PLACE IN RETURN BOX to roman thll chockoul from you! ncord. TO AVOID FINES Mum on or baton date duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU I. An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Initiation WM! TAIWANESE FARM WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AGRINUBIAL POWER PROCESS By Su-hao Tu A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University In partial fulfiiiment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1996 ABSTRACT TAIHANESE FARR HOHEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AGRINUBIAL POHER PROCESS By Su—hao Tu This study explores Taiwanese women’s role in farm production from a feminist perspective mainly based on the theory of marital power process elaborated with concepts from human capital, patriarchal ideology, and household strategy theories. For simplification, this study integrates the two concepts of agricultural production and marital power relations into one concept. The marital power process concerning farm production is termed the agrinubial power process. In the agrinubial power process, this examines (a) farm women’s position in the on-farm negotiation process -- from the presence of conflict, the initiation of negotiation, the use of communication strategies, to concluding solutions; (b) women’s involvement in farm work and decisions and receipt of rewards; and (c) women’s evaluation of their participation in farm work, decisions and rewards. The data used in this study are from a nationwide survey of 303 vegetable growers and 38 of follow-up in-depth interviews with vegetable growers. Three hundred and three survey questionnaires and 38 in-depth interviews were completed for data analysis. The findings support the propositions of "cooperative bargaining" theory. More than half of the women at least try to bargain with their husbands about farm management. However, they finally tend to play a passive role in initiation, mutual communication, and compromise solutions because of the patriarchal perceptions of gender role and altxwrism. Women commit a large amount of their time to farm work but tend to be pushed into the periphery of farm production. Most of them are remote from managerial work; do not have significant power over final decisions; and receive little or no economical rewards in terms of credit, wages and ownership on the basis of their substantial contributions to manual production work. Given this, most of the women do feel that their workload is heavy, but are satisfied with their current participation in decisions and their share of economic rewards. The ethnographic data show that women do receive non-economic rewards from farming. On the other hand, this study suggests the possibility of distributional equity among the women. Based on multivariate analysis, there might be a small group of women who share the most decisions and rewards for the most farm work. This supports the proposition of equity theory. Subjective human resources and objective human resources are important factors affecting farm women’s economic power in the family. The results of this study confirm the significance of linking microeconomic theoretical accounts (the new home economic model, bargaining model/cooperative conflict approach and human capital) and macro-ideological accounts (patriarchy, agrarianism, farm family) into a household dynamic framework to explain farm women’s economic position. Copyright by Su-hao Tu 1996 To My Parents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the input and assistance of many individuals. The deepest gratitude goes to Craig Harris, my dissertation advisor, mentor and good friend. I would never be proud to be a sociologist without his intellectual stimulation, constant encouragement, and caring, patient, and rigorous guidance. I thank my committee Janet Bokemeier, Larry Busch, Rita Gallin and Harry Schwarzweller for guiding me through courses, proposal and dissertation. I would also like to thank Dr. Dennis Keefe for his insightful comments on the dissertation. Special thanks go to Ching-yun Liu, my master thesis advisor and Yei-fei Su, my good friend for collaborating research funded by National Science Council in Taiwan and for their standing by me along the way. I am grateful to Tsui-ying Huang and Mo—Jein Li, good friends and colleagues at National Taiwan University for guiding me into fieldwork. My country fellow women who were willing to share their experiences and feelings also deserve special thanks. They provide a fountain of inspiration for my future research. I also wish to acknowledge Agricultural Extension Agents in the research townships for their help in the field interviews. Heartfelt thanks go to Chiung-yu Cheng, Mei-chin Chu, Ishien Li, Ching-ju Lin, Yu-mei, Liu, Meredith McLellan, Nei-hui Sung, Liang-yue vi Hang, Sping Hang, Meng-li Yang for their persistent support throughout my doctoral studies. From them, I learn the great meaning of lasting friendship. There would never be enough thanks for my parents. They are the reason why I am now, a humble, hardworking, and decent Hakka woman and why I never give up when I suffered. Thanks also go to my sisters for encouraing me and doing anything for me when I need a hand to get to this point. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ................................................... xii LIST OF FIGURES .................................................. xvi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................... 1 Statement of the Problem .................................. l The Purpose of this Study ................................. 2 CHAPTER 2 THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW ....................... 4 Political Economy Perspective ............................. 4 Patriarchal Perspective ................................... 6 Human Capital Perspective ................................. 9 Family Adaptive Strategy Perspective ...................... 11 Basic Notions of Family Adaptive Strategy ........... 11 Gender Relations in Family Adaptive Strategy ........ 13 Marital Power Process ..................................... 15 Resources and Constraints ........................... l7 Bargaining Process .................................. 20 Power Outcomes ...................................... 21 Outcome Evaluation .................................. 21 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES .................... 24 Conceptual Framework ...................................... 24 Hypotheses ................................................ 35 Negotiation ......................................... 35 Women’s Participation in Farm Work .................. 40 Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions ............. 46 Women’s Farm Rewards ................................ 52 Women’s Participation Evaluation .................... 56 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS ............... 61 Data Collection ........................................... 61 Survey Research ..................................... 61 Population .................................... 61 viii Sample ........................................ 63 Fieldwork, Pretest and Survey Interview ....... 64 Variables and Measurement ..................... 64 In-depth Field Research ............................. 78 Subcase Sampling .............................. 78 Instrument for Interview ...................... 78 Demographics .............................................. 80 Survey Sample ....................................... 80 Sample for In-depth Interview ....................... 86 CHAPTER 5 WOMEN’S ROLE IN NEGOTIATION ........................... 87 Presence of Conflict ...................................... 88 Consensus and Dissensus ............................. 89 Discovery of Conflict ............................... 92 Determinants of the Presence of Conflict ....... 99 Different Areas of Conflict ................... 101 Conflict in Farm Resource Decisions ...... 101 Conflict in Farm Operation Decisions ..... 105 Conflict in Wives’ Taking Off-farm Job .. 106 The Initiation of Negotiation ............................. 107 Wife as the Initiator ............................... 108 Explicit Objection ............................ 109 Silent Opposition ............................. 110 Mutual Discussion ............................. 110 Husband as the Initiator ............................ 112 Both as Initiators .................................. 113 Communication Strategies and Concluding Solutions .......... 114 Coercion ............................................ 116 Persuasion .......................................... 118 Violence ............................................ 121 Conclusion ................................................ 122 CHAPTER 6 WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN FARM WORK ..................... 123 Farm Work Participation ................................... 123 Total Time on Farm Work ............................. 124 Task Participation .................................. 126 The Determinants of Farm Work Participation ......... 132 Total Time on Farm Work ....................... 133 The Extensiveness of Task Participation ....... 140 The Intensity of Task Participation ........... 145 Work Participation Appraisal .............................. 151 Conclusion ................................................ 157 CHAPTER 7 WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN FARM DECISIONS ................ 159 Farm Decision Participation ............................... 159 ' Decision Participation .............................. 160 Determinants of Farm Decision Participation ......... 165 The Diversity of Decision Participation ....... 165 The Intensity of Decision Participation ....... 172 ix Farm Decision Participation Appraisal ..................... 179 Conclusion ................................................ 190 CHAPTER 8 GENDER DIVISION OF FARM REWARDS ...................... 192 Economic Rewards .......................................... 195 Short-term Rewards -- Wages ................... 196 Receipt of Wages ........................ 196 Determinants of the Likelihood of Receiving Wages ................ 197 Evaluation of Short-term Rewards ........ 198 Full Satisfaction ................. 198 Partial Satisfaction .............. 200 Dissatisfaction ................... 202 Long-term Rewards ............................. 203 The Division of Long-term Rewards ....... 203 Ownership of Farm Property ........ 203 Access to Credit Programs ......... 205 Control over Farm Incomes ......... 206 Determinants of Long—term Rewards ........... 210 Appraisal of Long-term Rewards .......... 215 Access to Farm Property ........... 217 Access to Credit Programs ......... 219 Control over Farm Earnings ........ 220 Non-economic Rewards and Women’s Evaluation ............... 223 Disadvantages from Farming .................... 223 Occupation as Farmers .................... 224 Physical Pressure from Farm Work ........ 225 Advantages in Farming ......................... 226 Self-employment ......................... 226 Self-actualization ...................... 227 Altruism ................................ 228 Conclusion ................................................ 229 CHAPTER 9 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS ............... 231 Do Taiwanese Vegetable Women Negotiate? ................... 232 Are Women Pushed into the Periphery of Farm Production? ... 234 Work Pattern and Self-evaluation .................... 234 Decision Patterns and Self-evaluation ............... 240 Do Women Get Rewarded for their Hard Work on the Farm? .... 243 A Summary of Women’s Diverse Experience in Vegetable Production? ......................................... 246 Implications and Suggestions .............................. 250 Conceptual Implications and Suggestions ............. 251 Methodological Implications and Suggestions ......... 256 Programmatic Implications ........................... 257 ' APPENDIX A A List of 37 Farm Tasks .............................. 259 APPENDIX B A List of Domestic Tasks ............................. 260 APPENDIX C A List of 24 Farm Decisions .......................... 261 APPENDIX D A List of 23 Topics for Patriarchal Role Belief Scale. 262 APPENDIX E Questionnaires ....................................... 263 LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................. 279 xi LIST OF TABLES Tables 4-1 Family and Farm Characteristics ............................ 82 4-2 Distribution of Net Farm Incomes ........................... 82 4-3 Distribution of Vegetable Production for Self-Consumption .. 83 4-4 Personal Characteristics ................................... 84 4-5 Distribution of Women’s Education .......................... 85 4-6 Distribution of Women’s Farm Experience .................... 85 4-7 Distribution of Women’s Patriarchal Role Beliefs ........... 86 5-1 The Presence of Conflict ................................... 88 5-2 Reliability of In-depth Interview Concerning the Presence 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7 5-8 5-9 of Conflict ............................................... 89 Presence of Conflict by the Orientation of Women’s Patriarchal Role Beliefs .................................. 93 Presence of Conflict by the Presence of Other Family Labor . 95 Presence of Conflict by Net Farm Incomes ................... 95 Presence of Conflict by Women’s Farm Experience ............ 97 The Logistic Regression Coefficients of Presence of Conflict 100 Decision Topics Involving Conflict ......................... 102 Usual Initiator in Negotiation ............................ 107 Hours on Farm Work Per Day Women Reported .................. 125 ' Women’s Task Participation 0n Farm ......................... 128 The Distribution of Farm Tasks Done by Women ............... 131 xii 6-4 6-6 6-7 6-8 6-10 6-11 6-12 6-13 6-14 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-5 7-6 Total Time on Farm Work By Independent Variables ........... 134 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Women’s Time on Farm Work on Independent Variables ............................. 135 Breadth of Work Participation by Independent Variables ..... 141 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Percentage of Farm Tasks Done by Women on Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ..................................... 143 Depth of Work Participation by Independent Variables ....... 146 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Intensity of Women’s Farm Task Participation on Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ..................................... 148 Women’s Response to their Farm Work Participation .......... 153 Women’s Satisfaction with their Work Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables ..................... 153 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Evaluation of Farm Work Participation on Farm Work Participation, Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ........................ 154 Satisfaction by Depth of Women’s Work Participation ........ 156 Women’s Willingness to Increase Farm Work by their Satisfaction ............................................. 156 The Distribution of Farm Decisions Made by Women ........... 161 Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions .................... 163 Breadth of Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables ..................................... 166 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Breadth of Decision Participation on Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ..................... 168 Depth of Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables ..................................... 173 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Depth of Women’s Farm Decision Participation on Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict, and Independent Variables ....... 174 Women’s Response to their Farm Decision Participation ...... 180 xiii 7-8 Satisfaction with Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables ................................. 181 7-9 Effect Coding Scheme for Main and Interaction Effect between Decision Depth and Farm Training Participation ............ 183 7-10 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Evaluation of Farm Decision on Farm Decision Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ..................... 183 7-11 Women’s Willingness to Increase Farm Decisions by their Satisfaction .............................................. 188 7-12 Women’s Willingness to Increase Decision Participation by Decision Depth ............................................ 189 7-13 Women’s Willingness to Increase Decision Participation by Decision Breadth .......................................... 190 8-1 Factor Loadings of Four Dimensions of Farm Rewards ......... 196 8-2 Women Receiving Wages ...................................... 197 8-3 Women’s Access to Farm Property ............................ 204 8-4 Women’s Access to Credit Programs .......................... 206 8-5 The Control Over Family Farm Incomes ....................... 207 8-6 Gender Division of Control over Farm Incomes ............... 209 8-7 The Distribution of Women’s Long-term Rewards .............. 211 8-8 Long-term Rewards by Independent and Intervening Variables . 212 8-9 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Long-term Farm Rewards on Farm Decision Participation, Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables ........ 213 8-10 Women’s Access to Farm Property ............................ 218 8-11 Women’s Evaluations of Non-economic Farm Rewards ........... 224 9-1 A Summary of Women’s Involvement in Negotiation ............ 233 9-2 A Summary of the Predication of Women’s Involvement in Farm Work Relative to Original Hypotheses ...................... 236 f 9-3 A Summary of the Predication of Women’s Involvement in Farm Decisions Relative to Original Hypotheses ................. 242 xiv 9-4 A Summary of the Predication of Women’s Long-term Farm Rewards Relative to Original Hypotheses ................... 245 9-5 The Typology of Farm Women in Vegetable Farming ............ 248 XV Figures LIST OF FIGURES 1 A Conceptual Model of the Agrinubial Power Process ............ 25 2 A Causal Model of the Agrinubial Power Process For Current Study ......................................... 28 3 A Partial Causal Influences on 4 A Partial Causal Influences on 5 A Partial Causal Influences on 6 A Partial Causal Influences on 7 A Partial Causal Influences on Model of the Agrinubial Power Process: Negotiation ................................. 29 Model of the Agrinubial Power Process: Women’s Participation in Farm Work .......... 30 Model of the Agrinubial Power Process: Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions ..... 32 Model of the Agrinubial Power Process: Women’s Farm Rewards ........................ 33 Model of the Agrinubial Power Process: Women’s Participation Evaluation ............ 34 8 The Prediction of Women’s Time Spent on Farm Work ............ 136 9 The Prediction of the Breadth of Women’s Farm Task Participation ............................................. 144 10 The Prediction of the Depth of Women’s Farm Task Participation 149 11 The Prediction of the Breadth of Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions ............................................ 169 12 The Prediction of the Depth of Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions ............................................ 178 13 The Prediction of Women’s Evaluation of Farm Decision Participation ............................................. 185 ' 14 The Prediction of Women’s Long-term Farm Rewards ............. 216 15 Women’s Work with Their Farm Skills and Knowledge ............ 238 xvi 16 Women’s Work with Their Time Availability for Farming ........ 238 17 Women’s Work with Their Physical Capability .................. 238 xvii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Statement of the Problem There has been a different labor allocation in Taiwanese farm families since rural industrialization began in the mid-l950s‘. 2, it created off-farm and non-farm Characterized by decentralization employment attractive to farm families. In most farm households, and adult, either man or woman, has entered the non-farm sector (Ho 1979; Tsai 1984; Hu 1985; Calkins et al. 1992). With this trend toward more part-time farm families (from 60.2 percent in 1965 to 90.3 percent in 1989 -- Lai 1991), men are more likely than women to take off-farm employment. Therefore, women are becoming responsible for a larger share of the agricultural workload. They do farm work on a much more regular basis than before, and they do it in addition to domestic work (Liu 1976; Gates 1979; Gallin 1984; Gallin and Ferguson 1988; Li 1988; Lo 1990a:13-16, 1990b:33-35; Cheng 1992:67-68). One might suggest that the feminization of agricultural production is a strategy to maximize economic well-being for the farm family (Colman and Elbert 1983; Gladwin 1988; Pfeffer 1989). This strategy ' In fact, some manufacturing industries already made advances in the 1930s and early 1950s. However, what is meant by rural industrialization is the rapid industrialization beginning after the mid-1950s (Ho 1979: 79-81). Decentralized rural industrialization is a spatial pattern of industrialization which enables the rural population to enter the industrial sector without having to leave the rural area (Ho 1979). l 2 might be expected to lead to a decrease_in the workload of, and time spent by, women on domestic work. However, as previous studies have shown, farm women’s domestic workload has rarely decreased in response to the increase of farm work (Huber and Spitze 1983; DeVault 1990; Gao 1991:137-139; Lai 1991:90-91). Furthermore, the maximum utilization of farm resources (financial and physical capital, labor and human capital, and land) for market and/or subsistence production is also what a farm family pursues for maintaining economic and material well-being. The ways in which the farm resources and the outcomes of agricultural production are allocated then are of concern to the farm family. Given this, the distribution of the three dimensions of farm organization -- farm work, farm decisions, and farm rewards -- among the family members becomes contested terrain (Kabeer 1990). If women make major inputs of labor to farm production, they would seek or demand participation in farm decisions and would seek to share in farm rewards. However, previous studies suggest that farm women in Taiwan tend to have low bargaining power over the rewards generated by farm work and have relatively little autonomy of decision making over the farm production process (Liu 1976; Lu 1988). II. The Purpose of this Study Given the gap between women’s high farm work participation versus their low farm decision involvement and low farm rewards, what causal . mechanism producing the gap remains unexplored. In order to make sense of this gap, this study investigates women’s position in farm production and in the process of farm decision-making and aims to answer the 3 following questions. First, what is women’s role in family negotiation about farming; that is, do women participate in negotiation and if so, why and how? Under what conditions do women submit to or resist their husbands’ claims of authority in negotiation? Second, how is farm work arranged between women and their husbands? What determines this gender division of farm labor? Third, how are farm decisions allocated and how is farm decision making organized? What factors lead to particular gender power relations in farm decision making? Fourth, how are farm rewards distributed to women relative to their husbands, and what factors lead to this distribution? Finally, what is women’s evaluation of their participation in farm work, decisions and rewards? Through an examination of different theoretical and empirical works, a unique integrative theoretical model is developed to frame this study. The theoretical model is a synthesis of Political Economy, Patriarchal, Human Capital, Family Adaptive Strategy and Family Process theories. In this synthetic framework, a gender decision process flows from the variations of resource and power bases to (l) the process of farm negotiation, and then to (2) the outcomes of the negotiation including the gender division of (2a) farm work, (2b) decisions and (2c) rewards, and to (3) the evaluation of the outcomes of negotiation. Nationwide survey data combined with follow-up ethnographic data collected from Taiwanese women vegetable growers will be used to test the synthetic framework. CHAPTER 2 THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEN Most of the previous literature suggests the economic importance of women’s labor inputs in family farms (Adams 1988; Pfeffer 1989; Blekesaune et al. 1993). Women are likely to be more involved in production which needs intensive labor such as dairy, vegetables, fruits, peanuts and soybeans (Wilkening 1981; Smith 1987; Simpson et al. 1988; Berlan Darque 1988; Raynolds 1991; Cheng 1992). In contrast, women’s control over farm decisions and rewards is relatively low (Wilkening and Bharadwaj 1967, 1968; Liu 1976; Kohl 1977; Meillasoux 1980; Wilkening 1981; Kohl and Bennett 1982; Lu 1988). Several main perspectives contribute to the explanation of the gender division of farm labor, decisions and rewards. Two wealth accumulation perspectives are based in political economy theory. The other perspectives are based in patriarchal, human capital, household strategy, and marital power process theories. 1 will briefly review the two political economy perspectives and then discuss the other four perspectives in more detail. 1. Political Economy Perspective One political economy approach links the accumulation of capital by rural industrialization to women’s status in farm production. Women’s contributions to farm production (for sale and for home consumption) are necessary to supplement the less-than-living wages paid 5 to men in off-farm employment (super-exploitation). To maintain the viability of the farm economy while men are taking off-farm jobs, women usually work hard for exchange and/or subsistence farm production, even though their labor is devalued. Therefore, their contributions to monetary value in the farm household not only are invisible but also serve capital accumulation in the industrial sector (Buttel and Gillespie 1984; Gasson 1986; Adams 1988; Simpson et al. 1988; Wenger and Buck 1988; Pfeffer and Gilbert 1991). The other political economy approach links women’s status in farm production to the accumulation of capital in the agricultural input and output sectors (cost-price squeeze) (Coughenour and Swanson 1983; Fink 1987; Barlett 1986; Gladwin 1988; Shaver and Reimer 1991). Industrialization makes possible men’s off-farm employment which is necessary for investment on the farm (to counter depreciation), to maintain the treadmill of production (Cochrane 1979) and to substitute for the lack of income to producers' labor (Hetland 1986; Gladwin 1991). Both these approaches thus assume that the feminization of farming is driven by the accumulation of profits of some non-farm sector. Women play an important role in subsidizing men’s wages. In turn, this perspective assumes that farm woman's significant participation in decision making and/or significant share of rewards would disrupt these processes of accumulation. This would happen because women might make production decisions which did not compensate for the super-exploitation of their husbands, and they might allocate their share of the rewards in ways which did not subsidize the farm operation (Agassi 1991; Baud 1992). 6 Though the political economy approach provides a basis for the structural analysis of gender inequality, it is preoccupied with the concern of social class so that the family tends to be bypassed (Haralambos 1984:339). While the political economy approach shows who benefits from women’s subordination, it does not explain why men would provide the mechanisms of their wives’ subordination (agency). Accordingly, women eventually and inevitably become the victims of capitalist development because of the assumption of altruistic relations within the household (Folbre 1988). II. Patriarchal Perspective The major assumption of the patriarchal perspective is that the "world” is a dichotomy of female and male, respectively termed Yin and Yang in Chinese culture; patriarchal ideology assigns merit to women’s dedication to unremunerative domestic tasks. Through gender role differences in socialization, gender norms often restrict women from equal access to economic or social opportunity (Beneria 1985; Bourque and Warren 1981; Folbre 1988; Sachs 1988; Safilios-Rothschild 1976; Szinovacz 1987; Whatmore 1988; Walby 1990). Men, in contrast, are presumed to have the ability and the legitimate power to organize farm family production in order to maximize their personal well-being and to perpetuate patriarchal structures. Accordingly, women tend to be treated as men’s property for men’s utilization in farm production. While technologies demand particular skills traditionally assigned to males (e.g., plowing, furrowing and spraying), women are excluded from agricultural production (Boserup 1970; Sachs 1983; Gladwin 1985; Fink 7 1987; Stratigaki 1988; Berlan Darque 1988). However, when the improvement of farm technology opens up a variety of new farm tasks for women under supervision (e.g., the acquisition of the technical information necessary to use modern agricultural technology or to engage in marketing, improved record keeping and machinery), women then have to contribute their labor voluntarily to farming in addition to the housework which is supposed to be their duty (Sachs 1983; Rosenfeld 1985; Pfeffer 1989; Garkovich and Bokemeier 1988; Goodman and Redclift 1991). One way or another, men could use their prescribed power to retain authority over the whole process and the outcomes of agricultural production while patriarchal ideology takes women’s high participation in farm work for granted in the name of enhancing household well-being (e.g., food and income necessary for reproduction). In other words, in light of the distinct effect of patriarchal ideology on attitudes of members in the same society, a man with strong patriarchal attitudes will not be open to women's participation in decision making, and a woman with strong patriarchal attitudes is not inclined to advocate her participation in decision making. That is because the patriarchal attitudes lead to a view of women as lacking the competence (e.g., analytical abilities) needed for farm decision making (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Hartmann 1981). By the same token, a man with strong patriarchal attitudes will not be open to women’s receiving farm rewards, and a woman with strong patriarchal attitudes is not inclined to claim a reward from farming, because patriarchal attitudes attribute no value to women’s investment and decision-making. 8 Furthermore, feminist political economists contend that the patriarchal structure strongly shapes the changing social structure -- especially capitalist society. It is the intersection of patriarchy and capitalism which results in women’s subordination in a labor market (Mies 1986). In this intersection perspective, a form of "inter-modal value transfer" takes place in the farm family and forces women’s subordination in not only the work role but also in the family role. First, when women are the labor outside the wage/capital economy in a farming context, they subsidize men’s wages while men’s labor is exploited by the capitalist labor market. Second, women’s contributions to subsidize their husbands’ wages from non-farm labor are hardly acknowledged because their role in families has been prescribed by patriarchy as a necessary sacrifice. Having realized the double oppression of women’s unwaged labor under the macro-social structure characterized by an emphasis on the accumulation of wealth from non- agricultural or agricultural markets (e.g., rural industrialization on the one hand and commercialization, commoditization and capitalist development of agriculture on the other hand), the super-exploitation of farm labor is imposed on women under the support of patriarchy which reinforces women’s subordination (Hedley 1981; Meillasoux 1975; Gallin 1984; Beneria 1985; Miss 1986; Reimer 1986; Wenger and Buck 1988; Whatmore 1991a). The patriarchal perspective adequately explains the cause of farm women’s burden and strengthens sexual exploitation of labor and women’s subordination in family farming. However, the emphasis of ideological determinism tends to overlook the psychological aspects of women’s 9 relations with their husbands. How and why women would go along with their subordination to their husbands require a theoretical approach which can articulate the inner story of marital relations. This theoretical approach will be illustrated in family adaptive strategy theory and marital power theory in sections IV and V below. 111. Human Capital Perspective In contrast to both political economy and patriarchy approaches, human capital theory focuses on the individual rather than the larger social structure and, in contrast to patriarchy, it ignores gender differentiation. This perspective puts much emphasis on the connections between resources (e.g., nonhuman or human capital) and the enhancement of the individual’s work power and family power. Wealth, education, training, work experience and other individual characteristics, which constitute important resources or power bases, would bring one into a superior position in the farm family. A family member with more of these resources is viewed as being able to produce/cause outcomes or decision behaviors of other members in the family (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Safilios-Rothschild 1970; McDonald 1980; Lu 1983; Szinovacz 1987). Among the elements of power bases, economically valued resources are often the major factors structuring differential power relations in the farm family. In the Human Capital perspective, women with high educational levels, and/or sufficient training and work experience, would make distinctive contributions to the monetary value of farm production. Therefore, these women deserve autonomy in control over the management 10 of farm resources and processes, and thereby those women deserve rewards for their labor and management inputs. At the same time, in the human capital perspective, despite women’s sizable contributions to farm labor, women do not deserve to share in farm decisions and rewards if they lack expertise in typical (especially advanced) agricultural technology and farm management. In this view, the development of human capital does, on the one hand, provide women the possibility to attain control over the allocation of work, decisions and rewards in farming; on the other hand, human capital theory also provides the rationale for the situation of gender inequality. However this approach still fails to explain why and how women who possess high levels of human capital would go along with their subordination (victimization). In short, human capital theory does not fully appreciate how intra-household relations and relations of production are socially constructed. That is, it fails to answer how the gender division of farm labor, authority and rewards is constructed both under external social or cultural constraints and under internal familial interactions, and how women take part in the constructing process with the interplay of the structural restraints and negotiation between wife and husband. To uncover the process, a new approach is needed to avoid the pitfalls which the previous approaches fall into -- the failure to recognize the existence of conflicts and diversity in family relations (Hedley 1981). 11 IV. Family Adaptive Strategy Perspective A. Basic Notions of Family Adaptive Strategy The family adaptive strategy perspective was developed as an effort to construct the family as a collective social actor which is responsible for linking individual lives to collective behaviors in a certain historical, cultural, social, and economic context (Bennett and Kohl 1982). In order to respond to certain social phenomena such as economic crisis, this social actor attempts to cope with the structural barriers and to utilize structural opportunities for pursuing its long- term goals (Barlett 1986). In this dynamic process, the family responds to the social environment under the guidance of certain strategies implicitly set by the consensus of family members. This guidance, which is closely associated with the effects of "decision making” processes at the level of the family (Wolf 1991:32), provides the family a means of "familial rational calculation" so as to deal with everyday life (Tilly 1979, 1987; Davidson 1991; Moen and Wethington 1992). Nevertheless, the conventional use of the family strategy approach faces conceptual challenges. First, many scholars question the uniformity of family interests in that this approach seems to give too much attention to macro-level dynamics in the ways families cope with structural parameters. Another dimension -- micro-level dynamics within the family process -- is simply neglected. Most of their criticism lies in that the treatment of the family as an actor fails to recognize the fact that each member brings his or her own values and perceptions to the family strategy for the whole family, and fails to make the apparent differentiation within the family of who actually makes the strategic 12 decisions (Smith 1987:118; see also Davidson 1991; Wolf 1991). Those failures occur because the focus on the collective interests tends to eliminate individual differentiated interests within the family (Connell 1987; Folbre 1987; Guyer and Peters 1987; Moch 1987; Davidson 1991). Second, but in a similar vein, the attempt to link family strategy to household economy is especially disputed in that the maintenance of economic well-being (such as buying or renting farm land, selling the products from farm production, and managing farm incomes) is seen as based on “family" decisions which are assumed to follow from the "weighted” individual preferences of family members. That is, "family" decisions are usually made by a few family members or only the head of the family who usually is male (Sen 1983; Folbre 1986, 1987; Smith 1987; Wolf 1991; Moen and Wethington 1992). Therefore, to avoid the biased representation of individual interests and preferences, much attention needs to be given to every single individual in the family and the internal processes of family interaction by acknowledging that different individual members of the family possess diverse interests, needs, duties, and rights (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Saraceno 1989). Given the importance of constructing family strategy as a sensitizing device for both macro- and micro-level processes and of articulating the dynamic nature of these processes, we need to do two things. First, we need to look into how the family employs the various strategies to confront the constraints outside the family. Second, we need to examine the extent which family members with different goals in mind achieve a consensus (Bell 1976). Put another way, we not only examine self-interests within the 13 family, but also visualize the interaction between both realms -- the family and the external environment. At the macro-level, the interlocking external constraints include the economic opportunity structure, social stratification, educational stratification, gender and age hierarchies, and social norms; these would explain how the family applies certain adaptive strategies which affect power relations among different members. At the micro-level, the dynamics in the family are affected by family characteristics such as family composition (e.g., family life stage); family economy characteristics which are closely associated with rational choices based on costs and benefits in the family relations such as family incomes; and individual characteristics such as family members’ human capital resources and belief systems (e.g., the role of altruism). 8. Gender Relations in Family Adaptive Strategy The application of the conceptual framework of family strategy to researching gender power relations in the farm family enables us to explore how individual husbands and wives communicate and cooperate with each other and finally agree on the same family goals in the face of resources and constraints. However, this application demands in-depth examination in order to situate the dialogue in the dyad. In the perspective of Neoclassical Home Economics, women’s work is examined through the distinction between non-market labor and market labor. Families are assumed to be non-labor markets. Furthermore, families are modeled as elementary decision units in which every member in the family is supposed to pursue the collective interest and to l4 maximize the family utility function subject to certain constraints related to family production. In short, gender relations within the family are implicitly considered to be altruistic (Manser and Brown 1980; Sen 1983; Folbre 1986, 1988). Accordingly, whether women are employed as farm labor or off-farm labor depends on the degree of benefit which they can contribute to the family utility. Furthermore, women’s involvement in farm production in addition to their domestic work is taken as a part of the overall family adaptation strategy which does not constitute a basis for women’s participation in decision-making or for rewards to women (Folbre 1986). This functionalist approach presents a conflict-free perspective, and fails to recognize the existence of different needs and preferences for wife and husband in the family’. At the same time, this static approach disregards the mechanisms by which the married couple reaches the final solution -- such as the process of discussion, negotiation and renegotiation, and agreement or disagreement over certain family strategies between genders (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Hartmann 1981; Thorne 1982; DeVault 1990; Feldman 1992; Kandiyoti 1991). In the feminist perspective, gender is taken as a basic category of analysis. Women’s experiences and perceptions are assumed to be different from men’s. To identify the sources of conflict between husband and wife within family life, men and women are assumed to bring different interests, resources, and values to the ongoing struggle over the allocation of housework, farm work, and resources and outcomes of ’ The functionalist approach also fails to recognize differential needs and preferences between adults and children; however our focus here is on gender relations among the adults in the household. 15 farm production. V. Marital Power Process Given the recognition of the family as a locus of substantive struggles, the marriage bargaining approach has been used by many scholars from different disciplines to explore intra-family and gender power relations (Manser and Brown 1980; Sen 1983, 1990; Szinovacz 1987; DeVault 1990; McElroy and Horney 1990; McElroy 1990; Agarwal 1992). In particular, the Nash bargaining model developed by John F. Nash (1950) has been applied to decisions regarding family production (Manser and Brown 1980; Folbre 1986, 1988; McElroy and Horney 1990). The Nash model postulates that an individual would maximize the joint utility based on a non-zero sum two-person game in which both sides may confront each other at first place, but would eventually come to cooperation (Nash 1950; Folbre 1986, 1988). In other words, Nash’s bargaining framework not only allows for different interests between the two actors, but also opens up the possibility of compromise for the bargaining problem (e.g., allocation of resources) to be resolved (McElroy and Horney 1990; McElroy 1990). Since any marital decision involves a certain degree of cooperation, the Nash bargaining model is completely applicable to the study of marital relations concerning family economic decision making (Manser and Brown 1980). Several theoretical and empirical studies comprehensively develop the application of the Nash-bargaining approach to marital relations. In the works of Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and Sen (1983, 1990) on economic bargaining in the family, "cooperative bargaining“ or 16 "cooperative conflict" is used to describe the bargaining process in which wife and husband each try multiple ways to present their own needs, concerns, interests, or reasons as they discuss and negotiate with each other. They would finally come to a particular convergent solution in order to achieve long term survival goals for the family; or they would never get to any conclusion or compromise. The extent to which the couple finally reaches a convergent solution would depend on the balance of bargaining power between wife and husband (e.g., asymmetric or symmetric). The balance of bargaining power is determined by all kinds of variables inside and outside of marriage and outside of the family (Manser and Brown 1980; Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987; McElroy and Horney 1990). Inside marriage, subjective beliefs (e.g., gender role beliefs and self-identity), objective human resources and individual monetary resources (e.g., human capital and personal independent incomes), and investment in personal goals or the marital relationship (e.g., career achievement, marital affection) would constitute power bases for the spouses to negotiate with each other and to achieve their own interests. However, in addition to individual interests, the couple need to take some other factors into consideration and then decide the priority of personal interests. Inside the family, the factors which might reinforce or restrict the husband’s and wife’s power bases are economic benefits for the family (e.g., family income. and the availability of labor in domestic sphere), and family constraint variables (e.g., the presence of young children or senior members). Similarly, the factors outside the family (e.g., economic opportunity, 17 ideology) structurally affect the partners’ power bases for marital bargaining. As all the resources and constraints from structural, family and personal levels influence marital negotiation, the couple then is involved in particular interactions in which they present their own interests and utilize certain communication strategies (e.g., verbal or behavioral communication) to pursue particular outcomes. The partners’ evaluations of the outcomes would produce an important input -- whether it mightbe resource or constraint -- for the next bargaining round. The process flowing from the variations of resources and constraints to (l) the bargaining/negotiation interaction, and then to (2) the gender division of work, decisions and rewards, to (3) the evaluation of the bargaining outcomes, and to (4) the next cycle of negotiation could be conceptualized as a marital power process which is recursive in nature (Hill and Scanzoni 1982; Szinovacz 1987). A. Resources and Constraints The base of bargaining power will be sensitive to various parameters which could be defined at three different levels -- structural, familial, and individual. At the structural level, economic opportunity (Agarwal 1992; Beneria 1992; Feldman 1992) and patriarchal ideology (Szinovacz 1987; Blumberg and Coleman 1989) in a certain social context would define the bargaining power potential. Women would have more bargaining power than men in a region with more access to better outside job opportunities resulting from rural industrialization. With a patriarchal belief system which sufficiently reflects the extent of 18 patriarchal structure, men would have more bargaining power and more favorable cooperative outcomes than women (Saul 1989). At the familial level, first, the characteristics of family compositional variables such as the number of children, family size and family life stage would determine the base of bargaining power between wives and husbands (Blood & Wolfe 1960; Burr 1970; Wilkening and Ahrens 1979; Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987). For example, the number of children affects the dependency on the mother’s caring, nurturance, and tutelage. The increase of dependency is assumed to decrease women’s negotiation power in farming matters, because the attention to the children -- especially young children -- would divert mothers' attention from seeking bargaining power (Duvall 1977; Yi et al. 1991). Second, family economy characteristics such as family incomes and the capacity of family labor for domestic work and self-employed family production could imply differences in power resources between wife and husband in the family (Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987). For example, the presence of other family labor (e.g., husband’s brother) on the farm could exclude women’s participation in the decision making process for farm production, because the participation of other family members in farm work would lead them to get involved in farm decision making (Bennett and Kohl 1982; Wilkening 1958). The effects of the factors at the individual level are mostly suggested by social exchange theory in that material and non-material resources such as waged labor, education, farming experience, farm training, and personal value orientation will determine one’s power base 19 (Szinovacz, 1987; Blumberg and Coleman 1989; DeVault 1990; Agarwal 1992). The material (monetary) resource of waged labor (e.g., incomes) could increase women’s decision power in the family (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Saraceno 1989). For example, women’s incomes from the off-farm production sphere would translate into their power in the farm decision process. Two non-material resources -- objective human resource and subjective human resource (personal beliefs) -- are viewed as important sources of power (McDonald 1980; Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987; Saraceno 1989). The effect of objective human resources on women’s power base is mostly derived from human capital theory. Women with higher educational attainment, farm experience, or participation in farm training programs would acquire more decision power in farm production in the family. Gender role beliefs and self-identity are the subjective human resources considered to be important power bases related to the strong effect of cultural ideology, (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Szinovacz 1987). Gender role beliefs are considered to be indicators of one’s position on the continuum of traditionalism-modernity which embodies one’s own guiding philosophy involving family decision making (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980:26). If women are on the traditional side -- patriarchal prescription -- they would be inclined to submit to their husbands in the decision process. In theoretical papers, several scholars criticize resource theory in family power studies for not including subjective perceptions derived from beliefs. These scholars stress that self-concept and self- 20 identity, including self evaluation, would direct women’s behaviors in the decision-making process. If women perceive their gender role from a more patriarchal perspective, they would be more oriented to stay in the patriarchal prescribed status/role and behave submissively (Scanzoni and Polonko 1980: Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Szinovacz 1987; Bokemeier and Garkovich 1987). B. Bargaining Process Based on marital power process theory, holding different amounts of power sources of different kinds, each member of the couple would attempt to employ certain interactional techniques in his/her involvement in the decision making process. One would seek to gain control over the other in this power exertion process. Utilizing different interactional strategies such as compromise, resistance, persuasion, coercion, and violence, each would attempt to improve his/her position in the bargaining relations with the other (McDonald 1980; Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987). The whole process of bargaining and power exertion is characterized by the development of consensus after the sequence of conflict discovery, bargaining initiation, communication strategy, and solution (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Hill and Scanzoni 1982; Godwin and Scanzoni 1989). The mechanisms and strategies in the power exertion process depend on the structural or individual characteristics which _ could enrich or constrict the person’s power bases and influence the consequences of the power exertion (Szinovacz 1987). 21 C. Power Outcomes As the results of the bargaining process, power outcomes could be viewed as the representation of the relative position achieved by the two spouses. Power outcomes could be assessed by the distribution -- in quality or quantity -- of responsibility (such as the division of farm work), costs, resources, benefits and rewards, and privileges (final family decisions) to the partners (McDonald 1980; Hill and Scanzoni 1983; Szinovacz 1987). As suggested by feminist scholars, persistent intra-family inequalities in the distribution of power and resources, tasks and decision-making prevail in many cultural contexts. Women are especially the victims of inequality (Agarwal 1992). Taking the societal context into account, the ideological constructions of the household and the cultural meanings attributed to gender relations in the household are all possible explanations of women’s traditional attitudes toward patriarchal practices and their low status in families (Rodman 1972; Guyer and Peters 1987; Hardesty and Bokemeier 1989). On the other hand, with individual resources, women might acquire a certain degree of autonomy in the bargaining process and achieve an equal distribution of power outcomes (Kandiyoti 1991). However, to what extent women’s “bargaining with patriarchy“ works out, as Kandiyoti termed it, is determined by the ways in which women and their husbands each exert the three levels of factors depicted earlier. 