STRIKING THE FEDERAL BARGAIN IN RUSSIA: COMPARATIVE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT

STRIKING THE FEDERAL BARGAIN IN RUSSIA: COMPARATIVE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

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This dissertation investigates variation in the expressed positions of the eighty-nine state governments and their publics within Russia with regard to their preferred federal-constitutional order. The positions of the state leaders and their constituencies are classified along a regional autonomy continuum, ranging from complete independence to a unitary state. Events data are gathered from two sources for the period 1991-95 to classify the behavior of state elites and their publics along this five-item index. Propositions derived from essentialist, instrumentalist, relative deprivation and resource mobilization schools are tested to determine which have the most explanatory power in predicting the behavior of both elites and the masses in the regions. Multinomial logit is used because the dependent variables, median scores on the autonomy index for both elites and the masses, are bounded and categorical.

While none of the theories is powerful on its own, a combined model predicts nearly two-thirds of state elite behavior. The combined model suggests that leaders of states with natural resource wealth and a high potential for the development of a separate national identity yet, are still critically depressed, are most likely to demand high levels of autonomy from the Center. Among the masses, the most interesting findings were the non-findings. There was little congruence between the preferences of the masses and their

governors, and mass preferences were not a significant factor in explaining elite behavior. Additionally, economic stagnation had a non-monotonic effect on the masses. Among the Russian publics, it pushed them to express preferences for a strong Center. Among the non-Russian peoples, however, stagnation pushed them in a more radical, autonomy-seeking direction.

The final chapter investigates the role of the Center in the formation of these regional government strategies. This examination revealed some fluidity in the expressed positions of leaders in response to Central actions, indicating the need to include factors such as issue area and the ambitions of local leaders in future analyses.

To Matt and Ben, thanks for waiting for me.

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And last, but not least, I would like to thank my husband and my son, for their boundless patience, love and support. Without them, this might have been possible, but not nearly so worthwhile.

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Introduction and Central Research Question

October 1991 -- General Dzhokar Dudayev wins controversial election to the new Chechen Republic Presidency. His first decree proclaims the sovereignty of the Chechen state. His first press release expresses his readiness to engage in a conflict with Russia, since he "does not intend to betray the freedom and sovereignty of the new state entity." (CDSP, Vol. XLIII, No. 43).

March 1992 -- President Shaimiyev of Tatarstan holds popular referendum on sovereignty, which 61% of the voters supported. Shaimiyev announces he cannot sign Federal Treaty with Russia, and demands a separate treaty as befits relations between two independent states. (CDSP, Vol. XLIV, No. 16).

July 1993 -- "Carrying out the will of the multinational people of Sverdlovsk Province, striving to create an effective federal structure for Russia based on equal rights for its members, and defending the rights of citizens of all nationalities, the Sverdlovsk Province Soviet of People's Deputies declares the elevation of the status of Sverdlovsk Province to the level of a republic within the Russian Federation (Urals Republic)." (CDSP, Vol. XLV, No. 27).

October 1993 -- President Yeltsin issues Decree 1617 demanding that all members of the federation disband existing Soviets and hold new elections to new assemblies, with the federal administration overseeing it. The decree does not apply to the Republics, who are merely "encouraged" to reform their local bodies of power. (CDSP, Vol. XLV, No. 41).

February 1994 -- Russia and Tatarstan sign a separate bi-lateral treaty, in which Tatarstan agrees to drop the clause "sovereign state subject to international law," in exchange for very generous tax terms. (CDSP, Vol. XLVI, No. 10).

December 1995 -- 10,000 plus Russian Interior Ministry troops enter Chechnya to halt armed resistance to its membership in the federation.

As the events described above demonstrate, the disintegration of the multinational Soviet Empire has afforded the numerous distinct ethnic and regional formations in Russia a new range of opportunities for increased autonomy and for some, the possibility of self-rule. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms not only unleashed separatist forces in the fifteen union republics, but within Russia itself as well. Some observers believe these centrifugal

forces will result in the break-up of the Russian state as they did the Soviet one, while others suggest that the spectre of such a possibility will in and of itself bring about a return to authoritarian rule to rein in regional demands.

In considering the relationship between transitions to democracy and the territorial integrity of the state undergoing such transitions, Przeworski *et al.*, argue that "institutional failure at the center provides a context in which regionally based nationalists can effectively mobilize to promote an autonomy movement."[1] Certainly the collapse of the main centralizing organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided just such a context for nationalists in the former Union Republics, and each of them successfully took advantage of it and achieved independence at the end of 1991. The rebels in Chechnya have not been as successful in their bid to attain independent status from the newly formed Russian Federation.

Yet the choice of "opting out" of a federation with Russia remains only one choice for the various ethnic and regional formations in Russia, and in fact, the majority of the administrative units within this vast territory have not sought independence in the wake of the center's collapse. So while Przeworski may be right to suggest that institutional collapse at the center is a necessary precondition to predicting the rise of peripheral nationalism, it is not a sufficient condition. To borrow from the language of Charles Tilly (1978), institutional collapse at the Center may provide "opportunity" but not necessarily

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[1]Przeworksi, Adam, et al., eds., *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 22.

"mobilization," which depends on group "resources" and "organization."[2] And indeed, most of the members of the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) have instead chosen to negotiate, largely in terms of political and economic decision-making autonomy from the new center. Secessionist wars, then, are one potential form of conflict among groups competing for power, but they are not the most common form we observe.

The central research goal of this project is to identify the factors related to a state's "federal bargain" with the center. Why, for example, has Buryatia remained a relatively loyal ethnic republic, with few public demonstrations for increased autonomy or elite demands for concessions from the center, while Chechens have waged war to defend their right to independence? Why have the political elite in Sverdlovsk pushed so hard for greater local political and economic autonomy, continuously defying decrees from the Center, while the Kursk territorial elite consistently supports arrangements akin to the centralized rule of a unitary state?

In her thoughtful, qualitative assessment of center-periphery relations in Russia since 1991, Gail Lapidus asserts that "...no single indicator is available for assessing the seriousness of the challenge to the center from a particular area."[3] This project challenges that assertion, and at the very least, seeks to falsify it empirically with data gathered from the regions in Russia.

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[2]Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, (Englewood Hills, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), p. 7.

[3]Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia," in Gail Lapidus, ed., *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 104.

FEDERALISTS, ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Bargaining between the Center and the periphery refers to bargaining between the central executive authority under Boris Yeltsin and the regional governments of each of the constitutionally defined 89 "members" of the federation over the distribution of power and authority between the Center and the regions. Historically, during state-building "constitutional assemblies" or "conventions," some actors argue for a strong union while others argue for the primacy of the state over the center. In his case study of the origins of American federalism, Riker (1964) argued that the state actors who supported federal arrangements did not do so out of a philosophical desire to guarantee social freedom or to promote democracy in the ideal, as is often suggested by the early American theorists. Instead, Riker argues, proponents of federalism advocated it as a strategy to protect the territory from an external military threat, or as a means of territorial expansion.[4] For him, the elites interested in strengthening the power of the federal center were not "ideologically" concerned with liberty and freedom *per se*, but with practical issues of national security or economic well-being. While Riker's work attempted to get at the origins of federal states and federalism in existing states, his framework is useful for this investigation as it provides a means for understanding and interpreting the actions of state elites and their publics vis-a-vis the center elsewhere.

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[4]Riker suggests that the center offers the bargain in order to expand without the use of force, usually because of a perceived threat. Those who accept the terms of the bargain, giving up some autonomy at the time, do so because they, too, perceive themselves strengthened against some military threat. He argues these conditions are "necessary" though not sufficient for the striking of the bargain. See William Riker, *Federalism: Origins, Operation, and Significance* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 12-13.

A fundamental assumption in Riker is that those political elites who negotiate a federal bargain do so out of a belief that their interests are better served by some kinds of federal arrangements. Expanding and reworking Riker, Burgess (1993) argues that the advocacy of federalism over confederalism or unitary government represents the pursuit of self-interest, and reflects the self-interest of those representatives making the case.[5] Federalism, then, is not an end in itself, but a means to promote and defend interests. Advocates of certain types of federal arrangements posture, lobby, cajole, threaten and act to establish a particular constitutional arrangement because they see it as the preferred political order.

Within the context of Russia, following the collapse of the old Soviet regime and the unifying presence of the old C.P.S.U., the question becomes, Who benefits from federalism? What interests are being defended or promoted? And how are those interests being articulated and aggregated? Likewise, who benefits from unitarism and re-centralization? And who benefits from complete independence from the federation?

Alternatively, one could make the case, as Publius did over two centuries ago, that federalism remains a means by which the rights and liberties of individuals and minorities (religious or ethnic) are best protected from "the violence" of majority factions. In its ethno-territorial form, such as the one adopted by the USSR in 1922 and the former Yugoslavia after World War I, federalism remains a potential institutional solution to the problems of governing a large, diverse multinational state, such as India and today, Russia.

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[5] Michael Burgess, "Federalism as Political Ideology," in M. Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, *Comparative Federalism and Federation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 104.

Ethnofederalism has, however, received a bad reputation of late in the wake of the collapse of the previously ethnofederal U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and even Czechoslovakia, as a potential institutional barrier to national integration and effective state-building.

In many ways, the renewed debate over the benefits of federal, confederal, ethnofederal and unitary state insitutions parallels that which the Bolsheviks confronted from 1917 to 1922. Though Marxism taught that national identity would disappear in the socialist state, or at least become secondary to one's socialist identity, Lenin initially supported the right to self-determination for the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire, and he codified this in the Soviet Constitution. He similarly came to accept the necessity of ethnofederalism in the new Soviet state ("National in form, socialist in content"), and he did so because he believed it would serve to, as Goldhagen suggests, "nip the desire for independence in the bud."[6] National republics and federal forms of political organization could persist, as long as they helped to fulfill socialist goals conceived in Moscow. With the disintegration of the Soviet state along the ethnic republic lines drawn by the Soviet state, this logic has been called into question.

My investigation will contribute to this ongoing debate on the merits of strong versus weak federations, and of ethnofederalism versus territorial federalism, as I examine the constitutional debates occurring during the years when new federal bargain was struck in Russia. Prior to any such analysis, however, I need to understand the preferences and strategies of the actors involved in the bargaining process. This investigation will focus

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[6]Erich Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. x.

primarily on the aspirations of the states, though the final chapter will also examine the degree to which these aspirations are related to the bargain being offered by the Center.

Which regions and republics in Russia are "federalists" and which are "anti-federalists," and why? In which states is ethnonationalism a force to be reckoned with, and in which others is it virtually absent? And perhaps more importantly for democratic theory and constitutional engineers in transitioning societies; what are the implications of various types of federal arrangements for the stability of the regime? To what extent are past institutional arrangements a prologue to current and future secession crises?

Soviet and Russian Federalism

Because Russia was at least nominally federal prior to 1991 within the Soviet Union, most actors expected it to remain federal after 1991. But as in the former British colonies separately administered under the Crown prior to 1776, there remained a lot of room for negotiating the terms of the federal bargain after the collapse of the previous governing center.

The national-territorial structure of the Soviet Union evolved over a number of years, but had not, with the exception of the forcible annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 and Tuva in 1944, been territorially altered since the 1936 Stalinist Constitution, though changes in the status of particular territories did occur.[7] In 1989, the country was

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[7]After the annexation of Tuva in 1944, the only territorial changes resulted from the war-time policy of deporting entire nationalities out of their ethnic homelands. Additionally, some autonomous entities were "demoted" and "repromoted" throughout the Soviet era. An example would be Karelia, which from 1940-56 existed as the Karelo-Finnish SSR, and was later demoted to an ASSR after 1956. See Ann Sheehy, "The Ethnodemographic Dimension," in A. McCauley's *Soviet Federalism* (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 63.

vertically divided between the 15 national union republics, 20 autonomous ethnic republics, eight autonomous *oblasts* (provinces), and ten autonomous *okrugs* (districts), in descending order of status and privilege under the Constitution. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) contained 16 of the autonomous republics, five of the autonomous *oblasts*, and all ten of the autonomous *okrugs*, in addition to forty-nine non-ethnically defined *oblasts* and six *krais* (regions). Table 1 lists the thirty-one "autonomies" (*avtonomii*) within the R.S.F.S.R. and the date each was formally created.

[TABLE 1-1 ABOUT HERE]

Altogether some 58 of the over 100 nationalities that were contained within the former U.S.S.R. had some form of administratively recognized autonomy under the old system. The criteria for receiving this recognition seem somewhat arbitrary when examined today. The "major" nationalities were granted formal autonomy in the shape of constituent republics to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While the autonomy granted seems spurious when examined today, one should not underestimate the symbolic and real importance such a status had on the lives of those in the national republics.

During the 1920s, the regime encouraged the use of native languages in local administration and schools, and deciphered written alphabets for unlettered peoples. While the early regime limited political autonomy, within the confines of the Union national identity was given considerable freedom to develop.[8] This was all to change dramatically during the Stalin years, but the memory proved impossible to banish.

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[8]Goldhagen, (fn. 6), p. ix.

Defining which were "major" nationalities--those deserving of national republic status-- presented the regime with a new challenge, and the new Soviet leaders were not always consistent in their response. In some instances, a divide and rule policy seemed to prevail. In Central Asia in particular, union republics were set up for groups that had not yet developed into self-proclaimed "nations". But rather than create one large "Muslim" or "Turkic" state, several entities were created with separate identities.[9] The nationally conscious peoples of Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia were given what they had once already possessed, "sovereignty" in an existing federation.

And while status in the four-tiered hierarchy was largely based on population, sometimes this, too, was overlooked, as the Tatars were granted only autonomous republic status though they outnumber Georgians, Tajiks and Turkmeni peoples, all of which were granted union republic status.[10] According to Tatar nationalists, the only reason they were denied "major" nationality status was because they shared no external borders with a foreign state.[11] This was the official line as well, which said, quite simply, that a region had to be able to secede "in principle" from the Union in order to be granted Union Republic status in the administrative hierarchy. In other cases, special recognition was provided to very small, seemingly insignificant groups, such as the Abkhazi in Georgia who number fewer than 100,000 and who make up less than 20% of the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Region. The grounds were purely political as the Bolsheviks attempted to dampen the very

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[9] Sheehy, (fn. 7), p. 67.

[10] See Sheehy, (fn 7) for a discussion of how Lenin and Stalin determined which groups were to be granted which status under the Constitution.

[11] See Lapidus and Walker, (fn. 3), p. 94.

strong sense of national identity which existed among Georgians, Armenians and Azeris by carving out autonomous formations for small groups within these existing nations.[12]

Only the union republics were granted the nominal right to secede from the Union, though the mechanism for taking such an action was never specified in any of the Soviet Constitutions. Autonomous ethnic republics had markedly fewer rights than union republics. For example, in most autonomous republics, education in the native language above the level of primary school has been available much less frequently, and they were allotted a smaller number of deputies in the federal parliament than the union republics.[13] But they were granted more autonomy than provinces, and special political opportunities were created for ethnic elites in the autonomous republics and oblasts, opportunities not created for elites representing the non-ethnic provinces (oblasts) and territories (krais) of the R.S.F.S.R.

This asymmetry in the treatment accorded the ethnic states[14] versus the purely territorial formations has become an issue in Russia's transition and the current negotiations over the terms of the federal bargain. Despite the special status granted the ethnic autonomous republics, however, 70% of Russia's territory and 80% of her population are contained within territorial formations (6 territories, 49 provinces, 2 federal cities), much in

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[12]For more on this subject, see Ronald Wixman, *Language Aspects of Ethnic Patterns and Processes in the North Caucasus*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[13]See Brian D. Silver, "Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities" in Jeremy Azrael's *Soviet Nationality Policy and Practices*, (New York: Praeger, 1978) and Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Equality, Efficiency and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy: 1934-80," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 1019-39.

[14]For purposes of clarity, I will use the term "state" whenever referring to any or all of the members of the Federation without reference to their administrative status or ethnic composition. The term ethnic state will refer to any of the three ethnic administrative units (ASSR's, Autonomous Oblasts or Autonomous Okrugs). The term region or territorial formation will be used generically to refer to any of the non-ethnic states in the Federation.

remote parts of Siberia, all of which have traditionally received even fewer political and economic rights than the ethnic republics and autonomous formations.

In his attempt to build an independent base of support from which to challenge the authority of Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin played the ethnic card as far back as 1990 in campaigns for the Russian parliament, for the chairmanship of that parliament, and even in his bid to become the first popularly elected president of the R.S.F.S.R.. When the Russian Parliament followed the lead of the Baltic republics in adopting a declaration of state sovereignty, they confirmed the need to "broaden substantially the rights of the autonomous republics, autonomous *oblasts*, and autonomous *okrugs*, along with RSFSR *krais* and *oblasts.*[15] And in 1990, while on a tour through Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Komi Autonomous Republic, Yeltsin told local elites to "take all the sovereignty you can swallow."[16] But less than a year later, he opposed Tatarstan's appeal to be a signatory to the new Union Treaty as an equal to the other fifteen Union Republics.

Relations between the Center (now identified with Boris Yeltsin and his administration of the Russian government) and the regions deteriorated after the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August of 1991, when Yeltsin moved to dissolve the local elites that had supported the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) in their attempt to overthrow Gorbachev. He even heard debates among his central advisors, such as Minister

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[15]See Lapidus and Walker, (fn. 3), p. 82.

[16]Bill Keller, *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, September 2, 1990.

for Nationality Affairs, Valery Tishkov, about thoroughly reconstituting the administrative boundaries of the existing states along territorial, not ethnic, lines. [17]

But by March of 1992, resistance at the local level proved too strong, and the Center offered its first of several federal bargains in the form of three hastily conceived treaties known collectively as the Federation Treaty. All representatives of the member states within Russia's borders signed the treaty except Tatarstan and Chechnya. It "confirmed and consolidated" the ethnic republics' special status, in granting them a number of political and economic rights not accorded the non-ethnic territories, such as the right to conduct a limited foreign policy and foreign trade independent of Moscow.[18] It also stated that the land and natural resources of the ethnic republics belonged to the people living there and that issues regarding disposal of these resources would be regulated by both the Russian and republican governments. That the other territorial units were not granted as much autonomy in foreign policy, trade or, most importantly, natural resources, signaled that the asymmetry in the federal structure would continue. While the treaty granted that the republics were "sovereign," no right to secession was stipulated and the treaty stipulated that republican consititutions could not conflict with the federal consititution.

Other issues, such as taxation policies, remained unresolved. Regions and republics are expected to pass on taxes to the federal budget which then distributes subsidies to the members. This process, as it evolved under the communist system, was intended to help

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[17] See the article in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, October 28, 1992.

[18] Sharlet, Robert, "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics," *Publius*, Spring 1994, 119.

equalize development across the regions and republics; however, it degenerated into a means of political patronage. Most of the ethnic republics are net gainers from the system, that is, they pay to the Center less than they receive in subsidies, in contrast to the non-ethnic regions, who have regularly paid in far more than they received back.[19] These issues were allowed to fester after the signing of the Treaty, given Yeltsin's preoccupation with the Parliamentary challenge to his authority in Moscow.

Indeed, most of the Constitutional debates from April 1992 through July 1993 focused on the division of powers between the executive and the parliament, and *not* on the unresolved question of the federal division of powers between the center and its member states. Ethnic conflict in Ingushetia and North Ossetia over a disputed border territory, the Prigorodny raion, and the increasingly militant rhetoric pouring out of Chechnya exacerbated tensions and signalled trouble ahead, but the debate did not receive national attention until the summer of 1993, when Yeltsin unveiled his draft Constitution for the Russian Federation at the June Constitutional Convention. Republics and territories continued to pressure the Center for more autonomy, by issuing declarations of sovereignty, holding referenda on upgrading their administrative status, and withholding taxes from the federal center. All of these the Yeltsin Administration seemed willing to tolerate in return for support from the regional elite, as the administration continued its struggle for control with an uncooperative national parliament. Only four of the forty appointed regional administrators audited by the

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[19]*Radio Liberty Research Reports*, 3 December 1993, p. 3.

Chief State Inspector were "fired" through March of 1993, and these were instances of official corruption, not defiance.[20]

When the executive-legislative struggle culminated in the bloody, forcible ouster of the National Parliament by Yeltsin-loyal forces in October, Yeltsin then turned quickly to new elections for the parliament and a referendum on its new Constitution. Unfortunately, the manner in which the referendum and draft were designed did not resolve many of the issues raised at the summer Constituent Assembly.

The new Russian Constitution was adopted by a slim majority of the voters in a referendum held on December 12, 1993, though the results were far from a sweeping mandate for its provisions. This version of the Constitution, unlike the draft proposed by the Constitutional Assembly in July of 1993, fails once again to establish clearly the powers of the member states of the Federation vis-a-vis the center, and did not include any of the text of the Federal Treaty signed the year before.

Article 5 of the latest Constitution does seem, however, to resolve the structural asymmetry of the former Russian federation by acknowledging that, "The Russian Federation consists of republics, territories, provinces, federal cities, an autonomous province and autonomous regions, all of which are equal members of the Russian Federation." Each state is to have equal representation in the Upper House of the federal legislature, the Council of the Federation. But Section 2 stipulates that each republic is to have its own Constitution and

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[20]Reported in Darrell Slider, "Federalism, Discord and Accomodation: Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet Russia," in J. Hahn and T. Friedgut, eds., *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics,* (London: ME Sharpe, 1994).

legislation while every territory, province, federal city and autonomous region is to have its own charter and legislation, which already implies a juridical difference in the status of each.

The equality provision was designed to alleviate the problems associated with the asymmetries under the old system of power, asymmetries which led some oblasts and krais to try to legislatively "upgrade" their position to republic status in order to share in the benefits promised to those holding republic status under the terms of the 1992 Federal Treaty. But while the powers of the federal government are detailed quite clearly in Article 71, Article 73 states merely that anything not covered by the Federal government, or by the "joint-jurisdiction" areas detailed in Article 72, falls under the authority of the member states.

Leaders of several vocal ethnic autonomous republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Karelia and Komi) refused to endorse the December Constitution because they argued that it did not guarantee them enough autonomy, and that it represented a loss of autonomy granted them under the Federal Treaty, all references to which were obliterated in the new Constitution. The 490,000 eligible voters from the republic of Chechnya boycotted the referendum in April 1993 as well as the final December vote, while only 14% of the eligible voters participated in Tatarstan, rendering the election null and void there.[21] And the current republic constitutions of Sakha (formerly Yakutia), Tatarstan, Tuva and Bashkortostan clearly contradict passages of the new Russian Constitution.

Among the most important areas of contention remain the rights to dispose of republic and regional natural resources, taxation policies, as well as the right to secede from the federation by virtue of a vote by only the individual state's population. With the Russian

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[21] *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, 8 April 1994, p. 26.

attack on renegade Chechnya in late 1994, the debate was renewed, not resolved. The carnage there has generated among some member states the desire to see central power more constrained and among others, the desire to see it expanded and strengthened. The current ceasefire negotiated by former Presidential National Security Chief Alexander Lebed promises the Chechens a referendum on independence after five years. This, along with the long-awaited direct election of regional governors in the fall of 1996, seems certain to renew economic and political debates between the Center and its constituent members.

Theoretical Framework

To explain the variation in the expressed positions of the eighty-nine states, I examine propositions derived from several competing theoretical traditions. Many scholars of the U.S.S.R. and its successor states were initially stunned by the important role ethnicity has played in mobilizing individuals in the political sphere to bring about the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist state.[22] They had argued that Soviet success in achieving increased social development and greater equality between republics would bring about assimilation and the weakening of ethnic appeals. Among those scholars long interested in the national question in the USSR, however, there were those who identified nationalism as the greatest potential threat to the stability of the Soviet state[23], and Richard Pipes (1977) went so far as to suggest

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[22]See the following quotation attributed to Martin Malia in Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffman, "Communist Studies and Political Science," in Fleron and Hoffman, *Communist Studies and Political Science*, (Boulder: Westview, 1993): "It is precisely because during the past twenty-odd years mainline Western Sovietology has concentrated on the sources of Soviet "stability" as a "mature industrial society" with a potential for "pluralist development" that it has prepared us so poorly for the present crisis..."

[23]See Therese Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 23 (May-June 1974).

that "sooner or later the empire will disintegrate roughly along the lines of the existing republics." Since the collapse of the Soviet state and the independence of the former union republics, the most visible and aggressive autonomy seekers within Russia have, in fact, been the former ethnic autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Chechnya, Tuva and Bashkortostan. While I want to address the question of elite strategies in all 89 states, not merely the ones administratively defined as "ethnic" republics, I must at least address the problem of visible, politicized ethnicity in the new federation.

Numerous theories have been advanced in political science to explain away the phenomenon of "ethnopolitics" as either a hangover from "primitive" societies that would disappear with modernization, or as itself a product of disruptive modernizing tendencies. On the left, Marxist scholars have suggested that ethnicity is one of the many tools used by elites to distract individuals from their true class identity. In this sense, individuals who enter politics to pursue "ethnic" goals are suffering from a sense of "false consciousness," imposed upon them, most likely, by a colonizing elite.[24] According to both Lenin and Stalin, nations and nationalism were a product of capitalist development, and once capitalism was eradicated, these, too, would disappear.[25]

In contrast, modernization theorists posited that "nationalism" or the ideological manifestation of politicized ethnicity, was an artifact of traditional societies which had not yet been integrated into the Western, liberal way of conducting politics. As these societies

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[24]See Marx on "The National Question in Ireland and Poland," and "Imperialism in India," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Robert Tucker, ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).

[25]Stalin, Josef, *The National Question and Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950), p. 16.

became more "modern," the phenomenon of politicized ethnicity would ultimately disappear with the arrival of modernization, with greater access to education and more social mobility.[26] Ethnic attachments will then be weakened by the process of modernization, and replaced by cross-cutting cleavages and a convergence of new cultural values compatible with social modernization.

The fall of the Soviet Empire and the resurgence of ethnopolitics in the developed and less developed world suggest that all of these explanations are inadequate to explain the waxing and waning of ethnicity as a mobilizing political force in the world. In fact, nationalism survived or outlived Marxism in the USSR, and for the most part, was just as evident in the most developed and "modern" of the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in contrast to what early modernization theorists would have predicted.

In studies of ethnonationalism, Gurr (1993) describes the two competing perspectives as "primordialist" (or "essentialist") and "instrumentalist." The first "regards ethnic nationalism as a manifestation of a persisting cultural tradition based on a primordial sense of ethnic identity,"[27] where ethnic and cultural cleavages are more "objective" than those of interest or class.[28]

Essentialists posit that the multinational "empire" or "prison of nations" was destined to come apart when the "nations" finally "awoke" to reclaim their identities, and their

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[26]See Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

[27]Tedd Robert Gurr, *Minorities At Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (US Institute of Peace, 1993), p. 124.

[28]Harry Eckstein, cited in Przeworksi, Adam, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1996), p. 20.

sovereignty. In fact, as Beissinger (1996) notes, the "general consensus" now appears to be that Soviet Union was an empire and for this reason, it broke up. The worst-case scenario sees old ethnic hatreds and rivalries reemerging out of the ashes of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the civil war in Yugoslavia providing a tragic rennaisance for primordialist scholars discredited during the late 1970s and 1980s.

"Instrumentalists" view ethnicity as one of a variety of identities that can be created and subsequently recreated in response to conditions which favor its emergence.[29] It was neither inevitable nor "natural" for the many suppressed ethnic groups to demand autonomy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Again, as Beissinger (1996) notes, many "self-avowed empires eventually evolved into states," suggesting that there is an inherent contradiction in suggesting that the Soviet Union broke up because it was an empire, and then defining it an empire because it broke up! Empires, states and nations are, in his words, "fuzzy concepts" deserving of more attention than many primordialists are willing to given them. Simple primordialist explanations fail to explain, for example, why only some of the ethnic groups in the former USSR have mobilized politically in the name of greater national autonomy. In contrast, instrumentalists, as Gurr (1993) suggests, interpret ethnic/communal movements as an "instrumental response to differential treatment."[30] The Soviet Union, then, is a failed state because it failed at the project of national integration of various ethno-linguistic groups. This failure was not, in the instrumental view, pre-ordained.

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[29]See Robert Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., *The State versus Ethnic Claims* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

[30]Gurr, (fn. 27), p. 124.

This view parallels that of the relative deprivation school of conflict analysis, which argues that peoples' frustration about "perceived" unjust deprivation relative to those around them is the primary motivation for political action by communal groups. This approach would then argue that those states most likely to opt out of a federal bargain with the Center are those that have not benefitted from such a bargain in the past. Those states that are considerably worse off than their neighbors, but with the expectation of doing better, are more likely to resist recentralization of power at the Center because they fared so poorly under such an arrangement in the recent past. In terms of regional actors, this cost-benefit evaluation of remaining in a federal relationship with the center would likely come down to this; what did we put into the relationship and what did we get out of it, relative to other states in the federation? Did we pay more into the federal budget than we received back in subsidies and investment? Is the standard of living in our state significantly better or worse than that of states around us? In relative deprivation theory, the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities" is more important than any real world measures of such discrepancies.[31]

Although the most strident autonomy-seekers have been the elites from the ethnic republics in Russia, their demands have not been as overtly ethnic as the demands made by elites within the former Union republics of the USSR, in that language rights and citizenship issues have not been debated in most of these states. The exception would be the three republics of North Caucasia, i.e., Chechnya, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. The most hotly contested issues in both ethnic and non-ethnic states are undoubtedly local control over

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[31] Gurr, Ted Robert, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 13.

natural resources, percentage of taxes collected to be kept at home, and ability to negotiate separate foreign investment and trade agreements.

The economic nature of most of these demands lends some credibility to an alternative, purely "rent-seeking" explanation of autonomy-seeking behavior by elites in the regions, which would predict that only the resource-rich states will demand autonomy and potentially independence from the center in the hopes of capturing greater rent than had been possible before. This is similar to the argument posited by Margaret Levi (1988) in her analysis of the "predatory" state. According to the logic of her argument, we can expect rulers to "...design institutions that they believe will be efficient in promoting their interests. More specifically, within the limits of the constraints upon them, they will design revenue production policies that maximize revenues to the state."[32] Rulers will be better able to do this the "less they depend on others and the more others depend on them." Governors of states with vast natural resource wealth and potential for high levels of economic development are less dependent on the Center for benevolence, and are in fact, much needed by the other members of the federation as a continued source of these same resources.

Alternatively, Roeder (1991), among others, argues that the most useful approach to evaluating the strength and weakness of the various ethno-national movements in the USSR is a political institutional approach. He suggests that the particular federal, institutional arrangements of the Soviet state, that is, the granting to territorially defined ethnic groups formal "autonomy" within the state, contributed to the potency and rationality of ethnicity as

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[32]Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), p. 16-17.

a mobilizing identity by local elites during the center's collapse. Within the "mobilization" school of political conflict, Roeder's political institutional explanation suggests why only some of the elites in the 89 states, those privileged under the old regime, were able to mobilize group resources in response to the changing political and economic environment.

