-certainty than
upward comparisons, both of which are associated with greater self-certainty than
downward comparisons.

When the results for the self-certainty variable are compared with the results for the
affect variable, some interesting points can be made. Speciﬁcally, it is illuminating to
compare the three-way interaction (between level of dyshporia, valence of feedback, and
comparison direction) on self-certainty with the same non-signiﬁcant interaction on the post-
comparison positive affect variable. For participants who received negative feedback,

dysphorics who also made upward comparisons felt less positive affect than dysphorics who

65

made downward comparisons, yet dysphorics making upward comparisons reported much
greater self-certainty than dysphorics making downward comparisons. In other words, for
dysphorics getting negative feedback, making an upward comparison was associated with
greater self-certainty but less positive affect than when making a downward comparison.
Since the majority of dysphorics made upward comparisons, this seems to indicate that
increased self-certainty after receiving negative feedback is initially more important to
dysphoric participants than increased positive affect, which is consistent with the self-
assessment hypothesis. The self-assessment hypothesis also states, however, that
increased self-certainty leads to an improvement in mood. This proposed relationship
between mood and self-certainty is somewhat dubious, because it was not conﬁrmed by the
analyses testing the causal relationship between these variables (although self-certainty
and change in negative affect were signiﬁcantly correlated, r = -.174, p < .05, two-tailed,
indicating that high self-certainty was associated with a reduction in negative affect). This
lack of ﬁndings may be due to the possibility that increased self-certainty leads to improved
affect on: time, as one chooses to engage in activities that she is self-certain about, thereby
increasing the probability of experiencing favorable outcomes in these activities. In Study 1,
participants rated their affect about 5- 10 minutes after making their comparisons, and it is
likely that this was not an adequate amount of time for positive affect to develop from their
increased self-certainty. The presence of the correlation between self-certainty and change in
mood, however, makes the temporal nature of the relationship between these two variables
a logical issue for future research.

It may also be that the affective and cognitive (e.g., self-certainty) consequences of
social comparisons occur in stages. A similar suggestion concerning self-relevant information
is made by Swann and colleagues (Swann, Grifﬁn, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987; Swann,
Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990). They state that reactions to self-relevant
information occurs in stages such that the initial appraisal of self-relevant information is

minimally cognitive and highly affective but tends to give way to more cognitive and reﬂective

66

thinking about the self during later appraisals. Similar ﬁndings concerning "self-
comparisons" bolsters this possibility. Self-comparisons are deﬁned as the process of
comparing self-relevant feedback to the "actual", "ideal", and "rejected" selves to ﬁnd a
match between the feedback and the self (Eisenstadt 8: Leippe, 1994). Eisenstadt and
Leippe (1994) found that affect-based reactions to self-relevant information give way to more
cognitively based reactions as time for self-comparisons increases. The same general process
may be occuring for the social comparisons made by participants in Study 1. Their initial
affective reactions to making social comparisons did not follow self-assessment expectations,
(as downward comparisons led to greater positive affect than lateral and upward
comparisons), but their cognitive reactions (i.e., self-certainty) did follow self-assessment
expectations. Thus, the self-assessment perspective can not be viewed as an accurate
explanation of the initial affective stage after social comparisons. The self-assessment
perspective, however, can be seen as an accurate explanation of the cognitive consequences
of social comparison. It may also be that if Study 1 had employed more longitudinal
measures of affect, an improvement may have occurred over time due to increased self
certainty. It is also possible that the self-enhancement hypothesis can explain initial
affective reactions to social comparisons. Recall that while non-signﬁcant, downward
comparisons did lead to greater positive affect than lateral and upward comparsions.
Additional research is needed to test these possibilities.

In summary, in reviewing the overall accuracy of the two hypotheses that were
tested, the self-enhancement hypothesis' predictions were not statistically corroborated and
consequently, it does not seem to be a good explanation for dysphorics' or non-dysphorics'
social comparison preferences or magnitudes. This hypothesis did not make any predictions
concerning the self-certainty variable. The self-assessment hypothesis' predictions, on the
other hand, were accurate in describing the effect of valence of feedback on magnitude of
comparison preferences, the effect of certainty of feedback on non-dysphorics' positive affect

and change in positive affect, and in explaining the utility of lateral and upward

67

comparisons as a means of increasing self-certainty. Thus, all of the signiﬁcant effects found
in Study 1 are consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis. While all of this hypothesis'
predictions were not corroborated, the evidence from Study 1 provides support for the self-
assessment perspective as a better explaination of dysphorics' and non-dysphorics' social
comparison behavior than the self-enhancement perspective. While Study 1 provided
support for the self-assessment perspective, a limitation of this ﬁrst study is the difﬁculty in
drawing ﬁrm conclusions about results involving the direction of comparison as a factor in
the analyses, particularly the results for the self-certainty measure. This ﬁnding was the
strongest evidence for the self-assessment hypothsis but may have been compromised by the
small number of participants who made downward comparisons. Consequently, the number
of participants per cell for a two-way or larger interaction was less than 10. In an effort to
remedy this difﬁculty, a second study was devised that has equal numbers of participants

making downward, lateral, and upward comparisons.

Study 2

Waders

The method used in Study 2 attempted to answer more precisely the question that
was raised in Study 1 concerning the utility of making upward, downward, and lateral social
comparisons. For example, do downward comparisons made by dysphoric people lead to an
improvement in affect, as the self-enhancement hypothesis would predict, merely because
they are feeling badly about themselves? Or, do upward comparisons made by dysphoric
individuals lead to an improvement in self-certainty and consequently an improvement in
affect, as the self-assessment hypothesis would predict, because the need for certainty is
greater than the need for self-enhancement? In an attempt to answer these questions,
Study 2 employed essentially the same procedure used in Study 1. Study 2 departed from
Study 1, however, by making the dependent variable of social comparison in Study 1, an
independent variable in Study 2. That is, participants did not choose whom they preferred
to compare their test performance with, but rather, a particular type of comparison was
randomly assigned to them by the experimenter. In addition, the certainty of feedback was
not manipulated experimentally, but instead, pre- and post-comparison dependent
measures of self-certainty, for the trait of synthetic ability, were employed. Positive and
negative affect were measured as in Study 1. The procedure for Study 2 was changed in this
way in an attempt to replicate the ﬁndings from Study 1 using a different method. This
procedure was also designed to test whether the consequences of social comparison are
different when social comparisons are sought out and freely made by participants, as
opposed to when participants are passively exposed to them. Finally, the particular
procedure used in this study also allowed for causal inferences about the impact of direction
of social comparison that could not be justiﬁed in the ﬁrst experiment. Thus, the design for
Study 2 was a 2 (Level of Dysphoria: mild, non-dysphoric) X 3 (Social Comparison type:

upward, downward, or lateral) between-participants factorial design. The main dependent

68

variables were pre- and post-comparison measures of self-certainty for synthetic ability, and

pre- and post-comparison affect ratings.

Method

2mm

Due to the large number of experiments being conducted during spring term, it was
not possible to use the Introductory Psychology participant pool for Study 2. Instead,
participants for Study 2 were recruited from three different 200 level psychology classes in
exchange for extra credit in their courses. Because of this unexpected change, Study 2
participants were not pro-tested and then called back to participate. Rather, the BDI and
Marlowe-Crowns scores attained at the experimental session were used as the inclusion
criteria. The BDI and Marlowe-Crowne cutoffs for the mildly dysphoric and non-dysphoric
samples were the same as they were in Study 1. Participants not meeting the cutoffs were
tested but their data was not used in the analyses. A total of 146 participants were tested
for Study 2. There were 12 with elevated BDI scores and 21 with elevated Marlowe-Crowne
scores that were not included in the analyses. Thus, the ﬁnal sample for Study 2 consisted
of 45 mildly dysphoric and 67 non-dysphoric participants. The scores on the BDI for non-
dysphoric participants ranged from 0—9 with a mean of 4. 73, while the scores for the
dysphoric sample ranged from 10-17 with a mean of 12.64. The scores on the Marlowe-
Crowne for non-dysphorics ranged from 9-19, with a mean of 15.17 while the scores for
dysphorics ranged from 5-20, with a mean score of 12.89. As with Study 1, an effort was
made to avoid identifying individuals, and because of this, participants were not asked to

indicate their age or ethnicity.

Emeedure
The procedure used in Study 2 was very similar to that used in Study 1 with a two

minor changes. The ﬁrst change involved asking participants for an initial estimate of their

69

70

level of synthetic ability, prior to taking the test. The second change eliminated the portion
of the procedure asking them for their comparison choices. Instead, after receiving their
feedback, participants were exposed to a passive social comparison. The remainder of Study

2 was identical to Study 1.

Participants read instructions explaining that before taking the test of synthetic
ability, the experimenters were interested in their own estimate of their synthetic ability.
Speciﬁcally, they were asked, based on the brief explanation given by the experimenter, to
estimate their level of synthetic ability in relation to others in the general population by
providing three ratings on a scale of 0 percentile to the 100th percentile. This part of the

procedure is identical to the post-comparison measure of self-certainty used in Study 1.

W

After participants completed the synthetic abilities test, the graduate student
collected them, and then they were given the second personality test, just as was done in
Study 1. After participants completed the second personality test, the graduate student
returned the scored tests of synthetic ability, the experimenter distributed them, and the
graduate student then collected the second set of tests and leﬁ: the room, ostensibly to score
them. Participants were individually seated in private cubicles, such that they could not see
the test scores of the other participants. All of the tests of synthetic ability had half of the
answers marked correct and half of the answers marked incorrect, with "50%" written in red
ink on the test. Recall that half of the items on the synthetic abilities test were unsolvable,

and it was these items that were marked wrong on the participants feedback forms.

Sedalﬂmarimn

When giving participants their feedback forms, the experimenter explained that
participants are sometimes curious about how they performed on the test relative to others
in the experiment. One at a time, she told the participants that she was not sure if the
score they received was a particularly high or low score, relative to the other participants in
this experiement because she had not tested that many participants yet. She stated that,
to give them an idea of how other participants were doing, she would tell them the score of
the last person she tested. This procedure has been adapted from Ahrens (1991). She
brieﬂy left the participant's cubicle ostensibly to check the last participant's score, and then
returned and did one of three things. In the upward comparison condition, the experimenter
showed the participants an anonymous protocol with three-fourths of the answers marked
correct and one-fourth of the answers marked incorrect and said, "The last participant I
tested got 75% of the answers correct so they did somewhat better than you on this
particular test." In the downward comparison condition, the experimenter showed them a
feedback sheet with one-fourths of the answers marked correct and three-fourths of the
answers marked incorrect and said, "The last participant I tested got 25% of the answers
correct so they did somewhat worse than you did." In the lateral comparison condition, the
experimenter showed them a sheet with one-half of the answers marked correct and one-half
of the answers marked incorrect and said, "The last participant I tested got 50% of the
answers correct so they did the same as you did." It was made clear that the comparison

participant was from an earlier session and was not part of their session.

E' I“ [SIEC |.| ”ﬁll
After the participants saw the comparison test, the experimenter collected the

feedback sheets from them. They were then asked to complete an additional questionnaire

while they were waiting for the graduate student to score their second personality test. The

instructions asked the participants to complete the self-certainty questionnaire again

71

72

because now they had more information to judge the degree to which they possess this trait.
The instructions also asked them to complete the PAN AS again. They were instructed to
complete the mood scale based on how they were feeling "right now." They were told that
their answers may or may not be the same as when they ﬁrst responded to these scales and
it was stressed that the experimenters wanted them to answer openly and honestly.
Finally, participants were asked to respond to a "suspicion" questionnaire. This measure
simply asked them to report, in an open-ended fashion, what they thought the purpose of
the experiment was. This was incorporated to assess whether any of the participants
suspected the true purpose of the experiment. These questionnaires were collected by the
experimenter and the participants were debriefed. The debrieﬁng procedure was similar to

the one used in the ﬁrst experiment.

Results

The ﬁrst dependent variable of interest in Study 2 was the participants' affect, both
before and after receiving feedback. Positive and negative affect was again measured using
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). It was predicted that pre-test positive
affect scores for dysphorics would be lower than for non-dysphorics, and that negative affect
scores for dysphorics would be higher than for non-dysphorics. An analysis of variance on
participants' pre-test positive affect scores was conducted with level of dysphoria, valence,
and certainty of feedback serving as between-participant factors. As can be seen in Table
18, consistent with predictions, dysphorics had signiﬁcantly lower positive affect than non-
dysphorics E(1, 106) = 11.10, p < .001. An analysis of variance was also conducted on
participants' pre-test negative affect scores, with level of dysphoria and direction of
comparison serving as between-participant factors, and it was again consistent with

predictions: Dysphorics had signiﬁcantly higher pre-test negative affect scores than non-

73

dysphorics E(1, 106) = 30.89, p < .0005. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the BDI cutoffs used for
the dysphoric and non-dysphoric samples in Study 2 were valid, and that dysphoric

participants were indeed feeling less positive and more negative than non-dysphoric

participants.
Table 18
Pre—test Positive and Negative Affect Scores
E . . 5 m | H l' E m |
W
Non-dysphoric 31.45 13.90
(67) (67)
Dysphoric 26.78 19.47
(45) (45)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

The second set of analyses on participants' affect scores involved differences in
means on post-comparison positive and negative affect scores. Main effects for level of
dysphoria emerged on both positive and negative affect. It is apparent from Table 19 that,
consistent with ﬁndings for pre-test positive affect, dysphorics still experienced signiﬁcantly
less positive affect than non-dysphorics at post-test, E(1, 106) = 7.92, p < .01, as well as
signiﬁcantly greater negative affect than non-dysphorics at post-test E(1, 106) = 24.09, p <
.0005. There was no main effect for direction of comparison on post-test positive aﬂ'ect, E(1,
106) < 1.0, as. as those exposed to downward comparisons (M = 26.71) had about the same
level of post-test positive affect as those exposed to lateral (M = 26.95) or upward (M =
27.39) comparisons. Similarly, there was no main effect for direction of comparison on post-
test negative affect, E(1, 106) = 1.1, p < .10, as those exposed to downward comparisons (M
= 15.18) experienced slightly more negative affect than those exposed to lateral comparisons

(M = 14.17), but experienced slightly less negative affect than those exposed to upward

74

comparisons (M = 15.97). Thus, dysphoric participants continued to feel less positive and
more negative affect at post-test than non-dysphorics, but direction of comparison alone did

not signiﬁcantly affect participants' post-test positive and negative affect.

