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THE I‘CLPA’J‘I‘ or 21m “113% REJOLUTION AND IiAI-‘OLEDI‘J UEON
' THE UNITED STATES gs REJFALEDSY THE FOREUNES or

71H: GROWINSHIELD FA’ZILY 0F 3 :21r

AN ABSTRACT

n

Dy
John H. Reinoehl

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of 2in chigan
State College of Agricultural and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the:requirements
for the degree of

DOCPOR.OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1953

Approved

 

III Ill l l I [Ill 1‘ ll ’l‘ l ( I (ll ll. lt

John H. Reinoehl

The years between 1792 and 1815 were troubled.years for
Europe. The French Revolution had brought internal strife to
France, which had spread rapidly until it involved the whole
of Europe in revolution and war. Across the Atlantic the
United States, enjoying the first fruits of independence, was
in a position to be affected as a neutral power by conditions
in Europe. The purpose of this study has been to trace the
impact of those years in Europe upon the United States.

The vehicle for tracing this impact has been the Crownin-
shield family of Salem, Massachusetts. The Crowninshields were
selected for this study because they were active and important
' in the two areas most apt to reflect European influences of
that time - economics and politics. As major shipowners and
merchant-captains they dealt directly with Europe throughout
the years between 1793 and 1315. In the political field they
provided a Jeffersonian Congressman and a Secretary of the
Navy to the national scene and were also in the very center of
the political hotbed of Salem.

Economically, the Crowninshields became significant as a
result of commerce generated by European wars. Their commerce
was regulated by European rulings. Decisions on neutral ship-
ping from Paris and London made their shipping profitable or
unprofitable, dangerous or safe, and even determined its des-
tination. Crowninshield shipping closely parallels the general
pattern shown by Shipping statistics for the entire United
States and therefore is illustrative of the impact of European

events upon the commerce of the entire United States.
3:!1'1‘5

John H. Reino ehl

The Crowninshi e1 ds prospered greatly during the war
yearslbetween 1793 and 1‘301. This prosperity was interrupted
by the Ami ens peace, 1801-1803. With the renewal of war,
American commercial prosperity again built. up until the peak
year was reached in 1807. The European powers began to en-
force their restrictions on neutral shipping in the late
summer of 1807, and with that enforcement, United States
commerce quickly became too dangerous to continue. The Ameri-
can Embargo Act was passed in December, 1807.

Crowninshi eld eXperi ence places Jefferson's Embargo in a
favorable light. The merchants of America had discovered the
difficulty of coping with the European bans on commerce and
had voluntarily restricted their shipping prior to the passage
of the Embargo. When they rushed to sea after the lifting of
the Embargo in 1909 they lost the wealth they had built up
over the years.

This study further indicates that French measures and
actions, which were less predictable and less honest in operation
that those of the British, were the more harmful.

Politically, there is nothing to indicate any doctrinal
influence of Europe on the Crowninshi elds or Salem. Names of
French revolutionary groups provided terms used for vilification
in Salem, but the Crownin shield papers do not indicate a doctri-
nal kinship between the "Jacobins" of Salem and their French
namesakes. Those terms, however, served to intensify the dif-

ferences between the two major political groups in Salem.

John H. Rei no ehl

Political differences were indigenous, based upon previous

biases, rather than upon French Revolutionary doctrines.

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A THESIS

Submitted to the School of uraduate etudies of Aichigan
State College of Agricultural and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

”acres 35‘ THIMSOPHY

.‘JV

Department of History

U1
\JJ

19

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

Chapter

II

III

IV

V
VI

VII

TABLE 0 F (I) LTEITS

The Setting

The Spoil of the Indies -

Europe Creates the Crowninshields
1792-1803

The Spoil of Battle -

Europe Nouri shes the Crowninshi elds
1803-1807

The Inevitable Hour -

Europe Destroys the Crowninshi elds
1308-1815 '

"Jacobins" in Salem

Aftermath -
The Crowninshields after 1815

Summary and Conclusions

Bibliography

5;;
VJ
l“
'33
"2
CL

66

129
193

226
237
246

I wish to eXpress my thanks to
Professor John B. Harri son for his helpful
suggestions and constructive criticism in
both the research and writing done in the

completion of this dissertation.

Chapter I
THE SETTING

In 1792 a series of wars which was to last twenty-three
years'broke out between France and Great Britain. This devel-
opment of itself was not'unique. The two powers had been riv-
ale throughout their existence as national states. They had
fought each other spasmodically for six hundred years. Philip
Augustus and John, Joan of Arc and Henry VI, Louis XIV and
William III, and Montcalm and Wolfe are representatives of
other phases of this centuries-long struggle. The 'two had
fought a series of world-wide wars throughout the hundred years
prior to 1789, wars which had seen France lose her colonial
empire to Great Britain and Great Britain lose her richest col-
ony, the United States of America. The wars had been carried
into the economic realm. They had aimed at beating down the
markets, commerce, and internal economy of the enemy power.

This economic struggle was also renewed with the new
military activity in 1792. From the outbreak of the war, ship-
ping was subject to raids by enemy privateers, the commerce
raiders of the eighteenth century. The British had their trad-
itional naval superiority however, so the French were quickly
reduced to dependence upon neutral shipping to supply their
commercial needs. With this development, the effects of the

2.

of the war spread. The position and rights of the neutral
carrier became important in this clash of the European giants.
Problems regarding neutral goods, continuous voyages, and what
constituted contraband of war assumed new prominence as the
war continued.

Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in France in late 1799.
The war, interrupted by the peace of Amiens (1801-03), inten-
sified in the following years. An intensification of the com-
mercial war also occurred. Napoleon's naval defeat at Trafal-
gar in 1805 eliminated any hope he may have had for an active
naval war. It coincided, however, with his victory at Auster-
lits which gave him the key to domination over continental
Europe. During the year that followed Napoleon decided upon
the Continental System as a means of continuing the economic
battle against Great Britain without substantial naval sup-
port.

The Continental System was initiated with the famous
Berlin Decree.1 This Decree, issued on November 21, 1806,
stated that the British Isles were in a state of blockade
and that all correspondence and commerce with them was pro-
hibited.. Any British property or British-produced goods was
a fair prize of war. Neutrals who might try to run British
goods onto the continent under false papers would be consid-
ered.British. The Decree was to apply in territory of

 

l. Corres ndance de Na leon Ier (Paris, 1858-1869),
# 11283. Berlin, Nov. 21. 1 , XIII, 82-85.

3.

Napoleon's allies. A year later, in his Milan Decree,
Napoleon added to his Continental System by stating that any
vessel which in any way dealt with Great Britain, voluntarily
or otherwise, was denationalized and subject to confiscation
as British property.2

Great Britain's retaliatory measures were not slow in
coming. A series of Orders in Council which made Great Brit-
ain the monitor over neutral commerce was issued.in early 1807.
These Orders also included a blockade of the European contin-
ent and prohibitions against neutral handlers of French goods
or French.colonial goods, which roughly corresponded to Napol-
son's decree against British goods. French certificates of
origin found on a vessel made it subject to confiscation. Both
nations gave every evidence that they intended to enforce
their pronouncements.

The obvious target of much of this battle of regulations
was the neutral carrier. Throughout the war the laws of the
embattled giants had been modified without warning. As a re-
sult, neutral ships had been plagued with uncertainties. Their
trade had been stimulated by the hostilities, but it also had
become more and more subject to the Jealous scrutiny of the
warring powers. With these new statements of policy, which
carried the threat of enforcement far beyond similar state-

ments of the previous years, the neutrals became especially

 

2. Ibide, # 13391, Milan, Dec. 17, 1807, XVI, 227-29.

4.

fearful. Jefferson said, "These decrees and orders taken to-
gather, want little of amounting to a declaration that every

neutral vessel found on the high seas, whatsoever her cargo,

and whatsoever foreign port be that of her departure, or des-
tination, shall be deemed lawful pri so."3 As the chief neut-
ral carrier, the United States was bound to be profoundly af-
fected by this struggle.

The United States had found its position radically dif-
ferent in 1792 from what it had been in the earlier wars.
Those clashes had taken place while the United States was
still a British colony. When those wars had extended to the
American continent, the American colonies had been only a pawn
in the game. During peaceful intervals these colonies had
been integrated with and made subservient to the British econ-
onw by means of British mercantili st policies.“ By 1792, how-
ever, an independent United States was in a position to take
whatever her independence and neutrality could offer. The ex-
tension of the commercial rivalry that came with the war pro-
vided the first opportunity for the American state to advance

 

3. Jefferson's message to Congress, Mar. 17, 1808, in
State Pa are d Publick Documents of the United States f m
the accession of George Washington to the Presidency exhigit-
in a com lete view of our Forei Relations since that time,
Published under patronage of Congress (Boston, 1817), VI, 75.
Hereafter cited as American State Papers.

4. Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in its Relationgzto the Wa_r_
of 1812 (London, 1905). I, 27-28. Hereafter cited as A. Mahan,
War of 1812.

5.

commercially after her separation from the British Empire.
America gained stature too with the Jay Treaty (1796), which
was a formal recognition on the part of Great Britain that
the American state was entitled to some commercial consider-
ation, however controversial the effects of that treaty may
have been.

The course of the following twenty years projected the
American state increasingly into the center of the European
maelstrom. The late nineties found it involved in a near war
with France.' The acceleration of the commercial struggle
after—the Amiens truce also saw America profoundly affected;
as the neutral state most involved in European commerce she
stood to profit or lose most from the rivalry which was in-
volving Europe more and more completely in its meshes. The
story of America's increased involvement and eventual war
against Great Britain is well known, as is the diplomatic fin-
esse with which.Napoleon steered her into that war.

The purpose of this study is to discover the effects the
French Revolution and.Napoleon had on America by tracing the
commercial and political affairs of a prominent American mer-
chant family which like many others was caught in the European
storm. The account of the fortunes of a family which was
significantly involved in both the commercial and political
areas of American life should give a sampling of the effects
of those two and one-half decades under consideration upon

America.

6.

The Crowninshield family of Salem, Massachusetts, has the
qualifications necessary for such a study. Their location at
Salem placed them in a key position economically and political-
ly. Salem was the sixth city in population in the United States
in 1790 and Salem's custom house provided five percent of the
nation's revenue during the years under consideration.5 Polit-
ically, Salem was a hotbed of passion and invective where "Jac-
obin" Jeffersonians and "Essex Junto" Federali sts battled each
other from pulpit and counting table, as well as in the press
and at the social function. Salem was a spot where hot polit-
ical feeling smouldered beneath the surface in mild times and
erupted forth with volcanic heat and fury when elections. ap-
proached or Jeffersonian Republicanism manifested itself.

The story of the Crowninshields is significant because
they were owners of one of the largest merchant firms in Amer-
ica, and so their story reflects the effects of the European
events on the American Economy. Politically the Crowninshields
were equally significant. They provided a Congressman and a
Secretary of the Navy to the national political scene as well
as influential persons in state and local government. Crown-
inshield money played a part in setting up one of the two news-
papers which existed in Salem during those hectic years. As
ardent Jeffersonians in a belligerently Federalist community
the Crowninshields were a social as well as a political storm

 

5. James Duncan Phillips, galem and the Indies (Boston,
19"?)g pe 166e

7.

center in those colorful and troublesome days of Salem's great-
ness and decline. It is strange that they are one of the few
great shipping families of the Napoleonic-Jeffersonian era that
have found no biographer. It is in the belief that their story
will cast light on the effects of French affairs upon America
during these highly significant years that this study is being

made .

Chapter II

THE SPOIL OF THE INDIES- EUROPE CREATES THE CRDWNINSHIELDS
1792 - 1803 . .

Salem of 1792 was a bustling, growing little city. As
an old city in a new country, Salem looked to the sea for her
future. These were days when "a Salem boy . . . was born to
the music'of a windlass chanty'and caulker's maul; he drew
in a taste for the sea with his mother's milk; wharves and
shipyards were his playground; he shipped as‘boy on a coaster
in his early teens, saw Demerara and St. Petersburg before he
set foot in Boston, and if he had the right stuff in him,
commanded an East Indiaman before he was twenty-five. "FL Salem-
ites had learned early that agriculture was at best a'hard
and precarious method of making a living in the bleak New
England territory; they had not yet come to realize the pot-
ential wealth that lay in the development of a manufacturing
system, and the sea provided an obvious, natural avenue to
fortune.

Although Salem was old, the merchants and shipmasters
were not of the old stock of original settlers. By and large
they were selfmade men, who had worked with their hands and

 

1. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Ma__s__s-

achusetts 1182-1860 (Boston, 1922), p. 80. Hereafter cited
as S. E. Morison, Maritime History.

9.

did not consider themselves above manual labor.2 They had
explored all possibilities for trade following the'American
Revolutionary War. As the vanguard of a developing-merchant
class they had pioneered in developing American sea routes

to China and the East Indies. They had sought out markets in
Ewesia,and around the Cape of Good Hope.3 When the war in
EMmope broke out in 1792, they were in the seeking and search-
ing stage of commercial development, looking here and there
for an outlet for their young enthusiasm.

The family of George Crowninshield was indicative of the
bent of Salem in the 1790's. At the time of the outbreak.of
the European war the boys of the family had turned to the sea
for their living. The five older sons, George, Jr., Jacob,
John, Benjamin, and'Richard had already commanded ships, while
the youngest, Edward, had already‘been at sea. They ranged in
age from 17 to 26. They were the third generation of Crown-
inshields who had turned to the salt water for their careers.

The Crowninshields were not of the original stock of old
Salem. Their first American ancestor of that name had been
Dr. Kaspar von Richter von Kronensheldt (or Kronenschielt or
Kroninsheldt). He had come to America from Upper Saxony in
16%." Dr. Kroninsheldt had been a surgeon on a French

 

2. Ibid., p. 122.
3. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 40-55.

4. The date given above is taken from a manuscript

10.

privateer. He had settled in Salem during the 1690's and
had married Elizabeth Allen of Lynn in 1694. '

The oldest son of this marriage, John Crowninshield (1696-
1761), had sailed for the Derbys and the Ornes, two of Salem's
oldest merchant families.5' John's sixth child and third son,
George Crowninshield (1734-1815), was the founder of the firm
of George Crowninshield 8: Sons.' George's early work history
had paralleled that of his father. He had sailed for the Derby
firm. George had married Mary, daughter of Richard Derby, 'head
of the Derby shipping interests, and so was very closely linked
to that'important and wealthy family.6 George had continued
to work for the Derbys until after the Revolutionary War, when
he had branched out for himself.7

 

genealogy of the Crowninshield family in the Essex Institute,
Salem, Mass., entitled "Crowninshield Family." It shows the
descendants of Dr. John.Kaspar Richtervon Kronensheldt.
Another genealogy in the Essex Institute, typewritten "Geneal-
ogy of the Crowninshield Family," has Dr. Kronensheldtcoming
to Boston as early as 1666 or 1668. A third genealogy of the
family places him in America in 1694. New England Hi stgricg;

and Genealogical Register, Vol. 104 (ls—5‘0), pp. 285- .
5. Ibid., Vol. 104, pp. 285-87.

6. George Crowninshield married a daughter of the head
of the house of Derby, and Elise Hasket Derby, who became head
of the shipping firm after the Revolutionary War, married Eliz-
abeth Crowninshield, George's sister. The Crowninshield broth-
ers were double cousins of their Derby contemporaries. William
Bentley, D1 of Wm. Bentley‘Salem, Mass., 1905-14), Aug. 15,
1811, IV, 41. Hereafter cited as Bentley,“ Dim.

7. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 82.

11.

Captain George Crowninshield was a stern, vitriolic, and
stubborn man. For personal and political reasons, he fought
and struggled with the Federali sts of Salem throughout the
years of his firm's existence. In the early years of the growth
of his firm, he fought the mass of Salem's wealthy over his
right to extend his wharf farther into the channel at Salem
harbor. He broke with his brother-in-law, Elias Hasket Derby,
during the midnineties, and when Lire. Derby, George's sister,
died, neither George nor any of his family attended the funer-
a1.8 Dr. Bentley, a friend of the family, said of him, "air C.
was a son of Nature. He had powers employed only in seafaring
concerns."9 and more pointedly, "It is unhappy when a man has
influence in any case from his wealth, who has it not from his
virtues 3: his reputation. The industry at abilities of child-
ren may oblige a notice of parents which public opinion may
otherwise refuse"10

Upon entering the lists of the Salem "merchants" after
the Revolutionary War, George Crowninshi eld had as his primary
asset a family of extremely capable sons. These boys had shown
much ability directing ships for the Derbys in the early period
when the Crowninshi elds were unable to supply ships for the

entire family. In 1789 George Jr., had taken the Crowninshi eld

 

8. Bentley, Diary, Apr. 23, 1799, II, 501.
9. Ibid., June 16, 1815, IV, 555.
10. Ibid., Dec. 19, 1806, III, 268.

12.

schooner Richard and Edward to the Isle of France and re-

turned with a cargo of coffee, tea,'rai sins—and almonds, all

to the account of George Crowninshi eld and Co .11 Jacob had

been around the Cape of Good Hope by 1787.12 The sons, as
they acquired manhood, were given authority on. ships and
George Crowninshield's sons demonstrated ample ability to

handle authority. Around the nucleus formed by these men,

George Crowninshield built his firm.

The Crowninshield brothers were an unusually active and,

in their early shipping days, a closely united group. Jacob,

the second son, early assumed the leadership over his brothers

and gradually took over leadership in the firm itself after the

middle 1790's. He was an excellent business man. Perhaps his

most spectacular gamble was that of bringing the first elephant

to be shown in America to this country. He estimated this

beast to be worth between $5,000 and $10,000.13 Jacob sailed

k

11. J. D. Phillips, "East India V es of Salem Vessels,"
E6862: Institute Historical Journal, Vol. 79 (19153). pp. 117-”15'5.
12. Jacob Crowninshield to James Madison, Salem, Sept.

11’: 1806, National Archives, Dept. of State, Miscellaneous
et'tl‘oers, Jan. - Dec., 1806.

1 13. Crowninshield Papers - Uncataloged Manuscript Col-

6(”lion in the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass. These papers

111° largely the letters exchanged among members of the Crown-

J 3h~1eld family and between them and business associates.

Nacob Crowninshi eld to George and John Crowninshield, Calcutta,

0". 20, 1795. Hereafter cited as 1521., Crowninshield Me.

31 The Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass. has a collection

ahfiler to that in the Essex Institute, See Jacob Crownin-

Olteld to Dear Brothers, Calcutta, Nov. 26, 1795. Hereafter
ed. as PM., Crowninshield Ms.

13.

longer for the Derbys than any of his brothers, but from 1797
to his death.in 1808 he played a major role in directing the
affairs of the family firm. The death of Jacob occurred only
fifteen months before the Crowninshield firm split and two of
the brothers went their separate paths. Probably the ability
of Jacob as the cool counselor of the firm is indicated better
in this bit of negative evidence than in any single concrete
deed which he performed. Jacob's guiding hand was felt in
areas other than the affairs of Crowninshield. He was elected
to Congress in 1802 and served continuously until his death.
Jefferson offered him the Secretary of the Navy post in 1805,
but he declined because of the poor health of his wife.14
Benjamin, the fourth son, seems to have been second to
Jacob among Crowninshield brothers. Like Jacob he was active
in political affairs. Benjamin has been credited with being
the fsolid brains of the firm, rather than his aggressive and

irascible father? and "much more of a merchant than Jacob".15

He too sailed for the Derby firm during his early career. He

 

14. Jefferson wrote Jacob Crowninshield asking him to
become Secretary of the Navy. After several letters to his
wife, Jacob declined. Nevertheless Jefferson sent his name
to the Senate and he was confirmed for that office in March,
1805, although he never served. See Henry Adams, Histor f
the United States, 1801-1811: New York,.1909). III—If, . 1.9..
Hereafter cited as H. Adams, United States. Also PM, Crown-
inshield Ms., copy Jacob Crowninshield to Thomas Jefferson,
Washington, Jan. 21}, 1805, and Sally to Jacob Crowninshield,
Salem, Feb. 9, 1805.

15. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indi_e;§, p. 330.

14.

became Secretary of the Navy under James L-iadi son in 18,14 and
served in that post for four years.

George Crowninshi eld Jr., the oldest of the brothers,
was a successful ship captain and merchant, but lacked the
balance of Jacob or Benjamin. He was of a spectacular nature
and liked to travel about Salern in a gaudy carriage, wearing
military boots. George owned the first pleasure yacht at
Salem, having built the twenty-two-ton Jefferson in 1801.15
He took a ship to Halifax during the War of 1812 torecover
the bodies of Captain Lawrence (of "Don't give up the ship"
fame) and Lieutenant Lucilow.17 After awsuccessful career as
a privateer in the War of 1812, George built a luxurious
yacht, the gleopatra's Barge, and sailed it to Europe.18
George never married, but when he died he scandali zed Salem

by leaving a trust fund for an illegitimate child.19 Dr.

Bentley commented on his generosity, but added, "what he did

n 20

was known when done. Despite his idiosyncraci es, George

 

16. Ship Registers of Salem and Beverly. 17891900
(Salem, 1906?, "JeffersoYF'. Hereafter cited as Salem Ship

Roasters.
17. Bentley, Diary, Aug. 10, 1813, IV, 187.

18. The yacht Clegpatra's Barge closed George's
spectacular career. He sailed it to Europe amid rumors that
he was going to rescue Bonaparte from St. Helena. See Francis
B. Crowninshi eld, The Story of George Crowninshi eld's Yacht
CleopatraLs Barge (Boston, 1913). Privately printed.

19. Bentley, Diary, Mar. 11, 1818, IV, 507.
20. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1318, IV, 499.

15.

was a successful captain and merchant.

The two remaining sons who played a role in the firm,
John and Richard, were merely less conspicuous members of
an exceedingly able family. Both commanded ships in their
early twenties. Both conducted business negotiations and
travelled extensively for the Crowninshield firm. JNeither
achieved the acclamation of Jacob or Benjamin, and neither
was as spectacular as their oldest brother. Both spent much
time away from Salem during the years after they retired as
sea-captains, John in New York and France, and Richard in
New York. Edward, the youngest son of the family, died in
early 1793.21

Commanding a merchant ship at this time required such a
variety of talents that it is difficult to see how a youth in
his early twenties could qualify for the position. First of
all he had to know how to handle his ship at sea. as had to
know navigation to direct the bantam craft across the seas to
dots on the map. Normally the ship captain had to sell his
cargoes and.buy new ones. This was no small accomplishment,
as it entailed changes of cargoes two or three times before
returning to home port. Economic conditions had to be studied
by the captains, for changing markets frequently required

changing orders. A knowledge of foreign currencies and rates

 

21. Ibid., Feb. 15, 1793, II, 4.

16.

of exchange was required in the transacting of business in
India and Bordeaux, or Sumatra and Naples. During the period
of uncertainty, which lasted almost continuously between 1793
and 1815, the captain had to be aware of the vagaries of bel-
ligerent interpretations of international and maritime law.
Some awareness of foreign politics certainly added to the qual-
ifications of a captain. Communications were slow and uncert-
ain, and the captain had to be able to report to his home firm
what his activities had been, and estimate two or three ports
ahead to his next mailing address so the owner could write to
him. He was expected to send letters back to his ship owner
by every possible means. The versatility required for com-
petence in the task of commanding a merchant vessel during the
late eighteenth century hardly merited the contempt revealed
by John Randolph.22

I The system of payment likewise added to the development
of wise and independent captains. The captain was paid a
wage and in addition was allowed a certain "adventure" - a
private merchandizing venture of a specified weight or amount
of space on the ship - plus a percentage of the net profits.
As the wage payment was a minor part of the total, the incent—
ive to sharp bargaining and careful investment was great in-
deed. It was through this hard school of training that the

22. See page 216n.

17.

Crowninshield brothers rose to prominence.

Despite the relative independence of the Crowninshield
sons as ship captains, George, Sr., advised them as closely as
possible and they regarded him in an almost patriarchal sense.
In the letters among themselves they always referred to their
father as "Sir". George gave his advise to his sons in no
uncertain terms. "Now John I will give you some directions
& if you do not follow them I will sell your Schooner when
she comes home. ‘Vz My orders is you are to write me by every
opportunity & by every Vessel bound for Philadelphia ...."2‘3
In other letters he. advised his sons on prices of goods in
Salem and suggested purchases they were to make.24’ During
the early 1790's, however, there were not enough Crowninshield
ships to supply the entire family and George was limited to
controlling those who were in the three small Crowninshield
craft.

When the war broke out between France and Great Britain
in 1793, the Crowninshields owned three schooners, all rated
under 100 tons.25 They were being sailed by John, Richard
and George Jr., while Jacob and Benjamin were still working

¥

23. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield Sr., to
John Crowninshield, Salem, Dec. 18, 1790.

24. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield Sr., to
Jehn Crowninshield, Salem, June 16, 1791.

25. salem Ship Registers.

18.

for their uncle, Elias Hasket Derby. Richard was trading
to Europe and to the West Indies, but the other brothers
were all trading around the Cape of Good Hope to the coast
of India and to the Isle of France. 26 I

. The first direct effects of the war on America were not
long in arriving. In November of 1793 the British ordered
the seizure of all neutral vessels carrying goods from French
colonies to France, under the prohibition by the rule of 1756
of carrying on a trade during wartime which was not allowed
in time of peace.27 Enforcement of the regulation was necessar-
ily left to the discretion of the ship captains on the scene,
and seizures came thick and fast during the early months of
1794. Several hundred American ships were seized by the Brit-
ish during this period,28 among them the Charming Sally be-
longing to the Crowninshi elds,29 although the schooner carried

26. The Isle of France, now called Mauritius, is located
due east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. It was controlled
by France until the British seized it in 1810. Its products,
with those of the sister island of Bourbon (Reunion), were cof-
fee, cloves, cotton, sugar, indigo and ebony. Jacob described
it as half-way between the Cape of Good Hope and India, and
as such it served as a stopping point and depot for India trade
Vessels.

27. A. T. Mahan, The Influence f Sea Power upon the
French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 (Boston. 1893). II, 234-35.
Hereafter cited as A. T. Mahan, Seg Power and French Revolution.

28. Ibid., II, 234-35 and Bentley, Diary, Mar. 9, 11,
12, 179#, II, 83-4.

29. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 106-7.

19.

no French property. The loss was apparently not serious.
TheCrowninshield papers do not refer to it directly, although
Richard's losses are mentioned from time to time. At this
point the Crowninshields bought Richard a new ship, the
Minefla and sent him to India. This same year, they had the
new ship, Beli sarius built for them in Salem and set her out
on the India trade.30

The shift away from the West Indies trade was a wise move.
Richard, the only one of the brothers engaged in this area,
reported consistent losses until he shifted to the Indian Ocean
trade, while all the others had done well in India; His loss
of the Charming Sally merely was a culmination of many finan-
cial setbacks in that trade, and by late 1796, when he had
completed his first Indian run, he also reported success in
his ventures.:51 I

For the Crowninshi elds the beginning of the war had two
results. They expanded with the general prosperity that had
been created by the war, and their trade with the West Indies
was cut in favor of total emphasis on the trade with the East
Indies and Indian Ocean area. The Bell sarius was a 209 ton ‘
ship as she was built, and was remodeled the following year

 

30. WW. L___elisar1u .
31. See pages 21-22.

20.

into a 261 ton vessel.32 The Minerva was rated at 266 ton.33
These figures compare with the small schooners that were
owned by the family at the beginning of the war, the Richard
and Edward at 64 tons, the agltlLand Saljll at 67 tons, and the
Charming Sally at 86 tons.34 The Bell sarius and the Minerva
represented the shift of the Crowninshieias‘rrom the small
ship to the big ship class, and marked a sharp rise in the
family fortunes.

Therletters among the brothers tell the story of con-
stantly rising income from their shipping ventures. In 1792
Jacob wrote to John of the result of his voyage in the Derby
Ship H3231 on which Mr. Derby had made 320,000 profit while
Jacob had made $4,000 beSides, but he added that "we cant al-
ways eXpect to do as well".35 The implication from this let-
ter, describing a voyage which occurred before the war in
Europe had had any effect on America, was that this profit
was unusually great for one voyage. Such profits were be-
yond eXpectations. Following the outbreak of war the Crown-
inshields "did" even better. By 1794 four of the brothers

 

32. Salem Shyp Registers, Belisarius.
33. Ibid., Minerva.

34. Ibid., Richard and Edward, Poll and Sall , Charming
Sal I.

35. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Dec. 11, 1792.

21.

were sailing in ships owned by the family. Richard, whose
business ventures to Europe and the West Indies had been con-
sistently bad35 had come over on the profit side of the ledger
with his transfer to the India trade}.7 Benjamin wrote in
late 1795 of how well the three, George Jr., John, and him-
self, had done in the India trade.38 In 1796 Richard congrat-
ulated George and John‘on their making 10,000 I. on a voyage,
which he thought was "great indeed“.39 Jacob Spoke of his
making $40,000 or perhaps more on a voyage he made for the
Derbys in 1795,“0 while in 1797 John’s profits on a run to
Bordeaux carrying coffee brought in $30,000.“1 By 1797 the
lggggzhe and the Brutus43 had been added to the fleet of the

Crowninshields, and all of the brothers were worldng for the

 

35. E1 Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
salem, Dec. 11, 1792.

37. ET, Crowninshield Ms., Richard Crowninshield to
Brothers, Altona, River Elb, Nov. 7, 1796.

38. El, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin to George and John
Crowninshield, Calcutta, Nov. 17, 1795.

39. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to George or John
Crowninshield, no sending address, Mar. 15. 1796.

40. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to George and John
Crowninshield, Isle of France, Jan. 11, 1796.

41. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-

42. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-

43. Salem Ship Registers, Brutus.

22.

family firm of George Crowninshield and Sons. Although prof-
its are difficult to determine on a careful statistical basis,
the general tone of these letters indicated that the Crownin-
shields were making bigger and bigger profits throughout the
early years of the war in Europe.

This expansion fits in well with the national and inter-
national pidure for the time. The British were allowing more
and more of their increasing tonnage to be carried by neutral
carriers. In 1792, before the war could affect her shipping,
479,630 tons of British commerce was carried in foreign bot-
toms and 3,151,389 tons in domestic bottoms. By 1796 the fig-
ures were 998,427 foreign and 2,629,575 domestic, while by
1800 1,448,287 tons of British goods were carried in foreign
ships and 2,825,078 in British Ships. While total British
shipping increased, the total amount of goods carried by Brit-
ish ships decreased, and percentage-wise the amount of foreign
carried British goods went from 13 per cent in 1792 to almost
34 per cent in 1800.44

Other figures indicate similar tendencies. The total
eXports of the inited States increased regularly between 1792
and 1796, going from $20,753,098 in the year ending September
30, 1792, to $67,064,097 in the year ending September 30, 1795.
Of the latter figure, $26,30,000 represented foreign goods

which was being re-eXported, contrasted with $540,000 of

 

44. A.T, Hanan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II,229.

23.

re-eXports in 1790. By 1799 the yearly export figure was
$76,665,522 of which over $45,523,000 was re-exported.45

. France had added to American trade in this period. In
February, 1793, the National Convention opened her colonial
trade to American vessels. Goods carried to or from French
colonies in foreign vessels were to pay no higher duties than
if carried in French vessels. The measure was to apply also

to ports in the East Indies and the Isle of France and Bourbon.
Later Senegal was also 0pened.46 ‘ - .
- Turning to specific articles of trade the same rise in
American shipping volume is indicated. fln 1792, before the
war, the United States exported to Europe 1,122,000 pounds
of sugar, and 2,136,742 of coffee; in 1796, 35,000,000 of
sugar and 47,000,000 of coffee; in 1800, 82,000,000 of sugar
and 47,000,000 of coffee."47 Much of this trade was that of

 

45. Eli F. Heckscher, The Continental System An Economic
Integpretation (Oxford, 1922), p. 103. Hereafter cited as
E. F. Heckscher, Continental System. Also see Adam Seybert,
Statistical Annalg; Embracing Views of the Population, Commerce,

Navigation, Fi sheries,fib1ic Landg, Post office Establishment,

Revenues, Mint, Military and Naval Establi 8111116th“, Exggnditureg,
Public ngt and.Sinking Fund, gf thg unitgg fitatgg Qf Amazigg;

founded on official documents: commencing on the Fourth of
March seventeen hundged and eighty-nine and ending on the twen-

tieth of April eighteen hundred and eiggteen (Philadelphia, 1818),
P. 93. Hereafter cited as A. Seybert, Statistical Annalg.

46. Anna C. Clauder, American Commerce as Affected b the
Wars of the French Revolution and Napgleon, 1123-1812 (Philadel-
phia, 19325, p. 28. Hereafter cited as A. C. Clauder, American ,
Commerce.

 

 

47. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and.French Revolution, II, 267.

24.

the French and the Dutch which had been interrupted by the

48 The implication

British after the outbreak of the war.
inherent in all these figures is that the increase represent-
ed the trade which had been prohibited during time of peace,
but which had been opened to the neutral carrier as soon as
the war broke out.

In the Far East, American ships were beginning to make
an appearance. Trade with the open port of Canton in China
had started shortly after the end of the American Revolut-
ionary War and increased rapidly following the beginning of
the war in Europe. In 1792-93 six United States ships ex-
ported 1,538,000 pounds of tea from that port. By 1798-99,
thirteen ships exported 5,674,000 pounds of tea from Canton.49
It is in this setting that the Crowninshield firm began its
rise to commercial prominence.

This stimulation to American shipping, in which the
Crowninshields shared, marked the major effects upon the firm
of the opening years of the wars of the French.Revolution.
With increased prosperity came the split from the old Derby

firm, a split which was described as a "deep, longitudinal

 

48. Ibid., II, 267.

49. William Milburn, Oriental Commerce; containing a

Geographical description of the Pginciple Places in The Egg;
Lpdies, China, and.J§pan, with their Producpp Manufacture,

and Trade, including the Coasting or Country Trade from Pgrt
pp Pgrt ‘ILondon, 1813), II, 486. Hereafter cited as W. Mil-
burn, Oriental Commerce.

 

25.

chasm, across which the rival clans of Derby and Crowninshield
glared defiance”.so This chasm represented the lines along
which Salem divided, and its beginnings might well be traced.
The first evidence of Derby-Crowninshield antipathy ap-
peared in a disagreement over accounts given to E. H. Derby
by Jacob Crowninshield in 1795. They had been workingnon a
friendly basis; Jacob and Benjamin had sailed Derby ships and
early in 1795 Derby had sold a ship to the Crowninshields at
advantageous terms.51 When Jacob and E. H. Derby disagreed,
a group of merchants was called in to act. as.umpires and Jacob
was awarded $59.59 by the group.52 Jacob refused to be mol-
lified. He wrote to Richard, " [Youknow 013 old Derby's
conduct to me; --- if you do not, suffice it to say‘thatit
was everything that was detestable. our a/c's were finally
settled by Mr. Gray, Mr. Norris a Captn Orne’in aw favor. "53
The following year the difference approached the stature
of a feud. The Crowninshields, to handle their increasing
business, extended their wharf to a point where the Derbys

 

50. S. E. Morison, Maritime Histopy, p. 123.

51. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
Shield, 58.19111, Jmo 18, 1795.

52. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 183.

53. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Ship America, Dec., 1795'.

26.

said it blocked the harbor channel. The matter was taken to
court and the Derbys won. Dr. Bentley, who throughout the
years admired and saw eye to eye with the Crowninshields,
noted: "The affair of Derby & Crowninshield was determined
against Crowninshield. -He is to lose the last addition of
12 feet to his wharf. Capt. Jno. Collins was foreman of the
Jury. The Judges were full against C. Mess. Derby, W. Gray,
Jno Hodges, a the most respectaele citizens were witnesses
against 0. that the channel actually did run under the wharf,
or where it is know built."54 The Derbys had won round two
of the disputes between the families.

The day before this decision was reached Jacob wrote to
his brothers that he had purchased the ship America from the
Derbys.55 This transaction was the last friendly relation-
Ship between the two families. The chasm mentioned earlier
developed rapidly from this point and Salemites, pro-Derby
and pro-Crowninshield, aligned themselves on their reSpective
sides of it. When Mrs. Derby, George Crowninshield's sister,
died, the "Crowninshield family would not attend [the funeral)
because of a disaffection of long standing. "56 And, as Dr.

 

54. Bentley, piggy, Nov. 11, 1796, II, 205.

55. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Brothers, Salem, Nov.
10, 1796. Jacob had bought the ship for Derby at the Isle of
France (Mauritius) in 1795. El, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to
George and John Crowninshield, Ship America, Sept. 16, 1795.

56. Bentley, Diary, Apr. 23, 1799, II, 301.

27.

Bentley remarked concerning the wharf case, the "most respect-
able citizens". were against the Crowninshields. Throughout the
twenty years under consideration, this antagoni smowas con-
stantly apparent. In politics the Crowninshields became
staunch Jeffersonians and the Derbys became more "respectable"
Federalists; in social activities Hamilton Hall became the -
Site of Federalist functions and w'ashington' Hall the location
for Republican functions; even on the sea the Crowninshield
letters, ordinarily interested in nothing but business, refer
with pleasure to their craft outsailing Federalist boats.57
The Crowninshield brothers were all bailing in the East
India. trade routes by late 1795. The hazards of the trade were
great. They included the problem of dealing with belligerent
ships, embargoes that were proclaimed without warning, the pro-
blem of finding trustworthy negotiators with whom one could
transact business, in addition to the natural dangers of sea
and storm. Naturally the profits were commensurate with the
risk involved. The pattern for shipping was not clear-cut,
but aside from an occasional trip, such as was made by Rich-
ard and another by John in 1796 the family kept their boats
out of European waters and concentrated on making the run to

the Indian Ocean and. back to the United States and letting

 

57. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 30, 1799, says, "The Belisarius sailed
with the Essex today a outsailed her - whatever the Federal-
ists say to the contrary on Sunday last."

28.

others reship the goods to the continent of Europe.

A typical voyage of this India trade was begun by George
and John Crowninshield on the Crowninshield ship Beli sarius in
late .1795. They sailed as joint captains. Their-orders read

. . . you are to put to sea the first fair wind and proceed to
Calcutta in India making all hast possible you may either stop
at St. Helena Bencoolen or Madras dc sell the articles that will
best answer those markets is than go for Calcutta in order to
finish your sales 8: than to purches a return cargo for this
country which consist of sugar pepper beeswax calicoes a all
kinds of conton cloth Bandano handkerchiefs at such goods as
you think best for our market you being upon the spot 3. having
been that way before must judge 0% all those kind of goods a
like wise the proportion of each. 8

Privateers or belligerent vessels made little impression
upon the Crowninshields at this time, although the latent
danger was recognized in the naive—sounding orders.

You have the usual necessary papers as clearances from this
country which you will of course produce to any Ship of War
or privateers belonging to any powers at War do have no doubt
but they will treat you well a let you pass without any mol-
estation or henderance a you have our full liberties to act
a do as you think most advantageous in the above or any ggher
matters . . . minding always you break no rule of trade.

The Belisarius sailed from Salem loaded with brandy,
wine,rum, iron bars, lead, soaps, portor (a limestone) and
815,000 in cash. By March 15, 1796 she had reached Calcutta.
John Crowninshield wrote his brother Richard of delays they
had had in arranging for an Indian intermediary called a

Banyan. John remarked that they were invariably deceitful

-—_.

58. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Beli sarius orders, Nov. 17,
1795.

59. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Beli sarius orders, Nov. 17,
1795.

 

29.

and dishonest.60 By June 1 the Beli sarius was caught in an
embargo at the Isle of France, and John complained of the
tremendous amount of shipping located at that base. At this
time he listed his cargo as 3250 bags of coffee plus nutmegs
andLijourney.61 The Belisarius returned to Salem with this
cargo, arriving there in September of 1796. On December 1,
1796, Jehn Crowninshield was in France attempting to sell the
coffee. I

By 1796 the international situation had become much more
unsettled and each rumor was of vital concern to the traders.
When John Crowninshield left for France to sell coffee in late
1796 the family bombarded him with letters advising him in
accord with the latest talk they had heard. George, Sr. told
him that there had been an increase in dangers to neutral ship-
ping and to keep his papers in order. He thought the‘French
were about to invade England and warned John of trouble.62

Two days later Jacob wrote to John at Bordeaux and told

him of the rising price of coffee and suggested that John g0

 

60. El, Crowninshield Ms., John to Richard Crowninshield,
Calcutta, Mar. 15, 1796. The function of the banyan was similar
to that of a.Chinese Co-hong. He arranged for the handling of
the cargo and served as an intermediary between merchant and
native populations. Like all interpretors, he had tremendous
possibilities for subterfuge. Dealing with un-loved.foreigners,
the banyan had little incentive for honesty.

