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THE VALUE OF PAIDEIA IN PLATO’S EARLY DIALOGUES
By

Paul Neufeld

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy

1997

THE VALUE OF PA IDEIA IN PLATO’S EARLY DIALOGUES
By

Paul Neufeld

In this thesis I argue that Socratic ethics endorses paideia (one’s youthful education) as a
necessary and prior condition of moral virtue or any approximation of it. In particular, I argue that
paideia is an important means of socialization into public and legal norms, as well as an
opportunity to develop and demonstrate one’s moral character and social aptitude. These goals are
primarily achieved through an education in poetry, music, and physical training. I argue that
Plato’s Socrates regards the moral beliefs one develops in these contexts as crucial for engaging in
successful philosophical discussion and moral activity. I also articulate why, on Socratic terms,

this contribution of paideia is essential for a “good life” within the polis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am first and foremost indebted to professor Nicholas D. Smith, without whose
comments, criticisms, and encouragement this project would not have been possible. In both word
and deed the example he sets is an invaluable resource and inspiration. I would also like to thank
professors Harold Walsh and John Rank, whose knowledge and experience resulted in much
sound advice and helpful conversation. I am also grateful to professor Carl Anderson for his
patient help with the translations and for his devotion as a teacher. Finally, I would like to express
my gratitude to Amy Osborn, whose proofreading, suggestions, and support greatly improved the
presentation of this thesis.

In some respects this undertaking has inspired as many questions as it has answers. But
good questions are hard to come by and I can only hope that those I may have raised along the
way will prove fruitful. That would be enough, for understanding is never merely static - It is
indeed always “on the way”. Some acknolwedgements, therefore, must inevitably wait and be

awaited.

iii

It was generally accepted among ancient Greek moralists that the value of a thing, or
course of action, should be considered in relation to the desired goal of attaining happiness.
The Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues also adopts this eudaimonist maxim and maintains as a
matter of course that it "does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy" (Rep. 354a6).l
However, for Socrates, if one is truly concerned with happiness, one must also be concerned
with virtue, since in his view the good life is also the virtuous life (Ap. 30a7-b4; Grg. 507b8-
c5; Cr. 48b2-5). The question of one’s happiness, Socrates claims, is no ordinary matter but
one that concerns the “right way of life” (Rep. 352d5-6).

Scholars have devoted much attention to the question of how exactly Socrates thinks
virtue is logically related to happiness.2 Maier, for example, has argued for the simple identity
of virtue and happiness. Others, such as Vlastos, contend that virtue is sufficient for, although
not identical with, happiness. In contrast to both of these views, Brickhouse and Smith argue
that the possession of virtue is neither sufficient nor even necessary for happiness, although
virtuous activity is both necessary and sufficient. Curiously, however, scholars do not give
serious attention to Socrates' claim that happiness is dependent not only upon virtue itself, but
also upon the education (paideia) of youth (Grg. 470e6),3 which consists primarily in poetry,

physical education, and music. A. D. Woozley, for example, denies that Socrates is concerned

 

l Translations are my own unless otherwise specified. In Vlastos’ (1991) opinion the early dialogues are as
follows: Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras,
Republic I. See “Socrates contra Socrates in Plato” for a discussion of this period distinction, pp. 45-80.
Brickhouse and Smith (1989) and Kraut (I992) agree. However, they also consider the Euthydemus,
Hippias Major, Lysis, and Menexenus as early period dialogues. In this paper I follow Kraut and Brickhouse
and Smith in assuming these latter texts are early period dialogues. For a dissenting view on appealing to
chronological periods see Debra Nails (1995).

2 Maier (1913), p. 319: ”...die Tugend an sich selbst schon nicht Gliick bringt, sondern--Gliick ist..." (cit.
Vlastos (1991) p. 209). However, Vlastos suggests there are degrees of happiness possible by the availability
and correct appropriation of non-moral goods such as health and wealth (Ly. 218e, Euthyd. 279a-b, 87c-
88d). Brickhouse and Smith argue that Socrates endorses neither of these views but recognizes (a) that one
may fight for the just and still be unhappy and, indeed, think life not worth living for other reasons such as
illness (Ap. 32a and 47c) and (b) though Socrates often denies that he possesses virtue, in the Apology he
contends that he finds happiness in his activities. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), chapter 4, pp. 103-136.

3 In general, although the notion of paideia is prominent in the early dialogues, its relevance to Socratic
ethics has typically been regarded as insignificant. One notable exception is Richard Kraut (1984).

with the education of his own children or with a father’s duty to educate in general.4 Henry
Teloh concurs and claims there is no evidence in the dialogues to suggest otherwise.5

In what follows, I will argue that the established view among scholars that paideia is
irrelevant to Socratic ethics is mistaken. I will claim that paideia is presented in the early
dialogues as a necessary precondition of moral virtue or any approximation of it. In particular,
I will suggest that Socrates considers paideia as an important means of socialization into
public and legal norms, as well as an opportunity to develop and demonstrate one’s moral
character and social aptitude. In my view, Socrates’ philosophical inquiry serves to critically
evaluate beliefs cultivated by these conventional methods. At the same time, Socratic inquiry is
also dependent upon paideia as a source for social virtues as well as common goals, both of
which are necessary to facilitate agreement and progress in philosophical discussion.

In the first section of this paper, I will consider the strongest opposition to the thesis I
wish to defend, as it appears in A. D. Woozley’s reading of the Crito (Section I). I will then
consider the implications of paideia elsewhere in the early dialogues and discuss its
relationship to virtue in the context of Socratic ethics (Section 11). Finally, I will consider the
connection between paideia, politics, and the possibility of the good life (Section III) .

I

Socrates: But as for the considerations you speak of concerning the expenditure

of money, reputation, and the upbringing of children, I suspect these are

truthfully, Crito, the speculations of the multitude, who would recklessly put

people to death and bring them back to life, if they were able, with no regard for

thought.

(Cr. 48c2-6)

This claim is one source of textual evidence cited in support of the view that Socrates

maintains a careless attitude with respect to the education of children. In Woozley’s view, for

example, Socrates exhibits a “hardheartedness” in his response to Crito, since he apparently

 

‘ Woozley (1979), p. 11.
5 Teloh (1986), p. 9. However, Teloh makes a number of distinctions absent in Woozley (1979). See 11. 22,
23 and 36 below.

disavows both his own duty to educate his sons as well as the duty of fathers in general.6
htitially, Woozley suggests two ways of interpreting the implications of this passage. Either
Socrates here dismisses Crito’s earlier claim that fathers have a duty to educate their children
(45d4-e2), or Socrates believes that Crito’s earlier claim that orphans fare badly is mistaken
(4SclO-d4). Woozley ultimately argues for an interpretation which draws on both alternatives.
Specifically, he suggests that since Socrates believes “his children will be as well off if he dies
as if he lives,”7 his response to Crito at 4802-6 may be read as the claim that Socrates’ children
in particular would not be neglected. The rebuttal to Crito’s claim that he would be neglecting
his duty to educate his children by accepting his death sentence, would thus be as follows:
whatever the fate of most orphaned children, at least in the event of Socrates ’ death, fiiends
may be relied on to care for his children. For this reason Crito’s worries about the children’s’
prospects for education remain unpersuasive.

In Woozley’s view, this response to Crito constitutes a dismissal of public opinions on
education in general, and thus lends support for the claim that “...what Socrates was belittling
was...the supposed importance of a father’s duty to educate his children.”8 More specifically,
Socrates can be understood to imply that “the idea that children have any rights to certain

:99

treatment is a popular but baseless cliche. In this regard, Woozley suggests that Socrates’

“curiously callous” treatment of one’s duty to educate children conveys the attitude that one

should not make too much of such matters.10 In Woozley’s estimation, this “is not exactly the

view that children are expendable, but it shows a certain detachment.””
Before considering the substance of Woozley’s claim that Socrates holds education and

the duty to educate in disregard, it is worthwhile to consider whether the way he interprets the

 

6 Woozley (1979), p. 9.

7 Woozley(l979), p. 10.

8 Woozley(l979), p. 11.

9 Woozley(l979), p. 9.

'0 Woozley (1979), p. 9, p. 11.
11 Woozley (1979), p. 11.

issue of education is in fact appropriate to the text in question at 48c2-6. I suggest that it is not
for two reasons. First, the conclusions he wishes to draw from this passage do not cohere with
the irrnnediate context of the discussion. Secondly, as I will later argue, the exact way Socrates
phrases his point at 48c2-6 suggests an alternative reading.

