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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE EFFECTS OF INTERPERSONAL DISCOMFORT ON INTERGROUP

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
presented by

Todd David Nelson

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
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MSU II An Afﬂrmaﬂve ActlonlEqunl Oppommlty Inetltuion
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THE EFFECTS OF INTERPERSON AL DISCOMFORT
ON INTERGROUP ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

By

Todd David Nelson

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1996

 

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT S OF INTERPERSONAL DISCOMFORT
ON INTERGROUP A'ITITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

By

Todd David Nelson

While researchers in social cognition have investigated the inﬂuence of positive (e. g.,
happiness) and negative (e. g., anger and sadness) emotions on the tendency to use
stereotypes in social judgments, little is known about the inﬂuence on stereotyping of two
other types of negative affect: guilt and discomfort. Two experiments were designed to
investigate the inﬂuence of guilt and discomfort that arise outside an inter-racial context
(incidental affect) and within an inter-racial context (episodic affect). Participants in
Experiment 1 were exposed to a guilt-inducing procedure, and their responses on measures
of stereotyping were examined. Though pilot testing showed the procedure to be successful
in producing guilt, the procedure was not successful in the experiment proper, and the
inﬂuence of guilt on stereotyping could not be examined. The procedure produced feelings
of 'other-directed negative affect' in participants, and the effects of this emotion on
stereotyping were examined in an exploratory fashion. Participants in Experiment 2 were
exposed to a procedure which was designed to increase their feelings of discomfort, and
the inﬂuence of this discomfort on measures of stereotyping was examined. Results
revealed that the procedure was successful, and that the discomfort experienced led to more
or less stereotyping depending on the race and (unexpectedly) gender of the participant and
interaction partner. The ﬁndings indicated that the discomfort participants feel interacts with

different factors in inter-racial contexts to produce complex patterns of motivation,

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cognitions, and affect among participants. The implications of the ﬁndings for research in

social cognition studying the inﬂuence of affect on stereotyping are discussed.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have been responsible (in direct and indirect ways) for
my path in academia that has taken me to the completion of my Ph.D. First and foremost,
my wife Barb has been wonderfully patient and supportive throughout this whole process.
She's been my balance and rock of support & encouragement, and has sometimes had to
drag me away from work to remind me to take breaks and have fun. I am extremely
thankful for her constant love and support. I also want to thank my mother & father. They
provided me with the values, self-conﬁdence, optimism and support that fueled my desire
to pursue my academic (and non-academic) dreams. For the endless support mom and dad
have given me, I am eternally grateful. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my undergraduate
mentor, Dr. John Fleming, who introduced me to social psychological research and was a
wonderful mentor, role model, and friend.

This dissertation couldn't have come to its fruition without the fantastic guidance,
support, and incisive constructive criticisms of my advisor, Dr. Galen Bodenhausen. I feel
honored to have worked with Galen because I have the highest respect and admiration for
what he has achieved and given to the ﬁeld in his brilliant career. Although Galen may not
realize it, he has inﬂuenced my professional development in countless ways. He has been a
wonderful role model for me in my training as an experimental social psychologist, and he
is also an excellent mentor. In my future research and supervision of graduate students, I
hope to maintain the high standards of excellence Galen has imparted to me.

I am very grateful to my dissertation committee members, Dr. Norbert Kerr, Dr.

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Linda Jackson, and Dr. Thomas Carr, for their cogent critiques, advice, and wonderful
support they provided which greatly facilitated my progress through the dissertation, and
enhanced the quality of the dissertation research.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to the following: Pepsi Co., for maintaining a
steady supply of Diet Mountain Dew to the Detroit area; my mother-in law, for allowing me
to take over her basement for the summer to work on the dissertation; Drew & Mike on
WRIF; Jaeger & Dr. Judy on Lovephones; USA Live with the People's Court; and
California State University - Stanislaus for granting me the leave time to return to MSU to

ﬁnish the dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................. viii
INTRODUCTION FOR EXPERIMENT 1 .................................................... 1
Affective Processes in Intergroup Relations .......................................... 1
Guilt ...................................................................................... 16
Summary and Predictions for Experiment 1 ........................................ 24
Hypotheses for Experiment 1 ......................................................... 36
METHOD ........................................................................................ 37
Participants and Overview ............................................................. 37
Measures ................................................................................ 37
Procedure ................................................................................ 42
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .............................................................. 47
Affective Reactions ..................................................................... 47
Evaluation of the Hypotheses ......................................................... 50
Exploratory Analysis of the Primary Dependent Measures ........................ 51
Analysis of Secondary Dependent Measures ........................................ 60
Ancillary Findings ...................................................................... 67
INTRODUCTION FOR EXPERIMENT 2 .................................................. 84
Discomfort in Intergroup Contexts ................................................... 85
General Effects of Discomfort and Arousal ......................................... 85
Hypotheses for Experiment 2 ......................................................... 91
METHOD ........................................................................................ 92
Participants and Overview ............................................................. 92
Measures ................................................................................ 92
Procedure ................................................................................ 92
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .............................................................. 97
Affective Reactions ..................................................................... 97
Evaluation of the Hypotheses ........................................................ 101
Analysis of Primary Dependent Measures .......................................... 102
Analysis of Secondary Dependent Measures ....................................... 104
Ancillary Findings ..................................................................... 105
GENERAL DISCUSSION ................................................................... 135
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 154

vi

REFERENCES ................................................................................. 1 5 8

APPENDICES
Appendix A - Modern Racism Scale ................................................ 171
Appendix B - General Information .................................................. 174
Appendix C - Sample Characteristics Survey ...................................... 175
Appendix D - Self-Description Questionnaire ...................................... 177
Appendix E - Social Opinion Inventory ............................................ 178
Appendix F - Student Court Questionnaire ......................................... 180
Appendix G - Post Evaluation Questionnaire ...................................... 181
Appendix H - BIDR Scale ............................................................ 182
Appendix I - Topics Questionnaire .................................................. 183
Appendix J - Personality Questionnaire ............................................ 184
Appendix K - Exit Questionnaire .................................................... 185
Appendix L - Factor Analysis of Individual Mood Items Experiment 1 ........ 187

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table l - Other-Directed Negative Affect Composite Scale .............................. 49
Table 2 - Severity/Seriousness Composite Scale .......................................... 54
Table 3 - Likelihood of Future Crimes ...................................................... 55
Table 4 - Likelihood of Guilt ................................................................. 58
Table 5 - Likelihood of Guilt 3-Way Interaction ........................................... 59
Table 6 - Topics Questionnaire (Target Ethnicity) ......................................... 62
Table 7 - Topics Questionnaire (Experimenter Race) ..................................... 64
Table 8 - Severity/Seriousness Composite Scale (Experimenter Race) ................. 68
Table 9 - Severity/Seriousness Composite Scale (Experimenter Gender) .............. 71
Table 10 - Likelihood of Guilt ............................................................... 73
Table 11 - Stereotyping of Feminine Items ................................................. 76
Table 12 - Time Volunteered to Help ....................................................... 78
Table 13 - Amount of Time Volunteered ................................................... 79
Table 14 - Guilt Inventory .................................................................. 100
Table 15 - Stereotyping of Feminine Items ............................................... 106
Table 16 - Uneasy/Uncomfortable Composite Scale .................................... 108
Table 17 - Self-Directed Negative Affect (Confederate Race) .......................... 110
Table 18 - Self-Directed Negative Affect (Participant Gender) ........................ 111
Table 19 - Self-Directed Negative Affect 3-Way Interaction ........................... 112
Table 20 - Guilt Inventory .................................................................. 114

viii

Table 21 - Topics Questionnaire ........................................................... 1 17

Table 22 - Topics Questionnaire 3-Way Interaction ..................................... 118
Table 23 - Stereotyping of Feminine Items (Participant Gender) ...................... 120
Table 24 - Stereotyping of Feminine Items (Participant Prejudice) .................... 121
Table 25 - Stereotyping of Masculine Items (Confederate Gender) ................... 123
Table 26 - Stereotyping of Masculine Items (Distance) ................................. 124
Table 27 - Stereotyping of Masculine Items (Prejudice x Confed. Gender) .......... 126
Table 28 - Stereotyping of Masculine Items (Prejudice x Distance) ................... 127
Table 29 - Total Sex Stereotyping Index (Gender x Gender) .......................... 129
Table 30 - Total Sex Stereotyping Index (Participant Gender x Distance) ............ 130
Table 31 - Total Sex Stereotyping Index (Prejudice x Confed. Gender) ............. 131
Table 32 - Total Sex Stereotyping Index (Prejudice x Distance) ....................... 133

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The Effects of Interpersonal Discomfort
on Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior

For decades, researchers in social psychology have been interested in uncovering
the antecedents, processes, and consequences of stereotyping. Though few researchers
investigated stereotyping in the early days of social psychology (Katz & Braly, 1933,
1935), empirical interest in stereotyping grew dramatically during the 1970's -- with the
advent of the "cognitive revolution" in psychology (and social psychology in particular
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991)). By some estimates, more studies on stereotyping were conducted
between 1973 and 1977 than in the prior 50 years combined (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson,
& Gaertner, 1996). Today, interest in stereotyping among social psychologists continues
unabated.

It is important to define what researchers mean by the terms "stereotype" and
"prejudice." A stereotype is typically deﬁned as a "cognitive structure that contains the
perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a human group" (Hamilton &
Trolier, 1986, p. 133). Most researchers (but not all; see Smith, 1993, for an exception)
agree that prejudice refers to "negative evaluations of social groups" (Stephan & Stephan,
1993, p. 125). The present research will also employ these deﬁnitions of prejudice and
stereotypes. While research on stereotyping and prejudice has important practical
applications for society, another reason that investigators continue to be fascinated with this
area of research is that stereotypes seem to be much more complex in origin and effect than
was previously suggested by Allport (1954) and his contemporaries. Researchers today
realize that whether or not an individual will utilize a stereotype in a social judgment
depends not simply on a rudimentary categorization process (Lippman, 1922), but on a
complex interaction of affective and cognitive processes (Hamilton & Mackie, 1993;
Hamilton & Sherman, 1994).

Affective Processes in Intergroup Relations
Since the early 70's, research on stereotyping has been dominated by a social-

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cognitive perspective, which focuses on how people think about others and about
themselves (Hamilton, 1981; Stephan, 1985). Discussions of stereotyping during the 70's
and early 80's centered on understanding the processes involved in the way perceivers
processed social information, and how breakdowns or biases in this information
processing increased the reliance of the individual on stereotypes for making social
judgments (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
A major beneﬁt of the cognitive approach to stereotyping has been the demonstration of the
important inﬂuence of expectations about social groups on social judgments and attitudes
and behavior toward outgroups. Examples of this type of theorizing include research
demonstrating that intergroup discrimination can originate from categorization (e.g., Tajfel,
1970); that the context-based salience of outgroup members can affect how those persons
are perceived (e. g., Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978); and that biases in the way
distinctive information about outgroup members is perceived can lead to an increased
tendency to stereotype outgroup members (e. g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1978).

During this period of cognitive dominance in the social psychological investigation
of stereotyping, the investigation of the inﬂuence of affect on stereotyping (an area of
research pursued with much less vigor) continued. Yet, amid the emphasis on cognition, a
few researchers called for the examination of the role of affect in stereotyping (e.g., Fiske,
1982, Hamilton, 1981). Toward the end of the 80's, researchers began to take a closer
look at the inﬂuence of affect on cognitive processes (e.g., Forgas, 1990; Isen, 1987;
Schwarz, 1990). This change was precipitated by the development of several theoretical
perspectives concerning the nature and structure of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988). In an inﬂuential article, Zanna and Rempel (1988) argued that
attitudes toward different attitude objects may be more or less determined by affective,
rather than cognitive, sources.‘ Researchers soon began investigating more directly the
effects of positive versus negative moods on the tendency to stereotype others in social

judgments (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993).

 

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In addition to the growing empirical basis for returning to the investigation of
emotion's effects on stereotyping, there were theoretical and intuitive reasons for such a
renaissance of emotion experiments in intergroup perception. Traditionally, emotions were
thought to contribute importantly to the development and endurance of stereotypes (Allport,
1954; Lippman, 1922). The history of intergroup relations is replete with evidence that
intense emotions guide the thoughts and actions of people in intergroup contexts (Katz,
1981). Affect plays a major role in the way that information about social groups and group
members is processed. Affect inﬂuences the accessibility of constructs in memory and thus
may determine which of many social representations are primed, and which characteristics
in a given representation become activated (Forgas, 1992; Stangor, 1990). Affect may also
inﬂuence the extent to which the individual exerts information processing effort (Schwarz,
1990; Stangor & Lange, 1994). Affect also becomes associated with social group labels
through learning processes (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Clark, Milberg, & Erber, 1988).
When affect and physiological arousal are associated with group members, they will
inﬂuence how information about the outgroup member is interpreted, how the perceiver
responds to the outgroup member, and whether the perceiver tends to interact with
members of the target group in the future. Below, I turn to a discussion of the ﬁndings
reported thus far in this rapidly-growing area of investigation.
Typology of intergroup affect

In one step toward specifying further the nature of affect in the intergroup context,
Bodenhausen (1993) has introduced the useful distinction between "incidental" and
"integral" affect. The former is deﬁned as affect that is elicited by situations unrelated to the
intergroup context, while the latter is affect that is elicited within the intergroup context
involving the stereotyped outgroup. Integral affect can also arise from merely thinking
about the outgroup. Bodenhausen notes that much research on stereotyping has utilized
incidental affect, but surprisingly few studies have examined the inﬂuence of integral affect

on judgments of members of stereotyped outgroups.

4

In the present research, it is useful to make a further distinction regarding integral
affect. It is reasonable to suggest that individuals should have a rather stable feeling toward
the outgroup as a whole, which may be termed "chronic racial affect." In addition, people
can also have an affective reaction within an interaction with a speciﬁc outgroup member,
and this can be termed, "episodic racial affect." In the present research, guilt and
discomfort are evoked within the experimental session. In some conditions, these feelings
will involve interaction with an outgroup member ("episodic racial affect"). One of the
goals of this research will be to examine the inﬂuence of episodic racial affect and incidental
affect upon an individual's tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments. Elaborated
below are discussions of chronic and episodic racial affect, as well as incidental affect.

Chronic racial affect. Attitudes have traditionally been viewed as stable,
enduring evaluations of an attitude object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Petty & Cacioppo,
1981). This idea certainly holds true for the notion of racial attitudes. In his classic treatise,
The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) defined a stereotype as "...a fixed idea that
accompanies a category" (p. 191). Because one's racial attitude was believed to be a stable
evaluation of the outgroup and its members, it was assumed that any evaluation of the
outgroup member in the future, regardless of the context, would be a direct result of the
simple recall of the perceiver's stored evaluation of the outgroup member. Because any
attitude (or 'evaluation' of the attitude object) has incorporated within it both a cognitive
and affective component (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), it is
reasonable to suggest that the affect associated with the attitude is also an enduring feature
of the evaluation of the attitude object. In other words, each time the attitude object is
perceived or remembered, the evaluation will trigger beliefs and other information
associated with the object, as well as enduring feelings associated with the attitude object
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). This process also holds when
considering enduring intergroup (racial) attitudes. The affect that one feels toward the racial

outgroup, as a result of one's enduring attitude toward the outgroup can be termed "chronic

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racial affect." This affect is distinct from affective reactions to an interaction with a M
member of the outgroup. In order to better understand the affect that accompanies this
enduring racial attitude, it is useful to examine further the nature of the enduring racial
attitude.

The attitudes of Caucasian Americans toward African-Americans have been
increasingly liberal and egalitarian since the mid-60's, suggesting to some that prejudice in
this country has decreased, and that Caucasians are more egalitarian toward African-
Americans today than they were three decades ago (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985).
However, much research suggests that while the overt form of hostility and prejudice
toward African-Americans may be much less prevalent, prejudice continues to exist in a
more subtle form (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gaertner,
1976; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Allen, 1984; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977,
1981). Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) use the phrase "aversive racism" to describe the
prejudiced attitude toward African—Americans that characterizes many Caucasian
Americans. These people, according to Gaertner and Dovidio, truly believe they are
egalitarian and regard themselves as nonprejudiced. However, they also possess negative
feelings about African-Americans. These aversive-racist individuals are able to express
negative attitudes toward African Americans yet feel no affective consequences of doing so,
thereby preserving the self from threatening conﬂict-related negative affect (Monteith,
1996a)

Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) suggested that this anti-Black affect has a number of
possible sources. Differences in physical appearance between Caucasians and African-
Americans can fuel this negative affect (e.g., Margaret Mead's statement that people must
"be taught to hate, but the appreciation and fear of difference is everywhere" (as cited in
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, p. 63)). The multiple effects of mere categorization of people
into "ingroups" and "outgroups" has biasing effects for the perceiver on the perception and

evaluation of people, irrespective of objective evaluations of the individual being perceived

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(Billig & Tajfel, 1973). People in the ingroup l) are assumed to be more similar in beliefs,
2) are evaluated more favorably, 3) are the recipients of more positive behavior by the
perceiver than are members of outgroups, and 4) are found to be more attractive by the
perceiver (Brewer, 1979). Some suggest that social and cultural factors also contribute to
the anti-black affect felt by aversive racists. These anti-black feelings are fostered by
traditional cultural stereotypes of blacks in the US, as lazy, ignorant, poor, and more
likely to commit crimes (Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). Finally, recent research
suggests that Caucasians tend to see black culture in the United States as promoting values
that are at odds with the Protestant work ethic (Jackson, Hodge, Gerard, Ingram, Ervin, &
Sheppard, 1996).

Central to low-prejudice individuals' self-concept is their belief that they possess
egalitarian values. Their negative feelings about African-Americans are often kept out of
awareness so that they do not threaten their view of their self as egalitarian and
nonprejudiced. When a situation threatens to make these negative feelings salient, the low-
prejudice individual tries to dissociate his/her self from these feelings, and often acts more
positively in ways that will convince him/her self and others that he/she is not prejudiced
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Monteith, 1993).

Because much affect in intergroup contexts involving stereotyped groups tends to
be negative, empirical attention has been devoted to the inﬂuence of such affective states on
judgments of the members of the stereotyped outgroup. In general, when people feel
negative affect, they are especially likely to describe racial outgroups using unfavorable
characteristics (Esses & Zanna, 1995). The particular negative affective state that has been
investigated the most is anxiety, because it is commonly experienced by individuals in an
intergroup interaction (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1993). Stephan and Stephan (1985)
developed a theoretical model of intergroup anxiety. In this model, anxiety has a disruptive

effect on the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings of the outgroup member and the perceiver.

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This anxiety can also lead to increased stereotyping by the perceiver, and an avoidance of
future intergroup interaction, and attempts by the perceiver to control others (Fiske,
Morling, & Stevens, 1996). According to Stephan and Stephan, the amount and conditions
of intergroup contact are crucial determinants in whether the individual will experience
anxiety prior to, or during, interactions with the outgroup. When there has been minimal
contact, and/or the contact has been characterized by conﬂict, the individual will tend to feel
more anxiety prior to or during the intergroup interaction. Research by Wilder (1993;
Wilder & Shapiro, 1989) and others (e.g, Rankin & CampbelI, 1955) supports the notion
that anxiety may be a common emotion felt among interactants in the intergroup contexts.
Moreover, anxiety may promote stereotyping of outgroup members by an affective
consistency process (cuing more negative cognitions) or through increased reliance on
expectancies (and schemas) regarding outgroup members as a result of a reduction in
cognitive capacity (Bodenhausen, 1993). Stereotyping may also occur through a
combination of each of these two processes.

Research by Dijker (1987) suggests that an important determinant of the type of
chronic racial affect that the perceiver feels in the intergroup context is the degree to which
the outgroup member is culturally dissimilar from the perceiver. Dutch participants in
Dijker's research were surveyed about the way they believe they would feel and behave in
response to various scenarios involving various forms of contact with different ethnic
groups. Dijker identiﬁed four types of emotion that appeared to be strongly related to ethnic
attitudes: positive mood, anxiety, irritation, and concern. More personal forms of contact
were associated with decreased anxiety and more positive mood with an ethnic group that is
culturally similar (Surinamers) to the Dutch perceivers. On the other hand, close contact
tended to be more negative with a group that is more culturally dissimilar from the Dutch
perceivers (Turks).

Some research also suggests that intergroup affect is a better determinant of

attitudes and behavior toward ethnic groups than are cognitions about the ethnic group

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(Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1990). However, others
suggest that our cognitions about members of the outgroup inﬂuence how we feel about the
outgroup. For example, Dijker and Frijda (1988, as cited in Esses et al., 1993) reported
evidence that supports the notion that the characteristics (positive traits, ethnic appearance)
that we attribute to members of an ethnic group may inﬂuence how we feel about that group
and our attitudes toward that ethnic group. In other words, many of the reported causes of
emotions in the intergroup context were related to characteristics of members of the ethnic
outgroup.

In sum, there appears to be a solid empirical basis for the notion that the intergroup
context brings with it an emotional component for the interactants, and that factors such as
proximity and degree of personal contact in the intergroup context, physical and personality
characteristics of the outgroup members, and the cultural similarity of the outgroup to the
perceiver's ethnic group tends to inﬂuence the strength and valence of the emotion felt by
each individual in the intergroup interaction. This emotion then has various
disruptive/biasing effects on the individual's perception of information, and it tends to
increase reliance on the use of stereotypes in processing information about the outgroup
member in the intergroup context.

Episodic racial affect. One's intergroup-related affect can also be a result of a
speciﬁc interaction with a speciﬁc individual member of the outgroup. This affect can also
result from the imagined interaction with an individual from the outgroup. This intergroup-
related affect, termed "episodic racial affect," can be similar or different in valence from
one's chronic racial affect toward the outgroup. Before an elaboration on the effects of
speciﬁc interactions between members of different outgroups on mood and stereotyping, it
is necessary to understand how stereotypes may (or may) not change as a result of the
contact between the individuals.

The contact hypothesis is the belief that increasing exposure to members of various

groups can increase positive evaluations of the outgroup and decrease prejudice and

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stereotyping. This idea is elegant in its simplicity and is an intuitively appealing notion of
how society might reduce prejudice. However, much research has shown that 'simple'
contact is ineffective in changing racial attitudes (Amir, 1969). The reason is that, upon
viewing the member of the outgroup, stereotypes and negative affect are elicited even prior
to the interaction. The stereotype ﬁlters the perception of the interaction in ways that
conﬁrm the stereotypes about the outgroup, and "By the time [the interactants] part, the
ofﬁshness each has shown has conﬁrmed the other's suspicion. The casual contact has lleft
matters worse than before" (Allport, 1954, p. 264). Researchers have also examined
multiple contact situations over time. For example, an experiment by Cook (1969) suggests
that contact over a period of time (2 hours a day for 20 days) can signiﬁcantly change
intergroup attitudes. In their research white women who were selected because of the
highly negative attitudes toward African-Americans, interacted with an African-American
woman on a cooperative task. The contact was close, the interactants had equal status, and
they had a superordinate goal that they were working toward. A comparison of the pre- and
post-interaction racial attitudes revealed that 40% of the women in the experimental group
showed a signiﬁcant positive change in racial attitudes toward African-Americans. More
evidence for the effectiveness of repeated equal-status contact was reported by Deutsch and
Collins (1951). They found that in desegregated public housing, equal-status contact
between white and African-American neighbors resulted in much more favorable attitudes
of the white individuals toward equal- housing policies.

Research on the contact hypothesis soon afﬁrmed, as Allport (1954) earlier argued,
"The case is not so simple" (p. 261). That is, it became apparent that in order to understand
why the contact hypothesis sometimes seemed to work well in reducing intergroup
prejudice, and other times it didn‘t reduce prejudice, it was necessary to ask not "does
intergroup contact reduce prejudice?" but rather, "in what types of contact situations, with
what kinds of representatives of the disliked group, will interaction and attitude change of

speciﬁed types occur, and how will this vary for subjects of differing characteristics?"

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(Cook, 1962, p. 76). In surveying the literature, Amir (1969) found that in order for the
contact hypothesis to work, the following conditions must be met: a) the members of each
group must be of equal status or the minority group member should be of higher status, b)
there must be a favorable climate for intergroup contact, c) the contact must be of an
intimate rather than casual nature, d) the contact should be rewarding and pleasant, and e)
the two groups should have a mutual (superordinate) goal which requires cooperative
action.

The reason researchers have been interested in what is here termed episodic racial
affect is that it can often have a strong impact on an individual's chronic, enduring racial
affect, and, it is believed, the individual's enduring attitudes toward the outgroup. In this
way, researchers have theorized, it may be possible to change negative chronic racial affect
(and, hence, negative racial attitudes) toward the outgroup by the opposing impact of
positive episodic racial affect.

While the above evidence provides support for the notion that, under certain
circumstances, it may be possible to change negative outgroup attitudes, the available

evidence does not speak to how the participants' affect changed in response to the

 

interaction with the minority group member. Though it seems quite reasonable to suggest,
as I have above, that the change in the valence of the interracial attitude (i.e., from negative
to positive) would also result in a change in affect that typically accompanies the evaluation
of the outgroup, empirical veriﬁcation is needed. Thus, one of the aims of the present
experiments is to examine the effects of episodic racial affect on an individual's subsequent
liklihood to use a stereotype in social judgments. This goal is elaborated more formally in
the hypotheses for each experiment.

Incidental affect. Feelings that have no origination associated with the outgroup
can be characterized as 'incidental affect.‘ A pervasive theme in the extant literature has
been that affect in one context can inﬂuence social judgments in another context (e. g., Isen,

1987; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that incidental affect (arising

1.5

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11

in a context having nothing to do with intergroup attitudes) can subsequently inﬂuence an
individual‘s proclivity to use stereotypes in social judgment. There is some research
evidence that supports this assertion. Stroessner and Mackie (1993) induced incidental
happiness or sadness in participants by having them watch amusing or depressing 5-minute
clips of television programs. Participants were then asked to estimate outgroup variability.
Results indicated that both incidental sadness and happiness signiﬁcantly reduced the
perception of outgroup variability. In research reported by Esses and her colleagues
(1993), incidental happy or sad affect was induced (via the Velten procedure and recall of
events procedure -- Izard, 1972), and this affect had an impact on participants' subsequent
judgments of characteristics associated with 6 different ethnic groups. Specifically,
incidental sad affect increased the tendency of participants to use negative stereotypes in
descriptions of Pakistanis and Native Americans. Interestingly, participants who felt
incidental happiness were more likely to provide especially favorable stereotypes of their
own ethnic ingroup. Research also indicates that incidental anxiety seems to facilitate the
use of stereotypes in making social judgments (Baron, Inman, Kao, & Logan, 1992;
Baron, Logan, Lilly, & Inman, 1994; Stephan, 1985), as well as increase the perception of
outgroup homogeneity (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). In sum, it appears that affect induced in
a context unrelated to the outgroup can have an impact on attitudes toward and judgments
about the outgroup. A primary goal of the present experiments is to add to this incipient
area of research, by further investigating the effects of incidental affect on the tendency of
individuals to employ stereotypes in social judgments.
Distinct effects of negative affect

Unfortunately, the pervasive affect that is felt among interactants in an interracial
context is often decidedly negative (Allport, 1954; Bodenhausen, 1993). This is true even
for those who think of themselves as egalitarian (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, it is
important for researchers to understand the speciﬁc effects that different negative emotions

can have on the way individuals think about and behave toward members of ethnic

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12

outgroups. The research in this speciﬁc domain is nascent, but it is already yielding some
consistent ﬁndings. In recent research on the effects of anger and sadness on stereotyping,
Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer (1994) found that angry participants tended to make
more stereotypic judgments, while participants who were sad did not differ from neutral
affect participants in their use of stereotypes. In fact, research on the effects of sadness on
subsequent social judgments has often found that mildly sad individuals engage in more
systematic, careful cognitive processing of information, and are less likely to rely on
stereotypes than angry and happy individuals (Bodenhausen, 1993). Incidental anger and
anxiety tend to lead to increased use of stereotypes in social judgments, while sadness (for
mildly depressed persons -- see Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer, 1994) does not lead
to an increased tendency to stereotype others.

