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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

"OUTSIDERS" AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY:
BOSNIA-(HERZEGOVINA, 1990-1995

presented by

John Edward Ashbrook

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Afflégree in History

 

 

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‘ ‘_.._ hail _ _

“OUTSIDERS” AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA,
1990-1995

By

John Edward Ashbrook

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1 996

ABSTRACT

“OUTSIDERS” AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA,
1990- 1995

By

John Edward Ashbrook

This M.A. Thesis argues that the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was started
and perpetuated primarily by a number of Yugoslav “outsiders” participated in the
perpetuation of the hostilities including, most importantly, Slobodan Milosevic, the
president of Serbia, and Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia. Each leader used
revisionist histories and nationalism to either retain, or gain positions of power in the
eleven years after Broz’s (Tito’s) death, inspiring chauvinistic nationalist movements
among their respective ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to redirect public criticism on
external, not internal affairs. This renewed interest in separatism was heightened by the
economic crisis which plagued Yugoslavia since the late 19703. Using the intelligentsia
and spreading nationalist rhetoric through the media, especially television, these
“outsiders” recreated new identities among the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the
end of the war in this republic, Tudjman and Milosevic, though still nominal enemies,
were actually aiding one another in the splitting up of the new country into relatively

homogenous ethnic enclaves.

 

To my Mother and Keely: without y’all, I’d probably be mining coal in Southwest VA.

iii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2

THE TRADITION OF MULTI-ETHNICITY AND HISTORICAL BORDERS ............... 5
CHAPTER 3

THEORIES OF NATION ALISM ...................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL ROLE OF NATIONALISM IN THE SOUTH SLAVIC LANDS ............ 21
CHAPTER 5

BROZ AND THE MAN IPULATION OF N ATIONALISM ............................................ 35
CHAPTER 6

MILOSEVIC: THE RISE AND POPULARIZATION OF NATIONAL APPEAL ......... 44
CHAPTER 7

TUDJMAN: CROATIAN NATIONALISM IN ACTION ............................................... 48
CHAPTER 8

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ...................... 53
CHAPTER 9

THE FAILURE OF MARXISM AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY .............................. 58
CHAPTER 10

THE SEIZURE AND MANIPULATION OF MEDIA .................................................... 74
CHAPTER 11

DEFINING NATIONALITY WITH MAPS AND BORDERS ....................................... 86
CHAPTER 12

iv

 

THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA ...................... 90

CHAPTER 13

THE SERBIAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE 1986 MEMORANDUM .................... 100
CHAPTER 14 .

COLLABORATION AND CONCLUSION ................................................................... 107
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 117

 

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
“They were soldiers...I remember the face of the guard. They took

everything we had. And we took what we could carry in our hands, what

was necessary. I remember they had guns...As children we [she and her

Serb evictors] were like brothers and sisters...It was sudden and I couldn’t

understand what was going on. People in my village were hating other

people. I remember I couldn’t understand why this was going on. Why

were these people speaking against one another?”.1

The above event, which occurred in late 1992, has been a common one throughout
the recent struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Lada”, a former teacher and rural woman in
her mid-twenties, described these people as her former friends and neighbors. This
practice of removing all of an ethnic group from a community has been coined “ethnic
cleansing”.2 Ethnic cleansing is a practice combining genocide, forced expulsion, mass
rape, forced pregnancies, and other brutalities to permanently remove the presence of a

certain group from a territory occupied by a different group. It is the direct result of the

disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and has been particularly concentrated in its most

 

"'Lada” a Muslim refugee, interview by author, July 1995, Ljubljana, tape
recording.

2Ethnic cleansing IS a widely used phrase 1n many sources. This term has been

popularized by scholars such as Norman Cigar 1n his WW

Ethnicfileansing writers such as David Reiff in his W
W, and journalists such as William Drozdiak 1n his article appearing in

the July 18, 1995 issue of the WWW, “France Fails to Gain Allied
Support to Act Against Serbs”.

2

central republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where no nationality had a clear majority. It seems
odd that this happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since many historians such as John Fine,
Robert Donia, Noel Malcolm, as well as many Yugoslavs such as “Lada”, Bogdan
Denitch, and Dzemal Hadzismajlovic, have provided substantial evidence that this area
was generally a tolerant, multi-ethnic society for centuries.

The historians searching for “mythical” or constructed explanations for historical
events in Bosnia have, in some cases, seriously distorted the real reasons for these
occurrences. Before World War 11 there were no widespread violent tensions between the
different ethnicities.3 After the war, these tensions, brought on by outside interference
and the outsider’s support of fringe groups,4 once again faded into the background, not to
be dredged up again into a mass movement until the problems in Kosovo began after the
death of J osep Broz, ruler of Yugoslavia from the end of World War II until 1980. The
“centuries old ethnic hatreds” many Western Europeans reported to the world were gross
exaggerations of historical events started and encouraged by the nationalists of
Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, not a few Yugoslavs took these “fake” histories seriously,
since they were often packaged by their own ethnic intelligentsia. This caused many
individuals to join movements led by ethnocentric leaders who supported platforms of
ethnic separation and mistrust of other nationalities.

The major question many academics are currently pursuing is why did this

 

3Ivo Banac, W (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1984), 410-411.

4Throughout this paper, “outsider” will be used to denote non-Bosnian-
Herzegovinian Yugoslavs and “foreign” will be used to denote non-Yugoslavs.

3

happen? What could provoke a group of people, who have been living in relative peace
for many centuries, to throw away their tradition of tolerance and actively participate in
the destruction and persecution of friends and neighbors? How could an individual, with
no prior record of violent behavior or national motivation, brutalize his or her, possibly
long-term neighbors because they were re-created as an “other”? There are clearly no
definite, over-arching answers to these questions. The ethnic strife appearing throughout
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not the product of internal divisions.
Ethnic tension in the Balkans in many cases had a common source throughout its history.
These episodes, like those which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina, were in some manner,
partially the result of external forces putting pressure on the separate nationalities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina during a time of crisis.

It is no secret that the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the result of the
resurgence of national feeling among the people living in the separate republics of the
former Yugoslavia. The most common type of nationalism to emerge was not
reminiscent of Hroch’s Phase A in which intellectual circles acknowledge and celebrate
the cultural diversity of a peasant culture.6 Even though this resurgent nationalism was
triggered first by the national intelligentsia and carried out by the politicians, it was of a

violent, chauvinistic type that quickly and decisively labeled one group as an enemy--as

 

’The discussion of the “other” is borrowed from Edward Said’s Qfientalism, and
will be used throughout the paper to establish the conflict of identity with respect to the
presence of different groups as potentially hostile outsiders.

‘Miroslav Hroch. WWW (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 23.

4

an “other”--thus reinforcing one’s own belonging to a specific group. It only reflected
Hroch’s Phase A in that the elite of the society first began to promote nationalism’s
spread, but this was done not to celebrate a specific culture, but primarily to promote
tension and hostility toward a group of perceived “others”. In order for the historian to
understand the nationalism which tore apart Bosnia-Herzegovina, this type of movement

should be examined in greater detail.

Chapter 2
THE TRADITION OF MULTI-ETHNICITY AND HISTORICAL BORDERS
Many nationalists have postulated that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an “unnatural”

construction in the second Yugoslavia. Bosnia, like medieval Croatia and Serbia, had an
independent kingdom. This state had a distinct, unique culture of religious toleration. If
the existence of a medieval kingdom is used as a source of legitimacy, as the Croats and
Serbs have done, then Bosnia has the same legitimacy due to the existence of its medieval
state.7 After the incorporation of the Bosnian state into the Ottoman Empire when the
first administrative center was established at Vrhbosna (modern day Sarajevo) in 1453,8
the conquerors continued to use the original borders as an administrative unit. This
would last throughout the Ottoman domination of Bosnia.9 After the Congress of Berlin
in 1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s borders remained as they had for centuries, but now under
the administration of the Habsburg Empire. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian

Empire at the end of World War I, Bosnian territory once again remained within its

 

7Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, W
W (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 13-35.

8Adem HandliC. WWW
Intemiew (Istanbul: Organization of the Islamic Conference Research Centre for Islamic

History, Art and Culture, 1994), 19.

9Donia and Fine, 72.

6

historic boundaries under the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.lo Only during
World War II did this change when the Axis powers awarded most of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to the fascist Ustasi state (NDH). After the victory of the Allies and Broz’s
partisans, it became a federal republic within its traditional boundaries.‘l With over a 500
year history of near continuous regional homogeny, the claim that Bosnia-Herzegovina is
a recently constructed state can be discarded.

Secondly, nationalist historians, such as Franjo Tudjman and those who wrote the
1986 Memorandum sponsored by the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, claim that the
ethnic violence was common in Bosnia throughout its history. This is also not supported
by historical evidence. Although violence has not been unusual in this area for the last
150 years or so, it is not endemic to nationalist rivalries nor ethnic tensions. Before the
concept of nationalism became widespread throughout the Balkan peninsula, most of the
organized violence was directed at the corrupt Ottoman officials, who were considered
parasitic to the Bosnian peasants. A famous demonstration which illustrates the
economic nature of past tensions is the riot of 1869. Both Orthodox and Muslim peasants
participated in the riot against the corruption of the Ottoman administration.12 It was in
no way a religious or an ethnic demonstration. The majority of Bosnian and

Herzegovinian discontent was focused on the Ottomans and not on other South Slav

 

l"Banac, blatinnalflumicn 375.

“Donia and Fine, 161.

12The peasants were more concerned with the state’s corruption due to the
economic hardships than they were about religious divisions.

7

groups. After the Habsburg takeover of Bosnia, discontent was refocused to the Austro-
Hungarian occupational army and officials-mot one another.'3 Prior to the Second World
War, the three primary nationalities thus lived in relatively peaceful coexistence for
hundreds of years.

According to a number of Bosnian refugees of all three ethnic groups now
residing in Annandale, VA, before the recent war the multi-ethnic nature of the
community was celebrated in which friends, regardless of religion, shared holidays
together. Amela Konakovic, 27, a half-Croat, half-Serb said, "We [Bosnians] didn't see
[religious differences] before the war. "'4 According to Dennison Rusinow, the number of
Yugoslavs declaring "Yugoslav" as a national determinate in the census dramatically
increased between 1971-1981,” of which the Bosnians made up the majority of these
people. In fact, in this same period, the number actually increased by 4.5 times, from
1.3% in 1971 to 5.4% in 1981. 15% of all youth declared themselves Yugoslav and 36%
preferred to declare Yugoslav over their own ethnicity.”

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s tolerance can also be examined theoretically.

Mark Von Hagen points out that the social science school of “modernization” predicted

 

l3Donia and Fine, 70.

l“Lena H. Sun, “For Refugees, a lament for Loss and Vigil for Peace,”
MM, 9 December 1995: from BOSNEWS Digest 496, 11 December 1995.

l5Dennison Rusinow, “National Policy and the “National Question”,” essay in
Pedro Rarnet, ed., M (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 132.

16Steven L. Burg and Michael Berbaum, “Community, Integration, and Stability 1n
Multinational Yugoslavia,” MW 83 (June 1989): 535- 54.

8

that ethnic and national differences were to disappear within states which were becoming
more developed and literate.l7 Von Hagen cites several Soviet sociologists and
ethnographers who postulated that in the Soviet Union, “ethnic differences were to
dissolve gradually in assimilation, intermarriage, migration and other demographic
patterns”.18 Even though this paradigm proved inaccurate in the former Soviet Union, it
can be used to examine the case of ethnic blending in Bosnia. Throughout the cold war,
more and more Bosnians of all ethnicities began to refer to themselves as Yugoslavs.
Intermarriage, especially in the metropolitan areas, increased dramatically.” Being
located in the center of Yugoslavia, traffic passing back and forth from the north and
south continuously passed through the area, bringing different cultural practices and new
technologies. This gradual disintegration of nationalism was beginning to occur in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was being replaced with a Bosnian identity as opposed to a
separate Croat, Serb, or Muslim one.

Just prior to the war, one in four marriages in Bosnia were mixed. People lived
together largely without ethnic tensions.20 For the most part this tolerance was much

stronger in the urban areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Sarajevo. Before the war,

 

17Mark Von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slam 54 (3) (Fall
1995): 662.

18Ibid., 664.

19Ivo Sivfic,Ihc_Eeasam_Culn1re.Q£Bcsnia_andflerzegQ¥ina(ChicagOI
Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 149; and Susan Woodward, W
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 36.

20Ed Vulliamy, W (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 39.

9

among the young, urban intellectuals of the city, individuals supporting national
separation were associated with farm animals and their beliefs were reviled.21 The day
after the first shots of war disturbed the streets of Sarajevo on April 6, 1992, a young
Bosnian in a crowd protesting the Serb sniping from the Holiday Inn was quoted as
screaming, "Let all Serb chauvinists go to Serbia and let the Croat chauvinists go to
Croatia. We want to remain here together. We want to keep Bosnia as one".22 This

attitude persevered throughout the war of aggression and chauvinism inside this city.

 

21Tom Gjelten, Wally (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 20.

22Noel Malcolm, W (London: MacMillan, 1994), 235.

Chapter 3
TI-IEORIES OF NATIONALISM
“Every member of a dramatic cultural system needs the Other as proof of
his or her own identity, because one’s own particularity is being proven

and articulated in relationship to the particularities of the Other.”--Dzevad
Karahasan”

Existing theories attempting to explain nationalist movements help to
contextualize some of the factors responsible for the emergence of violent ethnic
nationalism in late twentieth century Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any one of these theories
cannot adequately explain the causes of the recent war. However, a historian, combining
a number of their components, and expounding on some of these theories, can begin to
construct a partial paradigm to help explain the events leading up to and perpetuating the
hostilities.

Nationalism and nationalist movements should be examined culturally,
historically, and structurally, as well as politically to understand their extremely important

influence on modern Europe.“ Ethnicities define members of their nations by the

 

23Dzevad Karahasan, W, translated by Slobodan Drakulic
(New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 6-7. Professor Karahasan is a Muslim
academic and writer who fled Sarajevo about one year after the shelling started. At one
time he was a faculty member at the University of Sarajevo.

24David LoRomer, “The Geography of Italian Nationalism,” unpublished paper
(New Orleans: Social Science History Association, 3 November 1991), 2.

10

11

activities of their constituent peoples. This includes all cultural expressions such as
dance, language, etc.” Nation-states develop when an indigenous culture becomes aware
of its national existence and seeks a way to incorporate the whole nation, or a large
majority of the nation, into one political unit, in which the rulers of this entity are of the
same ethnicity.

Ernest Gellner's own theories rely to a great extent on language and nationalized
education as determining factors of national identity. Gellner, proclaiming himself
neither a Marxist theorist nor a nationalist, raises some other rather thought-provoking
interpretations of why nationalism is such a driving force in modern politics. He refers to
the presence of a High and Low culture based on educational factors, and a standardized
education dependent upon a single language. High Culture must, in Gellner’s conception,
be in a definite language and must transmit rules for acceptable behavioral patterns
[culture].26

According to Gellner, personal identity within the political unit becomes the
central and most important concern of the budding nationalist.27 Religious agitation and
economic crisis, he argues, have often inspired certain groups to latch onto nationalist
rhetoric. Religion, according to Gellner, can "over-excite" nationalist feeling, setting up a

national policy of intolerance, especially if the “other” threatens religious practices such

 

2’Ernest Gellner, WW (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 35.
261bid., 42.
271bid., Vii.

11
activities of their constituent peoples. This includes all cultural expressions such as
dance, language, etc.” Nation-states develop when an indigenous culture becomes aware
of its national existence and seeks a way to incorporate the whole nation, or a large

majority of the nation, into one political unit, in which the rulers of this entity are of the

same ethnicity.

- .. ‘r's own theories rely to a great extent on language and nationalized

  
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
     

ctors of national identity. Gellner, proclaiming himself
nationalist, raises some other rather thought-provoking

's such a driving force in modern politics. He refers to
6 based on educational factors, and a standardized

2 _e. High Culture must, in Gellner’s conception,

les for acceptable behavioral patterns

the political unit becomes the
alist.27 Religious agitation and
-s to latch onto nationalist
ionalist feeling, setting up a

ligious practices such

12

as those believed by many in Yugoslavia.28 The Serbian Orthodox29 and Catholic
churches have helped in over-exciting the separate nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.30
Some of the religious leaders of the churches have actively supported nationalist
politician agendas in order to sway their followers into the nationalist camps. A fine
example of this type of religious support of separation was reported in the Feb. 13, 1996
issue of the W by Mike O’Connor. Friars and nuns of the Franciscan order
explained to O’Conner that the Croats could never share power with the “Muslim”
government. According to Rev. Vinko Mikolic, “That is a government of Muslims.
They are no better than the Turkish occupiers from our history. We cannot let them
occupy us again.” And a nun, Sister Maximila, claims the Muslims are the Croat’s
“mortal enemies”. “They [non-Croats] say bad things about the Ustashe [the Fascist
leaders of the NDH during World War H who engaged in extremely brutal ethnic
cleansing targeting Serbs and “others” within their territory]. But to us they were
defending Croat culture, and they are heroes.” In their village Bobani, Herzegovina, on a
wall in St. Stephan’s Church, a mural is painted entitled, “The Suffering of the Croat
People”. On the mural, next to images of priests is Ranko Boban in Ustasi uniform. A

photograph of Ante Pavelic is displayed in the home of two of the Catholic priests.31 This

 

28Ibid., 178.

29Christopher Cviic, “Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe. The Case of
Yugoslavia.” MflleniumMmalntIntematicnaLSmdies 14(2) (1985): 203

30Mike O’Connor, “Bosnia Croats Resist Peace 1n Name and ‘Culture’, ” New
Wm, 13 February 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (66), 14 February 1996.

31Ibid.

13
illustrates the presence of chauvinism in the religious life of some of the Yugoslav
people.

Eric Hobsbawm's analysis of nationalist movements can be used in examining
reemerging nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His model for the evolution of a mature
nationalism is based on three major premises. First, an historical association with a
current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past must exist. Second, the existence
of a long-established cultural elite, possessing a written national literary and
administrative vernacular must be present. And third, the nation must have a proven
capacity for conquest.32

Hobsbawm’s theory pertains to Bosnia-Herzegovina in that Croats and Serbs have
sponsoring states which have some desire to unite all of their specific ethnicity into a
state. This model can be used to legitimize renewed national awareness and
campaigning. Both the Croats and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have historical
memory of an independent medieval kingdom. First, the Croats and the Serbs historically
had independent states in which a large part of their own nationality resided within the
borders of that state. With this knowledge, the leaders espousing national platforms are
romanticize the Serbian or Croatian cradles of civilization. Kosovo and Knin are both
used as sacred areas and forever belonging to their respective nations. “Others” in these

sacred areas can arouse emotional, irrational behavior in otherwise stable individuals.