The issue of context concems the fact that the remarks Woozley refers to at 48c2-6 are
not presented as a dismissal of Crito’s specific considerations, but of their supposed priority in
resolving the question of whether he should escape from prison. Just prior to this passage,
Socrates suggests that, rather than taking Crito’s opinions for granted, they should instead
commit themselves to the “the best course that reason offers” (Cr. 46b6). Having redefined the
means of settling the dispute, Socrates proceeds at 47a12-48b5 also to redefine the central
issue of importance to their discussion. This is accomplished at 48b5, where Socrates secures
agreement from Crito that, with respect to his escape, “the greatest thing is not to live but to
live well” (Cr. 48b5), and that to live well must be the same as living justly (Cr. 48b6). At
48c2-6, no new arguments are offered concerning Crito’s previous statements about education.
Socrates merely summarizes his objection; Crito neglected the priority of virtue when he
offered reasons for escape.

Socrates: ...following fiom these things we have agreed upon, one must examine

whether it is just for me to attempt to go away, if the Athenians forbid it, or not

just. If it appears just, let us attempt it, and if not, let us leave things be. But as for

the considerations you speak of concerning the expenditure of money, reputation,

and the upbringing of children, I suspect these are truthfully, Crito, the

speculations of the multitude, who would recklessly put people to death and bring

them back to life, if they were able, with no regard for thought. But we, since the

argument leads thus, should not have any consideration other than that which we

have just now spoken of, whether we will act justly

(Cr. 48blO-c9)

Socrates does not here pass judgment on the individual claims Crito has made regarding

money, reputation, and the upbringing of children, nor does he reject the importance of their

subject-matter collectively. '2 Rather he states that Crito’s concerns (O'Kétttta‘ta) are the

reflections of the public, and therefore beside the main point of consideration -- namely, the
priority of justice. For Socrates, whatever worth public opinions may have, whether they
concern money, reputation or upbringing, that worth is judged relative to their contribution to
the good life. However, properly rmderstood, the good life is the virtuous life. Thus, in the
Apology, Socrates states:

I go around doing nothing other than trying to persuade you, both young and old,

that you should not care for [your] bodies, nor your money, nor [for anything] so

greatly before you care for your soul, so that it may be as good as possible, saying

as I go, ‘Virtue does not come fiom money, but rather from virtue, comes money

and all the rest of things good for men, both individually and collectively.’ '3

(Ap. 30a7-b4)

The priority of virtue does not entail scorn for other goods. Socrates’ disregard for the
considerations of the “ordinary public” (Cr. 48c5) is to make a point in favor of considering,
first and foremost, what is just. Socrates does not imply, then, as Woozley claims, that he lacks
concern for a father’s duty to educate his children. I conclude that Woozley’s suggestion that
Socrates “belittles” the duty of a father to educate must be substantiated from passages
elsewhere in the text. However, no such evidence can be found. Indeed, evidence for the
opposite conclusion is abundant.

One must first confront Socrates’ explicit claim that he has no complaint against the laws

concerning education, but is in fact grateful for those laws that concern “the rearing and

education of progeny” and, in particular, an education in “music and gymnastics” (Cr. SOdS-

 

‘2 The line 1n question reads “dig 88 on kéyetg tag oxéwetg nepi t8 avakoooecog xpnua'cwv
Kai 865mg Kai 1101in tpoong, in] dog aAnOOSQ mum, q) rcpittuv, oxéuuaw. 1?] mm
baéicogw

‘3 In order to avoid attributing to Socrates the claim “from virtue, comes money,” Bumet (1990) suggests
the order of this passage is misleadingly “interlaced,” and should be read as follows: “it is goodness that
makes money and everything else good for men.” In any case, as Bumet points out, Socrates never
recommends apatf] as a “good investment” (p. 204, note on Ap. 30b3).

e1).M Woozley explains this passage by suggesting that, despite Socrates’ relative indifference
to this duty, he does not believe he actually contravenes it, since he supposes his friends will
look after his children, no matter what happens. Hence, Socrates’ indifference to the duty need
not be in conflict with his acknowledgment of that duty’s legal legitimacy.15

I do not think the text supports this argument. On the contrary, Socrates appeals to the
primacy of virtue and comes to the conclusion that, under the circumstances in which he finds
himself, it is in fact best for him, his family, his fiiends, and ultimately his fellow Athenians,
that he die. Socrates maintains that if he chose to live he would, in fact, do a great disservice to
his children. Thus, when Socrates personifies the laws of Athens and supposes what they would
“say” about his situation, the laws scoff at the idea that Socrates could educate his children if
he decided to escape”: “But now you want to live for the sake of your children, in order that -
you may bring them up [from childhood] and educate them. Indeed!” (Cr. 54a2-3).

The reason for the laws’ incredulity is twofold. First, as the laws point out, it is “fairly
clear” that in the event of an escape, Socrates’ fiiends run “run the risk ...of being banished
from the city and deprived [of their property] or losing [their] lives altogether” (Cr. 53bl-4).
These are the kinds of sacrifices which Crito acknowledges he and Socrates’ other fiiends are
willing to make (44el-4533). However, as valiant as Crito and fiiends may be, it will not
benefit Socrates’ children if his fiiends are in the same position he himself would be in if he
escaped. Of course, there still remain friends abroad in Thessaly. Yet, this is a place of
“disorderliness and intemperance” (53d3-4). Socrates might find protection and support for

himself among Crito’s fiiends, but he will certainly not find the cultural climate to raise

 

'4 Bumet (1990) notes that Aeschineus [.7 suggests that the laws of Solon contained regulations concerning
school discipline that stated it was expressly (Stappfifinv) necessary to train (tint'm58'0co) and rear
(tpétbw) children. Bumet doubts parents were compelled to teach music and gymnastics specifically (p. 282,

note on 50d8).
‘5 Woozley (1979), p. 11.

I will personify the “laws” (as Socrates does) throughout the remainder of the paper.

children, nor can he expect his philosophical activities to be taken seriously, having himself
violated “the strongest laws” (53e2). The cultural climate of Thessaly combined with the
probable hostility of its citizens makes it less preferable to Athens as a place to raise children.

However, if Socrates chooses to escape, he will not in any case be permitted to remain in
Athens with his children. Thus, even supposing that his friends come to be in a position to look
after his children, which seems unlikely, Socrates will either do harm to the paideia of his
children by taking them to an unfit city, or else be forced to live apart from them, and thus
leave them in Athens with fiiends of doubtful status and as the children of a fugitive. The only
other stated option involves fleeing to Thebes or Megara. Both cities are regarded as well
governed. However, for this very reason they are also likely to judge the fugitive Socrates as a
“destroyer of laws” with a “destructive influence” (53cl-3). Socrates is consistent in claiming
that one should not “study to seem but to be good, whether in public or private life” (Grg.
527b5-6). Moreover, he expects others to demonstrate their characters by example and holds
this same standard for himself (La. 186bl-5, Ap. 32c8-d7). Were Socrates to flee he would
indeed educate his children, but in precisely the wrong way: by undermining justice and the
laws which serve as the foundation of his family’s well-being in the polis.

It is clear from the testimony of the laws that both practically and morally the means are
not available for Socrates to benefit his children and their education by escaping. This is not a
matter of indifference to Socrates’ arguments; indeed, there would be no reason for him to
offer his considerations on the matter if it were. Socrates’ point in the text is plain: escaping
would harm his children. This is Socrates’ response to Crito’s earlier claim that Socrates would
be “giving up” on his sons by accepting his death sentence (Cr. 45clO-dl). Crito’s appeal does
not have the moral force it pretends to have, and as such does not offer a compelling reason for
escape. In this respect, Crito’s claim that Socrates is abandoning his children like a coward is

unpersuasive. I conclude that Woozley’s claims that (i) Socrates is indifferent to the duty to

educate children and (ii) Socrates believes “his children will be as well off if he dies as if he

lives”1 7

cannot be supported.