Elites in the ethnic autonomous republics and national level republics were appointed to represent the ethnic group interests in the larger state, and thus, their natural political base of support was supposed to be the ethnic group. Other political appointments in these regions were made on the basis of ethnicity, a Soviet form of affirmative action for the formally, institutionally, recognized ethnic groups referred to in the early years of the Soviet Union as *korenizatsiia* or nativization. Anderson and Silver (1990) found, for example, that Soviet language policy towards its minority populations was very much based on the institutional level of recognition a group had achieved in the federal hierarchy. In other words, the availability of native language training was based on status of the group in the federal hierarchy. Similarly, assimilation rates for ethnic groups in the USSR were highest among the groups that had not received institutional recognition and lowest among the Union republic status groups.[33]

According to Suny (1990), the "affirmative action" programs of the center ". . . promoted cadres from the titular nationalities, often to the detriment of more urbanized and

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[33]Groups without their own administrative unit which experienced a net decline in ethnic identification from the 1959 census to the 1970 census are groups such as the Germans, Jews and Poles. The Union republics all experience close to zero loss of population through the process of ethnic reidentification, while the ASSR republics fall somewhere in between, with the Tatars experiencing no loss, compared to the Karelians, who lose the most of the 26 groups considered in this study. For more details, see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

educated Russian populations". Thus in 1970, for example, Georgians made up 82.6% of the students in higher education, though Georgians represented only 66.8% of the population in Georgia.[34]

This kind of political, institutional advantage provides these recognized groups with greater mobilizational resources in the wake of the center's collapse compared to those groups that were not recognized under the old regime. Thus, we have fewer reported cases of ethnic groups which were not granted previous administrative status under the old regime mobilizing to demand autonomy or independence under the new federal bargain.[35]

The Communist Party elite, under Brezhnev's collective leadership especially, often debated the impact that such national-territorial arrangements had on the development of the Soviet state. In the early 1960s, official doctrine supported a new policy, a *sblizhenie* (coming together) leading to eventual *sliianie* (merging) of national differences. The debate after Khrushchev's fall centered on the nature and future of the nationality units, given their apparent lack of relevance to a socialist path to development.[36] Brezhnev's terminology concerning the eventual movement of nationalities to "complete unity" (*edinstvo*) did not speak about concrete steps to be taken, or any timetable for implementation. Indeed, it represented a more moderate position than the previous one.

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[34] See Ronald Suny, "Transcaucasia," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

[35] The exception to this might be the Crimea in Ukraine, but it is somewhat unique because it had republic status at one point but this status was taken away from them in 1940. The same might also be said of the Soviet Germans, who have continued to lobby for restoration of the German state that was abolished under Stalin's rule.

[36] See Grey Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies*, 18 (4), pp. 458-481.

Political structural theorists like Roeder posit that these ethno-federal institutional arrangements and the policies that accompanied them may have led not to any kind of ethnic fusion or merging, but to the maintainance strong, separate political identities. In addition to providing administrative resources to local ethnic elites that might not have been there had the Bolshevik government of 1917 adopted a unitary structure, contributes to the later rise of nationalist movements along lines already drawn into the Soviet federal-constitutional arrangements.

Together, these arguments represent four separate classes of explanation surrounding the behavior of regional politicians in the new Russian state. *Essentialism* emphasizes the importance of primordial attachments to a separate national identity, independent of the Russian Center, hypothesizing that collapse at the Center will allow these repressed identities to reassert themselves once more. *Instrumentalism* emphasizes the importance of the rational calculations of individual leaders to changes in their opportunity structure to capture greater rents by bargaining instrumentally for greater local control over resources. *Relative deprivation* focuses on the perception by groups of individuals that they are suffering relative to comparable groups due to some policy action or inaction by the Center. *Resource mobilization*, argues that the different resources and organizational capacity of governors will influence their bargaining strategy vis-a-vis the Center. The four approaches fall into two broader approaches to the study of political behavior. While instrumentalism and resource mobilization offer political approaches to the question, relative deprivation and essentialism emphasize more sociological explanations.

I draw on each of these theoretical approaches to inform this study of the variation in the preferred constitutional arrangements of both regional elites and their publics in the evolving Russian Federation. I derive specific, propositions from each of the four main approaches discussed above and test them using events data from all regions of the Russian Federation in forthcoming chapters. In Chapter 2, I discuss the research design of the project, including how I conceptualize and measure demands, and the data and sources used.

In Chapter 3, I focus exclusively on the behavior of the regional elite (governors) since 1991, empirically evaluating a number of models to explain the variation in their expressed positions vis-a-vis federal arrangements. Chapter 4 will then contrast this to the behavior and demands of the masses, investigate whether or not the masses are more extreme than their leaders, or less, and evaluate empirically hypotheses predicting which kinds of arrangements the masses in each state ought to prefer. In Chapter 5, I examine whether or not the expressed positions of the regions vary over time and the degree to which they change in response to the bargain being offered by the Center

In the final chapter, I present the major findings of the data analysis and reflect upon the conclusions to be drawn from this work for the future prospects of the Russian federal system, and to federal systems in transition around the globe. I also examine the full implications of the findings, especially as they relate to the major theoretical debates in the nationalist and political conflict literatures, and conclude with some thoughts about what kinds of further research need to be done.

CHAPTER 2:
Measuring Federation Members' Preferred Federal Arrangement

One of the primary tasks of this project is to classify the states, their leaders and their publics, according to their expressed preferences for political and economic autonomy. The first step to *explaining* variation in state leaders' and public's preferences for one constitutional arrangement over any other is to correctly *describe* or measure the range of possible positions. One means to conceptualize the range of potential positions of the 89 Russian states regarding the federal division of power is to use Albert Hirschman's (1967) "exit, voice and loyalty" typology of potential consumer strategies. Gurr (1993), for example, used such language in his discussion of the causes of communal and ethnic rebellion during periods of democratization.[1]

Since elites in the regions are potential consumers of the federal institutional division of power, as are their constituent publics, their attitudes toward the 1992 and 1993 proposed "bargains" or arrangements could be classified as one of complete rejection, qualified acceptance of the proposed arrangements while constantly pressuring for more, or complete satisfaction and acceptance of them. They could have opted for "exit" from the federation, exercised "voice" to garner as much autonomy as possible

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[1]Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1993), p. 135.

while remaining within the federation, or demonstrated "loyalty" to the bargain offered by the center.

Initially, I attempted to use this typology as the central construct of my autonomy scale, but interviews conducted in Moscow with federal policy analysts suggested that it inadequately captured the range of positions observed among the states.[2] In fact, a number of states are extremely critical of the Center's Federal Treaty and even the new Constitution, not because they offered too little autonomy to the states, but because they offered too much. The "voice" option failed to capture whether the states were exercising voice in order to push for greater decentralization or for the recentralization of political and economic power.

An alternative construct is suggested by Russian scholar and People's Deputy Galina Starovoitova (1994). She argues that one ought to classify the elites in the 89 regions of the federation along two dimensions, one of political autonomy, and one of economic reform, as shown in Figure 1-1.[3] In the first of the four quadrants, then, are those regional elites who want a very decentralized relationship with Moscow with lots of local political control, and who have proceeded quickly towards instituting free market reforms in their region. In the second quadrant are those who support renewed political centralization, but have also supported free market reforms. In the third are those who have supported greater central political control by Moscow, and no free market reforms;

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[2]Revisions to the original conceptual schema were made following interviews with Presidential Advisors Leonid Smirnyagin and Emil Payin in Moscow, March 1995.

[3]The following discussion stems from a paper presented by Galina Starovoitova at Michigan State University's *New Elites in Russia* conference held in the fall of 1994 and is cited with the permission of the author.

and in the fourth, those who support greater political autonomy from the federal center, while simultaneously working to inhibit the emergence of a free market in their region.

The least popular quadrant according to Starovoitova is the one in which elites push for continued centralization under a strong federal center and continued state planning in the economy (Quadrant III). She argues that nearly every one of the regions' elite needs to push at least for autonomy or freedom for their constituents in order to remain popular. What remains to be explained are the factors that lead regional elites to adopt one of the three remaining strategies above the others.

This two-dimensional classification corresponds with one developed by Slider *et al.* (1994) to classify political party positions in the December 1993 State Duma elections. In a factor analysis of regional *voting* behavior, Slider, *et al.*, found regions in all four quadrants. Voting behavior does, however, reflect popular attitudes, and not necessarily the positions actually adopted by the regional governmental leaders.

I adopt Starovoitova's classification scheme, which she has applied only to the ethnic autonomous regions; however, I apply it to the entire group of 89 states. But rather than dichotomize the notion of political autonomy as she has done above, I conceptualize it as a range of possible constitutional arrangements between complete independence, an ethnic confederation (which implies an asymmetrical relationship between the Center and ethnic and non-ethnic states), a loose confederation (in which the relationship between the Center and all states is symmetrical), a strong federation (also symmetrical), and a highly centralized, unitary, and indivisible Russia.

Using Events Data to Understand State Positions

To classify the positions of each state, I recorded events occurring within the regions or between regional political actors and the center which articulated or were related to a state's preferred position along this political autonomy dimension. The use of events data has long, if not controversial, history within the study of international relations, perhaps finding its most fervent early defense in the works of Edward Azar (1972). A smaller but still controversial body of scholarship using events history and events counts can be found in the field of comparative politics, especially in the study of domestic political conflict and rebellion. Issues raised in the use of events data include inaccurate reports of events in non-Western countries, Western bias in reporting these events as the most relied upon source for events data is the *New York Times Index*, and "missing" events not covered in the one or more sources used to capture events in the region under examination.[4]

Few scholars have used events data on the former USSR or the Russian Federation. In the past, researchers were hindered by the lack of access to sources that covered events outside the major cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Even then, it is harder still to find sources that covered events in regions other than the 15 union republics. This project seeks to fill this void. Events data are not used here to record exact detail about events or activities occurring in the regions, but instead to provide a systematic record of regional differentiation. Many scholars limit their focus to counts of events by type (strikes, political protests, etc.). The data I have gathered is not a count, however, but a systematic collection using a defined set

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[4]See, for example, Azar, Edward and Ben-Dak, D., eds, Theory and Practice of Events Research (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973) and Robert Jackman, "Multiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, No. 2, May 1979, pp. 434-458.

of criteria from all of the regions of Russia to depict each state's preferred position regarding the federal bargain.

"Events" of relevance range from responses to central decrees relating to the division of powers between the center and the regions, to boycotts of federal referendums or elections, withholding of federal taxes, petitions to the federal government, communiques to the federal government and strikes and demonstrations in favor or opposed to a proffered arrangement. Each of these would be reported in one of the sources used to collect information.

Additionally, I gather information on the Center, here defined as the position of the Executive Branch, or the administration of President Boris Yeltsin. I record statements made by Yeltsin and his Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister on federal issues. Additionally, I record actions taken by the Center vis-a-vis the regions, such as the firing and appointing of regional administrators, threats to withhold subsidies, and the military invasion of Chechnya. From this information, I track the position of the Center along the index of federal relations I develop. This will allow me to measure, through an events history analysis, whether or not the state governments' positions reflect responses to moves by the Center, or are to a greater degree independent of the Center's actions.

Sources

Events recorded in this data set are taken from the weekly *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (*CDSP*) from 1988 through 1995, and the *Open Media Research Institute's (OMRI) Daily Digest* (on-line service) from 1991-1995. OMRI is a non-profit news and analysis organization, which is custodian to the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty archives. The Daily Digest provides concise news reports based on current primary sources

from the region. The CDSP presents a weekly selection of Russian-language press materials, translated into English. It, too, is a non-profit, self-supporting corporation affiliated with Ohio State University and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

I record each event related to the topic of federal relations as a case, along with the date of the event, a brief description of the event, the state involved, the state actor (executive, legislative, or autonomous social actor), the issue area involved (politics, economics, culture, environment, foreign policy), and the source from which it was taken (CDSP or OMRI, or Both). From January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1995 a total of 1460 events are recorded by regional actors. Of these events, 46% are drawn exclusively from the CDSP, 45% from OMRI, and 9% from both sources.

Indexes

I assign each case a rank along a political autonomy continuum. The autonomy index ranks events from 1 to 5 based on the position it represents along this dimension.

The potential positions along the Political Autonomy Index range from a desire for independence from the federation (complete political autonomy) to a desire for a unitary state (little or no independent regional autonomy). The coding rules are as follows:

5 **The pursuit of independence from the federation.**

Comment: This is the greatest amount of political autonomy possible. This could be considered neither federalist nor anti-federalist, but simply nationalist. Nationalism is an ideology which argues that every self-proclaimed nation is entitled to its own state. States that adopt this position might settle for what the union republics got, that is, political independence with the ability to later agree to work with Russia in areas of common interest, but they will be unwilling to settle for anything short of this.

Events representative of this position include declarations of war against the Center, demands for international recognition of independence, acts of war or violence against the Federation, refusing to pay federal taxes or obey federal decrees on the basis that you are no longer a member of the federation, refusal to sign the Federal Treaty, boycotting referendum on Federal Constitution, demand for negotiation of separate Treaty-based relations with the Federation as a separate, sovereign state as former union republics did.

4 The pursuit or support of "cantonalism."

Comment: "Cantonalism" is defined, following Hughes (1993), as the cultivation of the component state as morally prior to the Union and in cases of conflict, preferable to it. It has as its goal the survival of the canton at all costs, and includes the idea of absolute state rights and the defense of the canton as a "historical" creation.[5] In other words, it is the ideology of those who remain a part of the Federation but essentially want to be recognized as separate nations within the federation, and expect to be treated to more autonomy than mere provinces that do not represent separate nations. As Beissinger (1995) indicates, "Nations need not be based exclusively on ethnicity. . . . However, ethnicity has formed the most powerful bond justifying nation status."[6] For this reason, I prefer the concept of cantonalism to the more traditional, but limited ethno-confederal one.

Events coded as representing this position include declarations of political sovereignty, referendums on sovereignty, support for the Federal Treaty which in effect sanctifies this position, opposition to the Constitution which in effect nullifies the special status of ethnic cantons or republics, appeals for the formation of a new canton, secession of a self-proclaimed nation from an existing territorial formation, demands for the right of the canton to print its own currency, conduct its own foreign policy, pass its own language and citizenship laws, as well as write and pass constitutions in conflict with federal ones, etc.

3 The pursuit or support of *territorial* confederation.

Comment: This category includes states that want much greater local political autonomy and much less central control over local natural resources, foreign investment, privatization programs, land reform, etc. These states will allow a weak center to maintain control over defense and maintain a single currency system, but not necessarily even a single national banking system. They do support the model of federalism under which all regions are equal regardless of whether they are "ethnic" states or not, and therefore, find the current Constitutional arrangement too centralizing with the President of the Federation having the sole right to decide disputes between

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[5]Christopher Hughes, "Cantonalism: Federation and Confederacy in the Golden Epoch of Switzerland," in M. Burgess and A. Gagnon, *Comparative Federalism and Federation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 155.

[6] Beissinger, Mark. 1995. "The Persistent Ambiguity of Empire," in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 156.

the Center and the individual states, but they also oppose the Federal Treaty on the grounds that it perpetuates unequal relations between the states. Anti-Federalist, states' rights position from the American experience.

Events coded in support of this position include public statements supporting creation of Upper Chamber with equal representation for all regions, demands that Upper Chamber be allowed more power to approve and veto national legislation, local Soviet resolutions or referendums declaring "sovereign state status" *within* the Federation, attempts to negotiate foreign investment apart from the Center's control, attempts to control privatization program apart from the Center's, claims right to keep higher percentage of taxes at home to support new responsibilities at local level.

2 **The pursuit or support of a strong federation – a central government with weaker local governments.**

Comment: The central state mandates many of the social and economic development program guidelines left to the regional governments to carry out, such as privatization programs, banking, trade, and even type of local political institutions. In conflicts between Center and States, the Center's ruling will have final authority. All states are deemed equal and subordinate to the center, but local governments are elected to better oversee the implementation of federal programs and to decide on local issues such as education and environmental legislation.

Events coded as representing this position include those that largely support the Center's decrees on privatization, payment of full federal taxes, support for Gorbachev's Union Treaty, strong support for the new Constitution, given its provisions for a strong center, with the President's right to decide disputes between the Center and the states. Also coded here is support for the creation of an upper house with equal representation for all states with less power than the lower house, support for continued central planning of most social programs, and opposition to those states that are demanding special treatment within the Federation.

1 **Unitarism: opposition to any kind of real federal arrangement.**

Comment: This is the classic unionist position, hoping to preserve a strong, centralized and unitary state, similar to the centralization of the past. Though the past system was federal in form, as Sharlet (1994) indicated, "Unitarism has long been the political-administrative norm in Russia."[7] All important policy decisions, personnel appointments, allocations and extraction were made by the Center, and advocates of this position would prefer to have that continue.

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[7] See Sharlet, R., "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics," p. 115.

> Events coded as representative of this position are statements or resolutions which oppose or criticize Yeltsin for being too lenient with the regions and republics, support the war in Chechnya (or argue it should have been done sooner), oppose separate treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, support the law-and-order centralizing platform of the SCSE during the coup of August 1991, oppose decrees that seem to support greater devolution of power and responsibility to the regions, support decrees that limit or constrain that power and responsibility, support the political platform of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

I code events over time, but do not develop a dynamic model of autonomy-seeking behavior here, because I do not hypothesize initially that the ideological position of the states changes dramatically over time. There should always be one arrangement that is preferred by the state over the others, though for bargaining purposes, they may at times adopt a position that is stronger or weaker than their true position. Thus I seek to measure their central tendency, based on observations of their behavior in a set of events. I use a "median" score on the Political Autonomy Index to capture the central tendency of the individual states. Each state will earn a median score along the index of political autonomy as the middle point in the ranking of all events involving that state. A median, rather than a mean, is used as the more appropriate measure of central tendency for rank-ordinal data. The median is also preferable in cases where only a few events were recorded as it is not as subject as the mean would be to distortion by one or two outlier events. In the final chapter, however, I will also examine the amount of variation in state positions to measure whether states' positions are in fact changing significantly in response to the Center's actions, in which case the assumption of the importance and relevance of the "central tendency" is called into question.

I suggest that what might conceivably change over time is the strategy each state uses to support their desired position. They might be more cooperative, or more hostile in their pursuit of the ends they seek depending on their resources, and on responses and reactions from the Center. The states might merely express unhappiness or they might resort to

violence. But the demandingness of their action is conceptually distinct from the position they adopt. It is also empirically distinct, I suspect, though an analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this investigation.

The number of events recorded for each state varies tremendously. Over the entire period, these range from as few as three (Koriak Autonomous Oblast) to as many as ninety-one (Chechnya). The distribution of events is very skewed, given Chechnya's 91 and the Koriak AO's 3. In fact, after Chechnya, the next highest number of events is 56 (Tatarstan). The distribution is bimodal, at 5 and 20 events, and the mean, removing the outlier Chechen case, is 15.5 events per state. Since I am using the recorded events to get the best estimate of the government's stated position, the more events per state, the better the estimate is likely to be. In the terminology of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) this effort in descriptive inference comes down to, "Do we get the right answer on average?"[8] If we do, then our estimator can be unbiased, even if we have only a small number of observations on which it is based and hence the estimator is inefficient. Therefore, I include all eighty-nine states, even those for which there are only a few observations because it represents the best information I have, although I feel more confident about the estimates for the states for which I have a greater number of recorded events.

A sample of the types of events recorded and the scores received for them is provided in Table 2-1 for the ethnic republic of Karelia, located in the Russian northwest, on the border with Finland. Karelia is an active player in the federal bargaining process, but not one of the more strident autonomy seekers. Tabulating the overall median score on the Autonomy Index

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[8] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994), p. 63.

gives Karelia a score of 4.0, with a range of 2. Interpreting this score according to the criteria laid out in the aforementioned Autonomy Index scheme indicates that the central tendency in Karelia is to support arrangements that favor the emergence of an ethnic confederation or cantonalism. This position is supported by actions such as threatening to sign the Union Treaty only if the "autonomies" are equal in status to the Union republics, refusing to support an upper chamber of the legislature with equal representation for regions, signing statements opposing the new Constitution because it fails to protect the republic's sovereignty, consideration of their own currency, etc. Future chapters will analyze the degree to which this position is consistent over time, and the degree to which elites and their publics diverge or converge onto this position.

Confronting Problems of Source Coverage and Bias

The choice of sources for events data in the region presents a separate challenge to the research project. Several potential problems arise out of any kind of data collection from secondary sources. Do the CDSP and OMRI reports provide adequate and accurate coverage of regional events to make this kind of events data collection useful and valid? Will I be "missing" data that use of additional sources might provide? Are there differences in the type and number of events each of these sources covers?

While using additional sources might have provided me with more events, it might not have substantially altered the overall picture. Jackman (1979) suggests that rather than be concerned with "whether different sources reports a different *volume* of events or type of event, we should more properly be concerned with (a) whether different sources provide data that yield the *same underlying structure among political events*, and (b) whether different

sources provide data that lead to the *same substantive conclusions in hypothesis-testing and model-building research.*"[9]

Jackman was primarily concerned with the costs and benefits of using additional sources, in particular regional versus merely global sources, to gather events data on political conflict and coups in Africa. In disaggregating his own data set by the five sources used, and testing several hypotheses about the relationship between social mobilization and conflict, he found little variation in the estimates produced by each of the individual sources, or between global (*NY Times)* versus regional *(Africa Recorder)* sources. While not producing identical estimates for each of the independent variables, each of the parameter estimates remains significant and produces signs in the same direction. The same substantive conclusions are implied by all three sets of estimates.

To examine whether the same substantive conclusions can be drawn from the use of only the CDSP, which is essentially a regional source, or only the OMRI reports, which come from global sources, or both, I undertake a similar test to that of Jackman's, using the Political Autonomy Index. I want to know whether or not I get the same "overall" picture of a state's expressed position on the Autonomy Scale from each of the sources, or if there is a significant difference in the way the two cover at least federal issues in the region. Use of both sources together obviously gives me more cases per state and should provide me with a better estimate of that state's position. But does combining the scores from the two sources hide important and potentially systematic differences in the events each reports?

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[9]Robert W. Jackman, "Multiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1979, p. 436.

I compare the median scores the states received on the autonomy index outlined above using both sources, and then the median score generated using each individual source. Using data from January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1995 (the period during which data are available from both sources), there is no difference in the overall median score for all events using exclusively the 795 CDSP events, exclusively the 790 OMRI events, or using all 1460 events. In all cases the overall median score for each source's events is a 3.0. On a state-by-state basis, however, there are more nuanced differences in the coverage. The results for each state, for each source are presented in Table 2-2.

In looking at the individual state scores for OMRI events only and CDSP events only, I find a number of states had different median scores from each individual source, but only in one case was the difference larger than 1 unit. In the case of Dagestan the difference (a 3.5 from CDSP, a 2 from OMRI) is striking, given the number of events recorded for each (12 for CDSP and 15 for OMRI). But as it is the only case with such a large discrepancy, I feel comfortable using both sources together to maximize the number of cases per state and to increase the accuracy of my results.

Another way of looking at the relationship between the events coverage of each source is through a correlation, looking at the degree to which scores from CDSP are correlated with scores from OMRI. The results are summarized in Table 2-3.

While not a perfect correlation (.471), the Kendall's tau-b is statistically significant (p=.001). This also suggests that the two sources are capturing somewhat different information about the events. Combining the information from the two sources should provide me with a more valid measure of the actual score of the states. For these reasons, I feel more confident that the use of the two sources together increases the accuracy of my

observations and therefore, my results. To the degree that we are able to impute preferences of political and social actors from actual behavior, the use of events data in this project seems not only justified, but optimal. It allows me to examine elite and mass behavior related to one issue--federal relations--over an extended period of time, between elites and their publics, and within and across states.

Operationalizing the Theoretical Models: The Independent Variables

As already noted, the dependent variables here will be scores on the Political Autonomy Index by each state, based on the coding of events or interactions between the center and the regions between 1991-1995. A median score will be calculated from all the scores assigned to individual events involving each member state. Additionally, the following independent variables are used to test hypotheses derived from the essentialist, instrumentalist, mobilization and relative deprivation approaches:

Essentialist Model (Model 1): Seeks to test aspects of the "essentialist" argument by determining which ethnic groups represent national groups most culturally "distant" from the Russian center. Gurr argues that communities most predisposed to act upon a grievance are those who already share a strong sense of "group identity."

This involves two kinds of hypotheses, one about cultural distance from the center, and one about the current strength of group identity. In the first case, it is clear that the groups in the federation most distant culturally, linguistically and religiously from the Slavic center are the Muslim and Buddhist groups that have not converted in the majority to some form of orthodoxy. States with a significant Muslim/Buddhist population, which in this case

means a plurality of the population, will be coded 1, all others 0. To measure strength of ethnic attachment, I will follow Silver's (1974) lead and use level of attachment of to native language as measured in the 1989 Soviet census, to capture the strength of a group's identity. Additionally, following Gurr (1993) in his *Minorities at Risk Project*, I will look at whether or not a "serious conflict" with the dominant Russian center has occurred in the past, the memory of which might be invoked successfully some 40-50 years later. The forcible deportation of many of the North Caucasian groups by Stalin during World War II is one such example.[10]

Instrumentalist Model (Model 2): Seeks to understand how important rational calculations of economic viability are in determining whether or not a state will seek greater autonomy. I use a simple 0/1 dummy variable based on World Bank indicators of which states contain the "valuable, exportable" natural resources of natural gas and oil, or diamonds and gold.[11] Likewise, those states which are most economically dependent on the Center are rationally viewed as least likely to demand confederal arrangement, and most likely to benefit from continued centralization. Those states whose economies are dependent on defense industries with continued substantial support from the Center are coded 1 versus those coded 0 with few defense/military bases. Tax data on which states receive more in subsidies from the federal government than they turn over in tax revenues is also included within this model.

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[10]See Alexander Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1978).

[11]See Christine Wallich, Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), map, pp. 182-183.

Relative Deprivation Model (Model 3): Seeks to test assumptions of relative deprivation theory, arguing that the historically most exploited regions are most likely to opt out of the bargain. Since deprivation is taken to mean a sense of "perceived" inequality, it might be difficult to capture in a single measurement. As objective indicators of relative well-being I use several different measures. The first is level of unemployment, the second income growth, and the third whether or not the region has been publicly identified by President Yeltsin's administration as a "critically depressed region." Both the level of unemployment and income growth measures are interval level indicators representing the percent change from one year (1993) to the next (1994). Those with the greatest increase in the level in unemployment and the slowest rate of income growth are expected to be least satisfied with the current federal arrangement, and most likely to opt "out." The public identification as a depressed region is a simple 1/0 dummy variable, but it captures something the other two indicators do not--the public recognition that they are doing less well relative to other regions in the Federation in 1992.

Resource Mobilization Model (Model 4): Seeks to understand the relative importance of political structures in shaping the mobilization strategies of regional elites. The independent variables are coded 1-4 for each of the four administrative statuses, ASSR, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, and Non-Ethnic Region. Secondly, for the importance of the regional elite and whether or not they are former members of the communist nomenklatura I will use biographical data obtained on the regional Soviet Chairs and on republic presidents from the source, "Politicheskaia Rossiia Segodnya: 1993 [Political Russia Today: 1993]." I will separate the leaders according to their career histories, whether they were full-time Party

leaders in the region prior to their appointment/election, each one a dichotomous dummy coded 0/1. I will also control for the autonomy of the regional elite by measuring which states have elected their leaders in each of the five years under investigation.

Each of these approaches and the propositions derived from them will be further fleshed out in the forthcoming chapters, along with the implications for both the political elite and the masses spelled out more explicitly. For the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to introduce the types of data that will used to test these various approaches and their usefulness in understanding and predicting the variation in behavior and preferences of elites and mass publics in Russia's regions with regard to the federal bargain.

CHAPTER 3:
Regional Elites and the Federal Bargain

The most important players in the bargaining process with the federal center are the regional and republican executives, though as with other matters, systematic differences in the level of administration between the ethnically-defined republics and the other members of the federation exist here as well. The so-called "governors" (*gubenators)* of the regions (not of the ethnic republics) were almost all appointed in the Fall of 1991 by President Yeltsin to the positions of "Glava Administratsiia," or Head of Administration. The appointment of regional heads of administration was intended to counterbalance some of the anti-Moscow sentiment of the oblast soviets (legislatures), particularly those who had supported the efforts of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, or the coup-plotters, in August of 1991.

According to the law adopted by the Russian Parliament in October 1991, heads of administration were to be directly elected in December 1991, but these elections were continually delayed by the Yeltsin administration, which was granted special emergency powers in November 1991 to appoint the regional chiefs for one year. This power was not taken away in 1992 or 1993.[1] In 1994, Yeltsin requested once again that the direct

[1] Vera Tolz, "The Role of the Republics and Regions," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Vol. 2, No. 15, 9 April 1993, p. 12.

election of the governors, as well as the presidential election of the Russian Federation, be delayed until 1996. He announced this on the eve of an expected election in the Maritime Province, where the current appointee, Nazdratenko (a man the Center suspected of corrupt practices), was expected to win easily. Despite loud protest and threats from Nazdratenko, the election was delayed.

During this period, however, a number of other regions (e.g., Briansk) defied the request and went ahead with local elections, and a number of others received special permission to hold their elections ahead of schedule (Sverdlovsk, Moscow City Mayoral elections). The pattern of defiance versus agreement with the federal center is something this chapter seeks to investigate. Up until now, we have only heard anecdotal accounts of defiance and loyalty among the regional elite. No systematic attempt has been made to understand which regional Chiefs, all of whom were originally appointed by the Center, went on to become the Center's adversaries and which remained loyal functionaries, and more importantly, what factors were important, and continue to be important in explaining the variation.

The heads of administration possess broad powers, including a great deal in the legislative sphere, mirroring developments at the national level for the emergence of strong executive authority at the expense of the legislative branch in their regions. In regions where the legislature (soviet) has opposed an unpopular appointee, stalemates have developed. While Yeltsin clearly intended the "glava Administratsiia" to represent a central stronghold in the provinces, this expectation went unfulfilled as several of these allegedly "dependent" administrators went on to win regional elections, and several others

were forcibly ousted from power by stronger local legislatures, often in direct violation of the center's decrees.[2]

Most of heads of regional administration went on to face competitive election to their office in the fall of 1996. As of March 1997, only three regions have not held such elections, and only one of these (Kemerovo) seems to be an intentional attempt by the administrator to avoid imminent defeat in an election. Of the 48 incumbent regional governors who stood for election this past fall, twenty-one held on to their jobs while 24 were defeated. Another three face run-off elections in the near future.[3] In anticipation of less-popular appointees losing elections to left-wing, communist or nationalist-party candidates, Yeltsin replaced fourteen governors in the "red belt" regions of the country in early 1996. But only six of these new appointees were able to hold on to their seats after the elections.

Although the threat of federal disintegration is today much smaller than two years ago, when I began collecting data on federal-state relations, the direct election of regional governors could embolden them to renew their autonomy demands. Khabarovsk Krai Governor Viktor Ishaev spoke for many regional leaders when he chose the following slogan for his successful re-election campaign, "I need a mandate of popular trust in order to speak with Moscow on equal terms."[4] This study remains relevant in identifying those

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[2]Josephine Andrews and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia," *Journal of Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 462.

[3]See Laura Belin, OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 2, No. 1 from 8 January 1997 for more on the elections in Russia's regions in the Fall of 1996 and the first week of 1997.

[4]OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 2, No. 1, 8 January 1997.

factors that lead a state executives to adopt an aggressive stance in favor of greater independence from the federal Center.

There is, to complicate the picture, a third center of power in both the regions and the republics. In addition to the centrally appointed heads of administration (which are now elected) and the soviets, Yeltsin has appointed special "presidential envoys" to oversee and supervise the activities of the very same heads of administration that he had appointed. The position of the envoys has been weak, with very little support in the regional administration or public at large. The envoys, or presidential representatives, were supposed to be the "emperor's eye in the localities," but in reality, they were rarely heeded and largely kept uninformed by the regional government of regional business.[5] For the purposes of this project, their role is also limited. Events reported in the sources used here did not include the behavior of envoys in federal negotiations, except in one or two instances. In these instances, they were coded as parts of the executive arm of regional authority, as opposed to the legislative branch.