Both nations also want to incorporate the remnants of their people in the disputed areas of

 

32Eric J. Hobsbawm. WW (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 37-38.

l4

Bosnia. Unfortunately, the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina are set, and much of the
ethnic concentration of the traditional territories overlaps and is discontinuous.

The High Culture of both nationalisms spread propaganda to the Middle"3 and
Low Cultures, disseminating nationalist rhetoric and conspiracy theories. Many Croats
(under Tudjman) and Serbs (under Karadzic and Milosevic) were members of the High
and Middle Cultures. These groups used education and propaganda to distribute their
ideas and fears to a large percentage of the population. Even though as many as 35% of
the Bosnian Serbs were illiterate,34 radio and television provided many with a vehicle for
distribution of this rhetoric. The majority of the urban inhabitants of Bosnia could read in
both alphabets and therefore the propaganda distributed by the national agitators could
not only rally one side together, but, at the same time, also inflame reactive responses.

These reactions could be seen as aggression toward the first group and a self-perpetuating

 

3"The Middle Culture is a group which is between Ernest Gellner’s High and Low
Cultures. While Gellner claims that the High Culture is literate and therefore the bearers
of national sentiment. The Low Culture is dragged along into a national movement after
the elite spread their rhetoric to the masses through various means. The Middle Culture is
indicative of a group in the nationality in question, which has some educational
background such as elementary school and personal experience with the High Culture,
and is therefore not as prone to distrust the elites as some in the Low Culture may. In
fact, the Middle Culture may even have great respect for those making up the High
Culture and could even make excellent and loyal disciples of the nationalist cause. The
Middle Culture tends to be more urban and blue collar than the peasant Low Culture. For
this reason the Middle Culture tends to have more access to media as well as a better
chance of being affected by a downturn in the industrial economy. I think that the
majority of the para-military combatants fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially just
after the beginning of the war, were discontent, unemployed members of the Middle
Culture.

3"Vulliamy, 52.

15

loop develops.” This forced a responsive nationalism to develop in a previously non-
nationalist group. This can be seen in Vulliamy's description of the experiences of
Fahrudin Alihodzic, a Muslim refugee turned combatant due to his experience with
Serbian ethnic cleansing of a Muslim village.“5 Unfortunately, many Muslims and Croats
had to fold into these pressures in order to stay alive.

And last, the Croats and the Serbs have shown the ability to conquer portions of
land, perceived by one side or the other, to have historically belonged to that nationality.
For example, in the summer of 1995, the Croatian army reconquered the area around
Knin, the supposed spiritual center of Croatia, yet the population living in this city was
primarily Serbian.37 Another example is the purging of the Albanian Kosovo leaders and
civil servants and replacing them with Serbs, and revoking the area’s autonomy within
the Serbian state, even though this area was about 85% ethnically Albanian.38 Kosovo
was the Serbian version of Knin in terms of national spirituality. It was at Kosovo that
the medieval Serbian kingdom ended with the Ottoman victory over the combined forces
of Serbs, Bosnians, and Albanians. This defeat is the most important event in Serbian
history (according to the nationalists) and because of this Kosovo became the heartland of

the medieval Serbian kingdom. The Albanians were a threat to this area and in order to

 

35James Gow, “Serbian Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the

International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?” Slamigandfiastemfiumpean
Ram 72 (3) (July 1994): 473.

36Vulliamy, 145—150.

37Misha Glenny, WM (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 19-20.

38Donia and Fine, 184.

l6

cement popular support to a Serb leader espousing a nationalist platform, Kosovo needed
to be secured. Kosovo was symbolically re-conquered by Milosevic's purge and
persecution of Albanians. So even though Hobsbawm’s theory was originally applied to
emerging nationalism, it can also be applied to revitalized national conflicts in order for
some intellectual nationalists to legitimize their revived movement.

Other theorists provide useful paradigms in analyzing the development and
ascendency of nations and nationalism. For example, Miloslav Hroch, in his book Social
Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, presents a model for the development of
small national movements. Hroch's national development model focuses on the evolution
of small nationalities which have been historically dominated by another power. Though
the Croats and Serbs are not analyzed here, they fit easily into Hroch’s paradigm since
they have historically been under the auspices of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Hroch’s model can be applied to not only emerging national movements, but also
to those that are “re-emerging”. This paradigm aids the researcher in analyzing certain
steps which led to the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina into its constituent nations. A
crisis of identity was introduced to Bosnia-Herzegovina by “outside” influences. Hroch’s
phases illustrate this rapid shift from a growing sense of Yugoslav identity, to a renewed
sense of national identity.

Hroch lists the three fundamental stages in developing national movements.
Phase A is the "passionate" concern with the study of language, culture, and history of an
oppressed nationality among the intelligentsia of the oppressed culture (or intelligentsia

of another nationality). Phase B is the period of national agitation by a group of patriots

l7

"dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the language and
culture, who saw their mission as the spreading of national consciousness among the
people [of their nationality]". Phase C, the rise of a mass national movement.” This
model creates an "other"—-in this case a dominating or competing “other”.

language and cultural differences are explored in Phase A by the intelligentsia
and national leaders. Both the majority of the Croats and the Serbs knew about the
nationality question since the interwar period. But the renewed study of specific national
culture can be labeled a rediscovery of the “people’s” consciousness and can provoke,
among the intellectuals and members of the High Culture, an increased interest in their
respective nationalities. According to Warren Zimmerman, the last United States
ambassador to Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia’s break-up was “a classic example of nationalism
from the top”. He claims that nationalist intellectuals used “pseudo-history” to glorify the
Serbian cause among themselves with every intention of spreading these ideas to the
masses of their nationalities."0 Revisionist histories, primarily read by the intelligentsia,
appeared, such as Veselin Djuretich’s W3 which
claimed that the World War II Chetniks were in no way Fascist and he places them as

moral equals with the Partisans. He also claimed in this book that the Serbs suffered the

 

39Hroch, 22-23.

”Warren Zimmerman, “The Last Ambassador--A Memoir of the Collapse of
Yugoslavia,” EomignAffairs 72 (2): from BOSNEWS Digest 480, 26 November 1995
and Digest 486, 1 December 1995.

18

most during the war because they were on everyone’s “hit list”.41 Milosevic too was
interested in the promotion of Serbian culture as illustrated by his introduction of Cyrillic
to a country which had been Latinizing since World War II, and his allowing the
rebuilding of damaged Orthodox Churches and the construction of new ones."2

Phase B is reflected in the adoption of nationalist platforms by the opportunist
leaders after Broz’s death and their first attempts to spread these ideas to their constituent
nations. Milosevic and Tudjman used this technique to gain support from the common
people. They idealize a future without the insidious plots against them formulated by the
re-created “other”. During this phase, the High Culture illustrates the joys of inclusion in
the new identity and degrades the mixing and impurities in those who wish to remain
with the “others”. This national agitation by the intelligentsia and leadership is illustrated
in the spreading of ideology as well as paranoia to the masses of each nation. These
activists pushed definitions of “us” and the “other” on their cultures by organizing events
such as national feasts, and glorifying heros of the past.43 The purity and wholesomeness
of the culture and the nation’s ability to endure even after foreign domination is also
stressed."4 Politically the national elite attempted to sway public opinion. For example,

in a political statement by a Serbian politician, Batric Janovljevic was quoted as saying in

 

“Alex N. Dragnich, “The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia: The Omen of the Upsurge
of Serbian Nationalism,” W3: 23 (2) (June 1989): 187.

“Sabrina Petra Rarnet, 33.1mm (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 27.

43Edward Said, W (New York: Knopf, 1993), 37.
“Ibid., 16.

19

the Serbian parliament: “The truth is that all non-Serbian ethnic groups, especially the
Croats, are at this very minute preparing the genocide of all Serbs...The Croats hate us,
the Slovenes don’t like us, we are despised by the Muslims and Macedonians?“ This
type of national agitation eventually spread to a significant number of peOple in each
nationality and then entered Hroch’s Phase C.

Phase C is shown in the mass acceptance of these new forms of identity which
facilitated the war in Yugoslavia, then in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This renewed interest is
then transferred to a more radical group of patriots, who spread the national identity
(stressing the "otherness" of outsiders) to the people making up the “new” nationality. By
using the media to distribute these exclusivist ideas, the Middle and Low Cultures reacted
to the political posturings and imagined plots and in many cases sided with the outside
separatist propaganda. This helped promote the split between the internal groups in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The nationalist agitators continued to keep their followers loyal by
continually pointing out the differences between the national groups, without taking into
account that the South Slavs shared the same Slavic blood and the common
irreligiousness prevalent before the outbreak of hostilities.“

But these and other theorists have not provided a completely satisfactory model to
explain the resurgence of separatist and chauvinistic nationalism in Yugoslavia-~a

“Peculiarities of Yugoslav Nationalism” if you will. In order to reach at least a partial

 

4’Paul Parin, “Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections,” essay in Alexandra Stiglmayer,

ed W (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994), 50.

4“Gjelten, 24.

20

explanation of what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one must combine parts of these
theories into a new theory while discarding the parts not relevant to this unique case. In
order to get a feeling for the peculiarities of the different Yugoslav national movements in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, one must examine the history of nationalism in the former

Yugoslavia.

Chapter 4
HISTORICAL ROLE OF NATIONALISM IN THE SOUTH SLAV LANDS

The traditional instability of this region is due in part to the historical east-west
power fluctuations and, in part, to the many ethnic nationalisms which sprouted in
response to this shifting power. One example of this instability was the irredentist Slavic
nationalist movement which embittered relations between Italy and Yugoslavia just after
World War I. This was due to the Allies granting Italy a substantive amount of land with
a South Slavic majority to secure Italian support against the Central Powers. The
antagonistic D’Annunzio raid against the Croatian city of Rijeka in 1920 further strained
relations between the Slavs and Italians."7 Serbian nationalism eventually came to
dominate the new state under Regent Petar Karadjordjevic. This facilitated the activity of
nationalist terrorist groups such as the Macedonian IMRO and the Croatian Ustasi
separatists."8

However, throughout the majority of its history, Bosnia was renown for its ethnic
toleration. Bosnia, as a political unit, enjoyed relative ethnic harmony among its Slavic

inhabitants. As nationalism was introduced to the region shortly before the middle of the

 

”See Mario Sznajder, “The “Carta del Carnaro” and Modernization,” W
Wight: 18 (1989): 439-61; which details this amazing event.

“Banac, Nationalfluesticn 326.
21

22

nineteenth century, tensions began to develop among a very small portion of the
population. The people mainly affected by this new form of self-identify came primarily
from the intelligentsia, local politicians, and certain members of the clergy of each of the
major religions indigenous to Bosnia. For example, among the Croatian population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Franciscans first introduced the concept of nationalism to the
peasants.49 However, the Croatian peasantry was "extraordinarily slow" in accepting their
roles as Croats?0

The history of nationalism in what was once Yugoslavia is a tempestuous history
among the elite of society, especially during the period of national maturation. Ivo Banac
attests to the problems of national identity among the Yugoslavian people in his work,
The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. He shows the many
twists and turns each nationalism took to mature into organized, mass movements in
Yugoslavia. But separatist nationalism did not become a major issue among the majority
of the Yugoslavian people until the Second World War.’1

In order to understand the current victory of nationalism over multi-ethnicity in
Bosnia, the historian must look to the past to see the outside influences that have torn
Yugoslavia, and its most multi-ethnic republic, apart. A movement for political

independence of a South Slavic people first began among the Serbs in 1804 against the

 

49Donia and Fine, 64-65.

soMirjana Gross, “Croatian N at1onal Integrational Ideologies from the End of

Illyrism to the Creation of Yugoslavia,” W 15-16 (1979-1980):
11.

"Banac, Naucnalfluesticn 225.

23

Ottoman Empire. This uprising proved unsuccessful, but dissatisfaction remained strong
among the local Serbian elite. This dissatisfaction resurfaced in 1815 in a series of
uprisings by the Serbs against their Turkish overlords. Russia, long at odds with the
Ottoman Empire, supported these revolts in the guise of pan-Slavic unity. With Russian
assistance, Serbia eventually gained autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and just 15
years later would gain, for all practical purposes, full independence.’2

This newly gained independence did not long satisfy the new political and
economic elite. History recorded that the medieval Serbian Empire had been much larger
and encompassed the majority of the Serbian people. History also provided the Serbian
intelligentsia with the idea of a so-called heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom--
Kosovouwhich would, in the latter twentieth century, bring about the beginning of the
fall of Yugoslavia as a unified political entity. In 1844, Ilija Gerasanin, the Serbian
minister of the interior, proposed a plan, in the form of a memorandum”, which called for
the unification of the entire Serb nation into a single state under self-rule.“ His idea of a
“Greater Serbia” periodically re-appeared, and caused massive fear and unrest in the
Balkans over the last 152 years.

The Serb nationalists (still a small minority of the Serbs as a whole) would

continue to push for more land containing significant proportions of Serbs. In 1875, a

 

”Mark Almond. WWW (Reading: Cox
& Wyman Ltd., 1994), 64-68.

53Ibid., 68. According to Almond, the Serbian Academy of Science would base
their 1986 document upon Gerasanin’s.

”Banac, Nationalfluestian 83.

24

peasant revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted in which the Russians, once again seeking
to gain influence at Turkish expense, and Montenegrins assisted the peasants in driving
the Ottomans from the region, as well as from Macedonia and parts of Serbia.” England
and the Habsburgs saw this new Russian influence in the Balkans as a threat to the
balance of power in Europe. To escape the possible violent ramifications of this
development, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 granted Austria—Hungary the right to govern
Bosnia-Herzegovina and returned Macedonia to the Ottomans?6 Since both of these
regions contained significant numbers of Serbs, the goal of creating “Greater Serbia” was
once again thwarted, and Serbia felt itself manipulated by the Great Powers.

The Serbs were not the only South Slav group interested in some sort of self-rule
and ethnic identification. During the Revolution of 1848, Croatian political elites sided
with the beleaguered Austrian crown against the rebelling Hungarians.” With this aid,
and the help provided by the Russian armies, Austria defeated the Hungarians which
resulted in Croatia and Dalmatia enjoying a favorable status within the empire. But also
in 1848, the Croatian intelligentsia had latched onto the growing notion of nationalism
and began to formulate a specific Croatian identity. Kadic claims that the intelligentsia of

the well-educated Croats in the Istrian peninsula rediscovered the importance that the

 

55Almond, 73.

"Mark Pinson. ed. IheMuslimmtannia—Herzegoxina (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994), 87.

57Almond, 70.

25

peninsula's literature played in the cultural identity of the Croats.58 The important role of
Croatian culture to politics is reflected in the election of Eugene Kumicic, a renown Croat
novelist and student of national literature, to the Croatian Sabor in Zagreb as a member of
Starcevic’s Party of Rights.’9

Unfortunately for the Croats, the Austrian Emperor, recognizing the possible re—
emergence of Hungarian revolution, granted the Aussgleich of 1867. This gave Hungary
equal status with Austria in the empire. The Croats received no such boon. To further
promote tensions, many parts of Croatia fell under the authority of the vengeful
Hungarians. A fierce policy of Magyarization then ensued, since Croatia remained loyal
to the Austrian Habsburgs during the Revolution of 1848.60 To escape the wrath of
Magyarization, two types of Croatian nationalism developed. One was to remain loyal to
the Austrian Empire and eventually st1ive for equality within the empire; the other was a
call for total autonomy from the empire. For more than 50 years the nationalist leaders
quarreled over which path the developing nationality should take. These differences
would separate the Croats, preventing a maturation of a national identity which would
unify the majority of the nation.

Some divisions were even visible among the nationalists wishing to leave the

 

”Ante Kadic, “Istria in Croatian Literature,” WM 20
(1979): 37.

”bid, 42. For an exhaustive explanation of the early struggle of the Yugoslav's
nationalities, see Ivo Banac's The National Question in Yugoslavia, 1984.

“Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, Qigflahshmmgmmhia;

WWW Band 11 (Vienna: Der Osterreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 1975), 481.

26

Habsburg Empire. By this time Croat nationalism had entered a phase somewhere
between Hroch’s Phase B and C, and competition between Croat groups were evident.
On one side were the'Yugoslavists who wished to merge with the Serbs into a single
South Slav state, and on the other were the Starcevic and other Croatian "rights" groups,
such as the Frankists, who desired an independent, Croatian state which included Bosnia-
Herzegovina."1 These divisions would prevent Croatia from attaining a state of its own
until the Second World War. Yugoslavism had the support of the middle classes and
intelligentsia, and therefore national agitators did not appeal to the mass of Croatian
lower classes.62 Yugoslavism never matured to Hroch’s Phase C because of this. In
1911, the Party of Rights began to identify with the Catholic Church and began to appeal
to the masses through religion. This was the first time ardent Croatian separatist
nationalism appeared within a larger group of people. Its rhetoric claimed that Orthodox
and Catholic Christians cannot live together and this has underlain many Croatian
national movements since the 1910s.“ Intellectual societies promulgated this separatist
sentiment. For example, the Croatian writer Victor Car-Emin, secretary for the Society of
Saint Cyril and Methodius, claimed the goal of this nationalist society was. to spread and
deepen national consciousness to the Croatian people--assimilation under "others" must

not be tolerated.64

 

61Banac, Won, 70-115; and Gross, 4.

62Gross, 5.
63Ibid., 32.

64Kadic, 43.

27

In 1908, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. A series of
wars erupted throughout the Balkans, in which Serbia won adjacent lands with a sizable
Serb populace from Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Only the Serb minority of Croatia
and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs remained separate from this “Greater Serbia”. On
the eve of the First World War, the Serbian nationalists, and the extremely small Serbian
nationalist movements in Bosnia, feared that national unity would never be realized.
Franz Josef, the emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was in his late sixties and his
heir-apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was rumored to favor an incorporation of
the Croats and Slovenes into the dual monarchy, which would give them an equal share
of power.“ This would permanently separate the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina from their brethren in Serbia proper. On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand
made a scheduled trip to Sarajevo. Waiting for the Archduke was an assassination plot
orchestrated by members of Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), a Serbian nationalist
organization with ties to the Black Hand.“ After a bungled first attempt at assassination,
Gavrilo Princip killed Ferdinand and his wife on the 525th anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo. This event would spark the war in which the Balkan question was one of the
major issues.

After World War I, the first Yugoslavia was created as the Great Powers redrew
the map of Europe. Due to Serbia’s victory on the Allied side, the existence of a working

political infrastructure, the presence of a standing army, a royal house, and a goodly

 

65Donia and Fine, 115; and Banac, W, 125

6"’Donia and Fine, 115.