61. E1, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshield,
Sr., Isle of France, June 1, 1796.

62. ET, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to John Crownin-
shield, Salem, Oct. 24, 1796.

30.

directly to Bengal from France.63 On December 1, 1796, John
wrote from Bordeaux thatflhis coffee would sell very slowly and
at a much lower price than he had originally supposed because
of rumors of a cessation of hostilities. Another rumor which
contributed to the general gloom of this letter said that the
tariff was to be lowered and that none of the prospective
buyers wished to buy in large lots for fear of being caught
with high priced goods on hand.64 In February of 1797, Jacob
wrote that John had reali zed much higher profits on his 'cof-
fee than he had originally thought possible and that he pro-
bably would make between $25,000 and 830,000 on the trip.
Likewise, heavier duties were expected to develop in France
within the forseeable future; as a result Jacob advised John
to take his profits, buy a new ship, and take her with the
Belisarius on the run to India.65
’ 4 One month later Jacob wrote Richard of the uncertainties
of the foreign trade situation. He complained that he did
not know from day to day which ships were safe and which would

be lost. Markets were so uncertain that he did not know what

to do. Sugar, which Richard had reported as being in demand

 

63. El, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Oct. 26, 1796.

64. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshield,

65. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-

31.

on the continent, was selling very low.66

Despite these drawbacks, the Crowninshields were profit-
ing a great deal from the war trade. Any letters that report-
ed actual sales of goods rather than specualtion on what would
be made on goods spoke of si zeable profits. Crowninshield ex-
pansion continued. Jacob bought the ship America in the fall
of 179667 and constantly advised in favor of continued expan-
sion by the other brothers as far as purchasing new ships was
concerned. Despite the worries over the war situation, John
headed for the Isle of France with the Beli sarius early in
February of 1797 without'bothering to return home, because he
éKnew the market at I France i knew the market was high there.68
-_ Wbrries to the Contrary, Crowninshield shipping was get-
ting through. They prided themselves on the speed of the B_e_]_.-
isarius, which Could.outsail trouble fromnother ships.69 In
spite of the concern that Jacob undoubtedly had over the state
of their shipping, no significant Crowninshield losses due to
action of the British or the French occurred during this time.

 

66. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, 1481'. 16, 17970

67. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to Brothers,
Salem, Nov. 10, 1796.

68. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Apr. 2, 1797.

69. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Apr. 2, 1797.

32.

The actions of those two powers meanwhile had changed,
following the negotiation of the Jay Treaty between Great Brit-
sin and the United States. The United States had signed the
Jay Treaty with Great Britain in late 1794. After modificat-
ion by the American government to allow the shipment of colon-
ial products to foreign states in American ships the treaty
had been ratified by the American Senate. British violence
toward American shipping, which had cost "hundreds" of Amer-
ican vessels, eased with the Jay Treaty.7O At the same time
this irritated the French and made them enact legislation
which would limit British control of or advantage from this
shipping wherever possible.71

The French opposition to the Jay Treaty developed from
two proviSions. The treaty extended greatly the list of con-
traband goods that had been drawn up in the Franco-American
treaty of Amity and Commerce. It directly contradicted that
treaty in the placing of "timber for ship-building, tar or
I rosin, copper, in sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and gen-
erally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of ves-

sels, unwrought iron and firs planks only excepted"72 on the

 

 

70. Edward Channing, A History of the United States,

New York (1935). IV (ngeralists and Republicans , 135.
Also see above p.18.

71. A. T. Nahan, Sea Power and Fpgnch Revolution, II,
239’ 242.

72. United States Senate Document #357, 61st Congress,

33.

contraband list. It also acknowledged the British denial of
the “free ships, free goods? concept despite the fact that
most European powers had refused to do 80.73 These two
sections of the treaty were so opposed by the French that

the Foreign Minister, Delacroix, told Monroe that the Direct-
ory Considered the Jay Treaty "a derogation of the Friendship
which unites the United States and the Republic, and in those
stipulations which concern the neutrality of the flag, an
abandon of the tacit engagement which eXisted between the

two countries on this point since the Treaty of Commerce of
1773374 '

The American Minister who was negotiating a treaty with
Spain, Thomas Pinckney, thought that the Spanish feared a joint
declaration of war against France and Spain by United States
and Great Britain as a result of the Jay Treaty. The implicat-
ion of alliance was more than just a FrenCh thought from all

 

 

2nd Session, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Prgt-
cools and reements Between the Uni ed States 0 America and
cher Ppwers 1128:1202, Compiled by wm. M. Malloy (Washington,
1910 , I, 01. For the entire Jay Treaty I, 590-609. Here-
after cited as U. S, Treaties. For the French American Treaty
of Amity and Commerce see Ibid., I, 468-479. The article on

contraband is #XXIV, pp. 475-77.

73. S. F. Bemis, Ja 's Treat A Stud in Commerce apg
Diplomacy, (New York, 1923), p. 152. Hereafter cited as Bemis,
ng s Treaty. .

74. .Requoted from E. Wilson Lyon, "The Directory a the

United States," American Historical Review, Vol. 43 (1938),
P. 515. Hereafter cited as E. W. Lyon, "Directory and U. S.,"

A,H.R.

 

34.

appearances.75 The statement that the Jay Treaty represented
a "‘submi salon for the period of the war to all British claims"
wae held to be accurate in the standard American monograph on-
the treaty.76

The French began with a policy which retaliated against
the British attitude opposing "free ships, free goods" and vic-
timi zed the neutral carrier. In November, 1794, the Directory
ruled that enemy goods on neutral ships were subject to seizure
so long as French property on a neutral ship made those goods
subject to Seizure by the British. This law lasted only six
weeks when it was withdrawn.77 In July 1796 the Directory made
a ruling that enemy goods on a neutral ship made those ships
subject to confiscation, search or detention as long as the
British regulations subjected them to the same treatment. A
little later French agents in the West Indies began to seize
all American vessels bound to or from British ports or those
carrying contraband.78

In 1797 the Directory again tried to coerce the Americans
to break from the provisions of the Jay Treaty. Working through

 

75. G. L. Rives, "Spain and the United States in 1795"
American Histgrical Revigw, IV (Oct., 1898), pp. 62—79, pp.
77"? e -

76. S. F. Bemis, Ja 's Treat , p. 267.

77. A. T. Mahan, S'eaflPdlwer and {xenon Rev lution, II, 243.

78. Ibid., II, 243-44.

35.

the puppet Dutch government, France issued a statement that
Dutch trade carried in American vessels should be protected by
the Americans.79 Quite naturally a neutral government in the
United States did not see eye to eye with this policy especial-
ly as it opposed the recently ratified Jay Treaty.

Likewise, the French issued a decree in 1797 which made
enemy goods subject to seizure, and branded as pirates Ameri-
cans who served on foreign vessels. American vessels were re-
quired to carry a list of the crew, or the ship was to be
considered a legal prize. These measures, aimed at British
policies on goods and impreSsment, placed the neutral Americans
in a precarious position.80

In January of 1798 the French strengthened their previous
rulings when they said that any vessel found to contain British
merchandize as her cargo, whether in part or in its entirety,
was subject to capture as a.prize of war.81 The undeclared
Quasi-War between the French.and the United States was under
way. °

This period of tension between France and the United
States found the Crowninshields unwilling to go to war with
France as long as the situation did not deteriorate noticeably.

 

79. I_p_i_g_., II, 247.

80. E. w. Lyon, “Directory and U. Sz’, A.H.R., Vol. 43,
P- 517.

81. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II, 250.

36.

They revealed Francophile tendencies early in the period and
their letters Showed a constant desire to maintain peace be-
tween the two countries. They considered the Jay Treaty as
chiefly responsible for the troubles between the two countries
and explained French action in'that light. Jacob, by this
time the leader of the family, wrote, "A war 'we must not have,
but agree to almost anything the French may demand, tho' I
would not subscribe to humiliating terms. We need not look
beyound the dfmd British treaty for the cause of all these
difficulties 1 - 4.".82 Later in March he mentioned that Amer-
ican opinion concerning France had been too derogatory, and
that the French were notfias bad as they were pictured.83 John,
from Frames, and George Sr. from Salem voiced similar feeling
at this time.84 A little later Jacob mentioned that the French
did not want war with America and that America would have to
bear the blame if war broke out between the two countries.85

Another factor in the desire of the Crowninshields for

peace was the presence of a great deal of American shipping in

 

82. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
58.16111, 141”. 20, 17970

83. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 22, 1797.

84. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George Sr. to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Apr. 2, 1797.

85. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 4, 1797.

37.

France during this period, which would have been subject to
eei zure had war broken out. John, who was in France during
the spring of 1797, a time when relations between the two na-
tions was rapidly deteriorating, commented that there was
'300,000 in Salem property in Bordeaux alone. The French
eould reap a great profit by "exchanging sei zures". with the
United States -- that is, sacrifice what few French vessels
were in American harbors for the vast quantity of American
ships in French harbors.86

As a.result of this strained relationship between France
and the United States, American commerce became a very risky
enterprise. Insurance rates, an adequate index of the risk
involved in commerce, became prohibitively high by the spring
of 1797. Jacob wrote of insurance rates being 20 per cent to
Europe and India in March of 1797.87 A year later the rates
were 40 percent out and home on a ship headed for the Indian

Ocean and 30 per cent on the home voyage for a ship already in

 

86. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George,Sr. to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Apr. 2, 1797. A recent scholar takes issue
with this view of John Crowninshield that France stood to gain
by war. He said that "France had everything to lose and nothing
to gain from a war with the United States." Her commerce was
carried in American ships. In June, 1798, when commerce between
the United States and the French West Indies was broken off by
Congress, the sugar colonies there suffered a serious blow. E. W.
Lyon, "Directory and U. S‘.’, A,H,R,, Vol. 43, p. 525.

87. PM Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Mar. , 1797-

38.

that area.88 Consequently the Crowninshields took no in-
surance.

Dangers for the individual ship ran high, and the Crownin-
shields were faced with the dilemma which confronted all neu-
tral shippers at this time. Their letters revealed the increas-
ing menace of the warring powers to their shipping. In October
of 1796, John was warned to keep his papers in order in case
he had to establish his conformity with the regulations of the
belligerents.89 In March of 1797, Jacob wrote that he momen-
tarily expected news that one or more of the Crowninshield ships
had been taken.90 In April of 1798, Jacob told Richard of
losing an "adventure". on "Pell's schooner" which was taken on
the grounds that theSumatran pepper on board belonged to the
British. Two days later he wrote again to Richard, to trust
no vessel,'not even near a port.91 He also told-Richard, who
was in the Brutus on the Coromandel Coast of India, "You must
take the greatest precautions coming home, run from every ves-

sel, speak none dc trust no one. The lighter your ship the

 

88. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 22, 1798.

89. El, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr. to John Crown-
inshield, Salem, Oct. 24, 1796.

90. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
88101“, mar. 16, 1797.

91. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Apr. 22, 1798.

39.

better that is for heaven sake do not get her deeper nor so
deep as when you went away. 8: should you find you are about
being taken you could contrive to have an officer a men con-
cealed below to retake the ship at all hazards afterwds twould
be a good scheme a may be done effectively”?2 The French were
condemning vessels on the strength of theirhaving British hand-
kerchiefs on board. "Ships are captured for a bale of English
goods, a p iece of cloth, a hhd sugar without clear Certificates
sworn to with seals in due form that the goods are not of Eng-
lish growth produce or manufacture or of her colonies."93
French seizures during this period were considerable.
Mahan‘said that between July 1796 and October 1797 over three
hundred vessels and more than $15,000,000 in produce was seized

94

by France. Another writer said, "No less than three hundred

and‘s‘ixteen American ships had beenksei zed principally in the
Caribbean, by the French between July, 1796, and June, 1797."95
There were a total of 1853 French‘spoliation claims between 1793
and 1800, of which the majority came in the 1796 - 1800 period.

They averaged three claims per vessel, which would mean that

 

92. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 24,1798

93. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 22, 1798.

94. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revolution,
II, 2411-45. . ‘

95. A. C. Clauder, American Commerce, p. 44.

40.

about 617 vessels were affected.96

Despite the high number of French captures during this
period the Crowninshields were able to escape the commerce
raiders and reap the higher profits that were the reward for
those who did escape. The Beli sarius arrived safely from the
Isle of France in July of 1798, and (was pronounced by Bentley
"one of the richest ships of our port."_97 The only sea encount-
er of the Beli sarius had resulted in one ofher seamen being

8
9 She had avoided the greater menace

impressed by the “Briti sh.
of the French privateers successfully. The Brutus, the other
CrowninShield ship in the Indian Ocean during this time arrived
safely in Salem in Januarytof 1799.99

During the spring of 1798 the federal government under
President John Adams made plans for defending the United States'
shipping against French seizures. Upon hearing of the govern- .
ment plans the Crowninshields quickly offered to loan their
largest vessel, the America, to the government and to accept

96. S. F. Bemis, A Di lomatic History of the United States
(New York, 1936), pp. ll 15. Hereafter cited as S. F. Bemis,

Diplomatic Histpyy.

97. Bentley, Dig_ry, July 26, 1798, II, 277.

98. United States Government, Naval Documents Related to
the ua -War Between the United States and France, prepared
under direction of Hon. Claude A. Swanson (Washington, 1935-38),
II, 321. Hereafter cited as Quasi-War.

99. J. D. Phillips, "East India Voyages of Salem Vessels,"
Wtitute Historical Collections, V01. 79. PP. 331-65.

41.

6 per cent stock100 in payment for the loan. In the summer,
when the Beli sarius arrived back in Salem, she was also offer-
ed to the government on the same terms.101 A misunderstanding
resulted. The Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to the Crown-
inshield firm acknowledging their offer to s_e;_1_ their vessels.
He stated, however, that the government could only buy ships
then under construction or yet to be constructed.102

The Crowninshields saw fit to be irritated at this mod-
ifiedrefulsal. In a letter to President Adams they said that
they had no intention of offering their ships for sale, but
only desired to loan them to the government at a fee. If the
vessels were not needed a quick.answer would‘be appreciated so
the ships could be sent out again to the lucrative, but danger-
ous, India market.103

The loan was never completed. On September 13, 1798 a

clearance was made for the Beli sarius to the port of Copenhagen.

104

She carried four guns and sixteen men. The America was armed

 

100. The letter does not eXplain the transaction beyond
this statement. Possibly the Crowninshields were to receive
U. S. government bonds at 6% for the value of their ship.

101. M, II, 149. Also, Ibid., George Crowninshield
and Sons to President Adams, Sept. 1, 1796, I, 369-70.

102. Ibid., Sec'y of Navy to George Crowninshield and Sons,
Aug. 25. 1795. I. 339.

103. Ibid., George Crowninshield and Sons to President
Adams, Sept. 1, 1798, I, 369-70.

10’}. Ibid., II, 153.

42.

and sent to the East Indies by way of Europe in February of
1799.105 The Brutus was likewise armed following the return
from the Indian Ocean}()6 The Beli sarius was commissioned a
privateer‘by the United States government in May of 1799 and
was armed with sixteen guns.107
American exports, which had increased in value each year
except 1796-97 since the beginning of the French Revolution Wars,
dropped in the French - American tension years of 1799-1800.108
Crowninshield activity slackened with the decline in exports.
They found more and more difficulty in shipping their goods to
Europe during the latter part of the 1790's and built up a
huge stock in American warehouses as a result of their success-
ful voyages to the Indian Ocean and the East Indies. In a
letter discussing the foreign situation in nay of 1799' Jacob
concluded that the wise thing for the firm would be to drop
out of "all trade excepting that to the East Indies."109
During 1799 the first reference by the Crowninshields of their

handling cargoes which had come from the Russian market occurr-

ed. When normal trade deteriorated, the Crowninshields began

105. Ibid., II. 379.
106. _I_Qi_d_., II, 385.
107. I_i;i_d_., II, 383.
108. E. F. Heckscher, Continental S stem, p. 103.

109. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, May 16, 1799.

43.

casting about for new trading areas. Russian hemp, duck and
iron bars became the topics for Crowninshield letters. The
American market proved difficult; Russian goods were one'of the
few areas in which the Crowninshields were unsuccessful. One
load of Russian duck was sent to Philadelphia late in 1799.110
When no market was available there it was sent on to Baltimore,
where the situation proved to be no better. Their agent in
Baltimore reported that there was no hope of selling it at a
profit.111 Although these goods could be acquired without in-
curring the wrath of either of the major belligerent powers,
their availability apparently made demand so small that no pro-
fits could be made.

By late 1799 the Crowninshields talked in terms of what
they should do with tremendous supplies of goods they had
stored in America. They recognized the dangers inherent in
the European trade, although Pdcnard did talk of sending a
ship to Gibralter loaded with native American preducts, or

Havana sugars.112 George Jr. spoke of shipping sugar and small

 

110. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Thomas Phippen to John
Crowninshield, Philadelphia, Nov. 29, 1799. Also Thomas
Phippen to John Crowninshield, Philadelphia, Dec. 5. 1799.

111. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Henry Payson to John Grown-
inshield, Baltimore, Dec. 10, 1799. Also Henry Payson to
John Crowninshield, Baltimore, Dec. 27, 1799.

112. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 13, 1799.

44.

arms and avoiding risks.113 George Sr., fretted that they had
overexpanded, they had too many ships and he worried about a
note due in New York.ll4 The underwriting business, in which
Richard was interested, was also dull.115

Whether from luck or good judgment in the dangerous ship-
ping trade of the three previous years, the Crowninshield fam-
ily at the turn of the century was in a position where it could
weather the hard times caused by the Quasi-War with France. It
had large supplies of goods on hand which would serve to con--
tinue its progress on the road to wealth and prominence in
Anerican commerce once the American-French troubles were solved.
With the signing of the treaty between the two countries in
1800, the Crowninshield fortunes were such that they could en-
ter a new surge of prosperity.

Considerable change had been made in the activities of
the Crowninshi eld brothers during the last three years of the
century, and the tone of the later letters revealed this. The
change was the result of added wealth and the strengthened
position that came with it. Between 1792 and 1799 the cor-

respondence among the family members was continuously on

 

113. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George, Jr., to John Crown-
inshield, Salem, Nov. 14, 1799.

114. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to John Crown-
inshield, Salem, Nov. 30. 1799.

115. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Dec. 30, 1799.

45.

business matters, but in the latter year the eagerness and
anticipation of the early period had been replaced by a.con-
sciousness of power and position. In 1792 they talked of cash
profits on individual ventures. By 1799 their comments were
limited to cautious statements about the care they need take
to guard their fconsiderable property? and avoid overeXpansion.
In 1792 they acknowledged the hostility of Salem's better class
and talked of Salem's surprise that they were doing so well;

in 1799 they were not concerned with proving their success, al-
though they still received pleasure in excelling Federalist
vessels. -

By 1799 the Crowninshield brothers had retired from act-
ive sailing. Jacob,,George, and Benjamin were in Salem hane~
dling the family's merchandizing affairs there. Richard was
involved in the insurance underwriting business and traveled
a great deal between Salem and New York. John handled Crown-
inshield affairs from the office of the New York merchant firm
of Bailey and Bogert. When the Belisarius put to sea in late
1799, she went under a Captain Skerry rather than under one of
the brothers. No longer was there talk among the brothers of
pride in "privet adventures." They talked in terms of sending
a load of sugar or hides or meat or fish to this or that mar-
ket. They still worked long and hard at the business of run-
ning a commercial enterprise, but their work was done from

the counting table rather than from the deck of their ships.

46,

Too they had branched out into new areas of endeavor, from
Richard's interest in insurance to Jacob's advancing part of
the money to found a Jeffersonian paper, the Impartial Register
in Federalist Salem.116 The brothers were all young. George,
Jr., the oldest, was 34 in 1800, while Jacob was 30, John, 29,
Benjamin, 28, and Richard, 26. Their success was one built on
outstanding ability and skill, but it was also built on the
base of a war-induced prosperity which caused American exports
by 1799 to rise to 350 per cent of what they had been in 1792,
This increase of shipping, interrupted by the Quasi-War
situation 1798-1800, built up again during the year 1800-01.
The treaty that had been worked out with the French and which
was signed on September 30, 1801, aided in this development.
The treaty stipulated that "commerce between the parties shall
be free."1r7 Any ships which had been seized but not yet con-
demned were to be returned. As for general shipping, the treaty
left little to be desired so far as the United States was con-
cerned:
It shall be lawful for the citizens of either country to sail
with their ships and merchandise (contraband goods always ex-
cepted) from any port whatever to any port of the enemy of the

other, and to sail and trade with their ships and merchandise,
with perfect security and liberty, from the countries, ports,

 

116. Harriet Silvester Tapley, §§lem Imprints:1768-l82§
A History of the First Fifty Years of Printing in Salem, Mass-
achusetts (Salem, 1927). p. 113. Hereafter cited as Tapley,

Salem Imprints.

117. U, S, Treaties, I, 498.

47.

and places of those who are enemies of both, or of either party,
without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, and to pass
not only directly from the places and ports of the enemy afore-
mentioned to neutral ports and places, but also from one place
belonging to an enemy to another place belonging to an enemy,
whether they be under the jurisdiction of the same Power or
under the several, unless such ports 8g places shall be actual-
ly blockaded, besieged, or invested.1
The treaty provided most favored nation status concerning duties
and treatment of the other's vessels in the other's harbors,
and worked out procedures for handling meetings and exchanges
of papers at sea.119

The effects of the treaty on American shipping in general
and specifically on the Crowninshi elds shipping were stimulat-
ing. American exports, which had dropped from #78, 670,000 in
1798-99 to $70,970,000 in 1799-1800, rose to $94,120,000 in
1800-01.120 The Crowninshields proceeded to sell their goods
that they had'on hand and send out more shipping bound for the
Indies. By this time the pepper trade had attracted the eyes
of the Crowninshields, and with this trade new highs were
reached in profits for each voyage. The Belisarius was sent

out to the island of Sumatra after pepper in November of 1800,121

 

118. Ibid., I, 500.

119. The entire Treaty may be found in Ibid., 1, 496-505.
For a discussion of the negotiations which preceded this con-
vention see E. W. Lyon, "The Franco-American Convention of 1800",
Journal of Modern History, XII (June, 1940), pp. 305-33.

120. E. F. Heckscher, Continental S tem, p. 103.

121. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield & Co.
to T. K. Jones, Salem, July 28, 1801.

48.

and the largest of the Crowninshield boats, the America, fol-

122 The flurry of pepper trading

lowed her out early in 1801.
continued through 1801, the America being sent out again late
in that year after returning with (840,000 pounds of the spice
in November.123 Under the leadership of Jacob Crowninshi eld
the firm of George Crowninshield and Sons arranged to ship
their pepper to European markets on other ships, paying the
captain a cash price and a percentage on sales for the trip.
The “tent to which the French treaty had eliminated sea dan-
gers is shown by the fact that insurance on a November, 1801,
cargo to Europe was 3 per cent.124

I The year 1801 ended on a prosperous but cautious note for
the crowninshields. Jacob wrote of profits received from stock
held in the Salem Marine Indies Company. The dividend paid
for the six months ending. at that time amounted to 16 per cent,
although they "proposed .20 which could have been done, but it
was thought beet not to go too fast, however they plan to div-
ide upward of 20 7% for the ensueing half year."l,25 The caution

came from the news in Salem in November of 1801 that peace had

 

122. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield 8c Sons
to T. K. Jones, Salem, July 28, 1801.

123. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indieg, p. 246.

124. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Nov. 13, 1801.

125. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Growninshield to N.
Silsbee, Salem, Dec. 8, 1801.

48.

and the largest of the Crowninshield boats, the America, fol-
lowed her out early in 1801.122 The flurry of pepper trading
continued through 1801, the America being sent out again late
in that year after returning with (840,000 pounds of the spice
in November.123 Under the leadership of Jacob Crowninshi eld
the firm of George Crowninshield and Sons arranged to ship
their pepper to European markets on other ships, paying the
captain a cash price and a percentage on sales for the trip.
The ettent to which the French treaty had eliminated sea dan-
gers is shown by the fact that insurance on a November, 1801,
cargo to Europe was 3 per cent.124

The year 1801 ended on a prosperous but cautious note for
the Crowninshields. Jacob wrote of profits received from stock
held in the Salem Marine Indies Company. The dividend paid .
for the six months ending at that time amounted to 16 per cent,
although they "proposed .20 which could have been done, but it
was thought best not to go too fast, however they plan to div-
ide upward of 20 % for the ensueing half year."]'.25 The caution

came from the news in Salem in November of 1801 that peace had

 

122. El, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield & Sons
to T. K. Jones, Salem, July 28, 1801.

123. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 246.

124. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Nov. 13, 1801.

125. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to N.
Silsbee, Salem, Dec. 8, 1801.

49.

come on the continent.

The Peace of Amiens was not a satisfactory peace in the
eyes of Great Britain. She had restored the colonial possess-
ions which she had taken from France and her allies, Ceylon
and Trinidad excepted, while the major French concession had
been the abandonment of Naples. France also was to evacuate

Taranto and the Papal States. A major aim of Great Britain,
trade with Frenchpcontrolled or French territory, was not ac-
corded in the pact. British merchandise was not to be imported
or sold throughout the territory of the French Republic, and
British merchants were displeased with the refusal of France
to change this policy. '

As for Napoleon, his boundless ambition probably made
any peace other than an absolute surrender a temporary thing.
He continued to extend his influence throughout the countries
not yet under his wing, and, especially in Spain and Portugal,
to force British goods and British influence from those coun-
tries. Napoleon's contempt for Amiens was continuous and com-
plete. During the time of negotiation and in the peace that
followed he sent an eXpedition to India which aimed at destroy-

126

ing British control there. The rupture of the peace of

Amdens was termed "inevitable" by Linglebach in his article

 

126. W. M Sloane, "Napoleon's Plans for a Colonial
System," American Historical Review, IV (1899). 439-55.

50.

discussing commercial aspects of the Anglo-French struggle.127

Amiens remained an uneasy truce during the fourteen months that

elapsed between the exchange of ratifications and the outbreak

of the new war in 1803.128

In America the peace implied the ending of the war-brought
shipping boom. Recognizing this, Jacob Crowninshi eld took a
practical view of the peace. He wrote his brother Richard:

we repub' heartily rejoice at it, many how'r will suffer, It
now behoves us to look about us, sell all wecan to ood men,
buy as little as possible in order to lessen our payments for"
money will soon become scarce. The banks will check a many
speculators will be ruined Lookout in N if; it will bear hard
on most people there; take care who y u trust & demd endorsers
or cash. We hope you have M bo (light the schooner. if you
have, send her to Salem & we will fit her out to Europe to car-
ry our goods as we expect now to be obliged to export more pep-
per Freights will fall; Russia goods, ship, beef, pork flour
but we hope Pepper will not. Get all the hard dollars possible;
if you can secure 50,0003 so much the better, Take all they'll
give you. We shall wantthem. Hope you have got the notes .
discounted there; draw on us for as little as possible as at as
long a sight as you conveniently can. It is a very important
crisis in the commercial 8c political world We are safe, altho
I could wish we had sold more. B no more vessel , for they 11
fall greatly. We'll let the America go to Sumatra one more
voyage if we can get Dollars - - - As the America is the larg-
est ship she ought to go first.129

Later Jacob wrote to Richard that many individuals faced ruin

because of the peace, especially those who had speculated in

 

127. W. E. Linglebach, "Hi storical Investigation and the
Commercial Hi sto of the Napoleonic Era," American Historical
Revi w, XIX (1914 s 259. .

128. Ward, Leathes, Prothero, eds., The Cambridge Modern
Histo , Ix (Napoleon). 75-80. This chapter is by Anton Guilland.
Hereafter cited as Ward, etc., Cambridge Histggz.

129. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Nov. 16, 1801.

1"

51.

beef and flour and also those who had bought large quantities
of Russian goods. Shipbuilders who had new ships for sale saw
the price of these ships out drastically almost overnight.130
As for the prospects of peace harming the Crowninshi elds,
they were not too despondent, at least so far as a letter appar-
ently sent to one of their selling houses would indicate. They
commented that the peace would not cut the price of pepper, ' and
so "we would not have you sell it except for approved endorsed
notes or for cash which in these uncertain times we should pre-
ffer to any notes.". However great care should be taken by the
dealer to select dependable merchants to buy Crowninshi eld

131 A letter written two weeks later indicated

goods on credit.
more clearly the dependence of American commerce on the contin-
uation of the war in Europe. The Crowninshields questioned
Thomas K. Jones, their Boston merchant, as to the sale of some
Silk handkerchiefs, and wanted information about whether there
was any demand for pepper; "can you dispose of any greater quan-

tity to safe men.“132 Upon‘receiving a negative answer to these

questions, they decided to ship five boxes of handkerchi efs

 

130. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Nov. 17, 1801.

131. E1, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield and Sons
t0 ‘ " ", Salem, NOV. 20, 18010

132. El, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield and Sons
to T. K. Jones, Salem, Dec. 2, 1801.

52.

south on an American coaster, to check prices along the Amer-
ican markets; if no better price could be obtained they would
keep the handkerchiefs.

While writing to each other, the Crowninshields were less
optimistic about their prospects, although there was no indi-
cation of panic or fear for their firm's stability. Richard
had bought a ship in New York just before the news of the war
arrived, and Jacob wrote that he foresaw a loss of $2,000 on
this transaction as the price of ships had fallen that much,
or would shortly do so.133 Later he told of the several fail-
ures which had occurred in Boston, and that many more would
undoubtedly follow. He told. of a cargo of gum which sold at
8.15 L in Liverpool that would have brought 14 L before the
peace, but then added. “The Peace effected it as I eXpected
nearly one half, but this we must keep to ourselves." He went
on to. comment that flour sales were dull in Salem and that
wages were remaining high.134 Early in January of 1802, the
Ship Ulysseg arrived at Salem from Muscat, carrying coffee,

 

133. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Nov. 21, 1801. This vessel was originally called the
J0hn.ng. That name was an anathema to the Crowninshield family
an in the renaming of the boat Jacob said they could call her
anything other than the John Jay. He once suggested Jefferson
but finally settled on Telemachus; the source of the Crownin-
shield's interest in things Greek and Roman indicated by the
names Telemachus, Belisarius, Ulysses and Brutus in not evident
from their writings.

134. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 11, 1801.

53.

gum arabic, senna leaf, aloes, salt petre, elephants "teath"
(tusks?) and several types of medicine. Jacob thought the .
profits on the ship's cargo would run as high as $30,000, al-
though rumors in Salem had the firm making $100,000 on the
trip. Some of the articles would yield a profit of 600 to
800 per cent.135

In late February of 1802 the Crowninshield firm experi-
enced one of those misfortunes which made sea commerce danger-
ous. Two of their ships, the Brutus and the Ulysses went
aground and broke up off Cape Cod in a storm.1364 Both ships
were insured and the cargoes were partially saved.‘ Crownin-
shield merchandi zing ability is indicated in their handling
of the sale of salvaged goods from these wrecked ships. At
an auction held in Salem, Jacob told John, if their damaged
goods sold over the expected prices they helped them along;
if they sold under expectations, they bought them.137

Although United States eXports dropped from $94,120,000
to 872,480,000138 in the year following the peace at Amiens,
there is little indication of actual discomfort or even loss~

 

135. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
Shield, Salem, Jane 5, 1802.

136. El, Crowninshield Ms., Unsigned to Dear Brothers,
No address, Mar. 1802.

137. El, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 3, 1802.

138. E. F. Heckscher, Continental System, p. 103.

54.

on the part of the Crowninshi elds. Despite their loss on the
two wrecked ships, they continued to-report heavy profits -
Benjamin Crowninshield (a cousin) in one of their ships at
the Isle of France was reported as making 317,000 profit on
his voyage.139 A pepper ship brought in "6 or 7000 [(101181‘83."
more than they eXpected.140 Other letters by the brothers
told of profits made on goods from the area of the East Indies.l4l
In May of 1802, Jacob spoke of pepper returning 200, per cent
profitfim2 and sizeable cargoes of pepper were coming from
the Indian Ocean area. When the Beli sariug arrived in Salem
in July of 1802 with a load of pepper, Jacob reckoned the profit
to the Crowninshields at $25,000.1113

Cheapened insurance rates tended to make shipping a more
acceptable occupation during the times of peace. Contrasted
with the 20 to 40 per cent that had been charged during the
Quasi-War period, the Crowninshields in May of 1802 insured
their ships that traveled to the East Indies at from 7% to

9 per cent and their one ship that was in the European trade

 

139. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Mar. 3, 1802.

140. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crownin-

shi eld, Sal em,

141. El,
shield, Salem,

142. EI,
Salem, May 14,

143. PM,
shi eld, Sal em,

Apr. 21, 18020

Crowninshi eld Ms. ,

Apr. 22, 1802.

Crowninshi eld Ms. ,

1802.

Crowninshi eld Ms. ,

July 13, 1802.

Richard to John Crownin-

Jacob to John Crowninshield,

Jacob to Richard Crownin-

55.

at 5 per cent.144 The policies were more lenient also. Where-
as during more dangerous times the vessels had been carefully
restricted as to what ports were to be visited, the 1802 pol-
icies read, "From Salem (& New York) to one or more ports
Islands a places situated to the EaStward of the Cape of Good
Hope one or more times 8: at 8: from them or other of them to
the port of discharge in the U. States, with full liberty to
touch & trade at any ports on the outward & home voyage."145
Arguments which frequently cropped up concerning deviations
from expected routes were avoided in this sort of contract.
Insurance rates continued to drop during the year 1802, and
by December of that year Jacob wrote of buying $22,000 insur-
ance at 3 per cent and said that they had been offered $20,000
more (on cargoes valued at $60,000) at 4 per cent. Here as
later the Crowninshields were inclined to insure as little as
possible, and hope for the best.146

During the late summer and autumn of 1802 the full impact
of peace seemed to hit the Crowninshields. A falling off of
the pepper trade was indicated in a letter received from a

Newport merchant in August of 1802, which said that "prospects

 

144. El, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, May 5, 1802.

145. El, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, May 5, 18020

146. 'PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 4, 1802 and Salem, Jan. 13, 1803.

56.

to Sumatra, are certainly dull but am in hopes, it will ter-
minate better. than we at present eXpect -- at any rate the
Bay of Benjou 8c Arabian Sea is before us -- So there we can
seek our fortunes."14’7 December 1802 brought the news from
Gibralter that "coffee, Sugar<& pepper have fallen consider-
ably in both Italy a France owing to the large quantity sent

"148

from your Quarter. Likewise, pepper prices in Holland

were reported as being very low.149 Despite these reports,
the Crowninshields continued to send boats into the Indian
Ocean for cargoes, preferring to emphaci ze the sinking Indies
trade to that with a Europe no longer engaged in war. '

Less tangible, but none the less effective, indications
that American shipping was no longer holding its favored
position as a much needed neutral carrier appeared during
this time. William Fairfield, a Crowninshi eld captain, re-
ported back that American vessels stopping at Cadiz had to
\mdergo a forty day period of quarantine, except those from

Philadelphia which were not admitted.150 A similar situation

 

147. El, Crowninshield Ms., John Bort to John Crownin-
shield, Newport, Aug. 23, 1802.

148. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Anderson a Go to George
Crowninshield 8: Sons, Gibralter, Dec. 4, 1802.

149. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-

150. PM, Crowninshi eld Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Jan. 22, 1803 and Wm. Fairfiéld to George
Crowninshield 8: Sons, Gibralter, Dec. 5, 1802.

57.

prevailed at Bordeaux, except the period of quarantine was only
thirty days. AJohn Crowninshield's influence in Pordeaux at
this time resulted in the quarantine there being- reduced to
twelve151 and then to eight days,152 but the principle of
rather eXtended quarantine persisted.

During the month of February of 1803, two Crowninshi eld
cargoes in European harbors were reported as being of such
inferior quality that they had to be dumped or sold at con-
siderable loss. A shipment of gum arabic and "assafaetida"
sent to Havre on the Four Sisterg was reported to John at _
Bordeaux as being of Such poor quality that heavy losses
occurred.153 A cargo of pepper sent to Holland was reported
as damaged by having the bags broken open, yet the firm han-
dling the goods for the Crowninshields did not bother to send
proofs to Salem so they could collect their insurance.l54
Likewise, in February of 1803, Captain Fairfield, having sold
a cargo at Gibraltar, was ordered to load his ship with bal-

last for the return trip to the United States, rather than

 

151. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Stroebel 8c Iiiartini to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Feb. 1, 1803.

152. El, Crowninshield Ms., Stroe‘oel & Martini to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Feb. 1, 1803.

153. El, Crowninshield Ms., Hotinger & Co. to John Crown-
inshield, Havre, Feb. 28, 1503.

154. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Feb. 24, 1803.

58.

pick up a cargo.155 While this could have been an isolated
occurrence, and if so of no significance, in the picture of
the times it indicates unfavorable trading conditions. The
Crowninshields had not become moderately wealthy during the
ten years prior to 1803 by carrying ballast, and ballast has
never been noteworthy as a money-making cargo. Similarly,
during the scarcities of war years, the continental merchants
did not indicate such fussiness over cargo quality as these
episodes evidence.

The Peace of Amiens was a brief interruption of hostil-
ities'rather than a full-fledged peace in the general sense
of the word. Relations between France and Great Britain were
strained throughout the eighteen months of peace, and the ten-
sion increased noticeably during the spring of 1803, just be-
fore the renewal of the war. The markets of Europe in March,
April and May of 1803 reflected this uneasiness. An Amsterdam
connection wrote John Crowninshield in March that "Owing to
the late news from England colonial produce are kept on hand
or at least only disposed of at very high prices."156 In
April a French firm (Havre) refused to make any advance to
John Crowninshield for goods "unless the objects . . . were

in our hands." They feared the outbreak of war and unless the

 

155. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Feb. 3, 1803.

156. El, Crowninshield Ms., Wid E. Croeses to John
Crowninshield, Amsterdam, Mar. 17, 1803.

59.

goods were delivered they could not risk payment as their port
would be closed in short order by the British in the event of
war. The same trouble was hinted at as eXisting in Bordeaux.157
In April John, in France, saw war as a probable occurrence and
although he hoped that it would not come he did acknowledge
that "should it be war here in Europe . . . do all our ships
that are after pepper get loaded we shall I think make good
voyages."o158 With that prospect, merchants tended to hold
goods to wait for price increases which seemed sure to come with
the renewal of the conflict.

John Crowninshield had gone to France, sailing December
23, 1802, to take care of the firm's-business there.- He had
taken the huge ship America to that country with rather indef-
inite plans, which included selling her if he could acquire a
price he considered acceptable, although Jacob did not think
that probable.159 From the tone of the letters that passed

between John and other firm members they eXpected him to return

 

157. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Hotinger & Co. to John Crown-
inshield, Havre, Apr. 2, 1803.

158. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshield &
Sons, Bordeaux, Apr. 21, 1803.

159. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 4, 1802, and Dec. 23, 1802. The America,
rated at 654 tons, was too large for colonial trade and too
large for Salem harbon'according to J. D. Phillips, she may
have been bought to sell to the government in 1798. Hence,
if a good market appeared, the Crowninshields were willing to
sell. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 134 and p. 252.

60.

to America shortly. First because of illness and later be-
cause of an inclination of his own to do so, John stayed on
in France until June of 1805, providing the Crowninshields
with the advantage of having a representative at the source
of continental commercial problems. This advantage was some-
what nullified, once war broke out. John's French residence
caused Great Britain to be suspicious of Crowninshield ship-
ping.

John's major problem consisted of selling Crowninshield
goods that were located in France and then in getting the money
for those goods out of the country. He was successful beyond
the highest hopes of the family in the projected sale of the
America. This ship was over 550 tons burden as compared with
she'srainaay 300 to 400 tons. John thought he might possibly
receive between $7,000 and $15,000 for her; he got $27,000 or
$28,000. He thought the French wanted to make a privateer of
her.l50 '

While in France John saw some firsthand evidence of the
type of activity the French were to Practice so effectively
later. He received a note from a William Savage of Bordeaux
telling of a fracas which had occurred at sea between a French
ketch and the American brig,N§ggy, The French ship had taken
ivory and gold dust from the brig. Savage informed John that

.160. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, May 7, 1803.

61.

if he wanted to contact the owners of the cargo they should be
advised that a friend of Savageh could recover one-half the
value of it for them. Savage, acting as a go-between, would
only require 5 per cent commission on the 50 per cent recovered
by the owners. John wrote the owners that he would advise them
to comply with the request as their only hope of recovering any
of the cargo, valued at 30,000 L to 40,000 L.161 Ill-disguised
blackmail combined with robbery similar to this appeared often
during the trying period of 1809 to 1811, when the operation

of the Continental System was at its height. It was indicative
of the tension that SXisted during the Amiens truce when action
of this type was so acknowledged by a ship owner as to provide
liaison for the robbers.