To summarize, in the research literature on the effects of negative affect on
stereotyping, the consensus is that anger can often lead to a greater likelihood of an
individual to use stereotypes in his/her social judgments. Some research suggests that
negative moods may decrease the cognitive capacity of a person to carefully think about
others as individuals, thus leading to a greater tendency to stereotype others (Mackie &
Worth, 1989, 1991). There is an equally substantial basis for suggesting that negative
moods diminish the motivation of a person to process social information in a systematic
fashion, which leads to greater sterteotyping of others (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack,
1990; Innes & Ahrens, 1991). This motivation - cognitive capacity debate is also ongoing
with respect to positive affect (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Isen, 1987).
Many researchers agree that it is likely the case that investigating the separate effects of
these factors on the inﬂuence of affect on stereotyping may be fruitless because the
motivational and cognitive capacity factors are inexorably linked together (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992). It may be the case that the
investigation of the dynamic interplay of the motivational, cognitive capacity, and hedonic

contingency processes will yield further insight about the inﬂuence of affect on the

13

tendency to stereotype (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Bodenhausen (1993) suggests that other
negative emotions (such as fear, embarrassment, and guilt) may be likely to occur in the
intergroup context, and therefore, their inﬂuence on stereotyping should be investigated.
The present research seeks to address this question. One of the primary goals of the present
research is to examine the inﬂuence of negative incidental affect on the tendency to utilize
stereotypes in social judgments. In Experiment 1, the affect induced is guilt, and in
Experiment 2, the affect induced is discomfort.
The present study

The extant research literature on the impact of affect on social judgments reveals a
consistent ﬁnding: with the exception of mild depression, negative affect -~ anger and
anxiety in particular -- seems to increase the tendency of individuals to rely on stereotypes
when making social judgments. Because the affect experienced by interactants in an
interracial interracial situation is often negative, it is important to examine how different
negative emotions impact the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments. Research
used to suggest that negative affect in general would have similar effects on cognitive
processes, because it was believed that the overall valence of the affective experience was
what was important in determining the effects of the affect on cognitive processes.
However, research by Bodenhausen and his colleagues (1994) showed that sadness and
anger have differential effects on the tendency of respondents to stereotype others. Thus, as
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) suggest, it appears that "all negative moods are not alike" (p.
59) in their effects on the tendency of an individual to stereotype others. The present
experiments are designed to further examine the role of 2 different types of negative affect -
guilt and discomfort/unease - on the tendency of individuals to use stereotypes in social
judgments.

Guilt is examined in Experiment 1 because, as discussed below, guilt may be a
prominent emotion felt by low-prejudice Caucasians -- in particular, aversive racists --

during an interaction with an African-American. In particular, when some event threatens to

14

make the aversive racist's unacknowledged negative feelings toward African-Americans
salient, the individual may feel guilt. If this is true, then it is important to examine whether
guilt might or might not then bias and distort the processing of further social information
pertinent to perceptions of the outgroup. Allport (1954) ﬁrst speculated that guilt could
arise in Caucasians in the interracial context, and Devine and her colleagues (1991) found
that when the negative feelings of Caucasians toward African-Americans were made
salient, the Caucasian experienced compunction (guilt and self-criticism). Though Devine et
al.'s (1991) ﬁndings are provocative and suggestive, little is known about the effects of
guilt on subsequent stereotyping of the outgroup. Devine et a1. ( 1991) did not examine how
compunction affected subsequent stereotyping tendencies, and the present experiment will
seek to address this question.

Furthermore, no experiments have been conducted on the effects of various type_s
of guilt on stereotyping tendencies. Like other types of affective experiences, guilt can also
take the form of incidental, episodic racial or chronic racial affect. A primary goall of
Experiment 1 will be to induce episodic racial guilt and incidental guilt experimentally, and
examine the effects of these types of guilt on subsequent social judgments (stereotyping
tendencies). The effects of chronic racial guilt on stereotyping are not examined in the
present experiment. Rather, the focus of the present experiment is to understand how the
feeling of guilt resulting from an outgroup-unrelated context could affect perceptions of the
outgroup, and how a speciﬁc interaction with a member of the outgroup can generate a
distinct type of guilt that may affect subsequent perceptions of the outgroup.

In Experiment 2, the negative affective experience of discomfort/unease is induced
and its effects upon subsequent stereotyping are examined. As is the case with the other
affective states previously mentioned, the negative emotion of discomfort/unease can also
be conceptualized with a ﬁner distinction along the intergroup-related and intergroup-
unrelated dimension. That is, discomfort/unease aroused in a situation not associated with

the outgroup can be termed "incidental discomfort/unease." Discomfort aroused in response

15

to a speciﬁc interaction with an outgroup member can be termed "episodic racial
discomfort." Finally, enduring discomfort/unease related to the outrgoup is termed "chronic
racial discomfort/unease." Much research suggests that both incidental anxiety (Baron et
al., 1990) and chronic racial anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) can increase the likelihood
than an individual will rely on a stereotype in social judgments. Yet, comparatively little is
known about the inﬂuence of episodic racial anxiety on subsequent social judgments of the
outgroup. In Experiment 2, this need is addressed: the effects of incidental and episodic
racial discomfort on the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments are examined. As
in Experiment 1, chronic racial affect (in this case, discomfort/unease) is not examined in
Experiment 2. Rather, the focus here is twofold: 1) how discomfort/unease that arises in a
context unrelated to the outgroup, can affect social judgments (stereotyping tendencies) and
2) how discomfort/unease arising in a speciﬁc interaction with the outgroup can affect
social judgments (stereotyping tendencies).

In daily interactions, we may encounter members of a racial outgroup in a variety of
contexts, and these interactions may indeed provoke episodic racial anxiety, as Stephan and
Stephan (1985) have argued. However, it is equally reasonable to suggest that there are a
number of intergroup interactions that cannot be characterized as anxiety-provoking, but
rather, simply make the interactants feel "uncomfortable," or "tense." The distinction I am
making here is one of degree not kind. That is, emotion researchers tend to
characteracterize anxiety as involving "apprehensive expectation" (Ohman, 1993, p. 312),
and "unresolved fear ..... a state of undirected arousal following the perception of threat"
(Epstein, 1972, p. 311, as cited in Ohman, 1993). Yet, in many cases, intergroup
interactions are neither characterized by a perception of threat, nor an apprehensive
expectation. Often, these interactions may involve either no physiological arousal or low
levels of physiological arousal with no concomitant apprehensive expectation, or perception
of threat regarding the outgroup member. For this reason, Experiment 2 will examine the

impact of low-level discomfort, rather than full-blown anxiety, on the tendency of an

16

individual to use stereotypes in making social judgments. It cannot be assumed that (to
paraphrase Bodenhausen et al., 1994) "all anxiety is alike," in the effect it has on
subsequent social judgments. Results from Experiment 2 should provide evidence
concerning the impact of discomfort on social judgments.
Guilt

Traditional approaches to guilt suggested that it may occur in the absence of a social
context (Erikson, 1963). For example, Buss (1980) argued that "The true test of guilt is
whether anyone else knows of the transgression. In true guilt, no one need know" (p.
159). However, recent empirical studies (e.g., Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995;
Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 1993) and theory (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) support the idea that guilt is an interpersonal emotion, in the
sense that it is likely to arise in relationship to others. Guilt can therefore be deﬁned as
follows:

By gum we refer to an individual's unpleasant emotional state associated with

possible objections to his or her actions, inaction, circumstances, or intentions.

Guilt is an aroused form of emotional distress that is distinct from fear and anger

and based on the possibility that one may be in the wrong or that others may have
such a perception (Baumeister, et al., 1994, p. 245).

As discussed above, guilt may be further distinguished according to whether or not it is
related to the outgroup. Speciﬁcally, people may have chronic racial guilt, which is an
enduring guilt feeling associated with the outgroup. An individual may also feel an episodic
racial guilt, as a result of a speciﬁc interaction (or thinking about) an outgroup member.
Finally, people can feel guilt that is unrelated, or "incidental" to the outgroup, and this guilt
may have an impact on social judgments in other situations. People who feel guilt evaluate
their action (or inaction or intentions) as a failure, but they always focus on behaviors that
are likely to repair this failure (Lewis, 1993). That is, these individuals are pained by their

guilt, but their focus is on undoing their wrong and preventing it from happening again

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(Tangney, 1995). Guilt is not as intensely negative as shame, in that the individual does not
have the concomitant desire to hide and disappear. While guilt does not implicate the global
self, it does involve a more targeted element of self-criticism (K. Fischer, personal
communication, 7/1/95). Moreover, guilt can be easily alleviated through a speciﬁc
corrective action, whereas shame often cannot be so reduced (Tangney, 1992). The above
deﬁnition suggests that when low-prejudice individuals in the intergroup context violate a
moral standard (egalitarian intergroup beliefs), they should experience guilt, and the
individual should be motivated to repair or "undo" his/her transgression in order to alleviate
the guilt feeling. Having presented the suggestion that when low-prejudice persons believe
they have transgressed their egalitarian ideals they feel guilt, an important ﬁrst question to
ask is, "how does guilt affect behavior?" That is, to what extent does guilt motivate an
individual to "repair" or "undo" his/her "wrongful act"?

In research by Tangney and her colleagues (Tangney, 1989; Tangney et al., 1993),
young adults' narrative accounts of their personal guilt experiences suggests that the
predominant motive associated with guilt was a strong desire to somehow repair their
wrongful act. Barrett and her colleagues (Barrett, 1995; Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole,
1993) classiﬁed children as either shame-prone or guilt-prone depending on the child's
reaction to a mishap in a lab play session that was caused by the child. Children who
avoided the experimenter, were slow to tell the experimenter about the mishap, and were
slow to make reparation were classified as shame-prone, while those who showed the
opposite pattern were classified as guilt-prone. The researchers found that these
classiﬁcations were signiﬁcantly related to independent parental reports of the child's
behavior outside the laboratory. Guilt has also been shown to increase compliance to
experimenter requests in lab participants (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman,
Wallington, & Bless, 1967).

Guilt and dissonance. These ﬁndings provide evidence for the notion that guilt

provokes a motive to engage in reparative action. Of interest in the present experiments is

18

the question of how guilt will affect one's intergroup attitudes. If guilt can affect behavior
in this way, a next logical question is, how will guilt affect attitudes on the guilt-relevant
dimension? Until recently, this question has not be addressed systematically. In a clever
series of experiments, Aronson and his colleagues (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Fried
& Aronson, 1995; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994) examined the
attitudinal and behavioral effects of making people mindful of their hypocrisy
(inconsistency between two cognitions/behaviors). Aronson believes that when one does
something that makes him/her feel guilty, cognitive dissonance (state of negative arousal
that arises from inconsistency between 2 or more cognitions or behaviors) will arise
(Aronson, personal communication, 7/1/95). Aronson suggests that when people are made
aware of the discrepancy between their cognitions, the person will feel guilt (because it
does something that threatens his/her self-esteem), and this will give rise to cognitive
dissonance, and this will lead to attitudinal and behavioral change on the relevant dimension
in order to reduce the dissonance. Is Aronson right? Can guilt, through the mediating
inﬂuence of dissonance, affect attitudes and behavior on the guilt-relevant dimension?

In the prototypical experiment in this paradigm (e.g., Stone et al., 1994),
participants are asked to participate in a study designed to examine "health and persuasion",
in which they are to develop a persuasive message about the importance of condom use to
prevent AIDS. Participants are exposed to one of four experimental conditions. Individuals
in the "W" condition are asked to deliver their speech to a videocamera for later use
in high schools as part of sex education. This procedure provides a pcblic ccrmnittment to
the idea that condoms are important in preventing AIDS. Individuals in this condition also
are then asked to recall instances in their past when they did not use condoms. This
sequence of events, according to Aronson and colleagues, is what produces the cognitive
dissonance (between cognitions of self as espousing the importance of a preventative
behavior, and realizing that the self has not always practiced this behavior in the past).

People in a "mindful only" condition are not asked to videotape their message, but are

19
asked to recall instances in their past when they did not use a condom. Others in a
"committment only" condition are asked to videotape their message, but are not asked to
recall their past transgressions in condom use. Finally, participants in the control condition
("information only") did not videotape their message and were not asked to recall their past
transgressions in condom use.

Aronson and his colleagues predicted that the dissonance that arose in participants
in the hypocrisy condition would lead them to change the cognition that they do not
"practice what they preach" about the importance of condom use, and the way they would
convince themselves that they really dc believe in the importance of condom use (despite
their past behaviors to the contrary) is to take free pamphlets and sample condoms at the
end of the experiment. Participants in the other conditions should experience no
dissonance, and therefore they were not expected to show any interest in the pamplets and
condoms at the end of the experiment. The results supported the authors' predictions:
participants in the "hypocrisy" condition showed the most behavior change (and attitude
change —- as measured by questionnaires concerning the importance of condom use, after
the experiment, and at a 3 month follow-up): they took signiﬁcantly more pamphlets and
condoms following the experiment, and they more much more likely to report that they
have used condoms at a 3-month follow—up. These ﬁndings are important in showing that
dissonance arising from hypocrisy (espousing a belief, and behaving in a way that violates
that belief) can change attitudes and behavior.

Guilt and compunction. Let us assume for the moment that the affective state
of aversive racist individuals in situations that threaten to make their negative feelings
toward African Americans salient is best characterized as guilt. A next logical question
becomes, "how does guilt affect one's attitudes toward members of typically stereotyped
outgroups?" In a series of experiments, Devine, Monteith, and their colleagues (Devine,
1989; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith,

1993; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994) have investigated the effects of the self-

20

generated affect that follows from violations of nonprejudiced values. Consistent with
Gilbert (1989) and others (e.g., Bargh, 1994), Devine (1989) showed that stereotypes are
activated automatically in high-prejudice persons, and in low-prejudice individuals. These
stereotypes are used in the very rapid categorization of the target person, and they help the
perceiver considerably in making sense (very quickly) of the enormous amount of
information in his/her social environment. Given the trivial nature of most of our daily
interactions with others, such stereotyping rarely has any negative effects. However, when
one is motivated to be accurate in an assessment of another individual, the automatically-
activated stereotype can be changed through more effortful cognitive work. Devine
demonstrated that only low-prejudice participants were motivated to inhibit the
automatically-activated stereotype-congruent thoughts and replace them with thoughts
consonant with their egalitarian values and negations of the stereotype.

How do these low-prejudice individuals (who have presumably internalized an
egalitarian belief system) feel when they know they have behaved in a way that violates
these beliefs? Allport (1954) suggested that these persons will feel "compunction," which
he deﬁnes as "feelings of doubt or guilt" (p. 326). Other theoretical frameworks have also
suggested that various affective outcomes are related to the discrepancy between one's
behavior and one's standards (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1987). In three
experiments, Devine and her colleagues (1991) tested the extent to which people report
such discrepancies, and the nature of their affective reactions to these discrepancies.
Results indicated that only the low-prejudice persons experienced compunction (note:
Devine et a1. (1991) deﬁne compunction as "guilt and self-criticism" (p. 827)) in response
to large discrepancies between how they believed they $211.4 respond, and how they
actually mid respond to scenarios involving interaction with a member of a typically
stereotyped outgroup (in this research, Blacks (Exp. 1) and Homosexuals (Exps. 2 and 3)
were the target outgroups). High-prejudice persons showed no compunction in response to

their large should-would discrepancies. Devine et al. suggest that this difference is due to

21
the fact that only low-prejudice persons seem to have highly internalized personal standards
concerning egalitarian values, and they felt strongly obligated to respond consistently with
them. When these standards (including egalitarian beliefs) are violated, the low-prejudice
person feels compunction because the transgression threatens the person's nonprejudiced
self-concept. These findings were also replicated when women were the stereotyped
outgroup (Pressly & Devine, 1992).

The work of Devine and her colleagues suggests that stereotypes tend to be
activated automatically, and that low-prejudice persons are more likely to experience
"compunction" when they. believe they have acted in a way that transgresses their
egalitarian beliefs. Thus, evidence reported by Devine and her colleagues supports
Allport's speculation that guilt may be a primary emotion felt by prejudiced persons in the
intergroup context when their negative racial attitudes are made salient.

Because Devine's experiments on the effects of should-would discrepancies on the
feelings of high and low-prejudice individuals' most closely resembles the purposes of the
present two experiments, it is important to delineate in some detail how the present two
studies differ from the experiments of Devine and her colleagues on prejudice and
compunction. One way the present studies differ from the experiments of Devine et a1.
(1991) is that Devine et al. sought to induce compunction in high-prejudice and low-
prejudice individuals, and measure whether in fact the individual felt compunction (and if
so, to what degree did he/she feel compunction). In contrast, the purpose of the present
experiments is to induce gm feelings in high-prejudice and low-prejudice persons and
assess (1) whether (and how strongly) the individual felt guilt as a result of the guilt
induction and (2) how those guilt feelings affect the individual's attitudes toward African-
Americans, and the likelihood that the individual will use a stereotype in his/her social
judgments.

A second way the present experiments differ from the experiments of Devine and

her colleagues is that in the Devine et a1. experiments, there were no measures of how

22

compunction affected the individual's proclivity to rely on stereotypes in subsequent social
judgments. The present experiments will try to address this important unanswered question
by asking participants to complete measures that assess their tendency to utilize stereotypes
in social judgments. A third way the present experiment is different from those of Devine
and her colleagues is that Devine et al. addressed how imagined transgressions affected
participants, whereas the present Experiment 1 seeks to address how actual transgressions
affect the tendency of participants to endorse stereotypes about African Americans.

A ﬁnal word on the differences between Devine et al.'s compunction studies and
the present experiments concerns differences in definition and measurement of guilt.
Devine et a1. term the feeling that the individual theoretically experiences upon the
realization that there is a large discrepancy between his/her should—would responses
"compunction." They deﬁne compunction as "guilt and self-criticism" (p. 818). In the
present experiments, guilt is operationalized more conservatively, according to the
prevailing theoretical/empirical definitions (as discussed earlier). Guilt is defined as
"remorse or regret over the 'bad thing' that was done and a sense of tension that often
serves to motivate reparative action...guilt motivates a desire to repair, to confess,
apologize, or make amends" (Tangney et al., 1992, pp. 669-670). This is distinct from
shame, in which "the object of concern is the entire self. The 'bad thing' is experienced as a
reﬂection of a 'bad self and the entire self is painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated"
(Tangney et al., p. 670). If guilt doesn't involve a focus on the gm self (guilt may have
an accompanying focus on a spccific aspect of the self (K. Fischer, personal
communication, 7/1/95)), but on the need to repair or undo the "wrong" act or thought,
then Devine et al. are measuring more than guilt in their measure of compunction.
Speciﬁcally, Devine's deﬁnition of compunction as "guilt and self-criticism" seems to be a
measure of both guilt m shame. As Tangney et a1. (1992) and others (e.g., Kugler &

Jones, 1992) have argued, it is important to recognize that there is an important distinction

23
between shame and guilt, and these should not be confounded in measurement (though
they all too often are), because of their distinct effects on thought and behavior.

As a measure of compunction, the Devine et al. submitted participants' responses to
the 35 affect items (Appendix C) to a principal-components factor analysis with varimax
rotation, to discover that 9 items loaded (.40 loading criteria) on a factor they termed
"negative feelings directed toward the self." These items included: "angry at myself,"
"guilty," "embarrassed," "regretful," "annoyed at myself," "disgusted with myself,"
"disappointed with myself," "shame," and "self-critical."

As just mentioned, it is important to distinguish between shame and guilt in
measurement of either emotion (Kugler & Jones, I992; Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Wagner,

Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). A review of the items in Devine et al.'s negative feelings
directed toward the self" factor reveals that many of the items are more characteristic of
s_h_a_rr_1c (i.e., annoyed at myself, disgusted with myself, disappointed with myself, self-
critical, and shame) than guilt. (Indeed, even the name for the factor suggests a deﬁnition
of shame, not guilt!) In our previous research (Nelson & Bodenhausen, 1994), we
submitted participants' responses to the 35-item affect questionnaire (Appendix C) to a
principal-components factor analysis with varimax rotation, and uncovered 7 factors. One
factor, which can be termed "negative affect" is composed of 5 items (all exceeding a

higher loading criteria of .64): "negative, guilty," "frustrated," "bothered," and
"regretful." Additionally, these items yielded a very good Cronbach's alpha (.92). These
items are more consistent with a deﬁnition of "guilt" than are the items in Devine et al.'s
composite factor.

It is therefore important to examine how this affective state may inﬂuence
intergroup perception, and the attitudes of prejudiced persons toward members of
stereotyped outgroups. Guilt may have different effects on the tendency of a person to

stereotype another depending on whether the guilt is related to (chronic or episodic) or

incidental to the intergroup context. As discussed above, Bodenhausen (1993) suggested

24

that the affective reactions of individuals to members of stereotyped outgroups should be
stronger in intensity when the individual is actually in an intergroup interaction situation as
opposed to instances when the individual is merely thinking about outgroup members. On
the other hand, much research shows that incidental affect can also have strong inﬂuences
on memory and judgments in other contexts (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1988; Wyer & Srull,
1989). It may be the case that if an individual feels guilt concerning an interaction with a
member of a racial outrgoup, the individual might be less likely to employ stereotype in
subsequent judgments of members of that outgroup. In other words, the individual may
repair his/her guilt by taking care to nc_t rely on stereotypes in the next judgment he/she
makes about a member of that outgroup. On the other hand, if the guilt is incidental
(unrelated) to the intergroup context, it may be less likely to affect the individual's tendency
to use a stereotype in judgments of members of a particular racial outgroup. These
predictions are elaborated upon below in a discussion of Experiment 1.
Summary and Predictions for Experiment 1

While researchers have a good idea of how happiness (Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Sﬁsser, 1994) and sadness and anger (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994) seem to
affect stereotyping tendencies, there has been little research on other speciﬁc emotions,
both positive and negative, that may moderate the tendency to stereotype members of racial
outgroups (Stangor & Lange, 1994). It seems reasonable to investigate emotions that may
be more prevalent in the intergroup context. The conﬂicted nature of the negative racial
feelings and egalitarian beliefs of people who are prejudiced provides a ready avenue for
exploration of these speciﬁc affective states. That is, it would be of theoretical interest to
examine how such persons react to a realization that they have violated -- by act, feeling, or
thought -- their cherished view of themselves as egalitarian toward members of stereotyped
outgroups. This realization can be conceptualized as the feeling of guilt. Recall that guilt is
deﬁned as an "...unpleasant emotional state associated with possible objections to [one's]

actions, inaction, circumstances, or intentions. Guilt is an aroused form of emotional

25

distress that is distinct from fear and anger and based on the possibility that one may be in
the wrong or that others may have such a perception" (Baumeister, et al., 1994, p. 245).
This deﬁnition seems to be a reasonable characterization of the experience of prejudiced
individuals who realize they have violated their view of themselves as egalitarian toward
stereotyped others. The central question that underlies the following two experiments is,
"how will the intergroup attitudes of people who are prejudiced toward African-Americans
be inﬂuenced as a result of feeling guilt?"

The present experiments will not only operationalize guilt more strictly, they will
employ an additional measure of guilt: the Guilt Inventory (Kugler & Jones, 1992). This
measure is composed of 45 items to which the respondent indicates the degree to which
his/her feelings are described by each item. This well-validated measure will provide
another indicator of the effectiveness of the guilt manipulations in each of the present
experiments.

Of interest in this experiment is the exploration of the impact the nature of the guilt
reaction on subsequent ethnic attitudes and social judgments. In other words, it is important
to examine whether episodic racial guilt has a different impact on attitudes toward members
of stereotyped outgroups than guilt that is incidental to the intergroup context. The two
types of guilt will be operationalized as follows. Incidental guilt is the guilt the Caucasian
individual experienced while interacting with a Caucasian experimenter, because the guilt is
incidental (or unrelated) to the individual's attitudes toward members of the racial outgroup.
Episodic racial guilt will be the guilt the Caucasian individual feels while interacting with an
African-American experimenter. The reason that guilt acquires the racial tone in this context
is that guilt is, as discussed earlier, an interpersonal phenomenon. In order for an
individual to feel guilt, he/she must perceive that his/her action caused "harm" to another
individual. In both the incidental and episodic guilt inductions, the participant realizes that
he/she has caused "harm" to the experimenter. Because of the focus of the participant on

the "victim" of the "harm" (the experimenter) and the rather automatic processing of the

26

experimenter's race, the guilt takes on a racial element. Based on responses to a pretesting
questionnaire of prejudice toward African-Americans, individuals who score high (upper
1/3 of obtained scores) and low (lower 1/3 of obtained scores) on the measure of prejudice
will be invited to participate in a study concerning "attitudes." Within the context of the
experimental session, the experimenter will ask the participant to complete two brief
questionnaires that the experimenter will analyze later for his/her senior honors thesis, and
then to complete a separate questionnaire packet for another study. The experimenter will
explain that since his/her honors thesis experiment is short, he/she decided to let another
experimenter utilize his/her participants for research.

Participants in the guilt-induction conditions will accidentally tip over a 'rigged’
table, which will topple the experimenter's pile of ordered honor's thesis index cards. In
conditions in which guilt is not induced, the table will be stablized, and there will be no
accident with the pile of ordered cards. The participant will complete a social desirability
measure (a ﬁller questionnaire, supposedly the questionnaire that the experimenter is using
for his/her senior honors thesis research) and a brief measure of self-reported affect.
Following this, the participant will be asked by a separate experimenter to complete a
separate questionnaire packet for an unrelated study. This questionnaire packet will
comprise the main set of dependent measures, containing measures of guilt, stereotyping,
egalitarian attitudes, and attitudes toward African-Americans. Following this, participants
will be probed for suspicion concerning the true purposes of the experiment, and then the
experimenter will fully debrief the participant. The experimenter will then give the
participant credit for his/her participation, and then thank and dismiss the participant.

Recall that guilt should make one want to act to repair one's wrongful
action/inaction (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1992). As discussed above, for participants in the
guilt conditions (particularly the episodic racial guilt condition), the race of the "victim" of
"harm" (the experimenter) is quite salient. This gives focus to the guilt motive to "repair"

the "harm" the participant has done to the experimenter. Low-prejudice participants

27
experiencing episodic racial guilt therefore will experience racial concerns and they should
therefore be searching about for a readily available way of alleviating these concerns. The
most readily available means of reducing their guilt will be the dependant measures packet,
which will contain questionnaires designed to assess participants' attitudes toward African
Americans, as well as other measures of the tendency to stereotype African Americans.

Even if this questionnaire packet is the ﬁrst opportunity for participants to convince
themselves that they really do espouse egalitarian views, why might one expect differences
between high and low-prejudice people in these episodic racial guilt and incidental guilt
conditions in the way these groups answer the dependent measure questionnaires?
Moreover, how should those differences in responding to the questionnaires manifest
between groups? There are two theories that allow one to make divergent predictions
concerning how participants might respond to their guilt under these various circumstances;
cognitive dissonance theory (CDT; Festinger, 1957) and self-afﬁrmation theory (SAT;
Steele, 1988). I turn now to a discussion of these theories, and then the speciﬁc predictions
for the experiment that are based upon these theories.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957)
states that when one holds two diametrically opposed cognitions, one feels negatively
aroused, and is motivated to reduce or eliminate the arousal stemming from these dissonant
cognitions. This negative arousal was suggested by Festinger (1957) to be analogous to
drive states such as hunger or thirst, and therefore, the motive to reduce the negative
arousal was hypothesized to be quite strong. Festinger argued that the dissonance could be
alleviated by changing either of the cognitions, to make it compatible with the other
cognition. There has been much support for Festinger's (1957) assertion that counter-
attitudinal behavior that is performed under conditions of low justification will arouse
dissonance, because the behavior is inconsistent with existing attitudes. The main avenue
for dissonance reduction in this situation is a change in the original attitudes in the direction

of the discrepant behavior. This notion has been supported in the early research on

28
cognitive dissonance (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Other
researchers have found that this result seems to occur primarily when there is no external
justiﬁcation for the behavior (Freedman, 1963), and when the individual feels as though
he/she personally chose to perform the discrepant behavior (Sherman, 1970).

Soon after the publication of Festinger's theory, researchers found that CDT was
not able to make predictions for situations in which the logical inconsistency between the
two cognitions is not apparent (Aronson, 1968). In other words, CDT worked well when
predicting dissonance between lcgm inconsistent thoughts, but human thought is often
far from logical (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and dissonance arousal is often felt as a result of
the W inconsistency between two cognitions. That is, even though two
cognitions are logically consistent, one may (as a result of one's biases, expectations,
cognitive heuristics) p_e_rc_ei_vc the two cognitions as inconsistent. Aronson (1969) suggested
a revision of the theory that tightened up these loose ends a great deal. He argued that what
is important in determining whether dissonance arousal is felt is whether the thought or
cognition threatens the individual's self-esteem or sense of who he/she is. According to this
revision, one will feel dissonance when one does something (or thinks something) that
"...astonishes me, makes me feel stupid, or makes me feel guilty" (Aronson, 1992, p.
305). Although there are many similarities between dissonance and guilt (e.g., Stice,
1992), in Experiment 1 guilt is conceived of as a precipitating factor (certainly not the guy
one however) which triggers dissonance.

In this view, the path that will be chosen during dissonance reduction efforts
(original attitude change, or attitude strengthening) depends on the centrality of the original
attitude to the self-concept (Gotz-Marchand, Gotz, & Irle, 1974). Sherman and Gorkin
(1980) suggest that "when the issue is not of central concern and the participant realizes the
consequences and inplications of the discrepant behavior, this behavior is likely to be the
target cognition for change" (p. 400). This is the case in the typical forced-compliance

experiments (e. g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). In other words, the cognitions associated

29
with the counterattitudinal behavior are the center of participants' attention, so any behavior
to re-afﬁrm the original attitude would only bring more dissonance. As the participant
focuses on the discrepant behavior, and tries to generate cognitions to support the behavior,
attitude change toward the behavior becomes the preferred means of reducing the
dissonance.

