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THE VALUE OF *PAIDEIA* IN PLATO'S EARLY DIALOGUES

By

Paul Neufeld

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THE VALUE OF *PAIDEIA* IN PLATO'S EARLY DIALOGUES

By

Paul Neufeld

In this thesis I argue that Socratic ethics endorses *paideia* (one's youthful education) as a necessary and prior condition of moral virtue or any approximation of it. In particular, I argue that *paideia* is an important means of socialization into public and legal norms, as well as an opportunity to develop and demonstrate one's moral character and social aptitude. These goals are primarily achieved through an education in poetry, music, and physical training. I argue that Plato's Socrates regards the moral beliefs one develops in these contexts as crucial for engaging in successful philosophical discussion and moral activity. I also articulate why, on Socratic terms, this contribution of *paideia* is essential for a "good life" within the *polis*.

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In some respects this undertaking has inspired as many questions as it has answers. But good questions are hard to come by and I can only hope that those I may have raised along the way will prove fruitful. That would be enough, for understanding is never merely static -- It is indeed always "on the way". Some acknolwedgements, therefore, must inevitably wait and be awaited.

It was generally accepted among ancient Greek moralists that the value of a thing, or course of action, should be considered in relation to the desired goal of attaining happiness. The Socrates of Plato's early dialogues also adopts this *eudaimonist* maxim and maintains as a matter of course that it "does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy" (*Rep.* 354a6).[1] However, for Socrates, if one is truly concerned with happiness, one must also be concerned with virtue, since in his view the good life is also the virtuous life (*Ap.* 30a7-b4; *Grg.* 507b8-c5; *Cr.* 48b2-5). The question of one's happiness, Socrates claims, is no ordinary matter but one that concerns the "right way of life" (*Rep.* 352d5-6).

Scholars have devoted much attention to the question of how exactly Socrates thinks virtue is logically related to happiness.[2] Maier, for example, has argued for the simple identity of virtue and happiness. Others, such as Vlastos, contend that virtue is sufficient for, although not identical with, happiness. In contrast to both of these views, Brickhouse and Smith argue that the *possession* of virtue is neither sufficient nor even necessary for happiness, although virtuous *activity* is both necessary and sufficient. Curiously, however, scholars do not give serious attention to Socrates' claim that happiness is dependent not only upon virtue itself, but also upon the education (*paideia*) of youth (*Grg.* 470e6),[3] which consists primarily in poetry, physical education, and music. A. D. Woozley, for example, denies that Socrates is concerned

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[1] Translations are my own unless otherwise specified. In Vlastos' (1991) opinion the early dialogues are as follows: *Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, Republic* I. See "Socrates *contra* Socrates in Plato" for a discussion of this period distinction, pp. 45-80. Brickhouse and Smith (1989) and Kraut (1992) agree. However, they also consider the *Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis*, and *Menexemus* as early period dialogues. In this paper I follow Kraut and Brickhouse and Smith in assuming these latter texts are early period dialogues. For a dissenting view on appealing to chronological periods see Debra Nails (1995).

[2] Maier (1913), p. 319: "...die Tugend an sich selbst schon nicht Glück bringt, sondern--Glück ist..." (cit. Vlastos (1991) p. 209). However, Vlastos suggests there are degrees of happiness possible by the availability and correct appropriation of non-moral goods such as health and wealth (*Ly.* 218e, *Euthyd.* 279a-b, 87e-88d). Brickhouse and Smith argue that Socrates endorses neither of these views but recognizes (a) that one may fight for the just and still be unhappy and, indeed, think life not worth living for other reasons such as illness (*Ap.* 32a and 47e) and (b) though Socrates often denies that he possesses virtue, in the *Apology* he contends that he finds happiness in his activities. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), chapter 4, pp. 103-136.

[3] In general, although the notion of *paideia* is prominent in the early dialogues, its relevance to Socratic ethics has typically been regarded as insignificant. One notable exception is Richard Kraut (1984).

with the education of his own children or with a father's duty to educate in general.[4] Henry Teloh concurs and claims there is no evidence in the dialogues to suggest otherwise.[5]

In what follows, I will argue that the established view among scholars that *paideia* is irrelevant to Socratic ethics is mistaken. I will claim that *paideia* is presented in the early dialogues as a necessary precondition of moral virtue or any approximation of it. In particular, I will suggest that Socrates considers *paideia* as an important means of socialization into public and legal norms, as well as an opportunity to develop and demonstrate one's moral character and social aptitude. In my view, Socrates' philosophical inquiry serves to critically evaluate beliefs cultivated by these conventional methods. At the same time, Socratic inquiry is also dependent upon *paideia* as a source for social virtues as well as common goals, both of which are necessary to facilitate agreement and progress in philosophical discussion.

In the first section of this paper, I will consider the strongest opposition to the thesis I wish to defend, as it appears in A. D. Woozley's reading of the *Crito* (Section I). I will then consider the implications of *paideia* elsewhere in the early dialogues and discuss its relationship to virtue in the context of Socratic ethics (Section II). Finally, I will consider the connection between *paideia*, politics, and the possibility of the good life (Section III) .

I

> Socrates: But as for the considerations you speak of concerning the expenditure of money, reputation, and the upbringing of children, I suspect these are truthfully, Crito, the speculations of the multitude, who would recklessly put people to death and bring them back to life, if they were able, with no regard for thought.
>
> (*Cr.* 48c2-6)

This claim is one source of textual evidence cited in support of the view that Socrates maintains a careless attitude with respect to the education of children. In Woozley's view, for example, Socrates exhibits a "hardheartedness" in his response to Crito, since he apparently

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[4] Woozley (1979), p. 11.

[5] Teloh (1986), p. 9. However, Teloh makes a number of distinctions absent in Woozley (1979). See n. 22, 23 and 36 below.

disavows both his own duty to educate his sons as well as the duty of fathers in general.[6] Initially, Woozley suggests two ways of interpreting the implications of this passage. Either Socrates here dismisses Crito's earlier claim that fathers have a duty to educate their children (45d4-e2), or Socrates believes that Crito's earlier claim that orphans fare badly is mistaken (45c10-d4). Woozley ultimately argues for an interpretation which draws on both alternatives. Specifically, he suggests that since Socrates believes "his children will be as well off if he dies as if he lives,"[7] his response to Crito at 48c2-6 may be read as the claim that Socrates' children *in particular* would not be neglected. The rebuttal to Crito's claim that he would be neglecting his duty to educate his children by accepting his death sentence, would thus be as follows: whatever the fate of most orphaned children, at least in the event of *Socrates'* death, friends may be relied on to care for his children. For this reason Crito's worries about the children's' prospects for education remain unpersuasive.

In Woozley's view, this response to Crito constitutes a dismissal of public opinions on education *in general,* and thus lends support for the claim that "...what Socrates was belittling was...the supposed importance of a father's duty to educate his children."[8] More specifically, Socrates can be understood to imply that "the idea that children have any rights to certain treatment is a popular but baseless cliché."[9] In this regard, Woozley suggests that Socrates' "curiously callous" treatment of one's duty to educate children conveys the attitude that one should not make too much of such matters.[10] In Woozley's estimation, this "is not exactly the view that children are expendable, but it shows a certain detachment."[11]

Before considering the substance of Woozley's claim that Socrates holds education and the duty to educate in disregard, it is worthwhile to consider whether the way he interprets the

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[6] Woozley (1979), p. 9.
[7] Woozley (1979), p. 10.
[8] Woozley (1979), p. 11.
[9] Woozley (1979), p. 9.
[10] Woozley (1979), p. 9, p. 11.
[11] Woozley (1979), p. 11.

issue of education is in fact appropriate to the text in question at 48c2-6. I suggest that it is not for two reasons. First, the conclusions he wishes to draw from this passage do not cohere with the immediate context of the discussion. Secondly, as I will later argue, the exact way Socrates phrases his point at 48c2-6 suggests an alternative reading.