A second problem that arose for John revealed the unhealthy
international situation (resulting from the impending renewal
of war) that existed between France and England, as well as a
problem for neutrals. John had inquired of his London represent-
ative of the possibility of British seizure if he should pur-
chase a condemned British prize while in France. He figured
that this sort of action was necessary to get the money he had
acquired from the sale of goods out of France. He received the
following answer.

As you have friends in France I see no difficulty in your pur-
chasing Prize Ships in order to get your money out of that

 

161. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Savage to John Crownin-
shield, London, far. 1803.

62.

Country. Prize English ships bought with your own funds, with
an authentic copy of condemnation, Bill of Sale, & such a cer—
tificate of property as the Anerican Council can give you on
board, may be sent from France to America, thru neutral ports,
or England, with little or no risk. With such papers only it
would not be prudent to think to perform more than one voyage.
From France to either of those countries they might be insured
at 5 to 7 pct. Our vessels with French property on board are
you {ggw liable to detention & the French goods to confisca-
tion _

During times of 'peace', the two antagonistic powers persisted
in detaining neutral vessels for carrying the goods of the other
and even confiscating the vessels of the other.

For the neutral carrier during these times of 'peace' the
problems were great. Strict regulations governed removal of
money from belligerently peaceful France. 'Uessels for sale in
France, at prices favorable to the "neutral", might well be
taken by Great Britain as illegally seized British property.
British vessels were being seized in France; it seems highly
unlikely that British property would be welcomed where British
ships were confiscated. The Amiens break in the war between
the two Goliaths of Europe saw the American "neutral" in a
position where he had most of the competition and controls of
peacetime shipping with few of the compensation safety factors.
The war which broke out again on May 16, 1803, could hardly be
looked upon by the Americans as anything other than a blessing,
howevermuch they acknowledged the attending evils the war would

bring to Europe.

 

162. El, Crowninshield Ms., Samuel Williams to John
Crowninshield, London, Mar. 1803.

63‘.

The ten years between 1793 and 1803 had seen tremendous
changes in the position of the Crowninshields. In 1793 they
had owned three small schooners engaged primarily in West
Indies trade; in 1803 they owned several large ships that
travelled wherever traders went and were in a position to em-
bark on an expansion period that would eclipse any of their
previous accomplishments. In 1793 they appeared to be no more
significant in the United States than other families of capable
ship captains may have been; in 1803 they were recognized lead-
ers of the Jeffersonian element of Salem.and.on3of the brothers,
Jacob, was a member of the national House of Representatives.
Their commercial prosperity was no hollow thing. They had lost,
by shipwreck, in one storm considerably more shipping (in ton-
nage) than they had.possessed in 1793. and had emerged damaged,
but with no threat of bankruptcy. The Crowninshields had be-
come rich and influential in those ten years.

The acquisition of such wealth and influence naturally re-
quired conditions conducive to such activity. The conditions
developed from the spur given to American trade by European
affairs. At the beginning of the Wars of the French Revolu-
tion American traders took over the major portion of the French
and Dutch colonial trade. Gradually this extension of American
trade included much of the British carrying trade as well. Un-
der these circumstances, the increase of Crowninshield fortunes

coincided with an increase in American mercantile activity. In

64.

the area of re-exported goods especially, American trade climbed
to new highs by the year 1801. The overall increase, too, was
remarkable. I

As this commercial activity was brought on by affairs in
Europe, they continued to exert a dominant influence on it.
When French seizures mounted in the Quasi-War period as the Di-
rectory tried to retaliate against Great Britain through the"
American trader, American trade slowed its increase and finally
showed a decrease in tonnage. Ending of hostilities at Amiens
had a,like influence, and in early 1803 the pinch of the cut-
ting down of continental trade occasioned by that peace was
being felt in America. Under the capable leadership of Jacob
Crowninshield, the family merchant firm watched Europe eXpect-
antly in the first months of 1803 to see if the continent would
renew the stimulation it had afforded American commerce for

most of the previous decade.

65.A

EXPORT TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES - 1790-1817
. (in dollars)

Foreign exports

Domestic exports
(re-exports)

Total exports

1790 19,670,000 540,000 20,210,000
1791 18,500,000 510,000 19,010,000
1792 19,000,000 1,750,000 20,750,000
1793 24I 000, 000 2,110,000 26,110,000
1794 26I 500, 000 6,530,000 33,030,000
1795 39 500,000 8,490,000 47,990,000
1796 40,760,000 26,300,000 67,060,000
1797 29,850,000 27, 000,000 56,850,000
1798 28I 530, 000 33, 000,000 61,530,000
1799 33, I140, 000 45, 520,000 78,670,000
1800 31, 840I 000 39,130, 000 70, 970,000
1801 47: 470, 000 46, 640, 000 94,120, 000
1802 36I 710, 000 35I 7oo, ooo 72I480I 000
1803 42I210I ooo 13I590I000 55,800,000
1804 41, 470,000 36,230,000 77,700,000
1805 42I 390, 000 53,180,000 95. 570, 000
1806 41I25o,000 60, 280I 000 101, 540,000
1807 48I700, 000 59, I640I 000 108I 340, 000
1808 9, 430, 000 13,000,000 22,430,000
1809 1, 410I 000 20I800I000 52, 200,000
1810 2I 370, 000 24,390,000 66I760I000
1811 45I 290, 000 16,020,000 6L 320,000
1812 30,030,000 8,500,000 38I 530, 000
1813 25I010I000 2,850,000 27I86o, 000
1814 6,780,000 150,000 6, 930,000
' 1815 45,970,000 6,580,000 52I560Iooo
1816 64,780,000 17,140,000 81,920,000
1817 68,310,000 19,360,000 87,670,000

These figures are taken from E. F. Heckschen,Continenta1
S stem, pp. 103 and 146.

 

'.

65.8

D TORT TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES - 1790-1817
. . (in dollars)

Home-used Imports Total Imports

1790 22,460,000 23,000,000
1791 28, I690, I000 29, 200, I000
1792 29,750,000 31I500I000
1793 28I990I000 31,100,000
1794 28,070,000 34,600,000
1795 61, 0,000 69,760,000
1796 55,1 ,000 81,440,000
1797 48I 380I 000 75,380,000
1798 35, 550,000 68,550,000
1799 33,550,000 69,070,000
1800 52,120,000 91,250,000
1801 64, 720,000 111,360,000
1802 4oI 560, 000 76,330,000
1803 51,070,000 64,670,000
1804 48:770, 000 85.000,000
1805 67, 420,000 120,600,000
1806 69,130,000 129,410,000
1807 78I860I000 138, 500,000
1808 4L 990,000 56, 99L 000
1809 38, 600,000 59I400I 000
1810 61, 01L 000 85,400, 000
1811 37, 380,000 53,400,000
1812 68I 540I 000 77,030,000
1813 19, I160, 000 22,010,000
1814 12, 820,000 12I970, 000
1815 106I 46oI 000 113,040,000
1816 129, I960I 000 147,100,000
1817 79I890I000 99I250I000

These figures are taken from E. F. Heckscher, Continental
S stem, pp. 103 and 146.

66.

Chapter III

THE SPOIL OF BATTLE - EUROPE NOURISHES THE CRDWKINSHIELDS
. 1803 - 1807 t .. - . __
The opening month of the new war in Europe, May 1803,

foundthe home firm of George Crowninshi eld and Sons carrying
on its usual activities, and expanding its fleet on the pros-
pects of war arriving. The Telemachu_g came to Salem in early
May with a cargo of gum arabiIc, and although Jacob saw small
profits on that he wanted her unloaded in a hurry and sent
back to the virgin island she had stumbled on by accident for
more of the same.1 At the same time he warned Richard that
the outbreak of war would probably break some New York mer-
chants and that Richard should be careful with whom he dealt.2
fichard had become convinced that the Arabian trade was val-
uable and thought it advisable for the firm to send the gum
arabic to Europe on one vessel and send the others out to
Arabic. and Sumatra.3 Another letter complained of losses

sustained on same pepper sold without the firm's consent at

 

1. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 2, 1803.

2. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacobto Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 6, 18030

3. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, May 8, 1803.

67.

Amsterdam.4

An indication of the problems of American shipping also
is evidenced by the presence of Russian goods in the plans and
problems of the Crowninshields. As in 1799, Russian goods seem
to have been handled by the firm only during periods when other
markets failed, because of excessive dangers or else the ex-
cessive competition of peace. In May of 1803, Jacob indicated
that the Russian duck was much in demand, probably because of
the expansion brought by prospective war in Europe.5

Jacob continued to regard the outbreak of war as a favor-
able business factor. He wrote Richard in this light, "The
affair of Peace or war will be determined in a day or two, all
are anxious. many however dread it. for my part I shall re-
gret its taking place, still as individuals I think we may turn
it to our advantage, but its effects will‘be' dreadful upon Eur-
ope."~6 On May 24 the Crowninshields bought the ship W

7

at a-Salem auction for $12,750. The Telemachu_s_ was loaded for

 

4. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Richard Crowninshield to S.
Williams, New York, May 15, 1803.

5. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 20,1803 and May 23, 1803.

6. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,

7. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May. 21+, 1803. The antipathy betweal Salemites and the
Crowninshi elds is fully indicated by the account of their pur-
chasing the Margaret. Jacob wrote, "The ship Margaret was sold

68.

the Isle of France at the end of May and. sent out with orders
to procure coffee. However if the price were favorable, the
Captain, Fairfield, had permission to sell the vessel at the
island. hikem se Jacob made plans for possible sale of the
Margaret at the Isle of France "if 25 or 35,000$ is offered
for her." This money, in turn, ”could then be used to buy a
larger vessel.8 The Crowninshi elds did not want war, but were
not averse to using it to their own profit, and their expan-
sion in the spring pointed toward their being able to do Just
that.

The renewal of the European conflict on May 16, 1803 did
not catch the Crowninshield firm by surprise; its members had
been eXpecting a break for so long that it came as a sort of
anti-climax. They had been conducting their affairs through-
out the month of May as though the war had actually been de-
clared, and their actions were not groundless. With the end-
ing of the Amiens peace, the family began pushing its economic
activity to an even greater extent. John sent a note from

Bordeaux to "any Crowninshield captain at Havre" directing him

 

at auction this forenoon for 12750 dolls 3 & 6 months Credit,
and we were the purchasers. she is a fine vessel & extremely
well found. the copper is good.& she has nearly two suits of
sails. we got Cpt. White to bid for us & only George attended
the sale, taking care to go late. I believe none thought we
were the buyers, till the sale was over, or we might have paid
a thousand dollars more. we had limited Cpt. White to 13,500 &
George had orders to make a private signal for 500 more.

8. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 30, 1803.

69.

to not sell any cargo, especially gums and pepper, until they
heard from him, as prices were climbing steadily in Bordeaux.9
A report to John from his Amsterdam merchant indicated that
coffee and pepper prices were soaring there, with ”demand in-
creasing every day." At the same time, however, the merchant
reported rumors of vessels being captured. He said that in-
surance rates had gone up to between 8 and 10 per cent, al-
though he thought they would drop to 6 or 7 per cent with time.10
The prestige of the Crowninshields had been improved by
the election of Jacob to the House of Representatives in the
November elections of the year of 1802. Jacob had run against

former Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, and in a hotly con-

11 From

tested election had defeated that prominent Federalist.
1803 until his death in 1808 Jacob sat in the United States
Congress as a Salem Republican, and with time became a promi-
nent adviser to Jefferson and Madi son on naval and especially
merchant marine affairs. Throughout this time, he continued
to dominate the activities of the Crowninshield firm.
John's letters to Salem from France give further the

tenor of the family firm's feeling regarding their business.

He wrote for them to rush trade to India and to the African

 

9. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to any Crown-
inshield Captain at Havre, BordeauX, June 11, 1803.

10. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Wid E. Croese to Jehn Crownin-
shield, Amsterdam, June 16, 1803.

11. Salem Gazette, Nov. 2, 1302.

70-

coffee producing areas along the Red Sea. He said that they
should have bought the Margaret (which they had bought) and the
gala (which they had not), and urged constant increases in busi-
ness ventures}-2 Later letters continued in that same vein,
"Remember you cannot make too much money this war -- drive the
India trade hard."_13 and "Remember that gums sold in France
last war at 608".I4 I I V A‘.

Activity in Salem followed the pattern that John sug-
gested. Jacob had already sent out $100,000 worth of property
by the time John had sent these bits of advice. Jacob correct-
ly estimated‘the sentiment of the belligerents also by sending
out all Crowninshi eld ships in the early period without the
high priced insurance. He reasoned this way. "I do not think
the belligerent nations will at first capture out vessels. our
flag will be more respected than last war, & if it is not we
must [makeJit so & a great deal will depend upon our Gov't
assuming [a] decided tone upon the first attack of our neu-

tral rights.15 The gamble paid off and all of the Crowninshield

 

12. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshi eld &
Co., Bordeaux, June 29, 1803.

13. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshield &
COO, Pan 8, July 13, 1803.

14. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John to George Crowninshield &
Co., Paris, July 21, 1803.

15. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,

71.

ships coipleted their voyages successfully, and avoided the in-
creased insurance rates that had resulted from the declaration
of war. Jacob‘s appraisal of the situation proved to be remark-
ably accurate.‘ Eli F. Heckscher, probably the most renowned

student of the Continental System, observes that "Especially
during the first years after the new outbreak of war in 1803

the treatment of'the neutrals, both Americans and Danes, was

unusually mild.and their shipping was little disturbed."l6

However, profitable commerce flor the optimistic American mer-
chants was to be by no means easy and smooth.

In the enthusiasm of looking for new profits with the out-
break of the war, the Crowninshields eXpanded considerably.
John inquired again shortly after the declaration of war of
the possibilities of British action against a ship purchased
from France. He received this qualified negative answer.

The purchase of an Enemy's Vessel in time of War is liable to
great suspicion. Should the Vessel be sent in for trial you
would most probably be called upon to show whence arose the
funds to purchase the Vessel Cargo. If it appeared that
they were advanced by S & M Strobel and Martini, the French
merchants through whom the Crowninshields dealt; a that you
had furnished the business which brought you to France, the
Court might, I apprehend, consider it as a French transaction;
but if they arose from the Proceeds of the America cargo which
you were withdrawing from France, there would be little doubt
of restitution.

 

16. E. F. Heckscher, Continental S stem, p. 106.

17. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Samuel Williams to John Crown-
inshield, London, June 17, 1803.

72.

The letter closed by warning John that his presence in France
would make any transactions negotiated by him appear suspicious
to an. English court; the possibility of his property being cap-
tured and condemned was much greater under the circumstances.
As a result of this warning, John avoided purchasing any ships
while in France following the outbreak of the war.

Expansion at home was the keynote of the family activity
during the twenty-four month period after the declaration of
war. Under the stimulus of new profit possibilities the Crown-
inshields expanded at the highest rate they were to assume dur-
ing the meteoric career of the firm. Seven vessels, the M
m, the Marar aret, the J_g__hn, the Americ______a_, the Uni__o_n, the Hind,
and the Traveller were registered in the name of one or more
members of the family during that period.]'8 Richard advised
John to buy a ship in Bordeaux and head her himself on the
voyage back to America, but John apparently thought better of
the warning from England and decided not to do so. The Crown-
inshields bought additional wharf space in Salem at the same
time they contracted to have the ship America built.19 They
added a new store to their Salem holdi ngs.2O The reopening

 

18. Salem Ship Registers.

19. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, July 14, 1803.

20. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Nov. 13. 1803.

73.

of the war in Europe found the Crowninshields willing and able
to expand. They recognized that the renewal of the European
struggle was'bound to cause an acceleration of neutral com-
merce, and their expansion came so they could take advantage
of it.

The early results of the war, however, did not indicate
that the Crowninshields had been wise in their gambles on big-
ger and better profits from the expanded commerce. 0n the
continent of Europe, John Crowninshi eld found cash difficult
to obtain; his request for an advance on cargoes from an Am-
sterdam house met the same cool reception that a similar re-
quest had received during the unstable days of the Amiens truce.‘21
Mchard Crowninshield in New York reported that "stores are shut-
ting up - indeed business is bad since the War commenced in
Europa??? Strobel and Martini, the Crowninshield merchant re-
presentative in Bordeaux, reported that business was slow for
them and complained of a dearth of American shipping in the har-
bor.2:5 Even as late as December of 1803, George Sr., complained24
from Salem of the lack of ready cash available for the trade to

 

21. Eli, Crowninshield Ms., Wid E. Croese to John Crownin-
shield, Amsterdam, July 26, 1803.

22. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to George Crowninshield
& Sons, New York, Aug. 2, 1803.

23. El, Crowninshield Ms., Strobel and Martini to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Sept. 30, 1803.

24. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Dec. 3, 1803.

1‘

74.

the Indian area, and from New York Richard wrote that "business
is at a. stand here nothing doing 6 or 700 vessels in port. the
regular ships for E- - -d dont sail, owing to the uncertain
state of affairs in Europe, and if the present state should not
change soon it wiClljbe attended with serious consequences to
some of our large commercial houses who cannot bear to stand
still.".25 The barren outlook indicated by these comments were
temporary however.

A glimmer of the prosperity to come was indicated by re-
ports from Copenhagen in October of 1803 that the cargo of the
Lnd had been sold at high prices, and that prices had gone
still higher there. Gum that the Crowninshields had bought for
speculation purposes had risen in price and "coffee at sugar
stand very high, we made no doubt of the prices keeping up."26
John notified their Copenhagen house the following month that
the firm had had two ships arrive at Salem loaded with pepper
and gums and that some of the cargo would be sent there.27 The
favorable position of the neutral was further indicated by a
notice from the Crowninshi eld's English agent relative to Brit-

ish action as far as goods entering the continent of Europe.

 

25. EI, Crowninshield is., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Dec. 25, 1803.

26. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Riberg & Co. to John Crown-
inshield, Copenhagen, Oct. 25, 1803.

27. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Riberg
& 00., Paris, Nov. 26,1803.

75.

It said, "Pepper from Sumatra may come to Europe in the Same
Ship. - {Pepper or other goods from the enemies colonies in E.
or W. Indies may come from the U. S. here or to any neutral
port in Europe, in the same ship but to an enemy's port in Eur-
ope, it would be prudent to reship the goods in another, to
avoid all suspicion of collusion."_28 Under those circumstances,
the prospects looked bright indeed to the industrious neutral
carrier. Trade to the continent promised to become much better
in the winter of 1803-04.

France itself remained the major exception to the unre-
strained continental bull market which developed. Despite the
arrival of several American ships in France in November of 180329
prospects did not appear as good as elsewhere. The reason for
this was that the French were reluctant to allow. cash to be
taken from the country. The fact that merchants were forced
to take French brandy or wine or glassware for their produce
from the Indies left both American and French traders uncertain
and cautious in their dealings with each other. The firm through
which the Crowninshi elds dealt, Strobel and Martini, was suspect-
ed. by Captain Ward of the Minerva in his dealings with them in
1803,30 and subsequent events bore him out. The same feeling

 

28. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Samuel Williams to George
Crowninshield & Sons, London, Oct. 22, 1803.

29. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Strobel 8c Martini to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Nov. 13, 1803.

30. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. Richard Ward to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Nov. 14, 1803.

76.

was reflected in the actions of the ever-alert Jacob in America,
who had Richard make drafts from New York on the French mer-
chants and advised John to transfer all funds from them to Lon-
don if at all possible.31 The action was sound. Strobel and
Martini went bankrupt early in 1804, while they held consider-
able Crowninshi eld funds. John immediately sent out letters

to representatives of the Crowninshi eld firm in Copenhagen, New
York, Baltimore, Charleston, South Carolina, Norfolk, Virginia,
Philadelphia, Boston and New Orleans asking them to hold any

32 Despite

assets of the French firm for the Crowninshields.
this move, theorowninshields lost between 90,000 and'loo,000
francs because of the collapse of the firm.

The net result of this continuous trouble with the mar-
kets in France was that Jacob began to advise discontinuing
sending cargoes to Europe and concentrating on handling trade
only between the Indies and the United States. Others could
run the risks of loss in continental commerce, the Crownin-

shields would stay with the safer Indian Ocean trade as they
had done in the 1790's. The problem of getting their goods

 

31. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Washington, Dec. 13, 1803.

32. PM, Crowninshield Ms. John Crowninshield to Samuel
Williams, Bordeaux, Jan. 6, 1801!. See also letters dated Jan.
8, 1804, Bordeaux, from John Crowninshield to Riberg and Co. of
Copenhagen, Baily and Bogert of New York, H. Payson of Baltimore,
Jon. Cort of Charleston, S. C., Phinias Dana, Esq., of Norfolk,
Va., J. W. Faussett of Philadelphia, Chew 8: Relf of New Orleans,
and Thomas K. Jones of Boston.

77.

into France free of duty was out of the question, according to
Jacob, and so he advocated selling it in New York at auction.33
Still later in January, Jacob came to the point where he was
willing to trade pepper for a ship if cash were not available.34
The major problem for the merchant following the turn of
the year continued to be the acquisition of dollars in hard
caSh. Jacob, from his vantage point in the Capital in Washing-
ton, indicated that they were obtainable there, and had Richard
come down to get some.35 The bullion shortage continued to
plague the Crowninshields well into 1804. Jacob remarked on
the difficulty of obtaining dollars in a letter.in February.36
By the middle of April, dollars were more scarce in Salem than
they had been for the previous ten years. The dollar shortage
apparently was caused by the restrictions against allowing money
to flow out of European countries, particularly France. Al-
though credit transactions could be handled in America, cash
was carried on the India voyages, and inveterate Indies mer-

chants like the Crowninshields felt the scarcity severely.

 

33. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to ------ ,

34. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Washington, Jan. 30, 1804.

35. PM, Crowninshi eld Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, washington, Jan. 20, 1804.

36. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Washington, Feb. 7, 1804.

Notes were being discounted at between 1 and 2% per cent per
month and dollars were selling at 5 per cent over par and in
one or two cases Jacob had seen them sell as high as 7 per
cent over par.37 Later in April George, Sr. wrote Richard
not to enter into any dealings with unknown merchants and
especially not to draw on the home firm for money.38 In July,
Jacob told John that "business is flourishing as formerly but
money is so scarce the India ships are not numerous."39 With
the Crowninshield firm having a traditional interest in Indian
affairs and with the dollars that made that trade possible
hard to get, much of the correspondence among the family mem-
bers dealt directly with that problem.

The problem of getting money gives the impression that
these were hard times for the Crowninshields, but nothing was
further from being the truth. Occasionally the howls of an-
guish from these merchants indicated dissatisfaction with the
very conditions which were creating the trade which allowed
them to grow wealthy. Despite their fears over shortages of
cash to send to India, their ships continued to go out and re-

turn with valuable cargoes. Richard told John in February,

37. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crownin-
shield, Salem, Apr. 13, 1804.

38. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to Richard
Crowninshield, Salem, Apr. 28, 1804.

39. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, July 10, 1804.

79.

1804, of the arrival of the Margaret and the Telemachu_s_ with
coffee and remarked that coffee was the paying article at that
time. The Crowninshi elds added to their business ventures by
taking 120 shares of stock (twenty each for the six members of
the family) in a new insurance company which set up in Salem.40
Benjamin estimated the profits on the average Indian voyage at
between $30,000 and $40,000, and spoke of the advantages of con-
tinuing that trade.41 The house which represented the Crownin-
shields in Copenhagen sent John word that the cargo of the ship
E92 had brought in $60,000, which was to be paid in Spanish

42

dollars. This cargo, which was made up in America, was said

by Richard to be the poorest they had ever made, the profits not

43

running more than $10,000 or $15,000. Later in the year

half shares on the John and Telemachus cargoes brought in pro-
fits of $20,000, which was considered by Jacob as "a good 4
months jab."44 The year 1804 represented a profitable period

 

40. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Feb. 20, 1804.

41. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Mar. 10, 1804.

42. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Roberg 8: Co., to John Crown-
inshield, Copenhagen, June 19, 1804.

43. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, July 30, 1804.

44. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Washington, Nov. 29, 1804. These same voyages were reported
by Richard to John in a letter dated New York, Nov. 3, 1804,
as netting 330,000 on their coffee for the Crowninshi elds and
$5,000 for Captain Silsbee. EI, Crowninshield Ms.

for the firm of George Crowninshield and Sons.

As may be expected, this profitable period was clouded
by occasional setbacks. The major area of trouble for the
Crowninshields centered around France. French policy at this
time, as well as later, followed the old mercantilist concept
that a favorable balance of trade increased one's national
strength; conversely, flie nation which could not sell its goods
would be forced.into an unfavorable balance of trade and con-
sequently weakened. Their policy during the peace of Amiens
and in the months later aimed at excluding British goods from
France, first by tariffs and after the renewal of war by out-
right prohibition. The penalty for bringing colonial or man-
ufactured goods of British origin into France was confiscation.
Certificates of origin were required of the neutral shipper,
and vessels which had touched at British ports were not admit-
ted to French ports.

Napoleon's system had a positive as well as a negative
side. Tariffs on goods which were imported were subject to
drawbacks if French goods were eXported. Under this arrange-
ment raw cotton paid a tariff for admission. If the carrier
eXported French produced cotton goods, he received a drawback
of five-sixths of his tariff fee. Restrictions against taking
currency from France were related to this desire to maintain

a favorable balance of trade.45 The problem the Crowninshields

 

45. E. F. Heckscher, Continental System, pp. 83-87.

v.

81.

had of getting money out of the country and the loss of pro-
perty occasioned by the failure of the firm of Strobel and Mar-
tini has already been mentioned. After losing heavily there
once the Crowninshields were not anxious to gamble on the
possibility or a repeat performance, so they avoided sending
goods to France whenever they could do so.

The loss of the French markets caused another venture
into the Russian area for goods, with results which.were not
favorable to the Crowninshields. In April of 1804, John wrote
Capt. James Brace of the ship Higg to take his cargo, which
would not sell in Bordeaux, to Copenhagen and.then to proceed
to St. Petersburg for a return cargo to New York.46 Two months
later Captain Brace reported back that he had been to Russia
and gotten a cargo of hemp and iron, but not enough for a full
load. He wrote that there had been a large number of American
ships in Russia.and that imports were cheap and.exports were
dear. He closed with the warning prophecy, "I do expect them
goods will not tirn to much Profit."47 Captain Brace arrived
in Salem late in August, having been stopped by the British

a
who impressed one seamah.4“ As to the final disposition of

 

46. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Capt.
James Brace, Bordeaux, Apr. 31, 1804.

47. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. J. Brace to Richard Crown-
inshield, Copenhagen, June 27, 1804 andEE, Crowninshield Ms.,
Capt. J. Brace to John Crowninshield, Copenhagen, June 27, 1804.

48. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Aug. 31, 1804.

82.

the Russian cargo, it was what seemed to be the normal one

for Crowninshield ventures into Russian produce. Jacob re-

ported the sale price as low, but "they could do no better - a

a great deal more is coming. & it has already sold at much lower

in Boston proper."49
Another problem created by the French came from their un-

inhibited use of privateers. This situation might have resulted

in less worry and higher insurance rates had the Crowninshields

been inclined to insure their ships, but, as earlier, when

insurance ran prohibitively high (10 per cent and over), they

tended to rely on the ability of their ships and captains to

outwit and outsail the privateers. The year 1804 found the

various members of the firm constantly worried about the fate

of their vessels. Richard commented on the danger from French

ships in letters to John. The family had sent vessels to

Haiti (Hi spaniola) in the spring of that year, and at one time

had given up on their safe arrival.50 At one stage of the

development, the firm asked about insurance premiums on a ship

armed with sixteen guns and forty-five men and sent to the

area of the West Indies for cargo, but apparently gave up on

that possibility.51 The two ships that went to the West Indies

 

49. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Dept. 5, 1804.

_ 50. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, May 7, 1804.

51. El, Crowninshield Ms., George Crowninshield & Sons to
Jacob Ashton, Esq., Salem, Apr. 23, 1804.

83.

in the summer of 1804 were armed.52 They reported seeing
French privateers and being chased by another vessel which
they assumed to be a British frigate.53

The French were also responsible for the failure of the
Crowninshields to find the Amsterdam market all that it had
been, as Holland was completely dominated by France during
this period. Richard told John that European markets had
seldom realized a profit to the firm. "We have to be sure
sometimes found a convenience in making some European ship-
ments, and in the most of them have been confoundedly cheated
& plundered, particularly at Amsterdam".54

Jacob had voiced somewhat mild opposition to trade with
France at the end of 1803 and in January of 1804. Based upon
the fears and trouble of the lateowinter and the spring and
summer of 1804, this opposition changed into a definite pro-
hibition of European trade by late in the year. The increas-
ing trend in this direction is plainly discernable in the fol-
lowing quotations from letters written by the different brothers.
In February, 1804, "I am glad the Margaret is going round the
Cape of Good Hope It is much better than to send her to Europe,

 

52. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, June 18, 1804.
\

53. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Aug. 28, 1804‘.

54. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Mar. 25, 1804.

84.

yet as Coffee is amazing high there it might be well to send 5
or 600 bags on freight to Copenhagen, & order the proceeds re-
mitted to London.'455 In March, 1804, “Considering we can make
a voyage to India nearly as soon as one to Europe & taking into
view what we have allready there we shall sell our coffee here;
for when we send to any Port in Europe 3 & 4 mo must lapse be-
fore we can draw and we push and strain all parts taught."56
Still later in March Richard wrote that they had to recoup
their losses (the ones suffered from Strobel and Martini).
"India voyages must be our aim & there our Fortune_;;§§ l-
as sales in this country is man. 4.1m; assess ass-
pects sometimes appear flattering -— but great or even small
profits are but seldom realized."57

In June of l804-Hichard wrote to John that he hoped he
had salvaged some of their losses from Bordeaux. He advised
John to come home, and.said that the firm would trust no more
goods to Bordeaux.58 In July, 1804, "I wish all the Mind‘s
funds were in London from Copenhagen.. no profits fron Russias

goods or any other from Europe. this you may be sure 9; - the

 

55. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Washington, Feb. 20, 1804.

56. El, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Mar. 10, 1804.

57. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Cnawninshield,
New York, Mar. 25, 1804.

58. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New Yerk, June 10, 1804.

85.

determination has been to send nothing more to any part of

France or Holland & We think not to change our determination."59
Finally, in November of 1804, Richard wrote that "We observe
the markets are looking up in Bordeaux but I apprehend we shall

make no shipments there our plans are well fixed for mor than

2 mo. "60

Over the major portion of the year 1804 the Crownin-
shields avoided contact with the European markets wherever
possible, even to the extent of sending their ships to the
area of the West Indies. When they ventured into the Russian
area their experience was similar to what it had been in the
earlier period, that Russian goods did not provide profitable
trade in most cases. Their usual plan of trading to the In-
dian Ocean area in theomain and allowing others to handle. the
contact with Europe was followed by them throughout most of
1804.

Reports from their European contacts in general indicated
similar action by others. In late October of 1804 their Copen-
hagen representative, Ryberg and Co., sent John Crowninshield
a balance statement and the following description of the mar-

ket there: "Our market is very favourable at present and we

have every reason to eXpect it will prove so next spring, when

 

59. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New Yerk, July 30, 1804.

60. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
INew York, Nov. 1, 1804.

86.

f

we shall be glad to receive the commands of your friends.01
From Bordeaux came the following, "The markets continue much
as for several months Sugar Cotton & Tobacco excepted, all
of which have risen from 3 to 5 p cent. There are but few
vessels in port & not many expected generally. -- although
for my part I calculate differently for soon as the state of
this market is known I am pursuaded it will produce many ad-
ventures."62 The London market was described: "Sugar & cof-
fee will be high in the Spring -- quantities on hand being
very small. Cotton wool has risen about 6 pct & some ports
more."i63 Favorable and rising markets on the continent indi-
catedlack-of American carriers of goods at this time almost
as completely as does the lack of American ships in the various
ports.

Statistics on American trade in general over the years
1800 to 1804 follow the general pattern indicated by the ex-
peri ences of the Crowninshields during that same time. Total
exports reached a peak of $94,120,000 in 1301. This figure

was almost equally divided between domestic eXports and foreign

 

61. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Ryberg & Co. to John Crownin-
shield, New York, Nov. 1, 1804. As these reports came from com-
mission merchants, whose income depended upon the quantity of
business they handled, they must be viewed w'i th some caution.

62. ET, Crowninshield Ms., S. B. l’igginton to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Nov. 29, 1804, and Leon Cohen to
John Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Nov. 28, 1804.

63. El, Crowninshield Ms., Samuel Williams to John
Crowninshield, London, Dec. 11, 1804.

87.

re-eXports. Imports for 1801 totalled $111,360,000, but of
this amount only $64,720,000, approximately 57 per cent, was
consumed at home.. The years affected by the Amiens peace,
those of 1802 and 1803, saw a sharp drop in all areas of Amer-
ican trade. In 1303 total exports had shrunk to $55,800,000.
Foreign goods handled in the re-export trade had naturally
dropped most drastically. Contrasted with 1801 when foreign
goods re-exported were valued at $46,640,000, the 1803 re-
export figure had shrunk to only $13,590,000. This re-export
trade was unprofitable in peacetime; the carrying of goods
to the neutral shores of the United States was unnecessary
for nations no longer at war. The other area where this de-
cline in war-induced trade was visible, imports, showed a
similar decline. From the 1801 figure of $111,360,000, Amer-
ican imports dropped to $64,670,000 in 1803. Whereas only 57
per cent of the 1801 total imports had been consumed domes-
tically in 1801, 80 per cent ($51,070,000) of the 1803 imports
were used in the United States. The catalytic effect of the
European war upon American commerce is clearly shown in these
statistics.64

This trend began to change with the shipping statistics
for the year 1804. Although domestic exports were slightly
lower in 1804 than they had been in 1803, total eXports climbed

 

64. These figures are taken from E. F. Heckscher,
Continental System, p. 103.

88.

to $77,700,000. Imports show a similar trend. Domestically
used imports were reduced from $51,070,000 in 1803 to $48,770,
000 in 1804, but total imports increased during this same period
by more than 30 per cent, from $64,670,000 to $85,000,000.

These figures show two characteristics of American com-
merce in general which apply specifically to the trade of the
Crowninshi elds throughout the first twelve years of the war in
Europe. First, the tremendous growth of American commerce
depended almost entirely upon the existence of the war in
Europe; it increased and declined with war and peace in Europe
as surely as a column of mercury rises and falls with changes
in atmospheric pressure. Secondly, the figures which responded
most significantly to war conditions in'Europe were those deal-
ing with foreign re-eXports, the fringedarea of commerce which
the belligerent powers were most apt to consider within their
power to regulate. Foreign re-eXports in the year of peace of
1802-03 represented 28 per cent of the last complete year of
war trading, and in the first year of fighting, re-eXports
climbed to 267 per cent of what they had been only one year
previously. This contrasts with eXports of native products
which climbed about 15 per cent between 1802 and 1803 and ac-
tually declined slightly the first year of the war.

Turning to the Crowninshields, their trade during late
1802 and early 1803 tended to decline in the same proportion
as that of the nation as a whole. With their realization of

the impending war they consciously increased their shipping

ventures throughout the spring of 1803. These figures would

be reflected in the national figures for 1804 rather than those
quoted for 1803, as four to six months each way were required
to complete a trip to the East Indies and also as the figures
represent a year running from October 1 to September 30. This
acceleration remained constant throughout the year 1804, al-
though the Crowninshields found the importing of goods for the
re-export trade more to their liking than completing the entire
process of supplying the warring continental powers with the
products of their colonies.

The Crowninshi eld trade was overwhelmingly that which was
most affected by the war in Europe. Aside from the occasional
Russian cargoes, the Crowninshields dealt in pepper, in coffee,
in gum arabic, and in drugs or cloths from the Indies. As
such they represent the area of American commerce most influ-
enced by the war in Europe and were most dependent upon it.
Their trade was a trade which had come into eXi stence with the
beginning of the war in Europe in 1792; it had flourished dur-
ing the war periods down to 1801 when it had suffered a decline
with the truce of Amiens. When the war was renewed in 1803,
the Crowninshields again began to receive the benefits of the
war-inspired neutral shipping between French and Dutch colo-

nies and the two mother countries. The first of the year 1805
did not indicate an impending change in the conditions which

had raised the Crowninshields to a position of power and wealth

in Salem, and in the United States as well.

90.

The accretion of the wealth, position, and power which
added'up to considerable prominence for the Crowninshield fam-
ily by the beginning of the year 1805 might well be summarized.
Their wealth was considerable. Definite statements of their
total possessibns are not available, but occasionally they re-
fer to the amounts of goods or money that they have on hand
at one particular time. In early 1804, for example, Benjamin
wrote Richard an estimate'of their wealth in goods and ships
alone; that is, wealth which did not include any store of
wharf property, and none of their shares in the insurance com-
pany, newspaper, or their various holdings of real estate.

At that time, their wealth included $358,500 in goods and cash
plus nine ships which Eenjamin assesSed at $111,000 for a to-
tal of $469,000 (sic). S The estimate of worth of the ships
in these figuresAis extremely conservative for a wartime fig-
ure; if Benjamin's estimate of their wealth in goods was like-
wise conservative this would be a low estimate of their actual
commercial wealth.

Their position in the nation and community had likewise
climbed considerably by this time. Jacob had been elected to
Congress in 1802 against the formidable Federalist opposition
of former Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. More signi-
ficant, he had even carried his native city of Salem, which

 

65. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin to Richard Crown-
inshield, Feb. 8, 1804.

91.

was a traditional stronghold of Federalism. 0n the occasion

of this election the Essex Register, the Republican paper in
which Jacob held a part interest, wrote, “In Salem the great-
est number of votes were given ever known.- The result was in
favor of Hon. Jacob Crowninshield, Esq. The Selectmen did
themselves great honor through the day and will derive a great-
ful remembrance from their fellow citizens.66 The Salem
Gazette, the Federalist paper, reported the election in the
following terms, er. Crowninshield, when he goes to Congress -

for, 'in spite of‘nature and his stars,‘ go he will - will
appear there as a representative from Hassachusetts - But he
will not be a Representative of Massachusetts - he will not be
even the Representative of Essex South District - We trust he
will be the true Representative of a portion of men who were
politically made for the day of his triumph, and who Will never
more be seen, till called out again by orders which they dare
not disobey."67 Jacob carried the election by getting 1400 votes
to 1293 votes for Pickering.

Standing for reelection in 1804, Jacob again proved his
political popularity by increasing his margin over the Feder-
alist candidate by 450 votes. He defeated his new opponent,

Read, 1884 to 1324 votes for a substantial triumph.68 Again

 

66. Essex Register, Nov. 4, 1802.
67. Salem Gazette, Dec. 3, 1802.
68. Essex Register, Nov. 8, 1804.

92.

the Gazette took a rather dubious view of the qualifications
of Jacob drowninshield, but the very harshness of the criticism
in their last edition before the election reflected the formid-
ible strength that the Republicans had acquired under Jacob's
leadership. They commented that the Register had complained
of their insinuations concerning Crowninshield and then, "We
mean to insinuate nothing; but to say, in unequivocal terms,
that he is totally unfit, both in point of principles & tal-
ents, for the situation he desires, and that the interests of
Essex South District, and indeed of all America, forbid that
he should receive our suffrage."
Shortly after the 1304 election Jacob received new honors
when Jefferson asked him to accept the office of Secretary of
the Navy. After writing to his wife, who had been in ill health,
Jacob decided to decline the position. he wrote, "It is sep-
aration from my family that I most dread. It is the fear that
I could not pursuade her without doing violence to her feelings
to come & reside in Washington, during that part of the time
when I ought to be on the spot. It is the apprehension that
seperate from my family & connections for a long period, I
should not only be unhappy myself, but feel certain that I de-
prived them in some degree of that share of happiness which

possibly my presence might contribute to promote."70 Despite

 

69. Salem Gazette, Oct. 30, 1904.

70. PM, Crowninshield $3., (Copy) Jacob Crowninshield to
Thomas Jefferson, Washington, Jan. 24, 1305.

93.