Table 19
Post-test Positive and Negative Scores

12 .. m H . m
We
Non-dysphoric 28.60 13.06
(67) (67)
Dysphoric 24.67 18.02
(45) (45)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

 

In addition to these main effects, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicted a two-
way interaction between participants' level of dysphoria and the direction of comparison that
was made. Speciﬁcally, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicted that dysphoric
participants who were exposed to downward comparisons would feel better (experience
greater positive affect and less negative affect) than non-dysphorics who were also exposed
to downward comparisons, while dysphorics who were exposed to lateral or upward
comparisons would feel worse than non-dysphorics also exposed to lateral or upward
comparisons. In addition, this hypothesis predicted that dysphorics exposed to downward
comparisons would experience greater positive aﬁect than dysphorics exposed to lateral or
upward comparisons, while non-dysphorics exposed to upward comparisons would
experience greater positive affect than those exposed to downward comparisons. The self-
assessment hypothesis also predicted a two-way interaction between level of dysphoria and

direction of comparison, but differed from the self-enhancement hypothesis such that

75

dysphoric participants who were exposed to downward comparisons would feel worse
(experience less positive affect and greater negative affect) than non-dysphorics who were
also exposed to downward comparisons, while dysphorics who were exposed to lateral or
upward comparisons would feel better than non-dysphorics exposed to the same types of
comparisons. In addition, this hypothesis predicted that dysphorics exposed to downward
comparisons would experience less positive affect than dysphorics exposed to lateral or
upward comparisons, while non-dysphorics exposed to upward or lateral comparisons would
experience less positive affect than those exposed to downward comparisons

As stated earlier, a univariate analysis of variance was performed on both positive
and negative affect scores with level of dysphoria and direction of comparison serving as
between-participant factors. The interaction between these two variables was signiﬁcant
for post-comparison positive affect, E(2, 106) = 3.11, p < .05, but not for post-comparison
negative affect, [(2, 106) < 1.0, as. The cell means for this interaction are presented in
Table 20. Post-hoc analyses were conducted on the cell means, and they indicated that
dysphoric participants exposed to downward comparisons felt signiﬁcantly worse than non-
dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons, E(1, 32) = 5.29, p < .03, consistent with self-
assessment predictions. Dysphorics exposed to lateral comparisons, however, felt
signiﬁcantly worse than non-dysphorics exposed to lateral comparisons, E(1, 40) = 8.76, p <
.005, which is inconsistent with the self-assessment hypothesis. Dysphoric participants
exposed to upward comparisons felt about the same as non-dysphorics also exposed to
upward comparisons. In addition, also consistent with the self-assessment predictions,
dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons experienced signiﬁcantly less positive aﬁ‘ect
than dysphorics exposed to upward comparisons, E(1, 28) = 12.04, p < .005, and non-
dysphorics exposed to upward comparisons experienced less positive affect than those
exposed to downward comparisons, although this trend was non-signiﬁcant, E(1, 40) = 1.08,

p < .10. Inspecting the cell means for negative affect in Table 21, it is apparent that the

7’6

main effect for dysphoria is responsible for the difference in scores. Dysphorics experienced

greater negative aﬁ'ect than nonodysphorics after being exposed to each type of comparison.

Table 20
Post-Comparison Positive Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison and Dysphoria

;D' . [Q .
Ikaanszard federal lLknaard
LLexelelexﬁnduuia
Non-dysphoric 29.21 29.54 26.95
(19) (26) (22)
Dysphoric 22.75 23.53 28.07
(15) (16) (14)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

In sum, results on post-comparison affect revealed a signiﬁcant two-way interaction
between direction of comparison and level of dysphoria that corroborates the self-assessment
hypothesis. The predicted interactions did not emerge for either hypothesis on the negative
affect variable, indicating that perhaps it is insensitive to social comparisons. These
ﬁndings are consistent with those in Study 1 where signiﬁcant effects emerged for positive

affect but not for negative affect.

Table 21
Post-Comparison Negative Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison and Dysphoria

D“ . [Q .
Iknznsuurl federal .Lhnaard
LLexelaleyﬁniunia
Non-dysphoric 12.32 12.92 13.86
(19) (26) (22)
Dysphoric 18.80 16.19 19.29
(15) (16) (14)

Km. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

The last level of the affect variables that was examined was the change in positive
and negative affect scores between the pre-test and post-test administrations. As stated in
this section in Study 1, Lord's Paradox arises when computing change scores for two groups
that differ at pre-testing on the variable in question. Thus, because of the signiﬁcant
differences between these groups on pre-test positive and negative affect, Lord's Paradox
arises again in Study 2. As before, this problem is minimal, as suggested by Wainer (1991),
if it can be reasonably assumed that there would have been no change in affect scores had
the participants not been exposed to the independent variable (direction of passive social
comparison). The change in both positive and negative affect was computed by subtracting
participants' pre-test scores from their post-test scores. For the change in positive affect,
negative values indicate a reduction in positive affect (participants felt worse) while positive
values indicate an increase in positive affect (participants felt better). For negative affect,
negative values indicate a reduction in negative affect (participants felt better), while
positive values indicate an increase in negative affect (participants felt worse).

The self-enhancement hypothesis predicts a signiﬁcantly greater increase in positive
affect and decrease in negative affect for dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons than
for non-dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons. In addition, this hypothesis also
predicts that non-dysphorics exposed to lateral or upward comparisons will experience a
signiﬁcantly greater increase in positive affect and decrease in negative affect than
dysphorics also exposed to these types of comparisons. Finally, this hypothesis predicts
that dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons will experience a greater increase in
positive affect and decrease in negative affect than dysphorics exposed to lateral or upward
comparisons, while non-dysphorics exposed to upward comparisons will experience a greater
increase in positive affect and decrease in negative affect than those exposed to downward
comparisons. The self-assessment hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that non-

dysphorics exposed to lateral or upward comparisons will experience a signiﬁcantly greater

77

78

decrease in positive affect and increase in negative affect than dysphorics exposed to these
types of comparisons. In addition, it predicts that dysphorics exposed to downward
comparisons will experience a signiﬁcantly greater decrease in positive affect and increase in
negative affect than non-dysphorics who are also exposed to downward comparisons.
Finally, this hypothesis predicts that dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons will
experience a greater decrease in positive affect and increase in negative affect than
dysphorics exposed to lateral or upward comparisons, while non.dyshporics exposed to
upward comparisons will experience a greater decrease in positive affect and increase in
negative affect than those exposed to downward comparisons.

A univariate analysis of variance was conducted on both change in affect variables
with level of dysphoria and direction of comparison serving as between-participant factors.
There were no main effects for dysphoria, RU, 106) < 1.0, us, or direction of comparison E(1,
106) = 1.19, p > .10, on change in negative affect, or on change in positive affect, both E's <
1.0. In addition, the predicted twooway interaction between level of dysphoria and direction
of comparison did not emerge on change in positive affect, E(2, 106) = 1.93, p > .10, or on
change in negative affect, E(2, 106) < 1.0, an. In sum, the change in positive and negative
affect did not corroborate either of the hypotheses' predictions. The cell means are presented

in Table 22.

Table 22
Change in Post-Comparison Positive Affect Scores by Direction of Comparison and Dysphoria

D' |° E Q .
Rosamund Lateral Hazard
Wade
Non-dysphoric -2.89 -2.46 -3.27
(19) (26) (22)
Dysphoric -3.00 -3.06 -0.07
(15) (16) (14)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

W

Participants' self-certainty was measured twice, prior to taking the synthetic ability
test and then again after receiving their feedback and making their comparison. The scores
on this variable were computed by subtracting participants' highest estimate of their level of
synthetic ability from their lowest estimate, thus creating a single number which represents
their self-certainty. Higher numbers indicate a wider range between estimates and thus
greater uncertainty whereas lower numbers indicate a smaller range and greater certainty.
Only the self-assessment hypothesis made predictions concerning participants' self-certainty
scores because the self-enhancement hypothesis does not incorporate certainty into its
position regarding social comparison. The self-asssessment hypothesis predicted a main
effect for level of dysphoria on participants' pre-test self-certainty ratings, such that
dysphorics would be less certain about their level of synthetic ability than non-dysphorics. A
univariate analysis of variance was conducted on the pre-test self-certainty ratings with level
of dysphoria and direction of comparison serving as between-participant factors. The
predicted main effect was not signiﬁcant, E(1, 106) < 1.0, na, as dysphorics experienced
about the same level of self-certainty (M = 29.69) as non-dysphorics (M = 27.63).

The self-assessment hypothesis also predicted a two-way interaction on the post-test
self-certainty variable between level of dysphoria and direction of comparison such that,
dysphorics who were exposed to lateral and upward comparisons would experience greater
self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed to lateral and upward comparisons. In addition,
it was predicted that dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons would experience less
self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons. This result was
predicted because the negative feedback should increase their uncertainty about how much
synthetic ability they have and being exposed to an upward or lateral comparison should
help to reduce this uncertainty but downward comparisons should not. As can be seen from
the cell means in Table 23, dysphorics and non-dysphorics had similar levels of post-test

self-certainty after being exposed to lateral and upward comparisons, but dysphorics

79

80

experienced greater uncertainty after downward comparisons than non-dysphorics. To test
for the predicted interaction, a univariate analysis of variance was conducted on the post-
test self-certainty variable with level of dysphoria and direction of comparison serving as
between-participant factors. The predicted two-way interaction between dysphoria and

direction of comparison, however, was not signiﬁcant E(2, 106) = 1.12, p_> .10.

Table 23
Post-Comparison Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Dysphoria

D' I' E C .
1191mm Lateral 1111mm
MW
Non-dysphoric 26.95 21.92 24.05
(19) (26) (22)
Dysphoric 32.07 21.79 23.19
(15) (16) (14)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

A main effect emerged for direction of comparison on the post-test self-certainty
variable E(1,106) = 4.72, p, < .05, that is generally consistent with the self-assessment
hypothesis and the ﬁndings in Study 1. The cell means for this main effect are presented in
Table 24. Post-hoe analyses for simple effects revealed that participants exposed to upward
comparisons experienced signiﬁcantly greater levels of self-certainty than those exposed to
downward comparisons, E(1,69) = 4.56, p, < .05. These analyses also revealed that
participants exposed to lateral comparisons also experienced signiﬁcantly greater levels of

self-certainty than those exposed to downward comparisons, E(l, 74) = 7.34, n < .01.

Table 24
Post-Comparison Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison

11' I . E Q .

Demand Inward Lateral

W 29.21 22.40 23.17
(34) (42) (36)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell

The last level of the self-certainty variable that was examined was the change in
self-certainty scores between the pre-test and post-test administrations. The change in self-
certainty was measured by subtracting participants' post-test scores from their pre-test
scores. Positive values indicate an increase in self-certainty, negative values indicate a
decrease in self-certainty, and a value of 0 indicates that there was no change in
participants self-certainty ratings. Lord's Paradox does not apply to these change scores, as
there were no signiﬁcant differences between dysphorics and non-dyphorics on pre-test self-
certainty. Again, only the self-assessment hypothesis makes predictions regarding this
variable. This hypothesis predicts a two-way interaction on the change in self-certainty
variable between level of dysphoria and direction of comparison such that, dysphorics who
were exposed to lateral and upward comparisons would experience a greater increase in self-
certainty than non-dysphorics exposed lateral and upward comparisons. In addition, it was
predicted that dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons would experience a greater
decrease in self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed downward comparisons. Finally, it
was predicted that dysphorics exposed to lateral comparisons would experience the greatest
increase in self-certainty, upward comparisons the next greatest increase, and downward

comparisons the least amount of increase in self-certainty.

81

82

A univariate analysis of variance was conducted on the change in self-certainty
variable, with level of dysphoria and direction of comparison serving as between-participant
factors. A main effect for direction of comparison again emerged, E(1, 106) = 5.55, p < .005.
The cell means for this main effect are presented in Table 25. Post-hoc analyses for simple
effects revealed that, consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis and with the ﬁnding for
post-comparison self-certainty, participants exposed to lateral comparisons experienced a
signiﬁcantly greater increase in self-certainty than those exposed to downward comparisons,
E( 1, 69) = 3.97, p < .05, and participants exposed to upward comparisons also experienced
a signiﬁcantly greater increase in self-certainty than those exposed to downward
comparisons, E(1, 74) = 8.21, p, < .005. Recall that positive values indicate an increase in

self-certainty and negative values a decrease.

Table 25
Change in Post-Comparison Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison

Direction of Comparison

Dmmardlateral Hazard

Senﬂenaintrﬁeeree 0.00 6.12 4.50
(34) (42) (36)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell

This main effect, however, was qualiﬁed by the predicted two-way interaction
between dysphoria and direction of comparison, which was highly signiﬁcant, E(2, 106) =
10.99, p, < .0005. The inspection of cell means in Table 26 indicate that the self-
assessment hypothesis was directionally accurate in its predictions. In post-hoe tests for
simple effects, it is apparent that dysphorics exposed to downward comparisons experienced
a signiﬁcantly greater decrease in self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed to a downward

comparison, who actually experienced an increase in self-certainty, E(1, 32) = 16.83, p <

83

.0005. In addition, dysphorics exposed to lateral comparisons experienced a signiﬁcantly
greater increase in self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed to lateral comparisons, E(1,
40) = 4.76, p < .03, and dysphorics exposed to upward comparisons experienced
signiﬁcantly greater increases in self-certainty than non-dysphorics exposed to upward
comparisons, E(1, 35) = 4.13, n < .05. Also, for dysphorics, lateral comparisons led to a
signiﬁcantly greater level of self-certainty than downward comparisons, E(1, 29) = 30. 01, p
< .0001, and upward comparisons also led to a signiﬁcantly greater level of self-certainty
than downward comparisons, E(1, 28) = 28.80, p < .0001. There were no simple effects for
direction of comparison in the non-dysphoric sample. These results offer strong evidence in
favor of the self-assessment hypothesis' explanation of the utility of social comparisons for

dysphorics and non-dysphorics.

