LIBRARY Michigan State Unlverstty PLACE IN RETURN BOX to roman this checkout from your noord. TO AVOID FINES Mum on or baton duo duo. DATEDjJE) 5 DATE DUE DATE DUE M 1 032603 m " J‘ [:I__]:j F—Wl I ] [::L_l :3 MSU lsAn Affirmativo Action/Equal Opportunity Instttwon Wanna-m ARISTOTLE’S AND HEGEL’S CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE By David Alan Howell A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillmnnt of the roquircm-nts for the dagroc of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1997 ABSTRACT ARISTOTLE’S AND HEGEL'S CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE By David Alan Howell I argue that Aristotle and Hegel can be interpreted in a useful manner as contextual thinkers. Critical analysis of Aristotle’s and Hegel's social theories suggests that these philosophers form their conception of justice in important respects on the basis of their understanding of the relationship between the distribution of knowledge and key features of social context such as conflict and the division of labor. A contextual approach helps in the statement of practical questions about the structure and control of knowledge within society. My second thesis is the claim that a contextual approach informed by the work of Aristotle and Hegel is useful for framing a normative conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge within contemporary institutions of education in our own society. The normative conception of justice that I argue for is defined in terms of a democratic control of the production and the distribution of knowledge within social institutions. Copyright by DAVID ALAN HOWELL 1997 To my parents, Howard and Martha Howell iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee Dr. Esquith, Dr. Garelick, and Dr. walsh for their patience in helping me work through a difficult project and especially my dissertation director, Dr. Richard Peterson, who made my obscure existence tolerable through his effort on my behalf. Dr. Seaton, the outside reader from the English Department, provided valuable substantive comments on this dissertation and editorial assistance. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER l—INTRODUCTION. _ l I. INITIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION or CONTEXTUALITY. ...................... 6 11. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO JUSTICE. .................................................... 10 A. The basis of normative principles within a contextual approach to justice. ................................ 10 B. A contrast to “non-contextual ” methods as a means of clarifying the notion of a contextual approach to justice. ....................................................................................................................... 13 C. Relation of this general discussion to Aristotle and Hegel. ........................................................ 15 III. SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS OF THE DISSERTATION. ................................................... 22 CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................................. 22 CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................................. 23 CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................................. 26 CIMPTER 5 .................................................................................................................................. 29 CHAPTER P—DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO JUSTICE IN THE WORK OF ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL 32 I. COMPARISON BETWEEN ARISTOTLE’S AND HEGEL’S CONTEXTUALIZING APPROACHES TO THE FORMATION OF NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES. ............................................................................................. 33 A. Aristotle ’s and Hegel 's use of inherited normative rationality as an initial basis for discussion. 33 B. Hegel ’s and Aristotle ’s contextualizati on of inheri ted normative principles. .............................. 38 II. ARISTOTLE As A CONTEXTUAL THINKER .......................................................................................... 42 A. Discussion of equity as a form of justice: flexibility in the formation and application of normative principles. ..................................................................................................................... 42 l. Philosophical contention over the Aristotelian discussion of equity. ....................................... 44 2. Approach to a social conception of equity. ............................................................................. 49 3. Flexibility in moral conduct and judgments according to rule. ............................................... 50 a. Do not demand more precision than the subject matter admits. .......................................... 50 b. What determines the degree of flexibility? .......................................................................... 52 (l) The subject matter involved in the formation of norms. ................................................ 52 (2) Argument for flexibility in practical judgments according to rule. ................................ 54 B. Conclusion to this section. ......................................................................................................... 56 III. HEGELAs ACONTEXI'UAL THINKER. .............................................................................................. 58 A. Hegel’s concrete, historical conception of rational norms. ........................................................ 58 B. Hegel ’s critique of formalism. ................................................................................................... 62 l. Formalism in theory: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formal approach to normative theory ........... 62 a. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formal conception of freedom. ................................................... 63 2. Formalism in practice: An examination of Hegel’s critique of the practical application of formal approaches to right in his analysis of the French Revolution. .......................................... 66 3. Examination of Rousseau’s conception of the general will ................................................ 67 C. Hegel ’s contextual approach to fi'eedom within society. ............................................................ 70 vi CHAPTER 3—ARISTOTLE’S CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO A THEORY OF JUSTICE. 74 I. JUSTICE AND CONFLICT IN THE NICOWCHEAN ETHICS. ...................................................................... 74 A. General and particular types of justice distinguished. ............................................................... 74 B. Analysis of particular forms of justice. ...................................................................................... 76 l. Compensatory justice. ............................................................................................................ 76 2. Distributive justice. ................................................................................................................ 78 a. Distributive justice involving public goods. ........................................................................ 78 (1) Social groups and conflict over the distribution of social goods. ................................... 79 C. Attempt at a normative resolution of competing claims among social groups. ........................... 82 1. There is a distribution according to a proportion which reflects the validity of claims that exist between social parties. ................................................................................................ 82 2. Justice and proportionate equality. ......................................................................................... 84 11. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE WITHIN THE STATE AND THE MEDIATING FUNCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN ARISTOTIE ’ S POLITICS. ....................................................................................................................... 87 A. The notion of distributive justice developed in the Nicomachean Ethics applied to politics ........ 89 1. Distributive justice concerns the distribution of political power. ............................................. 89 B. Conflict over the basis of the political distribution of power. ..................................................... 91 1. Division of constitutions, or political organizations, into correct and incorrect forms. ............ 91 a. The other-relatedness of Aristotelian justice. ...................................................................... 93 C. Knowledge and the determination of political organization. ...................................................... 95 l. Aristotle’s conception of constitutional government and the distribution of knowledge. ......... 97 a. Equality. ............................................................................................................................ 97 b. Education. ......................................................................................................................... 98 c. Knowledge and the mediation of social conflict over the material basis of society .............. 102 d Justice achieves concrete embodiment in law through practical rationality. ....................... 104 III. CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTIE ............................................................................................................... 106 A. Distributive justice is not universal ........................................................................................... 106 B. Reformulation of the Aristotelian conception of “democracy” is inadequate to resolve restrictions in access to political power. ....................................................................................... 109 IV. CONCLUSION: PosmVE ASPECTS OF ARISTOTLE’S POLITICAL THEORY. ........................................... 1 10 A. Conflicting interests can be mediated by practical rationality oriented toward the universal interests of the community ............................................................................................................. 110 B. Development of political capacity through education. .............................................................. 111 CHAPTER 4—HEGEL’S CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO A THEORY OF JUSTICE..............113 I. THE DIVISION OF LABOR. ................................................................................................................ 115 A. Explication of Hegel ’s understanding of the division of labor ................................................... 115 1. The division of labor in relation to the role of abstraction and simplification of the manufacturing process for greater productivity .......................................................................... 116 2. The division of labor is organized into a “systems of needs” diflerentiated in part by the distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” knowledge. .................................................... 117 3. The division of labor requires particular identity formations of individuals; this in turn corresponds to hierarchically organized social relations. ........................................................... 118 4. Advantage derived from the division of labor engenden'ng social universality. ...................... 124 5. Social deformations arising through the division of labor and the modern system of production. ........................................................................................................................... 127 B. Critique of Hegel ’3 construction of the division of labor ........................................................... 128 II. THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MEDIATING FUNCIION OF KNOWLEDGE. ..................................... 134 A. Differentiation in types of Imowledge and the social distribution of wealth. .............................. 134 B. Examining the differentiation between specialized expertise and skilled/unskilled practical lmowledge. ..................................................................................................................... 13 9 vii III. CRITIQUE: THE INADEQUACY IN HEGEL’S USE OF THE CONTEXIIIAL CATEGORY OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN RELATION TO THE DIFFERENTIATION OF KNOWLEDGE. ........................................................... 141 A. Exclusion of groups of people from specrjic spheres of rationali ty. ........................................... 142 B. Specialization of knowledge and political participation. ........................................................... 147 C. The formation of social character following distinctions in types of laiowledge is problematic. 148 IV. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN HEGEL’S DISCUSSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE. ..................................................................................................................................... 149 A. Recognition of the relation between social conditions of production and knowledge ................. 150 B. Knowledge and human freedom. ............................................................................................... 152 C. The development of public spheres of discourse. ...................................................................... I5 5 CHAPTER S—DEVELOPMENT OF A NORMATIVE CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AS A DEMOCRATIC DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE. - 160 I. RELEVANCE or ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPrION OF JUSTICE As A DEMOCRATIC DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE ................................................................................... 160 A. The critique of abstraction and formalism. ............................................................................... 161 B. Aristotle: conflict and the distribution of knowledge. ............................................................... 163 C. Hegel: the division of labor and the distribution of knowledge. ............................................... 165 II. DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE As A DEMOCRATIC DISTRIBUTION or KNOWLEDGE. ................................................................................................................................ 170 A. The Mediating Function of Knowledge for Conflict and the Division of Labor .......................... I 70 1. Conflict ................................................................................................................................. 173 a. Restricted access to educational institutions is inconsistent with a democratic conception of human political agency. .................................................................................. 173 b. The normative determination of educational content in a democratic society. .................... 178 2. The division of labor ............................................................................................................. 180 a. The division of labor and individual identity formation. .................................................... 181 b. Structural difl‘erentiation of knowledge on the capitalistic model of the division of labor. ..182 (1) Generating scarcity Within education as a means of restricting access to knowledge. 183 B. Possibilities for the development of a democratic distribution of knowledge through a contextualizing approach to justice. .............................................................................................. 185 1. The problematic nature of the control of the distribution of knowledge within educational institutions ................................................................................................................................ 186 2. Toward a democratic reconstruction of the distribution of knowledge .................................... 188 a. Arguments for the distribution of knowledge through democratic procedures. ................... 189 (l) Argument related to issues of stability/conflict. ........................................................... 190 (2) Arguments related to the ability of a democratic approach to respond with flexibility to social circumstances. .................................................................................................... 192 (3) Argument that knowledge is shared social wealth and does not fit the model of other commodities in a market economy. ................................................................................... 194 b. Democratic principles drawn on the basis of these arguments. .......................................... 196 CHAPTER 6—CONCLUSION. - , - 198 1. REVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION. ....................................................................................................... 199 [1. SOME REMAINING CONSIDERATIONS OF THE RELEVANCE or A CONTEXTUALIZING APPROACH To THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE. ................................................................................................... 202 A. Examination of conflict of interests over the privatization of education. ................................... 202 B. The distribution of Iorowledge across cultural boundaries ......................................................... 205 III. POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN CONTEXTUALIZING APPROACHES TO JUSTICE. ................ 207 A. Relevance of a contextual approach to constructivist approaches to the theory of justi ce. ........ 207 viii APPENDIX A—A CRITIQUE OF AN ACCOUNT OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN THE WORK OF ARISTOTLE. _ - 211 I. DIFFICULTIES IN A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTELIAN JUSTICE. ........................................... 212 A. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 212 B. General elements of natural law and its relation to justice. ...................................................... 213 C. Outline of Miller ’3 position on natural justice. ......................................................................... 21 7 D. Critique of M ller ’s account of natural justice .......................................................................... 224 1. Difliculties in the interpretation of natural justice in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. ............................. 225 2. Lack of clarity in explicating the relationship between natural justice and political justice. ...227 II. FUNCTIONS OF NATURALISM IN ARISTOTIE’S PRACTICAL WORKS .................................................... 230 A. Newman ’s conception of nature as a genetic function in Aristotle ’s practical works. ................ 230 B. Recognition that naturalism in Aristotle 's practical works serves certain ideological functions. ...................................................................................................................................... 233 III. CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE OF THIS DISCUSSION ............................................................................ 234 APPENDIX B—DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO JUSTICE AS EQUITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES. -237 1. WHY ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS INSTEAD OF UNIVERSALISTTC CLAIMS IN MORAerY? ............................ 238 II. ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS AND MORAL RELATIVITY. ........................................................................... 240 ID. THE KNOWLEDGEABLE JUDGE DETERMINES WHAT IS PROPERLY GOOD, BUT WHO DETERMINES WHO THE KNOWLEDGEABLE JUDGE Is? ............................................................................................... 243 IV. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE KNOWLEDGEABIE JUDGE. ................................................................ 246 ENDNOTES - _ - 249 WORKS CITED. 257 ix ABBREVIATIONS ARISTOTLE Met. = Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 1989; Princeton University Press, 1984, translated by‘w. D. Ross. m = Magna Moralia, Princeton University Press, 1989, tr. by St. G. Stock. NE = The Nicomachean.Ethics, Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 1982, translated by H. Rackham; Princeton University Press, 1984, translated by W. D. Ross. Poet. = Poetics, Princeton University Press, 1984, translated by I. Bywater. Pol. 2 Politics, Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 1977, translated by H. Rackham; Princeton University Press, 1984, translated by Jewett. Rhet. a The “Art” of.Rhetoric, Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 1982, translated by Jehn Henry Freese; Princeton University Press, 1984, translated by W; Rhys Roberts. HEGEL GER B Gtudlinien der.Philosqphie des Rechts, Reclam, 1970. HOP a History of'Philosqphyy 3 vo1s., University of Nebraska Press, 1995, translated by E. S. Haldane. .POR = Elements of the Philosophy of.Right, Cambridge University Press, 1991, translated by H. B. Nisbet. P08 8 Phenomenology'of Spirit, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, translated by A. V. Miller. OTHER AUTHORS CITED CPrR a Immanuel Kant, critique of'Practical Reason,1Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985. CS 8 J. J. Rousseau, Du contract Social, Flamarion, 1966. HET - Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1990. HTMS - Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge Uhiversity Press, 1972. PL - Jehn Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993. Rep. - Plato, Republic, Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 1982; Hackett Publishing Company, 1992. son - Immanuel Kant, Science of.Right. DOJ’a Jehn Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971. CHAPTER 1 Introduction h yap v00 évépyera Cmfi For the actuality of thought is life eAristotle,.Metaphysics, 1072b 26, tr. Ross- What is rational becomes real, and the real becomes rational.1 -Hegel, Natural Law and the Theory of the State— In writing this dissertation on a contextual approach to justice in the work of Aristotle and Hegel, I’m reminded of Hegel's comment that philosophy is considered to be like the funeral shroud that Penelope wove for Laertes—lasting only a day, unraveled and begun again: . . man sich vorstellt, das, was die Philosophie vor sich bringe, sei ein so ubernachtiges Werk als das Gewebe der Penelope, das jeden Tag von vorne angefangen werde. (GER 43-44) . it is imagined that what philosophy puts forward is as ephemeral a product as Penelope's weaving, which is begun afresh every day. (POR 10) I believe the discussion of justice with respect to the distribution of knowledge is an area that requires continual examination and reformulation, and so my intention is to be open to further discussion rather than otherwise. This dissertation 2 has a number of interwoven strands so that the structure is complex rather than a chain of deductive argumentation; nevertheless, the design is constructed through the development of two theses which can be stated quite plainly. First, I argue that Aristotle and Hegel can be interpreted in a useful manner as contextual thinkers. Critical analysis of Aristotle's and Hegel's social theories suggests that these philosophers form their conception of justice in important respects on the basis of their understanding of the relationship between the distribution of knowledge and key features of social context such as conflict and the division of labor. There are two related elements of my interpretation of Hegel and Aristotle as contextual thinkers. (1) I argue that a contextualizing theory of justice is informed by and developed on the basis of an understanding of inherently variable social conditions which require empirical analysis. One aspect of my analysis of Aristotle and Hegel as contextual thinkers is a contrast with abstract formulations of systems of justice based on the logical development of first principles. (2) More specifically, in the formation of normative principles, Hegel and Aristotle consider important social phenomena such as conflict and the division of labor insofar as these features of society are related to the production and the social distribution of knowledge. 3 A contextual approach helps in the statement of practical questions about the structure and control of knowledge within society. The first aim of this dissertation is to achieve a critical understanding of Aristotle's and Hegel's methods of social analysis as these bear on a conception of justice as a normatively grounded structure of society. In other words, in this dissertation I examine the relationship between social analysis and the normative principles developed on this basis. My second thesis is the further claim that a contextual approach informed by the work of Aristotle and Hegel is useful for framing a normative conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge within contemporary institutions of education in our own society. The normative conception of justice that I argue for is defined in terms of a democratic control of the production and the distribution of knowledge within social institutions. I argue that the distribution of knowledge (which is a political function in essential respects) should be determined through democratic procedures. In discussing knowledge in terms of distribution, it may be argued that I am.making a category mistake in considering knowledge to be an object that can be parceled out like potatoes or shoes. I recognize that it is too simplistic to conceive of knowledge in this fashion. Education and the distribution of knowledge are, in fact, inseparable. Education is the means though which knowledge is distributed and differential capacities in individuals developed. In short, it can be claimed 4 that conceiving of the distribution of knowledge as distinct from education is too abstract; for purposes of analysis, I'm separating things which in fact go together. As Aristotle said (EN 1.13.1102a 31), the convex and concave sides of a curved line can be abstracted in thought, but, in reality, they are inseparable. I claim, however, that certain features of our system parcel out knowledge in this fashion (consider classes conceived as credit hours and grades as an indication of intellectual progress). I will argue that the means of control over the educational process (as a means to distribute knowledge through the formation of intellectual capacities) should be democratic. Now that the two theses of the dissertation have been introduced, I want to turn to the problem of equivocation in the notion of justice. I note this difficulty of definition in order to indicate the notion of justice that I will be using throughout this dissertation. The variability of the meaning of the term justice’ makes it difficult to discuss the notion. This is a difficulty that has to be recognized, but it does not preclude the possibility of achieving greater clarity on the concept. Aristotle recognizes that there are a number of different connotations for the word justice (NE 5.1.1129a 27- 32). Both Aristotle and Hegel begin their main work in practical philosophy with a concept of justice that is undeveloped and in certain respects inadequate to the task at hand. There are certain essential connotations of the initial concopt that will 5 remain and direct the further evolution in thought undertaken by these philosophers. The depth of their thought is indicated by the fact that they are able to develop these initial concepts in a logical way which leads to a more concrete conception of justice related to actual social institutions. Instances of variability in meaning of the notion of justice can be found in Greek thought, where one finds a contrast between justice regarding the actions of individuals as just (virtue) and justice regarding a particular structure of the state legitimated through normative claims.3 Aristotle initially conceives of justice as a habitual state (éfitg) of the individual (NE 5.1.1129a 8-12) consistent with virtue. Aristotle’s discussion develops into a conception of justice as a distribution of political power in the state among social groups (Pol. 3.12-13). Contextual analysis aims to take into account the complex structural articulation of society rather than conceiving of individuals exclusively as autonomous, where justice is a matter of the character of individuals. A contextual approach is more useful as a means to examine conflict between groups with different social interests because such an approach extends beyond the limits of a discussion of justice as virtue possessed by an individual. It may be helpful at this time to provide a general overview of what follows in this introduction itself: (1) First, I present a schematic characterization of the notion of contextuality’to provide a framework for 6 understanding how education and the distribution of knowledge relate to social context in the formation of normative principles. (2) Next, I provide a general discussion of a contextual approach to justice. At this point, I am not trying to provide a definitive description of a contextual method but, rather, I am trying with broad strokes to provide an initial perspective on the problem of developing a theory of justice which takes into account the relationship between important features of social context and the distribution of knowledge. (3) Finally, I present an overview of how the dissertation proceeds—a summary in outline of the individual chapters of the dissertation. I. Initial Characterization of the Philosophical Conception of Contextuality. In order to provide a framework for the further discussion of this dissertation, it may be useful to provide an account of the notion of contextuality. The notion of contextuality can be given an initial characterization which serves to differentiate the senses of the term.under discussion. Since certain senses of the term.are more relevant than others to the dissertation, these distinctions will allow further refinement and articulation of the structure of the dissertation. By a philosophical notion of centextuality I understand three interrelated meanings of the term: 7 (1) A philosophical approach that is contextual considers contemporary social conditions as a starting point in arguing for normative principles. For example, Aristotle believes that the law and constitution structure the distribution of political power within society. One feature of Aristotle’s contextual approach is to relate distributions in power to knowledge. Aristotle argues that particular forms of political power are justified on the basis of an ability to bring expert knowledge to bear on problems that concern the state as an organic whole. In other words, Aristotle considers education and the distribution of knowledge when arguing for a just distribution of political power among groups of citizens with conflicting interests. Hegel develops his discussion of the organization of the state in the Philosophy'of.Right along similar lines. The law and constitution are concrete manifestations of the rational, historical development of humanity. This is to say that rationality is essential for legitimately structuring the organic whole of society, and the distribution of knowledge within society serves primary functions of social organization and control. (2) Another sense of contextuality concerns the philosophical discourse which surrounds the use of a concept and contributes to its meaning. Philosophers and social theorists develop central philosophical concepts within the context of specialized discourse. For Aristotle and Hegel, this is a 8 critical engagement (often polemical) with their contemporaries and their immediate predecessors concerning a particular philosophical issue. The context of this discourse delineates the subject matter of the philosophical discourse by providing a starting point for discussion and the boundaries within which the concept applies. As an example, present day discussion of justice occurs in the context of the debate defined by Rawls, walzer, MacIntyre and Habermas, among others. (3) Finally, a contextual approach can also be characterized as a retrospective examination by later social theorists of the historical conditions that determine the manner in which philosophers form their conceptualization of an issue—even though the influence of such conditions may be obscure to the philosophers themselves.‘1For instance, Aristotle was a privileged member within a a society that accepted slavery—an historical fact that requires recognition in order to properly interpret the ways in which his use of social context may be distorted by his own status in society. It is possible to make the claim that Hegel's political theory is likewise affected by his social and historical position as well. The central focus of this dissertation is on the first sense of contextuality given above: how Aristotle and Hegel make use of principal features of social context in relation to the distribution of knowledge in arguing for a particular 9 conception of justice. The relevance of the other two notions of contextuality to this dissertation are discussed briefly below before I turn to a further clarification of the first notion of contextuality. An examination of the critical philosophical discourse that Aristotle and Hegel undertake with their immediate predecessors and teachers (as in (2) above) is an important element in understanding the development of their own thought, especially as a means of orienting the discussion of their conceptions of justice. The method of both Aristotle and Hegel is dialogic—they are involved in a critical discussion that develops normative principles within a philosophical community of discourse. In order to understand their methods adequately it is helpful to point out the relevant aspects of their philosophical engagement with their own contemporaries (especially Plato and Kant, respectively) concerning the notion of justice. While recognizing the importance and interest of this discussion among philosophers for the development of normative arguments concerning justice, it is necessary to limit my analysis in this regard in order to keep this dissertation to a reasonable length. Particular reference will be made to this discourse among philosophers only insofar as it is directly relevant to the discussion at hand. Identifying the historical influences on the thought of a philosopher (my third sense of a contextualizing epproach) can clarify why a particular philosopher may have taken a certain 10 position. Although there are respects in which this manner of thinking about the issue of justice is crucial, such an approach is historical rather than philosophical, and is therefore secondary to the more philosophical aims of this dissertation. Ultimately, my discussion will require determining in what respects Aristotle and Hegel fail to justify their particular conceptions of social justice. It is important to realize the limitations of a contextual approach to justice as it relates to the issue of the distribution of knowledge within society. When I argue for a normative conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge the use of a contextualizing epproach will, therefore, be critical and reflective. II. General Discussion of a Contextual Approach to Justice. A. The basis of normative principles within a contextual approach to justice. Since it is clear that a contextual approach makes normative claims, it is reasonable to inquire what the basis is for the normative claims that are being made. My understanding of a contextual approach is that it is not radical relativism. By radical relativism I mean the acceptance of the principle that the validity of normative claims can only be evaluated from the perspective of the society in which they occur. If this were the case, then there would be no basis for a critique of any actual or ideal constitutions from a perspective outside that society. Such a view would be the social equivalent of the 11 position of Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things” (Kirk, Haven and Schofield 411). A contextual approach apprehends that an understanding of social context is useful for the formation of practical principles of justice relevant to a particular society, but it is not a sufficient condition. In other words, a contextual approach is not the view that normative principles derive from.social conditions in a deterministic, mechanical fashion. My intention in this dissertation is critical—to achieve an understanding of the value of a contextual approach as well as its limitations. In the previous paragraph I have argued that a contextual approach does not reduce the formation of normative principles to a radically relativistic basis in which the social conditions of a particular society necessarily determine the normative principles that direct practical activity. It could be argued then that, after all, there must be some absolute, non- contextual principles as the basis of a theory of justice.‘ To argue against this view it is necessary to show that there are social, historical sources of normative principles which can be used for the development of a contextual theory of justice. In a contextual approach to justice it is reasonable to make use of two contextual sources for the formation of normative theory. Constitutions, laws, and the morality of various cultures, including one's own, can serve as an inherited social, historical basis for forming normative principles. The rationality of constitutions, laws, and morality can be assessed 12 by those who have gained practical judgment through political experience and education. The assessment of the practical knowledge contained in these social resources can be used for the development of normative principles of justice applicable to society. Secondly, a contextual approach to justice is an engagement in a philosophical discourse with contemporary and past social theorists about the nature of justice. It is important to note that this discourse involves intellectual expertise, since the participants have access to knowledge that is not widely dispersed. A feature of the philosophical discourse in which social theorists are involved is the formation of normative principles which have reference to immediate social conditions. Those involved in this specialized discourse consider the practical applicability of theories of justice to contemporary social conditions. Although a.“utopian” discourse, as the etymology of the name suggests, is oriented toward the development of a perfectly rational and just society which presently exists “nowhere,” in general even utopian social conceptions serve a critical function in reference to actual, contemporary social conditions. It is important to recognize that a contextual epproach to justice and an epproach based on “universal” principles are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, the united Nations has treaties concerning the rights of all people. The ideal is that such treaties become universally accepted."flhis is a case 13 in which it can be argued that international social conditions have reached a point in which normative principles of a universal nature (applying to all societies) are a possibility. This is not to say, though, that such agreements have a basis in “absolute”:moral imperatives; rather, in this case it is clear that the basis of the agreement to the rights of all humans are the conventions to which member states agree. The agreement appears to be based in expediency rather than a universal, common conception of social justice among autonomous nations. The possibility of achieving this normative agreement is due to the present state of historical, international social conditions. B..A contrast to “non-contextual” methods as a means of clarifying the notion of a contextual approach to justice. In order to better define a contextual approach to social theory, I adopt the principle that it is useful to contrast such an approach to what I call “non-contextual” methods. By the term “contrast” I mean to clarify the differences between these approaches in the emphasis they give to social context, and the role that social context plays in theory formation. It is important to recognize that it is inaccurate to represent non- contextual theories and contextual theories as in complete opposition. This appears too extreme, so I have adopted the notion of a contrast class. So it is not a matter of always painting this comparison in terms of black and white but of trying to discern a contrast in the subtle gradation of hue. 14 By “non-contextual” approaches to the theory of justice I mean methods which proceed in an a priori fashion to construct ideal conceptions of society on the basis of procedures which in essence do not take account of contemporary historical, social conditions in the formation of normative principles oriented toward the organization of society. I argue that non-contextual methods that develop principles of justice for ordering society in an a,priori fashion are problematic, since the relationship to actual social conditions is an issue that arises only after the theory has been formulated. The relationship of actual social conditions to abstract theory is a problem, because it is not always evident how the theory will apply to the reality of a social situation that is far from ideal. In point of fact, both types of method may refer to social context. Plato (as well as contemporary social constructivists such as Rawls) bring contextual issues into their theories; Plato is in some respects a contextual thinker insofar as the catalyst of his notion of the guardian class is Sparta. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the case of non-contextual philosophers the intention is to form a theory of justice in the logical fashion of a deduction from first principles. For such non-contextual approaches to social theory the formation of normative principles oriented toward structuring society does not fundamentally require a sense of historical, social conditions. 15 In a contextual approach social context is an essential consideration in the formation of norms, whereas non-contextual theorists construct principles initially without reference to actual social conditions. A factor that gives support to this claim is that Aristotle and Hegel themselves recognize this distinction through the critical attitude they take to social theorists who are developing abstract theories of justice. This contrast with theories that are abstract or formal is an element of both Hegel's and Aristotle's own work. At this point it is necessary to at least note the issue concerning the degree to which contrast classes are useful for defining what something is in itself. In offering a contrast to non-contextual approaches the intention is not merely to say what a contextual approach is not, but at the same time to specify, explicitly, what such an approach involves. For instance, saying that a particular non-contextual approach does not consider history a relevant factor for the adequate development of an abstract construction of social theory from given principles implies that a contextual approach to social theory considers an understanding of historical context to be essential. C. Relation of this general discussion to Aristotle and Hegel. In this section I want to begin to relate the general discussion of a contextual approach that I have presented in the preceding sections to relevant issues and problems that arise in 16 Aristotle's and Hegel's social theories. This presentation will be developed in more detail as the dissertation proceeds. A contextual approach is a means of considering normative principles as intrinsic to human practices, institutions, and social organization. Humanity's purposive activity, organized by the laws and institutions of a particular society, is the point of reference from.which a contextual approach develops. This clarifies the purpose of the quotations that precede this dissertation: “fl yap v06 évép‘rela Can‘l . . . ” “For the actuality of thought is life . . .” LMet. 1072b 26, tr. Ross) and.“What is rational becomes real, and the real becames rational” (quoted from Dallmayr, p. 95). It is clear that for Hegel and Aristotle notions of justice inherently arise within the historical, social context of human activity. I claim that in Aristotle's and Hegel's contextual conceptions of justice their arguments for a particular social order are based on an understanding of the relationship between key features of society and knowledge. For a contextual approach it is essential to consider a specific distribution of knowledge when debating the legitimacy of a specific social structure. For instance, this claim.is exemplified by Hegel's notion that the division of labor in modernity requires a differentiation in knowledge between those who have intellectual expertise (e.g., the class of civil servants) and those who are involved in skilled and unskilled labor. By way of contrast, in Plato's construction of the state presented in the Republic, a 17 particular form of the distribution of knowledge produced through education gives rise to the hierarchical divisions between the classes (Rep. 4.4258-0, 428C-429A). This relation between knowledge and political structure arises within the development of an ideal conception of justice within the state. The main point of difference is that Plato's conception of the distribution of knowledge occurs in his highly idealized account of a just state so that the relevance to actually existing conditions is not entirely clear. In particular, it is not evident that the distribution of knowledge he envisions can arise from any contemporary social system. Aristotle achieves an understanding of Greek social and political life through the examination of his extensive collection of constitutions. This inquiry into contemporary constitutions exemplifies Aristotle's contextual thinking. Aristotle considered these constitutions repositories of practical knowledge which are useful resources when regarded critically. As Newman notes (Newman, vol. I, 57), the bulk of Aristotle's work is essentially the study of the order of the world from a biologist's perspective; such an approach involves empirical analysis oriented toward classification. Ingemar During makes the important point, though, that even.Aristotle's empiricism is oriented toward theory: Nenn sich.Aristoteles auch auf die Erfahrung und den consensus amnium.stutzt und empirische Tatsachen als Beweismittel anfuhrt, so dominiert bei ihm doch immer das spekulative Element. Seine Biologie ist durchweg eine philosophische Biologie. 