In the ethnic republics, the executives have had the potential to remain more autonomous than their appointed colleagues in the regions. Direct election to the executive positions of power varied in their timing. Initially, republican parliaments in 1990 were in the same position as the R.S.F.S.R. parliament vis-a-vis the Soviet government, in trying to claim rights away from the Center. They were aided in this endeavor by the republican elections of 1990, which resulted in fewer "democrats" being

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[5]Josephine Andrews and Katherine Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia," *Journal of Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 462.

elected than at the national level.[6] By and large, the chairs of these 1990-elected parliaments in the republics went on to become the executives in the newly independent Russian Federation. For some regions, such as Tatarstan, the election of the president of the republic, Mintimer Shaimiev (a former Secretary of the Tatar Communist Party), occurred simultaneously with the election of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of the R.S.F.S.R. in 1991. For others, it did not occur until as late as 1994 after the drafting of new republic constitutions redefining the relationship between the republic executive and legislative branches.

In most cases, however, the individuals in power prior to Russian "independence" in the fall of 1991 remained in power after 1991 in the ethnic republics. The most notable exceptions were Chechnya, Ingushetia, Chuvashia, and Kalmykia, the only four of the twenty-one republics which, by the beginning of 1995, had genuinely new executives (presidents or "chairs" of parliaments), that is, men who had not played a prominent role in the government of the republic under the Soviet state. In any case, in the republics, executive power tends to be even more concentrated than in the regions, where authority is somewhat more evenly divided between the heads of administration and the local legislatures. This is especially true where democratic elections to the presidency of republics took place as early as 1991 or 1992 (some as late as 1993).

In contrast, elections to the republican parliaments were often delayed, held as early as December of 1993 for the Moscow City Duma and as late as December of 1995

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[6]Vera Tolz, "Russia's Republics: A Threat to Its Territorial Integrity?", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Vol. 2, No. 20, 14 May 1993, p. 36.

for Adegeya and Tuva.[7] This gave republican presidents a perceived mandate and legitimacy the legislatures could not claim. Thus, the phenomenally popular 30-year old millionaire elected president of Kalmykia in 1992 went on to "dismiss" the Kalmykian Soviet and rule by decree. Likewise, in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, Major-General D. Dudayev was elected "president" of the Chechen part of the republic, and was successful in convincing the Chechen-Ingush Soviet to disband itself, after it supported the unsuccessful 1991 coup in Moscow. There are, of course, a couple of exceptions to dominant executives in the republics. The parliament of the republic Mordovia, for example, has resisted the introduction of a "presidency" and even went so far as to "dismiss" the democratically elected president, V. Gusliannikov.

Table 3-1 provides a list of the "governors" or executives in both the regions and the republics as of the beginning of 1995. It also notes whether or not the executive later went on to win competitive election to that office. Additionally, Table 3-1 reports which leaders from the beginning of 1995 were replaced by Yeltsin in 1996 prior to the elections in the hopes of increasing the electoral hopes of the administration in that region. The table also indicates which leaders have been consistently in power since 1991.

As is evident from a cursory examination of the table, the continuity of executive leadership in the ethnic republics is higher than in the *oblasts* from 1991 through 1995, where the most significant change in republican leadership has occurred in Chechnya following the reported death of Dzhokar Dudayev in the civil war during 1995. Elsewhere

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[7]Darrell Slider, "Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1996, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 253-254.

in the republics, those executives who came to power during transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation largely remain in power. As Table 3-1 indicates, many of those presidents have since been "elected" but in many of those cases, the elections were uncontested, as in Tatarstan (1995), Kalmykia (early 1996), and Kabardino-Balkaria (1997), or serious contenders were denied the opportunity to compete, as in Adegeya (1997). The fall elections in Mari-El and Khakhasia, where incumbents were both soundly defeated, are exceptions but may point to a new trend in the republics where strong executives have ruled almost unchecked since 1991.

In the *oblasts*, where the Yeltsin administration regularly exercised its right to dismiss local executives, especially following the showdown with the Parliament in the fall of 1993, there is little continuity in regional leadership. In some cases, however, even dismissal did not result in the end of some regional executives' power. In Yeltsin's home state of Sverdlovsk, for example, the charismatic appointee Edward Rossel was summarily dismissed after repeatedly demanding republic status for his state, against the wishes of the central administration. He went on, however, to become one of the first democratically elected governors of that region, despite (or perhaps because of) his falling out of favor with the President. Similarly, the one-time administrator of Briansk oblast, Yurii Lodkin, who was dismissed in 1993 for supporting the Parliament in the October 1993 showdown, made a political comeback this fall by defeating his successor in the fall election. This was also true of Petr Sumin, newly elected governor of Chelyabinsk.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE FEDERATION

Before analyzing the factors related to a state elite's preferences for one type of federal arrangement over another, I examine the regional socio-economic and geographic differences between the members of the Russian Federation. For the purposes of evaluating quality of life indices, industrial and agricultural production figures and other economic indicators, the Soviet and now Russian State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat) divides Russia into the several geographic zones. They roughly approximate the eight regional associations which have cropped up since the dissolution of the Soviet state. In fact, some members of the presidential administration, prior to the constitutional debates of 1993, proposed that the new federal structure of the Russian Federation be based upon these eight large divisions. This was fiercely resisted by the local leaders of almost all of the eighty-nine states. Despite their reluctance to see Russia divided along larger regional lines, most state leaders have still since joined a regional association (all states but Chechnya belong to one), recognizing their common interests and the power of collective action.

The federation and regional associations can be geographically subdivided as follows. The map in Figure 3-1 illustrates the zones discussed blow.

[Figure 3-1 (map) About Here]

The North-West (Association): Includes the republics of Karelia and Komi, and the oblasts of Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Kirov, Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod, Pskov, Murmansk, Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the city of St. Petersburg. The governor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Yakovlev, heads the North-West regional

association. Although the level of industrialization is high in this zone, the standard of living, outside of St. Petersburg, is not. Karelians have ethnic ties to neighboring Finns, but only make up about 10% of the Karelian Republic population. Komi are Northern Indigenous people (also Finnic), who make up about 23% of the Komi republic, which is primarily a mining enclave, very hard hit by the payments-in-arrears crisis hitting the whole mining industry in Russia.

Central Russia (Association): Includes the federal city and capital, Moscow, the oblasts of Briansk, Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow Oblast, Riazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Yaroslavl. These are all very small but highly populated, ethnically homogeneous regions, with relatively low levels of industrial development except for pockets of the defense sector (as in Tula and Tver). It is largely considered part of the "red belt" where support for the Communist Party of the Russian federation and nationalist parties is high. While the Yaroslavl Governor is the formal leader of this group, the most influential leader is undoubtedly Moscow Mayor Yurii Lyzhkov.

Greater Volga (Association): Located in the center of the federation, along the Volga river, it includes the Republics of Mari-El, Mordovia, Tatarstan and Chuvashia, and the oblasts of Astrakhan, Volgograd, Penza, Samara, Saratov, Ulianovsk, and Niznhy-Novgorod. The Volga region is generally more prosperous than the rest of the federation (with the exception of Mari-El), and Niznhy Novgorod is considered one of the most forward-looking, reform-oriented oblasts in the country. Tatarstan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Samara are all considered "donor" regions today (giving more than they get in federal subsidies in 1996).

Black Earth Zone: Located in central Russia, in the agricultural center of the federation, it is an ethnically "Russian" and politically conservative region. It includes the oblasts of Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel, and Tambov. The inter-regional association is headed by the Governor of Orel Province, Yegor Stroev, who is also the Speaker of the Federation Council, a man with clear national-level political ambitions.

North Caucasus (Association of Cooperation of Republics, Krais and Oblasts of): The region with the lowest standard of living among its members and the lowest level of industrial development in the federation. It includes the rural, mountainous republics of Adygeya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Kalmykia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya, in addition to Krasnodar and Stavropol Krais, and Rostov oblast. The North Caucasus is by far the most ethnically diverse of all the federation zones, with the most ongoing horizontal conflicts between ethnic groups (ethnic conflict in Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Dagestan) in the region. The region is also home to the Russian "Cossacks" in Stavropol, Rostov and Krasnodar. The Cossacks, who have been known to take the law into their own hands to protect fellow Russians and impose order on cities and villages in the area, contribute to ethnic tensions in the region.

Urals Region (Association): Includes the relatively prosperous republics of Bashkortostan and Udmurtia, and the oblasts of Kurgan, Orenburg, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Cheliabinsk, in addition to the Komi-Permiak autonomous okrug. It is well-developed industrially and rich in natural resources. The inter-regional association is headed by the well-known leader of Sverdlovsk, Eduard Rossel, who was removed by Yeltsin from his chief administrator position when he lobbied too hard for the rights of non-ethnic states

vis-a-vis the ethnic republics by declaring his oblast a "republic" with rights equal to those of the ethnic republics. Sverdlovsk and Bashkortostan are both today considered donor regions.

Siberia (Accord Association): The model inter-regional association for all the others. The regions that are party to the Accord are large but sparsely populated, containing centers or pockets of Russian cities around mining centers with northern, indigenous peoples living outside them. Harsh in climate but with a wealth of natural resources to exploit, the regions include the republics of Khakhassia, Altai, and the corresponding Altai and Krasnoiarsk Krais, as well as the oblasts of Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, and the Khanti-Mansii, Taimyr, Ust-Orda, Agin-Buryat, Yevenk and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs. Each of these okrugs is meant to represent a small ethnic group of northern people, but the percentage of "Khanti" or "Mansii" that actually populate the district is usually quite small, with the exception of the Agin-Buryat AO, which is 55% Buryat. The most serious threat to the unity of this region comes from several of the krais and autonomous okrugs, which are demanding administrative separation from their governing oblasts. Omsk governor Leonid Polezhaev heads the association. Krasnoiarsk, Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansii are all considered donor regions and the latter two have demanded legal and administrative separation from Tyumen oblast.

The Far East (and Baikal Association): Again, a natural resource rich region, includes the republics of Sakha/Yakutia, Tuva and Buryatia, the Primorskii and Khabarovsk Krais, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Koriak and Chukota Autonomous

Okrugs and oblasts of Chita, Sakhalin, Magadan, Amur, and Kamchatka. Sakha is rich in diamonds, Sakhalin in oil, and Kamchatka in fisheries. The region is trying to attract foreign direct investment in the more efficient extraction of its natural wealth.[8]

While I do not expect the state governing elites within each of these regions to act uniformly with regard to the federal bargain because of their geographic proximity and potentially similar levels of socio-economic development, there is at least the possibility of a relationship between these factors, as hypothesized in the relative deprivation and instrumentalist approaches. There is also the possibility of some "contagion" or "bandwagoning" effects within regions where a particularly strong leader of one state, Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk, for example, threatens the Center that all members of his regional association are banding together to form one large "Urals Republic" and the rest of the region follows suit. That kind of time-dependent analysis of elite behavior and demands will be examined in chapter 5. Within this chapter, I want to examine the primarily structural arguments set forth in general terms in chapter one, from the Essentialist, Instrumental, Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilization perspectives.

REGIONAL ELITE BEHAVIOR, 1991-1995

For the purposes of this study, I have recorded over one thousand events related to the federal-periphery constitutional debate over the division of powers between the center and the states. I have also broken down the events according to the type of actor involved

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[8]For more on the regional associations and their interactions with Moscow, see Laura Belin, OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 2, No. 2, 15 January 1997.

in the event, i.e., whether or not the actor was a member of the regional executive, legislature or a member of a civic association (leader of a party, union members, members of nationalist organizations, etc.). In this chapter, I analyze the behavior and demands of the political actors with regard to their preferred federal arrangement. Political actors include both the presidentially appointed Heads of Regional Administration and the Presidents of the ethnic republics, in addition to the chairs of regional and republican parliaments. Whether or not the elected presidents act significantly different from the initially appointed heads of administration is something this study will investigate.

I combine the two types (executives and legislative chairs) of state elites for the purposes of this analysis, expecting that the two branches will largely converge on federal policy, while recognizing that they often differed in their stands on the stalemate between the President and the Parliament in October of 1993. The majority of local executives tended to favor the President's position while over 60 of the 89 local parliaments sided with the Parliament.[9] But with regard to federal divisions of power I assume that their positions will be rather more similar than different. Ultimately, I will examine this hypothesis empirically, when the data permit me to do so.

After using those events involving only state political actors, using both the *CDSP* and *OMRI,* I recorded the distribution of autonomy scores displayed in Table 3-2. I recorded both the mean and median scores in the table. For statistical purposes, the median is the more appropriate indicator of central tendency on this, an ordinal scale. If,

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[9]Galina Starovoitova, "The Formation of the New Ethno-Political Elites in Russia," paper presented at Michigan State University Conference on the New Elite of Russia, October 1994, p. 8.

however, one conceptualizes the observations on the scale as measuring an underlying continuous variable, then the mean becomes meaningful as well. Theoretically, I do conceive of the scale as a continuum of autonomy from none to full. And it is possible, therefore, for a state to fall in between my categories and for that "in between" score to have meaning. For these reasons, I report the mean score for the political actors of each state on this index for the entire period from 1991 through 1995 and rank order them in Table 3-2 from those demanding the most autonomy, the leaders of Chechnya, to those demanding the most centralization, the leaders of Kursk. The number of events recorded (*n*) is also displayed in parentheses.

As is evident from Table 3-2, only Chechnya had a median score of five and a mean score above a 4.5, and Tatarstan is the only other republic with a mean above a 4.0, with a 4.33. It is the only other state whose political elite pushed for greater autonomy than would be granted in a real ethno-confederation during this five year transition period. Another fact also stands out: all states for whom the median score of their political elite is a four (favoring an ethnic-confederation) are ethnic republics. Among the non-ethnic states, only Tyumen and Sverdlovsk had mean scores above a 3.0.

But while only ethnic republics pushed for special cantons for the new federal constitution, ethno-federation was not the central tendency of all the republics' leaders. The republican leaders of North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Altai all had median positions of a 3.0, or support for a loose, but not ethnically defined, federation. Significantly, all but Altai are republics located in the North Caucasus, a region torn apart by interethnic strife. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-

Cherkessia and Dagestan leaders must contend on a daily basis with separatist movements within their own republics from small ethnic minority groups demanding equal recognition with other titular nationalities. The Congress of Balkars wants to separate from the Kabardinians and form their own republic, and the Lezgins, in Dagestan and Azerbaidjan, want to be united in one administrative unit, either independent or as a part of the Russian Federation. For these reasons, it may not be as easy for the ethnic leadership in these republics to play the nationalist card. But at this point, I will return to the theoretical propositions discussed in Chapter 1 to understand better the reasons for the variation in the expressed positions of the leaders of the republics, autonomous entities and oblasts of the Russian Federation along this continuum of autonomy from the federal center.

EXPLAINING REGIONAL ELITE BEHAVIOR

Why does one state's political elite pursue autonomy from the center while another is reluctant or hostile to any political decentralization? As discussed earlier, the types of explanations fall into several broad categories: Essentialism, Instrumentalism, Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilization schools of thought.

Essentialism:

If one were to look at the debates over the federal bargain in Russia as debates between ethno-nationalists in the peripheries and the Russian Center, as essentialist scholars do, then the inevitable consequence of the break-up of the Soviet state is the rise of movements in the non-Russian parts of the empire for their just recognition.

Essentialists would suggest that any self-proclaimed nation will eventually rise up to claim statehood with the collapse of the imperial center in 1991. In terms of the Russian Federation, while considerably less diverse than the former Soviet Union, this would suggest that over fifty different national groups should be seeking statehood. It is not within the bounds of this project to evaluate the demands or aspirations of those groups which did not already have an administratively defined territory and political leadership at the time of the collapse of the Soviet state, but the case of the Germans in the Volga region, who have pressured the German government to ask Russia to restore a German state within the Federation, would be evidence of such aspirations. But the Germans in Volgograd and Saratov are only one example of those without an existing unit which are seeking increased recognition. In reality, the majority of the small ethnic groups in the Federation are not aspiring to nation-statehood.

More nuanced arguments flowing out of the essentialist school suggest that only those national groups with an already strong sense of "group identity," sustained perhaps by cultural distance from the dominant national group and/or a past serious conflict with the same dominant center, are likely to mobilize for greater national autonomy. These are the hypotheses and findings of the ***Minorities at Risk*** **(1993)** project, and it is their measures that I will use to test the following hypothesis derived from this school of thought.

> **<u>Essentialist Proposition</u>: The state elites most likely to express a desire for greater autonomy from the center are those whose population shares a strong sense of group identity, are culturally distant from the center, and experienced a past serious conflict with the Russian center.**

I also hypothesize, based on the logic of the essentialist argument, that the converse is true: among the ethnic states with a weak sense of group identity, cultural proximity to the dominant Russian culture and no past serious grievance with the center (such as deportation, massacres, etc.), state leaders would be less likely to push for the maximum amount of autonomy from the center, or even for the special status granted by virtue of an ethnic confederation.

Instrumentalism:

Instrumentalists are more cynical about the rise of nationalist movements for autonomy and independence from the center. They view such movements not as the inevitable result of imperial or foreign rule over "nations" but as a function of deliberate strategies pursued by elites in territories where the benefits of greater autonomy would be greater than the costs incurred in demanding it. Elites in the states make calculations of the costs and benefits of remaining a part of the federation. They bargain to improve their position, instrumentally, within it.

Ethnicity, in this view, is just a means of rallying support for what is ultimately a rational calculation of costs and benefits. It is a form of leverage which may or may not be effectively mobilized against the center. Other forms of leverage might include natural resource wealth, such as if the state produced a large share of the Federation's oil, or the tax base of the state, that is, if the state is a donor vs. recipient economic unit.

While all of the executives in the regions were initially appointed at the end of 1991, all expected to ultimately face voters in their states. They would pursue autonomy if they felt benefits to their constituencies would enhance their own electoral chances

down the road. This assumes, of course, that the administrators aspire to remain governors for longer than their appointed terms. But if the 49 regional elections held this fall are any indicator, this is a fair assumption. Only one incumbent did not seek to extend his term. Once elected, one might expect that regional leaders would feel even freer to pursue the self-interest of the region vis-a-vis the center even more strenuously than before, something the final chapter will examine.

The following would represent one proposition derived from the instrumentalist argument.

> **Instrumentalist Proposition: Elites from states which are least dependent on the center for subsidies and investment are most likely to demand autonomy from the center. Similarly, elites from states which are most dependent on the center for subsidies and investment, with little or no independent resources valued on the world market, are least likely to pursue political decentralization.**

I will test this proposition in a number of ways, using different measures of "dependence." I will use several indicators, in order to show that the results are robust across measures, and not a function of a particular type of measure.

Relative Deprivation Theory:

Almost in direct contrast to the instrumentalist position, the relative deprivation approach would suggest that elites in states which have been exploited by the center *relative* to their neighbors or other members of the federation would use ethnicity or any other effective unifying symbol to argue that they have not benefited from membership in the Federation in the past. Mobilization of this resentment occurs either when

expectations rise well above capabilities to fulfill them, or when capabilities decline, even while expectations remain unchanged.

The collapse of the Communist state and central organization might have generated a tide of rising expectations that new/old leaders are simply unable to satisfy. Relative deprivation scholars might then hypothesize that the most depressed regions, and the leaders of those regions which have actually seen a decline in their overall quality of life since the collapse of the old center, would make a scapegoat of the federal center. Published reports appear almost daily in the Russian media discussing the relative wealth/poverty and environmental degradation of each of the federation's members. In negotiations over new federal-constitutional arrangements, it would be natural, relative deprivation theory suggests, for the most depressed regions to want to opt out of the bargain altogether on the grounds that the Center is untrustworthy. They might argue that they do not want to remain "proletarian" states forever, helping to maintain the wealthy lifestyles of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan with no benefits accruing to them.

> **Relative Deprivation Proposition: Elites from states whose population has experienced deprivation (an increase in expectations without a corresponding increase in abilities OR a decrease in capabilities) during the time period of this study are more likely to seek to blame the center for their situation, and as a result, be more likely to pursue independence from the center and to resist any attempts at a recentralization of political power which could signal a return to their exploited position in the federation.**

Relative deprivation theory focuses on the psychological impact of "perceived" inequality in treatment by the Center, towards the states. As Gurr (1976) noted, the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities" is more

important than what objective indicators might tell us about such discrepancies. Any measure of this "relative deprivation" has to contend with the issue of perception in order to be a valid test of the hypothesis.

Resource Mobilization Theory:

This branch of collective action theory has its origins in some of the early work of Charles Tilly (1974). It recognizes weaknesses in relative deprivation arguments, which like other revolutionary theories, overlook the fundamental problem of collective action. Given the same window of opportunity, what drives some individuals to undertake a collective action where there are costs to the individual and where the benefits are widely distributed to the many, and where the risk of defection is high? In this case, I apply the argument to individual state elites. What drives some of them to pursue autonomy from the center while others resist the decentralization of power? The answer, suggest resource mobilization scholars, resides in the different resources each state's elite can bring to bear on the bargaining process.

One such potential resource is the leader's experience in such political bargaining from under the old regime, and the amount of domestic political support he has already built up, independent of the center. This suggests that the political structures in place before the dissolution of the Soviet state will be important in shaping the bargaining for certain structural arrangements in the post-Soviet state. As mentioned earlier, Roeder (1991) makes a persuasive argument on the relationship between "ethnonationalism" and the previous administrative status of the state (and thereby, state elite) under the old regime. The more privileged the state (and thereby, the state elite), the more likely it will

be able to mobilize experience and support to maintain that privilege after the center's collapse.

> **Resource Mobilization Proposition: Elites from those states that were administratively privileged under the old regime will be most likely to mobilize to maintain those privileges (i.e. political, cultural and economic autonomy) in the transition period. They will be most likely to bargain for greater autonomy.**

Other such resources besides those accrued under the old regime, would be whether or not the elite were able to mobilize some kind of support outside of Moscow to counter Moscow's influence. If the leader of that state were independently elected, or when the elite of a given state are elected, they instantly develop a base of support independent of the Center, and with greater ability to act independent of the Center's authority. Therefore, a second proposition derived from this school would be:

> **Resource Mobilization Proposition 1-B: Elites who have stood for independent election and won are more likely to demand autonomy than those who are still subject to appointment and re-appointment from the Center.**

An additional resource that might be mobilized against the Center would be international support from neighboring independent states or larger "brothers" in the near abroad. One such example would be the continued pressure placed upon the Yeltsin administration by the German government on behalf of the newly created German-national districts in Volgograd. This hypothesis, too, will be examined later.

Operationalizing the Models

The dependent variable is a state elite's central tendency, or median score, on the autonomy index from 1991-95. The mean scores range from a 1.6 to a 4.62, while the median scores range from 2 to 5. No state had 1 as a median score, and only one (Chechnya) state had 5. Given the limited and bounded nature of the dependent variable, I will use a multinomial logistic regression when appropriate for each of the five categories to derive the probability of each model predicting a state elite's position along the autonomy index. So, for example, the model will generate coefficients for independent variables for each position on the index. Multinomial logit (MNL) is the most appropriate statistical technique to model the relationship between the above-mentioned factors and a state political elite's bargaining position (as opposed to linear regression). Though the coefficients are somewhat more difficult to interpret in logit when compared to a multiple regression analysis, regression only produces unbiased estimates when its basic assumptions are not violated, and one of those assumptions is a continuous, normally distributed dependent variable.

For the purposes of clarity, all of the independent variables for each of the four models are listed in Figure 3-2. To operationalize the essentialist model, or Model 1, I need to measure strength of group identity, cultural distance from the center, and past, serious conflict with the center. To capture the first, I follow Silver (1974) by using level of attachment to native language as a measure of attachment to one's national group. The 1989 Soviet census reports responses to questions about individuals' use of Russian and their native tongue. Those that have linguistically assimilated are treated as having a weak

sense of national identity, while those who have maintained the use of their native tongue, in spite of central pressures to Russify, are treated as having a strong sense of national identity.

As a measure of cultural distance, I could follow Anderson and Silver (1989) and Emizet and Hesli (1995) by using Muslim faith as an indicator of cultural distance from the center. They measure whether or not a republic (in their case, union republic) was "predominantly" Muslim. It is not clear if this means Muslims are in the majority, or mere plurality. In my study, however, I will use "Orthodox/Non-Orthodox," as did Silver (1974), as an indicator of proximity to the dominant Russian, Orthodox center. I score those states where the plurality of the population is not orthodox, that is Muslim or Buddhist, as one, while those where the plurality are orthodox Christian I score as zero.

Finally, I judged any state whose population was subjected to deportation, extermination or forcible annexation by Stalin during World War II to be a victim of a serious conflict with the center. They received a score of 1 on the "punished people" variable while those who were not subject to extermination or deportation, received a 0.

Eleven states are in the plurality Non-Orthodox states, according to the Anderson and Silver (1989) classification: Tatarstan, Tuva, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan. There were five "punished" peoples, which had administrative states taken away from them in 1944 by Stalin and were deported en masse for alleged collaboration with the Nazis: Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars and Kalmyks. I have also considered

Tuvinians "punished" peoples because of the forcible annexation of their territory to Russia in 1940.

To test the Instrumentalist Model, I use several indicators of dependence/ independence from the center. The first is natural resource wealth. All those states with significant (as defined by the World Bank) oil, natural gas, diamond and gold deposits have independent economic potential and are scored a 1, to those without, 0. In contrast, those states whose economy rests almost entirely on the defense industry/complex are considered to be dependent on the center and likely to be supportive of more centralized constitutional arrangements.

As an indicator of whether or not a state was a "defense" state or not, I used the sixteen regions that were designated "closed" security regions to foreigners for national security/defense reasons under the old Soviet state and the new Russian government in July of 1992. They were the following states: Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kaliningrad, Kamchatka, Amur, Primorskii Krai, several districts of Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts, Orenburg, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Sverdlovsk, Astrakhan, Krasnoyarsk, Mordovia and Volgograd. Additionally, I include those ten regions that contained the secret "nuclear" cities, which in addition to Chelyabinsk, Moscow Oblast, Krasnoyarsk and Sverdlovsk (all also listed above), include the regions of Tomsk and Penza. All of these are coded 1, for defense region, while all others are 0.

Under a separate indicator, I identify what Malleret (1992) refers to as the top fifteen "end product weapons" regions in the federation[10]. He ranks them according to the number of defense industry enterprises (whose end product is weapons) per 10 million of the population. They are as follows: Vladimir, Tula, Udmurtia, Chelyabinsk, St. Petersburg Oblast, Tatarstan, Mari El, Perm, Samara, Kirov, Nizhny Novgorod, Buryatia, Omsk, Voronezh, and what he calls the "Far Eastern region" (Kamchatka, Primorskii Krai, Magadan). They receive a 1, for defense industry regions, while all others receive a 0.

To test the Relative Deprivation Model, I need an indicator of overall well-being that captures the relative levels of inequality between regions of the federation, as well as how these levels are perceived by the public at large. As an objective indicator of this I use whether or not a region was identified by the President's administration as a critically depressed region in 1991, the starting point of this study. It does not, therefore, measure any changes in this status over the five year period of time, but it does provide evidence that such deprivation has been publicly and therefore, collectively, recognized, which is an essential component of the theory. To capture change in status over time, I will examine other objective indicators of well-being which are available yearly specifically changes in the level of unemployment in the region and the comparative rates of income growth. As states earlier, those with the slowest rates of income growth and highest rate of

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[10]See Thierry Malleret (1992), "Conversion of the Defense Industry in the Former Soviet Union," Institute for East-West Studies: New York, p. 52, Table 6.

unemployment, relative to their neighbors, will be most likely to opt out of the federal bargain.

The social indicators of the quality of life in the regions may, however, be a more important indicator of what the public at large is feeling and not a significant indicator of elite behavior. The deprivation, be it perceived or real, might have a more pronounced impact on the behavior of mass publics, and only be reflected in the behavior of regional elites to the degree that elites correctly represent the concerns of their publics. Both hypotheses are examined in this study.

Finally, to test the proposition derived from the Resource Mobilization School, I identify those regional elites who were working in administratively privileged states at the time of the collapse, in the fall of 1991. I assign scores to the eighty-nine states based on their status in the administrative hierarchy of the USSR, using four dummy variables for each of the four possible status': A.S.S.R., Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, and Non-Ethnic Territory. Additionally, I try to understand the mobilizational resources of the regional elite according to their past history (former Party leader of the region), and their current status (elected or appointed). I hypothesize that if they are elected they are more likely to display behavior that is independent of the Center's authority, and perhaps more confrontational.

Analysis:

The propositions to be tested are restated here.

Essentialist Proposition: The state elites most likely to express a desire for greater autonomy from the center are those whose population shares a strong sense of group identity, are culturally distant from the center, and experienced a past serious conflict with the Russian center.

Instrumentalist Proposition: Elites from states which are least dependent on the center for subsidies and investment are most likely to use this economic independence as leverage to demand increasing levels of autonomy from the center. Similarly, elites from states which are most dependent on the center for subsidies and investment, with little or no independent resources of value on the world market, are least likely to pursue political decentralization.

Relative Deprivation Proposition: Elites from states whose population has experienced deprivation (an increase in expectations without a corresponding increase in abilities OR a decrease in capabilities) during the time period of this study are more likely to seek to blame the center for their situation, and as a result, be more likely to pursue independence from the center and to resist any attempts at a recentralization of political power which could signal a return to their exploited position in the federation.

Resource Mobilization Proposition: Elites from states that were administratively privileged under the old regime will be most likely to mobilize to maintain those privileges (i.e., political, cultural and economic autonomy) in the transition period. They will be most likely to bargain for greater autonomy.

Resource Mobilization Proposition 1-B: Elites that have stood for independent election and won are more likely to demand autonomy than those that are still subject to appointment and re-appointment from the Center.

Essentialism: I begin with an analysis of the variables that identify those states likely to exhibit nationalist tendencies on the basis of their potential for the development of a separate national identity. These include indicators of strength of group identity and of the distance of that identity from the culturally, demographically and politically dominant Russian Orthodox Center. This school of thought predicts that only those states with a significant ethno-linguistic group present within its borders are likely to opt "out" of the Federation. Significant need not mean majority. In this case, it may be that a minority

within the state received "official" recognition of its status within those boundaries, either as a republic, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug. Essentialists do not posit that other factors are unimportant in explaining secessionist tendencies in a formerly united state, but do expect to see secessionism arise in those states where multiple national groups reside as minorities in a "foreign" state.

In order to test this, I need to determine which of the ethnic states, if any, have maintained a strong sense of group identity and are culturally distant from the center. I begin with some bivariate analyses of some commonly used indicators of this phenomenon: states with non-orthodox populations, states with populations retaining the use of a native tongue separate from Russian, and states with populations experiencing some past serious injustice at the hands of the Russian Center.

Table 3-3 reveals the strong relationship between my potential indicators. There is a strong relationship between those states which are non-orthodox and those with a past serious conflict with the center (i.e., deportation or forcible annexation during Stalin era). All of the "punished" peoples are non-orthodox groups, though there are five non-orthodox groups that are not punished. None of the ethnic groups that have largely converted to orthodoxy are punished peoples.[11] Use of both of these variables in an equation with the Median Score on the Autonomy Index would be problematic. The question is whether or not there is a "punished people effect" that interacts with the non-

[11]The Jewish people are not considered here to be "punished" in the sense that the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, established in 1928, never served as an ethnic "homeland" to Soviet Jews in the way that Kalmykia did for Kalmyks or Tuva did, and still does, to Tuvinians. This classification does not mean to suggest, however, that Jews were not systematically discriminated against or persecuted by the Soviet state. They clearly were. But by the logic of the essentialist case, there needs to be a strong sense of national identity also associated with a particular space or territory, which then becomes the object of a national secessionist movement.

orthodox measure, to mean that groups that are non-orthodox and formerly punished are most likely to push for autonomy.

