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BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1990-1995

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**"OUTSIDERS" AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA,
1990-1995**

By

John Edward Ashbrook

A THESIS

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

“OUTSIDERS” AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1990-1995

By

John Edward Ashbrook

This M.A. Thesis argues that the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was started and perpetuated primarily by a number of Yugoslav “outsiders” participated in the perpetuation of the hostilities including, most importantly, Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, and Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia. Each leader used revisionist histories and nationalism to either retain, or gain positions of power in the eleven years after Broz’s (Tito’s) death, inspiring chauvinistic nationalist movements among their respective ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to redirect public criticism on external, not internal affairs. This renewed interest in separatism was heightened by the economic crisis which plagued Yugoslavia since the late 1970s. Using the intelligentsia and spreading nationalist rhetoric through the media, especially television, these “outsiders” recreated new identities among the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of the war in this republic, Tudjman and Milosevic, though still nominal enemies, were actually aiding one another in the splitting up of the new country into relatively homogenous ethnic enclaves.

To my Mother and Keely: without y'all, I'd probably be mining coal in Southwest VA.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

“They were soldiers...I remember the face of the guard. They took everything we had. And we took what we could carry in our hands, what was necessary. I remember they had guns...As children we [she and her Serb evictors] were like brothers and sisters...It was sudden and I couldn’t understand what was going on. People in my village were hating other people. I remember I couldn’t understand why this was going on. Why were these people speaking against one another?”¹

The above event, which occurred in late 1992, has been a common one throughout the recent struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Lada”, a former teacher and rural woman in her mid-twenties, described these people as her former friends and neighbors. This practice of removing all of an ethnic group from a community has been coined “ethnic cleansing”.² Ethnic cleansing is a practice combining genocide, forced expulsion, mass rape, forced pregnancies, and other brutalities to permanently remove the presence of a certain group from a territory occupied by a different group. It is the direct result of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and has been particularly concentrated in its most

¹“Lada” a Muslim refugee, interview by author, July 1995, Ljubljana, tape recording.

²Ethnic cleansing is a widely used phrase in many sources. This term has been popularized by scholars such as Norman Cigar in his Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, writers such as David Reiff in his Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, and journalists such as William Drozdiak in his article appearing in the July 18, 1995 issue of the International Herald Tribune, “France Fails to Gain Allied Support to Act Against Serbs”.

central republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where no nationality had a clear majority. It seems odd that this happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since many historians such as John Fine, Robert Donia, Noel Malcolm, as well as many Yugoslavs such as “Lada”, Bogdan Denitch, and Dzemail Hadzismajlovic, have provided substantial evidence that this area was generally a tolerant, multi-ethnic society for centuries.

The historians searching for “mythical” or constructed explanations for historical events in Bosnia have, in some cases, seriously distorted the real reasons for these occurrences. Before World War II there were no widespread violent tensions between the different ethnicities.³ After the war, these tensions, brought on by outside interference and the outsider’s support of fringe groups,⁴ once again faded into the background, not to be dredged up again into a mass movement until the problems in Kosovo began after the death of Josep Broz, ruler of Yugoslavia from the end of World War II until 1980. The “centuries old ethnic hatreds” many Western Europeans reported to the world were gross exaggerations of historical events started and encouraged by the nationalists of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, not a few Yugoslavs took these “fake” histories seriously, since they were often packaged by their own ethnic intelligentsia. This caused many individuals to join movements led by ethnocentric leaders who supported platforms of ethnic separation and mistrust of other nationalities.

The major question many academics are currently pursuing is why did this

³Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 410-411.

⁴Throughout this paper, “outsider” will be used to denote non-Bosnian-Herzegovinian Yugoslavs and “foreign” will be used to denote non-Yugoslavs.

happen? What could provoke a group of people, who have been living in relative peace for many centuries, to throw away their tradition of tolerance and actively participate in the destruction and persecution of friends and neighbors? How could an individual, with no prior record of violent behavior or national motivation, brutalize his or her, possibly long-term neighbors because they were re-created as an “other”?⁵ There are clearly no definite, over-arching answers to these questions. The ethnic strife appearing throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not the product of internal divisions. Ethnic tension in the Balkans in many cases had a common source throughout its history. These episodes, like those which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina, were in some manner, partially the result of external forces putting pressure on the separate nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina during a time of crisis.

It is no secret that the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the result of the resurgence of national feeling among the people living in the separate republics of the former Yugoslavia. The most common type of nationalism to emerge was not reminiscent of Hroch’s Phase A in which intellectual circles acknowledge and celebrate the cultural diversity of a peasant culture.⁶ Even though this resurgent nationalism was triggered first by the national intelligentsia and carried out by the politicians, it was of a violent, chauvinistic type that quickly and decisively labeled one group as an enemy--as

⁵The discussion of the “other” is borrowed from Edward Said’s Orientalism, and will be used throughout the paper to establish the conflict of identity with respect to the presence of different groups as potentially hostile outsiders.

⁶Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 23.

an “other”--thus reinforcing one’s own belonging to a specific group. It only reflected Hroch’s Phase A in that the elite of the society first began to promote nationalism’s spread, but this was done not to celebrate a specific culture, but primarily to promote tension and hostility toward a group of perceived “others”. In order for the historian to understand the nationalism which tore apart Bosnia-Herzegovina, this type of movement should be examined in greater detail.

Chapter 2

THE TRADITION OF MULTI-ETHNICITY AND HISTORICAL BORDERS

Many nationalists have postulated that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an “unnatural” construction in the second Yugoslavia. Bosnia, like medieval Croatia and Serbia, had an independent kingdom. This state had a distinct, unique culture of religious toleration. If the existence of a medieval kingdom is used as a source of legitimacy, as the Croats and Serbs have done, then Bosnia has the same legitimacy due to the existence of its medieval state.⁷ After the incorporation of the Bosnian state into the Ottoman Empire when the first administrative center was established at Vrhbosna (modern day Sarajevo) in 1453,⁸ the conquerors continued to use the original borders as an administrative unit. This would last throughout the Ottoman domination of Bosnia.⁹ After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s borders remained as they had for centuries, but now under the administration of the Habsburg Empire. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, Bosnian territory once again remained within its

⁷Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 13-35.

⁸Adem Handzic, Population of Bosnia in the Ottoman Period: A Historical Interview (Istanbul: Organization of the Islamic Conference Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1994), 19.

⁹Donia and Fine, 72.

historic boundaries under the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.¹⁰ Only during World War II did this change when the Axis powers awarded most of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the fascist Ustasi state (NDH). After the victory of the Allies and Broz's partisans, it became a federal republic within its traditional boundaries.¹¹ With over a 500 year history of near continuous regional homogeny, the claim that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a recently constructed state can be discarded.

Secondly, nationalist historians, such as Franjo Tudjman and those who wrote the 1986 Memorandum sponsored by the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, claim that the ethnic violence was common in Bosnia throughout its history. This is also not supported by historical evidence. Although violence has not been unusual in this area for the last 150 years or so, it is not endemic to nationalist rivalries nor ethnic tensions. Before the concept of nationalism became widespread throughout the Balkan peninsula, most of the organized violence was directed at the corrupt Ottoman officials, who were considered parasitic to the Bosnian peasants. A famous demonstration which illustrates the economic nature of past tensions is the riot of 1869. Both Orthodox and Muslim peasants participated in the riot against the corruption of the Ottoman administration.¹² It was in no way a religious or an ethnic demonstration. The majority of Bosnian and Herzegovinian discontent was focused on the Ottomans and not on other South Slav

¹⁰Banac, National Question, 375.

¹¹Donia and Fine, 161.

¹²The peasants were more concerned with the state's corruption due to the economic hardships than they were about religious divisions.

groups. After the Habsburg takeover of Bosnia, discontent was refocused to the Austro-Hungarian occupational army and officials--not one another.¹³ Prior to the Second World War, the three primary nationalities thus lived in relatively peaceful coexistence for hundreds of years.

According to a number of Bosnian refugees of all three ethnic groups now residing in Annandale, VA, before the recent war the multi-ethnic nature of the community was celebrated in which friends, regardless of religion, shared holidays together. Arnela Konakovic, 27, a half-Croat, half-Serb said, "We [Bosnians] didn't see [religious differences] before the war."¹⁴ According to Dennison Rusinow, the number of Yugoslavs declaring "Yugoslav" as a national determinate in the census dramatically increased between 1971-1981,¹⁵ of which the Bosnians made up the majority of these people. In fact, in this same period, the number actually increased by 4.5 times, from 1.3% in 1971 to 5.4% in 1981. 15% of all youth declared themselves Yugoslav and 36% preferred to declare Yugoslav over their own ethnicity.¹⁶

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina's tolerance can also be examined theoretically. Mark Von Hagen points out that the social science school of "modernization" predicted

¹³Donia and Fine, 70.

¹⁴Lena H. Sun, "For Refugees, a Lament for Loss and Vigil for Peace," Washington Post, 9 December 1995: from BOSNEWS Digest 496, 11 December 1995.

¹⁵Dennison Rusinow, "National Policy and the "National Question"," essay in Pedro Ramet, ed., Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 132.

¹⁶Steven L. Burg and Michael Berbaum, "Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia," American Political Science Review 83 (June 1989): 535-54.

that ethnic and national differences were to disappear within states which were becoming more developed and literate.¹⁷ Von Hagen cites several Soviet sociologists and ethnographers who postulated that in the Soviet Union, “ethnic differences were to dissolve gradually in assimilation, intermarriage, migration and other demographic patterns”.¹⁸ Even though this paradigm proved inaccurate in the former Soviet Union, it can be used to examine the case of ethnic blending in Bosnia. Throughout the cold war, more and more Bosnians of all ethnicities began to refer to themselves as Yugoslavs. Intermarriage, especially in the metropolitan areas, increased dramatically.¹⁹ Being located in the center of Yugoslavia, traffic passing back and forth from the north and south continuously passed through the area, bringing different cultural practices and new technologies. This gradual disintegration of nationalism was beginning to occur in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was being replaced with a Bosnian identity as opposed to a separate Croat, Serb, or Muslim one.

Just prior to the war, one in four marriages in Bosnia were mixed. People lived together largely without ethnic tensions.²⁰ For the most part this tolerance was much stronger in the urban areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Sarajevo. Before the war,

¹⁷Mark Von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review 54 (3) (Fall 1995): 662.

¹⁸Ibid., 664.

¹⁹Ivo Sivric, The Peasant Culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 149; and Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 36.

²⁰Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 39.

among the young, urban intellectuals of the city, individuals supporting national separation were associated with farm animals and their beliefs were reviled.²¹ The day after the first shots of war disturbed the streets of Sarajevo on April 6, 1992, a young Bosnian in a crowd protesting the Serb sniping from the Holiday Inn was quoted as screaming, "Let all Serb chauvinists go to Serbia and let the Croat chauvinists go to Croatia. We want to remain here together. We want to keep Bosnia as one".²² This attitude persevered throughout the war of aggression and chauvinism inside this city.

²¹Tom Gjelten, Sarajevo Daily (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 20.

²²Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: MacMillan, 1994), 235.

Chapter 3

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

“Every member of a dramatic cultural system needs the Other as proof of his or her own identity, because one’s own particularity is being proven and articulated in relationship to the particularities of the Other.”--Dzevad Karahasan²³

Existing theories attempting to explain nationalist movements help to contextualize some of the factors responsible for the emergence of violent ethnic nationalism in late twentieth century Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any one of these theories cannot adequately explain the causes of the recent war. However, a historian, combining a number of their components, and expounding on some of these theories, can begin to construct a partial paradigm to help explain the events leading up to and perpetuating the hostilities.

Nationalism and nationalist movements should be examined culturally, historically, and structurally, as well as politically to understand their extremely important influence on modern Europe.²⁴ Ethnicities define members of their nations by the

²³Dzevad Karahasan, Sarajevo. Exodus of a City, translated by Slobodan Drakulic (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 6-7. Professor Karahasan is a Muslim academic and writer who fled Sarajevo about one year after the shelling started. At one time he was a faculty member at the University of Sarajevo.

²⁴David LoRomer, “The Geography of Italian Nationalism,” unpublished paper (New Orleans: Social Science History Association, 3 November 1991), 2.

activities of their constituent peoples. This includes all cultural expressions such as dance, language, etc.²⁵ Nation-states develop when an indigenous culture becomes aware of its national existence and seeks a way to incorporate the whole nation, or a large majority of the nation, into one political unit, in which the rulers of this entity are of the same ethnicity.

Ernest Gellner's own theories rely to a great extent on language and nationalized education as determining factors of national identity. Gellner, proclaiming himself neither a Marxist theorist nor a nationalist, raises some other rather thought-provoking interpretations of why nationalism is such a driving force in modern politics. He refers to the presence of a High and Low culture based on educational factors, and a standardized education dependent upon a single language. High Culture must, in Gellner's conception, be in a definite language and must transmit rules for acceptable behavioral patterns [culture].²⁶

According to Gellner, personal identity within the political unit becomes the central and most important concern of the budding nationalist.²⁷ Religious agitation and economic crisis, he argues, have often inspired certain groups to latch onto nationalist rhetoric. Religion, according to Gellner, can "over-excite" nationalist feeling, setting up a national policy of intolerance, especially if the "other" threatens religious practices such

²⁵Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 35.

²⁶Ibid., 42.

²⁷Ibid., vii.

activities of their constituent peoples. This includes all cultural expressions such as dance, language, etc.²⁵ Nation-states develop when an indigenous culture becomes aware of its national existence and seeks a way to incorporate the whole nation, or a large majority of the nation, into one political unit, in which the rulers of this entity are of the same ethnicity.

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²⁷Ibid., v.

as those believed by many in Yugoslavia.²⁸ The Serbian Orthodox²⁹ and Catholic churches have helped in over-exciting the separate nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁰ Some of the religious leaders of the churches have actively supported nationalist politician agendas in order to sway their followers into the nationalist camps. A fine example of this type of religious support of separation was reported in the Feb. 13, 1996 issue of the New York Times by Mike O'Connor. Friars and nuns of the Franciscan order explained to O'Connor that the Croats could never share power with the "Muslim" government. According to Rev. Vinko Mikolic, "That is a government of Muslims. They are no better than the Turkish occupiers from our history. We cannot let them occupy us again." And a nun, Sister Maximila, claims the Muslims are the Croat's "mortal enemies". "They [non-Croats] say bad things about the Ustashe [the Fascist leaders of the NDH during World War II who engaged in extremely brutal ethnic cleansing targeting Serbs and "others" within their territory]. But to us they were defending Croat culture, and they are heroes." In their village Bobani, Herzegovina, on a wall in St. Stephan's Church, a mural is painted entitled, "The Suffering of the Croat People". On the mural, next to images of priests is Ranko Boban in Ustasi uniform. A photograph of Ante Pavelic is displayed in the home of two of the Catholic priests.³¹ This

²⁸Ibid., 178.

²⁹Christopher Cviic, "Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Yugoslavia," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 14 (2) (1985): 203.

³⁰Mike O'Connor, "Bosnia Croats Resist Peace in Name and 'Culture'," New York Times, 13 February 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (66), 14 February 1996.

³¹Ibid.

illustrates the presence of chauvinism in the religious life of some of the Yugoslav people.

Eric Hobsbawm's analysis of nationalist movements can be used in examining reemerging nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His model for the evolution of a mature nationalism is based on three major premises. First, an historical association with a current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past must exist. Second, the existence of a long-established cultural elite, possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular must be present. And third, the nation must have a proven capacity for conquest.³²

Hobsbawm's theory pertains to Bosnia-Herzegovina in that Croats and Serbs have sponsoring states which have some desire to unite all of their specific ethnicity into a state. This model can be used to legitimize renewed national awareness and campaigning. Both the Croats and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have historical memory of an independent medieval kingdom. First, the Croats and the Serbs historically had independent states in which a large part of their own nationality resided within the borders of that state. With this knowledge, the leaders espousing national platforms are romanticize the Serbian or Croatian cradles of civilization. Kosovo and Knin are both used as sacred areas and forever belonging to their respective nations. "Others" in these sacred areas can arouse emotional, irrational behavior in otherwise stable individuals. Both nations also want to incorporate the remnants of their people in the disputed areas of

³²Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 37-38.

Bosnia. Unfortunately, the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina are set, and much of the ethnic concentration of the traditional territories overlaps and is discontinuous.

The High Culture of both nationalisms spread propaganda to the Middle³³ and Low Cultures, disseminating nationalist rhetoric and conspiracy theories. Many Croats (under Tadjman) and Serbs (under Karadzic and Milosevic) were members of the High and Middle Cultures. These groups used education and propaganda to distribute their ideas and fears to a large percentage of the population. Even though as many as 35% of the Bosnian Serbs were illiterate,³⁴ radio and television provided many with a vehicle for distribution of this rhetoric. The majority of the urban inhabitants of Bosnia could read in both alphabets and therefore the propaganda distributed by the national agitators could not only rally one side together, but, at the same time, also inflame reactive responses. These reactions could be seen as aggression toward the first group and a self-perpetuating

³³The Middle Culture is a group which is between Ernest Gellner's High and Low Cultures. While Gellner claims that the High Culture is literate and therefore the bearers of national sentiment. The Low Culture is dragged along into a national movement after the elite spread their rhetoric to the masses through various means. The Middle Culture is indicative of a group in the nationality in question, which has some educational background such as elementary school and personal experience with the High Culture, and is therefore not as prone to distrust the elites as some in the Low Culture may. In fact, the Middle Culture may even have great respect for those making up the High Culture and could even make excellent and loyal disciples of the nationalist cause. The Middle Culture tends to be more urban and blue collar than the peasant Low Culture. For this reason the Middle Culture tends to have more access to media as well as a better chance of being affected by a downturn in the industrial economy. I think that the majority of the para-military combatants fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially just after the beginning of the war, were discontent, unemployed members of the Middle Culture.

³⁴Vulliamy, 52.

loop develops.³⁵ This forced a responsive nationalism to develop in a previously non-nationalist group. This can be seen in Vulliamy's description of the experiences of Fahrudin Alihodzic, a Muslim refugee turned combatant due to his experience with Serbian ethnic cleansing of a Muslim village.³⁶ Unfortunately, many Muslims and Croats had to fold into these pressures in order to stay alive.