Even in light of these considerations, however, Socrates’ remarks at 48c2-6 may still seem
problematic to my interpretation. Even if Socrates’ dismissive remarks do not entail ridicule,
surely they seem inappropriate to the education of children, in a way they do not with regard to
finances and reputation. The grouping of education with other matters at 4802-6 may itself lend
credence to the view that Socrates intends to belittle the duty to educate. At the very least, one
might say, some tension persists in the Crito between Socrates’ dismissal of Crito’s concern for
education or paideia and Socrates’ acceptance of the duty to educate his children. However, I
suggest that if Socrates is indeed engaged in a dismissal of baser matters, it does not in any
case involve a dismissal of “education” or of “a father’s duty to educate,” as Woozley argues.

In the passage at 48c2-6, the word Woozley translates as the “upbringing of children” is
tpoqm. Woozley assumes in his interpretation of the passage that tpotpf] means “education.”
However, the word for education, TtOttSSiOt, does not appear in the passage. When Crito
makes his plea at 45d], he uses the verb TEOLISeuco together with the verb Tpdeu --

txfipéwou Kai émoufieiioou. Here ’Cpéqxi) carries the implication of being nurtured in the
sense of being reared by a Tpo¢80g, or nurse, whereas ita158130) implies being educated in
the sense of one’s “cultural and physical education” (Cr. SOeI, Prt. 312a1-b4). The word used
by Socrates at 48c4 is simply 'tpoclm', and it does not have the same connotations as tta1581a.
In the Apology, for example, tpo¢i1 is used by itself to refer to Socrates’ proposed punishment
of “free maintenance” at the state’s expense (Ap. 36e1). In the Euthyphro, the word Tpoqm

again appears in reference to food (E uthphr. l4a7). In addition to those specific references to

food and maintenance (in the sense of one’s “daily provisions” or “daily bread”), the word

 

'7 Woozley (1979), p. 10.

’tpoqm also appears in the Protagoras, where Protagoras uses the accusative plural form of
tpo¢1‘|, in the general sense of “foods of the earth” (Tag Etc yfig Ipo¢01g, Prt. 32237-8).
Plato’s use of ’tpocbt‘] in the Republic follows this same pattern. For example, at 585b3-
c1, the term appears in reference to the nourishment provided by food and drink. Here,
however, the word serves further to distinguish between nourishment of the body (worth) and
nourishment of the soul (dlnfiég 81509.”g Even more striking is the pattern of usage in

Plato’s Laws. Although a main theme of discussion in the Laws concerns education, and the

verb forms TpédXx) and flatbeum are used frequently, the word 100M] retains the same

semantic range -- for example, referring to the feeding of goats or to food and drink, or
sustenance generally (Laws 1.63ld7, 1.639a2, 1.653d5, 2.660a1, 2.667b8, et passim).‘° This

use of the term Ipo¢1‘| appears in the early dialogues, as well as in the Republic and in the

Laws, in a consistent pattern of usage -- to refer to food, sustenance, the means of life, or the
nursing of animals and children.

In view of this survey of ‘cpodm, I would suggest that the appearance of tpodm at 48c2-6
be read as consistent with the semantic range employed elsewhere in the dialogues: that is, as
the ‘livelihood of children’ in the sense of providing for their physical welfare and without the
attendant idea of education introduced by ita15810t or noct38‘0w. Woozley’s interpretation of
meet], as referring to education, is not the best rendering given the range of meaning found

consistently throughout the dialogues.20

 

'8 Only rarely does Plato break from this usage in the Republic, e. g. later at 608a, tpo¢fi appears by itself in
reference to the nourishment of poetry. However, given that they do not take this kind of poetry “seriously,”
this reference appears to be a metaphorical parallel to the bodily nourishment that was deemed insufficient at
585 b12-c5. Otherwise this use of the noun is anomalous.

19 woof] appears to be used less frequently in reference to children. But, for example, at Laws 1.63 1 d7, the
dative plural form, “cpooa'tg does appear in specific reference to nursing children.

20 Woozley’s translates 190011 as “upbringing”. However, as indicated earlier, he assumes in his discussion
that this term refers to education. There is no necessity to translate ‘tpodm' as “livelihood” instead of

10

Plato’s use of the term ’tpoqm', understood in the above sense, is consistent both with the

context of the passage itself (48c2-6), and my interpretation of Socrates’ position. Socrates, in
effect, interprets Crito’s concern for the welfare of his children as comparable to Crito’s

practical concerns for money and reputation. Although Crito earlier refers to tia158'10t, he

does not consider the higher goals of such an education; he only considers the fact that one is
expected to have an education and that it is remiss to abnegate one’s responsibility in this
regard (Cr. 45c6-d9). If Crito did consider education in the way Socrates did -- in other words,
as Socrates says, if Crito had remembered the principles on which they had formerly agreed
concerning justice (Cr. 49al-b5) -- it would have been apparent to Crito that escape is not an
option. It is not simply life, but the good lifiz that is of greatest importance (Cr. 48b5). Likewise
it is not simply the livelihood of one’s children that is important, but livelihood with a view to
virtue. In so far as Socrates recognizes the value of paideia, it must be considered relative to its
contribution to the virtuous life. The force of the duty to educate is not simply the requirement
to bring up the children, but to see to the proper cultivation of their souls.

This task is considered to be an impossibility if Socrates chooses to live, and it is
accordingly given as a reason for not escaping (Cr. 54a2-3). Crito, however, assumes it is self-
evident that the “good and brave man” would escape and is concerned that his own reputation
will be tarnished if Socrates does not agree to his plan (Cr. 45d6-e9): “I am ashamed, both on
your behalf and ours, for fear opinion on this whole affair about you be concluded to concern
some cowardice on our part” (Cr. 45d9-e2). However, the notion that what is right and
praiseworthy is self-evident is precisely what Socrates has rejected in numerous places

throughout the dialogue (Cr. 44c6-9, 48c2-6, and 54b3-c2). Crito’s agreement that the good

 

“upbringing” so long as “Cpodm’ is not inferred to include reference to education in the sense Socrates has in
mind (Cr. 50d5-e1;Prt. 312b4). Teloh interprets this passage much as Woozley does. See 11. 23 below.

11

life is the just life makes clear the mistake of his earlier considerations -- to see to the
livelihood of one’s children is one thing; to see to the health of their souls is another.
11

Such is the case made in the Crito. However, a plausible interpretation of Socrates’ view
of the duty to educate should reflect some consistency with other early dialogues. Along these
lines, Woozley attempts to bolster his view of Socrates’ detachment from his children and lack
of concern for education by claiming that this point is in harmony with Socrates’ remarks in the
Phaedo: “Plato represents Crito as asking Socrates if he has any instructions for himself or for
the others present about his children, and Socrates as replying he has none.”2| The conclusion is
evidently that Socrates is not much concerned with affairs related to his children. The exchange
Woozley refers to is as follows:

...Crito spoke: Socrates, have you any instructions for myself or the others,

concerning your children or anything else, since we would gladly carry them out

for you? I speak as always, Crito, nothing new; take care of yourselves and your

own, and whatever you have done or might do will be pleasing to me and my

own, though you may not agree; but should you neglect yourselves and your own,

and not care to live by following the path I have set forth, both now and in the

time before, however much you may now agree, you will do no good.

(Phd. I lel-cl)

The claim in this passage is not, as Woozley suggests, that there are no instructions

concerning the care of his children; only that there are no “new” (Kawbg) instructions. What

will please Socrates and his family is that his fiiends act in accord with the “pa ” he has set
forth. Here, as in the Crito and in the Apology, Socrates suggests that although it may not seem
self-evident to his friends, what is beneficial in the long run is that they attend to first things
first: namely, to matters of justice. In the context of the Phaedo, as in the passage at 48c2-6 in
the Crito, Socrates’ dismissal constitutes a question of priority in the argument, not an outright

rejection of other concerns.

 

2' Woozley (1979), p. 11.