0. Outcome Evaluation Given the disparity of negotiation processes and outcomes, what 22 concerns feminists are how women evaluate their contributions to productive or reproductive work and the benefits from it in the household; and whether women are conscious of their positions in the bargaining process. To investigate this concern, it is necessary to learn whether women are mystified (i.e., women might not recognize the existence of their low authority in the family); to what extent they are satisfied with the power outcomes; and what are the factors underlying their satisfaction. Women’s satisfaction provides the basic information of the possibility of the renegotiation process and the redistribution of outcomes. In the family power thesis, the outcome evaluation would be affected by the nature and forms of negotiation and also would lead to an ongoing negotiation process (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987). Having realized the marital power process, the farm family could be seen as operating within the dominant economic system (capitalism, rural industrialization, and globalized agriculture) and social ideology system (human capital, patriarchy, and agrarianism) which provide both opportunities and constraints. In response to those opportunities and constraints, the couple in the farm family would initiate a decision process. The decision process is affected by farm household characteristics and personal characteristics. The member with the more favorable negotiation potential (such as high education) would more actively push the decision process in the ways that enable her or him to have a high potential to reach the final decision she or he desired. More explicitly, women who are mostly passive in the process, and who are the house and farm workers, would adjust to multiple 23 constraints, accommodating not only material circumstances but also their husbands and other family members who make claims on their time. On the other hand, they may play an active part in negotiating with their husbands over the distribution of farm work and of returns from the productive work to which they make a significant contribution. Second, as a consequence of the negotiation, the women might or might not retain a degree of autonomy in the determination of their part in farm work, in decision-making concerning the family farm operation, and in the compensation from their hard work. Finally, their evaluation of the allocation of farm work, farm decisions and farm rewards would affect the iterative process of negotiation (Szinovacz 1987; DeVault 1990; Stichter 1990). Farm women may be satisfied with their low participation in farm decisions and then still play a passive part in negotiation; or they may not be satisfied with their low involvement and would like to get much more involved in making farm decisions. However, whether women’s appraisal of their participation in negotiation or of their outcomes from negotiation affects the next cycle of the negotiation process is not within the scope of this study. This recursive marital power process regarding agricultural production in the farm family is termed the agrinubial power'process‘ for this particular study. For simplification, this study integrates the two concepts of agricultural production and marital power relations into one concept. ‘ Agrinubial is coming from two words -- agriculture and nubile. CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 1. Conceptual Framework Integrating all the factors stressed in political economy, human capital, patriarchal, and family adaptive strategy perspectives into family process theory, a conceptual framework of the agrinubial power process is developed to explore women’s role in the marital power process concerning farm production (Figure I). At the family level, women’s participation in the negotiation process is directly affected by family composition (family life stage, and presence of senior family member) and family and farm economy (farm scale, domestic workload, the use of other family labor, and hired labor). At the individual level, all the resource variables (individual monetary resources, subjective human resources, and objective human resources) directly determine women’s autonomy in negotiation. Farm economy characteristics and independent monetary resources are determined by economic opportunity; and subjective human resources are determined in part by patriarchal ideology. Second, women’s share of power outcomes (farm work, farm decisions and farm rewards) is directly affected by their participation in negotiation and by resource and constraint variables at family as well as individual levels. At the same time, the resource and constraint . variables would also indirectly affect the power outcomes through negotiation factors. In the power outcomes, women’s contributions to 21; 25 is; 8.88: 32%... O ....i... U i, \ 202.: 9:59 is; $3.2m 2:850 mm— oocotoaxw Emu. 8:825 3533. 5:5: 338.30 3.953. .Ewm mco_m_ooo Emu. £o>> Emu. - u E «co—53oz: 55> 5:02ng «.5525 // ./ >38! 5:5“..- .2035... $2.8 2cm .EemEma oocaomom 55:: 33333.0: / £553.50 >Eocouu E>anw E895 wbcmnm EoE>anw grotto m.£_>> :omom B5805. .2635: J Refs; 0:858 983600 ES". .83 8:: 2 .83 2:5”. 350 o :5 llllllllllll 28w Em". a: >> a 8:28" __ u . fl 3326 " >Eocoum EN... a ESP... " co=8_::EEoo_ _ _ 522%.: .3822 27:5 .oEow /) F6:250 he 8:329 092w 05 >=Emm _ IIIIIIIIIIII _ . .3376 E00 Econ. r I I Icwmmfiomz u L_ cozmagm oEooSO 35050 .252. 326.... assent-om 8583.30 use «3583. 339:. 330.. _m_nactm< 2: ho Boos. .moueoocoo < —. 053m."— 26 farm work would cause an increase of their participation in farm decisions and their receipt of farm rewards. Similarly, their participation in farm decisions would lead to an increase of farm rewards. Third, women’s evaluation of their share of power outcomes is directly affected by the distribution of power outcomes (farm work, decisions, and rewards) and three groups of individual resource variables (individual monetary resources, subjective human resources and objective human resources). In fact, the agrinubial power process is recursive. The recursiveness occurs in three ways. First is the feedback from the evaluation of outcomes. Obviously, if women are not satisfied with the current arrangement of outcomes, they would seek to change the arrangements or to change the resources they have and the constraints they confront. Second is the feedback from satisfaction to negotiation. If women realize that they are not able to change the situation using their current negotiation strategy, they would get a chance change their negotiation strategy if they are able to. Third, one of the consequences of women’s involvement in the outcomes (work, decision, and rewards) is to produce changes in the resources and constraints. For example, the more a woman works, the more experience she has. The more a woman works and decides, the more she then gets involved in training. However, analyzing the recursiveness requires longitudinal investigation; it cannot be fulfilled in a simple cross-sectional research design. The present study limits itself to the causal mechanisms in the current cycle of the agrinubial power process (Figure 27 2). At the structural level, from the rural industrialization perspective, economic opportunity could affect women’s role in the decision making process. However, the influence is indirect in the sense that it goes through the direct effect on family structure and individual resources. In a similar vein, patriarchal ideology indirectly affects women’s position in decision making through its effect on women’s gender role preference and consciousness (patriarchal role beliefs and self-identity). Put another way, off-farm employment and farm economy characteristics embody economy opportunity; patriarchal role beliefs and self—identity embody patriarchal ideology in the current society. This study thus only focuses on the effects of family and individual variables in the agrinubial power process. More specifically, the influences on the agrinubial power process could be presented in three phases. First, as shown in Figure 3, women’s participation in the negotiation process is positively affected by farm scale, human resource variables, and self-identity, but negatively affected by the presence of senior family members and other family labor, age and patriarchal role beliefs. These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail below (pp. 35ff.). The second phase consists of three sub-phases. Women’s participation in farm work is positively affected by the nature of negotiation, farm scale, wife’s human resources and self-identity, and husband’s off-farm employment (Figure 4). Other family labor and hired labor, women’s off-farm employment and domestic workload negatively affect women’s participation in farm work. Family life stage has a 28 all.) 005801 .3322. 8.3.; £5“. 0.35) gm 080050 £55". :5“. 80250 :5“. x5>> E5“. u 5 5.5226. 5. 5.55.50 95.5 / 5m. 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These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail below (pp. 46ff.). women’s share of farm rewards is positively affected by their participation in farm decisions, and negotiation, net farm income, women’s farm experience and training attendance, women’s education, and wife’s off-farm employment, but negatively affected by hired labor and husband’s off-farm employment (Figure 6). These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail below (pp. 52ff.). Third, women’s evaluation of negotiation outcomes is positively affected by their actual involvement in negotiation and rewards. Participation in farm work and decisions have curvilinear effects on the evaluation of participation. There are interactive effects of women’s participation in farm work and farm decisions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the independent variables (patriarchal role beliefs, self-identity, age, farm experience, farm training involvement, { education, and off-farm employment) on their evaluation of participation (Figure 7). These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail below (pp. 56ff.). I 'I‘I‘IIIII l‘lll‘fl IIII‘I l‘I-IIKI‘ 'FQIII ‘c I‘tci .‘..~U‘U ‘E\~Nch.‘ < o ck‘ifl‘w. I 32 . -E 0_.Em. c..- . ....o @0533... §I> go .030... '— ice; c8188: _fl |J_ .coE>o_.E 6.02.0 w.o._>> is; 8.88.. .338. O 335...... 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O 8...... 8.8.90 8.8.8 U + x co..0....0>m. 5300.03.00 8.0.7.5 .0 x 3:82.00 .0 0.0..0m 0.0”. 020.050.. ... 1 5.0033 .m 5.0.000 E.0 x.o>> 8.0 .c0E>o.0Em .c0E0>.o>c. 9.....0.... 5.00. .N 00:0..00xm. 5.0“. .P 0.0005 :0..0:.0>m 00:00.0...0... 0.00802. :0 0000035.. "8.8.. .23. .2955... 2... .o .82.. .830 .00.... < x. 0.3m.“— 35 II. Hypotheses A. Negotiation (Figure 3) According to the negotiation approach, wife and husband would have differential power resources to influence each other on certain events and topics regarding management and operation of the family farm. In the literature review, four dimensions are used to conceptualize the process of negotiation -- the presence of conflict, the initiation of negotiation, communication strategies, and concluding solutions (Hill and Scanzoni 1982; Szinovacz 1987; Thomas 1990; Yi et al. 1992). To what extent agreement or disagreement emerges, who initiates the negotiation, in what ways communication occurs, and to what extent the issue is resolved would be determined by different sets of variables based on individual human resources (subjective or objective), family composition, and family and farm economic capacity (see Figure 3 on page 29). First, the most significant determinant of the negotiation process is gender role consciousness reinforced by cultural values (Bentley 1989). The overarching societal ideology oriented to male dominance constructs gender stratification in economic power in that it shapes personal attitudes and self-concept through socialization. Hence, attitudes and role-identity oriented to or consistent with patriarchy would lead women to be submissive (Bourque and Warren 1981; Beneria 1985; Blumberg and Coleman 1989). In a sense, women’s patriarchal role beliefs and their self-identity produced through the socialization process in patriarchal society are hypothesized to be strong forces influencing their negotiating positions (Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980; 36 Saul 1989). Previous research suggests that women with patriarchal role beliefs are less likely to present conflict, to initiate a negotiation, or to take an active part in negotiation. Those women tend to submit to their husbands (Safilios-Rothschild 1976; Bourque and Warren 1981; Beneria 1985; Homack 1987; DeVault 1990). Also, women with high patriarchal role beliefs, even though they make significant contributions to agriculture, tend to identify themselves as farm homemakers. According to family power theory, seeing oneself as a homemaker leads to a woman’s low engagement in negotiation over farm production (Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Scanzoni and Szinovacz 1980). Therefore, this study tests the following hypotheses: H-N.l.l The more patriarchal a woman’s role belief, the less likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. H-N.l.2 The more a woman considers herself an independent farmer, the more likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. Second, differences in familial context such as the presence of other family members in farm production would produce different options for the management and operation of the family farm. which of those options becomes implemented as a family adaptive strategy would affect women’s position in the negotiation (Saul 1988; Moen and Wethington 1992). Those family compositional and family economy variables, including senior family member, the scale of farm operation and other family farm labor, would either limit or increase women’s participation in negotiation. 37 The presence of senior family members implies the possibility of other stakeholders in the negotiation process (Szinovacz 1987). With the presence of senior members, such as parents-in-law, women’s bargaining power tends to be weak. That is because the senior members usually have peremptory voices on decision matters. They tend to restrict women’s participation in negotiation (Szinovacz 1987). Similarly, the presence of other family labor in farm production signals a barrier to women’s participation in the decision process. Other family farm contextual variables have positive effects. A large scale of farm operation implies that the farm family holds higher class and status than others with small scale farms (Stavenhagen 1975). Also, large scale of farm operation induces women’s contributions to specialization in farming in that women.tend to do certain farm activities and become an expert in those activities (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1983). This specialization means an enhancement of the human resource which increases women’s bargaining power in farm families (Liu 1976; Wilkening 1981; Rosenfeld 1985, 1986; Gasson 1988). This study proposes the following hypotheses: H-N.2.l Farm women in families whose composition includes senior members are less likely than women in families without senior members to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. H-N.2.2 Farm women in families with the presence of other family labor are less likely than women in families without the presence of other family labor to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution H-N.2.3 The larger a woman’s farm, the more likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. 38 Third, the relative power bases of wife and husband are important factors affecting women’s negotiation position. Based on social exchange theory, the different power bases for wives and husbands entail both human capital contributing to farm production and valued resources outside of the family farm (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Saul 1989; Morris 1990). The more power bases women acquire, the more active they would be in the negotiation. One important dimension of power bases is the investment of human capital in productive work (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Hill and Scanzoni 1982; Rosenfeld 1986; Hardesty and Bokemeier 1987; Szinovacz 1987). Formal education, farm experience and farm training are significant measures of human capital. Education has been considered to be an important parameter promoting bargaining power in marital dyads (Sen 1983). Education means the knowledge which enhances the spouses’ capacity of seeking information about decision matters so that they are able to get to a favorable position in the decision-making process (Sawer 1973, Scanzoni and Polonko 1980; Szinovacz 1987). Accordingly, women with higher education tend to be more active in negotiation. Similarly, husbands with more education tend to be more active in negotiation and thus to restrict women’s bargaining power. Furthermore, based on status attainment theory, working experience and participation in farm training programs would promote women’s bargaining power (Tiano 1984). It is difficult to anticipate the effect of age on negotiation. 0n the one hand, some studies in the context of Chinese culture suggest that young married women’s negotiation power in the family might be low 39 at first but rise gradually and reach a high level when they get old (Gallin 1984; Yi et al. 1991). On the other hand, this study is particularly concerned with the women in an occupation which implies the importance of physical capability as a form of human resource. From the human resource perspective, young means high potential for investment of human capital in the productive sphere which in turn would lead to high power position. Concerning these contradict effects, this study hypothesizes no effect of age on women’s role in negotiation. Altogether, this study presents the following hypotheses concerning individual resources: H-N.3.l The higher a woman’s education, the more likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. H-N.3.2 The greater a woman’s farm experience, the more likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. H-N.3.3 The greater a woman’s participation in farm training programs, the more likely she is to present conflict, to initiate negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. H-N.3.4 The higher a husband’s education, the less likely the wife is to present conflict, to initiate a negotiation, to play an active role in communication, and to develop a compromise solution. The other important dimension of one’s power base is the valued resources that one can bring into the family. The actual income contributed to the family produces a certain degree of power. In the farm family, the extent of one’s power base would depend in part on ‘ one’s earnings from off-farm employment. The greater the amount of valuable resources a person generates outside the family, the greater bargaining power within the family s/he would have (Fassinger and 40 Schwarzweller 1982; Rosenfeld 1986; Agarwal 1992). However it would also be possible that taking an off-farm job precludes one’s involvement in farm activities. That is because farm decisions often need particular expertise which is not necessarily important in the decision of average family matters. Therefore, concerning farm decision making, the member of the couple who has an off-farm Job tends to lose his/her bargaining power in negotiation (Sawer 1973; Lyson 1985). Given the contradictory expectations about the relationship between negotiating power and off-farm employment, this study assumes that off-farm employment would not be related to a person’s negotiation power in farm production. 8. women’s Participation in Farm Hork (Figure 4) Among other dimensions of farm organization, the gender division of farm work is an important outcome of negotiation; it suggests the balance of bargaining power between the two members of the married couple. The one with more bargaining power is likely to hold more authority or control over the allocation of farm labor. S/he would get much more involved in management-oriented or resource- controlling tasks. Moreover, the differential demand for farm labor from the family members is also determined by domestic workload, farm scale, presence of senior family member, and the availability of human capital for farming (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Bennett and Kohl I982; Sachs 1983; Rosenfeld 1985; Bokemeier and Garkovich 1987). The most immediate determinant of the allocation of farm work is 41 the nature of the negotiation process (see Figure 4 on page 30). According to familial process theory, women’s active negotiation will motivate them to seek an equitable distribution of responsibility for themselves (Szinovacz 1987; Agarwal 1992). Women are assumed to want to get out of private/domestic domains and make contributions to valued enterprises in order to achieve self-actualization and to enhance their status in their families. Those women are then assumed to be seeking husband’s help on domestic work. This principle could be applied to farm women whose farm enterprises are under the influence of modernization and commercialization in Taiwan. Therefore, farm wives who are able to bargain with their husbands over the distribution of work would tend to seek much more farm work. H-W.1.I Farm women who present conflict, initiate negotiation, play an active role in communication, or develop a compromise solution are more likely than others to take part in farm work. Second, the availability of farm labor, inferred from family characteristics, would lead to variation in women’s participation in farm work (Sachs 1983; Rosenfeld 1980). .Women’s contributions to farm work are affected by family composition. In part, this is due to the effects of the factors which indicate the degree of women’s time availability and capacity (e.g., family life stage, domestic work participation) and the supply of labor from others (e.g., the presence of other family labor, senior family member). Those effects will be discussed under separate topics. . Many pieces of literature suggest that the effect of the presence of a senior family member on women’s farm labor is due to two reasons (McAllister 1994). First, the presence of a senior family member would 42 take priority for women’s time. That is, senior members could demand that women use their time to take care of them. Second, but in contrast, senior family members provide an alternative supply of farm labor. This alternative makes women’s participation in farming not necessary. Other demands on women’s time is measured as a separate variable (family life stage and domestic work involvement) and other family labor is a measure concerning substitutes for women’s labor. Both measures sufficiently cover two dimensions rooted in the senior family member. Therefore, there is no need to include senior family member in the model. Devotion to domestic work tends to restrict women’s participation in farm work. Even if a woman wants to increase her participation in farm work, she finds it very difficult to decrease her domestic work (Huber and Spitze 1983; DeVault 1990). Despite a woman’s difficulty in decreasing her domestic work, most women are always assumed to be helpers on farm work. During the busy season, their farm workload is high but their domestic work does not decrease. That is because housework is supposed to be their duty (Rosenfeld I986; DeVault I990). Huber and Spitze (1983) have a similar suggestion based on their study of the division of household labor nation-wide in the United States. However, the theory of labor supply and demand suggests that women’s high involvement in domestic work implies the low availability of farm labor from them (HcAllister 1994). This study hypothesizes that the- devotion to housework tends to restrict women’s participation in farm work. Based on the theory of family life stage, married women’s 43 involvement in the productive sphere is affected by which stage of the family life course they are in (Kirkpatrick 1939; Bigelow 1942; Duvall I957). The earlier stages of the family life course demand that women stay at home taking care of children, and imply low availability of family farm labor. In later stages with children grown up, women have much more chance to devote themselves to the productive sphere. It was found that an increasing number of children under six years old tends to reduce women’s farm work (Wilkening and Ahrens 1979; Bennett and Kohl 1982; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Colman and Elbert I983; Rosenfeld 1985; Bokemeier and Garkovich I987). The presence of young children will restrict women’s devotion to farm work, because women have to take care of the children while husbands do not usually make contributions to domestic work (Hill and Scanzoni 1981; Rosenfeld 1986; Szcinovacz 1987). As the children -- especially sons -- grow up and make contributions to the supply of farm labor, the extent of a woman’s participation in farm operation remains low (Wilkening and Ahrens I979; Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Colman and Elbert 1983; Rosenfeld 1985). However, women’s participation in farm work increases when children leave home and their labor is lost to the family farm (Garcia-Ramon and Canoves 1988). Altogether, this study proposes the following hypotheses. . H-W.2.I Women on farms with other family labor are less likely than women without the presence of other family labor to take part in farm work. H-W.2.2 The greater a woman’s domestic workload, the less likely she is to participate in farm work. 44 H-W.2.3 Over the first half of the family life course, the later stage a woman is in, the less likely she is to take part in farm work. However, over the second part of the family life course as children leave home, she is more likely to take a greater part in farm work. Third, in addition to other family labor which affects whether the farm is economically viable, farm scale is also important in affecting the distribution of farm work between wives and husbands. Farm scale is related to the demand for farm labor in that the larger farm engages woman’s labor to avoid additional labor costs. Therefore, women’s participation in farm work is positively related to farm size (Rosenfeld I980; Wilkening 1981; Rosenfeld 1986). The general tendency of women’s participation is affected by the availability of hired labor. Bokemeier and Coughenour (1980) suggested that the increasing cost of hired labor will require women’s involvement in agriculture. Several studies found that there is a tendency for hired labor to substitute for women’s on-farm labor inputs (Wilkening and Ahrens 1979; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Elbert 1982). This substitution would be greater among households of large farms with more operation of new technology and machines, because the cost of hired labor becomes a minor factor for large scale farm operations (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Buttel and Gillespie 1984; Sharp et al. 1986; Simpson et al. 1988). Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: H-W-3.1 The larger a woman’s farm, the more likely she is to take part in farm work. ‘ H-W—3.2 Women on farms with hired labor are less likely than women on farms without hired labor to take part in farm work. Fourth, the capability and availability of woman’s farm labor 45 indicated by education, farm experience, farm training involvement, and off-farm employment, would affect women’s participation in farm work. Based on the thesis of human capital investment, more farm experience and training involvement would lead to more involvement in farm tasks because of a large proportion of lifetime on farm (Rosenfeld 1986). Although no empirical study addresses the relation between farm training involvement and women’s farm work involvement, in this study, farm expertise is treated as an important determinant of women’s participation in farm production. On the other hand, taking off-farm jobs means that family members are not likely to be available to farm production (Rosenfeld 1980; Gladwin 1986). Therefore, women’s off-farm employment would decrease their participation in farm work (Rosenfeld 1980; Sachs 1983; Gladwin 1991). On the other hand, husbands’ taking off-farm employment leads to wives’ high participation in farm work. H—W.4.l The greater a woman’s farm experience, the more likely she is to take part in farm work. H-W.4.2 The more a woman’s involvement in farm training programs, the more likely she is to take part in farm work. H-W.4.3 Women with off-farm employment are less likely than women without off-farm employment to take part in farm work. H-W.4.4 Women whose husbands have off-farm jobs are more likely than women whose husbands do not have off-farm jobs to take part in farm work. Finally, women’s perceptions of their roles in farm work are different from men’s, because women’s contributions to farm work might not be viewed as significant by men but might tend to be degraded. The acknowledgement of women’s contributions to farm work could be done by many outsiders. However, being recognized by themselves is more 46 important than being recognized by others. Along with rising gender consciousness, women’s self-perceptions might change and affect their working experience. Therefore, women’s self-identity is assumed to be closely associated with their participation in farm production (Elbert 1988; Whatmore 1991). In the Kentucky study, Bokemeier and Garkovich (1987) suggest that the less women identify themselves as home-oriented, the more actively they will be involved in farm tasks. As such, this study hypothesizes that an orientation of women’s self—identity to independent farmer will lead to their high involvement in farm production, because they tend to have high commitment to the farm work based on the perceptions of their role in farming. H-W.5.l The more a woman identifies herself as an independent producer, the more likely she is to take part in farm work. C. Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions (Figure 5) The distribution of farm decisions underscores the degree of negotiation power in the marital relations (see Figure 5 on page 32). Previous exploratory analyses of farm family power relations are mostly grounded in resource theory (Wilkening 1958; Wilkening and Bharadwaj 1967, 1968; Bennett and Kohl 1982; Liu 1976; Rosenfeld 1985). These studies suggest that the elements of human capital, such as incomes, education, training, and work experience, would bring one into a superior position in the family. One with much more resource is seen as being able to acquire much more ability or capability to produce or _ cause outcomes or decision behaviors of other members in the family (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Szinovacz, 1987). In this view, marital power in the family is dependent on the different resources held by the 47 spouses. The one who brings more resources for the family is supposed to hold more decision power (Lu 1984; Safilios-Rothschild 1970; Yi and Tsai 1989). The resources based in resource theory are in two categories -- individual monetary resources and objective human resources. In addition, inspired by normative resource theory, cultural ideology is regarded as a strong force which leads to women’s subordination in the family. The influence of patriarchal ideology on women’s subordination operates through its effect on their patriarchal role beliefs. For example, in the patrilineal family, the senior male member is always prescribed to be in a dominant position to make family decisions. By contrast, females in this family are likely to be excluded from making final decisions. In this tradition, those females who are comfortable with their subordinate position, that is those women who have higher patriarchal role beliefs, would take a lesser part in decision-making. Specification of these propositions generates the following expected relationships. First, based on social equity, participation in productive work should lead to decision authority in this productive Sphere. Previous studies in the U.S. demonstrate that women’s involvement in farm work reinforces their position in farm decisions (Sawer 1973; Rosenfeld 1980, 1986; Lyson 1985; Berlan Darque (1988). Therefore, the study hypothesizes that H-D.1.I The greater a woman’s part in farm work, the more likely she is to participate in farm decisions. Second, the negotiation process is considered strongly related to the allocation of farm decisions, because, to a large degree, bargaining trair colt: Scam DOUG!“ invol one’g decig “Mr 48 behaviors embody the allocation of decision power. In their study assessing the marital decision-making process in American white middle- class couples, Hill and Scanzoni (1982) note that women with active negotiation share much decision power. Agarwal (1992) also suggests that Indian women in a weak bargaining position have limited access to farm decisions. H-D.2.I Women who present conflict, initiate negotiation, play an active role in communication, and develop a compromise solution are more likely than others to take part in farm decisions. Third, based on resource theory, women’s farm experience, farm training participation, and education are critical human capital which could be translated into women’s decision power (Sawer 1973; Hill and Scanzoni I982; Lyson 1985; Rosenfeld 1986; Hardesty and Bokemeier 1987). As a form of human capital, working experience means the input of power base. Farming background is thus expected to lead to more involvement in decision making. As one spends a large proportion of one’s lifetime on a farm, s/he gets adequate capacity to make farm decisions (Rosenfeld I986). The positive relationship between farm experience and women’s farm decisions is supported by a previous study in Taiwan (Lai 1973). Human capital also includes technological knowledge which will make a long-term contribution to the inputs of women’s participation in farm production. According to Sawer (1973) in a study of farm families in British Columbia, Canada, the acceptance of technological change has a strongly positive relation to wife’s involvement in farm decision- making. In Taiwan, farm training programs are provided by the Agricultural Extension Service. In this study, farm training is treated 49 as an important influence on women’s participation in the decision - making process. Women with a high level of education as an important power base, are supposed to be highly involved in farm decisions. That is because higher education leads them to understand more about the content of decisions and how to make those decisions. Therefore, this study tests the following hypotheses. H-D.2.2 The greater a woman’s farm experience, the more likely she is to participate in farm decisions. H-D.2.3 The greater a woman’s participation in farm training programs, the more likely she is to take part in farm decisions. H—D.2.4 Women with more education are more likely to take part in farm decisions. On the other hand, among the elements of power bases, economic valued resources including income and employment outside the family are often the major factors differentiating power relations in the farm family, because the contributions to family utility could be translated into a family member’s decision-making power. Taking an off-farm job implies a monetary contribution to the farm family (Rosenfeld 1980; Gladwin 1986). One could assume that the greater a person’s waged employment outside the farm family, the greater would be his/her power within the farm family (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Rosenfeld 1986; Agarwal 1992). On the other hand, taking off-farm employment indicates low participation in farm production which leads to low involvement in farm decisions. Given the two effects in opposite directions, the relation of farm decisions to off-farm employment will be assumed to be insignificant. Therefore, this study hypothesizes no relationship between women’s participation in 50 farm decision and their off-farm employment or husbands’ off-farm employment. Third, two variables related to subjective power resources are identified as important factors affecting women’s participation in farm decisions. Women with high patriarchal role beliefs would not expect to participate in decision making, because they are socialized not to pursue decision authority but to obey the male’s decision or at least to let males in the family make decisions. Seeing oneself as an independent farmer leads to women’s engagement in farm decisions because of their self-perception of being independent in farm production. The study of Kentucky farm women suggests that the variation of women’s participation in decision-making is explained by their self-identity (Bokemeier and Garokvich I987). H-D.3.I Women with higher patriarchal role beliefs are less likely to take part in farm decisions. H-D.3.2 The more a woman identifies herself as an independent producer, the more likely she is to take part in farm decisions. Fourth, factors at family levels could indicate the degree of women’s power in two aspects -- family composition and farm economy. Women’s power in farming would go up as they enter into late stage of family life course. That is because they have spent lots of time, meaning they have learned all the things from farm work, and so become valuable partners. From a marital process perspective, it could be also because the couple get to know each other better through years of marriage, and they have learned to seek equity. However, their power in farming would go down as they enter later stages of the family life course -- retirement stage -- because of their preparation of passing on 51 the farm to the next generation. On the other hand, women’s participation in farm decisions is expected to be weak if there are senior members in the family. Concerning farm economy, Wilkening (1958) and Liu (1976) indicated a curvilinear relationship between farm income and wife’s participation in decision making. Joint decision making tends to occur among middle-income farm families more than low- or high-income families. Because none of the investigators could provide a convincing explanation of this curvilinear relationship, they all argued that the relationship requires further investigation. Given this, we will hypothesize that this study will find a curvilinear relationship. The presence of other family labor in the farm activities would be a barrier to women’s participation in decision making —- especially the eldest son or father-in-law in the family. Based on the tendency of a decrease of women’s participation in farm work with the presence of hired labor, the hiring of labor to replace the wife might be a way for the husband to increase his control over the farm labor (Liu 1976; Wilkening and Ahrens 1979; Moore and Wilkening I982; Elbert 1982; Rosenfeld 1986). Altogether, this study hypothesizes that: H—D.4.l Women in a later family life stage are more likely to take part in farm decisions until they enter the retirement stage. H-D. 4. 2 Women in families whose composition includes senior members are less likely than women in families without a senior member to take part in farm decisions. H-D.4.3 Women of farms with moderate net farm incomes are more likely than women with high or low net farm incomes to take part in farm decisions. H-D.4.4 Women with the presence of other family labor are less 52 likely than women without the presence of other family to take part in farm decisions. H-D.4.5 Women on farms with hired labor are less likely than women without hired labor on the farm to take part in farm decisions. Finally, in the case of the United States, no significant effect of age on women’s decision making in farming was found (Rosenfeld 1986). In contrast, it would be significant that in Chinese culture, as women are getting old, they gain more power base. However, under the rapid change of political economy which has lead to the differentiation of class among families in rural Taiwan, older women in proletariat or sub- proletariat would experience losing power in contrast to those in the petty bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie (Gallin 1994). Concerning farm families, farm scale is considered to be an indicator of the class difference. However, in Taiwan, 80 percent of farm families own less than 1.5 hectare of farm land, and 0.7 percent of farm families have farms larger than 5 hectares (Republic of China 1994). Therefore, the small variation in farm scale would not cause a significant interaction effect with age on women’s participation in farm decisions. This study hypothesizes that: H-D.5.I The older women are, the more likely they are to take part in farm decisions. D. Homen’s Farm Rewards (Figure 6) In the previous literature, little attention has been paid to . compensation for women’s productive farm work as a dependent variable and to the ways this compensation could be accounted for by different factors. This study includes different negotiation positions, 53 participation in farm work and decisions, and elements closely associated with the availability of farm labor as important factors (see Figure 6 on page 33). I Women’s position in negotiation, and participation in farm work and in farm decisions are identified as the most three important factors based on social equity theory. Women’s actual involvement in farm work and decisions should be compensated. That is, the extent to which women can get access to the rewards such as finance and ownership of land would depend on their actual participation in the activities which reflects their power relative to their husbands. Women who are active in negotiation would seek to maximize benefits from their contributions. Women in a weak bargaining position are found in the Indian case to have limited access to production rewards (Szinovacz 1987; Agarwal 1992). In the same vein, women’s actual participation in farm decisions would bring them to share much more in the rewards from farm production. Although no empirical evidence on farm rewards in response to labor participation was found in the previous literature, women who have high participation in farm work might expect to be highly rewarded on the basis of social equity. Nevertheless, the relationship between the contributions to farm work and the receipt of farm rewards might not necessarily be strong. The patriarchal or exploitative arrangement of farm tasks and the principle of the maximization of family economy would legitimate and rationalize the reduction or elimination of women’s rewards. Therefore, women under both situations tend to receive limited rewards even if they make a large contribution to farm work. 54 Accordingly, this study expects to find no relationship between women’s involvement in farm work and their farm rewards. Altogether, this study hypothesizes that: H-R.I.1 Farm women who present conflict, initiate negotiation, play an active role in communication, or develop a compromise solution are more likely than others to receive farm rewards. H-R.I.2 Women’s participation in farm work is not related to their receiving farm rewards. H-R.1.3 The greater a woman’s participation in farm decisions, the more likely she is to receive farm rewards. The second important group of factors associated with the share of farm rewards includes the variables related to human resources contributing to empower women. With high education both for wives and husbands, women’s share of rewards would be high, because wives or husbands have much more sense of what they or their spouse deserve, and/or how to get access to finances and other resources, and/or how to manage the finances. In this study, rewards will be conceptualized more broadly than just wages or monetary payment to include farm incomes, credit programs and ownership, etc. Therefore, in that broader conceptualization, greater farming background and involvement in farm training programs enable women to know better how to get access to these kinds of rewards. H-R.2.1 Farm women with more education are more likely to receive farm rewards. H-R.2.2 Farm women whose husbands have more education are more* likely to receive farm rewards. H—R.2.3 Women with more farm experience are more likely to receive farm rewards. H-R.2.4 Women with more involvement in farm training programs are more likely to receive farm rewards. 55 Third, the variables reflecting monetary input to the farm family have strong effects on women’s share of farm rewards. In the family with high net farm incomes, women’s share of farm rewards should be high for two reasons. One is related to farm organization. On large farms, women tend to be involved in managerial work which implies the possibility for them to control finance. The other reason is flexibility; in that women simply can get access to monetary resources easily in the families with high net farm incomes (Rosenfeld 1980; Wilkening 1981; Rosenfeld 1986). H-R.3.I Women with more net farm incomes are more likely to receive farm rewards. Finally, the variables concerned with the availability of labor such as hired labor and off-farm employment would deprive women of farm rewards. Hired labor tends to reduce woman’s participation in farm work which leads to a decrease of farm rewards (Liu 1976; Wilkening and Ahrens 1979; Moore and Wilkening 1982; Elbert 1982; Rosenfeld 1986). In a similar vein, taking an off—farm job means a decrease in involvement in farm work (Rosenfeld 1980; Gladwin 1986). Those who invest limited time in farm work, do not deserve farm rewards. However, as hypothesized earlier, there is no relationship between women’s contributions to farm work and their receipt of rewards. The indirect effect of off-farm employment on farm rewards would not be the case. The important direct effect could be found in the valued resource from off-farm employment for the farm family. With valuable resources frbm their off-farm employment, women’s bargaining power over the distribution of farm rewards may be high if they are still involved in farm production, even on a part-time basis as the sampled women in this 56 study. That is because of the increased awareness of the value of their labor. For example, women with off-farm employment will use that increased human resource and enhanced self-evaluation as the basis for demanding rewards for their labor. In the same rationale, husband’s taking an off-farm job means women’s participation in farm production which implies the increase of their rewards from production because of husbands’ self—awareness of seeking rewards (Rosenfeld 1980; Sachs 1983; Gladwin 1991). This study hypothesizes that off-farm employment has a positive effect on receiving farm rewards. H-R.4.1 Farm women on farms with hired farm labor are less likely than women without hired labor to receive farm rewards. H-R.4.2 Women with off-farm employment are more likely than women without off-farm employment to receive farm rewards. H-R.4.3 Women whose husbands have off-farm jobs are more likely than women whose husbands have no off-farm jobs to receive farm rewards. E. Women’s Participation Evaluation (Figure 7) Women’s evaluation of the outcomes of negotiation is recognized as one of the important drives to renegotiation which leads to the next round of decision-making. The evaluation of participation is assumed to come from a rational calculation of the difference between farm women’s expectations and their actual experience of participation in the three dimensions of farm production -- farm work, farm decisions, and farm rewards (see Figure 7 on page 34). Assuming women would seek an equitable opportunity in the public/production sphere, they would be’ satisfied with an intermediate level of participation in farm work and farm decisions that they perceive as fair or appropriate (Rosenfeld 1980). However, they would be satisfied with as much farm rewards as 57 they can get. Therefore, this study hypothesizes curvilinear relationships between women’s evaluation and their actual involvement in farm work and farm decisions, but a linear relationship between women’s evaluation and farm rewards. H-E.I Farm women’s satisfaction with their... (Ia) participation in farm work is likely to increase with their participation in farm work, but then to decrease when their workload turns heavy beyond the point of tolerance. (1b) participation in farm decisions is likely to increase with their participation in farm decisions, but then to decrease when their decision load continues to increase beyond the optimum point. (1c) farm rewards is likely to increase with their farm rewards. Women who are involved in active negotiation tend to find a convergent solution in terms of their share of farm work, farm decisions, and farm rewards. Given this assumption, women active in negotiation would be content with their participation in farm production. Therefore, this study tests the following hypotheses: H-E.2 Farm women who present conflict, initiate negotiation, play an active role in communication, and develop a compromise solution are more likely than others to feel: (2a) satisfied with their farm workload; (2b) satisfied with the part they take in decisions; and (2c) satisfied with the returns from their productive work. As suggested earlier, the gap between the expectation and the realization of the women’s participation in farm work and decisions influences women’s satisfaction with their participation. Any increase in the gap would cause a certain degree of disappointment. Under the influence of patriarchal theory, high patriarchal women would be satisfied with the rewards from their farm work no matter how much reward they actually receive. However, low patriarchal women’s 58 satisfaction would increase with the rewards they receive. Concerning the interaction effect of patriarchal beliefs and participation in farm work or decisions on the evaluation of that participation, high patriarchal women would be satisfied with any level of their participation in farm work or decision making. However, low patriarchal women would be satisfied with moderate involvement but dissatisfied with too much or too little involvement in work and decisions. One’s self-identity indicates the extent of one’s acknowledgement of one’s role in the family and/or in farm production, and of one’s willingness to stay in the role. To the extent that women identify themselves as independent farmers, they are assumed to want to take more part in farm production. If they do take a greater part in farm production, they are more likely to feel satisfied with their positions/participation in farm work and decision making. However, if they take a lesser part in farm production, they tend to be dissatisfied with their participation. Therefore, for the participation in farm work and farm decisions, the influence of identity on women’s evaluation depends on the congruity of disparity between their self-identity and their actual participation. This study proposes that satisfaction is influenced by an interaction effect between self-identity and participation in farm work and decisions. However, there is another form of the interaction effect between self-identity and rewards on women’s satisfaction with farm rewards. On the one hand, no matter how women identify themselves, they would be satisfied with receiving high rewards from their participation in farm 59 production. On the other hand, if women have independent producer self- identity, they would be satisfied with high rewards but be dissatisfied with low rewards. The effects of human resources on women’s satisfaction are determined by the conjoint relations between human resources and women’s participation in farm work and decisions. That is, higher educated women would feel that they are entitled to do farm work, and they would expect meaningful farm work and decisions. Therefore, high educated women with high participation and low educated women with low participation would be satisfied the with participation. To the contrary, high educated women with low participation and low educated women with high participation would be dissatisfied with the participation. Following the same line of reasoning, participation in farm training and farming experience are positively related to the involvement in farm work and decision as depicted in earlier sections. Therefore, we expect that women with more farm training involvement and more participation in farm work and decisions would be more likely than others to be satisfied with their participation in farm work and decisions. On the other hand, women with less farm training involvement and high participation in farm work and decisions, and those with high farm training involvement and low participation in farm work and decisions, would be dissatisfied with their participation in farm work and decisions. This logic also applies to the relationship between participation satisfaction and farm experience. Furthermore, concerning the effects of human resources on women’s 6O satisfaction with farm rewards, women with low human capital (education, farm experience, and involvement in training programs) would be satisfied with any level of farm rewards they receive. However, with higher human resource, women are more likely to be satisfied with higher level of farm rewards and dissatisfied with lower rewards. One with high human capital would think she deserves more and more of rewards from a productive sphere in which she specializes. Finally, women with off—farm jobs and low participation in farm work or decisions are more likely than women with off-farm but high participation to be satisfied with their participation in farm work and decisions. Women without off-farm jobs and high participation in farm work and decision are more likely than women without off—farm jobs but low participation to be satisfied with their participation in farm work and decisions. Furthermore, no matter whether women have off-farm jobs they would be happy to receive as much reward as possible. Therefore, there is no main or conjoint effect of off-farm employment on their satisfaction with the receipt of farm rewards. Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS I. Data Collection The data for this study were collected in two phases -- a nation- wide survey, and in-depth interviews. A. Survey Research The survey data were mainly derived from a project on which I collaborated with several faculty in the Department of Agricultural Extension at National Taiwan University. The preparation of this research project actually started in the Summer of 1994. We went into the field, interviewed agricultural extension agents and agricultural specialists, and visited vegetable growers and their wives. After the field work, I was mainly responsible for the literature review, the study framework, questionnaire design, sampling, pretest and actual data collection for this project, which was funded by the National Science Council of Taiwan (Liu et al. 1995). 1. Population Among all agricultural products in Taiwan, vegetable farming —— with small-scale operations and a relatively low level of mechanization -- is characterized by high labor intensity; growing vegetables requires that much of the field work be done with relatively simple hand tools. Some researchers argue that women play essential and influential roles in horticultural farming (Boserup 1970; Burton et al. 1984; Rosenfeld 61 62 1985; Gasson I988; Stratigaki 1988; Berlan Darque 1988). Assuming that men are increasingly working off the farms, women become a major source of labor in vegetable farming. Accordingly, this study concerns contemporary Taiwanese farm women, who are engaged in vegetable growing. Secondly, the attention of this study is restricted to the particular position of married women in family based agricultural production, recognizing that it is marriage which shapes most women’s and other family members’ participation in domestic work and in the farm labor process. Third, in order to explore gender relations in farming, it is necessary to have a couple in the farm household who are each actually working on the farm at least on a part-time basis. Therefore, this study only includes married farm women who have gotten involved in farm work and whose husbands are alive and working on the farm at least on a part-time basis. The restricted sample is believed to be sufficient to represent women’s participation in commercial vegetable farming in Taiwan. That is because commercial vegetable farming in Taiwan, in general, involves a huge amount of female labor. Thus, the conclusion of this study would be applicable to women engaged in commercial vegetable farming in Taiwan. Fourth, in order to investigate the dynamics of marital power relations, the farm families from which the sample in this study is selected are restricted to families which are identified as monogamous units including a heterosexual couple and which function as units of both agricultural enterprise and household activity. Given this scope, the population for this study is the married 63 women in farm households whose major enterprise is growing vegetables. In Taiwan, vegetable specialized areas were mapped by the Council of Agriculture in the late 19805. Those areas spread over 13 countiess. To promote vegetable production for the market, Farmers’ Associations are responsible for grouping farmers as research or cooperation teams. According to the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 117 vegetable groups have been established in specialized areas in 36 townships in those counties and municipalities. Each group includes on average 20 members. Almost all of the members are male. The wives of the members in those vegetable groups are thus the subjects for this study. The population size is about 2,340. 2. Sample Considering sampling error, eligibility, and completion rate of personal interview, 335 was decided to be the sample size following formula for desiring sampling on .95 confidence interval“. First, in light of the sample size over the population (335/2,340), seven was chosen as the interval to randomly select vegetable groups which were 5 There are sixteen counties (Hsien) and two Municipalities (Taipei and Kaohsiung) in Taiwan area. However, one of the sixteen which is Penghu Hsien -- offshore islands -- is not included in the design of vegetable specialized areas. ‘ the formula for calculating sample size (n) for .95 confidence interval is: +/- 0.05 a +/- 1.96 / [(O.S*O.5)/(n-1))*[1/(n-2,340)] n . 329 However, desired Sample Size considering 99 percent hit rate, 99 percent eligibility rate, and 99 percent completion rate for personal interview would be calculated as follows: 329/(.99*.99*.99) - 335. 64 accumulated. Fifteen vegetable research groups in 13 townships were selected. Second, 20 wives of the members in each vegetable group were randomly designated based on the roster of farmers maintained by the township Farmers’ Association. For seven townships selected and with more than 4-5 vegetable groups, 25 as the criteria for the selection of farm women from each vegetable group. Finally, 303 interviews were successfully completed with 90 percent completion rate. 3. Fieldwork, Pretest and Survey Interview Chia-yi and Yun-lin counties were selected for fieldwork and pretest before the survey, because they are the major locations of vegetable production on Taiwan. The initial fieldwork and pretest was used to explore the actual situation and to test the replication of items from previous studies reviewed, so as to facilitate the design of the subsequent survey. The design of the questionnaire for the subsequent survey was based on field observations and the pretest. 4. Variables and Measurement 1. Negotiation To translate power bases (resources) into spousal behaviors, two theoretical types of underlying interaction are suggested in the literature concerning marital power relations —- the development of agreement and the resolution of different interests (McDonald 1980; Hill and Scanzoni 1982; Thomson 1990; Yi et al. 1992). The first model, the development of agreement, is suggested as the major impetus to the subsequent process of negotiation. On the other hand, the second 65 model,the resolution of different interests, is concerned with the ways of solving disagreement in the dyad. To cover both models, in this study negotiation is measured by four major indicators which are inspired by Yi et al. (1992) in their research on the model of conflict resolution in a dyad: (a) The presence of conflict is a yes-no question asking respondents whether they have any disagreement with their husbands in making decisions. (b) Initiation is assessed by asking who initiates the negotiation. (c) Communication strategy is to find out patterns of communication and is assessed by asking how do you communicate with your husband when you have some disagreement in decision making. (d) Concluding Solution is the extent of cooperation to final solution or decision and is assessed by asking: ”How do you and your husband finally reach the solution? Do you think the conflict is finally resolved7'. Among the different dimensions of the negotiation process, only the presence of conflict is taken into account in the multivariate analysis of the survey data. Other dimensions of negotiation were hard ‘to gather through structured questions. These data were collected qualitatively with a limited number cases. ii. 'The Outcomes of Negotiation (a) Women’s Involvement in Farm Work According to the feminist conceptualization of family-based agricultural production which includes both subsistence production and 66 market production, farm work is defined as farm activities which contribute to the production for market sale and for household consumption, from operational inputs to marketing outputs (Whatmore 1991). Farm tasks are broadly defined to include errands, marketing and bookkeeping in addition to general farming activities (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Bennett 1970; Bennett and Kohl 1982; Reimer 1986; Safilios-Rothschild 1985). Accordingly, this study designates 37 farm tasks in the whole farm labor process (Appendix A). Three indicators are used to measure farm work participation -- time spent on farm work, and the breadth and the depth of participation in farm tasks (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982). The time devoted to farm work is measured by the average of reported hours per day women work on the farm throughout four time categories -- Winter slack, Winter busy, Summer slack and Summer busy seasons. Farm task participation depth and breadth is based on the 37 taSks in the agricultural labor process. The two measures of Farm Task Participation are revised from the original scale developed by Fassinger and Schwarzweller (1982). The breadth of women’s farm task participation is obtained by dividing the total number of farm tasks a woman is reported as doing (the answers for “always wife does it"; "usually wife does it"; "do it together with husband“; or "usually husband does it“) by the total number of tasks normally done7 on the farm and multiplying the result by 100. To assess the intensity of participation, the degree of 7 In counting farm tasks which are normally done on a woman's farm for the denomination of the measure of breadth participation, we treat the answer "no such task“ on the farm as missing data for the analysis. The tasks ”done by others" and "always done by husband” are all treated as those which could be, but have not been, done by the wife. 67 involvement on each farm task refers to a rating score which respondents report. 0 is given to the answers “always husband does it", I'usually husband does it", or ”someone else does it“; 1 to 'do it together with husband“; 2 to ”usually wife does it“; and 3 to “always wife does it“. The depth of participation is then calculated by summing scores for all tasks, then dividing by the total number of tasks reported as done by wife (scores 1-3) multiplied by three (the highest possible participation score per item task), and finally multiplying the result by 100. A measure representing the composite of breadth and depth was developed according to the original scale developed by Fassinger and Schwarzweller (1982). In that study, the coding of the involvement in each farm task is designed as a rating score which respondents reported: 1 is given to the answer "always husband does it“; 2 to usually husband does it”; 3 to ”do it together with husband"; 4 to "usually wife does it"; and 5 to ”always wife does it". The extent of women’s farm task participation then is calculated by summing the scores which women responded, then dividing by the total number of tasks reported as done on the farm multiplied by five (the highest possible participation score per task) and finally multiplying the result by 100. However, this composite measure was found to be highly correlated with both breadth (r - 0.7) and depth (r = 1.0). Since breadth and depth were not highly correlated with each other (r - -O.13), these two measures were used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis but the composite one was not. (b) Women’s Involvement in Farm Decisions Farm decision refers to the behavior of making final decisions on 68 24 farm management items (Appendix B) inspired by previous research by Rosenfeld (I985), Sachs (1983) and Bokemeier and Garkovich (1987). Two measures are used in Farm Decision Participation -- the breadth and depth of decision participation. They are formulated in the same way that was utilized for farm task participation. The breadth of farm decision participation is obtained by dividing the total number of farm decisions a woman is reported as making (the answer for I‘usually husband does it“; "do it together with husband"; "usually wife does it”; or "always wife does it") by the total number of farm decisions applicable to the family and multiplying the result by 100. The rating of each farm decision for computing participation depth is as follows: 0 for "always husband does it", ”usually husband does it“, or "someone else does it"; 1 for "do it together with husband"; 2 for "usually wife does it"; and 3 for "always wife does it". The depth of decision participation then is calculated by summing the total scores for all decisions, then dividing by the total number of decisions reported as made by wife (scores 1-3) multiplied by three (the highest possible participation score per item decision), and finally multiplying the result by 100. A measure representing the composite of breadth and depth was developed in the same way as the farm task participation composite scale. That is, the rating for each decision refers to a score which respondents reported: 1 is given to the answer "always husband does it’; 2 to ”usually husband does it"; 3 to "jointly"; 4 to ”usually wife does it"; and 5 to "always wife does it". This measure is then calculated by summing the total scores of 24 decisions, divided by the total number of 69 decisions reported multiplied by five (the highest possible score per decision); and finally multiplying the result by 100. However, this composite measure was found to be highly correlated with both breadth (r - 0.8) and depth (r - 0.6). Since breadth and depth were not highly correlated with each other (r - -0.05), those two measures were used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis but the composite one was not. (c) The Distribution of Farm Rewards Farm rewards in this study are conceptualized as access to valued resources which reflects the distribution of benefits. Research done in industrial societies usually narrowly defines the inequality of rewards by gender as the wage gap. With a different approach oriented to socio- cultural analysis rather than economic analysis, most of the studies done in Third World countries are much more concerned with gender differences in access to property and chance to take part in credit programs (Saito and Spurling 1993). In the context of a New Industrialized Country such as Taiwan, this study also considers the management of and the authority over finances as other important dimensions of monetary rewards. Accordingly, four indicators are used to measure farm rewards. (1) Whether women receive wages for their farm work. This is measured by the presence of monetary payment women receive for their farm work. (2) Whether women own farm property? 0 is assigned to ”no"; 1 to "yes but still processing the transfer of ownership"; and 2 to "yes". (3) Whether women participate in farm-related credit programs, such as a loan or a subsidy. O is assigned to "no"; and 1 to "yes". 7O (4) Women’s involvement in finance management. This is assessed by the combination of two questions. The first one is “how does the family handle the money from vegetable sales". 0 is assigned to ”put the earnings into husband’s account"; 1 to ”put earnings into a joint account”; and 2 to "put the earnings into wife’s account”. The second question is ”who decides the allocation of the income from vegetable production”. 0 is assigned to "husband”; 1 to “both"; and 2 to "wife". iii. Women’s Participation Appraisal Homen’s appraisal of their participation -- the outcomes of negotiation --is inspired by Rosenfeld’s (1985) instrument on farm women’s satisfaction with their responsibility for farm work and decision making. Her design is based on outcome evaluation conceptualized by Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980). In this study, Likert- type attitudinal questions on farm work, farm decisions, and farm rewards are used. Respondents are asked (1) how do you feel about the part you have in farm work?, (2) how do you feel about the part you have in farm decisions?, and (3) how satisfied are you with the pay you get for the farm work? The measurement of the first two evaluations is grounded in equity theory; women are assumed to pursue an equitable distribution of work and decision power. With respect to farm work evaluation, 0 is assigned to the answers "too little" or "too much", and 1 to ”about right". Similarly, for the evaluation of farm decisions, 0 is assigned to the answers 'too little" or ”too much"; 1 to "little" or "much"; and 2 to "about right”. The measurement for women’s rewards is designed to be a 71 Likert scale in which women’s satisfaction is rated from 1 for "very dissatisfied“; 2 for "dissatisfied"; 3 for ”undecided"; 4 for “satisfied”; to 5 for I'very satisfied“. iv. Family Compositional Variables (a) Senior Family Nember: Strictly speaking, the senior member is the member of the family who is the oldest. This study refers to senior member as the presence of an older adult member of husband’s kinship group in the current or the previous generation. Senior members in this study might include operator’s older brothers, older sisters, parents, aunts or uncles. Therefore, it is assessed by the presence of any adult members in the same kinship group as husband. This variable is created from the question asking the respondents about their household composition. 1 is assigned to the presence of adult member, 0 is assigned to absence. (b) Family Life Stage: Though there are different ways of categorizing the stages in the course from the establishment of the family to the retirement stage (Kirkpatrick 1939 and Bigelow 1942 cited in Gao 1991; Duvall 1977), this study mostly applies Duvall’s categories. In this study, family life stage is assessed with stages in the family life course starting from (1) no children, (2) infant to small children (the oldest child less than three years old), (3) children before schooling (the oldest child less than six years old), (4) children of school age (the oldest child from six to twelve years old), (5) teenage children (the oldest child 72 from 12 to 18 years old and the youngest child less than three), (6) teenage children (the oldest child from 12 to 18 years old and the youngest child from three to six years old), (7) teenage children (the oldest child from 12 to 18 years old and the youngest child from six to twelve years old), (8) adolescent children from 12 to 18 years old, (9) adult children (all are more than 18 years old), to (10) all children have left home. v. Family or Farm Economy Variables (a) Farm Scale: There are different ways of conceptualizing the scale of vegetable farm operation could be conceptualized in monetary or physical terms. This study employs Net Vegetable Farm Income which is measured in 13 categories from I'lost more than NTS 500,000“ to "made NTS 1,000,000 or more” to indicate the monetary aspect of farm scale. This measure is used under consideration of integrating two concepts associated with incomes -- gross income and expenses, and is equal to the substraction of total expenses from gross income. Although data were gathered in terms of new Taiwan dollars, results are reported here as the equivalent in U.S. dollars. Physical aspect of farm scale could be measured by the size of the vegetable farm owned by the operator, or the acreage which is operated by the operator but not necessarily owned by the operator. This study, uses the amount of farm land operated by the operator to grow vegetables as the indicator, because operational scale represents the actual capacity for the operator to make a contribution to the family’s 73 productive work and to get benefit from the farm operation. (0) Hired Labor Use: There are three ways to conceptualize the use of hired labor —- the number of hired workers on the farm, person-days of hired labor, or whether the family hires farm workers. .In this study, hired labor is assessed with the presence of hired labor on the family farm. Labor in Taiwan is usually hired for a short term. They are mostly temporary workers who are directly hired by individual farm owners. The hiring is never mediated by contractors. (d) The Use of Other Family Labor: Family members other than the operator and his/her spouse are also a major labor force for family-based production. The use of family labor could be measured by the number of family members working on the farm or by the presence of other family labor. For the purpose of this study, the presence of other family labor is used because the presence is viewed as the important influence on of women’s role in the farm decision-making process. (e) Women’s Involvement in Domestic Work Two indicators are used to measure the extent of women’s domestic work in terms of time investment and the nature of work (work patterns). The first indicator is based on the theory of time-budgeting and is measured by the amount of “time“ women devoted to housework. It consists of their reported average daily working hours on domestic 74 chores. Second, domestic work involvement will be measured by the Domestic Work Participation (DWP) scale which is composed of 21 domestic tasks (Appendix C). The DWP scale is calculated in the same way as the Farm Task Participation Scale (FTP) developed by Fassinger and Schwarzweller (1982). Similar scales can also be found in other previous research (Ross 1987; Hardesty and Bokemeier 1989). The score for each domestic task refers to a rating which respondents report: 0 is given to the answer "always husband does it"; 1 to "usually husband does it"; 2 to "does it together with husband"; 3 to "usually wife does it"; and 4 to "always wife does it". The extent of women’s domestic task participation then is calculated by summing all the responses, then dividing by the total number of domestic tasks reported multiplied by four (the highest possible participation score per item task), and finally multiplying the result by 100. DWP was verified to be multiple correlated with two other indicators of housework participation -- the breadth and depth of domestic work involvement (Multiple correlation coefficient is 0.99). Therefore, it was chosen to be the measure of women’s home making task participation. vi. Objective Human Resource Variables (a) Education: Educational attainment means the highest level of formal education which one has received, that is, the total years of schooling for the respondent. However, considering simplicity of the questionnaire for 75 the respondent to answer, in this study it is assessed with the respondent’s and spouse’s highest levels of school attendance. Six levels of education are then designated ranging from no schooling to graduate school. However, after the survey data was collected, it was realized that some respondents had not graduated from school; their responses had been recorded as the number of years of education they actually receive. To represent meaningful educational attainment for the statistical analysis, this study recorded the level of education into years of education. 0 is assigned to "no school attendance"; 2 to "2 years in elementary school"; 6 to "graduated from elementary school"; 7 to "1 year in junior high school"; 9 to "graduated from junior high school"; 12 to ”graduated from senior high school or vocational school"; 16 to "graduated from college and university"; and 18 to "graduated from graduate school". (b) Farm Experience: Farm experience means respondent’s past experience in farm work including any experience during her childhood. In this study, farm experience is assessed by the total years she has ever done farm work. (c) Farm Training Participation: Farm training is measured by women’s participation in lectures, . seminars or training courses held by institutes such as District Farm Stations, Agricultural Experimental Research Centers, agricultural colleges or agricultural companies. The training Participation (TP) 76 scale is a Likert scale consisting of eight training activities (programs on the use of pesticides, machinery demonstration, management and methods of pesticide use, techniques of building green house, application of fertilizer, management of vegetable growing, marketing, and tour to farm demonstration). Each activity was rated from 0 to 4, respectively from "never" to "very often". The total scores for this scale is used for data analysis. vii. Individual Monetary Resource Variables (a) Off-farm employment: The debate over the effect of off-farm employment on the well- being of farm households in the literature centers around the effects of off-farm employment on the division of farm and domestic labor. That is, one’s taking an off-farm job affects not only whether one’s spouse stays in farming, but also how domestic and farm labor are divided in the family (Sachs 1983; Hetland 1986; deVries 1990; Gladwin 1991; Godwin et al. 1991; Pfeffer and Gilbert 1991). Although there are other forms of monetary resource which might affect the division of domestic and farm labor (such as the bank account in which the family farm income is mostly put, and the couple’s access to credit), those resources are the main focus of this study as the dependent variables. Off-farm employment is assessed with the questions (1) whether the respondent is currently employed off-farm, and (2) whether her husband is currently employed off-farm. 77 viii. Subjective Human Resource Variables As suggested by the previous literature, personal value orientation is an important factor motivating or restricting a person’s action in decision making. Two subjective aspects of women’s value orientation -- self-perception and attitudes toward gender roles -- are used in this study. (a) Patriarchal Role Beliefs: A gender role belief scale indicating women’s attitudes toward patriarchal views of gender roles is used to represent the patriarchal value system. This scale includes 23 topics related to gender role consciousness. Most are selected from the Traditional Value scale developed by Yang and his colleagues (1987). In addition, topics relevant to farming have been added (Appendix D). Each topic will be rated from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Cronbach’s Alpha test shows that this attitudinal scale is a pretty reliable measure (alpha . .73). (b) Self-identity: Self-identity refers to farm women’s conceptions of their roles in farming. Four types of farm women were defined by Pearson (1979). Considering women’s increasing involvement in paper or management work, Bokemeier and Garkovich (1987) in their study of farm women’s self- identity created the additional category -- business manager. For the same reason, this study defines the roles in five categories: (1) Farm homemaker: A woman whose main farm activities involve running 78 errands and traditional homemaking chores (2) Agricultural helper: A woman who participates in agricultural production mainly during busy time (3) Business manager: A woman whose main responsibilities are bookkeeping, information gathering, and financial decision making, but her husband is the primary operator (4) Full agricultural partner: A woman who shares equally work, responsibilities, or decision making on all aspects of farm operation with her husband. (5) Independent agricultural producer: A woman who manages the farm largely by herself. B. In-depth Field Research To explore how women participate in the decision making process, how they deal with the conflict with their husbands, how they initiate negotiation, how they communicate with their husbands, and how conflict is finally resolved, the second phase of this study conducted in-depth interviews with women about the negotiation process in the farm family. In other words, the in-depth interviews attempt to understand the mixture of cooperation and conflict in the bargaining process which contributes to arrangements in farm production -- farm work, farm decisions and farm rewards. Further, the limited information from the survey questionnaires. failed to examine how women view farm rewards, how they are satisfied with different kinds of monetary farm rewards and whether they perceive non-monetary farm rewards. The in—depth interviews were also carried 79 out to collect ethnographic data in farm rewards. 1. Subcase Sampling Approximately 40 cases based on contrary findings were selected from the survey sample. That is, considering a whole range of characteristics among all the important variables at the family and individual levels, subcases were selected based on the unanticipated relationship between important independent variables and dependent variables in the conceptual framework. At the first step, the presence of conflict as a dependent variable had the largest total number of unanticipated relations with independent variables. It was chosen to be two by two cross tabulated with all the important but contrary independent variables including age, farm experience, farm training involvement, husband’s off-farm employment and education, and women’s education and patriarchal role beliefs. The third step was listing all the legitimate cases in each cell of the table. The fourth step was randomly selecting one case in each cell. These four steps were repeated for other dependent variables. 2. Instrument for In-depth Interview The design for the first part of instrument for the in-depth interviews is basically in response to flaws in the four dimensions of negotiation. To study the dynamics in the couple’s interaction, simple closed-ended questions are inadequate to understand the actual and complex patterns of communication behaviors between wife and husband in decision making (Hill and Scanzoni 1982). 80 In the in-depth interviews, the following open-ended questions were drawn from the studies of marital interaction and marital decision- making processes respectively done by Fitzpatrich and Dindia (1990) and Hill and Scanzoni (1982): a. Initiator is assessed by asking respondents who is usually the first one raising any question in the conflict? and who usually lets the conflict go on? b. Communication strategy entails two dimensions. i. The extent of respondent’s verbal communication with their husbands was assessed by asking them "In what ways do you verbally negotiate with your husband? And how? Please describe them in detail". ii. The extent of respondents’ behavior communication with their husbands was assessed by the questions "In what ways do you behave in the negotiation with your husbands? Please describe them in detail“. Second, the follow-up interview was also to collect information which was missing or ambiguous in the initial survey. The most important area is about women’s farm rewards which are almost invisible in the survey results. Therefore, the major questions used in the interviews are as follows: (1) What do you think about women’s receipt of pay from farming? Should they or shouldn’t they receive it? What are the reasons? Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your position in receiving payment? (2) For you, what are good things or bad things you can get from farming? 81 II. Demographics A. Survey Sample Most of the women in this sample do not have senior members in the family and are in a late stage of the family life course (Table 4-1). A bit more than half of the families have hired workers or other family members on the farm. The average of their scale of farm operation is not large in terms of both farm size or net farm incomes. The figures in the Table show a broad range of farm operational scale among the sampled family farms; the standard deviations for both measures of scale are approximately the same size as the means. Looking into the distribution of farm size, the results reveal that 38 percent of the farms are less than 0.5 hectare; while 24 percent of the farms are greater than one hectare. Among those farms with the size greater than 1 hectare, the largest farm is 5.8 hectares. With respect to net farm incomes, most of the farms (90 percent) do earn positive net farm incomes (greater than zero). Among those having net farm incomes greater than zero, around 10 percent have pretty high net incomes (greater than U.S. $20,000). In contrast, only nine percent of the families break even on net farm incomes. The smallest group is the families which run into debts (1.7 percent) (Table 4-2). 82 Table 4-1. Family and Farm Characteristics Mean Standard Total Deviation Cases 1. Farm Size (hectare) .899 .836 303 2. Net Farm Incomes (USS) 8,400 8,740 295 3. Time on Domestic Work (daily hours) 3.7 1.63 300 4. Domestic Work Participation Scores 64.9 17 300 Percentage 5. Senior Family Member Present 8 303 6. Family Life Stages: (1) the oldest < 3, or < 6 or 12 7.9 (2) the youngest < 6 and the eldest child between 12-18 7.2 ( 3) the youngest child < 12 and 303 the eldest child between 12-18 14.9 (4) all children > 18 56.4 (5) all children are gone 13.5 7. Hired Labor Present 57.5 303 8. Other Family Labor Present 50.2 303 9. Self-consumption of Vegetables 4.8 303 10. Non-vegetable Farming Present 36 303 Tab‘l e 4—2: Distribution of Net Farm Incomes Net Farm Incomes (USS) Percentage -2,000 - 0 1.7 Break Even 8.8 1,000 - 44000 27.6 4,000 — 8,000 24.1 8,000 - 20,000 27.9 20,000 0 or more 9.9 Total Cases 303 Alhong 303 vegetable growing families, the percentage of vegetable p ”Oduction for self-consumption is, on average, around five percent. 83 Most of the families (95.7 percent) consume less than 10 percent of their vegetable production (Table 4-3). This could be explained by the fact that the sample sites have been selected by Council of Agriculture since 1989 as vegetable specialized areas under the claim of vegetable commercialization. Although 36 percent of the families do grow non- vegetable crops such as rice, growing vegetables for market sale is the main enterprise for all of the families in this sample. table Production for Self-cons ion Table 4-3: Distribution of V Percent of Self-cons tion None 0.1 — 5.0 5.1 — 10.0 10.1 - 20.0 20.1 or more Total Cases Percent 5.9 67.4 22.4 3.3 1.0 303 In this sample, the level of educational attainment is very low (Tab‘l e 4-4). On average, women have less than four years of education, While their husbands have, on average, six years of education meaning 9‘ ementary school level. Forty—one percent of the women never went to SCh001 . In contrast, around half of the women (47.5 percent) have primary school education (Table 4-5). They have average over 30 years of farm experience and have lived 0" their current farm over 28 years (Table 4-4. The women in this sample have been involved in farming since they grew up or since they got married. More than half of the women (57.4 percent) have 23 to 46 y ears Of farm experience (Table 4-6). However, their opportunity for 84 attending farm training programs is limited. women have participated in farm training programs. Only one-third of the involvement in farm training programs is only .67. The average of the This group of women have an average of patriarchal role beliefs around 2.6 which is below the midpoint of three (Table 4-4). respect to the distribution of their patriarchal beliefs, 73 percent of them are less patriarchally oriented (mean scores are less than 2.8). Given the low patriarchal orientation, more than half of the women consider themselves farm helpers (53.1 percent). identify themselves as independent farm producers (Table 4-7). Only six percent ' Table 4-4. Personal Characteristics Off-farm Employment Mean Standard Total Deviation Cases . Women’s Age (years) 49.8 10.4 303 . Women’s Farm Experience (years) 32.8 13.7 303 - Women’s Residence on Farm (years) 28.5 12.9 303 - Homen’s Education (years) 3.77 3.53 303 . Husband’s Education (years) 5.96 3.43 301 - Women’s Patriarchal Role Beliefs 2.6 .365 303 Farm Training Involvement (score) 0.67 1.05 303 Percentage women’s Self-identity: ( l) Home maker 17.2 (2) Farm Helper 53.1 (3) Farm Manager 5.6 (4) Full Partner 18.2 (5) Independent Producer 5.9 303 The Presence of Wife’s Off-farm 5 303 Employment 10- The Presence of Husband’s 12.9 303 85 Table 4-5: Distribution of Women’s Education Education (Years of Schooling) Percentage No education 41.0 Primary or less 47.5 Junior High 8.6 Senior High 2.9 Total 303 Table 4-6: Distribution of Women’s Farm Experience Farm Experience (Years) Percentage 1-22 24.8 23-34 28.0 35-46 29.4 47-66 17.8 Total 100 ()nly five percent of the women in this sample have off-farm emp‘l oyment. In contrast, 13 percent of their husbands have off-farm JObS. In a sense, this is a particular group in which off-farm employment is not as common as other farmers who use off-farm employment as a family survival strategy. It also reveals that rural ludustrialization has had a limited effect on the sample farmers. 86 Table 4-7: Distribution of Women’s Patriarchal Role Beliefs Patriarchal role Beliefs Percentage 1.43-2.13’ 12.6 2.14-2.51 26.5 2.52—2.83 34.4 2.84-3.52 26.5 Total 100 t "can scores of the orientation of gender beliefs; high scores indicate greater patriarchy; nicboint I 3.0. 8. Sample for In-depth Interviews In comparison with the nationwide sample as a whole, the women in the follow-up interviews are, on average, a bit younger (48.2 versus 49.8 years old) and have less farm experience (30 versus 32.8 years); but have lower educational attainment (3.5 versus 3.77 years of school ing). Given their gender role beliefs are not highly patriarchal (the mean score is 2.52), more than half of them identify themselves as ‘farflfl Imealpers (57.9 percent), while one-fifth of them identify themselves as home makers. l=urthermore, more than 70 percent of them do not have senior members in the family (89.8 percent), farm training involvement (72.2 Percent), or off-farm jobs (96.3 percent). Around 60 percent of them have other family member help with farm work. Only 40 percent of them have hired labor on the farm. The average of their farm size is 0.78 hectare. Their net farm incomes are lower than the survey sample (U.S. $5.324) , CHAPTER 5 WOMEN’S ROLE IN NEGOTIATION This chapter revolves around four dimensions of women’s behavior in the negotiation process-- the presenCe of conflict, the initiation of negotiation, comunication strategies, and solutions. The first part of the chapter focuses on the presence of conflict, the determinants of the presence of conflict, and different domains of conflict. The second part of this chapter focuses on women’s involvement in the initiation of negotiation. The third section centers around the communication strategies used by women and their husbands in negotiation and around poss i ble solutions. The "cooperative bargaining" approach (Sen 1990) assumes that the married partners bring their own interests into a power exertion Process. In the power exertion process, each of the spouses would attempt to gain control over the other through the creation of conflict followed by a negotiation process in which different interactions and strategies are utilized to reach a concluding solution. Here, the definition of conflict for this study is broader than What Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) conceptualized in their theory of the falliily decision-making process. In Scanzoni and Szinovacz’s view, c"Scussion is the process of developing consensus in which the couple Conditionally agree with each other (semi-agreement) and are willing to adJUSt their own behaviors. However, conflict happens when the couple disagree with each other at first; conflict is followed by the efforts 01’ nEQOtiation and bargaining- 87 88 Put another way, for Scanzoni and Szinovacz there is a fundamental Discussion for them is not distinction between discussion and conflict. Conflict for problematic and does not necessarily require resolution. In contrast to them is what is problematic and requires resolution. their view, the "cooperative bargaining" approach that is used in this study sees both discussion and disagreement as points on a continuum. Accordingly, both discussion and conflict for Scanzoni and Szinovacz fit into the conceptualization of conflict for the present study. Presence of Conflict I. In the nationwide survey, women were asked about conflict in making farm decisions ("In general, do you have opinions different from Around one—third of the Your husband’s before the final decisions?"). women (35.8 percent) indicated that they never experienced conflict over farm decisions (Table 5—1). However, one might wonder whether they Tab‘l e 5-1: The Presence of Conflict Percentage Yes 64.2 No V 35.8 Total cases 303 really had no conflict or whether they just did not recognize it. A Closer examination is based on the follow-up interviews with the subset 01’ women from the nationwide survey. In the in-depth interviews, 38 women were asked: "Do you ever have conflict (such as a disagreement, arg‘ment or fight) with your husband in making farm decisions? What is 89 the source or the basis of the conflict? And why do you have the Only three women showed inconsistency with their response conflict?'. to the question in the survey concerning presence of conflict (Table 5- 2). One of these three was missing in the survey interview but reported having conflict in the follow-up interview. The other two responded no conflict in the survey but did indicate the presence of conflict in the follow-up interview. Because only two out of 38 show opposite responses on the presence of conflict, 94 percent of consistent response rate gives us an estimate for a high reliability. The follow-up interviews even show higher reliability than the initial survey because those women who did not recognize the existence of conflict did so in the follow-up That is, of 17 originally reported no conflict, two said interviews. Those two women are possibly mystified for they were not able to yes. identify the presence of conflict until they were probed. Table 5-2: Reliability of In-depth Interview Concerning the Presence of Conflict In-depth Interview survey Yes No Total Yes 20 O 20 No 2 15 17 Missing 1 0 1 Total cases 23 15 38 A. Consensus and Dissensus The ethnographic analysis shows that 15 out of 38 women report no Confl ict with their husbands over farm decisions. Two kinds of c°"$e"sus are defined in the non-conflict group. The first is conscious 90 autonomous consensus. That is, wives pretty much share the same evaluations and goals with their husbands on matters to be decided. The effort to increase family or farm incomes is an important concern to this group of women. Lo is 51 years old and has 40 years of ‘farmlexperience. She identifies herself as a farm helper. "We always work very hard on getting good a harvest.... We both are willing to try out any new farm practice which would benefit our [farm] production. We’re doing this all for our family" Kao is in her early 60’s, with 50 years of farm experience; she considers herself a farm helper. She demonstrates the importance to consensus of mutual understanding as she and her husband become an old couple. ”We don’t disagree with each other about what to do about farming ..... We have lived together under the same roof and listened to each other for years, I know what he wants to say mostly.... Quite often, he has the same thing on his mind while I am still thinking over and over ...... " In addition to the women just described as real acquiescence, those who share active, affirmative and substantive agreement with their husbands , other women are in the second type of consensus which is Passi ve yielding consensus. Some of the women in this category said that they did not really think about taking any responsibility for making decisions. They seemed to enjoy being acquiescent in the farm decision—making process. The common reasons are that they think they are supposed to obey their husbands as the leaders of the family; they are not experienced enough to get much involved in decisions; or they) Would like to yield their opportunity to other family members who are exP‘"—‘|"1'enced enough or who are ready to inherit the farm. As such, three different types ofpassive yielding acquiescence 91 are identified. The first reflects the virtue of submission to the husband extolled in traditional Chinese culture. Jang with 60 years of farm experience said that “.... Everything is always up to him. I just do whatever I can do to help him on the farm. We sometimes discussed, but we never yelled at each other.... I do not want to bother about it [farm decision] too much.... There is nothing to fight about.... If you do fight, it would never be over .... So why bother. Just keep quiet..." The second is self-abnegation mostly from women’s self-perception of relative incompetence in the productive sphere. Chu with 12 years of ecitlczation and three years of farm experience noted that: 'I am not good at [making farm decisions], I don’t have much experience in farm work. In fact, my father-in—law is very experienced. He is mostly the person we consult with....” This woman directs us to the third acquiescence -— substitution -- whi<:ta is determined by the presence of a third party. Substitution by a Partuv' is the most frequent reason rationalizing women’s low autonomy. When Su who has 31 years of farm experience remarked that she "never t"O‘JQI‘It of getting into decision-making much", she said: "My son will take over the farm in the near future. I don’t need to worry about so many things, because my son will take care of everything soon....” In brief, the women in pseudo-acquiescence are likely to fail to "3°09" ize the potential for conflict. They perceive the superiority of ”QD"53 knowledge, skills and ability in farm production and thus are comfortable with their subordination. They are willing to stay in an infer‘i or position for harmonious marital relations. This group of women are T 'i kely to be mystified by their low self-evaluation and strong luteV‘Vention from a third party. Accordingly, 9V9“ though they "fight sense dissensus concerning farm decisions, they are not able to express 92 their own concerns different from others. Some of them might be able to go along with the position of inferiority, although they might know that they do not have to. 3. Discovery of Conflict To identify the factors correlated with the presence of conflict, chi-square test is used to test whether the presence of conflict varies wi th characteristics at individual and family levels. Patriarchal role bel iefs, the use of other family labor and net farm incomes are found to support the hypotheses in that they contribute significantly (at the 0.05 level) to the variance in the presence of conflict and that their Joint distributions with the presence of conflict appear to be in the MPG t hesized directions . Although the Chi-square test shows no statistically significant cover ‘i ance between the presence of conflict and the rest of the characteristics (woman’s age, farm experience, farm training invo‘ Vement, education, and off-farm job; husband’s off—farm job; farm size; and senior family member), the directions of the insignificant assoc i ations support the hypothesized relations with the presence of cont-‘1 'i ct. As hypothesized in chapter 3, patriarchal role beliefs play an l“‘Dor‘t ant role in affecting the presence of conflict. According to Table 5-3, women with perceptions of gender roles oriented to patri archal traditionality are found to be less likely to present Shieh is in her early 50’s with 29 years of farm experience COHf1 ‘i ct . She considers herself a farm 3"" patriarchal role belief score of 1.91. 93 helper. Asked about what role she plays in conflict and why, she expounds the essence of gender equality and its constructive effect on negotiation. '1 just wanted that we can stand on the same position...when I told him my thought, I didn’t mean to do it just because I like to go against him. I just tried to let him know something maybe he hadn’t thought about.” Table 5-3: Presence of Conflict by the Orientation of Women’s Patriarchal Role Beliefs Presence of Conflict Patriarchal No Yes Total Role Beliefs (%l. (%) (%) 1.43-2.13' 26.3 73.7 12.6 2.14-2.51 31.3 68.8 26.5 2.52-2.83 36.5 63.5 34.4 2.84-3.52 43.8 56.3 26.5 Total 35.8 64.2 100 (:lai Square - 3.85 (Mantel-Haenszel test for Linear associatiorfl, df-l, p < .05., n-302. "' Mean scores of the orientation of gender beliefs; high scores indicate greater patriarchy; ssli thoint I 3.0. On the contrary, Lo is 51 years old and has 40 years of farm experience; she is high in patriarchal role beliefs (mean score is 3.43) and identifies herself as a farm helper. She provides an illustration 0': the negative relationship between gender role beliefs and the ""€!=Stence of conflict. She indicated that except for a few farm deci Sions, she always let her husband make farm decisions. Concerning t"Ose in which she took part, she hardly had conflicting opinions. She a] so commented that she certainly would do her best to help with farm Work if her husband wanted her to, but she Still thought that she, as a 94 woman, had better pay attention to housework. Therefore, about farm decisions, she said that ”it is just great that he would take care of them“. As suggested by the interviews with the women, the presence of other labor is an important factor lessening conflict. Table 5-4 shows that the likelihood of conflict decreases with the presence of other family labor. Women who report no conflict in the interview also report that other family workers such as son, mother—in-law or father-in—law p1 ay an important role in decision making. Ma is 37 years old and has two years of farm experience. Her mother-in-law and son help with farm mvcsrrk. “They both work on the farm.... 1 don’t need to spend my energy struggling with what machine to buy, how much to process, how much to sell.... all sorts of things." Turning to how net farm income is related to the presence of conflict, the nationwide sample shows a curvilinear distribution of net farm incomes by the presence of conflict (Table 5-3); the Chi square test is significant at the 0.05 level. Women in families with no gain 07‘ 'l 055 are the group that is the least likely to have conflict over farm decisions with their husbands. Tsai is 63 years old and has 40 years of farm experience but has zero net farm income. She is in the 10‘" of the patriarchal role scale (mean score 2.09) and considers he‘I‘Self a wife who is supposed to follow her husband’. "...he will find a way to earn or to borrow money. As long as we can live on and have no debts ahead of us, I don’t think this kind \ fr ' What the woman indicated about ”a wife following her husband“ is “00m a Chinese saying equal literally to "when husbands sing, wives “1d sing with them" (pronounced Ful Chan4 F114 Sui2). 95 of thing [budget management] that far ..... " Yes 41.7 58.3 50.0 Total 35.8 64.2 100 Pearson Chi Square a 4.67, df=1, p < .05, n=302. Table 5-4: Presence of Conflict by the Presence of Other Family Labor Presence of Conflict Other Family No Yes Total Labor (%) (%) (%) No 29.8 70.2 50.0 ‘Table 5-5: Presence of Conflict by Net Farm Incomes Presence of Conflict Net Farm Incomes No Yes Total (US$) (96) (96) (96) -2,000 - 0 20.0 80 1.7 No gain 61.5 38.5 8.8 1,000 - 4,000 30.9 69.1 27.6 4,000 - 8,000 35.2 64.8 24.1 13,000 - 20,000 26.8 73.2 27.9 20,000 or more 44.8 55.2 9.9 Total 34.7 65.3 100 pearson Chi Square = 12.52, df=4, p < .05., n=294. As net farm income goes up from zero to the category of 1,000 to 4’ 000 U.S. dollars, the probability of conflict rapidly increases from 38 ~ 5 to 69.1 percent. There is a fluctuation in the presence of conflict between 1,000 and 20,000 U.S. dollars. The rough tendency of thi S fluctuation suggests that women in families with net farm incomes 96 from US $8,000 to US S20,000 are more likely to report conflict with the increase of net farm incomes. Sun, with 12 years of education, 10 years of farm experience and a regular job in the Farmers’ Association in her town, identifies herself as a farm manager and is responsible for bookkeeping for her own farm with net farm income about US $15,000. She did report conflict over the arrangement of farm resources and the financial investment in farm production. According to her explanation, the conflict comes from different perceptions about family well-being. "Although we earn enough for living... it doesn’t mean that we can spend the money any way we want to...We have to save it for our family, our kids... He is more ambitious in using the money than I am...” As the net farm income goes beyond 20,000 dollars, the presence of conflict decreases to 55.2 percent which is not as low as the group with no gain and no debts. Part of the reason why it decreases a bit might be because the extremely high income itself provides farm families with security, to some degree, in terms of family living and farm management, as well as the potential for flexibility. With this security and fl exibility, conflict might be reduced. Lai is 54 years old from a fami ly with USS 25,000 net farm income. As she described, ”We got a good yield of vegetables last year. We are able to make both ends meet. It relieves us a lot and makes our life easy. ' At the same time, the security of finance might instead give the couple (:r‘ii'113es to argue over other things. Unfortunately, this argument is not suF’Dorted by the ethnographic data, in which two women with USS 25,000 net farm incomes did not report conflict with their husbands over farm dec‘i sions. Although the relationship between farm experience and conflict did 97 not meet the test of statistical significance, because of its substantive significance it will be discussed briefly. While it is true that the more years of farm experience women have, the less likely they are to experience conflict (Table 5-6), the relationship appears to be (:urvilinear. This finding is contrary to the study’s hypothesis and is not significant at the .05.level. Table 5-6: Presence of Conflict by Women’s Farm Experience Farm Presence of Conflict Experience No Yes Total (Year‘S) (96) (96) 1%) 1—22 29.3 70.7 24.8 23-34 36.5 63.5 28.0 35-46 33.0 67.9 29.4 47-66 48.1 51.9 17.8 Total 35.8 64.2 100 (:I1l Square . 4.51 (Mentel-Haenszel test for Linear association, df-l, p . .07, n=302. These findings lead us to wonder whether working experience would Produce homogeneity in mind between the couple. In their study of farm family decision-making, Elbert et al. (1976) suggest that as the couple Works together for many years, they would come to understand each other very well (Elbert et al. 1976). Some women who have limited years of farm experience and report conflict argue that conflicting opinions would enrich the discussion'and be"'efit farm production in the long run. Chan is 50 years old and has 40 years of farm experience. She believes that she is as capable as her husband in making farm decisions. 98 '1 advised him for good. He didn’t think I -- as a woman -- know much about farming and a ked me to shut up... I felt like a ’little daughter-in-law’ who, in fact, is not so incompetent as he thinks.