Table 26
Change in Post-Comparison Self-Certainty Scores by Direction of Comparison and Dysphoria

D. | . E Q .
Downward Lateral Upward
We
Non—dysphoric 4.53 3.69 2.64
(19) (26) (22)
Dysphoric -5.73 10.06 7.43
(15) (16) (14)

Note. Values in parentheses represent the number of participants per cell.

W

The methodological concerns raised by Tennen et al. (1995) were again addressed in
Study 2. Recall their recommendation to include comparison groups, such as those
exhibiting other kinds of psychopathology, like anxiety, in addition to the typical non-

depressed group. As stated earlier they make this recommendation because of the

84

possibility that participants who score a 10 or more on the BDI can do so without endorsing
items which convey the DSM IV depression prerequisites of sad mood, loss of pleasure or
interest (items 1, 4, 8t 12 respectively). Thus, participants may be placed into the dysphoric
sample when they are not dysphoric at all, but rather are exhibiting symptoms of anxiety or
general distress. To address this concern, the BDI's of the dysphoric participants in Study 2
were re-examined for endorsement of items 1, 4, and 12. It was found that of the 45
dysphoric participants in Study 1, 40 or 89% endorsed at least one of these items. This
ﬁnding conﬁrms that virtually all of the participants labelled dysphoric in Study 2 were in
fact, dysphoric. Recall that Tennen et al. also make this recommendation because of the
high correlation between anxiety and depression in both self-report and clinical diagnoses
(Barlow, 1988; Breier, Charney, & Heninger, 1985; Dobson, 1985; Metalsky 8r. Joiner, 1992).
Essentially, Tennen et al. state that because of these high correlations, participants scoring
high on the BDI may not be dysphoric or depressed, but may instead be exhibiting anxiety
or general distress.

To test this second possibility, the PANAS was again used to create two groups
within the dysphoric sample based on Tennen et al's recommendation: an anxious group
scoring high on the positive affect scale, and a dysphoric group scoring low on positive affect
(Clark 8: Watson, 1991; Laurent & Stark, 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992; Watson, Clark, &
Carey, 1988). Because of the smaller dysphoric sample size in Study 2, high scores on the
positive affect scale were deﬁned as those in the top 33% of the dysphoric sample and low
scores on this scale were deﬁned as those in the bottom 33% of the dysphoric sample.
Analyses of variance were conducted to compare these two groups on the main dependent
variables of interest (positive affect, negative aﬁ‘ect, self-certainty, and magnitude of
comparison,) with level of dysphoria/anxiety, valence, and certainty of feedback serving as
between-participant factors. Any signiﬁcant main eﬁ'ects or interactions involving the level of
dysphoria/anxiety would indicate that the distinction between anxious and dysphoric

participants within the dysphoric sample was meaningful. Looking ﬁrst at the affect

85

variables, it is apparent that a main effect emerged for level of dysphoria/anxiety on post-
comparison positive affect, E(1, 23) = 10,73, 3 < .003. Participants in the anxious group
had a signiﬁcantly higher mean post-comparison positive affect score (M = 29.07), than
participants in the dysphoric group (M = 20.53). This ﬁnding was expected, however,
because the anxious and dysphoric groups were created based on their pre-test positive
affect scores. Pre-test and post-test positive affect scores were again highly correlated for the
dysphoric sample in Study 2, r = .826, p < .01, two-tailed, and thus, one would expect this
main effect to emerge. One expects this ﬁnding not because the distinction between the
anrn'ous and dysphoric is meaningful but because of how these groups were deﬁned. There
were no interaction effects on post-comparison positive affect between the level of
dysphoria/anxiety variable and direction of comparison, E(2, 23) < 1.0, ns. There was no
main effect, E(1, 23) = 1.41, p > .10, or interaction, [(2, 23) < 1.0, ns, involving this variable
on post-comparison negative affect. Looking next at the self-certainty variable, there was no
main effect or interaction involving the level of dysphoria/anxiety variable on participants'
self-certainty ratings, both E's < 1.0. Thus, the distinction between anxious and dysphoric
participants in Study 2, as in Study 1, was not signiﬁcant. The recommendation by Tennen
et al. (1995) to include an anxious comparison group has been followed but the presence of
anxiety does not appear to have an impact on the social comparison process. In addition, it
appears that the possibility of having anxious participants in a dysphoric sample deﬁned by
BDI scores is not a risk in social comparison research. Further research with multiple a

priori assessments for anxiety should be conducted, however, to conﬁrm this initial ﬁnding.

Discussion

Study 2 tested hypotheses concerning the self-evaluative motives of self-enhancement

and self-assessment on the social comparison behavior of dysphoric and non-dysphoric

college students. The goals of Study 2 were to answer the utility question of why dysphorics

86

and non-dysphorics make certain types of comparisons in certain situations: To improve
their affect, to increase their self-certainty, or both? Also to test whether the effects of
passive social comparisons on affect and self-certainty differed from the effects on these
variables after freely selecting the type of social comparison to make. Study 2 was designed
to provide a direct test of the self-enhancement and self-assessment hypotheses' answers to
these questions. Each self-evaluative hypothesis made opposing predictions for the effects of
the independent variables of level of dysphoria,and direction of comparison on the dependent
variables of post-comparison affect and self-certainty.

Results showed that all of the signiﬁcant ﬁndings in Study 2 were consistent with
the self-assessment hypothesis, thus offering good evidence of its accuracy. There were main
effects for direction of comparison on post-test self-certainty and change in self-certainty:
Lateral and upward comparisons led to signiﬁcantly greater post-test self-certainty and
signiﬁcantly greater increases in self-certainty than downward comparisons. There were
also interactions between direction of comparison and level of dysphoria on post-comparison
positive affect and change in self-certainty. Combining these ﬁndings for self-certainty and
affect, one ﬁnds that downward comparisons led dysphorics to become signiﬁcantly less self-
certain and to experience signiﬁcantly less positive affect than non-dysphorics. Stated
another way, downward comparisons led non-dysphorics to become signiﬁcantly more self-
certain and experience signiﬁcantly greater positive affect than dysphorics. In addition,
upward comparisons led dysphorics to become signiﬁcantly more self-certain than non-
dysphorics and also led them to experience slightly greater positive affect, although non-
signiﬁcant, than non-dyshporics who were also exposed to upward comparisons. Finally,
lateral comparisons led dysphorics to become signiﬁcantly more self-certain than non-
dysphorics but they also experienced signiﬁcantly less positive affect than non-dysphorics
after lateral comparisons. Thus, for dysphorics, there seems to be little utility in making
downward comparisons when it comes to increasing self-certainty or improving affect. The

utility of lateral comparisons for dysphorics lies in their ability to increase self-certainty and

87

the utility of upward comparisons for dysphorics lies in their ability to increase self-certainty
and increase positive affect. For non-dysphorics, downward comparisons seem to have the
greatest utility, as they led to greater positive affect and greater self-certainty. Lateral
comparisons had some utility for non-dysphorics, as they led to greater positive affect.
Upward comparisons had the least utility for non-dysphorics, as they led to less positive
affect and less self-certainty. While not all of the self-assessment hypothesis' predictions
were corroborated with statistically signiﬁcant results, the ﬁndings from Study 2 offer strong
evidence for this hypothesis' explanation of the utility of social comparisons for dysphoric and
nomdysphoric participants. Thus Study 1 told us what types of comparisons dysphorics and
non-dysphorics prefer to make (upward and lateral) and when they want to make them
(after negative feedback and for non-dysphorics, after uncertain feedback). New Study 2 has
given us clues as to why they want to make them (to increase self-certainty and increase

podtive affect after upward comparisons).

General Discussion

In comparing the ﬁndings from Study 2 with those from Study 1, it is apparent that
there are similarities between the two that are consistent with the self-assessment
hypothesis: Downward comparisons led to less self-certainty for dysphorics but greater self-
certainty for non-dysphorics, while upward comparisons led to greater self-certainty for
dysphorics but less self-certainty for non-dysphorics in both Study 1 and Study 2. Lateral
comparisons led to high self-certainty for both dysphorics and non-dysphorics in the ﬁrst
study, but led to greater self-certainty for dysphorics in the second study. Perhaps the
nature of the comparisons had an impact on this difference. It is possible that lateral
comparisons lead to greater self-certainty for non-dysphorics when chosen freely as compared
to when they were made passively. Coupled with the strong preference for upward
comparisons in Study 1, these ﬁndings offer strong evidence that the self-assessment
hypothesis is a more accurate explanation of both the social comparison behavior of
dysphorics and non-dysphoria,and the utility that social comparisons have for each group.
Another similarity between the two studies is the lack of signiﬁcant ﬁndings on the negative
affect variable. Apparently, negative affect is insensitive to the effects of social comparisons.
This ﬁnding is informative, however, as attempts to reduce negative affect through social
comparison are not likely to succeed.

While lateral and upward comparisons increased self-certainty for dysphorics, they
did not consistently lead to greater positive affect (except for upward comparisons in Study
2). This result is not entirely consistent with the self-assessment hypothesis, which
expected positive aﬁect to increase for dysphorics after lateral and upward comparisons.
There are two possible explanations for this ﬁnding. First, it may be that increased self-
certainty will lead to improved affect over time. The self-assessment hypothesis expected
dysphorics' increase in self-certainty to increase positive affect and decrease negative affect.

Although this did not occur immediately, it is possible that it would occur at a later point in

88

89

time. Recall that self-certainty was signiﬁcantly correlated with change in negative affect.
As stated before, the presence of this correlation makes the temporal nature of the
relationship between these two variables a logical avenue for speculation and future
research. If synthetic ability were an actual trait, the increased knowledge of whether one is
high or low in this ability would guide one to include or exclude oneself from activities that
called for synthetic ability, thereby maximizing the likelihood of a positive affective outcome.
For example, if a person increases their self-certainty and knows they are high in synthetic
ability, they may take courses or choose a career that utilize this type of thinking. Because
they are good at it, they may receive praise from others, good grades, or promotions, all of
which would likely increase positive affect. Thus, over time, their greater self-certainty could
lead to an increase in positive affect. More longitudinal research designs that have
participants return to the laboratory several times over the course of a semester would help
to answer this question.

Second, the lack of ﬁndings on the affect variables may have occured because the
type of affect measured in Studies 1 and 2 reflected only general feeling states. There is
evidence (Baumgardner, 1990) that increased self-certainty leads to an increase in positive
affect that is speciﬁc to the self (i.e., "self-affect"). Positive self-affect in Baumgardner's
study was measured using a self-report inventory that contained items speciﬁcally related to
how one feels about oneself, such as: competent, conﬁdent, effective, efﬁcient, smart, and
resourceful. Positive affect in the current studies were measured using items that reﬂect
general feeling states that are not necessarily speciﬁc to how one views onesself, such as:
interested, excited, enthusiastic, alert, inspired, and attentive. Perhaps if Studies 1 and 2
had also employed measures of positive self-affect, then the self-assessment predictions may
have been corroborated. As it is, the increased self-certainty that dyshporics experienced
after upward and lateral comparisons in Studies 1 and 2 may have also increased their
positive self-affect, but there is no way to know this for certain. Future research on this

topic should include measures of self-affect as well as general affect used in a more

90

longitudinal fashion. It could then be determined whether positive self-affect is increased
via upward and lateral comparisons and also, if and when an increase in self-affect leads to
an increase in general affect.

The ﬁndings in Studies 1 and 2 that dysphorics prefer to make upward and lateral
comparisons, often without positive affective consequences, amounts to evidence against the
self-protective hypothesis. Recall that this perspective states that dysphorics avoid
potentially unfavorable social comparisons (i.e. upward comparisons) in an attempt to
protect the self from the negative implications of upward comparisons, such as increased
self-focus or thoughts that one is inferior, which can lead to a decrease in positive affect
(Trope, 1983). Instead, the self-protective perspective expects dysphorics to make
downward comparisons when given a choice. This perspective was not accurate, however, in
describing the ﬁndings of the current research, as dysphorics preferred upward comparisons.
Apparently, dysphoric participants were not concerned with the possible negative
implications of upward comparisons or in being self-protective. Rather, they appeared to
exhibit self-control (Trope & N eter, 1994) and eschew the negative possibilities of upward
and lateral comparisons to reach the positive consequences of increased self-certainty. This
ﬁnding tells us that college students may be more aware of and interested in long-run affect
improvement and self-improvement than one might think.