12

However, if the conclusion of the Phaedo is that the directions concerning the fate of his
children are nothing new but are implicit in what Socrates has been saying all along, then the
evidence for Socrates’ concern for paideia and its relative importance should be evident in the
early dialogues. However, Henry Teloh argues that one would look for such evidence in vain.
He states, in reference to the Crito:

Socrates seems to dismiss his responsibility to educate his children....As Woozley

claims, Socrates has a distasteful detachment from his children. He appears

unconcerned about his obligation to educate them. I know of no textual evidence

which rebuts this charge.22

The claim that Socrates appears detached from his children seems to rest on an

argu—mentum ex selentio, for there is little direct evidence to be found concerning Socrates’

feelings for his children. However, something may be inferred from Socrates’ last wish in the
Apology, where I believe Socrates’ concern for his children’s welfare is explicit. Already, at
25c1-4 Socrates has berated Meletus for having “never taken the slightest interest” in the
welfare of the young. And at the end of his final speech, he urges his fellow citizens to fulfill
the obligation to his children that he cannot:

I ask of them one favor. When these sons of mine grow up, reprimand them,

gentlemen, trouble them about these things, as I have troubled you, should they

seem to you to give heed to money or anything else before virtue, and should they

think [these things] to be something they are not, reproach them as I have

reproached you, should they still not give heed to being [virtuous] as they should,

and think they are something when they are good for nothing. If you do these

things, I shall receive justice by your hands, both for myself and my sons.

(Ap. 4lel-4Za3)

Socrates also takes this request especially seriously with regard to his own fiiends. Thus,
in the Laches, Socrates states that to corrupt the children of others by misguiding their
education is “...cause for the greatest blame” (La. 186b5-8). The charge that Socrates lacks

concern for his obligation to his own children’s’ education as well as those of his fiiends is, I

 

22 Teloh (1986), p. 121. Teloh assumes the issue at stake at 48c2-8 is education, and more specifically that
of the elenchus. I have rejected this interpretation. However, Teloh does grant that if escape is wrong
Socrates would be an evil influence on his children.

l3

conclude, unfounded. 23 Socrates clearly values the paideia both of his own children and
others. However, like all goods, the value of paideia must be considered relative to virtue.
Many scholars, however, assume paideia is not relevant to the Socratic conception of the
virtuous life. 2" The most illustrative example of scholars’ treatment of paideia is found in their
examination of Gorgias 470d-e, where Socrates explicitly states that one’s achievement of

happiness is dependent upon education (ita15810t) and justice (51Ka100'0vn):

Polus: Now does he [Archelaus the King] seem to you to be happy or miserable?
Socrates: I do not know Polus: Up to this day I have never met the man.
Polus: What? Can you not judge whether he is happy even though you have not
met him?
Socrates: No indeed I cannot.
Polus: Clearly then, Socrates, you will say you cannot judge whether the Great
King is happy.
Socrates: And I shall speak truthfully. For I do not know how well off he is in
education [ttoubeiot] and justice [StKatOGUvn].
Polus: What? Does happiness altogether rest on this?
Socrates: I for my part say so, Polus, for the man and woman who are noble and
good I call happy, but the one who is unjust and wicked I call miserable.

(Grg. 470d8-el I)

I want to raise two questions with respect to this passage. First, what kind of paideia does
the Socrates of the early dialogues believe is connected to eudaimonia? Secondly, how is
paideia related to justice? Scholars have not typically thought it necessary to pursue either
question.25 Vlastos, for example, suggests that virtue is itself sufficient for, though not identical
with, happiness.26 In keeping with this interpretation, Vlastos regards the reference to paideia

as superfluous, since he interprets it to be “quasi-synonymous” with justice.27 Irwin suggests

 

23 Teloh (1986) seems to think that the importance of paideia is ignored by Socrates in the early dialogues
but is recognized and developed in the Republic as a means of “low demotic virtue” (which is not the “real
virtue” learned by dialectic). See pp. 13-14, 150, 175.
24 The tendency to focus on the intellectualist side of Socratic ethics in philosophy has a long history.
Nietzsche (1928), for example, used the equation “Vernunfl=Tugend=Gliick” to describe Socrates’ position:
“Reason=virtue=happiness; this simply means that one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark desires by
producing a permanent daylight -- the daylight of reason” (Gotzen Dammerug, “Das Problem des
Sokrates,” 10).
25 Jaeger (1943) and Dodds (1959) are exceptions. See esp. Jaeger (1943), pp. 133-133.

6 Happiness may be enhanced by contingent needs such as health and wealth. See n.2 above.
’7 Vlastos (1991), p. 137, n. 28.

14

that paideia at 470e6 means “reasoned inquiry and knowledge,” rather than “habitual right
action.”28 Again, since knowledge of justice is the whole of happiness, the reference to paideia
must be redundant. Santas does not refer to education and, several times, identifies the claims
made at 470d8-ell with the argument that the just are happy and the unjust wretched.29
Brickhouse and Smith ignore the reference to education altogether in their understanding of the
passage.30

In each of these cases, Socrates’ reference to paideia is ignored or is considered
redundant. This latter assumption is questionable for a number of reasons. First, Socrates
consistently defines paideia in a way that rules out its identification with a “knowledge of
virtue.” In the Crito, Socrates defines paideia as instruction in music and gymnastics

(uououcrj Kort yuuvocotucfi flatbeuerv, 50d8-50e1) and in the Protagoras, he considers

the education received from the “schoohnaster, music teacher, and gymnastics instructor”

(ypocuuocttotoi) éyéveto Koc‘t mOapto'coi) x061 ironSo'cpiBou) to be the proper

constituents of one’s education (’ent flatbeia, 312b3-4). Paideia does not here concern

reasoned inquiry as to the nature of virtue.“

In fact, Socrates is skeptical of others’ presumptions to teach virtue. In order actually to
teach virtue one must first possess knowledge of virtue, and Socrates claims that neither he nor
anyone he has encountered possesses such knowledge (M. 7lc3-4). Thus, Socrates maintains
that he has never had a “teacher of virtue” (La. l86b8-c2) and denies that he himself is a
teacher (Ap. 19d8-e4); in this sense at least, he has no claim to be an expert in perfecting the
virtue “of people and of citizens” (Ap. 20b4). In the Apology, as in the Protagoras, Socrates is

also incredulous at the sophists’ claim to serve this end. Since neither he nor the sophists

 

2“ Irwin (1979), p. 149.

29 Santas (1979), pp. 223, 225, 227.

3" Brickhouse and Smith (1994), p. 117.

31 In the Sophist , a distinction is made between the traditional education of admonition and that of cross-
examination (see 229d 1 -230b8).

15

possess knowledge of virtue (Ap. 20e2-3; see also M. 7 lc3-4), they cannot be expected to
teach it (Prt. 36 lb7-c2). Paideia, then, cannot be instruction resulting in a knowledge of virtue.
Nor can it be supposed that by referring to paideia in the Gorgias passage, Socrates has in
mind an education in virtue attained through the elenchos itself. Socrates never claims that his
cross-examination results in virtue. Moreover, Socrates seems willing at least to consider the
possibility that Archelaus is happy, although Socrates has not met him and has no reason to
suppose that he has been exposed to the elenchos (Grg. 470d9).

My claim that paideia does not refer to Socratic virtue, or whatever education might
produce virtue, may seem complicated, however, by Socrates’ statement that "the man and
woman who are noble and good I call happy, but the one who is unjust and wicked I call
miserable" (Grg. 470e9-l 1). This reply does not obviously take account of the difference
between education and justice I have proposed, but instead appears to focus solely on virtue.

However, the stock expression used at 470e9-11 -- the "noble and good" (Kahbv K061

dyafl‘ov) -- does not simply refer to canonical virtues but also refers to a person's favorable

attributes or qualities, such as wealth, good upbringing and education, and accomplishment.
The ideal of kalokagathia concerns the possession of virtues in the broadest sense;
namely, of excellent qualities or character traits whatever they may be. The ideal of
kalokagaihia is the aim of paideia. I want to claim it is also essential to, although distinct
from, the pursuit of Socratic virtue.32 The Socratic notion of virtue concerns knowledge of
good and evil and, in the case of justice, knowledge of what is just and unjust. The virtues of
paideia, in contrast, concern social virtues -- in other words, those excellences of character and
ability required to participate in a community’s conventions and traditions. Both kinds of virtue

are valued by Socrates. In the Charmides, for example, Socrates uses the expression 10

 

32 Although this view is generally consonant with Jaeger’s (1943), I do not abide by Jaeger’s discussion of a
“Socratic paideia” which seems to confuse the issue. See pp. 107-125.

l6

KOLMW (the noble) not only to describe the virtue of temperance, but also to describe specific

abilities associated with writing, music, and wrestling (Ch. 159b8-159d2). However, as Jaeger
has argued, paideia “...is not merely a stage in man’s development where he trains a certain
number of his faculties; its meaning is extended to connote the perfection of his character, in
accordance with his nature.”33 For Socrates the perfection of human nature constitutes the best
life for a person, and this life is the just life. The kinds of virtues developed through paideia
are indeed excellences that contribute to human character and talent, and are necessary for the
pursuit of virtue. However, ultimately they are not good independent of a concern for the
Socratic notion of virtue - namely, knowledge of good and evil (Euthyd. 28ld2-el)."4 It is
Socrates’ insistence on this last point which bring interlocutors such as Callicles to claim that
Socrates turns things upside down (Grg. 481blO-c4). For Callicles, what is noble and good '
simply includes whatever talents and abilities make one “stronger and superior,” and thus more
likely to attain wealth and power (Grg. 484c1-dl).