‘I Ma with nine years of education but only two years of farm experience remarked that, "I got questions for him all the time. He thought he knew things lot more than me. At first, he ignored my questioning him. Since I kept asking him, he then started to explain to me....persuade me sometimes. But sometimes it turned out that he got furious with me....Given all this, I am kind of a patient person. I think it is not so bad that we have different things in mind. The difference is where we can learn from and get to the truth. I like to continue questioning him... it is a challenge in other words.." To a large degree, both the survey and ethnographic data suggest the negative relation between farm experience and conflict and thus di sprove the translation of working experience to women’s power base suggested by human capital theory. The difficulty for social exchange theory to apply to farm families is that in contrast to their urban counterparts, farm women face no separation between work pl ace and household. The family farm is organized and operated within the household as a unit of production. Women’s work in the production of a9"‘icultural comodities is performed outside the wage-labor market/productive sphere (Sachs 1988). As their work on the family farm does not conveniently fit into the categories of labor market and non- 1 abor market activities, their contributions to family-based farm "'”‘3<1I1ction could not easily be recognized and measured in monetary terms. As a result, those contributions can hardly translate into their \ ’ 80 called ”little daughter-in-law" is a metaphor in Chinese as 92’11'19 meaning that the daughter-in-law is supposed to be in a inferior aition and be tolerant to the orders from her husband's parents. 99 economic power in the family as predicted by social exchange theory (Whatmore 1991). l. Determinants of the Presence of Conflict BecauSe the dependent variable -- the presence of conflict -- is a dichotomous response in this study, logistic regression is used to assess further whether the characteristics at the household and individual levels significantly determine the presence of conflict. In the logistic regression, the dependent variable is logistically transformed and estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. That is, the probability of a woman reporting conflict in negotiation based on the independent variables at selected levels is derived from the logits (“I 09 odds ratios)” (Agresti 1990; Jobson 1992). Backward stepwise selection of predictors and the test of model Chi —square are used to decide a good logistic model". In Backward stepwise selection, Likelihood-ratio (LR) test12 is chosen to be the cri terion to determine which variables are to be removed from the model (Jobson 1992; SPSS for Windows 6.2 Manual 1996). To avoid the m The parameter equation for logistic regression can be written as: Prob (conflict) 3 e‘ / (1+e’) where z is the linear combination 2 - a, + s,x, + 32x, +...+ s, x, ()1: " Here, this study doesn't intend to target a best model. Whether (3° not the selected predictors are at 0.05 level, the model will be 1‘3‘idered acceptable when model chi-square shows significance at 0.05 61. u The likelihood-ratio is obtained by dividing the likelihood for t 1“ reduced 06661 by the 11101111666 for the full 066.1. 0111. test tests t ()1: null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables removed are 100 curvilinear relationship between net farm incomes and the presence of conflict, two dummy variables were created for three levels of net farm incomes (USS -2,000 to 0, 1,000 to 8,000, and 8,000 or more). The test of goodness of fit suggests that the revised logistic model is significant at the .01 level by keeping four predictors (patriarchal role beliefs, the use of other family labor, net farm incomes from 1,000 to 8,000, and net farm incomes 8,000 or more) (Table 5-7). Table 5-7: The Logistic Regression Coefficients of Presence of Conflict Ln (presence no-presence)a Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error Net Farm Income: 1.174" .4218 U.S. S 1,000-8,000 Net Farm Income: 1.152** .4314 U.S. S 8,000 or more Other Family Labor -.6218' .2571 Patriarchal Role Beliefs -.6674’ .3607 Constant 1.664 .9490 Log-likelihood -190.223 I Goodness of Fit (X2) 16.156" I Total Cases 292 0 Natural Logarithm of Odds uhich is the ratio of the probability of the presence of conflict over the probability of the abserlce of conflict. ** Significant at p < .01. * Simificant at p < .05. X p s .0643 The signs of the logistic regression coefficients in the revised model all support the hypotheses that patriarchal role beliefs and the use of other family labor have negative relations with the presence of 101 conflict; women in families with high net farm incomes are more likely than women with low net farm incomes to report conflict. Though the rest of the variables in the hypothesized model (Figure 3) are not significant, the direction of their relations with conflict, as discussed earlier, supports the hypotheses for this study. The Wald statistic is used to test whether predictors are s ‘i gnificant in the logistic model. According to the revised model, the use of other family labor, net farm incomes are shown to predict the probability of the presence of conflict (Table 5-7). 2 - Different Areas of Conflict In which domains do women have conflict or disagreement with their husbands? According to the ethnographic data, 23 out of the 38 women feel that they have some disagreement with their husbands in the farm decision process. The topics identified by asking the women about ”what ki nds of decision matters do you have conflict with your husband?" center around (1) the management of farm resources including loans, debts, renting and buying farm land, the allocation and availability of women’s labor, finance, and farm inputs, (2) farm operation including farm technology and marketing, and (3) taking an off-farm job (Table 5- 8) - 3- Conflict in Farm Resource Decisions Among the various topics, the management of farm resources such as “ans, debts, renting or buying farm land, labor allocation, the “a“agement of farm finances, and inputs to farm production are the most 102 important source of conflict (Table 5-8). This finding echoes a series of studies of gender relations in decision making among Wisconsin farm families (Wilkening and Morrison 1963; Wilkening and Bharadwaj 1967, 1968; Wilkening 1981). Wilkening and his colleagues found that farm couples were likely to make farm resource decisions jointly, such as buying or renting land, loans, and purchasing farm equipments. This i mplies that women tend to play an active role in discussing topics pertaining to farm resources. Table 5-8: Decision Topics Involving Conflict 1 . Farm Resources: (1) Loan, Debts, Renting and Buying Land 6 (2) Allocation of Labor 4 (3) Management of Farm Inputs 3 (4) Finance 2 2 . Farm Operation: ( 1) Marketing 3 (2) Technological Innovation 3 3 . Taking an Off—farm Job: 4 4. Unspecified: 3 Total cases 23 Total Responses 28 Unfortunately, Wilkening and his colleagues did not fully explore the reasons why women are active in those decision matters. In the 103 present study, the investigation of the main reasons behind women’s ciissent from their husbands on farm resource decisions is assessed by the question ”where does the conflict come from". The categories of the r~eeasons are explored in three major sub-domains -- loans/debts and tataying/renting land, budget and farm input management, and labor allocation. First of all, the ethnographic data suggests that husbands are 'i reclined to be risk takers or investors with the profits from family :ffaarm production; wives, in contrast, are likely to be conservative and treeluctant to live with loans and debts. The conflict is attributed to ”the conflict of perceptions". The couple, in fact, wants to maintain the farm in a good shape. Women’s philosophy of how to keep their farm '"llllnlng well is distinct from their husbands’ in the face of a budget (:tr‘isis. For example, Tien is in her middle 50’s, with 42 years of farm teacgmerience and low mean score for her patriarchal role beliefs (2.13); she considers herself a farm helper with no other family labor on the farm. She was concerned about the complexity of expanding farm scale and noted that ”I didn’t think we needed to buy more land ..... He wanted to enlarge our farm scale. He thought that the low-interest loan from government is worth applying for.... It is not as simple as we think it should be. We got to think it over.... How are we going to deal with debts. We had not enough family labor. Then we’d better get some machines. All these things cost us big bucks.... How can we afford them? I doubt it ...... ” Wu ‘ili her early 50’s with no education is concerned about securing fann ly well-being by getting away from debts. She considers herself a farm“ helper and has no other family labor helping with farm work. "You’d better not owe others too much money. You’d better not get in trouble with your debtor or creditor nor with your landlord or 104 tenant. .... He always disagrees with me on this. He is not anxious as I am, you know! ..... ' The second important reason for women’s conflict over farm resource decisions is related to the availability of family labor. The topics about family labor are mostly derived from the tension between the division of off-farm and on-farm workloads in addition to necessary housework. Off-farm employment is more attractive to the family than on-farm work because of the high cash compensation from off-farm work. "he is going to compromise, either by giving up her/his off-farm job or by working much harder across all work, becomes a crucial issue for the couple. In most of the cases, women seem to be the ones to sacrifice and face triple burdens from off-farm work, farm work and housework. Yang considers herself a farm helper with a 2.91 mean score of patriarchal role beliefs; she also works on another farm. ”... I also do farm work for others. To me, I am very tired, especially during busy seasons ..... Well, I feel like I have three jobs. One for our own farm. One for other’s farm. and.... don’t forget that I have the third one .... I also have housework to take care ..... It is hard to manage my time across those jobs ..... That is where our quarrel comes from. " The third major reason behind the conflict over farm resource deci sions centers around the different beliefs about budget and farm i"nuts management -— long-term/short-term plans, idealistic/realistic goal 8, and emphasis on farm production versus family consumption. In the Present study, husbands tend to pay attention to long-term farm Production more than to family utility and consumption; while wives be] leve in much careful consideration of farm investment so as not to ““bal ance the family budget. Sun, who has 10 years of farm experience and l .96 mean score of patriarchal role beliefs, considers herself a 105 farm manager and has other family labor on the farm (parents-in-law). ”I like to balance the budget more than he does.... What I am always concerned is to get the family enough to live on.... But he views farm production in the long run. So, we always dispute about what is to be taken into account ..... you know,... current needs for the families -- which are realistic but in a short term.... or future profits -- which are a long-term and ideal goal ...... It is a matter of who is willing to take a risk on t..' I).. Conflict in Farm Operation Decisions The next important topic which involves women in conflict is (leecisions about farm operation including technological innovation and marketing (Table 5-8). The issues which bring the couple into negotiation center around the debate over women’s competence in farming (especially agricultural technology) and the way of marketing the farm products. First, the women who say agricultural technology is an issue (it) think that they are as competent as their husbands pertaining to technological innovations. Sia with 25 years of farm experience, other family farm labor and 2.91 patriarchal beliefs score presents herself wi th a great deal of self-confidence. ' .... it is not so hard to try a new practice, a new variety or the technology that is good for the production. I don’t think I am worse than him.... Except that he is stronger than me.... So I would go for whatever I think we ought to go for...He usually would be patient to listen to me.... But you know! nobody is perfect.... He objected to me quite often. I did it to him, too. So it [conflict] is on and on... " Chan has 40 years of farm experience and other family labor on the farm “d considers herself a farm helper. She relates her competence of '“ak‘i ng technology decisions to her farming experience. ”Based on my experience, I will definitely suggest whether we should try new fertilizer or new pesticide, should adjust production for good price or should build a green house ...... But he was just not happy that I kept telling him what to do." 106 The second source of controversies between the couple is the way (if marketing. In general, the women who mention this topic usually present divergent opinions about where to sell the farm product so that the family could get as high a price as'possible. Wang with 22 years of 1Faarm experience, six years of education and 2.39 patriarchal beliefs ssczores has no other family labor working on the farm. ”.... For good price, we sometimes argue about where we should sell the product ..... The big market far away from our farm ... or small one near our farm.... It is hard to decide....I know that... But my point is that sometimes, the price in the market near our home is not bad. 1 am not sure whether driving the product all the way to the place far from here saves us time and money ...... Ti en with 42 years of farm experience considers herself a farm helper 001‘ th 2.13 patriarchal beliefs scores but without other family farm 1 abor. She believes that participation in an agricultural cooperative i s a good way to get a good price for vegetables. She never thinks of an 3! other way than cooperative marketing. “We already join the marketing cooperative [provided by farmers’ association]. That’s it. We just drive our vegetables to there [their processing factory] and let them hire people to do the rest of the job for us.... And then we get a good deal from it....I just don’t get it. Why do we need to bother about selling the product to the market ourselves as he insisted to do? He didn’t like my point at all....” c. Conflict in Wives’ Taking an Off-farm Job The final important topic for conflict between the spouses is Whether the wife should take an off-farm job. Husbands usually like their wives to stay home to be a good wife and a good mother. Lin who cmIsiders herself a housekeeper with family labor on the farm and has moderate patriarchal beliefs (mean score is 3). '.. I don’t have to work on the farm. Our sons can help out ...... 107 So I rather find a job outside. But he didn’t agree with me. He likes me to take care of his house." [from husbands’ perspective, women are required to devote their time to the family including the family farm business. Yei is in her middle llta’s and has six years of education; she identifies herself as a full paaartner and has no other family member working on the farm; she has 2.04 score of patriarchal beliefs. "I have a regular job outside....I also need to commit myself to our own farm... Our two children are still young [and] in need of me ..... I know him. He is not comfortable that I work outside. I am feeling pressure from the family, too..' 11. The Initiation of Negotiation In this study, women were asked "Who is usually the first person raising any question in the conflict? And who usually lets the conflict sac) on?”. Three different styles of initiation are found in the eeitlinographic data (Table 5-9). The partner who more frequently brings Ill) conflict across different decision realms is the wife. This section Vii l'l explore, in each category of initiation, what women’s role is in ‘tiiee initiation process; how the wife feels about her role in the conflict; and why she plays this role. Table 5-9: Usual Initiator in Negotiation Initiator Percentage Wife 52.2 .._____, Husband 26.1 ..____g, Both 21.7 Total Cases 23 108 A. Wife as the Initiator Eight out of the 12 women in this category show their self- assurance in the matters where they encounter conflict with their husbands. They usually start questioning, suggesting, requesting and consulting their husbands on issues related to technology innovation, 1 cans, off-farm employment, the division of farm labor, and the a1location of farm incomes. For example, Ma is in her middle 30’s and has nine years of education. She considers herself a farm helper, has sat: other family labor on the farm, and has moderate (2.78) patriarchal taeelief score. She shows her enthusiasm in clarifying the decision about the control over the amount of vegetables for sale which her husband kept from her. ”He didn’t tell me much detail about it....But..I believe that I deserve to know it because I am part of the family..So I kept asking.” In contrast, the rest of the 12 women seem to be less confident than others in the same category in the negotiation with their husbands. They did it mostly because of stopping their husband from doing things which sounded inappropriate to them. Wu is in her early 50’s and has 43 years of farm experience and low (2.3) mean score of patriarchal role bel i efs. ".... I was just trying to stop him from doing things stupid. you know, things too risky ..... ' Women’s role in the negotiation they initiate is examined in three categories based on husband’s response to wife’s initiation -- explicit 0biiection, silent opposition, and discussion. 109 1. Explicit Objection Around two-thirds of the husbands use verbal expression or silence as a mode of objection in response to their wives. Most of the husbands in this category straightforwardly reject their wives’ opinions or suggestions with reasons that they think are good. However, a closer examination shows that those reasons do not sound really reasonable. For example, Wang is 44 years old and low in patriarchal role beliefs (mean score is 2.39), but sees herself as a home maker. In a conflict over where to market the product, she suggested trying the local market which is not far away from their farm. Her husband did not agree with her because he ”gets used to" transporting the product to a more distant but much bigger market. In addition, Shiao is 48 years old and is moderate in patriarchal role beliefs (mean score is 2.61); she considers herself a farm helper. She liked to contribute her wisdom to farm management, but only received negative feedback from her husband. "I admit that he knows farming better than me ..... But, his reaction to my idea just stunned me.... He asked me not to put my nose in it [management decision] because I am just a woman who knows nothing about decision making." Most of the women in the face of an explicit objection tend to play a passive role and keep their mouths shut. They might have complaints at first, but finally would let go of them. Yei is in her middle 40’s with only six years of education and low (2.04) mean score of patriarchal role beliefs; she has no other family labor. She relates her response to her husband’s rejection to her conception of her role in farm production. "..... I mostly cannot do anything about it if he won’t accept my opinion ..... Because I am here to assist him .... " 110 It is not often the case that the wife speaks back to her husband’s rejection. Only Chan, who is moderate in patriarchal beliefs (mean score is 3) and whose input was rejected by her husband, is actively against her husband; she said: ”I couldn’t buy it [being discriminated by male]... he is too arrogant .... It is not fair. Woman is not like he thinks... no use but can only cook???" 2. Silent Opposition When husbands show silence in opposition to wives’ initiation, they either obviously ignore what their wives said or, slightly better, act like a listener. Being ignored would be painful. Wu is in her early 50’s who has no education but 43 years of farm experience; she considers herself a farm helper, has no other family labor, and is moderate in patriarchal role beliefs (2.3 mean score). She emphasized the maintenance of a harmonious relationship with her husband. "it is a pain not being concerned.... Sometimes, I would tell myself not to care much about it... As long as he is doing things for the whole family. I don’t want to mess up our relationship." However, the pursuit of family well-being does not require that the wife be subordinate to her husband. Cheng considers herself a full partner and has 2.52 mean score of patriarchal role beliefs; she has other family labor on her own farm. She demonstrates her ambition to protect the family from debts. “..he seemed to listen to me and kept silent... But in fact, he didn’t accept my advice at all.... But... [the advice] is not just for me or for him.... it is for our kids, our family.... So, I was patient and to did my best to get him really listen to me.“ 3. Mutual Discussion The third category of the response to wife’s initiation is that 111 the husband is at least willing to sit down and discuss with his wife. Even within the mode of discussion, husbands’ reactions imply various positions from egalitarian to hierarchical. Sia has 25 years of farm experience and is moderate (2.91) in patriarchal beliefs; she has other family labor on the farm. She articulates an egalitarian position, and appreciates the conflict between herself and her husband from an intellectual sharing point of view. 'He would be patient to talk to me about my idea... he would agree with me if it [my idea] should work out fine. If it is not going to work for him, I would try to talk him into it when he is ready to listen.... I try to be ready to talk anytime.“ If husbands’ response gets hot, women were inclined to challenge husbands’ competence of decision-making. Shiao identifies herself as a farm helper and is moderate (2.61) in patriarchal beliefs; she has no other family labor on the farm. ”Sometimes, I think he overreacted and was too stubborn. The more he insisted, the more I would like to remind him of being open— minded." With respect to a hierarchical position, most of the husbands seemed open to debate but still tried to dominate the whole interaction by way of defense or persuasion so that it turns out to be in their favor. Tseng has six years of education and is moderate (2.52) in patriarchal beliefs; she has other family member helping with farm work. Her husband shows his doubt and questions his wife about her intention to go for an off-farm job. ”He warned me that it is difficult for me to find a job at my age. I was so mad at him at first. Then I think... Yah, maybe he was right. I am too old to find a job which fits me, because I have no special skills except for farming.... " 112 B. Husband as the Initiator Husbands in this category mostly attempt to control farm resources and wives’ labor. When the issue is closely connected to their wives’ interests, they are afraid of losing power by trying to put pressure on their wives. Hang is in her late 40’s and has 27 years of farm experience. She considers herself a homemaker without any other family labor on the farm and is moderate (2.87) in patriarchal beliefs. ' ..... it is always he who tells me the information like market price, new techniques, new chemicals, good time to sell the vegetables ..... Actually, he let me know this exciting news and already had his plan to do about it.... When I objected him, I never wanted to have him totally with me. But he seemed upset and tried to force me to follow him consistently... ' Four out of six of the women in this category are passive in response to husband’s initiation. A typical example is Yang aged 55 with an off-farm job. She considers herself a farm helper, has other family labor on her farm, and is moderate (2.91) in patriarchal role beliefs. She complained about her husband’s demanding her contributions to farm work. "During busy season, we don’t have enough workers. He wanted me to help him as much as possible in addition to my paid work....Sometimes I got too tired to pick vegetables...But, he could't care less about my fatigue and thought I was lazy... I shouted at him and let him know I was not... He replied to me that ’everybody is tired in harvest season’ and that ’this is all for our family’... Well, what can I say?? I can only keep quiet and try to work hard... What else I can do?!..' Sung in her early 40’s has control over the income from farm production. She considers herself a full partner, has other family labor, and has low (2.22) patriarchal belief score. Concerning loans, she experienced threat-like feelings from her husband and tried to cool the conflict down. 113 "....I told him not to apply for it [loan] for some good reasons. But he came back at me with a horrible voice saying something like ’if you don’t agree with me, I will find another way which might be even worse to the family’... And he got so furious.. terribly ... Then I had to cool him down. Otherwise, things will really get worse! [smile]..." It is the least common in this category that the husband does not reveal himself but initiates the negotiation in an ambiguous way which is still the trigger of conflict. Liu is low in patriarchal beliefs (mean score is 2.3) but considers herself a home maker. She has other family labor helping with the farm work. "I always like to work outside and did insist on getting a paid job. Now, I do have a regular job ..... O.K. this is how the game went.... He at first totally agreed with me. I hadn’t noticed that he acted strange until one day I complained about the burden of domestic work. Then he was upset and spoke very loud ’I didn’t force you to work outside! It’s your own fault.’ I suddenly caught the reason why he sometimes didn’t talk to me and seemed not content with the loose child care and housework I had done.“ C. Both as Initiators Most of the negotiations in this category are likely to be on- going. For example, Sun considers herself a farm manager, is low (1.96) in patriarchal role beliefs, and has had conflict with her husband over the family budget issue for a long time. ”We always argue about how to balance the family budget. This seems to be a chronic issue to us. No matter who raised the question, we had our own purpose; we stood on our own point of view ..... Sometimes he persuaded me, sometimes I persuaded him.. our perceptions of running this farm are different.... Having competing viewpoints is hard to avoid.... I admit that it is common in the marriage... But I believe that everybody wants and try to make a happy family life." On the other hand, some women feel the importance of paying respect to each other in the negotiation. Chien is 38 years old and has nine years of education. She has 21 years of farm experience, does not have other 114 family labor, is low (1.65) in patriarchal beliefs, and identifies herself as a full farm partner. ”It is very important that we respect each other. Well, like us, we faced the conflict, he didn’t feel comfortable as I did.... But, we both .... well, at least I, tried my best to clear the misunderstanding all the time.... Again, what really matters is we got to be considerate for each other ' Given that the couple brings their own standpoints and sincere beliefs into the negotiation, deadlock may still happen. Pong has 53 years of farm experience and is moderate (2.74) in patriarchal beliefs but identifies herself as home maker with other family labor. She describes a deadlock condition when she had conflict with her husband over investment in land. "We both are stubborn. We can’t really pay attention to each other. It is hard to come to any conclusion. There seems to be no way to compromise with each other." 111. Communication Strategies and Concluding Solutions Whether or not the conflict appears to be constructive in the dyad would depend on the way the couple manages the conflict in their mutual Comunication. As suggested by Paolucci et al. (1977), an appropriate (Jr positive management of conflict could avert hostility and Inisunderstanding between family members. The discussion of women’s IJarticipation in the management of conflict will center around three major themes. The first is the ways women communicate with their husbands and reach concluding solutions. The exploration is based in three communication strategies defined by Scanzoni and her colleagues. Concerning whether or how women utilize certain bargaining strategies in 115 communication with their husbands, Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) and Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) suggest three major kinds of communication approaches -- violence, coercion, and persuasion. The second is the possible concluding solutions which the couple achieves by each communication strategy. Inspired by the Bargaining approach (Nash 1950; Hanser and Brown 1980) from Neoclassical theory of household economics, four types of concluding solutions are identified - - (1) husband wins and wife loses, (2) both husband and wife compromise or win, (3) nobody wins or ever achieves a desired solution, and (4) irife wins and husband loses. Given the assumption from cooperative bargaining theory that the bargaining game in the dyad is not necessarily a zero sum game, a specific communication strategy would not necessarily reach to a specific kind ofesolution. This study attempts ttl find out the diversity of outcomes of each communication strategy. The third is the examination of the connection between the strategy and its solution. What would be the diverse outcomes of each conmunication strategy? To what extent the different communication Strategies amplify or diminish the conflict, is the next interesting Iluestion concerning the management of the conflict. Is it usually the (:ase that the more aggression is involved in the mutual communication, 'the less solvable the conflict is? Although it might be hard to find a causal linkage between each communication strategy and its outcomes, this study tries to determine all the possible combinations of the connections so that we can comprehend Taiwanese vegetable women’s role in the negotiation process. 116 A. Coercion The interviews with Taiwanese farm women suggest that coercion is the most frequent communication strategy (11 among the 23 women who reported conflict in farm decision making). This strategy is characterized by active behaviors such as shouting, crying, or name calling on the part of women or their husbands. In most of the cases, women say that it is the husband who initiates the coercive behavior. Chao has two years of education and no other family on the farm; she identifies herself as a farm helper and is moderate (2.96) in patriarchal beliefs. She always complained about her husband’s way of managing farm incomes . “He is an absent-minded guy. I was afraid that he’d gone too far and went into heavy debts ..... Since I kept murmuring, he got annoyed, shouted and wanted me to get out of his way ..... He didn’t understand me at all. I was so disappointed. Then, I got mad, too, because he kept shouting ..... Until I shouted back and cried, he then turned his voice down.” Cheng has 10 years of farm experience, other family farm labor, and Inoderate patriarchal beliefs (mean score 2.52). She considers herself a 'full partner and is strongly attached to improving family well-being. ”He raised his voice and criticized my short sightedness. Then I criticized him being disorganized. It was hard for us to sit down and to listen to each other, although we all wanted to make our family better off." Although some women demonstrate an active role in this strategy as we saw earlier with Chao and Cheng, most women are found to have a passive response to husband’s coercion. Under the dictatorial mode of relations with husbands, women who experience coercion mostly adopt the tactics of keeping icy silence and calming husbands down to reach some kind of compromise. A usual and typical form is icy silence. Hang is 117 moderate (2.87) in patriarchal beliefs and identifies herself as a home maker with no other family labor. 'I was very angry but only hid my feeling. I then refused to talk with him ..... I believe that if he cares about me, he would try to know why I refused to talk.... In fact, sometimes, I didn’t want to stir things up.” Concerning calming down as another strategy for women to react to their husbands, Yei is in her middle 40’s, with 33 years of farm experience tand six years of education; she is low (2.04) in patriarchal beliefs. She considers herself a full partner and has no other family labor working on the farm. '1 was really irritated by his reaction to my suggestion [not only didn’t pay much attention to me but also yelled]....But I told myself to be patient. In order to settle the things down, I would find excuses to let go ... I tried to be gentle with him so that we wouldn’t be in a mess." In general, most of the women in this category are the ones who ‘finally compromise by saying that "if I just go ahead and take it (which ‘is even unfair to the woman)”, ”if I don’t care too much", or "if I let it (the irritation) go", no matter how much they ever did to try to reverse their husbands’ coercion. Women’s yielding behavior is mostly because they feel that they do not have as much advantage as their llusband has to win the game; so they finally give up (six out of 11 \women are in this situation) by burying the disagreement in their minds, lxy keeping silence as a way of protest or refusal, or by finding excuses for their husbands. Ma considers herself a home maker and is moderate (2.87) in patriarchal role beliefs. She has no other family labor helping with farm work. "... I tried my best to behave myself not causing any violence and fight.... Sometimes I was pretty mad, but couldn’t do anything....So I just kept quiet and try not doing things he 118 wanted me to do... you know... but it doesn’t last long... I still follow him... I don’t want to have life with him like in a war...." Another reason why women give up the chance to win is that they (three out of 11) are too busy doing farm work as well as domestic work to have energy to argue with their husbands. Cheng who presented the potential dissonance with her husband as depicted earlier works 14 hours a day on the farm and three hours on domestic work. ".... We didn’t talk to each other when we both get irritated. He didn’t know how to deal with me. I didn’t how, either... Given this, I usually forgot all about it because I don’t have time to think about his pretty reasons or my own thought....” The only one exception to the compromise as a solution is Liu. She has nine years of education and has an off-farm job which is the source of conflict. She had not noticed that her husband had been acting weird toward her until she complained about heavy housework. “....Then I suddenly figured out why he was sometimes angry with me for not paying much attention to the kids and other housework.... I had thought about how to talk [our disagreement] out... But he never turned it onto the table. So, I told myself, I won’t give up on my own job. I rather let the problem remain ..." B. Persuasion The next important strategy utilized by the couple is persuasion (there are 10 out of the 23 women who reported having a negotiation using persuasion). In this strategy, either one of the couple or both of them employ verbal communication to influence each other’s action. Three persuasion patterns are found -- (1) woman as the persuader, (2) both as persuaders, and (3) husband as the persuader. I Women as the persuader are conscious of nurturing the marital relationship when they try to persuade their husbands. Asked why she 119 tried to persuade her husband, Sia who has no education and considers herself a homemaker, replied that “If you don’t feel comfortable, just speak out. Otherwise, you’ll never understand each other.” She further described how she handled the communication, I'When we misunderstood each other, I didn’t want to get myself frustrated or in flame. I kept telling myself not to panic. Then I tried to find a different way to tell him what I think, how and why. At the same time, I still listened to him.“ The three women in this category feel that at least 90 percent of the conflict finally comes to a satisfactory conclusion (two of them even think 100 percent). That is mostly because their husbands are at least willing to listen to them, and do not object to their suggestions, although they might not totally agree with them. Chien considers herself a full partner and is low in patriarchal role beliefs. In the negotiation process she seemed to be in an equal position and pointed out the important principle for mutual communication to get a compromise for each other. ".... it is very important that each other ought to be reasonable when arguing... and really listen to each other... respect each other’s opinion ..... " With respect to the second pattern, the couple both tries to persuade each other. Jiang considers herself a farm helper and has no other family labor working on the farm. She has 2.48 score of patriarchal role beliefs. "... we are like a friend to each other... sometimes he tries to convince me...I try to listen to him... Sometimes I try to convince him and he tries to listen to me.... we get mad sometimes at each other... But it is not going to work when we both are not in the mood... So we usually wait until everybody is cool down..." Two «of the three women in this category do think around 80 percent of the <:onflict does finally reach a conclusion; Sung is the exception. 120 Sung is in her early 30’s with 12 years of education. She considers herself a full partner, has no other family labor, and is low in patriarchal role beliefs (mean score is 2.22). She presents us another way of conflict management -— introducing an intervention. “....Finally, I suggested him to ask others about it [our question].... ask whomever is available.... for example experienced neighbors, friends or extension agents....Well, what turned out was satisfactory" The third persuasion pattern is characterized by a male-dominant communication. That is, women are totally in the position of being persuaded by their husbands. Yang sees herself a farm helper and has 28 years of farm experience and 2.9 mean score of patriarchal role beliefs. "In the past years, we suffered from a bad yield of vegetables.... Even when I had a heavy workload, I tried not to complain because he said to me that he worked very hard and even harder than me... that he worked everyday from sunrise to sunset .... Fortunately, after all these slow, rough years, we are better off.... Now I look back... maybe I should thank those tough years for giving us chance to know each other better and to care about each other more ...... ' In contrast, Wang identifies herself as a homemaker, has no other family labor for working on her farm, and is moderate (2.4) in patriarchal beliefs. She seems not comfortable in the conflict. Nevertheless, she finally lets herself be subordinate to her husband. ”I acted like beating around the bush and learning what he really thinks.... After alT, he is the head of the family.“ Shieh is low (1.91) in patriarchal beliefs but considers herself a farm helper without family labor. She, on the other hand, felt tired of conflict. “I didn’t want to be in his way, although I didn’t think he realized what I thought and how I felt. I was too lazy to ...you know.... to tell him... Sometimes, I should admit, I think maybe he was right.... I don’t know...Maybe I was wrong...." 121 As another example, Chien is low (1.65) in patriarchal role beliefs and identifies herself as a full partner. However, she said: ' ... It is much more important to sit down listening to each other with respect to each other... When he got upset or angry, I kept quiet. It is the same thing to him, when I got uncomfortable, he would hold his breath ..... This is the way to avoid the tension between us... I don’t really care who wins ..... as long as we live in peace.” Based on the women’s descriptions above, women’s role in persuasion shows that women are likely to yield voluntarily to their husbands because of avoiding tension in the marital relationship, being totally convinced, or recognizing production is not her sphere. Given this, all of the women in this category think that almost all of the conflict is solved. C. Violence Only two of the 38 women interviewed said that violence was their principal strategy of communication. Even then, the women in this category did not intend to have the violence happen. Shiao has 28 years of farm experience and is moderate (2.61) in patriarchal role beliefs. She considers herself a farm helper and has no other family labor. She has been struggling with debts. "When the conflict [the different opinions between my husband and me] got heated, he dashed things to the ground and yelled at me. I usually kept my mouth shut at first....you know.... Just keep quiet and see what worse things he would be doing to me.... But when he irritated me, I couldn’t stand it. Then I got furious. I did the same things to him because I just didn’t want to look like a silent lamb waiting for execution. " This communication strategy is likely to be unsolved and come to a conciition that nobody wins. All of the women in this category reported less than 50 percent of the conflict have been solved. If it finally 122 comes to a concluding solution, this stressful communication usually needs a third person to stop the fighting. Pong considers herself a homemaker, has other family labor for their farm work, and is moderate (2.74) in patriarchal beliefs. 'Now we don’t have many fights as we did ...... I never thought we were compatible. We quarreled, we fought.... all the time.... I didn’t even know how I could go on with my life with him like this ..... Somehow, I am getting used to it and he changed a bit ...... We now care about each other more than we did..." IV. Conclusion More than half of the women in the survey sample reported that they generally have had disagreement with their husbands in farm decision making process. Theoretically, this disagreement would be likely to trigger an on-going negotiation. However, the in-depth interviews with 38 women showed that women are not likely to play an active role in the negotiation. Although half of the negotiations were initiated by women themselves, it usually turned out that they stayed submissive in the communication with their husbands. No matter which the strategy was used in the communication, women were often the ones who compromised with their husbands. The reasons for the submission imply the important notions of, respectively, household strategy (the pursuit of family well—being), familial interaction process (marital relations), and subjective perceptions (self-identity). Chapter 6 WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN FARM WORK This chapter focuses on two parts of the agrinubial power process concerning work participation: (1) women’s involvement in farm work and (2) their evaluation of their work involvement. In the preceding chapter, I have analyzed how women negotiate concerning farm production. Taiwanese women in this particular study are found, in general, to have a passive/subordinate role. Recognizing this situation, this chapter explores the amount of time women spend on farm work, the number of tasks in which they participate, how deeply they take part in those farm tasks, and the relation of their work participation to their role in negotiation and other individual and family resources and constraint variables (see Figure 3 on page 29). Second, having described women’s contributions to vegetable production, this chapter will further examine women’s evaluation of their participation in farm work and the reasons which lead to their personal evaluations. A woman’s evaluation then determines her subsequent activities in the next cycle of the agrinubial power process. This study thus tries to provide empirical evidence of the dynamic of the familial power process. I. FARM WORK PARTICIPATION In the previous literature, farm work participation is studied principally by one or both of two measures. The first is the total 123 124 amount of time invested in farm work regardless of individual farm tasks (Bennett and Kohl 1982). The second measure is a participation scale of two dimensions, which assess the depth and breadth of the participation across farm tasks (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1983). Time investment is a measure of one’s general agricultural workload. However, time investment per se tells us nothing about the breadth and depth of involvement. Therefore, as discussed in chapter 4 (pp. 66ff.), a composite measure of task depth and breadth has been developed. The composite measure was finally dropped because it was highly correlated with both breadth and depth and because breadth and depth were not highly correlated with each other. Breadth and depth allow us to articulate the patterns of women’s involvement in farm tasks. Using the three measures, the present study examines women’s farm work participation in terms of total time devoted to farm work, breadth of task participation, and depth of task participation. A. Total Time on Farm Work Women’s total time devoted to farm work is measured by the reported number of hours of farm work per day. Considering seasonality in vegetable production, women’s total time spent on farm work is examined in four categories -- Winter busy season, Winter slack season, Summer busy season, and Summer slack season. The women in this sample work very hard on the farm. They work nearly eight hours per day, and often more, for each of the four seasons (Table 6-1). During the Winter or Summer busy seasons, women contribute about two more hours than in the Winter or Summer slack seasons. In 125 general, the average of their total working hours is only slightly less than their husbands’. Lo is in her early 50’s with 40 years of farm experience; she identifies herself as an farm helper and works on the farm 10 hours a day. “... I wouldn’t do what I can’t do... but I definitely do whatever I can do to help for our farm. The more you work, the more earnings you will get... then you won’t be so poor....' I Table 6-1: Hours on Farm Work Per DayWomen Re orted I Mean SD' Total I Busy Wife 9.77 2.83 303 I S Season u Husband 10.30 3.13 296 m m Slack Wife 7.75 2.54 294 e Season r Husband 8.52 2.81 295 Busy Wife 9.28 2.67 303 W Season i Husband 9.74 2.96 295 n t Slack Wife 7.51 2.40 294 e Season Husband 8.22 2.66 294 St fiviation I: Previous research amply demonstrates the essential and influential contribution that women make to horticultural farming (Boserup 1970; Sachs 1983; Burton et al. 1984; Rosenfeld 1985; Gasson 1988a; Stratigaki 1988; Berlan Darque 1988). What needs our attention then is how women’s participation in vegetable growing influences the quality of their own lives and/or the quality of family life. For example, women might encounter a dilemma in allocating their time between farm work and domestic work; women might experience consequences to their personal to la 0t! 126 health from working two full-time jobs. Wu has 43 years of farm experience and considers herself a farm helper. She works eight hours a day on the farm. 'I spend quite a lot of time on the farm chores and house chores... I never got him to help me with the housework...1 never got released from taking care of things inside the house.” This bind would be particularly serious for women who are in an early family stage, with much domestic work on a regular basis. The quality of child care might be less if they pay less attention to children, especially young kids, because they have to invest many hours in farm work. Chan has four years of farm experience and four children all older than 18. 'When my kids were young, I had difficulty giving time to our own farm because kids were also important.... But, I still had to spend a lot of time on the farm because, at that time, we didn’t have others in the family to help with farm work except for me...." For the bivariate and multivariate analyses, women’s time on farm work will be the average of their working hours in four time categories as shown in Table 6-1. 0. Task Participation Concerning farm task participation, 37 farm tasks comprise the agricultural activities in the whole process of vegetable production from input to output. Each farm task was investigated with a question to the farm women, "who usually does this task?“. The score for each task was assigned as follows: 0 for "always done by husband" or ”done by others“, 1 for ”usually done by husband", 2 for "done together with husband“, 3 for I'usually done by wife", and 4 for ”always done by wife". 127 Table 6-2 demonstrates the extent of women’s participation in the particular chores done on vegetable farms. If we look at the tasks which are done mostly by women alone and together with husbands, we see that women make most of their contributions to farm work: picking ripe vegetables (95 percent), preparing foods for farm workers (84 percent), cleaning/washing vegetables after harvest (82 percent), weeding/cultivation (80 percent), covering vegetables (65 percent), watering vegetables (65 percent), overseeing farm work done by other family members (60 percent), transplanting vegetable shoots (58 percent), and watering shoots (51 percent). Most of those tasks are characterized by time-consuming manual work, that is, they are not mechanized tasks. Furthermore, the tasks of preparing food for workers, weeding, cleaning, and harvesting are more often done by women alone than by husbands or by others (other family members or hired laborers) alone. Yang is in her middle 50’s and has 28 years of farm experience. She considers herself a farm helper. "As long as he needs me, I sow, I weed by hand, I pick the vegetables.... But he usually does those heavy chores like plowing, furrowing..." Of all the tasks, women are least likely to take part in those associated with farm machinery or equipment and tools. Repairing farm equipment and machines; keeping equipment and tools organized; and purchasing machinery, supplies and equipment are done by husband alone or husband and wife together on at most 10 percent of the farms. Tsai is in her early 60’s with 40 years of farm experience and considers herself a homemaker but spends a average of 7.5 hours per day on farm work all four seasons. 128 - ' Women’ ask P rti i ati n arm Together with Mostly Husband Alone N___ MANUAL PRODUCTION WORK (1) Harvest/pick vegetables ............... 70.4 24.6 303 (2) Prepare foods for workers on farm ...... 2.7 81.8 187 (3) Clean/wash vegetables ................. 56.3 25.5 279 (4) Weeding/cultivation .................... 46.4 33.1 302 (5) Cover crop ............................. 51.3 14.1 199 (6) Regular watering ....................... 48.2 17.1 299 (7) Oversee farm work done by other family members ...................... 39.8 20.4 98 (8) Transplant shoots ...................... 47.5 10.8 265 (9) Water shoots ........................... 41.4 9.4 297 (10) Sowing ................................ 35.2 12.6 301 (11) Oversee farm work done by hired labor.26.9 14.4 104 MANAGERIAL WORK (12) Run errands .......................... 26.6 17.0 282 (13) Pay farm bills ........................ 22.7 16.0 300 (14) Do farm bookkeeping ................... 15.6 23.0 135 (15) Check market price .................... 28.5 9.1 242 (16) Plan cropping schedule ................ 24.2 6.7 302 (17) Sell products to local market ......... 22.0 7.9 191 (18) Gather production outlook information.15.5 8.0 239 (19) Sell products to retail market ........ 16.8 6.6 274 (20) Buy fertilizer ........................ 8.9 9.6 303 (21) Buy seeds ............................. 8.3 10.2 303 (22) Buy pesticides ........................ 8.6 8.7 301 NON-LABOR INTENSIVE PRODUCTION WORK (23) Apply additional fertilizer ....................... 31.0 9.2 303 (24) Apply basic fertilizer ................ 28.7 11.2 303 (25) Prepare for seedling .................. 19.9 10.3 281 (26) Apply herbicides ..................... 19.2 6.0 291 (27) Set vegetable beds(bedding/furrowing).19.9 5.0 276 (28) Build up green house .................. 19.5 3.6 113 (29) Apply pesticides/spray ................ 15.5 7.0 303 (30) Fix green house ...................... 17.5 3.5 114 (31) Run machinery or trucks ............... 11.3 4.3 275 (32) Prepare fields for planting (plowing)..7.3 5.9 260 MACHINERY MANAGEMENT (33) Make purchases of farm equipment and machinery ............................ 7.6 2.8 288 (34) Keep equipment and tools organized ... 5.1 4.1 294 (35) Make purchases of minor machinery supplies .............................. 4.8 3.8 291 (36) Minor machinery repairs ............... 1.4 2.8 292 or b r ver au .............. .1. 0 .2.7 294 * The percentage of each farm chore done by wife together with husband. ** The percentage of each farm chore usually or always done by wife. m Total respondents who reported that a particular type of task was done on their farms 129 ' ..... I actually do several chores... most of time [I do] chores such as sowing, watering seeds, planting, picking and washing vegetables. But I would go shopping for machines with him...