28

portion of the new nation’s population, Serbia quickly became the dominating influence
in Yugoslavian political and economic life.67 On June 28, 1921, the 532nd anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo, the constitution of Yugoslavia was passed providing for a centralist
government, nominally run by a parliament, but heavily influenced by the Serbian
monarch."8 Perturbed by this blatant show of Serbian domineering, the Slovene and Croat 3?-
delegations boycotted the vote to install the constitution, which. effectively gave them a
second class status in a country which was supposed to become a democracy under the

Wilsonian plan of national-determination.69 This boycott was the first major show of

 

active separatism among the South Slavs. "The roots of the present war...[in
Bosnia]...must be traced back to 1918-1921 when the Serbs rode roughshod over the
national aspirations of Croats, Macedonians, and Albanians, and imposed a centralized
administration dominated by Serbs".70
The inter-war period was a chaotic time for Yugoslavia. Ethnic discontent and

suspicion caused a number of governments to fail. Stjephan Radic’s Peasant Party of

Croatia represented a majority of Croats with his brand of pacifistic nationalism.71 But

 

°7Sebrina Petra Rarnet, Wrap: 2nd edition (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1995), 401.

“Banac, Nationalfluesticn 407.

69Roy Gutrnan, W (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1993), xix.

7"Rarnet,5.12;:iaLClurrrnts. 401.

71Ante Cuvalo, “Croatian Nationalism and the Croatian National Movement
(1966-1972) in Anglo-American Publications--A Critical Assessment,” humalgf
W 30 (1989): 73-

29

even a pacifist such as Radic perceived the Serbs, especially the Belgrade rulers, as “they”

and therefore a hostile “other” to the Croatian people.72 Radic recognized the Serbian

domination in that Croatia and Slovenia were more heavily taxed and their military

officers suffered demotions in favor of Serbs and Montenegrins. Macedonian and

Albanian children were denied education in their own languages, and Cyrillic was ”t.
imposed upon the Croats.73 The murder of Radic by a pro-Serb Montenegrin, Punisa
Racic, further heightened the already strained relations between the Croats and the
Serbs.74 The suspicion and tension only worsened when king Aleksander Karadjordjevic
dissolved parliament and established a royal dictatorship to stabilize and solidify his rule.
Neither Aleksander nor his Serb-dominated government practiced any form of melding
the Serbs and the Croats into a single people. For example, throughout the interwar
period, Serb children were only taught the Cyrillic alphabet, Serb history, and at an early
age an “other” identity was established upon non-Serbs. These children were taught to
consider themselves Serbs, not Yugoslavs, and to find fault with non-Serbs.” His
favoritism of the Serbian cause would last until his assassination in Marseilles, France in

1934 by the Croatian Ustasi separatists and the Macedonian terrorist organization,

 

"Banac, Natinnalflunstinn 242.
”Rarnet, Sncialfiurrents. 401.
7"Banac, Natinnalflrnstinn 226.

7’Charles Jelavich, "Comment on Gross article" MW 15-
16 (1979-1980): 40.

3O

IMRO.76

After King Aleksander’s death, a rapproachment between the Serbs and Croats
began. In 1939 an agreement was signed in which the Croats were finally allowed a good
deal of internal rule. Croatian autonomy within a Yugoslav state was agreed upon in the
1939 Cvetvokic-Macek Agreement. This diffused much of the tension between Croat
and Serb." Unfortunately this new development would not implimented over the long-
run due to the German invasion of April 6, 1941 in response to the overthrow of the
nominally pro-Nazi government.78

After eleven days of half-hearted resistance, the last organized Yugoslav military
units surrendered on April 17. What the conquerors would implement in the defeated
Yugoslavia is still fresh in the memories of the South Slavs and has provided much
stimuli to the national revenge cycle fueling the violence between Serbs and Croats. If
the sparks of the recent conflict began with the Serb-Croat question just after World War
I, then World War II dangerously aggravated these tensions. Germany occupied Serbia
and installed a puppet government under the former minister of war, General Milan
Nedic. For the first time since the Middle Ages, Croatia existed as an autonomous state,
albeit subject to the whims of the Nazis.

The Germans attempted to install a government under the auspices of the Croatian

Peasant Party just after their conquest. However, this most popular of political parties

‘1

761331136. Wm, 326.
77Woodward, 433.

78Donia and Fine, 132.

31

refused to help the Nazis, and Ante Pavelic’s Ustasi were put into power instead.79 This
regime was to control all of historical Croatia, the Dalmatian coast, and all of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Pavelic instituted a program of political, moral, and social violence which
surpassed Nazi Germany’s fervor in brutality, if not in efficiency. Jews, Gypsies, and
Serbs were tortured and slaughtered to create an ethnically pure Croatian nation which
included the most “ethnically pure Croats”, the Muslims.80 The Serbs in this area
suffered one of three fates. These were summed up at a state rally in which Mile Budak,
the second in command of the Ustasi state, said: “One part of the Serbs we shall kill,
another part we shall resettle, and the remaining part we shall convert to the Catholic faith
and thereby melt into Croats.”8|

Pavelic recognized that the Catholic Church could be used as a tool for swaying
Croatian support. By collaborating with the clergy, the idea was spread (which is relevant
in the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina) that the Orthodox faith, and therefore the Serbs,
struck an alliance with the communists to destroy Catholicism.82 This swayed some

Croats to side with the Ustasi, believing this was an active conspiracy to strip them of the

ability to practice their faith. Alojzie Stepinac, the arch-bishop of Zagreb, and other

 

7” Jasper Ridley, W (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1994), 162.

”Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations Between

Moslems and Non-Moslems,” We: 5 (3) (1990): 278.

81Darnir Mirkovic, “Victims and Perpetrators in the Yugoslav Genocide 1941-

1945: Some Preliminary Observations,” W 7 (3) (1993):
323.

82Menachem Shelah, “The Catholic Church in Croatia, the Vatican and the
Murder of the Croatian Jews,” WW 4 (3) (1989): 324.

32

clergy aided, in some form, the Ustasi Regime. For example, Filipovic Majstorovic, a
Franciscan, was the infamous “devil of J asenovac” who actively participated in the
genocidal practices against the Serbs.83

In response to these acts of savage brutality, the Serbian resistance movement
known as the Chetniks under Draza Mihajlovic began the decimation of Croatian and
Muslim civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mihajlovic’s instructions to his Chetnik
terrorists are chillingly similar to Budak’s plan: “...cleanse the state territory of all ethnic
minorities and non-national elements” and “create direct mutual borders between Serbia
and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing Sandzak of [its]
Moslem population and cleansing Bosnia of [its] Moslem and Croat population?“ The
Orthodox Church aided the Chetnik movement, and a number of Orthodox clergy actively
supported, and in some cases led, the Chetniks.” The Serbian violence pushed more
Croats and Muslims into the ranks of the Ustasi. As more Serbs were killed and
converted, some of those remaining free joined Chetnik units to extract revenge on the
Croat population. This sense of revenge and barbarity is one of the cornerstones of the
recent wave of violence in Bosnia. These memories receded during Broz’s rule, but
flared with the resurgence of nationalism after his death.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be the hardest hit by the war. Due to its high

 

83Ibid., 327.
8"Mirkovic, 324.

8SIvo Banac, “The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of
Yugoslavia’s Demise,” Daedalus 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 163.

33

proportion of Serbs located on NDH territory, many were killed by the Ustasi occupiers.
Chetnik activity claimed many Croat and Muslim lives in reprisals against the Ustasi.
Partisan activity against supporters of the Ustasi, Germans, Italians, or Chetniks, real or
imagined, claimed the lives of many Bosnians.86 “Of [Bosnia’s] 2.8 million people,
400,000 perished-every sixth Serb, eighth Croat, and twelfth Muslim”.87

During this period of ethnic hatred and violence, a former soldier from the old
Austro—Hungarian army organized a group of Yugoslavs intent on restoring autonomy to
their country. Josef Broz Tito, a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,
organized a military resistance movement open to all enemies of the German and Italian
invaders. The Partisans were formed in the mountainous regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and banded all nationalities together to force out the foreign occupiers. At the end of
1942, the Partisans numbered about 140,000 soldiers, most of them Montenegrin and
Serbian. During 1943, many Croats and Muslims who opposed the Ustasi government
and their German allies, joined the movement.88 The struggle between the Partisans and
Chetniks was one of the most poignant battles between multi-culturalists and nationalists.
This struggle was reflected in the recent three year war in Bosnia, in that it pitted national
separatists (the Serbian Chetniks and Milosevic’s regime on one hand, and the Croat

extremists and Tudjman’s Croatian state on the other) against the multi-ethnic community

 

“Mirkovic, 318.

87Aleksa Djilas, “The Nation That Wasn’t,” Wis; (20 September
1992): 30.

88Alexandra Stiglmayer, MassRanethnflaLAgainstflnmnniansnia:
Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 11.

34

led by Alija Izetbegovic’s Bosnian government.

Chapter 5
BROZ AND THE MANIPULATION OF NATIONALISM

Though much of Bosnia’s historical tolerance was shaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina
by the establishment of the Chetniks, Ustasi state, and the existence of two units of
Muslim SS, the Partisans under Broz exemplified the multi-ethnic character of the
Bosnian people. From the very beginning of the Second World War, Broz admired the
multi-ethnic toleration of the Bosnians. He declared that after the war, Bosnia "would be
'neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim but rather Serbian and Croatian and Muslim'.
As his Yugoslavia was to be a multinational socialist state, Bosnia would be its most
genuine portion".89 Broz was successful in liberating his country from fascism and
German occupation. His movement was open to members of all ethnicities willing to
fight a common enemy in the Ustasi, the Chetniks, and the Nazi occupiers. His success
against the enemy and in putting together a viable state after the war hinged on the
concept of multi-ethnic cooperation between equal units.90 Broz recognized that the
ethnic conflicts tearing apart the first Yugoslavia were due to the Serbian domination of

the government in the interwar period. He thought that if this happened again, it would

 

8"’Dusko Doder, “Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds,” W19! 91 (1993):
l 1.

90Bogdan Denitch, “Yugoslavia: the Limits of Reform,” Dissent 36 (l) (1989): 81.
35

36

significantly weaken his new state, and leave open the possibility that the other nations
would ally themselves with an invading enemy to free themselves from the yoke of
Serbian hegemony.91 Broz attempted to keep relations between the narods (nations)
peaceful. Laws were implemented to prevent wide-spread inter-ethnic violence. For
example, Serb royalist and Croat Ustasi symbols were banned from public display in an
attempt to heal the wounds between the nations caused by the war brought on by
Germany and Italy. Moreover Broz’s government punished crimes of ethnic violence
very harshly.92 As a further attack on symbols of ethnic conflict, he also prosecuted the
Chetnik commander Mihajlovic and attacked the role of the Catholic Church in the Ustasi
regime through its questionable bishop of Zagreb. Mihajlovic was tried and executed for
his part in the Chetnik atrocities.93 Stepinac was placed under arrest after the war due to
his participation, either active or passive, in the Ustasi policy of forced conversions of
non-Catholic peoples.“ The Catholic Church was portrayed as repressive, reactionary,
and anti-Yugoslav due its direct involvement with Croatian national identity.” Broz also

reduced the power of the Orthodox Church by encouraging the autocephalous branching

 

S"Banac, “Asymmetry”, 147.

”Jim Seroka, “Nationalism and the New Political Compact in Yugoslavia,”

WM 15 (4'6)(1992)1 577-578-
93Banac, “Asymmetry”, 145.
“Mirkovic, 327.

”Seroka, 577.

37

of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,96 therefore attempting to balance his policies
between both the Croats and Serbs. His attempted policy of equality among ethnicities
included the equalization of languages throughout Yugoslavia during his reign.97
Titoism, as it was later called, would supposedly guarantee equality to every constituent
nation and the right to internal development.98

After the German withdrawal from Yugoslavia, Broz created an unified state
under communist rule. Later during his reign, he did allow some forms of national
expression as long as these demonstrations did not promote violence. From its creation
as a socialist state, Yugoslavia has catered to the national groups making up the
multiethnic state in order to achieve socialist ends.99 The Marxist experiment in
Yugoslavia was based on the premise that the support of the nations of the constituent
South Slav peoples was necessary in order to rebuild successfully a dismembered political
unit. To appeal to these nationalities, Broz prorrrised to allow some cultural autonomy in
each newly formed republic. The Communist leaders mistakenly believed that as the
socialist experiment progressed and the workers identified themselves more and more by

class instead of national criteria, nationalism would soon fade, then die out altogether.‘°°

 

96Banac, “Asymmetry”, 145.
”Denitch, “Limits”, 82.

98Vladirrrir Dedijer, “Titoism,” essay in Gerasimos Augustinos, ed. W
W (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1996), 87.

99Oskar Gruenwald, “The Croatian Spring, 1971: Socialism in One Republic?”
Nannnalitinflapnrs 10(2) (1982): 225.

l""Gow, 460 and Cuvalo, 70.

38

In the case of the second Yugoslavia which was formed after World War II, and
especially Bosnia, Tito used the existing nationalisms against one another, reiterated
national commonalities, and sometimes used coercion to promote a multiethnic state
based much on the partisan movement which he led during the Second World War. "’1
However, Serbian elites attempted to dominate the policy of the government again
as they had in the first Yugoslavia. For the first twenty years of communist rule,
Aleksander Rankovic’s UDBA (secret police) put down numerous anti-govemment
demonstrations by the Croat and Albanian minorities. In an unprecedented move, Tito
responded to demands for liberalization, and sacked the Serbian head of the secret police
in 1966.102 Rankovic and his cohorts were made out to be the cause for the numerous
failed reforms initiated by the Tito regime in the first twenty years of its existence. He
was also made out to be repressive of non-Serb national groups, especially the Kosovo

"’3 A policy of more toleration toward displays of nationalism along with the

Albanians.
government reiterating commonalities between the nationalities became the order of the
day. ’0‘ More national freedoms were allowed along with the liberalization of each

republic’s economy, causing the republics to identify more with their own people than

 

"”Gruenwald, 227.

102Vojin Dimitrijevic, “The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a
Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” essay in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse,

Wm (Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, 1995), 50.

103Ridley, 380 and 400.

104Gruenwald, 227 .

39

with Yugoslavism.

In Spring of 1965 during the Fourth Congress of the League of Communists of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim population was given the right to national self-
determination‘“ effectively giving the Muslims a nation as well as a religious form of
identity. Broz allowed this political maneuver to try to end the Serb-Croat argument for
the control of Bosnia.“5 Even though Broz let the Yugoslavs enjoy some national
expression, he would not allow nationalism to go too far in challenging his central rule.
This can be seen in the movement that has been labeled the “Croatian Spring”.

In the last half of the 19605, the Croatian League of Communist and a number of
leading Croatian intellectuals, revived a cultural movement. As this minor cultural
movement became more popular, more people began to participate, somewhat reflecting
Hroch’s Phase B to C. As more time passed, questions were being raised about the
possibility of economically becoming more autonomous within the federation. When
these expectation could not be met in a legal manner, more extreme nationalism was
adopted in reaction to the people’s disappointment.107 In 1971, leading Croatian
politicians tried to force the central government into granting more autonomy to Croatia,
and rumors in official circles suggested the possibility of an independent Croatian nation.

The “Croatian Spring” was quickly quelled and new leaders loyal to Broz took the place

 

105Frederik W. Hondius, IhnXugnslaLCnmmuniuntNatinns (The Hague:
Mouton, 1968), 247-48.

lo”Cviic, 201.

lo”’Cuvalo, 81.

40

of the purged ones.108 Charges of nationalism facilitated the purges in which over 500
people were arrested by the Fall of 1972,‘09 including Tudjman.110 After the “Croatian
Spring” failed, Croatian identity was suppressed and the economy was further exploited
by the federal government.111 After the purge of the Croatian leadership, Broz realized
the potential danger that by sacking the Croat leadership, Croat loyalty to the central state
might be in jeopardy. To keep a balance of power between the two states most likely to
challenge Yugoslavism, Broz sacked the creative, liberal Serb party leadership with
charges of nationalist agitation and counterrevolution just after his purge of the Croat
leadership. ' '2

As a reaction to the Croatian Spring and sackings of the Croatian and Serbian
communist leaders, Broz once again decided to implement a new, more liberal
constitution. The Constitution of 1974 set a number of precedents that the Yugoslav
republics would use to legitimize secession from the collapsing state in 1990 and 1991.
First the constitution guaranteed each republic the right of secession. Supposedly, a state

could disassociate itself from the federation at any time that its association was

 

108Franjo Tudjman, W (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981), 134.

lo”Gruenwald, 223.

”Tudjman was also jailed for nationalist agitation again in the early 19803 for
accusing Serbia of domination of the Yugoslav state. Lenard J. Cohen, Bmkenfignds;

Xugnslanasflmntngrannnnndfialkanflnlmgsrnlransmnn 2nd edition (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995), 110; and Rarnet, Smial, 310.

lllCuvalo, 83.

112Ridley, 400; and Banac, “Asymmetry”, 148.

41

detrimental to its welfare. Of course Broz never believed the republics would ever use
this option, but it was technically available to appease those individuals pushing for a
looser confederation. Secondly, the constitution established more autonomous economies
in each republic. Portions of debt were assigned as the responsibility of individual
republics and more foreign capital acquired within a republic was allowed to remain in
the republic. And last, the new constitution allowed for more national expression among
ethnicities in Yugoslavia.113 These concessions would later come back to haunt the aging
Marshal. Bosnia-Herzegovina also adopted a federally approved constitution which
guaranteed the equality of all nations within her borders.“"

During Broz's reign, the majority of ethnic struggles were suppressed, and,
especially in the urban parts of Bosnia during the Serb, Muslim, Croat war, the national
boundaries were temporarily lowered as the traditions of ethnic and religious tolerance
once again rose above the turmoil created by occupation by a foreign enemy. As time
passed, Broz conceded more ground to the nationalist movements within Yugoslavia. His
government structure was based on a rotating presidency in which each official nation
sent a representative to Belgrade to take a turn as the chairman of the presidency

1115

counci The remainder of the presidency were “selected according to a strict regional

 

”3Woodward, 432.

11"Robert M. Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav
Republics,” W 51 (4) (Winter 1992): 661.

“’Sabrina Petra Ramet. Natinnalismandfiednralisminlugnslamiw
2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 66.