And last, the Croats and the Serbs have shown the ability to conquer portions of land, perceived by one side or the other, to have historically belonged to that nationality. For example, in the summer of 1995, the Croatian army reconquered the area around Knin, the supposed spiritual center of Croatia, yet the population living in this city was primarily Serbian.³⁷ Another example is the purging of the Albanian Kosovo leaders and civil servants and replacing them with Serbs, and revoking the area's autonomy within the Serbian state, even though this area was about 85% ethnically Albanian.³⁸ Kosovo was the Serbian version of Knin in terms of national spirituality. It was at Kosovo that the medieval Serbian kingdom ended with the Ottoman victory over the combined forces of Serbs, Bosnians, and Albanians. This defeat is the most important event in Serbian history (according to the nationalists) and because of this Kosovo became the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom. The Albanians were a threat to this area and in order to

³⁵James Gow, "Serbian Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?" Slavonic and Eastern European Review 72 (3) (July 1994): 473.

³⁶Vulliamy, 145-150.

³⁷Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 19-20.

³⁸Donia and Fine, 184.

cement popular support to a Serb leader espousing a nationalist platform, Kosovo needed to be secured. Kosovo was symbolically re-conquered by Milosevic's purge and persecution of Albanians. So even though Hobsbawm's theory was originally applied to emerging nationalism, it can also be applied to revitalized national conflicts in order for some intellectual nationalists to legitimize their revived movement.

Other theorists provide useful paradigms in analyzing the development and ascendancy of nations and nationalism. For example, Miloslav Hroch, in his book *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, presents a model for the development of small national movements. Hroch's national development model focuses on the evolution of small nationalities which have been historically dominated by another power. Though the Croats and Serbs are not analyzed here, they fit easily into Hroch's paradigm since they have historically been under the auspices of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Hroch's model can be applied to not only emerging national movements, but also to those that are "re-emerging". This paradigm aids the researcher in analyzing certain steps which led to the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina into its constituent nations. A crisis of identity was introduced to Bosnia-Herzegovina by "outside" influences. Hroch's phases illustrate this rapid shift from a growing sense of Yugoslav identity, to a renewed sense of national identity.

Hroch lists the three fundamental stages in developing national movements. Phase A is the "passionate" concern with the study of language, culture, and history of an oppressed nationality among the intelligentsia of the oppressed culture (or intelligentsia of another nationality). Phase B is the period of national agitation by a group of patriots

"dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the language and culture, who saw their mission as the spreading of national consciousness among the people [of their nationality]". Phase C, the rise of a mass national movement.³⁹ This model creates an "other"--in this case a dominating or competing "other".

Language and cultural differences are explored in Phase A by the intelligentsia and national leaders. Both the majority of the Croats and the Serbs knew about the nationality question since the interwar period. But the renewed study of specific national culture can be labeled a rediscovery of the "people's" consciousness and can provoke, among the intellectuals and members of the High Culture, an increased interest in their respective nationalities. According to Warren Zimmerman, the last United States ambassador to Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia's break-up was "a classic example of nationalism from the top". He claims that nationalist intellectuals used "pseudo-history" to glorify the Serbian cause among themselves with every intention of spreading these ideas to the masses of their nationalities.⁴⁰ Revisionist histories, primarily read by the intelligentsia, appeared, such as Veselin Djuretic's The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama which claimed that the World War II Chetniks were in no way Fascist and he places them as moral equals with the Partisans. He also claimed in this book that the Serbs suffered the

³⁹Hroch, 22-23.

⁴⁰Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador--A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 72 (2): from BOSNEWS Digest 480, 26 November 1995 and Digest 486, 1 December 1995.

most during the war because they were on everyone's "hit list".⁴¹ Milosevic too was interested in the promotion of Serbian culture as illustrated by his introduction of Cyrillic to a country which had been Latinizing since World War II, and his allowing the rebuilding of damaged Orthodox Churches and the construction of new ones.⁴²

Phase B is reflected in the adoption of nationalist platforms by the opportunist leaders after Broz's death and their first attempts to spread these ideas to their constituent nations. Milosevic and Tudjman used this technique to gain support from the common people. They idealize a future without the insidious plots against them formulated by the re-created "other". During this phase, the High Culture illustrates the joys of inclusion in the new identity and degrades the mixing and impurities in those who wish to remain with the "others". This national agitation by the intelligentsia and leadership is illustrated in the spreading of ideology as well as paranoia to the masses of each nation. These activists pushed definitions of "us" and the "other" on their cultures by organizing events such as national feasts, and glorifying heroes of the past.⁴³ The purity and wholesomeness of the culture and the nation's ability to endure even after foreign domination is also stressed.⁴⁴ Politically the national elite attempted to sway public opinion. For example, in a political statement by a Serbian politician, Batric Janovljjevic was quoted as saying in

⁴¹Alex N. Dragnich, "The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia: The Omen of the Upsurge of Serbian Nationalism," East European Quarterly 23 (2) (June 1989): 187.

⁴²Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 27.

⁴³Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), 37.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 16.

the Serbian parliament: "The truth is that all non-Serbian ethnic groups, especially the Croats, are at this very minute preparing the genocide of all Serbs...The Croats hate us, the Slovenes don't like us, we are despised by the Muslims and Macedonians."⁴⁵ This type of national agitation eventually spread to a significant number of people in each nationality and then entered Hroch's Phase C.

Phase C is shown in the mass acceptance of these new forms of identity which facilitated the war in Yugoslavia, then in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This renewed interest is then transferred to a more radical group of patriots, who spread the national identity (stressing the "otherness" of outsiders) to the people making up the "new" nationality. By using the media to distribute these exclusivist ideas, the Middle and Low Cultures reacted to the political posturings and imagined plots and in many cases sided with the outside separatist propaganda. This helped promote the split between the internal groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The nationalist agitators continued to keep their followers loyal by continually pointing out the differences between the national groups, without taking into account that the South Slavs shared the same Slavic blood and the common irreligiousness prevalent before the outbreak of hostilities.⁴⁶

But these and other theorists have not provided a completely satisfactory model to explain the resurgence of separatist and chauvinistic nationalism in Yugoslavia--a "Peculiarities of Yugoslav Nationalism" if you will. In order to reach at least a partial

⁴⁵Paul Parin, "Ethnopschoanalytic Reflections," essay in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 50.

⁴⁶Gjelten, 24.

explanation of what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one must combine parts of these theories into a new theory while discarding the parts not relevant to this unique case. In order to get a feeling for the peculiarities of the different Yugoslav national movements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one must examine the history of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia.

Chapter 4

HISTORICAL ROLE OF NATIONALISM IN THE SOUTH SLAV LANDS

The traditional instability of this region is due in part to the historical east-west power fluctuations and, in part, to the many ethnic nationalisms which sprouted in response to this shifting power. One example of this instability was the irredentist Slavic nationalist movement which embittered relations between Italy and Yugoslavia just after World War I. This was due to the Allies granting Italy a substantive amount of land with a South Slavic majority to secure Italian support against the Central Powers. The antagonistic D'Annunzio raid against the Croatian city of Rijeka in 1920 further strained relations between the Slavs and Italians.⁴⁷ Serbian nationalism eventually came to dominate the new state under Regent Petar Karadjordjevic. This facilitated the activity of nationalist terrorist groups such as the Macedonian IMRO and the Croatian Ustasi separatists.⁴⁸

However, throughout the majority of its history, Bosnia was renown for its ethnic toleration. Bosnia, as a political unit, enjoyed relative ethnic harmony among its Slavic inhabitants. As nationalism was introduced to the region shortly before the middle of the

⁴⁷See Mario Sznajder, "The "Carta del Carnaro" and Modernization," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsch Geschichte* 18 (1989): 439-61; which details this amazing event.

⁴⁸Banac, *National Question*, 326.

nineteenth century, tensions began to develop among a very small portion of the population. The people mainly affected by this new form of self-identify came primarily from the intelligentsia, local politicians, and certain members of the clergy of each of the major religions indigenous to Bosnia. For example, among the Croatian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Franciscans first introduced the concept of nationalism to the peasants.⁴⁹ However, the Croatian peasantry was "extraordinarily slow" in accepting their roles as Croats.⁵⁰

The history of nationalism in what was once Yugoslavia is a tempestuous history among the elite of society, especially during the period of national maturation. Ivo Banac attests to the problems of national identity among the Yugoslavian people in his work, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. He shows the many twists and turns each nationalism took to mature into organized, mass movements in Yugoslavia. But separatist nationalism did not become a major issue among the majority of the Yugoslavian people until the Second World War.⁵¹

In order to understand the current victory of nationalism over multi-ethnicity in Bosnia, the historian must look to the past to see the outside influences that have torn Yugoslavia, and its most multi-ethnic republic, apart. A movement for political independence of a South Slavic people first began among the Serbs in 1804 against the

⁴⁹Donia and Fine, 64-65.

⁵⁰Mirjana Gross, "Croatian National-Integrational Ideologies from the End of Illyrism to the Creation of Yugoslavia," Austrian History Yearbook 15-16 (1979-1980): 11.

⁵¹Banac, National Question, 225.

Ottoman Empire. This uprising proved unsuccessful, but dissatisfaction remained strong among the local Serbian elite. This dissatisfaction resurfaced in 1815 in a series of uprisings by the Serbs against their Turkish overlords. Russia, long at odds with the Ottoman Empire, supported these revolts in the guise of pan-Slavic unity. With Russian assistance, Serbia eventually gained autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and just 15 years later would gain, for all practical purposes, full independence.⁵²

This newly gained independence did not long satisfy the new political and economic elite. History recorded that the medieval Serbian Empire had been much larger and encompassed the majority of the Serbian people. History also provided the Serbian intelligentsia with the idea of a so-called heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom--Kosovo--which would, in the latter twentieth century, bring about the beginning of the fall of Yugoslavia as a unified political entity. In 1844, Ilija Gerasanin, the Serbian minister of the interior, proposed a plan, in the form of a memorandum⁵³, which called for the unification of the entire Serb nation into a single state under self-rule.⁵⁴ His idea of a "Greater Serbia" periodically re-appeared, and caused massive fear and unrest in the Balkans over the last 152 years.

The Serb nationalists (still a small minority of the Serbs as a whole) would continue to push for more land containing significant proportions of Serbs. In 1875, a

⁵²Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (Reading: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1994), 64-68.

⁵³Ibid., 68. According to Almond, the Serbian Academy of Science would base their 1986 document upon Gerasanin's.

⁵⁴Banac, National Question, 83.

peasant revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted in which the Russians, once again seeking to gain influence at Turkish expense, and Montenegrins assisted the peasants in driving the Ottomans from the region, as well as from Macedonia and parts of Serbia.⁵⁵ England and the Habsburgs saw this new Russian influence in the Balkans as a threat to the balance of power in Europe. To escape the possible violent ramifications of this development, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 granted Austria-Hungary the right to govern Bosnia-Herzegovina and returned Macedonia to the Ottomans.⁵⁶ Since both of these regions contained significant numbers of Serbs, the goal of creating "Greater Serbia" was once again thwarted, and Serbia felt itself manipulated by the Great Powers.

The Serbs were not the only South Slav group interested in some sort of self-rule and ethnic identification. During the Revolution of 1848, Croatian political elites sided with the beleaguered Austrian crown against the rebelling Hungarians.⁵⁷ With this aid, and the help provided by the Russian armies, Austria defeated the Hungarians which resulted in Croatia and Dalmatia enjoying a favorable status within the empire. But also in 1848, the Croatian intelligentsia had latched onto the growing notion of nationalism and began to formulate a specific Croatian identity. Kadic claims that the intelligentsia of the well-educated Croats in the Istrian peninsula rediscovered the importance that the

⁵⁵Almond, 73.

⁵⁶Mark Pinson, ed, The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 87.

⁵⁷Almond, 70.

peninsula's literature played in the cultural identity of the Croats.⁵⁸ The important role of Croatian culture to politics is reflected in the election of Eugene Kumicic, a renown Croat novelist and student of national literature, to the Croatian *Sabor* in Zagreb as a member of Starcevic's Party of Rights.⁵⁹

Unfortunately for the Croats, the Austrian Emperor, recognizing the possible re-emergence of Hungarian revolution, granted the *Aussgleich* of 1867. This gave Hungary equal status with Austria in the empire. The Croats received no such boon. To further promote tensions, many parts of Croatia fell under the authority of the vengeful Hungarians. A fierce policy of Magyarization then ensued, since Croatia remained loyal to the Austrian Habsburgs during the Revolution of 1848.⁶⁰ To escape the wrath of Magyarization, two types of Croatian nationalism developed. One was to remain loyal to the Austrian Empire and eventually strive for equality within the empire; the other was a call for total autonomy from the empire. For more than 50 years the nationalist leaders quarreled over which path the developing nationality should take. These differences would separate the Croats, preventing a maturation of a national identity which would unify the majority of the nation.

Some divisions were even visible among the nationalists wishing to leave the

⁵⁸ Ante Kadic, "Istria in Croatian Literature," Journal of Croatian Studies 20 (1979): 37.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 42. For an exhaustive explanation of the early struggle of the Yugoslav's nationalities, see Ivo Banac's *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 1984.

⁶⁰ Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie: Verwaltung und Rechtswesen Band II (Vienna: Der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1975), 481.

Habsburg Empire. By this time Croat nationalism had entered a phase somewhere between Hroch's Phase B and C, and competition between Croat groups were evident. On one side were the Yugoslavists who wished to merge with the Serbs into a single South Slav state, and on the other were the Starcevic and other Croatian "rights" groups, such as the Frankists, who desired an independent, Croatian state which included Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶¹ These divisions would prevent Croatia from attaining a state of its own until the Second World War. Yugoslavism had the support of the middle classes and intelligentsia, and therefore national agitators did not appeal to the mass of Croatian lower classes.⁶² Yugoslavism never matured to Hroch's Phase C because of this. In 1911, the Party of Rights began to identify with the Catholic Church and began to appeal to the masses through religion. This was the first time ardent Croatian separatist nationalism appeared within a larger group of people. Its rhetoric claimed that Orthodox and Catholic Christians cannot live together and this has underlain many Croatian national movements since the 1910s.⁶³ Intellectual societies promulgated this separatist sentiment. For example, the Croatian writer Victor Car-Emin, secretary for the Society of Saint Cyril and Methodius, claimed the goal of this nationalist society was to spread and deepen national consciousness to the Croatian people--assimilation under "others" must not be tolerated.⁶⁴

⁶¹Banac, National Question, 70-115; and Gross, 4.

⁶²Gross, 5.

⁶³Ibid., 32.

⁶⁴Kadic, 43.

In 1908, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. A series of wars erupted throughout the Balkans, in which Serbia won adjacent lands with a sizable Serb populace from Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Only the Serb minority of Croatia and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs remained separate from this “Greater Serbia”. On the eve of the First World War, the Serbian nationalists, and the extremely small Serbian nationalist movements in Bosnia, feared that national unity would never be realized. Franz Josef, the emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was in his late sixties and his heir-apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was rumored to favor an incorporation of the Croats and Slovenes into the dual monarchy, which would give them an equal share of power.⁶⁵ This would permanently separate the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from their brethren in Serbia proper. On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand made a scheduled trip to Sarajevo. Waiting for the Archduke was an assassination plot orchestrated by members of *Mlada Bosna* (Young Bosnia), a Serbian nationalist organization with ties to the Black Hand.⁶⁶ After a bungled first attempt at assassination, Gavrilo Princip killed Ferdinand and his wife on the 525th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. This event would spark the war in which the Balkan question was one of the major issues.

After World War I, the first Yugoslavia was created as the Great Powers redrew the map of Europe. Due to Serbia’s victory on the Allied side, the existence of a working political infrastructure, the presence of a standing army, a royal house, and a goodly

⁶⁵Donia and Fine, 115; and Banac, National Question, 125

⁶⁶Donia and Fine, 115.

portion of the new nation's population, Serbia quickly became the dominating influence in Yugoslavian political and economic life.⁶⁷ On June 28, 1921, the 532nd anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the constitution of Yugoslavia was passed providing for a centralist government, nominally run by a parliament, but heavily influenced by the Serbian monarch.⁶⁸ Perturbed by this blatant show of Serbian domineering, the Slovene and Croat delegations boycotted the vote to install the constitution, which effectively gave them a second class status in a country which was supposed to become a democracy under the Wilsonian plan of national-determination.⁶⁹ This boycott was the first major show of active separatism among the South Slavs. "The roots of the present war...[in Bosnia]...must be traced back to 1918-1921 when the Serbs rode roughshod over the national aspirations of Croats, Macedonians, and Albanians, and imposed a centralized administration dominated by Serbs".⁷⁰

The inter-war period was a chaotic time for Yugoslavia. Ethnic discontent and suspicion caused a number of governments to fail. Stjepan Radic's Peasant Party of Croatia represented a majority of Croats with his brand of pacifistic nationalism.⁷¹ But

⁶⁷Sebrina Petra Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe 2nd edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 401.

⁶⁸Banac, National Question, 407.

⁶⁹Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993), xix.

⁷⁰Ramet, Social Currents, 401.

⁷¹Ante Cuvalo, "Croatian Nationalism and the Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) in Anglo-American Publications--A Critical Assessment," Journal of Croatian Studies 30 (1989): 73.

even a pacifist such as Radic perceived the Serbs, especially the Belgrade rulers, as “they” and therefore a hostile “other” to the Croatian people.⁷² Radic recognized the Serbian domination in that Croatia and Slovenia were more heavily taxed and their military officers suffered demotions in favor of Serbs and Montenegrins. Macedonian and Albanian children were denied education in their own languages, and Cyrillic was imposed upon the Croats.⁷³ The murder of Radic by a pro-Serb Montenegrin, Punisa Racic, further heightened the already strained relations between the Croats and the Serbs.⁷⁴ The suspicion and tension only worsened when king Aleksander Karadjordjevic dissolved parliament and established a royal dictatorship to stabilize and solidify his rule. Neither Aleksander nor his Serb-dominated government practiced any form of melding the Serbs and the Croats into a single people. For example, throughout the interwar period, Serb children were only taught the Cyrillic alphabet, Serb history, and at an early age an “other” identity was established upon non-Serbs. These children were taught to consider themselves Serbs, not Yugoslavs, and to find fault with non-Serbs.⁷⁵ His favoritism of the Serbian cause would last until his assassination in Marseilles, France in 1934 by the Croatian Ustasi separatists and the Macedonian terrorist organization,

⁷²Banac, National Question, 242.