18 Even if, by the consensus omnium,.Aristotle has a basis in experience and states empirical facts as evidence, still, for him the speculative element always prevails. His biology is, therefore, a philosophical biology. (During, Aristoteles: Darstellung'und Interpretation seines Denkens, vii-viii, my translation) It is important to consider the consequences this empirical perspective has for his political philosOphy. His method is to examine social justice empirically through an analysis of actually existing political institutions, social practices, and organization. Aristotle’s intention is not merely descriptive but is speculative empiricism in the sense that it is oriented toward understanding the rational elements within various constitutions in order to form normative principles of social order. It is reasonable to approach the study of justice by making use of historical context rather than merely arguing for abstract ethical principles. There is a reciprocal relationship between normative principles and social conditions in the thought of both Aristotle and Hegel—an interaction that is well worth examining as a means to better understand the nature of the relationship between theory and practice in political thought in general. On the one hand, the intention of Hegel and Aristotle clearly was to develop a social theory that would ultimately be realized in normatively structured social activity-so they develop normative principles to direct social activity rather than merely to describe it. On the other hand, 19 both philosophers form their normative theories with regard to already established cultural practices (including the activity of social theorists), institutions, and political forms—in this manner, social reality contributes to each philosopher’s development of social theory. Alfredo Prados notes the view that Aristotle's political work has a certain form due to its empirical and practical nature. “En cambio, e1 espiritu du Aristoteles, mas realista y pratico, y mas atento a lo experiencial, conduciria su dbra politica hacia un sistema mas participativo y dialogico.” “However, the spirit of Aristotle, more realistic and practical, and more attentive to the empirical, leads his political work toward a system that is more participatory and dialogic”(Prados 9, my translation). The proposition that a certain way of thinking (empirical and practical) leads to political thought that has elements of democratic procedure is interesting, but it is not immediately evident why this would be the case. Part of the solution to this difficulty is that both Aristotle and Hegel are concerned with the distribution of political power in order that different segments of society can participate in the constitution of the state as a means of ensuring social stability. In this respect justice manifested through political participation in society serves to legitimize political systems. This argument will be developed more fully within the following chapters. In particular, I examine practical rationality as a 20 human activity which mediates social conflict and the division of labor in order to achieve greater social stability. Aristotle and Hegel conceive political participation within their systems according to actual forms of differentiation within knowledge between intellectual expertise and the knowledge involved in skilled/unskilled labor. The level of effective political participation that one has in society is directly related to the type of specialized knowledge that one has. In the political constructions of both Aristotle and Hegel, laborers have limited (if any) real input into the political functioning of society. Even among those with intellectual expertise, the political machinery is run by experts whose particular specialization is running the state. Internal inconsistencies occur in the thought of Aristotle at this point. Aristotle feels that “Man is by nature a political animal” (Pol. 1.2.1253a 3). Aristotle is making the claim that a universal characteristic of humans is involvement in practical activity of a political nature. It follows that if there is a restriction of political activity, it has to be based on the claim that certain types of humans (slaves, women) are not fully human in their rational capacities. Aristotle's position in effect legitimates the established power structures of ancient Greek society insofar as the ruling order is based on the exploitation and exclusion of women, slaves and common laborers based on claims concerning knowledge. Aristotle connects his conception of the structure of political power to a 21 differentiation of knowledge. Even though, as Prados notes, there are aspects of Aristotle’s approach that are ’ clearly a contextual approach does “participatory and dialogic,’ not inherently lead to democratic political activity based on knowledge. It will be necessary, then, to show how a contextual approach to justice can contribute to a democratic distribution of knowledge. Hegel introduces the claim that rationality is a process of historical development from the abstract to the concrete. It is important to emphasize Hegel's intention to submit the notion of rationality in his philosophy to the judgment of empirical evidence, which is to say that rationality must refer to an actual social context. In other words, rationality is not an abstract idea but is manifest in the social, historical context of humanity’s development: It is this very relation ofjphilosophy’to actuality which is the subject of misunderstandings, and I accordingly come back to my earlier observation that, since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the comprehension of the ‘present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which exists God knows where . (FOR 20) Hegel conceives of actual historical conditions of human history as corresponding to levels of rationality about which normative claims concerning social reality can be made. Hegel considers dangerous the notion that freedom is compatible with irrationalism in any of its various manifestations. A central Hegelian critique of Romanticism is 22 that the association of freedom and irrationalism is a questionable move both philosophically and in terms of social practice. For Hegel this was not an abstract question; he was concerned about trends in his society that can be characterized as protofascist—especially insofar as ultra-nationalist rhetoric makes an appeal to the heart and feelings in opposition to rational consideration of right. In our century there is a similar philosophical tendency towards irrationalism due to the perception that the rationalization of society is a threat to human freedom. It may be reasonable to argue, though, that the problem is not rationality per se, but the misapplication of a particular type of rationality to a sphere in which it does not apply. Aristotle constantly reiterates the error of applying methods of validation from.one sphere of rationality (e.g. mathematical rationality) to the sphere of practical reason. III. Summary of the Individual Chapters of the Dissertation. This section contains a summary account of the four remaining chapters of the dissertation. CHAPTER 2 The aim.of this chapter is to justify my interpretation of Aristotle and Hegel as contextualizing thinkers in their development of normative theory. In the first section a comparison is made between the approaches of these philosophers, since I'm claiming that there is a similarity in the social theory of Aristotle and Hegel. The second section of this 23 chapter deals more specifically with Aristotle’s account of flexibility in the application of normative rules as an example of a contextualizing approach to justice. In the third section I first examine Hegel's critique of formal (Kantian) accounts of human freedom as inadequate due to a disregard of the context of social activity. Next I examine Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution and the Terror to show what for Hegel are the practical social consequences of applying an overly abstract normative concept. In the following two chapters I examine in turn Aristotle's and Hegel's contextual approaches to the distribution of knowledge within their own societies in relation to social conflict and the division of labor respectively. There are four parallel sections in which the contextual nature of Aristotle's and Hegel's social theories are examined in these chapters. CHAPTER 3 Section 3.1 In section 1 I examine specifically how Aristotle is a contextual thinker. It is evident for both philosophers that certain contextual categories are more important than others for the development of their conceptions of justice. I claim.that Aristotle's understanding of conflict as a contextual focal point in society is central to his construction of social justice. Social conflict is both external and internal to the Greek city-state. 24 Aristotle conceives justice as a distribution of political power by referring to the interests of well-defined social collectives within the state. The notion of justice as a social order is developed in the Nicamachean.mthics and Politics through an analysis of conflicting interests between social groups. Aristotle argues that, in general, the universal interest of society as a whole serves to justify normative claims among political groups with conflicting interests. Aristotle argues that the best structure for the distribution of political power corresponds to a particular form of the distribution of knowledge within society: the political order that can most effectively utilize practical knowledge oriented toward the interest of the state as a whole should run the state. This will be achieved by having greater numbers of people participate in political activity rather than just a few or one person. The perpetual external conflict endemic to the Greek city- states can be seen as a struggle not only of economic interests but also as conflict over the type of constitution that is proper for the city-state. Aristotle collects constitutions to comprehend the practical rationality they contain through an analysis of their merits and weaknesses. Actual constitutions (such as the Spartan, Cretan, Carthaginian) are representations of justice as a social order in various states. He argues from this contextual analysis for a certain social order justified, in part, on the basis of a particular distribution of knowledge. 25 Section 3.2 The aim of this section is to show how Aristotle conceives of social context in relation to education and the distribution of knowledge in order to develop his conception of social justice. Since states achieve justice through the mediation of internal conflict by practical, political knowledge, understanding the relationship between knowledge and conflict is essential for developing a political conception of justice. Section 3.3 Here a critical assessment of Aristotle is provided. In particular, I will show how his contextual arguments go wrong— especially in the sense that the central universalistic tendencies of his thought make his arguments for a highly restricted distribution of social power based on knowledge inconsistent. The basis for a broader political inclusion in Aristotle's political system is evident, since the criterion for the distribution of political power is knowledge of the universal interest of society. It is nevertheless true that Aristotle excludes slaves, women and workers from actual citizenship on the basis of a distinction between intellectual expertise and the types of knowledge involved in skilled and unskilled labor. So the general interest of society as a whole ends up being in actuality the interests of a fairly restricted class of citizens. Aristotle's position is ultimately inconsistent with a democratic viewpoint, and so the problem arises whether the use 26 of contextual categories can be justified for the development of a democratic distribution of knowledge. Section 3.4 In this section I examine how Aristotle's contextual approach, which confronts normative claims about justice with social conditions, is useful for the development of a democratic distribution of knowledge. There are elements of Aristotle' s contextual approach that can be redeemed for a democratic approach to knowledge: his insistence on practical rationality as a means to mediate social conflict between groups, his notion that in applying the rules generated through practical rationality flexibility is essential, and his conception of a legitimate, constitutional state as founded on informed, knowledgeable participation by individuals. CHAPTER 4 Section 4.1 Hegel's intention in his construction of a political system based on right (Recht) is to delineate the conditions of the modern state. My particular focus is Hegel's claim that the division of labor and the material basis of society contribute to a more universal culture based on concrete freedom. He argues that universal freedom is realized through the fact that the universal interdependence of humans on one another has become established by the division of labor. The division of labor is structured to a large degree through differentiation in knowledge related to the development of individual capacities. 27 In this sense the notion of the division of labor is central to Hegel's philosophical thought represented in The Philosophy of Right. An important aspect of Hegel's contextual social analysis is his understanding of the division of labor as a source of conflict arising within modern systems of production. Those who are excluded from the system of production become a source of social conflict. Furthermore, it is clear that for Hegel differentiation in knowledge associated with the division of labor is tied to differentiation in identity formation of individuals—much as in our own culture. Section 4.2 It is clear that social position in Hegel's system is largely based on distinctions in knowledge between those with intellectual expertise and those having knowledge involved in skilled and unskilled labor. This primary distinction in knowledge arises on the basis of the division of labor in modern society. Hegel recognizes that one unfortunate consequence of this distribution of knowledge is the social disenfranchisement of those who are excluded from the social sources of knowledge. The modern form of the division of labor also gives rise to extreme specialization in knowledge. This specialization is particularly problematic given the importance that Hegel attaches to the informed political participation of individuals in the state. 28 Section 4.3 .A critique of Hegel's account is developed in which I argue that Hegel's acceptance of the form of the differentiation of knowledge that arises with the modern structure of the division of labor is inconsistent with his conception of universal freedom” The division of labor in modernity is based on a distinction between those having intellectual expertise and those educated to skilled and unskilled labor. It is apparent that the universal class of civil servants have true political power, while the participation of others is restricted to discourse mediated by their estates within a public sphere only informally connected to the actual functioning of the state. Furthermore, although Hegel's work does contribute a great deal to the understanding of the type of alienation that modern systems of production create, the rigid type of identity formation of individuals that the division of labor requires is not thoroughly challenged by Hegel. This situation is inconsistent with his positive conception of freedom. Section 4.4 In examining Hegel's contextual account a number of positive social possibilities are evident which can contribute to the development of a democratic conception of the distribution of knowledge. Hegel feels the development of a public sphere of discourse connected to political processes is necessary to promote the dissemination of practical knowledge 29 throughout society. Such a public sphere of discourse serves to solidify the bonds of community and lends legitimacy to the social system. Hegel's positive construction of freedom can be contrasted with accounts of freedom developed on a Kantian, formal basis. Hegel argues that the relationship between actual freedom and knowledge within modernity cannot be understood independent of the conditions and institutions of society. CHAPTER 5 In this chapter I argue for a normative conception of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge based on the preceding analysis of the work of Aristotle and Hegel. A number of arguments are presented which aim.at justifying a democratic distribution of knowledge by means of a contextual approach. I argue that in our society knowledge within educational institutions is shared social wealth. Furthermore, in a democratic society I argue that the educational institutions of that society should be run democratically. It follows that the distinction between intellectual expertise and knowledge involved in skilled and unskilled labor should not be constituted within educational institutions on the model of economic forms of the division of labor but should be mediated through democratic procedures. Another argument for a democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge is that such an approach serves to stabilize conflict within institutions in a legitimate manner. Conversely, if the distribution and mediation of knowledge is 30 not democratic, certain forms of conflict within educational institutions may be justified. This can be contrasted with the approach of Cohen and Arato, who argue that state institutions are not the proper sphere for developing democratic structures. Furthermore, it is argued that democratic procedures for mediating the distribution of knowledge are best able to provide the required degree of flexibility in dealing with the control of knowledge in our social institutions under conditions that are far short of ideal. The social context of contemporary educational institutions will define in a manner the types of normative principles that can be developed to govern educational activity. CHAPTER 6 This chapter is a brief conclusion to the dissertation. In the first section I review what has been accomplished in reference to the two main theses of the dissertation. In the next section I address some remaining considerations that are relevant to the dissertation but could not be adequately dealt with in the body of the dissertation itself. In particular, I bring up the case of a contrast between democratic means for mediating the distribution of knowledge and the present trend toward privatization of control over educational institutions. In this section, I also bring up the fact that my approach to a democratic distribution of knowledge is limited to our society, but it is evident that with advances in communication technology this issue can no longer be restricted to a discussion of the 31 distribution of knowledge in one state. Lastly, I point to some areas in which further research is possible using a contextualizing approach to a democratic distribution of knowledge. For instance, it is useful to consider how a contextual approach to justice can be put into critical relation to the contemporary approaches to justice of Rawls and Habermas. CHAPTER 2 Development of a Contextual Approach to Justice in the Work of Aristotle and Hegel The aim.of this chapter is to explain my interpretation of Aristotle and Hegel as contextual thinkers. In the first section (chapter 2.1.) I begin with a general comparison of Aristotle and Hegel with the intention of showing that there is a similarity in their philosophical approaches. The perspective that these philosophers begin with is an informed critique of inherited normative principles from.the most noteworthy of their philosophical predecessors, as well as a consideration of normative principles embodied in laws and constitutions. Both philosophers point to the inadequacy of normative theory that does not take into account fundamental aspects of social context. Finally, both philosophers arrive at a more adequate conception of central philosophical normative principles by reformulating these inherited normative principles in reference to crucial features of social context. It should be noted that in these respects my contextualizing approach to the construction of a democratic distribution of knowledge is comparable to Hegel and Aristotle. In the last two sections of 32 33 this chapter, I substantiate the general exposition given in the first section by providing specific instances of the contextualizing methods of Aristotle and Hegel. I. Comparison Between Aristotle's and Hegel’s Contextualizing Approaches to the Formation of Normative Principles. A. Aristotle's and Hegel's use of inherited normative rationality as an initial basis for discussion. In the first chapter of this dissertation I make reference to three forms which a contextualizing approach to justice can take. One of these forms (chapter 1.1.(ex. 2.), see pp. 7-8) is the appropriation for critical analysis of contemporary philosophical discussion surrounding central normative principles. In other words, both Aristotle and Hegel begin their social philosophy from.a position of inherited normative principles formulated by their predecessors. Aristotle often begins his major philosophical inquiries with a survey and examination of the relevant thought of his predecessors. For instance, in the Metaphysics (Book A.) his discussion of material first principles covers the relevant 'doctrines of the Presocratics in a systematic, critical fashion that is unique for that time in Greek thought. Within Aristotle’s political thought, the starting point of his discussion often turns on an analysis of prevalent debate around central philosophical conceptions—such as the key notion of justice within Greek society. As an example, in the Politics Book 2 Aristotle begins his discussion with a critique of ideal 34 constructions of the state. Aristotle has Plato in particular in mind here. The touchstone of Aristotle’s critique of Plato is the impracticality of Plato's thought when confronted with the reality of social conditions in the Greek city-state and actual human nature. Plato argues that the structural unity of the state arises due to the virtues of tenperance (omepoofivn) and justice (Stratoofivn) . Temperance is the agreement of all of the citizens about who should rule—the few elite guardians who have the virtue of wisdom in regard to the interest of the whole state (Rep. 4.9.431D-E). Justice is the virtue of each person operating in their own restricted sphere of activity. “10610 toivuv. fiv 8’ éyt’o, 6) oils, Kwfiovefiet tpéxov nvd ytyvépevov 1'1 Stratoofivn elven, 1:6 Id (113106 spdnew.” “This, then,” I said, “my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this principle of doing one's own business" (Rep. 4.10.4338, tr. Shorey). Aristotle's critique is an examination of the inadequacy of Plato's conception of the unity his ideal state achieves through the realization of the virtues of justice and temperance. “The error of Socrates.must be attributed to the false supposition from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only” (Pol. 2.5.1263b 30-32, tr. Jowett). This general point of criticism against the Platonic conception of unity runs through the particular points of 35 criticism that Aristotle brings against Plato: the nature of a state is a plurality of individuals with different functions (Pol. 2.2.1261a 14-25), but the unity Plato's conception achieves is undefined; in a state of equal citizens, having a small group rule continually is inconsistent with equality (the “principle of reciprocity”) (Pol. 2.2.1261a 30-1261b m)" and, furthermore, incompatible with the necessary diversity of offices (Pol. 2.2.1261b 4-6); if community of property, women and children is thought to bring about unity, it remains unclear whether this communal sharing applies to all of the society or only to the guardians (Pol. 2.5.1264a 14-19). In Hegel the confrontation with received normative principles is an explicit part of his philosophical dialectic. In the Philosophy'of'Right there is a development from an inadequate conception of formal right to a more concrete conception of right consistent with the modern differentiation of social spheres: In opposition to the more formal, i.e..more abstract and hence more limited kind of right, that sphere and stage of the spirit in which the spirit has determined and actualized within itself the further moments contained in its Idea possesses a higher right, for it is the more concrete sphere, richer within itself and more truly universal. (FOR 59) Hegel feels that concrete right is more universal because it does not receive its legitimacy from.the individual conscience itself, but is formed in reference to historical developments in law and the constitution as realized in the objective order of 36 the state and society. Formal right is “subjectivistic” in that its normative basis is found in the individual conscience. It is clear that the object of Hegel's critique of formal right is Kant's formulation of right given in his works on practical reason. Hegel also argues against normative principles that are formed on a non-rational basis rather than beginning with an understanding of inherited norms set forth concretely in law and morality. This is in response to tendencies within protofascist political movements that make appeals to the “heart” and “feeling” for the basis of the structure of the state.“ It is clear that Hegel discerns the rational basis for the formulation of his normative principles in the inherited normative principles of laws and constitutions: The truth concerning right, ethics, and the state is at any rate as old as its exposition andflpromulgation in public laws and in public.morality'and religion. What more does this truth require, inasmuch as the thinking mind [Geist] is not content to possess it in this proximate manner? What it needs is to be comprehended as well, so that the content which is already rational in itself may also gain a rational form and thereby appear justified to free thinking. For such thinking does not stop at what is given . . . but starts out from itself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermost being with the truth. (POR 11) This passage is important in a number of respects. First, for Hegel the basis of the truth in inherited normative principles is found in law, morality, and religion. Second, there is a further confrontation of these principles structuring human 37 activity with the understanding that discerns what is rational within law, religion and morality. It is necessary to point out, however, that Hegel is not attributing rationality to every aspect of actual social reality. Hegel often points out the inadequacy and arbitrary nature of Roman law (FOR 19) and the danger of applying religious conviction to every aspect of society, as if this were sufficient for the rational organization of the state (see Hegel's extended discussion attached to 5270, p. 291-302). Aristotle's and Hegel’s confrontations with inherited principles take various forms, but it is evident that a common critical theme of both philosophers concerns the inadequacy of applying norms formulated in a non-contextual fashion to society. Hegel's and Aristotle's critiques of the non-contextual formulation of normative principles does not concern theory alone. Both philosophers make it clear that attempts to apply such formulations of normative principles are not just ineffective but are dangerous as well, since such attempts may end in violent social chaos. Aristotle states: The government, too, as constituted.by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors? (Pol. 2.5.1264b 7-10, tr. Jowett). For Hegel the abstract formulation of right may lead to a subjectivistic morality, but, since there is no objective 38 element grounding such morality, the will may just as well be expressed in an arbitrary fashion as either good or evil: Where all previously valid determinations have vanished and the will is in a state of pure inwardness, the self-consciousness is capable of making into its principle either the universal in and for itself'or the arbitrariness of its own ‘particularity, giving the latter precedence over the universal and realizing it through its actions—i.e. it is capable of being evil. (POR S139, p. 167) If principles based on arbitrary particularity remain on the level of the individual, the outcome may certainly be tragic—as in Dostoevsky's portrayal of Raskolnikov. If, however, such principles of arbitrary freedom are taken as the foundation of state authority, the result may not be indeterminate freedom for individuals within such a state, but a state willing to negate positive dimensions of society on arbitrary principles of self-detenmination. B. Hegel's and Aristotle's contextualization of inherited normative principles . In the foregoing section I have tried to show that a central aspect of Aristotle's and Hegel's social theories is a critical examination of inherited normative principles. Aristotle's and Hegel’s explicit and thorough examination of such principles is itself an element of the method through which they form their own normative theory. I have indicated that this corresponds with one conception of a contextualizing approach to the formation of a normative theory of justice (chapter 1.1.(ex. 2.). see p. approal mm m a note t‘ Aristo mm! It: d 39 I turn now to another aspect of a contextualizing approach to justice as stated in the introduction (chapter 1.1.(ex. 1.), see p. 6-7). According to this formulation of a contextualizing approach, Aristotle and Hegel confront normative principles with central features of social reality in the process of forming a more adequate conception of social justice. It is important to note that this element of the contextualizing method of Aristotle and Hegel is the main concern of my dissertation. The main focus of chapter five is to examine respects in which a contextualizing approach is useful for the development of a democratic distribution of knowledge. Since this aspect of a contextualizing approach to justice is the central concern of this dissertation, it is necessary to show that Aristotle's and Hegel's approaches are similar in this regard. The general schema of a contextualizing approach is explicit in Hegel's dialectical method. In Hegel's conception of the dialectical development of a notion, an initially abstract idea is shown to be inadequate as a representation of phenomenal experience. Through a comparison with experience a new notion is developed which is capable of subsuming the truth of the original notion and experience, and the process is then repeated. The experience of the phenomenal world itself becomes richer through the development of the idea, and the idea becomes more adequate (or concrete) as a representation of experiential phenomena. 4O Aristotle does not set forth in an explicit manner his method in practical philosophy. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that Aristotle's method is similar to Hegel in this regard in showing that normative principles become more adequate and concrete when they are confronted with central features of actual social context. For instance, Aristotle's development of the norm of justice is not simply a criticism of Plato's approach with the intention of establishing a more adequate abstract conception of justice. Aristotle examines actual constitutions of Greek societies as well to consider in what respects they are rational and in what respects they fail in realizing their fundamental principles: On the subject of the constitution of Sparta and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for consideration are two, one whether their legal structure has any feature that is admirable or the reverse in comparison with the best system [tfiv apio'mv vsvopoOétntm tdétv], another whether it contains any provision that is really opposed to the fundamental principle and character of the constitution that the founders had in view. (Pol. 2.6.1269a 29-34, tr. Rackham) For instance, Paul Cloche notes that Aristotle considers education a positive democratic element of the Spartan constitution insofar as it tends toward stability. The Spartan state provides for equality of education to the children of citizens: Proclamant son estime pour les regimes mixtes, 01‘: sent heureusement melangees la democratie et l'oligarchie, il fait observer qu'il en est ainsi dans “la politea des Lacedemoniens” (Pol., IV,‘VII, 4). En effet, d'une part, “bien des personnes a- n ’1' H H. ‘HMH he}, a ”tab; t‘at c' This : .,_ N C‘Jc “he: 41 entreprennent d'en parler comme d'une democratie parce qu'elle possede nombre d'élements democratiques”. Quels sont ces elements? D'abord, l'éducation des enfants, qui est identique pour les riches et les pauvres; “cette égalité persiste a l'fige suivant et quand ils sont devains hommes”, rien ne distinguant alors visiblement 1e riche du pauvre . . Proclaiming his esteem for mixed systems of government, where democracy and oligarchy are happily combined, he [Aristotle] makes the observation that it is thus in “the constitution of the Lacedaimonians” (Pol., IV, VII, 4). In effect, on one hand, “many people undertake to speak of it as a democracy because it possesses numerous elements of democracy”. What are these elements? First, the education of children, which is identical for the rich and the poor; “this equality persists into the following years and when they have become men”, nothing visibly distinguishes, then, the rich from the poor . . . (Cloche, “Aristote et les Institutions de Sparta”, my translation)9 Such an egalitarian form of education has the merit of establishing equality among the citizens as political agents so that distinctions between the rich and poor are less evident. This form of education in turn lends legitimacy to the state through the stability that it engenders. In effect, this form of education is a means through which a form of mutual recognition between citizens arises through an equal distribution of education in their society.10 In the following two sections I point to particular aspects of Aristotle's and Hegel's thoughts which exemplify particular cases of a contextualizing approach. For Aristotle this is an examination of the relationship between equity and the inherently variable nature of human activity. For Hegel I 42 examine his critique of Kantian formalism with respect to the notion of freedom.and the actual social disorder that results from an application of inadequately developed normative principles. The claim that Hegel is making is examined in light of Rousseau's conception of the general will as a form.that abstract freedom takes within the French Revolution. II. Aristotle as a Contextual Thinker Aristotle argues that human activity is a type of social ‘heterial” conformable to law. At the same time human activity in.some measure determines the form.of law itself. Aristotle considers it useful to take into account contemporaneous social realities in the process of forming normative principles that direct human activity. For Aristotle such a method indicates a contextual approach to practical reasoning. In other words, the Social reality of human activity influences the application and fOrmation of normative principles. To clarify how Aristotle uses thil method, I will examine Aristotle's conception of the role °f flexibility in the formation and application of law. In this d1'cussion I indicate the distinguishing features of a cOhtextual approach for Aristotle, and I point out the features °f his conception of justice I will discuss in later chapters. 3° Discussion of equity as a form of justice: flexibility in ‘. formation and application of normative principles. In this section of the dissertation I want to explicate the important philosophical notion of flexibility in the 43 institution and application of laws that Aristotle develops in the context of his discussion of equity (éIIEtKég) in Book‘v of the Nicomachean.zthics (NE 5.10.1137a 31-1138a 4). The notion of equity is central to Aristotle's theory of justice. In the Niccmachean Ethics Aristotle's conception of justice at times gives the impression of being a fairly mechanical method for distributing social or material goods according to a correct proportion. In his discussion of equity it is clear that Aristotle has a far more subtle account of justice which requires practical judgment based on a life thoroughly grounded in the experience of practical, political activity. Aristotle's discussion of equioy'illustrates the nature of Aristotle's contextual approach to justice, and so an ”lamination of Aristotle's conception of equity is useful for an Understanding of Aristotle's method. In addition, I will argue in chapter five of the dissertation that the notion of flexibility in application and formation of laws is useful for a dI'lllocratic construction of education within our own society, so th. material developed here has application for the further «Velopment of normative principles. Starting from the claim that law is a construction of humin practical rationality that aims to structure human °°hduct, it is appropriate to as]: whether and how flexibility in th‘ formation and application of laws occurs. This will apply to th. study of the particular way in which political judgment “lates to law and the institutions of the state as well. As kusu laws ‘ dwzo is th 31m r‘585 it 1| 44 Aristotle argues, it is not merely a matter of comparing all the laws written and choosing somehow those that are best, even such choice demands judgment that is well-constituted. The notion of political judgment itself can be viewed as one means through which the notion of flexibility in the formation and application of norms comes into effect. 1. Philosophical contention over the Aristotelian discussion of equity- At one point Aristotle states that in some manner equity is the form of justice par excellence: 16 1:8 yap énencég fitxa’tou two; 6v Bélnév éon Bixatov. Kat 0151 d); 6110 n yévog 6v Bélnév ion 10% fitxaiou. tabIOV (ipa Sixatov Kai émencég. Kai dueo’iv oxoufiaiow bv'rotv xpe’iflov to émetxég. For equity, while superior to one sort of justice, is itself just: it is not superior to justice as being generically different from it. Justice and equity are therefore the same thing, and both are good, though equity is the better. (NE 5.10.1137b 7-11, tr. Rackham) Given the importance that attaches to this notion, it is r‘alonable to inquire further into its nature. Gauthier and Jolif in their superlative commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics state that the basis of equity according to AIii-stotle can be found in nature (natural right). - - . l'equite n'y est pas definie comme indulgence, elle n'est pa. en dehors de la sphere du droit, elle est au contraire ‘ollrce de droit, et d'un droit superieur, puisque inserit dans ‘1‘ nature.” ''Equity is not defined here [Book V] as indulgence, it is not outside the sphere of right, it is on the contrary the 45 source of right, and of a superior right, since it is contained in nature” (Gauthier and Jolif, 433) . By “indulgence” Gauthier and Jolif apparently mean an enactment that arbitrarily circumvents a particular law. Gauthier and Jolif feel it is important to eliminate any sense that the Aristotelian notion of equity involves arbitrary enactments pertaining to law. The attempt to base the equitable in natural law points to a problem that by all appearances is inherent to the concept— without an external foundation the notion of equity is open to a Charge of arbitrariness in application and, hence, is inconsistent with justice. I argue below, though, that the trgument that equity is based on natural law cannot be derived from the text as we have it, and, even further, it is inconsistent with the text. The issue is of broader interest to understanding Aristotle' s contextual approach, because it aPpears reasonable to argue that any form of justice that takes Account of particular circumstances is arbitrary unless there is an Objective basis (such as nature) on which it is founded. It 1' important to show that even without a basis in natural law Al-‘ilstotle' s conception of equity is a legitimate normative Principle, and that this principle is inherently based on a °°ntextual approach to justice. With respect to the conception of equity as based in some “hse on nature, there are difficulties involved in trying to “tract a coherent, explicit view of natural law and justice them Aristotle's work. In Appendix A to this dissertation, I 46 offer a critique of an account of natural justice in the work of Aristotle. Aside from this issue, it should be noted that the discussion of equity in Book 5.10 of the Nicamachean.Ethics nowhere makes reference to natural law. In this chapter the term phusis (e'bolg, nature, essential quality) is used only in the sense of essential character of a thing, as it is used, for example, when we say that the nature of Socrates' philosophical method is dialectical. The claim.that equity is based in natural law is derived from the Rhetoric. It is evident that the characteristics of equity are not so much at issue for Aristotle in the passages of the Rhetoric as the more immediate question of how best to argue a case . spfitov uév 013v xspl vbumv stampev, m; xpno'téov rat sporpésov’w Ital dzoxpésovxa rat ratnyopofiwa Kai exoloyofipevov. oavepbv 761p 6n. édv pév évavflog fi 6 yeypauuévog 10 spayuan. 14$ Kowfb véum xpnotéov Kai toi‘; énetxéow (b; Gtxatonépmg . . . . rat 6:: to uév émeucég (mi pévet Kai obfiéson pechdllu, 0138’6 Kowég (mm ofimv yap éonv), oi as yeypauuévom roller“; . . . Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading, accusing or defending. For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice . . . that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary . . . (Rhet. 1.15.1375a 25—33, tr. Freese). If the written law is against the matter we have in hand to ‘t‘gue (ét‘xv pév évavflog fi 6 ysypauuévog rd spdvuan) , then one atl‘ategy is to argue that there are natural, immutable laws 47 common to all that transcend the written laws. In this passage Aristotle practically gives a list of persuasive techniques suitable for the case at hand. If, on the other hand, the written law is advantageous to a position, Aristotle presents another set of arguments that can be used in support of the written law: If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath ‘to give my verdict according to my honest opinion’ is not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from.the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means . . . . Or that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at all, etc. (Rhet. 1.15.1375b 16-20, tr. Roberts). Clearly, in these passages the conception of natural law that Aristotle puts forth is subservient to the purpose at hand Of'winning a legal case; so it is highly questionable whether a coherent philosophical conception of equity can be based on the fiction of natural law derived from.these passages. In other "Orde, Aristotle's intention in these passages was not to give hie considered view on the definition of equity. Furthermore, Atistotle only says (see Rhet. 1.15.1375a 25-33 above) that 'quity is like the general law in terms of constancy, but Aristotle only states specifically that the general law is ‘ccording to nature.11 There is additional external evidence ‘Vhioh makes it difficult to accept these passages of the RhOtoric as Aristotle's definitive position on the notion of ‘*luity. In the discussion of equity (éxtelxég) given above Juristotle says that “equity is ever constant and never changes,’ 48 but in the Nicomachean.Ethics Aristotle repeatedly argues for flexibility in the determination of what equity is. These considerations make it difficult to adopt his argumentation in the4Rhetoric as his considered philosophical view on this issue. Finally, the evidence of the discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics itself is explicitly against the notion that equity has its basis in a conception of natural law that is universal and immutable. In Book‘V of the.Ethics Aristotle indicates that the equity that is required with respect to the laws of a state is not according to an imutable standard of natural law. The application of flexibility in the laws is itself a human construction, and the standard is itself human practical rationality: 610w 06v léyn pév 6 vbpoc; Kaeéloo, 0011311 5’ éxl 1015101) tape to anélou. 161:8 boom; Ext-:1. fi sapaletsst b vouoOétng Kai fiuaptev ans; eiu’ov, ésavop000v to éllewflév, 6 raw 6 vouoflétng abtbq av etsev éwei‘ sapmv. rat at 118m, évopoOétnoev. When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the Lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question. (NE 5.10.1137b 20-24, tr. Rackham) "‘3 mention is made of an appeal to natural law. It is even unclear how humans would become cognizant of such laws in nature thet apply to humans, or how such natural laws are to be inltitutionalized within society. Given the difficulties that “Ilse in the notion of equity from the above considerations, it 49 nuw'be useful to provide a fuller explication of this concept in Aristotle's work. 2. Approach to a social conception of equity. My initial interest in the topic of equity in the formation and application of normative principles resulted from reading the following passage of Aristotle's Nicamachean Ethics: 101) yap abptotou déptomg rat 0 Kavdnv éonv, moxep Kai tfig AeoBtd; bucofioufig 0 polifiéwog xavmw 100g yap 10 cxfipa 100 M001) ustamvei‘tat Kai 0i) pévet 0 xavéw. nut 10 wfimopa prg 1:0: spayuata. For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case. (NE 5.10.1137b 29 ffl, tr. Rackham) A difficulty in the interpretation of this quotation of the leaden rule of the builders of Lesbos is the metaphorical nature in which it is expressed. This metaphor seems to require explication, since “sav yap coamég 10 mm petaoopcv 18Yépevov”“'E:verything said metaphorically is unclear” (Top. 6.2.139b 34, tr. Guthrie).” The following explication is, in Port, an attempt to arrive at a clear, non-metaphorical concoption of Aristotle’s notion of equity and to determine its r‘levance to Aristotle's contextual conception of justice. 50 3. Flexibility in moral conduct and judgments according to rule. a. Do not demand more precision than the subject matter admits. sesatfieuuévou yap éo‘nv ésl IOOO‘D’IOV 1‘ axptfiég énCn‘re‘iv xao’ éxaatov yévog éo’ 600v 1'1 100 spayuatog efiou; émfiéxetar sapaxlfiotov yap activate: paOnuanxofl 1:8 meavoloyoflvrog drofiéxeoflm Kai bntoptxov drofie’téug exaltetv. éxaorog so xpivet mm; 6: ytvdmxet, Kat 100nm; éoflv 6:71:00; xpufig. . for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. (NE 1.4.1094b 24-1095a, tr. Ross) This passage is of primary significance to the discussion at hand. It is essential not to search for more accuracy in the inquiry than the subject matter demands. In general, a person knowledgeable in terms of practical judgment determines the degree of flexibility allowed for a particular subject matter under question. With respect to the equitable application of normative principles, the subject matter is human practice ordered by law. It is first necessary to note that there are different requirements of proof according to the type of inquiry under question. This point is central to Aristotle's method: Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all 51 discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. (EN 1.4.1094b 12-14, of. 1.4.1094b 24 ff. and 1.7.1098a 25 ff., tr. Ross) The point is not simply that practical reasoning is less rigorous than theoretical reasoning, but that the subject matter (human action) is inherently variable, so anyone demanding the same sort of clarity in understanding of practical matters as in geometry, for instance, is not so much showing scientific rigor as lack of education. The types of validity claims that are made and supported in theoretical and practical reason are clearly different. Furthermore, as is well-known, the ends to which these types of reasoning lead are different: “Oeopnttxfig pév 701p télog amoem xpaxnxflg 5‘ ép'yov.” “For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, but for practical knowledge it is the act” (Met. 2.1.993b 19-20, tr. Ross). From this introductory perspective a number of concerns arise which this present section attempts to formulate and respond to. How does Aristotle's conception of a flexible rule relate to action, in contrast to absolute laws that are literally inscribed in stone? It is important to note that being flexible does not mean that Aristotle falls into absolute moral relativism here, since, while the subject matter with regard to human action does require flexibility in practical judgments, there are limits to the degree to which principles can bend. Just as the leaden rule of the builders of Lesbos can be bent to 52 fit the form of a curved object, the rules of human conduct can be instituted to allow for mitigating circumstances. The person that determines what is appropriate to the situation has knowledge of the subject matter; in the passage of the Nicomachean.Ethics stated above it is the lawgiver. Ideally, in an educated democracy one would suppose this function could be filled by the average citizen. Certain difficulties arise, though: why accept this account of what is morally acceptable rather than, say, a moral system built on absolute imperatives? What are the advantages for human existence and activity in a political community based on Aristotle's account of practical rationality? b. What determines the degree of flexibility? (1) The subject matter involved in the formation of norms. It is necessary to determine more precisely the sphere in which the notion of flexibility applies. The purpose is to discern in what manner human practical rationality is flexible, not due to something non-rational, but as a particular mode of rationality which inherently applies to a certain social context. The evident variability of the subject matter with which practical rationality deals (human conduct) requires flexibility in spheres involving practical judgments. “. . . matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this 53 nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art.or precept (xapayyeliav) but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation (NE 2.2.1104a 4-9, tr. Ross).” The subject matter of an inquiry often determines the degree of accuracy which obtains concerning it. If the object under scrutiny is justice as a structure of the state that organizes human activity, then it is indispensable to realize the inherent variability of the subject matter to which justice as a system of normative principles applies. Stewart provides the following enlightening quotation by Bustratius on the relation of the knowledge in ethical inquiries to the underlying subject matter. 