While the ﬁndings in Study 1 and 2 constitute evidence against the self-protective
hypothesis, they are nonetheless consistent with evidence showing that dysphorics make
comparisons that are likely to result in unfavorable evaluations of the self. Evidence from
Ahrens (1991) indicates that dysphorics selectively attend to individuals who perform better
than themselves, while evidence from Wheeler and Miyake (1992) indicates that dysphorics
also tend not to make downward comparisons on a daily basis. McFarland and Miller
(1994) propose that individuals with "negative orientations” (e.g., dysphorics), respond to
feedback by comparing themselves with people who performed better then they did. This

idea is consistent with work by Beck (1976) stating that people who are depressed, tend to

91

keep themselves depressed by focusing their cognitive processes on the negative implications
of the events they experience. Thus, there exists an alternative explanation for the ﬁndings
in Studies 1 and 2. The question then becomes, were participants in the current research
making upward comparisons because of faulty cognitive patterns that conﬁrm their negative
views of themselves? This proposition seems to explain some of the current ﬁndings (i.e.
comparison preferences in Study 1) but when one considers the impact of upward and
lateral comparisons on self-certainty, this explanation does not seem to capture the essence
of the comparison processes in the current research. Instead, a more optimistic explanation
can be proffered. Evidence from Studies 1 and 2 show that it is not a signiﬁcant short-run
beneﬁt to one's positive affect to choose an upward comparison but it is a cognitive beneﬁt to
one's self-certainty to choose or be passively exposed to an upward comparison. This is
initial evidence that cognitive goals in social comparison are more important to dysphorics
than affective goals in the short-run. But if these short-run cognitive successes via upward
comparisons lead to long-run improvements in positive affect, as some have suggested
(Baumgardner, 1990; Festinger, 1954), then perhaps dysphorics are more clever, and more
interested in improving how they think and feel than the selective attention to negative
information hypothesis would suggest. Perhaps increasing self-certainty can lead to longer
lasting or more meaningful improvements in affect than simple self-enhancement.
Enhancing oneself by making a downward comparison could have only a short-lived impact
on one's affect, and it may be why non-dysphorics tend to engage in it so frequently (Ahrens
et al., 1988; Kuiper & McDonald, 1982; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987 ; Tabachnik, Crocker, 8:
Alloy, 1983; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) . Whereas making upward comparisons to increase
self-certainty could help one formulate a long-run plan of which activities or abilities to
engage in or use and which ones to avoid, which in turn could result in continued
improvement in affect. Obviously these postulations require empirical testing, but they do

offer an optimistic explanation for dysphorics' social comparison behavior.

92

There were a number of limitations in the current research. First, it is difﬁcult to
generalize the ﬁndings concerning dysphorics from Studies 1 and 2 to a clinically depressed
population. There are qualitative differences in the experience of depressive symptoms
between dysphorics and severely depressed people (Kendall et al., 1987 ), which could
inﬂuence comparison behavior and its consequences. Simply including severely depressed
participants does not solve this problem, however, as a number of ethical concerns arise
when conducting research involving deception with this type of population. It would be very
difﬁcult to justify deceiving depressed participants and giving them contrived negative
feedback. If future research attempts to include a clinically depressed sample, special
precautions should be taken, such as changing the typical social comparison paradigm to
include more open-ended questions or self-reports of daily social comparison behavior, such
as that used by Wheeler and Miyake (1992). It might also be possible to eliminate the
experimentally controlled threat to self-esteem (i.e., negative feedback) by assuming that
severely depressed participants experience continual threats to their self-esteem. A second
limitation is that the current research did not include a measure of affect speciﬁc to the self.
This failure might account for the lack of ﬁndings on the affect variable, particularly with
regard to the self-assessment hypothesis. Future research on this topic should include a
measure of self-affect, such as that used by Baumgardner (1990), to test for a differential
impact of social comaprisons on general and self-affect. A third limitation of the current
research was the failure to include longitudinal measures into the experimental design. The
dependent variables were measured within minutes of the participants receiving feedback
and making comparisons. Future research could improve on this methodology by including
repeated measures of affect and self-certainty over a number of days or weeks. Such a
design would help to answer the questions raised above regarding the long-run utility of
lateral and upward comparisons and increased self-certainty. Since self-evaluation is an
ongoing process, it would be informative to examine self-enhancement and self-assessment

motives in social comparison behavior over repeated pieces of success or failure information.

93

This more longitudinal approach will also allow one to test the cumulative effects of social
comparisons on affect to see if the short-run beneﬁt of increased self-certainty does indeed
lead to long-term beneﬁts of improved affect. Finally, the procedure in Study 2 did not
employ multiple assessments of dysphoria because of the limited resources in the
participant pool, thus leaving open the possibility of including some participants in the
dysphoric sample who were only experiencing a transient state of sadness. While this
occurence goes against the suggestions of Kendall et al. (1987) and Tennen et a1. (1995), it
does not weaken the conclusions drawn from this research. It is still meaningful to those
who may only have been transiently dysphoric that self-certainty is improved by making
lateral and upward comparisons.

In addition to these suggestions, some other directions for future research include
testing variables that might moderate the social comparison process. One possible
moderator variable in the social comparison process could be the degree of controllability
that people perceive as having over improving themselves on a particular dimension (Major,
Testa, & Bylsma, 1991). For example, people may not perceive an upward comparison as
disappointing if they believe that they have the potential to inﬂuence or improve their
standing on the dimension. Likewise, a downward comparison may not be very self-
enhancing if people perceive little control over the dimension, as they may fear that they will
drop to the level of the worse off other (Wood et al., 1985). The inclusion of this variable
could help to create a clearer picture of when dysphorics and non-dysphorics will self-enhance
or self-assess in their social comparisons, especially since there are differences between them
in perceptions of control (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Vasquez, 1987).

A second possible moderator is the relevance of the trait in question to one's self-
deﬁnition. Comparisons along self-relevant dimensions appear to have more impact than
comparisons that are not self-relevant. Tesser and his colleagues have accumulated a great
deal of evidence that suggests that another person's success is distressing when it involves a

dimesion that is centrol to one's own self-deﬁnition (Tesser 8:. Campbell, 1982; Tesser,

94

Millar, & Moore, 1988). Thus, people should be more likely to prefer downward comparisons
and less likely to prefer upward comparisons on self-relevant dimesions (Wood 8: Taylor,
1991). Although the relevance of synthetic ability was not measured, Tesser's ﬁndings
would suggest that synthetic ability was not relevant to participants in Studies 1 and 2. In
addition, Tesser did not directly test his model using dysphoric subjects but it is easy to
extrapolate predictions from the self-enhancement and self-assessment perpectives for self-
relevance as a moderator variable. Both propositions could easily be tested by including a
measure of self-relevance in future research. Such research could provide fruitful information
regarding the role of moderator variables in social comparison processes.

Finally, the current research did not use severely depressed participants. Because of
this fact, it is difﬁcult to draw any conclusions about how the social comparison process
could help clinicians treat people suffering from clinical depression. Many people who seek
counseling, however, do experience dysphoria, whether or not it is the focus of their
treatment. The ﬁndings from the current research indicate that after exposure to
threatening feedback, dysphoric people might increase their self-certainty by engaging in
active (Study 1), or passive (Study 2), lateral comparisons, and that they might increase
both their self-certainty and positive affect by engaging in active or passive upward
comparisons. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they will no longer experience
dysphoria. The increase in self-certianty will be in the ability or trait that they receive
threateining feedback about, which may or may not be related to their central concerns. One
would imagine that the more closely related the dimension is to their reason for treatment,
the more pronounced the effect of social comparison would be, (although this possibility
would best be answered by ﬁrst testing for the moderator effect of self-relevance). It is
possible to imagine a scenario, however, in which merely entering into a therapeutic
relationship could constitute negative feedback about one's ability to cope with their
problems. Unfortunately, many people believe that if they have to enter counseling, this

constitutes a failure of some sort on their part. If a dysphoric person holds this negative

95

thought about their decision to enter therapy, and s/he is then exposed to a lateral, (e.g.,
someone with similar problems who also entered therapy), or upward comparison, (e.g.,

someone with similar difﬁculties who came in for therapy, improved, and who no longer

needs treatment), they may increase their self-certainty regarding coping ability as well as
their general positive affect. In addition, increased conﬁdence in knowing when one should
seek help to cepe with life events and when one is capable of handling the events on their
own, can be a beneﬁcial aspect of therapy. Future research with dysphorics in counseling,
using coping ability as the dimension of interest, is needed, however, before such a claim can

be made ﬁrmly. The current research provides an initial step in this direction.

References

Abramson, L.Y., & Alloy, L.B. (1981). Depression, non-depression, and cognitive illusions: A
reply to Schwartz. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 110, 436-447.

Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in
humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.

Achtinen, P. & Joukamaa, D. (1994). Prevalence rates for depression and depressive
symptoms. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 89, (377, suppl.), 7-10.

Ahrens, AH. (1986). Choice of social comparison targets by depressed and nondepressed
students. Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University.

Ahrens, AH. (1991). Dysphoria and social comparison: combining information regarding
others' performances. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 10, 190-205.

Ahrens, A.H., Zeiss, A.M., Kanfer, R. (1988). Dysphoric deﬁcits in interpersonal standards,
self-efﬁcacy, and social comparison. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 53-67.

Alloy, L.B. & Abramson, L.Y. (1979). Judgments of contingency in depressed students:
Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 441-485.

Alloy, L.B. & Abramson, L.Y. (1982). Learned helplessness, depression, and the illusion of
control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1114-1126.

Alloy, L. B. 8: Ahrens. AH. (1987). Depression and pessimism for the future: Biased use of
statistically relevant information in predictions for self versus other. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 366-378.

Amenson, C.S. & Lewinshon, PM. (1982). An investigationinto the observed sex differences
in prevalence of unipolar depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 90, 1-13.

American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders, Fourth Edition. Washington D.C,: American Psychiatric Association.

Aspinwall, LG, 8: Taylor, SE. (1993). Effects of social comparison direction, threat, and
self-esteem on affect, self-evaluation, and expected success. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 64, 7 08-722.

Barlow, D. H. (1988). Anxiety and its disorders. New York: Guilford Press.

Baron R.M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.

Baumeister, R.F., Tice, D., & Hutton, D. (1989). Self-presentational interpretation of
personality differences and self-esteem. Journal of Personality, 57, 547 -577 .

Baumgardner, AH. (1990). To know oneself is to like oneself: Self-Certainty and Self-Affect.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1062- 1072.

Baumgardner, A.H., Kaufman, C.M., 8: Levy, RE. (1989). Regulating affect interpersonally:

When low esteem leads to greater enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 56, 907-921.

96

97

Beck, AT. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York:
Harper & Row.

Beck, A.T. ( 1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York: International
Universitites Press.

Beck, A.T., Ward, C.H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J ., & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for
measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561-571.

Becker, J. (1974). Depression: Theory and Research. New York: V.H. Winston & Sons.

Belsher, G., & Costello, CG. (1988). Relapse after recovery from unipolar depression: A
critical review. Pychological Bulletin,104, 84-96.

Blaney, P.H. (197 7). Contemporary theories of depression: Critique and comparison.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 203-223.

Breier, A., Charney, D S. ,& Heninger, G. R. (1985). The diagnostic validity of anxiety
disorders and their relationship to depressive illness. W

Psychiatry, 142, 787- 797.

Bumberry, W., Oliver, J .M., & McClure, J .N . (1978). Validation of the Beck Depression
Inventory in a university population using psychiatric estimate as the criterion. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 150-155.

Buunk, B.P., Collins, R.L., Taylor, S.E., Vaaneren, N.W., & Dakof, G.A. (1990). The
affective consequences of social comparison: Either direction has its ups and downs.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1238-1249.

Byrne, D. (1971). The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press.

Carver, C.S, & Scheier, KW. (1981). Attention and self-regulation. New York: Springer-
Verlag.

Clark, L.A. & Watson, D. (1991) Tripartite model of anxiety and depression: Psychometric
evidence and toxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 316-336.

Coates, D., & Peterson, B. (1982). Depression and deviance. In G. Weary & H. Mirels
(Eds), Integration of clinical and social psychology, (pp. 154-170). New York: Oxford
Press.

Collins, R.E., Dakof, G., & Taylor, S. E. (1988). Social comparison and adjustment to a
threatening event. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Coyne, J .C. (1976). Depression and the response of others. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
85, 186-193.

Coyne, J .C. & Gotlib, I. H. (1983). The role of cognition in depression: A critical appraisal.
Psychological Bulletin, 94, 472-505.

Crocker, J. & Gallo, L (1985). Self-enhancing effects of downward comparison: An
experimental test. In T.A. Wills (Chair), Self-esteem maintenance: Theory and evidence.
Symposium presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los
Angeles, CA.

Crowns, D.P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354.

98

Depue, R.A., & Monroe, S. M. (1978). Learned helplessness in the perspective of the
depressive disorders: Conceptual and deﬁnitional issues. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 87, 3-21.

DeVellis, R., Holt, K, Renner, B., Blalock, S., Blanchard, L., Cook, H., Klotz, M, Mikow,V.,
& Harring, K (1990). The relationship of social comparison to rheumatiod arthritis
symptoms and affect. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 11, 1-18.

Dobson, KS. (1985). The relationship between anxiety and depression. Clinical Psychology
Review, 5, 307-324.

Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: Academic
Press.

Eisenstadt, D. & Leippe, MR. (1994). The self-comparison process and self-discrepant
feedback: Consequences of learning you are what you thought you were not. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 611-626.

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-140.

Freud, S. (1917). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans), The standard
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (V 01. 14, pp. 151- 169).
London: Hogarth.

Funabiki, D., Bologna, N .C., Pepping, M, & Fitzgerald, KC. (1980). Revisiting sex
differences in the expression of depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 194-
202.

Gibbons, F.X. (1986). Social comparison and depression: Company's effect on misery.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,51, 140- 148.

Gibbons, F.X., Benbow, CR, 82 Gerrard, M (1994). From top dog to bottom half: Social
comparison strategies in response to poor performance. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 67, 638-652.

Gibbons, F.X., Gerrard, M, Lando, H., 8: McGovern, P. (1991). Smoking cessation and social
comparison: The role of the ”typical smoker." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
27, 239-258.

Gibbons. F.X., & McCoy, S. (1991). Self-Esteem, similarity, and reactions to active versus
passive downward comparison. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 414-
424.

Golin, S., & Terrell, F. (197 7). Motivational and associative aspects of mild depression in
skill and chance tasks. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 389-401.

Gotlib, I.H. (1984). Depression and general psychopathology in university students. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 93, 19-30.

Hakmiller, KL. (1966). Threat as a determinant of downward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 2 (Supplement 1), 32-39.

