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Illa-9.1

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE: THE ROLE
OF IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS

By

Neerja Chaturvedi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1997

ABSTRACT

The United States and India's Independence: The Role of Images

and Perceptions

By

Neerja Chaturvedi

This study examines the evolution of ideas and opinions about India in the
United States, and evaluates their impact on America's relationship with India.
It traces the development of American thought on India from the 1920s to the
19508. The crucial period began in 1942 when the British sent the Cripps
Mission to negotiate with the Indian nationalists. At this time American
official and popular interest converged on India as never before.
Consequently, India was comprehensively studied and reported, and the
perceptions formulated became politically meaningful. British
representations of India played a major role in inﬂuencing American views.
However, opinions of American journalists, writers, officials and intellectuals
became critical in establishing a distinctively American reading of India.
Before the outbreak of the Second World War American observers had
generally concurred with the British view of India. However, during the
period of the war various strains of thought emerged ranging from opposition
to British imperialism to the promotion of American interests. Nevertheless,
an overpowering image of India had been established in the United States.
India became synonymous with the Hindu--driven by its

religion, caste system and a Hindu mentality--breeding passive, otherworldly

and hierarchical traditions. Indian nationalism was confined within this
image. India continued to be studied from this perspective even when the
Americans reassessed their own objectives.

This study, while focusing on America and India, is situated in the broader
context of western perceptions of non-western cultures. It illustrates the
difficulties in overcoming deeply embedded habits of perceiving other

cultures.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my graduate advisor Dr. Gordon
Stewart for his invaluable guidance and constant support. My gratitude
extends to my committee members, Dr. Donald Lammers for his thoughtful
observations, Dr. Peter Levine, Dr. Sayuri Shimizu and Dr. Roger Bresnahan
for their critical insights and support. I thank my father, Satish Chand
Chaturvedi, for the love and encouragement he gave me. I thank my mother,
Kusum Chaturvedi, for being my constant inspiration. I extend my special
thanks to Laurie Anderson. I also wish to express my gratitude to Linda
Jackson, Loretta Fiacco, Arnavaz Taraporevala, Shoba Krishnan, Venkatesh

Gopinath, Lillian Damer, Carol Ann Cocozzoli for their friendship.

iv

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Introduction ................................ 1
Early Perceptions, 19203-19303 ............... 33
Perceptions Formulated in the 1940s .......... 73
Ofﬁcial Perspectives on Wartime India ....... 116
Diverse Thoughts on India, 1942-1947 ........ 164
Conclusion ................................ 215
Bibliography .............................. 235

Chapter 1

Introduction

The evolution of perceptions and images of India in the United States
has contributed significantly in establishing India's place in American
political thought. American involvement in the Second World War, and
subsequently in India's nationalist movement, marked a crucial period during
which India was, for the ﬁrst time, comprehensively studied and discussed. It
was during this time that a well defined image of India emerged and gained
prominence. Many of the assumptions about India being formulated during
this period rested on readings of its cultural, religious and social institutions,
and patterns of behavior, within which the nationalist movement and India's
aspiration for independence were understood. These perceptions not only
influenced the American response to Indian nationalism but had a
considerable impact on American understanding of independent India as well.

The major emphasis of this study is on the examination and evaluation
of ideas and images about India that developed in the United States during the
era of the Second World War. This period is signiﬁcant in many respects. First,
it marks the birth and development of an official American interest in India
where none had existed previously. This interest arose as a result of America's
need to evaluate both India's capacity to contribute to the war effort and the
validity of its claim for independence, a condition on which the Indian
nationalists' willingness to aid the Allies depended. Consequently, perceptions
of India became meaningful at the political level in the United States during
this period as they never had before. Additionally, American opinion of India
was inﬂuenced by a reevaluation of British imperialism, accompanied by both

a reassertion of an American identity distinct from that of Britain and an

awareness of America's emerging role in world politics. India, as a colony of
the British, became a likely site for the Americans to express their
distinctness. In light of these developments, American perceptions of India
were shaped and reﬁned. This study further shows that America's relationship
with India has been influenced not only by national interests, economic and
strategic goals, military considerations and global politics, but also by
personalities as well as social and cultural characteristics.

Until the outbreak of the Second World War American ofﬁcial interest
in India had been largely nonexistent. India had remained a remote outpost
far removed from American concerns-- a bastion of British power and
prestige. Americans were aware of India, but from a distance, and they
generally condoned British rule there. There was a widespread acceptance of
the British in India as the providers and keepers of western values and
interests. American missionaries, consuls and travelers generally praised the
British presence in India and reiterated images of India as constructed by the
British. One of the best known images portrayed by an American was M other
India, written by Katherine Mayo in 1927.1 Mayo presented negative images
of the Indian pe0ple—-primarily of the Hindu society, religion and culture and
recommended the continuation of British rule in India.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 produced a
signiﬁcant change in American attitudes towards India. It drew the United
States into the war, while Japan's military successes in Asia made India's active
participation in the war a necessity. But the problem confronting the
Americans was the unwillingness of the Indian nationalists to participate in

the war unless they were granted independence. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's

 

1Harcourt Brace ﬁrst published Mather India in May 1927. By December 1927
the book was in its 11th printing.

administration was forced to reevaluate the British empire's position in the
face of the rising tide of nationalism in India. There was a marked increase in
the number of discussions which took place between Washington and London
regarding India. Likewise, American journalists, writers, military and political
ofﬁcials, made their pilgrimage to India. They wrote about and discussed India
extensively, resulting in a plethora of information being made available to the
American public. Consequently, India gained notoriety in both the popular
arena and the political forums. Even though the war remained their primary
focus, Americans managed to construct an image of India which acquired a
signiﬁcant place in political debates.

Major debates regarding India's political future took place between
American policy makers in the State Department and their British
counterparts. They primarily focused on the evaluation of wartime strategies
and the political situation in India, but topics regarding Indian society and
culture frequently emerged in the discussions in an effort to assess India's
political will to ﬁght in the war. In addition, India was examined by those not
overtly connected with the political process-~mainly, the media and military
professionals, who had the capacity to reach large audiences, as well as the
capability of creating and shaping opinions. American writers, journalists,
and others associated with the war effort made a signiﬁcant contribution in
presenting a . political, cultural and social understanding of India. Together,
the official opinions and popular representations created a dominant image of
India within which India's ability to participate in the war and achieve
independence was appraised.

The outbreak of the war forced the Americans to abandon their
disinterest in India's politics and evaluate the country from a new perspective.

Wartime observers were presented with the opportunity and motivation to

examine India independently. Thus, it was possible for a different perspective
to emerge, since American observers in India were not representatives of the
colonizing nation. They did not profess paternalistic affection towards the
subject nation, which had come to be associated with and popularized by the
colonizers. Furthermore, they were not seeking romance and adventure in
remote parts of the world, as is often visible in colonial literature, nor were
they seeking to escape in an empire to enhance their social and financial
status. Therefore, the American venture into India was seemingly untainted
by colonial interests. Instead, Americans were chieﬂy in India to ﬁght and
report the war, to examine India's independence movement, and to evaluate its
contribution in the war. India had directly influenced the lives of its
colonizers but not those of the Americans. Yet, from this vantage point, it can
also be reasoned that America's lack of sustained contact with India could
impede its ability to evaluate India from a new perspective. Unfamiliar with
India and operating under time constraints, American observers might easily
have relied on already established and easily accessible images of India, which
had been provided by the British and advanced by Americans like Mayo. Under
these circumstances, their perceptions of India could have become more stark
and more sweeping. In any case, the opinions formulated and generated by
American observers and commentators would become an important means of
assessing India's capabilities.

Viewing the situation in India from a distance policy makers in
Washington also had to grapple with this issue of how to seek out information
about India as a prelude to raising their own opinions, without relying on
British intermediaries. Roosevelt tried to signal America's assertiveness by
appointing two special representatives, Louis Johnson and William Phillips. to

explore India's political situation. Johnson and Phillips became involved in

Indian politics and wanted America to dissociate itself from Britain. The
ideological opposition towards imperialism advanced by Americans from a
distance had become immediate reality to the two representatives. They
advanced opinions which deviated from the accepted opinions of India which
had been perpetuated in Washington by the British and the American media.
However, their vision was not shared by most ofﬁcials in Washington who
either adhered to the maintenance of traditional comaraderie with the British,
or conceptually opposed imperialism in India but placed the conduct of the
war in the forefront.

An important factor that contributed significantly to America's
assessment of India was its own self image and self identity.2 Americans'
perception of themselves as Westerners was central to their observations and
evaluation of a non-western culture. American policy makers in Washington
and American observers in India, even though viewing the country from
different perspectives, converged in their perception of an alien society like
India. Furthermore, even while acknowledging and defining their own

uniqueness and separate identity from the British, the Americans remained

 

2 A deﬁned collective American identity may or may not exist within the
boundaries of the United States. But a national and cultural identity emerges as
an important factor in the international arena in establishing and
acknowledging an affinity with the familiar but also in distancing from the
unfamiliar. Anthony P. Cohen, Self Consciousness: An alternative
Anthropology of Identity. (New York: Routledge, 1994) 120. It is this aspect of
the American identity that is the subject of this investigation. The more this
cultural difference is acknowledged, the more magniﬁed a collective identity
becomes in such a comparison. In relation to India, American journalists,
writers, political and military officials and intellectuals, by imposing a
collective identity on an eastern culture, may have also assumed a collective
western or/and an American identity. Kalpana Ram contends that the Indian
identity is positioned in relation to an entire tradition of western thought and
emerges as what the western 'man' is not. "Modernist Anthropologists'
'Comparative' Project : The Construction of Indian Identity as Tradition" in
Alberto Gomes ed. Modernity and Identity: Asian Illustrations. (Bundoora: La
Trobe U. P., 1994) 123.

culturally and racially tied to the British. India's social and cultural alienness
became as politically meaningful to the Americans as it was to the British.

Images and perceptions held and conveyed by the British, and those
developed by the Americans became critical in assessing India's short term
value in terms of the war effort, and its long term political and economic
viability. It is important to note the distinction between American official
records and popular literature on India. Official records may not contain
explicit representations of a particular culture or reveal opinions overtly, but
they certainly can, and do, reflect cultural attitudes. The officials may not
have used the same vocabulary or imagery as employed by the popular media
but shared similar assumptions, although their expression took a different
form. Popular images, on the other hand provide a more explicit and graphic
understanding of American images of India. Collectively, these written images
present an encompassing view of India's political, economic and cultural
makeup within which Americans evaluated India's ability to participate in the
war and establish self rule. A composite image emerged encompassing popular
views of India and those of the policy makers, who were certainly in tune with
the images with which they were surrounded.

The most significant period in which the Americans defined their
interest in India began in March 1942, when the British sent a mission, headed
by Sir Stafford Cripps, to discuss constitutional reform in India. This period is
the focal point of this investigation because, for the ﬁrst time, American
popular and political interests actively converged on India. During this period,
India was extensively discussed by the American and British political elite, and
also by American journalists, writers, and military officials. A variety of
opinions on India were presented, ranging from India's social, religious and

cultural habits to its political will. It was during this period that a

comprehensively defined image of India and a vocabulary with which to

discuss Indian cultural and political characteristics emerged.

Overview

The major players selected for evaluation are the American policy
makers and those who presented popular images which inﬂuenced both policy
makers and public opinion. The latter category consists mainly of journalists,
writers, and political and military ofﬁcials who were either posted in Asia or
were visiting India. Some opinions of American missionaries and intellectuals
have been included primarily to evaluate the pervasiveness and continuities
in the images of India. British official and popular representations of India
are also included herein because of their contribution to American thought on
India.

The method of treatment is both topical and chronological. Popular
representations and official discussions have been examined separately.
Chronology is maintained within each topical division in order to evaluate the
progression of thought on India. It is difﬁcult to treat this subject as a
straightforward historical narrative because ideas about India were expressed
and developed by people of different backgrounds and biases, under different
circumstances and in different formats and also, with a different focus.
Topical divisions also provide more opportunity to include opinions which fall
beyond the purview of the period selected but are essential 'to establishing the
development of opinions on India, especially in regard to popular
representations. Diplomatic and policy records have been examined from the
perspective of the evolution of American official ideas about and attitudes

towards India.

The current chapter lays out the analytical/conceptual context for this
study and reviews the literature on Indo-American relations and images and
perceptions of the East in the West. Chapter Two focuses on popular images of
India constructed in the United States before the outbreak of the Second World
War. These images have been included in order to determine their impact on
the construction of wartime pictures of India. Chapter Three examines images
constructed during the war and after India achieved independence. Chapters
Two and Three concentrate on the memoirs and writings of journalists,
writers, and military and political officials who observed India from within. A
more explicit understanding of India is visible in their writings than the one
available in the public records. India has often not received much
consideration in these writings which itself reﬂects the level of interest India
generated in the United States. The purpose is to evaluate what aspects of India
became central in these evaluations, what images became dominant and how
they were deployed to explain India's political behavior.

Two salient images emerge, one which establishes India as rooted in the
past, unable to free itself from its stagnant traditions. The other establishes an
insurmountable gap between the 'real' India residing in villages, rooted in the
past, and the 'nationalist' India aspiring towards a uniﬁed nationhood. In this
period, Americans' evaluation of themselves and of the British underwent a
noticeable change which also inﬂuenced their evaluation of India's political
future. Their views ranged from acceptance of British rule in India to
criticism of colonialism. However in most discussions, the images of India
remain more or less consistent, even after India achieved independence. The
observers affirmed India's political deﬁciencies through the use of graphic

descriptions of Indian society, culture and religion. In their descriptions,

Indians were generally denied any individuality, and were lost in a
collectivity, which these observers deﬁned as India.

Chapter Four introduces the development of American official ideas
about and interest in India. The focus is primarily on discussions within the
State Department and with British ofﬁcials especially at the time when the
Cripps Mission was sent to India. This period was the most active regarding
American involvement in India. British representations of India played a
critical role in creating an understanding of India among American policy
makers. During this time Louis Johnson was appointed by Roosevelt as his
Personal Representative in India. As noted earlier, Johnson recognized
American interests as distinct from those of the British which inﬂuenced his
reaction towards Indian nationalism. However, Johnson's opinions about India
constantly competed with representations of India provided by British
ofﬁcials and the American media. Some Opinions expressed by commentators
in newspapers and magazines are included herein in order to evaluate the
ideas that had begun to emerge in popular forums regarding India in the
context of the Cripps Mission.

Chapter Five deals with the period after the Cripps Mission failed to
resolve the Indian problem and when Gandhi initiated a civil disobedience
movement demanding that the British quit India. This chapter introduces a
wide range of ideas that emerged in the United States regarding India. During
this period William Phillips was appointed by Roosevelt as his representative
in India. Phillips represents those voices which promoted American interests
as distinct from those of the British and recommended an independent
approach towards India. However, in contrast to Phillips' advocacy of active
American involvement in India, the American ofﬁcial response remained

noncommittal while the media, in general, ﬂayed the India nationalists for

10

failing to endorse the Cripps plan. India's social and cultural peculiarities
became the primary means of demonstrating its political immaturity and
irrationality. This chapter concludes with the official anticipation of an
India's independence and the various opinions that surfaced regarding
American expectations of independent India. Observations on an independent
India are examined in the concluding chapter.

During the period under review some shifts are apparent in the
development of the American opinion of India. Before the outbreak of the
Second World War American observers generally endorsed British rule in
India and reiterated British representations of India. However, in the period of
the war, American observers' view of the British changed. Even though their
ideas about India remained consistent they wanted to be viewed as being
distinct from the British colonizers. Relatedly, some Americans even embraced
Indian nationalism as a way to oppose British imperialism. In contrast,
American official understanding of India was largely inﬂuenced by the
information provided by their British counterparts. However, different strains
of thought had begun to emerge in the official, intellectual, and media
presentation of India. The basic stereotypical image of India remained, yet
ﬂuctuated with a reevaluation of British imperialism and the emerging
American role in world politics. American understanding of independent

India was inﬂuenced by the different perspectives that had begun to emerge.

Review of Literature

I - Political Relations

The study of Indo-American relations is a relatively new ﬁeld and has

acquired significance only in the recent past. Within the body of scholarship

11

on Indo-American relations, the greater concentration of writing has been on
the American relationship with an independent India. The Cold War
imperatives became central to this evaluation. Consequently, the focus has
been on the examination of American role in South Asia in the context of
American global concerns, strategies, and commitments. Political, economic,
and strategic aspects of this interaction have acquired signiﬁcance in order to
examine the tensions and conﬂicts between India and the United States.3
Regarding American interest in India prior to India's independence,
the available literature can be classiﬁed into two broad categories. One
concentrates specifically on the American role in India's independence and
the other examines India's place in the overall Anglo-American relationship
during war. In general, the concentration of the scholars is on the study of
policy records to examine diplomatic and political aspects of this interaction.
One of the earlier studies is A. Guy Hope’s America and the Swaraj.4
Hope provides a favorable assessment of the American role in India’s
independence struggle. He concludes that American official and unofficial
inﬂuence on the British government to grant independence to India was

significant. On the other hand, Gary Hess represents a more widely accepted

 

3 Some of the major works dealing with American interaction with
independent India are M. S. Venkataramani, The American role in Pakistan,
1947-1958 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1982); Kilaru Ram Chandra Rao, India, United
States and Pakistan: A Triangular Relationship (Bombay: Himalay, 1985);
Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: the United States and India's Economic
Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
1990); H.W. Brands, India and the United States: the Cold Peace (Boston:
Twayne, 1990); Srinivas C. Mudumbai, United States Foreign Policy towards
India, 1947-1954 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1980); Robert J. McMahon, "Food as a
Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of 1951," Pacific Historical Review
LVI.3 (August 1987) 349-377. For bibliographical information regarding
scholarship on Indo-American relations see Gary R. Hess "Historiographical
Essay: Global Expansion and Regional Balance." Pacific Historical Review
LVI.2 (May 1987) 259-295.

4 A. Guy Hope, America and Swaraj: The U. S. Role in Indian Independence.
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968).

12

view of the American role in India's independence. In America Encounters
India, he contends that even though Roosevelt adhered to anti-colonial
convictions, he failed to assert himself against the British to transfer power to
the Indians. Hess believes that while policy makers remained divided over
India, public opinion and the press were generally sympathetic to the
nationalist cause, and to Gandhi, at least until 1943.5 Kenton Clymer argues
that the United States had traditionally championed independence and self-
determination and that Roosevelt was part of the anti-colonial tradition which
inﬂuenced his interest in India. Clymer suggests that Roosevelt put pressure
on Britain when he sent Louis Johnson as his Personal Representative to India
in 1942, at the time of the Cripps Mission. But the conduct of the war prevented
Roosevelt from antagonizing Britain, particularly Churchill, by pursuing the
Indian cause.6 On the other hand, two Indian scholars, M. S. Venkataramani
and B. K. Shrivastava, present a general American indifference to colonial
aspirations and a deference among the policy makers towards the British. They
contend that Roosevelt knew and cared little about colonial peoples and did
nothing to support the nationalist position.7

These studies show that American attitudes towards India were closely

related to America's relationship with Britain. However, ideas about India

 

5 Gary R. Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971) and "Historiographical Essay: Global Expansion and
Regional Balance." Paciﬁc Historical Review LVI.2 (May 1987) 259-295.

5 Kenton J. Clymer, Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's
Independence (New York: Columbia U. P., 1995) “Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis
Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look.” Pacific Historical Review
LVII.3 (August 1988): 261-284 and "The Education of William Phillips: Self
Determination and American Policy towards India, 1942-1945." Diplomatic
History 8.1 (Winter 1984): 143-161. Also see Harold Gould in “US-Indian
Relations: The Early Phase.” in Hope and Reality: U. S.-Indian Relations from
Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder: Westview, 1992).

7 M. S. Venkataramani and B. K. Shrivastava, Quit India: The American
Response to the 1942 Struggle (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979) and Roosevelt Gandhi
Churchill: America and the Last Phase of India 's Freedom Struggle. (New
Delhi: Radiant, 1983).

13

conveyed by the British, and those constructed by the American observers
themselves have not received much attention in terms of their impact on
American understanding of India. Venkataramani and Shrivastava provide
some discussion of British propaganda in the United States, and of the
American press coverage of India and its nationalists. Unlike Hess, they do not
discover any signiﬁcant sympathy for India in the American media. Still, the
major thrust of their discussion is on the political aspect of this interaction.
Images of India remain subordinate to them and, at best, are presented as
reﬂections of and commentaries on policy decisions. The language and images
used to describe India and the political significance of the perceptions
formulated about India's culture and society are not the primary focus of their
study.

Regarding Anglo-American relations and India's place in them, David
Reynolds, in his analysis of Anglo-American relations during the war,
contends that American pressure on the British in 1942 to grant independence
to India was a major challenge put forth by the United States to the British
empire.8 Christopher Theme believes that there was a basic dislike of British
imperialism in the United States and that it challenged Britain in 1942 not just
for military reasons but to preserve American prestige and inﬂuence in Asia.
Thorne also presents the prevalence of racist views in Britain and the United
States regarding the Asians, but regarding India he believes that the United
States kept its distance from British politics.9 Akira llriye, on the other hand,

believes that the importance of Asia increased for the Americans essentially to

 

8 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American
Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards a new Synthesis.” the ‘Special Relationship':
Anglo-American Relations since 1945, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

9 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War
against Japan, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford U. P. , 1978).

14

prevent German-Japanese access to the British empire and that the policies
they formulated in Asia were not unilateral but in alliance with the British.10

The focus of these studies is primarily on the political, strategic, and
military discussions within which the scholars generally conclude that
American interest in India’s independence was put on hold in order to
preserve the wartime alliance with Britain. They have become valuable works
since introducing India into the study of American foreign relations and have
substantially enhanced the study of India's independence movement. Two
important ideas emerge in these discussions which are particularly useful for
this investigation. First, they confirm American suspicion of British
imperialism and a growing desire to challenge Britain's political and economic
position. Second, the conduct of the war seemed to take precedence over the
other concerns. Related to this issue emerges the relative marginality of the
Indians themselves. The conclusion that can be derived from these
assessments is that the Americans challenged the British position in India but
withdrew their challenge in consideration of the war. However, America's
opinion of India in terms of broad cultural readings does not emerge as a
factor in these studies.

The question that needs to be addressed is how the Americans perceived
the colonized and what impact it had on their interest in India. Even though
America's concern was directed to the war, perceptions of India had begun to
inﬁltrate into the discussions. American interest in India in 1942 has
generally been considered a questioning of the British imperial position in
India. But when ofﬁcial and popular impressions as well as descriptions of
India and the Indian nationalists are examined, the American challenge to

British imperialism does not translate into the acceptance of the aspiration of

 

10 Akita Iriye, The Cold War in Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974).

15

the colonized. Nor does it mean, on the other hand, an unconditional
acceptance of the British interpretation of India, but emerges as something
new and more complex. In this period the foundation for a distinctively
American reading of India was laid down. The war had created American
interest in India; India's capabilities would be measured by the evolving
American images of its society and people.

Also, within the body of literature on Indo-American relations,
American interaction with colonial and independent India have generally
been studied independently of each other. However, despite the different
political imperatives created by the Second World War and the Cold War, within
which Indo—American relations have been presented, a unifying element can
be discerned in the images which guided American perceptions of India in
both periods. Kilaru Ram Chandra Rao in his examination of tensions between
the United States and independent India claims that the United States did not
understand the Indian way of life or its political ideology. However, he also
suggests that American interest and involvement in India's nationalist
struggle had created goodwill for America in India.1H Rao's analysis is
problematic in that he does not take into account Americas's vision of pre-
independence India and its long term implications. In contrast, this
investigation addresses the paradox present in Rao's analysis. This study
contends that America's response to India even before 1947 was problematic
and was based on and reinforced by stereotypes. An examination of American
images of India during the period of the Second World War has a twofold

signiﬁcance; it provides another dimension into examining America's role in

 

11 Kilaru Ram Chandra Rao, India, United States and Pakistan: A Triangular
Relationship (Bombay: Himalay, 1985) 2, 239.

l6

India's independence and also affords an opportunity to establish the long

term impact of images on America's understanding of independent India.

II- The Image of India in the United States

Only a handful of scholarly works have examined the image of India in
the United States, generally concentrating on America's interaction with
independent India or presenting images from a cultural perspective without
relating them to their political role.12 Harold Isaacs study, Scratches on our
Minds, is one of the work most often cited in this area of study. This study is
based on interviews conducted in 1957 with what Isaacs terms the ‘official
types’ of India in which an exotic, mystic, poverty stricken India dominates
the American understanding of India.13 Isaacs study introduces a more
favorable image of China in contrast to India. A lack of sustained interaction
between the United States and India, and American's reliance on the images
portrayed by the British, can be construed as possible reasons for the
differing perceptions of the two Asian peoples. Charles Heimsath arrives at a
similar conclusion--negative images of India have continued to inﬂuence

American policy.14 A distinct image of India emerges in these studies, which is

 

12 In the 1950s, when relations between India and the United States were most
contentious, there seems to have been a spurt of studies on the American
image of India. Two dissertations, Earl Robert Schmidt's American Relations
with South Asia, 1900-1940 Ph.D. thesis (University of Pennslvyania, 1955)
and Bernard Saul Stern's American View of India and Indians, 1857—1900 Ph.D.
thesis (University of Pennsylvania, 1956) have delineated some American
images of India. Their studies are particularly useful regarding the views of
the American missionaries in India. In his dissertation Some Aspects of the
Development of American Opinion on India, 1918-1947, Walter Charles Mackett
has surveyed American press Opinions with a focus primarily on their reports
on the political developments in India. Ph.D. thesis (Los Angeles: University of
Southern California, 1957). These studies do not examine the language or the
images used to describe India or explore their political implications.

13 Harold A. Isaacs, Scratches on our Minds: American Images of China and
India (New York: John Day, 1958).

14 Charles H. Heimsath, “The American Images of India as Factors in

17

further developed and to which other perspectives are added, in Nathan
Glazer's edited volume, Conﬂicting Images. It provides valuable insights into a
wide range of images of India, such as American views of Gandhi, India in
American fiction and anthropology, and perceptions of Indian women.15 A
noticeable element in these studies is the American emphasis on the essential
difference between the two societies and an obvious lack of competitive
accounts available to counter the burgeoning negative image of India. This
concentration on negative images of India and a comparative framework to
examine India can possibly be extracted in the present study as well.

There is a general acknowledgment among scholars that American
perceptions of India were largely inﬂuenced by British interpretations.
Andrew J. Rotter introduces a gendered analysis to evaluate American policy
makers' view of the East in contrast to the West. He contends that the British
representation of India greatly inﬂuenced American views of India and
created assumptions founded on perceptions of gender. The British conferred
feminine traits on India within which Indian politics and leaders were
perceived as passive and emotional; traits which made Indian society
antithetical to the West in absolute terms.16 Regarding America's contribution
to the perception of India, most studies consider the images provided by
Katherine Mayo in Mother India as most critical. Mayo may have contributed
signiﬁcantly in establishing the image with which to examine India, but it
was the proliﬁc writings on India by lesser known authors during the period

of the Second World War which are crucial in a more deﬁnitive and

 

U. S. Foreign Policy Making.” Asian Thought and Society 2.3 (December 1977).
271-289.

15 Sulochana Raghavan Glazer and Nathan Glazer, Conﬂicting Images: India
and the United States (Glenn Dale: Riverdale, 1990).

16 Andrew J. Rotter, "Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States
and South Asia, 1947-1964" The Journal of American History 81:2 (September
1994). 518-542.

18

comprehensive establishment of India's place in American thought.
Furthermore, with the outbreak of the war, the Americans no longer deﬁned
India apolitically, and only to justify British rule in India. India was no longer
a British concern alone and images of India had become politically
meaningful to the Americans as well. The images of India, constructed by the
Americans during this period, contributed substantially to the understanding
Americans acquired about Indian nationalism.

The established images of India are related to a more general American
interaction with the Third World, as set out in recent scholarly writings. These
studies have accepted and further developed the images popularized in the
period under discussion to explain the problems in relations between an
independent India and the United States. In the earlier description of India
these images were discovered and viewed with obvious disapproval, requiring
India to ad0pt the western norms in order to win acceptability. Now these
images have become indisputable facts creating a firm cultural and political
boundary between America and India.

Indian cultural images have acquired a significant role in explaining
political differences between an independent India and the United States.
Harold Gould, for instance, considers India’s non-aligned policy rooted in
Hindu and Buddhist faith based on the "efﬁcacy of diversity and pluralism as
opposed to the Judeo Christian moral absolutism thus creating dissonance in
the Indo-American interaction."17 Similarly, Selig Harrison believes that
rejection of culture-centered political identity in America's ‘melting pot’
ethos contributes to problems with the Third World. It is the Hindu concept of

time which has led the Indians to adopt relativistic foreign policy attitudes

 

17 Harold A. Gould, "U. s.- Indian Relations: The Early Phase" in Harold A.
Gould and Sumit Ganguly ed. The Hope and the Reality: U. S.-Indian Relations
from Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 31.

19

while the Americans are concerned with the revealed dogma which requires
the world to conform to their own beliefs and perceptions of their own
interests.18 In Negotiating Across Cultures, Raymond Cohen established the
effects of cultural differences on diplomatic negotiations. Regarding India, he
believes that the Indians, humiliated by British rule and governed by the elite
Brahmin caste, find the prospect of subordination insufferable.19 In these
discussions a comparative framework is deployed to examine India and India's
difference from the West is confirmed. India's political philosophy does not
emerge as a product of political imperatives but is rooted in its social and
religious traditions. The implications are that India's past continues to dictate
the present, from which India apparently cannot escape. The explanation of
political tensions in cultural practices lends permanency to the discord,
leaving no scope of growth or change. To Ainslee Embree, Mother India is a
forgotten title among Americans, but it is not among Indians.20 But Mother
India seems as much a factor to the Americans as Embree claims it is to the
Indians. The image of India has acquired a permanent place in such
discussions which emphasize problems in this relationship in the essential
and insurmountable differences between the two cultures.

Besides the predominant inﬂuence of cultural traditions on Indian
politics, India's colonial experience has become another means of explaining
tensions between India and the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in

analyzing anti-Americanism in the Third World. believes the root causes of

 

18 Selig S. Harrison, “Dialogue of the Deaf: Mutual Perceptions and Indo-
American Relations.” Conﬂicting Images, ed. Sulochana Raghavan Glazer
(Glenn Dale: Riverside, 1990) 56-60.

19 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in
International Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1991) 13, 33. ‘

20 Ainslee Embree, "Anti-Americanism in South Asia: A Symbolic Artifact," in
Alvin Z. Rubeinstein and Donald E. Smith eds. Anti-Americanism in the Third
World (New York: Praeger, 1985) 140.

20

this sentiment are cultural, ideological and historical factors.21 He believes
that perceptions formed by the Third World leaders, educated in centers of
colonial power, led them to admire the cultures of the colonizers. Moreover,
they had no prolonged exposure to the American culture or politics. In India,
the "brown Englishman," whose acquired English culture separated him from
the traditional culture of the masses, also made him distant from the United
States.22 Rubinstein exempliﬁes a shift that has taken place in the manner in
which Americans perceive India. Even though he reiterates entrenched
opinions of the Indian leadership, however, unlike most wartime observers,
he does not view America and Britain as equal representatives of the West,
rather he afﬁrms America's distinctness from Britain. Writing in the post war
era, Rubinstein's analysis represents an independent American reading of
India.

Rubinstein's analysis is limited in the sense that instead of placing
India's political concerns in the current political scenario, the answers to
India's political philosophy and behavior are sought in the past. There is truth
to Rubinstein's contention that the 'Indian leaders were not exposed to
American culture. However, what he fails to examine is whether the Indian
nationalists considered the United States distinct from Britain or perceived the
two powers as equal representatives of western ambition in India. During the
period of the nationalist struggle, India may have been more suspicious of
Britain and given the Americans an opportunity to distance themselves from

the colonizer. Suspicion of the United States may have emerged in India

 

21 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Preface" Rubeinstein et. al. eds. Anti-Americanism in
the Third World, xi.

22 Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a
Phenomenon.” in Rubeinstein et. al. eds. Anti-Americanism in the Third
World, 5-7.

21

during the period Of the independence struggle when the Americans defined
their attitudes towards India.

These studies have explored many facets and aspects Of American
images Of India covering a vast period Of time. Despite the diversity of themes,
a unifying element can be discerned in the tangible cultural gap they present
between India and the United States. These studies have not only established
the impact of British inﬂuence on American Opinions but have also introduced
independently constructed American Opinions Of India. The period selected for
review in the present study, however, is still left largely under-explored. The
Second World War was a period Of transition in which the Americans made a
conscious effort tO distance themselves from the British and attempted to study
India independently and possibly with some sympathy. The images constructed
during this period acquired political significance more forcefully and

meaningfully.

III-American view Of Other cultures

The leading question regarding American interest in India, drawing
from the scholarship discussed above, is whether it developed within the
framework Of the general American perception Of non-western cultures. The
issue that will be explored is whether American policy makers, as part Of the
western world, shared the same attitudes with the British regarding a non-
western society. The Americans may have begun to establish a distinction
from the British but may still have shared their assumptions regarding India's
cultural and social makeup and understood its nationalist movement within it.
They may also have still adopted or developed similar views as those of the

British even when opposing British imperialism.

22

The issue that requires some discussion is how non-western societies
were perceived in the American public arena and popular forums and
evaluate whether these perceptions played any role in policy formulations
regarding India. One of the earlier views available is that Of President
Theodore Roosevelt. He stated in 1909 that “successful administration of the
Indian empire by the English has been one Of the most notable and most
admirable achievements of the white race during the past centuries.”23 This
statement highlights America's identification with Britain at the height of
European imperialism. Public figures like Theodore Roosevelt promoted the
notion of the superiority Of the white race and approved the colonizer's role in
spreading western values while neglecting the aspirations Of the colonized.

Many scholars contend that this belief has been the guiding force of
American foreign policy.24 According to Michael Hunt, American policy in
the twentieth century has been guided by an active quest of national
greatness, promotion of American values, a sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority
and limited acceptance of political and social changes in other parts of the

world. The Anglo-Saxons were united by the common quality and common

 

23 Cited in M. s. Venkataramani, Quit India 10-11.

24American perception of other cultures can be studied in the period of
American expansion begun in 1898 with the Spanish-American War. The ideas
of the expansionists are presented in Julius Pratt's Expansionists of 1898 : The
Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1936), Walter LaFeber's The New Empire: An Interpretation of American
Expansionism, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 1963), Ernest May's American
Imperialism: A Speculative Essay lst ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
Historian John Fiske, minister Josiah Strong and President Theodore Roosevelt
emerge as prominent proponents Of American racial and cultural superiority
and advocates of the British empire. In Howard Beale's Theodore Roosevelt and
the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1956)
Roosevelt echoes the popular British sentiment that expansion was essential to
preserve the vigor of a society and to prevent its physical and moral
stagnation and degeneration. For an evaluation of American views Of the
Native Americans see Richard White's The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge U.
P., 1991) White discusses the use of the ideas of race, birth and progress by the
Americans to establish domination over the native population.

23

interest and viewed the "oriental" with racial superiority. The American
policy—makers Often worked with the colonial powers to win time until the
‘natives’ were ready for independence.25 Martin Weil similarly contends that
the State Department Ofﬁcials were racially arrogant, and had little respect for
members of those races customarily dismissed by Anglo-Saxons as inferior.26
Hunt has presented American racial and cultural affinity with the
British but the notion of America's uniqueness in terms Of its own values and
beliefs also emerges as a major factor in the development of an American
identity. David Reynolds has presented both aspects of an American identity
in his study. He argues that in American history, Britain had been central to
the definition Of American values and American sense of identity. But the
Americans also considered Britain an Old society and criticized British
colonialism even though their understanding of the empire was vague and
distorted. Reynolds believes that it was towards the end of the war that the
Americans recognized their superiority which in turn enhanced their sense
of their own Americanness.” Reynold's contention is based on the response of
the American GIs posted in Britain, but similar recognition can be anticipated
in the American Observers in India, especially among those associated with
the war. However, Americans in India had an added opportunity to recognize
and express their distinctness in relation to a non-western culture as well.
Regarding the role of American values in the international arena,
Emily Rosenberg presents the argument that American policy was guided by

the belief that American values were meant to uplift the world which included

 

25 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale U. P.,
1987) 77, 161.
25 Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) 90, 125.

27 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-
1945 (New York: Random House, 1995) 22-35, 442.

24

spreading American ideas and capital throughout the world.28 This self
recognition and self image had signiﬁcant political implications regarding
American attitude towards other cultures. Phillip Darby contends that their
self image led the Americans to reject other forms of political and social
organizations and their incentive to observe and inquire overseas was
lessened by this reliance on their own experience and values.29

This duality in an American identity, one expressing America's
uniqueness and the other identifying with the British especially in observing
another culture, played a significant role in defining an American attitude
towards India. During the course of the war, Americans recognized and
asserted their own interests and challenged the British position. but their
belief in the general superiority of western traditions continued to inﬂuence
American perceptions of India. Darby believes that the affinity between
Britain and the United States led them to share the same assumptions, mental
pictures, and their purpose towards other cultures.30 This shared belief with
the British, along with the emerging American self image, had a considerable
impact on American view of other cultures. According to Akira Iriye,
Americans had an image of Asia because they had an image of America which
led them to establish a stark contrast between American liberty and Asian
tyranny. They believed that the Asians were potentially capable of

improvement but were been constrained by their own despotic institutions

 

28 Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1982) 203.

29 Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American
Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970 (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1987) 143,
170, 186-187.

30 Ibid., 3 Darby points out that the Americans and the British were uniﬁed in
their western rationalism and viewed the East as mystic, superstitious, lazy and
fatalistic. 41.

25

and foreign conquests.31 In this respect, British imperialism was bound to
become an impediment to the realization of American interests. American
perceptions of India may have been guided by the same assumptions as those
of the British, but envisioned a world order different from the one already
established by the British.

If considered from this perspective, American attitudes towards Indian
nationalism were bound to develop within the context of their own superiority
and would, therefore, subscribe to a British interpretation of India whether
unilaterally or in alliance with the British. Indian aspirations could easily be
subordinated to American values and beliefs. The American Opinion of India
developed on the assumption that the Indians were inferior, and the observers
were inclined to focus on those aspects which confirmed India's inferiority.
The image of India constructed by the British could be invoked but usually as a
means to subordinate India to American values and beliefs. According to
Augelli, when American policy makers confront people, who because of their
race, culture, or behavior, could be convinced Of the superiority of the
American system, then policy-makers can work to convert them. If they reject
or deny the American value system, repression is used.32 American
perceptions of India's political and cultural behavior and the willingness of
the Indians to conform to American values could decide India’s future viability

and inﬂuence policy decisions.

 

31 Akira Iriye, Across the Paciﬁc: An Inner History of American-East Asian
Relations. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967) 4, 7, 23.

32 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and the
Third World (London: Pinter, 1988) 59.

26

IV-Orientalism

Recently there has been a spurt of academic activity in the area of
colonial discourse concerning the West’s image of the East and the impact it
had on their relationship. This approach, which has sharpened the analytical
issues partially present in the earlier scholarship, has turned attention to the
study of how the colonized were represented, and what language, images,
metaphors, and myths were used to describe their culture and society. What
has generally been identified as Orientalism is a vast set of images in
scholarship, literature, art and other media that conjures up the essence of the
East.33

Edward Said establishes the argument that the knowledge the West
developed and accumulated of the Orient led to its “dominating, restructuring
and having authority over the Orient" which meant for ‘us’ to deny autonomy
to ‘it’. The accepted basis of this knowledge was the establishment of a
distinction between the East and the West as a starting point for elaborating
theories and political accounts, and describing the people, their customs, their
mentality. The oriental was ﬁxed in a stereotype: gullible, devoid of energy
and initiative, and at the same time cunning and irrational as opposed to the
direct and rational West.34 Homi K. Bhabha elaborates on the objective of
colonial discourse. He believes that this discourse construes the colonized as a
population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify
conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction. Necessity

of such rule is justified by moralistic and normative ideologies, recognized as

 

33 David Ludden, "Orientalist Empiricism: Transformation of Colonial
Knowledge" in Carol A. Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the Postcolonial
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia. (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1993) 251.
34 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 2, 3, 32,38.

27

the "Civilizing Mission" or the "White Man’s Burden." But within the same
apparatus of colonial power coexists the notion of a modern system and science
of government--progressive ‘Western’ forms of social and economic
organization which also justify colonization.35

In the above discussion, orientalism is intrinsically tied to
imperialism. Knowledge is power. But knowledge can be detached from an
overt form of power--that is, colonialism. This knowledge did originate in the
writings of the orientalists associated with colonialism, but contributions to
this knowledge were also made by‘ those not formally associated with
colonialism. Ludden's contention that only by separating knowledge from
power can orientalism elsewhere be explained36 is relevant to the study of the
American perception of India. Americans never colonized India, but they
reproduced and developed knowledge of India which may not have led to
territorial acquisition but which had, nevertheless, significant political and
cultural implications.

Furthermore, Britain, the colonizer, within the Orientalist context,
could not only use its knowledge to maintain control over India but also to
educate the Americans to assume similar attitudes. Also, by providing negative
images of India, Britain aspired to make itself indispensable in any discussion
about India, thereby limiting American involvement. On the other hand, the
United States, although, not a colonizer of India, may already have harbored
the same attitudes as those of the colonizer, thereby demonstrating its own

superiority, in the process marginalizing the Indian society and its aspirations

 

35 Homi K. Bhabha, “Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of
Colonialism,” The Politics of Theory, ed. Francis Barker (Colchester:
University of Essex, 1983) 198, 209.

36 Ludden, 252.

28

unless they were subordinated to the western norms and values.37 In light of
this, the shared sense of superiority with the colonizer over India would
reﬂect in the perceptions Americans developed of India. Spurr terms it the
West’s "essential narcissism," idealizing itself and subordinating the world of
its subject.38

The scholars of Orientalism have presented the pervasiveness of this
sentiment in the West by including novels, travel literature, and journalistic
writings in the domain Of politics. Spurr argues that the media normally
relies on institutional sources, their place in the market economy, and their
standardized discourse produces an ideology that is fairly easily explained in
terms of national policy and public opinion.39 In this respect, pOpular
representations of India in the United States can be considered vital to
understanding the American view of India, not only from a cultural
perspective, but for its political impact as well.

American images of India can be considered as signiﬁcant as those of
the British in the context of India's independence movement and also in view
of the dominant role the United States assumed after 1945. By expressing their
own understanding of India the Americans were in a position to contribute
new vitality and authority to the knowledge about India in the West. Ludden

argues that Orientalism, as a body of knowledge, drew material sustenance

 

37 Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993)
notices the tendency in Americans to expand and extend and not spend time
"reﬂecting on the integrity and independence of Others..." 289.

38 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire (Durham: Duke U. P., 1993) 110.

39 Spurr, 8-9. Edward Said is particularly critical of American/western media.
He believes that while the European culture was associated with white man's
physical presence in a particular area, the new American controlled
international media insinuates itself over a wide area and sheepishly follows
the government policy model. Culture and Imperialism. 291, 295. In these
analyses the media is generally presented as a reﬂector of government
policies and ideologies. In the case of India, the media had also become
significant educators about India to a largely uninformed public and the
policy makers.

29

from colonialism but became objectiﬁed by the ideology of science as a set of
factualized statements about a reality that existed and could be known
independently of any subjection or colonizing will.40 This argument becomes
evident in Augelli's contention that Social Darwinism gave white Americans a
scientiﬁc basis for their racism. The competitive struggle could be identiﬁed
as a war between the whites and the rest of the world and could provide an
incentive to the Americans to impose their values on the rest of the world.41
As early as 1927 Jawaharlal Nehru had recognized this trait in the
colonizer. He stated that India is to England a “part of the mysterious and
eff ‘ete East, which always plots and intrigues most irrationally against the
God-ordained might and majesty of England and ungratefully forgets the many
favours which England has bestowed on her."“2 Nehru had deployed the
orientalist knowledge against the British and this opinion could be transferred
to the Americans once the American position became apparent to the Indians.
There is a general consensus among scholars regarding the persistence
of the notions Of the backward East and the progressive West in post colonial
literature and political thought. According to Spurr, the ideology of ‘modern’
has replaced the ideology of ‘civilized,’ but the function and motive have
remained the same; to maintain authority and to classify people according to
Western standards of technological and political progress.43 Said believes that
since the Second World War the United States has dominated the Orient and
approaches it as France and Britain once did, always demonstrating the

strength of the Occident. "What counts is not what people are or think, but

 

40 Ludden, 252.
41 Augelli. 45, 64-65.
42 Sarvepalli Gopal. ed. Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Delhi: Oxford U.

P., 1983) 7. Nehru wrote this in an article, “The Psychology of Indian
Nationalism," in the Review of Nations.

43 Ibid.. 69.

30

what they can be made to be and think." Now they [the Americans] try to see
the Orient as the imitation of the West and when they discover otherwise, it
only testifies to the 'incorrigibility' of the oriental.44 But an overt form of
domination is not a requisite for images to become politically significant. The
Americans may have already harbored similar sentiments. By constructing
negative images of India they may have deﬂected the aspirations of the
Indians from becoming prominent, and abetted the cause of the colonizer, and
rcasserted the greater strength of the Occident.

Regarding the impact of orientalist knowledge on India, Ronald Inden
agrees with Said’s contention that while, once this knowledge enabled the
West to gain trade concessions and to colonize, now it authorizes the area
specialists and their colleagues in government and business [primarily in
America] to aid and advise, develop and modernize, arm and stabilize the
countries of the Third World. Even independent India has not regained the
power to know its past and present.“5 Similarly, Gyan Prakash believes that
the Indians were, to the British, an inert object of knowledge, to be managed
and changed. Now caste driven and otherworldly India has been reformulated
as ‘traditional India,’ and old projects of modernizing by the colonials have
been renovated and deployed as economic development.46 According to Hunt,
now it is no longer race but attributes of modernity and tradition that ﬁx a
nation in the hierarchy. The American model is used to rebuild traditional

societies and stagnant economies, all with an abiding sense of superiority}.7

 

44 Said, Orientalism 4. 291, 321.

45 Ronald Inden, “Orientalist Construction of India,” Modern Asian Studies
20.3 (1986) 401-446.

46 Gyan Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World:
Perspectives from Indian Historiography,” Comparative Studies in Society and
History 32.2 (April 1990) 383-408.