6111 5%. éo' éwdozng [1806501) Kai téxvng “781011 10 fisoxeiuevov ainflg rep). 6 xatayivetat, bxore’tpevov a: 11) fiatxfi Kat soltnxfl 10: év Bit.) £011 spayuata rat ai sepl taflra cm depdmmv spdéstg re Kai évépyewt. énva 10v 6); last 10 solb évfiexouévev eiol Kai 01)): as) 60(10th éxovxa . . . The fimatter” of each inquiry and art means the underlying subject in regard to which that science comes about, the underlying subject in ethics and politics consists of those matters in life concerning the practice and activity of humans—whatever is capable of not being thus, or not always holding in such a manner . . . (quoted from Stewart, 28, my translation) To arrive at a proper notion of the Aristotelian concoption of equity it is important to keep in mind that normative principles consistently involve a reference to a variable subject matter. To disregard this subject matter (i.e., 54 to take a non-contextual approach to the normative issues of justice as equity) leads to error. (2) Argument for flexibility in practical judgments according to rule. For Greek thought in general the function of the rational faculty of humans (1670;) is to properly define limits, so the proper activity of the practical rationality of humans is for Aristotle a manner of making determinations in this sphere according to reason (NE 1.7.1098a 13 ff.). The etymology of the Greek word 1070; (generally, rationality) has relevance in this regard. Btymologically, 1670; is related to léya) (to say, or relate), which originally meant to enumerate; 1070; is associated with proper ratios. This is readily apparent, for example, in the definition of virtue: Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle (éplauévn 1610) , and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. (Nl’2.6.1106b 36-1107a 2, tr. Ross) Flexibility in the application of rational principle is inherent to this definition insofar as it concerns a mean that is relative to us. Furthermore, with respect to the issue of virtue in general, the formation of principles is flexible as well, in that such principles are determined by a person of practical wisdom. The nature of practical wisdom is different from pure theoretical knowledge due to the variable subject matter to which it applies, and for a variable subject matter a flexible 55 rule is required. Reason demarcates the extent to which any rule can bend within the parameters of a mean relative to us and the variable circumstances inherent in human activity. An argument for flexibility in the application of rule according to reason is not explicitly given by Aristotle, but I believe can be consistently drawn from various places within the text: (1) The subject matter of moral inquiry is human action. (2) The subject matter (practice) is naturally such as to allow a range of conduct that is appropriate within a given situation. Furthermore, the circumstances themselves determine the range of practice—the proper time, the proper degree, the attitude involved etc., (NE 3.7.1115b 17 ff.). All these factors require a range in which judgment concerning moral action can occur. (3) It is not reasonable to ask for more in terms of reason (as forming normative principles) than the subject matter allows. (4) Since the subject matter of moral inquiry does not admit of absolute exactness, it would show a lack of education to demand exactness rather than flexibility in the formation and application of the normative principles which guide human practice. At this point it would be reasonable to respond to objections to Aristotle's position on flexibility in the application and formation of normative principles. Since my aim 56 was to show how Aristotle's discussion of equity illustrates a contextualizing approach in relation to the formation of normative principles, the examination of objections is a digression in the line of argument of the dissertation. In order not to neglect an examination of the objections to such an approach, the difficulties that arise for Aristotle’s conception of equity as flexibility in the formation and application of normative principles are given in an appendix (3) to this dissertation. 3. Conclusion to this section. In summary, I review two reasons from the foregoing discussion that indicate why Aristotle's notion of equity as flexibility in the formation and application of normative principles requires a contextualizing approach: (1) The material activity of social beings itself requires application of flexible rules insofar as it is not amenable to a strictly uniform characterization. “ . . . the material of conduct is essentially irregular” (NE 5.10.1137b 19-20, tr. Rackham). (2) Universal, abstract laws are inherently inadequate in that general rules cannot cover all particular cases: And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. (NE 5.10.1137b 26-29, tr. Ross) 57 It may be useful to restate the essential points that can be drawn from the discussion that have importance for what follows: (1) The discussion of flexibility in the formation and application of normative principles indicates the development of a normative theory that is neither universal nor based in natural law. In other words the theory is contextual in that it is related to the practical activity of human beings. (2) The material which is the subject matter of practical rationality (human activity according to rational rules) influences the formation of principles. (3) The formation and application of principle is not entirely relative even though it is flexible, but is determined by those possessing phronssis (wpbvnOIQ. prudence, thoughtfulness), i.e., flexibility is related to practical knowledge. In the preceding discussion the intention has been to examine the contextual approach that Aristotle uses in his discussion of equity as a form of justice in order to gain understanding of how such an approach can contribute critical insight into the relationship between the development of normative principles and practical social activity. In this regard, Aristotle's notion of equity merits more consideration than it is usually accorded, insofar as it provides a concrete example of the practical application of a method that is contextual. 58 III. Hegel as a Contextual Thinker. In this section of the dissertation I present Hegel’s contextualizing approach to the formation of normative principles by demonstrating that Hegel bases his philosophical- political theory on an analysis of concrete historical social conditions. I begin with Hegel’s view that rationality is an evolving process inherent in the actual historical course of humanity’s development. Next, referring to Hegel’s analysis of the French Revolution, I examine a particular instance in which he argues that an instantiation within society of an inadequate rational conception of freedom (formalism) can have destructive COMOqUODCOI . A. Hegel's concrete, historical conception of rational norms. Hegel argues that rationality is a historical and actual phenomenon in the world. A difficulty in accepting Hegel’s account of historical development is that Hegel conceives of this development as the dialectical unfolding within the world of an Idea that is already inherent in history from.the beginning: “For, like the soul-conductor Mercury, the Idea is in truth, the leader of peoples and of the world; and Spirit, the rational and necessitated will of that conductor, is and has been the director of the events of the world's History” (P03 8). Even granting the problematic nature of Hegel's teleology, the manner in which Hegel analyzes the course of concrete historical events retains great value, because he argues that his theory 59 must be consistent with the empirical facts of history: It is only an inference from the history of the world, that its development has been a rational process; that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the world-Spirit- that Spirit whose nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds this its one nature in the phenomena of the world's existence. This must, as before stated, present itself as the ultimate result of History. But we have to take the latter as it is. we must proceed historically—empirically. (POH'10) Characterizing Hegel's thought, as Marx does, as a peculiar sort of logical mysticism tends to diminish these features of Hegel’s thought that are in fact concrete. Marx's analysis of Hegel's political thought in the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State is important for an understanding of the Hegelian method, but Marx appears at times to stress his point to the extreme: Hegel' s sole concern is simply to re-discover ‘the Idea’, the “logical Idea’, in every sphere, whether it be the state or nature, whereas the real subjects, in this case the “political constitution’, are reduced to mere names of the Idea so that we are left with no more than the appearance of true knowledge. (Marx, critique of'Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, 67) He [Hegel] does not develop his thought from the object, but instead the object is constructed according to a system of thought perfected in the abstract sphere of logic. His task is not to elaborate the definite idea of the political constitution, but to provide the political constitution with a relationship to the abstract Idea . . . (Marx, Critique of'Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, 69) In contrast to Marx, others have considered Hegel’s thought to be mainly a response to the social circumstances that existed at his time-a social philosophy solely oriented toward 60 political expediency. As Fries said, “Hegel's metaphysical mushroom has grown not in the gardens of science but on the dunghill of servility‘.”13 In my view, it is a misconception to suppose that either Hegel or Aristotle’s project is essentially a description and, implicitly, a support of the established political structure. The intention of the following is to make clear that Hegel is developing normative claims—not merely through an elaboration of an idea in the “abstract sphere of logic“—but in relation to actual social institutions and practical activity. As indicated by the comparison between Aristotle and Hegel given in the first section of this chapter, the general notion of contextual thinking for both Hegel and Aristotle is a method of philosophical theorizing that confronts prevalent normative principles by taking account of main features of social context in order to formxmore practical, realizable principles for ordering social activity. As such, there is an immediate concern with the relationship between theory and practice in contrast to attempts to come to terms with this issue only after abstract normative principles have been developed. In this respect forming principles according to a contextualizing method can be distinguished from.formalistic approaches that develop normative principles in an a.priori fashion. Such a formal method conceives of practical rationality according to the paradigm of mathematical reasoning in its application to the physical world. A non-contextualizing approach considers that once a universal 61 norm has been worked out in abstraction it can be applied to the social reaLm-just as in physics the mathematical formula that describes gravitational attraction applies everywhere in the universe: “But just as those conceptions presented in dynamics are founded upon a merely formal representation of pure mathematics as presented in geometry, reason has taken care also to provide the understanding as far as possible with intuitive presentations a priori in behoof of a construction of the conception of rightm“ (Kant, 80R). In the following section, I examine two aspects of Hegel’s critique of formalism in the construction and application of normative principles. First, Hegel argues that the theoretical foundation of formal approaches to the construction of normative principles can be found in Kant's conception of practical rationality. In order to understand Hegel's critique of Kantian formalism it is necessary to examine the features of Kent's theory that Hegel characterizes as “formal.” Second, through an examination of Rousseau's conception of the general will I present an analysis of a formal principle that Hegel argues is inadequate in its practical, social application. Within this analysis the elements of Hegel's critique of formalism will be identified. Following this examination, a contrast to a formalistic approach is given by Hegel's conception that “universal history” is the historical development of the consciousness of concrete, positive forms of freedom (in section C.). 62 B. Hegel's critique of formalism. 1. Formalism in theory: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formal approach to normative theory. The debt that Hegel owes to Kant's moral theory is evident throughout Hegel's practical work. Hegel explicitly acknowledges the contribution that Kant has made in this regard: “In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and free. The merit and exalted viewpoint of Kant's moral philosophy are that it has emphasized this significance of duty” (FOR 161). At the same time, in his discussion of the problems inherent in formal approaches to the formation of normative theory Hegel constantly returns to Kant as the wellspring of formalism. In order to understand Hegel's critique of formalism in moral theory it is necessary to grasp the aspects of Kent’s theory that Hegel argues are problematic. The focus of this discussion of Kantian formalism will be on the conception of freedom in its relation to individual will. Kant claims that freedom is the foundation of moral law, so that by following the moral law a person is acting in accordance with freedom.as it is generally understood. “Freedom, however, among all ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. we do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law” (CPrR 4). An understanding of Rant's conception of freedom can be attained through an analysis of his conception of autonomy. 63 Autonomy is, in effect, the very nature of the will according to Kant. Autonomy is the nature of the will such that it is not determined by any empirical conditions, whether subjective (e.g., psychological, emotional) or objective (for instance, profit). An act can only be considered autonomous if the condition for its action arises within the individual rather than through some external constraint. Within Kant's philosophy a further condition for moral autonomy is that internal influences (such as desire and self-interest) must not determine the free functioning of the will. Autonomy of the will is required for applying the categorical imperative—otherwise there is always the question whether some interest is behind the formation of particular maxims according to the pure form.af moral law as set forth in the categorical imperative. Kant maintains that the only principle of moral law that is consistent with the autonomy of the will (and, hence, for Kant is a determining ground of the free will) is the categorical imperative. a. Hegel's critique of Kent's formal conception of freedom. One of Hegel's primary criticisms of Kant's formalism is that it essentially provides a.“subjectivist“ basis for a theory of human freedom.based on human will (a theory of right) that is inadequate in its application to social-political theory: The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, 64 desire, passion—pertaining to the particular individual as such—a limitation of caprice and self- will is regarded as a fettering of Freedom. we should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom.is realized. (POH'AI) Kant puts forward a negative conception of freedom as the condition of subjective will which is not determined by anything empirical (CPrR 15). The only legitimate restriction of right is a limitation of an activity of will which would interfere with another person's free activity of will: In the Kantian definition [Bestimmung] of right . . . the essential element [Moment] is ‘the limitation of my freedom or arbitrary will in such a way that it may coexist with the arbitrary will of everyone else in accordance with a universal lawfi . . . The definition of right in question embodies the view, especially prevalent since Rousseau, according to which the substantial basis and primary factor is supposed to be not the will as rational will which has being in and for itself or the spirit as true spirit, but will and spirit as the .particular individual, as the will of the single person Ides Eunxelnen] in his distinctive arbitrariness;15 (FOR 58) In this respect it is clear that only conscience can determine moral action. Hegel argues that according to such a formal account the content of universal law is in fact empty so that any activity can be willed as a universal law without contradiction: However essential it may be to emphasize the pure and unconditional self-determination of the will as the root of duty . . . to cling on to a merely moral point of view without making the transition to the concopt of ethics reduces this gain to an empty formalism, and moral science to an empty rhetoric of 65 duty.for duty's sake. . . . The fact that no‘property is present is in itself [fur sich] no more contradictory than is the non-existence of this or that individual people, family, etc., or the complete absence of'human life. But if it is already established and presupposed that property and human life should exist and be respected, then it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction with something, that is, with a content which is already fundamentally present as an established principle. (FOR 162-63) while Kant's notion of freedom based on a subjectivistic account of the will occupies a certain stage of moral theorizing, its application in spheres where it is inadequate can be detrimental: One of Hegel's major arguments against the Kantian heritage is that just as the categorical imperative is inoperative in the family-where it is superseded by love—so its writ does not run in political life. (HTMB, Avineri 137) Formulations of the nature of freedom in human activity that have their basis in formal, or “pure”, practical theory (CPrR 4) such as Rant presents, are problematic when it comes to providing a concrete account of liberty within society. Hegel feels that Kant can be viewed as the theoretician of the French Revolution, whereas Rousseau's political work is the practical application of this mode of theorizing. In the following section, I examine Rousseau's conception of freedom realized through the general will in order to clarify Hegel's claim that a consistent application of a formal approach to right based on individual will is dangerous in application to determinate, modern social conditions and, hence, leads to the atrocity of 66 the Terror in which the development of any determinate social group is a threat which must be negated through death. 2. Formalism.in practice: An examination of Hegel's critique of the practical application of formal approaches to right in his analysis of the French Revolution. Hegel's examination of the French Revolution is an example of a contextual approach to social theory, insofar as Hegel argues that the actual historical results of the French Revolution are an application of an inadequately developed, subjectivistic conception of freedom. In the course of this examination it will become clear what Hegel takes to be a more concrete conception of freedom sufficiently structured to be adequate to modern social circumstances. According to Hegel, the French revolution itself is related to developments in historical forms of human rationality. The assertion of the freedom of will as a principle of political power indicates that humans, as individuals, are fundamentally free, or self-determining. Hegel accepts the principle of the freedom of individuals as the central achievement of the modern world. Within Rousseau’s political theory human freedom is brought about within society through the instantiation of the general will. Hegel argues that the formulation of freedom within the conception of the general will-realized in the French Revolution-is inadequate due to its “formal” nature. Hegel argues that in the French Revolution the general will is arbitrary particularity itself, so the notion of 67 the general will is negative—only a universalization of arbitrary particularity which opposes anything positive. The formation of any social institution with positive content is inconsistent with such a conception of freedom. a. Examination of Rousseau's conception of the general will. In order to understand the point of reference of Hegel's view on the French Revolution it may be useful to briefly examine Rousseau’s conception of the general will (volonté general). According to Rousseau no absolute authority can be based on even an explicit revocation of freedom due to the fact that liberty is a right that is inalienable. “Renoncer d sa liberté c’est renoncer d as qualite dfhomme.” “To renounce liberty is to renounce one's humanity” (CS 46){“ Since there is no legitimate authority based on force through which rule can be established, it follows that legitimate authority is based on agreements (les conventions) among people. So, the only means through which individual liberty can be secured within society under conditions of scarcity (whether artificial or not) is through the establishment of a contract embodied in the general will." Rousseau states that each individual subsumes his or her will within the general will and that the general will is an “indivisible” association of each individual's will (CS 51-52). The general will is a means to transform society so that the 68 state association as the ”moral and collective body” respects the inherent freedom of each individual. Describing some of the elements of this social association may help to clarify what individual liberty is under the social contract. One element of the constitution of the general will is that “all voices be heard” (CS 64), since any exclusion would destroy the basis of the general will. The opportunity to voice political concerns is, then, one of the elements that indicates liberty within a society-at least the means to express one's own particular will must be available. Rousseau also maintains that equality is essential for the maintenance of liberty (CS 88). By this Rousseau does not mean that there is an exact equality of wealth, but that no inequality can legitimately be maintained by violence against others. At this point certain questions arise concerning the formation and application of the general will to those who may be reluctant to enter into the agreement, and to those who feel that they have little faith in the political association. First, Rousseau states that anyone not agreeing to the general will is to be forced to agree to it: Afin donc que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obeir a la volonte generale y sera contraint par le corps: se qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera d’étre libre . . . Therefore so that the social pact may not be an empty formula, it is tacitly affirmed that only the following obligation is able to give force to the others: whoever refuses to obey the general will 69 will be constrained by the social body; this means nothing other than that person will be forced to be free . . (CS 54) This clearly goes against the notion that the social contract is in some sense an agreement between individuals. There is a tendency for Rousseau to talk as if the individual will is totally subsumed within the general will. The radical nature of this subsumption of the particular by the volonté generals Hegel believes is the basis of the horror of the French Revolution. under these conditions individual liberty is in danger of becoming just an empty abstraction. Originally, it appears as if Rousseau's intention is to provide a social theory that supports human liberty within a social context. The reality, though, is that the liberty of the individual in Rousseau's theory is under constraint through the enforcement of the general will: 11 y a done une profession de foi purement civile dent il appartient au souverain de fixer les articles. . . . Que si quelqu'un, apres avoir reconnu publiquement ces.mflmes dogmes, se conduit comme ne les croyant pas, qu'il soit puni de mort; il a commis le plus grand des crimes, il a menti devant les lois. There is, therefore, a profession of purely civil faith concerning which it belongs to the sovereignty [of the people] to establish the articles. . . . So if anyone, after having public recognized these articles of faith, acts as if they do not believe in them, let them.be punished by death. They have committed the greatest of crimes—they have lied before the law. (CS 179) Hegel notes that according to such a conception of freedom actual humans are themselves an abstraction, so that under such 70 a principle killing may become a matter of complete indifference: The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling [Erfullung], for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water. (P08 360). C. Hegel's contextual approach to freedom within society. In this section a contrast is provided to a formalistic account of freedom—whether theoretical in Kant, or applied practically as in Rousseau—through a brief examination of Hegel's contextualizing approach to the nature of freedom as a historical result of rational social development. Hegel argues that formalism is inadequate to resolve the duality between subjective will and social context, because it reduces the content of individual subjectivity to “arbitrariness”. Subjective will can be anything, so, in fact, its essential nature has the inherent potentiality of being sheer negativity. Similarly, there is a relationship between pure will as an abstraction and universal (formal-categorical) imperatives that Hegel feels are devoid of content and, therefore, are capable of specifying any normative claim whatsoever without contradiction. It is difficult to see how a formal approach can adequately address the issue of conflict, for instance, at a level of abstraction that ex.hxpothesi excludes context in the formation of principles that are then 71 applied to a social substratum that is mistakenly taken to be undifferentiated. The basis of social activity according to this view ultimately rests on a conception of the will associated with subjective conscience. The difficulty for Hegel arises when this abstract, formal conception of will is applied inappropriately to social and political spheres. As Alan wood points out, an abstract conception of freedom lacks any realization of the development of individual liberty and conscience as a social process that has to be consistent with the empirical facts of history: Hegel rejects liberal theories on the basis of their abstract, impoverished, and ahistorical view of human beings, their preference for a fictional human nature in place of historically situated self- understanding. . . . The real significance for us of Hegel's conception of ethical life is that it shows how we can accept a historicized and communitarian critique of liberalism without renouncing the Enlightenment's confidence in universal standards of reason. (my? 208) This quotation is important because it brings to light the nature of the concrete relation between historical, interested individuals and universal law that Hegel’s political theory seeks to resolve dialectically. Hegel maintains that an adequate account of human freedom has to take account of the prevailing social conditions that are related to the historical development of the awareness of human freedom: The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its 72 nature, it is our business to investigate. The general statement given above, of the various grades in the consciousness of Freedom—and which we applied in the first instance to the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and Roman world only that some are free; while we know that all men absolutely (man as man) are free- supplies us with the natural division of Universal History, and suggests the mode of its discussion. (POH'lQ) Hegel maintains that the historical dialectic between individual, particular interests and the universal nature of freedom is resolved on the level of the state: “The State is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form. The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom” (POH'47)..According to this view human freedom is associated with the progressive evolution of practical rationality within the state characterized by, on the one hand, universal principles set forth in law, the constitution and ‘moral codes and, on the other hand, by the civil sphere of particular human activity. The intention of chapter four of this dissertation is to examine whether Hegel is consistent in his account of the resolution between the particular social activity of human beings and the universal normative principles that direct such activity. I address this issue through an analysis of the adequacy of Hegel's conception of the relationship between the division of labor as a development specific to modernity and the distribution of knowledge. If Hegel is to achieve his goal of a 73 social structure that is universal in the extent of its rationality, there must be actual historical conditions in the social realm capable of fostering social universality. I claim that in the Philosophy'offiRight Hegel argues for a specific form of the distribution of knowledge that is capable of serving social universality through its mediating function within the state. It will be shown that the form of the distribution of knowledge that is based on distinctions inherent to the modern construction of the division of labor is inconsistent with Hegel's account of the universal nature of human freedom. CHAPTER 3 Aristotle’s Contextual Approach to a Theory of Justice 1. Justice and Conflict in the Nicomschean.Ethics. An adequate approach to understanding Aristotle's conceptualization of justice must provide a clear account that, as far as possible, is not biased toward a preconceived notion of justice. In this section I want to explicate Aristotle’s conception of justice as he presents it in the fifth book of the Nicomaohean.zthics. Primarily this will be useful for the subsequent discussion of the relation between justice and the distribution of knowledge within society. A. General and particular types of justice distinguished. Aristotle explicitly moves from a discussion of justice in general to an analysis of particular forms of justice. Aristotle recognizes that the term.5rxatoofivn (justice, or accordance with right) is a term that has a multiplicity of meanings that roughly bear a common sense. The sense that is common to the term.justice Aristotle says is virtue in general, but it is necessary to distinguish between the more particular types of justice. 74 75 611 uév 06v 8161 Stratoo'bvat rleioug, rat 61:: £011 n9 Kai étépa rapd tfiv élnv apatfiv, 8fll0w ti; 5% Kat 61010: 11;, lnxtéov. Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of Justice than one, and that the term has another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. we have then to ascertain the nature and attributes of Justice in this special sense. (NE 5.2.1130b 6-8, tr. Rackham) The notion of justice, then, has a plurality of meanings. This insight is important for the analysis of the contextual aspects of Aristotle's conception of justice. There is a realization here that one exclusive meaning of the term justice does not exist. As Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, “And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance . For being falls immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera (Met 4.2.1004a 4-6, tr. Ross) .” “inapxe: yap mom; yévn Exov :0 (iv: 510 not at énozfipat uroloum‘monot 100mm.” As Aristotle says, it is reasonable that spheres of knowledge are ordered according to the genera that are being studied. There is a sense in which the notion of justice for Aristotle falls immediately into genera of justice. This leads to the conclusion that there is no overarching conception of justice that is definitive for the more concrete notions of justice that Aristotle focuses on. Aristotle's project in book five of the Nicomachean.Ethics is to articulate the various meanings of the term justice. I want to first draw the general lines along which Aristotle presents his discussion, but my main intention is to focus on 76 Aristotle's account of distributive justice, since this particular type of justice is most relevant to the dissertation. Furthermore, a practical understanding of justice is more likely to be achieved by examining particular forms than from considering justice in general. Aristotle himself quickly leaves aside the notion of justice as “virtue in general” and focuses on particular types of justice (NE 5.2.1130b 16 ff.). First of all, he divides the particular forms of justice (rather than justice in general) into distributive justice and compensatory justice. This distinction corresponds roughly to justice in the public and justice in the private spheres. Compensatory justice is then divided again into voluntary and involuntary forms. 8. Analysis of particular forms of justice. 1. Compensatory justice. I only discuss compensatory justice sufficiently to distinguish it from distributive justice. Compensatory justice involves transactions between individuals in which someone has unduly suffered a loss or gain. The degree of corrective justice applied in such cases is determined by the material loss or gain directly and is not proportional to any claim.related to the distribution of some social good according to a criterion separate from the loss or gain itself (i.e., the “worth” of the individuals involved).” The question is not whether someone 77 acted ethically or not, but what amount is required to equalize transactions between two people (NE 5.4.1132a 2-6). As noted earlier, compensatory justice is either voluntary or involuntary. Examples of voluntary actions are selling, buying and loaning money; theft, assault, adultery are forms of involuntary actions. Aristotle characterizes certain actions as “involuntary” because they involve an injury to some party. In the case of adultery the injured party is someone not directly involved in the activity, although one could argue that adultery does, in some sense, injure even those actively engaged in the practice. Both voluntary and involuntary actions of this sort involve “transactions” between at least two people, and this appears to be the distinguishing feature between compensatory justice in general and distributive justice as the distribution of common social goods. The reason that Aristotle subsumes voluntary and involuntary action under a conception of compensatory justice is not immediately evident. There is not an essential feature or mark under which voluntary monetary exchanges and involuntary ones such as theft and assault can be subsumed. The notion of compensatory justice is less relevant to the topic of this study, so I proceed directly to a discussion of distributive justice. 78 2. Distributive justice. a. Distributive justice involving public goods. Distributive justice deals with the distribution of goods that are public rather than with private transactions between individuals. This general statement requires clarification on a number of points. First, the type of goods that are distributed may be material, such as money and material goods collected through taxation or war, or the distribution may involve non- material social benefits such as honor: ti); 5%. mm uépog Stratoofivng not 100 mn’ airtflv Straiou 8v pév éonv £180; to év tat; btavoua’igt npfig fl xpnudtmv f) «M allmv boa (Lemon): tot; Icowmvofio: tfl; roltteiag (év tofitow yup Eon Kat deov éxew Ital {00v hepov étépou). (tbtavouoi‘g < btavéum, to distribute, apportion.) Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another) (NE 5.2.1130b 30-33, tr. Ross) Aristotle also says that distributive justice concerns those goods which are an intrinsic resource of the political community. When Aristotle discusses distributive justice, his concern is not only to provide an account of the distribution of material goods. The discussion proceeds on two levels: (1) distribution in material wealth and labor and (2) distribution of political power through honor attaching to public offices. In an important respect, justice is conceived as a social 79 distribution of political power. The specific type of justice involved is social justice rather than the general notion of justice as virtue, or some ideal notion of justice that is apart from real relations between citizens. The nature of the social/political conception of justice that Aristotle is developing will become clearer as the discussion proceeds. An essential aspect of political justice is the distribution of social power. Already the nature of distributive justice as a means of apportioning social power is beginning to be drawn out. Aristotle mentions that one of the advantages being distributed is honor'(t1pfi). The acquisition of public honors would certainly have been as politically useful in ancient Greek society as it is in ours. In addition, the distribution that is occurring is according to those who are enfranchised in the political community through the constitution. In other words, levels of power are already being articulated through which the direction of the social distribution of various sorts of “goods” takes place. (1) Social groups and conflict over the distribution of social goods. Aristotle recognizes that one of the main difficulties involved in questions concerning the distribution of social goods is conflict over the criteria for determining social distributions. This issue is complex because it is not merely a matter of determining a procedural mechanism for efficiency of distribution so that the outcome will be balanced. While 80 different social groups may agree that it is necessary for any distribution to be according to merit; nonetheless, there is contention over what constitutes merit: to 761p Bixatov év taig fitavoua’ig opoloyouot saws; xat’ (xg'tav two fiefv eTvat, tflv pévro: ogiav 01’) 'cflv afin‘lv léyoom rows; [incapxew], (1MB oi uév finpoxpanxol élequpiav, oi 8’ bltyapxtxol xKOOTOV, oi 5' eiwévewv. oi 8‘ optowxpanxol opetfiv. . . . for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence. (NE 5.3.1131a 24-28, tr. Ross) This passage indicates that distributive justice occurs according to claims made on the basis of merit. The discussion proceeds in a dialectical fashion, since fundamentally there is agreement over the initial assumption that the basis of the distribution must be merit. It is not the case that there is a presumption in Aristotle's thought that the basis of such claims is necessarily aristocratic. Aristotle recognizes conflicting claims for control over the organization of a just distribution: (1) according to wealth, (2) citizenship, or (3) excellence of an aristocratic class. The appearance of a consensus surrounding merit is in one sense problematic—power structures that are already instituted along lines of social interest are primary. The forces of competing social power structures make a disinterested distribution of public goods difficult—if not in principle, then 81 at least in practice. In this regard the question arises whether justice as a distribution of social goods can be achieved through a rational, practical procedure under conditions of such divergent social interests. The resolution of this question is fundamental to any conception of justice that intends to aim at a just distribution of knowledge within society, since, clearly, the distribution of knowledge is structured along lines of interest as well. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle recognizes the difficulty of distributive justice within a society articulated according to socially constituted formations of power but does not extensively investigate this issue here. This difficulty is examined on the more concrete structural level of society in Aristotle's Politics. Aristotle’s analysis in the Politics of issues related to this discussion will be addressed later in this dissertation. The immediate concern is to understand more clearly how Aristotle characterizes distributive justice so that it may serve as a normative basis for the allocation within the state of social goods (such as political power) particularly as this relates to the distribution and control of knowledge within society. 82 C..Attempt at a normative resolution of competing claims among social groups. 1. There is a distribution according to a proportion which reflects the validity of claims that exist between social parties. The first step that Aristotle makes in further defining the conception of distributive justice is to characterize the division that does take place as proportional. At one point Aristotle goes so far as to simply equate the proportional with the just. “This, then, is what the just is—the proportional (To dvdkoyov); the unjust is what violates the proportion” (NE 5.3.1131b 17-18, tr. Ross). By proportional Aristotle means that the distribution is not necessarily a strict equality of shares. Distribution is according to a ratio of shares that corresponds to the degree to which a legitimate claim can be made on social resources 3 to uév yup fitaveunnxbv Sixatov 10v rowan) (181 mm 111v ovaloyiav éofl tflv eipnuévn (Kai yap (no xpnudtmv Kowtbv éov yiyvnta: 1‘1 Btavopfi, tom: mm 16v lbyov 16v ainbv ovatep éxoum xpo; (2111110: to: sicevexflévra). .. For justice in distributing common property always conforms with the proportion we have described (since when a distribution is made from.the common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several persons have contributed to the common stock) . (NE 5.4.1131b 27-31, tr. Rackham) One problem with this procedure for determining a proper proportion for distribution of common goods is that in Greek society the contributions of certain members are consistently not taken into account. For example, women have always 83 contributed immensely to social welfare through their labor in child-rearing and household management. There are no public honors that attach to this kind of labor—this is an indication of the proportion of social benefit that those involved in this activity may count on receiving for all their effort. Aristotle does mention a sort of “domestic” justice between a husband and wife (NE 5.6.1134b 8-17). It is clear, though, that this type of justice is restricted to the household. For Aristotle domestic justice nowhere overlaps with political justice, and, like the type of justice that exists between a master and a slave or a father and a child, this type of justice is only “analogous” to political justice. Another difficulty involved in this conception is that some groups are preempted from.contributing to society in terms of political activity on the basis of their inclusion in a class that is not accorded equal membership within the society; Aristotle often refers to common workers in this regard. The fact that they have not contributed to the social welfare is then used as grounds to justify their exclusion from receiving benefits from the community. I want to develop these comments further in the discussion of Aristotle's understanding of justice as a distribution of knowledge related to political power within the Politics. So those people who do not have leisure to acquire the type of knowledge necessary to participate in a substantial way to politics are excluded from political activity on this basis. There is a sense in which 84 Aristotle intends to strengthen the normative basis for his conception of distributive justice by claiming that political knowledge of the interest of society as a whole is an essential condition for justifying a particular political structure. 2. Justice and proportionate equality. Aristotle’s intention in the Nicomachean Ethics is to discern the essential attributes of distributive justice itself, and then to determine what the implications are for this conception. One feature of Aristotle's normative conception of distributive justice is equality based on proportionalzmerit: rat 1‘] uév Stratombvn éofl Kao’ fiv 6 811mm; léyeta: sparnxbg mm spoaipeow 106 Suction, Kat fitavepn‘tnmg Kai ainQ tpbg (illov Kai étépm rpbg hepov 013x ofnmg (bore 106 uév aipeto’o rléov a'bfli) élanov 8%. Nb rlnoiov. 100 BlaBepo’o 8’ ovdrahv. (11M! 100 Icon 106 not avaloyiav, buoim; Bé Kat lillm rpm; allov. And justice is that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion; and similarly in distributing between two other persons. (NE 5.5.1134a 1-7, tr. Ross; cf. 5.3.1131a lO-l4, 5.4.1132a 28-29) Aristotle develops this notion of distributive justice progressively through an analysis of concrete aspects of justice. The attempt to relate justice to the other virtues as a mean is also evident (NE 5.5.1133b 29 ff.), but this appears to 85 be an attempt to maintain consistency in a discussion that has advanced beyond his previous understanding of the virtues. It does seem reasonable that diverse groups are allowed social benefits in proportion to the merit that their claims have. Still, an initial problem with Aristotle's conception of proportionate distribution is that it is not exactly clear how the correct proportion or ratio for distribution is to be determined. It is problematic to claim that a distribution exclusively according to a particular form of social power is Aristotle's intention, as he does recognize that there are competing claims for the control of social distribution. To accord any group a greater portion of social goods merely because they have a greater proportion of social power may be a persistent social reality, but it is difficult to see how such a state of affairs could be normatively justified. The problem is in the assumption that the concept of proportional social worth between individuals is adequate to resolve questions of social justice: rat 1‘] m’nfl Eaton 106111; oIg Kai év 01;: db; yap éxei‘va Ext: [m év otg}, obtm Koretva éfiev at 701p ml {001, 01‘): {ca ééovow, 6111’ évrefiOev at udxa: rat m éyxlmm‘ca, 61m: fl {om uh {ca fl uh too: too Exam: Kai vépmvrat. £1: its 106 xat’ dé’tav 10010 bfilov . . . And the same equality will exist between the persons and between the things concerned; for as the latter— the things concerned—are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either equals have and are awarded 86 unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be according to merit . . (NE 5.2.1131a 20-24, tr. Ross) Aristotle also makes the stronger and more comprehensive claim that without equality political justice is not possible (NE 5.6.1134a 24-29). Political justice subsumes distributive justice insofar as it has as its aim a common life oriented toward self-rule (Kowmvébv Biou npbg «no EIVGI afitdpxemv)- distributive justice serves to further this political end. In the movement to a more comprehensive notion of justice essential for politics Aristotle recognizes that the basis for sustaining political justice is the establishment of a form of equality that is less restrictive. The advantage of a comprehensive conception of social equality for maintaining political stability in a state in which self-determination or “self-rule” exists will be examined further in the discussion of Aristotle's Politics below. Especially important is the relation between social equality and the distribution of knowledge that structures social and political relations. Social equality is itself based on the state function of education. Aristotle makes the reasonable claim that social conflict arises as a result of inequalities in social distribution. Proportionate equality, then, is a means to achieve an equitable distribution according to the validity or legitimacy of claims that groups or individuals make on social benefits. 