CDT may provide a useful theoretical base from which to predict how participants
might respond on the dependent measures. Recall that participants in the guilt conditions
should feel guilt after they accidentally topple the experimenter's stack of neatly ordered
honor's thesis index cards. This particular situation nicely captures the two essential criteria
for experience of guilt: the offending individual has a clear concern with his/her
transgression on the other person, and the transgression caused "harm" (not necessarily
physical) to the other person (Tangney, 1992). With regard to the relation of the guilt to the
intergroup context and intergroup attitudes, the guilt the participant feels can be
characterized in two ways. If the experimenter / victim, is African-American, the guilt
experienced by the participant is episodic to the context. If the experimenter is Caucasian,
the guilt experienced by the participant is incidental to the intergroup context
(Bodenhausen, 1993).

Cognitive dissonance theory asserts that when individuals experience dissonance on
some dimension, their only recourse to alleviate the negative arousal that accompanies
dissonance is to change one or both cognitions on that dimension (Festinger, 1957). In his
revision of CDT, Aronson (1969) suggested that when people do something that threatens
their self-esteem, they will experience dissonance, and in order to reduce the negative
arousal, they must afﬁrm their self-integrity on the dimension in question. Both of these
versions of CDT have in common their stipulation that dissonance arousal will only be
reduced or eliminated if the individual makes a cognitive change on the conﬂicted
dimension. In the present experiment, CDT would predict that the guilt the individual feels

in the intergroup context can only be alleviated by making a cognitive change on the

30
dimension of intergroup attitudes. Therefore, those individuals who experience episodic
racial guilt should be motivated to repair their guilt, and the direction of this motivation,
according to CDT, should be toward the next available opportunity to express positive
intergroup attitudes. As discussed earlier, this tendency should be more prominent in those
who are lower in prejudice than those who are higher in self-reported prejudiced attitudes
toward African-Americans.

However, CDT suggests that this avenue of alleviating guilt is not effective for
those individuals who experience incidental guilt. In the present experiment, the individual
experiences incidental guilt when he/she commits the transgression against a Caucasian
experimenter. The guilt should motivate a strong desire to repair the transgression, but
here, the nature of the dissonance arousal is different: the individual may experience
cognitions that threaten his/her view of the self as helpful and careful, but this guilt is
incidental, or unrelated, to the intergroup context. Therefore, CDT suggests that endorsing
more egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans, and being more careful to not use
stereotypes in social judgments are behaviors that will M alleviate the individual's guilt.
Thus, the individuals in this condition should be m likely, relative to those in the
episodic racial guilt conditions, to rely on stereotypes in social judgments, and to endorse
more stereotyped attitudes.

Thus, low-prejudice and high-prejudice individuals experiencing episodic racial
guilt, according to dissonance theory, should be less likely to evidence stereotyping (as
compared to incidental guilt and no guilt participants). This effect should be rather weak for
high-prejudice participants, but should be quite strong for low-prejudice participants. The
reason is that high-prejudice participants are much less motivated to avoid stereotyping, and
thus are not willing to expend the cognitive effort to suppress their expression of
stereotypes. However, low-prejudice individuals are motivated to do the cognitive work to
avoid stereotyping, and therefore they should be less likely to rely on stereotypes in social

judgments. Much research suggests that thought (and, hence, stereotype) suppression is an

31
effortful, and cognitive resource-consuming activity (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1996;
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992).
However, when the individual is motivated to expend the cognitive effort to avoid
stereotyping others, he/she can be successful in not using stereotypes in social judgments
(yet sometimes even highly-motivated persons will use stereotypes in social judgments, see
Nelson, Acker, & Manis, 1996; Pendry & Macrae, 1994).

When the individual experiences episodic racial guilt, according to dissonance
theory, the guilt should motivate individuals to reduce their dissonance by not stereotyping.
Because high-prejudice individuals should show relatively low levels of dissonance, the
effect of episodic racial guilt on stereotyping tendencies should be quite minimal, yet the
effect should hold. When low-prejudice individuals experience episodic racial guilt,
according to dissonance theory, they should show significantly less stereotyping as
compared to participants in the no-guilt and incidental guilt conditions.

When individuals experience incidental guilt, however, they should show m_qrc
stereotyping than those in the no-guilt and episodic racial guilt conditions. The reason is
that, according to dissonance, guilt (dissonance) that is unrelated to the outgroup can only
be alleviated by changing one's cognitions on the guilt-related dimension. Therefore,
dissonance theory suggests that individuals experiencing incidental guilt have no motivation
to expend the cognitive effort to suppress their tendency to rely on stereotypes in making
social judgments. Moreover, research and theory from the guilt literature suggests that guilt
short-circuits stereotype suppression because it is takes up cognitive resources that
otherwise would be used to suppress the stereotype. As Tangney (1995) writes, "People in
the midst of a guilt experience often report a nagging focus or preoccupation with the
speciﬁc transgression -- thinking of it over and over wishing they had behaved differently
or could somehow undo the bad deed that was done" (pp. 177-178). Therefore, individuals
feeling incidental guilt, who already have no motivation to expend cognitive resources to

avoid stereotype expression, should be cven more likely to use stereotypes in social

32
judgments. Guilt in this condition, according to dissonance theory, has a magnifying effect
on the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments because of the cognitive resources it
consumes, and because the individual has no motivation to avoid stereotyping. The reason
guilt doesn't lead to more stereotyping in episodic racial guilt conditions, is that the guilt
(dissonance) can be alleviated via the reduction in the tendency to stereotype, so the guilt,

in this instance, actually reduces the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments, and

 

this is especially true for low-prejudice persons who are likely to be experiencing greater
levels of guilt (dissonance). I would like to turn now to more closely examine Steele's self-
afﬁrmation theory (1988), from which speciﬁc predictions can be made concerning the
impact of episodic racial guilt and incidental guilt on stereotyping.

Self-Affirmation Theory. Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) states that
dissonance from two inconsistent cognitions can be alleviated via the afﬁrmation of one's
"larger self-worth" (p. 270). As Steele and Liu (1983) wrote, "Thoughts and actions that
afﬁrm an important aspect of the self-concept should reduce dissonance by casting the self
in a positive light. This should occur even when the self-affirming thoughts have no
relevance to the provoking inconsistency" (p. 6). In other words, the theory suggests that
the dissonance that arises from two inconsistent cognitions that involve the self-concept can
be reduced by thinking of oneself as good, competent, or of worth on some other
dimension. The reader will note that Steele is suggesting that the self-afﬁrmation process
will alleviate only the dissonance that involves the self-concept. It is suggested that the
concept of oneself as one who is not a "hypocrite" (thoughts/behavior which contradict the
person's self-concept) is very important to the self, and that cognitions and behaviors
which are dissonant threaten the self-concept. The behavior of participants in this
experiment (toppling the experimenter's index cards) harms another person, creating guilt,
which leads to dissonance because the behavior contradicts the individual's important
beliefs that he/she is helpful and does not harm others. Therefore, the dissonance the

participants feel in this experiment should be self-concept involving, and should thus be

33
amenable to reduction via an afﬁrmation of another aspect of the self (enhancing the larger
self-worth of the individual).

These two theories provide different explanations of how people feeling episodic
racial guilt and incidental guilt might resolve their dissonance. CDT suggests that the
dissonance from two inconsistent cognitions can only be resolved by changing one to make
it consonant with the other, or performing some behavior that is relevant to the particular
dimension/topic which is the source of the dissonance. In other words, in the present
experiment, CDT suggests that only those caucasian participants who feel dissonance
related to their attitudes toward African-Americans (i.e., the "episodic racial guilt"
conditions) should have their dissonance resolved by re-asserting their view of themselves
as egalitarian on the dependant measures that tap their attitudes toward African Americans.

The theory says that the dissonance felt by the participants about their attitudes
toward the Caucasian experimenter (i.e., the "incidental guilt" conditions) should n_ot be
resolved by expressing egalitarian views on the dependent measures. Because the
dissonance one feels is dimension-speciﬁc, only resolution of the cognitions (or behavior)
related to the dimension can resolve the dissonance. Therefore, according to CDT, there
should be more egalitarian attitudes toward, and less of a tendency to stereotype, members
of a typically stereotyped outgroup for participants who experience episodic racial guilt, as
compared to participants who feel incidental guilt. Participants who experience incidental
guilt should be more prone to use stereotypes in social judgments, and to express more
prejudiced opinions toward African Americans, relative to their episodic racial guilt
counterparts, because being vigilant against the use of stereotypes in judgments and
expressing more egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans will not serve to reduce the
participants' dissonance.

SAT suggests that participants who feel episodic racial guilt cr incidental guilt can
relieve their dissonance by expressing more egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans.

Recall that participants who experience guilt, (which triggers dissonance) on a particular

34

self-relevant dimension can, according to the theory, relieve the dissonance they feel by re-
afﬁrrning their "larger self worth" on another self-concept related dimension. Applied to the
present experiment, the theory offers the following predictions. Participants who
experience episodic racial guilt should evidence less stereotyping and endorse more
egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans, in an effort to resolve the negative arousal
associated with the dissonant cognitions they have about themselves. Participants in the
incidental guilt condition will also relieve their dissonance by being less inclined to
stereotype others and endorsing more egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans.
Thus, SAT suggests that participants who feel dissonance can reduce the dissonance by
changing their cognitions on either the same dimension, cc on another self-relevant
dimension. Recall that CDT suggests that the dissonance can only be resolved by changing
one of the dissonance-producing cognitions to make it consonant with the other.

These two theories diverge in their predictions for what should occur in the
incidental guilt condition. CDT suggests that individuals experiencing guilt over their
conﬂicting attitudes/behaviors in the experiment (self as helpful, not harming others;
toppling experimenter's index cards) should only be able to resolve the dissonance arising
from this situation by changing one cognition or performing a behavior that is consonant
with a cognition and negates the other on the self-concept relevant dimension. Expressing
egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans and showing a reduced tendency to utilize
stereotypes in social judgments are not viable avenues for dissonance reduction since they
are not related to the dissonance-producing dimension of guilt at "harming" the Caucasian
researcher. Therefore, CDT predicts that there should be little effect of incidental guilt --
both for those participants high and low in prejudice -- on the tendency of the participant to
stereotype others, and on his/her attitude toward African-Americans. Essentially, only
participants in the episodic racial guilt condition should show more egalitarian attitudes
toward African-Americans, and a reduction in the tendency to stereotype others in social

judgments.

35

SAT suggests that participants in the incidental guilt condition cg relieve their
dissonant cognitions/behaviors by afﬁrming another part of their self-concept. Expressing
more egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans and being less prone to rely on
stereotypes in social judgments is one way to achieve this self-afﬁrmation. By doing this,
the participant afﬁrms his/her larger self-worth by verifying to him/her self that he/she has
the positive characteristic of being egalitarian and non-prejudiced toward African-
Americans. The participants' dissonance is eliminated because the self -- after being
threatened by the inconsistency in cognitions/behaviors -- is then cast in a positive light.
How does this occur? The reasoning, expressed by Steele and Liu (1983) is as follows:
"When considered along with value-afﬁrming images of the self, speciﬁc, self-threatening
inconsistencies may become tolerable" (p. 6). In sum, if the results indicate that participants
showed more egalitarian attitudes and less of a tendency to rely on stereotypes in social
judgments, in the incidental guilt conditions, we would take that as supportive evidence for
the SAT.

There have been a few studies which provide a hint at how participants might
respond in the present study. Dutton and his colleagues (Dutton & Lake, 1973; Dutton &
Lennox, 1974) reported a series of experiments in which Caucasian participants who
scored low on self-reported measures of prejudice were given false feedback suggesting
they might be prejudiced, and they were subsequently provided an opportunity to donate
money to either a Black or Caucasian panhandler. Results indicated that the participants
donated larger sums to the Black panhandler. This result seems to support a Cognitive
Dissonance Theory prediction for how this episodic racial guilt-likel affect might be

alleviated. Participants feeling this episodic racial guilt-like affect re-afﬁrmed their self-

 

1 I use this term to denote the fact that Dutton did not report any manipulation checks, other than
reporting that participants who were told they might be prejudiced "felt more upset" than those who were
not told they might be prejudiced. While the affect that was generated likely was guilt, there is no way to

ascertain this with any certainty.

36

concepts (as egalitarian and non-prejudiced) by donating larger sums to the Black

panhandler, versus the Caucasian. Thus, the predictions for Experiment 1 are as follows:

Hypotheses for Experiment 1:

1.

A main effect of participant pretest prejudice is predicted, such that participants
who are high in prejudice should show more stereotyping and prejudice on the
dependent variables than low-prejudice individuals.

According to both CDT and SAT, participants who experience episodic racial
guilt should show the most egalitarian attitudes toward African-Americans, and
should be the least likely to use stereotypes in making judgments about
members of a traditionally stereotyped outgroup (African-Americans). This
tendency should be more pronounced for participants who score low in self-
reported prejudice toward African-Americans.

According to CDT, relative to their episodic racial guilt and no-guilt (control)
counterparts, participants in the incidental guilt conditions should be more likely
to express prejudiced attitudes toward, and utilize stereotypes in judgments of,
members of a traditionally stereotyped outgroup (African Americans).
However, SAT predicts the opposite: relative to their episodic racial guilt and
no-guilt (control) counterparts, participants in the incidental guilt condition
should be less likely to express prejudiced attitudes toward, and utilize
stereotypes in judgments of, members of a traditionally stereotyped outgroup
(African Americans) tendencies should be more pronounced for participants
who score high in self-reported prejudice toward African-Americans.

EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and Overview

At the beginning of the fall 1995 semester, approximately 1,250 introductory
psychology students at Michigan State University were pretested for their attitudes toward
African-Americans using a common measure of prejudice, the Modern Racism Scale
(MRS; McConahay, 1986; see Appendix A). Also included in the questionnaire packet was
a demographics questionnaire which asked the participants to indicate their ethnicity, as
well as their phone number if they wished to be contacted later to participate in future
research (see Appendix B). Modern Racism scores were calculated and the scores which
formed the beginning of the top and bottom third percentages of the score distributions
were selected as cutoff points for the creation of the high and low-prejudice categories. The
exact cutoffs were as follows. A score of 18 or lower was categorized as a "low-prejudice"
score. A score of 22 or higher was categorized as a "high-prejudice" score. From this pool
of pretest participants, 161 (58 male and 103 female) Caucasian undergraduates in
introductory psychology classes were recruited to participate in the present experiment.
Participants received course credit for their participation in the experiment.

High and low—prejudice participants engaged in an interaction with an experimenter
that either did or did not involve an accidental spilling of research cards, apparently due to
the actions of the participant. Afterward participants were asked to read about a "student's
court" case involving an allegation of misconduct. Participants were asked to report
judgments about the target accused in the case. The experiment had a 2 (pretest prejudice:
high vs. low) x 2 (race of experimenter: African-American vs. Caucasian) x 2 (accident
condition: accident vs. no accident) x 2 (student court target ethnicity: African American vs.
Caucasian) between-participants factorial.

Measures
Modern Racism Scale. Participants were pretested for their pre-existing level of

37

38

prejudice toward African-Americans, using a well-validated and common measure of
prejudice, the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). The measure was embedded in a
set of 20 items designed to tap a variety of prejudiced attitudes toward Aﬁican—Americans,
women, and homosexuals. For the present studies, only the 7 items that tap prejudice
toward African-Americans (items 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 17, and 20; see Appendix A) were
examined to determine the individual's prejudice score. Items are statements to which the
respondent indicates his/her degree of agreement or disagreement on a Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate more
prejudice toward African-Americans.

Affect Measures. Effects of the accident manipulation were assessed in 2 ways.
First, participants completed a "Sample Characteristics Survey," (see Appendix C)
designed to resemble a brief demographic questionnaire, with the ﬁrst three items asking
for the age, sex, and grade point average of the participant. The questionnaire then lists 35
various feelings, and participants are asked to indicate the degree to which the mood
describes how they currently feel, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at
all) to 7 (applies very much). This measure contains a number of items that may reﬂect guilt
or compunction (Devine, et a1. 1991), and participant responses to this questionnaire were
used to supplement findings from the Guilt Inventory. Second, the degree to which
participants felt guilt was assessed by having participants complete the Guilt Inventory
(Kugler & Jones, 1992; see Appendix D). This questionnaire is comprised of 45 statements
to which the respondent indicates (on a scale of 5 = "very true of me or strongly agree" to l
= "very untrue of me or strongly disagree") the degree to which the statement is self
descriptive. Of the 45 items, 10 measure the transient "state guilt," 20 tap more stable "trait
guilt," and 15 measure "moral guilt." For the present experiments, only the 10 items that
measure scatcguilt were used, because the manipulations of guilt in the laboratory should

produce changes in transitory (or state) guilt feelings. The measure has good reliability and

39
validity characteristics (see Kugler & Jones, 1992, for details), and provides an added
check for the expected impact of the accident manipulation on momentary feelings of guilt.

Egalitarianism. This 10 item scale (see Appendix E; called the Social Opinion
Inventory in the present experiment) is comprised of the 10 "equalitarianism" items from
the Bales and Couch ( 1969) Value Proﬁle questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed
to assess the degree to which individuals agree or disagree with value statements on 4
dimensions: (1) acceptance of authority, (2) need-determined expression, (3)
equalitarianism, and (4) individualism. Respondents indicate their agreement or
disagreement to 10 statements on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Participants with the higher scores on the equalitarianism subscale hold
more egalitarian values. This scale enabled an examination of the degree to which
individuals supported the notion of egalitarian values overall (equality for all, as a general
value). Scores on this scale were compared with post experiment scores on the Modern
Racism Scale (which measures an individual's attitudes toward African Americans), in
order to determine whether the individual's overall attitudes toward the ideal of equality
were consonant or different from his/her attitudes toward the notion of equality for African
Americans. Unfortunately, no reliability or validity data were reported, so the conclusions
derived from the responses on this questionnaire are necessarily tentative.

Student Court Questionnaire. In this questionnaire (originally used by
Bodenhausen, 1990, Experiment 2; see Appendix F), participants were asked to take the
role of a member of a student judicial review board and to make judgments about a case of
alleged academic dishonesty. There were 2 variations of this questionnaire (accused target:
stereotyped ethnicity or non-stereotyped ethnicity); the participant was randomly assigned
to make judgments for 1 of these versions. Each case consisted of 5 or 6 sentences of
evidence, which were ambiguous in their overall implications for the defendant's guilt or

innocence in the misconduct. Half of the cases involved a student with a typically African

40
American sounding name (e.g., Darnell Jackson), while the other half of the cases involved
a student with a name that pretest samples assume to be Caucasian (e. g., Dan Jenson).

Each student received one case with either an African American name (stereotyped
target), or an ethnically-nondescript (non-stereotyped target) name. The Student Court
Questionnaire provided a measure of participants' tendency to rely on stereotypes in social
judgments. Recall that the "evidence" presented in all cases was identical, so any
differences in ratings of "Darnell" vs. "Dan" must be due to stereotypes or prejudice
evoked by these names.

Post Evaluation Questionnaire. This questionnaire (see Appendix G)
consisted of two open-ended questions designed to tap the participants' suspicions about
the study. To assess demand characteristics and the participants' understanding of the
purpose of the experiment (based on the cover story), participants were ﬁrst asked "In your
own words, what is the purpose of this study?" To assess participant suspicion,
participants were asked "Sometimes, no matter how straightforward an experiment is,
participants might think that there is more to the study than what the experimenter has told
them. If you feel this was the case in this study, please explain WHY below. If not, just
leave this space blank." Participants who responded to this question with a reasonably
accurate description of the true purpose of the study were discarded from data analyses.

BIDR Scale. This short questionnaire is a measure of social desirability (Paulus,
1988; see Appendix H). This measure was included as an innocuous questionnaire that the
participant completed along with the Sample Characteristics Inventory in the "ﬁrst study"
(honors thesis experiment) phase in the experimental session. Participants were led to
believe that this questionnaire was related to the experimenter's honors thesis, when in fact
it was not, and was merely designed as a relatively neutral "ﬁller" questionnaire.

Topics Questionnaire. This questionnaire (see Appendix 1) contains a list of 20
topics. For each topic, the participant was asked to indicate his/her interest in the topic by

rating the topic from 1 (not at all interesting) to 5 (very interesting). Topics ranged from the

41
relatively superﬁcial (e.g., "the best bar in East Lansing") to more substantive issues (e.g.,
"why it is important to vote"). Of interest in this questionnaire was how respondents in
each experimental condition tended to rate their interest in the topics "why race relations are

important, mner city poverty," and "ﬁghting job discrimination." It was predicted that
those high in prejudice should be less likely to rate these topics as interesting, as compared
to those low in prejudice.

Sex Stereotyping Questionnaire. This is an abbreviated version of the ratio
measure of sex stereotyping by Martin (1987; see Appendix J). This measure is a well-
validated measure of stereotyping that allowed an examination of the extent to which racial
or incidental guilt affected one's tendency to utilize gender stereotypes in judgments about
personality characteristics common to men and women. In particular, responses on this
measure allowed an assessment of the degree to which stereotyping is limited to the racial
domain, or whether participants also used stereotypes in other domains, such as judgments
of typical gender personality characteristics. Participants each received two versions of this
questionnaire. The only difference between the two is that for one, the participant estimated
the percentage of malcs who had the personality characteristics, and for the other
questionnaire, the participant estimated the percentage of females who had the listed
personality characteristics. The order of presentation of the 2 versions of the questionnaire
was counterbalanced.

Martin used a ratio measure of gender stereotyping. The ratios were calculated as
follows. The mean estimated percentage of men with a particular trait was divided by the
mean estimated percentage of women with that trait (e.g., .20 I .40 = .50). Ratios that were
signiﬁcantly (as measured by a 1-sample t-test) m than 1.0 were taken as evidence that
the attribute was seen as more associated with females than males. Ratios that were
signﬁcantly gm than 1.0 were taken as evidence that the attribute was seen as more

associated with males than females. In the interests of keeping the experimental session as

short as possible, the present questionnaire represented an abridged form of Martin's

42

gender stereotyping measure, using less than half of the items in the original measure. In
order to keep the reliability of the abbreviated measure relatively high, only the 18 most
diagnostic items were selected from each of 6 categories in Martin's original 40 items. In
the present questionnaire, there were 3 items from each of the following 6 categories:
masculine - positive, masculine - negative, feminine - positive, feminine - negative, neutral
- positive, and neutral - negative.

Exit Questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed as a rating form of
psychology honors students ostensibly designed by and used by the department faculty in
their assessment of honors students and the quality of students' research. The questionnaire

(called the "Exit Questionnaire,‘ see Appendix K) contains 4 questions that ask the
participant to rate the ﬁrst experimenter on 4 dimensions, using a Likert-type scale with
anchors ranging from 1 (the most negative rating) to 9 (the most positive rating). For
example, item one asks the participant, "How friendly was the experimenter?" with
anchors of 1 (very unfriendly) to 9 (very friendly). The other two items asked the
participant to rate the ﬁrst experimenter's competence, and how professional he/she
seemed. The ﬁnal item asked the participant to evaluate the ﬁrst experimenter's overall
abilities as a researcher, with anchors of 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive). On the
second page of the Exit Questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate whether they
would be willing to participate in another research project in the future. Participants
indicated their response to the question by checking one of ﬁve possible responses (ranging
from "deﬁnitely yes" to "deﬁnitely not"). Finally, participants are asked to indicate (if they
said they might be willing to participate in the future) how much time they might be
available to participate in a future research study. Answers were coded in terms of minutes
participants indicated they might be willing to help.

Procedure

Participants who were either high or low in prejudice as measured by the Modern

Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), were called back and invited to participate in the

III.

 

 

43

experiment. Participants arrived at the laboratory to participate in an experiment entitled
"Attitudes." Participants completed the study individually. The duration of the experiment
was approximately 30 minutes. Participants were seated at a table in the main room of the
laboratory, and they were asked to read a Consent Form, which explained their rights as a
participant in research, and to sign the form if they understood their rights and wished to
participate. After the participant signed the consent form, the experimenter explained the
study to the participant. The cover story for the experiment was as follows. The
experimenter explained that he/she was collecting data for his/her senior honors thesis, and
that the professor who was supervising the project agreed to let him/her use a small lab
room (one of the 6 small lab rooms that make up the perimeter of the main lab room) for
his/her ofﬁce and data collection. The experimenter explained that his/her study concerned
self-reported attitudes of college students on a number of issues concerning their behavior
(the BIDR scale). The experimenter explained that his/her questionnaire packet, consisting
of two brief questionnaires, could be completed in a very short time, and because of this,
'another researcher' asked if he could administer his questionnaire packet to participants in
the current study. The experimenter explained that that packet contains more questionnaires
but it shouldn't take longer than 15 minutes to complete. The experimenter asked the
participant if this arrangement was satisfactory (all participants in the present experiment
agreed that this arrangement was satisfactory). The experimenter then began the ﬁrst phase
of the experiment.

Accident Manipulation. In an attempt to create feelings of guilt, a procedure
ﬁrst used successfully by Freedman, Wallington, and Bless (1967) was employed. In
"accident" conditions, participants were asked to complete the short questionnaires in the
experimenter's ofﬁce at a desk (in reality, the room was a lab cubicle decorated to look like
an ofﬁce). The desk had books, research articles, and a stack of nearly 1,000 neatly
ordered 3 x 5" index cards near the left front comer of the desk, such as would be typical

of the workspace of a person working on an in-depth research paper (it was important that

44
the participant believed that this was the experimenter's office). Notes were written on
about 1/2 of the cards, and the rest were blank. In order to make it obvious that the cards
were ordered, there were blue cards with extended alphabetical tabs interspersed evenly
throughout the stack of cards suggesting that the cards were ordered alphabetically. The
desk of the ofﬁce was 'rigged' such that front left leg of the desk was three inches shorter
than the others, thereby making it very unstable.

In the "accident" conditions, when participants sat at the desk and leaned on it to
begin completing the questionnaires, the desk tipped suddenly to one side (it did not fall
completely over, and the participant was in no danger of getting hurt), and the stack of
neatly ordered index cards crashed to the ﬂoor in disarray (other items on the desk were
secured so that they too did not fall). The experimenter then rushed in, and appeared
noticeably "bothered" by the calamity, but forgiving of the participant. The experimenter
then replaced a wooden block by the shorter desk leg, and made the desk secure again, as
the participant looked on. It was evident that the block that normally stabilized the desk
must have been loose, and the participant, even though he/she knows it was an accident,
should feel guilty at having "wrecked" the experimenter's many hours of neatly ordering
the index cards.

This manipulation is a particularly desirable guilt induction procedure, since it
satisﬁes two related and essential criteria necessary to produce guilt in an individual: the
individual must commit an act that causes "harm" (broadly speaking) to another, and the
person must show a clear concern for how his/her actions affect the other person (Tangney,
1992). After the wood block was replaced by the experimenter, the participant completed
the ﬁrst packet of questionnaires (the BIDR and the Sample Characteristics Survey).
Participants in the no-guilt conditions did not experience a disaster with the cards falling off
the desk, because prior to their arrival, the wood block was secured under the short desk
leg making the desk stable. These participants completed the ﬁrst packet of questionnaires

without incident.

45

Incidental vs. Episodic Racial Guilt. In the "episodic racial guilt" condition,
the experimenter was African-American. Here, the guilt of the participant was related to an
intergroup interaction (him/her self and the experimenter) in general. In the "incidental guilt
condition," the experimenter was Caucasian. Thus, the guilt felt is considered 'incidental'
or unrelated, to the intergroup context in general. In the no-guilt induction conditions, half
of the participants were run with an African-American experimenter, and half were run with
a Caucasian experimenter.

After the participant completed the two questionnaires for the experimenter's study,
the experimenter brought the participant to an adjacent lab, where a "second experimenter"
(who was always Caucasian) greeted the participant. In order to convince the participant
that the second packet of questionnaires was not related to the ﬁrst phase of the study, the
second experimenter conducted the second phase of the experiment. The experimenter in
the second phase asked that the participant complete a separate questionnaire packet for a
different study. In this separate packet, participants again completed a Consent Form, and
then they completed the bulk of the dependent measures (see description in Method above).
Following completion of that packet of questionnaires, participants were led out of the lab
room into the main room to get their experimental credit.

In this main room however, the ﬁrst experimenter (either an African American or
Caucasian experimenter) approached the participant and explained that he/she "forgot" to
give one last questionnaire, the "Exit Questionnaire," to the participant, and asked if the
participant would take a moment to ﬁll it out before leaving (all participants agreed to
complete this extra questionnaire). Participants were told that they could deposit their
responses in a slot in a box by the door that the department provided, in order to maintain
the conﬁdentiality of their responses (so that the ﬁrst experimenter could not see the
participants' evaluations). Participants were then given credit for their participation, and
were debriefed and dismissed. It is important to note that during debrieﬁng, participants

who were in the "accident" conditions were made aware that the experimenter was not

46
really conducting a senior honors thesis, therefore, the "accident" with the cards did no

harm at all (it was rigged to fall).