“ Taiwanese women do make contributions to farm management through tasks such as running errands (44 percent), bookkeeping (39 percent), paying farm bills (39 percent), monitoring market prices (38 percent), planning the crop schedule (31 percent), gathering information on overall production forecasts (24 percent), and buying supplies (18 percent). These results about management work are a significantly different finding from U.S., British, and Australian studies (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1982; Sachs 1983; Rosenfeld 1985; Whatmore 1991; Alston 1995). But in general, Taiwanese women’s contributions to farm managerial work are much less than their contributions to time—consuming manual production work. Concerning farm bookkeeping, the particular history of agricultural development in Taiwan suggests that farmers have not traditionally kept accounting records of their expenses and earnings. Agricultural policy makers have been encouraging them to do so, and agricultural extension agents have been teaching them formal bookkeeping since 198313. Despite the encouragement from policy makers and extension agents, the number of farm households involved in such programs is less than one percentfl‘. The present findings, in fact, indicate that more than half of the farm households (55.4 percent) do ” The programs designed by Provincial Department of Agricultural and rorestry for advancing family bookkeeping started in 1983 by focusing on nuclear farmers defined as elite farmers who are willing to stay in farming and whose farms are on average larger than their counterpart farmers. In 1988 the programs targeted all possible farmers defined in the agricultural census (Cheng 1992). “ Only 725 out of 850,395 farm households had joined the programs as of 1990 (Cheng 1992; Council of Agriculture 1994). no per act tog wom- chou pari if he ‘0 ”DJ ”M f/ié’fe 130 not carry out farm bookkeeping. Shieh considers herself a farm helper and has 29 years of farm experience. ”He is responsible for taking care of farm expenses. The earnings are all put in his bank account.... As far as I know, he is not used to keeping farm books...he has his own way of tracking the expenses... As a measure of breadth of participation, this study employs the percentage of all the farm chores a woman could undertake which are actually done by the woman (combining together those chores done together with husband, usually by wife, or always by wife). On average, women participate in more than half (52.9 percent) of the listed farm chores (Table 6-3). The standard deviation is 29 and the range of participation in tasks is from 3.2 percent to 100 percent. Only three percent of the women take part in less than 10 percent of the farm tasks. Liu has 15 years of farm experience and considers herself a home maker; her breadth of task score is 6.9 out of 100. In the interview, she recalled that from the time of her marriage up to the present, she has always harvested and washed the vegetables. In contrast, 50 percent of the women contribute 10 percent to 50 percent of tasks. Furthermore, 30 percent of the women in the survey reported that they do between 50 and 90 percent of the tasks. Finally 12.3 percent of the women take part in all the tasks. Having examined the variance of women’s breadth of participation, we might still wonder about the significance of the tasks for the women. For example, a woman could participate in all the tasks; however, that would not necessarily be more important than a woman who takes part in a small number of tasks but is fully responsible for those tasks. Therefore, we need a way of characterizing the intensity of women’s task 131 I Table 6—3: The Distribution of Farm Tasks Done by Women I Range Breadth Depth (96) 1%) I 0-10 3.0 2.3 I 10.01-20 9.3 15.6 I 20.01-30 14.2 30.4 30.01-40 14.9 22.2 40.01-50 11.6 12.0 50.01-70 18.2 11.5 70.01-90 11.6 6.0 90.01-99 5.9 0.0 100 12.3 0.0 Mean 52.9 36.0 Standard Deviation 36.0 18.4 Total Cases 303 303 participation. Put another way, for those tasks in which the women do take part, how deeply involved are they in those tasks? The measure of the intensity15 of task participation is constructed to examine, for those tasks in which the women do participate, whether the women are responsible for those tasks entirely by themselves, mostly by themselves or together with their husbands. This study displays a modest intensity of women’s task participation across the tasks in which they do participate (mean score is 36 out of 100; standard deviation is 18.4) (Table 6-3). Ho considers herself a farm helper; her breadth score is 131 and depth score is 63.3. When talking about her involvement in those ” Please see the details about the measurement of the intensity of task participation in Chapter 4, pp 62-63. 132 tasks in which she does take part, she said 'though we work together, I am not totally dependent on him to do those tasks. If he was not free, I still handled things like spraying, planting, and applying fertilizers by myself....' In short, women in the present study make a substantial contribution to farm labor for family-based vegetable production. While their husbands perform farm work, women devote many of their hours daily to a wide range of farm tasks in addition to their domestic work. Given this fact, the factors that could explain their long and arduous work life are the next interest of this study. The next section tests the causes of women’s farm work participation. C. The Determinants of Farm Work Participation The relationships between women’s work participation and their role in negotiation and influences at familial and personal levels are analyzed in two steps. First, all the variables will be hierarchically entered into the regression model -- the presence of conflict first and then the rest of the independent variables (see Figure 3 on page 29). In the proposed theoretical framework, some independent variables are hypothesized to influence women’s farm work participation operating through the presence of conflict. Therefore, in the second step, if the presence of conflict is significant in the hierarchical multiple regression, I will determine which variables operate through the presence of conflict to affect women’s farm work participation. The, indirect and direct effects will finally be presented in path models. ex fa eq Ta ex] Sig the to QXp 133 1. Total Time on Farm Work The presence of conflict -— one important dimension of women’s role in negotiation among initiation, communication strategies and concluding solution -- is not statistically significant in the bivariate analysis. Pearson correlation analyses showed that the number of hours women spend on farm work is negatively related to their hours spent on house work, their participation in farm training programs, education and farm experience (Table 6-4). Hours of farm work is positively related to women’s patriarchal role beliefs, and net farm income. One-way ANOVA showed that women with hired labor put more hours into farm work than women without hired labor do. The difference is significant at the .01 level. Among those significant variables, none of the three human capital variables (education, training involvement and farm experience) support the thesis that the investment of human capital is positively related to women’s contributions to farm work. Of the family and farm economy variables, only hired labor is opposite to the hypothesis. Age can represent farm experience because farming is learned from experience. Most of the women were born on the farm and began doing farm chores at a young age. Thus for most of the women, age almost is equivalent to farm experience. Bivariate analysis supports this rationale and showed a high inter-correlation between age and farm eXperience (Pearson correlation coefficient is equal to 0.867, significant at the .001 level). To integrate age and farm experience, the standardized score (Z-score) of each variable is computed. In order to eJiminate collinearity, the square of Z-scores of age and farm experience is computed for the multivariate analysis. 134 I Table 6-4: Total Time on Farm Work 9y Independent Variables .Mean Hours 1. Training Involvement (scores) 8.61 303 (1) 0 8.83 202 (2) 3 0 8.15 101 r - -.11 2. Farm Experience (years) 8.61 303 (I) < 22 8.31 75 (2) 23 - 34 9.01 85 (3) 35 - 56 8.69 89 (4) > 47 8.23 54 r - -.O33 3. Education (years) 8.61 303 (1) O 8.76 124 (2) 1 — 6 8.67 144 (3) > Z 7.74 35 r - -.125 4. Patriarchal Beliefs (scores) 8.61 303 (1) 1.43 - 2.13 7.77 ‘ 38 (2) 2.14 - 2.51 8.53 80 (3) 2.52 - 2.83 8.97 104 (4) 2,84 - 3.52 8.59 81 r - .105 5. Hours on Housework 8.61 300 (1) <-2.5 8.59 73 (2) 2.5 - 3.0 9.04 78 (3) 3.3 - 5.0 8.58 105 (4) 5.0*- 9.0 7.97 44 r - -.119 6. Net Farm Income (U.S. S) (1) -2,000 (2) 0 (3) 1,000 - 4,000 (4) 4,000 - 8,000 (5) 8,000 - 20,000 (6) 29,000 and more r - .136 7. Hired Labor No Yes F -= 8.688" * P < .05 ** P <.01, *** P < .001 135 Also, to eliminate the curvilinearity, three dummy variables for family life stage were created. The excluded group for creating the dummy variables are the stages at which either all children are less than 12, or the eldest child is more than 12 and the youngest is less six. One human capital variable which is significant in the multivariate analysis -- the age and farm work experience composite variable -- is supposed to represent the abilities women have for farming (Table 6—5). However, the present findings display an opposite relationship. Women who are young with few years of farm experience, are more likely to contribute their time to farm work. Three family variables -- time on domestic work, family life stage and the use of hired labor retain their significance in the regression. Altogether this set of independent variables explains six percent of the variance of women’s working hours (significant at .001 level) (Figure 8). Table 6-5: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Women’s Time on Farm Work on Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient House Work Time -.128' H Family Life Stage(4): All -.124* Children > 18 8 at home (Farm Experience[Age)2 -.225m Hired Labor .1547. R2 - .0916“ * P < ~05- . **_P__ -°_1: _*_* < -_°_1 The most significant effect on women’s time on farm work is the composite of age and farm experience. In human capital theory, 136 snai>£8sos§. ' 23.98.68.132. 0 6.3.9.5.... .\\j o>> ....00. :0 0.30: ( £02. 5.0.... :0 «room 05F 0.00.002. .0 00.0050... 2.... Q 0.33?— 02.0.0wa E.0n..0m<. 0 2.000060 0...... 0 E0... 0033 080... .0 0:0 m.. A c9220 =< .\\\flm.\r\\ln.$ 00.0.0 0.... 2.50... 0...... 0:02. 0030... .....vm ... .80.. 8.... 137 resources are hypothesized to increase women’s farm work participation. The relationship between the square of the composite variable and women’s time on the farm is negative“. Empirical studies done in the U.S. suggest that older women are likely to take a smaller part in farm work than younger women (Rosenfeld 1986; Lobao and Meyer 1995). Accordingly, the measure of age/experience could represent physical capability for women to make contributions to farm work. This finding presents an unanticipated result opposite to human resource theory. That is, as women get older, although with much farm experience, their physical capability decreases so that their contributions to farm work decrease. In this particular study sample, around half of the women are more than 50 years old. Among those women more than 50 years old, 40 percent are more than 60 years old. The old cohort of women appears to demonstrate limited physical capability to make contributions to farm work. In the in-depth interview, Jang is in her late 60’s with 60 years of farm experience said that 'I am getting old. My health is getting worse. I can’t do so much for the farm as I did. I’d rather stay home and rest." With respect to hired labor use, its effect on women’s time spent on farm work was opposite to that predicted by substitution theory; nevertheless other debates over the effect of hired labor remain. The most important contention is that in production which uses intensive labor, there would be a positive relation of women’s involvement in farm work to hired labor (Rosenfeld 1986). This argument implies that substitution between hired labor and woman’s labor could not totally “ The relationships for age and farm experience separately were also negative. to Ch D3 Iabl chl” 138 apply to family vegetable farming, the concern of this study. First, it is mostly because vegetable farming demands laborers to do manual work. Women are usually the best labor force to fulfill the intensive manual productive work. Second, family labor is often the priority for the inputs of family-based farm production in Taiwan. When the available family labor is not enough, most farm families then hire seasonal labor. In this study, more than half of the families (57.1 percent) do hire labor to help with farm work. Hired labor in vegetable farming is thus a common phenomenon. Therefore, it would be difficult for hired labor to substitute for women who are the reserve labor force of the family. Cheng with 10 years of farm experience identifies herself as a full partner and works 14 hours on the farm. '1 never feel relaxed because I still pick vegetables, weed and sow when we hire others during the busy season." Furthermore the results of this study imply that women’s time on the farm even increases with the use of hired labor. Two reasons are found in the ethnographic data. First, they need to oversee the work of the hired labor. Chou considers herself a farm helper and spends an average of eight hours a day working on the farm. "When we really get busy.. we have to hire two others workers to help us... I need to work with the workers all the time... and never get rest." The second reason comes from the preparation of foods for the hired labor. Yang is in her middle 50’s and has no education. She has three children all over 18 years old who can help with farm work. She also has hired labor on her family farm. “we do hire others when my husband and I can’t do all the vegetable picking by ourselves.... But I don’t get to rest at that time.... Because then, I have even more work to do! I pick 139 Chinese cabbage myself, and I also check on the hired hands -- and I make food for them, or order meals for them.” With respect to the family composition factors, the results of this study show that the time commitment to domestic work decreases women’s time devoted to farm work. This finding supports the hypothesis that domestic work tends to reduce the time women have available to get involved in farm work. In the in-depth interviews, most of the women do agree that their domestic work would decrease their participation in farm work, especially when child nurturing requires their time (90 percent). For instance, kuan woman in her early 30’s with three young kids said: ”when the kids were first born, it took most of my time to take care of them. I didn’t have help from my mother or mother-in-law .... there was only me and three small babies. Certainly, I did less farm work than before when I didn’t have children....' As hypothesized in this study, the family life stage represents the time a woman has available for farm work (Fassinger and Schwarzweller 1983; Rosenfeld 1986). Women’s time for farm work goes up as children are growing up before all the children are 12 to 18 years old. Their time allocation then goes down until all the children are more than 18 years old. Then it goes up again to the highest point when all children are gone. Concerning different phases in the curvilinearity, the regression analysis shows that women in the family life stage when all the children are older than 18 and still at home are less likely to spent their time on the farm than the women in other, family life stages (Table 6-5). In one interview, Pong is at the age of 61 and has three children all older than 18. She recalled that "I worked very hard when I first got married ..... After the kids were born one after another, I didn’t have much time for farm work 140 because I took care of three small children, and did all the household laundry, washing, cleaning, cooking ..... But still, when I had a free minute of free time, I had to help my husband because we were so poor ..... When our children were old enough, they helped with the farm work and the housework, and then it was a little bit easier for me." 2. The Extensiveness of Task Participation Pearson correlation analyses showed that women’s participation in farm training programs, education, and self-identity are positively related to the range of women’s participation in different farm tasks (Table 6-6). The range of farm tasks in which women participate is negatively related to their participation in domestic work and farm experience. Farm experience is the only variable which shows a relationship with work breadth which is opposite to the hypotheses. Women’s breadth of work participation has a curvilinear relation with family life stage. The diversity of task participation goes up as children are growing older until they are school age but not yet 12 years old; then it goes down to the lowest point when all the children turn eighteen. It then goes up a bit, after all children are gone. To eliminate the curvilinearity, three dummy variables for family life stage were made for the regression analysis. The excluded group for creating the dummy variables are the stages at which either all children are less than 12, or the eldest child is more than 12 and the youngest child is less than six. Table 6-6: Breadth of Work Partici ation by Independent Variables 141 Mean Scores N 1. Training Involvement (scores) 52.9 302 (1) 0 50.9 201 (2) >*O 56.8 101 r - .119 2. Farm Experience (years) 52.9 302 (1) < 22 59.1 75 (2) 23 - 34 49.3 85 (3) 35 - 46 51.7 89 (4) > 4] 52.1 53 r . -.154 3. Education (years) 52.9 302 (I) 0 52.5 123 (2) 1 - 6 51.0 144 (3) >.7 62.0 35 r - .095 ‘ 4. Self-identity 52.9 302 (1) homemaker 34.5 51 (2) farm helper 49.9 161 (3) farm manager 71.8 17 (4) full partner 62.5 55 (5) iggependent producer 85.3 18 r - .407 ' 5. Housework Participation Scale 52.9 302 » (1) O - 50 54.9 56 (2) 50 - 70 55.6 115 (3) 70 - 80 52.4 76 (4) 80.— 90 46.0 55 r - -.101 '. I- P 001 142 Table 6-6 (cont’d): Breadth of Work Participation by Independent Variables Mean Scores N 6. Family Life Stage 52.9 302 (1) all children < 12 64.4 23 (1a) no children 98.9 3 (1b) eldest child < 3 31.7 3 (1c) eldest child < 6 49.3 4 (1d) eldest child 6-12 68.2 14 (2) youngest < 6 and eldest child > 12 63.5 22 (2a) youngest child < 3 8 eldest child 12-18 82.8 1 (2b) youngest child 3-6 8 eldest child 12-18 33.3 1 (3) youngest child < 12 8 eldest child 12-18 59.2 45 (3a) youngest child 6-12 8 eldest child 12-18 64.1 20 (3b) all children 12-18 59.2 45 (4) all children > 18 48.4 170 (5) all children are gone 52.5 41 F - 3.349 ’ * P < .05, ** P < .01 *** P < .001 I Of the independent variables that show significant bivariate relationships with the breadth of farm tasks in which women participate, only three -- domestic task participation, family life stage with children all more than 18 and at home, and self-identity -- maintain their significance in a regression analysis (Table 6-7). This set of independent variables explains 20 percent of the variance in the breadth of farm tasks done by women (significant at .001 level)(Figure 9). Self-identity, an individual resource variable, has the most significant influence on the breadth of task participation. As hypothesized, women who identify themselves as independent producers are more likely to take part in a wide range of farm tasks. This result is 143 Table 6—7: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Percentage of Farm Tasks Done by Women on Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient I Domestic Task Participation -.151** Family Life Stage (4): -.119* All children > 18 8 at home Self-identity .394‘” R2 - .197’” * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 also supported by the ethnographic data. Cheng spend three hours a day on domestic work; she has three children, one is less than 12 and two are more than 12. She considers herself a full partner on the farm, and said that she enjoyed farm work: "From setting the crop plan to buying seeds and fertilizer, to cultivation, and to harvest.. I can do and I actually do everything ..... the workload is not heavy for me at all. We work together." In contrast, Sia identifies herself as a homemaker and spends six hours in domestic work. However, she also spends 10 hours a day on the farm and does some farm tasks (breadth score is 15 out of 100) with depth score 60. ”I don’t like working on the farm very much. I rather stay at home taking care of kids. I just do some farm tasks when he needs me." With respect to domestic task participation, as hypothesized, women with a low domestic workload are more likely to take part in a wide range of farm tasks. This finding supports the theoretical hypothesis that domestic work tends to constrain women’s opportunity to get involved in a large number of farm tasks. The in-depth interviews 1 Jill. IIIIU 1.11.1145 0C Cuuuflfiam 0:. 50 8020.30}... 02h mw mvkmeWMU‘ 144 0385>9E830m150 ”--__w «389 8.88.. .3220... O >._.coo_¢.0m 0.:0Eo>> 0:5... .0 .0 8.0.2.0. 0? 8.2.5 __< H .00k 8.0.. .o £000.. / 3 000.0 0.... 2.0.0.. smrrf 2.57 5.0.00.0. 0.00h 0:00:50 8.3.0.5. .0... ....a. 0.5562. .6 5.2.6.0 2.. .6 8.8.8.. 2: a 0.30....— 145 with women also show that housework tends to decrease women’s participation in a wide range of farm tasks. Sung in her early 40’s has five children. As she recalled her participation in farm work shortly after marriage, she said: “after I first married, I did almost every task even ones using machines such as spraying fertilizer and pesticide ..... After my first kid was born, there was much more housework. At that time, I learned how to take care of a small infant and so on.... It was a tough time for me at first, because I had to learn it myself.... So, I did only a small part of the farm work they want me to do, but I still worked on the farm though ...... Now, all the children are older. Though they are still in school, the older boys [who are more than 12 years old] help with farm work after school. My daughter helps me with washing dishes, clothes, etc. So, then I can do whatever I can do to help [my husband]." Family life stage has only a modest significant effect on the extensiveness of task participation. The result indicates that women in the family stage in which all children are older than 18 and some are still at home are less likely than women in other family stages to do a wide range of farm tasks. This implies the replacement of women by adult children in farm tasks. Pong is in her early 60’s and has two children older than 18, who both worked on the farm. She said: "my sons and daughters-in-law help with farm work. So, I don’t need to do so many tasks on the farm ..... I just hope that they can take over this farm as soon as possible so that my husband and I can spend less time working ...." 3. The Intensity of Farm Task Participation Pearson correlation analyses showed that the intensity of women’s involvement in farm tasks is positively related to their participation in farm training programs and to an independent self-identity (Table 6- 3)- One-way ANOVA showed that women with husbands having off-farm jobs 0" With hired labor are more likely than others to be deeply involved in 146 the tasks. Among these four significant variables, the relationship between women’s work participation and hired labor is opposite to the hypothesis. Table 6-8: Depth of Work Participation by Independent Variables Mean Scores N 1. Training Involvement (scores) 36.0 302 (1) 0 34.4 201 (2) >flp 39.3 101 r - .188 2. Husband’s Off-farm Employment 36.0 302 No 33.5 Yes ... 53 .4 F - 45.58 3. Self-identity: 36.0 (1) homemaker 36.2 (2) farm helper 34.0 (3) farm manager 32.2 (4) full partner 29.3 (5) independent producer 77.7 r - 226 4. Hired labor 36.0 No 34.2 Yes * 37.4 F - 4.521 P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 147 I Table 6-8 (Cont’d): Depth of Work Participation by Independent Variables I Mean Scores N 5. Family Life Stage 36.0 302 (1) all children < 12 29.5 24 (1a) no children 18.0 (lb) eldest child < 3 26.3 (1c) eldest child < 6 31.7 (1d) eldest child 6-12 32.0 (2) youngest < 6 and eldest child > 12 32.2 2 (2a) youngest child < 3 8 eldest child 12-18 26.3 (2b) youngest child 3-6 8 eldest child 12-18 33.0 (3) youngest child < 12 8 eldest child 12—18 37.0 65 (3a) youngest child 6-12 8 eldest child 12-18 32.5 (3b) all children 12-18 37.0 (4) all children > 18 37.3 170 (5) all children are gone 35.4 41 F - 4.227* I * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 This study supports the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between family life stage and depth of women’s participation in farm tasks. The intensity goes up as children are growing until all the children are more than 18 years old; then it goes down a bit when the children are all gone. To eliminate the curvilinearity, three dummy variables for family life stage were made for the regression analysis. The dummy coding is the same as it was for the regression analysis of breadth of work participation in the previous section. 0f the five independent variables that show significant bivariate relationships with depth of women’s participation in farm tasks, a set of four -- hired labor, family life stage, self-identity, and husband’s 148 off-farm employment -- retain their significance in the regression analysis (Table 6-9). This set of four independent variables explains 19 percent of the variance of the depth of women’s participation in farm tasks (significant at .001 level)(Figure 10). Table 6-9: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Intensity of Women’s Farm Task Participation on Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient Husband’ s Off-farm Employment .357." Self-identity .171" Family Life Stage (4): .136' Children all > 18 8 at home Hired Labor .116‘ R2 - .192’“ * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 Husbands’ off-farm employment has the most significant effect on task intensity; women whose husbands have an off-farm job are more likely than others to be intensely involved in farm tasks. The ethnographic data also provides evidence of this relation. Yei is 46 years old and considers herself a full partner with depth score 40, breadth score 100 and 6.5 hours on farm work; her husband has a full- time job in a paper factory. 'I put a lot effort on farm tasks because he has a paid job off the farm. Busy. Busy. Busy. Til now.... Those tasks really give me a headache sometimes; and my back hurts a lot...." Women’s self-identity has the second most significant effect on the depth of work participation. As hypothesized, the more women II-eIC-C-tmwn. v.05? Ebmwhh 0.050.850; ho :wnmmwo sense to ab°~wnw=U°LA§ avaFF o... ”haul. 149 030:0) 00.0050 .030... '— .c0E>0_aEm a...) as... .382. O 80....0 0.0883: V 80.0, 2...... fl— \ /l\l\ 0.82.80 \ 0.:0Eo>> 8.8.8.8. 080... .0 w . . .00.. 0:0“. .0 £000 _ 4N . 90.0.2.5. ..< . .... 600.0 o... ....8. tome. am e F. 5004 00...... 8.8.8.8. .0... :8. 0.88.5 .6 £80 a... .6 8.8.8.. 2... 0.. 0.30.". 150 identify themselves as independent producers, the more deeply involved they would be in the tasks they do take part in. Chien in her late 30’s with 21 years of farm experience, identifies herself as a full partner with depth score 52, breadth score 96.8 and 8 hours on farm work. when talking about her involvement in farm work, she said that "I am always busy working on the farm. The workload for me hasn’t changed a bit since I got married. He [my husband and I] work together closely. I know much about how to build the green house; how to water the vegetables; how to control weeds, insects, and pests and how to keep farm books. I indeed do all these tasks with him.” In contrast, Fu of 41 who considers herself a farm homemaker with breadth score 17, depth score 45 and 4.5 hours on farm work. Her husband does not have an off-farm Job. "I don’t do farm work very much. Until now, I only sometimes plow, pick vegetables and check market price for my husband. Even in harvest season, I don’t do a lot because I just keep myself at home. I can stay home, now, doing housework, because my children can help their father." Multivariate analysis showed that only one dummy variable among the three has a significant effect on women’s task participation. women in the stage with all children older than 18 and some still at home are more likely than those in other family stages to take an intensive part in farm tasks. This result together with the previous finding on the breadth of task participation, implies that even women who have adult children to help with different kinds of farm tasks, are still likely to be deeply involved in those tasks in which they do take part. Fu is 41, with 20 years of farm experience and four adult children; her participation depth score is 45 out of 100; breadth score is 17 and 4.5 hours on farm work. She spends five hours on farm work. "Now, two of my children also work on the farm. The older one 151 will take over this farm. The younger one just helps during busy season. So now, I don’t need to do all those chores [farm tasks] as I did... I just focus on few chores that I have been doing.” Similar to working time on the farm, hired labor use has a positive effect on women’s task participation intensity. Following Rosenfeld’s argument as elaborated earlier, the present finding apparently supports the requirement of female labor in addition to hired labor in small-scale vegetable farming (Rosenfeld 1986). In the interviews women confirm this finding. For example, Chou has other family labor, additional hired labor, and a task depth score of 26, breadth score of 87.5 and 7.8 hours on farm work. Her husband does not have an off-farm job. ”Though we already have several helpers from this family, we still need more workers. We need to hire two more hands during sowing and harvesting. So, my workload never gets less. I even work harder than hired hands so we don’t spend a lot of money on them.“ II. HORK PARTICIPATION APPRAISAL Although this study is only focused on vegetable farming, it supports the view that women’s role in agricultural production tends to be underestimated, as previous studies of farm women have suggested (Sachs 1983; Rosenfeld 1985). How do these hardworking women feel about their involvement in farm work? This section investigates women’s evaluation of their participation in farm work in general. The notion of participation evaluation is inspired by the work of Szinovacz and Scanzoni and their colleagues on family power over the' past few years. Following their viewpoint, participation evaluation is defined as a subjective assessment of outcomes of the marital power process. A measure of subjective evaluation was employed by Rosenfeld 152 (1985) in her study of U.S. farm women to assess women’s satisfaction with farm decision participation. The present study applies Rosenfeld’s design to the examination of work participation evaluation. In the questionnaire, women were asked: "In general, how do you feel about the part you have in the activities listed above?'. In the feminist perspective, women are assumed to seek an equitable distribution of responsibility that implies a certain degree of power they could retain. Accordingly, there would be a high degree of satisfaction with work participation for those women who respond that farm workloads are about right. To the contrary, the response of "too little” or "too heavy” is defined as a low degree of satisfaction. The measurement of satisfaction is thus based on the dichotomy between high and low satisfaction. The results of the present study show that most (60 percent) of the women are not satisfied with their work participation. Among those women, 17 percent think it 'too little”, while 43 percent think it "too heavy” (Table 6-10). Bivariate analyses showed that the relationship of women’s evaluation of their participation in farm work with the depth of farm task participation is upward opening parabolic (Table 6-11). Furthermore, women’s evaluation is positively related to their education is positive (significant at the .05 level). As hypothesized, there should be a curvilinear relationship between work participation and participation evaluation. Women’s satisfaction with their participation would go up as the actual participation increases up to a certain point. This point could be viewed as a tolerance point at which women would start feeling burdened/dissatisfied with the workload. So, it would go 153 Table 6-10: Women’s Response to their Farm Hork Participation I 4 Percentage About Right 40.3 Too Little 16.8 Too Heavy 43.0 Total cases .. 303 Table 6-11: Homen’s Satisfaction with their Hork Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables Mean Scores N 1. The Depth of Work Participation .41 301 (l) 0 - 20 .63 54 (2) 20 - 40 .37 159 (3) 40 - 60 .35 55 (4) 60 - 80 .24 19 (5) 89 - 100 .43 14 r - -.127 2. Education (years) .40 302 (l) 0 .35 123 (2) 1 - 6 .43 144 (3) z 7 .49 35 r - .104 *P<.% _ down after this point. However, this study shows another kind of curvilinear pattern different from the hypothesized one. The mean scores of women’s satisfaction go up to a maximum as the depth of participation increases from 0 to 20; then they keep decreasing to a minimum when the participation depth scores reach 80. There is an increasing tendency of satisfaction for the women whose participation depth are greater than 80. Based on the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3, there should be an interaction effect of women’s education and their participation in farm 154 work on women’s work evaluation. Therefore, to test the interaction effect, this study employs two-way ANOVA to examine whether education has a conjoint relation with farm work participation. Two-way ANOVA showed no significant any interaction effect. Therefore, no interaction term is included in the regression analysis. To eliminate the curvilinearity, three dummy variables for the four levels of the depth of work participation (0-20, 20-60, 60-80, and 80-100) were made for the regression analysis. The excluded group for the dummy variable analysis in the regression is the lowest level of work participation (0-20). Multiple regression analysis showed that two dummies for the depth of task participation retain their significance in the regression model (Table 6-12), and explain 4.6 percent of the variance of work evaluation (significant at .001 level). Women with depth scores between 20 and 80 are less likely than women with depth scores less than 20 and greater than 80 to be satisfied with their work participation . The women with scores between 20 and 60 are relatively less satisfied than the women with scores between 60 and 80 are. A Table 6-12: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Evaluation of ~ Farm Hork Participation on Farm Hork Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient ‘. Hork Depth Score between 20 and 60 -.207"' Hork Depth Score between 60 and 80 -.l87*' R2 - .046” * P < .05, L_._.. ._ __,.. _.__..._—_.—--——— **_ < .01, *** P < .001 155 Looking into diversity of women’s response to their work participation, first, 18 percent of the women who have depth scores less than 20 are more likely than other women to be satisfied with their participation in farm work (63.0% as shown in Table 6-13). Second, the majority of the women are those whose depth scores are between 20 and 80. They are more likely to feel too much workload with the increase of the depth of task participation, and are less likely to feel that they take part in about the right amount of farm work when they get deeper involvement in farm work. Finally, there are only 5 percent of the women whose depth scores are more than 80. This group of women are more satisfied than those with depth scores between 20 and 80 but less satisfied than the group with the lowest participation depth with their task participation. None of those women think their workload is too little. This study also suggested two groups of women who have depth scores between 20 and 80 show their Opposite satisfaction with task participation (Table 6-13). First, 37 percent of the women (22.9 plus 8.3 plus 4.7 overall percent) tend to be the group being exploited; they are forced to do the farm tasks they do not want to do. Second, to the contrary, 14 percent of the women are oppressed. They are being kept from doing farm work they want to do. Overall, the depth score of 20 as the tolerance point suggests the overwhelming workload which women have. It especially concerns us that despite their time spent in farm work, women get little satisfaction from that work. Furthermore, this finding leads to a subsequent question about their willingness to take on even greater participation ; Table 6-13: Satisfaction by Depth of women’s Hork Participation Satisfaction Hork (%) Depth Total (Mean Score) Ahout (x) Too Much Right Too Little (22.9) (19.6) (10.3) 0-20 24.1. 62.9 13.0 17.9 (4.3) (11.3) (2.3) 20-40 43.4 37.1 19.5 52.8 40-60 45.5 34.5 20.0 18.3 (8.3) (6.3) (3.7) 60-80 73.7 21.1 5.3 6.3 (4 7) (1.3) (.3) 80-100 57.1 42.9 0.0 4.7 (2.7) (2.0) (0.0) Total in farm work. 42.9 * t e nuber in the parenthesis is overall percentage. ‘ 40.5 do this (88 percent) (Table 6-14). ___6 f . Table 6-14: Women’s willingness to Increase Farm Work by their Satisfaction Motivation (%) Satisfaction Total Milling Unwilling (x) j Too Much 7.8 92.2 43.8 ; About Right 15.5 84.5 39.7 ; Too Little 14.5 85.4 16.4 L_Total_ 12.0 88.0 _100 298 Homen’s low willingness underscores their negative evaluation of farm work participation. In the interviews, several women said that their workload was too much and strained their physical endurance. Lu This study showed that most of the women are unwilling to 157 is in her late 40’s with 28 years of farm experience. She has a task intensity score 32, breadth score 46.4, and 13.5 hours on farm work. 'I have to get up early in the morning to help with any task that my husband wants me to do. However, working all day long under the big, hot sun is not fun. After sun sets, I got to go back home and cook dinner for the family. While cooking, I’d better not think of my painful, aching bOdy ..... I want to do only housework. It does not hurt me so much.“ In addition to disliking physical exhaustion, women’s evaluation of farm work as an occupation appears to be another important factor that diminishes their willingness to take on more farm work. Sia is 45 years old and has 25 years of farm experience; her mean task intensity is 60, task diversity is 15.2; and she spends 16 hours on farm work. She commented: ”Farming is not profitable at all. Back in the time we were raising our young kids, we worried about three meals all the time simply because we could not possibly earn them.... Because of this lesson, I rather go out for a steady paid job. With regular income, we don’t need to rely on heaven [good weather] to give us a good harvest for our three meals." 111. Conclusion This chapter reveals that Taiwanese vegetable farming women, on average, spend a lot of time on farm work on a full-time basis. They take part in quite a variety of farm tasks but tend to be deeply involved in time consuming and intensive labor work more than other tasks. The mean scores of women’s depth of participation in those intensive manual tasks (2.10 to 3.27) are more than other tasks (.31 to 1.42). This study suggests that education has the most significant and negative effect on women’s time devoted to farm work. Together with the ethnographic data, this result implies that they would rather spend time on in) pa] br< em; von far par far the the bet! fan 009' thar Home Part 158 on off-farm work than on farm work. Self-identity has the most important and positive effect on the breadth of women’s task participation. The more entrepreneurial identity women have, the broader range of tasks they would take on. Husband’s off-farm employment has the most substantial and positive effect on the depth of women’s task participation. That is, the absence of husband from the farm leads to women’s intensive contribution to agriculture. Generally speaking, women are not satisfied with their work participation mostly in the sense that they feel too much burden from farm work. Their satisfaction could be explained by the intensity of their task participation. In fact, this study showed a diversity of their dissatisfaction across the intensity of their task participation between 20 to 80. That is, among the women who are not satisfied with farm work, some of them feel being exploited but some feel being oppressed. However, the proportion of women in exploitation is more than those in oppression. There is a very small group of professional women (3.3 percent) in this sample who have high intensity of task participation and are satisfied with their work participation. sut the tin 1H1 far mg the ext: inf' eva‘ inf] inve Dari 1.: Chapter 7 WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN FARM DECISIONS As the previous chapters suggested, women in this study are in a subordinate position in negotiation regarding farm production. Though they make a substantial contribution to vegetable production in their time commitment to intensive manual work, they are likely to be pushed away from managerial work. This chapter continues by investigating women’s participation in farm decision making -- the second dimension of the outcomes of negotiation. Given the understanding of women’s peripheral position in the division of farm work, the first part of this chapter examines the extent of their participation in farm decisions and the factors influencing that participation. Second, this chapter explores women’s evaluation of their participation in farm decisions and the factors influencing their personal evaluation. In doing so, this part of the investigation tries to elucidate the possible drive for women to participate in the next cycle of the agrinubial power process. I. FARM DECISION PARTICIPATION As depicted earlier, Taiwanese women spend many hours on all kinds of farm tasks and make an intensive contribution to production work, particularly in those tasks which require intensive labor. However, ' they tend to be remote from farm management activities; this might 159 160 signify that Taiwanese women are likely to be excluded from access to authority in farm production. In order to investigate whether women exercise significant authority, they were asked about the degree of their participation in each of 24 selected decisions involved in farm production. Each decision was investigated with a question to the farm women, ”who usually makes final decision on the following tasks?'. The scoring for each decision was assigned as follows: 0 for ”always made by husband“ or "made by others", I for "usually made by husband", 2 for "made together with husband”, 3 for "usually made by wife” and 4 for I'always made by wife". If a respondent indicated that a particular decision did not apply to her farm, that decision was not included in the calculation of the participation scores. A. Decision Participation The discussion of women’s participation in farm decisions will consider both extensiveness and intensity of final decisions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the composite measure of decision participation was dropped because it was highly correlated with both breadth and depth, and because breadth and depth were not highly correlated with each other. With respect to extensiveness, for all of the 24 decisions that apply to the farm and that women could participate in, what is the percentage of those decisions in which women do participate? The percentage of the 24 decisions made by women, either always or sometimes on their own, or together with their husbands, is the measure used to examine the breadth of involvement in farm decisions. On average, women 161 vegetable growers take part in 60 percent of different types of farm decisions; however the standard deviation of the distribution is 37.5 percent, so the women vary considerably in their breadth of participation (Table 7-1). ‘ Table 7-1: The Distribution of Farm Decisions Made by Women Score Range Breadth Depth (961 1%) 0.0 10.4 6.3 0—10 6.4 13.8 10-20 6.7 18.7 20-30 4.7 45.5 30-40 5.0 4.1 40-50 7.3 1.9 50-70 10.1 4.5 70-99 20.4 5.2 99-100 29.4 0.0 Mean 60.0 25.6 . Standard Deviation 37.5 19.0 “ Ln_____;Total Cases 299 268 n A woman could participate in all the decisions and share responsibility for all of them with her husband. However, that would be very different from a woman who takes part in a small number of decisions but is fully responsible for those decisions. Therefore, we need another way of characterizing women’s decision participation. To put it another way, for those decisions in which the women do take part, how deeply involved are they in those decisions? A measure of the 162 intensity"'of decision participation is constructed to examine, for those decisions in which the women do participate, whether the women make those decisions entirely by themselves, mostly by themselves or together with their husbands. The average of the depth of involvement in those decisions in which the women do take part is around one-quarter (mean is 25.6; standard deviation is 19). This result suggests although the women get involved in many different types of decisions, most of them are not deeply involved in those decisions. More precisely, Table 7-2 displays an overview of specific farm decisions in which women take part alone or together with their husbands. A small percentage of women (0.3 to 7.9 percent) had sole or principal authority for the various types of farm decisions. Pong has decision breadth score about 89 and depth score about 49. “Since he [my husband] had a part-time job outside, I am often in charge of many things. For example, whether and when I should 5512.2 new variety and new methods for growing our vegetables for However, the percentage of women who have joint responsibility with their husbands varies widely across decisions (14.9 to 78.1 percent). The topics in the joint decision pattern mostly center around off-farm job taking, the place and price to sell the product and labor hiring. Chu considers herself a full partner, and has decision scores 87.5 in breadth and 28.6 in depth. ”We mostly decide things like buying machines and selling the product. I went with him to see the machine we are going to buy.. We go to market together selling our vegetables....“ ” Please see the detail about the measurement of the intensity of decision participation in Chapter 4. 163 Table 7-2: Women’s Participation in Farm Decisions Together Item with *Mostly .. ... Husband Al one N RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1) Whether you take an off-farm job ........... 78.1 7.6 98 (2) What price to sell at ...................... 68.9 1.3 299 (3) Where to sell the product .................. 64.0 2.0 300 (4) Whether to hire labor ...................... 49.9 7.9 225 (5) Whether your husband takes an off-farm job..56.9 0.7 99 (6) Whether to rent in land .................... 45.0 2.0 181 (7) Whether to buy land ........................ 41.2 4.3 301 (8) Whether to apply for an agricultural loan.. 43.6 1.3 205 (9) Whether to rent out land .................. 35.1 0.3 133 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (10) Whether to process some of produce ........ 37.0 7.6 226 (11) Whether to sell products to local market.. 36.8 7.6 232 (12) Whether to grow a new vegetable ........... 30.4 6.3 303 (13) How much (area of) vegetables to grow ..... 30.0 5.6 303 (14) How much of products to sell ............. 29.3 6.3 295 (15) Whether to adopt a new variety ............ 27.1 5.9 303 (16) Whether to buy major farm equipment ....... 24.7 2.3 279 PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES (17) Which of several alternative practices to use ........................ 30.4 5.3 303 (18) Whether to try a new farm practice/technology ...................... 24.9 5.0 298 (19) How to water .............................. 21.7 4.6 302 (20) How to control vegetable insects .......... 20.1 5.6 303 (21) How to control vegetable diseases ......... 19.5 4.9 302 (22) How to control vegetable weeds ............ 15.5 5.7 303 (23) How much fertilizer to buy ................ 14.2 6.3 303 (24) How to fertilize .......................... 14.9 4.9 302 * The percentage of each farm decision made by wife together with husband. ** The percentage of each farm decision usually or always made by wife. *** Total respondents tho reported that a particular type of decision was made on their farms. Concerning the decisions made by women, independently and jointly, women are more likely to be involved in management decisions than in operational decisions. Two kinds of participation are identified among the managerial decisions -- resource management and business management. Women are likely to be involved in resource management pertaining to production inputs of labor (e.g., off-farm job taking and labor-hiring), land (e.g., land renting and farm size)and money (e.g., applying for 164 loans). Comparatively, women are less likely (43-78 v.s. 24-37) to participate in decisions on business management concerning production outputs (e.g., marketing, processing, storage). On the other hand, women are least likely to participate in technical/operational decisions (e.g., new practice adoption, weed control, insect control, disease control, and fertilizing and watering techniques). Less than one-third of them reported sole or joint decision responsibility on such topics as new practices and the methods of applying fertilizer and of controlling diseases, insects and weeds. Ho considers herself a farm helper; she is involved in only 17 percent of decisions but her depth is greater than her breadth (mean depth is 30). She did many kinds of farm tasks from cultivation and weeding to marketing. However, her participation in those tasks does not necessarily lead to her decision making power in those tasks. ”We only discussed about how to transport those vegetables from our farm to the market, what price we need to ask, how much of the vegetables we sell everyday and how much we store and sell later on..." Since the previous chapter has shown that most Taiwanese farm wives work a large amount of time on the farm, putting those results in conjunction with these findings, we can conclude that high participation in intensive operational work does not necessarily imply high participation in farm operational decisions. Nevertheless, we might still ask if there is a positive relationship between the two variables. In addition, several other questions associated with this connection are as follows. Will women’s participation in diverse farm tasks predict the diversity of their decision participation? Similarly, will the intensity of task participation predict the intensity of decision 165 participation? What are other factors affecting the intensity and extensiveness of participation in farm decisions. The answers for those questions will be explored in the next section. B. Determinants of Decision Participation Following the way used to examine the determinants of farm work participation, the two measures of women’s farm decision participation are each hierarchically regressed on three sets of variables. Those variables are entered in the following order: (1) the three measures of farm work participation, (2) the presence of conflict, and (3) all the independent variables (power resource or constraint variables) proposed in the theoretical model. The second step is to investigate which of the independent variables will operate through any of the significant intervening variables (farm work participation or the presence of conflict) to influence women’s farm decision participation. 1. The Diversity of Decision Participation Pearson correlation analysis showed that the diversity of farm decisions in which women take part is positively related to the breadth of farm task participation, farm training involvement, women’s education and independent self-identity; it is negatively related to women’s farm experience and age, and patriarchal role beliefs (Table 7-3). Those significant variables all support the hypotheses except for age and farm experience. r.-\ M\\ 166 Table 7-3: Breadth of Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening variables . Mean Scores N 1. Breadth of Task Participation: 60.3 299 (1) O - 30 33.0 80 (2) 30 - 70 61.5 134 (3) 72": 100 84.1 85 r - .519 2. Presence of Conflict 60.3 298 No 41.5 105 Yes “N 70.7 193 F - 47.72 3. Training Involvement (score) 60.3 299 (1) O 56.4 199 (2) 2.1.0 68.1 100 r - .155 4. Age 60.3 299 (1) 29 - 39 73.3 46 (2) 4O - 59 57.6 198 (3) 60.-79 60.0 55 r - -.124 5. Farm Experience (years) . 60.3 299 (1) < 22 69.5 75 (2) 23 - 34 58.8 84 (3) 35-46 55.2 88 (4) > 47 58.2 52 r - -.123 6. Education (years) 60,3 299 (1) O 54.0 121 (2) l - 6 63.3 143 (3) 7.51" more 70.1 35 l r - .181 7. Self-identity 60.2 299 (1) homemaker 44.5 51 (2) farm helper 54.0 159 (3) farm manager 68.7 17 (4) full partner 80.7 55 (5) independent producer 92.7 17 r - .380 l* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 d. th W ”91 167 Table 7-3 (cont’d): Breadth of Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening variables Mean Scores 8. Husband’s Off-farm Employment 60.3 No 57.9 Yes .. 77.1 F - 8.941 9. Family Life Stage 60.3 (1) all children < 12 69.4 (2) the youngest < 6 and the eldest child > 12 65.3 (3) the youngest child < 12 and the eldest child between 12-18 73.6 (4) all children > 18 54.8 (5) all children are gone 60.0 F - 2.807 * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 One-way ANOVA supports the hypothesis that women who reported having conflict with their husbands are more likely than others to take part in decisions broadly; but rejects the hypothesis that husbands’ taking off-farm jobs is not related to women’s participation in farm decisions. However, women’s breadth of decision participation has an irregular curvilinear relation with family life stage. The diversity of decision participation goes down from the early family stage to the stage at which the youngest child is less than six and the oldest child less than 12. Then it goes up to the maximum point when the youngest child is more than 12 and the oldest child is between 12 and 18. Then it goes down again to the minimum point when all the children are more than 18. It then goes up a bit, after all children leave home. To avoid the curvilinearity, three dummy variables for family life stage were made for the regression analysis. The excluded group for creating D. Di Da 168 dummy variables is the stage at which all children are less than 12 or the eldest child is more than 12. In the multiple regression analysis, the breadth of farm work participation and the presence of conflict remain significant at the .05 level. Of the nine independent variables which are significant in the bivariate analysis, only women’s self-identity remains significant at the .05 level in the regression analysis (Table 7-4). Table 7-4: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Breadth of Decision Participation on Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient The Range of Farm Task Participation .403". Presence of Conflict .322." Self—identity .202’“ R2 - .406‘“ * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 As shown in Table 7-4, the three variables which are significant in the multiple regression analysis come from different phases in the family power process (Figure 11). They explain 40.6 percent of the variance of the breadth of decision participation (significant at .001 level). Of the three, the one from the outcomes phase, women’s participation in diverse tasks, has the largest effect on their . participation in a wide range of farm decisions. As hypothesized, the more extensive actual task participation is, the more diverse decision participation is. This result is illustrated in the ethnographic data. 169 3:886 .28.. .. . m 5.