47 Hunt, 162.

31

These scholars present certain images which have become dominant in
Western discourse on India and can be anticipated in the present discussion.
In his discussion of Indological discourse, Inden believes that the ‘irrational’
institution of ‘caste’ and the ‘Indological religion’ [Hinduism] that
accompanies it have displaced human agency and define India. Caste,
conceived as India’s essential institution, became both the cause and effect of
India’s low political and economic development and its failure to prevent its
conquest by outsiders. He cites the opinion of James Mill that the Hindus are
'timid beings" who run away from danger with more trepidation and
eagerness than has been almost ever witnessed in any other part of the globe;
the "mental habits of the Hindu" are implicated in "India’s inherent political
incapacity."4 8

These were accepted notions among the British, and once they were
popularized, they could become the accepted norm of discussing India by the
Americans as well. The acceptance of these Opinions during the course of the
war would make the Indians immaterial in the war and undermine their
aspiration by questioning their political abilities. A marked distinction was
established between the East and the West in which the former could win
acceptability by adopting the latter's values and beliefs. The survival of these
perceptions is visible in Maurice Zinkin's understanding of India. He
considers Eastern thought other worldly while Western thought promises that
the world can be changed for the better. He believes that it was the inﬂuence
of Western ideas that made Indian politics dynamic.49 Following the same

reasoning, David Gordon praises Nehru for his impatience with suffocating

 

48 Inden, 409.

49 Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West (London: Chatto and Windus, 1951) 75,
90.

32

traditions fostered by Gandhi, in order to reconstruct and rediscover India.50
It is the rejection of the Indian traditions and acceptance of western values
which seem to be a prerequisite for India to win acceptability. But this
capacity also hinges on the western perception of India's ability to step out of
its traditions and emulate the West.

The scholarship on Orientalism has created opportunities to examine the
interaction between the West and the East not only in terms of policy
objectives and national interests but also in terms of the impact of cultural
expressions on political thought. By incorporating opinions of writers,
journalists, missionaries and intellectuals, scholars of Orientalism have made it
possible to explore the collective perception the West developed about other
cultures. In the context of the role America played in India's independence,
this field of study has widened the scope of examining perceptions and
interests not only to include the political elite but also opinions generated in
the popular media reﬂecting and creating a more encompassing opinion of
India. This approach makes it possible to investigate the American
involvement in India not only in terms of American advocacy of anti-

colonialism, but also in relation to their opinion of the colonized.

 

50 David C. Gordon, Self-Determination and History in the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton U. P. , 1971) 49.

Chapter 2

Early Perceptions, 19205-19305

In the 1920s and 1930s American ofﬁcial interest in India was largely
nonexistent, however, images of India were available for public consumption.
These representations are an important introduction into ideas about India
circulated by the Americans in the period before the war. Collectively, they
lay the groundwork upon which future American observers built their
Opinions of India. In the examination of the role America played in India's
independence, American perceptions of India have generally received
cursory attention and have been subordinated to an indepth investigation of
political debates and diplomatic discussions. Undoubtedly, strategic and
economic interests and global politics play a major role in policy decisions, but
Opinions of peoples and cultures are also relevant in the decision making
process. Similarly, opinions presented in popular forums play a critical role
not only in reﬂecting dominant perceptions but also in shaping and
manipulating opinions. The political and ideological roles of the intellectuals,
journalists and writers have to be recognized and their implicit or explicit
alignment with or against the institutions of power must be explored.

Edward Said, as previously noted, has made a compelling argument for
the recognition of the privileged role of culture in the modern imperial
experience.1 However, the role of culture need not be limited to the

imperialist powers alone but can be broadened to include other western

 

1 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) 5.
John M. MacKenzie contends that imperialism on the domestic scene in Britain
has been discussed largely as a debate of an elite while 'popular imperialism' is
ignored. Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion,
1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester U.P., 1984) 2. MacKenzie's contention is
relevant in terms of popular representations of India in the United States.

33

34

nations, who have also expressed their Opinions about non western cultures
from a vantaged position.

As a colonial power, Britain's representation of India has received
considerable attention in the study Of Orientalism. Some discussion of British
images of India is necessary in order to evaluate their inﬂuence on America's
understanding of India. Francis Hutchins' study, The Illusion of Permanence,
is particularly useful because it delineates the evolution of British thought on
India and presents images whose impact on the Americans is markedly
noticeable. Hutchins points out that the British perception of India was based
on assumptions of racial, political, and religious superiority. These
assumptions led the British to envision a permanent raj in India. In order to
justify their prolonged rule in India the British created a conventional
stereotype Of the Indians. They singled out the alleged Indian laziness,
fatalism, feebleness, and preference for despotic institutions-~all of which, in
turn, confirmed India's cultural, political, physical and mental inferiority.
These traits were explained as consequences of climate and diet to the eventual
adoption of the scientiﬁc explanation of racial difference. The scientiﬁc proof,
in particular, provided confirmation of the fact that the Indians were
inherently inferior and, therefore, required protection.2 Consequently, the
peasants and the minorities, who conformed to this image, acquired

prominence in British writings. The emerging Indian middle class, which did

 

2 David Ludden, "Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial
Knowledge" in Carol A. Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the Postcolonial
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1993) Ludden contends that European superiority became
more theoretically pronounced in Europe. Hegel and Marx considered India's
stagnant backwardness a consequence of traditional village economy, despotic
government, religion based social life and sacred caste divisions. Knowledge
had become detached epistemologically from colonialism. 265 American
representation of India can also be viewed from this perspective.

35

not fit the conventional image of the childlike, was ignored.3 The British
delegitimized a class, schooled in western thought, which had begun to emerge
largely as a consequence of the British initiative.

Hutchins contends that after the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the British
approach underwent a noticeable change. Instead of promoting their mission
to reform and educate, the British singled out the Hindu majority and
associated an unchangeable 'Hindu mentality' with it. This characteristic
denied the Hindus the capability to change and reform. The 'Orientalizer'
reasoned that the British rule should be made agreeable to suit the Hindu mind.
Consequently, an India of the imagination was created, associating the Hindu
culture with social and political stagnation.4

The English constructed the 'real' India, which existed in the
countryside, among peasants, princes and minorities, who were all dependent
on the British. India was assumed a static society which was introduced to real
history by its confrontation with the modern colonial world. The emerging
Indian nationalism was obscured by the argument that India was not a nation.
It was not only the caste system but also religious differences between Hindus

and Muslims which conveniently confirmed India's fragmentation.5 Scholars

 

3 Homi K. Bhabha observes that colonial discourse creates a space for a
'subject peoples' through production of knowledge in terms of which
surveillance is exercised and seeks authorization for its strategies by the
production of knowledge of the colonizer and the colonized. "Difference,
Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism" in Francis Barker et. al. eds.
The Politics of Theory (Colchester: University of Essex, 1983) 198. Such
strategies can create a comparative framework to study other cultures, leading
one culture to establish superiority over the other. A comparison between two
different cultural systems can be anticipated in the American observers of
India as well.

4 Francis Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence xii, 57, 61-67, 73, 141, 154-157.
179.

5 Peter van der Veer, "The Foreign Hand: Orientalist Discourse in Sociology and
Communalism" in Carol A. Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the Postcolonial
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1993) Nationalism is an ideology that emphasizes a
collectivity of political will, common history and territory. A nation is not

..ntIlE;-Lrl~l

al.. at“

36

of Orientalism have generally presented the British representation Of India as
a systematized knowledge which silenced competitive accounts. The British
surveyed and bound India within villages and its politics within religious
institutions.6

The pervasiveness of these representations is visible in the British
novels of India as well. Allen Greenberger, in his study of British novelists Of
the empire, points out that the Indians never emerged as individuals but
remained a collective 'mind set.’ Most novelists did not recognize Indian
nationalism as a factor and ignored or underplayed its relevance.7 Imperial
writers like John Buchan reasoned that the Indians were childlike and needed
protection. He claimed that Indian nationalism was inconsequential and
advocated the postponement of independence indefinitely.8 Said, in
evaluating the privileged role of culture in imperialism, examines the
representation of the natives by a number of imperial novelists. In his

analysis of Joseph Conrad's vision of Africa in The Heart of Darkness, Said

 

built on common religion and religion was what the British considered a
unifying element in India. 24-31. Also in the same anthology see
Breckenridge, "Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament." She argues that
the British created a pervasive view that India is a land of difference,
unfathomable and ungovernable. The Orientalist strategy was to constitute a
particular space as inherently timeless or conﬁned to the past. 2, 17.

6 Ludden, 252, 263, 266. In the same anthology Arjun Appadurai points out that
hunt for data about caste created an unmanageable ﬂow of information, that
only "numerical majorities" were given prominence which led to
essentialization of groups. After 1931 the idea of politics as a contest of
essentialized communities became popular. Colonial body count created not
only types and classes but also homogenous bodies. "Number in the Colonial
Knowledge." 315-335.

7 Allen J. Greenberger, The British Image of India: A Study of the Literature of
Imperialism (London: Oxford U. P., 1969) 203-204.

Juanita Kruse presents Buchan as needing the empire in order to escape
from his own society which stiﬂed and dwarfed him. It was only when out of
Britain and observing others in Asia and Africa that Buchan could appreciate
his own culture. John Buchan and the Idea of Empire: Popular Literature and
Political Ideology (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1989) For the Americans the
empire was not a material necessity as it was for Buchan but they may still
have shared his views based on their racial and cultural superiority.

37

believes that Conrad could not conceive the natives as capable of
independence and effectively silenced them. E. M. Forster in A Passage to India
made everything in India seem incomprehensible and unidentifiable. If
someone did come to terms with India he/she could not recover from that
experience. Forster may have expressed his disillusionment with the British
Raj, however, in his descriptive narrative he adhered to orientalist images of
India. Said's discussion of Kipling's Kim, which was written after the Indian
Mutiny of 1857 and the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885,
is particularly notable because Kipling is most frequently cited by American
observers in India as their source of information on India. Said presents
Kipling's India as an uncontested empire, where the Indians were placed in
the protective orbit of the British rule. This India had the essential
unchanging qualities, with no conﬂicts and with no reference to any social
change or political menace. Kim could express love and fascination for India
but from the vantage of a controlled Observer.9

These cultural expressions could independently create assumptions
about India without being overtly tied to political institutions and political
processes. These writers shaped and were shaped by their histories and
ideologies, which they presented in popular media. Two critical factors seemed
to inﬂuence these writers in their study of eastern cultures like India. To
begin with, a distance from India seemed requisite for the celebration and
preservation of western values. Having established a distance, these writers
found India mysterious and incomprehensible. However, they felt compelled to
demystify India by simplifying it and reducing it into distinct categories.
Consequently, Indians were depicted not as individuals but merely as socially

and culturally driven entities, rigidly bound within their caste and religious

 

9 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism 23, 166, 201-203, 132-160.

38

affiliations. Elements which threatened to undermine the stability of the
empire were disregarded or discredited. These cultural expressions contributed
signiﬁcantly to justifying British imperialism especially 'when the enterprise
was threatened or questioned. John MacKenzie and Phillip Darby point out
that, after the First World War, the argument about the beneﬁts of colonialism
had to be spelled out in great detail, especially with the rise of nationalism in
Asia and the growing criticism of imperialism as the cause of the war. In the
1920s, the propaganda of the empire had to be made vigorously, because the
English public lacked an ideological commitment and vested interest in the
empire. In this respect, the propaganda in the form of popular literature,
games, documentaries, and exhibitions had a lasting effect. It never showed
the updated view of the world, rather, it remained entrenched in the
nineteenth century and, therefore, froze the images of the public's view of the
world--a world of military advances, oriental fascination, and racial
condescension. It contributed to a complacent habit of superiority which
created, what MacKenzie has termed, the 'protected markets of the mind.‘1 0

In MacKenzie and Darby's analyses, Orientalism does not emerge as a
monolithic, uncontested, self propelling discourse. Their arguments suggest
that the knowledge about the Orient had to be reinvented, modified, and
rcasserted in order to reeducate people about the beneﬁts of the empire and to
counter the emerging criticism of British imperialism. It seems that such
resistance and reassertions had emerged in the aftermath of major upheavals
like the Indian Mutiny and the First World War, creating a need to reassert the
benefits of colonial rule. This necessity could be anticipated in the era of the

Second World War as well.

\

10 Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American
Approaches to Asia and Africa, 11370-1970 (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1987) 101-107
and MacKenzie, Propaganda... 61, 91, 257.

39

These cultural expressions, promoting imperial ideology, could not
remain rigidly bound within a given territory. Given that the Americans
shared racial and cultural afﬁnity with the British, these opinions could have
found fertile ground in America as well. Here, too, the 'protected markets of
the mind' could be created and the Americans bound within the nineteenth
century view of the empire. In this respect, popular literature about India,
produced in the United States following the First World War, is signiﬁcant.11
According to Jayant Lele, Orientalism, while it serves the purpose of control,
can do so by insulating common peOple of the occident from a self-
examination that can result from contact with the rest of the world.12 With
limited political interest in India and subjected to views which condoned
British rule in India, Americans easily adopted the orientalists' vision as well.
It may not have led to overt domination, but knowledge without the trappings
of imperialism is powerful in its own right. The perceptions of Indian society
and culture developed in the United States had a significant impact on
American assessment of India's political will. It was possible for the Americans
to assume racial superiority and cultural authority but without the love and
fascination which Kipling could express through Kim.

The inﬂuence of British opinions on American perceptions of India is
apparent in American missionaries and the American cinema. This study does
not include missionary writings and cinema for detailed analysis because
missionaries were not a major factor during the era of the Second World War

or a part of the mainstream discourse selected for evaluation in this study.

Cinema had been excluded because the focus of this study is on the printed

g

1 1 In the United States, India in Ferment, written by Claude H. Van Tyne, and
M Other India, written by Katherine Mayo were published in the 19208. Both
Condoned British rule in India.

I 2- Jayant Lele, "Orientalism and the Social Sciences," in Breckenridge ed.
Orientalism... 45.

 

40

word.13 Nevertheless, some comments are warranted here in order to
establish the general trends in the American image of India and the inﬂuence
of the British on these representations.

The ﬁlms made in the United States and Britain, according to MacKenzie,
all expressed racial stereotypes and projected the supremacy of Europe and
America's triumph of the civilized over the rest of the world. MacKenzie
believes that imperial epics ﬂowed from Hollywood because they gave the
American filmmakers the Opportunity to relive and celebrate America's
imperial past.l4 One example that stands out in Isaacs' evaluation is the ﬁlm
Gunga Din, made in 1939, which introduced a 'cringing and rather pathetic
creature' with 'doglike' devotion to his British master.15 Like the British
novels, the ﬁlms also ignored the nationalists. According to Dorothy Jones, the
only rebellions recognized by Hollywood were those of the hillsmen or the
frontier tribes which the British always won for India's greater good and
safety. Jones points out that these ﬁlms were produced in the 19308 when the
Indian nationalist movement had become most vocal and visible.16 Such
depictions may have catered to the public‘s appetite for adventure in exotic
places but could also reinforce stereotypes and prevent alternative thoughts

and images from emerging.

13 India had been examined by intellectuals like Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Henry David Thoreau who contrasted Indian spirituality favorably with
western materialism. But as Kenton Clymer points out, by the turn of the
century the United States had become a colonial power and accepted England
as a model to be imitated. The opinions of American missionaries and consuls,
Who condoned British rule in India, had a greater impact than those presented
by intellectuals. Quest for Freedom. (New York: Columbia U.P., 1995) 3-4.
4 MacKenzie, Propaganda... 69, 88.
1 5 Harold A. Isaacs, Scratches on our Minds: American Images of China and
India. (New York: John Day, 1958) 241-242.
The 'creature' was probably the 'childlike' Indian created and popularized by
5116 British transformed into a sub-human category.
6 Dorothy B. Jones, The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen,
1896-1955 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1955) 55-59.

41

American missionaries were some of the earliest commentators on
India.17 F. De. W. Ward for example wrote his observations of India in 1850. The
inﬂuence of British opinions is most evident in his analysis, an example of
which is Ward's observation of Indian laziness. He reasoned that the "tropics,"
unlike "our own more vigorous clime" created "idleness" in the Indians.
Further, Ward blamed the caste system for preventing the Indians from
uniting against their foreign rulers. However, he also praised the British for
improving the mental and moral being of the Indians. He believed that despite
their painful and galling state of servitude and debasement, Indians were
better governed by the British and the masses did not desire a transfer of
power to native rulers.18 As a Westerner and a Christian, Ward could not
accept the Indian people, their society, culture or religion, and held them
responsible for their own servitude. Although, ideologically uncomfortable
with imperialism, he concurred with British representations of India and
praised the beneﬁts Britain brought to India.

William and Charlotte Wiser, two members of the American
Presbyterian Society, spent ﬁve years in an Indian village in North India and
recorded their observations in 1930. Their primary interest was to help the
lower caste Indians overcome prejudices and fears in order to achieve better
things in life.19 A shift is visible in the views expressed by the Wisers from
those of Ward. Whereas Ward had emphasized racial and climatic deficiencies
in the Indians, carrying with it implications of permanency, the Wisers

focused on social reforms, suggesting a potential for improvement in India.

~

1 7 For an examination of American missionaries in India see Sushil Madhava
Pathak's American Missionaries and Hinduism: A Study of their Contact from
1813-1910 (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967).

I F. De. W. Ward, India and the Hindoos (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850)
79-81, 206, 270, 284, 310.

1 9 William H. Wiser and Charlotte Viall Wiser, Behind Mud Walls, 1930-1960
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 c1963) 15, 38, 113, 129.

42

But like Ward, the effort of the Wisers was primarily to transform the Indian
society from within, with western help. The issue of the impact of imperialism
on the Indian condition was left largely unattended.20

Even though American film makers and missionaries were not
representatives of the colonizing nation, they certainly found an outlet in
India to promote western values and proclaim the validity of their own
cultures. Their observations of India were not different from those of the
British, which, in all probability, prevented them from giving serious

consideration to India's subjugation.

Writers, Journalists and Consuls--l920s-1930s

Opinions expressed by some American journalists, writers and consuls
in India in the period before the outbreak of the war will help delineate the
prominent images of Indian culture, society and politics in order to evaluate

their inﬂuence on wartime observers of India. These Observers cannot be
considered experts on India but are good indicators of the commonly shared

discourse on India.21 Their opinions and perceptions were definitely

20 Margaret Strobel also presents such limitations among British women in
India who could not transcend maternalistic hierarchy to establish real
afﬁnity with Indian women. They attributed problems in India to its society
and not to imperialism. European Women and the Second British Empire
(Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 1991).

2 1 Claude H. Van Tyne, Head of the Department of History at the University of
Michigan, acknowledged that he was not an authority on Indian history and
institutions, yet he believed that he could provide an understanding of India
by recording the facts accurately. But he also concluded that because of the
diversity of race, religion and caste, a lifetime would not sufﬁce to gain
fullness of knowledge about India However, he proceeded to authoritatively
define the country and its people. He considered the British incorruptible, just,
Pfert, incisive and positive and categorized the Indians as 'dark skinned,’
uIllid, cowering herd' and described his Indian guide as a 'miserable rat.‘
aSCd on these observations he wondered if the Indians could ever win and
maintain self rule. x, xi. 4-5, 16. India in Ferment. (New York; D. Appleton,

mil-(gra‘erAl‘

43

inﬂuential and far reaching. The discussion in this chapter will focus
primarily on the writings and memoirs of these observers. Some of the
observations about India were written and published in the period under
consideration and reﬂect not only the writers' personal biases but also the
current trends in American thought. Moreover, such literature provides a
more unrestrained and more comprehensive picture which is often lacking in
newspaper and magazine reports as these tend to focus on the analysis of
particular events and are often limited by constraints of space. Also, the views
of these writers were not reproduced instantaneously, in order to satisfy

deadlines, but were written with reﬂection and introspection.
Writers

In 1927 Katherine Mayo presented her version of India to the Amerian
public. Mayo went to India to discover her ‘truth,’ and her opinion is
established early in the book which helped deﬁne the ‘Hindu mind.’ According
to Mayo, India suffered from "inertia, helplessness, lack of initiative and
originality, lack of staying power and of sustained loyalty, sterility of
enthusiasm, weakness of life-vigor itself."22 The only redeeming element in
India was the presence of the British. Mired in illiteracy, suffering from
material and spiritual poverty "... it is only to the British that the Indian
villager can look for sympathetic and practical interest and steady, reliable

help in his multitudinous necessity." As far as the Indian nationalists were

‘

1923). The notion of India's incomprehensiveness is visible in the National
Geographic acknowledging that it was "difficult for the Occidental mind to
gain an accurate concept of India." July 1926, (v. L no. 1) 60. Van Tyne
represents the opinion of many British and American observers who
aCknowledged that India was beyond comprehension but at the same time
believed it could be understood by describing and simplifying it and provided
e observer maintained a distance from India.

22 Katherine Mayo, Mother India (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927) 11.

44

concerned she considered them wasting their energies in "sterile,

obstructionist tactics while the rest...sat apathetic."23 Like the British, Mayo

discovered the real India residing in villages where, she believed. the

She discredited Indian

influence of the nationalists was negligible.

nationalism, and like the British, focused on those groups and classes which

conﬁrmed the necessity Of British presence.24

Mayo was accused of writing this book at the behest of the British, in
order to justify their benevolent rule in India.25 In India this book caused an

uproar and resulted in the publication of a number of books in answer to her

criticism. One such book was, A Son of Mother India Answers, by Dhan Gopal
Mukerji. He countered that vices like Opium, syphilis and alcohol were

 

23 Ibid., 215, 296.
24 Van Tyne marginalized Indian nationalism by focusing on the educated

classes. He found only the high-spirited Indians and fanatically loyal disciples
of Gandhi aspiring for immediate independence. But the judicious, cautious,
and conservative educated Indians did not agree with Gandhi and believed
India was unprepared to assume political responsibility and urged delay. India
in Ferment. 2, 86, 107. In Mayo and Van Tyne's analysis, the subservient masses
and the educated classes needed and wanted the continuation of British rule.
Nationalism as a force could be delegitimized because the nationalists were

sterile and fanatical.
25 Mayo's book was written when, in the aftermath of the First World War,

British imperialism had begun to be questioned in the United States.
Publishers William Randolph Hearst and Robert R. McCormick publicized
Gandhi's challenge to British rule. It suited both to use Gandhi to promote
American interests and discredit those who admired Britain and its empire.
Gandhi had also become a hero to the paciﬁsts in America. Lloyd I. Rudolph,"
Gandhi in the mind of America" in Nathan Glazer ed. Conflicting Images
(Glenn Dale: Riverside, 1990) 145-148. John Haynes Holmes, minister of New
York Community Church 1919-1949, became an admirer of Gandhi and
publicized his cause. He presented Gandhi as a spiritual force in India. M y
Gandhi (New York: Harper, 1953) 42. Before Mayo, Van Tyne had published
his observations on India and justiﬁed British rule in India. Van Tyne's
Concern was that in the United States, a consistent and powerful enemy of
Britain, particularly the 'parlor Bolshevists,’ were spreading among 'ignorant'
Americans stories of British misrule in India. He undertook a trip to India to
Seek out the truth. He commended the British for leaving their home and
fannilies to come to a land of excessive heat and unsanitary conditions and
"1' Bed people in Britain to let the British ofﬁcials in India prepare the Indians
‘0 assume the burden of responsibility. (New York: D. Appleton, 1923) viii, 166-

167. 239.

45

brought to India by ‘civilization’ and accused Mayo of perpetuating white
domination in India by arguing that India was unfit to rule herself.26
Nevertheless, Mother India became a bestseller in the United States and
introduced Mayo’s version of India to a large chunk of the American
population. Henceforth, India would only be viewed as a land languishing in
material and spiritual poverty.

A notable aspect of Mayo's construction of India and the Indians was the
image of the Hindus. She presented them as weak and unreliable, sexually
depraved, beyond the scope of self uplift, led by purposeless and unfocused
nationalists, whose real needs were met only by the British.27 In this
evaluation, Indian social, cultural and mental habits subordinated and
imprisoned its nationalists as well.

Mayo’s sentiments regarding the British rule in India were not
original. Theodore Roosevelt had praised the achievements of the white race
and believed “If the English control were [now] withdrawn from India, the

whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence.”28 Even

 

26 Dhan Gopal Mukerji. A Son of Mother India Answers (New York: E. P.
Dutton, 1928) 46-47, 74.

27 According to Veena Das the constitution of "otherness" in the missionary
mode was rooted in an obligation to bring the gospel to the inﬁdel. In contrast,
Mayo saw herself as representing the interest of the Americans who needed to
be protected against the sickness of lands like India. "The Imagining of Indian
Women: Missionaries and Journalists" in Nathan Glazer ed. Conﬂicting Images.
213. This aspect is evident in Van Tyne's account of India as well. He considered
it necessary for the West to maintain its distance from India for self
preservation. He contended that any race that came to India from the North
West [that is, by land] conquered India and built an efﬁcient government
before the climate sapped its strength. But the British came by the sea and
returned to their home and renewed their strength. India in Ferment, 2, 231.
This odd explanation can be interpreted as an expression of Van Tyne's relief
at the geographical and intellectual distance between Britain and India. The
need to maintain a distance from India for self preservation would deﬁnitely
not encourage intimacy with the Indians. Consequently, western observers
would not discover individuals but view India as a vast alien mass.

28 Quoted in A. Guy Hope, America and Swaraj (Washington: Public Affairs
Press, 1969) 6.

46

Franklin D. Roosevelt foresaw the possible independence of colonial peoples
only after a period of tutelage by the ‘parent’ state.29 Historian Van Tyne had
applauded the British for giving India habits of peace and order, sanitation
and hygiene. Without the British, India would remain medieval, barbaric--
belonging to the dark ages of superstitions In the ﬁnal analysis, Van Tyne had
accepted Kipling's warning to all 'lovers of efﬁciency' that 'You can't hustle
the East.’30 Mayo seemed to have articulated popular sentiments regarding the
continued necessity of the West to train and instruct those cultures considered
uncivilized according to western standards. Her contribution, in this respect,
was not only in popularizing this notion in the United States, but in providing
graphic descriptions of 'Hindu' India, making India more stark and its
nationalistic aspirations more questionable.

Other observers of India, who followed Mayo, presented similar views
when evaluating India’s quest for independence and assessing its leadership
qualifications vis-é-vis the British, although they prefer to cite Rudyard
Kipling as their source of authority on India. Probably due to the notoriety
Mayo had achieved in India, she was not a declared source of reference, but
the images she presented inﬂuenced how India should be studied in the
future.31 India seemed to be imprisoned by its religious and social structures
symbolized by the ‘sacred cow’ which became the metaphor for Hindu India,--
superstitious, docile, idle, passive, obstructing the path of modern
advancement. Whether such an India was ready for independence? Would it be

willing and capable of ﬁghting with the Allied forces? These would become

 

29 Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1977) 4.

30 Van Tyne, India in Ferment, 160-161, 193-195.

31 Journalist Negley Farson observed India in the 19308. He believed that Mayo
had corrupted American opinion of India which journalists like himself were
attempting to correct. "Indian Hate Lyric" in We Cover the World ed. Eugene
Lyons ( New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937) 137.

47

the leading questions among those who ventured into India. The abilities and
capabilities of India were beginning to be defined during this period and
India's social and cultural characteristics contributed vitally towards this
assessment.

Mayo's contribution in providing a focus and direction with which to
study India becomes apparent in writer Patricia Kendall's criticism of India,
particularly of 'Hindu' India.32 Kendall presented an extensive account of
India's history and explained its culture and politics. She presented and
reaffirmed her opinions about India primarily by relying on observations
made by some American and British nationals based in India and those Indians
who confirmed her vision of India. She cited observations made by an
American missionary who informed her that the Indians never contributed a
science, a religion, a philosophy or art to the growth of the world beyond its
frontiers except Buddhism. In fact, according to the missionary, the Aryans
lost their physical and mental stamina and some of their culture after moving
to India. He believed that India's "instinct is static." Kendall further
contributed to this image by pointing out that the Hindus lacked the concept of
cleanliness and health. Their physical debasement affected their mental
qualities as well.33 Once again, in Kendall's assessment the debilitating
inﬂuence of India had emerged prominently. In Kendall's examination of

India, like Mayo, the inﬂuence of the British representation is obvious. Both

 

32 Kendall is known primarily for her study on India. In her obituary,
theNew York Times described her as a writer on customs of India. February 7,
1973. In a report in the New York Times on October 30, 1931, Kendall had
argued that modern India needed evolution instead of revolution. It was
impossible for the Indians to take their place in world affairs until their
physical and mental poverty was removed. She expressed the same views in
her book as well. 383. Like Mayo, Kendall had diverted attention away from
nationalism to Indian character and cultural deﬁciencies.

33 Patricia Kendall, Come with me to India (New York: Charles Scribner,

48

writers considered India rooted in the past and its people physically and
mentally retarded, and used this information to explain India's nationalism as
well.

Kendall used the opinion of the missionary to reafﬁrm the fact that the
Indian [Hindu] mind was ﬂuid and elastic, but not creative. The people
reﬂected an inability to grasp the realities of life which was often falsely
labeled, "spirituality." They made elusive comments which were "a mixture of
realness and unrealness which is inseparable in the Indian mind."34 India
seemed to destroy any positive inﬂuence of the West as is apparent in case of
the degeneracy of the Aryan race itself. The missionary conﬁrmed that the
Indian mind was unreliable and illogical which rendered the Indians
untrustworthy and suspect. These essentialized and collectivized social,
cultural, mental, and physical characteristics of the Indians had the potential
to assume political relevance when applied to the Indian nationalists. The
nationalists could either be ignored, as is apparent in the American ﬁlms, or
submerged in the dominant image of an emasculated India. Kendall contended
that the Hindu mentality saw no purpose in change and believed that Gandhi
stagnated India by denouncing material progress and western education.35 If
the British prevented the Indians from emerging as individuals, American
writers also followed the same trend and presented the Indians only as a 'mind
set.‘

With these insights into the Indian mentality, Kendall questioned the
appeal of "many Indians" to "our people" to aid them in shaking off the "yoke"
of the English government. She reasoned that India was such an alien country

and we have so few means to assist us in judging whether these supplicants

 

34 Ibid., 135, 137-139.
35 Ibid., 270.397.

49

were true representatives of the Indians. Kendall believed that very few
Indians were politically conscious and concluded that all her evidence favored
the British position in India. The missionary concurred with her opinion by
pointing out that Indians were childlike and needed nurturing.36 Kendall's
assessment indicates that, even though ideas about India were present in the
United States, an interest in Indian politics was lacking. She may have
contributed to this disinterest by imprisoning the Indian nationalists in
India's stagnation and submerging them in an all-encompassing vision of a
retarded and debased India.

It is noteworthy that Kendall's examination of India continued the trend
of projecting an inherent difference between the West and the East. India
remained incapable of assuming independence and required continued
western assistance and presence. Kendall believed that British rule was
impartial and promoted freedom and liberty among the Indians because “They
cannot comprehend democracy.” She warned that if Gandhi's strategy of
dismantling banking, shipping and transportation--symbols of material
progress--was implemented it would ruin not only the British but the
American economy as well.37 In Kendall's analysis, like Mayo, there was no
recognition of American distinction from the British. She not only justiﬁed
British rule in India but also adopted their reasoning to conﬁrm it.

Kendall attributed the failures and problems of India to the Hindu
mentality. Thus, she justified colonialism as instructing the natives to learn
the norms of the West and the colonizer as performing a duty to the natives in
preparing them for eventual independence. But her assessment of the Indians

also denied them the capability to overcome these deficiencies. The mental

36 Ibid., 142, 301.
37 Ibid., 142,427.

50

habits of the Indians were presented as an inherent condition, making the
people incapable of change. By blaming the Indians for their own
debasement, writers like Mayo and Kendall absolved the British of any blame
for India's condition. Kendall did not anticipate the independence of India or
present a critique of imperialism. Like many British women travelers, Kendall
conducted her research in India, maintaining her distance, reiterating the
difference between the two worlds. She seemed unable or unwilling to
establish any identiﬁcation with the indigenous people or to sympathize with
their colonized state.38

It should be noted that for the purpose of this investigation the focus is
on American representation of India in non fictional genres like popular
journalism, travel writings and memoirs. This kind of literature has been
selected primarily because of its explicit rendition of opinions of other
cultures unmediated by the aesthetic and interpretive requirements of
imaginative and creative writing. Moreover, the impact of such writings on
political debates is generally more direct and more immediate.

Creative literature, too, is a powerful medium and its contributions to
cultural representations are undeniable. Fictional writing has a longevity and
reaches a more diverse audience, and like cinema, can contribute to the
sustainability of images beyond the time and space in which they are
conceived. Fictional representations can reﬂect a standardized version of a
given culture but can also freeze an alien culture into defined images and
categories for an extended period of time. The literature available on India's

representation in American ﬁction is extensive and for that reason alone

 

38 See Strobel. European Women and the Second British Empire (Bloomington:
Indiana U. P., 1991). In the case of the British women in India, Strobel
discovered an attempt by some to establish an identiﬁcation with Indian
women. Kendall, on the other hand, illustrates a complete distance from India
by the American Observers.

51

constitutes a full subject of study in its own right. However, one novel has
been reviewed in order to examine the manner in which India was
represented in American ﬁction and assess the impact of entrenched images
on American literary writers.

Louis Bromﬁeld, a Pulitzer prize winning novelist, traveled to India in
1932 and again in 1935. His impressions of India are available in his well
known novel The Rains Came.39 Bromﬁeld's novel has to be studied in the
context of his vision not only of an Eastern culture but also of the Western
society. Bromﬁeld seemed to be disenchanted with Western materialism and
industrialism and its dehumanizing effects. In India, he discovered the
possibility of creating a better society and also redeeming those Westerners
who had lost faith in their own civilization.40 Bromﬁeld's critique of the West
could mean that, unlike writers like Mayo and Kendall, he would not project
Western superiority over the East and would avoid establishing a
confrontational relationship between India and the West.

Bromfield visited India and wrote about a period in which Indian
nationalism had become active and vocal but, following the trend of British
novels and American ﬁlms, it does not impinge on the story and is rarely
mentioned in the novel. The novel is centered in the ﬁctional princely state of
Ranchipur which is ruled by a benevolent king. The king has acquired his
enlightened ideas of promoting health, education and hygiene and lifted
himself out of the "malarial apathy and superstition of ancient India" with the

help of his English tutor.“1 It is apparent that Bromﬁeld may have expressed

 

39 Louis Bromﬁeld, The Rains Came.- A Novel of Modern India. (New York: P.
F. Collier, 1937)

40 David Anderson, Louis Bromﬁeld (New York: Twayne, 1964) Preface, 77,
99.

41 Bromﬁeld. 20. This fascination with the enlightened princely states pitted
against an overpowering apathetic, superstitious India is visible in reports
published in magazines like the National Geographic as well. John and Frank

52

disenchantment with Western materialism, however, he also established the
fact that enlightened ideas emanated from the West and benefited other
cultures.

Bromfield's understanding of India emerged through the observations
of his main character Tom Ransome, a rich American with ties to the British
aristocracy. Ransome had become disenchanted with western materialism and
escaped to India. He is introduced as a waster, living an apathetic life.
Ransome seemed to mingle freely with the Indians, but in his observations a
distance is apparent. In the ﬁrst few pages of the novel Bromﬁeld established
an overpowering and an all-encompassing image of the Indian landscape, an
image which persisted throughout the novel. India emerged as alien and
threatening, at the mercy of a primitive and an undeﬁnably savage "nature."
Ransome observed a "primitive terror in the Indian sunset" when the jackals
and vultures emerged to prey on men and sacred cows, while the mongoose,
lizards, snakes and mice rattled about the whole night. The chaos of the night
was replaced by the wild cacophony of sacred monkeys in the morning. Lady
Esketh, a former love interest of Ransome, now married to a British Lord, was
frightened by India's vastness, heat, dust and jackals. She believed that the
hostility was shared by both people and animals, by nature itself. This
undeﬁnable nature seemed to encompass more than the Indian landscape. It
seemed to represent the basic core of man and beast alike, trapping both in a
primitive and savage state. Throughout the novel India retained an air of
sinister mystery. Like most western observers of India, Bromﬁeld concluded

that this mystery was generated by the lying and intrigue of the Orthodox

 

Craighead in "Life with an Indian Prince" found the state of Bhavnagar one of
the most modern and progressive states in India because of its modern
hospital, roads, sanitation vying with the mud villages, bullock carts,
wandering goat herds which represented the primitive and the ancient. Jan.
1942 (v. LXXXI no 1 336-237.)

53

Hindus. It was the Hindu religion, with a devastating indifference which had
managed mysteriously to swallow up everything human--ambition, faith,
conquerors, and glory.42

Having established the Hindu culture as enervating and primitive,
Bromﬁeld introduced some characters who could effect change in India. In
this respect, Bromfield broke away from the general trend of depicting
Indians only as a collective entity. He not only selected westerners as agents of
change but included some Indians as well. However, these Indians were
different from the rest because they seemed to have escaped India's
primitiveness and acquired civilized qualities. One such Indian was Major
Safti, the fair skinned, blue eyed, western educated Hindu Brahmin surgeon
who was free of the controlling "nature" of India. Safti believed that this
nature stiﬂed and suffocated the human spirit. He identiﬁed problems in India
with earth, life, an overfertile country ﬁlled with snakes and wild beasts. Safti
was convinced that nature was a monster and conceded that despite educating
and feeding the people, eventually this nature will continue to triumph. He
believed that it was the drought, the monsoons and the earthquakes, leprosy
and plague which lay at the root of terror in India.43 In Bromfield's
estimation, what distinguished Safti from the other Hindus was his western
education which shaped his enlightened ideas and prepared him to uplift the
savage and diseased land and its resistant culture.

The other agent of change was the Muslim head of the police, Raschid
Ali Khan. Once again, like most western observers, Bromﬁeld distinguished
Raschid from the Hindus. He reafﬁrmed the fact that the Muslims were frank,

positive and visionary while the Hindus possessed tact and intrigue, were

 

42 Ibid.. 1-11. 30. 54. 106.160, 200258.
43 Ibid., 261.

54

passive and mystical. Raschid could not understand the sinister mystery of
India and considered it responsible for making the Hindus cowardly and
treacherous. Bromfield may have placed Raschid in India, but presented him
as an outsider, uncorrupted by India's debasement. He considered Raschid
intelligent, physically strong, a descendent of the Arabs, Afghans and Turks,
who did not understand the slow pace of India's growth. Bromﬁeld presented
Raschid in glowing terms-~as the warrior. the Muslim, the enemy of the
British empire.44

The third group of people whom Bromfield distinguished from the
larger Hindu society were the Untouchables. They seemed to be vital for the
running of the households of the enlightened king and the numerous western
residents. In contrast to the Hindus, Bromfield considered the Untouchables
active and purposeful. Mr. Jobenekar, the Untouchable leader, had the
smoldering vitality special to the Untouchables. They ate meat and, unlike the
deformed Hindus, were tough. In the maternity ward of Miss MacDaid, a
Scottish nurse working with Safti, this difference became most apparent. The
untouchable woman appeared to be vibrant and healthy and gave birth to
healthy children while the Hindu patients gave up easily and resigned
themselves to their fate. Miss MacDaid dreaded her Hindu patients and
considered their silly superstitions [possibly vegetarianism] responsible for
their thinness.45

Life in Ranchipur was disrupted when an earthquake caused the dam to
break and ﬂood the state. The dam seemed to symbolize the worst aspect of the
West but also reafﬁrmed the childlike nature of the Hindus. Bromﬁeld points

out that the dam was built by a crooked westerner because the Hindus were

 

44 Ibid., 60, 141, 259, 383.
45 Ibid., 17-18. 24, 27, 64.

55

gullible. They had placed their mystical and childlike faith in western
achievements, in things they could not conceive themselves. The dam was a
symbol of oriental faith in occidental practical achievement and honesty. In
this moment of crisis, Bromﬁeld's hero Ransome, the disenchanted westerner,
discovered a purpose in life. But he did not ﬁnd similar awakening among the
Indians. Ransome observed a stranded servant, "a thin ugly little man," "very
black", a monument of patience and erosion to whom the British empire meant
nothing. "He was not quite an animal, for he was made in human shape."
Ransome believed that this man was India, which went on breeding and
breeding, symbolizing animal pleasure and superstition. Life was cheap in
India, millions sprang up somehow from the dead villages like fungus from
rotten wood. Ransome understood how complicated were the problems of
bringing light to these people.46 In a rare look at an average Indian,
Bromﬁeld's hero was unable to dissociate him from the animal world. This
seemingly human Indian represented Hindu India and its insurmountable
problems. Like most western observers Bromﬁeld could not envision that such
an India was ready to assume responsibility.

In view of the devastation in Ranchipur, the two westerners, Ransome
and Lady Esketh, and the Muslim, Raschid had singlemindedly become
involved in tending to the miserable and helpless Indians. But the
transformation was not easily achieved by the Hindu, Major Safti. He was on
the verge of succumbing to the terror induced by India-~the "thing" clung to
him, and it came from his past. Naturally, Raschid could not understand Safti's
terror and despair. Safti's hope for rejuvenation lay in relying on Ransome
for strength and avoiding Miss MacDaid lest she accused him of having

"turned Hindu". Eventually, Safti's spirit won and he emulated the strength

 

46 Ibid., 311, 314, 359, 397.457.

56

displayed by Ransome and Lady Esketh. In observing Safti's turmoil, Ransome
reasoned that perhaps in grief and emotion the differences between their
cultures become more apparent.“7 In the moment of crisis, even when the two
worked towards the same goal, the distance between them instead of
narrowing had become wider. Safti's reliance on Ransome seemed to symbolize
enlightened India's need for western, presumably American support.48
Bromfield could not envision a rapid transformation in India. Even
though Indians like Safti and Raschid represented hope for the country's
revival, considering the immense problems in India's innate nature. that
possibility lay in a distant future. Ransome was convinced that India's
awakening would not occur in his lifetime. Like most western observers,
Bromfield identified problems in India strictly with the Hindus. He
distinguished the enlightened princes, Muslims and the untouchables as active
agents, free of. the debilitating "nature" of India. Bromﬁeld may have opposed
British imperialism, but he certainly did not acknowledge the Indian
nationalists as bearers of change. He singled out all those groups whom the
British claimed needed protection. But Bromﬁeld assigned them active agency
to change India and challenge the British. However, the problems Bromﬁeld
identified within India were so enormous that they seemed to overshadow
British imperial rule in India. The task of uplifting India seemed
overwhelming in view of the not quite "animal" nature Of the Hindus. Hope for
India lay in the future, in Safti's promise to the king to breed healthy

children.49 Ultimately, Western, particularly American ideals and values,

 

47 Ibid. 582-585.

48 Bromfield introduced a character, Colonel Moti, who in observing
Ranchipur's devastation and Hindu passivity, wanted to destroy the old India
and emulate the Americans who had changed 'awful places' like Cuba, Panama
and the Philippines. 550.

49 Ibid.. 119. 499.

57

represented by Ransome, emerged as essential for India's awakening. Muslims
and Untouchables seemed to possess the necessary qualities and Safti had
acquired them.

Bromfield acknowledged India's real and potential capabilities, an
aspect which was absent in the accounts of Mayo and Kendall. However, his
larger vision of India conformed to the pervasive orientalist images. The
problem with such representations is that they can overpower the alternative
vision that the author(s) may have intended. However, Bromfield's vision of
India also indicates that even those author(s) who sought an alternative vision
of India may not have looked at India alternatively because they appropriated
old images. These images when projected in the public arena, whether in
sympathy or contempt, tended to become larger than the author's purpose or

bias.

Journalists

In the memoirs of the journalists, in contrast to Mayo and Kendall, India
received negligible attention, which perhaps was a symptom of a lack of
America's political interest in India. But their observations, however limited,
contributed to establishing an image of Indian nationalism and the Indian
society. Their opinions of the two Indian nationalists, Gandhi and Nehru,
although rudimentary, inﬂuenced the tone for future investigations as well.

Negley Farson, a correspondent with the Chicago Daily News, visited
India in 1930 and acknowledged Kipling as his source of information on India.
Parson's reliance on British representations as his guide to India become
apparent in his observation of the "naked men in loin cloth," "naked fakir’”

[ascetic] and "through all this placidly wandered a sacred cow."so Farson's

 

50 Negley Farson, "Indian Hate Lyric" in We Cover the World ed. Eugene

58

representations showcase the inability of the Americans to view India outside
the conﬁnes of the established images or to adopt a different perspective. The
coexistence of the bizarre, the mystical and the superstitious seemed to deﬁne
India in its totalin and once again confirm the insurmountable gap between
India and the West.

Farson was not enamored of the British, but nor was he with the
Indians. The British, he observed, were complacent and the ‘natives’ obeisant,
"living with a fearful, irremovable inferiority complex that Englishmen have
given to India." Even the Indian leaders were unable to rise above this
subservience to lead the people purposefully. The British may have
constructed the image of the Indians as lacking virility and demonstrating
feminine traits of passivity and timidity, but these images had been accepted as
factualized statements by Americans like Farson, and as Ludden has observed,
known independently of any subjugation.

Farson, in contrast to Mayo and Kendall, did not condone British
imperialism and distanced himself from the British. However, the problems he
highlighted were not associated with British imperial rule but with the
inability of the Indian nationalists to develop a cogent resistance against the
British. He considered Gandhi digniﬁed but spent the major portion of his
account discrediting his philosophy and strategy. He believed that Gandhi was
playing up the inferiority complex to the point of masochism in passive
resistance. Gandhi wanted the English to beat the Indians and the Congress

was using this tactic to blackmail them to leave.51 Farson seemed relieved to

 

Lyons ( New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937) 129, 132-133.