87 II. Distributive Justice within the State and the Mediating Function of Knowledge in Aristotle's Politics. Aristotle says that the state is “prior” to the individual in the sense that the individual exists as an integral part of an already established social order: not spotepov 5t ‘tfi 06021 mam; fl oix’ta Kai éxao'coc; 1mm éonv. 10 701p blov rpétepov avayxai‘ov etva: 106 pépoog' ovatpouuévou yup 106 62.01) 01’): tom: not; 0135:} xeip. at ufl 0pmvfipmg, (1:0er 8! n; léyo: tflv AtOivnV' Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. (Pol. 1.2.1253a 19-22, tr. Jewett) Similarly to Hegel, Aristotle recognizes the priority of the state in relation to the individual in the sense that a distinguishing feature of humans is their social existence. Given the importance of already established state institutions to the distribution of social wealth, it is reasonable to adopt a contextual approach to understanding the issue of the distribution of knowledge in society. Part of this examination is descriptive, insofar as it is based on an analysis of social conditions together with the development of a philosophical, normative theory. Aristotle's intention is to derive prescriptive claims from this approach taking into account existing social conditions. Aristotle maintains that justice is the order of actually existing states:” “11 6t stratoofivn roltnxév- fl yap Mum zolt‘nxflg towmviag tdétg éoxiv, 1‘] 6t Stratoofivn 106 Straion Kpi01g3' “But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society” (Pol. 1.2.1253a 37-39, tr. Jewett). Since there are different social structures for different states, for Aristotle it follows that different forms of justice exist. Aristotle's uses his collection of 158 constitutions as a means to understand the forms in which different city-states are structured. According to Aristotle, the conditions which constitute various social structures are contextual factors. This approach is in contrast to the intent of ordering the state on a unitary moral conception, such as that based on Plato's conception of the Good. In considering the Aristotelian notion of justice in the state, a number of issues can be addressed which serve to orient the discussion. First, it is clear that for Aristotle the state is the concrete manifestation of the constitution. Richard Robinson correctly notes that the notion of the constitution for the Greeks is not limited to a system of laws but has a meaning that is more “sociological”fl" This refers to the fact that the political organization is not only founded on written law but also on traditional morality, established social relationships such as the family and clan, as well as religious practices. On this basis justice is a distribution of political power within the state among the citizens. The questions that are of 89 immediate concern and which will structure the following discussion are: (1) What is the guiding normative principle for Aristotle such that he can claim that some states are correct and some are “divergent (zapeKBeanoiag) forms"? (2) How does Aristotle arrive at this normative principle? (3) What are the particular possibilities under which a political structure can be organized for Aristotle or, otherwise stated, what are the possible ways of distributing political power? (4) How are the distribution of political power and distribution of knowledge related for Aristotle? A. The notion of distributive justice developed in the Nicamachean.lthics applied to politics. 1. Distributive justice concerns the distribution of political power. Aristotle conceives of justice as a concept that undergoes a dialectical development, so that eventually it is sufficient to serve as a justification for the legitimate structure or order the state. In the beginning of the Politics, this conception of justice is presented in its most abstract form simply as the order of the polity: f1 8?. Stratoofivn soltnréw 1‘1 161p Mm zohntflg toweviag 1d§1g éo'ctv, 1‘] 8?. fitxatoofivn 100 titration xp£01g. (Pol. 1.2.1253a 37-39) But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination 90 of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. (tr. Jowett) Justice on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership. (tr . Rackham) ’1 It is important to note that for Aristotle justice is not an abstract ideal; in fact, different states will have different forms of justice. The Politics has as a main goal the determination of the different forms that justice takes in various states, and how humans are bound together in inter- relationships under different forms of the ordering principle of justice. Such an approach is consistent with the Aristotelian method of defining an area of inquiry in terms of categories. In general the initial categorization of states is alpriori: rule must be by one person, a few, or many. Later on in the inquiry, these initial categories are divided more concretely according to the empirical evidence of actually existing constitutions. The passage noted above does not go further into the issue of the nature of this political bond than to say that the structure of political and social relationships has a basis in justice. In dealing with the political ramifications of the legitimate form of justice, Aristotle is dealing with an inquiry over which there is a great deal of contention. Different definitions of the central political conception of justice can be equated with different interest groups, each of which desire to have different political power structures established within 91 the state. A.main concern of Aristotle's work in the Politics is to arrive at a sense of justice which takes account of these actual conflicts and which results in a normative position that mediates these conflicts. Before this analysis can proceed, the nature of justice within the state requires further definition. An aspect of Aristotle's writings that clarifies the notion of justice within the state is the interconnection between the conception of justice developed in the Nicamachean Ethics and his references to justice within the Politics. As shown above (chapter 3.I.B.-C.), in the Nicamachean.lthics the nature of distributive justice consists of a distribution according to some merit between competing social groups within a state. Such merit may be wealth, intellectual worth, or freedom in virtue of being a citizen. The means of adjudicating within the city between these various claims does not appear to be thoroughly worked out within the.Ethics, and it is only in the Politics that the legitimacy of such claims for political power becomee evident. 3. Conflict over the basis of the political distribution of power. 1. Division of constitutions, or political organizations, into correct and incorrect forms. ‘Within the Politics, Aristotle accepts the initial notion of distributive justice as set forth within the Nicamachean .Ethics. Furthermore, there is a principle that determines the division of political power into correct and incorrect forms. 92 Aristotle distinguishes between correct and incorrect forms of government on the basis of the political intention of those in power. Aristotle considers whether their political aim is to establish private interest (incorrect forms) or to further the interest of the state as a political community'of'individuals (correct forms). As previously noted, there is an initial a priori division of political control according to whether one person rules, or few, or many. In terms of the actual context of the Greek city-states this initial division yields six forms of government according to whether the political formation functions according to the good of the state as a collection of citizens or is based on the particular interests of a group within the state. This gives rise to the well-known division into kingship, aristocracy, and constitutional government for forms that have the interest of the state in mind; and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy for incorrect forms. There are important relationships between these forms of government for Aristotle, and it may be useful to organize them here in a schematic way: a‘prieri Incorrect. Correct Basis of contextual division division Incorrect Correct one ruler tyranny' kingship “greed” *virtue & law (sleove§ia) few oligarchy' aristocracy wealth virtue (aperfi) many democracy cons ti tutional poverty education , government equality 5 law 93 Two points can be made: (1) The basis of incorrect forms of government involves primarily economic considerations. For Aristotle, basing government on economic self—interest leads to incorrect forms of government. (2) It is necessary to clearly distinguish democracy'as it is used by Aristotle from constitutional government. The term.democracy'as it is used by Aristotle has the pejorative sense of “rule of the rabble” (to use Hegel's terminology). a. The other-relatedness of Aristotelian justice. Aristotle maintains that those constitutions that are “correct” have as their end not particular interests but what is best for the community.“ The conception of justice as inherently oriented to others is an interesting contrast to conceptions of justice that are based on an attempt to understand in a systematic fashion the functioning of atomistic, possessive individuals-as exemplified in early theories of political economy, such as Adam.3mith's conception of the “invisible hand”. It is possible to relate the conception of justice as an orientation towards others to issues of autonomy. Concerning the issue of autonomy raised here one mey ask what the idea of autonomy accomplishes in Kantian ethics. The notion of autonomy serves to justify ethical principles through the following considerations: (1) there is a separation of judgment from.aelf-interest in the moral agent, 94 (2) there is a resolution to act according to one's own moral sense, rather than through external pressure or in relation with others. Interestingly, the notion of autonomy in this sense arose at the time when capitalism was becoming a world force. So just as weber analyzed the relations between the spirit of the Protestant religion and capitalism, it is interesting to postulate an underlying relation between the development of the philosophical notion of autonomy and developments in the economic sphere. One difficulty that arises in the issue of justice as an orientation toward others is that inevitably the intention of political agents is to do good or benefit those who belong to their own group. So even by this criterion of justice there is ultimately a restriction that makes it clear that the underlying principle involved is not in any sense universal. The intention (as in the Kantian conception of autonomy) is to arrive at a notion of disinterestedness toward one’s own self in order to justify a particular normative position. Aristotle's approach to justice as inherently oriented toward others (rather than individuals acting in an atomistic fashion) has two advantages. First of all, through a distribution of the material and non-material goods of a 'Ociety, moderate wealth for a largely middle-class society arises. Under this situation Aristotle reasonably proposes that the self-interested pursuit of material wealth is likely to be “minimized.in comparison to societies in which there is a great 95 deal of conflict due to inequalities of wealth (Pol. 4.11.1295b ff.). Second, as Aristotle clearly recognized, a process of education has a stabilizing effect so that citizens are socialized to moderate their material needs, to recognize the social equality of other citizens, and to orient themselves to the development of human capacities (Pol. 2.7.1266b 26-31, see discussion below, Chapter 3.C.1.c.). C. Knowledge and the determination of political organization. If one of Aristotle's aims is to consider the relationship between the distribution of knowledge and political organization, then there is a question of how far his social theory is primarily descriptive. If Aristotle's orientation is essentially pragmatic, then how does he develop and support the normative claims of his political conception of justice? To resolve this difficulty requires an examination of the normative basis of his conception of justice. At times Aristotle's portrayal of the distribution of knowledge and the manner in which society is structured on this basis appears to be almost instrumental. According to this view it may even be possible to argue that an adequate normative 3basis is lacking in Aristotle's work. In this dissertation I fizgue against such a position and propose instead that practical knowledge gives rise to justice as a system of normative Extinciples which structures the distribution of political power Vithin society. For Aristotle the level of practical, political 96 knowledge is almost a quantitative function; of those political structures that are correct, the best is that one which is capable of directing its political activity to the largest extent on knowledge and least influenced by emotional persuasion . 2’ Among the correct forms of government the determining factor for a choice of political organization is the political formation which attains the highest level ofjpractical knowledge oriented towards the interest of the state as a community of individuals. For Aristotle justice as a distribution of political power is correlated with the degree of practical knowledge that can be embodied within a political formation or “constitution”..Aristotle recognizes, of course, that this embodiment is, as the word suggests, through the individuals who are actively engaged in political functions. The highest level of practical knowledge oriented toward the guidance of practical activity occurs within a constitutional government. One of the concrete problems concerning justice as a distribution of power and knowledge is related to political education. If the aim.of political education is political control, then it is possible to argue that those with expert political knowledge ought to exercise political control. It is reasonable to argue that this is the view of both Aristotle and Hegel. On the other hand, if political knowledge and power is in the hands of a few experts (though they may claim to be impartial, and servants of the public interest, etc.), it is 97 difficult to see how such an arrangement can contribute to a democratic reconstruction of the distribution of knowledge. This presents a problem.for modern constructions of democracy. I will address this important difficulty for modern democracy in the final chapter of this dissertation. 1. Aristotle's conception of constitutional government and the distribution of knowledge. a. Equality. The constitutional form.of government for Aristotle is based on equality in terms of practical political knowledge among those who are capable of ruling: év pév ofiv tat; soltnxatg (xpxa’tg tat; xle'w'talg petafldllet to dpxov Kat 1:6 apxéuevov (éé I001) yap etvat Bofilerat 111v ofimv Kat Gtaoépelv pnfiév) . . . But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. (Pol. 1.12.1259b 4-8, tr. Jowett) Ruling and being ruled in turn is a procedure for the distribution of political power in an egalitarian fashion among those with equal citizenship, since there is no reason why one should have political authority over another. Equality in terms of knowledge as a political capacity entails that there be equality of political control. Given the equality of the citizens there is no basis for a distribution of political control in a fashion that is not equal. It follows that political participation will be distributed equally through some 98 unohanism within the constitutional form.of government. If it is reasonable to argue that an equitable distribution of knowledge is essential for forms of government that are more universal and participatory, then it is necessary to determine how to constitute the political function of knowledge. Clearly, this is also an issue that is important in our own society. Political activity requires control of knowledge in two respects: (1) the formation of character through a process of education (or social enculturation) that will allow the individual to participate within the social organization realized through the constitution of the state, and (2) the use of’practical knowledge itself in the functioning of the state. The issue of the distribution of knowledge within the state is central to Aristotle's political conception, hence, it is necessary to further clarify his understanding of the relationship between the distribution of knowledge and political power. b. Education. Aristotle's discussion of the role of education is oriented to the types of political institutions actually existing in Greece at the time. Education is a means to preserve certain forms of constitution, but at the same time Aristotle acknowledges that some forms are better than others—an indication that Aristotle is making normative claimu concerning 99 the social/political role of knowledge based on his understanding of social realities: Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions ltd; toklteiag]; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution . . . for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and the best spirit always causes a better constitution. (Pol. 8.1.1337a 10-19, tr. Rackham) As stated earlier, Aristotle divides the types of constitution according to the number who rule: one, few or many. Each form exists in a correct form and an incorrect form: rule of a king/tyrant, aristocracy/oligarchy and constitutional rule of the many/“democracy” (in the sense of “rabble”). A prtmary concern of the Politics is to determine the basis for a normatively justified distribution of political power within the state. To achieve the good life, which is the aim of politics, Aristotle argues that this choice should be according to education and virtue (rather than by wealth, or family nobility for instance): 1pc); uév 013v to séltv elven Bégeuav (iv 4) Iowa fl évufiz 18 tofitev Oped; dumcfintei‘v, kpbg uévrot (mflv dyaaflv fl realista Kai fl opt-:11) pallets Strain); 6w apolcfintoinaav ... If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life, then, as I have already said, education and virtue have superior claims. (Pol. 3.13.1283a 22-25, tr. Jowett) 100 Aristotle argues that in actuality the state which most readily realizes the rule of educated and virtuous individuals is the constitutional rule of the many. Aristotle justifies this conclusion on the grounds that even though a few individuals can be expected to show preeminent superiority in terms of understanding or virtue, still the understanding of many individuals together will exceed that of just one person or a few together: tot); yap tollofig. 6w éxaatég éonv 01’) oxoubai‘o; avflp, 6pm; évbéxetat ouvelOévzag that Benton; éxe’tvmv. 013x (5)9 éxaorov 6111’ d); cbusavrag. oIov m ouueopnta Beisva mv éx mag Saxavng xopnynfiévrmv- sollav 101p bv'cmv éxacxov uéplov éxew apetfig Kai opovhcemg, Kai yivecflat ouvelflévcag makep éva depmxov 16 slflOog, solfiroba Kai sol'bxmpa Kai solid; éxovf atomistic, 051:0 Kat sepl ta flan Kai 111v 6l6v01av. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought. (Pol. 3.11.1281a 42-1281b 6, tr. Jowett) Furthermore, Aristotle argues that it is not only those who have expert knowledge within a certain sphere who are best able to judge their own work. (111' Ice; 01’) xavwz 10010 léyetal with; 51a 18 16v mm léyov, 6v 1) to xlfiOOg pf} Mav dvfipaxofimée; (£01m yap tracto; utv xetpmv xpttfl; 10v eiéétmv, draws; 6?. ouvelOévrsg 11 Benton; ‘1) 01’) xeipoug) . . . 101 Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge—as a body they are as good or better. (Pol. 3.11.1282a 14-17, tr. Jowett) For instance, an artist may not always be the best judge of her own creation, nor is the carpenter alone fit to judge the construction of a house, but the judgment of those who live in the house must in some sense be primary (Pol. 3.11.1282a 17-23). These passages reveal that under general conditions the distribution of political power among those who are politically equal should properly be based on which political structure engenders the highest degree of practical rationality within the state oriented toward the promotion of a conception of the good life. It is necessary here to recall the point that the constitutional government for Aristotle is highly restricted, and the notion of equality in the distribution of political power means “equality among equals”, explicitly disqualifying women, slaves, aliens and menial laborers. This restriction in the distribution of political power makes clear the inadequacy of Aristotle's account for a contemporary conception of democracy. It is reasonable to suggest that what Aristotle is attempting here is to avoid the undesirable situation in which those who have not been educated in terms of practical rationality are running the state. Aristotle's solution is to restrict control to a very limited class of male citizens who 102 have expert political knowledge about running the state. This result is unacceptable for us as a contemporary political construction due to the undemocratic nature of the result. It is also clear that our own political structure at various levels of social organization does not approach a democratic ideal but is a system.in which political authority is invested in politicians who we believe, often mistakenly, have expert authority in running social institutions. To attain a positive notion of equality among citizens there must be education that is oriented toward the formation of citizens with sufficient practical knowledge to function in a political manner. For Aristotle this involves learning that occurs in political activity itself and the training of social character. It is necessary to note that knowledge alone is not sufficient to achieve this social enculturation of the individual: “01’: 761p Iva eififipev 1:1 éc'cw fi dpezfl oxentéueaa, (111' Iv’ (11(1001 flavoured . . . ” “For we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good . .” (Nl’2.2.1103b 28-29, tr. Ross). c. Knowledge and the mediation of social conflict over the material basis of society. For.Aristotle a political organization oriented toward stability, or the elimination of conflict, requires that the material basis of property be maintained.‘within the Politics Aristotle considers it necessary for the state to secure the interests of property for the sake of the good of the citizens 103 of the polis: “801:8? 161p not to amp! 1619 obciag erat péywtov tatdxeat raxfig- uspl 762p toinmv nomiofiai «past 161; 0161081; xdvragf’“1n the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn” (Pol. 2.7.1266a 37-38, tr. Jowett). One of the main factors in securing the stability of the ‘polis is the distribution of wealth among the citizens. With respect to wealth or property within the state, Aristotle argues that the distribution which leads to the greatest stability is one in which the citizens in general will have moderate means for their maintenance. Equality in material possessions is not sufficient to maintain stability, but citizens must also be educated so that they realize the danger to social stability in the insatiable desire to acquire material possessions. In the ‘polis one of the functions of political education is the formation of character with respect to material needs. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. (Pol. 2.7.1266b 26-31, tr. Jowett). This view can be related to the theory in the Nicomachean .Ethics that such needs should be regulated according to the mean. The distribution of property is not merely a matter of the mathematical distribution of material goods but involves considerations of political education with respect to what 104 citizens actually require. If there is no political education in this regard, no distribution of wealth would result in political stability, since individuals would never be satisfied with the means that they have. In other words, education serves a mediating function between the needs of individuals and the material wealth which exists in society. This mediating function of education is political in the sense that it is a source of social stability through engendering a reasonable sense of moderation within citizens. d. Justice achieves concrete embodiment in law through practical rationality. Aristotle considers the basis of law to be practical rationality within both the Nicamachean.Ethics and the Politics. In both ancient society and modernity how the law is interpreted is an indication of the fundamental political organization of a society. Within the sphere of practical rationality, law is a normatively governed steering mechanism for social activity. The constitution is the primary means through which justice as a distribution of political power is achieved within the state. For both Aristotle and Hegel it is clear that the formation and administration of law is governed by expert knowledge. One of the essential elements that legitimizes constitutional government is rule according to law. Aristotle lists a number of advantages to rule by law: it serves as a mechanism for organizing the distribution of political power through office in a state composed of equals, especially in 105 regulating the succession of those in office (Pol. 3.16.1287a 15-24). Law diminishes the deleterious effects of desire on political decisions: “liven bpééemg v06; (5 vépog éoriv.” “The law is reason unaffected by desire” (Pol. 3.16.1287a 31—32, tr. Jowett). Constitutional law has the interest of the state as a whole in mind rather than self-interest; in this sense law is “impartial” (Pol. 3.16.1287b1-4). The relation to the Nicamachean Ethics is evident in this section of the Politics, in that Aristotle recognizes that not everything can be legislated, and so practical judgment is required in conjunction with the law (Pol. 3.16.1287b 20-21). This recognition of the limits of law is discussed above in the section on flexibility. Aristotle recognizes further that progress has occurred historically with the change of law. 8o cautious change of the laws can be beneficial to the state as tending to the common good (Pol. 2.8.1268b 26 ff.) The law is a form of mediation between the state and the individual-not in an abstract sense, but as a means through which individuals realize themselves as social beings through a process of political education. “The distinctive characteristic of a téktg according to Aristotle—that which marks it off from an alliance—is to be found in the benevolent care of each citizen for the virtue of all belonging to the State (Pol. 3.9.1280b 1 sqq.). In every way the saying of Simonideséflélag livfipa fitfidmcmu—held good” (Newman, Vol. I, '71) . 106 But if justice is only'the structural embodiment of the constitution, then a difficulty arises. How is it possible to avoid relativism with respect to normative principles, given that various states are structured differently in ways which are even contradictory? Aristotle would say that there are correct structures: those that are oriented toward the common good even though the manner in which this may be achieved can and, indeed, does vary. III. Critique of Aristotle. A. Distributive justice is not universal. Aristotle and Hegel conceive of their political philosophy in terms of a structural analysis at the level of the constitution of the state. Procedures which institute democratic principles of equality with respect to the distribution of knowledge on a broad level are only incipient features of their work. This does not preclude the possibility that Aristotle's and Hegel's political theories are useful for envisioning ways in which society can be structurally transformed to a more democratic system. Newman notes (vol. I, 74-5) that Aristotle's conception of law (vopég) is not as restricted as ours. Aristotle understood law as extending to principles that order human activity in general, rather than viewing law as essentially prohibitive. In this regard Aristotle's political philosophy is positive, and it is reasonable to consider in what 107 manner aspects of his political analysis can be appropriated for a democratic politics. Although the order of society structured by law is thought of in terms of an influence extending throughout the whole of society, it is important to bear in mind that Aristotle thought the distribution of primary benefits essentially extended to only a small segment of society. Both Aristotle and Hegel present arguments for social inequalities based on the view that the distribution of knowledge is in respects natural. The most troubling aspect of Aristotle's political theory is that certain groups of people (women, slaves, and common laborers) are means to serve the ends of an educated elite-the relegation of some humans to the status of “living tools”: “1:0 Ktfipa 6p7avov prg Qmflv éon. not i} rtfimg slflOog bpydvmv éoti, rat 6 6003.0; rtflpd fl Epvuxov.” “An article of property is a tool for the purpose of life, and property generally is a collection of tools, and a slave is a live article of property.” (Pol. 1.4.1253b 31-34, tr. Rackham). In addition, there is exclusion from political power through the subordination of women to the rationality of men (Pol. 1.13.1260a 12-23). Aristotle indicates that the working class should not be part of the ruling authority because they lack the leisure necessary to develop correct political judgment (Pol. 7.9.1328b 34-1239a 2). It is important to recognize, though, that Aristotle's views on slavery are not unambiguous. Diogenes Laertius relates that Aristotle in his will indicated that his slaves were not to 108 be sold but employed until they reached the proper age, then set free according to merit (Laertius 459). This is consistent with his view in the Politics (Pol. 7.10.1330a 32-34) that liberty in general should be given to slaves as a reward. Aristotle also recognizes the opinion of those who consider slavery unnatural: 10$; 51% tapt‘x e'bmv to Seoxégetv, vémp 701p 16v uév Bofllov etvat 10v 8’ élebeepov, e603: 5’ ofiOév fitaeépetv, fitéxep 06613. Sixatov, Biatov yap. . . . others however maintain that for one man to be another man’s master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention [véuqn Jowett: “by law”) that makes the one a slave and the other a freeman and there is no difference between them by nature, and that therefore it is unjust, for it is based on force. (Pol. 1.3.1253b 20-23, tr. Rackham)” Aristotle recognizes that slavery is not natural, but, rather, a function of the economic structure of the polis. Aristotle says, remarkably, that if it were possible to automate work processes then there would in effect be no need for slavery: at yap flfibvato éxaorov 16w bpydvev xeleuoflév fl spoatoOavéuevov drorelei‘v to (113101) épyov, moxsp w Aatbdlou «paciv fi 10%; mi) 'Hoaiorou 'tpixofiag, 06:; snow 6 sown); afitopdtoo; Octov 809,000” (have, 0610; at xepxibeg éxépxtgov ainai Kai 16x xlfixtpa éxtOdptCev, obfiév (iv fiat 0618 101‘; dpxuéxtomv inmpetfiv 0611-: 101‘; beosétatg 5061:“. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hophaestus, which, says the poet, of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, 109 chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. (Pol. 1.4.1253b 34-1254a 1, tr. Jowett) This statement indicates a recognition of the humanity of slaves—that their status is an economic function of ancient society. On the other hand, such statements can in no sense serve as an apology for Aristotle's views in general in this regard. It is not unreasonable to consider Aristotle's account of slavery as ideological: Aristotle justifies the use of slaves because they fulfill an economic need due to an aristocratic ruling class requiring a tremendous amount of leisure time and great material resources. 8. Reformulation of the Aristotelian conception of “democracy” is inadequate to resolve restrictions in access to political power. In this section I want to point out that it is philosophically problematic to attempt to formulate a modern conception of a universal democracy developed from a conception of democracy that obtains in the ancient world. It is not evident what the basis is for such claims as Richard Robinson makes in his commentary on Book IV of the Politics: The reason for this almost total absence of equality from.Aristotle's conception of democracy is probably that he takes democracy literally as the sovereignty of a demos, and a demos though large is not the whole population equally. It is another side of the fact that Aristotle’s democracy is the eastern dictatorship of the proletariat rather than the western equal sharing of everybody in the government. It is probable, however, that somebody in ancient Greece had the western idea of democracy as the equal sharing by everybody in the government, or 110 Aristotle would not have mentioned this kind of democracy even once. (Robinson 82) A.number of connected points arise in this regard. (1) First, there is general consensus that the legitimate basis for democracy in modernity is some type of universal access to political functions within a society. (2) To suggest that Aristotle saw what we would call modern democratic potential in the ancient notion of'“democracy” is merely a conjecture. (3) It is more reasonable to argue that Aristotle makes a contribution to the modern conception of universal democracy in his understanding of what he calls a constitutional government. IV. Conclusion: Positive aspects of Aristotle's political theory. In this section I briefly summarize features of Aristotle's social theory which are useful for the discussion of a democratic distribution of knowledge in our society. A. Conflicting interests can be mediated by practical rationality oriented toward the universal interests of the community. There is a strong tendency within Aristotle's political analysis toward the critique of political power that is interested, i.e., that has as its goals the furtherance of the interests of a particular class of people above the interest of the state as a community of individuals. It is clear that practical knowledge serves a mediating function between conflicting groups within society insofar as those who have such 111 knowledge are capable of discerning what in particular is able to benefit the state as a community of individuals. One reason for a political system that is more universalistic is that it serves as a stabilizing force within the state. Aristotle mentions exclusion from political power of those who have the capacity to govern as a cause of subversion. On the other hand, the strength of the Athenian democracy can in large part be seen as the ability to mediate these conflicting group interests through the apprOpriation of practical knowledge oriented toward the universalistic interest of the state. 8. Development of political capacity through education. One of the reasonable assumptions of Aristotle's political thought is that people who exercise political power should have the capacity to exercise this power. This involves issues of the control of the distribution of knowledge within society and its relation to political control. It is difficult to work out such normative issues abstractly, since this problem occurs within an already existing social context. Given the importance of equality of political capability within the constitutional rule of government, it is reasonable to argue that political, practical rationality, insofar as possible, should be extended to all those involved in the political process, and such capacity should actually be tied to political power within the political structure of society. This 112 distribution of social power requires a universal distribution of knowledge to citizens oriented toward the development of their political capacities. CHAPTER 4 Hegel’s Contextual Approach to a Theory of Justice This chapter addresses Hegel's contextualizing approach through an analysis of his conception of the division of labor in relation to the structure of the modern state. Hegel considers the division of labor a key organizing principle of modern social institutions. It will become apparent that the notion of the division of labor serves an important philosophical role for Hegel in his development of a social system.based on right. His development of this notion draws from historical developments within the economic structure of society. This is the contextual dimension of Hegel's thought that I consider here. NY intention is to show that for Hegel the distribution of knowledge within the state serves a mediating function between the spheres of civil society and the state. I will argue that Hegel’s philosophical use of the division of labor is ultimately inconsistent with his conception of human freedom as a universal norm of modernity. This chapter proceeds along the following lines: (1) First, I provide a brief examination of Hegel's important discussion of the division of labor. 113 114 (2) Second, I reconstruct Hegel's normative position with respect to the distribution of knowledge within society and trace the relationship between the division of labor and the structure of knowledge. In particular, my focus will be on Hegel's construction of the particular social distribution of knowledge according to the distinction between intellectual expertise and the type of knowledge involved in skilled/unskilled labor. This primary distinction within knowledge itself is not a natural outcome of the development of human rationality but is a result of the division of labor and serves the modern form of economic production structured by the division of labor. (3) I examine the ways in which Hegel's approach are problematic, especially how the use of contextual categories (such as the division of labor) in relation to a particular sort of distribution of knowledge within society can be ideological insofar as it leads to results that may appear justified by social circumstances but in fact are questionable. (4) In conclusion, I note some of the positive aspects of Hegel's work that can be derived from the foregoing discussion that will be useful in the construction of my own conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge within society. 115 I. The Division of Labor. A. Explication of Hegel's understanding of the division of labor. The Scottish political philosophers had considerable influence on Hegel's conception of the division of labor. According to Adam.Smith the origin of the division of labor can be found in the peculiarly human activity of trade, or barter. The division of labor has its roots in a form of specialization oriented towards the efficient production of basic necessary goods which are suitable for barter. A person may find that focusing on a particular type of activity is beneficial in circumstances where trade of excess production is possible. The notion of the division of labor is being defined here in a number of important respects. The division of labor is associated with an increase in productivity, the division of labor is a formative process which constrains individuals to specialized tasks, the division of labor leads to greater technological innovation through the introduction of machines to take over the tasks that have become more “abstract” and “simpler" (cf. POR 5198, pp. 232-33), and, furthermore, there is the conjunction of the division of labor with radically individualistic interest. Certainly, there is tremendous potential within modern systems of production for the increase of material wealth. A factor of modernity that is equally as evident as a real 116 contradiction to this potentiality for increased, universal wealth is the abject poverty of certain sectors of society. The poverty of segments of the working class population is in large measure the result of the changes in the relations of production that occur within modern forms of industrial production structured.by the the division of labor. Since manufacture is so thoroughly structured by the division of labor, if there is a change in consumer demand or if the manufacturing process itself is changed, then entire segments of the working population may become superfluous due to their association with obsolete forms of production-as Hegel recognized. Another factor is that the value of any one person as a worker is for the most part inconsiderable, since work becomes the repetition of ever more simple tasks. It will become evident that while Hegel recognizes the destructive effects of the division of labor, he does not develop an adequate normative basis for dealing with these issues. 1. The division of labor in relation to the role of abstraction and simplification of the manufacturing process for greater productivity. The division of labor is in part a function of the application of abstract thought to material production. In modern systems of production work itself is broken down into abstract, simple functions. The notion of work in modernity has a unique, historical construction (POR 5198, pp. 232-233): 117 (1) work is simpler, so that the individual as such is less important. (2) The reciprocal dependence of individuals is more important than in craft where one person oversees and is involved in the whole process. (3) work is mechanical, so it is possible to supplant human labor with machines. 2. The division of labor is organized into a.“systems of n ” differentiated in part by the distinction between “theoretical” and “practi cal” knowledge . The process of increasing differentiation within the sphere of production results in ever greater refinement of the division of labor. The divisions of work surrounding the fulfillment of particular needs are organized into “systems of needs”: The infinitely varied means and their equally infinite and intertwined movements of reciprocal production and exchange converge, by virtue of the universality inherent in their content, and become differentiated'into universal masses. In consequence, the whole complex [zusammenhang] evolves into ‘particnlar oystems of needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical education—into systems to which individuals are separately assigned, i.e. into different estates. (POR 5201, 234). At the most general level these systems of needs are organized at the level of the estates of agriculture, trade and industry, and the universal estate of social administration. For each estate there are corresponding requirements for those 118 involved in a particular system in terms of education, skill and character traits. 3. The division of labor requires particular identity formations of individuals; this in turn corresponds to hierarchically organized social relations. For Hegel, the initial step in the enculturation of individuals through education is the subsumption of natural drives under a “rational system of the will's determination” (POR §19, 51). It is evident that within society the first step towards socialization is the subsumption of the will to certain rational presuppositions of society. The individual will is not simply a manifestation of an idea in the external world. Rather than postulating a separation between theoretical and practical rationality, Hegel maintains that they are connected in important ways: The theoretical is essentially contained within the practical; the idea [Vbrstellung] that the two are separate must be rejected, for one cannot have a will without intelligence. On the contrary, the will contains the theoretical within itself. The will determines itself, and this determination is primarily of an inward nature, for what I will I represent to.myself as my object [Gegenstand]. (POR 5, 36) What is important in this regard is that, unlike Aristotle, Hegel does not make a clear distinction between theoretical rationality and practical rationality. The activity of an individual's will (thelgpractical” aspect of subjectivity) is realized in large measure by the theoretical knowledge that a subject has. Insofar as the practical activity of the will is 119 indissolubly linked to theoretical knowledge for Hegel, questions arise concerning the limitations this suggests if there are restrictions placed on the types of knowledge that one can receive—in particular if social restrictions are placed on the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. An individual's action is the expression of will in the external world. The result of such action is not just an external effect; to an important degree it is also the formation of the self: In so far as I am practical or active, i.e. in so far as I act, I determine myself, and to determine myself means precisely to posit a difference. But these differences which I posit are nevertheless also mine, the determinations apply to me, and the ends to which I am.impelled.belong to me. (POR 36) In general, the positing of the will in the external world and the concomitant formation of individuality is accomplished through labor. In the Phenomenology'of Spirit the activity of labor serves liberating functions even if it is undertaken in the most abject servitude: “Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own” (PCB 119). In the Phenomenology of'Spirit, though, Hegel's conception of labor is quite abstract. In particular, it is evident that Hegel does not distinguish here between the differentiation of the types of labor according to whether such labor is related to specialized expertise or to physical labor. Such an account is not an 120 accurate portrayal of forms of labor in ancient Greek society, for instance, because slave-masters were often employed in occupations requiring intellectual expertise (intellectual labor) whereas slaves were employed in skilled and unskilled manual labor. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the basis of the freedom and leisure of the aristocratic class in the ancient world was slave-labor. These considerations point to difficulties in Hegel's thought concerning the relationship between forms of knowledge and his notion of human freedom achieved through labor. I argue that in the complex structure of the modern state Hegel's hierarchical structure of political participation according to degrees of intellectual expertise is inconsistent with his account of the universal nature of human freedom, because real freedom belongs essentially to those employed in a sphere requiring “universal” knowledge (intellectual expertise). The nature of labor oriented towards the fulfillment of needs requires the formation of particular types of individuality. For instance, technological innovation requires abstract thought-consider the role of mathematical thought in ballistics. This requirement entails the formation of individuals involved in intellectual labor. In a section entitled “The Nature of'Work” Hegel notes: The variety of determinations and objects [Gegenstandb] which are worthy of interest is the basis from.which theoretical education develops. This involves not only a variety of representations [vorstellungen] and items of knowledge [Kenntnissen], 121 but also an ability to form such representations [des Vbrstellens] and pass from one to the other in a rapid and versatile manner, to grasp complex and general relations [Beziehungen], .tCt—it is the education of the understanding in general, and therefore also includes language. (FOR 5197, 232). Hegel notes that.