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
Prestige Press Coverage Of Sino-American Relations
From The Cold War's Demise To The Post-Cold War
Period: Reagan's Final Years To The Clinton
Administration (1985 to 1993)

presented by

Robyn S. Goodman

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Mass Media


Major professor

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**PRESTIGE PRESS COVERAGE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
FROM THE COLD WAR'S DEMISE TO THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD:
REAGAN'S FINAL YEARS TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
1985 TO 1993**

By

Robyn S. Goodman

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

PRESTIGE PRESS COVERAGE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM THE COLD WAR'S DEMISE TO THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: REAGAN'S FINAL YEARS TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

1985 TO 1993

By

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This dissertation examined, via five research questions and agenda-setting theory, whether the global Cold War's demise and resulting post-Cold War period led to more government-independent American press coverage of Sino-American relations. The study analyzed, during the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period, how American press coverage presents Sino-American news and how the press and government interact in Sino-American foreign policy making.

Although this study reviewed pre-Cold War to post-Cold War Sino-American press coverage to place this current topic into context, it focused on its quantitative analysis of nine years (1985 to 1993) of Sino-American coverage during three stages: the global Cold War's demise (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), transitional (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991) and post-Cold War (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993).

In this dissertation, Sino-American relations coverage from two U.S. prestige press newspapers, the New York Times and Washington Post, was compared to Sino-

American relations coverage found in three government publications, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch. Content analysis was used to analyze and compare press and government articles in a similar manner. The study's units of analysis were each article and each month during the study period. The sample consisted of a total of 1,576 articles, 1,177 press articles and 399 government articles. The dissertation's main finding concluded, via basic descriptive statistics and time series analysis, that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor. Ever since the global Cold War containment paradigm began crumbling during the Cold War's demise, each administration has been unable or unwilling to substitute this out-dated Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement. Accordingly, it seems that Cold War demise to post-Cold War administrations have been less successful at setting the press' agenda. In other words, the American press covered Sino-American relations more independently during the Cold War's demise and beyond than during the Cold War itself.

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**Dedicated to my parents, Larry and Sharlene Goodman,
for their love, support and teaching me the value of hard work and perseverance.**

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout most of the Cold War, many scholars have argued that the media have left Sino-American relations policy up to each Cold War administration and its experts (Chang, 1986, 1993). Such scholars argue that the press, instead of performing its watchdog function of critiquing each administration's China policy and objectives, has simply played the role of government "guard dog" (Donohue, Tichenor & Olien, 1995). Since throughout the Cold War world peace and much economic prosperity have hinged on Chinese stability and cooperative Sino-American relations, professional journalists argue that such international relationships have been too important to leave to government experts (Heuvel, 1993; Hadar, 1994). Although scholars tend to agree that during the Cold War news coverage generally lacked government-independent characteristics, some of the few research articles available focusing on news coverage during the break up of the Cold War indicate some significant government-independent characteristics.

In Sino-American relations, the only available studies thus far that have found government-independent Sino-American press coverage during the Cold War's demise have focused on the spring 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement and ordeal (Cheng, 1993; Wang, 1992). The 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement, combined with the dramatic collapse of many communist regimes throughout Eastern

Europe, set off strong democratic waves that not only toppled the Berlin Wall and the former Soviet Union, but marked the beginning of the end of the global Cold War (Cherrington, 1991; Horvat and Szanto, 1993).

Since the break up of the Cold War, many media professionals have been claiming that post Cold War news coverage also possesses government-independent characteristics (Hadar, 1994; Heuvel, 1993). These media professionals describe a brave new world emerging from the rubble of communism, a new, freer world that has been unraveling so quickly that the government and press are simultaneously grappling to make sense of it all. These media professionals are also claiming that the press is rising to this occasion by forging ahead with its own coverage of this new political existence. They claim that unlike their traditional Cold War predecessors, who often relied too heavily on the government's paradigm of the world, this new breed of journalists are turning toward the market place of ideas and making up their own minds about American relations with other countries and covering the news as they see fit.

Although the view that post-Cold War journalists are more self-reliant and less government dependent than their traditional Cold War predecessors is widely supported among media professionals, after an exhaustive literature review this researcher could only find one empirical study partially supporting this claim, a study that just happens to be Sino-American related and deals with both pre-Tiananmen and post-Tiananmen time frames (Huang, 1994).

In an attempt to determine whether professional media claims of more

independent post-Cold War coverage would be supported by a more comprehensive study set up specifically to analyze whether post-Cold War coverage is more government independent than its Cold War counterpart, Goodman (1994) conducted a pilot study of Clinton era post-Cold War news coverage of Sino-American relations in a manner that made possible statistical comparisons between Clinton era findings and previous Cold War press coverage findings determined by Chang (1986). Goodman's content analysis found that prestige press coverage of post-Cold War Clinton policy did indeed seem to possess government-independent characteristics. First, while administrations during the Cold War were able to set the press' Sino-American agenda, the Clinton administration did not seem able to accomplish this goal. In addition, Clinton era coverage seemed to possess more independent characteristics than its Reagan counterpart. In Goodman's (1994) study and throughout this dissertation, independent press coverage is defined as press coverage that does not support and/or reflect Sino-American policy. A lack of support and/or reflection is illustrated by either significant criticism of Sino-American policy, limited or non-existent coverage of official Sino-American statements and activities, press coverage portraying or interpreting official Sino-American policy in a significantly different manner than the government, and/or press coverage focusing on different issues than the government. Also in both studies, official government Sino-American policy is defined as official government publication press releases, announcements and documents focusing on Sino-American topics.

Although Goodman's (1994) study hints that post-Cold War U.S.-China policy

coverage may be more independent than Cold War U.S.-China policy coverage, this study's limited focus on Reagan and Clinton policy coverage was only able to shed a limited amount of light on the Cold War versus post-Cold War issue.

In the wake of a new world order, does Tiananmen Square coverage represent the beginning of more government independent Sino-American press coverage during the global Cold War's demise or merely an isolated issue covered in a government-independent fashion? And if post-Cold War Clinton era Sino-American coverage is truly more government independent than its Cold War counterpart, does seemingly more independent Clinton coverage suggest a continuation of government independent coverage from the global Cold War's demise throughout the post-Cold War era?

In order to fill this current research gap, this present study answered such questions in two ways. First, by empirically examining how Cold War demise to post-Cold War press coverage portrays Sino-American relations compared to corresponding governmental coverage. And second, by longitudinally examining the interaction between the press and government in the Sino-American foreign policy-making process. In this manner, this study shed light on its main inquiry: Is Cold War demise to post-Cold War Sino-American press coverage more government independent than its Cold War predecessor?

This dissertation answered this question, among others, via the following six chapters:

Chapter 1 offered a historical overview of pre-Cold War to post-Cold War Sino-American relations, while chapter 2 described pre-Cold War to post-Cold War

press coverage of Sino-American relations. These chapters found that pre-Cold War and Cold War demise through post-Cold War press coverage tended to be more government independent than Cold War press coverage. They also determined that the three Cold War stages following the Cold War's break up possessed three clearly different levels of government independence. While Cold War demise press coverage was most government independent, transitional coverage was second most government independent and post-Cold War coverage was third.

Chapter 3 explained the interactions between the press and government in foreign policy making and the theories in which these interactions are grounded. It concluded, via agenda-setting theory and Allison's (1971) model of government and press interactions during the foreign policy-making process, that the press plays a limited but important role in influencing foreign policy making and the government's foreign policy agenda.

Chapter 4 described this study's methodology. Although this study describes pre- to post-Cold War coverage, its empirical, quantitative analysis consists of a nine-year longitudinal content analysis of prestige press and government Sino-American coverage from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1993, Reagan's second term in office, to the end of President Clinton's first year in office. This coverage was divided into three Cold War stages: the global Cold War's demise (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), transitional (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991) and post-Cold War (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993). Prestige press coverage was represented by the New York Times and Washington Post. Government coverage

was represented by two presidential publications, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, and one State Department publication, the Department of State Dispatch/Bulletin. All three government publications were combined into one historical Sino-American record in which press coverage was compared. Content analysis was used to analyze and compare press and government articles in a similar manner. The study's units of analysis were each article and each month during the study period. This study's sample consisted of a total of 1,576 articles, 1,177 press articles and 399 government articles.

Chapters 5 and 6 analyzed this study's findings and discussed their significance. This researcher used frequencies, chi-square tables and time series analysis to answer five research questions based on agenda-setting theory. These research questions helped both pinpoint the Cold War stages in which more government-independent press coverage was found and describe the amount and characteristics of such more government-independent press coverage. While research question #1 focused on determining during which time frame press coverage was most government independent, research question #2 dealt with whether the press set the government's agenda or vice versa. Research question #3 dealt with the characteristics of the most government-independent press coverage, while research questions #4 and #5 dealt with comparing government independent press coverage across Cold War periods and administrations.

This study is the first known to determine that Sino-American press coverage

from the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor. Ever since the global Cold War containment paradigm began crumbling during the Cold War's demise, each administration has been unable or unwilling to substitute this outdated Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement. Accordingly, it seems that Cold War demise to post-Cold War administrations have been less successful at setting the press' agenda.

In addition, this study is also the first known to find that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's demise, second most government independent during the transitional period and least government independent during the post-Cold War period. The more government independent coverage during the Cold War's demise and transitional periods, spanning both the Reagan and Bush administrations, was largely attributed to the initial shock waves dispersed by the global community's first recognition of a suddenly approaching new world order. The post-Cold War's less government-independent coverage was attributed to the much less dramatic international recognition of the global Cold War's extinction and the Clinton administration's more positive Sino-American relations and press-government interactions.

This study also found that neither the press nor government set each other's agenda. Accordingly, it suggested that breaking world events themselves may have set both government and press agendas.

Finally, this study discovered that from the Cold War's demise through the

post-Cold War period, the press more successfully covered Sino-American relations in a culturally biased yet watch-dog fashion than during the Cold War.

Chapter 1

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: PRE- TO POST-COLD WAR YEARS

This study examines how independently the U.S. press covered Sino-American relations during the pre-Cold War to post-Cold War eras. Accordingly, a historical review of Sino-American topics dealt with in press coverage during this study's Cold War time frames is in order. (Actual press coverage of Sino-American relations during this study's Cold War time frames will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.)

Pre-Cold War U.S.-China Relations

During the pre-Cold War era, Communist Party attempts in the 1930s and early 1940s to overthrow the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party appeared to receive the most American pre-Cold War press coverage. In addition, the most prominent examples of pre-Cold War Sino-American government-independent coverage focus on this power struggle. During this chaotic, turbulent period in Sino-American relations, the American administration seemed indecisive, confused about how to forge ahead with positive Sino-American relations. Although the American government backed the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), once it appeared that the Communist Party might very well overthrow the KMT it became concerned that it may have backed the wrong party. As detailed in the following chapter, reporters frequently criticized the U.S.

government for what they viewed as its misguided practices and policies during this power struggle. Since it would be difficult to accurately assess just how government independent press coverage of this issue is without some background information on the power struggle itself and the government's position on it, these topics are briefly addressed below.

Seeds of Discontent

In 1928, General Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), helped China gain leverage over its many foreign occupants by unifying China and securing leadership in Peking (Spence, 1990). Since American business interests were based on the need for Chinese stability, America quickly recognized Chiang Kai-shek as China's rightful leader. When the CCP gained enough political clout and popular support to threaten the National Party's standing, a power struggle for Chinese leadership broke out. In 1937, Japan took advantage of this power struggle's resulting chaos by invading China. In what has become known as the Sino-Japanese War (1937 to 1945), the Japanese attempted to rule China. As a result, the National Party and the CCP were temporarily forced to not only call a truce, but to combine forces in order to fend off the Japanese (Spence, 1990). However, soon after the Japanese were defeated in World War II and driven from the Chinese mainland, the power struggle between the two Chinese parties quickly rekindled and sparked the Chinese Civil War (1945 to 1949).

U.S. Involvement in the Nationalist vs. Communist Power Struggle

Four years before the Chinese Civil War broke out, when Japan attacked Pearl

Harbor (1941), the American government became involved in the Nationalist vs. Communist power struggle. When America entered World War II, China, ruled by Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party, became an American ally. The U.S. government kept close official contact with Chiang Kai-shek in order to monitor the war from the Far East. America's war-time support of the Nationalist government was best illustrated by the appointment of General Joseph Stilwell as Chiang Kai-shek's chief-of-staff (Sutter, 1978).

Although the fact that the U.S. government assigned a military general as Chiang Kai-shek's chief-of-staff illustrates its support of the ruling Nationalist Party during this pre-Cold War period, this act does not mean that the American government placed Sino-American policy at the top of its priority list. On the contrary, Theodore White (1978), a prominent China hand who devoted his life to reporting about China, viewed the appointment of General Joseph Stilwell as Chiang Kai-shek's chief-of-staff as an example of President Roosevelt's tendency to consider Sino-American policy a low priority item. After all, White argued, Roosevelt handed China over to the military. White (1978) wrote:

Roosevelt knew that a President must set priorities, and with all the pressure of a clamorous world on him, as well as war strategies, domestic politics, Congress, Churchill, deGaulle, Stalin and Tito, Roosevelt set China at a very low priority in his thinking. It was a military matter, to be handed over to military men - with no reaching beyond combat considerations to the problems of politics and policy (p. 136).

Even though Roosevelt tried to solve the China power struggle in an apolitical fashion, Stilwell understood "that no fighting army could be created in China without changing the politics of China" (White, 1978, p. 136). White (1978) claims Chiang

Kai-shek turned out to be a weak leader, a leader unable to overcome corruption within his own army. Stilwell was frustrated that Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be more afraid of Mao's Communists than of the Japanese invaders, against whom Stilwell was supposed to lead the Chinese Army. White (1978, p. 179) quoted Stilwell as claiming "every major blunder of this war (Sino-Japanese) is directly traceable to Chiang Kai-shek" and that "China had a government, recognized by America, which did not govern." White (1978) agreed:

It would have been better for China, for America and for the world had Chiang been removed from China's leadership in time. There might then have been some hope of a Chinese leadership more humane, less hostile, just as effective yet more tolerant than the one that succeeded Chiang (p. 179).

Since Stilwell's negative views toward Chiang Kai-shek and vice versa made it near impossible for these two men to effectively work together, Roosevelt eventually was forced to remove Stilwell from office in order to placate Chiang Kai-shek (White, 1978).

The U.S.-Nationalist alliance led to CCP antagonism toward America. Once the CCP eventually won the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and overthrew the Nationalist government, the stage was rapidly set for more than three decades of hostile Sino-American Cold War relations.

U.S.-China Relations and Global Cold War to Post-Cold War Time Frames

Since Cold War era Sino-American relations can not be adequately explained without considering their U.S.-Soviet roots, a brief review of the Cold War's impact on U.S.-Soviet policy and, in turn, Sino-American relations is in order. Once Sino-American relations are put into context, the groundwork for understanding U.S. press

coverage of Cold War Sino-American relations will be set.

U.S.-Soviet Roots

Although Cold War politics greatly affected Sino-American relations, the Cold War itself was based on U.S.-Soviet relations (Sullivan, 1992). During the Cold War, especially in the beginning, American relations with any nation-state were often based more on whether such relations would advance U.S. and Soviet goals than on any other consideration. America's strong desire to use other countries to help achieve U.S. and Soviet goals was probably most evident in the case of China. After all, China's emerging superpower status placed Beijing in a unique geopolitical and ideological Beijing-Washington-Moscow triangle (Zagoria, 1991). Accordingly, China, outside of the superpowers themselves, possessed the most power to influence U.S.-Soviet relations. Whenever possible, the American government took advantage of China's power to "deter and discomfort the Soviet Union" (Sullivan, 1992, p. 4). China's tendency to constantly alter its allegiance between America and the Soviet Union, depending on its political and economic needs of the moment, led to its characterization as the "wild card" of U.S.-Soviet relations. Throughout most of the Cold War, America and the Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to strike up a private, predominant China alliance in hopes of tipping the bipolar geopolitical scale in their favor (Sullivan, 1992).

Global Cold War to Post-Cold War Time Frames

In order to determine the impact of Cold War time frames on U.S. press coverage of Sino-American relations, Cold War to post-Cold War time frames must

first be determined. While most researchers tend to agree on when the Cold War began, two schools of thought debate when the Cold War actually ended.

Accordingly, this study was carefully designed to avoid confusing Cold War and post-Cold War coverage. This study accomplishes this goal, as explained below, by creating a transitional time frame that deals with coverage falling into the grey area dividing Cold War and post-Cold War coverage.

Global Cold War Time Frame

Most political scientists and historians seem to agree that the end of World War II, Sept. 2, 1945, marked the official beginning of the Cold War (Hill, 1993; Talbott, 1991/92; Lindsay, 1955). For more than 40 years, countries worldwide viewed international politics according to the Cold War paradigm. This paradigm viewed the world as being divided into two major camps: the Soviet Union's Eastern communist camp and America's Western democratic camp. In addition, Cold War theorists argued that bipolar balance between the two superpowers was necessary in order to obtain world security (Steel, 1992). After all, the Cold War's infamous arms race, in which super rivals stockpiled conventional and nuclear weapons, made it possible for either camp to destroy the other. Since both superpowers viewed each other as expansionist, they viewed military confrontation as inevitable. Accordingly, the world community feared that at any time this bipolar balance could be seriously disrupted, thus resulting in nuclear warfare and possible worldwide destruction (Steel, 1992). This fear of expansionism and nuclear destruction underlined each nation's Cold War foreign policy.

According to American Cold War foreign policy, this balance of power could only be achieved in two ways. First, by stabilizing Europe and keeping Western Europe under its sphere of influence. And second, by "containing" the Soviet Union's sphere of influence (Lindsay, 1955). In order to stabilize Europe, an integrated Europe was needed. However, a stable, integrated Europe could not hope to be built unless post-war Germany was kept in check.

The Cold War did not begin to wind down until 1986 when former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev told the Soviet congress that the Cold War must end and vowed to take the necessary steps to bring it to a halt (Garthoff, 1992). Gorbachev's decision was based on his realization that communism had left the Soviet Union in economic and political ruin. He argued that the Soviet Union could not continue to survive without fully recognizing the world community's interdependence and the need for the former U.S.S.R to become actively involved in world trade and economic activities.

During the next four to six years, Gorbachev's actions set off a chain reaction that led to the end of the Cold War (Garthoff, 1992). Gorbachev called for the banning of all nuclear weapons, greatly reduced the Soviet armory, withdrew all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, encouraged the ouster of the aged communists in Eastern Bloc countries, accepted the independence of Eastern Bloc countries, discarded the Warsaw Pact, pulled the Soviet military out of Eastern Europe and supported plans to destroy the Berlin Wall and reunify Germany. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe eliminated the Soviet threat to Western Europe. Accordingly, a restored, unified

Europe, was placed, as in pre-Cold War years, onto center stage in the international political arena. In 1991, the December 8 collapse of the Soviet Union and the December 25 Gorbachev resignation and condemnation of the communist system made it clear that the Soviet Union had faded into oblivion (Hill, 1993). Once the Soviet superpower ceased to exist, a continuing Cold War battle between the Soviets and Americans became an impossibility.

The Global Cold War Ends

Although political science and history experts agree that the above chain of events was instrumental in leading to the Cold War's destruction, the majority seem to avoid pinpointing when exactly the Cold War ended. However, of those experts attempting to pinpoint the Cold War's finale, they seem to follow one of two major camps or schools of thought. Each camp argues that the Cold War officially ended with one of two major events: the destruction of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) or the fall of the Soviet Union (December 8, 1991) and/or Gorbachev's resignation (December 25, 1991) (Rupieper, 1990; Steel, 1992; Zagoria, 1991; Hill, 1993; Garthoff, 1992; Talbott, 1991/92; Marshall, 1992; Mandelbaum, 1990/91; Sullivan, 1992; Lampton, 1991).

The Berlin Wall Falls

Those supporting the Berlin Wall school of thought argue that after the fall of 1989, when the Soviet Union's Eastern Bloc sphere of influence came to an end, only one major Cold War stumbling block remained to re-unifying Europe: the Berlin Wall (Marshall, 1992). Once the Berlin Wall was officially destroyed on German

Reunification Day, November 9, 1989, Europe was reunified and Soviet influence in the Eastern Bloc became minimal. Accordingly, any remaining American fears of expansionist Soviet influence were laid to rest. Once Europe was reunified, the main struggle that led to the Cold War, each superpower's attempt to gain predominant influence in a divided Europe, became irrelevant. Accordingly, the Berlin Wall camp argues that the Berlin Wall's destruction marked not only the end of this struggle, but the end of the Cold War itself (Mandelbaum, 1990/91; Garthoff, 1992; Rupieper, 1990).

The Soviet Union Dissolves and Gorbachev Resigns

Although the second school of thought acknowledges that the destruction of the Berlin Wall was the beginning of the end of the Cold War, it argues that this episode did not end the Cold War. On the contrary, this camp argues that the Cold War did not officially end until more than two years later, either on December 8, 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved, or December 25, 1991, when Gorbachev resigned from office and condemned the communist system and President Bush credited Gorbachev for ending the Cold War (Zagoria, 1991; Steel, 1992; Talbott, 1991/92; Hill, 1993). After all, once the Soviet Union ceased to exist, it was no longer possible for any relations between the Soviet Union and America to continue. In other words, the existence of a Cold War battle between the Soviet Union and America became a virtual impossibility.

Those subscribing to the second school of thought seem to have at least partially based their decisions on hindsight. In 1989 the unexpected democratic

Eastern Bloc revolutions and the destruction of the Berlin Wall may have seemed to signify the end of the Cold War. However, more than two years later, the even more surprising dissolution of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev resignation and condemnation of the communist system may have appeared to be an even better Cold War finale. Former President Bush's approach to the end of the Cold War is a good example. After the Eastern bloc began to cast off Soviet influence in late 1989 and the Berlin Wall fell, Bush called for "an end to the Cold War for once and for all" (Dennis, Gerbner & Zassoursky, 1991, p. 1). On December 4, 1989, near Malta, in the first ever joint news conference with Soviet and American chiefs-of-state, Gorbachev was asked by the press to respond to this request. Gorbachev said that he and Bush had discussed the Cold War and have both agreed that it was indeed over. He said: "We stated, both of us, the world leaves one epoch of Cold War, and enters another epoch" (Dennis, Gerbner & Zassoursky, 1991, p. 1). However, more than two years later, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's resignation, Bush, on Christmas Day, once again stated that the Cold War had just ended and called the Soviet Union's demise a "victory for democracy and freedom" (Hill, 1993).

Regardless of whether the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall or the Soviet Union, both events marked important episodes in the destruction of the Cold War infrastructure or framework.

Designated Global Cold War Time Frames

Since many scholars do not agree on when the global Cold War ended, it remains unclear when Sino-American relations entered into the global post-Cold War

era. If one argues that the global Cold War officially ended as a result of the November 9, 1989, destruction of the Berlin Wall, then post-Cold War Sino-American relations would run from November 10, 1989, up until the present. However, if the global Cold War did not officially end until the December 8, 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union, post-Cold War U.S.-China relations would run from December 9, 1991, up until the present. Finally, if the global Cold War did not officially end until the December 25, 1991, Gorbachev's resignation and condemnation of communism and President Bush's announcement that the global Cold War had ended, post-Cold War U.S.-China relations would run from December 26, 1991, up until the present.

Even President Bush, who was president during the end of the Cold War demise period to the beginning of the post-Cold War era (1989 to 1992), seemed to have a difficult time figuring out just when the Cold War ended. After all, he claimed that the Cold War had ended on two different occasions, both of which were separated by a more than two-year time span: on December 4 during talks with Gorbachev in Malta and on Christmas Day, 1991, after Gorbachev's resignation and condemnation of the communist system.

The time frame of post-Cold War relations can not be determined until this issue is at least temporarily resolved. Since the Cold War did not just suddenly end on a given date -- over several years a string of often turbulent and unpredictable events brought the Cold War crashing down --, this study will consider the official "end" of the Cold War a finale of events, not a singular episode. Accordingly, all

Sino-American issues or events occurring from November 10, 1989, to December 24, 1991, will belong to a transitional period. Only those studies analyzing U.S. relations beginning on December 26, 1991, up until the present will belong to the post-Cold War period.

Regardless of the exact timing of the Cold War's collapse, administrations during this study's Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War time frames experienced the fall out or impact to varying degrees. The first signs of the Cold War's collapse were most dramatically experienced in this study's Cold War demise period (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), during Reagan's second term, which was characterized by massive growth in Sino-American business ventures, and during the Bush administration's first year, with mainly the Tiananmen Square incident. The Cold War continued unraveling, perhaps less feverishly, throughout this study's transitional period (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991), which also took place during the Bush administration. During this transitional time frame, the impact of the Tiananmen incident continued to deteriorate Sino-American relations. During this study's post Cold War era (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993), the end of the Bush and beginning of the Clinton administration, the Cold War appeared to be over.

However, the impact of the Cold War's several-year collapse remained clear: As was true from the Cold War demise period to the post-Cold War era, no post-Cold War administration was successfully able to substitute the Cold War's all-encompassing, comprehensive paradigm of international relations with an adequate,

updated replacement. In other words, a post-Cold War paradigm of foreign policy was not supplied to journalists, leaving a void where a comprehensive view of America's policy goals in the international arena used to exist (Hadar, 1994; Heuvel, 1993). Accordingly, since the government did not clearly outline a comprehensive view of Sino-American relations, journalists would not be able to reflect government policy even if they wanted to. Thus, out of necessity, the press may have been forced to come to many of its own conclusions about Sino-American relations. After all, this researcher has found that post-Cold War coverage, like its Cold War demise and transitional predecessors, possesses independent characteristics (see following chapter). Independent press coverage is defined as press coverage that does not support and/or reflect Sino-American policy. A lack of support and/or reflection of Sino-American policy is illustrated by either significant criticism of Sino-American policy, limited or non-existent coverage of official Sino-American statements and activities, press coverage portraying or interpreting official Sino-American policy in a significantly different manner than the government, and/or press coverage focusing on different issues than the government. Official government Sino-American policy is defined as official government press releases, announcements and documents focusing on Sino-American topics.

Now that this study's Cold War time frames have been specified, Sino-American relations can be examined within a global Cold War context.

U.S.-China Relations: The Cold War Years

During the Cold War most studies examining U.S. press coverage of Sino-

American relations dealt with issues concerning the U.S. government's attempts at normalization, a re-establishment of Sino-American relations. Accordingly, a brief review of the U.S. government's approach to normalization is in order. After all, since it would be difficult to accurately assess just how government independent press coverage of this issue is without some background information on the normalization process itself, this topic is briefly addressed below.

The Normalization Process

On Oct. 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung, head of the Communist Party, proclaimed victory in the Chinese Civil War and founded the People's Republic of China. When President Truman refused to recognize the Chinese communist regime as China's legitimate leadership, the Communists expelled American reporters and citizens from mainland China and cut off official Sino-American relations. The U.S. government responded to this expulsion by attempting to contain China and imposing a trade embargo. It was not until two decades later, in the early 1970s, that the U.S. government began re-establishing official Sino-American relations. While President Nixon and the Shanghai Communique were largely responsible for re-opening China to the West, it was not until the Carter administration that Sino-American relations were once again officially recognized.

After winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China, kicked out American reporters and citizens alike and severed Sino-American relations. American policy toward China immediately began focusing on "isolating and containing" China (Chang, 1986, p.43). As a result of this

policy, in December of 1950 the Truman administration announced a complete trade embargo with China, which lasted for 21 years. During the Nixon administration, the Shanghai Communique not only pledged to continue supporting Sino-American normalization, but officially conceded that only one legitimate China existed -- China, not Taiwan. This statement was a breakthrough in Sino-American relations (Schaller, 1979). Written in an affirmative, friendly tone, it marked a new beginning in Sino-American relations even though major issues still separated both nations (Schaller, 1979). On December 15, 1978, President Carter addressed the American people with an announcement that America and the People's Republic of China "have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979" (Schaller, 1979, p.190). The American government acknowledged Peking as the sole legal capital of China, thus breaking off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Cold War Demise Period

During the Cold War's four-year finale, the government's hegemonic Cold War paradigm of the world began crumbling without a comprehensive, understandable replacement paradigm to take its place (Hadar, 1994). Since the U.S. government's paradigm of the world substantially changed from the Cold War proper to the Cold War's finale, this study will consider the Cold War finale as distinct from the Cold War time frame. This newly specified Cold War time frame will be referred to as the Cold War demise period.

For purposes of this study, the global Cold War demise took place from the beginning of Reagan's second term throughout much of Bush's first year in

office (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), when the Tiananmen Square uprising and incident took place.

Although many Sino-American issues were frequently covered during the Cold War's demise, such as American arm sales to Taiwan and Chinese arms sales to developing countries, the Tiananmen Square uprising and incident appeared to receive the most New York Times and Washington Post coverage. In addition, most press studies during the Cold War's demise dealing with the issue of press independence appeared to focus on the Tiananmen Square ordeal. Since it would be difficult to accurately assess just how government independent press coverage of this issue is without some background information on this issue and the government's position on it, this topic is briefly addressed below.

Reagan's Cold War Demise Policy

During Reagan's second term, the following occurrences illustrated the beginning of the Cold War demise's impact on Sino-American relations: First, Reagan to a great extent relinquished his Cold War support of Taiwan in favor of the People's Republic of China, though during his previous presidential campaign one of his strongest campaign promises was his continued vigorous support of the Taiwan Nationalist government (Copper, 1992); second, he abruptly toned down his anti-communism rhetoric, which formerly was a theme of his administration's foreign policy objectives (Schaller, 1992); and third, Reagan increased Sino-American trade to its highest point since the re-establishment of Sino-American relations in the late 1970s (Sutter, 1978).