51 Ibid., 135-137. Gandhi had some admirers in the United States like the
Reverend John Haynes Holmes. Holmes met Gandhi in London in 1931 and
recognized the difﬁculty the West would have in understanding Gandhi. He
believed that it was impossible to understand Gandhi unless one understood the
basic religious aspect of his life. My Gandhi, 58. Time magazine made Gandhi,
the "little half naked brown man," Man of the Year for 1930. (January 5, 1931,

59

discover that not all Indians subscribed to Gandhi's passive resistance and
wanted to retaliate against the British for denying them equality. One such
leader was Nehru, whom Farson considered a Harrow and Cambridge educated
"brilliant communist leader" of the left wing of the Congress who was driven
into extremism by a boorish alien ruling class, refusing social equality even to
men like himself. However, in his narrative Farson merely mentioned other
forces within Indian nationalism. He did not examine their strength or
popularity but concentrated primarily on describing the beatings Congress
leaders and other "Hindus" invited on themselves in order to shame the British
to leave India.52

Farson acknowledged that little attention had been given to the Indian
problem in the world press. The information the press conveyed was of
"beatings" given to Indians by the British but they soon became old news to
the West.53 Clearly, the struggle of the Indian nationalist had not acquired
any sustained interest or credibility. Farson's account brings into focus the
limitations within which Americans perceived India. As students of Kipling,
reproducing British images of India, the American observers were unable to
create an alternative vision. Even though Farson found diverse elements
within Indian nationalism he did not examine them. India's strangeness.
exemplified by Gandhi, seemed more compelling and newsworthy. The
tendency on the part of American journalists and writers was to concentrate
on visually appealing and marketable images rather than on a substantive
examination of the political philosophies of the nationalists and their validity

in the Indian context. Instead, they highlighted those aspects which

‘

v. xii no. 1 14-15) But as Lloyd 1. Rudolph points out, Gandhi remained a
powerful, pervasive, intrusive version of the other in Glazer ed. Conflicting
Images 165.

52 Ibid., 127,129,132,136,138.

5 3 Ibid., 137.

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he

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reaffirmed India's deficiencies.

Another journalist who ventured into India in 1936 was Webb Miller,
foreign correspondent with the United Press. Like Farson, he too was
perplexed by "a rebellion based upon a strange phiIOSOphy of non-violence
and nonbloodshed" led by Gandhi “...a wizened, lO4-pound Hindu lawyer..."
who "...inspired millions of underfed, illiterate, unarmed people...” Once again
be singled out the lack of vigor as a predominant Indian characteristic, as is
visible in his emphasis on the underfed ﬁgures of Gandhi and the people he
inSpired. On witnessing non-violent resistance, Miller “felt an indefinable
sense of helpless rage and loathing almost as much against the men who were
submitting unresistingly to being beaten...” Miller believed that if the British
were driven out of India or forced to relax their supervision, some other power
would enter India in the chaos that would inevitably ensue. Miller thus
concluded that at this point the British were better equipped than the Indians'
to govern India.54

Farson and Miller, in contrast to Mayo and Kendall, attempted to distance
themselves from the British, but reiterated views constructed by the British
about India. It is worth noting that they did not ignore Indian nationalism or
deny a link between the people and the nationalists. It was the political
strategy of the nationalists which was incomprehensible to them. They did not
view Gandhi's non-violent phIIOSOphy as an effective political weapon but saw

it as a symptom of India's inferiority complex. In these representations India's

_

54 Webb Miller, I Found no Peace (New York: Garden City, 1938) I89, 194,
218. Unlike Miller, John Haynes Holmes found Gandhi a man of inﬁnite grace
and charm. He opposed Miller's desire to bring Gandhi to America because
Gandhi's policies were still regarded as fantastic and believed that Gandhi's
Personality would evoke vulgar curiosity and ribald jesting. My Gandhi. 40,
49-54. Holmes highlights the image Gandhi had acquired in mainstream
feprescntations in the United States. His recommentation also reﬂects the
ulaibility of peOple like Holmes to challenge these assumptions and had resort
‘0 sheltering Gandhi from being exposed to ridicule.

61

character and personality traits overshadowed its political aspirations and
imposed limitations within which India‘s nationalism had to function. Another
important issue that emerged in their representation of India was the
conviction of India’s inherent incapacity of defending itself. The nationalists
and the illiterate and underfed masses they represented both seemed to lack
initiative, judgment and vigor. The lack of masculinity and virility associated
with the Hindus would become an overpowering image once India's
participation in the war became an issue. None of the observers held
imperialism responsible for India's poverty and illiteracy but believed it to be
almost entirely an Indian responsibility. '
Arthur Goodfriend, a foreign serviceman who later served as a member
of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in India, observed India
between 1936 and 1958. In 1936 he found himself like the others "plunging
into Kipling’s India." He too observed streets "thronged with sacred cows" and
"half-starved, half naked seemingly human masses" who "suffused the land
with their sadness." Even his initiation into the Indian culture in the form of a
"three thousand year old ritual dance of Vedic India," evoked revulsion, which
he considered "debased, denatured and burlesque." Like Kendall, for
Goodfriend, India's cultural debasement could easily have described the entire
society and explained India's political susceptibility as well. Like the other
journalists, Goodfriend's opinion of Gandhi was one of incredulity that the
British power could be challenged by "this little man in a wrinkled
dhoti."[loincloth] With this insight into India, Goodfriend wondered "how a
handful of Englishmen could rule so vast, so populous, so mysterious a land"
and concluded that it was the wealth and power of the British which sustained

the empire. Consequently, Goodfriend concluded that "odds against

62

independence seem too great."55 The mental and physical limitations of the
Indians translated into their political susceptibility as well. By focusing on
Gandhi's stature and attire and not on his political phiIOSOphy, observers like
Goodfriend could not conceive Gandhi as a political force but only as a symbol
of India's emasculation. Consequently, most observers were left uncomfortable
with and unconvinced by India's political aspirations. Whether such a society
could succeed in winning the respect of the American policy makers would
remain questionable. In the eyes of these observers, India's problems lay in
its social and cultural retardation making it responsible for its own
colonization.

These American journalists deployed the same images and arrived at the
same conclusions about India. The sight of the sacred cows and the underfed
masses, in essence, described and explained India. In fact, these Observers
seemed to have come prepared to find certain familiar sights and focused
almost exclusively on them in order to understand India. Unlike Mayo and
Kendall, Farson, Miller and Goodfriend did not seem to be overt admirers of the
British but rather reluctant endorsers of their rule. However, in their
assessment of India, they did not differ from the two women writers.

From the Western perspective, it seemed that India would become
capable of self rule only by abandoning the 'sacred cow’ and the ‘wrinkled
dhoti.’ Yet, at the same time, Indian tradition and culture seemed to enervate
the Indian will, thereby making it impossible for the Indians to emerge as a
dynamic, modern people. India, in fact, seemed to make the British seem
capable and needed administrators. The concepts of 'self-rule' and 'democracy,’

derived from the West and deployed by the nationalists, were never given

¥

:5 Arthur Goodfriend, The Twisted Image (New York: St- Martin, 1963) 51-53-
7-62.

63'

credence because they fell beyond the image of an India with which the
American Observers seemed comfortable. A vigorless, culturally debased,
otherworldly, slow-moving, politically“ infantile image of the Hindus
dominated these discussions.

In the opinion of these observers, there was no acknowledgment of a
current American interest or even an anticipation of any future interest. The
issue Of India's independence remained primarily a British problem. The
Americans were detached observers who, in viewing India, tended to
emphasize their Westernness more than their American identities. Said has
observed that Kipling's India had an essential quality because he deliberately
saw India that way. He did not dehumanize the Indians, but placed them in the
protective orbit of the British rule. He also established absolute distance
between the whites and the non-whites.S6 Unlike the colonizer, who had
devised a paternalistic view of the Indians, the Americans did not have to make
this deliberate choice. Yet they accepted Kipling's image of India without
question. However, even when they adopted this vision of the Indians, they did
not acquire the affection for them in the manner of Kipling and could

describe the Indians only as "seemingly human."

Consuls

Until 1941 the United States did not have any representatives in New
Delhi, the seat of the British government in India after 1911, which was
possibly a symptom of India's political irrelevance to Washington. American
consulates, located in the three major cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras
dispatched reports periodically to Washington about India. These reports, in

general, did not sympathize with Indian nationalists or their struggle.

 

56 Said, Culture and Imperialism 132-161.

64

American officials remained ardent admirers of British rule in India. They
mingled primarily with the British and shared with them their reasoning
which conﬁrmed India's inabilities. This close association and affinity with
the British, in all probability, insulated the American consuls from the
Indians and prevented them from establishing independent opinions or
independent political interests.57

The reports presented by American consulates in India are another
indicator of American opinion of British rule and of the Indian nationalists.
In 1920, Consul General in Calcutta, James Smith, reported that “India is
governed wisely, justly, humanely” and the British civil servants demonstrate
“unselﬁsh spirit of sacriﬁce in the interest of India...”58 Smith did not present
the self serving and exploitative aspect of imperialism, but rather emphasized
the duty and sacrifice performed by the British towards India. Smith's
justification of British rule illustrates the complete identiﬁcation the consuls
made with the British.

The consuls not only endorsed British rule in India but also reiterated
British representations of Indian nationalism. Regarding the Indian demand
for independence, Consul General in Bombay, Charles H. Hathaway, reported
in 1921 that historically there was no sense of unity in India and the Indians

were not yet ﬁt to govern themselves. He noted that Gandhi was “purely a

 

57 Earl Robert Schmidt, in his dissertation American Relations with South
Asia, 1900-1940, presents the ﬁnancial state of the American consulates. He
points out that the consuls could not keep up with their German, French and
Russian colleagues, even though in Rangoon, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras
they had their own clubs. Their informational work was directed from South
Asia to Washington, but the publicity of American ideals and policies was left
to the missionaries and American public Opinion groups. 40-44, 370. Ph.D.
thesis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1955). This division of
responsibility could have removed any motivation from the consuls to
establish relations with the Indians, thus preventing them from expressing
American ideals and in the process recognizing their distinct identity.

58 Cited in Manoranjan Jha, Civil Disobedience and After (Meerut: Meenakshi
Prakashan. 1973) 23.

6S

religious leader” who was opposed to western industrial capitalist civilization
and who, by attacking the British, criticized the very “spirit of European
civilization." He also warned that if Gandhi’s views were endorsed, it “would
make completely impossible the rule of any western power,” and the faith in
the superiority of Asiatic idealism would largely exclude western inﬂuence in
the further development of Asia.59 What seemed primary to ofﬁcials like
Hathaway was the continuation of western inﬂuence in India. He did not
distance himself or American interests from the imperialist rather, he aligned
the Americans and the British as representatives of western civilized ideals.
Since American interest was lacking in India, the task of preserving western
inﬂuence was delegated to the British. Consequently, Gandhi could not be
observed as a nationalist trying to dismantle colonial rule but as a threat to
western inﬂuence in Asia. Like the other observers, these officials did not
develop an American perspective to evaluate the possibility of American
interest in India.“

The consuls further undermined Indian nationalism by presenting it as
a factionalized religious idea. Consul Wilbur Keblinger reported from Bombay

on May 26, 1927, that leaders of both Hindu and Muslim communities showed a

 

59 Ibid., 24-25.

60 Suspicion of western imperialism and racial inequality were dominant in
the minds of Indian leaders. At the time the consuls and other observers did
not distinguish themselves from the British, the Indians, too, did not notice a
difference between the two western powers. As early as 1917, Lajpat Rai, an
Indian nationalist identified an imperialist tendency in the United States.
Regarding racism be equated the plight of the 'negro' with that of the Indians,
both valued by the whites for their labor and services, but not their
leadership. The United States of America: A Hindu's Impressions and a Study
2nd ed. (Calcutta: R. Chatterjee, 1919) 117-118, 331. In 1927 Nehru articulated
similar thoughts about the United States. At the International Congress Against
Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels, he stated that the
problem in the near future will be American imperialism, even more than
British imperialism, or the two will join together to create a powerful Anglo-
Saxon bloc to dominate the world. in Sarvepalli Gopal's Jawaharlal Nehru: A
Biography v. 1 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975) 104 These ideas seem to have
aroused no concern among the consuls.

66

“woeful lack of sincerity.” He believed that the communal trouble was only
another symptom of the lack of life in the country.61 Keblinger emphasized
not only the religious divisions among the nationalists, but also their lack of
vision. The 'lack of life,’ inherent in the Indian society seemed to infect its
political behavior as well. Similarly, on April 30, 1927 E. Verne Richardson
reported from Karachi that politics in India was a ceaseless struggle between a
few leaders of the two chief religious communities for the "realization of
selfish interests regardless of any consideration of true nationalism."62 It
should be noted that at this time the consuls seemed to criticize Indian
nationalism in its totality and did not favor either community. With the
outbreak of the Second World War, this image was modiﬁed when the British
presented the Muslims as loyal to the British and, unlike the Hindus, a "martial
race," willing to fight in the war. Such representations were accepted by the
wartime American observers, as we shall see.

The inﬂuence Of British justifications to deny nationhood to India is
evident in the opinions expressed by the American consuls. On March 17, 1928
Consul Robert Frazer reported from Calcutta that India was not one nation but
was comprised of four stocks--Aryan, Dravidian, Semitic, and Mongol--
representing diverse cultures. He wondered if India was made a self-

governing dominion whether all these groups would continue to maintain

 

61 United States Department of State, Records of the Department of State:
Decimal File relating to Internal Affairs of India and Burma 1910-1920
(henceforth U. S. Consular Despatches) 845.001591.

62 According to Peter Van der Veer the Orientalists defined religious
community as a 'nation.‘ Indian civilization was supposedly founded on a
Hindu religious ideology and the Muslims were seen as not belonging. This
knowledge denied India and its inhabitants unity of common history and
common territory and questioned India's claim of nationhood. 24, 28
According to Talal Asad, historically, boundaries between the religious
communities in South Asia had been ﬂuid and the identities of members of
neighboring communities had overlapped. "Religion and Politics: An
Introduction" in Social Research v. 59, no. 1 (Spring 1992) 11. The consuls had
accepted the orientalist deﬁnition of India.

67

harmony among themselves. Whereas the British had emphasized religious
and social differences in questioning India's unity, Frazer added racial
divisions to deny nationhood to India. Frazer believed that the worst
indictment that critics of Britain could make against them was the
insigniﬁcant progress they had made in the education of the masses. 53
Frazer's criticism was not aimed at British imperialism in India but its
imperfections.

Another image which had acquired widespread acceptance among the
Americans was that of the physical weakness and docility of the Indians. In
maintaining the idea of this "gender identiﬁcation" the British played up their
need to be more masculine. While the British may have created the image of
effeminate and passive Indians, Americans posted in India readily adopted this
notion. This stereotype served well Britain's political purpose of justifying
their masculine assertion. over the passive Indians. American observers in
India tended to include themselves in this separation. Cyril L. Thiel, vice
consul in Calcutta, on June 8, 1925 reported on the subject of physical culture
and outdoor recreation in India. He believed that physical culture was
neglected in India and that it had taken the western world to demonstrate that
the pursuit of physical culture is an art that brings real happiness to
mankind.64 Francis Hutchins has provided insights into the value attached to
sports by- the British colonial officials. Sports were not viewed as merely
frivolous activities but served a larger moral purpose. Games provided the best
training in leadership and prepared the British to fit into the masculine

society of British India.65 A lack of interest in physical exercise provided

 

53 United States Department of State, U.S. Consular Despatches 845.00/618.
64 United States Department of State, U.S. Consular Despatches 845.4063.

65 Hutchins, 43-45. Hutchins points out that the notion of sports as providing
training in leadership may have had its origin among the British in India. It is
logical to assume that the Americans posted in India would adopt this

68

more proof of India's lack of masculinity and leadership qualities. These
characteristics which gave the British deﬁnition and helped distinguish them
from the Indians were also accepted by the Americans. Not only did it enhance
their own self deﬁnition but it also increased the distance between themselves
and the Indians.

Following the trend established by the British and adopted by the
Americans, the consuls reiterated India's lack of dynamism and innate
inability to change. On June 30, 1923 T. M. Wilson, the consul in Bombay, in his
report on matters of economic interest there, concluded that only after
spending time in this city was he convinced that the "rush and hurry" he ﬁrst
noticed was artiﬁcial. It was more a "disordered haste" with which people had
seized upon the new modes of living but in fact they were "slow to initiate and
adapt."66 Wilson's observations bring to light a denial of any aspect in India
which could disprove India's established characterstics. For the colonizer, this
approach could have been adopted deliberately, as Said has discovered in
Kipling. But for the Americans, the motives were not so tangible. The attitudes
adopted by the consuls suggest the controlling power of the knowledge created
by the colonizer. American observers, in keeping with British attitudes, tended
to define themselves by emphasizing their difference from the Indians. This
necessity could have prevented an American or any Western observer from
formulating alternative thoughts on India. An acceptance of any positive
element in India seemed to threaten the very image the West had built of itself
in this comparison. In this respect, the consuls aligned themselves with the
British, and while living in a colonial environment they seem to have adapted

themselves to the colonial frame of mind.

 

reasoning to define their own identity as westerners.
56 United States Department of State, U.S. Consular Despatches 845.50/9.

69

American officials, like the writers and journalists discussed previously,
clearly endorsed British rule in India as keepers of western inﬂuence in a
society which needed and required this intervention. They agreed with the
British that the Indians were unfit to rule themselves. Commenting on
communal riots between Hindus and Muslims, Consul Edward M. Groth reported
from Calcutta in 1935 that it was a “difﬁcult and thankless task which Britain
faces as a peace-maker in this country.”67 American interest in India’s
independence was definitely lacking at this time. In 1937, Cordell Hull, the
American Secretary of State, exempliﬁed this view when he stated:

...I, nor my country, would in any circumstances see
anything said or done which would weaken a single link
in the British empire; that it was the greatest stabilizer Of
human affairs in the world today; that it meant everything

to the future of human progress and civilization for the
British Empire to continue to function for the service of

the human race, as well as itself.68

The United States' lack of interest in India during this period is reﬂected
in this image of India. The acceptance of the British as propagators of human
progress helped solidify American approval of British rule in India. Clearly,
the Indian nationalists did not possess attributes of progress or civilization.
The inert masses and unlikely leadership meant that India's impulse towards
independence was lacking and misguided. For the Americans, this was not a
familiar world with familiar political behavior. A British brigadier informed
Goodfriend that the British ﬂatter, bribe and sometimes frighten the leaders--
maharajas, upperclass, and the educated,--while the rabble do as they are

told.69 The consuls may have endorsed British rule in India wholeheartedly,

 

67 Jha, 235.

68 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 v. 2 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1954) 13-14. Memorandum by the Secretary of
State (Hull) of his conversation with a Canadian Minister on the question of
Empire Preference on February 18, 1937.

69 Goodfriend, 57.

70

but the journalists seemed at best resigned to British justifications. These
assessments highlighted certain aspects of Indian society, which became the
focus for all observers, thereby, making it practically impossible to examine
India outside the framework of these images.

The impact of entrenched images is visible even among those who
seemed sympathetic to India. Writer John Gunter is one such example. His
assessment of India, published in 1939, establishes a link between pre-war and
wartime observations of India. Unlike most observers, Gunther found Gandhi
an astute politician and recognized his non-violent philosophy as a practical
weapon in an unarmed nation. But he also considered Gandhi a "slippery
fellow," and a "unique kind of dictator" who ruled by love. These epithets could
easily reinforce the accepted perception of the Indian mind as elusive and
Indian traditions as undemocratic without necessarily converting Gandhi into
a legitimate political force. Like the other observers, Gunther described India
as a land of caste, holy cattle, religious fanaticism and dissociated the Muslims
from this India. Gunther's distance from an eastern culture became apparent
when he distanced a westernized Indian, namely Nehru, whom he considered a
modern man of reason and rationality, from the colossal medievalism of India.
Gunther's Opinion of the British was also ambiguous. Regarding British
attitude towards communal tension in India, Gunther argued that as
humanitarians and men of the West the British deplored it, but as imperialists
they found it a useful convenience.7o Gunther, like Bromﬁeld, even though
critical of British imperialism, associated positive ideas with men of the West
and with men trained in western ways.

The Opinions expressed by these observers in India were mostly

 

70 John Gunther, Inside Asia (New York: Harper, 1939) 344-346, 354, 401, 403,
408.

71

adaptations of British views on India, primarily of Hindu India, and no
meaningful American distinction from the British is apparent. At this time,
the Americans seemed to observe India more as Westerners than as Americans.
Their opinions may not have directly contributed to the imperial condition,
but they certainly hindered any serious questions being raised about British
imperialism. The British, as colonizers, may have made a deliberate choice to
expose certain aspects of India, but the American observers seem to have
accepted these opinions unquestioningly, consequently making the images
more stark and uncontestable. In the process, these Americans may have added
a new vitality to the knowledge about India in the United States.

Americans accentuated differences with the "other" in order to make a
firm distinction between themselves and the Indians. This practice resulted
partially from the Americans being enamored of the British. But the
acceptance of their differences with India were also expressed by those who
were ideologically opposed to British imperialism and the decadence brought
on by that imperialism. American opposition to British imperialism never
became related to their Opinion of the imperialized. The western popular
image makers wrote about the Indians as if they were entirely devoid of life
and culture, thereby defining them collectively, but WIIIIOIII acknowledging
their humanness.

Before the outbreak of the war the Americans' justiﬁcation of British
colonial rule can easily be considered within the framework of Said and
Bhabha’s discussion of colonial discourse and within the framework of racist
ideology discussed by Hunt. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, these
observers had assumed superiority over India and focused on those images of
India which not only conﬁrmed India's inferiority, but also their own cultural

Superiority. They did not dispute the benevolence of the West in providing

 

72

‘progress’ to the colonized and they gave credit to Britain for preventing a
society from disintegrating into chaos. Consequently, nationalists like Gandhi
were denied legitimacy because their rootedness in India's stagnation seemed a
requisite for the West to retain its superior position. Before the outbreak of
the war, the United States may not have participated in the colonization of

India but the Americans certainly endorsed British rule in India.

Chapter 3

Perceptions Formulated in the 19405

America's involvement in the Second World War produced a change in
the American perspective on India. No longer was it feasible to Observe India
only as a ward of the British. The necessity of India's cooperation in the war
and America's disillusionment with British imperialism .held the possibility for
the wartime observers to reevaluate their existing notions about India. The
question to be addressed in this chapter is whether in light of these
developments, America's understanding of India deviated from the established
course. Were the wartime observers able to translate their misgivings about
the British to articulate distinct interests rather than continuing their

identification with the British and condoning their rule in India?

Journalists/Writers and Military Officials--l942-194S

With the coming of the war more correspondents, military and political
observers visited India and wrote comprehensively and extensively about the
Indian political situation. In fact, India's growing importance led to a deeper
probing into the Indian culture and society in order to evaluate the Indian
capability to contribute in the war and to understand Indian nationalism.

The manner in which these Americans observed India may not have
changed but some change had deﬁnitely occurred in the American attitude
towards the British. If the wartime observers continued to ﬁnd India incapable
and unprepared for self rule, many also articulated problems with British
imperialism. Opinions of some military ofﬁcials and journalists have been
Selected for evaluation in this section. Whereas, the attention of the military

Ofﬁcials centered mainly on the impact of political problems in India on the

73

74

conduct of the war, the journalists and writers extensively examined the
Indian society in order to assess India's ability to achieve independence. Those
Observers who questioned British imperialism developed a different
perspective on America's role in India. The military ofﬁcials, in particular,
separated themselves from the British colonial culture and professed a distinct
American self image and interests. In this respect, in contrast to the pre-war
observers, their evaluations of India produced different strains of thought.
However, in their basic conceptualizations of India, these observers assumed a
more encompassing Western identity which often blurred their self professed

distinctions from the British.

Military Officials

In general American military officials, posted away from the center of
power, did not view the British with admiration. Their misgivings about
British imperialism in India became more pronounced with Britain's reversals
in the war. To Fred Eldridge, who served with General Joseph Stilwell in the
China-India-Burma Theater, the British were not a distant but an immediate
reality, and his criticism was based on this reality. Unlike American consuls,
the military ofﬁcials assessed the British not as colonial administrators but as
soldiers. Consequently, their major concern was not British colonial rule in
India but ~British performance in the war. According to Eldridge, the "burra

"ﬂ

sahibs [British lords and masters in India] spent most of their time second
guessing their defeats in the war over glasses of gimlet. They lived a good life
and dismissed the Japanese as ‘bloody rats’ who would not last long against a

white man’s army even if that army was using brown men as cannon fodder.1

Evidently, Eldridge believed that the colonial rulers, instead of maintaining

 

1 Fred Eldridge, Wrath in Burma (Garden City: Doubleday, 1946) 18, 32.

75

western ideals of masculinity and purposefulness, had regressed into a
decadent mode of behavior, rejoicing in being "burra sahibs" to the natives,
blind to the war. On the other hand, Americans, unscathed by colonialism, had
retained their vision and purpose.

But if Eldridge presented a critical perspective on British colonial rulers
he also confirmed a lack of American interest in India. He pointed out that
Americans posted in India probably did not think much about the
contradictions Of fighting a war to free and democratize the white people
while maintaining imperial status quo for the imperialized brown people. In
this indifference Eldridge recognized a major threat to the inﬂuence of the
West in Asia. He pointed out that John Davies, Stilwell's political advisor,
feared the effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda of ‘Asia for the Asiatics.’
The incompetence of the British in the war and the growing anti-white
sentiment made Davies and Eldridge recognize the need to dissociate
themselves from the colonizer.2 Unlike the consuls, and most pre-war
observers, Eldridge had separated American interests from those of the
colonizer's. However, they did not seem to accept 'Asia for Asiatics.’

The problems Eldridge encountered with the British are visible in most

 

2 The fear of Pan-Asianism was expressed in both England and the United
States. Churchill on February 3, 1942, was concerned at the possible
consequence of Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to New Delhi. He foresaw a spread of
'pan-Asian malaise through all the bazaars of India.” In a memo, Lord Privy
Seal Clement Attlee stated that with Russia’s defeat by Japan the acceptance of
the superiority of the European over the Asiatics had sustained a severe blow.
He believed that the reverses sustained by the Allied forces would contribute
to the process that the East was asserting itself. (Nicholas Mansergh, The
Transfer of Power, v. 1 110-111, 114) The rise of Pan-Asianism had concerned
the Americans as well. Hull wrote in his memoirs that American position
among the Asiatic peOples would be adversely affected by a belief on their part
that 'we' were helping Great Britain maintain her imperial policy in the
Orient. (Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull v. 2 (New York: MacMillan,
1948) 1482.

The war had created this awareness among the Americans, which was
frequently expressed by American military ofﬁcials posted in Asia.

 

76

American observers associated with the war. John King Fairbank, who served
as Special Assistant to the American Ambassador in Chungking and the Ofﬁce
of War Information from 1941 to 1946, points to problems in the Anglo-
American alliance due to American disenchantment and suspicion of British
colonialism. He believed that the "outward show" of "servants and empire" was
accompanied with "fever and diarrhea." But the Indians ﬁgured no better in
his assessment. His criticism was not directed at all Asians but speciﬁcally at
the Indians. Unlike the vigorous, smiling Chinese, he found the Indians
timorous, cowering creatures, too delicate to fight. Unlike the Chinese, who
met the Americans on equal terms, the Indians remained servile to the
British.3 Isaacs presents the pervasiveness of this sentiment among the
American servicemen posted in Asia who addressed the Indians as ‘wogs.’
"Wogs were all those brown unsmiling people who cluttered up in a hot and
stinking country." To these men, Isaacs points out, adaptation to life in India
usually meant, in some form or another, a gradual acceptance of the idea that
"these miserable people were less than human."4 By referring to the Indians
as 'creatures,‘ these servicemen, like many American observers, had lowered
the Indians below the level of the accepted 'childlike' to a subhuman level.
Fairbanks seemed frustrated with India for not challenging its colonial
rulers aggressively. He distinguished the attitudes and characteristics of the
two Asian peoples but not their political and historical circumstances. His
assessment showcases the inability of Americans to relate their opposition of

British colonialism to its impact on the condition of the colonized. These

 

3 John King Fairbank, China Bound (New York: Harper and Row, 1982) 189-
192.

4 Harold A. Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967) 10-11.
William Fischer recorded in Life magazine that American enlisted men did not
like life in India though he contends that they were friendly to the Indians. "
Yanks Make a History in India" (January I, 1943) 11-14.

77

observers seemed to criticize imperialism for its debilitating impact on the
British character rather than show sympathy for the imperialized. Regarding
India, it was the inherent Indian trait of passivity and servility which
remained central to American criticism. It prevented men like Fairbanks from
regarding Indian nationalism as a symbol of resistance against the British.
Indians, ﬁxed in the image of cowering creatures, from a political perspective
demonstrated their inability to meet the West on equal terms, and from the
military point of view, could not be of material use. It is not clear whether
these American formulated their opinions independently or with the help of
British propaganda, but their opinion was likely to become a factor in
Washington. These Ofﬁcers would become inadvertent cohorts of British
colonialism even as they professed their differences from the colonizer.

John Davies' discussion of India focuses on a period in which Cripps
Mission led to a debate on India’s prospective independence. This period has
generally been considered the most active phase of American involvement in
India. But Davies pointed out that Stilwell had no one on his staff well informed
about India, yet counted on India as a vital staging and production area for
China. Americans were vaguely aware of India’s disaffection from the British
Raj, but had little knowledge of how seriously the British position was being
challenged.5

Davies, stationed in India, considered himself better informed about the
country. In his estimation, he was at the center of action whereas the ofﬁcials
in Washington, observing India from the periphery, lacked a true perspective
on India. Davies expressed his reservations about Roosevelt's suggestion to
Churchill, made on March 10, 1942, that Britain constitute for India an interim

government similar to the thirteen colonies in America under the Articles of

\

5 John Paton Davies, Dragon by the Tail (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972) 235.

78

Confederation. Davies reasoned that what had been good for American
colonists would not be good for Indian colonials, smoldering with "ancient
explosive antagonisms of race, religion and caste." Davies, with his insight
into India, disagreed with Roosevelt's acceptance of India as a nation because
Indians, with their "diverse outlook, subjectivity, persecution complexes,
yielded no coherent explanation of what India was."6 .

Davies' assessment of India suggests that the opinions about India
expressed by the war time observers had not changed. However, his views also
indicate that American interest in India had become linked to the change in
American perception of the British. On June 4, 1942, after the collapse of the
Cripps Mission, when the general American opinion of India had deteriorated,
Davies informed Stilwell that American presence in India contributed to
British domination and led the Indians to anticipate no political support from
the United States. On June 18, 1942, he informed Laughlin Currie,
administrative assistant to the President, that the British would not conciliate
unless prodded by Washington.7 The policies adopted by the American
administration will be analyzed in the later chapters. But, recommendations
made by ofﬁcials like Davies were based more on a recognition of America's
emerging differences with Britain in terms of their power and interests than
in acceptance of the Indian aspirations. The policy makers were introduced to
such criticisms of British imperialism, but these assessments remained
unrelated to opinions about India that were conveyed to them. In their
criticism of both Britain and India, Americans like Davies had discovered a
distinct self image and separate national interests, and informed the political

elite about this discovery. But their assessments, even though recommending a

‘

6 Ibid., 235.237.
Ibid., 238.

79

distance from the British, remained critical Of India. Davies wanted to preserve
America's image in India yet he criticized the Indians. These Opinions
prevented the policy makers in Washington from developing a defined and
clearcut policy towards India.

Edmund Taylor, attached to the South East Asia Command (SEAC),
examined the relationship between the British and the Americans in India in
1943, after the demise of the Cripps Mission. Like his fellow ofﬁcers, his
observations reaffirmed the problems American posted in Asia had begun to
articulate about the British. Taylor pointed out that to the Americans associated
with Stilwell's command, Lord Mountbatten was the "Glamor-Boy of South East
Asia" and a "Chocolate Sailor," an image contrary to the rugged masculinity
associated with the colonizer. The British may have created this image of
themselves but seemed to have lost it to the Americans. Free of formal imperial
trappings, Americans established a greater distance between themselves and
the British in terms of their own self deﬁnition and national interests. General
Stilwell. according to Taylor, did not believe in the goals of the empire and
avoided the appearance of the war as being fought between white and yellow
races. Taylor's view, that the Americans distrusted the empire, even those with
greater race superiority and color prejudice than the British,8 summed up the
general American attitude towards India. Even though acknowledging
problems with British imperialism, Americans stationed in India assumed a
prejudicial attitude towards the colonized.

Taylor's views about India are not neatly deﬁned but ﬁlled with
complexities and subtleties. He believed that political experts in the West had
built up a mythical Indian world composed of questions and themes instead of

‘

8 Edmond Taylor, Richer by Asia 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1964)
320 38-395 95.

80

human beings. He acknowledged that the West was living in insulation in
India, and that their only contact with the natives was through the bearer,
who shaped their image of Asia.9 Taylor displayed an awareness of the bind
the West had imposed upon itself regarding India. His observation are
revealing in that Americans stationed in India may have developed an
overarching image of the country based on preconceived notions and also
their limited access into Indian lives.

Throughout his account Taylor was conscious of images of India popular
in the West and seemed to resist the temptation to succumb to them. He
resolved the problem by displaying deﬁciencies not only in India but also in
Britain and America.10 Taylor was angered at the "cold, beefy arrogance and
sterility of British imperialism in India." He disagreed with the British logic
that Indians had no sense of public morality and were unﬁt to govern
themselves. He recognized the loss of Indian dignity at being slighted by the
British and in the process recognized the similar position the Negro was placed
in America.11 However, his criticism of British imperialism did not mean that
the Indians and the Americans could be absolved of their shortcomings. He
highlighted the American hypocrisy of ﬁghting for democracy abroad while
denying it to the Negro at home. He also pointed out the hypocrisy of the caste
Hindu for crying against British oppression while he himself oppressed the
Untouchable. India was the "pathological museum of modern society" which
exhibited every form of human aggression, every aberration of human reason
and every ideology of disunity. Whatever incurable separation of man the

Asiatic mind had failed to produce, the western mind supplied it in the

\

?0 Ibid., 150-151. 163-164.
11 Ibid., 28.150-151, 169.
Ibid., 5. 101-102.

 

81

institution of imperialism.12

In following this pattern of examination Taylor seemed to have freed
himself from the limitations imposed by British as well as American attitudes
towards India. Instead of merely targeting India he exposed inadequacies in
each culture. However, in his exposition of India he seemed unable to escape
from images to which he objected. Taylor reduced the stature of the British and
the Americans but proportionately lowered the Indians as well. He was critical
of western attitudes and practices, but regarding India, he focused his
attention on unravelling the Indian mind. In the process, he constructed a
psychological profile in which the irrational and aggressive tendencies
became a permanent fixture in the Indian personality which imperialism
merely compounded. Further, in a letter Taylor wrote home about India he
described witnessing "promiscous association" of man and beast. "There was no
sharp dividing line between the human and animal kingdom." Cows and dogs
were simply animal members of the Indian community.13 Perhaps
subconsciously, Taylor had resorted to the notion of India's promiscuity with
which many western writers of India were fixated. Mayo had concerned
herself with the resultant disease and physical unﬁtness of the Indians. In
contrast, Taylor let his observations stand on their own, open to
interpretations and inferences. Taylor had reproduced an image, perhaps
subtly suggesting what many American observers of India had overtly stated--
India's subhumaness.

Taylor continued to highlight those aspects of India which were
entrenched in the western thought. In the process he assigned to India larger

Asian tendencies and also singled out some defined Indian characteristics. He

\

12 Ibid., 168.
13 Ibid., 61.

82

believed that Asia was a land fettered by changeless tradition and misery. He
seemed resigned to the fact that India was unable to challenge British
imperialism and that it consoled itself with memories of ancient glory.
Further, Taylor conﬁrmed that in India progress was totally absent--Indians
were content to use the tools their forefathers used. Yet he also added that that
the slumber in Asia was constantly stirred by dreams of the future and
nightmares of the past. In the case of India he believed that "we go to India
expecting nightmares."14 However, despite acknowledging the trend in
western thought Taylor reproduced the same nightmares.

Like most observers, Taylor highlighted India's unwillingness and
inability to change. He reasoned that India's lack of progress was a result of its
culture which the Asiatic people were loathe to change. This aspect of India
had drawn relentless criticism in the West but Tayor chose to display tolerance
towards it. He pointed out that it was impossible to possess "soul value" and at
the same time devise methods of keeping track of efﬁcient running of the
locomotives. The same men who discovered the law of karma could not be
expected to discover how the atom can be split. He believed that Gandhi's
greatness was undoubtedly the byproduct of India's backwardness.15 Taylor's
assessment can be considered a resistance to the British justification to reform
the Indians and also an attempt to reinstate India's spiritual qualities which
most western Observers criticized. However, Taylor also imprisoned India in an
image of inherent stagnation. Since India possessed "soul force" it could not
achieve material growth. Undoubtedly, Taylor displayed tolerance towards a
Culture which possessed spirituality but which also exhibited "every

abberation of human reason." Unlike most observers he believed that West

\

14 Ibid., 48-50.186.
Ibid., 385. 394, 406.

83

could learn from India but his interpretations also implied that India could not
learn from the West. By pitting India's spirituality against West's materiality
Taylor subtly, but effectively, emphasized the "otherness" of India. Westerners
could venture into a materially stagnant India for spiritual rejuvenation and
then depart for their progressive and modernized cultures.

Among the military ofﬁcials selected for an evaluation, Taylor is the
only observer who provided a detailed assessment of Indian politics and
identified the Indian nationalists. However, he reiterated the generally
accepted opinions about them. Taylor considered Indian politics an emotional
and intellectual muddle. He was confused by the fact that the Indians revered
Gandhi but disagreed with his economics, admired Nehru but found him too
westernized. What could have been interpreted as a healthy pluralism in a
democratic society and a valid search for a national identity, was characterized
by Taylor as a 'muddle' in India. Taylor's vision of a land chained to the past
prevented him from accepting India as emulating western ideas and the
nationalists employing rational concepts to oppose white domination. It should
be remembered that Taylor wrote at a time when the Indian National Congress
had been implicated for irrationally rejecting the Cripps Mission. He conceded
that like most westerners he had considered Nehru self righteous and
unreasoning and criticized the Indian nationalists for frivolously rejecting
Cripps' proposals.16 Taylor blamed western interpretations of India for
inﬂuencing his views. However, in his account, he failed to provide an
alternative explanation. He atoned for West's misconceptions about India by
bounding the country in another stereotype--in the realm of spirituality.

Taylor believed that the British had consciously and deliberately

maneouvered to keep Indian politics divided. However, he also argued that

16 Ibid., 13,95,120-121,126.

84

without deliberate attempt the British rendered the Indian character weak and
ﬁlled the Indian mind with nightmares.” Even though Taylor denounced
British imperialism, he also affirmed the Indian character as irrational, weak
and dillusional. Imperialism could be dismantled but a mindset became a
permanent condition. Even though he acknowledged why not accept
contradictions and tentativeness of India; why not practice the noble
disciplines of bewilderment and irrelevance, he was unable to put these
recommendations to practice.18 As an American, Taylor could criticize
imperialism on moral grounds and question British right to rule India. but as a
westerner, imbued with entrenched images of India, he could not escape from
those interpretations. In the final analysis, Taylor shared his conclusions
about India with most Americans. He could not escape from what he objected
to--"When we despair of understanding Indian politics we are tempted to
conclude that they are desperate and so we create negatives."19

However, unlike most observers, Taylor also articulated problems with
American attitudes towards other cultures. He considered it an American
failure to believe that peOple did things for or against the United States and as
a consequence regarded India’s refusal to cooperate in the war a betrayal.2 0
This introspection remained more or less confined to Taylor. American
withdrawal from active involvement in India’s independence after the failure
of the Cripps Mission was a result of their sense of betrayal by India. But,
Opinions constructed by thoughtful observers like Taylor could not have
helped the Indian cause in America. Taylor was unable to bridge the gap

between India and the West.

 

 

‘7 Ibid., 151.

:3 Ibid., 166.
20 Ibid., 119.

Ibid., 164.

85

A major feature in the assessment of the American military ofﬁcials was
their contempt for British colonial rulers and criticism of their performance
in the war. These Americans were also conscious of the rise of anti-white
sentiment in Asia and desired to dissociate themselves from the imperialists.
But the Indian nationalists seemed unreasonable in their demands and equally
inept. The image of weak and servile Indians, enmeshed in old traditions,
surfaced repeatedly in most discussions. Most ofﬁcials did not view Indians as
individuals but lumped them together in this essentialized image. They
criticized the British but also remained uncomfortable with the Indians. The
two American opinions, one of the colonizer and the other of the colonized,
developed separately, inviting disdain towards both. Importantly, in
professing their distinctness from the British, these observers may have also
assumed that their opinions of India as independent constructions. In the
process, India had acquired an American perspective but one that was still

infused with popular western conceptions of India's people and culture.
Journalists

The American journalists who ventured into India during the war
concentrated on interpreting Indian nationalism. They relied on the study of
Indian society and culture in order to evaluate India’s aspiration for
independence. Unlike the military officials, the journalists remained
observers of the British and not their wartime colleagues. Consequently, they
viewed the British from a different perspective. Their views developed more in
the context of British colonial rule in India than in relation to their
Performance in the war. Their perceptions of India's culture did not change,
however, their attitude towards British imperialism inﬂuenced their response

to India's nationalism.

86

Eve Curie, a writer and journalist, visited India in 1942.21 Her trip
coincided with the Cripps Mission. Much hope was placed at this time in the
United States on the success of the Mission. Curie began her journey into India
with her confrontation with ‘Hindu’ nationalism which, she believed, desired
to establish Hindu domination in India. Interestingly, Hindu nationalism was
progressively acquiring a threatening, undemocratic. emotionally charged
image which was contrary to the passivity assigned to its followers. Curie was
disappointed with the Indian nationalists for failing to recognize the
signiﬁcance of the war and for spouting bitter hatred against the British and
Americans.22 But for Curie, the frame of reference was the committed French
resistance, to which she referred frequently. It was not the British but the
Axis Powers who were the real enemies. In view of this fact, the bitter hatred
the nationalists spouted against the British and Americans, in her account,
took on an irrational tone. Unlike the military observers, she did not criticize
British performance in the war or separate American interests from those of
the British. Instead she focused primarily on problems within Indian
nationalism. By presenting the nationalists as threatening and irrational,
Curie made the Indian aspirations even more suspect.

Even though the military observers questioned India's abilities, they
did not dissociate the nationalists from common people. In fact, with the
exception of Taylor, they did not even discuss the nationalist leaders. Curie, on
the other hand, added another dimension to the problems in Indian
nationalism. She presented two separate Indias, one Obsessed by its 'mystical

dream' and indifferent to the world, and the other, 'nationalist' India,

 

 

2 1 Eve Curie witnessed the fall of France in 1940 and worked for the cause of
F.l'ee France. Because of her pro-ally activities she was deprived of her French
cltizenship by the Vichy government. She went to the United States in 1941.

Eve Curie, Journey among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1943)
293-294. 413.

87

planning independence after the war. In the mystical India she found people
apathetic and believed that their poverty was responsible for their
indifference. Curie considered their poverty a result of poor administration
and inexpensive government of the British which had created unemployment
and illiteracy. However, Curie also pointed out that India's miseries were
compounded by superstition and religious fanaticism.23 Importantly, Curie
criticized the imperfections of British colonial rule but did not oppose the
institution of the British Raj. In fact, in view of her opinion of India, she
believed that the country needed British rule otherwise it would remain
trapped within its superstitions and traditions. Her observation of the
"secure"24 looking sacred cows conﬁrmed India's obsession with the past and
meaningless cultural traditions. Curie seemed unable to express any sympathy
for India and in her descriptions maintained an absolute distance from its
people.

In most evaluations, a powerful image of an indifferent and poverty
stricken India, adhering to obsolete traditions, provided conﬁrmation of the
country's regressive culture. These images received disproportionate attention
and prevented concrete debates about British colonialism from emerging. Most
observers did not present Indians as individuals but bound them within a
collectivity which defined India. But the presence of nationalism threatened to
undermine the assumptions of India's cultural and political stagnation. Curie

resolved the issue by presenting two distinct Indias, each unrelated to the

¥

23 Ibid., 409410.

24 Ibid., 297-298. Curie's lack of criticism of imperialism echoes the sentiment
0f I. S. Mill. Mill stated that "There are conditions of society in which a
Vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the
DCOple in what is speciﬁcally wanting to render them capable of a higher
Civilization." Despotism is required where "...there [is] no spring of
ﬁpontaneous improvement in the people themselves..." (I. S. Mill,
Representative Government [1861] Three Essays [1975] , p. 408-409. Cited in
Talal Asad "Religion and Politics... 12

88

other. This perspective diminished the scope and strength of nationalism. She
further presented the nationalists as firmly divided on religious lines,
proclaiming different political futures. To the Hindu dominated Congress
independence meant one India but not to the Muslim League. Curie further
undermined the strength of the Congress by presenting the Sikhs, the
untouchables and the princes as completely outside its fold, needing and
preferring British rule. With this insight into India Curie seemed unsure
whether the Cripps Mission could succeed.25 Interestingly, Churchill used the
same argument and the same language to describe the problem in India to
Roosevelt. Curie could have acquired this vocabulary from the British in India.
Importantly, by providing graphic images of apathetic and superstitious
masses, and a deeply divided nationalist movement, Curie undermined those
leaders who had so far been perceived as national spokesmen for India.
Furthermore, by concentrating on the Indians she deﬂected attention away
from the British.