Hammen, C.L., & Krantz, S. ( 1976). Effects of success and failure on depressive cognitions.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85, 577-586.

Hoberman, H.M, 8r Lewinsohn, RM (1985). The behavioral treatment of depression. In
E.E. Beckham 8; W.R. Leber (Eds), Handbook of depression: Treatment, assessment, and
research (pp. 39-81). Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

99

Joiner, T., Schmidt, T., & Metalsky, G. (1994). Low-end speciﬁcity of the Beck Depression
Inventory. Cognitive Therapy & Research, 18, 55-68.

Kendall, P.C. & Flannery-Schroeder, EC. (1995). Rigor, but not rigor mortis, in depression
research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 892-894.

Kendall, P.C., Hollon, S., Beck, A.T., Hammen, C., & Ingram, R. (1987). Issues and
recommendations regarding the use of the Beck Depression Inventory. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 11, 289-300.

Kuiper, N ., & MacDonald, M. (1982). Self and other perception in mild depressives. Social
Cognition, 1, 223-239.

Kuiper, N. & Olinger, L.J. (1989). Stress and cognitive vulnerability for depression: A self-
worth contingency model. In R.W. J. Neufeld (Ed.), Advances in the investigation of
psyhological stress (pp. 367-391). New York: Wiley.

Kuiper, N ., Derry, P., & MacDonald, M (1982). Self-reference and person perception in
depression: A social cognitive perspective. In G. Weary & H. Mirels (Eds), Integration of
clinical and social psychology. New York: Oxford.

Laurent, J. & Stark, KB. (1993). Testing the cognitive content-speciﬁcity hypothesis with
anxious and depressed youngsters. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 226-237.

Lazarus, AA. (1968). Learning theory and the treatment of depression. Behavior Research
and Therapy, 6, 83-89.

Lehman, HE. (1971). Epidemiology of depressive disorders. In R.R. Fieve (Ed.)., Depression
in the 70's: Modern theory and research. Princeton, NJ: Excerpts Medica.

Lewinsohn, P.M, & Shaw D. (1969). Feedback about interpersonal behavior as an agent of
behavior change: A case study in the treatment of depression. Psychotherapy and
Psychosomatics, 17, 82-88.

Lewinsohn, P.M, Antonuccio, D.O., Breckenridge, J .S. 8: Teri, L. (1984). The coping with
depression course. Eugene, OR: Castalia Publishing Company.

Lewinsohn, P.M., Hoberman, H., Teri, L., & Hautzinger, M (1985). An integrative theory of
depression. In S. Reiss &. R. Bootzin (Eds), Theoretical issues in behavior therapy
(pp.331-359). New York: Academic Press.

Lewinsohn, P.M., Mischel, W., Chaplin, W, 8; Barton, R. (1980). Social competence and
depression: The role of illusory self-perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 203-
212.

Lord, P.M., (1967). A paradox in the interpretation of group comparisons. Psychological
Bulletin, 68, 304-305.

Lyubomirsky, S. & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric
rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 339-349.

Major, B., Testa, M., 8; Bylsma, W.H. (1991). Response to upward and downward social
comparisons: The impact of esteem-relevance and perceived control. In J .Suls & T.A.
Wills (Eds), Social compamn: Contemporary theory and research (pp. 237-257).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Mendels, J. (1975). The psychobiology of depression. New York: Spectrum Publicatios.

100

Metalsky, G.I., & Joiner, TE. (1992). Vulnerability to depressive symptomatology: A
prospective test of the diathesis-stress and causal mediation components of the
hopelessness theory of depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 667 -
675.

Myers, S.K., & Weissman, M.M. (1980). Use of a self-report symptom scale to detect
depression in a community sample. American Journal of Psychiatry, 137, 1081-1084.

Nelson, R., & Craighead, W. E. (1977). Selective recall of positive and negative feedback,
self-control behaviors and depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 379-388.

Oliver, J .M. 8; Burkham, R. (1979). Depression in university students as measured in
random samples: Duration, relation to calendar time, prevalence, and demographic
correlates. Journal of Abnormal Psychoology, 88, 667-670.

Pelham, B.W., 8i Swann, W.B., (1989). From self-conceptions to self-worth: On the sources
and structure of global self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,
672-680.

Pinkley, R., Laprelle, J ., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J. (1988). Depression and the self-
serving search for consensus after success and failure. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 6, 235-244.

Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J ., 8r LaPrelle, J. (1985). Social comparison after success and
failure: Biased search for information consistent with a self-serving conclusion. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 195-211.

Pyszczynski, T. 8: Greenberg, J. (1987 ). Self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive
self-focusing style: A self-awareness theory of reactive depression. Psychological Bulletin,
102, 122- 138.

Radloff, LS. (1977). The CES-D scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the
general population. Applied Psycholgical Measurement, 1, 385-401.

Rado, S. (1928). The problem of melancholia. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 9,
420-438.

Rosenblatt, A., 82 Greenberg J. (1991). Examining the world of the depressed: Do depressed

people prefer others who are depressed? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
60, 620-629.

Sacco, W.P. (1981). Invalid use of the Beck Depression Inventory to identify depressed
college-student subjects: A methodological comment. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 5,
143-147.

Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, Enhancement, and Veriﬁcation Determinants of the self-
evaluation process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 317-338.

Seligman, ME.P. (1975). Helplessness. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

Shedler, J ., Mayman, M., & Mania, M. (1993). The illusion of mental health. American
Psychologist, 48, 1117-1131

Skinner, B.F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Free Press.

101

Smith, R.H., & Insko, GA. (1987). Social comparison choice during ability evaluation: The
effects of comparison publicity, performance feedback, and self-esteem. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 111-122.

Spaner, Bland, & Newman (1994). Prevalence rates of depression. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica, 89 (377), 7-10.

Suls, J.M. (1977). Social comparison theory and research. In J .M Suls & R. L. Miller
(Eds). Social comparison processes: Theoretical and experimental perspectives (pp. 1-19).
Washington, DC: Hemisphere.

Swallow, S.R. & Kuiper, N .A. (1987 ). The effects of depression and cognitive vulnerability to
depression on judgemnts of similarity between self and other. Motivation and Emotion,
11, 157 -167.

Swallow, S.R. & Kuiper, NA (1990). Mild depression, dysfunctional cognitions, and
interest in social comparison information. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 9,
289-302.

Swallow, S.R. & Kuiper, NA (1992). Mild depression and frequency of social comparison
behavior. Journal of Social and Clinical Psycholgy, 11, 167-180.

Swallow, SR. 8: Kuiper, NA (1993). Social comparison in dysphoria and nondysphoria:
Differences in target similarity and speciﬁcity. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 17, 103-
122.

Swann, W.B., Griffin, J .J., Predmore, S.C., & Gaines, B. (1987). The cognitive-affective
crossﬁre: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement. Journal of Personlaity and
Social Psychology, 52, 881-889.

Swann, W.B., Pelham, B.W., & Krull, BS. (1989). Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth?
Reconciling self-enhancement and self-veriﬁcation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 57, 782-791.

Swann, W.B., Hixon, J ., Stein-Seroussi, A, & Gilbert D.T. (1990). The ﬂeeting gleam of
praise: Cognitive processes underlying behavioral reactions to self-relevant feedback.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 17-26.

Tabachnik, N., Crocker, J., & Alloy, L.B. (1983). Depressioon, social comparison, and the
false-consensus effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 688-699.

Taylor, S.E., & Brown, J .D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.

Taylor, S.E., Falke, R.L., Shoptaw, S.J., & Lichtman, RR. (1986). Social support, support
groups, and the cancer patient. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 54, 608-
615.

Taylor, S.E., & Lobel, M. (1989). Social comparison activity under threat: Downward
evaluation and upward contacts. Psychological Review, 96, 569-57 5.

Teasdale, J .D. (1978). Effects of real and recalled success on learned helplessness and
depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 155-164.

Tennen, H., Hall, J .A, & Affleck, G. (1995). Depression research methodologies in the
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: A review and critique. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 870-884.

102

Tesser, A, & Campbell, J. (1982). Self-evaluation maintenance and the perception of friends
and strangers. Journal of Personality, 50, 261-279.

Tesser, A., Millar, M, & Moore, J. (1988). Some affective consequences of social comparison
and reﬂection processes: The pain and pleasure of being close. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 54, 49-61.

Trope, Y. (1983). Self-assessment in achievement behavior. In J .M. Suls & AG. Greenwald
(Eds), Psychological perspectives on the self (V 01. 2, pp. 93-121). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Trope, Y. (1986). Self-enhancement and self-assessment in achievement behavior. In R.M.
Sorrentino & E.T. Higgins (Eds), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of
social behavior (pp. 350-378). New York Guilford.

Trope, Y. & Neter, E. (1994). Reconciling competing motives in self-evlauation: The role of
self-control in feedback seeking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 646-
657 .

Vazquez, C.V. (1987 ). Judgments of contingency: Cognitive biases in depressed and
nondepressed subjects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 419-431.

Wainer, H., (1991). Adjusting for differential base rates: Lord's paradox again.
Psychological Bulletin, 109, 147-151.

Warren, L.W. & McEachren L. (1983). Psychological correlates of depressive
symptomatology in adult women. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 151-160.

Watson, D., & Clark, LA. (1992). Affects separable and inseparable: On the hierarchical
arrangement of the negative affects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62,
489-505.

Watson, D., Clark, L.A, & Carey, G. (1988). Positive and negative affectivity and their
relation to anxiety and depressive disorders. Jounal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 346-
353.

Watson, D., Clark, L.A, & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS Scales. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070.

Weary, G., Edwards, J .A, & Jacobson, J .A. (1995). Depression research methodologies in
the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: A reply. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 68, 885-891.

Weary, G., Elbin, S., & Hill, MG. (1987). Attributional and social comparison processes in
depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 605-610.

Weinberger, D., Schwartz, G., 8: Davidson, R. (1979). Low anxious, high znxious, and
repressive coping styles: Psychometric patterns and behavioral and physiological
responses to stress. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88.

Weissman, MA, Sholomskas, D., Pottinger, M., Prusoff, B.A, 8: Locke, B. Z. (1977).
Assessing depressive symptoms in ﬁve psychiatric populations: A validation study.
American Journal of Epidemiology, 106, 203-214.

Wheeler, L. (1966). Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1 (Supplement 1), 27-31.

103

Wheeler, L. & Miyake, K (1992). Social comparison in everyday life. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 62, 760-773.

Wills, T.A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology. Psychological
Bulletin, 90, 245-251.

Wills, TA (1987). Downward comparison as a coping mechanism. In Synder C.R. & Ford,
C.E. (Eds.) Coping with negative life events (pp. 243-268), New York: Plenum Press.

Wood, J .V. 82 Taylor, KL. (1991). Serving self-relevant goals through social comparison. In
J .M Suls & TA Wills (Eds.), Social comparison: Contemporary theory and research (pp.
23-49). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Wood, J .V., Taylor, S.E., & Lichtman, RR. (1985). Social comparison in adjustment to
breast cancer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1169-1183.

Wood, J.V., Giordano-Beech, M., Taylor, KL., Michela, J .L., & Gaus, V. (1994). Strategies
of social comparison among people with low self-esteem: Self-protection and self-
enhancement. Journal of Personlity and Social Psychology, 67, 713-731.

Appendix A

Stimulus Materials for Study 1

104

Experlmenf #1 Instructlons

You will be participating in two separate and unrelated experiments today. In
the first experiment, you will be asked to fill out 2 anonymous surveys about
your mood and 1 survey about your attitudes. These surveys will not ask you for
your name or any other identifying information. The researchers are
investigating the different percentage of college aged people who experience

one feeling or another.

The 3 surveys are attached. Please be very open and honest in your answers.
Remember that these surveys are anonymous. Please do not put your name

anywhere on this questionnaire.

When you are finished with this questionnaire, please come out of your cubicle,
place it in the box at the front of the room, and then return to your cubicle. When
everyone has completed the first experiment, the experimenter will explain the

second experiment.
If you have any questions at this point, please address them to the

experimenter. If not, then please W and you may begin
completing the questionnaires.

105

Mood Inventory

This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. After reading each grotp of statements
carefully, circle the nurrber (0, 1, 2, or 3) that corresponds to the one statement in each group
wich best describes the way you have been feeling the past week, Including today. If
several statements within a group seem to apply equally well, circle the one that best describes
how you are feeling. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your
choice.

A ldonotfeelsad.
Ifeelsad.
Iamsosadallthetimeandlcan‘t snepouofit.

Iamsosadormhappythatlcan'tstandi.

I am not particularly discouraged about the future.

I feel discouraged about the future.

I feel I have nothing to look forward to.

I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot inprove.

ldo not feel like a failure.

IfeeI l have failed morethan the average person.
Asllookbackonmylife,alllcanseeisalotoffailure.
Ifeel Iamacorrpletefailureasa person.

I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.

I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.

I don't feel particularly guilty.

I feel guilty a good part of the time.
I feel quite guilty most of the time.
I feel guilty all of the time.

I don't feel I am being punished.
I feel I may be punished.

I expect to be punished.

I feel lam being punished.

I don‘t feel disappointed in myself.
I am disappointed in myself.

I am disgusted with myself.

I hate myself.

ldon'tfeel Iamanyworsethananybody else.

I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
I blame myself all the time for my faults.

I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

I don‘t have any thoughts of killing myself.

I have thoung of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
I would like to kill myself.

Iwouldldlmyselfifll'ladthechance.

106

{ADM-‘0

“IN-I'D (ADM-3° (“N-5° GIN-IO GIN-5° (A) ”‘0 (I’M-‘0 “IO-‘0 GIN-56

ldon't cry any more than usual.

Icrymorenowthanlusedto.

Icryallthetimenow.
lusedtobeabletocry,butnowlcan'tcryeventhoughlwantto.

lamnomoreirr'latednowthan I everam.

I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.

I feel irritated all the time now.

I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to initate me.

I have not lost interest in other people.