Another means of measuring strength of group identity is through language use. Those groups with a high level of retention of their native tongue (as self-reported on the census of 1989) are believed to have a stronger sense of national identity than those groups that have lost their native tongue to the process of assimilating to Russian culture and language. Even native language retention is correlated with non-orthodoxy. The Muslim groups and the Buddhist Tuvinians in particular (who are also a punished people) are the highest among the thirty-two groups in reporting native language use. Since there is a high degree of multicollinearity between all three of these "essentialism" variables, I will not incorporate them into a multivariate equation just yet.

According to the essentialist theory, we would expect that groups with a strong sense of identity, cultural distance from the center and a past historical grievance would be the most demanding of autonomy. Therefore a summated scale of "potential" for developing a separate national identity with separatist ambitions seems appropriate. If the population of the state is recognized as non-Russian, non-orthodox, previously punished by Stalin and has a high reported use of its native tongue (75%+), it receives a score of 4. Any combination of three of the above is a 3, two of the above a 2, and one of the above a 1. "Russian" states receive a score of 0. I consider those states with all four factors to have a high potential for the development of a strong, separate national identity, while those with none to have a low potential for doing so. Accordingly, there are 6 states with

a score of 4, 5 with a score of 3, 12 with a score of 2, 9 with a score of 1 and the rest, 57, with a score of 0..

Correlating this "Essentialism Index" with the Median Autonomy Score Index yields the results shown in Table 3-4. The Kendall's tau-b coefficient (.575) is statistically significant (p = .000), suggesting that the essentialist propositions are important when explaining the behavior of the state elite. A closer examination of the relationship among the *ethnic* state elite is provided in the crosstabs presented in Table 3-5. While the only state (Chechnya) to pursue a course of independence is also one with the highest potential for the development of a separate national identity, five other states with similarly high levels of national identity have not opted for independence. So while presence of these four factors might be considered necessary to the leadership before embarking on a path to independence, they are not sufficient conditions for doing so.

Likewise, the only two ethnic states to adopt positions asking for less autonomy than is represented by the overall median of 3.0 are states lacking any of the essentialism factors present (the Koriak and Evenki AO). So while the presence of a strong sense of national identity is not sufficient for predicting a desire for greater autonomy, it does seem less likely that states with some potential for the development of a separate national identity will be unlikely to call for the return of a strong, central government at the expense of the development of regional government.

But the indicators cannot tell us much more about the likely behavior of these state elite beyond the most extreme positions. For example, the leaders of the state of Karelia, with only one of the factors present and those of Tuva, with all of them present, score the

same on the autonomy index, in asking for the maximum amount of autonomy possible within a single state, position four. We need more than what the essentialism school offers to explain the behavior of both ethnic and non-ethnic elite in bargaining with the center over the distribution of political power.

Instrumentalism: In contrast to what the essentialist school would suggest, the instrumentalist approach suggests that elites in states with credible economic leverage to use against the Center will be most likely to demand increasing levels of autonomy from the Center to capture greater rents from those same resources. In the more prosperous regions, elites may be aware of the fact that continued membership in this federation would signal a continuation of their status as "donor" regions, supporting poorer regions at the expense of the development of their own constituencies. Increasing levels of political autonomy then would mean that regional elites gain more control over tax revenues collected in their regions, and over wealth accumulated from the sale of natural resources in the region, etc. This case has been made with regard to the Baltic states and their desire for independence from the Soviet Union. That they had a consistently higher standard of living than most of the other republics, and felt they could be doing even better if they did not have to continue to subsidize the development of poorer regions like those in Central Asia, are among the primary reasons for the emergence of strong independence movements in these regions. In contrast, that the much poorer and culturally distant Central Asian republics were reluctant to secede from the Union is consistent with the fact that they were budgetary recipients under the terms of the old federal bargain.

To test these propositions on the eighty-nine regions of the Russian Federation, I use data on the degree of economic dependence/independence of the state on the federal Center. There are several ways to measure dependence. The first is to use an indicator that captures which regions are the "donor"regions and which are the "subsidized" ones. One such indicator uses 1992 tax and subvention data to rank the regions according to whether they pay into the federal budget more than they receive back in subsidies. Those that pay more than they receive have negative values while those that receive more than they pay have positive values. Net gainers are expected to be least likely to demand a loose or decentralized federal arrangement, and not at all likely to opt for independence. They are expected to mirror the behavior of the Central Asian states during the collapse of the old Soviet center in 1991.

A Kendall's tau-b correlation of .366 between the Median Autonomy Score for state elites and the net budgetary gainers/losers variable is statistically significant ($p = .000$) and positive. I find that states that are budgetary gainers in the federal bargain are more likely to demand autonomy than those that are budgetary losers. This is the opposite of what the theory would predict, which is that the most well-to-do would want to opt out to do better, like the Baltics in 1990-91. The result is not, however, entirely surprising when one examines the net gainer variable more closely. Table 3-6 identifies the 15 net-gainer states, that is, those with excess subsidies received over the taxes they paid into the federal budget (per capita), 13 of which are ethnic republics. Of the non-ethnic regions, only Kamchatka and Irkutsk receive more in subventions than they pay out in federal taxes in 1992. Thus, there is a strong interaction between the budgetary measure and the status

of the state. Since Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva, and Sakha are all net gainers but are still among the most demanding of autonomy, the motivations are not that they are being economically "exploited" to fund development in poorer regions, as we often heard from the leaders of the Baltic independence movements. The leaders from the highest paying donor regions are probably not, by the same token, instrumentally using their status as donors to bargain for better either.

The measure is imperfect, however, because it does not allow us to consider the position of the autonomous okrugs and krais, which in budgetary terms, are considered one with their oblasts/republics. This removes a number of important cases from consideration (N= 73).

Looking at the natural resource base of the regions is another way to examine whether elites are motivated by instrumental considerations in their bargaining with the center. Those with a strong natural resource base of tradable goods on the world market (i.e. oil, gas, diamonds and gold) might be more likely to bargain for more autonomy. A cross-tabulation of resource base against the Median Autonomy Score seems to support this proposition, as Table 3-7 indicates. The state elites demanding a strong federation, that is, a strong center at the expense of regional state governments are those from states with no known resource wealth. Of the 25 state elites opting for a 2 or 2.5 on the autonomy scale most of the time, 20, or 80 percent, are from states without any oil, gas, diamond or gold reserves to speak of.

At the other end of the spectrum, however, things are not as clear. Of the seventeen 4's, that is, state elites advocating a very loose ethnic federation of states, ten

are resource-rich and seven are not. Resource base is not an important predictor of this position, as it is the strong federalist position. The one 5, Chechnya, is an oil-producing state. The overall Kendall's tau-b correlation between natural resource wealth and the median autonomy position of state elites is moderately positive at .295 (p= .001).

One additional way to determine the economic dependence of a particular state on the center is to examine the state's expenditures to revenues ratio. The World Bank has compiled a listing of the state budgets for 1992--their expenditures and resources. From these figures, I calculated the percentage of the local budget expenditures made up by federal subsidies. It ranges dramatically across regions from virtually nothing to well over 75%. Again, in a rational economic world, one would expect that those states least dependent on the center would be most likely to demand a loose federation, special autonomy or outright independence.

A list of the states ranked according to how dependent they are on the center for resources is presented in Table 3-8. A Kendall's tau-b correlation between percent of local budget obtained from federal subsidies and the median autonomy index is statistically significant, but not in the expected direction. It is positive .172 (p= .043). Once again, economic motivations alone are not important predictors of state elite behavior with regards to the federal bargain. Those with little or no dependence on the center for subsidies are not more likely to demand autonomy; in fact, they are slightly less likely to do so.

Among the instrumentalist measures expected to predict demands for autonomy, then, only natural resource base is significant and predictive in the expected direction.

State leaders seem willing to use oil, gas, diamond wealth as leverage against the center to obtain greater autonomy themselves over those same resources and other political and economic powers. This is true even in cases where the state has done well vis-a-vis the center in terms of what they have received relative to what they put in, and in cases where they appear to be dependent on the center for resources to cover local budget expenditures.

What it is about natural resource wealth above other kinds of wealth that makes local leaders more bold is not immediately apparent. Perhaps the marketability of these goods on a world market at values higher than they are likely to receive on the domestic market contributes to this phenomenon. Another possibility, worthy of further consideration at a later point, is more political. I can only begin to speculate here about the degree of influence that directors of natural resource extraction and production facilities (the profitable oil/ gas ones, that is, not the forlorn coal mining facilities) in the states have on local leaders, but one could hypothesize that it is relatively strong and that they would tend to favor a loosening of federal authority over their prizes.

Along these same lines, I have a final test of the instrumentalist position involving reverse expectations. If the elite/managers/directors from the profitable firms are pushing for a looser federation with more local control, the reverse would certainly be true of those firms which are almost entirely dependent on the Center for survival in the new marketplace. In this case, one can imagine that the advocates of a strong center at the localities expense would be those states whose economy is almost entirely based upon the Center's continued strength--the defense regions. According to the logic of the

instrumental approach, defense regions and their leaders are more likely to be hostile to attempts by other regional elite to jeopardize the territorial integrity of the Federation; defense regions would also resent the demands from resource rich states for lighter tax burdens, greater revenue sharing and economic decentralization.

The numbers do not support these expectations. In fact, there is no statistically significant relationship between defense regions and their position on the autonomy index. The Kendall's tau-b correlation is a -.086 ($p = .381$)

Relative Deprivation: Moving next to an assessment of the relative deprivation school, I begin by attempting to measure "relative deprivation" in each state. The concept attempts to capture a psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals, or groups of individuals, feel they are being mistreated relative to others. This comes to a crisis when there is a change in circumstance, when either the capabilities or status of a group experience a decline due to some outside force, or when the expectations of the group increase without a corresponding increase in their ability to fulfill those expectations.

I assume, at the onset, that the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 and Yeltsin's "victory" over the putschists of August created a tide of rising expectations all over the federation, which residents in some regions were more able to capitalize on than others. What is important in the relative deprivation school is the perception among large groups of people that they are doing worse than their neighbors, and that the Center is somehow to blame, either from pursuing reckless policies, or more likely, from the sense that they are purposefully privileging some regions over others. Those regional elites who are up for election in regions where large parts of the population are experiencing relative

deprivation during this period are more likely to opt out of the federal bargain. Once again, I have several means to test this hypothesis.

First, I look at changes in the standard of living of the states. In states experiencing a dramatic decline in the standard of living during this time period, leaders might opt to deflect the criticism from themselves by blaming the Center and telling their constituents that they could do better without so much interference from the Center. As a measure change in the standard of living over time, I look at the level of change in income and unemployment from 1993-94. Elites in those states experiencing slower income growth in the face of rampant inflation and a corresponding jump in the level of unemployment are more likely to demand autonomy from the center as a means of taking the heat off themselves.

The results do not bear this hypothesis out. Kendall's tau-b correlations between change in unemployment/change in income by median autonomy score do not yield statistically significant results. The correlation between level of unemployment and median autonomy score is negative (-.049), as expected, but not significant ($p = .567$). Likewise, level of income growth and median autonomy score are negatively correlated ($p = -.030$) so the higher the growth the less the deprivation and the less likely the leader is to demand autonomy. But this relationship, too, is not significant ($p = .733$).

An alternative to this measure of relative deprivation is one which measures whether or not the Center considers this region to be a "depressed" region. In 1992, the President's Analytical Center identified twenty regions as economically depressed compared to the rest of the Federation during 1991-92. While this measure is only for a

single point in time, and therefore, cannot measure the degree to which a state's population's capabilities have declined over this time period, if we take the collapse of the USSR to be a point in time at which all individuals expectations were raised, then we do not need to find a corresponding decrease in abilities. By the logic of the theory, the worse off regions would be more likely to opt out than the well-to-do regions, by virtue of the fact that they were worse off than their neighbors in a time when things were expected to improve (however unrealistic this expectation) for all.

The Kendall's tau-b correlation between "depressed region" and the state elite's median autonomy score is .284 ($p = .004$). The relationship is strong and positive, as the theory would have predicted. The fact that these regions were also identified publicly by the Center as having been worse off than the average state in the Federation lends support to the relative deprivation theory. It is not enough that the region be depressed, but the population must perceive this to be the case in comparison to some "other." In this case, the comparison was made clear for them.

The relative deprivation school then, receives mixed reviews here. It finds little support when we use income and unemployment levels to measure deprivation, but when we consider a state's classification on a federal list of depressed regions, we find evidence of a relationship between those on the list and those demanding autonomy from the center. Not surprisingly, many of those classified as depressed are also on the "net gainers" list. The most depressed regions are receiving subsidies from the Center as the Central Asian states did under the Soviet system, but as was also true under the Soviet system, these subsidies did not do away with the dramatic differences in quality of life between the

peoples of Central Asia and the Baltics, for example, any more than they did away with the poverty afflicting the North Caucus' and the relative wealth of the Moscow suburban area.[12] What is perhaps left unanswered here, by the limitations of the data analyzed, is whether the public declaration of critical depression measures absolute or relative levels of deprivation.

Resource Mobilization: The final test examines the proposition that those elites from states that were privileged under the old regime are most likely to demand increasing levels of autonomy on the basis that these elites gained in experience and networks the political skills and tools necessary to bargain effectively with the Center. While the federalism that existed under the Soviet state was nominal in the amount of power it granted to state officials, it did allow for elite recruitment and some bargaining to go on between these local elites and the federal center. And it allowed this on an unequal, hierarchical basis. Elites from the A.S.S.R.'s had more flexibility than those from the autonomous oblasts, who had more than those from the autonomous okrugs, who had more than those from the non-ethnically defined oblasts and krais. This relationship should show up in an evaluation of the relationship between previous administrative level and demands for autonomy under the new regime. Those from the ASSRs should be more demanding than those from the Autonomous Oblasts, Okrugs, and non-ethnic states, and so forth.

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[12]See Donna Bahry (1987), Outside Moscow: Power, Politics and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics (New York: Columbia University Press) for an excellent study on the nature of the relationship between federal subsidies to the Union Republics and their overall level development.

The relationship is both strong and statistically significant. The higher in the administrative hierarchy (which I have divided into a rank-ordered four-fold classification: ASSR, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, Non-Ethnic State) the state was under the Soviet state, the more likely its current state elite are to demand "special" autonomy for themselves, if not outright independence. Only 3 of the 16 previous ASSR's are now demanding a federal arrangement under whose terms they are likely to give up some of their privileged status. Likewise, none of the territorial formations (non-ethnic states) are demanding the kind of special status or independence demanded by the likes of Chechnya or even Tatarstan. Within the group of non-ethnic states, however, there is disagreement about how strong a federal center should be created. Twenty-three of 57 non-ethnic states lean towards a very strong central state while 34 others prefer a looser federation with more autonomy granted to the local leadership. This variation cannot be explained away in terms of the previous administrative status or non-privileged status of the state under the Soviet system.

Multivariate Analysis

Next, I will examine explanatory power of the variables for each theory in a multivariate analysis. Multinomial logit will be used as the dependent variable is bounded. While the bivariate analysis above allows us to understand whether any relationship exists between the variables chosen to represent the four theories examined here, bivariate correlations do not allow us to see how the variables interact, the relative weight of the variables in explaining variation in the dependent variable or the comparability of the

models' goodness of fit. Multinomial logit (MNL) will generate coefficients representing the probability of being in each category of the dependent variable when the independent variables are altered. It will also indicate whether those coefficients are statistically significant. MNL also generates data on what the model would predict each state's position to be compared to what its actual position was, providing us with an overall "percentage correctly predicted" statistic for comparison among models.

For the purposes of the multivariate analysis, I recode some of the median autonomy scores in order to have enough cases in each category to allow the analysis to converge. The one '5' is recoded into the category 4 while the eight 2.5's and the three 3.5's are recoded into either a 2, 3, or 4 based on their mean score on the autonomy index. The final result is 24 2's, 47 3's and 18 4's.

First, I ran the MNL on the Essentialism Model, using as my independent variable the 0-4 composite scale of "potential" for the development of a separate national identity. The results are presented in Table 3-9. The essentialism index does produce significant coefficients for categories 3 and 4, and in the expected direction. In fact, an examination of the actual versus predicted values reveals that knowing where a state falls on the essentialism index will allow me to correctly estimate its position on the autonomy index 56% of the time. A closer examination of the actual versus predicted values reveals that Essentialism is very strong predictor of category 4, the ethnonationalist position. It is less successful at predicting whether or not a state's elite would be strong or loose federalists, the distinction between categories 2 and 3. In fact, since 3 is the modal category, if you

predicted 3 for all eight-nine cases, you would end up with the correct score 53% of the time!

The MNL of the instrumentalist position uses defense region, net gainers in the federal bargain, natural resource region, and percent of the local budget obtained from subsidies as the four representative independent variables. Table 3-10 reveals that how dependent the local budget is on federal subsidies and possession of valuable natural resources do make a significant difference in the probability of being in one versus another category of autonomy, while being a defense region and/or a net budgetary gainer do not. Possession of a marketable natural resource(s) gives elites leeway to bargain for greater autonomy(.139 for 3, .116 for 4), and is a negative predictor (-.255) of wanting a return to a strong center, position 2. Consistent with the bivariate analysis, the higher the percentage of the state budget subsidized by the center, the higher the probability that a state will adopt an ethnonationalist position. The coefficient is very small, however, (.005). It is not a significant predictor of the other two positions. The log-likelihood for this model is a -56.736. It does, however, correctly predict the position of each state 61% of the time, which is somewhat better than the essentialism model predicts.

The test of the relative deprivation model used change in income, change in unemployment and identification as a "depressed" region by the President's Analytical Center as independent variables. As demonstrated in Table 3-11, only being identified as a depressed region was significant, as it increased the probability that a state's elite would demand increased autonomy from the center, .167 for a 3 and .257 for a 4. It was a negative predictor for category 2, yielding a coefficient of -.425. The log-likelihood

statistic was a -72.817. It correctly predicts in 42 of 78 cases, or 54%, but the greatest success is in predicting category 3 (92%) which again, is the modal category. It only predicts category 2 9% of the time and category 4, 25% of the time.

The test of the resource mobilization school used past administrative level and whether or not a state held early elections (pre-1995) for the post of governor as independent predictors. In this case, Table 3-12 shows that only past administrative level was significant. The higher a state was in the old Soviet administrative hierarchy, the higher the probability its elite would fight for more autonomy in the new regime. The log-likelihood statistic for this model -58.842. This model predicts correctly only 47% of the cases, or 42 out of 89. Interestingly, it correctly predicts all of category two and all of category four correctly, and virtually none of category three correctly. It is possible that past administrative level leads the model to predict all previous ethnic states, no matter what their rank in the hierarchy, should be a four and almost all non-ethnic states should be a two. In the real world, however, a number of ethnic states and non-ethnic states fall into category 3.

Comparing the log-likelihood estimates allows me to determine if the overall models are significant, even if individual variables are not significant for all categories. Using a null model, with a log likelihood of -90.232, I find that all of the models examined here are a significantly better fit than the null model.

However, none of the models performs spectacularly. In their simple forms, the models are not persuasive in explaining the behavior of regional elite in the Russian Federation. It is possible, however, that a new model based upon what we have learned

from testing the performance of the simple models will better explain this behavior. In a combined model, I use the essentialism index, the possession of natural resources, whether or not the state is identified as a critically depressed region, and past administrative level to predict where a state's elite will position itself in the federal bargain. The combination of ethnicity with perceived economic injustice, living in a critically depressed region while in possession of vast natural resource wealth, and an elite that was privileged and experienced under the old regime, would seem to provide the ingredients for a successful autonomy-movement. Likewise, the absence of these factors should lead to no visible autonomy movement, with leadership supporting a strong center to reign in the autonomy -seekers.

In this combined model, the results of which are presented in Table 3-13, only natural resource possession is statistically significant for all positions, while past administrative level is a significant predictor of position 4 and depressed region is a significant predictor of position 3. This model, does, however, correctly predict 57 out of 89 cases correctly, or 64% of the cases. This is substantially better than any single model does on its own. The log-likelihood is -51.097, which means it is also a significantly better fit than the null model as well (p=.000).

One explanation for why the combined model is a better fit while few of the indicators are individually significant is the high degree of multicollinearity between past administrative level and the essentialism index. While they attempt, conceptually, to measure two distinct phenomena, in fact, they do not. They are correlated -.912 (p=.000). For this reason, one of the variables (past administrative level) is thrown out. Without

past level included, the essentialism index becomes significant in the equation, as does possession of natural resources, while being identified as a depressed region remains significant only in predicting the non-ethnic categories. The log-likelihood estimate is -62.4570. The high potential for the development of a separate national identity and possession of natural resource wealth are strong indicators of a state elite's commitment to an ethnofederalist position. And the absence of either factor is indicative of a preference among regional elite for a strong federal Center.

But, while the combined model performs better and predicts a state elite's position on the federal bargain better than any of the single models, it does not do as well as expected, especially at distinguishing between loose federalists (anti-federalists) and strong federalists (federalists).

Something is missing in all of the models examined here, and it may well be that the "missing" parts of the puzzle are to be found in the masses themselves or in the behavior of the federal center. Perhaps the elite are merely responding the best they know how to societal pressures from below which are driving them to adopt a more extreme position than we would expect given their resource base, previous experience and level of assimilation and acculturation to the dominant Russian center. Perhaps the elite are responding to mixed signals from the Center about what levels of autonomy are "acceptable" for individual states to administer. These questions are the subject of the final two chapters of this investigation. Chapter 4 will look more closely at the behavior of the masses in each of these states, explicitly comparing the positions of mass publics to that of their governing elite, and re-testing the models examined here to see if some of

them are better at explaining mass versus elite behavior with regards to the federal bargain.

Chapter 5 will introduce the Center into the bargaining process to see what effect the changing policy preferences of the Center and its representatives has on the local leadership. It is also in the final chapter that I investigate the assumption that each state has a central tendency or preference for a certain type of constitutional order, and that these preferences are not fluid and subject to frequent vacillations. In concluding, I will synthesize the findings from each of these separate empirical investigations to sort out what we now know.

CHAPTER 4:
The Masses and the Federal Bargain

Up until this point, I have focused on the behavior of the political elites, and specifically on the political elites in the member states of the Russian Federation, as opposed to elites in Moscow or the masses in the regions. The behavior of actors in the federal center will be investigated in the final chapter. This chapter focuses on the behavior, actions, threats, and expressed preferences of non-elites in the regions. Events recorded for this portion of the study include voting behavior, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, acts of violence, rallies, petitions, party conferences and related manifestos.

The actors in this analysis are not members of the regional (executive) administration, or the legislature. They may, however, be *political* actors in that they represent nationalist movements, religious associations, political parties, labor/trade unions, business interests, or simply the spontaneous, unorganized masses. They are the constituents in this new democracy, and members of an ever-expanding civil society. What do *they* want? Are their interests being represented? Are they the missing part of any theory explaining regional elite behavior?

My interest in the behavior and expressed preferences of the masses is many-faceted. First, I am interested from a democratic theory perspective in what the masses want and what they prefer as a constitutional arrangement. Following closely from this, I

am interested in the degree to which the elites in these states express preferences that are close to that of their population. As most of these leaders were not directly elected in competitive multi-party systems during the time when the federal bargain was negotiated, it is worth finding out if the leaders in these states, particularly in the most adamant autonomy-seeking states, were merely reflecting the will of their population, or if they were, as many scholars of ethnic conflict in the modern era suggest, manufacturing "nationalism" and "separatism" in their regions as opportunistic political entrepreneurs. In contrast, they may well have been the moderating forces in the bargaining process, reflecting views that were less independence-minded than their constituencies seemed to be. Alternatively, they may have been subject to intense pressure from below to demand more and more autonomy from the Center, despite their own sense that this was not in the best interests of their state.

This chapter investigates these and several other questions about the relationship between the masses in the member states of the Federation and their representatives. It, too, uses events data gathered from both the *CDSP* and *OMRI Daily Digest*.

There is a potential problem in the use of events data for the study of mass behavior that was not as evident for the study of elite behavior. Protests, acts of violence and other non-conventional forms of participation are likely to be over reported compared to cooperative, more conventional forms of political behavior, which just are not as newsworthy. To compensate, I have voting behavior data for several elections: the 1991 vote on the Union Treaty, the vote of confidence in Yeltsin in April 1993 (and several local initiatives tacked onto it), the parliamentary elections and referendum on the

constitution in December 1993, as well as various local referenda on independence and declarations of sovereignty. These results balance out the reports of strikes, demonstrations and rallies for political resignations that might tend to overestimate the "radicalness" of the masses.

Additionally, I am not *counting* events, but once again trying to determine the central tendency of the actors that make up the "civil society" of each state. While the actions and statements of a small but highly radical nationalist party in one of the ethnic states might yield several events with scores of '5' on the autonomy index, these are counterbalanced, in many cases, by voting behavior which a) never elects anyone from this party to either national or local office, or b) re-elects by overwhelming majority deputies from the old Communist Party apparatus, or from Zhirinovsky's unitarist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

First, I will establish a median autonomy score for the civil society in each of the 89 states in a manner similar to that in the previous chapter on elites in the regions. I will use events recorded by social (non-elite) actors to give each state a median autonomy score. I compare these scores to the scores received by each state's elite, and retest the theoretical perspectives from Chapter 3 on the civil society data. There are fewer events (495) gathered on social actors than on elites, with the number of events per state ranging between 2 and 32. The modal number of events per state is 4.

Mass Preferences and the Federal Bargain

Table 4-1 reveals the ranking of the social actors of each state along the autonomy index.[1] As Table 4-1 indicates, the median is lower (2.0) for the masses than for the elites (3.0). Table 4-2 reclassifies the data presented in Table 4-1 according to the size of the difference between each state's elite and their general population. The masses in most states seem to prefer a stronger central government than the regional elites, though there are 3 states for which the median score of the publics is one level higher than that of their leaders. Thus, in 56 of the 89 cases the public's behavior indicates support for a stronger central government than their respective leaderships are advocating.

In seven cases, there is a substantial difference (+2.0) between the mass score and the elite score for the same state. In six of these seven cases, the state in question is a republic. In the one non-ethnic state, Volgograd, where the public is most unitarist, the predominantly Russian masses are responding negatively to central pressure on them to

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While voting behavior data from several referenda and elections are available for all states, the results are not interpretable in some cases, at least from the perspective of this investigation. For this reason, some states have only two events recorded, while data from at least three elections/referenda are available. Voting behavior was only relevant to the federal bargain position of the voters in this study if they voted in the plurality for the Communists and the Liberal Democratic Party in the 1993 elections, which would indicate a desire for a return to a strong centralized government. Likewise, victory for candidates representing secessionist/nationalist parties would indicate (depending on the platform) either a 4 or a 5 on the autonomy scale. Victory for independent candidates, about whom little data were available, or smaller parties without a clear position on the nature of the federal-constitutional arrangement of the country were coded as missing data, as were evenly divided outcomes between liberal parties and the LDP/KPRF.

Similarly, voting "no" on the constitutional referendum of December 1993 could not be interpreted without additional information. "No" could mean, in the case of the republics, that the constitutional draft proposed by the Yeltsin administration was too centralizing, without enough guarantees of state sovereignty. In the case of the regions, "no" might have meant it was too liberal, too accepting of the demands of the republics for separate, unequal status. And alternatively, no may have been a vote against Yeltsin for the actions he took against the Parliament in October, with little or no thought given to the federal distribution of power at all. In this case, only boycotts of the election were coded 5.

recreate German autonomous districts within their existing state, a status taken away from Soviet Germans during the second world war. Supporting the LDP, then, is one way to protest against the recreation of these districts, and potentially even a republics, within their territory. The substantial difference between the leadership and the public on this issue was reflected at polls in the fall of 1996 as well, when the incumbent governor was defeated by a more conservative opponent. This was also true in Unitarist/Strong Federalist (1.5) Kaliningrad and Kirov, where more loose federalist (3.0) leaders paid the price in the fall gubernatorial elections as well.

In the cases of the republics of Mari-El, Chuvashia, Khakhassia, Adegeya, Mordovia, and Buryatia, the public is generally voting very conservatively compared to how their leaders are bargaining with the Center. In Khakhassia, for example, where the public voted pro-LDP/KPRF in the 1993 elections, they just elected the brother of nationalist Alexander Lebed as their new governor in the fall of 1996. While Lebed's party platform was not as rabidly Russian-nationalist and unitarist, it certainly emphasized the need for a strong center to reassert control over the undisciplined regions. The incumbent governor, seeking more autonomy for Khakhassia than the public apparently desired, lost to Lebed.

Similar results were witnessed in Mari-El as well, where the conservative public voted out their incumbent governor as well. In 50% (6 of 12) of those states where the difference between the elites and the publics was greater than 1.0 on the autonomy index, the incumbent suffered a defeat in the 1996 elections. They may have escaped such fates only temporarily in Komi, Chuvashia, and Buryatia, (3 of 12) where elections were not yet

held. In Adegeya and Chukota, the incumbents were victorious despite the discrepancy between their publics and themselves on the federal division of power issue. Other issues were either more important in the eyes of the voters, or the voters did not perceive their leader as having held views that differed from their own on this issue.

While the 1991-1995 governors of these ethnic republics played the ethnic card to extract autonomy from the center (and often special tax breaks as well), their constituencies moved closer to the center, if not with the past. In each of these cases except that of Chuvashia, the titular ethnicity is in the minority, which may explain why the majority or even plurality voting population is not supportive of nationalist agendas, a position 4 on the autonomy index. But it does not explain why they support a strong as opposed to a weak center, or a 2 versus a 3 on the index. A reinvestigation of the theoretical propositions from the third chapter may shed more light on those factors that influence the masses, and if, in fact, some of the factors which seemed insignificant in explaining the behavior of regional elite, become more important to understanding the behavior of the public.

Explaining Mass Preferences and Behavior

The propositions tested in the previous chapter are restated here.

Essentialist Proposition: Those most likely to express a desire for greater autonomy from the center are those from state's whose population shares a strong sense of group identity, is culturally distant from the center and has experienced a past serious conflict with the Russian center.

Instrumentalist Proposition: States whose populations are engaged in the extraction of a valuable natural resource are most likely to use this economic independence to assert demands for greater independence from the center. States whose populations are engaged in work dependent on the center for resources are least likely to demand autonomy from that center.

Relative Deprivation Proposition: Populations that have experienced deprivation during the recent past (the time of this study) are most likely to blame the center for their frustrated expectations, and unlikely to demand a recentralization of power.

Resource Mobilization Proposition: States whose populations experienced some special recognition and privileges under the Soviet system are going to be more likely to want that status to continue. They will be most likely to resist any movement toward a recentralization of power or a "leveling" of administrative powers.

Essentialism: I begin with the bivariate analysis of the composite index of "cultural distance" created in chapter 3 to capture important dimensions of the essentialism approach. The Kendall's tau-b correlation between Cultural Distance and the Autonomy Score for each state's population is .409 (p=.000). The more culturally distant the population, the more likely they are to pursue greater autonomy from the center. The results of this and a cross-tabulation of the two to reveal the pattern of association are presented in Table 4-3. Of the 47 populations that want to see a return to a centralized or highly centralized state, 38 are those with no potential for the development of separate national identity, or 80%.