Curie also presented the views of the nationalists, particularly the
Hindu nationalists, but at the same time exposed the hollowness of their claims.
She cited Gandhi’s views, published in the Harijan on May 24, 1942, criticizing
both the Americans and the British for lacking the moral basis to ﬁght in the
war until they withdrew their inﬂuence and power from both Africa and Asia.
But Curie- had already established the irrationality of the Hindu nationalists for
demanding independence at a time the war was being fought to preserve
democracy. The issue of growing anti-white sentiment in Asia, articulated by
the military ofﬁcials, did not concern Curie. She also introduced her audience
to Nehru's beliefs and his impressions of the United States by citing from

Nehru’s own writings. In a letter Nehru had written to his daughter in 1933,

25 Curie, 415. 438.

89

he had stated that the Americans were not colonizers but economic
imperialists, interested in creating an invisible empire. But Curie
marginalized Nehru's concerns by denying him the status of a viable political
leader. She believed that Nehru, like most Hindus she encountered, was
confused and evasive. He was unable to outline with precision a political chart
to iron out differences between the Muslims, untouchables and the princes.
She further undermined Nehru's legitimacy among his own people by
distinguishing him from other nationalists as a modern thinker of a "purely
western variety", "a Marxist socialist leader" of a medieval and deeply spiritual
India. India was in the heart of Asia and he was trying to solve her problems
with a western idea in a western way.26

The association Of Nehru's positive qualities with the West and his
negative aspects as part of his Eastern personality became a part of the
general American formula to understand Nehru. Nehru would be praised and
criticized accordingly. Perhaps it was because of the perception formed by
observers like Curie, that traditional and superstitious India would continue to
defeat Nehru’s ‘western’ attributes, which undermined Nehru's relevance in
the West. Furthermore, by denying Nehru a political status among his own
people, Curie delegitimized a leader who possessed those attributes which most
western observers demanded from the Indian nationalists. Trained under the
British system of education, imbued with Western ideas and values, Nehru
could have emerged as a viable candidate to assume power. But Nehru was
overshadowed by an even more powerful India made up of passive and

SUbservient masses.

\

26 Ibid., 420, 425, 428, 430. In an article titled "Nehru of India," John and
Fl‘ances Gunther reported that Nehru detested the medievalism of India. He was
n0t only ﬁghting the British but the entrenched ritualism of his own peOple.
Life Magazine (December 11 1939) 93-101. '

90

Curic's arrangement of Nehru's personality is particularly significant.
It introduces the reasoning applied by many Western observers to reaffirm
their convictions about India. Most Americans assumed that as a westemized
Indian Nehru would fail because he would not be able to identify with his own
peOple. But Nehru's western attributes also challenged British justifications to
continue their rule to further train and instruct the natives to adopt western
ways. Consequently, Nehru's eastern personality and his Hindu mind were
conveniently resurrected, to place him within the Indian tradition and raise
doubts about his convictions. Curie may or may not have developed this
argument deliberately, but her assessment does provide an insight into how
single mindedly India could be observed in the West. India's incompatibility
With the West and inability to change had been so overwhelmingly ingrained
in the western thought that any element which could disturb this image of a
ch angeless India was obscured or undermined.

Curie also presented the Muslim League and its leader Mohammad Ali
JitIllah as a factor in Indian politics. Whereas the American consuls in the
Pre —war period had described both religious factions and their political
ag<=ludas as unreasonable, Curie believed that Jinnah showed that the Muslim
1)“°l)lem was real and not a creation of British imagination. In view of these
fitltlings she concluded that the British did not follow the policy of divide and
rule but had taken concrete steps to create a representative government in
Itlclia.27 Curie's arguments regarding the Muslim demands were made at a time
when the British were introducing similar ideas to the American ofﬁcials in
V”’iishington. In view of all the problems identified with Indian nationalism,

American ofﬁcials commended the Cripps Mission, questioned the claims of the

QOrlgress and rejected Louis Johnson's espousal of the Congress' cause.
\

27 Ibid., 458. 464.

91

The images and ideas about India in the United States became more

pronounced in American newspapers during the period following the collapse
of the Cripps Mission. Herbert L. Matthews, correspondent for the New York
Times covered India from July 1942 to July 1943. During this period Gandhi
and Nehru were arrested for planning a civil disobedience movement.
American interest in India had ebbed and Matthews commentary on the
Indian society and political developments was a reﬂection of America's
disenchantment and anger at India's failure to accept Cripps' proposals.
Matthews wrote in a prestigious newspaper and his views found a receptive
audience in both the ofﬁcial circles and in the general public.28 His
Observations provide an insight into the investment Americans had made in
the success of the Cripps Mission and in its failure discovered anew India's
sOcial, cultural and political deﬁciencies.

Comments made by Matthews are indicative of how ﬁrmly entrenched
certain images of India had become in American thought; His impressions are
a reiteration of the accepted characteristics of India, only more vociferously,
comprehensively and authoritatively stated. In Matthews' account there was
no ambiguity or introspection. The rejection of Cripps' proposals was an
irrEi.tional act, a betrayal of American ideals and interests, an explanation of
which Matthews found in the Indian society itself. In Matthews' analysis, the
images of India, presented by the other observers came together in all their
dimensions to explain India's political behavior. He inspected India from a
s‘lIJerior and authoritative position and often lectured Indians on how to gain

9" eStern acceptance. He argued that unlike the Indians, as a foreigner, he was

\

f 8 Betty Miller Unterberger, “American Views of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and
he Pakistan Liberation Movement,” Diplomatic History 5.4 (Fall 1981)
Uhterberger considers Matthews' coverage balanced and objective. She also
points out that the State Department paid close attention to Matthews' reports

and respected his opinions. 313-336.

92

able to have some objectivity and to embrace a wide view.29 In this respect,
Matthews effectively silenced the Indians as subjective and inward looking
and denied them the capacity to deﬁne themselves or their interests.

In Matthews' vision there seemed to be a ﬁrm demarcation and an
impossibility of communication between India and the West. He pointed out
that it was in India that he realized how little ‘our’ Western philosophy applied
to the East, and how hopeless it was to try to foist upon the Asians a way of life
and government that did not conform to their profound beliefs and customs.
Asia's future was for the Asians to determine.30 This statement, even though
maintaining an absolute distance from the East, can be interpreted as an
aclcnowledgment of the aspirations of another culture to determine its own
futtxre. Matthews may have re-evaluated his position because this
acknowledgment is made in his later work. But in 1946 he seemed unable to
a<=<2ept, what can be understood as the failure of the West to reform the East.
“It was not part of our world, and we just did not care about it”.31

Matthews began his search for India in the "horrors of climate and
disease, of ignorance and ﬁlth," within which he discovered the 'Hindu,‘ whom
he considered both mild and full of hatred. The Hindu view was different from
‘Qurs’, they were inward looking, desiring an escape from life into
nothingness. Like most western observers, he wondered how could a British or
an American understand the sacredness of the cow. He concluded that India of
I{ipling’s time was still with "us and our wisdom lies in recognizing that

‘never the twain shall meet.”32 In accepting Kipling's dictum, Matthews

\

29 Herbert Matthews, A World in Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner,
1971) 154.

Matthews, A World in... 153.
31 Herbert Matthews, The Education of a Correspondent lst ed. (New York:
Harcourt. Brace, 1946) 215.
32 Matthews, The Education 226, 252, 263-264, 266 Indian nationalist Lajpat

93

unequivocally and completely affirmed his identiﬁcation with the British.
Concerns raised by the military officials about America's partnership with an
imperialist power were absent in Matthews. After the failure of the Cripps
Mission, American involvement in India was over. Matthews' assessment
represented a return to the tone adopted by Mayo and Kendall-~establishing a
stark distance from India and a complete identiﬁcation with the British.
However, the circumstance in which Matthews evaluated India was
different from the one in which Mayo and Kendall had expressed their
opinions. The war had made it impossible to ignore Indian nationalism. The
development of American interest in India had also disturbed the one-
dimensional views of India which Mayo and Kendall had constructed. But like
CUrie, Matthews could certainly marginalize the nationalists by describing
their constituency as limited and by separating them from the 'real' India.
Matthews deﬁned the 'real' India as composed of inarticulate masses
who lacked the capacity to understand the concept of democracy. These masses
re’lbresented overpopulation, malnutrition, religious taboos, and cow
pt‘<1btection,33 which prevented India from emerging out of its stagnation. He
blrattled the caste system for destroying the concept of human equality and

lll<incing an enervating fatalism in the people.34 Further, Matthews
\

I{ai was an astute observer of the West. He had observed that Americans in
g¢.11eral knew very little about India and mainly from Kipling and the

lssionaries. India was therefore seen by the world through western
sIDoctacles. He believed that the leaders of the Congress had never enlisted
sYulpathy for their cause anywhere outside England. They had never realized

e value of the world forces and the great sensitiveness of the English to what
the world thought of them. Lajpat Rai, Young India (New York: B. W.

\lebsch, 1917) 223. Rai had noticed this tendency as early as 1917 and
atthews in 1943 still relied on Kipling to understand India.

33 Matthews, The Education of... 325, 329-330.

34 In his discussion of Indological discourse Ronald Inden holds that the
essence of Indian civilization is just the opposite of the West. Caste is conceived
as India's essential institution which is both the cause and effect of India's low
level of political and economic development. People in such a society lack the
capability to shape or reshape their world. Ronald Inden, “Orientalist

94

questioned the idea of India as a unified nation by arguing that an average

Indian knew little about his own country. With this assessment Matthews not

only removed the masses from the reach of nationalism but made nationalism

seem a minor intrusion on an otherwise indifferent India. Interestingly, he

chose to provide evidence by reporting from the princely states which were

mostly loyal to the British. He reported on December 25, 1942, from the

princely state of Cooch Behar, that Gandhi and Jinnah were more names to the

peOple. He found no one who knew that Gandhi was in jail and none who could

CXpIain concepts Of ahimsa and swaraj [non-violence and independence], none

Who wanted the British to leave. Matthews believed that the masses did not

know what India was, the war had come vaguely to their ears, but they did not
Connect it with their lives.35 Matthews detached the masses from their

nEditional identity and located them ﬁrmly in villages. He constructed the 'real'

In(lia, which, without exception was ignorant of its leaders and their political
aspirations. As a correspondent of a prestigious newspaper, Matthews had
r eCourse to a vast readership, who were introduced to his version of India.
Matthews effectively established the enormity of the 'real' India and
affirmed its detachment from the nationalist forces. He denied the nationalists
the capability of changing India by arguing that the Old India, residing in
villages, would continue to defeat the impulse of a uniﬁed modern India.
Matthews provided proof by reporting from yet another princely state. He
believed that the Maharaja of Dholpur, although a member of the high caste,
was more in tune with the Indian peasants and artisans than the Cambridge

‘rained Nehru. Caste, astrology, sacredness of cows were accepted by him

¥

Construction of India,” Modern Asian Studies 20.3 (1986) 401-446. Matthews
seems to have adopted this interpretation of the Indian society.

35 Matthews, A World of... 157.

95

unquestioningly.36 The local prince had greater affinity with his people
because be identified with the real interests and traditions of his people,
whereas a westernized leader remained an outsider. Matthews' effort can be
seen either as a deliberate attempt to conﬁne India within a standard discourse
or as the inability of an American, or a westerner, to represent India
otherwise.

Further, Matthews rejected. the Indian National Congress's claim that it
represented India and that all of India wanted the British to leave. The
Congress, according to Matthews, represented only the politically conscious
Hindus in what he deﬁned as 'British India.’ Matthews proclaimed that his
work led him inevitably to explode the 'myth' that the Congress was known all
Over.37 He acknowledged that he did more harm in the United States by
harping on this fact.

Having established a gap between the nationalists, particularly the
COngress, and the masses, Matthews undermined the Hindu nationalists
tllemselves by trapping them in the well publicized stereotype of the Hindus.
Even though Matthews acknowledged the inﬂuence of the "despised West" on
t1‘lleir political beliefs, he undermined them by rooting them in an
eSsentialized India where religion controlled politics. Matthews argued that
unlike the West, politics in India was not a specialized system and the Indians
had different standards of honesty and morality. He believed that the Indian
mind understood only a more personal and elastic interpretation of law and
failed to appreciate western standards of logic. Naturally, Matthews found an

answer to Gandhi's irrationality in his ‘Hindu’ character.38 Gandhi's secret

\

36 Matthews, A World of... 158-159.
37 Matthews, The Education of... 274, 286, 288, 291.

38 According to Partha Chatterjee the idea that "Indian nationalism" is
synonymous with "Hindu nationalism" is not the vestige of some premodern
religious conception. It is an entirely modern, rationalist, and historicist idea.

96

had been to use religion as a political instrument in a country where religion
was the most powerful factor. Matthews believed that Gandhi's political
following did not rise from his political success but from his religiosity.39
However, Matthews did not specify the extent of Gandhi's following. Further,
adopting an encompassing western perspective, Matthews argued that Lord
Linlithgow and any other westerner would contend that Gandhi had no legal
rights but "emotional Hindus" could see only his greatness and holiness.40
David Spurr has recognized in the western observers, the celebration of their
own culture and the requirement of a single standard of economic and

Political organization to which all must aspire.41 Matthews certainly adhered

t0 this belief.

Matthews further undermined the Congress leadership by declaring
Gandhi dictatorial and dubbing other Congress leaders Fascists and Nazis.
l)1ll‘ing the course of the war, the association of the Congress with Fascism was

b(Diarld to make the Congress seem a threatening and subversive organization.

\

Like other modern ideologies, it allows for the central role of the state in the
modernization of society. Its appeal is not religious but political. 147 Social
gaseorch v. 59, no. 1 (Spring 1992).
9 Matthews, The Education of... 292, 293-294, 296-297. Louis Fischer, an
a(limiter of Gandhi, had made similar observations, only Matthews turned
andhi's religious appeal into sacrilege. Images and impressions presented by
I)e-Ople like Matthews, with which to discuss India have survived even today.
.aymond Cohen in his study dealing with effects of cultural differences on
lplomatic negotiations points out that United States founded in Age of Reason
dFmarcated Church from State. The passionate belief in progress has relegated
1mum] to the sidelines. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures
Washington: Institute of Peace Press, 1991). 125. On the other hand, Talal
sad contends that in narrating the history of modern civilization we mark
‘he separation of religion from the state as a crucial step in our liberation
fl‘om bigotry and superstition. But the separation has always involved links
between religion and public knowledge, moral identity and political
processes. Even in Western liberal societies "modernized religion" and "secular
culture" have supported each other in crucial, if often indirect, ways.
"Religion and Politics: An Introduction" Social Research v. 59, no. 1 (Spring

1992). 3.
40 Matthews, A World of... 170.
41 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire (Durham: Duke U. P., 1993) 62.

97

Matthews also believed that because of Gandhi, Nehru's great abilities,
idealism, patriotism and commonsense has been frustrated. He was kept in jail
because he followed Gandhi which Matthews considered Nehru's "weakness."42

Like Curie, Matthews emphasized the differences between Muslims and
Hindus and believed that the Muslim League was far stronger than any one in
the United States had realized.43 This difference between the two religious
groups, and a favorable assessment of the Muslims had been presented by the
British officials to their American counterparts at a time Cripps was
negotiating with the Indians. The acceptance of these Opinions is apparent in
both Curie and Matthews. Bromfield had presented similar views in the 19308.
However, these views seemed to have gained widespread acceptance in the
period of the Second World War. Matthews praised the Muslims for not having
religious and social traditions of renunciation and non-violence. Although
Matthews considered the Hindus brighter and more intelligent and even
acknowledged that the Rajputs and the Marathas, two regional groups
belonging to the Hindu community, represented the martial races, he still
concluded that the Hindus were not as good soldiers as the Muslims. 44

Unlike the military officials, who feared the growth of anti-white

sentiment in India and notified the officials in Washington of their concerns,

 

42 Matthews, The Education of... 300-304 Nehru had written in the Atlantic
Monthly in 1940 “India is far from America but more and more our thoughts
go to this great country, which seems, almost alone, to keep the torch of
democratic freedom alight, in a world given over to imperialism and fascism,
and violence and aggression and opportunism of the worst type.” Cited in
Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography v. 1 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975). 260-
261. Nehru's aim to separate the British and the Americans had not won a
convert in Matthews. In fact, Nehru's indecisiveness and lack of conviction
could remove the mantle of westernized from his personality. His articulation
of India's foreign policy objectives and opinions of the United States would fail
to acquire significance.

43 Unterberger points out that Herbert Matthews exposed the fact to the
Americans that Jinnah, the Muslim League leader was one of the most
important factors in the Indian situation. 313-336.

44 Matthews, The Education of... 281, 289, 308.

98

journalists like Matthews neutralized these concerns by exposing the
impracticality of Gandhi, and loyalty of the princes and Muslims to the British.
Such arguments enhanced the necessity of British rule in India. Matthews
was aware of the tensions between the Americans and the British, but agreed
with General Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief, that the British
had a long experience in India and had honorable intentions.“5 From the
perspective of the war, Matthews could not blame the British. He concluded
that the British picture was not all that black, they may not give India
independence, yet were efficient, honorable and just.46

A common element present in most assessments of India is that
problems in India were seldom associated with imperialism, but almost entirely
with the Indians themselves. The American critique of British imperialism in
India had never overcome American misgivings about India's society and
culture. Because India failed to live up to western standards, observers like
Matthews were unable to recommend the end of British rule. Matthews could
not fault colonialism but did question colonial attitudes. He pointed out that the
British civil servants were respected, liked, dedicated but kept themselves
secluded from the Indians.47 They felt superior to all including the
Americans. But Matthews argued that in the world of white people the superior
attitude of the British was not taken seriously since it was a part of the British
character. But in India they had adopted a condescending attitude. For the first
time Matthews observed the British as an American but failed to recognize the
similarity in his own attitude towards the Indians for which he criticized the

British. This lack of recognition in Matthews provides an insight into the

 

45 Matthews, A World of... , 176 The Congress had demanded from Cripps the
transfer of the defense portfolio to the Indians.

46 Matthews, The Education of... 288, 318.
47 Ibid., 171.

99

general inability of the Americans to view India with empathy. Their criticism
of the British remained unrelated to opinions they developed of India.

Another common feature among western commentators was their
observation of India's subservience which they presented as an
overwhelming trait. Matthews believed that the Indians had to outgrow their
sense of inferiority, "Americans find their subservience embarrassing."48 He
echoed sentiments expressed by many American commentators that the
Indians were living in ‘pathetic contentment,’ and would not find
independence until they recognized that they were Indians.“9 Matthews also
believed that when India achieved independence men like Nehru and Jinnah,
with their western ideas, would assume power and the process of reform would
begin, but would take generations to accomplish. Matthews did not go back to
India but was certain the Indians could not have changed in any fundamental
way.50 This certainty about India's inability to change set the tone for
observers of an independent India as well and will be examined in the next
section.

Matthews' views were markedly similar to those of the colonizer and his
justiﬁcations of the British rule similar to those provided by the British.
Unlike the military observers, Matthews made no attempt to distance himself
from the British or anticipate any future American interest. He only predicted
the inability of India to change. Matthews' biases may have contributed to his

Opinions but they also reﬂect the general American opinion, especially after

 

48 Ibid., 269 Matthews views are similar to those of Churchill who considered
the Indians 'baboos,’ (literally clerks, connotatively subordinate and
subservient) gross, dirty and corrupt. Leapold Amery wanted to instill vigor
in the Hindus. Amery believed that India needed an increasing "infusion of
stronger Nordic blood.” Cited in Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (New
York: Oxford U. P., 1978) 5-6, 356.

49 Matthews, The Education of 347-348.
50 Matthews, A World of... 179.

100

the failure of the Cripps Mission.

Opinions about India expressed by Matthews are similar to those
presented by many British commentators. Beverly Nichols, a British novelist
and a contributor to the Sunday Chronicle, has been selected for review to
illustrate the continuing parallels in British and American views about India.
Nichols' trip to India was a topic of discussiOn between Leopold Amery, the
British Secretary of State for India, and Lord Linlithgow, British Viceroy in
India. The former wrote on November 11, 1942, that Nichols would present
British attitudes toward India in a popular form especially in the United States
where he was considered a literary figure.51 After the publication of the
book, on August 16, 1944, Amery wrote to Archibald Wavell, who had succeeded
Linlithgow as the Indian Viceroy, that he agreed with Nichols' description of
the Hindus as 'sordid' and Jinnah as 'constructive.' Amery acknowledged that
in Britain and in the United States, Nichols accounts would be useful for his
frank opinion of the Congress and his 'flaying' of Gandhi.52 The
correspondence between the British officials is signiﬁcant because despite the
favorable reports sent by observers like Matthews, officials in Britain seemed
to want even greater exposure of such views in the United States.

In Verdict on India, published in 1944, Nichols reiterated popular
images of India. He reaffirmed India's stagnation in untouchability, illiteracy,
and in a pantheon of gods stocked only with "creatures of dream and

delusion."53 In contrast, Nicols believed that Linlithgow showed deep affection

 

51 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power v. 3. (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971) 236.

52 Ibid., v. 4 1207. Amery believed that it would have been better if the book
had been written more moderately and in better taste. Wavell agreed with
Amery, but acknowledged that the book appealed to a large class of people in
England and United States. Ibid., 1228-1229

53 Beverly Nichols, Verdict on India (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944) 28,
71, 74, 112.

101

for India, and knew its people far better than the average Indian. Nichols'
motive seemed to be to correct any misconception about British attitudes
towards the Indians. Americans had applied epithets like duty, efficiency, and
justness to commend British rule, but not considered them affectionate towards
the Indians. Nichols' task seemed to be to demonstrate a relationship of
affection between the British and the Indians. His motivation for writing the
book became more apparent when he accused the British liberals of applying
principles of western democracy to a country in which democracy had no
hope.54 Instead, Nichols emphasized the irrationality of the Indian leaders,
especially the paciﬁst approach of Gandhi. He believed that the Congress was a
fascist Brahmin organization, and only the Muslims and Jinnah could be
trusted. Nichols also attempted to silence any opposition by establishing a
unity between the United States and Britain, by pitting them against India's
bitterness directed against both powers.55

A common thread is visible in Matthews' and Nichols' assessment of
India. Both justiﬁed the ability of the West to better understand and represent
India. Both concentrated on exposing the Congress as a fascist organization
and presented the Muslims favorably. They presented India's incapacity and
unpreparedness to become independent, except that in case of Nichols, his
image of the British was untainted, perhaps in an attempt to counter the
growing resentment against British imperialism.

Nicols' account showcases the general tone western commentators

adopted towards India. However, it also indicates the presence of alternate

 

54 Ibid., 21,168.

55 Ibid., 37, 95, 184. Nichols was perhaps answering to criticism leveled at
Britain by Louis Fischer, Frances Gunther and Pearl S. Buck. Buck believed
that there were very strong unifying elements in India and that no people
can learn to self govern until they govern themselves. American Unity and
Asia (New York: John Day, 1942) 87, 89.

102

opinions which he attempted to address and correct. There were some
journalists and writers who broke away from the standard norms of discussing
India. They opposed British imperialism and expressed sympathy for India and
its nationalists. One such journalist was Louis Fischer who spent a week with
Gandhi in June 1942, after the Cripps Mission had failed to resolve the Indian
problem. Whereas Curie had criticized the elusiveness of the Indian mind,
Fischer praised the malleable and ﬂuid mind of Gandhi and commended Gandhi
for opening his mind and allowing Fischer to see how it worked. Unlike most
observers, Fischer found Gandhi a wise and shrewd politician whose sole aim
was to win India's independence. But it was Gandhi's profound religiousness
in "the most religious nation in the world" which, according to Fischer,
explained his preeminence. Fischer elevated Gandhi but at the same time
criticized his followers for revering Gandhi’s religiosity and not his political
objectives and nationalist aims. In Gandhi's village, Sevagram, he observed
that no one read newspapers or listened to the radio. In the final analysis,
Fischer reiterated Curie and Matthew's assessment that Indians in general
were oblivious of the outside world. But unlike Curie and many other observers
who praised the British for shaking India out of its insulation, Fischer did not
blame the Indians but considered it "one of the disservices of British rule." He
argued that "the Indians see England ﬁrst, and this picture close to their eyes
prevents them from seeing the world and the war."5 6

Fischer had broken away from the established opinion of Gandhi.
Unlike most observers who questioned the rationality of Gandhi's philosophy,
Fischer considered him a shrewd politician. However, he did not relate

Gandhi's political astuteness to his ability to mobilize the otherwise inert and

 

5 5 Louis Fischer, A Week with Gandhi ( New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1942) 66, 116-119, 121-122.

103

passive Indian masses into a nationalist cause. In this respect, like Matthews,
Fischer seemed unable to reconcile Gandhi's political role with his religious
appeal. It seemed inconceivable to western observers to perceive Gandhi
beyond his religiosity and to view him as instrumental in increasing the size
of the nationalist force by appealing to and identifying with sentiments the
masses best understood.

The accounts of both American detractors and admirers of Gandhi
indicate that Gandhi's spiritual appeal and political philosophy was generally
regarded in the West as outlandish and absurd. In 1931, the Reverend John
Haynes Holmes, pastor of New York's Community Church had discouraged
Gandhi from visiting the United States in order to protect him from the vulgar
curiosity of the Americans and also because Gandhi's non-violent philosophy
was considered strange by the Americans.57 Journalist Vincent Sheean
contended that any western mind acquainted with the ways of the world would
concede that Gandhi's ethical and moral teachings were much too ascetic.5 8
These admirers may have understood Gandhi's spirituality and political
astuteness at a personal level, but seemed unable to display Gandhi's political
viability in the context of India. Perhaps inadvertently, Holmes emphasized
Gandhi's alienness by comparing him with Nehru. Holmes explained Nehru's
differences with Gandhi by presenting Nehru's mind as systematically trained,
more in tune with western than eastern ways of thinking. Holmes believed
that Nehru could understand Gandhi only when he adopted Gandhi's way of
thinking.59 Holmes praised Nehru for this conversion but, in general, Nehru
was criticized for accepting political directions set by Gandhi.

Journalist Frances Gunter, like Fischer, broke away from the standard

 

57 John Haynes Holmes, My Gandhi (New York: Harper, 1953) 54, 58.
58 Vincent Sheean, Lead, Kindly Light (New York: Random House, 1949). 242.
59 Holmes, 145.

104

interpretation of India and presented an alternative view of Indian
nationalism. Gunther not only criticized the British but also expressed
sympathy for India. She found the English oblivious to the needs of the people
they ruled. She disagreed with the accepted British representation of the
inherent differences between Hindus and Muslims and considered Gandhi and
Nehru 'great' politicians and praised the Congress for giving guarantees of
equality to all. Gunther seemed intent upon establishing a complete
separation between the British and the Americans. She believed that unlike
the British, the American troops were friendly and sympathetic to the
Indians.60 Gunther's book was published at a time when American
involvement in India was over. Her effort to present India and its nationalists
positively was, in all probability, an effort to rekindle support for India in
America.

Similarly, journalist Edgar Snow also presented views which opposed
British imperialism. In contrast to Curie, Matthews and Nichols, Snow believed
that the British had manipulated the Indians in order to maintain their rule.
He remained unconvinced when informed by Lord Linlithgow that the Indians
had no political sense, and that when the British withdrew India would break
up. Many observers of India had agreed with this argument, but Snow doubted
this reasoning. He believed that India .would soon not be the same again, not
for Britain, not for any white man. He believed that the era of privileges and
pretensions of racial superiority was over. But, unlike most observers, Snow
was not threatened by this proposition, ‘In fact he seemed sympathetic to the

aspirations of the Indians.61

 

50 Frances Gunther, Revolution in India, (New York: Island Press, 1944) 15,
21, 27, 75, 88, 90, 105.

61 Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958)
272, 383. According to Snow Nehru's argued that why should the Indians help
vanquish the Japanese on the mere assumption that brown imperialism was

105

Snow may have questioned British imperialism, however, he was unable
to present an alternative image of India. India continued to be evaluated
within the framework of the established images whether by those who
sympathized with or those who questioned India's political aspirations.
Interestingly, Snow sympathized with India's nationalism but did not contest
the established cultural image of India. He saw India as full of contradictions.
It was the mother of civilizations and the harborer of barbaric customs, of
sacred cows and communal hatred. Within it ‘caste’ stood as a formidable
barrier to understanding, fellowship, cooperation and exchange of social
graces not only between Hindus and Muslims but also among the Hindus
themselves.62 Snow once again demonstrated the inability of western
observers to view India outside the conﬁnes of an overpowering image. Even
though he opposed Linlithgow's argument, be yet presented the same
reasoning to question India's ability. India may get rid of the British but
lacked the capacity to change from within.63

In the eyes of American observers of India, whether in sympathy or
criticism, an overpowering image of India had been created beyond which no
explanations seemed possible. These commentators trapped themselves as they
trapped India, in an image. They assigned characteristics to an entire culture
without discovering individuals or complexities in the relationship among

various people. Instead, they rigidly compartmentalized Indians into caste and

 

worse that the white one. 22. According to John Maxwell Hamilton, Snow
empathized with nationalist movements but also believed in America's
superiority. He was exasperated with Indian belief that every problem in India
stemmed from British imperialism. Edgar Snow: A Biography (Bloomington:
Indiana U. P., 1988) 2, 138.

62 Edgar Snow, People on our Side (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1945) s, 12,
20.

63 David Spurr believes that the journalistic eye is not always so clearly or
consciously the instrument of colonial authority, it can be used to resist
authority. But even in sympathy his gaze is commanding, a product of deeply
held colonial (in this case western) values. The Rhetoric of Empire 20.

106

religious affiliations. Most observers were disappointed with India for not
following the norms they could understand. In contrast to the rational and
balanced West, Hindu India emerged as mystical and otherworldly, operating
under emotional extremes, at once both fanatical and passive. Their depictions
of a fractionalized and divided nationalism and the domination Of the Congress
by a fascist Hindu leadership prevented the nationalists from emerging as
reasonable and viable alternative tO the British especially during the course of
the war. The accepted premise that India was changeless, rooted in
meaningless traditions seemed to make it impossible to view nationalism and
even the western educated nationalists as representing change. The
comparative framework which these observers adopted Obstructed them from
viewing Gandhi's strategies in the Indian context. Consequently, the concerns
and opinions Of the Indian nationalists could not assume any signiﬁcance or
create any concern. Such depictions of India left the United States ill prepared
tO deal with independent India except with the help Of the established images.

However, an element that distinguished war-time observers in India
from their pre-war compatriots was a shift in their opinion Of the British.
Ideologically Americans opposed British imperialism, and in this recognition
emerged an American self definition, untainted and free Of an imperial
mindset. India's independence, in this context, was acceptable tO some
observers. In this respect, during the period of the war, different thoughts on
India had begun tO emerge. However, even when sympathizing with India's
nationalism, these observers were unable to provide an alternative view Of
India's culture. In general American disillusionment with the British
developed independently of their conception of India. Importantly, whether
in questioning imperialism or in agreement with the British, American

Opinion of India was being constructed independently Of the British.

107

Post-Independence Views--l947-l949

The pervasiveness of India's images in the United States can be best
realized in the examination of American opinions Of independent India, when
the circumstance of both countries and the global situation had changed.
Matthews did not expect India to change and his contention can be tested by
examining the representations of independent India.

In this section, opinions Of one American writer and one American
Official developed during the initial phase Of India's independence will be
examined. The intention is tO assess whether India's independence evoked a
fresh examination in the United States, or did perceptions already formulated
continue to guide American understanding Of India? The idea Of India's
independence had remained foreign to almost all Observers, and the new

observers now expressed their discomfort with independent India.

Writer

Two distinct impressions about India that had emerged in most
discussions were its rootedness in the past and a gap between the masses and
the nationalists. Both images had questioned India's ability to establish a stable
government and make social and economic progress. Writer John Frederick
Muehl, who presented his impressions Of India immediately following India's
independence, noticed both aspects in India. He discovered that even though
India had broken away from the British it was still an India Of the past. In
Interview with India he Observed that the independence day speeches he
heard in Bombay were made in English which the masses could not
understand, “...it was their independence, but not their language." Muehl

reafﬁrmed the Indian leaders inability to communicate with the masses not

108

only in terms of ideas but language as well. Moreover, the leaders did not offer
change, but reaffirmed the traditional order. The country was led by
"degenerate traditional leaders," the feudal lords, brahmins and princes whose
common interest was to preserve the status quo. They spoke of "Asian
tradition" and damned the "materialism of the West" while they themselves
adhered to traditional abuses. They had left the old order of the British empire
intact vying with "spirituality," "leprosy", and "caste."64 These leaders,
according tO Muehl, justified poverty, which they claimed, the villagers were
accustomed to because they lived in the "realm of the spirit." The leaders were
divorced from the people by barriers of caste and class--whether a Brahmin or
a Maharaja--and the Congressmen [the Indian National Congress had assumed
power with Nehru as the Prime Minister] blamed their ineptness on the Indian
masses. Nehru spoke of freedom of the people yet jailed editors of newspapers
for criticizing him.65 In general, Muehl found the new government "weak,

stupid and jealous of its new power."66

 

54 John Frederick Muehl, Interview with India (New York: John Day, 1950)
4, 8-9.

65 Said in Culture and Imperialism points out that nationalist thought in India
was inﬂuenced by realities Of colonial power and led to an elitism of the
intelligentsia. In the streets nationalism was led by those created by the
colonial power who replicated old colonial structures in new terms. National
identity struggling to free itself from imperial domination found itself lodged
in by the state, armies, ﬂags and national education. 217, 223, 264 In this sense
there is validity to Muehl's argument. But he still continues to use old images to
explain new realities. The nationalists were not old relics of India's traditional
past but products of western education and western interpretation of India and
had adopted western Opinions to critique India. In that sense, the nationalists
were attempting to dismantle what Muehl identiﬁes as India's rottenness
though he prefers to include the nationalists in it. Furthermore, Muehl, like
other observers had totalized the masses as passive and inert, with no
acknowledgment of any difference in regional or political groupings. The
Subaltern Studies groups have challenged this totalizing vision. They are
attempting to restore agency to common people in an effort to rectify the
elitist bias. They accuse both the colonists and the nationalists of robbing
common people of their agency. Their contention is that subalterns acted in
history on their own and independently of the elite. See The American
Historical Review (99:1 February 1994) for a discussion on Subaltern Studies.

66 Muehl, 13, 17;1s, 299, 300.

109

Muehl seemed impatient with India’s inability to liberate itself not only
of British inﬂuence but from its own cultural bind. As an American Muehl had
dissociated himself from the decadence of both British and Indian social and
political culture. The earlier observers may have been inﬂuenced by the
British but opinions of independent India had become distinctly American. In
emphasizing India's social and cultural deficiencies. like the other observers,
Muehl ignored India's imperial past and the possible consequences of
colonialism on its lack of development. India had barely achieved
independence, yet Muehl had already predicted India's stagnant future.

Turning to the grass roots, Muehl found people as sick and as
degenerate as their surroundings, a response similar to that of Matthews, who
had also considered both the land and the people miserable and unappealing.
Like all other observers, Muehl singled out Hinduism and the institution of
caste as the cause of India's debasement and reinforced the irreversible
distance between the culture he belonged to and the culture he observed. He
was appalled at statements like "it was my fate to be born where I was" and "it
is hard for a westerner to understand [but] this subjugation of the body is a
tradition of Hinduism." He found no organized and responsible protest against
the institution of caste. The whole country was emasculated by a "twisted
religious law, deprived of its very will to live by an elaborately rotten social
code." "A phenomenon of mass hypnosis, a constant suggestion of inferiority
and guilt-living in superstition," resigned in the K arma, not concerned about
economic development or questioning economic problems. Misery, squalor,
death and disease were all accepted not as necessary evils but as laudable
instruments of gods retribution The cause of this debasement for Muehl lay in

villages, palaces and especially temples.67

 

67 Ibid., 30, 42, 190. 261-262. 301.

110

It was in India's inability to change and discard old tradition that Muehl
discovered the reason why Britain had exercised power for so long. The image
of India had not altered. Even independent India's politics and economic
practices had been subordinated to its strangulating cultural, religious and
social practices. Muehl had essentialized India, leaving no possibility of
difference or deviance. The newly independent nation was denied the
opportunity and ability to create a viable political, social and economic order.
The difference was that the British no longer managed this society and the
Americans had assumed the role, to criticize and instruct.

Muehl’s solution was a revolutionary leader who did not harp on "the
glorious tradition of India" but who could tear down the rotten props of old
India. But like Matthews, Muehl concluded that "perhaps Asia was already
beginning to prove that the progress of the race is not inevitable."68 This
image of India, reafﬁrming a cultural gap between the East and the West, has
successfully survived in political and academic discussion even today. In
Negotiating Across Cultures, Raymond Cohen has examined American
relationship with non-western societies. Regarding India, he presents this
interaction as a confrontation between America's individual and India’s
collective impulses. The former’s adherence to a Protestant concept of
predestination led to equality, a free market economy and democracy, while

the latter's rural traditions emphasize caste, cooperation and subordination of

 

68 Ibid., 300, 302. According to Bhabha this recognition of difference of race,
culture, history as elaborated by stereotypical knowledges, racial theories,
administrative colonial experience, institutionalizes a range of political and
cultural ideologies that are prejudicial and discriminatory. Homi K. Bhabha
"Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism," in Francis
Barker et. al. eds. The Politics of Theory (Colchester: University of Essex, 1983)
209. Regarding the Indians, Roosevelt had stated that "...racially the mass of
Indians were really cousins of us Westerners." Thorne, Allies... 158-159 But
Muehl did not share Roosevelt's ideas and seemed to have relied on the
stereotypical knowledge about India and emphasized racial differences.

111

the individual. In America if the past obstructs progress, it is discarded while
in non-western societies there is a pervasive sense of the past.69 When such
ﬁxity is assigned to any society, Muehl’s conclusion, that progress of a race is
not inevitable, becomes an accepted fact. Every aspect of India can be
explained as rooted in its past and a product of its cultural and social and even
racial characteristics.

Muehl’s India lacked progressive impulses. The cause of it was the
suffocating effects of caste and the Hindu obsession with the otherworld. With
an inept leadership and the masses trapped in the grips of suffocating
customs, India could not take a leap into the future. Independent India
continued to exist in ignorance and in passive acceptance of its condition. A
lack of vitality was responsible for the prolonged British rule and could
definitely inspire others to take control. The policy makers adopted this

reasoning when fear of the spread of communism became predominant.

Official

George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South
Asia, and Africa division of the State Department, was the ﬁrst major ofﬁcial
responsible for South Asian affairs who interacted with independent India and
its leadership. The opinions he expressed about India in his memoirs showcase
the ofﬁcial view and the context in which American policy makers understood
independent India. McGhee acknowledged in Envoy to the Middle East that
much of what the Americans had learnt of what be deﬁned as the 'Middle
World’ was interpreted by the colonial powers. No one in the State Department

had time for "these strange countries" which had been the outposts of other

 

69 Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington: Institute of Peace
Press, 1991). 23-24, 29.

112

empires. McGhee did not fault British colonialism and commended Britain's
withdrawal when the colonies had been prepared for self government. In this
evaluation, McGhee ignored the role of Indian nationalism in India's
independence. He acknowledged that Americans knew appallingly little of the
people and their contacts were still with local ofﬁcials trained in colonial
patterns.70

McGhee visited India in 1949 and expressed his opinions about India in a
vocabulary used by the American writers and journalists and by the British.
His description of India was short but authoritatively written, in which
predominant images of India stood out starkly. He noticed the cows, which, he
informed his reader, were holy to the Hindus. The cows were protected, but
were a miserable looking lot. Holiness did not protect them from labor.
Regarding the Hindu religion, he presented the Brahman as the "passive"
universal spirit of the Hindus.71 Within this terse description of the Hindu,
McGhee had summed up India in its entirety. There seemed no need to Observe
anything else. The image of the passive Hindu controlled by a passive religion,
which sapped him of his worldly endeavors, had become the accepted norm of
understanding India. The sacred cow seemed to reﬂect the very essence of the
Hindu culture. McGhee’s suggestion to limit American resources because of the
failure of South Asians to make economic progress 72 can ﬁnd a resonance in
the failure of Hinduism itself.

McGhee's encounter with Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, once again
reveals the reliance Americans placed upon their understanding of Indian

culture in order to decipher Indian politics. Opinions about Nehru, formed

 

70 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle East: Adventures in Diplomacy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1983) 6-8, 12.

71 Ibid., 103.
72 Ibid., 279.

113

over a period of time now ﬁnd a ready audience in McGhee. Nehru's observers
had to wrestle with two aspects of his personality, the man imbued with
'westem' values and ideas versus the 'Hindu Brahmin,’ a product of his familial
traditions and beliefs. Most observers were unable to reconcile the two and the
'Hindu' aspect of his personality emerged whenever his policies or political
philosophy became contrary to the western interests and were recorded with
extreme negativity.

McGhee reported that Nehru "rambled on" while McGhee "kept waiting
for something substantial that I would be able to report. There was nothing."
McGhee sought an explanation for it in the peculiarity of the eastern mind. He
wondered whether it was a result of the difference between the "inner
working of the Indian and the Anglo-Saxon minds." Nehru's mind "just did not
go from cause to effect or progress from a to b to c as mine did." McGhee
reasoned that "Perhaps the Indian mind, particularly after centuries of coping
with conquerors, has adapted a more cautious and circuitous line of reasoning
than prevails in the West."73 The understanding developed earlier by
observers like Kendall, who did not ﬁnd Indians forthright but elusive and
illogical, "a mixture of realness and unrealness" was applied by McGhee to
assess Nehru and in it McGhee rcasserted a gap between the West and India.
McGhee deﬁned himself as an Anglo-Saxon in order to distinguish himself
from the Indians. This self deﬁnition is perhaps an indication of the general
attitude employed by the State Department ofﬁcials to discuss non-western
cultures. The irrationality and lack of logic that had been assigned to the
Hindus had now found a place in defining Nehru. Nehru was no longer
perceived as a product of western education, propagating western ideas and

values. He was ﬁrmly placed in the Hindu orbit. His failure was no longer that

 

73 Ibid., 100, 106.

114

of a westernized man, unable to establish an identification with his own
people, but a man rooted in his own culture, unable to identify with the West.

At this time Americans expressed their disapproval of Nehru's adoption
of a non-aligned policy, perceived as a threat to the American policy of
containment of Communism. Nehru, according to McGhee, by professing the
policy of non-alignment was "hiding his head in the sand." He believed that
Nehru adopted this policy to maintain his "mystical role" as the leader of an
ex-colonial developing nation.74 A tradition seems to have been established to
explain any contrary aspect of India in its culture. It could prevent McGhee
and other officials from examining Nehru as a leader whose beliefs and
interests may have been more 'practical' than 'mystical.‘ Following the
established trend, McGhee accepted the Muslims easily and favorably. He was
impressed with the Muslim leaders of Pakistan. He liked Pakistan's Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "As a man you could do business with him." "They
sought our aid on our terms compared to the wishy washy neutrals they were a
breath of fresh air."75 With his insight into India and its leadership, McGhee
concluded that permanence of democracy in India could not be taken for
granted as long as people were illiterate and poor and 'untouchability'
survived.75

The images that were constructed of India in the pre-independence
period seem to have become part of American Ofﬁcial and popular vocabulary.
India was assumed to be otherworldly and weak and incapable of imbibing
western dynamism and rationality. Its inability to survive on it own had

become an accepted fact. These images would be consistently reiterated but

 

74 Ibid., 295-296.

75 Ibid., 93-94, 97. Henry Kissinger echoed the same sentiments when he met
the complex Hindus and the simpler, more direct Moslems. White House Years
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) 842-843.

76 Ibid., 424.

115

rarely disputed.

The most noticeable element in the Observation of the Americans is the
singularity of vision and uniformity of images and metaphors to describe
India. The passive masses and the sacred cow seemed to represent India in its
entirety. Indians were rarely perceived or presented as individuals and were
generally confined to a social and cultural collectivity. India's nationalism
became an integral part of this culture represented by Gandhi or separated
from it like the westernized Nehru. Later Nehru, too, was wrested out of his
western identity and placed within the traditional Indian orbit. India's
rootedness in the past and inability to identify with western dynamism and
rationality had been firmly established. India's acquiesence to western
interests and objectives seemed essential to win respectability. India's
rejection of the Allied war objectives, the Cripps Mission and American
proposals to combat communism brought forth entrenched social and cultural
images to the forefront. Some shifts had occurred in America's vision of India
but beneath it a rigidly deﬁned image had survived.

The American observers, in general, established a firm gap between
the West and the East and later, speciﬁcally, between themselves and the
Indians. In accepting this distance, they resorted to the same images of India
as those constructed by the British, which over a period of time, had become
accepted American opinions as well. American distinctness may have emerged
in opposition Of British imperialism but the reasons behind this opposition, in
the context of India, were never established. The Americans reevaluated their
own ideals and interests but conﬁned India to an essentialized image. These
observers were the primary informers about India but were also reﬂectors of
the western view of non-western cultures. In their observations, American

ofﬁcial response towards India during the wartime crisis can be anticipated.

Chapter 4

Official Perspectives on Wartime India

The interest of American policy makers in the politics of India did not
materialize until the outbreak of the second World War. The general image of
India available to them was of a society which would disintegrate if the British
gave up control. But with the outbreak of the war, the Indian problem was
thrust upon the American policy makers. India's aspiration for independence
had to be given consideration. But the policy makers' perspective on India
developed under different conditions from that of those Americans who
observed India from within, especially those who associated with the British as
fellow soldiers and not as diplomats. The policy makers' distance from India
and its colonial culture and close association with British officials in
Washington and London had a significant impact on their attitudes towards
India.

Three major factors can be considered significant in the American
policy makers' view of India. To begin with, the primacy of the war and

concerns of their British ally would receive major consideration.1 Indian

 

1 American interest in India developed at a time when Nazi victories in Europe
in the summer of 1940 had weakened French and Dutch empires and
undermined the British position in Asia. America wanted to prevent Japan
from affecting British abilities in Europe and lendlease was given to China to
keep it involved in the Paciﬁc war. See Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant
Belligerent: American Entry into World War II 2nd ed. (New York: Dell, 1962),
Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941
(Ithaca NY, Cornell U. P., 1958), Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: the American
Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton:
Princeton U. P., 1953). Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (New York:
Oxford U.P., 1978) : Akira Iriye believes that importance of Asia in the United
States increased in order to prevent aJapanese assault on the British empire.
Churchill gave freedom to the United States in Japan in return for total control
of the empire, Cold War in Asia: a Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1974) and The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1977).