- 9:0: 6 w 13:33:: it--. $8.25.. T . 3822.5 __< H FIIIIL xmfl. ho Samoan E macaw o5 2.25”. 3838381 33%... 0 ./...§./ cozmgofma xmmF ozmmEOD tamov €88.58 m.coEo>> fwow. 22$ 23. \ 35.8.2.8“. .o m fEm co imam. .. ........... n\ a. _. n. 50 m 8:288 m - _ . _ _ ooo.w..ooo. _. me IIIIIIIIIIIII + .mEooE .Emu “oz / 804qu .... ”9:00:— Ehmn— ~02 oocomoi 233.com— :tau 5 30.393.59.— o.:oEo>> mo .5595 05 no 9.032395 on... —.—. 053mmu I70 Cheng has 10 years of farm experience and shares a middle range of farm tasks (mean score is 43); she never participated in farm training programs, but considers herself a full partner on the farm. She did report conflict with her husband in making farm decisions. 'I decided many things..what kind of vegetables we should grow... we have to check whether we can get benefit from, say, asparagus, or something special and rare. We are thinking of whether to expand our farm by renting in land. We have been thinking about it quite a while... We are also thinking whether we should apply for a loan ..... About the product, how much to sell is very important. We need to check the market and see how much we need to store and wait until the price is better ...... 0h!....many things... we usually made those decisions together." Liu is in her early 30’s with nine years of education and 15 years of farm experience. She has an off-farm job and can only devote limited (2.5) hours to farm work; she shares about 30 percent of farm decisions and her depth score is 30. She reported conflict with her husband in farm decisions. ”Since I can’t undertake a heavy workload, I don’t think I’d like to take part in making decisions, either. We’d better take care of our own business separately -- his farm and my own job." The second important factor in women’s participation in farm decision making is from the negotiation phase, the presence of conflict. Women who report conflict with their husbands over problems concerning farm production are more likely than women who did not report having conflict to participate in a wide range of farm decisions. For example, Shiao is on a farm without other family labor or hired labor; she works ten hours a day on the farm. She did report conflict with her husband in farm decisions. The statistical data, in particular, shows that she is involved in all kinds of tasks from inputs to outputs. She is feeling equal with her husband in decision making. 171 As hypothesized, women who identify themselves as independent farm producers, a background individual resource variable, are more likely to participate in authority over a broad range of farm production. This finding supports Bokemeier and Garkovich’s (1987) argument in the study of Kentucky farm women that women’s involvement in farm authority varies with their perceptions of their role in farm production. Further, this study suggests a specific relation of self-identity to one dimension of decision involvement -- breadth. The ethnographic data in the present study demonstrates this close relationship in the following two comments. First, some farm homemakers view their non-involvement in the authority as appropriate. Sia who reported conflict with her husband in making decisions about technology, loans and labor, shares 17 percent of the decisions which she could participate in. In spite of her farm background and full participation in farm work, her self-identity leads her away from farm authority. “Although I did many farm chores and I think I know things enough to help him to make up his mind on farm matters, I feel like being a homemaker. I just sometimes work off-farm on a part-time basis to earn some extra money for the family. That’s it. I don’t really care about who decides farm matters.“ Taking an opposite stance, kuan, who has only two years of farm experience but 12 years of education considers herself a full partner of their family enterprise. She reported that she never has conflict with her husband in making farm decisions, but does participate in almost the full range of decisions (breadth score - 95). She indicated that: '1 did many farm tasks except those in need of muscle such as pesticide spraying, machine running ...... as far as it is within my ability, I take part in many decisions except those extremely technical such as fertilizer application....' 172 As shown in Figure 11, in addition to the direct effect of self- identity on decision breadth, there is an indirect effect which operates through the effect of self-identity on the range of task participation. Task breadth is twice as strong as self-identity for its effect on decision breadth. In fact, if one takes the direct and indirect effects of self-identity into account, they are almost equal in influence. After the computation of path coefficients in the revised path model, the total indirect effect is the product of the two direct effects (.404 times .403 -.160). Therefore, the total effect of self-identity (.362 which is equal to the sum of .16 and .202) is a bit less than the effect of task breadth, but is even greater than the effect of conflict on decision breadth. 2. The Intensity of Decision Participation Pearson correlation analyses supported the hypotheses that the intensity of women’s participation in farm decisions is positively related to the breadth18 and depth of farm task participation, their farm training involvement, and self-identity. One-way ANOVA supports the hypothesis that women’s decision depth is negatively related to other family labor. However, opposite to the hypothesis, the presence of conflict presents a negative relation with decision participation intensity. Furthermore, husband’s off-farm employment also fails to support a zero relation with decision participation hypothesized for the present study. " Although Table 7-5 shows a curvilinear relationship between farm task participation breadth and decision participation depth, the test of linearity relationship is significant at the .05 level 173 Intervening Variables Table 7-5 Depth of Decision Participation by Independent and Mean Score N 1. Depth of Task Participation 25.6 268 (1) 0-10 13.4 51 (2) 10-60 24.2 139 (3) 60-80 28.3 47 (4) 893100 48.0 31 r - .556 2. Breadth of Task Participation 25.6 268 (1) 0-30 26.0 62 (2) 30-70 23.5 123 (4) 79-100 28.4 83 r - .104 3. Presence of Conflict 25.6 268 No 31.8 174 Yes “a 22.8 94 F -l3.418 4. Farm Training Involvement 25.6 268 (l) O 22.4 174 (2) >4) 31.6 94 r - .253 5. Self-identity 25.6 268 (l) homemaker 25.2 50 (2) farm helper 21.0 140 (3) farm manager 19.8 17 (4) full partner 27.2 54 (5) independent producer 65.6 17 r - .362 6. Husband’s Off-farm Employment 25.6 268 No 23.2 233 Yes ... 41.5 35 F-test 7. Other Family Labor 25.6 268 No 28.1 138 Yes * 23.0 130 F - 4.737 * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 Of the two measures of farm task participation, only the intensity of task participation is significant in the regression model. The 174 presence of conflict as a measure of the bargaining process remains significant at the .05 level in the regression. Only one farm economy variable (other family labor use) and one subjective human resource (self-identity) remain significant at .05 level (Table 7-6). Table 7-6: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Depth of Women’s Farm Decision Participation on Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient The Range of Farm Task Participation .1030 The Depth of Farm Task Participation .513." Presence of Conflict -.210"' Other family Labor Use -.129"' Sel f-identi ty .188". R2 - .427‘“ *P<.%, ** P < .01, *** P < .001, @ P - .0557 The range of task participation is not quite significant at the .05 level (P a .0557) but is still kept in the regression model. The fall from significance might be because self-identity has a stronger relationship than task breadth to the depth of decision participation. Before self-identity enters the regression, the breadth of task participation remains significant at the .001 level. However, after identity comes in, it takes much of the explained variance from task breadth. Although task breadth becomes insignificant at .05 level, it was kept in the regression because it is an important variable mediating the effect of self-identity on decision depth in the path model. Altogether, all the variables in the regression model account for par dir WON} Var in 1 9T0u no c hem 30. 175 42.7 percent of the variance of the intensity of women’s decision participation (significant at .001 level). The intensity of task participation has the most significant effect on decision depth. Jiang is 43 and has no education but 30 years of farm experience; she considers herself a farm helper and decision depth 25 and decision breadth 95. She reported that she needs to do and indeed does many farm chores from seedlings to marketing in case her husband is not able to do them, for example, when he is sick or busy; her task depth is 25 out of 100 and task breadth is 95 out of 100. Her discussion of farm production with her husband whenever or wherever it is possible suggests that the depth of her decision participation is medium because she jointly shares the decision power with her husband all the time. ”We always discuss what to do whenever and wherever it is needed. We do it when we are eating or resting... We do it at home, or when we are working on the farm... or even when we are at a friend’s home...." The second important factor associated with the depth of decision participation is the presence of conflict. The relationship between the depth of participation and the presence of conflict does not match the direction hypothesized for this study. Although, as found earlier, a woman’s active role in negotiation broadens her participation in a wide variety of farm decisions, it limits the intensity of her participation in those decisions. To explore the reason behind this relationship, a group of women who take an intensive part in decision making but repdrt no conflict are identified. Su is an example. She is 49, considers herself a farm helper, and has a depth of decision involvement score of 30. Ga pr vh ye pa be esl pl; prOI 176 “We pretty much share the same things in mind about hiring labor ..... there is nothing to argue about when we need hands, because we could only hire many more ..... This is the only choice. There is no other choice but hiring others ..... I don’t see what we need to argue about.." Conversely, how would the women with conflict present but low intensity of decision participation explain the situation? Hang shares all decisions equally but does report conflict over farm decisions. '1 admit that he was always right about when is a good time to sell the product, no matter it is good to apply for a loan.... many kinds of things.... Somehow, I always need to listen to and follow his decisions. He thinks I know nothing. I totally disagree on this. I don’t like to be put down like this....' As hypothesized and supported by a Kentucky study (Bokemeier and Garkovich 1987), women who identify themselves as independent farm producers have more intensive involvement in farm decisions than those who view themselves as homemakers. Tsai is in her early 60’s and has 40 years of farm experience; she did not think it inappropriate not to be involved in much decision making, even given her wide range of participation in farm work (breadth score = 71.4; depth score - 18), because ”women’s duty is in the household. He doesn’t know how to take care of house chores at all. Even when I am busy on the farm, I still won’t do less a bit of house chores. But, it is O.K. to me.“ This study supports the hypothesis that other family labor, especially an adult relative or an adult son, tends to have a special place on the family farm. That is, the presence of other family labor is likely to decrease the depth of women’s participation in farm . decision making. In the interviews, both sons and adult family members play an important role in reducing women’s exercise of authority in farm production. Liao is in her early 60’s with five children all older than di Da rel 177 18 years old; she considers herself a homemaker and actually does not get deeply involved in the wide range of farm tasks in which she takes part (task depth - 24; task breadth - 95.8). Her decision depth is only 10 out of 100 and decision breadth is 83. “This farm is going to be passed on to my eldest son. In fact, [my son] is getting involved myself in making decisions with his father... It is a relief to me. Doing farm work so many years, I have felt comfortable not involving in decision making.... Now it is even better that my son will take care of it.” Shiao is in her late 40’s. She has six years of education and 18 years of farm experience; she considers herself a farm helper and is not deeply involved in the tasks in which she takes part (depth score - 21; breadth score - 41.7). “I am only responsible for farm chores.... I always let my husband decide what needs to be done, whether or when or how to do what. I never got a chance to make decisions because my parents-in-law usually convey their opinions and suggestions to my husband." Part of the effect of self-identity appears to be indirect. The indirect effect is the product of the direct effects, that is, the sum of all paths linking the independent variable and dependent variable other than the direct one. Specifically, for self-identity, the indirect effect is the sum of the path between self-identity and task breadth times the coefficient for the path between work breadth and decision depth, plus, the coefficient for the path between self-identity and task.depth times the coefficient for the path between task depth and decision depth (Figure 12). Total effect is thus the combination of the direct effect and the indirect effects on the depth of decision participation. After the computation of path coefficients in the revised path model, the total indirect effect of self-identity is 0.12. 178 8.8.8.5“. as Pm —. ... . ...... gasses? Til... Aammmfimm /# 3.28.5.3 28.98.23... 39%... O m.coEo>> £19.55“. :5 . 680... .m w 8.8.0.5“. on. .27 8222.5 __<. m2. 3.8» .o 580 . 3 892m 9... 2.58“. . 15mm. 95295 chm... {ism rm. imm v .+ 1&0 m.UCNDm3 5.390.th 4m; .83 use: 8.8.08 .0 £88 Fm=mm m_o . 6555?. .onm. 2.58“. .850 coo.» «A «m: IIIIII ._ .+/ 658:. Etc“. .62 + 658:. scan. .62 25.330 Etc... 5 cozsowztam 95:33 ..o Econ 05 ..o c2882.. 2:. N? 9.30?— 179 The total effect for self-identity is then .308 which is even greater than the effect of the presence of conflict. Similarly, part of the effects of the presence of other family labor, patriarchal role beliefs and net farm income on the depth of decision participation are from the effect of those variables on the presence of conflict. However, we are not able to compute the indirect effects mostly because the path coefficients between those variables and the presence of conflict are not from multiple regression but from logistic regression which has different form of regression coefficients. II. FARM DECISION PARTICIPATION APPRAISAL When asked "In general, how do you feel about the part you have in making the decisions listed above?”, most (57.4 percent) of the women felt that the part they have is "about right”. Very few women (6.4 percent) responded that the part they have in decision-making is ”too much” or "much". The rest of the women (36.2 percent) felt that the part they have in farm decisions is “little" or "too little” (Table 7- 7). This finding implies that, although most women do not participate very extensively or intensively in farm decisions, at the same time most women are satisfied with their extent of participation. This is contrary to the expectations implied by gender balance of power. The gap could be examined in three ways —- statistical analysis, ethnographic analysis, and a survey of women’s motivation to take a] greater part in decision making. Under the assumption of gender balance of power, women pursue a symmetrical distribution of decision authority. It is thus hypothesized = th gr of of fig tal tal in Sa‘ ha) sal Bl) Par Mr is Up- flw 180 Table 7-7: Women’s Response to their Farm Decision Participation __| Percentage Too Little 10.6 I Little 25.5 About Right 57.4 Much 0.5 Too Much 5.9 Total cases . 303 that an equitable distribution of decision power will lead to the greatest degree of satisfaction. For the purpose of making an indicator of satisfaction for multivariate analysis, the measure of the evaluation of decision participation is constructed in the following way. ”About right' is assumed to be high satisfaction. ”Little" and ”much ”are taken to be moderate satisfaction; and "too much" and "too little” are taken to be low satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This measure is treated as a 0, 1 and 2 interval scale, with 2 representing high satisfaction. As hypothesized, one-way ANOVA showed that women who reported having conflict with their husbands are more likely than others to be satisfied with their participation in decision-making (Table 7-8). Bivariate analysis showed that women’s satisfaction with decision participation has curvilinear relationships with women’s decision participation depth and breadth, but overall test of linear relationship is significant at the .001 level. As the participation diversity goes up to the score which is equal to 80, women’s satisfaction presents a flux but an increasing tendency after 80. .ll II- L. the rel Sat Whe dOlh anal 181 I * Table 7-8 Satisfaction with Decision Participation by Independent and Intervening Variables Total Sample Mean Scores 1. Breadth of Decision Participation 1.41 (1) 0-10 .90 (2) 10-20 1.25 (3) 20-40 1.21 (4) 40-50 1.55 (5) 50-60 1.69 (6) 60-80 1.71 (7) 80-90 1.59 (8) 993100 1.68 r - .283 2. Depth of Decision Participation 1.47 (1) 0-10 1.43 (2) 10-20 1.69 (3) 20-30 1.50 (3) 30-40 1.81 (4) 40-50 2.00 (5) 50—60 1.27 (6) 60-80 0.00 (7) 80;;00 0.56 r - -.260 3. Presence of Conflict 1.41 No 0.84 Yes m 1.73 F - 133.6 P < .05__ff_P g .o1, *** P < .001 ———— 7:: On the other hand, the distribution of their satisfaction across the depth of decision participation showed two peaks in the curvilinear relationships. As the participation intensity goes up to 20, women’s satisfaction increases. Then it goes down to a low point again when the depth score is between 20 and 30. Then it goes up to the highest point when the depth score is between 40 and 50. From there to 100, it goes down. In order to account for the curvilinearity in the regression analysis, three dummy variables for four levels of depth decision were an va ef- as: co< de: cn tm ant dun Dar (th 3191 011' 182 created; the four levels are mean scores from 0-30, 30-50, 50-60 to 60- 100 in which women with scores between 0 and 30 were the excluded group. Similarly, two dummy variables are made for three levels of decision breadth (0-10, 10-40 and 40-100); while the category for 0 to 10 is treated as the excluded group (Table 7-8). In order to test the interaction effects of decision participation and the rest of the independent variables on decision satisfaction, two- way ANOVA was used. Two-way ANOVA showed the conjoint effects of self-‘ identity and the breadth of decision participation on decision satisfaction, and the interactive effects of training program involvement with both the breadth and depth of decision participation on decision satisfaction, to be significant at 0.05 level. To include the interaction effects in the regression analysis, effect coding was used. In effect coding, the excluded group is assigned minus one on all the dummy variables (please see the effect coding in the example of the interaction of training Involvement and decision depth in Table 7-9). As a result, two interaction terms were created for the combination of self—identity and two breadth dummies, two interaction terms for training involvement with two breadth dummies, and three interaction terms for training involvement with three depth dummies, as predictors of women’s satisfaction with decision participation (Table 7-9). The regression analysis showed that one of the breadth dummies (the group with scores from 40 to 100) and two of the depth dummies were significant (the groups respectively from 30 to 50 and 60 to 100). None of interaction effects were significant at the .05 level in the 183 Table 7-9 Effect Coding Scheme for Main and Interaction effect between DWQMM Four Levels Depth Depthl Depth2 Depth3 Depthleran Depth2xTran Depth3xTran Scores 30-50 1 0 0 DepthIxTran 0 0 50-60 0 1 O 0 Depth2xTran 0 60-100 0 0 1 O , 0 Depth3xTran 0-30 -1 -1 —1 —Depth1xTran —Depth2xTran -(Depth3xTran) regression model. The presence of conflict retained its significance in the regression model. The four variables explain approximately 38 percent of the variance of decision participation evaluation (significant at 0.001 level) (Table 7-10). Table 7-10: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of the Evaluation of Farm Decision on Farm Decision Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Inde endent Variables Standardized Regression Coefficient Decision Breadth 40-100 .156" Decision Depth 30-50 .291". I Decision depth 60-100 _.404*** I Presence of Conflict .422." R2 - .383’“ * P < .05 ** P < .01, *** P < .001 . Comparatively, the presence of conflict has the largest effect on women’s satisfaction. Further, the presence of conflict has indirect 184 effects on decision participation evaluation which operate through the two dimensions of decision participation (Figure 13). The total of the indirect effects which is the sum of the product of two path coefficients (the path between conflict and decision breadth, and the path between breadth and evaluation) and the product of another two path coefficients (the path between conflict and depth and the path between depth and evaluation). Put another way, first, the relationship of the presence of conflict to the 40-100 breadth dummy is .383. The indirect effect through 40-100 decision breadth is thus .06. Second, the relationship of the presence of conflict to the 60-100 depth dummy is -.25. The indirect effect through 60/100 decision depth is thus .101. Third, the relationship of the presence of conflict to the 30-50 depth dummy is - .086. Thus, the indirect effect through 30-50 decision depth is -.025. Altogether, the total indirect effect of presence of conflict on women’s satisfaction operating through decision participation is .136. The total positive effect of the presence of conflict on women’s satisfaction, although operating through negative effect of the presence of conflict on high decision and negative effect of high decision depth on women’s satisfaction, support the hypothesis that women’s active participation in negotiation leads to a positive evaluation of their participation in decision-making. Ma is in her late 30’s with nine years of formal education. Although she was not highly involved in decision making process (depth score . 20; breadth score - 41.7), she did report conflict with her husband. She is very positive about her involvement in farm decisions through discussion with her husband. 4. 11141.10 5:. NF 0L3Mwmhs 185 00 Too Egon. co_m_ooo 031.!) gm eEase—.5 8-0m canon co.m.oon_ co:n:.m>m cozmgofimn. wwor gimmv. 1.3%. N 30m... 00 70v 5395 56.80 cos—3.2:: :o_m.ooa Eta“. ho coznzgu 95825 no c2352“. och M —. 9.305 186 'I think it is great to have discussion with [my husband] because I can learn many things such as new techniques. Argument is not avoidable and does not harm our relationship. It is important to me to be part of decision-making and involved in any kind of communication than no interaction with him.“ The second most important factor influencing women’s satisfaction with decision participation is the depth of their participation greater than 60. This group of women is a lot less likely than other groups of women to be satisfied with their decisions. Tseng considers herself a homemaker and actually shares only nine percent of decisions; but the depth of her decision participation is 60. "He manages the farm pretty good. We have good years often. I am quite happy to let him decide as much as possible. At the same time, I also wish him to respect my advice even though it doesn’t happen quite often." The third significant variable affecting women’s satisfaction with decision participation is decision depth between 30-50. Women in this group are more likely than others to be satisfied with their decision participation. Chan considers herself a farm helper with patriarchal scores for 3.0, and has depth of decision participation score of 33 and a breadth score of 38. She did report conflict with her husband. ”When I first got married, I worked very hard and didn’t care not taking part in decision making.... After hard work through all these years until now, I feel like having more decision power but doing less work, because I am part of the business like he does...." Finally the regression analysis suggested that women whose breadth of decision participation score is greater than 40 are more likely than other women to be satisfied with their decision participation. Shieh is in her early 50’s with 29 years of farm experience and considers herself a farm helper. She is low in patriarchal role beliefs (1.91 mean score), middle in her breadth of decision participation (56.3) and low 187 in her depth of decision participation (23.3). She did report conflict with her husband. 'I don’t feel any heavy or burden in farm work or decision making at all... I’d like to take more part in decision making..' The diverse findings on the effects of decision breadth and depth on women’s satisfaction suggest that women who take part in decisions broadly are happier than the women who do not take part in a wide range of decisions; however, for the women who are deeply involved in the decisions, they are strongly dissatisfied with the part they take in decision making. This leads us to speculate how actually women feel about increasing their part in decision-making? To explore this question, in the survey, the women were asked: "Would you like to take a greater part in making decisions?“ The survey data shows that most of the women (91.9 percent) refused a greater part in farm decisions (Table 7-11). It suggests either that many of women could be mystified or that they could be dissembling. Even if in reality they would like to take more part in decision making, they might not say so for some reasons. Three categories of reasons could be found in the ethnographic data. Even given our in-depth interviews, we can not distinguish between mystification and dissembling, but we can look at three types of reasons and see how any of those reasons might be mystification or might be dissembling. ' The most frequent reason is the presence of other family labor such as father-in-law or son. As has been noted above (pp. 99ff.), the presence of other family labor restricts their participation in decision making so that most of the women with other family labor present never think about taking more responsibility in decision making. 188 [Table 7-11: Women’s Willingness to Increase Farm Decisions by their Satisfaction Motivation (%) Satisfaction Total Unwilling Willing (%) Too Much 3.1 0.0 2.9 I About Right 45.8 35.3 45.0 Little 35.4 52.9 36.8 Too Little 15.6 11.8 15.3 Total 91.9 8.1 100 (209) The second reason behind the low motivation is women’s dependence on their husbands’ competence in farming. Yang is in her middle 50’s with 28 years of farm experience and identifies herself as a farm helper. Concerning the decision making process, she did report conflict with her husband, she shares 42 percent of the decisions, and she is not deeply involved in those decisions (mean score is 15). “He always does a good job in planning things for our own farm. I totally depend on him because making up your mind on something important in the whole production process is too big of a responsibility for me. Since he knows things lots better than me, I’m happy to let him do it. I don’t worry too much about how to reduce the risk from the decision." The last reason lies in off-farm employment. Off-farm employment simply restricts women’s time commitment to farm work. Tseng is in her middle 50’s with 28 years of farm experience and considers herself a homemaker. She has an off-farm job and shares about 42 percent of farm decisions with depth score about 15. She did report having conflict with her husband. '[My husband] decides almost everything. I just do what I can do to help him....Since I also work outside... I am too tired to discuss things with him ..... " 189 Further, taking decision depth into account, women with decision depth between 60-100 are more likely than others to be willing to increase their participation in decision-making (Table 7-12). It implies that even though, in general, women tend to refuse to take a greater part in decision making, there is a bigger proportion of the women whose decision depth is between 60-100 and who would like to gain more authority in farm management. Similarly, women with the highest decision breadth tend to be more willing than others to increase their participation in decision making (Table 7—13). Altogether, this study suggests that given to the low willingness of participation in farm decisions for most of the women in the present sample, there is still a small proportion of women who are professional oriented and not content with their inadequate participation in farm decisions. They maybe a group of self-assertive and independent farm producers but being oppressed from decision making power. Table 7-12: Women’s Willingness to Increase Decision Participation by Decision Depth Decision Depth Unwilling Willing Total (Mean Score) (%) (%) (%) 88.0 12.0 38.6 0-20 (34.0) (4.6) 88.5 11.5 50.2 20—40 (44.4) (5.8) 92.9 7.1 5.4 40-60 (5.0) (.4) ' 80.0 20.0 5.8 60-100 (4.6) ((1.2) Total 88.0 12.0 100 (259) “ the nunber in the parenthesis is overall percentage. 190 I Table 7-13: Women’s Willingness to Increase Decision Participation by Decision Breadth Decision Breadth Unwilling Willing Total (Mean Score) (%) (%) (%) 0-20 87.5 12.5 22.2 (19.4) (2.8) 20-40 96.4 3.6 9.7 (9.4) (.3) 40-60 94.1 5.9 11.8 (11.1) (0.7) 60-80 91.7 8.3 12.5 (11.5) (1.0) 80—100 83.3 16.7 43.8 (36.5) (7.3) Total 58.1 35.6 100 (298) * the nuber in the parenthesis is overall percentage. 111. Conclusion The results of this study showed that Taiwanese women take part in around 60 percent of decisions concerning inputs to output of farm production. However, they are not deeply involved in those decisions in which they do take part. They are not likely to make the decisions related to operational production in which they do take a great part, especially manual production work. That is, their participation in those farm operational tasks do not necessarily imply that they would take part in operational decisions. This study supports the equity theory that women’s actual . participation in farm work would lead to their participation in farm decision-making. In addition to the support of equity theory, the results also suggest the importance of negotiation in determining 191 women’s decision participation. Women’s active role in negotiation leads them to take part in a greater variety of decisions. For the decisions they do make, their conflict with husbands, to the contrary, leads them to be less deeply involved. Women who reported conflict with their husbands are more likely than others to be satisfied with their decision participation. Women with decision breadth equal to or greater than 40 are more likely than others to be satisfied with decision participation. However, women with deep participation in decision-making (equal to or greater than 60) are less likely than others to be satisfied with their decision participation. When women are probed whether they are willing to take a greater part in decision making, most of them refused to do so. The significant reasons found in ethnographic data are the presence of family other labor, dependence on husband’s competence, and women’s taking off-farm jobs. Although the majority of the women in this study are unwilling to increase their part in decisions, women with high decision depth and breadth are found to be more willing to do so than others. Those women might be the group being oppressed from the authority in farm management. th ex DH Chapter 8 GENDER DIVISION OF FARM REWARDS This chapter is concerned with the final dimension of outcomes of negotiation and evaluation in the agrinubial power process -- women’s farm rewards and their evaluation of these rewards. Given women’s passive/subordinate role in negotiation as found in Chapter 5, a patriarchal arrangement of farm rewards would be expected. That is, patriarchal ideology provides legitimation for allowing or even encouraging women to work extensively and intensively while at the same time pushing women to the periphery of production in that they are denied control over farm rewards. On the other hand, women’s participation in farm work and decision-making, as found in Chapters 6 and 7, would lead us to expect that women should receive some significant rewards commensurate with their contributions to farm work and farm decisions. In addition, the influence of women’s position in negotiation and other factors at the individual and family levels on the distribution of farm rewards will be explored. Furthermore, having described and analyzed women’s subordination in the division of farm rewards, this chapter subsequently focuses on women’s evaluation of their farm rewards and possible explanations for their evaluation. The understanding of women’s subjective evaluation is expected to provide a clue for the next cycle of the agrinubial power process. In the survey phase, this study failed to include questions 192 193 related to all kinds of farm rewards and women’s satisfaction with their rewards. Besides, for some aspects of farm rewards, closed—ended questions could hardly explore the psychological dimensions of rewards. Therefore, the analysis of women’s evaluation of farm rewards will mainly be based on the in-depth interview data. According to the previous literature, farm rewards generally refer to economic returns on investment in land and capital, and compensation of labor and other economic inputs (Edwards 1991). Income obtained for individual labor is the most direct and explicit farm reward that a person can receive (Saul 1989; Narotzky 1990). But money is not the only reward and, for women, may not even be the most important reward. As suggested by Blumberg (1989) in her theory of gender balance of power, which was supported by empirical findings from several societies, the control over economic resources -- income, property and other means of production -- is an important base of gender power. Therefore, in this study, four facets of economic rewards will be examined -- ownership of farm property, access to farm earnings, participation in credit programs and wages. In order to make sense out of women’s experience of rewards, this study examines both direct payments, and the forms of rewards other than incomes to individual labor, as follows. First, wages are used as the direct measure of monetary compensation for women’s contributions to farm work. Second, women’s control over the income from the sale of the farm production is conceptualized as the extent to which they not only have access to the money but also have decision-making power over the allocation of the farm income. It is important to acknowledge that 194 women’s role in the allocation of farm incomes relative to their husbands is usually conditioned by differential marital power (Blumberg 1991). Third, involvement in credit programs is not exactly a direct monetary reward. However, it is viewed as a form of reward because it could be viewed as a step to farm rewards, to financial autonomy, or to independent entrepreneurship. Fourth, land is viewed as a base for income generation that appreciates in economic value. Although land ownership does not involve money, it is predicated on the terms of monetary accounting (Gilbert and Harris 1984). Non-economic aspects of farm rewards are poorly developed and rarely studied in the literature (Levitan and Feldman 1991). Non- economic rewards in a family-based economy such as family farming need to be explored in part because moral and other social psychological accounts (e.g., obligation, voluntarism, altruism and other non-altruist dimensions) are important for the family—based economy (Cheal 1989). Women in this type of economic activity are mostly those who make morality possible at the expense of losing their independent autonomy in economic resources (Friedmann 1990). In addition, concerning non-moral accounts, two other non-economic rewards will be also examined in this study -- self-actualization and the advantages of self-employment. These two rewards are concerned with women’s psychological aspects involving security from self-employment, autonomy of working status, and personal development. The questions to examine women’s non-economic rewards are as follows. Do they perceive it to be their necessary duty to fulfill morality necessary? Do they see the existence of non-economic rewards? 195 How do they define non—economic rewards? How do they feel about their part in the non-economic rewards they do (or do not) receive? Therefore, using mostly data from the in-depth interviews with farm women, this study attempts to find the answers to those questions. 1. Economic Rewards Among the four types of economic rewards, wages embody visible and prompt compensation for women. The other three are long-run arrangements. Those three are respectively ownership of farm property (the base of income generation), the control power over farm incomes, and the involvement of credit programs (a step to farm monetary rewards) (see the measurement of each rewards on page 69 in Chapter 4). In investigating the appropriateness of the short-term versus long-run categorization, a factor analysis was performed to construct a simple measure from those farm rewards. This study uses principle components analysis to reduce four indicators of farm rewards. There are two eigenvalues greater than 1. Thus, the first two components account for 60.8 percent of the variance. However, the first three components explain 82.3 percent of the variance. Therefore, the final communality estimates show all four reward variables are well accounted for by two components. Those two components could be conceptualized as short-term and long run rewards as theorized. Short-term reward is simply defined as the presence of wages women have received. Long-term reward, defined as the benefits which do not appear immediately, includes access to credit, property ownership, and the management of earnings from farm production. For bivariate and 196 multivariate analysis, long-term reward is measured as the summation of those three rewards weighted by the loadings from Factor 1 (Table 8-1). Two kinds of weighting are applied. Factor loading is the weight for the rewards in dichotomy. However, a quarter of factor loading is the weight for the rewards with five categories. Table 8-1 Factor Loadings of Four Dimensions of Farm Rewards Factor Loadings Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 l Wages —.0891 .8625 Property Ownership .5926 .4894 Credit Program Involvement .7756 -.0456 Income Allocation .6397 -.2779 A. Short-term Rewards -- Wages 1. Receipt of Wages In the survey, only three percent of the women received wages for the farm work they did (Table 8—2). The high percentage of women’s labor which is unwaged implies that women’s substantial participation in farm work as an essential part of vegetable production (as shown in Chapter 6), does not directly yield income that they can manage themselves. As suggested in the previous literature, this kind of unwaged labor functions as a source of household income for ensuring the survival of self-employed or family-based production (Reimer 1986; Wenger and Buck 1988; Collins 1990; Gimenez 1990; Shaver and Reimer 1991). Having realized the big proportion of farm women who are unwaged, what are the main factors influencing the likelihood of their 197 access to the compensation from their hard work? Who will be likely to receive wages? How do other women feel about not receiving wages? These questions will be explored in the following sections. Table 8-2 Women Receiving Wages (%) Yes 3.0 (%) No 97.0 (%) I LI Total Cases 303 I 2. Determinants of the Likelihood of Receiving Wages Bivariate analysis showed that none of the variables at any of the different stages of the marital power process hypothesized in the causal model of women’s rewards (Figure 6, page 33) is even close to significant at the .05 level. One possible reason would be the extremely low percentage of women who actually receive wages from their farm labor. Accordingly, there is no need to go on to the regression analysis. Nevertheless, we still can catch a bit of the inner story of wages from the ethnographic data. In the 38 interviews, the only reason that women mentioned for receiving wages was work on another farm. H0 is in her middle 30’s and has 26 years of farm experience. She described her contributions to farm work: "After my sons started helping their father on farm work, my workload decreased. 1 then went to work for my neighbor. It doesn’t mean that I don’t work for our own farm anymore. During the harvest period, in addition to my family and me, we even need to hire workers." 198 3. Evaluation of Short-term Rewards In the in-depth interviews, women were mainly asked the following questions -- what do you think about women’s receipt of pay for their farm work? Should they or shouldn’t they receive it? What are the reasons? Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your position in receiving payment? The responses from women in this sample are in three categories. Full satisfaction is that women have no doubt about not their receiving wages for their hard work. Partial satisfaction refers to the conditional response that they do not really agree with not having wages from farm work but finally feel all right about it. The third of women totally disagree to receive no wages. a. F077 Satisfaction Most of the women (67 percent) do not agree with the idea that farm women should receive wages for their hard work; they are happy with the current arrangement. The most common reason lies in the consideration of family survival. For example, Shiao who is in a family with no other family labor or hired labor and about U.S. $2,000 of debt told us that: "We have been deep in debt. We didn’t even have enough money to pay the debt. Although we are getting better off, I don’t think it is the right time to talk about wages for me, my children or himself [husband]." Hu is in a family without hired labor or other family labor and with zero net farm income. She indicated the importance of savings as family economic security. Savings would help the family to survive in case there is no profit from the production, or even worse in case there is bankruptcy or huge expenditure ahead for the family. 199 'I think it is okay for me to have no wages. As long as we can keep up the [vegetable] production and make some savings, 1 am content..' Second, even when not facing a deficit, the family bond is still the prominent factor which leads several women to devote themselves to the common wealth of the family. Taking a typical case from the in- depth interviews, Chu considers herself a farm full partner and has only three years of farm experience. Her net farm income is zero. I'We are all working for our own family. What we earn is all from the family and also for our family. We don’t receive wages. We are the boss in other words." Third, women’s sympathy for their husbands is also one element which leads to their involvement in unwaged labor voluntarily and with no question. Chou with 18 years of farm experience and about U.S. $2,000 of debts is considerate about her husband’s situation. 'He is also working very hard on the farm. If I receive wages, he deserves it, too. I am saying that as long as we live on, it doesn’t matter to me whether to have wages or no. We are all together and are all the same in the family." The fourth significant reason why women do not see receiving wages as appropriate for women working on the farm is that they envision another important form of rewards other than wages. That is the control over farm incomes. Lai has 46 years of farm experience and is on a family farm with net farm income about U.S. $25,000. Farm income is put in a joint bank account; both she and her husband have decision rights over the allocation of the farm income. "Although I don’t get wages, I have the chance to arrange the income. I can get the money from the bank whenever I want as long as we both agree ...... " Kao has 50 years of farm experience and considers herself a farm helper. She works 10 hours a day on the farm (depth score is 38; breadth score 200 is 29); and her decision depth score is 30 and breadth score is six. Although she does not participate in making decisions about the allocation of farm incomes, the incomes are usually deposited into her account. 'Even though I don’t have wages, I am at least glad that I have the chance to get to the money .... This, for me... I would say, is pretty good." We will discuss this form of reward in more detail in the next section. The rest of the reasons include women’s self-identity and their taking off-farm jobs. With respect to self-identity, Tsai is in her early 60’s and has 40 years of farm experience. She identifies herself as a farm homemaker but participates extensively in farm work (mean score 71) and decisions (mean score 75). In contrast, her intensity of ivork and decision participation is low (20 and 8.3 respectively). "I don’t think it’s necessary for me to receive wages [for my farm work]. I am just a helper. He is the one responsible for making money for the family." With respect to off-farm employment, Yei is in her middle 40’s but identifies herself a farm helper. Although she was not deeply involved in farm work and decisions (the mean depth scores are all around three percent), she helped with all the farm tasks and took part in all the farm decisions listed in the survey (mean breadth scores are both 100). ”I work outside. But I help him with different [farm] chores sometimes. Since I don’t really contribute to the farm, I don’t see why I should receive wages ..... “ b. Partial Satisfaction In addition to the group that expressed no dissatisfaction with being unwaged labor, 13 percent of the women have thought about 201 requesting wages but have chosen to give up on them. The reason why they finally give up the effort is mostly from their altruism for the family. For example Jiang is in her early 40’s and has 30 years of farm experience; she considers herself a farm helper. The depth of her task and decision participation is low (mean scores are less 25), but she shares more than 90 percent of farm tasks and decisions (97 and 95 respectively). She receives wages for her work for another farm. “...Fairly speaking, everybody is supposed to be rewarded [for the hard work]... Nothing is free...It is like we have to pay for hired women... However, now we are talking about our own farm. It seems to be a different story. We have to devote ourselves to our own business. Our children helping with farm work don’t receive wages, either ..... " In a similar case, Ma is in her middle 30’s with nine years of education and two years of farm experience. She seems to provide a contradictory statement. She says that no wage for her own farm is quite all right. However, she also wishes to have it, although she knows it is impossible. 'No pain no gain. We put our effort, our energy, in the hard work; we certainly deserve pay.... However if what we work for is our own family, it doesn’t matter to me.... If I worked outside, most of it would be spent for the family use anyway ... But it would be better if I can have some wages for my hard work, though." There is another reason behind women’s partial satisfaction ~- pragmatism. Hang is in her middle 40’s with six years of education and 27 years of farm experience. She did receive wages from a neighbor’s farm. When we were discussing wages for her own farm, she told us how she rationalized the appropriateness of not receiving them, through a comparison with her husband. '1 have thought about [wages]. But when I think of my husband who doesn’t receive it either, it seems not right for me to have the 202 wages....” c. Dissatisfaction Finally, about 20 percent of the women in the in-depth interviews do think that women should receive wages for their family farm labor exactly like others do off-farm. This group of women are dissatisfied with not receiving wages. The most common reason behind their feelings is that they lack access to money for daily life. Sia has no education and identifies herself as homemaker. Her participation in farm work is low in breadth (16) but high in depth (60). Her decision participation scores are 30 in depth and 17 in breadth. "...if I could allocate the money, I would spend the money on daily necessities or groceries the way I want. I wish I didn’t need to beg him for money." The other significant explanation they give is a comparison with other paid jobs and professional work. Wu is in her early 50’s and has 43 years of farm experience and considers herself a farm helper. She participates in 79 percent of farm tasks but the participation is not intensive (mean score 15). She takes part in 25 percent of farm decisions, but the intensity of decision participation is low (25 mean score). She viewed farm work as professional like other jobs in the labor market. ”Every job needs a special technique... if you don’t know anything about farming, you can’t get a good year [high productivity].... What I am saying is that farming is also valuable work...." . Liu is 30 years old and has nine years of education; she has an off-farm job but helps with farm work on a part-time basis. "We’d better receive wages for our hard work. It is just like me. I have my own income off-farm so that I can do whatever I want to 203 do with the money." 8. Long-term Rewards 1. The Division of Long-term Rewards a. Ownership of Fare Property In Taiwanese vegetable producing families, husbands dominate the ownership of farm property. When women in the survey were asked "whether you have legal sole or joint ownership of farm business assets such as farm land, farm house or others", more than four-fifths (82.8 percent) of the women reported that they did not have any legal ownership of farm property (Table 8—3). Unequal access to farm property is grounded in the tradition of patrilineal inheritance in Taiwan. Patrilineal kinship practices define the ownership and the transfer of the family property. Family property means a heritage a father passes on to his heir, who is the son. At the same time, patrilineal kinship practices take ideological forms to restrain women’s claim to the family property. For example, after the father is retired from farming, the transfer of property implies his reliance on the son for the rest of his life. That is, the heir who inherits the land not only receives the full authority in the succession of the family enterprise but also needs to be responsible for his parents’ living. With the heir’s responsibility, the father can not only secure the family property but also his aging life (Lin 1988). On the other hand, women are socialized to give up willingly any claim on their family’s property for the ' family’s next generation. It has been argued in U.S. studies that when a woman inherits farm property, she is likely to keep ownership after her marriage (Sachs 204 Table 8-3 Women’s Access to Farm Pro Percentage No Ownership 82.8 With Ownership (Joint or Individual) Inherited, bequeathed Other 6.6 I Total cases 303 1983). However, the present study only partially supports this argument. That is, when women bring farm land to a marriage it is not necessarily true that they maintain a legal interest in the land. Among the women who inherited farm land from their natal family (10.6 percent), the majority (7.4 percent) in fact would like to transfer ownership to their husbands or sons. Ma, who transferred her title to her husband, explains this fact. She started farming after ten years of marriage. She provides us the rationale that her husband’s competence in farming is the matter. This reason obligates her to sacrifice her rights in favor of meeting collective needs or her husband’s needs. "the land which my father passed on to me was put under his name right after we got married ..... I thought it might be better that the ownership is changed to him and I let him be responsible for managing the farm because I didn’t anticipate doing much farm work at that time....I hadn’t worked on the farm until ten years after my marriage." In the ethnographic data, two-fifths of the women without land ownership consider themselves homemakers and do not want to get much involved in farm work (although they actually work on the farm more than eight hours per day). The rest of the women without land ownership consider themselves farm helpers and also work hard on the farm (more 205 than eight hours per day). However, none of the women who have land ownership ever viewed the ownership as a kind of reward for their productive work. Jiang works on the farm around 11 hours a day and takes care of more than 95 percent of farm tasks and decisions although the depth of the participation is not high (1.7 for work; 2.5 for decision). She did think having family owned enterprise is good because the owners control the compensation for hard work themselves. However, she did not explicate having ownership as a reward specifically for herself. A possible reason could be speculated in the sense that most of land ownerships is patriarchal inheritance which give little chance for them to think about take over the privilege. b. Access to Credit Prograas About 90 percent of the women have never had access to an agricultural loan or subsidy (Table 8-4). The reason might be that the husband is the head of the household in patrilocal marriage. He is the member who always represents the whole family in public and social activities. The possibility for women to represent the family in credit programs is thus overlooked. Hu is in her early 50’s with no education; she considers herself a farm helper. She works very hard on farm work (11.5 hours a day, mean breadth score 17 and mean depth score 15) and shares only 12.5 percent of farm decisions in which the intensity is 30. "They [agricultural extension agents] would tell [my husband] when to attend a board meeting, farm demonstration, or technique ' meeting. They would let him know when the subsidies are ready for us to apply. They don’t tell me." Among the ten percent involved in credit programs, 47 percent identify themselves as farm managers, full partners or independent 206 Table 8-4 Women’s Access to Credit Programs Yes 9.6 % No 90.4 % I Total Cases 302 producers. Comparing this figure with sample as a whole, in which 30 percent of the women identify themselves as farm managers, full partners or independent producers, we see that those women who participate in credit programs identify themselves as more responsible in the productive sphere. Chien is in her late 30’s and has nine years of education and 21 years of farm experience; she considers herself a full partner and participated in training programs sometimes. She endorsed the independent participation in credit programs held by agricultural extension agents. Nevertheless, her narration implies that she involves herself in the credit not because it is a form of reward but for a pragmatic reason. “As I have had contact with our agents in Town often...