Jacob's refusal to accept the position, his name was sent to
the senate by Jefferson in harch of 1805 and his appointment
was confirmed by that body. A copy of the commission to the
office shows that it was signed by both Jefferson and Secretary
of State Madison.71

Another indication of the prominence of the Crowninshields
was the naming of their Salem minister, Dr. William Bentley, as
Chaplain of the House of Representatives-in 1805. Although
Dr. Bentley requed the honorary position, Jacob's considerable
influence in the House of Representatives is revealed by the
choice going to his minister.72

In Salem itself, their position had improved tremendously,
and the opposition gave them the respect that goes with power.
Perhaps a statement of Dr. Bentley best shows the change that
had been accomplished by the Crowninshields. "The great success
which attends the Crowninshields has so far eclipsed the succes-
sors of Mr. Derby that they move into the shadow unseen. The
names of Pickman & Derby no longer stand preeminent in the busi-

ness & navigation of the Town."73

 

71. PM, Crowninshield Ms. (Copy) List of nominees
sent to Senate by Thomas Jefferson and Commission of Office
for Jacob Crowninshield signed by Thomas Jefferson and James

f-fadi son 0

72. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
washington, Nov. 7, 1804, Bentlem.Diar , III, 87, 122.

73. Bentley, Diar , her. 29, 1805, III, 148.

94.

The power of the Crowninshield name was also indicated
from the occasional letters which asked for the use of that
name for reference or recommendation. In Europe, John Crown-
inshield received letters from individuals who desired his
recommendation to acquire a start in America. One person in-
dicated that a letter from John Crowninshield would mean a
great deal, insure success in America; a second said that it
would "be a great help . . . not only your connections but it
would assertain those of others."_74 In summary, the Crownin-
shields, over the period of about twelve years, had risen from
a position of obscurity in the shipping of Salem to a position
where they were one of the top firms in the country. Not only
that, but with their rise to commercial preeminence, they had
achieved success politically far beyond what could have been
eXpected of them in 1793.

Despite this tremendous success in politics and prestige
of the Crowninshields by 1805 that year also saw the beginning
of a series of events which were bound to affect the firm se-
riously. The first of these was the British ruling in the case
of the Egggg, a Salem vessel. Great Britain had, from the
opening.of the war following Amiens, taken a rather moderate
View concerning American shipping. Host of the shipping of the

 

74. EI, Crowninshi eld Ms., Leon Cohen to John Crownin-
shield, Bordeaux, Mar. 18, 1805, also see Wiederholdt to
John Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Mar. 18, 1805 and Jno. Ellery
to John Crowninshield, Gloucester, Aug. 13, 1805.

95.

Crowninshields was contrary to the spirit of the rule of 1756
(trade prohibited in times of peace cannot be allowed in time
of war). The British, however, had allowed American "broken
voyage" shipping to violate the idea of thi slaw. Legal prec-
edent for this position came in the case of the £9.21 and the
ruling by the legal adviser to the British Crown (which had
stated in 1801 that "landing the goods and paying the duties
in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the voyage."75
The American traders had gotten around the financial drawbacks
to such a system by arranging with their government to receive
kickbacks on the duties paid when the goods were re-eXported.
This system had held sway until 1805. At that time the Brit-
ish courts reversed themselves with the'§_s_s_e_)£ and decided that
such trade did oppose the rule of 1756, and (began making con-
fi scations. Seizures had begun in 1804.

This decision struck very near to the heart of the Crown-
inshield trade. Jacob, the director of the firm's activities,
frowned upon carrying their own goods to Europe if it could be
avoided, but Richard's letters indicated that continental prices
were enough higher than what could be received on the American
market to make the risks palatable. For eXample, early in 1805
he wrote John that "If we could feel safe from British depre-
dations we should like to send 1 cargo to Leghorn l to lvlarsailles

at one with gum a coffee to the North of Europe. The difference

 

75. A. To 1:811811, it"ltiij 33 3.. 'Ql 2, I ' 103.

96.

betwixt the best European prices & ours in our coffee say
900,000 expected is at least lO0,000$ - it is a great sum

and we ought in justice to ourselves."76 .Late in 1305, he
wrote again, "coffee worth here about 75,000 & we hope in
Leghorn about‘lOO,OOO$.77 A firm which tended to avoid carry-
ing insurance when rates approached 10 per cent could not be
eXpected to be diverted from that sort of profits by a clouded
international situation. During 1805, despite the added dan-
gers of the European trade, Crowninshi eld ships carried in-
creasing numbers of cargoes to Europe.

Coupled with the new interpretation on the Egggg was a
toughening of the British attitude in general. Throughout the
year 1805 fear of the British was eXpressed by the Crownin-
shields among themselves. In July of that year Jacob went so
far as to write to James Hadison to ask of the status of the
Island of Curacao. '"Several recent captures of vessels belong-
ing to this quarter of the Union, under the charge of being
bound to Curacoa has caused much sensation anong our merchts
and I have been repeatedly asked for information on the sub-

t."78

Jec Nonetheless, Crowninshield ships continued to go out,

 

76. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crownin-
shield, Salem, Feb. 23, 1805.

77. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crownin-
shield, Salem, Dec. 7, 1805.

78. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to James
Madison, Salem, July 9, 1805.

97.

and were successful in avoiding seizure by the British. Ap-
parently they were lucky or exceptionally clever. Admiral
Mahan reported that "great numbers of American vessels carry-
ing colonial produce-to Europe were seized and brought into
port, as well as others proceeding from the United States to
the West Indies, with cargoes originating in the mother coun-
tries; and when, in the opinion of the court, the duties had
been only nominally paid, they were condemned.79

Reaction to this sort of treatment came quickly from
Republican voices in Salem. Dr. Bentley reported that the
"Public mind was much agitated by the Commercial news which
has arrived. The British have adopted a new Construction of
the right of neutral powers . . . . The English deny this
right at a time when an immense property is upon the Ocean &
without any notice have actually taken and condemned many
vessels . . . ."80 One week later Bentley reported that for
fear of the British regulations, vessels fitted for the sea lay
in the harbor and waited.81

The Crowninshield vessel, Eggs, was readibd for sea by
mid-December 1805, but the family decided to hold her in Salem
for a time. Richard thought "the British will be cooled down
soon & that they will learn to Respect the rights of Neutrals -

 

79. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revoigiigg, II, 268-69,
80. Bentley,Diary, Sept. 14, 1805, III, 190.
81. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1805, III, 192.

98.

or we must attempt to teach them."82 The battle of Trafalgar
had been fought in October of 1805, and no doubt that influenc-
ed the Crowninshields in their consideration of British power.
John wrote that ftheir late sea success will . . . make them
more insolent than ever."‘83 At Christmas time the we was
still waiting in Salem, “the English are such rogues, we are
afraid to let her go yet."81+ January of 1806 found the Crown-
inshields still undecided‘as to what to do. The Beli sarius
arrived from the East Indies at that ti me, but the trade to

the continent was so uncertain that the gang was still held.
Finally, in March of 1806 the game and the Margaret were both
sent out for Europe. Richard reported that .the "(Engli sh have
relaxed their doing a will find it to their interest to give
up the unjust 8c infamous principles they have been pursuing. "85
By May of 1806, four Crowninshield vessels were on route to '
Europe with cargoes. All arrived safely, although because
of the carelessness of the captain one of the vessels was sunk

in the Loire below Nantes. The loss suffered was estimated at

 

82. ET, Crowninshieldl~1s., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Dec. 13, 1805.

83. ET, Crowninshield Ms., John to Mchard Crowninshield,
New York, Dec. 19, 1805.

84. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Dec. 25. 1805.

85. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Apr. 10, 1&6.

99.

$80,000.86 Profits on these voyages were extremely high, no
doubt because of the increased danger attached to the trade.
Certainly the Crowninshields were making money at a high rate,
but two ship losses (one was lost in October, 1806, on a bar
off the coast of New Jersey) cut into those profits rather
severely. Jacob reported to Rev. Bentley that the family had
saved enough to pay the full value of both ships by not taking
out insurance in the usual manner and risking all the losses
themselves. Bentley estimated the dual loss fat the lowest
estimate given at 100 thousand Dollars."87 The worst curse
of the merchant, uncertainty, had been eliminated when Great
Britain relaxed its severity toward neutrals in March, 1806,
and shipping went on with renewed speed.

Unfortunately the British threat was not the only one
confronting the neutral American merchant in 1805 and 1806.
On the continent the second of the belligerent goliaths waited
to bedevil the harassed trader. As has been indicated above,
commerce to France had not taken on the favorable aspects that
might have been assumed to have followed the renewal of war.
Because of this, during 1803 and 1804 the Crowninshields had

tended to avoid sending their own ships to France whenever

other shipping could be obtained. They had lost money when the

 

86. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, July 24, 1806.

87. .Bentley, Diary, Oct. 25, 1806, III, 257.

lOO .

firm through which they dealt, Strobel and Martini, had gone
bankrupt early in 1804. Despite the presence of John Crownin-
shield in France during all of those two years, Crowninshield
ships had not made that country a regular port of call.

Jacob Crowninshi eld saw nothing to change that condition
in early 1805. In January he wrote, "How unwi sely the French
act with their embargoes & exhorbitant‘ duties. They will never
learn what is for their interest at the worst of it is they injure

us without benefitting themselves."88

Writing about a cargo
of coffee later in the month Jacob‘said, "i rather it shd all
be sold here if possible than 'to risk thenshipment to Europe.
In France or Holld‘ I suppose it will be considered as English
coffee, for they wd'willingly make Arabia a part of British
India with a view of condemning it if they could at having the
power I w‘1 not depend much on their sense of justice. ".89
The awkwardness of dealing in France is further indicated
by the fate of the Crowninshield bark gig, which came to Bor-
deaux in January of 1805, loaded with sugar, gum, coffee and
indigo. At this time John (in Paris) sent the captain, James
Brace, notice that unless he was definitely consigned he should

stay there and sell his goods only for cash.90 Throughout

 

88. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to Nath-
aniel Silsbee, Washington, Jan. 13, 1805.

89. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to Nath-
aniel Silsbee, Washington, Jan. 30, 1805.

90. PM, Crowninshieldi~1s., John Crowninshield to Capt.
Brace, Paris, Jan. 22, 1805.

101.

March and April the reports from Bordeaux merchants were all
the same, that business was bad although prices were good enough
so that those who sold their property "make generally from 20

"91 Many reasons were given by the

to 40 pCent clear money.
merchants, the~season was bad, correspondence between France &
England threatened to end the war, a carnival had been-held.

On April 1 came the report from Bordeaux that Captain Brace had

left Bordeaux bound for Nantes with his cargo intact. "Business

still remains here very dead. "92

Captain Brace reported to John from Nantes on April 11.
He wanted to know if John's orders meant that he should remain
there indefinitely or if he should go overland and attempt to
handle the sales at some inland city.93 On, April 13 aspessi-
mistic account of conditions came from Nantes, but the news
was added that Brace had turned the cargo over to a Nantes mer-
chant; prospective sales were bad.94 On April 18 Captain Brace

wrote that he had gotten rid of the coffee at highest prices.

 

91. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wigginton to John Crowninshield,
Bordeaux, Mar. 4, 1805, and Mar. 24, 1805. Also Leon Cohen to
John Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Apr. 1, 1805.

92. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Leon Cohen to John Crowninshield,
Bordeaux, Apr. 1, 1805.

93. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. James Brace to John
Crowninshield, Nantes, Apr. 11, 1805.

94. El, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. James Brace to John
Crowninshield, Nantes, Apr. 13, 1805.

102.

Other boats coming into the harbor had hurt his sales, but he
had completed them in good order except for some frankincense
which was of badquality.95 Captain Brace had been delayed
for about three months in the process of disposing of the goods
of the small (157 T.) vessel. He had been forced to go from
one harbor to another after spending a fruitless two and one-
half months trying to sell his goods at Bordeaux. He finally
left France for the United States on June 3, 1805, and John
Crowninshield left with him. There was nothing connected with
this voyage of Brace's that was indicative that French mar-
kets were worth the risk involved in shipping to them in early
1805.

Reports later in the year on the French market were var-
ied, but generally better. A Bordeaux contact said that "the
American business is at present pretty bri sk"_96 in October of
1805. Two months later the same contact considered."Business
here very dull here and many failures."97 At year'send Jacob
had.modified.his position somewhat as regards France. As the
leader of the House of Crowninshield his statement that ". . .

we have little to fear from her (Spain) or even from her potent

 

95. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. James Brace to John
Crowninshield, Nantes, Apr. 18, 1805. .

96. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Leon Cohen to John Crownin-
shield, Bordeaux, Oct. 7, 1805.

97. El, Crowninshield.Ms., Leon Cohen to John Crownin-
shield, Bordeaux, Dec. 2, 1805.

103.

& powerful ally France, tho' most certainly we have no favours
to expect from either of them!’98 was reflected by shipments

of goods in Crowninshield ships to France, Italy, and "the
north of Europe", in the spring of 1806. The rising markets
in Europe promised high profits to those who could get goods
onto the continent. The Crowninshields were, then as ever,
quick to seize each opportunity for profit.

That spring saw the Crowninshields enter the great boom
period of the Napoleonic era, a boom period which was to last
for about eighteen months. Like the others from 1793 on, it
was a war-induced boom; consequently events in the warring
countries played a most prominent role in eventually destroy-
ing the boom. A resume of events in the European theater fol-
lowing the renewal of the war helps bring the picture into
focus.

Aside from the fluctuations of policy by the belligerents
which caused the changes in the commercial picture already men-
tioned, the events of the first two years of the war which broke
out in 1803 were not significantly different for the Crownin-
shields. The British had taken some of the West Indian possess-
ions of the French anleapoleon had sold his dubious title to
Louisiana to the United States early in the war. Napoleon as-
sumed the title of Emperor in late 1804. The formation of

 

98. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to Nath-
aniel Silsbee, Washington, Dec. 29, 1805.

104.

the Third Coalition, comprising Great Britain, Russia, Austria,
Sweden, and later Prussia, was completed during 1805 as the
British sought to organize opposition to the French juggernaut.
. In late 1805 the areas of the concentrations of power by
the two major adversaries became apparent. In October, Admir-
a1 Nelson's British fleet annihilated the French fleet under
Villeneuve in the battle of Trafalgar. This naval victory
fehattered all (Napoleon's) confidence in the French navy and
destroyed.his hopes of directly invading Great Britain."99
Great Britain, previously dominant on the seas, became ever-
whelmingly so with this victory. On the other hand, Napoleon's
land strength evidenced itself almost simultaneously with the)
revelation of his naval inadequacy. The surrender at Ulm of
the Austrian troops occurred one day before the Trafalgar de-
feat, and the battle of Austerlitz, which came in December of
1805, made the imperial forces appear as invincible on land

as the fleets of Great Britain were on the sea.

The appearance of invincibility was borne out by events
of 1806 and 1807. Napoleon took advantage of Prussia's vac-
illating policy by extorting a treaty from that nation in the
winter of 1806. Before the end of June of that year he had

placed his brothers Joseph and Louis on the thrones of Naples
and Sicily (combined) and Holland respectively. The headship

of the Holy Roman Empire, weak as it had been, was removed

 

99. A. T. Hahan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II, 271.

105.

from the Austrian Hapsburg house, and Central and Western
Germany became a French puppet state under the name of Con-
federation of the Rhine. In the autumn Napoleon's destiny
took him into battle against the Prussians; the month of Oct-
ober found the Prussians humiliated at Jena and the Hohen-
zollern kingdom reduced to quavering submission. The last
major foe on the continent, Russia, stood before him and
Bonaparte flung himself into the campaign against Alexander.
In February of 1807 he claimed a victory over the Russians in
a costly and indecisive battle at Eylau. After licking their
wounds for four months the French scored a more real triumph
over the Russians at Friedland and in July signed the Treaty
of Tilsit with AleXander, a treaty which allied the French and
Russian states. The Emperor's cup appeared filled when Russia
declared war on Great Britain in November of 1807. The Third
Coalition had proved unable to stand against the military
might and genius of Napoleon. In late 1807 Continental Europe
was thoroughly under Napoleon's thumb, "from Memel to Ragusa",
and the allied forces were as completely overmatched on land’
as the French fleets had been on the sea.

The combination of circumstances which made France domin-
ant on the continent and Great Britain just as dominant on the
seas spawned the series of decrees and orders in council which
made up Napoleon's Continental System and its antithesis. Nap-

oleon, defeated in whatever hope he may have had of reducing

106.

the British Isles by direct attack, decided to "conquer the
sea by the land9;'sritain, stung by the formidable scope of
the decrees issued by the Emperor, countered with orders de-
vised to offset the effectiveness of the continental blockade.
Napoleon initiated his Continental System with a decree
issued from Berlin and dated.November 21, 1806.100 The first
section of the decree listed abuses relative to international
law which the British had broken according to Napoleon. These
included charges of using a paper blockade, seizing neutral
shipping, and attempting to ruin world commerce for the bet-
terment of their own. with the charges in this section serv-
ing as a motive, Napoleon outlined the procedures the French
would take. Great Britain was to be blockaded and all corres-
pondence with her prohibited. All British subjects and British
property were subject to capture or seizure. Commerce was pro-
hibited with any vessel which had been to Great Britain or any
of her colonies; such ships were not to be admitted to any port.
False declarations by any ship were to make it British property.
The order was sent to the kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, Etruria
and all France's allies. This was the famous Berlin Decree.
Although the Berlin Decree prohibited any trade with Great
Britain or her colonies, a loophole was created by an interpret-

ation which was handed to the American minister by Decree, the

 

100. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, #11283, Nov. 21,
1806, XIII, 682-85.

107 .

French Minister of Marine. This ruling stated that American

ships were not liable to seizure on the high seas because they
had vi sited or planned to vi sit a British port, although such
ships were denied admittance to France.101 The author of the
decree, Napoleon, had become engaged in the war against Russia
in early 1807 and so the decree was inoperative until the end

of that campaign.102

Great Britain retaliated quickly against the Berlin
Decree. AnOrder in Council of January 7, 1807 cited the
Emperor'sdecree as a motive and.then prohibited the coasting
trade by neutral carriers, that is, the trade between two hos-
tile ports located on the continent.103 The difficulty raised
by this regulation for shippers like the'Crowninshields was
obvious. Their boats, which up to this time had sought out
the continental port where their goods would sell best and,
if their captains deemed it advisable, had gone from port to
port in search of better markets,were by this order now pro-
hibited from doing so.

Napoleon entered into the spirit of measure versus counter-
measure with his Warsaw Decree which called for the confi sca-

tion of all Bri tish merchandise or colonial property in the

 

101. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II, 273.

102. Ibid., II, 274; E. F. Heckscher, Continental Sy -
tem, pp. 90-91-

216.03. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II,
275-7 .

108.

Hanseatic cities. The British responded with a blockade of
the continental coast between the Elbe and the Ems River.104
As far as fresh legislation was concerned, matters rested here
until the latter part of 1807.

During the summer of 1807 Napoleon completed his triumph
on the continent (with the defeat of Russia) and was able to
divert his attention to commercial affairsn Aside from meas-
ures to tighten the control of vessels seeking to enter con-
tinental ports very little change occurred until September of
1807, when Napoleon modified the interpretation of his Min-
ister of Marine by stating that his intention had been for
French armed vessels to seize. and carry to port any vessels
carrying goods of British origin.105 Later an American ves-
561 which was wrecked upon the French coast had her cargo which
was British confiscated and sold by France.10 American com-
merce, which had reached an alltime high in the year ending
with September, 1807 (see tables, pp. 65A-.-B) received a body
blow from this interpretative measure. Two‘new measures, one
by each of the major warring adversaries, made the American
position untenable by year's end in 1807.

The first of these measures, a series of three Orders in

Council by Great Britain, appeared to stifle all neutral

104. Ward, etc., Cambridge Hi stor , IX, 366.

105. A. T. Mahan, _Sea Power flaw II, 281.
106. Ibid., II, 282.

 

1

 

 

 

_|!.--- -Illin- .J

109.

commerce with France and her colonies by interdicting shipping
with them and any ports or places in Europe from which British
shipping was excluded.‘107 The general confusion attached to

this series of Orders in Council was made apparent by the sec-
ond order which allowed any friendly vessel to import to Great

108 Two major exceptions

Britain produce from hostile countries.
to the first of these rulings added to the confusion. Neutral
traders were allowed to trade between their own country and
enemy colonies or between enemy colonies and open British col-
onial ports. Neutral traders could also trade directly be-
tween hostile ports and British continental ports, although
not between their home ports and hostile ports.109 The con-
sistency amid the confusion of these Orders. in Council follow-
ed mercantili st lines. Great Britain's economic function was
two-fold: to drain France's liquid wealth away and at the
same time to increase the gold supply of Great Britain. Thus
goods could go to France through England, after paying fees
which added to the wealth of Great Britain by taking from
France. By controlling French eXports and supervising French
imports, both for a fee, Great Britain could simultaneously
build her own economic strength as she drained that of her en-

emy. Fringe retaliatory measures added to the confusion by

 

107. Ibid., II, 234.
108. Ibid., II, 284n.
109. Ibid., II, 285-86.

110.

claiming the right to confiscate neutral vessels that carried
the French-required certificates of origin. The middle road

of neutrality was dwindling to nothing between the two oppos-

110
ing systems.

Napoleon's answer to this latest British ruling was his
Iilan Pecree, of December 1?, 1507.111. Like its Berlin pred-
ecessor, the Hilan “ecree set up its motivation in British
aetion which.violated the rights of neutrals. It denationalized
any ship which.submitted to British vessels, went to a British
port, or paid a duty to the British. Any such vessels were
to be legal prize, whether in ports of France or on the high.
seas. In an attempt to make the British action more odious
to the neutral carrier, the decree stated that these provisions
would not be enforced against those who forced the British to
respect their flag. It would be discontinued whenever the
British returned to Just maritime policies.

The nature of these two opposing systehs of measures has
been much debated, especially as applied to specific measures.
The Orders in Council are masterpieces of confusion and incon-
sistency. Napoleon's decrees, while clearly worded for the

most part, left enough loopholes of interpretation to beguile

and confuse the American government as to specific action to

 

110. E. F. Heckscher, Continental System, pp. 110-21.
For the text of the fourteen 1307 Orders in Council, issued
between Jan. 7 and Dec. 18, see Appendix I.

111. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XVI, 227-29.

111.

be taken at any given time. Action and law were intentionally
kept confusingly different throughout the effective period

of operation of the Continental System. Had the principles
relating to the two powers' actions been clearly stated the
neutral shipper would have been sonly harassed, but the en-
forced penalties added to the uncertainty brought about by
frequent and occasionally unannounced or retroactive changes
served to make his eXistence itself doubtful.

In general, the decrees of Napoleon prohibited all trade
with Great Britain in the hope of defeating that country by
destroying her industrial and commercial base. The British
orders, on the other hand, attempted to channel all French
commerce through the British Isles and at the same time force
British produced goods into the continent through the oppo-
sition set up by the Continental System. In both cases,
the neutral carrier had to be broken to conformity to pro-
vide any hope of success. Thomas Jefferson said of these
regulations: "These decrees and orders taken together, want
little of amounting to a declaration that every neutral ves-
sel found on the high seas, whatsoever be her cargo, and what-
soever foreign port be that of her departure, or destination,
shall be deemed lawful prize; and they prove more and more
the eXpediency of retaining our vessels, our seamen, and
property within our own harbours, until the dangers to which

they are exposed can be removed or lessened."112 The Crown-i

 

112. American State Papers, VI, 74.

112.

inshields, whose trade was almost entirely war created and
so most apt to contravene the spirit and the letter of the
opposing systems, accepted this statement as a sound one.
Jacob Crowninshield believed, with the Jeffersonian ad-
ministration, that the English were the primary enemy. Al-
though he had refused the position of Secretary of the Navy
when Jefferson had offered it to him, he did serve as a fre-
quent adviser to Secretary of State Madison on shipping and
wrote opinions to Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith. Jacob
thought the major effort of the nation in the area of naval
defense should be spent in the construction of gunboats. In
an undated letter to William Bentley (apparently written in
1805) he gave his opinion that gunboats were superior to forts
for naval defense. He thought that 100 gunboats would cost
less than one frigate while that number could be supported at
one-fourth the cost of the support of a frigate.113 In the
spring of 1906 he reiterated this faith in gunboats to Robert
Smith. At that time he advocated the spending of $250,000
for them and estimated the protection afforded by such an
amount would be double that to be gained by construction of
shore batteries. He gave instances where naval craft had
succeeded in getting by shore batteries, most recently the

success of Nelson in the attack upon Copenhagen, and advocated

 

113. PM, Crowninshi eld Isis” Jacob Crowninshield to
Wm. Bentley, Washington, 1305.

113.

the construction of boats to protect the harbors of New York
and New Orleans.114 As gunboats were effective only against
naval attack, it is inconceivable that Jacob intended these
measures against France, whose navy had been made impotent in
the Trafalgar struggle.

'In a detailed report made to James Ladison 0n the state
of American commerce, Jacob restated his belief that Great
Britain was the major enemy. He said that American shipping
was much more economically run than that of other countries
and so was able to operate more profitably. Because of inef-
ficiently run ships, said the report, British vessels could not
compete with those of the Americans, and so they countered
this difficulty by restricting the products the American could
carry from their colonies. his solution to the problem of
British restrictions on American commerce had a pr phetic tone,
"If we shut up the eXport trade six months the Islands (the
British West Indies) would be starved. It is not believed they
could possibly hold out any considerable time without supplies
from the U. States. . . . Whatever may be said to the contrary
it is a.fact that the west Indies are dependent on us for the
necessaries of life, both for the white & black population."115

It is unlikely that suggestions from this source were taken

 

115. National Archives, Ms., Department of State Miscel-
laneous Letters, January to December 1306, Jacob Crowninshield
to James Ladison, Salem, Sept. 1, 1306. Hereafter cited as
NA, State its.

114.

lightly by Jefferson and his Secretary of State. Although
Jacob did not hold the position of Secretary of the Navy, his
advice was sought and his years of experience, both as a ship
captain and as the leader of a commercial concern gave that
advice considerable stature.

As far as the general picture for the American merchant
in September of 1806 Jacob was not gloomy so long as the war
lasted. “We can get along tolerably well in war time, even
with the present embarrassments but if peace dimes and France
adopts the principles of the English navigation act, we ought
& we must resort to totally different regulations in regard to
English & French shipping than what are now in operation in the
U. S."116 -This prophecy came two and one-half months before
Napoleon issued his Berlin Decree. Apparently the idea of the
emperor of France embaricing‘on the self-denying policy of a
continental blockade had not occurred to Jacob as a possibility
.while the war lasted. Even with the issuance of the decree,
the early interpretation of it offered little danger to the
American shipper who, as the Crowninshields did, tended to avoid
shipping goods from one belligerent power to the other.

The feeling that Great Britain was the major threat to
American commerce persisted with Jacob Crowninshield. He was

particularly irritated with the British Order in Council which

 

116. NA, State Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to James Hadison,
Salem, Sept. 1, 1805.

115.

prohibited continental coasting trade by neutrals as retalia-
tion against the Berlin Decree. The British regulations were
ffar worse than Bonaparte's decree even if it was executed
without the modification referred to by Mr. Armstrong & the
French Minister."117 What made this ruling particularly harsh
was that it struck at the merchant who was not in fact carry-
ing on hostile coasting trade, but who, as was his custom,
went from port to port looking for higher markets to dispose
of his goods.

Jacob likewise opposed ratification of the treaty with
Great Britain which James Monroe and William Pinkney had neg-
otiated and signed in the late months of 1806. Monroe and
Pinkney had done this despite Madison's instructions to re-
gard Great Britain's disavowal of the right of impressment as
a g;gg_gg§,ggn, and that nation's refusal to accept that pos-
ition. ‘As negotiated the treaty defined contraband and the
Americans formally gave up the position that a neutral flag
covers non-contraband enemy goods. The British also agreed
not to stop unarmed vessels within five miles of the United
States shore. The American negotiators agreed that contin-
uance of the East India trade should require a broken voyage
each way; that is, ships could no longer sail directly to the

Indian Ocean area from Europe, or from that area to Europe,

 

117. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield, no
address, no date.

116.

but must stop at an American port to neutralize the goods.
Heretofore the broken voyage, whereby the shipper stopped and
paid duties at an American port, had been required only on
the Indies to Europe run. The harm that such legislation
would have done to the India trade was obviously consider-
able.118 In a letter to James Madison in April of 1807, Jacob
suggested that this treaty's acceptance would entirely destroy
the rich India trade.119 Still later in the year, Jacob sug-
gested to Madison that no treaty should be accepted that did
not include a British concession on the right of impressment
of American sailors.12o His conmderation of the French po-
sition was limited to comparing it with that of the British,
and it appeared to him to be less offensive to American in-
terests.

Beginning with the late summer of 1807, several factors
combined to bring an end to the booming commercial state which
had eXi sted for America. The spectacular action of the Brit-
ish in forcibly impressing seamen off the American frigate, the
Chesapeake. retained the British in the position as top offenders

 

118. Charles E. Hill, "James Madison," in S. F. Bemis, ed.,
The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, (New York,
192‘? 3 III, 112-1 0

119. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to James
Madison, Salem, Apr. 7, 1807.

120. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to James
Madison, Salem, Aug. 18, 1807. Jefferson refused to submit
this treaty to the Senate for ratification.

117.

so far as the American government was concerned. Public
indignation tended to agree as to the menace of Great Britain.
In late August Bentley reported a stagnation of business be-
cause of the apprehension brought by this affair.121 Few
vessels went out during the month of September. "We still
remain as under an Embargo. Our merchants are afraid to trust
their valuable cargoes at sea till they know the state of the
negociation in England."122 In addition, it was in September
that Napoleon ruled that his Berlin Decree, hitherto held in-
operative on the high seas, was to be enforced wherever ships
carried British goods. The effectiveness of the new inter-
pretation of the decree was demonstrated by the seizure and
confiscation by the French of the British goods of a ship-
wrecked vessel.123 Finally, in November of 1807, the British
Government issued a new series of Orders in Council, which
prohibited all continental trade except through Great Britain.
Napoleon's'iilan Decree, issued in December of 1807 in retal-
iation against the latest Orders in Council denationalized

all vessels which complied with the British Orders, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily. Before news of this new decree

reached America, an Embargo has been passed.

 

121. Bentley, Diary, Aug. 29, 1807, III, 316.
122. Ibid., Sept. 19, 1807, III, 320.

125. A. T. Mahan, Sea Power and French Revolution, II,
282.

ll 8.

The picture of American connerce in the late months of
1307 was one of vessels returning to home ports and being
retained there by fearful owners. Fear of hostilities break-
ing out with England haunted the merchant shippers, who recog-
nized the complete supremacy Great Britain was able to wield
over American commerce. This was reflected in the pessimism
of the available comments during that period. an acquaintance
of John Crowninshield, writing from New York, told of a beau-
tiful new ship being constructed, but added that there would
be but "little occasion to use her, as business here in the
freighting line is entirely at a stand, and indeed in almost

."124 Bentley, at the same time, record-

every other line; . .
ed that "our vessels continue to arrive & the proportion now
abroad is inconsiderable compared with the sum at the first
alarm of war."125 In November came the news of the condem-
nation by the British of a vessel which had visited two con-
tinental ports.126 Crowninshield ships that were reported at
sea were in the Indian Ocean area. A New York merchant wrote
to Jacob Crowninshield that one of his captains reported that
the Belisarius had sailed from Calcutta at the end of September,

1807. The same source said that the Telemachus was preparing

 

121+. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Drake Seymour to John Crown-
inshield, New York, Oct. 14, 1807.

125. Bentley, Diar , Oct. 17, 1807, III, 323.
126. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1307, III, 328.

 

 

 

11.11ll .

119.

to sail a short time Iater.127 The Belisarius arrived in
Salem in March, 1808.128 One estimate showed that 117 of
185 Salem vessels were caught in Salem by the I:‘.‘.ubargo.129
This represents an abnormally high figure for vessels in
their home port. In short, the period for two or three months
before the Embargo was a period of developing stagnation of
commerce.

The Embargo was passed by the United States Congress on
December 22, 1807. Jacob Crowninshield, consistent with
his actions throughout the previous decade, voted with the
administration forces in favor of the measure.130 In his
direction of the Crowninshield fortunes, throughout the pe-
riods of great danger, Jacob had tended to avoid the areas of
trade where possibilities of irregularities or captures were
greatest, in favor of the calmer trade regions. In the early
days of the war which began in 1803, Crowninshi eld ships had
avoided the markets of Europe when that was at all possible.
In his report on shipping which he sent to James Madison in
the late summer of 1806, Jacob suggested the beneficial re-
sults that could be obtained by cutting off American trade to

 

127. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin Bailey to Jacob
Crowninshield, New York, Jan. 30, 1808.

128. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin w; to nary Board-
man Crowninshield, Washington, Ear” 1808.

129. J.'D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 266.

130. Salem Gazette, Jan. 1, 1808.

120.

the West Indies and thus forcing modification of what he at
that time; considered the high—handed attitude of Great Britain
against American commerce. Finally, Jacob's policy regarding
naval defense of the homeland, in which headvocated the use
of gunboats as the primary block against a potential enemy,
would be in line with his acceptance of an embargo, rather
than attempting to defend American slnpping wherever it hap-
pened to be. ‘

Jacob Crowninshi eld's attitude toward the Embargo was
further evidenced by the following report from the Gazette.
"On the 29th December, in consequence of a motion from Mr.
Growninshield a bill supplementary to the Embargo Act, was
reported ~to the House. It provides, that licensed vessels
shall give bonds. to reland any goods, etc. they may take on
board, in some part of the United States. Licensed fishing
vessels, with salt are excepted."131

The passing of the Embargo and supplementary legislation
marked the end of the brief legislative career of Jacob
Crowninshi eld, He became sick during the month of January
of 1808 and grew rapidly worse. In February Benjamin and John
Crowninshield went to washington to take care of their brother.
Their letters to Salem from Washington, written between Feb-
ruary and April, tell of the constantly weakening condition of

 

131. Salem Gazette, Jan. 5, 1808.

121.

Jacob, and finally of his death on April 15, 1808.132 He
was 38 years old. _ .

The immediate effects of the Embargo on Salem were
slight. According to Dr. Bentley "The Merchants had already
laid one in our port as few vessels ventured abroad so that
this measure has excited no surprise or particular alarm at
present & it is yet a secret whether the cause be from French
or British measures."133 Two days later the same source men-
tioned that official-notification of the Embargo had arrived.
The delay between official and unofficial news of the law had
allowed several vessels to escape Salem harbor.134

However, within a silort period of time more dire news
of the effects of the Embargo began to arrive. As early as
January 2, 1808, Dr. Bentley reported rumors of failures of
"some unprincipled adventurers in'business? from Portland,
fithat dissipated but infant settlement of Speculators."135
By Aoril the full effects of the prohibition upon shipping
were upon Salem. An acute depression prevailed. Goods could

not be sold at all as no cash was to be had and the Crown-

inshields thought credit too risky to consider non-cash sales.

 

132. PM, Crowninshi eld Ms., Benjamin to Mary Boardman
Crowninshield, Washington, Apr. 15, 1808.

133. Bentley, Diary, Dec. 29, 1807, III, 336.
134. Ibid., Dec. 31, 1807, III, 336.
135. Ibid., Jan. 2, 1803, III, 336-37.

122.

The debilitating effects of embargo, which John Crowninshield
had prophetically described as comparable to the effects of
consumption on an individual,136 hit with full fury during the
spring and summer of 1808. American exports, the primary
area.of trade fer the Crowninshields, had reached an alltime
high of $108,343,150 in the year ending September 30, 1807.
For the year ending September 30, 1808, the figure was 322,
430,000.137 '
Despite this indication of hardship caused by the Em-
bargo, there was another side to the picture. This was in-
dicated by the self-imposed embargo in the fall of 1507. In
April, 1808, several vessels, which had pushed to sea hastily
in late December, 1807 in the hope of beating the effects of
the Embargo, limped back into Salem. “Three were carried into
Gibralter, & two escaped from the fleet & returned home with
their cargoes not in better condition than when they went out
with all the charges of the voyage to pay."138 Indications
were that European waters were eXtremely troubled ones for
neutral commerce. A similar situation was revealed in the
eXperience of a Maryland shipowner who sent out fifteen ves-

sels between September and December, 1807. Of the fifteen

 

136. E1, Crowninshi eld Ms., John to George Crowninshield,
Ile de France, June 1, 1796.

137. See Statistics on page 65.A.
138. Bentley, Diar , Apr. 30, 1808, III, 356.

123.

vessels, three reached their destinations, two were captured
by the French and Spanish, one was taken at Hamburg, and nine
were seized by the British.139 It seems highly questionable
that American shipping was worse off in American harbors than
engaging in trade under those conditions.

The Crowninshi eld fortunes received their first formi-
dable setback in September, 1807 when the opposing European
maritime systems forced their commerce off the seas and fi-
nally made the Embargo necessary. They had gone through a
period.of fifteen years of commercial activity, which, with
limited exceptions, had been extremely opportune years, and
they had taken advantage of them. Beginning with their three
small vessels in the fall of 1792, they had, as a result of
their war-induced commercial activity, grown to a position of
considerable wealth. They had risen from theicomparative ob-
scurity of ship captains to the prominence of important busi-
ness men, one of whom had held, for six years, a seat in the
Congress of the United States. The gods of war, who had creat-
ed the Crowninshield fortunes, now had decreed that the out-
come of the struggle was to be decided in the area where those
fortunes lay. In the struggle between the overwhelming land
power of one antagonist and the overwhelming sea power of the
other, the neutral carrier became a prime target for both. The

original American answer was the answer that Jacob Crowninshield

 

139. E. F. Heckscher, Continental System, p. 131.

124.

had used throughout the fifteen years of successful commerce -
withdraw and wait for better days. In this case, however,
there was no area toward which to direct the activities of
the firm while waiting for conditions to improve, and so
throughout 1808 the Crowninshields suffered the consumption
of embargo which the United States government had determined
was less damaging than the suicide of continued commercial
activity.

The Embargo had created hard times for Salem, as it
had.for the entire commercial world. Federalist opposition
to the Jefferson Administration had concentrated its attack
on the Embargo and the hard times that resulted, and the
attack had been successful in creating opposition to such
a policy. It had not mattered that Salem's richest merchant,
William Gray, hitherto a Federalist, had openly backed the
140

Embargo. Gray had been placed in charge of Salem harbor,
and his statement that of eight vessels which had left port

in the month of December, 1507, not one had reached its des-
tination141 likewise fell on deaf ears to those whose political
leanings permitted no useful result to come from the Embargo.

Gray defended the Embargo, and so Gray was attached unmerci—

fully.142

 

140. Bentley, Diar , June 9, 1808, III, 364.
141. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1808, III, 379—90.

142. Ibid., July 8, 1°09, III, 375.

125.

Despite the concentrated attack upon the Embargo in Salem
(and er England generally), opinion was not solidly opposed
to the measure. In October of 1:03 a Salem town meeting voted
down a motion to petition Congress to oppose the Embargo, by
a majority of "above one hundred out of nearly one thousand
Votes."143 Votes for Congressman in that same city in Hovem-
ber, 1903, found the Federalist and Republican numbers evenly
divided with 901 votes each.144 Normally Republican harblehead
continued to agree with the administration policies in the 1308
congressional election by favoring the Republican candidate,
664 to 79.145 Reports of suffering due to the Embargo varied
also with the political viewpoint of the person reporting.
The Federalist charge that Salem alone had five hundred fam-
ilies suffering was vigorously denied by William Bentley, who
countered that "not one person has become a pauper by the op-
eration of the Embargo. ."146

Yet misery undoubtedly accompanied the Embargo, as even
Bentley inadvertently admitted. He told of the generousity
of the merchants, Mr. Gray, Captain White, and Captain George

Crowninshield in providing flour, corn, biscuits, rice, and

 

143. 1919-. Oct. 26, 1803, III, 391.

144, LQ;Q., Nov. 7, 1808, III, 395.

145. Essex Register, Nov. 9, 1909.

146. Bentley, Diar , Sept. 13, 1T03, III, 333.

126.

other food stuff for the poor during the winter of 1903-09.147
A soup house was in operation in Salem in January of l?09
where the poor could obtain food. Those who made their liv-
ing on the seas; the young captains, mates, and seamen were
the major sufferers according to Bentleyfw8
The loss suffered by the merchant because of the Embargo
is extremely difficult to estimate. The damage done to ships
lying at anchor for an indefinite period must have been sizeable.
The goods caught by the Embargo that had to be sold at a loss
or stored at a.loss or allowed to deteriorate must have cost
the merchant a great deal. The destruction of established con-
tacts at ports throughout the world that must have been occa-
sioned by the Embargo would be impossible to assess. Probably
the merchants would have had difficulty estimating the cost of
the Embargo to themselves.
Two bits of evidence point to the idea that the Embargo
costs were high, but not of the type that would wipe a firm
of the stature of the Crowninshields out of eXistence. Wil-
liam Gray, while defending his position regarding the Embargo
against Federalist attack, made the statement that his estate
had declined more than ten per cent in the first eight months
of Embargo.149 Such losses must have included the sizeable

 

147. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1809, III, 409-10.
148. Ibid., Jan. 31, 1909, III, 413.
149. Ibid., Aug. 12, 1808, III, 377.