The issue of context concerns the fact that the remarks Woozley refers to at 48c2-6 are not presented as a dismissal of Crito's specific considerations, but of their supposed priority in resolving the question of whether he should escape from prison. Just prior to this passage, Socrates suggests that, rather than taking Crito's opinions for granted, they should instead commit themselves to the "the best course that reason offers" (*Cr.* 46b6). Having redefined the means of settling the dispute, Socrates proceeds at 47a12-48b5 also to redefine the central issue of importance to their discussion. This is accomplished at 48b5, where Socrates secures agreement from Crito that, with respect to his escape, "the greatest thing is not to live but to live well" (*Cr.* 48b5), and that to live well must be the same as living justly (*Cr.* 48b6). At 48c2-6, no new arguments are offered concerning Crito's previous statements about education. Socrates merely summarizes his objection; Crito neglected the priority of virtue when he offered reasons for escape.

> Socrates: ...following from these things we have agreed upon, one must examine whether it is just for me to attempt to go away, if the Athenians forbid it, or not just. If it appears just, let us attempt it, and if not, let us leave things be. But as for the considerations you speak of concerning the expenditure of money, reputation, and the upbringing of children, I suspect these are truthfully, Crito, the speculations of the multitude, who would recklessly put people to death and bring them back to life, if they were able, with no regard for thought. But we, since the argument leads thus, should not have any consideration other than that which we have just now spoken of, whether we will act justly ...
>
> (*Cr.* 48b10-c9)

Socrates does not here pass judgment on the individual claims Crito has made regarding money, reputation, and the upbringing of children, nor does he reject the importance of their

subject-matter collectively. [12] Rather he states that Crito's concerns (σκέμματα) are the reflections of the public, and therefore beside the main point of consideration -- namely, the priority of justice. For Socrates, whatever worth public opinions may have, whether they concern money, reputation or upbringing, that worth is judged relative to their contribution to the good life. However, properly understood, the good life is the virtuous life. Thus, in the *Apology*, Socrates states:

> I go around doing nothing other than trying to persuade you, both young and old, that you should not care for [your] bodies, nor your money, nor [for anything] so greatly before you care for your soul, so that it may be as good as possible, saying as I go, 'Virtue does not come from money, but rather from virtue, comes money and all the rest of things good for men, both individually and collectively.' [13]
>
> (*Ap.* 30a7-b4)

The priority of virtue does not entail scorn for other goods. Socrates' disregard for the considerations of the "ordinary public" (*Cr.* 48c5) is to make a point in favor of considering, first and foremost, what is just. Socrates does not imply, then, as Woozley claims, that he lacks concern for a father's duty to educate his children. I conclude that Woozley's suggestion that Socrates "belittles" the duty of a father to educate must be substantiated from passages elsewhere in the text. However, no such evidence can be found. Indeed, evidence for the opposite conclusion is abundant.

One must first confront Socrates' explicit claim that he has no complaint against the laws concerning education, but is in fact grateful for those laws that concern "the rearing and education of progeny" and, in particular, an education in "music and gymnastics" (*Cr.* 50d5-

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[12] The line in question reads "ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥᾳδίως....

[13] In order to avoid attributing to Socrates the claim "from virtue, comes money," Burnet (1990) suggests the order of this passage is misleadingly "interlaced," and should be read as follows: "it is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men." In any case, as Burnet points out, Socrates never recommends ἀρετή as a "good investment" (p. 204, note on *Ap.* 30b3).

e1).[14] Woozley explains this passage by suggesting that, despite Socrates' relative indifference to this duty, he does not believe he actually contravenes it, since he supposes his friends will look after his children, no matter what happens. Hence, Socrates' indifference to the duty need not be in conflict with his acknowledgment of that duty's legal legitimacy.[15]

I do not think the text supports this argument. On the contrary, Socrates appeals to the primacy of virtue and comes to the conclusion that, under the circumstances in which he finds himself, it is in fact *best* for him, his family, his friends, and ultimately his fellow Athenians, that he die. Socrates maintains that if he chose to live he would, in fact, do a great disservice to his children. Thus, when Socrates personifies the laws of Athens and supposes what they would "say" about his situation, the laws scoff at the idea that Socrates could educate his children if he decided to escape[16]: "But now you want to live for the sake of your children, in order that you may bring them up [from childhood] and educate them. Indeed!" (*Cr.* 54a2-3).

The reason for the laws' incredulity is twofold. First, as the laws point out, it is "fairly clear" that in the event of an escape, Socrates' friends run "run the risk ...of being banished from the city and deprived [of their property] or losing [their] lives altogether" (*Cr.* 53b1-4). These are the kinds of sacrifices which Crito acknowledges he and Socrates' other friends are willing to make (44e1-45a3). However, as valiant as Crito and friends may be, it will not benefit Socrates' children if his friends are in the same position he himself would be in if he escaped. Of course, there still remain friends abroad in Thessaly. Yet, this is a place of "disorderliness and intemperance" (53d3-4). Socrates might find protection and support for himself among Crito's friends, but he will certainly not find the cultural climate to raise

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[14] Burnet (1990) notes that *Aeschineus* I.7 suggests that the laws of Solon contained regulations concerning school discipline that stated it was expressly (διαρρήδην) necessary to train (ἐπιτηδεύω) and rear (τρέφω) children. Burnet doubts parents were compelled to teach music and gymnastics specifically (p. 282, note on 50d8).

[15] Woozley (1979), p. 11.

[16] I will personify the "laws" (as Socrates does) throughout the remainder of the paper.

children, nor can he expect his philosophical activities to be taken seriously, having himself violated "the strongest laws" (53e2). The cultural climate of Thessaly combined with the probable hostility of its citizens makes it less preferable to Athens as a place to raise children.

However, if Socrates chooses to escape, he will not in any case be permitted to remain in Athens with his children. Thus, even supposing that his friends come to be in a position to look after his children, which seems unlikely, Socrates will either do harm to the *paideia* of his children by taking them to an unfit city, or else be forced to live apart from them, and thus leave them in Athens with friends of doubtful status and as the children of a fugitive. The only other stated option involves fleeing to Thebes or Megara. Both cities are regarded as well governed. However, for this very reason they are also likely to judge the fugitive Socrates as a "destroyer of laws" with a "destructive influence" (53c1-3). Socrates is consistent in claiming that one should not "study to seem but to be good, whether in public or private life" (*Grg.* 527b5-6). Moreover, he expects others to demonstrate their characters by example and holds this same standard for himself (*La.* 186b1-5, *Ap.* 32c8-d7). Were Socrates to flee he would indeed educate his children, but in precisely the wrong way: by undermining justice and the laws which serve as the foundation of his family's well-being in the *polis*.

It is clear from the testimony of the laws that both practically and morally the means are not available for Socrates to benefit his children and their education by escaping. This is *not* a matter of indifference to Socrates' arguments; indeed, there would be no reason for him to offer his considerations on the matter if it were. Socrates' point in the text is plain: escaping would harm his children. This is Socrates' response to Crito's earlier claim that Socrates would be "giving up" on his sons by accepting his death sentence (*Cr.* 45c10-d1). Crito's appeal does not have the moral force it pretends to have, and as such does not offer a compelling reason for escape. In this respect, Crito's claim that Socrates is abandoning his children like a coward is unpersuasive. I conclude that Woozley's claims that (i) Socrates is indifferent to the duty to

educate children and (ii) Socrates believes "his children will be as well off if he dies as if he lives"[17] cannot be supported.

Even in light of these considerations, however, Socrates' remarks at 48c2-6 may still seem problematic to my interpretation. Even if Socrates' dismissive remarks do not entail ridicule, surely they seem inappropriate to the education of children, in a way they do not with regard to finances and reputation. The grouping of education with other matters at 48c2-6 may itself lend credence to the view that Socrates intends to belittle the duty to educate. At the very least, one might say, some tension persists in the *Crito* between Socrates' dismissal of Crito's concern for education or *paideia* and Socrates' acceptance of the duty to educate his children. However, I suggest that if Socrates is indeed engaged in a dismissal of baser matters, it does not in any case involve a dismissal of "education" or of "a father's duty to educate," as Woozley argues.