I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
I have lost most of my interest in other people.

I have lost all of my interest in other people.

I make decisions about as well as I ever codd.

I put off making decisions more than I used to.

I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
I can't make decisions at all anymore.

ldon't feel I look any worse than I used to.

I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.

I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look
unattractive.

I believe that I look ugly.

I can work about as well as before.

It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.

I can't do any work at all.

lcansleepaswelasusual.

Idon'tsleepaswellaslusedto.

Iwake tp 1-2 hours earlierthan usual and find it hardtogetbackto sleep.
I wake tp several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.

I don't get more tired than usual.

I get tired more easily than I used to.

I get tired from doing almost anything.
I am too tired to do anything.

My appetite is no worse than usual.
Myappetite isnotasgoodasitusedtobe.
My appetite is much worse now.

I have no appetite at all anymore.

I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
I have lost more than 5 pounds.

I have lost more than 10 pounds.

I have lost more than 15 pounds.

I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. YES NO

107

‘0

0M

”IO-5°

lamnotany moreworriedabout myhealththan I usualyam.
lamworriedabomphysicalproblemssuchasachesand painsorupset stomach
or constipation.

I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else.
lamsoworriedaboutmyphysicalproblemsthat Icannotthinkabout anything
else.

I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
I am less interested in sex than I used to be.

I am much less interested in sex now.

I have lost interest in sex wnpletely.

108

Feellng Queetlonnalre

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what
extent you are feellng thls way rlght new. Use the following scale to respond to each item.

1 2 3 4 5

very slightly or a Elle moderately quie a bit extremely
not at al

1. interested

2. distressed

3. excited

4. upset

5. strong

6. guilty _____
7. scared

8. hostile

9. enthusiastic

10. proud

1 1. initable

12. alert

13. ashamed

14. inspired

15. nervous

16. determined—

1 7. attentive

18. jittery

19. active

20. afraid

109

General Attltude Survey

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each
item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.

T

.1

-l-I—I-l-l-l

.4

-I-l-I-I-l-l

-I-I-l-l

TI

TITITI'HTI'H

TI

TITITI'HTITI

'n'n-nm

1. Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the
candidates.

2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

3. ltissometimeshardformetogoonwithmyworkiflamnot
encouraged.

4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.

5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8. Mytable mannersat homeareas good asan l eatom ina restaurant.

9.lfloouldgetintoamoviewithompayingandbesurelwasnotseen,I
wouldprobablydoit.

10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I
thought too little of my ability.

11. I like to gossip at times.

12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.

13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.

14. I can remerrber 'playing sick“ to get out of something.

15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

17.lalwaystrytopracticewhatlpreach.

18. I don‘t find it particularly difﬁcult to get along with loud-mouthed,
obnoxious people.

19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
20. When I don‘t know something, I don't at all mind admitting to it.
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

110

_|

-l-I-I-l

11

11111111

23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my
wrongdoings.

25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.

26. l have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.

27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune
of others.

29. l have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
31. l have never felt that l was punished without cause.

32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what
they deserved.

33. l have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's
feelings.

111

General Instructions

This is an experiment concerning personality traits. We are interested in the
different background characteristics of people who have certain personality traits. You will
ﬁrst be asked to respond to a "background survey" that asks you for some personal
information. We are interested in group averages and are not particularly concerned with
any one individual. You will not be asked to give your name. In addition, if you feel
uncomfortable answering any of the questions on the "background survey“, you
may leave them blank.

After completing the background survey, you will be asked to respond to a number of
brief, self-report personality tests. You will nQLbe asked to put your name on these
tests. Aﬁzer you complete the ﬁrst test, the experimenter will collect them and give them to
a graduate student in psychology who will score the tests. Too often in psychology
experiments, subjects do not learn anything about themselves or the topic of research
because it is uninteresting to them or because it is not personally meaningful. To alleviate
this problem, you will be provided with the results of your tests and feedback about what
your scores mean. We have selected personality tests that are brief, so that you will be able
to see the results of your tests before you leave today.

After completing the ﬁrst test, the experimenter will distribute the second
personality test. Upon completion of the second test, they will be collected and given to the
graduate student to score. By this time, the ﬁrst tests will be scored and the results will be
distributed to you. You will be given a few minutes to look them over. You will then be
asked to ﬁll out some post-experiment surveys before leaving. If you have any questions
during the experiment, please direct them to the experimenter. If you have no questions at

this point, you may begin the experiment.

112

Do Not Put Your Name on This Page

DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

Year in school 2. Major

Hometown Geographic Location: (In the US.)
a) Northeast b) Southeast c) Midwest (1) Southwest e) Far West f) Other

Hometown Type:
a) Urban b) Suburban c) Rural

Hometown Population (approximate)

3) Less than 10,000 b) 10,000 - 50,000 c) 50,000 - 100,000 (1) 100,000 -500,000

e) over 500,000

Father's Occupation:

a) Professional (doctor, lawyer, professor)

b) Business (accountant, stock broker, business executive)
c) Managerial (supervisor, foreman)

d) Laborer (factory worker, construction)

e) Agriculture (farmer)

0 Domestic (homemaker)

g) Self-employed

h) Unemployed

Mother's Occupation:

a) Professional (doctor, lawyer, professor)

b) Business (accountant, stock broker, business executive)
c) Managerial (supervisor, foreman)

d) Laborer (factory worker, construction)

e) Agriculture (farmer)

f) Domestic (homemaker)

g) Self-employed

h) Unemployed

Previous Military Service:
Yes No If "Yes," What Branch?

 

113

Standard Test of Synthetic Ability
(STSA)

Form X327

INSTRUCTIONS: Read each item carefully and pick the one best answer
from among the available options. Answer every question, even if you have to
guess. There is no penalty for wrong answers.

SAMPLE ITEM:

WRITE : SCRAWL :: TALK: ( a. crate, b. translate, c. mumble, d. speak)

Copyright 1981: University Social Psychology Consultants, Inc.

114

10.

SUPERLATIVE : BEST :: COMPARATIVE : (a. poor, b. good, 0.
best, d. great)

TRAIN:TRACK::GONDOLA: (a.canal,b.air,c.ocean,d.
hangar)

GARROTIN G : DEATH :: FRICTION : (a. rubbing, b. lubricant, c.
heat, d. slaughtered)

ROYALTY : CROWN :: RELIGION : (a. prayer, b. cruciﬁx, c.
priesthood, d. bible)

EMPEROR : ROMAN EMPIRE :: PHARAOH : (a. Babylonia, b.
Phoenicia, c. Egypt, d. India)

ENERGY: CONDUCTION :: SYNERGY: (a. induction, b.
deduction, c. reduction, (1. transduction)

COMPLETE : COMMENCE :: IMPERMEABLE : (a. temporary, b.
porous, c. impenetrable, d. permanent)

APEX: SUMMIT :: ZENITH : (a. nadir, b. end, c. cumulous, (1.
beginning)

ATOM: MOLECULE :: CELL : (a. DNA, b. cytoplasm, c. nucleus,
d. membrane)

SILENT: TACITURN :: MUTE : (a. voluble, b. shy, c. lively, (I.
deal)

115

ll.

12.

l3.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

ROOSTER: CHICKEN :: DRAKE : (a. quail, b. turkey, c. hen, d.
pheasant)

STATUE : SCULPTOR :: FUGUE : (a. composer, b. politician, c.
psychiatrist, d. blacksmith)

BROGUE : FOOT :: SHEATH : (a. skin, b. compass, c. escutcheon,
d. tendon)

ALPINIST : MOUNTAINS :: SPELUNKER: (a. deserts, b. caves, c.
glaciers, d. forests)

LONGEST : RED :: SHORTEST : (a. blue, b. yellow, c. violet, d.
green)

WAR BETWEEN THE STATES : CIVIL WAR :: GREAT WAR : (a.
American Revolution, b. Hundred Years War, 0. World War I, (1.
World War II)

KENNEDY: BULLET :: SOCRATES : (a. dagger, b. suffocation, c.
noose, d. hemlock)

CIRRHOSIS : LIVER :: NEPHROSIS : (a. gall bladder, b.
diaphragm, c. pancreas, d. lungs)

DEDUCTION: INDUCTION :: ANALYTIC : (a. post hoc, b.
inferential, c. a priori, d. a fortiori)

ETIOLOGY: SYMPTOM :: SCATOLOGY: (a. fatal, b. abreaction,
c. sublocution, d. rejoinder)

116

Test of Social Awareness

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.

Ii

1. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
3. In a discussion I often ﬁnd it necessary to repeat myself several times to
make sure I am being understood.

4. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

5. In times like these, a person must be pretty selﬁsh if he considers his own
happiness primarily.

6. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

7. I'd like it if I could ﬁnd someone who would tell me how to solve my
personal problems.

8. Of all the different philosophies which have existed in this world there is
probably only one which is correct.

9. It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that his life
becomes meaningful.

10. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going
on is to rely upon leaders or experts who can be trusted.

11. There are a number of persons I have come to hate because of the things
they stand for.

12. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

13. It is better to be a dead here than a live coward.

14. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own
members cannot exist for long.

15. It is only natural that a person should have a much better acquaintance
with ideas he behaves in than with ideas he opposes.

16. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes have the
ambition to become a great man, like Einstein, Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
17 . Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is
unfortunately necessary at times to restrict the freedom of certain political

groups.

117

18. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to
gamble "all or nothing at all."

19. Most people just don't give a damn about others.

20. A person who gets enthusiastic about a number of causes is likely to be a
pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

21. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it
usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

22. If given the chance I would do something that would be of great beneﬁt to
the world.

23. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against
ideas put out by certain people or groups in one's own camp than by those in
the opposing camp.

24. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am
going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

25. Once I get wound up in d heated discussion Ijust can't stop.

26. There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who are on the side of
truth and those who are against it.

27 . Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

28. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

29. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of
really great thinkers.

30. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of
democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

31. The present is all too often fall of unhappiness. It is the future that
counts.

32. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed
important social and moral problems don't really understand what is going
on.

33. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place.

34. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one
has had a chance to hear the opinions of these one respects.

35. The worst crime a person can commit is to attack publicly the people who
believe in the same thing he does.

36. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and associates

whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

118

T F 37. Most of the ideas which get published nowadays aren't worth the paper
they are printed on.

T F 38. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

T F 39. My blood boils whenver a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

If you are ﬁnished, please open the door to your cubicle so the experimenter can collect your
test.

119

Personality Test #1
Test of Synthetic Ability
Feedback Form

1. Comparative: (poor, good, best, great) :: Superlative : Best

2. Gondola : (canal, air, ocean, hangar) :: Train : Track

3. Garroting : Death :: Friction : (rubbing, lubricant, heat, slaughtered)

4. Crown : Royal :: (prayer, cruciﬁx, priesthood, bible) : Religious

5. (Babylonia, Phoenicia, Egypt, India) : Pharaoh :: Roman Empire : Emperor

6. Energy: Conduction :: Synergy : (induction, deduction, reduction, transduction)

7. (temporary, porous, impenetrable, permanent) : Impermeable :: Commence : Complete
8. Apex : Summit :: Zenith : (nadir, end, cumulous, beginning)

9. Atom : Molecule :: Cell (DNA, cytoplasm, nucleus, membrane)

10. (voluble, shy, lively, deaf) : Mute :: Silent : Taciturn

11. (Quail, turkey, hen, pheasant) : Drake :: Chicken : Rooster

12. Sculptor : Statue :: (composer, politician, psychiatrist, blacksmith) : Fugue
13. Brogue : Foot :: Sheath (skin, compass, escutcheon, tendon)

14. Spelunker : (deserts, caves, glaciers, forests) :: Alpinist: Mountains

15. Red : Longest :: (blue, yellow, violet, green) : Shortest

16. War Between the States : Civil War :: Great War : (American Revolution, Hundred Years
War, World War I, World War II)

17. Socrates : (dagger, suffocation, noose, hemlock) :: Garﬁeld : Bullet

18. Cirrhosis : Liver :: Nephrosis : (gall bladder, diaphragm, pancreas, lungs)

19. Induction : Deduction :: (post hoc, inferential, a priori, a fortiori) : Analytic

20. Etiology : Symptom :: Scatalogy( fatal, abreaction, sublocution, rejoinder)

The questions that you answered incorrectly are marked with an "X." The correct answers
to those you answered wrong are not indicated in order to prevent you from "learning" the
test. You may have to take this test at some point later in your life and knowing the correct
answers would unfairly bias your future test protocal. Each item is worth a different value.
Some easy items are worth only three-tenths of a point while some difﬁcult items are worth
a full point. When these values are summed, the highest score possible is a "10" and the

lowest possible score is a "0."

Subject # , you received a score of 7 on the test of Standard Synthetic Ability (form
X327-F). This places you in the very high range of synthetic ability. This means that you

are very high, in the ability to reason abstractly. Furthermore, based on your pattern of
responses, I am not entirely certain (i.e. only 50%), that you are actually in the high range of

 

synthetic ability. Your pattern of responses did not yield an easily interpretable proﬁle, and
I can not say with certainty that your score represents your true level of synthetic ability.

Scored by
Bradley Hack, MA

120

Do not put your name on this page

After reviewing the feedback regarding your performance, please select someone with whom
you would like to compare your performance with. That is, you want to compare yourself

with someone who:

Performed Worse Performed Better__ Performed the

Same

 

Now, please select the speciﬁc test score with which you would like to compare your

performance to. That is, you want to see the test of a subject who received a score of:

 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very Poor Below Average Very Superior
' Average High

* Please open your door when you are ﬁnished.

122

Synthetic Ability
Post-Test Questionnaire

Please ﬁll out the two brief questionnaires on the following pages. The
experimenters are interested in your reaction to the Synthetic Ability test.
You will be ﬁlling out similar questionnaires regarding the Test of Social
Awareness. Please read the instructions carefully.

Please Open your door when you are ﬁnished with these questionnaires so the
experimenter can collect them.