116

117

scholars M. S. Venkataramani and B. K. Shrivastava believe that the Indian
nationalists had little understanding of the special relationship between
Britain and the United States and that American policy makers held the British
in considerable esteem.2 This contention leads into the second factor, which is
American perception of British imperialism. Phillip Darby brings out the
difference in the perception of the two western powers regarding the British
empire. He contends that British imperial system proceeded on the assumption
of the centrality of British empire in world affairs, while Roosevelt conceived
the empire as a threat to world peace.3 But Britain, according to David
Reynolds, had been central to the deﬁnition of American values and identity.
The American image of the British, during the war, took shape as part of the
debate about American identity, about nationalism and cultural values.
Britain's colonial policy evoked particular criticism in the United States, even
though Americans lacked any substantial knowledge about the colonies.
Reynolds points out that the British had also become concerned about the
intrusion of American culture into Britain which, they believed, eroded the
foundation of 'civilized life.'4 Clearly, the relationship between the two
western powers was being reevaluated during the course of the war, in which
American identiﬁcation with the British struggled to come to terms with their
emerging self image and role in the world. The British had also begun to

recognize the growing military, cultural and economic power of the United

 

2 M. S. Venkataramani and B. K. Shrivastava, Quit India: The American
Response to the 1942 Struggle (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979) 10.
Arnold A. Offner contends that the United States was suspicious of the British
empire but also considered it important to sustain Britain as the ﬁrst line of
defense. The Origins of the Second World War and United States Foreign Policy,
1943-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1975).

3 Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American
Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970 (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1987) 82-
83.

4 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-
1945 (New York: Random House, 1995) 34-35.

118

States and feared American encroachment in the colonies. These reevaluations
lead into the third factor--American perception of the non-western world.
Darby contends that at no stage in American history did Asia and Africa
represent a natural unit of reference to the Americans. Aside from China and
the Philippines, the rest of Asia had impinged little on American
consciousness. Darby believes that much of the moralizing about self-
determination and evils of colonialism was facilitated by American remoteness
from actual issues. Moreover, America's incentive to observe overseas was
lessened by American reliance on their own experience and values and their
self conception loomed even larger in Asia and Africa.5

The Second World War can be considered a period of reevaluation in
which the Americans wrestled to come to terms with their identiﬁcation with
the British position in India and their own emerging power and distinct
interests. This tension between the two points of view, one identifying with
Britain and the other critical of the colonizer and promoting American values,
had emerged in the American observers in India. The military Officials,
closely associated with the British war effort, had begun to profess America’s
distinctness. The journalists also present two diverse views, one sympathetic to
the British and the other opposed to their rule in India. However, these
observers remained unified in their opinion of India's culture and politics.
The tension between the emerging American self image and traditional
relationship with the British can be anticipated in the policy makers as well.
Distanced from and generally ignorant about India, they were reliant upon
the available information on India. In this respect, their perception Of the
information providers, mainly the British, and their recognition of their

growing power both had an impact on their understanding of India.

 

5 Darby, 142,186,223.

119

Official Review of India in the Early Stages of the War

The political situation in India had become complicated due to the
policies instituted by the British. The decision of Lord Linlithgow, the British
Viceroy of India, to lead India into the war was not accepted by the Indian
National Congress (henceforth Congress) on the grounds that India was being
forced into the war without prior consultation and without popular consent.6
The Congress argued that India would not participate in the war to defend
British imperialism. A free and democratic India would ﬁght willingly with
other free nations.

India had become an important base for the Allied forces to launch
offensives into Burma and to send supplies into China. In this respect, India's
willingness to co-operate in this endeavor and to resist Japan had become
important factors. If India's cooperation required independence for the
country, then such a policy had to be pursued. The question that had emerged
was how much was the United States prepared to invest in Indian politics.
American policy makers had to grapple with the issue of their relationship
with an imperial power who was also their major wartime ally. These
evaluations were further complicated by opinions about India and its
nationalism which were conveyed to them.

The records indicate that the major discussions about India by the

American policy makers were conducted almost exclusively with their British

 

6 According to C. S. Venkatachar, who served as an Indian Civil Servant from
1922 to 1961, the imperialists had no understanding of the sentiments of Indian
nationalism. The Conservatives had sent Linlithgow, a landowning aristocrat,
who believed that the abiding purpose of his class was to rule India and that
their rule would endure for as long a time as he could foresee. "1937-47 in
Retrospect: A Civil Servant's View" in C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen
Wainwright ed. The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970) 477.

120

counterparts. In this respect, American officials had made themselves
dependent on British ideas about India. Furthermore, the administration of
Roosevelt had to contend with Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister,
who seemed particularly unwilling to relinquish control over India. Cordell
Hull, the Secretary of State, has stated in his memoirs that it was a delicate
question as to how far the United States could go in any representation to
Britain to grant independence to India or in any action that might encourage
the Indian demand for independence:7 Hull's statement is indicative of
American official reluctance to interfere in India or open channels of
communication with Indian leaders. Any consultations they deemed necessary
would be directed to England. American ofﬁcial interest in India was largely
dependent on the American view of the British. Indian aspirations had not
emerged as signiﬁcant in themselves.

America's lack of interest in Indian politics is exemplified by the fact
that until 1941 there was no American ofﬁcial representative in New Delhi,
the seat of the British power. Although, American ofﬁcials acknowledged the
necessity they left the initiative with their British counterparts. It was only
when the British Embassy in Washington proposed to attach to its embassy an
Indian official with the rank of minister to deal with non-political questions,
that Hull raised the issue with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in
Washington.8 Hull's concern was not India's politics but the efﬁcient
transactions of ofﬁcial business and the implementation of the coordinated
war programs.9 Consequently, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai was appointed as the

Agent General of India in Washington and Thomas M. Wilson, the Consulate

 

7 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull v. 2 (New York: The Macmillan,
1948) 1482.
3 Lord Halifax had served as Viceroy Irwin in India from 1926 to 1931.

9 Memorandum by Hull of a conversation with Halifax. Foreign Relations of
the United States (henceforth FR) 1941, v. 3, 171.

121

General at Calcutta, became the American Commissioner in Delhi. Wilson’s
appointment was approved by Lord Linlithgow, the British Viceroy in India.
He informed Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for India, on March 16,
1943 that no Indian knew or cared what Wilson did or said.10

During the early stages of the war American ofﬁcials did. not seek to
undermine British authority in India. On September 16, 1941, Under Secretary
of State, Sumner Welles requested George Winant, American Ambassador in
Britain, to inform the British ofﬁcials that "Our primary interest, of course, is
the establishment of effective representation in complete accord with the
wishes of the British Government and the Government of India."11 Regarding
the importance of the British empire to the conduct of the war, Roosevelt
informed Joseph Grew, American Ambassador in Japan, that Britain had the
advantage of its empire on which it could depend for resources and prevent
the enemy from concentrating full force in Europe.12 In such a climate, any
Opinion or policy recommendation which threatened British rule in India had
little possibility of succeeding.

The ﬁrst major State Department review of the situation in India took
place on May 5, 1941, when Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle addressed
the issue in a memoramdum to the Secretary of State.133 The discussion
centered on India’s relevance to the war effort. Berle reported that India had
manpower and a strategic position but was contributing little to the war effort.

He believed that India exerted a vast inﬂuence upon the affairs of the Middle

 

10 Linlithgow to Amery, March 16, 1943. Nicholas Mansergh, Transfer of
Power v. 3, 818.

11 FR, 1941 v. 3, 174-175.

12 FR. l941v. 5, 6-8.

13 The Opinions expressed by Roosevelt, Hull and Welles about the British were
not shared by Berle. According to Berle there were many men in the State
Department who accepted the British without developing a strictly American
point of view. Cited in Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1978) 111.

122

East and its status was of interest to all the surrounding nations. The degree to
which, and the methods by which, India became integrated into a common
cooperative effort of free peoples would affect the attitudes of the Middle
Eastern countries. Berle recommended bringing India into a partnership on
equal terms with other members of the British Commonwealth. But he also
emphasized that the United States should disclaim any desire to intervene in
the affairs of the Empire.14 Berle did not seem to share the general ofﬁcial
deference towards British rule in India. He approached this issue by
emphasizing India's potential role in Asia independent of the British. In this
respect, Berle did not focus on popular images of India and its nationalism
when he proposed independence for India. Instead, he directed his efforts
toward presenting an independent American perspective on India and invited
American ofﬁcials to recommend policies to Britain.

Berle's recommendations inﬂuenced Hull to raise the issue of India's
independence with Halifax. In response Halifax pointed out that the Indians
had self-government in the provinces and that the British only managed
India's national defense, foreign policy and general ﬁnance. He also stated
that Hindus and Muslims were at odds with each other and that any future
concessions were neither feasible nor necessary.15 Hull did not dispute
Halifax's claims. He seemed to lack curiosity about India's dissatisfaction

despite the concessions made by the British. He was either unaware of the

 

14 Berle to Hull. Draft Aide-Memoire enclosed to Hull and Welles. FR,
1941 v. 3 176-177.

15 Memorandum by Hull of a conversation with Halifax, May 77, 1941. FR, 1941
v. 3, 178. The Government of India Act of 1935 had given autonomy to the
provinces. In the 1937 General Elections, Congress had won majority in 7 of 11
provinces. In November 1939 Congress had resigned because of British
unwillingness to give guarantees on India's post war status. The British policy
of providing limited self government has been considered a British strategy to
seek Indian collaborators and to reduce Indian political aspirations to local and
provincial levels.

123

political situation in India or merely deferred to Halifax's assertions. Both Hull
and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles considered it inappropriate for
Roosevelt to raise the question of India with Churchill. Welles reiterated
Halifax’s belief that any change in the situation in India would lead to internal
dissension.1 6

From these discussions it becomes evident that ofﬁcials like Hull relied
almost exclusively on the British for any information on India.17 Among the
higher ofﬁcials, there seemed to be no reevaluation of the American position
in relation to the British or a recognition of American interests in India
independently of the British. The British, therefore, were in a position to
convince their American counterparts about the inability of the Indian
nationalists to form a stable government and the necessity of British rule to
prevent India from erupting into chaos.

However, American Ofﬁcials, in view of the war effort, had to take into
account the growing opposition to British imperialism in Asia as well as in
America.18 On August 1, 1941, American Ambassador in London, John G.
Winant, suggested to the State Department that the United States might try to
persuade Britain to grant Dominion Status to India. Winant pointed out that the
issue was important because Australia and New Zealand were disturbed by
Japan's successes and wanted the United States and Britain to increase their
security net. Winant believed that if the Indian situation was solved, a friendly
India along with China would become significant factors in deterring Japan
in the Far East and would serve as a bridge between the East and the West.

Winant also argued that Opposition to British imperialism in the United States

 

15 Ibid., 186. Memorandum by Welles to Hull.

17 According to Martin Weil, Hull expressed no desire to reform anything
except tariffs and he had few independent opinions. Moreover Roosevelt
ignored Hull and preferred to consult with Welles. A Pretty Good Club 75, 87
18 See Thorne, 59-61.

124

was largely directed at the political situation in India and hindered support for
Britain. In view of these considerations Winant recommended Dominion Status
for India.19

Winant's recommendations, like those of Berle, indicate the presence of
a different perspective in the official assessment of India's independence.
Both emphasized India's independence in terms of its impact on the war effort.
Winant did not bring into discussion the question of India's capability to form
self government. In fact, he did not even include Indian nationalism or the
Indian society in his exposition. In both Berle and Winant's proposals India
seemed to be a convenient site to impress upon their superiors the
development of an independent American perspective free of the British
connection. On the one hand, Winant wanted to improve the British image in
the United States: however, on the other, he also emphasized America's ability
to 'persuade' Britain to grant Dominion Status to India.

Winant's recommendations led Berle, on August 5, 1941, to suggest that
the State Department raise the issue of India with the British government.
Consequently, a telegram was drafted on behalf of Roosevelt, addressed to
Churchill, recommending that India be given Dominion Status: thereafter,
India, Australia, New Zealand and China would enter a defensive alliance for
security in the Far East. But the telegram was withheld as both Hull and Welles

opposed any intervention by Roosevelt. They argued that the President should

 

19 Winant to Hull. FR, 1941 v. 3 178-179. Australian diplomats had expressed
concerned about British complacency and disorganization in Asia especially in
Singapore and Hong Kong. See Thorne, 55-56. American military ofﬁcials had
also made similar observations. Regarding American criticism of British
imperialism, Halifax reported to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary,
that the appointment of an agent general of India coincided with an increase
in American interest in the Indian political situation and in an increase in
criticism of British policies. Thomas E. Hackey, Confidential Dispatches:
Analyses of America (Evanston: New University Press, 1971). Halifax to Eden,
June 26, 1943. Political review of the United States for the year 1942. 65

125

raise the issue of India personally and conﬁdentially with the British Prime
Minister.20 Hull believed that Britain was ﬁghting for her life and the United
States could not impede her struggle. In contrast to Berle and Winant, Hull was
convinced that cooperating with Britain, India could be of immense assistance
in Britain’s defense, while working against the British, it could become a
"frightful danger."21 Hull did not acknowledge the American ability or
interest to recommend or persuade the British to grant independence to India.
A more deﬁned American perspective on India had emerged only among those
officials who promoted American interests independently of the British. They
did so by emphasizing India's potential role free of the British connection. But
those who had been introduced to problems in Indian politics did not dispute
the British position. They believed that India would better serve in the war
under British guidance. A reevaluation of the American position regarding
India was so far conﬁned to those ofﬁcials who were either distanced from
Washington or had little control over political decisions.

America's unwillingness to become involved in India was tested when
on September 9, 1941, Churchill made a statement in the House of Commons
that Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, stating that the subject people have a
right to choose their own form of government, applied only to countries under
the Nazi yoke and not to the empire. This statement was contrary to the
proclamation made in August 1941. According to Hull, Roosevelt did not agree
with this interpretation but had no desire to engage in any altercation with
Churchill.22 However, Winant objected to Churchill's proclamation. He

reported from London on November 4, 1941 that such a declaration ran

 

20 Memorandum by Berle to Welles. Memorandum by Welles to Hull, August 6,
1941.FR, 1941 v. 3 180-181.

21 Hull, v. 2 1482.
22 Ibid., 1484.

126

counter to the general public interpretation in the United States and would
intensify charges of imperialism against Britain.23 But Winant's superiors
seemed convinced of the positive aspects of British colonial rule in India.
Welles informed Hull on November 15, 1941, that the British had been
governing India for over a hundred years and understood the country and its
problems. Welles believed that Halifax had been "the most liberal viceroy in
India," and agreed with the British Ambassador that there was a consensus of
Opinion among the British civil servants, most experienced in Indian affairs,
that any immediate change in the status of India would create internal
dissension in India on a very wide scale, beyond Britain's capacity to cope.
Welles argued that Britain had better a understanding of India than the United
States. Unlike Winant, he did not believe that Churchill's proclamation meant
much to public opinion in the United States. He believed that if any action was
taken by the Americans, Churchill would consider that the United States was
taking advantage of Britain’s dependence upon the United States.24

Welles’ argument illustrates the impact of popular ideas about India on
the attitudes of ofﬁcials in the State Department. Welles may not have
reiterated images of India presented by Mayo and her like, but he had
certainly accepted their justification of British rule in India. A century of
British rule in India testiﬁed to Britain's understanding of India and its
capability to manage India's political problems. Welles identiﬁed Halifax as the
‘most liberal’ viceroy and therefore an acceptable authority on India. This
acceptance seemed to have made it unnecessary for Welles to propose an
independent evaluation of India. Welles' view of the British brings to light the

difference in attitudes of the ofﬁcials in Washington and the American

 

23 Winant to Hull. FR, 1941 v. 3 181-184.
24 Ibid., 186-187.

127

military ofﬁcials posted in India. Observing British colonial rulers from a
distance, Welles accepted them as just and wise, whereas the military officials
saw them as decadent rulers and inept soldiers, and proposed a separation of
interest. Welles' views also indicate that anti-imperialist sentiment in the
American public in the context of India, as suggested by Winant, may not have
been so widespread as to demand a change in policy.

Thomas Wilson, American Commissioner in India, further conﬁrmed
Welles' contention that Churchill's statement could be disregarded. Wilson
belonged to a community of consuls in India who had a long established
tradition of admiring British rule in India and disregarding Indian
nationalism. Wilson reported to Hull on November 28, 1941 that the
considerable prominence which American press gave to Churchill's statement
regarding the application of the Atlantic Charter to the colonies had not been
reﬂected by any section of the Indian press. He reaffirmed Roosevelt’s
popularity in the Indian press and discouraged an American response to
Churchill's comments because they were of "infrequent occurrence."25

Moreover, the officials in Washington had to contend with the British
Prime Minister who seemed unwilling to give up control over India. When
Churchill was in Washington in December 1941, Roosevelt raised the question
of India’s independence. Churchill recorded in his memoirs that be reacted so
sharply that Roosevelt never raised it verbally again.2 6

During the early stages of the war no concrete policy towards India
had emerged in the State Department. In the initial reviews in the State
Department, the discussions had centered vaguely on India and its nationalists

leaders were not identiﬁed or their aspirations given consideration. The

 

25 Ibid., 188-189.
26 Winston s. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: 1950) 209.

128

position of those who believed in the necessity of British rule in India, the
importance they attached to British experience and knowledge of India had
prevailed. Signiﬁcantly, no speciﬁc image of India or criticism of the Indian
nationalists had yet emerged, perhaps an indication of a lack Of interest in
India among the ofﬁcials. Even those who prOposed independence for India did
so to advance America's independence from the British and not out of any
special regard for the Indian nationalists.

Edward Said, in his discussion on Orientalism, has stated that the
knowledge created about the orient provided both power and knowledge to the
West which meant for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it.’27 Said’s argument may be
directed at the colonizer, in this case Britain, but by accepting the colonizer’s
position, American Officials had accepted the justiﬁcation of British rule in
India making it difﬁcult for India to be examined beyond the knowledge about

India conveyed to them by the British.

Growth in American Understanding of India: the British Role

American acquiescence to the British was largely related to the conduct
of the war in Asia. A reversal in the Allied position held the possibility of
changing the American perspective on British rule in India. With American
involvement in the war, in the wake of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the
possibility of a reevaluation of American opinion of the British and relatedly
of the Indian nationalists increased. However, American reliance on British
Opinions along with views circulated by the pOpular media largely determined
the development of American Ofﬁcial Opinion of Indian nationalism.

During the course of the war the British officials were becoming

 

27 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 32.

129

increasingly concerned at the possible development of American interest in
the empire, especially in economic matters. Leopold Amery, the British
Secretary of State for India, wrote to Linlithgow on January 5, 1942, that Hull
wanted to use lend-lease as a lever to compel Britain to abandon Imperial
Preference. “We in our anxiety to secure Lease-Lend and bring America in
[the war] have never had the courage to say straight out that Imperial
Preference is not merely a matter of economic policy but a national political
right of British Commonwealth.”28 Fearing American involvement in India, it
would also become necessary for the British officials to discourage the
Americans by presenting the Indian nationalists, particularly the Indian
National Congress, as immaterial and subversive.29

With Japan's successes in the war and the fall of Singapore on February
15, 1942, the situation in India became a matter of greater concern to the
American policy makers. Progressively, the Allied forces faced greater
adversities in the Paciﬁc War. They were forced to relinquish the Dutch East
Indies. By March 8, 1942, Rangoon fell to Japan and by early April Japanese
forces threatened the eastern borders of India. The assumption of British
ability to control the nationalists and successfully conduct the war was now
tested. With active participation of India becoming imperative, the United
States was forced to reevaluate its own position regarding India. In this
respect, their impressions about Indian nationalism became a major factor in

deciding American policy objectives towards India. The major focus of the

 

28 Amery to Linlithgow. Mansergh, v. 1 7-8. The policy of lendlease was
developed by Roosevelt in March 1941 to provide material and ﬁnancial
assistance to the Allies.

29 According to Darby, there was little to suggest that world Opinion about
India inﬂuenced London before the First World War. But in the period leading
up to the Second World War, anti-colonialism in the United States jolted the
British out of their complacency. 107. In the case of India, American ofﬁcials
may have made anti-colonial pronouncements but seemed unwilling to become
involved.

130

Americans was on the Indian National Congress and its leaders, Gandhi and
Nehru. The question arises, would the Congress get an opportunity to address
American leaders itself or would impressions and images provided by the
British ofﬁcials gain precedence in any discussions about India.

Americans officials may have lacked a substantial understanding of
India and only recently begun to evaluate Indian nationalism but in Britain,
the images of India, discussed in the previous chapters, remained central to
their evaluation of India. Views expressed by Churchill, Amery and Linlithgow
provide insights into ideas about India they would introduce to American
officials in Washington. Churchill was convinced that the Indian troops were
loyal to the British king and that the "ﬁghting races" would not tolerate the
rule of the Congress and the "Hindoo Priesthood” machine. He did not
anticipate any problems from the Americans because of their involvement in
the war. Linlithgow, on the other hand, believed that the morale and ﬁghting
value of the army was more important than the American Opinion. Like
Churchill, Amery was convinced that India’s war effort was dependent on
Muslim support and active assistance of the Congress would not make much
difference to India’s fighting strength. He hoped to expose Chiang Kai-shek,
the Chinese leader who had become concerned about the political situation in
India, to the "niggling impractical creatures" Nehru and Gandhi were.30 The
British intention was clearly to prevent any outside interference by revealing
the true character of the Indian nationalists. Indians, particularly the
Congress leaders, had already been accepted as impractical 'creatures' by the

American observers in India, but so far this sentiment had not been echoed by

 

30 Ibid. Churchill to Attlee, January 7, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1 14. Linlithgow to
Churchill, February 14, 1942. 170. Amery to Linlithgow, January 10, and
February 2, 1942. 20, 108. Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February-March,
1942.

131

the American officials.

It is noteworthy that the British strategy was not only directed towards
exposing the ‘Oriental’ to the West as its opposite31 but was also directed
towards another ‘Oriental’ power, namely China, which had begun to question
British rule in India in the context Of India's participation in the war.
Churchill wrote to Chiang Kai-shek on February 3, 1942, and emphasized the
importance of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League. Churchill
argued that Jinnah represented eighty million Muslims, who, unlike the
Hindus, were a martial race and were loyal to the British.32 In contrast, the
Hindus were characterized as non-martial and passive people, irrelevant to the
war effort.

Similarly, differences between Hindus and Muslims were reiterated by
the British officials in India when Chiang Kai-shek visited the country.
Linlithgow informed Amery on February 20, 1942, that he conveyed to the
Chinese leader the importance of the Muslims in the army and "exploded
Gandhi’s myth."33 But the British strategy apparently failed to convert
Chiang Kai-shek to their point of view. Instead, the Chinese leader expressed
his concerns to Roosevelt regarding India's military and political situation. He
believed that only when the British handed power to India would they be able
to win Indian loyalty.34 The British had failed to deflect Chiang Kai-shek's
attention away from the issue of India's independence. The Chinese leader

seemed unconcerned about the differences between Hindus and Muslims. He

 

31 Said, Orientalism 38.

32 Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek. Mansergh, v. 1 113-114. Churchill on
February 3, 1942, expressed his concerns at the possible consequence of
Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to New Delhi. He foresaw a spread of ‘pan-Asian
malaise through all the bazaars of India.” Ibid. v. 1 110-111.

33 Ibid., 213.

34 The Chinese Foreign Minister (T.V. Soong) to Roosevelt, enclosing the text
of the telegram dated February 24, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 604-605.

132

focused primarily on India's confrontation with Britain and believed that
India's independence was imperative.

The issues that concerned the Chinese leader were also expressed in the
United States Congress. At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting in
February 1942, there was a noticeable expression of anti-British sentiments
and promotion of America's growing power. The Committee argued that even if
the Americans equipped the Indians with arms, the Indians would still not be
encouraged to fight merely to prolong British rule in India. The Committee
reasoned that America had provided Britain with lendlease and had achieved
the position of strength to justify American participation in the empire
councils and to recommend that Britain make changes in the empire. They
argued that America should accept Gandhi's objectives and demand India's
autonomy from Britain. In response to these suggestions Assistant Secretary of
State Breckinridge Long informed Welles on February 25, 1942, that the
Committee might use their recommendations to attack not only Britain but also
Roosevelt's administration for failing to take advantage of America's power.35

The Congressional Committee viewed India's independence in the
context of their recognition of America's power and its ability to wrest
concessions from Britain. Their recommendations were similar to those of
Berle only more forcefully stated. The Committee did not concur With the
notion that India would better serve the Allied purposes under the British.
Furthermore, they did not dispute India's ability to achieve and sustain
independence. Rather, they accepted the claims of the Indian nationalists and
acknowledged the Indian National Congress as their voice. The ideas about
India, which had been circulated by American writers and journalists were

not even a factor in this discussion. The driving force behind the

 

35 Ibid., 606-607.

I33

Congressional members was their belief that the United States had achieved
the position of power to 'demand' from the British political concessions in the
empire.

In response to recommendations made by the Chinese leader and the
Congressional committee, Roosevelt was forced to act immediately. He advised
Winant and Averell Harriman, second in command at the American embassy in
London, to get a "slant" on what Churchill thought about a new relationship
between Britain and India. Roosevelt clariﬁed his position that he hesitated to
send a direct message to Churchill because "in a strict sense, it is not our
business but interest in the conduct of the war"36 Churchill’s earlier
admonitions may have inﬂuenced the President to act with caution.37 By
addressing his concerns only to the British, the President had provided
Churchill an opportunity to further instruct the Americans about the
importance of British rule in India and to establish India's political and
cultural image for them.

Churchill’s response was similar to the one delivered to the Chinese
leader. Considering that American interest in India had developed because of
the war, Churchill's approach was to convince his American counterpart that
the ﬁghting forces in India were loyal to the British. Facing a challenge from
his own Cabinet colleagues Churchill also knew that he had to negotiate with

the Indian nationalistsﬂ’8 By confining the problems within Indian

 

36 Roosevelt to Winant, February 25, 1942. Ibid., 604.

37 Robert Dallek contends out that Roosevelt saw United States as a major force
for world peace, but believed that aid to Britain and France was essential to
preserve American values. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign
Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford U.P., 1979). 219.

38 Churchill had to contend not only with external pressures but also from his
Cabinet colleagues of the Labour Party for a British initiative on India. Labour
leader Clement Attlee, on February 2, 1942, had challenged Churchill that the
time had come to be statesmanlike towards India. Venkataramani, Quit India...
75.

134

nationalism he probably hoped to discourage American interference. It was
now the turn of the Americans to be educated about Indian politics. It was
essential to convey that the Congress was not the voice of all Indians but only
the Hindus, and that for the war effort to continue successfully the Muslims
demands had to be accounted for.

Churchill informed Roosevelt that approximately thirty five percent of
the Indian troops were Muslims, of whom only twelve percent sympathized
with the Congress. The fighting forces were largely antagonistic to the
Congress and were from the northern provinces [Churchill did not clarify the
demographic makeup but implied the Muslims] while the population of the
center and the south [Churchill probably meant the Hindus] had no vigor to
ﬁght. In view of these facts, Churchill was unwilling to take political steps
which would alienate the Muslims. He emphasized the inadequacies of the
Congress and importance of the Muslims by providing numerical proofs,
exposing character traits and social makeup of the Indians to justify his
arguments. He did not provide speciﬁc data on the population composition but
elaborated on the nature Of the two religious groups. He informed Roosevelt
that there was some danger in offending the Muslims, who were the main
ﬁghting force in the Indian army, and that they would not allow themselves to
be governed by the "Congress Caucus" and the "Hindu priesthood."39

It is noteworthy that Churchill made no mention of either Gandhi or
Nehru. It probably suited him to submerge Gandhi within the larger Hindu

nationalism and ignore Nehru in case Nehru's western upbringing be

 

39 Warren F. Kimball, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete
Correspondence. v. 1. (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1984) 374 and FR 1942 v.
1 604-608. Linlithgow had emphasized to Churchill that India was not one
national state but two major nations, composed to Hindus and Muslims and also
the princes. Any attempt to militate against the Muslim demand for a separate
state would lead to disaster in India. Mansergh, v. 1 233.

135

perceived as a sign of positive leadership by the Americans.40

Having established the framework within which to understand Hindu
nationalism, Churchill, on March 4, acquainted Roosevelt with the British plan
to review India's future. Churchill once again informed Roosevelt of the
problems between the two religious groups in India. He enclosed messages of
Jinnah and the British military advisers to illustrate his point. These
statements helped Churchill's argument that plans for India should be made
after the war and should provide the right to secede to the Muslims. Churchill
argued that the protection of the Muslims was essential because they
represented 100 million people and the main army elements on which "we
must rely for immediate ﬁghting." He expressed his fear that the Muslims
would be sacriﬁced if power in India was handed over to the Congress, as
would the future of 30 to 40 million untouchables and the princely states.
These were standard British arguments which writers like Bromﬁeld had also
adopted. Now it was the turn of the American ofﬁcials to be introduced to them.
Churchill argued that immediate transfer of power would deprive these
minorities of assistance of "European elements" on whom they depend. "We do
not want to throw India into chaos."41

In his correspondence with Roosevelt, Churchill progressively
emphasized not only the divisions between Hindus and Muslims but also the

fears of the minorities whose interests the Congress did not represent and

 

40 According to John Gunther the British unendingly attacked Nehru as a
socialist. Inside Asia (New York: Harper, 1939) 408, 424.

41 Warren F. Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt 376-79 also Mansergh v. 1
309-13 and FR 1942 v. 1 612. Linlithgow wrote to Amery on March 6, 1942 that
Indian army percentage composition was Hindus forty one, Muslims thirty
ﬁve, Sikhs ten, Gurkhas eight and a half and Others ﬁve and a half. Linlithgow
believed that a promise of independence to India would discourage the martial
races and bring forward non-martial classes who would be worthless against
external aggression. India's independence would lead to widespread communal
disturbance. This information was conveyed by Churchill to Roosevelt on
March 7, 1942. Kimball, 388-389.

136

whom only the British could protect. The success of this stereotype of martial
Muslims and submissive Hindus depended on its continuous and repeated
reiteration. The data that Churchill provided often contradicted his argument
regarding the unbridgeable gap between Hindus and Muslims but served his
purpose of presenting the confusion in Indian politics.42 India’s
independence was no longer a simple problem with a simple solution.

American policy makers who had consistently relied on British
Opinions did not ignore this information. Churchill knew that the Congress
demanded immediate independence and a uniﬁed India and disagreed with the
Muslim demand for a separate state of Pakistan. By suggesting a postponement
of India’s independence until after the war and conceding the demands of the
Muslims, Churchill was inviting the Congress to reject the British proposals.
The strategy of presenting the Congress as limited in popularity and
immaterial in the war would remove the Congress as the accepted voice of
Indian nationalism. According to Churchill, the motive of the mission was not
to work out a solution but to project to the United States a better image of
British rule in India. In Britain, the Special Cabinet Committee, set up to
examine the Indian problem, on March 7, 1942, constituted. a mission headed by
Sir Stafford Cripps to negotiate a settlement. On March 10, Churchill wrote to
Linlithgow that owing to the general American outlook the Cripps Mission was
indispensable to prove "our honesty of purpose."43

The information provided by Churchill had a definite impact on

 

42 Churchill's delegitimization of the Hindu Congress has to be examined in the
context of his objectives. The Congress may have been caste based but what
Churchill ignored was that it was also mass based which also included the
Muslims. He had acknowledged that twelve of the thirty ﬁve percent of the
Muslims in the army sympathized with the Congress. Moreover, Churchill also
underplayed the fact that 41% of the Indian army was composed of Hindus,
instead he focused on non-martial traits of the Hindus.

43 Mansergh, v. 1 394-395.

137

Roosevelt. On March 10, 1942, he wrote to Churchill expressing his difﬁdence
in making recommendations about India. Yet he suggested setting up a
temporary government in India using the American example of the 13
colonies which had joined in the Articles of Confederation as an obvious stop-
gap arrangement. Roosevelt argued that a similar temporary government
could be set up in India headed by a small representative group composed of all
castes, religions and geographical regions which would have certain
executive and administrative power over public services. A more permanent
government would be set up over five or six years. Roosevelt argued that it
would make the Indians forget their hard feelings towards Britain. He added
“For the love of heaven don’t bring me into this, though I do want to be of
help. It is strictly speaking none of my business."44

In his war memoirs Churchill dismissed Roosevelt’s suggestions as an
illustration of the difﬁculties of comparing the situation in various centuries
and in trying to apply any superficial resemblance between the two
countries.45 As noted earlier, John Paton Davies, political advisor to General
Stilwell, criticized Roosevelt for not understanding the Indian political reality
and for assuming that India was a single nation. Davies believed that What was
good for American colonists would not necessarily be good for the Indian

colonials, smoldering with ancient explosive antagonisms Of race, religion and

 

44 FR 1942 v. 1 613-16 and Francis L. Loewentein, ed. Roosevelt and
Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1975) 190. On the February 25 draft, which was not sent, Roosevelt had
reevaluated colonialism and expressed American distinctness in more defined
terms. He had informed Churchill that the old relationship had ceased to exist
at least 10 to 20 years ago and that no substitute had been worked out except the
American policy of eventual freedom for the Philippines. Roosevelt expressed
his concern about India and believed that there was real danger in India and
that unless granted independence India would not resist Japan
wholeheartedly. Kimball, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt 400-401.

45 Churchill, 214.

I38

caste.46 Roosevelt's understanding of India may have been limited but had
emerged out of the information provided by Churchill. He did not dispute the
facts and figures provided by Churchill. He accepted India as divided by
geography, caste and religion. Moreover, Roosevelt did not suggest immediate
independence for India, rather he believed that real independence could come
later whenever it was deemed self-govemable by Britain.

Roosevelt's discussion with Churchill introduces not only a spirit of
cooperation but an underlying competitiveness as well. Their correspondence
was not conﬁned to discussions about India but dealt extensively with war
related matters in which the adversities Britain suffered in Asia were evident.
The British dependence on American assistance seemed to have given
Roosevelt an incentive to impress upon Churchill his recommendations.
However, Roosevelt did not give credence to the demands of the Indian
nationalists or examine the impact of Churchill's plan on their aspirations.
Instead, he presented his own plan promoting America’s own successful
pOlitical experiment.

Roosevelt had certainly been inﬂuenced if not convinced by the British
Prime Minister’s interpretation of problems within Indian nationalism. He
sought journalist Edgar Snow's advice about constituting a new government in
India because of "that Hindu Muslim problem," the "untouchables and the
"princes" and the British argument that they had to protect them all. Snow
recorded in his memoirs that Roosevelt believed that the Japanese were a
necessary evil to break the old colonial system.47 Roosevelt, like many

American observers of India, may have opposed British imperialism but this

 

46 John Patton Davies, Dragon by the Tail (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972)
236.

47 Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958)
254-255.

139

opposition remained unrelated to the opinions he developed of India. He did
not express a distaste for Hindu nationalism but he echoed India's problems in
a vocabulary provided by Churchill. He did not dispute Churchill's dismissal of
the Hindus as nonmartial despite the data provided to him which indicated that
forty one percent of the Indian army was composed of the Hindus and that
some Muslims sympathized with the Congress. Roosevelt may not have
necessarily marginalized Indian nationalism but had largely accepted it as

presented by the colonizer.

America's Response to the Cripps Mission

On March 11, Churchill announced the Cripps Mission in the House of
Commons. At this time the United States had constituted a Technical Mission to
India with the intention to boost the war effort. The mission was headed by
Henry Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State, and Louis Johnson, former
Assistant Secretary of War, to assist in developing industrial resources of
India. Berle had clariﬁed to the Indian Agent General in Washington, Sir Girja
Shankar Bajpai, that the mission did not have political objectives.48 But with
the announcement of the Cripps Mission, and in view of the mounting
internal and external pressures, Roosevelt was presented with an opportunity
to exert some inﬂuence on the British.

Once the Cripps Mission was announced, Roosevelt detached Louis
Johnson from the Technical Mission and made him his Personal
Representative in India. Johnson’s appointment raises a number of questions

regarding Roosevelt's intentions. Was Johnson's appointment merely an effort

 

48 Memorandum of conversation of Berle with the Indian Agent General
Bajpai. February 28,1942. FR, 1942 v.1 609-610.

140

to placate the growing Opposition to the British in America, or was Johnson
assigned to put pressure on the British or to encourage the Indians to accept
the Cripps prOposals. According to Davies, Johnson was a coarse and bombastic
man. His appointment was "a crude expression of Roosevelt’s concern over the
Indian problem." Davies was also critical of Roosevelt's assumption that India
was a nation.“9 But Davies, like many American observers in India was critical
of the British as well. In contrast, Johnson had no experience in India and had
largely associated with British ofﬁcials in London. There were two possible
attitudes Johnson could develop about India. Either like Davies, his distance
from Washington could change his perspective, or his experience in the State
Department and with the British Officials could encourage a greater
identification with the British.

Johnson's role in India was largely dependent on Roosevelt's
involvement in Indian politics. The Cripps Mission had provided Roosevelt an
opportunity to assert America's inﬂuence. He challenged Churchill's
assumptions about the Hindu Congress by corresponding with Maulana Azad,
the Indian National Congress President. Roosevelt sent a letter with Johnson to
Maulana Azad expressing his hope that India would accept Cripps' proposals
and participate in the war actively.50 Earlier, in February 1942, Roosevelt had
sent Nehru a message by journalist Edgar Snow, asking Nehru to write to him
about What he wanted done for India.51 No record of Nehru’s reply to
Roosevelt could be found. But when the Cripps Mission was announced

Roosevelt did not approach Nehru. It is possible that Roosevelt was following

 

49 Davies, 236-237. Time had described Johnson as a 'gusty ﬁgure' with a
'brash style' who knew India from Kipling's Kim. April 20, 1942, xxxix no. 16,
28.
50 Maulana Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York: Longmans, Green, 1960)
119.

51 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: a Biography v.1 290.

141

the protocol by approaching the president of the nationalist organization.

Roosevelt's communication with Azad does not indicate that he gave
consideration to the demands and concerns of the Indian nationalists. Instead,
he seemed to want the Indians, particularly the Congress to accept the
proposals without debate. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's involvement meant that he
had not been entirely converted by Churchill to adopt the British
interpretation of Indian politics nor had he rejected the Congress as Churchill
wanted him to. If Roosevelt wanted to put a dent in the British imperial
enterprise, he wanted the Indians to take the lead by accepting the proposals.
Unlike observers like Eve Curie, who had established a ﬁrm identiﬁcation with
the British, Roosevelt had adopted a more independent approach and seemed to
have challenged the British, albeit indirectly and discreetly.

In view of India becoming an American concern, the British had to deal
not only with the American President, but also with American public opinion
and the reports presented by the American media. Amery informed Linlithgow
on March 8, that fear of the breakdown of Indian morale, if no concessions
were made, was being worked to death by the American press.52 Earlier, on
February 26, the British Ambassador in Washington had reported that
American interest in British rule in India and Indian demands showed signs of
revival.53 A New York Times editorial stated that if the British proposal was
rejected the only explanation that would save Cripps and his Cabinet
colleagues was that India herself put her Old quarrels ahead of freedom.54 In
view of such opinions it was likely that the British would attempt to turn world

attention away from themselves to 'old quarrels' among the Indians. Amery

 

52 Mansergh, v. 1 375..

53 H. G. Nicholas, ed. Washington Despatches 1941-1945 (New York: Harcourt,
Brace 1944) 22.

54 New York Times, March 24, 1942 (8:2).

I42

believed that by sending an extreme Left winger [Cripps], who was close to
Nehru and the Congress, the British would be able to absolve themselves of any
responsibility for failure. Amery was certain that chances of Cripps' success
were minimal.55 Cripps had written to Nehru on October 11, 1939, that he had
put before the Cabinet Ministers the "democracy and freedom" argument for
India. He believed that the Congress should stand as ﬁrm as a rock upon its
demands.56 Cripps’ was the voice of the dissident and like the Congress had to
be silenced.

Amery was correct in his assessment. Cripps received much praise in
the American press. Time magazine declared that Cripps was the only member
of the British War Cabinet who had advocated the offer of Dominion Status for
India. But when Cripps was asked if a guarantee could be obtained from
Roosevelt for the mission's success he had stated “I am afraid you won’t get
it.”57 This statement provides an insight into the limited intervention that the
British ofﬁcials, including Cripps, expected from the American policy makers.
The Mission was designed to convince the Americans that British intentions
were fair and that the obstacle towards constitutional reforms was created by
the Indians themselves.

The success of this strategy is visible in a New York Times editorial of
March 31, 1942, which praised the British for acknowledging their mistakes
and suggested the Indians do the same. The editorial commented that if India
could reconcile her factions, then she can have a "new birth of freedom."
However, it also warned that if Indian leaders refused this "gift of freedom" for

petty, or personal, or spiteful reasons they Will lose American sympathy and

 

55 Amery to Linlithgow, March 10, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1 401404.

56 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (New York: Asia Publishing House
1960) 395.
57 Time, v. xxxix no. 14 April 6, 1942, 19, 26.

143

the "offer of American comradeship that is now theirs for the asking."58 This
view indicates that with the advent of the Cripps Mission the onus of
responsibility had deﬁnitely shifted on India. The editorial did not examine the
demands of the Indian nationalists but placed requirements on them to display
political maturity by accepting the "gift" unquestioningly or lose American
support. The British, on the other hand, by merely sending Cripps to India had
proven their good intentions. No effort seems to have been made to examine
the possible motives of Churchill, who had never hidden his intentions of
keeping the empire intact. Rejection of the proposals by the nationalists
would have to be for petty, personal and spiteful reasons alone. If the
Americans wanted British imperial power dismantled, the Indians had to do so
by accepting the proposals regardless of their own concerns. There was no
evaluation of Cripps' proposals in context of India's demands or the manner in
which the nationalists wanted the transfer of power to take place. The New
York Times warning to the Indians predicts the opinions that would be adopted
about India if the Indians rejected the proposals.

Further, on April 3, 1942, an editorial of New York Times contended that
with Japan marching to Burma, the war was the priority. The real choice for
the Indian people was not on what terms they would settle for their
independence, but whether they would have a chance to achieve
independence. Americans understood what freedom meant and were fighting
to preserve it.5 9 The editorial emphasized the American capacity to understand
"freedom" but denied it to the colonized Indians. British imperialism was not
even an issue in this report.

At this time Nehru wrote an article for Fortune magazine entitled

 

58 New York Times (20:1).
59 New York Times, (20:1).

144

‘India’s Day of Reckoning.‘ This article can be read as his attempt to inform
the Americans about India's concerns and aspirations. Nehru urged the
"leaders of America and Britain" to issue declarations recognizing the rights of
the people of every race to equality of treatment and opportunity. He wanted
them to recognize India’s independence and right to frame her own
constitution through an assembly of elected representatives followed by a
provisional national government with "real power" handed to it. Nehru argued
that the American President had spoken words of freedom, but the words were
vague and unsatisfactory because no action followed these words. He urged the
Americans to divest themselves of conceptions of India "as a kind of colonial
appendage or offshoot of Britain" that required a period of "tutelage and
training" to become ready for nationhood and freedom.’ He warned that India
should not be considered a British responsibility and a problem militarily:

NO country can ignore India’s present and her future, least of all

Americans, on whom rests the vast burden of responsibility and

towards whom so many millions look for right leadership at this
crisis in world history.60

Nehru not only appealed to the Americans to dissociate themselves from
the British but was also aware of ideas Americans held of India. The general
image of India present in the writings of Mayo and Kendall indicate that India
had been widely perceived as requiring British 'tutelage' and Nehru seemed to
address and correct that misconception. Interestingly, Nehru's recognition of
American power and his appeal to the Americans to establish a distance from
the British echoed the sentiments expressed by American military ofﬁcials in

India.

Opinions expressed by the New York Times and Nehru illustrate the

 

60 Cited in M. s. Venkataramani Quit India... 90-91 Nehru had cabled the

article on March 8, 1942 and it was published in the April edition of the
magazine.

145

different perspectives on the concept of "freedom" presented by Americans
and Indians. The Times viewed freedom in the context of the war against
Fascism whereas Nehru emphasized it in terms of freedom from colonialism.
Nehru wanted freedom to decide India's own future whereas most Americans

expressed doubts about India's capability to understand the concept.

Louis Johnson's Involvement

In the United States, Louis Johnson, the newly appointed Special
Representative of the President, inquired whether "he could do much" with
the nationalists and was advised by Assistant Secretary Howland Shaw to "be
careful." According to Shaw, Johnson seemed to feel that he had not been
given any positive information about anything.61 This unpreparedness of
Johnson is suggestive of the State Department’s lack of perspective on India
and the disregard with which they treated the Indian nationalists. Indian
nationalism and the nationalists were lost in the vaguely identiﬁed ‘India,’
when their personalities did emerge, they had often been defined by the
British.

As the stage was set for the Cripps Mission, the retiring Commissioner in
New Delhi, Thomas M. Wilson provided his assessment of the aspirations of the
Indian nationalists regarding the Mission. He reported that the Muslims were
prepared to wait so long as no plan was put forth which torpedoed Muslim
claim for a homeland. Moreover, proposals which did not give to India

complete freedom coupled with effective guarantees for their fulfillment

 

61 Memorandum of conversation of Shaw with Johnson, March 11, 1942. FR,
1942 v.1 616-617.

146

would certainly not be accepted.62 In the State Department, Paul Alling, Chief
of the Near Eastern Affairs, emphasized the importance of the Cripps Mission.
He believed that a settlement in India would contribute significantly to
winning the war.63 Ailing acknowledged the significance of the Cripps
Mission but its real outcome lay in the hands of the British and their access to
Washington.

The British utilized their access to Washington and forewarned the
American ofﬁcials about the possible failure of the Mission and placed the
responsibility for it on the Congress. On April 1, 1942, Halifax informed Welles
that he did not believe 'that the Congress would accept any plan because of
their inability to reach any agreement with the Muslim League. He also
reassured Welles that the failure of the Mission would not have any adverse
effect in India.64 Welles had found no reason to disagree with Halifax earlier.
In fact, he had acknowledged the British ability to preserve order in India.
Independence for India on its own merit had never emerged as an issue in
itself. On the day Halifax spoke to Welles, Cripps had reported to Churchill that
the Congress would reject the proposal and informed him of the low morale
and anti-British feeling in India.65 British ofﬁcials qualified this information
when reporting to the Americans. The low morale and anti-British sentiment
in India was not reported.

