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NILLINGNESS OF OPINION EXPRESSION

-An Alternative Explanation to
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WILLINGNESS OF OPINION EXPRESSION: AN ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATION TO THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE THEORY

By

Sci-Hill Kim

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Advertising
1997

ABSTRACTS

WILLINGNESS OF OPINION EXPRESSION: AN ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATION TO THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE THEORY

By

Sci-Hill Kim

The spiral of silence theory, which emphasizes the efl’ect of opinion climate on
individuals’ willingness of opinion expression, was reexamined by considering
simultaneously other possible factors as well as fear of isolation. The relative contributions
of those factors were also compared across different settings of opinion expression. For
these purposes, several approaches to path analysis were employed to analyze the data
collected by surveying university students.

It was found that the relative importance of ‘opinion congruency’, one of the central
elements of the theory, varied with the types of opinion expression and individual’s levels
of interest in a given issue in determining the willingness of express opinions. Furthermore,
the opinion distribution in a numeric sense was not the only factor constituting the entire
opinion climate. Several other factors such as ‘issue benefit’, ‘eflicacy’, ‘lmowledge’, and

‘political interest’ were also formd to be influential on the willingness of opinion

expression.

 

 

To Jesus and my family

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not be possible without the sincere assistance and advice of many
people whose names can not be all mentioned here. My adviser, Dr. Charles T. Salmon
has always been supportive throughout my studies in East Lansing. Without his help and
encouragement, it must have been impossible for me to start this study. Above all, he
introduced me the study of public opinion which will be the main subject of my ongoing
studies and research. I have owed everything I accomplished to him from the beginning to
the present.

I greatly appreciate Dr. Gordon B. Miracle and Dr. Hairong Li for their invaluable
advice and wisdom on the problems I could not find myself In addition, I have to thank
my classmates in our department for their encouraging my study. Especially, I would like
to appreciate Jeong-Heon Chang and J‘mhee Bae. Without them, it was impossible for me

to complete this thesis.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................. vii

LIST OF FIGUIRES ............................................................................................ viii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER 1

THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION

AND THE MOTIVES OF OPINION EXPRESSION ........................................ 5
Public Opinion Process ....................................................................................... 5
Opinion Expression as a Collective Action ......................................................... 16

CHAPTER 2

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE WILLINGNESS OF

OPINION EXPRESSION (RESEARCH HYPOTHESES) ................................ 24
Issue Benefit (Social and Personal Benefit) ......................................................... 24
Expectation ........................................................................................................ 28
Procedural Cost and Incentive ............................................................................ 33
Efficacy .............................................................................................................. 36
Relative Contribution of Factors on the Willingness of
Opinion Expression ............................................................................................ 38

CHAPTER 3

METHOD ............................................................................................................. 41
Sampling ............................................................................................................ 41
Issues ................................................................................................................. 42
Measurement ..................................................................................................... 44

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS ................................................... 48
Issue Benefit ...................................................................................................... 48
Expectation ........................................................................................................ 49
Opinion Congruency .......................................................................................... 52
Eflicacy .............................................................................................................. 52
Types of Opinion Expression ............................................................................. 53
Issue Characteristics ............................................................................................ 54

DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................... 63

APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS ...................... 72
APPENDIX B
MEASUREMENT INSTRUNIENT (SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE) ............... 74
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 83

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Comparison of Two Issues .......................................................................

Table 2. Comparison of Subjects’ Opinion between Partner Benefit and
Assisted Suicide Issues .............................................................................

Table 3. Comparison of Mean Vahies of the Variables between
Supporting and Opposing Factions ...........................................................

Table 4. Summary of the Results ............................................................................

vii

43

44

56

62

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Spiral of Silence Process .........................................................................
Figure 2. The Effect of Expectation on the Willingness of Opinion

Expression ..............................................................................................
Figure 3. The Hypothetical Relations among Variables ...........................................
Figure 4. Path Analysis on the Issue of Doctor-Assisted Suicide ............................
Figure 5. Path Analysis on the Issue of Same- Sex Partner Benefit ..........................

Figure 6. Path Analysis on the Issue of Doctor-Assisted Suicide for the
Respondents with High Interest (interest>4.58) ........................................

Figure 7. Path Analysis on the Issue of Doctor-Assisted Suicide for the
Respondents with Low Interest (interest<4.58) ........................................

viii

30

32

37

50

51

6O

61

INTRODUCTION

The great importance of public opinion stems from its ability to influence policies as
a type of common people’s censor of government in our democratic system Therefore, it
does not make sense to limit discussing the concept of public opinion to the notion of
mere majority public’s sentiments. As Bhimer (1948) noted, individual sentiments and
opinions should be expressed in certain ways, and also need to be transformed into a
consolidated social force to reach policy maker’s attention.

As many studies (e. g., Mead, 1934) in social psychology have noted, an individual’s
social behavior is explained not only by his/her own attitude or perspective, but also by the
relationship with other people - in a large sense, with a society he/she belongs to. It is
obvious, in an ideal perspective of democracy, that public opinion should consist of the
opinions of every individual in a society (Bryce, 1900; Gallup and Rae, 1940; Gallup,
1966). However, not all individual opinions become expressed, that is, become a part of
the social discourse. Opinion expression, as a social behavior, is not solely determined by
individual opinions. When we express our opinions, various structural and situational
factors in our society encourage, discourage, and even distort our opinion expression.

What does it mean not to express one’s opinion? As Alinsky noted, keeping silence

does not mean a ‘neutral’ or ‘no’ opinion, but instead implies an acquiescence to an

established social order or dominant majority opinion: “... throughout history, silence has

 

2

been regarded as assent - in this case assent to the system.” (1971, p. xix). In fact, silence
of the public is always regarded as a ‘consent’ - sometimes, a coerced one.

Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theory (1973, 1974, 1977, 1985, 1995) has paid
attention to the notion of ‘fear of isolation’, and empirically tested its effect as one of the
factors which determine the level of individual’s willingness to express opinion. Many
previous studies (e.g., Taylor, 1982; Glynn and Mcleod, 1984; Donsbach and Stevenson,
1984; Neuwirth, 1988; Salmon and Neuwirth, 1990; Salmon and Oshagan, 1990; Lasorsa,
1991) have applied the theory to various cases, and tried to identify the efi‘ect of fear of
isolation (or ‘opinion environment’) on the willingness of opinion expression. However, as
Salmon and Glynn (1996, p.162) noted, most of findings showed limited supports for the
theory:

Researchers have found what might be characterized as a ‘modest ’ degree of reluctance,
rather than a consuming fear, about publicly expressing a minority opinion on most
issues. Indeed, it is very often the case that a plurality of those holding (or believing that
they hold) the minority position are still willing to speak out, far more than the few
hardcores that the model would predict.

These results seem to be attributed to the fact that the theory overestimates the
negative sanction of fear of isolation in determining the level of willingness to express
opinions, while ignoring other possible factors such as a certain benefit (or positive
motive) of opinion expression (Taylor, 1982). In this context, several researchers
(Donsbach and Stevenson, 1984; Lasorsa, 1991) suggested whatever possible factors be
included in the consideration of the willingness of opinion expression. They also pointed
the limited conditions in which the theory might be at work and some factors which
seemed to operate against ‘fear of isolation’ in determining the level of willingness to

express one’s opinion.

3

Taking this perspective, the present study investigates the influences of several
possible factors (including fear of isolation) on the willingness of individual’s opinion
expression. The core assumption of this study is that the relative importance of those
factors, in determining the level of willingness, will vary with the different settings of
opinion expression. Here, the different settings of opinion expression are related to the
characteristics of issues (according to ‘issue status’) and the types of opinion expression.

For this purpose, the present study begins with the discussion of the process of
public opinion formation, relating the process to the characteristics of issues and their
relevant public. Then, the motives of individual’s opinion expression will be examined,
paying attention to the nature of opinion expression as a social behavior, especially as a
participation in a collective action. Finally, factors influencing individual’s willingness of
opinion expression will be introduced, and their influences on the willingness will be tested
in different settings of opinion expression.

Noelle-Neumann (1995) defined public opinion as ‘social control’, contrasting the
concept with ‘rationality’ which is based on the rational judgment and decision making of
the public. In her definition of public opinion: “Public opinion is the opinion which can be
voiced in public without fear of sanctions and upon which action in public can be based.”
(1974, p.44), an individual is recognized as a passive and irrational entity who conforms to
the social pressure without resistance. This kind of behavior might seem to be irrational in
societal level However, the present study posits that the irrationality in a societal level can
be explained as an unintended outcome of the pursuit of individual rationality. Therefore,
an individual will be described as a rational entity, at least in an individual level, who

consciously calculates the benefit and cost of his/her behavior when the individual decides

4

to behave. From this perspective, an opinion expression is also assumed as a result of the
conscious and rational calculation of benefit and cost which are related with the opinion
expression. Therefore, the factors discussed in this study are regarded as a benefit or cost

which is conducive or deterrent to the social behavior, ‘opinion expression’.

Chapter 1

THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION
AND THE MOTIVES OF OPINION EXPRESSION

Public Opinion Process

About a century ago, Bryce (1900) recognized the formation of public opinion as a
complex process rather than a mere aggregation of public sentiment responding to a given
issue. According to him, public opinion is formed through several stages, in which a
particular issue is presented to the public, discussed through the expressions of individual
Opinions, and under a certain type of public consent, the individual opinions are
consolidated into a social force, ‘public opinion’, influencing relevant policies.

What we have to note is that this process of public opinion formation determines the
being of an issue, gives the definition and meaning of the issue, and finally directs the way
of resolution regarding the given issue (Blumer, 1971). Not all issues become accepted as
an ‘issue’ - in a realistic sense - in a society unless they are legitimized as what is socially
significant and required to be discussed in public. How an issue is discussed in the public
discourse shapes the meaning and definition of the issue. Finally, the meaning or the
definition of an issue which is recognized as a prevalent one in public determines what
should be done about the issue - the fate of an issue.

Surrormding a given issue, there are relevant groups whose values and interests are

closely associated with what is done about the issue. These groups actively participate in

5

6

the process of public opinion formation through giving their own opinions - how to define
the issue, and accordingly how to deal with the issue - to the realm of public discussion. In
the public discussion, these different opinions, representing conflicting values and interests
of each group, compete with one another to gain a majority public’s attention and support
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) and, above all, the attention of policy makers (Blumer, 1948).

The discussion in the public discourse provides the public with interpretations and
meanings for an issue, evolving and changing over the time in accordance with the phases
of the competition and interaction among the relevant groups. Along with this public
discourse, individuals bring their own life histories, social interactions, and psychological
predisposition to their process of constructing meaning (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
From this meaning, individuals form their attitude and opinion toward the issue, and under
certain conducive conditions, express their opinions in a certain way. These opinion
expressions - approving or disapproving a particular issue - eventually become a part of
public discourse. At a moment an opinion (or an opinion position) is supported by those
opinion expressions which are significant in numbers and consolidated strongly enough to
be recognized as a prevalent one, the opinion becomes a ‘public’ opinion which is
supposed to be adopted as a policy in a democratic social system.

From this point of view, public opinion can be understood as a type of social
resource which is mobilized by some groups to achieve their values and interests regarding
a given issue. Since the fate of an issue, as noted above, is determined by the process of
public opinion formation, the groups whose interests are closely related with the fate of
the issue compete to mediate or modulate the phase of the process in the direction of

maximizing their values and interests.

7

In this constructionist perspective, Crable and Vibbert (1985) classified public issues
in terms of their status in a issue ‘life cycle’. From an emergence to a certain resohrtion, an
issue goes through various levels of status: ‘potential’, ‘imminent’, ‘current’, ‘critical’, and
‘dormant’. Here, the status of an issue does not depend on the objective nature of the
issue, but is characterized by the salience of the issue in the public discourse - that is, the
extent to which an issue may prompt people to perceive personal concern (or interest)
with the issue.

When some individuals or groups begin to have some interest or concern about an
issue, the issue possesses a potential status to be arisen as a social issue. As more and
more people begin to pay attention to the issue and the issue becomes legitimized as a
topic of public conversation, the issue goes through the imminent and current status. The
issue becomes critical as people begin to identify with one of the competing opinion
positions, and the conflict among them intensifies. Finally, when the issue is resolved in a
certain way, the issue becomes a dormant one, which is remote from the public concern.

What we have to note is that not all issues go through those status. When an issue
fails to reach up to the next status, it falls - even without a certain resolution - to the
dormant status which represents the public’s apathy. It should be also noted that this life
cycle of an issue continues perpetually. The dormancy of an issue does not mean the end
of the issue. As Crable and Vibbert (1985) said, the dormancy of an issue, caused with a
resolution or even without any resolution, might be agitated by some incident or new

circumstance at a later timel. When this occurs, the life cycle of an issue recurs to the

 

‘ Think about the issue of ‘death penalty’, for an example. Whenever there is a sentence of death,
the issue re-arises as a significant one with the new setting and circumstance of the issue.