Of the five state populations preferring an ethnofederation or complete independence (Chechnya, Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia), all have at least a high potential for the development of a separate national identity. All are Muslim populations, with relatively high-levels of language retention and the

Chechens, Ingush and Balkars are all deported peoples during World War II. The relationship is slightly weaker for the masses than it was for the elites, despite the fact that confounding ethnic states like Karelia, whose elite adopted a position of ethnofederalism but who score very low on the essentialism index, have populations that would be happy enough with a loose territorial federation. This is largely because a number of state populations with high potential for the development of a separate national identity (Karachai-Cherkessia, Dagestan) are not adopting an ethnofederalist position.

Essentialism, then, significantly predicts the position of the average person, but does not necessarily lead to the emergence of separatist tendencies among the masses any more than it did among the elites. This is a finding that ultimately lends support to those who suggest that ethnonationalist movements are often (but clearly not always) a function of elite manipulation rather than primordial attachments. At the same time, however, those with strong attachments after years of attempted forced assimilation and acculturation are very likely to move to maintain that separate national and ultimately political identity.

Instrumentalism: The masses most dependent on Moscow economically are expected to argue for a strong center while those with the highest potential for independent economic development are expected to demand decentralization and greater local autonomy. The measures of independence/dependence used to test this school in the previous chapter were possession of natural resource wealth, whether or not a state was classified as a defense region and percent of the local budget made up of federal subventions. Those with natural resources and few subventions from the center were

deemed to be regions with high potential for independent development. Those whose local budgets were highly subsidized and were dependent on the growth and support of national defenses were more likely to remain dependent regions.

The Kendall's tau-b correlations are recorded in Table 4-4. Natural resource wealth is positively correlated at .209 (p=.05) with increasing levels of autonomy, as expected. In this case, defense region is negatively correlated -.235 (p=.05) also as predicted by the instrumentalist position. Budget subsidization is not significantly correlated (.103), nor is the relationship in the expected direction. This is not surprising when one considers that the percent of the local budget subsidized by the center is not something that one would expect the average citizen of Karelia or Kursk to be aware of. Budget subsidy was a significant predictor of elite behavior because the regional elite are probably very aware of the region's balance of trade with Moscow, and are probably reminded of it by the Center when necessary.

In contrast, every Yakutian citizen is well aware of that northern Siberian republic's vast and still unexplored natural resource wealth and might well understand that a strong center means continued regulation of the energy sector, and less revenue for them. Similarly, every defense plant worker in Tula is aware how a strong center means continued contracts and payment of back wages. Even conversion of defense industries in most cases requires enormous cash infusions from the center (continued subsidization), while "decentralization" or regional autonomy to them implies that the regions themselves will be forced to make conversions or shut the plants down.

Relative Deprivation: Relative Deprivation might be expected to perform better as a predictor of mass behavior than of elite preferences, as it refers to a collective psychological phenomenon--the collective recognition by one group of exploitation by some central "other" relative to comparable groups. The measures of deprivation used here are change in income, which should be negatively related to autonomy demands, change in unemployment, which should be positively related to them, and identification by the President's Analytical Center as a critically depressed region, which should be positively related to autonomy position. The results of the bivariate analysis are presented in Table 4-5. Only the "percent increase in income from 1993 through 1994" indicator is significant, but not in the expected direction. The Kendall's tau-b correlation is .209 (p=.05). Relative deprivation would not predict that those groups with the fastest growing incomes would be those most likely to demand autonomy. Instead, those with the stagnant incomes should become frustrated as their capabilities fail to keep up with rising expectations. Instead, it is those who are doing well in the post-transition economy that are most likely to demand greater regional autonomy at the expense of the Center.

Table 4-6 presents a cross tabulation of income growth, recoded into three categories of high, medium and low, and median autonomy position of social actors. Of the 46 states preferring a strong center at the expense of regional autonomy, only three are regions in which individual incomes are growing at a high level (greater than 4.25%). At the far end of the scale, none of unitarists (1's or 1.5's) are high-growth regions. Rate of income growth seems to be a significant predictor of conservatism on the autonomy index, something that will be reexamined in the multivariate analysis.

Resource Mobilization: To a large extent, the resource mobilization better predicts the behavior of elites, rather than of the masses. It tries to explain why one person might be likely and willing to incur the costs of mobilizing collective action against some "other," to become a political entrepreneur. The institutional advantages afforded some regional elite over others in the Soviet era and the advantage of having stood for competitive election as opposed to still being a federal appointee were both factors which I hypothesized would have an impact on elite behavior in the previous chapter. In this analysis of mass behavior, it does not make sense to replicate the second factor, whether the leader was elected or appointed, on the behavior of the masses.

Institutional advantage under the old regime, might, however, still be related to mass preferences for a given institutional arrangement under the present regime. "Special" autonomy for ethnic republics under the old regime did more than provide affirmative action opportunities for ethnic political cadres; it also created affirmative action for the average citizen in terms of post-secondary educational opportunities and often, career advancement. For these reasons, and not those directly related to the resource mobilization school, mass actors in the old ethnic republics might be mobilized to preserve their privileges by advocating a continuation of the special status they were accorded under the old regime--a 4 on the autonomy index. But the past administrative status of the region should not otherwise be very helpful in explaining the preferences of the masses, especially in predicting why some would prefer a loose as opposed to a strong federation.

The results of the Kendall's tau-b correlation between past administrative status and the median autonomy score of mass actors is provided in Table 4-7. The correlation

is .390 (p=.000), slightly stronger than we would have expected given the above theoretical discussion. Even for the masses, past administrative level is a positive and significant predictor of the desire for autonomy from the Center. The multivariate analysis will tell us more about which positions on the autonomy index the past status will allow us to predict, that is, for which categories of autonomy past level is a significant predictor.

Multivariate Analysis:

For the purposes of the multivariate analysis, I again collapsed the median autonomy scores into categories 2, 3 and 4 only. This involved coding the single region coded a 5, Chechnya, down to a 4 again; recoding the single region coded a 1 into the 2 category; and rounding all of the 1.5's, 2.5's and 3.5's up or down according to the mean score generated by the mass actors in each state. This left the following distribution: 47 "2"s, 36 "3"s, and 6 "4"s. Again, multinomial logit (MNL) is used to generate log-likelihood goodness of fit statistics and to calculate the impact of each variable on the probability of being in each of the above three categories.

Essentialism: First, I ran the MNL on the Essentialism Model, using the 0-4 composite index of "potential" for the development of a separate national identity. The results are presented in Table 4-8. The log-likelihood function is -67.431, which is a significantly better fit than the null model, but the index is only a significant predictor of category 4, the ethnofederalist position, which it predicts correctly 50% of the time, and category 2, which it predicts correctly 79% of the time.

Populations with the highest or very high potential for the development of a separate national identity are those that are demanding the maximum amount of regional autonomy within the federation, or demanding the right to leave the federation. But among the medium, low and no potential groups, the model places all of them into category 2, where it predicts 66 of the 89 states to be. There is little in the model to tell us why some states would want a loose federation rather than a strong one. Instead, it tells why some would want an ethnofederation versus a territorial federation. This is similar to the findings on elites as well.

Instrumentalism: The MNL of the instrumentalist position uses defense region, percent of the local budget subsidized by the center and natural resource wealth as independent variables. The results are presented in Table 4-9. The log-likelihood function generated is -68.766, which is also a significantly better fit than the null model. However, none of the indicators is significant in either category 3 or 4. None of the instrumental indicators is a significant predictor of mass behavior and attitudes towards the federal division of power. This is reinforced by the fact that although it correctly predicted cases 61% of the time, better than the essentialism model, it predicts none of the category 4 regions correctly. It correctly predicts category 2 85% of the time and category 3 only 36% of the time.

While defense region and natural resource wealth were significantly correlated with mass positions on the autonomy index, they are not significant in the multivariate model. One problem is probably that there are so few 4's now, only six, one of which is missing data for one of the indicators. The t-values are very close to significant (with 81

degrees of freedom and a one-tailed test, $t > 1.66$), especially in the case of budget subsidies, but it is possible that too few 4's (ethnofederalists) are throwing off the estimates. It also possible that these variables are significant predictors of the non-ethnic states' behavior, but tell us little about the behavior of the ethnically defined units, or how ethnicity interacts with these variables.

Relative Deprivation: As presented in Table 4-10, the Relative Deprivation indicators perform better than the instrumentalist ones, as one might expect given the nature of the theories. Instrumentalism seems more appropriately targeted to be an explanation of elite rather than mass behavior, while relative deprivation is explicitly a mass phenomenon. The log-likelihood function generated is a -58.402, which is significantly better than the null model alone. The overall model predicts correctly 67% of the time, better than either the instrumentalist and the essentialism models. However, the model as a whole is unable to predict correctly even one of the five state populations that rank a 4 on the index.

As expected from the bivariate crosstabs, rate of income growth is a significant predictor of category 3 and 2, though again, not in the manner relative deprivation scholars would anticipate. The states whose populations are doing relatively *well* are the ones arguing for greater local control, while the ones that are stagnating are demanding greater centralization. One potential explanation is that the greater insecurity produced by the uneven transition to a market-driven economy has resulted in a backlash in the poorer regions, where a return to a strong central state is equated with a minimum level of security and economic subsidization.

Resource Mobilization: Table 4-11 presents the results from this model. The MNL performed here only with past administrative level produces a log-likelihood of -69.998, which is again a statistically better fit than the null model generates on its own. It correctly predicts the correct position 55% of the time, again, worse than the Instrumentalism or Relative Deprivation model does, and only slightly better than the Essentialism model. On an individual level, however, the variable is significant in predicting both category 3 and 4. Only previous ethnic republics are now to be found among the populations demanding level 4 or more autonomy from the center. And 35 of 48 strong federalists/unitarists are previous non-ethnic states under the old regime. A closer examination of the correctly predicted categories, however, reveals that the model is unable to correctly predict category 4 at all, correctly predicts category 2 60% of the time, and category 3 24% of the time.

The Combined Model: Specifying a new model, combining the indicators we selected in the previous chapter as representative of each theory to generate a new model of mass preferences, I now run MNL on the essentialism index, natural resource wealth, and being declared a critically depressed region, the same combined model tested in Chapter 3. The results, presented in Table 4-12, are impressive, as the model predicts correctly in nearly 69% of the cases, just slightly better than the 67% achieved by the Relative Deprivation model (which predicted in the wrong direction anyway). The log-likelihood generated (-59.567) is also significantly better than the null. The Essentialism Index is a significant predictor of both categories 3 and 4, as is being declared a depressed region. Natural resource wealth is not individually significant.

No single theory presented here seems to adequately predict the behavior of the masses in all 89 states, though we can draw some preliminary conclusions. First, a strong sense of ethnicity among a state's population, combined with a relative or absolute level of poverty, appears to be a potent combination predicting mass support for independence or the maximum amount of autonomy possible within the existing federation.

Second, among those states without a high level of potential for the development of a separate national identity, doing poorly translates into the opposite phenomenon, the demand for a return to a strong center, the old order, the old level of security that was at least minimally guaranteed by the Soviet state. Thus, what appear on the surface to be mutually contradictory results are actually quite interpretable. However, they are not what would be predicted by any of the theories examined here.

Are Mass Preferences the "Missing Link" in Understanding Elite Behavior?

Are the preferences of the masses are important indicators of the strategies elites in the regions have adopted in negotiating with the center? As noted earlier, one could hypothesize that the masses are in fact pressuring the elites to push for greater autonomy than might be expected from an assessment of a state's level of economic dependence on the Center or strength of separate ethnic identity from that of the Russian center. Similarly, elites demanding autonomy from the center to further their own political ends--acting as political entrepreneurs--may well be constrained in this pursuit by the conservatism of their voting or soon-to-be voting constituencies.

Looking first at how well the preferences of the masses (here using the unrounded median scores of the masses presented originally in Table 4-1) predict the expressed preferences of their leaders, the results are presented in Table 4-13. The MNL on this model generates a log-likelihood of -83.690, which is better than the null model would predict on its own. The model correctly predicts cases 55% of the time, doing best in category 3, where it correctly predicts 94% of the cases. Mass behavior only correctly predicts elite preferences for category 2 in one of the 24 cases, and for category 4 in four of 18 cases.

On its own, it is not a very compelling model of elite behavior, but perhaps in conjunction with the combined model specified at the end of Chapter 3, it would increase the number of cases predicted correctly. At the end of Chapter 3, I specified a combined model of elite behavior using natural resource wealth, the essentialism index, and being a critically depressed region as predictors. It correctly predicted the positions of the elite in 64% of the cases. Adding the additional indicator--mass preferences in the state--does not increase the percentage of correctly predicted cases at all. The model as a whole is a significantly better fit than the null model, however, generating a log-likelihood of -62.049. Examining the variables individually, natural resource wealth remains a significant predictor of elite positions in all categories, while essentialism is significant only in predicting category 4. The mass indicator is not significant in any of the categories.

It is worthy of note that the primary problem encountered by all of the models examined is one of distinguishing category 2 from category 3, and this problem is one also experienced in Chapter 3. One potential explanation is that the scale created here is

actually measuring two different dimensions of political behavior, not one. Instead of one dimension ranging from autonomy to centralization, I may have convoluted two very separate dimensions: one for degree of administrative centralization, where the territorial integrity of the state is not in question, and perhaps an entirely different dimension for the disposition to secede, as identified by Hesli and Emizet (1995). It is a question worthy of further investigation in a future study, and a point to which I will return in my conclusion.

The most interesting finding from this examination of factors influencing mass behavior is the differential effect that economic growth has on ethnic and non-ethnic states. In the non-ethnic states, income stagnation results in a desire for a return to a strong Center, to restore order and the old guarantee of at least a minimal level of economic security. In the non-ethnic states, stagnation is associated with the desire to escape federal control over policies governing the economy and the state.

Among the important *non-findings* of this chapter are the lack of congruence between mass and elite preferences for autonomy from the Center, and the non-existent relationship between what the masses want and what the elites are doing about it. The fact that mass preferences are not driving elites in a more radical direction, that is, towards autonomous behavior and non-compliance with federal decrees, is important. While Yeltsin may believe negotiation of separate treaties guaranteeing regional autonomy is the best way to win support outside of Moscow, in most republics, it appears to be a strategy that will not yield him tremendous electoral gains.

CHAPTER 5:
The Other Half of the Bargain

Throughout this analysis, I have made several assumptions about both the behavior and preferences of regional elites and their constituencies. First, I have assumed that the analysis of each actors' central tendency is meaningful to a discussion about the future of the Russian Federation. This implies that the central tendency of each represents their "true" position on the subject of federal-constitutional design.

From this flow the assumptions that these positions are stable over time *and* without reference to what is being offered by the Center. In retrospect, these assumptions seem rather questionable. After all, to discuss the federal "bargain" as a process suggests that there is an ongoing dialogue between the two sides of the bargain--the center and the regions. To ignore the Center, then, is to suggest, as many of the theories discussed in earlier chapters implicitly do, that structural factors, be they institutional, economic or cultural, are more important than the actual decisions of individual leaders in explaining mass or elite behavior.

While the nature of the bargain offered by the Center might be important in terms of how willing states are to express their preferences, it need not affect what the masses feel they want or deserve any more than it constrains or emboldens elites to alter their position on autonomy. I am not the first to make such assumptions about the existence of

an identifiable tendency towards a given position. Treisman (1997), for example, created an index of separatist activism based on the actions of the ethnic regional elites, assuming implicitly that what these leaders are demanding, independent of what the Center is offering, matters.

However, while an examination of the central tendency of these states and their publics may give us a view of what they are demanding, it does not tell us how strongly they hold these views, and to what extent they are willing to fight for them. This brings us back to the temporal discussion. By looking only at the central tendency of the states, I miss not only their potential responses to the Center's actions, but to each others' actions as well. In their analysis of the "disposition to secede," Emizet and Hesli (1995) construct an index based almost entirely on the timing of demands for autonomy, which puts Estonia, for example, in a higher category than Kazakhstan among the Union Republics seeking independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This is fundamentally different from my scale or Treisman's (1997), for that matter, where it is important only that the leadership asked, not when they asked.[1]

In the case of the Russian Federation, my examination of each state's central tendency makes Tatarstan the equivalent of Buryatia in that they both register a 4, or the ethnofederalist position. While I believe that the ethnofederalist label is appropriate for the elites in both states, there are some obvious differences. Tatarstan has been a leader in

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[1]Treisman's index differs from mine as it is an additive one, not one which measures a central tendency. Therefore, Tatarstan comes out ahead of Udmurtia because it has more actions, and is therefore, more demanding. For more, see Daniel Treisman, "Russia's Ethnic Revival: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Post Communist Order," *World Politics*, 49 (January 1997), pp. 212-49.

regional movements for autonomy, while Buryatia has been a bandwagoner, or follower. Tatarstan was the first to ask to be an equal signatory to the 1991 Union Treaty with the Union Republics like Ukraine and Kazakhstan. They were the first to hold a referendum on their "sovereign" status and they were the first to demand and receive a separate treaty with the center detailing special tax and resource privileges.

Buryatia's leaders supported Tatarstan in these endeavors and ultimately went on to declare sovereignty and demand a separate treaty akin to the one made with Tatarstan. But being a follower is substantially different from being a leader. One could hypothesize, for example, that leader states are those with firmer stances, stronger commitments to their position, or more leverage with which to credibly bargain. Follower states, in contrast, are more likely to be those that vacillate, who express a wider range of opinions along the autonomy continuum, and who therefore, are more subject or sensitive to changes in the mood and policy priorities at the Center.

If this is so, it is important from a state-building perspective that the leadership of the Federation is aware of the difference. In order to develop a federal system that is both stable and responsive, the Center needs to understand where the ability to compromise is possible and where it is not, and which are the most effective strategies for reaching it where it is possible.

The goals of this final chapter are threefold. First, I introduce the Center as a party to the bargaining process. The degree of influence it exercises on the behavior of the individual states and publics is an empirical question which is examined in some detail. Prior to this, however, I trace the position of the Center as it has evolved from 1990

through the end of 1995, with some comment on the current status of this debate as well. While the actions of the Center may not, in the end, be all that important to an understanding of regional elite or mass behavior, it is important to the stability of the region as a whole. That is, if the Center's position is in opposition to that of its regions or republics and its position has been stable and rigid over time, as has that of the regions, the potential for center-regional conflict is greater than for center-regional cooperation and compromise. For this reason alone, it is important to trace the position of the Center over time.

Secondly, I re-examine the position of the individual state elites introducing a temporal dimension to the analysis. Instead of looking at the central tendency of the state elite, I look at the amount of variation, or the range of positions adopted by state elite during this time period. This will either validate or challenge the previous assumption of a "true" position for each state. It may, in fact, present a more complicated picture which reveals stability in the position of some state elites and tremendous variation in others. This, I suggest, will be linked to whether or not the state is a leader or follower in the "parade of autonomies," as one Yeltsin administrator dubbed the struggle.

Finally, I will examine, in a more descriptive manner, the effectiveness of certain Center strategies in dealing with the parade of autonomies and the challenges to its rule. Has the use of force, or the real threat of it, been effective in reducing the demands for autonomy from the regions, or has it inflamed these demands? Did the use of special tax incentives negotiated under the separate treaty with Tatarstan serve to "buy off" the nationalist impulses in the region? This portion of the analysis will have to be preliminary,

given the small number of events recorded for some states during this time period, but will nonetheless provide some insights into the bargaining process, the future of the federal system in Russia, and hopefully leave us with some specific avenues of future research.

The Center and the Federal Bargain

While touring through Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin told local leaders to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."[2] His support for local autonomy at the Center's expense was calculated to gain regional support in his own struggle with Mikhail Gorbachev for decentralization of the Soviet state and the empowerment of Union Republic governments. Yeltsin's speeches throughout the latter part of 1990 even promised the autonomies ownership of the natural resources in their territories, much as he demanded of the Soviet government for the R.S.F.S.R.. Indeed, within months of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic's declaration of sovereignty, the autonomous republics in Russia followed suit. Yeltsin's position in the summer of 1990, then, and the position of the Russian Center (as opposed to the Soviet Center represented by Gorbachev), could be considered close to a 5, if one interprets "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" to mean you, too, can have the independence we seek as the right of a union republic.

That position shifts to the more conservative end of the spectrum by the spring of 1991 while campaigning is underway for the signing of the Union Treaty, Gorbachev's last

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[2]Bill Keller, *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, September 2, 1990.

attempt to hold the Union's Center together. At this point in the negotiations, Yeltsin opposed Tatarstan's bid to become an equal signatory to the Union Treaty with the R.S.F.S.R., and angrily criticized the refusal of Tuva, North Ossetia, Chechen-Ingushetia, and Tatarstan to include a question on the creation of a Russian Presidency along with the referendum approving the adoption of the Union Treaty.[3] A May 1991 agreement between Yeltsin and the leaders of all the autonomous republics except Tatarstan ultimately determined that the autonomies would sign the Union Treaty as members of both the U.S.S.R. and the RSFSR. At this point, shifting from a 5 to a 4, Yeltsin seems to shut down the possibility of exit from the Federation, but supports the idea of a loose confederation of ethnically defined states.

His position seems to harden further following the coup in August of 1991, when he threatens the dismissal of any local legislatures that had supported the coup against his supporters. He ultimately demands and receives permission from the Russian Parliament to appoint presidential representatives in the regions, and to fire at will those who oppose his democratic restructuring efforts. It is difficult to code this position on the autonomy index. On the one hand, it is clearly an infringement on local autonomy for the Center to assert the right to hire and fire local administrators. This implies a strong Center--a position 2, at most. By the same token, however, the administrators who were fired were those supporting a return to the old order, where federalism and local power existed on

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[3]See Gail Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism," in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, (Bouder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 83-87.

paper, not practice. Opposition to them represents a broadening of local authority at the expense of the Center, or at least the Party.

The latter interpretation is supported by the first official bargain proffered by the new Russian Center to the regions--the March 1992 Federal Treaty. This document satisfied all but Chechnya and Tatarstan, in that it supported continued special autonomy for the ethnic republics, protection of their sovereignty, and greater local control over local resources. In March 1992, then, the Center adopts position 4, the ethnofederalist position.

The next critical phase is the bargaining during the summer of 1993 over the new Constitution. Here again, Yeltsin adopts a republic-friendly stance in order to gain their support in his struggle with the Parliament. Indeed, he promises them most of what they want, even at the expense of the non-ethnic regions which begin to express their discontent with the unequal treatment during the Constitutional Convention. But as the struggle with the Parliament intensifies, and as republican governments still refuse to ratify the draft constitution adopted in July, Yeltsin loses patience with the bargaining process and launches his "democratic coup" in September of 1993.

With the bloody ouster of the Russian Parliament came a similar, though largely bloodless, ousting of recalcitrant local leaderships, in all areas of the Federation but the republics. Presidential Decree 1617 of October 1993 tells regional legislatures (soviets) to disband and allow presidential representatives and chief administrators to dictate until new charters and elections to smaller, full-time legislatures can be established. This puts Yeltsin at a 1 for the period of September-October 1993, and is reinforced by his

subsequent abolition of the Urals Republic, which declared itself in November 1993.

His position evolves back to a 2 with the second official "bargain" proffered in late November 1993, with the publication of the Presidential draft of the constitution scheduled for referendum in December of 1993. The draft deletes all references to the much more decentralized structure of governance hinted at in the Federal Treaty, and suggests that all 89 members of the Federation are equal members of the federation, implying that the era of special privileges for the autonomies is at an end.

While adopting a hard line publicly, the Yeltsin administration then went on in 1994 to sign separate treaties with Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and North Ossetia, and other treaties/agreements were negotiated with several other republics in 1995. The terms of these agreements are largely secret, though it is now common knowledge that the treaty with Tatarstan guaranteed the republic's sovereignty, its right to conduct separate international and economic relations, and the republic's right to determine ownership, use and distribution of the natural resources on its territory.

This agreement contradicts the essence of the constitution, again suggesting the Center is undecided on the status of the republics vis-a-vis the regions and on the strength of its own authority vis-a-vis the states. The early part of 1994, then, after the passage of the strong Constitution, sees the administration moving back to accepting a 4 on the autonomy index. Indeed, during much of 1994 the Center seems to be using the carrot of separate treaties to assuage the republican leadership after virtually forcing the Constitution upon them, up until December of 1994 when more than 10,000 Russian

Interior Ministry Troops cross the border into Chechnya to force an end to the Dudayev administration's independence bid.

The use of force against the renegade Chechen regime puts the Yeltsin administration back at position 2, perhaps even at a 1. No matter how one feels about the Chechen independence movement, the administration's decision to use force to resist it, rather than institutions put in place under the new Constitution, calls into question the Center's commitment to democratic norms of decision-making and dispute resolution. It also challenges the significance of any agreements signed to date with other regions and republics, since the trust upon which they were founded was violated. The Center's inability since then to end the Chechen resistance, the domestic and international opposition to the bloody fiasco that ensued there for over two years, and its inability since that time to compel regions to send the required conscripts to serve or to turn over revenues to the federal budget have since served to reopen, rather than resolve, the question of the nature of the bargain in the Federation.

The evidence for the lack of resolution mounts, and though many of the events referred to are not yet catalogued in my index (1996 events), they are proof of the continuing relevance of this study to the state-building process in Russia. In 1996, only 10 regions paid the taxes they were supposed to into the federal budget. In Sverdlovsk, the self-proclaimed Urals Republic, they have issued their own currency to be used locally to pay for food and local services. In Udmurtiya, the governor has dismissed city mayors and

legislatures as agents of the Center who were working to weaken the region.[4] Despite a Federal Treaty, despite a new Constitution, despite the Civil War, the bargaining continues.

To some extent, this is the nature of federal systems. Federal institutions are not static and they are constantly experiencing periods of federal and state revival. It is the give-and-take of federal systems that make them so attractive, adaptable, and responsive to changes in context and the political environment. But there needs to be a framework and some rules to which all participants are willing to adhere. As of yet, these rules do not exist in Russia.

Figure 5-1 tries to catalog the shifting position of the Center, identified with that of the Yeltsin administration, during the five years of this study and beyond, along with that of the non-ethnic and ethnic states. The first observation is that the shifts by the Center have been very dramatic. What seems to be missing is the middle ground between ethnofederalism and strong federalism. The loose federation position, based on a territorial not ethnic principle, is virtually absent from the Center's bargaining portfolio. We can point to individual advisors from among his administration who early on advocated a complete restructuring of the federation, moving away from the national-territorial principle to, for example, a federation of eight large regions, largely matching the boundaries of the existing interregional associations.[5] These advisors, however, were

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[4]Michael Spechter, "Regions Defy Yeltsin to Start Talk of a More Perfect Union," *New York Times,* March 25, 1997, p. A1.

[5]See comments by Minister for Nationality Affairs Valerii Tishkov in the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,* October 28, 1992. Tishkov went on to resign as Minister for Nationality Affairs, as did his successor, Sergei Shakhrai.

never seriously heard, for largely political reasons, and most went on to resign in frustration.

We can observe from the Figure that while the median position of the ethnic states has remained relatively stable over time, as has that of the regions, after the bloody September 1993 ousting of the national parliament and the subsequent crack-down on regional autonomy demands, the positions of the elite in the regions and ethnic states shifted to the more conservative end of the spectrum. This may reflect a sense of fear on the part of the regional elite about the Center's willingness to use force to gain compliance with its policy objectives. Or it may simply reflect, as it is a fairly short-term phenomenon, the positions of new appointees in the regions, replaced in the aftermath of the coup, not yet emboldened to challenge federal authority. Since most of the ethnic elite were not replaced by the Yeltsin administration (republic presidents/governors were never subject to federal appointment the way *oblast* administrators were), the shift in their median positions in the fall of 1993 more likely reflects caution about how far they are able to push the Center.

However, the use of force against rebel Chechnya in December 1994 did not cause the median position of the ethnic states to weaken, and in many cases, heightened the demands of local leaders' for guarantees against the sort of federal abuse of power many felt the Yeltsin administration was guilty of in the Chechen republic.[6] Indeed, the use of

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[6]President Fyodorov of Chuvashia, for example, was very vocal in condemning the military action against the Chechen state and issued numerous proclamations in his republic which stated that citizens of his state did not have to adhere to federal conscription requirements to serve in that war. Yeltsin admonished him on more than one occasion, and declared his proclamations null and void, but Fyodorov never rescinded them. The story is related across several issues of the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, from January and February of 1995. Fyodorov is a former Federal Minister of Justice in the Yeltsin administration, who resigned

force against Chechnya also gave rise to a corresponding increase in the demands of the non-ethnic states as well, so that at the end of this period of study, the Center is moving in the opposite direction of its member states, at least the median position of both the ethnic and non-ethnic states. By the summer of 1995, however, the Center was again sending mixed signals. On the one hand, it negotiated several other independent agreements with the ethnic republics, such as Sakha and Buryatia. On the other hand, Yeltsin moved to prevent early elections to regional administration, decreeing that the gubernatorial elections would not be held until after the June 1996 presidential elections. This move was calculated to prevent what was seen as the imminent election of communist and nationalist candidates in a number of regions, but was also undoubtedly calculated to allow Yeltsin to continue to exercise some control over the regional administrations during his competitive campaign against challengers Gennadi Zyuganov and Alexander Lebed.

Once again, Yeltsin seemed anxious to buy off the ethnic states at the expense of the non-ethnic states, granting privileges to the former and reining in the latter. The reasoning is simple, though it remains to be empirically examined at a future date: the states with a credible threat to exit the federation are those with the ability to mobilize the masses against the Center, and the ethnic states, especially those with the characteristics examined in the previous two chapters (a strong sense of a separate national identity and natural resource wealth) are those that are being bought off. The non-ethnic states do not present a credible threat to the stability or territorial integrity of the state, and therefore, are not achieving as much success at securing local autonomy over their political or

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after the September 1993 coup in protest of the use of force.

economic fates. The next phase of this study would look, then, at the factors that determine which states are successful at obtaining the degree of autonomy they appear to be seeking.

One means of measuring this would be to examine the states that have been able to negotiate separate treaties with the Center which make them net gainers in the overall budgetary process. A second would be to look at those states that were able to hold early elections on their territory, despite the decree prohibiting such elections until late 1996. A third would be to examine the states that have been able to get the center to pay its arrears owed to firms and employees in the regions, compared to those that have not.

Each region is liable to define "success" in terms of its preferred constitutional order as discussed here, though its credibility may depend on the strength and stability of this position over the transition period. This investigation leaves the analysis of "success" to a separate study, but will begin to examine the question here by looking next at the variation in the individual positions of the state elite over time. Those that exhibit the greatest degree of stability in their positions over time are those hypothesized to be leader states and those more likely to have gained credibility in the bargaining process, both factors which may ultimately influence the Center's willingness to deal with them.

Examining Variation in the Strategies of State Elites

Figure 5-1 provides an overall sense of the shifts in the behavior and demands of regional and ethnic elites following critical shifts in the strategy and policies advocated by the federal administration. This next section examines these shifts, or lack of them, among

the individual states to get a better sense of the relative stability or fluidity of state elite's preferences over time. Table 5-1 provides the individual level data on the degree of variation in the regional elites' position over the entire period of the study. To evaluate variation in the position of the elites in the individual member states, I use a standard deviation from the *median* statistic. The table rank orders those from most to least variation from 1991 through 1995. While three states register no variation in their position during this period--Tver, Riazan, and the Koriak AO--this is probably a function of the few events recorded for these states more than an iron will.