⁷³Ramet, Social Currents, 401.

⁷⁴Banac, National Question, 226.

⁷⁵Charles Jelavich, "Comment on Gross article" Austrian History Yearbook 15-16 (1979-1980): 40.

IMRO.⁷⁶

After King Aleksander's death, a rapprochement between the Serbs and Croats began. In 1939 an agreement was signed in which the Croats were finally allowed a good deal of internal rule. Croatian autonomy within a Yugoslav state was agreed upon in the 1939 Cvetkovik-Macek Agreement. This diffused much of the tension between Croat and Serb.⁷⁷ Unfortunately this new development would not be implemented over the long-run due to the German invasion of April 6, 1941 in response to the overthrow of the nominally pro-Nazi government.⁷⁸

After eleven days of half-hearted resistance, the last organized Yugoslav military units surrendered on April 17. What the conquerors would implement in the defeated Yugoslavia is still fresh in the memories of the South Slavs and has provided much stimuli to the national revenge cycle fueling the violence between Serbs and Croats. If the sparks of the recent conflict began with the Serb-Croat question just after World War I, then World War II dangerously aggravated these tensions. Germany occupied Serbia and installed a puppet government under the former minister of war, General Milan Nedic. For the first time since the Middle Ages, Croatia existed as an autonomous state, albeit subject to the whims of the Nazis.

The Germans attempted to install a government under the auspices of the Croatian Peasant Party just after their conquest. However, this most popular of political parties

⁷⁶Banac, National Question, 326.

⁷⁷Woodward, 433.

⁷⁸Donia and Fine, 132.

refused to help the Nazis, and Ante Pavelic's Ustasi were put into power instead.⁷⁹ This regime was to control all of historical Croatia, the Dalmatian coast, and all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pavelic instituted a program of political, moral, and social violence which surpassed Nazi Germany's fervor in brutality, if not in efficiency. Jews, Gypsies, and Serbs were tortured and slaughtered to create an ethnically pure Croatian nation which included the most "ethnically pure Croats", the Muslims.⁸⁰ The Serbs in this area suffered one of three fates. These were summed up at a state rally in which Mile Budak, the second in command of the Ustasi state, said: "One part of the Serbs we shall kill, another part we shall resettle, and the remaining part we shall convert to the Catholic faith and thereby melt into Croats."⁸¹

Pavelic recognized that the Catholic Church could be used as a tool for swaying Croatian support. By collaborating with the clergy, the idea was spread (which is relevant in the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina) that the Orthodox faith, and therefore the Serbs, struck an alliance with the communists to destroy Catholicism.⁸² This swayed some Croats to side with the Ustasi, believing this was an active conspiracy to strip them of the ability to practice their faith. Alojzije Stepinac, the arch-bishop of Zagreb, and other

⁷⁹ Jasper Ridley, Tito: a Biography (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1994), 162.

⁸⁰Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, "Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations Between Moslems and Non-Moslems," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5 (3) (1990): 278.

⁸¹Damir Mirkovic, "Victims and Perpetrators in the Yugoslav Genocide 1941-1945: Some Preliminary Observations," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7 (3) (1993): 323.

⁸²Menachem Shelah, "The Catholic Church in Croatia, the Vatican and the Murder of the Croatian Jews," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4 (3) (1989): 324.

clergy aided, in some form, the Ustasi Regime. For example, Filipovic Majstorovic, a Franciscan, was the infamous “devil of Jasenovac” who actively participated in the genocidal practices against the Serbs.⁸³

In response to these acts of savage brutality, the Serbian resistance movement known as the Chetniks under Draza Mihajlovic began the decimation of Croatian and Muslim civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mihajlovic’s instructions to his Chetnik terrorists are chillingly similar to Budak’s plan: “...cleanse the state territory of all ethnic minorities and non-national elements” and “create direct mutual borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing Sandzak of [its] Moslem population and cleansing Bosnia of [its] Moslem and Croat population.”⁸⁴ The Orthodox Church aided the Chetnik movement, and a number of Orthodox clergy actively supported, and in some cases led, the Chetniks.⁸⁵ The Serbian violence pushed more Croats and Muslims into the ranks of the Ustasi. As more Serbs were killed and converted, some of those remaining free joined Chetnik units to extract revenge on the Croat population. This sense of revenge and barbarity is one of the cornerstones of the recent wave of violence in Bosnia. These memories receded during Broz’s rule, but flared with the resurgence of nationalism after his death.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be the hardest hit by the war. Due to its high

⁸³Ibid., 327.

⁸⁴Mirkovic, 324.

⁸⁵Ivo Banac, “The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia’s Demise,” *Daedalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 163.

proportion of Serbs located on NDH territory, many were killed by the Ustasi occupiers. Chetnik activity claimed many Croat and Muslim lives in reprisals against the Ustasi. Partisan activity against supporters of the Ustasi, Germans, Italians, or Chetniks, real or imagined, claimed the lives of many Bosnians.⁸⁶ “Of [Bosnia’s] 2.8 million people, 400,000 perished—every sixth Serb, eighth Croat, and twelfth Muslim”.⁸⁷

During this period of ethnic hatred and violence, a former soldier from the old Austro-Hungarian army organized a group of Yugoslavs intent on restoring autonomy to their country. Josef Broz Tito, a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, organized a military resistance movement open to all enemies of the German and Italian invaders. The Partisans were formed in the mountainous regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and banded all nationalities together to force out the foreign occupiers. At the end of 1942, the Partisans numbered about 140,000 soldiers, most of them Montenegrin and Serbian. During 1943, many Croats and Muslims who opposed the Ustasi government and their German allies, joined the movement.⁸⁸ The struggle between the Partisans and Chetniks was one of the most poignant battles between multi-culturalists and nationalists. This struggle was reflected in the recent three year war in Bosnia, in that it pitted national separatists (the Serbian Chetniks and Milosevic’s regime on one hand, and the Croat extremists and Tudjman’s Croatian state on the other) against the multi-ethnic community

⁸⁶Mirkovic, 318.

⁸⁷Aleksa Djilas, “The Nation That Wasn’t,” The New Republic (20 September 1992): 30.

⁸⁸Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 11.

led by Alija Izetbegovic's Bosnian government.

Chapter 5

BROZ AND THE MANIPULATION OF NATIONALISM

Though much of Bosnia's historical tolerance was shaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the establishment of the Chetniks, Ustasi state, and the existence of two units of Muslim SS, the Partisans under Broz exemplified the multi-ethnic character of the Bosnian people. From the very beginning of the Second World War, Broz admired the multi-ethnic toleration of the Bosnians. He declared that after the war, Bosnia "would be 'neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim but rather Serbian and Croatian and Muslim'." As his Yugoslavia was to be a multinational socialist state, Bosnia would be its most genuine portion".⁸⁹ Broz was successful in liberating his country from fascism and German occupation. His movement was open to members of all ethnicities willing to fight a common enemy in the Ustasi, the Chetniks, and the Nazi occupiers. His success against the enemy and in putting together a viable state after the war hinged on the concept of multi-ethnic cooperation between equal units.⁹⁰ Broz recognized that the ethnic conflicts tearing apart the first Yugoslavia were due to the Serbian domination of the government in the interwar period. He thought that if this happened again, it would

⁸⁹Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy 91 (1993): 11.

⁹⁰Bogdan Denitch, "Yugoslavia: the Limits of Reform," Dissent 36 (1) (1989): 81.

significantly weaken his new state, and leave open the possibility that the other nations would ally themselves with an invading enemy to free themselves from the yoke of Serbian hegemony.⁹¹ Broz attempted to keep relations between the *narods* (nations) peaceful. Laws were implemented to prevent wide-spread inter-ethnic violence. For example, Serb royalist and Croat Ustasi symbols were banned from public display in an attempt to heal the wounds between the nations caused by the war brought on by Germany and Italy. Moreover Broz's government punished crimes of ethnic violence very harshly.⁹² As a further attack on symbols of ethnic conflict, he also prosecuted the Chetnik commander Mihajlovic and attacked the role of the Catholic Church in the Ustasi regime through its questionable bishop of Zagreb. Mihajlovic was tried and executed for his part in the Chetnik atrocities.⁹³ Stepinac was placed under arrest after the war due to his participation, either active or passive, in the Ustasi policy of forced conversions of non-Catholic peoples.⁹⁴ The Catholic Church was portrayed as repressive, reactionary, and anti-Yugoslav due its direct involvement with Croatian national identity.⁹⁵ Broz also reduced the power of the Orthodox Church by encouraging the autocephalous branching

⁹¹Banac, "Asymmetry", 147.

⁹²Jim Seroka, "Nationalism and the New Political Compact in Yugoslavia," History of European Ideas 15 (4-6) (1992): 577-578.

⁹³Banac, "Asymmetry", 145.

⁹⁴Mirkovic, 327.

⁹⁵Seroka, 577.

of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,⁹⁶ therefore attempting to balance his policies between both the Croats and Serbs. His attempted policy of equality among ethnicities included the equalization of languages throughout Yugoslavia during his reign.⁹⁷ Titoism, as it was later called, would supposedly guarantee equality to every constituent nation and the right to internal development.⁹⁸

After the German withdrawal from Yugoslavia, Broz created an unified state under communist rule. Later during his reign, he did allow some forms of national expression as long as these demonstrations did not promote violence. From its creation as a socialist state, Yugoslavia has catered to the national groups making up the multiethnic state in order to achieve socialist ends.⁹⁹ The Marxist experiment in Yugoslavia was based on the premise that the support of the nations of the constituent South Slav peoples was necessary in order to rebuild successfully a dismembered political unit. To appeal to these nationalities, Broz promised to allow some cultural autonomy in each newly formed republic. The Communist leaders mistakenly believed that as the socialist experiment progressed and the workers identified themselves more and more by class instead of national criteria, nationalism would soon fade, then die out altogether.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶Banac, "Asymmetry", 145.

⁹⁷Denitch, "Limits", 82.

⁹⁸Vladimir Dedijer, "Titoism," essay in Gerasimos Augustinos, ed. The National Idea in Eastern Europe (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1996), 87.

⁹⁹Oskar Gruenwald, "The Croatian Spring, 1971: Socialism in One Republic?" Nationalities Papers 10 (2) (1982): 225.

¹⁰⁰Gow, 460 and Cuvalo, 70.

In the case of the second Yugoslavia which was formed after World War II, and especially Bosnia, Tito used the existing nationalisms against one another, reiterated national commonalities, and sometimes used coercion to promote a multiethnic state based much on the partisan movement which he led during the Second World War.¹⁰¹

However, Serbian elites attempted to dominate the policy of the government again as they had in the first Yugoslavia. For the first twenty years of communist rule, Aleksander Rankovic's UDBA (secret police) put down numerous anti-government demonstrations by the Croat and Albanian minorities. In an unprecedented move, Tito responded to demands for liberalization, and sacked the Serbian head of the secret police in 1966.¹⁰² Rankovic and his cohorts were made out to be the cause for the numerous failed reforms initiated by the Tito regime in the first twenty years of its existence. He was also made out to be repressive of non-Serb national groups, especially the Kosovo Albanians.¹⁰³ A policy of more toleration toward displays of nationalism along with the government reiterating commonalities between the nationalities became the order of the day.¹⁰⁴ More national freedoms were allowed along with the liberalization of each republic's economy, causing the republics to identify more with their own people than

¹⁰¹Gruenwald, 227.

¹⁰²Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia," essay in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse, Yugoslavia the Former and Future (Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995), 50.

¹⁰³Ridley, 380 and 400.

¹⁰⁴Gruenwald, 227.

with Yugoslavism.

In Spring of 1965 during the Fourth Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim population was given the right to national self-determination¹⁰⁵ effectively giving the Muslims a nation as well as a religious form of identity. Broz allowed this political maneuver to try to end the Serb-Croat argument for the control of Bosnia.¹⁰⁶ Even though Broz let the Yugoslavs enjoy some national expression, he would not allow nationalism to go too far in challenging his central rule. This can be seen in the movement that has been labeled the “Croatian Spring”.

In the last half of the 1960s, the Croatian League of Communist and a number of leading Croatian intellectuals, revived a cultural movement. As this minor cultural movement became more popular, more people began to participate, somewhat reflecting Hroch’s Phase B to C. As more time passed, questions were being raised about the possibility of economically becoming more autonomous within the federation. When these expectation could not be met in a legal manner, more extreme nationalism was adopted in reaction to the people’s disappointment.¹⁰⁷ In 1971, leading Croatian politicians tried to force the central government into granting more autonomy to Croatia, and rumors in official circles suggested the possibility of an independent Croatian nation. The “Croatian Spring” was quickly quelled and new leaders loyal to Broz took the place

¹⁰⁵Frederik W. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 247-48.

¹⁰⁶Cviic, 201.

¹⁰⁷Cuvalo, 81.

of the purged ones.¹⁰⁸ Charges of nationalism facilitated the purges in which over 500 people were arrested by the Fall of 1972,¹⁰⁹ including Tadjman.¹¹⁰ After the “Croatian Spring” failed, Croatian identity was suppressed and the economy was further exploited by the federal government.¹¹¹ After the purge of the Croatian leadership, Broz realized the potential danger that by sacking the Croat leadership, Croat loyalty to the central state might be in jeopardy. To keep a balance of power between the two states most likely to challenge Yugoslavism, Broz sacked the creative, liberal Serb party leadership with charges of nationalist agitation and counterrevolution just after his purge of the Croat leadership.¹¹²

As a reaction to the Croatian Spring and sackings of the Croatian and Serbian communist leaders, Broz once again decided to implement a new, more liberal constitution. The Constitution of 1974 set a number of precedents that the Yugoslav republics would use to legitimize secession from the collapsing state in 1990 and 1991. First the constitution guaranteed each republic the right of secession. Supposedly, a state could disassociate itself from the federation at any time that its association was

¹⁰⁸Franjo Tadjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 134.

¹⁰⁹Gruenwald, 223.

¹¹⁰Tudjman was also jailed for nationalist agitation again in the early 1980s for accusing Serbia of domination of the Yugoslav state. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition. 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 110; and Ramet, Social, 310.

¹¹¹Cuvalo, 83.

¹¹²Ridley, 400; and Banac, “Asymmetry”, 148.

detrimental to its welfare. Of course Broz never believed the republics would ever use this option, but it was technically available to appease those individuals pushing for a looser confederation. Secondly, the constitution established more autonomous economies in each republic. Portions of debt were assigned as the responsibility of individual republics and more foreign capital acquired within a republic was allowed to remain in the republic. And last, the new constitution allowed for more national expression among ethnicities in Yugoslavia.¹¹³ These concessions would later come back to haunt the aging Marshal. Bosnia-Herzegovina also adopted a federally approved constitution which guaranteed the equality of all nations within her borders.¹¹⁴

During Broz's reign, the majority of ethnic struggles were suppressed, and, especially in the urban parts of Bosnia during the Serb, Muslim, Croat war, the national boundaries were temporarily lowered as the traditions of ethnic and religious tolerance once again rose above the turmoil created by occupation by a foreign enemy. As time passed, Broz conceded more ground to the nationalist movements within Yugoslavia. His government structure was based on a rotating presidency in which each official nation sent a representative to Belgrade to take a turn as the chairman of the presidency council.¹¹⁵ The remainder of the presidency were "selected according to a strict regional

¹¹³Woodward, 432.

¹¹⁴Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51 (4) (Winter 1992): 661.

¹¹⁵Sabrina Petra Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 66.

quota system".¹¹⁶ These concessions, guaranteed in the Constitution of 1974, would signal the beginning of the end of Marxism in Yugoslavia. The constitution also allowed the republics and autonomous provinces the right to veto measures which effectively emasculated the federal government. State-wide statutes could not be implemented even if one veto was registered.¹¹⁷ Even Broz may have recognized his mistake at allowing the nationalities too much freedom along national lines. He is reported as saying to Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, one of his loyal lieutenants, that "Yugoslavia no longer exists" just after the passage of the Constitution of 1974.¹¹⁸

But Broz's "brotherhood and unity" would not last long after his death in 1980. Without his charismatic leadership, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia continued to splinter along national lines. Each republic's official party focused evermore on the interests of each nationality and not on Yugoslavia as a whole.¹¹⁹ The splintering accelerated due to the dire economic situation of Yugoslavia, which had been in crisis since 1979,¹²⁰ and allowed a strange relationship between liberal communism and nationalism to develop. More freedoms were granted to the separate republics and the

¹¹⁶Steven L. Burg, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," Soviet Studies 38 (2) (April 1986): 179-80.

¹¹⁷"Restless Slav soldiers," The Economist 305, 3 October 1987, 18.

¹¹⁸Stevan Pavlowitch, Tito--Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992), 78.

¹¹⁹Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), 60.

¹²⁰Burg, "Elite," 173.

central government became exceedingly weaker in controlling these areas based on the precedents established in the 1974 Constitution.¹²¹ Heavily indebted to the West from foreign loans and numerous failed reforms of socialism, Broz's policies, as well as those of his successors, brought the economy to a standstill. The vacuum of power created after Broz's death could only be filled by politicians espousing an agenda which would promise economic success and strength. The most accessible and increasingly popular agenda which could appeal to the many factions in Yugoslavia was nationalism. Nationalist rhetoric could create blame for this crisis on one group or another before the actual blame could be turned against those communist leaders whom served under Broz. Nationalism buoyed up the sinking careers of many failing politicians and provided others with a rapid advancement socially and politically.

¹²¹Gow, 460.