If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter.

123

Do Not Place Your Name On This Page
Latitude of Self-Description Questionnaire

Instructions: Please answer the questions, following the sample given next.

Sample: In this exercise, you will ﬁnd a series of descriptors, some of which may seem to
describe you and others of which may not seem to describe you. There are We involved
in answering each question. Your ﬁrst task is to decide if you think you have more than
average, about average, or less than average of the particular trait. Then mark on the scale
with an X where on that continuum you see yourself, and write in parentheses below the X,

the exact number where you see yourself.

 

Athletic

0 10 20 30 4Q 50 60 :70 80 29 199
much less than average much more
average than average

So if you see yourself as being more athletic than average, say, at the 85th percentile
(more athletic than 85% of the population), than you might place an X halfway between the
80 and 90 and then write an "85" in parentheses below the X. But if you see yourself as
being less athletic than average, say at the 33rd percentile (less athletic than 67% of the
population), then you might place an X a little above the 30 and write a "33" in parentheses
below the X.

After you have decided about where you fall on this continuum, then your second
task is to decide where you see your range on that trait. You probably found yourself a bit
unsure of where to place the X in the ﬁrst exercise. This is because we usually view
ourselves as somewhat flexible on almost all traits (although some more than others). What
you now need to do is simply decide where that range is, mark the two endpoints with
arrows, and write the actual numbers in parentheses.

So if you are sure you are more athletic than at least 15% of the population, then
place an arrow (1) halfway between 10 and the 20 above and write a "15" below the arrow.
And if you are sure you are not more athletic than 90% of the population, then put the

second arrow there and write a "90" below the arrow.

124

When done, you should have two arrows, marking the endpoints of where you might
fall, and one X, marking your best guess of where you do fall and the exact numbers in
parentheses below the arrows and the X.

After completing the sample question, please go on and answer the remaining

descriptors in the same way.

125

Intelligent

 

 

 

 

 

O 11L 20 30 40 50 60 7 O 80 9_0__19_Q
much less than average much more
average than average
Humorous

o 10 20 30 4o 50 60 70 so so 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Overconﬁdent

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7O 80 M
much less than average much more
average than average
Synthetic Ability

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Reckless

0 10 JD 30 40 50 60 70 80 99—191)
much less than average much more

average

126

than average

Happy

 

 

 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 '10 80 99 1110
much less than average much more
average than average
Persistent

0 10 20 3O 40 50 60 7Q 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Logical

0 10 10 30 40 J0 611 7 0 80 9_0__1,Q_Q
much less than average much more
average than average

127

Feellng Ouestlonnalre

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what
extent you are feellng thls way rlght new. Use the following scale to rewond to each item.

1 2 3 4 5

very slightly or a Rtle moderately quie a bit extremely
not at all

1. interested

2. distressed

3. excited

4. upset

5. strong

6. guilty ____

7. scared
8. hostile

9. enthusiastic

10. proud

1 1. irritable

12. alert

13. ashamed

14. inspired

15. nervous

16. determined
1 7. attentive

18. jittery

19. active

20. afraid

128

Test Reaction Questionnaire

The experiment is now over. It will be explained to you in a few minutes. In the space
provided below, please explain brieﬂy what you think the purpose of this experiement was.
Please open your door when you are ﬁnished.

129

DEBRIEFING

This study is about over. Before we go any further, I'd like to ask you a
few questions, ok? First, has there been anything about the tasks we've done
so far, or things I've explained to you that may have made you think there may
be more to this study than I've told you? Anything that made you suspicious?
(ask all subjects and follow-up in detail if they say yes).

There is more to this study than I have told you so far. But before I tell
you more about it, I just want to remind you to feel free to interrupt if
something is unclear or if you want more explanation about anything, OK?

OK. This experiment is designed to look at how people respond to
positive and negative feedback about their abilities. Speciﬁcally, we are
interested in whether or not getting positive or negative feedback about your
synthetic ability had an effect on who you wanted to compare yourself to.
Social psychologists are interested in this because it can reveal more about
how we evaluate ourselves and our abilities. As you might have heard in your
psychology classes, one ﬁnding in psychology is that "we compare ourselves
with people below us." Another ﬁnding is that we compare ourselves to people
above us. But which one is true? We are seeking to understand the conditions
where each option may apply, and when, for example, we compare with
someone who performed below us and someone who performed above us.

In this experiment, we do a number of things as experimenters, in order
to create different conditions where we can test this idea. Beforehand, you
ﬁlled out a consent form, and a mood inventory. We want to measure mood to
see how it varies in people and how it may vary under experimental conditions
(i.e. after getting positive or negative feedback).

First we had you complete the synthetic abilities test. Then we had you
take another personality test. This second test was unimportant for the
experiment and served to ﬁll some time. Then we gave you feedback about
how you performed on the synthetic abilities test. Recall that we want to see
how people react to either positive or negative feedback. And remember, in
experiments, we need to keep everything that you are exposed to constant,

130

except for the things we want to study...i.e., test feedback being either positive
or negative. So this is one of the things that I manipulated. So what that
means is that I gave each of you Imgns feedback sheets that I had written up
before you even arrived today. I have feedback sheets that are primarily
positive and primarily negative (show subjects). This way, I can have
experimental control of the feedback you get, and it is the same for every
subject I run. So, I did no], really rate your performance, those were bogus
feedback sheets nrtﬁllﬁdﬂnt by me. I randomly decided who would get what
type of feedback before you even arrived.

(Take out the two bogus feedback sheets and say:)

I have a copy of the feedback sheet we assigned to each of you. Also, I
have another copy of the feedback that was randomly assigned to people in
other conditions (show participants). Do you see the differences?

Do you understand why we deceive you in that way? If we had you give
your real scores on the test, then every participant would get different types of
feedback. This leads to a lot of experimental errors, and we are not able to say
with certainty how people react to positive vs. negative feedback. So the score
we gave you had nothing to do with how you actually performed. In fact, 10 of
the items on the test were unsolvable.

OK So that explains those conditions of psoitive vs. negative feedback.
The next thing we are interested in is who you chose to compare yourself with.
Some psychologists think that when you get negative feedback you compare
yourself with someone who did worse than you and when you get positive
feedback, you compare yourself with someone who did better than you. Other
psychologists think the opposite. That is, when you negative feedback, you
compare yourself with someone who did better than you did but when you get
positive feedback, you will compare yourself with someone who did worse than
you. Neither type of comparison pattern is "right" or "wrong," "better" or
"worse." They are just different. We want to know which psychologists are
correct in their ideas about how participants do this.

131

Finally, we are interested in how you decision to compare yourself with
someone who did better than, worse than, or the same as you, made you feel.
Some psychologists believe that such a comparison will have no eﬂ‘ect on your
mood or how certain you are of your abilities, while others think the
comparison will have an effect on you feelings and certainty. Noticing a
change in your mood after comparing yourself with someone else, however, is
not any better or worse than not noticing a change.

OK Now if you got assigned to receive negative feedback, that was
totally random. That is, the sheets were made up before you got here and you
got assigned to it solely by a random determination. That is, even before
participants arrive, I choose from a set of experimental conditions, which one I
will put the next participants in.

(Discussion: Ask participants if they have any more questions or comments.
Tell them that if they do, they can contact Bradley Hack in B-109 West Fee
Hall or at 353-4362.)

132

Appendix B
Stimulus Materials for Study 2

133

Experiment #1 Instructions

You will be participating in two separate and unrelated experiments today. In
the first experiment, you will be asked to fill out 2 anonymous surveys about
your mood and 1 survey about your attitudes. These surveys will not ask you for
your name or any other identifying information. The researchers are
investigating the different percentage of college aged people who experience

one feeling or another.

The 3 surveys are attached. Please be very open and honest in your answers.
Remember that these surveys are anonymous. Please do not put your name

anywhere on this questionnaire.

When you are finished with this questionnaire, please come out of your cubicle,
place it in the box at the front of the room, and then return to your cubicle. When
everyone has completed the first experiment, the experimenter will explain the

second experiment.

It you have any questions at this point, please address them to the

experimenter. If not, then please W and you may begin
completing the questionnaires.

134

Mood Inventory

This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. After reading each group of statements
carefully, circle the number (0, 1, 2, or 3) that corresponds to the one statement in each group
wich best describes the way you have been feeling the past week, Includlng today. If
several statements within a group seem to apply equally well, circle the one that best descrbes
how you are feeling. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your
choice.

A I do not feel sad.
I feel sad.
I am so sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.

I am so sad or unhappy that l wn't stand it.

I am not particularly discouraged about the future.

I feel discouraged about the future.

I feel I have nothing to look fonrvard to.

I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.

I do not feel like a failure.

I feel I have failed more than the average person.

As I Iookbackon mylife, all I canseeisa lotoffailure.
I feel I am a complete failure as a person.

I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.

I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.

I don't feel particularly guilty.

I feel guilty a good part of the time.
I feel quite guilty most of the time.
I feel guilty all of the time.

I don't feel I am being punished.
I feel I may be punished.

I expect to be punished.

I feel I am being punished.

I don't feel disappointed in myself.
I am disappointed in myself.

I am disgusted with myself.

I hate myself.

I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.

I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
I blame myself all the time for my faults.

I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.

I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
I would like to kill myself.

I would kill myself if I had the chance.

CAIN-9° (QM-5° ”NI-9° GIN-9° (QM-9° (AIM-l0 ”NI-*0 GIN-*0 GIN-9°

135

GIN-5°

GIN-AD GIN-30 ”ND-i6 rare-so GIN-5° 0 ”-50 ”N‘O ”MAO (BM-9°

I don't cry any more than usual.

I cry more now than I used to.

I cry all the time now.

I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.

I am no more irritated now than I ever am.

I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.

I feel irritated all the time now.

I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.

I have not lost interest in other people.

I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
I have lost most of my interest in other people.

I have lost all of my interest in other people.

I make decisions about as well as I ever could.

I put off making decisions more than I used to.

l have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
I can't make decisions at all anymore.

I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.

I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.

I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look
unattractive.

I believe that I look ugly.

I can work about as well as before.

It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.

I can't do any work at all.

I can sleep as well as usual.

I don't sleep as well as | used to.

I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.

I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.

I don't get more tired than usual.

I get tired more easily than I used to.

I get tired from doing almost anything.
I am too tired to do anything.

My appetite is no worse than usual.

My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
My appetite is much worse now.

I have no appetite at all anymore.

I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
I have lost more than 5 pounds.

I have lost more than 10 pounds.

I have lost more than 15 pounds.

I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. YES NO

136

 

 

‘0

ON

GIN-9°

I am not any more worried about my health than I usualy am.

I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains or upset stomach
or constipation.

I am very worried about physical problems and it‘s hard to think of much else.

I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything
else.

I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
lam less interested in sex than I used to be.

I am much less interested in sex now.

I have lost interest in sex completely.

137

Feellng Questionnaire

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what
extent you are feeling this way right now. Use the following scale to respond to each item.

1 2 3 4 5

very slightly or a little moderately quie a bit extremely
not at all

1. interested

2. distressed

3. excited

4. upset

5. strong

6. guilty ___-__

7. scared
8. hostile

9. enthusiastic

10. proud

11. irritable

12. alert

13. ashamed

14. inspired

15. nervous

16. determined

17. attentive

18. jittery

19. active

20. afraid

138

General Attitude Survey

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each
item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.

T

-I-l-I-I-I-l-I -I-I-I-I-l-I-I

-r-r-r-r

'TITITITITI'TI TI ‘n'n'n'n'n'n 11

“IITITITI

1. Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the
candidates.

2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

3. It issometimes hardformetogoonwithmyworkiflam not
encouraged.

4. l have never intensely disliked anyone.

5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.

6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.

9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I
would probably do it.

10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I
thought too little of my ability.

11. I like to gossip at times.

12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.

13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.

14. I can remember “playing sick“ to get out of something.

15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

17. I always try to practice what I preach.

18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed,
obnoxious people.

19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
20. When I don't know something, I don‘t at all mind admitting to it.
21 . I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

139

.4

-I--I-l-l

.n

TI'TITI‘I'I

23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my
wrongdoings.

25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.

26. l have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.

27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune
of others.

29. l have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
31 . I have never felt that l was punished without cause.

32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what
they deserved.

33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's
feeﬁngs.

140

General Instructions

This is an experiment concerning personality traits. We are interested in the
different background characteristics of people who have certain personality traits. You will
ﬁrst be asked to respond to a "background survey" that asks you for some personal
information. We are interested in group averages and are not particularly concerned with
any one individual. You will not be asked to give your name. In addition, if you feel
uncomfortable answering any of the questions on the "background survey", you
may leave them blank.

After completing the background survey, you will be asked to respond to a number of
brief, self-report personality tests. You will neLbe asked to put your name on these
tests. After you complete the ﬁrst test, the experimenter will collect them and give them to
a graduate student in psychology who will score the tests. Too often in psychology
experiments, subjects do not learn anything about themselves or the topic of research
because it is uninteresting to them or because it is not personally meaningful. To alleviate
this problem, you will be provided with the results of your tests and feedback about what
your scores mean. We have selected personality tests that are brief, so that you will be able
to see the results of your tests before you leave today.

Aﬁzer completing the ﬁrst test, the experimenter will distribute the second
personality test. Upon completion of the second test, they will be collected and given to the
graduate student to score. By this time, the ﬁrst tests will be scored and the results will be
distributed to you. You will be given a few minutes to look them over. You will then be
asked to ﬁll out some post-experiment surveys before leaving. If you have any questions
during the experiment, please direct them to the experimenter. If you have no questions at

this point, you may begin the experiment.