Table 5-2 tries to reclassify the results in Table 5-1 in a more general and interpretable manner. Interestingly, of the nine states with standard deviations greater than or equal to 1, which represents a propensity to identify with either the position above or below the median for that state, seven are ethnic states. Indeed, 12 of the top 15 (80%) most "fluid" states are ethnic states, while 32 of the 36 (91%) least variable states are non-ethnic states. While this might simply be a function of the fact that the ethnic states record, on average, more events than the non-ethnic states, it is worth looking more closely at the cases with the largest standard deviations, to try and understand what that statistic actually captures.

Mordovia, the state with elites expressing the greatest variation in their position over this period, is an interesting case. While its central tendency is towards the ethnofederalist position on the autonomy index (a 4), its leaders also at different points expressed support for positions 1, 2 and 3 as well. Mordovia has been a problem state for the administration in its reluctance to deconstruct the past. The Mordovian Parliament

dismissed the democratically elected president there, arguing they had not adopted a constitution there which allowed for the introduction of a presidency. They were the last "Soviet" to formally drop the "Soviet Socialist" part of the republic name, even under pressure from the Center. They also sent the presidential representative of Boris Yeltsin home, suggesting that such oversight was an infringement on their local autonomy. On the one hand, they behave in a manner befitting a state seeking real autonomy from the Center, though the ends ultimately sought from this maneuvering appear to be the blocking of most reforms.

The voters in Mordovia, as discussed in Chapter 4, came out much more conservative than their elites, but upon examining the fluid position of the Mordovian Soviet elites, the position of the elite appears closer to that of their public than is apparent from their median 4 score. In fact, the mean score in Mordovia is 3.14, much closer to a 3 than a 4, largely because the elites vacillate between a 2 and a 4 on my index, between supporting anything that signals a return to the past and opposing anything from the Center that signals a move away from it.

Among the ethnic states expressing substantial fluidity in their positions over time (.875 or higher) are the republics of Udmurtia, Kalmykia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Komi, Dagestan and North Ossetia in addition to the Nenets, Chukota, Yamal-Nenets, Evenki and Taimyr AO's. The positions of these states, especially the republics, whose scores were based on a greater number of events, have vacillated enough to suggest that their positions were never hard and fast, never non-negotiable.

Worthy of further investigation is the degree to which their variation appears to be in response to some action by the Center, and whether or not that reaction sent them in a more conservative or radical direction. For example, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, and North Ossetia are all extremely proximate to Chechnya and may well have hardened their positions over time as the situation there deteriorated. Likewise, Ingushetia and North Ossetia have been engaged throughout the entire period of this study in low grade civil war/border dispute over a region inside the borders of North Ossetia, Prigorodny, which was once Ingush territory taken away during the reign of Stalin. The Center's inability to resolve the conflict after years of trying may also have hardened the positions of these elite to demand more local authority to resolve it more effectively.

On the other end of the spectrum, again ignoring those with no variation because of too few cases, we find that Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk have been the most consistent over time in arguing for a loose territorial federation, a position 3 over time, and this despite a substantial number of events recorded for each. Their positions are remarkably steady, though this is in part due to the consistency in the leadership throughout this period as well. Sverdlovsk Governor Edvard Rossel has been the outspoken leader of the movement for greater local autonomy and an equalization of power and privilege across the states regardless of whether or not the state has been defined an ethnic state. He defied President Yeltsin in proclaiming Sverdlovsk Oblast the "Urals Republic," in an effort to gain the same measure of autonomy accorded the ethnic republics.

Irkutsk has likewise been led for the entire period by Governor Yurii Nozhikov, a self-proclaimed social democrat who advocates a responsible pace of reform and greater

local control over oblast resources. He was "dismissed" and subsequently reinstated by Yeltsin for refusal to implement presidential decrees, including stalwart resistance to a federal attempt to nationalize the regional energy production facilities. He is considered a leader among the Siberian states, and like Rossel before, an open critic of the asymmetrical federalism that favors the republics by granting them special control over their budgets and natural resources.[7] He was elected to serve as Governor in 1994, and is no longer subject to dismissal by the Center.

Other unwavering states, among those with over ten events recorded, are St. Petersburg and Niznhy Novgorod, both considered progressive states advocating faster reform and greater decentralization. Both were also led by single individuals throughout this same period. Among the ethnic states, somewhat surprisingly, Mari-El seems committed to the ethnofederalist position, although its score is based only on 7 events. Mari-El does not rank highly on the essentialism index and is not one of the more vocal advocates of autonomy. In its 7 recorded events, however, it has been consistent in defending the right of the ethnic states to a special privileged status within the federation.

Tuva, with 15 events, is also a solid four with little fluctuation in its position over time, regardless of what the Center was apparently doing. Tuva remains the only republic to have adopted, albeit quietly, a Constitution with a provision for unilateral secession from the Federation. As noted in the previous chapters, it is a poor and highly subsidized republic, but also one with a previous history of independence, a past historical grievance with the Center and a population that has successfully maintained a strong, separate

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[7]OMRI Russian Regional Report, "Irkutsk," at www.omri.cz/Elections/Russia/Regions/About/Irkutsk.html.

national identity independent of Moscow. Like Chechnya, Tuva also has an international border with a country closer to its own culture and religion in Mongolia.

Among the autonomy movement leaders, universally recognized to be Chechnya, Tatarstan and Sakha, we find somewhat more variation than we expected, especially in Chechnya, which registers a .806 deviation from its median. This may simply be a reflection of the fact that for a period of time, the question of who represented Chechnya was in doubt and that while the position of Dzhokar Dudayev may have been consistent over time, other leaders have positions recorded for the Chechen state during this time period as well. At the beginning and end of this study, he is not acting as the leader of the renegade republic, and the variation in position may simply reflect changes in leadership. In Tatarstan and Sakha, however, this kind of explanation is not valid, since Shaimiyev in Tatarstan and Nikolaev in Sakha have ruled consistently throughout the period of this study and beyond.

The variation captured in Tables 5-1 and summarized in Table 5-2 may suggest, then, something other than merely changes in leadership. It may, for example, show that at one point in time, the Chechen leadership was willing to settle for less than full independence and that their positions hardened over time perhaps in relation to actions taken by the Center. It also suggests that Tatarstan and Sakha responded to actions taken by the Center, though the direction of their response along the autonomy continuum requires further investigation..

At this point, the question seems worthy of closer examination. Among those states that vacillated substantially, is there a pattern related to the actions taken by the

center, corresponding to the time periods introduced at the beginning of this Chapter? To answer these questions, I now examine the variation in each state leaders' position during the critical periods already introduced: (a) summer 1990-spring 1991, (b) spring 1991-Federal Treaty in March 1992, (c) Federal Treaty - October 1993, (d) October 1993-December 1993, and (e) post-Chechen war (December 1994-December 1995).

Variation in Response to the Center's Shifting Strategies

At this point, the analysis can only proceed at a descriptive level. There are not enough events to allow for a detailed analysis of each period. For example, in the summer of 1990, there are no events recorded for 46 states, and for 23 others there is only one event recorded. Part of this is due to the fact that only the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* is available during this period. OMRI did not begin cataloguing on-line until January of 1991. However, even in later time periods, there are states for which only one event is recorded. For the states of Tver, Riazan, and the Koriak AO, for example, there are only a total of 4 events, rendering any analysis over time impossible.

With these reservations in mind, however, some comparisons can still be made for those states with a substantial variation in their position captured by the standard deviation, and a significant enough number of events (+10) to allow for some comparisons throughout these critical periods. Using these criteria, Table 5-3 compares the median positions of the following twenty-five states over the course of the critical time periods: Mordovia, Udmurtia, Kalmykia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Komi, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kaliningrad, Krasnoiarsk, Chita, Samara, Sakha, Chechnya,

Buryatia, Karelia, Saratov, Krasnodar, Chuvashia, Tatarstan, Moscow City, Rostov, Khakhassia, and Kemerovo oblast. Ethnic republics are necessarily over represented here, and Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs are absent, as none of them record more than 7 events. Again, with these reservations in mind, the data collected and presented in Table 5-3 are interesting. I analyze each critical period below.

Summer 1990: The summer 1990 position of the Center, one seemingly accepting of the possibility of exit from the federation, does seem to have radicalized or at least allowed for the expression of aspirations for independence in not only Chechnya and Tatarstan, but in Kabardino-Balkaria and Udmurtia as well. Interestingly, it is the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union that seems to frighten Kaliningrad leaders into adopting a position 1, for the return to a unitary state. Their fate next to the independent Baltics and geographically distant from the borders of the Russian Federation seemed uncertainty and perhaps support for the old order reflects this terrible uncertainty.

North Ossetia, in contrast, adopts during this period a strong federalist position, a whole level lower than its overall central tendency. This appears to reflect concern by the leaders' for the territorial integrity of the state, with Ingush rebels initiating military actions along the disputed borderlands. The North Ossetian government throughout this period and beyond appeals to the Center to restrain the Ingush and monitor the border, rather than accepting the mantle of local authority to resolve this crisis regionally.

Among the non-ethnic states, almost all with the exception of Kaliningrad are adopting position 3 for a loose federation, in this case advocating the greater

decentralization that comes from the adoption of more democratic political norms and the end to one-party rule.

Spring 1991-March 1992: This period witnessed the failed campaign to unify the country under the new Union Treaty, a failed coup by Communist hardliners, and the break-up of the Soviet state. More states register a 1 during this period than in any other period under investigation, including Udmurtia, which had previously seemed to support independence! The 1's recorded for Udmurtia, Samara, Saratov, and Rostov oblasts indicate that the regional elite in these states had been vocally supportive of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE)'s attempted coup in August of 1991. Udmurtia is not the only republic that supports the SCSE but because it has fewer recorded events for this time period than other republics, its support stands out as its central tendency for this period. Other states with more recorded events later go on to invalidate their support by proclaiming their sovereignty in the fall of 1991, dismissing leaders that supported the coup, and so forth. Tatarstan hardens its stance to that of a 5 in that during the early part of 1992 it was refusing to even discuss the Federal Treaty with the new Yeltsin government as it wanted to be dealt with as an independent state.

Ironically, while Tatarstan's position hardens during this time, Chechnya's and Sakha's are lower than their overall median scores by one level. During this time, the leaders of the still unified Chechen-Ingush Soviet support the coup plotters in Moscow. They are subsequently ousted for that support, creating a vacuum and power struggle which Dudayev ultimately fills in winning a questionable election, held against the Yeltsin

administration's wishes in the late fall of 1991. After that, their position firms to a 5, where it remains for most of the period under investigation.

In Sakha, demands for regional autonomy have not yet escalated. Though considered a regional leader in the demand for autonomy, Nikolaev and the Sakha/Yakutian leadership vacillates between a 3 and a 4 during several of the periods under investigation. A closer examination of Sakha's position reveals an interesting strategy on the part of Nikolaev. He seems very firm on the demand for economic autonomy and decision-making authority, and willing to trade corresponding political autonomy for this economic freedom, yielding him a mixed bag of scores depending on the issue area. He has been very successful in trading political loyalty to Yeltsin for considerable freedom in the economic sphere, to negotiate, for example, lucrative contracts with DeBeers for the exploitation of Sakha's diamond reserves. Economic autonomy for this region, which will prosper on the world market more than others, seemed the most it could get, as independence for an ethnic state scoring only a 1 out of 4 on the essentialism index, Nikolaev could not credibly threaten to play the ethnic card in Sakha as his counterparts in Tatarstan, Tuva or the North Caucasus republics could. So he traded one kind of autonomy for the other, and the wide variation in his position reflects the issue area more than anything else.

For the non-ethnic states of Kemerovo, Rostov, Samara, Saratov, and Krasnoiarsk and Krasnodar Krais, the time after the coup attempt in the summer of 1991 and the time leading up to the signing of the federal treaty saw most of them adopting strong federalist or unitary positions. Interestingly, Rostov and Krasnodar both border the North Caucasus

republics, and leaders in both states responded to the increasing crime, ethnonationalist activism and guerrilla warfare in the region by asking the Center to intervene to restore order to the area, to reign in the "irresponsible" leaders of these republics. One might suspect that Samara, Saratov, and Krasnoiarsk's leaders, who later adopt fairly consistent support for a loose territorial federation, adopt more conservative positions here finding themselves for the first time with an *international* border with newly independent Kazakhstan.[8] There is little evidence of this, however. Their score is based solely on support for the SCSE, of which many regions distant from Moscow were guilty. Most were unable to gauge, with little information at their disposal, how credible Yeltsin and his supporters, or the coup plotters were.

Federal Treaty through September 1993: During this period, true negotiating was underway for the adoption of a new Constitution, and the scores for this time seem to reflect a radicalizing of both the republics and the regions as they battle each other for status under the new Constitution. Among the many republics considered here, only Kabardino-Balkaria records a low score on the autonomy index, and among the other states, only Moscow supports the strong federalist position, while the others have hardened their stance into one which supports a decentralized federation with equal autonomy and status for all members. Kabardino-Balkaria receives a low score because its Supreme Soviet is acting in cooperation with the Federal Center to a) arrest the leader of the Congress of Mountain Peoples organization for agitating for North Caucasian unity

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[8]Bordering on another nation does not seems to effect the scores of the non-ethnic states, however. Among the 16 non-ethnic states with a median score of 2, 8 have a international border, or 50%. Among the remaining 41 non-ethnic states, 19 have international borders, or very nearly 50%.

and independence from Russia; b) to declare a state of emergency in the region, to fight rebel, criminal activities. Kabardino-Balkaria's score reflects the desire of that state's governing elites to have the Center manage their local problems, even militarily if need be.

In Moscow, a similar scenario emerged, where the governing Soviet requests the Center's aid in combating rampant crime and skyrocketing underworld activities. Again, the willingness to turn to the Center as opposed to finding local means for resolving the conflict reflects the desire for a federation in which the Center is stronger than any of its parts. Of course in both these states, these somewhat conservative soviets (legislatures) are later ousted for more popular and populist executives.

Outside of the North Caucasus, republican elite seem firmly committed to the ethnofederalist arrangement promised them under the terms of the Federal Treaty of 1992, and worked together to oppose any draft of the Constitution that did not protect the gains made under that Treaty. They include the states of Karelia, Komi, Buryatia, Udmurtia, Tatarstan, Khakhassia, and Chuvashia.

However, as conditions deteriorated further in the North Caucasus, with military preparations under way in Checnhya and Ingushetia-North Ossetia continuing their guerilla warfare with one another, and with a civil war being conducted in neighboring Georgia against its own nationalist autonomous districts, the leaders of North Ossetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia were more interested in having the Center act to control the violence, the gun-running and the flow of refugees than in fighting for more autonomy to govern an increasingly ungovernable situation. Meanwhile, Ingushetia was forced somewhat reluctantly into separate statehood by the actions of the

Chechen leadership. President Aushev felt the Center was favoring the North Ossetians to the detriment of the Ingush people's claims on the North Ossetian Prigorodny region, and thus began asserting the right to resolve the conflict without interference from the Center--thereby moving up to the ethnofederalist position, from its earlier 3.

The "Democratic Coup" of September-October 1993: This time period covers two short months of events, but in many ways, it is the most critical period to examine next to the period following the Center's invasion of Chechnya. The use of force points to a hardening of the Center's position vis-a-vis the demanding republics and regions and to its willingness to use force to persuade the non-believers. The leaders and the followers should be easy to sort out during this period, and those not so committed to the positions they adopted during the Constitutional Convention of that summer weaken in their stance at the show of force by the Center. Of the previous 4's from the summer of 1993, Kalmykia, Sakha, Buryatia, Chuvashia, and Khakhassia buckle. North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan remain 3's. Only Chechnya, still at a 5, Tatarstan, Komi, Udmurtia and Ingushetia hold on to their pervious position, while Karelia slips slightly to a 3.5. Mordovia, which had all along been a supporter of the national Parliament over the President, moves up to a four, the only republic to see an increase in its desire for autonomy from the Center.

Among the non-ethnic states examined in Table 5-3, there is no systematic or observable decrease in their demand for a loose federation, except in Krasnodar and Krasnoiarsk, where the leaders moderate from a 3 to a 2.5 on the autonomy index. We know from Figure 5-1 that a corresponding decrease in the demands of the non-ethnic

elites did occur following the ouster of the National Parliament by forces loyal to Yeltsin, but not among the states examined in Table 5-2.

December 1993 through December 1994: This period traces the impact of the second official bargain proffered by the Center with the publication and subsequent referendum on the President's own Constitution in late November and early December 1993. Here, we might actually see a moderating of the demands of the regions and republics based on the bargain offered, or more likely, the actions of the voters in their constituencies. In regions where the Constitution was accepted by a wide margin, or where nationalist (LDP) or Communist candidates did well in the corresponding Parliamentary elections, autonomy-seeking elites may well have changed their demands.

In fact, all but Chechnya, Tatarstan, Sakha and Moscow City moderated their demands, while Sakha and Moscow were the only ones to demand more than they had immediately after the coup. Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov has resigned as mayor, mostly in protest to the Center's actions that Fall and the new mayor, Yurii Lyzhkov has proven a very wily leader, confronting Yeltsin at every level where he feels the Center is interfering in city affairs, from migration restrictions to the city from the countryside, to rationing products for city residents, to personnel appointments from judges to police chiefs to prosecutors.

Many believe Lyzhkov is using these highly publicized confrontations to gain national attention and recognition before making a bid for national office himself. The personal ambition of regional governors is something that has been looked at in the American literature on federalism, and is certainly worthy of further investigation here as

well, especially now that all regional executives must be elected and serve more regular terms than during the 1991-95 period under investigation.

Tatarstan's leadership encouraged a boycott of the referendum, and got it, with far fewer than the required percentage of voters participating, the results were not valid here. In Chechnya, likewise, an organized boycott was underway as well. In Sakha, Nikolaev was one of the first and only republic heads to vocally support Yeltsin in the aftermath of the coup, though he was critical of Yeltsin's deletion of the language of the Federal Treaty from the draft constitution. Sakha went on to ratify the draft after Nikolaev had negotiated a deal with the Center to keep all tax revenues in the republic during 1994, once again trading his political loyalty for economic freedom. The higher score for Sakha comes from a dispute between Nikolaev and his Prime Minister, who opposed the Constitution and who walked out of the first meeting of the new Upper House of the National Parliament in protest of the new Constitution.

Post-Chechen War: If Tatarstan and Chechnya remained firm in their commitment to positions 4 and 5, respectively, and Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk evidenced little fluidity in their support for a loose territorial federation despite central action through 1994, then the war in Chechnya is unlikely to affect them either. But for weaker states, it may have a dramatic impact. On the one hand, one can imagine that the use of force against an actual member of the federation, against civilians and soldiers alike, might silence once and for all the clamoring and bickering among states for special privileges and status within the Federation for fear that the Center would next send troops to unseat the sitting governor, elected or not.

But the alternative is almost as persuasive. Regions or republics with no aspirations towards independence might view the Center's actions as so unacceptable that they begin to take a harder stand than ever before, if only because they now see that strong regions are necessary to curb the growth of unchecked power by the federal executive. After creating a particularly weak legislature, Yeltsin's only real check on power are the regional governments and their representatives in the Council of Federation. The use of force in Chechnya without prior notification, let alone approval, by any other governing body may well have served not to quell the desire for autonomy, but to have exacerbated it. Table 5-3 tells the story, though not an immediately clear one.

Chechnya and Tatarstan remain firm at 5 and 4, respectively. Sakha and Chuvashia are among the first leaders to announce that their constituents do not have to answer conscription notices by the federal government to serve in the military action in Chechnya, both defying Yeltsin. In the Caucasus, reaction is mixed along no clear lines. While Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia harden to a 4 and 3.5's respectively, above their overall median position, Dagestan and Karachai-Cherkessia weaken to a 2, demanding federal intervention to stop the flow of arms and refugees across its border. Ingushetia jumps back up to a 4 after reducing its demands following the October coup. There is, then, no uniform response to the federal assertion of power in Chechnya among the Muslim states.

Non-ethnic states bordering the conflict, including Rostov and Krasnodar krai, are not sympathetic to the Chechen cause, especially after Chechen rebels entered Stavropol and took a hospital and its patients hostage in response to the Center's military actions.

They harden firmly to a 2 on the autonomy index, demanding the Center reign in the Chechen state and its illegal activities.

The republics of Buryatia, Kalmykia, Komi and Khakhassia also cease their demands for autonomy following the Chechen invasion, settling on a 2.5 for Buryatia and a 3 for the others. Buryatia stops thinking like an ethnic republic, and begins working more cooperatively with other members of the Siberian Accord, which include ethnic and non-ethnic states alike. Buryatia signs onto several Siberian Accord agreements to improve the development of the region, along with Khakhasia. The role of the interregional associations in the new federation is something requiring further investigation, but this author remains optimistic about the positive role they are playing in integrating regions along geographic and socio-economic lines, cutting across ethnic cleavages to the benefit of all. While the strength of the interregional associations varies tremendously, and the Siberian one is one of the strongest, they remain an alternative outlet for bargaining and reaching compromise, and in the long run, may become more effective and credible bargaining partners with the Center than any single republic or regional administration is likely to be. Jumpy Mordovia leaps to a 4 following the invasion, from a 2 prior to it, though its rationale is once again somewhat suspect.

Among the non-ethnic states considered here Kaliningrad, Samara, Chita and Krasnoiarsk all resorted to demands for a strong center, to oppose movements that threatened the territorial integrity of the country as a whole. Chita's Chief Administrator went so far as to meet with Yeltsin to *criticize* a joint-statement made by signatories to the Heads of the Urals Republics Accord, which condemned the federal military action in

Chechnya and called for a reactivation of a transitional governing body, the Council of the Heads of Republics.

Table 5-4 shows those states which were signatories to the condemnation, or otherwise condemned the action, and those who came out to criticize the condemnation, like Chita's Chief Administrator. The others were noticeably silent or withholding judgement on the whole affair, calling it a tragedy, but perhaps an unavoidable one. In essence, they were hedging their bets, not committing themselves to a firm position. Among the vocal critics, only Irkutsk is a non-ethnic state, and as already noted, a state whose position over time has been relatively unwavering in its commitment to a decentralized federation. Among what could be called the supporters of the war, only Karachai-Cherkessia is an ethnic state, and one notably close to the conflict, and no doubt affected by the conflict. North Ossetian and Dagestani leaders were eager to have it resolved as quickly as possible, but they never voiced outrage at the Center's actions, nor suggested that it in any way violated the terms of the Constitution or the Federal Treaty, which renders them supporters of a federal position beneath that of their colleagues in the Urals Republics listed below, or Karelia and Komi.

The Siberian Republics of Khakhassia and Buryatia have again turned to the Siberian Interregional Association for guidance and planning, and have thereby abandoned the firm ethnofederalist position represented by their overall median score. The positions of the republics in the column condemning the war are those which now seem firmly on the path to pursuing local autonomy even when at odds with the Center. This may mean they will continue to withold taxes whenever they feel it is justified, pursuit of

privatization plans at odds with the federally mandated ones, resistance to privatization of public properties mandated by the center, negotiation with foreign investors without prior approval from Moscow for exploitation of natural resources, appointment of judges without approval from the center, passage of any number of local laws at odds with the Federal laws on issues ranging from migration and residence restrictions to economic and price regulations.

The Center responded to what amounts to a campaign of civil disobedience or non-compliance that rivals some of the best strategies from the Soviet era. In the non-ethnic states, support for the return to a strong central government is highest in those regions firmly committed to a 2 on the autonomy index. After the war, the firm 2's remain those states bordering on the North Caucasus region, such as Rostov, Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais, which all feel threatened by the enduring conflict and are drawn to the strong federal principle, much as Riker originally argued, in the interest of self-preservation against an external military threat.

The other 2's after the war are *not* likely to be in Siberia, which seems to be progressing towards some kind of common market among its member states, not simply talking about regional economic and political autonomy and waiting for Central approval, but acting on it on a daily basis. The other 2's, proponents of the strong center, are in the states now commonly referred to as the Red Belt of Russia, the suburbs of Moscow where communist and nationalist parties do well, and where leaders regularly ask for stronger central leadership to reign in defiant regions. Moscow Oblast, Briansk, Orel, Riazan, Smolensk, Tula, Tver, Yaroslavl, Belgorod, Kursk, Lipetsk, Penza, Saratov, Ulianovsk

and Volgograd--the regions of the geographic center are perhaps, not surprisingly, in favor of a constitutional arrangement that favors the rule of the center over the regions. Add distant Kaliningrad to the list, on the grounds that it, too, feels its security would be better served by a stronger center.

Firmly in the 3 camp after the war, favoring the continued decentralization of the Russian state are Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk and Nizhny Novgorod, all led by pioneers in the regional autonomy game, and their follower neighbors in Siberia (Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, Agin-Buryatia, Buryatia, Khakhassia, Taimyr) and the Urals (Chelyabinsk, Komi-Permyak, Orenburg). It is difficult to ignore the fact that there are regional effects at play here, and that a dynamic regional leader, in the case of Sverdlovsk or Irkutsk or Sakha, can bring others with him. Again, in the judgment of this researcher, the potential of the interregional associations to act to bring ethnic and non-ethnic states together to serve as an alternative locus of power to challenge federal executive power is worthy of further investigation.

Conclusion: In conclusion to this examination of the fluidity in state positions over time and the role of the center in shaping these positions, several points are worth stressing. While there have been some rather impressive shifts in the positions of individual states in response to both changes in local leadership and policy shifts at the Center, the majority of the states examined remain throughout this five year period within one standard deviation of their overall median position, making the earlier analysis of their central tendencies meaningful in most cases. Indeed the use of the median position ensured that single outlier events did not distort the true position of the state. For

example, in Udmurtia, where the regional Soviet in 1991 supported the coup plotters, but in all other time periods thereafter, remains firmly committed to an ethnofederal constitutional division of power, and today, remains one of those non-compliant regions holding out for exactly that kind of autonomy.

Secondly, the Center's strategy of using a "show of force" to enforce compliance with its current policy position seems to resemble a card played once too often. While engendering an overall lessening of the autonomy demands of both the ethnic and non-ethnic states following the October coup in 1993, no corresponding decrease was recorded following the Chechen invasion in December of 1994. In fact, a slight increase was registered across the board, and compliance, as noted earlier, is once again on the decline in the regions.

Table 5-5 summarizes the changes in state positions across the above-mentioned critical time periods, in relation to both the Center and the position the state had adopted in the previous time period (in other words, was the state's position moving up or down relative to where it had been before critical event *x*). The period during which significant agreement existed between the regions and the Center was the period following the signing of the first bargain, the Federal Treaty of March 1992, in that only one state is demanding more autonomy than the Center was willing to allow (Chechnya). During this period, it is the non-ethnic states that threaten the bargain by demanding a strengthening of central power, resentful of the perks offered to only the ethnically defined territories. They are among the 51 states demanding less autonomy than the Center is offering. One-third of the states are at the same position as the Center at that time.

The only period during which there is more "agreement," that is, the period during which the highest percentage of states recorded positions equal to that of the Center, is the post-December 1993 period, when fully 40% of the states were in agreement with the new hard line offered by the Center, though only 4 were ethnic states. After the Chechen war, in which I assign the Center a 1 on the autonomy index, no states are in agreement. If I move the Center back up to a 2 by the summer of 1995, in its efforts to extract itself from the war, then there are 15 of 65 in agreement with the Center's new hardline, or 23%. This amounts to a 17% drop in agreement, and no drop in the demands of the leader states, Tatarstan, Sakha, Bashkortostan, and most importantly, no change in the expressed position of the Chechen leadership, even after Dudayev's death.

Twice as many states increased their demands as weakened them during the period following the Chechen invasion. After the October 1993 coup against the National Parliament, those numbers are reversed. Twenty-two states lessened their demands while only 5 increased them. The use of force against an entire people, as opposed to several hundred political opponents, was not a successful gamble on many fronts, independent of the hundreds of thousands of lives already lost.

While these conclusions can only be preliminary, in that there are few events for each individual time period recorded, the observations are still worth noting. Use of the median autonomy position seems justified in most cases, with the potential exception of Mordovia, whose leadership seems to march to the beat of a drummer none of the other states are hearing. While some states weakened their demands after the December 1993

referendum, the decline was only temporary, and the mean score is back above a three again, where it was in the spring of 1992 after the signing of the Federal Treaty.

Nonetheless, the examination of variation in state leaders' positions over these time periods did allow us to learn something more about individual states, such as the quiet determination of Tuva in its commitment to ethnofederalism, and the possibility of exit; the strategic behavior of Sakha Governor Nikolaev in his ability to successfully trade political for economic autonomy; and the personal ambition of Moscow Mayor Yurii Lyzhkov. Each of these cases served to introduce alternative factors worthy of further consideration in a future project. In future analyses, it is worth investigating the differences between those states, like Sakha, which are demanding almost exclusively economic autonomy, and those which, like Tuva, are demanding true political autonomy. Secondly, it is worth considering a means of introducing more information about the political ambitions of the individual regional executives, like Lyzhkov, which may well be instrumental in explaining the bargaining stance they were willing to take with the Center on the federal division of power.

CHAPTER 6:
Conclusion

The central research goal of this investigation was to explain why states in Russia adopt different bargaining positions with regard to the federal division of power in Russia. I wanted to understand which states were likely to lobby for a return to a strong central, even unitary state and which were likely to push for increasing levels of political and economic autonomy, supporting the continued devolution of power from the federal Center to its constituent parts. An understanding of the strategic preferences of both regional elites and their publics is prior to any investigation into the stability of the Russian state, its territorial integrity, and its prospects for continued democratic development.

The first step to explaining the variation in the positions of state elites was to identify where states fell where along this dimension of centralization-decentralization of political decision-making authority. This study accomplishes this and is the first to have systematically attempted to do so. While a number of studies investigate the disposition of individual cases, such as Sullivan's (1995) study of inter-ethnic relations in Tuva, and fewer others systematically classify the positions of the ethnic states, such as Treisman (1997), none have tried to put all 89 states on a single autonomy continuum based on the behavior of elites in the regions. I have elected not to examine the ethnic states and their preferences and behavior independent of the other federation members. I felt that their distinctiveness was an empirical question, not something to be assumed prior to the study.

I chose to use events data on the behavior of both elites and their publics for several reasons, and I think the merit of this approach has been demonstrated by the scope of this investigation. While gathering information on over one thousand events relevant to the federal bargain was arduous, it provided me with a better overall picture of politics in the regions than use of any other single indicator could have. The use of voting behavior data, has, for example, become commonplace for identifying regions as "conservative" or "reformist." Voting behavior is an integral part of my data set, and is useful in identifying the preferences of non-elites in the regions. However, it is limited. It identifies preferences at a single point in time, and does not allow me to gauge how mobilized the population is at large. Events data allows me to identify those regions with populations that are "in the streets" on a weekly basis, as opposed to those who come out only to vote. And this may well have an impact on their overall bargaining position vis-a-vis the Center.

The events data is also useful in identifying the positions of state elites, as opposed to just their publics, in a systematic manner. It allows me to track positions over time, determining the degree to which the behavior of elites converges on a central preference, and the cases in which there is no apparent or meaningful tendency. All of which is useful to understanding what drives these political actors in one direction as opposed to another. Within the scholarly community engaged in research on federalism, my approach to the question is unique. The two most common approaches to the study of regionalism in Russia are game theoretic and analysis of voting behavior. Most game theoretic studies do not include an empirical component, and most analyses of voting behvior are limited to

mass behavior and to single points in time. The use of events data at the very least complements these other approaches, and provides singular insights into center-regional interactions.