The British proposal promised Dominion Status to India at the end of the
war. But it also contained within it the clause offering possible non-accession

to any province or princely state in the new Indian union. The non-accession

 

52 Ibid. Wilson to Hull, March, 17,1942. 619-621
63 Memorandum of Alling, April 1, 1942. General Records of the Department of
State, Record Group 59, 845.01/181.

54 Memorandum Of the conversation of Acting Secretary of State Sumner
Welles with Halifax. FR, 1942 v. 1 623.

65 Cripps to Churchill, April 1, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1 600.

147

provinces could enter into a new constitutional arrangement with Britain. The
states in the constitution-making body were be to represented not by persons
selected by the people but by nomination.66

The Ofﬁcer-in-Charge in New Delhi, George R. Merrell, on April 2, 1942,
informed the State Department of the Congress's concerns regarding the
provisions. Merrell reported that the Congress objected to the non-transfer of
defense to the Indians and was dissatisfied with the provision for
appointments rather than elections of delegates from Indian states to the
Constituent Assembly.67 But the ofﬁcials in the State Department had already
been introduced to the marginality of the Congress and possibility of the
failure of the Mission. Amery wrote to Linlithgow on April 3, 1942, “I am not
sure that these people [Indians] want responsibility," if Britain offered them
"the moon" they would reject it. The Cripps mission had improved “our position
in outside world."68 These Opinions of the Indians had more or less been
expressed only by the British, but they seemed to anticipate their adoption by
American ofﬁcials as well.

With the arrival of Johnson in India a new avenue had opened for the
officials in Washington to learn about Indian politics. Johnson was informed
by both Cripps and the British Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell that the
appointment of an Indian Defense Minister would lead to chaos and loss of
army morale. These arguments apparently convinced Johnson and in his
initial reports he favored the British position. He informed Roosevelt on April
4, 1942, that Cripps was unwilling to modify the non-acceding clause for the

provinces and believed that Cripps was justified regarding the Muslim

 

66 For a detailed analysis of the Cripps Mission see V. T. Patil, Jawaharlal
Nehru and the Cripps Mission_ (Delhi: B. R. Publishing, 1984) and RJ. Moore,
Churchill, Cripps and India, I939-I945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

67 FR, 1942 v. 1 624-627.
68 Mansergh, v. 1 632-634.

I48

provinces and treaty rights of the princely states. Johnson pointed out that
Nehru wanted people, not rulers, as representatives in the Constituent
Assembly, which instilled fear in the Muslims and the Sikhs. In view of these
facts, Johnson urged Roosevelt to intervene in the matter in order to prevent
the collapse of the negotiations because such a failure would adversely affect
the war.59 Johnson may not have accepted the image of the Hindu as
immaterial in the war but he had accepted the Congress as a threat to those
who had been identiﬁed by the British as needing protection. But he had also
recognized the American ability to intervene to effect a solution. However, on
April 5, Welles informed Johnson that Roosevelt did not consider it desirable or
expedient to intervene.70 Unfortunately, by predicting chaos in India if the
Congress was handed responsibility, Johnson had reconﬁrmed the problems
with which Churchill had already acquainted Roosevelt.

In the meantime, British officials, in anticipation of Cripps’ failure,
were already planning future strategies. Halifax informed Linlithgow on April
7, that if Cripps failed to bring about a settlement he should return to Britain
via the United States as it would be good for public relations.‘ In his initial
response to Johnson, Linlithgow reported to Amery on April 7, that Johnson
was a "pleasant man" and had succeeded in increasing the pressure on the
Congress. But Linlithgow also made it clear that he did not like the principle of
anybody concerning himself too closely with detailed negotiations between
Britain and India.71 The general American deference to the British suggests
that Johnson's role in India would be controlled by the British.

Johnson was the ﬁrst American official in India who made serious

contact with the Indian leaders, especially Nehru, and reported extensively

 

69 FR. 1942 v. 1 626-627.
70 Ibid., 627-628.
71 Mansergh, v.1 690.

149

and frequently about the situation in India. He was apparently not converted
by the British to adopt their interpretation of the Congress or discouraged by
Washington's unwillingness to intervene. Instead, he progressively changed
his perspective on problems in India. Like the military officials, his
observation of British incompetence in the war helped him recognize the
growing American power. Consequently, his involvement in the Cripps
Mission increased and his emphasis shifted to reporting the ability of the
Americans to exert inﬂuence on the British.

Whereas the British insisted that Cripps' failure would not adversely
affect the war, Johnson emphasized the Opposite. In his reports be
concentrated on the negative impact of the political impasse in India on the
war effort. He informed Hull that Japan had successfully disrupted shipping
between Madras and Calcutta. He also informed the Secretary of State that at
the request of Cripps and Nehru he had been acting as a mediator and believed
that the negotiations had survived due to his efforts as Roosevelt's personal
representative. He reported on his attempt to urge Wavell to join Cripps in
requesting the British Cabinet to make further readjustments which, Johnson
believed, Wavell rejected because of his distrust of Nehru.72 With the rejection
of Cripps' prOposals. Johnson even developed his own plan that the Defense
Department be placed in charge of an Indian representative, but certain
functions of the war remain with the British.73 In view of this initiative,

Linlithgow changed his opinion of Johnson. He was displeased with Johnson

 

72 Johnson to Hull, April 7, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 628-630.

73 Venkataramani, Quit India... 111-112. Over the issue of defense the ultimate
proposal was that the British Commander-in-Chief retain his seat in the
Viceroy's Executive Council and maintain full control over all war activities.
An Indian representative would be added to the Council but his functions
would remain different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. For the text of
the Cripps-Johnson formula see the memorandum of Linlithgow to Amery on
April 9, 1942. Mansergh v. 1 699-700.

150

for sharing the formula with the Congress before consulting him. He found
the American position in the "business" intolerable because it presented the
British as obstructionists.74

Johnson’s initiatives caused concern in London as well. On April 9,
Churchill raised the question of Johnson's role with Harry Hopkins, Special
Emissary of Roosevelt. Hopkins informed the Prime Minister that Johnson’s
original mission in India had nothing to do with the Cripps Mission. He also
informed Churchill that Roosevelt was unwilling to be drawn into Indian
politics except at the personal request of Churchill and only if assured that
both sides accepted the proposals.75 Hopkins urged Roosevelt to play down
Johnson's role because there was an "unfortunate impression" in England
that Johnson was mediating under the President’s instruction.76 At this time
Cripps asked Churchill to thank Roosevelt for Johnson's assistance. But
Churchill, with his newly acquired assurances from Hopkins, informed Cripps
that Johnson was not Roosevelt’s personal representative in any matter
outside the speciﬁc issue of the war.77

Hopkins' initiative to inform Churchill about the limits of Johnson's
role, without consulting the President, indicates a lack of American
perspective on India. Roosevelt may have sent Johnson as his personal
representative but seemed disinclined to pursue the issue any further.
Johnson's support from his superiors depended largely on the British
approval. As far as the British were concerned the mission was over. Churchill

declared the mission a success in terms of creating a favorable Opinion in both

 

74 Note by Linlithgow April 8, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1 694-696.

75 Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, lst ed. (New York: Harper, 1948)
524-525.

76 FR, 1942 v. 1629-630.

77 Cripps to Churchill and Churchill to Cripps, April 9, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1
697, 704.

151

England and the United States. Amery wrote to Linlithgow that for the ﬁrst
time Americans "will have learnt something about the complexities of Indian
affairs and the intransigence of the Congress and their refusal to face
responsibility."7 3

However, the British insistence upon the complexities in Indian politics
did not convince Johnson. He informed Hull that, even though the Congress
had rejected the proposals, he believed that Cripps could work with Nehru if
given authority by Churchill. Johnson had recognized that Churchill,
Linlithgow and Wavell did not want Cripps to succeed. But Johnson was astute
enough to emphasize the ﬂedgling war effort and the weakness in the British
army in order to evoke a response from Washington. Unlike his initial report,
in which he had focused on the problems within India, Johnson had shifted
the focus to the British in an apparent effort to keep American interest in
India alive. He reported that the Indian Ocean was controlled by the enemy,
British shipping to India was suspended, Wavell was worn out and the British
were in the process of abandoning Burma. Johnson emphasized that in such a
situation any association by the Americans with the British was bound to
adversely affect the morale of American Officers.79 Johnson's assessment
indicates that those Americans who witnessed British military reversals were
able to draw distinctions with the British more easily than the officials in
Washington. It was this distance which had given Johnson a different
perspective.

According to B. Shiva Rao, correspondent in Delhi of the The Hindu and
The Manchester Guardian, Johnson informed him that "We are ﬁghting this

war more than the British." Johnson further added that Roosevelt wanted to

 

78 Ibid. Churchill to Cripps and Amery to Linlithgow April 11, 1942. 739. 756-
758.

79 Johnson to Hull, April 11, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 631-632.

152

know whether India would continue to fight, and whether free India could
give guarantees to the Muslims and the Untouchables. If Roosevelt could be
convinced of these two positions, Johnson believed, the President would use
his inﬂuence with Churchill to give India independence.8O Roosevelt may
have encouraged Johnson by expressing these sentiments, however, Johnson
failed to recognize that Roosevelt's activism towards India had already ceased.
Johnson may have made promises to the Indians on behalf of the President but

without a mandate from Washington.

End of the Cripps Mission: the American Reaction

The State Department may have been aware of the possibilities of Cripps'
failure but had nevertheless planned policies in anticipation of the Mission's
success. Welles informed the President that the failure of the Cripps Mission
made it impossible for the United States to utilize the announcement of an
agreement between Britain and the people of India as a platform upon which
to base an announcement of a broader policy. If the mission had succeeded
Welles would have recommended an announcement affirming the
independence of Korea and expulsion of the Japanese from all occupied
territories. Welles contended that if such an announcement was now made it
would lack conviction as the war was going in favor of the Japanese and the
question of India’s independence still held the center Of attention.81 There is

no indication in the printed policy records that any major consideration had

 

30 B. Shiva Rao. "India, 1935-47," in C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright
ed. The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1970) 431.

81 Welles toRoosevelt, April 11, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 631.

153

been given to this aspect of the Cripps Mission. As long as the mission was
considered narrowly, only in terms of India’s independence, American
ofﬁcials were willing to act within the limits set by the British. But with
Japanese victories and the low morale among the Allied troops in India, and in
recognition of the larger implications of India's independence, suddenly the
Cripps Mission acquired greater signiﬁcance.

Roosevelt now wanted to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations and
wanted Cripps to be authorized to continue the mission. He informed Churchill
that American opinion was not satisfied and believed it was due to the
unwillingness of the British government to concede the rights of self
government to the Indian people. If the British Government was willing to
permit parts of India to secede from the British empire after the war, why was
it not willing to permit India during the war to enjoy self government. Once
again, Roosevelt suggested that if component groups in India could be given
the opportunity to set up a nationalist government similar to the American
one, a solution could be found. He believed that if such an effort was made and
failed then at least public Opinion in the United States would be satisﬁed that a
real and fair offer had been made. But Churchill informed him that the
negotiations could not be reopened because Cripps had already left India. He
added that anything like a serious difference between the two of them would
"break my heart" and would deeply injure both the countries at the height of
the terrible struggle.82

Johnson's commentaries on Britain's failures in the war seemed to have
succeeded in convincing Roosevelt to renew his interest in India's

independence.83 However, there is no evidence of a widespread criticism of

 

82 Ibid. Churchill to Roosevelt, April 12, 1942. 633-635, Mansergh, v. 1 764.

83 According to Hess, Roosevelt was pressured by Johnson and Berle to assert
his inﬂuence but, as usual, did not consult the State Department ofﬁcials when

154

Britain in the United States to which Roosevelt referred. This was a period in
which Americans were slowly coming to grips with their increasing power
and recognizing the gradual loss of the British strength. Roosevelt was
probably testing the new found American poWer and his latest initiative may
have come as a result of this awareness allowing him to challenge the British
once again, but this time more forcefully.

Johnson's interest in India had arisen out of a similar recognition. He
may have failed to make India's independence an issue on its own merit but
had deﬁnitely succeeded in arousing American interest in it in the context of
the war. If India was to win independence at this stage, it would not be because
its aspirations were recognized but because India's independence had become
linked to larger American interests.

However, Roosevelt's assertions against the British were not accepted by
all officials. Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, believed that the President
had foolishly intervened on behalf of India. Stimson believed that it was a
difﬁcult position for Churchill to have the United States "butting" into an area
which Churchill had declared a British concern.84 The vacillation in
American interest in India occurred primarily because of the tension between
those who recognized the emergence of American power, whose interests in
Asia diverged from those of the British versus those who adhered to a
traditional relationship with Britain. However, Indian nationalism had not

aroused any interest on its own merit and the concerns expressed by the

 

he approached Churchill. He relied on personal diplomacy which, according to
Hess, often meant acting on whim. America Encounters India, 51-52. Clymer
believes that Roosevelt's suggestions to Churchill were a logical extension of
the American policy which was progressively moving toward intervention. It
was exempliﬁed by the President's proposals about establishing an interim
government, made on March 10, 1942 and the appointment of Johnson as his
Special Representative in India. Quest for Independence, 68.

34 Cited in M. s. Venkataramani, Quit India... 131.

155

military officials regarding the growth of anti-white sentiments in India had
not acquired any significance.

The suspicion of British motives to which Roosevelt referred to seemed
to have subsided in the American media. In fact, with the demise of the Cripps
Mission the focus of attention had shifted to India and the American press
reported extensively on the failures of the Indian nationalists. In the ofﬁcial
circles the discussion still centered on ‘India,' but the press, in the aftermath
of Cripps' failure, identiﬁed and characterized the nationalists, drawing on the
images and vocabulary so far promoted by the British. Churchill’s opinion of
the Indian National Congress was readily adopted by the journalists. Before
Cripps had begun negotiations, the media had not questioned the Indian ability
to establish self rule or criticized the Indian nationalists. However, with the
failure of the Cripps Mission, the focus of the media shifted mainly to India.
The media may not have absolved the British but had become effective
collaborators of the British arguments about India.

A New York Times editorial on April 13, 1942, questioned the very
concept of "the people of India." The editorial declared that "India is a maze of
vertical and horizontal divisions" and questioned how could one ﬁnd a solution
that could satisfy provinces, princes and the Muslims. It singled out the
Congress leaders as "sleep-walkers" who spoke of "freedom Of India" but would
obtain nothing unless they cooperated fully with England. The leaders had no
experience or training to be put in charge of defense. The editorial pointed out
that having been trained in the habits of protest, the Congress seemed unable
to change quickly enough to adopt the habits of responsibility. The editorial
acknowledged that at times Britain may have put leaders like Gandhi and
Nehru in jail, but under the despotism of Hitler and Japan they would had been

silenced. In fact, Gandhi's philosophy of non-resistance was possible "only

156

under a ruler with a conscience."85

A noticeable change had occurred in the American media's view of the
situation in India. With the failure of the Cripps Mission, the popular media
downplayed their occasionally critical evaluation of the British rule in India
and concentrated primarily on criticizing Indian politics.86 It was the Indian
nationalists who emerged as betrayers of freedom. Now India's ability to
achieve independence was questioned and the Congress leadership singled out
as inept and irresponsible. They could not comprehend the ideas of freedom
and democracy and the necessity of cooperating with the British in the war.
The British were still imperialists, but with a 'conscience,' who had allowed
India's nationalism to exist.87

It should be noted that American criticism of the British had not
entirely disappeared. In an article published in Time magazine, ‘As England
Feels...,’ the unnamed author stated that England had taken the empire for
granted. The English people did not know or care that only under England did
India ever achieve unity, peace, constitutional law and evenhanded justice.
After the fall of Singapore the English were shocked to learn that Englishmen
in Singapore were all very rich, drank a great deal and failed to inspire the
natives to die for the empire.88 The British failures in the war had deﬁnitely

presented the Americans with the opportunity to criticize and satirize British

 

85 New York Times, (14:1).

35 Even in 1930 when Gandhi had been made Man of the Year by Time
magazine, John Haynes Holmes had believed that Americans regarded Gandhi's
policies as fantastic. My Gandhi (New York: Harper, 1953) 54. Gandhi's
rejection of the Cripps' mission was bound to arouse criticism in the United
States.

87 David Spurr points out that the essential confrontation of cultures marking
the colonial situation extends beyond the banner of colonial rule. Ruling ideas
continue to hold sway outside institutional limits of direct domination. The
Rhetoric of Empire (Durham: Duke U.P., 1993) 6.

8 Time, v. xxxxix no. 15. April 13, 1942, 28-29.

157

imperialism. Americans had begun to establish their distinction from the
British by emphasizing British incompetence in the war, for forgetting their
purpose and ideals and for becoming decadent imperial rulers. An American
identity, free of the imperial baggage, had begun to assert itself in this
comparison.

However, the criticism of the British did not necessarily mean that the
Indian nationalists had gained respectability. Gandhi was described as a "wily
saint" who came to confer with Cripps in his "loincloth" from his "mud hut."
Cripps tried his "Christian-Socialist" best to sway the "Hindu saint" but failed
while Nehru was left with "both feet off the ground." Time magazine
considered Nehru "fanatically" loyal to Gandhi, but also aspiring to be India’s
savior. He saw the point like a "practical westerner," yet he felt as a "mystical
Hindu." Jinnah, on the other hand, represented only a small faction of the
Muslims but his importance lay in the fact that he epitomized the Muslim fear
of the Hindus.89

The Time magazine article did not analyze political differences but
focused primarily on cultural incompatibility between the Indians and the
British. At the time American ofﬁcial interest withdrew from India the media
become more intrusive in its examination Of Indian culture and politics. It was
not the political aspirations but the irrational behavior of the Indians which
was forcefully and graphically criticized. The failure of the Cripps Mission was
not examined in the context of its contents or the motives and objectives of the
British. Instead, popular perceptions of India were resurrected to demonstrate
the difference between Gandhi and Cripps, in effect between the East and the
West. Such epithets and visualizations as ‘wily’ Gandhi’s emergence from the

‘mud hut’ wearing a ‘loin cloth’ to confer with the 'Christian-Socialist'

 

39 Ibid., 33-34.

158

disqualified Gandhi as a rational and practical politician as did the fanatic
loyalty of Nehru to Gandhi.90 The description of Nehru is signiﬁcant because
his positive ‘westernized’ self would always be at odds with his Hindu
mysticism in which the latter always subdued his rational westernized
personality. Nehru, whom Johnson had attempted to present as a reasonable
leader, had lost his credibility. India was progressively becoming synonymous
with the Hindus where the Muslims did not belong.

The American press, although at times derisive of British imperialism,
accepted the British assessment of India. Amery believed that while Indians
demanded independence, none of them had that spirit of self government.91
Time magazine echoed this belief that the defeatist and alarmists in the
Congress had prevailed, they did not want to accept power and responsibility
on the eve of the invasion.92

The British were conscious of this trend in the American thought.
Halifax made some astute Observations to Anthony Eden. He reported that the
shift of attention from the European war to the Paciﬁc war itself was one of
the largest single factors reducing British popularity in America. Halifax
believed that America's attention in Asia, where Britain’s colonial operation
were already suspect, "heroic" China took the pride of place. National pride
found an outlet in America and in comparison Britain emerged unfavorablym
Halifax singled out the "internationally minded liberals" in America who
found their worst fears of the inefﬁciency and decadence of British colonial

administration confirmed by the swift collapse of the far eastern empire.

 

90 Spurr points out that the West 'aestheticized' the non-West by showing it as
unprotected by the restraining constructs of advanced civilizations, 'classified'
it according to western standards of advancement and 'naturalized' it by
representing it in terms of natural space and natural phenomena, as primitive
people. 46, 69, 156.

91 Note by Amery, April 28, 1942. Mansergh, v. 1 838-841.

92 Time, xxxix no. 17 April 27, 1942 36.

159

Halifax believed that in the State Department, below the level of Hull, Welles
and Acheson, there was an unwillingness to take Britain into closer
consultations. Halifax believed that the President gave the American people to
understand that Britain was no longer capable of protecting its own colonies
and the United States must take a lead in Asia. Regarding India, Halifax also
believed that with the failure of the Cripps Mission the prestige of the
Congress party leaders declined in America. Never again would "glib
generalizations about the simplicity of Indian problem be accepted by the
majority of the people." Americans had become better educated about India and
the wave of criticism of the British conduct of the war died down.93

Halifax had correctly understood the growing differences between the
British and the Americans. In this respect, the Cripps Mission had served the
purpose of diminishing the criticism of British rule in India. American
criticism of British imperialism may have survived ideologically but India,
where the Americans could have put this distinction into practice, had
effectively been removed as the battle ground. Americans in general were
obviously disenchanted with India, and the President had lost the opportunity
to pursue the Indian cause with Churchill any further. If Roosevelt depended
on public Opinion to boost his effort to assert American power against the
British then public opinion and the popular forums had undermined his
ability.

In face of Amerian criticism of India's leaders, Nehru wrote to Roosevelt

expressing his disappointment at the failure of the Cripps Mission. Nehru

 

93 Thomas E. Hachey, ed. Confidential Dispatches (Evanston: New University
Press, 1974) Halifax to Eden, June 26, 1943. Political review of the United States
for the year 1942. 61-62. Halifax may have had intellectuals like Pearl S. Buck
in mind who praised the Chinese and believed that the United States could no
longer trust Britain. American Unity and Asia (New York: John Day, 1942) 28,
79.

160

explained the Congress’s position to Roosevelt and conveyed India’s desire to
"organize real national resistance." Nehru emphasized that the Indians were
anxious to defend India and to promote freedom and democracy. In conclusion,
Nehru stated "To your great country we send greetings and good wishes for
success. And to you, Mr. President, on whom so many all over the world look
for leadership in the cause of freedom we would add our assurance of our high
regard and esteem."94

Nehru made no direct appeal to Roosevelt to intervene, neither did he
mention Johnson's efforts. But his letter reﬂected disappointment at American
proclamations of freedom and their failure to act upon it in India. Nehru had
said in a press conference that "We have not asked for anyone’s intervention.
For my part, I admire President Roosevelt and consider he has been
shouldering a very great burden worthily."95 But Nehru had also recognized
the growing power of the United States and observed that it was America’s war
in which Britain played a minor role.96 Nehru did not receive any direct reply
from Roosevelt. Instead Acting Secretary Welles asked Johnson to urge Nehru
to ﬁght for the common cause.97 Clearly, Johnson's efforts to distinguish
Nehru from the other nationalists had failed to impress Roosevelt. In Welles'
message there was no reference to India’s independence. According to Edgar
Snow, Nehru kept hoping for pressure from Roosevelt on Churchill and

became bitter when no help was forthcoming.98 Roosevelt by not replying to

 

94 Johnson to Acting Secretary of State Welles, April 13, 1942, Enclosing letter
of Nehru, April 12, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 635-637.

95 Time xxxix no. 16 April 20, 1942. 33.

96 Sarvepelli Gopal, ed. Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Delhi: Oxford U.
P., 1983) 58.

9; Acting Secretary of State Welles to Johnson, April 15, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1
6 7.

98 Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1956)
271-72. B. Shiva Rao wondered whether Johnson's intervention complicated
the situation in India. Would Nehru have been quite so ﬁrm in his talks had he

161

Nehru seemed to have conceded the British argument and also to the popular
sentiment in the United States.

Louis Johnson was the only ofﬁcial voice which continued to appeal for
an American involvement. In his initial response to India, Johnson had
adopted the British point of view about India. But with his involvement in the
Cripps Mission his position changed considerably. At a time when general
Opinion of Gandhi and Nehru had plummeted, Johnson continued to present
Nehru as a reasonable leader. He informed the Secretary of State that Nehru
had made a bid to take charge of the Congress and had driven out the "Gandhist
non-resisters." He believed that Nehru’s position would be strengthened if
Britain, China and the United States could issue a joint statement of Paciﬁc war
aims, specifically including freedom and self determination for India. He
believed that the weight of the United States was needed to overcome India's
distrust of the British. But on April 27, Hull informed Johnson that a joint
declaration of Paciﬁc war aims at this time would raise a number of complex
problems relating to the future of the Oriental peoples. He found an inherent
danger in adopting any measures which might appear to unduly favor a
particular faction in India. He advised Johnson to be impartial and not identify
with any group.99 Hull’s statement is revealing in not only what he said but
what he did not say. Whereas Johnson recommended plans for India in terms
of the Congress, Hull, following the general trend of thought, did not
acknowledge it as the voice of Indian nationalism. Johnson's recognition of
American interests, independent of Britain, was not shared by his superiors

nor any particular future relationship with India anticipated.

 

not been encouraged to think that America would insist upon a settlement by
agreement. in C. H. Philips ed. The Partition of India... 435-436.

99 Johnson to Hull, April 21, Hull to Johnson, April 27, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1
638-639, 644-645.

162

Johnson, like the American military ofﬁcials posted in India, had found
the British incompetent and inefﬁcient. But he had also attempted to present
the positive aspects of the Congress. In this effort he projected Nehru as a
reasonable leader, but in the process he had to deny Gandhi his place in the
nationalist movement. Probably, like the other observers, he too distinguished
between Gandhi, who exempliﬁed the worst aspects of the Hindu mentality
while Nehru, a product of western inﬂuences, emerged as a viable alternative.
But Johnson's views competed with an even more overpowering and more
acceptable opinion presented by the media which branded Congress as
irresponsible and dismissed Nehru as weak. The officials seemed to concur
with the views presented by the media.

Despite the fact that his recommendations were rejected by the State
Department Johnson remained undeterred. He informed Hull on April 28, that
in Rangoon the whole civil administration had collapsed, there was panic and
incompetence in Madras because of the inefficient and irresponsible British
ofﬁcials who had no contact with the country and did not care for the needs
and safety of the people. It was only ,the Congress that was working towards
inculcating self reliance and self sufficiency among the people.100 This
Opinion was contrary to the one presented by the British and accepted by Hull
and Welles and most Americans. Alternative thoughts on India were likely to
fail in view of the burgeoning negative impressions of the Indian nationalists
in the United States. Johnson's views about India not only disturbed the
accepted opinion of India but undermined his credibility as well. His position
was further undermined when Cripps stated in the House of Commons that

Johnson had not acted on the President's order but in a purely personal

 

100 Ibid., 645-646.

163

capacity. 1 01

Amery wrote to Linlithgow on April 30, that Johnson was
condescending about the British war effort. He concluded that Americans were
apt to be hasty in judgment and considered the East was exactly like the West
and could move as fast as Americans moved. However, Amery conceded that it
was possible that there may be something in Johnson's view that the whole
British machinery had become "somewhat oriental" in its notions of "time and
energy."102 Amery reiterated the British opinion of the Orient as frozen in
time, immune to change, lacking in energy and often subversive, requiring
both guidance and surveillance. Any inﬂuence it imparted to the West was
only negative. Johnson’s espousal of the Indian cause and his interaction with
the Indian nationalists, especially the Congress leadership, may have made
him 'somewhat oriental' and his arguments suspect. The Cripps Mission had
ably served the British purpose of deﬂecting attention away from themselves
by exposing the Indian nationalists to the American ofﬁcials and the public as
irresponsible and irrational. This incompatibility may not have strengthened
commonality between the United States and Britain, but had definitely
provided a vocabulary to the Americans to express their differences with the

Indians.

 

101 lbid., 646-647.

102 Mansergh, v. 1 870-871. The notion popularized by Kipling about not
hurrying the East had been accepted widely by the American observers in
India. This acceptance had led them to recommend the continuation of British
rule in India. See chapters 2 and 3.

Chapter 5

Diverse Thoughts on India, 1942-1947

American involvement in India during the period of the Cripps Mission
had brought Indian politics into mainstream discussion in the United States.
The concerns which had led to the development of American interest in India
had survived, but the American approach underwent a noticeable change. A
dominant opinion of India had emerged in America emphasizing the
difference between the two cultures and constructing an extremely negative
image of Hindu nationalism. A greater exposure of Indian politics had brought
deeply embedded images to the surface. In 1942 these images were forcefully
and compellingly reported, and inﬁltrated political discussions as well. The
American reaction can be understood on one level as the adoption of a British
representation of India, thus becoming part of the dominant discourse about
the East in the West. But the American response to India also acquired
distinctive overtones. American understanding of and attitude towards India
were also inﬂuenced by the growing recognition of America's power and role
in world politics leading to a reevaluation of its association with Britain.

With an increasing recognition of their own ideals and interests, a
single monolithic thought on India was no longer possible. British
representations had a considerable impact on American understanding of
India, but American misgivings about associating their interests with an
imperialist power were producing independently constructed opinions of the
American role in and Opinion of India as well. These reassessments can be
understood within the framework of Michael Hunt's contention that American

policy was guided by an active quest for national greatness and promotion of

164

165

American values.1 The impact of these Opinions become apparent in America's
perceptions of independent India.

Even though criticism of India was rampant in the United States, there
was an emergence of a different perspective which challenged the accepted
position of America regarding India. Alternative thoughts on India, although
marginal, are apparent in the writings of John Haynes Holmes, Louis Fischer,
Frances Gunther and to some extent in Adolf Berle as well. These opinions had
emerged either in sympathy for Indian nationalism, or in spiritual response
to Gandhi in particular, or in promotion of America's emerging role in Asia.
These reevaluations had occurred among those who were on the periphery of
Washington's mainstream political culture, whose vision of the American role
in postwar Asia had become more defined. The military officials posted in
India, although critical of India, had distanced themselves from the British
and recommended independent policies. Louis Johnson, in recognition of
America's distinctness, had deviated from the standard discourse on India. He
had not only acknowledged a complete break from the British but
progressively adopted the cause of the Indian National Congress at a time
when the ofﬁcials in Washington and the media abandoned it. This deviance,
by challenging the British, and asserting American values, produced a
knowledge with its own inﬂuence. American thought on India was
constructed by the interplay of those who accepted the British version and
those who opposed British imperialism, those who sympathized with Indian

nationalism and those who questioned it.2

 

1 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1987)
77, 161.

2 Jayant Lele has critiqued Said's adoption of a structuralist concept of power,
for not seeing domination and critique as recurring moments in the history of
a society. Lele contends that this decontextualized conception of power both
renders the authors of the dominant discourse and those whose discourse
capability has been silenced by it, irrelevant for a critical analysis of power

166

Different Thoughts on India

The Official Perspective

Louis Johnson had challenged the established political culture in the
State Department by adopting the cause of the Indian National Congress and
insisting upon the recognition of a distinct American role in India. The Cripps
Mission may have ended but Johnson still held his position in India and
continued to recommend American intervention. But America's position on
India was not only inﬂuenced by the emerging American differences with the
British but also by their own evolving perceptions of India. In this respect,
deveIOpments in Indian politics also provided direction to America's opinion
of India. Now Gandhi's decision to launch a civil disobedience movement,
demanding the British to 'Quit India' came under American scrutiny. Johnson
informed the Secretary of State on May 4, 1942, that the Congress had resolved
to follow Gandhi’s lead in the non-resistance movement. But he also reported
that the Congress had agreed to negotiate if the Viceroy's Executive Council
was converted into a national government, and an Indian defense minister
given all powers except the function of the Commander-in-Chief. Johnson
reiterated that only the United States could save lndla.3

But Johnson's insistence on presenting the Congress as the nationalist
voice in India was no longer acceptable in Washington and neither was
Roosevelt willing to assume an independent role in India. On May 8, the

President outlined the policy Washington would henceforth adopt towards

 

relations. By default, it contributes to the entrenchment of the totalizing
power of the ruling classes. Lele's contention is relevant in the study of
American opinion of India especially in view of their evolving perception of
themselves and of the British. "Orientalism and the Social Sciences." in Carol
A. Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the Postcolonial... 46-47

3 Johnson to Hull, May 4, 1942. Foreign Relations of the United States,
(henceforth FR) 1942 v. 1 648-650.

167

India. He advised Johnson that the position in India was largely military; if
successful it would aid the military effort and if unsuccessful, harm that
effort. He rejected the plan outlined by Johnson because it would be acceptable
only to the Congress. It would further alienate the Indians from the British
and cause disturbance among various communities.4 Whereas Johnson had
insisted upon the capability of the United States to save India, the President
rejected the idea of American involvement. Whatever doubts Roosevelt may
have had about accepting British Opinion of Indian nationalism had been
subdued Or overcome and Roosevelt had reverted India back to the British.
American involvement in India's independence movement was over and
on May 16, 1942, Johnson’s mission in India ended. In the State Department,
opinions which conﬁrmed the problems within Indian politics were readily
endorsed. One such opinion was expressed by Graham Spry, a Canadian
national, who had served with the Cripps Mission in India. Spry met Roosevelt
on May 15, 1942, and reported to London of his conversation with the
President. Spry believed that be convinced Roosevelt that Churchill had placed
no restrictions on Cripps. In turn, according to Spry, Roosevelt conﬁded in
him that Johnson was not supposed to interfere and that Gandhi was
responsible for the Mission's failure.5 Spry informed the State Department
officials that Gandhi's "narrow political outlook," had brought about the
failure of negotiations with Cripps and that the Congress was unwilling to
accept political responsibility during the war. Spry further insisted that the
issue of India’s independence was not related to the defense of the country. In

fact, Indian nationalists were not hampering the war effort. Chief of Near

 

4 Ibid. Hull to Johnson, "From the President for Colonel Johnson," May 8, 1942.
650.

5 Spry's interview with Roosevelt. Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power.
v. 2 89-92.

168

Eastern Affairs, Paul H. Alling (replaced Wallace Murray who became Advisor
on Political Relations) did not dispute Spry's claims. He considered Spry an
intelligent and liberal minded person and concluded that Indian problems
should be left alone.6

Calvin H. Oakes, of the Department of Near Eastern Affairs, disputed
Johnson's argument that Britain had poor quality officers and was wasting
American lend lease material. Oakes also disagreed with Johnson's dismissal of
Jinnah as a creation of the British. Oakes considered the Muslim League a force
in India which the British could not ignore. He also doubted Johnson's
contention that Cripps was denied power to negotiate.7 At a time when the
Congress leadership was deemed irresponsible, Johnson’s espousal of their
cause itself had undermined his credibility. Spry, on the other hand was
received by American officials as rational and intelligent, a balanced,
unbiased and credible reporter of the Indian affairs. The discussions in
Washington no longer focused on India, but on a factionalized India, in which
the Congress progressively acquired an image which had so far been deployed
by British ofﬁcials and had been accepted by the American media.

The association of the Congress with political problems in India is
apparent in the report of George Merrell, who took charge from Johnson in
New Delhi. On May 21, he provided his assessment of Gandhi’s decision to
launch a mass civil disobedience movement. Unlike Johnson, who had
concentrated on exposing British incompetence and rigidity, and their
unwillingness to negotiate with the Indians, Merrell’s report, focused

exclusively on the Congress's inadequacies in terms of both its policies and

 

6 Memorandum of conversation of Alling with Spry, May 13, 1942. FR, 1942,
v. I 651-653.

7 Ibid. Memorandum of conversation of Oakes with Johnson, May 26, 1942.
657-662.

I69

leadership. He pointed out that Gandhi was unmoved by warnings that a civil
disobedience movement would lead to a civil war and make India an easy prey
to Japan. Merrell believed that if this program was launched India would lose
its usefulness. Unlike Johnson, Merrell did not recommend an American
initiative. Further, on May 25, Merrell reported his discussion with Nehru
concerning Gandhi’s plan. He found Nehru unable or unwilling to state his
position which led Merrell to suspect that Nehru was veering to "his master’s
point of view."8

Nehru, whom Johnson had attempted to project as a reasonable man of
independent thinking, was deemed weak and dependent on his 'master.‘ These
opinions of Gandhi and Nehru were expressed by journalists Eve Curie and
Herbert Matthews and were reiterated by Merrell as well. Two distinct
positions on India had emerged among American ofﬁcials. One represented by
Johnson, recognized America's special place and a distinct role in addressing
India's political problems. The other Opinion, represented by Merrell, focused
primarily on India's weak and inept leadership. But Merrell's view had
become progressively more acceptable in discussions on India. American
opposition to British imperialism and a recognition of American self interest
was submerged or expressed independently of their criticism of India.

In such a climate, when the Congress had lost credibility in Washington
and Nehru's ability and willingness to stand up to Gandhi had become
questionable, Nehru attempted to explain Gandhi's position to the American
ofﬁcials. He wrote to Johnson that Gandhi did not want to impede the war
effort but wanted independence and wanted to resist the Japanese.9 Nehru

clariﬁed to Lampton Berry, member of the American Mission in New Delhi,

 

8 Ibid. Merrell to Hull, May 21 and May 25 1942. 663-665.

9 Ibid. Ofﬁcer-in-Charge at New Delhi to Hull, enclosing text of message from
Johnson, July 1, 1942. 667-669.

170

that a lack of conﬁdence in India was due to the incapacity of the British to
resist the Japanese. Nehru believed that independent India would participate
in the war wholeheartedly.10 Nehru's clarifications failed to impress
American ofﬁcials. Nehru had been widely criticized in the media for not
standing up to Gandhi and this opinion was adopted by the ofﬁcials as well.
The Secretary of State informed the Indian Agent General in Washington,
Girja Shankar Bajpai, that Gandhi was playing into the hands of the Japanese
and that no practical steps of resistance were advocated by other leaders
including Nehru.ll

At the time when the Opinion of Gandhi in the United States was at its
lowest, Gandhi wrote to Roosevelt on July 1, 1942. Gandhi declared that the
British should withdraw and enable the Indians to ﬁght. He believed that the
Allied objective of fighting to make "the world safe for freedom of the
individual and for democracy sounded hollow, as long as India, and, for that
matter, Africa were exploited by Britain, and America had the Negro problem
in her own home." Gandhi argued that if the Allies considered it necessary,
they may keep their troops in India at their own expense, not for keeping
internal order but for preventing Japanese aggression. So far as India was
concerned, "she must become free even as America and Great Britain are," and
the Allied troops would remain in India during the course of the war under a
treaty with an independent Indian government.12

Roosevelt's reply to Gandhi reveals the Opinion he and the State
Department officials adopted about Gandhi and India. However, in his

response, Roosevelt distinguished American objectives, ideals and values from

 

10 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (New York: Asia Publishing
House, 1960) 491-493. June 23, 1942.

11 Memorandum Of conversation of Hull with Bajpai, June 15, 1942. FR, 1942
v. 1 670-672.
12 Gandhi to Roosevelt. FR, 1942 v. 1 677-678.

171

those of Britain. The President wrote to Gandhi on August 1, 1942, that the
United States consistently strove for and supported policies of "fair dealing for
fair play." He also clariﬁed that at this moment the Allies were ﬁghting to
defeat the Axis. Roosevelt enclosed Hull’s speech to illustrate the attitude of the
government.13 Hull had made the speech with "India in mind" on July 23, 1942.
He had stated that all people who are "prepared and willing to accept the
responsibility of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment" and "we encourage and
aid all who aspire to freedom...by preparing themselves to assume its
obligations." The United States would support attainment of freedom by all
peoples who, "by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it."14
Roosevelt's letter was delivered to Gandhi two years later as he was in prison.
When the question was later posed if a new one be sent to Gandhi, Roosevelt
was encouraged by Hull to reject it in case it encouraged Gandhi to take up the
issue of India with Roosevelt again.15

Both Roosevelt and Hull presented American ideals to make their point
to Gandhi. Clearly, India had not proven its worth and preparedness to be
assisted in assuming power. The Congress leaders had not played "fair" nor
demonstrated an ability to understand liberty and assume responsibility. Hull's
speech implied what Matthews had explicitly stated, that Indian politics was
inconsistent and the leaders had a different standard of honesty and

morality.16 This perception of India and its leadership had found a place in

 

13 Ibid. Roosevelt to Gandhi, August 1, 1942. 703.

14 Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948)

v. 2 1484-1485.

15 Merrell to Hull, May 19, 1944 memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, June 22,
1944. FR, 1944 v. 5 234-236. Kenton Clymer believes that Hull inﬂuenced
Roosevelt. The sentiments expressed in the letter did not reﬂect Roosevelt's
thinking which was again moving away from supporting colonial possessions.
Hull's recommendation appealed to a busy and tired president. Quest for
Freedom (New York: Columbia U. P.,1995). 199-201.

“5 Matthews, Education of... 218, 262.

172

Official discussions as well. Roosevelt and Hull may not have adopted the same
vocabulary as the media to express their opinions but their attitudes reﬂected
their agreement with the media regarding India's irresponsible political
culture. Signiﬁcantly, Roosevelt and even Hull did not even bring Britain into
the discussion. Instead, American values and ideals had emerged more
forcefully as the standard to which Indians should aspire in order to win
American support. It was not British imperialism but the irresponsible
behavior of the Indians which had emerged as critical issues. Roosevelt did not
address the issue of liberation of the colonized raised by Gandhi but rather
emphasized freedom of the world from Fascism. He also ignored Gandhi's
apparent willingness to let the Allied forces maintain troops in India. Gandhi
had been confirmed an obstructionist and his overtures were disregarded.
Both Roosevelt and Hull demanded and required India to provide proof of
political maturity in order to win American approval.

During this period Louis Fischer was one of the few journalists who
presented an alternative perspective on Gandhi. Fischer believed that Gandhi
did not favor Japan. He reiterated that after demanding Britain's political
withdrawal from India, Gandhi had agreed to let the Allied forces maintain
their troops in India. Fischer pointed out that he had informed the British
Viceroy about Gandhi's conciliatory mood but Linlithgow did not pay any heed
to Gandhi's overtures. Fischer believed that Gandhi procrastinated about
launching the civil disobedience movement in the hope of being approached
by the British for a compromise, but was ignored. In his assessment of Gandhi,
Fischer broke from the widely accepted opinion of Gandhi and considered him
as a tough and shrewd politician. Fischer also believed that the United States

had the power to 'prod' the British to negotiate with Gandhi.17 But Roosevelt's

 

17 Nation August 15, 1942 v. 155 no. 7 121-122, August 22, 1942, v. 155 no. 8 145-

I73

reply to Gandhi indicates-that Fischer's version of Gandhi would fail to inspire
America's intervention in India.

Gandhi's decision to launch a civil disobedience movement had
concerned Chiang Kai-shek as well. On July 25, he appealed to Roosevelt and
expressed his concern that India's decision to launch this movement would
help the cause of the Axis powers. The Chinese leader insisted that the Indians
expected help from the United States. But the Americans were not willing to
take any action. Instead, Roosevelt chose to consult the British Prime Minister
and asked for his suggestions.18 Churchill reiterated that the Congress
represented only the intelligentsia of non- fighting Hindu elements and
lacked the ability to defend India or to. revolt. Following the trend, the British
Ambassador informed Hull that the civil disobedience movement was not a
factor.19 On August 7, the British acquainted Roosevelt with the fact that the
Indian leaders would be imprisoned. By this time Roosevelt had already made
his position on India clear to Gandhi. He informed Chiang Kai-shek that
American intervention in India would undermine British authority?-0

The ambitious native ‘nationalist’ bourgeoisie now required an exercise
of punitive and restrictive power by the colonizer21 and this development was
not challenged in the United States. The British argument that the Congress
was not a factor, and that British presence in India was necessary was not

disputed.

 

147.

18 Chiang wrote to the President on July 25, 1942. Memorandum of
conversation with the Foreign Minister of China (T.V. Soong) by Welles, July
28, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 695-700.

19 Churchill to Roosevelt, Halifax to Hull, July 31, 1942. Mansergh, v. 2 533,
177-178.

20 Winant to Hull, July 30, 1942. Roosevelt to Chiang n.d. handed on August 8,
1942 to the Mr. Soong. FR 1942 v. 1 700-706.

21Homi Bhabha, “Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism,”
The Politics of Theory, ed. Francis Barker (Colchester: University of Essex,
1983) 198.

174

However, those officials who evaluated India in the context of larger
American interests presented a different perspective. Laughlin Currie,
administrative assistant to the President, sent to Asia as a special emissary,
warned Roosevelt of the tendency on the part of the Congress supporters to
identify Americans stationed in India with the British. Currie reported that
Gandhi believed that the Americans had made common cause with the British
and feared that Gandhi's opinions could endanger America's moral leadership
in Asia and its ability to exert inﬂuence for an acceptable and just settlement
in post-war Asia. Currie believed that it was to Britain’s own long term interest
to preserve Asian belief in America's disinterestedness. He recommended a
policy stating that American troops were in India to help the Chinese and not
to support Britain in India. In view of these concerns raised by Currie an
ofﬁcial statement was released by the State Department that American trOOps
were in the country solely to aid China.22

Currie succeeded where Johnson had failed, probably, by
recommending only statements professing America's separation from the
Britain and not an active involvement in India. However, Currie's
recommendation introduces a recognition in Washington of the British aim to
keep America out of Asia and an awareness of America's emerging leadership
and independent role in postwar Asia.

However, in the case of India, the dominant image of a chaotic society

 

22 Ofﬁcer-in-Charge at New Delhi to Hull, enclosing a message from Currie to
Roosevelt, August 11, 1942. FR, 1942 v. 1 712-15. Currie was probably
referring to Gandhi's statement made on April 26, I942. Gandhi had stated "the
promise of a never ending stream of soldiers from America" meant that
American aid in the end would amount to American inﬂuence. Cited in
Venkataramani, Quit India... 154. Similarly, Nehru in a speech made before the
Congress Committee on August 9, 1942 had denounced the United States for
following the British lead and for looking upon India as an appendage of the
British and harboring a racially superior attitude towards a "benighted
backward people." Cited in Venkataramani, Quit India... 239.