42

quota system”.116 These concessions, guaranteed in the Constitution of 1974, would
signal the beginning of the end of Marxism in Yugoslavia. The constitution also allowed
the republics and autonomous provinces the right to veto measures which effectively
emasculated the federal government. State-wide statutes could not be implemented even
if one veto was registered.“7 Even Broz may have recognized his mistake at allowing the
nationalities too much freedom along national lines. He is reported as saying to Svetozar
Vukmanovic-Tempo, one of his loyal lieutenants, that “Yugoslavia no longer exists” just
after the passage of the Constitution of 1974.”8

But Broz’s “brotherhood and unity” would not last long after his death in 1980.
Without his charismatic leadership, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia continued
to splinter along national lines. Each republic’s official party focused everrnore on the

119

interests of each nationality and not on Yugoslavia as a whole. The splintering

accelerated due to the dire economic situation of Yugoslavia, which had been in crisis

9 120

since 197 , and allowed a strange relationship between liberal communism and

nationalism to develop. More freedoms were granted to the separate republics and the

 

116Steven L. Burg, “Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” mm: 38 (2)
(April 1986): 179-80.

117"Restless Slav soldiers,” W 305, 3 October 1987, 18.

“’Stevan Pavlowitch. Iitnzhgnslaxialsfirnatflintatnrmkmsnssmnnt
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992), 78.

”’30ng Deniteh WWW
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), 60.

”oBurg, “Elite,” 173.

43

central government became exceedingly weaker in controlling these areas based on the
precedents established in the 1974 Constitutionm Heavily indebted to the West from
foreign loans and numerous failed reforms of socialism, Broz’s policies, as well as those
of his successors, brought the economy to a standstill. The vacuum of power created after
Broz’s death could only be filled by politicians espousing an agenda which would
promise economic success and strength. The most accessible and increasingly popular
agenda which could appeal to the many factions in Yugoslavia was nationalism.
Nationalist rhetoric could create blame for this crisis on one group or another before the
actual blame could be turned against those communist leaders whom served under Broz.
Nationalism buoyed up the sinking careers of many failing politicians and provided others

with a rapid advancement socially and politically.

 

121Gow, 460.

Chapter 6
MILOSEVIC: THE RISE AND POPULARIZATION OF NATIONAL APPEAL

In 1981, Kosovo’s Albanian population held a series of strikes and protests
against the Serb-dominated economy and power structure in this autonomous province.
The Serbs, holding the majority of power in Kosovo, crushed the revolt before it became
uncontrollable. The Albanian uprising provided Serbs, still seeking to carve out a
“Greater Serbia”, with the perfect opportunity to push home their case. During the
uprising, the Serb controlled media released reports that evidence had been found that
Albanian Muslims were planning to remove the Serbian presence from Kosovo using
genocide, and to join the province to Albania. Since the “heart” of Serbia has
traditionally been in Kosovo, the Serbian population of Yugoslavia supported the violent
reprisals against the “heathen” Albanian majority. This continued hostility in Kosovo
provided the perfect opportunity for a political opportunist to take the reigns of power
among the Serbian people. Using the Kosovo crisis to introduce nationalist policy to
“protect” threatened Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic mobilized the disillusioned Serbs of
Serbia and Kosovo against the “threatening” nationalities. He would later use many of
the same tactics to turn Bosnian Serbs against their Croat and Muslim neighbors.

Most sources indicate the first truly successful nationalist politician in the post-

Tito Yugoslavia was a former banker, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic, an experienced

44

45

politician, attempted to link nationalist interests with communist leadership in a strong
centralized governmental structure.122 Riding the wave of national sentiment and
benefitting from the deteriorating economic situation, Milosevic turned on his former
mentor and patron, Ivan Stambolic, and seized control of the Serbian presidency in
1986.123 Milosevic saw that the only way to alleviate his country’s woes was to institute
an extremely centralized government, which was totally subservient to his leadership. In
an astute political move, he turned the Serbian people’s scrutiny from economic reform to
an imaginary plot against the Serbian people planned by the Albania majority in Kosovo.
Using the shrinking Serb population of Kosovo due to economic failure in the area as
“hard evidence”, Milosevic spread rumors of persecution against the Serbs by the
Albaniansm The Serbian leader, having seen the power and respect mass
demonstrations promoted in people, organized mass gatherings to further instill national
pride in Serbs, and provide an outlet of paranoid rhetoric focused on non-Serb ethnicities,
especially the Albanians.125 Milosevic recognized the nationalist love affair with the
province of Kosovo and the quasi-religious significance of the defeat of the medieval
Serbian kingdom in Kosovo on June 28, 1389. On June 28, 1989, the 600th anniversary
of the losing battle, Milosevic helped organize a national rally of Serbs to celebrate this

‘holiday’. Approximately one million Serbs from all over the world came to Kosovo.

 

122Denitch, Ethnic, 60.
123Woodward, 90.
124"Force of Destruction.” Natinnalliexim 39 (28 August 1987): 42-

125Denitch, “Yugoslavia,” 80.

46

Milosevic delivered a pro-Serbian speech peppered with warnings for non-Serbs refusing
to tow the Serbia-dominated line.126 These events were to scare non-Serbs into
complacency within Yugoslavia.127

Milosevic effectively continued to turn the Serbian population against other
nationalities. He began to use history to justify the resurgence of Serbian nationalism.
Milosevic blamed Yugoslavia’s decline on non-Serbs who dominated the state during
Broz’s reign. In another deft move, he replaced all party functionaries with loyal
underlings in the autonomous provinces and in Montenegro.128 The autonomous

‘29 much to the

provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, would quickly lose their special status,
chagrin of their non-Serbian populations. Milosevic stifled all ethnic Albanian practices
in Kosovo, including classes taught in Albanian, while ruthlessly repressing any
opposition to his mandates. His enthusiasm created suspicion among the other republics,
especially those with a significant Serbian population. “Greater Serbia” was once again
being talked about among the nationalities of Yugoslavia, among some with fear, among
others with longing.

Recognizing the danger of Serbian nationalism for non-Serbs across Yugoslavia,

the communist parties in Slovenia and Croatia officially protested the crack-down in

Kosovo. In response to deserved criticism, Milosevic publicly labeled the critical leaders

 

126Glenny, 35.
mIbid., 33-34.

mRamet, National, 228.
129“Did.

47

as “‘enerrries of Serbia’. Milosevic accused them [the Slovenian and Croatian
Communist Parties] of being ‘separatist, nationalists, and destroyers of Yugoslavia’” who
considered “Serbian greatness a thorn in the side [of their respective republics].”.130 A
round of political accusations tore at the weakened seams holding Yugoslavia together.
This would culminate at the final meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
Recognizing the political darn Milosevic constructed blocked any effective executive
action by the rotating presidency of the federal government, the Slovenian delegation
walked out on the proceedings, making any chance of reaching a general accord on

maintaining the union difficult.

 

130Stiglmayer, 15.

Chapter 7
TUDJMAN: CROATIAN NATIONALISM IN ACTION

Milosevic’s rise to power using a nationalist agenda provided the other
nationalities with a model for the protection of their respective national groups. The most
influential politician to rise up and protest Milosevic’s domination of Yugoslavia was a
former communist general turned historian and politician, Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman was
the creator of the nationalistic Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). He was also a
revisionist historian of European history, and his biases were easily identified in his work
Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, which would reflect his national policies in the
newly formed Croatian state. This monograph is overtly partial to Western South Slavs
and their culture.131 He, like the Serbian intellectuals, uses history to glorify the struggle
of his nation, while vilifying (although not as viciously as some of the Serbian renditions
of overtly subjective histories) that of the perceived oppressors. In reference to the Serb-
Croat conflict, he consistently speaks out against any Serbian action which he views as
detrimental to Croatia.

In the first multiparty elections in Yugoslavia since the end of World War II,
Tudjman won the presidential seat and the I-IDZ much of the legislature. In May 1990,

the HDZ won 205 of the 356 seats, easily out-pacing the number two communist party

 

131Tudjman, 15.
48

49

which took 75 seats.132 Tudjman's election campaign centered on the natural right of self-
deterrnination for the Croatian people, the end of communist rule, and taking a firm hand
with the Serb minority in Croatia.133 He effectively used Croatian disillusionment with
communism to secure support over a wider constituency in his campaign, and equated the
communist rule with Serbs and Serbia. The Serbs were portrayed as barbarians and the
“civilized” Croatian people needed a strong defense to protect themselves from these
“wild” people.‘3‘ With his history as a national agitator, and his illegal running of the
HDZ one year prior to the election, Tudjman was portrayed as a patriot by the Croatian
people. Combining the blame for the Croatian economic decline on Croatia's unfair share
of the upkeep of the rest of Yugoslavia, along with an aggressive, foreignly funded
campaign,135 Tudjman was able to secure the election. His campaign posters reflected his
successful attempt to turn Croat energies toward an independent homeland, "assert[ing]
the priority of Croatian interests ("Let us decide ourselves the destiny of our own
Croatia").‘36 The specific wording of the poster makes a potential HDZ supporter feel a
sense of belonging with a larger ethno-national group. This was appealing to those
individuals looking for a scapegoat to blame for the deterioration of Yugoslavia'

economy. "The HDZ appealed directly to voters' patriotic and nationalistic sentiments

 

132Cohen, Brnken, 98.
133Hayden, 655.

l3"Woodward, 208.

'350f which a significant portion came from Croats living outside of Yugoslavia.

”‘Cohen, Brnken, 96.

50

and the their dissatisfaction with the existing regime and situation in the country".137

Thus the identification of the “other” is re-introduced to the masses.

In order to appeal to those individual Croats wishing to reform a united
Yugoslavia, Tudjman promised to push for improvements within a confederal union with
Yugoslavia's republics. Tudjman believed this was just the continuation of the views

‘38 This gained him a number of

espoused by the popular Croat folk-hero, Stjepan Radic.
votes from fence-sitters undecided between the HDZ and the communist party, who,
during the campaign, argued for market economy and more autonomy from the Yugoslav
federal government.

One of Tudjman's most radical ideas centered on the ethnic situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Tudjman, in a statement reminiscent of the World War II Ustasi's policy,
suggested the Bosnia Muslims were just Islamicized Croats, and if Yugoslavia ever
broke-up, that Bosnia-Herzegovina be incorporated into an independent Croatian state.
He defended this expansionistic idea in a statement claiming the two regions had been
linked throughout their histories,‘” and must continue to work together against their

common enemy--the Serbs. ‘

Still believing that Yugoslavia had been Serb dominated as expressed in his

 

l3“’Ibid.
138Ibid.
139Ibid., 97.

51

book,”0 Tudjman bombarded the electorate with these motivating accusations. Believing
that the more economically developed Croatia could do better without the “backward”
southern and eastern parts of Yugoslavia,141 he envisioned a Croatia free of Serbian
domination and the economic parasitism of the underdeveloped parts of the country.
Cohen points out that Tudjman made a statement about the ethnic composition of the
governmental structure, in which he claims that 40% of the government in Croatia was
made up of Serbs while only 12 % of the population was Serbian prior to the free
elections. Tudjman further claimed that all Croatian national expression was suppressed
by the central government.”2 Finding similarities between Croatian repression and
suppression of Kosovar Albanian national feeling, more Croats fell into Tudjman's camp
with a new nationalist vigor. This inflamed a large portion of the Croatian Serb
population as well as causing widespread mistrust of the HDZ by the Bosnian Serbs.
After the Croatian elections, a wave of Serbian nationalism swept across the Krajina area.
The Yugoslavian federal army began to covertly provide firearms and ordinance for the

Serbs residing in this area. "Thus it was a classic case of Croatian and Serbian

 

1""It matters very little if Tudjman actually believed in Serb domination of
Yugoslavia’s political organs or society. What is of significance is whether or not he can
persuade Croats into following his rhetoric and therefore maintain his power.

141Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the
Theme “Balkans”: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slam
Rexiew 51 (1) (Spring 1992): 4. These two authors argue that the northwestern republics,
namely Slovenia and Croatia, borrowed the concept of “orientalism”, which the West
bestowed on the whole of Yugoslavia, and used it to justify their secession from the
Yugoslav federation.

142Cohen, Bmken, 97 .

52

nationalism feeding upon on another, a pattern that had tragically emerged several times
before"."‘3 Tudjman, throughout his tenure as president of the Republic of Croatia, has
pointed out that Milosevic's nationalist rhetoric and policies were the real reason behind
Croatian reactionary nationalist feeling. In turn, the Croatian mobilization of nationalism
to "combat" the Serbian threat has inspired "similar nationalist backlash on the part of
Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia"."“ This appears to be another example of scapegoating
on the Croatian and Serbian sides, pointing to external factors facilitating a violent

reaction against the “other”.

 

"3Ibid., 10].

14"Ibid., 140-41.

Chapter 8
THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Andras Riedlmayer, a Harvard University librarian who has extensively
studied Yugoslavia for 25 years, claims, “All [that] most people have now

is the sketchiest knowledge of their own religion and the crudest
stereotypes of what their neighbors believe and practice.”“5

Realizing the up—coming danger to a united Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegovic's
Muslim’s Party of Democratic Action (SDA) actively attempted to pacify the increasingly
agitated rural Serb population. The party's official platform was the continued existence
of multi-ethnic toleration, in which no nation was favored over any other. ”6 Croatian
Vice-President of Yugoslavia, Stipe Mesic, just before the declarations of independence
by Slovenia and Croatia, attempted to institute a confederal system to preserve some form
of unity. “7 This proposal was rejected by Milosevic and on June 25, 1991, Croatia and
Slovenia declared their independence. The next day Milosevic ordered the INA into

Slovenia and Croatia, which began the series of ethnic wars in Yugoslavia‘“ As

 

l"5Lena Sun, BOSNEWS Digest, 11 December 1995.
”Malcolm, 217-219.

1“Robert F. Miller, “The Pitfalls of Economic Reform in Yugoslavia,” Anatmlian
lnurnalnflnternatinnaLAffairs45 (2) (November 1991): 213.

148Rarnet, B3131, 37.
53

54

negotiations between the break-away republics and Serbia completely broke down,
Izetbegovic's government agreed to hold a referendum to determine if Bosnia—
Herzegovina should employ their constitutional right and secede from the Yugoslavian
union. On February 28-March l, 1992, a vote was held in which the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS) under Radovan Karadzic boycotted the vote. In an almost unanimous
decision by the sixty-six percent of the entire electorate who voted (and a number of
urban Serbs participated in the referendum), the republic chose to break with
Yugoslavia. “9 Of the Serbs choosing to vote in the legal elections, most were the more
educated and urbanized Serbs who were much less likely to support politicians like
Karadzic and Milosevic.”o In a SDS plebiscite held before this official referendum,
about 90% of the Serbs agreed to remain within the union (which shows that at least 10%
of the Serbs who participated in this plebiscite voted to separate from Milosevic's
aggressive state).151

On April 5, 1992, a mass demonstration of all Yugoslav nationalities in Sarajevo
was held to support a peaceful, multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the Holiday Inn,
Serb extremist snipers fired on the protestors, killing or wounding scores of participants.
This started the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IN A, after fighting to a standstill in

Croatia just months before, rushed into Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia and Serbia in

 

l”Anna Cataldi. WWW (Dorset:
Shaftesbury, 1994), 11.

l""Gjelten, l3.

mCataldi, ll.

55

an attempt to hold the republic within the federation. This was justified by the call of the
Serb minority for protection against the Muslims and Croats. By April 7, 1995, most of
Europe and the United States recognized Bosnia’s independence and demanded the
withdrawal of the J NA.

Under pressure from Western Europe, the U.S., UN, Milosevic agreed to remove
the INA presence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. He decommissioned a large percentage of
his troops, allowing them to retain heavy equipment and weapons,”2 and brought back a
mere shadow of the army which invaded Slovenia and Croatia just months before. Most
of the decommissioned troops joined the Bosnian Serb army for the most part, and
proceeded to overrun about 70% of Bosnia’s territory. Throughout the war, evidence
indicates that Milosevic continued to supply the Bosnian Serb army with arms, supplies,
and men.153

In 1993, the Croat-Muslim alliance broke down when Croat extremists allied with
the Bosnian Serbs to expel the Muslim population in what was to eventually become the
self-proclaimed territory of Herzeg-Bosna. Mate Boban took control of the autonomous
province when moderate Croatian leader Stjepan Kljuic, in the tradition of tolerance,
refused Tudjman's order to allow the breaking away of the self-declared province.154 The

new Croat leader desired an ethnically pure state which would have the option of joining

 

152Anthony Lewis, “Anatomy of Disaster,” Wines, 5 January 1996:
from BosNet Digest 5 (l4), 8 January 1995.

l”Rarnet, Sneial, 403.

1“Vulliamy, 213.

56

Croatia in the future. This came to an end in March 1994 with the renewed hostility
between the Croats and Serbs which forced the Muslims and Croats to once again join
forces in an uneasy coalition.”5

Sarajevo and a number of ethnically mixed cities were subject to bombardment
and sniper activity. The UN, in a token gesture, established a number of safe-havens in
territory which was overrun by the Serbs. These safe-havens provided primarily Muslim
refugees with supposedly secure areas to flee into to escape the ethnic cleansing practices
being perpetrated by the marauding Serbs. In July and August of 1995, the Serbian army
overran two of these safe-havens, Zepa and Srebrenica.“S Aid workers were denied
access to 7,000-8,000 Muslim men157 who are still missing from Srebrenica as of April
1996. According to evidence gathered by the War Crimes tribunal in The Hague,
Milosevic ordered General Perisic to launch this attack.”8 These actions, combined with
the public support for the relief of Sarajevo, forced the UN to perform the air strikes
promised throughout the war. With the help of a rejuvenated Croatian Army (HV), the
Bosnian Government Army (Armija), pushed back the Serbs and much of Bosnia-

Herzegovina was recaptured. In an attempt to consolidate and legitimize the possession

 

”Almond, 285.

15"Riccardo Orizio, “Zepa innalza la bandiera,” MW. 20 July
1995, 3.

157"Serbs Are Poised to Take 2d Muslim Town,” IntematinnaLHemldIn’bnne, 18
July 1995, PD- 1 and 6.

15""No Charges Against Slobodan Milosevic,” Press TWRA release: from BosNet
Digest 5 (14), 8 January 1996.

57

of this much territory, the Bosnia Serbs, represented by Slobodan Milosevic, came to the
bargaining table to end the war. On November 15, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were

signed. Since then, peace in the region has been nothing if not tenuous and strained.

Chapter 9
THE FAILURE OF MARXISM AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY
"[The] economic collapse, political disintegration, inflation and
consequent wiping out of savings, emergence of opportunist and resented
new wealth, national humiliation, the transformation of large proportions
of the previously dominant cultural group into minorities in new national

units, moral disorientation, facile and opportunist centrifugal

nationalism...[causes the resurgence of national re-alignment and
n 159

feeling] .