Finally, I derived propositions from several competing theoretical perspectives to explain the behavior of both state elites and their publics once each was assigned a position on my five-item autonomy index, ranging from unitarism to independence. The schools from which these propositions are derived represent different subsets of largely structural factors which explain the behavior of individual elites. While Essentialists focus on the underlying strength and survival of a distinct cultural and political identity, Instrumentalists look at the ability of local leaders to command concessions from the Center based on their relative economic independence or dependence on the Center. Relative Deprivation scholars focus on the perception in the regions that they are being exploited relative to other subjects in the federation, and Resource Mobilization scholars focus on the individual resources governors bring to the bargaining table, in particular, their past experience and level of electoral or popular support.

Findings

The findings of the study are complicated and do not serve to validate or invalidate any single argument presented above, but instead allow for a synthesis of several strands. In looking first at the behavior of state elites, I found that cultural factors do seem to matter, and cannot simply be dismissed as factors that will disappear with the onset of modernization. State elites with populations that have been able to maintain a strong

separate national identity are more likely to continue to push for the maximum amount of autonomy from the Center as possible, and for a continuation of their privileged status in the Federation as separate "ethnic" nations. In fact, it might be a necessary condition to a state elite electing to opt out of the Federation altogether.

But as powerful a predictor of demands for autonomy as having a strong, separate and distant identity is, it is not sufficient. A number of state elites adopt a strong ethnofederalist position despite the apparent weakness of the group identity of their populations, such as Karelia's Stepanov, and Sakha's Nikolaev (both of whom are also ethnic Russians). Karelians and Yakutians have largely assimilated to Russian culture through conversion to orthodoxy and the adoption of Russian as their native tongue; the Presidents of Karelia and Sakha have nonetheless been vocal in their advocacy of republican sovereignty, and critical of attempts by the Yeltsin administration to reassert Federal control over the republics.

Are Presidents of Karelia and Sakha, then, being driven to adopt the maximum amount of autonomy from the Center by their own instrumental and predatory concerns? Are they representing states with high potential for economic development independent of Moscow, which would allow them greater access to rents than they previously had in a system where the Center controls local development, privatization and foreign investment contracts? Among the instrumental variables which would support this interpretation, I do find that possession of natural resources of value on world market is positively and significantly related to a state elite's position on the autonomy index, and is no doubt highly influential in the case of Sakha, which is rich in all categories, but especially

diamonds and gold. It does not help explain Karelia's Stepanov, however, whose region is rich in timber, but little else.

Likewise, lack of natural resources to bargain with external sources for revenue seems to be related to elites preferring the continuation of a strong center, if only to hinder the flight of cheap resources from the Federation. But being otherwise dependent on the Center, such as being from a defense industry region, or having a highly subsidized local budget, are not significant predictors.

Among the Relative Deprivation indicators, being publicly declared a Critically Depressed Region by the Center significantly increases the probability that a state's elite will demand autonomy from the Center, as does the previous administrative status of the region, which speaks to the resources of its elites, though past administrative level and the essentialism index are so highly correlated it is not apparent that they successfully measure conceptually distinct factors.

The combination of a strong separate national identity, a marketable natural resource, and being publicly declared in crisis, are powerful predictors of the ethnofederalist position, explaining nearly all of them but for Karelia. The combined model, including the essentialism index, the natural resource and depressed region variables, does better than any of the individual models, predicting 64% of the cases correctly. The problem, in all of this analysis, is that none of the models does especially well at sorting out the loose federalists, or position 3 on the autonomy index. The models seem fairly well suited to explaining extremes on either end of the autonomy index, but not the middle position of, for example, the governors Sverdlovsk or Irkutsk, who consistently

lobby for less centralization *and* an end to the privileges accorded the ethnic states at the expense of the territories.

I next investigated whether or not the behavior of the regional publics or masses could be influential in explaining the missing parts of the puzzle discussed above, again using events data to first classify the overall mood of the public towards the federal division of power. I found overall that the masses in the overwhelming majority of states are more conservative regarding the federal division of power than their regional executives. In cases where there was nearly a two-level difference in the autonomy desired between the elites and their publics, many of those leaders were ousted in the most recent gubernatorial campaigns.

Different factors were significant in predicting the position of the masses, though once again, the cultural factors were significant to explaining the few mass publics that were demanding the maximum amount of autonomy possible within the Federation. Those that have been able to sustain a separate identity fight to maintain it, such as the Chechens, Tuvinians, Ingush, and Tatars. And here, we see that among the states with the weaker separate identities, such as Karelia, the public is dramatically less independence-minded than their leaders, which eliminates for those cases, at least, any explanation of elite behavior as a reaction or response to pressures from below. In fact, mass preferences are not a significant predictor of elite preferences at all.

Perhaps the most important finding among the tests for mass behavior is the one which found a relationship between income growth and autonomy preference. As an indicator of the relative deprivation approach, it predicts in the wrong direction. In fact,

there seems to be a non-monotonic relationship between this and the essentialism indicator which suggests that stagnant growth reacts with strong ethnic attachments to propel populations away from the Center, while in the non-ethnic regions, the economic insecurity generated by the collapse of the old order sends them back, towards a strong Center, almost as if they have no alternative vision to which they can turn, unlike those in the states with a potential for an alternative national path to development.

As with the analysis of elite behavior, however, I find that none of the models predicts or distinguishes between the states with a preference for a non-ethnic but otherwise very loose federation of strong states and those that want a strong Center to rein in the more demanding regions.

My final attempt to explain this problem involved introducing both the Center and time into the analysis of regional bargaining positions. I felt the need to justify, empirically, my analysis of each state's central tendency as somehow meaningful to the bargaining process by establishing that state leaders were fairly consistent in their desire for a particular federal arrangement, though perhaps vacillating with sudden and dramatic shifts by the Center. I think this was born out, to a large extent, by my necessarily descriptive analysis of the variance in state positions over time, in response to critical events such as the signing of the Federal Treaty, the "democratic coup" of 1993, and the invasion of Chechnya. The overwhelming majority of states remain within one standard deviation of their overall median position, despite dramatic shifts by the Center.

Among those states with more substantial fluidity in their position are some that experienced dramatic changes in leadership (Chechnya, Amur province--which had five

governors in as many years), some who seemed willing trade some kinds of autonomy for others (Sakha, Tatarstan), and some who have abandoned one position in favor of an alternative vision, one associated with an Interregional Association, for example (Buryatia, Khakhassia). These findings bring to light some of the weaknesses inherent in the investigation, as well, and point to several interesting avenues for future research.

Implications and Avenues for Future Research

What this study has done best is classify the 89 members of the Federation along a single contiuum of autonomy from the Federal Center. This is a contribution to the field, which, as noted earlier, is spotted with case studies and only a few systematic efforts to examine the behavior of elites outside Moscow in a comparative manner. Likewise, studies of mass behavior have focused on either voting behavior or the actions of radical nationalist movements in the republics. They have not integrated these actions, as I have, into a single account of the political life of the region, and therefore, I think, much of this work is missing important parts of the puzzle.

What this investigation was much less successful in accomplishing was systematically explaining the behavior of either the elites or their publics with regard to the federal bargain. All of the approaches examined here have provided some insight into the behavior of the ethnonationalists, in both their political and civil attire, but were much less instructive about distinguishing between "federalists" and "anit-federalists" in either the political or civic arena.

Some reasons why are explored below. Though most of these points were raised in the individual chapter conclusions, I offer them again here for the sake of clarity, and for some closure on the subject. Perhaps the easiest explanation to provide is one that simply says the models did not perform well because I did not operationalize them well. I was, for example, somewhat strict in my interpretation of those states that had experienced a past serious conflict with the Center by limiting my cases to the states with a 20th-century history of oppression or annexation during the Stalin era. I could have included Karelia, which had its status demoted from the Karelo-Finnish Union Republic to Autonomous Republic. I could likewise have included the Tatars, who consider the fact that they were conquered and enslaved by the ancestors of Russia's current rulers centuries ago a valid and vivid form of "serious conflict." Inclusion of these cases would have rendered the Essentialism Index even more powerful a predictor of the ethnofederalist position than it already was.

Likewise, in the Instrumental case, I could find alternative ways of measuring dependence/independence from Moscow, and sharpen my largely crude measures of natural resource wealth or defense region into interval variables based on percent of federal oil reserves or percent of local industrial production made up by defense industries. I might also have included agrarian or mining regions as regions highly dependent on the Center for subsidies, therefore, unlikely to have elites demanding autonomy, which would be the equivalent of biting the hand that feeds them. It is also probable that international factors need to be included within this approach, to get at the role that international capital, in particular, plays in encouraging or discouraging autonomous behavior by

rational elites. Some measure of foreign influence in each of the regions, such as amount of foreign investment or exports as a percentage of the total regional budget, might account for the lack of explanatory power this model had with the domestic economic measures alone.

In the relative deprivation school, I have recently read a number of working papers on the political economy of the regions arguing about the best means of measuring the relative well-being of the states.[1] The consensus now seems to be that income growth and unemployment are not especially good indicators in this transition from the state socialism period. The argument about income growth is demonstrative of this logic. With privatization and the slow but steady freeing of prices and wages, some regions have seen real increases in income, such as Moscow City, which corresponds to an increased ability to buy things to live better. But in other areas, like most of Siberia, high wage increases do not mean as much because there is still virtually nothing to buy with increased rubles, and the quality of life there remains harder than anywhere around Moscow. Alternative measures include the amount of backwages (arrears) owed to regional industries by the Center, degree of urbanization (with which the purchase of goods is substantially correlated), and perhaps a measure of industrial output to capture whether the regional economy is rebounding or stagnating.

The resource mobilization school needs some further consideration here, as its only significant indicator, past administrative level, was too highly correlated with the

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[1]See Mikhail Filippov, "Economics and the Electoral Choice of Russia's Regions," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, April 10-12, 1997.

essentialism index to constitute an independent test of its tenets. Some other resources and organizational advantages individual governors might bring to the table include previous administrative position (which means more than were they a member of the Communist Party or not), presence of an organized nationalist movement in the region, and the personal ambition of the individual leader to move up the political ladder from the regions to the national political arena.

Indeed, more reflection on the regional differences in local political conditions in general seems warranted. How strong and well developed are political parties and interest groups across the regions? How free are the presses? Do these resources make it harder or easier for local governors to demand autonomy from the Center? These are all factors which would fall into the resource mobilization school's realm of possible explanations, but which were not examined here.

Likewise, political ambition as a mediating factor needs to be considered further. Ordeshook (1996) identifies the integration of local politcal leaders' ambitions into the national political arena as an important element in the evolution of the federation to a stable republic. Local leaders with ambitions must feel they have a stake in the federal system, that benefits to them accrue, on an individual basis. This will only happen as the party system in Russia matures and helps elect unknowns in the hinterlands on the basis of well-known platforms, and when regional elites see governorships and senatorships as legitimate stepping stones to a national career in politics, as Ordeshook claims they are in other successful federations. Without these mechanisms in place, federal systems become too combative and are more likely to splinter.

The current party list system in Russia is biased in favor of Moscow-based politicians at the expense of regional politicians, and there may well be a geographic effect related to this and the federalism dimension.[2] The governors of the regions around Moscow are the most solid base of strong Center supporters in the country right now, and they are also the leaders with the most proximate chance of being included on such a national party list. Governors of non-ethnic regions less proximate to Moscow may well find that they are being left out of the game anyway, and with little ability even to influence it, and therefore, they opt for more local control over resources, to remain big fish in their little ponds.

And finally, the role of the Interregional Associations is an additional factor worthy of further investigation that may well shed more light on those regions that (a) moved away from their original bargaining position towards a state's rights perspective, and (b) are moving towards the kind of confederalism discussed only in theory here. The Siberian and Far East Associations are the most innovative and have proven remarkably united despite the mix of ethnic and non-ethnic states included in their memberships.

On a normative level, this author recognizes the need for the emergence of strong regional governments to counteract the unchecked authority of the federal executive under the current constitution. Some would say the regions provide the only possible credible check on that authority, with the new legislature so weak and divided and the Court viewed as an arm of the executive.

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[2]See M. Steven Fish, "The Advent of Multipartism in Russia," in *Journal of Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 4, 1996, for more on the evolution of the party system in Russia and its regional effects.

However, the regional executives themselves have more often acted in a manner less democratic than the federal center whose authority we seek to check. Their parochialism and penchant for corruption appear unrivalled at the Center. This kind of conclusion then begs the question, is one type of autonomy to be preferred over another, to better ensure, at minimum, a politically stable and democratic state? Which is to be feared more, a strong center or strong regions? Without a strong Center, do local leaders "fix" privatization auctions to the benefit of the few at the expense of the many? Without strong regions, does the Center impose draconian adjustment reforms without reference to the well-being of the regional constituencies?

This study does not allow me to answer that question, but it does allow me to see the need for further research to investigate it. While the Center continues to demand compliance with its decrees, the Siberian states have already begun to develop independent means of cooperating and resolving local issues, especially as they pertain to the environment and foreign investment. Their vision of the Federation's future is very far afield from that of the suburbs of Moscow, and a thousand miles from the battlefields of the North Caucasus. It is probable that this differential development will continue until someone replaces the tired administration of Boris Yeltsin. Unfortunately, the only viable

alternative candidates are those with visions for a federal center much stronger than the median state leader, though apparently much closer to the median state voter.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Quadrant I	*Quadrant IV*
Regional Political Autonomy **Free Market Economy**	**Regional Political Autonomy** **State Planned Economy**
Quadrant II	*Quadrant III*
Political Centralization **Free Market Economy**	**Political Centralization** **State Planned Economy**

Note: Based on G. Starovoitova, "The Formation of the New Ethno-Political Elites in Russia," (1994).

FIGURE 1-1: Classification of Regional Elites

Figure 3-1: Map 3.1
The Russian Federation, 1993



FIGURE 3-2: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES BY MODEL

Essentialism:	
Punished People	Ethnic Groups deported, exiled or annexed during Stalin era. Coded 1/0.
Non-Orthodox	Ethnic states whose populations have resisted conversion to orthodoxy. Coded 1/0.
Use of Native Language	Percentage of each ethnic state's population that claims to use its native tongue. Coded -9 for non-ethnic states, otherwise its a percentage
Instrumentalism:	
Net Gainers/Losers	Ratio of gains or losses from the federal bargain, in terms of rubles received in subventions versus rubles paid in federal taxes (in millions) Scale ranges from -9.9 to +67.0, with -9 signifying missing data for okrugs
Natural Resources	Regions the World Bank identified in 1992 as having significant oil, natural gas, diamond or gold reserves. Coded 1/0.
Defense Regions	Regions identified by the Center as "closed" because they were national security zones, or states whose local economy is highly dependent on the defense industry. Coded 1/0.
Budget Subsidies	Percent of each state's local budget that is paid for by federal subventions. Ranges from 0 to 80%, with -9 for missing data. (World Bank data)
Relative Deprivation:	
Change in Income	Percent change in individual income from each state, 1992-93.
Change in Unemployment	Percent change in unemployment figures of each state, 1992-93.
Depressed	Identified by President's Analytic Center as critically depressed region in 1992. Coded 1/0.
Resource Mobilization:	
Past Level	Ordinal scale identifying rank in Soviet federal hierarchy, code 1-4 for oblast through A.S.S.R.
Early Elections	States which had elections to governor prior to the end of 1994. Coded 1/0.

Figure 5-1. Median Autonomy Positions of Center, Ethnic States and Territories Over Time



APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

TABLE 1-1: Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs in the R.S.F.S.R.

ASSRs

Bashkir ASSR
Created in March 1919.
21.9% Bashkir

Buryat ASSR
Created in May 1923 as Buryat-Mongol ASSR. Renamed in July 1958.
24.0% Buryat

*Chechen-Ingush ASSR
Chechen Autonomous Oblast created in 1922. Ingush Autonomous Oblast created in 1924. The two were merged in 1936, then abolished altogether during the 1944 deportations. Recreated in 1957.
57.8% Chechen/12.9% Ingush

Chuvash ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in June 1920. Became an ASSR in 1925.
67.7% Chuvash

Dagestani ASSR
Created in January 1921.
80.1% Dagestani

Kabardino-Balkar ASSR
Kabardinian Autonomous Oblast created in 1921. Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Oblast created in 1922. Became an ASSR in 1936, but when Balkars were deported in 1944, renamed Kabardinian ASSR. In 1957, it was again renamed Kabardino-Balkar ASSR.
48.2% Kabardinian/9.4% Balkar

Kalmyk ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in 1920. Became an ASSR
in 1935. It was abolished during deportations of 1943. Recreated in 1957.
45.3% Kalmyk

Karelian ASSR
Created as Karelian Labour Commune in 1920. Became an ASSR in 1935. It was renamed the
Karelo- Finnish SSR from 1940-56, but demoted to Karelian ASSR in 1957.
10.0% Karelian

Komi ASSR
Created as Komi-Zyryan Autonomous Oblast in 1920. It became Komi ASSR in 1936.
23.3% Komi

Mari ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in 1920. Became an ASSR in 1936.
43.2% Mari

Mordvin ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in 1930. Became an ASSR in 1934.
32.5% Mordva

North Ossetian ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in 1924. Became an ASSR in 1936.
52.9% Ossetian

Tatar ASSR
Created in May 1920.
48.5% Tatar

Table 1-1 (con't)

Tuvin ASSR
Independent until 1944. Made an Autonomous Oblast in 1944, and became an ASSR in 1961.
64.3% Tuvin

Udmurt ASSR
Created as an Autonomous Oblast in 1920. Became an ASSR in 1934.
30.9% Udmurt

Yakut ASSR
Created in April 1922.
33.4% Yakutian

*The Chechen-Ingush ASSR split in late 1991-early 1992 into two separate republics.

Autonomous Oblasts

Adegeia AO
Created in July 1922. Known as Adegeia-Cherkess AO until 1928.
22.1% Adegei

Gorno Altai AO
Created in June 1922. Known as Oirot AO until 1948.
31.0% Altai

Jewish AO
Created in May 1934.
4.2% Jewish

Karachai-Cherkess AO
Created in 1922. In 1926, it was divided in two. The Karachai AO was abolished in 1943, and a joint AO was reestablished in 1957. 31% Karachai/9.7% Cherkess

Khakhass AO
Created in October 1930.
11.1% Khakhass

Autonomous Okrugs

Agin-Buryat AOk
Created in 1937 from the split of the Buryat-Mongol ASSR. 54.9% Buryat

Chukchi AOk
Created in December 1930. 7.3% Chukchi

Evenki AOk
Created in December 1930. 13.9% Evenki

Khanty-Mansi AOk
Created in December 1930. .9% Khanty/.5% Mansi

Komi-Permyak AOk
Created in February 1935. 60.1% Komi-Permyaks

Koryak AOk
Created in December 1930. 16.5% Koryaks

Nenets AOk
Created in July 1929. 11.9% Nenets

Taimyr AOk
Created in December 1930. 8.9% Dolgan/4.4% Nenets

Ust'-Orda Buryat AOk
Created in 1936 when Buryat-Mongol ASSR split. 36.1% Buryat

Yamalo-Nenets AOk
Created in December 1930. 4.2% Nenets

TABLE 2-1: Sample of Events Data and Autonomy Scores
Republic of Karelia, 1991-95

Date	Event Description	Source	Score
3-27-91	Karelian majority votes yes on Union Treaty	CDSP	2
4-25-91	Karelian SupSoviet votes to lease land to Finns	OMRI	3
5-12-91	Karelian ViceChair threatens to sign Union Treaty only if status equal to that of Union Republics	CDSP	4
9-05-91	Karelian Chair signs statement asking new Council of Republic Heads	CDSP	4
1-27-92	Karelian Parl doubts independence, asks for special Federal Treaty with guarantees instead	OMRI	4
3-12-92	Karelia says Karelia doesn't want independence, will sign the Federal Treaty	OMRI	4
3-14-92	Karelian Chair initials Federal Treaty	CDSP	4
9-28-92	Karelia signs statement supporting strong Parliament to balance executive power	CDSP	3
3-31-93	Karelian Leader won't support creation of an upper house with equal representation for regions	CDSP	4
4-23-93	Karelians vote confidence in President Yeltsin	OMRI	3
5-15-93	Karelia signs a statement opposing President's Constitution bc it doesnt protect republic sovereignty	Both	4
6-04-93	RussDepPrime Min says Karel wants own currency	OMRI	4
6-16-93	Karelia says it wants guarantee of sover in all drafts	CDSP	4
7-12-93	Karelia abstains from vote on Draft Constit on procedural grounds	CDSP	n/a**

Table 2-1 (con't.)

9-21-93	Karelian Deputies ask help preserving national cult from Russian "hegemony"	OMRI	4
9-24-93	Karelian Parliament condemns Yeltsin's decree dissolving Federal Parliament	OMRI	4
10-02-93	Karelia and 61 regional heads agree to form interim gov't. as Council of Federation	CDSP	3
10-11-93	Karelian Parliament agrees to hold new elections in keeping with Yeltsin decree	OMRI	2
10-14-93	Karelian Leader joins Federal Commission on regional reform	OMRI	2
10-23-93	Karelian Leader calls new constit a return to empire	CDSP	4
11-02-93	Karelia offers compromise to make all regions equal and sovereign in the new constitution	CDSP	3
11-04-93	Karelia joins federal working group seeking compromise on constitution	OMRI	3
12-03-93	Karelian leader criticizes draft for leaving out Treaty, But he will support it anyway	OMRI	3
12-15-93	Karelia votes plurality Russia's Choice, Yabloko Women's Parties	OMRI	3
2-03-94	Karelian Leader boycotts first Council meeting	CDSP	4
4-19-94	Karelia's Stepanov elected to new Chair w/40%	CDSP	n/a**
10-21-94	Center reports Karelian Const ok by Federal one	CDSP	2
1-12-95	Karelian leader condemns war in Chechnya, asks revival of Council of Republic Heads	CDSP	4
1-19-95	Stepanov issues statement asking for more checks on central executive power	CDSP	3
	Median Score on Autonomy Index (All Actors)	=	4

Table 2-2: Comparing Source Differences on the Autonomy Index

STATE	CDSP ONLY	OMRI ONLY	BOTH SOURCES
Arkhangelsk	2.5	2.5	2.5
Karelia	4	4	4
Komi	3	3	3
Murmansk	3	2.5	3
Nenets A.O.	3	3.5	3
Vologda	3	2.0	3
Leningrad Oblast	2.5	3	3
Novgorod	2	3	3
Pskov	2	2	2
St. Petersburg	3	3	3
Briansk	2	3	2
Ivanov	2	2	2
Kaluga	2	1.5	2
Kostroma	2	2.5	2
Moscow City	3	3	3
Moscow Oblast	2	2	2
Orlov	2	2	2
Riazan	2	1.5	2
Smolensk	2	2	2
Tula	2.5	2	2
Tver	2	2	2
Vladimir	2.5	3	3
Yaroslavl	3	2.5	2.5
Chuvashia	4	3	4
Kirov	2	2	2
Mari-El	4	3	4
Mordovia	2	4	3
Nizhny Novgorod	3	3	3
Belgorod	2	2	2
Kursk	2	2	2
Lipetsk	2	2	2
Tambov	2	2.5	2
Voronezh	3	2	3
Astrakhan	2.5	3	3
Kalmykia	4	3	3.5
Penza	2	2	2
Samara	3	2.5	3
Saratov	2	3	2.5
Tatarstan	4	4	4
Ulianovsk	2	2	2
Volgograd	2.5	2	2
Adegeia	3.5	4	4
Chechnya	5	4.5	5
Dagestan	3.5	2	2
Ingushetia	4	4	4
Kabardino-Balkaria	3	4	4

Table 2-2 (con't).

Karachai-Cherkessia	2	3	3
Krasnodar	2	3	3
North Ossetia	3	3.5	3
Rostov	2	2	2
Stavropol	2	2	2
Bashkortostan	4	4	4
Chelyabinsk	3	3	3
Komi-Permiak AO	2	3.5	3
Kurgan	2	2.5	2
Orenburg	2	2	2
Perm	3	2	2
Sverdlovsk	3	3	3
Udmurtia	4	4	4
Altai Republic	3	3.5	3
Altai Krai	3	2	2
Kemerovo	3	3	3
Khanty-Mansii	3	4	3
Novosibirsk	2	3	3
Omsk	3	3	3
Tomsk	3	2	2.5
Tyumen	3	3	3
Yamal-Nenets	3	3.5	3
Agin-Buryat	2	3	2
Buryatia	3	4	3.5
Chita	3	2.5	3
Evenkii	3	2.5	3
Irkutsk	3	3	3
Khakhassia	4	3	3.5
Krasnoiarsk	3	2	3
Taimyr	3	4	3
Tuva	4	4	4
Ust-Orda	2	3	2
Amur	2	2	2
Chukota	3.5	3	3.5
Jewish A.O.	2.5	3	3
Kamchatka	3	3	3
Khabarovsk	3	3	3
Koryak	2	2.5	2
Magadan	3	2.5	3
Primorsk (maritime)	3	2	3
Sakha	4	4	4
Sakhalin	2	2	2
Kaliningrad	2.5	3	3
Total Events	N=795	N=790	N=1460
Overall Median	3.0	3.0	3.0

Table 2-3: Correlation of Autonomy Scores Between the Two Sources

	Median Autonomy Scores OMRI coverage only
Median Autonomy Scores CDSP coverage only	.471** (N=89)

**Sig= .01
Kendall's Correlation Coefficients

TABLE 3-1: Regional Executives in the Russian Federation

	January 1995 Incumbent	Elected Fall 1996
Adeygeya		
President	Aslan A. Dzharimov	Re-elected
+Altai		
Head of Republic	Valerii I. Chaptinov	
+Bashkortostan		
President	Murtaza G. Rakhimov (elected 1995)	
+Buryatia		
President	Leonid V. Popatov (elected 1994)	
+Dagestan		
President of Supreme Soviet	Magomedali M. Magomedov	
Ingushetia		
President	Ruslan S. Aushev (elected 1993, unopposed)	
+Kabardino-Balkaria		
President	Valerii M. Kokov	Re-elected, unopposed
Kalmykia		
President	Kirsan I. Ilyumzhinov	Re-elected, unopposed
Karachai-Cherkessia		
Head of the Republic	Vladimir I. Khybiev	
+Karelia		
Chair/Head of the Government	Viktor Stepanov (elected 1994)	
+Komi		
Head of the Republic	Yuri Spiridinov (elected 1994)	
Mari-El		
President	Vladislav M. Zotin	Vyacheslav Kislitsyn*
Mordovia		
Head of the Republic	Nikolai I. Merkyshin	
+North Ossetia		
President	Akhsarbek Kh. Galazov (elected 1994)	
+Tatarstan		
President	Mintimir Shaimiev (re-elected 1996, unopposed)	
Tuva		
President/Head of Government	Sherig-ool D. Oorzhak	Scheduled 3/16/97
Udmurtia		
Chair of the Governing Council	Alexander A. Volkov (elected 1994)	
Khakhasia		
Chair, Council of Ministers	Yevgenii A. Smirnov	Aleksei Lebed*
Chechnya		
President	Acting Pres. Yandarbiev	Scheduled 1/27/97
Chuvashia		
President	Nikolai V. Federov (elected 1993)	
+Sakha/Yakutia		
President	Mikhail Ye. Nikolaev	Re-elected

*Incumbent defeated in 1996 elections.
+Same leader in power since Fall of 1991

Table 3-1 (Con't).

KRAI (province) HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION (GLAVA ADMINISTRATSIIA):

	1995 Incumbent	Elected Fall 1996
Altaiskii Krai	Lev A. Korshynov (apt'd 1/94)	Aleksandr Surikov*
Krasnodarskii Krai	Yevgenii M. Kharitonov, replaced by N. Yegorov in 1996	Nikolai Kondratenko*
Krasnoiarskii Krai	Valerii M. Zybov**(1993)	Scheduled for April 1997
Primorskii Krai	Yevgenii I. Nazdratenko	Re-elected
Stavropolskii Krai	Peter P. Marchenko (apt'd 1995)	Alexander Chernogorov*
+Khabarovskii Krai	Viktor I. Ishaev	Re-elected

AUTONOMOUS OKRUG (district) HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION

	January 1995 Appointee	Elected Fall 1996
+Taimyrskii Autonomous Okrug	Gennadii P. Nedelin	Re-elected
+Evenkiiskii Autonomous Okrug	Anatolii M. Yakimov	Rescheduled
Nenets Autonomous Okrug	Yurii V. Komarovskii	Vladimir Butov*
Ust-Ordinskii Autonomous Okrug	Alexei N. Batagaev	Valerii Maleev*
Koriakii Autonomous Okrug	Sergei G. Leyshkin	Valentina Bronievich*
+Chukotskii Autonomous Okrug	Alexander V. Nazarov	Re-elected
+Komi-Permyakii Autonomous Okrug	Nikolai A. Poluyanov	Re-elected
+Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrug	Alexander V. Filipenko	Re-elected
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	Yurii V. Neelov (apt'd 8/94)	Re-elected
+Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug	Gurodarma Ts. Tsedashiev	Scheduled for 2 February

AUTONOMOUS OBLAST (region) HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION

	January 1995 Appointee	Elected Fall 1996
+Evreysskaia Autonomous Oblast	Nikolai M. Volkov	Re-elected

OBLAST HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION

	1995 Appointee	Elected Fall 1996
Amur	Yuri Lyashko (apt'd 6/96, 5th in 5 yrs!)	Rescheduled for March 1997
Arkhangelsk	Pavel N. Balakshin, replaced 1996	Anatolii Yefremov (inc.)
+Astrakhan	Anatolii P. Guzhvin	Re-elected
Belgorod	Yevgenii S. Savchenko**(1995)	
Briansk	Vladimir A. Barabanov	Yurii Lodkin* (prev. ldr.)
Vladimir	Yuii V. Vlasov** (1995)	
Volgograd	Ivan P. Shabynin	Nikolai Maksyuta*
Volodya	Nikolai M. Podgornov, replaced 1996 by Vyachasla Pozgalev(inc.)	
Voronezh	Alexander Ya. Kovalev, replaced 1996	Ivan Shabanov*
Ivanova	Adolf F. Laptev, replaced 1996	Vladislav Tikomorov (inc.)
+Irkutsk	Yurii A. Nozhikov**(aptd '91. removed & reaptd 3/93, elctd 1994)	
Kaliningrad	Yurii S. Matochkin	Leonid Gorbenko*
Kaluga	Alexander V. Deryagin (resigned 1/96)	Valerii Sudarenkov*
+Kamchatka	Vladimir A. Biriukov	Re-elected
+Kemerovo	Mikhail B. Kisliuk	Unspec. future elections
Kirov	Vasilii Desyatnikov	Vladimir Sergeenkov*
Kostroma	Valerii P. Arbuzov	Viktor Shershunov*

Table 3-1 (Con't).