In the passage at 48c2-6, the word Woozley translates as the "upbringing of children" is τροφή. Woozley assumes in his interpretation of the passage that τροφή means "education." However, the word for education, παιδεία, does not appear in the passage. When Crito makes his plea at 45d1, he uses the verb παιδεύω together with the verb τρέφω -- ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι. Here τρέφω carries the implication of being nurtured in the sense of being reared by a τροφεύς, or nurse, whereas παιδεύω implies being educated in the sense of one's "cultural and physical education" (*Cr.* 50e1, *Prt.* 312a1-b4). The word used by Socrates at 48c4 is simply τροφή, and it does not have the same connotations as παιδεία. In the *Apology*, for example, τροφή is used by itself to refer to Socrates' proposed punishment of "free maintenance" at the state's expense (*Ap.* 36e1). In the *Euthyphro*, the word τροφή again appears in reference to food (*Euthphr.* 14a7). In addition to those specific references to food and maintenance (in the sense of one's "daily provisions" or "daily bread"), the word

[17] Woozley (1979), p. 10.

τροφή also appears in the *Protagoras*, where Protagoras uses the accusative plural form of τροφή, in the general sense of "foods of the earth" (τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς, *Prt.* 322a7-8).

Plato's use of τροφή in the *Republic* follows this same pattern. For example, at 585b3-c1, the term appears in reference to the nourishment provided by food and drink. Here, however, the word serves further to distinguish between nourishment of the body (τροφή) and nourishment of the soul (ἀληθὸς εἶδος).[18] Even more striking is the pattern of usage in Plato's *Laws*. Although a main theme of discussion in the *Laws* concerns education, and the verb forms τρέφω and παιδεύω are used frequently, the word τροφή retains the same semantic range -- for example, referring to the feeding of goats or to food and drink, or sustenance generally (*Laws* 1.631d7, 1.639a2, 1.653d5, 2.660a1, 2.667b8, *et passim*).[19] This use of the term τροφή appears in the early dialogues, as well as in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, in a consistent pattern of usage -- to refer to food, sustenance, the means of life, or the nursing of animals and children.

In view of this survey of τροφή, I would suggest that the appearance of τροφή at 48c2-6 be read as consistent with the semantic range employed elsewhere in the dialogues: that is, as the 'livelihood of children' in the sense of providing for their physical welfare and without the attendant idea of education introduced by παιδεία or παιδεύω. Woozley's interpretation of τροφή, as referring to education, is not the best rendering given the range of meaning found consistently throughout the dialogues.[20]

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[18] Only rarely does Plato break from this usage in the *Republic*, e.g. later at 608a, τροφή appears by itself in reference to the nourishment of poetry. However, given that they do not take this kind of poetry "seriously," this reference appears to be a metaphorical parallel to the bodily nourishment that was deemed insufficient at 585 b12-c5. Otherwise this use of the noun is anomalous.

[19] τροφή appears to be used less frequently in reference to children. But, for example, at *Laws* 1.631d7, the dative plural form, τροφαῖς does appear in specific reference to nursing children.

[20] Woozley's translates τροφῆ as "upbringing". However, as indicated earlier, he assumes in his discussion that this term refers to education. There is no necessity to translate τροφῆ as "livelihood" instead of

Plato's use of the term τροφη΄, understood in the above sense, is consistent both with the context of the passage itself (48c2-6), and my interpretation of Socrates' position. Socrates, in effect, interprets Crito's concern for the welfare of his children as comparable to Crito's practical concerns for money and reputation. Although Crito earlier refers to παιδεία, he does not consider the higher goals of such an education; he only considers the fact that one is expected to have an education and that it is remiss to abnegate one's responsibility in this regard (*Cr.* 45c6-d9). If Crito did consider education in the way Socrates did -- in other words, as Socrates says, if Crito had remembered the principles on which they had formerly agreed concerning justice (*Cr.* 49a1-b5) -- it would have been apparent to Crito that escape is *not* an option. It is not simply *life*, but the *good life* that is of greatest importance (*Cr.* 48b5). Likewise it is not simply the *livelihood* of one's children that is important, but *livelihood with a view to virtue*. In so far as Socrates recognizes the value of *paideia*, it must be considered relative to its contribution to the virtuous life. The force of the duty to educate is not simply the requirement to bring up the children, but to see to the proper cultivation of their souls.

This task is considered to be an impossibility if Socrates chooses to live, and it is accordingly given as a reason for not escaping (*Cr.* 54a2-3). Crito, however, assumes it is self-evident that the "good and brave man" would escape and is concerned that his own reputation will be tarnished if Socrates does not agree to his plan (*Cr.* 45d6-e9): "I am ashamed, both on your behalf and ours, for fear opinion on this whole affair about you be concluded to concern some cowardice on our part" (*Cr.* 45d9-e2). However, the notion that what is right and praiseworthy is self-evident is precisely what Socrates has rejected in numerous places throughout the dialogue (*Cr.* 44c6-9, 48c2-6, and 54b3-c2). Crito's agreement that the good

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"upbringing" so long as τροφη΄ is not inferred to include reference to education in the sense Socrates has in mind (*Cr.* 50d5-e1; *Prt.* 312b4). Teloh interprets this passage much as Woozley does. See n. 23 below.

life is the just life makes clear the mistake of his earlier considerations -- to see to the livelihood of one's children is one thing; to see to the health of their souls is another.

II

Such is the case made in the *Crito*. However, a plausible interpretation of Socrates' view of the duty to educate should reflect some consistency with other early dialogues. Along these lines, Woozley attempts to bolster his view of Socrates' detachment from his children and lack of concern for education by claiming that this point is in harmony with Socrates' remarks in the *Phaedo*: "Plato represents Crito as asking Socrates if he has any instructions for himself or for the others present about his children, and Socrates as replying he has none."[21] The conclusion is evidently that Socrates is not much concerned with affairs related to his children. The exchange Woozley refers to is as follows:

> ...Crito spoke: Socrates, have you any instructions for myself or the others, concerning your children or anything else, since we would gladly carry them out for you? I speak as always, Crito, nothing new; take care of yourselves and your own, and whatever you have done or might do will be pleasing to me and my own, though you may not agree; but should you neglect yourselves and your own, and not care to live by following the path I have set forth, both now and in the time before, however much you may now agree, you will do no good.
>
> (*Phd.* 115b1-c1)

The claim in this passage is not, as Woozley suggests, that there are *no* instructions concerning the care of his children; only that there are no "new" (καινός) instructions. What will please Socrates and his family is that his friends act in accord with the "path" he has set forth. Here, as in the *Crito* and in the *Apology*, Socrates suggests that although it may not seem self-evident to his friends, what is beneficial in the long run is that they attend to first things first: namely, to matters of justice. In the context of the *Phaedo*, as in the passage at 48c2-6 in the *Crito*, Socrates' dismissal constitutes a question of priority in the argument, not an outright rejection of other concerns.

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[21] Woozley (1979), p. 11.

However, if the conclusion of the *Phaedo* is that the directions concerning the fate of his children are nothing new but are implicit in what Socrates has been saying all along, then the evidence for Socrates' concern for *paideia* and its relative importance should be evident in the early dialogues. However, Henry Teloh argues that one would look for such evidence in vain. He states, in reference to the *Crito*:

> Socrates seems to dismiss his responsibility to educate his children....As Woozley claims, Socrates has a distasteful detachment from his children. He appears unconcerned about his obligation to educate them. I know of no textual evidence which rebuts this charge.[22]

The claim that Socrates appears detached from his children seems to rest on an *argūmentum ex selentio*, for there is little direct evidence to be found concerning Socrates' feelings for his children. However, something may be inferred from Socrates' last wish in the *Apology*, where I believe Socrates' concern for his children's welfare is explicit. Already, at 25c1-4 Socrates has berated Meletus for having "never taken the slightest interest" in the welfare of the young. And at the end of his final speech, he urges his fellow citizens to fulfill the obligation to his children that he cannot:

> I ask of them one favor. When these sons of mine grow up, reprimand them, gentlemen, trouble them about these things, as I have troubled you, should they seem to you to give heed to money or anything else before virtue, and should they think [these things] to be something they are not, reproach them as I have reproached you, should they still not give heed to being [virtuous] as they should, and think they are something when they are good for nothing. If you do these things, I shall receive justice by your hands, both for myself and my sons.
> (*Ap.* 41e1-42a3)

Socrates also takes this request especially seriously with regard to his own friends. Thus, in the *Laches*, Socrates states that to corrupt the children of others by misguiding their education is "...cause for the greatest blame" (*La.* 186b5-8). The charge that Socrates lacks concern for his obligation to his own children's' education as well as those of his friends is, I

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[22] Teloh (1986), p. 121. Teloh assumes the issue at stake at 48c2-8 is education, and more specifically that of the *elenchus*. I have rejected this interpretation. However, Teloh does grant that if escape is wrong Socrates would be an evil influence on his children.

conclude, unfounded.[23] Socrates clearly values the *paideia* both of his own children and others. However, like all goods, the value of *paideia* must be considered relative to virtue.