In-

 

127.

amounts of aid given to the poor - at one stage Gray offered
those who had charge of care of the poor to draw whatever they
needed from his account.150 The other evidence, an estimate
of the value of the crowninshield assets in September of 1809,
shows that the firm was worth $742,646,151 as contrasted with
an estimate of $469,000 in 1804. Although this statement gives
no indication of the size of the loss suffered by the Crownin-
shields due to the Embargo, it does indicate that they had not
suffered overwhelming financial losses.152
The Embargo was undeniably costly. Any consideration of
its cost, however, must be weighed against the cost of the al-
ternative move, that of trying to compete with the maritime
restrictions imposed by the belligerent powers. As Jefferson
had said, the neutral could not go to sea without violating
some of the requirements of the warring states. The self-
imposed Embargo of late 1307 showed that the merchants them-
selves were aware of these dangers. The plight of those ves-

sels which had fled Salem at the news of the Embargo had made

it apparent that European trade was so hazardous as to be

 

150. Ibid., Oct. 26, 1808, III, 392.

151. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Crowninshield Estate Agreement,
Sept. 17, 13090

152. A standard Monograph on the Embargo is L. M. Sears,
Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, N.C.,l927). For the effects
of the Embargo in New England, see pp. 143-96. The emphasis of
this work is on Jefferson's desire for peace and his rationale
which led to the Embargo rather than on the economic scene itself.

128.

operated only at a loss; some of those craft had returned to
Salem after four months with their outgoing cargo still intact.
The fate of the Crowninshield.fortunes in dealing with the con-
tinent in the post-Embargo period confirms the hypothesis that
the Cost of the Embargo was low compared to the cost of con-
tinued trade. But critics of the Embargo were not faced with
the responsibility of creating an alternative policy. They
seized upon the Embargo as a vulnerable spot in the Jefferso-
nian administration, and it admirably filled the requirements.

129.

Chapter IV

THE INEVITABLE HOUR - EUROPE DESTRDYS THE CmWNINSHIELDS
1808 - 1815 . .

The United States Congress repealed the unpopular Embargo
act on March 1, 1809, only three days before the new admin-
istration of James Madison took office. In its place it sub-
stituted the Non-Intercourse law which prohibited trade with
all ports under British and French control, but reopened Amer-
ican trade with the rest of the world. American ports were
opened to American ships, and the merchant world rushed to
take advantage of the renewal of commerce.

Negotiations with Great Britain during the first three
months of the new administration were of particular signifi-
cance to the American shipper. The Non-Intercourse law stip-
ulated that the President should have the authority to with-
draw the effecte of the law against either of the belligerent
powers if that power agreed to raise its restrictions against
neutral shipping. The British minister in Washington, David
Erskine, worked out an agreement with the Madison admini stra-
tion whereby the Orders in Council would be withdrawn and a
preliminary agreement to this effect was signed. Consequently
Hedi son, in what has come to be regarded as a major diplomatic

blunder, announced that non-intercourse with Great Britain

130.

would be withdrawn as of June 10, 1809. Under this ruling,
American ships were allowed to sail to continental ports, such
as Cadiz and Gibraltar and Cagliari, which were under British
control. George Canning, British foreign secretary, quickly
disavowed the Erskine agreement and announced that the Or-
ders in Council would be retained, and the Madison admini stra-
tion was forced to reinstitute its ban on commerce with Great
Britain in the month of August of 1809.1

Meanwhile Great Britain had taken a constructive step
which allowed safer American trade with the continent. In
an Order in Council dated April 26, 1809, she ruled that'only
the ports of Holland, France, and as much of Italy as was un-
der Napoleon's immedi ate control were to be considered under
blockade. Consequently, American trade to the Hanse cities,
to Spain, Portugal and the Baltic Sea was allowed by Great
Britain. Trade with the enemy, that is with France, Holland
and Italy, was still only allowed under conditions which
would result in its confiscation upon arrival in those coun-

triil.2

The period following the Embargo found Napoleon taking
measures to strengthen his Continental System. He had sealed

 

1. For the complete story see C. C. Tansill, "Robert
Smith", in S. F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State
and their Di lomac , III, 157-164.

2. A. T. Mahan, Sea Pow__e_£ and French Revolution, II, 313-14.

131 e

the ports of France and Italy against British trade and had
control of that territory. On the other hand, the Dutch Neth-
erlands was under the rule of Napoleon's brother Louis, who
seems to have been:interested.in the welfare of his subjects
to a sufficient extent to bring the wrath of Napoleon upon
his head. After summoning Louis to Paris in November of 1809,
Napoleon warned him of possible French sei zure of his lands
if he did.not enforce the measures of the Continental System
more effectively. Because of continuing evasions of the sys-
tem on the part of the Netherlands, the territory was annexed
to France in July of 1810 by a decree of’Napoleon.3 By the
«ne‘er that year, Napoleon had annexed the northwest section
of Germany, and included that territory within the confines
of the continental area which he personally was determined

to make as inhospitable to commerce as possible.

The direct measures of Bonaparte whereby he seized terri-
tory and.closed that territory to commerce of British origin
or which had in any way been tainted by British hands was only
a part of his system affecting neutral commerce. Goods which
he did allow to enter the continent were subjected to merci-
less tariff charges by a series of decrees laid down in the
late summer of 1810. Sugar, which had.paid no duty or slight

 

3. C. M. Galisset, ggrps du droit francais; or,precueil
complet des lois, decrets,ordonnances,_g§fiatus-consultesl_;§8-
lemong,_avis du conseil dTetatgzrapports au roi,finstruction§

ggnistérielles, etc., pupliés des uis 1 8 us uTa nos ours
his en ordre et ann te,(Paris,{lB£3-37), July 9, 1310, II, 9&3.

 

13 2o

duties during the years between 1802 and 1806 (duties ranged
between 30 and 80 francs per 100 kilograms), paid 300 to 400
francs per 100 kilograms in 1810. Duties on the same measure-
ment of pepper went from 30 francs to 600 francs between 1802
and 1810. Cinnamon, nutmeg, and cochineal, none of which had
paid a duty prior to 1810, paid a duty of 1400, 2000, and 2000
francs per 100 kilograms in 1810. Raw cotton, which had paid
2 francs per 100 kilograms in 1802 and 1803, paid 200 to 800
(depending upon the point of origin) in 1810.4 These were the
products which the Crowninshields had carried throughout the
years, and the development of this tariff structure was bound
to be felt by them if they continued to handle their traditional
cargoes. '

The lifting of the Embargo was the signal for the burst-
ing forth of the long bound economic enera es of American mer-
chants, the Crowninshields among them. The first Crowninshield
vessel to clear for foreign shores after‘the Enbargo was the
Minerva, which was reported as having sailed for Canton on May
5. 1809.5 Others followed in rapid succession, the ship Golden
Age bound for Sumatra on June 20, 1809;5 the Traveller for

 

4. E. F. Heckscher, Continental System, Appendix II,
pp. hoe-.09.

5. Salem Gazett , May 5, 1809.
6. Ibid., June 20, 1809.

133.

Algiers on June 23;? the John; for Loningen on June 2738

the Margaret for Tunis on July 4;9 the bark fling and the
ship America for Loningen and Cagliari respectively on July
14.10 In the flurry of activity after the Embargo, the Salem

Gazette. reported that by June 20, 1809, 145 vessels cleared

Salem harbor for foreign ports.11

The rush of trade which followed the lifting of the
Einbargo does not bear out the idea that Jefferson's measure
completely destroyed Salem's economic base. In 1807, the
last year before the Embargo, 134 vessels had. cleared from
Salem for foreigh ports.12 The ability to exceed the last
active year's number of port clearances in ninety days indi-
cates some economic strength; such activity is hardly feasible
for a community whose economic strength has been destroyed.
The American historian Edward—Charming stated that the Embar-
go losses on a national scale were not as severe as had been
claimed. He said that the Federalist use of the measure as a

propaganda weapon succeeded in creating the impression of

 

7. Ibid., June 23, 1809.

8. Ibid., June 27, 1809. Loningen‘ is in Oldenburg in
Northwest Germany.

9. Laid” July 4, 1809.

10. £213., July 14, 1809.~

‘11. £213., June 20, 1809.

12. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 267.

 

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134.

losses beyond their actual size.13

The Crowninshields decided to split their firm into three
separate companies in the summer of 1809. Richard Crowninshield,
who had spent considerable time in New York over the course of
the years, split from the parent firm in June of 1809 and
from that time forward operated.his own firm from New York
City. John Crowninshield, like Richard, took his one-sixth of
the firm's wealth and worked independently of the parent company
from that time. Benjamin 14., George, and George, Jr., contin-
ued the operation of the parent company, while the final one-
sixth of the Crowninshield wealth was set aside for the use of
Jacob's orphaned children (Jacob's wife, Sarah, had died a
year earlier than Jacob). The details of the transfer were
concealed behind bills of sale of vessels from the parent firm
to the sons for one dollar each. Apparently there was no se-
rious disagreement or family quarrel involved in this change
of ownership, as all branches of the firm continued to write
among themselves and to exchange comments on the state of busi-
ness throughout the world.

In the as early hectic days after the lifting of the
Embargo, the major chore was the gathering together of a cargo
and hastily sending it out for Europe. Crowninshield ships

were not sent to the warring states, as such action was

1'5. Edward Charming, The Jeffersonian System, 1801-1811
(Vol. XII of A. B. Hart, ed., The American Nation: A History)
(New York, 1906), pp. 216-20.

135.

prohibited by federal law, but all other markets were consid-
ered. In the case of the M, John Crowninshield changed her
destination within the last week before she sailed, because of
doubt as to where the vessel would be better received.14 Six
Crowninshield vessels cleared Salem harbor in the course of
twenty-five days between June 20 and July 14, 1809. Of these,
five went to European or North African prts, while one had
Sumatra as her destination.

The problems of coping with the Continental System and
the Orders in Council were not long in appearing. The first
indication of trouble for the Crowninshields was in. the cryp-
tic postscript on an insurance policy dated at the end of
September, 1809. The ship John was sent to "one or more ports
in the north of Europe below Copenhagen." The qualifying
statement read: "It is understood notwithstanding the above,
that the assurers: are not to be liable for any loss arising
from capture, restraint or detention, but are to be account-
able for other risks as well while under restraint, as at
other times, until her arrival as above mentioned. "15 The
policy makers refused to accept the risks of capture at the
hands of European powers. They forced the ship owner to

 

14. PM Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to T.
Williams, Salem, July 6, 1809, and John Crowninshield to s.

15. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy on ship
John, Salem, Sept. 22, 1809.

136.

brave the hazards of continental trade; insurance companies
continued to insure against the standard peacetime risks.

The Crowninshield papers revealed the further troubled
conditions of continental trade. Jacob Endicott, handling a
cargo for Richard Crowninshi eld at Algiers, wrote that he
contemplated getting a cargo of oil and heading for Lisbon
or England. His original cargo had sold at a loss because
the Algiers market was bad. In addition, he was detained for
considerable time in making the sale and then had to wait
longer in collecting for the goods. He did not anticipate
great profits from the sale of oil, but the oil represented
the only method of getting his money out of Algiers without
incurring further loss. London bills of exchange were selling
on the Algiers market at 25 per cent over par. Endicott sought
to avoid this loss by going to a port where the London bills
were more available.16 This type of trouble was not of such
a nature as to be reflected in captures or shipping stati s-
tics, but was extremely costly to the shipowner, who took not
only the original loss on his cargo, but then absorbed add-
itional losses in transferring his returns into a currency
which was usable.

Later in October, Richard Crowninshield reported that

Altona and Loningen or possibly Hamburg were acceptable

 

16. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Endicott to Richard
Crowninshield, Algiers, Oct. 11, 1809.

137 .

receiving points for goods destined for continental Europe.17
The feeling that Nortn Europe represented the best marketing
place persisted throughout the autumn of 1809. On November 5,
Richard wrote that "There have been great shipments made to
Loningen yet the markets have kept up. there are several ships
going now and I have a cargo going on one of the'best. Rice
cotton coffee."18 Ten days later he wrote of two recent arriv-
als from Loningen who reported prospects good there, with both
cotton and coffee selling at high prices. The British, said
Richard, were apparently not interested in the blockade if
they did not blockade Loningen.19
The old standard run for the Crowninshields, to the
East Indies for pepper with occasional stops at Europe, also
presented problems. The parent firm's ship F_a_.m_g left Salem
for Lisbon in October, 1809, carrying flour, gum arabic, pep-
per, tobacco and sugar. One day out of Lisbon harbor she was
approached in the evening by a strange vessel. Captain Bull-
ock noted in his log, "She kept away with apparent intention
to board us. Supposing her to be a Pirate fired 10 shot at
her. She finally hauld to 3. passed a Stern of us."20 The

 

17. PM, Crowninshieldl‘«1s., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Oct. 25, 1809.

18. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Nov. 5. 1809.

19. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Nov. 14, 1809.

20. EI, Ms., Log of ship Fame, Nov. 2, 1809.

138.

Fame arrived in Lisbon on November 3. The process of dispos-

 

ing of her cargoand getting underway for Sumatra required
stops at Cadiz for six weeks, a two-day stop at Tangi ers, and
five weeks at Algeciras. On February 22, 1810, she left Gib-
raltar to head for the Island of Sumatra carrying Spanish
dollars and rock ballast. She acquired a cargo of pepper in
Sumatra and headed back for Salem, arriving there on November
29, 1810.21 The problems attached to her voyage, those of
delay, of difficulty in obtaining negotiable currency or goods,
struck at the heart of profitable commerce.

More direct and dire results of the commercial war were
not long in arriving. The ship Mar aret, owned by John Crown-
inshield (five-sixths) and Wm. Fairfield (one-sixth), had left
Salem on July 4, 1809, bound for Tunis. She carried India piece
goods, clayed sugar, Havanna sugar, India sugar, black pepper,
ginger, coffee, Frankinsense, myrrh, gum arabic, codfish, New

England rum, rice, indigo, and cassia.22

She carried French
certificates of origin. She went to Sardinia "without being
boarded or even spoken to by any Foreign Ships", stopped at
Cagliari Bay and got information and refreshmmts, but did no
business. She did not obtain prati que (permission to trade

granted after a ship obtains a clean bill of health). Leaving

 

21. El, Ms., Log of ship Fame.

22. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to American
consul in Naples, Gaeta, Aug. 10, 1809.

139 .

Cagliari, the Margaret sailed for Tunisia, and when within two
miles of land, at Bizert, she was stopped and captured by a
French privateer. The privateer took all the ships papers and
put on a pri ze crew, which took the Margaret into Gaeta. They
arrived at Gaeta on August 16, 1809, and Captain Fairfield
could locate nobody there with whom he could converse.23

Fairfi eld attempted to make contact with the American con-
sul at Marseilles and at Naples to get advice on what he should
do. His fish were getting bad and the situation was getting
desperate. On January 12, 1810, Samuel Williams, John Crown-
inshield's agent in London, reported to John that “Capt. Fair-
field had compromised at Naples for his Ship, her eXpenses to
be paid out of the cargo, & for half the net proceeds of her
cargo."'24 Meanwhile, in Salem John Crowninshield did some
figuring on a piece of scratch paper, dated November 12, 1809,
as to- his possibilities in the dealings with the ship Margaret.
Her total cargo was worth, according to these figures, 358,840.
The ship was worth $11,160 for a total value of $70,000 of
vessel and cargo as they were carried into Naples. The vessel
had been insured for $15,000 at 10 per cent, so the value of
her insurance was 313,500. The difference, by these figures,
between acquittal or condemnation at Naples was $56, 500. The

 

23. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to Isaac Cushing,
Gaeta, Aug. 10, 1809.

24. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Sam. Williams to John Crown-

140.

actual loss, based upon the value of the cargo of the Margaret
as she left Salem, lightened the possible lo 88, but it was
still formidable. The outgoing cargo was worth $26,000 in
Salem while the ship was worth $11,000. Deducting the payment
for insurance ($13,500), the owners still would lose $23,500
if the ship were condemned. At the bottom of all this figuring
was the statement "if acquitted may fetch me as above $70,000
a if condemned shall receive only 13,500."25 Captain Fairfield's
compromise figure was $27,765.22.26 The Margaret was released
and headed for America, loaded with American seamen whose ships
had been confiscated in the port of Naples. Her troubles were
not yet ended - she was wrecked in a storm forty-one days out
of Naples and sank with a sizeable loss of life. The final in-
surance payments on the Margaret were delayed until November,
1811, when a partial payment was made on her.27 John received

28 as the amount

a tetal of $4646 insurance on the M ararg aret,
paid on herwas pro-rated as to the amount of the loss compared
with the total value of ship and cargo as they left Salem.

The Margaret story shows some of the problems continental

 

25. E1, Crowninshield Ms., note by John Crowninshield
dated Nov. 12, 1809.

26. United States National Archives, Department of State
Spoliation Claims from 1831 Treaty with France, Margaret.
Hereafter cited as NA, Claims.

27. Bentley Diar , Nov. 28, 1811, IV, 70.

28. NA, Claims, Margaret.

141.

regulations made for the neutral shipper. Napoleon, anxious

to insure that no British goods travelled on neutral ships and
that no neutral ships visited British held territory, had two
violations against the Margaret. According to the Council of
Prizes at Paris, which passed upon the legality of the com-
promi se, the Margaret had stopped at the enemy port of Cagliari
and had not had a French certificate of origin to cover her
entire cargo.29 Possession of a certificate of origin, in
compliance with the latter regulation, made a vessel subject

to English seizure; British orders also made a stop at a Brit-
ish port mandatory for vessels trading to French held territory.
The neutral was forced to encounter the Charybdis of British
orders in order to avoid the Scylla of the Continental System.
No safe route lay between.

The Margaret case was the most spectacular misadventure
of the Crowninshield family in the 1809-10 period, but was far
from the only one. The general state of European commerce was
so treacherous that little profit derived from it. The ;I_‘e_l_e-
machus went to Smyrna, in hopes of finding favorable markets.
The fact that she did not return to Smyrna, nor did any of the
other Crowninshield vessels do 80, indicated that her quest was
not successful. The 11119:, which had sailed from Salem for
Loningen, had sold her cargo in Copenhagen and come back to
Salem, arriving there in January of 1810. John Crowninshield

 

29. NA, Claims, Margaret.

142.

made estimates of the proceeds to be netted on her cargo
based upon the report of the Captain, James Brace,30 but
these proved too high. The money was remitted to the London
agent, Samuel Williams, but by the time the money arrived in
London, John had already overdrawn on the eXpected amount.”-
Williams, writing to John in the fall of 1809 acknowledged
the receipt of 3185 L, and described the European market
prospects as follows: "Sugars were rising, other goods fall-
ing a little but prices eXpected to revive with the inter-
ruption of arrivals, naturally to be looked for from the ad-
vanced season of the year."32

Upon her arrival in Salem the _Higd took on a new cargo
of tobacco, whale and fish oil, and cotton and returned to
Loningen. The whale and fish 011 sold, but the cotton ran
afoul of the new tariffs enacted by the French emperor. The
cotton was allowed to g) to Hamburg on payment of a 6 per-
cent duty. From there the sale of the cotton could proceed
subject to a duty of two-thirds of the cotton. The French
seized 17,872 pounds of cotton, leaving the owner, John Crown-
inshield, in possession of half that amount or 8,936 pounds

 

30. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Prince 3.
Ward, Salem, Nov. 21, 1809.

31. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to S. W11-
liams, Mar. 5, 1810.

32. EI, Crowninshield Ms., S. Williams to John Crownin-
shield, London, Nov. 6, 1809.

143.

of cotton, which was sold.33 This was not confiscation; it
was a tariff payment, but the result for the shipowner was
similar to confiscation.

The other member of the Crowninshields me at active in
continental trade, Richard, had similar experiences with his
dealings. Richard had bought the former pride of the Crownin-
shield fleet, the Beli sarius, from the family firm, and had
sent her to Europe in late 1809. In February, 1810, the
Beli sarius was wrecked and she sank off the coast of Tunis.
Her cargo was saved and placed on the Tunisian vessel, Mgr;-
m, which sailed for Cadiz and Lisbon. The Marbruka was
captured by a French privateer; the, Pelican, ' and taken to the
Bay of Almeria‘off Spain where she was condemned, probably
on the grounds that she was going to Briti sh-controlled Lisbon.
Her cargo was sold by a judgment reached on October 12, 1810.34

In another case, not involving a Crowninshi eld ship,
Richard suffered a loss of half the value of forty-six bales
of Georgian cotton. He had shipped the cotton on the ship
Emeline, which had headed for the Spanish port of San Sebastien.
She was captured by a French privateer as she approached the
port. Rather than face the French courts the captain of the

Emeline completed a deal whereby he accepted half the value of

 

33. NA, Claims, Hind. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crown-
inshield to Alex Brodie, Esq., Boston, Mar. 11, 1833.

34. NA, Claims, Marbruka.

144.

his cargo in exchange for being allowed to proceed on his
way.35

Not all of the Crowninshield cargoes faced such impos-
sible trading conditions. Richard's ship, American Flower,
had headed for San Sebastian in late 1809, but was warned off
by a British vessel. She then sailed to England and arrived
there on January 22, 1810. She waited there for twenty-eight
days, trying to ascertain exactly the type of reception she
would receive on the continent of Europe, especially Loningen.36
The American. Fl_gwer was successful in her chore of getting her
goods landed on the continent, for in June John wrote Richard
a letter in which he congratulated him on his success in get-
ting goods through to the centinent on that boat, especially
seeing that those vessels which landed at San Sebastian had
been confi scated.37 In another letter, Richard wrote of his
vessel the (legal; getting through, but that she had suffered
a loss of $4,000. A second vessel would clear between $5,000
and $6,000, according to reports he received from Gothenburg.
He had been guaranteed a profitable return on the goods car-
ried by the American Flower, and the merchant to whom the

Property was consigned was holding it for a price rise, in

35. NA, Claims, Emeline.

36. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard Crowninshi eld to Capt.
Silsbee, New York, Apr. 17, 1810.

37. El, Crowninshield Ms., John to Richard Crowninshi eld,
Salem, June, 1810.

145 .

which case Richard would receive still more.38

The general pattern, even for the se ships which escaped
the privateers and direct condemnations, was not good. The
shipping which was getting through was doing so in the face
of odds which took the profit out of commerce. Delays and
being warned off from a prospective port and having to change
destinations added to the uncertainly involved in a hazardous
business. Despite all these odds, prices were not high enough
to guarantee a profit on what goods did get through. British
regulation and competition made prices unfavorable in territory
they controlled. The French tariff structure and regulations
against taking money from France combined to make prices low
there.

Cargoes sent to France were in a particularly ticklish
situation. The fear of trusting one's fate in the hands of
French courts was indicated by the willingness of ship cap-
tsins to accept partial value for their goods rather than risk
the prospects of a trial. Nonetheless, Crowninshield ships
were sent to France. Richard's ship Traveller was there in
the summer of 1810, and first faced a sequestration despite
her American cargo. In June the merchant firm through which
Richard dealt sent the following information:

. . . the sequester was raised on the ship Traveller and other

 

38- EIs Crowninshield Ms., Ltr. addressed "Dear Brother",
“1181811654 probably by Richard Crowninshield, New lork, June 14,
1810.

146.

American vessels in port loaded with articles the growth of
America, and that liberty was given to dispose of the Cargoes
and depart with the neat (sic) proceeds employed 2/3 in Silks
and l/3 in any other productions of France, at the same time
it was further reported, that a decree was rendered which
gave more favourable conditions to the American trade and a
diminution of existing high duties was to be the result.
He continued that the decree had not yet passed, and that g
business was dull.39

The Crowninshields had piled up a sizeable fortune in
the fifteen years before the laying of the Embargo, but this
sort of restriction and lo as on commerce could not help but
be felt. In the first year after the renewal of commercial
activity, they had suffered losses enough to destroy many firms.
Their old pattern of trade, that of bringing goods to America
and allowing others to run the risks involved in carrying those
goods to Europe had been destroyed, and they were forced to
take on the ruinous task of selling their own goods on the
continent. Delay, confiscations, confiscatory tariffs, and rules
which restricted produce which could be carried from a country
all took their toll of what had once been an extremely profit-
able enterpri ze. Their captains on the continental run were
battling the tough odds of the Continental System and Orders
in Council on the scene. The family itself was faced with the
problem of keeping their financial heads above water and meet-

ing obligations and raising cargo es for new ventures that

they hoped would be more rewarding.

 

39. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jonathan Jones to Richard »
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, June 8, 1810.

147.

Those problems began to assert themselves in conditions
which have already been indicated, such as the question of
where to send ships and John's overdrawing on Samuel Williams
on money derived from the sale of the _H_i_r_l_d's cargo. Letters
sent by these captains of commerce speak of still other prob-
lems which confronted them. Large quantities of goods piled
up on American docks, but ships were either unavailable or
refused to take the risk of carrying them to Europe."0 Money
was hard to obtain, and could not be obtained on the cargoes
which were ordinarily considered ample collateral for loans.
John Crowninshield found this out to his sorrow when he tried
to borrow "$6,000 to 38,000" from a Boston merchant. The
high rates quoted and'the demand for an endorser for the note
were indignities to which the Crowninshi elds were unaccustomed.
But such conditions obtained nonetheless.“ News available
from their ships was unreliable at best and occasionally en-
tirely false, as is indicated by the discrepancy between Cap-
tain Brace's estimate of the value of the M's cargo and the
actual sale price (see above) or the false report of the cap-

ture by the British of the Beli sarius.“2

 

40. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Mar. 12, 1810.

41. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Wm.
Marston, Salem, June 14, 1810.

148.

The problem of insurance and the Continental System also
came up to plague the merchant. Prior to the post-Embargo
period, the Crowninshields had made a habit of not taking in-
surance when the rates were high. In the days shortly after
the outbreak of war in 1803, they sent their ships out unin-
sured, and Jacob had boasted of their being able to pay for
the loss of ‘two ships in 1806 by what they had saved in not
taking out insurance over the course of years. In these
treacherous days however, insurance was necessary, and it came
high. A list of policies issued to Richard Crowninshield be-
tween late 1809 and early 1811 amply illustrates the high cost
of insurance and the added dangers of dealing with that area
of the continent under French control or within reach of French
privateers. The vesselghgda and Betsy, New York to Loningen,
November 29, 1009, insured at 17%per cent,43 the same vessel
to the same port February 28, 1810, 13 per cent.“4 The Emeline,
New York to San Sebastian, February 28, 1810, was insured at
6 per cent.45 The Merchant, New York to Gottenburg, May 9,
1810, paid 10 per cent.46 The Traveller, three policies all

 

43. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Rhoda & Betsy,
NOV. 29, 1809e

44. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Rhoda & Betsy,
Feb. 28’ 1810.

45. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Enelin__e_,
Feb. 28, 1810.

46. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Merchant,

149.

dated July 14, 1810, New York to Lisbon, was insured at 4
per cent, 3 per cent, and 4 per cent respectively.47 The

Traveller, Lisbon to New York, October 6, 1810, 2% percent.’+8

 

The Pocahantog, New York to Lisbon, November 1, 1310 (two
policies), 2% per cent.49 The 2233, New York to Bordeaux, Dec-
ember 7, 1810, 15 per cent.50 The Pocahantog, Lisbon to New
York, February 1, 1811, 2% per cent.51 Napoleon's system and
the British blockade had placed insurance rates on a plane
where they reduced profits in continental trade considerably.
Only areas free from the French privateer allowed a merchant
vessel to acquire insurance at rates which were not ruinous.
Vessels which would trade directly with France faced the most
formidable gauntlet. If they did succeed in making their way
into and out of the French port, they immediately became fair
prey for the British navy, and under the dual threat insurance
was impossibly high priced.

Under the circumstances, it was only natural for the

 

47. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Traveller.
July 14, 1810. '

48. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Traveller,
Get. 6' 1810.

49. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy. Pocahantqa.
Nov. 1, 1810.

50. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurance policy, Dart,
Dec. 7, 18100

 

51. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Insurm ce policy, Pocahagjxtos,
Feb. 1, and Feb. 2, 1811.

150.

directors of the commercial fleets to look elsewhere for mar-
kets. Richard reported ta John Crowninshield in May of 1810
that many vessels were going to Great Britain and her depend-
encies. He also reported that sugar was paying high prices
at the port of Loningen, but ventured no information as to the
best method of landing the sugar at that port. he closed on
a note which held an ominous portent, "I am sorry to hear of
the failures that have occurred in Sales since last fall."52
Failures or discouraging comments began to occupy con-
siderably more space in Salem correspondence in the spring
and summer of 1810. A letter to John in June spoke of the
discouraging situation in Europe regarding sequestered prop-
erty, and offered a hope that the Margaret would do better
than was feared.53 A report from an agmt in Naples was
even more discouraging. After saying that American .vessels
that had been taken were being left to rot in the harbor
rather than resold, the agent commented, "As things now stand
it would be of no use to talk about commercial business."54
Bentley added to the gloomy picture, "More failures in Busi-

ness. Wielman and Ropes have suffered their property to be

 

52. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, May 7, 1810.

53. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Unsigned, addressed "Dear
Brother," probably Richard to John Crowninshi eld, New York,

June 14, 1 8100

54. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Degen to John Crowninshield,
Naples, June 19, 1810.

151.

attached. Salem never was witness to more speculation & more
sufferings from them."55 As yet the merchants of Salem would
not bring themselves to realize that the boom years were a.thing
of the past. The war was still on. Aside from one major ex-
caption, conditions still prevailed which had resulted in fast
profits and vast accumulations of wealth throughout the war
years. That exception was that the major powers were now en-
forcing their regulations which restricted neutral shipping.
The regulations which Jefferson considered reason for issuing
the Embargo still eXisted, and neutral merchants were receiv-
ing negative proof of Jefferson's wisdom. The attempt to ob-
viate the consequences this change brought became the serious
concern of the Crowninshields in the spring of 1810 after bit-
ter experience taught them that the good old days were gone.

Despite the history of unsuccessful attempts to deal in
the Russian markets on other occasions when normal continental
commerce had failed, John Crowninshield turned to that area of
trade in the spring of 1810. He loaded two vessels, the Tglg—'
machus and the M, and sent them to Russia, while a third
ship, the Diomede was sent to Christianburg. The two vessels
which ventured into the Russian market had more trouble than
their predecessors into that region.

Both the Telemachus and the Qidg went to the port of

 

55. Bentley, Diary, June 5, 1810, III, 522.

152.

Archangel. The first report to come back to Salem came from
Captain Penn Townsend of the Telemachus. The brig had arriv-
ed at Archangel on June 13, 1810, and on July 24, 1810 was
still waiting in port for a clearance from the port commiss-
ioner. There were 111 ships in the fleet which entered Arch-
angel at that time, and in the six weeks that had elapsed only
forty-seven had been cleared for landing their cargoes. Town-
send's trouble had only started with the difficulty of land-
ing his cargo. He had been ashore and checked the market on
exportable goods. As might be eXpected the rush of business

to the northern port had sent Russian prices soaring. Manu-
factured goods were too high to hope for a profit. Sail cloth,
which the Crowninshields had taken from Russia on their pre-
vious ventures into that land, was prohibi tively high priced.
Charges on exchange of money and for credit were likewise
described as prohibitively high. The only hope for profit

was a somewhat dubious one. Townsend planned to wait in Russia
until winter, while sending the Telemachus back to Salem under
the mate (he had little hope of getting out before winter any-
how). He would send iron and hemp back to Salem and have the
goods imported on the Telemachus loaded on 81 edges and taken to
Moscow?6 He, Townsend, planned to accompany it there and trans-

act the sales. As a footnote he added that cotton and all dye

 

56. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Penn Townsend to John Crown-
inshield, Archangel, July 24, 1810.

153.

woods were in great demand and would bring high prices. The
Telemachus had carried currants, raisins, pepper, sugar, cof-
fee, cassia, nutmegs, cloves, and frankincense.57

The report from the second vessel, the 219;, was equally
disheartening. Captain Lewis reported that the voyage was al-
most a total loss and that he was returning to Salem and leav-
ing Townsend with the responsibility of selling his cargo. He
wrote: "I do not think according to present appearances that
my cargo will sell for near the Invoice. Pepper is very low
a dull sail (sic). Gums no price is mencioned. Our coffee
is a very bad quality for this market. So the Principle part
of my cargo is low a dull, but The Sugar will do very well.
The thirty Eight casks of oil is'a Total loss it being prohib-
ited but I am in hopes that Capt. Townsends will sell so as to
make up for the loss of mine."58 The M9 and the _T_gl_§machus
left Archangel in the autumn of 1810 leaving Penn Townsend
behind to make what he could from what appeared to-be a bad
situation.

Townsend's next report was dated November 24, 1810 and
said that the goods had been sold, except for the coffee, gums
and tamerack root. The oil had been mnfi scated. He had ac-

quired some hemp and some duck in the process of selling his

 

57. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Telemachus papers, cargo list,
May 21, 1810.

58. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. Edmund Lewis to John
Crowninshield, Archangel, Sept. 8, 1810.

154.

cargo.59 This action required further dealings in the dis-
estrous Russian markets by John Crowninshield. The follow-
ing spring John sent the vessel Diomede to Archangel to bring
back the proceeds (in goods) of the receipts of the sales
from the two previous vessels. The Diomede carried ballast,
cotton and logwood to Russia. John asked Townsend to return

' with all possible haste and to bring back iron, cordage,
sheeting and duck.60 He later instructed him to sell the
Diomede cargo in Archangel and to return immedi ately.61 Re-
ports in America indicated that many ships were going out in
the Archangel trade in the spring of 1811, and that as a re-
sult little could be hoped for in the way of profits from
Russian goods.62

The Russian story was a familiar one. The Crowninshields
had been forced into that trade on other occasions when their
trade with Europe had become too dangerous or too competitive
under war or peacetime conditions respectively. Statistics
for the nation as a whole show that the Russian trade was

used in the nature of a safety valve, as an outlet for shipping

 

59. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Capt. Penn Townsend to John
Crowninshield, Archangel, Nov. 24, 1810.

60. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Penn
Townsend, Salem, May 8, 1811.

6L. EI, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Penn
Townsend, Salem, May 11, 1811.

62. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, May 14,1811.

155.

which found the normally more profitable markets of Western
Europe or the European colonies unhospitable. For example,
figures for the nation as a whole reveal that the United States
had shipped no sugar to Russia in the years 1800 and 1801. In
the peacetime year of 1802 the negligible amount of 61,048 pounds
of sugar was shipped. The next year in which any cargo of sug-
ar was sent to Russia was 1805, when again a negligible amount
of 44,476 pounds was sent. In 1807, by the end of which Eur-
opean waters were extremely hazardous, 350,696 pounds of sugar
went to Russia. The next year in which Russia received sugar
from American ports was the post-Embargo year 1809, when 2,193,
257 pounds of sugar were sent to Russia. In 1810 the figure
climbed to 11,414, 895 pounds and in 1811 to 14,608,428 pounds.63
Coffee statistics show the same situation. The only years
following 1800 in which coffee was shipped to Russia were the
years, 1802, 1805, and 1807, which were, respectively, a year
of peace, the year of the Ease; decision, and the year when the
powers of Europe began to enforce the Continental System and the
Orders in Council. Shipments for those years were: 101,126
pounds in 1802; 129,577 in 1805; and 149,271 in 1807. In the
first year after the repeal of the Embargo. however, the amount

 

6}. Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of
the United States of America; its connection with Agriculture
and Manufactures° and an account of the Public Debt, Revenues,
and :ngjenditures of the United States (Hartford, Conn., 18m,

pp. 145-147.

 

156.

of coffee sent to Russia was 1,283,100 pounds; in 1810 it
was 4,048,909 pounds; in 1811 the amount reached 5,113, 891
pounds.64 The Crowninshield dealings with Russia hold rough-
ly to this pattern. The Russian trade in which they engaged
during the period between 1798 and 1800 represented a stop-
gap trade which was not overly successful. In the post-Embar-
go period, it was disastrous in its outcome.

The former stand-by of the Crowninshields, trade to the
Indian Ocean islands and the East Indies had been eliminated
by the gradual capture of all of those lands by Great Britain.
As they had done in the war in the 1790‘s, the British reduced
the French and Dutch strongholds in the‘East Indies. A treaty
with-the Dutch king, at that time living in exile in England,
allowed the forces of Great Britain to occupy any Dutch poss-
essions in case of war in order to defend them from the French.65
A systematic policy had effectalthe capture of French Indian
Ocean possessions: Bourbon and Mauritius (Isle of France) had
been taken in 1810; by 1811 the last major‘Dutch stronghold,
the island of Java, surrendered after a siege of the major city

of Batavia.66 Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo, and Amboina had like-

.

 

64. Ibid., pp. 148-49.

65. Justus van der Kroef, "Indonesia and the Origins of
Digtch Colonial Sovereignty," Far Eastern thrctezgl, x 1951).
1 5.

66. Ward, etc., _Cflbritgge History, IX, 240.

157.

wise fallen to the British by 1811.67 The British did not look
with favor upon neutral commerce in this area. A blockade was
enforced in the East Indian islands, and the warehouses of Bat-
avia piled high with coffee in the 1808-11 period.68

Even had their normal source of re-exportable goods not
been cut off, the Crowninshield's experience with the European
markets made their business ventures dubious. After the uncom-
fortable undertakings in Russian markets, John turned back to
the continent as the lesser evil. His brother Richard had been
successful upon two occasions in getting cargoes accepted, and
there was no other direction in which to turn. It was not the
nature of these merchants to submit to a personal embargo, so
they continued to send out cargoes in the hope of a turn for
the better.

Our diplomatic relations with France had assumed para-
mount importance for the shipper again in the spring of 1810.
The Non-Intercourse act had been superseded by a bit of leg-
islative chicanery known as Macon's Bill No. 2, on May 1.

This law repealed the Non-Intercourse act, which had prohib-
ited trade with the belligerent states. However it stated
that should either France or Great Britain change its obnoxious

edicts regulating American commerce to such an extent that

 

67. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara A History of the
East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), p. 242.

68. Ibid., p. 234.

158.

the American President should recognize their negation, the
other power would be given three months to do likewise. Fail-
ure of the second of the great belligerents to lift its res-
trictions on neutral shipping would result in the reimposition
of non-intercourse against that power.

Napoleon‘s eyes must have gleamed at the possibilities
for deceptivemdiplomacy this bill afforded. He had his Foreign
Minister, de Cadore, send a note to the American minister in
Paris to the effect that the Berlin and Milan Decrees had been
revoked and that they would cease to be operative after Novem-
ber l, 1810, providing the English likewise revoked their
counter-blockade or the United States forced England to res-
Pect its rights. Although this famous Cadore letter promised
nothing, Madison accepted it as a revokation of the two fund-
amental decrees of the Continental System. When England re-
fused to consider the diplomatic letter as a repeal of the Em-
peror's blockade, non-intercourse was proclaimed against her. 4
by a new law dated March 1, 1811. This diplomatic coup on the
part of the Emperor of France made war with Great Britain nearly

inevitable.69

Meanwhile the brig Telemachus returned to Salem late in
1810 after her venture into the Russian markets. John Crown-

inshi eld had her loaded with cargo entirely American in origin:

 

69. S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United
States (New York, 1935). Pp. 154-55-

159.

"green fish, cotton, ashes, and oil" and sent her out with the

orders "therefore no one can trouble nor molest you but must

70

let you-pass safely dc freely both out 3: home." Those in

charge of the vessel, a captain and supercargo. were to bring
back French products, brandy, sewing silk, crepes, silk gloves,
stockings, suspenders, and ladies kid gloves, according to their
orders. The Telemachus left Salem on December 7, 1810 and had
an uneventful'passage, arriving in Bordeaux in 32 days. On

March 27 she was still waiting for the details of the French
system to be worked out so she could acquire a cargo.71 Mean-
while a detailed report of conditions in France was sent to

John Crowninshield by the merchant firm in Bordeaux through
which he dealt. It read as follows:

Although the Operation of the Berlin dc Milan Decrees is sus-
pended, as far as those laws respect American vessels yet all
the examinations, interrogations & other complicated formal-
ities to which they gave rise continue in activity. After the
assurances which have been given to the U. States through their
Minister in Paris, we did hope that a general measure would
have been adopted to authorize the admission of all American
vessels, loaded exclusively with American produce; but so far
from this being the case, a simple order was issued to the Cus-
toms Houses in the Seaports to examine very strictly such ves-
sels & send the result of their examinations to the Director
General of the customs at Paris, on whose Report the Emperor
was to decide the admission or non-admission of each vessel a

a special Decree was necessary for every individual case.