141

Do Not Put Your Name on This Page

DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

Year in school 2. Major

Hometown Geographic Location: (In the US.)
a) Northeast b) Southeast c) Midwest (1) Southwest e) Far West 0 Other

Hometown Type:

a) Urban b) Suburban c) Rural

Hometown Population (approximate)

a) Less than 10,000 b) 10,000 - 50,000 c) 50,000 - 100,000 (1) 100,000 -500,000

e) over 500,000

Father's Occupation:

a) Professional (doctor, lawyer, professor)

b) Business (accountant, stock broker, business executive)
c) Managerial (supervisor, foreman)

d) Laborer (factory worker, construction)

e) Agriculture (farmer)

0 Domestic (homemaker)

g) Self-employed

h) Unemployed

Mother's Occupation:

a) Professional (doctor, lawyer, professor)

b) Business (accountant, stock broker, business executive)
c) Managerial (supervisor, foreman)

d) Laborer (factory worker, construction)

e) Agriculture (farmer)

f) Domestic (homemaker)

g) Self-employed

h) Unemployed

Previous Military Service:
Yes No If "Yes," What Branch?

 

142

Pre-Test Instructions

Before taking the ﬁrst personality test, we are interested in knowing how much of certain
personality traits you see yourself possessing.

That is, we want your initial impression of how much of each trait you see yourself as
having, before you take the tests and get your feedback about how much of each trait you
actually do possess.

We are also interested in your self-perceptions of some traits that you will not be tested for.

Please read the instructions on the next page and ﬁll out the questionnaire. The
experimenter will answer any questions you may have.

143

Do Not Place Your Name On This Page
Latitude of Self-Description Questionnaire

Instructions: Please answer the questions, following the sample given next.

Sample: In this exercise, you will ﬁnd a series of descriptors, some of which may seem to
describe you and others of which may not seem to describe you. There are Meme involved
in answering each question. Your ﬁrst task is to decide if you think you have more than
average, about average, or less than average of the particular trait. Then mark on the scale
with an X where on that continuum you see yourself, and write in parentheses below the X,

the exact number where you see yourself.

Athletic

0 10 20 30 4O 50 60 70 80 M
much less than average much more

average than average

So if you see yourself as being more athletic than average, say, at the 85th percentile
(more athletic than 85% of the population), then you might place an X halfway between the
80 and 90 and then write an "85" in parentheses below the X. But if you see yourself as
being less athletic than average, say at the 33rd percentile (less athletic than 67 % of the
population), than you might place an X a little above the 30 and write a "33" in parentheses
below the X.

After you have decided about where you fall on this continuum, then your second
task is to decide where you see your range on that trait. You probably found yourself a bit
unsure of where to place the X in the ﬁrst exercise. This is because we usually view
ourselves as somewhat ﬂexible on almost all traits (although some more than others). What
you now need to do is simply decide where that range is, mark the two endpoints with
arrows, and write the actual numbers in parentheses.

So if you are sure you are more athletic than at least 15% of the population, then
place an arrow (1) halfway between 10 and the 20 above and write a "15" below the arrow.
And if you are sure you are not more athletic than 90% of the population, then put the

second arrow there and write a "90" below the arrow.

144

When done, you should have two arrows, marking the endpoints of where you might
fall, and one X, marking your best guess of where you do fall and the exact numbers in
parentheses below the arrows and the X

After completing the sample question, please go on and answer the remaining

descriptors in the same way.

145

 

Intelligent

 

 

 

 

 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7Q 80 99 199
much less than average much more
average than average
Humorous

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Overconﬁdent

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7 O 80 29 199
much less than average much more
average than average
Synthetic Ability

(I 10 2O 30 40 50 60 70 80 9_D____1_0_Q
much less than average much more
average than average
Reckless

O 10 20 30 4O 50 60 70 80 L199
much less than average much more

average

146

than average

Happy

 

 

 

0 10 20 3Q 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Persistent

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Logical

0 10 20 30 4O 50 60 7O 80 90 100
much less than average much more

average

147

than average

Standard Test of Synthetic Ability
(STSA)

Form X327

INSTRUCTIONS: Read each item carefully and pick the one best answer
from among the available options. Answer every question, even if you have to
guess. There is no penalty for wrong answers.

SAMPLE ITEM:

WRITE : SCRAWL :: TALK: ( a. crate, b. translate, c. mumble, (I. speak)

Copyright 1981: University Social Psychology Consultants, Inc.

148

10.

SUPERLATIVE : BEST :: COMPARATIVE : (a. poor, b. good, c.
best, (1. great)

TRAIN : TRACK :: GONDOLA: (a. canal, b. air, c. ocean, d.
hangar)

GARROTING : DEATH :: FRICTION : (a. rubbing, b. lubricant, c.
heat, d. slaughtered)

ROYALTY : CROWN :: RELIGION: (a. prayer, b. cruciﬁx, c.
priesthood, d. bible)

EMPEROR : ROMAN EMPIRE :: PHARAOH : (a. Babylonia, b.
Phoenicia, c. Egypt, (1. India)

ENERGY: CONDUCTION :: SYNERGY: (a. induction, b.
deduction, 0. reduction, (1. transduction)

COMPLETE : COMMENCE :: IMPERMEABLE : (a. temporary, b.
porous, c. impenetrable, d. permanent)

APEX: SUMMIT :: ZENITH : (a. nadir, b. end, c. cumulous, d.
beginninw

ATOM : MOLECULE :: CELL : (a. DNA, b. cytoplasm, c. nucleus,
(1. membrane)

SILENT : TACITURN :: MUTE : (a. voluble, b. shy, c. lively, d.
deaf)

149

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

ROOSTER: CHICKEN :: DRAKE : (a. quail, b. turkey, c. hen, d.
pheasant)

STATUE : SCULPTOR :: FUGUE : (a. composer, b. politician, c.
psychiatrist, d. blacksmith)

BROGUE : FOOT :: SHEATH : (a. skin, b. compass, c. escutcheon,
d. tendon)

ALPINIST : MOUNTAINS :: SPELUNKER: (a. deserts, b. caves, c.
glaciers, d. forests)

LONGEST : RED :: SHORTEST : (a. blue, b. yellow, c. violet, (1.
green)

WAR BETWEEN THE STATES : CIVIL WAR :: GREAT WAR : (a.
American Revolution, b. Hundred Years War, c. World War I, d.
World War II)

KENNEDY: BULLET :: SOCRATES : (a. dagger, b. suffocation, c.
noose, d. hemlock)

CIRRHOSIS: LIVER:: NEPI-IROSIS: (a. gall bladder, b.
diaphragm, c. pancreas, d. lungs)

DEDUCTION: INDUCTION :: ANALYTIC : (a. post hoc, b.
inferential, c. a priori, d. a forticri)

ETIOLOGY: SYMPTOM :: SCATOLOGY: (a. fatal, b. abreaction,
c. sublocution, d. rej cinder)

150

Test of Social Awareness

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.

a

1. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
3. In a discussion I often ﬁnd it necessary to repeat myself several times to
make sure I am being understood.

4. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

5. In times like these, a person must be pretty selﬁsh if he considers his own
happiness primarily.

6. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

7. I'd like it if I could ﬁnd someone who would tell me how to solve my
personal problems.

8. Of all the different philosophies which have existed in this world there is
probably only one which is correct.

9. It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that his life
becomes meaningful.

10. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going
on is to rely upon leaders or experts who can be trusted.

11. There are a number of persons I have come to hate because of the things
they stand for.

12. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

13. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

14. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own
members cannot exist for long.

15. It is only natural that a person should have a much better acquaintance
with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

16. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes have the
ambition to become a great man, like Einstein, Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
17 . Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is
unfortunately necessary at times to restrict the freedom of certain political

groups.

151

18. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to
gamble "all or nothing at all."

19. Most people just don't give a damn about others.

20. A person who gets enthusiastic about a number of causes is likely to be a
pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

21. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it
usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

22. If given the chance I would do something that would be of great beneﬁt to
the world.

23. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against
ideas put out by certain people or groups in one's own camp than by those in
the opposing camp. 9

24. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am
going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

25. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

26. There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who are on the side of
truth and those who are against it.

27 . Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

28. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

29. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of
really great thinkers.

30. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of
democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

31. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is the future that
counts.

32. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed
important social and moral problems don't really understand what is going
on.

33. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place.

34. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one
has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

35. The worst crime a person can commit is to attack publicly the people who
believe in the same thing he does.

36. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and associates

whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

152

T F 37 . Most of the ideas which get published nowadays aren't worth the paper
they are printed on.

T F 38. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

T F 39. My blood boils whenver a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

If you are ﬁnished, please open the door to your cubicle so the experimenter can collect your
test. '

153

Personality Test #1
Test of Synthetic Ability
Feedback Form

1. Comparative: (poor, good, best, great) :: Superlative : Best

2. Gondola : (canal, air, ocean, hangar) :: Train : Track

3. Garroting : Death :: Friction : (rubbing, lubricant, heat, slaughtered)

4. Crown : Royal :: (prayer, cruciﬁx, priesthood, bible) : Religious

5. (Babylonia, Phoenicia, Egypt, India) : Pharaoh :: Roman Empire : Emperor

6. Energy : Conduction :: Synergy : (induction, deduction, reduction, transduction)

7. (temporary, porous, impenetrable, permanent) : Impermeable :: Commence : Complete
8. Apex: Summit :: Zenith : (nadir, and, cumulous, beginning)

9. Atom : Molecule :: Cell (DNA, cytoplasm, nucleus, membrane)

10. (voluble, shy, lively, deaf) : Mute :: Silent : Taciturn

11. (Quail, turkey, hen, pheasant) : Drake :: Chicken : Rooster

12. Sculptor : Statue :: (composer, politician, psychiatrist, blacksmith) : Fugue
13. Brogue : Foot :: Sheath (skin, compass, escutcheon, tendon)

14. Spelunker : (deserts, caves, glaciers, forests) :: Alpinist: Mountains

15. Red : Longest :: (blue, yellow, violet, green) : Shortest

16. War Between the States : Civil War :: Great War : (American Revolution, Hundred Years
War, World War I, World War II)

17. Socrates : (dagger, suffocation, noose, hemlock) :: Garﬁeld : Bullet

18. Cirrhosis : Liver :: Nephrosis : (gall bladder, diaphragm, pancreas, lungs)

19. Induction : Deduction :: (post hoc, inferential, a priori, a fortiori) : Analytic

20. Etiology : Symptom :: Scatalogy ( fatal, abreaction, sublocution, rejoinder)

Subject # , you received a score of 50% on the test of Standard Synthetic Ability
(form X327-F). This places you in the average range of synthetic ability. This means that

 

you are average in the ability to reason abstractly.

Scored by

Bradley Hack, MA

154

Synthetic Ability
Post-Test Questionnaire

Please ﬁll out the two brief questionnaires on the following pages. The
experimenters are interested in your reaction to the Synthetic Ability test.

You will be ﬁlling out similar questionnaires regarding the Test of Social
Awareness. Please read the instructions carefully.

Please open your door when you are ﬁnished with these questionnaires so the
experimenter can collect them.

If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter.

155

Do Not Place Your Name On This Page

Latitude cf Self-Description Questionnaire

Instructions: Please answer the questions, following the sample given next.

Sample: In this exercise, you will ﬁnd a series of descriptors, some of which may seem to
describe you and others of which may not seem to describe you. There are Malena involved
in answering each question. Your ﬁrst task is to decide if you think you have more than
average, about average, or less than average of the particular trait. Then mark on the scale
with an X where on that continuum you see yourself, and write in parentheses below the X,

the exact number where you see yourself.

 

Athletic

0 10 20 30 4O 50 60 7Q 80 9_O__1_0_Q
much less than average much more
average than average

So if you see yourself as being more athletic than average, say, at the 85th percentile
(more athletic than 85% of the population), than you might place an X halfway between the
80 and 90 and then write an "85" in parentheses below the X But if you see yourself as
being less athletic than average, say at the 33rd percentile (less athletic than 67 % of the
population), than you might place an X a little above the 30 and write a "33" in parentheses
below the X

After you have decided about where you fall on this continuum, than your second
task is to decide where you see your range on that trait. You probably found yourself a bit
unsure of where to place the X in the ﬁrst exercise. This is because we usually view
ourselves as somewhat ﬂexible on almost all traits (although some more than others). What
you now need to do is simply decide where that range is, mark the two endpoints with
arrows, and write the actual numbers in parentheses.

So if you are sure you are more athletic than at least 15% of the population, then
place an arrow (I) halfway between 10 and the 20 above and write a ”15" below the arrow.
And if you are sure you are not more athletic than 90% of the population, then put the

second arrow there and write a "90" below the arrow.

156

When done, you should have two arrows, marking the endpoints of where you might
fall, and one X, marking your best guess of where you do fall and the exact numbers in
parentheses below the arrows and the X.

After completing the sample question, please go on and answer the remaining

descriptors in the same way.

157

Intelligent

 

 

 

 

 

O 10 20 30' 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Humorous

0 10 20 3O 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Overccnﬁdent

0 10 ZIL 30 4O 50 60 70 80 ESL—19.0
much less than average much more
average than average
Synthetic Ability

Q 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Reckless

Q 10 20 30 40 5O 6O 70 80 9_0__1_0_Q
much less than average much more

average

158

than average

Happy

 

 

 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 _29_1_0_Q
much less than average much more
average than average
Persistent

0 10 20 30 4O 50 60 70 80 90 100
much less than average much more
average than average
Logical

0 10 20 3 O 40 5 0 60 7 0 SI) 90 100
much less than average much more

average

159

than average

Feeling Questionnaire

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what
extent you are feeling this way right now. Use the following scale to respond to each item.

1 2 3 4 5
very slightly or a little moderately quite a bit extremely
not at all

1 . interested

2. distressed

3. excited ______
4. upset
5. strong

6. guilty

7. scared

8. hostile

9. enthusiastic

10. proud

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

irritable
alert
ashamed
inspired

DONOUS

determined

attentive
iittery

active

20. afraid

160

Test Reaction Questionnaire

The experiment is now over. It will be explained to you in a few minutes. In the space
provided below, please explain brieﬂy what you think the purpose of this experiement was.
Please open your door when you are ﬁnished.

161