Perhaps Reagan began realizing that his foreign policy, driven by the overriding goal to contain communism, was rapidly becoming obsolete, and thus began tempering his Cold War goals with pragmatic actions. As Schaller (1992) found, "Reagan's gut anti-communism did not prevent him from muting his feelings and acting pragmatically when required" (pp. 125-126). For example, Schaller pointed to Reagan's 180-degree turn-around on the Taiwan issue, from dealing with Taiwan as an independent country to accepting Taiwan as a satellite of mainland China. In addition, Reagan's tendency to stray from anti-communist rhetoric and ideology whenever it was politically and economically viable to do so seemed to be illustrated in his push to build Sino-American trade, such as American computer technology and wheat sales to China.

The above examples suggest that the Reagan administration understood that the Cold War was rapidly declining and, accordingly, the global Cold War containment, anti-communist paradigm was rapidly becoming outdated. The Reagan administration also, from a practical standpoint, saw that business opportunities in China were perhaps never better. However, still wanting to hold onto its global Cold War paradigm and not knowing how to reconcile its anti-communist mentality with promoting a potentially booming Sino-American market, Reagan policy toward Sino-American relations seemed to teeter between a disintegrating Cold War containment approach and pro-business philosophy. The Reagan administration's unwillingness and/or inability to replace the global Cold War paradigm with a more accurate one representing the Cold War's collapse left America, and much of the world, without a

clear picture of the state of international relations between nation-states, let alone Sino-American relations. Reagan administration actions continued teetering between contradictory containment and business interests. As a result of these mixed messages, the American public and press seemed to have a difficult time assessing the impact of the Cold War's demise on the international community, let alone Sino-American relations.

On the one hand, the Reagan administration approached Sino-American policies from a traditional global Cold War containment paradigm -- it struggled to limit communist world-wide influence by pressuring the Chinese to limit its sales of silkworm missiles and nuclear technology to American adversaries, such as Iraq; it struggled to limit China's nuclear arsenal; and it struggled to limit what it viewed to be China's human rights' abuses, such as its rigorous one-child per family policy and government crackdowns on peaceful Tibetan demonstrations for independence.

On the other hand, the Reagan administration heavily promoted Sino-American trade. As Sutter (1978) noted, "[Sino-American] Trade ties grew to an annual turnover of \$13 billion in 1988. Aside from Hong Kong, the United States (became) China's most important source of investment" (p. 241).

The Reagan administration's clashing, contradictory attempts to contain and condemn what it considered to be negative communist tendencies, such as human rights abuses, while promoting Sino-American trade often led to strained Sino-American relations and U.S. press criticism. For example, although the Reagan administration criticized the Chinese government for its often violent crackdowns on

peaceful Tibetan demonstrations for Tibetan independence from China, it still heavily promoted Sino-American trade. China reacted to such criticism by condemning the U.S. government for meddling in its internal affairs, while the New York Times and Washington Post widely criticized the U.S. government for its business-as-usual attitude toward Beijing while Beijing engaged in massive human rights abuses toward the Tibetan people.

The Reagan administration's legacy of contradictory containment and pro-business policies and an inability and/or unwillingness to replace the traditional Cold War paradigm with an adequate, updated Cold War demise version seemed to be passed down to the Bush administration.

Bush's Cold War Demise Policy

Regardless of when the Cold War truly ended, the fact that President Bush's administration seemed just as confused as everyone else about the time frame surrounding the Cold War's collapse may have influenced his Sino-American policy. This confusion was perhaps at least partially responsible for Bush's reluctance and/or inability to create a comprehensive, solid Sino-American policy framework during the Cold War demise period.

Once the "overlay" of U.S.-Soviet relations began being lifted from U.S.-China policy, Bush and foreign policy experts struggled to evaluate Sino-American relations during his administration (1989 to 1992) on a more independent basis (Segal, 1992). Since Sino-American policy was no longer being considered an integral part of U.S.-Soviet relations, its future success would depend on how snugly it could fit into

a yet-to-be-determined, comprehensive framework of international relations (Lampton, 1991). Lampton (1991) argues that since the Bush administration was never able to come up with a global strategy in which Sino-American interests played an important part, Bush was in no position to determine what U.S.-China interests would best serve America. Lampton (1991) explains:

The United States can have no consensus on China policy until it has a clear global strategy ... and until there is a clearly defined role for China within it. Until such a framework exists, United States-China relations will be characterized by a cascade of ad-hoc responses to a continual stream of discrete irritants (pp. 149-150).

Bush's lack of a comprehensive framework also seemed to account for his lack of direction in Sino-American relations (Tow, 1991). Since he did not possess any overall strategy toward dealing with global concerns or Sino-American relations -- the Cold War "containment" strategy no longer worked and Bush could not find an adequate replacement --, he merely focused on obtaining two China-related goals: maintaining stability and cooperation in Sino-American relations and promoting human rights (Tow, 1991). Unfortunately, the Tiananmen Square ordeal seems to suggest that Bush was not able to achieve either goal. Perhaps if he had possessed a global strategy, he would have understood not only what China policies were most important to American interests, but how to best achieve them.

According to many scholars, Bush's Sino-American policy was doomed to failure since conflicts between American and Chinese interests during his administration were inevitable and human rights could not be promoted without stirring up even more conflict (Talbot, 1991/92; Tow, 1991). In other words, the

contradictory nature of his two major foreign policy goals invited failure. In addition, the Bush policy's unrealistic focus on maintaining cooperative relations at all costs gave the Chinese the ultimate advantage. The Chinese government took advantage of Bush's aim to please by threatening conflict whenever Bush did not meet its needs. As a result, since such conflict made it look as if Bush's foreign policy objectives were failing, Bush was often pressured into meeting Chinese demands.

Events surrounding the Tiananmen Square incident are a key example of why Bush's superficial "short-term, day-to-day" policy did not work (Oksenberg, 1989, p. 146). Although Bush publicly reacted to the Tiananmen Square ordeal by condemning the Chinese government for its human rights abuses, he secretly sent representatives to China to beg the Chinese to behave. In so doing, Bush allowed the Chinese once again to gain the upper-hand in the relationship. When the American public eventually learned of the secret conciliatory Scowcroft Mission to China, it was outraged. The resulting backlash made it even more difficult for Bush to gain enough public support to achieve his U.S.-China policy objectives.

The Tiananmen Square Ordeal

Since U.S. press coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen Square ordeal represents perhaps the strongest example of government-independent press coverage during the Cold War's demise (see following chapter for details), a brief review of this occurrence is in order.

The most recent Tiananmen Square ordeal (1989) grew out of a lack of Chinese democratic reform, run-away inflation and the decreasing standard of living.

In 1987, Chinese students marched on Tiananmen Square to demand increased democratic freedom. Although this march was quickly crushed by government officials, the pressures that caused it kept building. This pressure reached an all-time high when Hu Yaobang, a Communist official demoted for his open sympathy for student concerns, died April 13, 1989. He died near the anniversary of the May Fourth (1919) Movement, a movement in which students sought the same type of democratic reform being sought by students during the Cold War demise period -- nearly 70 years later. The students' anger at the government's lack of an apology for not returning Hu Yaobang to his rightful leadership role before his death, combined with their anger over the government's reluctance to instigate any meaningful democratic reform over the past 70 years, set the stage for the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement. The knowledge of Gorbachev's upcoming historical diplomatic visit to China to improve relations between both countries further fueled the student movement. Student leaders knew the world would be watching this summit meeting and took advantage of the international media's presence by successfully stealing the limelight from Gorbachev and, via marches and hunger strikes, emotionally illustrating their struggle for democracy to the international community.

As the world watched with horror, what began as a peaceful student movement ended about two months later with a government crackdown on June 3/4 1989. Although the Cold War "containment" paradigm seems to have begun grinding to a halt as early as the beginning of the Cold War transitional period, the Tiananmen Square incident illustrated one of the first and most dramatic preludes to the global

Cold War's demise. President Bush's response to the incident was critical, but lackluster.

The Bush administration responded to the ordeal by issuing diplomatic and trade sanctions, while Congress called for eliminating China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Most of the Bush administration's Tiananmen Square sanctions were rescinded within a six-month period, and Congress proved unable to abolish China's MFN status. A large segment of the American media, including the New York Times and Washington Post, lambasted Bush for what they called a business-as-usual approach to Sino-American relations in the wake of what many referred to as a massacre of peacefully demonstrating students and citizens. The press criticized the Bush administration for being much more concerned with not angering the Chinese government than retaliating against it for a massive human rights atrocity. Regardless of whether or not President Bush responded to the Tiananmen Square ordeal in an appropriate fashion, immediately following the Tiananmen Square incident Sino-American relations became especially strained.

U.S. Government Transitional Policy

Although both the Reagan and Bush administrations were in power during the Cold War's demise, during the transitional era (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991) only the Bush administration was in office. During this transitional period perhaps the best example of how Bush's lack of a comprehensive strategy hampered all of his U.S. foreign policy objectives, not just those related to China, deals with the early 1991 Persian Gulf War. During this 40-day war, the lack of a policy

framework interfered with Bush objectives. Mandelbaum (1990/1991) claims that Bush's inability or reluctance to create a framework made it difficult, at least initially, for Bush to gain public support for the Gulf War. After all, the American public was reluctant to rally behind a war without understanding why it should be fought. As Mandelbaum explains (1990/91):

In the absence of a Soviet threat the Bush administration floundered in finding a public justification for its military buildup in the Persian Gulf ... To rally public support for a continuing American ... presence abroad, what is needed is what this administration notably lacks: vision -- the capacity to paint a vivid, convincing picture of the new world and America's interest in it (p. 14).

Bush's Sino-American Transitional Policy

During this transitional time frame, the Bush administration's Sino-American policy objectives seemed to be plagued by both the Tiananmen Square ordeal and the MFN controversy, both of which are briefly discussed below.

Tiananmen Square

During this transitional period, the Bush administration seemed more interested in repairing Sino-American relations in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident than with determining how Sino-American relations would fit into the new world order. Bush sent dignitaries such as Henry Kissinger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to meet with Chinese leaders in hopes of reinvigorating Sino-American relations. As was the case during the Tiananmen Square incident itself, many journalists, congressmen and citizens criticized such Bush actions as being too conciliatory, too soon. The Tiananmen Square ordeal, with its civilians single-handedly facing down Chinese tanks and soldiers, was one of the most memorable,

highly emotional events of 1989. Although Bush seemed to want nothing more than to put Tiananmen Square behind him and return to conducting Sino-American business as usual, the American press and public seemed hesitant, unwilling to do either.

While Bush continued trying to return to more friendly pre-Tiananmen Square Sino-American relations, the Chinese did not seem to make his job any easier. Many Chinese activities during this time frame were considered undesirable by the U.S. government and press alike. For example, after the Tiananmen Square incident China continued to punish and mistreat pro-democracy dissidents, many of whom were associated with the 1989 demonstrations.

Most-Favored-Nation Controversy

The Tiananmen Square ordeal sparked the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) controversy, a controversy over whether to continue permitting China to receive the lowest available tariffs on exports to the United States. The deadline for the annual renewal of China's MFN trading status coincided with the Tiananmen Square ordeal, a government crackdown on citizens peacefully demonstrating for democratic reforms. Since renewal of MFN was contingent on improved Chinese human rights policies, public opinion and many congressional leaders opposed MFN renewal in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident. After all, this incident represented a significant, violent Chinese crackdown on the human right perhaps most cherished by Americans -- freedom of speech.

When Bush began arguing for renewal of China's MFN status in spite of the Tiananmen Square ordeal -- he claimed that the best way to improve China's human

rights policy was to maintain normal American influence on Chinese society via normal commerce and trade contacts --, congressional and press criticism was harsh. More than nineteen congressional hearings directly challenged the president's MFN philosophy, along with numerous press articles. Despite public outcry, the Bush administration soon took advantage of its presidential prerogative to renew MFN status. However, after MFN was approved, public and press criticism continued being voiced. Bush's attempts to maintain normal Sino-American relations after the Tiananmen incident, as illustrated with his MFN decision, led to public and press criticism of his Sino-American policy throughout his administration.

Clinton's Post-Cold War Relations

This study's post-Cold War time frame takes place during the Clinton administration. While the Bush administration supported American business interests in China, the Clinton administration has made stimulating the American economy via U.S.-China business ventures its No. 1 Sino-American policy objective. The Clinton administration, unlike the Bush administration, has also attempted to lend credibility to this objective by placing it within a broader global strategy: the "enlargement" of "market democracies" via "enhanced engagement" (Awanohara, 1994, p. 19). This attempt to define post-Cold War strategy illustrates the Clinton administration's recognition that an effective global strategy is essential for defining and promoting American interests. However, critics claim that the Clinton administration has yet to explain this strategy in any meaningful detail (Awanohara, 1994; Kaye, 1994; Chanda, 1993). They argue that "enlargement" of "market democracies" via

"enhanced engagement," unlike "containment," does not seem to offer a useful theory of American international relations that would help promote American interests abroad. Ironically, Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, has admitted that this global strategy is still in the idea phase. He admits that this strategy is "certainly a framework of principles ... [that] need to be translated into actions in Asia that aren't seen as interference in internal affairs (Awanohara, 1994, p. 18).

Clinton's Sino-American Post-Cold War Relations

China's Most Favored Nation status, and the human rights concerns it represents, remained a major U.S. government concern during the post-Cold War era. Since the Clinton administration's main Sino-American foreign policy objective is to take advantage of the growing Chinese market, Clinton took a new approach to MFN and China's human rights abuses. Until recently, the American government tied the annual renewal of China's MFN status to an improved Chinese human rights record. Clinton has changed this procedure by officially eliminating human rights considerations from MFN renewal procedures. Clinton justified this act by stating that terminating China's MFN trade status would be more destructive to China's human rights than granting it. Clinton argues that increased Chinese exposure to Western capitalism and ideology will do more to educate the Chinese people about the need for improved human rights than anything else. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen backed up Clinton's claim by stating: "[Trade] can be the engine of political change" (Awanohara, 1994, p. 19).

Although Clinton's decision to separate human rights concerns from MFN

renewal drew criticism from Congress, the press and the public, this criticism appeared to be much milder and less frequent than Bush administration MFN-related criticism. Perhaps milder Clinton criticism dealt with the fact that by time Clinton came to office the Tiananmen Square incident was no longer a fresh wound -- it was a 4-year-old memory. In addition, during the post-Cold War era America was actively pursuing a massive amount of international trade, a policy that Americans applauded.

Although the Clinton administration seems most interested in improving the American economy via Chinese markets, it is also attempting to influence several China-related issues (Chanda, 1993). In an ad-hoc, day-to-day approach, the Clinton administration is attempting to convince China to quit selling long- and medium-range missiles and transferring nuclear technology to unstable countries and American adversaries, such as Syria and Iran; to help in halting the North Koreans from making nuclear weapons and stabilizing the Korean Peninsula; and to keep China from expanding its territory into the South China Sea.

Chapter 2

AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRE-COLD WAR TO POST-COLD WAR COVERAGE

This chapter fulfills a dual purpose: First, it describes the degree of independence demonstrated by American press coverage of Sino-American relations throughout the pre-Cold War to post-Cold War eras. And second, it draws parallels between the American press' degree of independence during different Cold War periods. It then concludes that pre-Cold War press coverage and press coverage after the Cold War (Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War coverage) tended to be government independent, while press coverage during the height of the Cold War tended to be government dependent. As explained throughout this chapter, more independent coverage before and after the Cold War may be due to a lack of a comprehensive, understandable government paradigm or view of the world during these time frames. In other words, the government's lack of a compelling, easy-to-follow view of international relations both before and after the Cold War seemed to have pressured journalists covering international relations to make more independent assessments of relations between nation-states. On the contrary, during the Cold War era the government's clear cut paradigm of the world -- its East vs. West road map of international affairs -- seems to not only have been accepted by many journalists but seems to also have resulted in less independent press coverage. After all, since many

Cold War journalists adopted this paradigm as their own, it is not surprising that press coverage of American foreign policy tended to echo and share official government approaches and perspectives instead of challenging them.

This chapter explores the degree of government independence demonstrated by Sino-American press coverage throughout the Cold War periods in three steps. First, during each Cold War period it briefly describes the degree of press independence demonstrated by American press coverage of international issues at large and then places American press coverage of Sino-American relations in context. (Since American press coverage of Sino-American relations is especially limited after the Cold War time frame, this chapter's brief examination of American coverage of foreign affairs is helpful.) Second, American press coverage of Sino-American relations is characterized as predominantly either government independent or government dependent. And third, conclusions about the degree of government-independent coverage practiced by the press in each Cold War time frame are compared and contrasted across Cold War time frames.

Pre-Cold War American Press Coverage

As described below, pre-Cold War American press coverage of various foreign affairs issues, specifically Sino-American relations, demonstrated government independent coverage. Independent Sino-American coverage was attributed to the press' apparent lack of confidence in the government's understanding of Sino-American relations and the manner in which it handled them. Since the government did not offer the press a credible, solid paradigm of pre-Cold War Sino-American

coverage, the press became more self-reliant in its coverage in an attempt to educate the government and public alike about the reality and importance of Sino-American relations. (For more details on this theory, see chapter 3.)

Pre-Cold War Coverage

A limited amount of available studies on pre-Cold War American press coverage of foreign affairs analyzed the following: isolated American diplomatic activities, such as the Yalta Conference and the Marshall Mission to China; wars, such as the Sino-Japanese War and World War I; features on major foreign political figures, such as Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek; and U.S. government attitudes toward the Cold War and the Soviet Union (Liebovich, 1988; Aronson, 1970; Elson, 1968; Elson, 1973). The above works were all located in books and dissertations, not in scholarly communication journals. The predominant scholarly journalism journal in the pre-Cold War years, Journalism Quarterly, focused most of its pre-Cold War foreign affairs attention on introductions to various foreign press systems.

Several of these pre-Cold War press coverage studies indicate that the press often reported independently of official U.S. foreign policy views. Liebovich (1988), Hohenberg (1968) and Bibber (1969) found that pre-Cold War coverage in several American newspapers and magazines often promoted viewpoints in direct opposition to official foreign policy. Bibber (1969) also discovered that pre-Cold War American newspaper and magazine coverage was much more likely to promote each publisher's political agenda than official U.S. policy.

Liebovich (1988) claims that the press' often government-independent views

were partially due to the government's pre-Cold War era lack of foreign policy direction and its tendency to remain tight-lipped about rapidly changing foreign policy objectives. Liebovich (1988) argues that since many foreign policy objectives were in a state of flux during this era, the government purposefully kept a low profile in order to quietly explore different policy options. Accordingly, even if the American press wanted to merely echo the government's approach toward U.S.-China policy, it would have been extremely difficult to do so.

Several of these pre-Cold War studies also found that the press, at least indirectly, seemed to influence the U.S. government's foreign policy agenda (eg., Liebovich, 1988; Chang, 1986; Byers, 1980). For example, Liebovich (1988) found that the Chicago Tribune's persistent ideological diatribe against the Soviet Union influenced not only opinion leaders, but U.S. government policy as well.

Pre-Cold War Sino-American Coverage

The first American journalists appearing in China to report about China, who began arriving there after World War I, tended to report on China in a government-independent fashion. American journalism in China dates back to about July 6, 1928, when Edgar Snow, a University of Missouri journalism graduate, began his career of covering China in Shanghai (Salisbury, 1990). Although Snow became one of the most prestigious, well-known China reporters of our times, he represented one of many fellow Missouri graduates who went to China for romance and adventure. According to Salisbury, these reporters were young, idealist and driven by the romance of independent inquiries and discoveries. They embarked on reporting

adventures in China with not only few preconceptions or in-depth knowledge of China, but limited intentions of turning to either official information from Chinese or American government sources. Their biggest goal was to discover China on their own terms -- to understand it in a way that no one else could -- and to educate both the Chinese and Americans on their findings.

As Salisbury (1990) explained:

These young journalists played little or no role in American policy. They often shunned official contact. They came to China not for politics or high commerce, but for romance and adventure. These reporters, by and large, shared American ignorance of China. Their image of the country was whetted by some memories of the Clipper trade and Yankee commerce with the China coast and by benevolent attitudes springing from the vast American missionary effort in China, a movement of such scale that its traces can still be seen underlying many American assumptions about China. Many worked for the English-language newspapers of the port cities and sent their reports back to this country [USA]. Thus, we [journalists] became independent sources of information and began to present an independent view of China (p. 31).

The limited number of pre-Cold War studies on American press coverage of Sino-American relations found such coverage was often not only government independent, but influenced government views and policy (e.g., Liebovich, 1988; Chang, 1986; Byers, 1980; Hamilton, 1988).

The most prominent examples of pre-Cold War Sino-American government-independent coverage focus on a chaotic, turbulent period in Sino-American relations in which the American administration seemed indecisive, confused about how to forge ahead with positive Sino-American relations: the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Communists struggled to overthrow KMT rule of China. Although the American government backed the KMT, it became concerned in the early 1940s that it may

have backed the wrong party. In this turbulent, murky period of history, the U.S. administration seemed especially open to any valuable insights or advice. Time publisher and editor Henry Luce and reporters Joseph Alsop and Edgar Snow took advantage of the administration's insecurity by offering it their own input whenever possible.

Liebovich (1988) found that Time publisher Henry Luce independently continued to strongly support Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist party in the 1940s even when the American government began seriously questioning whether it was backing the wrong horse. Liebovich also argues that Time's independent, constant promotion of Chiang Kai-shek was at least partially responsible for the government's decision to stick with the Nationalist party instead of switching its allegiance to the CCP.

Benjamin Bradley claimed that Joseph Alsop, an independent-minded columnist who wrote for the Washington Evening Star from 1937 to 1940, not only wrote his columns for the president of the United States, but helped set the agenda of high level policy meetings. Like Luce, Alsop also feverishly supported the KMT in its struggle with the Communists (Grabavoy, 1988). His many passionate writings on the virtues of the KMT seemed to help influence the administration not only to keep backing the KMT, but to lend it additional support. During the Sino-Japanese War (1937 to 1945), Alsop was able to help convince President Roosevelt that additional military and financial support of the KMT government was necessary in order for the KMT to successfully defeat the Japanese invasion. As a result, Alsop was partially responsible for Roosevelt's decision to send additional aid to the KMT, such as a hundred P-40

fighter planes and a \$100 million loan.

President Roosevelt was so influenced by Alsop's views on the dire need to lend additional support for the KMT during the Japanese invasion that, at Alsop's urging, the president agreed to support the KMT and retired U.S. Army Captain Clair Lee Chennault's plan to strategically bomb Japanese cities. That is, until Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall intervened, claiming that American support of this plan could lead to an American-Japanese war.

Like Luce and Alsop, Edgar Snow, who often wrote for such publications as the Saturday Evening Post, the New York Herald Tribune and Foreign Affairs, also covered China in a government-independent fashion: He dug up news that none of his contemporaries could find, masterfully interpreted these findings, and reported them as he saw fit -- often in sharp contrast to Chinese and American government views. However, unlike Luce and Alsop, during the KMT-Communist confrontation he avidly championed the cause of the Communist Party. Although during this upheaval Snow's support of the Communist Party directly confronted Sino-American policy from both the Chinese and American perspectives, his views on Chinese communism clearly influenced each government's understanding of this emerging political entity.

In 1936 Snow not only discovered that Chinese Communists were not "Red Bandits," as they were portrayed by Nationalists at the time, but a formidable political entity with popular grass-roots backing. His expertise about Chinese Communists was sought out by the Americans and the Chinese alike.

Snow's book on the Chinese communism, Red Star over China, is still today

one of the most read texts on this topic.

In addition, Snow's tendency to play up the CCP's positive qualities while simultaneously downgrading the KMT no doubt helped lead to the Roosevelt administration's confusion over whether it had backed the right political entity in China.

In conclusion, the above-mentioned research suggests that American press coverage of Sino-American relations during the pre-Cold War era was indeed government independent. The lack of a solid, credible government paradigm of pre-Cold War Sino-American relations is credited for the press' determination to cover Sino-American relations in a self-reliant fashion.

Cold War American Coverage

Although American press coverage of foreign affairs and specifically Sino-American relations was government independent during the pre-Cold War era, the press' coverage of these same topics during the Cold War, as described below, was just the opposite: government dependent.

The press' lack of independent Cold War coverage appeared largely due to the government's credible, persuasive view of not only Cold War international relations but Sino-American relations itself. The Cold War government, unlike its pre-Cold War predecessor, appeared to gain acceptance by much of the press. Accordingly, since much of the press seemed to agree with government assessments, it is no surprise that during the Cold War era the press' views of Sino-American relations predominantly echoed government views.

Cold War Coverage

A multitude of studies on Cold War press coverage of American foreign policy indicate that the Cold War press did not independently cover U.S. foreign policy or influence the government's foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, such coverage, written by a press largely in agreement with the government's assessments of Cold War relations, merely echoed each administration's foreign policy framework and objectives (Cohen, 1957; Cooper, 1985; Cozcan, 1979; Ganju, 1975; Hallin, 1984; Kern, Levering & Levering, 1983; Lynch and Effendi, 1964; Osmer, 1980; Shain, 1972; Vilanilam, 1983; Welch, 1972).

Cold War Sino-American Coverage

Soon after the Communist Party took control of the China's government on October 1, 1949, American reporters were expelled from China for, among other reasons, backing the KMT and refusing to accept China's new communist government. (American reporters as a group were not invited back into China until after January 1, 1979, 30 years later, when former President Jimmy Carter officially recognized the legitimacy of the Communist Party and re-established diplomatic relations with China.) As the KMT-CCP power struggle came to a halt, the government-independent American press coverage of Sino-American relations typifying pre-Cold War era coverage began being replaced by the type of government-dependent coverage that would soon characterize Cold War era coverage.

For example, Yu and Riffe (1989) analyzed Time, Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung coverage from October 1949 to

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September 1976, from establishment of CCP rule of China up until the death of Mao in 1976 (Chiang died in 1975). As U.S. government policy began shifting from supporting Taiwan to recognizing China, news coverage views toward Mao mostly began shifting from that of an American arch-enemy to a "semi-ally " (Yu and Riffe, 1989, p. 919). In addition, as time went on favorable news coverage of Mao significantly increased as overall coverage of Taiwan and Chiang decreased. Thus, the news magazines' Sino-American coverage did indeed "follow the flag."

In addition, Yu's (1951) study of four Chicago daily newspapers' coverage of China, immediately proceeding and following the CCP takeover of China, found that all four newspapers covered Sino-American topics more heavily than any purely China topics. Of these Sino-American stories, those focusing on U.S. foreign policy toward China and U.S. officials in China received the most coverage. Accordingly, it appears that the government was able to successfully focus the media's attention on its official agenda.

During the Cold War, the majority of studies on China-related topics during this time frame suggest that the press seemed to demonstrate much stronger "guard-dog" than "watchdog" qualities over government activities and assertions, and the government was much more likely to influence or set the agenda of the press than vice versa (Chen, 1984; Coffey et al., 1974; Chang, 1986; Chang 1993; Ge, 1987; Lin, 1985; Lin and Salwen, 1986). Thus, even though during the Cold War the press at times maintained a limited amount of independent characteristics in coverage, in the majority of studies government influence clearly dominated over press influence.

Although most Cold War press coverage studies were framed around the normalization issue, others looked at additional issues in U.S.-China policy coverage.

For example, Lin and Salwen (1986) analyzed New York Times coverage of normalization of U.S.-China relations, a re-establishing of official relations which, although set in motion after Nixon's visit to China in 1972, became official on January 1, 1979. Normalization was examined via six landmark events. These events began as early as February 3, 1978, when a proposal finalizing normalization was presented, and ended May 15, 1979, when a trade accord between America and China was initialized.

Lin and Salwen found that the New York Times' more neutral tone toward China during these watershed normalization events indicated that the press' tone reflected that of the government's.

Another scholar, Teling Lin (1985), found prestige press coverage of China and Sino-American relations during the Cold War reflected U.S. foreign policy toward China. His study compared New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times coverage to Department of State Bulletin coverage during the 1970s and early 1980s, important historical Sino-American periods. Topics analyzed in this study included the U.S. government's termination of official ties with Taiwan and normalization of relations with China in 1979, and a 1981 major dispute between China and America on the sale of arms to Taiwan.

In addition, Ge (1987) analyzed how Time magazine portrayed China and its citizens in three separate time frames between 1966, when Sino-American relations

were especially strained, up until 1985, when Sino-American relations had improved at the end of a post-normalization period. Ge found that Time coverage of China and Sino-American relations reflected the government's official version of Sino-American ups and downs.

Finally, Chang (1984, 1986, 1989, 1993) has conducted many studies examining various aspects of prestige press coverage of Cold War Sino-American relations. His seminal research on this topic covers continuous prestige press coverage of U.S.-China policy from the Truman administration up until the end of Reagan's first term (1949 to 1984). Chang's longitudinal research on this topic is the only such research available that does not study Sino-American press coverage in a cross-sectional fashion. Chang's content analyses have found that the U.S. administration, specifically the president, set the press' agenda on Sino-American policy issues. Chang concluded that prestige press coverage of Sino-American relations merely echoed government stands.

In conclusion, Sino-American Cold War press coverage was government dependent. Unlike its pre-Cold War predecessor, it tended to echo and support government assertions and initiatives.

Cold War Demise American Coverage

For purposes of this study, Cold War demise coverage deals with coverage taking place during the Cold War's initial four-year finale (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989). During this time frame, the government's hegemonic Cold War paradigm of the world began crumbling without a comprehensive, understandable

replacement paradigm to take its place. The Cold War demise press seemed to react to this lack of government guidance in much the same manner as its pre-Cold War predecessors: by covering foreign relations, specifically Sino-American relations, in a more self-reliant, government-independent fashion (for more details, see the following chapter). Once again, the press seemed to make more independent efforts to understand the new world order (Hadar, 1994). Accordingly, during the height of the Cold War era press coverage was predominantly government dependent while during the Cold War's demise, it was just the opposite: predominantly government independent.