8

potential status and it may cause the change of public opinion on the issue in some cases.

The fact that an issue becomes salient in a society implies the issue is now erqianding
to the greater size of people, who begin to recognize the issue, understand the significant
impact of the issue, form a resolute opinion, and talk about the issue. In terms of how an
issue is expanded to the wide range of public concern, Cobb and Elder (1972) postulated
several definitional dimensions which determine the issue characteristics: the degree of
‘specificity’ (how abstractly or concretely an issue is perceived), the scope of ‘social
significance’ (perceived potential of an issue to impact on the great number of people), the
extent of ‘temporal relevance’ (short term/temporal or persistent/fimdamental relevance),
the degree of ‘complexity’ (highly complex or simply understandable), and the degree of
‘categorical precedence’ (whether the issue is routine matter with precedents or
extraordinary).

As noted earlier, issue characteristics are not an objective or intrinsic matter of an
issue itself; but a matter of how the issue is defined and perceived in the perspective of
those dimensions. When an issue is defined and perceived as being abstract, socially
significant, persistent, easily understandable, and extraordinary, there is a high possibility
that the issue becomes salient, and attracts a great concern of the public. Therefore, the
characteristic of an issue can be tmderstood as a product of competing efforts of relevant
interest groups in the process of public opinion formation.

The following discussion will deal with the process of public opinion in detail,
relating the process with the characteristics of issue (issue status) and relevant publics. As
noted before, those characteristics are expected to have a relation with the relative

importance of the factors in determining the level of willingness to express opinion about a

given issue.

Initiation of Issue. The formation of public opinion begins with a situation in which
some individuals or groups recognize a significant discrepancy between their values or
interests and a given status quo of a society. In the broad perspective, the status quo
includes certain phenomenaz, behaviors of some individuals or groups, and social rules
(such as policies) which are possibly associated with those phenomena and behaviors.

For those who perceive the discrepancy, the status quo is defined as a problematic
condition or a ‘social problem’ which requires a certain action or change, in the direction
of restoring their values and interests. That is to say, the given condition becomes an issue
to the groups who are directly involved in the condition. In most cases, however, there is a
disagreement among groups with conflicting values and interests in dealing with the
condition. Some individuals or groups may want to maintain that condition while others
claim a certain action toward or change of it. The disagreement may also arise among
groups holding difl‘erent opinions of how to change the condition. Some groups demand
somewhat radical change of social system while others insist a certain partial change inside
the social system3

At this early stage of public opinion formation, the issue possesses the

characteristics of ‘potential’ or ‘imminent’ status. Even though some individuals or groups

 

2 Such as ‘pollution’, ‘unemployment’, ‘economic depression’, and so on

3 There can be various opinions in how to deal with a given issue, or in some cases, a consensus on
the issue. However, there is a significant tendency that the opinions are dichotomized into dual opinion
positions (e.g, ‘pros’ and ‘cons’). Several scholars (Tuchman, 1978; Condit, 1994) attributed this
tendency to the mass media’s practice of issue coverage, which dichotomizes or polarizes the public
debate under the norm of ‘objectivity’ and ‘entertainment value’.

10

who are directly relevant (involved) to the issue, and some claim makers or opinion
leaders may have concern about the issue, general publics are remote from the issue. They
are less informed, have an ambiguous tmderstanding of the impact of the issue to
themselves or their society, and accordingly do not perceive any strong personal
connection (or interest) with the issue. They are ‘indifi‘erent’ public who do not have any
preference to a specific opinion position (e.g., ‘approving’ or ‘disapproving’; ‘pros’ or
‘cons’).

When there is a certain compromise or agreement among groups, the issue is
resolved in a certain way, and accordingly does not evolve to a salient social issue. When
the relevant groups cannot reach to an agreement, however, the conflict and competition
among the groups become intensified, and the debates regarding the issue move to the

reahn of public discourse.

Legitimization of Issue. For those who do not want a given condition to be
changed, it is undesirable for the condition to be revealed to or to be discussed by general
public. However, as the conflict becomes intensified, the amount of knowledge about an
issue increases in a society (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1980; Olien, Donohue, and
Tichenor, 1995). Owing to the increased knowledge about an issue, the public begins to
recognize the significant impact of the issue, and increasing number of people perceive
some personal connection to the issue. For the individuals, perceiving personal connection

(or interest) with an issue means they recognize its possible impact on themselves or the

ll

society they belong to.4 Finally, the issue becomes legitimized as a ‘current’ social issue at
that moment.

From this moment, the groups, whose interests are directly related with the issue,
compete actively to inform the public of their definitions and opinions to obtain wide
public support and to make their opinions dominate the public discourse. Along with this
competition, the social elite start to respond to the issue by providing the public discourse
with their own definitions and opinions about the issue. Finally, the general public begins
to talk about the issue, expressing a sentiment of approving or disapproving the given
condition.

The mass media play an important role in this legitimization of an issue through their
‘agenda-setting’ or ‘gate—keeping’ function, which determines the standard or threshold
level of legitimization (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 197 2;
Cobb and Elder, 1972; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). In addition to this fimction of
legitimization, mass media elect and present the definitions and flames of the issue fiom
the relevant groups and social elite, representing conflicting values and interests
(Tuchman, 1978; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). The initial sentiments of the general
public and the responses of oflicials are also reflected on the media coverage of the issue.
In a realistic sense, therefore, mass media dominate the public discourse, and mediate the
process of public opinion formation by indicating what issues we have to see, how we
have to see the issue, and what the opinions of other people are.

Even though the issue became salient in the society, the initial opinions of general

 

‘ However, it should be noted that the perception of a significant impact of an issue is not the only
factor determining the level interest.

12

public are still somewhat difihse and ambiguous at this moment of legitimization (the
initial point of public debate). That means even though most people recognize the
significant impact of the issue and perceive a personal connection with what will be done
about the issue, they have not firmly decided which opinion position to support - ‘an
ambivalent situation’. In general, they have initial opinion or preference to an opinion
position (e.g., ‘pros’ or ‘cons’), but also perceive some attraction from other (or even
opposite) opinion claims5 Therefore, they do not have a resolute opinion of which
position to support. In many cases, as a result, these unfocused, uncertain, and shapeless
opinions are vulnerable to the following information and others’ opinions about the issue,
and accordingly confirmed, weakened, or sometimes changed through ongoing
communication activities with mass media and other people (Bryce, 1900). General
publics are ‘ambivalent’ to a given issue at this stage. They talk about the issue, and

express their opinions, however, in non-articulated and uncertain ways.

Public Debate and Consolidation of Opinion. Public debate on an issue is
advanced as the relevant groups, social elite, government omcials, and the general public
actively ermress their opinions on the issue. Individuals participate in the public discourse
through various types of opinion expression, such as discussion with others, voting, public
hearing, petition, and demonstration. From the public debate, individuals obtain more

information (or knowledge) about the issue, thus gaining a more clear understanding

 

’ Think about a person who supports the ‘anti-nuclear’ energy opinion position. This person may
also perceive some attraction from the advantages of nuclear energy such as ‘low cost’, ‘pollution free’
which are claimed by ‘pro-nuclear’ energy side.

l3

(regardless of whether it is objectively true or not) of the possible impacts of the issue on
their values and interests. They also test the acceptability or popularity of their opinion in
the society by examining the direct and indirect responses of other people toward the
individuals’ own opinion (Bryce, 1900).

Through these comnnmicative interactions, a previously ambiguous and ambivalent
individual opinion is developed into a clear, stable, and resolute one supporting either side
of opinion positions. Crable and Vibbert (1985) termed the status of the issue at this
moment as a ‘critical issue’, in which more and more people identify with some side (one
op'mion position) of the issue. Bryce (1900, p.4) also described this process by stating:

The effect of controversy is to drive the partisans on either side from some of their
argumenm which are shown to be weak; to conform them in others, which they think
strong; and to make them take up a definite position on one side.

This process in which a person develops his/her own resolute opinion position can
be explained by the increased knowledge - that is, more clear understanding of which
opinion position would be the most beneficial to the person’s own values and interests.
Especially, the ‘selective exposure’ to the information which is congruent with the
individual’s opinion can also expedite the process. As an individual finds out more and
more information which supports his/her opinion position, the individual begins to hold a
resolute opinion of which position to support.

The perception of others’ opinions also influences the process. When an individual
finds out that most of others have the same opinion as his/hers own, this popularity of the
opinion position confirms the individual’s opinion. However, in the opposite cases, the
unpopularity of one’s own opinion position weakens or changes the individual’s opinion,

or at least threatens the individual to conceal his/her opinion (N oelle-Neumann, 197 3;

14

1974; 1977; 1985; 1995). Therefore, the degree of resolution in one’s opinion is the
function of information (or knowledge) which supports or discredits the opinion, and the
perception of others’ opinions which confirms or weakens one’s own opinion. This high
level of resolution is expected to encourage or expedite the expression of one’s own
opinion publicly.

Through the public debates, those opinion expressions are consolidated6 into an
opinion of a group whose members have shared values and interest regarding an issue
(McLeod, Pan, and Rucinski, 1995). When this occurs, the consolidated opinion becomes
a social force which can influence relevant policies. In this context, an opinion expression
in public opinion situation can be understood as a political participation.

Political participation takes place in various types which have difl‘erent levels of
impact on the social system (Verba and Nie, 1972). Therefore, difl‘erent types of opinion
expression, such as a discussion with others, public hearing, petition, demonstration,
voting, vary in their visibility and impression on the public and policy makers and
accordingly in their potential or effectiveness to prompt a system level response. In
addition, each opinion expression has difl‘erent level of impact, according to who
expresses that opinion. As Blumer (1948) noted, public opinion is formed and expressed
through the interaction of unequally powerfirl functional groups which vary in their ability
to translate private interests into public policy. Therefore the conflicting opinions,
expressed and supported by the individuals and groups with unequal prestige and

social/political resources, possess different level of efficacy in achieving their intended

 

‘ The consolidation of opinion expression means that the opinions are expressed in simultaneous,
resolute, and articulated ways, rather than sporadic, inconstant, or obscure ways.

15
goal. In sum, the strength of an opinion, as a social force, is determined by its significance
in the numbers of supporters, the level of cohesion (see footnote 6), how the opinion is
expressed - the types of opinion expression, and who expresses the opinion. The more

power an opinion has, the more possibility the opinion can be adopted as a policy.

Resolution of issue. The outcome of competition and conflict, regarding a given
issue, depends on the relative social power possessed by relevant groups. How much
power the relevant groups possem determines the nature and the extent of change. Here,
the power represents any types of social, political, and economic resources which can be
mobilized by the groups, usually with disproportional manners.

The mobilization of resources means the supports from some powerful individuals
and groups, established social institutions, and public opinion which are supposed to have
potential to influence or control the members of a society. Even though public opinion is
merely one of the resources which can be utilized by the relevant groups, interestingly
enough, the usage of other resources is always rationalized as a democratic one, disguised
as the name of public opinion. Therefore, most outcomes of issues and conflicts are
depicted as ‘the will of public’.

When a group widely and efliciently mobilizes social resources, a given issue is
resolved in a way which maximizes the group’s values and interests. In most cases, not all,
social system has a tendency to uphold stable maintenance of established social order

rather than radical social change7. That is because the most powerful group in a society, in

 

7 It should be also noted that the target of change, when it is inevitable, is mostly individual level
rather than societal or system level. Individuals, as far as they are common people, are those who have the

16

general, does not want the change of established social order which is the very foundation
of its dominant social power. In this point of view, it is noticeable that there are a few
cases, in realistic sense, that an issue reaches to the stage of actual policy change, despite
the countless number of issues and problems in a society.

On the other hand, when there is a balance of power among groups with conflicting
opinion positions, an issue becomes prolonged without a certain resolution (McLeod, Pan,
and Rucinski, 1995). Such issues as environment, gun control, atomic energy, and
abortion represent the prolonged issues.

In both cases, the issue becomes remote from public concern. When there is a
certain resolution, the issue falls into a ‘dormant’ status where “the issue lies quietly - not
dead but sleeping - until the issue is given new life by people who see new problems in the
new situation” (Crable and Vibbert, 1985, p.7). In the case of prolonged issue, the issue
also vanishes from the concern and discussion of the public with the rise of new issues

which attract more concern of people at a given time and situation.