175

and its disfunctional nationalist leadership tended to overshadow American
suspicions of the British. These trends in the United States were noted with
relief by the British. Halifax reported to London that Gandhi’s non-violence
policy was unpopular in the American press. Gandhi was a "bad man" from the
point of view of the war effort.23 A report on ‘India as a Factor in Anglo-
American Relations’ prepared by Spry on July 27, had astutely summed up the
end of American interest in India. Spry contended that the United States and
Britain were competitive but also shared a natural sense of community,
language and laws. India had stirred American nationalism but Spry did not
give signiﬁcance to India in the development of Anglo-American relations. He
believed that the American view of India was a part of the American view of
Britain.24 Spry's observation help explain the general acceptance‘of British
Opinion of India by the American ofﬁcials. It was not just the British
strategies and maneuverings that converted the Americans, but the very
existence of the shared sense of values that made British arguments reliable
and acceptable. It seemed relatively easy to accept the British as benevolent
but impossible to accept the Indians as reasonable.

There was truth to Spry's contention that American view of India was a
part of the American view of Britain. Undoubtedly, most Americans shared a
natural afﬁnity with the British, but those who Opposed British imperialism
and those who recognized America's interests as independent of the British,
found in India the Opportunity to make their case. The American view of
themselves and relatedly of the British was undergoing a change, even if to a
limited extent, India was one place where the Americans articulated their

growing distance.

 

23 H. G. Nicholas, ed. Washington Despatches 1941-I945 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981) 70.

24 Mansergh, v. 2 471-473.

176

Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate for presidentship in 1940,
articulated such views. His interest in visiting India in the course of a global
tour concerned Linlithgow in case Willkie wished to meet the imprisoned
Congress leaders. Linlithgow believed that such an occurrence would
encourage the Hindu press to exploit the opportunity for American
intervention. But Welles assured Halifax that Willkie would not visit India.
Halifax reported to Eden that Roosevelt agreed with British objectives.25

Willkie had questioned the vacillating attitude of American government
towards India and believed that America's silence on India had "drawn heavily
on the American reservoir of goodwill in the East."26 Sir Ronald Campbell,
member of the British Embassy in Washington, reported to Eden that Willkie’s
One World reader felt America was rising to the height of its "material and
spiritual power and that its duty lay in its own material expansion with
political deliverance of under-privileged nations."27 Willkie's views, however
marginal for the moment, had acquired a following and were the harbinger of

what would become the American image of itself and of its place in the world.

The Intellectual Perspective

The presence of two thoughts on India, one critical of India and the
other examining India in the context of larger American interests is apparent
among intelletuals as well. Those intellectuals who concentrated on examining
India's culture conﬁned India to images popularized by the British. American

anthropologists can usefully be singled out for a brief examination. Their

 

25 Ibid. Halifax to Eden, September 3.1942. 890.
26 Venkataramani, Quit India... 323-324.

27 Hachey, 96. Sir Ronald Campbell to Eden, August 31, 1943, political review
of the United States for 1943.

177

views, although not of a popular variety or related directly to political
processes, nevertheless indicate the general trend of thought and provide an
intellectual endorsement to the manners and mores of an alien culture.28 T. N.
Madan, an Indian sociologist, believes that American anthropologists adopted
the vision of their British counterparts to examine India. Whereas the British,
for reasons of developing effective administration concentrated on local
settings, on tribes and castes, American anthropologists, free of imperial
interests, assumed a broader and totalizing vision of the Indian civilization.
They adopted a homogenizing gaze of the modern man, emphasizing the
'otherness' of the Indian.29

Two anthropologists, A. L. Kroeber and Ralph Linton, are selected for an
evaluation primarily because they wrote about India at a time when American
interest in Indian politics had developed. Incidentally, neither scholar did any
ﬁeld work in India. Lacking an intimacy with India, it was possible that these
Americans would direct their limited but firmly ingrained knowledge to
construct a homogenized and essentialized picture of India.

Kroeber believed that the Hindus had developed a great civilization but
without a historical sense. He presented proof for his contention in the Indian
sculpture, which, he observed, had developed uninﬂuenced from the outside,
with no fundamental changes of direction. He concluded that India's high
culture period ended by the year 1200 A. D. Similarly, Indian nationalism,

Kroeber observed, remained relatively underdeveloped within the 'vast

 

23 Edward Said considers the anthropologists most closely tied to colonialism.
They advised colonial rulers on the manners and mores of the native people
and embodied the notion-you cannot govern India unless you know it. Culture
and Imperialism 152.

29 T. N. Madan, "India in American Anthropology" in Sulochana Raghavan
Glazer ed. Conﬂicting Images: India and the United States (Glenn Dale, MD.:
The Riverdale Co., 1990) 192-193.

178

amorphous caste' system which had divided India.30 Kroeber's views were not
original, but a reiteration of opinions already expressed by most commentators
of India. India's rootedness in the past, social fragmentation and inability to
adapt, had been firmly entrenched in western thought. The nationalist
movement itself was a part of this past, retarded by India's social and cultural
patterns. By denying the Indians a sense of history, and an ability to change,
Kroeber could deny any possibility Of social or political change in the future
as well.31 India had been scientifically explained, bound and surveyed,
theorized about, making it unnecessary for the two anthropologists to make
first hand observations.32

Ralph Linton's study was published after India became independent.
Like Kroeber, Linton concluded that India lacked a historical sense and that
Indian political history did not begin to meet western standards of precision
until after the ﬁrst Muslim invasion. He deﬁned India as a static culture,
where the foundation of society was the village self government, the caste
system and the joint family. Linton believed, that it was primarily British
colonialism which had dealt a blow to the village autonomy and self

containment and further fractured the caste system.3 3

 

30 A. L. Kroeber, Configurations of Culture Growth (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1944) 62, 260, 682-683.

31 Partha Chatterjee contends that the middle class Indians were being
schooled in the new colonial education and taught principles of European
history, statecraft and social philosophy. The English educated middle class in
Bengal by the 1870s was unanimous in its belief that the Old institutions and
practices needed to be fundamentally changed. "History and the
Nationalization of Hinduism" in Social Research v. 59, no. 1 (Spring 1992)
122, 127 Kroeber and Linton ignored this class of Indians.

32Arjun Appadurai, "Number in the Colonial Imagination" in Carol A.
Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament"
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) discusses British focus
on quantiﬁcation. The census made numerical majorities prominent, thereby
providing a simpliﬁed and essentialized view of the Indian society. This view
is apparent in Kroeber's analysis of India.

33 Ralph Linton, The Tree of Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962 c1955)

179

In their observations, the two anthropologists maintained that India,
primarily Hindu India, was a static and divided society, not merely living in
another space but in another time as well. In their views, Indians did not
deviate from traditional social and cultural patterns of behavior. The
emerging middle class and the growing nationalist movement had been
subsumed by an even more powerful image of India residing in villages and in
the past. India's real time was not in the present, but in the future and the
British had challenged India to prepare for that future. Both scholars denied
social and political changes that had begun to take place in India because an
acceptance of change could have undermined their theoretical assumptions.
The position adopted by the anthropologists and the American observers in
India seemed uniﬁed with the British in condemning a non-western culture.34

However, India had begun to emerge in discussions among those
intellectuals who reviewed America's association with Britain in terms of
larger American interests. These opinions refocused attention on British
imperialism and ignored India's cultural images. In their discussions
American ideals and interests were distinguished from those of Britain and its
colonial enterprise and relatedly America's role in India was reevaluated.
George E. Taylor, an academic, argued that despite the cooperation between
Britain and the United States there were many differences that had emerged
between the two countries based on their differing traditions and economic
arrangements. Taylor believed, that unlike Britain, the American system

created a strong urge towards westernizing non-industrial people and had

 

486. 511-518.

34 Dorothy B. Jones points out that the subject matter of American ﬁlms
regarding India remained consistent, focusing of religion and mysticism in
India. During the Second World War the focus had shifted from feature to
factual ﬁlms, concentrating on subjects such as India's religion and poverty.
The Portrayal... 52, 58, 68.

180

only secondary interest in colonies. Taylor was concerned at the growth of
economic nationalism in the former colonies and believed that American
interest lay in liberating and modernizing people and keeping the world
market open. Relatedly, he considered the nationalist movement in India of
enormous consequence. But Taylor also believed that regarding India, the
United States was in a delicate situation. If the Americans pressed for full
mobilization of India it would mean granting a large measure of independence
to the country. Such a policy would bode ruin for Britain. Even though Taylor
recognized the problems Britain faced, he ultimately believed that the United
States should propose independence for India provided India agreed to
participate actively in the war.35 In Taylor's analysis the widely accepted
political immaturity of the Indian nationalists was not of material
consequence. It was the promotion of American self interests and potential
role in world politics to which he gave precedence.

Similarly, writer Pearl Buck expressed concern at the increase in racial
tensions in Asia. She believed that Japan's racial propaganda in Asia was
becoming effective. In view of this fact, she argued that Americans should
recognize, whether Britain did or not, that a world based on former principles
of empire and imperial behavior was no longer possible. She believed that
America must ﬁght for democracy for all people and not to continue western
control over colored people. She argued that Americans cannot trust the
English and 'we' must think and act for 'ourselves.’

Buck had recognized the need for America to establish a separation
from British imperialist Objectives. However, she was not entirely critical of

British colonial rule in India. She. believed that whatever the fault of

 

35 George E. Taylor, America in the New Paciﬁc (New York: Macmillan, 1942)
6-7, 18-21, 112, 150-151.

181

imperialism, under the British a strong healthy national movement had
developed in India. She argued that because Britain had allowed freedom to
exist in India, nationalists like Gandhi and Nehru could exist, whereas, under
Japanese rule they would not even be alive. However, Buck also believed that
no people can learn self government until they govern themselves. She
disputed the British argument that Muslims were innately different from
Hindus. Instead, she contended that there were strong unifying elements in
India. Ultimately, Buck believed that India was the business of all Allied
Nations.36 In her analysis, Buck was not entirely critical of the British but
gave precedence to the promotion of American national interests. The British
ability to uphold western interests had become outmoded and it was time for
the Americans to take over. India's independence, in these analyses, had
become part of larger American interests. In all probability, this recognition
had led both Taylor and Buck to accept Indian nationalism and India's ability to
establish self rule.

The expression of such ideas, promoting America's self interests and
relatedly accepting Indian nationalism, concerned the British officials.
Consequently, the Government of India, Home Department, directed its
attention towards "exposing" Gandhi to the English and American public and
in presenting the Congress as a "Hindu-bourgeois" dominated organization.
The British aim seemed to be to focus American attention on problems within
India in order to stall India's reappraisal within the larger context of
America's emerging self interests. The earlier British efforts had been more or
less conﬁned to educating American ofﬁcials about India, but now the focus

had shifted to the larger public. It was essential to reafﬁrm American unity

 

36 Pearl 5. Buck, American Unity and Asia (New York: John Day, 1942) 22-28,
45, 87-89. This anthology is composed mainly of speeches of Buck, most of
them delivered in April 1942.

182

with the British by refocusing the attention of the American public back to
the alleged failings of India. In this respect, the British hoped to exploit
Gandhi's decision to launch the civil disobedience movement to demonstrate
Congress's prejudice to the American war effort and safety of the American

troops in India which may result from Gandhi’s plan.37

The Media Perspective

The British purpose was effectively served by the American media. To
begin with, American journalists had focused narrowly on India and
emphasized the irrationality of Gandhi's strategies. Gandhi’s political
philosophy was incomprehensible to most Americans and in analyzing
Gandhi's personality, Americans tended to reaffirm their differences with
India and often, even if reluctantly, accepted British rule in India. While the
officials remained critical of the political strategy and philosophy of the
Indian nationalists, the press targeted cultural aspects of India and emphasized
an unbridgeable gap between themselves and the Indians.3 8

However, the reports presented by the media also highlighted the
change in the American perspective on the British. These reports did not

present India favorably but at the same time contained expressions of

 

37 Government of India, Home Department to Amery, June 7, 1942. Mansergh,
v. 2 188—9.

38 Rosane Rocher points to the dialectics between pursuit of knowledge and
government pursuits. She believes that knowledge and government objectives
are often, but not always, related. While a political agenda corrupts, drives and
even deﬁnes the production of knowledge, intelletual (in this case also the
media) trends also impinge upon the government. Rosane Rocher, "British
Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century: The Dialectics of Knowledge and
Government." in Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer ed. Orientalism
and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) 215, 240-241. Rocher's contention is
particularly applicable to the role of the American intellectuals and the media
on the growth of knowledge about India in America.

183

America's distinctness. Two reports in Time magazine present both
perspectives. Major General Lewis Hyde Brereton, commander of American Air
Force in India, clung to his Americanism--he feared he would catch himself
describing an air battle as "a jolly good show." But he also informed the
Maharajas that he had no time to shoot tigers with them. Time blamed the
British for being "woefully late" in modernizing the Indian troops and for
being immersed in the old tradition--a tradition with "more grandeur, more
Kiplingesque affection between officers and men than effectiveness."39 In
such observations Americans had freed themselves of the decadence of both
British and Indian cultures. India remained slow moving and backward but
British imperialism was rapidly becoming anachronistic and ineffective.
Americans posted in India may have accepted British interpretations of India
but now questioned British imperialism.

In another report Time magazine focused on an evaluation of Gandhi's
political strategies. The report stated that Gandhi's Satyagraha [resistance by
non-violent non-cooperation] was not "so nonsensical as it appeared to the
western eye." It had philosophical basis in Buddhism, Indian mysticism and
Christianity. But Time also pointed out that this philosophy was popular only
among the Hindus who were a "good deal closer" to Gandhi than to Nehru, and
did not inﬂuence the Indian Muslims who cooperated with the Allied forces.40
This report is signiﬁcant in many respects. TO begin with it exempliﬁes the
American inability and unwillingness to accept Gandhi's philosophy in
political terms or examine its implications for Indian nationalism. At best it
could be' explained as not ’so nonsensical.’ Gandhi's strength lay not in any

political rationality but in Hindu spiritual and mystical beliefs. It should be

 

39 Time, xxxix no. 18 May 4 1942 22.
40 Time, xxxix no. 19 May 11, 1942 33.

184

noted that even sympathizers with Gandhi had not been able to present him
beyond the conﬁnes of this image. In accepting Gandhi as a leader only of the
Hindus and separating the Muslims from Hindu India completely and
unequivocally Time had confined Indian politics rigidly to religious
affiliations. Furthermore, by dismissing Nehru as a nonfactor in Indian
politics, Time had dismissed him as a credible political leader. Moreover, such
opinions diluted the concerns raised by the military officials regarding
American association with an imperial power and unlike the intellectuals did
not anticipate any future American interests in Asia. Time dismissed the
concerns about western imperialism raised by "little Mohandas Gandhi" and
presented his "Oriental formula" of non-violence as "ﬁbreless."41 Time had
reduced not only Gandhi's stature but also his political philosophy.“2

One aspect that was progressively becoming prominent in most
discussions was the incompatibility between Hindus and Muslims, presenting
the latter more favorably. The New York Times correspondent, Herbert L.
Matthews, took credit for exposing the Congress as a Hindu organization and
not a representative body of all Indians. He believed that the Muslim League
was far stronger than anybody in the United States had realized and the
Muslims did not fit the autocracy of Gandhi. Matthews considered Gandhi
unwise, impractical and dictatorial while Nehru was unable to stand for his

own ideas.43 John Patton Davies, Advisor to Stilwell, made a note of the

 

41 Ibid., xxxix no. 21 May 25, 1942 32-34.

42 The acceptance of this opinion is visible in Adolf Berle. Berle doubted
whether Japan would invade India, but would put pressure on China and blow
up the Indian empire by propaganda and political activity from inside. Gandhi
seemed to be playing the game for them very well, probably sincerely. Berle
added "I have always wondered why rulers ﬁnally shot saints, and I am
beginning to ﬁnd out." June 20, 1942. Memo VIII 3 203-208, The Diary of Adolf
A. Berle (Hyde Park: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1978).

43 Herbert Matthews The Education of a Correspondent 1st ed. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1946) 224-225, 281, 303-304.

185

information provided by the Muslim League to the effect that the Hindu was a
coward and temperamentally incapable of defending himself.44

Buck, Currie and Willkie may have recognized America's emerging role
and reassessed India's independence but the general trend of thought on India
remained conﬁned to the criticism of the Indian society and politics. India had
not proven its capability to achieve political deliverance with American help.
Furthermore, the focus on India, especially in the media, tended to obscure the
emerging American difference with the British. On August 11, 1942, the day
Laughlin Currie recommended American separation from the British, a New
York Times editorial considered that it would be a major disaster for the United
Nations to permit the Indians to "cool the friendship" between Britain and the
United States. According to the editorial Gandhi's demands for freedom were
demands for anarchy. India's people needed to be educated in political
responsibility.45 While American ofﬁcials distanced themselves from India,
the media became more vocal in its praise of the British policies. The New York
Times editorial reported on August 13, 1942, after the Indian leaders had been
arrested, that in victory British have always been "magnanimous" and can
now be merciful to the arrested leaders. "There is enough goodwill in Britain
to accomplish it." On September 8, 1942, Herbert Matthews reported from India
that the British government had no alternative but to arrest Gandhi as his

strategy would lead to anarchy.4 6

The media, in general, had become propagators of the views popularized

 

44 Snow, People on our Side (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1945) 28-30.
45 New York Times (18:2).

45 New York Times (18:2) and (10:2). Edgar Snow claims that Roosevelt
considered the Japanese a necessary evil to break the old colonial system.
Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958) 254-255. But
American opinions of the Indian nationalists, especially Gandhi, were
significant factors in preventing Americans from becoming involved in
India.

186

by the British regarding India's inability to assume political responsibility.
But these opinions can be considered accepted American views as well.
Roosevelt had expressed similar sentiments when addressing Gandhi, but had
deployed American values to make his point. The irrationality of the Congress,
particularly that of Gandhi, had become the focal point of criticism. In view of
America’s mission to make the world safe for democracy, Hindu nationalism
had emerged as a combination of mystical and fanatical, weak and
irresponsible, subversive and totalitarian, antithetical in the extreme to
American values.

Even those who apparently sympathized with the Indian cause were
unable to deviate from the established norms when discussing India and
reconﬁrmed the difference between 'us' and 'them.'47 On August 22, a report
in the Nation stated that "our sympathy does not blind us, as their [Congress]
bitterness blinds them, to the cold facts that the Axis victory would not only
end India’s chances of independence but destroy the freedom of the world."4 8
India's demand for independence, which, during the Cripps Mission had been
considered rightful, had now become questionable. The image of an
irresponsible Congress leadership was largely responsible for this change in
perception. Also, from the western perspective, colonialism, as opposed to
fascism, seemed a minor infringement on the rights of self-determination.
These opinions were presented by both British and American contributors to

the Nation. In the August 9 issue of Nation, Norman Angell reported in ‘British

 

47 These opinions had emerged in publications like The New Republic and
Nation which are considered outspoken political and social critics. But these
publications do not attract a large audience or circulate their ideas widely.
They are directed largely at the intelligentsia and those of liberal views.
James Playstead Wood, Magazines in the United States (New York: The Ronald
Press, 1949) 175-177. The One World reader, alluded to by Ronald Campbell, in
all probability, subscribed to these publications.

48 Nation v. 155 no. 9 172-173.

187

view of India’ that it was Gandhi’s "sincerity and saintliness, his fanaticism"
which was the problem. The Congress' demand that power he handed to a
single party dominated by a "mystic personality" in the midst of the war was
unjustifiable. Angell considered the Muslims far more distant from the Hindus
than the Irish were from the English. Similarly, Bertrand Russell on
September 5, wrote that many liberals in America did not understand that
Cripps failed because of the unwillingness of the Hindus to admit that the
Muslims had same rights to independence from the Hindus as Hindus from the
British.49

Whereas the American media, in general, questioned India's quest for
independence, Angell and Russell did not deny the Indians this right. But the
two writers also reiterated the unquestioning acceptance of the popular
British assumptions of Hindu and Muslim political and cultural differences.50
The Muslims were absolved of any criticism and effectively removed from
Hindu India. Gandhi was conﬁned to the realm of the mystical and spiritual,
which in political terms translated into irrational and impractical. If a Hindu
like Nehru, did deviate from the established behavior patterns, he was ignored
or denied credibility. These images of India and its leadership were so
powerful that an alternative interpretation seemed impossible. These images
had apparently become self sustaining, repeated without any evaluation or

even an explanation.

 

49 Nation v. 155 no. 8 144, no.9 200.

50 The western observers, both American and British, had adopted what Peter
van der Veer considers the essentialized difference between the Hindus and
Muslims adopted in the colonial period. It transformed the religious
communities into 'nations.’ Such a discourse, according to van der Veer, reiﬁes
culture as an unchanging system of ideas and values that is not historically
produced but that simply exists out there. It ignores a sense of historical
development and regional differences. "The Foreign Hand: Orientalist
Discourse in Sociology and Communalism." in Carol A. Breckenridge ed.
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1993) 241-242, 261.

188

Even American sympathizers with India, although critical of British
imperialism tended to emphasize the failures of the Indian nationalists. Freda
Kirchway's assessment provides one such example. On September 9, 1942, she
reported in the Nation that the resistance of the Indian leaders and their lack
of vision were the product of imperialism. She believed that the Indians
needed to be won over not whipped.51 The New Republic on September 12,
1942, disputed the British argument that the attitude of the Indian population
was immaterial and argued that "we" must not apply "occidental standards to
oriental problems."52 However, even sympathizers like Kirchway could not
accept the Indian nationalists as reasonable or give credence to their political
objectives. They trapped the nationalists in the image of the childlike-~lacking
vision and maturity--who needed to be nurtured and won over. Perhaps
unwittingly, the sympathizers too had applied ‘occidental’ standards to the
‘oriental’ problem.

In general, British and Americans analysts had silenced India. A
dominant image of India had successfully emerged and was expressed
frequently and more forcefully. Alternative opinions, attempting to present
positive aspects of Indian nationalism, were generally conﬁned to forums with
a smaller audience. In the August 15, 1942, issue of the Nation Louis Fischer
described Gandhi as a shrewd politician. He believed that Gandhi was willing to
make concessions while the British could not be trusted. On August 22, Fischer
urged Roosevelt to "bring the British government to a point" where it would
be forced to negotiate with Gandhi. But in view of the fact that no American
official action was taken, Fischer toned down his recommendations. On

September 5, Fischer suggested that the American ofﬁcials should intervene

 

51 Ibid., v. 155 no. 12 224-225.
52 The New Republic, v. 10 no. 12 330.

189

discreetly and informally so as not to irritate Britain. On December 5, he
blamed Churchill for the failure of the Cripps Mission.53 During the course of
these reports Fischer changed his position from recommending a tough stand
against Britain to suggesting discreet negotiations. Fischer's effort was
obviously to reinstate Gandhi as a credible politician in order to rekindle
America's interest in India. But during this period no American ofﬁcial action
was taken.

Clearly, American political interest in India had declined. On November
30, 1942, The New Republic reported that India "was slipping out Of our
minds."54 In an earlier report on November 16, 1942, ‘Is it a People’s War,’
Michael Straight5 5 argued that Britain and America were still the oppressors
or alien masters and little different from Japan or Germany. He questioned not
only the British argument that Nehru was an isolated individual, under attack
for his modernism by high caste Hindus, but also their assertion that Congress
represented only a part of India. Straight did not believe that the Muslim
League was a representative body Of all Muslims. Instead, he considered the
League a relic of feudalism and a one man dictatorship. Straight believed that
it was because of the British attitudes that Indian leaders were transforming,
discrediting moderates like Nehru, despising Britain and the United States.56

In this rare introspection, Straight, instead of imposing judgments on
India, questioned American policies and attitudes. In his interpretation
colonial subjugation was not different from fascist oppression. Unlike most
observers, he presented Nehru as a reasonable leader and disputed the well

publicized differences between Hindus and Muslims. But the arguments for

 

53 Nation, v. 155 no. 7 121-122, no. 8 145-147, no. 10185, no. 23 621.
54 Ibid., v. 107 no. 22 696.

55 Michael Straight served as the editor of The New Republic from 1941-1943
and from 1946-1956.

56 The New Republic, v. 107 no. 20 633-35.

190

which Straight criticized the British had also become accepted American
opinions. During the same period Herbert Matthews countered Straight's
views. In a report sent from the Indian state of Punjab on November 5, 1942,
Matthews argued that relationship between Hindus and Muslims was full of
distrust and antipathy. None had any understanding of or desire for
independence. None thought of India in national terms and could not conceive
India without the British.57 Matthews had a larger audience and his reports
were well received in the policy making circles. Unlike Straight, Matthews did
not question America's association with an imperial power and focused
entirely on problems within India and questioned India's claim for
independence. With a barrage of such reports, voices like those of Nehru who

wondered what role American troops would play, our guests or our
hangmen,"58 could easily be ignored.

If during the Cripps Mission Americans had begun to Observe the
Indian leaders as inept and irresponsible, Gandhi's decision to begin passive
resistance had helped solidify this perception. India's aspirations may have
been acknowledged by the Americans, but India’s unpreparedness to assume
responsibility had also been accepted. The timetable for India's independence
was to be set not by the Indians themselves but by the Americans or the
British.

Despite the recommendations of those Americans who promoted
America's national interests, Washington was unable to dissociate itself from
the British. The widespread perception of India's inability to assume

responsibility along with India's social and cultural incompatibility with the

West could have prevented American ofﬁcials from committing themselves to

 

57 New York Times, (6:2).
58 Ibid., August 9, 1942 (1:3) Cited in Quit India... 260.

191

India's cause. It was probably the reason why for a long time after the
departure of Johnson no American representative was sent to India. This
position was filled only when the British mission in Washington made a
request. The British speciﬁed that the post should not carry with it any
implications that the new commissioner was to undertake any form of
mediation between the British and the Indians.59 On September 28, 1942, Eden
had instructed Halifax to take the initiative to advise the Americans about what
type of ofﬁcial they wanted and what limitations they expected. Linlithgow did
not want a "Johnson or a Currie type." He wanted a Foreign Service Ofﬁcer of
reputation and controlled ambition.60 These requests show that the British
fear of America's involvement in the British empire persisted. In view of this
fact Amery declared in the House of Commons that "We are not quitting India
on anybody’s order."61 On November 10, 1942, Churchill made it clear that “I
have not become the King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of
the British Empire."62 Both leaders Obviously made these statements to warn

the Americans to stay away from the empire.

William Phillips' Perception of India

At the end of October 1942, Roosevelt appointed William Phillips as his
Personal Representative in India. At this time Phillips was in charge of the
London Branch of the Ofﬁce of Strategic Services. Phillips' close association

with the British seemed to make him an ideal choice.63 On December 19, 1942,

 

59 Welles, Memorandum of conversation with Halifax, October 2, 1942. FR, 1942
v. I 736.

60 Eden to Halifax September 28, 1942 and Linlithgow to Amery, September 18,
1942. Mansergh, v. 3 53-54 and v. 2 983-4.

61 Time, XL no. 16 October 19, 1942.

62 Cited in John Sbrega, Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East
Asia, 1941-1945 (New York: Garland, 1983) 17-18.

53 According to Martin Weil, William Phillips had steeped himself in the

192

he reported to Hull from London that it would be wise for him to keep a
distance from political subjects in India until he could gain the conﬁdence of
the Indians and that he already had the conﬁdence of the British.64 Hull
cautioned Phillips on November 20, 1942, not to be partisan and to discuss the
Indian situation with appropriate British officials. Hull reasoned that the
United States could not bring pressure on Britain as it would disturb the unity
of command and cooperation both during and following the war. American
forces and supplies were pouring into India for which peaceful conditions
were necessary. But Hull also suggested that Phillips could remind the British
that America's involvement in the Philippines provided a good example of
how a nation should treat a colony or dependency--by cooperating with it.65

In this briefing, American involvement in India’s independence was
not an issue. Hull was representing what David Spurr defines as American
style self-afﬁrmation of material prosperity and moral progress in its colonial
enterprise in the Philippines. The Philippines, according to Spurr, was an
extension of American civilized ideals.66 Hull's position was similar to the one
assumed by Roosevelt when he recommended to Churchill the adoption of the
American model to settle India's problems. Now it was the American
management of the Philippines as Opposed to British rule in India, which
distinguished American values and ideals. But the opinions expressed by Hull
in the State Department and Matthews in the media maintained India as a
British concern and Hull did not want Phillips to disturb that relationship.

In January 1943, Phillips left London for India. Although a proclaimed

friend of Roosevelt, Phillips would write about Roosevelt in his memoirs that

cosmopolitan culture of European courts. A Pretty Good Club (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1978) 67

Phillips to Hull. FR, 1943, v. 4 178-180.
65 William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952) 344.
66 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire (Durham: Duke U. P., 1978) 117-118.

193

“...I never fully trusted his assurances...his desire to please might lead him to
appear enthusiastic..." about any Suggestions offered yet [he] realized that
"there were political considerations to which he might have to give
preference..."67 Phillips' frustration with Roosevelt can be examined in the
context of his role in India and the response he received from the President.68

The initial response of Phillips about India was predictable. In his
report to the President he pointed out that the ofﬁcial British position in India
was not unreasonable. They had ruled India for over a century and their
withdrawal would create chaos in India. However, in retrospect, his memoirs
recorded inconsistency in the British policies. He realized that the British
invited the Indians to negotiate yet kept Gandhi and Nehru in prison.69 In
view of Phillips' initial response to India Linlithgow was satisfied and
informed Amery that Phillips had agreed not to interfere in Indian politics:70

Phillips' stay in India eventually changed his assessment of the Indian
problem. The conclusions he reached were similar to those adopted by most
American military officials. Phillips recognized that the British were
incompetent but that did not necessarily mean the Indians were ready to
assume political responsibility. On January 22, 1943, Phillips reported to
Roosevelt that the Hindus were united in their distrust and dislike of the
British but were not altogether united behind Gandhi. Jinnah feared Hindu
domination and hoped for the continuation of the British rule while the

princes remained detached from Hindu political objectives. Phillips also

 

67 Phillips, 183-184.

68 According to D. Cameron Watt, India's policies were made in London, the
Government of India was subordinated to the Cabinet. Under these
circumstances Phillips' interaction with the Government of India could not
have been of consequence. Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place,
1900-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1984) 236.

69 Phillips. 352-353.

70 Linlithgow to Amery, January 11, 1943. Mansergh, v. 3 485-488.

194

commented on the social and cultural aspects of India. He singled out the caste
system which "divides people into rigid categories." Phillips pointed out that
Gandhi was revered as a god, but was "a wholly impractical god,” and
considered Jinnah a formidable Opposition to Hindu nationalism. Phillips may
have reiterated ideas about India popularized by the British, but his opinion of
the British in India was not ﬂattering. He believed that the viceroy
represented the traditional empire that was governing backward people. The
civil servants were unaware of the outside world and wanted a status quo to be
preserved as their livelihood depended on it.71 In view of Phillips'
reassessment of the British, Linlithgow reevaluated his opinion of Phillips. He
wrote to Amery on January 28, 1943, that he did not propose to "suffer any
interference."72 Phillips reported to Hull on February 10 that Linlithgow had
grown suspicious of him.73

The impressions of India Phillips presented to his superiors were not
original, but based on the ones that had already been confirmed by most
commentators on India. Caste and religion had subdued Indian nationalism.
The Congress did not represent India and its appeal among the Hindus,
personified by Gandhi, was based more on Gandhi's religiosity than on any
viable and practical political philosophy. Phillips' failure to interest
Washington in India probably lay in his own inability to review India
differently and to present an alternative perspective. His rendition of India
may have even undermined his criticism of the decadence of British
imperialism in India.

Unlike Johnson, Phillips was unable to meet Gandhi and Nehru because

they were in prison and Gandhi had gone on fast in protest. But Phillips had

 

71 Phillips to Roosevelt FR, 1943 v. 4 180-183.
72 Mansergh, v. 3 554-556.
73 Phillips to Hull. FR 1943 v. 4187-188.

195

recourse to the British officials which led him to review America's
relationship with Britain. This reevaluation led him to recognize America's
ability to assert its power and promote its interests independently of the
British. It was this recognition which, in all probability, inspired Phillips to
become involved in Indian politics. Consequently, he disregarded Hull's
warning not to interfere and asked the viceroy to see Gandhi. He attempted to
make his request palatable by presenting Roosevelt as popular in India.74 In
his next report Phillips asked Hull for directions as his silence on Gandhi's fast
was looked upon unfavorably by the Indians. However, in this report Phillips
did not emphasize Roosevelt's popularity but cited criticisms leveled at the
President in the Bombay Chronicle for not implementing his pledges for self
determination for non-white people. But Phillips' reports did not have the
desired effect. On February 16, 1943, Hull informed Phillips that the President
wanted him to return to the United States for consultations at the end of April
or beginning of May.75 Furthermore, Phillips' reevaluation of India was not
shared by all Americans reporting from India. His assessment of Gandhi's fast
competed with that of Herbert Matthews. On February 21, 1943, Matthews
expressed his doubts that there was a countrywide demand in India for
Gandhi's release. He found the masses unconcerned and the Muslims distant.76
Matthews was both reﬂecting and affirming the ideas about India already
established in Washington. Unlike Phillips, there was no concern in Matthews
regarding America's image in India. The President's instruction to Phillips to
return was probably a warning to Phillips not to interfere.

Phillips had failed to recognize how ﬁrmly entrenched the American

¥

74 Ibid. Phillips to Hull, February 10, 1943. 188-191.

75 Phillips to Hull, February 12, 1943, Hull to Phillips, February 16, 1943. lbid.,
191-194.

76 New York Times (21:4).

196

opinion of India had become. He may even have strengthened these beliefs by
reiterating problems in India in a vocabulary which provided confirmation to
the accepted Opinions of India. Like the military observers in India, who had
recognized America's emerging role, Phillips was concerned at the possible
loss of American prestige in Asia. On February 19, he reported that
Rajagopalachari, an Indian nationalist, believed that the American
government should help India in order to remove the impression in Asia that
America was collaborating with Britain.77 But Phillips' concerns evoked no
response in Washington. Instead Hull informed Phillips that if Phillips was
pressured to make any statement he should inform the Indian nationalists that
he was required to discuss the situation with "ranking American and British
officials."7 3

Hull's recommendation suggests that American ofﬁcials had already
determined their understanding about India and were unwilling to consider
India in the context of their larger interests. Phillips probably recognized that
the image of the Indian nationalists he had presented to the officials in
Washington had contributed to their disinterest. In his next report to
Roosevelt, presented on February 23, Phillips acknowledged the difﬁculty of
understanding Gandhi. He conceded that it was difﬁcult for the "Anglo-Saxons"
to understand the deep seated feeling aroused. by a seventy three year old
Gandhi who many Hindus considered possessed a "semi divine quality." Phillips
acknowledged that neither the President nor the Secretary could do much in
India but hoped to avoid the impression that his own presence and the
presence of American forces in India encouraged the British to retain control

over India.79 Phillips' assessment is insightful at many levels. At a personal

 

77 Phillips to Hull. February 19, 1943. FR 1943 v. 4 196-97.
78 Ibid., 199.
79 FR 1943 v. 4 201-203.

197

level, he had been unable to accept any rationality in Gandhi's popularity and
sought to explain the Indian leader within the parameters of the image
already established of the Hindu culture. In this respect, Phillips reconfirmed
the gap between the political behavior of the "Anglo Saxons" and those of the
Indians. But his explanation to Roosevelt also provides an access into a
vocabulary with which he and the other State Department Officials were most
comfortable discussing non-white cultures. Phillips was part of a political
culture which, in all probability, routinely deﬁned itself as Anglo Saxon and
confirmed its unity with the British against the non-western world. But
removed from the close knit circle, where the preservation of the unity
between the Anglo Saxon powers was not yet challenged, Phillips had been
exposed to the reality of the colonizer's position and questioned their
collaboration. He reminded Roosevelt of America's distinction and distance
from the British. He may have wanted white prestige to be preserved in Asia,
but by dissociating from the British.

Phillips qualifies as a representative and adherent of the belief
presented by Emily Rosenberg that American values were meant to uplift the
world.80 Like Johnson, his stay in India convinced him of America's
independence from the British. Phillips' focus was not so much on the
viability of Indian nationalism or an acceptance of the political objectives of
the Asians, as on the maintenance of white prestige in Asia, which American
association with the British was hampering.

Following the general trend among American commentators in India
Phillips concentrated primarily on Gandhi and ignored Nehru. Nehru's

disagreements with Gandhi had not acquired any voice even though they had

 

80 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1982) 203.

198

been recorded in the State Department. Nehru had acknowledged in his prison
diary on January 26, 1943, that Gandhi was insensitive to the Americans and
ignored "international aspects."81 But the American tendency to focus on
Gandhi made Nehru's place in Indian nationalism irrelevant. If American
Ofﬁcials accepted cultural and racial differences in their discussions on India,
then Gandhi conveniently fit the image which conﬁrmed the difference.

Phillips had recognized the political necessity to establish a distance
from Britain but the ofﬁcials in Washington seemed unwilling to detach
themselves from a power with which they had shared a long-established
affinity. Their acceptance of British rule in India could not be negated
suddenly. On March 3, when Gandhi ended his fast, Phillips informed Roosevelt
that, even though, the British had ruled India for over a century they had also
recognized the emergence of new forces in the world. Phillips believed that
the British would Offer freedom to India as soon as the Indians could secure a
government. He reminded Roosevelt that the Atlantic Charter had given the
Indian nationalists hope and that they were caught up with new ideas of
freedom. He believed that Americans could induce the Indian leaders to talk
and recommended that the President invite them for a meeting as it would
become advantageous for America in the future.8 2

Phillips had changed his tone considerably. Instead of directing his
attention to divisions and problems among the Indian nationalists, he focused
on the western inspired new forces of freedom and democracy in India.
Western standards were now applied by Phillips to deﬁne Indian nationalism
in an effort to make it more palatable. But, unlike Johnson, Phillips did not

promote the cause of the Congress, or present a leader like Nehru as a

 

81 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru .- An Anthology (Delhi: Oxford U. P., 1983) 180-
181.
82 FR 1943 v. 4 205-207.

199

reasonable alternative to Gandhi. His primarily goal was to promote an
independent American role in Asia. Instead of criticising the British he
focused on the limitations an imperial power faced in effecting change.
American policy makers, in this respect, were being educated about the
necessity to assume responsibility from Britain. But opinions expressed by
Phillips consistently competed with those of the British officials and the
American press. Both reiterated inadequacies of Indian nationalism and
promoted the necessity of British rule in India. Herbert Matthews reported
that the end of Gandhi's fast was a political blow to his reputation as the
Muslims and the princes remained detached.83

In contrast to journalists like Matthews, whose focus remained conﬁned
to problems within India, Phillips had recognized America's future role in
Asia. This fact was recognized by Wallace Murray, Advisor on Political
Relations. He reported to Welles on April 6, that Phillips' request to see Gandhi
should be given consideration, at least for the record. Murray believed that in
view of America's espousal of the Atlantic Charter "we will be vulnerable in
the future" in Asia. Consequently, on April 14, Hull instructed Phillips to make
a request to see Gandhi, but on a personal basis.84 Hull's recommendation does
not suggest any urgency to reevaluate the American position on India. The
political climate and public opinion in the United States did not require the
ofﬁcials to take any immediate action. In this sense the media may have
contributed towards creating a disinterest towards India. Unlike Phillips, who
had recognized America's emerging role, the media had remained shortsighted
in its evaluations and in all probability created a similar mind set in the

general public.8 5

 

83 New York Times March 3, 1943 (10:5).
34 FR 1943 v.4 212-213, 215.
85 American public opinion regarding India's independence is apparent in a

200

Phillips viewed America's association with Britain as a liability and
realized that the prestige of the white race could no longer be preserved by
the British and that role had to be assumed by the Americans. He warned the
President of the growing anti-white sentiment in Asia and that "oriental
hopelessness" could easily turn to hostility. He further informed the President
that India was suffering from hopelessness and that Indian leaders had
become disillusioned with the Americans. Phillips added that there was no war
spirit in the British. He warned that unless the situation in India changed,
Americans would have to bear the burden of future campaigns in Asia where
color consciousness was developing and a "vast bloc of oriental people shared a
growing dislike and distrust of the occidentals." The only reaction that this
report induced was that Welles requested Hull to recall Phillips in case the
British thought that Americans had modiﬁed their policy on India.86 Phillips
may have conﬁned his opinions of India within the established parameters:
however, his primary concentration was on establishing America's distance
with the British. In contrast, the media limited itself to presenting graphic
images of India which conﬁrmed the country's social and cultural alienness
and political immaturity. This inability to view India from a different
perspective seemed to have made British presence in India a necessity and

India’s independence a liability. Phillips left India at the end of April 1943.

 

poll conducted in April 1943. It indicates that 62% favored India's
independence, but only 19% favored it immediately while 40% favored it after
the war. Cited in Gary Hess, America Encounters India (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971) 128.

86 April 19,1943.FR 1943 v. 4 217-223.

201

Planning the Future

The sentiments Americans may have expressed about British
imperialism continued to develop independently of American view of the
imperialized, at least regarding India. In this respect, the media continued to
emphasize India's alienness and backwardness. On June 14, 1943, a report in
Time magazine focused on differences between Jinnah and Gandhi, in effect,
between Muslims and Hindus. The report presented Jinnah as possessing "Bond
street clothes and the rich palace," who revived the Muslim pride in its one
time imperial greatness. Gandhi, on the other hand, with his 'mysticism," his
"dhoti" [loincloth], and his "goats" aspired to a uniﬁed India.87 In this graphic
description both leaders appeared as caricatures-Jinnah in his suit imitating
the West and Gandhi in his loincloth rejecting the West. Suggestions made by
Phillips that the President invite such leaders to a conference could not have
won public approval or support.

The withdrawal of America's interest in India's nationalist struggle was
noted with relief by the British officials. Halifax reported to Anthony Eden,
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Cripps Mission had
revealed the impracticability of the Congress leaders.88 However, those voices
which promoted America's national interests continued to concern the British.
Now the British directed their efforts towards limiting American interest in
Asia in the post-war period. Amery believed that there was a widespread and
rooted feeling in the United States which regarded the British colonial empire

as equivalent to a private estate. He acknowledged that Britain needed

 

37 Time XLI no. 24 31.

88 Thomas E. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches: Analyses of America the
British Ambassador I939-1945 (Evanston: New University Press, 1974) 65.
Halifax to Eden, June 26, 1943, political review of the United States for the year
1942.

202

America's protection and would have to convince the Americans that British
colonial policies were not an anachronism. Amery wanted Americans to
recognize that Britain had consistently applied liberal ideas in social,
economic and political spheres for the beneﬁt of the people. He believed that it
was important to encourage the United States to look outward and join in the
acceptance of these policies towards colonial people and their development.89

One of the major concerns of the British was the growing economic
ambition in the United States. Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, informed
Amery on September 21, that the United States would make industrialization of
India and China an important objective. Under such circumstances it would be
to "our beneﬁt" to train Indians in Britain and encourage them to look to
Britain for capital equipment.90 Linlithgow wrote to Amery on January 2,
1943, that in economic and commercial ﬁelds America's objective in the post-
war period was likely to be free trade for all and expressed his discomfort
about “ welcoming...American interest in the British colonial empire.”91 Sir
Ronald Campbell reported from Washington that powerful business interests,
which favored American participation in world affairs, were becoming
interested in overseas affairs.92

With the growing threat to their own position, the British did not only
have to retain India's loyalty but also educate America about the value of their
empire. The strategy of the British seemed to be directed towards controlling
American ambition by appealing to their views of other cultures and keeping
them dependent on the British role and experience in the empire. Halifax

explained in the National Geographic that Indians were a "primitive people

 

89 Ibid. Amery to Linlithgow, December 13, 1942. 363- 366.
90 Mansergh, v. 3 122,8.
91 Mansergh, v. 3 457-460.

92 Hachey, 127. Ronald Campbell to Eden, October 27, 1943, political review of
the United States for the year 1943.

203

to whom the British had provided social and economic upliftment. He argued
that that the British had helped change the Indian outlook by introducing
them to the language of Shakespeare and Milton, Thomas Jefferson and
Abraham Lincoln. In this respect, Halifax conveniently hinted at America's
contribution, however indirect, towards India's awakening. He also expounded
on the differences between the realistic and democratic Muslims and the
mystical and introspective Hindus--between "dynamic" and "static" people.93
The British empire would now be justiﬁed in terms of what Said and Bhabha
have considered the necessity of progressive ‘western’ forms of social and
economic organizations, to develop, modernize and stabilize the East. The
attributes of modernity and tradition would now ‘ﬁx’ a nation in the hierarchy
and policies planned accordingly. Said contends that the United States
inherited this posture after the war, when colonies like India became
independent.94 Perhaps these beliefs already existed in the United States to
which the British could appeal.

Britain's concerns regarding the growth of America's interest in the
empire were evident in the opinions expressed by Americans reporting from
Asia. On June 19, 1943, Paul Alling, Chief of the Department of the Near Eastern
Affairs, reported John Paton Davies' concern that Britain was fighting
primarily to retain its Empire and the United States to defeat Japan. Davies
wanted Americans to dissociate themselves from working the British in
programs like the psychological warfare program as they tended to identify
America with British imperialism. Hull concurred with Davies' concerns and

wanted to avoid programs that presented American and British interests as

 

93 Lord Halifax, "India-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," National
Geographic (October 1943 v. L xxxix no. 4) 385-405.

94 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 4, 291, 321,
Bhabha, 209.

204

identical.95 The emergence of American interests in Asia also led American
ofﬁcials in India to review India's opinion Of America. Merrell reported on
May 4, 1943, from New Delhi that the Indians wanted American economic
assistance but feared American power. He reported on the suspicion of ‘dollar
diplomacy’ and ‘economic imperialism’ in the press. On February 2, 1944, he
reported that Indian nationalists believed that America's interest in India was
not altruistic and that Roosevelt may sacriﬁce his principles in the course of
making economic adjustments with Britain. On April 12, 1945, Merrell reported
that the editorial in the Indian newspaper The Hindustan Times attacked
America's imperial tendency in the Far East. The editorial, according to
Merrell, was another example of anti-American propaganda in the Indian
press.96 Merrell’s reports indicate that it was no longer sufﬁcient to inform
Washington about the inadequacies of Indian nationalism. His reports covered
a large span of time, but apparently nothing was done to quell India's
suspicion of the United States. Once again, Washington seemed prepared to
issue policy statements proclaiming a dissociation from the British as long as it

did not require an active involvement in India.9‘7

 

95 FR, 1943 v. 4 239-240. On his return to the United States Phillips reiterated
to Roosevelt on May 14, 1943 the fear of anti-white sentiment and that people
in Asia saw the war as fought between fascism and imperialism. India was
bound to be an important base against Japan and the Indians felt they had
nothing to ﬁght for. Phillips, 387-388.