“practical education” involves the formation of habits of work which are necessary in the form of the division of labor intrinsic to modern systems of production. Practical work requires “limitations” on the personality to conform to particular areas of material production. The division of labor in production requires the inculcation within the individual of work habits that correspond to the nature of work in modernity: the need to be constantly occupied, the application to tasks that are abstract or “universally applicable” and, importantly, the trait of conforming one's activity to the “arbitrary will of others” (POR 5197, 232). It should be noted that in our culture the traits that Hegel says apply to practical education are becoming more and more valued in theoretical education as well. At the concrete level of civil society individual needs and the means to fulfill them have become ever more diversified (POR $191, 229). The proliferation of consumer products and the generation of needs oriented toward their consumption is one of the distinguishing marks of our own culture. An important aspect of this expansion of needs within modern capitalist culture is that the differentiation of needs and requirements for their 122 satisfaction gradually corresponds to the formation of constant structural relationships between humans requiring mutual recognition at the social level: Needs and means, as existing in reality [als reelles Dasein], become a being [Sein] for others by whose needs and work their satisfaction is mutually conditioned. That abstraction which becomes a quality of both needs and means (see S191) also becomes a determination of the mutual relations [Beziehung] between individuals. (FOR 5192, 229) The notion that the division of labor involves mutual recognition at the social level becomes essential to Hegel's construction of the state in the Philosophy of.Right. One of the characteristics of modern society is that the division of labor does not serve only economic or material ends but involves social differentiation along lines of social status, power and capacities also. Bernard Cullen notes that the division of labor occurs in a “horizontal” manner, i.e., that the divisions of labor can be represented in a non-hierarchical fashion and not associated with a corresponding inequality in power relations. On the other hand, Cullen states that Hegel is aware that the division of labor is associated with “vertical” social structures insofar as it is a means for replicating hierarchical forms of social power: Hegel departs from.his overall schema of horizontal divisions in society (Standb) to draw our attention to the vertical division between the Klassen within the manufacturing Stand—the Stand which is, after all, the motive force of civil society and the modern state. (Cullen 105) 123 The notion that the will of an individual must be educated to conform to social structures is a fact of our existence as social beings. The point can be argued that education is a universal, social concern (POR S187, pp. 224-25). The universal nature of education is apparent in the role that education plays in forming capacities allowing participation in society within various spheres of social activity. Education serves as a mediating function which enables individuals to participate as members of society. Knowledge serves various mediating roles within the state. Even though workers are involved in fairly restricted spheres of economic activity, through participation in public, political discourse they become aware of the relationship between their sphere of activity and the universal, interconnected interests of the state. Such knowledge serves to legitimate the activity of the state. Furthermore, the class of civil servants has a form.of expert knowledge which is capable of understanding the role of the different estates so as to coordinate the activity of these particular spheres with the universal interest of the state as an organic whole. It is reasonable to argue that the breakdown of the family alone could not lead to the type of social decay that Hegel recognizes. Social decay arises, in part, through broad social irresponsibility that does not properly articulate the role of the state in the education of individuals. In this regard the family itself is a limited sphere of society and is not entirely capable of dealing with the social formation of individuals 124 within modern western culture. Furthermore, religious institutions for Hegel operate in the sphere of feeling and faith, so their role in this regard is subordinate to that of the state (POR 5270, 293-94). If there is an attempt by religious institutions to become the primary source of the education of individuals this is considered by Hegel to be essentially “fanaticisms” One difficulty, of course, is that recognizing the role of the state in education raises the very real concern that the state may become an instrument for which the individual is only raw material to be used up in the interest of state functions. The best way to ensure that this possibility does not become an actuality is to increase the democratic elements within educational institutions. This will be discussed further in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 4. Advantage derived from the division of labor engendering social universality. Hegel characterizes the starting point of civil society as the self-interested economic activity of individuals. Hegel attempts to subsume this self-interested activity in the broader community of the state. For Hegel it is a historical fact that we have arrived at a point in which the universal interconnectedness of humans has been achieved through the division of labor as an essential aspect of our existence. The necessity of mutual interdependence within civil society has the effect of generating social universality. Hegel thinks the 125 positive outcome of this mutual interdependence is that people are more aware of their relation to the community embodied as the state. In a sense this relation between individuals and the state is similar to the relation of the individual to the Greek polls in ancient times. The important difference for Hegel is that now the relation of the individual to the state coexists with the consciousness of human freedom-the interest of the individual cannot be subsumed entirely within the state, but the state has to recognize this aspect of the human condition for it to be legitimate (rational). Bernard Cullen argues that in section 245 of the Philosophy'of Right Hegel is essentially recommending that those who are left destitute due to alienation from the system of production be left to beg in the streets. In a conflict between alleviating hunger and preserving the ‘self -respect' of the hungry individual, Hegel seems to choose the latter. In fact, he seems to speak approvingly of the situation in Scotland, where it was decided that the most direct measure against poverty, loss of dignity, laziness and so on was ‘to leave the poor to their fate and instruct them to beg in the streets’ (§245R); presumably, such displays of individual initiative were good for their sense of ‘shame and self-respect- the subjective bases of society’ (§245R) . (Cullen, 88).“ Cullen's claim that Hegel recommends excluding certain groups from society is cynical and inconsistent with the universalistic tendencies in Hegel's thought. One of the main points that Hegel makes in his discussion of the division of labor is that the modern form of production which it entails 126 requires the formation of a society that is universalistic. This desire for individual self-respect that arises through involvement or participation in civil society is a central aspect of Hegel's work, but to conclude from this that Hegel can accept the exclusion of certain classes of people due to the material functioning of society is quite a cynical viewpoint, and, I believe, an inaccurate portrayal of Hegel's intent. Cullen's argument, though, is to no effect, since those who are begging on the streets already are alienated from.the state and it is questionable how far under such conditions they can be said to be “preserving their self-respect.” Hegel's end is to propose a social system in which such desperate human conditions are overcome. The passage on poverty which Cullen refers to (POR S245, 267) is important because it points to an unresolved difficulty in Hegel's system: to alleviate poverty through welfare in the form.of hand-outs alienates people from.the state, and so has the undesirable effect of creating a class that is disconnected from.the society in which it lives. But if the state were to provide work this would only exacerbate the problem of over- production which gives rise to an impoverished class of people who are no longer needed in the system.of production. On the one hand, the system of production as organized by the division of labor has universal tendencies in the sense that it requires that people recognize the interconnectedness and interdependence of people in society, on the other hand the system of production 127 generates social deformations which are destructive to this sense of social community. 5. Social deformations arising through the division of labor and the modern system of production. There are consequences of the division of labor which Hegel recognizes are detrimental to the formation of individuals who are capable of social participation beyond.mere market activity. For instance, the unique individuality of a certain person's character or personality becomes far less important than her or his function as a consumer and producer. Within the system of production and consumption itself there is, as Hegel recognized, the need to “imitate” so that the quantities of mass-produced products will be utilized. On the other hand, there is also the socially generated need to feel some sense of “distinction” (POR 5193, 230). So, for instance, much modern advertising is oriented toward instilling in consumers the sense that if they buy and use a mass-produced product they will be distinguished individuals in virtue of using that product. This can be seen as the seed of the discussion in critical theory of the formation of’“pseudo-individuality”. This drive for something distinctive in turn generates the formation of new products (or a distinctive variation on an old product) and correspondingly new social needs are developed through which the division of labor becomes ever more refined. Hegel identifies a number of respects in which the division of labor leads to social deformations: 128 (1) over-production due to the tremendous increases in productivity generated in large part through the division of labor, (2) an increase in poverty due to the fact that over- production goes along with a decreased need for full employment, (3) a restriction in the intellectual development of the masses who are alienated from the system of production. The question arises whether Hegel adequately deals with these social disorders in the sense that his system is capable of overcoming these difficulties at the level of the state as he conceives it. B. Critique of Hegel’s construction of the division of labor. Hegel recognizes conflicting aspects of his account of the division of labor, but the question remains how well he was able to resolve these conflicts theoretically. First, the division of labor has aspects which are socially beneficial: the increase in productivity, and the increased,possihility'of greater social integration of people. It is clear that the technical knowledge of modern material production tends toward the possibility of greater freedom. The issue at this point in history is how the division of labor constitutes social activity and capacities. In particular, there is a division of labor between intellectual expertise and the practical knowledge involved in skilled and unskilled labor. It is evident that positive social freedom.for 129 the most part is associated with intellectual expertise: through the development of political and social capacities; increased access to material and intellectual resources; and greater status and wealth. Since the division of labor is not a natural phenomenon but a social construction, it is clear that various ways of mediating the division of labor are possible: it could be a matter of administrative concern, it could be regulated by the market (which is imagined to be in some fashion an autonomous mechanism), or some form.of political control over the division of labor could be instituted. The issue then is to determine the manner of controlling the divsion of labor which has the most legitimate normative basis. Hegel also recognizes the deleterious effects of the division of labor. These effects of the division of labor can be considered “unintended consequences” according to the general view put forth by the Scottish philosopher, Adam.Ferguson: Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design. (Ferguson 119) Presently it is possible to critique the notion of the inevitability of'“unintended consequences” of systems of production. Richard Peterson contributes to this critique in Democratic Philosophy'and the Politics of'Rnowledge by arguing that the division of labor can be surpassed in the sense that the adverse effects of modern systems of production can and 130 should be mediated through democratic processes. In this view the consequences of the division of labor are not beyond mediation through human rationality: To say that scarcity is not inevitable is to assert that under certain conditions shortage could be experienced without informing such relations. It is to suggest that under appropriate conditions, a society could confront shortage as a problun for politics. Such politics would have to be democratic if the inequalities and dominations associated with scarcity were to be avoided. Since shortage in some form.seems unavoidable, the replacement of scarcity by politically organized shortage becomes a key theme for a democratic politics concerned with challenging the division of labor. (Peterson 98) The implications of this view with regard to a democratic distribution of knowledge will be examined in the last section of my dissertation. Hegel presents arguments against social equality on the grounds that the differentiation that characterizes modern society is necessary due to the natural differences in the abilities of people and in the natural resources available to a particular state (FOR §200, 233-4). In one sense, this view can be brought into question by an immanent critique. From.what Hegel is saying about material production and the division of labor within modern society, the differences generated among individuals in terms of their social position and function for the most part is not a result of a natural basis or “the right of particularity” but is a function of social, material production. In particular, differences in ability arise due to the process of educating individuals to function within the 131 modern form.of production constituted by the division of labor. This is evident in that individuals are formed differently according to the type and level of education that they are allowed to receive for the type of labor they do. It is clear that the basis of the hierarchical and unequal division of wealth and social power is not based on contingent, natural factors but is justified in large measure on the socially constructed distinction between intellectual expertise and the type of knowledge involved in skilled/unskilled labor. The tension between the universal and particular is also evident in Hegel's understanding of universal suffrage. Given Hegel's universalistic outlook, there is a requirement that participation in society must extend to everyone. Hegel claims that this does not entail universal suffrage; Hegel argues against universal suffrage on the basis that such a form of voting is individualistic and atomistic. The.many'as single individuals—and this is a favourite interpretation of [the term] ‘the people’-do indeed live together, but only as a crowd, i.e. a formless mass whose movement and activity can consequently only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and terrifying. (FOR 5303, 343-4) The division of political power in a state is a specific form of the division of labor, different spheres serve different functions. For Hegel what is definitive is not the separation of spheres of society, but the “organic” nature of this division— there is at some level a unity that supersedes the particular moments within state functions (of. POR §272, 305-6). It is 132 important to note that Hegel feels the mass of people are not sufficiently educated to this political end, and therefore they make political decisions on the basis of emotion rather than rationality. It is reasonable to argue that Hegel should have recognized that education is essential to a universalistic conception of human freedom oriented toward social/political activity—a democratic distribution of knowledge is surely necessary to achieve this end. An interesting point that Hegel makes in $303 of the Philosophy'offlnight is that the social activity through which the individual participates in the state occurs through organized groups. Hegel states that the “corporations” should serve this mediating role. “But the state is essentially an organization whose members constitute circles in their own right [fur sich], and no moment within it should appear as an unorganized crowd” (FOR 5303, 344). This is relevant to the notion of social participation that Hegel puts forth. It is comparable to our own modern culture in the sense that effective social change is generally accomplished at the level of group practice—although there is the sense that such change involves conflict more than following pre-established norms through which the interests of particular segments of society are directed. In terms of educational institutions there is presently a sense that some groups have had success in creating institutionalized structures which represent their interests; women studies groups as well as the study of African-American history come.to mind. 133 On the other hand, it seems to be the case that groups formed around these particular areas of study are marginalized within institutions rather than being incorporated into the standard curriculum. There is a sense that the formation of such areas may, in fact, serve to restrict access to the forms of critique that these disciplines can bring to bear on society. In effect, this form of the division of intellectual labor within educational institutions replicates the hierarchical forms of power relations which such areas intend to critique. The issue of the relation between the division of labor and the instantiation of hierarchically organized power relations along lines of differentiation in knowledge will require further examination. I want to argue in chapter five of this dissertation that a major means through which this tension between universalistic ideals of democracy and the particularizing and alienating tendencies of modernity can be mediated is through democratic distributions of knowledge within our culture. In conclusion it may be valuable to review the aspects of Hegel's discussion of the division of labor that are relevant to the further development of this dissertation: (1) The division of labor is related to the enculturation of individuals, since access to knowledge is either restricted or allowed on the basis of the division of labor. (2) The division of labor is itself a means through which the distribution of knowledge is structured within society. In 134 particular, it is necessary to note the division between manual and intellectual labor that has persisted throughout history. (3) Hegel’s conception of the division of labor manifests conflicting social conditions insofar as the formation of universalistic tendencies is countered by deleterious effects such as the restriction of understanding that arises from being occupied in labor that is so specialized (this is evident in both intellectual and manual labor). (4) Since groups most effectively generate social change, it is necessary to examine what groups in our own society may incorporate more democratic procedures for the distribution of knowledge. II. The Division of Labor and the Mediating Function of Knowledge. A. Differentiation in types of knowledge and the social distribution of wealth. Hegel states that property arises as an essential manifestation of the will of individuals through labor. Property comes about when the individual wills that material existing in a natural, self-subsisting state becomes private through the act of taking possession and through the labor of the individual. Inequality arises at this point due on one hand to differences in natural surroundings, resources, technical knowledge, and on the other hand through the particular differences of individual character and ability: 135 The demand is sometimes made for equality in the distribution of land or even of other available resources. The understanding which makes this demand is all the more vacuous and superficial in that this particularity encompasses not only the external contingency of nature, but also the whole extent of spiritual nature in its infinite particularity and differentiation and in its organically developed reason. (POR S49, 80) The differentiation that Hegel is considering with respect to unequal divisions of property and material possessions is complex. In part this division of wealth arises through contingent factors such as natural resources available to particular people merely in virtue of their location, in other respects the division of wealth is based on factors which Hegel considers to be the particular characteristic of individuals: one such characteristic is the intellectual capacities which an individual has. Hegel feels, then, that the differentiation inherent in “organically developed reason” is the basis for justifying distributions of material wealth that occurs within society. A distinct aspect of Hegel’s social philosophy is that this initial economic theory does not provide a sufficient normative basis for the regulation of a complex, differentiated state. In other words, in Hegel's more advanced conception of the state, the state is an “organic” entity composed of interconnected spheres of social activity. To consider a state as a composite of entirely distinct spheres is an unwarranted abstraction from.actuality. The individual is always in various 136 relationships to others which in effect has a profound effect on the nature of individuality itself. A social theory based on possessive individualism.is inadequate for capturing the concrete ethical life of a society. It has to be reiterated that for Hegel the normative basis for establishing social structures with respect to the uneven distribution of material wealth is the differentiation he feels is inherent to rational spirit. Although the effects that result from this differentiation of rationality are:mediated by society, the normative basis of such a distribution is not adequately worked through by Hegel. It will becomerevident in later sections how important the distinction between intellectual expertise and the types of knowledge involved in both skilled and unskilled labor is for determining the structure of the modern state for Hegel. Possession requires recognition by other persons of the right of possession. For Hegel inter-subjective relations in this sphere become primary (FOR 551, 81). This contrasts sharply with the conception of the market as exclusively a system.based on atomistic decisions and actions of isolated individuals. The nature of self-understanding developed in the economic sphere is for Hegel more universalistic, since it requires the adoption of inter-subjective social norms and the development of a human consciousness that recognizes the rationality of these principles. Society mediates individual rights in relation to the universalistic concerns of society as a whole. An important feature of Hegel's contextualizing thought is his attempt to 137 describe a social system which does justice to the rights of the individual and the ethical life of the community as a whole. Private property is only one element of society and is mediated by higher functions of social control. This is essential in two respects: Hegel develops the important claim that the realm of the material base mediated by individual activity in the sphere of private property within civil society is only one function of a society and should be regulated in a rational, self-conscious way as subsumed in other social ends. This idea opposes the false notion that the marketplace is in some manner an isolated, independent sphere of society. Hegel constantly reiterates the necessity of integration of the spheres of society. Hegel refers to the integrating function of the state through reference to Aristotle's statement that a hand separated from the body is no more a hand in the essential sense of its function than the stone hand of a statue (Fol. 1.2.1253a 19-25, sc. FOR 5270, 302). Hegel recognizes that life in civil society requires mediation by the state because of disturbances arising in civil society: poverty, estrangement (in the sense of disconnection from.the institutions of society), lack of recognition, etc. It even is reasonable to argue that if the functioning of the material basis of society is the only concern of the state, then these social disturbances will become a permanent feature of that society—as appears to be happening in our own culture. 138 Hegel can be considered one of the most progressive political thinkers of modernity because the notion of the self- consciousness of individual freedom as self-determination is the fundamental principle of his social thought. The Philosophy of .Right is his attempt to demonstrate the objective nature of this principle in terms of the social context of modernity. The issue of education is important in this regard because for Hegel freedom is not self-evident but is knowledge that has been gained through the historical progress of humanity. If this principle is recognized as applying to humans universally, it still remains that people must be educated to an awareness of this principle. Such a view conceives a direct connection between education and the economic, social and political functioning of a society. It is reasonable to argue that people that have been educated to the degree necessary to realize Hegel's conception of freedom.would be less likely to submit to authoritarian modes of control (whether economic or governmental), and also less likely to recognize an external authority that is alien to any sense of individual self- determination. One of the reasons for apathy in our own educational institutions is the lack of policies that allow students to participate in the system in such a way that encourages self-determination. 139 B. Examining the differentiation between specialized expertise and skilled/unskilled practical knowledge. Isolating Hegel's position on the division of labor shows how he makes use of this contextual category to justify a structure of society that is universalistic insofar as he considers modernity the realization of positive human freedom. It is possible to demonstrate, however, that Hegel is using a contextualizing theoretical framework to legitimate non- universal distributions of knowledge that conflict with his notion of positive freedom. Such forms of the distribution of knowledge in a sense presuppose certain structures of power. Once the seemingly reasonable distribution of knowledge is accepted, the hierarchical power arrangements are taken as almost natural. The intention of this section is to understand how Hegel's use of the contextual category of the division of labor connects to his conception of the distribution of knowledge. How does Hegel use the category of the division of labor to justify the distribution of knowledge that he is proposing? The general approach that I take in the following is to focus on one issue in particular with respect to the distribution of knowledge within society: the distinction between those who have the type of knowledge involved in intellectual expertise (some form of theoretical knowledge) in contrast to those with limited access to such knowledge. While such an approach is not all-encompassing, for the most part it 140 does allow Hegel's understanding of the division of labor to be related to his position on the social distribution of knowledge. In other words, I argue that Hegel is using a contextual approach to support his normative social theory on a particular form of the distribution of knowledge within modern societies. One of the benefits of such an approach is that it relates the role of theoretical and practical knowledge within educational institutions to concrete consequences within society. There is a sense that in our culture the focus in educational institutions is toward the development of expertise required by the market. This neglects the need for the development of practical, political knowledge necessary in a participatory democracy. At best political knowledge itself is merely an area of specialization within academia open only to a select few. Due to the role of the division of labor in educational institutions, political knowledge (patterned along the lines of other forms of highly specialized knowledge) is primarily the interest of academic specialists within universities: political scientists and social philosophers. At another level systems of education are not simply conduits of theoretical knowledge, but are systems for excluding classes of society from access to such knowledge. The distinction in knowledge between what Hegel calls theoretical and practical knowledge corresponds to a division of labor between intellectual elites as distinct from those who are involved in manual and service labor. 141 The most conspicuous benefit to those who possess theoretical knowledge is clear: social power. The basis for justifying the division between theoretical knowledge and the type of knowledge involved in skilled/unskilled labor serves as a justification for the hierarchical, social/economic division between those involved in each form of labor. Laborers are excluded from.theoretical knowledge through systems of education, so it is necessary to focus on this issue in the discussion aimed at developing a democratic conception of the distribution of knowledge within our own society. III. Critique: The inadequacy in Hegel's use of the contextual category of the division of labor in relation to the differentiation of knowledge. One difficulty for Hegel as a contextual thinker is the possibility that injustices within society can be incorporated into the development of normative principles so that social systems of injustice will be perpetuated and, even worse, appear justified through such an approach. This gives rise to the standard critique that Hegel was a conservative apologist of the Prussian monarchy. The notion that Hegel is conservative in this sense has been refuted, but the issue remains that philosophical methods that incorporate contextual material from the social and political sphere can be a means through which social injustice can be legitimated. There are respects in which Hegel does not adequately take account of this difficulty in his thought. It is reasonable to 142 argue, though, that Hegel did see the problem and attempted to deal with it on a general level through an analysis of the relationship between rationality and actuality. For instance, any political system that has existed is “actual” in the commonly accepted sense, but clearly Hegel in his historical analyses did not consider all systems to be entirely adequate as rational exemplifications of the idea of freedom. Social systems are stages in a historical process that Hegel characterizes as a development based on conflict while maintaining a rational orientation: But even regarding History as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized— the question involuntarily arises—to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered. (FOH’21) It is reasonable to argue that for Hegel political systems are actual in a teleological sense; insofar as social systems realize the potentiality for human development that is immanent in the conception of human freedom, they are actual. A. Exclusion of groups of people from specific spheres of rationality. In this section I examine the respects in which Hegel's understanding of the division of labor is problematic for developing his conception of the distribution of knowledge within society. The distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge must in some sense be of social utility insofar as it is a distinction that has been maintained since 143 ancient times. At the same time, the use of contextual issues can be used to support a certain social structuring of this distinction that cannot be normatively justified. The most evident difficulty in Hegel's position is that ultimately he argues for the exclusion of certain groups (e.g., women and.menial laborers) from active political participation on the basis of contextual issues. For instance, Hegel presents the modern form of the division of labor as necessary insofar as it leads to a society which is recognized as universal in its interconnectedness. Hegel does not adequately deal with the restriction of individuals to specific forms of knowledge and the associated limitation in forms of activity and cepacities that such a division of labor requires. Aristotle and Hegel both try to justify the limitation of the political participation of the laboring classes and women based on a pre-existing exclusion of these groups from theoretical knowledge. Hegel maintains that women are defined by feeling rather than rationality and that their place is restricted to the environment of the family. women are excluded from.certain spheres of society through the fact that their natural sphere of activity is the family—in effect, this restricts the degree to which they can participate in the rational order of the state. Hegel justifies the subordination of women on the basis of an exclusion from theoretical spheres of knowledge that in some sense is seen as natural. In this regard Hegel's position is unfortunately similar to Aristotle's. 144 Hegel argues for a certain type of distribution of social knowledge involving a distinction between intellectual expertise and the expertise associated with skilled and unskilled labor. This distinction is supported through a contextualized understanding of social realities. His strategy can be summarized through the following points that I have set forth in the preceding sections of this dissertation: (1) The question naturally arises concerning what type of knowledge is necessary for citizens involved in political decision processes. For Aristotle such citizens must have a knowledge of the universal concerns of society. In other words, they must be disinterested—trained to focus on the interest of the state (universal interests) rather than their own particular interests. This is similar to the Hegelian conception that those who have have the intellectual expertise to run the government are the “universal” class insofar as they have a conception of the universal ends of society. (2) Political knowledge/power and activity is associated with intellectual expertise, so that practical, political activity requires forms of specialized, theoretical knowledge. (3) Through the division of labor and the form of modern material production the laboring classes and women have restricted access to the type of intellectual expertise that Hegel feels is requisite to participate in the actual functioning of the government. 145 (4) This restriction gives rise to the notion that certain groups can be characterized on the basis of socially limited or even abnormal forms of mentality: the conception of women as human beings operating naturally on the basis of feeling and the “rabble” mentality as a form of resentment against the state and society. (5) Since political participation is based primarily on intellectual expertise, certain groups are restricted in their ability to participate in state institutions according to the level of intellectual expertise that they have. This means that laborers will have some access insofar as they can participate in public discourse through their status as numbers of estates having a certain level of practical knowledge. For the “rabble” and women there appears to be no mechanism in Hegel's political structure through which they can obtain participation in the state. Hegel does not offer a solution so that these groups can attain even limited membership in the political organization of the state. The distinction between those involved in activities requiring intellectual expertise and those involved in activities requiring the type of practical knowledge associated with labor becomes a hierarchical distinction in social power. The general argument is that those involved in spheres requiring theoretical knowledge are doing work that is more valuable, so that the person holding such knowledge is more valuable and 146 acquires a position of social eminence. The legitimacy of such a social structure can be questioned along the following lines: (1) First, there is not equal opportunity to all to obtain theoretical knowledge, as educational institutions are sources of restriction as well as access to such knowledge. It is evident that one of the main features of a social hierarchy arranged on the basis of distinctions in knowledge is that it is itself a means to control and restrict access to knowledge. (2) Secondly, this argument conceives intellectual expertise on the basis of private property. Such a view of intellectual expertise neglects the social aspects of such knowledge: in particular, the general social resources that go into the development of theoretical knowledge, and the importance of communities of discourse in which such knowledge is nurtured, as well as the need of society for individuals with knowledge that is more universal to fulfill state functions. The form of the distribution of knowledge that Hegel's conception of the division of labor requires is inconsistent with aspects of Hegel's normative conception of universal features of modernity. Given Hegel's notion that modern society has universal interests, such as the concern that the subjectivity of each individual is respected, it is difficult to see how he can at the same time propose a form of differentiation of knowledge that effectively limits the mental development of entire classes to conditions of servitude based 147 on the type of knowledge to which they have access. If the intellectual education of specific classes of people is actually insufficient for them to make political decisions, it is difficult to see how far such a system can legitimately represent the collective interests of society. It might be said that the Hegelian notion of universality in society has not achieved an adequate form of differentiation consistent with his conception of the universal freedom inherent to modernity. If there are means only in principle whereby people can participate in social organization, but in actuality there are methods of exclusion, then it is invaluable for instituting democratic procedures to identify the concrete means of exclusion so that they can be eliminated. B. Specialization of knowledge and political participation. A social system.based on universalistic principles requires universal access to knowledge to the degree that allows political decisions to be made. Furthermore, insofar as the type of comprehension required for political activity is of a more universal nature, the notion of differentiated forms of knowledge becomes problematic in respects—such specialization of knowledge can be associated with tendencies that are in fact anti-social to the degree that specialization can cause alienation from social comunity. One of the implications of a restriction in access to intellectual expertise is that it leads to passive citizenship; 148 that is, citizens are not decision makers althoughvin some respect they may be involved in political and civic processes. One difficulty I see in the interesting account of civil society put forth by Cohen and Arato is that the associations that constitute civil society are in some manner disconnected from the political process. They then maintain that civil society itself must become politicized (in a democratic fashion);"'They :mention that associations in civil society are based on democratic principles, but the formation of such organizations does not seem to involve democratic procedures, since, in fact, such organizations are often organized hierarchically along the lines of economic and political systems. Furthermore, since educational institutions are themselves state institutions in our culture, it is not clear how Cohen and Arato deal with the democratization of state educational institutions, especially, since they argue that the democratizing processes of civil society should be “self-limiting,” that is, they do not challenge directly the non-democratic structure of state institutions. C. The formation of social character following distinctions in types of knowledge is problematic. Accepting the distinction between theoretical knowledge and skilled/unskilled labor as Hegel presents it leads to the acceptance of corresponding types of character formation and agency associated with this distinction. In particular, “corporations” are a means of distributing and controlling 149 specific forms of knowledge with associated formations of identity. It is significant that those who are actually in political control are not restricted to highly specialized forms of knowledge, but are members of the “universal” estate in that they understand the requirements of society as a whole. Given that the practical knowledge of laborers is so specialized through the division of labor, the political role that such citizens have in Hegel is highly restricted. Hegel uses the distinction between “theoretical knowledge” (intellectual expertise) and the practical knowledge of laborers to justify a political structure that is not universalistic, so Hegel's claim that modernity has achieved a universal sort of freedom is problematic. It is reasonable to argue that in many respects Hegel uses a contextual approach to justify the limitation of theoretical knowledge and political power in the working class. Obviously, this is relevant to our own society as well. IV. Conclusion: Social possibilities inherent in Hegel's discussion of the distribution of knowledge. This section extracts from the previous discussion the indications of social possibilities that arise through an examination of contextuality in Hegel's work. In part the development of my own conception of a just distribution of knowledge is based on this critical analysis. In the present section I indicate some of the positive aspects of Hegel’s thought which contribute to the construction of my own normative conception of a democratically informed distribution of 150 knowledge. In particular, the intention is to indicate the specific issues of contextuality that are relevant to a democratic distribution of knowledge. The intent is not yet to further develop these issues in terms of my own normative concerns, as this will be done in the final chapter of the dissertation. The critical understanding gained from analyzing Hegel's contextualizing approach will be useful for identifying and avoiding similar difficulties when developing my own normative conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge. For instance, it seems that a distinction is necessary between the type of knowledge that is involved in work that is characterized as intellectual expertise versus the type of knowledge involved in manual labor (what Hegel would call practical knowledge). How can the deleterious effects of such a distinction, such as the formation of personalities who are strictly identified or characterized by their class of work, be diminished? If the examination of contextual issues is important for theorizing forms of distribution of knowledge within society, how is it possible to avoid the mistake of considering the established structure of knowledge as in a manner justified simply through its actuality? A. Recognition of the relation between social conditions of production and knowledge. First of all, it is fruitful to look at the material basis of society and the division of labor in relation to the 151 distribution of knowledge because such an approach recognizes that education is not simply a process of developing the understanding but is to a great degree coordinated with the material production of society and the relationships of production. Hegel recognizes the fundamental role that labor has as a formative process of individuals. In some respect Hegel considers labor a liberating activity in situations of servitude: the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own” (P08 119). One fundamental contextual analysis within the Philosqpby of Right concerns the modern construction of labor. The rational construction of the process of labor in modernity has become simpler and more mechanized. Given that labor is essential to the formation of individuality, it is reasonable to conclude that the type of character formation that occurs in modern societies will correspond to this change in the nature of labor. To be specific, individuals become less able to engage in spheres outside their narrowly defined field of work. This is a problem for a society that has democratic ideals which require the education of individuals to a level that can ensure substantive participation in the political functioning of society. It follows that the nature of material production and the division of labor is a central philosophical issue that must be addressed in devising a theory of a democratic distribution of knowledge. 152 B. Knowledge and human freedom. One of the most interesting aspects of Hegel’s discussion of the formation of individuality is that it is tied to the historical development of human beings becoming self-conscious of their own freedom: The human being, in his immediate existence [Existent] in himself, is a natural entity, external to his concept; it is only through the development [Ausbildung] of his own body and spirit, essentially by means of his self-consciousness comprehending itself'as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others. Or to put it the other way round, this taking possession of oneself consists also in translating into actuality'what one is in terms of one's concept. (FOR 557, 86). A number of points can be made here as a means to sketch this important Hegelian notion of freedqm. First the notion of freedom.that Hegel develops is historical. This is a sharp contrast to the formal freedom of the will that Kant presupposes. Second, for Hegel the nature of material existence at the level of civil society is characterized in large measure by its contingency. A higher level of rationality (political) is necessary to mediate the contingency of the civil sphere, due to Hegel's claim that a fundamental aspect of modernity is the universality of human freedom” The nature of human freedom is the normative basis for state welfare in a broad sense. Furthermore, production itself functions in a universal manner in some capacity in the production of society as a whole. Hegel recognizes this universality in the complex interconnectedness 153 of human activity that modern systems of production require. Third, as a historically developed potentiality of humanity, it is reasonable to claim that self-consciousness of freedom is something that could decline. The Hegelian notion of freedom as positive requires further examination. There are many aspects of Hegel’s notion of freedom that go beyond an abstract conception of the will as formally free. Hegel conceptualizes the system of right in terms of a positive notion of the freedom of the will: The basis [Baden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmnngj and the system.of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature. (POR §4, 35) Given that the construction of the system of right is based on the nature of the will as free, the difficulty in Hegel of the apparent subsumption of the will of the individual to that of the state is diminished insofar as the rational state is a construction based on the free will (POR §57, 87-88). The state is an objectification of the free will for Hegel, so there :Ls.a sense in which the state is essentially a construction involving the will of individuals who have participated in its construction. Hegel does not exclude human interest from the realm.of right. An aspect of the human condition is the necessity of fulfilling needs and Hegel recognizes that this is cOzasistent with human freedom“ “There is nothing degrading about §E ha of su re in: fr; acC '1” f0:- 154 being alive, and we do not have the alternative of existing in a higher spirituality. It is only by raising what is present and given to a self-creating process that the higher sphere of the good is attained . . . ” (POR §123, 151; of. 151-52). The conception of freedom is positive insofar as it attains an objective manifestation in society. The contrast is with a negative conception of the will which has as its aim only the negation of any positive sort of determination at all (POR §5, 38-9): “The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves which have never been green (POR §124, 153).” For Hegel certain forms of social determination are the manner in which human subjectivity becomes free (POR 57, 42-43; 513, 47). This is related to the process of education as social enculturation in the sense that education is a means of forming social identity. If the fundamental principle of modernity is the recognition, or self-consciousness, of the inherent freedom of the subject, a requirement of such recognition must be the universal dispersal of the knowledge of subjective freedom. A system of social education is necessary to enculturate individuals to the degree necessary to function as free social beings with an awareness of the universality of this claim to freedom” Hegel characterizes such knowledge as,“theoretical” or, according to less loaded terminology, what I have called “intellectual expertise”. Theoretical knowledge is the capacity for dealing with universal considerations rather than focusing 155 in a strategic manner on particular interests. It is clear that broader dispersal of at least certain forms of intellectual expertise is requisite for the normative construction of a participatory democracy. It is necessary here to indicate the relationship between the Hegelian notion of freedom and law as the embodiment of historically developed practical rationality normatively governing human activity. As a system of normative principles, law is essential to the social enculturation of individuals. Hegel recognizes that law, as the rational production of humanity itself, is not “alien.” In this regard, it is possible to see a relationship between the legitimacy of law and the fact that humans are not estranged from.the law: in various respects humans have participated in the formation of law (FOR $148, 191). A.difficulty for Hegel is that the notion of law as the “essence” of human rational activity is often too abstract. Furthermore, there is a tension in Hegel's thought between the “absolute” objectivity of law and its human origins. C. The development of public spheres of discourse. The development and functioning of civil society in modernity requires knowledge in citizens that is universalistic. Knowledge of norms which establish the interconnectedness of individuals in society must be distributed throughout society. The manner that Hegel achieves this result is, of course, no longer a historical possibility—a discourse in a public sphere 156 mediated by the representatives of the Estates. Nevertheless, it is reasonable, I argue, to see in this conception possibilities for the transformation of our own civil society. There is a possibility of developing “spaces” for public discourse about the functioning of institutions within society. One problem in Hegel's analysis is that he disconnects this form.of public discourse from political power. Public knowledge according to Hegel occurs within this sphere in a non-restrictive or “universal” way, but it remains only an “edifying discourse” disconnected from possibilities of changing social practices and institutional structures. Hegel's notion of the division of civil society into estates representing essential forms of the division of labor has been surpassed, but there are elements of his conception of the structure of civil society that are useful. First, Hegel realizes that an individual’s interests in society are often best represented in terms of membership within a certain group or organization rather than in terms of particular interests. Conflicts that occur in society are generally indications of the interests of a collective rather than of isolated individuals. Furthermore, in general, effective change, resolution of social conflicts, and access to political power comes about through group activity rather than that of individuals. Hegel also recognizes that it is necessary for some sense of community to develop in society in order for individuals to overcome the deepening sense of alienation that pervades modernity. 