Opinion Expression as a Collective Action

Even though there is no single definition of the concept ‘public opinion’ widely
accepted, behavioral aspect of public opinion can be found in many definitions. Allport
(1937, p.61) defined public opinion as an action rather than a sentiment, and emphasized
the necessity of collective opinion expression in a large number:

The term public opinion is given is meaning with reference to a multi-individual situation
in which individuals are expressing themselves, or can be called upon to express

 

least social power (Salmon, 1989; Salmon, 1990; Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan, Themba, 1993).

17

themselves, as favoring or supporting (or else disfavoring or opposing) some definite

condition, person, or proposal of widespread importance, in such a proportion of number,

intensity, and constancy, as to give rise to the probability of aflecting action, directly or
indirectly, toward the object concerned.

Bernard (1926, p.559) emphasized the ‘uniformity’ as a fundamental aspect of
public opinion: “Any fairly uniform collective expression of mental or inner behavior
reactions... Suficient uniformity to insure a unity of definition of the content of public
opinion”. Best (1973) also noted that the concept, ‘public opinion’, possessed collective
properties as a macro-level characteristic to be influential on system changes.

A single laborer’s default of his/her duty is a behavior to be punished. However,
when enough number of other laborers participate in the same way, these collective
behaviors are transformed into a powerful force, a ‘strike’, which can influence company’s
policy. A voice (or opinion expression) of a single individual often does not mean anything
(as far as he/she is a common person). When it is supported by enough number of others’
resonance and participation in a collective way, their voices are transformed into a social
force, ‘public opinion’, which can translate their collective interest into public policy.
Therefore, for an opinion to become a public opinion, the opinion ought to be expressed
and voiced in a collective way, and consolidated into a social force which can influence
relevant policy.

When we express our opinion in a public opinion situation, the opinion expression is
neither a mere expression of our sentiments nor an answer to a question of what is right
and wrong: “Public opinion which was a mere display, or which never came to the

attention of those who have to act on public opinion would be impotent and meaningless

as far as afl‘ecting the action or operation of society is concerned” (Blumer, 1948, p.73).

18

Instead, an Opinion expression should be understood as a social behavior intended to
achieve a specific goal, such as policy change, which may influence the interest of those
who express the opinion. Here, the goal has a property of collective one which are
expected to influence large number of people, and can not be achieved by a single
individual’s separated efl‘orts. Therefore, opinion expression can be regarded as a type of
collective behavior, which is initiated by specific groups (such as movement group, change
agency, or political party), expecting others’ (those who have the same opinion) resonance
and participation in a collective way. Considering this property of collective action in
opinion expression, previous studies on the collective action, especially on its motivations,
seem to provide some implications in understanding the willingness of individuals’ opinion
expression.

Weber (1978, p.24-25) classified social behaviors in terms of their motivations:

Value-Rational Action, that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own
sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its
prospects of success.

Instrumentally Rational Adion, that is, determined by expectations as to the behaviors of

objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as

“conditions ” or “means ” for the attainment of the actor ’s own rationally pursued and

calculated ends.

Based on these two types of social actions, two conflicting factions in collective
action studies have been developed. The studies (e.g., Scott, 1977), based on the ‘value
rational’ perspective, focus on such motivations as ‘grievance’, ‘injustice’, ‘moral
mandate’, or ‘collective identity’, and investigate how social and personal factors give rise
to those motivations, encouraging the participation in collective action.

In many cases, an individual’s participation in collective action can be explained by

19

‘moral mandate’. When we perceive a certain injustice fiom a given issue, we sometimes
behave according to moral mandate regardless of any expected risk or damage. That is
also the reason why many movements always try to frame their issue as a moral one.
‘Collective identity’ (group solidarity) also explains a large part of our behaviors. As a
member of various social groups, we have particular ways of our behavior expected by
other group members, which set the direction of our behavior under a given situation.

However, these value-rational explanations are criticized as they deal with collective
action as if there will always be collective action where injustice exists. They cannot give a
plausible explanation to the question of why so many historical efl‘orts to mobilize
oppressed publics into a collective action have been fiustrated in changing their unjust
social situations.

On the other hand, the studies based on the ‘instrumentally rational’ perspective,
such as ‘Rational Choice’ theories (Olson, 1971), understand a participation in a collective
action as a result of the calculation of desired benefit and expected cost regarding the
participation. Other studies in this perspective, such as ‘Resource Mobilization’ theories
(Zalt and Ash, 1966; Curtis and Zurcher, 1973; Gamson, 1975) emphasize the coalescence
of factors such as ‘resource mobilization’, ‘formalized organization’, and ‘the role of
professionals’, which enables movement to successfully redefine a given situation.

These instrumentally rational explanations are also criticized because of their
tendency to imply the impossibility of collective action as they presuppose narrow
perspective of rationality, which ignores the role of grievance, moral mandate, or
collective identity as a motivation of the participation in a collective action (Cohen 1985;

Ferree, 1992). They fail to explain the behaviors of peasants and laborers who resist, like

20
warriors, against unjust authority despite any possible damage and risk, especially among
groups with established group solidarity.

In many cases, those two types of rationality seem to be mutually complementary
rather than exclusive in explaining collective action. Weber (1978, p.26) also noted this
point: “It would be very unusual to find concrete cases of action, especially of social
action, which were oriented only in one or another of these ways.” Collective action is not
solely explained by either of those rationalities. Instead, it seems to provide more proper
explanation of collective action to consider those rationalities simultaneously. In this
perspective, several scholars such as Gamson (1992), Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina
(1982), Gamson and Modigliani (1987), Benford (1993), Taylor (1986), Pride (1995)
have suggested a constructionist approach of collective action which focuses on how such
factors as ‘grievance’, ‘collective identity’, and the ‘benefit and cost’ are socially defined
and perceived in public discourse.

In the present study, the opinion expression - as a participation in a collective action
- is assumed as a result of a rational calculation of benefit and cost related with the opinion
expression. Here, the benefit means personal utility which is expected to be given to the
individuals when their opinion achieves its goal such as policy change. The benefit also
includes that of societal level such as restoring social justice and morality. However, the
process in which those benefit factors (personal and societal) influence the willingness of
opinion expression is also understood in the relation with the expected cost. The cost
inchrdes not only physical one such as money or time but also psychological one such as

‘fear of isolation’ which is perceived to be required in the process of opinion expression.

21

Calculation of Benefit and Cost. As a self-interested and instrumentally rational
entity, individuals do not always behave for their collective interest. They consciously
calculate the benefit and cost of participating in a collective action. Only when they
recognize the benefit exceeding cost, do they participate in the collective action. This
calculation of benefit and cost determines an individual’s willingness to participate in a
collective action. Therefore, we can also assume that individuals consider this calculation
when they express their opinions in public opinion situations.

The cost of collective action means personal resource which is needed to participate
in collective action. Participating in collective action is sometimes risky, and requires, at a
minimum, personal resources and time which otherwise can be utilized for other more
private and profitable purposes.

As far as individuals have the same interest in a group objective, and believe they
would all be better ofl‘ by achieving the objective, they can expect benefit from
participating in collective action. In general cases, this group interest is something too
huge to be achieved by separated individual efi’orts. Under this situation, it seems to be
rational for individuals to participate in collective action. However, this situation does not
credit individual’s active participation in collective action. That is because of ‘the problem
of free rider’ which stems from the characteristic of ‘public good’ in group interest. It
should be noted that the benefit of collective action has a characteristic of public good,
especially that non-participants cannot be efiiciently excluded from the utility of the
benefit. Olson (1971, p.21) noted this notion:

Though all of the members of the group have a common interest in obtaining this

22

collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that
collective good Each would prefer that others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would
get arty benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not.

If this is the firndamental nature of self-interested and rational behavior, achieving
collective interest seems to be always impossible because everybody wants to be a flee
rider. If everybody wants to be a flee rider, the consequence is the failure in the creation
of public good, that is a group irrationality resulted by the pursuit of individual rationality.

Then, is collective action always impossible among those self-interested and
instrumentally rational individuals? As Elster (1985, p.347) said that “I define (positive)
class consciousness as the ability to overcome the free-rider problem in realizing class
interest”, the problem of flee rider can be overcome if we assume value-rational behavior.
However, in other situation where we cannot expect any moral mandate or strong group
solidarity, how can the flee rider problem be overcome?

Olson (1971, p.2) emphasized the necessity of selective incentive such as ‘coercion’
or ‘positive reward’ as a device to overcome flee rider problem: “. .. unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests.” Even though everybody wants to be a flee rider, it is possible to mobilize flee
riders into a collective action when there is a certain positive reward that is given to
participants exclusively, or some coercion that is imposed to non-participants. The
selective incentive means a utility produced flom the process of participating in a
collective action, regardless of any outcome of the collective action.

This explanation might be seen as an extremely utilitarian one. In public opinion

23

situation, however, selective incentive can explain a motivation of opinion expression. For
instance, if the only reason a person participates in a demonstration is because the feeling
of alienation flom his/her colleagues (or reference group) is greater than the expected risk
of being arrested by police, the person solves the problem of public good through selective
incentive, ‘not being alienated flom colleagues’. Selective incentive not only explains a
motivation of opinion expression, but also implies the possibility that individuals might
express an opinion, which has nothing to do with their own understanding or opinion of a
given issue, because of others’ direct or tacit coercion.

Elster (1985) suggested that flee rider problem can be overcome through
‘conditional solidarity’. When the efforts to produce public good (collective benefit) fail
repeatedly because of the flee rider problem, individuals come to recognize that “We
would better cooperate than be a flee rider”. At this situation, if a condition is fulfilled, the
individuals would participate in collective action. The condition means confidence that
others will also participate in the collective action, and finally succeed in achieving their
collective goal Therefore, when individuals recognize that cooperation is better than being
a flee rider, and have a confidence that others will also cooperate, participation is a more

rational choice than abstain.8

 

‘ See details in Elster (1985, p.318-371).

Chapter 2

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE WILLINGNESS OF
OPINION EXPRESSION (RESEARCH HYPOTHESES)

Issue Benefit (Social and Personal Benefit)

As noted earlier, opinion expression as a social behavior is not simply answering
which opinion (or opinion position) is right or wrong. When individuals express their
opinion, they expect their opinion to be adopted as a policy, which is believed to have
impact on their values and interests. Therefore, when the individuals expect a significant
impact (benefit or damage) on themselves or their society flom the consequence of an
issue, they are supposed to actively express their opinions of approving or disapproving:
“The greater the impact, the more people who will be seeking active engagement in the
decision making” (Gergen, 1968, p.193).

Issue Benefit, in this study, represents the amomrt of benefit or utility which is
perceived to be given to the individuals or their society when their opinion claim is
adopted as a policy and successfully achieves its goal, such as ‘pollution-flee
environment’, ‘employment’, ‘adequate health care’, ‘social justice and morality’.

Noelle-Neumann emphasizes that the determinant of the level of willingness to
express one’s opinion is a negative sanction of ‘fear of isolation’ rather than a benefit
(positive sanction) achieved by opinion erpression: "To the individuals, not isolating

himselfis more important than his own judgment” (1974, p.43). She also noted that “But

24

25

positive sanctions would not sufice to make most members of a community (that is all of
them, leaving aside the outsiders, the marginal groups) strive for conformity. Only
ambitious persons can be motivated by positive sanctions (1985, p.70-71).

This statement implies that she also accepts the possibility that issue benefit
influences individual’s opinion expression. However, her point is that most of people do
not expect the significant amount of benefit to overwhehn negative sanction of isolation,
and, as a result, their opinion expressions are solely determined by the examination of
whether their opinions are congruent with majority opinion. It might be true in many
cases. However, the most serious problem is that she excludes any possible influence of
other factors, such as issue benefit, flom her discussion of individual’s willingness of
opinion expression, ignoring various settings of opinion expression such as issue
characteristics and the types of opinion expression.9

Our question, here, is that “Do most individuals expect really nothing flom pubic
issue?” In many cases of public issues, especially which are solely morality-loaded, the
consequences of them do not have a direct or immediate impact on individual’s personal
interest. Instead they have impact on our family, fiiends, or country, represented by social
benefit, justice, or morality. If these kinds of ‘social benefits’ have nothing to do with
individual’s motivation of opinion expression, why do people enthusiastically talk about

such issues as ‘0]. Simpson case’ or ‘abortion’ which do not have any direct impact on

 

9 In a recent article (1995), Noelle-Neumann stated that “The concept of public opinion as social
control is not concerned with the quality of the argument. The decisive factor is which of the two camps in
a certain controversy is strong enough to threaten the opposing camp with isolation, rejection, and
ostracism. Many writers have intuitively recognized that victory or defeat in the process of public opinion
does not depend on what is right or wrong” (p.43-44).