Many scholars, however, assume *paideia* is not relevant to the Socratic conception of the virtuous life.[24] The most illustrative example of scholars' treatment of *paideia* is found in their examination of *Gorgias* 470d-e, where Socrates explicitly states that one's achievement of happiness is dependent upon education (παιδεία) and justice (δικαιοσύνη):

> Polus: Now does he [Archelaus the King] seem to you to be happy or miserable?
> Socrates: I do not know Polus: Up to this day I have never met the man.
> Polus: What? Can you not judge whether he is happy even though you have not met him?
> Socrates: No indeed I cannot.
> Polus: Clearly then, Socrates, you will say you cannot judge whether the Great King is happy.
> Socrates: And I shall speak truthfully. For I do not know how well off he is in education [παιδεία] and justice [δικαιοσύνη].
> Polus: What? Does happiness altogether rest on this?
> Socrates: I for my part say so, Polus, for the man and woman who are noble and good I call happy, but the one who is unjust and wicked I call miserable.
> (*Grg.* 470d8-e11)

I want to raise two questions with respect to this passage. First, what kind of *paideia* does the Socrates of the early dialogues believe is connected to *eudaimonia*? Secondly, how is *paideia* related to justice? Scholars have not typically thought it necessary to pursue either question.[25] Vlastos, for example, suggests that virtue is itself sufficient for, though not identical with, happiness.[26] In keeping with this interpretation, Vlastos regards the reference to *paideia* as superfluous, since he interprets it to be "quasi-synonymous" with justice.[27] Irwin suggests

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[23] Teloh (1986) seems to think that the importance of *paideia* is ignored by Socrates in the early dialogues but is recognized and developed in the *Republic* as a means of "low demotic virtue" (which is not the "real virtue" learned by dialectic). See pp. 13-14, 150, 175.

[24] The tendency to focus on the intellectualist side of Socratic ethics in philosophy has a long history. Nietzsche (1928), for example, used the equation "Vernunft=Tugend=Glück" to describe Socrates' position: "Reason=virtue=happiness; this simply means that one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark desires by producing a permanent daylight -- the daylight of reason" (Götzen Dammerung, "Das Problem des Sokrates," 10).

[25] Jaeger (1943) and Dodds (1959) are exceptions. See esp. Jaeger (1943), pp. 133-133.

[26] Happiness may be enhanced by contingent needs such as health and wealth. See n.2 above.

[27] Vlastos (1991), p. 137, n. 28.

that *paideia* at 470e6 means "reasoned inquiry and knowledge," rather than "habitual right action."[28] Again, since knowledge of justice is the whole of happiness, the reference to *paideia* must be redundant. Santas does not refer to education and, several times, identifies the claims made at 470d8-e11 with the argument that the just are happy and the unjust wretched.[29] Brickhouse and Smith ignore the reference to education altogether in their understanding of the passage.[30]

In each of these cases, Socrates' reference to *paideia* is ignored or is considered redundant. This latter assumption is questionable for a number of reasons. First, Socrates consistently defines *paideia* in a way that rules out its identification with a "knowledge of virtue." In the *Crito*, Socrates defines *paideia* as instruction in music and gymnastics (μουσικῇ και γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν, 50d8-50e1) and in the *Protagoras*, he considers the education received from the "schoolmaster, music teacher, and gymnastics instructor" (γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου) to be the proper constituents of one's education (ἐπὶ παιδεία, 312b3-4). *Paideia* does not here concern reasoned inquiry as to the nature of virtue.[31]

In fact, Socrates is skeptical of others' presumptions to teach virtue. In order actually to teach virtue one must first possess knowledge of virtue, and Socrates claims that neither he nor anyone he has encountered possesses such knowledge (*M.* 71c3-4). Thus, Socrates maintains that he has never had a "teacher of virtue" (*La.* 186b8-c2) and denies that he himself is a teacher (*Ap.* 19d8-e4); in this sense at least, he has no claim to be an *expert* in perfecting the virtue "of people and of citizens" (*Ap.* 20b4). In the *Apology*, as in the *Protagoras*, Socrates is also incredulous at the sophists' claim to serve this end. Since neither he nor the sophists

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[28] Irwin (1979), p. 149.
[29] Santas (1979), pp. 223, 225, 227.
[30] Brickhouse and Smith (1994), p. 117.
[31] In the *Sophist*, a distinction is made between the traditional education of admonition and that of cross-examination (see 229d1-230b8).

possess knowledge of virtue (*Ap.* 20e2-3; see also *M.* 71c3-4), they cannot be expected to teach it (*Prt.* 361b7-c2). *Paideia*, then, cannot be instruction resulting in a knowledge of virtue. Nor can it be supposed that by referring to *paideia* in the *Gorgias* passage, Socrates has in mind an education in virtue attained through the *elenchos* itself. Socrates never claims that his cross-examination results in virtue. Moreover, Socrates seems willing at least to consider the possibility that Archelaus is happy, although Socrates has not met him and has no reason to suppose that he has been exposed to the *elenchos* (*Grg.* 470d9).

My claim that *paideia* does not refer to Socratic virtue, or whatever education might produce virtue, may seem complicated, however, by Socrates' statement that "the man and woman who are noble and good I call happy, but the one who is unjust and wicked I call miserable" (*Grg.* 470e9-11). This reply does not obviously take account of the difference between education and justice I have proposed, but instead appears to focus solely on virtue. However, the stock expression used at 470e9-11 -- the "noble and good" (καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν) -- does not simply refer to canonical virtues but also refers to a person's favorable attributes or qualities, such as wealth, good upbringing and education, and accomplishment.

The ideal of *kalokagathia* concerns the possession of virtues in the broadest sense; namely, of excellent qualities or character traits whatever they may be. The ideal of *kalokagathia* is the aim of *paideia.* I want to claim it is also essential to, although distinct from, the pursuit of Socratic virtue.[32] The Socratic notion of virtue concerns knowledge of good and evil and, in the case of justice, knowledge of what is just and unjust. The virtues of *paideia*, in contrast, concern social virtues -- in other words, those excellences of character and ability required to participate in a community's conventions and traditions. Both kinds of virtue are valued by Socrates. In the *Charmides*, for example, Socrates uses the expression τὸ

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[32] Although this view is generally consonant with Jaeger's (1943), I do not abide by Jaeger's discussion of a "Socratic paideia" which seems to confuse the issue. See pp. 107-125.

καλόν (the noble) not only to describe the virtue of temperance, but also to describe specific abilities associated with writing, music, and wrestling (*Ch.* 159b8-159d2). However, as Jaeger has argued, *paideia* "...is not merely a stage in man's development where he trains a certain number of his faculties; its meaning is extended to connote the perfection of his character, in accordance with his nature."[33] For Socrates the perfection of human nature constitutes the best life for a person, and this life is the just life. The kinds of virtues developed through *paideia* are indeed excellences that contribute to human character and talent, and are necessary for the pursuit of virtue. However, ultimately they are not good independent of a concern for the Socratic notion of virtue -- namely, knowledge of good and evil (*Euthyd.* 281d2-e1).[34] It is Socrates' insistence on this last point which bring interlocutors such as Callicles to claim that Socrates turns things upside down (*Grg.* 481b10-c4). For Callicles, what is noble and good simply includes whatever talents and abilities make one "stronger and superior," and thus more likely to attain wealth and power (*Grg.* 484c1-d1).