The ideal of the "noble and good" understood in this sense is an ideal common to
Athenian education in the fifth and fourth centuries, one which hearkens back to the
unmistakable association of physical and moral beauty inherited from earlier societies such as
those represented in Homer’s Iliad. Achilles was clearly recognized as the “best of the
Achaeans” (II. I. 244) because he possessed the virtue of an ideal warrior, not Socratic virtue.
The ideal of the superior warrior is maintained by later city-states, such as Sparta, although it is
esteemed as “the best” in a quite different sense. According to the Spartan elegiac poet
Tyrtaeus, writing in the mid-seventh century, “true virtue” (ape’t’h) does consist in “standing
fast in battle,” yet not for individual wealth or gain but for the good of the polis: “virtue -- the

highest reward a man can obtain from his fellows. It is a good common to all, a service to the

 

’3 Jaeger (1943), p. 133.
34 See Brickhouse and Smith’s ( 1994) discussion of “dependent” and “independent” goods, pp. 106-110.

17

city and the people as a whole...”35 In this regard a competitive physical or athletic ideal served
a military purpose, the moral worth of which was judged relative to the livelihood of the polis,
not to the individual.

This focus on the well-being of the polis comes nearer to the sense in which Socrates
takes paideia and virtue to be related. However, Socrates is not simply concerned with the
well-being of the polis as a state apparatus, but also with the well-being of the polis as a just
community. It is not simply the rule of the state which Socrates upholds; on the contrary, his
defiance of the Thirty suggests that he has no such inclinations (Ap. 32c—d). His conviction is
not to uphold the law of decree, but rather the mle of law as a pre-condition of justice.
Paideia, then, must be specifically related to justice and not simply to power, whether it is
power in the hands of an individual, as Callicles imagines, or the power of the state apparatus
itself. Nonetheless, the relevance of paideia to the pursuit of Socratic virtue can be explained
both in reference to the individual and the polis.

For his part, Socrates states in the Crito that he has received a cultural and physical
paideia, that he is grateful for this fact, and (as I argued earlier) that he recognizes education as
a duty (Cr. 50d5-el). Socrates claims in the Protagoras that, properly understood, paideia
does not serve “professional” purposes as many Sophists and their students presume (Prt.
312a7-b4). Rather, as Socrates says to Hippocrates, paideia concerns the cultivation of one’s
character by pursuing an education “...of the sort [you received] from your schoolmaster, music
teacher, and gymnastics instructor...For of these things, every one, you did not learn for a skill,
so as to become a professional, but for education, as an individual and fiee man shonld” (Prt.
3 l Zal-b4).

Indeed, as Socrates confirms in the Laches, the choice of pursuits and teachers is crucial,

since the whole order of the household is dependent upon how one’s children grow up (La.

 

35 Tyrtaeus, Fr. 12, 13-18, in Bergck, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, trans. Marrou (1964), p. 38.

l8

l85a5-7). This emphasis reveals a belief that one’s education in youth is an important, if
imperfect, means of inculcating a good character. This, for example, is the expressed aim of
Pericles’ attempt to educate his sons (Prt. 320a1), and Protagoras also implies that paideia can
impart constraints which compel people “to be heedful of virtue” (Prt. 327dl), or in other
words civilized.36 In the Crito, Socrates also affirms the role of paideia in establishing a sense
of belonging and responsibility to the others in the polis. In the words of the laws: “ ...since
you were born, raised, and educated, can you deny that you were our child and slave, both you
and your ancestors” (Cr. SOel-4).

Given that paideia is relevant to inculcating good character and a sense of moral
responsibility, the question remains as to how education specifically relates to virtue. Socrates,
of course, must deny that paideia results in knowledge of virtue - only the god truly possesses
virtue (Ap. 23a5-6). Thus, Socrates speaks approvingly of Sirnonides in the Protagoras when
he interprets the poet to say: “If I wait for perfection I will praise no one” (Prt. 346d6). As
Sirnonides suggests, even a “skillful, wise, and good man” may falter: “...whenever
extraordinary misfortune brings him down [to naught], [he] cannot help but be bad” (Prt.
344e1-2). In the Crito, Socrates argues that, in such cases of misfortune, life may not be worth
living (Cr. 47d8-e2; see also Grg. 512a2-b2). Among mortals at least, Socrates seems to affirm
the notion that it is “ridiculous” to maintain that moral matters are an all-or-nothing affair (Prt.
346d2).

Socrates’ own example illustrates this point. He maintains that, in spite being ignorant of
what virtue itself is, he is a good man. He also believes that he has wronged no one and that his

philosophical activities, if unimpeded, would count as an “inconceivable happiness” (Ap. 41c4,

 

36 Teloh (1986) calls the virtues associated with education in political matters -- implied by the example of
Pericles -- “high demotic virtues.” He calls those virtues associated with being cultivated or civilized, “low
demotic virtues.” See p. 226, n. 17.

l9

4Ob7-c2).37 Socrates may not possess knowledge of virtue, but he is neither amoral nor
immoral. It is rather between arnorality and the possession of virtue that even the best of
mortals are necessarily situated. Although lacking virtue itself, Socrates is no less capable of
moral concern, disposition, and action. It is within this context of human imperfection that
Socrates maintains the relevance of Athenian paideia to virtue and the good life.

In Athens, each element of cultural and physical education provided an outlet for the
expression of community life, which in the time of Socrates still retained something of the
heroic ideal fi'om Homer while it also supported and valued the rule of law. The polis was the
center of family livelihood, not the warrior’s clan. The defense of city and household
nonetheless remained a preeminent concern, and physical education had long since had the
moral function of cultivating and rewarding solidarity, courage, and physical dexterity in times

of peace.38 As Plato’s Protagoras notes, children are “... sent to a trainer [nouSO’tp‘tBOU], in

order that good intelligence may have a good body, and not be forced to play the coward in
war or other trials, through weakness of body” (Prt. 326b6-c3). Music and poetry combined to
enliven lyric songs with the heroes of Homeric poetry and teach the youth of Athens, as
Phoenix taught Achilles, how “to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds” ([1. 9.443). But
Athens had its own poets too, including the widely quoted Solon, who expressed the political
idea ebvoula, meaning ‘good order’ or ‘equilibrium’ in a polis without internal strife.39 To
this end, Protagoras maintains that by instruction in music, the youth “...may be more civilized,

and become orderly and accommodating, and well-suited to speak and act” (Prt. 326b3-4).

 

37 Brickhouse and Smith (1994) argue that these claims are consistent with Socrates’ belief that he does not
actually possess moral wisdom. See esp. pp. 123-136.

38 Fomal military training or ephebia in Athens consisted of two years of service between the ages of 18 and
20 (see “education, Greek,” @2 [1996]). Possibly, ephebia was instantiated in the Peloponnesian war
(431404) (see Marrou [1964], p. 64.).

39 See Ostwald (1986), pp. xx-xxi, 112. See also Jaeger (1986), p. 201.

20

Protagoras claimed that music also makes a contribution to character: “...for the whole of
human life stands in need of rhythmical order and easiness of temper” (Prt. 326b5).