Cold War Demise Coverage

American news coverage of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War demise period demonstrated the press' increasingly government-independent coverage. Studies offering examples of government-independent foreign policy coverage include those dealing with American coverage of U.S. relations with the Middle East, the Philippines, Panama and, as described in the following section, China.

Cold War demise coverage demonstrated independent press initiative and influence over U.S. government policy in a Middle East study dealing with Palestinian uprisings and revolts in occupied Israeli territories. By focusing on Palestinian uprisings in Israel when the U.S. government apparently preferred to remain silent on the topic, the U.S. press impacted U.S. foreign policy by pressuring the government into publicly commenting on this issue (O'Heffernan, 1991). If it were not for the news media's intense, frequent coverage of the Palestinian uprisings

from December 11, 1987 to March 15, 1988, it is doubtful that the U.S. government would have publicly condemned Israel, its closest Middle East ally, for its approach to quieting Palestinian dissent via violence activities such as beatings (O’Heffernan, 1991, p. 30). During these uprisings, Palestinian civilians, many of whom were teenagers, protested against Israeli soldiers for what they described as second-class treatment in their own land. The U.S. government, according to its apparent policy to avoid publicly criticizing Israel, did not comment publicly on these uprisings until the media began publicizing them. O’Heffernan (1991) found that:

Although U.S. officials were aware of the violence before the media reported it, the U.S. did not respond until the day of the first televised reports, and then in the form of a mild White House expression of concern for the treatment of Palestinian youths. This was a direct result of the media coverage ... of soldiers beating teenagers (p. 31).

In 1986 the U.S. press was instrumental in pressuring the Reagan administration to urge President Ferdinand Marcos to relinquish his leadership of the Philippines (Hachten, 1996). The media’s frequent critical coverage of Marcos’ misuse of his country’s funds on personal investments, such as U.S. real estate, and on ballot tampering impacted public opinion and congressional views toward Marcos (Wriston, 1986; Bain, 1986). As press coverage of Marcos’ wrongdoings intensified and helped set the agenda for public opinion and congressional attitudes against Marcos, the Reagan administration seemed to have no option but to respond to mounting criticism of the Marcos regime by urging him to give up his office.

Finally, U.S. news magazine coverage of the Panama Invasion, from May 1989 to January 6, 1990, was critical of U.S. administration policy (Gutierrez-

Villalobos, Hertog and Rush, 1994). This study, which spanned both this dissertation's Cold War demise and transitional period, found that Time and Newsweek substantially disagreed with the administration's tactical approach to carrying out the invasion. In addition, they found that the Nation, an alternative news magazine with a recognized leftist political bias, was "vehemently critical" of administration policy: it openly and persistently challenged both the administration's strategic understanding of the issue and its tactical approach to solving it (Gutierrez-Villalobos, Hertog and Rush, 1994, p. 625).

Sino-American Cold War Demise Coverage

As was the case with U.S. press coverage of foreign affairs during the Cold War demise period, U.S. press coverage of Sino-American relations during this same time frame, specifically Tiananmen Square coverage, was predominantly government independent.

Only one Cold War demise media study mentioned in this section did not deal with the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident: Li's (1992) study of New York Times coverage of American press reactions to Chinese reform from January 1982 to March 1989. Li found that New York Times coverage was government independent in the sense it not only criticized government policy, but suggested alternative government approaches toward Sino-American relations and China in general.

Tiananmen Square Coverage

In addition, all of this dissertation's studies analyzing U.S. press coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and/or incident and comparing this

coverage to official U.S. government Sino-American coverage also have found evidence of government-independent press coverage (Cheng, 1993; Wang, 1992, Huang, 1994).

Cheng (1993) found that press coverage of Bush administration U.S.-China policy during and immediately following the Tiananmen Square incident did not predominantly echo government views. The government-independent press coverage seemed to be a result of the Bush administration's limited agenda-setting influence during the Tiananmen Square incident.

The Cheng (1993) study dealt with Bush's official responses during a Tiananmen Square time frame in which Cheng believed would possess the heaviest news coverage: from June 1 to June 10, 1989. In this study, he compared New York Times and Washington Post Sino-American coverage to Bush's policy statements in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Cheng found that although both elite newspapers and the government often held similar opinions about the Tiananmen incident -- they all supported the student demonstrators --- they responded significantly differently to the government crackdown. For example, while Bush was reluctant to criticize China's senior leader Deng Xiaoping for the incident in hopes that quiet diplomacy would later put relations back on track, the elite media's criticism of Deng was harsh.

In addition, Wang (1992) studied six countries' media coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Chinese student demonstrations, from April 15 to June 15, 1989. He found that the tone and approach of U.S. Tiananmen Square press coverage

substantially differed from the U.S. government's tone and approach to this issue, illustrated by the government-run Voice of America radio coverage regarding student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. For example, Wang found a significant difference between the VOA's and New York Times' use of official Chinese sources. The New York Times seems to have totally discredited the sources, while about one-third of the VOA stories used official Chinese sources. In addition, New York Times and VOA coverage of the student demonstrations varied greatly. As Wang explained:

They [VOA and NYT] differed not only in the tone of reporting [objective and balanced vs. emotional, respectively] in their treatment of the Chinese government positions [neutral vs. extremely negative, respectively] and their use of the official Chinese sources, but also in the fact that political ideology did not affect the VOA's coverage of the news. No anti-communism message was found in their coverage. As an American government agency, VOA's coverage of the Tiananmen events was seen to be more influenced by diplomatic considerations of Sino-American relationships [than NYT coverage] (Wang, 1992, p. 211).

Finally, Huang's (1994) comparison of U.S. news magazine coverage of pre-Tiananmen (1985 to 1988) and post-Tiananmen (1990 to 1993) coverage, which spanned both this study's Cold War demise and transitional periods, found that press coverage did not tend to echo U.S. government views toward Sino-American relations. Both Time and U.S. News & World Review covered China in a government-independent fashion.

Conclusion

During the Cold War's demise U.S. press coverage of foreign relations, specifically Sino-American relations, was predominantly government independent. The reason for government-independent press coverage during the Cold War's demise

seems to be related to the government's lack of an adequate replacement for its Cold War paradigm (see following chapter for more details). Apparently, as this Cold War paradigm began to crumble, so did the government's road map to international issues. Accordingly, the press coverage of such issues appeared to grow more self-reliant, perhaps illustrating the press' attempt to make better sense of American foreign relations than the U.S. government itself.

Beyond the Cold War Demise Period

As explained in the previous chapter, scholars do not agree on when the Cold War officially ended. However, since the time frame of post-Cold War coverage can not be determined until this issue is at least temporarily resolved, this study will apply the two main schools of thought on the issue to create a transitional and a post-Cold War period. Accordingly, all studies analyzing press coverage focusing on issues or events occurring the day after the Berlin Wall was officially destroyed on German Reunification Day up until the day before Gorbachev resigned from office, from November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991, will belong to the transitional period. Transitional era coverage represents about two years of coverage that does not clearly belong to either the Cold War demise or post-Cold War era. As for post-Cold War coverage, it will consist of issue or events covered from the day after Gorbachev's resignation, December 26, 1991, up until the present.

Transitional Era Press Coverage

Government independent coverage after the Cold War continued from the Cold War's demise throughout the transitional era. During both the Cold War demise and

transitional period, the government's continued lack of a solid paradigm of foreign affairs, specifically Sino-American relations, appeared to keep journalists more self-reliant and innovative than their Cold War predecessors.

During this transitional era, several studies indicated government-independent coverage of American foreign policy and Sino-American relations. As stated above, the Panama Invasion study (Gutierrez-Villalobos, Hertog and Rush, 1994) indicated government-independent press coverage spanning from the Cold War demise through the beginning of the transitional era. In addition, several such studies during the transitional era dealt with the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Zaharopoulos, 1993; Kellner, 1993). Finally, the Huang (1994) study, also mentioned above, discovered government-independent press coverage of Sino-American relations spanning the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras.

Transitional Coverage

Although government independent press coverage of the Panama Invasion began during the Cold War's demise period, it continued into the transitional era (Gutierrez-Villalobos, Hertog and Rush, 1994). This Panama study, introduced above in the Cold War demise section, examined U.S. news magazine coverage of the Panama Invasion from May 1989 to January 6, 1990. In this study, the press was found to be critical of U.S. administration policy regarding the invasion. For example, the study found that Time and Newsweek disagreed with the administration's tactical approach to carrying out the invasion, and the Nation condemned administration policy: The Nation openly and persistently challenged both

the administration's strategic understanding of the issue and its tactical approach to solving it (Gutierrez-Villalobos, Hertog and Rush, 1994).

Although Persian Gulf War media coverage often supported government views, much print coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis was government independent (Zaharopoulos, 1993; Kellner, 1993; Frank, 1992). For example, Frank (1992) found that the New York Times fueled anti-government debates on what it viewed as an excess amount of bombings. In addition, Zaharopoulos (1993) and Kellner (1993) found that the press critically debated the government's pro-war intentions up until Congress approved the war.

Studies on the Gulf War are especially useful since many scholars call it the first crisis after the Cold War (Greenberg and Gantz, 1993; Mowlana, Gerbner and Schiller, 1992). These scholars argue that the Soviet Union's unprecedented backing of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf War represents a "defining moment" in the Cold War's wake (Li, 1991). The fact that the Soviets sided with American interests in the Persian Gulf War made it clear that a new world order was unfolding.

Sino-American Transitional Press Coverage

Tiananmen Square Coverage

Huang (1994) analyzed Time, Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report articles dealing with pre-Tiananmen (1985 to 1988) and post-Tiananmen (1990 to 1993) China coverage in hopes of determining if the U.S. government's policy before and after Tiananmen is reflected in news coverage of these time periods. Huang found that both Time and U.S. News & World Review covered China in a government-

independent fashion -- their coverage did not echo government views.

Conclusion

During the Cold War's transitional period U.S. press coverage of foreign relations, specifically Sino-American relations, remained predominantly government independent. The reason for continuing government-independent press coverage, throughout the Cold War demise and transitional periods, seem to be related to the government's lack of an adequate replacement for its Cold War paradigm (see following chapter for more details). After the Cold War paradigm crumbled, the government seemed to remain either unwilling or unable to replace it with a comprehensive view of the world. Accordingly, press coverage appeared to remain relatively self-reliant, perhaps illustrating the press' continued attempts to make sense of seemingly more complicated relations between America and nation-states such as China.

Post-Cold War American Coverage

All press coverage analyzed from the day after Gorbachev's resignation, December 26, 1991, up until the present will be considered post-Cold War coverage. As explained above, this post-Cold War coverage time frame was chosen since most scholars agree that the Cold War was definitely over by Christmas Day of 1991, when Gorbachev and Bush both told the world that the Cold War had ended.

Government-independent coverage, which first became evident during the Cold War's demise, appears to have continued throughout both the transitional and post-Cold War eras. Ever since the U.S. government's comprehensive Cold War paradigm

crumbled during the Cold War's demise, U.S. media coverage of foreign relations, specifically Sino-American relations, has demonstrated its independent streak. It seems that from the Cold War's demise throughout the post-Cold War era the government's continued lack of a solid paradigm of foreign affairs, specifically Sino-American relations, pressured journalists to be more self-reliant, innovative than their Cold War predecessors (see following chapter for details).

Freedom Forum Colloquium

Three years ago in a Freedom Forum colloquium on the American media's role in post-Cold War foreign policy coverage (Heuvel, 1993), some of America's most eminent journalists, scholars and government officials met in an attempt to answer one main question: Will post-Cold War press coverage of foreign policy differ from its Cold War counterpart? The fact that this inquiry was framed in the future tense, and that no post-Cold War research was referenced throughout the colloquium, is telling: It seems no empirical research was available to help answer this question. However, the Freedom Forum concluded this colloquium by predicting that media after the Cold War would be more government independent than their Cold War counterpart. It also predicted that post-Cold War coverage would influence the government's American foreign policy agenda by pressuring it to focus on issues the media, after taking off its Cold War paradigm glasses, consider to be most important, such as international crises. Heuvel (1993), who summarized the Freedom Forum's conclusions about the media after the Cold War, stated:

The media realize that, perhaps for the first time, they have a chance to set their agenda, to determine what is really important for them and their

readers and viewers, a determination that may not coincide with foreign policy prospectives at all. The media, by throwing their searchlight on particular crises around the world, may put pressure on the government to take action to ameliorate a crisis situation. In this way, the end of the Cold War may have increased the media's ability to influence the foreign policy agenda (Heuvel, 1993, p. 10).

Empirical research on the impact of post-Cold War American press coverage on U.S. administration foreign policy views was not available by this dissertation's publication date. However, as Freedom Forum colloquium participants have pointed out, U.S. press coverage of two specific crises, civil unrest and famine in Somalia and civil war in the former Yugoslavia, has suggested that post-Cold War U.S. press coverage has already demonstrated government-independent prodding that has appeared to not only catch the U.S. government's attention, but to influence its actions as well.

Media coverage of the Somalia crisis appeared to be government independent in the sense that the media, predominantly via images of starvation, won the public's sympathy and, accordingly, pressured the government into helping feed starving Somalis (Heuvel, 1993). As Heuvel (1993) explains:

In instances of famine like in Somalia ... the public outcry signals for some policy-makers a popular will for action. In this sense the media can serve as a conduit of public opinion between the government and the people (p. 27).

As one unnamed U.S. government official explained, "In the case of the Somalis ..., the pictures forced us into action" (Heuvel, 1993, p. 27). As stated above, the media's consistent focus on the Somalia famine seemed to pressure the government into taking action: In December of 1992 U.S. Marines arrived in Somalia to help relief organizations deliver food and supplies to Somalis stuck among warring

clans. As journalism scholar Harrison Salisbury concluded, the media's spotlight on the Somali famine "certainly ... saved some lives" (Heuvel, 1993, p. 29).

Media coverage of the civil war crisis in the former Yugoslavia also appeared to be government independent in the sense that the media's unrelenting focus on the civil war and its resulting chaos pressured the government, via public opinion, to not only pay attention to the issue, but to ultimately respond by sending aid (Heuvel, 1993; Hachten, 1996). Syndicated columnist Anthony Lewis has observed that the New York Times' Sarajevo correspondent, John Burns, is one such journalist who, by consistently focusing on the 1991 break up of the former Yugoslavia and its bloody ramifications, influenced the U.S. government's decision to get directly involved in trying to peacefully rectify the situation (Heuvel, 1993). Lewis pointed out in the Freedom Forum colloquium that journalists such as Burns have definitely had "an agenda-setting impact on America's foreign policy toward the former Yugoslavia" (Heuvel, 1993, pg. 26).

Sino-American Post-Cold War Coverage

As for post-Cold War coverage of Sino-American relations, only one available study sheds some light on this topic: Huang's (1994) study on Tiananmen Square coverage. This study, discussed above, examines Tiananmen Square coverage throughout this dissertation's Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras. It concludes that post-Cold War press coverage, such as its Cold War demise and transitional counterparts, is predominantly government independent.

However, a single study alone can not begin to fill a massive gap in the

literature or to answer a question of such fundamental importance. Accordingly, this researcher conducted a pilot study (Goodman, 1994) of post-Cold War press coverage to determine whether it indeed possessed government-independent characteristics. Goodman followed through with this inquiry by examining New York Times and Washington Post press coverage of Sino-American relations during Clinton's first year of office (January 21, 1993 to December 31, 1993) and comparing this coverage to government coverage of Sino-American relations as illustrated in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.

Goodman (1994) found that press coverage of Clinton administration Sino-American relations seemed to be government independent. She found that the administration was unsuccessful at setting the media's agenda. For example, the amount of government attention to U.S.-China policy was not reflected by the press. In other words, when the government gave limited to great attention to specific China policy issues, the press did not follow suit. In addition, the government seemed to have no influence on how the press played such issues. For example, the press and government focused different amounts of attention on different aspects of the China boat issue during different time periods. In addition, the press tended to play up the issue while the government tended to play it down. And finally when the government briefly mentioned its diplomatic efforts to solve the problem, the press played up human rights concerns and the boat captains' connections with the New York-based Chinese mafia.

Conclusion

Few studies have thus far evaluated post-Cold War U.S. coverage and its impact on U.S. foreign policy views and initiatives. However, those that are presently available suggest that post-Cold War U.S. coverage of foreign affairs, and specifically Sino-American relations, is predominantly government independent.

Sino-American Coverage Shortcomings

Most of the China coverage studies mentioned in this chapter possess three shortcomings. First, most of them do not differentiate between China and Sino-American relations articles -- their samples or populations are derived and their results calculated based on an indiscriminate mix of both types of stories. Second, they deal with coverage of China and Sino-American relations in a cross-sectional fashion. And third, they mostly quantify press coverage and compare it to Sino-American relations at large -- they rarely quantify a record of official Sino-American relations, such as the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, for comparison's sake.

Although studies mixing China and Sino-American coverage do give some indication of the nature of Cold War Sino-American coverage and how it is impacted by U.S.-China policy, these results may be confounded by "mixing apples and oranges" (Chang, 1986; Chang, 1993). After all, many studies have indicated that American news coverage of a foreign country opposed to news coverage of U.S. policy with that country are not only inherently different, but should produce different results that, if not controlled for, may lead to faulty or spurious conclusions.

For instance, the same event or issue covered from a China news perspective versus a Sino-American perspective may result in coverage of totally opposite directions. For example, China articles dealing with the Chinese government's attempts to halt the production of prison labor products could be coded in a positive direction, while Sino-American articles dealing with the inhumanity of prison labor and U.S. considerations of a trade embargo against such products could be coded in a negative direction.

Chang (1986) and Goodman (1994) took special precautions to make sure that no purely China articles were mixed in with their Sino-American articles.

In addition, most of the above studies are carried out in a cross-sectional fashion. Although this approach often effectively helps researchers answer their hypotheses, it has two major shortcomings. First, by focusing exclusively on a small piece of the puzzle, little is often learned about how this piece fits in with others, how it relates back to the puzzle itself, or the broader scheme of the issue. And second, literature reviews based on such segmented pieces or puzzles of information make it difficult for researchers to grasp a comprehensive, complete picture of a body of work attempting to explain certain theories, findings and phenomena.

Only Chang (1986) was able to overcome these shortcomings by conducting a continuous, longitudinal times-series analysis of Sino-American coverage (1949 to 1984).

Finally, most of these studies used inconsistent techniques to compare China and/or Sino-American coverage to generalized U.S. policy on the same issues. They

tended to quantify the former while measuring the later according to their impressions, based on articles, documents and interviews, of each administration's official U.S.-China policies and stances. A basic problem with this approach is that each researcher's conclusions about official Sino-American policy views may differ depending on what he read and/or who he interviewed on this matter. In addition, even if all experts described official U.S.-China policy in the exact same manner, expert views of U.S.-China policy may appear much differently than expected when U.S.-China policy is viewed in actuality on a regular basis. Accordingly, a more accurate, precise measure of official U.S.-China policy can be obtained by quantifying the actual record of its official proceedings as documented in publications such as the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Accordingly, results should be most telling and accurate if press coverage is compared to its official policy counterpart in a similar fashion. For instance, Goodman (1994) and Chang (1986) coded Sino-American press and policy in a similar manner except for when such procedures, due to the different nature of each type of coverage, were not possible. For example, while the type and number of sources were coded in the exact same manner for newspapers and policy alike, questions such as what type of news article is being coded -- a front-page, news or editorial article --, had no relevance for government documents and thus could not be coded where government documents were concerned.

Final Conclusions: Pre-Cold War to Post-Cold War U.S. Press Coverage

This study's review of U.S. press coverage of U.S. foreign policy, specifically Sino-American coverage, has determined the following: U.S. press coverage during the pre-Cold War era and after the Cold War era (Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War periods) has been predominantly government independent, while U.S. press coverage during the Cold War has been predominantly government dependent. As is discussed in detail in the following chapter, it seems that from the Cold War's demise throughout the post-Cold War era the government's continued lack of a solid paradigm of foreign affairs, specifically Sino-American relations, pressured journalists to be more self-reliant, innovative than their Cold War predecessors.

Chapter 3

AGENDA SETTING AND THE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

This present study was inspired by post-Cold War journalists' experiences and observations about the chaotic nature of post-Cold War international relations and its impact on press coverage (Heuvel, 1993). Many such journalists argue that as a result the U.S. government's inability to replace a crumbling Cold War paradigm with a comprehensive, updated version has forced responsible reporters to not only make sense of the international arena themselves, but to make sure, via their own reporting, that the American public is as educated as possible about international affairs. Since this study was built around such first-hand, qualitative assessments of the post-Cold War's impact on the degree of government-independent reporting, this researcher sought out a compatible theory to help investigate whether such qualitative observations would be reinforced by empirical, quantitative analysis. Since this study attempted to quantitatively determine whether journalists after the Cold War did indeed have a greater agenda-setting influence on Sino-American relations than their Cold War predecessors, the well-established agenda-setting theory was the obvious choice. Not only did agenda-setting theory drive this research in a well-focused and productive manner, but it lent itself well to quantitative analysis of this research topic. Based on agenda-setting theory, this researcher was able to logically determine what

her quantitative analysis of U.S. press coverage vs. U.S. government coverage of Sino-American relations during different Cold War time frames represented. For example, if the press heavily covered Sino-American topics not covered by the government, and the press continued this practice more heavily during the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War, it could be safely assumed that the press practiced more government independent coverage after the Cold War ended than during it. Although at the beginning of this study several other theories were considered for driving this research, such as agenda building, functional and structural analysis, for reasons mentioned above agenda-setting theory was clearly the most appropriate for developing this project in a logical, thoughtful manner.

The Agenda-Setting Process

The relationship between Cold War eras and varying levels of government-independent press coverage cannot be thoroughly understood without first examining the role of the press in the foreign policy-making process and how the press and administration attempt to gain each other's attention and influence each other's views, via agenda setting, this study's major theoretical foundation.


The agenda-setting theory or process explains one view of how modern democratic societies operate, a view based on the mass media, public opinion and government policy and how they interact and constantly compete to persuade and influence each other's agendas -- "issues or events that are viewed at a point in time as ranked in a hierarchy of importance"(Rogers & Dearing, 1988, p. 555).

Mass communication researchers have traditionally focused on a small slice of

the agenda-setting process, how the mass media attempt to communicate the significance of certain issues and occurrences to the public (Rogers & Dearing, 1988). Such research focuses on how the media, by focusing on certain issues for some duration, is able to transfer priority items from their agenda to the public agenda. A vast amount of agenda-setting research, most combining audience surveys and content analyses, support this aspect of the agenda-setting process. For example, Kraus and Davis (1976) found a consistent correlation between media issue coverage and subsequent audience issue salience. In addition, researchers using cross-lag correlations have found priority issues of the media lead to priority issues of the audience (McCombs, 1983; Rogers and Dearing, 1988).

While much traditional research interested only in how the media sets the public agenda ends here, the agenda-setting process, and its explanation of how the media sets the policy agenda and vice versa, is just beginning. As Rogers and Dearing (1988) clearly illustrate, once "gatekeepers, influential media and spectacular news events" influence the media's agenda, and the media influences the public agenda, the public influences the government's policy agenda (p. 555) (see figure 1, p. 69). However, this process is anything but linear. While this above phenomenon is occurring, the media directly attempt to influence the government's policy agenda and vice versa. In addition, "real-world indicators of the importance of an agenda issue or event" and "personal experience and interpersonal communication among elites and other individuals" influence all three major agendas -- the media agenda, public agenda and policy agenda (Rogers & Dearing, 1988, p. 555).

Figure 1: The Agenda-Setting Process



Rogers, E., & Dearing, J. "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?" Communication Yearbook 111 (1988), p. 555.

Foreign Policy Making

In order to better understand the agenda-setting process as it applies to foreign policy making, the above agenda-setting scenario needs to be explained from this perspective. In the foreign policy arena, both the media and government have a tendency to directly influence and/or set each other's agenda while sidestepping the public agenda. Although public opinion has been known to have an important impact on the foreign policy-making process, Cohen (1973) found that researchers "cannot say with confidence how, why or when" (p. 33) public opinion influences foreign policy making. He also criticizes existing findings of public opinion influencing foreign policy making as "partial, unsystematic, disconnected and discontinuous" (p. 39).

In addition, since in the foreign policy-making process most Americans have limited, if any, personal experience with international events or issues, the public's personal experiences are generally too limited to have much of an impact on any of the three agendas. And foreign policy issues are often so abstract that any average citizens witnessing some aspect of a foreign policy related event would be hard-pressed to make sense of it, let alone to influence others' views toward the issue (Zucker, 1978).

Saliency Cues

The content and design of newspapers are based on fundamental agenda-setting decisions (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Newspaper editors, "gate-keepers," must

reject more than 75 percent of available news stories due to space limitations alone. After selecting the stories important enough to make it "through the gate" into the newspaper, these editors unofficially rate the importance of these selected stories (Baskette, Sissors & Brooks, 1982). These editorial decisions determine how much each story is emphasized, via lay out and design devices. Stories considered most important are emphasized by salience cues.

Traditional salience cues are created by the manipulation of many design elements, such as story placement, story length and issue frequency (Shaw and McCombs, 1977; Baskette, Sissors & Brooks, 1982). Newspaper readers tend to "read" the newspaper by scanning its pages for not only stories of special interest, but those emphasized by salience cues. These news readers tend to agree with the press that the issues emphasized with salience cues are the day's most important issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 1983; Eyal, Winter & DeGeorge, 1981).

The more an agenda-setter plays up salience cues or repeats items of importance, the more likely he will be able to focus his audience's views on his favored topics. Until recently, most communication scholars argued that agenda setting was capable of doing little more than focusing attention. Now communication scholars widely agree that agenda setting can also affect one's views on favored topics. McCombs and Shaw (1993), perhaps the most well-known agenda-setting scholars, explain:

Bernard Cohen's [1963] classic summation of agenda setting -- the media may not tell us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about -- has been turned inside out. New research exploring the consequences of agenda setting ... suggest that the media not

only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to think" (p. 58).

Agenda Setting: How Long Does it Take?

Researchers agree that even in agenda setting mass media effects take time to appear (Eyal, Winter & DeGeorge, 1981). What researchers do not agree on is how much exact lead time is necessary before the media or opinion leaders are able to set each other's agenda (Eaton, 1989; Gandy, 1982; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Gandy (1982) explains, "Some kinds of issues or events move easily to the public agenda (or policy agenda), others take more time, and the theoretical base of agenda-setting research is incapable of predicting just what that optimal lag should be" (p. 7).

However, many researchers examining this issue have agreed that this time lag seems to be about four weeks. While Zucker (1978) estimated the agenda-setting time lag in between two to six weeks, Winter and Eyal (1981) estimated it at four to six weeks, and Gilberg, Eyal, McCombs and Nicholas (1980) and Chang (1986) estimated it at four weeks. In a study of whether the State of the Union Address affected press coverage or vice versa, Gilberg, Eyal, McCombs and Nicholas (1980) found, after examining news coverage four weeks before and after the State of the Union address, that four weeks was ample time to observe both press responses to a set of priorities set forth by the president and evident presidential responses spanning from pre-State of the Union news coverage.

Sources Influence News Media's Agenda

The agenda-setting process can also be studied from another angle, one that Wanta refers to as "the interface of press values and practices with news source behavior" (Wanta, Stephenson, Turk & McCombs, 1989). The more a given source is able to present himself/itself, an issue or event in a newsworthy fashion, the more likely the news media are to both cover the story and to play up the story's prominence by displaying it with salience cues (Sigal, 1986; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Wanta, Stephenson, Turk & McCombs, 1989; Miller, 1977; Cornwell, 1959; Balutis, 1977; Kaid and Foote, 1985). And the more salience cues are played up in a story, the more likely readers are to consider the story important to the news industry and themselves.

Press vs. Administration: Who Sets Whose Agenda?

The prestige press has long been recognized as an essential component in the U.S. foreign policy-making process (Nimmo, 1979). However, researchers say it remains unclear how the news media enter into the foreign policy-making process and shape the outcome of policy decisions (Bennett, 1980). In an attempt to better understand the role and influence of the mass media in this process, many researchers have turned to agenda-setting theory. Although much of agenda-setting research has found that the mass media's agenda is capable of influencing the public's agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), it remains unclear how and to what degree the mass media is able to influence and/or set the government's foreign policy agenda and vice versa (Nimmo, 1979; Bennett, 1980). The answer to this

question will help shed light on the role of the media in foreign policy.

The Press: An Independent Agent or Agent of Power?

Even though agenda-setting theory states that under certain circumstances the media can set the government's policy agenda and vice versa, many scholars dispute the power of the press to set the government's foreign policy agenda. Although while trying to assess the role of the press in foreign policy making many scholars and media professionals have argued many variations on the power-of-the-press theme, two extreme conclusions are most often drawn: The press either predominantly acts as an independent agent or as an "agent of power," which basically supports and reflects government positions (Chang, 1993; Altschull, 1984).

Independent Agent

The press as an "independent agent" school of thought is based on several assumptions about the American democratic system and the press' role in supporting it. American democracy operates on the assumption that the public not only knows what is in its best interest, but is able to decipher good from bad policies and use this knowledge combined with voting privileges to elect the best possible government. However, it is also assumed that citizens can not successfully perform this democratic function without being adequately and regularly informed about government policies and procedures. Accordingly, the press, by informing the public of the day's events, plays an extremely important role in the democratic process.

The press' role of informing the public is especially important in the foreign policy arena due to the unobtrusive nature of foreign policy news (Zucker, 1978).