The ideal of the "noble and good" understood in this sense is an ideal common to Athenian education in the fifth and fourth centuries, one which hearkens back to the unmistakable association of physical and moral beauty inherited from earlier societies such as those represented in Homer's *Iliad.* Achilles was clearly recognized as the "best of the Achaeans" (*Il.* I. 244) because he possessed the virtue of an ideal warrior, not Socratic virtue. The ideal of the superior warrior is maintained by later city-states, such as Sparta, although it is esteemed as "the best" in a quite different sense. According to the Spartan elegiac poet Tyrtaeus, writing in the mid-seventh century, "true virtue" (ἀρετή) does consist in "standing fast in battle," yet not for individual wealth or gain but for the good of the *polis*: "virtue -- the highest reward a man can obtain from his fellows. It is a good common to all, a service to the

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[33] Jaeger (1943), p. 133.

[34] See Brickhouse and Smith's (1994) discussion of "dependent" and "independent" goods, pp. 106-110.

city and the people as a whole..."[35] In this regard a competitive physical or athletic ideal served a military purpose, the moral worth of which was judged relative to the livelihood of the *polis*, not to the individual.

This focus on the well-being of the *polis* comes nearer to the sense in which Socrates takes *paideia* and virtue to be related. However, Socrates is not simply concerned with the well-being of the *polis* as a state apparatus, but also with the well-being of the *polis* as a just community. It is not simply the rule of the state which Socrates upholds; on the contrary, his defiance of the Thirty suggests that he has no such inclinations (*Ap.* 32c-d). His conviction is not to uphold the law of decree, but rather the rule of law as a pre-condition of justice. *Paideia,* then, must be specifically related to justice and not simply to power, whether it is power in the hands of an individual, as Callicles imagines, or the power of the state apparatus itself. Nonetheless, the relevance of *paideia* to the pursuit of Socratic virtue can be explained both in reference to the individual and the *polis*.

For his part, Socrates states in the *Crito* that he has received a cultural and physical *paideia*, that he is grateful for this fact, and (as I argued earlier) that he recognizes education as a duty (*Cr.* 50d5-e1). Socrates claims in the *Protagoras* that, properly understood, *paideia* does not serve "professional" purposes as many Sophists and their students presume (*Prt.* 312a7-b4). Rather, as Socrates says to Hippocrates, *paideia* concerns the cultivation of one's character by pursuing an education "...of the sort [you received] from your schoolmaster, music teacher, and gymnastics instructor...For of these things, every one, you did not learn for a skill, so as to become a professional, but for education, as an individual and free man should" (*Prt.* 312a1-b4).

Indeed, as Socrates confirms in the *Laches*, the choice of pursuits and teachers is crucial, since the whole order of the household is dependent upon how one's children grow up (*La.*

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[35] Tyrtaeus, *Fr.* 12, 13-18, in Bergck, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, trans. Marrou (1964), p. 38.

185a5-7). This emphasis reveals a belief that one's education in youth is an important, if imperfect, means of inculcating a good character. This, for example, is the expressed aim of Pericles' attempt to educate his sons (*Prt.* 320a1), and Protagoras also implies that *paideia* can impart constraints which compel people "to be heedful of virtue" (*Prt.* 327d1), or in other words civilized.[36] In the *Crito*, Socrates also affirms the role of *paideia* in establishing a sense of belonging and responsibility to the others in the *polis*. In the words of the laws: " ...since you were born, raised, and educated, can you deny that you were our child and slave, both you and your ancestors" (*Cr.* 50e1-4).

Given that *paideia* is relevant to inculcating good character and a sense of moral responsibility, the question remains as to how education specifically relates to virtue. Socrates, of course, must deny that *paideia* results in knowledge of virtue -- only the god truly possesses virtue (*Ap.* 23a5-6). Thus, Socrates speaks approvingly of Simonides in the *Protagoras* when he interprets the poet to say: "If I wait for perfection I will praise no one" (*Prt.* 346d6). As Simonides suggests, even a "skillful, wise, and good man" may falter: "...whenever extraordinary misfortune brings him down [to naught], [he] cannot help but be bad" (*Prt.* 344e1-2). In the *Crito*, Socrates argues that, in such cases of misfortune, life may not be worth living (*Cr.* 47d8-e2; see also *Grg.* 512a2-b2). Among mortals at least, Socrates seems to affirm the notion that it is "ridiculous" to maintain that moral matters are an all-or-nothing affair (*Prt.* 346d2).

Socrates' own example illustrates this point. He maintains that, in spite being ignorant of what virtue itself is, he is a good man. He also believes that he has wronged no one and that his philosophical activities, if unimpeded, would count as an "inconceivable happiness" (*Ap.* 41c4,

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[36] Teloh (1986) calls the virtues associated with education in political matters -- implied by the example of Pericles -- "high demotic virtues." He calls those virtues associated with being cultivated or civilized, "low demotic virtues." See p. 226, n. 17.

40b7-c2).[37] Socrates may not possess knowledge of virtue, but he is neither amoral nor immoral. It is rather between amorality and the possession of virtue that even the best of mortals are necessarily situated. Although lacking virtue itself, Socrates is no less capable of moral concern, disposition, and action. It is within this context of human imperfection that Socrates maintains the relevance of Athenian *paideia* to virtue and the good life.

In Athens, each element of cultural and physical education provided an outlet for the expression of community life, which in the time of Socrates still retained something of the heroic ideal from Homer while it also supported and valued the rule of law. The *polis* was the center of family livelihood, not the warrior's clan. The defense of city and household nonetheless remained a preeminent concern, and physical education had long since had the moral function of cultivating and rewarding solidarity, courage, and physical dexterity in times of peace.[38] As Plato's Protagoras notes, children are "... sent to a trainer [παιδοτρίβου], in order that good intelligence may have a good body, and not be forced to play the coward in war or other trials, through weakness of body" (*Prt.* 326b6-c3). Music and poetry combined to enliven lyric songs with the heroes of Homeric poetry and teach the youth of Athens, as Phoenix taught Achilles, how "to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds" (*Il.* 9.443). But Athens had its own poets too, including the widely quoted Solon, who expressed the political idea εὐνομία, meaning 'good order' or 'equilibrium' in a *polis* without internal strife.[39] To this end, Protagoras maintains that by instruction in music, the youth "...may be more civilized, and become orderly and accommodating, and well-suited to speak and act" (*Prt.* 326b3-4).

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[37] Brickhouse and Smith (1994) argue that these claims are consistent with Socrates' belief that he does not actually possess moral wisdom. See esp. pp. 123-136.

[38] Fomal military training or *ephebia* in Athens consisted of two years of service between the ages of 18 and 20 (see "education, Greek," OCD [1996]). Possibly, *ephebia* was instantiated in the Peloponnesian war (431-404) (see Marrou [1964], p. 64.).

[39] See Ostwald (1986), pp. xx-xxi, 112. See also Jaeger (1986), p. 201.

Protagoras claimed that music also makes a contribution to character: "...for the whole of human life stands in need of rhythmical order and easiness of temper" (*Prt.* 326b5).

Paideia, as described by Plato's Protagoras, prepares the young for the time when they learn for themselves the laws that govern the *polis:* "...whenever they may be dismissed from their teachers, the city compels them to learn the laws, and live out their lives according to this model, for fear that, left to themselves, they act without purpose" (*Prt.* 326c6-d1). The three main elements of *paideia* to which Socrates makes reference are poetry, physical education, and music. Each of these aspects of education might have taken place in a different locale and with a different teacher:

> The *paidotribēs* deals with gymnastics, games, and general athletic fitness, mainly in the palaestra...The *kitharistēs* taught music and the works of lyric poets, the lyre school inheriting the musical education of the Archaic period. The *grammatistēs* taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as literature, which consisted in learning by hearing the work of the poets especially Homer who were regarded as giving moral training.[40]

Whether it was *paideia* of poetry, music, or gymnastics, education was an imitative process. In this regard, the teacher was held morally culpable for the pupil's development in the eyes of the public,[41] and, as Socrates states in *Laches*, the choice of tutors was a crucial one (*La.* 185a3-7). Organized education had made its appearance to a limited degree by the latter half of the fifth century, as intimated by Socrates' reference to schoolmasters at 312a1-b4 in the *Protagoras.* But whether by school master or private teacher, *paideia* involved an introduction into all aspects of daily life and was

> ... maintained openly by daily association, personal contact and example, conversation, a sharing in the common life, and the gradual initiation of the younger into the social activities of the elder -- the club, the gymnasium and the banquet.[42]

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[40] See "education, Greek," OCD (1996).