157 Individual identity formed through education is not an individual achievement but is a function of involvement in determinate collectivities. For Hegel the character of individuality is defined through “determinate particularity” (FOR §207, 238). It is necessary that the individual achieve recognition through involvement in one of the estates of civil society. These estates provide the individual with a sense of self-recognition; that is, individual identity arises through belonging to a particular estate. Furthermore, the estates are the means by which a person gains recognition from others. The estates serve as a mediating function between the individual and state government as well, since the individual’s interests are not represented in their contingent particularity but as the interests of a particular estate (FOR §253, 271). It is possible to critique the notion of mediation through estates that Hegel is developing, since Hegel argues that this form of social mediation is sufficient, and universal suffrage is undesirable (FOR 5311, 350). There is a contradiction in Hegel in this regard, in that he feels the self-consciousness of individual freedom is the outstanding achievement of modernity: The principle of the modern world at large is freedom of subjectivity, according to which all essential aspects present in the spiritual totality develop and enter into their right. . . . all political constitutions are one-sided if they cannot sustain within themselves the principle of free subjectivity and are unable to conform to fully developed reason (FOR 5273, 312). 158 Yet Hegel apparently restricts this notion of freedom to males. The identity of women in effect is defined by nature and feeling according to Hegel (FOR 5166, 207). Elsewhere Hegel argues forcefully against the view that humanity can be defined by nature and feeling (FOR 13). The development of a public sphere of discourse aims at the education of individuals in a political sense. The formation of the individual in terms of education is a process that is not only a matter of an individual's own development but involves the notion of the inter-relatedness of individuals and the formation of their identity through participation in collectives. It is important to note that the manifestation of the will of individuals occurs essentially in relation to others (FOR 5112, 139). In Hegel's development of the notion of subjective will he arrives at a point that establishes a system of social life that requires social relationships to others. Habermas argues that the notion of a public sphere of discourse has become problematic in modernity. This raises the issue of how it may be possible to create such a public sphere of discourse. The essential requirement of such a sphere in my view is that practical, political knowledge should be connected to actual power to accomplish change. So, for political discourse to be democratic it should be constructed in a manner in which it is connected to political power. One difficulty with Hegel's conception in this regard is that he disconnects the process of public discourse from procedures for initiating 159 change. The power to change institutional structures and normative practices resides essentially in a certain class of people who, Hegel argues, have the intellectual expertise to run government. CHAPTER 5 Development of a Normative Conception of Justice as a Democratic Distribution of Knowledge One of the intentions of this dissertation is to show that understanding Aristotle and Hegel as contextual thinkers can contribute to the development of a political conception of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge. The purpose of this chapter is to answer the following question: How can a contextual approach to justice contribute to a sense of social justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge and better enable us to understand what such a notion entails concretely? I first will make clear what elements of the preceding discussion of Aristotle and Hegel are useful for the development of my own normative concerns (chapter 5.1.). next, I will show how a contextual approach contributes to the development of a contemporary sense of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge (chapter 5.11.). 1. Relevance of Aristotle and Hegel for the Development of a Conception of Justice as a Democratic Distribution of Knowledge. Aristotle and Hegel argue for specific distributions of knowledge based on contextual analyses which refer to social 160 161 conditions such as social conflict and the division of labor. The interest for us of these approaches does not lie in the specific forms of social order that they argue for, especially the distribution of knowledge—since the social conditions of modernity and the historical, social norms structuring human activity and capacities are different. Nevertheless, I argue that the methods of reflecting on norms in relation to social conditions that these philosophers have developed is a useful approach for understanding the relationship between social context and the legitimation of the distribution of knowledge within our society. A. The critique of abstraction and formalism. For an account of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge the preceding critique of Aristotle and Hegel is useful because it analyzes the structure of socially differentiated knowledge in relation to actual historical circumstances. This aspect of Aristotle's thought is evident in his argument that practical rationality differs from.pure theoretical thought by taking account of the particularity of human activity, which cannot be entirely subsumed under the constructions of a priori normative theories. The procedure through which normative principles are applied to particular cases is not specified in detail by Aristotle, but it is evident that the application of principles is a function of specialized 162 knowledge in the capacity of a person with practical wisdom (phroneeis). Hegel argues against non-contextual, or abstract, conceptions of justice in his critique of Kantian formalism. The essential difficulty of formalism in ethics is that it does not conceive of justice in relation to historical conditions. under a formalist view, human freedom is an abstract characteristic of human subjectivity. In contrast, Hegel's historical analysis makes clear that human freedom.may be more or less manifest (or concrete) as a function of the rationality which a society has achieved. It is evident from the foregoing analysis (chapter 2.11.8.) that Hegel believes the application of formal (subjectivistic) conceptions of freedom.are inadequate because of the high degree of differentiation in modern society. In this dissertation I have argued that Aristotle and Hegel are concerned with conflict and the division of labor in relation to the distribution of knowledge in the formulation of their normative conceptions of justice. Aristotle and Hegel believe that the contextual categories of social conflict/resolution and the division of labor are essential to a contextual analysis. Aristotle and Hegel develop normative theory with regard to the distribution of knowledge consistent with conditions within their own societies. 1n the following two sections 1 recapitulate the exposition of Aristotle and Hegel on these issues, and I summarize their normative positions. 163 H. Aristotle: conflict and the distribution of knowledge. Aristotle conceives of justice as the structure a society achieves through laws and the constitution..A difficulty concerning how the constitution should be constructed and interpreted follows from the conflict between social groups with different social interests (such as wealth, honor, excellence, and freedom). Aristotle argues that the distribution of knowledge is important for resolving this conflict. He argues that under actual conditions a constitutional government best utilizes the rational potential within Greek society for achieving the universal interest of the city-state. Participation of equal citizens is essential to this form of government; each citizen is responsible for contributing their practical wisdom to the governance of the whole. It is clear that there are universalizing tendencies in Aristotle's thought involving the distribution of knowledge with respect to politics. This is especially evident in the sentence with which Aristotle begins his Metaphysics: “xdvxeg (ivOpmmt 100 eifiévat opéyov'tat emu-:1." “A11 humans by nature desire to know” (Met. 1.1.980a 21). Aristotle argues for a constitutional form of government, because it is in such a state that the practical rationality of individuals is best utilized through their participation in the state. Furthermore, such participation is a means through which citizens attain knowledge of the collective action of the state. This opens the state to public scrutiny, which serves 164 to legitimize the actions of the state. Political participation can be considered a process by means of which the normative principles directing the activity of a social collective attain validity. Since Aristotle maintains that the very nature of human existence is to desire knowledge and that knowledge is essential to the functioning of the city-state, the only means to exclude groups from the state is to characterize their rational capacities as either not fully human, or not fully developed. On this basis Aristotle argues it is reasonable to exclude women, slaves, children and workers. The social ideology behind this position is apparent. If these groups have deficient capacities, it is due to restrictions placed on them by society (with the possible exception of children). Although the mechanisms of exclusion are different, it is evident that restrictions in levels of social participation in our own society are associated with the types and degree of knowledge which one has. It can be reasonably argued that many social functions that are political have been taken over by mechanisms of control that are not open to public scrutiny and discourse (Peterson 18-19; 209 ff.). Expert authority is increasingly being used to make decisions that are political and, hence, should be open to public debate. As an example, recently in the city in which 1 live, there was a question over how to contain a cancer-causing agent that is seoping into the public water supply from a toxic waste site. Litigation over 165 this matter had been going on for years between the company that owns the site and the city. Rather than reclaiming the land (a more expensive solution), the decision was made to cap the land with clay, in which case the land can never be used by humans again. While there was a public meeting about the action being taken, the decision seems not to have involved input or administration by those concerned from the general public. Unless the use of expert knowledge as a mechanism.which assumes political power can be identified and justified, it is reasonable to question the legitimacy of the relationship in our society between the degree of social/political participation which one can actually engage in and the form of knowledge one has acquired. C. Hegel: the division of labor and the distribution of knowledge. According to Hegel, the division of labor is potentially a means through which humanity can achieve concrete freedom in modernity. The division of labor reduces individuals to specialized roles within the organic whole of society through the formation of individual capacities.‘While this may seem.to bera process of sheer atomization, Hegel emphasizes that people become aware of the necessary cooperative interconnection among individuals within society structured by the division of labor. Knowledge serves various mediating functions within the modern form of the division of labor. First, individuals come to the realization that the security of their social situation is a In. 3W 166 function of the interconnection of everyone within the division of labor. The notion of recognition is essential to the formation of social community in this regard. Second, the specialized knowledge associated with the sphere of a person's social and economic activity allows participation through Corporations within the political institutions of the state. As with Aristotle, political participation for Hegel is a way that citizens can acquire knowledge of the collective action of the state and political participation is a means through which the validity of state activity is realized. In this respect, knowledge serves a mediating function in which the particularity of an individual's own social position is put in relation to the more universal interests of society. The importance of Hegel’s analysis of the division of labor is readily apparent. In many respects his understanding of the social implications of the division of labor is far more subtle than that developed by his predecessors in their theories of political economy. It is also necessary to recognize the respects in which Hegel's theory is inadequate. Hegel understood that the division of labor is associated with a high degree of differentiation and specialization of knowledge. under the modern form of the division of labor the rational capacities of individuals are developed within particular areas of specialization of human activity. This applies to spheres requiring intellectual expertise as well as areas of labor .involving skilled and unskilled activity. Within Hegel's social 167 system there is, in fact, only one group of people (civil servants, the “universal class”) who have the type of specialized knowledge that allows them to understand the organic totality of the state. In order to understand the difficulty involved in Hegel's conception of the division of labor, it is necessary to consider his notion of positive freedom. According to Hegel, freedom is a function of the level of rational social development which a state has achieved. This contrasts with subjectivistic conceptions of freedom.in which freedom is a function of the will of the subject. The Hegelian notion of freedom.is realized within a social context as a result of historical development. Hegel argues that the modern form of the division of labor is consistent with his conception of freedom, given the social structure which he sets forth in the Fhilosopby'of.Right. The primary difficulty with Hegel’s account is the degree of specialization and restriction in knowledge that he must accopt as a condition of the modern form of the division of labor. The division of labor restricts the spheres of individual activity to the degree that the notion of “positive” freedom becomes an abstraction. At times Hegel suggests that the end of individual activity is universal insofar as subjectively willed activity is in accordance with objective will (such as the laws of a state). Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual [IndividuumJ himself has objectivity, 168 truth, and ethical life. Union as such is itself the true content and end, and the destiny [Bestimmung] of individuals [Individuen] is to lead a universal life . . . Here, in a concrete sense and in terms of its content, it consists in the unity of objective freedom (i.e. of the universal substantial will) and subjective freedom (as the freedom of individual [individuallen] knowledge and of the will in its pursuit of particular ends). And in terms of its form, it therefore consists in self-determining action in accordance with laws and principles based on thought and hence universal. (FOR 276) But if knowledge of the rationality manifest in society is restricted to a small class of intellectuals, it is apparent that the positive freedom that arises through a union of “subjective freedom? and.“objective freedom? is not a universal aspect of modernity but is only available to the understanding of a few individuals: . . . but the Greeks were still unacquainted with the abstract right of our modern states, that isolates the individual, allows of his acting as such, and yet, as an invisible spirit, holds all its parts together. . . . It is a divided activity in which each has only his part, just as in a factory no one makes a whole, but only a part, and does not possess skill in other departments, because only a few are employed in fitting the different parts together. It is free nations alone that have the consciousness of and activity for the whole; in modern times the individual is only free for himself as such, and enjoys citizen freedom alone-in the sense of that of a bourgeois and not of a citoyen. (POE, Vol. II, 209) Within the highly differentiated and specialized modern form of the division of labor, individuals do not generally possess knowledge of the universal interests of the state— according to Hegel himself. So the type of freedom attained is not universal but can only be a non-rational acceptance of the 169 objective order. The implication is that this type of freedom is not positive because the majority of citizens have not attained an understanding that the objective social order may embody rationality in its objective order. To conclude this section, the central objective has been to recapitulate Hegel's and Aristotle's normative concern with the distribution of knowledge in relation to social conflict and the division of labor within society. Even though it has been shown that the manner in which they think contextually about the mediating function of knowledge is not adequate, I argue that aspects of their approach are useful for developing a conception of justice which requires a democratic distribution of knowledge within our own society. It may be useful to point out some general aspects of the preceding analysis that will guide the development of my conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge: (1) A.contextual method directly confronts normative principles with a specific social reality in contrast to ideal theories of justice formed in abstraction from.social context. (2) Furthermore, a contextualizing approach to the distribution of knowledge within society provides an analysis of the contemporary historical conditions which make the construction of a democratic distribution of knowledge feasible. 170 (3) A.contextual analysis can show how conceptual obscurity/conflict over notions such as democracy and the role of the division of labor can lead to difficulty for a democratic construction of education. II. Development of a Contemporary Conception of JUstice as a Democratic Distribution of Knowledge. In the following two sections of this dissertation the general approach of a contextualizing theory of justice is followed, but I turn the discussion to the development of a prescriptive conception of justice requiring a democratic distribution of knowledge. In the first section I discuss contemporary social conditions of conflict and the division of labor as these bear on the development of a conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge. In the next section I show how an understanding of a contextual approach is useful for addressing'problems around the issue of the distribution of knowledge in existing educational institutions and how such an approach can identify possibilities for the introduction of more democratic practices when applied critically. A, The Mediating Function of Knowledge for Conflict and the Division of Labor. The distribution of social goods, such as political power, economic wealth, and social status, is determined.by various factors. It is evident that a major factor in social distribution is the type and degree of knowledge that individuals have. Distribution according to knowledge may seem 171 reasonable and fair on first inspection. For example, it is often claimed that authority should be distributed according to knowledge, especially authority that has the public sphere as its realm.of operation, and one sense of the term authority'is someone who has expert knowledge about a particular subject matter. Even granting that it is better that knowledge rather than arbitrary power should be the basis of authority, the differentiation of social authority based on knowledge can serve ideological purposes. Differentiation in knowledge may be used as the basis for the appearance of legitimacy with respect to claims of authority but may in fact support social injustice. For instance, proponents of dismantling affirmative action often argue that it is unfair to white males as a form of institutionalized inequality that is not based on the degree of knowledge one has achieved through education. This argument is based on the reasonable claim.that advancement in educational institutions should.be based.on merit;” In a society largely structured on the competitive systemLimperatives of the market, it is not difficult to understand the resentment that policies such as affirmative action may engender. On further consideration, though, there are issues that often remain unaddressed by those who propose abolishing affirmative action. In particular, such arguments typically ignore the persistent racial inequalities in our society that are the reason for affirmative action in the first place. Distribution of knowledge 172 as a form of social wealth is said to be based on equality of opportunity, but may, in fact, be based on more fundamental social inequalities. One difficulty is the persistence of the need for affirmative action; ideally, affirmative action policies would.become obsolete in a society that has dismantled institutional racism..A legitimate question is whether such policies are actually effective, and, if they are not effective, how can they be transformed to achieve the desired result of equality of opportunity in education. There may be an over- reliance on affirmative action alone to achieve this goal. In addition, what other solutions should be considered for creating possibilities of more egalitarian education? There is an encouraging tendency presently to increase funding for higher education, so the scarcity associated with the distribution of knowledge may be alleviated to a degree. These aspects of the distribution of knowledge can be analyzed in a contextual way by looking at the relation between contextual categories (such as conflict and the division of labor) and knowledge within our society. In the following section I first examine conflict within educational institutions to show that a democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge becomes intelligible by confronting the issue of conflict directly. 173 1. Conflict Conflict is endemic to educational institutions—from large scale student unrest, to the disheartening passivity of individual students in classrooms as an expression of alienation from even their own education and the development of their own intellectual capacities. There is conflict over access to higher education, which is becoming a privilege of wealth rather than a means to a more democratic society. In addition there is conflict over the nature of education in schools. Educational institutions increasingly represent private business and technical interests rather than the more universalistic interests of society as a whole. under these conditions, groups not associated with business/technical interests have little input into the social construction of knowledge. understanding the nature of these conflicts is essential for formulating normative principles that are consistent with a democratic distribution of knowledge within society giving rise to a more democratic environment for teaching and learning. a. Restricted access to educational institutions is inconsistent with a democratic conception of human political agency. The view of justice that I adopt is democratic in that it involves as an ideal an equitable distribution of knowledge through democratic procedures. Democratic control over institutionalized forms of knowledge can be thought of in terms of access to knowledge. In a society which is largely structured on the communication of information, access to knowledge is 174 equated with access to social and political control. A society that is democratic should provide that political power be distributed equally throughout society as far as possible. If access to knowledge is restricted, such restriction translates into a restriction of social agency to those without access to education. A.problem for a democratic conception of justice insofar as it relates to the distribution of knowledge is the issue regarding limitation in access to education within our society. It is reasonable to suggest that a democratic distribution of knowledge would alleviate social conflict over the distribution of social wealth by generating equality of opportunity. One possibility for a more equitable and democratic distribution of knowledge is the use of technology to expand access to knowledge within society. The expansion of the Internet and other communication technologies is often put forth as a means for vastly increasing access to knowledge in terms of both quality and quantity. The situation put forth as a possibility by‘Walter Benjamin in.“The work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” still remains a possibility, but unfortunately not presently an actuality. Benjamin argued that with advances in mass production, reproduction of works of art and literature could become widely available to all. This is an instance in which it is thought that cultural knowledge can be distributed along the lines discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation. This view conceives of knowledge 175 as distributable as if it were simply some object: like a book. Adorno reasonably argued against this view that what is required is not simply the dissemination of cultural objects, but the generation of understanding as well. What seems to require reproduction is not simply cultural objects, but an entire system of education. Opportunities for the dissemination of knowledge are expanded due to technological advances to the extent that the material of liberal education could be readily available to all. The Internet is capable of functioning as a communications system reproducing understanding. For instance, language courses could be set up in a fairly programmatic fashion. Nevertheless, a system of education is necessary in which the use of this resource is encouraged. It is difficult to ignore the views of those who talk about the benefits of this new technology with such optimism, but it is important to note that similar claims were made for television. The question is whether there is something inherent in more advanced systems of communication (such as the Internet) that lead one to suppose that they could fulfill such optimistic claims to expand access to knowledge and increase the quality of education. Even granting the tremendous potential in such advanced technology, it is necessary to be aware of the difficulties involved. First of all, the control of communication technology presently is not diffused throughout our society but is in the hands of those who can be characterized as privileged in terms of wealth and education. 176 Secondly, it seems likely that the same mechanisms of administrative control that are now in place will just be applied to new systems of communication rather than being controlled by democratic processes. This means that such systems will serve already constituted formations of power rather than serve the promotion of democratic forms of education. Restriction of access to knowledge can be viewed as an instance of socially generated scarcity which gives rise to inequality of opportunity and, hence, causes social conflict. It is clear that the distribution of knowledge could be more universal than it presently is. It may be supposed that the introduction on a broad scale of technology such as the Internet and other systems of communication has the potential of making access to knowledge nearly universal. I think it would be wrong to dismiss outright the potentialities in this technology; on the other hand the situation appears similar to the introduction of machine technology into production. The liberating potential of machine technology is evident, but a major factor in achieving greater social freedom is the control of technology. As Mhrx notes, the introduction of machinery is accompanied by an increased exploitation of labor and the stultification of the labor force rather than its liberation. “If”, dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, “if every tool, when summoned, or even by intelligent anticipation, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves . . . then there would be no need either of apprentices for the master craftsmen, or of slaves for the lords.” . . . Oh those heathens! They 177 understood nothing of political economy and Christianity, as the learned Bastiat discovered, and before him the still wiser MacCullock. They did not, for example, comprehend that machinery is the surest means of lengthening the working day. (Capita1,'Vol. 1, 532-533) A number of considerations arise at this point. It is clear that increased productive capacity could generate new forms of social activity by decreasing the number of hours needed to work to reproduce the necessities of life. Instead, as Hegel noted, there is an ever increasing differentiation of the system of needs, so that most production is not oriented toward essential products but towards “luxury” (FOR 5195, 231). The enculturation of human capacities is a secondary concern under this form of social organization and production. Furthermore, unless there is a conscious attempt to develop the positive aspects of technology oriented toward education and liberation, it is likely that the positive potential of such technology will go unrealized.‘With respect to the importance of communication technology presently, it is evident that it remains under the control of a fairly small percentage of those with the intellectual expertise and material resources to utilize this technology. In other respects the sphere of this communications technology is being “colonizedriby the market as a system with tremendous potential to take over the function of advertising. It is reasonable to conclude that technologies such as the Internet are serving the ends of entrenched hierarchies of power 178 based on intellectual expertise. The democratic potential of such communication technology remains to be realized. b. The normative determination of educational content in a democratic society. A democratic conception of the distribution of knowledge in institutions can be considered in terms of the different forms that acquisition of knowledge can take. In an interesting article, Gerald Graff examines the internal conflicts that arise within educational institutions over the issue of allowing a more pluralistic education. This conflict is presently mediated by a proliferation of new departments rather than open debate about points of conflict: In the absence of discussion, this state of uneasy peaceful coexistence is achieved by academic administration, which becomes an art of crisis-management designed not to exploit intellectual turf wars for their educational potential but to neutralize them by keeping the clashing factions as separate as possible. (Graff 441). This is an important point, in that it indicates that conflict over the issue of the quality of education is generally not mediated through a democratic process of discussion but becomes a focus of administrative control. In particular, specific features of the conflict over types of education are not addressed, such as how certain forms of education serve particular interest groups (the business community, public health, political interests, etc.), and how limited public 179 resources are distributed among various groups with diverse educational needs and goals. An aspect of this state of affairs in academia is that pluralistic discourse between conflicting views on the nature of education is not controlled by those groups who have a vested interest in this issue and could potentially enter into this discourse, but by administrative measures oriented toward isolating those who are trying to attain some critical understanding. So, the point is that it is not only necessary to bring groups with conflicting points of view together (a pedagogical point), but, also to attempt to change administrative control to more democratic procedures so that the issue of conflict and possibilities for its resolution can be discussed by those who are actually involved in education. The university system is now geared to a capitalist system of material production which extensively determines the character of education within the system. In chess a generally successful strategy is to capture as much space as possible. The side that can accomplish this strategy most effectively can control the board. In the university system the production of knowledge that is geared toward business and technology dominates the board through having captured a major portion of the “space” within the system of education. A false sense of security arises for those in the liberal arts from.the belief that the positions they occupy are so powerless as not to be worth capturing. It is evident, though, that the character of 180 liberal education is increasingly determined in a non-democratic fashion by system imperatives rather than by those working within the sphere of the liberal arts.” 2. The division of labor At this point I turn to a consideration of how the division of labor relates to the construction of a democratic distribution of justice. Hegel recognizes the necessity of the social differentiation that is a condition of modern society. If, at the same time, an aspect of modernity for Hegel is the universality of human subjective freedom, Hegel must understand this conception of universality in a manner that takes account of social differentiation. Hegel requires that social integration be consistent with modern forms of differentiation while maintaining human freedom as an inherent feature of human existence. One means through which this relationship between universality and differentiation is mediated is through the division of labor. For Hegel the division of labor represents social elements of differentiation and universality (as seen above in chapter four), but from our perspective it would be difficult to consider the type of universality achieved as desirable. Hegel requires a form.of universality that integrates the individual in a social structure in which the individual is conscious of an affinity with society. In modernity, though, it is clear that the division of labor tends to the atomization and alienation of individuals through specialization in knowledge. 181 The division of labor then becomes a problematic philosophical issue for the construction of normative principles regarding the distribution of knowledge. In the following section I examine critically the role that the division of labor plays with respect to knowledge. a. The division of labor and individual identity formation. Education is not just the transmission of accumulated technical knowledge, but an important aspect of education is the development of individuality suitable to a specific social and economic position. One function of the division of labor is to delineate the types of knowledge that individuals acquire in order to fulfill particular roles in social production. The development of capacities through education is essential for a democratic society as well, which requires citizens who are capable of political participation. There is a relation here to the issue of the division of labor within the sphere of knowledge. There is a correspondence between the formation of personal identity and the division of labor. The philosophical conception of the division of labor is related to the differentiation of knowledge associated with the development of individual identity. Due to the extreme degree of specialization that is presently a feature of the division of labor, a certain narrowness is instilled in individuals so that questions of practical social and political significance seem 182 outside the field of specialization-becoming solely a matter for political “experts.” b. Structural differentiation of knowledge on the capitalistic model of the division of labor. A democratic commitment of our society is an ideal that the distribution of knowledge occurs on the basis of a fundamental norm of equality. The idea is that education should be distributed equally as far as possible, and then further differentiation in terms of who is allowed access to more intellectually specialized education occurs on the basis of merit. It is doubtful how far a commitment to equality is in fact a factor in the distribution of knowledge within our culture. A contextual approach to understanding the justification for differentiation of knowledge within our society requires that the relationship between the economic sphere and the distribution of knowledge is clarified in respects. Although the illusion of meritocracy and democratic equality in education persists, there is a strong tendency toward the control of education based on patterns of control in the economic sphere; business becomes the paradigm for running educational institutions. But the basis of control in the economic sphere is clearly not democratic. A contextual critique of education reveals the illegitimacy of the arrangement of education on the pattern of economic practices and suggests that an alternative to the present trend is democratically controlled 183 institutions of education. One issue that a democratic approach to education raises is the legitimacy of the connection between the division of labor in the market and the formation of individuality through specialization of knowledge oriented toward fulfilling market imperatives. Part of the difficulty is that education is perceived in our culture as an individual accomplishment and in some sense is considered a form of private property rather than an achievement of social production. Since education is thought of as a form.of personal property, democratic procedures are thought not to apply in this realm and educational institutions become merely “a business.” (1) Generating scarcity within education as a means of restricting access to knowledge. The type of differentiation in knowledge that occurs within educational institutions gives rise to an associated division of wealth and social power. Those with professional knowledge (intellectual expertise) earn a great deal more over the length of their employment than laborers. It is apparent, then, that differentiation in knowledge structures not only educational institutions, but the economic sphere is structured to a large degree according to the types of knowledge characterized as intellectual expertise and the knowledge involved in skilled and manual labor. Differentiation in terms of specialization within and among spheres of knowledge is fundamental to the division of 184 labor. The control of the distribution of knowledge is a way of mediating the division of labor within our society. One aspect of the mediating function of the distribution of knowledge is the restriction of access to education and the corresponding generation of institutional structures of power relations. In effect, education and educational institutions are means for creating scarcity of the social resource of knowledge. According to this view it is possible to question the validity of claims that educational institutions are oriented toward the promotion of people based on merit. Furthermore, it becomes reasonable to argue that, insofar as scarcity within the area of education is socially generated, questions about the nature of scarcity within educational institutions and the distribution of knowledge may be addressed democratically rather than being viewed as in some way a natural or an inevitable phenomenon of the market . It may be useful to summarize the important points to be derived from the foregoing discussion of the division of labor as it relates to the distribution of knowledge. (1) Specialized forms of knowledge correspond to specialization within the division labor. The formation of individuals' capacities corresponds to specializations of knowledge. Capacities are often formed in such a restricted fashion that the legitimacy of basing specialization in knowledge on the division of labor can be brought into 185 questioned, given a normative concern with positive individual freedom as self-determination. (2) Even though there is a democratic ideal of equality of opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge, the capitalist market structured on the basis of the division of labor directs the distribution of knowledge in a way that is not concerned with generating equality through democratic means. (3) As an aspect of the division of labor, there is a distinction in knowledge between those with intellectual expertise and those involved in skilled/unskilled labor. Corresponding to this distinction in knowledge there is differentiation in social power and resources. Generating scarcity of intellectual expertise can be considered a social mechanism through which access to knowledge is restricted. The generation of scarcity as a mechanism of social control can be brought into question from the perspective of democratic control over the distribution of knowledge. 8. Possibilities for the development of a democratic distribution of knowledge through a contextualizing approach to justice. The contextual approach of Aristotle and Hegel is useful for a philosophical construction of justice that is democratic insofar as it involves elements that I consider fundamental to democracy: participation and dialogue.30 There are democratic tendencies in Aristotle and Hegel as far as they emphasize these aspects of democracy, but their philosophical constructions are 186 not democratic. On the other hand, it is reasonable to argue that social conditions are now such that a democratic distribution of knowledge can be theorized in a manner that is consistent with its realization according to actually existing social possibilities. Such an approach to a theory concerning the distribution of knowledge is necessarily contextual. In the following sections I first discuss why it is necessary to construct a normative ideal of a democratic distribution of knowledge. The main problem that gives rise to this need is that knowledge within educational institutions is a socially generated and socially supported public resource, but the administration of these institutions is not democratic. It is reasonable to raise the question concerning the legitimacy of forms of control over educational institutions. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to arguments justifying a democratic control over the distribution of knowledge within educational institutions. 1. The problematic nature of the control of the distribution of knowledge within educational institutions. If one considers the various forms that distribution of social resources can take, it is evident that there are various possibilities. As Aristotle notes (Pol. 2.1.1261b 20 ff.), such a distribution could be to everyone severally: for instance such as the residents of Alaska each receiving $900 in 1994 as a tax refund for the exploitation of their state's resources. Alternatively, everyone could own something in common, such as 187 our national parks being a common property of all United States citizens. How does this analysis relate to the question of knowledge as a distributive normative concern? In our society knowledge is often distributed to individuals severally as an individual property. On the other hand, education is a function of collectives. For example, within universities the collaboration of scientists within a field is a collective endeavor, and even competition itself is grounded in a sense on a more fundamental social collective. Furthermore, educational activity often has as a goal the advancement of public welfare and human interests rather than individual interests. A democratic reconstruction of knowledge conceives of knowledge not as a private commodity but as a public resource. One criticism that Aristotle makes of the view that goods should be considered common is that whatever is held most in comon is valued least. But this argument is certainly not universal-in some cases just the opposite is true. People consider the environment (and, in particular, natural resources such as parks, rivers, lakes, air and water quality) to be common property that is of immeasurable value. If private property is considered a certain kind of social right, then it is the case that there are other rights that are valuable just because they are common: freedom of speech and assembly, and equality of opportunity for instance. Since knowledge generated by the educational system is a social product, in a.democratic society there should be 188 democratic control over the use and production of knowledge. It can be argued that in modernity within the social education system there is an illegitimate application of procedures that are driven by the capitalist system of production based on private or restricted ownership. A contextual approach may be helpful in giving definition to the problems associated with the distribution of knowledge in our society and point to possible solutions. In the following section I argue that a contextualizing democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge offers solutions to some of the normative concerns raised in this chapter. 