Since few citizens outside of the White House and State Department are privy to foreign policy news and few citizens have had any first-hand experience with foreign affairs events or phenomena, most receive information about foreign issues from the press. In this foreign policy arena, the press also often acts as a forum for national debates and provides essential links between the public and policy makers.

This school of thought argues in order for this information to be comprehensive enough to offer its public a true glimpse into its governance, the press must not be unduly influenced by government pressures to agree with its policies. On the contrary, it must take an independent view of government in its pursuit of truth. The First Amendment offers the press an incredible amount of power to report about government in an independent fashion.

For the above reasons, this independent agent theory argues that the press, unofficially the fourth branch of government or "Fourth Estate," acts as a "watchdog" over government -- supporting good policies and politicians and weeding out rotten ones -- in order to better inform and serve the public (Cohen, 1963). This "watchdog" role leads to an adversary press that strongly believes that a democracy is much better off with an opposition press than with one that blindly supports government policy. For example, many journalists credit what they call their independent approach to government coverage for the end of the Vietnam War, the discovery of Watergate and the eventual resignation of former President Richard Nixon.

Press coverage that does not support U.S. foreign policy is considered government independent. In the foreign policy arena, many studies have demonstrated

U.S. press independence or lack of press support for U.S. government policy (e.g., Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad and Riffe, 1987; Lefever, 1974).

Agent of Power

The opposite extreme of the above school of thought is the "agent of power" view. Altschull (1984, 1995) argues that although the press is indeed a strong political force, in reality it is an "agent of power," not an independent agent. He claims that the press, rather than questioning authority, merely helps promote the government's agenda by focusing attention on its stances and policies and generally covering it in a positive light. This agent-of-power approach is grounded in hegemony theory, which states either consciously or subconsciously the press plays into dominant American cultural and socio-economic values by supporting authority institutions, figures and hierarchies, such as those found in government, and promoting their interests (Gitlin, 1980; Hallin, 1984; Tuchman, 1974). In this paradigm, the press acts more like a "manufacturer of consent" than an independent agent (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). At the extreme, this philosophy paints the press as a mouthpiece of the government. Herman and Chomsky (1988), strong proponents of this extreme view, have suggested on many occasions that the New York Times is Pravda.

Press coverage that supports U.S. foreign policy is at least government influenced and at most government dependent. In the foreign policy arena, many studies have found evidence of press support for official U.S. foreign policies (e.g., Cassara, 1989; Cohen 1957; Cooper, 1985; Dorman and Farhang, 1987).

A Middle Road Perspective


In between these two perspectives of how the American press functions in a democratic society are many additional ones formulated by a multitude of political science, sociology and mass communication scholars trying to determine the best possible conceptual model describing the relationship between the press and government in the foreign policy-making arena (e.g., Chang, 1993; Allison, 1971; Berry, 1990; Cioffi-Revilla, Merritt & Zinnes, 1987; Cohen, 1963; Hilsman, 1967). However, Chang (1993) found Allison's (1971) model of the media's role in U.S. foreign policy making to be most inclusive.

Allison's governmental politics model is partially based on Hilsman's (1967) view, illustrated via four concentric circles, that while the government possesses predominant power in foreign policy making, the press maintains a less powerful yet significant ad hoc role in this process (see figure 2, p. 78). In such models, the more powerful the players in foreign policy making, the closer they are to the center of the circle. From inner to outer circle, Allison describes the key players, from most powerful to least powerful, as "chiefs" (the President and his closest aides), staffers (the immediate staff of each chief), foot-soldiers¹ (appointed and permanent officials with each of the departments and agencies) and "ad hoc players" (such as the media, Congress, interest groups and political parties) (Allison, 1971, p. 15).

Allison states the rules of foreign policy decision making come primarily from

¹This term has been modified to replace Allison's since the original term could be considered culturally insensitive.

Figure 2: The Concentric Circles of Power in Foreign Policy Decision-Making



Spanier, J., & Uslander, E. How American Foreign Policy Is Made, 2nd ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978, p. 50.

the Constitution, statutes, court rulings and executive orders. These rules determine the power of each position and the acceptable channels and paths in which policy making flows. Allison adds that each player's power in decision making "is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients" (Allison, 1971, p. 36). Although the President and his key advisors have the most authority and control in foreign policy making, the extent, manner and degree in which their decisions are carried out depends on how they are interpreted by lower level bureaucrats and whether they fall within these bureaucrats' personal and official agendas. While these government officials vie amongst themselves for political advantage, Congress, political parties, interest groups, public opinion and the media, all equipped with their own political and personal agendas, enter the fray. As a result of this political negotiating and leveraging, foreign policy is "made."

Although Allison fails to explain in his model how successful the press is at influencing policy makers and vice versa, Cohen (1963) suggests that the press is often quite successful in this venture. Regardless of whether the press supports specific government policies, it still holds government officials accountable for their actions and acts as a go-between between the government and foreign countries and the government and the public. Accordingly, it is often able to define and present issues in a manner that gains it considerable influence in this complicated process. Cohen has gone as far as equating the influence of journalists and lower level government bureaucrats in foreign policy making. The press obviously does not have

the authority to make official foreign policy decisions. However, by focusing government and public attention on aspects of foreign policy it finds most important, its influence is at times strong enough to set the government's foreign policy agenda. Although additional theoretical propositions and models are needed to better explain the exact interactions between the press and government in foreign policy making, it remains clear that the press plays an influential role in international relations.

Agenda Setting by Administration

The President

Many researchers have used agenda-setting theory to explain the influence of the President on the news media's agenda. The President, the nation's "ultimate spokesman," most "newsworthy" individual and most famous source, has often been able to transfer his own agenda onto the media's agenda (Berry, 1990; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Miller, 1977; Kaid and Foote, 1988). In the foreign policy arena, the President's agenda-setting powers have often been strong (Berry, 1990; Nimmo, 1979; Bennett, 1980; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The President's agenda-setting strength is mainly due to his role as the country's key foreign policy maker and his near monopoly of information on the intra-workings of American foreign policy. It is also due to his often successful ability to conduct secret diplomacy and to limit the press' knowledge of crucial foreign policy actions due to real and manufactured national security risks. In the foreign policy arena, a combination of the above factors has often led to government influence over the media's agenda and/or media dependence on government information and views as illustrated by studies discovering

press support of government views and/or policy (e.g., Serfaty, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Chang, 1986; Ganju, 1975). The President has often been able to take advantage of his significant constitutional powers and inside knowledge of foreign policy to transfer his own agenda onto the media's agenda.

The President often attempts to influence the public's and Congress' agenda by getting what he believes to be important issues covered in the press. He often attempts to take advantage of his "ultimate spokesman" status in order to call the mass media's attention to his own agenda. The President's special access to the media via devices such as presidential campaigns, debates, State of the Union addresses and press conferences provides him with ample opportunities to practice his agenda-setting skills.

How successful are presidential agenda-setting attempts? If the amount of mass media coverage of the President answers this question, the President seems to possess significant agenda-setting capabilities. Cornwell found that New York Times and Providence Journal presidential news coverage steadily increased from 1855 until 1957 (Cornwell, 1959). When Balutis (1977) up-dated Cornwell's classic study, from 1958 to 1974, he found that the Presidents' agenda-setting influence continued to increase. In more recent presidential agenda-setting studies, Kaid and Foote (1988) found that presidential coverage dominated network news.

The State Department

The State Department, the second most prominent, newsworthy source in foreign affairs (Chang, 1986), also has the ability, at times, to push the American

foreign policy agenda onto the media's agenda (Dumbrell, 1990). The fact that the State Department is technically in charge of foreign policy, a process responsible for protecting national security and meeting American interests abroad, makes it a well sought-after source in its own right (Sigal, 1973). In addition, since the State Department shares in the President's near monopoly of knowledge about the intra-workings of foreign policy -- knowledge that the president has at times used successfully to take advantage of the media's dependence on such information --, it seems likely that the State Department can at times also set the media's agenda in such matters.

In the realm of Sino-American foreign policy, the State Department has successfully influenced and/or set the media's agenda on several occasions via launching trial balloons and voicing its foreign policy views, policy decisions and actions (Dumbrell, 1990). For example, the State Department's trial balloons, which often test public reactions before initiating controversial foreign policy ideas, are often prominently covered by the press. A famous example of how the State Department has used the media to fly a China-related trial balloon took place during the Kennedy administration (Hilsman, 1971). Although Kennedy warned the State Department that the public was not ready to recognize communist China, a resigning State Department official decided to "leak" the possibility to the press. Since heavy media attention soon followed, the State Department seemed to focus the media's agenda on this issue. In addition, Lin's (1985) agenda-setting study on the impact of State Department views (measured by State Department Bulletin articles) on prestige press

coverage of Sino-American relations found that the State Department did indeed set the media's agenda.

Finally, the fact that a great number of foreign policy reporters spend much of their day in State Department press rooms also suggests that the State Department plays a significant agenda-setting role (Cohen, 1963).

Pre-Cold War to Post-Cold War Agenda Setting

Although many researchers claim that Cold War administrations have been especially successful at setting the agenda for Sino-American policy coverage (e.g., Chang, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1989) evidence of administration agenda setting in pre-Cold War, Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War Sino-American coverage is limited (Liebovich, 1988; Hohenberg, 1968; Bibber, 1969; Goodman, 1994).

The apparently limited agenda-setting abilities of pre-Cold War, Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War administrations to influence U.S.-China press coverage during corresponding Cold War eras may be best explained by each era's either deteriorating or non-existent government paradigm of Sino-American relations (Heuvel, 1993). The absence of a comprehensive, workable strategic framework operating as a foundation for Sino-American policy may have encouraged journalists to make more independent assessments of U.S.-China policy -- to criticize Sino-American government policies and/or to challenge them with oppositional views.

Since historical analysis of Sino-American relations during the first two Cold War eras discussed in this study, the pre-Cold War and Cold War periods, is clear-cut and plentiful, and both Cold War eras have already been discussed in adequate detail,

only limited additional information is needed to theorize about each of these period's agenda-setting capabilities. However, in order to better theorize about the agenda-setting capabilities of the remaining three Cold War periods -- Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War --, the only Cold War eras empirically analyzed in this study, additional interpretation of these watershed Cold War eras is helpful. While this study's historical chapter offered an overview of basic events and issues occurring during these time frames, this section will offer Soviet, Chinese and American perspectives on each of these remaining Cold War eras in order to aid theoretical analysis.

Pre-Cold War Agenda Setting

During the pre-Cold War era, administrations seemed much more concerned with promoting and protecting American business interests in China than with placing U.S.-China relations into a workable framework (Spence, 1990). Perhaps the media's lack of a comprehensive government-instituted paradigm of U.S.-China relations severely limited the administrations' agenda-setting capabilities. After all, without a comprehensive, understandable government version of U.S.-China relations to lean on, the media were forced to become more self-reliant and to create their own understanding of Sino-American relations and appropriate U.S. government strategies and objectives toward China.

Cold War Agenda Setting

The Cold War's comprehensive "containment" framework, by offering the media an easily understandable international perspective, may have strengthened the

Cold War administrations' agenda-setting capabilities (Chang, 1993, p. 43). After all, when the Cold War international perspective of the world was well-established, press coverage seemed especially dependent on administration views. The "containment" framework not only seemed reasonable to journalists, but helped make their job easier by offering them a readily available paradigm in which most international occurrences could be easily fitted and explained.

Cold War Demise Agenda Setting

In order to offer a clear view of Cold War demise period agenda setting for theoretical purposes, this time frame will be discussed via Soviet-American and Sino-American perspectives. Once background on the Cold War demise era itself is presented, Cold War demise agenda setting will be discussed. After all, until the Cold War demise era itself is understood, conclusions about the agenda-setting process during this time frame would be difficult to make.

Soviet-American Perspectives

The Cold War and its East versus West mentality did not simply fade out of existence. On the contrary, it ground to a halt. Evidence of this "grinding" can be documented as early as the Cold War demise period. However, at that time both the Soviet and American government and many of their citizens were skeptical of whether the Cold War would truly end any time soon.

On the one hand, the Cold War's rapidly approaching demise seemed inevitable. Gorbachev introduced long-awaited democratic reforms, such as *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, to the Soviet people. And President Reagan responded to

such overtures by finally ceasing to refer to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and supporting Mikhail Gorbachev and his political and economic reforms and democratic leanings with financial aid and increased business ventures. In addition, as relations began warming, the threat of nuclear obliteration began to wane. As the Cold War paradigm began slipping from political reality, both governments and citizens began gaining a glimpse of a new, more open existence in which the Cold War paradigm was obsolete (Kaplan, 1990).

However, on the other hand, Soviets and Americans alike worried that Gorbachev's democratic reforms would not succeed (Kaplan, 1990). This Soviet sentiment was clearly illustrated in one of most popular sayings in the Soviet Union at the time: "Strike the iron while Gorbachev (while it's hot)." This saying obviously implied that the democratic reforms would not be in existence for much longer and, accordingly, they should be taken advantage of as soon as possible. Everyone from Soviet politicians to average citizens seemed to share this philosophy. Ironically, due to this fear of democratic reform failure, many citizens were afraid to take advantage of democratic reform. After all, they feared if democratic reform became suspect under a new communist regime, so would they (Kaplan, 1990).

The widespread Soviet fear that the Soviet Union would not be able to sustain democratic reform was mostly based on the economic hardship that accompanied it. Many Soviets who at first embraced such policies were growing disgruntled due to the economic hardships associated with setting up a free market economy, the cornerstone of a democratic society. In addition, ethnic clashes sparking up in Soviet republics,

such as Azerbaijan and Moldavia, also threatened Gorbachev's more democratic rule by suggesting a lack of government control. Under communist rule this type of social upheaval would be immediately quashed -- often in a most undemocratic fashion. Soviets worried economic hardship and ethnic strife were leading to a strong conservative communist backlash threatening Gorbachev's office. And, if Gorbachev was overthrown from office, the new communist regime would be especially repressive -- it would no doubt turn back the clock to more traditional communist rule (Kaplan, 1990).

Sino-American Perspectives

The Chinese observed Soviet democratic reforms with great interest and fear: Great interest because the Chinese government was founded on a Soviet model, and fear since if the Soviet government's increased openness led to its collapse, the Chinese government's necessary increased openness to support rapidly expanding international markets might make the Chinese government next in line. In addition, the demise of the Soviet Union and Cold War would force China into the insecure position of being the last existing major communist power in the world. The thaw in Soviet-American relations could also lead to an alliance against China, a constant fear that China has possessed ever since the beginning of the Cold War. And finally the fact that China's Soviet neighbor had instigated democratic reforms led to unescapable comparisons of the two major powers by Chinese dissidents and intellectuals, comparisons which led to criticism of the Chinese government for not accompanying its economic reforms with democratic political ones.

Domestically, the Chinese government continued grappling with its citizens gaining unwelcome desires for democratic reform via commerce, education abroad, and outlawed broadcast stations, such as Voice of America. However, in the international arena, Sino-American relations were a mixed bag.

On the one hand, they were especially strong. The Chinese government concentrated on conducting as much business as possible with American companies. During this time frame, China's huge amount of trade with American markets was second only to that of Chinese trade with Hong Kong. Trade in China took off, and no one was happier about it than President Reagan and corporate America. With this unprecedented amount of Sino-American business, older negative views derived from past Sino-American Cold War confrontational relations were being replaced by more positive ones. Even President Reagan stopped referring to China in negative terms, such as "Red China" and "Chinese Reds" (Chang, 1986, p. 188). China soon became in vogue. Americans, let alone the entire world, became fascinated with this exotic land and people. Tourism boomed in an unprecedented fashion.

On the other hand, Sino-American relations were strained. The American government and press often criticized the Chinese government for human rights abuses, such as violent suppression of peaceful Tibetan demonstrations, strict enforcement of a one-child birth control policy and crackdowns on political dissent.

The best examples of suppression of political dissent were the 1987 and 1989 student movements, which culminated into the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. As frustration among Chinese intellectuals mounted over a lack of democratic reform and

run-away inflation lowered all citizens' standards of living, tensions grew ripe for student-government confrontations. In 1987, Chinese students marched on Tiananmen Square to demand increased democratic freedom. Although this march was quickly crushed by government officials, the pressures that caused it kept building. That is up until Hu Yaobang, a Communist official demoted for his open sympathy for student concerns, died April 13, 1989, near the anniversary of the May Fourth (1919) Movement, a movement in which students sought the same type of democratic reform being sought by students during the Cold War demise period nearly 70 years later.

The students' anger at the government's lack of an apology for not returning Hu Yaobang to his rightful leadership role before his death, combined with their anger over the government's reluctance to instigate meaningful democratic reform over the past 70 years, set the stage for the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement. The knowledge of Gorbachev's upcoming historical diplomatic visit to China to improve relations between both countries further fueled the student movement. Student leaders knew the world would be watching this summit meeting, and took advantage of the international media's presence by successfully stealing the limelight from Gorbachev and, via marches and hunger strikes, emotionally illustrating their struggle for democracy to the international community.

As the world watched with horror, what began as a peaceful student movement ended about two months later with a government crackdown on June 3/4 1989. The Tiananmen Square incident illustrated one of the first and most dramatic preludes to the global Cold War's collapse. President Bush's response to the incident was critical,

but lackluster. A large segment of the American media, including the New York Times and Washington Post, lambasted Bush for what they called a business-as-usual approach to Sino-American relations in the wake of what many referred to as a massacre of peacefully demonstrating students and citizens. The press criticized the Bush administration for being much more concerned with not angering the Chinese government than retaliating against it for its massive human rights atrocity.

Conclusions

During the Cold War proper the U.S. government's comprehensive "containment" paradigm offered the press a comprehensive, understandable view of the world, and Cold War press coverage seemed to echo government policy. However, during the Cold War demise era, this solid Cold War paradigm began to crumble. In addition, the U.S. government's inability to replace the weakening Cold War paradigm with a more appropriate one seemed to lead to a weakening of its agenda-setting capabilities as well. After all, a government unable to portray a foreign policy scenario in a convincing manner should not expect to be as heavily echoed and/or supported by the press as a government that can expertly make sense of specific foreign policy objectives in a global, comprehensive fashion.

The press found itself faced with mixed messages -- both remnants of the Cold War past and a yet-to-be-defined new world order. Since the government apparently faced the same dilemma, the press could no longer depend on the government for a comprehensive scenario of East-West relations. In this pivotal era of upheaval and change, the press, which could no longer rely on government directions, was forced

to become more self-reliant and find its own way. Accordingly, Cold War demise coverage should be more government independent than its Cold War predecessor.

Transitional Agenda Setting

Scholars predominantly tend to agree that the Cold War ended during this study's transitional period. What they do not agree on is the actual date on which it officially ceased to exist. However, most seem to agree that it officially ground to a halt on one of three dates: the November 9, 1989, destruction of the Berlin Wall; the December 8, 1991, fall of the Soviet Union; or December 25, 1991, the date Gorbachev resigned from office and condemned communism and President Bush announced to the world that the Cold War had ended.

Accordingly, the Cold War might have officially ended as early as November 9, 1989, or as late as December 25, 1991. This study deals with this unavoidable uncertainty by placing all coverage falling within these two time frames into a transitional period. Regardless of the official date on which the Cold War ceased to exist, all of these events led to the Cold War's collapse. The transitional period picked up where the Cold War demise period left off, with the Cold War grinding to a halt, and contained a crucial chain of events that concluded with the Cold War's extinction.

In order to gain a clearer picture of the transitional period itself and agenda setting during this time period, Soviet-American and Sino-American perspectives on the transitional period will be discussed before conclusions about transitional agenda setting are made.

Soviet-American Perspectives

Whether or not scholars agree that the Cold War officially ended with the destruction of the Berlin Wall, all tend to see this event as a major factor in the Cold War's collapse. In perhaps one of the most significant events in the Cold War's finale, in a nearly unprecedented move by a Soviet leader, Gorbachev allowed the Soviet satellite country of East Germany to be reunited with its Western counterpart. Perhaps the next most significant event leading to the Cold War's destruction was the mid-August, 1991, Soviet coup. Events leading to the coup began with Boris Yeltsin's and Soviet citizens' frustration over the Communist Party's slow democratic reform. While Gorbachev was in the Crimea on vacation, Yeltsin took his concerns to the streets. Tens of thousands of Soviet citizens were receptive to Yeltsin's message (Kaplan, 1990). Yeltsin soon became the crowd's spiritual leader. When the pro-democracy demonstrators demanded that major Communist leaders be ousted from office, Yeltsin demanded their resignation as well. As the situation grew more tense, a group of conservative Communist leaders planned a coup. Due to their lack of military support, they were easily defeated and arrested by Yeltsin-loyalist forces. Yeltsin decided that the best way to free himself from Soviet government interference was for Russia, along with Ukraine and Belorussia -- the Soviet Union's three cornerstone, lynch-pin republics -- to secede from the Soviet Union. In order to accomplish this goal, he held secret negotiations with leaders from the other two republics. As a result, on December 8, 1991, all three republics declared independence, and the Soviet Union became unhinged. Soon after, the Soviet Union's

remaining republics declared independence and, on December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned from office and President Bush told the world that America had won the Cold War (Kaplan, 1990).

During this transitional period, the U.S. government was supportive of the Soviet Union's break with its Cold War past: It applauded its lasserfaire attitude toward German reunification and its many democratic reforms. It also tended to be supportive of Gorbachev. However, when it became unclear whether Gorbachev or Yelstin would be in power to carry on democratic reforms, the U.S. government expressed its confusion over which leader should receive the most attention. That is, until Gorbachev faded into political obscurity and Yelstin maintained his leadership of Russia (Kaplan, 1990).

Sino-American Perspectives

During this transitional period, the Bush administration seemed more interested in repairing Sino-American relations in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident than with determining how Sino-American relations would fit into the new world order. Bush sent dignitaries such as Henry Kissinger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to meet with Chinese leaders in hopes of reinvigorating Sino-American relations. As was the case during the Tiananmen Square incident itself, many journalists, Congressmen and citizens criticized such Bush actions as being too conciliatory, too soon. The Tiananmen Square incident, with its civilians single-handedly facing down Chinese tanks and soldiers, was one of the most memorable, highly emotional events of 1989. Although Bush seemed to want nothing more than to

put Tiananmen Square behind him and return to conducting Sino-American business as usual, the American press and public seemed hesitant, unwilling to do either.

While Bush continued trying to return to more friendly pre-Tiananmen Square Sino-American relations, the Chinese did not seem to make his job any easier. With the exception of "good behavior" preceding Bush's annual decision to renew China's MFN (most favored nation) status -- such as allowing Fang Lizhi, China's leading dissident, to leave China, and releasing political prisoners (often only temporarily) --, many Chinese activities during this time frame were considered undesirable by the U.S. government and press alike. For example, after the Tiananmen Square incident China still continued to punish and mistreat pro-democracy dissidents, many of whom were associated with the 1989 demonstrations, and to sell weapons to Arab countries.

Conclusions

As previously discussed, the Cold War containment theory began crumbling during the Cold War demise period. When the government was not able to replace this rapidly deteriorating scenario of world events with an adequate substitute, its agenda-setting abilities seemed to weaken as the U.S. press, growing less confident in the government's foreign policy objectives, was forced to become more self-reliant and make more independent assessments of a seemingly chaotic world. The press' need to come to its own understanding of international relations continued throughout the transitional period. As the Cold War wound down, the U.S. government still seemed unable to provide journalists and the public with a solid paradigm of the emerging new world order. Accordingly, as was concluded in the case of Cold War

demise press coverage, transitional press coverage of U.S. policy should be more government independent than Cold War press coverage.

Post-Cold War Agenda Setting

In order to gain a clear view of the post-Cold War period itself and agenda setting during that time frame for theoretical purposes, Sino-American relations during this time frame will be discussed before conclusions about post-Cold War agenda setting are made. (Since the Soviet Union no longer existed during this time frame, American relations with the former Soviet Union are not discussed here.)

Sino-American Relations

After the Cold War, as the former Soviet Union republics struggled to build their more democratic countries, the U.S. administration continued to repair Sino-American relations, which were set back considerably in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Although diplomats, China hands, journalists, Congress and much of the public realized the importance of Sino-American relationships and wanted relations to return to their pre-Tiananmen strength, Bush's approach to accomplishing this goal during the last year of his administration seemed to be much more criticized than Bill Clinton's. Bush's attempts seemed thwarted by what many perceived as a black cloud over his head based on his failure to adequately punish the Chinese for the Tiananmen incident in the first place and his perceived strong personal stake in pleasing the Chinese government based on his fond memories of China gained during his hiatus as a China-stationed ambassador.

Bush's perceived failures in Sino-American relations were reflected in

Clinton's presidential campaign pledge regarding China, which stated that Clinton, unlike Bush, would not renew China's MFN status without a more significant improvement in its human rights record. Although during his first year of office Clinton decided to renew this MFN status in a less critical fashion than promised during his campaign, the fact that under Clinton Sino-American business was booming seemed to deflect much, but not all, criticism.

While Bush's dark Tiananmen cloud seemed to make the press, Congress and much of the public critical of his Sino-American policies, Clinton's lack of a Tiananmen blemish, combined with his more neutral, business-oriented stance toward Sino-American relations, seemed to turn many such critics into at least cautious supporters. Clinton's Sino-American policies seemed to have received more American support than Bush's. However, that does not mean that Sino-American relations under Clinton were never strained. Although during Clinton's first year of office he seemed to be rebuilding post-Tiananmen relations with China, relations were periodically strained due to such Chinese activities as human rights abuses in Tibet, breeches in nuclear testing agreements, prison labor abuses, widespread copyright infringements and continued mistreatment of political prisoners.

Conclusions

During the post-Cold War era, the loss of the Cold War framework in many ways put post-Cold War journalists into the same boat as their pre-Cold War predecessors. Post-Cold War administrations, by failing to replace the "containment" framework with a workable post-Cold War equivalent, once again limited their

agenda-setting abilities. Without a government-supplied view of the new world order and how U.S.-China relations fit into it, the press was once again left to its own means (Awanohara, 1994). This lack of a post-Cold War framework not only limited the government from setting the press' agenda, but may have offered journalists themselves greater agenda-setting influence over the government (Heuvel, 1993).

Since the U.S. government did not possess a comprehensive paradigm of world affairs in either the pre- or post-Cold War era, journalists were given the least amount of direction to cover the international arena. It was previously determined that pre-Cold War era coverage of China and/or Sino-American relations was especially independent. Accordingly, it is expected that post-Cold War coverage will also possess government-independent features.

Like post-Cold War period U.S. government foreign policy, Cold War demise and transitional era U.S. government foreign policy did not offer journalists a solid paradigm of international affairs. Accordingly, this researcher expects to find not only that post-Cold War press coverage demonstrates more government-independent characteristics than its Cold War counterpart, but post-Cold War press coverage also shares the type of government-independent characteristics found in Cold War demise and transitional press coverage.

Salience Cue Variables

In this study the question of whether the U.S. administrations' Cold War demise, transitional or post-Cold War policy set the press' agenda during each time frame or vice versa will be largely determined by directly comparing U.S. policy to

press coverage salience cues.

Researchers have found that the following salience cues are accurate approximations of the importance certain "gate-keepers" assign to given stories and issues:

1. Individual story length and combined story lengths overtime -- the greater the length of a story on a certain subject, and the more frequently stories, especially longer ones, appear on this certain subject, the more importance is given to this subject (Rogers and Dearing, 1988);
2. The number of times a source is mentioned in each story and over time -- the greater the amount of times a source is mentioned in each story and over time, the greater the source's importance (Sigal, 1973);
3. The number of times a channel is mentioned in each story and over time -- the greater the amount of times a channel is mentioned in each story and over time, the greater the channel's importance (Chang, 1986);
4. The number of times a subject is mentioned in each story and over time -- the greater the amount of times a subject is mentioned in each story and over time, the greater the subject's importance (Rogers and Dearing, 1988).

In addition, researchers have found that articles often contain strong underlying contexts or conditions and views that can also act as important salience cues. For example, the more often the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident coverage is played up in the context of a major crisis with serious negative Sino-American consequences, the more likely readers will tend to view the Tiananmen Square

incident in the context of a major crisis with negative Sino-American implications.

Many of these less traditional cues, such as contexts or conditions -- e.g., crisis, conflict, deviance and violence -- and variables such as attitude, are common in international news coverage in general, and Sino-American coverage specifically.

Accordingly, this study will examine traditional salience cues, such as the amount and type of source, channel and subject mentions, and less traditional cues, such as the amount and type of contexts or conditions and attitude mentions, in order to obtain the most accurate assessment possible of whether U.S. press coverage influences U.S. policy coverage or vice versa.

The Present Study

Did Sino-American press coverage truly become more government independent when the Cold War containment philosophy no longer accurately described East-West relations? If so, when did this more independent Sino-American press coverage begin -- during the Cold War demise period, the transitional era or post-Cold War era? Did more government-independent Sino-American coverage begin in the Cold War's demise and continue throughout the post-Cold War era in a consistent pattern or in fits and starts? And if more government-independent coverage is found, what are the characteristics of this coverage, and did the characteristics of government-independent press coverage vary across Cold War time frames and when different presidents were in office?

This dissertation attempts to answer the above such questions by updating the seminal study on this issue, Chang's (1986) dissertation on New York Times and

Washington Post coverage of Cold War Sino-American policy. This study will update much of Chang's (1986) research by both applying several of his variables and research questions and several of this author's variables and research questions, derived from an updated, extensive literature review, to a newer decade of government and press data. In order to update this study without suffering from any possible shortcomings that a missed segment of time might represent, this present study will begin where Chang's left off -- in January of 1985 at the beginning of Reagan's second term --, and will continue up until the end of 1993 -- the Clinton administration's first year in office --, the latest date possible when data collection was completed.

In order to answer the above inquiries and fill the significant research gap that has existed ever since the end of Chang's study, a longitudinal content analysis will empirically answer the following research questions: (Variable definitions can be found in the method section.)