[41] Marrou (1964), p. 5.

[42] Marrou (1964), p. 56. I have not discussed the role of friendship or love in education. From the *Phaedrus* it would seem their contribution is often questionable. P. Friedländer's (1964) synopsis of the *Lysis* explains the possible benefit this way: "Lysis loves Socrates. Socrates loves truth. Love tends upward" (I, p. 98).

This account of "cultural and physical education," as Socrates understood it, emphasizes how *paideia* could play an important role in the social and moral development of the city's youth by providing activities aimed at developing and demonstrating one's character. The beliefs and habits one develops in this context are a necessary prerequisite for engaging successfully in moral discussion and activity and, ultimately, in leading the good life within the context of the *polis*.

Although *paideia* does involve socialization into a common group, it is not a passive transmission of cultural norms. In particular, the activities associated with one's youthful education are intended to provide a forum for demonstrating one's character in action. It is clear to Socrates why Melesias and Lysimachus, in the *Laches*, are eager to enlist their sons in the art of fighting in armor among "other studies or pursuits." Socrates states that such matters are "no trivial affair" (*La.* 185a3). Despite Socrates' concern with the possibility of moral wisdom, one's virtue is not attested to by propositions but by one's "deeds" (*La.* 186b2). In the case of youths, these deeds must be attested to first-hand or else by the general testimony of others. The same holds true for "teachers" (διδάσκαλοι), who must demonstrate their worthiness by providing evidence that they have improved others (*La.* 186b3-4). In this regard, *paideia* provides the necessary opportunities to develop and demonstrate a nobility of character. This view is summarized in the *Menexenus*, when Socrates recites the "speech of Aspasia":

> It seems to me necessary, according to nature, to so commend them [the dead], just exactly as they became good. They became good through goodness of birth. Therefore let us praise first their nobility of birth; secondly, their nurture and education; let us display the result of their works, let us prove how good and worthy of them [they were].
>
> (*Mx.* 237a4-b2)

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates elaborates on the relevance of *paideia* as a prerequisite, not only for moral activity, but also for engaging in moral inquiry. Socrates maintains that three qualifications are necessary if one wishes to test the good or evil of another person's soul:

knowledge, good will, and frankness (ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν, *Grg.* 487a2-3). Socrates playfully suggests that Callicles has all three: "...you possess all these things, which the others do not, for you have been sufficiently educated, as many of the Athenians would say, and [are] well-disposed towards me (*Grg.* 487b5-7). Given the context of the dialogue, Socrates' irony is apparent: it is Callicles' lack of knowledge, good will, and frankness that is exposed in the dialogue. Nonetheless, what is important with respect to the present thesis is that "good will" and "frankness" are associated with one's education and, moreover, considered prerequisite to moral discourse. Moral inquiry presupposes these social virtues because they are required for making progress towards honest agreement on the truth of a matter. Thus Socrates states:

> You would never have agreed with me for want of wisdom, nor an excess of shame, nor again would you have agreed to deceive me; for you [are] a friend, as you yourself would say. This being [so], agreement between you and me will constitute a conclusion of truth.
>
> (*Grg.* 487e3-7)

But no agreement is forthcoming. Callicles has already intimated that he has no intention of shaming himself by admitting Socrates' conclusions as Polus did (*Grg.* 482c4-e2).[43] Callicles is willing to endorse claims which he does not believe in order to avoid Socrates' claims (*Grg.* 495a5-a9); he appears to doubt Socrates seriousness and is, accordingly, intent not on agreement but on getting the upper hand (*Grg.* 481c5-482b2). Although "good will" and "frankness" may appear to have little to do with dialectic itself, according to Socrates they have everything to do with the way dialectical inquiry is carried out and whether agreement or progress is possible.

Ultimately, it would be through knowledge -- and not habit-- that perfect happiness would be possible, since then one would know in every situation how the good may be fulfilled. But,

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[43] Teloh (1986) indicates these aspects of the debate. See pp. 148-149. Again, Teloh also sees predialectical training as the means to improve disposition and personality but defers Plato's response to the educational theory of the *Republic*.

in either case the source of moral action is the soul of the individual, and it is here that Socrates directs his attention. At the same time, there is no clear-cut distinction made between the well-being of the *polis* and that of the individual.[44] Socrates is no politician, but he is a citizen and regards the *polis* as a necessary precondition for the justice of the individual, stating his preference for death over banishment accordingly (*Ap.* 37c5-d6). The clearest expression of Socrates' view comes at *Ap.* 36c8, when he makes a distinction between minding the business of the *polis* and his own mission, caring for the *polis* itself (μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως). This point is reiterated later when Socrates shows that he conceives of his duty not as keeping quietly to himself, but rather minding the matters of morality affecting the citizenry of Athens as a whole (Ap. 37e3-38a7). In so far as the citizenry and their laws comprise the *polis*, morality is not a private matter separate from the welfare of the *polis*.

III

The important thing, Socrates claims, is not to live, but to live well, and this is to live justly. Yet one does not live justly alone. The choice to live outside of a city is never considered seriously by Socrates, either in the *Crito* or the *Apology*.[45] In this regard, we may take Socrates as being in agreement with Aristotle: "...the one who is not able to take counsel with others, or through self-sufficiency has no need to, has no part in the city, and consequently is either a beast or a god" (*Politics* I.1253a28-29). Yet, as Socrates argues in the *Crito*, the just community is not possible without a common agreement to abide by the rule of law rather than rule of the stronger, as suggested by Thrasymachus, Polus, and Callicles. From whence this agreement is supposed to come is another matter.

Socrates himself professes to have learned the rule of law and the norms guiding life in Athens from the city, which required his father to educate him (*Cr.* 50d8). As a citizen,

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[44] See Nagle (1989) for a general discussion of *polis* society, pp. 104-110.

[45] The possibility is implied at *Cr.* 53c4 but rejected.

Socrates' obligation to the laws is not only based upon his implicit agreement to abide by them[46] but also, he thinks, because they have benefited both him and the citizens of Athens -- in the words of the laws: "...we have brought you into the world and reared you and educated you, and given you and your fellow citizens a share in all the good things we have" (*Cr.* 51c9-d1). These are the values Socrates must adduce if his claim that the good life is the just life is to be convincing.

At *Crito* 49a6 Socrates secures Crito's admission that "to do a wrong is never noble or good" (οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν). Gregory Vlastos has suggested that this claim provides an expression of Socrates' *eudaimonism*, since it includes οὔτε ἀγαθὸν as descriptive of the consequence of injustice:

> Of these two adjectives, ἀγαθόν, καλόν, the latter is the one normally used to express what is morally right as such. The use of the former is much broader -- fully as broad as that of "good" in English, ranging over the whole spectrum of values: not only moral ones, but also hedonic, economic, political, psychological, physiological or whatever.[47]

But, if, as Socrates maintains, it is never permissible to do injustice, he must be understood to claim that no matter what might be gained through injustice, it will nonetheless be so harmful for the wrongdoer that nothing could provide compensation for acting unjustly, even on pain of death. The commonly-held belief is, of course, that one ought to return injury for injury regardless of circumstances. In the words of Thuycidides, "Coming as close as possible in thought to what you felt when they made you suffer, when you would have given anything to crush them, now pay them back."[48] In this case inflicting injury is restricted to retribution for an injustice -- it is a debt owed and paid. However, Socrates claims more broadly that

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[46] Socrates claims he was free to leave Athens after having underwent his δοκιμασία, if he had disagreed with its laws (*Cr.* 51d3). The δοκιμασία, or "examination," took place before city magistrates to see if a youth (of 18 years) met the legal requirements for citizenship.