These reports often laid over for weeks without being taken
into consideration, & the few admissions which have taken place.
were granted after ruinous, [delays 7] & on the condition of

 

70. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Telemachus orders, Dec. 1810.

71. ET, Crowninshield Ms., David Burdette to John Crown-
inshield, Bordeaux, Mar. 27, 1811.

160.

exporting one half the net proceeds in silk goods, 8.: the other
half in other french manufacturery or the produce of the French
Soil- To ascertain the amount to be exported a scale or es-
timate was to be made dc sent to Paris to be inspected & approved
before the outward cargo could be cleared out. Of all the Amer-
ican vessels arrived here within the last 3 months 3 or 4 only
have been admitted as yet, dc orders were issued in the begin-
ning of this month to suspend all further Reports on American
cases until called for by the Emperor, which has excited much
alarm. The Telemachus was among the small number admitted to
entry, at an estimate of the proceeds of her outward cargo has
been long since sent to Paris for the inspection dc verification
of the office charged with that formality, dc we are dayly eX-
pecting its return in due Rule to enable us to expedite the Brig.
She will probably have on board about 6000 gallons of Armagac
Brandy in Cogpac Pipes 5: $3000 worth of silk goods. This is

a very small cargo, but the green fish only sold for 50 francs
pr Quintal, with the numerous deductions to which that article
is subject. 5: both cottons dc oils & votashes are such Drugs

here that no offer has been made for them. Large quantities

of oil have been imported from England underlicences, & the
consumption is now eXtremely small. Great commercial distress
during the last three months & innumerable failures havelde-
stroyed all confidence, but an end to all speculation, 5. so
completely dried up the resources of the manufacturers that

they have almost entirely ceased the purchase of raw materials.72

This rather dismal report concluded by saying that the
only article which could be imported with any assurance of
decent profit was sugar, of the best quality. If John Crown-
inshield could obtain any of that commodity they "could in-
form . . . him of the needfggl‘ formalities to ensure its ad-
mission. Under existing circumstances we cannot recommend the
shipment of any other articles as the prices are low and we
cannot regard American property as entirely safe in the pres-

entimcertain state of the relations of the two countries.”73

72. El, Crowninshield Ms., Morton and Russel to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Mar. 26, 1811.

73. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Morton and Russel to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Mar. 26, 1811.

161.

The next report on the progress of the Telemachus cane
form the same merchants in April of 1811. They apologized
for the loss which was incurred in the sale'of the cargo, and
attributed.it to the poor quality of the incoming goods and
the high prices of brandy in France. N0 ships had been grant-
ed entry at Bordeaux in the previous four weeks, and they con-
sidered it "hazardous to send any cargo from the United States
to this country unless protected by an Imperial Permission."
Business continued extremely dull, with only sugar and fine
coffee in any demands“

John Crowninshi eld decided he needed additional insurance
on the Telemachus and her cargo for the return voyage to the
United States. Insurance rates had soared, however, even from
the time when the brig had headed for France. He had taken
out $10,000 in insurance for the round trip to Bordeaux at that
time; in May of 1811, the rate for insurance one way from the
French seaport was 20 per cent.75 The amount of insurance a
merchant could acquire at those rates was extremely limited.

The round trip to Archangel for the Diomede, which went out at

 

74. El, Crowninshield Ms., Morton and Russel to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Apr. 22, 1811. For a detailed account
of the license system under which some British goods were ad-
mitted to the continent as is suggested here and in the letter
cited by footnote 72 see Frank Melvin, Napojleon's Navigation
S stem, A Study of Trade Control Buzzing thejgongitnental Block-
a_L_d_e_ New York, 1919), and E. F. Heckscher, Continental System.

75. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Chas.
Bradbury, Salem, May 1, 1811.

162.

this time, was only 11 per cent.76 Under the circumstances
the risk involved was great slough to force the purchase of
insurance, whatever its cost. Richard Crowninshield wrote of
insurance home from Frmce being as high as 20 per cent in New
York, although he had hopes of acquiring it at 15 per cent,
"or at any rate for it will not due for me to risk it."77

- Late in May 1811 the report reached John Crowninshield
that the Telemachus would sail from Europe in twenty-five or
thirty. days, and that she was carrying brandy and silk. Des-
cribing his affairs to Richard, John wrote, "- - that she may
arrive home safe is ---- possiblg."78 Early in July word arriv-
ed in Salem that the Telemachus had been taken by the British
and condemned, on the, grounds that she had illegally entered
a French port. John Crowninshield found himself signing a
paper which included the words which had become common to com-
mercial firms during the previous two years, ”. . . I do here-
by abandon to said William Gray such proportion of said Brigt
as two thousand dollars bears to her value and such proportion

of the cargo as two thousand dollars bears to the first cost

 

76. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Chas.
Bradbury, Salem, May 10, 1811.

77. EI, Crowninshi eld Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, May 14, 1811.

78. EI, Crowninshield Ms., John to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 25, 1811

163.

at Bordeaux."79

The Telemachus was not an isolated example, even for the
Crowninshields. Richard Crowninshield's vessel, the pgrp, had
sailed for Bordeaux in December of 1810. She was captured and
condemned by the British for breaking the conditions of the
blockade. The captain and supercargo arrived back in New York
in April of 1811 with a copy of the condemnation procedures.80
The ship Traveller set out on a similar voyage in December of
1810, and-arrived in Bordeaux in January of 1811. “She was de-
tained in the process of unloadingal and acquiring a return
cargo until July of 1811. When she finally left Bordeaux she
was captured by the British vessel Little Belt and taken to
London and condemned.82 The wealth which the Crowninshields
had built up on war-induced commerce over a fifteen year span
was being dissipated in a much shorter period of time than it
had taken to build it up.

Despite the losses which had come almost without exception

on every cargo sent out after 1809, the first indication of

any financial emergency for the Crowninshield firms did not

 

79. E1, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield, abandonment
statement on Telemachus, Salem, July 9, 1811. The wording safe-
guarded the merchant against loss of more than the sum of the in-
surance money he received should the vessel be recovered.

80. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Apr. 19, 1811.

81. El, Crowninshield Ms., John to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, May 25, 1811.

82. NA, Claims, Traveller, Dec. 27. 1833.

164.

appear until February of 1811. During that month Richard
Crowninshield wrote a rather lengthy letter to his father
discussing the state of his business affairs. The mi ssive
is filled with complete optimism. Richard listed his assets,
including five ships and cargoes plus what he had on deposit
with Samuel Williams in London, at $283,000. In addition his
other credits, including sheep, goods, insurance stock, and
cash brought his total wealth to $359,500. Against this he
listed his liabilities as $161,000, due in the following notes:
February, $30,000; March, 340,000; April, $60,000; May, $14,000;
June, $2,000; July, $13,000; August, $2,000. Richard described
his financial condition as very prosperous. He closed with a
request that the family raise $30,000 to help him meet his
notes which were coming due, and to avoid his taking the tre-
mendous losses involved in converting his assets into cash.
He enclosed promissory notes for 312,000 of the $30,000 de-
sired.83 ' I

The entire family answered Richard's plea for money with
a simple statement of their own situation. In a letter bear-
ing the names of George, George, Jr., Benjamin and John they
told him that they did not have the cash nor the means to
raise it. They told him that they had all 10 st heavily since
the, firm had broken up. "We owe at home & abroad about 20,000?)

 

83. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to George Crownin-
shield, Sr., New York, Feb. 8, 1811.

165

do no means of paying but from the America's stock -- only
60003 in Sam:L Williams hand, now if we put the America cargo
into‘your hands, the Ship must lay by, you only know how
long.” Their closing statement, exaggerated though it may
be because of the context in which it was written, summed up
the position of their firm, ". . . in fact Richard, you only
out of all the family are the only one who has made anything
since the 01 solution, 6: you have actually by your own state-
ment, more means of raising money than we §1_l_ put together."34
John Crowninshi eld wrote his brother the following day
with a summary of his own personal affairs. They were similar
to those of the rest of the family. '

My own property like your own is out, what little on hand will
not sell to pay my immediate and unavoidable calls. do my two
last Russia market from Archangel vessels did not bring half
their stocks. it is now with Penn Townsend left there with
it. --& there is no one who can tell or pretend to calculate
if it will come home safe. The little Telemachus is gone to
Bordeaux with a very small cargo green fish etc -- you can
tell if she will return in safety as well as anyone can. .
what property at home will pay my debts but it cannot be sold
-- but yet necessity is obliging me to force the sale in as
prudent a way as it can be done. -- it is but a short time
since that a friend in Boston paid a considerable sum for me
at is now repaying himself from goods which was put in his
hands for that purpose from the pressure of the times. We
find that is is not dishonourable to request a. friend to post-
pone his gemand, but he must be made secure 3: it is our duty
130 do its

 

84. EI, Crowninshield Ms., George, Jr., George, Ben-
jamin, and John to Richard Crowninshield, Salem, Feb. 13, 1811.

85. El, Crowninshield .Is., John to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Feb. 14, 1811.

166.

The position in which the Crowninshields found them-
selves in the spring of 1811 was being repeated and worse in
other Salem commercial firms. Chronicler Bentley noted in
his diary the failure of a Captain John Barr, who had endorsed
notes totalling $300,000 and was committed to pay $200,000
for which he had "no kind of property to that amount. These
things explain the state of the Commercial world & the in-
fluence it has upon the moral."86 The following month Bentley
reported new bankruptcies of individuals who had speculated
in the morass of commercial affairs and had been caught short
when payments were due.87 In April, 1811, the number of those
who failed in business increased. "Repeated failures among
the Tradesmen turned Merchants. They could sail down the
Ohio without steering but lost when they entered the Ocean."88
Other reports of "failures of Speculators" were mentioned by
Bentley later in the year, although he tended to repeat his
contention that those who failed were those who were not
natives of Salem, and not members of the old established
churches of Salem.89 The implication from this was that those
who failed were mainly those'who gainedltheir wealth hurriedly

 

86. Bentley, Diar , Feb. 17, 1811, IV, 7.
87. Ibid., Mar. 14, 1811, IV, 11.
88. Ibid., Apr. 23, 1811, IV, 17.

89. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1311, Iv, 51-52, and Oct. 12,
1811, IV,‘BBT‘

157.

and were not clever enough or eXperienced enough in the
field of mercantile activity to succeed when conditions
became difficult.

Richard Crowninshi eld managed to avoid succumbing to
the cri sis'he faced in February of 1811. On February 17 he
wrote a letter assuring his family that he would never do
anything which would lower their credit rating or result in
a loss to them. He said that he had ssumed that they could
raise the money he needed rather readily. He resented their
inference that he could not repay them in time for them to
meet their own obligations?O On February 20 he told them that
he had raised $20,000 by giving some bills and by putting up
some of his vessels as security.91

John Crowninshi eld had not been exaggerating the extent
of his financial embarrassment when he had refused to aid
Richard in the settlement of his. debts. In. a series of let-
ters written during the month of March of 1811 to a William
Marston of Boston, John arranged to have hemp sold at a con-
siderable sacrifice to meet some outstanding bills, amounting

to 537.120.31.92 The year 1811 opened with the most dismal

 

90. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to George, George, Jr.,
John, and Benjamin Crowninshield, New York, Feb. 17, 1811.

91. EI, Crowninshie1d2~is., Richard to George, George, Jr.,
John, and Benjamin Crowninshield, New York, Feb. 20, 1811.

92. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crownins‘rdeld to .111.
Marston, Salem, Mar. 4 to Mar. 28, 1811. ‘

168.

prospects for the entire Crowninshield family of any year
since the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution in
1792.

Reports from European agents continued to be discourag-
ing. The disastrous French market situation, the dangers of
which were multiplied by the presense of British ships which
preyed on American merchants, has already been mentioned. A
report from Hamburg indicated that the confi scatory tariffs
which had caused the loss of the cotton in Denmark on 1810
still obtained. It stated ". . . that a part of the goods
will be received as duty for the rest . . . if no more fa-
vorable mode is adopted this will always leave a part to the
propi etor. "93 In June of 1811 new correspondence showed
little change in French markets. Little commerce was report-
ed. Sugar, cotton and coffee were scarce enough to sell well,
although the source thought that none except the very best
quality would return a profit.94 Similar conditions held in
August of 1811. American goods could be imported, but two
thirds of the value of the return cargoes had to be in French

produced silk goods. Changes were eXpected shortly.95

 

93. E1, Crowninshield Ms., J. Pitcairn to John Crownin-
shield, Hamburg, Nov. 22, 1810.

94. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Preble to John Crownin-
shield, Paris, June 5, 1811.

95. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Morton & Russell to John
Crowninshield, Bordeaux, Aug. 8, 1811.

169.

Under these dismal circumstances the family firm sent
the Fame out to the East Indian area again in the spring of
1811. A The vessel was armed. She proceeded to Sumatra and
took on pepper there, and was successful in acquiring a load
although she had to stop at two different ports to acquire
enough to make the home trip. Included in her cargo was one
buffalo, not indicative that she carried a tremendous load of
pepper. The game completed an uneventful trip by arriving
back in Salomon November 28, 1811. It was the shortest trip
that had been made to Sumatra and back up to that time, seven
months and ten days.96 The voyage of the Fame represented a
faint glimmer of hope that the old marketsmight come back,
and that the old conditions might again prevail. 0n the other
hand, Dr. Bentley, after noting the arrival of the Egg from
Sumatra, discussed the affairs of the family as follows:
"They have lost their property almost as fast as they collect-
ed it from their unsuccessful enterprises. Some taken, some
detained, some foundered, some upon false credit, do some from
overstocked markets. These things are different from what
they have been in past years when we might risk anything with-
out danger. "97 Crowninshield fortunes were at a low ebb by
the end of 1811.

 

96. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Log of ship Fame.
97. Bentley, Diar , Nov. 28, 1811, IV, 70.

170.

Throughout the year 1811, however, John Crowninshi eld had
retained one ship in the European area. She was the Golden Age,
with William Fairfield as captain. She had arrived at the
island of Minorca in January of 1811 with a cargo which was
not admitted to the continent, mainly rum and tobacco. Rumors
had reached him at that time of the revocation of the French
decrees. After consulting with the British commander as to
their attitude toward American commerce with France, he decided
that the only continental area safe for American trade was the
Italian Adriatic coast. He then reported the sale of his car-
go. Sales were bad but he though it better to sell than to
retain the cargo and suffer further 00 sts of carrying and
handling.98

The next word from the Golden Age came in February, 1811,
when her captain reported the impressment of two men by the
British frigate Cambrian. The two had had different papers
from the rest of the crew. In addition the British captain
charged that Captain Fairfi eld had threatened an officer of
the British navy, a charge which Fairfield denied. The
Golden Age was at Terragona’off the south coast of Spain.99

Fairfi eld remained at Terragona for more than a month.

In a report to John Crowninshield in late March he said that

 

98. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Fairfield to John Crownin-
shield, Minorca, Jan. 6, 1811.

99. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Fairfield to Am. consul at
Mahon, Spain, Terragona, Feb. 20, 1811

171 .

he had sacrificed his entire outward cargo. He was taking on
a load of wine for his next sales venture. He had had favor-
able reports of the markets on wine from both Lisbon and Eng-
land, and had placed a private adventure in wine on another
boat bound for Lisbon.100 His report of May 21 came from
Lisbon. He reported that wine prices were off there. He now
contemplated going on to Plymouth in England to sell the wine.
As to the Lisbon markets, he considered them bad. "The markets
in this quarter are overstocked with Colonial Produce & also
the productions of our country." He explained that possibil-
ities in England were much better. However, if he could not
obtain cash for his cargo there he thought he would return
to Gibralter so as to obtain cash which he could remit to
John Crowninshield.101

These letters reached John Crowninshi eld in America
early in July. He answered quickly, telling Fairfi eld to
remit some of his money to Samuel Williams in London and to
try to pick up a salable cargo in England. He thought it
advisable to proceed to the Mediterranean area, and there,
preferably at Sicily, pick up a cargo for the West Indies.
If a British cargo were obtained, Fairfi eld should not bring

 

100. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Fairfield to John Crownin-
shield, Terragona, Mar. 24, 1811.

101. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Fairfield to John Crownin-
shield, Lisbon, May 21, 1811, and May 23, 1811.

172.

it to the United States.102 Five days later John wrote

Fairfi eld not to attempt to pick up a cargo in England, but

to take what cash he had and go .to the Mediterranean Sea.

He should go to Malta and. try to pick up a cargo which would
sell in the West Indi es.103 This was the period when both
John and Richard Crowninshi eld were suffering heavy losses
from their continental trade. John's vaficillation and frequent
changes of mind are explainable when one considers that he had
just received notice of the loss of the Telemachus to British
privateers for violating the continental'blockede, and that
his brother Richard had lost three vessels engaged in that
same trade since April.

In July of 1811, Fairfield reported to his shipowner that
he had arrived in England. Some of his cargo of wine had been
rejected as being of poor quality upon arrival.104 Throughout
the months of August, September, October and November Fair-
field remained in Plymouth, England, attempting to settle the
snarled mess of the sale of wines. He had contracted with a
Captain Carleton to reship the wine to a Baltic port, as it
would not sell in England. Carleton had taken the wine, but

H.- ‘4'-

102. EI, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Wm.
Fairfield, Salem, July 3, 1811.

 

103. EI, Crowninshield 51s., John Crowninshield to Elm.
Fairfield, Salem, July 8, 1811.

104. El, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfi eld to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, July 25, 1811.

173 .

had later refused payment on the grounds that the wine was

of such defective quality that it would not sell. After con-
sulting with Samuel Williams, Fairfi eld had Carleton jailed.
Released on bail, he still refused to arbitrate on the wine
settlement, and Fairfi eld was delayed throughout this extended

105

period waiting for payment. Finally, in December, 1811,

Fairfi eld reported to John Crowninshield that he had settled
the wine incident at aloss of 500 L106
The next action of Captain Fairfi eld appeared to make

no sense whatever. He bought 750 hogsheads of pilchards at
Plymouth and headed for the .‘Iediterranean sea in December,
1811. He had reci eved 5410 L in the wine settlement, and the
cost of the pilchards had been only 700 Is. He had hopes of
avoiding a loss on the exchange rate in the Mediterranean area
by carrying the pilchards. He told John Crowninshield that
he was going to Sicily, in all probability.107 As Sicily

was under British control, high profits on the cargo of fish
from England could not have been anticipated by Fairfi eld.

En route to Sicily, while in the Mediterranean Sea, the Golden

Ag e met a French privateer. Fairfi eld was taken on board her

 

105. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, see letters written Sept. and Oct. 1811.

106. El, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, Dec. 2, 1811.

107. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, Dec. 2, 1811.

174.

where he "was very Politely treated, and after 20 minutes
detention allowed to proceed on my voyage." Perhaps this polite
treatment caused Fairfield to assume that the conditions of the
Continental System would no longer apply. Perhaps the captain
of the privateer gave him information which led him to believe
that he could land Briti sh produce at French controlled Naples
with impunity. Whatever his reasoning, instead of going to
British Sicily, Fairfield took the Golden Age to French Naples.
He wrote, "I arrived at Naples on the 19th Febry where my car-
go was Immediately Confi seated 8: sold by order of Govt.

"The cause assign'd for such Proceeding was that I had
not alNeapoliten licence, tho' it prov'd finally, that every
vessel having such a Document, were in a much worse situation
then the Golden Age."108

The Golden Age was held in quarantine in Naples for forty
days after her cargo was taken. At the end of that time, Fair-
field took on a cargo of wine and set out on the return trip
to England. On May 23, 1812, he was back in Plymouth, England,
attempting to sell his wine.109

Some explanation of the action of Captain Fairfield in

this obvious contravention of the Napoleonic Decrees appeared

 

108. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, May 23, 1812.

109. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, May 23, 1812.

175 .

when the price of the fish in Naples became known. In an
attempt to collect spoliation for the cargo John Crowninshield
claimed that he had lost $35,000 on the seizure of the Golden
ggp pay load.110 That sum, contrasted with the 700B cost of
the fish on board ship in England, made rather formidable risks
seem worth taking. Too, Alexander Hammett, American consul
in Naples, suggested that Fairfield had made a deal for the
pilchards (such as an agreement to split the proceeds with a
privateer captain or a dishonest official) and had received
a partial settlement.lll I

William Fai rfield remained in England attempting to sell
his wine through the rest of May and all of June, 1812. His
first report indicated that the British government might be
willing to purchase the cargo; if they would not, he planned
to sell it through Mr. Samuel Williams.112 This impression
was destroyed by the news that the British government planned
to grant licenses to import wines and brandy from France,
"which destroys all hope of effecting a sale here. - - -
therefore no person would make any offer for the cargo after

those arrangements, showing no alternative left but to seek a

 

110. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Maxey to John Crowninshield,
Washington, Oct. 20, 1834. .

111. El, Crowninshield Ms., Alex. Hammett to John Crown-
inshield, Naples, May 6, 1833. '

112. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, June 14, 1812.

176.

market in some other quarter."113 After conferring with
Williams, Fairfield wrote that he planned to Join a convoy
being formed in London and sail with it to the Baltic Sea.

The charges were to be 5 to 6 per cent out and 2 to 3 per

cent for the return trip. Williams considered it possible
that the wine might sell at Copenhagen or Gothenburg, possibly
without depositing "the proceeds of the Wine in the publick
(treasury?) and draw [ing] it out in 22 monthly payments"114
as was customary. In September, 1812, Fairfi eld wrote that he
was in a convoy bound for St. Petersburg. "The prospects of
obtaining a good Price for the wine at St. Petersburg appear
flattering."115 Meanwhile, the United States had declared war
on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.

The adventures of the Golden Age in her wanderings in
European waters for twenty months between the end of 1810 and
autumn of 1812 show clearly the strangling effect of the com-
peting blockade systems on the limited shipping which managed
to avoid direct confiscation of vessel and cargo. Available

markets were glutted with goods the American carrier had to

 

113. E1, Crowninshield Ms., W . Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, July 3, 1812.

114. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fed rfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, July 5, 1812.

115. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Plymouth, Sept. 9, 1812. This letter was written
with this address apparently after Fairfield had left England
and was en route to St. Petersburg.

177.

offer. Those who succeeded in landing their goods were fiarc-
ed.to suffer delays in arranging sales. Dubious return car-
goes had to be accepted for produce carried into harbors to
ayoid taking a further loss on the exchange rate, which was al-
ways rigged against the merchant. The danger of the privateer
was always present. Convoys which were run to avoid this dan-
ger dipped into the slender profits or added to the losses
1 which were being sustained. And lurking in the consciousness
of each merchant captain, like a desire for some forbidden but
very delicious fruit, was the knowledge of fabulous prices to
be obtained for his wares in the closed ports. If he resisted
temptation and stayed on the open markets he faced slow but
sure losses. On the other hand, quick confiscation awaited
those who failed to resist the lure of the prohibited port.
Meanwhile, in America, the fortunes of the Crowninshields
continued to spiral downward. Richard, never quite recovering
from the crisis he had passed through in February of 1811,
acknowledged debts to J0hn Crowninshield of $19,800, borrowed
in amounts of $5,000, $4,300, $5,000, and $5,500. His only
possibility of payment was enclosed; two insurance policies
that were valued at $10,000 each which he had taken out on his
vessel, the S 1 h, which had been lost in the Continental trade

in early 1811;16He estimated the amount due on the two policies

 

116. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, July 13, 1911.

178.

as $16,997.50, but that he could do no better so far as pay-
ment was concerned. John noted that he had lost $3,912.00

in the transaction.117 Actually John was overly optimistic in
spite of his bad arithmetic. One of the Insurance companies
refused to pay its claim until the account it had with Richard,
amounting to $9,463.64 of the $10,000 policy, had been set-

tied.118

In January of 1812 Richard was brought to court by his
creditors to attempt to fierce payment of his bad debts. He
sent letters to hisifamily, asking them to come to New York
and testify as to the validity of notes in which he acknow-
ledged money owed to them.119 In February word arrived in
Salem that Richard was in Jail and that his wife and children
were in want. A friend of Richard's wrote to ask John to send
them aid.120 Richard Crowninshield went through bankruptcy
proceedings in 1812. His creditors were paid, according to
notes in the Essex Institute, about 67 per cent of the value
of their loans to Richard. In addition to the $20,000 he owed

to his brother John (which was not paid in the bankruptcy

117. EI, Crowninshield £19., note by John Crowninshield.

118. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Bailey & Willis to John
Crowninshield, New York, Jan 11, 1812.

119. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
New York, Jan. 30, 1812.

120. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Silvanus i-Iiller to John
Crowninshield, New York, Feb. 4, 1812.

179 o

proceedings, because of John's acceptance of the insurance
policies the summer before) he owed debts of $12,000 to the
family firm and $13,000 to a brother—in-law, Nathaniel Sils-
bee.121 John Crowninshield paid the legal fee, $227, for
Richard's bankruptcy proceedings.l‘22

John Crowninshield's affairs were in less danger than
those of his brother. His ships had suffered sizeable loss-
es in the two and one-half years following the repeal of the
Embargo. He still had some vessels at sea, and retained hope
of adequate returns on cargoes that were not definitely known
to be lost. His losses in the Russian market had not cost
him any ships, although they had been heavy. William Fair-
field's reports from the Golden Age, although never showing
any profits, eXpressed confidence in finding a market which
would give some returns. The Diomede, sent to Russia in the
spring of 1811 to recover the goods and money from the ill-
fated voyages of the Telemach:u§ and the M, had returned to
Salem in the autumn of that year. She had been sent to Man-
ila in 1812 in the hope of obtaining a cargo. Some relief had

123
been afforded with an advance in the low prices of Russian goods

 

121. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Letter to John Crowninshield,
no date, no signature.

122. ELI, Crowninshield 143., Receipt to John Crowninshield,
Apr. 12, 1812.

123. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Bailey i- Willis to John Crown-
inshield, New York, Jan. 6, and Jan 18, 1812.

180.-

in January, 1812.

. The relief was temporary, however. No firm could stand
the consistent losses which John Crowninshield had had for an
indefinite period. He received a severe financial blow when
the insurance companies refused to pay on the policies he had
accepted from Richard in lieu of payment of a $20,000 debt.
Likewise in January, John requested William Marston, his Bos-
ton merchant, to pay an 3800 debt for him without security, a

function normally performed by those representing major commer-

cial firms. He received the following answer:

. . . I am truly sorry that . . . you should wish me to for-
ward you, your proportion of Ravens duc re a/c/August, and

to pay your note to Mr. Bradbury for over $800. --for, upon
every principle of commission business, I think I ought t3
decline it. - If I should comply, it would make me in advance
nearly 2000 dolr8 - Eithout any fund§,-- and.0arry me com-
pleatly over my bounds, of what I call the best of Rules --
viz., Not to advance without Funds -- I think you must be seno-
ible that such rules ought to be strictly attended to; It
certainly will give greater confidence amongst all my friends
-- Had I dispensed with those rules 5 years since -- shggld

I am sure, have been bankrupt 2 or 3 times before now.

Marston then proceeded to sell John Crowninshield's-ravens
duck and apply it to John's debts.125 On February 17, 1812
Marston sent him a financial statement which indicated further

trouble. "All your goods on hand are worth about $2100

 

124. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Marston to John Crown-
inshield, Boston, Jan. 11, 1812.

125. E1, Crowninshield Ms., John Dodge to John Crownin-
shield, Boston, Jan. 22, 1812, and EI, Crowninshield Ms., wan.
Marston to John Crowninshield, Boston, Jan. 31, 1812.

181.

which when sold will leave a ballance in your favour of be-
tween 5 at 600 (10118 ---This you will perceive is a small sum
to retain for bad debts, when the whole amot outstanding is
near $6000."126
The months between March and August of 1812 were months
of trying to satisfy the demands of needy creditors for John
Crowninshield. The number of letters demanding cash for notes
held and the number of different individuals to whom John owed
money testify as to the uneasy state of his finances. On March
9, 1812, a letter from C. Bradbury, said: "Mr. J. Crowninshield,
Dear Sir, If perfectly convenient to you to pay the amt of your
note some time in. this month, it would oblidge me having some
cargo payments to provide for. "127 J. Putnam, on March 14,
1812, wrote John: "Sir We find among our notes yours of $255
for Premiums on the Harriott due us D] Feby to which we beg
your attention when convenient. "128 On March 20, 1812, William
Marston notified John that he had sold some of John's wine with-
out permission. John answered that he was displeased with the
sale, as it had been pmmised to a Captain Leach, but Marston

answered that Leach would probably prefer cash for his debt

 

126. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Marston to John Crown-
inshield, Boston, Feb. 17, 1812.

127. EI, Crowninshield Ms., C. Bradbury to John Crown-
inshield, Boston, Mar. 9, 1812.

128. EI, Crowninshield Ms., J. Putnam to John Crownin-
shield, Boston, Mar. 14, 1812.

182.

than the wine.l29 Other notes continued to arrive with re-
quests or demands or acknowledgements of a deferred date for
the notes from various individuals.130

John's only salable cargoes were those he had obtained
from Russia and some wine that he had held. His delay in sell-
ing these goods indicated that the markets were highly unfav-
orable. He had ignored the ri as that had occurred in Russian
cargoes in January, 1812, and had sent some of his hemp to
Philadelphia for sale there. Dull Philadelphia markets had
forced him to move the hemp on to Baltimore, just as the family
firm had done ten years earlier while dealing with Russian
goods. Baltimore reported dull markets, and that the only
possible sales would result in a heavy loss on the hemp.131
Improved markets early in April brought the sale of this cargo

132

in Baltimore. The necessity of moving it from market to

market eliminated whatever hope John had had for profit on it.

 

129. EI, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Wm.
Marston, Salem, Mar. 20, 1812, and Wm. Marston to John Crown-
inshield, Boston, Mar. 21, 1812.

130. See letters, EI, Crowninshield Ms., Joseph White to
John Crowninshield, no place given, Apr. 24, 1812; C. Bradbury
to John Crowninshield, Boston, June 4, 1812; July 5, 1812,
and July 12, 1812; Also seePM, Crowninshield Ms., John
Crowninshield to C. Bradbury, Salem, July 4, 1812 and July

131. E11, Crowninshield Ms., Jona. Felt to John Crownin-
shield, Baltimore, Mar. 15, 1812.

132. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Henry Payson to John Crown-
inshield, Baltimore, Apr. 3, 1812 and Apr. 8, 1812.

183.

In June, 1812, John Crowninshield was forced to reduce
some of his capital assets to meet notes which were due. He
transferred a small parcel of land located next to the Crown-
inshield wharf, and his one-sixth of the wharf itself to his
father George for $14,000 that he owed him.133 In early
August, 1812, he inquired as to the possibility of wine sales
in Boston. The report came back that the price on wines was
Very dull.134 He then tried to obtain an advance on the wines.
The answer that came'back was the familiar answer of the cau-
tious merchant, ". . . I should be happy to make an advance
on your wine, but haveing advanced largely on many goods on
hand it is not in my power to advance any more at present,
you will have a Just Idea of this no doubt when you recollect
the dull sale of all goods at present." The merchant, William
Ray of Boston, advised John to sell the wine at short credit
to a wine dealer rather than hold it further.135

In the summer of 1812, after war with Great Britain
broke out, John Crowninshield faced the same ruin his brother
Richard had suffered. His assets had dwindled from the small
fleet he had owned to two small vessels, the schooner Elizabeth_

 

133. E1, Crowninshield Hs., Bill of Sale for wharf,.
June 23, 18120

134. E1, Crowninshield Ms., wm. Ray to John Crownin-
shield, Boston, Aug. 1, 1812.

shield, Boston, Aug. 3, 1812.

184.

and the brig Bets , which he had limited to American waters.
His two vessels still at sea, the Golden Age and the Diomede,
were not to return to Salem. That most valuable asset of the
merchant, credit, was removed from John by the merchants with
whom he dealt. John did not go through bankruptcy proceedings
as Richard had done. His debts had been kept more among mem-
bers of his irmnediate family or Salem and Boston creditors

who did not hail him into court for settlement as Richard's
creditors had dome in New York.

The only section of the fires-headed Crowninshi eld firm
not to go under financially was the parent firm, consisting of
the two Georges and Benjamin W. They had lost heavily because
of the European restrictions on shipping, but managed to re-
tain two large vessels, the £21313. and the America which.they
sent out privateering once the war with Great Britain broke
out. The parent firm, however, had tended to avoid European
markets during the vigorous enforficement of the Continental
System and Orders in Council. They were not forced to sell
off their wealth-producing goods or suffer the embarrassment
of continued debts as was John Crowninshi eld. Neither were
they compelled to settle their accounts at law as Richard had
done.

In summing up the fortunes of the Crowninshi eld family,
one observes that their decline, as their eXpansion had been,
was a result of Eumean affairs. They had suffered during
the Embargo, but their suffering had been a limitation of

185.

growth rather than great losses. Once the Embargo had lifted,
and they were allowed to return to their old markets and trad-
ing areas, they began to lose much more heavily. Ewidence
concerning the Crowninshi elds indicated that the cost of the
Embargo to the shipper was cheap compared to continued com-
mercial intercourse, whether or not that intercourse was
limited to belligerent areas. At first they had learned by the
application of the confiscation and seizure restrictions of
the Continental System and British measures and.actions finat
the profitable colonies-to-continent trade was not permitted.
Forced into marginal trade areas, they had lost money because
of overstocked markets and delays in handling their goods.
Each venture back into the ever-narrowing legal area of con-
tinental trade had cost them money, whether by confiscatory
tariffs or complex port restrictions. Their venture into the
extremely low margin trade, represented by Russia, was disas-
trous. When they attempted to carry American cargoes to
France as the last possible market, their ships were seized
and confiscated by the British. The three year period between
June, 1809, when the Crowninshield fleet went forth under the
partial freedom of non-intercourse, and June, 1812, when the
war with Great Britain broke out, had seen the reduction of
their fortunes to the point where only the parent firm had
enough resourses to join in the wave of privateering which

came With the war.

:6.

H
(I)

The beginning of the War of 1812 marked the end of the
period in which.the Crowninshields were engaged.in the un-
equal commercial struggle against the goliaths of Europe.

The economic affairs of the family were in ruins. Richard
had been eliminated from commerce, and did not continue mar-
itime activity. John's two remaining ships were at sea when
the war came; the parent firm alone had two large ships at
Salem.

With the news of the outbreak of war (June 1812), the
citizens of Salem, and particularly the Republican ones,
hastened to send out privateers in search of British merchant-
men. The parent Crowninshi eld firm, the only branch of the
family which was still able to put ships to sea, entered
vigorously into the battle. American ships were successful
in the early days of the war, and the vessels owned by the
Crowninshields were very successful in the summer, autumn, and
early winter of 1812.

The first Crowninshi eld privateer to take to sea was
the little yacht Jefferson, of twenty-two tons, which headed
for open waters with a crew of thirty on July 1, 1812.136
However small she may have been, two prizes to the Jefferson
appeared in Salem harbor On July 11.137 The Jefferson was

too small for privateering. A Maine woman, who saw the crew

 

136. Bentley, Diar , July 1, 1812, IV, 104.
137. Ibid., July 11, 1812, IV, 106.

187.

of the Jefferson coming ashore to purchase milk, commented

 

that "when I saw you landing, I could.think of nothing else

"138

than so many goslins in a bread tray. Bigger Crownin-

shield ships were ready to go out to take up the task which
the Jefferson had begun.

In August the two large Crowninshield vessels, the £222
and the America, were readied for the see. On her first cruise
the John captured eleven British merchantmen.l39 The next voy-
age of the gghn ended on October 23, 1812, after forty-five
days at sea. She had taken five vessels on this cruise, al-
though only one had arrived at Salem by this time. Some of
the problems of privateering were suggested in the report on
the John, Of the eleven prizes she had taken on her first
voyage, only three had been "secured". On her second cruise
she had retaken an American privateer which had had so many
British prisoners on board that they had revolted and put the
American captain and crew in irons.140 The £222 made one more
cruise, her third, which ended with the vessel being captured
by the British and sent to St. Thomas. Bentley described her
as the largest and best of the vessels of Salem which had'been

captured.141

 

138. Lipid” July 16, 1812, Iv, 107.
139. 121i.. Aug. 21, 1812, IV, 110.
140. .I_b_ig., Oct. 23, 1812, Iv, 125.
141. _I_13_i_c_1_., Mar. 19, 1813, IV, 159.

The most successful privateer of the Crowninshields was
the America. The America was a large vessel, and extremely
fast. She managed to avoid capture throughout the entire
war, and went on five successful cruises. Because of her great
speed she was able to outrun any ship dangerous enough to cause
her trouble.142 The success of the America assisted in re-
building the fortunes of the Crowninshield family.

The America put to sea "for the first time . . . against
British shipping" on September 7, 1812. She carried sixteen
guns and was "prai sed as the best ship ever fitted from this
Port for an armed vessel."'143 The legendary feats of this
ship during the war justified this high praise from Dr. Bent-
ley. On January 5, 1813, a prize of the America came to Salem
and reported that the ship had been in the British Channel
attacking shipping. Two of her five captured vessels had

arrived at Salem.144 .Later in January Bentley described the

America as the "mo st successful Ship in our Port & Ehe one

14
that; will divide the largest sums." 5

The America came back to Salem in the late winter, and

by the end of March was away again with a new contingent of

 

142. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 402-03.
143. Bentley, m, Sept. 7, 1812, IV, 115.

144. 1213., Jan. 5, 1813, IV, 144.

145. _I_b.i_d._, Jan. 25, 1813, IV, 147.

139.

officers. This second voyage was successful, but nearly
disastrous, as the America was chased up the kennebec by Brit-
ish vessels.146 On her neXt voyage the America was fitted for
the sea at Bath in Maine, and by December 13, 1813 was report-
ed back at sea again.147 At the end of this cruise, her third,
in April of 1814, it was estimated that she had taken 26 prizes,
of which the number which arrived at Salem were worth "11 hun-
dred thousand dollars."'148 Prizes of the America continued to
come into American ports throughout the remainder of the war
period.149 Late in 1814 the now famous ship suffered damages
to her mast which removed her from the lists of privateers

for a time.150 She went to sea for one last voyage after the
repairs were made. When the America reached Salem three months
after the end of the war, she had captured forty-one prizes,

of which twenty-seven arrived safely in America and of which
the Crowninshields received one-half the total value.151 The

 

146. J. D. Phillips, Salem an‘d_the Indies, p. 400.

147. Bentley, Diary, Nov. 2 and 12, 1813, IV, 213-14:
and Dec. 13, 1813, IV, 221.

148. Ibid., Apr. 1, 1814, IV, 246.

149. Ibid., Mar. 21, 1814, IV, 244; Apr. 1, 1814, IV, 246;
also J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 401-02.

150. Bentley, Diem, Nov. 10 and 14, 1814, IV, 297, 298.

151. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 405-06.
For the complete account of the privateering career of the Amer-
iga see B. B. Crowninshield, "The Private Armed Ship America,"
Essex Institute Historical Collections, Vol. 37, p. 1.

190.

Crowninshield family firm succeeded in making the war pay
enough to regain the wealth they had lost in the years imme-
diately before the war.

John Crowninshield was not so fortunate in avoiding loss
as his brothers and his father. His Golden Age, heading for
St. Petersburg with a cargo of wine shortly after the United
States declared war, had gone instead to Stockholm. Consider-
able confusion existed in the convoy system which had develop-
ed. When the news of the outbreak of war arrived at Gothen-
burg in late July, 1812, many United States vessels were cap-
tured. Apparently the Golden Age was one of those fortunate
enough to escape, although Captain Fairfi eld spoke of being in
a British convoy after that time.152 In the spring of 1813
Fairfield reported that the cargo of the ship was only bring-
ing enough to pay his eXpenses plus duties. He was forced to
sell the wine at low prices, and then only at three or four
pipes per sale. His only hope of retrieving anything on the
ship itself was to sell her, but that would be difficult be-
cause the vessel was not large enough to satisfy Swedish buyers.

Fairchild had discharged the crew of the vessel, but they had

 

152. Franklin D. Scott, "President Madi son's Foreign
Policy - The views of an American Merchant abroad in 1811,"
Jougna1:gf Modern History. XVI (1944), pp. 294-98. Also
EI, Crowninshield.Ms., wm. Fairfield to John Crowninshield,
Plymouth, England, Aug. 24, 1812 and Sent. 9, 1812. Goth-.
enburg is in Sweden opposite the point of the Danish penin-
sula.

191.

been unable to get home.153 Two weeks later a second letter
reported that Fairfield could'not sell his cargo or the ship.
Sales of wine had been reduced to the point where he was forc-
ed to sell it by the single pipe. He talked in terms of sell-
ing the Golden Age at a small fraction of what she would bring
in the United States, but the choice that he had was between
selling her at a tremendous loss or letting her rot in the har-
bor.154 The Crowninshi eld papers do not tell what happened to
the Golden Age, but she did not return to Salem and was presum-
ably a total loss.