Research Question #1: If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the transitional period or the post-Cold War period?

In order to pinpoint more government-independent coverage and to test agenda-setting theory, all questions throughout this study will be answered according to the following definition of government independence and basic agenda-setting assumptions.

Government-independent press coverage is defined as press coverage that does not support and/or reflect Sino-American policy. A lack of support and/or reflection

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is illustrated by either statistically significant criticism of Sino-American policy, limited or non-existent coverage of official Sino-American statements and activities, press coverage portraying or interpreting official Sino-American policy in a significantly different manner than the government, and/or press coverage focusing on different issues than the government.

As for agenda-setting assumptions, if a source, news item, etc., is being covered in a newspaper or government publication, some individual, group or organization was able to get this source or news item covered by convincing the relative publication(s) of the item's importance. Thus, on a small scale, this entity has set the press' or government's agenda. And the more the entity is covered, the more successful this entity has been at setting the press or government agenda. The opposite is also true: If a source, news item, etc., is not covered, the entity behind each has not successfully set its target's agenda. On a broader scale, it is assumed that the more the press writes about government activities in a manner reflecting the government's own interpretation/presentation of the activities (e.g., with the same type of sources, channels and attitudes), the more the government will influence the press' agenda and vice versa. Conversely, the less the press writes about government activities in a manner reflecting the government's own interpretation/presentation of the activities, the less the government will influence the press' agenda and vice versa.

In this historic research question, the independent variable is "Cold War period" and the dependent variable is "government-independent press coverage."

The Cold War variable is measured via the three time frames in this study in

which each Cold War period took place.

If press coverage and government policy coverage vary significantly during a given Cold War period, the press coverage will be considered independent. If press coverage is determined to be independent during more than one Cold War period, the first Cold War period possessing independent press coverage will be noted.

As for government-independent press coverage itself, it will be measured via several variables comparing press and policy coverage, such as amount of sources, conflict, American attitude toward Sino-American relations, story length, description of China and human rights.

Research Question #2: If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage influence the government's agenda?

In this research question, as in research question #1, the independent variable is "Cold War period" and the dependent variable is "more government-independent press coverage." The same types of variables described above will be used to answer this question. Time series analysis will be used to determine if independent press coverage was influenced by the government's agenda and/or if it set the government's agenda. This will be accomplished by comparing each aggregated month of government policy coverage to the following aggregated month of press coverage. If no statistically significant results are found, then it will be concluded that the press' agenda was not influenced by the government. In order to determine if the press set the government's agenda, each aggregated month of press coverage will be compared to the following aggregated month of government coverage. If no statistically

significant results are found, then it will be concluded that the press did not set the government's agenda.

Research Question #3: Under what types of conditions or contexts does Sino-American policy tend to receive the most government-independent press coverage?

In this research question, the dependent variable is "most government independent press coverage" and the independent variable is "condition/context." When press coverage is determined to be independent, significantly different from its government counterpart, the independent coverage with the strongest correlations will be determined to be "most government independent."

Conditions/contexts will be measured via many variables, including the following: China status quo deviation, conflict, American attitude toward Sino-American relations, China description, story length, economic change/development, and usage of official and unofficial sources and channels.

Research Question #4: How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare across all three administrations?

In this research question, the dependent variable is "more government-independent press coverage" and the independent variable is the "administration." More independent press coverage during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations will be determined and compared. In addition, the amount of more government-independent coverage via administration will be noted and significant variables indicating more independent coverage will be described.

Condition/context variables will be used to measure independence, as explained in the above question.

Research Question #5: How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?

In this research question, the dependent variable is "more government-independent press coverage" and the independent variable is the "Cold War era."

This question and question #4 will be answered via the same approach with one exception: While the above question examines more government-independent press coverage via administration, this question examines more government-independent press coverage via Cold War era.

Chapter 4

METHOD

This chapter addresses this study's following issues: content analysis procedures; operational definitions of variables; coding procedures, including reliability tests; data analysis; and preliminary findings.

Content Analysis Procedures

Content analysis will be used to examine the relationship between prestige press coverage and government coverage of Sino-American relations. This study's content analysis procedures have been broken down into the following sections: introduction to content analysis; study period; sources of data; sample and selection criteria; and unit of analysis.

Introduction to Content Analysis

Content analysis is "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 21). It is the most effective and practical approach for analyzing past press coverage in a longitudinal study (Holsti, 1967). Content analysis is also a practical and effective method of studying U.S.-China relations since direct access to each administration and policy makers is often impossible. Holsti (1967) found that the best way to access foreign policy makers' attitudes, values and "definition of situation" at the time of decision is

via an ex post facto examination of appropriate documents.

In this study, content analysis was conducted in a predominantly identical manner on two prestige press newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and three publications/records of U.S. administration documents, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch (see sources of data for details).

Study Period

This study period covered nearly 10 years of Sino-American relations coverage beginning on January 1, 1985, with President Reagan's second term of office, and ending December 31, 1993, after President Clinton's first year of office (the latest date available during data collection). This study examined press and government coverage in three Cold War periods: Cold War demise (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), transitional (November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991) and post-Cold War (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993).

Sources of Data

During this study's near decade of review, Sino-American relations coverage from two prestige press newspapers was compared to Sino-American relations coverage found in three government publications. The two prestige newspapers were the New York Times and the Washington Post; the three government documents were the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch.

Press Coverage

The New York Times and Washington Post were chosen for this study since they are widely read by policy makers and for their significant influence on international politics (Cohen, 1963). These newspapers "end up influencing the content of wire service stories, TV and radio news and magazines" (Cohen, 1963, p. 299). Page and Shapiro (1984) say they are also good indicators of "the general thrust of news that reaches the citizenry" (p. 651). In addition, the fact that the New York Times and Washington Post are among a half-dozen American elite newspapers that provide the most reliable and most comprehensive foreign affairs news means that both newspapers should offer enough Sino-American coverage to test the study's agenda-setting research questions. Finally, these elite U.S. newspapers were chosen for this study not only because they tend to carry the most foreign news, but since foreign policy makers and diplomats worldwide tend to read them (Weiss, 1974; Cohen, 1963). After all, in order for this study to successfully measure the impact of U.S. press coverage on Sino-American relations, foreign policy makers need to be exposed to U.S. press coverage of such issues.

These newspapers were also used for comparison's sake. Most of the Sino-American relations coverage studies seem to use one or both of these publications. For example, Chang (1986), Cheng (1993) and Goodman (1994) used both newspapers in their analysis of U.S.-China policy coverage.

Prestige newspaper coverage was found to be a more appropriate representative of foreign policy news than its television broadcast counterparts

since newspaper reporting tends to be more in-depth and audience members tend to retain more international news information from the print media (Cassara, 1989; Chang, 1986; Paraschos and Boice, 1985). Thus, it can be assumed that Sino-American policy makers looking for more insight into Sino-American relations depend more heavily on analysis from the prestige press than from television outlets.

Presidential and State Department Documents

This study's government produced Sino-American policy articles, drawn from three government publications, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch, were viewed as an extra-media variable -- the official government historical record of "what actually happened" in Sino-American relations (Rosengren, 1970, p. 99).

The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and Presidential Papers carry documents on U.S.-China relations released by the White House, including documentation of news conferences, announcements, public speeches, agreements and messages to Congress. Together, both government-published official records of presidential activities cover all Sino-American events and issues deemed important by the President and White House (Chang, 1986).

For purposes of this study, both presidential publications were chosen due to their highly representative records of official Sino-American relations, as the following observation illustrates:

An examination of [these] presidential documents on Sino-American relations ... clearly delineated official U.S. attitudes toward China as well as

the tempo of policy change and the changing pattern. Within a historical framework ... [they provide] the necessary context under which the press performed its duties in the U.S.-China policy making process (Chang, 1986, p. 159).

While the above presidential publications act as a crucial official historical record of presidential involvement in Sino-American relations, the State Department Bulletin/Dispatch publication acts as a crucial official historical record of State Department involvement in Sino-American relations. The State Department Bulletin/Dispatch carries documents on U.S.-China relations released by the State Department, including documentation of news conferences, announcements, public speeches, agreements and messages to Congress. This official record of State Department activities and business covers Sino-American events and issues deemed important by the State Department.

There were both practical and theoretical reasons for choosing these publications to represent each administration's "official attention" to U.S.-China policy. Practically, these publications are not only considered the most frequent, comprehensive sources available of presidential and State Department messages, but they are the only such publications that were published on a consistent basis throughout this study's entire time frame and that carried monthly Sino-American policy news. Theoretically, much research has indicated that both the President and the State Department, via speeches and actions, are ultimately responsible for developing and shaping foreign policy (Hilsman, 1971; Katzenback, 1973; Chang, 1986).

Sample and Selection Criteria

Prestige Press


All New York Times and Washington Post front-page news, news, features and editorials focusing on Sino-American relations were included in this study.

Although this study is an updated version of Chang's (1986) dissertation, this study did not follow Chang's practice of analyzing only front-page news coverage opposed to general news coverage of Sino-American relations. Even though Chang (1986) found that front-page news coverage is representative of newspaper coverage found in inside pages, this researcher analyzed all Sino-American news coverage in order, via time series analysis, to make monthly comparisons of press and government coverage a possibility (for more information, see the following data analysis section). Chang (1986), who analyzed the impact of Sino-American press coverage on Sino-American government policy and vice versa on a yearly basis, suggested that monthly comparisons of press and government coverage might measure such relationships more precisely. However, when this researcher attempted to update Chang's research on a monthly basis via time series analysis, it was immediately apparent that this current study's front-page coverage was much too sparse to make this type of data analysis possible. Accordingly, in order to resolve this problem, to add substantially more data points to make time series analysis possible, this study's front-page coverage, general news and features were combined for analysis purposes.

Coverage of Sino-American relations, not China domestic issues (such as earthquakes and unrelated Chinese domestic politics), were included in this study. By

selecting Sino-American relations stories only, and eliminating general foreign coverage, this study avoided past, major methodological problems in studies on the press and foreign policy (Chang, 1986). Sino-American relations stories were defined as those stories dealing with any aspect of Sino-American affairs or interactions -- such as diplomatic and defense activities, cultural exchanges and general relations --, and/or American actions or comments regarding China or vice versa. Since the content of each article, not its country of origin, was deemed most important, stories were selected regardless of their domestic or foreign datelines. A story was considered to be focusing on Sino-American relations if at least 75 percent or more of its contents dealt with this issue. This selection process resulted in the study's 1,177 press articles, a combined total of 647 New York Times and 530 Washington Post articles.

Articles from both newspapers were located by using the Michigan State main library's UMI Newspaper Abstract CD-ROM computer-based service. In hopes of making sure that all possible Sino-American focused articles were located, a broad search was initiated by crossing "China," "Hong Kong," and "Tibet" with "America," "American," "United States," "U.S.A.," "U.S.," and "US." In order to avoid making decisions, and possible mistakes, on whether at least 75 percent of each story was focused on Sino-American relations, no articles were eliminated from the study based on computer index summaries. Student employees copied all of the computer index listed stories from microfilm onto 8 1/2" by 11" paper at Michigan State's main library. This researcher then examined this entire stack of articles, eliminating all



articles that did not fit the above outlined selection criteria.

Government Publications

Appropriate government articles were located via paper indexes attached to each of these publications. In the two presidential documents, the following categories were searched: "Asia/Asian", "China," "Communist China," "People's Republic of China," "Hong Kong," "Pacific Rim" and "Tibet." In the State Department publication, the following categories were searched: "China," "Hong Kong," "Tibet," "International Relations," "Foreign Affairs," "International Business" and "Cultural Affairs." In order to avoid making decisions, and possible mistakes, based on whether each government article met selection criteria, no articles were eliminated from the study based on index summaries. Student employees located and copied at Michigan State's main library all stories mentioning China found in these index listings. This researcher then examined this entire stack of articles, eliminating those that did not fit the government document selection criteria.

All government articles meeting the following criteria were included in this study: Government articles focusing on any aspect of Sino-American affairs or interactions -- such as diplomatic and defense activities, cultural exchanges and general relations --, and/or American actions or comments regarding China or vice versa. This selection process resulted in the study's 399 government articles, a combined total of 156 presidential articles and 243 State Department articles.

Unit of Analysis

In this study, the units of analysis were defined on two levels: each newspaper

and government article and each month of press and government analysis.

On the newspaper and government article level, both types of articles were analyzed in a nearly identical fashion for comparison's sake. For example, all articles were examined in similar manners for variables such as source usage, channel usage, deviation, crisis, violence, attitude toward Sino-American relations and perception of China. The only differences between coding the two types of articles were minimal ones. For example, a newspaper article question dealing with the column in which each article was located was not relevant to government articles and thus could not be coded in government cases.

Although Chang (1986) used each government or newspaper paragraph as his unit of analysis on the article/document level, this researcher used each government document or newspaper article for her article/document unit of analysis for many reasons, including increased reliability, consistency and efficiency. For example, in this researcher's pre-dissertation pilot study updating Chang's research, coders analyzing articles or documents via each paragraph often coded in an unreliable, inconsistent fashion. For instance, with the subject variable they had a difficult time determining the main subject of each paragraph. However, when these same coders were eventually asked to code variables such as subject according to the entire article or document, not separate paragraphs, the reliability and consistency of their answers greatly improved. And in those cases in which these coders were found to have coded paragraphs in a reliable and consistent fashion, their multiple responses for each article or document did not seem to offer much increased depth for analysis. For

example, coders often ended up merely repeating the main subject for each paragraph several times instead of just mentioning it once as the main subject of the article or document. And finally, this researcher analyzed all appropriate newspaper articles dealing with Sino-American issues, not only front-page articles. Accordingly, even if this researcher wanted to analyze all of her 1,177 press articles via paragraphs, in this study this probably would have meant analyzing 20,000 or more paragraphs overall, this researcher's time and financial constraints would not have made this type of analysis possible.

On the level concerning monthly analysis, newspaper and government article variables coded in the same month were separately aggregated. Means were then calculated for each of these aggregated variables, and the resulting aggregated means were used to facilitate newspaper versus government variable comparisons. The monthly time frame was chosen since, according to many scholars, 30 days is the optimal time frame needed for one entity to influence the other's agenda. In other words, after 30 days, agenda-setting influences seem most visible. This monthly time frame was also chosen because Chang (1986) found that a one-month unit of analysis should most accurately gauge the length of time needed for Sino-American agenda-setting to take effect (for more details, see the data analysis procedures section).

This monthly time frame may present at least two disadvantages. First, as discussed above, since front-page news coverage alone did not provide enough data points for monthly time series analysis, all additional news and features dealing with Sino-American relations needed to be analyzed. As a result, this researcher's time and

financial resources were stretched: hundreds of additional articles needed to be coded and a coder needed to be hired overtime. And second, although journalism literature suggests that it takes a month for one entity to set another's agenda, this optimum time frame, and the research that advances it, may be limited and outdated. For example, new technologies, such as e-mail and the Internet, have presented journalists and foreign policy makers with new opportunities to directly communicate with each other in a quick, informal fashion. Accordingly, agenda-setting may be taking place at a much quicker pace than is presently documented by researchers. If this is the case, studies using monthly agenda-setting analysis could be misleading. As a result, researchers using the monthly time frame may miss agenda-setting evidence that might have been discovered if agenda-setting influence was considered under a shorter time span.

Operational Definition of Variables

Major variables were operationally defined as follows:

1. Source: Sources of Sino-American relations were defined as the actors or institutions that initiate or are attributed to the ideas, measures and actions concerning Sino-American relations. Only sources clearly mentioning or referring to any aspects of Sino-American relations or American sources commenting on China or vice versa are coded in applicable source categories.

A source must be clearly signified in a traditional way, such as by an "according to" tag, or linked to assertions by verbs denoting:

- a. speaking, such as "said," "announced," "called for," "pronounced," and/or;

b. state of mind, verbs representing one's internal statements or self-described thoughts, such as "thinks," "feels," "believes," "predicts," "affirms/reaffirms," "worries," "hopes," "argues," "speculates" and "agrees" (Simon, Fico & Lacy, 1989. coding form, p. 7).

U.S.-China related sources attached to a verb representing "speaking" or "state of mind," as long as the verb clearly describes "speaking" or "state of mind," not a reporter's observation or description of an action, should be coded.

For example, in "Sharlene protested the law," it is unclear whether Sharlene actually told the reporter that she protested the law, or if the reporter observed Sharlene's actions via civil disobedience, such as a sit-in (Simon, Fico & Lacy, 1989).

In such cases, the coder must examine relative paragraphs in order to determine if an action, not "speaking" or "state of mind," is being described. If an obvious action, such as an actual protest, is being described, then a source situation does not exist and is not coded as such. However, if "speaking" or "state of mind" is described, a source situation exists and must be coded in the appropriate category.

Official versus Unofficial Sources

Although many various types of sources were coded throughout this study, this researcher later combined sources into official versus non-official categories so that press usage of sources overtime could be more readily observed in order to help determine how heavily the press relied on non-government (unofficial) versus government (official) sources in coverage of Sino-American relations.

For purposes of this study official sources were defined as White House and State Department sources, while unofficial sources were defined as non-government sources.

Unofficial sources are more likely to present unofficial viewpoints than their official government counterparts. For example, unofficial sources such as American students with Chinese friends should be expected to have a much more lenient view toward granting political asylum to 1989 pro-democracy dissidents than Bush administration officials afraid to anger the Chinese leadership. Accordingly, this study considers significant reliance on unofficial sources an important indication of more government-independent press coverage.

Since the press' job description also demands that it seeks out official sources as well in order to determine the official scenario of Sino-American relations before coming to its own conclusions and to fulfill its check-and-balance role over government in the foreign policy-making arena, government-independent press coverage is also expected to contain at least limited official sources.

2. Channel: Channels of Sino-American relations are defined as the conduit through which information about such relations is transmitted. Channels include White House and State Department press releases, news conferences, speeches, addresses and interviews.

Official versus Unofficial Channels

Although many types of various channels were coded in this study, this researcher later combined these channels into official versus non-official categories so

that press usage of channels overtime could be more readily observed in order to help determine how heavily the press relied on non-government (unofficial) channels versus government (official) channels in coverage of Sino-American relations.

For purposes of this study official channels were defined as White House and State Department channels, while unofficial channels were defined as non-government channels.

Unofficial channels are more likely to present unofficial viewpoints than their official government counterparts. For example, an unofficial Amnesty International press release dealing with allegations of Chinese government human rights abuses and the effect such abuses might have on Sino-American relations would tend to be much more critical than an official government press release on this same topic. After all, the government by nature needs to deal with such issues in a more diplomatic fashion than the press in order to maintain the most positive Sino-American relations possible. Accordingly, this study considers significant reliance on unofficial channels an important indication of government-independent press coverage.

Since the press' job description also demands that it seeks out official channels as well in order to determine the official scenario of Sino-American relations before coming to its own conclusions and to fulfill its check-and-balance role over government in the foreign policy-making arena, government-independent press coverage is also expected to contain at least limited official channels.

3. Subject: A subject is defined as the main Sino-American topic covered in each press or government article. Throughout this study, many various Sino-American

subjects were determined and coded, including cultural and educational exchanges, government and diplomacy, human rights abuses, media censorship, weapon sales, politics and international trade.

If an article contained more than one Sino-American topic, the topic taking up the most paragraphs of space was determined to be the main topic.

4. China Status Quo Deviance: Status quo deviance is defined as the extent to which each article describes its topic in terms of its threat to China's status quo, what each article considers to be China's normal political, socio-economic and/or cultural state-of-being. This study used an established four-point scale to measure this type of deviance intensity as follows: "(1) not at all threatening, (2) somewhat threatening, (3) dangerous to status quo, and (4) extremely dangerous to status quo" (Shoemaker, Danielian and Brendlinger, 1991, p. 787).

For example, while articles on increased American trade in China would tend to be good examples of coverage that offers no threat to China's status quo, articles on the 1989 Tiananmen Square government crackdown would tend to be good examples of coverage that describe the event as "extremely dangerous" to China's status quo. (Although China historians might not agree with this later assessment, for purposes of this study only the comparison of press versus government assessments of Sino-American relations is relative.)

5. U.S. Deviance: U.S. deviance is defined as the extent to which each article describes its topic in terms of its threat to U.S. norms, what each article considers to be normal U.S. political, socio-economic and/or cultural practices. This study used an

established four-point scale to measure this type of deviance intensity as follows: "(1) would not have broken any norms, (2) would have somewhat violated U.S. norms, (3) would have violated existing U.S. norms, and (4) would have seriously broken U.S. norms" (Shoemaker, Danielian and Brendlinger, 1991, p. 787).

For example, while an article on an American production of the "Music Man" being staged in Beijing would tend not to break any U.S. norms, an article accusing the Chinese government of seriously mistreating political prisoners to speed up their production of American export goods would tend to "seriously break" U.S. norms.

6. Conflict: Conflict is defined as an article's underlying description of its main topic as possessing clear-cut opposition represented by two or more individuals, groups, institutions, entities, governments or countries.

The conflict variable was coded on a "yes" or "no" basis.

While stories about educational and cultural exchanges do not tend to possess conflict, stories about U.S. government responses to Chinese missile sales to Arab countries and Chinese trademark and copyright infringements of American goods and intellectual properties tend to possess conflict.

7. Crisis: Crisis is defined as an article's underlying description of its main topic as a natural or manmade event that poses an immediate and serious threat to many citizens' piece of mind, lives and/or property.

This study used a four-point scale to measure crisis intensity as follows:

(1) no crisis, (2) limited crisis (piece of mind is seriously threatened or an actual crisis threatening life and/or property is about to begin), (3) crisis (actual crisis

threatening life and/or property exists), and (4) severe crisis (crisis resulting in an extreme loss of lives and/or property damage).

Only the most severe conflicts are also coded as crises. For example, while severe Sino-American trade clashes would be considered a clear conflict, they would not be considered as any type of crisis.

8. Non-Administration American Attitude: This variable is defined as any non-administration American individual's or group's views toward any U.S.-administration China policies, actions, initiatives or stances.

If a non-administration American view toward U.S.-China policy was found in an article, this variable was coded on the following five-point scale:

(1) unsupportive (clearly condemns or criticizes the government's Sino-American position), (2) qualified unsupportive (criticizes the government's Sino-American position while still offering some limited support of it), (3) neutral/balanced (makes no value judgment about the government's Sino-American position or offers an equal amount of criticism and praise for the position), (4) qualified supportive (praises the government's Sino-American position while still offering some limited criticism of it), and (5) supportive (clearly supports and praises the government's Sino-American position).

For example, if in a given article American students all criticized the Bush administration in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident for not moving quickly enough to help Chinese students in America stay abroad, this article's non-administration variable would have been coded as "unsupportive;" if this article's

criticism was also tapered with at least some limited government policy support, this variable would have been coded as "qualified unsupportive;" if this article's criticism of the Bush administration's policies toward helping American-based Chinese students was balanced with support of other related Bush policies, "balanced/neutral" would have been coded; if this article predominantly praised Bush's policy toward Chinese students in America and offered only limited criticism of it, "qualified supportive" would have been coded; and if this article clearly praised and supported Bush's policy toward China's students without reservations, "supportive" would have been coded.

9. **Description of China:** This variable is defined as government or non-government stated descriptions of China, excluding government or non-government Chinese descriptions/impressions of their own country.

If a description of China was found in an article, this variable was coded according to the following five-point scale:

(1) negative (clearly condemns or criticizes China), (2) qualified negative (criticizes China while still offering some limited support of it), (3) neutral/balanced (makes no value judgment about China or offers an equal amount of criticism and praise for China), (4) qualified positive (praises China while still offering some limited criticism of it), and (5) positive (clearly supports and/or praises China).

10. **Attitude Toward Sino-American Relations:** This variable is defined as any American (government or non-government) views toward any Sino-American relations.

If an American (government or non-government) view toward Sino-American

relations was found in an article, this variable was coded according to the following five-point scale: (1) unfavorable, (2) qualified unfavorable, (3) neutral/balanced, (4) qualified favorable, and (5) favorable.

Unfavorable attitudes toward Sino-American relations were defined as views that demonstrated, suggested or pointed out the negative characteristics and/or implications of Sino-American relations. Unfavorable views were often characterized by disagreements, tension and/or antagonism between the U.S. and China. Examples of unfavorable attitudes toward Sino-American relations included American criticism of China's one-child policy, copyright infringements and human rights abuses.

Favorable attitudes toward Sino-American relations were defined as views that demonstrated, suggested or pointed out the positive characteristics and/or implications of Sino-American relations. Favorable views were often characterized by agreements, cooperation, solidarity, stability and/or shared-interests. Examples of favorable attitudes toward Sino-American relations included American support of Sino-American joint-ventures and education, cultural and scientific exchanges.

Neutral/balanced attitudes toward Sino-American relations were defined as views that demonstrated, suggested or pointed out a neutral or balanced (equally positive and negative) tone toward Sino-American relations. Neutral/balanced views were often characterized by terms such as "fair-minded," "equal" and "balanced." Examples of neutral/balanced attitudes toward Sino-American relations included American views balancing the pros and cons of imposing trade sanctions against China in an attempt to improve China's human rights record and angering China by

selling American jet-fighters to Taiwan.

Finally, while "qualified unfavorable" attitudes are defined as predominantly unfavorable attitudes that possess a limited amount of favorableness, "qualified favorable" attitudes are defined as predominantly favorable attitudes that possess a limited amount of unfavorableness. An example of qualified unfavorable and qualified favorable attitudes can be illustrated with the annual China MFN (most favored nation) trade status controversy. An article that predominantly argues the granting of MFN status for China was a mistake because it seriously limited America's ability to pressure China into improving its human rights record but also briefly mentions that MFN did save American business interests in China would be coded qualified unfavorable. On the other hand, an article that predominantly argues the granting of MFN status for China was a good idea since it increased the number of Sino-American joint-ventures but also briefly mentions that, as a result, China's human rights abuses may worsen and further strain Sino-American relations would be coded as qualified favorable.

Coding procedures

Since this study's content analysis focuses on comparing administration and newspaper coverage, the majority of procedures and categories for coding both types of articles is nearly identical.

This study's units of analysis were newspaper and government articles and each month of press and government coverage. The agenda-setting impact of each of this study's variables was measured by how often each was mentioned within each

monthly time frame throughout the study and overall. In this study the frequency of many major variables is measured in three ways -- via number of articles, number of paragraphs and number of mentions. All three of these techniques have proven to be successful measurements of salience cues, have illustrated the value assigned to such salience cues and have demonstrated the influence of agenda-setting on audience views and perceptions (Salwen, 1988; Rogers & Dearing, 1988; Sigal, 1973). Once such variables were measured via all three techniques, subsequent newspaper variables were compared to government variables on a monthly basis in order to determine whether newspapers set the government's agenda or vice versa.

Throughout this study, each coding category was carefully defined, pre-tested, and, when necessary, re-defined in order to maintain mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories. In addition, all variables had answer options for non-applicable or none-of-the-above type responses to ensure that non-relative responses did not get mixed into relative ones. New categories were also added to some variables in order to improve this instrument's sensitivity. For example, in an attempt to improve the sensitivity of the scale dealing with attitudes toward Sino-American relations found in Chang's (1986) study, which consisted of favorable, unfavorable, neutral and non-applicable responses, this researcher added qualified favorable and qualified unfavorable options to this scale. These new categories were added to detect attitudes that were predominantly of one direction, but also contained less distinctive elements of another.

In addition, whenever it was unclear if additional categories for a variable

might appear once the study was well under way, spaces were left on the answer sheet for adding these additional categories. For example, new Sino-American subjects were added to the subject category list when they were discovered. Also, during data analysis categories were combined in some cases in order to facilitate newspaper and government comparisons. For example, sources were combined into official (government) and unofficial categories in order to examine in yet another manner how frequently the press turned to the government in Sino-American coverage.

Scales

This researcher attempted to increase her instrument's sensitivity by coding six of its variables via four- and five-point scales. Three of these variables were coded via five-point scales: China Status Quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance and crisis; while the remaining three variables were coded via four-point scales: American non-administration attitude toward U.S. government China stands, description of China and American attitude toward U.S.-China relations. These six variables and their scales are described in detail in the above variable definition section.

Once the coding was completed and the data were first examined, it was quickly discovered that these scales were over-sensitive. In other words, the data predominantly clumped and fell within two specific response categories, those either indicating that a variable was represented or not or that a variable was presented in a positive/supportive or negative/unsupportive fashion. For example, the responses for the crisis variable predominantly fell into one of two categories: either "crisis," a

crisis was existent, or "no crisis," a crisis was not existent. And responses to the American description of China variable fell predominantly into either "negative" or "positive" response categories, not "qualified negative," "qualified positive" or "neutral" ones. Accordingly, in order to most accurately describe the scaled variables and to most precisely pinpoint how each variable represented the government's impact on the press and vice versa, the scales were collapsed and re-coded from their original values into dichotomous values. The dichotomous values representing each of these six variables, described below, were used in this study's data analysis:

1. China status quo deviance: "Not threatening" or "threatening" China's status quo.
2. U.S. norms deviance: "Not violating" or "violating" U.S. norms.
3. Crisis: "No crisis" or "crisis."
4. American non-administration attitude toward U.S. government China stands: "Unsupportive" or "supportive" toward U.S. government China stands.
5. Description of China: "Negative" or "Positive" U.S. descriptions of China.
6. American attitude toward U.S.-China relations: "Unfavorable" or "favorable" attitude toward U.S.-China relations.