[47] Vlastos (1991), p. 198

[48] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 3.40.7, trans. Vlastos (1991), p. 184.

reciprocating injury is never "noble or good." As he argues in the *Apology*, to harm (κακόν) others is to invite harm on oneself, and here Socrates' *eudaimonist* appeal to the "noble and good" is evident:

> Tell, me seriously Meletus, is it better to live in a good or in a bad community?... Have you discovered that bad people always have a bad effect, and good people a good effect, upon their nearest neighbors. Am I so hopelessly ignorant as not even to realize that by spoiling the character of one of my companions I shall run the risk of getting harm from him?
>
> (Ap. 25c5-e5)

If one does not recognize that the good life consists of goods afforded by community life within the *polis*, the claim that the good life is just life cannot serve as a persuasive appeal to abide by the rule of law. Socrates admits his arguments can hold no sway if his interlocutors are unwilling to accept the premise that justice is of ultimate concern in moral discussion.[49] Socrates tells Crito that, in the context of the *polis*, the principle never to do wrong cannot be advocated by one individual but not another and still properly serve as a standard for moral action and inquiry. Socrates makes a point of emphasizing this point:

> So one should not return a wrong, or commit an evil act against any person, whatsoever one might suffer by them. [One should] take heed, Crito, when confessing these things, in order not to agree [to something] contrary to [one's] beliefs. For I know [there are] few who think or will think [that] one should honor these things. Consequently, between those who think so and those who do not, there is no common agreement concerning these things, but necessarily they observe one another's decisions with contempt.
>
> (*Cr.* 49c10-d5)

Socrates stresses this point again at 49e1-3; if he and Crito cannot agree on this issue, there is no basis for their discussion. Socrates claim is that if he is bound by a just agreement to abide by the law, even if he is unjustly accused, he cannot return injustice for injustice. Socrates

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[49] This is not to say that the possibility of moral debate actually depends upon the acceptance of this premise. Thrasymachus, for example, doubts that justice is of ultimate concern and Socrates attempts to persuade him otherwise in Book I of the *Republic*. Even Glaucon, who is sympathetic to Socrates, takes up Thrasymachus' position *for the sake of argument*. However, in the *Crito* 49c10-d5 Socrates is explicitly concerned with *agreement upon a common principle for action*, and not simply debate or, as Thrasymachus would have it, entertainment (*Rep.* 354a10-11).

appeals to the good of *paideia* he has received in the *polis* as part of his explanation for this position: The laws ask "...since you were born, raised, and educated, can you deny that you were our [i.e. the Laws'] child and slave, both you and your ancestors?" (*Cr.* 50e1-4). Socrates evidently does not think so, and his reasoning in this regard returns to the idea of what is good for one in terms of the "good things" he has received from the *polis* (*Cr.* 51c6-d5). *Paideia* predisposes one to pursue virtue, not only by developing a sense of responsibility to the *polis*, but also by inculcating the belief that those things that one considers good and beneficial are directly dependent upon the well-being of the community.

In the *Gorgias,* however, Callicles does not consider what is "good and noble" to rest in the good community or the *polis*, but rather to rest in the advantage of the stronger individual -- and ideally, in the tyrant whom he esteems. Socrates argues that Callicles is mistaken: the tyrant is not happy but is "savage and uneducated" (ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, *Grg.* 510b7-8), and thus does not acknowledge his own good to be dependent upon the goods of the community rather than purely on power. Specifically, Socrates claims that a tyrant would be socially inept, incapable of friendship and fearful of superior wisdom (*Grg.* 510c3-5). Despite his power, he is in effect powerless to attain happiness. Here again, Socrates also emphasizes the point that a lack of such qualities is detrimental to the possibility of moral discussion and agreement. In Socrates' account, this would only be possible if one was accustomed "from childhood to feel pleasure and annoyance at the same things as his ruler and to contrive to be as like him as possible" (*Grg.* 510d6-9) -- in effect, educated with a view to imitating the ruler. Callicles, however, makes it clear that he is not interested in agreement, but in power: the tyrant has no need of the qualities Socrates recommends since he may kill those who oppose him (511a4). This disparity between Socrates and his interlocutors is the undoing of the discussion, and Socrates is left to reflect on the nature of the impasse: " [we]...are like hot-headed youths,

who never form an opinion concerning these things, and those [which are] most important -- so terribly uneducated are we..." (*Grg.* 527d6-e1).

As in the *Laches, Protagoras,* and *Gorgias*, Socrates is sensitive in the *Crito* to the relation of moral activity to social context and discourse. Unlike his interlocutors, who for the most part presume to teach the art of securing political power and personal gain irrespective of moral virtue, Socrates takes into account the intimate connection between the well-being of individuals and the well-being of the *polis*. Each is dependent upon the other, and Socrates attempts to show how, in the case of the ruler and even the tyrant, inattention to this fact leads to consequences contrary to one's own happiness. In all cases, Socrates' concern is with the social refinement of the individual and not with the advantages of education for the unscrupulous use of power. It is thus not the orator, such as Polus or Callicles, but the educator of the "private individual" which is recommended to Hippocrates (*Prt.* 312b4).[50]

For Socrates the prime aim and purpose of politics is to inculcate good moral habit in citizens and their children -- the art of politics is the promise to "make men good citizens" (*Prt.* 319a4-5). Although he rejects the sophists' ability to make good on this promise, he nonetheless regards the best life to be found in a morally good community (*Ap.* 25c5-6) where the "standard of public life" is a devotion to the improvement of citizens' moral character (*Grg.* 515b6-c3). Accordingly, when Socrates converses with his politically-minded interlocutors, his question is always the same: "... will you want to take care of anything concerning state-affairs other than how we citizens may be as good as possible?" (*Grg.* 515b8-c1). Yet making citizens better is not, for Socrates, simply a question of law-making. He rejects Meletus' reply in the *Apology* that the laws "makes the young good" (*Ap.* 24d11). Socrates

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[50] Although education is essentially open to citizens, and therefore men, in Socrates' view, education should not be thought of as restricted to men. At 342d2-4 of the *Protagoras*, for example, Socrates expresses his approval of the education in Sparta where, as he points out, men and women are equally versed in "intellectual culture," and at *Gorgias* 470e10, he states that for both men and women, happiness rests on education and justice. However, here I have not explicitly discussed the relationship of Athenian education for women, and Socratic ethics.

suggests that it is not the laws themselves which perform this function, but the people who interpret those laws. In this regard, for Socrates the main issue at stake in making the young good is the ability of individual citizens and the citizen body of Athens as a whole to educate the young by their example. In the attempt, p*aideia* serves to approximate moral virtue through the societal ideal of *kalokagathia* ("nobility and goodness"). *Paideia* is insufficient for Socratic virtue, but in the absence of knowledge of virtue, a belief in the value of social virtues and the "good order" of the *polis* are crucial to dialectic. Socrates' judgment in the *Crito* of the best *polis* takes into account both the value of *paideia* and the *elenchos*.

The question naturally arises as to why Socrates thinks Athens is, despite its failings, superior to other cities. As all with all things, it must be superior relative to the degree which it facilitates the pursuit of virtue. He does not appear to prefer Athens simply on the grounds that it is a democracy.[51] Socrates often criticizes the views of the many as being indifferent to reason, and in any case no arbiter of the right course of action. At the same time, he is equally critical of tyrants and would-be tyrants, such as Callicles or Polus, on the grounds that they do not esteem justice above all else. As Socrates makes clear in the *Euthydemus*, the best rulers would be those who had knowledge of virtue, whatever the political system (292b4-c1). However, since Socrates has no reason for thinking that such knowledge is forthcoming among the citizenry in Athens or elsewhere, it is under imperfect conditions that one must judge the best city. In the *Apology* and the *Crito*, the criteria for making this judgment, in his own case, are the same. The city should (1) have the proper conditions for the conventional moral education afforded by *paideia* as a child (*Cr.* 50d5-e4, 51c6-d5, 54a2-8), and (2) permit freedom as an adult to continue one's education by philosophical investigation and criticism of this moral education (*Ap.* 29d2-e3). The two criteria are related in a similar way to the distinct kinds of learning that Socrates distinguishes in the *Euthydemus*:

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[51] Kraut (1984) makes this point. For a detailed discussion, see ch. VII, pp. 194-231.