The failure of the Marxist world model had serious repercussions on the
reemergence of nationalism in previously socialist states. Hobsbawm predicts the death
of nationalism as technology and ideology become more modern and world-wide.“50 He
sees the disintegration of nationalist feeling, and in its place an intemationalist
identification becoming the predominate scheme of identification among people. John
Breuilly comes to a similar conclusion in his work, Nationalism and the State,“51 that
nationalist feeling is in decline and probably will never reoccur. However, technology
did not spread intemationalist ideology as expected. Instead technology, under the

auspices of opportunistic leaders, bombarded the public-at-large with separatist

 

‘59Gellner, xi.
“Hobsbawm, 191-192.

1"‘John Breuilly, Natinnalismenmmte (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985), 422.

58

59

propaganda and “evidence” of conspiracies plotted by the “others”. Therefore modernity
provided the tools for the destruction of a Marxist, international society instead of
creating it as envisioned by Hobsbawm and Breuilly.

Gellner spends considerable time pointing out the numerous flaws in the Marxist
model. He defends the idea that nations are more pragmatic in their motivation when a
crisis of identity occurs. National feeling does not depend on formal theory or history
steering a situation a certain way, but on concrete social situations.“52 These social
conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina included the failing economy and the crisis of identity
directly associated with the desperate situation. Furthermore, Gellner attacks the Marxist
paradigm of social development which predicts the future will be made of classless,
nationless, and religion-less masses. Marxist theory only predicts the future’s outcome
and provides some vague map of the road to this goal.”

According to Marxist theorists, nationalism should have declined as more and
more modernization and industrialization appeared throughout the world.
Industrialization supposedly breaks down the cultural and ethnic boundaries fostered by
feudal society as capitalism replaces the outdated modes of production.“54 As increasing
numbers of people from the periphery flock to the industrial centers, their local cultures
will eventually blend into a single overarching culture as time passes and a new

generation born in the city interacts. In order for the boundaries between nations to erode,

 

l“Gellner, 65-66.
'63Ibid., 5-6.

'“Ibid., 39.

60

the industrial population of every country has to become more alike, and therefore less
individual (in terms of national identity). As more people join the work-force, and
become “equal” to one another in a factory setting, the workers will begin to identify with
one another, in effect replacing nationalist feeling with the solidarity of the same class.
As time passes and technology provides the common man with communication systems
to communicate with individuals around the world, a solidarity between workers,
regardless of nationality or ethnicity, will gradually progress until boundaries separating
people from one another completely break down, and the Marxist worker's utopia is
realized with equality for all.165

However, this did not occur because national identity overcame class identity in
many areas. Having an emotional and psychological identity crisis in response to a
worsening economic crisis in a working society, which happened in the late eighties and
early nineties in Yugoslavia, the worker feels the need to become part of a group.
Desperation in turn leads the person to seek people like oneself (e. g. similar appearance,
similar language, similar likes and dislikes). Once a number of these individuals come
together, probably from the same or similar areas with similar traditions and histories,
family histories and traditions are related to the like members. Therefore ethnic and
national groupings are reinforced, not broken down. Instead, ethnic and national
identification between "similar" people is encouraged by organized events such as

celebrations of a common past (e. g. the Scottish games, Oktoberfest, Independence Day,

 

165Cuvalo, 70-71.

61

etc.).166 Events such as shooting competitions and physical contests produce a mixture of
religious and patriotic elements, thus reinforcing the solidarity of a nation.‘67 This new
identification gives the workers a sense of solidarity, not just with one another, but with
all-Scottish, all-German, all-American people regardless of social position because the
“traditional” past--or “invented traditional” past-celebrates the ethnic past of all of its
national members, not just a single class. Therefore, industrialization, which is supposed
to break down ethnic and national boundaries, in many cases creates more rigid
boundaries, and possibly reinforces an ethnic and national sense of belonging, at the
expense of Marx's worker's utopia.

These new nationalities need a political entity to protect their culture from outside
interference. National movements put a government into power, and once in power this
leader's responsibility is to protect the nation that he or she is a part of. With an official
government established, the nation is therefore legitimized in the eyes of the international
community and a precedent is established for other people to create governments based
on ethno-nationalist principles. It is a self-perpetuating system. As nation-states spring
up over geographically adjacent areas, tensions may erupt over economic or minority
situations in one or the other political unit. If one economy is more prosperous, a

manipulative leader may suggest conspiracy by the other nation to justify aggressive

 

l“Although Hobsbawm and Ranger in Inmnongflmdmon claim that these
events were invented, this matters very little to the majority of participants. These games
and activities still represent a commonality among fellow nationals.

”7Rud01f Braun. W
W (Erlenbach, Zurich. 1965). 337.

62

actions to rectify the situation. And often times the best way to garnish support for a
military endeavor is to point out the plight of your national minority residing within the
opponent's state (as in the case of Serbia's concern over the Krajina and East Slavonic
Serbs--that is as an excuse to forcibly retain an economically advanced Croatia in a
financially bankrupt Yugoslavia).

The origin of the Yugoslavian and Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict was the
breakdown of federal governmental authority and the economy, not historical hatred. The
major reason for this slide into national chauvinism was the severe economic decline and
the collapse of the communist system, beginning in the early 19705 and lasting until the
dissolution of the country in 1991. Each newly formed territory wanted to protect its
economy from the other former republics and the leaders which emerged from this
debacle saw a golden opportunity to enhance their power-bases due to this economic
decline.‘68 The economic situation of these new states had suffered greatly under the
failed communist and socialist experiment, and the leadership no longer had a secure
position in the new, emerging societies. Leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman needed
this new, re-vitalized political agenda to retain and strengthen their power bases. These
leaders inherited an especially favorable situation in order to recruit followers
disenchanted with the old socialist system. F. L. Carsten, in his book W
Easg'sm, many times makes the point that both the Nazis and Italian fascists actively

recruited followers from the unemployed and these loyalties often depended on which

 

168Woodward, 15 .

63

group recruited and organized them.169 Both Tudjman and Milosevic, and their
apprentices in Bosnia-Herzegovina sought followers from these economically
disadvantaged individuals and provided them with a renewed sense of belonging and a
promise of better times ahead. The nationalists had to re-create and revitalize a sense of
belonging to a Croatian nation or a Serbian one. At the same time the destruction of a
Bosnian identity had to occur. The failing economy provided a perfect opportunity to
realign identity among the nationalities. By pointing out “irreconcilable” differences
between the nations during economic bad-times, these leaders “play[ed] on people’s fears
and fuel[ed] the flames of exclusivist passions”.170

Yugoslavia went through a period of economic failures, punctuated with sporadic
episodes of economic gains, in part financed by Western loans. The economic downturn
of the economy in the early 1970s brought a new wave of unemployed workers into the
already labor-glutted cities. In order to survive in this new environment, which was
somewhere between a socialist framework and a capitalist one, people generally migrated
to urban centers in which a member of their family or a former resident of their village
lived. Generally one of these familiar faces was of the same ethnicity as the new migrant,
and their patrons either hired them over someone who was an unknown, or aided them in

acquiring a position in a company in which they worked. Often these workers, even if

they found a position, experienced an inferiority complex and a sense of marginality,

 

”F. L. Carsten, Wm (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982).

”“Michael Renncr. WW Worldwatch
Paper 114 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993), 16.

64

especially if the ethnic make-up of the city was different from their own nationality.I71

This decade was the beginning of the economic decline which would precipitate ethnic
division of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the help of outside elements.
Throughout the 1980s Yugoslavia’s communist system deteriorated rapidly.
Many economic reform policies failed soon after they were implimented. For nearly
thirty years, the Yugoslav people were bombarded by Broz’s message of “brotherhood
and unity” and how this could be achieved through the perpetuation of a Marxist, socialist
government. According to Titoism, the country supposedly guaranteed equality among
constituent ethnic groups and the right to autonomous internal development of the
economy and industry.172 Since Croatia and Slovenia continued to be more developed
industrially than the remainder of the country, Serbian nationalists could claim Broz’s
policy favored the two northwestern republics. This would later be used by Milosevic to
revile the “favoritist” agenda of the Broz regime, especially as the economy throughout
the less developed areas continued to decline. Unfortunately the economy did not
improve during the years just after Broz’s death. The cost of living increased
dramatically while wages decreased173 and unemployment reached roughly 15%

174

statewide. Within a seven year period between 1982 and 1989, the average standard of

 

171Woodward, 44.
172Dedijer, 87.
173Miller, 218.

174John Greenwald, “Teetering on the Brink,” Time 130 (30 November 1987): 32.

65

living had decreased by 50%.”5 By the end of 1989, the inflation rate peaked at 2660%
per annum, prices were decontrolled, and a massive devaluation of the dinar [in part the a
result of Belgrade’s printing of un-backed bills to cover short term foreign loan debt]
racked Yugoslavia’s economy.176 Individuals throughout Yugoslavia began to feel the
defeat associated with the dissolution and inviability of their country under this failing
system. Due in part to the ending of the Cold War and the unique position Yugoslavia
had between East and West, Western foreign loans no longer helped in bolstering a deficit
economy, and therefore an important source of income was no longer available.177 With
the collapse of the socialist system, social security became more and more insecure and
guaranteed employment opportunities remained scarce. With the anxieties created by this
economic downturn, the vacuum of power left after the death of Broz was more evident
as the crisis worsened. Yugoslavs no longer saw themselves as united and the
“brotherhood and unity” slogan had a hollow ring. Both Milosevic and Tudjman used
this economic disparity and identity crisis to gain political power in their respective
states. Pragmatic issues such as the economic hardships178 suffered by a disillusioned
Yugoslavian population influenced the resurgence of nationalism and the support for

opportunistic leaders. The nationalist agendas first adopted by the predecessor of the

 

175Steven L. Burg, “Nationalism and Democratization in Yugoslavia,” Ih:

Warmly 14 (Autumn 1991): 11.
176Miller, 217.

_mPavlowitch, 100 and 106.

178Gellner, 51.

66

SDS under Milosevic, then copied and adapted by the HDZ under Tudjman,179 provided
the Serbs and Croats in non-parent republics a new form of identification in which their
own nations were not to blame for the economic crisis and the failure of Marxism--
instead the newly revived “other” was targeted as the culprit. Greater numbers of people
began to believe the propaganda launched at them by their own nation, and alienation
with long-time neighbors not of the same nationality affected local relations. And of
course the nation without a patron state to which to turn to (the Muslims) received the
lion’s share of pressure derived from a growing sense of becoming the outsider within
their native country.

This paper has previously established the multiethnic character of Bosnia-
Herzegovina throughout its history (with a sporadic episode of ethnic violence
precipitated by the Nazi invaders and occupiers). The vast majority of primary and
secondary sources confirms this position. But, as in the World War 11 period, when
outside pressures combined with an internal “lunatic fringe” are allowed to dredge up the
painful memories of history along with revitalized conspiracy theories, the disease of
nationalism tends to spread in a sick economy. The national populations of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, frustrated by the worsening situation around them, wished to find a
scapegoat to blame for this situation. This scapegoating began as early as 1973-75 during

an economic downturn in which “some of Yugoslavia’s nations h[ad] put forward the

 

l7“’Milica Bakic-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,”
W 54 (4) (Winter 1995): 922. Both Milosevic and Tudjman just adapted the
“other” label which the West had forced upon the Yugoslavs. In effect, Tudjman just
borrowed from the borrower.

67

claim that they were exploited by other members of the Federation” and economic
nationalism has gained in power ever since.180 By 1991, “the productivity sector in
Yugoslavia had collapsed”"’1 and there was no real hope of economic recovery during the
Yugoslav dissolution. According to “Ivo”, a Croatian nationalist interviewed in Zagreb,
the primary reason for this dissolution was Slovenia’s and Croatia’s desire to separate
themselves from the poorer republics to the east and south.182 With the growing power of
the nationalists in Serbia and Croatia, and their ever-increasing concern with the
economic position of minority nationalities in neighboring states, the population’s
resistance to nationalist rhetoric weakened much like an organism which has had to fight
off a parasite for an extended period of time. As the lives’ of the citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina worsened and more people began to realize the opportunity the new
nationalist leaders provided--to once again feel a similar identification with a supposedly
healthy, wholesome body (this time national as opposed to regional)--those fence-sitters
increasingly fell onto the nationalists side, pulling with them those who at first only
wanted to join them on the fence. As the numbers increased in the ranks of the
separatists, they received more legitirnization, and therefore more acceptance in this new

community. With the familial ties which are supposedly so strong among all peasants in

 

'wDesanka Pesic and Dusan Janic, “Nationalism and Socialism: The Case of

Yugoslavia,” W 15 (1-3) (1992): 205.
l“Rarnet, Balm, 45.

‘82"Ivo” of Zagreb, interview by author, July 1995, hand-written HOtCS, Zagreb,
Croatia.

68

Bosnia-Herzegovina,183 family members were drawn into these national camps, further
swelling their numbers.

After the collapse of the socialist system, Milosevic and later Tudjman needed a
motivating movement to retain their suddenly tenuous powers bases. Nationalism
provided them with a most utilitarian tool since it provided two essential things. First it
refocused the discontent suffered by the masses away from bleak economic condition
which, by all appearances, had no solution, to a more emotional, and therefore more
motivating, concem--national solidarity cross-cutting class boundaries. Their rhetoric
espoused state protection of the dominant culture (nation), totally separated from “other”
nations by solid, seemingly legitimate, and internationally recognized geo-political
boundaries. Secondly nationalism provided a convenient scapegoat on which to pin the
blame for the failure of Marxist theory and the desperate economic and social
degeneration. Using nationalist rhetoric, the leaders could mobilize a goodly portion of
the ethnic population, and coerce them into pointing their fingers at other groups and
screaming, “They’re at fault for this situation! Not us!” The identification of the “other”
can be directed toward internal minorities or outsiders who, at some point in history, may

(or may not have) dominated the area in which the new national identity developed.184 In

 

“’3According to Sivric throughout his work, the peasant population feels great
loyalty to their families which last throughout their lives’. However, in some areas this
may not be the case and should be examined in greater anthropological detail.

18"This method of argument is similar to Katherine Verdery’s in her examination
of the redefining of the “other” in post-socialist Romania. Katherine Verdery,
“Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania,” W 52 (2)
(Summer 1993): 179-203.

69
Yugoslavia, and more specifically in Bosnia, both types of “others” have been identified
and movements against them have been, and are even now in violent progress.

Under the leadership of Tudjman and Milosevic, the societal glue holding
Yugoslavia together washed away at a faster rate. Karadzic, under Milosevic’s tutelage,
began his push to "redefine" the ethnic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To do this he
had to "re-create" Bosnia's Serbs and separate them from the two other ethnic groups
through a restructuring of Bosnian identity.

As Bosnia-Herzegovina began to split due to the pressures exerted from the
outside by Milosevic and Tudjman, ethnic separation was further aggravated by the
foreign debt in which each republic was responsible for a certain proportion of its own
debt since 1977, and economic unrest across the republic.” Using the shattered economy
to manipulate their potential followers, Milosevic and Tudjman fostered a mistrust in the
Bosnian identity. Some Bosnians, especially the poor rural Serbs at the beginning of the
Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, found solace in the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism to address
their economic griefs.186

The outside leaders continued to use economic motivators to perpetuate the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the war raged first in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Croatia and Serbia, began to suffer, in

part under the economic sanctions imposed on the states by the United Nations. The war

 

185Woodward, 432.

186Lenard J. Cohen, “The Destruction of Yugoslavia’ essay in Gerasimos

Augustinos,ed.Ihe_N_angna1_1dgajn_East§m£nmp§ (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co.,
1996),152.

70

was costly to fight and costly to supply from either Croatia or Serbiam First of all,
neither Tudjman nor Milosevic could afford to end the war without a decisive victory.
Serbia and Croatia, both reeling under the effects of the sanctions against them, needed to
keep the fires of nationalism hot to draw attention away from their internal problems.188
By keeping the focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the plight of their repressed minorities,
some of the pressure was taken off the leaders and redirected toward the “enemies” in the
neighboring state. For example, Milosevic continually blocked all programs introduced
by liberal Serbian politicians to de-escalate Serbia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,‘89 so that the Serbian people would continue to focus on external, and not
internal, crises. Therefore, it was in Tudjman’s and Milosevic’s best interests to

I perpetuate the war until one or the other could achieve a victory.

Secondly, the war provided a safety valve for the parent economies by allowing
the unemployed throughout Croatia, Serbia, and even Bosnia-Herzegovina to earn money
by fighting in Bosnia. According to a letter written on November 29, 1992 by a family to
their children sent out of Sarajevo at the beginning of the siege, weekends in the city were
particularly rough due to the presence of weekend mercenaries.190 The war provided the

criminals, the unemployed, the underemployed, the uneducated, and the bored with

 

18"Rarnet, Social, 414-16.

'“Slavenka Drakulic, “Yugoslavia’s New Political Truth,” Ihelflation 248 (6
March 1989): 298.

18"Stephen Kinzer, “Yugoslav-American in Belgrade Leads Serbs Who Won’t
Follow,” Wm, 24 August 1992, A1.

190Cataldi, 91.

71

something to do. It provided these malcontents with the opportunity to earn good money
through mercenary work (e.g. Arkan’s “Tigers” and Seselj’s Chetniks and many others).
“Tanja” claimed in her interview, that many rumors circulated that Serbs from Eastern
Bosnia fought with the Bosnian Serb army exclusively for pay. Some even fought to
support their families in an economy where legitimate jobs are hard to come by and pay
much less for more work.191 This mercenary work also provided incentives through the
obvious perks. Looting, theft, and adventure have been traditional benefits to mercenary
armies. Another perk was the sense of belonging to a group after a prolonged period of
alienation due to the lack jobs and reliable wages.192 These mercenaries and the “regular”
Bosnian Serb army viewed the capturing of land as necessary in achieving their goals.
According to an interviewed Serb woman in Zagreb in July 1995, one of the reasons for
the Serb aggression was to acquire new, better land. The majority of the land the Serbs
held before the war was either agriculturally, mineralogically, or industrially poor. Due to
the poor quality of their land, they were jealous of the “richer” lands inhabited by the
Croats and Muslims, especially the urban centers with large numbers of Muslims.‘93
Another incentive for the continuation of the war was the black-market trade
which flourished across Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the direct benefit of Tudjman and

Milosevic, criminal overlords, such as Arkan and Boban of Herzeg-Bosna, were provided

 

l9"'Tanja” Muslim refugee, interviewed by author, July 1995, Ljubljana, Slovenia,
tape recording.

l”Woodward, 248.

19"""Sanja” Serbian doctor visiting family in Zagreb, interview by author, July
1995, hand-written notes.