Paideia, as described by Plato’s Protagoras, prepares the young for the time when they
learn for themselves the laws that govern the polis: “...whenever they may be dismissed from
their teachers, the city compels them to learn the laws, and live out their lives according to this
model, for fear that, left to themselves, they act without purpose” (Prt. 326c6-dl). The three
main elements of paideia to which Socrates makes reference are poetry, physical education,
and music. Each of these aspects of education might have taken place in a different locale and

with a different teacher:

The paidotribe—s deals with gymnastics, games, and general athletic fitness, mainly

in the palaestra..The kithariste's taught music and the works of lyric poets, the

lyre school inheriting the musical education of the Archaic period. The

grammatiste} taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as literature, which

consisted in learning by hearing the work of the poets especially Homer who were

regarded as giving moral training.40

Whether it was paideia of poetry, music, or gymnastics, education was an imitative
process. In this regard, the teacher was held morally culpable for the pupil’s development in the
eyes of the public,4| and, as Socrates states in Laches, the choice of tutors was a crucial one
(La. 185a3-7). Organized education had made its appearance to a limited degree by the latter
half of the fifth century, as intimated by Socrates' reference to schoohnasters at 312a1-b4 in the
Protagoras. But whether by school master or private teacher, paideia involved an introduction
into all aspects of daily life and was

maintained Openly by daily association, personal contact and example,

conversation, a sharing in the common life, and the gradual initiation of the

younger into the social activities of the elder - the club, the gymnasium and the
banquet."2

 

40 See “education, Greek,” OCT; (1996).

4‘ Marrou (1964), p. 5.

42 Marrou (1964), p. 56. I have not discussed the role of friendship or love in education. From the Phaedrus
it would seem their contribution is often questionable. P. Friedlander’s (1964) synopsis of the Lysis explains
the possible benefit this way: “Lysis loves Socrates. Socrates loves truth. Love tends upward” (I, p. 98).

21

This account of “cultural and physical education,” as Socrates understood it, emphasizes
how paideia could play an important role in the social and moral development of the city's
youth by providing activities aimed at developing and demonstrating one's character. The
beliefs and habits one develops in this context are a necessary prerequisite for engaging
successfully in moral discussion and activity and, ultimately, in leading the good life within the
context of the polis.

Although paideia does involve socialization into a common group, it is not a passive
transmission of cultural norms. In particular, the activities associated with one's youthful
education are intended to provide a forum for demonstrating one's character in action. It is clear
to Socrates why Melesias and Lysirnachus, in the Laches, are eager to enlist their sons in the art
of fighting in armor among "other studies or pursuits." Socrates states that such matters are "no
trivial affair” (La. 185a3). Despite Socrates' concern with the possibility of moral wisdom,
one's virtue is not attested to by propositions but by one’s "deeds" (La. l86b2). In the case of
youths, these deeds must be attested to first-hand or else by the general testimony of others.

The same holds true for ”teachers" (5t5d0’KOtlLOl), who must demonstrate their worthiness by

providing evidence that they have improved others (La. l86b3-4). In this regard, paideia
provides the necessary opportunities to develop and demonstrate a nobility of character. This
view is summarized in the Menexenus, when Socrates recites the “speech of Aspasia”:

It seems to me necessary, according to nature, to so commend them [the dead],

just exactly as they became good. They became good through goodness of birth.

Therefore let us praise first their nobility of birth; secondly, their nurture and

education; let us display the result of their works, let us prove how good and

worthy of them [they were].

(Mx. 237a4-b2)
In the Gorgias, Socrates elaborates on the relevance of paideia as a prerequisite, not only

for moral activity, but also for engaging in moral inquiry. Socrates maintains that three

qualifications are necessary if one wishes to test the good or evil of another person's soul:

22

knowledge, good will, and frankness (tmorr‘lunv ts x061 several) lccx‘l rtocppnoiow, Grg.

487a2-3). Socrates playfully suggests that Callicles has all three: “...you possess all these
things, which the others do not, for you have been sufficiently educated, as many of the
Athenians would say, and [are] well-disposed towards me (Grg. 487b5-7). Given the context
of the dialogue, Socrates' irony is apparent: it is Callicles' lack of knowledge, good will, and
frankness that is exposed in the dialogue. Nonetheless, what is important with respect to the
present thesis is that "good will" and "frankness" are associated with one's education and,
moreover, considered prerequisite to moral discourse. Moral inquiry presupposes these social
virtues because they are required for making progress towards honest agreement on the truth of
a matter. Thus Socrates states:

You would never have agreed with me for want of wisdom, nor an excess of

shame, nor again would you have agreed to deceive me; for you [are] a fiiend, as

you yourself would say. This being [so], agreement between you and me will

constitute a conclusion of truth.

(Grg. 487e3-7)

But no agreement is forthcoming. Callicles has already intimated that he has no intention
of shaming himself by admitting Socrates’ conclusions as Polus did (Grg. 482c4-e2).“3
Callicles is willing to endorse claims which he does not believe in order to avoid Socrates’
claims (Grg. 495a5-a9); he appears to doubt Socrates seriousness and is, accordingly, intent
not on agreement but on getting the upper hand (Grg. 48 lc5-482b2). Although “good will”
and “frankness” may appear to have little to do with dialectic itself, according to Socrates they
have everything to do with the way dialectical inquiry is carried out and whether agreement or
progress is possible.

Ultimately, it would be through knowledge - and not habit— that perfect happiness would

be possible, since then one would know in every situation how the good may be fulfilled. But,

 

43 Teloh (1986) indicates these aspects of the debate. See pp. 148-149. Again, Teloh also sees predialectical
training as the means to improve disposition and personality but defers Plato’s response to the educational
theory of the Republic.

23

in either case the source of moral action is the soul of the individual, and it is here that Socrates
directs his attention. At the same time, there is no clear-cut distinction made between the well-
being of the polis and that of the individual.44 Socrates is no politician, but he is a citizen and
regards the polis as a necessary precondition for the justice of the individual, stating his
preference for death over banishment accordingly (Ap. 37cS-d6). The clearest expression of
Socrates’ view comes at Ap. 36c8, when he makes a distinction between minding the business

of the polis and his own mission, caring for the polis itself (111118 16w ’tfig nonemg, np‘tv
ab’tfig ’tfit; néhswg). This point is reiterated later when Socrates shows that he conceives of

his duty not as keeping quietly to himself, but rather minding the matters of morality affecting
the citizenry of Athens as a whole (Ap. 37e3-3 8a7). In so far as the citizenry and their laws
comprise the polis, morality is not a private matter separate from the welfare of the polis.

1]]

The important thing, Socrates claims, is not to live, but to live well, and this is to live
justly. Yet one does not live justly alone. The choice to live outside of a city is never
considered seriously by Socrates, either in the Crito or the Apology.45 In this regard, we may
take Socrates as being in agreement with Aristotle: “...the one who is not able to take counsel
with others, or through self-sufficiency has no need to, has no part in the city, and consequently
is either a beast or a god” (Politics 1.1253a28-29). Yet, as Socrates argues in the Crito, the just
community is not possible without a common agreement to abide by the rule of law rather than
rule of the stronger, as suggested by Thrasymachus, Polus, and Callicles. From whence this
agreement is supposed to come is another matter.

Socrates himself professes to have learned the rule of law and the norms guiding life in

Athens from the city, which required his father to educate him (Cr. 50d8). As a citizen,

 

44 See Nagle (1989) for a general discussion of polis society, pp. 104-110.
45 The possibility is implied at Cr. 53c4 but rejected.

24

Socrates’ obligation to the laws is not only based upon his implicit agreement to abide by
them46 but also, he thinks, because they have benefited both him and the citizens of Athens --
in the words of the laws: “...we have brought you into the world and reared you and educated
you, and given you and your fellow citizens a share in all the good things we have” (Cr. Slc9-
d1). These are the values Socrates must adduce if his claim that the good life is the just life is
to be convincing.

At Crito 49a6 Socrates secures Crito’s admission that “to do a wrong is never noble or

good” (0018 dyaOov 001:8 Kakov ). Gregory Vlastos has suggested that this claim provides
an expression of Socrates’ eudaimonism, since it includes 001:8 (1.701.901) as descriptive of the

consequence of injustice:

Of these two adjectives, dyaOév, KOLMW, the latter is the one normally used to

express what is morally right as such. The use of the former is much broader -

fully as broad as that of “good” in English, ranging over the whole spectrum of

values: not only moral ones, but also hedonic, economic, political, psychological,

physiological or whatever.“
But, if, as Socrates maintains, it is never permissible to do injustice, he must be understood to
claim that no matter what might be gained through injustice, it will nonetheless be so harmful
for the wrongdoer that nothing could provide compensation for acting unjustly, even on pain of
death. The commonly-held belief is, of course, that one ought to return injury for injury
regardless of circumstances. In the words of Thuycidides, “Coming as close as possible in
thought to what you felt when they made you suffer, when you would have given anything to

crush them, now pay them back?”8 In this case inflicting injury is restricted to retribution for

an injustice -- it is a debt owed and paid. However, Socrates claims more broadly that

 

46 Socrates claims he was free to leave Athens after having underwent his 5010110610., if he had disagreed
with its laws (Cr. 51d3). The Somao‘ta, or “examination,” took place before city magistrates to see if a

youth (of 18 years) met the legal requirements for citizenship.
‘7 Vlastos (1991), p. 198
’8 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.40.7, trans. Vlastos (1991), p. 184.