Reliability

Krippendorff (1969) found that in order for the results of content analysis to be reliable, data "should be reproducible by independent researchers, at different

locations, and at different times, using the same instructions for coding the same set of data" (p. 132). In order to assure that this study's data is reliable, both intercoder and intracoder reliability were tested in a well-established per-item agreement method -- via calculating coder agreement on one variable at a time (Kassarjian, 1977; Stempel and Westley, 1989). While intercoder reliability measures agreement between coders, which helps gauge the reliability of the instrument itself, intracoder reliability measures each coder's agreement with himself, in order to establish each coder's coding consistency (Holsti, 1969). Both types of reliability, via Scott's *pi* statistical analysis, were tested for each individual coding category.

In this study, the above reliability concerns and procedures were carried out as follows: Several student coders were trained by this researcher in a six-session coding workshop designed specifically for this project by this researcher. Throughout the workshop students and this researcher coded, together and separately, many randomly chosen practice government and press Sino-American articles that were not included in this study due to their early time frames. Coders were encouraged to critically assess coding instructions and individual categories and, as a result, in several cases coding instructions were refined and individual categories were added. When reliability tests of several students' coding began indicating high agreement, two especially reliable coders were chosen to code the actual study.

When time constraints forced one of these two coders to resign from this study, the remaining coder, a graduate student, and this researcher coded this study's official reliability tests along with the actual study itself. Ten percent of the study's

1,576 articles, 158 articles chosen in representative proportions from the New York Times, Washington Post and all three government documents, were coded for reliability test purposes. Once each coder finished coding her entire set of articles, she coded them once again in order to make intra-reliability test comparisons possible.

The intercoder reliability test found that the intercoder percent of agreement, via Scott's *pi* (Scott, 1955), ranged from 86% to 100%, with an average agreement of 92%. Scott's *pi* is calculated as follows:

$$pi = \frac{\% \text{ observed agreement} - \% \text{ expected agreement}}{1 - \% \text{ expected agreement}}$$

When using this formula, percentage of expected agreement (by chance) needs to be determined by discovering the proportion of items falling into each category of a category set and adding up the square of those proportions.

In addition, the intracoder reliability test for the intracoder percent of agreement ranged from 90% to 100%, with an average agreement of 96%.

While the strongest reliability scores were recorded for variables such as subjects, sources, non-administration attitude, description of China, conflict and U.S. norms deviance, more moderate but still strong reliability scores were recorded for variables such as channels, China status quo deviance, crisis, attitude toward Sino-American relations and violence.

Data Analysis

Data were collected in a manner most appropriate for data entry and analysis via SPSS (Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences) software and most efficient in

terms of time, energy and finances. In order to meet all of the above stipulations, this researcher took advantage of Michigan State University's computer center scoring office's professional scantron service. The scantron office helped this researcher find an appropriate scantron form, one with enough space for all possible anticipated coding responses that could be found in each article. It also taught her the ins-and-outs of coding with scantron forms.

This researcher revised and clarified her code book and her coding instructions to make scantron data entry as efficient and simple as possible. She then trained her coders on how to successfully fill out scantron forms. Coders were quick to master this skill.

After all coding was completed, this researcher shipped more than 20 pounds of scantron coding sheets to the MSU scoring office. The scoring office then used a scanning program to transform this raw data from scantron forms onto an ascii file, which was mailed to this researcher. The result of this process was a raw data computer file ready to be drawn from for this study's DOS-based SPSS-PC 4.0 analysis. Trends analysis was used for time series results.

Once all variables were named and assigned value labels and data sets and command files were created, SPSS analysis was ready to initiate. SPSS analysis was first used to run frequencies on all variables in order to make sure that all values were being read properly and no spurious values existed. All other possible mistakes were also checked for by searching for outliers and suspicious results, such as high or low numbered responses that were not given as coding options or missing results. Once

mistakes were corrected, this study's official SPSS analysis began.

SPSS was used to calculate different types of statistics in order to answer all of this study's research questions. Both simple and sophisticated statistics were used, ranging in complexity from frequency distributions to cross-tabulations to time series analysis.

Frequency distributions, which display the frequency in which each value in a given distribution was observed, were used for descriptive analysis. Cross-tabulations, using tau-c statistics for ordinal data and chi-square statistics for nominal data, were used to analyze variables being compared, determining whether differences in press and government coverage can be explained by chance. Tau-c statistics described the strength of each relationship -- relationships with scores closest to zero are considered weakest, while those closest to 1 or -1 are considered strongest. When using tau-c statistics, differences in press and government coverage determined via different variables were deemed statistically significant if they produced a minimum tau-c of .10 or -.10, a t-score greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability score less than .05. A t-score is the ratio between a statistic and its standard error. In order to substantially limit the possibility of spurious results caused by chance, researchers widely agree that relationships or correlations should not be considered significant unless there is no more than five chances in 100 that they occurred by chance. When using chi-square statistics, differences in press and government coverage determined via different variables were deemed statistically significant if they produced a t-score greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability score less than .05.

Time series analysis was also used in this study. Anderson (1971) calls a time series a "sequence of observations, usually ordered in time" (p. 1). Time series analysis, unlike basic correlations, attempts to determine the true impact of time on correlations (Ostrom, 1990). Time series represents the only type of data analysis that statistically compares means overtime. Accordingly, it is the only appropriate mode of analysis for this longitudinal study (Chang, 1986).

In order to compare means over time, this study's time series analysis aggregated each variable over a relative time frame, calculated the means for each aggregated variable and used the resulting aggregated means, representing newspaper versus government variables, in order to facilitate comparisons over time. Pearson r-squared statistics and regression analysis were then run on these aggregated means in order to determine the strength and nature of relative correlations. Correlations closest to zero are considered weakest, while those closest to 1 or -1 are considered strongest. Correlations were deemed statistically significant if they produced a T-value greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability score less than .05. In addition, time series models or charts were created, when appropriate, to describe the impact of several independent variables on a specific dependent variable. Such models included betas. The beta statistic measures the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable. It is defined as how many standard deviations the dependent variable moves for one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The greater the beta statistic number, the greater the impact a given independent variable has had on the dependent variable.

Time series analysis often attempts to determine relationships of variables overtime by lagging data. Since a dependent variable might not respond immediately to a specific increase or decrease in independent variables, lagging data allows researchers to observe effects that might have otherwise been overlooked (Ostrom, 1990). This study has already established that 30 days is the optimal time frame needed for one entity to influence the other's agenda. Accordingly, newspaper versus government aggregated means were compared on a monthly basis. For example, instead of comparing the average daily length of newspaper and government articles over time, the averages of each were calculated and compared on a monthly basis.

Since this study operated on the premise that it would take at least one month before agenda-setting effects took place, a given month of press coverage was generally compared to the next month's government coverage and vice versa. In the first scenario if a significant correlation was found between press and government coverage, the press appeared to have set the government's agenda. In the second scenario a significant correlation would suggest that, vice versa, the government set the press' agenda. If as a result of either scenario no significant correlation was found, then the press did not influence the government's agenda or vice versa. And finally, if significant correlations are not normally appearing during the above one-month lagging procedure, but when identical months of press and government coverage are compared they result in significant correlations, a third factor, such as breaking international events, may be setting both the press and government agenda.

Finally, since control of extraneous variables is beyond this study's scope,

causal relationship tests between the variables were exploratory. Accordingly, interpretations of these findings will be made with caution.


Preliminary Findings

Preliminary content analysis subject and source findings are briefly discussed in this section in order to offer readers a general overview of this data before research questions are answered.

Subjects

During this nine-year study (1985 to 1993), the prestige press drew attention to many Sino-American topics, ranging from military affairs to the pro-democracy Tiananmen Square ordeal. From the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period, Sino-American press coverage predominantly grew steadily, with the exception of a dramatic upward spike largely due to Tiananmen Square coverage. This spike in coverage began with the 1988 democratic incidents that led to the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement, culminated with the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and rapidly dropped during the post-Tiananmen Square period. However, in the Tiananmen Square aftermath the amount of overall Sino-American coverage did not rapidly decline to pre-Tiananmen coverage levels. After the Tiananmen Square government crackdown, most topics, with the exception of Tiananmen Square itself, were covered more heavily than before the Tiananmen Square democratic protests began. In addition, coverage of these topics mostly remained consistently higher after the Tiananmen Square government crackdown than before it (see figure 3, p. 135).

Figure 3: Subjects in U.S.-China Coverage



During the Tiananmen Square ordeal, all but one major Sino-American subject received the heaviest coverage: immigration. Immigration issue coverage spiked up after the Tiananmen Square incident mostly due to Tiananmen Square activists seeking political asylum in America.

According to agenda-setting theory, topics receiving the heaviest coverage have not only drawn the most press attention, but have influenced the press to consider such topics among the most important in Sino-American relations. Throughout this study the press' most consistently predominant topics, in order of heaviest to lightest press coverage, consisted of military affairs, diplomacy, human rights, MFN, economy/business and Tiananmen Square. In addition, Chinese immigration to America was the heaviest covered topic during both the transitional and post-Cold War time frames -- especially the latter. Even though the 1989 Tiananmen Square ordeal was viewed as an extremely important Sino-American development, in the larger scheme of Sino-American relations military affairs were most often emphasized by the press from 1985 through 1990, while immigration was most emphasized from 1992 through 1993.

Throughout this nine-year study, military affairs topics were most heavily covered. During the Cold War demise period, early coverage focused on topics such as American reactions to China's selling of weapons and nuclear technology to Arab countries and nuclear testing, while later coverage focused on American criticism of China's 1989 military crackdown on pro-democracy advocates in Tiananmen Square and Bush's decision to temporarily freeze military-related interactions between the

Chinese and Americans. After the Tiananmen Square incident, during the transitional and post-Cold War periods, military coverage focused on topics such as China's anger over American jet-fighter sales to Taiwan and American reactions to increased Chinese sales of nuclear technology to developing countries.

Sino-American diplomacy issues were the second most often covered subjects throughout this study. During the Cold War demise period, such coverage began with America's continuing efforts to switch its allegiance from Taiwan to China in order to improve Sino-American relations and meetings between Chinese and American leaders and culminated with strained Sino-American relations after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. After Tiananmen Square, during the transitional period, heavy diplomatic coverage focused on criticism of Bush's handling of post-Tiananmen Sino-American policy -- what was seen as his premature attempts to return Sino-American relations to their previous standing shortly after the Tiananmen Square incident ended. During this study's post-Cold War period, diplomatic issues were normally less controversial and often focused on business concerns, such as trying to get the Chinese government's help in cracking down on Chinese copyright infringements.

Human rights were the third most covered Sino-American topic. During the Cold War demise period, human rights coverage began with issues such as China's one-child per family, Tibetan and political dissident policies and culminated with major criticism of the Chinese government's Tiananmen Square crackdown on peaceful Chinese pro-democracy demonstrators. During the transitional period, most human rights coverage seemed to focus on Bush's post-Tiananmen Sino-American

relations. Newspaper coverage highly criticized Bush for his lackluster response to the Chinese government crackdown, for trying to rebuild Sino-American relations to its pre-Tiananmen level without first adequately punishing the Chinese government for its huge human rights atrocity. During the post-Cold War period, human rights abuse coverage remained strong with stories focusing on everything from Chinese prison labor abuse to continued Chinese mistreatment of political dissidents.

Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was the fourth most covered Sino-American topic. MFN coverage deals with economic and human rights concerns. MFN trade status is an advantage America grants to preferred countries in order to enable them to sell their goods to American markets at low tariff rates. This preferred trade status, until recently, has been partially based on each country's improved human rights record. Since China's human rights record never seems to improve enough to meet international human rights standards, throughout this study Congress and the President constantly grappled over whether to renew China's MFN status during the yearly renewal-option period. Throughout this study, often to Congress' chagrin, each President has renewed China's MFN status without interruption. Although the MFN issue is always hotly debated, it was debated most heavily just after the Tiananmen Square crackdown since the President was on deadline to renew or revoke China's MFN status during the same time period. After the Tiananmen Square incident, during the transitional and post-Cold War period, MFN coverage remained strong, especially surrounding its yearly renewal period.

Business/economy coverage was the fifth most often covered Sino-American

topic. During the Cold War demise period, business/economy coverage predominantly focused on the increasing amount of American business ventures in China, such as the opening of Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants and Jeep dealerships in Beijing.

During the transitional and post-Cold War periods, business and economy coverage remained strong, with topics ranging from increasing Sino-American trade opportunities to Chinese unfair trade practices.

Finally, although military affairs consistently received the heaviest coverage throughout the study, immigration was the heaviest covered topic after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in both the transitional and post-Cold War time frames, although this coverage was heaviest in the post-Cold War era. During the transitional period, the main immigration topic dealt with the many Chinese students and political dissidents that escaped from China during and immediately following the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown, and the Chinese students living in America during this time frame. While many of these students and dissidents wanted to become permanent U.S. citizens, others wanted to merely extend their visas. As previously stated, during the post-Cold War period immigration coverage was at its highest point. The vast majority of this coverage focused on the sudden influx of Chinese boat people sailing into American harbors and seeking American political asylum, and the pressure the Chinese government placed on the American administration to send these dissidents home.

During this study's nine-year time frame, subjects covered most heavily, such as military affairs and diplomacy, seemed most important to the press. However, on a

deeper level, the 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement and Chinese government crackdown seemed to most fundamentally influence the press' view of the importance of Sino-American relations. Not only did the Tiananmen Square ordeal focus massive press attention on the Tiananmen Square issue itself, as illustrated in the substantial spike in this coverage during the Tiananmen Square ordeal, but it seems to have led to heavier overall post-Tiananmen Square coverage of Sino-American relations. In other words, it seems as though the Tiananmen Square incident somehow influenced the prestige press to make Sino-American relations a higher priority item.

Sources

During this study, the press' use of both unofficial and official sources predominantly grew consistently over time with the exception of a dramatic upward spike in Tiananmen Square ordeal sources, a scenario similar to that of the overall amount of Sino-American coverage overtime. In addition, the press tended to use proportionally more unofficial versus official sources during the Cold War's collapse, the Cold War demise and transitional periods, than during the post-Cold War era. Unofficial sources are more likely than their official counterparts to give unofficial views of Sino-American relations. For example, unofficial sources such as American students with Chinese friends should be expected to have a much more lenient view toward granting political asylum to 1989 pro-democracy dissidents than Bush administration officials who were afraid to anger the Chinese leadership. Accordingly, this study considers significant reliance on unofficial sources an important indication


of government-independent press coverage. As a result, official versus unofficial source usage suggests that during all three of this study's Cold War stages press coverage is more government independent than during the Cold War proper. In addition, source usage results also indicate that during the Cold War's collapse, press coverage was more government independent than during the post-Cold War period.

Since the press' job description demands that it seeks out official sources as well as unofficial ones to determine the official scenario of Sino-American relations before coming to its own conclusions in order to fulfill its check-and-balance role over the government in the foreign policy-making arena, government-independent press coverage is expected to contain at least limited official sources.

The attached figure (figure 4, p. 142) illustrates the amount of unofficial and official sources used in Sino-American newspaper coverage throughout this study. It shows that throughout the Cold War's demise the press consistently turned to many more unofficial sources than official ones. Also, both unofficial and official Sino-American sources tended to consistently increase over time. That is, with the exception of the upward spike due to Tiananmen Square democratic protests and crackdown. After the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown, an immediate, dramatic decline of both types of sources took place. However, after the Tiananmen ordeal both unofficial and official source use settled at a higher level than in the pre-Tiananmen Square period. And both types of source usage steadily increased up until the end of this study.

During the Cold War's demise, unofficial source usage averaged about double

Figure 4: Official Nature of Sources Named in U.S.-China Coverage



official source usage. During the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown, unofficial source usage more than tripled over official source usage (it topped out at about 1,100 unofficial source usages versus about 300 official source usages). Obviously, unofficial source usage increased with conflict and especially crisis situations. After the Tiananmen incident, during the transitional period, unofficial source use decreased even though it remained high. It was not until the post-Cold War era that average unofficial source use proportionally decreased from triple to double that of official source usage as official source use increased. This finding was perhaps a result of Clinton's more open approach to Sino-American relations, he was more accessible to the media than either Reagan or Bush. These source results also illustrate that the press appeared less government independent during Clinton's presidency, perhaps due to Clinton's more effective press management style and/or the less dramatic Sino-American developments facing the Clinton administration during the post-Cold War era.

In other words, the press may have turned more to official sources during the Clinton administration since it offered relatively easy access to such information and, since no major Sino-American crisis was brewing at the time, the press may have been less inclined to challenge the Clinton administration's Sino-American initiatives and activities. And since the press was getting the information it needed from official sources, perhaps it did not see the need to seek out as many unofficial sources for verification's sake as it did during the much more controversial, dramatic Cold War demise and transitional periods.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS

This researcher used frequencies, cross-tabulations, including tau-c and chi-square statistics, and time series analysis to answer five research questions based on agenda-setting theory. These research questions helped pinpoint the Cold War stages in which government-independent press coverage was found and helped describe the amount and characteristics of such government-independent press coverage.

While research question #1 focused on determining during which time frame press coverage was most government independent, research question #2 dealt with whether the press set the government's agenda or vice versa. Research question #3 dealt with the characteristics of the most government-independent press coverage, while research questions #4 and #5 dealt with comparing government-independent press coverage across Cold War periods and administrations.

Research Question #1: If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the transitional period or the post-Cold War period?

Research question #1 focused on determining during which time frame press coverage was most government independent. First, it found that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's demise. Cold War demise press coverage differed from government coverage in a significant manner (a minimum tau-

c of .10 or -.10, a t-score greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and a probability value less than .05) via all of the following nine variables: China status quo deviance (see table 1, p. 146), U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict, violence, American non-administration attitude toward U.S-China relations, China description, economic change (see table 2, p. 147) and story length (see table 3, p. 148). Second, it also found that press coverage appears to grow less independent as time goes on. This significant finding is best illustrated by the following two variables: China status quo deviance and China descriptions. During the Cold War's demise, the press and government demonstrate the most significant disagreement on the extent to which certain issues represent a threat to China's status quo and whether they view the Chinese government in a more positive, negative or neutral light. From the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War period the degree of government versus press disagreement between China status quo and China description significantly decreases. Since the press and government disagree most on these issues during the Cold War's demise and disagree least on these issues during the post-Cold War era, press coverage appears to grow less independent overtime.

As stated above, the Cold War demise period was determined most government independent. This finding was based on statistical findings during this period indicating the highest tau-c scores and most frequent statistically significant differences in the manner in which the press and government characterize certain issues, place them into context and/or consider their importance. The nine variables supporting this finding are described as follows:

Numbers in all tables are percentages.

Table 1: China Status Quo Deviance

Time Period	Press Cov.	Government Cov.	Tau-C	T
Cold War's Demise	28.1	8.3	-.26	-8.74
Transitional	18.5	3.5	-.10	-3.71
Post Cold War	8	0	-.13	-5.42

Table 2: Cold War's Demise Press Coverage

Variable	Press Cov.	Government Cov.	Tau-C	T
China Status Quo Deviation (a great deal)	28.1	8.3	-.26	8.75
U.S. Norms Deviation (a great deal)	42	18.2	-.26	-7.55
Crisis (a great deal)	24.2	7.2	-.22	-7.86
Conflict	70	26	-.34	-10.36
Violence	31.7	10.5	-.16	-6.66
American Non-Adm. Attitude Toward China	24.2	positive 75.1	.43	13.51
	41.2	negative 6.1		
	34.5	neutral 18.8		
China Description	6.7	positive 32.6	.29	9.
	35.1	negative 11.6		
	58.2	neutral 55.8		
Economic Change	13.9	37.6	.18	5.87

Table 3: Length Variable

Number of paragraphs	Press Cov.	Government Cov.
1-9	23.6	76.8
10-19	46.7	9.9
20-29	22.4	5.0
30 or more	7.3	8.3

Tau-C = -.38 T = -9.89

Table 4: China Description (positive)

Time Period	Press Cov.	Government Cov.	Tau-C	T
Cold War's Demise	7	33	.30	9
Transitional	8	30	.18	5.51
Post Cold War	17	19.4	.06	1.2

1. 28% of press coverage indicated a great deal of China status quo deviance compared to only 8.3% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.26$; $t=-8.75$).

2. 42% of press coverage indicated a great deal of U.S. norms deviance compared to only 18.2% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.26$; $t=-7.55$).

3. 24% of press coverage indicated a great deal of crisis compared to only 7.2% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.22$; $t=-7.86$).

4. 70% of press coverage indicated conflict compared to only 26% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.34$; $t=-10.36$).

5. 32% of press coverage indicated violence compared to only 10.5% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.16$; $t=-6.66$).

6. Press coverage of U.S. government Sino-American policy is positive 24.2% of the time versus 75.1% government coverage of Sino-American policy; press coverage is negative 41.2% of the time versus 6.1% government coverage; press coverage is neutral 34.5% of the time versus 18.8% government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=.43$; $t=13.51$).

7. Press coverage of China descriptions is positive 6.7% of the time versus 32.6% of the time for government coverage of China; press coverage of China is negative 35.1% of the time versus 11.6% government coverage; press coverage of China is neutral 58.2% of the time versus 55.8% government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=.29$; $t=9$).

8. 14% of press coverage dealt with economic change compared to 37.6% of government coverage; 86.1% of press coverage did not deal with economic change

compared to 62.4% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=.18;t=5.87$).

9. 7% of press coverage is the longest (30 or more paragraphs), versus 8.3% of government coverage; 22.4% of press coverage is the second longest (20 to 29 paragraphs) versus 5% of government coverage; 46.7% is the third longest (10 to 19 paragraphs) of press coverage versus 9.9% of government coverage; and 23.6% is shortest (1 to 9 paragraphs) of press coverage versus 76.8% of government coverage ($\tau\text{-}c=-.38;t=-9.89$).

As for Cold War demise press coverage being most independent, transitional coverage being second most independent and post-Cold War coverage being least independent, the significant differences between press and government perceptions toward China status quo threats and the Chinese government itself (measured by the China description variable) support this finding.

For example, during the Cold War demise period 28.1% of press articles indicated there was a great threat to China's status quo versus 8.3% of government articles ($\tau\text{-}c=-.26;t=-8.74$); compared to 18.5% of press articles to 3.5% of government articles in the transitional period ($\tau\text{-}c=-.10;t=-3.71$); and 8% of press articles and zero government articles in the post-Cold War period ($\tau\text{-}c=-.13;t=-5.42$) (see table 1, p. 146).

In addition, during the Cold War demise period 7% of press articles gave positive descriptions of China (Chinese government) versus 33% of government articles ($\tau\text{-}c=.3;t=9$); compared to 8% of press articles to 30% of government articles in the transitional period ($\tau\text{-}c=.18;t=5.51$). By the post-Cold War period,

significant relationships between press and government descriptions disappeared --

17% of press articles gave positive descriptions of China versus 19.4% of government articles ($\tau\text{-}c=.06$; $t=1.2$) (see table 4, p. 148).

Research Question #2: If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage influence the government's agenda?

Research question #2 dealt with whether the press set the government's agenda or vice versa. Since agenda-setting literature claims it takes one month for one entity to set another's agenda, this question was answered by using time series analysis to compare each month of government coverage to press coverage one month later and vice versa. As a result, it found that neither the press nor the government set each other's agenda. However, it also found that when government and press coverage were considered during identical months, this coverage was often significantly correlated. In other words, the government and press not only appeared to focus on many of the same issues at the same time, but also covered many of these issues in a similar manner. This finding may suggest that breaking Sino-American events set both the government and press agenda.

As determined in question #1, the Cold War demise period possesses the most government-independent press coverage, while the transitional period possesses the second most government-independent press coverage. An examination of the agenda-setting capabilities and vulnerabilities of press coverage during both time frames follows.

Cold War demise period coverage

The press' agenda during the Cold War demise period was not set by the government. This finding is based on the fact that during this era when each month of government coverage was compared to press coverage one month later, there were no significant results. Accordingly, this lack of significant results means that the government appeared to have limited if any impact on the press' agenda. In other words, government perceptions, views or stances toward Sino-American relations, measured via this study's many variables, were not significantly echoed or repeated by the press. Examples of the lack of significant government influence on press coverage is illustrated by the following four variables: American attitudes toward Sino-American relations ($r\text{-squared} = .088; t = -1.13$); American non-administration attitudes toward government Sino-American policy ($r\text{-squared} = .184; t = 1.55$); U.S. norms deviance ($r\text{-squared} = .082; t = .4$); and economic development ($r\text{-squared} = .256; t = -.348$) (see table 5, p. 153). All of the above correlations are deemed insignificant since their t-scores are not greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and their p-values are not less than .05.

P-values, which measure significance, determine whether a relationship or correlation is due to an independent variable's impact on a dependent variable or merely by chance or randomness. Scholars widely agree that a relationship or correlation should only be considered significant if its p-value indicates less than five chances in 100 ($p < .05$) that the relationship or correlation is a result of chance. In other words, a five in 100 risk of a correlation being a result of chance is an

Table 5: Government Has No Measurable Impact On Press Coverage During Cold War's Demise

Variable	r - squared	T
American attitudes toward Sino-American relations	.088	-1.13
American non-administration attitudes toward government Sino-American policy	.184	1.55
U.S. norms deviance	.082	.4
Economic development	.256	-.348

* In order for a relationship to be significant, its t-score must be >1.96 or <-1.96.

acceptable risk. According to the same line of reasoning, correlations with p-values indicating a greater than five chance in 100 ($p > .05$) that a correlation occurred by chance should be deemed insignificant. Such p-values demonstrate that there is too much of a risk that given correlations may be caused by chance, not an independent variable's impact on a dependent variable.

The above four correlations' lack of significance means that in all four relationships the independent variables (Cold War demise government coverage variables) did not impact or predict the dependent variables (Cold War demise press coverage variables). Simply put, the government's views and stances toward Sino-American relations, whether a Sino-American issue is deviant according to American standards and economic development did not appear to influence press views or stances toward these same issues.

Although the government did not set the press' agenda during the Cold War's demise, this does not mean that the press set the government's agenda during this same time frame. During the Cold War demise period neither the government nor the press set each other's agendas. When each month of press coverage was compared to government coverage one month later, the vice versa of what was explained above, there were no significant findings. Examples of this lack of significant press impact on the government's agenda were illustrated by the following four variables, the same four variables used above to illustrate the government's lack of influence on press coverage: American attitudes toward Sino-American relations ($r\text{-squared} = .084$; $t = .945$); American non-administration attitudes toward government Sino-American

policy ($r\text{-squared} = .004; t = -.225$); U.S. norms deviance ($r\text{-squared} = .098; t = .598$); and economic development ($r\text{-squared} = .137; t = 1.59$) (see table 6, p. 156). For example, in the American attitudes toward Sino-American relations variable this lack of significance is illustrated by a t-score of .945 and p-value greater than .05. All of the above relationships are deemed insignificant due to t-scores not greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and p-values not less than .05.

Simply put, the press' views and stances toward Sino-American relations, Sino-American policy, whether a Sino-American issues is deviant according to American standards and economic development did not significantly impact, predict or influence government views or stances toward these same issues.

Although during the Cold War demise era neither the government nor the press set each other's agenda, in many instances the two entities' opinions and stances were significantly and positively correlated. In other words, the government and press not only seemed to emphasize Sino-American coverage during the same monthly time frames, they also tended to focus on many of the same issues at the same time. This finding was determined by comparing government and press coverage variables during identical months. Examples of these significant results are represented in the five following variables: democratic mentions ($r\text{-squared} = .714; t = 13.53$); Tiananmen Square coverage ($r\text{-squared} = .774; t = 16.63$); amount of paragraphs ($r\text{-squared} = .297; t = 5.18$); amount of articles ($r\text{-squared} = .31; t = 4.64$) and human rights coverage ($r\text{-squared} = .149; t = 3.11$) (see table 7, p. 157). As explained above, all of the above relationships were deemed statistically significant due to t-scores greater than 1.96 or

**Table 6: Press Has No Measurable Impact On Government
During Cold War's Demise**

Variable	r - squared	T
American attitudes toward Sino-American relations	.084	.945
American non-admin- istration attitudes toward government Sino-American policy	.004	-.225
U.S. norms deviance	.098	.598
Economic development	.137	1.59

* In order for a relationship to be significant, its t-score must be >1.96 or <-1.96.

Table 7: Press and Government Coverage Correlate
During Cold War's Demise

Variable	r - squared	T
Democratic mentions	.714	13.53
Tiananmen Square coverage	.774	16.63
Amount of paragraphs	.297	5.18
Amount of articles	.31	4.64
Human rights coverage	.149	3.11

less than -1.96 and p-values less than .05.

For example, the Tiananmen Square coverage correlation mentioned above ($r\text{-squared} = .774; t = 16.63$) is statistically significant due to its t-score of 16.63 and p-value less than .05. In other words, it is a safe assumption that this correlation did not occur by chance. R-squared is defined as the percentage of variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variable. Accordingly, the independent variable (government Tiananmen Square coverage in the first case scenario, press Tiananmen Square coverage in the second) appears to account for 77.4% of the change in the dependent variable (press coverage respective to the first case scenario, government coverage respective to the second). Only 22.6% of the variance in the dependent variable is not accounted for in its correlation with the independent variable. In both case scenarios, the independent variable is helpful in estimating the dependent variable.

Simply put, the press and government tended to emphasize, during the same monthly time frames, the following: democratic mentions, Tiananmen Square coverage, human rights coverage and overall Sino-American coverage (according to the amount of paragraphs and amount of articles variables). Although this study was not set up to determine which, if any, third party set both the government's and press' agenda, these results suggest that breaking Sino-American news may have set both the press and government agendas.