[my husband and I] usually go for what they suggested ... For example, there is a good chance to get a loan at a low interest rate, his name has been used in applying loans ..... we need to find an alterative ..... we sometimes have to consider things of this kind... for reasons like tax or eligibility..." c. Contro7 over Fara Inca-es The location of the money that comes in and decisions over income allocation are conceptualized as two dimensions of budgetary control (Morris 1990). Women’s status in the control over farm incomes needs to be examined across both dimensions. The location of income refers to the bank account or other financial mode in which the couple usually 207 deposits income from the sale of farm products. Decisions over income allocation refer to how (by what process) and where (to what uses) the couple will distribute the farm earnings. Three income locations are found in the sampled Taiwanese farm families. The first one is joint accounts in which farm earnings are deposited so that both wife and husband have equal access to the money. More than half (55.8 percent) of the families use joint accounts (Table 8-5). For those farm income pooling families, the most common pattern (70.2 percent) is that both husband and wife decide the allocation of farm incomes. That is, the couple in this common pattern not only put earnings where either can access them, but also jointly decide what the earnings are used to buy. l Table 8-5: The Control Over Family Farm Incomes I Decision Maker Income Location of the , Allocation Husband’s Joint Wife’s Total Account Account Account 62.4%; 24.4% 0% 39.3% Husband (25.7%) (13.5%) (0%) (119) 34.4% 70.2% 44.4% 54.5% Both (14.2%) (38.9%) pp(1.3%) (153) 3.2% 5.3% 55.6% 5.9% Wife (1.7%) (3.0%) (1.7%) (18) 41.3% 55.8% 3.0% 100% Total (125) (168) (9) (302) Th s percentage stands for the nuiber of respondents in each cell divided by total cases in each location category. ** Total percentage represents the nmber of respondents in each cell divided by the total valid cases in the study sanple. However, the pooling of farm income does not necessarily imply absolute gender equality in the family. That is, even if both wife and 208 husband seem to have equal access to the money physically and legally, they may not have separate and equal, or joint and equal, authority to distribute it. Where there is differential authority, husbands are more likely than wives to play a dominant role in the control over income allocation (24.4 percent versus 5.3 percent). The second income location is husband's bank account. Around 41 percent of the families deposit the earnings from the sale of vegetables into the husband’s account (Table 8-5). Furthermore, in this category, around 62 percent of the women reported that their husbands solely decide the allocation of incomes, while 34 percent jointly make the decision with their husbands. Even those women who have joint decision power do not necessarily have full access to the money, because the money is in husbands’ bank account. The third and the least common income location is wife’s bank account. Only three percent of the families are in this category. Women in this category, however, are more likely to make the decision over the allocation of the earnings alone (56 percent) other than do it with their husbands (44 percent). Overall, concerning the division of control over family farm income, five specific patterns are identified based on the combination of two dimensions —- decision power over income allocation, and independent access to the earnings. Each pattern embodies a particular gender division of power between the couple. The first pattern is gender equality. Thirty-nine percent of the couples have equal access to the earnings and equal authority to decide how to allocate the earnings (Table 8-6). 209 Table 8-6 Gender Division of Control over Farm Incomes Patterns Percentage Husband Unilateral Authority 25.7 lHusband Advantage in Authority 27.7 Gender Equality in Authoripy 38.9 Wife Advantage in Authority 6.0 Wife Unilateral Authority 1.7 Total Cases 302 The second is husband unilateral authority. Around one-quarter (25.7 percent) of the couples use this pattern. Husbands in this category have full privilege to decide and to allocate the earnings from farm production, and full control over the actual expenditure. The third pattern is husband advantage, where husbands are more able than wives to affect income allocation. This comes about two ways -- either the income is in the joint location but the husband has the authority to allocate the money, or the income is subject to the joint allocation process but is in husband’s account. There are 27.7 percent (14.2% plus 13.5%) in this category. The fourth pattern is wife unilateral authority. Only 1.7 percent of the couples are in this category. The fifth pattern is wife advantage, where wives are in an advantage in their partial authority in income allocation. They at least have the decision power over the distribution of incomes no matter whose account the incomes finally are deposited in. Six percent (1.3% plus 3.0% plus 1.7%) of women are in this category. Figures across these five patterns show that the majority of women 210 (53.4 percent) have little or no control over income allocation, while the rest of the women have at least equal, or greater control over the incomes. 2. Determinants of Long-term Rewards As stated earlier, factor analysis suggests that three of the four kinds of economic rewards -- real estate ownership, credit program involvement, and income allocation -- are coherently directed to a long- run arrangement of compensation. The first two rewards are coded in the dichotomous form (0 for "no” and 1 for "yes"); the third one is in ordinal form coming from the five patterns of control over farm income shown in Table 8-6. The scoring of the five patterns is respectively from 0 to 4 for "husband unilateral authority" to "wife unilateral authority". For the purpose of multivariate analysis, this study creates a single measure of long-term rewards integrating the three. The factor loadings for ownership and credit involvement variables are the weights for both variables. However, the weight for income allocation is the factor loading divided by four. The integrated measure is the summation of each of the three rewards multiplied by the weightings as described earlier (see Table 8-1 on page 196). The results of this study suggest that Taiwanese women have low autonomy in access to long-term rewards. In general, one-fifth of the women receive no long-term rewards (Table 8-7). Most of the women (76.8 percent) have the scores less than .50. 211 Table 8-7: The Distribution of Women’s Long-term Rewards Scores Percentage 0 20.9 .01-.25 23.8 .26—.50 32.1 .51-.75 7.0 .76 or more 16.2 I Total Cases 302 I Bivariate analyses showed that long-term rewards for women are positively related to the breadth and depth of their farm task participation and decision participation, net farm income, participation in farm training programs, and husbands’ off-farm employment (Table 8- 8). All of them except for husband’s off-farm employment support the hypothesis that women’s rewards would increase with their involvement in decision making, farm work and farm training programs and with their net farm incomes. The finding concerning husband’s off-farm work related to women’s rewards fails to support the hypothesis of the present study that off-farm employment raises one’s consciousness of seeking rewards. To contrary, this study seems to suggest an equity theory in that one deserves the rewards from his/her substantive contribution to farm production. As shown in Table 8-9, the depth of decision participation, the breadth of farm task participation, net farm income, and husband’s off- farm employment retain their significance in the multiple regression analysis. Although decision breadth is not significant but still remains in regression model. Those variables explain 30.8 percent of 212 Table 8-8 Long-term Rewards by Independent and Intervening Variables Total Sample Mean Score N 1. Breadth of Decision Participation .387 298 (1) 0-30 .323 83 (2) 30-70 .328 66 (3) 72:100 .449 149 r - .161 2. Depth of Decision Participation .405 267 (1) 0-20 .390 103 (2) 20-50 .352 138 (3) 50-60 .724 11 (4) 623100 .765 15 r - .188 3. Breadth of Task Participation .386 301 (1) 0-30 .232 80 (2) 30-70 .410 134 (3) 793100 .491 87 r - .26 4. Depth of Task Participation .386 301 (1) 0-20 .402 54 (2) 20-40 .333 158 (3) 40-60 .415 56 (3) 69:100 .568 33 r - .155 5. Training Involvement (scores) .386 302 (1) 0 .347 201 (2).? 0 .463 101 r -.152 6. Husband’s Off-farm employment .386 302 No .341 263 Yes “" .689 39 - 25.69 . Net Farm Income (USS) .390 294 (1) <- -2,000 .128 5 (2) O .429 26 (3) 1,000 - 4,000 .336 82 (4) 4,000 - 8,000 .365 70 (5) 8,000 - 20,000 .429 82 ' .501 29 (6) 20,000 and more r - .114 P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 213 Table 8-9: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Long-term Farm Rewards on Farm Decision Participation, Farm Work Participation, the Presence of Conflict and Independent Variables Standardized Regression ~ Coefficient *The Range of Farm Task Participation .186“. The Depth of Farm Decision Participation .107' The Breadth of Farm Decision Participation ..033 Net Farm Incomes .135. Husband’s Off-farm Employment .219 R2 - .152“ * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001 the variance (significant at the .001 level). The breadth of farm task participation has a larger effect than the other factors in increasing women’s long-term farm rewards. This result supports the hypothesis that with high participation in farm work, women are more likely to gain greater access to long-term farm rewards. This finding supports the proposition of equity theory that the inputs of productive work would lead to the deserving rewards. That is, the participation of farm work is an important way for women to achieve equity in the productive sphere. The in-depth interviews provide an explanation for the positive relation between the diversity of farm work participation and the share of long-term rewards. Jiang has been doing all kinds of farm chores and decisions (task diversity - 96.8; decision breadth - 94,7); her decision depth is only 25. She has property ownership, has net farm income U.S.S 3,000, and is currently involved in a credit program. Furthermore, she 214 also has equal control over farm earnings. She commented that: ”We are in the same business, we work together all day long. I am sure that I can do all kinds of [farm] tasks ..... About how I can be paid back.., as much as earnings from [the sale of] vegetables, I guess.... Uh, as much as I can spend...” Two other important factors which would get women an equitable share of farm rewards are the intensity and diversity of their decision participation. Women who share more decisions, or participate in them more deeply, would be more likely to share long-term farm rewards. This finding supports the equity thesis; women’s decision participation would lead them to achieve equitable rewards. Jiang’s diversity of decision participation is 95 and intensity is 2.5; her task breadth is 96.8. She has ownership of farm land and a joint account for the farm income which is jointly decided by her husband and her. Her net farm income is USS 3,000. ”I have to do whatever I can do to work on the farm and take part in making decisions ..... I only hope that we can sell as much product as possible and get incomes as high as possible from the sale ..... and he and I can work together, share things together and utilize money together ..... " The next important influence on women’s long-term reward is net farm income; women in high net farm income families are more likely to receive long—term rewards. This finding especially implies that high net farm incomes provide the flexibility or open up chances for women to get access to, or control over, earnings from the sale of vegetables. Sun has net farm income about U.S. $15,000. She takes part in the full range of farm tasks but the depth of her task participation is 14. She takes part in 83 percent of farm decisions but her depth score is two. She said that she had control over how the money from farming is used, because 215 "It is me keeping farm books. The earnings is often put in my account ..... because I am good at this kind of paper work.... I got to be good at it, because we are talking about a huge amount of money; not just some hundreds of bucks." In addition to the direct effect (8 = 0.192), husband’s off-farm employment also affects long-term rewards by operating through its direct effect on the depth of women’s farm work participation which directly influences the depth of decision participation (Figure 14). Husbands’ taking off-farm jobs implies a decrease of their involvement in farm work. With husbands’ low involvement in farm work, women tends to be the legitimate person to take almost full responsibility for farm production. As such, women are likely at least to share the control over farm finances or to have the chance to get access to farm resource and credit services. Chien works eight hours per day on the farm and participates in many activities, meetings, and seminars since her husband got an off-farm job. She identifies herself as a farm full partner. "We jointly decide how to spend the incomes from production. Most of the time, we deposit the earnings in his account, but I am responsible for bookkeeping because he works outside and doesn’t have much time for our farm." c. Appraisal of Long-term Rewards As found earlier, although women play an important role in agricultural production, they experience gender disparity in access to farm property and credit and in the control over farm earnings. Their participation in the wide range of farm chores and farm decisions, their net farm incomes, and their husbands’ taking off-farm jobs would lead to the increase of their rewards. What concerns this study next is how those women feel about their current position. Do they feel comfortable 216 32586.26“. 0 rlllll_ .38; 838.. Ease... O is! 2.5... 2222.5 .. 89 a. 2.5... 580 ..me 58% co.m_ooo 55850 .. mammal. Agfiwm mucmsom Eco“. provocog _r 853.... L .8: . 1.8... £39m xmmh lllll . fill: .+/ :5... :2 V . .\ .. 3 mo / ll erosemw . / ..tmom 5:36.th + xmm... ozmoEoo .mmr. oEooc. cam“. .02 uptake”. EB“. 8.2.93.— n.:oEo>> to 5.852.. 2F 3 0.50.“.— £82m co.m_ooo 217 with this kind of subordination? If they do, what are the possible reasons? If they do not, how do they respond to it; do they contest it or go along with it? The discussion of these questions centers on the three major elements of long-term rewards. a. Access to Fame Property The survey data showed that among the women who have no ownership of farm property (83 percent), 40 percent did not even think that having the title of ownership was necessary for them. More than two-fifths of the women (43 percent) indicated that they are not interested in taking ownership and said they felt fine letting the husband have the legal title of ownership (Table 8-10). That is because everything was already taken care of by their husbands. The rest of the women (17.2 percent)reported that it is out of the question to have ownership because the father-in-law or son is entitled to the ownership. Cheng works on the farm 14 hours a day and takes part in 43 percent of the tasks (depth score is 30). She has USS 1,500 net farm income and her husband has no off-farm job. She participates in all the decisions but is not deeply involved in those decisions (depth score is 17). Although she considers herself a full partner, she is not, even jointly, entitled to the farm land. " ..... because this land is my father-in-law’s ..... I don’t think he would pass the land to me. He [my husband] is the one who would receive the land....If he [my husband] would like my name in the ownership, let him do that, but I will never ask for this ..... after all, this is not the land from my father...." 218 r Table 8-10 Women’s Access to Farm Property Percentage No 82.5 Never thought it necessary 39.7 Not interested in it 43.1 The presence of third person 17.2 | Yes 17.5 I Total 100 The women’s responses reveal that they are satisfied with the position they currently have even though it does not include property ownership. Husband, father—in-law and son are the main reasons why they are comfortable with the subordination. In order to learn whether they had any interest in legally titled ownership, the interviewers probed further and asked them whether they have ever thought about making the ownership under their own names or joint with their husbands. Only one- seventh of the women said they had ever thought about this. This result suggests that patriarchal ideology strongly shapes women’s beliefs so that women mostly view ownership of property as unnecessary. In contrast, the ethnographic data shows that all of the five women who own land are satisfied with having the ownership, although they never thought of it is a reward. Sia identifies herself as a homemaker but does work hard on the farm (10 hours a day, breadth score 16 and depth score 60). "... Well, it is good to have something of my own,... if he wants to do something with the land..he has to tell me.. " 219 b. Access to Credit Programs Women’s reaction to unequal access to credit seems to be mild. This is similar to property acquisition in that most of the women with access to credit did not really care about whether they join credit programs. Tsai considers herself a homemaker and takes part in quite many farm tasks (mean score is 72 but depth score is 18). She also participates in many decisions (mean score is 75) but her depth score is only 8.3 on those decisions. “... Credit is used for our own farm... I don’t see the difference whether using his name or my name to apply for the loan.... ' If they did care, they viewed it as a way of improving the long term survival of the farm rather than as a personal reward. Chu is in her middle 20’s with 12 years of education and three years of farm experience. Her breadth scores of task and decision participation are 56 and 87 respectively. The depth scores, in contrast, are 36 for farm work and 29 for decisions. She said that she just got married four years ago. When asked about her feelings about her access to credit, she noted that "Most of time, we share the same thought on loan application, although I didn’t get much experience in farming such as technology and marketing....lt is very good that we also have his father to consult with when he and I have something different in mind ...... After a decision was all made, he applied for a loan ..... I didn’t have any objection about whose name was going to be used. It was not a big difference to me." With respect to lack of access to credit, Sung has 20 years of farm experience, has never participated in farm training activities, and identifies herself as a full partner of the farm with task scores 83 in breadth and 26 in depth. She participates in the full range of decisions with depth score 20. In the interview, she said that she 220 always suggested that her husband not invest too much money in farm production to avoid debts she would never like to get involved in. However, she complained that 'It occurs to me that he always has plenty of good reasons to apply for a loan. For example, our neighbors or his good friends have gotten advantages from a loan. For example, the advice is from extension agents we trust and are acquainted with ..... Those reasons sounds not bad.... Since all the information is correct and we won’t put heavy debts on our back, I seem to have no reason to stop him although I myself would never do that....' c. Control over Farm Earnings As we learn from the findings, half of the women have at least equal, predominant or full control over the farm income. This section examines how women feel about their access to the legal right (bank account) and decision on the family farm income. The in-depth interviews showed that women who have legal right of access to income or joint authority over the allocation of farm income do not necessarily hold equitable autonomy in farm earnings relative to their husbands. There might be the case that women are only responsible for bookkeeping as a task but do not really have power over the distribution of the earnings. The explanations of this subordinate position could be discussed in four categories. The first one is women’s willingness to yield. Kao is in a family with net farm income around U.S. $5,000; she actually keeps the farm books. Her tasks scores are 29 in breadth and 37.5 in depth. Her decision participation is 30 in depth and six in breadth. ’ ”I often help to record the flow of money for our farm. We would discuss about how to use the money. Somehow, he is the one who finally decides where the money goes. I don’t usually have objections. If I do, he will listen to me... But, I know 221 him,.. .he doesn’t want me to say too much about how he should do. .... I am not really interested in competing with him like grasping things from him." Second, women’s trust in their husbands’ ability in farm investment provides another explanation of women’s acquiescence. Yang has U.S. $1,000 net farm income and considers herself a farm helper. Her task participation scores are 65 in breadth and 15 in depth. Her decision participation scores are 42 in breadth and 15 in depth. She has joint control over the allocation of farm earnings (joint decision and joint account). She described her husband’s competence in farm investment. ”He is very good at seeking loans and credits and planning for money investment and so on. Although we manage the earnings from the sale of vegetables together, I often follow his suggestion. I trust him." A similar reason also happens in patriarchal income allocation families. Su considers herself a farm helper and has U.S. $1,000 net farm income; she is not widely or deeply involved in farm tasks (breadth score is 17 and depth score is 30) or in farm decisions (breadth score is 41 and depth score is 6.7). She has no chance to access farm income (her husband solely decides, and the income is put in her husband’s account), but shows no doubt about the actions taken by her husband, 'He makes up his mind where to put the money. Joint account or his account... whatever he likes... I totally agree with him ..." Third, for those women in the patriarchal income control families, self-identity as a farm homemaker is another important reason they get along well with the subordination. Wang, aged 44 is comfortable with letting her husband arrange the earnings. Although she works seven hours a day on the farm with task scores 22 in breadth and 51 in depth 222 and with decision scores 48 in breadth and 18 in depth, she considers herself a housekeeper and believes that she depends on her husband for a living. '1 just try to be a good wife... He takes care of the farm. So, he certainly needs to earn as much as possible for the whole family. We have our own duty. If he has free time to help me with housework, I am happy to let him do it. But, that’s fine, if he hasn’t.“ Finally, women’s consideration of family survival also makes them submissive to their husbands. Lin is in her early 50’s with 30 years of farm experience. She shared her philosophy of making the family’s living. Family survival is her priority, although she dreamed about keeping her own money. She pointed out that: 'As long as we got a good year, it does not matter who controls the money. We are not wealthy. He is responsible for making our family’s ]iving.... Yeah, of course it would be great if I had my pin money'9. Then I could go ahead to get whatever I want without his permission." However, wives are not always content with submission to their husbands concerning control over farm earnings. For example, Li identifies herself as a farm helper and has U.S. $5,000 net farm income. She participates in 47 percent of farm tasks with depth score equal to 28, but only shares around eight percent of decisions with depth score equal to 30. She complained about the restricted money from her husband for family daily expenditures and consumption. ”1 don’t really know the details of bookkeeping. He takes care of everything. I just regularly receive money from him for grocery shopping ..... it is really not convenient for me because every time I need to ask him for more. I get rejected often.” Chuan considers herself a homemaker and takes part in 17 percent of the " In Taiwanese, it is called Se(2)-Kia(2)-Zi(2) meaning that you keep some money for your own use in secret. 223 farm tasks with depth score equal to 42; she shares 12 percent of the decisions with depth score equal to 30. She complained that her husband never understood what she was actually doing in housework and that he does not understand why she always requests more money. ”Sometimes, he gets furious at my asking more money to get our baby kids good clothes. He doesn’t understand why I have to do that. He won’t understand. He doesn’t even know how to change a diaper....' II. Non-economic Rewards and Women’s Evaluation As indicated earlier in this chapter, this study tries to explore various dimensions of non-economic rewards as defined by the farm women themselves. In order to investigate the non-economic rewards, an unstructured question in the in-depth interview asked the respondents (38) ”for you, what are good things or bad things you can get from farming?'. The discussion in this section then centers around two categories -- negative and positive aspects of farming -- based on those women’s subjective evaluations. The distribution of women in each category is shown in Table 8-11. A. Disadvantages from Farming When the women criticize farming, two major disadvantages are found. The first is concerned with farming as an occupation. The second is related to physical stress from farm work. 224 1. Occupation as Farmers Women’s complaints about farming mostly come from the lack of stable incomes generated from the farm work to which they have made sizable contributions. For example, Liu aged 30 with nine years of education and 15 years of farm experience does not contribute a lot to farm work (2.5 hours per day, 7 in breadth score and 30 in depth score) or farm decisions (breadth and depth scores are both 30). She commented that "Being a farmer, you got to work very hard. You sweat, you get exhausted but you got to keep working all for the limited compensation.... If I could have a regular and stable paid job, I can have independent income which should not be so low!" Table 8-11 Women’s Evaluations of Noneeconomic Farm Rewards Percentage Disadvantages Low and Unstable Income Occupation 21.1 Physical Difficulty 18.4 Advantages Self-emplgyment 23.7 Self—actualization 18.4 Altruism 15.8 Other 2.6 Total cases 38 Total responses 50 Sung who has 20 years of farm experience identifies herself as a farm full partner; she participates in a wide range of farm tasks (breadth score is 83) and decisions (breadth score is 100). However the depth of 225 her task and decision participation is not high (task depth is 26 and decision depth is 30). The net farm income in the year before the survey was carried out was not low (U.S. $3,000). However, she said that: "I don’t see it being any good doing farm work. The profit is little. We just applied for a loan last year. Our kids are still in school and need us to pay for their tuition. We fortunately have money our parents left for us. Otherwise, we might not be able to survive....” 2. Physical Pressure from Farm Work The ethnographic data shows that physical exhaustion is another reason the women devalue farm work. Many women in this study complained that farming is an extremely fatiguing job which consumes a lot of energy and strength from the human body. For a typical example, Hang is in her late 40’s with six years of education and no other family labor on her farm. She spends over eight hours (8.25 on average) on 38 percent of farm tasks with depth score 35. "It is just too tiring to stand the heavy and time-consuming farm work. If we could get good prices from the product stable through years, I would be willing to put more of my effort on farm work. It is a pity that I seem not to have so many choices as I am getting older. It is hard for me to find a job outside at my age.” Lu spend 13.5 hours a day on the farm in 46 percent of tasks with depth score 32. She has other family labor and hired labor to share the farm work; she is hired by others sometimes. She commented that '[Farming] is a toilsome job. You get tired not only physically but also mentally. You got to put in much energy especially in heavy tedious tasks. You also worry about getting the tasks done before typhoon or flood is coming. I can’t see how it is positive unless we get good years." 226 8. Advantages in Farming Given the perceived disadvantages, the interesting question remains why some women continue farming. The advantages defined by the women are from three different perspectives -- the nature of family- based production, self-actualization from farm work, and altruism for the family. 1. Self-employment Self-employment is seen as advantageous in two ways. The first is autonomy in the work process. The major notion is that self-employment enables one to be free of subordination to an employer. For example, Jiang is in her early 40’s with 30 years of farm experience; she identifies herself as a farm helper and shares 95 percent of the farm decisions with depth score of 25. She said in the interview that “Being a farmer, you can, at least, manage your own business and your own property yourself. You don’t need to listen to the boss’ mandate. You are the boss...." Ho who takes part in 100 percent of farm decisions with depth score 30, shares the same thought as Jiang, and further commented that: "...Working for others, sometimes we have to follow the boss’ direction and have to be able to be patient about the boss’ request.... However, at home, we work for ourselves. If we have problems, we can discuss. [My husband] is not my boss." Second, self-employment implies the ability to provide one’s livelihood. Self-owned enterprise and property mean security for the family. Yei has six years of education and 33 years of farm experience; she works off the farm but still helps with farm work and has high decision participation breadth (100) and decision depth score of 34. As she remarked 227 'If we get fired, we still have a farm to work on, to earn our ;;ving. That is not too bad, though. At least we have a place to 2. Self-actualization Self-actualization for Taiwanese farm women has several dimensions. One sense is that farming is the career which makes her happy not only because farming shows she is a worthy person, but also because farming gives her an opportunity to show she is a worthy person. In this category, women are satisfied with their chance to work on the farm. For example, women express fulfillment in the joy of the harvest. Chao, 60 years old, has 35 years of farm experience and considers herself a farm helper. “When we got a good harvest, I knew we deserved it. I see the fruit from our hard work. It is a joyful feeling." In addition, skill plays an important role in women’s self-actualization in farm production. Yang who has no education but 28 years of farm experience is only a farm helper. However, she is grateful for being in farming which at least is a skilled job. “For me, I never went to school; I happened to have farming skills for living after marriage. So far, our living has been steady. This is all I wanted [having skills for my living and also partly responsible for the family living] .... I appreciate any chance for me to learn from farming. I am happy that I make contributions to our farm..." With the basic skills from farming, Pong in her early 60’s shared with us how they are fair enough for her life. ”I am content with what I get from farming. This is all the skill I have had in my whole life. I can also work for other’s farm for pay. That is enough for me. I don’t need to earn a great deal of money." The second sense of self-actualization is that of using farming to 228 establish a field of her own. Chu with 12 years of education but three years of farm experience considers herself a full farm partner. ”It is not bad, farming, as long as you know what the trick is and are brave to try new things [such as new technology/practices] like my husband usually does.... Besides, you’d better open your eyes and ears and seek any information as much as possible. It is not hard to get to know what services or programs are available. You just go to farmers’ association often. You just keep in touch with them [extension agents]. They would provide you news and good advice ..... Sometime you need to take the risk. Taking risk is not so bad when you plan for it for long-term sake..' The third sense of self-actualization refers to farming giving the women access to other areas of social and community life. That is, farming provides a route to various public activities and so benefits women’s personal development. Chien is in her late 30’s with nine years of education. She shares her excitement with us about her experience of learning from agricultural professionalists. ”I never thought that attending meetings, seminars or demonstrations are nice until one day I went to board meeting for him [husband]. I remembered, he was not able to attend on that day. Then I found that from the meeting, I learned a lot from other friends. After that, I enjoyed going for those kinds of activities. It is especially great in technique consultant seminars which the official from agricultural improvement station help us to solve whatever the problems we brought to the meeting....' 3. Altruism In this study, altruism consists of three components. The first is that women cherish the opportunity to work for the family and to be a contributor to the family enterprise. They do not have much request from the enterprise as long as they are part of it. Shiao who has six years of education and identifies herself as a farm helper indicated that: "It is not too bad that I am capable of devoting myself to the 229 family. It is kind of feeling that I an useful and helpful for our business.” Similarly, Ma aged 37 with nine years of education and two years of farm experience identifies herself as a farm helper. She commented that: "....At least I feel content when I make contributions to our family incomes by working on the farm.” The second type of altruistic behavior highlights harmonious marital relations. For example, Li who is 50 years old and considers herself a farm helper, has no education but 30 years of farm experience; she expresses her love for her husband by saying that: "He is also making a huge effort on our farm. I just help him and share his burden. I am trying to make his life easier rather than worn out through years of hard work." The third type of altruism comes from the concern about the next generation. Chuan who is in her middle 50’s with 48 years of farm experience provides us with a typical reason and shows us her expectation of her children regarding their future career. ”Marrying a farmer, I don’t have many choices except farming. Now, I only hope that I raise our kids to be well grown-up. They don’t have to take over our farm. Our son had better find a non- farm job. Our daughters had better not marry into farm families. I try to let them get education as much as possible. I don’t like them to work with nature, to depend on heaven for giving us three meals." Another reason found in the interviews is keeping the heritage. Sia who is 45 years old and has 25 years of farm experience said that ”.... We want to keep the farm which is from our former generations. Other than that, I’d rather go find a job outside to get more earnings.“ 111. Conclusion Women in this study are unlikely to be monetarily rewarded. Among four dimensions of economic rewards, the joint control over farm income 230 is the only significant reward for them. However, the multivariate analysis also suggests the possibility for women to get equitable access to farm rewards. That is, women with higher involvement in farm work and farm decisions would be more likely to get access to the four long- term rewards. Given that women are not highly rewarded in economic terms, the ethnographic data showed that a large of them perceived non- economic rewards from farming as important, and were satisfied with their involvement in farm production for the reasons such as self- employment, self-actualization, and altruism. CHAPTER 9 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS The central concern of this study is the exploration of women’s role in farm production from a feminist perspective mainly based in the theory of the marital power process elaborated with concepts from human capital, patriarchal ideology, and household strategy theories. In the integrative theoretical model which is proposed to frame the understanding of Taiwanese farm women’s experience, this study begins by exploring women’s position in the first phase of the agrinubial power process -- negotiation. In the negotiation process, certain resource and constraint factors at the family and individual level affect the presence of conflict which in turn drives an on-going interaction between women and their husbands -- the initiation of negotiation, the use of conlnunication strategies, and concluding solutions. Concerning the second and succeeding phases of the agrinubial power process -- the outcomes of the negotiation -- this study examines women’s involvement in farm work, participation in farm decisions, and receipt of farm rewards. This study finally investigates women’s evaluation of each of the outcomes -— their satisfaction with their farm work, farm decisions and farm rewards. This final chapter first discusses the evidence from Taiwan which provides an empirical and conceptual understanding of women vegetable farmer’s diverse experiences from an integrative theoretical framework. Second, it addresses the main implications for current debates and future 231 232 research about women’s status in family farming. I. Do Taiwanese Vegetable Women Negotiate? The survey data shows that more than half of the women (65.3 percent) did report different opinions from their husbands in the farm decision making process. However, does having a conflicting opinion before the final decision imply that Taiwanese women have independent power in the whole negotiation process? The in-depth follow-up interviews show that around half of the women who reported conflict over farm decisions are usually the ones who initiate the negotiation (Table 9-1). However, women’s initiation does not necessarily mean that they hold an equal position to bargain with their husbands. Most of them do yield to their husbands in response to their husbands’ objections, no matter whether it is explicit or implicit, for the sake of keeping harmonious relations with husbands and of family survival and because of their domestic self-identity. When husbands initiate the negotiation, they tend to hold a superior position and leave their wives little or no space to argue with them. Some of the women in this stressful situation did complain about husbands’ domination. In general, women are not likely to be deeply involved in an aggressive negotiation with their husbands. In most of the cases in the in-depth interviews according to the wives, it is the husband who utilizes coercion as a conmunication strategy. When women are involved in persuasion -- the next most common conmunication strategy -- they are mostly the ones being convinced. Therefore, women mostly participate in negotiation by compromising with their husbands in reaction to their 233 husbands’ coercion or persuasion. Table 9-1: A Summary of Women’s Involvement in Negotiation I Percentage No Difference of Opinion 39.5 Different Opinions 60.5 Do not Initiate Negotiation 26.1 I Initiate Negotiation Herself 52.2 I Yield to Husband 83.3 00 not Yield to Husband 16.7 Total 100 (38 cases) Women’s willingness to yield to their husbands at the end as the concluding solution mostly comes from their being too busy to argue with their husbands, their perception of their being less capable than their husbands in making farm decisions, their fear of making the tension worse, and their altruism to husbands and the whole family. Those women involved in negotiation at least tried at the beginning to express their conflict with their husbands over farm decisions, although in the end they are mostly willing to give up what they want and let their husbands win the bargaining game. That is because, subjective perceptions (women’s self-identity and the significance of the marital relationship) and the objective family well-being (joint utility for the family) are likely to outweigh the importance of women’s involvement in economic decision-making. This study supports the bargaining approach and challenges. old structural - functional assumptions of homeostasis and consensus in studying the dynamics of agrinubial power relations. The women may 234 perceive that they jointly make a decision with their husbands, but fail to acknowledge the substance of their own interests distinct from those of their husbands, and thus live with unrecognized submission in the marital power relations. Here, the bargaining approach helps us to clarify the inner interaction prior to the couple’s final decisions. More importantly, this study supports the propositions of “cooperative bargaining" theory. That is, the women can get a chance to negotiate in their own interests. However, they finally compromise and cooperate with their husbands in the name of maintaining family well- being. The Taiwanese case suggests that, as argued by Sen (1985), a woman’s self-perception is the most important parameter in determining her bargaining position which is usually socially constructed. About four- fifths of the Taiwanese women in this particular sample consider themselves homemakers or farm assistants. These figures are sufficient to explain why most of the women accept being subordinate to their husbands. 11. Are Women Pushed into the Periphery of Farm Production? A. Work Pattern and Self-evaluation Farm women in this study comit a large amount of their time to farm work. On average, they take part in quite a variety of farm tasks. However, they are more likely to be concentrated in specific task areas characterized by time consuming and intensive use of labor, while the managerial work tends to be male-dominated. Furthermore, they tend to participate more deeply in intensive manual work -- especially weeding and harvesting vegetables (mean depth for harvesting, weeding, and preparing foods for workers are all greater than 2.1, where 2.0 means 235 women jointly do those tasks with their husbands) -- than in all 37 tasks (mean score is 3.6) included in this study. In fact, there is a gap between the depth (mean score is 36) and breadth (mean score is 53) of women’s task participation. That is, two groups of women might experience the gap -- the women with low depth and high breadth of task participation, and the women with high depth and low breadth of participation. How they experience or feel about the gap becomes the next important question. However, the present study did not explore women’s experience of this gap. Although this study is only focused on vegetable enterprises, it supports the view that women’s role in agricultural production tends to be underestimated as previous studies of farm women contended (Reimer 1986; Rosenfeld 1986; Altson 1995). It is especially true for women’s time spent on the farm. Put another way, the census data showing a limited increase of female labor in agriculture?‘0 have totally failed to uncover women’s substantial involvement in family-based vegetable production. Among other variables, conflict is hypothesized to have a positive and direct effect on women’s participation in farm work. However, this study fails to support the hypothesis in that there is no statistically significant causal relation. As suggested by the findings in Chapter 5, this might be because women’s farm work participation is more important as a family survival strategy than for the pursuit of women’s own interests or for the enhancement of women’s position in commercialized agricultural production (Table 9-2). ” According to official statistics, female agricultural labor force increased from 27.8 percent in 1965 to 30.1 percent in 1991 (Li 1988; Lai 1991; Council of Agriculture 1994). 236 I Table 9-2: A Summary of the Prediction of Women’s Involvement in Farm Work Relative to Original Hypotheses Hours Breadth Depth Predictors Hypoth1 R512 R51 R51 , Presence of Conflict + + + - , Family Composition Variables - . Family Life Stage(4) - ~ ~' I ~' I ~* I Family & Farm Economy Variables Farm Size + + + Net Farm Income + + + +++ Other Family Labor - - _ IHired Labor - +f* - I Domestic Work Hour - - - - + IDomestic Task Participation - - - - I Individual Monetary Resource ; Wife’s Off-farm Employment I - I - I - I - ; Husband’s Off-farm Employment I + I — I + I + . Sub ective Human Resource Self-identity + I + I +"' I +" , Objective Human Resource : Wife’s Education + — + - if. 5 Square of Age/Experience + - _ + i Farm Trainin- Involvement + - + + -—‘— —— —— ——.———-— =— -—- - — . Wypoth: Original Hypothesis, + is positive relationship, - is a negative relationship. 2. Rsl: Results, + is a positive relationship, - is a negative relationship. * Significant at the .05 level. - ** Significant at the .01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level. Opposite to the proposition derived from human capital theory, this study found that age, experience and education tend to reduce women’s time devoted to farm work. However, as far as the composite measure of experience integrated with age is concerned, the importance of these human 237 resources would decline because three relations are actually involved in this composite. First, old women’s profound knowledge and skills in farming actually mean that they are capable of making a big contribution to family farm production. This relation appears to be a linear relationship (Figure 15). Second, in terms of time availability, women’s time available for farm work would decrease after their children are born but still young. After the children are grown up, their time availability would increase. Therefore, it is a curvilinear relation between women’s time and their age (Figure 16). Third, as women are getting old, their physical capability would decrease. That is, while old women have much more time and knowledge and skills available for farmlwork, their physical capability, at the same time, deteriorates (Figure 17). This finding suggests that old women’s limited physical capability outweighs their time availability influencing their farm work participation. Given that human capital theory is likely to be limited in its ability to explain women’s farm work participation, off-farm employment which implies the availability of human resources for farm production has the largest effect on the depth of women’s task participation. Husband’s off-farm employment means the decline of his presence in farm work. Therefore, this absence induces women’s deep participation in farm work. Women’s self-identity has a substantial effect, as hypothesized, on both the breadth and depth of their task participation. This finding suggests that this subjective power resource is an important explanatory variable for women’s participation in farm tasks. It is especially important in explaining women’s participation in a wide range of farm tasks. That is, the more they view themselves as independent farm 238 3:32.39 .mofiagm b___cm__m>< me..... {o>> 9:53... .5... 3.33.5 Hamid b___n~__m>< oEc. ...oE. 55> .35. 5.? £25 m.:oEo>> t. 959“. £25 95:63 2. 95m.“— amuesocx use 2.2m {o>> v... o>> 62.233: use «.....m Ea". ..2: 5.2, {o>> 95825 2. 95m."— 239 producers, the broader the range of tasks they would be responsible for, although they might not be deeply involved in those tasks. As a result, women’s broad participation in farm tasks would reinforce their self- identity to independent producers which would lead to active participation in the next sequence of agrinubial power process. Last of all, family composition and family economy variables which represent labor availability for the family farm, have a relatively low effect on women’s farm work participation. The possible reasons could be in the particular characteristic of family-based vegetable production. Vegetable growing is characterized by large amounts of intensive manual labor. For family based vegetable production, women as the indispensable family labor are hard to replace with other forms of labor inputs. This thus further explains why hired labor has positive effect on women’s involvement in farm work, contrary to the hypothesis. Having realized women’s work patterns (large breadth and moderate depth) and high time commitment to farm work, this study further finds that most of the women are not satisfied with their part in farm work. In most cases, this is because the workload is too heavy, but in some cases it is because the workload is less than desired. The regression analysis highlights a negative effect of the depth of task participation on women’s satisfaction for the group of women with depth scores between 20 and 80. For the majority of those women, their intensity of participation tends to make them uncomfortable. Among those women, more of them feel being exploited (forced to do more than they desire) than being oppressed (forced to do less than thy desire). The detailed characteristics of those women will be discussed later on. 240 8. Decision Patterns and Self-evaluation Concerning the 24 decisions designated in this study, Taiwanese women do take part in quite a wide range of farm decisions. However, when they do make those decisions, they are not deeply involved in the decision making. In order to fully represent women’s decision participation, the gap between broad decision participation (mean score is 60) and low intensity of decision-making (mean score is 25.6) requires a closer inspection on the measure of decision participation . When introducing the composite measure of decision participation, mean score of women’s decision participation comes back to low (26.6). This finding suggests that in terms of the total decision space that women might occupy, they are only allowed to occupy 27 percent. Following this line, women’s deciSion participation is not as high as we expected on the basis of their high participation in farm work. However, this does not necessarily mean that women are absent from farm decisions. Women do share moderate to high amounts of decisions with their husbands pertaining to labor allocation, access to farm land and product selling. 0n the other hand, the decision-making responsibilities tend to be male dominated for decisions concerning technical and operational management. The pattern of women’s decision participation does not necessarily match their farm working patterns. As discussed earlier, women tend to make a bigger contribution to manual intensive work than to managerial work. Nevertheless, they are likely to take less part in decisions related to production operation than to resource and business management. Consistent with the hypothesis, the most influential factor for 241 women to gain more decision participation is their participation in farm tasks (Table 9-3). That is, when women who do take part in a wide range of farm tasks, they are likely to take part in a wide range of farm decisions. Similarly, when women perform intensive farm work, they tend to share high intensity of farm decisions. The actual inputs of labor in farm production significantly determine the extent of farm decisions shared by women. The actual farm work participation confirms equity theory. The present study also supports the proposition in the family power process that conflict is an important drive for women to participate actively in the decision—making process, and does lead to women’s high authority in farm production. Women’s perception of their role in farm production is found to significantly predict their participation in farm decisions. As discussed in Chapter 7, the most important finding is that although many women do not take a significant part in decision-making, most of them are satisfied with their positions and unwilling to take a greater part. The survey data even suggests that women with deep involvement in decision making are not necessarily more satisfied with their decision participation than other women. In contrast, women with broad participation in decision making are more likely than others to be happy with their decisions. These findings reflect a curvilinear pattern of women’s evaluation of their participation in decision making across the depth and breadth of decision participation which partially supports the 242 Table 9-3: A Summary of the Prediction of Women’s Involvement in Farm Decisions Relative to Original Hypotheses Breadth Depth Predictors Hyppth1 Rsl2 Rsl ‘ Time Spent on Farm Work + - + Farm Task Breadth + +'" + Farm Task Depth + + +*** i Presence of Conflict + «Pm -"" . Family Composition Variables I Senior Family Member I - I - I - FamilyLife Stage(4) I ~ I ~ I ~ J Family 8 Farm Economy Variables 3 Net Farm Income ~ ~ ~ Other Family Labor - - -*“ Hired Labor - - Individual Monetary Resource ( IWife’s Off-farm Employment I O I + I IHusband’s Off-farm Employment I 0 I + I + ISubjective Human Resource Patriarchal Role Beliefs I - - I - Self-identity I + ,6" I .