Chapter 6

MILOSEVIC: THE RISE AND POPULARIZATION OF NATIONAL APPEAL

In 1981, Kosovo's Albanian population held a series of strikes and protests against the Serb-dominated economy and power structure in this autonomous province. The Serbs, holding the majority of power in Kosovo, crushed the revolt before it became uncontrollable. The Albanian uprising provided Serbs, still seeking to carve out a "Greater Serbia", with the perfect opportunity to push home their case. During the uprising, the Serb controlled media released reports that evidence had been found that Albanian Muslims were planning to remove the Serbian presence from Kosovo using genocide, and to join the province to Albania. Since the "heart" of Serbia has traditionally been in Kosovo, the Serbian population of Yugoslavia supported the violent reprisals against the "heathen" Albanian majority. This continued hostility in Kosovo provided the perfect opportunity for a political opportunist to take the reigns of power among the Serbian people. Using the Kosovo crisis to introduce nationalist policy to "protect" threatened Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic mobilized the disillusioned Serbs of Serbia and Kosovo against the "threatening" nationalities. He would later use many of the same tactics to turn Bosnian Serbs against their Croat and Muslim neighbors.

Most sources indicate the first truly successful nationalist politician in the post-Tito Yugoslavia was a former banker, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic, an experienced

politician, attempted to link nationalist interests with communist leadership in a strong centralized governmental structure.¹²² Riding the wave of national sentiment and benefitting from the deteriorating economic situation, Milosevic turned on his former mentor and patron, Ivan Stambolic, and seized control of the Serbian presidency in 1986.¹²³ Milosevic saw that the only way to alleviate his country's woes was to institute an extremely centralized government, which was totally subservient to his leadership. In an astute political move, he turned the Serbian people's scrutiny from economic reform to an imaginary plot against the Serbian people planned by the Albania majority in Kosovo. Using the shrinking Serb population of Kosovo due to economic failure in the area as "hard evidence", Milosevic spread rumors of persecution against the Serbs by the Albanians.¹²⁴ The Serbian leader, having seen the power and respect mass demonstrations promoted in people, organized mass gatherings to further instill national pride in Serbs, and provide an outlet of paranoid rhetoric focused on non-Serb ethnicities, especially the Albanians.¹²⁵ Milosevic recognized the nationalist love affair with the province of Kosovo and the quasi-religious significance of the defeat of the medieval Serbian kingdom in Kosovo on June 28, 1389. On June 28, 1989, the 600th anniversary of the losing battle, Milosevic helped organize a national rally of Serbs to celebrate this 'holiday'. Approximately one million Serbs from all over the world came to Kosovo.

¹²²Denitch, Ethnic, 60.

¹²³Woodward, 90.

¹²⁴"Force of Destruction," National Review 39 (28 August 1987): 42.

¹²⁵Denitch, "Yugoslavia," 80.

Milosevic delivered a pro-Serbian speech peppered with warnings for non-Serbs refusing to tow the Serbia-dominated line.¹²⁶ These events were to scare non-Serbs into complacency within Yugoslavia.¹²⁷

Milosevic effectively continued to turn the Serbian population against other nationalities. He began to use history to justify the resurgence of Serbian nationalism. Milosevic blamed Yugoslavia's decline on non-Serbs who dominated the state during Broz's reign. In another deft move, he replaced all party functionaries with loyal underlings in the autonomous provinces and in Montenegro.¹²⁸ The autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, would quickly lose their special status,¹²⁹ much to the chagrin of their non-Serbian populations. Milosevic stifled all ethnic Albanian practices in Kosovo, including classes taught in Albanian, while ruthlessly repressing any opposition to his mandates. His enthusiasm created suspicion among the other republics, especially those with a significant Serbian population. "Greater Serbia" was once again being talked about among the nationalities of Yugoslavia, among some with fear, among others with longing.

Recognizing the danger of Serbian nationalism for non-Serbs across Yugoslavia, the communist parties in Slovenia and Croatia officially protested the crack-down in Kosovo. In response to deserved criticism, Milosevic publicly labeled the critical leaders

¹²⁶Glenny, 35.

¹²⁷Ibid., 33-34.

¹²⁸Ramet, National, 228.

¹²⁹Ibid.

as “‘enemies of Serbia’. Milosevic accused them [the Slovenian and Croatian Communist Parties] of being ‘separatist, nationalists, and destroyers of Yugoslavia’” who considered “Serbian greatness a thorn in the side [of their respective republics].”¹³⁰ A round of political accusations tore at the weakened seams holding Yugoslavia together. This would culminate at the final meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Recognizing the political dam Milosevic constructed blocked any effective executive action by the rotating presidency of the federal government, the Slovenian delegation walked out on the proceedings, making any chance of reaching a general accord on maintaining the union difficult.

¹³⁰Stiglmeier, 15.

Chapter 7

TUDJMAN: CROATIAN NATIONALISM IN ACTION

Milosevic's rise to power using a nationalist agenda provided the other nationalities with a model for the protection of their respective national groups. The most influential politician to rise up and protest Milosevic's domination of Yugoslavia was a former communist general turned historian and politician, Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman was the creator of the nationalistic Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). He was also a revisionist historian of European history, and his biases were easily identified in his work *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe*, which would reflect his national policies in the newly formed Croatian state. This monograph is overtly partial to Western South Slavs and their culture.¹³¹ He, like the Serbian intellectuals, uses history to glorify the struggle of his nation, while vilifying (although not as viciously as some of the Serbian renditions of overtly subjective histories) that of the perceived oppressors. In reference to the Serb-Croat conflict, he consistently speaks out against any Serbian action which he views as detrimental to Croatia.

In the first multiparty elections in Yugoslavia since the end of World War II, Tudjman won the presidential seat and the HDZ much of the legislature. In May 1990, the HDZ won 205 of the 356 seats, easily out-pacing the number two communist party

¹³¹Tudjman, 15.

which took 75 seats.¹³² Tudjman's election campaign centered on the natural right of self-determination for the Croatian people, the end of communist rule, and taking a firm hand with the Serb minority in Croatia.¹³³ He effectively used Croatian disillusionment with communism to secure support over a wider constituency in his campaign, and equated the communist rule with Serbs and Serbia. The Serbs were portrayed as barbarians and the "civilized" Croatian people needed a strong defense to protect themselves from these "wild" people.¹³⁴ With his history as a national agitator, and his illegal running of the HDZ one year prior to the election, Tudjman was portrayed as a patriot by the Croatian people. Combining the blame for the Croatian economic decline on Croatia's unfair share of the upkeep of the rest of Yugoslavia, along with an aggressive, foreignly funded campaign,¹³⁵ Tudjman was able to secure the election. His campaign posters reflected his successful attempt to turn Croat energies toward an independent homeland, "assert[ing] the priority of Croatian interests ("Let us decide ourselves the destiny of our own Croatia").¹³⁶ The specific wording of the poster makes a potential HDZ supporter feel a sense of belonging with a larger ethno-national group. This was appealing to those individuals looking for a scapegoat to blame for the deterioration of Yugoslavia's economy. "The HDZ appealed directly to voters' patriotic and nationalistic sentiments

¹³²Cohen, Broken, 98.

¹³³Hayden, 655.

¹³⁴Woodward, 208.

¹³⁵Of which a significant portion came from Croats living outside of Yugoslavia.

¹³⁶Cohen, Broken, 96.

and the their dissatisfaction with the existing regime and situation in the country".¹³⁷

Thus the identification of the "other" is re-introduced to the masses.

In order to appeal to those individual Croats wishing to reform a united Yugoslavia, Tadjman promised to push for improvements within a confederal union with Yugoslavia's republics. Tadjman believed this was just the continuation of the views espoused by the popular Croat folk-hero, Stjepan Radic.¹³⁸ This gained him a number of votes from fence-sitters undecided between the HDZ and the communist party, who, during the campaign, argued for market economy and more autonomy from the Yugoslav federal government.

One of Tadjman's most radical ideas centered on the ethnic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tadjman, in a statement reminiscent of the World War II Ustasi's policy, suggested the Bosnia Muslims were just Islamicized Croats, and if Yugoslavia ever broke-up, that Bosnia-Herzegovina be incorporated into an independent Croatian state. He defended this expansionistic idea in a statement claiming the two regions had been linked throughout their histories,¹³⁹ and must continue to work together against their common enemy--the Serbs.

Still believing that Yugoslavia had been Serb dominated as expressed in his

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Ibid., 97.

book,¹⁴⁰ Tudjman bombarded the electorate with these motivating accusations. Believing that the more economically developed Croatia could do better without the “backward” southern and eastern parts of Yugoslavia,¹⁴¹ he envisioned a Croatia free of Serbian domination and the economic parasitism of the underdeveloped parts of the country. Cohen points out that Tudjman made a statement about the ethnic composition of the governmental structure, in which he claims that 40% of the government in Croatia was made up of Serbs while only 12 % of the population was Serbian prior to the free elections. Tudjman further claimed that all Croatian national expression was suppressed by the central government.¹⁴² Finding similarities between Croatian repression and suppression of Kosovar Albanian national feeling, more Croats fell into Tudjman's camp with a new nationalist vigor. This inflamed a large portion of the Croatian Serb population as well as causing widespread mistrust of the HDZ by the Bosnian Serbs. After the Croatian elections, a wave of Serbian nationalism swept across the Krajina area. The Yugoslavian federal army began to covertly provide firearms and ordinance for the Serbs residing in this area. “Thus it was a classic case of Croatian and Serbian

¹⁴⁰It matters very little if Tudjman actually believed in Serb domination of Yugoslavia's political organs or society. What is of significance is whether or not he can persuade Croats into following his rhetoric and therefore maintain his power.

¹⁴¹Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme “Balkans”: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51 (1) (Spring 1992): 4. These two authors argue that the northwestern republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, borrowed the concept of “orientalism”, which the West bestowed on the whole of Yugoslavia, and used it to justify their secession from the Yugoslav federation.

¹⁴²Cohen, Broken, 97.

nationalism feeding upon on another, a pattern that had tragically emerged several times before".¹⁴³ Tudjman, throughout his tenure as president of the Republic of Croatia, has pointed out that Milosevic's nationalist rhetoric and policies were the real reason behind Croatian reactionary nationalist feeling. In turn, the Croatian mobilization of nationalism to "combat" the Serbian threat has inspired "similar nationalist backlash on the part of Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia".¹⁴⁴ This appears to be another example of scapegoating on the Croatian and Serbian sides, pointing to external factors facilitating a violent reaction against the "other".

¹⁴³Ibid., 101.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 140-41.

Chapter 8

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Andras Riedlmayer, a Harvard University librarian who has extensively studied Yugoslavia for 25 years, claims, "All [that] most people have now is the sketchiest knowledge of their own religion and the crudest stereotypes of what their neighbors believe and practice."¹⁴⁵

Realizing the up-coming danger to a united Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegovic's Muslim's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) actively attempted to pacify the increasingly agitated rural Serb population. The party's official platform was the continued existence of multi-ethnic toleration, in which no nation was favored over any other.¹⁴⁶ Croatian Vice-President of Yugoslavia, Stipe Mesic, just before the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, attempted to institute a confederal system to preserve some form of unity.¹⁴⁷ This proposal was rejected by Milosevic and on June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The next day Milosevic ordered the JNA into Slovenia and Croatia, which began the series of ethnic wars in Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁸ As

¹⁴⁵Lena Sun, BOSNEWS Digest, 11 December 1995.

¹⁴⁶Malcolm, 217-219.

¹⁴⁷Robert F. Miller, "The Pitfalls of Economic Reform in Yugoslavia," Australian Journal of International Affairs 45 (2) (November 1991): 213.

¹⁴⁸Ramet, Babel, 37.

negotiations between the break-away republics and Serbia completely broke down, Izetbegovic's government agreed to hold a referendum to determine if Bosnia-Herzegovina should employ their constitutional right and secede from the Yugoslavian union. On February 28-March 1, 1992, a vote was held in which the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) under Radovan Karadzic boycotted the vote. In an almost unanimous decision by the sixty-six percent of the entire electorate who voted (and a number of urban Serbs participated in the referendum), the republic chose to break with Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁹ Of the Serbs choosing to vote in the legal elections, most were the more educated and urbanized Serbs who were much less likely to support politicians like Karadzic and Milosevic.¹⁵⁰ In a SDS plebiscite held before this official referendum, about 90% of the Serbs agreed to remain within the union (which shows that at least 10% of the Serbs who participated in this plebiscite voted to separate from Milosevic's aggressive state).¹⁵¹

On April 5, 1992, a mass demonstration of all Yugoslav nationalities in Sarajevo was held to support a peaceful, multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the Holiday Inn, Serb extremist snipers fired on the protestors, killing or wounding scores of participants. This started the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The JNA, after fighting to a standstill in Croatia just months before, rushed into Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia and Serbia in

¹⁴⁹Anna Cataldi, Letters From Sarajevo: Voices of a Besieged City (Dorset: Shaftesbury, 1994), 11.

¹⁵⁰Gjelten, 13.

¹⁵¹Cataldi, 11.

an attempt to hold the republic within the federation. This was justified by the call of the Serb minority for protection against the Muslims and Croats. By April 7, 1995, most of Europe and the United States recognized Bosnia's independence and demanded the withdrawal of the JNA.

Under pressure from Western Europe, the U.S., UN, Milosevic agreed to remove the JNA presence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. He decommissioned a large percentage of his troops, allowing them to retain heavy equipment and weapons,¹⁵² and brought back a mere shadow of the army which invaded Slovenia and Croatia just months before. Most of the decommissioned troops joined the Bosnian Serb army for the most part, and proceeded to overrun about 70% of Bosnia's territory. Throughout the war, evidence indicates that Milosevic continued to supply the Bosnian Serb army with arms, supplies, and men.¹⁵³

In 1993, the Croat-Muslim alliance broke down when Croat extremists allied with the Bosnian Serbs to expel the Muslim population in what was to eventually become the self-proclaimed territory of Herzeg-Bosna. Mate Boban took control of the autonomous province when moderate Croatian leader Stjepan Kljuic, in the tradition of tolerance, refused Tudjman's order to allow the breaking away of the self-declared province.¹⁵⁴ The new Croat leader desired an ethnically pure state which would have the option of joining

¹⁵²Anthony Lewis, "Anatomy of Disaster," New York Times, 5 January 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (14), 8 January 1995.

¹⁵³Ramet, Social, 403.

¹⁵⁴Vulliamy, 213.

Croatia in the future. This came to an end in March 1994 with the renewed hostility between the Croats and Serbs which forced the Muslims and Croats to once again join forces in an uneasy coalition.¹⁵⁵

Sarajevo and a number of ethnically mixed cities were subject to bombardment and sniper activity. The UN, in a token gesture, established a number of safe-havens in territory which was overrun by the Serbs. These safe-havens provided primarily Muslim refugees with supposedly secure areas to flee into to escape the ethnic cleansing practices being perpetrated by the marauding Serbs. In July and August of 1995, the Serbian army overran two of these safe-havens, Zepa and Srebrenica.¹⁵⁶ Aid workers were denied access to 7,000-8,000 Muslim men¹⁵⁷ who are still missing from Srebrenica as of April 1996. According to evidence gathered by the War Crimes tribunal in The Hague, Milosevic ordered General Perisic to launch this attack.¹⁵⁸ These actions, combined with the public support for the relief of Sarajevo, forced the UN to perform the air strikes promised throughout the war. With the help of a rejuvenated Croatian Army (HV), the Bosnian Government Army (*Armija*), pushed back the Serbs and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recaptured. In an attempt to consolidate and legitimize the possession

¹⁵⁵Almond, 285.

¹⁵⁶Riccardo Orizio, "Zepa innalza la bandiera," *Corriere della Sera*, 20 July 1995, 3.

¹⁵⁷"Serbs Are Poised to Take 2d Muslim Town," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 July 1995, pp. 1 and 6.

¹⁵⁸"No Charges Against Slobodan Milosevic," Press TWRA release: from BosNet Digest 5 (14), 8 January 1996.

of this much territory, the Bosnia Serbs, represented by Slobodan Milosevic, came to the bargaining table to end the war. On November 15, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed. Since then, peace in the region has been nothing if not tenuous and strained.

Chapter 9

THE FAILURE OF MARXISM AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY

"[The] economic collapse, political disintegration, inflation and consequent wiping out of savings, emergence of opportunist and resented new wealth, national humiliation, the transformation of large proportions of the previously dominant cultural group into minorities in new national units, moral disorientation, facile and opportunist centrifugal nationalism...[causes the resurgence of national re-alignment and feeling]" .¹⁵⁹

The failure of the Marxist world model had serious repercussions on the reemergence of nationalism in previously socialist states. Hobsbawm predicts the death of nationalism as technology and ideology become more modern and world-wide.¹⁶⁰ He sees the disintegration of nationalist feeling, and in its place an internationalist identification becoming the predominate scheme of identification among people. John Breuilly comes to a similar conclusion in his work, *Nationalism and the State*,¹⁶¹ that nationalist feeling is in decline and probably will never reoccur. However, technology did not spread internationalist ideology as expected. Instead technology, under the auspices of opportunistic leaders, bombarded the public-at-large with separatist

¹⁵⁹Gellner, xi.

¹⁶⁰Hobsbawm, 191-192.

¹⁶¹John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 422.

propaganda and “evidence” of conspiracies plotted by the “others”. Therefore modernity provided the tools for the destruction of a Marxist, international society instead of creating it as envisioned by Hobsbawm and Breuilley.

Gellner spends considerable time pointing out the numerous flaws in the Marxist model. He defends the idea that nations are more pragmatic in their motivation when a crisis of identity occurs. National feeling does not depend on formal theory or history steering a situation a certain way, but on concrete social situations.¹⁶² These social conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina included the failing economy and the crisis of identity directly associated with the desperate situation. Furthermore, Gellner attacks the Marxist paradigm of social development which predicts the future will be made of classless, nationless, and religion-less masses. Marxist theory only predicts the future’s outcome and provides some vague map of the road to this goal.¹⁶³

According to Marxist theorists, nationalism should have declined as more and more modernization and industrialization appeared throughout the world. Industrialization supposedly breaks down the cultural and ethnic boundaries fostered by feudal society as capitalism replaces the outdated modes of production.¹⁶⁴ As increasing numbers of people from the periphery flock to the industrial centers, their local cultures will eventually blend into a single overarching culture as time passes and a new generation born in the city interacts. In order for the boundaries between nations to erode,

¹⁶²Gellner, 65-66.