Results and Discussion

Of the 161 participants who participated in the experiment, three participants
reported accurate suspicions on the Post-Evaluation Questionnaire concerning the true
purpose of the experiment. These individuals were therefore dropped from the data analysis,
leaving a ﬁnal sample of 158 participants.

Affective Reactions

In order to examine the effects of the accident procedure, responses to two different
affective measures were examined. One measure consisted of the 35-item affect measure
labelled the "Sample Characteristics Survey" (see Appendix C), and the other was the 10-
item "state guilt" scale, taken from the Guilt Inventory to form the "Self Description
Questionnaire" (see Appendix D).

Guilt Inventory. The 10 state guilt items from the Guilt Inventory that comprise
the Self Description Questionnaire were analyzed for their reliability as a composite measure
of guilt, and the measure showed good reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .85). An ANOVA
examining the effects of of accident condition, prejudice, and experimenter race on the
composite measure of state guilt which revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions
(all ps > .10). The lack of differences between participants in the accident vs. no-accident
conditions is surprising. Given that the items from this inventory showed good reliability in
the present study, and that the Guilt Inventory has good validity & reliability characteristics
(see Kugler & Jones, 1992), it seems that whatever affect was induced in the accident
condition, it was not guilt. To discover whether any other affective variables were
inﬂuenced by the accident manipulation, additional analyses were conducted.

Factor Analyses of Affect Items. The 35 affect items in the Sample
Characteristics Survey were subjected to a factor analysis with oblique rotation, which
revealed 7 distinct factors. Inspection of the scree plot suggested that the ﬁrst three factors
were responsible for most of the meaningful variance in affective responses (see Appendix
L). Factor 1, "self-directed negative affect (SDNA)," had very good reliability (Cronbach's

47

48
alpha = .95) and is comprised of 22 items. Factor 2, "positive affect (PA)," also had good
reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 87) and is comprised of 6 items. Finally, factor 3, "other-
directed negative affect (ODNA)" showed good reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .86) and is
comprised of 3 items.

Separate AN OVAs were performed to examine the effects of participant prejudice,
experimenter race, and accident condition on participant scores on each of the three
composite affect scales just described. Consistent with the null results of the Guilt
Inventory, the ANOVA for SDNA revealed no significant main effects or interactions,
indicating that the accident manipulation did not appear to induce negative feelings directed
toward the self. The ANOVA for PA also revealed no main effects or interactions.
However, an AN OVA for ODNA revealed a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between
prejudice, guilt, and experimenter race, F(1, 157) = 5.47, p <.02I (see Table 1). In the "no
accident" conditions, high-prejudice participants reported more ODNA when interacting
with a Caucasian experimenter, while low-prejudice participants reported somewhat higher
ODNA when dealing with an African American experimenter, although simple effects tests
were inconclusive.

After an accident, however, high-prejudice participants showed equivalent ODNA
regardless of experimenter race, while low-prejudice participants reported signiﬁcantly
greater ODNA only when the accident involved a Caucasian experimenter. Follow up tests
conﬁrmed that the simple main effect of race under accident conditions was signiﬁcant for
low-prejudice participants, but not for those high in prejudice. This pattern suggests that
peOple who are low in prejudice may resist expressing other-directed negative affect when it
may appear to be directed at an African American person. However, they appear to have no
qualms about expressing these feelings when the person involved in the distressing

interaction was Caucasian.

49

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In sum, while the SDNA measure and the state guilt scale showed good reliability, it
appears that the accident manipulation did not elicit a predominant feeling of guilt, contrary
to predictions. The results of the affect measures indicate that a more accurate
characterization of the affect these participants experienced was a feeling of negative affect
tcwgd others. As a result of these analyses, it seems prudent to conceive the effects of the
accident manipulation not in terms of guilt, but in terms of other-directed negative affect.

Evaluation of the Hypotheses

Recall that Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with the effects of guilt on tendencies
to stereotype and express prejudice. The results of the affective measures indicated that the
accident manipulation did not induce guilt, or even a more general sort of self-directed
negative affect in participants. Rather, the feeling induced seems to be characterized by
negative feelings directed toward others. This result was quite suprising, considering that
the procedure has successfully been used to induce guilt in prior experiments (Freedman,
Wallington, & Bless, 1967) and it was effective in eliciting the predicted levels of guilt in
pilot testing. Unfortunately, because the manipulation failed to induce the desired affective
state in participants, evaluation of hypotheses 2 and 3 (and, hence, CDT and SAT) will have
to be deferred. Hypothesis 1 will still be evaluated, because it does not concern effects of
the accident manipulation. The rest of the data will be examined in an exploratory fashion, in
order to better understand the effects of distressing interpersonal interactions on subsequent
expressions of prejudice and stereotyping. Of primary interest are interactions of the
accident manipulation with the race of the person with whom the participant is interacting.
Although the data are not able to address the intended focus of the investigation, these
analyses may provide very interesting insights into the interpersonal dynamics of
stereotyping, a topic that has been largely ignored.

Participant responses to the Modern Racism Scale and the Student Court Items will
be examined as the primary measures of prejudice and stereotyping, respectively. Below,

Hypothesis 1 is re-stated, and the evidence from the primary dependant variables will be

51
analyzed as it bears on this hypothesis. Then the data from the secondary dependent
measures will then be examined to determine whether or not those data support the

hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1:

A main effect of participant pretest prejudice is predicted, such that participants who

are high in prejudice should show more stereotyping and prejudice on the dependent

variables than those who are low in prejudice.
Exploratory Analysis of Primary Dependent Measures

Modern Racism Scale. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with experimenter
race, prejudice, target ethnicity, and accident condition as independent variables indicated
that the prejudice level of the participants had the expected impact on the participants'
willingness to express negative racial attitudes on the primary measure of prejudice, the
Modern Racism Scale, E( 1, 157) = 151.01, p < .001. Not surprisingly, those high in
prejudice showed signiﬁcantly more prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans (M =
23.94) than those who were low in prejudice (M = 16.88). Because the primary criterion for
selection of participants was their responses on the Modern Racism Scale pretest, this
variable was treated as a covariate in an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) in order to
examine the effects of the accident induction, target ethnicity, and the experimenter's race
upon the participants' expressions of prejudiced racial attitudes on the Modern Racism Scale
administered in the questionnaire packet at the end of the present study. Results revealed no
signiﬁcant main effects or interactions (all ps > .11). It appears then, that the accident
manipulation and the feelings of ODNA it induces in participants did not inﬂuence
participants' willingness to express negative racial attitudes on this measure.

Student Court Questionnaire. Participant responses to the primary measure of
stereotyping, the student court questionnaire, were also examined. Recall that on the student
court questionnaire, participants were asked to read about a stereotyped target (Darnell

Jackson) or a non-stereotyped target (Dan Jensen). All information in the questionnaire is

52

identical in the two types of questionnaires, except for the name of the accused student
(either an African-American - sounding name -- Darnell Jackson, or an ethnically
nondescript sounding name -- Dan Jensen). Participant responses to 4 of the ﬁve questions
on the Student Court questionnaire were analyzed in order to examine the extent, if any, of
the participants' tendency to use stereotypes in making judgments concerning the guilt of the
accused defendant.2

A factor analysis with oblique rotation was conducted on the four items to be
examined from the student court scale in order to examine the possibility that the items are
intercorrelated and whether they form one stable factor. If this is the case, these four items
can be formed into a composite measure of stereotyping. The factor analysis revealed two
distinct factors. "Severity of punishment" and "seriousness of the crime" loaded onto factor
1 (loadings of .87 and .85, respectively). They were positively correlated (r = .60) and
when submitted to a reliability analysis, they showed good reliability as a composite
measure (Cronbach's alpha = .75). Factor 2 consisted of the items "likelihood of guilt" and
"likelihood of future crimes," which loaded onto the factor with loadings of .66 and .73,
respectively. However, these two items were weakly correlated (r = .14) and showed an
unacceptably low reliability as a composite scale (Cronbach's alpha = .22). Therefore,
analyses described below involving this questionnaire will ﬁrst discuss the effect of the
independent variables on the severity/seriousness composite scale, and then will examine the
likelihood of guilt and likelihood of future crimes items separately.

Severity / Seriousness Composite Scale. An ANOVA was conducted to

examine the effects of accident, experimenter race, participant prejudice, and target ethnicity

 

2 The ﬁfth item, "In general, do you think the rules and methods for dealing with student misbehavior
at MSU are too lenient or too strict?" was included as a 'ﬁller item' (a conceptually unrelated question to the
rest of the items on the scale) by Bodenhausen (1990) in his research, and therefore it will not be examined

in the present study.

53

on participants' scores on this composite measure. Results indicated no significant effects
involving the accident manipulation on this scale. However, a marginal two-way interaction
between experimenter race and accident condition emerged, F(1, 157) = 3.17, p .07 (see
Table 2). This crossover interaction indicated that, when dealing with a Caucasian
experimenter, participants viewed the cheating offense as more serious following an
unpleasant interpersonal incident with the experimenter, compared to the no-accident
condition. However, when interacting with an African American experimenter, participants
rated the cheating offense as more serious in the absence of an unpleasant incident.
Unfortunately, none of the simple effects tests were signiﬁcant. In previous research using
the students' court paradigm (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990), the seriousness judgments have
never shown evidence of stereotyping (or any other) effects. And in the current case, the
observed pattern was not contingent on the race of the person accused of cheating, so it may
reﬂect little having to do with stereotyping per se. Thus, these differences may not be of
particularly great theoretical interest and clearly should be treated with caution pending
replication.

Likelihood of future crimes. An ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of accident condition, prejudice, target ethnicity, and experimenter race on
participants' ratings of the likelihood that the defendant would commit more crimes in the
future. The analyses revealed a marginally significant 4-way interaction of accident
condition, experimenter race, prejudice, and target ethnicity, 115(1, 157) = 3.52, p < .06 (see
Table 3).

To understand this interaction, it is useful to consider the no-accident, Caucasian
experimenter condition as a baseline. Against this baseline we can see how the introduction
of the accident (and/or the presence of an African American experimenter) affected ratings
of the Black vs. White target's likelihood of future cheating. For high-prejudice
participants, reactions to the Black target were relatively positive and unaffected by these

manipulations. However, their judgments of the White target became more negative after an

54

Table 2

Severity / Seriousness Composite Scale

Accident
Qualiﬁer.)
No Accident Accident
Experimenter
Race
Caucasian 13.29 14.28
(35) (40)
African 14.98 13.71
American (42) (41)

 

Note: Means are not signiﬁcantly different. Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

55

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56
accident, especially when the accident "victim" was a Caucasian. In contrast, for low-
prejudice participants, reactions to the Black target became more negative following the
occurrence of an accident, especially with a Caucasian experimenter. However, their
judgments of White targets were largely unaffected.

When the experimenter was African American and no accident happened, low-

 

prejudice participants' ratings of White targets actually became more favorable. Although
simple effects tests revealed few reliable differences (see Table 3), it seems clear that the
thrust of the pattern consists in the fact that the accident manipulation increased the
negativity of high-prejudice participants' perceptions of White, but not Black, accused
cheaters, while the same manipulation increased the negativity of low-prejudice persons'
reactions to Black, but not White, accused cheaters. These effects of the accident
manipulation were particularly pronounced when the experimenter was a Caucasian.

This intriguing pattern might be explained by the following assumptions. First,
high-prejudice participants may be sensitive to the social inappropriateness of their more
negative views of African Americans. As such, when given an African American target to
judge, they may conceal or mask their true feelings by reporting relatively more favorable
judgments. Thus, although they may be feeling some ODNA after an interpersonal accident,
they only express this negativity toward a White target but not toward a Black one. In
contrast, low-prejudice participants seem to become more harsh only toward Black accused
cheaters. Although at ﬁrst surprising, this might reﬂect an interesting extension of the Black
Sheep Effect (e.g., Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). This effect emerges when people judge
negative forms of deviancy more harshly when these acts are performed by ingroup rather
than outgroup members. The idea is that the "black sheep" reﬂects poorly on the ingroup, so
her or his actions are particularly reprehensible. Perhaps in a similar fashion, low-prejudice
participants are bothered by individuals who seem to be conﬁrming negative stereotypes of
Blacks (in this case, by cheating). Such behavior, they may feel, is making it harder to

confront and change prejudices in society. If this negative reaction is more likely to be

57
triggered when participants are feeling ODN A (even if this affect derives from an incident
involving a Caucasian), then it might explain the pattern seen in the table. Obviously, more
research will be needed to explore this possibility.

Likelihood of guilt. An ANOVA on the effects of the accident manipulation,
experimenter race, prejudice, and target ethnicity on the participants' assessment of the guilt
of the accused student in the Student Court questionnaire revealed a marginally signiﬁcant 2-
way interaction between accident condition and prejudice, £(1, 157) = 3.49, p < .06 (see
Table 4). The pattern of the interaction indicates that for low-prejudice participants, the
accident did not inﬂuence their guilt judgments, but for high-prejudice participants, guilt
judgments increase following the experience of an interpersonal accident. Apparently, the
ODNA they feel after the accident gets transferred to guilt judgments of the accused cheater,
whatever his race may be, but this was not the case for low-prejudice people, who might be
less prone to such forms of displacement.

The ANOVA also revealed a marginally signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between
experimenter race, accident, and target ethnicity, E(1, 157) = 3.00, p < .08 (see Table 5).
Taking the no-accident, Caucasian experimenter condition as a baseline, it is interesting to
see how the occurrence of an accident and/or the presence of an African American
experimenter might inﬂuence guilt perceptions. In general, it seems that guilt perceptions of
the White target remain unchanged by the accident manipulation, while guilt perceptions of
the Black target increase following the accident, especially when the experimenter was
Caucasian. Simply having an African American experimenter (but no accident) tends to
increase guilt perceptions of African American targets somewhat, but it tends to decrease
perceptions of the guilt of Caucasian targets. These trends must be treated with caution,
because follow-up tests revealed no signiﬁcant simple effects. However, to the extent that
the pattern is reliable, it may reﬂect a scapegoating pattern in which ODNA elicited by the
interpersonal incident results in harsher judgments of minority group members, but not

majority group targets (Allport, 1954).

58

Table 4

Likelihood of Guilt

Accident
Men
No Accident Accident
Participant
Prejudice
High 5_53a 6.24b
(40) (41)
Low 5.61 5.398
(41) (36)

 

Note: Means with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different at p < .05. Numbers

in parentheses are cell N's.

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Analysis of Secondary Dependent Measures

Egalitarianism Scale. An ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
prejudice, accident, target ethnicity, and experimenter race on participants' ratings on the
Egalitarianism Scale, a secondary measure of prejudice. Participants' prejudice level had a
signiﬁcant impact on their endorsement of egalitarian ideals, E(l, 156) = 8.93, p_ < .003.
High-prejudice individuals were less likely to endorse egalitarian statements (M = 40.86)
compared to low—prejudice individuals (_M_ = 43.86). All other main effects and interactions
were not signiﬁcant. In principle, this ﬁnding supports Hypothesis 1. Though Hypothesis 1
makes a prediction about the main effect of prejudice on measures of prejudice and
stereotyping, it is clear from these data that participants' pretest prejudice inﬂuenced not
only race related attitudes (as indicated above in the analyses of the Modern Racism Scale
scores) but it also inﬂuenced endorsement of these more general ideals of equality that are
not tied to any speciﬁc dimension of stigma.

Sex Stereotyping Questionnaire. In order to ascertain whether any racial
sensitivities triggered in the interaction with the experimenter might generalize to an
unrelated dimension of stereotyping, participants completed two forms of sex stereotyping,
which tap the degree to which they endorse sex stereotypes of men and women. Separate
ANOVAs were conducted to investigate the effects of accident, prejudice, experimenter
race, and target ethnicity on participants' scores on three separate indices of sex
stereotyping: stereotyping of feminine items (SFI), stereotyping of masculine items (SMI)
and a total sex stereotyping index (TSI). The ANOVAs for each of these stereotyping
indices indicated no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions involving the accident
manipulation. The lack of ﬁndings on this measure suggests that the other-directed negative
affect generated among those in the episodic accident conditions may inﬂuence stereotyping
only along race-related dimensions. However, as indicated in the analyses of the student
court questionnaire, the tendency to stereotype African Americans was very weak, and was

not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, it appears that the negative affect induced in

61
participants in the accident conditions does not have any differential effects on stereotyping
along race-related or gender-related dimensions.

Topics Questionnaire. On the Topics Questionnaire, participants were asked to
indicate their interest in writing an essay on 20 various topics. Three of these topics were
either overtly race-related, or were likely to be perceived as race-related ("Inner city
poverty," "Fighting job discrimination," and "Why race relations are important"). These
items were combined into a composite scale to assess the effect of the incidental or episodic
guilt on participants' attitudes toward race-relevant issues. This composite scale had fair
reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .68). An ANOVA was conducted in order to examine the
effects of accident, prejudice, target ethnicity, and experimenter race on participants' scores
on this composite scale. Results revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for participant prejudice,
E(l, 157) = 39.92, p < .001. Low-prejudice participants indicated a greater interest in these
race-related issues (_M_ = 12.08) than high-prejudice participants (M = 10.12). Though not
addressing prejudice or stereotyping of African Americans, participants' responses on this
measure indirectly bear on Hypothesis 1. Speciﬁcally, it appears that high-prejudice
participants, as one might expect, were less interested in writing about race-related issues
than low-prejudice participants, indicating that the negative attitudes toward African
Americans inﬂuenced their interest in issues that appeared race-related.

A signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between target ethnicity, accident, and prejudice also
emerged in the analyses, EU, 157) = 3.89, p < .05 (see Table 6). As indicated in Table 6,
there seemed to be a strong inﬂuence of participant pretest prejudice in that in 3 of 4
conditions, low-prejudice participants were signiﬁcantly more interested in race-related
topics. More informative, however is an examination of the differences between high and
low-prejudice in the target ethnicity conditions across accident conditions. These difference

scores will essentially yield some information about the inﬂuence of reading about a

62

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stereotyped vs. non-stereotyped target in the student court scenarios on participants' interest
on race-related topics.

As shown in Table 6, high-prejudice participants in the accident condition did not
differ across target ethnicity conditions in their interest in the race-related topics (2 > .90).
However, those high-prejudice participants in the no-accident condition were slightly more
interested in race related topics if they had read about an African American defendant in the
student court scenario (ps > .05). This trend was reversed for low-prejudice participants.
That is, in all conditions, low-prejudice participants indicated a high interest in race-related
topics. However, those in the no-accident condition who read about an African American
defendant were slightly less interested in race-related topics than other low-prejudice
participants (125 > .15).

These results are difﬁcult to interpret because they do not include the experimenter
race variable. However, these data are interesting in their own right, suggesting that there
was something unique about those in the no-accident condition who read about a
stereotyped target that causes a non-intuitive turn in the results: high-prejudice participants
tended to indicate higher interest in race-related topics, and low-prejudice participants were
less interested in race-related topics. Perhaps in this condition, high-prejudice participants
are sensitized to the issue of stereotyping (because of the stereotypical nature of the case
they read), so they respond by concealing their prejudices and feigning a slightly greater
interest in race-related topics. Yet, this does not explain why high-prejudice participants did
not do this in the accident condition. Perhaps the affect they may be feeling in the accident
condition overrides or cancels their concealment motivations.

Finally, results of the ANOVA indicated a marginal 3-way interaction between
prejudice, accident, and experimenter race, E(1, 157) = 2.98, p < .08 (see Table 7). As can
be seen in Table 7, high and low prejudice participants did not differ signiﬁcantly in their

interest in racial topics under the baseline condition (no accident, Caucasian experimenter),

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65
but when an African American experimenter was present and/or an accident had occurred,
responses of the two groups became more polarized. Under these conditions, low prejudice
persons indicated a signiﬁcantly greater interest in the racial topics than did high prejudice
persons.

Exit Questionnaire. The Exit Questionnaire (see Appendix K) was designed as a
rating form of psychology honors students ostensibly designed by and used by the
department faculty in their assessment of honors students and the quality of students'
research. The questionnaire contains 4 questions that ask the participant to rate the ﬁrst
experimenter on 4 dimensions, using a Likert-type scale with anchors ranging from 1 (the
most negative rating) to 9 (the most positive rating). These four items were submitted to a
factor analysis with oblique rotation and all loaded on one distinct factor (all loadings higher
than .74). The items showed good reliability as a composite scale (Cronbach's alpha = .82).
The questionnaire also asked participants whether they would be interested in returning at a
later date to help the experimenter conduct more experiments, and if so, participants were
asked to indicate the amount of time they were willing to devote to help the experimenter.

Composite Measure Analyses. An analysis of participant responses to the
composite measure from the Exit Questionnaire showed a marginal main effect of participant
prejudice level on participants' evaluation of the experimenter, E(1, 155) = 3.05, p < .08.
High-prejudice participants were slightly more likely to rate the experimenter highly (M =
33.45) than low-prejudice participants (M = 32.62). No effects involving the accident
manipulation were signiﬁcant.

Volunteering to Help. On the Exit Questionnaire, participants were asked to
indicate whether they would like to help the experimenter in a future experiment.
Participants indicated their responses on a Likert-type scale, with anchors of 1 = "deﬁnitely
not" to 5 "deﬁnitely yes." An ANOVA on the influence of the experimenter's race, the
accident condition, target ethnicity, and the participants' pretest prejudice level on

participants' responses to this question revealed a main effect for experimenter race, EU,

66

157) = 4.64, p < .03. Those interacting with a Caucasian experimenter were signiﬁcantly
more likely to volunteer to help that experimenter in a future experiment (_M_ 2.23) than those
interacting with an African American experimenter (_M_ = 1.96). It is interesting to note that
this main effect was not qualiﬁed by the expected 2-way interaction between experimenter
race and participant prejudice. It appears that participants' racial attitudes didn't matter here,
and that both high and low-prejudice participants (all Caucasian) were more willing to help
another Caucasian than an African American.

Time to Help. As a ﬁnal question on the Exit Questionnaire, participants were
asked to indicate (if they previously indicated that they would like to help the experimenter
in a future experiment), how much time they would be willing to devote. This was an Open-
ended question, and participants responses were coded as number of minutes volunteered,
in order to obtain a more precise assessment. An ANOVA on the effects of the
experimenter's race, the accident condition, target ethnicity, and the participants pretest
prejudice level on participants' responses to this question showed no signiﬁcant main effects
or interactions (all ps > .23). Because no signiﬁcant interactions were obtained on the
measure of participants' willingness to volunteer to help, it is not surpising that the results
would yield no main effects or interactions on this measure too, since it is tied to the
measure of volunteering.

Recall that on the affect measures, participants in the accident condition indicated
signiﬁcantly more "anger at others" than those in the no-accident condition. While this
experiment had no provisions for probing the nature of this negative affect toward others,
the Exit Questionnaire could be useful in discovering whether the negative affect was
directed at the experimenter. Most telling would have been a signiﬁcant main effect of the
accident condition, whereby those in the accident condition rated the experimenter worse,
and were signiﬁcantly less willing to help the experimenter. This would lend support to the
idea that the anger at others was really directed toward the experimenter (presumably --

among those in the accident condition -- for causing the participant discomfort and

67

embarrassment by leaving the research cards out where the participant could (and did) knock
them over). If it was indeed the case that ODNA was directed at the experimenter,
participants were not willing to openly express this in the Exit questionnaire.
Ancillary Findings

Gender Effects. Below, the results of the analyses that include participant gender
and confederate gender will be presented. Where possible, speculative explanations of the
interactions involving gender will be offered. However, the reader should note that for some
of the patterns, no explanation is offered. In most cases, patterns in the participant
responses across questionnaires involving similar independent variables will be pointed out,
in an effort to explain and understand how gender affects participants' tendencies to endorse
stereotypes and express prejudiced attitudes.

Affective Reactions.

Males did not differ from females in their scores on the composite measures of "self-

directed negative affect, other-directed negative affect," and "positive affect," (all ps >
.10). Males also did not differ from females in their scores on both the negative mood
composite scale and the Guilt Inventory. No other signiﬁcant main effects or interactions
involving participant or experimenter gender emerged in the affect analyses.

Primary Dependent Measures. The analyses revealed no significant main
effects or interactions involving participant or experimenter gender for participants'
responses to the Modern Racism Scale. The results of the AN OVA investigating the effects
of accident, prejudice, target ethnicity, experimenter gender, participant gender and
experimenter race on participants' scores on the seriousness / severity composite measure

yielded two signiﬁcant 3-way interactions. First, a 3-way interaction between experimenter

race, participant gender, and prejudice emerged, E(1, 157) = 5.55, p < .02 (see Table 8).

68

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Among high-prejudice males, those interacting with a Caucasian were slightly more
likely to judge the crime as serious and indicate a severe punishment compared to those
interacting with an African American experimenter. However, low-prejudice males showed
the opposite pattern, indicating higher scores on the severity/seriousness scale when they
were interacting with an African American experimenter than when they were with a
Caucasian experimenter.

This pattern is strange, because one would expect high-prejudice participants to be
more punitive toward the defendant on the questionnaire when they feel the negative affect
that (for high-prejudice individuals) accompanies interacting with an African American.
Similarly, low-prejudice participants should be even more vigilant to n_ot indicate the
defendant as guilty when they are exposed to an African American defendant. Perhaps for
high-prejudice males, the negative affect they experience when interacting with an African
American experimenter attenuates their inclination to express the negative affect on the
student court questionnaire. The low-prejudice individual should be very vigilant against
stereotyping or feeling discomfort in the presence of African Americans. These individuals
can be regarded as constantly trying to suppress all thoughts of stereotyping. However, this
tendency can backﬁre, and it may be the case that this is happening here. Speciﬁcally, low-
prejudice males were slightly more punitive when in the presence of an African American.
The reason may be that because they are trying hard to m think about stereotypes or feel
negative affect in the presence of an African American, the thought-suppression makes the
stereotypes and/or negative affect even more salient, thereby inﬂuencing their judgments of
the defendant on the student court questionnaire (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1996; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).

Interestingly, women (both high and low-prejudice) showed the opposite pattern
entirely. High-prejudice females were more more punitive when in the presence of an
African American experimenter than when with a Caucasian experimenter. Low-prejudice

female participants were slightly less punitive when exposed to an African American

70

experimenter than when they were with a Caucasian experimenter. While this pattern makes
intuitive sense, because, as mentioned above, high-prejudice participants should be more
punitive because of the negative affect they feel when interacting with an African American
(while low-prejudice participants would not feel negative affect with an African American),
it seems unlikely that the speculations offered for the observed data for males would not also
apply to females. Speciﬁcally, why would females not show the same pattern of scores on
the severity/seriousness scale as males? Because the follow-up tests were inconclusive, the
answer lies in future investigations and replications. If this pattern is replicated in future
experiments, it suggests that males and females regard social information differently in
making social judgments, which might lead to differences between males and females in the
tendency to stereotype others.

Second, a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between experimenter gender, participant
gender and prejudice was revealed, 15(1, 157) = 6.36, p < .01 (see Table 9). High-prejudice
males were slightly more punitive toward the defendant when the experimenter was a female
than when the experimenter was a male. However, low-prejudice males were slightly less
punitive when the experimenter was a female than when the experimenter was a male.
Simple effects tests revealed that these differences were not signiﬁcant. Females showed a
completely different pattern of evaluations. Whereas low-prejudice females were more
punitive toward the student court defendant when they interacted with a female experimenter
than with a male experimenter, high-prejudice females were more punitive when they
interacted with a male experimenter than with a female experimenter. Again, simple effects
tests showed that these differences were not signiﬁcant.

What might explain this interaction? One explanation might be an inﬂuence of a
gender priming on the participants' subsequent evaluations on the student court

questionnaire (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985). Among the high-prejudice participants

71

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interacting with a same-sex experimenter, judgments of seriousness and severity are lower
than they are when the experimenter is of a different gender than the participant, because the
gender of the opposite-sex experimenter may prime gender stereotypes, which may also
increase the tendency to make negative judgments across racial categories. There has been
some evidence to support this cross-dimensional (i.e., gender to race) inﬂuence of priming
(Sherman, Mackie, & Driscoll, 1990; Sinclair, Mark, & Shotland, 1987). However, for the
low-prejudice participants, interacting with an opposite-sex experimenter may invoke the
stereotype, which may then trigger a vigilance against using gender, as well as other
stereotypes, as heuristics in making judgments about the crime of the accused defendant.
The question arises, if this were true, aren't the low-prejudice individuals susceptible to
increased tendencies to stereotype as a result of trying to suppress their gender stereotypes?
It is possible that participants would be more susceptible to germ stereotypes (since these
would be made more accessible by the participants' attempt to suppress them), but this
stereotype may serve as a trigger for low-prejudice participants to increase vigilance against
using general heuristics in making an assessment of the ambiguous information about the
crime of the defendant in the student court scenario. Again, it must be noted that the post-
hoc explanations of the data offered here are highly speculative attempts to describe the
obtained data, and should be regarded as such, pending future investigations.