** Objective Human Resource Wife’s Education 4+ + - Square of Age/Experience + - - Farm Trainin Involvement .....i.-_-.___ “j; _-_______+- FAQ. Nypoth: Original Hypothesis, + is positive relationsh p, - is a negative relationship. 2. Rsl: Results, + is a positive relationship, - is a negative relationship. * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. m Simificant at the .001 level. theoretical hypothesis. A closer examination of women’s motivation to increase their part in 243 decision-making suggests that most of the women are unwilling to take a greater part in decision making. The ethnographic data suggests that this is mostly because of the presence of family labor and off-farm employment. However, it is also true that women who are active in negotiation are likely to be satisfied with their decision participation as predicted by the theory of family power process. 111. Do Women Get Rewarded for their Hard Work on the Farm? Having realized women’s high participation in farm work and relatively low participation in farm decisions, the next question is whether women get equitable amounts of farm rewards. Among four dimensions of farm rewards, this study suggests that a high proportion (97 percent) of women do not receive wages for their hard work; they do not have ownership of farm property (83 percent); nor do they participate in credit programs (90 percent). Most of the women who receive little or no reward, either do not care about credit, wages, or ownership, or do not view them as a form of reward. Most of the women feel either satisfied or partially satisfied with not receiving wages (67 percent and 13 percent). Most of the women do not really care about whether they join credit programs because of a pragmatic reason; whether she or her husband applies for it makes no difference for the family farm. Furthermore, most of the women tend to be content with their current position in property ownership. However, with respect to the fourth dimension of farm reward -- control over farm incomes, this study suggests that around half of the women (53.4 percent) have little or no control power over income 244 allocation, and the other half have at least equal control over the farm income. Income control is the only frequent reward. However, it is also real that some of those women even with equal power over income are still submissive to their husbands in the name of trust in husbands, altruism and family survival. To the extent that there is any complaint about their subordination, some of them are not satisfied with the restricted allowance they receive from their husbands. Given that women are unlikely to be highly rewarded, it is also true, as the regression results suggest, that women who work harder or who decide more get more rewards (Table 9-4). First, with higher participation in farm work (especially in terms of the range of participation), women are likely to gain greater access to long-term rewards (including ownership, credit involvement and income control). This finding supports equity theory in that the actual participation in productive work leads to desired rewards they deserve. Second, another important factor which would get women an equitable share of farm rewards is their decision participation in terms of intensity. This study suggests that women who share deeper decisions would be likely to share more long-term rewards. This finding supports social equity thesis in that women’s decision participation would lead them to get access to equitable rewards. In addition to economic rewards, the ethnographic data also suggest that more than half of the women do identify some non-economic rewards such as self-employment, self-actualization in the productive 245 Table 9-4: A Summary of the Prediction of Women’s Long-term Farm Rewards Relative to Original Hypotheses Hypotheses Results Farm Decision Breadth + + I Farm Decision Depth + ' ‘ Time Spent on Farm Work 0 + , Farm Task Breadth 0 +" I Farm Task Depth 0 ~ 1 Presence of Conflict + - lFamily & Farm Economy Variables Net Farm Income IHired Labor Individual Monetary Resource I ... Wife’s Off-farm Employment I Husband’s Off-farm Employment I - I + Objective Human Resource Wife’s Education + + Husband’s Education + + Square of Age/Experience + - Farm Trainin Involvement + __j;__ g * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level. sphere, and altruism. They see being a self-employed farmer as meaningful for them because it implies personal freedom in the work site and the security of a family business. On the other hand, women in the self-actualization category are simply content with having a good harvest, being able to develop their own sphere of career, and making good and honest friends around. Finally, altruism is another reason why women are comfortable being the major contributor to the family business 246 'regardless of economic rewards. They put much more emphasis on Inaintaining harmonious marital relations and on the concern about the next generation. The only things which dissatisfy women are related to farming itself. This dissatisfaction mostly comes from the low and unstable incomes from farming as a career and from the physical difficulty in doing farm work. IV. A Summary of Women’s Diverse Experience in Vegetable Production? On average, women vegetable growers in Taiwan do a lot of farm work, but share relatively low farm authority and low autonomy in land ownership and credit program involvement. Accordingly, there is overall gender inequality for women as a whole. The majority of the women are not getting what they ought to get in terms of farm decisions and two dimensions of long-term farm rewards on the basis of their high participation in farm work. Nevertheless, for a particular group of women, when they do the most work and share the most decisions, they tend to get the most rewards. That is, it is also real that there maybe some equity or at least distributional equity within the women. Take the control over income allocation as an example; in some ways, there is equity in this particular dimension of farm rewards. The argument of distributional equity leads us to ask in what ways we can understand vegetable production in the context of Taiwanese farm women. Grounded in the results of the study, diverse groups of women would be easy to distinguish. To characterize the different experiences 247 among Taiwanese women, this study takes all the important variables depicted earlier into account, and suggests four possible groups of the women with distinct characteristics as follows. First, in the 303 women, there are a group of about 20 women (5.9 percent) who might be considered professional vegetable growers (Table 9-5). This group of women do almost a full range of tasks (mean score is 85.3), are highly devoted their time to the farm work (8.9 hours on average), and have high intensity in task participation (mean score is 78). They share an extremely high proportion of farm decisions (mean score is 93) and are deeply involved in the decisions in which they do participate (depth score is 65.6). They are more likely to get access to long-term rewards (mean a .946). These women consider themselves independent farmers and have a slightly lower patriarchal role beliefs than other women (mean score is 2.41). They regard vegetable production as their field of specialty. The profound involvement in agricultural production is what they want for their career life; from it they can get their money and do what they want to do. Therefore, farming means a lot to them. Low task and decision participation and low rewards are not going to satisfy them at all. Second, there are a group of about 70 women (23.8 percent) who only want to be farm partners or managers, but not independent farmers (Table 9—5). Their time committed to farm work is moderate (8.3 hours a day) compared with other women. The breadth of task participation is lower than the professional group (mean score is 64.7), and the depth of task participation (mean score 30) is low. They are moderate in breadth 248 . Table 9-5: The Typology of Farm Women in Vegetable Farming . Independent Partner/ . Self-Identity Producer manager Farm Helper* Homemaker L * Work Hours 3.9" 8.3 9.1 7.3 lWork Breadth 85.3 64.7 50.0 34.5 Work Depth 78.0 30.0 34.0 36.0 I Work Satisfaction .22 .50 .40 .33 IDecision Breadth 93.0 78.0 54.0 45.0 Decision Depth 65.6 25.4 21.0 25.6 Decision Satisfaction .94 1.58 1.42 1.29 Long-Term Rewards .946 .465 .362 .290 Patriarchal Role Beliefs 2.41 2.45 2.66 2.65 Total Cases 18 72 161 52 (mean score 78) and depth (mean score 25.4) of decision participation and long-term farm rewards (mean = .465). This group of women see themselves as farm managers or full partners and are a bit higher in patriarchal role beliefs than the professional group (mean - 2.45). For them, the point of satisfaction is 50-50 sharing of farm work, decisions and rewards. In fact, they are the group of women who are mostly satisfied with their participation in farm work, decisions and rewards. They do not treat farming as their independent activity. They are happy with the partnership with their husbands in the family farm enterprise. . Third, the majority of Taiwanese vegetable farm women, about half of the women in the sample, are those who are only assistants in the family farm business (table 9-5). Their time spent on the farm is very 249 high compared to other women (mean - 9.1 hours a day). They participate in a smaller proportion of farm tasks than the partner-manager group (mean score 50); they are not deeply involved in those tasks (depth score 34). They share 50 percent of decisions but are not deeply involved in those decisions (mean - 34). They share relatively low amount of long-term farm rewards (mean - .362). This group of women are relatively high in patriarchal beliefs (mean score 2.66) and view themselves farm helpers. They may complain about the heavy workload and expect to have a equal share of decisions. However, concerning vegetable production, it is their way to contribute their labor to the family farm. For them, vegetable production is one piece of the whole family strategy. Compared to other women, they are not in vegetable production because of self-actualization but because their sense of their value comes from being able to contribute to family survival. Therefore, they are quite comfortable with being exploited in the participation in farm work and being dominated in farm decisions. Finally, the rest of about 50 women (17.2 percent) share many characteristics with the helper group but are much more home oriented (Table 9-5). In comparison with other women, this group of women spend the smallest amount of time on the farm (7.3 hours a day), do the smallest proportion of farm tasks (mean score 34.5) but are moderate in the intensity of task participation (mean score 36). They share a smallest proportion of farm decisions (mean score 45) but are median in the depth of decision participation (35.6). They are low in the share of long—term farm rewards (mean = .290). This group of women consider themselves housekeepers and have high 250 patriarchal beliefs as the farm helper group has. They do not really care about taking more part in either farm work or decisions. Similar to the farm helper group, they enjoy their role in the private sphere but help their husbands when their husbands need a hand. They are altruistic and care primarily about maintaining family well-being. Given these groups of women, we can see women who are not satisfied for different reasons. For example, we can see some women who look like the women in the professional group, but are not happy because of too much burden of the load in farm work and decisions. The survey data suggests that among those women who identify themselves independent farm producers, 50 percent do not enjoy farming but feel exploited. At the same time, it is also possible that some women in the group of farm helpers are not happy because of low participation in farm work and farm decisions. In the in-depth interview, Ho considers herself a farm helper and is moderate in patriarchal role beliefs (2.61) with 26 years of farm experience. She takes part in the full range of farm decisions (breadth score 100) but has not been deeply involved in those decisions (depth score 30). 'I worked hard and decided many things around the farm.... but I’d like to take a rest... because they kept me too busy .... I even dreamed that my son was grown up already and could help with farm work and decisions." V. Implications and Suggestions The major contribution of this study is linking of microeconomic theoretical accounts (the new home economics model, the bargaining and cooperative conflict models, and human capital theory) with macro- ideological accounts (patriarchy, family farming, and agrarianism) into 251 a household dynamic framework to explain farm women’s economic position. In addition to the application of the integrated theoretical framework, this study applies a multi-method approach to the study of farm women. The results of this study give many aspects of support to the importance of each theory in the integrative model and also open debates for future research. A. Conceptual Implications and Suggestions First of all, the experience of Taiwanese vegetable farming women fails to support the hypotheses derived from human capital theory that working experience would translate into women’s economic power in the farm family (Table 9-2 and Table 9—3). The difficulties come from the dualistic conception of productive and reproductive spheres and the relationship between the two. Different from working women in the non- agricultural sector, women’s contributions to agriculture are hardly recognized because the family farm is organized and operated within the household as the unit of production. That is, women’s work in the production of commodities for the market is performed outside the wage— labor market/productive sphere (Sachs 1988). As farm women’s work on the family farm does not conveniently fit into the categories of labor market/productive or non-labor market/reproductive activities, their contributions to family-based agriculture could not be monetarily measured and so are not translated into women’s economic power in the family as human capital theory would predict (Whatmore 1991). I Second, this study supports the importance of equity theory. The actual investment of labor participation would translate into women’s 252 decision power and rewards in farm production (Table 9-3 and Table 9-4). Third, the study suggests that subjective power resources are very important in assisting farm women to achieve equitable economic power. Women’s self-devaluation tends to reinforce their altruism for the survival of the family farm. It certainly consistently provides the husband with an uncontested position to hold the vested authority, and consequently weakens women’s bargaining position in the family (Szinovacz 1987; Dwyer and Bruce 1989; Morris 1990). However, this study also suggests that a very small group of women are very self-assertive and self-reliant. They, to the contrary, present a very important example to other women that positive subjective power resources do matter for their economic power in farm production. They are also an example of challenging the stereotype of women imposed on them, that is, the view that women are more emotional and less rational than men; they are an argument against most justifications for the exclusion of women from agricultural activities. This study fails to confirm the significance of another dimension of subjective power resource -- patriarchal role beliefs. Based on the correlation between patriarchal role beliefs and self-identity (r - - 0.3, significant at .001 level), the patriarchal role orientation may operate through self-identity to affect participation in economic power. Fourth, this study presents the importance of the cooperative conflict model which emphasizes not only individual but also collective interests. That is, Taiwanese women’s subordination in on-farm negotiation suggests that many theories are faulty in treating the family as a production unit but ignoring the possibility of internal 253 conflicts and diverse decision making processes (Bruce and Dwyer 1988). At the same time, Taiwanese women’s experience also implies that the family definitely is a consensually operating unit in which different individual interests finally turn neglected (outweighed by collective interests), even though husbands play the dominant role in the negotiation. This fact further brings us back to the criticism of the Home Economics Model and Family Adaptation Theory which many feminist scholars have argued about. That is, the family strategy perspective which takes the family as an unproblematic unit with overwhelming voluntarism and an implicit assumption of consensual decision making misleads our analysis of marital power relations (Morris 1990). In order to make sense of marital power relations or power relations among family members, individual accounts are equally important for the family adaptive strategy approach in which family adaptation is assume to benefit each member in the family. Furthermore, this study does investigate, from women’s perspective, how women and their husbands experience and value conflict, and communicate and resolve the conflict -- an important component of the farm decision process. However, it is limited in exploring gender differentials in perceptions of farm decisions, and the extent of the actual participation in those farm decision. It certainly lacks the examination from husbands’ perspective of husbands’ and wives’ roles in the farm decision making process. This leads to another issue. Many of the other dimensions of the agrinubial process, such as prestige, love and affection, and mutual understanding, are not taken into account in the present study. Those 254 dimensions are especially important for research involving the marital bargaining process in which the couple certainly attempts to influence or modify each other’s perceptions. Fifth, the results of this study suggest that the effect of rural industrialization is minimal. However, it is still a regret that the important forces outside of the family are not explicitly explored, especially the structural accounts derived from political economy theory such as the effect of rural industrialization, economic opportunity, and the State on farm women’s role in farming. It is especially crucial to examine women’s role in family farming which appears to be a different form of economy distinct from political economy but, in fact, is surrounded by political economy. This form of family economy, as argued by Cheal, is called moral economy which has a close linkage with political economy (Cheal 1989). The important questions are then how we relate commercial farm family as commercial vegetable farm family to the moral economy? What is the link between a restrictively moral economy and political economy? How does political economy shape moral economy? How do women relate to this link? Sixth, although the inherent recursiveness of the agrinubial power model was not covered in the present study, the results of this study provide a well base for the on-going research concerning agrinubial power process. Longitudinal researches on agrinubial power process in Taiwanese Farm Family would be the ways to fulfill the analysis of recursiveness of marital power process. Some women selected from the current sample could be the same subjects of analysis. The analyses can be, from women’s perspective, whether women’s participation in 255 negotiation, farm work, and decisions and their farm rewards affect their role beliefs and role identity, their participation in off-farm employment, the use of other family labor and hired labor, and their involvement in domestic work. Similarly, those topics could be pursued from husbands’ perspective. No matter whose perspective it is, the central concern is the trajectory of a woman’s and/or her husband’s role in the power process concerning farm production. In this trajectory, we may find diverse or singular patterns power process. Finally, the application of the Westernized theories, especially human capital theory, requires additional investigation in the cross- cultural research. In the case of Taiwan which has been experiencing rapid social change (e.g., rural industrialization, agricultural modernization), cultural effects on Taiwanese personality are the important field to explore beyond economic and social explanations. According to Yang (1993), traditionality and modernity is possible to co-exist in the personality of Taiwanese. That is, from the social- cultural perspective, Taiwanese are kin-oriented; are very concerned with social relations which reflect self-identity; like to keep harmonies; are comfortable with being determined by destiny; and are patriarchal oriented. At the same time, the recent rise of individualism also arouses Taiwanese’s consciousness of gender equality, self-independence, and self-determinism. The co-existence of social-individualist personality was considered and designed in the measure of patriarchal role beliefs for the current study. However, this measure seems not to make a significant contribution to explain women’s role in vegetable production 256 from survey data. Given this, in the ethnographic data, in contrast, we still can find some threads of women’s traditionality and modernity orientation which produces their participation in negotiation, farm work, and farm decisions and their receipt of farm rewards. B. Methodological Implications and Suggestions The multi-method approach using both self-report surveys and in- depth long interviews with the subjects shows a significant contribution to understanding Taiwanese farm women’s experience. With respect to questionnaire design, the measurement of labor force participation used in this study not only covers the number of hours but also the possible variation of diversity and intensity of farm tasks. The strength of this design is that it leaves room for the flexibility of women’s participation in farm tasks. The measurement of decision participation also shares the strength of task participation. However, the problem with the power measures is that the amount, scope and extension of power outcomes require specification. The assumption behind the measurement in this study is that each decision is treated as equal and is weighted equally. But in fact, decisions have differential importance, and thus deserves differential weight. For example, a farm woman’s participation in a certain decision is a much more significant indicator of her involvement in decision-making than would be her participation in another decision. Therefore, to get a more exact sense of women’s decision participation, decisions should be weighted by importance. The way may be to ask a sample of farm women how they think about the differential significance 257 of different decisions, then develop a decision scale and test its reliability. In order to test the reliability, the development of this decision scale could be performed in a longitudinal form. Although this study employs in-depth interviews as a supplement to survey analysis, it is still questionable whether we can get the full trust of, and details information from, the 38 women we interviewed. Therefore, behavioral measures such as longitudinal participatory research seem needed in order to extend the observations and a longer and less structured interview. This approach is especially important for the study of the dynamics in the family power process in which the analysis of life course would provide a fruitful information. C. Programmatic Implications The results imply that Taiwanese farm women tend to be on the periphery of production in terms of work participation and decision participation. They need special attention to their capacity to access the agricultural welfare programs and extension service, especially those programs for promoting the quality of female human capital. While urban women receive welfare services or well-programmed on-the-job training, farm women’s subordination prevents them from a variety of opportunities for enhancing their capacity in and benefits from farm production (Sachs 1983; Saito and Spurling 1993). The women in this study are remote from the involvement in farm training and credit programs and from ownership of farm property. Therefore, it is I important for policy makers to pay more concern to this group of underestimated but hard working farm women. 258 It is also important for the future empirical research to analyze the impact of women’s farm work participation on family life and for the agricultural extension service to pay attention to home economics programs in which rural women usually participate (Elbert 1988). The current programs in home economics have well-programmed classes or clubs for rural women to learn to be a good homemaker. However, some programs for those hard working farm women to recognize their gender role in the farm family, to acknowledge their role in productive sphere, and to learn how to deal with the double day life (double workload -- domestic work and farm work) are needed. APPENDICES APPENDIX A OGDNGUI-FWNa—o 259 APPENDIX A A List of 37 Farm Tasks Plan cropping schedule Build up green house Prepare for multiplication Buy fertilizer Buy seeds Buy pesticides Sowing Water shoots Prepare fields for planting (plowing) . Set vegetable beds (bedding/furrowing) . Apply basic fertilizer . Transplant shoots . Cover crop . Apply pesticides/sprays . Weeding/cultivation . Regular watering . Apply additional fertilizer . Apply herbicides . Harvest/pick vegetables . Clean/wash vegetables . Run machinery or trucks . Check market price . Do farm bookkeeping . Gather production outlook information . Supervise farm work done by other family members . Prepare foods for workers on farm . Supervise farm work done by hired labor . Make purchases of farm equipment and machinery . Make purchases of minor machinery supplies . Fix green house . Major machinery overhauls . Minor machinery repairs . Keep equipment and tools organized . Sell products to retail market . Sell products to local market . Pay farm bills . Run errands APPENDIX B 260 APPENDIX B A List of Domestic Tasks Do Laundry Food shopping Make purchase of car, stereo etc. Prepare meals ' Clean table after meals Clean the house Keep track of household bills omummawNo—a Grocery shopping (tissue, tooth paste etc.) Home repairs (paint, decorate in the home) 10. Prepare food for religion festival (fair) 11. Go to temple for praying 12. Supervise kids doing school homework 13. Supervise kid’s progress in school 14. Educate kids 15. Take medical care of kids 16. Take care of garden 17. Mowing 18. Pay most of household bills 19. Clean garbage *** If you don’t have kids under six, 20. Take care of kids on eating, bathing etc. 21. Play with kids a as flowers are grown. In this Garden, only plants not for subsistence production such APPENDIX C sooowmm-the—n 261 APPENDIX C A List of 24 Farm Decisions Whether to adopt new variety of vegetable? Whether to grow a new vegetable? How much (area of) vegetable to grow? How much fertilizer to buy? Whether to try a new farm practice/technology? Which of several alternative practices to use? How to control vegetable insects? How to control vegetable weeds? How to control vegetable diseases? . How to fertilize? . How to water? . Whether to rent out land? . Whether to rent in land? . Whether to buy land ? . Whether to buy major farm equipment? . Whether to apply agricultural loan? . How to adjust the amount of products to sell? . Whether your husband to take off-farm job? . Whether you to take off—farm job? . Where to sell? . What price to sell at? . Whether to sell products to local market? . Whether to process some of produce? . Whether to hire labor? APPENDIX D tom N 0101 A (a) N 10. . Wives’ temper/mood should be rooted in cheering their husbands up. 12. 13. 14. 15 262 APPENDIX D A List of 23 Topics for Patriarchal Role Belief Scale . It would be much better if girls were educated primarily to be good wives and mothers. . A working mother can establish a warm or secure relationship with her children as a mother who doesn’t work. . Women’s a career is family so that married women should not have go to work. . Men are the hosts of families; all things in families should be decided by men. . Women had better not participate in political activities. . Women should obey their fathers before marriage and obey their husbands after marriage. . There is no different ability/capacity between women and men, so women should achieve the same social economic status as men do . Women should follow husbands’ ways to rear children. . The couple should have their own friends different from their another halves. A woman should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man. It is not bad if women take part in a high position in political office (such as majors, administers). Women can not always do a good job as men. Men should share the work around the house with women such as doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth. As long as women get married, they should always follow or listen to their husbands. They should admit their fortunes, no matter who or what their husbands are. . It is ridiculous that women don’t use husbands’ last name. . Husbands should not object if wives want to have a job . . Farm wife, if interested, could also be a good operator effectively managing the farm business. . The couple should not disturb their another halves on being alone, time management etc. . Both females and males should have equal opportunities of good education. . Husbands should not feel shame if wives have higher education or achievement than they do. . The purpose of marriage is to have offsprings in the interest of inheritance. . Marriage is not a trade, bride should not ask bridegroom for retaining fee. APPENDIX E 263 APPENDIX E QUESTIONNAIRES VEGETABLE FARM WOMEN SURVEY: THE CASE STUDY OF TAIWAN No. This is a survey about the concerns of farm women. The main purpose of the present study is to visualize women’s substantial contributions to agricultural production. It is expected that the claim to avoid women’s being obscured in many aspects will be achieved through this study. In this regard, your cooperation and support will be more than important for us to establish basic information about what you have done and what you haven’t gotten and should get in terms of rewards from production. This is a purely academic research, all results will be treated with strict confidence and you will remain anonymous in any report of research findings. If you request, we are very happy to provide you the results. Again, thank you very much for your help. Respondent’s Name: Respondent’s Address: Respondent’s Tel. No.: Date of Interview: Beginning of Interview: End of Interview: Interviewer’s Name: A. DIVISION OF FARM WORK AND DECISIONS: 1. How many hours in an active day you and your husband spend on the following activities categories? 264 Winter Summer Harvest season Non-harvest Harvest season Non-harvest season season Self Husband Self Husband Self Husband Self Husband ; Farming Domestic 1 work I Off-farm l. Employment _ j _ __ 2. Who is involved in the following farm tasks vegetables? Please specify, if there are other persons than you and your husband to take care of those farm tasks. Please also specify if there is no such a farm task. (AH: Always husband; UH: Usually Husband; BT: Both Together; AW: Always Wife; UW: Usually Wife; OT: Other; NA: No Such a Task). (1) Plan cropping schedule (2) Build up green house (3) Prepare for seedling (4) Buy fertilizer (5) Buy seeds (6) Buy pesticides (7) Sowing (8) Water shoots (9) Prepare fields for planting (plowing) (10) Set vegetable beds (bedding/furrowing) (11) Apply basic fertilizer (12) Transplant shoots (13) Cover crop (14) Apply pesticides/sprays (15) Weeding/cultivation (16) Regular watering (17) Apply additional fertilizer (18) Apply herbicides (19) Harvest/pick vegetables (20) Clean/wash vegetables (21) Run machinery or trucks HHHHHHHHI) I s—a p—ag—ap—ap—ag—ap—sg-a t—IO—lO—IO—IH NNNNN NNNNNNN N NNNNNNNNE wwwww wwwwwww w wwwwwwwwlg .he-454:» assess-4:45;: A Ahoeaoaalctz 0101me @GOO‘O‘O‘O’O Oi OOO’OOOOGO If-i I§ 4050904040 40404040404050 ‘0 40900505040400 265 AH UH 81 OW AW OT _NA (22) Check market price 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (23) Do farm bookkeeping 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (24) Gather production outlook information 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (25) Oversee farm work done by other family members 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (26) Prepare foods for workers on farm 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (27) Oversee farm work done by hired labor 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (28) Make purchases of farm equipment and machinery 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (29) Make purchases of minor machinery supplies 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (30) Fix green house 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (31) Major machinery overhauls 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (32) Minor machinery repairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (33) Keep equipment and tools organized 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (34) Sell products to retail market 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (35) Sell products to local market 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (36) Pay farm bills 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (37) Run errands 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 2.1 In general, how do you feel about the workload of above farm activities you have participated? (1) too heavy (2) About right amount (3) Not too heavy at all 2.2 Would you like to take a greater part in farm tasks? (1) Strongly no (2) No (3) Yes (4) Strongly yes 3. Who usually makes final decision on the following tasks? Please specify, if there are other persons than you and your husband making these decisions. Please also specify if there is no such a decision. (AH: Always husband; UH: Usually Husband; BT: Both Together; AW: Always Wife; UW: Usually Wife; OT: Other; NA: No Such a Decision). flfliflwflfli'fl (1) Whether to adopt new variety of vegetable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (2) Whether to grow a new vegetable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (3) How much (area of) vegetable to grow? 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 266 AH E B IE I? I9. Is (4) How much fertilizer to buy? 1 (5) Whether to try a new farm practice/technology? 1 (6) Which of several alternative practices to use? 1 (7) How to control vegetable insects? 1 (8) How to control vegetable weeds? ' l (9) How to control vegetable diseases? 1 (10) How to fertilize? 1 (11) How to water? 1 (12) Whether to rent out land? 1 (13) Whether to rent in land? 1 (14) Whether to buy land? 1 (15) Whether to buy major farm equipment? 1 (16) Whether to apply agricultural loan? 1 (17) How much to sell or store?l (18) Whether your husband to take off-farm job? 1 (19) Whether you to take off-farm job? 1 (20) Where to sell? 1 (21) What price to sell at? 1 (22) Whether to sell products to local market? 1 (23) Whether to process some of produce? 1 (24) Whether to hire labor? 1 MN N NNN N NN N NNNNNN N N N N N 004.0 on 000000 00 000) w wwwwww w (A) w w w h-h «h ##ufi -# h-b 4h ##fi-fihb «D -h «:fi 45 JD 0101 01 010101 01 0101 01 0141101010101 01 01 U1 0'! 0'! 01m 0" 010501 OS 0505 m 05016050101 as O1 01 Oi 0‘ II I III I II | MIN | | I II 4040 SD 40040 to £040 40 40405040040 40 40 SD 40 40 3.1 In general, how do you feel about the part you have in making above decisions? (1) too much (2) a bit much (3) About right amount (4) a bit little (5) too little 3.2 would you like to take a greater part in making these decisions? (1) Strongly no (2) No (3) Yes (4) Strongly Yes 3.2-1 If you disagree on increasing participation in decisions, what is the main reasons? 267 3.3 In general, is there any disagreement between you and your husband when you are making your final decision? (1) Yes (2) No 3.3-1 If yes, how do you and your husbands settle the disagreement? (1) we cannot settle the disagreement; there is no need to compromise. (2) we discuss and consult with each other, and find the most reasonable way to solve the disagreement. (3) we quarrel first, then reach a final decision. (4) we consult others or find mediators (5) other (please specify) B. DIVISION OF DOMESTIC WORK 1. Who is usually involved in the following house work? Please specify, if there are other persons than you and your husband to take care of those tasks. Please also specify if there is no such a task. (AH: Always husband; UH: Usually Husband; BT: Both Together; AW: Always Wife; UW: Usually Wife; OT: Other; NA: No Such a Task). MUHBTUWMOLJ (1) Do Laundry 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (2) Food shopping 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (3) Grocery shopping (daily necessities) 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (4) Make purchase of car, stereo, furniture etc. 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (5) Prepare three meals 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (6) Clean after meals 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (7) Clean the rooms 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (8) Finance bookkeeping 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (9) Remodeling house 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (10) Prepare things for worshiping (sacrifices of chicken, port ..etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (11) Take part in worshiping 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (12) Keep kid’s company in doing homework I 2 3 4 5 6 9 (13) Supervise kid’s progress in school 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (14) Raise kids (discipline) 1 2 3 4 5 6 - 9 (15) Medical care of kids 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (16) Flower gardening 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (17) Mowing 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (18) Pay household bills 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (19) Throw garbage 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 268 All 111:! Bl Ill! 8! SILL—NA *** If you don’t have kids under six, please skip to question 1.1 (20) Take care of young kids (feeding, bathing etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 (21) Play with your kids 1 2 3 4 5 1.1 In general, how do you feel about the part you have in above domestic tasks? (1) too much (2) a bit much (3) About right amount (4) a bit little (5) No, too little 1.2 would you like your husband to take a greater part in domestic tasks? (1) Strongly No (2) No (3) Yes (4) Strongly Yes 2. As a farm woman, what following position do you see yourself: (1) Farm homemaker: A woman whose main farm activities involve running errands and traditional homemaking chores (2) Agricultural helper: A woman who participates in agricultural production mainly during busy time (3) Business manager: A woman whose main responsibilities are bookkeeping, information gathering, and financial decision-making, but her husband is the primary farm operator (4) Full agricultural partner: A woman who shares equal work, responsibilities, or decision-making on all aspects of farm operation with her husband (5) Independent agricultural producer: A woman who manages the farm largely by herself 269 C. GENERAL FARM BACKGROUND: 1. Please tell us about your farm? Vegetable farm Non-vegetable farm Green house* No green house Own Rented Rented Own out in Rented Rented Own Rented Rented . out in in out Chia Fen $m@m . _ ..---.._ . 2. If you have green house on vegetable farm, please tell us what kind? 3. What major types of vegetables are you growing? (Multiple choice) (1) Cabbage (3) Small Chinese cabbage (5) Green stem Chinese cabbage (7) Leaf Mustard (9) Celery (11) Spinach (13) Cole (15) Crown daisy (2) Chinese cabbage (4) Small green Chinese cabbage (6) Cabbage mustard (8) Lettuce (10) Amaranth (12) Water spinach (14) Leaf of sweet potato (16) Other 4. How many percent of vegetable production is for your family consumption? 0 IO 20 30 4O 50 60 7O 80 90 100 ----+ ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + ----- + 5. What was the gross incomes from vegetable production in 1993? (1) None (3) NTS 50,000 to 100,000 (5) NTS 200,000 to 300,000 (7) NTS 400,000 to 500,000 (9) NTS 600,000 to 700,000 (11) NTS 800,000 to 900,000 (2) Less than NTS 50,000 (4) NTS 100,000 to 200,000 (6) NTS 300,000 to 400,000 (8) NT$ 500,000 to 600,000 (10) NTS 700,000 to 800,000 (12) NTS 900,000 to 1,000,000 (13) NTS 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 (14) NTS 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 (15) NTS 1,200,000 and over 270 6. What was the net incomes from vegetable production in 1993? (1) Lost more than NTS 500,000 (2) Lost NTS 250,000 to 500,000 (3) Lost NTS 100,000 to 250,000 (4) Lost NTS 1 to 100,000 (5) Broken even (6) Made NTS 50,000 or less (7) Made NTS 50,000 to 100,000 (8) Made NTS 100,000 to 150,000 (9) Made NTS 150,000 to 200,000 (10) Made NTS 200,000 to 250,000 (11) Made NTS 250,000 to 500,000 (12) Made NTS 500,000 to 750,000 (13) Made NTS 750,000 to 1,000,000(14) Made NTS 1,000,000 or more 7. In 1993, how much interest did you or your husband pay on all loans, both personal and farm loans? (1) None (2) Less than NTS 1,000 (3) NTS 1,000 to 5,000 (4) NTS 5,000 to 10,000 (5) NTS 10,000 to 15,000 (6) NTS 15,000 to 20,000 (7) NTS 20,000 to 30,000 (8) NTS 30,000 to 40,000 (9) NTS 40,000 to 50,000 (10) NT$ 50,000 to 100,000 (11) NTS 100,000 to 200,000 (12) NTS 200,000 to 500,000 (13) NTS 500,000 or more 8. Do you think you get regular pay from your farm work? (1) No (Please go on question 8.1 and 8.1.1, then skip to question 9) 8.1 If no,]do you interchange farm labor with other family farm abor? (1) No (Please skip to question 9) (2) Yes 8.1.1 If yes, how many days per week you work on other family farm? (2) Yes (Please go on question 8.2 and 8.2.1 or 8.2.2) 8.2 If yes, how much? On your own farm On other’s farm Days/week NTS/day Days/week INTS/day 8.2.1 Are you satisfied with the pay you get from the work on your own farm? (1) very dissatisfied (2) dissatisfied (3) undecided (4) satisfied (5) very satisfied 271 8.2.2 Are you satisfied with the pay you get from the work on other’s farm? (1) very dissatisfied (2) dissatisfied (3) undecided (4) satisfied (5) very satisfied 8.3 How do you and your husband do with the money from the sale of the vegetables? (1) deposit into the joint bank account or invest in other businesses in joint name (2) deposit into my own bank account or invest in other businesses in my own name (3) deposit into my husband’s bank account or invest in other businesses in his name (4) use it for expenditures of the family (5) other, 8.4 Who decided the allocation of incomes from vegetable production decided? 9. Do you hire any labor on your farm (including contract work)? (1) No (2) Yes (Please skip to question 10 if the answer is no) 9.1 If yes, how many contract laborers worked on your farm in 1993? and How many days did they work in a week? Male Female Tasks Persons Days Persons Days Plowing Sowing Spraying I Harvesting Other 10. Do you have legal sole or joint ownership of this farm business including farm land, farm house or others separate from land and house? (1) Yes (Please skip to question 11) (2) Still pending (Please skip to question 12) (3) No (Please go on question 10.2; 10.2.1) 10.1 If not, why? (1) Did not think it necessary (2) All is taken care of by husband (3) Some other reasons: 272 10.1.1 Do you ever think about making the ownership of farm business under your own name? (1) Yes (2) No 11. Are you a formal partner, shareholder or director of any agribusiness or cooperatives? (1) No (2) Yes 11.1 If yes, do you think you are treated fairly by the other members? _(1) No (2) Not sure (3) Yes 11.1.1 If no, in what way do you think you treated unfairly? 12. Did you ever receive, inherit, be bequeathed or buy any farm land or farm business assets? (If no, please skip to question 13) Yes No Land Business assets 12.1 If yes, what have you done with any land or business assets which have come into your ownership? (1) Sold it; and put the earnings into my own bank account or invest other enterprise under my own name (2) Sold it; and share the earnings with my whole family (3) Transfer the legal ownership to husband (4) Still keep the ownership; but my husband takes full charge of it (5) Not only keep the ownership but also take full charge of it (6) Still keep the ownership; and my husband and I take charge of it (7) Other, 13. Did you ever apply agricultural loan or subsidies in your name? (1) No (2) Yes 13.1 If yes, who manages the finances? (1) my husband (2) myself (3) my son (4) others D. SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION ACTIVITIES: 1. Are you a member of Farmers’ Association? (1) No (2) Yes 2. Are you a member of vegetable farming group in Farmers’ Association? (1) No (2) Yes 273 3. Are you a member of vegetable/fruit cooperative? (1) No (2) Yes 4. Have you had farmer health insurance? (1) No (2) Yes 5. Are you a member of Home Economics Group in Farmers’ Association? (1) No If No, what not? (2) Yes If yes, how frequently have you involved in the following activities in the past five years? n a e some l v times w e a r y s a. Regular member meeting 1 2 3 4 5 b. Training (seminar) 1 2 3 4 5 c. Experience demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 d. Method demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 e. Result demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 f. Symposium (group discussion) 1 2 3 4 5 9. Social gatherings (tours, sports, cultural activities etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 h. Personal contact with extension agents 1 2 3 4 5 i. Other 1 2 3 4 5 6. Are you a member of 4-H group in Farmers’ Association? (1) No (2) Yes (If no, please skip to question 7) 6.1 If yes, have you ever involved in farming sub-group? (1) No (2) Yes 6.1.1 If yes, what kind of farming sub-group are you in? (1) Flower (2) Fruit (3) Vegetables (4) Staple crop (5) Livestock (6) Other 274 7. In the past five years, how frequently have you participated in the activities held by Farming Research Group in Farmers’ Association? n a e some l v times w e a r y s a. Regular member meeting 1 2 3 4 5 b. Training (Seminar) 1 2 3 4 5 c. Experience demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 d. Method demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 e. Result demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 f. Symposium (Group discussion) 1 2 3 4 5 9. Social gatherings (tours, sports, cultural activities etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 h. Personal contact with extension agents 1 2 3 4 5 i. Other 1 2 3 4 5 8. How frequently have you participated in lectures, seminars or training courses held by the institutes other than Farmers’ Association (such as, District Farm Station, Agricultural Experimental Research Center, agricultural college or agricultural related company etc.)? n a e some l v times w e a r Y s a. The knowledge of safe use of pesticides l 2 3 4 5 b. Machinery demonstration 1 2 3 4 5 c. Management and practices of pesticides 1 2 3 4 5 d. Techniques of building green house 1 2 3 4 S e. Application of fertilizer l 2 3 4 5 f. Management of vegetables growing 1 2 3 4 5 9. Marketing 1 2 3 4 5 h. Farm Tours 1 2 3 4 5 i. Other 1 2 3 4 5 275 9. Have you involved in social activities in 1993? n a e some l v times w e a r y s a. Annual member meeting of community 1 2 3 4 5 b. Vote 1 2 3 4 5 c. Volunteers of local community affairs 1 2 3 4 5 d. Religion activities 1 2 3 4 5 e. Annual member meeting of Farmers’ Association 1 2 3 4 5 f. Women Association 1 2 3 4 5 9. Other 1 2 3 4 5 E. We would like to know your opinion on the following statements which are excerpted from newspapers, magazines, and books. (50: strongly disagree; 0: Disagree; U: undecided; A: Agree; SA: strongly Agree.) SD 0 U A SA (1) Girls receive education in order to become a good wife good mother 1 2 3 4 5 (2) Working mothers can establish a warm or secure relationship with their children as non-working (14) Men should share household chores with women such as washing dishes, doing laundry, cooking 1 mothers do 1 2 3 4 5 (3) Women’s career is within the family; married women should not go out to work 1 2 3 4 5 (4) Men are the hosts of the family; family decisions should be decided by men 1 2 3 4 5 (5) Whatever said, women had better not to be involved in political activities 1 2 3 4 5 (6) Women should obey their fathers before marriage and obey their husbands after marriage 1 2 3 4 5 (7) Women’s ability/capacity is not so bad as men’s; they should have the same social status as men do 1 2 3 4 5 (8) Wives should follow husbands’ ways to discipline children 1 2 3 4 5 (9) Wife and husband should have their own respective friends 1 2 3 4 5 (10) Women and men should have the same opportunity to work 1 2 3 4 5 (11) Wives should do what she can to please their ' husbands 1 2 3 4 5 (12) It is not bad for women to be administers 1 2 3 4 5 (13) Women’s working ability and efficiency are always less than men 1 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 276 SD 0 U A SA (15) Married with a chick, follow the chick; married with a dog, follow the dog. Whether the husband is good or bad,the wife should always follow him 1 2 (16) It is a ridiculous idea for a married woman not to put her husband’s last name on her name 1 2 (17) Husbands should not object if wives want to go out to work 1 2 (18) Farm women, if interested, could also be excellent farm operators 1 2 (19) Wife and husband should have their own individual time,without interference from each other 1 (20) Women and men should have equal opportunity to receive a good education 1 (21) Husbands should be ashamed if wives have higher education or achievement than they do 1 (22) The purpose of marriage is to breed offsprings in the interest of inheritance (23) Marriage is not a trade, bride should not ask bridegroom for retaining fee 1 00030003 chub-huh 01010101 NNNNN wwwww «hhh-Dtb 010101014)! F. FAMILY COMPOSITION: 1. How many children in the following age categories do you have in your family? (If none, please put a "O" in the blank, and skip to question 2) Male Female Live in Not live in Live in Not live in a. Less than 1 year b. 1 - 3 years c. 3 - 6 years d. 6 - 12 years e. 12 - 18 years f. 18 & over 1.1 How many children have paid jobs? Male persons; Female persons 2. Do your children work on this farm? (1) No (2) Yes (If no, please skip to question 3) 2.1 If yes, how many? Male persons; Female persons 277 3. Are there other members in the family except for your husband and children help on this farm? (1) No (2) Yes (If no, please skip to next section) 3.1 If yes, how many? what is their relations with you? Relation Persons G. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: 1. Your age: . Your husband’s age: 2. Your education (If not graduated, please specify) (1) None (2) Elementary school (3) Junior high school (4) Senior high school or vocational school (5) College and University (6) Graduate school 3. Your husband’s education (If not graduated, please specify) (1) None (2) Elementary school (3) Junior high school (4) Senior high school or vocational school (5) College and University (6) Graduate school 4. How long have you been married? 5. How long have you been farming? 5.] Are your parents (father or mother) farmers? (1) No (2) Yes 5.2 Did you grow up on a farm? (1) No (2) Yes 5.3 Did you work on a farm while growing up? (1) No (2) Yes 6. How long have you been living on this farm? 278 7. Do you currently have any paid off-farm job? (Off-farm job is work done off your own farm or work for pay or profit done at home that is separate from your farming) (1) No (Please answer question 7.1 and 7.1.1) 7.1 If no, did you have any paid off—farm job before your marriage? (1) No (2) Yes 7.1.1 If yes, what kind of job is it? (1) Agriculture (2) Industrial sector (3) Commercial industry (4) Officer in public administration (5) Teacher (6) Service industry (7) Building (8) Transportation (9) Other (2) Yes (Please answer questions 7.2, 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) 7.2 If yes, what kind of job is it? (1) Agriculture (2) Industrial sector (3) Commercial industry (4) Officer in public administration (5) Teacher (6) Service industry (7) Building (8) Transportation (9) Other 7.2.1 How long have you worked on this job? years months days 7.2.2 What is the salary for this job? NTS per month/day ' 8. Do your husband currently have any paid off-farm job? (1) No (2) Yes (If no, please skip to question 9) 8.1 If yes, what kind of job is it? (1) Agriculture (2) Industrial sector (3) Commercial industry (4) Officer in public administration (5) Teacher (6) Service industry (7) Building (8) Transportation (9) Other 8.1.1 How long has he worked on this job? ears months days 8.1.2 What is the salary for his job? NTS per month/day 9. 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