¹⁶³Ibid., 5-6.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 39.

the industrial population of every country has to become more alike, and therefore less individual (in terms of national identity). As more people join the work-force, and become “equal” to one another in a factory setting, the workers will begin to identify with one another, in effect replacing nationalist feeling with the solidarity of the same class. As time passes and technology provides the common man with communication systems to communicate with individuals around the world, a solidarity between workers, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, will gradually progress until boundaries separating people from one another completely break down, and the Marxist worker's utopia is realized with equality for all.¹⁶⁵

However, this did not occur because national identity overcame class identity in many areas. Having an emotional and psychological identity crisis in response to a worsening economic crisis in a working society, which happened in the late eighties and early nineties in Yugoslavia, the worker feels the need to become part of a group. Desperation in turn leads the person to seek people like oneself (e.g. similar appearance, similar language, similar likes and dislikes). Once a number of these individuals come together, probably from the same or similar areas with similar traditions and histories, family histories and traditions are related to the like members. Therefore ethnic and national groupings are reinforced, not broken down. Instead, ethnic and national identification between "similar" people is encouraged by organized events such as celebrations of a common past (e.g. the Scottish games, Oktoberfest, Independence Day,

¹⁶⁵Cuvalo, 70-71.

etc.).¹⁶⁶ Events such as shooting competitions and physical contests produce a mixture of religious and patriotic elements, thus reinforcing the solidarity of a nation.¹⁶⁷ This new identification gives the workers a sense of solidarity, not just with one another, but with all-Scottish, all-German, all-American people regardless of social position because the “traditional” past—or “invented traditional” past—celebrates the ethnic past of *all* of its national members, not just a single class. Therefore, industrialization, which is supposed to break down ethnic and national boundaries, in many cases creates more rigid boundaries, and possibly reinforces an ethnic and national sense of belonging, at the expense of Marx's worker's utopia.

These new nationalities need a political entity to protect their culture from outside interference. National movements put a government into power, and once in power this leader's responsibility is to protect the nation that he or she is a part of. With an official government established, the nation is therefore legitimized in the eyes of the international community and a precedent is established for other people to create governments based on ethno-nationalist principles. It is a self-perpetuating system. As nation-states spring up over geographically adjacent areas, tensions may erupt over economic or minority situations in one or the other political unit. If one economy is more prosperous, a manipulative leader may suggest conspiracy by the other nation to justify aggressive

¹⁶⁶Although Hobsbawm and Ranger in Invention of Tradition claim that these events were invented, this matters very little to the majority of participants. These games and activities still represent a commonality among fellow nationals.

¹⁶⁷Rudolf Braun, Sozialer und kultureller Wandel in einem ländlichen Industriegebiet im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Erlenbach, Zurich, 1965), 337.

actions to rectify the situation. And often times the best way to garnish support for a military endeavor is to point out the plight of your national minority residing within the opponent's state (as in the case of Serbia's concern over the Krajina and East Slavonic Serbs--that is as an excuse to forcibly retain an economically advanced Croatia in a financially bankrupt Yugoslavia).

The origin of the Yugoslavian and Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict was the breakdown of federal governmental authority and the economy, not historical hatred. The major reason for this slide into national chauvinism was the severe economic decline and the collapse of the communist system, beginning in the early 1970s and lasting until the dissolution of the country in 1991. Each newly formed territory wanted to protect its economy from the other former republics and the leaders which emerged from this debacle saw a golden opportunity to enhance their power-bases due to this economic decline.¹⁶⁸ The economic situation of these new states had suffered greatly under the failed communist and socialist experiment, and the leadership no longer had a secure position in the new, emerging societies. Leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman needed this new, re-vitalized political agenda to retain and strengthen their power bases. These leaders inherited an especially favorable situation in order to recruit followers disenchanted with the old socialist system. F. L. Carsten, in his book The Rise of Fascism, many times makes the point that both the Nazis and Italian fascists actively recruited followers from the unemployed and these loyalties often depended on which

¹⁶⁸Woodward, 15.

group recruited and organized them.¹⁶⁹ Both Tudjman and Milosevic, and their apprentices in Bosnia-Herzegovina sought followers from these economically disadvantaged individuals and provided them with a renewed sense of belonging and a promise of better times ahead. The nationalists had to re-create and revitalize a sense of belonging to a Croatian nation or a Serbian one. At the same time the destruction of a Bosnian identity had to occur. The failing economy provided a perfect opportunity to realign identity among the nationalities. By pointing out “irreconcilable” differences between the nations during economic bad-times, these leaders “play[ed] on people’s fears and fuel[ed] the flames of exclusivist passions”.¹⁷⁰

Yugoslavia went through a period of economic failures, punctuated with sporadic episodes of economic gains, in part financed by Western loans. The economic downturn of the economy in the early 1970s brought a new wave of unemployed workers into the already labor-glutted cities. In order to survive in this new environment, which was somewhere between a socialist framework and a capitalist one, people generally migrated to urban centers in which a member of their family or a former resident of their village lived. Generally one of these familiar faces was of the same ethnicity as the new migrant, and their patrons either hired them over someone who was an unknown, or aided them in acquiring a position in a company in which they worked. Often these workers, even if they found a position, experienced an inferiority complex and a sense of marginality,

¹⁶⁹F. L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

¹⁷⁰Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping, Worldwatch Paper 114 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993), 16.

especially if the ethnic make-up of the city was different from their own nationality.¹⁷¹

This decade was the beginning of the economic decline which would precipitate ethnic division of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the help of outside elements.

Throughout the 1980s Yugoslavia's communist system deteriorated rapidly. Many economic reform policies failed soon after they were implemented. For nearly thirty years, the Yugoslav people were bombarded by Broz's message of "brotherhood and unity" and how this could be achieved through the perpetuation of a Marxist, socialist government. According to Titoism, the country supposedly guaranteed equality among constituent ethnic groups and the right to autonomous internal development of the economy and industry.¹⁷² Since Croatia and Slovenia continued to be more developed industrially than the remainder of the country, Serbian nationalists could claim Broz's policy favored the two northwestern republics. This would later be used by Milosevic to revile the "favoritist" agenda of the Broz regime, especially as the economy throughout the less developed areas continued to decline. Unfortunately the economy did not improve during the years just after Broz's death. The cost of living increased dramatically while wages decreased¹⁷³ and unemployment reached roughly 15% statewide.¹⁷⁴ Within a seven year period between 1982 and 1989, the average standard of

¹⁷¹Woodward, 44.

¹⁷²Dedijer, 87.

¹⁷³Miller, 218.

¹⁷⁴John Greenwald, "Teetering on the Brink," Time 130 (30 November 1987): 32.

living had decreased by 50%.¹⁷⁵ By the end of 1989, the inflation rate peaked at 2660% per annum, prices were decontrolled, and a massive devaluation of the dinar [in part the a result of Belgrade's printing of un-backed bills to cover short term foreign loan debt] racked Yugoslavia's economy.¹⁷⁶ Individuals throughout Yugoslavia began to feel the defeat associated with the dissolution and inviability of their country under this failing system. Due in part to the ending of the Cold War and the unique position Yugoslavia had between East and West, Western foreign loans no longer helped in bolstering a deficit economy, and therefore an important source of income was no longer available.¹⁷⁷ With the collapse of the socialist system, social security became more and more insecure and guaranteed employment opportunities remained scarce. With the anxieties created by this economic downturn, the vacuum of power left after the death of Broz was more evident as the crisis worsened. Yugoslavs no longer saw themselves as united and the "brotherhood and unity" slogan had a hollow ring. Both Milosevic and Tudjman used this economic disparity and identity crisis to gain political power in their respective states. Pragmatic issues such as the economic hardships¹⁷⁸ suffered by a disillusioned Yugoslavian population influenced the resurgence of nationalism and the support for opportunistic leaders. The nationalist agendas first adopted by the predecessor of the

¹⁷⁵Steven L. Burg, "Nationalism and Democratization in Yugoslavia," The Washington Quarterly 14 (Autumn 1991): 11.

¹⁷⁶Miller, 217.

¹⁷⁷Pavlowitch, 100 and 106.

¹⁷⁸Gellner, 51.

SDS under Milosevic, then copied and adapted by the HDZ under Tudjman,¹⁷⁹ provided the Serbs and Croats in non-parent republics a new form of identification in which their own nations were not to blame for the economic crisis and the failure of Marxism-- instead the newly revived “other” was targeted as the culprit. Greater numbers of people began to believe the propaganda launched at them by their own nation, and alienation with long-time neighbors not of the same nationality affected local relations. And of course the nation without a patron state to which to turn to (the Muslims) received the lion’s share of pressure derived from a growing sense of becoming the outsider within their native country.

This paper has previously established the multiethnic character of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout its history (with a sporadic episode of ethnic violence precipitated by the Nazi invaders and occupiers). The vast majority of primary and secondary sources confirms this position. But, as in the World War II period, when outside pressures combined with an internal “lunatic fringe” are allowed to dredge up the painful memories of history along with revitalized conspiracy theories, the disease of nationalism tends to spread in a sick economy. The national populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, frustrated by the worsening situation around them, wished to find a scapegoat to blame for this situation. This scapegoating began as early as 1973-75 during an economic downturn in which “some of Yugoslavia’s nations h[ad] put forward the

¹⁷⁹Milica Bakic-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” *Slavic Review* 54 (4) (Winter 1995): 922. Both Milosevic and Tudjman just adapted the “other” label which the West had forced upon the Yugoslavs. In effect, Tudjman just borrowed from the borrower.

claim that they were exploited by other members of the Federation” and economic nationalism has gained in power ever since.¹⁸⁰ By 1991, “the productivity sector in Yugoslavia had collapsed”¹⁸¹ and there was no real hope of economic recovery during the Yugoslav dissolution. According to “Ivo”, a Croatian nationalist interviewed in Zagreb, the primary reason for this dissolution was Slovenia’s and Croatia’s desire to separate themselves from the poorer republics to the east and south.¹⁸² With the growing power of the nationalists in Serbia and Croatia, and their ever-increasing concern with the economic position of minority nationalities in neighboring states, the population’s resistance to nationalist rhetoric weakened much like an organism which has had to fight off a parasite for an extended period of time. As the lives’ of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina worsened and more people began to realize the opportunity the new nationalist leaders provided--to once again feel a similar identification with a supposedly healthy, wholesome body (this time national as opposed to regional)--those fence-sitters increasingly fell onto the nationalists side, pulling with them those who at first only wanted to join them on the fence. As the numbers increased in the ranks of the separatists, they received more legitimization, and therefore more acceptance in this new community. With the familial ties which are supposedly so strong among all peasants in

¹⁸⁰Desanka Pesic and Dusan Janic, “Nationalism and Socialism: The Case of Yugoslavia,” History of European Ideas 15 (1-3) (1992): 205.

¹⁸¹Ramet, Babel, 45.

¹⁸²“Ivo” of Zagreb, interview by author, July 1995, hand-written notes, Zagreb, Croatia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina,¹⁸³ family members were drawn into these national camps, further swelling their numbers.

After the collapse of the socialist system, Milosevic and later Tudjman needed a motivating movement to retain their suddenly tenuous powers bases. Nationalism provided them with a most utilitarian tool since it provided two essential things. First it refocused the discontent suffered by the masses away from bleak economic condition which, by all appearances, had no solution, to a more emotional, and therefore more motivating, concern--national solidarity cross-cutting class boundaries. Their rhetoric espoused state protection of the dominant culture (nation), totally separated from "other" nations by solid, seemingly legitimate, and internationally recognized geo-political boundaries. Secondly nationalism provided a convenient scapegoat on which to pin the blame for the failure of Marxist theory and the desperate economic and social degeneration. Using nationalist rhetoric, the leaders could mobilize a goodly portion of the ethnic population, and coerce them into pointing their fingers at other groups and screaming, "They're at fault for this situation! Not us!" The identification of the "other" can be directed toward internal minorities or outsiders who, at some point in history, may (or may not have) dominated the area in which the new national identity developed.¹⁸⁴ In

¹⁸³According to Sivric throughout his work, the peasant population feels great loyalty to their families which last throughout their lives'. However, in some areas this may not be the case and should be examined in greater anthropological detail.

¹⁸⁴This method of argument is similar to Katherine Verdery's in her examination of the redefining of the "other" in post-socialist Romania. Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania," Slavic Review 52 (2) (Summer 1993): 179-203.

Yugoslavia, and more specifically in Bosnia, both types of “others” have been identified and movements against them have been, and are even now in violent progress.

Under the leadership of Tudjman and Milosevic, the societal glue holding Yugoslavia together washed away at a faster rate. Karadzic, under Milosevic’s tutelage, began his push to “redefine” the ethnic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To do this he had to “re-create” Bosnia’s Serbs and separate them from the two other ethnic groups through a restructuring of Bosnian identity.

As Bosnia-Herzegovina began to split due to the pressures exerted from the outside by Milosevic and Tudjman, ethnic separation was further aggravated by the foreign debt in which each republic was responsible for a certain proportion of its own debt since 1977, and economic unrest across the republic.¹⁸⁵ Using the shattered economy to manipulate their potential followers, Milosevic and Tudjman fostered a mistrust in the Bosnian identity. Some Bosnians, especially the poor rural Serbs at the beginning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, found solace in the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism to address their economic griefs.¹⁸⁶

The outside leaders continued to use economic motivators to perpetuate the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the war raged first in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Croatia and Serbia, began to suffer, in part under the economic sanctions imposed on the states by the United Nations. The war

¹⁸⁵Woodward, 432.

¹⁸⁶Lenard J. Cohen, “The Destruction of Yugoslavia,” essay in Gerasimos Augustinos, ed. The National Idea in Eastern Europe (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1996), 152.

was costly to fight and costly to supply from either Croatia or Serbia.¹⁸⁷ First of all, neither Tudjman nor Milosevic could afford to end the war without a decisive victory. Serbia and Croatia, both reeling under the effects of the sanctions against them, needed to keep the fires of nationalism hot to draw attention away from their internal problems.¹⁸⁸ By keeping the focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the plight of their repressed minorities, some of the pressure was taken off the leaders and redirected toward the “enemies” in the neighboring state. For example, Milosevic continually blocked all programs introduced by liberal Serbian politicians to de-escalate Serbia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,¹⁸⁹ so that the Serbian people would continue to focus on external, and not internal, crises. Therefore, it was in Tudjman’s and Milosevic’s best interests to perpetuate the war until one or the other could achieve a victory.

Secondly, the war provided a safety valve for the parent economies by allowing the unemployed throughout Croatia, Serbia, and even Bosnia-Herzegovina to earn money by fighting in Bosnia. According to a letter written on November 29, 1992 by a family to their children sent out of Sarajevo at the beginning of the siege, weekends in the city were particularly rough due to the presence of weekend mercenaries.¹⁹⁰ The war provided the criminals, the unemployed, the underemployed, the uneducated, and the bored with

¹⁸⁷Ramet, Social, 414-16.

¹⁸⁸Slavenka Drakulic, “Yugoslavia’s New Political Truth,” The Nation 248 (6 March 1989): 298.

¹⁸⁹Stephen Kinzer, “Yugoslav-American in Belgrade Leads Serbs Who Won’t Follow,” The New York Times, 24 August 1992, A1.

¹⁹⁰Cataldi, 91.

something to do. It provided these malcontents with the opportunity to earn good money through mercenary work (e.g. Arkan's "Tigers" and Seselj's Chetniks and many others). "Tanja" claimed in her interview, that many rumors circulated that Serbs from Eastern Bosnia fought with the Bosnian Serb army exclusively for pay. Some even fought to support their families in an economy where legitimate jobs are hard to come by and pay much less for more work.¹⁹¹ This mercenary work also provided incentives through the obvious perks. Looting, theft, and adventure have been traditional benefits to mercenary armies. Another perk was the sense of belonging to a group after a prolonged period of alienation due to the lack jobs and reliable wages.¹⁹² These mercenaries and the "regular" Bosnian Serb army viewed the capturing of land as necessary in achieving their goals. According to an interviewed Serb woman in Zagreb in July 1995, one of the reasons for the Serb aggression was to acquire new, better land. The majority of the land the Serbs held before the war was either agriculturally, mineralogically, or industrially poor. Due to the poor quality of their land, they were jealous of the "richer" lands inhabited by the Croats and Muslims, especially the urban centers with large numbers of Muslims.¹⁹³

Another incentive for the continuation of the war was the black-market trade which flourished across Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the direct benefit of Tudjman and Milosevic, criminal overlords, such as Arkan and Boban of Herzeg-Bosna, were provided

¹⁹¹"Tanja" Muslim refugee, interviewed by author, July 1995, Ljubljana, Slovenia, tape recording.

¹⁹²Woodward, 248.

¹⁹³"Sanja" Serbian doctor visiting family in Zagreb, interview by author, July 1995, hand-written notes.

with a legitimate arena in which to practice their criminal specialities. First of all, young criminals were provided with an outlet to relieve frustration through “legitimate” violence, including rape.¹⁹⁴ But those who especially profited from the war were the black-market smugglers and gun runners. Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the perfect backdrop for young, enterprising hoods to trade arms, medical supplies and hard-to-come-by luxury items to those people with enough hard currency to purchase them.¹⁹⁵ “Sanja” claimed that these smugglers provided the governments of Croatia and Serbia with funds to allow them to transport contraband into the Bosnia-Herzegovina war-zone. Without this opportunity to earn money, the criminals would return to whence they came, and continue their illegal activities in places where the government would have to deal with them to placate the local population. If the war ended, so would their livelihoods.¹⁹⁶

Finally, the leaders couldn’t afford to stop the war before the NATO air strikes began due to the serious political backlash their own people would direct against them. With the desperate economic situation combined with the absence of an external enemy to focus frustration and blame upon, the general population would begin to question the validity of their nationalist leaders. Tudjman and Milosevic would also lose the money associated with the illegal activities. During the peace talks secretly held in Norway in November 1993 between Tudjman and Milosevic, Tudjman leaked the existence of these

¹⁹⁴Ruth Seifert, “War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis” essay in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 55.

¹⁹⁵Woodward, 17.

¹⁹⁶“Sanja” interview.

talks, therefore killing them.¹⁹⁷ This was an astute political move. First it reconfirmed in the eyes of the international community that Tudjman and Milosevic were sincerely pursuing peace, and provided the possibility of the UN loosening the economic sanctions against them. Secondly it killed the talks before any kind of lasting decision to stop the war was made. The war could continue uninterrupted and neither Milosevic nor Tudjman were to blame for its continuation.