25

reciprocating injury is never “noble or good.” As he argues in the Apology, to harm (Kalcbv)

others is to invite harm on oneself, and here Socrates’ eudaimonist appeal to the “noble and
good” is evident:

Tell, me seriously Meletus, is it better to live in a good or in a bad community?...

Have you discovered that bad people always have a bad effect, and good people a

good effect, upon their nearest neighbors. Am I so hopelessly ignorant as not even

to realize that by spoiling the character of one of my companions I shall run the

risk of getting harm from him?

(Ap. 25c5-e5)

If one does not recognize that the good life consists of goods afforded by community life
within the polis, the claim that the good life is just life cannot serve as a persuasive appeal to
abide by the rule of law. Socrates admits his arguments can hold no sway if his interlocutors
are unwilling to accept the premise that justice is of ultimate concern in moral discussion.49
Socrates tells Crito that, in the context of the polis, the principle never to do wrong cannot be
advocated by one individual but not another and still properly serve as a standard for moral
action and inquiry. Socrates makes a point of emphasizing this point:

So one should not return a wrong, or commit an evil act against any person,

whatsoever one might suffer by them. [One should] take heed, Crito, when

confessing these things, in order not to agree [to something] contrary to [one’s]

beliefs. For I know [there are] few who think or will think [that] one should honor

these things. Consequently, between those who think so and those who do not,

there is no common agreement concerning these things, but necessarily they

observe one another’s decisions with contempt.

(Cr. 49c10-dS)
Socrates stresses this point again at 49el-3; if he and Crito cannot agree on this issue, there is

no basis for their discussion. Socrates claim is that if he is bound by a just agreement to abide

by the law, even if he is unjustly accused, he cannot return injustice for injustice. Socrates

 

49 This is not to say that the possibility of moral debate actually depends upon the acceptance of this
premise. Thrasymachus, for example, doubts that justice is of ultimate concern and Socrates attempts to
persuade him otherwise in Book I of the Republic. Even Glaucon, who is sympathetic to Socrates, takes up
Thrasymachus’ position for the sake of argument. However, in the Crito 49c10-d5 Socrates is explicitly
concerned with agreement upon a common principle for action, and not simply debate or, as Thrasymachus
would have it, entertainment (Rep. 354a10-1 l).

26

appeals to the good of paideia he has received in the polis as part of his explanation for this
position: The laws ask “...since you were born, raised, and educated, can you deny that you
were our [i.e. the Laws’] child and slave, both you and your ancestors?” (Cr. 50el-4). Socrates
evidently does not think so, and his reasoning in this regard returns to the idea of what is good
for one in terms of the “good things” he has received from the polis (Cr. 51c6-dS). Paideia
predisposes one to pursue virtue, not only by developing a sense of responsibility to the polis,
but also by inculcating the belief that those things that one considers good and beneficial are
directly dependent upon the well-being of the community.

In the Gorgias, however, Callicles does not consider what is “good and noble” to rest in
the good community or the polis, but rather to rest in the advantage of the stronger individual -
and ideally, in the tyrant whom he esteems. Socrates argues that Callicles is mistaken: the

tyrant is not happy but is “savage and uneducated” (Ci‘yptog Ka‘t (inawemog, Grg. 510b7-

8), and thus does not acknowledge his own good to be dependent upon the goods of the
community rather than purely on power. Specifically, Socrates claims that a tyrant would be
socially inept, incapable of friendship and fearful of superior wisdom (Grg. 510c3-5). Despite
his power, he is in effect powerless to attain happiness. Here again, Socrates also emphasizes
the point that a lack of such qualities is detrimental to the possibility of moral discussion and
agreement. In Socrates' account, this would only be possible if one was accustomed "from
childhood to feel pleasure and annoyance at the same things as his ruler and to contrive to be as
like him as possible” (Grg. 510d6-9) -- in effect, educated with a view to imitating the ruler.
Callicles, however, makes it clear that he is not interested in agreement, but in power: the tyrant
has no need of the qualities Socrates recommends since he may kill those who oppose him
(511a4). This disparity between Socrates and his interlocutors is the undoing of the discussion,

and Socrates is left to reflect on the nature of the impasse: “ [we]...are like hot-headed youths,

27

who never form an opinion concerning these things, and those [which are] most important - so
terribly uneducated are we...” (Grg. 527d6-el).

As in the Laches, Protagoras, and Gorgias, Socrates is sensitive in the C rito to the
relation of moral activity to social context and discourse. Unlike his interlocutors, who for the
most part presume to teach the art of securing political power and personal gain irrespective of
moral virtue, Socrates takes into account the intimate connection between the well-being of
individuals and the well-being of the polis. Each is dependent upon the other, and Socrates
attempts to show how, in the case of the ruler and even the tyrant, inattention to this fact leads
to consequences contrary to one's own happiness. In all cases, Socrates' concern is with the
social refinement of the individual and not with the advantages of education for the
unscrupulous use of power. It is thus not the orator, such as Polus or Callicles, but the educator
of the “private individ ”which is recommended to Hippocrates (Prt. 312b4).’°

For Socrates the prime aim and purpose of politics is to inculcate good moral habit in
citizens and their children - the art of politics is the promise to “make men good citizens” (Prt.
319a4-5). Although he rejects the sophists’ ability to make good on this promise, he
nonetheless regards the best life to be found in a morally good community (Ap. 25c5-6) where
the “standard of public life” is a devotion to the improvement of citizens’ moral character
(Grg. 515b6-c3). Accordingly, when Socrates converses with his politically-minded
interlocutors, his question is always the same: “... will you want to take care of anything
concerning state-affairs other than how we citizens may be as good as possible?” (Grg. 515b8-
cl). Yet making citizens better is not, for Socrates, simply a question of law-making. He rejects

Meletus’ reply in the Apology that the laws “makes the young good” (Ap. 24dl l). Socrates

 

50 Although education is essentially open to citizens, and therefore men, in Socrates' view, education should
not be thought of as restricted to men. At 342d2-4 of the Protagoras, for example, Socrates expresses his
approval of the education in Sparta where, as he points out, men and women are equally versed in
”intellectual culture," and at Gorgias 470e10, he states that for both men and women, happiness rests on
education and justice. However, here I have not explicitly discussed the relationship of Athenian education
for women, and Socratic ethics.

28

suggests that it is not the laws themselves which perform this function, but the people who
interpret those laws. In this regard, for Socrates the main issue at stake in making the young
good is the ability of individual citizens and the citizen body of Athens as a whole to educate
the young by their example. In the attempt, paideia serves to approximate moral virtue through
the societal ideal of kalokagathia (“nobility and goodness”). Paideia is insufficient for Socratic
virtue, but in the absence of knowledge of virtue, a belief in the value of social virtues and the
“good order” of the polis are crucial to dialectic. Socrates’ judgment in the Crito of the best
polis takes into account both the value of paideia and the elenchos.