An AN OVA examining the inﬂuence of accident, experimenter race, experimenter
gender, participant gender, target ethnicity, and prejudice on participants' judgments of the
likelihood that the defendant in the student court scenario would commit a crime in the future
yielded no significant main effects or interactions. On participant responses to the
'likelihood of guilt' item on the student court questionnaire, an ANOVA investigating the
effects of accident, experimenter race, experimenter gender, participant gender, target
ethnicity, and prejudice revealed a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between experimenter

gender and experimenter race, E( 1, 157) = 4.09, p < .04 (see Table 10). Simple effects tests

73

Table 10

Likelihood of Guilt

Experimenter
Base
Caucasian African Am
Experimenter
mg
Male 5.89 6.22
(37) (23)
Female 5.50 5.52
(38) (60)

 

Note: Means with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different at p < .05. Numbers

in parentheses are cell N's.

74

showed no signiﬁcant differences between the means. As might be expected, those
participants who interacted with an African American male experimenter judged the
defendant as slightly more likely to be guilty of the crime than those who interacted with a
Caucasian male experimenter or a Caucasian female, or an African American female. This
may be due to the fact that African American males (more than African American females)
are most often associated with negative stereotypes (Dovidio, et al., 1996) often acquired as
perceived correlations (Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993) that get stronger over time.
The negative stereotypes of the African American male tend to be strong, and therefore are
more likely to make concepts associated with that negative stereotype (i.e., "guilt,"
"criminal," "violent", etc.) more accessible in the participants' memory (Bargh, 1994;
Fazio, 1995) thereby negatively inﬂuencing the participants' subsequent judgments of the
defendant. Again, because follow-up tests were inconclusive, these speculations about the
interaction must be regarded with caution, pending future experiments.

Secondary Dependent Measures. On the Topics questionnaire, an ANOVA on
the effects of accident, participant gender, experimenter gender, experimenter race, target
ethnicity, and prejudice on participants' interest in race-related topics indicated a main effect
for participant gender, E0, 157) = 8.2, p < .005. Overall, females were signiﬁcantly more
interested than males in race-related topics (Ms = 11.54 and 10.20, respectively).

The ANOVA on the effects of target ethnicity, accident, prejudice, experimenter
race, experimenter gender, and participant gender on participants' endorsement of egalitarian
ideals on the Egalitarianism questionnaire revealed a main effect for participant gender, E( 1 ,
156) = 5.81, p < .01. Females were more likely to agree with the egalitarian statements on
the questionniare than males (Ms = 43.14 and 40.80, respectively). The results of the
analyses for the Topics questionnaire and Egalitarianism questionnaire suggest that overall,
females tended to be more open-minded about race-related issues and the ideals of equality
among all people (however, it should be noted that there were no differences in attitudes on

the Modern Racism Scale between males and females).

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Participant responses to the sex stereotyping questionnaire were examined in three
separate ANOVAs, each exarrring the effects of accident, prejudice, participant gender,
experimenter gender, experimenter race, and target ethnicity on participants' tendencies to
endorse sex stereotypes. The AN OVAs focused on three indices: stereotyping of feminine
items (SFI), stereotyping of masculine items (SMI), and an overall total sex stereotyping
index (T SI). The AN OVA on the SFI revealed a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between target
ethnicity and participant gender, E(1, 154) = 7.77, p < .006 (see Table 11). Simple effects
tests showed that males who had previously read about a stereotyped target (an African
American defendant) on the student court questionnaire were more likely to endorse sex
stereotypes about females compared to males who had read about a non-stereotyped
(Caucasian) target.

As with the severity / seriousness composite scale, this effect among males may also
be due to a priming process. Speciﬁcally, males who had a racial stereotype activated by
reading about an African American target may be more likely than those who had read about
a non-stereotyped (Caucasian) target to utilize gender stereotypes in subsequent judgments
about women. However, this process doesn't seem to hold true for female participants, who
show a slight (non-signiﬁcant) reverse trend to stereotype against women more after reading
about a non-stereotyped (a Caucasian defendant) target than after reading about a
stereotyped target.

The ANOVAs on the SMI, T81, and the Exit questionnaire composite measure
revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions (all ps > .05). The ANOVA investigating
the effects of accident, prejudice, experimenter gender, participant gender, target ethnicity
and experimenter race on participants' willingness to volunteer to help the experimenter in a
future experiment (as measured on the Exit questionnaire) indicated a signiﬁcant main effect
for experimenter gender, E( l, 157) = 3.90, p < .05. Participants were signiﬁcantly more
willing to volunteer to help male experimenters (M = 2.12) than female experimenters (M =
2.07).

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76

Table 11

Stereotyping of Feminine Items (SFI)

Participant
Gender

Male Female
Target
Ethnicity
Caucasian .8 1a .65b

(25) (48)
African .59b .72
American (30) (52)

 

Note: Means with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different at p_ < .05. Numbers

in parentheses are cell N 's.

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An ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effects of accident, prejudice,
experimenter gender, participant gender, target ethnicity and experimenter race on the
amount of time participants would be willing to devote to helping the experimenter in a
future experiment. The results indicated a significant 2-way interaction between
experimenter gender and prejudice, E(l, 151) = 11.51, p < .001 (see Table 12). Among
those interacting with a male experimenter, low-prejudice participants volunteered slightly
more time to help the experimenter in a future experiment than high-prejudice participants.
However, among those interacting with a female experimenter, high-prejudice participants
volunteered more time to help her than low-prejudice participants. Simple effects tests
showed that these differences were not signiﬁcant. Simple effects tests showed that among
high-prejudice participants, those interacting with a female experimenter tended to volunteer
more time to help the experimenter than those who interacted with a male experimenter, E(1,
77) = 4.18, p < .05.

Overall, the analyses suggest that both low and high-prejudice participants were
more willing to volunteer more time to help a female experimenter (Ms = 71.25 and 83.96,
for low and high-prejudice participants, respectively) than a male experimenter (Ms = 66.18
and 51.60, for low and high-prejudice participants, respectively). However, it is unclear
why low-prejudice participants were more willing to volunteer more time with a male
experimenter, and high—prejudice participants were more willing to volunteer more time to
help a female experimenter. It remains for future research to verify these ﬁndings and
discover the basis for the interaction. The ANOVA on the effects of accident, prejudice,
experimenter gender, participant gender, target ethnicity and experimenter race on the
amount of time participants would be willing to devote to helping the experimenter in a
future experiment also revealed a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between experimenter
gender, accident, and prejudice, E(l, 151) = 5.43, p < .02 (see Table 13). As can be seen in
Table 13, this interaction suggests that among those in the accident condition, both low and

high—prejudice participants were more willing to devote more time to help a female

78

Table 12

Time (in minutes) Volunteered to Help Experimenter

 

Experimenter
Gender
Male Female
Participant
Prejudice
High 51.60 83.96
(25) (53)
Low 66. 18 71 .25
(34) (40)

 

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experimenter in the future. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. The analyses also indicated that for those in the accident condition,
low-prejudice participants volunteered more time to help the experimenter than high-
prejudice participants. Simple effects tests showed that these differences were not
signiﬁcant, however. Nevertheless, this ﬁnding is consistent with what one would expect
from low and high-prejudice participants. That is, high-prejudice participants should be less
likely to help an African American experimenter, but have no problem volunteering to help a
Caucasian experimenter. On the other hand, a low-prejudice participant should be willing to
help both. Thus, when one collapses across race of the experimenter, high-prejudice
participants should show a decreased tendency to help (both male and female experimenters)
compared to low-prejudice participants, and this is precisely what occurred.

The pattern of findings in the no-accident condition is a bit more ambiguous.
Speciﬁcally, it is unclear why high-prejudice participants would tend to offer more time to a
male experimenter, and low-prejudice participants would offer signiﬁcantly more time to a
female experimenter. Because the simple-effects tests were inconclusive, this particular
interaction awaits future replication and investigation, in order to clarify the nature of these
ﬁndings.

Brief Summary of Findings for Experiment ll. It was predicted that when
participants tipped over the stack of nearly 1,000 organized research cards of the
experimenter, they would feel guilt at having (temporarily) ruined the organized cards,
costing the experimenter more time to remedy the situation. However, the affect analyses
suggest that, surprisingly, participants in this condition did not feel guilt, but instead
experienced what might be characterized as "other—directed negative affect." Given that the
guilt induction procedure was successful in previous research (Freedman et al., 1967) and
in pilot testing, it was surprising that the procedure did not induce guilt among participants

in the present study. The failure of the manipulation to induce guilt in participants

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81
unfortunately precluded testing of two of the three hypotheses, because they are concerned
with the effects of guilt on stereotyping and prejudice in various experimental conditions.

Hypothesis I predicted a main effect of participant pretest prejudice on the primary
measures of prejudice and stereotyping. Not surprisingly, prejudice level had a main effect
for participants' responses to the Modern Racism Scale, because participants' pretest scores
on this scale were used as an index for participant selection for the experiment proper. On
the primary measure of stereotyping, the student court questionnaire, prejudice did not have
the expected main effect. However, recall that the marginal 2-way interaction between
accident and prejudice for the "likelihood of guilt" item showed a pattern similar to what one
might expect for high and low-prejudice participants. Specifically, high-prejudice
participants were not more likely than low-prejudice participants to judge the defendant as
guilty when they were in the no-accident condition. However, when high-prejudice
participants were in the accident condition, they were signiﬁcantly more likely to judge the
defendant as guilty (p < .05) than participants in two of the three remaining comparison
conditions (see Table 7). It is almost as if the accident condition, and the concomitant
ODNA it induced in the participant, did not have an impact on low-prejudice participants,
but it was the catalyst for greater judgments of guilt in high-prejudice participants. Again, as
mentioned above, because the race of the experimenter variable and the target ethnicity
variable did not interact with prejudice and accident here, the question of whether
participants were using a stereotype in their judgments of guilt remains unanswered by this
marginal 2-way interaction.

It is important to note that the ODNA produced was only observed for the interaction
between prejudice, guilt, and experimenter race (see Table 1). ODNA was not produced
across conditions with respect to the accident manipulation. In fact, it was often unclear
what affective states were manipulated by the accident. For this reason, caution should be
employed when interpreting the results of the accident condition in the results for

Experiment 1.

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Results from the primary measure of stereotyping, the student court questionnaire,
indicated the following ﬁndings. When participants experience the unpleasant interpersonal
incident with the experimenter (and the other-directed negative affect that accompanies the
incident), high-prejudice individuals are more negative in their perceptions of White, but not
Black targets. However, low-prejudice individuals show the reverse pattern of judgments,
indicating more negative judgments of Black, but not White targets. Perhaps this effect is an
extension of the "Black Sheep Effect" in which low-prejudice individuals in the present
study are more punitive toward African Americans who conﬁrm stereotypes of African
Americans as a group, making it harder to change negative views of that group. High-
prejudice individuals making judgments about White and African American targets in the
accident condition may be attempting to conceal their negative inter-racial attitudes (for social
desirability purposes), choosing instead to express their other-directed negative affect in
more negative judgments toward the White target, and rate the African American more
positively. Because follow up tests were often inconclusive, these patterns (and the
specultations about their nature) must be evaluated with caution, pending future
investigations.

It is important to note that a limitation in the present study is that it is unclear whether
participants accurately detected the ethnicity of the defendant in the Student Court
questionnaire. No manipulation check for the proper perception of this crucial element of the
questionnaire was provided. Thus, because it is an open question whether participants
perceived the questionnaire accurately, the present conclusions about the reactions to the
Student Court questionnaire are more tentative.

The results of the analyses of the secondary dependent measures provide additional
support for hypothesis 1. Specifically, on the Egalitarianism Scale (3 measure of the
endorsement of egalitarian ideals), and the Topics composite measure (a measure of the
interest in race-related topics), the prejudice level of participants inﬂuenced their responses.

Speciﬁcally, the main effect of prejudice obtained on each of these measures suggests that

83
high-prejudice participants were less interested in race-related topics and were less likely to
agree with egalitarian statements. These speciﬁc ﬁndings were not directly predicted by
hypothesis 1, because hypothesis 1 made predictions concerning prejudice and stereotyping,
but the pattern of ﬁndings is consistent with what one would expect from high vs. low-
prejudice participants on these measures.

The analyses of the sex stereotyping questionnaire indicated that participants in the
accident conditions were not more likely than other participants to endorse sex stereotypes.
This ﬁnding, coupled with the participant responses on the student court questionnaire,
indicates that the other-directed negative affect generated in the accident conditions did not
seem to enhance the tendency to use racial or sex stereotypes in social judgments.

Analyses of the gender effects indicated that participants who interacted with an
African American experimenter showed the highest judgments of guilt. This may be due to
an often-produced perceived correlation in American media between African American males
and violence and crime. Thus, merely seeing an African American male may trigger negative
attitudes in participants, and these may transfer to greater judgments of guilt for the

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The accident procedure in Experiment 1 was designed to induce feelings of guilt in
participants who spilled over the research cards of an African-American experimenter
(episodic racial guilt) or a Caucasian experimenter (incidental guilt). The results of the
affect measures revealed that guilt was not induced. Rather, feelings of "other-directed
negative affect" were induced in those who were in the accident condition. As a result, the
data obtained in the ﬁrst experiment could not address the predictions about the effects of
guilt on prejudice and stereotyping derived from CDT and SAT. As mentioned above, this
result was surprising, given the success of the guilt induction procedure in previous
research and in the pilot testing for Experiment 1.

In order to get a more complete picture of how negative emotion affects the
tendency of individuals to utilize stereotypes in social judgments, it would be useful to
examine the effects of another common negative emotion in the intergroup context:
discomfort. Discomfort can be deﬁned as a positive or negative subjective feeling arising
from the perception of physiological arousal. As was discussed above, discomfort can be
further distinguished as either: originating in an outgroup-unrelated context (incidental
discomfort), as the result of a speciﬁc interaction (or imagined interaction) with a member
of the racial outgroup (episodic racial discomfort), or as part of an enduring reaction to the
outgroup (chronic discomfort). This experiment seeks to shed light on how discomfort
might differ from (or resemble) anxiety in its effect on an individual's tendency to
stereotype others. Experiment 2 was also designed to examine systematically how
incidental and episodic racial discomfort differentially affect the tendency to employ
stereotypes in subsequent social judgments. As discussed above, discomfort is
conceptualized as a low-level physiological arousal. In Experiment 2, incidental and
episodic racial discomfort was induced, and their effects upon subsequent social judgments

(stereotyping tendencies) were examined.

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Discomfort in intergroup contexts

An experimental paradigm which is useful for the induction of discomfort is that of
a "personal space invasion." Personal space is deﬁned as "the area individual humans
actively maintain around themselves into which others cannot intrude without arousing
discomfort" (Hayduk, 1978, p. 118). Hall (1966) proposed four regions of personal
space. The "intimate zone" is a distance of touching to 18 inches from the body, and this
space is reserved only for behaviors that are very involving and personal, such as hugging
and love-making. The "personal zone" is deﬁned as 18 inches to 4 feet from oneself, and is
reserved for a wide-range of small group experiences, friendly conversation, and
interaction with acquaintences. The "social zone" is the distance of 4 feet to 12 feet from
oneself, and is reserved for meetings, formal dining, and professional presentations. The
"public zone" is the distance of 12 or more feet from oneself, and is reserved for even more
formal meetings, stage presentations, and lectures.

Many of these personal space distance norms are variable between cultures (Hall,
1966; Smith, 1981): the British and Scandinavians prefer more distance than the French
and Arabs, while North Americans prefer more space than Latin Americans (Stockdale,
1978). However, while the distances between personal space zones may ﬂuctuate between
cultures, much research has documented that, across cultures, personal space invasions
into the intimate and personal zones increases physiological arousal (Altman & Vinsel,
1978; Middlemist, Knowles, & Matter, 1976; Patterson, 1976). When a stranger comes
within the "intimate zone" for example, the "invaded" individual tends to ﬁdget, look away,
back off, or show other signs of discomfort (Altman & Vinsel, 1978). When so aroused,
people will often take steps to restore their personal space by moving away from the
invader (Aiello, 1987).
General effects of discomfort and arousal

The physiological arousal that one experiences in response to a personal space

86

invasion does not create speciﬁc emotional responses. Rather, the arousal intensiﬁes the
feelings the individual already experiences in response to the "invader" (Knowles, 1980).
In an experimental demonstration of this idea, Storms and Thomas (1977) had an
experimenter sit either very close (6 inches) or farther away (30 inches) from the participant
while the participant was being interviewed. The experimenter was to either be rude or
friendly toward the participant. Participants then were asked to rate how much they liked
the experimenter. Not surprisingly, people liked the friendly experimenter more than the
rude experimenter. However, this difference was magniﬁed when the experimenter sat
close to the participant: friendly experimenters were rated as even more friendly, and rude
experimenters were rated as even _m_o_r§ rude. Thus, participant liking or disliking for the
experimenter was intensiﬁed when the experimenter invaded the personal space of the
participant. Because the arousal produced by a personal space invasion is a very robust
effect (see Hayduk, 1983 for a comprehensive review), the personal space manipulation
provides a ready vehicle for experimentally inducing feelings of discomfort arising from
physiological arousal in participants, and examining its effects on the participants' attitudes
toward members of an ethnic outgroup (in this experiment, African Americans) and his/her
tendency to utilize stereotypes in subsequent social judgments.

In the present experiment, the ﬁrst step in inducing discomfort was to cause a
physiological arousal in the participant. To accomplish this, the personal space of the
participant was invaded. Participants (all Caucasian) completed the study individually. The
experimenter brought participants to a "waiting room," where they were led to believe that
there were more participants yet to arrive. Confederates either sat next to (discomfort), or
several seats from (no discomfort) the participant. An African American (episodic racial
affect) or Caucasian (incidental affect) confederate anived and either sat next to or several
seats away from the participant. In the "near" conditions, the confederate's invasion of the

participants' personal space (confederates will be less than 8 inches from the participant)

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should generate physiological arousal and feelings of discomfort in the participant. What
happens next?

According to the two-stage model of emotion by Schachter and Singer (1962), this
arousal should cause the participant to initiate a search of the environment for the causes of
his/her arousal, and feelings of discomfort (Reisenzein, 1983). The cause the participant
ﬁnds will determine how he/she labels the experience (fear, love, etc.), and also, the
emotion he/she experiences. The participant should scan the environment for the probable
cause of his/her discomfort, and should likely arrive at one of three possible causes. First,
the participant could attribute his/her discomfort to the fact that he/she was participating in a
psychological experiment, and was uncertain about what will happen to him/her. Second,
the participant could attribute his/her discomfort to the fact that the confederate was sitting
very close to the participant. Third, the participant could attribute the discomfort to the fact
that the "invader" (in some experimental conditions) was an African American.

Which did the participant choose as the source of his/her discomfort? Schachter and
Singer (1962) provide an answer. They suggested that, "Given a state of physiological
arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will label this state and
describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him" (p. 398). This process
should make the ﬁrst possible source (the fact that the participant is in a psychological
experiment) less likely than the second and third possible sources, since physical distance
to another person and the race of another person should be more prominent possible causal
factors than the fact that the participant is in a psychological experiment. The second and
third sources are more salient in this situation. It is suggested that when the confederate is a
Caucasian and is seated next to the participant (incidental discomfort), the most salient
source of the participants' discomfort (as reasoned by the participant) should be the fact that
the confederate is seated so close to the participant. However, when an African American

confederate sits next to the participant (episodic racial discomfort), it is suggested that the

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88
race of the confederate is more salient to the participant as a source of the participants'
discomfort rather than the fact that the confederate is seated very close to the participant.
This hypothesis was predicated on the idea that, in social perception, people tend to most
readily notice sex and race characteristics of others (Bruner, 1958; Fiske & Neuberg,
1990).

In the present experiment, as mentioned above, the individual who was exposed to
confederates (Caucasian or African-American) who sat at the other end of the row of chairs
in the "waiting room" should experience either no discomfort or very low levels of
discomfort. In participants who experience a personal space invasion by the confederate,
the high and low-prejudice participants who are exposed to either a Caucasian confederate
(incidental discomfort) or an African American confederate (episodic racial discomfort)
should both experience discomfort. However, it is predicted that those low in prejudice
should show a reduction in the tendency to use stereotypes. The reasoning is as follows.
The participant feels physiologically aroused, and searches his/her environment for the
most salient cause of the arousal (and feelings of discomfort). Because the race of the
person who sits next to him/her is one of the ﬁrst things the participant notices about
his/her immediate environment, the participant will L81. attribute his/her discomfort to the
fact that the confederate is someone of another race.

In high-prejudice participants, such a thought may not be particularly guilt-
producing. However, the thought of becoming nervous as a result of the fact that one is
seated very close to an African American is a thought that should trouble low-prejudice
individuals. These persons, after having the ﬁrst thought that they are nervous because the
person next to them was Black, should feel discomfort as a result of harboring such a
prejudiced thought, and they should then search the environment again for another causal
agent for their arousal feelings (Monteith, 1993). This discomfort feeling (caused by the
transgression of the person's egalitarian beliefs by having the prejudiced thought) should

89
linger, however, in the low-prejudice individuals. It is quite possible that low-prejudice
participants' in the episodic discomfort condition may perceive their heightened feelings of
discomfort as violations of personal egalitarian goals, and this perception may then produce
feelings of guilt and compunction in these participants. In this way, Experiment 2 provides
another avenue for studying whether discomfort contributes to later feelings of guilt.

There are a few experiments in the literature which speak to the effects of arousal on
stereotyping. Kim and Baron (1988) found that after exercise (creating physiological
arousal, as indicated by increased heart rate, blood pressure, and other physiological
measures), participants were more likely to report perceived correlations between
stereotypical traits and target individuals of stereotyped outgroups. Bodenhausen (1990)
found that circadian variations in arousal affected the propensity of participants to use
stereotypes in social judgments. Speciﬁcally, when participants were asked to make social
judgments at times that were "nonoptimal" for them (i.e., in the morning for "evening
persons" and in the evening for "morning persons"), their social judgments were more
likely to show stereotypic biases than judgments rendered by individuals in a control
group. Similarly, Wilder, Cooper, and Thompson (1980, as cited in Wilder, 1981) found
that arousal decreased the ability of perceivers to note within-group variability of other
individuals in a discussion group. It should be noted, however, that this effect that Wilder
et a1. (1980) suggest is due to arousal was a result of inducing embarrassment in the
participant. It is unclear whether the increased tendency to perceive within-group
homogeneity was due solely to the effects of arousal, per se, versus other psychological
forces connected to feeling embarrassed. More indirect evidence for the effects of arousal
on stereotyping can be found in research reported by Wegner and Giuliano (1980).
Participants in their studies who were physiologically aroused (as a result of physical
exercise) were signiﬁcantly more self-focused than their non-aroused counterparts.

Although the authors do not discuss their results in terms of the effects of arousal on

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stereotyping, it seems reasonable to suggest that to the degree that one is self-focused, the
less he/she will be able to devote attention to the environment, and the more likely he/she
would be to rely on stereotypes (or other cognitive heuristics) to make social judgments.
Taken together, these studies suggest that physiological arousal seems to increase the
liklihood that an individual will utilize stereotypes in social judgments. Thus, in the present
experiment, those who felt physiologically aroused (and thus discomfort) should indicate
an increased tendency to utilize stereotypes in social judgments in order to re-afﬁrm to
him/her self that he/she is truly non-prejudiced.

In the present experiment, it was necessary to attempt to assess whether the
responses to the social judgment and racial attitude questionnaires were affected by the
discomfort that the participant may be feeling. To that end, the following measures were
taken. First, the design of the experiment allowed a comparison of the reactions of
participants to African American vs. Caucasian confederates who invaded the participants'
personal space. Participants exposed to a personal space invasion by a Caucasian
confederate (incidental discomfort) should, as a result of the discomfort they are
experiencing, be m likely to use stereotypes in his/her social judgments. However, the
effects of the discomfort that the participant feels in conditions in which he/she is exposed
to a personal space invasion by an African American confederate (episodic racial
discomfort) should be rev—erg. That is, these participants should feel discomfort in these
conditions (for reasons discussed above), and this discomfort should lead the participant to
be ms likely to use a stereotype in his/her social judgments on the subsequent
questionnaires (although this prediction does not apply to high-prejudice participants, as
discussed below).

In sum, in conditions in which the participant is exposed to a personal space
invasion by an African-American confederate (episodic racial discomfort) or by a Caucasian

confederate (incidental discomfort), it was predicted that the participant will experience

91

discomfort. In the incidental discomfort condition, the discomfort feeling should affect the
individual such that he/she is more likely to use stereotypes in social judgments as
compared to those who experience no discomfort or episodic racial discomfort. In the
incidental discomfort conditions, stereotyping levels should be higher for those high in
prejudice. On the other hand, when the participants' personal space is invaded by an
African American confederate, two different predictions are made depending on the
prejudice level of the participant. If the participant is low in prejudice, then he/she will
show _l_es_s stereotyping as compared to no-discomfort and incidental discomfort
participants. However, for participants high in prejudice, the participant should show
equivalent stereotyping regardless of discomfort levels (equal for both episodic racial
discomfort and no-discomfort conditions). The hypotheses for Experiment 2 are:

Hypotheses for Experiment 2:

1. Participants in conditions in which their personal space has been invaded should
feel more discomfort than participants who have not had their personal space
invaded.

2. Participants who are high in prejudice should evidence more stereotyping
in their social judgments than those low in prejudice.

3. Participants who have their personal space invaded by a Caucasian confederate
(incidental discomfort) should be more likely to use stereotypes in making
social judgments, as compared to all other conditions (no discomfort (control)
and episodic racial discomfort).

4. Only low-prejudice participants who have their personal space invaded by an
African American confederate (episodic racial discomfort) should be
Less likely to use stereotypes in making social judgments, as compared to all
other conditions (no discomfort (control) and incidental discomfort). High-
prejudice participants in the episodic racial discomfort conditions should show
equivalent levels of stereotyping for both discomfort and control (no
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Method
Participants and Overview

As in Experiment 1, participants were recruited from a pool of approximately 950
students in introductory psychology classes at the beginning of the spring 1996 semester.
Participant selection and criteria were identical to that stipulated in Experiment 1. However,
participants were asked during solicitation whether they have participated in Experiment 1
(called "attitudes"). If they had participated in that experiment, the participant could not
participate in the present study, because both studies employ identical dependent measures.
From the pool of pretest participants, 152 participants (53 males, and 99 females)
undergraduates in introductory psychology classes were recruited to participate in the
present experiment. Participants received course credit for their participation in the
experiment.

The design of the experiment is a 2 (pretest prejudice: high vs. low) x 2 (race of
confederate: Caucasian vs. African American) x 2 (Confederate seating distance: near vs.
far) x 2 (student court target ethnicity: African American vs. Caucasian) between—
participants factorial.

Measures

As mentioned above, this experiment used essentially the same questionnaire
packet, with the questionnaires in the same order, as was used in Experiment 1. The
exception in this studywas that the BIDR and the Exit Questionnaire were not used. Thus,
the order of the questionnaires was as follows: the Sample Characteristics Survey (35-item
mood checklist), the Self-Description Questionnaire (Guilt Inventory), Student Court
Questionnaire, Social Attitude Survey (Modern Racism Scale), Social Opinion Inventory
(Egalitarianism Scale), Topics Questionnaire, Personality Questionnaire (sex stereotyping
questionnaire, both male and female forms) and the Post-Evaluation Questionnaire.
Procedure

Participants completed the experiment individually. Participants arrived for an

92

93

experiment entitled "Social Issues." The experimenter (in all cases, the experimenter was a
Caucasian male or female) greeted the participant, and seated the participant in a small lab
room that contained several chairs very close to each other along a wall. The participant
was asked to sit at an end chair. The experimenter explained that he/she was expecting
more participants, and that it was necessary to wait for the other participants to arrive
before beginning the experiment. The experimenter asked the participant to wait in the
"waiting room," while the experimenter waited for the rest of the participants in the hall.
The experimenter asked the participant to complete the consent form while he/she waited.

The Waiting Room. This experiment utilized a common paradigm in social
psychology, known as the "waiting room" paradigm. The essential feature of this paradigm
is that while the participants are seated together in a 'waiting room,‘ waiting for the
experiment to begin, the actual experiment concerns the interactions or reactions of the
participants to events in the waiting room to some experimental manipulation. This
paradigm is very useful for experimenters because participants are more prone to "act
naturally" in this waiting room scenario.

The waiting room was set up in the following manner. The chairs were situated so
that they were very close together (almost touching the chairs on each side of a particular
chair) so that they could not be moved apart from each other (because of the size of the
room). The reason the chairs were attached this way was to ensure that the participant
would not move his/her chair away from the confederate who sat close to him/her. The
participant was seated and the experimenter said "ok, I'm going to wait for the others. It
should only be a few rrrinutes. One more thing: it is important for our study that you don't
talk to the other participants before we start the study, ok? Not even 'hi' or anything, ok?
Thanks." The experimenter then shut the door, and, after one minute had elapsed, the
experimenter greeted the confederate. The experimenter treated the confederate in the same
manner as he/she treated the real participant, and then explained, "there are some other

participants we are waiting for, so could you have a seat in here while I wait in the hallway

94
for the others? One more thing: it is important for our study that you don't talk to the other
participants before we start the study, ok? Not even 'hi' or anything, ok? Thanks." As this
last sentence was uttered, the experimenter opened the door to the waiting room, and closed
it after the confederate entered. It is important to note here that the experimenter did not
direct the confederate to a designated seat, so that it would appear that the confederate freely
"chose" to sit near or far from the participant.