Even after the Dayton accords, some of these criminals and war-profiteers who profited from the continuation of the war are still trying to make the Dayton Accords a dead letter. According to Muhamed Sacirby, Bosnia's ambassador to the UN, in March 1996, special interest groups in "Herzeg-Bosna" threaten the Federation between the Croats and Muslims not so much for a Greater Croatia but for criminal gain.¹⁹⁸ These elements impose a barrier to the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords and a lasting peace to the war-torn country.

¹⁹⁷Woodward, 510 (note 35).

¹⁹⁸Patrick Moore, "Sacirby Warns About Future of Federation," OMRI Daily Digest No. 63, 28 March 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (115), 28 March 1996.

Chapter 10

THE SEIZURE AND MANIPULATION OF MEDIA

Benedict Anderson argues that print capitalism and state-regulated education helped intellectuals spread the word concerning their beliefs about nationalism and nationalist feeling.¹⁹⁹ But as technology advanced and became more and more available to the average person, radio and television soon replaced print capitalism as the major tool for dissemination of ideas. In the modern period, especially in the last 25 years, television has been used to spread political and social ideas to large groups of individuals. During the information war occurring in the former Yugoslavia, printed fliers, such as those used extensively just prior and during the French Revolution of 1789, newspapers, radio and most notably television were combined into a powerful weapon in the hands of national chauvinists. Upon the ascension of Milosevic and later Tudjman, these media sources were placed under the direct control of the government, and used in the campaign against the “other” nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Media, directed from above, accomplished, and is still accomplishing, what it set out to do; to break apart groups of people who had for centuries lived together in peace.

By equating Anderson’s print capitalism idea with the modern media, one can more effectively use his arguments to examine the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Media

¹⁹⁹Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), 67.

was extensively used by all sides to distribute motivational literature supporting or attacking certain ideas. Combining Anderson's idea of mass distributed information (media), with some of Gellner's ideas of educational levels, one can see the role the outsiders had on the development and perpetuation of the war.

Gellner suggests that ignorant and uneducated people can be influenced into supporting questionable causes.²⁰⁰ Modern day people, demanding some form of input, rely heavily on mass media to get their information, especially those in the Low and Middle Cultures. The Middle Culture has been exposed to elementary education and maybe some form of secondary education as well. It is also not as hostile to the elites of the nation as the Low culture many be due to their previous educational background and lingering respect for the High Culture. This culture also has more access to radio and television, and due to the low level of education, depends on these two devices to receive information. As the media provides information, in some cases incorrect or misleading information, opinion among the Middle Culture could shift, especially if only one side of an issue is represented. According to Susan Woodward, rural people are more likely to depend on television for input due to the fact that they are generally less educated. Because of this lack of education and their dependency on television, they voted for ethnonational parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 in response to their ethnicity's political messages.²⁰¹ As an educated person, Tanja believed the media manipulated the Middle Culture and made a number of the less educated "act less than human" in relation

²⁰⁰Gellner, 55.

²⁰¹Woodward, 238.

to other nationalities. She also explained that the nationalist media suppressed the ideas of ethnic harmony which had existed in Bosnia for centuries.²⁰²

Sabrina Ramet states the importance of the sometimes free Yugoslav press, radio, and television before the rise of the nationalist leaders, especially in work, Balkan Babel. Many of the media sources she examines include underground youth papers, magazines, and student radio stations. Even the more traditional and mainstream publications had a certain amount of editorial freedom and circulated to a large audience across the country. This media, even as early as the 1970s, warned of the dangers associated with the ethnic mix in the multi-national states. Since 1973, the Yugoslavian press periodically warned of the dangers of fundamentalism and pan-Islamic pressures.²⁰³ The press even criticized the federal government and the union of the national republics under the central government in Belgrade. In 1987, a publication, *Nova Revija*, put out a series of essays which claimed that economically and socially Slovenia had only been harmed by its association with the Yugoslav union. These essays also claimed that the Yugoslav state was parasitic on Slovenia due to its close economic ties to Austria. The communist officials across Yugoslavia were outraged by the audacity of the editorial staff in printing such material, and the editor of *Nova Revija* was summarily dismissed from his position with the paper.²⁰⁴ But the damage from the essays had already been done. Media,

²⁰²Tanja, interview.

²⁰³Pedro Ramet, "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims," Nationalities Papers 13 (2) (Fall 1985): 185.

²⁰⁴"It's hard to be a good Slovene," The Economist 303 (11 April 1987): 50.

especially television, was to become a popular and effective vehicle to spread the messages of the new nationalist leaders.

During the mid-80s, Milosevic began to experiment with television to spread his platform ideas to a wider audience. In 1987, a televised session of the Serbian League of Communists was broadcast in which a major argument ensued between the Communist leaders. The nationalist faction under Milosevic preached a hard-line on the Albanian problem in Kosovo. This vicious debate eventually was won by the nationalists. The session was the best-rated show on television for that week.²⁰⁵ Milosevic's support for televising political sessions was an astute move. It easily distributed a good deal of his faction's more popular and sensational platform to a large number of Serbs (and others), attempting to sway mass support for himself and his policies. The above-mentioned case cost Milosevic nothing due to the public nature of the debate. The televising was also an attempt by Milosevic to sway the population's attention away from the economic hardships in Serbia and in Kosovo. Instead it emphasized an ethnic problem which, when attempted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would prove to be just as successful.

After the elections of Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic in Serbia in the 1990 elections, the newly "legitimized" nationalist leaders officially took over the media in each of their respective republics. Milosevic was the first to put the media under state control. He took over the television stations in a country where over 60% of the population had televisions and 35% were illiterate. At this time, television reached

²⁰⁵"Restless Slav soldiers", 18.

almost everyone either through direct viewing or through word of mouth.²⁰⁶ As the war in Croatia raged, Milosevic's media focused propaganda on the *Krajina*, East Slavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as it had on Kosovo. The broadcasts and printed material claimed that the Serbs were being threatened with genocide by the Croats and especially the Muslims. TV Belgrade stated numerous times that the Muslims were "fundamentalists, *mudjahedins*, and extremists", while the Croats were all labeled as Fascists.²⁰⁷ According to Edward Said, "media is far better equipped to deal with caricature and sensation than with the slower processes of culture and society"²⁰⁸ and the national leaders used this knowledge of the media to hype imagined threats and attack "other" groups. The attacks, focusing on the Muslims, helped show that Milosevic planned the hostilities erupting in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Croatian war ended.²⁰⁹ Milosevic's dictatorial rule over the police forces and the media would prevent any opposition from using this same weapon against him. For example, Milosevic brutally repressed a student demonstration in Belgrade when anti-Milosevic students demanded liberalization of Serbia and the moving away from the nationalist agenda. During this

²⁰⁶Vulliamy, 52.

²⁰⁷Stiglmeier, 16 and 20.

²⁰⁸Said, *Culture*, 37.

²⁰⁹Borislav Jovic, a former "side-kick" of Milosevic's, and federal president of Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1991, claimed that Milosevic and the JNA had actively planned out the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to incorporate all Serbs into a single state before 1990. The military plans had been allegedly drawn up into a document called "RAM" in the 1980s. Taken from an untitled compilation by Bernard Meares in BOSNEWS Digest 487, 2 December 1995.

attack on the student population, Milosevic closed down the oppositional free television station, Studio B, and the radio station, Youth Radio B92, providing him with an unquestioned monopoly over all influential media sources.²¹⁰

Tudjman, recognizing the success of Milosevic's media blitzes, copied the Serb by monopolizing the popular media. This action reflects Anderson's idea of reactionary nationalities "pirating" the formula of another's rhetoric.²¹¹ This "pirating" and use of the media was legitimized due to the state of war existing between the newly independent Croatia and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).²¹² Television was crucial in disseminating this rhetoric. Belgrade and Zagreb hegemonized radio and television to gain public support with "lies, inventions, and propaganda, sometimes horrifying, sometimes sentimental".²¹³

With the educational level of the majority of Bosnians, partial literacy contributed heavily to the success of propaganda. The nationalist "model" gave nationalist thinkers in literate societies a tool to construct both a national identity and an "other". As more propaganda was distributed and aired by one side, the other side just picked up the same format, and changed it to fit a reactive message against the first side. This pirating of a hostile "other" is a form of reactive nationalism. The nationalists in Yugoslavia who took

²¹⁰Glenny, 49.

²¹¹Anderson, 81.

²¹²Sebrina Petra Ramet, "The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding "Vietnam" and Blundering into "Abyssinia"," East European Politics and Societies 8 (1) (Winter 1994): 200.

²¹³Parin, 41.

over the organs of power in the late 1980s, had to rebuild the weakened national identities, and the ideas were spread using the media.

Throughout the war, media broadcasted propaganda in hopes of stirring up their constituent nations into a frenzy against the enemy. All sides in the war in Slovenia, Croatia, and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina used history to further their aims and much of this manipulated history came into the living rooms of the different nationalities by way of television.²¹⁴ This history, carefully adapted by the intelligentsias of every side, would ignite rage against neighbors of differing nationalities and promote fear that the “others”, which sometimes had to be defined, were plotting against one nationality or the other. These myths included one of the most popular claims that the South Slav tribes have been at war with each other for centuries. This propaganda, when continuously aired on radio and television, had an effect on many of these uneducated and undereducated people. The sensationalist media, in collusion with the nationalist leaders, perpetuated the myth that irascible hatreds have always split the South Slav peoples, and the hatred was always just under the surface of everyday life.²¹⁵ Not only did it effect the Low and Middle Cultures, but High Cultures outside of the targeted nationality as well. One such misinformed Western journalist claims in one of his articles that: “Ancient enemies, Croats and Serbs had dangerous scores to settle.”²¹⁶ This provides significant evidence in proving that media misinformation can affect even large numbers of well-educated

²¹⁴Vulliamy, 7.

²¹⁵Banac, “Asymmetry”, 142.

²¹⁶James Walsh, “The Flash of War,” Time (30 September 1991): 42.

people.

Many former participants and victims of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina feel confused about what has happened and what could happen. “After 40 years of being told by Communists that ‘brotherhood’ was good, the Serb people heard the opposite from their leaders in the 1990s. Bigotry was now rational, not objectionable”.²¹⁷ This illustrates a dependence of the Low and Middle Cultures on their leadership and media to provide input of events outside the local circles. With a single view bombarding the population night and day, with televised accounts of atrocities supposedly performed against one’s own ethnicity by the “other”, this propaganda can have a deadly effect. As greater numbers of individuals are misinformed about national issues and reconstructed pasts, these people are prone to support rather questionable causes.²¹⁸ “Black and white portrayal” of conflict between nationalities generated sympathy for one side or another, especially when civilians were directly involved.²¹⁹ The televised broadcasts of the destruction of Vukovar in Croatia, and the rape of “Serbian” women by “Croatian and Muslim” men were aired to strengthen people’s resolve to remain apart from one another and to continue the hostilities until the leaders achieved their goals. In one documented case, a group of Serbs video-taped a mass rape of a Croat woman, claiming that she was a Serb being raped by Croats and Muslims because of her nationality. The obviously dubbed vocals had Serbian intonation and usage, indicating blatant propaganda, even

²¹⁷Gjelten, 133.

²¹⁸Gellner, 55.

²¹⁹Woodward, 14.

though it was poorly executed.²²⁰ The media convinced many Serbs that they were defending themselves against Croats and Muslims and vice versa.²²¹

Non-Yugoslav observers have commented on the effectiveness in which the media was utilized by Tudjman, Milosevic, and their underlings. Marco Altherr, the one-time head of the International Red Cross, directly stated that television caused many people to believe that the “others” deserved to die.²²² This devastating tool forced wedges between long-time friends across Bosnia, which was exactly what the politicians wanted. A 28-year-old Muslim doctor said this about the Serbs: “They used to think the Muslims were their friends and neighbors, but then the propaganda clouded their minds. They told me that they had lists with the names of Serbian children who were going to be butchered. That was the propaganda lies of Serbian TV from Banja Luka.”²²³

So why didn’t the local people just ignore all this aired rhetoric and get on with their lives living beside their Croatian, Serbian, or Muslim neighbors? First, this media blitz coming as it did during a time of crisis--a crisis of economy and one of identity--caught a number of the Middle Culture off-guard when they were most vulnerable. Television constantly attempted to reinforce the concept of a conspiracy directed specifically toward a nationality by “other” nationalities. This was a favored method used

²²⁰Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Turning Rape into Pornography,” essay in Alexandra Stiglsmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 76.

²²¹Stiglsmayer, 20.

²²²Parin, 41.

²²³Stiglsmayer, 89.

by the Serb nationalists. Secondly, in many cases, the local religious leaders harbored nationalist sympathies. Religious leaders, especially revered in more rural regions, were viewed as the “keepers” of the nation and their churches as “defenders of national identity”.²²⁴ In fact, media could point out the visible traditions perpetuated by a certain religious group. For example, the Muslim tradition in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought visible “non-European” architecture, dress, and customs to a European country.²²⁵ The rhetoric which appeared constantly on television from either Belgrade or Zagreb could be used to the advantage of the clergy in pointing out “alien” differences, while at the same time defending one’s own nationality against the lies spread by the “other”. For example, to a nationalist Croatian priest, information broadcast from Zagreb is supported as the truth, while that from Belgrade just legitimizes separatism by spreading obvious lies about Croats and the Croat nation.²²⁶ Third, in many cases the local leaders used nationalism to retain their offices during the collapse of the union. These leaders are just “mini”-versions of Milosevic and Tudjman and the media gave them more political clout. Fourth, local or more tolerant views no longer had access to broadcasting. Therefore, especially in villages without a large proportion of a minority population, the majority population would not have any personal experience with significant numbers of the “other” to justify to themselves that the media was attempting to manipulate the target

²²⁴Cviic, 195-196.

²²⁵Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10.

²²⁶See the previous note on O’Conner’s experience with the Franciscans earlier in this paper.

audience. This ignorance of the “other” has been historically damning to persecuted minorities. But the most important reason for believing much of this rhetoric had to do with the personal intrusion by outsiders. According to “Lada”, just before her village was ethnically cleansed, few people actually paid much attention to what was on television. Then one day “the Serb army was on a hill above my village, and a man walked down to the Orthodox Church. In a few days, my neighbor knocked on my door with a gun demanding we leave immediately.”²²⁷ Also with such a large army roaming the countryside of Bosnia (the remnants of the JNA and the paramilitary units), many people could be coerced into committing atrocities. For example, as Arkan’s paramilitary units entered Eastern Bosnia just after the JNA’s “withdrawal”, they immediately began to kill and plunder. This sparked waves of terror and “counter-violence”. The counter-violence often forced local Serbs into combat, “as was anticipated by the strategists who had been preparing for the conflict for some time.” These outsiders “were needed [to] kill anonymous victims without compulsion and thereby polarize society and force people to take sides.”²²⁸ These armed bands would be a great incentive to either flee, or to participate in combat and possible ethnic cleansing.

Presently the media is still being used against nationalities all across the partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina. One frightening example of the possible perpetuation of nationalist-dominated media is illustrated in the March 1996 purchase of Belgrade’s

²²⁷“Lada”, interview.

²²⁸ Almond, 264-265.

Radio Pingvin by Arkan, the notorious criminal para-military leader.²²⁹ Although he claims that the music format will remain the same and no political announcements will be made, this station poses a possible threat to the remaining supporters of a multi-ethnic society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A goodly portion of propaganda directed at the Bosnia Serbs came from television and radio stations in Belgrade, so the fears of this manipulative propaganda again fomenting ethnic strife in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not unfounded by this turn of events.

²²⁹Stan Markotich, "Serbian Paramilitary Leader Buys Radio Station," OMRI Daily Digest 58, Part II, 21 March 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (105), 21 March 1996.

Chapter 11

DEFINING NATIONALITY WITH MAPS AND BORDERS

One example of how politics and academia worked together can be seen in the power of maps and borders. This power was established even before war erupted in Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia warned the Yugoslav government during Milosevic's attack on the Albanian population of Kosovo that the Constitution of 1974 gave them a legal and binding right of secession in which all of their territory defined by existing internal borders would be included. The Serbian leadership posed their own warning to these republics stating that if they left the union, the areas containing a majority of Serbs would remain with the parent state. Each side agreed to foreign arbitration to settle this dispute. The Badinter Commission was formed, headed up by Robert Badinter, a French constitutional lawyer, to solve the problem. Much to the chagrin of the Serb politicians, the Badinter Commission claimed the secession was legal and self-determination, according to the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, was not dependent on nationality but on existing republic boundaries.²³⁰ Therefore the West affirmed that recognized borders legitimized national existence. The Serb and Croat nationalist pushing for the consolidation of territory inhabited primarily by their own nationality into the parent states, went on a campaign of war and ethnic-cleansing to redraw and justify new borders

²³⁰Gow, 467-468.

on new maps.

National movements identify with specific geographical territory. Using this identification which Thongchai Winichakul refers to as a nation's geo-body, a specific nationality can easily formulate the identity of its own constituent people and that of the "other".²³¹ Yugoslavian leaders also used the concept of a geo-body to legitimize what would eventually become an active policy of ethnic cleansing. For example, the nationalists supporting the idea of a "Greater Serbia", and the Croatian national movement attempted to de-legitimize the boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, claimed the boundaries of this area were entirely artificial. Supposedly they were constructed by members of an "other" nationality with the sole purpose of permanently dividing either the Serb or Croat nations into separate states. The important factor is how the opposing nationalities used the geo-body as a political weapon to achieve their expansionistic goals. The physical manifestation of this weapon is the map.