Transitional period coverage

The press' tendency to maintain some degree of independence from

government influence by side-stepping government agenda setting was also evident during the transitional era. As in the Cold War demise period, transitional period press coverage did not appear to influence the government's agenda or vice versa. However, as was also indicated in the Cold War demise period, that did not mean that the press and government never shared similar views and stances during the transitional period. On the contrary, examples of shared, similar perspectives are demonstrated by significant correlations (t-score is greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96, p-value is less than .05) demonstrated by the following two variables: amount of Tiananmen Square coverage and China description, specifically the tendency to describe the Chinese government in a negative fashion. When press and government coverage during this time frame were compared on an identical month-by-month basis, the press' and government's respective focus on Tiananmen coverage was strongly correlated ($r\text{-squared} = .774; t = 3.71$). In addition, every negative press description of the Chinese government was accompanied by .39 of a negative government description ($r\text{-squared} = .29; t = 2.68$) (see table 8, p. 160). In other words, for approximately every two and one-quarter times the press described the Chinese government in a negative fashion, the government followed suit once.

Research Question #3: Under what types of conditions or contexts does Sino-American policy tend to receive the most government-independent press coverage?

Research question #3 dealt with the characteristics of the most government-independent press coverage. It found that press coverage appeared to be most independent when conflict clearly existed or when the press carried a positive attitude

**Table 8: Press and Government Coverage Correlate During
Transitional Period**

Variable	r - squared	T
Tiananmen Square coverage	.774	3.71
Negative description of China	.29	2.68

toward Sino-American relations. It suggested that more independent coverage tends to be conflict oriented since when conflict arises, it is the press' duty to serve the public by seeking out alternative, unofficial perspectives on the problem at hand. In addition, the more the press turns toward unofficial entities opposed to official ones, the more the likelihood that resulting press coverage will consist of more unofficial or government-independent press views than official ones. Accordingly, conflict-oriented coverage was determined to be more government independent than coverage not containing conflict due to the tendency of such coverage to turn to unofficial channels for information. The finding that much government-independent coverage tends to possess a positive attitude toward Sino-American issues may be due to the fact that when no Sino-American conflict is brewing, a China news hole is left open. And, as a result, China reporters may tend to fill such news holes with lighter articles about Sino-American topics, such as innovative new Sino-American joint ventures or interesting cultural differences between America and China. This study determined that press coverage containing positive press attitudes tends to be more government independent based on its finding that positive attitude coverage tends to rely on an increased proportion of unofficial versus official sources for information. Since increased reliance on unofficial sources tends to translate into more government-independent coverage, positive attitude press coverage appears to be especially government independent.

Conflict coverage -- reliance on unofficial channels and official sources increases

In clear conflict situations, the press tends to turn more often to unofficial

channels than when clear conflict does not exist. Since unofficial entities tend to offer more unofficial, government independent views of Sino-American relations than official entities, an increased reliance on unofficial entities tend to lead to more government-independent coverage. Accordingly, this study's increased reliance on unofficial channels tends to result in more unofficial, government-independent coverage. In addition, this most independent coverage also contains a significant amount of official sources. Although this unofficial channel and official source finding seem to contradict each other, this study's literature review suggests they do not. During a clear international conflict the press needs to interview official sources in order to fulfill its professional duty of explaining the official version of the conflict and how to overcome it. The press demonstrated its more government-independent approach to conflict stories by simultaneously reporting official views of the conflict while downplaying these official views via unofficial views derived from unofficial channels.

As suggested above, when conflict exists, unofficial channel use is highest. For example, when conflict exists 87% of press articles carry the highest possible amount of unofficial channels (5 or more) compared to only 13.4% of press articles with the highest amount of unofficial channels when no conflict is present ($\tau = .11; t = 4.7$) (see table 9, p. 163). However, as also suggested above, during clear conflict situations press usage of official sources is highest. When a clear conflict exists, 90.1% of press articles carry the highest amount possible of official sources (10 or more), compared to only 9.9% of press articles with the highest amount of

Table 9: Amount of Unofficial Sources vs. Conflict

	Amount of Sources		
Conflict	5 +	Tau-C	T
Clear Conflict	87		
		.11	4.7
No Conflict	13.4		

Table 10: Amount of Official Sources vs. Conflict

	Amount of Sources		
Conflict	10 +	Tau-C	T
Clear Conflict	90.1		
		.23	8.86
No Conflict	9.9		

official sources when no conflict is present ($\tau\text{-}c=.23$; $t=8.86$) (see table 10, p. 163).

Although this second finding may seem to contradict the first, the standard operating procedure of the press during conflict situations suggests that it does not. In times of international conflict, the press would not be acting professionally if it did not seek out official government views of the conflict at hand. The fact that the press sought out government views during an international conflict does not label it as government dependent. The manner in which the press handles the official version of the news is what determines its level of government independence. For example, a totally government-dependent press would merely echo government views, while a more government-independent press would critically analyze them.

However, the press' independent tendency to seek out more unofficial channels during clear conflict situations seems to have weakened during the Clinton post-Cold War era. The strength of the relationship between unofficial channels and clear conflict has dropped from a statistically significant $\tau\text{-}c$ of .11 ($t=4.7$) in the Cold War demise period to a statistically insignificant $\tau\text{-}c$ of .07 ($t=1.6$) in the post-Cold War period (see table 11, p. 165). This conclusion supports previous findings that the amount of government-independent press coverage continuously decreased from the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War era.

Positive press attitude coverage -- reliance on unofficial sources increases

Press coverage also seems to be most government independent when the press has a positive attitude toward U.S.-China relations. This conclusion is based on cross-tab and time series findings that articles with positive attitudes toward Sino-American

Table 11: Unofficial Channels in Conflict Coverage
Cold War Demise vs. Post-Cold War Periods

Period	Tau-C	T
Cold War demise	.11	4.7
Post Cold War	.07	1.6

relations seem to rely more heavily on unofficial sources than official ones.

As demonstrated in the attached time series model (see table 12, p. 167), articles with positive press attitudes are more responsible for driving up article reliance on unofficial sources than any other variable. This conclusion was made after determining that the positive press attitude's beta statistic (.343) was higher than any other betas associated with the only other three variables that were found to have a significant impact on the dependent variable, the percentage of unofficial to official sources paragraphs found in press coverage. In this model, positive betas represent increased reliance on unofficial sources while negative betas represent increased reliance on official sources. The three other independent variables were crisis (beta=.19), concrete issues (beta=-.30) and U.S. norms deviance (beta=-.20). The impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable was determined by regressing source paragraphs on each independent variable, one by one (specifics about the three other variables will be discussed later in this section). The impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable is measured via the beta. The beta statistic is defined as how many standard deviations the dependent variable moves for one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The greater the beta statistic number, the greater the impact a given variable has had on the dependent variable. That is, if the relationship illustrated by each beta is statistically significant. (All independent variables mentioned on the current model are significant. Although all of the study's major variables were tested to determine if they had a significant impact on the dependent variable at hand, only those variables deemed statistically

Table 12: Unofficial Press Sources

Variables in the Equation:

R-Squared = .274

	BETA	P
Positive Attitude	.343	.00028832
Crisis	-.20	.03387314
Concrete	-.30	.00116889
Deviance	-.19	.03498246

significant are represented in this model.)

The fact that out of all of this model's four independent variables the biggest beta is associated with the positive attitude variable indicates that this variable is most responsible for a larger proportion of unofficial to official sources (beta = .343). In other words, a larger proportion of sources are unofficial in stories with positive attitudes toward U.S.-China relations. Thus, the overall ratio of unofficial to official sources goes up, making the press more government independent. Although the overall ratio of unofficial versus official sources increases when the press portrays U.S.-China relations in a positive light, this does not mean that the press is using more unofficial sources than official ones in such coverage. In reality, it is merely using fewer official sources. When press coverage of U.S.-China relations portrays a positive attitude, the greatest amount of official sources (10 or more) is found in 18% of the news coverage; versus 58.7% of the greatest amount of official sources found in negative coverage (tau-c = .11; t = 2.9) (see table 13, p. 169).

This finding seems to be best explained by standard journalism needs and practices. Press coverage possessing a positive attitude is less likely to deal with a turbulent situation. After all, according to standard journalism practice turbulent situations are usually not covered in a positive fashion. As a result, since positive attitude coverage tends to focus on uncontroversial issues, less official input, such as official sources, are normally needed to flesh out such stories. For example, throughout this study stories about increased American joint ventures in China tended to focus much more on the personal anecdotes of American businessmen and women

Table 13: Amount of Official Sources vs. Press Attitude

	Amount of Sources		
Attitude	10 +	Tau-C	T
Positive	18		
		.11	2.9
Negative	58.7		

conducting business in China than on any official government reactions to increased Sino-American business ventures. On the contrary, press coverage possessing a negative attitude is more likely to focus on worrisome turbulent situations. And in such problem situations, journalists are bound by duty to seek out official sources in order to understand the official perspective of the situation before seeking out unofficial perspectives to temper such views. For example, the most consistently negative coverage throughout this study focused on what the press perceived to be President Bush's lack of serious sanctions against China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Obviously, the press needed to seek out official sources before it was able to learn enough about Bush policy to write thoughtful criticisms of it.

Official source reliance increases in conflict and U.S. norms deviance coverage

What drives the press to seek out official sources? As previously discussed, one of the two most important conditions is when conflict is clear. The second most important condition is when coverage deviates from U.S. norms. As explained above, journalists tend to seek out official sources in high conflict situations because official government perspectives are an important aspect of such coverage. In addition, this study has also found that stories possessing the most deviance from U.S. norms tend to possess conflict.

This finding seems to be supported by this study's literature review of this topic. Since U.S. journalists tend to cover stories in accordance with American cultural values and perspectives, stories that directly oppose American sensibilities tend to be viewed, from a cultural, political and/or socio-economic perspective, as

possessing clear conflict. Press coverage about American views on China's restrictive one-child policy is a good Sino-American example. American press coverage of the completely alien concept of a government forcing a family to bear only one-child or face harsh political and economic repercussions tended to be negative and stressed the underlying basic conflict between Chinese and American views toward population control. Most of this study's Sino-American one-child policy coverage focused on American debates on the conflict over whether China should be economically punished, via cutbacks in foreign aid, for what many Americans viewed as a significant human rights abuse. The press tended to cover this conflict by seeking out official sources, which explained how this issue impacted Sino-American relations, and later tempering official perspectives with unofficial ones. Since coverage possessing U.S. norms deviance also tended to possess clear conflict, journalists covering such stories tended to be twice as likely to turn toward an increased number of official sources for information.

The tendency of coverage possessing U.S. norms deviance to rely more heavily on official sources was found to be statistically significant via the following cross-tabulation and time series results.

Cross-tabulation results indicated that when the greatest amount of U.S. norms deviance is present, the greatest amount of official sources (10 or more) are present 58.2% of the time; versus when no U.S. norms deviance is present the greatest amount of official sources is present 32.9% of the time ($\tau\text{-c}=.16$; $t=6.31$) (see table 14, p. 172).

Table 14: Amount of Official Sources vs. U.S. Norms
Deviation

	Amount of Sources		
U.S. Norms Deviation	10 +	Tau-C	T
The greatest amount	58.2		
		.16	6.31
None	32.9		

The tendency of U.S. norms deviance stories to be more reliant on official sources than unofficial ones is also supported in the time series table explained above (table 12, p. 167). Since U.S. norms deviance ($\beta = -.20$) is traveling in a negative direction (indicated by the negative β), it indicates reliance on official, not unofficial, sources. Accordingly, U.S. norms deviance is more reliant on official sources than unofficial ones.

Research Question #4: How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare across all three administrations?

Research question #4 dealt with comparing government-independent press coverage across administrations. It found that press coverage was most government independent during the Reagan administration, second most government independent during the Bush administration and the least government independent during the Clinton administration. This conclusion was based on significant cross-tab findings that from the Reagan to the Clinton administration, the press' official source usage tended to significantly increase during conflict situations while unofficial source usage tended to decrease overall. The press' tendency to use an increased amount of official sources during conflict situations was illustrated in the previous question. What has not yet been discussed is why reliance on official source use during conflict situations increases from this study's earliest administration through its latest.

The increase in official source usage during conflict situations from the Reagan to Clinton administration may be best explained by the amount of access each administration offered the press. After all, since each new administration offered more access to the press than its predecessor -- Reagan offered the least access to the

press, Bush offered more access to the press and Clinton offered the most access to the press -- it makes sense that the press would take advantage of this increasing access to information.

In addition, cross-tabulations indicated that, ironically, increased press usage of official sources correlated with negative press views of each administration's Sino-American policies. That is, with the exception of the Clinton administration. During the Clinton administration, increased press usage of official sources correlated with positive press views of the Clinton administration's Sino-American policies. These findings seem to be best explained by the press' standard practice of trying to remain as government independent as possible even when quality coverage of Sino-American relations, especially during conflict situations, requires at least partial reliance on official government sources for information.

During the Reagan administration, when press coverage was most independent, the press often at least partially relied on official sources to flesh out stories. However, as soon as the press collected its official government version of Sino-American activities it often turned around and criticized the Reagan administration for its views and actions. For example, the press tended to interview many U.S. official sources about their views toward Chinese crackdowns on political dissidents and China's occupation of Tibet. However, when the press wrote about such issues it strongly criticized the Reagan administration for not punishing the Chinese government for such activities.

During the Bush administration, the press' approach to using official sources

as a means to an end continued. As press access increased to this administration, the press took advantage of this increased openness by interviewing more official government sources. However, the press' tendency to disapprove of Bush's approaches to Sino-American relations still led to negative coverage of Sino-American policy. For example, reporters covering Sino-American relations heavily interviewed Bush administration officials during the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square ordeal in order to determine whether the government was planning on punishing the Chinese government to what the press considered to be an appropriate degree. However, when official interviews helped the press see that the Bush administration's response to the crackdown was lackluster at best, the press responded with harsh criticism of Bush post-Tiananmen policy.

Finally, during the Clinton administration, the press continued taking advantage of increased access to official government sources. Especially during conflicts, which were much less frequent in the Clinton administration than during either the Reagan or Bush administrations, the press turned to official government sources. However, since the press tended to agree with Clinton administration China policy, resulting coverage tended to be positive. For example, one of Clinton's main goals in Sino-American relations was to build Sino-American trade to an all-time high. Since increasing Sino-American trade was good news for Americans, and, according to this study's literature review, the press shares American pro-business values, it is not surprising that the press tended to support such pursuits. In addition, the press' more friendly, open and continuous contacts with Clinton administration

officials may have also made the press more susceptible to subtle media management ploys.

As the press increased its official government source usage over time, it simultaneously decreased its unofficial source coverage. As a result, from administration to administration the press grew more reliant on official sources. Why did the press decrease its unofficial source usage over time? Perhaps because the more it approved of official Sino-American coverage the less it felt it was necessary to seek out alternative views.

The following cross-tabulation findings support the view that from the Reagan administration throughout the Clinton administration official source usage increased while unofficial source usage decreased. During the Reagan administration, the greatest amount of official sources (13 or more) occurred 40.1 % of the time, compared to 37.8% official sources during the Bush administration and 22.1 % official sources during the Clinton administration ($\chi^2 = 15.94; p = .01$) (see table 15, p. 177). In addition, during the Reagan administration, the greatest amount of unofficial sources (13 or more) occurred 52.3 % of the time, compared to 33.2 % unofficial sources during the Bush administration and 14.6% unofficial sources during the Clinton administration ($\chi^2 = 17.99; p = .006$). And finally, during the Clinton administration when conflict is clear, the most official sources (10 or more) are found 88.2% of the time, versus 11.8 % of the time when no conflict is present ($\tau\text{-}c = .28; t = 5.54$) (see table 16, p. 178).

**Table 15: Amount of Official and Unofficial Sources Across
the Three Administrations**

Administration	Official Sources (13+)	Unofficial Sources (13+)
Reagan	40.1	52.3
Bush	37.8	33.2
Clinton	22.1	14.6

Pearson chi-square =15.94; p =.01 (for official sources);

Pearson chi-square =17.99; p =.006 (for unofficial sources).

**Table 16: Amount of Official Sources in Conflict vs.
Non-Conflict Coverage During Clinton
Administration**

	Amount of Sources		
Conflict	10 +	Tau-C	T
Conflict	88.2		
		.28	5.54
No conflict	11.8		

Table 17: Amount of Official Sources vs. Press Attitude

	Amount of Sources		
Attitude	10 +	Tau-C	T
Positive	9.9		
		-.10	-4.58
Negative	27.3		

The following cross-tabulations support the finding that, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, more official source usage seemed to be associated with more negative press coverage of each administration's China policy. And during the Clinton administration, the opposite was true: Increased official source usage was associated with the least negative press coverage of the Clinton administration's China policy. When press attitudes toward an administration are negative the most official sources (10 or more) are used 27.3% of the time, versus when press attitudes toward an administration are positive only 9.9% of the time the most official sources are used ($\tau\text{-c} = -.10; t = -4.58$) (see table 17, p. 178). However, during the Clinton administration, the press' attitude toward Clinton policy is negative least often only 11.4% of the time, versus 45.5% of the time in the Bush administration and 43.1% in the Reagan administration ($\chi\text{-square} = 34.30; p = .00$) (see table 18, p. 180).

Research Question #5: How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?

While research question #1 found that press coverage was most government independent during the Cold War's demise, second most government independent during the transitional period and least government independent during the post-Cold War period, research question #5 acknowledges that even though some Cold War time frames were more government independent than others, all Cold War time frames possessed some degree of government-independent coverage. Accordingly, research question #5 tried to discover, via time series analysis and cross-tabulations, more about the amount and nature of government-independent coverage by placing it

Table 18: In Clinton Administration, Press Attitude Toward
Administration is Negative Least Often

	Negative Attitudes		
Attitude	10 +	chi- squared	p
Reagan administration	43.1		
Bush administration	45.5	34.30	.00
Clinton administration	11.4		

in the context of general news coverage being played up across all three Cold War eras.

Cold War demise coverage

For example, during the Cold War demise period this research question found that the press tended to emphasize human rights issues and the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and ordeal (see table 19, p. 182). According to agenda-setting theory the press emphasizes issues that are high on its agenda of priorities.

Accordingly, during the Cold War demise period the press seemed especially concerned with these issues. This finding is not surprising since the press tends to view human rights abuses and Tiananmen Square as especially important concerns. In addition, since during the Cold War's demise the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown took place -- on top of the more ordinary, common Sino-American human rights issues, such as forced abortion and Chinese government crackdowns on Tibet -- there were perhaps more human rights abuse issues to cover during this time frame than in other in this study.

The finding that Cold War demise coverage concentrated on human rights issues and Tiananmen Square coverage is illustrated in the attached time series model (see table 19, p. 182). This significant finding is extremely strong ($R\text{-squared} = .862$). However, before the relevance of this finding for more government-independent Cold War demise coverage is discussed, the time series model itself should be understood.

In this model, number of press articles, the dependent variable, was regressed on each of the following independent variables: Human rights coverage, violence

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Table 19: Amount of Press Articles

Variables in the Equation:

R-squared = .862

	Beta	P	Mean (articles per month)
Tiananmen			
*Cold War Demise	.87	.00000000	1.8393
Transitional			3.5769
Post-Cold War			.2083
Violence			
*Cold War Demise	.20	.01839100	.1202
Transitional			.2084
Post-Cold War			.1584
Human Rights			
*Cold War Demise	.21	.00000057	.7321
*Transitional	.20	.00006366	1.0769
Post-Cold War			1.5000
U.S. Deviance			
Cold War Demise			24.2326
*Transitional	.50	.00000982	34.3762
Post-Cold War			38.9196
MFN			
Cold War Demise			.1964
*Transitional	.21	.00000460	2.1154
*Post-Cold War	.17	.00019771	1.7500

Cold War Demise period = January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989

Transitional period = November 10, 1989 to December 24, 1991

Post-Cold War period = December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993

coverage, Tiananmen Square coverage, MFN coverage and U.S. norms deviance coverage. As a result, it was found that these variables explain 86% of the variation in the number of articles written across Cold War periods. This finding also indicated that the press' interest in these topics and type of coverage varied during different Cold War periods (see table 19, p. 182). In other words, 86% of the time when press coverage of these variables increased during specific Cold War periods, the overall amount of general Sino-American press coverage also increased during the same Cold War periods. Since none of the five variables prompted increased general coverage during all three Cold War periods, the attached model illustrates specifically which variables during which Cold War period/s tended to do so. In this model, all five variables are represented via Cold War period, and those Cold War periods in which each variable prompted increased overall coverage are starred and include betas and p-values. While the R-squared statistic measured the strength of the combined variables' impact on the amount of overall coverage, beta statistics are stated for each variable during the Cold War period/s in which the variable had a significant impact on overall coverage. The beta statistic measured the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable. The beta statistic is defined as how many standard deviations the dependent variable moves for one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The p-value determines statistical significance if it is less than .05, if there is less than five chances in 100 that the given results occurred by chance. Although the model's five variables did not prompt increased general coverage during all Cold War time frames, the monthly means of the amount of stories dealing

with each variable within each Cold War period are given in order to describe each variable's amount of story coverage over time (see table 19, p. 182).

According to this time series model, Cold War demise coverage not only concentrated on human rights and Tiananmen Square coverage, but when such issues arose, Sino-American press coverage increased. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that during this time period the press was especially concerned with covering these Sino-American topics.

How do such press concerns during the Cold War demise period shed light on more independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special concern with human rights and Tiananmen Square seem to have driven its more government-independent coverage during the Cold War's demise. In question #1, nine variables illustrated the press' tendency during the Cold War's demise to cover the news in a more government-independent fashion. Six of these variables were covered in a predominantly negative fashion: China status quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict, violence and American non-administration attitudes toward Sino-American relations. In addition, Tiananmen Square coverage was covered in an especially negative fashion. Views toward China and Sino-American relations were much more negative during the Tiananmen Square incident.

Predominantly negative views toward China regarding Tiananmen were supported by the following variables: conflict, media attitude, description, China status quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance and crisis.

When Tiananmen was covered, conflict was clear 91.9% of the time in

coverage versus 8.1% of the time when Tiananmen was not covered ($\tau\text{-}c=.11$; $t=7.41$) (see table 20, p. 186); when Tiananmen was covered, American non-administration attitudes were negative 66% of the time, positive 7.7% of the time and neutral 26.3% of the time ($\tau\text{-}c=-.19$; $t=-8.22$) (see table 21, p. 186); when Tiananmen was covered, China descriptions were negative 67.9% of the time, positive 1.9% of the time and neutral 30.1% of the time ($\tau\text{-}c=-.17$; $t=-7.58$) (see table 21, p. 186); when Tiananmen was covered, China status quo deviation was greatest 45.5% of the time, versus 33.7% of the time when China status quo deviance was non-existent ($\tau\text{-}c=.2$; $t=7.69$) (see table 22, p. 186); when Tiananmen was covered, U.S. norms deviation was greatest 61.1% of the time, versus 32.2% of the time when U.S. deviance was non-existent ($\tau\text{-}c=.15$; $t=6.13$) (see table 23, p. 187); when Tiananmen was covered, the greatest amount of crisis was portrayed in 59.4% of coverage versus 40.6% when Tiananmen was not covered ($\tau\text{-}c=.23$; $t=8.88$) (see table 20, p. 186).

Since the press' more government-independent coverage of Sino-American relations during this time frame echoes the press' special concern with human rights abuses and Tiananmen Square, it seems that more independent press coverage was driven by respectable press concerns.

Transitional coverage

Transitional coverage did share its Cold War predecessor's concern for human rights. In addition, transitional coverage was concerned with U.S. norms deviance issues and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) controversy (see table 19, p.

Table 20: Tiananmen Events: Crisis and Conflict

Variable	Tiananmen Events		Tau-C	T
	Covered	Not Covered		
Crisis (a great deal)	59.4	40.6	.23	8.88
Conflict	91.9	8.1	.11	7.41

Table 21: Tiananmen Events Covered: Non-Administration Attitude and China Description

Variable	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Tau-c	T
American Non-Adm. Attitude	7.7	66	26.3	-.19	-8.22
China Description	1.9	67.9	30.1	-.17	-7.58

Table 22: Tiananmen Events: China Status Quo Deviation

	China Status Quo Deviation	Tau-C	T
A great deal	45.5	.2	7.69
None	33.7		

Table 23: Tiananmen Events: U.S. Norms Deviation

	U.S.Norms Deviation	Tau-C	T
A great deal	61.1		
		.15	6.13
None	32.2		

181). Since the Tiananmen Square incident evokes all of the above transitional era concerns, and the negative impact of the Tiananmen Square ordeal was at least mentioned in most transitional stories, Tiananmen Square also seemed to remain a major concern for China reporters. For example, the Tiananmen Square ordeal was extremely inconsistent with U.S. norms, it represented a serious human rights abuse and it was one of the main reasons that Congress and many Americans fought feverishly, yet unsuccessfully, with President Bush to revoke China's MFN status.

How do such press concerns during the transitional period shed light on government-independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special concern with U.S. norms deviance, human rights and MFN coverage seem to have driven its more government-independent coverage during the transitional period. This independent press coverage, described in research question #1, was illustrated by coverage of the following two variables in a predominantly negative fashion: China status quo deviance and descriptions of China. After all, a press interested in issues that deviate from U.S. norms should also be interested in issues that threaten China's status quo since they are often related. For example, the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown both strongly deviated from U.S. norms and threatened the Chinese status quo by endangering the Chinese government's stability. In addition, general and MFN-related human rights concerns often led to negative coverage of the Chinese government during the transitional era.

As was the case with press coverage during the Cold War's demise, transitional coverage seemed based on both newsworthy and respectable journalistic

concerns. In addition, in both time frames Sino-American coverage tended to be predominantly negative.

Post-Cold War coverage

Post-Cold War coverage, unlike its Cold War demise and transitional predecessors, did not emphasize Tiananmen Square or U.S. norms deviance coverage. However, post-Cold War journalists, like their transitional predecessors, did concern themselves with MFN coverage (see table 19, p. 182). In addition, post-Cold War press coverage tended to emphasize economic matters. Since during the post-Cold War period Sino-American trade was booming, and journalists tend to share basic American business values, it is not surprising that journalists became more concerned with business-related issues.

At first glance it may seem as if post-Cold War journalists did not share their Cold War demise and transitional predecessors' concerns about topics such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, human rights abuses and issues that deviate from U.S. norms and threaten the Chinese status quo. But since by the beginning of the post-Cold War era much debate over the Tiananmen Square issue had died down and human rights abuses were less prevalent than during the Cold War demise or transitional periods, the post-Cold War press should not have been expected to focus on concerns that were not as prevalent during the post-Cold War time frame. After all, the fact that the press seemed most concerned with the MFN issue during the post-Cold War era suggests that the press remained dedicated to human rights issues. Although the MFN issue is predominantly economic, the re-occurring controversy

over renewing it in light of China's human rights record makes it a strong human rights issue as well.

Did such press concerns during the post-Cold War period shed light on more government-independent coverage during this time frame? Research question #1 found that post-Cold War press articles covered Chinese status quo deviance in a statistically different manner than the government ($\tau\text{-}c=-.13$; $t=-5.42$). Since the connection between post-Cold War reporters' concerns with economic and human rights issues and Chinese status quo deviance is not clear, these concerns did not appear to shed additional light on the post-Cold War era's limited government-independent coverage.

However, post-Cold War period journalists' economic concerns do help describe post-Cold War coverage and its often limited government independence. For example, economic development is an area where journalists have expressed more positive attitudes toward U.S.-China relations than in other topics. However, in covering this technical subject journalists tend to rely on official sources and, in so doing, do not necessarily use more unofficial sources and channels. Since Sino-American relations experienced much less controversy during the post-Cold War era than in this study's previous two Cold War time frames, and the press seems to agree more with President Clinton's Sino-American policies than with either administration from these time frames, the post-Cold War press appears much less government independent than its Cold War demise and post-Cold War counterparts.

The finding that the post-Cold War press has a tendency to cover economic development with a positive attitude is based on the following statistically significant

cross-tab results. When economic change is covered, 54.2% of the time press attitudes toward Sino-American relations are positive, versus 19.2% positive coverage when economic change is not covered ($\text{tau-c} = .24; t = 4.26$) (see table 24, p. 192).

Accordingly, in the post-Cold War era the press seems optimistic about the prospects of economic change. However, this does not mean that more government-independent economic coverage is a result of this concern. Since economic change is a technical subject, journalists rely less on unofficial channels for information on this subject and more on official channels and sources. When economic change is covered, the most unofficial channels (5 or more) are used 6% of the time versus 12% of the time when economic change is not covered ($\text{tau-c} = -.10; t = -1.96$) (see table 24, p. 192).

Finally, it would be misleading to conclude that since this study only found limited evidence of post-Cold War government-independent press coverage that post-Cold War Sino-American coverage was covered in an inferior manner compared to its Cold War demise and transitional predecessors. This study's post-Cold War era contained much less dramatic events than during either the Cold War demise or transitional eras. Accordingly, this study's limited post-Cold War events did not seem to give the post-Cold War press an equal opportunity to challenge government policy, let alone to establish much of a government-independent streak. Until post-Cold War journalists covering Sino-American relations are faced with more challenging issues, it remains to be seen just how government independent post-Cold War coverage may become. In the meanwhile, the post-Cold War press' concern with economic and

Table 24: Positive Press Attitude vs. Economic
Change Coverage During Post-Cold War Period

Variable	Economic Change		Tau-C	T
	Covered	Not Covered		
Positive Press Attitude	54.2	19.2	.24	4.26
Unofficial Channels (5+)	6	12	-.10	-1.96

human rights issues seems both professional and respectable.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation empirically, quantitatively examined American prestige press coverage of Sino-American relations for nearly a decade during perhaps one of the most historically important international events of our time -- the Cold War's collapse. This study was inspired by the many professional journalists and organizations, such as the Freedom Forum, who, for the last few years, have been arguing to predominantly deaf academic ears that ever since the Cold War global paradigm began crumbling, journalists have been facing unprecedented freedom, responsibility and opportunity to cover international news in a more government-independent fashion.