72

with a legitimate arena in which to practice their criminal specialities. First of all, young
criminals were provided with an outlet to relieve frustration through “legitimate”
violence, including rape.“ But those who especially profited from the war were the
black-market smugglers and gun runners. Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the perfect
backdrop for young, enterprising hoods to trade arms, medical supplies and hard-to-
come-by luxury items to those people with enough hard currency to purchase them.195
“Sanja” claimed that these smugglers provided the governments of Croatia and Serbia
with funds to allow them to transport contraband into the Bosnia-Herzegovina war-zone.
Without this opportunity to earn money, the criminals would return to whence they came,
and continue their illegal activities in places where the government would have to deal
with them to placate the local population. If the war ended, so would their livelihoods.196
Finally, the leaders couldn’t afford to stop the war before the NATO air strikes
began due to the serious political backlash their own people would direct against them.
With the desperate economic situation combined with the absence of an external enemy
to focus frustration and blame upon, the general population would begin to question the
validity of their nationalist leaders. Tudjman and Milosevic would also lose the money
associated with the illegal activities. During the peace talks secretly held in Norway in

November 1993 between Tudjman and Milosevic, Tudjman leaked the existence of these

 

19"Ruth Seifert, “War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis” essay in Alexandra
Stiglmayer, ed., ._ _ ; ._ . - ' .. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 55.

 

195Woodward, l7.

l9""Sanja” interview.

73

talks, therefore killing them.197 This was an astute political move. First it reconfirmed in
the eyes of the international community that Tudjman and Milosevic were sincerely
pursuing peace, and provided the possibility of the UN loosening the economic sanctions
against them. Secondly it killed the talks before any kind of lasting decision to stop the
war was made. The war could continue uninterrupted and neither Milosevic nor Tudjman
were to blame for its continuation.

Even after the Dayton accords, some of these criminals and war-profiteers who
profited from the continuation of the war are still trying to make the Dayton Accords a
dead letter. According to Muhamed Sacirby, Bosnia’s embassador to the UN, in March
1996, special interest groups in “Herzeg-Bosna” threaten the Federation between the
Croats and Muslims not so much for a Greater Croatia but for criminal gain.198 These
elements impose a barrier to the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords and a

lasting peace to the war-tom country.

 

mWoodward, 510 (note 35).

198Patrick Moore, “Sacirby Warns About Future of Federation,” OMRI Daily
Digest No. 63, 28 March 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (115), 28 March 1996.

Chapter 10
THE SEIZURE AND MANIPULATION OF MEDIA

Benedict Anderson argues that print capitalism and state-regulated education
helped intellectuals spread the word concerning their beliefs about nationalism and
nationalist feeling.199 But as technology advanced and became more and more available
to the average person, radio and television soon replaced print capitalism as the major
tool for dissemination of ideas. In the modern period, especially in the last 25 years,
television has been used to spread political and social ideas to large groups of individuals.
During the information war occurring in the former Yugoslavia, printed fliers, such as
those used extensively just prior and during the French Revolution of 1789, newspapers,
radio and most notably television were combined into a powerful weapon in the hands of
national chauvinists. Upon the ascension of Milosevic and later Tudjman, these media
sources were placed under the direct control of the government, and used in the campaign
against the “other” nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Media, directed from above,
accomplished, and is still accomplishing, what it set out to do; to break apart groups of
people who had for centuries lived together in peace.

By equating Anderson’s print capitalism idea with the modern media, one can

more effectively use his arguments to examine the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Media

 

199Benedict Anderson, WW3 (London: Verso, 1983), 67.
' 74

75

was extensively used by all sides to distribute motivational literature supporting or
attacking certain ideas. Combining Anderson's idea of mass distributed information
(media), with some of Gellner’s ideas of educational levels, one can see the role the
outsiders had on the development and perpetuation of the war.

Gellner suggests that ignorant and uneducated people can be influenced into
supporting questionable causes.200 Modern day people, demanding some form of input,
rely heavily on mass media to get their information, especially those in the Low and
Middle Cultures. The Middle Culture has been exposed to elementary education and
maybe some form of secondary education as well. It is also not as hostile to the elites of
the nation as the Low culture many be due to their previous educational background and
lingering respect for the High Culture. This culture also has more access to radio and
television, and due to the low level of education, depends on these two devices to receive
information. As the media provides information, in some cases incorrect or misleading
information, opinion among the Middle Culture could shift, especially if only one side of
an issue is represented. According to Susan Woodward, rural people are more likely to
depend on television for input due to the fact that they are generally less educated.
Because of this lack of education and their dependency on television, they voted for
ethnonational parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 in response to their ethnicity’s
political messages.201 As an educated person, Tanja believed the media manipulated the

Middle Culture and made a number of the less educated "act less than human" in relation

 

200Gellner, 55.

201Woodward, 238.

76

to other nationalities. She also explained that the nationalist media suppressed the ideas
of ethnic harmony which had existed in Bosnia for centuries.202

Sabrina Rarnet states the importance of the sometimes free Yugoslav press, radio,
and television before the rise of the nationalist leaders, especially in work, W-
Many of the media sources she examines include underground youth papers, magazines,
and student radio stations. Even the more traditional and mainstream publications had a
certain amount of editorial freedom and circulated to a large audience across the country.
This media, even as early as the 19705, warned of the dangers associated with the ethnic
mix in the multi-national states. Since 1973, the Yugoslavian press periodically warned
of the dangers of fundamentalism and pan-Islamic pressures.“ The press even criticized
the federal government and the union of the national republics under the central
government in Belgrade. In 1987, a publication, Nova Revija, put out a series of essays
which claimed that economically and socially Slovenia had only been banned by its
association with the Yugoslav union. These essays also claimed that the Yugoslav state
was parasitic on Slovenia due to its close economic ties to Austria. The communist
officials across Yugoslavia were outraged by the audacity of the editorial staff in printing

such material, and the editor of Nova Revija was summarily dismissed from his position

with the paper.204 But the damage from the essays had already been done. Media,

 

202Tanja, interview.

203Pedro Rarnet, “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of
Yugoslavia’s Muslims,” MW 13 (2) (Fall 1985): 185.

20""It’s hard to be a good Slovene,” W 303 (1 1 April 1987): 50.

77

especially television, was to become a popular and effective vehicle to spread the
messages of the new nationalist leaders.

During the mid-80$, Milosevic began to experiment with television to spread his
platform ideas to a wider audience. In 1987, a televised session of the Serbian League of
Communists was broadcast in which a major argument ensued between the Communist
leaders. The nationalist faction under Milosevic preached a hard-line on the Albanian
problem in Kosovo. This vicious debate eventually was won by the nationalists. The
session was the best-rated show on television for that week.205 Milosevic’s support for
televising political sessions was an astute move. It easily distributed a good deal of his
faction’s more popular and sensational platform to a large number of Serbs (and others),
attempting to sway mass support for himself and his policies. The above-mentioned case
cost Milosevic nothing due to the public nature of the debate. The televising was also an
attempt by Milosevic to sway the population’s attention away from the economic
hardships in Serbia and in Kosovo. Instead it emphasized an ethnic problem which, when
attempted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would prove to be just as successful.

After the elections of Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic in Serbia in the 1990
elections, the newly “legitimized” nationalist leaders officially took over the media in
each of their respective republics. Milosevic was the first to put the media under state
control. He took over the television stations in a country where over 60% of the

population had televisions and 35% were illiterate. At this time, television reached

 

20’"Restless Slav soldiers”, 18.

 

78

almost everyone either through direct viewing or through word of mouth.206 As the war
in Croatia raged, Milosevic’s media focused propaganda on the Krajina, East Slavonia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina as it had on Kosovo. The broadcasts and printed material
claimed that the Serbs were being threatened with genocide by the Croats and especially
the Muslims. TV Belgrade stated numerous times that the Muslims were
“fundamentalists, mudjahedins, and extremists”, while the Croats were all labeled as
Fascists.207 According to Edward Said, “media is far better equipped to deal with
caricature and sensation than with the slower processes of culture and society”208 and the
national leaders used this knowledge of the media to hype imagined threats and attack
“other” groups. The attacks, focusing on the Muslims, helped show that Milosevic
planned the hostilities erupting in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Croatian war ended.209
Milosevic’s dictatorial rule over the police forces and the media would prevent any
opposition from using this same weapon against him. For example, Milosevic brutally
repressed a student demonstration in Belgrade when anti-Milosevic students demanded

liberalization of Serbia and the moving away from the nationalist agenda. During this

 

206Vulliamy, 52.

207Stiglmayer, l6 and 20.

“Said, Quinn, 37.

20"Borislav Jovic, a former “side-kick” of Milosevic’s, and federal president of
Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1991, claimed that Milosevic and the JNA had actively planned
out the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to incorporate all
Serbs into a single state before 1990. The military plans had been allegedly drawn up
into a document called “RAM” in the 1980s. Taken from an untitled compilation by
Bernard Meares in BOSNEWS Digest 487, 2 December 1995.

79

attack on the student population, Milosevic closed down the oppositional free television
station, Studio B, and the radio station, Youth Radio B92, providing him with an
unquestioned monopoly over all influential media sources.210

Tudjman, recognizing the success of Milosevic’s media blitzes, copied the Serb
by monopolizing the popular media. This action reflects Anderson’s idea of reactionary
nationalities “pirating” the formula of another’s rhetoric?” This “pirating” and use of the
media was legitimized due to the state of war existing between the newly independent
Croatia and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).212 Television was
crucial in disseminating this rhetoric. Belgrade and Zagreb hegemonized radio and
television to gain public support with “lies, inventions, and propaganda, sometimes
horrifying, sometimes sentimental”.213

With the educational level of the majority of Bosnians, partial literacy contributed
heavily to the success of propaganda. The nationalist "model" gave nationalist thinkers in
literate societies a tool to construct both a national identity and an "other". As more
propaganda was distributed and aired by one side, the other side just picked up the same
format, and changed it to fit a reactive message against the first side. This pirating of a

hostile "other" is a form of reactive nationalism. The nationalists in Yugoslavia who took

 

210Glenny, 49.
211Anderson, 81.

212Sebrina Petra Rarnet, “The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding “Vietnam”

and Blundering into “Abyssinia”, ” WW 8 (1) (Winter
' 1994): 200.

213Parin, 41.

80

over the organs of power in the late 19805, had to rebuild the weakened national
identities, and the ideas were spread using the media.

Throughout the war, media broadcasted propaganda in hopes of stirring up their
constituent nations into a frenzy against the enemy. All sides in the war in Slovenia,
Croatia, and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina used history to further their aims and much of
this manipulated history came into the living rooms of the different nationalities by way
of television?” This history, carefully adapted by the intelligentsias of every side, would
ignite rage against neighbors of differing nationalities and promote fear that the “others”,
which sometimes had to be defined, were plotting against one nationality or the other.
These myths included one of the most popular claims that the South Slav tribes have been
at war with each other for centuries. This propaganda, when continuously aired on radio
and television, had an effect on many of these uneducated and undereducated people.
The sensationalist media, in collusion with the nationalist leaders, perpetuated the myth
that irascible hatreds have always split the South Slav peoples, and the hatred was always
just under the surface of everyday life.” Not only did it effect the Low and Middle
Cultures, but High Cultures outside of the targeted nationality as well. One such
misinformed Western journalist claims in one of his articles that: “Ancient enemies,
Croats and Serbs had dangerous scores to settle.”216 This provides significant evidence in

proving that media misinformation can affect even large numbers of well-educated

 

mVulliamy, 7.
215Banac, “Asymmetry”, 142.
216James Walsh, “The Flash of War,” Iimg (30 September 1991): 42.

81
people.

Many former participants and victims of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina feel
confused about what has happened and what could happen. “After 40 years of being told
by Communists that ‘brotherhood’ was good, the Serb people heard the opposite from
their leaders in the 19905. Bigotry was now rational, not objectionable”.217 This
illustrates a dependence of the Low and Middle Cultures on their leadership and media to
provide input of events outside the local circles. With a single view bombarding the
population night and day, with televised accounts of atrocities supposedly performed
against one’s own ethnicity by the “other”, this propaganda can have a deadly effect. As
greater numbers of individuals are misinformed about national issues and reconstructed
pasts, these people are prone to support rather questionable causes.218 “Black and white
portrayal” of conflict between nationalities generated sympathy for one side or another,
especially when civilians were directly involved.219 The televised broadcasts of the
destruction of Vukovar in‘Croatia, and the rape of “Serbian” women by “Croatian and
Muslim” men were aired to strengthen people’s resolve to remain apart from one another
and to continue the hostilities until the leaders achieved their goals. In one documented
case, a group of Serbs video-taped a mass rape of a Croat woman, claiming that she was a
Serb being raped by Croats and Muslims because of her nationality. The obviously

dubbed vocals had Serbian intonation and usage, indicating blatant propaganda, even

 

2”Gjelten, 133.
218Gellner, 55.

21”Woodward, l4.

82

though it was poorly executed.220 The media convinced many Serbs that they were
defending themselves against Croats and Muslims and vice versa.221

Non-Yugoslav observers have commented on the effectiveness in which the
media was utilized by Tudjman, Milosevic, and their underlings. Marco Altherr, the one-
time head of the International Red Cross, directly stated that television caused many
people to believe that the “others” deserved to die.222 This devastating tool forced wedges
between long-time friends across Bosnia, which was exactly what the politicians wanted.
A 28-year-old Muslim doctor said this about the Serbs: “They used to think the Muslims
were their friends and neighbors, but then the propaganda clouded their minds. They told
me that they had lists with the names of Serbian children who were going to be butchered.
That was the propaganda lies of Serbian TV from Banja Luka.”223

So why didn’t the local people just ignore all this aired rhetoric and get on with
their lives living beside their Croatian, Serbian, or Muslim neighbors? First, this media
blitz coming as it did during a time of crisis--a crisis of economy and one of identity--
caught a number of the Middle Culture off-guard when they were most vulnerable.

Television constantly attempted to reinforce the concept of a conspiracy directed

specifically toward a nationality by “other” nationalities. This was a favored method used

 

22"Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Turning Rape into Pornography,” essay in
Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed. ., u . .. - ._
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 76.

 

221Stiglmayer, 20.
222Parin, 41.

223Stiglmayer, 89.

83

by the Serb nationalists. Secondly, in many cases, the local religious leaders harbored
nationalist sympathies. Religious leaders, especially revered in more rural regions, were
viewed as the “keepers” of the nation and their churches as “defenders of national
identity?“ In fact, media could point out the visible traditions perpetuated by a certain
religious group. For example, the Muslim tradition in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought
visible “non-European” architecture, dress, and customs to a European country?” The
rhetoric which appeared constantly on television from either Belgrade or Zagreb could be
used to the advantage of the clergy in pointing out “alien” differences, while at the same
time defending one’s own nationality against the lies spread by the “other”. For example,
to a nationalist Croatian priest, information broadcast from Zagreb is supported as the
truth, while that from Belgrade just legitimizes separatism by spreading obvious lies
about Croats and the Croat nation.226 Third, in many cases the local leaders used
nationalism to retain their offices during the collapse of the union. These leaders are just
“mini”-versions of Milosevic and Tudjman and the media gave them more political clout.
Fourth, local or more tolerant views no longer had access to broadcasting. Therefore,
especially in villages without a large proportion of a minority population, the majority
population would not have any personal experience with significant numbers of the

“other” to justify to themselves that the media was attempting to manipulate the target

 

vaiic, 195-196.

225Aleksa Djilas, W (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1 99 1 ), 10.

226See the previous note on O’Conner’s experience with the Franciscans earlier in
this paper.

84

audience. This ignorance of the “other” has been historically damning to persecuted
minorities. But the most important reason for believing much of this rhetoric had to do
with the personal intrusion by outsiders. According to “Lada”, just before her village was
ethnically cleansed, few people actually paid much attention to what was on television.
Then one day “the Serb army was on a hill above my village, and a man walked down to
the Orthodox Church. In a few days, my neighbor knocked on my door with a gun
demanding we leave immediately.”227 Also with such a large army roaming the
countryside of Bosnia (the remnants of the JNA and the paramilitary units), many people
could be coerced into committing atrocities. For example, as Arkan’s paramilitary units
entered Eastern Bosnia just after the JNA’s “withdrawal”, they immediately began to kill
and plunder. This sparked waves of terror and “counter-violence”. The counter-violence
often forced local Serbs into combat, “as was anticipated by the strategists who had been
preparing for the conflict for some time.” These outsiders “were needed [to] kill
anonymous victims without compulsion and thereby polarize society and force people to
take sides.”228 These armed bands would be a great incentive to either flee, or to
participate in combat and possible ethnic cleansing.

Presently the. media is still being used against nationalities all across the
partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina. One frightening example of the possible perpetuation of

nationalist-dominated media is illustrated in the March 1996 purchase of Belgrade’s

 

227"Lada", interview.

228Almond, 264—265.

85
Radio Pingvin by Arkan, the notorious criminal para-military leader.229 Although he
claims that the music format will remain the same and no political announcements will be
made, this station poses a possible threat to the remaining supporters of a multi-ethnic
society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A goodly portion of propaganda directed at the Bosnia
Serbs came from television and radio stations in Belgrade, so the fears of this
manipulative propaganda again fomenting ethnic strife in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not

unfounded by this turn of events.

4

22"’Stan Markotich, “Serbian Paramilitary Leader Buys Radio Station,” OMRI
Daily Digest 58, Part II, 21 March 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (105), 21 March 1996.

Chapter 11
DEFINING NATIONALITY WITH MAPS AND BORDERS
One example of how politics and academia worked together can be seen in the

power of maps and borders. This power was established even before war erupted in
Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia warned the Yugoslav government during Milosevic’s
attack on the Albanian population of Kosovo that the Constitution of 1974 gave them a
legal and binding right of secession in which all of their territory defined by existing
internal borders would be included. The Serbian leadership posed their own warning to
these republics stating that if they left the union, the areas containing a majority of Serbs
would remain with the parent state. Each side agreed to foreign arbitration to settle this
dispute. The Badinter Commission was formed, headed up by Robert Badinter, a French
constitutional lawyer, to solve the problem. Much to the chagrin of the Serb politicians,
the Badinter Commission claimed the secession was legal and self-determination,
according to the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, was not dependent on nationality but on
existing republic boundaries?” Therefore the West affirmed that recognized borders
legitimized national existence. The Serb and Croat nationalist pushing for the
consolidation of territory inhabited primarily by their own nationality into the parent

states, went on a campaign of war and ethnic-cleansing to redraw and justify new borders

 

230Gow, 467—468.

86

87
on new maps.