John's other vessel, the Diomede, had been sent to the
Phillipines in the spring of 1812. In May, 1813, word arrived
in Salem that the Diomede had been captured and taken to Hal-
ifax by the British vessel La Hogue. John asked for permission
to go to Halifax to attempt to have his ship restored to him.
The war and the ease with which such ships were converted to
privateer-g made such a quest fruitless, although John did go
to Halifax.155

After this failure, John, left without any maritime

interests, decided to turn to privateering as his father and

 

153. El, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown,
inshield, Stockholm, Apr. 24, 1813.

154. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Wm. Fairfield to John Crown-
inshield, Stockholm, May 6, 1813.

155. PM, Crowninshield Ms., John Crowninshield to Richard
Cetts, Salem, May 18, 1813, and EI, Crowninshield Ms., Bailey
8c Willis to John Crowninshield, New York, May 19, 1813.

192.

brothers had done so successfully. He went to New York City,
and.between September, 1813, and January, 1814, he arranged

to have a fast schooner built, which he also called the
Diomede. Bentley's piggy recorded cryptically the story of
the new privat eer. On March 8, 1814, "The fast sailing
schooner built at New York on the Baltimore outline with im-
provements, the Diomede, John Crowninshield, commander, reach-
ed this port this morning."155 June 6, 1814, "We have the
disagreeable news that Capt. John Crowninshi eld of the Diomede,
armed vessel from this port, has been taken. Three of her
prizes have arrived in Maine. --The Diomede was taken by a
Sloop of war & could not escape as was expected by her high
reputation."157 John's fortune was not so bad as this indi-
cated, but he had nowhere near the success of the others of
his family. On the cruise between New York and Salem he had

158 and they brought him, as captain and

captured six prizes
part owner of the vessel, about $8,000. On her second and last
voyage she captured twelve vessels, of which only three arriv-
ed back in the United States safely.159 John, who had married

just before starting out on the voyage, spent the remainder of

 

156. Bentley, Diary, Mar. 8, 1814, IV, 240.
157. Ibid., June 6, 1814, IV, 258.

158. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Mary Boardman Crowninshield
to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, Salem, Mar 9, 1814.

159. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 405.

193.
the war a prisoner at Halifax.160
Richard Crowninshield turned to greener pastures follow-
ing his release from jail as a debtor. He went to Connect-
icut and became involved in woolen manufacturing, and toward
the end of the year 1814 returned to Salem to set up a textile

161 Later Richard constructed a building in Danvers

mill there.
to be used in woolen manufacturing.l62 His bankruptcy had
apparently saved him from the financial troubles which bothered
John Crowninshield for the remainder of his lifetime.

. The friendliness which had existed among the Crownin-
shield brothers had deteriorated by the end of the war to
something close to a condition of constant bickering. Rich-
ard had never completely forgiven the others for their fail-
ure to come to his aid when he faced emergencies in 1811.

When the war came both Richard and John were heavily in debt.
Irritations which had been concealed at the time of the fam-
ily split cropped up with the antagonism caused by the wide
discrepancy between the fortunes of these two and Benjamin,
George, and George, Jr. Apparently Richard and John were

urging George, Sr. to assist them with their debts. Benjamin,

 

160. Bentley, Diary, Apr. 4, 1814, IV, 247, and Mar.
16, 1815, IV, 320.

161. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1814, IV, 301.

162. Ibid., Oct. 29, 1815, IV, 358, and Mar. 21, 1816,
IV, 378.

in Washington, wrote his wife, . . .

R & J debts, from our money?

194.

tell me if Sir pays

this must not be done, his own

he can do what he pleases with, but he ought to know who

made in who left him in the hour of trouble. "163 Later he

wrote that "George must take care of our own property as

give nothing up, . . .
for nothing can be
suit, at law."164

longer speaking to

tell him how anxious I am about it,

got bag}; from John 8: Dicks hands, but by
Benjamin's wife reported that John was no
her in May, 1815.165 The trouble and an-

tagoni sm piled up when George, Sr., died and the spoils of

the estate were left for them to battle over.

George, Jr.,

refused to attend his father's funeral because he would not

sit with his brothers and their wives.166

Benjamin W. Crowninshield went to dashington, D. C., in

1814 to eXpedite the condemnation of some of the vessels that

the Crowninshi eld privateers had captured.

Hi s success in

getting the condemnations approved was worth "above half a

million of dollars. . . ."

The prizes to the America and

 

163. E1,
Crownin shi eld,
164. El,
Crownin shi eld,
‘ 165. m,
to denjamin W.
166. E1,

to Benjamin W.

Crowninshield £18., Benjamin N. to :Cary Boardman
Tut'asmngton, Apr. 29’ 1815.

Growninshi eld Ms. Benjamin W. to -.-lary Boardman
Washington, May 24, 1815.

Crowninshi eld Ms., Mary Boardman Crowninshi eld
Crowninshield, Salem, May 21, 1815,

Crowninshi eld Ms., Mary Boardman Crowninshi eld
Crowninshield, Salem, June 22, 1815.

195.

Jefferson were concer'ned.167 Later that year he accepted

Madi son's offer of the post his brother Jacob had refused
nine years earlier, that of Secretary of the Navy.168 While
in Washington he made the decision that was to remove the last
solvent Crowninshi eld firm from the shipping industry. He
wrote his wife, "Well, I have written to Sir & Geo that tis
best for us not to trade any more, this I think right, I ad-
vise to sell off all ships Hemp etc. get money & pay debts."169
Benjamin retained the post of Secretary of the Navy through
the rest of I-Eadi son's term and untill l8 8 served in the cab-
inet of James Irionroe‘.

George Crowninshield, Jr., who never married, provided
Salem with conversational topics throughout his lifetime.
During the summer of 1813 the famous Chesapeake-Shannon battle
occurred, in which Captain James Lawrence (of "don't give up
the ship" fame) was killed. The British took his body to
Halifax. At the request of the Crowninshield's Dr. Bentley
wrote James Madison asking for permission to go to Halifax

to recover the body}?0 Permission was granted, and Bentley

mentioned that George sailed on August 10, 1813.171 Feeling

 

167. Bentley, Dian, Mar. 17, 1814, IV, 242-43.
168. Ibid., Dec. 22, 1814, IV, 304.

169. E1, Crowninshield Ms., Benjamin W. to Mary Board-
man Crowninshield, Washington, Feb. 15, 1815.

170. Bentley, Diary, July 20, 1813, IV, 180-81.
171. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1813, IV, 187.

196.

in Salem was high in opposition to the war, and the wrath of
the Federali sts came to the surface when the body of this hero
was brought back to Salem later in the month. Bentley's des-
cription indicated the strength of this wrath.

The day of the interment of Capt. Lawrence dc Lieut. Ludlow.
Circumstances which will not be found in the printed account.
The North Meeting was refused under the influence of Samuel
Putnam, now a Senator of the State, 6c Icabod Nichols, a Master
of a Vessel a lately master of the Salem East India Marine,

19 black balls being in that Society against an attendance at
the funeral or a third of the whole. It is affirmed out of
doors not more than 12 propi store would have refused the North
House. If they would not few dare to shew any signs of dis-
approbation. Putnam wrote the note & Deacon Holman, as he
was required, signed it. . . . The bell of the North Church
did not toll, tho' we passed & turned at the Church. Again
not an officer of the State Government appeared with any
badge of Office. All the Officers of the General Government
offended. Gov. Strong was in his council determined not to
appear. The Arrangement was on the large scale. . . . Putnam
& Nichols left Salem upon the occasion of the solemnities to
express the maligni ty of their fefifings, etc. On the other
hand, Salem never saw such a day.

After making whateva' political capital was to be obtain-
ed by bringing the bodies to Salem, George Crowninshield ap-
plied for permission to take the bodies of Lawrence and Ludlow
to New York City, but the permission was refused.173 Later
the bodies were taken overland to New York, where final services
and burial occurred.174

. The indecisive conclusion of the War of 1812 ended the

period in which European conditions dominated Crowninshield

 

172. Ibid., Aug. 23, 1813, IV, 191.
173. Ibid., Sept. 2, 1813, IV, 195.
174. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 383.

197.

affairs. The family was no longer involved in the commerce
which had brought them wealth and fame. John Crowninshield
was in Halifax, a British prisoner; both Georges were in Salem
but no longer engaged in commerce; Richard was a novice man-
ufacturer; and Benjamin was serving as Secretary of the Navy
to James Madison. The war had restored the fortunes of the
three members of the old firm. On the other hand it had com-
pleted the destruction of John Crowninshi eld's wealth. Rich-
ard, engaged in manufacturing, was less directly concerned.
The ending of the war brought down the curtain on the
House of Crowninshield as a significant maritime concern.
The parent firm, which had grown weal thy again with the war,
retired from the sea voluntarily. Richard remained in manu—
facturing. John Crowninshield, who had lost his privateer
after brief successes, was never able to revive the Crownin-
shield name to its old position of power in the nation's

CO mmerceo

198.

Chapter V
"JACOBINS" IN SALEM

The political effects of the French Revolution and
Napoleon upon the affairs of the Crowninshi elds are closely
ti ed to the commercial development of the family firm. It
is doubtful if the Crowninshi elds, albeit capable, would have
climbed to the position of respect and authority in the area
of government without the economic power they derived as a
result of the unsettled conditions in Europe, although such
a thesis would be impossible to prove. On the other hand,
the political scene of which the Crowninshi elds were a part
was not considered with the account of their merchant activity,
and it is to this part of the Crowninshield story that this
section is devoted.

The American Revolution had been a relatively conserva-
tive affair. Henry Adams described Americans of the 1790's
as a group whose "soci ety was democratic; in the worst eX-
cesses of their own revolution they had never become savage
or blood thirsty; their experience could not explain, nor

could their imagination excuse, wild popular excesses; . . ."1

There had been few displays of wild radicalism in the early

 

1. H. Adams, United States, I, 82.

199.

stages of the French Revolution either, although the storming
of the Bastile, the descent of peasants upon country homes of
the nobility in the late summer of 1789, the march of the
women upon Versailles, or the establishment of the liberal
constitutional monarchy in 1791 might be so termed. Hence
the great majority of American s, recipimts of French aid in
their struggle for independence, were inclined to view without
disfavor the establishment of constitutional government in
France.2 William Bentley reported toasts being drunk favoring
the French Revolution at a meeting of the militia in 17913 ‘
and as late as January of 1793 his diary indicated considerable
public support for the liberalism of France.4
The execution of Louis XVI in January, 1793, changed
some of this sentiment. Bentley, whose liberal leanings are
obvious, wrote of the "melancholy news of the beheading of
the Roi de France" and-said that the "french loose much of
their influence upon the hearts of the Americans by this
event."5 Women in Boston wore a black rose in honor of the

monarch who had aided in the cause of American independence,

and in Providence the bells tolled at the news of the

 

2. Eugene P. Link, Democratic-Remblican Societies, 119 -
1800,(I-iorningside Heights, N. r., 1942), pp. 44-45.

3. Bentley, Diar , Sept. 5, 1791, I, 295.
4. Ibid., Jan. 9 and 18, 1793, II, 2; Jan. 31, 1793, I, 4.
5. Ibid., 1"'Iaro 25, 1793, II, 130

200.

eXecution.6 With the building up of revolutionary intensity
following the proclamation of the Republic in France, most
New Englanders tended to look:with alarm at their erstwhile
benefactor. "Thenceforward the mark of a wise and good.man
was that he abhorred the French Revolution, and believed
democracy to be its cause. Like Edmund Burke, they listened
to no argument: 'It is a vile, illiberal school, this French
Academy of the sans-culottes; there is nothing in it that is
fit for a gentleman to learn.’ The answer to every democratic
suggestion ran in a set phrase, ‘Look at France.' "7

New England Federalism seized upon the odious terror of
French radi cali sm'and associated opposition to their political
befiefs with the evils of Jacobini sm. The Federalist half of
the population, which according to Adams cast about 25,000
votes in Massachusetts in the late 1790's (contrasted with
about 20,000 votes by the Republican half), "included nearly
every one in the professional and mercantile classes, and rep-
resented the wealth, social position and education of the Com-
monwealth; but its strength lay in the Congregational churches
and in the cordial union between the clergy, the magistracy,
the bench and bar, and respectable society throughout the
state."8 The union of respectability, bench, and religion

 

6. Ibid., Apr. 2, 1793, II, 14.
7. H. Adams, United States, I, 82.
8. Ibid., I, 76.

201.

tended to ostracize and strike out against dissenters of all
types, and in an Eighteenth Century application of guilt by
association, political opponents to their rule assumed the
proportions of the bloodthirsty French extremists. "The dem-
ocrat had no caste; he was not respectable; he was a Jacobin,
-- and no such character was admitted into a Federalist house.
Every dissolute intriguer, loose-liver, forger, false-coiner,
and prison-bird; every athiest, -- was a follower of Jefferson;
and Jefferson himself was the incarnation of their theories."9
’One continental interpreter of the change in this seg—
ment of American attitude toward France considered the attack
on religion as the dominant factor in the change. He consid-
ered the enthusiasm of the United States for the revolution
as being retained so long as Americans thought the attack of
the apostles of reason to be against Roman Catholicism and not
against Christianity itself. Hence they "protested little" at
the execution of Louis XVI. As soon as the pure deism of the
movement revealed itself in America, through what were called
the anti-Chri stian speeches of Genet, anti-French and anti-
Revolution sentiment soared. "It was no longer a valuable
auxiliary that they saw in the French Revolution, but a power-

ful enemy that would have replaced the religion of Christ with

 

9. Ibid., I, 79-80.

202.

the worship of man deified.":LO Despite the variance of
opinion as to the source of the new feeling concerning France,
there is little disagreement with the statement that a sol-
idification of opposition feeling, based upon religious-
political grounds, did develop in the period of three years
following the execution of Louis XVI.

The outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars forced
the American nation to take a stand. The United States was
bound to France by the treaty of alliance Signed in 1778, but
was in no position to undertake a war at the side of the
French Republic. American neutrality was therefore proclaim-
ed. American political opinion was splitting over the problem
of which of the two major antagonists was our worst enemy, and
the early raids upon shipping conducted by both powers did
little to lessen the problem. Several incidents of the early
years of the war, most significant of which were the Gen8t
affair in 1793, the negotiation and signature of the Jay Treaty
with England in 1794, and the Quasi-War situation with France
between 1798 and 1800 which made commerce so hazardous, all
tended to place American politics on a base where prime issues

between the two political groups centered around the attitude

 

10. Bernard Pay, The Revolutionary Spirit in France
and America, tr. from the French by Ramon Guthrie (New York,

1927). pp. 353- 68

203.
toward the two major belligerents.ll The latter two of these
events have been dealt with earlier, but the Genet mission to
America, which was very influential in forming American opinion,
needs some eXplanation. .

Edmond Gen’e‘t had been sent by the French Republic to the
United States as minister. He arrived in America at the port
of Charleston in early 1793 and proceeded overland to Phila-
delphia, drawing the applause and well wishes of those with
whom he came in contact. He arrived in the American capital
shortly after the proclamation of American neutrality. Gen’ét
was brilliant but he was also young, and he overestimated the
pro-French feeling of the American people and government. He
had fitted out a privateer in Charleston, an act which placed
American neutrality on shaky ground. Arriving in Philadelphia,
Gen’etwas also greeted by pro-French throngs whose enthusiasm
l2

seemed to match that of the young diplomat himself. The

 

11. An interesting and enlightening account of the
development of this thought and of the intensity of feeling
involved is the study of the writings of the highly literate
Ames brothers, Fisher the Federalist and Nathaniel the Jeffer-
sonian, by Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto (Cambridge, Mass.,
1931). The account is based upon the diary of Nathaniel Ames,
but the complete opposition between the brothers is clearly
presented by comparing this diary with the more widely-known
writings of Fisher Amos. Seth Ames, ed., Works ofjigher Amps

(Boston, 1854) .

12. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Amer-
ican People (New York, 1946), p. 75. Hereafter cited as T.
A. Bailey, Diplomatic History.

204.

American government, however, remained cool toward Gené‘t.13
Gen8t was not discouraged by the coolness of the

officials of the federal government of the United States. He
continued his activities aimed at helping France from American
soil in two ways; by attacking British shipping, and by attempt-
ing to organize attacks on British and Spanish territory in
North America.14 He succeeded in aligning many private cit-
izens with his ventures, but quite naturally ran afoul of the
already unenthusiastic men charged with the responsibility of
running the American government. First Hamilton, and later
Jefferson, came to the decision that Gen’e‘t’s activities were
dangerous to American neutrality. Finally Gen’e‘t, whose ex-
periences had revealed unrestrained eagerness for his schemes
’ on the part of the American people and equally unrestrained
opposition on the part of the government, attempted-to over-
come the opposition by appealing directly to Congress as the
representatives of the people. It was an unforgiveable breech
of diplomatic etiquette. The Washington Administration had

already asked for Gen’e‘t's recall. The French government,

 

13. The account of the Gen'ét affair comes from Edward
Channing, A History of the United States (New York, 1905-27),
IV, leg-330

14. An account of comet's attempt on Louisiana and the
Floridas is Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origin of Gené‘t's
Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," American
Historical Review, III (1898), 650. Hereafter cited as F. J.
Turner, ItGen'e‘t,"_A.H.R.

205.

which had moved several degrees farther to the left since
Genet's appointment, was willing to have its minister returned,
probably fiar the purpose of executing him; so Genet, relieved
of his official position, took refuge in the United States for
the remainder of his life.15

Genet's diplomatic fiasco served to diminish sharply the
support the French had held, including even that of Jefferson
himself, who normally was associated with pro-French feelings.
The Jay Treaty, thoroughly detested by France and by a great
share of the American public, also focused attention on the
significance in American politics of attitude toward the war-
ring European powers. After the Senate had ratified the treaty,
there was action in the House of Representatives to block money
appropriations needed for the operation of the treaty. A
speech by the Federalist orator Fisher Ames served to work the
bill through the House, but did little to ease the ever-widen-
ing breach between Anglophile and Francophile in American 11 fe.16
The Quasi-War with France, which followed the excitement over
the Jay Treaty, added to the importance of the embattled Eur-

opean states in American politics.

 

15. Gen’ét had been sent to America by the Girondi st
element of the French revolutionists. He was of the aristo-
cracy close to Louis XVI. His sister, Madame Campan, was
lady in waiting to Marie Antoinette. See F. J. Turner, "GenEt,"
A.H,R., III, 656.

16. T. A. Bailey, Diplomatic History, pp. 65-68.

206.

The Crowninshield brothers were ship captains in their
early. twenties or late teens when the French Revolution began.
Their connection with it was vague at best until the wars of
the French Revolution began to affect their shipping, and
then their contact with continental affairs lay entirely with-
in the area of maritime activity. The seizure and condemnation
of one of their three small schooners by the British in 1793
had been the mo st significant event in orienting their affection
for either power. Their early letters gave no indication of
interest in the political theory involved between the Jacobin
or the Junto. The French and British were making their ship-
ping hazardous e consequently they took what measures they
thought necessary to deal with the inconveniences created by
those powers. Their concern in the years 1792-96 lay in the
direction of finding goods that would sell, and markets where
those goods would bring the highest prices. Their activity
as ship captains placed them in a position where application
of theory to commercial regulations in certain areas was ex-
tremely significant; on the other hand their closeness to the
privateers and embargoes of the conflicting systems made them
impervious to the subtleties of doctrine. In the early stages
of the war, the position of the Crowninshields might be liken-
ed to that of a peasant whose house and farm are in the center
of a battle ground. The immediate inconveniences and dangers

of the struggle were of such dimensions that little time was

207.

left to ponder the problem of where moral correctness lay.
Each side seemed equally destructive.

Attempting to decide at what stage the Crowninshields be-
came thorough-going Jeffersonians, and the depth of their feel-
ing for the political ideas associated.with Jefferson, is diffi-
cult. Their writings are dissappointly free from expression
of political ideas. On the other hand, outward manifestations
of Jeffersonian feeling appear rather early. There was evidence
that they were thoroughly opposed to the English.from the be-
ginning of the war. The seiZure of the Charming Sally in the
first year of the war'doubtle ss contributed to the ‘Asgiophom a.
Jacdb, writing a letter of advice to his brother Richard in
November, 1795, told him that he should not trust the English,
as they were contemptuous of Americans, and that Americans
should reciprocate the feeling.17 Opposition to the Jay Treaty,
normally associated with hatred for England and with Repub-
licanism in America at this time, likewise appeared.18 Wheth-
er this dislike for England was new to the Crowninshi elds in

the 1790's or represented a holdover from antipathy generated
during the Revolutionary War was not indicated.
Linked.to this animosity toward the British was a.feeling

 

17. PM, Crowninshield Ks., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Ship America, Nov. 15, 1795.

18. PM, Crowninshield 18., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Her. 20, 1797.

208.

of admiration for the French which appeared in the Crowninshield
papers of the middle 1790's. Jacob said early in the crisis
with France that war with France should be avoided at any co st,
80 long as humiliating terms were not agreed to.19 After
learning of the French action in freeing a captured Arneri can
merchant vessel, Jacob commented, "Our friends the French are
not quite so bad you see as they are represented."20 On another
occasion he mentioned how shameful it would be for America to
fight France. "They [the French] do not want a liar with us, &
twill be our own fault if we engage11n one with them."21 Dur-
ing this same period of uncertainty, John wrote from France
that the designs of the French state were peaceable, and that
America stood to lose much by starting a war with France.
Were France disposed to war, said John, she wauld gain greatly
by starting a conflict and confiscating American property in
France. He estimated that there was $300,000 in Salem pro-
perty in Bordeaux alone.22
In 1798, when the near war situation between the United

States and France was at its height, the attitude of the

 

19. PM, Crowninshi eld rze., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,

20. PM, Crowninshield I~Is., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, liar. 22, 1797.

21. M, Crowninshield Hs., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 4, 1797.

22. PM, Crowninshield I-ls., George, Sr. to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Apr. 2, 1797.

209 .

Crowninshi elds toward France remained essentially friendly.

In a letter where he told Richard of the French capturing
vessels "for a bale of English goods, a p8 of cloth, a hhd
sugar without clear Certificate sworn to with seals in due
form that the goods are not of English growth produce or
manufacture or of her colonies", Jacob spoke of the war
threat, but added, "I can assure you me are disposed to

go to war against our good old French friends."23 Such state-
ments categorize their writer as a "Jacobin". '

Two other events cannot be overlooked in the political
development of the Crowninshield house. The first was the
long feud which arose between them and their powerful Derby
cousins, and the second the attempted loan of ships to-the
federal government.

Some of the details of the Derby-Crowninshi eld falling-
out have been mentioned earlier. It apparently had its begin-
nings when Jacob Crowninshi eld, a captain of Derby ships, had
a disagreement with Elias Hasket Derby over shipping accounts.
When the accounts were finally settled a group which acted as
umpires in the dispute awarded Jacob a cash settlement, but
the rancor remained. In 1796 the Derbys went to court to
attempt to force the Crowninshi elds to cut the end off their

wharf, and in the Salem courts the decision favored the

 

23. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 22, 17980

210 .

Derbys. From that point on the Crowninshields were rarely

at peace with either the Derbys or Salem. As the Derbys re—

presented Salem Federalism at its highest, political opposi-

tion on the part of the Crowninshields naturally developed.
Examples of this feud appeared constantly in the writings

and actions of the period. In April, 1799. the Crowninshield

family refused to attend the funeral of Mrs. Derby because

24

of the ill feeling between the two groups. The Crownin-

shields boasted of the ability of the Beli sang in beating

the Federalist boat, the Essex” as the two left Salem harbor.25
Bentley wrote in 1803 of the determination to exclude the
"friends of Mr. Crowninshield from the usual pleasures of

the winter season. To the men this was no evil, but it was
not acceptable to the ladies. The excluded gentlemen wrote &
wrote again to require the reasons, a at length obtained only
a vote that there should be no notice taken of their letters."26
The legal battle over the wharf cropped up again and again.
In 1803 the case again went before the courts in Salem, and
after a lengthy trial Bentley reported that Crowninshield had

lo st his case.2’7 In this struggle, the major opponents were

 

24. See page 26. Bentley, Diary, Apr. 23, 1799, II, 301.

25. ET, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Dec. 309 17990

26. Bentley, Diar , Jan. 7, 1803, III, 2.

27. Ibid., Sept., 1803, III, 45—48; Oct. 25, 1303, III,
56; and May 5, 1801+, III, «S4.

211.

the Crowninshields and Derbys, although the Federali sts of

Salem, except in rare cases where their own purses were in-

volved, stood solidly against the Crowninshields.28

The feud affected young and old alike in its malice.
George Crowninshield, Sr., told Richard how "young BenJ
Crowninshield is Now aboute to Set of for the Southard to Enter
the Collages at Virginia under Bi shop Madison. . . . He was re-
fused admission in our (town) on a/c of his Principles."29

George, Sr., had cut down a Federalist fence along the water-
front, and after he had been forced to pay for the fence he
was brought to trial for inciting a riot. A hung Jury forced
the case to be taken to Ipswich Court for trial.30 Jacob's

description of the Ipswich case was as follows:

Good news from the Court at Ipswich in Sirs riot case. After
4 years prosecution & persecution the Judge has ordered a nol
prosegue to be entered to the extreme mortification of the
Derbys 8c Wards & our other federal friends. No honest Jury
would convict & this irritated them. Three times had it been
tried at the Jury could never agree. A Judge by the name of
Parker who took Judge Story's E?) place presided at the last
court. He came upon the bench unpreJudiced & advised the

 

28. J. D. Phillips, _S__a_.lLem and the Indies, pp. 245-58.
Jacob wrote Richard, "Mr. Gray rs ship Lucia hauled in to the
wharf this morning to repair her bottom. he could not do so
well at any other place or she w'd never have been sent among
the Jacobins." EI, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to mohard Crown-
inshield, Salem, June 15, 1803.

29. PM, Crowninshield Ms., George, Sr., to Richard Crown-
inshield, Salem, Feb. 21, 1804.

30. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, p. 255.

212.

solicitor . . . to drop the suit. he was obliged to cari-
sent. So far good 8: we consider it a sort of triumph.

In December 1906, a wharf case trial concluded with the Crown-
inshields being the losers, and they were ordered to cut forty
feet off the end of their pi er.32 a battle as long standing
and involved as this one was bound to involve the dead as well
as the living. The body of a little Crowninshield girl, dead
twenty—eight years, was removed from its Federalist burial
spot in the Derby tomb to the more hospitable Republican soil
of the Crowninshi eld tomb.33 The chasm which divided Salem
society was of such depth that, all were affected by it. Its
influence in politics must have been considerable. A remark
to the writer by a Salem resident that if the Derbys had been
Republicans the Crowninshi elds would have been Federali sts
appears to have more than a little credibility.

The second occurrence, the Crowninshi eld's attempted
loan of two of their ships to the government during the near
war situation, of 1798-1800, undoubtedly added to the anti-
federalist feeling of the family. A misunderstanding arose
between the family and the government as to the nature of the
agreement. The final Crowninshield letter on the subject to

President Adams showed some irritation. The implication that

 

31. E1, Crowninshi eld Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, May 2, 1806.

32. Bentley, Diar , Dec. l9, 1906, III, 263.

33. Ibid., Kay 19, 1807, IIV, 296.

213.

the Crowninshields political position was affected by this
event is probably also sound.34 By this time the Crownin-
shield's were thoroughly associated with the "Jacobin" ele-
ment of Salem society.

Not too much emphasis should be placed upon the terms
Francophile or "Jacobin" in connection with the Crowninshields.
Their loyalty, throughout the entire period, was with the
‘United States. Although they asserted their friendship for
France they did not hesitate to offer their ships to the
Adams administration during the period of the Quasi-War,
and this at the same time that they were writing to each
other of their desire for peace. Their shipping, largely
concerned with trade which the French and Dutch were no
longer able to carry on for themselves, depended upon peace-
able relations with France; their dislike and even hatred
for the British was a part of their make-up; through it all,
however, their allegiance remained with the United States
as was demonstrated in this action.

By 1900 the Crowninshi eld family had taken over the
leadership of the Salem Republicans. In that year Jacob
Crowninshield had advanced part of the money to purchase

the press for a Republican newspajer, the Salem Impartial

 

34. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 134-35
and 251-52.

214,

Register, which printed its first issue on May 12, 1800.35

 

Jacob had.also run for Congress in the year 1800 but failed
to make the grade, in contrast with the success of the nation-
al ticket. Despite the support of the new Journal, Jacob
was defeated.by the Federalist candidate, Nathan Reed.36

Jacob Crowninshield succeeded in defeating one of the
big name Federalists, however, in the 1802 federal election,
when he was sent to Congress over the candidacy of former
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.37 Jacob continued to
hold this seat in Congress until his death in 1808 at the
age of 38. Although he was elected on the ticket that the
Gazette consistently labeled "Jacobin", there appeared to be
little of the radical in him. He evidenced a liking for a
spoils system when he remarked that he was "more i more con-
vinced that all the federalists holding offices under the U.
States should be replaced with republicans & friends to their
government and cmlntry."38 His primary legislative interest

naturally turned to maritime activity. In the letters that he

wrote back to salem he favored leniency toward the owner of

 

35. Tapley, Salem Imprints, pp. 112-13. For an accounts
of the Republican newspaper see Chapter V, pp. 112-52. Bentley,
Diary, 0013. 8, 1811, IV, 530

36. Bentley, Diary, Aug. 25, 1800, II, 346-47.
37. Salem Gazette, NOV. 2, 1502.

58. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Apr. 7, 1802 and Jacob to John Crowninshield, Salem, n.d.

215.

the cargo of a vessel which had fired on a peaceful ship.

Rather than have both ship and cargo confiscated he said only
the vessel should be seized.39 A seamen's bill was opposed by
Jacob because it advocated sailor's bonuses. Jacob commented
that the New York merchants likewise opposed this legislation.40
In 1806 he proposed that the government tax banks for deposits
of public funds at a rate of 6 per cent, from which he esti-

41 This could have been radicali SJ];

mated revenue of $180,000.
it could have been the merchant attempting to force taxation
upon another element of society and remove it from his own
group. There was no legislative activity by Jacob Crowninshield
which indicated anything close to the position of the Jacobins
in France. The law which aimed at spreading more wealth among
seamen by granting sailors bonuses he rejected along with the
other merchants.

The "Jacobinism" of the Crowninshields continued to con-
sist of three elements. They hated the English, and considered
them the primary enemy of the United States. They admired and
felt friendship for France, not necessarily Jacobin France, but

France under the directory, under the consulate, or under the

empire. They were Jeffersonians, partly because they felt with

 

39. PM, Crowninshield Ks., Jacob to Richard.Crowninshield,
Washington, Nov. 29, 1804.

40. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Washington, Dec. 18, 1S04,

41. Salem Gazette, Dec. 19, 1906.

216.

the Republicans relative to Engl and and France, and partly
because they hated and consistently fought with the pro-English
Federalist element of Salem. Other reasons are not readily
discernable from their writings.

The hatred of England was revealed in many ways, of
which Jacob's action in the House of Representatives was the
mo st significant. In Liarch, 1306, he was quoted as saying
that he would not hesitate to go to war with England over
the impressment problem. "But, as I observed before, I do
not believe Great Britain will go to war. Our trade is too
valuable to her." Ie went on to indicate that Hassachusetts
and Vermont stood ready to seize Canada and hova Scotia, and
to talk of the benefits that would fall to Americans, who owed
$40,000,000 to British subJects, which could readily be con-
fiscated.42 In a report to James hadison in September, 1206,
Jacob listed the British as the chief foe, and spoke in terms

of bringing the British to a proper attitude by cutting off

 

42. H. Adams, United States, III, 157. It was at this
point that John Randolph attacked Jacob Crowninshield with
all the venom of his strikingly sharp tongue. "The proper
arguments for such statesmen are of strait-waist-coat, a
dark room, water-gruel, and depletion."

"God help you if these are your ways and means for
carrying on war! if your finances are in the hands of such
a chancellor of the exchequer! Because a man can take an
observation and keep a log-book and a reckoning, can navigate
a cock-boat to the West Indies or the East, shall he aspire
a navigate the great vessel of State, to stand at the helm
of public councils?"

217 .

shipping to the West Indies.43 On another occasion he noted
that the British Orders in Council were far more harmful on
American shipping than the French decree (Berlin). "The late
order is every way more alarming than Bonaparte's decree even
as it was understood when it was first issued, & is so consider-
ed by all our well-informed and dispassionate merchants.44
Other correspondence throughout the period spoke in
derogatory terms of the British. In 1803 Jacob had written
to Richard that he thought the British declaration on shipping
at that time was a Justification for war. John Crowninshield
was in France during this time, and Jacob feared that England
would condemn Crowninshi eld vessels as being French-owned.45
In 1807, when negotiations were going on between England and
the United States, Jacob wanted the British terms rejected by
the American government. He wanted the American government to
hold the relinqui shment of the right of impressment by Great
Britain as a sine ope non, and continued to attack the whole

structure of the Orders in Council, which he considered much

harsher and more restrictive of American shipping than the

 

43. NA, State Ms., Jacob Crowninshi eld to James Madison,
Salem, Sept. 1, 1806.

44. PM, Crowninshield Ms., no addressee, no date, signed
Jacob Crowninshield.

z*5. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, July 5, 1803.

218.
decrees of Napoleon.“6
The other brothers believed with Jacob so far as the

wickedness of the British was concerned. The years 1805

and 1806 found more and more references to the arrogance and
viciousness of the British treatment of neutrals. Richard
wrote to John that he assumed the British "will learn to Res-
pect the rights of Neutrals - or we must attempt to teach
them."_47 Following Trafalgar, John wrote of his fear that

48 The

the British would become more insolent than before.
English were termed "rogues'f49 and the notion that neutrals
had to pnatect their rights against Great Britain was repeat-
ed with great frequency.SO John described the Engli sh as

"determined to support their navy by all arbitrary means in

their power" and "willing to take from foes 8c plunder friends.

Similar quotations continued to indicate the antipathy of the

 

46. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob Crowninshield to James
I‘iadi Son, salem, Aug. 1 8, 1 807.

"51

47. El", Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,

Salem, Dec. 13, 1805.

49. FT, Crowninshield Ms., John to Richard Crowninshield.

NeW'York, Dec. 19, 1905.

49. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,

Salem, Dec. 25, 1805.

50. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,

Salem, Sept. 10, 1805.

51. EI, Crowninshield Ms., John to BenJamin Crownin-
shield, New York, Jan. 21, 1306.

219.

Crowninshields for the British throughout the years down to
the War of 1312. The speed and relish with which the Crown-
inshield privateers left Salem after the Declaration of war
against England was in part due to their hatred of the English,
for the Federalist element, who opposed the war, were disin-
clined to support it in any fashion.52

Crowninshield appnyval for French actions and even for
Bonaparte also held constant throughout the period, although
Jacob occasionally sounded a warning against the piling up
of too much authority in the hands of the Corsican. A false
report of the death of Bonaparte in lSOO brought the comment
from Richard Crowninshi eld that "if so we shall honour his
memory on board the America . . ."53 Jacob's caution and
warning for the French came when Napoleon had the term of the
First Consul extended to a lifetime Job54, and again when he
became emperor. "Great reJoicing there [France in conse-
quence of Bonaparte's being declared Emperor. They had
better cry I think for they are now going into the calm of
despotism & that of the worst 7.:ind."55 Later that same

 

52. J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies, pp. 3‘81 and 336.

53. El, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Salem, June 1, 1800.

54. PM, Crowninshield 35., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, July 3, 1802.

55. PM, Crowninshield Ms., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
Salem, July 30, 1904.

 

filtlil I {litiilzllfl

year Jacob spoke in friendly terms of the new French ambas-
sador-in "slashington.56 In 13.06 Richard Crowninshi eld spoke
of ". . . Bonna fighting and conquering to our benefit I
hope a trust."57

John Crowninshield, who spent considerable time in France
and was there continuously between lBO2 and 1805, shared the
opinions of his brothers concerning this friendship for France.
John also thought highly of Napoleon and commented that Frede
erick (Frederick William III) of Prussia should have been
placed in a madhouse for attempting to oppose Bonaparte on
the field of battle. John described Bonapacte as well-loved
by his people and the administrator of an efficiently operated
kingdom.58

When the Continental System of Napoleon began to con-
tribute itsehare to the destruction of American commerce,
the Crowninshields tended to concentrate their vilification
in the direction of the British, who were also seizing their
vessels. Lore direct seizures were made by Great Britain,
so far as the Crowninshields were concerned, but the losses

in markets and because of general conditions brought about

 

56. PM, Crowninshield ;~;s., Jacob to Richard Crowninshield,
hashington, Nov. 19, 1904.

57. EI, Crowninshield Ms., Richard to John Crowninshield,
Salem, Jan. 3, 1906.

58. EI, Crowninshield .-is., John to Jacob Crowninshield,
New York, Dec. 15, 1906.

221.

by the Continental System were at least as destructive to
the affairs of the family as all British captures. Sent-
ley's comment in late 1310 that "the measures of the French
have quite perplexed our poor republicans"59 might well des-
cribe the feelings of the Crowninshields. They had become
so accustomed to hating the English and so completely as-
sociated with France that even financial loss to the French
did not eliminate their affection for that country. Follow-
ing the War of 1912, the old friendship for Bonaparte and
France was still evident. Letters from Liary Boardman Crown-
inshield to her husband, the Secretary of Navy in 1315, spoke
sympathetically of Napbleon, and of the low state to which

Fran ce had fall en. 60

The party conflict in Salem, which contributed to the
Crowninshi eld attitudes, became increasingly violent and
bitter as the years passed. E'J'ith the passing of the Embargo
law, the opposition to the Jefferson administration became
more vociferous. Two episodes serve to indicate the height
of passions. Jaocb Crowninshield died in April, 1308-. The
body was brought to Salem from Washington and Dr. Bentley
conducted funeral services. He wrote, "This day I delivered
a funeral discourse upon the death of Jacob Crowninshield

our worthy member of Congress. 80 virulent is political

59. Bentley. Diarx. Nov. 3, 1810, III, 544.

60. E1, Crowninshi eld 22s., Iriary Boardman Crowninshield
to Benjamin If. Crowninshield, Salem, Apr. 30, 1815.

2222.

party we could not be suffered to perform this service un-
disturbed. A relative of Timothy Pickering undertook to
place himself in the centre of the congregation to insult

them . . . . This is the party who have a deep interest in

promo ting reli gion . "61

The violence was further demonstrated when ’rfilliam
Gray, . the leading Federali at merchant in Salem, accepted
the Embargo and became the federal official for the port.
His Federalist associates made Gray an outcast, and broke
ti es with his family. Gray was attacked by the Federalist
newpaper, the Gazette. Timothy Pickering, the former Secre-
tary of State and United States Salator from Liassachusetts,
likewise took up the attack against Gray. In 1809 Gray bought
a house in Boston, and later, hounded bythis Federalist pres-

62 The offensive force

sure, he moved from Salem to Boston.

needed to drive any individual from his home is considerable,

but when one considers that Gray was the wealthiest merchant

in Salem the power of this political enmity looms even greater.
The same names were used to describe Republicans in

1808- as were used in the 1790's. Bentley summed up political

thought with these terms. "fife have no Jesuits in talents in

 

61. Bentley, Diary, Kay 1, 1808, III, 356.

62. For the Bentley references to the Gray story see
Bentley, Diary, June 9, 1908, III, 364; Aug. 12, 1808 III
377; Aug. 27, 1808, III, 379-80; Dec. 20, 1908, III, 403-04;
Jan. 10, 1909, III, 408; Feb. 15-19, 1809, III, 416-17.
Also see J. D. Phillips, Salem and the Indieg, pp. 271-80.

223.

this Country, who we have in villany. Religion is to make
its defence by liystici sm & one Parish . . . is to give the
alarm. The French are Antichrist. The opposers of British
tyrrany are friends to Antichri st,. . ."63 In May, 1811, the
Gazette reported the election results by calling the one

party the French ticket and the other the American ticket.64
The Federalist insistence upon linking the Salem Jeffersonians
not only to France but to Jacobin France persisted throughout
the years between 1795 and 1812.

As for the Crowninshields, they simply do not fit the
mold for Jacobins. There is no indication that they even
pondered the doctrines of the French radicalism, much less
subscribed to them. Aside from a reference to a copy of
"foltaire65 and a receipt for the binding of a ten volume
history of the French Revolution66 there is nothing which
shows the Crowninshields were interested beyond the practical
application of these thoughts to commerce. Their admiration
for France was obvious throughout the period, but this was
not an admiration of principles, for they respected France

under the Directory, France under the Consulate, or France

 

65. Bentley, Diar , Kay 8, laoa, III, 557.
64. Salem, Gazette, may 21, 1811.
65. Bentley, Diar , Apr. 27, 1505, III, 154.