Incidental Discomfort vs. Episodic Racial Discomfort. One of the main
independent variables of this experiment was the race of the confederate. Of interest was
how Caucasian people would react to an African American vs. Caucasian person sitting
either very close to them (invading the participants' personal space) or farther away. In the
experiment, half of the participants were exposed to either an African American or
Caucasian confederate. In the conditions in which the participants‘ physical space is
invaded, the participant should either feel incidental discomfort (with the Caucasian
confederate) or episodic racial discomfort (with the African American confederate). This
discomfort was distinguished in this way, because each occurs either in relation to an
intergroup context (African American confederate) or in a context that is unrelated to the
intergroup context (Caucasian confederate).

Confederate Distance. The seating distance between the participant and the
confederate should affect the participants' physiological arousal (and feelings of
discomfort). Therefore, seating distance will be varied in the following manner. In half of
all conditions, the confederate chose to sit in the seat immediately next to the participant,
such that the actual distance between the two persons is less than 6 inches. Such a close
distance is clearly within the "intimate" personal space of the participant, and as such, it
violates this space, and should cause an increase in the participants' physiological arousal
(Hayduk, 1983). In the other half of the conditions, the confederate will sit about 6 seats
away from the participant in a chair that is second to the end chair in the row of chairs, such

that the actual distance between the two people is approximately 10—12 feet. In these

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conditions, the participant should feel very little or no discomfort because his/her personal
space is not being invaded by the confederate.

The Wait. Participants will be in the room with the confederate for approximately
1 minute (as timed by the experimenter outside of the room). This short duration will serve
many functions. First, this is adequate time for participants sitting next to the confederate to
become physiologically aroused (Patterson, 1976; pilot testing verified that this was
sufﬁcient duration to induce discomfort in subjects who had their space invaded by a
confederate). Second, we do not want the participant to begin talking with the confederate
to pass the time. Thus, it is desirable to have a brief enough time to let the arousal in the
close seating conditions to take effect, but not too long to the point where participants
become bored and habituated to the discomfort they should feel in the near conditions.

During this time, in all conditions, to avoid eye contact with the participant and to
discourage chatting with the participant, the confederate averted his/her gaze as much as
possible, and ﬁlled out a questionnaire packet identical to that given to the participant. The
main reason for the lack of contact was that the social norms for these waiting room
situations stipulate that people generally mind their own business, and rarely chat. Thus,
any chatting between the participant and confederate may be a confound in the experiment
(e.g., the participant could feel positively toward the African American as a result of the
content of their talk, and thus label his/her arousal "liking for the other person"). Therefore,
in the event that the participant does talk to the confederate, the data packet the participant
completes will be excluded from the data analysis.

After the 1 minute had passed, the experimenter returned, and said "Ok, it looks
like the other participants are a no-show, so we can get started. I will get the other
questionnaires ready in the lab room, and we will begin the study in a minute." The
experimenter then waited in the main lab room for 1 minute, and then returned to the
waiting room with the questionnaire packets attached to a clipboard and a pen. The

experimenter then returned to the waiting room, closed the door, and then explained,

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"Ok, these questionnaires are designed to assess the attitudes college students have
about a number of issues. Be sure not to put your name on any of the
questionnaires, because we don't want any record of anyone's identity on the
questionnaires. Read each one carefully, take your time completing them, and
answer the questionnaires according to how you feel right now. I will be back in
about 10-15 minutes or so. Ok? If you have any questions, just let me know. Also,
remember that there are some questionnaires that have items on the back of the
page, so check each page carefully to make sure you have completed the whole
questionnaire. Thanks."

The experimenter then asked the participant and confederate to complete the
questionnaires thoughtfully and honestly, while the experimenter waited in the other lab
room for them to ﬁnish. Confederates were instructed to take their time ﬁlling out the
questionnaires, as they would if they were actually ﬁlling them out in a real experiment.
While the participant and the confederate were completing their questionnaire packet, the
experimenter returned to the waiting room. The confederate always completed the
questionnaires at a slow pace, such that the participant always finished before the
confederate, in order to maximize the time that the confederate and participant were exposed
to each other. After participants completed the questionnaire packet, they walked out of the
waiting room and into the main lab room, where the experimenter took the packet,
thoroughly debriefed the participant, gave him/her experiment credit, and thanked him/her

for participating.

Results and Discussion

Of the 157 participants who participated in the experiment, ﬁve participants reported
accurate suspicions on the Post-Evaluation Questionnaire concerning the true purpose of the
experiment. These individuals were therefore dropped from the data analysis, leaving a ﬁnal
sample of 152 participants.
Affective Reactions

In order to examine the effects of the distance manipulation, responses on the
Sample Characteristics Survey (see Appendix C) were examined in the following manner.
A "discomfort" composite scale comprised of 6 items from the Sample Characteristics
Survey was used as the primary measure of arousal. The six items in this scale are,

"negative, tense," "bothered," "content" (reverse-scored) "uneasy" and "uncomfortable."
In addition, participant responses to each of the 35 individual affect items will be examined
in order to detect any patterns of affect induction that occur among participants in the near
versus far seating (i.e., discomfort versus no discomfort) conditions.

General Discomfort Composite Scale. The six items for this composite scale
(negative, tense, bothered, content (reverse-scored), uncomfortable, and uneasy) were
submitted to a reliability analysis. The analysis indicated that the scale had good reliability
(Cronbach's alpha = .81). An ANOVA on the effects of prejudice, confederate race, and
distance on the " general discomfort" composite scale indicated no signiﬁcant main effects or
interactions involving the distance manipulation. This was quite surprising, considering that
these affect items were chosen to comprise a composite scale because they represent feeling
states that should be conceptually close to the arousal that should be induced in the near
conditions. However, the failure to ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences on this composite measure
suggests that a closer look at the affect items in the composite measure is warranted.

Analyses of Affect Items. Upon reﬂection, it appears that the "tense" item and
the "bothered" item may encompass feelings that are closer to anxiety and negative affect,

respectively, and which are more extreme negative emotions that are not under investigation.

97

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Similarly, the (dis)content (as measured by the reverse-scored "content" item) and the
"negative" items may be too vague to accurately capture the discomfort feelings that should
arise in the near conditions. Thus, a composite scale comprised of the "uneasy" and
"uncomfortable" affect items was constructed to determine whether the distance
manipulation had the intended effects on participants in the near and far conditions. The
scale was constructed from these two items because of the conceptual closeness of these
affect items to the feeling of discomfort that was expected to arise in the near conditions.
These items were strongly correlated (r = .69), and showed good reliability as a composite
scale (Cronbach's alpha = .82). Results of an ANOVA on the effects of prejudice,
confederate race, and distance on the uncomfortable / uneasy composite scale showed the
expected main effect of distance, E(l, 150) = 5.64, p < .01. Those in the near condition felt
signiﬁcantly more discomfort (M = 4.60) than those in the far conditions (M = 3.62).

In order to further examine the nature of the affective state that should arise in the
near conditions, participant responses to the three affect composite scales from Experiment 1
-- SDNA, PA, and ODNA -- were evaluated in three separate AN OVAs (each examining the
effects of prejudice, confederate race, and distance on responses to each scale). Responses
to the SDNA and PA composite scales showed no main effects or interactions. The AN OVA
on the ODNA scale showed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions involving distance,
but a signiﬁcant main effect of prejudice emerged, E(1, 151) = 9.63, p < .002. High-
prejudice participants felt more ODNA (M = 7.17) than low-prejudice participants (M =
5.17). Similarly, an ANOVA on the effects of prejudice, confederate race, and distance on
responses to the Guilt Inventory revealed no main effects of distance, while a marginal main
effect of prejudice was revealed, E(1, 151) = 3.57, p < .06. High-prejudice participants felt
slightly more state guilt (M = 29.31) than low-prejudice participants (M = 27.13).

Although no speciﬁc predictions were made concerning the speciﬁc types of affect
participants would feel in the near vs. far arousal conditions, the analyses of the Guilt

Inventory questionnaire indicated a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between distance and

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confederate race, E(l, 151) = 4.33, p < .03 (see Table 14). Participants in the far condition
felt virtually the same amount of state guilt regardless of the race of the confederate to whom
they were exposed. However, increasing participants' feelings of discomfort by having the
confederate sit next to them and invade their personal space had an interesting effect. For
those exposed to a Caucasian confederate, the discomfort participants felt slightly increased
their feelings of state guilt. Conversely, those who had an African American confederate
invade their space actually felt less state guilt than their counterparts in the far condition.

In sum, the failure of the manipulation to indicate differences between the distance
groups on the "general discomfort" composite scale, the positive affect, the negative affect,
the SDNA, PA, and ODNA composite scales suggests the following. It appears that the
discomfort induced in participants in the near condition did not encompass a global feeling
of negative affect (as indicated by the " general discomfort," and "negative affect" composite
scales) nor was it a negative feeling directed toward the self (as revealed by the SDNA
results) or toward others (indicated by the ODNA analyses). Moreover, the distance
manipulation did not induce differential feelings of guilt in participants in the near or far
conditions. Finally, there were no differences in positive affect between those in the near
versus far conditions. The results of the affect analyses suggest that, as predicted, the
distance manipulation had the intended effect of increasing feelings of discomfort (as
measured by the uneasy / uncomfortable composite scale) in participants who had their
personal space invaded by a confederate.

The results of these affect analyses have implications for the evaluation of the
hypotheses. Recall that hypothesis 4 predicts that low-prejudice participants, exposed to an
African American confederate who invades the participants' personal space, should ﬁrst
attribute their feelings of discomfort to the most salient factor, the race of the confederate.
Then, they should feel negatively (speciﬁcally, feelings of guilt, disappointment in oneself,
or a more self-directed negative affect) about the fact that they are feeling discomfort in the

100

Table 14

Guilt Inventory

DISTANCE
Near Far
CONFEDERATE
RACE
Caucasian 29.46 28.13
(37) (39)
African Am. 27.26 28.05
(34) (42)

 

Note: None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all ps > .05).
Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

101

presence of an African American, because the low-prejudice individual likes to think of
him/her self as egalitarian and not prey to prejudiced feelings. This negative affect then
should have implications for the tendency of the person to use stereotypes in social
judgments. The affect analyses showed that the discomfort participants experienced in the
near conditions did not encompass any feelings that resemble guilt, disappointment in
oneself, or self-directed negative affect. Thus, because the discomfort felt by low-prejudice
participants in the episodic discomfort conditions did not include feelings of SDNA or guilt,
a test of hypothesis 4 is not possible. The data bearing on hypotheses l, 2, and 3 will be
examined below.

Evaluation of the Hypotheses

In the present experiment, of primary interest are the effects of the distance
manipulation on the tendency to express racial prejudice and use stereotypes in making
social judgments. Therefore, participant responses to the Modern Racism Scale and the
Student Court Items will be examined as the primary measures of prejudice and
stereotyping, respectively. Below, hypotheses 1 through 3 will be presented, and the
evidence from the primary dependant variables will be analyzed as it bears on each
hypothesis. Then the data from the secondary dependent measures will then be examined to
determine whether or not those data support / do not support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1:

Participants in conditions in which their personal space has been invaded should
feel more physiological arousal than participants who have not had their personal
space invaded.

As discussed above, this hypothesis was supported. Results indicated that
participants in the near conditions did feel signiﬁcantly more "discomfort" than those in the
far conditions (as measured by the uneasy/uncomfortable composite scale).

Hypothesis 2: 2

Participants who are high in prejudice should evidence more stereotyping and
prejudice in their social judgments than those low in prejudice.

v , u

102

Hypothesis 3:
Participants who have their personal space invaded by a Caucasian confederate
(incidental discomfort) should be more likely to use stereotypes in making social

judgments, as compared to all other conditions (no discomfort (control) and
episodic racial discomfort).

Analysis of Primary Dependent Measures

Below, the results of the analyses of the primary dependent measures, the Modern
Racism Scale and the Students Court questionnaire will be examined as they bear on each of
the hypotheses. Recall that hypothesis 3 predicts a two-way interaction between confederate
race and distance. However, for the analyses of the student court items, hypothesis 3
predicts a 3-way interaction between target ethnicity, confederate race, and distance. In the
analyses of the primary and secondary dependent measures, only main effects of prejudice
and distance, as well as the predicted interactions will be discussed. Because the hypotheses
do not make predictions concerning the inﬂuence of gender in the analyses, all other main
effects involving gender, and race of the confederate, as well as interactions involving
gender will be discussed in the "ancillary ﬁndings" section.

Modern Racism Scale. An analysis of variance (ANOVA ) with confederate
race, prejudice, target ethnicity and distance condition as independent variables indicated that
the prejudice level of the participant had the expected impact on the participants' willingness
to express negative racial attitudes on the primary measure of prejudice, the Modern Racism
Scale, E(1, 151) = 92.46, p < .001. Those high in prejudice showed signiﬁcantly more
prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans (M = 23.94) than those low in prejudice (M
= 16.88). This result supports hypothesis 2, which simply predicts a main effect of
participant pretest prejudice on measures of prejudice and stereotyping. However, this
particular main effect was not surprising (considering that the participants' pretest MRS

scores were used as selection criteria for participation in the present experiment), and better

103
tests of hypothesis 2 are the participants' reactions to the rest of the questionnaires
measuring stereotyping and prejudice, which are discussed below.

Because the primary criteria for the selection of participants was their responses on
the Modern Racism Scale in the pretesting session, this variable was treated as a covariate in
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) in order to examine the effects of the distance
manipulation, target ethnicity, and confederate race on participants' expression of prejudiced
racial attitudes on the Modern Racism Scale administered in the questionnaire packet at the
end of the present study. Results revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions (all ps >
.09). Thus, it appears that the distance manipulation and the uneasy feeling it arouses in the
participant in the near condition, did not have a differential effect on participants in the near
and far conditions to express different levels of prejudice on the Modern Racism Scale. This
may simply be due to a consistency motive in high and low prejudice participants to answer
the MRS the same way they did in the pretest, thus overwhelming any effects of the
independent variables on expressions of prejudice on the MRS.

Student Court Questionnaire. Participant responses to the primary measure of
stereotyping, the Student Court questionnaire, were also examined. The analyses described
below involving this questionnaire will ﬁrst discuss the effect of the independent variables
on the severity / seriousness composite scale, and then will examine the likelihood of guilt
and likelihood of future crimes items separately.

Severity / Seriousness Composite Scale. An ANOVA was conducted to
examine the effects of distance, confederate race, prejudice, and target ethnicity on
participants' scores on this composite measure. Results indicated that no main effects were
signiﬁcant. Moreover, the predicted 3-way interaction of confederate race, target ethnicity,
and distance was not signiﬁcant (p > .18).

Likelihood of future crimes. An ANOVA was conducted to examine the

effects of distance, confederate race, prejudice, and target ethnicity on participants'

104
judgments that the defendant in the student court questionnaire would commit more crimes
in the future. Results indicated that no main effects were signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
predicted 3-way interaction of confederate race, target ethnicity, and distance was not
signiﬁcant (p > .59).

Likelihood of guilt. An ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
distance, confederate race, prejudice, and target ethnicity on participants' judgments of the
likely guilt of the defendant in the student court scenario. Results indicated that no main
effects were signiﬁcant. Moreover, the predicted 3-way interaction of confederate race,
target ethnicity, and distance were not signiﬁcant (p > .74).

Analysis of Secondary Dependent Measures

Egalitarianism Scale. An ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
prejudice, distance, target ethnicity, and confederate race on participants' ratings on the
Egalitarianism Scale, a secondary measure of prejudice. Participants' prejudice level had a
signiﬁcant impact on their endorsement of egalitarian ideals, E(1, 150) = 12.85, p < .001.
Low-prejudice individuals were more likely to endorse egalitarian statements (M = 43.48)
than were high-prejudice participants (M = 40.05). All other effects involving the arousal
variable were not signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding indirectly supports hypothesis 2. Speciﬁcally,
those who are high in prejudice reject the idea that all people are equal, and hence these
individuals should be less likely to endorse egalitarian statements. This is precisely what
happened in the present experiment.

Sex Stereotyping Questionnaire. Separate ANOVAs were conducted to
examine the effects of distance, prejudice, confederate race, and target ethnicity on
participants' scores on the SFI, SMI and T81 indices of sex stereotyping. The analyses on
the SFI revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for distance, E(1, 149) = 7.42, p < .008. Those in
the far conditions were signiﬁcantly more likely to endorse stereotypes of women (M = .60,

recall that lower means on the SFI correspond to greater stereotyping of women) compared

105
to those in the near condition (M = .65). The 3 hypotheses under investigation in the present
experiment do not make any predictions concerning a main effect of distance on levels of
stereotyping and prejudice. However, these data suggest that when participants felt more
discomfort (in the near condition), they were more likely to be egalitarian in their judgments
about women.

This main effect was qualiﬁed by a marginally signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between
distance and confederate race, E(1, 149) = 3.24, p < .07 (see Table 15). As can be seen in
Table 14, participants in the far condition were less likely to endorse stereotypes about
women when they were exposed to a Caucasian confederate than when they were exposed
to an African American confederate. On the other hand, when participants felt
uneasy/uncomfortable from the personal space invasion, those exposed to the African
American were slightly less likely to stereotype women, while those exposed to a Caucasian
were signiﬁcantly more likely to stereotype women than their far-condition counterparts. It
appears that the feelings of unease that arise in the near conditions tends to make participants
exposed to a Caucasian less likely to stereotype women, but this tendency was somewhat
reversed for participants exposed to an African American confederate.

Topics Questionnaire. An ANOVA was conducted in order to examine the
effects of distance, prejudice, target ethnicity, and confederate race on participants' scores
on the topics composite scale. The analyses showed the expected main effect of prejudice,
E(l, 150) = 14.48, p < .001. Low-prejudice participants were signiﬁcantly more interested
in race-related topics (M = 11.55) than high-prejudice participants (M = 9.94).

Ancillary Findings

Gender Effects. Below, the results of the analyses that include participant gender
and confederate gender will be presented. Where possible, speculative explanations of the
interactions involving gender will be offered. However, the reader should note that for some

of the patterns, no explanation is offered. In most cases, patterns in the participant

106

Table 15

Stereotyping of Feminine Items (SFI)

DISTANCE
Near Far
CONFEDERATE
RACE
Caucasian .69a .57b
(37) (39)
African Am. .61 .62

(33) (41)

 

Note: Lower numbers indicate greater stereotyping of women. Row means
with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different at p < .05. Numbers in
parentheses are cell N's.

107
responses across questionnaires involving similar independent variables will be pointed out,
in an effort to explain and understand how gender affects participants' tendencies to endorse
stereotypes and express prejudiced attitudes.

Affective Reactions.

WW. An AN OVA was conducted to
examine the effects of prejudice, distance, confederate gender, confederate race, and
participant gender on participants' responses on the scale indicated a signiﬁcant main effect
of confederate gender, 5(1, 150) = 5.32, p < .02. Those exposed to a male confederate felt
more uncomfortable / uneasy (M = 4.53) than those exposed to a female confederate (M =
3.92). A main effect of participant gender was also revealed, E(1, 150) = 6.09, p < .01.
Male participants felt more uncomfortable / uneasy (M = 4.75) than female participants (M =
3.70).

Finally, the ANOVA yielded a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between prejudice,
confederate race, and participant gender, E(l, 150) = 4.93, p < .02 (see Table 16). As can
be seen in the table, among low-prejudice participants exposed to a Caucasian confederate,
females reported feeling slightly more uneasy/uncomfortable than males. However, among
low-prejudice participants exposed to an African American confederate, males reported
feeling more uneasy/uncomfortable than females. Among high-prejudice participants
exposed to a Caucasian confederate, simple effects tests showed that males reported feeling
signiﬁcantly more uneasy/uncomfortable than females. Interestingly, the strong feelings of
being uneasy/uncomfortable in high-prejudice males are attenuated among those males
exposed to an African American. Also interesting is the fact that high-prejudice females
show relatively low levels of unease regardless of the race of the confederate to whom they
are exposed.

el -D d N 'v Aff . An ANOVA was conducted to examine the

effects of prejudice, distance, participant gender, confederate gender, and confederate race

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on the self-directed negative affect (SDNA) of the participant. The analyses indicated a
signiﬁcant main effect of participant gender, E(1, 145) = 6.40, p < .01. Males felt more
SDNA (M = 51.15) than females (M = 44.68).

A 2-way interaction between confederate gender and confederate race was also
indicated in the analyses, E(1, 145) = 6.87, p < .01 (see Table 17). Participants reported
feeling more SDNA when exposed to a female Caucasian confederate than a male Caucasian
confederate. However, the pattern was reversed for African American confederates.
Participants reported feeling more SDNA when exposed to a male African American
confederate than a female African American. The pattern observed suggests that one
possible explanation for the greater SDNA experienced while exposed to an African
American male versus a Caucasian male may be the perceived correlation between African
American males and crime/violence. It is important to note that this explanation is
speculative, and further research is needed to investigate the nature of this interaction.

A signiﬁcant 2-way interaction emerged between participant gender and confederate
gender, E(1, 145) = 4.38, p < .03 (see Table 18). Speciﬁcally, participants exposed to
same-sex confederates reported feeling more SDNA than those exposed to opposite-sex
participants. Why this pattern was obtained is unclear. Perhaps those exposed to opposite-
sex confederates may feel more positive affect as a result of some attraction to the
confederate. If this is so, it represents the possibility of a rather signiﬁcant confound in the
experiment, and this point will be discussed in detail below.

Finally, a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction was revealed for prejudice, confederate race,
and participant gender, E(l, 145) = 16.11, p < .001 (see Table 19). Among low-prejudice
participants exposed to a Caucasian confederate, females reported feeling slightly more
SDNA than males. However, among high-prejudice participants exposed to a Caucasian
confederate, the pattern was reversed. Simple effects tests showed that males reported

feeling signiﬁcantly more SDNA than females, E(l, 39) = 18.95, p < .01. Among those

110

Table 17

Self-Directed Negative Affect (SDNA) Composite Scale

CONFEDERATE
GENDER
Male Female
CON F EDERATE
RACE
Caucasian 44.44 50.00
(18) (53)
African Am. 48.39 44.54
(18) (57)

 

Note: None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all ps > .05).
Numbers in parentheses are cell N 's.

111

Table 18

Self-Directed Negative Affect (SDNA) Composite Scale

CONFEDERATE
GENDER
Male Female
PARTICIPAN T
GENDER
Male 55.258 49.93
(18) (53)
Female 42.00b 45.60

(18) (57)

 

Note: Means with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different at p < .05.

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exposed to an African American confederate, the pattern was reversed for low- and high-
prejudice participants. Among low-prejudice participants, males reported feeling slightly
more SDNA than females. However, among high-prejudice participants, females reported
feeling slightly more SDNA than males.

Quilt Invgntgg. The analyses of the Guilt Inventory questionnaire showed a 3-
way interaction between distance, confederate gender, and confederate race, E(1, 151) =
5.94, p < .01 (see Table 20). Simple effects tests showed that among those in the far
condition, participants who were exposed to a female Caucasian confederate felt
signiﬁcantly more state guilt than those exposed to a Caucasian male confederate, H1, 38) =
4.60, p < .05. However, participants in the far condition who were exposed to an African
American confederate felt more state guilt if the confederate was a male than if the
confederate was a female. This particular pattern mirrors the ﬁndings for the SDNA
composite scale, which suggests that participants feel more negative affect when exposed to
an African American male confederate than a Caucasian male confederate, and they feel
more negative affect with a Caucasian female confederate than with an African American
female confederate.

When the personal space of the participants was invaded, their increased feeling of
being uneasy/uncomfortable had the following effects. As with those in the far condition,
those in the near condition who were exposed to a female Caucasian confederate felt slightly
more state guilt than those exposed to a male Caucasian confederate. Among those exposed
to an African American confederate, participants felt more state guilt when the confederate
was a female than if the confederate was a male. Interestingly, the feeling of being
uneasy/uncomfortable seems to have reversed the pervasive tendency of participants to rate
their affect as more negative when exposed to an African American male confederate than

when they were with an African American female confederate.

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Primary Dependent Measures.

Wade. An ANOVA on the effects of distance, prejudice, target
ethnicity, confederate race, confederate gender, and participant gender on participants'
willingness to express prejudiced racial attitudes revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or
interactions involving gender.

v ri eri usness om sit c le. An ANOVA on the effects of
distance, prejudice, target ethnicity, confederate race, confederate gender, and participant
gender on participants' scores on this composite scale revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or
interactions involving gender.

MM. An ANOVA on the effects of distance, confederate gender,
confederate race, participant gender, prejudice, target ethnicity on participants' judgments of
the defendant's guilt showed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions involving gender.

Likeliheed ef Future Crimes. An ANOVA on the effects of distance,
confederate gender, confederate race, participant gender, prejudice, target ethnicity on
participants' judgments of the likelihood that the defendant would commit crimes in the
future showed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions involving gender.

Analyses of Secondary Dependent Measures.

Egalitarianism Questionnaire. An ANOVA investigated the effects of
confederate race, confederate gender, participant gender, distance, prejudice, and target
ethnicity on participants' endorsement of egalitarian ideals. The analyses revealed no
signiﬁcant main effects or interactions involving the gender variables.

Wm. An ANOVA investigated the effects of confederate race,
confederate gender, participant gender, distance, prejudice, and target ethnicity on
participants' interest in race-related topics, as measured by the topics composite measure

(discussed in Experiment 1 above), showed a main effect of participant gender, E( 1, 150) =

116
12.03, p < .001. Female participants were more interested in race-related topics (M =
11.36) than male participants (M = 9.57).

Results also showed a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between confederate gender and
confederate race, 13(1, 150) = 7.36, p < .008 (see Table 21). Participants exposed to an
African American male confederate were less interested in race-related topics than those
exposed to a Caucasian male confederate. On the other hand, participants exposed to a
Caucasian female confederate indicated less interest in race-related topics than those exposed
to an African American female confederate. This pattern makes sense in light of the previous
2-way interactions between confederate gender and confederate race for the affect composite
scales. Speciﬁcally, the prior interactions indicated that participants felt more negative affect
with African American male, and Caucasian female confederates. These are precisely the
conditions where participants indicated the least interest in race-related topics. This is
interesting in that it suggests that the negative affect that is more pervasive in these
conditions somehow diminishes interest in race-related topics. Simple effects were
inconclusive however, and future research should investigate the nature of this pattern.

Finally, a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between participant gender, prejudice, and
distance was indicated in the analyses, E(1, 150) = 7.0, p < .009 (see Table 22). Using the
low-prejudice, far condition as a baseline, one can see that without any feeling of being
uneasy/uncomfortable and without negative attitudes toward race-related topics, males were
slightly less interested in race-related topics than female participants. When low-prejudice
participants felt uneasy/uncomfortable as a result of a personal space invasion, simple
effects tests showed that this difference was signiﬁcantly magniﬁed, with males showing
signiﬁcantly less interest in race-related topics than female participants, E( l, 33) = 6.98, p <
.05. Among high-prejudice participants, the effect of the unease participants feel when their
personal space is invaded was quite different. Speciﬁcally, high-prejudice male participants

in the far condition were signiﬁcantly less interested in race-related topics than high

117

Table 21

Topics Questionnaire Composite Scale

CONFEDERATE
GENDER
Male Female
CON FEDERATE
RACE
Caucasian 1 1.30 10.25
(20) (56)
African Am. 10.65 1 1.02

(17) (58)

 

Note: None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all [25 > .05). Numbers
in parentheses are cell N's.

118

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prejudice females, E_(l, 39) = 19.94, p < .01. When the personal space of the high-
prejudice participants was invaded, however, male participants were much more interested
in race-related topics than their far condition counterparts, to such a degree that they were
essentially as interested as high-prejudice female participants who had their personal space
invaded.

To recap, these ﬁndings indicate that feelings of being uneasy/uncomfortable tend to
make low-prejudice males less interested and low-prejudice females more interested in race-
related topics. However, the reverse is true for high-prejudice participants. High-prejudice
males became more interested in race-related topics when their personal space was invaded,
while high-prejudice females became slightly less interested in race-related topics as a result
of the personal space invasion.

Sex Stereotyping Questionnaire. Separate ANOVAs were conducted on each
of the 3 indices of sex stereotyping: stereotyping of feminine items (SFI), stereotyping of
masculine items (SMI), and the total stereotyping index (TSI). Each ANOVA examined the
effects of participant gender, confederate gender, confederate race, target ethnicity, distance,
and prejudice on participants' tendency to endorse sex stereotypes. The analyses for the SFI
indicated a signiﬁcant 2—way interaction between participant gender and distance, 5(1, 149)
= 7.49, p < .007 (see Table 23). In the far condition, males were more likely to endorse sex
stereotypes about women than were female participants. However, the feeling of being
uneasy/uncomfortable that accompanies the personal space invasion made males and females
less likely to endorse stereotypes about women, though the effect was greatest for male
participants.