National movements identify with specific geographical territory. Using this
identification which Thongchai Winichakul refers to as a nation’s geo-body, a specific
nationality can easily formulate the identity of its own constituent people and that of the
“other”.”' Yugoslavian leaders also used the concept of a geo-body to legitimize what
would eventually become an active policy of ethnic cleansing. For example, the
nationalists supporting the idea of a “Greater Serbia”, and the Croatian national
movement attempted to de-legitimize the boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, claimed the
boundaries of this area were entirely artificial. Supposedly they were constructed by
members of an “other” nationality with the sole purpose of permanently dividing either
the Serb or Croat nations into separate states. The important factor is how the opposing
nationalities used the geo-body as a political weapon to achieve their expansionistic
goals. The physical manifestation of this weapon is the map.

The easiest way to visualize the territory belonging to a certain nation is through
the use of accurate maps drafted with accurate mapping techniques. This is of
considerable importance to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a number of maps
have been introduced to solve the problems resulting from war. Winichakul proposes that
by using maps as legitimizers, the group trying to claim and solidify territory can either

use aggression to gain hegemony over the disputed area then map the territory, or map the

 

231Thongchai Winichakul, “A Nation Mapped Out: A History of the Geo-body of
Siam,” unpublished paper (New Orleans: Social Science History Association, 3
November 1991), 2.

 

88

territory and then use force to “liberate” the region from the “occupying” outsiders.232
Again the techniques have been useful to the aggressive nationalist aspirations of the
Serbs and Croats. A rather popular illustration of this kind of politicking, was the
partition suggested by Tudjman to Milosevic at a meeting in Karadjorjevo on March 25,
1991.233 Somehow this partition was seen by some of the warring nationalists as a direct
legitimization by the leaders of their parent countries. To the Bosnian Croat or Bosnian
Serb the parent state’s approval legitimized violent action against other ethnicities. This
shows direct outside influence in the internal matters of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Force has
been used to attempt the total partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croatia and Serbia
based on the map drawn by Tudjman.234 Using this technique, national intellectuals can
solidify claims on territory not under the direct control of their nation. And mapping can
further solidify the domination of an “us” versus “them” discourse. The map of a divided
Bosnia, containing three mini-states with borders based only on conceptual principles and
not natural borders, such as mountain chains or rivers, and solidified into reality based on
the lines of a map, may, in the future, be a useful tool for the perpetuation of national
identification?”

Maps introduced to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina could reasonably

legitimize partitioning of the country along ethnic lines. Cantonment of the ethnicities

 

232Ibid., 10.
233Cohen, Broken, 208.
234Ibid.

23SWinichakul, 12.

89

would effectively give “exclusive” territory to a certain nation, wherein a member of
another nation could neither reside nor travel freely. But with an internationally approved
chart, clearly defining the negotiated borders (negotiated by leaders not the general
populace), there is no real room for internal, political maneuvering by either side to ease
the tensions still so near the surface. The Vance-Owen and Vance-Stoltenburg maps are
examples of attempts which failed before the final negotiated map was accepted in the

Dayton Accords.

Chapter 12
THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA

As Bosnia was breaking up, the Serbian and Croatian leaders began to develop
“histories” of their respective peoples to support their expansionist agendas against those
striving to retain a multi-ethnic state separate from the domineering Serbian state. Each
ethnicity was endowed with certain stereotypical traits, which effectively labeled non-
members as “others”. With this label attached to other ethnicities, the leaders could more
easily carry out the ethnic cleansing that has occurred during the duration of the war. The
only way this desired ethnic cleansing could have occurred was through the alienation of
the “other”.

To further their nationalist agendas, nationalist rewritings of history began to
appear in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in the late 19805 and early 19905.
These histories often portrayed certain nationalities in an area as “innocent victims of
other nations in a litany of valiantly heroic but ultimately tragic (previous) struggles for
national independence. These nations languished in the darkness of foreign occupation
until the light of liberation restored their long suppressed dignity”.236 Slovenian and
Croatian nationalists claim Serbian domination of politics during Broz’s rule, citing the

large amounts of money generated from the northwest going to the underdeveloped south

 

236Von Hagen, 665.
90

91

and east?” Serbian nationalists too point their finger at Broz, indicating his check on the

238 These historians have

Serbs, preventing them from becoming a ‘greater’ people.
purposely re—created and re-interpreted history to suit their individual, or national, needs
at any given time?”

Von Hagen expresses the dogmatic approach toward history the nationalists
borrowed from Marxist-Leninist historians to justify the perpetuation of the state. This
history is based on official morality, heavily influenced by the existing power structure,
and adhered to by the official intelligentsia as the one true history.240 This literature
provides the targeted reader with a sense of superiority over less “mor ” ethnicities, and
gives a distorted view of history to influence the actions of otherwise ordinary
individuals.

The question of legitimacy frequently appears in the revisionist histories. By
citing the existence of independent medieval kingdoms and suggesting that the nation is
“primordial” and “essentialist” gives the notion of an exclusionary nation-state legitimacy

in the academic community. These intellectuals suggest “an eternal, unchanging, fixed

collectivity of identities made more sacred by its very antiquity and stability”.2"'

 

237Cviic, Religion, 204; and Miller, 219.
238Banac, “Asymmetry”, 147.

239Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Irnagines What and

When,” essay in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., W
(New York: Oxford Press, 1996), 160.

240V an Hagen, 665.
waid., 666.

 

92
Nationalist historians continually romanticize their respective nations as unchanging and
aware of themselves throughout history. Yet the constant moving of peoples across the
Balkans has left lasting influences on all the local cultures--none are “pure”. In the past,
the entire area was divided up and under the authority of either the Austrian or Ottoman
empires; German, Hungarian, and Islamic cultures spread into the urban areas, further
modifying the existing cultures. This romanticization of nationality allows a member of
the nation to see him- or herself as a member of a continuous and unfluctuating culture,
which reinforces identity with a group that has enjoyed a long, heroic historical past.”42
But legitimacy can also be contested by a different interpretation of history. One can
effectively argue that no single culture remained unchanged by the many migrations to
and from the Balkans. This person could rightly argue that each nation was legitimate, or
that none were legitimate in their uniqueness. Secondly, the revisionist national histories
claim that federalist and regionalist political thought is unnatural, and nation-states are
the teleological outcome of all lasting modern states.243 This is clearly not the case in
some multi-ethnic states. For example, the United States and Belgium have substantial
minorities living in relative peace with one another. That is not to say that sporadic
episodes of violence do not occur, but it is unthinkable in either society for a large
number of people to engage in the fanatically separatist national movement similar to the

one which recently rocked Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Tudjman’s histories provide an example of intellectual manipulation of history for

 

”Duara, 159.

243Von Hagen, 666.

93

political legitimization. Tudjman expresses the opinion that nationalism is the ultimate
result of mature political development. He believes that nation-state formation is
inevitable in all societies, especially when facing a crisis of identity.“ Tudjman finds
numerous flaws in Marxist thinking of the nationalist question. Tudjman predicted the
collapse of the East European socialist and communist states and explains the reasons for
communism's eventual fall in his 1981 publication. According to Tudjman, universalist
and socialist theories [of nation-forming] do not recognize nor understand small
nations?” These nations are anathema to Marxist thinkers in that they represent divisions
between the same classes and identification with members not of one's own class. To
Tudjman, this identification with a national group is natural and therefore desirable. He
believes national aspirations always take precedence over Marxist hypothesis in the
development of societies because these nationalist drives are much stronger.”

Tudjman uses the Russian Revolution to provide evidence supporting his theory.
It is well known that Lenin, in an attempt to gather greater support for the Bolshevik
Revolution, promised some form of national determinism to the different nationalities
participating in the revolt. Tudjman, and perhaps correctly so, postulates that without the
communist leadership espousing nationalism, the Russian Revolution would have

inevitably failed to overthrow the Russian government.247 He finds it ironic that

 

2""‘I‘udjman, 11.
waid., 3.
2”’SIbid" 171.

2"7Ibid., l2.

94

communism, which claims that in the perfect society nationalism will cease to exist, must
use nationalism to create new governments during times of crisis. Of course Lenin and
his followers believed that nationalist feeling would eventually disappear after the
workers realized the benefits of socialism and communism. Tudjman wrote that tsarist
Russia collapsed to the Soviets only after national rights were guaranteed, but eventually
Russia, the largest nationality, would exert its will upon all. of the other nationalities in
the "guise of proletarian intemationalism and Soviet patriotism".248 Broz also believed
this to be true and he used this Leninist model on his ascension to power in Yugoslavia.
Tudjman believes that Serbia played the role of Russia in Broz’s union.

Tudjman believes that multi—ethnic states are doomed to failure due to the
hegemony of one of its constituents. In his opinion, the existence of a multi-ethnic state,
especially one emerging out of World War II, is not legitimate. It would promote
"violance [sic], revenge, and application of military force" to maintain its integrity.249
Instead of aggressively maintaining a multi-ethnic existence, the powers-that-be should
recognize that nations (supposedly of whatever size) have a "natural right" to liberate
themselves whenever they reasonably can.250 He states, "The material and spiritual roots
of national movements should be recognized [as legitimate] and one should search for

international solutions which would seek to eliminate restrictions on the development of

 

248Ibid., 13.
waid., 68.
25"’Ibid., 27.

95

national individualisms and hindrances to the expression of nation individuality".251 Due
to his identification with the Croatian nation, Tudjman is incredulous that some political
leaders believe nationalism anachronous in modern history,”2 for he feels that it is the
only important thing in the natural development of modern states.

Tudjman’s adamant defense of nationalism colors his analysis of historical events,

 

p:
especially those involving the Serbian and Croatian nations. He documents that the Croat

and Slovene nationalists proposed on May 17, 1917 that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-

Herzegovina be merged into one political entity based on the "thirteen centuries old state i
and national identity of Croatia".253 This assessment of a continuous existence of a

Croatian nation is far-fetched at best. First of all, Croatia lost its independence long
before the concept of nationalism was even conceived. And even when Croatia was an
independent medieval kingdom, the peasants had no idea that they were Croatian and did
not care who ruled them as long as taxes were not too bad and protection from invaders
was provided. Most Croats did not identify with any nationality until the very late
nineteenth century?“ so Tudjman's support of the proposed continuity of a Croatian
nation is far-fetched.

The bulk of Tudjman’s analyses of the interwar years in Yugoslavia is colored by

the insistence that Serbia dominated the first Yugoslav state. Of course this argument is

 

”’Ibid., 73.
252Ibid.
253Ibid., 19.

2“Banac, “Asymmetry”, 143.

96

based on certain facts such as the Serbian leadership and overall use of the secret police,
but his language is chauvinistic and detracts from the main argument. A prime example
of this bantering is Tudjman's explanation of the coup which toppled the Yugoslav
government just before the German invasion. Just prior to World War II, the federal
government of Yugoslavia met with Croatian representatives to discuss more autonomy
for Croatia within the federal framework. Soon a compromise was reached and Croatia
gained a substantial amount of internal independence.”5 Tudjman claims that the
compromise reached between the federal government of Yugoslavia and the Croatian
autonomists proved to be threatening to Serbian hegemonists. In response to this
agreement for a more confederal union, and the government siding with Hitler in 1941
(though with many reservations), the Serbian hegemonists toppled the government to stop
a pro-Croatian resolution to the ethnic hostilities which had'been brewing in interwar
Yugoslavia. He writes that the people that carried out the coup would rather have had a
war with Germany than any form of Croatian autonomy.”6 Most historians of the war
indicate the primary reason for the coup was the government's decision to side with the
Axis powers, much to the displeasure of the majority of the people of Yugoslavia.
Tudjman's word choice also leads the reader to believe he supported the partition of
Yugoslavia by Hitler and Mussolini into an independent Croatia, Montenegro, and later

Serbia to create a lasting stability in the Balkans.”7 It is no wonder some of his

 

2”Donia and Fine, 132.
2”Tudjman, 35.

257Ibid., 55.

97

opponents today claim he is a Fascist.

Another passage in his book may come back to haunt him. Tudjman describes the
meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow during the war to discuss spheres of
influence in Eastern Europe after the hostilities ended. Churchill proposed a 50-50 split
of influence in Yugoslavia after the Germans were defeated, and Stalin agreed.”8 This is
very reminiscent of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed by Tudjman to
Milosevic in a conference in on March 25, 1991 at Karadjordjevo in which it is rumored
that the two presidents drew a rough map of Bosnia, which clearly designated two areas
which would be incorporated into either Serbia or Croatia, depending upon the ethnic
build-up of the regions in question.”9 In both cases two outsiders were determining the
fate of an entity in terms of power relations, even though the Western Allies in World
War II ignored their half of the bargain to prevent the possibility of a renewed war against
Joseph Stalin.

By using history, especially World War II, for legitimization of hostilities as the
people from all sides of this conflict have been prone to do, Tudjman down-plays the role
Bishop Alojzie Stepinac had in the Ustasi government and underestimates the number of
people murdered at the J asenovac extermination camp. He claims that Stepinac
continually condemnedthe Ustasi regime for its genocidal policies and abuse of non-

Croats.260 According to the author's own research, Stepinac did not support the regime

 

2581bid., 60.
259Cohen, Broken, 208.
260Tudjman, 59.

98

and in some cases condemned the brutality of the Ustasi. However, he did enjoy the
impetus it gave to the non-Croats to convert to Catholicism in the hopes of being saved
from extermination. Stepinac also actively tried to save Jews and Serbs that were
converted, but not the entire population of the Ustasi controlled areas?61 Although
Stepinac was innocent of some collaboration, he was not the saint that Tudjman paints
him to be.

The numbers of people killed have also become a point of contention in the Serb-
Croat conflict. According to Tudjman, the Serbian hegemonist would have the public
believe that the Ustasi atrocities were twelve times the actual number in some cases. For
example, the Serb nationalists claim that at least 700,000 people were killed at J asenovac
camp. Tudjman unrealistically readjusts this number to about 60,000 murdered in all

2‘2 According to a recent study done by two independent researchers of

camps and jails.
the World War II atrocities in Yugoslavia, 400,000 Serbs at the most died in the NDH,
and not all of these were killed by the Ustasi. The new figures show that between 45-

52,000 Serbs were killed in J asenovac, along with 12,000 Croats and Moslems, 13,000
Jews, and 10,000 Gypsies?"3 What's more, in order to redirect blame toward the Serbs,

Tudjman describes Serbia as primarily under the influence of the Chetnik movement and

therefore just as guilty as the Ustasi.264 References such as this try to sway the reader into

 

26'Shelah, 329.
2“Tudjman, 162-3.
263Mirkovic, 321-322.

2"“Tudjman, 1 17.

99

agreeing with an argument based more on emotion than on actual fact.

Tudjman attempts to convince the reader of Serbian hegemony after the ascension
of Broz's communists. He argues that Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been
incorporated into a Greater Croatia due to the historical links between the Croats in
Croatia, and the Croats (in which the Muslim population is included) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina?“ However, the Serbs blocked this "legitimate" incorporation citing the
large percentage of Serbs living in this province-44%?“ He further attacks the separate
existence of Bosnia in his claim that Bosnia's borders were artificially determined by the
Ottomans and should be redrawn to remove this influence on post-WWII Yugoslavia.267
According to Western historians, such as Fine and Donia, this hypothesis does not hold
water. These authors argue that the state's borders have been nearly the same since before
the Ottoman invasion, and became more cemented with Turkish administration?“
Throughout his narrative on Bosnia, Tudjman makes statements meant to misinforrn the

gullible or ignorant reader.

 

2"Ibid., 114. It is an interesting fact pointed out in Cohen's monograph, that
Tudjman, in more recent times, has claimed major differences between the Croat and
Muslim nations. According to Cohen he has done this to bolster his popularity which
flagged during the hostilities between Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia. This is just
another example of how nationalist ideology can be revised to suit the current
circumstance (Cohen, Broken, 111).

26"Ibid., 113. But Tudjman still supports the policy of self-determination and if
the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina had a pleblicite to resolve this issue immediately
after the war, the majority would probably have voted against incorporation into a state
with a very recent history of atrocities.

267Ibid., 122.

268Fine and Donia, 72.

Chapter 13
THE SERBIAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE 1986 MEMORANDUM

“Nationalist ‘intellectuals’, wrapped in the mantle of august academies of

sciences, expounded their pseudo-history of the victimization of Serbs (or

Croats) through the ages. One of them seriously asserted to me that Serbs

had committed no crimes or moral transgressions at any point in their long

history.”-- Warren Zimmerman?”

According to Branka Magas, Serb nationalists fear the creation of a nation-state
which does not include all Serbs. Since the primary goal of Serb nationalists throughout
the last two centuries has been to unite the Serbian nation into a single state, these
nationalist see total failure of their agenda if only a small percentage of Serbs must live
outside “Greater Serbia”. The Serb nationalists refuse to allow large minorities of Serbs
to remain under “outside” control, so a strong central government which can force the
vast majority into one state is desirable?70 Many Serbian intellectuals are also
nationalists. Even before the rise of Milosevic, intellectual national sympathizers were

revising and glorifying events in Serbian history. Upon the assertion of Milosevic to

power, these nationalists actively worked with the state to justify reincorporating the

 

2“”‘Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 480.

2""Branka Magas, “Yugoslavia: The Sphere of Balkanization,” W
174 (1989): 9.

100

101

entire Serb population of the former Yugoslavia into a single state.271 To do this the Serb
intelligentsia began a campaign of intellectual revisionism and re-vitalization of Serbian
custom and tradition. This revisionism began with the glorification of novels written by
people such as Dobrica Cosic who wrote of glories and losses of the Serb nation in World
War I?72 With this spread in revisionist history, this intelligentsia became more and more
concerned with reviving the memories of old war criminals as modern, misunderstood
heroes.

Serbian intellectuals not only overestimated the Ustasi atrocities, but glorified
their own butchers. Though all sides made an issue of World War II and the communist
government atrocities?” many of the Serb intellectuals took this to the extreme. Veselin
Djuretic’s The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama claimed that the Chetniks were not in
any way fascist. He places them on the same level as Broz’s Partisans. He also claims
that the Serbs suffered more than anyone else because they were on everyone’s “hit
list”?" This would be a common theme among the intelligentsia in extolling the
suffering endured by the Serbian people in their struggle for freedom and self-rule
throughout their history. After significant numbers of works appeared praising the

Chetnik movement during World War II, Milosevic ordered a statue of Draza Mihajlovic

 

271Verdery, 181.
272Woodward, 75.

273John F. Burns, “Tribal War? Bosnians Don’t See It that Way,” mm
mm, 26 July 1992, E3.

2""Dragnich, “Upsurge”, 187.