The easiest way to visualize the territory belonging to a certain nation is through the use of accurate maps drafted with accurate mapping techniques. This is of considerable importance to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a number of maps have been introduced to solve the problems resulting from war. Winichakul proposes that by using maps as legitimizers, the group trying to claim and solidify territory can either use aggression to gain hegemony over the disputed area then map the territory, or map the

²³¹Thongchai Winichakul, "A Nation Mapped Out: A History of the Geo-body of Siam," unpublished paper (New Orleans: Social Science History Association, 3 November 1991), 2.

territory and then use force to “liberate” the region from the “occupying” outsiders.²³² Again the techniques have been useful to the aggressive nationalist aspirations of the Serbs and Croats. A rather popular illustration of this kind of politicking, was the partition suggested by Tudjman to Milosevic at a meeting in Karadjorjevo on March 25, 1991.²³³ Somehow this partition was seen by some of the warring nationalists as a direct legitimization by the leaders of their parent countries. To the Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb the parent state’s approval legitimized violent action against other ethnicities. This shows direct outside influence in the internal matters of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Force has been used to attempt the total partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croatia and Serbia based on the map drawn by Tudjman.²³⁴ Using this technique, national intellectuals can solidify claims on territory not under the direct control of their nation. And mapping can further solidify the domination of an “us” versus “them” discourse. The map of a divided Bosnia, containing three mini-states with borders based only on conceptual principles and not natural borders, such as mountain chains or rivers, and solidified into reality based on the lines of a map, may, in the future, be a useful tool for the perpetuation of national identification.²³⁵

Maps introduced to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina could reasonably legitimize partitioning of the country along ethnic lines. Cantonment of the ethnicities

²³²Ibid., 10.

²³³Cohen, Broken, 208.

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Winichakul, 12.

would effectively give “exclusive” territory to a certain nation, wherein a member of another nation could neither reside nor travel freely. But with an internationally approved chart, clearly defining the negotiated borders (negotiated by leaders not the general populace), there is no real room for internal, political maneuvering by either side to ease the tensions still so near the surface. The Vance-Owen and Vance-Stoltenburg maps are examples of attempts which failed before the final negotiated map was accepted in the Dayton Accords.

Chapter 12

THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA

As Bosnia was breaking up, the Serbian and Croatian leaders began to develop “histories” of their respective peoples to support their expansionist agendas against those striving to retain a multi-ethnic state separate from the domineering Serbian state. Each ethnicity was endowed with certain stereotypical traits, which effectively labeled non-members as “others”. With this label attached to other ethnicities, the leaders could more easily carry out the ethnic cleansing that has occurred during the duration of the war. The only way this desired ethnic cleansing could have occurred was through the alienation of the “other”.

To further their nationalist agendas, nationalist rewritings of history began to appear in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These histories often portrayed certain nationalities in an area as “innocent victims of *other* nations in a litany of valiantly heroic but ultimately tragic (previous) struggles for national independence. These nations languished in the darkness of foreign occupation until the light of liberation restored their long suppressed dignity”.²³⁶ Slovenian and Croatian nationalists claim Serbian domination of politics during Broz’s rule, citing the large amounts of money generated from the northwest going to the underdeveloped south

²³⁶Von Hagen, 665.

and east.²³⁷ Serbian nationalists too point their finger at Broz, indicating his check on the Serbs, preventing them from becoming a 'greater' people.²³⁸ These historians have purposely re-created and re-interpreted history to suit their individual, or national, needs at any given time.²³⁹

Von Hagen expresses the dogmatic approach toward history the nationalists borrowed from Marxist-Leninist historians to justify the perpetuation of the state. This history is based on official morality, heavily influenced by the existing power structure, and adhered to by the official intelligentsia as the one true history.²⁴⁰ This literature provides the targeted reader with a sense of superiority over less "moral" ethnicities, and gives a distorted view of history to influence the actions of otherwise ordinary individuals.

The question of legitimacy frequently appears in the revisionist histories. By citing the existence of independent medieval kingdoms and suggesting that the nation is "primordial" and "essentialist" gives the notion of an exclusionary nation-state legitimacy in the academic community. These intellectuals suggest "an eternal, unchanging, fixed collectivity of identities made more sacred by its very antiquity and stability".²⁴¹

²³⁷Cviic, Religion, 204; and Miller, 219.

²³⁸Banac, "Asymmetry", 147.

²³⁹Prasenjit Duara, "Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When," essay in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (New York: Oxford Press, 1996), 160.

²⁴⁰Van Hagen, 665.

²⁴¹Ibid., 666.

Nationalist historians continually romanticize their respective nations as unchanging and aware of themselves throughout history. Yet the constant moving of peoples across the Balkans has left lasting influences on all the local cultures--none are "pure". In the past, the entire area was divided up and under the authority of either the Austrian or Ottoman empires; German, Hungarian, and Islamic cultures spread into the urban areas, further modifying the existing cultures. This romanticization of nationality allows a member of the nation to see him- or herself as a member of a continuous and unfluctuating culture, which reinforces identity with a group that has enjoyed a long, heroic historical past.²⁴² But legitimacy can also be contested by a different interpretation of history. One can effectively argue that no single culture remained unchanged by the many migrations to and from the Balkans. This person could rightly argue that each nation was legitimate, or that none were legitimate in their uniqueness. Secondly, the revisionist national histories claim that federalist and regionalist political thought is unnatural, and nation-states are the teleological outcome of all lasting modern states.²⁴³ This is clearly not the case in some multi-ethnic states. For example, the United States and Belgium have substantial minorities living in relative peace with one another. That is not to say that sporadic episodes of violence do not occur, but it is unthinkable in either society for a large number of people to engage in the fanatically separatist national movement similar to the one which recently rocked Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Tudjman's histories provide an example of intellectual manipulation of history for

²⁴²Duara, 159.

²⁴³Von Hagen, 666.

political legitimization. Tadjman expresses the opinion that nationalism is the ultimate result of mature political development. He believes that nation-state formation is inevitable in all societies, especially when facing a crisis of identity.²⁴⁴ Tadjman finds numerous flaws in Marxist thinking of the nationalist question. Tadjman predicted the collapse of the East European socialist and communist states and explains the reasons for communism's eventual fall in his 1981 publication. According to Tadjman, universalist and socialist theories [of nation-forming] do not recognize nor understand small nations.²⁴⁵ These nations are anathema to Marxist thinkers in that they represent divisions between the same classes and identification with members not of one's own class. To Tadjman, this identification with a national group is natural and therefore desirable. He believes national aspirations always take precedence over Marxist hypothesis in the development of societies because these nationalist drives are much stronger.²⁴⁶

Tadjman uses the Russian Revolution to provide evidence supporting his theory. It is well known that Lenin, in an attempt to gather greater support for the Bolshevik Revolution, promised some form of national determinism to the different nationalities participating in the revolt. Tadjman, and perhaps correctly so, postulates that without the communist leadership espousing nationalism, the Russian Revolution would have inevitably failed to overthrow the Russian government.²⁴⁷ He finds it ironic that

²⁴⁴Tadjman, 11.

²⁴⁵Ibid., 3.

²⁴⁶Ibid., 171.

²⁴⁷Ibid., 12.

communism, which claims that in the perfect society nationalism will cease to exist, must use nationalism to create new governments during times of crisis. Of course Lenin and his followers believed that nationalist feeling would eventually disappear after the workers realized the benefits of socialism and communism. Tadjman wrote that tsarist Russia collapsed to the Soviets only after national rights were guaranteed, but eventually Russia, the largest nationality, would exert its will upon all of the other nationalities in the "guise of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism".²⁴⁸ Broz also believed this to be true and he used this Leninist model on his ascension to power in Yugoslavia. Tadjman believes that Serbia played the role of Russia in Broz's union.

Tadjman believes that multi-ethnic states are doomed to failure due to the hegemony of one of its constituents. In his opinion, the existence of a multi-ethnic state, especially one emerging out of World War II, is not legitimate. It would promote "violence [sic], revenge, and application of military force" to maintain its integrity.²⁴⁹ Instead of aggressively maintaining a multi-ethnic existence, the powers-that-be should recognize that nations (supposedly of whatever size) have a "natural right" to liberate themselves whenever they reasonably can.²⁵⁰ He states, "The material and spiritual roots of national movements should be recognized [as legitimate] and one should search for international solutions which would seek to eliminate restrictions on the development of

²⁴⁸Ibid., 13.

²⁴⁹Ibid., 68.

²⁵⁰Ibid., 27.

national individualisms and hindrances to the expression of nation individuality".²⁵¹ Due to his identification with the Croatian nation, Tadjman is incredulous that some political leaders believe nationalism anachronous in modern history,²⁵² for he feels that it is the only important thing in the natural development of modern states.

Tudjman's adamant defense of nationalism colors his analysis of historical events, especially those involving the Serbian and Croatian nations. He documents that the Croat and Slovene nationalists proposed on May 17, 1917 that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina be merged into one political entity based on the "thirteen centuries old state and national identity of Croatia".²⁵³ This assessment of a continuous existence of a Croatian nation is far-fetched at best. First of all, Croatia lost its independence long before the concept of nationalism was even conceived. And even when Croatia was an independent medieval kingdom, the peasants had no idea that they were Croatian and did not care who ruled them as long as taxes were not too bad and protection from invaders was provided. Most Croats did not identify with any nationality until the very late nineteenth century,²⁵⁴ so Tadjman's support of the proposed continuity of a Croatian nation is far-fetched.

The bulk of Tadjman's analyses of the interwar years in Yugoslavia is colored by the insistence that Serbia dominated the first Yugoslav state. Of course this argument is

²⁵¹Ibid., 73.

²⁵²Ibid.

²⁵³Ibid., 19.

²⁵⁴Banac, "Asymmetry", 143.

based on certain facts such as the Serbian leadership and overall use of the secret police, but his language is chauvinistic and detracts from the main argument. A prime example of this bantering is Tudjman's explanation of the coup which toppled the Yugoslav government just before the German invasion. Just prior to World War II, the federal government of Yugoslavia met with Croatian representatives to discuss more autonomy for Croatia within the federal framework. Soon a compromise was reached and Croatia gained a substantial amount of internal independence.²⁵⁵ Tudjman claims that the compromise reached between the federal government of Yugoslavia and the Croatian autonomists proved to be threatening to Serbian hegemonists. In response to this agreement for a more confederal union, and the government siding with Hitler in 1941 (though with many reservations), the Serbian hegemonists toppled the government to stop a pro-Croatian resolution to the ethnic hostilities which had been brewing in interwar Yugoslavia. He writes that the people that carried out the coup would rather have had a war with Germany than any form of Croatian autonomy.²⁵⁶ Most historians of the war indicate the primary reason for the coup was the government's decision to side with the Axis powers, much to the displeasure of the majority of the people of Yugoslavia. Tudjman's word choice also leads the reader to believe he supported the partition of Yugoslavia by Hitler and Mussolini into an independent Croatia, Montenegro, and later Serbia to create a lasting stability in the Balkans.²⁵⁷ It is no wonder some of his

²⁵⁵Donia and Fine, 132.

²⁵⁶Tudjman, 35.

²⁵⁷Ibid., 55.

opponents today claim he is a Fascist.

Another passage in his book may come back to haunt him. Tadjman describes the meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow during the war to discuss spheres of influence in Eastern Europe after the hostilities ended. Churchill proposed a 50-50 split of influence in Yugoslavia after the Germans were defeated, and Stalin agreed.²⁵⁸ This is very reminiscent of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed by Tadjman to Milosevic in a conference in on March 25, 1991 at Karadjordjevo in which it is rumored that the two presidents drew a rough map of Bosnia, which clearly designated two areas which would be incorporated into either Serbia or Croatia, depending upon the ethnic build-up of the regions in question.²⁵⁹ In both cases two outsiders were determining the fate of an entity in terms of power relations, even though the Western Allies in World War II ignored their half of the bargain to prevent the possibility of a renewed war against Joseph Stalin.

By using history, especially World War II, for legitimization of hostilities as the people from all sides of this conflict have been prone to do, Tadjman down-plays the role Bishop Alojzije Stepinac had in the Ustasi government and underestimates the number of people murdered at the Jasenovac extermination camp. He claims that Stepinac continually condemned the Ustasi regime for its genocidal policies and abuse of non-Croats.²⁶⁰ According to the author's own research, Stepinac did not support the regime

²⁵⁸Ibid., 60.

²⁵⁹Cohen, Broken, 208.

²⁶⁰Tadjman, 59.

and in some cases condemned the brutality of the Ustasi. However, he did enjoy the impetus it gave to the non-Croats to convert to Catholicism in the hopes of being saved from extermination. Stepinac also actively tried to save Jews and Serbs that were converted, but not the *entire* population of the Ustasi controlled areas.²⁶¹ Although Stepinac was innocent of some collaboration, he was not the saint that Tadjman paints him to be.

The numbers of people killed have also become a point of contention in the Serb-Croat conflict. According to Tadjman, the Serbian hegemonist would have the public believe that the Ustasi atrocities were twelve times the actual number in some cases. For example, the Serb nationalists claim that at least 700,000 people were killed at Jasenovac camp. Tadjman unrealistically readjusts this number to about 60,000 murdered in *all* camps and jails.²⁶² According to a recent study done by two independent researchers of the World War II atrocities in Yugoslavia, 400,000 Serbs at the most died in the NDH, and not all of these were killed by the Ustasi. The new figures show that between 45-52,000 Serbs were killed in Jasenovac, along with 12,000 Croats and Moslems, 13,000 Jews, and 10,000 Gypsies.²⁶³ What's more, in order to redirect blame toward the Serbs, Tadjman describes Serbia as primarily under the influence of the Chetnik movement and therefore just as guilty as the Ustasi.²⁶⁴ References such as this try to sway the reader into

²⁶¹Shelah, 329.

²⁶²Tadjman, 162-3.

²⁶³Mirkovic, 321-322.

²⁶⁴Tadjman, 117.

agreeing with an argument based more on emotion than on actual fact.

Tudjman attempts to convince the reader of Serbian hegemony after the ascension of Broz's communists. He argues that Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been incorporated into a Greater Croatia due to the historical links between the Croats in Croatia, and the Croats (in which the Muslim population is included) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁶⁵ However, the Serbs blocked this "legitimate" incorporation citing the large percentage of Serbs living in this province--44%.²⁶⁶ He further attacks the separate existence of Bosnia in his claim that Bosnia's borders were artificially determined by the Ottomans and should be redrawn to remove this influence on post-WWII Yugoslavia.²⁶⁷ According to Western historians, such as Fine and Donia, this hypothesis does not hold water. These authors argue that the state's borders have been nearly the same since before the Ottoman invasion, and became more cemented with Turkish administration.²⁶⁸ Throughout his narrative on Bosnia, Tudjman makes statements meant to misinform the gullible or ignorant reader.

²⁶⁵Ibid., 114. It is an interesting fact pointed out in Cohen's monograph, that Tudjman, in more recent times, has claimed major differences between the Croat and Muslim nations. According to Cohen he has done this to bolster his popularity which flagged during the hostilities between Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia. This is just another example of how nationalist ideology can be revised to suit the current circumstance (Cohen, Broken, 111).

²⁶⁶Ibid., 113. But Tudjman still supports the policy of self-determination and if the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina had a plebiscite to resolve this issue immediately after the war, the majority would probably have voted against incorporation into a state with a very recent history of atrocities.

²⁶⁷Ibid., 122.

²⁶⁸Fine and Donia, 72.

Chapter 13

THE SERBIAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE 1986 MEMORANDUM

“Nationalist ‘intellectuals’, wrapped in the mantle of august academies of sciences, expounded their pseudo-history of the victimization of Serbs (or Croats) through the ages. One of them seriously asserted to me that Serbs had committed no crimes or moral transgressions at any point in their long history.”-- Warren Zimmerman²⁶⁹

According to Branka Magas, Serb nationalists fear the creation of a nation-state which does not include all Serbs. Since the primary goal of Serb nationalists throughout the last two centuries has been to unite the Serbian nation into a single state, these nationalist see total failure of their agenda if only a small percentage of Serbs must live outside “Greater Serbia”. The Serb nationalists refuse to allow large minorities of Serbs to remain under “outside” control, so a strong central government which can force the vast majority into one state is desirable.²⁷⁰ Many Serbian intellectuals are also nationalists. Even before the rise of Milosevic, intellectual national sympathizers were revising and glorifying events in Serbian history. Upon the assertion of Milosevic to power, these nationalists actively worked with the state to justify reincorporating the

²⁶⁹Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 480.

²⁷⁰Branka Magas, “Yugoslavia: The Sphere of Balkanization,” New Left Review 174 (1989): 9.

entire Serb population of the former Yugoslavia into a single state.²⁷¹ To do this the Serb intelligentsia began a campaign of intellectual revisionism and re-vitalization of Serbian custom and tradition. This revisionism began with the glorification of novels written by people such as Dobrica Cosic who wrote of glories and losses of the Serb nation in World War I.²⁷² With this spread in revisionist history, this intelligentsia became more and more concerned with reviving the memories of old war criminals as modern, misunderstood heroes.

Serbian intellectuals not only overestimated the Ustasi atrocities, but glorified their own butchers. Though all sides made an issue of World War II and the communist government atrocities,²⁷³ many of the Serb intellectuals took this to the extreme. Veselin Djuretic's *The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama* claimed that the Chetniks were not in any way fascist. He places them on the same level as Broz's Partisans. He also claims that the Serbs suffered more than anyone else because they were on everyone's "hit list".²⁷⁴ This would be a common theme among the intelligentsia in extolling the suffering endured by the Serbian people in their struggle for freedom and self-rule throughout their history. After significant numbers of works appeared praising the Chetnik movement during World War II, Milosevic ordered a statue of Draza Mihajlovic

²⁷¹Verdery, 181.

²⁷²Woodward, 75.

²⁷³John F. Burns, "Tribal War? Bosnians Don't See It that Way," New York Times, 26 July 1992, E3.

²⁷⁴Dragnich, "Upsurge", 187.

built which officially recognized the old Chetnik leader as a hero and not a criminal.²⁷⁵

The intellectual community took the opportunity to slam Broz's execution of Mihajlovic as a way of damaging the Serbian nation. They proclaimed that Broz weakened and mistreated the Serbs by forcing them to remain divided after the war and denying them a unified state.²⁷⁶

After Milosevic's take-over, Serb nationalist historiography fell in line behind the nationalist policies espoused by the Serbian leader. Serb intellectuals set out to link any questioning of Belgrade power to Ustasism and genocidal tendencies against the Serb nation. Banac also asserts that the historiography proposes that Fascism was a Croat tendency and therefore very dangerous to Serbs.²⁷⁷ By using the Serb historians to connect Fascism to the Croat nation, Milosevic and the intelligentsia helped sway some Serbs with an active historical memory of the Ustasi crimes of World War II, to harbor separatist feelings. Tudjman's adoption of Croatian symbols used by the Ustasi and mandatory official use of the Latin alphabet also unwittingly aided the separatist intellectual elites.²⁷⁸ This dredging up of atrocities in World War II fired up motivation to extoll revenge and justify aggression.²⁷⁹

The intelligentsia were also involved in spreading misinformation to alienate and

²⁷⁵Ramet, Social, 418.