26

their personal interests? Therefore, we need to include the influence of ‘social benefit’ in
the consideration of the willingness of opinion expression. It should be also noted that
individuals become highly involved in those kinds of social benefit in a particular situation.
When we witness police brutal'ny toward minorities, or hear about the govemment’s plan
to built a disposal facility for nuclear-material in our town, the benefit such as ‘racial
equality’ or ‘the world flee flom nuclear risk’, which has been remote flom our concern,
becomes urgent, significant, and direct one which requires a certain political decision, and
attracts people’s active participation in the process of the decision making.

In the cases of issues which are not highly morality-loaded, such as election,
taxation, public welfare, Medicare, employment, there is a high possibility that many
people perceive ‘personal benefit’ which is directly related with individual’s personal
interest. This personal benefit is also supposed to increase individual’s willingness of
opinion expression especially in those kinds of issues.

Even though the issue benefit (social and personal) is somewhat subjective matter
across individuals, its amount seems to be related with the status of a given issue (or issue
characteristic). When an issue is a ‘potential’ or ‘imminent’ one (the early stage of public
opinion process), the public is not nnrch informed about the issue, and do not have clear
Imderstanding of the issue’s impact on themselves and their society. Therefore, in the
cases of issues which are not socially salient, it is possible that individual’s willingness of
opinion expression is highly influenced by other factors such as ‘other’s opinion’. That is
to say, individuals simply follow the majority opinion because they do not know much

about the issue, and do not have any particular reason or incentive to support an opinion.

27

Even in the stage of ‘current’ issue, the actual amount of perceived issue benefit is
not significant. Even though individuals recognize the possible impact of an issue, and
have higher interest in the issue, their opinions are still somewhat ambivalent at this stage
of public opinion formation. That is, they perceive benefits flom both sides of opinion
position. A person may think like that “I think both sides of opinion position have their
own rationales, so I can’t firmly decide which to support.” In this cases, he/she perceives
relatively little significant issue benefit flom one side of opinion position because achieving
one goal means losing the other which is also beneficial (zero-sum situation). Accordingly,
the actual amormt of issue benefit flom the individual’s opinion position is offset by the
issue benefit of the opposite one.

In the stage of ‘critical’ issue, publics are divided into two groups of partisans who
support either side of opinion positions. As individuals become to have a clear
understanding (knowledge) of the consequence of an issue, they perceive a significant
impact of the issue - that is, a great amount of issue benefit, and hold a resolute opinion
(not ambivalent) of which opinion position would be the most beneficial in terms of their
values and interests. From this perspective, we can assume a positive relation between the
level of knowledge and the amount of issue benefit.

In addition to the level of knowledge, others’ opinions also seem to influence the
amount of issue benefit. When individuals find other people also have the same Opinion,
they come to a resolute belief that their Opinion position would be the most beneficial
toward themselves or their society. Therefore, we can also assume a positive relation

between opinion congruency with others and the amount Of perceived issue benefit.

28

When individuals perceive a great issue benefit, the benefit is supposed to be related
with the increased willingness of opinion expression. Furthermore, when they perceive the
great amount of issue benefit, and hold a resolute opinion of which position to support,
there is a possibility they would express their opinion in spite of an unfavorable opinion
climate (such as majority’s opposition to their opinion). In other words, in the stage of
critical issue status, more and more people become ‘hardcores’ who publicly express their
opinion regardless of other’s opposition. From the above discussion, following hypotheses
were developed:

H1: Greater issue benefit perceived by individuals will be associated with
the increased willingness of Opinion expression.

H2: The amount of issue benefit will be positively related with the level of
knowledge about a given issue.

H3: The amount of issue benefit will be positively related with the Opinion

congruency with others.
Expectation

‘Expectation’, in this study, represents an individual’s perceived possibility (or
confidence) that the opinion position, he/ she supports, would be adopted by policy makers
and successfirlly achieve its goal In the case of election, for example, this expectation
means the ‘confidence Of victory’. The expectation (or confidence) is formed when an
individual recognizes that his/her opinion is shared by the majority of others. That means
individuals become confident when they recognize most of others support their opinions.
However, the perception of majority’s support does not always lead to a strong
confidence. For example, if an individual perceives that policy makers strongly oppose to

his/her Opinion, the individual will lose the confidence despite the perception of majority’s

29
support. 1° On the other hand, if an individual has a previous experience, similar with
current issue, in which minority Opinion successfiilly achieved its goal, the individual
would have relatively high confidence despite the perception of his/her opinion’s minority
position.

Especially, at the early stage of public opinion formation, where there are not many
opinion expressions which are visual in public, those other factors (attitude of policy
makers or previous experience of similar situation) are more likely to determine an
individual’s expectation than the perception of opinion distribution. It is also possible that
an individual’s subjective judgment of opinion distribution (Fields and Schuman, 1976),
such as ‘phrralistic ignorance’ or ‘projection efl‘ect’ determines the level of expectation or
confidence under an uncertain perception of opinion distribution in the early stage.

For whatever reason, when the confidences of opposite factions become unbalanced,
a faction with high confidence speaks up its voice while the other faction with low
confidence keeps silence due to ‘fear of isolation’. This difference in willingness of opinion
expression, in turn, influences individuals’ perception of opinion distribution, and this
perception influences the level of confidence. This explains Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of

silence process. (see Figure l)

 

w This is an important difference between voting and other general public Opinion situations. In
general public opinion situation, there is no strong promise that a group’s consolidated opinion be adopted
by policy makers. In voting process, however, there is constitutional promise that a group’s opinion be
adopted by policy makers as far as the opinion is the majority merely in terms of numbers.

30

 

l

 

 

 

 

 

 

perception of
opinion
om... \ W, -
(confidence) '

 

 

 

/ ‘°""’°"’°“

Figure 1. Spiral of Silence Process

What we have to note here is that it is confidence (expectation), not the perception
of Opinion distribution, which determines willingness of opinion expression. Even though
there is a positive correlation between the perception of opinion distribution (other’s
opinion) and confidence, because the perception of opinion distribution is not the only
determinant of confidence, an individual can express his/her opinion even under the
perception of minority position as far as some other reasons cause strong confidence.
Noelle-Neumann (1974, p.45) also noted this fact:

There is a positive correlation between the present and the fitture assessment

(expectation): If an opinion is considered to be the prevailing one, it is likely to be

considered the fitture one also (and vice versa), but to varying degrees. The weaker the
correlation, the more public opinion is going through a process of change.

The other causes of confidence are, as noted above, policy makers’ attitude,
experience of similar situation, some outbreak event”, the effort of movement, or
whatever. In some cases, these causes can increase minorities’ confidence even under the

majority’s opposition, accordingly make them express their opinions. If this occurs, it is

 

“ Think about the event such as ‘Watergate’ or ‘ the death of Rock Hudson’ for the case of AIDS
issue.

31
the starting point of public opinion change.

For Noelle-Neumann, the ftmction of confidence (expectation) is to determine the
level of fear of isolation: “... when does one isolate oneself? by assessing the distribution
of Opinion for and against his ideas, but above all by evahrating the strength
(commitment), the urgency, and the chance of success of certain proposals and viewpoint”
(1974, p.44). It implies if a person has strong confidence, despite the perception of
antagonistic opinion climate, the person feels not much fear of isolation: “If he is
conceived that the trend of opinion is moving his way, the risk of isolation is of little
significant.” (1974, p.45).

Here, Noelle-Neumann explains the contribution of confidence toward the increased
willingness of opinion expression by decreased fear of isolation. However, the present
study understands the expectation (confidence) as another incentive which can overcome
the fear of isolation imposed to an individual who holds minority opinion position. Then,
how does the confidence work as an incentive which can increase the willingness of
opinion expression?

As discussed earlier in Elster’s explanation, individuals - as an entity with self-
interested nature - do not participate in a collective action without strong confidence of
success since they do not want to pay the cost for a benefit which is uncertain. However,
it is more rational for them to participate than to abstain, especially when there is a high
possibility of success, because the amount of collective benefit is perceived to be much
larger than the cost they have to pay. Therefore, we can assume positive relation between
expectation and the willingness of Opinion expression. In addition, the expectation can be

assumed to be related with the amormt of issue benefit. That is attributed to the notion

32

that no matter how attractive a benefit is, the benefit is meaningless if there is no
possibility of success. Therefore, we can assume that individuals perceive the greater issue
benefit when they perceive the issue benefit as more achievable.

When there is a high level of expectation, this confidence seems to function as an
incentive which can overcome the fear of isolation (a cost) caused by the perception of
minority position in current opinion distribution. Furthermore, this confidence seems to
increase the amount of issue benefit which also can encourage an individual’s willingness
of Opinion expression. Figure 2 summarizes the fimction of expectation on the willingness

of opinion expression.

 

other causes:
-policy makers’ attitude [ issue benefit

previous ewmces l
- ific events
Spec More \\
v \
Expectation

perception of crurent of opinion
opinion distribution > expression
(other’ opinion) A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

willingress

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fear cf isolatiur

Figure 2. The Effects of Expectation on the Willingness of Opinion Expression

From these discussions, several hypotheses about the expectation were developed:

H4: Greater expectation of success of an opinion claim will be associated
with the increased willingness of opinion expression.

H5: The amount of issue benefit will be positively related with the
individual’s perception of expectation.

33

H6: The level of expectation will be positively related with the opinion
congruency with others.

H7: The level of expectation will be positively related with the opinion

congruency with policy makers.
Procedural Cost and Incentive

Issue benefit is related with issue itself; and influences any members in a society only
when an Opinion claim is adopted as a policy. However, following factors, procedural
‘costs’ and ‘incentives’, are related with the process of Opinion expression, and imposed to
only the individuals who actually express their Opinions, regardless of whether the Opinion
claim succeeds or not.

To express our Opinion, we have to go to a voting booth, or sometimes, donate
some money for a group or cause. That is, opinion expression costs our time and resource
which can be utilized for other purposes. In addition to these physical costs,12 sometimes,
opinion expression requires a certain psychological cost. For example, we have to expect a
risk to be arrested to participate in a demonstration. Noelle-Neuman’s basic concept, ‘fear
of isolation’, can be also understood as a psychological cost imposed to the individuals
who express unpopular (minority) Opinion. When we perceive most people oppose to our
opinion, the risk (a psychological cost) to be isolated may deter our opinion expression.

On the other hand, the opinion congruency with others can be understood as an
incentive to express our Opinions. Due to any kind of cost, an individual may not want to

express his/her opinion. However, as noted earlier in Olson’ discussion, if there is a

 

'2 In many cases, this physical costs are too small to be considered However, we can witness that
the entire voting rate, in general, is relatively low on rainy day of election.

34

selective incentive (coercion or reward), the individual can participate in the opinion
expression. For example, think about a person who does not want to participate in a
demonstration due to the risk to be arrested. Ifthe person finds out other people also have
the same opinion as his/hers own, this opinion congruency can fimction as an incentive to
express opinion. That is, he/ she can avoid being alienated flom others (coercion), or show
his/her identity as a member of a group (reward) by expressing the congruent opinion.
From this perspective, we can assume a positive relation between opinion congruency with
others and the willingness of opinion expression.

Here, the problem is what the ‘others’ refer to. DO they represent general and
anonymous public in a broad level or intimate reference group such as family or fiiends?
Because it is possible that there is a difference between the opinions of general public and
reference group”, we need to distinguish the opinion congruency in terms of congruency
with general public and reference group: “... individuals are influenced by a number of
opinion climates rather than a single one, ranging flom the national climate portrayed in
the national media to more localized climate with which individuals have more direct and
personal contact” (Salmon and Neuwirth, 1990, p.568).

We can assume a situation in which an individual has an opinion which is supported
by his/her intimate reference group, but opposed by other majority public. In this case,
Salmon and Kline (1985) emphasized the role of opinion congruency with reference

group, which can overcome the fear of isolation caused by unfavorable opinion climate of

 

’3 Salmon and Oshagan (1990) have shown that individuals were capable of estimating difierences
in multiple opinion climates.

35
general public. 1" However, Noelle-Neumann (1985, p.72) argued:

The pressure to conform that comes fi'om public opinion is exerted in the name of moral or

aesthetic values rather than in the name of a cognitive judgment. What is at issue is not

‘correct ’ or ‘not correct ’ but the good or bad. It is the fact that public opinion is morally

loaded that makes it so powerful in pressing for conformity. Thus it would not be enough

for normal people to find just one or two others of a like minded in order to lose their fear
of isolation and their fear of appearing contemptible to others. ”

Does this kind of incentive (opinion congruency with reference group) have the
potential to overcome the fear of isolation even amid the hostile majority public? Olson
(1971) noted that it is much easier to impose selective incentive (‘coercion’ and ‘reward’)
in a small group than in a large one because individual behavior is easily detected by others
in a small group. Regardless of what benefit an individual expects flom remaining in the
position of reference group, it is obvious that the response flom the reference group is
more flequent and immediate, and the individual’s opinion expression has higher
possibility to be exposed to reference group than amorphous general public.

Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) also pointed it was close and intimate
group, not amorphous general public, that influences voters’ decision making. They noted
that yielding to personal influence gives an immediate and direct reward than yielding to a
radio broadcast or newspaper editorial which brings only anonymous praise or
prmishment.

From this perspective, the influence of opinion congruency on the willingness of

opinion expression was hypothesized in terms of two kinds of opinion climates:

 

1" Salmon and Kline (1985, p. 8) pointed that “support for one’s position -even if the support comes
from only one other person- apparently makes an individual confident enough to express his or her own
opinion despite overwhelming opposition from the majority.”

36

H8: Greater opinion congruency with general public will be associated with
increased willingness of Opinion expression.

H9: Greater opinion congruency with reference group will be associated
with increased willingness of opinion expression.

Efficacy

‘Eflicacy’ of opinion expression refers to a perceived importance or necessity of
one’s opinion expression for achieving desired goals, such as policy change. The efiicacy
is related to a confidence in one’s capability or competence to influence a political
decision.

As Bhrmer (1948) noted, individuals are different in the ability to translate their
Opinion into public policy. That is, they have unequal prestige and social/political power in
terms of their contribution to political decision. When a person perceives his/her opinion
expression as being very important in the process of policy decision, this eflicacy can be
supposed to function as a motivating factor of opinion expression. Therefore, the eflicacy

of Opinion expression was assumed to influence the level of opinion expression:

H10: Greater perception of efficacy of individual’s opinion expression will be
associated with increased willingness of opinion expression.

The ‘efiicacy’ of opinion expression can be understood in terms of a person’s ‘self-
esteem’ which is usually related to such demographic factors as level of education, age,
and occupation. Therefore, the eficacy can be regarded as a highly personal matter.
However, certain situational factors can also influence the level of efficacy. When a person
expects little possibility that his/her opinion can be adopted as a policy, his/her opinion

expression is perceived as being meaningless and impotent. On the other hand, if he/she

37

perceives a possibility of success, the importance of his/her opinion expression increases.
Therefore, the relation between individual’s expectation of success and the level of

eflicacy was hypothesized:

H11: The level of efficacy will be positively related with individual’s

perception of expectation.

Figure 3 summarizes the relations among factors (independent variables) and
influences of those factors on the willingness of opinion expression (dependent variable)

hypothesized in this study.

 

 

 

Knowledge ’ Issue Benefit ,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cgpm: > Willingness
gru cy Expectation " of Opinion
Expression

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Policy
Maker’s
Attitude

 

Emcacy ‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3. The Hypothetical Relations among Variables

38

Relative Contribution of Factors on the Willingness of Opinion Expression

Issue Characteristics. As noted earlier, when an issue is highly salient in a society,
the public perceives the great amount of issue benefit (a significant impact of an issue),
and holds a resolute opinion position. In this case, the influence of Opinion congruency
with others is expected not to be significant. That is, individuals would express their
opinion regardless of other’s opinion because they have a clear reason or incentive (issue
benefits) to express their opinion, and hold a resolute opinion of which position to
support. On the other hand, if individuals do not expect much benefit (or significant
impact) from a given issue, or hold an ambivalent opinion position, they are expected to be
very sensitive to others’ opinions.

Noelle-Neumann (1973) has noted that an issue should be morally loaded and
controversial for her model to work well When an issue is morally loaded, there is a
possibility that individuals do not expect significant and direct impacts on their personal
interest - less personal benefit. The fact that an issue is very controversial also implies that
individuals are likely to have somewhat ambivalent opinion. Therefore, in both cases, we
can expect high influence of opinion congruency.

H12: The effect of opinion congruency on the willingness of opinion

expression will be more significant for the issues which are not salient

in a society than for the salient issues. (relative contribution of opinion

congruency)

The relative contribution of issue benefit on the willingness of opinion expression is

expected to vary according to the level of interest (or concern). For example, consider a

39

smoker who already knows nnrch about the health risk regarding smoking. Even though
he/she knows about the risk, the perception of risk does not influence his/her smoking in a
normal situation. However, imagine the smoker hears about a death of his/her fiiend due
to lung cancer. In this situation, the smoker may perceive an actual personal connection
with the risk of smoking. Thus, there is a high possibility that the risk can actually
influence the smoker’s behavior (e.g., quitting smoking). We can also find the similar
cases in public opinion situations. For example, imagine that an accident of nuclear
generator occurs. In this situation, people may have the great interest in the issue of
nuclear energy, and perceive strong and actual connection with the benefit of ‘a world free
from the risk of nuclear energy’ which was previously remote from their concern.
Therefore the benefit, which previously could not influence people’s behavior, becomes to
have a great impact on their behaviors (e. g., opinion expression). In this point of view, we
can assume the contribution of issue benefit will be more significant when there is a high
level of interest (concern) in a given issue - that is, more salient issue.

H13: The effect of issue benefit on the willingness of opinion

expression will be greater for the salient issues than the issues which

are not salient in a society. (relative contribution of issue benefit)

Types of Opinion Expression. The diflerent types of opinion expression can be
distinguished by their confidentiality. For example, while such opinion expression as TV
interview has a great possibility to be revealed to others, opinion expression in a voting
booth is a highly confidential situation. If an opinion expression can be made in a very
confidential way, there is little reason to worry about fear of isolation. Therefore, we can

assume the efl‘ect of opinion congruency will be more significant in more public type of

40

opinion expression.

H14: The effect of opinion congruency will be greater in a situation of
more public types of opinion expressions than in confidential types.
(relative contribution of opinion congruency)

Chapter 3

NIETHOD

Sampling

On April 21, 1997, one htmdred and seventy one university students were surveyed
regarding their willingness of opinion expression on two public issues, ‘doctor assisted
suicide’ and ‘same- sex partner benefit’. The student subjects were recruited from an
introductory advertising class at the Michigan State University. In the class, the subjects
were informed about the purpose of the survey and the extra credit which would be given
to the participants. It was also ensured that the participation in the survey would be
completely anonymous and voluntary. Then, the survey questionnaires (see appendix B)
were distributed to the subjects, and their responses were collected. Among the responses,
fifleen were excluded as incomplete or unreliable responses, and finally one hundred and
fifty six responses were used for data analysis.

Previous studies (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Salmon and Neuwirth, 1990; Lasorsa,
1991) have found that several demographic factors, especially ‘age’ and ‘education’ (or
‘occupation’), influence the willingness of opinion expression. Therefore, when we
understand the eflects of the factors tested in this study on the willingness, it should be
kept in mind that the student sample does not perfectly represent general population.

However, the results regarding the comparison of relative contributions of those factors

41

42

on the willingness in difl‘erent setting - the main concern of this study - can be generalized

in an ordinal perspective without great limitation.

Issues

Two issues, ‘doctor-assisted suicide’ and ‘same-sex partner benefit’” were selected
to compare the relative contribution of opinion congruency and issue benefit on the
willingness of opinion expression according to the difl'erent levels of issue ‘salience’. As
shown in the Table l, the subjects’ interest was significantly greater for the issue of
‘doctor-assisted suicide’ than for the ‘same-sex partner benefit’. The level of knowledge
and the amormt of issue benefit was also higher for the ‘doctor—assisted suicide’ than for
the ‘same-sex partner benefit’. However, the diflerence of social benefit between two
issues was not statistically significant.

As we can see in the Table 2, when the subjects were asked their opinions regarding
the two issues, more subjects answered the opinion of ‘support’ or ‘oppose’ for the issue
of assisted suicide than for the partner benefit. On the other hand, for the partner benefit
issue, more subjects showed their ambivalent opinion - ‘neutral’ than for the assisted
suicide issue. Therefore, subjects seemed to hold more resohrte opinion for the assisted
suicide than for the partner benefit. From these results, therefore, it was accepted that the

‘assisted suicide’ represented a more salient issue than the ‘partner benefit’.

 

‘5 Since 1992, the MSU Gay and Lesbian Faculty and Stafl‘ Association (GLFSA) has advocated
that the ‘partner benefit’ program, run by MSU for faculty and staff members, should provide the same
health insurance and other benefits to same-sex couples as legally married couples currently can get. This
issue was relatively new and not much informed to the students subjects. This issue was also considered
not to have significant impact on the subjects’ interest because the partner benefit program was applicable
to only staff and faculty members.

Table 1. Comparison of Two Issues

43

 

 

 

 

Assisted Suicide (n=156) Partner Benefit (n=156)

Variable mean (st. dev.) mean (st. dev.) t
interest‘ 4.58 (1.21) 3.25 (1.49) -8.69”
knowledge 5.28 (1.26) 4.01 (1.35) -852“
social benefit 1.54 (1.03) 1.44 (1.13) - .84
personal benefit 0.85 (1.06) 0.60 (1.01) -2.15’
eflicocy 4.36 (1.15) 3.83 (1.32) -382“
expectation 4.35 (1.34) 3.96 (1.38) -250‘
Michigan 4.18 (1.17) 4.16 (1.33) -.14
MSU 4.44(1.18) 4.22(1.l9) -1.62
family 4.87 (1.59) 4.94 (1.75) .34
fiiends 5.03 (1.27) 5.10 (1.52) .40
policy maker 3.73 (1.09) 3.75 (1.42) .12
demonstration 3.91 (1.79) 3.69 (1.86) -1.09
discussion 4.98 (1.58) 4.61 (1.74) -1.98‘
TV interview 4.43 (1.69) 3.96 (1.87) -2.32‘

 

'P< .01;' P< .05

" The level of interest was measured by asking whether the subjects had great concern (interest) about the
given issue on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The measurement of other variables

are explained in the following ‘measurement’ part (see next page).

44

Table 2. Comparison of Subjects’ Opinion between Partner Benefit and
Assisted Suicide Issues.

 

The number ofrespondents who answered on a question,
“regarding this issue, what is your opinion 7”

 

“W” or Wm “neu ..
(n=23 1) (n=7 8)

Partner

Benefit 101 53

(n=154)

Assisted

Suicide 130 25

(n=155)

 

X2=13.69, df=1, P<.OOl

Measurement

VVlllingness of Opinion Expression (Dependent Variable). One of the core
assumptions of this study was that the relative contribution of opinion congruency with
others on opinion expression would be difl‘erent according to the types of opinion
expression. Therefore, the subjects’ willingness of opinion expression was measured in
three difl‘erent types of opinion expression, ‘participation in a demonstration’, ‘acceptance
of TV interview’, and ‘participation in discussion’. Subjects were asked how likely they
would: (a) participate in a demonstration with others who have the same opinion; (b) be
interviewed by TV reporter; and (c) participate in a discussion on the given issue. The
willingness of opinion expression was scored on a scales of 1 (not likely at all) to 7 (very
likely).

Those three types of opinion expression can be distinguished conceptually in terms
of their confidentiality and the probability of hostile feedback Expressing an opinion to a

TV interview can be considered as the most public form of opinion expression (low

45

confidentiality). On the other hands, participating in a demonstration can be regarded as
one which may result in the most hostile feedback from others. Participating in a
discussion can be thought as a type of relatively high confidentiality and low probability of

hostile feedback.

Issue Benefit. Issue benefit was measured in two types, ‘social’ and ‘personal’
benefit. Respondents were asked whether they believe legalization of assisted suicide (for
doctor-assisted suicide issue) and allowing partner benefit to same sex couples (for same—
sex partner benefit issue) would be a benefit or loss (damage) to their society (social
benefit) and themselves (personal benefit). The issue benefit was scored on a 7-point scale
in which each ends anchored ‘a great benefit’ and ‘a serious loss’ (damage), and ‘neutral’
located on center. A ‘0’ was given to the respondents who answered ‘neutral’, while a ‘3’
was given those who answered ‘a great benefit’ or ‘a great loss’ (damage). Therefore,
higher score means the respondents perceive the greater amount of issue benefit fi'om
‘legalizing (allowing)’ or ‘banning (disallowing)’ assisted suicide (partner benefit), while

lower score represents the less amormt of issue benefit.

Opinion Congruency. Opinion congruency was measured in terms of four
different opinion climates: (a) people in the state of Michigan; (b) people in Michigan
State University; (c) family members; and (d) fiiends. The people in Michigan and MSU
represent anonymous general public while family members and fiiends represent reference
group. Respondents were asked whether they agreed most of those others had the same

opinion as themselves. Then, the responses were scored on a 7-point scale in which ‘1’

46

means “strongly disagree”, and ‘7’ means “strongly agree”. Therefore, the higher score,

the more opinion congruency with others.