> Socrates: The two strangers point out to you, because you didn't know, that people use the term to "learn" in the following sort of situation: whenever a person at first (ἐξ ἀρχῆς), having no knowledge about a matter later grasps knowledge of it; they also employ this identical term whenever a person actually having knowledge examines that same matter with the knowledge appropriate to it, whether it be a matter done or spoken--people call this "to know" rather than "to learn," but there are times when this is also "learning" (μανθάνειν). [52]
>
> (*Euthyd.* 277e5-278a5)

Socrates makes this distinction in order to demonstrate how Euthydemus was playing with words in order to trick Clinias into agreeing to absurd conclusions. For the present thesis, however, the distinction Socrates makes is important for considering how the *elenchos* and *paideia* are related. Just as one might reexamine learning in attempt to refine previous knowledge, so the *elenchos* serves to reexamine the knowledge attained through *paideia*, also refining it, in an attempt to gain knowledge of virtue. Both *paideia* and the *elenchos* are learning processes which are corruptible and fallible, and Socrates is critical of sophists and trainers alike. In the *Apology* he suggests that only a few are capable of improving others (*Ap.* 25a13-b4). However, his remarks to this effect in no way preclude his insistence that both conventional *paideia* and the philosophical investigation of the *elenchos* are crucial.

In the *Euthydemus*, Crito and Socrates become engaged in a discussion that bears remarkable similarity to their exchange in the *Crito*. Crito expresses his concern for his own children's education, maintaining that he has married well and that he has seen to it that his children "may be as rich as we can manage " (*Euthyd.* 306e1-2). Nonetheless, he laments the fact that he can find no suitable educators and is doubtful that he can lead his sons to philosophy. Socrates cautions him not to give up so easily:

> Socrates: My dear Crito, do you not know that in all pursuits, the thoughtless [are] many and worth nothing, the excellent are few and worth everything? Doesn't gymnastics seem to be good to you, and business, and rhetoric, and the office of a general?
> Crito: Certainly, they seem so to me.
> Socrates: What? Don't you see that in each of these pursuits the many [are] ridiculous at their work?

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[52] I am indebted to John Rauk for this rendering of the passage.

> Crito: Well yes, you are quite right.
> Socrates: Therefore, because of this you will shrink from the many pursuits, and not entrust one to your sons?
> Crito: That would not be just, Socrates.
>
> (*Euthyd.* 307a3-b5)

Socrates does not dismiss *paideia* in the form of gymnastics, but in fact claims that the incompetence of its practitioners are not reason to neglect its pursuit. Socrates applies the same consideration to philosophy, suggesting that Crito consider the merits of the pursuit, whatever he may think of those who practice philosophy (*Euthyd.* 307b6-c4).

Paideia, as well as Socratic inquiry, I have argued, are key elements to the pursuit of the good life and are uniquely inter-dependent. These opinions are cultivated by *paideia* in poetry, music and physical training and include many which Socrates accepts -- the necessity of the *polis*, the rule of law, the importance of the cardinal virtues, civilized social virtues such as frankness and goodwill, *eudaimonism*, the need of warfare, etc. -- and which serve as preconditions for his philosophical activity, not only as sources of beliefs to examine, but also as a source of common goals and social virtues which are amenable to agreement and progress in moral inquiry. In this regard, Socrates singles out *paideia* as an integral part of community life in Athens (50d5-e4, 51c6-d5) as a means of developing beliefs necessary to participate in social and political life.

This understanding of the role of education helps to make clear why, in the *Crito,* Socrates appears to endorse authoritarian states such as Sparta as one his "favorite models of good government" while at the same time claiming that the democracy of Athens is preferable to all (*Cr.* 52e5-53a1). Richard Kraut has suggested in this regard that Socrates does not mean to endorse the political institutions of Sparta and Crete themselves, but instead the fact that both states are highly structured and well-suited to inculcating a system of moral beliefs: "In these societies more than any others, the life of the individual, both in childhood and adulthood, was regulated by law. In other words, Sparta and Crete went to greater lengths to

mold the individual's conception of right and wrong."[53] Kraut's interpretation would support my suggestion in criterion (1) that Socrates' presumption is that a city must have the proper conditions for the conventional moral education afforded by *paideia*. However, as Kraut notes, the Spartan regime was also repressive in many ways. Although a child's education was carefully attended to by ministers of education from the age of seven, this control extended into the Spartan's adult life. Thus, although (1) would be well satisfied, the conditions for (2) would not --namely, that a city should permit freedom as an adult to continue one's education by philosophical investigation and criticism of conventional morality.[54]

Kraut presents his view about Sparta somewhat tentatively, suggesting that since the highest aim of the city would be to teach virtue, the fact that Socrates considers Sparta to be well-governed must mean that he believes the city holds virtue in high regard.[55] However, Socrates is far more direct in specifying why he esteems Sparta and Crete. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates makes clear that he esteems the Spartans and Cretans because they are the best educated and are right to be proud of the intellectual and physical activities of their culture (*Prt.* 342c-342d). One reason he cites for their success in education is their tight control. They do not, for example, "...permit any of their youths to go to other cities...so that they do not unlearn what they have learned at home" (*Prt.* 342c8-d2). In this instance tight control has been a mainstay of their education; however, Socrates clearly does not prefer to live in a city that cannot tolerate his philosophical activities (*Ap.* 29d1-e2, Cr. 53c1-5), nor will he bend to authoritarian rule (*Ap.* 32c3-e1).[56] I conclude that, in Socrates' view, provisions for both

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[53] Kraut (1984), p. 222.

[54] As Kraut notes, the Spartans "... couldn't even enter the marketplace until they were thirty. How could Socrates, the great marketplace iconoclast and advocate of the examined life, have called such a society well governed?"[54] Kraut does not think that Socrates would conclude it is well governed in this respect, and therefore deems Athens as ultimately preferable since it permits the greater degree of freedom prerequisite for Socrates' philosophical activities.

[55] Kraut (1984), p. 222, fn. 60.

[56] Whether Socrates would commit an unjust act, if it was demanded by the legal authority of Athens, is another matter. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), pp. 141-155.

conventional education *and* philosophical critique are necessary preconditions for the moral health of the individual and the *polis*.

The precarious position of philosophy's critical role is evident from Socrates' own death, but the role of *paideia* is no more secure. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates explains why education is something that must be attended with great care. Specifically, he states that whether one goes to a sophist, a doctor, or a trainer, the teaching one receives should not be taken lightly: "Learning is not carried off in a jar, but by necessity you pay for it with your honor, carrying the learning in your soul, and once you have learned, you go away either having been harmed or benefited accordingly" (*Prt.* 314b1-4). Thus, despite the importance of *paideia,* Socrates also emphasizes the importance of continued moral criticism (*Ap.* 38a1-7). Socialization into community life through *paideia* is no guarantee of a virtuous character, as Socrates notes in the case of Pericles' son, Clinias (*Prt.* 320a3-b1).

Accordingly, Socrates is mindful of *paideia*'s limitations and, in this respect, the *elenchos* serves to evaluate critically the character which emerges from *paideia*. This limitation of *paideia* is particularly important in the *Gorgias* where Socrates implies that Callicles, despite his education-- either because it was deficient or corrupted--remains uneducated (ἀπαιδεύτος, *Grg.* 487b6, 527e1). However, since no amount of Socratic examination proves adequate to the task of bringing Callicles out of this state, the *elenchos* likewise reveals its limitations, and here the interdependency of the *elenchos* and *paideia* is clearly evident: the social competencies and moral dispositions one develops as result of *paideia* are crucial for successfully undertaking Socratic inquiry. Indeed, as I have argued, in the absence of complete wisdom, the pursuit of virtue in Socratic ethics is ultimately grounded in *paideia,* as a necessary pre-condition for moral activity, inquiry, and ultimately, for one's happiness.

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