²⁷⁶Woodward, 92.

²⁷⁷Banac, "Asymmetry", 155.

²⁷⁸Woodward, 120.

²⁷⁹Djilas, 30.

isolate non-Serbs from possible Western allies. For example, Serbian professor Nikola Koljevic claimed that Iran, Libya, Iraq, and their agents inside Bosnia-Herzegovina were planning a jihad against the Serbs.²⁸⁰ When Westerners were bombarded by this kind of propaganda by “respectable” academics such as Koljevic, doubt began to erect barriers between the beleaguered Muslims and states which fear Islamic fundamentalism. Milosevic and Karadzic quickly picked up on this lie, and spread it across Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia to scare the Bosnian Serbs into reacting for defense.

The Memorandum of September 1986 provides an excellent example of the intelligentsia supporting a nationalist agenda. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drafted a 74-page “diatribe” claiming that the Serbs were the victims of “historical injustice”.²⁸¹ It further stated: “In 1981 [the year of the Kosovo strikes] a war--a truly special, open and total war--was declared against the Serb nation...with active and open support of certain political centers in the country: a war far more devastating than that coming across the border.”²⁸² This supposed “war” was created in this document to expose the existence of a conspiracy theory against the Serbs, which in turn would facilitate paranoia among the semi-educated Middle Culture. It also suggests the intellectual paranoia and possible inferiority complex of Serbian intelligentsia. The Memorandum reflected the sympathy of the academic circle to the victimization theory. It pointed to economic domination of post-World War II Yugoslavia by Croatia and

²⁸⁰Vulliamy, 98.

²⁸¹Ramet, Social, 402-3.

²⁸²Magas, 18.

Slovenia. It claimed the Serbs were being purposely split up within a number of republics to weaken them. It reported that genocide had been, and was being used in Kosovo against the Serb population. The Memorandum called for the restoration of the integrity of the Serb nation and this was to be accomplished by the readjustment of internal borders to incorporate the entire Serb population into one administrative unit.²⁸³ This document also officially restored individuals such as Mihajlovic as national heroes.²⁸⁴

Milosevic and his followers used the Memorandum to legitimize their policies for a "Greater Serbia". Some of the authors of the document joined the SDS and became political as well as academic players in the regime. For example, Dobrica Cosic, one of the more important authors, became the president of the rump Yugoslavia.²⁸⁵ As more political leaders used the Memorandum as a legitimatizing tool, more Serbs eventually fell into their ranks.

Serbian folk culture was revitalized by the media's nationalist campaign. This was especially the case with the unemployed, underemployed, and the bored who found a renewed sense of belonging with this revival. They began to live in the [created] past when glory was theirs for the taking and defeat still brought tears of remembrance to the eyes.²⁸⁶ Kosovo took on new meaning and became even more sacred. The Ustasi

²⁸³Woodward, 78; and Magas, 20.

²⁸⁴Woodward, 91.

²⁸⁵Vulliamy, 52.

²⁸⁶Magas, 24.

memory was even more reviled. And, in the eyes of many Serbs, the Muslims of the Sandzak and Bosnia-Herzegovina took on the ominous character as promoters of European instability and supporters of a holy war against the Christian world as claimed by leaders such as Radovan Karadzic.²⁸⁷ There was some resistance to this movement, but Milosevic had the student protests crushed before they posed any real threat.

As the nationalist intelligentsia helped renew Serbian pride and identity, the real propaganda machine could start producing. Serbs in both Belgrade and Pale were handed out “evidence” that the civilians being slaughtered in Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina were Muslims being slaughtered by Izetbegovic’s forces to get sympathy and support from the West. Even well-educated Serbs supported and believed this evidence.²⁸⁸ This disinformation campaign orchestrated by the intelligentsia and carried out by the state run media perpetuated the myth that the Serbs were the only victims. In a July 1992 poll, only 20% of the Serbian population in Serbia knew who was shelling Sarajevo.²⁸⁹

A former Serbian separatist leader, Vladimir Srebov, recently commented on the active role played by the intelligentsia of Serbia and the Bosnian Republic of Serbia. Srebov, a poet and one of the founders of the Bosnian SDS, abandoned his chauvinistic nationalism and the pursuit of a Greater Serbia in April 1992. He then preached

²⁸⁷Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 480.

²⁸⁸Chris Hedges, “Never Again, Again...” New York Times, 14 January 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (22), 14 January 1996.

²⁸⁹Ramet, Social, 420.

reconciliation between the three ethnicities involved in the war. In September he was arrested, tortured by Bosnian Serb authorities, and tried for high treason. He spent 39 months in jail until he was freed in a prisoner exchange. Srebov indicates that the intelligentsia were active participants in the war, both academically and violently. In his interview for *Vreme*, he claimed that Vojislav Maksimovic, a professor at the Philosophical Faculty of Sarajevo University, had “butchered people in Foca”.²⁹⁰ This active participation was significant in the three and a half year war.

²⁹⁰Bernard Meares, “Vladimir Srebov Speaks Out,” Taken from interviews appearing in the Bosnian weeklies *Ljiljan* (1 November 1995) and *Oslobodjenje* European Edition (2-9 November 1995), and the Serb weekly *Vreme* (30 October 1995): from BOSNEWS Digest 467, 15 November 1995.

Chapter 14

COLLABORATION AND CONCLUSION

“The nationalist feeling was started by nationalists in Serbia first, then by nationalists in Croatia, then together against us.”--“Azra”, Bosnia Muslim in an interview July 1995²⁹¹

“Boban and Karadzic [are] dividing up Bosnia.”--Pejo Juric, a Bosnian Croat soldier²⁹²

According to Tom Gjelten, Serb and Croatian national parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are primarily controlled by non-Bosnian politicians, some of whom questioned the right of the country to exist.²⁹³ A good deal of evidence supports the statement that Milosevic and Tudjman, along with their underlings, directly perpetuated the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But they also worked together against the Muslims and multi-ethnicity supporters in the new country. According to Warren Zimmerman in his recent memoirs, “Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman made any effort to conceal their designs on Bosnia from me. As a place where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had co-existed more or less peacefully for centuries, Bosnia was an affront and a challenge to these two ethnic

²⁹¹“Azra” Muslim still residing in northern Bosnia visiting a sick relative, July 1995, Ljubljana, Slovenia, tape recording.

²⁹²Vulliamy, 183.

²⁹³Gjelten, 65.

supremacists".²⁹⁴ Cooperating with one another, Serbia and Croatia imposed sanctions on top of the sanctions imposed by the UN on Bosnia-Herzegovina's reeling economy in order to further de-stabilize it, and force its ethnicities to look to the parent states in the hopes of rescuing those ethnic areas from continuing depression and starvation.²⁹⁵

The leaders themselves even met frequently to discuss the possible partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tadjman admitted to a London Times reporter in July 1991, he and Milosevic met secretly to discuss plans to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between them. These meetings possibly occurred as early as July 1990 and seemed to confirm rumors that both had panels of experts actively working on this impending action, which also included population transfers.²⁹⁶ It seems that both leaders felt that partition would bring an end to the Muslim problem (the Muslim national identity and the confusion it precipitates among Serbian and Croatian nationalists) and would end the war which had stripped Croatia and Serbia of needed funds.²⁹⁷

The result of these secret meetings was a plan to partition the territory between the two parent countries which, when released at a meeting in Graz, Austria, was endorsed by both Boban and Karadzic. Military means were to be used if necessary to realize this goal.²⁹⁸ More meetings between Tadjman and Milosevic dealing with the eventual

²⁹⁴Zimmerman, BOSNEWS Digest 486.

²⁹⁵Woodward, 194.

²⁹⁶Ibid., 172.

²⁹⁷Ibid., 463 (note 73).

²⁹⁸Ibid., 472 (note 139).

partition of the country into ethnic cantons continued. In one of these agreements announced in June 1993, Bosnia was not to be split up between the countries, but instead would be divided into three separate ethnic areas in a loose confederation.²⁹⁹ In other words, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided internally, given almost complete autonomy in governmental and economic matters, and then immediately hold a plebiscite in which the Croatian and Serbian cantons would vote to be incorporated within their parent states.

The next partition plan proposed by foreign powers was the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. This plan, which the Bosnian government under Izetbegovic adamantly opposed at first, was based on a draft prepared by Tudjman and Milosevic. It reflected the military gains of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. These new cantons retained the option of joining with their parent states.³⁰⁰ This not only showed that Milosevic and Tudjman were actively planning to tear Bosnia-Herzegovina roughly in half. It also showed the world that they were the representatives for their nations inside the country. The West, and therefore the UN, had to recognize the two leaders as the superiors in charge of individuals such as Boban and Karadzic. This greatly increased the security of their power bases outside as well as within their territories, legitimizing their reigns. Although Milosevic claimed he was not supporting Karadzic toward the end of the war, he allowed Karadzic to remain in power. And without the support of Tudjman's Croatian troops and

²⁹⁹Paul Lewis, "Two Leaders Propose Dividing Bosnia into Three Areas," New York Times, 17 June 1993, A3.

³⁰⁰Woodward, 310.

supplies, Boban would not have had a “state” to run. According to Susan Woodward, Milosevic strongly influenced all matters of leadership in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and Tudjman completely controlled Herzeg-Bosna.³⁰¹

As this passage is being written in April 1996 the heavy guns are silent across Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sporadic fire is sometimes exchanged across the still divided town of Mostar, and limited violence has been reported in Sarajevo. The NATO implementation force (IFOR) is in place across the country and has already taken casualties from unexploded ordinance and sniping activity. Tudjman and Milosevic are no longer quite as interested in expanding their political borders into a country in which the rest of the world just recently took enough interest to send some of their young soldiers to die. The political stakes are too high for either leader to be supporting war and war-criminals. Now life in Bosnia is returning to normal. If one calls a country littered with land-mines, unexploded artillery shells, mass-graves, and crawling with numerous foreign soldiers normal. But neither leader really has to worry about pursuing a “Greater Croatia” or a “Greater Serbia”. Elements in the so-called Herzeg-Bosna still want a divided Mostar and eventual integration into Croatia proper. Karadzic resurfaced recently in Pale in March 1996 to speak at a factory. At this occasion he distributed medals to Bosnian Serb soldiers and pledged to continue seeking a “peaceful union with rump

³⁰¹Ibid., 510 (note 32).

Yugoslavia".³⁰² Why should Milosevic spoil his international reputation as a peace-maker when his primary goal of a "Greater Serbia" is being pursued by people he claims not to support? Milosevic wanted to end the war since a good portion of the ethnic cleansing had been accomplished. Karadzic was still overtly hinting that he wanted the Republic Srpska annexed to Serbia proper, so Milosevic's goal of a "Greater Serbia" may still be realized through peaceful means.³⁰³ Questions are again going back and forth, most notably the question of war-crimes and criminals. But the question that returns to the forefront again and again is: Has peace been achieved and will the Bosnian tradition of tolerance return to the divided country? The evidence so far is contradictory.

Some ethnic cleansing is still occurring. Pale has ordered the Serbs remaining in the suburbs of Sarajevo to evacuate before this area is turned over to Federation authorities. Those who have not left have been terrorized first by evacuating Serbs, then by Muslim hoods after the return of these areas. And Mostar is still a center of tension within the Federation. Constant meetings between the Croat and Muslim representatives have just complicated matters within their fragile coalition. Unfortunately, this is more common than is evidence for continuing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Toleration had been the tradition of this land between the Islamic, Orthodox, and

³⁰²Patrick Moore, "Karadzic Reappears," OMRI Special Report: Pursuing Balkan Peace 1 (13), 2 April 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (120), 3 April 1996.

³⁰³Susan Sontag, "A Lament for Bosnia," The Nation 261 (22) (25 December 1995): 818.

Catholic worlds.³⁰⁴ For centuries Bosnia had been a mingling ground for numerous nationalities. Tearing them apart was not an easy goal considering the diversity of this once tolerant, multi-ethnic state.³⁰⁵ Until the outsider nationalists and their media campaign disturbed this multi-ethnic community, peace generally reigned. During the Ottoman rule of Bosnia-Herzegovina discontent was focused on the Ottomans, not on other Slavs, due to the corruption and economic hardships faced by the Bosnians. Ethnic identity in this region in the past, as in others, has been extremely fluid. A certain “elasticity” in identity can be used to adapt to specific changing situations.³⁰⁶ Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, identity (especially Muslim identity) has been very fluid, as people flipped back and forth between identities depending upon the situation at the time.³⁰⁷

But this was soon to change in the media campaign and the Serbian war on Croatia. By 1990, the major Bosnian parties were divided along ethnic lines. The Croatian Democratic Union, the Serbian Democratic Party, and the primarily Muslim party, the Party for Democratic Action became the major political factions in the

³⁰⁴Dzermal Hadzismajlovic, “Statement to the Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Human Rights Sub-committee, Parliament of Australia on 30 October 1995”: from BOSNEWS Digest 464, 12 November 1995.

³⁰⁵Helmut Konrad, “History Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe,” History Teacher 25 (4) (August 1992): 448.

³⁰⁶Verdery, 193.

³⁰⁷Ramet, “Primordial”, 180-182; and Robert J. Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle: the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 177.

disintegrating state.³⁰⁸ As rumors of Serbian domination and the possible secession of Slovenia and Croatia spread across Yugoslavia in late 1990, some politicians attempted to preserve the multi-ethnicity of not only Bosnia, but also Yugoslavia. In the tradition of multi-ethnicity, the Bosnian constituency elected Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, as president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Serb as the head of the legislature, and a Croat Prime Minister.³⁰⁹ The Muslim president's platform clearly rested on the premise that Bosnia-Herzegovina must represent every nation within its borders.³¹⁰

For three and a half years, the Serbs on the mountains surrounding Sarajevo subjected it to intense shelling in which much of the Turkish and Turkish influenced architecture, a number of museums, and many libraries were completely destroyed. "The mere fact of the city's existence undermined their [the nationalist's] argument that people of different national backgrounds had to be separated".³¹¹ But the shells would not destroy the multi-ethnic nature of the city. Throughout the war, the multi-ethnic principal survived and flourished under this impossible situation.³¹² Even the weekend mercenaries who made the sieges more intense, could not dampen the spirit of toleration in Sarajevo.³¹³ And the make-up of the Bosnian army reflected the strength of brotherhood

³⁰⁸Burg, 10.

³⁰⁹Ibid., 10.

³¹⁰Stiglmyer, 17 and Vulliamy, 41.

³¹¹Gjeltten, 140.

³¹²Ibid., 163.

³¹³Cataldi, 91.

in that many Bosnian Serbs, as well as Muslims and Croats, served in its ranks.³¹⁴

Even during the nearly impossible times during the war when the Croats turned against their Muslim allies, Izetbegovic's government would not compromise the SPD's commitment to multi-ethnic co-habitation which further soured hard-line Croatian resistance to the Bosnian president.³¹⁵

And now that the war has ended (maybe), the old traditions are not really reemerging in the war-torn country. In one of the few instances of pre-war tradition, on January 20, 1996 in the town of Jajce recently liberated by the HVO, 44 Bosniak families returned and were treated warmly by their former Croat neighbors.³¹⁶ Reported in the newspaper *Oslobodjenje* on January 22, 1996, the anti-nationalist Serbian Civic Council (SGV) has expressed an interest in becoming a political party functioning within the Bosnian government framework.³¹⁷ But this is still rare.

So the "outsider" leaders and their followers helped create new identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the seizure and control of the extensive media machine already existing in the former Yugoslavia, this tool was easily adapted to fit their needs. As the federal government of Yugoslavia slowly unraveled throughout the 80s, and the economic situation continued to steadily worsen, the Yugoslav people began to question

³¹⁴Hadzismajlovic, BOSNEWS 464.

³¹⁵Malcolm, 237.

³¹⁶"Good News From Jajce, Says UNHCR," Press TWRA, 20 January 1996: from BosNet Digest 5 (34), 23 January 1996.

³¹⁷Patrick Moore, "A New Serbian Political Party?" OMRI Special Report: Pursuing Balkan Peace 3, 23 January 1996: from BosNet 5 (36), 24 January 1996.

who they were and what place they held in the country and the world. At this crucial time, some former communist apparatchiks, nationalist agitators, and ethnically motivated intellectuals re-created identities which offered a sense of belonging to individuals in an uncertain world. Using nationalism to further the national leaders agendas, they mobilized their ethnic groups, and the demand for separation came to be realized in the early 90s. But in order for the nationalist agendas to succeed, entire nations needed to make up the newly formed states. Unfortunately, in some areas of Yugoslavia the population was mixed between two, and sometimes three, different ethnicities. The greatest mixture of peoples was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So the nationalist leaders, motivated by the previous success and needing to refocus their respective nation's attention on external matters, began applying additional pressure to the most ethnically heterogenous republic of Yugoslavia. Milosevic and Tudjman directly supported and perpetuated the emerging separatism with money, guns, and media bombardment. Coercion was also used in a number cases. Thus the re-definition of the "other" spread among each nationality. Whether it was reactive or aggressive nationalism matters very little. What really matters was that there was an attempt to re-molded identity according to the plans of "outsiders" using "insiders" as both tools and scapegoats. The nationalists, though claiming that Croat-ness or Serb-ness was eternal, knew that identity, under the right circumstances and using the right tools, could be reformed and redefined. And as previously stated, the two outside forces worked together to alienate the third. But maybe with time the Bosnians can reach the 'happy-medium' they shared before the war. Since the concept of identity is fluid and shifting, a sense of

“Yugoslavism” could, however unlikely, emerge once a long-term peace comes to the region. But this will not happen without much healing, justice, and most importantly, forgetting of the hostilities associated with chauvinistic nationalism.

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