Expectation. Respondents were asked whether they agreed their opinion position
(supporting or opposing the regalization of assisted suicide and allowing same-sex partner
benefit) would be adopted by the state of Michigan (for assisted suicide) and MSU (for
partner benefit) in the end. Then, the responses were scored on a 7-point scale in which
‘1’ means “strongly disagree”, and ‘7’ means “strongly agree”. Therefore, higher score

represents the higher expectation of success.

Efficacy. The level of eflicacy was also measured by asking respondents whether
they agreed their opinion expression on the given issue was very important if their opinion
position to be adopted by the state of Michigan (for assisted suicide) and MSU (for

partner benefit) on a 7-point scale.

Knowledge. The measurement of knowledge did not intend to examine the
accuracy of respondents’ knowledge. Instead, in this study, the level of knowledge was
considered as a highly subjective matter. The knowledge could be also highly biased one
which had been selectively collected in accordance with respondent’s opinion position.
Therefore, the level of knowledge was measure by simply asking respondents whether

they agreed they had clear understanding (knowledge) of the given issues.

47

Policy Makers Attitude. Policy makers attitude was measured in the same manner
as opinion congruency. Respondents were asked whether they agreed the policy makers of
the state of Michigan (for assisted suicide issue) and MSU policy makers (for partner
benefit issue) had the same opinion as themselves. Then, the responses were scored on a
7-point scale ill which ‘1’ means “strongly disagree”, and ‘7’ means “strongly agree”.
Therefore, the higher score represents more favorable attitude of policy makers toward the

respondents’ opinion.

Personal Characteristics. In addition to above hypothesized variables, several
personal variables (‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘political interest’) were also measured. A ‘1’ was
given to male subjects, while a ‘2’ was given to female subjects. Subjects’ political interest
was measured by asking how interested the subjects were in social afl‘airs, such as public
issues. Then, the answers were scored on a 7-point scale where ‘1’ represents ‘Very little”,

and ‘7’ represents “very much”.

Several factors, hypothesized to influence the willingness of opinion expression,
were expected to be themselves interrelated. Furthermore, the present study intended to
compare the relative contribution of those factors according to issue status and type of
opinion expression. Therefore, to test the hypotheses, several approaches to path analysis

using Multiple Regression were employed.

Chapter 4

RESULTS

Issue Benefit

The first hypothesis, which assumed a positive relation between issue benefit and
opinion expression, was supported in the issue of doctor-assisted suicide. The significant
influence of social benefit on the willingness to participate in a discussion (B=.21, p<.01)
and that of personal benefit on the willingness to participate in a demonstration (3:. l9,
p<.01) were found (see the Figure 4). On the other hand, a counter hypothetical result was
found in the issue of same-sex parmfl benefit. As shown in Figure 5, there was a negative
relation between personal benefit and the willingness to participate in a discussion (B=.-23,
p<.01). This result will be discussed in detail in the later part of this chapter.

The second hypothesis, regarding positive relation between the level of knowledge
and the amount of issue benefit, was supported in the issue of partner benefit. There was a
significant relation between knowledge and social benefit (B=.26, p<.01). However, the
hypothesis was not supported in the issue of doctor-assisted suicide.

It was found that the opinion congruency with others was also positively related
with the amount of issue benefit - hypothesis 3. In the assisted suicide issue, there was a
positive relation between opinion congruency with family members and the social benefit

(B=.24, p<.01). In the partner benefit issue, several positive relations were also found:

48

49

family and personal benefit (B=.15, p<.05); fiiends and social benefit (B=.25, p<.01);

fiiends and personal benefit (B=. l7, p<.05).

Expectation

The positive influence of expectation on the opinion expression, postulated by
hypothesis 4, was not supported in any three types of opinion expression and both issues.
Instead, the efl‘ect of expectation on the opinion expression seemed to work indirectly
through the positive relation with social benefit (B=.18, p<.05 for assisted suicide) -
hypothesis 5. However, this hypothesis was not supported in the issue of partner benefit.
As expected in the sixth hypothesis, opinion congruency with others was positively related
with the level of expectation in the assisted suicide issue. Especially, the opinion
congruency with Michigan residents (general public) showed significant eflect on the level
of expectation (B=.36, p<.01). The seventh hypothesis, which posited the positive relation
between policy makers’ attitude and the level of expectation, was also supported in both
assisted suicide (B=.15, p<.05) and partner benefit issue (B=.27, p<.01). Therefore, the
subjects showed the expectation of success that their opinion position would be accepted
as a policy when they perceived their opinions were shared by policy makers and general

public (rather than reference group).

50

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Opinion Congruency

One of the central elements of Noelle-Neumann’s model - the positive relation
between opinion congruency and the willingness of opinion expression (hypothesis 8 and
9) was supported only in the assisted suicide issue and especially in the case of opinion
congruency with fiiends. Subjects were more likely to engage in demonstration (B=.21,
p<.01) and TV interview (B=.22, p<.01) when they believed their fiiends had the same
opinion as their own. Therefore, subjects seemed to be more sensitive to the opinion of the
reference group (especially fiiends) than the general public’s Opinion in determining their

willingness of opinion expression.

Efficacy

The efl‘ect of eflicacy on opinion expression, postulated by hypothesis 10, was
supported in both issues. The emcacy was positively related with the willingness of
demonstration (B=.37, p<.01 for assisted suicide; B=.33, p<.01 for partner benefit) and
TV interview (B=.20, p<.01 for assisted suicide; B=.27, p<.01 for partner benefit).
Therefore, subjects were more likely to engage in demonstration and TV interview when
they believed their opinion expressions were really important to a policy decision. As
expected in the eleventh hypothesis, the level of eflicacy was positively related with that of

expectation (B=.39, p<.01) in the issue of assisted suicide.

53

Types of Opinion Expression

In both issues, subjects showed the highest willingness for participating in discussion
(m=4.98 for assisted suicide; m=4.61 for partner benefit), medium willingness for
accepting TV interview (m=4.43 for assisted suicide; m=3.96 for partner benefit), and the
lowest willingness for participating in demonstration (m=3.91 for assisted suicide; m= 3.69
for partner benefit). The mean difl‘erences among those three types of opinion expression
were statistically significant except for the demonstration and TV interview for the partner
benefit issue. These results may suggest that diflerent types of opinion expression are
distinguishable in terms of their attractiveness to people. The level of attractiveness can be
explained, as noted earlier, by the confidentiality and the possibility of hostile response
which are relevant to fear of isolation. In addition, several other factors such as ‘risk’ to be
arrested for demonstration, physical cost such as money for donation or time for voting or
demonstration seem to explain the level of attractiveness of a given type of opinion
expression

As we can see in the Figure 4, the opinion congruency with fiiends was related to
the willingness to participate in demonstration and to accept TV interview which are
public types of opinion expression. On the other hand, participating in a discussion,
considered the most confidential one among the three types of opinion expression, was
related with the opinion congruency with fiiends in a positive direction (B=.08), but with
no statistical significance. This result supported the hypothesis 14 which postulated the
diflerence in the relative contribution of opinion congruency according to the types of
opinion expression.

Even though it was not hypothesized, the level of knowledge showed direct efl‘ects

54
on the willingness to participate in discussion (B=.22, p<.01 for assisted suicide; B=.18,
p<.05 for partner benefit) and to accept TV interview (B=.20, p<.05 for assisted suicide).
However, the willingness to participate in a demonstration, which requires not much
knowledge, was not significantly related with the level of knowledge.

In both issues, the efl'ect of eflicacy was limited only to the opinion expression
through demonstration and TV interview. These two types of opinion expression can be
considered as those which are more likely to reach policy makers attention, that is, more
influential on policy decision than opinion expression in a discussion with others. As a
personal characteristic, political interest was also positively related with the willingness to
participate in a discussion for both issue (B=.22, p<.01 for assisted suicide; B=.23, p<.01
for partner benefit). However, the effect was significant for simply participating in a
discussion, but not much related with other types of opinion expression - demonstration

and TV interview.

Issue Characteristics

Several counter hypothetical results were found in comparing two issues. In
comparing the relative contribution of issue benefit between two issues, a negative relation
between personal benefit and the willingness of opinion expression (discussion) was found
in the partner benefit issue. (see Figure 5) This result was opposite direction to what was
expected in the hypothesis 1, and made it impossible to compare the relative contributions

of issue benefit between two issues (hypothesis 13). In addition, even though the assisted

55

suicide was regarded as a more salient issue than the partner benefit, the eflects of opinion
congruency (especially with fiiends) was significant only for the assisted suicide issue.
This result was also opposite direction to the hypothesis 12 which posited less significant
eflect of opinion congruency for the salient issues. To find out a possible explanation for
these results, the responses were reexamined by dividing supporting and opposing factions
of each issue. The respondents who answered “support” to the question asking their
opinions were regarded as ‘supporting faction’, while those who answered “oppose” to

the question were regarded as ‘opposing faction’.

Same-Sex Partner Benefit Issue. As we can see fi'om the Table 3, it was found
that the opposing fiction to partner benefit showed less willingness for three types of
opinion expression than the supporting fiction (statistically insignificant mean difl‘erence in
TV interview).

Even though opposing faction perceived significantly greater amount of issue
benefits (m=2.20 for social benefit; m=1.24 for personal benefit) than supporting fiction
(m=1.62 for social benefit; m=0. 19 for personal benefit), the respondents in the opposing
fiction showed the lower willingness of opinion expression than those in the supporting

fiction.

56

Table 3. Comparison of Mean Values of the Variables between Supporting

 

 

 

 

 

and Opposing Factions
Assisted Suicide Partner Benefit
mean t mean t
variables supporting opposing supporting opposing
faction(n=98) faction(n=32) faction(n=5 2) faction(n=49)
demonstration 4.05 3.88 .48 4.17 3.24 2.39“
discussion 5.02 5.00 .06 5.17 4.22 2.69“
TV interview 4.59 4.25 .92 4.40 3.83 1.51
interest' 4.74 4.69 .23 3.48 3.59 -.37
knowledge 5.53 4.97 2.33" 4.15 4.32 -.64
social bmefit 1.55 2.06 -2.66** 1.62 2.20 -303“
personal benefit 0.95 0.94 .05 0.19 1.24 -5.77**
efficacy 4.36 4.53 -.72 3.88 4.16 -l.02
expectation 4.49 4.22 .94 4.32 3.71 2.02"“
Mchigan 4.06 4.32 -.65 3.62 4.92 -5.21**
MSU 4.61 3.97 2.66" 4.13 4.59 -l.99*
family 4.83 5.44 -l.90 4.15 6.02 -6.24**
friends 5.15 4.81 1.28 4.48 5.90 -5.04**
policy maker 3.63 4.23 -2.61"I 3.33 4.39 -3.66*"'

 

as e
P< .01; P< .05

57

It can be a possible explanation for these results that there was an unfivorable
opinion climate which forced the opposing fiction to keep silent, overwhelming the
fiction’s greater amount of issue benefit. The respondents’ perception of this opinion
climate was reflected on the difference in the level of expectation between supporting and
opposing factions. The expectation of success for supporting (m=4.32) fiction was
significantly higher than the opposing fiction (m=3.7 1). Interestingly enough, however,
the opposing fiction perceived the greater opinion congruency with Michigan, MSU,
fimily, and fiiends than the supporting fiction (see Table 3). Therefore, these results
suggested that the opinion climate which was unfavorable to the opposing fiction did not
come fiom the perception of unbalanced opinion distribution (opinion congruency).

This unfivorable opinion climate against opposing fiction seems to strongly keep
opposing fiction from expressing its opinion publicly, overwhelming the faction’s greater
expectation of issue benefits and the perception of opinion congruency than supporting
fiction (see Table 3). The existence of this opinion climate seems to result in the negative
relation between issue benefit and opinion expression (a counter hypothetical result for
hypothesis 1), and the insignificant eflect of opinion congruency (a counter hypothetical

result for hypothesis 12) for partner benefit issue which was regarded not to be salient.

Doctor-Assisted Suicide Issue. Because of the existence of an opinion climate,
which did not come fi'om the perception of unbalanced opinion distribution, as well as the
negative relationship between issue benefit and opinion expression in the partner benefit
issue, it was impossible to compare the relative contributions of issue benefit and opinion

congruency between the two issues (hypothesis 12 and 13). Therefore, instead of

58

comparing the two issues, the respondents on the assisted suicide issue were divided into
two groups with high and low interest on the issue. 16 The group with higher interest was
assumed to possess the characteristic of public in the cases Of salient issue while the group
with lower interest was assumed tO possess that Of public in the Opposite case. It was
found that the respondents with low interest expected the less amount Of issue benefit, and
showed the lower level Of knowledge than those with high interest. (t=4.38, p<.01 for
social benefit; t=3.65, p<.01 for personal benefit; t=5.01, p<.01 for knowledge). Several
path analyses were conducted to compare the relative contribution Of issue benefit and
opinion congruency on the willingness Of opinion expression according to the diflerent
levels Of the public’s interest (concern) on the assisted suicide issue.