Finally, a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between distance and prejudice emerged in
the analyses, E(1, 149) = 3.97, p < .04 (see Table 24). Among those in the far condition,
high-prejudice participants were very slightly more likely to endorse stereotypes about

women than were low-prejudice participants. When these participants had their personal

120

Table 23

Stereotyping of Feminine Items (SFI)

PARTICIPANT
GENDER
Male Female
DISTANCE

Near .65 .65

(25) (45)
Far .55 .62

(27) (53)

 

Note: Lower numbers indicate greater stereotyping of women. None
of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all ps > .05). Numbers in
parentheses are cell N 's.

121

Table 24

Stereotyping of Feminine Items (SFI)

PARTICIPAN T
PREJUDICE
High Low
DISTANCE
Near .63 .67
(36) (34)
Far .59 .60
(40) (40)

 

Note: Lower means indicate greater stereotyping of women.
None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all us > .05).
Numbers in parentheses are cell N 's.

122

space invaded, low-prejudice participants were less likely (though not signiﬁcantly) to
endorse stereotypes about women, while high-prejudice participants were slightly less likely
to endorse stereotypes about women. Thus, it appears that the effects of being
uneasy/uncomfortable tend to make both high and low prejudice persons less likely to
endorse stereotypes about women, though the effect of the uneasy feeling on the tendency to
avoid stereotyping of women was stronger for low-prejudice individuals.

The analyses for the SMI revealed a main effect of participant gender, Ij(l, 148) =
6.67, p_ < .01. Male participants were more likely to endorse sex stereotypes about men
compared to women. The analyses also revealed several signiﬁcant 2-way interactions. A 2-
way interaction between participant gender and confederate gender also emerged, E(1, 148)
= 6.49, p_ < .01 (see Table 25). Recall in the analyses of the affect composite scales the
consistent ﬁnding that participants who are exposed to same-sex confederates feel more
negative affect. This negative affect seems to have inﬂuenced the tendency to endorse
stereotypes about males among male participants exposed to a male confederate. These
individuals were more likely to endorse stereotypes about men than were male participants
who were exposed to a female confederate. It appears therefore that the negative affect
participants feel when exposed to a same-sex confederate tends to inﬂuence males such that
they were more likely to endorse stereotypes about men. However, the inﬂuence of the
negative affect did not similarly affect female participants who were exposed to a female
confederate. In fact, these participants were slightly less likely to endorse stereotypes about
men than female participants exposed to a male confederate. Thus, it appears that the
negative affect participants feel when they are exposed to same-sex confederates has
differential effects on males and females with regard to the endorsement of sex stereotypes
about males.

A 2-way interaction between distance and participant gender was revealed, E_(1, 148)

= 8.94, p < .003 (see Table 26). In the far condition, males were signiﬁcantly more likely to

123

Table 25

Stereotyping of Masculine Items (SMI)

PARTICIPANT
GENDER
CON FEDERATE Male Female
GENDER

Male 2.88 2.21

(1 1) (26)
Female 2.25 2.12

(40) (72)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater stereotyping of men.
None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all ps > .05).
Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

124

Table 26

Stereotyping of Masculine Items (SMI)

PARTICIPAN T
GENDER
Male Female
DISTANCE

Near 2. 16 2.20
(26) (45)

Far 2.62a 2.09b
(25) (53)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater stereotyping of men. Means
with different superscripts were signiﬁcantly different at p < .05.
Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

125

endorse stereotypes about men than were female participants, E(1, 77) = 4.28, p_ < .05.
However, when they felt uneasy/uncomfortable as a result of the personal space invasion by
the confederate, males were much less likely than their far condition counterparts to endorse
stereotypes about males while females were slightly more likely to endorse stereotypes
about men. Recall that for the interaction of distance and participant gender on stereotyping
of feminine items, the uneasy/uncomfortable feeling participants felt in the near condition
inﬂuenced both males and females to be less likely to endorse stereotypes about women.
The same thing happened here for males, but not females, who in this interaction were
slightly more likely to endorse stereotypes about men when they felt uneasy/uncomfortable.
It is unclear why this interaction differed from the one obtained for SFI, and future research
is needed to further examine the nature of these differences.

A 2-way interaction confederate gender and prejudice was indicated in the analyses,
E(l, 148) = 9.45, p < .003 (see Table 27). Among low-prejudice participants, those
exposed to a male confederate were signiﬁcantly more likely to endorse stereotypes about
men than those exposed to a female confederate, E(1, 72) = 5.11, p < .05. However,
compared to the low-prejudice participants, high-prejudice participants exposed to male
confederates were less likely to endorse stereotypes about men while high-prejudice
participants exposed to a female confederate were slightly more likely to endorse sex
stereotypes about men.

A 2-way interaction between distance and prejudice also was revealed in the
analyses, 13(1, 148) = 6.15, p < .01 (see Table 28). As can be seen in Table 28, both high
and low prejudice participants in the far condition showed essentially identical levels of
endorsing stereotypes about men. However, when participants felt uneasy/uncomfortable as
a result of the personal space invasion, low-prejudice participants were less likely to endorse
stereotypes about males while high-prejudice participants were slightly more likely to

endorse stereotypes about men.

126

Table 27

Stereotyping of Masculine Items (SMI)

PARTICIPANT
PREJUDICE
CONFEDERATE High Low
GENDER
Male 2.15 2.58a
(15) (22)
Female 2.33 1.97b

(61) (51)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater stereotyping of men.
Means with different superscripts were signiﬁcantly different
at p < .05. Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

127

Table 28

Stereotyping of Masculine Items (SMI)

PARTICIPANT
PREJUDICE
High Low
DISTANCE
Near 2.34 2.02
(37) (34)
Far 2.25 2.27
(39) (39)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater stereotyping of men.
None of the means were signiﬁcantly different (all ps > .05).
Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

128

The ANOVA examining the TSI showed a main effect of participant gender on
participants overall tendency to endorse sex stereotypes, E(1, 146) = 7.59, p < .007. Male
participants were more likely to endorse sex stereotypes than female participants. The
analyses also indicated a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between participant gender and
confederate gender, E(1, 146) = 7.77, p < .006 (see Table 29). Recall that previous
ﬁndings from the affect analyses indicated that participants who are exposed to same-sex
confederates feel more negative affect, and in the SFI analyses, this resulted in an increased
tendency among male participants to endorse stereotypes about females while females in that
interaction did not show more stereotyping. The same sort of pattern has emerged in the
present interaction. Consistent with the above results, males exposed to a male confederate
showed more total gender stereotyping than males exposed to a female confederate.
However, females exposed to a female confederate showed slightly less total gender
stereotyping than females exposed to a male confederate.

A 2-way interaction between participant gender and distance also emerged in the
analyses, E(l, 146) = 5.99, p < .01 (see Table 30). This pattern is essentially identical to
the observed 2-way interaction between the same variables for the SMI, but not SFI,
analyses. Speciﬁcally, males in the far condition were slightly more likely to endorse sex
stereotypes than females. However, when participants felt uneasy/uncomfortable as a result
of the personal space invasion, males were slightly less likely to endorse sex stereotypes
while females were slightly more likely to endorse sex stereotypes.

A 2-way interaction emerged for prejudice and confederate gender, E(l, 146) =
10.24, p < .002 (see Table 31). This pattern is identical to that observed for the same factors
in the SMI analyses. Low-prejudice participants exposed to male confederates were
signiﬁcantly more likely to endorse sex stereotypes than low-prejudice participants exposed
to female confederates, E(l, 71) = 6.36, p < .05. However, high-prejudice participants

exposed to a male confederate were slightly less likely than their low-prejudice counterparts

129

Table 29

Total Sex Stereotyping Index (TSI)

PARTICIPAN T
GENDER
CON FEDERATE Male Female
GENDER
Male 2.56 1 .86
(11) (39)
Female 1.86 1.74

(26) (7 l )

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater endorsement of sex
stereotypes. None of the means were signiﬁcantly different
(all ps > .05). Numbers in parentheses are cell N 's.

130

Table 30

Total Sex Stereotyping Index (TSI)

PARTICIPANT
GENDER
Male Female
DISTANCE
Near 1.85 1.85
(25) (45)
Far 2. l9 1 .7 1
(25) (52)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater endorsement of sex
stereotypes. None of the means were signiﬁcantly different
(all ps > .05). Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

131

Table 31

Total Sex Stereotyping Index (TSI)

PARTICIPAN T
PREJUDICE
CONFEDERATE High Low
GENDER

Male 1.79 2.26a

(15) (22)
Female 1.95 1.58b

(60) (50)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater endorsement of sex
stereotypes. Means with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly
different at p < .05. Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

132
to endorse sex stereotypes, while high-prejudice participants exposed to a female
confederate were slightly more likely than their low-prejudice counterparts to endorse sex
stereotypes.

The analyses also indicated a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction between prejudice and
distance, E(1, 146) = 4.50, p < .03 (see Table 32). This interaction is interesting in that the
pattern observed is completely opposite to that observed for the same factors for both the
SMI and SFI analyses. Here, participants in the far condition were essentially equally likely
to endorse sex stereotypes, with high—prejudice participants showing a slightly greater
tendency to endorse sex stereotypes than low-prejudice participants. However, when
participants feel uneasy/uncomfortable as a result of a personal space invasion, high-
prejudice participants were slightly less likely to endorse sex stereotypes, while low-
prejudice participants were slightly more likely to endorse sex stereotypes.

Brief Summary of Findings for Experiment 2. Unexpectedly, none of the
predicted main effects or interactions were significant in the analyses of participants'
responses to the Modern Racism Scale and the student court questionnaire. The analyses
supported Hypothesis 1. Participants who had their personal space invaded felt more
discomfort than those in the far condition. Results of the analyses indicate that Hypothesis 2
was supported for measures of prejudice, but not for stereotyping. Those high in prejudice
showed more prejudiced attitudes on the Modern Racism Scale, were less likely to endorse
egalitarian statements, and were less interested in race-related topics compared to low-
prejuidice participants. Hypothesis 3 predicted a 3-way interaction between distance, target
ethnicity, and confederate race for items on the Student Court questionnaire.

The hypothesis also predicted a 2-way interaction between distance and confederate
race for sex stereotyping measures. Results from the Student Court analyses did not indicate
the predicted 3-way interaction. However, the predicted 2-way interaction did emerge for

the SFI analyses. Unfortunately, the pattern of means was exactly the opposite of that

133

Table 32

Total Sex Stereotyping Index (TSI)

PARTICIPANT
PREJUDICE
High Low
DISTANCE
Near 1.69 2.00
(34) (36)
Far 1.88 1.85
(38) (39)

 

Note: Higher means indicate greater endorsement of sex
stereotypes.None of the means were signiﬁcantly different
(all ps > .05). Numbers in parentheses are cell N's.

134
predicted by Hypothesis 3. Speciﬁcally, participants in the near condition who were
exposed to a Caucasian confederate showed the least stereotyping of women. Therefore,

Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

General Discussion

The present experiments were conducted in order to examine the effects of
incidental and episodic racial guilt and discomfort on the tendency of individuals to express
racial prejudice and use stereotypes in making social judgments. Experiment 1 was
designed to induce feelings of guilt in participants, and examine the degree to which that
guilt inﬂuences the expression of prejudice and stereotyping. Experiment 2 was designed to
induce increased physiological arousal in order to examine the effects of discomfort on
subsequent tendencies to express prejudice and use stereotypes in social judgments.

Below, the ﬁndings from Experiment 1 are summarized, and limitations of the
experiment are presented. The major ﬁndings from Experiment 2 are then presented, and
then some limitations of the experiment are discussed. Finally, the general discussion
section ends with a description of how the present experiments ﬁt into the research
literature on affect and stereotyping, and suggestions for future research.
Experiment 1

The guilt manipulation did not have the intended effect of inducing guilt. Moreover,
the manipulation did not have any noticeable effects on the participants' positive or negative
affect, or their SDNA. Rather, it seems to be the case that participants in the guilt induction
procedure felt more ODNA than those in the no-guilt conditions. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were
not evaluated because they depended upon the success of the guilt manipulation. There are
a number of possible reasons why guilt was not produced in the present study. One
possible explanation is that participants did not believe that the experimenter was telling the
truth (that the experimenter was lying and acting, concealing the true purpose of the
experiment), and that the cards falling off the end of the table seemed to be too coincidental
to be anything other than an artiﬁcially constructed experiment, designed to look at how the
individual reacted to the manipulation. The problem with this explanation is that participants
were given an opportunity to convey their suspicions about the experiment and
experimenter on the Post-Evaluation Questionnaire, and only 3 participants reported being

135

136
suspicious of the nature of the cover story. Thus, either participants believed the cover
story, or they just were not divulging their suspicions on the Post-Evaluation
Questionnaire. Assuming that participants did not conceal their suspicions, another
explanation is needed to account for the problem of why the guilt manipulation did not
work.

Perhaps the guilt induction scenario did not elicit feelings of guilt in participants
because they did not feel they had really "harmed" the experimenter (by disrupting the
experimenter's organized research cards). In other words, perhaps the manipulation did not
encompass the elements to induce strong feelings of guilt. This is certainly a possibility,
however, as discussed at the beginning of Experiment 1, there are equally valid reasons to
believe that the procedure would induce sufﬁcient guilt in the participants. First, the
participant was led to believe he/she m responsible for the disruption of the
experimenter's study, and therefore should assume responsibility for his/her actions and
feel the consequent guilt as a result of the disruption of the experimenter's study. Second,
in addition to the belief of the participant that he/she 'harmed' the experimenter (by
disrupting the experimenter's study), the participant also encountered this situation in an
inter-personal context (i.e., the experimenter saw and reacted to the participants'
transgression against the experimenter), which is consistent with current deﬁnitions of guilt
as occurring in an inter-personal context (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). It is
one thing to feel guilt as a result of thoughts that an individual has that he/she has violated
some personal standard or harmed another in some way, but the research by Baumeister
and colleagues (1994) suggests that guilt experienced should be stronger when one sees the
reaction of the 'victim' (in this case, the experimenter) who was harmed by the participants'
transgression. Moreover, the procedure was effective in inducing guilt feelings in
participants in earlier research (Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967) as well as in pilot

testing for present study.

137

Perhaps the reaction of the experimenter to the cards crashing was a contributor to
the failure to induce guilt in the participant. Speciﬁcally, it is possible that, even though the
experimenters were well-trained in how to react to the cards toppling off the table, they may
have deviated from this training in such a way that the participant did not feel guilt at having
toppled the index cards. The experimenter's reaction could have been too unemotional, or
mild, conveying no real harm was done, thus short-circuiting any guilt feelings on the part
of the participant. The reaction of the experimenter may have also induced suspicion in the
participant (though responses to the post-evaluation questionnaire did not indicate
suspicion) or doubt in the veracity of the cover story, and this may have interfered with the
induction of guilt in the participant. Although the suspicion explanation seems unlikely, a
more thorough debrieﬁng interview would have been more useful in addressing the
possibility of suspicion in participants.

In future research, special care should be taken to more carefully script the reaction
of the experimenter to the cards crashing off the table, such that the participant clearly sees
the emotional distress the experimenter experiences at the sight of his/her research
temporarily 'ruined' by the participant. The importance of the research (and the harm done
by the participant) should be emphasized in dialogue and action by the experimenter, in
order to increase the chances that the participant would feel guilt at having temporarily
'ruined' the research. It may also be necessary to modify the method of Freedman et al
(1967) to attempt to avoid suspicion and enhance the chances that guilt will be produced.
For example, it was not made obvious that the stack of index cards on the table were
essential for writing up the experimenter's thesis, and it was not obvious why they were
placed on the comer of the table, stacked high & somewhat precariously. Especially
suspicious was the fact that the experimenter knew about the wobbly table, yet still stacked
these supposedly important cards on the unstable table. Future research using this

methodology should address these considerations, to better avoid suspicion in participants.

138

Without further testing of the procedure, it is difﬁcult to specify why the guilt
induction failed to produce guilt feelings in the participants. Although the failure to produce
guilt had unfortunate implications for the evaluation of Hypotheses 2 and 3, the study
nevertheless produced some interesting data on the effects of other-directed negative affect
generated in the tense interpersonal context (the accident conditions) on participants'
subsequent tendencies to express prejudiced racial attitudes and utilize stereotypes in social
judgments.

Evaluation of Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 made the prediction that the
prejudice level of the participant would have a main effect on measures of prejudice and
stereotyping, such that high-prejudice participants should show more stereotyping and
prejudice than low-prejudice participants. The hypothesis was supported for measures of
prejudice, but not stereotyping. As one might expect, high-prejudice participants were less
interested in race-related topics, and were less likely to endorse statements about
egalitarianism. Not surprisingly, high-prejudice participants showed more prejudiced
attitudes on the MRS. The prejudice level of the participant had no main effect on the
study's two measures of stereotyping, the Student's Court questionnaire, and the gender
stereotyping questionnaires.

Overall Patterns Observed. Though Hypotheses 2 and 3 could not be
evaluated, the data are interesting in their own right, providing information about the impact
of other-directed negative affect on the tendency to express prejudiced attitudes and use
stereotypes in making social judgments. Below, the major ﬁndings are presented.

Results from the likelihood of future crimes item on the Student's Court
questionnaire suggests that high-prejudice participants who experience ODNA are more
likely to express this affect in more negative judgments of White but not Black targets. It
may be the case that high-prejudice participants are sensitized to the negative social

reactions of others to the expression of prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans, and

139
thus the high-prejudice individual may feel more comfortable expressing negative affect
against a target from the ingroup.

Low-prejudice participants who experience ODNA tend to be more negative in their
judgments about African American targets than in judgments about White targets. This
interesting ﬁnding may reﬂect an extension of the "Black Sheep Effect" (Marques &
Yzerbyt, 1988). Speciﬁcally, these participants are not more negative toward members of
their ingroup (other Whites), but rather are more negative in their perceptions of African
American targets. It appears that low-prejudice individuals who feel ODNA tend to be
bothered by individuals who seem to be conﬁrming stereotypes of African Americans (i.e.,
cheating on a test). These participants may believe that this behavior makes it more difﬁcult
to change stereotypes of African Americans. It is important to note that the interaction was
marginally signiﬁcant and simple effects tests showed no differences between the means in
the interaction. Therefore, although these speculations about the data are intriguing, they
should be regarded with caution pending future research.

The feelings of ODNA that accompany the accident manipulation had differential
effects on high versus low prejudice participants' ratings on the questionnaires. Among
low-prejudice participants, the accident manipulation seems to lower guilt judgments about
the Student Court defendant. Among high-prejudice participants, the accident manipulation
increased guilt judgments. It may be the case that the ODNA that hi gh—prejudice participants
feel after the accident is transferred to guilt judgments of the accused defendant, irrespective
of the defendant's race. However, this does not seem to be the case for low-prejudice
participants, who may be less likely to experience such forms of displacement.

Participants' guilt judgments of Student Court targets were inﬂuenced by the race of
the target and the race of the experimenter. When the race of the target matched the race of
the experimenter, the accident manipulation had no inﬂuence on guilt judgments. However,

when the race of the target was different from the race of the experimenter, the accident

140

manipulation increased guilt judgments. When with an African American experimenter,
participants were hesitant to let the ODN A they feel in the accident condition to inﬂuence
their judgments of an African American defendant, but when with a Caucasian
experimenter, the ODNA participants felt resulted in increased guilt judgments. It may be
the case that the race of the experimenter is a factor that has an inhibitory effect on the
inﬂuence of ODNA on judgments of same race defendants. The ODNA in the accident
conditions also resulted in increased stereotyping of African American targets when
participants interacted with a Caucasian experimenter. However, when participants were
with an African American experimenter, ODNA resulted in decreased stereotyping of
African Americans. Simple effects were inconclusive and further research is necessary to
replicate these ﬁndings. However, the inhibitory nature of the race of others in one's
environment on the inﬂuence of ODNA on one's social judgments is an interesting ﬁnding,
and merits further investigation.

Moreover, when low-prejudice participants interacted with a Caucasian
experimenter, the accident increased participants' interest in race-related topics. When with
an African American experimenter, the accident decreased low-prejudice participants'
interest in race-related topics. When high-prejudice participants interacted with a Caucasian
experimenter, the accident manipulation decreased interest in race-related topics. However,
when the experimenter was African American, high-prejudice participants showed more
interest in race-related topics. Assuming that ODNA participants feel in the accident
conditions may likely be directed toward the experimenter, it appears to be the case that for
low-prejudice participants, the experience of ODNA directed toward a Caucasian
experimenter actually increases interest in race-related topics. However, when low-
prejudice participants feel ODNA toward an African American experimenter, they lose
interest in race-related topics, presumably because the negative affect associated with a

member of the minority group decreases positive attitudes toward issues pertaining to that

141
minority group. This is particularly interesting, because lower interest in race-related topics
gives an observer the suggestion that the individual may be prejudiced toward African
Americans, yet in this condition, the ODNA seems to override the low-prejudice
participants' self-presentation efforts.

Among high-prejudice individuals, feeling ODNA with a Caucasian experimenter
only decreases their already relatively low interest in race-related topics. However, when
with an African American experimenter, high-prejudice participants feeling ODN A seem to
avoid expressing this ODNA by lower interest in race-related topics, and instead show a
slight increase in their interest in these topics. Again, it may be the case that high-prejudice
participants are sensitive to the social consequences of expressing their negative attitudes
toward African Americans -- and this seems to be especially so when they are interacting
with an African American experimenter -- and try to avoid the appearance of prejudice by
slightly increasing their interest in race-related topics.

The race of the experimenter seems to have an interesting impact on high and low-
prejudice participants' responses to the Topics Questionnaire. This might suggest that the
measure is a reactive instrument, whereby participants express less prejudice with an
African American experimenter than with a Caucasian experimenter. As seen in Table 7,
when one collapses across the accident conditions, the low-prejudice participants do indeed
show more interest in race-related topics with an African American experimenter, however
the high-prejudice participants show a decrease in interest in race-related topics when with
an African American experimenter. Thus, it appears that low-prejudice participants may be
susceptible to the reactive nature of the Topics Questionnaire, an indirect measure of
prejudice toward African Americans. There is evidence that suggests that having an African
American experimenter results in lower overall Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores,
thereby highlighting the reactive nature of the MRS (Jackson & Fazio, 1995). More about

this issue will be discussed below in the section on future directions for research.

142

Gender Effects. Although the analyses indicated a number of main effects and
interactions involving participant and experimenter gender, none of the interactions
qualiﬁed the primary main effects or interactions. However, several interesting effects of
gender were obtained, and these are presented below. It should be noted again that gender
effects were not speciﬁed in the hypotheses. Moreover, these data are sometimes difﬁcult
to interpret, presenting what appear to be scattershot gender effects. However, where
possible, overarching patterns in the data will be pointed out.

The analyses indicated that female participants were more interested in race-related
topics and egalitarian ideals. Participants were more willing to help male experimenters than
female experimenters. There were also differences between high and low prejudice
participants in the inﬂuence of the experimenter gender on their responses on the Severity /
Seriousness composite scale from the Student Court questionnaire. When interacting with a
female experimenter, high prejudice males were more punitive, while high-prejudice
females were less punitive. However, low-prejudice males were less punitive, while low-
prejudice females were more punitive.

Those who interacted with an African American male experimenter indicated the
highest ratings of guilt on the Student Court questionnaire. As mentioned above, this may
be due to the strong perceived correlation in American society between African American
males and crime / violence. Thus, the negative attitudes and negative affect of Caucasions
toward this subgroup of African Americans could ﬁnd an outlet in increased guilt
judgments of the Student Court defendant (irrespective of the defendant's race). This may
be the case here, although the inconclusive simple effects tests preclude more deﬁnitive
interpretations of these data.

Another interesting, though quite speculative explanation for this ﬁnding, concerns
a mood-matching process in social interaction. Speciﬁcally, Jackson et al. (1996) found

that Caucasians generally tend to view African Americans as angry. Erber, Wegner, and

143

Therriault (1996) found that when participants are about to interact with another person,
they tend to match the mood of the other individual. If this is the case in participants'
interactions with experimenters, the Caucasian participants who interact with an African
American experimenter should tend to feel more negative moods as a result of attempting to
match the preconceived angry mood of the African American experimenter. As can be seen
in Table 10, this explanation would account for the data for African American male
experimenters, but not for African American female experimenters. It may be the case that
Caucasians are much more likely to view African American males, rather than African
American females, as 'angry.’ Again, this is likely due to Caucasians‘ perceived
correlations in American society between African American males and crime/violence.
Though quite speculative, this explanation suggests interesting possibilities for future
research.

Interestingly, after participants had read about a Caucasian defendant in the Student
Court questionnaire, females were significantly more likely than males to endorse
traditional sex stereotypes about women. However, after participants had read about an
African American defendant, males were more likely than females to endorse sex
stereotypes about females. Using the Caucasian defendant condition as a baseline, it
appears that females may tend to be more inclined to endorse stereotypes about women than
males. It is unclear why this might be so, although one might speculate that males tend to
inhibit endorsing sex stereotypes about women, because of possibly appearing prejudiced
or sexist.

However, the endorsement of sex stereotypes shifted after reading about an African
American defendant, such that males were more likely (than their Caucasian defendant
counterparts) to endorse sex stereotypes about women. Conversely, women were less
likely (relative to their Caucasian defendant counterparts) to endorse sex stereotypes about

women. One reason the shift may have occurred is that after reading about an African

144

American defendant, the salience of this racial minority may have activated concepts and
traits associated with other minorities, including women. The greater accessibility of these
concepts may, for male participants, make the participant more likely to endorse stereotypes
about women. A second reason may be that, for females, activation of the racial minority
construct may have a different effect on the activation of associated constructs (i.e.,
"women"). Specifically, because women are also a minority, they experience
discrimination sexism akin to racism felt by African Americans. In females, then, these
negative aspects of the racial minority may have an inhibitory effect on the activation of
stereotypes about women, making these participants less likely to endorse sex stereotypes
about women. This is an intriguing possibility, and there is some evidence for such an
excitatory / inbitory mechanism in social categorization (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne,
1995).

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research. The major limitation of
the ﬁrst experiment was of course, that the guilt induction procedure did not produce guilt
feelings in participants. Because the two major hypotheses were based on the assumption
of a successful guilt induction, the hypotheses were not evaluated. Unfortunately, the
present data do not provide any hints about the likely reason for the failure of the guilt
induction procedure. While it is possible that participants didn't believe the experimenter's
cover story, or that the guilt induction procedure itself did not encompass the necessary
features that would trigger guilt feelings in the participant, these explanations are not
probable, and further research is required to investigate the nature of the guilt induction
procedure, and the conditions under which it is successful in producing guilt feelings in
participants.

Because the present experiment was unable to test predictions derived from CDT
and SAT, future research should address these unanswered questions. First and foremost,

researchers should extensively pilot test the guilt induction procedure in a number of

145

variations, in order to examine the speciﬁc contexts in which the guilt feeling is more
strongly elicited in participants. In other words, it may be the case that guilt is more
strongly produced in variations of the procedure described here. For example, two possible
ways to magnify the likelihood that guilt will be produced would be: 1) to increase the
feelings of responsibility among participants for disrupting the experimenter's research,
and 2) to increase the perceived importance of the project to the experimenter in the eyes of
the participant. Another interesting question not addressed in the present experiment, but
one which future research should investigate is whether guilt produced in an inter-personal
contex vs. imagined guilt (i.e. guilt arising from a perceived harm done to another person,
without knowing whether another individual knows of the harm) has any differential
effects on expressions of prejudice and stereotyping in social judgments. The questions
about the inﬂuence of guilt on prejudice and stereotyping remain an unanswered challenge
for future research to address.

The conceptual 'purity' of the low-prejudice group derived from Modern Racism
Scale scores has been called into question in a recent paper by Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and
Williams (1995). Speciﬁcally, they argue that participant responses to the MRS are
susceptible to social desirability concerns and are inﬂuenced by the race of the experimenter
administering the MRS. These authors suggest that the MRS merely measures one's
willingness to express prejudiced attitudes, not one's true attitudes toward African
Americans. Using a priming procedure, Fazio and his colleagues found that they could
further separate the truly non-prejudiced (i.e., those whose judgments of negative words
were not facilitated by a Black face prime) from those who are prejudiced, but motivated to
conceal such negative feelings toward African Americans. This method of identifying
participant prejudice levels should be considered for future research on stereotyping and

prejudice.

146
Experiment 2

Affect Analyses. The analyses of the affect items indicated that the distance
manipulation did not have a noticeable effect on those in the near and far conditions in the
degree of SDNA and ODN A the participants felt. However, it did have the predicted effect
on the degree of discomfort felt by the participants. Speciﬁcally, participants who had their
personal space invaded felt signiﬁcantly more uneasy/uncomfortable than those in the far
conditions.