2. Toward a democratic reconstruction of the distribution of knowledge. It is necessary to reiterate that in constructing a democratic conception of a just distribution of knowledge, contextual conditions do not in themselves legitimate a particular structure of the differentiation of knowledge within our society. Rather a contextualizing democratic construction of the differentiation of knowledge within modernity requires that democratic ideals reflect an understanding of relevant social conditions. One difficulty with respect to our own society is to determine in what respects it is truly undergoing transition. If social conditions do not currently hold much promise for democratic change, a contextualizing approach should acknowledge this fact. It does not seem reasonable presently to postulate 189 for our society a theory of justice on the possibility of broad, revolutionary social change. For somezphilosophers fundamental social change seems to be the underlying motivation for their entire philosophy. If such revolutionary change is historically unlikely, then the merit of their approach can be questioned. At a more local level, though, within most institutions possibilities exist for progressive transformations towards more democratic means of administrative control. It remains an open question whether the transformation of educational institutions to more democratic, egalitarian means of control would have any effect on a broader social scale. It would be cynical to deny that this is a possibility, at any rate. One function of a democratic state is to realize institutions which make democratic activity possible. It is reasonable, then, to consider the possibilities for progressive transformations towards more democratic educational institutions. a. Arguments for the distribution of knowledge through democratic procedures. The nature of democratic control over educational institutions is not a straightforward issue but requires further examination. What is essential is that a contextual theory of justice with respect to education present realizable contributions to a democratic distribution of knowledge given the present state of social and economic conditions. Support for this thesis is gained from the following arguments: 190 (1) Argument related to issues of stability/conflict. A distribution of knowledge that is democratic can be realized to the extent that the resources available in universities are no longer a privilege but are readily accessible to everyone. It is reasonable to argue that the distribution of knowledge on a democratic basis can be a means of achieving greater social stability. Participation in the social order is facilitated through education—in this sense education serves a mediating function between individual activity and social agency. Those who sense that they are participants in a social system are committed to the preservation of its social institutions. Conversely, exclusion from democratic involvement in education generates conspicuous conflict over the system of education. Broad dispersion of democratic control over educational institutions involves a sense of commitment to the preservation of educational institutions. It is reasonable to argue that democratic control over educational institutions will be effective as a means of preserving institutional stability. It is also reasonable to argue that stability within the educational system is attained through democratic procedures insofar as such procedures are the most legitimate means for resolving internal conflicts that do arise. Democratic procedures in this sense can serve not only a function of the administrative ordering of educational institutions, but are generally recognized as legitimate means for mediating disputes 191 between groups that may have divergent claims on the resources of educational institutions. Also, the institution of such procedures tends to dissolve the extreme hierarchical organization of universities, so that conflicts which arise over the imposition of administrative control are diminished or eliminated. The mediating function of a democratic construction of educational institutions is beneficial for social stability in that the state gains legitimacy insofar as education is generally looked on as an investment in the development of human resources that is properly a function of a democratic state. In this respect social justice is manifest to individuals through access to educational institutions; such participation serves in turn to legitimize democratic political systems. In the present situation students in educational institutions are perceived more often as objects of administration than subjects capable of being involved in a discourse directed towards the acquisition of knowledge and the development of personality. It is important to note, however, that social stability in itself is not the essence of justice, because it is evident that stability is possible in systems that are far from just. In this case stability is not an end in itself. It is more reasonable to argue that stability is one element that indicates that a democratic conception of justice has been realized within institutions of education. 192 (2) Arguments related to the ability of a democratic approach to respond with flexibility to social circumstances. A contextual approach is characterized in part by its ability to take account of historical conditions that constrain the application of a more equitable distribution of knowledge through democratic procedures. Through a contextualizing approach to justice it is possible to address the question whether there are conditions in which certain inequalities in the social distribution of knowledge may be justified. For instance, affirmative action can be seen as an inequality in distribution that aims to offset inequalities that have been generated by racism in society. Given the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to argue that such inequalities can be addressed through a democratic approach that is participatory and involves discourse oriented toward the public resolution of problems of distribution. It should be noted that one aspect of this public discourse is the generation of a sense of the interests of the community as a whole, rather than the promotion of individual interests. The public sphere of discourse is oriented toward achieving a legitimate course of action through the public validation of normative principles directing human activity—such a view of democracy differs from a conception of democracy as simply voting on an issue. This is an indication of the flexibility inherent in such an approach. One of the intentions of the discussion in chapter two is to explicate Aristotle's understanding of flexibility in the 193 application of normative principles. My intention was to show that flexibility in the application of laws that structure human activity is an important facet of a contextualizing approach to justice. It is possible, however, to argue that Aristotle does not adequately theorize the conditions and limitations to flexibility in the application and formation of norms. He states that the law-maker will determine the degree of flexibility in law. If such a principle were applied to the present structure of educational institutions, this would amount to arguing that administrators should determine the degree of flexibility allowed in the application of rules structuring institutional activity. A democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge argues that those persons who are involved in educational processes should themselves determine to what extent flexibility is required. With respect to the present discussion, this is to argue that such a determination ought properly to be achieved through democratic procedures. Those persons to whom the law applies are the very people who construct the law, and are capable of changing it. In other words a contextualizing approach argues that normative principles should be able to take account of the inherently variable subject matter to which they apply. A.democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge is able to adequately realize this condition because those individuals to whom the rule applies determine the degree of flexibility in application that is appropriate. As an example, in this view it would be consistent to argue that both students 194 and teachers should be more closely involved in the administration of their own programs rather than outside administrators because they are familiar with the conditions required to attain knowledge within that field. (3) Argument that knowledge is shared social wealth and does not fit the model of other commodities in a market economy. Aristotle defines distributive justice primarily as the distribution of political power. Similarly, Hegel presents a view of society defined through a complex distribution of power within the social system. Consistent with this conception of distributive justice, the following claims can be put forth in defense of an interpretation of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge: (1) In democratic educational institutions knowledge is constructed in a universalistic fashion as shared social wealth. (2) In the economic sphere knowledge is viewed as intellectual property and is treated as a commodity under private ownership and control. (3) In modernity social power is largely based on differentiation in the distribution of knowledge distinguishing intellectual expertise from.the types of knowledge involved in skilled and unskilled labor. This distinction is tied to the capitalist market economy requiring rigid specialization of function. 195 (4) There are tendencies in educational institutions toward the reconstruction of the democratic view of knowledge in public institutions to a model of knowledge based primarily on the forms of administration that obtain in the capitalist economic sphere. A main aspect of this is the appropriation of knowledge acquired through public, socially-supported activity and institutions to the interests of the market. (5) Without public supervision, private interests should not be allowed to exploit public wealth for private gain. (6) It follows that democratic procedures should be set up to ensure that the social interest in the distribution of knowledge does not become solely a function of economic interests, but is oriented toward public interests rather than private profit. (7) This entails that social justice requires democratic procedures for the distribution of knowledge. The distinction in knowledge between intellectual expertise and the forms of knowledge based on unskilled and skilled labor is not a matter which should be determined solely by economic systems of control, but through democratic procedures. If the distribution of knowledge is to become more democratic, this means that knowledge as a socially generated resource should be distributed equally as far as possible. This means that the distribution of knowledge should not be driven by market imperatives. This requires a critique of the division of 196 labor that exists in educational institutions according to the presently existing structural differentiation of knowledge. b. Democratic principles drawn on the basis of these arguments. The arguments I have dealt with in the preceding sections show how a democratic approach to the distribution of knowledge is capable of dealing with particular aspects of conflict and the division of labor within educational institutions. In this sense, I have considered possibilities through which a democratic approach can be contextual. It is reasonable to maintain from the foregoing discussion that the following principles are necessary for a democratic distribution of knowledge: (1) There exists in democratic societies an ideal of equality in terms of access to knowledge which engenders social and political capacities. (2) One aim of a democratic government is to increase the diffusion of knowledge throughout society. This is necessary to achieve positive, or concrete, equality among those who are participating in a democratic polity. (3) A major benefit of such a distribution of knowledge is that it serves the preservation of democratic forms of government through legitimization of political processes. In effect, this is a means whereby the distribution of knowledge serves to mediate conflict within our society. 197 (4) The development of a democratic culture requires equality of political control based on equality in the distribution of knowledge oriented toward practical, political capacities. One of the primary means through which universality as legitimate social integration can be furthered (though actual conditions will presumably always limit its achievement) is through democratic forms of education. In this regard, the regulation of the distribution of education through democratic procedures plays a similar role in my thought that the division of labor does in Hegel's thought. In particular, such a view acknowledges the necessity of differentiation in modernity but requires that such differentiation should not be achieved at the loss of self-determination. Further, such differentiation should inherently be a means through which positive forms of human freedom—involving the enculturation of individuals—is attained. CHAPTER 6 Conclusion In conclusion to this dissertation, I briefly review what has been accomplished, and indicate areas that are relevant to the discussion but cannot be developed fully within the limits of this dissertation. I briefly point out the relevance of a contextualizing approach to the issue of privatization in education. In addition, I note that a democratic distribution of knowledge should concern access by people in other nations to knowledge within our society. As an example, certain African nations have connected to the Internet to improve the quality of their educational systems. Concerns arise though whether this may be a means of furthering market-oriented means of control over education within these countries. Finally, I indicate areas in which further research is possible along the lines of this dissertation. In particular, I suggest that the democratic procedures developed by Jurgen Habermas are valuable for the resolution of certain practical, procedural difficulties that a contextual approach defines for a democratic distribution of knowledge. It also becomes reasonable to inquire in what 198 199 respects initially abstract approaches to justice (such as put forth by Rawls) can be contextualized. I. Review of the Dissertation. One thesis of this dissertation has been that Aristotle and Hegel are contextual thinkers whose understanding of social conditions is essential for the development of their normative social theories. I have argued that Aristotle constructs his social theory on the basis of an understanding that knowledge mediates social conflict among political groups so that there is a legitimate basis for the distribution of power within society. One feature of Aristotle's social thought relates the distribution of power in society to the distribution of knowledge—in particular there is an important distinction between those who have intellectual expertise (such as knowledge of how to run the state) and those who have knowledge involved in skilled/unskilled labor. I have also argued that Hegel conceives of the division of labor as forming the rational capacities of individuals based on a similar distinction between those with intellectual expertise and those involved in occupations requiring “practical” knowledge. The basis of authority in the state according to this distinction lies in knowledge of a universal nature; the class of civil servants have universal knowledge necessary to run the state, whereas other citizens' knowledge consists of recognizing the rationality in the state through public spheres of discourse. 200 There are difficulties in Aristotle's and Hegel's contextualizing approaches for the development of normative principles. In particular, there are indications within their political theories that a universal distribution of knowledge is socially beneficial for the mediation of conflict and the division of labor within society. Nevertheless, both Aristotle and Hegel develop political theories that maintain a contradiction between the universal features of human rational capacities and a normative theory which tends to support restrictions within the sphere of knowledge. On the one hand, Aristotle argues that a person with practical wisdom.(the law-giver) should determine how law should change in its application to particular instances. This is necessary due to inadequacy in the universal formulation of law in application to particular circumstances which are inherently variable. On the other hand, Aristotle claims that those to whom the law applies have the knowledge to say whether a law is suitable—just as a shoemaker is not properly the one to say that a shoe fits, but the person who uses the shoe. In addition, Aristotle argues that when a greater number of people participate in politics, the political judgment that they can bring to bear is greater than when just a few people are making political decisions. These aspects of Aristotle's thought lead to the conclusion that a general distribution of knowledge is a benefit to the state and necessary for the development of humans' inherent rational capacities. Still, Aristotle restricts 201 political agency based on knowledge to a very limited class, and this can only be accomplished through an ideological characterization of certain groups of people as non-rational. I argue that the difficulty with Hegel's social theory is that his construction of the distribution of knowledge based on the division of labor is inconsistent with his positive conception of universal human freedom. Accepting the notion that universal human freedom is a characteristic of modern society that is a result of the historical development of humanity, it is inconsistent to accept the legitimacy of a distinction between those with intellectual expertise and those with knowledge oriented toward skilled and unskilled labor when this distinction in fact greatly restricts the development of the intellectual capacities of masses of individuals. The point is that a contextualizing approach by itself is open to abuse through the acceptance of unexamined presuppositions. My second thesis is that understanding the advantages as well as the difficulties of Hegel's and.Aristotle's contextual methods is useful for the development of a normative conception of a democratic distribution of knowledge. my intention has been to achieve greater clarity about the formation of democratic normative theory within the parameters of contemporary social conditions. I have argued that democratic control over the distribution of knowledge is a legitimate mechanism for mediating conflict within educational institutions over access to knowledge and over the quality of education. Conversely, I 202 have also argued that non-democratic means of control, essentially based on the paradigm of administrative control within the economy, are oriented toward particular, market mechanisms based on the division of labor rather than the universalistic interests of society. In particular, one of the functions of education within a democracy is the formation of individuals with the intellectual capacity to form political judgments necessary for positive political participation. Such a conception of education contrasts with the extreme form of specialized education that presently exists within educational institutions. It is reasonable to argue that a contextual approach to justice is necessary to specify the contemporary social conditions that make a democratic distribution of knowledge a realizable possibility. At the same time, a contextual approach allows the identification of social conditions, institutions, and practices that usurp democratic tendencies toward the democratic distribution of knowledge. II. Home Remaining Considerations of the Relevance of a Contextualizing Approach to the Distribution of Knowledge. A. Examination of conflict of interests over the privatization of education. Insofar as I argue for the social distribution of knowledge through democratic procedures, it may be useful to contrast such an approach with arguments for non-democratic means of distributing knowledge. Presently there is a tendency 203 to invoke non-democratic means for distributing knowledge within our society due to inadequacies in the education system— especially at the level of primary and secondary education. One of the prevalent alternatives to the situation in education as it presently exists is the privatization of educational institutions. Those who promote the privatization of education use a number of arguments that have an initial plausibility. First, given the inefficiency of state-run schools, they argue that the privatization of school districts will allow the market to provide a more cost-effective, efficient service to the community. Second, due to the expertise of a business whose function is oriented toward providing educational services, the quality of education is said to improve through switching to for-profit schools. A major aspect of increased quality is said to be the choice in the school that a student can attend- increased competition engendered by school choice, it is argued, will lead to better quality. Lastly, education will not be politicized due to the fact that the ends of market driven educational institutions would not be geared toward engagement of political issues.’1 It is typically argued by conservatives that control by the federal government over education is inefficient, overly regulatory and not cost-efficient. One of the main arguments for privatization is that it will give control back to parents over their children’s education. It is clear, though, that the 204 movement towards privatization in education has numerous political dimensions: is it appropriate to use “vouchers” for students to attend religious schools, as Governor Thompson of Wisconsin recommends?‘What sort of parental control is going to be exercised over privatized schools other than “voting with their dollars”? Are alternatives such as democratic control over schools by parents and students being neglected by such arguments and, if so, why? It is reasonable to argue that the issue of control over education is political, and that it is illegitimate to abandon control over democratic institutions to mechanisms of control and regulation that are run by private, profit-oriented imperatives. If the issue is that educational institutions are under political control, but in a non- democratic fashion, the solution may be to consider how such institutions can become more democratic. Against the conservative position on the privatization of education it is possible to argue that privatization serves a political agenda, but such a policy is undemocratic due to dissimulation concerning the political dimensions involved in this issue. Those who argue for the privatization of education base its legitimacy on the good of the community in some fashion, but it is often the case that other interests are primary: either a desire to use public money for religious education, or the intention to have the government subsidize a ‘highly privileged private education. 205 Aristotle has a standard for the legitimacy of political power: that it be oriented toward the good of the community. How does this relate to the question of justice as a distribution of knowledge? Clearly any political distribution of knowledge which puts control into the hands of those who do not have the good of the community as a concern is at least questionable. But Aristotle notes that what people take to be the good of the political community in a democracy varies. This seems to be a question which cannot be established once and for all, so a method of discourse ethics connected to practical activity such as Habermas presents has something to offer here. 3. The distribution of knowledge across cultural boundaries. The discussion of this dissertation concerns the distribution of knowledge within the United States, but the issue can, and should be considered on a broader basis. In this section I want to indicate certain relevant issues that relate to control over the distribution of knowledge across cultural boundaries. One concern is that there is tension between a universal dissemination of knowledge and the preservation of distinct cultural characteristics. A concern within France presently is the degree to which their culture is being swamped by the culture of the United States. This concerns the distribution of knowledge because the transmission of a country's particular culture is a function of the educational institutions of that 206 country, as well as the unique sort of knowledge that is expressed in a particular culture's language and customs. Modern communication technology is capable of reaching a gldbal audience, but the forms of knowledge that this technology transmits is often driven by market imperatives. A recent Associated Press article states that ten African Universities have been connected to Internet sites in the United states and Europe. The article argues that one benefit of such a program.is to improve the quality of education that African Universities can offer, but it is clear that by “quality” is meant the market imperatives of capitalist economies. “The [world] bank, which is contributing $1.2 million, says most African universities have become increasingly irrelevant in a rapidly changing world, graduating a disproportionate number of students in the humanities rather than the sciences and engineering.”32 According to this article the control of knowledge is evidently not an issue of public, democratic control but is tied to the needs of capitalist production. I am.not arguing that education in the sciences and technology is a not a benefit to these African countries. my concern is that an opposition is being proposed between the humanities and science/technology in which the humanities are “irrelevant in a rapidly changing world.” It could be argued that humanities are increasingly more relevant in a rapidly changing world in order to understand the system imperatives that are driving the control over education and in order to formulate the position that control over education is 207 potentially a matter which can be addressed within a democratic politics. III. Possibilities for Further Research in Contextualizing Approaches to Justice. A. Relevance of a contextual approach to constructivist approaches to the theory of justice. The intention of this dissertation has been to consider justice with respect to the distribution of knowledge in a manner that is attentive to the actual social conditions of conflict and the division of labor. It is possible to contrast this account with constructivist theories of justice which logically develop the social implications of principles that describe the initial conditions necessary for justice. The account presented in this dissertation allows a critical examination of other contemporary ways of looking at justice in this regard. In this section I do not claim.to rigourously work out this comparison, but it is important to note the relevance to other theories of justice as a point of interest for further research. Both Aristotle and Hegel develop concrete theories with an explicit relation to the actual social and political context in which they live in contrast to the often abstract formulations of their predecessors. It is evident that important contemporary philosophers adopt an abstract approach to-the issue of social justice as well, so Aristotle's and Hegel's critiques of abstract approaches to social justice continue to be relevant. 208 A.primary aim of this dissertation has been to demonstrate that contextual categories such as social conflict and the division of labor are useful for analyzing primary questions within our own actual social situation in regard to the notion of justice in the distribution of knowledge within present institutions. A.point of contrast with constructivist theories of justice is the claim that such approaches are universally applicable—at least as an ideal that serves as a standard of reference by means of which a social situation can be judged. A contextual approach to justice does not make claims to universality due to the intention to form.normative principles in reference to particular conditions of social context. If a theory of justice is developed that is universally applicable or in some manner*“eternal”, then it remains that for such a theory to have practical implications it must be related to present social context.33 As Hegel said in his introduction to the History'ot'Philosophy; “Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, and it leads back to the concrete” (HOP‘VOl. I, 25). A contextual approach to justice addresses the issue of applicability directly. The primary intention of a contextual approach is to examine social conditions in order to develop norms pertaining to the present construction of the distribution and production of knowledge within society. I raise the issue of applicability with regard to theories of justice which are abstract in order to formulate certain 209 concerns. While I have an intuitive sense that abstract theories describe conditions of justice, it is not always distinctly evident what sort of social institutions are consistent with such theories. Furthermore, such theories generally are not concerned with the practical question of how we achieve more just institutions given present circumstances. How is an approach to a more just society measured given an ideal theory of social justice as a standard? Is it always possible to adjudicate between competing claims that one social system approaches an ideal of justice better than another? It is possible to relate the normative conception of justice that I present within this dissertation to notions of justice within the liberal tradition of philosophy. Hegel offers a critique of the Kantian abstract conception of norms through his analysis of Kant's practical philosophy. Hegel's critique is useful in orienting the discussion of this dissertation to contemporary normative theories that are influenced by Kent's practical theory—especially the theory of justice that Rawls puts forth. As an example, Rawls claims: “The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic structure of society, the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation” (TOJ 54). Rawls, however, does not specify in detail what such an arrangement of’“basic institutions” might be, or how his conception helps in a practical way in the transformation of present institutions which do not meet his ideal of justice. My point is not to deny 210 the merit of much of what Rawls says (in particular the importance of his emphasis on individual liberties is apparent), but to suggest that the practical dimensions of a Rawlsian approach would be clearer if it were more frequently put into relation to the present social context. A contextualizing approach to the democratic distribution knowledge does take account of contemporary discourse surrounding the development of normative principles. In this regard, a contextualizing approach can incorporate elements of a public discourse surrounding the formation of normative principles. Nevertheless, to meet the conditions of a democratic distribution of knowledge it is necessary that the discussion be open to voices beyond intellectuals involved in often esoteric debate over the formation of normative principles. I believe that Habermas’ theory of a discourse ethics is useful for constructing a public discourse about how the distribution of knowledge can become more democratic under present social conditions. The main element of Habermas' discourse that is relevant in this regard is the requirement that normative principles are valid when the people to whom they apply are involved in the construction of these principles. Clearly, such an approach is worth consideration as a procedure that is capable of forming democratic principles with regard to prevalent conditions of social context. Appendices APPENDIX A A Critique of an Account of Natural Justice in the Work of Aristotle Certain philosophers and social theorists develop a notion of justice based on principles of natural law. The attempt to reduce normative concerns to natural law is a form.of ethical foundationalism that puts questions of justice beyond human dialogue and agency. I argue that neither Hegel nor Aristotle attempt to reduce the social construction of justice to a coherent theory of natural law. Given that Hegel and Aristotle both construct their conceptions of justice in terms of political participation based on rationality oriented toward the universal interests of society, the attempt to regard justice as based on natural law is inadequate. There are tendencies, though, in Aristotle to base structural differentiation in knowledge on natural ability. If Aristotle's theory of justice is essentially based on natural law, then a contextual approach would be a misinterpretation. In this appendix I examine the issue of reducing Aristotle's theory of justice to natural law. I argue that, even though aspects of Aristotle's social theory are based on natural law, Aristotle's 211 212 theory of justice as a whole is irreducible to such a foundation. I. Difficulties in a Naturalistic Account of Aristotelian Justice. A. Introduction. Many political philosophers feel that fundamental aspects of the theory of natural law can be traced back to the social philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. I have two reasons for wanting to examine the attempt to understand Aristotle's conception of justice and political philosophy in terms of natural law. First, certain analytic philosophers argue that Aristotle's political philosophy, and in particular his conception of justice, has a foundation in nature—so there is a sort of natural justice which is primary. For example, Fred Miller in Aristotle on Natural Law and Justice claims that Aristotle's position is that the organization of the state through its constitution is ultimately based on natural justice. “The principle of natural justice provides the theoretical foundation for the best constitution and its legal structure, and also a rationale for the rule of law” (Miller 306). This is an attempt to portray Aristotelian political philosophy as a naturalistic theory which, if true, would be contrary to Aristotle's theory of politics as a form of rational, practical human activity. On a naturalistic account of justice, political organization is not formed on the basis of human agency and 213 rationality. To understand the present social relevance of Aristotle's political philosophy, it is necessary to examine the adequacy of this view of Aristotle's thought concerning justice. Secondly, many modern philosophers frequently support socially conservative positions against egalitarian forms of justice through arguments based on various types of naturalism. If naturalism as a determinant of social conditions is undermined, support for such politically reactionary arguments is diminished. Bringing into question the adequacy of such naturalistic views of Aristotle's conception of justice allows the development of an alternative view that conceives of justice essentially as a political function rather than a result of laws which have their ultimate basis in nature. First, I want to give a general, commonly accepted description of natural law, and present the aspects of Aristotle's philosophy which appear to support such a position. Then Miller's position on natural justice is examined with the intention of showing that such an account is in respects problematic and more importantly does not demonstrate an account of natural justice as an explicitly acknowledged element of Aristotle's political thought. B. General elements of natural law and its relation to justice. Although there is disagreement in the particulars of what constitutes natural law, there is a general understanding that natural law has the following characteristics: 1) necessity; 2) 214 immutability, in other words, regularity; 3) universality and 4) the ordering of life through a generative force which is not under the conscious control of human beings. As Gisela Striker makes plain, natural law does not remain at the level of some instinctual human agency, but is ultimately encoded in terms of a social morality. “The term ‘natural law’ refers, it would seem, to the rules of morality conceived of as a kind of legal system, but one that has not been enacted by any human legislator” (Striker 79). In some respect, all of the foregoing elements of natural law can be found in Aristotle, and it may be worthwhile to take note of their occurrence to see the manner in which nature can be considered an element in Aristotle's social theory. Furthermore, this may provide some insight into how and why some philosophers have come to regard natural justice as a correlative to natural law. some; 511 updnouo: sdvra 1a uév 01') 61’ ainoi); m M. 61’ abtofig. tfbv pév ofw uh 51’ (161:on ca pév 51a tfixnv spduouo: 1:0: 6’ éé (zvdyxflc. ‘tfiv 8’ é§ avayxn; 1a pév 810: m fit soon. Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himaelf. Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. (Rhet. 1.10.1368b 33—37, tr. Roberts) In this passage a certain sub-set of human actions can be considered governed by nature insofar as they are necessary and not due to the agent's own will. Insofar as the actions concerned are not due to the practical activity of the agents 215 involved but are governed by nature, this aspect of human activity is problematic for a conception of law that has its basis in the social construction of human norms. For instance, if it is the case that humans actually are social by nature, it still is not clear that this would necessitate any particular sort of normative code that could be instituted in law. One could say that social laws occur on a different level than that of nature—that of rational human action. Even beyond the obvious variability in social institutions of norms in various societies, Aristotle feels there is a degree to which nature itself is variable-the example Aristotle provides concerns a person naturally right-handed learning to become left-handed. This passage is perceived as particularly troublesome by Miller in his discussion of natural law and justice. Another aspect of nature as it applies to law for Aristotle is its regularity. @0661. fié, 600w fl 1’ atria év auxoi‘g Kai tataypévw fi yap (:81 fl (0; éxl to 1:016 (hombre); (noBatvet. Things which are the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and regular; for they turn out always, or generally, in the same way (Rhet. 1.10.1369a 34-1369b2, tr. Freese). The discussion of the universality of natural law is the most important element involved in this discussion. If one accapts that there is a law of nature that applies to the social realm, then it follows that there will be aspects of social organization that are inevitable, hence, universally valid and requiring no justification. 216 Aéym 8t v6uov 16v uév {810v 10v 5:: KOtVOV, {610v uév 10v tractor; (“optouévov 1pc); (113106;, Kai tofitov 10v uév cypaeov 16v 8%. yeypauuévov, KOIVOV fié 10v Kan): Cp'bO'lV. Eon nip. 6 uavxsfiovrai n xdvmg, cocci KOIVOV Stratov Kai dfitxov, xdv pnfispta Kowcovia rpm; allfiloug fi unfit ouvo'hxn. oIov rat 1’] Zoeoxléoug ’Avnyovn caivetat léyouoa, on Stratov ozetpnuévov Bayou tov Iloluvetxn, mg Mme: 6v toflto Stratov- 01’) nip 1: vfiv 71-: xdeég. 1m: (xx-:1 sore Cfi 10610, 1:066:51; oifiev é§ 6101) odvn. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. Hy particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. This is what Antigone in Sophocles evidently means, when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just: For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came. (Rhet. 1.13.1373b 3-13, tr. Freese) The law associated with nature Freese translates as “general law” (véuov KOlVOV); Roberts translates this as “universal law”. To translate this as “universal” is problematic, since Aristotle says that natural law may in respects hold only for the most part. In nature Aristotle saw diversity, whereas commentators committed to some conception of natural law in Aristotle argue for a conception of natural law that is immutable. The conception of natural law as immutable follows the model of physical natural law and then applies this model to the social realm” A large part of Miller's argument is oriented toward minimizing Aristotle's notion that there is the possibility of change in what is considered an aspect of nature (a right-handed 217 person able to use the left-hand with facility such as a violinist might). This example can even be seen as only a rough metaphor for what occurs in the social realm, since with respect to human activity, as Aristotle never tires of reiterating, the material is not defined in terms of necessity, but only what happens “for the most part“. On the other hand, Aristotle says (Loeb, 115) that “nature belongs to the idea of ‘always' (Eon 6’ fl uév ofiong 10% flat ... ” (Rhet. 1.11.1370a 8, tr. Freese). But here the discussion is dealing with physical states of the body, so the conception of nature that applies is materialistic rather than social. C. Outline of Miller’s position on natural justice. It is possible to give a rough general outline of Miller's technical and detailed discussion of natural law and justice in Aristotle which will make evident his general aim.and will enable a critique of his project. Miller's project can be roughly summarized along the following lines: (1) Miller first identifies the inconsistencies in Aristotle's account of natural law. (2) Miller argues that such inconsistencies on natural law in Aristotle's practical works can be accounted for through an examination of positions that Aristotle developed elsewhere- particularly his biological works. 218 (3) Lastly, Miller draws some further political conclusions base on this revised version of Aristotle's account of natural law and justice. Miller notes that most commentators on Aristotle's theory of justice have reached the conclusion that there is no consistent, uniform theory of justice ultimately based on natural law. For instance, in Origins of the Concept of'Natural Law, Gisela Striker argues persuasively that there is not an attempt by Plato or Aristotle to work out a conception of natural justice based on natural law: I conclude that Plato does indeed hold that there is an objective, “natural” standard of justice; but he decidedly does not believe that this standard is given by anything that could be called natural law. The same is true, I believe, of Aristotle, who accepted, with very slight modifications, Plato's view of the inherent weakness of general rules (op. Pol. 3.15.1286a 7-16). (Striker 86) Striker maintains (86) that according to Aristotle natural justice arises through the order of a human community which has arisen through the natural tendency of humans toward sociality. Such a natural tendency is plastic in that it does not specify any direct connection between natural law and a pre-determined concoption of justice. The particular form that justice may take within society is something not given by natural law but to be worked out through a rational, dialectical process. Striker's claim that the first thoroughly worked out theory of natural law can be found in Stoic doctrine is reasonable given the clarity 219 with which the stoic doctrine of natural law is expressed in works such as Cicero's De Re Publica: Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans, sempiterna . . . nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit . There is, certainly, a true law agreeing with the right reason of nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting . . . And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times . . (Cicero, De Re.Publica translation by C.W3 Reyes with some revision on my part, Loeb Edition, 210-211). Stoic influence on the doctrine of natural law is evident in this passage through the emphasis on a type of natural law that is in conformity with reason that pervades nature itself. The hypostatization of practical reason within nature can be questioned along the lines that Feuerbach critiques religion—it is the projection of an ideal into nature as a realm beyond the practical activity of humans as a means to legitimate the authority of natural law while undercutting in advance any attempted critique of the doctrine. Other elements of a stoic conception of natural law are apparent: universality, eternality, and the impossibility of abrogating or redefining the law through human practical activity. Equally evident is the lack of any definition concerning what form this law might achieve. Given Aristotle’s critique of empty, formal abstractions, the content of natural law would have to attain a high degree of definition. The question, then, is whether 220 Aristotle himself has even attempted to further elucidate this concept. Miller identifies a number of difficulties in Aristotle's account that it is necessary to resolve if a coherent doctrine of natural law is to be maintained. First.Miller has to resolve the difficulty of the conflicting views concerning the permanence of natural law given in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean.Ethics: . . . in the Rhetoric he [Aristotle] does link natural law to natural justice, which he discusses in Magna Moralia I.33-and Nicomachean Ethics v.7. However, the latter discussions seem to conflict with the.Rhetoric, for they agree with each other that natural justice is in some sense compatible with change, but this seems to contradict the claim.of the Rhetoric that natural law is immutable. (Miller 278-279) For Miller to maintain the view that Aristotle had a consistent conception of natural law as it is generally accepted, it is necessary that he provide justification for the view that the passages on natural justice in Aristotle's Rhetoric are the primary source of Aristotle's views on natural justice (Miller 285). This requires that.Muller account for the passages in which Aristotle states the view that nature shows variability in how underlying tendencies may be realized. This appears to be the crux of Miller's entire paper. Two difficulties appear to be developing for Miller in his attempt to maintain the conception of natural law as given in the Rhetoric. The main function of natural law seems to be its immutability. Such a foundationalist account of social law will 221 clearly serve the purpose of countering relativistic normative claims that are put forth by conventionalists. In passages in both the Magna Moralia and Nicomachean Ethics what is natural in both a physical and social sense is mutable (Miller 285) . Miller feels that what is particularly difficult is the passage in the Nicomachean.Ethics in which Aristotle maintains that even though the right-hand is by nature stronger, the left-hand can be trained to be stronger (in: 5.7.113» 33~35) ." Second, it is necessary for Miller to represent the Rhetoric as a thoroughly considered philosophical presentation of a coherent conception of natural law rather than a manual of sorts examining the rhetorical methods of successful persuasion such as would be useful within the Athenian court system. Although the use of the biological analogy of right- handedness may be considered rather incidental, Miller feels it is of central importance for illustrating the naturalistic foundation of Aristotle's conception of justice: . . . I think that the example of right-handedness provides us with a valuable clue, in that it suggests a biological perspective on natural justice. Aristotle finds it necessary to adopt this biological perspective because he has repudiated the metaphysical foundations of Plato's theory of natural law and justice. (Miller 288) In other words, the “biological perspective” of Aristotle’s natural law theory is fundamental, and the aporiae of natural law and justice can be elucidated through solving the puzzle that this analogy presents: that of a natural law that is 222 seemingly not universal. Miller's claim requires a great deal of support considering it is primarily based on a rather limited analogy given by Aristotle—as if the Pharaohs tried to have the pyramids constructed with the pinnacle supporting the base. On the other hand, Muller maintains with some justification that part of this puzzle can be explained through Aristotle's use of teleological justification in his empirical works. According to Miller, even though a person naturally right-handed can be trained to be left-hand, by nature the right is still superior due to the fact that the final end of the organism reaching its full potential is best attained through the use of the right hand (Miller 292). Translating this biological analogy into the discourse of practical reason the conclusion that follows is that even though natural law can be bent to the conventions that arise within society, still natural law is the true standard for achieving the proper end of the social animal—namely the happiness of humans within society. In fact under this view society becomes nothing more a medium through which the natural ends of humans are fulfilled according to a teleological view of human beings that is borrowed from Aristotle's empirical biological works (Miller 295). Miller ultimately concludes that Aristotle's account of justice is only as adequate as his teleology: This account, as I have interpreted it, stands or falls with his teleological view of human nature and the polis, which has of course been the object of many criticisms. But given this teleological view, 223 his account of natural law and justice is coherent and plausible. (Miller 306) In support of this, Miller argues that Aristotle's position is that law is necessary for forming the natural moral character of individuals so that they can reach their full human potential (Miller 295). This does not support Miller’s discussion of natural law, though, because it is not evident that law itself is natural according to Aristotle, even if one accepts the claim that humans have a natural potential to realize an enduring state of moral conscience through the cultivation of character by means of law. In this view, justice and law in themselves are not natural, but there is a “natural potential” to receive them” Further, the notion that Aristotle's teleology supports a naturalistic conception of justice requires clarification in one important respect: Aristotle holds that the end (telos) of a thing is achieved through a realization of its full potential. If this full realization of human potentiality is only possible in the state, as Aristotle clearly maintains, then the notion of justice can only be understood in terms of the state—just as it is reasonable to argue that the notion of what a human is can only be fully realized within a social context. The whole is “by nature”jprior to the part hence the state is prior to the individual in the sense that the fully developed individual would not be realized outside of the state. The role of nature within the state then becomes a secondary issue, and not 224 directly related to a conception of justice that is essentially social.35 There are certain political consequences that follow from a naturalistic view of justice. The interpretation given to Aristotle which conceives of natural justice as somehow diffused through the state in the more concrete form of political justice Miller finds “promising” (Miller 287). Miller does state that nature is fundamental to the further development of the notion of justice within the structure of the state: “The conception of nature underlies Aristotle’s account of the correctness and justice of constitutions” (Miller 300). Nevertheless, Miller's discussion of the types of justice within the state, and in particular the discussion of distributive justice as the allotment of power within a state refers only tangentially to natural law. In the preceding discussion there does appear to be the basis for a critique of the interpretation that Miller offers of Aristotle's conception of natural law and justice within his practical works. D. Critique of Miller's account of natural justice my position is that Miller's account is not adequate to deal with the ambiguities in Aristotle's account of natural justice, and so his position that Aristotle's conception of justice is essentially naturalistic is open to question. Ultimately this allows that there are elements of Aristotle’ s conception of justice that open up concrete possibilities of 225 conceiving of justice in less rigid terms than fundamentalist theories of justice based on natural law. 1. Difficulties in the interpretation of natural justice in Aristotle's Rhetoric. It is evident that the characteristics of natural law are not so much at issue for Aristotle in the passages of the Rhetoric which are relevant to a Miller's discussion as the more inmediate question of how best to argue a case. spotov uév 06v rcpt vOpmv etumpev, rm; xpno'téov Kai npozpérovxa Ital dzocpéxovxa Kai Katnyopoflvra Kai oxoloyobpsvov. ouvepbv yap on, éov uév évavflo; f] o yeypaupévog 16$ rpayuan. 