The Cold War's collapse immediately left the world without a collective global paradigm. As a result, after nearly 50 years of existence, the East versus West global containment paradigm suddenly became obsolete. Much of the world community grappled to fill this void of understanding with a replacement paradigm that would place international relations into context in the emerging new world order. Many professional journalists claim it was this lack of a comprehensive Cold War paradigm that gave journalists the unprecedented opportunity to impact the world's understanding of international affairs. Since the Cold War ended, journalists, by

developing their own interpretations of the significance of international events, have helped influence the government's policy by challenging its interpretations of international affairs.

Many journalists have argued that the Cold War's collapse had left government officials and newspaper editors and journalists insecure about their understanding of unfolding international events. And since even the government seemed unclear on such issues, journalists seemed to have little choice but to become more self-reliant in their interpretation of international issues. Thus, journalists became more likely to allow their personal interpretation of international events to influence their views.

Since such journalistic claims about a possible link between the Cold War's collapse and government-independent press coverage has been almost exclusively based on anecdotal evidence and first-hand experiences, this dissertation represents the first available comprehensive, longitudinal analysis of this issue. This dissertation explored this issue, and its theoretical implications, in the previous five chapters.

In order to put this issue into historical perspective, chapter 1 consisted of a historical review of pre-Cold War to post-Cold War global relations and each historical period's impact on Sino-American relations. The Cold War's collapse had a significant impact on Sino-American relations. The breakup of the former Soviet Union and Cold War left China as the only major communist force still remaining worldwide. Resulting Chinese Communist fears of losing control of China were instrumental in the Chinese government's decision to crackdown on 1989's Tiananmen Square demonstrators. The negative impact of the Tiananmen ordeal on Sino-

American relations is still being felt today.

Chapter 2 analyzed all available studies dealing with pre-Cold War to post-Cold War U.S. press coverage of Sino-American relations in order to determine the following: If historical precedence can shed any light on previously mentioned journalistic claims about increased government-independent coverage following the Cold War's collapse, and/or if these journalistic views have been supported in the past by academic communication and political science literature. The pre-Cold War literature offered the strongest precedent for government-independent coverage during historical time frames lacking a comprehensive global framework of international affairs. However, studies indicating Cold War dependent coverage and more government-independent Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War coverage also supported these journalistic claims.

Chapter 3 analyzed this issue in the context of the press' agenda-setting capabilities and vulnerabilities and its role in the foreign policy-making process. Although the government has traditionally been more successful than the press at agenda setting and influencing views in the foreign policy-making process, the Cold War's breakup may have helped level the playing field. After all, during the Cold War's demise and throughout its collapse and the post-Cold War period, press coverage tended to be more government independent than during the Cold War itself. Finally, since the government and press tended to write about the same topics at the same time, and statistical findings illustrated that the government did not set the press' agenda or vice versa, it seems that Sino-American breaking world events may have

set both the government and press agenda. (However, since this study was not set up to measure this variable, future research is needed to determine if this is the actual case.)

Chapter 4 explained this study's methodological, empirical approach to examining this issue. This researcher conducted a nine-year longitudinal content analysis (January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1993), from Reagan's second term in office to the end of President Clinton's first year in office, of New York Times and Washington Post coverage of Sino-American relations. In order to facilitate press and government coding comparisons, government articles from two presidential publications, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, and one State Department publication, the Department of State Dispatch/Bulletin, were combined into a government historical Sino-American record.

Chapter 5 analyzed this study's findings. Via frequencies, cross-tabulations and time series analysis, this researcher's conclusions support the claims of many professional journalists and some communication academicians -- that during and after the Cold War's collapse, press coverage seemed to be more government independent than during the Cold War proper. In other words, during and after the Cold War's collapse the press more successfully covered Sino-American relations in a watch-dog fashion than during the Cold War itself.

Summary of Research Question Findings

Chang's (1986) seminal work on Cold War prestige press coverage of Sino-

American policy, which spanned 35 years (1950-1984) and ended with President Reagan's first term, found that the Cold War press covering Sino-American policy did so in a completely dependent fashion. Cold War journalists not only failed to cover Sino-American policy in a government-independent fashion, but merely echoed government views and stances. In 1996, a decade later, only a handful of available academic articles have conducted research, mostly case studies, comparing Cold War to post-Cold War foreign policy coverage. Only one of these studies is China related. Although some of these studies have made passing references to the Cold War, none of them have purposefully compared Cold War to Cold War demise, transitional or post-Cold War coverage. Although professional journalists have been arguing for the past several years that the Cold War's collapse has affected the manner in which they cover the news, their coverage has become more government independent, communication literature has neither supported nor refuted such claims. This dissertation represents the first known concerted effort to take off Cold War colored glasses and directly examine this claim via analyzing foreign policy coverage during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War era.

In order to safeguard that this current research did not miss any possible effects the Cold War's break up might have had on the level of independence in press coverage, this researcher picked up where Chang left off -- at the beginning of President Reagan's second term (January, 1985). Almost immediately, via research question #1, this researcher found what she had expected: Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War press coverage all tended to be more government

independent than Cold War coverage. In addition, Cold War demise coverage was most government independent, transitional coverage was second most government independent and post-Cold War coverage was least government independent.

In research question #2, based on pre-Cold War findings of government-independent press coverage, agenda-setting theory and Allison's (1971) model explaining the role of the press in foreign policy making, this researcher expected to find that government agenda setting would be limited during this study's Cold War breakup and post-Cold War time frames. She found no evidence of government agenda-setting influence over the press during any of the study's three time frames. She also found that when government and press coverage was compared over identical time periods, both entities tended to write about the same topics during the same time frames. These conclusions suggested that unidentified factors, such as breaking Sino-American developments, simultaneously set both the government's and the press' agenda.

In research question #3, this researcher examined under what type of conditions or contexts press coverage tended to be most government independent. Her main findings were that press coverage tended to be most independent in conflict situations and when the press held a positive attitude toward Sino-American relations. Although she expected the first result, she did not expect the latter. After all, while conflict is a major element of news worthiness, positive news, let alone a positive attitude toward a situation, is not. On the contrary, according to basic news coverage standards of foreign news, negative news tends to be much more heavily covered than

positive news. While both findings demonstrate responsible government-independent coverage, the latter finding seems to suggest that the press did more than follow basic newsroom practices when covering Sino-American coverage. By seeking out and publishing more positive news about Sino-American policy than the government, along with focusing more on Sino-American conflicts than the government, the press seemed to cover this study's decade of Sino-American relations in a balanced and especially thoughtful manner.

In research question #4, this researcher examined the amount and nature of more government independent press coverage across the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations. She found what she expected: The level of government-independent press coverage during all three administrations, which roughly fit into this study's three Cold War time frames, matched the respective level of government independence represented in each of the three Cold War time frames. In other words, Cold War demise and Reagan coverage was most government independent, transitional and Bush coverage was second most government independent and Clinton and post-Cold War coverage was least government independent. This finding suggests that the Cold War eras may have had more of an impact on the level of government-independent reporting than any difference in each administration's policies or press relations.

In research question #5, this researcher examined the amount and nature of government-independent press coverage by placing each era's independent coverage into context within each Cold War time frame's overall press coverage. In this

research question, she found what she expected: Independent press coverage seemed to be driven by American cultural values and predominant concerns, such as human rights, economic issues and an ordeal that substantially encompassed both of these issues: the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and government crackdown.

This study's research questions suggest two main findings. First, during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years the press covered Sino-American policy in a more government-independent manner than its Cold War predecessor. And second, the press covered Sino-American relations during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years in a culturally biased yet responsible, watch-dog fashion.

Research Limitations

This study shares a shortcoming inherent to longitudinal analysis: This research design does not have a built-in system for controlling for outside variables. As a result, relevant outside, unconsidered or unknown factors, such as Chinese government actions or policy, could be biasing results. Accordingly, this study's exploratory findings must be considered with caution.

In addition, this study only considers the possible impact of the global Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War period on Sino-American press coverage. Since Sino-American relations are like none other, generalizations about the impact of individual Cold War periods on the reporting of other foreign policy issues dealing with different countries must be made with caution.

Finally, although a month-to-month analysis of Sino-American relations was successfully used to examine this study's data, no such unit of analysis is perfect. For

example, although much of the literature states a month is the optimal time frame for agenda setting to take place, some issues in some circumstances set the agenda in more or less than a month. Accordingly, in such cases these effects may be lost or mistaken for others.

Conclusions

This study's results can be summarized with two major findings. First, during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years the press covered Sino-American policy in a more government-independent manner than its Cold War predecessor. And second, the press covered Sino-American relations during the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years in a culturally biased yet responsible, watch-dog fashion.

This study's findings can also be interpreted on a broader scale, one that places this study into context with current, related communication literature.

Accordingly, this study sheds additional light on the following topics: American coverage of Sino-American relations, agenda setting, foreign policy-making theory, the impact of the Cold War's collapse on how U.S. journalists covered Sino-American relations, and the amount of time necessary for the government to impact the press' agenda and vice versa.

Pre- to Post-Cold War Sino-American Coverage

This study's findings help bring the literature on U.S. press coverage of Sino-American relations full circle. Much has been written on the charismatic pre-Cold War American journalists who have covered Sino-American relations in an often fiercely opinionated, independent fashion. In addition, much communication research

suggests that Cold War journalists covered Sino-American policy in a predominantly government-dependent fashion. Finally, the present research is the first known research to find that during the Cold War's collapse and the post-Cold War years journalists once again returned to covering Sino-American relations in a more government-independent fashion.

Due to the different historical periods and journalist practices represented in the pre-Cold War versus Cold War demise through post-Cold War eras, it is difficult to directly measure whether the former or latter time frame covered Sino-American relations more independently. For example, while many pre-Cold War journalists were allowed by their editors to cover Sino-American relations in a largely opinionated, crusade-type manner, journalists during this study's time frame who wrote in this fashion would have had a difficult time getting published in a leading publication on an editorial page, let alone in a news section. But this does not necessarily mean that pre-Cold War journalists were more government independent than their Cold War collapse and post-Cold War counterparts. Although many pre-Cold War journalists seemed to live up to the highest journalistic standards of their time by digging up and presenting Sino-American news in as dramatic a fashion as necessary to get their points across, Cold War collapse and post-Cold War journalists also seemed to live up to their era's highest journalistic standards by reporting Sino-American news in an enterprising, balanced fashion. Accordingly, during both of these eras the press tended to report Sino-American news in a watch-dog fashion.

Agenda-Setting Theory

Why was pre-Cold War and Cold War demise through post-Cold War Sino-American press coverage more independent than Sino-American Cold War coverage? This researcher used agenda-setting theory in an attempt to shed light on this question. As a matter of fact, the above results were predicted via agenda-setting theory. Based on literature review findings that government administrations during the pre-Cold War and Cold War demise and beyond historical periods did not possess either a comprehensive understanding or frame work of Sino-American relations, this researcher predicted the following: Since the press would not be able to rely on the government during these time frames for a true understanding of Sino-American relations, it would be forced to cover Sino-American relations in a much more self-reliant, government-independent fashion in order to adequately educate the public about this crucial international relationship. This train of thought also explained why Cold War Sino-American press coverage tended to be much more dependent than such coverage in either the pre- or post-Cold War periods. Cold War administrations offered journalists not only what appeared to be a solid, comprehensive paradigm of international relations, but an explanation of how Sino-American relations specifically fit into this scenario. Since Cold War journalists covering Sino-American relations echoed government views, it appears that they were predominantly satisfied with the government's paradigm of Sino-American relations.

As explained above, this researcher predicted her main results based on agenda-setting theory. However, according to this study's results, the government did

not set the press' agenda or vice versa. How then did this study shed light on the agenda-setting process? The fact that government and press coverage significantly correlated when compared during identical time frames throughout this study suggests that a third factor or factors simultaneously set both the government's and press' agenda. And although agenda-setting research could not pinpoint what this study's third factor/factors may be, it suggests that both agendas may be simultaneously set by real-world indicators dealing with Sino-American events themselves and/or the public's Sino-American agenda. In other words, perhaps real-world indicators or breaking current events and public opinion about these events are driving both the press and government agenda.

Future research is needed to determine if this third factor was indeed real-life indicators. However, this scenario seems reasonable in light of this study's findings. For example, during the Cold War's demise and transitional period when global Sino-American events, such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, were most turbulent, Sino-American press coverage was most turbulent. And during the post-Cold War era when global breaking events were most sedate, Sino-American press coverage was most sedate.

This study seemed to support the idea that agenda setting did occur during the Cold War's collapse and beyond. However, future research is needed to determine if this third factor/factors were indeed related to real-life indicators and/or public opinion.

The Time Gap: Its Impact on Agenda Setting

Although Chang's (1986) seminal study on press coverage of Cold War Sino-American relations compared government and press coverage of Sino-American relations on a yearly basis, Chang suggested that the government's impact on press coverage may have appeared as early as on a monthly basis. In addition, many agenda-setting studies previously discussed suggested that it only takes one month for the government to influence the press' agenda and vice versa. Accordingly, this dissertation logically examined the government's and press' impact on each other on a monthly basis.

However, although much of the print journalism research suggests a one-month time frame is optimal for government vs. press agenda setting, the advent of the Internet, e-mail and instantaneous satellite hook-ups between the government and the press seem to question these previous findings. In today's computer-friendly, interactive world, a reporter needs nothing more than a computer, modem and telephone line to contact government leaders anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. Accordingly, if reporters and government officials are e-mailing each other on a daily basis, if the computer revolution is leading to substantially increased government and press communications, is it still safe to conclude that it takes an entire month for the government to influence the press' agenda and vice versa?

In this present study when government Sino-American coverage was compared to Sino-American press coverage one month later and vice versa, the government did not appear to influence the press' Sino-American agenda and vice versa. In addition,

this study also found that when government and press coverage were compared during identical monthly time frames, when no lagged comparisons took place, the government and press often covered Sino-American relations in a similar fashion. Accordingly, although comparing government to press coverage one month later and vice versa does not result in evidence of agenda setting, the fact that the government and press are often taking similar approaches to Sino-American relations during identical time frames suggests that both entities are experiencing agenda setting at the same time, whether it is the result of influencing each other's agenda on a quicker than monthly basis and/or the result of one or more third party influences on both entities' agendas. Third party influences might include real-world incidents affecting Sino-American relations such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, third party influences that focus both the government's and press' attention on breaking Sino-American events at the same time.

For example, during the Clinton administration press coverage was least government independent, government and press Sino-American agendas and attitudes appeared most similar. This increased similarity between government and press Sino-American views may have been partially due to increased government and press usage of e-mail and the Internet during this time frame. Perhaps less formal, increased computer contact may have at least partially led to improved, more friendly reporter-government relations and thus increased agreement between both entities on Sino-American policy. In addition, the fact that Sino-American economic growth tended to be highlighted by the press in a positive fashion throughout most of Clinton's post-

Cold War era, a great turn-around from the predominantly negative press coverage of Sino-American relations during the Bush administration, suggests that both government and press contacts with the Chinese government were much more frequent and friendly during Clinton's administration than Bush's. Accordingly, friendlier press and government relations with the Chinese government may have made both entities susceptible to possible Chinese government agenda-setting influence. For example, when the Chinese government introduces a trade initiative or decision that would lead to increased and/or improved Sino-American trade, both the U.S. government and press may be more willing to consider such actions at face value than to search for ulterior motives.

In addition, when the U.S. government and press both view real-life indicators as having a positive effect on Sino-American relations, such as Chinese government decisions to increase Sino-American trade, their agendas may be more easily, more quickly set by each other and the Chinese government due to friendlier relations not only with each other, but the Chinese government as well. After all, increased friendliness may lead to less agenda-setting resistance. Accordingly, during the Clinton administration the U.S. government, press and Chinese government, partially as a result of new technologies and substantially improved, positive Sino-American trade, may have all influenced each other's agenda within a much quicker time frame than a month. As a result, since a shorter than one month agenda-setting time frame would not have been detected in this study, it is possible that the agenda-setting influence of either the U.S. press or government may have been overlooked.

Since the government and press may be using new technologies to help influence each other's agenda at a quicker pace than the Chang (1986) and previously mentioned press agenda-setting research suggests, this dissertation contributes to the literature by suggesting that the amount of time in which it takes for the government to set the press' agenda and vice versa needs to be re-examined and updated to include the possibility of the impact of new technologies on the agenda-setting process. In addition, this study also suggests that in order to understand the true nature of how the government influences the press' agenda and vice versa, confounding entities such as third party contributors, real-life indicators such as the Chinese government's latest Sino-American initiatives, should be considered.

The Foreign Policy-Making Process

Allison's (1971) model of the administration's versus the press' role in foreign policy making suggests that while the administration plays the predominant role in foreign policy making, the press plays an important but less central role in this process. This present study seems to support this model.

Although the Cold War collapse press and post-Cold War press were not found to set the government's agenda on Sino-American foreign policy, they were found to cover Sino-American policy in a more government-independent fashion than their Cold War predecessor. The fact that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold War's collapse through the post-Cold War era often directly and openly criticized Sino-American government policy suggests the press was a more active player in the foreign policy-making process during this study's Cold War collapse through post-

Cold War time frames than during the Cold War itself. After all, the more the press criticizes government policy and the more the government and public read this criticism, the more likely the government will be forced into responding to negative press reports. Depending on where public opinion falls, such press criticism could lead to the government having to temper or change its foreign policy objectives. In such cases, the press' impact on Sino-American foreign policy making is clear.

The Cold War's Collapse and Sino-American Reporting

Did the Cold War's collapse affect the independence level of Sino-American reporting? This study suggests that it did. After all, Cold War collapse through post-Cold War coverage was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor.

How did the Cold War's collapse lead to more independent coverage? As explained throughout this study's theory section, once the Cold War began to crumble and government administrations failed or were unwilling to substitute the Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement, the press was forced to become less complacent. The Cold War's collapse seemed to act as the press' wake-up call. As the Cold War crumbled, the press seemed to begin realizing that the government was not doing an adequate job of developing Sino-American relations and making it understandable to the American public. Accordingly, in order for the press to fulfill its double duty of keeping the government on track and informing the public, it was forced to become more self-reliant, more actively involved in digging up Sino-American news and emphasizing its own views and the views of others on the meaning of Sino-American relations. Cold War time frames clearly had an impact on

Sino-American coverage. In addition, this study suggests that a third factor/factors, such as real-life indicators, also influenced Sino-American coverage.

Future Research

This dissertation suggests the value of many future research studies, including those dealing with press coverage of foreign policy and the agenda setting time frame, third-party factors influencing the press' foreign policy agenda, the impact of Cold War time frames and different administrations on the press' coverage of various foreign policy issues, interviews of top foreign policy makers and journalists for insider views on the press' impact on foreign policy making, and analysis of the role of public opinion in influencing the press' foreign policy agenda.

Since this study did not find any evidence using a one-month time lag that either the government or the press set each other's agenda, but both parties often seemed to comment about the same types of issues at the same time, this researcher can only assume that third party factors, such as real-world events regarding Sino-American relations, set both the government and press agenda. In addition, given more direct, frequent interactions between the press and government via e-mail and the Internet, future research should examine government vs. press agenda setting on a shorter than 30-day time span.

However, researchers using time series analysis to examine whether the government and press set each other's agenda in the foreign policy arena in a quicker fashion than previously believed should be cautioned: Foreign policy press coverage tends to be sparse and time series analysis is only successful if enough articles, data

points, are present within the specific time frame being measured.

Future research should also examine how additional factors can affect press coverage of international affairs during different administrations and Cold War eras. factors such as: public opinion, changing administration vs. press relations, each individual reporter's views toward Sino-American relations, the quality of each reporter's sources and changing newsroom budgets.

In addition, future research should examine the possible impact of the Cold War's collapse on U.S. news coverage of American foreign policy with other foreign countries. After all, generalizations about the Cold War's collapse and its impact on foreign policy reporting will not be able to be made with confidence until future research examines this issue from many other perspectives.

Future research should also examine qualitative historical data based on interviews of administration and State Department officials actively involved in foreign policy making and journalists actively covering the same foreign policy issues during the Cold War's demise.

Finally, since public opinion often plays an important role in the agenda-setting process, future studies dealing with government vs. press agenda setting in the foreign policy arena should attempt to analyze the possible impact of public opinion on this process. Public opinion polls based on foreign policy concerns could be compared to press and government coverage of the same issues in hopes of shedding additional light on the agenda-setting process.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Code Book

Prestige Press Coverage of Sino-American Relations

1. CODER -- your first name box (in box closest to middle name box)--(1 column)

Coder A = A

Coder B = B

2. ARTICLE SECTION -- middle name box (1 column)
for newspapers only

Blank = no article section (government document, etc.)

A = 1

B = 2

C = 3

D = 4

E = 5

F = 6

Y = unclear

3. PAGE -- double box #1 & #5 (4 columns)

Blank = no page number

0001 = 1

0002 = 2

9998 = unclear

9999 = non-applicable

4. COLUMN -- line 1 (for newspapers only)

Blank = no column (government documents, etc.)

Column 1 = 1

Column 2 = 2
 Column 3 = 3
 Column 4 = 4
 Column 5 = 5 or higher

5. DATE -- PID box (6 columns, start at far left column)

1. Month = 2 columns (01: January - 12: December)
2. Day = 2 columns (01 - 31)
3. Year = 2 columns (85 - 93)

6. STORY NUMBER ID# -- PID box after date (2 columns)

01 = 1
 02 = 2
 03 = 3
 98 = 98
 99 = 99

7. RELIABILITY #I (for reliability test) -- Section number box (3 columns)

If an article has a reliability number in red ink on its upper right-hand corner, code the number in an identical fashion in this box.

8. RELIABILITY #II (for reliability test) -- Form box (2 columns)

If an article has a reliability number, this number will be accompanied by one of the two following designator numbers: 2a or 2b. Code the number accordingly.

2a = article included in main data set and reliability test
 2b = article for reliability test only (will not be included in main data set)
 4d = non-applicable

9. RELIABILITY #III (serial ID# for reliability test) -- triple box 13 (3 columns)

Every reliability test article has an original serial number marked as such in black on the top middle of each article. Code this number accordingly.

001 = 1
 002 = 2
 003 = 3
 999 = 999

10. STORY LENGTH - triple box 14 (3 columns)

001 = 1
 002 = 2
 003 = 3
 999 = unclear

11. TYPE OF ARTICLE - line 2 (1 row)

1. The New York Times
 2. Washington Post
 3. Presidential documents/papers
 4. State Department Bulletin

12. TYPE OF COVERAGE FOR NEWSPAPERS -- lines 3 and 4 (2 rows)

Blank = government documents
 11. Front page
 12. Editorial
 13. News

13. TYPE OF COVERAGE FOR GOVERNMENT DOCS -- lines 5 and 6 (2 rows)

Blank = newspaper article
 11. Interviews/ Conversations/ Questions and answers
 12. Press releases/ Statements (written or oral)
 13. Speeches/ Addresses
 14. News conferences/ Briefings
 15. Embassy briefing
 21. Pentagon briefing
 22. State Department briefing
 23. White House briefing
 24. Congressional briefing
 25. Messages to Congress/ Congressional related hearings
 35. unclear
 41. none of the above

14. SOURCES

1st SOURCE -- double boxes 2 and 6 (3 columns)
 2nd SOURCE -- double boxes 6 and 10 (3 columns)
 3rd SOURCE -- double boxes 3 and 7 (3 columns)
 4th SOURCE -- double boxes 7 and 11 (3 columns)

5th SOURCE -- double boxes 4 and 8 (3 columns)

6th SOURCE -- double boxes 8 and 12 (3 columns)

Blank = no source

001. President

002. Presidential Advisers/Spokespersons

003. Vice President

004. National Security Adviser/Staff

005. Other White House/Administration

006. Secretary of State

007. State Department/Organizations/Staff

008. U.S. Ambassadors/Diplomats/Embassies

009. Other State Department

010. Defense Department/Military

011. Commerce Department/Treasury/Trade/Customs

012. American Justice Department/Courts/Judges

013. FBI

014. CIA

126. INS (Immigration and naturalization service)

127. Police department/coastal border control

130. U.S.-China international agreement

015. Other Government Departments

016. U.S./America

017. U.S./American government/U.S. officials

018. Senate

019. House

020. Congress/Congressmen/Congresswomen (Only code "Congress" when Senate and/or House distinctions cannot be made.)

021. American academicians/researchers/students

022. American businesses/corporations

023. American lawyers

024. American labor/unions

025. American celebrities/producers/actors

026. Other American civilians/groups/organizations (non-government)

027. American presidential candidates

028. Former American presidents/officials

131. President elect

132. American Mass media

995. Other (clear, but not listed here)

999. Unclear

15. NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS SOURCES MENTIONED IN

- 1st SOURCE -- lines 7-8 (2 rows)
- 2nd SOURCE -- lines 9-10 (2 rows)
- 3rd SOURCE -- lines 11-12 (2 rows)
- 4th SOURCE -- lines 13-14 (2 rows)
- 5th SOURCE -- lines 15-16 (2 rows)
- 6th SOURCE -- lines 17-18 (2 rows)

Use the attached two-line counting chart below. The abbreviated version is:

- Blank = none
- 1 = 11
- 2 = 12
- 54 = 24 or more
- 55 = unclear

16. CHANNELS

- 1st CHANNEL -- lines 19-21 (3 rows)
- 2nd CHANNEL -- lines 23-25 (3 rows)
- 3rd CHANNEL -- lines 26-28 (3 rows)

- Blank = no channel
- 111. Administration press releases/statements (written or oral)
- 112. Administration news conferences/briefings
- 113. Presidential memo
- 114. Embassy briefing
- 115. Pentagon briefing
- 121. White House briefing
- 122. CIA briefing
- 123. Treasury briefing
- 124. Congressional briefing
- 125. Administration speeches/addresses
- 131. Congressional messages/hearings/debates/statements/letters
- 132. State Department briefing
- 133. Administration other
- 134. American civilian letters/reports
- 135. American civilian newsletters
- 141. American non-government news conferences
- 142. American media
- 143. American civilian other
- 554. Other
- 555. Unclear

17. AMOUNT OF GRAPHS WITH INFORMATION FROM EACH CHANNEL

- 1st CHANNEL -- lines 29-30 (2 rows)
- 2nd CHANNEL -- lines 31-32 (2 rows)
- 3rd CHANNEL -- lines 33-34 (2 rows)

Use the attached two-line counting chart below. The abbreviated version is:

- Blank = none
- 1 = 11
- 2 = 12
- 54 = 24 or more
- 55 = unclear

18. MAIN SUBJECT -- triple box 15 (3 columns)

- 001. Government and Diplomacy
- 002. Politics
- 003. Human Rights
- 004. Military/Defense
- 005. Economics/Trade/Business
- 006. Education
- 007. Media/Media Censorship
- 008. Culture/Cultural Exchanges/Arts/Music/Books
- 009. Religion
- 010. Science and Technology/Medicine
- 011. Nature Preservation
- 012. Sports
- 013. Tourism
- 014. Personality Profiles/Biographies/Obituaries
- 015. Crime/Terrorism/Drug Trafficking
- 016. Immigration
- 017. MFN
- 018. Tiananmen Square
- 995. Other (clear, but not listed here)
- 999. Unclear

19. DEVIATION I (China status Quo) - line 35 (1 row)

- Blank = non-applicable
- 1. Not at all threatening
- 2. Somewhat threatening
- 3. Dangerous to status quo

- 4. Extremely dangerous to status quo
- 5. Unclear

20. DEVIATION II (U.S. Norms) - line 36 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. Would not have broken any U.S. norms
- 2. Would have somewhat violated U.S. norms
- 3. Would have violated existing U.S. norms
- 4. Would have seriously broken U.S. norms
- 5. Unclear

21. CONCRETE - line 37 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Other
- 4. Unclear

22. CONFLICT - line 38 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 4. Other
- 5. Unclear

23. CRISIS - line 39 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. No crisis
- 2. Slight/limited crisis
- 3. Crisis
- 4. Severe crisis
- 5. Unclear

24. VIOLENCE - line 40 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 4. Other
- 5. Unclear

25. AMERICAN NON-ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. GOVERNMENT CHINA STAND -- line 41 (1 row)

Blank = no American non-administration attitude

- 1. Unsupportive**
- 2. Qualified unsupportive**
- 3. Neutral/balanced**
- 4. Qualified supportive**
- 5. Supportive**

26. AMERICAN DESCRIPTIONS OF MAINLAND CHINA -- line 42 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1. Negative**
- 2. Qualified negative**
- 3. Neutral/balanced**
- 4. Qualified positive**
- 5. Positive**

27. AMERICAN ATTITUDE TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS -- line 43 (1 row)

Blank = non-applicable

- 1 = Unfavorable**
- 2 = Qualified unfavorable**
- 3 = Neutral/balanced**
- 4 = Qualified favorable**
- 5 = Favorable**

28. IF ANY FORM OF THE WORD "DEMOCRACY" IS MENTIONED, HOW MANY MENTIONS ARE MADE?

Use the attached two-line counting chart below.

Two-line counting

blank = no mention	
1 mention	= 11
2 mentions	= 12
3 mentions	= 13
4	= 14
5	= 15
6	= 21
7	= 22
8	= 23
9	= 24
10	= 25
11	= 31
12	= 32
13	= 33
14	= 34
15	= 35
16	= 41
17	= 42
18	= 43
19	= 44
20	= 45
21	= 51
22	= 52
23	= 53
24 or more	= 54
Unclear	= 55

APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX B
Scantron

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

SIDE 1

YOUR NAME LAST FIRST MI	COURSE	SECTION	DATE	/	/	/	INSTRUCTOR'S NAME																																																																																																			
							1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

YOUR LAST NAME		YOUR FIRST NAME		MI			
SECTION NUMBER		PID		SEX		DOB	
DOB		DOB		DOB		DOB	

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