66. EI, Crowninshield 3~£s., Receipt for bookbinding,
B. B. L‘Iacanulty to John Crowninshield, Dec. 1, 1805.

224.

under the Empire. Probably the admiration held over from

the time of the Revolutionary War. It is certain that no
little amount of the admiration for France stemmed from a
continuous hatred of England. The other main source of
Crowninshi eld political feeling'was the fact thatFederali st
Salem hated Jefferson and France and the Crowninshi eld hated
the Derbys and Federali st Salem. It was only natural for

them to turn to the enemies of their worst foes for associates
and friends. .

Opponents of the Jeffersonian system persisted in as-
sociating it with French radicalism during the entire period
under study. They were mistaken in this association. Per-
haps no better'indication of their error need be cited that
that John Adams and John Quincy Adams were included in this
thought.67 But political mistakes are rarely acknowledged.
In the desire for invective to hurl at their opposition,
the Federalists lumped their opposition together under the
category of evil French radicalism. The constant and wide-
spread application of the term destroyed any meaning it may
have held so far as indicating certain political beliefs.
The Crowninshi elds were among the opponents of the Federali sts,
and so were Jacobin radicals.

There is no indication that the political ideas of

 

67. Bentley, Diary, July 8, 1808, III, 375; and Mar.
29, 1309, III, 425.

225.

the French Revolution influenced the Crowninshields one way
or the other. Their feeling for France, which at first
glance one might have assumed to mean radicalism, could
more reasonably have come from their hatred of England or
their hatred of the French-hating Federalists. The Wars of
the Revolution gave them prominence and wealth, but the
political changes in France did not appear to have made

an impression upon the political beliefs of the Crownin-

Shi 91d. family.

226.

Chapter VI
' AFTERI‘IATH - THE CEBE‘IEII‘JSHIELDS AFTER 1815

The Crowninshield family continued to separate after
the breakup of the firm, which had served as a unifying element.
The old animosities continued to irk, and the old debts were
retained. The unity which had characterised the family down
to the beginning of the tier of 1812 never returned.

George Crowninshi eld continued to excite Salem. After
the end of the war, and following the decision of Benjamin
to get out of the shipping industry, George set out to build
a yacht which would take him to Europe. The CleopatraLLBargg-i
was the grandest thing Salem had seen in the way of a pleasure
yacht, for George was not one to avoid grandiose play-things.
Dr. Bentley implied disapproval when he wrote, "George is eX-
pending a fortune upon a hemaphrodite Brig, which he is pre-
paring for a visit 00 (sic) Europe, in a manner to us before
unknown as to eXpence & project."l L>a1em go ssiped that
George was actually going to go to St. Helena to attempt to

bring Napoleon back to the United States.2 The event was

 

1. Bentley, Diary, Nov. 21, 1916, IV, 422.

2. Francis E. Crowninshield, The Story of George
Crowninshield's Yacht Cleopatra's Barge (Boston, 1913;,
Privately printed. This little book covers the story of the
building of the vessel and the account of her trip to Europe.

227.

hardly that eXtravagant, but George's trip in the year 1817
kept him in the limelight he so dearly cherished.

George Crowninshi eld, Sr., died in the summer of 1815.
Papers in the Essex Institute indicate his estate was worth
about $260,000, with each of seven heirs receiving more than
$37,000.3 By the summer of 1915 the ill feeling among the
members of the family had become greater; concern over John's
and Richard's debts had led to constant recrimination among
them, and the death of the fat.er and founder of the firm did
nothing to heal the breach among the brothers.

The Crowninshi eld property in Salem withered away. 'u’i th
Benjamin in Z'Jashington and George interested in building an
eXpensive toy, the wharf and merchant property tended to de-
cay.4 By 18l7, it had fallen into sich a state of disrepair
that Bentley commented that it had depreciated the property

5 Ten years from the time of their

around to a great extent.
greatest power and wealth as merchants the Crowninshi eld's
marine interest had split, scattered and decayed to a point
where it was of no significance.

George Crowninshield, Jr., died on November 26, 1:17, at

 

3. ET, Crowninshield rls., Account of stocks belonging
to the Estate of George Crowninshield late of Salem deceased,
Dec. 31, 1815. Also statement of estate of George Crownin-
shield dated Aug. 29, 1316.

4. Bentley, Diary, Nov. 21, 1816, IV, 422.

5. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1817, IV. 435.

228.

the age of fifty-one.6 Even in death, George set tongues
wagging. First Richard Crowninshi eld appropriated George's
gaudy carriage, and when he refused to return it to the estate
he was threatened with court action.7 The fund which George
left for a mistress and illegitimate child has already been
mentioned.

The only member of the Crowninshield family to attempt
to retain any commercial interest was John. Although his
property had wasted away and he was heavily in debt by the
time the war ended, John Crowninshield continued to live with
the hope that he could revive his shipping fortunes. His ad-
venture into privateering had not been profitable as had that
of his brothers, and John spent the last months of the war as
a prisoner of the British at Halifax, returning to Salem in
the late winter of 1815.8 John was still heavily in debt,
although the confused records do not give a clear indication
of the exact amount. He still owed $10,700 to his father
and $13,000 to the estate of Jacob Crowninshield in addition
to numerous smaller debts according to an account book dated_
October 10, 1914.9 Following the death of’his father, John

left Salem and travelled to New Orleans "with a view to an

 

. Ibid., Nov. 27, 1817, Iv, 488.

NO\

Ibid., Jar]. 15’ 1913', 1"], 496.

(D

. Ibid., E-Iar. 16, 1815, Iv, 320.
9. El, Crowninshield 59., Account book, dated Oct. 10, 1314.

229.

establishment, "10 according to Bentley. John did not receive
a full share of the estate of his father; probably the dif-
ference in amounts represented the amount deducted for debts
which John owed his parent.ll In 1818, Bentley said that
John was hiring a ship builder by the day in an attempt to
put a vessel to sea in the New Orleans trade}2 An 1818
account book shows that John listed as assegts one-fourth of
a brig and cargo, one-tenth of a ship and cargo, and one-
eighth of a bark}: It also indicated that John was still
heavily in debt, althOugh the exact amounts were not quoted.

The old debts stayed with John Crowninshi eld. Although
he was listed as the owner of a brig and owner of one-third
interest in another brig and cargo in 1820, he signed a con-
tract in September of 1821 aclmowledging debts of $21,359.95
to Jacob Crowninshield's heirs and $9,000 to B. ".‘=.-’..Crownin-
shi eld and Nathaniel Silsbee Jointly.14. A letter from John
to his wife in November of 1821 spoke of his losing money

 

10. Bentley, Diary, Nov. 21, 1816, IV, 421.

11. ET, Crowninshield Ms., Account of stocks belonging
to the Estate of George Crowninshi eld, late of Sal em deceased,

D80. 31, 1815.
12. Bentley, Diary, Jan. 5, 1818.

13. ET, Crowninshi eld Ms., Account book, John Crownin-
shield, 1818.

14. ET, Crowninshield Ms., Contract John Crowninshield
with Benjamin W. Crowninshield and Nathaniel Silsbee, Sept.6,
1821; also orders for brig Eunice and brig Wild Goose.

230.

in New Orleans because his credit was not good.15 The only
payments John received during these years to compensate for
his heaizy losses in the years of trading between the ending .
of the Embargo and the beginning of the War of 1312 was an
occasional four or five hundred dollars from the insurance
companies on the policies of Richard's ship S 1 h, which he
had accepted in lieu of payment for notes from Richard. He
was still receiving driblets of money from this source as late
as 1839.16

Richard made the transition from sea to factory success-
fully, although he had had sone hazardous times. After the
financial cleansing of the bankruptcy suit, Richard inherited
a full share of his father's estate. The factory which he
had built at the end of the war years burned before he managed
to get it into production, but Bentley commented that Richard
would be able to rebuild the plant with what money he received
from the estate of his brother Geo rge.l7 In 1833 Richard
gave his occupation as a woolen manufacturer.18

After years of negotiating over the losses to the Con-

tinental System the American government concluded the Rives

 

15. EI, Crowninshi eld I-‘Is., John to Maria Crowninshield,
New Orleans, Nov. 23, 1821.

16. E1, Growninshield Ms., See letters from B. Bailey
to John Crowninshield between 1824 and letters from Thatcher
Payne to John Crowninsheild in 1838 and 1839.

17. Bentley, Diar , Nov. 25, 1817, IV, 487 and Dec. 3,
1?17, IV, 490.

18. NA, Claims, Traveller.

231 o

Treaty with France in 1831. Article I of this agreement read:
The French Government, in order to liberate itself completely
from all the reclamations preferred against it by citizens of
the United States, for unlawful seizures, captures, sequestra-
tions, confiscations or destructions of their vessels, cargos
or other property, engage to pay a sum of twenty-five millions
of francs to the Government of the United States, who shall
distribute it among those entitled in the mgnner and accord-
ing to the rules which it shall determine.

The merchants who had lost vessels to the regulations of
Bonaparte were to submit their claims to the American govern-
ment for consideration.

The two members of the Crowninshield family who had
suffered losses at the hands of France began to compile in-
formation which would lead to restitution of their property.
Ship manifests, bills of lading, instructions to ship captains,
protests at seizures, consular records and reports, types and
terms of compromises which were made, decisions which were
handed down by prize courts, all these were gathered by John
and Richard Crowninshield for each of their vessels which
they thought might stand a chance of receiving payment.

John and Richard each had one of his claims against
the government allowed. The Ear aret, which had been seized
at Naples on her first trip to Europe after the Embargo, was
the basis for John's claim. Her captain had obtained half
of the value of her cargo by a compromise and the ship had

been released after being detained for several months. She

had been caught in a storm and sunk on her return voyage to

 

19. U. S. Treaties, I, 524. For entire treaty I, 523-26.

232.

America. John claimed losses of $27,981.90 which were charge-
able to French action; the claim was allowed, but John re-
ceived $4,569 rather than the huge sum he had anticipated.20
Richard Crowninshi eld's only recovery from the losses of
the Continental System came in the case of the Belisarius,
which had sunk from natural causes. Her cargo had been rescued
only to be confiscated from the Tunisian vessel which had saved
the goods from the sea. This vessel had been condemned in
October, 1910. Richard's claim for $14,905 was allowed.21
The other instances of damage directly traceable to the
decrees of Napoleon were not allowed by the claims commission.
The confiscatory tariff which seized two-thirds of the cotton
of the fling in 1510 was apparently considered a legitimate
tariff by the claims commission, as they rejected John's claim.22
John's only other possible claim, that which aimed at a re-
covery of the money lost on the cargo of pilchards carried by
the Golden Age to Naples in 1812, became involved in difficulty
when the American consul in Naples suggested that the captain,
William Fairfield, had accepted a deal in connection with the
lost fish.23 Furthermore, this voyage had.en obviously violated

 

20. NA, Claims, Margaret. John had been paid $2760.
Claimants were paid 59.8 per cent of the money awarded them.

21. NA, Claims, Iarbrusha.
22. NA, Claims, Hind.

23. El, Crowninshield is., Alex. Hammett to John Crown-
inshield, Naples, Kay 6, 1933.

233.

the letterzufl.the spirit of the Continental System by carry-
ing British good to Naples without a permit that it was dif-
ficult to make the claim appear plausible.

Richard's other claims against the government received
similar harflling. He claimed that his ship Traveller, cap-
tured by the British en naute from Bordeaux to Lmerica, had
been seized by the British ship only because of a delay forced
upon her in a French port. His only claim on the government,
he said, was for 3:?9,676.Ol which he had been forced to pay
while being delayed in Bordeaux. He said he had spent this
amount for freight, wages, provisions, and miscellaneous other
charges in France. The claim was refused.24 Similarly claims
on the cargo of the Emeline, where the captain had made a deal
for a share of the cash received on the shipment, were not al-
lowed.25 Another claim, on the cargo of the Success, was also
refused.26

The major losses to the blockade of the continent, those
of delay and uncertain markets, of higher insurance rates and
forced sales of cargoes, of hiring a position in a convoy
and seeking out marginal markets which could be depended upon
to return a loss, were not collectable. There was no adequate

method of determining the loss that resulted from the ventures
Q

 

24. NA, Claims, Traveller.
25. NA, Claims, Emeline.

26. NA, Claims, Success.

234.

into Russian markets, for example. The greatest losses to
the Continental system,which John Crowninshield described as
"a plan laid in fraud a secret system for deliberate plunder"27
were of such a character that no settlement was made for them.
The curse of the Corsican hit heavily on the Crowninshields,
and ironically so, for they had been his consistent admirers.
The meteoric career of the Crowninshield firm paralleled
the career of Salem itself as a great port of the United States.
In 1790 Salem had had 5 ships, 41 brigs, 76 schooners, and 2
sloops for a total registered tonnage of 13,725. In 1300 the
figures had changed to 34-ships, 45 brigs, and 59 schooners,
representing a total registered tonnage of 19,636. In 1310
there were 71 ships, 60 brigs and 90 schooners and a total ton-

28
The tendency toward larger vessels and more

nage of 36,272.
vessels, reflected in the development of the Crowninshield
firm, also appeared in theggeneral picture for Salem. The
decline of the Crowninshi elds was shared by Salem even as their
rise had been. "In 1809-10, fifty-one of our ships were seized
in the ports of France, forty-four in the ports of Spain,
twenty-eight in Naples, and eleven in Holland, worth a total

loss to helpless American owners of at least ten million dollars."29

 

27. El, Crowninshield Ns., John Cnowninshield to Virgil
Maxey, Boston, Jan. 20, 1835.

28. J. D. Phillips, "Who Owned the Salem Vessels in 1310,"
Essex Institute Historical Collections. LXXKIII: 3.

29. Ralph D. Paine, The Ships and Sailors of Old Salem
(Chicago, 1912), p. 4830

 

235-

Like the Crowninshield fleet too, the fleets of Salem were
sadly depleted as a result of the War of 1912. A Salem
Chronicler reported that of 126 Salem vessels regi stered in
1812, only 57 remained by the end of the war with Great Brit-
ain.30 The foreign commerce of Salem dwindled wi th the years
following the war, until by 1878, no vessels entered Salem
harbor from any foreigh port other than the British provinces.
The brothers Crowninshi eld who had left commercial activity
behind them following the War of 1812 had correctly estimated
the wave of the future. The one brother who attempted to fight
it was still bemoaning his poverty in 1735.

The turning to manufacturing, and particularly textile
manufacturing, by Richard Crowninshi eld, was also a harbinger
of things to come for the New England area. Bentley noted as
early as January 1816 that there were less traders and more
trades (craftsmen) in Salem than in previous times.31 The
development of the textile industry in New England in the
period following the Embargo is a well-known story. The
shifting of emphasis from commerce to manufacturing placed

Richard Crowninshield in a position to ride the new crest of

 

30. Ibid., 84. J.D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies,
p. 422, uses the figures 200 vessels of which 57 remained.
Neither Paine nor Phillips deals with the economic hardships
that must have come to the merchant firms with such a drastic
reduction of their fleets. Surely many of Salem's merchant
families were reduced financially as were the Crowninshi elds.

31. Bentley, Diar , Jan. 29 and 30, 1816, IV, 371-72.

236.

manufacturing as he, his father, and his brothers had ridden
the crest of commerce in an earlier period.

The Crowninshield family continued its position of lead-
ership in Salem and in the nation following the ‘Jar of 1312.
Benjamin N. was Secretary of the Navy until 191? and a member
of Congress during the 1820's. Nathaniel Silsbee, who mar-
ried a sister of the five brothers, served as United States
Senator from Lassachusetts for an extended period. The com-
mercial boom brought on by the Wars of the French Revolution
and Napoleon, which had brought them wealth and prominence,
saw them eliminated from trading activities when the European
powers decided to fight the war in the area of commerce. The
War of 1812 had then provided the coup-de-grace to Crownin;

shield commercial activities.

237-

Chapter VII
SUHLARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The story of the Crowninshield fortunes is a boom and
bust chronicle. The dominance of European affairs in the
story of the Crowninshields is perhaps the most significant
general observation that can be made from this study. That
dominance in the economic development of the Cnowninshield
merchant firm continued throughout the period 1793-1815.

European affairs were responsible for the boom period
which created the Crowninshield fortunes. Between 1793 and
1900, when the family firm was in its formative years, it was
the legislation from European capitals or war by European
states which provided the najor stimulation for the firm's
growth. The opening of French and Dutch colonial trade to
neutrals and the gradual taking over of a sizeable proportion
of the British carrying trade by Americans during those years
were two highly important factors in the growth of Crownin-
shield trade. The signing of the Jay Treaty likewise brought
its influence to bear on the Crowninshields. Peaceable relations
with Great Britain brought harsh relations with France, and
during the Quasi-War with France, 1798_lEOO, the Crowninshields
arsed their vessels and fled at the sight of sails at sea.
Through it all they prospered, and by lFOO the five brothers,

‘the oldest of whom was thirty-four and the youngest twenty-six,

had all retired form the sea to the merchant's counting-table
or the politician's bench.

The cessation of the war between France and Ereat Brit-
ain in 1901 and the period of truce following the treaty of
Amiens brought home to the Crowninshields how completely their
activity was dependent upon European affairs. A new emphasis
upon the pepper trade with Sumatra kept them from feeling the
full impact of the end of hostilities immediately, but by the
end of 1902 their merchandizing activities were suffering from
the buyer's market in Europe which peaceful seas brought. Prob-
ably only the fact that the peace was short and.not too well
observed by either side kept the Crowninshields from witness-
ing even harder times. Also, many of the wartime restrictions
remained throughout flue period of the Amiens peace, particularly
the hostile treatment of British goods by the French. The
Crowninshields therefore, were able to cut their losses at the
eXpense of the British.

When the war broke out again in 1803 the Crowninshi elds
had been anticipating such a development and were well pre-
pared to take advantage of it. They had been building up
supplies of goods and had sent out several vessels in the
spring of lCOB in the hope of reaping the harvest of inflated
prices which would naturally result from the war. Although
money shortages continued for the first year after the war
broke out, the firm continuedto expand, and the years 1803,

1904, and 1305 brought new wharf space, new stores and several

239.

new vessels into Crowninshield possession. The period be-
tween 1803 and 1307 saw the greatest prosperity for the
Crowninshield family in its entire career.

The years which developed Crowninshield prosperity to its
zenith also brought the legislation which was to destroy that
prosperity. In November, 1806, Napoleon's Berlin Decree set
off a chain reaction of measures and counter-measures which
set the pattern for the economic battle for supremacy in Eu-
rope. fihen these measures were enforced by the French and
British, normal commerce with Europe was impossible.

The Crowninshield's commerce was mainly of the broken
voyage variety which supplied the continent of Europe with
goods from the East Indies, by way of America. During the
years down to 1305 they had found it mo st profitable to bring
the goods to America and sell them, allowing others to re-ship
them to European markets. By late 1805 a new British interpre-
tation of the broken voyage system had made European prices
for Indies goods mough higher than American prices for the ‘
same goods to justify the Crowninshields shipping their own
merchandise to Europe. Throughout the fifteen year period
from 1792 to the end of 1907 it was this war-induced trade
which made money for the Crowninshields.

The enforcement of the belligerent powers' economic sys-
tems led to a self-imposed embargo by Aperican merchants in
the fall of 1807. In December, 1307, the Jefferson adminis-

tration made the Embargo mandatory. These events combined to

240.

interrupt the profitable trade of the Crowninshields. Jacob
Crowninshield, a member of Congress from 1303 to 1808, voted
for the Embargo. The dry rot of Embargo lasted for nearly
fifteen months. Its effects on the Crowninshields were cer-
tainly not beneficial. The tying up of their ships and the
cessation of busineSS activity could not help but hurt the
merchants. The Embargo did not come in a vacuum however.

Its harm or benefit has to be measured in terms of the alter-
natives which were available. Considered in that light later
events show that the Embargo was wise. The Crowninshield firm
emerged from the Embargo in the summer of 1309 with enough
vigor to send its ships to Europe and the Indies. Jacob, the
director of the firm who had cautioned against European waters
and who, in Congress, had voted against allowing American mer-
chantmen to travel the high seas at all, had died in 1808.
Without his council the Crowninshi elds entered whole heartedly
into European trade. The results of trying to conduct a com-
mercial enterprise under the rules imposed by two blockade
systems were disastrous for the Crowninshi elds.

Between 1909 and 1512 the two members of the Crowninshield
family who continued to trade in the markets controlled by France
and Great Britain were completely ruined by the actions of those
two powers. Several of their vessels were seized and condemned
for violations of the two opposing systems. However, the .Crown—
inshields suffered even more disastrous losses. Uncertainly,

the bane of any commercial enterprise, was the keynote of

241 .

European trade. Tariffs were raised and lowered and port
restrictions and regulations fluctuated from day to day.
Privateers, those licensed pirates, struck even those who
tried to obey all the rules and regulations that were in
eXistence. Delays were forced upon the shipowner for both
unloading a vessel or loading a return cargo. If marginal
markets were sought out by the merchant he found the compe-
tition so keen that profits were out of the question. Losses
were the pattern for such trade.

Under these circumstances, the French action was the
more harmful, although the Crowninshields refused to admit it.
The nature of the British system, which included the desire
to get goods onto the continent as well as a retaliatory
blockade of France proper, made the British at least part time
accomplices in the Crowninshields attempt to trade with Europe.
British controlled ports like Lisbon were relatively safe and
British ships provided convoys for goods along the Baltic and
North Sea areas. Crowninshi eld ships that traded with France
were confiscated by England as violating her orders; but the
Crowninshield goal, trade with non—French Europe, was also a
goal of Great Britain. The uncertain regulations, the high
tariffs, the long delays, the rigged courts, and the privateers
who made "deals" all added to the problem of the merchant and
it was here that the French action took its toll. The mer-
chant at least could.insure against British seizure, although

at high rates. There was no insurance to cover a tariff which

242.

confiscated two—thirds of a cargo, or a regulation Which
forced one to delay ten or twenty days or even three months
before unloading a cargo. These factors combined to make

the shipping that did get through unprofitable. Sea losses
or occasional confiscations could have been offset by profits
on goods which did get through. It was in this taking away
of the profit of commerce that the French system hurt the
Crowninshields.

Because of such actions, Richard Crowninshield went bank-
rupt in 1812. John Crowninshi eld accrued debts which he re-
tained throughout his life. The parent firm was not finanially
able to prevent the loss of property by the two brothers. By
1912, the same two belligerent states whose action had created
the Crowninshi eld wealth had destroyed it by shifting their
field of battle to the arena of international commerce. The
parent Crowninshield firm recovered its fortune by privateer-
ing duming the War of 1812, but John and.Bichard Crowninshield
never returned to the maritime prosperity they had known.
Richard become a woolen goods manufacturer, while John attempted
unsuccessfully to rebuild his shipping fortunes.

The effect of the French Revolution and Napoleon on the
political affairs of the 0m wninshi elds is far less direct and
distinct than the effect on economic affairs. The Crowninshields
were Jeffersonians from the time they expressed any political
opinions, but there was little of the radical in them. The

opposition continued to describe them as Jacobins (the word

243.

Jacobin was hurled in Jefferson's day very much as the word
Communist is today) throughout the period, although any ad-
herence to Jacobin principles was not indicated in their
writings. They were unquestionable pro-French in an America
where political affiliation demanded that one be either pro-
French or pro-Briti sh, but their feeling for France lasted
long after the Jacobins had given way to the Directory and the
Consulate and the Empire. It may well have been motivated by
hatred for Great Britain or an even greater hatred for the
Anglophile Federali sts of Salem. There is more reason to
suppose that the Republicanism of the Crowninshields came
from these negative tendencies than from any doctrinaire polit-
ical creed. Indirectly the wealth, which was developed in

the favorable soil of European war conditions, contributed to
the political. fortunes of Jacob, and later Benjamin Crownin-
shield, but the revolutionary political theories made little
or no creative impact; the effect of these theories was to
intensify old oppositions rather than to create new ones.

In describing the impact of European affairs on the Crown-
inshi elds I have perhaps tended to underemphasi ze the abilities
of the men being discussed. Undoubtedly the five Crowninshield
brothers were extraordinarily capable or they would never have
achieved the success they did in their merchant ventures. Jacob
Crowninshi eld, probably the most capable of the brothers, showed
a variety of talents, whether as a merchant captain, a director

of a firm, or a skillful politician and statesman. All the

244.

brothers were certainly far above average in ability. The
favorable conditions presented by European affairs provided

that ability with friendly developmental conditions, and the
Crowninshields became wealthy. Affairs in Europe then proceeded
to destroy those friendly conditions and, like a healthy plant
on soil suddenly deprived of water, the Cndwninshield fortune
wilted away.

The significance of the Crowninshi eld story lies in the
fact that the family represents the two phases of American life
most affected by events of the period of the French Revolution
and Napoleon in Europe -' the economic and thepolitical. The
close conformity of Crowninshi eld ship'iing activity with the
general pattern of the commerce of Salem and the United States
as a whole shows that the Crowninshield story is more than an
isolated family history. The Cnowninshields and the United
States rose to commercial significance on the strength of war-
generated trade, a trade that began with the French Revolution-
ary Wars and continued until the belligerent European powers
came to grips on the battle~ground of neutral commerce in 1807.
The Crowninshields and the United States saw their commercial
prosperity vanish when European regulations forced that com-
merce out of existence.

In light of Crowninshi eld eXperi ence, the Embargo was a
sound measure for the merchants of the United btates. A self-
imposed embargo had caused a stagnation of American commerce

prior to the passage of the Embargo by Congress in 1907, and

245 .

disastrous Crowninshield attempts to cope with European com-
mercial regulations in the three years following the lifting
of the Embargo support the notion that Jefferson's measure
was wise.

In the battle of conflicting regulations, the policies
of France proved more harmful to the United States than the
British Orders. The French system aimed.at self-denial, but
its vagaries and its fundamental dishonesty of operation made
commerce a.dangerous game of blind man's bluff for the merchant.
The British Orders, on the other hand, developed a consistent
policy which aimed at forcing their trade onto the continent,

a policy which paralleled that of the Americans.

Politically the Crowninshields were also strategically
located and significantly active so as to reflect European
influences. Political opinions in the United States tended
to split along lines represented by a feeling for either France_
or Great Britain during the 1790's. The political battles in
which the Crowninshields were involved fail to show the impact
of Revolutionary doctrines. Names associated with radical
French thought were hurled for.purposes of vilification; this
use of names as invective terms intensified existing differences,
but in time made those same terms meaningless so far as indicating
a pattern of political thought. Issues which indicated doctrinal
differences between Jacobin and Junto were not apparent in the;

continuous struggle for political power in Salem.

246.

Bibliography
Bibliographi cal aids

In a study of this nature, which includes both European
and American events for the period concerned, but concentrates
on a specific family in one city the normal bibliographical
aids are not significantly useful. A good starting place was
Ward, Leathes, Prothero, eds., The Cambridge Modern History,
Vol. IX Napoleon (New York, 1906). W. E. Linglebach, "His-
torical Investigation and the Commercial History of the Napole-
onic Era," in the American Historical Review, XIX (1914),
257-281, gives the student of Commercial history of this
period encouragement with its bibliographical and topical
suggestions.

Extremely useful as guides to the American picture were
Samuel F. Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplo-l
matic History of the United Stateng1775-1921 (Washington,
1935), and the bibliographical notes at the ends of the related

chapters in Thomas A. Bailey. WWW:-
ican People (New York, fourth edition, 1950). For materials

 

pertaining specifically to Salem and the Crowninshi elds the
two most useful guides were James Duncan Phillips, Salem and
the Indies (Boston, 1947), and Samuel Eliot Morison, The

Maritime History of Massachusetts (Boston, 1921). Especially

247 .

useful in work on the Crowninshields also were the suggestions
that came from the helpful staffs at the Essex Institute and

the Peabody Museum at Salem, Massachusetts.
Pri mary Mat eri al

The heart of the material used in this study came from
the manuscript collections of Crowninshield papers located at
the Essex Institute and the Peabody Museum in Salem Massachusetts.
Each of these collections is composed of letters and papers of
the family during the years between 1789 and 1839, with the
vast majority of the material pertaining to the period 1792-
1815. These collections were particularly useful in tracing
the economic life of the Crowninshield firm, as they are mainly
letters concerning the activity of these merchants in dealing
with ship captains or commercial contacts throughout the world.
These materials were mainly boxed, uncatalogued manuscripts
in both museums. There was also a sea chest of assorted mate-
rial in the Peabody Museum. In addition the sizeable collection
of ship logs at the Essex Institute was useful when it was nec-
essary to trace the wanderings of a specific vessel. The rec-
ords of the Salem Custom House are also available at the Essex
Institute.

In the National Archives in Washington, D. C., manuscript
material in the Department of State archives relative to spo-
liation claims submitted by the Crowninshields following the

Rives Treaty of 1931 was useful. The merchants concerned

248.

compiled all available information which would assist the
settlement of their claims and included imformation on ships
and cargoes, and especially the circumstances under which losses
were suffered. In connection with this study these papers gave
some of the details of the capture of Crowninshield vessels

and information as to the amount paid as a result of the claims.
In addition two volumes of bound manuscript documents, entitled
Department of State, Miscellaneous.Letters,January - December,
lfigfi, and.Department of State, MiscellaneoustettersLJanuani«-

December, 1801, contained letters fnam Jacob Crowninshield to

 

members of the Jefferson administration.

The manuscript material cited above was well supplemented
from three contemporary printed sources from Salem. First and
most important was The Diary of Willi am Bentley. D.D.4 1784-
1212, 4 Vols.(Sa1em, 1905-14). Dr. Bentley was the minister
of the East Church in Salem, the confidante of Jacob Crownin-
shield, and a thorough-going Jeffersonian. In addition,
Bentley's interest in science and his remarkably broad interests
for one who travelled little add to the stature of his work.
These characteristics, combined with the ability to write
clearly and pointedly, make Bentley's Diggy both readable and
of primary significance as a source for the Salem of his day.
The two Salem newspapers of the period, the Salem Gazette and
the Essex Rey; ster gave the opposing points of view politically,
and there was little that these two papers reported that was

not influenced by political feeling. The Federalist Gazette

249.

and the Republican_§egister asked fOr andggavezno quarter in
the hard politics of the Jeffersonian period. Both of these
biweekly papers were available at the Essex Institute.
French source publications which proved useful in this
study were the Corresppndance de Napoleon Ier, 32 Vols.
(Paris, 1858-69), and the Gazette nationals ou le moniteur

universel. These were used for‘the commercial regulations of

 

France during the period. Useful also on French laws governing
Cbmmerce was C. M. Galisset, Corps du droit francais ou recueil
complet des loisl d6crets, ordonnancesl senatus-consultes,
reglementsp_avis du conseil d'etat, rapports au roi, instructions
ministerielles, etc., publiés despuis 1789 jusqu'a'nospjours,

9 Vols. (Paris, 1843-47).

Three source publications of the United States government
were especially useful in this study. Treaties, Conventions,
International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United
States of America and other Powers 1776-1909 (Senate Document
# 357, 61st Congress, Second Session), compiled by Wm. M. Malloy,
2 Vols. (Washington, 1910), supplied copies of the several trea-
ties in which the United States was involved that were pertinent
to this study. Information dealing with the Embargo period was
obtained from State Papers and Publick Documei ts of the United
States from the accession of George Washington to the Presidency
exhibiting a complete view of our foriegn relations since that
Lipp, 10 Vols., published under patronage of Congress (Boston,

1817). Material relating to Crowninshield participation in the

Quasi-War with France was found in Naval Documents Related to
the Quasi-War Between the United States and France, 7 Vols.,
prepared under the direction of the Hon. Claude A. Swanson
(Washington, 1935-38).

Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
10 Vols. (New York, 1899), and Seth Ames, ed., Works of Fisher
épgg, 2 Vols. (Boston, 1854) presented the opposite sides of
the political struggle in which the Crowninshi elds and their
opponents in Salem participated.

Genealogical material on the Crowninshield family came
from two genealogies in the Essex Institute collection of
family histories, one a manuscript document called simply
"Crowninshield family" and the second a typewritten "Genealogy

of the Crowninshield family."
Secondary Material - Books

The United States

There was little material that dealt directly with the
Crowninshi elds, aside from an occasional incidental reference.
The most useful guide fbllowed for the American scene of the
period under consideration was Henry Adams History of the
United States, 1801—1817, 9 Vols. (New York, 1909). This work
was supplemented by John Spencer Bassefi, The Federalist System,

1789-1801 (New York, 1906), and Edward Channing, The Jeffersonian

 

SystemiflSOl-l8ll (New York, 1906). Also used was Edward Channing,

 

A History of the United States, Vol. 4 (Federalists and

251 0

Republicans) (New York, 1935).

Twostaldard teth were used for the general background
for the diplomatic history of the period. They were Samuel
Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New
York, 1936), and Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
United States, Fourth Edition (New York, 1950). Useful also
were Volumes II and III of S. F. Bemis, ed., The American
Secretaries of State and their Diplomagy(New York, 1927),
and Mr. Bemis' monograph, Jayls Treaty A Study in Commerce
and Diplomapy (New York, 1923). '

Background material of the War of 1812 was found in J. W.
Pratt, Expansionists of:;8lg (New York, 1925) and A. L. Burt,
The United States, Great Britain, and srptish North America
(New Haven, 1940). Readable and pertinent also is A. T. Mahan,
Sea Power in its Relptions tithe War of 121g, 2 Vols. (London,
1905). L. M. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, N. 0.,
1927), gives the background for the Embargo, although it deals
mainly with the problem of Jefferson's philosophical consistency
in calling for the measure.‘ Allen Johnson, Jefferson and His
leleagues A Chronicle of the Virginia Dynasty (New Haven, 1921),
also deals with the diplomacy of the War of 1812 and the Embargo.
He considersl the Embargo a hopeless failure.

The general picture of American commerce was obtained from
the following books. R. D. Paine, The Old Merchant Marine (New
Haven, Conn., 1921), is a light treatment of the development

of American commerce. The broad picture of the growth of American

252.

commerce is well covered in A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, 2 Vols.
(Boston, 1893).. Anna C. Clauder, American Commerce as Affected
by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (Philadelphia,
1932) deals with the continental regulations and statistics
on commerce in its coverage of this period. Eli F. Heckscher,
The Continental System An Economic Interpretation (London, 1922)
has excellent sections dealing with the rise of American com-
merce following the 1792 period, as well as useful statistics.
Statistical coverage of the growth of American commerce,
in addition to Heckscher, came from the following sources:

Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals: Embracinngiews of the

 

Population, Commerce, Navigation, Fisheries, Public Lands,

Po st Office Establi shmen t, RevenuesL mint, military and naval
establishments, eXpenditures, public debt and sinking fund, of
the United States of America: etc. (Philadelphia, 1818):
Timothy Pitken, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the
United States of America: its connection with Agriculture and
manufactures: and an account of the Public Debt, Revenues, and
eXpenditures of the United Stateg (Hartford, 1816); and William
Milburn, Oriental Commerce; containing a Geographic Description
of the Principle Places in the East Indies, China, and Japan,
with their Producepgmanufactures,,mld Trade, including the
coasting or Country Trade from Port to Port; etc., 2 Vols.
(London, 1813).

The political struggles in the United States are covered in

253.

Henry Adams, History of the United States. Eugene P. Link,
Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (Morningside Heights,
N. Y., 1942) shows the development of liberal organizations in
the United States in the last decadecof‘the 18th Century.
Bernard ray, The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America,
tr. by Ramon Guthrie (New York, 1927), relates political de-
velopments in the two nations. Charles Warren, Jacobin and
Junto or Early Amenican Politics as viewed in the diary of
Dr. Nathaniel Ames_l758-l82g (Cambridge, Mass., 1931) is an
interesting account of the hoStility developed between two
talented brothers in the fever-hot politics of the early United
States.

The two most useful books that deal directly with Salem
are James Duncan Phillips, Salem and the Indies (Boston, 1947)
and Samuel Eliot Mori son, The Mari time History of Massachusetts

1183-1860 (Boston, 1921). R. D. Paine, The Ships and Sailog

 

of Old Salem (Chicago, 1912) was of little use although some
reference was made to the Crowninshields. Charles E. Trow,
The Old Ship-Masters of Salem (New York, 1905), like the Paine
book was interestinngut usable for little except background
reading. Details on individual ships belonging to the Crown-
inshields came from Shig) Regista‘s of the District of Salem
and Beverly Massachusetts 1189-1900, Copied by Abijah Frank
Hitchings with annotations by Stephen Willard Phillips (Salem,
1906). Interesting accounts of the development of the Salem
Gazette and the Essex Register were contained in Harriet Sil-

vester Tapley, Salem Imprints 1768-1825 A History of the First

254.

Fifty Years of Printing in Salem, Iassachusetts (Salem, 1927).
The story of George Crowninshield's trip to Europe in 1817 is
in Francis B. Crowninshield, The Story of George Crowninshield's

Yacht Cleopatra's Barge (Boston, 1913).

Europe

Three secondary works on the European scene stand out
abovethe others for the purposes of this study. Ranked in
order of their usefulness they are: Eli F. Heckscher, The
Continental System An Economic Interpretation, which carefully
coveres the development of the opposing economic systems and
their effects on Europe; A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, which
also takes up the problem of control of the seas and the
attempt of Napoleon to conquer the sea by th: land, with the
resultant triumph of England; and Nard.Leathes, Prothero, eds.,
The Cambridge .ziodern History, Vol. Ix, Napoleon, which was
extremely useful for general reference work as well as for the
chapter on the Continental System (Chapter XIII) by J. Holland
Rose.

Frank Melvin, Napoleon's Navigation System A Study of
Trade Control During the Continental Blockade (New York, 1919)
is a technical treatment of the decrees and subsequent problems
that made up the Continental System. Albert Sorel, L'Europe
et la revolution francaise, 1199-1815, 8 Vols. (Paris, 1885-
1904), devotes the first part of Volume VII to a treatment of

the Continental System. Louis Adolphe Thiers, History of the

2550

Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon, tr. by D.
Forbes Campbell and John Stebbing, l2 Vols. (Philadelphia, 1893-
9A), is less useful because of a tendency to scatter its coverage
of the Continental System over much of the twelve volumes. J.

H. Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, 2 Vols. in 1 (New York, 1924)
was the most useful of the many biographies of-Napoleon for this
study. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara A History_of the East
Indian nrchipelago (Cambridge, Kass., 1945) provided useful
information of the results of the British capture of the colonies

of the Dutch and French in the East Indies area.

256.

Secondary EJIateri a1 - arti c1 es

The following articles were useful in this study.

Margaret Pardee Bates, "Some Letters of Iary Bordman
Crowninshield," in Essex Institute Historical Collections,
LCCCIII, 112

B. S. Crowninshi eld, "An Account of the Private Armed
Ship America, " in Essex Institute Historical CollectionsL
AAAVII, l.

W. Freeman Galpin, "The aneri can Grain Trade to the
Spani sh Peninsula 175710-14. " in Areric an Historical Aevi ew,
AxVIII (1922), 24.

‘3. E. Lingelbach, ”Historical lnvesti3ation and the

Commercial History of the liar oleonic Era," in ._._-___l:1erican
Historical Review AIS/C (191102

E. N. Lyon, "The Directory and the United Stat es,
in American Historical Review, XLIII (1938 ), 514.

---------- , "The Franco-American Convention of 1800,’
in Journal of E-Zodern Hi story, XII (1940), 305.

J. D. Phillips, "East India Voyag es of Salem Vessels
Before 1 0,0 " in Essex Institute Historical Collections,
Lxxlx,117, 222, and 351.

"""""""" : "533-8111 L‘IGI‘Chants of 1300 and their
Vessels," in Essex Institute Historical Collections, LAAA" "",
261.

-------------- , "’nfno owned the Sellem Vessels in 1810,‘
in Essex Institute Historical Collections, LELAIII, l.

G. L. Rives, "Spain and the United States in 1795."
in American Historical Review, IV (1898), 62.

Franklin D. Scott, "President L~Iadi son 's Foreign Policy -
the Views of an American Merchant Abroad in 1.311, " in
Journal of iodern Histopy, XVI (1944), 294.

W. M. Sloane, "Napoleon's Plans for a Colonial System,"
in American Historical Review, IV (1899). 439.

Frederick J. Turner, "The Origin of Genét's Projected
Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," in American Historical
Review, III (1898), 650.

257.

Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia and the Origins of
DutchColonial Policy," in Far Eastern Quarterly, X (1951), 151.

"Crowninshi eld Genealo. ," in New England Historical and
Genealogical Register, CIV 1950), 285.

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