Kurgan	Anatolii N. Sobolev (aptd 95)	Oleg Bogomolev
Kursk	Vasilii I. Shuteev	Alexandr Rutskoi*
Leningrad	Alexander S. Belyakov	Vadim Gustov*
Lipetsk	Mikhail T. Narolin**(1994)	
Magadan	Viktor G. Mikhailov	Valentin Tsvetkov*
+Moscow	Anatolii S. Tyazhlov **(1994)	
Murmansk	Yevgenii B. Komarov	Yurii Yevdokimov*
+Nizhny Novgorod	(Governor) Boris Nemtsov**(1994)	
Novgorod	Mikhail M. Prusak**(1995)	
Novosibirsk	Ivan I. Indinok	Vitalii Mukha* (1995
elctn)		
+Omsk	Leonid K. Polezhaev**(1993)	
Orenburg	Vladimir V. Yelagin	
Orel	Yegor S. Stroev (1993)**	
+Penza	Anatolii F. Kovliagin**(1993)	
Perm	Boris Yu. Kuznetsov, replaced 1996	Gennadii Igumnov (inc.)
Pskov	Vladislav N. Tumanov (apt'd '92)	Yevgenii Mikhailov*
+Rostov	Vladimir F. Chub	Re-elected
Riazan	Gennadii K. Merkulov, replaced 1996	Vyacheslav Lyubimov*
+Samara	Konstantin A. Titov	Re-elected
Saratov	Yurii V. Belikh, replaced in '96	Dmitrii Ayatskov
(inc.)Sakhalin	Yevgenii A. Farkhutdinov (apt'd 4/95)	Re-elected
Sverdlovsk	Edward E. Rossel **(1995)	
Smolensk	Anatolii Ye. Glyshenkov**(1993)	
Tambov	Oleg I. Betin**(1995)	
+Tver	Vladimir A. Suslov	
+Tomsk	Viktor M. Kress	
+Tula	Nikolai V. Seriugin	
+Tyumen	Leonid Yu. Roketskii	Re-elected
+Ulianovsk	Yurii F. Goriachev	Re-elected
Cheliabinsk	Vadim N. Solov'ev	Petr Sumin*
Chita	Boris P. Ivanov, replaced 2/96 by	Ravil Geniatulin (inc.)
+Yarsoslavl	Anatolii I. Lisitsin	

FEDERAL CITY MAYORS

+Moscow	Yurii M. Lyzhkov	Re-elected 6/96
St. Petersburg	Anatolii A. Sobchak	Vladimir Yakovlev*

* Incumbent was defeated in election
**Stood for competitive election prior to fall of 1996
+Same leader in power since the Fall of 1991

TABLE 3-2: Mean and Median Scores of Regional Elites, 1991-95

State	Mean	Median	N
Chechnya	4.62	5.00	62
Tatarstan	4.33	4.00	43
Bashkortostan	4.00	4.00	46
Mari-El	3.86	4.00	7
Tuva	3.80	4.00	15
Sakha	3.68	4.00	41
Khakhasia	3.64	4.00	11
Adeygeya	3.62	4.00	8
Chuvashia	3.62	4.00	13
Karelia	3.56	4.00	25
Buryatia	3.50	4.00	15
Ingushetia	3.50	4.00	30
Komi	3.44	4.00	16
Udmurtia	3.43	4.00	14
Chukota	3.33	4.00	3
Khanty-Mansii AO	3.33	3.50	6
Mordovia	3.20	4.00	15
Altai	3.33	3.00	6
Nenets AO	3.33	4.00	3
Kalmykia	3.29	4.00	17
Yamal-Nenets AO	3.25	3.50	4
Taimyr AO	3.17	3.50	6
Tyumen	3.13	3.00	8
North Ossetia	3.12	3.00	34
Kabardino-Balkaria	3.05	3.00	21
Sverdlovsk	3.04	3.00	23
Ust-Orda AO	3.00	3.00	3
Agin-Buryat AO	3.00	3.00	3
Komi-Permyak AO	3.00	3.00	3
Karachai-Cherkessia	3.00	3.00	11
Irkutsk	2.88	3.00	16
Vologda	2.86	3.00	7
Dagestan	2.84	3.00	19
Khabarovsk	2.83	3.00	6
St. Petersburg	2.82	3.00	22
Jewish AO	2.80	3.00	5
Omsk	2.80	3.00	5
Kaliningrad	2.79	3.00	14
Nizhny Novgorod	2.79	3.00	14
Magadan	2.75	3.00	4
Evenkii AO	2.75	2.50	4
Cheliabinsk	2.75	3.00	12
Vladimir	2.75	3.00	4
Moscow City	2.72	3.00	25
Voronezh	2.71	3.00	7
Briansk	2.71	3.00	7

Table 3-2 (con't.)

State	Mean	Median	N
Novosibirsk	2.69	3.00	16
Primorskii Krai	2.67	3.00	12
Chita	2.67	3.00	12
Kurgan	2.67	3.00	3
Astrakhan	2.67	3.00	3
Orlov	2.67	2.00	6
Ivanova	2.67	3.00	3
Pskov	2.67	3.00	3
Novgorod	2.67	3.00	6
Murmansk	2.67	3.00	3
Kemerovo	2.64	3.00	14
Krasnoiarsk	2.63	3.00	24
Volgograd	2.62	3.00	8
Amur	2.60	2.00	5
Leningrad Oblast	2.60	3.00	5
Tomsk	2.57	3.00	7
Altai Krai	2.57	3.00	7
Arkhangelsk	2.57	3.00	7
Samara	2.54	3.00	13
Kamchatka	2.50	2.50	2
Perm	2.50	2.50	6
Saratov	2.50	3.00	12
Penza	2.50	2.50	4
Tambov	2.50	2.50	4
Kirov	2.50	2.50	2
Yaroslavl	2.50	2.50	4
Kaluga	2.50	2.50	2
Orenburg	2.43	3.00	7
Tula	2.43	2.00	7
Moscow Oblast	2.43	2.00	7
Sakhalin	2.38	2.00	8
Ulianovsk	2.38	2.00	8
Krasnodar	2.36	2.00	11
Smolensk	2.33	2.00	3
Kostroma	2.33	2.00	3
Stavropol	2.25	2.00	12
Belgorod	2.25	2.00	4
Rostov	2.20	2.00	10
Koriak AO	2.00	2.00	1
Tver	2.00	2.00	2
Riazan	2.00	2.00	1
Lipetsk	1.75	2.00	4
Kursk	1.60	2.00	5
Overall Mean	3.14	Overall Median 3.00	Total N = 966

Table 3-3: Past Serious Grievance by Cultural Distance from Center

	Punished Peoples	Not Punished Peoples
Non-Orthodox Groups	Kalmykia Chechnya Ingushetia Kabardino (Balkaria) Karachai (Cherkessia) Tyva	Tatarstan Bashkortostan Dagestan Adegeya North Ossetia
Orthodox/Assimilated Groups	NONE	Karelia Buryatia Komi Agin-Buryatia (AO) Nenets (AO) Yakutia (Sakha) Chuvashia Mordovia Udmurtia Mari-El Khakhassia Taimyr (AO) Altai Khanti-Mansii (AO) Ust-Orda Buryat (AO) Evreiski (AO) Koriakii (AO) Chukota (AO) Evenkii (AO) Komi-Permyak (AO)

Table 3-4: Correlation Between Median Autonomy Score and Essentialism Index

	Median Score on the Political Autonomy Index
Essentialism Index Score	.575** (n=89) Sig .000

**Indicates that a Kendall's tau-b statistic was calculated because of the ordinal nature of the variables.

Table 3-5: Potential for Separate Identity by Elite's Autonomy Score

		Essentialism Index Score			
		Low Potential (1 factor)	(2 factors)	High Potential (3 factors)	(4 factors)
Median Autonomy Position					
2.0	Strong Federation	Koriak AO	0	0	0
2.5		Evenki AO	0	0	0
3.0	Loose Federation	Evreyski AO	Komi-Permyak Gorno-Altai Ust-Orda Agin-Buryat	Dagestan N. Ossetia	Kab-Balkaria Kara-Cherkessia
3.5		Khanty-Mansi Taimyr	Yamal-Nenets	0	0
4.0	Ethnic Confederation	Karelia Komi Nenets AO Chukota	Chuvashia Mordovia Mari-El Buryatia Khakhasia Sakha Udmurtia	Tatarstan Adeygeya Bashkortostan	Ingushetia Kalmykia Tuva
5.0	Independence	0	0	0	Chechnya

Table 3-6: Net Gainers[1] and Losers in the Federal Budget, 1992

Gainers: (+59.0 - +0.29)	Losers: (-64.91 - -11.49)
Komi	Tyumen
North Ossetia	Samara
Tuva	Yaroslavl
Tatarstan	Moscow City
Dagestan	Niznhy Novgorod
Irkutsk	Perm
Kalmykia	Magadan
Karelia	Belgorod
Buryatia	Ulianovsk
Kamchatka	Kursk
Sakha	St. Petersburg
Mari-El	Vladimir
Kabardino-Balkaria	Sverdlovsk
Chechnya	Smolensk
Bashkortostan	Riazan
	Khabarovsk Krai
	Murmansk
	Ivanova
	Tambov
	Moscow Oblast
	Kaliningrad
	Primorskii Krai
	Tomsk

[1] States who paid into the federal budget less than they received back compared to those who paid in more than they received back in subsidies and subventions. See Leonid Smirnyagin, reported in the *CDSP*, Vol. XLV, no. 25 (1993), p. 8, for the figures and calculations.

Table 3-7: Natural Resource Base by Median Autonomy Score

	No Natural Resources	Oil, Gas, Diamond, Gold Reserves
2.0 Strong Federalists	(n=13)	(n=4)
2.5	(n=7)	(n=1)
3.0 Loose Federalists	(n=26)	(n=17)
3.5	(n=0)	(n=3)
4.0 Ethnic Confederalists	(n=7)	(n=10)
4.5	(n=0)	(n=0)
5.0 Independence	(n=0)	(n=1)

	Value	ASE1	Approx. Sign.
Kendall's tau-b Correlation Coefficient:	.29509	.08852	.0014

Table 3-8: Percentage of Local Budget Obtained from Center, 1992

States Operating at Surplus, with Subsidies not necessary to functioning budget:

Vologda	Samara
Tatarstan	Ivanova
Volgograd	Moscow City
Perm	Moscow Oblast
Sverdlovsk	Riazan
Khanty-Mansii	Tula
Yamal-Nenets	Tver
Irkutsk	Vladimir
Khakhassia	Yaroslavl
Krasnoiarsk	Nizhny Novgorod
Sakha	Lipetsk

Percent of Local Budget Made-Up by Federal Subsidies:

Agin-Buryat AO	80.8%	Amur	17.5%
Ust-Orda Buryat AO	73.5	Tyumen	16.9
Tuva	70.7	Altai Krai	16.8
Dagestan	67.9	Orlov	16.5
Gorno-Altai	67.4	Kemerova	16.0
Kalmykia	62.0	Magadan	13.2
Koriak AO	61.9	Briansk	12.1
Evenkii AO	58.7	Voronezh	10.1
Komi-Permyak AO	52.4	Omsk	9.2
Evreyski AO	45.9	Penza	7.7
Mordovia	44.2	Murmansk	5.2
Mari-El	44.1	Kaluga	4.9
Ingushetia	43.5	Ulianovsk	4.4
Chechnya	43.5	Kirov	4.1
Buryatia	40.1	Tomsk	3.6
Nenets AO	39.5	Komi	3.6
Kabardino-Balkaria	39.1	Tambov	3.3
Kamchatka	37.2	Kursk	2.5
Adyegeya	36.3	Belgorod	2.4
Taimyr AO	33.8	St. Petersburg	2.3
Pskov	30.5	Primorskii Krai	2.2
Karachai-Cherkessia	29.6	Krasnodar	2.0
North Ossetia	29.4	Khabarovsk	1.6
Chuvashia	29.3	Stavropol	1.5
Sakhalin	26.2	Orenburg	1.4
Novgorod	26.2	Saratov	1.4
Astrakhan	24.8	Arkhangelsk	1.3
Kurgan	24.5	Smolensk	1.0
Chita	22.7	Udmurtia	0.9
Chukota	20.5	Novosibirsk	0.6
Kostroma	18.0	Leningrad Oblast	0.4

Table 3-9: Essentialism Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -68.6357
Number of choices: 267
Correctly Predicts: 56%

Autonomy Score	Estimate	Constant	Std. Error	T-statistic
2	--	--	--	--
3	1.875	.3012	.939	1.997
4	2.968	-2.180	.575	3.053

dp/dx*

	2	3	4
Constant	-0.01437	0.2477	-0.2333
Essentialism Index	-.32189	.19079	.133110

d.f.=88

Table 3-10: Instrumental Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 69
Log of Likelihood Function: -56.7361
Correctly Predicts: 61%

Net Gainers	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.5861E-02	-.0903	.0279	.2104
	4	.0488	-2.649	.0329	1.482
Defense Region					
	3	.1120	-.0903	.5730	.1954
	4	.1720	-2.649	.9447	.1821
Natural Resources					
	3	1.240	-.0903	.6566	1.8887*
	4	2.215	-2.649	1.016	2.1794*
Budget Subsidies					
	3	.0267	-.0903	.0251	1.0623
	4	.0748	-2.649	.0303	2.4714*

dp/dx*

	2	3	4
Constant	.07438	.15807	-.23245
Net Gainers	-.00207	-.00194	.00400
Defense Region	-.02239	.01447	.00792
Natural Resources	-.25487	.13924	.11563
Budget Subsidies	-.00609	.00115	.00493

d.f.=65
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Table 3-11: Relative Deprivation Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 78
Log of Likelihood Function: -72.8171
Correctly Predicts: 54%

Change Income	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.4277	-1.335	.4421	.9675
	4	-.5594	.9963	.6971	-.8026
Change Unempl.					
	3	.0299	-1.335	.4163	.0717
	4	-.0373	.9963	.5440	-.0686
Depressed Region					
	3	1.9881	-1.335	1.0985	1.8099*
	4	3.1584	.9963	1.1677	2.7048*

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	.1456	-.4187	.2731
Change Income	-.0359	.1577	-.1219
Change Unemplymt	-.0026	.0108	-.0083
Depressed Region	-.4256	.1689	.2567

d.f.=75
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Table 3-12: Resource Mobilization Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -58.8422
Correctly Predicts: 47%

Past Level	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	-1.823	3.871	.982	-1.856*
	4	-3.769	4.437	1.192	-3.163*
Early Election					
	3	-.273	3.871	.628	-.434
	4	-.478	4.437	1.635	-.293

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	-1.277	1.029	.247
Past Admin. Level	.306	-.187	-.118
Early Elections	.045	-.033	-.013

d.f.=87
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Table 3-13: Combined Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -51.0968
Correctly Predicts: 64%

Essentialism Index	Autonomy Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	1.110	1.191	1.939	.573
	4	.456	7.081	2.013	.226
PastLevel					
	3	-.379	1.191	1.944	-.195
	4	-3.202	7.081	2.062	-1.553
Natural Resources					
	3	1.640	1.191	.657	2.498*
	4	3.648	7.081	1.391	2.622*
Depressed Region					
	3	2.003	1.191	1.135	1.764*
	4	1.912	7.081	1.786	1.071

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	-.182	-.111	.293
Essentialism Index	-.151	.180	-.029
Past Admin. Level	-.061	.080	-.140
Natural Resources	-.232	.128	.104
Depressed Region	-.276	.274	.002

d.f.=87, *= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Table 4-1: Mass vs. Elite Median Autonomy Scores for Each State

	Mass Median Score	Elite Median Score	Difference in Median
Volgograd	1.00	3.00	+2.0
Kaliningrad	1.50	3.00	+1.5
Kirov	1.50	3.00	+1.5
Pskov	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Briansk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Ivanovo	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Penza	2.00	2.50	+0.5
Novgorod	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Smolensk	2.00	2.00	same
Orel	2.00	2.00	same
Sakhalin	2.00	2.00	same
Arkhangelsk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Kaluga	2.00	2.50	+0.5
Moscow Oblast	2.00	2.00	same
Riazan	2.00	2.00	same
T'ula	2.00	2.00	same
Tver	2.00	2.00	same
Belgorod	2.00	2.00	same
Kursk	2.00	2.00	same
Lipetsk	2.00	2.00	same
Vladimir	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Tambov	2.00	2.50	+0.5
Ulianovsk	2.00	2.00	same
Kurgan	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Altai Krai	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Chuvashia	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Novosibirsk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Orenburg	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Omsk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Tomsk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Agin-Buryat AO	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Chita	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Khakhassia	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Ust-Orda Buryat AO	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Amur	2.00	2.00	same
Mordovia	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Perm	2.00	2.50	+0.5
Magadan	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Rostov	2.00	2.00	same
Dagestan	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Mari-El	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Adyegeya	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Tyumen	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Karachai-Cherkessia	2.00	3.00	+1.0

Table 4-1 (con't.)

Buryatia	2.00	4.00	+2.0
Samara	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Saratov	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Krasnoiarsk	2.00	3.00	+1.0
Komi	2.50	4.00	+1.5
Murmansk	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Cheliabinsk	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Kemerovo	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Nenets AO	2.50	4.00	+1.5
Vologda	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Leningrad	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Kostroma	2.50	2.00	-0.5
Yaroslavl	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Voronezh	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Astrakhan	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Khabarovsk Kr	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Chukota	2.50	4.00	+1.5
Koriak AO	2.50	2.00	-0.5
Pirmorskii Kr	2.50	3.00	+0.5
Karelia	3.00	4.00	+1.0
St. Petersburg	3.00	3.00	same
Moscow City	3.00	3.00	same
Kalmykia	3.00	4.00	+1.0
Sakha	3.00	4.00	+1.0
Udmurtia	3.00	4.00	+1.0
Stavropol Krai	3.00	2.00	-1.0
Nizhny Novgorod	3.00	3.00	same
Krasnodar Krai	3.00	2.00	-1.0
Yamal-Nenets AO	3.00	3.50	+0.5
Evenkii AO	3.00	2.50	-0.5
Irkutsk	3.00	3.00	same
Taimyr AO	3.00	3.50	+0.5
Jewish AO	3.00	3.00	same
Khanty-Mansii AO	3.00	3.50	+0.5
Kamchatka	3.00	2.50	-0.5
Altai	3.00	3.00	same
Sverdlovsk	3.00	3.00	same
North Ossetia	3.50	3.00	-0.5
Tuva	3.50	4.00	+0.5
Komi-Permyak AO	3.50	3.00	-0.5
Bashkortostan	4.00	4.00	same
Ingushetia	4.00	4.00	same
Kabardino-Balkaria	4.00	3.00	-1.0
Tatarstan	4.00	4.00	same
Chechnya	5.00	5.00	same

N=89

Table 4-2: Difference Between Elites and Mass Autonomy Scores

Elites Are Demanding 2 Levels More Autonomy Than The Masses	Volgograd Chuvashia Mordovia Khakhassia	Mari-E Adegeia Buryatia
Elites Are Demanding 1.5 Levels More Autonomy Than the Masses	Kaliningrad Kirov Chukota AO	Nenets AO Komi
Elites Are Demanding 1 Level More Autonomy Than the Masses	Pskov Ivanovo Arkhangelsk Kurgan Novosibirsk Omsk Agin-Buryat AO Ust-Orda Buryat AO Dagestan Karachai-Cherkessia Saratov Karelia Sakha	Briansk Novgorod Vladimir Altai Krai Orenburg Tomsk Chita Magadan Tyumen Samara Krasnoiarsk Kalmykia Udmurtia
Elites are Demanding the Same or Within .5 of Level of Autonomy Demanded by the Masses (* indicates elites were less demanding than their masses)	Penza Orel Kaluga Riazan Tver Kursk Tambov Amur Murmansk Kemerovo Leningrad Yaroslavl Astrakhan Koriak AO* St. Petersburg Nizhny Novgorod Irkutsk Jewish AO Kamchatka* Sverdlovsk Tuva Bashkortostan Ingushetia	Smolensk Sakhalin Moscow Oblast T'ula Belgorod Lipetsk Ulianovsk Rostov Cheliabinsk Vologda Kostroma* Voronezh Khabarovsk Kr Primorskii Kr Moscow City Evenkii AO* Taimyr AO Khanty-Masni AO Altai North Ossetia* Komi-Permyak AO* Tatarstan Chechnya
Elites are Demanding 1 Level Less Autonomy than the Masses	Stavropol Krai Krasnodar Krai	Kabardino-Balkaria

Table 4-3: Correlation Between Essentialism Index and Mass Autonomy Scores

	Cultural Distance from Center
Mass Actors' Median Autonomy Score	.409** (n=89)

Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficent
**p=.000

Crosstabs: Essentialism and Median Autonomy Score

Median Autonomy Score
Mass Actors

Potential for the Development of a Separate National Identity	Unitarist	1.5	Strong Federalist	2.5	Loose Federalist	3.5	Ethno-federalist	Indepen-dence
No potential	1	2	35	11	8			
Low potential				4	5			
Medium Potential			7		4	1		
High Potential			2			1	2	
Highest Potential						4	1	

Table 4-4: Correlation Between Instrumentalism Indicators and the Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors

	Percent of the Local Budget Made up By Federal Subsidies
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	.103 (n=85) (p=.227)

	Possession of Valuable Natural Resources
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	.209 (n=89) (p=.034)

	Defense Expenditure Dependent Region
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	-.235 (n=89) (p=.017)

Table 4-5: Correlation Between Relative Deprivation Indicators and the Median Autonomy Score of Mass Actors

	Rate of Income Growth (1993-1994)
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	.209 (n=78) (p=.016)

	Percentage Increase in Unemployment (1993-94)
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	-.138 (n=81) (p=.106)

	Presidentially Declared "Depressed Region"
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	-.017 (n=89) (p=.865)

Table 4-6: Income Growth by Autonomy Position of Mass Actors

Median Autonomy Position	Slow Growth (2-3.25%)	Medium Growth (3.25-4.25%)	High Growth (4.25-8%)
Unitary	1	0	0
1.5	1	1	0
Strong Federalist	12	28	3
2.5	1	10	1
Loose Federalist	3	4	6
3.5	1	1	1
Ethnofederalist	1	3	0
Independence	0	1	0
TOTAL	20	48	11

Table 4-7: Past Administrative Level by Mass Autonomy Scores

	Past Administrative Level
Median Autonomy Score for Mass Actors	.390 (n=89) (p=.000)

Table 4-8: Essentialism Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -67.431

Essentialism Index	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.267	-.486	.212	1.258
	4	1.679	-5.269	.500.	3.360*

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	.191	.002	-.193
Essentialism Index	-.085	.026	.059

d.f.=87
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	38	28	1
3	9	5	2
4	0	3	3

Correctly Predicts: 46/89, 52%

Table 4-9: Instrumental Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 85
Log of Likelihood Function: -68.7657

Defense	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	-.682	-.471	.495	-1.378
	4	-.887	-3.332	1.214	-.731
Natural Resources					
	3	.726	-.471	.476	1.523
	4	1.283	-3.332	1.002	1.280
Budget Subsidies					
	3	-.682	-.471	.011	.467
	4	.032	-3.332	1.002	1.280

dp/dx*

	2	3	4
Constant	.182	-.022	-.160
Defense Region	.161	-.133	-.028
Natural Resources	-.181	.133	.048
Budget Subsidies	-.002	.0003	.002

d.f.=81

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	40	7	0
3	21	12	0
4	3	2	0

Correctly predicts: 52/85, 61%

Table 4-10: Relative Deprivation Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 78
Log of Likelihood Function: -58.4017

Income Growth	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	1.149	-3.45	.534	2.150*
	4	-.380	-3.506	1.082	-.285
Unem-ployment					
	3	-.504	-3.45	.459	-1.098
	4	.687	-3.506	.575	1.195
Depressed Region					
	3	-1.095	-3.45	.702	-1.558
	4	1.881	-3.506	1.115	1.687*

dp/dx*

	2	3	4
Constant	.757	-.612	-.145
Income Growth	-.191	.223	-.032
Unemployment	.061	-.105	.044
Depressed Region	.117	-.234	.117

d.f.=74

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	42	3	1
3	17	10	0
4	5	0	0

Table 4-11: Resource Mobilization Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -69.9976

Past Administrative Level	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.361	.883	.206	1.748*
	4	1.582	1.677	.539	2.937*

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	.217	-.159	-.059
Past Admin. Level	-.107	.038	.069

d.f.=87
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	40	8	0
3	26	9	0
4	1	5	0

Correctly Predicts: 49/89, 55%

Table 4-12: Combined Model Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -59.5666

Natural Resources	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.387	-.527	.491	.788
	4	1.822	-10.029	1.461	1.247
Essentialism Index					
	3	.686	-.527	.305	2.248*
	4	3.95	-10.029	1.534	2.574*
Depressed Region					
	3	-2.166	-.527	.957	-2.263*
	4	-5.664	-10.029	2.591	-2.186*

dp/dx*

	2	3	4
Constant	.207	.085	-.292
Natural Resources	-.094	.047	.047
Essentialism Index	-.174	.069	.105
Depressed Region	.480	-.352	-.128

d.f.=85

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	44	3	1
3	20	12	3
4	0	1	5

Table 4-13: Mass Predicts Elite Behavior Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -83.6902

Median Autonomy Score for Masses	Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	.910	-1.399	.541	1.681*
	4	1.925	1.532	.620	3.104*

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	.399	.167	-.566
Mass Autonomy Scores	-.207	.028	.179

d.f.=87
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test

Actual Scores

Predicted Scores	2	3	4
2	1	23	0
3	2	44	1
4	0	14	4

Correctly Predicts: 49/89, 55%

Table 4-14: Combined Model Empirical Estimates

Number of cases: 89
Log of Likelihood Function: -62.0486

Essentialism Index	Autonomy Score	Estimate	Constant	Standard Error	T-statistic
	3	1.497	-1.324	.994	1.506
	4	2.868	-3.422	1.062	2.701*
Natural Resources					
	3	1.529	-1.324	.664	2.303*
	4	2.424	-3.422	.989	2.450*
Depressed Region					
	3	2.068	-1.324	1.138	1.818*
	4	1.354	-3.422	1.534	.882
Mass Median Position					
	3	.446	-1.324	.691	.646
	4	.031	-3.422	.898	.035

dp/dx

	2	3	4
Constant	.203	-.001	-.203
Essentialism Index	-.220	.081	.138
Natural Resources	-.220	.123	.096
Depressed Region	-.278	.322	-.044
Mass Median Score	-.057	.091	-.033

d.f.=84
*= .10, significant in a one-tailed test
Correctly predicts: 57/89, 64%

Table 5-1: Ranking the Variation in State Elite Positions, 1991-1995

State	Standard Deviation from the Median	Number of Events
Mordovia	1.363	14
Udmurtia	1.195	14
Nenets AO	1.155	3
Orel	1.155	6
Chukota AO	1.155	3
Kalmykia	1.085	17
Ingushetia	1.049	30
Kabardino-Balkaria	1.047	21
Amur	1.000	5
Yamal Nenets AO	.968	4
Evenkii AO	.968	4
Taimyr AO	.957	6
Orenburg	.926	7
Komi	.901	16
Dagestan	.889	19
North Ossetia	.874	30
Karachai-Cherkessia	.853	11
Kaliningrad	.845	14
Krasnoiarsk	.842	24
Chita	.816	12
Komi-Permyak	.816	3
Samara	.816	12
Ust-Orda Buryat AO	.816	3
Agin-Buryat AO	.816	3
Sakha	.812	41
Chechnya	.806	60
Buryatia	.802	14
Adegeya	.791	8
Tyumen	.791	8
Saratov	.784	13
Karelia	.775	25
Jewish AO	.775	5
Khanti-Mansii AO	.764	6
Moscow Oblast	.756	7
Krasnodar	.739	11
Chuvashia	.734	13
Yaroslavl	.707	4
Tatarstan	.665	43
Moscow City	.663	25
Arkhangelsk	.655	7
Tomsk	.655	7
Tula	.655	7
Altai Krai	.655	7
Kursk	.632	5
Rostov	.632	10
Leningrad Oblast	.632	5

Table 5-1 (con't.)

Ulianovsk	.612	8
Volgograd	.612	8
Sakhalin	.612	8
Khakhassia	.603	11
Kemerovo	.598	14
Smolensk		3
Kurgan		3
Altai Republic		6
Primorskii Krai		12
Ivanovo		3
Astrakhan	.577	3
Kostroma		3
Murmansk		3
Novgorod		6
Pskov		3
Novosibirsk	.559	16
Voronezh	.535	7
Briansk	.535	7
Bashkortostan	.511	46
Kirov		2
Vladimir		4
Magadan		4
Kamchatka		2
Stavropol		12
Chelyabinsk		12
Perm	.500	7
Belgorod		4
Kaluga		2
Lipetsk		4
Tambov		4
Penza		4
Nizhny Novgorod	.463	14
Tuva	.447	15
Omsk	.447	5
St. Petersburg	.426	22
Khabarovsk	.408	6
Mari-El	.378	7
Vologda	.378	7
Irkutsk	.354	16
Sverdlovsk	.209	23
Tver		2
Riazan	.000	1
Koriakii AO		1

Table 5-2: Variance in Elite Positions By Administrative Division

Variance	Ethnic States	Non-Ethnic States
High (.875+)	80% (n=12)	20% (n=3)
Medium (.6-.874)	43% (n=15)	57% (n=20)
Low (.20-.599)	11% (n=4)	91% (n=32)

* Three states (Koriak AO, Riazan, Tver) are not included because of no variation, due to each having too few recorded events to evaluate.

Table 5-3: Median State Responses to Shifting Center Strategies

States in order of variation	Overall Median	Summer 1990-4/91	Spring 1991-3/92	March 1992-9/93	October 93-11/93	December 1993-12/94	Post War
CENTER	----	5.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
Mordovia	4.0	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	4.00
Udmurtia	4.0	5.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.00
Kalmykia	4.0	3.50	4.00	4.00	3.00	no events	2.50
Ingushetia	4.0	(not a state)	3.00	4.00	4.00	2.50	4.00
Kab-Balk.	3.0	5.00	2.50	2.00	3.00	2.00	4.00
Komi	4.0	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.00
Dagestan	3.0	no events	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
N.Ossetia	3.0	2.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.50
Karach-Cherkes	3.0	4.00	4.00	3.50	no events	2.00	2.00
Kaliningrad	3.0	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	no events	2.00
Krasnoiarsk	3.0	no events	2.00	3.00	2.50	no events	2.00
Chita	3.0	3.00	2.50	3.00	3.00	no events	2.50
Samara	3.0	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	no events	2.00
Sakha	4.0	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Chechnya	5.0	4.50	4.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Buryatia	4.0	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.50
Saratov	3.0	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	no events	3.00
Karelia	4.0	no events	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50
Krasnodar	2.0	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.50	2.00	2.00
Chuvashia	4.0	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	no events	4.00
Tatarstan	4.0	4.50	5.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
MoscowCity	3.0	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.50	3.00	3.00
Rostov	2.0	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
Khakhassia	4.0	no events	no events	4.00	3.50	no events	3.00
Kemerovo	3.0	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00

Table 5-4: Responses to the Use of Force in Chechnya

Condemned the Action	Criticized the Condemnation
Mari-El	Moscow Oblast
Tatarstan	Chita
Bashkortostan	Kostroma
Komi	Moscow City
Chuvashia	Karachai-Cherkessia
Mordovia	Rostov
Karelia	Stavropol
Ingushetia	
Udmurtia	
Irkutsk	
Sakha	
Tuva	

Table 5-5: Trends in Regional Variation Over Time

	Summer 1990	Spring 1991	March 1992	October 1993	December 1993	Post-War 1995
Median Center	5	4	4	1	2	1
Median Regions	3 (n=43)	3 (n=48)	3 (n=78)	3 (n=57)	3 (n=28)	3 (n=65)
# states >Center	0	2	1	57	17	65
# states = Center	3	15	26	0	11	0
# states < Center	40	31	51	0	0	0
# states ⇑ from previous period	n/a	5	15	5	4	6
# states ⇓ from previous period	n/a	11	9	22	9	3

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