1Q 1:0th VOpQ xpnoréov Kai tot; émeméow d); {immorépmg . . . . not On to pév extents; (1st uévst Kai 0136151018. petafldllm, 0138’ 6 1(0th3; (mm 960w yap éonv), 01 8% yeypaupévm xollénctg . . . Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading, accusing or defending. For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice . . . that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary . . . (Rhet. 1.15.1375a 25-33, tr. Freese) If the written law is against the matter we have in hand to argue (éav uév évavflog ii 6 yeypapuévog 1:8 upd'wan) , then one strategy is to argue that there are natural, immutable laws common to all that transcend the written laws. Another strategy (flattery) is to argue that a “better man” would prefer unwritten, immutable laws to those that are written down. This passage continues in the same vein with Aristotle practically giving a list of arguments or persuasive techniques that will be 226 suitable just in case what we are arguing for happens to be against the written law. If on the other hand the written law is advantageous to our position, Aristotle presents another list that can be used in support of the written law: If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath ‘to give my verdict according to my honest opinion' is not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means . . . . Or that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at all . . . etc. (Rhet. 1.15.1375b 16-20, tr. Roberts). Clearly, in these passages the concoption of natural law that Aristotle puts forth is subservient to the legalistic purpose at hand. Aristotle's use of natural law is here context-dependent so it is highly questionable whether a coherent, over-arching conception of natural law can be derived from.these passages. There is additional external evidence which makes it difficult to accept these passages of the Rhetoric as philosophical statements. For instance in the discussion of equity (éxt81xég) given above Aristotle says that “equity is ever constant and never changes,” but in the Nicomachean.Ethics Aristotle repeatedly argues for flexibility in the determination of what is equitable. The fact then that in the Rhetoric Aristotle presents rhetorical methods of argumentation that are two-sided makes it problematic to adopt one side of his argumentation as his considered philosophical view on an issue. Furthermore, there is often conflict between passages in the Rhetoric and 227 other works which are more expository in a philosophical nature such as the Politics and the Nicomachean.lthics. 2. Lack of clarity in explicating the relationship between natural justice and political justice. Miller states: “Natural justice is viewed as in some way “permeating” political justice.‘When the Nicomachean.Ethics states that “constitutions are not [the same], though everywhere only one is the best according to nature” (1135a4-5), it is implied that constitutions can be evaluated and compared as better or worse on the basis of the extent to which they possess naturally just features” (Miller 288). This entire passage is problematic. Miller argues that we should not neglect the discussion of justice presented in the problematic work the Magna Moralia. But Miller ignores Aristotle when he states: “But what we are in search of is political justice. Now the politically just is the legal, not the natural” (MM, 1.33.1195a6-8, tr. Stock). Furthermore, the account of the relationship between natural justice and political justice that Nfiller presents varies from one moment to the next. Miller first claims that “Natural justice is viewed as in some way “permeating” political justice” (Miller 288). Further on Miller claims that natural justice and political justice are distinct: There is considerable agreement among Aristotle’s different discussions of natural law and justice. They all recognize a distinction between, on the one 228 hand, common (natural) law or natural justice which has an objective basis and applies to all persons and, on the other hand, particular law or political justice which depends upon local agreement and consequently differs for different localities. Moreover, natural law or justice serves as a standard by which the laws of different localities may be compared and evaluated. (Miller 305) Immediately following this Miller states again that political justice has a “natural component”: “Since the lawgiver must cooperate with nature in order to create the polis with its constitution and laws, political justice has both a natural and a legal (conventional) component” (Miller 305). The exact relationship between natural justice and political justice remains unclear. What is the concrete relation between “natural” universal laws and individual constitutions which often vary? If constitutions, which are the basis of distributive justice, vary then how can it be said they are based on universal, immutable natural law? How do individual constitutions as the representation of the ordering of a community through justice “ if one were arise from natural law? Miller claims that, to examine the constitution, laws, and customs of a polis which possessed political justice, one would find that certain features could be deemed to be naturally just . . . ” (Miller 288). This statement is not illuminating because it is not clear what elements of the constitution and laws are natural, nor is it evident why they are natural, and the relationship between 229 the natural and its embodiment in any particular law is left unexplained. Miller's discussion of natural law in Aristotle's practical works becomes convoluted and based on rather distorted presumptions. Miller arrives at the peculiar notion that the solution to a quite particular difficulty in Aristotle's political thought is to be found ultimately in his biological works. The majority of the commentators on Aristotle regard the notion of natural law as undeveloped in the Aristotelian corpus. As stated earlier Miller takes Aristotle’s references to nature as central to his political conception of justice: “The conception of nature underlies Aristotle's account of the correctness and justice of constitutions” (Miller 300). Miller is arguing along the following lines: (1) if justice is essentially natural, (2) and justice is the organization of the constitution, (3) then the organization of the state is essentially natural. The main uses of the notion of nature in relation to society for Aristotle are not central to his discussion on justice: in the Rhetoric arguments based on natural justice serve the legal case at hand, in the Politics the conception of nature is used in a genetic sense to explain the evolution of social structures rather than their essence and, additionally, appeals to nature are used ideologically to support the established social hierarchy. 230 II. Functions of Naturalism in Aristotle's Practical works. Even agreeing that there is in some sense a conception of natural influence to human organization in Aristotle, it is still necessary to ask what this means. There is a conception of nature that is characteristic of Aristotle's empirical work, but the particular question arises what function naturalistic accounts of rational human institutions serves in Aristotle’s practical works. A. Newman’s conception of nature as a genetic function in Aristotle's practical works. Newman, in his erudite four volume commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, first provides an account of the role that nature serves in Aristotle's practical works, and thereafter draws conclusions that are relevant to the Aristotelian notion of justice. This approach is more satisfactory than those accounts which have the intention from the beginning of qualifying the Aristotelian concaption of justice as natural, and then attempt to work out the inconsistencies of this account. The primary reason Newman's discussion is superior is that it provides a better sense of the structural evolution and integrity of the practical concopts that Aristotle is using and developing. As Newman notes, the primary function that nature plays for Aristotle (and for ancient people in general) is genetic (see, for example, Met., 5.4.1014b 16-10) . Within the Politics this means that the origin of the state is natural (i.e., 231 through the family), that the formation and development of the state is constrained by natural material needs, and, finally, that there is an end or telos to the state which is consistent with its natural origin. In the Politics, however, Aristotle not only contrasts law with compact (Pol. 3. 9. 1280b 10), but seems everywhere to imply that the State neither came into being by way of compact nor is dependent on compact for its authority. It began in the blind impulses which first formed the household and broadened there into wider aims which nothing but the State could satisfy. It glided imperceptibly into existence, as men became successively aware of the various needs bound up with their nature. (Newman, vol. I, 27). The origin of a natural thing is essential to the ensuing genesis; however, it is clear from experience that there is flexibility in the type of formation that is possible on this natural basis for Aristotle. Related to the genetic connotation of “nature” for Aristotle is the notion of phusis as the essence of a thing. “ustaoopa 8’ flbn Kat 67mg rdoa oimia ofiou; lé'yetat 6th “minnv, 61:1 Kai 1’] @(m‘tg oimia 1i; éonv. ” “Indeed from this sense of ‘nature,’ by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called ‘nature,’ because the nature of anything is a kind of essence” (Met. 5.4.1015a 12-14, tr. Ross). What is important about this passage is that it indicates that it is not uncommon for a Greek philosopher to refer to the “natural” attributes of something and actually be talking about its essence. So when Aristotle talks about “natural” justice, he is referring in part 232 to the essential characteristics or definition of justice rather than what we would call “nature”,per'se. my point is that a strict translation of the Greek text may give rise to some misunderstanding in this context. Newman conceives of norms as social developments that serve practical functions and that have arisen along with the evolution of human society. Even though Aristotle recognizes that society evolves in part according to constraints imposed by natural needs, in his ethical and political work he recognizes that normative concerns arise on the social rather than the natural level. “But though the State resembles the household and the village in this particular [a common life, 16 ouCflv], it develops virtues unknown or imperfectly known to them. Justice, in the true sense, first appears in the State” (Newman,‘vol. I, 38). The commonly accepted notion of natural law and justice as an immutable, objective force that imposes certain (undefined) normative constraints on the practical reason of humans is foreign to Aristotle (sc. Nicomachean.Ethics, 5.7.1134b 18 ff.). It is instructive to compare this view of justice with that of Miller: “In this context humans have the innate capacity to perceive and express justice and injustice because this is necessary in order for them to attain their natural ends. For humans must engage in cooperative forms of social and political organization in order to fulfill their nature and these forms of cooperation require a conception of justice” (Miller 294). This 233 passage gives the impression that for Aristotle what is primary is nature, whereas in fact Aristotle clearly argues that the State is “prior” to the individual (P01. 1.2.1253a 19), and the realization of our potentiality is not as natural but as social beings. B. Recognition that naturalism in Aristotle’s practical works serves certain ideological functions. In Book I of the Politics the discussion of the natural foundation of slavery is put forth to defend an ideological position. The discussion of nature in these passages does not seem to be essential to the structure of Aristotle's political thought, but is an attempt to justify a political position supporting a particular class structure. Even recognizing the ideological tendency of such passages, I believe it would be dangerous to then bracket these expressions as irrelevant to Aristotle's considered philosophical position. In some respect slavery is not a social institution with a natural basis for Aristotle but is recognized in terms of its. overt economic functions. A question arises that Aristotle does not ask but that follows with obvious importance for his political philosophy: If there is no economic function served by the social institution of slavery, would it then be reasonable to maintain that slavery is a natural function within society? These passages give the impression of a philosopher whose rationality is leading him.to form.conclusions that he is, perhaps for psychological or social reasons, incapable of 234 accepting. This is relevant because if there is no economic advantage for slavery, then it is reasonable to presume, as Aristotle does, that there would be no need for slavery. So these considerations conceive of slavery as a social rather that a “natural” problem for Aristotle. The attempt to reduce this problem to an objective fact of nature is inherently problematic. Further discussion of this concern, though, must presently be left aside. III. Conclusion: Relevance of this Discussion. It may be useful to summarize the position garnered from the foregoing discussion and to reiterate why I feel this discussion is important in general and to this dissertation in particular. My conclusion is that Aristotle's reasoned account of justice as presented in the Nicomachean.zthics and the Politics is not in essence based on the commonly accepted notion of natural law. Aristotle does not present a consciously worked out, coherent or connected discussion of natural law and justice that explicitly serves as the foundation for his social theory. Those philosophers who feel they can discern a coherent notion of natural justice in Aristotle’s work arrive at their position through a patchwork process that often conveniently overlooks the context of the discussion that Aristotle is engaged in. Second, certain of the passages in which Aristotle does make reference to a natural order which exists in society are profoundly problematic. They are ideological insofar as they 235 provide an appearance of justification for a social order that is unjustifiable. It is at least possible to suppose that Aristotle realized that there could be no reasoned argument for the institution of inequality in these particular instances, and so recourse is taken to naturalism. Furthermore, to over- emphasize the role of nature in Aristotle's discussion of justice diminishes the relevance of Aristotle’s account of justice in relation to political questions concerning the distribution of power and knowledge within society. Discussions of natural justice persist both in philosophical discussions and in contemporary social debate. Furthermore, the discussion and critique of natural law and justice raises relevant issues for other areas of philosophy. For instance, naturalistic conceptions of justice are presented as somehow objective according to a specific view of human nature. A feminist could easily argue that such a view of human nature is ideological because it appears to present a conception of nature which is universal, and yet naturalistic accounts of justice are often used to legitimate differences in the distribution of power and wealth within society. It is clear in Aristotle's case that when he incorporates naturalism into his discussion of practical rationality the function is often ideological-whether he is conscious of this fact or not. Even though my presentation of Miller's position has been contentious, it is necessary to realize the truth of what 236 Aristotle says concerning the philosophical dialogue with those whom we disagree: they deserve our gratitude for providing a starting point for the discussion. APPENDIX B Difficulties Involved in a Contextual Approach to Justice as Equity and Flexibility in Normative Principles After drawing arguments for the flexibility in application and formation of normative principles from.Aristotle's ethics (Chapter 2.1.) a number of interesting implications and objections follow which require a response from an Aristotelian viewpoint. What determines the degree of flexibility to which a rule is subject? Doesn’t such flexibility lead to caprice or individualistic relativism in the choice of principles for moral conduct? Does a universalistic ethics based on an abstract conception of the good avoid such difficulties in a way that is suitable for practical activity? Is there a problem insofar as Aristotle considers some rules inflexible; for instance, killing a parent would be reprehensible under any condition? These considerations require a critical examination of limiting factors to flexibility in the application of principles, in particular the role that character plays, and the function for Aristotle of the person possessing phronSEis (vpévnowg. prudence, thoughtfulness, (here) correct practical judgment) as the source of practical rationality on which judgments are based. 237 238 I. Why Aristotelian Ethics Instead of Universalistic Claims in Morality? In this section I want to address some of the difficulties that have arisen for Aristotelian ethics within the context of a discussion on strictly universal application of ethical principles. One matter of concern is the extent to which flexibility is allowed. Why did Aristotle feel flexibility is necessary in moral systems to begin with? In part, this can be seen as a response to Plato, for whom the good was an ideal that is eternal and immutable. Aristotle has a clearer conception of the variability of human principles and practice. This variability imposes difficulties on the formulation of an ethical system, but Aristotle had the insight to see that ethics can not be made abstract in the same manner as geometry in its formulation of principles based on pure figures (Stewart 27). Problems arise in attempting to force universal, immutable principles on a variable subject matter-especially within the realm of ethics. The Aristotelian approach seems better in that it starts from experience (the person with QprflOt; seems to be a repository of practical experience) and constructs practical principles on this basis. Categorical moral imperatives appear, in contrast, to be of limited applicability in a schema of knowledge in which the subject matter plays such an important determining role in the fommation of principles which aim at directing human action. 239 One argument against the view that knowledge of an ideal good is useful for directing individual practical activity in a morally justified manner is that such a view is inconsistent with the actual practice of human beings. Nevertheless, one could argue that, although a conception of the absolute good is inconsistent with actual practice, it is possible such a conception of the good is useful as a guide. Aristotle argues that for this to be the case, there would have to actually be a conception of an ideal good that is not empty, and it would have to be demonstrated how such a good could‘direct (or Plato would say’“participate”) in the various species of good. The initial plausibility of such an abstract theory seems quickly to fade when put to the test. One benefit of Aristotle's approach is that it allows for flexibility in the application of legal justice in that it is capable of taking into account the intentions of agents rather than only the outcome of their actions. The application of law here is not strict, but is determined according to what is suitable to the occasion and the people involved. Aristotle's ethical system is a vast improvement over Procrustean moral systems in which the rule is the sole determinant of the matter under consideration. In such absolutist systems there is no flexibility of rule-human practice must simply conform to the rule. Arguing for flexibility in application of laws is by far the more humane approach. 240 II. Aristotelian Ethics and Moral Relativity. The question arises whether it is reasonable to claim that Aristotelian ethics is merely a situational ethics. The difficulty is that if this is the case, then there is little basis for formulating principles that can be justified outside the limited situation in which they apply. Aristotle’s contextual approach is an open method of inquiry which leads to results that are applicable to and evaluated within the realm.of social activity. By an.“open” inquiry I mean the following: (1) Aristotle feels it is first necessary to define a problem within a sphere which is practical (involving human activity) rather than theoretical in nature, and (2) there is an application of the knowledge learned to new situations which are not pre-determined in their outcome. Aristotle often begins with a critical examination of common prevailing opinions, as well as the more reflective thought of his philosophical predecessors, to see in what respects these views are correct and in what respects inadequate. In this regard Aristotle is not a relativist—it is possible to judge among the various positions of discourse in matters that concern social justice. Knowledge of the ethical dialogue between Plato and Aristotle, for instance, is extremely valuable, even essential, to an understanding of their respective positions. 241 Part of the reason the question of normative relativity comes up within Aristotelian ethics is due to the problematic nature of what is commonly taken to be the “good life” (sfiéaluovta). Aristotle starts the discussion with an examination of commonly received opinions concerning happiness- clearly such opinions vary greatly in nature. Following Aristotle's approach provides an interesting contrast to the skeptics who take such a state of affairs as an indication that morals are radically relative. For Aristotle this aporia serves as a beginning of the discussion. If there is something that is an end in its own sake and never a means to something else, this indicates an ultimate source of ethical action. If everyone admits that it is happiness, the pursuit of happiness may be taken as a moral principle in itself.“ Nevertheless, it is clear that while everyone agrees that happiness is desirable for its own sake and may be the source of moral action, what the conception of happiness actually is varies to such a degree that it is necessary to proceed by analyzing what people take happiness to be. Three types of orientation in life (cf. Stewart, 45) are generally considered to constitute happiness, (1) external happiness (material goods, honor and fame), (2) corporeal (pleasure in general), (3) intellectual. There are problems in translation insofar as efifialuovia is not only a state, but an activity, as such it is inherently diverse. “fi.efi8atuovta év zpdéu éo‘tt, rat to télog xpaétg ng éo‘ttv, 01’) xowtng.” “All 242 human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality” (Poet. 6.1450a 18, tr. Bywater). The difficulty is that there seems to be no agreement with respect to what constitutes a good life, similarly with regard to the actions that are inherent to such a life. Aristotle states (NE 1.4.1095a 16) that almost everyone agrees that the highest end is happiness, the account of the life that people relate as happy, though, is variable. In this case it is not so much that there is relativity with respect to what is judged as the mark of a good life, the standard of a good life is in any case happiness, but the life that can properly'be construed as good requires clarification and justification. Such difficulties are perhaps the reason utilitarians seek refuge in the basis of pleasure and pain as the sole foundation of the good on which human action is judged. With respect to happiness, Aristotle shows that according to common conceptions there is no universal agreement on what constitutes happiness. The variability seems to be a matter of conviction concerning what yields happiness rather than a difference in the definition of happiness,per so. For Aristotle it is appropriate to say that everyone agrees on what happiness is, but only disagrees on the means to attain it—for some it is wealth, for some honor, for others the life of contemplation. One of the characteristic features of early ethical systems is the belief that there must be one ultimate good—an 243 absolutist ethics. When it becomes apparent that there are, in actuality, a multiplicity of goods and different ethical modes of action for different situations, it is supposed that moral conduct is radically relative (with the implicit assumption that, therefore, ethics is meaningless). III. The Knowledgeable Judge Determines What is Properly Good, But Who Determines Who the Knowledgeable Judge is? While Aristotle recognizes the need for a flexible approach to the formation of laws, his political solution to handle this is far from adequate. The view that flexibility in the application of normative principles should be conducted as the original law—giver would if he were present and appraised of all the circumstances appears ad hoc. Aristotle maintains that the person of practical wisdom (opévnoxg) is considered the proper judge in deliberations about moral/political matters. It is necessary to discuss the factors which define the person of practical wisdom and thereby the limits to flexibility in rational principles which such a person would set as guidelines. Merely having a disposition towards ethical activity is not sufficient for Aristotle to say that a prudent life has achieved its proper realization. But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or displaying it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. [ . . . ] And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for 244 the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found,-so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life. (NE 1.8.1098b 32—1099a 5, tr. Rackham). Aristotle's account is not directed to the functioning of moral agents in an abstract sense, but to the realization of human capability in activity. It is reasonable to maintain that within the Aristotelian account humans are better able to realize their potentiality than an ethical system based on abstract conceptions insofar as absolute imperatives are inadequate for the formation of human agency within a social context that is so variable. Furthermore how such ideal moral imperatives relate to and condition actual human activity is often not defined. Aristotle argues that we act morally due to our character which is formed through habitual action guided by principle (NE 3.5.1114b 26-30). Aristotle denies that “ . . . one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good” (NE 3.5.1114 b 6-7 tr. Ross). This denies any innate moral intuitionism within Aristotelian ethics, at least it isn't clear how intuition could function in this capacity. The manner in which Aristotle talks about.“practical intuition“ (NE 6.11.1143a 36-1143b 6) essentially involves discerning particular, variable facts on which practical judgments are based. While Aristotle does speak metaphorically of an.“eye” which discerns correctly in this book, such a faculty is a function of experience, rather than being an innate 245 faculty. for experience has given them [the elder men of practical wisdom] an eye for things, and so they see correctly (NE 6.11.1143b 13-14, tr. Rackham).” If “seeing” what is right is a matter of nature (innate) then moral responsibility cannot be assigned because, as an involuntary act, it is something for which one is not responsible within Aristotle's ethics. A.prob1em arises at this point: who determines ultimately what sort of habits should be instilled in the first place? This question concerns political education. Plato’s Apology is interesting in this regard, as an example of the common Athenian notion that the laws themselves serve an educating function: {at 81’] vuv size 106101;. tic; 01inch; 8811101); zousi‘; fifilov yap 61:1 01000:, pélov 7.6. cm. 10v pév 701p macpeeipovza ééeupmv. (o; tpfig, épé, eioa'yetg 10010101 Kat Katnyopefg mv 8% 8h Beltioug xomfivra to: size not ufivooov ainoi‘g m; éonv. 006;, (I) Mélnte, 6n swag Ital 01’): £181; eixetv; 1:0:th 01’): aioxpév 001 Goxei‘ erat not ixavbv texpfiptov of) 5:) cm léym, on 001 0136“ pepélnxsv; (111' eixé, dryaOé, tic; abtobg apeivoug 1016f; oi vbum. Socrates: Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing:me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is. Meletus: The laws. (Apology 24D, tr. Jewett) 246 It, appears necessary to at least open the question of the relation between the person of practical wisdom and politics. IV. The Political Role of the Knowledgeable Judge. The ultimate teacher of morality is the person of practical wisdom. It is necessary to question how the practically wise person acquires this knowledge. For Aristotle this is through practical, political experience: inquiry among philosophers, knowledge of commonly accepted principles, historical analysis, and analysis of the laws of other cultures. This inquiry is an activity and this activity is essentially political in nature. The person most suited to judge what is appropriate (6 Kpttfig) is the person knowledgeable about the appropriate human conduct for a state, for Aristotle this is the citizen educated in the polis, oficet xoltnxéw 6 livOpmxog (NE 1.7.1097b 12): And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. (NE 1.2.1094a 27-1094b 7, tr. Ross) The political activity of citizens with practical wisdom determines ultimately to what principles moral conduct conforms. 247 These principles in turn form the character of the citizens. There is more merit in Meletus’ response to Socrates than is generally acknowledged insofar as he realized the importance of the laws to the formation of character. “And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts” (NE 1.9.1099b 27-32, tr. Ross). Aristotle states that the variable nature of the subject matter of ethical inquiry is such as to give the impression of being a matter of convention. While Aristotle ultimately denies that it is purely a matter of convention, he explicitly states that the formation and application of law is not absolute, but requires flexibility. It is clear with respect to Aristotle's discussion on happiness that he does not accept the view of Protagoras that, “udvzmv xpnuéztmv pétpov éoflv depmxog. 16v uév bvww (b; éonv, 16v 8:} 60!: (Snow 6); ODK éonv.” “Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are, of the things that are not that they are not.”" The role of the person with practical wisdom is social and not just the activity of a moral individual-especially considering that the formative process through which individuals of practical wisdom arise is a ‘political function of the state. It is in this sense that Aristotle states one positive aspect of law is that it is 248 “reason unaffect by desire”: “816mm liven bpégeo); v06; 0 véuog éoflv”(Pol. 1287a 31-32, tr. Jowett). Endnotes Endnotes 1 Quoted from Fred Dallmayr, G. W..F. Hegel: .Mbdernity'and Politics, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 95. As Dallmayr notes, this formulation of the famous phrase given in The Philosophy of Right is less problematic in that there is not a simple equation of the real with rationality. 2 The Greek word firkaloofivn, generally translated as justice, is much more general than the English word justice in its application and meaning. thaloofivn, justice, righteousness, < bikalog, observant of'custom or rule, esp. social rule (Liddell-Scott) . In Utilitarianism J. S. Mill has an extremely interesting discussion on the etymology of the term justice in regard to the issue of equivocation in its meaning. 3 Even though in Greek thought of this time it would not make sense to completely distinguish justice as an individual ethics and justice as a political “virtuefi.it is clear that the main contrast between Plato and Aristotle is that Plato emphasizes justice in the subjective, moral sense as a “way of life” similar in respects to a Christian conception of “righteousness” as a moral way of life which is instilled in citizens of a state through a process of “education”-much like wool that is prepared to permanently receive a purple dye (Rep. 4298-4308). ‘ This view can be compared to one aspect of Marxist thought in which social, material conditions of production determine the prevalent ideology of a society: The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life- process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, or development; but men developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (Marx, The German Ideology, 154-55) 5 One possible source of absolute moral inperatives is natural right. I argue at various points in this dissertation that 249 250 neither Aristotle nor Hegel base their theories of justice on natural right. ‘ common Rights and.Expectations: Primary International Treaties Protecting The Rights Of'All People, united Nations Texts, Gerald and Maas Editions, Ottawa (Canada). http://www.hiddencharms.com/gm/texts.htmm (Accessed on 4/30/97). 7 It is important to note that Plato contrasts the specialized knowledge of the aim.and order of the whole state (oomia, wisdom) with more particular knowledge such as a smith might have (téxvn, art, skill; a trade, handicraft). Such restricted knowledge belongs to the few guardians who govern the state. “Then,” said I, “is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself and other states?” “Why, there is.” “What is it,” said I, “and in whom is it found?” “It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word.” . . . “And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations?” “By farx” “Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole” (Rep. 4.6.428D-428E, tr. Shorey) ' Cf. Hegel's comment on Fries' Philosophy: The chief tendency of this superficial philosophy is to base science not on the development of thought and the concept, but on immediate perception and contingent imagination; and likewise, to reduce the complex inner articulation of the ethical, i.e. the state, the architectonics of its rationality—which, through determinate distinctions between the various spheres of public life and the rights LBerechtigungen] they are based on, and through the strict proportions in which every pillar, arch, and buttress is held together, produces the strength of the whole from the harmony of its parts-to reduce 251 this refined [gebildeten] structure to a mush of 'heart, friendship, and enthusiasm'. (POR 15-16) ’ Paul Cloché, “Aristote et les Institutions de Sparte”, in Schriften zu den Politika dbs Aristoteles, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Publishing, 1973), p. 340. " As the dissertation proceeds it will become evident that Aristotle does considers respects in which justice is useful for structuring a society of constitutional rule among equals. I will argue that features of Aristotle's thought in this regard are useful for developing a conception of justice as a democratic distribution of knowledge. “ I do not want to get into the particulars of translation in this passage but in the phrase: Kai 611 To uév ézletké; (181 uévet Kai ofifiésore netafldllel. 0138’ 6 Kowég (and show yap éonv), it may be better to translate 0135'6 Icowég as “and neither does the general law [ever change]” rather than Freese's translation “even as the general law”, which tends to equate equity with general law. At any rate, the parallelism in this passage between equity and the general law concerns immutability rather than nature: 1:6 pév éxtetxé; . . . ofifiéxore 1181118011181, 91E [petafldllet] b tones. The phrase Kath ofiow ydp éonv appears to be an afterthought added to o Kowég [vouégl “the general [law]”. Ii v.4. “sb‘htfl‘h-u-afx—isar _ - i l ‘ a ' - .__ _ —-——’_I “ From W. K. C. Guthrie, History of'Greek Philosophy? Aristotle an.Encounter, vol. 6, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1981). ” Quoted from Allen Wood's introduction to Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1991). 1‘ Cf. Rawls, “Political Constructivism”, in Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia university Press, 1993), pp. 102-103. “ Cf. Kant, Science of.Right: “Freedom.is independence of the compulsory will of another; and in so far as it can coexist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original, inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity” (REF). ‘" Translations of Du Contrat Social are mine. 252 “ Cf. Article VI of Declaration des Droits de L’Somme et du Citoyen: “La loi est l'expression de la volonte generale. Tous les citoyens ont droit de concourir personnellement, ou par leurs representants, a sa formation. Elle doit etre la meme pour tous, soit qu'elle protege, soit qu’elle punisse.” " Examples of corrective justice are common in the Old Testament and can be distinguished from the type of retributive justice demanded in the phrase “an eye for an eye”: Exodus 21:33 And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit, and not cover it, and an ox or an ass fall therein; Exodus 21:34 The owner of the pit shall make [it] good, [and] give money unto the owner of them; and the dead [beast] shall be his. Aristotle distinguishes these two types of justice at NE 5.5.1132b 22 ff. 1’ Plato's construction of an ideal social order with the intention of determining whether justice is the proper attitude for the individual to take in life is from an Aristotelian perspective an inquiry that from the beginning has been framed in a problematic fashion. For Plato there is an ideal Good which conditions the order of a state. If this notion of the Good is inherently problematic (as Aristotle came to believe) then it is difficult to justify a social construction on this basis. " Richard Robinson, from the introduction to Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), xv. 21“I've included Rackham's translation, which, in my opinion, does not adequately capture the sense that justice is primary for structuring the state, rather than being only an.“element of the state”. This illustrates the difficulty in approaching these texts through translation. ” Aristotle often repeats the common notion that justice is “the good of the other,” for instance note the passage: abtn pév 013v f] Stratoobvn open) uév éon 181810;. (111’ 01’); (11:10; (1116: 1pm; Etcpov. Kat 81d 10010 zolldxtg spatiom 10v apetav etval Soxei‘ f] Stratoo'bvn, not 000’ éozepog 0150’ {300:3 ohm Oauuaowg . . . Justice then in this sense is perfect'Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought 253 to be the chief of the virtues, and more sublime ‘or than the evening or the morning star' (NE 5.1.1129b 26—29, tr. Rackham) One might more reasonably translate xpOg Etepov as “in relation to others” as Ross does rather than “displayed towards others”. The immediate precursor to this idea of justice as the good of others is in Plato, but it is generally distorted by the poets or to serve the arguments of sophists such as Thrasymachus. Cf. Plato's Republic, 1’} 8e Stratoofivn allo'mtov pév (xyaOév. oixeia 8t Cnpia .. .” “Justice is another's good but one's own loss . . . ” (Rep. 3.5.3928, tr. Grube). ‘” For Aristotle, and ancient Greek philosophers in general, the use of emotion in political rhetoric has great potential for abuse. " “The polis teaches man.” 25 Interestingly, Jowett translates “Biatov yap” as “being an interference with nature” which is far too mild, Bialog means: forcible, violent, compulsory. ‘“ “There (especially in Scotland), it has emerged that the most direct means of dealing with poverty, and particularly with the renunciation of shame and honour as the subjective bases of society and with the laziness and extravagance which give rise to a rabble, is to leave the poor to their fate and direct them to beg from.the public” (POR $245, 267). ” Cf. Cohen and Arato, Civil Society'and.Political Theory, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992): We take seriously the normative principles defended by radical democrats, but we locate the genesis of democratic legitimacy and the chances for direct participation not in some idealized, dedifferentiated polity but within a highly differentiated model of civil society itself (19). Our framework, however, allows in principle for a third approach, one that does not seek to correct the economic or state penetration of society by shifting back and forth between these two steering mechanisms. Instead, the task is to guarantee the autonomy of the modern state and economy while simultaneously protecting civil society from destructive penetration and functionalization by the imperatives of these two spheres (25). 254 The rigid conceptual division of civil and political society is difficult to maintain in the specific form in which it is used in the French discussion. Politically, however, the distinction makes good sense because it implies a reorientation of democratic politics away from the state to society without promoting the overpoliticization of society (38). ” As an example of this argument, consider the following statement from conservative state Representative David Jaye: "It's racist, sexist, unfair and unacceptable to give positions to less qualified minorities and steal them from.more qualified non-minorities," Jaye said, "Why should a rich Black kid from.Bloomfield Bills whose parents are doctors get preference over a poor white kid who grew up with a welfare mom.in Mount Clemens?" (State Rep. David Jaye, quoted from The State News, 14 May 1997) I think that in addressing the contentious issue of affirmative action, it is better to avoid extreme rhetoric that inflames emotions. 1” Cf. Michael Walzer's notion that education requires protection from outside forces which tend to subsume control of educational institutions to system imperatives: Schools can never be entirely free; but if they are to be free at all, there must be constraints in other distributive spheres, constraints roughly of the sort I have already described, on what money can buy, for example, and on the extent and importance of office. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, (Basic Books: 1983), p. 213, cf. p. 204. ” Cohen and Arato feel that participation is not required for democratic practice. The notion of the development of a social sphere separate from the state (economic or civil) that is based on democratic principles appears rather desperate. Transformation of political institutions to allow democratic equality in access to knowledge appears to be a goal that is not entirely in vain. ” In order to illustrate these arguments the following quotations are taken from an article on the internet endorsing privatization: 255 The marketplace comes to terms with how to meet customer demands. . . . Failure to retain and satisfy customers leads to losses. Success in retaining and satisfying customers generates profits. The incentive system gives central importance to the customer. Competition among schools would keep tuition levels under control and force them to satisfy the wishes of students and parents. Schools that successfully satisfied their consumers would.meke money, and those that did not would lose money. No longer would educational decisions be largely a function of political considerations. James R. Rinehart and Jackson F. Lee, “Can the Marketplace Save Our Schools?”, http://townhall.com/townhall/spotlights/9-11- 95/market.html, (Accessed 10 Fobruary 1997). ” Abebe Andualem, The Lansing State Journal, “Cyberspace Project Offers Lifeline to African universities", 6 April 1997. n I have in mind here a comparison to Jehn Rawls who states that the original position allows such an application: Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub rpecie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view. . . . it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, they can, whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint. John Rawls,.A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 587. “ It may give insight into the extent of Miller's difficulty to quote this passage in context: Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or 256 rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming'tbat both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. (my emphasis, EN, 5.7.1134b 24-1135b 1). 35 As Ronald Beiner notes in Political Judgment, it is just this lack of any direction from natural law that makes an inquiry into the concrete details of practical political rationality necessary for both Aristotle and for contemporary political theorists. “It is because we do not have available to us an infallible natural law that merely wants means of implementing that a painstaking process of judgment or‘phronesis in the Aristotelian sense, the careful weighing of given particulars, is required of us” (Beiner 24). ‘“ Cf. the Declaration of Independence: “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”. ” Protagoras, quoted from.Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957/1983), 411. 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