However, the lack of differences between the near and far conditions in the degree
of SDNA had implications for the ability to evaluate Hypothesis 4, which depended upon
low-prejudice participants feeling more SDNA or guilt when exposed to an African
American confederate. The lack of a main effect for distance as well as a lack of a 3-way
interaction between prejudice, confederate race, and distance on the SDNA and Guilt
Inventory scales unfortunately resulted in the inability to evaluate Hypothesis 4 in the
present experiment.

This ﬁnding may be explained in light of recent research by Monteith (1996b). She
found that when low-prejudice participants experienced discrepancies between how they
respond in intergroup contexts ("would" responses) and their personal standards for
behavior in that context ("should" responses), they will only experience self-directed
negative affect to the extent that they think about the relation between how they should
respond and how they would respond in these contexts. Monteith found that this drinking
is not spontaneous. In the present experiment, it may be the case that the low-prejudice
participants in the episodic discomfort conditions were not thinking about the relation
between their "should" and "would" behaviors, and therefore did not feel self-directed
negative affect (or guilt). Future research should explore the degree to which thinking about
should-would discrepancies is essential for producing SDNA or guilt feelings.

147

Evaluation of Hypothesis 1. The ﬁrst hypothesis predicted that those who had
their personal space invaded by a confederate would feel greater levels of discomfort. The
results of the affect analyses showed that this was indeed the case. Participants in the near
conditions felt more uneasy/uncomfortable than those in the far conditions. It is interesting
to note that the feelings of discomfort elicited did not encompass feelings of SDNA or
ODN A. Moreover, analyses of the "general discomfort" composite scale indicated that the
personal space invasion produced feelings that were better characterized as
uneasy/uncomfortable.

Evaluation of Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 made the prediction that those high
in prejudice should be more likely to show prejudiced attitudes and use stereotypes in
making social judgments than those low in prejudice. Because pretest MRS scores were
used to select participants for the experiment, it is not surprising that prejudice had a
signiﬁcant effect on participants' responses to the MRS when they completed it again at the
end of the experiment. However, more telling indicators bearing on Hypothesis 2 are
participant responses to indirect measures of prejudice, speciﬁcally, the Egalitarianism
Scale, and the Topics composite scale. As predicted by the hypothesis, high prejudice
participants were less likely to endorse egalitarian ideals, and were less interested in race-
related topics compared to low-prejudice participants. On measures of stereotyping, the
hypothesis was not supported. Although responses to the Student Court questionnaire
indicated a main effect of prejudice for judgments of guilt (high-prejudice participants rated
the defendant as more likely to be guilty than low-prejudice participants), this does not
indicate any stereotyping, because what is missing is the needed interaction of prejudice
and target ethnicity. Thus, while interesting, it does not support the hypothesis. On the sex
stereotyping measures, no main effect of prejudice emerged. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was

supported for measures of prejudice, but not for measures of stereotyping.

148

Evaluation of Hypothesis 3. According to this hypothesis, when participants'
personal space is invaded by a Caucasian confederate, they should be the most likely to use
stereotypes in social judgments (compared to those in the near condition with an African
American confederate, and those in both far conditions). Results of the analyses of the
Student Court and sex stereotyping questionnaires did not show the predicted interactions.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

The failure to ﬁnd evidence to support this hypothesis suggests that the feelings of
being uneasy/uncomfortable in the presence of a Caucasian confederate (i.e. "incidental
discomfort conditions" did not disrupt participants' ability to suppress heuristic judgment
processes. Moreover, the discomfort felt in the incidental discomfort conditions did not
increase the tendency to show prejudiced attitudes. These results contradict the ﬁndings of
earlier research on physiological arousal and stereotyping, which suggested that the more
arousal one felt, the less able that person would be to avoid using stereotypes in social
judgments (Kim & Baron, 1988; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980).

These distinct ﬁndings suggest that the nature of the physiological arousal should
may have important implications for whether the individual will be more likely to stereotype
others. Speciﬁcally, earlier research by Kim and Baron (1988) and Wegner and Giuliano
(1980) examined stereotyping in people who were exercising to increase physiological
arousal. It may be the case that physiological arousal through exercise or other physical
activity increases self-focus (as Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, suggested), and this is the key
that enhances stereotyping. That is, to the degree that one thinks of oneself and not the
other individual, one will not be able to carefully consider information about the person,
and may be more susceptible to employing stereotypes when asked to make judgments
about that person. Unfortunately, the data collected in this experiment do not allow for an
examination of the degree to which participants were self-focused. However, it is

reasonable to assume that participants in the waiting room were indeed more self-focused

149
as a result of having an "audience" in the confederate (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Indeed,
this self-focus should have made the participant more likely to attend to his/her current
bodily state, and in the "near" conditions, experience more intense discomfort (Scheier,
Carver, & Matthews, 1983). Future researchers should examine the nature of the arousal,
and focus on whether self-focus seems to play a key role in enhancing the use of
stereotypes in social judgments.

Overall Patterns Observed. The analyses indicated that high-prejudice
participants felt more ODNA, and slightly more guilt than low-prejudice participants. High
prejudice participants were also more likely to judge the defendant (irrespective of the
defendant's race) in the Student Court questionnaire as guilty compared to low-prejudice
participants. When participants were not uncomfortable (i.e., in the far condition), those
exposed to a Caucasian confederate were more likely to endorse stereotypes about women.
However, when participants' personal space was invaded, those who were exposed to a
Caucasian confederate were the least likely to endorse stereotypes about women. Thus,
when participants were exposed to an African American confederate, the distance
manipulation had no effect on their tendency to endorse stereotypes about women. But
among those exposed to a Caucasian confederate, the discomfort participants felt when
their personal space was invaded made them signiﬁcantly less likely to stereotype women.

This result suggests that the presence of a minority group confederate may have
served as a cue to participants to not use stereotypes in social judgments not only about
race, but in an unrelated dimension, gender stereotyping. This cue acts to remind
participants to not stereotype, and the tendency to not stereotype was not affected by
feelings of discomfort elicited by the personal space invasion. Among participants with a
Caucasian confederate, there was no such cue to refrain from stereotyping, and participants
were more likely to endorse stereotypes about women. Interestingly, this tendency was

completely reversed when participants felt uneasy/uncomfortable. That is, the feelings of

150
discomfort these participants experienced when their personal space was invaded
inﬂuenced their proclivity to endorse stereotypes about women. Specifically, the
discomfort signiﬁcantly reduced their tendency to stereotype women. These ﬁndings have
some interesting implications for future research, which will be discussed below.

Gender effects. The analyses indicated a number of main effects and interactions
involving participant gender and confederate gender. However, the hypotheses do not
make any predictions with regard to gender. As was the case with the gender effects
observed in Experiment 1, the present interactions involving gender were sometimes
difﬁcult to interpret in terms of an overall pattern. Where possible, general ﬁndings that
encompass several interactions will be presented.

The analyses indicated several main effects of gender. First, results indicated that
male participants felt more uncomfortable than females, and those exposed to male
confederates felt more uncomfortable than those with female confederates. Males felt more
SDNA than females. Females were more interested in race-related topics. Finally, males
were more likely to endorse stereotypes about men, and endorse sex stereotypes in general.

Interestingly, participants who were exposed to a same-sex confederate felt more
SDNA. Males exposed to a male confederate were more likely to stereotype males and
endorse general sex stereotypes. However, the same did not hold for female participants
exposed to a female confederate. These females were slightly ﬁgs likely to endorse
stereotypes about men and general sex stereotypes compared to female participants who
were exposed to a male confederate. Thus, the SDNA participants felt when exposed to a
same-sex confederate had a differential effect on male and female participants. Males
feeling SDNA were more likely to endorse sex stereotypes, while females were slightly
less likely to endorse sex stereotypes.

The analyses also showed that participants who were exposed to an African

American male or a Caucasian female confederate felt the most SDN A. Interestingly, these

151

participants were also the least interested in race-related topics. As mentioned above, one
possible explanation for the increased SDNA among participants exposed to an African
American male compared to those exposed to a Caucasian male, is the prevalent perceived
correlation in American society between African American males and crime / violence. The
negative attitudes Caucasians may feel toward African American males as a result of this
pernicious perceived correlation (even among low-prejudice participants, see Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986) may be triggered by the mere presence of the African American male
confederate, and this could be inﬂuencing the participants' affect and interest in race-related
topics. It is unclear why participants were more likely to feel SDNA with a Caucasian
female confederate compared to an African American female confederate, and further
research is needed to clarify the nature of these results.

Limitations of Experiment 2. One limitation of the present experiment was the
failure to produce SDNA or guilt feelings among low-prejudice participants in the incidental
discomfort conditions. This was necessary in order to evaluate Hypothesis 4. The present
data do not suggest why the discomfort procedure did not arouse these feelings in low-
prejudice participants. It is entirely possible that participants in this condition could indeed
be less likely to use stereotypes in social judgments, but for reasons other than those
hypothesized in the present experiment. Speciﬁcally, it may not be necessary to feel guilt or
similar negative affect in order to feel motivated in these conditions to not use stereotypes in
social judgments. Future researchers should examine in greater detail the affect participants
felt, as well as attempt to obtain the content of participants' thoughts (through a thought-
listing questionnaire) as they are experiencing the procedure, in order to ascertain more
speciﬁcally the affect and cognitions participants feel when they are in this condition, and
whether it leads to less stereotyping among these low-prejudice individuals. As with
Experiment 1, another limitation in the present study is that it is unclear whether

participants accurately detected the ethnicity of the defendant in the Student Court

152
questionnaire. No manipulation check for the proper perception of this crucial element of
the questionnaire was provided. Thus, because it is an open question whether participants
perceived the questionnaire accurately, the present conclusions about the reactions to the
Student Court questionnaire are more tentative.

A second limitation concerns the possibility that participants in the near conditions
may have a strong motivation to escape the arousal-producing situation, and this may lead
the participant to complete the questionnaire faster and with less thought than those in the
far conditions. Such a possibility would be indicated by an overall pattern of greater
stereotyping in the near conditions. An examination of the results of Experiment 2 suggests
that there may be a slight tendency toward this pattern. This possibility represents an
unwanted inﬂuence on the way participants ﬁlled out the questionnaires. Future researchers
should address this in the instructions to participants, telling them that they should take
their time in completing the questionnaires, and that it is very important that they not hurry
through the experiment.

Another limitation of the experiment was the possibility of a confound of participant
gender, interacting with the gender of the confederate. Speciﬁcally, in mixed-sex dyads, it
is possible that the arousal participants feel when their personal space is invaded could be
attributed to an attraction to the confederate. The participant may believe that because the
confederate sat immediately next to him/her, that the confederate is attracted to the
participant, and this could bias the way the participant responds on all of the affect and
stereotyping measures. Such a bias would be indicated clearly in the analyses by a 3-way
interaction between distance, participant gender, and confederate gender. However, no
such interaction was revealed in the analyses. Nevertheless, it is possible that the
attributions to attraction may have introduced an unwanted bias in the way participants
responded to the questionnaires. This presents a difﬁcult issue for future researchers in that

eliminating mixed-sex dyads in favor of same-sex dyads introduces another confound into

153
the experiment. However, this alternative may be desirable to the possibility of the

atuibution of heightened arousal to attraction in mixed-sex dyads.

Conclusion

Most Americans will unfortunately agree that social interactions with members of
other races usually involves some feelings of tension. Clearly, it is important to determine
how this tension affects the dynamics of intergroup interactions. In other words, what
types of tension, and under what conditions does this tension affect the way majority and
minority group members perceive each other and themselves in an intergroup interaction?
The present research has attempted to address how two types of tension, guilt and
discomfort, affect the tendency of Caucasians to endorse stereotypes of African Americans.
The results of these studies were inconclusive, but suggest some interesting directions for
future researchers. Because the results of Experiment 1 precluded analyses of guilt, the
inﬂuence of guilt on intergroup interactions remains an important unanswered question for
future researchers to address. However, results of Experiment 2 indicate some strong
effects of discomfort on Caucasians' cognitions about African Americans, and,
interestingly, about another minority group, women. However, there is some evidence to
suggest that the discomfort from personal space invasions in the present study may differ in
its effects from physiological arousal arising from physical exercise (e.g., Kim & Baron,
1988). These ﬁndings merit more investigation.

A recent paper by Devine, Evett, and Vasquez-Suson (1996) makes several cogent
points that highlight nicely the importance of further research on the inﬂuence of guilt, and
discomfort in intergroup contexts. Devine and her colleagues argue, as I have, that the
analysis of intergroup tension has received little attention, and that it deserves much more
research. As Bodenhausen (1993) and I have made the argument for the importance of
investigating the inﬂuence of the many different types of negative affect on intergroup
interactions, Devine et al. also call for research into the different types of tension that may
arise in intergroup contexts.

Devine et al. also highlight the importance of understanding the difference between
low-prejudice Caucasians with motivation to show they are non-prejudiced in interactions

154

155

with an African American, and those who also have the My (i.e., social skills) to
effectively communicate their non-prejudiced attitudes and intentions. She suggests that if a
low-prejudiced person is motivated to show he/she is non-prejudiced, but does not know
quite how to do so when interacting with an African American, this uncertainty can lead the
Caucasian to engage in avoidance behaviors (e.g., decreased eye contact, increased
interpersonal distance). This behavior is then likely to be interpreted by the African
American individual as evidence of prejudice toward African Americans (Major & Crocker,
1993). Their tension, and perception of their own nervous behavior, along with worries
that the African American individual will interpret such behavior as prejudice, can lead
some Caucasians to feel guilt at having violated their own standards for social interaction
with African Americans, and possibly guilt at the thought of experiencing tension in the
presence of an African American.

These two feelings, tension, and the guilt that arises from feeling tension in the
intergroup context, are closely intertwined in low-prejudice Caucasians who lack the social
skills necessary to smoothly interact with African Americans. Future research should
attempt to examine the separate contributions of each of these feelings to the thoughts,
feelings and behavior of Caucasians in interactions with African Americans. However, as
Devine et al. rightly point out, this only presents one side of the story in understanding
intergroup interactions.

Another major direction for researchers examining the inﬂuence of affect on
intergroup perceptions is the examination of the expectations, perceptions, thoughts and
feelings of the African American individual in the interaction. Surprisingly little empirical
attention has been devoted to the important inﬂuence of the minority interactant in
intergroup interactions. How do African Americans expect to perceive the behavior of
Caucasians, and how does this inﬂuence the tendency of Caucasians to endorse stereotypes

about African Americans? There has been much research to suggest that African Americans

156

live in perpetual "attributional ambiguity" with regard to the behavior of Caucasians toward
them, and that they approach such interactions with a degree of suspicion and mistrust
(e.g., Crocker, Voekl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993). In their paper,
Devine et al. make the point that the intergroup context is a dynamic one, whereby the
behavior of the Caucasian inﬂuences, and is inﬂuenced by the African American interaction
partner. Such reciprocal inﬂuences also have a strong impact on the perpetuation of
negative affect or stereotypes each have about the other, and to the degree that the African
American and the Caucasian individuals expect to feel tension (Ickes, 1984), the negative
affect can serve to conﬁrm negative expectations about intergroup interactions (Hilton &
Darley, 1991) and perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes.

In sum, it is clear that many individuals experience discomfort, and some
experience guilt in intergroup interactions. The present experiments represent a ﬁrst step
toward understanding the inﬂuence of guilt and discomfort on the tendency to utilize
stereotypes when making judgments about African Americans. The trends reported in each
experiment offer interesting starting points for future researchers to investigate the
conditions under which these emotions arise, and their inﬂuence on the thoughts, feelings
and behaviors of Caucasian and African American interactants. Researchers should also
investigate whether different types of guilt (i.e., interpersonal or intrapsychic) and different
types of physiological discomfort (i.e., induced by physical exercise, or by other means,
such as personal space invasions) have differential effects on the tendency to stereotype
others. It is also important to understand the inﬂuence of the expectations, feelings,
thoughts, and behavior of minority interactants in the intergroup context on the tendency of
majority members to utilize stereotypes in social judgments about the minority group.

Finally, research should also be directed at how Caucasians can "break the
prejudice habit" (Monteith, 1993). That is, how Caucasians can learn smooth social skills

in the intergroup context, such that they will no longer approach the intergroup interactions

157
with tension, and will not experience guilt as a result of their avoidance behaviors that
result from poor intergroup social skills. What types of social skills are important for
Caucasians in order to experience smooth intergroup interactions? How will the African
American participant interpret these behaviors, and how will these interpretations affect the
Caucasians' thoughts and feelings about African Americans? These are just a couple of the
questions that need to be addressed in future research.

Much more research on the inﬂuence of guilt and discomfort on stereotyping is
needed, and some researchers have turned their attention to this area (e.g., Devine et al.,
1996). The complex pattern of results indicated in the present experiments highlight many
starting points for researchers interested in disentangling the motivations, feelings, and
cognitions people feel when they interact with others in today's ever-increasing multi-racial

society.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

 

APPENDIX A
Modern Racism Scale

[Noter Scores are only calculated from the following relevant items: 2, 6 (reverse-scored item), 8, 10, 12,
17, and 20. All other items are ﬁller items.]

DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS PAGE! CIRCLE YOUR SEX: Male Female
Social Attitude Survey

On the pages that follow, you will ﬁnd a number of opinion statements about various social
issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by
circling the number on the scale underneath each statement that best indicates your own
opinion. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers; we are simply interested in your honest
opinions.

1. Sex education should be taught in public school systems in the United States.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

2. Over the past few years, the government and news media have seemed more concerned
aboutthe rights of African-Americans than of other groups.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

3. Homosexuals contribute positively to society.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

4. The government needs to pass stricter immigration laws.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

5. We need more women in leadership positions in industry and government.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

6. It is easy to understand the anger of African-Americans.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

7. I feel that homosexuality is a sin.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

171

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

172

APPENDIX A

Minority groups are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Homosexuals should have the same civil rights as other citizens.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Blacks seem to have more political power to inﬂuence social policy than other
groups.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

To me, homosexuality is disgusting.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Discrimination against African-Americans is no longer a signiﬁcant problem in the
United States.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Most feminists have no idea what being a woman is really all about.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

I believe that homosexuals corrupt young people.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Almost all erotic or sexually explicit material should be outlawed.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Homosexuals are just as moral as heterosexuals.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

Over the past few years, African-Americans have gotten unfair economic gains due
to preferential policies.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

173

APPENDIX A

18. Too many women make their careers more important than their families.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

19. I feel that homosexuality should be against the law.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

20. Racial integration should not be forced where it is not wanted.

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral/No Opinion Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

 

APPENDIX B

 

APPENDIX B

GENERAL INFORMATION

We are interested in obtaining general information about the demographic characteristics of our
research sample. Please provide information about yourself as requested below. Thank you.

 

1. Age
2. Gender Male Female
3. Ethnic Origin (please circle one)

a. African-American

b. Hispanic

c. Native American

(1. Caucasian

e. Asian-American / Paciﬁc Islander

f. Other

 

4. Hometown
5. Major at MSU

 

 

IMPORTANT: 1F Yon woter) LlKE THE oppoammn To
PARTICIPATE IN FoTnRE RESEARCH FoR EXTRA CREDIT THIS TERM,

please provide the requested information below! (remember, all the identifying
information will only be seen by the project supervisor and is strictly
confidential).

Name (please PRINT)

 

Phone # where we can reach you

 

174

 

APPENDIX C

 

APPENDIX C

Sample Characteristics Survey

lnsjmojjons. Your responses in today's research will be completely anonymous. However, it is
helpful to us to know about the typical characteristics of the sample of participating in the study.
Please answer each of the questions below as honestly as you can.

 

A. Age: years
B. Sex: Male Female (circle one)
C. Approximate GPA (circle one)

1)o-1.9 2)2.0-2.4 3125-29 4)3.0-3.4 5)3.5-4.o

D. Below are several words that can describe different types of feelings. For each word,
please indicate how much it describes how you are feeling at this moment by circling a
number on the scale. "1" means "does not apply at all" and '7" means "applies very much"

to W Don't spend too much time thinking

about each word, just give a gut-level response.

does not applies

apply at all very much
angry at myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
concerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
angry at others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
embarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
frustrated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
energetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
irritated at others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
fearful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

175

 

annoyed at myself
tense

distressed

optimistic

disgusted with others
regretful

anxious

bothered

content

good

disappointed
with myself

shame

disgusted
with myself

self-critical
uneasy
uncomfortable
consistent

olw

helpless

neutral

—L—L—L—L—b=$—L

NNNNNNNNNNNN

NNNNNNN

APPENDIX C
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4

4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4

176

mmmmmmmmmmmm

01

01010101010101

O)O)O)O)O)O)O)O)O)O)O)O)

O)

mmmmmmm

VNV‘IN‘JVVVVV

V

NVNVVVV

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

SELF -DESCRIPTION QUESTIONNAIRE

[NOTE: items 1, 4, 5, & 6 are reverse-scored]

Instructions: Below you will read a number of statements. Use the response format
presented below to rate each statement according to how you are feeling at this
particular moment. Be honest and use your ﬁrst gut-level response to the statement
(don't think too much about each statement).

5 = Very true of me or strongly agree

4 = True of me or agree

3 = Sometimes true, sometimes not, or partially agree
2 = Not true of me or disagree

1 = Very untrue of me or strongly disagree

1. Lately I have felt good about myself and what I have done.
2. I have recently done something that I deeply regret.

3. Lately, it hasn't been easy being me.

4. Lately, I have been calm and worry-free.

5

. If I could relive the last few weeks or months, there is absolutely nothing I
have done that I would change.

6. At the moment, I don't feel particularly guilty about anything I have done.

7. I would give anything if, somehow, I could go back and rectify some
things I have recently done wrong.

8. There is at least one thing in my recent past that I would like to change.

9. Recently, my life would have been much better if only I hadn't done
what I did.

10. I have been worried and distressed lately.

177

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

Social Opinion Inventory

Below, you will find a number of opinion statements about various social issues.
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each stattment
by circling the number on the scale that best indicates your own opinion. There
are no "right" or "wrong" answers; we are simply interested in your honest
opinions.

1. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

2. There should be equality for everyone -- because we are all
human beings.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

3. A group of equals will work a lot better than a group with a rigid

hierarchy.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

4. Each one should get what helshe needs -- the things we have
belong to all of us.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

5. No matter what the circumstances, one should never arbitrarily
tell people what they have to do.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

6. it is the duty of every good citizen to correct anti-minority
remarks made in his/her presence.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

178

179

APPENDIX E

7. Poverty could be almost entirely done away with if we make
certain basic changes in our social and economic systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

8. There has been too much talk and not enough real action in
doing away with racial discrimination.

 

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly "
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

9. In any group, it is more important to keep a friendly atmosphere
than to be efficient.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

10. In a small group, there should be no real leaders -- everyone
should have an equal say.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX F

Student Court Questionnaire

Student's Court Case #11

This case concerns a matter of academic dishonesty. Speciﬁcally, a mathematics professor
at a prominent west-coast university accused a student named Darnell Jackson (a junior) of
cheating during an examination and disrupting the classroom. The professor, Dr. Gerald
Dubler, told the student judiciary board that during the ﬁnal examination in a mathematics
course, he observed that Mr. Jackson seemed to be looking at the work of students sitting
in front of him and beside him. Dubler asked Jackson to move to an isolated chair near the
front of the room as a warning. Jackson became indignant, loudly stated that he was not
cheating, and refusted to move to a new location. When Dubler insisted that he move to the
other chair, Jackson became very upset, shouted that he was not cheating, and stormed out
of the classroom, knocking over an empty desk in the process. Other students in the class
veriﬁed the agitated behavior displayed by Jackson. Jackson admitted to disrupting the
classroom, but said he only did it because of his extreme frustration at being falsely
accused of cheating, when he had in fact studied extensively and was prepared for the
exam. He refused to apologize, however, unless Dr. Dubler apologized for falsely accusing
him of cheating.

Indicate your judgments about this case by circling the number that best represents your
opinion on the response scale provided. If you have any questions, feel free to ask the
experimenter.

How serious is this matter, in your opinion?
trivial 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 extremely serious
How likely is it that Jackson is in fact guilty of the alleged offense?

extremely extremely
unlikely 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1O likely

If it could be proven beyond any doubt that Jackson were indeed guilty, how severely should he
be punished?

not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 O extremely
severely severely

If Jackson did commit the offense, how likely do you think it is that he would do something similar
again in the future?

extremely extremely
unlikely O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1O likely

In general, do you think the rules and methods for dealing with student misbehavior at MSU are
too lenient or too strict?

too lenientO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10toostrict

180

APPENDIX G

APPENDIX G

Post Evaluation Questionnaire

In your own words, what is the purpose of this study?

Sometimes, no matter how straightforward an experiment is, participants
might think that there is more to the study than what the experimenter has
told them. If you feel this was the case in this study, please explain WHY
below. If not, just leave this space blank.

181

APPENDIX H

APPENDIX H

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
much you agree with it.

 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Somewhat Very
True True True

1. My ﬁrst impressions of people usually turn out to be right.

2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.

3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.

4. I hate not always being honest with myself.

5. I always know why i like things.

6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.

7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
10. It's hard for me to shut off disturbing thoughts.

 

11. I never regret my decisions.
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.

14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.

15. I am a completely rational person.
16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
17. I am very conﬁdent of my judgments.
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.

20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.

182

 

APPENDIX I

Instructigns:

APPENDIX I

TOPICS QUESTIONNAIRE

Below, please RATE each of the 20 topics according to how interesting you think they are.
For each topic below, place a number in the blank before it that corresponds to your rating
of the interest you have in that topic. Use the rating scale below:

1 = not at all interesting

2 = somewhat uninteresting

3 = neither interesting nor uninteresting (no opinion)
4 = somewhat interesting

5 = very interesting

The best place to relax on campus
Why race relations are important
My favorite things to do in the summer

 

Why recycling is important
The best bar in East Lansing
The best TV. show

My favorite musician (music group)

 

.‘OWNP‘MPP‘N?

Nh—ih-‘P-di—ih-ﬁt—‘h—ﬁh—ﬁI—AII—l
PPQNQMF‘PP?‘P

The most interesting major at MSU

The most boring class I ever took

The best thing about being in a long-term relationship

The importance of exercising regularly

Fighting job discrimination

The best vacation spot in the US.

How MSU compares to other top universities in academics
Why it is important to vote

The most embarrassing thing that ever happened to me
Inner city poverty

The best reason to use the Internet

How reading is important to daily life

Why it is important for adults to save for their child's college education

183

APPENDIX J

APPENDIX J
PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE

Instrugg'gnsz Below are a number of personality traits that people can have. For each trait,
estimate the percentage ( O to 100) of female students at this university with the trait.

 

 

competitive %

makes decisions easily %
feels superior %

dictator %

hostile %

arrogant %

aware of others' feelings %
emotional %

devoted to others %
nagging %

subordinates self to others %
whiney %

truthful %

friendly %

reliable %

unhappy %

conceited %

jealous %

184

APPENDIX K

APPENDIX K

Exit Questionnaire

 

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY Honors Student Evaluation

The Department of Psychology is interested in evaluating the performance of the
undergraduate honors students as they conduct their thesis research. Below please rate
your experimenter on the following performance dimensions. Indicate your evaluation
based on the interaction you had with the experimenter during the study. Your responses
are conﬁdential, so be frank and honest in your evaluations.

How friendly was the experimenter?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very very
unfriendly friendly

How competent was the experimenter?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

very very
incompetent competent

How professional was the experimenter?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

very very
unprofessional professional
Overall, how would you rate your experimenter's abilities as a researcher?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

very neither very
negatively positive positive
nor negative

185

 

186

APPENDIX K

As part of our continuing research program, we are conducting another
experiment related to the ﬁrst experiment you participated in today.
However, we need participants -- such as yourself -- who have been
through this study in order for the experiment to run properly.

If we were to call you in the next few days to ask for your
participation in another research project, do you think you
would be able to help? (check one below)

Deﬁnitely yes
Probably yes
Possibly (uncertain)
Probably not
Deﬁnitely not

If you think you might be able to help, this project is flexible
regarding times participants can help. How much time would

you be willing to volunteer to help us get the experiment set

up?

 

 

APPENDIX L

 

APPENDIX L

Factor Analyses of Individual Mood Items
from the Sample Characteristics Questionnaire used in Experiment 1

bothered (.81)

angry at myself (.81)
annoyed at myself (.81)
sad (.78)

frustrated (.77)
disappointed with myself (.77)
uneasy (.76)
depressed (.75)
negative (.74)

fearful (.73)

disgusted with myself (.70)
low (.69)

self critical (.68)
distressed (.67)
uncomfortable (.66)
shame (.65)

tense (.65)

regretful (.65)

guilty (.58)

threatened (.54)
concerned (.54)
helpless (.48)

t 2 - " itiv "
energetic (.71)
friendly (.67)

happy (65)
optimistic (.64)
good (.63)
content (.45)

t _ II _ t t V II
angry at others (.65)
disgusted with others (.61)
irritated at others (.54)

embarrassed (.45)

r . II II

neutral (.58)

consistent (.52)

anxious (-.44)

187