96 Records of the Department of State, Decimal Files Record Group 59, Box
4951 845.50/7-2244, Box 349 1742 64500l6-2044, Box 6062 845.00/4-1245.

97 According to D. Cameron. Watt, Roosevelt's sense of power grew from 1942
and so did the American populist anti-colonial sentiment which the President
and his representatives, Louis Johnson and William Phillips transferred to
India. Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, I900-I975
(Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1984) 91, 223-224. But Wm. Roger Louis believes
that from about 1943 the American government, in pursuit of security, tended
to support, rather than break British imperial system. Imperialism at Bay
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 567. Roosevelt's sense of power may have
grown after 1942 but he seemed unwilling to challenge the British and assume
a dominant role at least in the case of India. Americans had not been able to
articulate an interest in India within the framework Of larger American goals.

205

Halifax astutely summed up the evolution of American policies during
the course of the war. He believed that the Roosevelt administration had set
out to free itself of charges that they were following Whitehall, but for
strategic reasons the American ofﬁcials realized that America's interest lay in
the perpetuation of the empire. It was in the matter of economic interests that
Halifax predicted a conﬂict of interest, especially over imperial preferences.
He believed that in the ﬁrst quarter of 1944 India and the colonies were not
discussed much in the United States.98

Kenneth Decourcy reaffirmed Halifax's reasoning. In the January 1944
Review of World Affairs, he reports that there was an increasing appreciation
of the fact in the United States that no peace system could exist unless the
British empire was preserved. It was the empire rather than the British Isles
which was strategically important to the United States. Regarding India, the
Review in April 1944 pointed out that the Hindus had no faith in democratic
institutions because democracy was the antithesis of their faith while the
Muslims were more adaptable to democratic ideas as they considered all men
equal. Moreover, in villages the British were more popular than the Indians.99
DeCourcy was obviously propagating the standard British opinion of India. The
British had once again found it necessary to remind themselves and the

Americans Of India's inadequacies and the necessity of their rule.

Towards Independence: A Reappraisal

With the end of the war approaching American policies towards India

underwent a reevaluation. With the death of Roosevelt in April 1945 those

 

98 Hachey, 162, 191, 194. Halifax to Eden, June 19, 1944, political review of the
United States for the year 1944.

99 Review of World Affairs, January 1944 no. 64 10. April 1944 no. 65 7-8.

206

officials who had unsuccessfully promoted an independent approach towards
India attempted to inﬂuence the new administration of Harry S. Truman.
Phillips was one such person. He advised the State Department on April 19,
1945, that the Atlantic Charter and the statements of the late President
regarding independence for all people had led India to expect sympathy from
the United States. Phillips wanted Truman to convey to Eden that Americans
were disturbed by the resentment among Indians against the Anglo Saxon
powers because it adversely affected the military effort and the prestige of the
white race in Asia.100 Phillips' emphasis on the preservation of white prestige
in Asia was probably meant to make the concern palatable to Truman and was
expressed in a vocabulary with which, in all likelihood, Truman was familiar.

American Objectives in post-war Asia had begun to manifest themselves
more forcefully. In Britain the Labour Party had won the general elections in
July 1945. The State Department, where misgivings about British policies in
India had remained subdued, were now expressed more openly. Leslie F. Smith,
of the State Department, reported on July 26, 1945, that the British were
spending large sums of money on anti Indian propaganda in the United States
and anti American propaganda in India. Smith pointed out that the experts in
the State, War and Navy departments believed that lend lease given to British
India was not used towards the war but to prevent revolts in India. He also
pointed out that the State Department experts believed that Roosevelt never got
really tough on Churchill. Truman should.101

Smith echoed sentiments which had been expressed earlier by Louis
Johnson. However, as during Johnson's involvement in India, criticism of

India continued to coexist and Often competed with the articulation of

 

100 Phillips memorandum. FR 1945 v. 6 249-250.

101 Smith to the Secretary of State. General Records of the Department of State.
Decimal Files RG 59 box 6063 845.00/7-2645.

207

American self interests. Winant reported from London on November 16, 1945,
that Nehru had become impatient with Gandhi and "his spinning wheel" and
non-violence. Winant also believed that the Congress was unwilling to assume
responsibility and hoped to achieve its ends versus the British and the Muslims
by resorting to violence because Britain would hesitate to use force.102 In his
earlier reports Winant had focused primarily on American Objectives and
ignored the Indian nationalists. But, once his focus shifted to India, he
reinforced the entrenched images of the Indian nationalists. The Congress
remained an irresponsible, obstructionist and manipulative organization with
a cunning and unreasonable leadership at its helm.

Even though the political habits and objectives of the Indian
nationalists continued to earn criticism in the United States, such opinions no
longer discouraged the ofﬁcials from planning long term strategies towards
India. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew advised Truman on June 9, 1945,
to lift the barriers placed on Indian immigration in order to alleviate hostility
towards the "white races" in India and other places. Grew believed that Pearl
Harbor had been a reminder of the oriental bitterness against those
westerners who treated them as racially inferior. Grew also highlighted
India's economic potential. He pointed out that India had plans for post war
economic reconstruction and was a great potential market for American
goods.103 Howard Donovan, Consul in Bombay, reported to the Secretary of

State on January 9, 1945, that due to the war the United States had vastly

 

102 FR 1945 v. 6 253-254. In April 1946, Peter and Frances Muir wrote that
Gandhi did not speak for India because India was riven by geographical
barriers, religious allegiances and caste. They illustrated the gap between the
Hindus and the Muslims by pointing out that Jinnah would not be a popular
leader in India because he lived too well and his linen was too clean. (National
Geographic v. L xxxix no. 4) 443-467.

103 Ibid., 287-288. The bill permitting 100 Indians per year to enter the
United States passed on July 2, I946.

208

improved its position in Indian markets which hitherto exclusively belonged
to Britain.104 The concerns the British had anticipated regarding America's
economic interests in the empire had now begun to manifest themselves. A
recognition of the American role and interests in India and Asia had become
more directed and focused among the American ofﬁcials. No longer did
negative images of India or its nationalism impede an American review of
India's economic potential. But significantly, no Indian leadership was
acknowledged with whom the Americans would begin an interaction.

The development of American interest in Asia was recognized by the
British. Halifax reported to Eden that America's esteem for British political,
social, economic and military leadership had declined. Suspicion of colonialism
was seen in Britain's supposed reluctance to take the last steps towards self
government in India. Halifax believed that as the United States moved more
and more into world affairs differences with Britain emerged.105 There was
truth to Halifax's assessment. Ofﬁcial discussions in Washington indicate that
America's interests in Asia were being consistently articulated. Their
concerns for British interests, which had once received priority, were not
even voiced in the new policy suggestions. American ofﬁcials had apparently
recognized Britain's inability to uphold white interests, and that role had to be
taken over by the Americans. The Americans had not excluded the British
from the exclusive club but had deﬁnitely subordinated them.

Even though American ofﬁcials articulated their own interests in India,
they did not take into consideration opinions Indians like Nehru developed of

the United States. Over a period of time, American policy makers had been

 

104 General Records of the Department of State, Decimal Files RG 59 box 6061
845.0/1-945.

105 Hachey, 259-60. Halifax to Eden, June 16, 1945. Political review of the
United States for the year 1945.

209

informed about the irrational, irresponsible Indian leadership and had
accepted the Congress leadership within the parameters of this image. Nehru
believed that America had kept itself clear from all entanglements, a passive
and sometimes active supporter of British policies and propaganda.106 He
wrote in The Discovery of India that the British colonial outlook was not
compatible with American policies and expansionist tendencies because the
United States wanted an open market and looked unfavorably at those who
opposed it.107 Nehru’s fears of American objectives in India were similar to
those expressed by the British. Both eventually wanted to keep American
inﬂuence at bay, one to preserve the empire the other to preserve India’s
independence. The contentions made by Hunt and Rosenberg regarding
America's mission to spread its values and capital and its inability to accept
changes incompatible with American interests had been understood and
responded to by Nehru. In a speech made in 1946 Nehru declared “I do not
want India to be a supplicant country," and in January 1947, “We can only
deal with other countries on an equal basis and if this is denied to us, we shall
rely upon our own resources how ever poor they might be."108 Nehru had
announced the basis of India’s foreign policy. He stated that "Asians and
Africans have become increasingly conscious of themselves and their
destiny." They were nationalists and were seeking neither domination nor
interference.10 9

Grew, in selling India to Truman as a potential market, did not take into

 

106 Hess 164.
107 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day, 1946)
549-550, 560.
108 Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 2nd series v. 4 (New Delhi:
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986) 428 and Jawaharlal Nehru's
Speeches 2nd ed. v. 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting, 1958) 472.
109 Nehru, The Discovery 559.

210

account Nehru’s opinion of American economic imperialism and his views on
capitalism. In general, American commentators had not assigned Nehru a
political stature and regarded him as a weak and ineffective leader. Naturally,
his views had not acquired relevance. Nehru believed that imperialism and
capitalism were cohorts and neither would disappear until both systems were
rejected.110 Nehru contended that since "capitalism necessarily led to
exploitation of one by another," the solution lay in the adoption of a socialist
economy.111 As during the Cripps Mission, Americans tended to give
precedence to their own expectations of India over the avowed political
Objectives of the Indian leaders. Nehru’s economic policy and his non-aligned
policy, and promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity eventually became
incompatible when the Americans defined their political objectives towards
Asia and Africa. India's resistance to America's objectives, as in the case of
their rejection of Cripps' proposals, could easily be explained within the
framework of images and ideas which demonstrated India's political
irrationality and irresponsibility.

The American inability to accept policies and attitudes which did not
conform to America's self image and interests is evident in Merrell's
observations. He seemed offended that the Indians classed the United States
with Britain as an imperialist power and that Britain was not trying to dispel

the illusion.112 He was disappointed with Sardar Patel, future deputy prime

 

110 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: a Biography v. 1 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1975) 104-105.

1“ Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology 292.

112 Merrell to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1946. FR 1946 v. 5 86-94.
American officials held the British responsible for presenting the United
States as an imperialist power. In a memo, Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of
South Asian Affairs stated that Britain had made no attempt to consult with 'us,'
and seemed unhappy with 'our position' in India. Lord Mountbatten, the last
British Governor General of India, had warned Nehru against dollar
imperialism of the United States. 26, December 1946. FR 1947 v. 3. 175-178.

211

minister of India, for believing that the United States was unduly inﬂuenced
by Britain. Patel, according to Merrell, was "obsessed" with Britain’s
insincerity. Similarly, another Congress leader, Rajagopalachari evaded the
question posed by Merrell as to how democracy would survive in India if
tensions between the Hindus and Muslims continued. Merrell concluded that
no leader demonstrated "statesmanlike" behavior, vision or courage to rise
above his party or communal afﬁliation.113

American opinion of India did not change but continued to coexist with
the promotion of America's objectives and interests. With the threat of
communism looming large, the future of India and the demands of the Muslim
League for a separate state of Pakistan were reviewed from a global
perspective. America's involvement in the process of transfer of power in
India was minimal but American interest in the outcome had heightened. Dean
Acheson, the new Secretary of State, believed that a quick settlement of the
Indian problem would expedite other colonial questions in Asia and limit the
appeal of Communism. In view of these facts, Acheson wanted the Congress to
accept British and Muslim League’s interpretations of compulsory groupings
of provinces.114 Acheson advised the American mission in New Delhi on
December 11, 1946, to dispel any belief in India that America's actions and

initiatives were inspired at the instance of Britain.115 Acheson's

 

113 Merrell to Acheson. FR 1946 v. 5. 101-103, 109-112. Kenton Clymer
believes that American policy makers considered the Indian nationalists not
only capable but ultimately reasonable. Quest for Freedom 292. Merrell's
statements do not reﬂect Clymer's contentions.

“4 Ibid. Acheson to Merrell. 97-98. The Cabinet Mission sent by the British
in 1946 had proposed two groupings of Indian provinces, one of the
predominant Hindu provinces and the other of the Muslims. The Congress
leaders wanted a strong central government while minimizing the power of
the provincial groups but the Muslim League disagreed. The Cabinet Mission
failed to resolve the impasse.

“5 Acheson to Merrell, December 10, 1946. General Records of the Department
of State, Decimal Files RG 59 box 6068 845.00/12-1046.

212

recommendations reﬂect a similarity in the present American posture towards
India with the one adopted both during and immediately following the Cripps
Mission. Americans had placed requirements on the Indians, especially the
Indian National Congress, to adopt recommended policies. Also, the need to
dispel the Indian fear of American association with the British had not been
resolved. India's anti-imperialist sentiment was constantly rediscovered by the
American ofﬁcials and handled on an ad hoc basis.

With India's impending independence in sight, and the division of the
subcontinent into India and Pakistan becoming a reality, American officials
had to review their interests in the two emerging nations separately. In this
respect, the well publicized ideas about the characteristics of Hindus and
Muslims became convenient tools to assess the two nations. On May 2, 1947,
Merrell warned the State Department that Indian Muslims considered
Americans unsympathetic to their cause. He emphasized Jinnah’s importance
and conveyed the Muslim fear of the spread of "Hindu imperialism" into the
Middle East. Merrell believed that the allegiance of the Muslim countries was
important to the United States in order to deter Russian aggression in that
region.116 Merrell's contention indicates that American interest in India's
independence had changed signiﬁcantly over a period of time. In 1941 Berle
had viewed India's independence in terms of its favorable impact on the
Middle East.117 At this time Berle did not even consider differences between
the two religious communities a factor. But in 1947, Merrell seemed to have
accepted the well publicized incompatibility between the two communities and
redefined the relevance of India's independence. In this respect, he even

removed the Muslims from the culture and politics of the Indian sub-continent

 

116 Merrell to Acheson. FR 1947 v. 3 154-155.
117 Berle to Hull. Drafte Aide Memoire, May 5, 1941 FR 1941 v.3 176-177.

213

and aligned them with that of the Middle East. The understanding Americans
developed of the Hindus and Muslims had a considerable impact on American
involvement in the politics of the two nations as well.

Once India's independence became a certainty, its leadership
represented by Nehru also given consideration. The newly appointed
American Ambassador to India, Henry Grady reported on July 9, 1947, that
Nehru based his foreign policy on the need to avoid involvement with any
bloc and wanted friendly relations with the United States. Grady projected that,
even though some Indians feared American economic penetration, they would
generally welcome American exports. He believed that international
ideological conﬂicts were less important to India than the domestic problems it
faced.118 In view of the fact that Indian opinion had generally been ignored
in the United States, the information provided by Grady regarding Nehru's
political beliefs could easily receive a similar disregard. Nehru had articulated
his political philosophy long before India became independent, but it had not
generated any discussion in America.119 In the ﬁnal stages of India's drive
towards independence Americans remained observers of the process. On
August 15, 1947, India achieved independence.

On August 18, 1947, days after India’s independence, Time reported that
on the whole British despotism had been benevolent. Thoughtful Indians

wondered what new conquerors might be coming over the hill, and whether

 

118 Ibid. Grady to Acheson. 160-161.

119 The incompatibility of Nehru's non-aligned policy probably kept
American attention focused on Nehru's personality without necessitating a
review of his Opinion of the communists and Soviet Union in particular. It was
on January 31, 1952 that the OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research
Report on China and India, 1950-1951 acknowledged Nehru's suspicion of the
Soviet Union. The report pointed out that in The Discovery of India, written by
Nehru in 1944, he mentioned expansionists tendencies of the Soviet Union.
OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports. China and India
I950-1961. ed. Paul Kesaris. Part IX. 1979.

214

they would be as helpful as the British had been.120 Time’s opinion
exempliﬁes that India was still not considered capable of forming an able and
competent government or defending itself. It would remain open to new
conquerors who in the current scenario would not be the ‘benevolent’ British
but more sinister communists. American interaction with independent India

would begin on this premise.

 

120 Time L no. 7 34.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

American involvement in the politics of India in the early 1940s was a
crucial period in which a well deﬁned image of India was established and
accepted within government circles, and intellectual and popular arenas in
the United States. Certain aspects of India acquired a dominant place in
American thought within which Indian society, politics, and leadership was
ultimately defined. These images were so powerful, so arresting, that the
American policy makers, the writers, military ofﬁcials, and the media seemed
compelled to understand India within their conﬁnes. This perception of India
had a signiﬁcant political impact: it served the immediate purpose of deﬁning
the tone of American involvement in India's achievement of independence.
Furthermore, in the long run it provided a framework within which to discuss
and deveIOp a relationship with independent India.

Even though the discussion centered on India, it was primarily Hindu
India which was the object of scrutiny. Within the broadly deﬁned "Orient,'
the Hindus were placed much lower than the Chinese1 and even the Indian
Muslims. India, in fact, became more or less synonymous with the Hindus and
the Muslims were excluded from the boundaries that the western observers
deﬁned as India. Hindus were singled out as passive and subservient and
discussed with extreme negativity. Hinduism and the institution of caste
became the deﬁning elements of India which in turn became the basis for
examining India's political aspirations. Both the religious and the social

institutions were perceived as breeding an otherworldly, passive, fatalistic,

 

1 See Harold A. Isaacs, Scratches on our Minds: American Images of China
and India (New York: John Day, 1958)

215

216

undemocratic tradition. Within these confines, Hindu nationalism, represented
by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Gandhi, became
suspect. It was not merely the political philosophy of Gandhi, but such
visualizations as Gandhi's attire, the inert masses and the sacred cows which
demonstrated and confirmed India's inability to break away from
strangulating traditions and irrational, irresponsible, and illogical political
behavior. Consequently, India's ability to participate in the war or to develop
self-rule became questionable. Since the Second World War was the primary
reason for American involvement in India, this interpretation imposed limits
on the United States' interest and role in India's independence movement.

The success and acceptance of these images depended largely on their
constant reiteration until they became firmly entrenched in American
political thought. The British played a significant role in this respect,
particularly during the period of the Cripps Mission. They defined India,
provided graphic images, numerical proofs, and introduced a vocabulary into
American politics with which to discuss India. Yet, for these images to become
accepted a certain impulse had to exist in the United States in order to identify
with the British. In fact, traditionally, Americans had accepted and endorsed
the British position in India. To begin with, an admiration for the British had
existed among the American policy making elite since the period of Anglo-
American rapprochement, c1900-1914, which was expressed as the civilized
'white race' performing an admirable duty to uplift the unruly 'natives.‘ These
sentiments were also expressed by American observers in India prior to the
outbreak of the Second World War. But India was still distant from American
interests and consequently, it was not explored, or its subject reported widely
in popular forums and policy making circles. The images of India created by

writers such as Katherine Mayo, while popular, may have over time become

217

peripheral. However, with the growth of American interest in India's
independence these images were rediscovered, extensively developed and
discussed both in policy making arenas and public forums. The Opinions of the
new observers of India became more deﬁned and more meaningful to the
American officials and also more widely reported in the media. When, during
the war, India did become signiﬁcant to American policy makers they had
been educated to limit their analysis to these characteristics of India. The
British could then appeal to and channel these sentiments. The cultural, racial,
and linguistic afﬁnity between the United States and Britain, which
presupposed superiority, set them further apart from a non-western society.
It should be realized that Anglo-American interaction over the subject
Of India cannot be considered simply an exchange between an active informer
and a passive recipient. Even within their wartime alliance certain tensions
and dissensions are evident. Their similarity in purpose and affinity of race
and culture could unify, but also create rivalry and competition. American
unwillingness to condone imperialism and the British fear of the Americans
establishing a foothold in their empire were important factors in this
relationship. These concerns made it necessary for the British to emphasize
India's inadequacies and the necessity for continued British rule. Even though
in the State Department there was usually a general consensus regarding the
British position in India, there were still some who were unwilling to accept
the British arguments passively. Roosevelt himself did not seem ready to
acquiesce to the British. His appointment of Louis Johnson as his
representative in India during the Cripps Mission can be considered a
reﬂection of this resistance. On the other hand, Roosevelt also adopted a
standard vocabulary on India and relied almost exclusively on the British

whose position he had challenged. Moreover, he seemed unconcerned with the

218

opinions of the Indians themselves in response to the proposals made by
Cripps. His actions seemed more an effort to establish the United States as
being distinct from the British, rather than taking up the cause of the Indians.
Questioning imperialism did not necessarily mean elevating the imperialized
to an equal status. Even Louis Johnson, who delineated America's interest in
India as being separate from the British, could not make India palatable to his
superiors. The failure of the Cripps Mission provided confirmation of a
collective group of images that, in composite, showed a portrait of India which
could not take political initiative or demonstrate political maturity. American
identity, which was struggling to establish a distinction from the British in
terms of national roles in the world, had manifested itself in confirming a
separation from the Indians. Americans, in recognition of their own values
and beliefs, had placed requirements on the Indians to incorporate these ideals
into their lives in order to win American support. Under these circumstances,
the ofﬁcials and the media ignored Louis Johnson's espousal of the Indian
National Congress and Nehru. In this respect when analyzing policy decisions,
not only are policies significant in themselves but the language and images
employed to discuss India which are equally political in content and equally
consequential in determining attitudes in the context of which policies are
made. Similarly, opinions recorded by writers, journalists and military
ofﬁcials, scrutinizing social, cultural and political characteristics of India,
carry signiﬁcant political implications.

American writers, journalists, and military ofﬁcials may have objected
to British imperialism but these reservations were overridden by their
Opinion of India. Furthermore, their inability to develop a different
perspective also lay in their preconceived conception of India which emerged

in their frequent references to Rudyard Kipling's version of India. In fact,

219

American observers in India performed a significant role in propagating an
image of India which suited the British position. These Observers were unable
to view Indian society outside the conﬁnes of the entrenched images. They
derided imperialism yet could not accept the imperialized. It was as if India was
responsible for its own colonization. Even in rejecting British imperialism
they seemed to have accepted the colonizer's representations.

One of the major factors which inﬂuenced these observers was the
immense difference between the society to which they belonged and the
culture they observed. Partha Chatterjee highlights the problem that beliefs
held by other peoples turn out to be manifestly irrational and false when
judged in terms of western criteria of rationality and truth.2 Chatterjee’s focus
is on the western anthropologist but this problem is not confined to their
discourse alone. It can also encompass writers, the media and the policy
makers, who may not be experts on other cultures, who but occupy positions of
inﬂuence and with their observations make a significant impact on policy
making and public opinion.3 Frank Ninkovich contends that a study of
culture requires an emancipation from cultural fetters but acknowledges that
it is impossible for the intellectual to proceed independently of this bondage.4

In case of India, it is noticeable that the negativity India generated was

 

2 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative
Discourse 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 11.

3 An important work regarding the anthropologists' view of the Other is
Johannes Fabian's Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object
(New York: Columbia U. P., 1983). He states that anthropology is a science of
other men in another time, an ideologically construed instrument Of power in
which the Other is ultimately other people who are our contemporaries. The
relationship between them and their object is inevitably political and Fabian
recommends that the anthropologists meet the Other on the same ground and
in the same Time. 143-144, 165. American observers consistently placed India
not only in another space but in another time as well. In their views India
seemed destined to remain rooted in its past.

4 Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (New York: Cambridge U. P., 1981) viii.

220

primarily due to its inability to meet western standards of political and social
behavior. Gandhi evoked particular criticism because he represented
everything that was contrary to the West. The standards and values of western
institutions and beliefs seemed to impede an acceptance of Indian society and
nationalism On its own terms. In this respect, India frustrated the American
observers and often led them to endorse British rule in India with the hope
that the British would eventually inculcate western values and norms of
behavior in the Indians. Their discomfort with Indian nationalism also led the
American observers to deny Nehru political legitimacy. Nehru, although
commended for his western upbringing, was also criticized for his Hinduness.5
The images of Hindu India were so Opposite of and contrary to the West that in
this polarity a deﬁnite 'us' and 'them' emerged, in which 'us', even if in some
cases reluctantly, enfolded the British.

The notion of India's essential difference with the West was accepted by
most American commentators and overpowered the voice not only of the
Indians but of any dissenting opinion from successfully emerging in the West.
The marginality of alternate thought on India in popular forums is markedly
noticeable. Sympathetic voices for India were more or less conﬁned to smaller
forums with limited readership and constantly competed with growing
criticism of India. Even those who professed sympathy for India often adopted
a paternalistic tone in presenting the Indian nationalists as lacking vision and
maturity, who needed to be nurtured and instructed to learn responsible
political behavior. The opinions of those Americans who included India within

the framework of larger American interests did not gain widespread

 

5 Ninkovich warns that foreign ideas usually end up adjusting to the
limitations imposed by local traditions. New patterns of thought are
domesticated not assimilated. 6. Nehru's failure to impress American
observers probably lay in the fact that he had domesticated foreign ideas and
the impact of the West was not obviously visible in him.

221

acceptance during the period of India's nationalist struggle. Their opinions
emerged more forcefully when the United States interacted with independent
India. However, by then India had already been imprisoned within deﬁned
images and categories. Even William Phillips, who promoted an independent
approach towards India, was unable to accept India on its own terms and
deﬁned it in the established vocabulary. Phillips did not give centrality to the
aspirations of the Indians but the emerging American role in Asia. He
recognized the inability of the British to maintain white inﬂuence in Asia and
that role had to be assumed by the Americans. However, during the phase of
India's nationalist struggle, Phillips' exposition on India and the disregard
with which it was received in Washington revealed the inability of American
ofﬁcials to sever long established ties with Britain.

The distinctions American observers in India made with the British
remained unrelated to the ideas they developed about India. India's failures
lay more in the character Of the people than in their historical circumstances.
Most observers did not treat Indians as individuals, but merely as socially and
culturally driven entities. Gandhi's spiritualism and mysticism became so
central and so contrary to the western norms that the political consequences
of his strategies on Indian nationalism were not considered. In fact, Indian
nationalism itself was questioned. These were the standard British views of
India, which had become American as well. But these Americans also made
signiﬁcant contributions to the knowledge about India in the West. Even
though they questioned British imperialism, these Americans had begun to
employ their own values and ideals to distinguish themselves from the
Indians. Also, they assumed a much broader and totalizing vision of India and
in the process denied any difference or deviance in the Indian society and

politics. In general, they presented the Indians as devoid of any humanness

1'

 

 

222

and assigned them a collective identity often termed the "Hindu mentality." In
case of Nehru, the British generally marginalized him by imprisoning and
ignoring him, but the Americans delegitimized Nehru either by exposing his
Hindu personality or by declaring him a misﬁt in a tradition bound India.
Ultimately, American ofﬁcials, writers and the media had become unified in
their understanding of India. This knowledge had given the colonizer
authority to maintain dominance over India and the same ideas gave
Americans a reason to define the limits of their own participation and
authority to demand the Indians to convert to more acceptable forms of
political, social and cultural behavior. This position is evident in Roosevelt's
reply to Gandhi. After the failure of the Cripps Mission a more deﬁned ofﬁcial
opinion on India had emerged.

The writers, military officials and the media cannot be considered
merely reﬂectors of the dominant thought on India, but as active educators as
well. The images and perceptions they provided often helped the ofﬁcials in
the United States deﬁne India and set limits on their response towards India. It
is unclear whether these observers arrived at their conclusions
independently or were inﬂuenced by the British, because as Americans they
often distanced themselves from the colonizer. But their contribution was as
significant as that of the British. They reinforced, reiterated and
progressively provided a more comprehensive and a more detailed picture of
India to a large public and the policy makers. They silenced the voice of the
Indian nationalists by submerging them in a chaotic and irrational culture
rooted in the past. They helped the discussion in both popular and official
forums shift from questioning British imperialism to concentrating on India's
inabilities and deﬁciencies. When they did question the British, it was in

recognition of America's emerging role and recommended policies geared

223

towards preserving white inﬂuence in Asia. American values and ideals
emerged more forcefully in establishing a distance with India.

The images of India in the United States considerably inﬂuenced the
American perception of India's viability for independence. But these images
had long term political implications as well. K. Balaraman, American
correspondent for the Indian newspaper Hindu, draws attention to
representations of non-western societies like' India in the West. He points out
that the American press ignores progress made in science and education and
only shows interest in bizarre and the outlandish stories and conveys the
impression of a backward, superstitious country.6 The problem Balaraman
highlights is the survival of images which go beyond mere consumer
satisfaction to inﬂuencing relationships at many levels and at different times.

The American relationship with independent India began at a time
when Cold War concerns dominated American politics. The Second World War
had witnessed the demise of British power and the emergence of the United
States as the only country powerful and inﬂuential enough to uphold the
western interests. But the growing power of the Soviet Union threatened to
undermine these interests. It naturally became the prime concern of the
United States to thwart the economic, political and ideological expansion of the
Soviet Union. South Asia, occupying a strategic position on the periphery of
the communist dominated Asia, naturally became important in the strategic
designs of the United States. At this time India, under the leadership of Nehru
had adopted a policy of non-alignment. Nehru had rejected the western
premise that the world needed to be freed from the threat of communism and
he was convinced that both the East and the West shared the blame for the

international tensions. Hence he considered non-alignment vital to peace and

 

5 As Others See Us, (Zurich: International Press Institute, 1954) 18.

224

a means to alleviate international tensions.

America's interaction thus began with a country which had challenged
American foreign policy objectives and world leadership. But the Americans
had already deﬁned India as a land of apathy, passivity, outdated traditions,
lacking modern political and economic thought and incapable of developing a
cohesive and coherent political structure. This image overpowered India's own
political imperatives and aspirations. The new American observers confined
independent India within these images. The New York Times correspondent C.
L. Sulzberger's assessment of India was limited to his observation of the ’stark
naked sadhus' [ascetics], 'sacred cows' and 'lazy Hindus.’7 Sulzberger
reinforced India's social, cultural and political distance from the West by
identifying those characteristics which had come to define India in the United
States. His panacea was that 'we' must do more than help the Indians ﬁll their
stomachs 'we' must inﬂuence their minds.8

Sulzberger's opinions reﬂect the dominant views American officials
had adopted about India. A Report of the National Security Council on the
position of the United States in Asia suggested increasing the western
orientation of South Asia and the utilization of the skills and knowledge of "our
European friends" to help check the spread of Soviet inﬂuence.9 Americans
had learned to disregard Indian opinions and in the policy recommendation
gave no consideration to the suspicion Indian leaders had expressed about the

West. The report, in fact, placed reliance on Britain's knowledge of India to

 

7 C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954
(Toronto: MacMillan, 1969) 547.

3 Sulzberger, 791-797.

9 United States-Vietnam Relations, I945-1967 Book 8 December 23 1949,
(Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1971) 226-258. The
Office of the Near Eastern Affairs had recommended that American
information and cultural programs be expanded to indoctrinate people with
pro-West leanings and anti-communist ideas. Records of the Office of South
Asian Affairs RG 59 lot 54 D 341 box 23 December 5, 1949

225

increase the western orientation of India. Considering the Opinions Britain
held of India, this reliance, in all probability, would not have produced a
different perspective on India but reaffirmed the already entrenched
opinions.

The premise of American policy was outlined in the National Security
Council recommendation (NSC 68) that "we" must make ourselves strong,
affirm "our" values and build a successfully functioning political and
economic system in the free world. The policy report acknowledged American
responsibility for world leadership in order to contain Soviet expansion. The
argument presented was that moderate regimes in India and Pakistan would
not be able to restore or retain popular support and authority unless assisted
in improving their economic and social structures.10 The NSC policy report
was an afﬁrmation of American values as the standard to which all must
aspire. In this respect, the report echoed the sentiments expressed by
Roosevelt in his reply to Gandhi. But a shift had also become apparent in the
American position on India. The NSC report did not place requirements on
India to fulﬁll, instead it recommended America's involvement to assist India
improve its social and economic structures. Still, there was no recognition of
the self-defined aspirations and concerns of countries like India, emerging
from imperial rule and suspicious of western inﬂuence. India's ability to
survive on its own had always been questionable, and Americans had no
conﬁdence in India's ability to withstand communism. A Regional Policy
Statement of the Ofﬁce of South Asian Affairs conﬁrmed that the region faced
serious threats to stability, inherent in mass illiteracy, communalism and

poverty, disease and hunger. The report recommended development of an

 

10 National Security Policy report (NSC 68) April 14, 1950. Foreign Relations of
the United States (henceforth FR) 1950 v. 1 234-292.

226

attitude in South Asia which would assist the United States and its allies to
obtain facilities in times of peace and war. It also suggested development of
domestic information programs and expansion of training programs for South
Asian language and area specialists.11

From these suggestions it can assumed that American ofﬁcials showed a
new interest in understanding South Asian people in terms of their own
language and culture. But these recommendations have to be examined in the
context of the mind set of the American ofﬁcials regarding India and also in
view of the general perception of India in the United States. A framework had
been established within which the area specialists could easily conﬁne India.
It is evident from the examination of more current literature on India that
American scholars tend to study India within the confines of established
images and Often use a comparative framework in which America's distance
from India is reinforced.12

The State Department not only proposed a study of India in the United
States but also recommended efforts to create a better understanding of the
United States in India. George McGhee recommended intensifying American
information and cultural programs in India.13 Consequently, more Americans

were sent by the State Department to India. These Americans seemed to be

 

11 FR 1950 v. 5 245-254 October 9.1950.

12 Carol Breckenridge has noticed a lack of competitive accounts in the
western studies on South Asia. These studies in general, use a comparative
framework in which "the West" is contrasted to "the rest." Decolonization does
not entail immediate escape from the colonial discourse. "Orientalism and the
Postcolonial Predicament" in Breckenridge ed. Orientalism and the
Postcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1993) 2. This contention can be interpreted as the dominant beliefs obscuring
and obstructing alternative thoughts on India from developing. Ronald Inden
believes that now western area specialists and their colleagues in the
government and business aid and advise, develop and modernize countries of
the Third World. "Orientalist Construction of India," Modern Asian Studies 20.3
(1986) 401-446.

13 Records of the Office of South Asian Affairs RG 59 lot 54D 341 box 18.
December 27, 1950.

227

indoctrinated not only in anti-communist rhetoric, but also in deeply
entrenched views of India. The images of an impoverished, passive and
illiterate India had once conﬁrmed its incapability to develop self rule. Now,
with the threat of communism looming large, the same images were applied to
address similar notions of India's inadequacies and vulnerabilities. Arthur
Goodfriend, of the United States Information Agency in New Delhi, and two
African American journalists, Carl T. Rowan and Saunders Redding sent to
India by the State Department to interpret American life to the Indians reﬂect
the general trends regarding India in American policy making circles in the
1950s.

These observers may have been sent to create an understanding
between Americans and Indians, but could not overcome the deep chasm that
divided them or the images that guided them. If the official recommendations
to create a better understanding of India in the United States through the
study of India's language(s) and culture were implemented, then these
observers certainly did not subscribe to that proposal. In fact, they provide a
glimpse into the ﬁrmly entrenched opinions of India in the State Department.
They did not seek a different perspective but conﬁrmed what they expected
India to be. Goodfriend concluded that many Indian ways of life corroborated
Kipling's edict that never the twain shall meet.14 Reddings similarly
concluded that "We are as apart...as primitive asceticism and the current
western fashion in human nature could have put us."15

These observers could not place their faith in the survival of democracy

or even in the survival of India itself. They resurrected the entrenched

 

14 Arthur Goodfriend, The Twisted Image (New York: St. Martin, 1963) 95.

15 Saunders Redding, An American in India: A Personal Report on the Indian
Dilemma and the Nature of Her Conﬂicts, lst ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1954) 163.

228

impressions of India's social, cultural and religious characteristics to
overpower any impulse which could deviate from the standard behavior
pattern of India. In the process, they not only afﬁrmed the superiority of
western values but also assigned a permanency to the gap between India and
the United States. Goodfriend was convinced that in India dictatorship would
succeed while an elected representative of a 'civilized people' [probably
Nehru] would be lost.16 According to Redding, the communist rival for power
in India was not democracy or socialism, but traditional Hinduism which, he
believed, was also "bitterly inimical to the West." It was the "terrible
orthodoxy" which choked off the avenues of freedom and turned India to
national slavery.l7 Rowan believed that it was impossible to eat heritage and
bathe in the glorious past.18 These Americans would have agreed with
Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner in India, that the Hindus
were sustained by a religion which made them other worldly rather than
practical citizens of the world. It deprived them of the discontent which made
other people strive eagerly to improve themselves.19 None of these observers
considered the Indians as individuals but only as mind sets, propelled by
forces beyond their control. The survival of images of India developed in the
colonial period is evident in these expositions. The strangulating,
undemocratic traditions imposed by Hinduism which sapped the Indians of
initiative continued to deﬁne India. These opinions may have been developed
by the British, but had become accepted American opinions as well.

The leadership of India, represented by Nehru, was criticized for not

 

16 Goodfriend, 205.

17 Redding, 254-55, 273-74.

18 Carl T. Rowan, The Pitiful and the Proud (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1941) 10, 30.

19 Malcolm MacDonald, Titans and Others (London: William Collins, 1972)
216.

229

accepting the American point of view regarding communism or the necessity
of the West to assist India's social and economic development. Once Gandhi had
been implicated for being politically irresponsible by obstructing the western
effort to rescue the world from fascism, now that perception was transferred
to Nehru on the issue of communism. Western observers had found it easy to
place Gandhi within the framework of the Hindu image and had marginalized
the apparently westernized Nehru as a misfit in a traditional culture. In this
respect, Nehru's rejection of American policy objectives acutely disappointed
these American observers. Rowan seemed puzzled that Nehru had the best
western education yet adopted a non-aligned policy. He was convinced that if
the "free world" left Asia, communism would triumph, and that non-alignment
had been successful only because of the stabilizing inﬂuence created by the
western world.20 At the South Asian Regional Conference of the United States
Diplomats and Consuls, held in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) between February 26 and
March 2, 1951, McGhee rejected the idea of developing a regional association of
South Asian nations because it would come under the domination of India
which would encourage other countries emerging from colonial domination to
adopt non-alignment.“ Non-alignment had challenged American interests
and like communism had to be contained.

The opinions expressed by these observers ﬁt within the framework of
Hunt's contention that American foreign policy is guided by an active quest of
national greatness, promotion of American values and limits of acceptance of
political and social change in other parts of the world.22 This hierarchy,

according to Augelli, was established on the basis of power and wealth, which

 

20 Rowan, 126, 178-179
21 FR 1951 v. 6 1664—1679. March 20, 1951.

22 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale U.P.,
1987) 77, I62.

230

separated the backward nations from the advanced nations. America's destiny
to extend the liberal economic creed to the world had become linked with their
crusade against communism. Since it was assumed that poverty led to
communist successes, it became essential for the American model of
development to be emulated.23 In the case of India, according to Gyan
Prakash, caste driven and otherworldly India was reformulated as ‘traditional
India’ and old projects of modernizing the colonials, renovated and deployed as
economic development.24

It is apparent in these analyses and in opinions expressed by American
observers that Americans, as westerners, had inherited colonial assumptions
and as Americans projected the superiority of their own culture, belief and
values. Operating under such beliefs, American observers of independent
India classiﬁed India according to western, particularly American standards of
development and advancement and the deployed established images to conﬁrm
India's stagnation and backwardness. Furthermore, India's apparent
unwillingness to adhere to American objectives reaffirmed India's political,
economic and cultural irrationality.

India's resistance to American policy objectives were not well received
in Washington. Once again, entrenched images of India helped explain India's
deviance. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, resurrected old images and
reinforced the notion of Indian irrationality in their mental makeup. He
informed Loy Henderson, American Ambassador in India, on April 21, 1950
that the impediment to better Judo-American understanding was the "mental

compartmentalism" which seemed to characterize Indian ofﬁcialdom as well as

 

23 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the
Third World (London: Pinter, 1988) 62-65, 82-83.
24 Gyan Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World:

Perspectives from Indian Historiography," Comparative Studies in Society and
History . 32.2 (April 1990) 383-408.

231

articulate Indians. They want American aid yet complain of dollar
imperialism.25 Augelli's contention that Americans deal with dissent by
isolating themselves from the dissenters (or the dissenters from the
Americans), by converting them or by destroying them26 may not apply in its
totality to India, but Acheson's exposition does express a political and cultural
distance from India. American ofﬁcials may have responded similarly to
dissent elsewhere, but in the context of India, these opinion could easily
become linked to American understanding of the Hindu mind and character
which had been consistently presented as illogical and elusive. These opinions
become apparent in McGhee's attempt to decipher Nehru's political and
philos0phical beliefs. McGhee seemed confused by Nehru's "double talk" and
sought an explanation in the difference in the inner working of the Indian
mind and the Anglo-Saxon mind.27 Similarly, Acheson found Nehru
emotional, unrealistic and confusing.28 Sulzberger, who had access to
ofﬁcials like Acheson and Loy Henderson, was privy to these opinions. He
considered Nehru disorganized, indecisive, confused, indirect and a "vain
feminine personality."29

The American reliance on the entrenched images of India in order to

 

25 FR 1950 v.5 1464-1466

26 Enrico Augelli, America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World.
(London: Pinter, 1988) 37. In a proposal made on August 29, 1950 McGhee
wanted to combat India's neutralism and to limit Nehru by increasing the
capacity of other non-communist Asians to exert inﬂuence and leadership.
This proposal was eventually withdrawn. On September 11, 1950 McGhee
acknowledged that United States had taken action in Asia without consulting
with the Asians. Now he wanted Britain to win India back for the Americans.
Records of the Ofﬁce of South Asian Affairs, RG 59 Lot 54D 341 box 17, 18.

27 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle East (New York: Harper and Row, 1983)
100.

28 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My years in the State Department
(New York: Norton, 1969) 334-6.

29 Sulzberger, 541-547. 791. Malcolm MacDonald believed that Nehru had
streaks of "oriental autocrat" in his makeup. Titans and Others, 205-206.

232

understand Nehru emerge again in the November 1950 paper on 'Nehru's
Attitude toward the United States,’ presented by the Ofﬁce of Near Eastern
Affairs. In this paper Nehru was described as a 'hypersensitive egotist' with a
'Brahmanic‘ approach towards the masses, acting as their guide, leader and
critic. The conclusion drawn was that Nehru was disinclined to cooperate with
the more truly democratic Americans.30 A reliance on the image of a society
controlled by the caste system, breeding hierarchical and undemocratic
traditions, made it unnecessary to look beyond to ﬁnd any 'rational' or
'realistic' basis to Nehru's political philosophy and its appeal among countries
emerging from colonial rule. Acheson's assessment that there was a
fundamental difference in values that was responsible for the great gap
between the thinking of our president and Nehru31 represents the general
conﬁrmation in the United States of an insurmountable gap between the
cultural, social and political behaviors of the Indians and the Americans.

The larger question that arises out of this discussion is the difﬁculty in
creating an understanding between different cultures. Ninkovich

acknowledges that to study cultural relations is inevitably to confront the

 

30 McGhee to Acheson, November 3, 1950. cited in Dennis Merrill, Bread and
the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-I963
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 56-57. Another
evaluation of Nehru emerges in Michael Brecher's study. Brecher believes
that the Victorian disdain for the 'immature,’ 'boorish,‘ and 'materialistic,‘
Americans which Nehru imbibed at Harrow and Cambridge greatly inﬂuenced

his perception of the United States. Nehru: A Political Biography (London:
Oxford U.P., 1959) 560, 582.

31 Oﬂicial Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson, 1949-1953 October
12 1949, January 9, 1951 Microﬁlm. Douglas Brinkley points to Acheson's
criticism of the Afro-Asian bloc for attempting to undermine American
inﬂuence, especially in the United Nations, by citing from Acheson's letter to
Lord Patrick Devlin written on March 18, 1959. Acheson stated that one of his
prejudices was the Indians, "...they and their country gives me the creeps."
Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years I953-I97I (New Haven:
Yale U. P., 1992) 304-305. C. L. Sulzberger found Nehru a confused man who

was unquestioningly 'enveloped in a cloud of his own egotism.‘ A Long Row...
544. 79.

233

other.32 But in this confrontation one culture always and inevitably
subordinates the other.33 Ninkovich believes that cultural peculiarities, if
studied from a dispassionate scientiﬁc point of view, can more easily be
catalogued by an observant outsider.34 In case of India, it was not only the
scientist but an equally potent and possibly a more inﬂuential force which
had the power to reach a large public and the policy makers in a language
more simple and images more palatable. Herbert Matthews, the New York
Times correspondent, professed objectivity yet he assumed superiority and
criticized India for not emulating western forms of political and social
behavior. Even those who came to spread understanding in India came armed
with the same images and inherited the same attitudes. None of these observers
were experts on India, yet they interpreted India with authority. A vast
difference is noticeable in their description of India and the West. India was
described as inert, otherworldly, orthodox and traditional, while the West was
deﬁned as the free world, active and practical.

On December 2, 1955, Nehru wrote to his sister Vijay Laxmi Pandit that
"people in England and America are very courteous to us and friendly but, in
the ﬁnal analysis, they treat India as a country to be humoured but not as an
equal."35 In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State under Richard

Nixon, wrote in his memoirs about his encounter with the "intricate, complex

 

32 Ninkovich, 2.

33 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire (Durham: Duke U. P., 1993) 4. Spurr
has cited Jacques Derrida's examination of Claude Levi-Strauss's studies of the
Indians of western Brazil. Derrida calls it "the essential confrontation that
opens communication between peoples and cultures, even when that
communication is not practiced under the banner of colonial or military
oppression." The writing produced by this confrontation always involves a
violence of "difference, of classiﬁcation, and of the system of appellations."
34 Ninkovich, 6.

35 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography v. 2 (Cambridge:
Harvard U. P., 1979) 242.

234

Hindus" and the "complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of
India."36 Given the almost two decade span between these two statements, it is
apparent that a mutual perception had been established within which Indo-
American relations would be conducted. The notions about India had come to
dominate the American psyche, thus proving that once an image has been

established, it seems to become self-sustaining and all pervasive.

 

36 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) 844-845,
849.

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