As shown in the Figure 6, the efl‘ect of issue benefit on the willingness Of opinion
expression was significant in the group with high interest. (B=.40, p<.01 for social benefit
and discussion; B=.38, p<.01 for social benefit and TV interview; B=.3l, p<.01 for
personal benefit and demonstration) However, among the respondents with low interest,
greater expectation Of issue benefit was not related with increased willingness tO express
their Opinion (see Figure 7). These results supported indirectly the hypothesis 13 which
assumed the greater eflect Of issue benefit for the cases Of salient issues - among those
with higher level Of interest. Therefore, the eflect Of issue benefit seemed tO work when
the subjects recognized actual personal connection (interest) with the given issue.

Instead Of the efl‘ect Of issue benefit, Opinion congruency with fiiends (B=.31, p<.01

 

‘6 The mean value Of whole respondents’ interest was 4.58 for assisted suicide issue. The
respondents were divided by this mean value.

59

for demonstration; 13:.33, p<.01 for TV interview) was the most powerful determinant of
the willingness Of Opinion expression for respondents with low interest. (see Figure 7) This
result supported indirectly the hypothesis 12 which posited the greater influence Of Opinion
congruency for the issue which is not salient. The following Table 4 summarizes the

hypotheses and the results found in this study.

60

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Table 4. Summary of The Results

 

 

Hypotheses Results
Assisted Suicide Partner Benefit

1. Issue Bait- Social Bait-Discussion (B=.21;p<01) not supported
Opinion Expression Personal Bait-Demonstration

(B=- l9;p<01)
Z Knowledge-Issue Bait not supported Knowledge-Social Bait

(B=..26;p<01)
3. Opinion Congruacy- Family-Social Bait (B=.24;p<.01) Family-Personal Bait (B=.15;p<05)
Issue Bait Friads-Social Bait (B=.25;p<01)
Friads-Personal Bait ([3=. l7;p<. 05)

4. Expectation— not supported not supported
Opinion Expressron
5. Expectation- Expectation-Social Bait not supported
Issue Bait (B=.18;p<05)
6. Opinion Congruacy- Michigan Residats-Expectation not supported
Eiqiectation (B=.36;p<01)
7. Policy Maker’s Attitude- B=.15;p<05 B=.27;p<.01
Expectation
8. Opinion Congruacy with not supported not supported
Gaeral Public-
Opinion Expression
9. Opinion Congruacy with Friads-Demonstration (B=.21;p<01) not supported

 

 

 

Referace Group- Friads-TV Interview ([5=.22;p<01)

Opinion Expression

10. Eficacy- Macy-Demonstration (B=.37;p<01) Eficacy-Demonstration (B=.33;p<01)

Opinion Expression Fificacy-TV Intaview (B=.20;p<.01) Efficacy-TV Interview ([3=.27;p<.01)

l 1. Expectation-Eflicacy B=.39;p<01 not supported

12 Relative Contribution of Greater i‘ect of opinion congruacy (with friads) on the willingiess of opinion

Opinion Congruuacy expression for the subjects with low interest in a giva issue (B=.3 1, p<01 for

According to Issue demonstration; B=.33, p<01 for TV interview) than for those with high interest

Characteristics (B=. 20, p<05) - tested in assisted suicide issue only

13 Relative Contribution of Significant iect of issue bait on the willingiess of opinion expression for the

Issue Bait According to subjects with high interest in a giva issue (B=.40, p<.01 for social bait and

Issue Characteristics discussion; B=.38, p<.01 for social bait and TV interview, B=.3l, p<01 for
personal bait and demonstration); Insignificant effect of issue bait for those
with low interest - tested in assisted suicide issue only

14 Relative Contribution of Simificant effect of opinion congruacy with fiiads on the willingness to

Opinion Congruacy participate in demonstration and to accept TV interview, Insignificant effect of

According to the Types of opinion congruuacy on the willinguess to participate in discussion (assisted suicide

Opinion Expression issueL

 

DISCUSSION

Noelle-Neumann’s theory of win] of silence, which emphasizes the eflect of
opinion climate on individuals’ willingness to express their opinions, was reexamined by
considering simultaneously other possible factors as well as fear of isolation. The relative
contributions of those factors in influencing the willingness of opinion expression were
also compared across difl‘erent settings (issue status and types of opinion expression) of
opinion expression.

The effect of opinion congruency, one of the central elements of the theory, was
foumd to be more influential when the type of opinion expression is a public one in which
an individual’s opinion expression is likely to be easily exposed to other people, or to
cause hostile response from others. When an issue is not salient, we found that individuals
do not perceive the great impact (or ‘issue benefit’) of the issue on their values and
interest, or do not hold a resolute opinion of which opinion position to support. Among
those who lack for any reason to support a particular opinion, or hold ambivalent opinion,
was the effect of opinion congruency more influential That is, without apparent
expectation of benefit regarding a policy decision on an issue, they simply follow majority
opinion to avoid fear of isolation.

It was also found that the fear of isolation, which conceals minority opinion, came

from intimate reference group rather than anonymous general public. The effect of opinion

63

64

congruency with general public on opinion expression, emphasized by Noelle-Neumann,
seemed to work indirectly through influencing the level of expectation and consequently
the level of eflicacy (as examined in hypothesis 6 and 11), rather than influencing directly
the opinion expression. However, what should be kept in mind is that these results should
not exchrde the possibility that various groups of age can be distinguishable in terms of
their sasitivity to the opinion congruency with each group of other people (e. g., family,
fiiends, anonymous general public). That is, the significant efl‘ect of opinion congruency
with fiiends can be limited to the student sample used in this study. There is still a
possibility older people will be more sensitive to the opinion of anonymous general public.

It was found in partner benefit issue that an opinion climate, which was favorable to
an opinion but unfavorable to the other, did not come fi'om the perception of opinion
distribution. This result may suggest that an unbalanced opinion distribution in a simply
numeric sense is not the only factor which constitutes entire opinion climate. In some
cases, therefore, eva though a person believes most of others have the same opinion as
his/hers own, this perception of opinion congruency does not always lead the person to
express his/her opinion comfortably and publicly.

Then, what factors, other than imbalanced opinion distribution, constitute the
opinion climate which is favorable or umfavorable to expressing a specific opinion? In
some societies, the will of dictator or the opinion of social elite can be a possible factor
which constitutes an opinion climate. That is, if a person has an opinion which opposes to
that of dictator or social elite, the fear of political or economic punishments can threaten
the person’s opinion expression. In many cases, however, these punishments seem to be

more plausible in explaining the journalistic process of gate-keeping rather than individual

65

level of opinion expression. Public discourse can be dominated by the opinion of dictator
or social elite when those punishments are at work manifestly or, in most cases, tacitly.

The efl‘ort of movement groups can be a possible factor of opinion climate. The
groups’ active or sometimes aggressive participation in public debates can cause a fear of
confrontation to a person who opposes to the groups’ opinions even though the person
believes his/her opinion is majority one. Therefore, when the fear of confrontation is
perceived to be more unpleasant than the fear of isolation from majority, the minority
opinion of a movement group can dominate the public discourse.

A specific social norm, tradition, or condition in a society can be the factors which
constitute an opinion climate. For example, in a society with high density of population,
expressing the opinion of ‘pro-life’ (for abortion issue) can cause the fear of being
awkward or deviant. A specific event can also work as a factor of opinion climate at a
particular moment. For example, when an accident of nuclear power plant occurs,
expressing the advantages of nuclear energy can cause those fears of being awkward and
deviant at least at that moment. Therefore, those norms and tradition emphasized strongly
in a society, and a specific condition or out-breaking event can preclude the expression of
a particular opinion, regardless of actual opinion distribution among the public.

As Noelle-Neumann noted, the strong influence of opinion climate on individuals
can be explained by ubiquitous and consonant nature of mass media contents. However,
what people monitor flom the mass media contents seems not to be limited to the

judgment of which opinion is majority one. Instead, the individuals are informed what the

66

dictator’s or elite’s opinion is, what punishments are imposed to the people who oppose to
the authority", how unpleasant the confrontation will be if an opinion is expressed
publicly, and how an opinion is congruent with a specific social norm, tradition, or a
certain situation of a society.

An opinion climate, which determines the acceptability of a specific opinion in public
discourse, seems to be constituted as a compound of those factors, rather than to be
simply determined according to an unbalanced opinion distribution. 18 Therefore, it is not
always the case in which an Opinion dominating public discourse is believed to be a
majority one by the public (Moscovici, 1991). Even though an opinion is prominent in
public discourse for whatever reasons discussed above, it is possible that public do not
believe the opinion is majority one among themselves. Instead, their perception of opinion
distribution can be what is formed through interpersonal communication or subjective
judgment of opinion distribution (‘looking glass’ or ‘conservative bias’: Fields and
Schuman, 1976). Therefore, it is possible the individuals who hold - or believe to hold -

majority opinion may not publicly or comfortably express their opinion as we found in

 

‘7 Think about the media coverage of demonstration. When we witness brutal suppression of police
on demonstrators, it tells us how much cost we have to pay to participate in the demonstration even
though it sometimes incites our indignation.

1' Noelle-Neumann already noted that the perception of opinion distribution is not the determinant
factor of willingness of opinion expression. Instead, she continuously emphasized a confidence or an
opinion trend (future assessment of opinion distribution) as a determinant factor. “... when does one
isolate oneself? by assessing the distribution of opinion for and against his ideas, but above all by
evaluating the strength (commitment), the urgency, and the chance of success of certain proposals and
viewpoint” (1974, p.44). Unfortunately, she seems to persist in the effect of fear of isolation: “If he is
conceived that the trend of opinion is moving his way, the risk of isolation is of little significant.” (1974,
p.45). However, it must be more plausible explanation that the opinion climate is constituted not only by
the opinion distribution but also by other factors discussed above, and the influence of opinion climate an
be exerted through the fear of punishment, confrontation, or being awkward or deviant as well as fear of
isolation.

67

partner benefit issue. Future study should pay attention to the possible factors (other than
opinion distribution) which constitute entire opinion climate, and how the opinion climate
is reflected and constructed in mass media contents, informing the acceptability of an
opinion expression in a society, in other words, how much cost we have to pay to express
our opinions.

Among various opinions regarding an issue, which opinion is regarded as a public
opinion does not always depend on a numeric distribution of opinion among the public,
except for the case which conducts voting process. In a realistic sense, an opinion which
dominates public discourse, in other words, successfirlly threatens opponent opinions to be
concealed is always regarded as a public opinion because it is highly visible in public
discourse, and accordingly reaches easily to the attention of policy makers. From this
perspective, an opinion which has been concealed imder a currently unfavorable opinion
climate should be expressed in public discourse to change the current public opinion.
When this occurs, it is a starting point of public opinion change. Then, how can an
opinion, concealed under an unfavorable opinion climate, be expressed publicly? There
shouuld be certain incentives regarding expressing the opinion to overcome the fears (or
costs) imposed to the individuals who want to, but cannot express the opinion under the
unfavorable opinion climate.

First of all, the present study paid attention to a certain benefit (or damage) an
individual may expect fiom the possible consequences of the policy decision on public
issues. It must be true that individuals, in many cases, may not expect significant amount
of direct and immediate impact on their personal interest from what is done about public

issues. Furthermore, in many cases, individuals have somewhat ambivalent opinion, that is,

68

cannot decide which opinion to support. In these cases, the opinion climate rather than
individual’s own understanding of an issue is more likely to determine the individual’s
willingness of opinion expression. However, when an issue is highly salient, the public
perceives increased amount of issue benefit from the issue. The increased amount of issue
benefit was foumd to be associated with the increased willingness of opinion expression.
Especially, it was found that the social benefit, which is not directly relevant to personal
interest but associated with such benefits as restoring social justice or morality in societal
level, was also able to function as a motivating factor of opinion expression. This finding
can be a rationale of movement groups or public relation practitioners for their flaming
public issues in the context of social morality or justice.

There are coumtless number of public issues in our society. However it is only a
handfiul number of issues that are actually salient in public discourse. Many of them usually
fail to attract the great concern of the public. It should be also noted that even without any
policy decision, do previously salient issues vanish fi'om the public concern with the arise
of other new (or renewed) prominent issues. We usually know much about possible
(mostly significant) impact of the issues on ourselves. However, those issues do not attract
the great public concern without certain incidental factors which make the public perceive
strong and actual connection with the issues’ impacts. Those incidental factors can be
‘drama’ and ‘novelty’ of an issue, discussed in the ‘selection principles of public arena"9

by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), which can attract or refi'esh the public’s concern toward

 

1’ Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) suggested ‘drama’, ‘novelty and saturation’, ‘the rhythm of
organizational life’, and ‘cultural and political preoccupation’ as the principles for an issue to be selected
as a social agenda in public arena (public discourse).