The question naturally arises as to why Socrates thinks Athens is, despite its failings,
superior to other cities. As all with all things, it must be superior relative to the degree which it
facilitates the pursuit of virtue. He does not appear to prefer Athens simply on the grormds that
it is a democracy.5 ‘ Socrates often criticizes the views of the many as being indifferent to
reason, and in any case no arbiter of the right course of action. At the same time, he is equally
critical of tyrants and would-be tyrants, such as Callicles or Polus, on the grounds that they do
not esteem justice above all else. As Socrates makes clear in the Euthydemus, the best rulers
would be those who had knowledge of virtue, whatever the political system (292b4-cl).
However, since Socrates has no reason for thinking that such knowledge is forthcoming among
the citizenry in Athens or elsewhere, it is under imperfect conditions that one must judge the
best city. In the Apology and the Crito, the criteria for making this judgment, in his own case,
are the same. The city should (I) have the proper conditions for the conventional moral
education afforded by paideia as a child (Cr. 50d5-e4, 51c6-dS, 54a2-8), and (2) permit
freedom as an adult to continue one’s education by philosophical investigation and criticism of
this moral education (Ap. 29d2-e3). The two criteria are related in a similar way to the distinct

kinds of learning that Socrates distinguishes in the E uthydemus:

 

51 Kraut (1984) makes this point. For a detailed discussion, see ch. VII, pp. 194-231.

29

Socrates: The two strangers point out to you, because you didn’t know, that
people use the term to “learn” in the following sort of situation: whenever a
person at first (a: dpxfig), having no knowledge about a matter later grasps
knowledge of it; they also employ this identical term whenever a person actually
having knowledge examines that same matter with the knowledge appropriate to
it, whether it be a matter done or spoken--people call this “to know” rather than
“to learn,” but there are times when this is also “learning” (uocvfldcvew). 52
(Euthyd. 277e5-278a5)

Socrates makes this distinction in order to demonstrate how Euthydemus was playing with
words in order to trick Clinias into agreeing to absurd conclusions. For the present thesis,
however, the distinction Socrates makes is important for considering how the elenchos and
paideia are related. Just as one might reexamine learning in attempt to refine previous
knowledge, so the elenchos serves to reexamine the knowledge attained through paideia, also
refining it, in an attempt to gain knowledge of virtue. Both paideia and the elenchos are
learning processes which are corruptible and fallible, and Socrates is critical of sophists and I
trainers alike. In the Apology he suggests that only a few are capable of improving others (Ap.
25313-b4). However, his remarks to this effect in no way preclude his insistence that both
conventional paideia and the philosophical investigation of the elenchos are crucial.

In the E uthydemus, Crito and Socrates become engaged in a discussion that bears
remarkable similarity to their exchange in the Crito. Crito expresses his concern for his own
children’s education, maintaining that he has married well and that he has seen to it that his
children “may be as rich as we can manage ” (E uthyd. 306el-2). Nonetheless, he laments the
fact that he can find no suitable educators and is doubtful that he can lead his sons to
philosophy. Socrates cautions him not to give up so easily:

Socrates: My dear Crito, do you not know that in all pursuits, the thoughtless [are]

many and worth nothing, the excellent are few and worth everything? Doesn’t

gymnastics seem to be good to you, and business, and rhetoric, and the office of a

general?

Crito: Certainly, they seem so to me.

Socrates: What? Don’t you see that in each of these pursuits the many [are]
ridiculous at their work?

 

52 I am indebted to John Rank for this rendering of the passage.

30

Crito: Well yes, you are quite right.

Socrates: Therefore, because of this you will shrink from the many pursuits, and

not entrust one to your sons?

Crito: That would not be just, Socrates.

(Euthyd. 307a3-b5)
Socrates does not dismiss paideia in the form of gymnastics, but in fact claims that the
incompetence of its practitioners are not reason to neglect its pursuit. Socrates applies the same
consideration to philosophy, suggesting that Crito consider the merits of the pursuit, whatever
he may think of those who practice philosophy (E uthyd. 307b6—c4).

Paideia, as well as Socratic inquiry, I have argued, are key elements to the pursuit of the
good life and are uniquely inter-dependent. These opinions are cultivated by paideia in poetry,
music and physical training and include many which Socrates accepts - the necessity of the
polis, the rule of law, the importance of the cardinal virtues, civilized social virtues such as ,
frankness and goodwill, eudaimonism, the need of warfare, etc. - and which serve as
preconditions for his philosophical activity, not only as sources of beliefs to examine, but also
as a source of common goals and social virtues which are amenable to agreement and progress
in moral inquiry. In this regard, Socrates singles out paideia as an integral part of community
life in Athens (50d5-e4, 5 lc6-d5) as a means of developing beliefs necessary to participate in
social and political life.

This understanding of the role of education helps to make clear why, in the Crito,
Socrates appears to endorse authoritarian states such as Sparta as one his “favorite models of
good government” while at the same time claiming that the democracy of Athens is preferable
to all (Cr. 52e5-53al). Richard Kraut has suggested in this regard that Socrates does not mean
to endorse the political institutions of Sparta and Crete themselves, but instead the fact flrat
both states are highly structured and well-suited to inculcating a system of moral beliefs: “In

these societies more than any others, the life of the individual, both in childhood and

adulthood, was regulated by law. In other words, Sparta and Crete went to greater lengths to

31

mold the individual’s conception of right and wrong.”53 Kraut’s interpretation would support
my suggestion in criterion (1) that Socrates’ presrunption is that a city must have the proper
conditions for the conventional moral education afforded by paideia. However, as Kraut notes,
the Spartan regime was also repressive in many ways. Although a child’s education was
carefully attended to by ministers of education fiom the age of seven, this control extended
into the Spartan’s adult life. Thus, although (1) would be well satisfied, the conditions for (2)
would not -namely, that a city should permit freedom as an adult to continue one’s education
by philosophical investigation and criticism of conventional morality?4

Kraut presents his view about Sparta somewhat tentatively, suggesting that since the
highest aim of the city would be to teach virtue, the fact that Socrates considers Sparta to be
well-governed must mean that he believes the city holds virtue in high regard55 However,
Socrates is far more direct in specifying why he esteems Sparta and Crete. In the Protagoras,
Socrates makes clear that he esteems the Spartans and Cretans because they are the best
educated and are right to be proud of the intellectual and physical activities of their culture
(Prt. 342c-342d). One reason he cites for their success in education is their tight control. They
do not, for example, “...permit any of their youths to go to other cities...so that they do not
unlearn what they have learned at home” (Prt. 342c8-dZ). In this instance tight control has been
a mainstay of their education; however, Socrates clearly does not prefer to live in a city that
cannot tolerate his philosophical activities (Ap. 29dl—e2, Cr. 53cl-5), nor will he bend to

authoritarian rule (Ap. 32c3-el).56 I conclude that, in Socrates’ view, provisions for both

 

5’ Kraut (1934), p. 222.

54 As Kraut notes, the Spartans “... couldn’t even enter the marketplace until they were thirty. How could
Socrates, the great marketplace iconoclast and advocate of the examined life, have called such a society well
govemed?”54 Kraut does not think that Socrates would conclude it is well governed in this respect, and
therefore deems Athens as ultimately preferable since it pemlits the greater degree of fi'eedom prerequisite
for Socrates’ philosophical activities.

’5 Kraut (1984), p. 222, iii. 60.

56 Whether Socrates would commit an unjust act, if it was demanded by the legal authority of Athens, is
another matter. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), pp. 141—155.

32

conventional education and philosophical critique are necessary preconditions for the moral
health of the individual and the polis.

The precarious position of philosophy’s critical role is evident from Socrates’ own death,
but the role of paideia is no more secure. In the Protagoras, Socrates explains why education
is something that must be attended with great care. Specifically, he states that whether one goes
to a sophist, a doctor, or a trainer, the teaching one receives should not be taken lightly:
“Learning is not carried off in a jar, but by necessity you pay for it with your honor, carrying
the learning in your soul, and once you have learned, you go away either having been harmed
or benefited accordingly” (Prt. 314bl-4). Thus, despite the importance of paideia, Socrates
also emphasizes the importance of continued moral criticism (Ap. 38a1-7). Socialization into
community life through paideia is no guarantee of a virtuous character, as Socrates notes in the
case of Pericles’ son, Clinias (Prt. 320a3-bl).

Accordingly, Socrates is mindful of paideia’s limitations and, in this respect, the elenchos
serves to evaluate critically the character which emerges from paideia. This limitation of
paideia is particularly important in the Gorgias where Socrates implies that Callicles, despite
his education-- either because it was deficient or corrupted--remains uneducated

(attatSefi‘cog, Grg. 487b6, 527el). However, since no amount of Socratic examination

proves adequate to the task of bringing Callicles out of this state, the elenchos likewise reveals
its limitations, and here the interdependency of the elenchos and paideia is clearly evident: the
social competencies and moral dispositions one develops as result of paideia are crucial for
successfully undertaking Socratic inquiry. Indeed, as I have argued, in the absence of complete
wisdom, the pursuit of virtue in Socratic ethics is ultimately grounded in paideia, as a

necessary pro-condition for moral activity, inquiry, and ultimately, for one’s happiness.

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33

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