102

built which officially recognized the old Chetnik leader as a hero and not a criminal?75
The intellectual community took the opportunity to slam Broz’s execution of Mihajlovic
as a way of damaging the Serbian nation. They proclaimed that Broz weakened and
mistreated the Serbs by forcing them to remain divided after the war and denying them a
unified state?"S

After Milosevic’s take-over, Serb nationalist historiography fell in line behind the
nationalist policies espoused by the Serbian leader. Serb intellectuals set out to link any
questioning of Belgrade power to Ustasism and genocidal tendencies against the Serb
nation. Banac also asserts that the historiography proposes that Fascism was a Croat
tendency and therefore very dangerous to Serbs.277 By using the Serb historians to
connect Fascism to the Croat nation, Milosevic and the intelligentsia helped sway some
Serbs with an active historical memory of the Ustasi crimes of World War II, to harbor
separatist feelings. Tudjman’s adoption of Croatian symbols used by the Ustasi and
mandatory official use of the Latin alphabet also unwittingly aided the separatist
intellectual elites.278 This dredging up of atrocities in World War II fired up motivation to
extol] revenge and justify aggression?”

The intelligentsia were also involved in spreading misinformation to alienate and

 

275Ramet, m, 418.
276Woodward, 92.

277Banac, “Asymmetry”, 155.
278Woodward, 120.

279Djilas, 3o.

103

isolate non-Serbs from possible Western allies. For example, Serbian professor Nikola
Koljevic claimed that Iran, Libya, Iraq, and their agents inside Bosnia-Herzegovina were
planning a jihad against the Serbs.280 When Westerners were bombarded by this kind of
propaganda by “respectable” academics such as Koljevic, doubt began to erect barriers
between the beleaguered Muslims and states which fear Islamic fundamentalism.
Milosevic and Karadzic quickly picked up on this lie, and spread it across Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia to scare the Bosnian Serbs into reacting for defense.

The Memorandum of September 1986 provides an excellent example of the
intelligentsia supporting a nationalist agenda. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
drafted a 74—page “diatribe” claiming that the Serbs were the victims of “historical
injustice”.281 It further stated: “In 1981 [the year of the Kosovo strikes] a war--a truly
special, open and total war--was declared against the Serb nation...with active and open
support of certain political centers in the country: a war far more devastating than that
coming across the border.”282 This supposed “war” was created in this document to
expose the existence of a conspiracy theory against the Serbs, which in turn would
facilitate paranoia among the semi-educated Middle Culture. It also suggests the
intellectual paranoia and possible inferiority complex of Serbian intelligentsia. The
Memorandum reflected the sympathy of the academic circle to the victimization theory.

It pointed to economic domination of post-World War H Yugoslavia by Croatia and

 

2""Vulliamy, 98.
2"‘Rarnet, 5min], 402-3.

2”Magas, l8.

104

Slovenia. It claimed the Serbs were being purposely split up within a number of
republics to weaken them. It reported that genocide had been, and was being used in
Kosovo against the Serb population. The Memorandum called for the restoration of the
integrity of the Serb nation and this was to be accomplished by the readjustment of
internal borders to incorporate the entire Serb population into one administrative unit?”
This document also officially restored individuals such as Mihajlovic as national
heroes?“

Milosevic and his followers used the Memorandum to legitimize their policies for

 

a “Greater Serbia”. Some of the authors of the document joined the SDS and became
political as well as academic players in the regime. For example, Dobrica Cosic, one of
the more important authors, became the president of the rump Yugoslavia?” As more
political leaders used the Memorandum as a legitimatizing tool, more Serbs eventually
fell into their ranks.

Serbian folk culture was revitalized by the media’s nationalist campaign. This
was especially the case with the unemployed, underemployed, and the bored who found a
renewed sense of belonging with this revival. They began to live in the [created] past
when glory was theirs for the taking and defeat still brought tears of rememberence to the

eyes?“5 Kosovo took on new meaning and became even more sacred. The Ustasi

 

283Woodward, 78; and Magas, 20.
28"Woodward, 91.
285Vulliamy, 52.

28"Magas, 24.

105

memory was even more reviled. And, in the eyes of many Serbs, the Muslims of the
Sandzak and Bosnia-Herzegovina took on the ominous character as promoters of
European instability and supporters of a holy war against the Christian world as claimed
by leaders such as Radovan Karadzic.287 There was some resistance to this movement,
but Milosevic had the student protests crushed before they posed any real threat.

As the nationalist intelligentsia helped renew Serbian pride and identity, the real
propaganda machine could start producing. Serbs in both Belgrade and Pale were handed
out “evidence” that the civilians being slaughtered in Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were Muslims being slaughtered by Izetbegovic’s forces to get sympathy
and support from the West. Even well—educated Serbs supported and believed this
evidence?88 This disinformation campaign orchestrated by the intelligentsia and carried
out by the state run media perpetuated the myth that the Serbs were the only victims. In a
July 1992 poll, only 20% of the Serbian population in Serbia knew who was shelling
Sarajevo?89

A former Serbian separatist leader, Vladimir Srebov, recently commented on the
active role played by the intelligentsia of Serbia and the Bosnian Republic of Serbia.
Srebov, a poet and one of the founders of the Bosnian SDS, abandoned his chauvinistic

nationalism and the pursuit of a Greater Serbia in April 1992. He then preached

 

287Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 480.

288Chris Hedges, “Never Again, Again...” W5, 14 January 1996:
from BosNet Digest 5 (22), 14 January 1996.

289Rarnet, 3552131, 420.

106

reconciliation between the three ethnicities involved in the war. In September he was
arrested, tortured by Bosnian Serb authorities, and tried for high treason. He spent 39
months in jail until he was freed in a prisoner exchange. Srebov indicates that the
intelligentsia were active participants in the war, both academically and violently. In his
interview for Vreme, he claimed that Vojislav Maksimovic, a professor at the
Philosophical Faculty of Sarajevo University, had “butchered people in Foca”?"o This

active participation was significant in the three and a half year war.

 

2”"Bernard Meares, “Vladimir Srebov Speaks Out,” Taken from interviews
appearing in the Bosnian weeklies Ljiljan (1 November 1995) and Oslobodjenje
European Edition (2-9 November 1995), and the Serb weekly Vreme (30 October 1995):
from BOSNEWS Digest 467, 15 November 1995.

Chapter 14
COLLABORATION AND CONCLUSION

“The nationalist feeling was started by nationalists in Serbia first, then by

nationalists in Croatia, then together against us.”--”Azra”, Bosnia Muslim

in an interview July 1995291

“Boban and Karadzic [are] dividing up Bosnia.”--Pejo Juric, a Bosnian

Croat soldier292

According to Tom Gjelten, Serb and Croatian national parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina are primarily controlled by non-Bosnian politicians, some of whom
questioned the right of the country to exist?93 A good deal of evidence supports the I
statement that Milosevic and Tudjman, along with their underlings, directly perpetuated
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But they also worked together against the Muslims and
multi-ethnicity supporters in the new country. According to Warren Zimmerman in his
recent memoirs, “Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman made any effort to conceal their designs

on Bosnia from me. As a place where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had co-existed more or

less peacefully for centuries, Bosnia was an affront and a challenge to these two ethnic

 

291"Azra" Muslim still residing in northern Bosnia visiting a sick relative, July
1995, Ljubljana, Slovenia, tape recording.

292Vulliamy, 183.
293Gjelten, 65.

107

108

supremacists”?9’ Cooperating with one another, Serbia and Croatia imposed sanctions on
top of the sanctions imposed by the UN on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s reeling economy in
order to further de-stabilize it, and force its ethnicities to look to the parent states in the
hopes of rescuing those ethnic areas from continuing depression and starvation?”

The leaders themselves even met frequently to discuss the possible partition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman admitted to a London Times reporter in July 1991, he and
Milosevic met secretly to discuss plans to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between them.
These meetings possibly occurred as early as July 1990 and seemed to confirm rumors
that both had panels of experts actively working on this impending action, which also
included population transfers?96 It seems that both leaders felt that partition would bring
an end to the Muslim problem (the Muslim national identity and the confusion it
precipitates among Serbian and Croatian nationalists) and would end the war which had
stripped Croatia and Serbia of needed funds?”

The result of these secret meetings was a plan to partition the territory between the
two parent countries which, when released at a meeting in Graz, Austria, was endorsed by
both Boban and Karadzic. Military means were to be used if necessary to realize this

goal?98 More meetings between Tudjman and Milosevic dealing with the eventual

 

2“"Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 486.
29sWoodward, 194.

2"mlbidn 172.

297Ibid., 463 (note 73).

298Ibid., 472 (note 139).

 

109

partition of the country into ethnic cantons continued. In one of these agreements
announced in June 1993, Bosnia was not to be split up between the countries, but instead
would be divided into three separate ethnic areas in a loose confederation?” In other
words, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided internally, given almost complete
autonomy in governmental and economic matters, and then immediately hold a pleblicite
in which the Croatian and Serbian canton would vote to be incorporated within their
' parent states.

The next partition plan proposed by foreign powers was the Owen-Stoltenberg
plan. This plan, which the Bosnian government under Izetbegovic adamantly opposed at
first, was based on a draft prepared by Tudjman and Milosevic. It reflected the military
gains of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. These new cantons retained the option of
joining with their parent states.300 This not only showed that Milosevic and Tudjman
were actively planning to tear Bosnia-Herzegovina roughly in half. It also showed the
world that they were the representatives for their nations inside the country. The West,
and therefore the UN, had to recognize the two leaders as the superiors in charge of
individuals such as Boban and Karadzic. This greatly increased the security of their
power bases outside as well as within their territories, legitimizing their reigns. Although
Milosevic claimed he was not supporting Karadzic toward the end of the war, he allowed

Karadzic to remain in power. And without the support of Tudjman’s Croatian troops and

 

299Paul Lewis, “Two leaders Propose Dividing Bosnia into Three Areas,” New
Wm, 17 June 1993, A3.

30"Woodward, 310.

110

supplies, Boban would not have had a “state” to run. According to Susan Woodward,
Milosevic strongly influenced all matters of leadership in the Republic of Serbian

Krajina, and Tudjman completely controlled Herzeg-Bosna.301

As this passage is being written in April 1996 the heavy guns are silent across
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sporadic fire is sometimes exchanged across the still divided town
of Mostar, and limited violence has been reported in Sarajevo. The NATO
implementation force (IFOR) is in place across the country and has already taken
casualties from unexploded ordinance and sniping activity. Tudjman and Milosevic are
no longer quite as interested in expanding their political borders into a country in which
the rest of the world just recently took enough interest to send some of their young
soldiers to die. The political stakes are too high for either leader to be supporting war and
war—criminals. Now life in Bosnia is returning to normal. If one calls a country littered
with land-mines, unexploded artillery shells, mass-graves, and crawling with numerous
foreign soldiers normal. But neither leader really has to worry about pursuing a “Greater
Croatia” or a “Greater Serbia”. Elements in the so-called Herzeg-Bosna still want a
divided Mostar and eventual integration into Croatia proper. Karadzic resurfaced recently
in Pale in March 1996 to speak at a factory. At this occasion he distributed medals to

Bosnian Serb soldiers and pledged to continue seeking a “peaceful union with rump

 

301Ibid., 510 (note 32).

 

111

Yugoslavia”.302 Why should Milosevic spoil his international reputation as a peace-
maker when his primary goal of a “Greater Serbia” is being pursued by people he claims
not to support? Milosevic wanted to end the war since a good portion of the ethnic “
cleansing had been accomplished. Karadzic was still overtly hinting that he wanted the
Republic Srpska annexed to Serbia proper, so Milosevic’s goal of a “Greater Serbia” may
still be realized through peaceful means.303 Questions are again going back and forth,
most notably the question of war-crimes and criminals. But the question that returns to
the forefront again and again is: Has peace been achieved and will the Bosnian tradition
of tolerance return to the divided country? The evidence so far is contradictory.

Some ethnic cleansing is still occurring. Pale has ordered the Serbs remaining in
the suburbs of Sarajevo to evacuate before this area is turned over to Federation
authorities. Those who have not left have been terrorized first by evacuating Serbs, then
by Muslim hoods after the return of these areas. And Mostar is still a center of tension
within the Federation. Constant meetings between the Croat and Muslim representatives
have just complicated matters within their fragile coalition. Unfortunately, this is more
common than is evidence for continuing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Toleration had been the tradition of this land between the Islamic, Orthodox, and

 

302Patrick Moore, “Karadzic Reappears,” OMRI Special Report: Pursuing Balkan
Peace 1 (13), 2 April 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (120), 3 April 1996.

303Susan Sontag, “A Lament for Bosnia,” Ibeflation 261 (22) (25 December
1995): 818.

 

 

 

 

112

Catholic worlds.304 For centuries Bosnia had been a mingling ground for numerous
nationalities. Tearing them apart was not an easy goal considering the diversity of this
once tolerant, multi-ethnic state?“ Until the outsider nationalists and their media
campaign disturbed this multi—ethnic community, peace generally reigned. During the
Ottoman rule of Bosnia-Herzegovina discontent was focused on the Ottomans, not on
other Slavs, due to the corruption and economic hardships faced by the Bosnians. Ethnic

identity in this region in the past, as in others, has been extremely fluid. A certain

 

“elasticity” in identity can be used to adapt to specific changing situations?“ Throughout

the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, identity (especially Muslim identity) has been

very fluid, as people flipped back and forth between identities depending upon the
situation at the time.307

But this was soon to change in the media campaign and the Serbian war on
Croatia. By 1990, the major Bosnian parties were divided along ethnic lines. The
Croatian Democratic Union, the Serbian Democratic Party, and the primarily Muslim

party, the Party for Democratic Action became the major political factions in the

 

30‘Dzemal Hadzismajlovic, “Statement to the Joint Standing Committee of
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Human Rights Sub-committee, Parliament of
Australia on 30 October 1995": from BOSNEWS Digest 464, 12 November 1995.

305Helmut Konrad, “History Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe,”

Histofleaeher 25 (4) (August 1992): 448.
30"Verdery, 193.

mRamet, “Primordial”, 180-182; and RobertJ. Donia,JslamflndeLthe_M_uble

EagleJheMuslinmeosniaandHemminaJfilSdfllfi (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981), 177.

 

 

113

disintegrating state.308 As rumors of Serbian domination and the possible secession of
Slovenia and Croatia spread across Yugoslavia in late 1990, some politicians attempted to
preserve the multi-ethnicity of not only Bosnia, but also Yugoslavia. In the tradition of
multi-ethnicity, the Bosnian constituency elected Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, as
president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Serb as the head of the legislature, and a Croat Prime
Minister.309 The Muslim president's platform clearly rested on the premise that Bosnia-
Herzegovina must represent every nation within its borders.310

For three and a half years, the Serbs on the mountains surrounding Sarajevo

 

subjected it to intense shelling in which much of the Turkish and Turkish influenced
architecture, a number of museums, and many libraries were completely destroyed.

"The mere fact of the city's existence undermined their [the nationalist's] argument that
people of different national backgrounds had to be separated"?“ But the shells would not
destroy the multi-ethnic nature of the city. Throughout the war, the multi-ethnic principal
survived and flourished under this impossible situation? ‘2 Even the weekend mercenaries
who made the sieges more intense, could not dampen the spirit of toleration in

Sarajevo.313 And the make-up of the Bosnian army reflected the strength of brotherhood

 

30"Burg, 10.

mlbidq 10.

310Stiglmayer, l7 and Vulliamy, 41.
3"Gjelten, 140.

312Ibid., 163.

313Cataldi, 91.

 

114

in that many Bosnian Serbs, as well as Muslims and Croats, served in its ranks?”

Even during the nearly impossible times during the war when the Croats turned
against their Muslim allies, Izetbegovic's government would not compromise the SPD's
commitment to multi-ethnic co-habitation which further soured hard-line Croatian
resistance to the Bosnian president.315

And now that the war has ended (maybe), the old traditions are not really
reemerging in the war—torn country. In one of the few instances of pre-war tradition, on
January 20, 1996 in the town of J ajce recently liberated by the HVO, 44 Bosniak families
returned and were treated warmly by their former Croat neighbors?” Reported in the
newspaper Oslobodjenje on January 22, 1996, the anti-nationalist Serbian Civic Council
(SGV) has expressed an interest in becoming a political party functioning within the
Bosnian government framework.317 But this is still rare.

So the “outsider” leaders and their followers helped create new identities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the seizure and control of the extensive media machine
already existing in the former Yugoslavia, this tool was easily adapted to fit their needs.
As the federal government of Yugoslavia slowly unraveled throughout the 805, and the

economic situation continued to steadily worsen, the Yugoslav people began to question

 

31"Hadzismajlovic, BOSNEWS 464.
31’Malcolm, 237.

31""Good News From J ajce, Says UNHCR,” Press TWRA, 20 January 1996: from
BosNet Digest 5 (34), 23 January 1996.

3”Patrick Moore, “A New Serbian Political Party?” OMRI Special Report:
Pursuing Balkan Peace 3, 23 January 1996: from BosNet 5 (36), 24 January 1996.

 

 

 

115

who they were and what place they held in the country and the world. At this crucial
time, some former communist apparatchiks, nationalist agitators, and ethnically
motivated intellectuals re-created identities which offered a sense of belonging to
individuals in an uncertain world. Using nationalism to further the national leaders
agendas, they mobilized their ethnic groups, and the demand for separation came to be
realized in the early 905. But in order for the nationalist agendas to succeed, entire
nations needed to make up the newly formed states. Unfortunately, in some areas of
Yugoslavia the population was mixed between two, and sometimes three, different
ethnicities. The greatest mixture of peoples was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So the
nationalist leaders, motivated by the previous success and needing to refocus their
respective nation’s attention on external matters, began applying additional pressure to
the most ethnically heterogenous republic of Yugoslavia. Milosevic and Tudjman
directly supported and perpetuated the emerging separatism with money, guns, and media
bombardment. Coercion was also used in a number cases. Thus the re-definition of the
“other” spread among each nationality. Whether it was reactive or aggressive nationalism
matters very little. What really matters was that there was an attempt to re-molded
identity according to the plans of “outsiders” using “insiders” as both tools and
scapegoats. The nationalists, though claiming that Croat-ness or Serb-ness was eternal,
knew that identity, under the right circumstances and using the right tools, could be
reformed and redefined. And as previously stated, the two outside forces worked together
to alienate the third. But maybe with time the Bosnians can reach the ‘happy—medium’

they shared before the war. Since the concept of identity is fluid and shifting, a sense of

 

 

 

 

116

“Yugoslavism” could, however unlikely, emerge once a long-term peace comes to the
region. But this will not happen without much healing, justice, and most importantly,

forgetting of the hostilities associated with chauvinistic nationalism.

 

l.”-

 

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