69

an issue. Especially, a certain outbreak event”, which gives a novelty and dramatic value
to an issue, seems to be able to make the public perceive strong connection with the
issue’s impact which is thought to be significant but has been remote from the public
concern In a realistic sense, therefore, it seems that the significant impact of an issue for
itself cannot always attract the great concern of public because there are so many issues
which are, at least superficially, very significant. Instead, when those incidental factors
enable an issue to be perceived as the most urgent one in a society, the public becomes
concerned with the impact of the issue.

It was formd that the issue benefit can function as a motivating factor of opinion
expression only when individuals perceive actual personal connection with a given issue.
In other words, no matter how significant an issue’s impact (or issue benefit) is, the impact
does not influence on an individual’s behavior unless the individual is actually interested in
it. Therefore, for the issue benefit to actually fumction as a motivating factor of opinion
expression, it is required to construct an issue as an urgent one, and to give continuously a
novelty and dramatic value to the issue. This may explain why social activists and public
relation practitioners have to create a certain event to attract the public’s attention to their
issues.

In both issues, assisted suicide and partner benefit, it was supported that the level of
emcacy was positively associated with the willingness of opinion expression. Therefore, it
is required to convince people of how important and eficacious their opinion expressions

are in changing a problematic or unjust situation in order to prompt an active opinion

 

2° Such as TMI accident for nuclear energy issue and the death of Rock Hudson for AIDS issue

70

expressions of those who want to conceal their opinion under an unfavorable opinion
climate. Individuals’ confidence of success was found to be positively related with the
level of eflicacy. This result may suggest that people think their opinion expressions are
meaningless (impotent) when they expect little possibility of success. When we remind the
positive relation between opinion congruency with general public and the level of
expectation, the result can be also interpreted in a way that individuals think their opinion
expressions do not have any impact on a policy decision when there are few supporters of
their opinions while they perceive more importance (strong impact) of their opinion
expressions as they find more and more supporters.

The level of knowledge about a given issue was also found to be influential 0n the
willingness of opinion expression. When a person lacks for knowledge, he/ she may fear for
appearing ignorant, or sometimes has to undergo being humiliated as he/she cannot
logically rebut opponent’s retort in a debate. On the other hand, a person with a high level
of knowledge may expect such incentive as feeling of self-esteem or appearing politically
eficacious by demonstrating his/her knowledge about public issues. Therefore, the
knowledge can be also regarded as a procedural cost or incentive which is given only to
the person who expresses an opinion, discouraging or encouraging his/her opinion
expression.

In the present study, individuals were described as rational entities who consciously
calculate the benefit and cost of their behaviors when they decide to behave. As a
structural influence, an unfavorable opinion climate on the individuals can be explained as
a cost (with the name of fear of isolation, punishment, confrontation, being awkward, and

whatever) imposed to those who express an unpopular opinion in a public discourse.

71

Several other factors than opinion climate were also found to be influential on the
willingness Of opinion expression. When those factors function as a benefit (or incentive)
regarding an opinion expression, and the benefit is perceived to exceed the expected cost,
it is possible for the individuals to express their opinion even under the currently
unfavorable opinion climate, that is, to overcome passive conformation to the structural
constraint. When this happens, those Opinion expressions must be a momentum which
makes it possible to change current opinion climate, and consequently to fluctuate public
opinion.

However, as Mueller (1992) said, it should be also noted that the calculation Of
benefit and cost is not an objective matter. Instead, in a large scale, how much benefit we
can get from an opinion expression and how much cost we have to pay to express the
Opinion seem to be socially constructed especially through the contents Of mass media.
Therefore, it is indispensable to investigate the effect of the mass media on opinion
expression in terms Of how mass media create the meaning Of a social behavior, expressing
a particular Opinion, in addition to their functions of issue selecting (or agenda setting) and

issue flaming.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 0F VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS

Var_ra_' bles

Personal Characteristics

A86
Gender

Political Interest

Issue-Related Information

Knowledge
Policy Maker’s Attitude
Opinion Consmmcy
(MI)
(MSU)

(Family)
(F riads)

Motivation of Expression

Expectation

Efl'rcacy

Issue Bait
(Social)
(Personal)

VWIingness of Expression

Demonstration

Range
18-25
1 (male)-2 (female)
1-7

Assisted Partner

Suicide Bait
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7
0-3 0-3
0—3 0-3
1-7 1-7

72

Mean
19.89
1.5
4.78
Assisted Partner
Suicide Bait
5.28 4.01
3.73 3.75
4.18 4.16
4.44 4.22
4.87 4.94
4.03 5.10
4.35 3.96
4.36 3.83
1.54 1.44
0.85 0.60
3.91 3.69

Standard
Deviation
1.49
0.50
1.17
Assisted Patna
Suicide Bait
1.26 1.35
1.09 1.42
1.17 1.33
1.18 1.19
1.59 1.75
1.27 1.52
1.34 1.38
1.15 1.32
1.03 1.13
1.06 1.01
1.79 1.86

Discussion
TV Interview

Personal Concern

(interest) about the Issue

Opinion‘

“SLlppOft”

“wpose’i
“Neutral”

(missing)

* Number of respondents
Total N=156

73

1-7 1-7
1-7 1-7

Assisted Suicide

98
32
25

4.98
4.43

4.58

4,61 1.58 1.74
3.96 1.69 1.87

3.25 1.21 1.49

Partner Benefit

52

49
53
2

APPENDIX B

NIEASURENIENT INSI‘RUIVIENT (SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE)

- Please read carefully following statement.

 

This questionnaire is a part Of a study designed to understand people’s opinions about some public
issues. Your participation in this study is completely anonymous and voluntary. SO, do not put
your name on this questionnaire. Participants will be given extra credit for their participation in
this survey. But you can refuse to answer some questions or discontinue completing questionnaire
without any penalty whenever you feel uncomfortable with answering those questions. This
survey will take approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Your completion of this questionnaire will
indicate your voluntary consent to the participation.

You may not find an answer which fits perfectly with your Opinion. However, please don’t leave
a question blank. Instead, please choose gn_e answer which is the closest to your Opinion. You
may also find several answers which fit equally well with your Opinion, but please choose Lug
O_n_e answer which fits the best.

 

- Please answer the following questions on a scale Of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates “vm little”, 4
inch'cates “neutral”, and 7 indicates “vm much”.

1. In general, how interested are you in social affairs, such as public issues?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
very little neutral very much

2. Imagine you are in a situation in which you need tO express your Opinion about an issue in front
of stra ers, and you believe most of them hold the Opposite Opinion to yours. In this case, how
much would it be a bad experience for you?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
very little neutral very much

74

75

3. Imagine you are in a situation in which you need to express your Opinion about an issue in front
of our famil members, and you believe most of them hold the Opposite Opinion to yours. In this
case, how much would it be a bad experience for you?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
very little neutral very much

4. Imagine you are in a situation in which you need to express your Opinion about an issue in front
Of our friends, and you believe most Of them hold the Opposite Opinion to yours. In this case, how
much would it be a bad experience for you?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
very little neutral very much

Ir Please read carefully following statement.

 

Since 1992, the MSU Gay and Lesbian Faculty and Staff Association (GLPSA) has advocated that
the ‘partner benefit’ program, run by MSU for faculty and staff members, should provide the same
health insurance and other benefits to same-sex couples as legally married couples currently can
get.

In 1996, lawmakers in the state of Michigan agreed to prohibit public universities from using state

funds to provide the benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of the university employees, and
to reduce the appropriations for the state universities which spend money for that purpose.

Regarding this issue, in 1995, the MSU Board of Trustees voted unanimously to delay a decision
on this issue “for not less than 24 months”, that is, until the end of 1997.

The following questions ask your opinion about this issue.

 

n- Please answer the following questions on a scale Of I to 7, where 1 indicates “not liker at all”, 4
indicates “neutral”, and 7 indicates “vm likely”.

5. Imagine a situation in which you are asked to participate in a demonstration held by those who
hold the same Opinion on this issue as yours. How likely is it that you would participate in the
demonstration?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
not likely at all neutral very likely

76

6. Imagine a situation in which you are asked to be interviewed by a TV reporter, and to give your
opinion about this issue. How likely is it that you would accept the interview?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
not likely at all neutral very likely

7. Imagine a situation in which you are asked to participate in a discussion about this issue. How
likely is it that you would participate in the discussion, and express your Opinion?

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
not likely at all neutral very likely

- The following two questions ask your belief about the consequences which are expected if MSU
allows the benefit program to provide same partner benefits to same-sex couples. Please answer as
frankly as possible

8. You believe that allowing the ‘partner benefits’ to same-sex couples would be a

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()

serious loss neutral great benefit
(or damage) to our socim
to our socigty

9. You believe that allowing the ‘partner benefits’ to same-sex couples would be a

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()

serious loss neutral great benefit
(or damage) to to yourself
yourself

- Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements on a scale Of 1 to
7, where 1 means “WW, 4 means “neutral”, and 7 means “W.

 

80

24. You believe that legalizing the ‘assisted suicide’ would be a

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()

serious loss neutral great benefit
(or damage) to to yourself
yourself

- Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements on a scale of 1 to
7, where 1 means “strongly disaggg”, 4 means “neutral”, and 7 means “W”.

25. You have clear understanding (knowledge) of the details of this issue.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
stronglydisagree neutral stmnsly‘sm

26. You have great personal concern (interest) about this issue.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

27. You believe your opinion position (supporting or opposing the legalization Of the assisted
suicide) would be adopted by the State of Michigan in the end.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral “”9817 881'“

28. You believe your Opinion expression on this issue is very important if your Opinion position
(supporting or Opposing the legalization ofthe assisted suicide) is tobe adoptedby the state Of
Michigan.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

 

78

1 6. You think most of your family mm have the same opinion as yours.
1( ) 2( ) 3( ) 4( ) 5( ) 6( ) 7( )
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

17. You think most of your friends have the same opinion as yours.

1( ) 2( ) 3( ) 4( ) 5( ) 6( ) 7( )

strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

18. You think most MSU p_olig makers have the same opinion as yours.

1( ) Z( ) 3( ) 4( ) 5( ) 6( ) 7( )
strongly disagree neutral strongly 381'”

19. Regarding this issue, what is your opinion?
I 3% MSU’s offering the same partner benefits to same-sex couples.

I gm MSU’s offering the same partner benefits to same-sex couples.
I neither support nor oppose MSU’s offering the same partner benefits to same-sex couples.

- Please read carefully following statement.

 

Lately, the issue of “Doctor Assisted Suicide” has attracted great public attention. Those who
support assisted suicide claim that it is a rational way to avoid the excruciating pain and suffering
of patients who are typically seriously ill to the point where there is little, if any, hope that they
could enjoy a meaningful lifestyle again.

On the other hand, those who oppose assisted suicide believe that it is nothing more than murder.
They hold life as sacred and thus consider it immoral to take, no matter what the circumstance is.

Regarding this issue, the Michigan Supreme Court is now reviewing the state law which currently
bans the assisted suicide.

The following questions ask your opinion on this issue.

 

81

29. You think most mle in the State of Micl_11g' an have the same opinion as yours.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

30. You think most pale at MSU have the same opinion as yours.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()

strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

31. You think most of your family mm have the same opinion as yours.
1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()

strongly disagree neutral strongly 381'“

32. You think most of your friends have the same opinion as yours.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

33. You think most pglig makers of the State of Lflcmg' an have the same opinion as yours.

1() 2() 3() 4() 5() 6() 7()
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

34. Regarding this issue, what is your opinion?

I gum—rt the legalization of ‘assisted suicide’.
I m the legalization of ‘assisted suicide’.
I neither support nor oppose the legalization of ‘assisted suicide’.

 

Fail}

82

- The following questions ask some demographic information. Please answer as frankly as

possible.
35. What is your gender? Male Female
36. How old were you on your last birthday? (Please write.)

37. What best describes your race or ethnic group?

 

White African-American Hispanic
__ Asian or Pacific Islander
Other: (Please specify.)

 

 

 

If you wish to comment on any questions, please use this space.

 

It If you have any questions regarding your participation in this survey, please feel free to
contact Sci-Hill Kim at (517) 336-8002.

Thanks for your participation!!!

 

 

LIST OF REFERENCES

 

83

LISTOFREFERENCFS

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Bernard, L. L. (1926), Q Introductifl to Social Pachology, New York: Holt and
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Best, J. J. (1973), Public Opinion: Micrmd Macro, Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

 

Blumer, Herbert (1948), “Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling”, American
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84

Curtis, Ruselland Louis Zurcher (197 3 ), “Stable Resources of Protest Movements: the
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